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Kennedy-Khrushchev Strategies Of Persuasion During The Cuban Missile Crisis

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Kennedy-Khrushchev Strategies Of Persuasion During The Cuban Missile Crisis

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MERCHANT, Jerrold Jackson, 194-1-
KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION
DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.
University of Southern Califomia, Ph.D.,
1971
Speech
University Microfilms, A X ER O X Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan
C o p yrigh t © by
JE R R O L D JACKSON M ER C H A N T
1971
t
i
i
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j
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV STRATEGIES OP PERSUASION
DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
by
Jerrold Jackson Merchant
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OP THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OP SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY
(Speech Communication)
February 1971
UNIVERSITY O F SOU TH ERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
................J e r r old J a ck s on Me r c h ant ................
under the direction of hiis... Dissertation C om
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by T he G radu
ate School, in partial fulfillm ent of require
ments of the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
Dean
D a te Eeb.ruary^..l27.1
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairman
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION...................................... 1
Chapter
I. THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM................... 2
The Problem
Definitions of Terms Used
Review of Literature
Methodology
The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Case Study
II. THE COMMUNICATIVE SITUATION............... 46
Introduction
Kennedy’s Pre-crisis Situation
The Crisis Situation
III. IDENTIFICATION OF KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV
STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION ............... 6j
Kennedy’s Strategies and Tactics
Khrushchev's Strategies and Tactics
IV. ASSESSMENT OF KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV
STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION ................. 95
Kennedy's Strategies and Tactics
Khrushchev's Strategies and Tactics
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS .... 120
Summary
Conclusions
Implications for Further Research
APPENDIX.............................................132
BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................180
li
INTRODUCTION
Communication scholars are showing increasing con
cern for the multifaceted aspects of cross-cultural commu
nication. A review of the program for the 1969 Speech As
sociation of America convention reveals that speech commu
nication scholars' interests range from "Reconstructing the
Black Past" to "Linguistic Attitude Research." Moreover,
the mounting interest by speech communication scholars in
research on all types of communication can be evidenced by
the recent change in the name of the Speech Association of
America to the Speech Communication Association and that of
the National Society for the Study of Communication to the
International Communication Association. This regard- for
expanding research in all types of communication is the
foundation upon which this dissertation is built; it at
tempts to increase knowledge of yet another type of commu
nication— int ernat ional c ommunic at ion.
1
CHAPTER I
THE BASIS OE THE STUDY
The Problem
At the writing of this study, the archetype of nu
clear confrontation in the twentieth century was the 1962
Cuban missile crisis. During this encounter communication
between the two great nuclear powers became more important
than ever before. Robert McNamara called this period "the
greatest danger of a catastrophic war since the advent of
the nuclear age."^ Robert Kennedy said that the conflict
"brought the world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and
the end of mankind." Priority should be given to the
analysis of comparative strategies of persuasion in inter
national communication during this crucial time.
Statement of the Problem
The intent of this study is to identify and assess
the strategies of persuasion in the Kennedy-Khrushchev com
munications during the Cuban missile crisis. This problem
■^In the introduction of Thirteen Days by Robert Ken
nedy (New York, 1 9 6 9)* p. 13.
^Thirteen Days, p. 23.
2
3
is approached with these questions: (l) What shaped the
strategies that President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev
used to settle the 1962 Cuban missile crisis? (2) What
were the comparative persuasive strategies they employed?.
(3) To what extent did these strategies determine the out
come of the crisis?
Significance of the Problem
This study provides a review of research on inter
national communication in speech communication and offers
an overview of the key research in international relations
on international communication. It bridges the gap between
international relations and speech communication and sug
gests that the research findings of these two areas of
study may be relevant to one another. Moreover, by identi
fying and assessing the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies of
persuasion in the Cuban missile crisis, the study may sug
gest a new methodology for dealing with similar communica
tions. Hopefully, this identification and assessment will
offer guidelines for helping prevent and settle similar
crises. Finally, perhaps this dissertation will open a new
area of research in speech communication, particularly in
international persuasion and the role of inducement in in
ternational communication.
4
Scope of the Problem
Because this study considers only comparative Ken
nedy-Khrushchev strategies of persuasion during the Cuban
missile crisis, its conclusions are temporalj they are
bound by the perimeters of United States-Sovlet crisis com
munication and by the dynamics of decision making in Presi
dent Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev's governments in
October, 1 9 6 2.
Definitions of Terms Used
Strategies of persuasion.— A strategy of persuasion
is an overall plan, method, or series of maneuvers designed
to obtain acceptance of or compliance with a specific idea
or action. A strategy of persuasion may utilize any number
of communicative acts to achieve its objective. For ex
ample, a delaying strategy could be realized through per
sonal interviews, letters, and/or speeches. Moreover, an
individual message may contain different strategies of per
suasion. A speech could shift the burden of responsibility
in an international crisis to the opposition. Thus, there
are essentially two levels of strategies of persuasion—
those which are implemented by different communicative acts
and those within individual messages. The former might
properly be called primary strategies of persuasion and the
latter secondary strategies of persuasion. A persuasive
tactic is a maneuver for realizing or implementing a per
5
suasive strategy. For example, denial may be a useful tac
tic in trying to delay action on an issue.
Cuban missile crisis.— The Cuban missile crisis is
defined as the time between 7:00 P.M., E.S.T., October 22,
1962— the time President Kennedy began his "Arms Quarantine
of Cuba" speech over national television— and 9:00 A.M,
E.S.T., October 28, 1 9 6 2— the time Moscow Radio broadcast
Premier Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy in which
the Premier agreed to withdraw Russian missiles from Cuba.
International communication.— Although most defini
tions of international communication include the entire
"stream of social messages transmitted over time and across
O
national boundaries," in this study international communi
cation is interpreted to mean symbolic interaction between
national states which makes a difference in the affairs of
one state with another. What is productive of change in
attitude or action in any given instance of international
communication is determined by judgment of the effect of
the message. Richard Fagen observed that "almost all po
litical behavior involves communication activity of some
sort. Yet in comparative politics we cannot study all this
^Charles McClelland, "Communication, Political: In
ternational Aspects," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences
( 1 9 6 8), p. 9 6.
6
activity. Somehow we must narrow the scope of our in
quiry."^ Fagen proposes that the scope of political com
munication can be narrowed, by studying only the "most rele
vant" communication. Thus Fagen defines communication ac
tivity as "political by virtue of the consequences, actual
and potential, ... it has for the functioning of the po
litical system."^ Similarly this study defines interna
tional communication as communication which is passed
across national boundaries and produces a politically sig
nificant change in attitude or action in the receiver.
Kennedy-Khrushchev communications.— The Kennedy-
Khrushchev commmunications are defined as (l) President
Kennedy's "Arms Quarantine of Cuba" speech on October 22,
1962; (2) the five extant, unclassified Kennedy-Khrushchev
letters as well as the Khrushchev letter of October 26 as
£
reported in Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Daysj ( 3) the Knox-
Khrushchev, Scali-Fomin, and Robert Kennedy-Anatoly Dob
rynin conversations. These conversations are reported re
spectively in Elie Abel's The Missile Crisis,^ John Scali's
8
"I Was the Secret Go-Between in the Cuban Crisis," and
h .
Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communication (Bos
ton, 1 9 6 6), p. 1 7.
^Ibid., p. 20.
^Thirteen Days, pp. 86-90.
^(Philadelphia, 1 9 6 6).
^Family Weekly (October 25j 1964), pp. 4-l4.
7
Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days;^ and (4) the strategic mil
itary communication in the crisis.
Strategic military communication.— Strategic mili
tary communication is defined as military movements and
operations designed to render the enemy unwilling to make
war or to behave in a prescribed manner. This kind of com
munication is initiated by non-verbal military action.
Review of Literature
The review of available literature is divided into
two sections: International communication and the Cuban
missile crisis. The first section considers international
communication in international relations, international
communication in speech communication, and the completeness
of the literature. The second section reviews the status
of knowledge concerning the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and
evaluates the completeness of.-present analyses of the
crisis.
International Communication
As the pioneering M.I.T. study, Research in Inter
national Communication] An Advisory Report of the Planning
Committee, observed the term "international communication"
is so broad that "it embraces most of the social proc-
^Kennedy, pp. 6 5-67, 107-110.
8
esses.Nevertheless, It is possible to outline the key
research in international communication and illuminate the
direction that research in this area has taken.
International Communication in
International Relations
In order to survey the vast amount of extant liter
ature., two initial steps were taken. These bibliographical
sources in international relations were consulted: Inter
national Affairs,^ A Guide to Bibliographic Tools for Re-
12
search in Foreign Affairs, International Political Sci
ence Abstracts, 1962-1969* ^ Recent Publications in the So-
14
cial and Behavioral Sciences, International Bibliography
of the Social Sciences, 1 9 6 7*^ International Communication
16
and Political Opinion: A Guide to the Literature, and
The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.^ In addi-
■^Hans Speir, et al., Research in International Com
munication: An Advisory Report of the Planning Committee
(Cambridge, Massachusetts/ 1953)* p. 2.
*1 1
Codex of International Affairs, Volume I of the Po
litical Science, Government, and Public Policy Series
(Princeton, New Jersey, 1 9 6 9).
■^(Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1 9 6 3).
■^Prepared by the International Political Science As
sociation (Oxford).
^(Beverly Hills, 1 9 6 7).
15Vol. XVI (Chicago, 1 9 6 8).
1 f
Bruce Lannes Smith and Chitra M. Smith (Princeton,
1956).
January, 1950-November, 1 9 6 9).
9
■ j O
tion, a datrix search was done. Two key words were used—
"communication" and "international." The qualifying condi
tions were 1955 to 1964. The three references found dealt
with international organizations,^ foreign policy formula-
20
tion, and Fulbright and Smith-Mundt grantees' interna-
21
tional communication, rather than with the strategies of
persuasion in international communication.
As the literature in international communication wag
reviewed, the thesis of each article or book was placed in
a category. The author's concerns tended to cluster into
four main topics: (l) political systems, (2) content analy
sis, (3) image, (4) diplomacy.
Political Systems
A political systems approach is here understood to
mean "the analyzing and organizing of a problem to make it
suitable for solution or processing by electronic equip-
1 f t
• ^ Search number 006432, prepared for Jerrold J. Mer
chant .
■^Teresa Schmatz, "The Membership of Dependencies in
International Organization in the Field of Communications, "
Unpubl. diss. (Columbia University, 1959)-
pn
Satish Kumar Arora, "The Process of Foreign Policy
Formulation— A Study of Communication Images and Attitudes,"
Unpubl. diss. (Cornell University, 1959)*
PI
Jeanne Erard G-ullahorn, "A Factorial Study of In
ternational Communication and Professional Consequences Re
ported by Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Grantees," Unpubl.
diss. (Michigan State University, 1964).
10
22
ment." The term ’ ’system" connotes a complete unit and
usually signifies the study of some segment of the body
politic done in the context of the entire political process.
The notion behind this methodology is that the various
parts of the body politic cannot be legitimately studied
apart from the whole. For example, opinion leaders are a
part of the "system," but they are not studied as a unit in
and of themselves; they are studied in relation to the way
they affect society.
One of the principal incentives for research on the
various parts of the body politic in terms of the way they
relate to the "political system" was the 1953 M.I.T. study
23
referred to earlier. The committee report laid much of
the groundwork for the significant research on interna
tional communication during the 1960's and suggested the
need for a macroscopic approach to the study of interna
tional communication. Projects relevant to the present
study are reported in this chapter.
One of the most important contributions to research
in developing a complete system for dealing with interna
tional communication is Karl Deutsch's The Nerves of Govern-
22
Random House Dictionary of the English Language,
College Edition (New York, i960' ) ' .
23
-'Speir, et al., Research in International Communica-
tion.
11
oh
ment. Deutsch*s book is a report on his progress in con
structing a new theory of national and international poli
tics., including the cybernetic model of national and inter
op
national decision making and communication. As with all
cybernetic models., the basis of the construct is informa
tion flow. This construct attempts to outline the channels
of communication in foreign policy decision making; it is a
visual representation of the entire decision making proc-
26
ess. However, such concepts as "screen of repression
oh. .
Models of Political Communication and Control (New
York, 19557*:
25Ibid., p. 2 5 8.
26
Hour other contributions are: (l) K. W. Deutsch,
"On Theories, Taxonomies, and Models as Communication Codes
for Organizing Information," Behavioral Science, II(l)
(January, 1 9 6 6), 1-17. Deutsch argues that the theories
and schemes for information classification and retrieval
all can be evaluated from the viewpoint of communication
theory, by their performance characteristics as languages
or codes for organizing information; (2) Raymond A, Bauer,
"Problems of Perception and the Relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union," Journal of Conflict
Resolution, V-3 (l95l), 223-229. Bauer says: "I am con-
cerned with the problem of understanding an on-going social
and political system— not only the people but also their
institutions" (p. 223); (3) Berkley B. Eddins, "Communica
tion: On Evaluating Conceptual Models," Journal of Conflict
Resolution, II-4 ( 1 9 6 7), 523-525. Eddins argues that If
human conflict is a dysfunction of human behavior then a
consensus model must be constructed to resolve or eliminate
the conflict; (4) Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the
International System (New York, 1 9 6 6). McClelland asserts
that the study of international communication is not con
cerned with "the correction of misunderstandings." Rather a
systematic analysis of the noise In the communication net
work is the domain of the researcher in international com
munication. Such areas of study as bad channels, interfer
ences in a channel, coder errors, and defective receivers
should concern the scholar in international communication.
12
from consciousness" and. "screen of acceptable recalls" in
Deutsch's model may defy positive identification and prac
tical application.
The study of the mass media is another type of po
litical systems research. The focus of most of the research
in this area is upon the downward flow of information— from
the top of the political power structure to the "masses"
27
below. 1 Two important contributions in this area are
Wilbur Schramm's The Process and Effects of Mass Communica-
28 PQ
tion and Mass Media and National Developments. ^ These
works deal with the dynamics of social and political com
munication, more specifically, the relationship of communi-
^Another contribution to this concept of the down
ward flow of information and communication is Elihu Katz'
"The Two-Step Plow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report
on an Hypothesis," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXI (Spring,
1957),» 6 1-7 8. Katz concentrates on the "opinion leaders"
who pass on what they read and hear to .those of their
everyday associates for whom they are influential. This
hypothesis is called the "two-step flow of communication."
28(Urbana, Illinois, 1955).
on
- TLhe Hole of Information in Developing Countries
(Stanford^ 1964)'. Others are Anthony Lewis Dexter and
David Manning White (eds.), People, Society, and Mass Com
munications (New York, 1964), and Alfred 0. Hero, Mass Me
dia and World Affairs (Boston, 1959)• Of tangential rela
tionship, but of greater specificity are: James W. Markham,
Voices of the Red Giants: Communication in Russia and China
(Ames, Iowa, 1 9 6 7)* and A. T. Jordan, "Political Communica-
tion: The Third Dimensions of Strategy," Orbis, 3 (Pall,
1964), 6 7 0-6 8 5. Markham argues that Russian and Chinese
press, journals, and broadcasting are the best indicators
of communist thinking and behavior. The latter argues that
the United States needs to increase its political communica-
tion abroad for the purpose of ideological conversion in
foreign communities.
13
cation to political control., and social and political de
velopment .
Public opinion research concentrates on the upward
flow of information and communication and on how public
opinion affects foreign policy. An impressive compilation
of sociological research in this area is W. Philipps Davi-
■30
son's International Political Communication. Davison
tries to relate public opinion to social political decision
making. Another important work in public opinion is Reo M.
Christensen and Robert 0. McWilliams' Voice of the People:
31
Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda. This collec
tion contains some of the landmark articles on public opin
ion by V. 0. Key Jr., Harold Lasswell, Margaret Mead, and
32
others.
Two observations concerning public opinion research
30(New York, 1965).
31(New York, 1 9 6 7).
32
Other contributions to public opinion research are:
W. Phillips Davison, "On the Effects of Communication,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (Pall, 1959 )j 3^-3-360; Ithiel
de Sola Poole, Communication and Values in Relation to War
and Peace: A Report to the Committee on Research for Peace
(New York, 1961Jj and Alfred 0. Hero, Voluntary Organiza
tions in World Affairs Communication (Boston, I960). The
latter book Is rather lengthy discussion of the various
clubs, organizations, and committees in the United States
which facilitate participation in the democratic process.
Poole's work Is an extension of the 1953 M.I.T. pilot study
cited earlier (see footnote 10). Although only a pamphlet
of proposed research in international communication this
project is much more thorough than its predecessor. Davi
son's article is a discussion of man's need for psychology.
14
are warranted. First, public opinion may be the beginning
of foreign policy. Insofar as there is a cause and effect
relationship between public opinion and foreign policy,
public opinion research should provide the key to that re
lationship. For example, in the case of the Vietnam War,
American antiwar public opinion may have communicated its
dissatisfaction to Washington and/or to the North Vietna
mese; the link between that expression of public opinion—
rallies, demonstrations, editorials, speeches— and the
United States' or North Vietnam's altered conduct or for
eign policy in the Vietnam war is the concern of the re
searcher in public opinion. The data— the editorials,
speeches, and newspaper reports— provide the basis for the
conclusions about the relationship between public opinion
and foreign policy. Possible limitations of this type of
research are: only in a representative democracy does the
public play any significant role in determining foreign
policy and perhaps this premise is questionable; moreover,
possibly newspaper reports and editorials do not reflect
the public mind.
Second, public opinion research studies far out
number other types of political studies. The most probable
reason for this quantity of research is the ready availabil
ity of the data.
In another related area, game theory research is
done within the framework that man is the primary decision
15
maker in foreign policy. Thus by studying the individual
man, or a small group of men, as they participate in their
decision making processes in controlled experiments— games—
it is supposed that important clues to the process of na
tional decision making will be gained. Thomas Schelling is
probably the single-most important contributor in this
field. His articles on the application of game theory to
the study of international politics have laid the ground
work for much of the research in this area. Schelling ex
plains the premise upon which game theory research is based:
"The philosophy ... is that in the strategy of conflict
there are enlightening similarities between, say, maneuver
ing in limited war and jockeying in a traffic jam, between
deterring the Russians and deterring one's own children."^3
Closely related to game theory research is the
study of the psychological dimension of international pol
icy making. This theory holds that the study of man's psy
chology will help to resolve international conflict, Ross
Stagner explains this approach:
The thesis, ... is fairly simple. First, policy
decisions which lead to international tension and war
are made by human beings, and these humans are guided
by their images of our nation and of other nations.
They cannot have direct knowledge of either reality.
Second, these images are often distorted, and an erro
neous image may induce actions which are self-destruc-
tive, ... We must apply the most rigorous, dispas-
^ The Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1 9 6 3)j p. v.
16
sionate, scientific methods available to find out which
images offer the safest guides to action.34
A potential weakness in these types of research is
that what is true of part of the whole may not necessarily
be true of the whole. Most game theory research and the
research on the "psychological aspects of international
conflict" are inherently plagued with this problem. In
game theory research, a given set of frustration tolerances
in "war game negotiations" may not necessarily indicate the
frustration tolerance of the North Vietnamese in the nego
tiations in Paris. In the case of the psychological dimen
sion of foreign policy making, the behavior of a single in
dividual or a group in the laboratory may not indicate the
behavior of a nation. Contrary to Stagner's analysis,
whether "men make foreign policy decisions"^ or not, the
foreign policy decision made by a single man is not neces
sarily the same as the decision made by the Department of
State.
Content Analysis
Content analysis research is an attempt to evaluate
quantitatively the objective meaning of recorded discourse.
The General Inquirer defines content analysis as: "any re
search technique for making Inferences by systematically
S4
Psyhological Aspects of International Conflict
(Belmont, California, 1967J.
^ Ibid., pp. 1-16.
17
and objectively identifying specified characteristics within
text."^ By combining Charles Osgood*s semantic differen
tial^ with long established principles of content analysis,
The General Inquirer offers computer programs for the analy
sis of data in a number of different disciplines. Thus
many new studies in content analysis in psychology, sociol
ogy, anthropology, and political science have been made
possible.
Robert C. North * s Content Analysis: A Handbook With
•3Q
Applications for the Study of International Crisis^- 7 is
another widely used approach to content analysis. The book
contains four distinguishable approaches to content analy
sis— frequency count and qualitative identification, pair-
comparisons, Q-sort, and evaluative assertion analysis. As
with much of the other political "systems" research, the
^Philip J. Stone, et al. (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1966).
^Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H.
Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana, 1 9 6 7)^ PP*
76-124.
^®A typical study is: Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody,
and Robert C. North, "Measuring Affect and Action in Inter
national Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962
Cuban Crisis," Journal of Peace Research, 3-4 (1964), 170-
184. This is a study of 15 United States, 10 Soviet, and
10 Chinese Cuban missile crisis documents— a total of ap
proximately fifty thousand words. The conclusions will be
reported in the review of literature on the Cuban missile
crisis.
39(Evanston, Illinois, 1 9 6 3). A representative study
is W. Eckhart, "War Propaganda, Welfare Values, and Politi
cal Ideologies," Journal of Conflict Resolution (3)j (Sep-
tember. 1965). 3 4 5 - 3 5 6 . ________
18
primary weakness of content analysis research is its prac
tical application. As Cartwright noted:
One of the most serious criticisms that can be of
much of the research employing content analysis is that
the "findings" have no clear significance for either
theory or practice. In reviewing the work in this
field, one is struck by the number of studies which
have apparently been guided by a sheer fascination
with counting,40
Image
Three important concepts that deal with the differ
ence between appearance and reality in international rela
tions are symbolism, mirror image, and self-fulfilling
prophesy.
Kenneth Boulding describes the role of the symbolic
image in international relations In his pioneering work,
The Image:
In international relations, the symbolic image of
the nations Is of extraordinary importance. Indeed,
it can be argued that it has developed to the point
where it has become seriously pathological in its ex
treme form. The national symbol becomes the object of
a kind of totem-worship. Cartoon and political
speeches continually reinforce the image of roles of
nations as "real" personalities-— lions, bears, and
eagles— loving, hating, embracing, rejecting, quar
reling, fighting. By these symbols, the web of con
flict is visualized not as a shifting, evanescent,
unstable network of fine individual threads but as
a simple tug-of-war between large opposing elements.
This symbolic image Is one of the major causes of
international warfare and is the principal threat to
the survival of our present world.41
^ The General Inquirer, p. 24.
^(Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1966), pp. 110-111.
19
One of the best explanations of the mirror image
concept is Ralph K. White's "Images in the Context of In-
jio
ternational Conflict." White points out that the concept
of the mirror image occurred, independently to a number of
different people— Urie Bronfenbrenner in i9 6 0, Charles Os
good in 1962, and to Ralph White in 1 9 6 1. These different
origins have contributed to the illusiveness of the concept.
Thus some scholars view the concept as "seeing in others
that which one sees in himself." White comments on this
aspect of the concept: "We should be on guard against as
suming that in these respects their national self image is
JlO
close to an exact replica of our own." Daniel J. Boor-
stin treats this concept in much the same way in his book
44
The Image.
However, the most Important constituent of the mir-
i
ror image concept is that of the fallacy of black and white.
That Is, as one's lift side appears as the right side of
the image in the mirror, so nations tend to see the oppo-
42 /
International Behavior, ed. Herbert Kelman (New
York, 1965). In their book, Image and Reality in World
Politics (New York, 1 9 6 7), John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith
deal with this same problem. Farrell and Smith's collec
tion of essays by such scholars as Kenneth Boulding, Reln-
hold Neibuhr, Stanley Hoffman, and Robert S. North is con
cerned with the gap between appearance and reality in
world politics. Such articles as "Cognitive Dynamics and
Images of the Enemy" and "The Social Myths in the JCold
War'" deal with this metaphysical quest as it relates to
International affairs.
40
International Behavior, p. 258.
______^(New York, 1961).__________________________________
20
site of themselves in other nations. For example, the
United States may see itself as fundamentally moral— acting
on the side of peace and justice and may see the Soviet
Union as a mirror image— opposite itself. Thus the Soviet
Union may appear decadent— acting on the side of war and in
justice.
Closely related to the mirror image is the self-
fulfilling prophecy. Boulding describes this phenomenon as
a process in which:
A nation perceives itself as insecure and, hence,
increases its armaments or maintains an aggressive
posture. By doing so, it seeks to increase its image
of its own security. In so doing, however, it dimin
ishes the security in the image of its opponent. The
security of one is the insecurity of the other.^5
The principle behind this concept is that one party
will elicit expected behavior from another party by acting
in a way which will necessitate that behavior. Although
theoretically interesting, the positive identification and
evaluation of these different images and their constituents
may often defy absolute verification.
Diplomacy
Diplomacy or the study of international negotiation
more directly relates to this dissertation than any other
type of research in international relations. Its methodol
ogy is largely historical rather than behavioral and its
^ The image, p. 112.
21
subject matter is similar to the study of the strategies of
persuasion proposed in this dissertation.
Perhaps the most comprehensive work in this area
46
is Fred Charles Inkle's How Nations Negotiate. Inkle's
book
is concerned with the process and effects of negotia
tion between governments; in particular, it seeks to
relate the process of negotiation to the outcome. To
begin with, two elements must normally be present for
negotiation to take place: there must be both common
interests and issues of conflict.47
As in the analysis of the strategies of persuasion, the
focus of this type of research is upon maximizing the "com
mon interests" and resolving the "issues of conflict." For
example, Inkle deals with many concepts familiar to the
student of persuasion: (l) "the Function of Arguments,"
(2) "Reaching Points of Agreement," ( 3 ) "Moods and Manners
of Thinking," (4) "Domestic Pressure Groups," ( 5) "Inducing
J i Q
the Opponent to Want Agreement." The strongest feature
of Inkle's book is that it is imminently practical; it in
structs a diplomat on how to negotiate. The following are
only a few of the many areas Inkle covers: (l) the role of
specificity in agreement and disagreement; (2) negotiating
for side-effects; (3) warnings, threats, bluffs, and com-
216(New York, 1 9 6 7). ^7Ibid., p. 2.
48
How Nations Negotiate. Related to Inkle's work is
Mary Capes' edition of Communication of Conflict (New York,
i9 6 0). Capes' book is a collection of essays on conference
techniques and on the process and functioning of interna
tional conferences.
22
mitments; (4) rules of accommodation; and ( 5) personalities
in negotiation.
A more recent edition of current thinking on di
plomacy is Hoffman’s International Communication and the
40
Hew Diplomacy. ^ Hoffman’s concern is for the broader as
pects of diplomacy; he believes that the study of diplomacy
must encompass educational and cultural relations., public
opinion research, national cultures, language studies, the
news media, and communication to open and closed societies.
In short, Hoffman's approach is macroscopic. A contributor
to Hoffman's book argues that if diplomatic communication
is to be effective, it must be directed to those who have
a significant voice in international decision making. But
in a democracy, that "significant voice" is obscure.^ The
truth or falsehood of this conclusion notwithstanding, the
focus of this "new diplomacy" is upon public opinion re
search.
Yet another approach to the study of diplomacy is
found in Edward T. Hall’s The Silent Language.-^ Hall's
work, required reading for all Peace Corps volunteers, is a
landmark study in intracultural non-verbal communication.
^Arthur s. Hoffman, ed. (Bloomington, Indiana, 1 9 6 8).
"^Bryant Wedge, "Communication Analysis and Compre
hensive Diplomacy," International Communication and the New
Diplomacy.
(Greenwich, Connecticut, 1959).
Certainly non-verbal behavior is important to the student
of diplomacy.
Of signal importance to this study is Thomas Schel-
52
ling's Arms and Influence. Schelling introduces a new
type of "diplomacy"; he argues that military force can be
used to achieve an objective by threatening harm to another
country, its government, and its people. This process
Schelling calls the "diplomacy of violence." His book is a
discussion of the "principles" that underlie this type of
bargaining. Thus the notion that military movements and
planned military strategies are forms of communication is
not new. As early as 1965 Schelling argued that mutual
understanding and trust are not necessarily the keys to
congenial international relations; but that mutual respect
and planned military expenditures and maneuvers communi
cated more to the Soviets than any amount of "goodwill."
American force goals must be somewhat related to
what number of bombers and missiles we think the So
viet Union has or is going to have; and probably the
missile buildup in the Soviet Union is related in some
fashion to the size of Western forces.53
Because this theorizing deals with military action
as communication, it offers a precedent for the projected
^2(New Haven, 1 9 6 6).
■^T. c. Schelling, "Signals and Feedback in the Arms
Dialogue," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January,
!965).
24
analysis of the strategic military communication in the Cu
ban missile crisis as outlined in this dissertation.
The primary weakness of much of the research in in
ternational relations on international communications is
that it does not provide the answers to some of the press
ing problems in international communication. For example.,
if one were interested in American decision making in the
Cuban missile crisis., it is doubtful that a content analy
sis of the New York Times would reveal anything very sub
stantial about that decision making process. A study of a
panel of fourteen college students role-playing as decision
makers probably would be equally unrevealing. The problem
must dictate the methodology; not vice versa. Too often it
seems that a quantitative research design is applied to a
problem simply because it is empirical and "scientific."
Moreover, many times, tight and refined research designs
neatly solve insignificant "problems." As James Schlesinger
pointed out: "The danger becomes quite great that, in the
press for quantification, the nonquantifiable elements will
be obscured, and in higher-level problems it is the non-
54
quantifiable elements that are of greatest importance.
54
James R. Schlesinger, Quantitative Analysis and
National Security," Problems of National Strategy, ed.
Henry A. Kissinger (New York, 19557* P* 91.
25
International Communication
in Speech Communication
In order to review relevant literature in speech
communication., three bibliographical sources were consulted:
(l) Table of Contents of the Quarterly Journal of Speech,
1915-1964; Speech Monographs, 1945-1964; and The Speech
Teacher, 1952-1964;^ (2) Indexes and Table of Contents of
Southern Speech Journal, 1935-1965J Western Speech Journal,
1937-1965j Central States Speech Journal, 1949-1965; To
day 's Speech, 1953-1965;^ (3) Author and Key-word Indexes,
1951-1968, The Journal of Communication.-^ In addition,
recent Journals not included in these indexes were examined.
For the most part, scholars in speech communication
have neglected international communication. Of the limited
number of studies in speech communication that pertain to
international communication two are particularly important
to this dissertation: (l) Robert T. Oliver, "Culture and
Communications: A Major Challenge to International Rela
tions"/^ (2) Paul W. Keller, "The Study of Face-to-Face
International Decision-Making.
-^Franklin H. Knower, ed. (New York, 1 9 6 5).
v Robert E. Dunham, L. S. Harms, and Richard G.
Gregg, eds. (New York, 1 9 6 6).
-^Kenneth D. Frandsen, ed. (Lawrence, Kansas, 1 9 6 9).
^®Vital Speeches of the Day, XXIX (September, 1 9 6 3) *
721-724.
•^Journal of Communication, 13 (1963)* 67-76.
26
Robert T. Oliver began the work in speech on inter-
60
national communication. In part, Oliver's work was the
product of his service as adviser to the Republic of Korea
delegation at United Nations Conferences in New York and in
Paris, and at the Korea-Japan Conferences in Tokyo in 1951.
This experience may have led Oliver to question the produc
tive study of international communication. In his first
article, Oliver argues that: (l) traditional approaches to
the study of diplomacy are inadequate; (2) governmental
spokesmen in international conferences are often puppets
speaking before shadow audiences; ( 3) governments are prone
to distort or misrepresent facts; (4) language is often un
intentionally ambiguous and misleading; (5) intentional
6l
ambiguity is a factor that impedes understanding. Many
of the same points are made in Oliver's second article on
62
International communication. This view of international
fan
"Speech in International Affairs," Quarterly Jour-
nal of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), 171-175; "The Rhet-
oric of Power In Diplomatic Conferences," Quarterly Journal
of Speech, XL (October, 1954), 288-292.
^"Speech in International Affairs," pp. 171-176.
6p
"Rhetoric of Power." Other articles which deal
with international communication are: Lyman Bryson, "The
Rhetoric of Conciliation," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
XXXIX (December, 1953), 437-443; Ben C. Limb, "Speech: The
Life of a Diplomat," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIII
(February, 1957), 55-51; and Paul Malhuish The Rhetoric
of Crisis: A Burkian Analysis of John F. Kennedy's October
22, 1962 Cuban Address," Unpub1.M.A. thesis (University of
Oregon, 1963).' Bryson argues that there is a need for a
rhetoric of conciliation, a rhetoric of democratic media
tion among men. Limb observes that the purpose of the
______________________________
27
communication may have made speech communication scholars
aware that their traditional rhetorical tools would not
serve adequately in the study of international communica
tion.
In 1962 in a speech delivered at the University of
DenverOliver recommended a frontal assault on the prob
lems of international communication: "What we must not ig
nore is the desperate urgency of the need for undertaking
a new approach to the problem of people-to-people communica
tion."^ He argued that speech communication should aban
don its traditional concept of a unitary or generic rhetoric
and develop the ability to deal with a complex series of
65
divergent rhetorics.
diplomat is often to "concoct an ambiguous composition
which— no matter how carefully it may be analyzed— will add
up to no real meaning whatsoever," p. 57* Limb says "the
real purpose of such ambiguities is to mask and minimize
disagreements while experts are hard at work behind the
scenes trying to eliminate their causes. Perhaps students
of international communication should concentrate on the
work of "experts" and less on the work of "diplomats." Fi
nally, Melhuish outlined the history of Castro revolution
in Cuba, American and Cuban relations between 1961-62, and
Keating's early warning speeches in the summer of 1962.
Melhuish then concluded that there were three principal
Burkian strategies in Kennedy's "Arms Quarantine of Cuba"
speech— justification, warning, and reassurance. Essential
ly, Melhuish's study is an attempt to understand Kennedy's
speech from a traditional rhetorical standpoint, yet Burki
an terms are used to describe the historical setting and
the structure of Kennedy's speech.
^"Culture and Communications," Vital Speeches of the
Day.
6A
Ibid., p. 722.
6k
_______^Probably the best two summary articles on current
28
What we need is to learn how to hook into one
another's modes of thinking. What we need is to learn
how to bridge from one culture to another.
But this is precisely , . . what rhetoric always
has intended to do. Rhetoric, in fact, has been de
fined as the art of using language in such a way as
to produce a desired impression upon the hearer or
reader.66
Very similar in attitude to Oliver's view is Paul
W. Keller's "The Study of Face-to-Face International Deci-
67
sion-Making." ' Keller suggests a number of possible areas
of investigation in international communication. He pro
poses that there are a number of areas concerning the role
that language plays in international decision making that
have not been investigated. Other areas of possible inves
tigation he suggests are: (l) the "frequency of communica
tion" between nations, (2) leadership in international
meetings, ( 3) the dynamics of decision making in interna
tional meetings.
thought concerning this concept are: Douglas Ehninger, "On
Rhetoric and Rhetorics," Western Speech, XXXI (Fall, 1 9 6 7)»
242-249, and Douglas Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric,"
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1(3) (Summer, 1 9 6 8), 131-144.
f\fs
"Communication and Culture," p. 722.
67
'Journal of Communication. A study of the litera
ture in sociology and related fields on face-to-face inter-
cultural communication is Lauren Elton Ekroth, "The Study
of Face-to-Face Communication Between Cultures: Present
Status and Directions" Unpubl. diss. (University of Minne
sota, 1 9 6 7). Ekroth examines over 250 studies that deal
with such communication variables as: non-linguistic sign
behavior, linguistic sign behavior, and psychological fac
tors in cross-cultural communication.
29
Keller stresses the Interpersonal aspect of Inter
national communication. He is not concerned, with a macro-
spoic view of the entire decision making process in inter
national affairs: "We have made few efforts to understand
what goes on when representatives of nation-states try to
ro
reach accord in face-to-face meetings.'
Contributions by speech communication scholars to
the literature of international communication have been
jTQ
Ibid.j p. 6 7. Other articles in the Journal of
Communication on international communication are E. S. Lor-
imor and S. Watson Dunn, "Reference Groups, Congruity The
ory and Cross-Cultural Persuasion," Journal of Communica
tion, 18 (1 9 6 8), 354-368; E. W. Ziebarth, "The Mass Media
in International Communication," Journal of Communication,
2 (1952), 24-28; Michael J. Flaek^ "Communicable and Uncom-
municable Aspects in Personal International Relationships,"
Journal of Communication, 16 ( 1 9 6 6), 283-290; and Alex
Weilenmann, "Communication and Control in International
Politics," Journal of Communication, 16 ( 1 9 6 6), 322-332.
The first two articles have to do with mass communications.
Lorimor and Dunn conclude from a study done in Egypt that
advertisements may often be successfully adapted from one
culture to another, Ziebarth argues that radio as a medium
of international communication is essentially an instrument
for the extension of national policy. Flack is concerned
with the role culture plays in international communication.
He says: "The essence of culture is that it is a ’universe
of discourse,’ that is that common contents, manifestations,
meanings, and heirarchies of status, timing and spatial po
sition within the system are reflected in language and be
havior" (p. 2 8 5). Thus Flack concludes by asking: "How
much ’community’ can there be in intercultural communica
tion?" In an even more macroscopic view of international
communication, Weilenmann maintains that all social activ
ity is manifested in information flows and that this activ
ity is characterized by the communication that occurs in
the social Interaction. Weilenmann's "system" of interna
tional communication is made up of all intracultural and
intercultural communication; he has not excluded much from
his definition. The value of a more limiting definition
was discussed earlier.
30
disappointing. In addition to Oliver's initial judgment of
the difficulty of studying speech in international affairs,
possible reasons may be any or all of the following: (l)
difficulty in acquiring data, (2) governmental suppression
of data, (3) secrecy in diplomatic negotiations, (4) se
curity regulations, (5) bureaucracy in governmental admin
istration. As Keller notes: "Busy administrators have been
known to have little sympathy for the scholarly curiosity
of the academic man.
Completeness of Literature
A principal area in which the literature on inter
national communication is incomplete is the area of strate
gies of persuasion in international discourse. As Paul W.
Keller noted, "There has been an impressive flow of re
search on international communication, but virtually none
on the face-to-face, oral decision making aspects of it."7^
Moreover, when the 1953 M.I.T. advisory report on
research in international communication asked for research
on all types of communication, it asserted: "Plainly, we
need to improve the existing body of knowledge about inter
national communication if we are to give better advice to
the statesmen and private individuals who are active in
69"The Study of Face-to-Face International Decision-
Making, " p. J6.
7°Ibid., p. 67.
31
this field.n^ ' * " This statement emphasizes the need for
practical knowledge in international communication. Present
levels of knowledge are not complete in this area. Typical
questions that need answers are: What strategies of persua
sion would be most useful in the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks? What arguments will the Soviets find most convincing
concerning the danger of involvement in the Middle East?
What strategy would be most persuasive in trying to con
vince Israel to repatriate the Palestinian Arabs? It Is
the intent of this dissertation to begin to offer a method
ology for dealing with these kinds of questions.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
As in the review of the literature on international
communication, bibliographical sources were examined in an
attempt to uncover the extant literature on the Cuban mis
sile crisis. Preference was given to the seven bibliograph-
72
ical sources in international relations noted earlier.
In addition two separate datrix searches were done.^ One
71
1 Speirj et al., Research in International Communica
tion, p. 37.
^2Codex of International Affairs (January, 1950-
No vember^ 1969)•
"^Search number 004543, prepared for Jerrold J. Mer
chant, 04/02/69; search number 004543, prepared for Jerrold
J. Merchant, 04/09/69. In the first, three key words were
used: missile, Cuba, and crisis. No references were found.
The second search was done with the single word "Kennedy,"
However, a qualifying condition was placed upon the search—
1962-1968. Thirteen references were found._______________
32
valuable reference was found. In a dissertation done In
1965 at the University of Oklahoma, Robert Earle Cecile en
deavored to compare and contrast President Eisenhower's de
cision making process during the 1956 Hungarian and Suez
crises and President Kennedy's decision making process dur
ing the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Cecile concluded that
Kennedy's "final authority" system of government was more
efficient than Eisehhower's government by "council."^
The literature on the missile crisis falls into
three categories: (l) a chronological history of the crisis,
(2) American decision making in the crisis, ( 3) the Soviet
motives for placing missiles in Cuba.
Chronological History
One of the most informative histories of the Cuban
crisis is Elie Abel's The Missile Crisis.^ Abel treats
each day of the crisis as a separate chapter.
<711
"Crisis Decision-Making in the Eisenhower and Ken
nedy Administrations: The Application of an Analytical
Scheme," Unpubl. diss. (The University of Oklahoma, 1 9 6 5).
Cecile's analytical scheme consisted of applying the deci
sion to the following variables: (l) spheres of competence,
(2) motivation, and (3) information-communication.
^(Philadelphia, 1 9 6 6). Other less substantive his
torical accounts of the crisis are James Daniel and John 0.
Hubbell, Strike in the West: The Complete Story of the Cu
ban Missile Crisis (New York, 1963); Henry M. Pachter, Col
lision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence
(New York, 1963); and Bertrand Russell, Unarmed Victory
(New York, 1963). Russell argues that the United States is
obsessed with the proud glory of "standing form" and "Amer
ican maddness" almost brought nuclear war.
33
Of the various news magazine descriptions of the
crisis, probably the best is that of Roger Hilsman, Assis
tant Secretary of State in the Kennedy administration.
Hilsman recounts the entire story of the Cuban Crisis with
emphasis on the parts he played in resolving the conflict.
His description of the Keating early warning speeches, the
U-2 flight over Russia on Saturday October 27, and the
Scali-Fomin conversations were particularly informative.^
Finally, David Larson1 s The ’ ’ Cuban Crisis1 1 of 1962:
Selected Documents and Chronology is the only published
collection of the documents in the crisis.^ Larson’s edi
tion contains 94 primary sources in the main text and 12
supplementary documents in the appendix. Concerning the
textual authenticity of the documents, Larson states: "This
collection of documents and the chronology are primarily
designed as a case study for the student of international
relations and United States’ foreign policy. All documents
and events were received and treated as they occurred and
not edited with the benefit of hindsight."^
^ "The Cuban Crisis: How Close We Were to War," Look,
XXVIII (August 25, 1964), 17-21. The most exhaustive analy
sis of American and Soviet foreign policy preceding the
crisis, and the role that the crisis played in formulating
new policy after the crisis is Robert D. Crane’s "The Cuban
Crisis: A Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet Policy,"
Orbis, VI (Winter, 1 9 6 3), 5 2 8-5 6 3.
^(Boston, 1 9 6 3).
^ Ibid., pp. v-vi.
34
Decision Making In the Crisis
Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen probably have
made the largest contributions to research in this area.
In his book Thirteen Days, Robert Kennedy revealed much new
information on the processes and forces which led to the
r 7Q
ultimate resolution of the crisis.1^ Although written in a
chronological fashion like Abel's book, this book dealt
more with the "inside" nature of the crisis. Harold Macmil
lan noted in the introduction of the book, "What President
John Kennedy thought and did during these fateful hours,
So
Senator Robert Kennedy has here faithfully recorded."
Theodore C. Sorensen's major contribution to the
O i
literature in this area are in his two books, Kennedy,
82
and Decision-Making in the White House. Although neither
of these works are on the crisis itself, both contain valu
able information on decision making during the crisis. The
focus of the latter is on the three forces which shape
presidential decisions: (l) presidential advisers, ( 2)
Qo
presidential politics, ( 3) presidential perspective. D The
decision making in the Cuban crisis is not dealt with as a
separate issue. However, it is frequently discussed as
^(New York, 1 9 6 9).
8°Ibld., p. 17.
On
(New York, 1 9 6 5).
Qo
(New York, 1963).
88Pecision-Making, p. 22.
35
supporting material for establishing the three forces just
84
mentioned.
Soviet Motives
Of the research on the Cuban crisis, no area has
received more attention than the analysis of Soviet motives
for placing missiles in Cuba. Only those most substantive
articles will be discussed.
Probably the most exhaustive analytical research
done in this area is the work done under the auspices of
the RAND Corporation for the United States Air Force Project
Rand. Arnold L. Horelick's "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An
Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior" is the most
Hr
representative. ^ Horelick argues that the American expo
sure of the "missile gap" myth at the end of 1961 caused
Khrushchev to seek a quick means to achieve a substantial
improvement in Soviet strike capabilities against the
United States.
Khrushchev may therefore have sought some quick
and dramatic means for achieving a breakthrough that
would strengthen the USSR's position on a whole range
of outstanding issues affected by the strategic balance
84
Two other books on President Kennedy which devote
sections to the Cuban crisis are Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.,
A Thousand Days; John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston,
1965j, and Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (New York, 1 9 6 6).
^RM-3779-PRj The RAND Corporation (September, 1 9 6 3);
this memorandum was late published under the same title in
World Politics, XVT (April, 1964), 3 6 3-3 8 9.
36
and by beliefs about it— notably by the long-smoulder
ing issue of B e r l i n .
In a later publication for RAND, Horelick expanded
his missile gap thesis to explain Soviet Foreign policy in
the late 1950Ts and the early 1960’s.8^ "The efforts to
deceive the West about Soviet missile capabilities had a
central place in Soviet foreign policy during the years
OQ
1957-1962." Regarding the Soviet reaction to the United
States' exposure of this deception, Horelick observed:
By the end of 1961 the U.S. leaders had largely
resolved their uncertainty regarding the Soviet ICBM
program and had publicly declared their confidence
that the United States was far superior to the USSR
in intercontinental strategic forces. In the months
following, the Soviet leaders decided on a rapid de
ployment of strategic missiles of limited range in
Cuba, In order to present the United States with a
fait accompli that would alter the strategic balance
In their favor and regain for the USSR the initiative
in the cold w a r.°9
86T, . ■ ,
Ibid., p. vi.
^Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, "Strategic Power
and Soviet Foreign Policy," R-434-PR, The RAND Corporation,
1965.
88Ibid., p. x.
8 q
• ^ Ibid., p. xi. Another RAND publication dealing
with the Cuban Crisis is Roman Kolkowicz1 "Conflicts in So
viet Party-Military Relations: 1 9 6 2-1 9 6 3," RM-3 76O-PR, The
RAND Corporation (August, 1 9 6 3). Kolkowicz argues that
Khrushchev’s retreat in the crisis provided the Soviet mil
itary establishment with the support it needed to cause
Khrushchev to devote more priority to a stronger program on
conventional and strategic military development. Other ar
ticles which deal with motives for Soviet behavior are:
Eugene Rabinowitch, "After Cuba: Two Lessons," Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, XIX (February, 1 9 6 3), 2-7; Roger
Hagan and Bart Bernstein, "Military Value of Missiles of
Cuba, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XIX (February,
37
The preceding review of the literature on the Cuban
missile crisis reveals a lack of concern for the communica
tive dimensions of the crisis. Only two articles deal
with this subject.
Roberta Wohlstetter argues that by comparing the
indications of the impending military actions in Pearl Har
bor and Cuba* a good deal may be learned about basic uncer
tainties in intelligence.9^ Wohlstetter analyzes the
wealth of information the United States received just be
fore each crisis and by comparing and contrasting them
concludes:
We cannot guarantee foresight. But we can improve
the chance of acting on signals in time to avert or
moderate a disaster. We can do this by a more thorough
and sophisticated analysis of observers’ reports, by
making more explicit and tentative the framework of
assumptions into which we must fit any new observations,
and by refining, subdividing and making more selective
the range of responses we prepare, so that our response
may fit the ambiguities of our information and minimize
the risks both of error and of inaction. 91
1963), 8-13; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Ouba in Soviet Strategy,"
New Republic, CXLVIII (November 1962), 7-8; Robert D.
Crane, The Sino-Soviet Dispute on War and the Cuban Cri-
sis," Orbis, 8 (Fall, 1964), 537-561; and Josephine W.
Pomerance, "The Cuban Crisis and the Test Ban Negotiations,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (1 9 6 3), 553-559. The
latter two articles concurred that the resolution of the
crisis demonstrated that both the United States and the So
viet Union rejected nuclear war as a rational instrument of
policy; furthermore, that the exchange between Kennedy and
Khrushchev and the pursuant understanding could point to a
significant reduction in the cold war.
9^"Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIII (July, 1 9 6 5), 691-707.
91Ibid., p. 107.
38
The General Inquirer content analysis of the verbal
communication in the missile crisis also deals with part of
Q2
the communication in the crisis. This fifty thousand
word content analysis concluded:
In the Cuban crisis, both sides tended to perceive
rather accurately the nature of the adversary's actions
and then proceeded to act at an appropriate level. Ef
forts by either party to delay or reverse the escala
tion toward conflict were generally perceived as such,
and responded to in like manner.93
These two studies as well as the other research on
the crisis reveal inadequate regard for the role that strat
egies of persuasion play In international communication.
In the Cuban crisis, such communications as the Kennedy-
Khrushchev letters, the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategic mili
tary communication, the Scali-Pomin Khrushchev-Knox, and
Robert Kennedy-Anatoly Dobrynin conversations are not ex
amined in depth. In short, there is no extant study which
concentrates on the modes and methods of strategies of per
suasion In international communication; there is no study
of the comparative strategies of persuasion in the Cuban
missile crisis; and there Is no study which identifies and
assesses the worth of these strategies.
Methodology
This section is designed to outline the methodology
9%Iolsti, et al., "Measuring Affect and Action."
93Ibid., p. 189.
39
of the study and discuss the suitability of the Cuban mis
sile crisis for a case study.
The historical case study will be the principal
method used to deal with the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies
of persuasion in the Cuban missile crisis. As J. Jeffery
Auer points out, historical research involves two types of
approaches:
It might properly be called documentary research,
since jLt focuses upon documents and other written rec
ords for the purpose of ordering and evaluating the
evidence yielded by them. . . . Second, it may be use
ful to think of the historical method as critical analy
sis, for in the process of ordering and evaluating doc
umentary evidence the research student derives general
izations about the meaning and significance of the doc
ument s. 95
But a specific approach to the "critical analysis"
is needed. In other words, In what way will the data be
systematically handled? And how will this treatment differ
from the way other scholars might handle these data? This
study is message centeredj it focuses on interpersonal ver
bal and non-verbal messages as Indicators of the dynamics
of interpersonal inducement in an exemplar international
crisis. However, unlike other message centered communica
tion studies, this study concentrates on primary and second
ary strategies of persuasion as indicators of the effective
ness of messages rather than on the interrelationships of
■^J. Jeffery Auer, An Introduction to Research in
-Speech (New York, 1959)^ pp. 118-119.
4o
the various channels of communication, objective meaning,
or different images in the crisis.
There are three principal components for any iden
tification of comparative strategies of persuasion in in
ternational crisis communication: the communicators, the
forms of communication, and the content of the communica
tion.
The analyst's first task is to determine the prin
cipal governmental decision makers and communicators in an
international conflict. This process necessitates deter
mining the power positions of government leaders as well as
analyzing those variables that relate to communicator be
havior: (l) consensual support— support of cabinet, govern
ment, and public opinion; (2) social and political con
straints— moral positions and values that act as restraints
on behavior; and ( 3) speaker credibility— each communica
tor's perception of the other's stamina and moral courage.
Second, the analyst must decide upon the form of
the communication. Pour typical verbal and non-verbal
forms are: a public address and/or policy statement, public
or private letters, intermediary or third party conversa
tions, and non-verbal strategic military maneuvers. The
communicator may choose these different forms of communica
tion for any number of different reasons: speed, conven
ience, secrecy, impact, and/or effect.
Lastly, the analyst should evaluate the content of
41
the communication or the messages themselves in terms of:
(l) forms of inducement— appeals, arguments, proofs, and
evidencej (2) motives— reinforcement, revenge, guilt, sur-
vivalj ( 3 ) implicit values; and (4) coercion and threats.
The effectiveness of strategies of persuasion in
crisis communication is determined by judging the degree to
which the strategies were able to produce a desired reaction
or change in attitude or action in the receiver or the ex
tent to which they were able to neutralize the situation
which produced them.
The easiest way to determine "effectiveness" in
communication is to observe whether or not a receiver's be
havior can be adjusted or changed in a prescribed manner by
discourse or non-verbal behavior. If the desired change
can be accurately perceived, then it may be concluded that
the discourse was effective. But if a judgment about a re
ceiver's reaction is not possible— for example, If the re
ceiver is concealed--then the critic must judge the effec
tiveness of the communication by some other yardstick. In
the study of international discourse it Is often virtually
impossible to judge a receiver's reaction to a given mes
sage or strategy of persuasion because of concealment.
In the case of the evaluation of the Kennedy-Khrush
chev strategies of persuasion in the Cuban missile crisis,
when a judgment of either Kennedy or Khrushchev's reaction
to a given message is not possible then an evaluation of
42
the effectiveness of the message according to the degree to
which it caused the communicative situation to deteriorate
is made. That is, available historical data are evaluated
for possible cause and effect relationships between the
Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies of persuasion and a decrease
in the level of American and Soviet tensions during the
Cuban crisis.
This is a subjective judgment; it is not absolute.
A cause and effect relationship between a specific strategy
of persuasion and an alteration in the communicative situa
tion or status quo must be argued. The strength or weakness
of the cause and effect relationship— hence, the effective
ness of the strategy of persuasion— must rest with the
strength or weakness of the argument which supports it.
This dissertation offers an alternative method for
dealing with international communication. Public opinion
research tries to link public opinion with foreign policy
decision making; content analysis attempts to understand
the relationship between recorded verbal behavior and ob
jective meaning; and image research tries to account for
blurred subjectivity and misperception in international re
lations. This study draws conclusions concerning the ex
tent to which the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies of persua
sion determined the outcome of the Cuban crisis by evaluat
ing the effectiveness of the strategies.
The value of this approach is that an extraordin-
43
arily complex communicative situation like the Kennedy-
Khrushchev communication in the Cuban missile crisis can be
studied in its entirety. Both the verbal and non-verbal
communication in the crisis can be studied simultaneously.;
United States' and Soviet strategic military communication
can be examined and compared and contrasted with the re
corded verbal messages in the crisis. Yet., the methodology
allows the researcher to focus on limited data and pass
judgment on the utility of overall and individual strategies
of persuasion.
Thus the strategies of persuasion can be evaluated
for possible use in preventing or mitigating future crises.
Perhaps the most relevant questions one can ask regarding
the value of studying the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies of
persuasion in the Cuban missile crisis are: What can we
learn from them? How by studying these strategies can we
either avoid similar confrontations or resolve them more
quickly if they develop? It is the intention of this dis
sertation to evaluate the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies of
persuasion so that these strategies can be either more
properly used or discarded in future similar communicative
situations.
44
The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Case Study
The Cuban missile crisis is an ideal case study of
comparative strategies of persuasion in international com
munication. J. Jeffery Auer defines a case study as "an
intensive., even microscopic, investigation, . . . in situ,
of an individual 'case, In speech communication, Auer
observes that a case study may involve any "act (or cluster
of acts) of communication, about which we would gather all
available information, trying to create the most complete
picture possible of that act in its setting, and establish
ing the broadest base possible for interpreting it."97
The Cuban crisis satisfies this definition. The
time period in which the crisis occurred satisfies the
prescriptions for a case study of a complex communication
situation; it began and ended within a short enough time
period that all relevant data can be studied.
As a case study, the Cuban crisis might contribute
to our understanding of international communication: (l)
the crisis itself is the prototype of nuclear confrontation
in the twentieth century; (2) the time span of the crisis
is sufficiently limited to permit intensive study; (3) the
data are available and not so voluminous as to prevent de
tailed study; (4) the Kennedy-Khrushchev communication in
96Ibid., p. 120.
97Ibid.
45
the crisis is compatible with this study's focus on com
parative strategies of persuasion in international communi
cation.
CHAPTER II
THE COMMUNICATIVE SITUATION
Introduction
This chapter is designed to answer the question:
What shaped the strategies used hy President Kennedy and
Chairman Khrushchev to settle the 1962 Cuban missile cri
sis? Before and during the crisis two separate communi
cative conditions were discernible: (l) the pre-crisis
decision-making situation confronting President Kennedy
between October 16 and 22, ( 2) the crisis situation con
fronting Kennedy and Khrushchev between October 22 and 28.
A description of these two situations and their Inherent
motivating forces follows.
Kennedy1s Pre-crisis Situation
The ruling exigence'1 ' of Kennedy's precrisis situa
tion was the imminent possibility of an alteration In the
strategic balance. If Soviet medium range ballistic mis-
Lloyd BItzer defines an exigence as "an imperfec
tion marked by urgency; it Is a defect, an obstacle, some
thing waiting to be done, a thing which is other than It
should be." "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and
Rhetoric, I (January, 1 9 6 8), 6.
46
siles in Cuba had become operational, this strategic bal
ance would have been drastically altered. Arnold Horelick
and Myron Rush point outs "The Cuban missile episode was a
bold effort to alter the unfavorable strategic environment
in which the USSR found itself in 1962 as the result of
the U.S. intercontinental arms build-up and the collapse
of the 'missile gap' myth."^
The Soviets hoped to alter the strategic balance
in two ways. "The deployment of strategic weapons in Cuba
may have recommended itself to the Soviet leaders as a
'quick fix' measure to achieve a substantial improvement
in Soviet strike capabilities against the United States."3
Horelick and Rush observe: "It is difficult to conceive of
any other measure that promised to produce so large an im
provement in the Soviet strategic position as quickly or
as cheaply."^ Second, the Soviets hoped to improve their
political position. Their bargaining stance on a whole
range of political issues would have been importantly af
fected by the strategic imbalance in favor of the United
States.3 Horelick and Rush conclude: "The objective of the
p
Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, "Strategic
Power and Soviet Foreign Policy," R-434-PR (August, 1 9 6 5)*
U.S. Air Force Project RAND, 199*
3Ibid., p. 214.
^Ibld., p. 2 1 6.
5Ibid., p. 217.
48
Cuban offensive, while also far-reaching was largely to
set the stage for future engagements."^
For a number of reasons, President Kennedy could
not allow this alteration in the strategic balance. The
factors that moved him to act in this precrisis situation
probably were: (l) his self-image and his views of the
Presidency, (2) his theories of international politics,
(3) United States tradition and foreign policy in the hem
isphere, (4) Kennedy's explicit statements warning Khrush
chev that he would not permit a Soviet offensive capability
in Cuba, (5) Kennedy's concern for not perpetuating the
indecision and inaction begun during the Bay of Pigs in
vasion and enhanced during the building of the Berlin wall.
Self-Image and Views of the Presidency
It is impossible to separate Kennedy's image of
himself from his views of the Presidency. Because he was
President, his actions were motivated by both of these in
terrelated factors. In his intensive analysis of John F.
Kennedy's "spheres of competence," Robert Cecile observed:
All of the personality traits of President Ken
nedy— his sense of personal responsibility, his ease
of decision, his curiosity, his ability to identify
himself with the aspirations of the American people,
his political sensitivity, his independence, and his
instinct for the relevant, were synthesized and set in
6Ibid., p. 219.
49
motion by what was perhaps his most outstanding trait*
an unremitting intent of action.7
That this intent of action probably waB the main
constituent of Kennedy's image of himself and his role as
President can be evidenced by looking at the decision
making structure in Kennedy's administration. Sorensen
observes that "from the outset he [Kennedy] abandoned the
Q
notion of a collective* institutionalized Presidency."
He abolished the pyramid structure of the White
House staff* the Assistant President-Sherman Adams-
type job* the Staff Secretary* the Cabinet Secretariat*
the NSC Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating
Board* all of which imposed* in his view* needless pa
perwork and machinery between the President and his
responsible officers. ... He paid little attention
to organization charts and chains of command which di
luted and distributed his authority. He was not in
terested in unanimous committee recommendations which
stifled alternatives to find the lowest common denom
inator of compromise.
He relied instead on informal meetings and direct
contacts— on a personal White House staff* the Budget
Bureau and ad hoc task forces to probe and define is
sues for his decision--on special Presidential emis
saries and constant Presidential phone calls and mem- q
oranda— on placing Kennedy men in each strategic spot.
Kennedy adopted this structure to facilitate rapid govern
mental decision making and to encourage more speed in
taking action on important decisions.
7
Robert Earle Cecile* "Decision-making in the Eisen
hower and Kennedy Administrations: The Application of an
Analytical Scheme*" unpubl. diss. (The University of Okla
homa* 1965)j P* 184.
Q
Theodore Sorensen* Kennedy (New York* 1965)> P* 281.
9Ibid.* pp. 281-282.
50
Moreover., Kennedy himself bore the consequences of
the decisions he made. "He firmly believed that the Pres
ident . . . stood alone."10 As Harold MacMillan observed:
Always ready to listen to advice, generous in
giving due weight to opinions however diverse, careful
and even cautious before reaching final conclusions on
any problem, he [Kennedy] had the supreme quality,
shared by only very great men, of refusing to evade or
cushion his final responsibility by an attempt to
spread it out upon the backs of his colleagues. He
was ready to carry the burden of responsibility him
self
Quite clearly, the President was the one who de
cided to initiate action on the Soviet missile build-up in
Cuba. Moreover, he was responsible for the action which
resulted in the resolution of the crisis. Concerning the
decision whether to attack or blockade Cuba, Robert Ken
nedy said: "It was now up to one single man. No committee
12
was going to make this decision." Sorensen observed:
"It was the most difficult and dangerous decision any
President could make, and only he could make it."1^ This
responsibility rested on the President's shoulders through
out the entire crisis. Every important communication and
military maneuver was the result of a Presidential deci
sion. As Alain C. Enthoven noted:
10Cecile, p. 163.
"i *1
Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York, 1969)3 p.
20.
12Ibid., p. 47.
1^Kennedy, p. 6 9 4.
51
Control was applied In a thoroughgoing way In the
recent Cuban crisis. Each military move was, In ef
fect, a carefully formulated message from the Presi
dent to Khrushchev .... All moves had to be care
fully controlled from the White House.1^
Theories of International Politics
An examination of Kennedy's most important theo
ries of national and international politics leads to the
conclusion that Kennedy would not allow an alteration in
the strategic balance of the magnitude that the Soviet
medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba presented.
Very early, as an undergraduate at Harvard, Ken
nedy recognized the Importance of courage in international
politics. In Why England Slept, Kennedy said: "Democracy
is essentially peace-loving; the people don't want to go
to war. When they go, it is with a very firm conviction,
because they must believe deeply and strongly in their
cause before they consent."1- ’ But how do the citizens of
a democracy come to "believe deeply and strongly In their
cause" before they consent to action? Kennedy answers by
citing the example of England in the 1930's and says that
the citizens of a democracy must be instructed and pre
pared for a moment of national crisis. He says of the
llL„ , ,
"American Deterrent Policy, Problems of National
Strategy, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York, 1965)* PP*
122-123.
15(New York, 196l), p. 222.
52
English in World War II: "For the Englishman had to he
taught the need for armaments.'1"^ This point is vital to
understanding Kennedy as a statesman. He "believed that
the leaders of a democracy have to prepare the populace
for any potential moment of crisis. In the conclusion of
Why England Slept, Kennedy said:
Munich should teach us that; we must realize that
any bluff will be called. We cannot tell anyone to
keep out of our hemisphere unless our armaments and
the people behind these armaments are prepared to back
up the command, even to the ultimate point of going to
war. There must be no doubt in anyone's mind, the de
cision must be automatic, if we debate, if-we hesi
tate, if we question, it will be too late.1'
There are two important points to consider In this
statement. First, Kennedy stressed "and the people behind
these armaments," implying that a national leader has the
responsibility for seeing that the citizenry Is prepared
to meet a national crisis. Preparing the citizenry for a
possible national crisis was one of the essential ingredi
ents of Kennedy’s "new frontier." Second, the citizenry
must be conditioned; they must be so saturated with the
necessity for responding to a moment of national crisis,
that when the moment arrives, the decision will be auto
matic. In America, perhaps the Second World War and the
Truman years provided the Initial conditioning for this
process. The Kennedy administration channelized that con-
^ Why England Slept, p. 4.
17Ibid., p. 130.
53
ditioning. The main point here is that the Cuban missile
crisis provided the moment of crisis, and the response was
automatic.
Further proof of Kennedy's concept of popular pre
paredness is found in Profiles in Courage. Senator Ken
nedy said: "And thus, in the days ahead, only the very
courageous will be able to take the hard and unpopular
decisions necessary for our survival in the struggle with
1 O
a powerful enemy." In a speech delivered in Washington
D.C. on January 1, i9 6 0, President Kennedy asked the ques
tion: "Are We Up to the Task?" He argued that the Ameri
can citizenry had become fat and complacent. He asserted
that America was not prepared to meet the challenge of the
sixties. He appealed to America to recapture its national
purpose and redouble its energy.^
Finally, in his inaugural address. President Ken
nedy said:
Let the word go forth from this time and place, to
friend and foe alike, that the torch has passed to a
new generation of Americans . . . unwilling to witness
or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to
which this nation has always been committed.
We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hard-
18(New York, 1964), p. 39.
■^The Strategy of Peace, ed. Allan Nevins (New York,
i9 6 0), pp. 1 9 9-2 0 2.
54
ship,, support any friend, oppose any foe. to assure
the survival and the success of liberty. ^0
Kennedy confidently believed that America as a na
tion would be prepared under his leadership. In the con
clusion of this speech, President Kennedy said: "In the
long history of the world, only a few generations have
been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of
maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility.
PI
I welcome it."
The Tradition and Foreign Policy of the
United States in the Hemisphere
Another factor that contributed to Kennedy's de
cision to act decisively on Cuba was our American tradi
tion against foreign intervention in the Western Hemi
sphere. This tradition and associated foreign policy is
summed up in the joint Resolution of Congress on Cuba,
September 20-26, 1962. The statement affirms that the
United States is determined to prevent the creation of an
externally supported military capability endangering the
security of the United States in Cuba. This affirmation is
supported by: (l) the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which de
clares that the United States would consider any attempt
on the part of European powers "to extend their system to
20
"The Inaugural AddresB of President Kennedy," De
partment of State Bulletin, XLIV (February 6, 1961), p. 175*
2 1Ibid., p. 176.
55
any portion of thiB hemisphere aB dangerous to our peace
and safety*" (2) the Rio Treaty of 1947 which states that
"an armed attack by any State against an American State
shall be considered as an attack against all the American
States*" (3) the Organization of American States declara
tion at Punta del Este in January of 1962 which stated:
The present Government of Cuba has identified it
self with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology*
has established a political* economic* and social sys
tem based on that doctrine* and accepts military as
sistance from extracontinental Communist powers* in
cluding even the threat of military intervention in
America on the part of the Soviet Union. 22
The resolution passed the Senate on September 20
by a vote of 86 to 1 and passed the House of Representa
tives on September 26 by a vote of 384 to 7* The dissent
ing votes were cast because some congressmen believed that
the resolution was not strong enough.
Thus American tradition clearly rejected the in
troduction of a foreign offensive capability in the hemi
sphere. In addition* congressional pressure and public
opinion would not allow the President to refrain from act
ing if the Soviets placed missiles in Cuba. Aside from
the resolution just mentioned* Senator Kenneth Keating of
New York and Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania proposed
immediate action to prevent a Communist build-up in
PP
U.S. Congressional Record* 8 7th Congress* Second
Session* CVIII* 1982* 18892-16951.
23Ibid.* pp. 19702-19753.
56
2k
Cuba. The Republicans were preparing to make Cuba a
leading campaign issue in the November 6, 1962 election.
"There continued to be heard demands from around the coun
try that the President not yield to Soviet interventions
in the hemisphere. Senator Jacob Javits also urged
Kennedy to demand that the Soviet Union stop extending
military assistance to Cuba and., if the Soviets refused.,
26
to take whatever action was necessary.
Kennedy's Statements
Kennedy's own statements clearly indicated that he
would not permit an alteration in the strategic balance.
As early as September 4, after his brother talked with
Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States,
Kennedy issued a warning to the Soviets. The text was
prepared by Robert Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenback, Deputy
Attorney General. In this statement Kennedy warned:
There is no evidence of . . . the presence of of
fensive ground-to-ground missiles,* or of other signif
icant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or
under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it to be
otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.
The Castro regime will not be allowed to export its
aggressive purposes by force or threat of force. It
oil
New York Times (September 17> 1962), p. 3«
^^New York Times (October 22, 1962), p. 16.
New York Times (September 18, 1 9 6 2), p. 16.
57
will be prevented by whatever means may be neces
sary . 27
Finally, in a statement read at his September 13
press conference, President Kennedy said:
But let me make this clear once again: If at any
time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger
or interfere with our security in any way . . . or if
Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive pur
poses by force or the threat of force against any na
tion in this hemisphere, or become an offensive mili-
tary base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union,
then this country will do whatever must be dope to pro
tect its own security and that of its allies. (em
phasis supplied)
Kennedy could not refuse to act in the face of
these explicit statements. To do otherwise would be to
discredit himself and to damage the credibility of the
United States.
Prior Inactions
In three specific instances Kennedy had refused to
act decisively when confronted with Communist in-roads in
to the strategic balance and to do so again would surely
perpetuate a "climate of inaction" regarding United States
foreign policy.
First, Kennedy had permitted the Bay of Pigs fi
asco. He gave permission for the CIA to launch a "quixotic
^Department of State Bulletin, XLVTI (September 24,
1962), p. 450.
nQ
Department of State Bulletin, XLVII (October 1,
1 9 6 2), pp. 48l-4«2.
58
landing attempt on Cuba, putting some 1,000 exiles ashore
in the wrong place at the wrong time without sufficient
ammunition or promise of reinforcements, and then . . .
acknowledged full personal responsibility for the fail
ure . "^9
Kennedy's regard for assertive leadership in the
Presidencyj and his personal respect for physical courage
in the face of adversity undoubtedly was dissonant with
the failure of the Bay of Pigs decision.
Second, Kennedy did in a sense allow Khrushchev to
build the Berlin Wall. John McCone, Director of the CIA
during the Kennedy years, believes that the Berlin Wall
episode was one of the reasons which led Khrushchev to be
lieve that Kennedy would do nothing in Cuba. "McCone
blames not only the Kennedy Administration but also the
Eisenhower Administration before it for creating a 'cli
mate of inaction.' "3<' )
Finally, there is reason to believe that Khrush
chev questioned Kennedy's readiness to use American power
to assert its foreign policy. "Khrushchev took Kennedy's
measure at their Vienna meeting in June 1961, and decided
this was a young man who would shrink from hard deci-
^Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, 1 9 6 6),
P. 35-
30Ibid.
59
sions."3^ The fact that Kennedy was unwilling to use
American power to topple Castro during the Bay of Pigs in
vasion as well as his indecision over what to do about the
Berlin Wall must have impressed Khrushchev. "Khrushchev
may have reflected: the Americans certainly possess over
whelming power— but they have forgotten how a great power
op
must behave.James Reston saw Kennedy ten minutes af
ter his final meeting with Khrushchev at Vienna. He re
members it this way: "He [the President] came into a dim
room in the American Embassy shaken and angry ....
Khrushchev had bullied him and threatened with war over
Berlin.1,33
Quite clearly Kennedy could not ignore these exi
gencies. He could not disregard his own values concerning
the necessity of acting decisively in the face of adver
sity; he could not disregard his beliefs concerning the
role of the President in acting with resolution during a
moment of crisis; he could not disregard his beliefs con
cerning national preparedness to meet international crises;
he could not refuse to act in the face of the United
States’ tradition against interference in the hemisphere;
he could not back down from nor retract his prior state-
31Ibid.
32Ibid.# p. 3 6.
33Ibid., p. 37-
6o
ments to Khrushchev; and he could not perpetuate the "cli
mate of Inaction" that he began with the error in judgment
during the Bay of Pigs. Now was the time to act. As Rob
ert Kennedy said to his brother Wednesday morning, October
24, after the quarantine had gone into effect: "'If you
hadn't acted, you would have been impeached.' The Presi
dent thought for a moment and said, 'That's what I think--
■alL
I would have been impeached. ' " - 1
i
A negative factor that helped shape American pol
icy during the crisis was American tradition concerning a
first strike. Robert Kennedy concludes: "The strongest
argument against the all-out military attack, . . . was
that a surprise attack would erode if not destroy the
moral position of the United States throughout the
world. 1,33 As a matter of fact, Robert Kennedy was the
strongest advocate against a peremptory first strike. At
the beginning of the Security Council discussions over
what action to take in Cuba, most felt that an air strike
against the missile sites was the only reasonable course of
action.-5 Listening to this proposal in the discussion,
Robert Kennedy passed a note to the President, "I now know
^ Thirteen Days, p. 6 7.
33Ibid., p. 49.
36Ibid -, p. 3 1.
61
how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor."3^
The Crisis Situation
Once Kennedy had formalized the crisis at 7:00
o’clock over national television, both Kennedy and Khrush
chev were faced with the same situation, for if one had
immediately backed down from the other, the balance of
power would have been altered. In Khrushchev'b case, an
immediate and unilateral withdrawal would have signified
weakness on his part. Realizing this,
President Kennedy spent more time trying to deter
mine the effect of a particular course of action on
Khrushchev or the Russians than on any other phase of
what he was doing. What guided all his deliberations
was an effort not to disgrace Khrushchev, not to hu
miliate the Soviet Union, not to have them feel they
would have to escalate their response because their
national security or national interests so committed
them.3°
President Kennedy, recognizing the explosiveness of
the situation, proceeded with extreme caution. Most cer
tainly the Soviets possessed the capability to inflict
great harm on the United States. Robert D. Crane observes:
Already in position and almost operational in Cuba
at the time of President Kennedy's address were the
means to reach a third of the continental bases of the
U.S. Strategic Air Command, and to kill more than
twenty-five million Americans. The United States had
no effective radar defense along its southern borders,
could not intercept more than 40 percent of the stra
tegic bombers from Cuba, and had no means whatsoever of
intercepting any ballistic missiles of any range.
37Ibid. 38Ibid., p. 124.
62
If the strategic build-up in Cuba had continued much
longer, sixty MRBM1s and fifty IRBM's traveling at
12,000 miles per hour, with a target reliability of
70 percent, would have increased the megatonnage with
which the Soviets could hit the United States by as
much as one-half, and could have destroyed almost
every fixed strategic base in the United States. The
average warning time would have not been much more than
five minutes.39
The Soviets could have acted decisively in the
face of the American decision to blockade Cuba. Thus a
key factor in determining the strategies of persuasion for
both Kennedy and Khrushchev during the crisis was the pre
vention of nuclear war.
But who held the seat of power in the Soviet Union?
Khrushchev probably was the principal decision maker in the
Cuban missile crisis, but this contention cannot be proven
conclusively. For example, Horlick observes:
Apparent inconsistencies and contradictions in com
munications received in Washington from Moscow and in
Soviet press treatment of the crisis, . . . suggest
that Soviet decision making was being conducted in an
environment of considerable uncertainty and perhaps
even sharp controversy among political and military
elite groups.
Kolkowicz observes that what really went on in Soviet
ruling circles is as yet unknown.
^Robert D. Crane, "The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic
Analysis of American and Soviet Policy," Orbis, VI (Winter,
1963), 536-537.
iin
Arnold Horelick, The Cuban Missile Crisis:An
Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," The RAND
Corporation, RM-3779-PR (September, 1963)> ^9«
63
Military opposition of unknown extent seems to have
emerged during the crisis. At the very least, we can
say that the military blamed the Party for the fiasco.
At most, the military may have demanded a quid pro quo
from the Americans. This hypothesis is based on an
analysis of the editorial position of Krasnia Zyezda,
the central organ of the Ministry of Defense, which
differed extensively from that of Pravda and Isvestia,
the central Party and governmental organs. The mili
tary paper took a much tougher and less conciliatory
attitude toward U.S. demands than the others.^
Speaking of Soviet decision making in general, Herbert S.
Dinerstein declares:
First, it is not clear to what body or bodies the
Soviet leadership answers. Is it the Politburo [Pre
sidium].? What is the role of the Secretariat? When
is there recourse to the whole Central Committee of
the Communist Party? The best that can be said is that
these factors vary with the situation. ^ 2
Nevertheless, the evidence seems to suggest that
Khrushchev was responsible for both the missile venture in
Cuba and the decision to remove those missiles. These de
cisions certainly were not the result of the pressure of
public opinion. Important decisions in Soviet politics
are initiated at the top of the Party leadership, rather
than below, by public opinion, or the organized pressure
of interest groups and experts. Morton concludes:
The power struggle in the U.S.S.R. takes place within
the highest policy and administrative organs of the
Party— the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central
Al
Roman Kolkowicz, "Conflicts in Soviet Party-
Military Relations: 1 962-6 3,” The RAND Corporation, RM-
376O-PR (August, 1963), 11.
iip
Herbert S. Dinerstein, Fifty Years of Soviet For
eign Policy (Baltimore, Maryland^ 196b}, p. 35^
64
Committee of the CPSU. Potential leaders, supporters,
and opponents thus emerge from a pool of less than
thirty individuals.43
Khrushchev held the seat of power in both the Po
litburo and the Secretariat. Slusser observes that in
November 1 9 6 1,
The reorganization carried out by the Twenty-second
Congress and the first post-Congress plenum left the
contestants for control of the Party almost evenly
matched. Khrushchev still dominated the Presidium but
was outnumbered in the Secretariat,44
Then in May 19^2, Khrushchev presided over the removal of
Spiridonov, a member of the opposition, as First Secretary
of the Leningrad Party.
Spiridonov's ouster erased the opposition’s lead in
the Secretariat. The plenum of April 26 saw another
Khrushchev triumph: Kirelenko was brought back as a
full member of the Presidium, and two days later it was
announced that he had been appointed Deputy Chairman of
the CC Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R.45
Kirelenko was a loyal supporter of Khrushchev. Thus
Khrushchev clearly controlled both the Presidium [Polit
buro] and held the deciding balance of power in the Secre
tariat .
Contrary to Kolkowicz1 analysis of the conflicts
in Soviet party-military relations in 1962, the fact re-
^Henry W. Morton, "The Structure of Decision-
Making in the U.S.S.R.," Soviet Policy-Making, eds. Peter
H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton (New York, I9d7)j P- 21.
^Robert M. Slusser, "America, China, and the Hydra-
Headed Opposition," Soviet Policy-Making, p. 214.
45Ibid., p. 216.
65
mains that Khrushchev held control of the military. As
Kolkowicz himself points out: "The party , . . regards
strong political controls over the military as indispen
sable., since it fears the military as a potential rival in
46
internal.struggles for power." Khrushchev maintained
control over the military through the "Stalingrad Group."
This was a group of ranking military officers who occupied
the highest positions in the Soviet Army during the Khrush
chev years. Their careers were closely linked with Khrush-
krr
chev over a twenty-year time period. '
It would seem that Khrushchev was in the seat of
power in the Soviet Union in October 1 9 6 2. Speaking of
the decision to install medium-range ballistic missiles in
Cuba, Slusser observes:
As to the identity of the initiator of the ven
ture, there can be little doubt that it was Khrushchev.
The pattern of his actions over a period of years makes
that a reasonable assumption, and all available evi
dence tends to confirm it. His motive was again, as
in the Berlin criBes of 1958/59 and 1961, to gain a
symbolic but nonetheless decisive diplomatic-military
triumph over the United States, which would buttress
his internal position.
It is highly unlikely, however, that Khrushchev
acted alone in deciding on the missile venture. Had
he done so, the failure of the move would certainly
have resulted in organizational defeats for him in the
Party comparable to those of the May, i9 6 0, plenum.
^"Conflicts," p. i.
^ Ibid., Appendix B, "A Historical Note on the Emer
gence of the 'Stalingrad Group,'" pp. 37-^5-
66
On the contrary, the first post-crisis plenum . . .
appeared to be an organizational victory for Khrush
chev. °
Linden remarks:
While the Cuban venture, on the face of it was a
blatant contradiction of his [Khrushchev's] own de
tente policies, it nonetheless bore the earmarks of
the classic Khrushcheveian tactic— the sudden and bold
initiative aimed at setting opponents off balance and
producing. Quick and decisive advantage in political
struggle.^9
The earlier analysis of American decision-making
in the crisis*^ and the foregoing analysis of Soviet
decision-making in the crisis lead to the conclusion that
Kennedy and Khrushchev apparently were the principal
decision-makers in the Cuban crisis. This conclusion is
hardly unique or unusual, but it i3 necessary before the
strategies of persuasion in the Cuban missile crisis can
be analyzed.
48
Slusser, p. 219.
4q
Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leader
ship, 1957-1964 (Baltimore, Maryland, 1966J, p. 152. In
addition to the sources noted in Chapter I in the review of
the literature on the Cuban missile crisis (Chap. I, foot
notes 82 and 8 6), the following are only a few of the many
books and articles which attempt to analyze Soviet motives
for placing missiles in Cuba: Lincoln P. Bloomfield et al.,
Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 6), pp.
66-69; Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev (New York, 1 9 6 6), pp.
272-279; Linden, pp. 152-157; and Slusser, pp. 1 8 3-2 6 9.
See pages 50-51.
CHAPTER III
IDENTIFICATION OP KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV
STRATEGIES OP PERSUASION
The preceding chapter outlined the forces that im
pelled President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev to re
spond to the communicative situation in the Cuban missile
crisis. The situation demanded that they act in a way
that would prevent an alteration in the strategic balance
and would restore the status quo without causing nuclear
war.
This chapter will establish the authenticity of
the text of the written discourse in the crisiSj and iden
tify the principal and secondary strategies and tactics
used by Kennedy and Khrushchev to respond to their individ
ual communicative situations. An assessment of the effec
tiveness and worth of Kennedy and Khrushchev's strategies
and tactics will follow in the next chapter.
Kennedy was the first to face the decision of which
strategies to use in returning the world to the status quo.
His was the task of persuading Khrushchev to remove his
missiles from Cuba. After October 22, Khrushchev was
faced with a similar decision— How could he persuade Ken-
67
68
nedy to relax his firm stand on the removal of Soviet mis
siles?
Kennedy*s Strategies and Tactics
The communicative situation confronting President
Kennedy before October 22 demanded that he act., but there
were a number of alternatives left open to him. He could
have launched an invasion of Cuba; he could have selective
ly bombed the Soviet missile sites; he could have militar
ily blockaded Cuba; or he could have sought restitution
through diplomatic means. The President and the National
Security Council considered each of these options and de
cided on the blockade because it was a restrained yet overt
response to the Soviet provocation. Despite Schelling's
observation that "missiles in Cuba, though owned and manned
by Russians, were less 'nationalized' as a target than
missiles in the U.S.S.R. itself," Kennedy decided that an
invasion or an air strike was too provocative. Most cer
tainly an attack on Cuba would result in the loss of Rus
sian lives, and this would greatly increase the possibility
of Khrushchev's responding militarily to American action.
Moreover, the Russians had clearly stated on September 11,
1962 that a United States attack on Cuba would mean nu-
^Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven,
Conn., 1 9 6 6), p. 5 8.
6 9
2
clear war. In addition, Robert Kennedy and others in the
National Security Council expressed concern over the pos
sibility of the United States eroding if not destroying its
moral position abroad by launching a surprise attack on
3
Cuba. This issue was discussed in the preceding chapter.
Diplomatic appeal was quickly eliminated as an option be
cause it was too weak and ineffectual.
So Kennedy decided in favor of the blockade of
Cuba. By choosing this action, Kennedy was presenting the
Soviets with a unique persuasive strategy. Essentially,
he was shifting the burden of decision in the crisis to
Khrushchev by demonstrating American fortitude. As Hore
lick and Rush observe:
By imposing a quarantine on strategic arms ship
ments to Cuba as the first in a series of measures de
signed not only to prevent a further build-up, but to
secure the removal of weapons already on the island—
the other measures remained deliberately unspecified—
the United States shifted to the Soviet side the im
mediate burden of deciding whether or not to resort to
violence.
Kennedy’s principal strategy of shifting the burden of de
cision to Khrushchev would have been useless if Khrushchev
p
"Statement by Soviet Union that a U.S. Attack on
Cuba Would Mean Nuclear War," The "Cuban Crisis" of 1962:
Selected Documents and Chronology, ed. David L. Larson
(Boston, 19^5)j PP- 7-17.
3Ibid., p. 1 7.
4
Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, "Strategic
Power and Soviet Foreign Policy," The RAND Corporation,
r_434-PR (August, 1965), 2 3 7.
70
had not been led to believe that Kennedy and the United
States were determined to see the removal of Soviet MRBM's
from Cuba., since believing the United States was weak in
its resolve, Khrushchev could have accepted the burden of
decision in the crisis and then forced the United States
to accept Soviet missiles 90 miles off its coast.
Kennedy's primary tactics for buttressing his
"shift of burden" strategy was to try to demonstrate Amer
ican determination in not allowing Soviet missiles off its
coast. Kennedy did more than set up a blockade of nine
teen ships of the United States Second Fleet on Wednesday,
October 24, 1962 to demonstrate American fortitude. The
following are the principal ways Kennedy implemented his
"fortitude" tactic: (l) he warned the Soviets on Monday
evening, October 22, that the United States intended to
stand firmj (2) he instructed his brother to inform Ana
toly Dobrynin of the firmness of the American position;
( 3) he pursued a series of military maneuvers which com
municated American fortitude to Khrushchev; and (4) he
communicated this fortitude to Khrushchev in his personal
letters to him. Each of these four actions contains in
herent strategies and tactics designed to obtain acceptance
of or compliance with a specific idea or action.
71
The "Arras Quarantine of Cuba" Speech
Authenticity of Text
President Kennedy read his speech word for word
over television. He did not digress from the text; the
speech itself was a carefully drawn policy statement. The
texts in Vital Speeches,-^ David Larson's collection of
documents in the crisis,^* The New York Times, October 2 3,
1962, and the official text issued by the U.S. Government
printing office are exactly the same.
The question of who wrote the speech is not as
easy to answer. The principal author of the speech was
President Kennedy, but many people contributed to its
ideas and to the text itself. The main contributor was
Theodore Sorensen. Sorensen says:
I worked until 3 A.M. on the draft speech. Among the
texts I read for background were the speeches of Wil
son and Roosevelt declaring World Wars I and II. At
9 A.M. Saturday morning my draft was reviewed, amended
and generally approved.7
However, this draft speech was significantly al
tered by President Kennedy. According to Sorensen, the
following were the significant alterations Kennedy made in
his draft: (l) Kennedy adopted the term "quarantine" as
^John P. Kennedy, "Arms Quarantine of Cuba," Vital
Speeches of the Day, XXIX (November 15j 1 9 6 2), 6 6-6 8.
^Larson, "Statement by Soviet Union."
^Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1964), p. 693*
72
less belligerent and more applicable to an act of peaceful
self-preservation than "blockade." (2) The statement,
"The worst course of all would be for us to do nothing,"
was Kennedy's. ( 3) To avoid panic, the President deleted
all references to the missiles' megatonnage as compared
with Hiroshima; he spoke of their capability of "strik
ing," instead of "wiping out," certain cities. (4) To
increase hemispheric unity, he included a reference to the
Canadian and Latin American areas within the missiles'
range. ( 5) "Deciding to make a virtue out of necessity,
the President listed increased surveillance as an an
nounced part of his response." (6) He deliberately ob
scured the issue of whether or not the U.S. would act
without the Organization of American States, for the Pres
ident had definitely decided to act with or without the
OAS. (7) It was Kennedy's idea to try to forestall a
Soviet retaliatory blockade of Berlin. He did so by warn
ing that the United States would resist "any hostile move
anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of
peoples to whom we are committed— including in particular
the brave people of West Berlin." (8) The President de
leted from Sorensen's original draft a call for a summit
meeting, preferring to state simply that the United States
was prepared to present its "case." ( 9) "Kennedy struck
from the speech any hint that the removal of Castro waB
his true aim." "In the same vein, he deleted references
73
to his notification of the Soviets, to the treatment await
ing any ships attempting to run the blockade and to predic-
tions of the blockade's effect on Castro.” In sum, Sor
ensen seems to acknowledge that the speech was essentially
Kennedy's:
He made dozens of other changes, large and small.
After each recitation of the September Soviet Govern
ment and October Gromyko assurances, he inserted the
sentence: "That statement was false.” References to
Latin America and the hemisphere were inserted along
with or in place of references to this country alone.
And' a direct appeal to the Cuban people was expanded
considerably by one of Kennedy's top appointees in
State from Puerto Rico, Arturo Morales Carrion.9
Thus most of the key ideas in the speech were either ideas
with which Kennedy fully agreed and Sorensen wrote them
out for him, or they were ideas which Kennedy himself sub
stituted in Sorensen's rough draft.
Strategies and Tactics in
''Arms Quarantine of
Cuba" Speech
The central theme of American fortitude in Ken
nedy's speech was directed to two separate audiences— (l)
the Soviets, (2) the American public and the free world.
The former audience obviously was a mediator of change.
Only the Soviets could remove their missiles from Cuba.
But the latter also was a mediator of change. For by not
supporting the President, American and free world public
opinion could have forced the President to alter or aban-
8Ibid., pp. 694-700. ^Ibid., p. 700.
74
don his firm stand against the Soviet alteration of the
strategic balance. Moreover, perhaps the consensus support
this public opinion gave President Kennedy was instrumental
in persuading Khrushchev to remove his missiles from Cuba.
That is, while Kennedy was bolstering American resolve to
meet the national crisis, he may have been communicating
American fortitude to Khrushchev. Thus by addressing one
audience— the American publie--Kennedy may have been per
suading another— Khrushchev.
Soviet audience.— Clearly President Kennedy wanted
to communicate the United States' determination to the So
viets: "We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the
costs of worldwide nuclear war . . . but neither will we
shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.
"I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any even
tualities." "This latest Soviet threat . . . must and will
be met with determination."
Kennedy also wanted to inform Khrushchev that he
would allow him certain latitude in removing his missiles
from Cuba.
In a master's thesis done at the University of Ore
gon., Paul S. Melhuish concludes: "He combined a warning to
the Soviet Union with policy justification and reassurance
to American citizens and allied and neutral nations."
"The Rhetoric of Crisis: A Burkian Analysis of John F. Ken
nedy's October 22, 1962 Cuban Address," unpubl. M.A. thesis
(1963), P. 8 9. ________________________
75
I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and elim
inate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative
threat to world peace and to stabilize relations be
tween our two nations. ... He has an opportunity
now to move the world back from the abyss of destruc-
tion--by returning to his Government's own words that
it had no need to station missiles outside its own ter
ritory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba— by
refraining from any action which will widen or deepen
the present crisis--and then by participating in a
search for peaceful and permanent solutions.il
Kennedy's strategy was to apply pressure gently but firmly
to Khrushchev to force him to return the world to the
status quo. A sudden explosion of pressure surely would
have triggered an equally explosive reaction from the
Soviet Union.
American and free world audience.--Kennedy1s strat
egy for this audience was to try to persuade it to stand
firm. Kennedy implemented this strategy with two separate
but related tactics. First, he appealed to the audience's
sense of self preservation.
At the beginning of his speech, Kennedy said:
Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of
striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Ca
naveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the south
western part of the United States, in Central America,
or in the Caribbean area.
Additional sites not yet completed appear to be
designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles
capable of traveling more than twice as far--and thus
capable of striking most of the major cities in the
Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson
Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru.
11
This and any further references to the text of Ken
nedy's speech are from "Address by President Kennedy,"
Larson, pp. 4l-46.
76
Kennedy did not have to be so explicit about the vulnera
bility of the various areas within the hemisphere. But by
so doing, he brought the gravity of the threat within the
frame of reference of the people living in these areas.
Virtually everyone in the United States fell inside these
boundaries. In addition, by mentioning Hudson Bay, Canada,
our northern neighbor was brought into the act; so was
Mexico, all of Central America, and most of South America.
Kennedy’s second tactic was to convey the moral
injustice of Soviet behavior. He explained that the Soviet
statement of September 11 was a falsehood and he pointed
out how Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had lied to him.
He concludedr "Neither the United States of America nor
the world-community of nations can tolerate deliberate de
ception and offensive threats on the part of any nation"
(italics mine).
Kennedy's single most important argument in this
tactic laid groundwork for the claim that the missile cri
sis was not caused by the United States and that the United
States' action in establishing the blockade was morally
justified. The importance of this argument to Kennedy’s
speech cannot be overemphasized; it elicited a response of
moral indignation. The implied syllogism would read: (l)
People who make false statements commit moral injustice to
those to whom they lie; (2) the Soviet Union made false
statements to the United States; (3) conclusion: The
77
Soviet Union has committed a moral Injustice against the
United States.
The Robert Kennedy-Anatoly Dobrynin
Conversations
Knowing that Dobrynin had a direct line to Khrush
chev and the other decision-making bodies in the Soviet
Union, Kennedy instructed his brother, the Attorney Gen
eral, to visit Ambassador Dobrynin and "personally relate
to him the serious implications of the Russians' duplicity
and the crisis they had created through the presence of
their missiles within Cuba."*''2
Robert Kennedy talked with Dobrynin twice. The
first time was at 9:30 P.M. Tuesday, October 2 3. Despite
Dobrynin's denial that offensive missiles existed in Cuba,
Robert Kennedy warned him that "now the President knew he
had been deceived, and that had devastating Implications
for the peace of the world.
During the most perilous hours of the confronta
tion, after a United States U-2 had been shot down and its
pilot killed, Robert Kennedy talked to Dobrynin a second
time.
Now they had forced our hand. Because of the de
ception of the Soviet Union, our photographic recon
* 1 p
Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York, 196 9), p.
63.
^Ibid., pp. 65-66.
78
naissance planes would have to continue to fly over
Cuba., and If the Cubans or Soviets shot at these
planes, then we would have to shoot back. This would
Inevitably lead to further incidents and to escalation
of the conflict the implications of which were very
grave indeed.14
Kennedy warned Dobrynin that:
We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those
bases would be removed. I was not giving them an ul
timatum but a statement of fact. He should understand
that if they did not remove those bases, we would re
move them. 15
"Time was running out. We had only a few more hours--we
needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Union. I
said we must have it the next day."'L^
Strategic Military Communication
The President’s military actions were designed to
enforce his tactic of American fortitude. On Friday, Oc
tober 19j the United States Armed Forces around the world
were put on alert. "Telephoning from our meeting in the
State Department, Secretary McNamara ordered four tactical
17
air squadrons placed at readiness for an air strike."
Missile crews were placed on maximum alert. Troops
were moved into Florida and the southeastern part of
the United States. Late Saturday night, the First
Armored Division began to move out of Texas into Geor
gia, and five more divisions were placed on alert.
The base at Guantanamo Bay was strengthened.
The navy deployed one hundred eighty ships into
the Caribbean. The Strategic Air Command was dis-
1^Ibid., p. 1 0 7. 15Ibid., p. 1 0 8.
l6Ibid., p. 109. 17Ibid., p. 47.
79
persed to civilian landing fields around the country,
to lessen its vulnerability in case of attack. The
B-5 2 bomber force was ordered into the air fully loaded
with atomic weapons. As one came down to land, another
immediately took its place in the' a i r .3-8
In addition, the President ordered that "operation X, the
contingency plan for the invasion of Cuba, be activated.
The plan listed the following requirements:
250,000 men, 2,000 air sorties against the various
targets in Cuba, and 90,000 Marines and Airborne in
the invasion force. One estimate of American casual
ties put the expected figure over 25,000.20
The President made other preparations: (l) Plans for the
P * 1
Soviet closedown of Berlin were initiated. (2) Soviet
submarines in the Caribbean "or moving toward Cuba from
the Atlantic were followed and harassed and, at one time
or another, forced to surface in the presence of U.S. mil-
22
itary ships." (3) "Friday morning, President Kennedy
ordered the State Department to proceed with preparations
for a crash program on civil government in Cuba to be es
tablished after the invasion and occupation of that
2o
country.”
l8Ibid., p. 52.
"^Robert Earle Cecile, "Decision-Making in the Eisen
hower and Kennedy Administrations: The Application of an
Analytical Scheme," unpubl. diss. (The University of Okla
homa, 1965), p. 1 3 5-
20
Thirteen Days, p. 55•
21Ibid., p. 70.
22Ibid., p. 77- 23Ibid., p. 85.
80
Khrushchev’s Strategies and Tactics
Khrushchev directed his persuasive strategies to
President Kennedy during the Cuban crisis because Khrush
chev realized that Kennedy held the seat of power in the
United States. Kennedy had presented Khrushchev with a
resounding fait accompli on October 22. In addition* Am
bassador Stevenson's speech before the United Nations
Security Council on October 23 clearly established the
tenor of the American stand on Cuba:
If the United States and the other nations of the
Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of
aggression* we would be delinquent in our obligations
to world peace. If the United States and the other
nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this
disturbance of the world's structure of power* we would
invite a new surge of Communist aggression at every
point along the frontier which divides the Communist
world from the democratic world. If we do not stand
firm here* our adversaries may think that we will stand
firm nowhere— and we guarantee a heightening of the
world civil war to new levels of intensity and dan
ger . 24
The Organization of American States resolution
which Stevenson read at the end of his speech called for a
2F >
Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. ^ This nineteen to zero vote
may have helped Khrushchev decide to direct his persuasive
strategies to President Kennedy rather than to world pub
lic opinion.
oh
"Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to U.N. Security
Council*" Larson* pp. 70-80.
^"Resolution Adopted by QAS*" Larson* pp. 64-65.
81
Khrushchev's appeals to Kennedy took three identi
fiable forms: He tried to delay any decision whatever
concerning action on the missiles in Cuba; he attempted to
test Kennedy's resolve; he took steps to resolve the cri
sis. .
Delaying Strategies
The first official Soviet statement on the Cuba
crisis sought to delay any United States action on the
26
missiles in Cuba. The statement did not deny that there
were offensive missiles in Cuba., but asserted that they
were there to "serve the purposes of defense against ag
gressors." In addition the statement tried to shift the
burden of responsibility in the crisis in two different
ways. First,, the United States was charged with piracy.
"The peace-loving States cannot but protest against the
piratical operations which the President of the United
States has announced against ships bound for Cuban shores."
In addition, the Soviet government appealed "to all Govern
ments and people to raise their voice in protest against
the aggressive acts of the United States of America against
Cuba and other States." This appeal fell on deaf ears.
Second, the Soviets attempted to shift the blame for the
26
This and any further references to the text of the
Soviet statement are "Soviet Request for Convening the U.N.
Security Council and Statement by the Soviet Government,
October 2 3, 1 9 6 2," Larson, pp. 49-54.
82
crisis from themselves to the Cubans:
The United States Government accuses Cuba of creating
a threat to the security of the United States. But
who is going to believe that Cuba can be a threat to
the United States? ... No statesman in his right
mind can imagine for one moment that Cuba can be a
threat to the United States of America.
President Kennedy placed the full burden of responsibility
for the situation in Cuba on the Soviet Union in his Octo
ber 22 speech. As a matter of fact, Kennedy sympathized
with the Cuban people in his speech: "I have no doubt that
most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will
be truly free."2^
Khrushchev also employed the channel of writing
personal letters to Kennedy in an attempt to delay action
and test Kennedy's resolve in the crisis. Robert Kennedy
observed: "There were almost daily communications with
pO
Khrushchev." In a direct challenge to the position the
president had taken, Khrushchev warned that
if any effort to interfere with Soviet ships were to
be made, "we would then be forced for our part to take
the measures which we deem necessary and adequate in
order to protect our rights. Por this we have all
that is necessary."29
Private correspondence between Kennedy and Khrush
chev had been initiated by Khrushchev in a private letter
2^Larson, "Address by President Kennedy," p. 45.
28
Thirteen Days, p. 7 9.
29Ibld., p. 80._______________________________
83
sent on September 29, 19^2 from his Black Sea resort.3^
"It might be useful to have a purely informal, personal
correspondence," he wrote, "which would by-pass the
foreign office bureaucracies in both countries, omit
the usual propaganda for public consumption and state
positions without a backward glance at the press."31
Sorensen declares that the proposed correspondence channel
fitted Kennedy’s idea of open channels of communication.
In a very significant statement, Sorensen declared: "The
familiarity of this private channel facilitated . . . the
02
exchange of letters that ended the Cuban missile crisis.
The letters also enabled both men to judge the other
more accurately. Khrushchev told Salinger and others
that he had acquired a healthy respect as well as a
personal liking for Kennedy, despite their differ
ences.33
"Kennedy in turn wholly rejected the popular images of
Khrushchev as a coarse buffoon or lovable figure. The
Chairman, in his view, was a clever, tough, shrewd adver-
„34
sary. ^
Testing Strategies
Khrushchev’s second main strategy was to test Ken
nedy’s resolve over the Cuban incident. One of Khrush
chev's first moves in this strategy was to invite a
visiting American businessman in Moscow, William Knox of
- 30
J Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 552.
3^Ibid. 3^Ibid., p. 555*
33Ibid. 34Ibid.
84
Westinghouse International* to the Kremlin. "Khrushchev's
motivation* it would seem* was to let Kennedy know through
a private channel that he did have missiles in Cuba* some
thing his ambassadors in New York and Washington were still
indignantly denying.
Khrushchev's alteration of his delaying strategy
and open admission that he had missiles in Cuba gave the
crisis a new dimension. "Khrushchev added* that if the
United States Navy tried to stop Soviet ships at sea* his
submarines would start sinking American ships. And that
would mean a third world war."^
Khrushchev's conversation with Knox was reassuring
in one respect.
According to Knox* Khrushchev acknowledged that
Soviet ballistic missiles had been furnished to Cuba*
but insisted they were completely controlled by Soviet
officers. "But the Cubans were very volatile people*
Mr. Khrushchev said* and all of the sophisticated
hardware furnished for their defense was entirely un
der the control of Soviet officers; it would be used
only in the event that Cuba was attacked* and it would
never be fired except on his orders as Commander in
Chief of all of the Soviet Union."37
Khrushchev also tried to bluff Kennedy into re
laxing his blockade around Cuba by employing his own brand
of strategic military communication. On the same Wednes
day that Khrushchev warned Knox that Soviet submarines
^Abel* The Missile Crisis, p. 151*
36ib±d.
Horelick and Rush, "Strategic Power," p. 208.
85
would sink American ships if they tried to stop his ships
from running the blockade,, Khrushchev instructed his ship
captains to proceed full speed ahead.
It was now a few minutes after 10:00 o'clock. Sec
retary McNamara announced that two Russian ships, the
Gagarin and the Komiles, were within a few miles of our
quarantine barrier. The interception of both ships
would probably be before noon Washington time. Indeed,,
the expectation was that of at least one of the vessels
would be stopped and boarded between 1 0 :3 0 and 1 :0 0
o’clock.
Then came the disturbing Navy report that a Rus
sian submarine had moved into position between the two
ships.3 8
As warned, Khrushchev's submarines were ostensibly
preparing to do combat with the American Navy. Clearly
this new move was a challenge to Kennedy's resolve. Robert
Kennedy recorded his brother's reaction in this tense time:
I think these few minutes were the time of gravest
concern for the President. Was the world on the brink
of a holocaust? Was it our error? A mistake? Was
there something further that should have been done? Or
not done? His hand went up to his face and covered
his mouth. He opened and closed his fist. His face
seemed drawn, his eyes pained, almost gray. We stared
at each other across the table. For a few fleeting
seconds, it was almost as though no one else was there
and he was no longer the President.39
But at 10:25 a messenger brought in a note: "'Mr.
President, we have a preliminary report which seems to in
dicate that some of the Russian ships have stopped dead In
the waterKhrushchev had tried to call Kennedy's
•^Thirteen Days, p. 6 9.
3 9Ibid,, pp. 6 9-7 0.
40
Ibid., p. 71.________
86
bluff and. succeeded In having how own bluff called. "Dean
Rusk, sitting at the President's right hand, nudged
McGeorge Bundy and said softly: 'We're eyeball to eyeball
ill
and I think the other fellow just blinked.'"
Resolution Strategies
Once Khrushchev realized that he would not be able
to bluff Kennedy into retreating, he was faced with the
problem of how to back out of the crisis as gracefully as
possible. Denied victory, Khrushchev decided to try one
last ploy. He tried to squeeze from the United States a
commitment not to attack Cuba in return for his withdrawal.
Horelick observes that it is indeed questionable "whether
deterrence of a local U.S. attack on Cuba was ever re
garded by the Soviet leaders as more than a subsidiary and
derivative effect of a venture intended primarily to serve
42
other ends. Castro himself is quoted in Le Monde as
saying that the reason missiles were placed in Cuba was
"not in order to assure our own defense, but first of all
to reinforce socialism on the international scale."
^1The Missile Crisis, p. 153.
4p
Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An
Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," The RAND
Corporation, RM-3779-PR (September, 19&3)> p. 21.
43Ibid., p. 22.
87
So Khrushchev tried to persuade Kennedy to issue a
noninvasion pledge in Cuba for his promise to remove his
missiles. His tactic for achieving this secondary objec
tive was to appeal to Kennedy in a personal letter and
then to reinforce that appeal by sending a message through
Alexander Fomin., the chief of Soviet intelligence opera
tions in the United States. "He had the reputation of
being a personal friend of Khrushchev.
Letter of October 26
Robert Kennedy's memoirs of the Cuban crisis., re
cently published in book form as Thirteen Days, discusses
and quotes from Khrushchev's letter of October 26 at
length.
Concerning the authenticity of this letter, Robert
Kennedy said: "There is no question that the letter had
4 s
been written by him [Khrushchev] personally." ^ Abel
states: "The letter bore the stamp of Khrushchev's own
style.The letter of October 26 was apparently written
by Khrushchev himself.
This letter is probably the single most important
piece of communication exchanged between the United States
^John Scali, "I Was the Secret Go-Between in the
Cuban Crisis," Family Weekly (October 2 5, 1 9 6 4), p. 4.
^ Thirteen Days, p. 8 6.
46
The Missile Crisis, p. 180.
88
and the Soviet Union during the Cuban crisis. It provided
the loophole through which the United States was able to
persuade Khrushchev to remove his missiles from Cuba.
Khrushchev's letter was a manifestation of despera
tion. He knew at this point in the crisis that Kennedy
intended to stand firm. He had delayed Kennedy as long as
he could by appealing to him in a series of personal let-
47
ters beginning on October 2 3. Soviet Ambassador Zorin
supplemented this delaying strategy in the United Nations
two days later. He called upon the United States to "dis
play reserve and stay the execution of its piratical
48
threats." He also accused the United States of falsi
fying information and claimed that there was no evidence of
Soviet missiles in Cuba. "The Government of the United
States has no such fact in its hands except these (sic)
falsified information of the United States Intelligence
Agency. " ^ 9 Stevenson responded to Zorin's challenge with
his now famous question and reply:
All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question:
Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has
placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range
missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no--don't wait for
the translation--yes or no?
^ Thirteen Days, pp. 79-83.
48
Larson, "Statement by Ambassador Zorin," October
25, 1 9 6 2, p. 137.
49Ibid., pp. 136-137.
89
(The Soviet representative refused to answer.)
You can answer yes or no. You have denied they
exist. I want to know if I understood you correctly.
I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes
over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared
to present the evidence in this room.50
And with that Ambassador Stevenson revealed U-2 photo
graphs of the Soviet missiles and sites with devastating
effect.
Moreover, Khrushchev had tested Kennedy's resolve
by running his ships and submarines up to the edge of Ken
nedy's blockadej Kennedy did not budge. He had threatened
him in personal letters and through William Knox, the
American businessman. The President did not budge.
So Khrushchev was forced to either resort to vio
lence or resolve the crisis. In choosing the latter,
Khrushchev hoped to secure an American noninvasion pledge
of Cuba. And the Khrushchev letter of October 26 was the
first and most important tactic in achieving that objec
tive.
The letter itself reassures Kennedy that the So
viet Union does not intend to use its missiles in Cuba.
"'You can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound
mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you,
you will respond the same way. ' " ^ 1 "How can we permit the
-^Larson, "Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the
U.N. Security Council," October 25, 1962, p. 1 3 8.
•^Thirteen Days, p. 8 7.
90
incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics
or suicides* who themselves want to perish and to destroy
the whole world before they die, could do this.'" - ^ 2 Pos
sibly Khrushchev was communicating the kind of assurances
to Kennedy he would like Kennedy to give him. At this
point in the crisis, Khrushchev was probably very worried
about the possibility of an American peremptory strike.
Pear of an American first strike was an integral part of
Soviet foreign policy in 1962. In an article published in
Nedelya (The Week), the magazine section of Izvestia, Gen
eral Colonel Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko charges:
Our military doctrine considers a constant high
combat readiness as the primary task of the Soviet
Army and Navy. This is because the aggressive imperi
alist forces, particularly the United States, are pri
marily banking on a surprise first blow.53
Khrushchev hoped to communicate to Kennedy that he^
would not initiate a first strike, but that if Kennedy did,
then Kennedy would be responsible for the necessary Soviet
reaction. "'If indeed war should break out, then it would
5 2Ibid.
53i'The Queen of the Battlefield Yields Her Crown, M
The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, eds.
William R. Kintner and Harriet Past Scott (Norman, Okla
homa, 1 9 6 8), p. 53* Such studies as Urie BronfenbrennerTs
"Allowing for Soviet Perceptions and Motives," unpubl. con
vention paper, 1964, point out that the Soviet populace is
almost paranoid about an impending American first Btrike.
91
not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of
war. 1 1 1
Khrushchev then asked Kennedy to issue a non
invasion of Cuba pledge. In exchange, Khrushchev promised
to withdraw his missiles from Cuba.
"If assurances were given that the President of the
United States would not participate in an attack on
Cuba and the blockade lifted, then the question of the
removal or the destruction of the missile sites in
Cuba would be an entirely different question."55
In this letter, Khrushchev demonstrated his con
cern for the dimensions to which the crisis had grown.
Abel noted: "Even in paraphrase it [the letter] readB like
56
the nightmare outcry of a frightened man." Khrushchev
perceived that Kennedy had forced the Soviet Union into a
position with only one alternative--remove its missiles
from Cuba. But Khrushchev could not do that without some
form of reciprocation from the United States. Khrushchev
could not unilaterally withdraw from Cuba in full view of
the world community. Khrushchev was forced to ask Kennedy
to give him a reason for withdrawing his missiles from
Cubaj KhruBhchev had to be able to claim to the world that
he had gained something by his action in Cuba. Khrushchev
proposed that Kennedy cast him a straw by promising not to
54 o .
^ Thirteen Days, p. 87.
5 5Ibid., p. 89.
-^The Missile Crisis, p. 180.
92
invade Cuba; this promise or act on Kennedy's part would
allow Khrushchev to back away from the crisis with dignity.
Khrushchev's metaphorical description of a tug of
war at the end of his letter demonstrates the desperation
of his appeal:
"If you have not lost your self-control and sen
sibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. Pres
ident, we and you ought not to pull on the ends of the
rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because
the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will
be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be
tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have
the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary
to cut the knot, and what that would mean is not for
me to explain to you, because you yourself understand
perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dis
pose. Consequently, if there is no intention to
tighten that knot, and thereby to doom the world to
the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not
only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope,
let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready
for this."57
John Scali-Alexander Fomin
Conversations
Khrushchev coupled his October 26 letter with an
unorthodox move which baffled those inside the State De
partment. Khrushchev apparently instructed his chief of
Soviet intelligence in America, Alexander Fomin, to contact
John Scali, State Department correspondent for ABC tele
vision and radio news. Why Khrushchev used this channel
of communication is still unknown. It is equally unknown
why Fomin picked John Scali from among the many corres
•^Thirteen Days, pp. 89-90.
93
pondents in Washington. Scali believes that he was picked
for any one or all of the following reasons: (l) Fomin had
talked to Scali a half a dozen times before* so he knew
him quite well.9® (2) Fomin knew Scali had a direct link
to the State Department. For example, Scali took Fomin's
proposal directly to Roger Hilsman, Director of State De
partment Intelligence and Research; from there Scali was
taken directly into Dean Rusk's office. (3) Fomin may
have thought that Scali was part of the American intelli
gence network. Scali observes: "Did he believe that I
secretly was a member of American intelligence because in
the past my conversations with him had reflected official
American government policy so consistently? " 99
Scali recounts Fomin's instruction to him:
The Cuban delegate at the United Nations, he said,
had already pointed the way in the Security Council
debate on the problem. If the United States promised
not to invade Cuba, Castro would be willing to dis
mantle the missiles ....
I had followed the United Nations debate very care
fully, but I could not recall that the Cuban delegate,
or anyone else, had said anything approximating this,
and I told him so. (A check of the record later showed
that no such suggestion had been m a d e . ) ^ 0
Shortly after giving this tactic time to work,
Khrushchev "tried a familiar Soviet negotiating trick:
9®Scali, "I Was the Secret Go-Between," p. 4.
"ibid., p. 5.
60Ibid.
-94
upping the ante when you believe you have the opposition
hooked."^'1 ' Fomin mentioned to Scali if there was to be
international inspection of the dismantled missile bases
in Cuba.,
Why shouldn't there be a simultaneous inspection of the
coast of Florida and some of the nearby Caribbean coun
tries to prove there wouldn't be any sneak invasion of
Cuba once Russia removed its missiles?&2
Khrushchev did not stop here. He apparently is
sued another letter to Kennedy in which he asked for a
quid pro quo in Turkey. This was the letter of October
27. This letter was written by someone other than Khrush
chev. Robert Kennedy said of this letter, "It was no
longer Mr. Khrushchev personally who was writing, but the
Foreign Office of the Kremlin.Abel asserts: "The sec
ond letter . . . was markedly different in style and tone
from the secret letter of Friday. . . . The Saturday let
ter bore the telltale signs of group thinking.Kennedy
rejected both Fomin's inspection appeal and Khrushchev's
October 27 quid pro quo offer.
6lIbid., p. 1 2.
62T, . ,
Ibid.
^ Thirteen Days, p. 93*
64
The Missile Crisis., p. 190.
CHAPTER IV
ASSESSMENT OF KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV
STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION
This chapter Is designed to answer the question:
To what extent did the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies of
persuasion determine the outcome of the Cuban missile cri
sis? Major strategies and tactics will be analyzed in
terms of their effectiveness; they will be judged accord
ing to the degree to which they produced a desired change
in attitude or action in the receiver or the extent to
which they were able to neutralize the situation which
produced them.
Kennedy's Strategies and Tactics
One of Kennedy's principal objectives in the Cuban
missile crisis was to portray the image of a united Amer
ica. He wanted to communicate the Image of a prepared,
capable, willing, and determined nation that would coura
geously respond to any threats to its liberty. This image
of American fortitude was communicated by three principal
channels: (l) the "Arms Quarantine of Cuba" speech, (2)
95
96
strategic military communication, and (3) the Robert
Kennedy-Anatoly Dobrynin conversations.
"Arms Quarantine of Cuba" Speech
Kennedy's strategy of shifting the burden of de
cision in the crisis to Khrushchev was effective. The day
after Kennedy's speech Khrushchev weakly tried to abrogate
this responsibility by asserting in the United Nations
that Kennedy was challenging Cuba and not the Soviet
Union. 1 The tactic was both ineffectual and shortlived;
everyone knew that Kennedy was challenging the Soviet
Union and not Cuba. Kennedy had made this distinction
quite clear in his October 22 statement: "This Government,
as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the
o
Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba" (italics
mine). "This action also contradicts the repeated assur
ances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately de
livered. " "It shall be the policy of this nation to re
gard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet
1See discussion of Soviet delaying strategies in
the preceding chapter, pp. 8 1-8 3.
2
This and any further references to the text of Ken
nedy's speech are from "Address by President Kennedy," The
"Cuban Crisis" of 1962: Selected Documents and Chronology,
ed. David L. Larson (Boston, 1 9 6 3), pp. 41-46.
97
Union on the United States." "This latest Soviet threat
. . . must and will he met with determination."
Khrushchev's immediate response to Kennedy's Octo
ber 22 speech cannot he gauged. The earliest Soviet re
sponse was on October 2 3. This response skirted the prin
cipal issues in the crisis! Were there Soviet MRBM's in
Cuba? Did the Soviets intend to remove these missiles?
Neither of these questions was answered until Khrushchev's
conversation with William Knox and his letter of October
2 6.
One reason the Soviets may not have responded to
these issues could be that Kennedy's speech did not prop
erly address itself to its principal mediator of change in
the crisis, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. Only the So
viet Union could peacefully remove the MRBM's from Cuba.
But less than two-fifths of Kennedy's speech was directed
to Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. Most of the speech
was expository in nature; it explained how and why actions
were taken in Cuba. This information was invaluable in
inducing the American and free world audience to respond
to Kennedy's plea for fortitude, but it did little to in
duce Khrushchev to admit that his missiles were indeed in
Cuba or to remove them. Kennedy does not make Soviet re
moval of its MRBM's from Cuba the focus of his statement.
He does say:
98
He [Khrushchev] has an opportunity to move the
world hack from the abyss of destruction— by returning
to his Government’s own words that it had no need to
station missiles outside its own territory, and with
drawing these weapons from Cuba.
But this statement is buried in step seven of Kennedy's
announced actions. At no other place in his speech does
Kennedy state that Khrushchev must remove his missiles from
Cuba. In short, Kennedy does not concentrate on dispelling
the principal ingredient of the cause of the crisis, So
viet missiles in Cuba.
Moreover, Kennedy’s speech was unduly vague. The
following statements demonstrate this lack of specificity:
"ThiB quarantine will be extended if needed to other types
of cargo and carriers." "If needed" is unclear at best.
Further, "Any hobtile move anywhere in the world . . .will
be met by whatever action is needed." "Whatever action is
needed" is equally vague and imprecise. But perhaps a
policy statement should permit such flexibility of action.
Perhaps governmental discretion concerning whether, when,
and in what specific ways to act is needed.
Although governmental flexibility of action was
unquestionably needed to counter unspecified Soviet moves
as a result of Kennedy's "shift of decision making" strat
egy* Kennedy probably gave the Soviets too much freedom of
choice in the crisis. The United States wanted to restrict
the Soviet's options. Kennedy did this very effectively
when he said:
99
It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any
nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation
in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet
Union on the United States., requiring a full retalia
tory response upon the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Kennedy warned that any Soviet action in Berlin
would result in an American reaction.
These explicit policy statements limited the So
viet's options; Khrushchev could not move against Berlin
without United States retaliatory action and any missile
launched from Cuba would result in a United States action.
So why was Kennedy so vague about the principal objective
of his action in Cuba--to get the Soviets to remove their
missiles? Perhaps if Kennedy had taken a firmer stand on
this primary issue the crisis would not have extended to
five days. Possibly the reason it took so long to resolve
the crisis was that the Soviets were unsure of the action
the United States would take if they did not remove their
missiles.
A clear indication of Kennedy's refusal to be spe
cific and present Khrushchev and the free world with the
evidence available to him was his reluctance to release the
U-2 photographs of the sites in Cuba, the original evidence
that had prompted the crisis.
The president's personal inclination had been not
to publish the photographs. But Pierre Salinger and
Donald Wilson had argued long and hard that in the ab
sence of published proof the United States could
scarcely hope to rally support round the world. Both
the American Ambassador in London, David Bruce, and the
100
British Ambassador In Washington, David Ormsby Gore,
agreed with the reckoning.3
Perhaps if Kennedy had been more inclined to use the photo
graphs as specific, hard evidence of Khrushchev's intrusion
in the hemisphere, Khrushchev's denial tactic and delaying
strategy would have been forestalled and the crisis might
have ended sooner. As things turned out, according to
Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's decision to release the photo
graphs on Wednesday, October 24 was "'the best thing that
ever happened. Those pictures played a major role in per
suading foreign opinion that the President was justified
in taking action.'"^
Coupled with the lack of specificity over removing
the missiles from Cuba and releasing tangible evidence re
garding the Soviet missile sites in Cuba, Kennedy made
another mistake. He as much as invited the Soviets to pro
long the crisis: "No one can forsee precisely what course
it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred.
Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead."
Certainly the American and free world audiences needed to
be warned to be prepared for any contingency, but to state
that the crisis might last "many months" is to openly in
vite a prolonged conflict.
^Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, 1968),
p. 148.
A
Ibid.
101
Kennedy should have made it clear to the Soviets
at the outset that: (l) the missiles had to be removed
from Cuba, and (2) they had to be removed before they be
came operational.
If Kennedy's appeal to this Russian audience was
inordinately weak, his appeal to his American and free
world audiences was inordinately strong. Kennedy's tactics
of appealing to this audience's sense of self preservation
and moral injustice apparently was quite effective. The
OAS backed Kennedy nineteen to zero, and the next day the
abstaining vote from Uruguay cast its ballot with Kennedy,
making the vote unanimous.
The American public also backed Kennedy's action.
Sorensen observed: "Some Americans reacted with panic, but
most with pride."By a ratio of ten to one," Sorensen
reported, "the telegrams received at the White House ex
pressed confidence and support. Reminded that the public's
main response in the 1958 Formosa crisis had been against
risking military action, Kennedy offered no comment."^
"Tuesday the GOP Congressional leaders, echoed by Senator
Keating, called for complete support of the President."^
U.S. News and World Report said: "Americans across the
^Kennedy (New York, 19^5)* P* 704.
6Ibid., p. 7 0 7-
7Ibid.
102
country backed the decision of President Kennedy In the
first few days after he imposed a 'quarantine1 on Commu-
O
nist Cuba." A typical response was that of a housewife
in Little Rock., Arkansas. She observed: "We wanted some
thing like this done long before this. And now that it
looks like we may get into war, we're ready to face it. " 9
Another typical reaction was that of a businessman in
Tallahassee, Florida: "What Kennedy has done is good for
the country— the country's spirit and its spine. It puts
us back into the American mold."^ George Gallup, Direc
tor of the American Institute of Public Opinion, commented
on the immediate reaction of the American population:
President Kennedy's momentous decision to blockade
Cuba has the overwhelming support of the American
people. In a nationwide survey of initial reaction to
the President's address— completed within hours after
he finished speaking--more than eight out of ten per
sons interviewed (84 percent) who had heard about the
blockade decision approved of the move. Only 4 percent
disapproved; the remainder withheld judgment. Immedi
ately following Monday night's presidential address,
Gallup Poll interviewers in 30 areas across the nation
talked with a sample of 553 adults who said they had
listened to or watched Kennedy's speech.
^(November 5j 1962), p. 3 6.
9Ibid.
1QIbid., p. 3 7.
■^Reported in "Americans Back JFK Cuba Action," The
Oregonian, October 24, 1 9 6 2, p. 1 by Paul S. Melhuish, "The
Rhetoric of Crisis: A Burkian Analysis of John F. Kennedy's
October 22, 1962 Cuban Address," unpubl. M.A. thesis (Uni
versity of Oregon, 1 9 6 3), pp. 7 6-7 7•
103
Foreign reaction was varied. Abel sums up the re
action of the British press:
The Dally Mail, true blue Conservative in politics,
called the blockade "an act of war." Its frontpage
editorial was calculated to undermine public support
for Kennedy. "The world cannot help fearing., " the
Mail said, "that in thus advancing to the brink of war,
President Kennedy may have been led more by popular
emotion than by calm statesmanship .... The peril
ous trend of events now set in motion must be halted
before it is too late." The Guardian, traditionally
liberal, predicted a Soviet countermove against the
Jupiter bases in Turkey. "In the end," said the Guar
dian, "the United States may find it has done its
cause, its friends and its own true interests little
good." The Daily Telegraph, Conservative, conceded
that Britons could "sympathize with the President’s
refusal to condone a military build-up at his back
door." But, the Telegraph clucked, "he has surprised
more than his enemies by the announcement."-^
Reactions outside the press seemed to be pro-
American. In London, "a public opinion poll showed that
58 per cent of those questioned believed that U.S. block
ade to prevent offensive missiles from going to Cuba is
Justified.
In France,
Privately and publicly, France backs President Kennedy.
President Charles de Gaulle long has advocated a firm
line toward Khrushchev in Berlin and has been critical
of Mr. Kennedy’s efforts In the past to seek a compro
mise there.
12Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, 1 9 6 6),
pp. 1 28-1 2 9.
^ Atlas (December, 1 9 6 2), p. 408.
^ U.S. News and World Report (Nov. 5 . » 1 9 6 2), p. 3 7.
104
West Germany is convinced that President Kennedy could
not have acted otherwide, since Soviet rocket bases in
Cuba had become a deadly danger to the United States.
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer quickly emphasized that
West Germany is ready to share all risks with the
U.S.1-5
It would seem that Kennedy's tactics of appealing
to his American and free world audience's sense of self
preservation and moral injustice were effective. Inasmuch
aB these two appeals were the two main inducements in Ken
nedy's speech it is reasonable to assume that they played
a significant part in determining the audience's reaction
to the President's speech.
President Kennedy's concentration on his American
audience may have had an interesting side effect on his
Soviet audience. Perhaps by solidifying one audience—
the American and free world audience— Kennedy was further
enhancing his theme of fortitude with the Soviets. Evi
dence of this secondary effect is offered by an examina
tion of Soviet statements after October 22. For the most
part, they did not appeal to public opinion, either domes
tic or foreign, for support. Perhaps Kennedy preempted
such a strategy by his heavy concentration on his second
ary rhetorical audience in his October 22 speech. Thus by
addressing one audience— the American and free world--
perhaps Kennedy was inadvertently applying pressure to
another— the Soviets.
l5Ibid., p. 38.
105
Strategic Military Communication
What Kennedy lacked In his October 22 speech, he
more than made up for In his strategic military communica
tion to the Soviets. The military preparations Kennedy
took in i960 and 1961 paid big dividends in October 1 9 6 2.
Kennedy believed in arming the United States to provide
bargaining power and backing for disarmament talks and
diplomacy. He also believed in 1961 that urgent steps
were required to make cgrtain that "our arms are suf
ficient beyond doubt."1°
"'Like any investment,' Kennedy had said of defense spend
ing in I960, 'it will be a gamble without money. But the
alternative is to gamble with our lives.
The situation in Cuba on October 22 called for an
application of the force Kennedy had prepared in 1960-
1 9 6 1. Kennedy began with a nineteen vessel naval quaran
tine of Cuba, a rapid build-up of U.S. Army and tactical
Air Force installations in the southeastern part of the
country, and a worldwide alert of the Strategic Air Com
mand. This firm but not oppressive pressure was commen
surate with Kennedy's notion that too much pressure on the
- 1 O
Soviets would be counter productive. Kennedy augmented
his military pressure by instructing the Navy to board and
inspect the first Soviet chartered vessel that crossed the
^Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 602.
1 7Ibid., p. 6 0 3.
~^New York Times (October 28, 1 9 6 2).
106
blockade. At 7:30 Friday morning, October 26, the Marucla
was boarded and inspected. The President demonstrated to
Khrushchev that the United States intended to enforce the
quarantine, and yet because a Soviet owned ship was not
boarded, Kennedy's action did not represent a direct af
front to the Soviets.
Late that same day,
The President . . . ordered a gradual increase in pres
sure, still attempting to avoid the alternative of
direct military action. He increased the number of
low-level flights over Cuba from twice a day to once
every two hours. Preparations went ahead for night
flights.!9
"The State Department and the Defense Department were
asked to prepare to add petroleum oil and lubricants to
20
the embargo list." The President also "ordered the
State Department to proceed with preparations for a crash
program on civil government in Cuba to be established af-
21
ter the invasion and occupation of that country."
The Soviets took these actions seriously. This
fact can be evidenced by Soviet behavior on Saturday morn
ing:
Certain Soviet personnel in New York were apparently
preparing to destroy all sensitive documents on the
■^Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York, 19^9)> P*
83-
20
Ibid.
21Ibid., p. 85.
basiB that the U.S. would probably be taking military
action against Cuba or Soviet ships, and this would
mean war. 22
Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet: "'Several paratroops
of infantry, tank and armored divisions--numbering about
100,000 men— were detailed for an attack on Cuba alone.'
Fravda quotes Khrushchev as saying: "'Immediate actions
were required in order to prevent an attack against Cuba
24
and preserve peace.'" Kolkowicz says of Khrushchev's
reaction to this American pressure: "Ominous signs of
American preparations for an invasion of Cuba seem to have
ii 25
caused confusion and near panic in Moscow. ^ In short,
it would seem that Kennedy's steadily increasing strategic
military communication was both an effective and fitting
strategy to force Khrushchev to return the world to the
status quo.
Robert Kennedy-Anatoly Dobrynin
Conversations
President Kennedy supplemented his increasing stra
tegic military communication on October 26 through 28 by a
2 2Ibid., p. 9 3-
^Arnold Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An
Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," The RAND
Corporation, RM-3779-PR (September, 1963)^ P* 13-
24
Ibid.
2^Roman Kolkowicz, "Conflicts in Soviet Party-
Military Relations: 1962- 6 3," The RAND Corporation, RM-
3760-PR (August, 1963)j P. 10.
108
private emissary to one of the main Soviet channels of
communication, Ambassador Dobrynin.
Robert Kennedy telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at
7:15 P*m. on October 27j he asked him to come to his De
partment of Justice office at 7:^5 p.m. He told him:
We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those
bases would be removed. I was not giving them an ul
timatum but a statement of fact. He should understand
that if they did not remove those bases, we would re
move them.^o
Kennedy conveyed the President's great respect for Dobry
nin's country and the courage of its people. "Perhaps his
country might feel it necessary to take retaliatory action;
but before that was over, there would not only be dead
Americans but dead Russians as well."2^ "Time was running
out. We had only a few more hours— we needed an answer
immediately from the Soviet Union. I said we must have it
nQ
the next day."
Robert Kennedy returned to the White House. "The
President was not optimistic, nor was I. He ordered
twenty-four troopcarrier squadrons of the Air Force Re
serve to active duty. They would be necessary for an in
vasion . "2^
Thirteen Days, p. 108.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., p. 109.
29Ibid.
109
Khrushchev's reaction to this pressure was Immedi
ate. At 10:00 a.m. the next day, Khrushchev transmitted
his letter of October 28 which contained the statement
that he would remove his missiles from Cuba. The crisis
was over.
Khrushchev's Strategies and Tactics
Khrushchev was operating at a disadvantage in Oc
tober 1962. Kennedy had presented him with a resounding
fait accompli the evening of October 22. Moreover, Ste
venson's speech in the United Nations on October 23 had
ended with the unexpected announcement of the unanimous
support of the Organization of American States. Concern
ing this unexpected support, Horelick and Rush conclude:
U.S. success in securing prompt and unanimous sup
port for the quarantine from the .Organization of Amer
ican States, and the active participation of naval
elements from some Latin American countries, must have
dampened Soviet hopes of success in bringing diplomatic
pressure to bear for a lifting of the quarantine. This
may have made a "waiting strategy" appeal less promis
ing diplomatically than they had hoped, while the U.S.
military preparations made such a strategy increasing
ly risky.30
Possibly prompted by Kennedy's admission that the
crisis could last "many months," and invited by Kennedy's
lack of decisiveness over the removal of Soviet missiles
from Cuba, Khrushchev decided to stall. Possibly by de~
^Arnold L. Horelick and Myron RuBh, "Strategic Pow
er and Soviet Foreign Policy," The RAND Corporation, R-
43^-PH (August, 1965), PP. 2 3 8-2 3 9.
110
laying American action In Cuba, he could prepare a series
of maneuvers which would extricate himself from the di
lemma he faced. On one hand he could succumb to Kennedy's
pressure and lose considerable prestige and on the other
he could stand up to Kennedy and risk nuclear war. The
following were the constraints Kennedy placed on Khrush
chev: (l) move against Berlin and face the possibility of
an American nuclear response; ( 2) launch a Soviet missile
anywhere in the world and face an American nuclear re
sponse; and (3) make any Soviet move which would lead Ken
nedy to believe that Russia intended to solve its dilemma
militarily and the United States would launch its feared
first strike. Considering the United States' strategic
superiority, these three constraints probably weighed very
heavily on Khrushchev. Khrushchev's only peaceful alter
native was to delay.
And Khrushchev's delaying strategy was quite effec
tive. He postponed the removal of his missiles from Cuba
for six days; he did not remove them until October 28.
The longer he stalled, the greater were the chances that
he could bargain with President Kennedy from a position of
strength rather than from a position of weakness. An op
erational MRBM force in Cuba would give him this strength.
Without the missiles, the United States clearly was in a
more powerful strategic position. Not only were American
strategic forces at full alert, thus eliminating the pos-
Ill
sibility of a Soviet first strike, but also the United
States held a superior strategic position. Horelick and
Rush point out that the "missile gap" myth was exploded in
early 1961 and American superiority in strategic weapons
Q 1
was recognized by the Soviets and Americans alike.
Concerning the rapid buildup of a Soviet delivery
capability in Cuba,, Robert Kennedy observed that on Satur
day October 27:
The launching pads, the missiles, the concrete
boxes, the nuclear storage bunkers, all the components
were there, by now clearly defined and obvious. Com
parisons with the pictures of a few days earlier made
clear that the work on those sites was proceeding and
that within a few days several of the launching padB
would be ready for w a r .32
Two days earlier, "Our photography revealed that
work on the missile sites was proceeding at an extraordi
narily rapid pace. " 33 Apparently Khrushchev intended to
delay Kennedy until he could bargain with him from a
stronger military position.
Considering the circumstances, Khrushchev's de
laying strategy was the most appropriate and fitting strat
egy that he could have used. For the longer he delayed
Kennedy, the better the chances were that his missile
sites in Cuba would be finished and the better the chances
31Ibid., pp. 1 9 7-2 2 0.
32Thirteen Days, p. 6 8.
33Ibid.. p. 77-
112
were that Kennedy would learn to "live with the missiles."
As Sorensen observed., "Once the missile sites under con
struction became operational, and capable of responding to
any apparent threat or command with a nuclear volley, the
o |i
President's options would be drastically changed."D Hore
lick and Rush concluded:
The Soviet leaders obviously believed that speed
was essential and that deception and diplomacy must be
employed in order to minimize the time between the dis
covery and the completion of the missile bases.
In the event of premature detection, the Soviet
leaders may have relied on diplomacy to substitute for
concealment.35
Thus Khrushchev succeeded in delaying any decisive
American action after October 22 until October 2 7. Khrush
chev's delaying strategy was implemented by one principal
tactic— denial. Hirst, the Soviets refused to admit that
there were missiles in Cuba, and second, they denied that
the missiles were offensive. In their first statement af
ter Kennedy's October 22 speech, the Soviets neglected to
comment on the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. They
did not deny that they were there; they said: "The nuclear
weapons made by the Soviet people are in the people's
hands; they will never be used for purposes of aggres-
• 3l i
J Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White
House (New York, 1963)j P* 31*
■^"Strategic Power," p. 2 3 2.
113
sion. 1 1 Moreover, the Soviet Government asserted its
"defense only" stand: "The Soviet Government emphasizes
once again that all weapons in the Soviet Union's posses
sion are serving and will serve the purposes of defense
against aggressors. "3^
In the next official Soviet statement on the cri
sis, Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the United Na
tions, went a step further— he denied that there were So
viet missiles or missile bases in Cuba: "Having searched
in the pile of junk, the so-called detectives of the State
Department proposed to their Government a variant involving
the setting up of so-called rocket bases in Cuba."3®
Zorin continued: "There we have emerging as clear as the
light of day . . . the thesis of some incontrovertible evi
dence of the presence in Cuba of Soviet rockets, the fal
sity of which is all too obvious." Zorin asserted: "The
falsity of the accusations advanced now by the United
States against the Soviet Union— which consist of the fact
that the Soviet Union has allegedly Bet up offensive arma
ments in Cuba— is clear from the outset." Zorin then re
asserted the Soviet position on September 11: "The Soviet
3®Larson, "Statement by the Soviet Government," p. 31*
37Ibid.
3®This and any further references of Zorin's state
ment are from "Excerpt from Statement by Soviet Ambassador
Valerian A. Zorin to U.N. Security Council," October 23,
1962, Larson, pp. 90-102.
114
Union has so powerful a series of rockets and missile car
riers that there is no need to seek a location for their
launching anywhere outside the territory of the Soviet
Union."
Apparently the Soviet's denial tactic worked be
cause the next day U Thant issued an appeal based on the
apparent consensus of "the Permanent Representatives of a
large number of Member Governments, who have discussed the
matter amongst themselves and with me [U Thant
These Representatives feel that in the interest of
international peace and security all concerned should
refrain from any action which may aggravate the situ
ation and bring with it the risk of war. In their
view it is important that time should be given to en
able the parties concerned to get together with a view
to resolving the present crisis peacefully and normal
izing the situation in the Caribbean. This involves
on the one hand the voluntary suspension of the quar
antine measures involving the searching of ships bound
for Cuba.^O
The President was anything but grateful for U Thant's in
tervention .
To accept would be to pull the plug on the elabo
rate machinery of diplomatic and military pressure that
he had just set in motion. The all-important thing was
that Khrushchev should be made to realize how near the
abyss his rocket diplomacy had carried the world. If
U Thant's negotiations were to fail, once the machinery
had been disconnected, it might be impossible to start
it running again. Kennedy's decision was to refuse
39"statement by Acting Secretary General U Thant to
U.N. Security Council, Including Text of Letter to Presi
dent Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, October 24, 1962,"
Larson, p. 112.
40.
Ibid.
115
negotiations until the Russians showed some willingness
to dismantle and remove their Cuban missile bases.^1
Khrushchev's delaying strategy was effective only
to a point. At the point that his missiles would have be
come operational., Kennedy drew the line. He could not al
low this alteration in the Soviet Union's nuclear capabil
ity. At this point in the crisis* Khrushchev was faced
with the choice of either resolving the crisis on Kennedy's
terms or going to war with the United States.
Before resolving the crisis* Khrushchev employed a
secondary strategy; he tried to test Kennedy's resolve.
Coupled with the threats he voiced to William Knox* Khrush
chev tested Kennedy's nerve by running his submarines right
up to the edge of the quarantine. If Kennedy had faltered*
the outcome of the crisis could have been completely dif
ferent. But he did not* and Khrushchev's testing strategy
was totally ineffective. Kennedy stuck to his position
that the Soviet missiles had to be removed from Cuba.
But Khrushchev did not stop with the Knox threats
and his submarine maneuver in the Caribbean;'' On October
27 after Kennedy had offered Khrushchev his noninvasion
pledge In exchange for Khrushchev's promise to remove his
missiles from Cuba* Khrushchev upped the ante for an agree
ment in the crisis. First* in his letter to Kennedy on
October 27* Khrushchev asked for a quid pro quo In Turkey.
^1Abel* The Missile Crisis, pp. 150-151.
116
This is why I make this proposal: We agree to re
move those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offen
sive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this
commitment in the United Nations. Your representatives
will make a statement to the effect that the United
States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and
concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analo
gous weapons from Turkey. Let us reach an understand
ing on what time you and we need to put this into ef
fect. 42
After receiving this letter, Dean Rusk sent John Scali to
talk with Alexander Fomin and find out what had happened.
Defensively, Fomin sought to justify Soviet action on the
ground that only the morning before Walter Lippman had sug
gested the possibility of a quid pro quo in Turkey. Per
haps, as Abel speculated, "It was possible that they had
misread Walter Lippman's column of Thursday morning, leap
ing to the wrong conclusion that the columnist was privy to
the President's thoughts. Whatever led Khrushchev to
believe that Kennedy would accept his proposal, John Scali
told Fomin: "'It's totally unacceptable. It was unaccept
able yesterdayj it's unacceptable today. It will be unac
ceptable tomorrow and ad infinitum.'" Scali went on:
"If you think the United States Is bluffing . . . you
are part of the most colossal misjudgment of American
intentions in history. We are absolutely determined to
get those missiles out of there. An invasion of Cuba
is only a matter of hours away. " 44
jip
"Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Ken
nedy, " October 2 7, 1962, Larson, pp. 157-158.
^ The Missile Crisis, pp. 190-191.
^"I Was the Secret Go-Between In the Cuban Crisis,"
Family Weekly (October 2 5, I964), p. 13-
117
Scali voiced the American position very eloquently.
Thus Khrushchev was faced with the alternatives of
accepting Kennedy’s noninvasion pledge and resolving the
crisis or facing the possibility of an imminent American
attack on Cuba and possibly on the Soviet Union. As Hore
lick and Rush point out., this latter alternative was un
acceptable to the Soviets:
In view of the adverse strategic balance., which the
rockets in Cuba were to help rectify., the Soviet lead
ers would hardly have undertaken their venture unless
they had been virtually certain that the United States
would not respond by attacking the USSR. . . . This
established a very crucial limit on the risks they did
accept. No doubt as the crisis unfolded the Soviet
leaders became concerned that a real danger of nuclear
war might arise. In fact, the sudden withdrawal of
their missiles apparently resulted from a decision to
end the crisis quickly before it became necessary to
accept even greater losses that could be avoided, if
at all, only at the cost of facing serious risk of nu
clear war.
Khrushchev's delaying strategy had worked as long
as it was going to; an American attack was imminent. His
testing strategy had failed miserably: Kennedy was stead
fast. Thus Khrushchev was forced to resolve the crisis.
Throughout the crisis, Kennedy had laid the burden of de
cision for the outcome of the crisis at Khrushchev's door
step. That is, "the United States shifted to the Soviet
side the immediate burden of deciding whether or not to re
sort to violence."^
Strategic Power," p. 222.
^Ibid., p. 2 3 7.
118
Thus Khrushchev was forced to either resolve the
crisis or resort to violence. Inasmuch as the latter
course was unacceptable, Khrushchev ended the conflict. In
his letter of October 28 Khrushchev said:
In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the con
flict which endangers the cause of peace . . . the So
viet Government . . . has given a new order to dis
mantle the arms which you describe as offensive and to
crate and return them to the Soviet Union.^7
Then, in a customary Soviet ploy, Khrushchev tried
to shift the burden for the cause of the crisis to Kennedy
and clothed his retreat from Cuba in language which made it
look like a victory instead of a defeat:
I regard with respect and trust the statement you
made in your message of 27 October 1962 that there
would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only
on the part of the United States, but also on the part
of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said
in your same message. Then the motives which induced
us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disap
pear . (.Italics mine.J
The notion that Khrushchev’s move in Cuba was
really a pre-planned withdrawal in return for a United
States non-invasion pledge is not acceptable because the
objectives "would have been blatantly disproportionate to
the means expended, and to the costs and risks incurred by
the Soviet Union in the undertaking."^
h<7
1"Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Ken
nedy, " October 28, 19&2, Larson, pp. 1 61-1 6 2.
^8Ibid., p. 1 6 2.
^Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," p. v. Also
see discussion of this issue in Chapter III, pp. 8 6-8 7.
119
Given Khrushchev's situation., his responses to Ken
nedy’s actions probably were the most fitting possible.
Khrushchev was playing against the odds; Kennedy had the
element of surprise in his favor, and he held the stra
tegic power position. Thus the constraints of the situa
tion literally forced Khrushchev to— first, try to delay
Kennedy’s action in Cuba; second, test his resolve; and
third, end the crisis on as favorable terms for himself as
possible.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
The literature in international communication may
be divided into four research categories: political systems,
content analysis, image, and diplomacy. Political systems
research investigates different segments of the body poli
tic by studying them within the context of the political
process. Divisions of research in this area are: (l)
"systems" development— the channels of communication and
decision making in international communication, (2) mass
media— the flow of information from the political power
structure through the media to the "masses," ( 3) public
opinion— the way public opinion affects foreign policy,
and (4) game theory— the mathematical analysis of strate
gies for maximizing gains and minimizing losses within pre
scribed constraints In the laboratory. Content analysis
research focuses on the relationship between recorded ver
bal behavior and objective meaning. Image research concen
trates on the relationships between appearance and reality
in international politics, and diplomacy research gathers
and analyzes data relevant to the dynamics of international
negotiation.
120
121
Existing methodologies for dealing with interna
tional communication do not provide sufficient means for
judging the effectiveness of comparative strategies of per
suasion in international crisis communication. This
study's approach is singular in its process of identifying
and assessing interpersonal strategies of persuasion as a
way of better understanding interpersonal inducement in in
ternational communication.
Three principal components provide the means for
identifying strategies of persuasion in international cri
sis communication: (l) the communicators— their power po
sitions, consensual support, social and political con
straints, and speaker credibility; (2) the forms of commu
nication— public address and/or policy statements, public
or private letters, intermediary or third party conversa
tions, and non-verbal strategic military communication;
and ( 3 ) the content of the communication— forms of induce
ment, motives, implicit values, and coercion and threats.
Assessing the strategies and deciding which strate
gies were effective in determining the outcome of the cri
sis is done by either noting a positive change in attitude
or action in the receiver as a result of a given strategy,
or by noting a deterioration of the situation which called
for the strategy. In the latter case, historical data rel
ative to the crisis are evaluated for cause and effect re
lationships between the Kennedy-Khrushchev strategies of
122
persuasion and the decrease in tensions during the crisis.
By their nature., either process of determining effective
ness is subjective; the strength or weakness of the strat
egy of persuasion— hence, the effectiveness of the strat
egy— must rest with the strength or weakness of the argu
ment which supports it.
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev were the
principal decision makers in the Cuban crisis. Their strat
egies of persuasion were governed by one ruling exigence—
the imminent possibility of an alteration in the military
and political strategic balance. Kennedy's strategies were
more directly controlled by this exigence than Khrushchev's
because Kennedy would have altered the United States' stra
tegic military posture by accepting Soviet medium range
ballistic missiles ninety miles off the Florida coast;
whereas, Khrushchev stood only to harm Soviet International
credibility by removing Russian missiles from Cuba. Ken
nedy could not allow the installation of missiles in Cuba
because it would have been inconsistent with his views of
his role as President, his belief in national preparedness,
the United States tradition and foreign policy in the hem
isphere, Kennedy's public statements to Khrushchev, and his
concern for not perpetuating the /'climate of inaction" be
gun during the Bay of Pigs fiasco and enhanced during the
building of the Berlin wall.
Kennedy responded to the news that Soviets were
123
establishing missile bases in Cuba by attempting to place
the responsibility for creating a nuclear crisis on Khrush
chev. Kennedy implemented this ''shift of burden" strategy
in his "Arms Quarantine of Cuba" speech by clearly stating
that the United States was leaving the decision of whether
or not to resort to violence in Cuba to Khrushchev and the
Soviet Union. Moreover, Kennedy stressed America's deter
mination to stand firm in the face of this new Soviet
threat. Kennedy's strategy for achieving this "fortitude"
objective was to appeal to the American and free world's
sense of self preservation and to argue the moral injustice
of Soviet actions in Cuba. Kennedy took other actions to
communicate American firmness to Khrushchev: (l) he in
structed his brother to inform Anatoly Dobrynin of America's
determination, (2) he pursued a series of military maneu
vers which communicated American resolve, and ( 3) he stress
ed American fortitude in his personal letters to Khrushchev.
Khrushchev employed three strategies: (l) he at
tempted to delay Kennedy until Soviet missiles were opera
tional in Cuba by trying to force him to resort to diplo
matic channels to settle the crisis, ( 2) he tested Kennedy's
resolve by threatening him through William Knox, an unof
ficial channel of communication, and by ostensibly rushing
Kennedy's blockade with Soviet submarines, and ( 3) he took
steps to end the crisis in a personal letter to Kennedy on
October 26. Khrushchev agreed to remove Soviet missiles
124
from Cuba In exchange for a United States' non-invasion
pledge. Alexander Fomin, head of Soviet intelligence ope
rations in the United States, acted as Khrushchev's emis
sary and communicated this same agreement to the State De
partment through John Scali of ABC News.
Kennedy's "Arm's Quarantine of Cuba" speech on
October 22 was not as instrumental in settling the crisis
as it could have been. The speech induced America and the
free world to respond positively to Kennedy's plea for
unity, but it did not address itself adequately to the
principal mediators of change in the crisis, Khrushchev and
the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as Soviet removal of their mis
sile bases from Cuba was the only acceptable solution to
the crisis, Kennedy should have made this premise the focus
of his October 22 statement. From the outset, it should
have been made crystal clear to Khrushchev and the Soviet
Union that only by removing their missiles from Cuba could
they hope to resolve the crisis peacefully. Unfortunately,
Kennedy did not make this point forcefully enough in his
speech. Moreover, Kennedy was unduly vague with regard to
what American actions would be taken if Soviet missiles
were not removed from Cuba.
Kennedy's strategic military communication to the
Soviets was forceful and decisive. He ordered a nineteen-
vessel naval quarantine of Cuba, a rapid build-up of U.S.
Army and tactical Air Forces in the southeastern part of
125
the United States, a worldwide alert of the Strategic Air
Command, and preparations for an invasion and occupation of
Cuba. The Soviets regarded these actions as evidence of
American determination to prevent an alteration in the stra
tegic balance.
Robert Kennedy effectively communicated America's
resolve to Anatoly Dobrynin on October 27 when he warned
that the United States intended to invade Cuba if Khrush
chev refused to remove the Soviet missiles there; Khrush
chev responded immediately to Robert Kennedy's warning.
Khrushchev's delaying strategy postponed the re
moval of his missiles from Cuba for eight agonizing days.
Khrushchev maneuvered Kennedy into permitting this eight-
day stall by first denying that there were Soviet missiles
in Cuba; second, he denied that they were offensive.
Khrushchev's strategy of testing Kennedy was inef
fectual because even though Kennedy was inexplicit about
the Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba, he was steadfast
in his determination to see their removal. Kennedy would
not alter this conviction.
Finally, Khrushchev's resolution of the crisis re
stored part of his international credibility. By persuad
ing Kennedy to agree to a non-invasion pledge of Cuba,
Khrushchev was able to claim virtual victory in Russia for
his actions in Cuba. Kennedy and the National Security
Council regarded Khrushchev's personal letter and message
126
through Alexander Fomin as the last chance to peacefully
end the crisis; both the United States and the Soviet Union
welcomed this chance to avoid nuclear war.
Conclusions
The single most important conclusion to emerge
from this study is that the approach outlined for the iden
tifying and assessing comparative strategies of persuasion
is a viable and useful analytical tool for evaluating in
ternational crisis communication. The application of this
methodology added at least four new dimensions to the knowl
edge and understanding of the dynamics of top level inter
personal communication during international conflict:
1. The first act of interpersonal communication
between principal decision makers in an international con
frontation influences the character of the ensuing crisis;
consequently, it may be of utmost importance in determining
the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy's failure to make So
viet removal of their missile bases from Cuba the main
point of his "Arms Quarantine of Cuba" speech may have out
lined the course of the six-day crisis. Perhaps this lack
of emphasis prompted Khrushchev to try to persuade the
United States to accept missile bases in Cuba by trying to
delay any United States action toward Cuba until Soviet mis
sile bases became operational when he could bargain with
Kennedy from a stronger strategic military position.
127
2. Verbal and non-verbal strategic military commu
nication may be more important than any other strategy of
persuasion in determining the outcome of an international
conflict, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy's stand in Cuba
only when directly confronted with the option of either
facing United States military intervention in Cuba or re
treating from Cuba. The United States full strategic mili
tary power gave both of these options their credence.
3. Shifting the burden of decision of whether or
not to resort to violence to the opposition at the begin
ning of an international conflict may be a worthwhile strat
egy because it may forestall the possibility of the opposi
tion feeling threatened and reacting with a nuclear re
sponse. Kennedy shifted to Khrushchev the decision of
whether or not to resort to violence in Cuba. Thus the
blame for any Soviet initiated military confrontation in
Cuba rested squarely on Khrushchev's shoulders.
However as an international conflict prolongs,
shifting the burden "of decision or allowing the burden of
decision to rest with the opposition may be a questionable
strategy because it may leave the opposition too many op
tions. Kehnedy gave Khrushchev too many options between
October 22 and 26, and Khrushchev exercised them by delay
ing the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and testing
Kennedy's resolve. But on October 27 Kennedy changed his
strategy and drastically limited Khrushchev's options:
128
(l) He warned, him in a personal letter that Soviet missiles
had to be removed from Cuba promptly, (2) Robert Kennedy
warned Dobrynin that the United States had to have a com
mitment by "tomorrow" that Soviet missile bases in Cuba
would be removed, and ( 3 ) John Scali informed Alexander
Pomin that an American attack on Cuba was "only a matter
of hours away." Confronted with the alternative of either
going to war with the United States or removing his mis
siles from Cuba, Khrushchev chose the latter.
4. In a conflict of the magnitude of the Cuban
crisis, specificity in communication is of signal impor
tance to settling the confrontation. The aerial photo
graphs of Russian missile sites in Cuba that Kennedy re
leased on October 24 demonstrated to the world that Ken
nedy's action in Cuba was justified and played a major
role in rallying international support for American actions
in Cuba. Had Kennedy released these photographs on October
22, Khrushchev's delaying strategy and tactic of denying
that they were Soviet missiles in Cuba would have been pre
empted. Kennedy may have erred by not preempting the pos
sibility of this initial Soviet strategy.
Lastly, the particular advantage of the approach as
outlined in this study is that an extraordinarily complex
communicative situation like the Kennedy-Khrushchev commu
nication during the Cuban missile crisis can be studied in
its entirety. Both the verbal and non-verbal Kennedy-
129
Khrushchev communications during the crisis can be analyzed
by judging the effectiveness of comparative strategies of
persuasion during the crisis. Thus the determination of
the future utility of "politically significant" communica
tions during an international conflict is more likely.
Implications for Further Research
A wide variety of investigations based upon the
methodology outlined in this study may reveal the different
roles that persuasive inducements play in settling inter
national conflicts. For example, an in-depth study of the
communications in the United Nations during the Cuban mis
sile crisis may reveal the degree to which these communica
tions were effective in resolving the conflict. A similar
study of Arab-Israeli communications in June, 19^7 may in
dicate which strategies helped resolve that crisis. Per
haps enough of these types of studies may make it possible
to predict which strategies of persuasion would be most
effective in settling a given instance of international
conflict.
A further application of this methodology may be to
try to develop a repertoire of individual persuasive strat
egies that could be useful in trying to induce a specific
kind of behavior from a particular state official or head
of state. Thus an investigation of the strategies Dobrynin
or Brezhnev has found most persuasive in the past may indi
130
cate which strategies of persuasion they would find most
appealing in the future. If effective, this methodology
could be applied to principal decision makers in different
nations.
Another area of investigation where knowledge is
insufficient is the role that various interpersonal second
ary channels play in international communication. This
study revealed that the Knox-Khrushchev, Scali-Fomin, and
Robert Kennedy-Dobrynin conversations were instrumental in
settling the Cuban crisis. Typical questions regarding
these types of interpersonal communications are: To what
extent was ambassadorial communication instrumental in
settling the 1962 Berlin crisis? The potential confronta
tion over the Berlin wall? The 1967 June War? Perhaps a
series of these types of studies would lead to the develop
ment of different genres of secondary channel communica
tion.
131
132
ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY
October 22, 1962
Good evening, my fellow citizens. This Government,
as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the
Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the
past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact
that a series of offensive missile sites is now in prepara
tion on that imprisoned island. The purposes of these
bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike
capability against the Western Hemisphere.
Upon receiving the first preliminary hard informa
tion of this nature last Tuesday morning (October 1 6) at
9:00 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up.
And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the
evidence and our decision on a course of action, this gov
ernment feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in
fullest detail.
The characteristics of these new missile sites in
dicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them
include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying
a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1 ,0 0 0 nauti
cal miles. Each of these missiles, In short, is capable of
Btriking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaver
al, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part
133
of the United States., in Central America,, or in the Carrlb-
bean area.
Additional sites not yet completed appear to be
designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable
of traveling more than twice as far— and thus capable of
striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere,
ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far
south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of
carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and as
sembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being
prepared.
This urgent transformation of Cuba into an impor
tant strategic base— by the presence of these large, long-
range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass de
struction— constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and
security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate
defiance of the Rio Pact of 19^7j the traditions of this
nation and hemisphere, the joint Resolution of the 8 7th
Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own
public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 1 3.
This action also contradicts the repeated assur
ances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately de
livered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its
original defensive character and that the Soviet Union had
134
no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the ter
ritory of any other nation.
The size of this undertaking makes clear that it
has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, af
ter I had made clear the distinction between any introduc
tion of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of de
fensive antiaircraft missiles, the Soviet Government
publicly stated on September 11 that., and I quote., "The
armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed
exclusively for defensive purposes," and I quote the Soviet
Government. "There is no need for the Soviet Government to
shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other coun
try, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote the Govern
ment, "The Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry
these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for
sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union."
That statement was false.
Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid of
fensive build-up was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was in
structed to make it clear once again, as he said his Gov
ernment had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba,
and I quote, "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to
the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him,
"training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in hand
ling defensive armaments waB by no means offensive," and
135
that "If it were otherwise.," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the So
viet Government would never become involved in rendering
such assistance." That statement also was false.
Neither the United States of America nor the world
community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and
offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.
We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing
of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nationrs
security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are
so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any
substantially increased possibility of their use or any
sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as
a definite threat to peace.
For many years both the Soviet Union and the United
States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nu
clear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precari
ous status quo which Insured that these weapons would not
be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own
strategic missiles have never been transferred to the ter
ritory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and de
ception; and our hiBtory, unlike that of the Soviets since
the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no de
sire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our
system upon Its people. Nevertheless, American citizens
have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of
136
Soviet missiles located inside, the U.S.S.R. or in subma
rines .
In that sense missiles in Cuba add to an already
clear and present danger--although it should be noted the
nations of Latin America have never previously been sub
jected to a potential nuclear threat.
But this secret., swift, and extraordinary build-up
of Communist missiles— in an area well known to have a spe
cial and historical relationship to the United States and
the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of So
viet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemisphere
policy— this sudden, clandestine decision to station stra
tegic weapons for the first time outside Soviet soil— is a
deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the
status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our
courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by
either friend or foe.
The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive
conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ul
timately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We
are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective,
therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles
against this or any other country and to secure their with
drawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.
Our policy has been one of patience and restraint,
as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a
137
world-wide alliance. We have been determined not to be di
verted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fa
natics. But now further action is required— and it is un
derway; and these actions may only be the beginning. We
will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of
worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory
would be ashes in our mouth— but neither will we shrink
from that risk at any time it must be faced.
Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own secur
ity and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the
authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed
by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the
following initial steps be taken immediately!
First: To halt this offensive build-up, a strict
quarantine on all offensive military equipment under ship
ment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind
bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if fbund
to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back.
This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types
of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however,
denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to
do in their Berlin blockade of 19^8.
Second: X have directed the continued and increased
close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The
Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States in
their communique of October 3 rejected secrecy on such mat
138
ters in this Hemisphere. Should these offensive military
preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the
Hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have di
rected the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities]
and I trust that in the interests of both the Cuban people
and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all
concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.
Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to
regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet
Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory
response upon the Soviet Union.
Fourth: As a necessary military precaution I have
reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the de
pendents of our personnel there, and ordered additional
military units to be on a standby alert basis.
Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate
meeting of the Organ of Consultation, under the Organiza
tion of American States, to consider this’ threat to hemi
spheric security and to invoke articles six and eight of
the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The
United Nations Charter allows for regional security ar
rangements— and the nations of this Hemisphere decided long
ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our
other allies around the world have also been alerted.
139
Sixth: Under the charter of the United Nations, we
are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Secur
ity Council be convoked without delay to take action against
this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution
will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all
offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United
Nations observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.
Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman
Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reck
less, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable
relations between our two nations. I call upon him further
to abandon this course of world domination and to join in
an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and trans
form the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move
the world back from the abyss of destruction— by returning
to his Government's own words that it had no need to sta
tion missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing
these weapons from Cuba--by refraining from any action
which will widen or deepen the present crisis--and then by
participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solu
tions .
This nation is prepared to present its case against
the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a
peaceful world, at any time and in any forum in the Organi
zation of American States, in the United Nations, or in any
140
other meeting that could be useful--without limiting our
freedom of action.
We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit
the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elim
ination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effec
tive disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new
proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides— in
cluding the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba,
free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war
with the Soviet Union., for we are a peaceful people who de
sire to live in peace with all other peoples.
But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these
problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why
this latest Soviet threat--or any other threat which is
made either independently or in response to our actions
this week— must and will be met with determination. Any
hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and
freedom of peoples to whom we are committed— including in
particular the brave people of West Berlin— will be met by
whatever action is needed.
Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive
people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly car
ried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a
friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your
fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty
and Justice for all. And I have watched and the American
l4l
people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist
revolution was betrayed and how your fatherland fell under
foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban
leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and
agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba
against your friends and neighbors in the Americas— and
turned it into the first Latin American country to become a
target for nuclear war, the first Latin American country to
have these weapons on its soil.
These new weapons are not in your interest. They
contribute nothing to your peace and well being. They can
only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause
you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know
that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those
who deny you freedom.
Many times in the past Cuban people have risen to
throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have
no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time
when they will be truly free— free from foreign domination,
free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own
leaders, free to select their own system, free to own land,
free to speak and write and worship without fear or degra
dation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society
of free nations and to the associations of this Hemisphere.
My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is
a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out.
142
No one can foresee precisely what course It will take or
what costs or casualties will he incurred.. Many months of
sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead--months in which
both our patience and our will will be tested., months in
which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of
our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to
do nothing.
The path we have chosen for the present is full of
hazards, as all paths are; but it is the one most consis
tent with our character and courage as a nation and our
commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always
high--but Americans have always paid it. And one path we
shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or
submission.
Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindi
cation of right— not peace at the expense of freedom, but
both peace and freedom, here in this Hemisphere and, we
hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be
achieved.
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1220
(November 12, 1 9 6 2), 715-720.
143
LETTER FROM PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV
TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY
October 26, 1962
A great deal has been written about this message,
Including the allegation that at the time Khrushchev wrote
It he must have been so unstable or emotional that he had
become incoherent. There was no question that the letter
had been written by him personally. It was very long and
emotional. But it was not incoherent, and the emotion was
directed at the death, destruction, and anarchy that nuclear
war would bring to his people and all mankind. That, he
said again and again and in many different ways, must be
avoided.
We must not succumb to "petty passions" or to
"transient things," he wrote, but should realize that "if
indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our
power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have
participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has
rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death
and destruction." The United States, he went on to say,
should not be concerned about the missiles in Cuba; they
would never be used to attack the United States and were
there for defensive purposes only. "You can be calm in
this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand per
144
fectly well that If we attack you, you will respond the
same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl
against us. And I think that you also understand this.
. . . This indicates that we are normal people, that we
correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation.
Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which
you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who them
selves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before
they die, could do this."
But he went on: "We want something quite different
. . . not to destroy your country . . . but despite our
ideological differences, to compete peacefully, not by mil
itary means."
There was no purpose, he said, for us to interfere
with any of his ships now bound for Cuba, for they con
tained no weapons. He then explained why they carried no
missiles: all the shipments of weapons were already within
Cuba. This was the first time he had acknowledged the
landing at the Bay of Pigs and the fact that President Ken
nedy had told him in Vienna that this was a mistake. He
valued such frankness, wrote Khrushchev, and he, too, had
similar courage, for he had acknowledged "those mistakes
which had been committed during the history of our state
and I not only acknowledge but sharply condemned them."
(President Kennedy had told him In Vienna that he was quick
to acknowledge and condemn the mistakes of Stalin and
145
others* but he never acknowledged any mistakes of his own.)
The reason he had sent these weapons to Cuba was
because the U.S. was interested in overthrowing the Cuban
government* as the U.S. had actively attempted to overthrow
the Communist government in the Soviet Union after their
revolution. Khrushchev and the Soviet people wished to
help Cuba protect herself.
But then he went on: "If assurances were given that
the President of the United States would not participate in
an attack on Cuba and the blockade lifted* then the ques
tion of the removal or the destruction of the missile sites
in Cuba would then be an entirely different question. Ar
maments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them*
this damages the economy* and if one puts them to use* then
they destroy people on both sides. Consequently* only a
madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in
the life of society. No* they are an enforced loss of hu
man energy* and what is more are for the destruction of man
himself. If people do not show wisdom* then in the final
analysis they will come to a clash* like blind moles* and
then reciprocal extermination will begin."
This is my proposal* he said. No more weapons to
Cuba and those within Cuba withdrawn or destroyed* and you
reciprocate by withdrawing your blockade and also agree not
to invade Cuba. Don’t Interfere* he said* in a piratical
way with Russian ships. "If you have not lost your self
146
control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to.,
then, Mr. President, we and you ought not to pull on the
ends of the rope In which you have tied the knot of war,
because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot
will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be
tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the
strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut
that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to ex
plain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of
what terrible forces our countries dispose. Consequently,
if there is no intention to tighten that knot, and thereby
to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war,
then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends
of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We
are ready for this."
Robert P. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York, 19^9)j
pp. 8 6 -9 0 .
147
LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV
TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY
October 27* 19&2
Dear Mr. President:
It is with great satisfaction that I studied your
reply to Mr. U Thant on the adoption of measures in order
to avoid contact by our ships and thus avoid irreparable
fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part per
suades me that you are showing solicitude for the preserva
tion of peace, and I note this with satisfaction.
I have already said that the only concern of our
people and government and myself personally as chairman of
the Council of Ministers is to develop our country and have
it hold a worthy place among all people of the world in
economic competition* advance of culture and arts* and the
rise in people's living standards. This is the loftiest
and most necessary field for competition which will only
benefit both the winner and loser* because this benefit is
peace and an increase in the facilities by means of which
man lives and obtains pleasure.
In your statement* you said that the main aim lies
not only in reaching agreement and adopting measures to
avert contact of our ships* and, consequently* a deepening
of the crisis* which because of this contact can spark off
148
the fire of military conflict after which any talks would
he superfluous because other forces and other laws would
begin to operate— the laws of war. I agree with you that
this is only a first step. The main thing is to normalize
and stabilize the situation in the world between states and
between people.
I understand your concern for the security of the
United States, Mr. President, because this is the first
duty of the president. However, these questions are also
uppermost in our minds. The same duties rest with me as
chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. You have
been worried over our assisting Cuba with arms designed to
strengthen its defensive potential— precisely defensive po-
tential--because Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could
not compare with you since these are different dimensions,
the more so given up-to-date means of extermination.
Our purpose has been and is to help Cuba, and no
one can challenge the humanity of our motives aimed at al
lowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people
desire. You want to relieve your country from danger and
this is understandable. However, Cuba also wants this.
All countries want to relieve themselves from danger. But
how can we, the Soviet Union and our government, assess
your actions which, in effect, mean that you have sur
rounded the Soviet Union with military bases, surrounded
our allies with military bases, set up military bases lit
149
erally around our country, and stationed your rocket weap
ons at them? This Is no secret. High-placed American of
ficials demonstratively declare this. Your rockets are
stationed In Britain and in Italy and pointed at us. Your
rockets are stationed in Turkey.
You are worried over Cuha. You say that it worries
you because it lies at a distance of ninety miles across
the sea from the shores of the United States. However,
Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels are pacing up and
down and watching each other. Do you believe that you have
the right to demand security for your country and the re
moval of such weapons that you qualify as offensive, while
not recognising this right for us?
You have stationed devastating rocket weapons,
which you call offensive, in Turkey literally right next to
us. How then does recognition of our equal military pos
sibilities tally with such unequal relations between our
great states? This does not tally at all.
It is good, Mr. President, that you agreed for our
representatives to meet and begin talks, apparently with
the participation of U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant.
Consequently, to some extent, he assumes the role of inter
mediary, and we believe that he can cope with the respon
sible mission if, of course, every side that is drawn into
this conflict shows good will.
150
I think that one could rapidly eliminate the con
flict and normalize the situation. Then people would heave
a sigh of relief., considering that the statesmen who hear
the responsibility have sober minds, an awareness of their
responsibility, and an ability to solve complicated prob
lems and not allow matters to slide to the disaster of war.
This is why I make this proposal: We agree to re
move those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive
weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment
in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a
statement to the effect that the United States, on its
part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet
state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey.
Let us reach an understanding on what time you and we need
to put this into effect.
After this, representatives of the U.N. Security
Council could control on-the-spot the fulfillment of these
commitments. Of course, it is necessary that the Govern
ments of Cuba and Turkey would allow these representatives
to come to their countries and check fulfillment of this
commitment, which each side undertakes. Apparently, it
would be better if these representatives enjoyed the trust
of the Security Council and ours--the United States and the
Soviet Union— as well as of Turkey and Cuba. I think that
it will not be difficult to find such people who enjoy the
trust and respect of all interested sides.
151
We, having assumed this commitment in order to give
satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and
to increase their confidence in their security, will make
a statement in the Security Council to the effect that the
Soviet Government gives a solemn pledge to respect the in
tegrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not
to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey,
not to make available its territory as a place d'armes for
such invasion, and also will restrain those who would think
of launching an aggression against Turkey either from Sovi
et territory or from the territory of other states border
ing on Turkey.
The U.S. Government will make the same statement in
the Security Council with regard to Cuba. It will declare
that the United States will respect the integrity of the
frontiers of Cuba, its sovereignty, undertake not to inter
vene in its domestic affairs, not to invade and not to make
its territory available as (a) place d'armes for the inva
sion of Cuba, and also will restrain those who would think
of launching an aggression against Cuba either from U.S.
territory or from the territory of other states bordering
on Cuba.
Of course, for this we would have to reach agree
ment with you and to arrange for some deadline. Let us
agree to give some time, but not to delay, two or three
weeks, not more than a month.
152
The weapons on Cuba., that you have mentioned and
which, as you say, alarm you, are in the hands of Soviet
officers. Therefore any accidental use of them whatsoever
to the detriment of the United States of America is ex
cluded. These means are stationed in Cuba at the request
of the Cuban Government and only in defensive aims. There
fore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or an attack on the
Soviet Union, or other of our allies then, of course, these
means do not threaten anyone and will not threaten. For
they do not pursue offensive aims.
If you accept my proposal, Mr. President, we would
send our representatives to New York, to the United Na
tions, and would give them exhaustive instructions to order
to come to terms sooner. If you would also appoint your
men and give them appropriate instructions, this problem
could be solved soon.
Why would I like to achieve this? Because the en
tire world is now agitated and expects reasonable actions
from us. The greatest pleasure for all the peoples would
be an announcement on our agreement, on nipping in the bud
the conflict that has arisen. I attach a great importance
to such understanding because it might be a good beginning
and specifically, facilitate a nuclear test ban agreement.
The problem of tests could be solved simultaneously, not
linking one with the other, because they are different
problems. However, It is important to reach an under
153
standing to both these problems in order to make a good
gift to the people, to let them rejoice in the news that a
nuclear test ban agreement has also been reached and thus
there will be no further contamination of the atmosphere.
Your and our positions on this issue are very close.
All this, possibly, would serve as a good impetus
to searching for mutually acceptable agreements on other
disputed issues, too, on which there is an exchange of
opinion between us. These problems have not yet been
solved, but they wait for an urgent solution which would
clear the international atmosphere. We are ready for this.
These are my proposals, Mr. President.
Respectfully yours,
(s) Nikita Khrushchev
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1220
(November 12, 1 9 6 2), 7^1-743.
154
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY
TO CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV
October 27, 1962
I have read your letter of October 26th with great
care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a
prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs
to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive mis
sile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba cap
able of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under ef
fective United Nations arrangements.
Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my
representatives in New York instructions that will permit
them to work out this weekend— in cooperation with the Act
ing Secretary General and your representative--an arrange
ment for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along
the lines suggested In your letter of October 26th. As I
read your letter, the key elements of your proposals— which
seem generally acceptable as I understand them— are as fol
lows :
1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems
from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and
supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to
halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into
Cuba.
155
2) We, on our part, would agree— upon the estab
lishment of adequate arrangements through the United Na
tions to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these
commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine meas
ures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an
invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the
Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.
If you will give your representative similar in
structions, there is no reason why we should not be able to
complete these arrangements and announce them to the world
within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement
on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a
more general arrangement regarding "other armaments," as
proposed in your second letter which you made public. I
would like to say again that the United States is very much
interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race;
and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to dis
cuss a detente effecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are
quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful pro
posals .
But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the
cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to
render such weapons inoperable, under effective interna
tional guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a
prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking
these problems to the broader questions of European and
156
world security., would surely lead to an Intensified situa
tion on the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of
the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree
along the lines out-lined in this letter and in your letter
of October 26th.
(s) John F. Kennedy
U.S. Department of State., Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1220
(November 12, 1962), 743-745.
157
LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV
TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY
October 28, 1962
Dear Mr. President:
I have received your message of 27 October. I ex
press my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of pro
portion you have displayed and for realization of the re
sponsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation
of the peace of the world.
I regard with great understanding your concern and
the concern of the United States people in connection with
the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are
formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what
kind of weapons these are.
In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the
conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an as
surance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the
American people, all of whom, I am certain, also want peace,
as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Govern
ment, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontin
uation of further work on weapons constructions sites, has
given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described
as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet
Union.
158
Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had
already written to you in my earlier messages— that the So
viet Government has given economic assistance to the Repub
lic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban
people were constantly under the continuous threat of an
invasion of Cuba.
A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that
this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres.
Perhaps so. However, the question is from where did they
shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory,
they are fugitives from their country, and they have no
means to conduct military operations.
This means that someone put into their hands these
weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean
in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time
not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration
in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything
can be seen and observed.
In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam
around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful
cargo ships. It Is known that they even shelled a British
cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous
threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their
intention to invade Its territory.
The Cuban people want to build their life in their
own interests without external interference. This is their
159
right, and they cannot he blamed for wanting to be masters
of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their
own labor. The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other
schemes for creating tension over China are designed to
strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intim
idate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their
new life.
Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once
more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The
Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with
means of defense against aggression--only with means for
defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means,
which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied
them to prevent an attack on Cuba— to prevent rash acts.
I regard with respect and trust the statement you
made in your message of 2y October 1962 that there would be
no attack,‘no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of
the United States, but also on the part of other nations of
the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message.
Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of
such a kind to Cuba disappear.
It is for this reason that we instructed our of
ficers— these means as I had already informed you earlier
are in the hands of the Soviet officers— to take appropri
ate measures to discontinue construction of the aforemen
tioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to
160
the Soviet Union. As I had informed yon in the letter of
27 October, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable
U.N. representatives to verify the dismantling of these
means. Thus in view of the assurances you have given and
our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition
for eliminating the present conflict.
I note with satisfaction that you have responded to
the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the
aforementioned dangerous situation as well as with regard
to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of
the international situation, fraught as it is with great
dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry,
spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All
people are interested in insuring peace.
Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibil
ity, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated
and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation
fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has
arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assistance
of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this
tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other
dangerous conflicts, which could lead to a world nuclear
catastrophe, would arise.
In conclusion, I should like to say something about
a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that
you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since
161
and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this
question with you and to find a reasonable solution.
We should like to continue the exchange of views on
the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons., gen
eral disarmament, and other problems relating to the re
laxation of international tension.
Although I trust your statement, Mr. President,
there are irresponsible people who would like to invade
Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical
steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the
means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same
time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with
them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for
rendering assistance to the Cuban people.
We are confident that the people of all countries,
like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We
are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our coun
try is now on the upsurge. Our people are enjoying the
fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tre
mendous successes since the October Revolution, and cre
ated the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values.
Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue
developing their achievements and insure their further de
velopment on the way of peace and social progress by their
persistent labor.
162
I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that
military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of
the Soviet Union. In connection with. this there have been
conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In i960 we shot
down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the
U.S.S.R. wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that
time, you took a correct position and denounced that crim
inal act of the former U(nited) S(tates) administration.
But during your term of office as president another
violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2
plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that vio
lation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that
violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and
gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted
your assurance, because the weather was Indeed poor In that
area at that time.
But had not your plane been ordered to fly about
our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an
American plane Into our airspace, hence, the conclusion
that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon,
which tramples on international norms and violates the
borders of other states.________________________ ____
A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October,
when one of your reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet
borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and
flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President:
163
How should we regard this? What Is this., a provocation?
One of your planes violates our frontier during this anx
ious time we are hoth experiencing, when everything has
been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an
intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nu
clear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step; and
all the more so since the U(nited) S(tates) Government and
Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a con
tinuous nuclear bomber patrol?
Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you
are assuming; especially now, when we are living through
such anxious times.
I should like also to express the following wish;
it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic
relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports
that American planes are making flights over Cuba.
We are interested that there should be no war in
the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace.
And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have
our people on Cuba. Under a treaty with the Cuban Govern
ment we have sent three officers, instructors, mostly plain
people: specialists, agronomists, zootechnicians, irri
gators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, trac
tor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.
I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that
violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also
164
lead to dangerous consequences. And If you do not want
this to happen, It would be better If no cause is given for
a dangerous situation to arise. We must be careful now and
refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the
defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could
only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a
fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason,
and refrain from such steps.
We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples
because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But
our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our
people trust their government, and we assure our people and
world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not
allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs un
leash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the
grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are
confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be
unleashed, and peace and the security of the peoples will
be insured.
In connection with the current negotiations between
Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the
Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba,
the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minis-
165
ter V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his
noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous
situation.
Respectfully yours,
(s) N. Khrushchev
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, XLVTI, No. 1220
(November 12, 1 9 6 2), 743-7^5.
166
WILLIAM KNOX -CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV CONVERSATION
October 24, 1962
In Moscow on that Wednesday afternoon, Nikita
Khrushchev sent for a visiting American businessman who
could carry a message back to Washington. The visitor was
William Knox., President of Westinghouse International, once
a neighbor of Dean Rusk In Scarsdale, New York. Knox’s
business in the Soviet Union was not with the Kremlin lead
ers ,but with Licensintorg, a new state trading organization
that wanted advice on international patent procedures. He
was just saying good-bye to the head of Licensintorg after
a friendly luncheon when summoned to the Kremlin for an un
solicited, wholly unexpected three o'clock appointment with
the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. Khrush
chev’s motivation, it would seem, was to let Kennedy know
through a private channel that he did have missiles In
Cuba, something his ambassadors in New York and Washington
were still indignantly denying.
Knox arrived fifteen minutes late to find Khrush
chev in a state of near-exhaustion. He looked like a man
who had not slept all night. For three hours he treated
Knox to a succession of threats, complaints and peasant
jokes. It was true, he said, the Soviet Union had missiles
167
and attack planes in Cuba; moreover he would use them if
need be.
He wanted the President and the American people to
know, Khrushchev added, that if the United States Navy
tried to stop Soviet ships at sea, his submarines would
start sinking American ships. And that would mean a third
world war. Khrushchev complained that he could not under
stand Kennedy. Eisenhower had been troublesome enough* but
Eisenhower was a man of his own generation. "How can I
deal with a man who is younger than my son?" he asked the
astonished Westinghouse man. Then, extending a stubby in
dex finger across the table in Knox's direction, he talked
of weapons, offensive and defensive. "If I point a pistol
at you like this in order to attack you," Khrushchev said,
"the pistol is an offensive weapon. But if I aim to keep
you from shooting me, it is defensive, no?"
Knox replied that he was no military man. But he
had noticed that Khrushchev's neighbors, the Swedes, had
modern antiaircraft guns and interceptor planes but no
bombers or missiles capable of attacking the Soviet Union.
Surely intent alone, Knox said, did not determine whether
a weapon was offensive or defensive. Khrushchev soon
changed the subject. Knox left Moscow the next day and
delivered the message to Washington.
Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, 1968),
pp. 151-152.
168
JOHN SCALI-ALEXANDER FOMIN CONVERSATIONS
October 26, 1962
[First conversation] He was already seated at a
table for two., along the wall, when I arrived 15 minutes
later. His greeting and handshake were quite b'rlef.
"The situation is very serious," he said. "Some
thing must be done."
Somewhat coldly, I replied: "This is something you
should have thought of before you moved your missiles into
Cuba. It’s an insane move."
We lapsed into an uncomfortable silence while or
dering lunch. Mr. "X" is a blond of medium height, in his
late 40’s, who always had shown keen interest in good food.
This time, he ordered quickly, as if he didn't care.
Once the waiter had left, he leaned forward, low
ered his voice, and said: "Perhaps a way can be found to
solve this crisis."
The Cuban delegate at the United Nations, he said,
had already pointed the way in the Security Council debate
on the problem. If the United States promised not to in
vade Cuba, Castro would be willing to dismantle the mis
siles, Mr. "X" said.
I had followed the United Nations debate very care
fully, but I could not recall that the Cuban delegate, or
169
anyone else* had said anything approximating this, and I
told him so. (A check of the record later showed that no
such suggestion had been made.)
Mr. ''X" insisted that it had but that, regardless
of whether I remembered or not, the idea was worth consid
ering now.
"¥3/11 you check with your high State Department
sources?" he asked.
On this we had no need to play games. He knew that
if I really wanted to I could get quick access to Secretary
of State Dean Rusk, whom I had accompanied on all his over
seas trips.
But I was suspicious. Why had he approached me in
stead of a State Department official? Was this a fishing
expedition on his part, under instructions from the Krem
lin, to find out what the best terms were that the Soviets
could get to lead them out of the blind alley which prom
ised nuclear disaster?
I knew that Mr. "X" was a "loner," that despite his
title of diplomat he seldom if ever went to the State De
partment. Was it possible, I thought, that this man in a
moment of crisis could think only of me, a reporter, as a
swift channel to the American government?
Did he believe that secretly I was a member of
American intelligence because in the past my conversations
170
with him had reflected official American government policy
so consistently?
Prom my 20 years experience as a diplomatic re
porter., I also knew the Soviets sometimes used unofficial
channels to pass on critically important information.
Methodically, so there could he no possibility of
misunderstanding, I went over the precise suggestions he
wanted me to check. I had no way of knowing at that time,
of course, but the formula he was outlining was the one
that would lead the world back from the brink of a nuclear
holocaust.
The proposition he advanced was one that I, as a
reporter, recognized as a complete Russian backdown. But I
said nothing about this as he outlined the four points:
(a) Russia would dismantle and ship home all the
medium-range and intermediate-range missiles it had sent to
Cuba; (b) it would allow United Nations on-the-spot inspec
tion of this; (c) Russia would pledge never to introduce
such "offensive" weapons into Cuba again; (d) in return,
the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba.
What was my immediate reaction, he asked. Still
wary, I said that I didn’t know but that perhaps this was
something that could be discussed. I stressed that, of
course, I was speaking only as a reporter.
171
"You must check this Immediately with your Impor
tant friends In the State Department/' he said. "It is
very important."
I said, truthfully., that I did. not know whether I
could immediately, since Secretary Rusk and most of his top
aides were very busy. Again, he urged that I check the
plan, and this time he added that the Soviet government had
decided to make some concessions to Communist China because
of the Cuban crisis— an implied hint that unless Moscow
settled its problem with Washington it would team up with
Peiping to stir up trouble elsewhere.
Mr. "X" then gave me two telephone numbers. The
first was the number where he could be reached at the em
bassy after the switchboard closed. The second was his
home telephone number. Call me at these numbers at any
hour, he said, if you don’t have an answer this afternoon.
[Second conversation] From Hilsman's office I
phoned Mr. "X" at the embassy and arranged to meet him at
7:35 p.m. I chose the Statler Hotel coffee shop because it
was only half a block from the embassy.
Over a cup of coffee, I repeated word for word the
message Rusk had given me. I had the paper in my pocket
but never showed it to him.
As expected, he began to press me about the iden
tity of the government officials involved. I told him only
what Rusk had suggested, and at one point Mr. "X" said that
172
if the information did not come from the highest levels in
the American government and he passed it on to his govern
ment, he could be made to look like a fool at a very crit
ical moment in history. I replied: if I lied about this,
when the world stood on the edge of a nuclear war, I would
have to be the world's most irresponsible man.
Finally, he gave up on this, apparently satisfied
that the message was authentic. Then he tried a familiar
Soviet negotiating trick: upping the ante when you believe
you have the opposition hooked.
If there were to be international Inspection of
Cuba, he asked, why shouldn't there be simultaneous inspec
tion of the coast of Florida and some of the nearby Carib
bean countries to prove there wouldn't be any sneak inva
sion of Cuba once Russia removed its missiles?
I bristled at this. This was a completely new ele
ment he was Introducing. He shrugged. I hammered away at
this, and he finally acknowledged it was so. But he sought
to explain it by claiming that he was only a "small fry"
and that he was only asking.
I said I had no Instructions on this point. But
speaking as a reporter, I felt it would raise a new and
terrible complication, one which would ruin any chance for
an agreement. After all, I said, it was Russia's mobiliza
tion of missiles In Cuba that was the direct threat to
peace, not the defensive countermobilization of American
173
military power against Cuba. If Russia removed the mis
siles, presumably the need for the American mobilization in
Florida would no longer exist.
President Kennedy, I said, could never consent to a
settlement which allowed foreign inspectors to roam Florida.
Mr. "X" sought to justify his argument, then gave up when I
emphasized time was short and that if there were to be any
settlement much remained to be done.
He then assured me the information would be passed
on immediately to the highest levels of the Soviet govern
ment and also simultaneously to Valerian Zorin, the Soviet
representative at the United Nations.
He picked up the check and walked quickly to the
cashier's booth to pay the 30~cent bill. Impatiently, he
fished through his pockets for change, couldn't find any,
then slapped a $5 bill on the counter and raced up the
steps without waiting for his change.
[Third conversation] Again, I called Mr. "X" and
arranged to meet him in the lobby of the Statler Hotel. I
was so angry that I decided not to meet him in the coffee
shop where people might overhear us. Instead, I took him
to a deserted banquet hall. He seemed as upset and jittery
as I was angry.
I immediately lit into him, starting with the same
question Rusk had asked me. "What happened?"
174
Mr. "X" seemed genuinely mystified by the new Mos
cow message. The only explanation could be, he said* that
Moscow had not received the message he had sent the previ
ous night. "There are so many messages, back and forth,
that everything is being delayed for hours," he said.
I literally exploded. At this point I was con
vinced this man had used me to betray my own country at a
moment of mortal danger. I denounced him for "a stinking
double cross." I just couldn’t believe his explanation.
Only a fool could accept it. He said nothing whatsoever to
me about a missile swap. Defensively, he sought to justify
it on the ground that a nationally syndicated columnist on
ly the morning before had suggested the possibility.
"I don’t care who suggested it," I said. "It's
totally unacceptable. It was unacceptable yesterday; it's
unacceptable today. It will be unacceptable tomorrow and
ad infinitum. If you want to talk about American missile
bases, talk about them in the regular disarmament talks in
Geneva, not as a part of any last-minute deal on Cuba.’ "
Mr. "X" insisted there had been no effort at a
double cross. His suggestions were still valid, he said,
and that I must advise my high American friends of this.
"Don’t get excited," he implored.
I said I could not believe him and did not see how
any American official could, either. An American TJ-2 plane
had been shot down over Cuba only an hour before, I told
175
him, by Soviet-manned antiaircraft missiles. His face
blanched at this. He appeared not to know of this develop
ment. "Oh, noj" he said wearily.
"If you think the United States is bluffing," I
went on, "you are part of the most colossal misjudgment of
American intentions in history. We are absolutely deter
mined to get those missiles out of there. An invasion of
Cuba is only a matter of hours away."
He again appealed for me to believe him. He and
the Ambassador (Anatoli Dobrynin), he said, were anxiously
awaiting a reply from Moscow and that he would contact me
immediately once it came. We parted on a frosty note.
John Scali, "I was the Secret Go-Between in The Cu
ban Crisis," Family Weekly (October 25, 1964), pp. 4-14.
176
ROBERT KENNEDY-ANATOLY DOBRYNIN CONVERSATION
October 27* 1962
I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about 7J15 P.M.
and asked him to come to the Department of Justice. We met
in my office at 7^5. I told him first that we knew that
work was continuing on the missile bases in Cuba and that
in the last few days it had been expedited. I said that in
the last few hours we had learned that our reconnaissance
planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of
our U-2s had been shot down and the pilot killed. That for
us was a most serious turn of events.
President Kennedy did not want a military conflict.
He had done everything possible to avoid a military engage
ment with Cuba and with the Soviet Union, but now they had
forced our hand. Because of the deception of the Soviet
Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes would have to
continue to fly over Cuba, and if the Cubans or Soviets
shot at these planes, then we would have to shoot back.
This would inevitably lead to further incidents and to es
calation of the conflict, the implications of which were
very grave indeed.
He said the Cubans resented the fact that we were
violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not
violated Cuban air space, we would still be believing what
177
Khrushchev had said— that there would be no missiles placed
in Cuba. In any case, I said, this matter was far more
serious than the air space of Cuba— it involved the peoples
of both of our countries and, in fact, people all over the
globe.
The Soviet Union had secretly established missile
bas.es in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming privately
and publicly that this would never be done. We had to have
a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be removed.
I was not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact.
He should understand that if they did not remove those
bases, we would remove them. President Kennedy had great
respect for the Ambassador's country and the courage of its
people. Perhaps his country might feel it necessary to
take retaliatory action; but before that was over, there
would be not only dead Americans but dead Russians as well.
He asked me what offer the United States was mak
ing, and I told him of the letter that President Kennedy
had just transmitted to Khrushchev. He raised the question
of our removing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there
could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this
kind of threat or pressure, and that in the last analysis
this was a decision that would have to be made by NATO.
However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to re
move those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period
of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and
178
It was our judgment that, within a short time after this
crisis was over* those missiles would he gone.
I said President Kennedy wished to have peaceful
relations between our two countries. He wished to resolve
the problems that confronted us in Europe and Southeast
Asia. He wished to move forward on the control of nuclear
weapons. However., we could make progress on these matters
only when the crisis was behind us. Time was running out.
We had only a few more hours— we needed an answer immedi
ately from the Soviet Union. I said we must have it the
next day.
Robert P. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York, 19^9)s
pp. 107-109.
179
i8o
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Creator Merchant, Jerrold Jackson (author)

Core Title Kennedy-Khrushchev Strategies Of Persuasion During The Cuban Missile Crisis

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Speech Communication

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Speech Communication

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor McBath, James H. (committee chair), Fisher, Walter R. (committee member), Van Cleave, William R. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-523171

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