University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

An Intensive Rhetorical Analysis Of Selected Speeches Of Robert Maynard Hutchins: 1940-1955

(USC Thesis Other)

An Intensive Rhetorical Analysis Of Selected Speeches Of Robert Maynard Hutchins: 1940-1955

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content AN INTENSIVE RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SPEECHES OF ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS: 1940-1955 by George William Dell A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Speech) January 1960 UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C A L IFO R N IA GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES 7, CALIFORNIA This dissertation, written by ......... G.e.Qrge...WiHlanji.I)ell....... under the direction of hir$....Dissertation C om mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y January I960 DISSERTATIOJ •'/ Chairman / . y . ITTEE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The preparation of this dissertation was stimulated by several persons; I wish to express my gratitude to them. One of Chet Huntley's broadcasts on Hutchins provided the original impetus for the investigation. Professors Charles Redding and Alan Nichols helped initiate the study. Dr. Robert Hutchins and the staff of the Fund for the Republic supplied otherwise inaccessible materials; he also assisted by making a tape-recorded interview. The Guidance Committee of Professors Forrest Seal, James McBath, and Arthur Kooker provided helpful criti cism. Maynard Smith, Caroline Rodriguez, and Elizabeth Handy prepared the final typescript. My energetic wife typed the rough draft. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii Chapter I. THE BASIS OF THE RHETORICAL INVESTIGATION ....................... 1 Introduction The Problem Definitions of Terms Used Review of Previous Studies Done on Hutchins Methodology and Procedures Organization of the Remainder of the Study II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "CRUSADING METAPHYSICIAN" ....................... 26 The Education of Hutchins The Young Yale "Hell-Raiser" Hutchins at the Foundations III. THE SPEECHES ON WAR AND EDUCATION . . . 85 Introduction Social Milieu, 1940-1947 The War and Education Speeches IV. THE SPEECHES ON CIVIL LIBERTIES .... 141 Introduction The Intellectual Milieu: 1945-1955 Civil Liberties Speeches During the 1950's iv Chapter Page V. SPEECHES ON EDUCATION ..................... 253 Introduction The Intellectual Landscape The Educational Speeches VI. HUTCHINS IN ACTION AS A SPEAKER............ 351 Preparation and Delivery of the Hutchins Speeches Style in the Addresses The Organization of Hutchins1 Speeches A Content Analysis of the Forms of Support "Reminiscences" "What Kind of Society Do We Want?" "The Proposition Is Peace" "The University of Chicago and the Bachelor’s Degree" "The Issues in Education: 1946" "Education and Independent Thought" "Academic Freedom" "Freedom and the Responsibility of the Press: 1955" "The Fund for the Republic" VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS........ 425 Introduction Conclusions Recommendations and Summary BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................... 445 APPENDIXES ..................................... 488 Appendix A. The Addresses of Robert Maynard Hutchins Appendix B. An Interview with Robert Maynard Hutchins LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Descending Rank Order of the Forms of Support Used by Hutchins in Nine Selected Speeches ................... 405 2. Reminiscences .......................... 407 3. What Kind of Society Do We Want? .... 408 4. The Proposition Is Peace . ........... 410 5. The University of Chicago and the Bachelor's Degree ................... 412 6. The Issues in Education: 1946 413 7. Education and Independent Thought .... 414 8. Academic Freedom ........................ 416 9. Freedom and the Responsibility of the Press: 1955 418 10. The Fund for the Republic............... 419 11. A Comparison of the Support Densities before Educators and Laymen Audiences.............................. 421 CHAPTER I THE BASIS OF THE RHETORICAL INVESTIGATION Introduction Robert Maynard Hutchins has been "easily the most- controversial figure in American higher education/' since he accepted the Presidency of the University of Chicago in 1929.^ On June 30, 1951, he became Associate Director of the Ford Foundation, and in May, 1954, was appointed Presi dent of the Fund for the Republic.^ During the 1950*s he extended his "controversial" fame to the area of civil liberties through his positions in the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic. Professor Baird has commented, "Speech students rate Hutchins as one of the four of five best speakers O among educational leaders." Another volume of Representa tive American Speeches states that Hutchins "is an ■^Don Eddy, "Dr. Hutchins Rebel of Education," Coronet. 25:163, March, 1949; "Hutchins to Ford," Newsweek. 37:51, January 1, 1951. ^Marjorie Dent Candee (ed.), Current Biography (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1954), p. 357. 3 A. Craig Baird (ed.), Representative American Speeches: 1951-1952 (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1952), XXIV, 129. extempore speaker of a superior effectiveness."^ He has made over eight hundred public appearances between 1925 and 1950.^ Milton Mayer, a former University of Chicago Professor, and an ardent admirer of Hutchins, said the President received approximately one thousand speaking invitations a year during the 1930 period.® In 1949, the Tau Kappa Alpha Speaker-of-the-Year award went to HutchinsDelta Sigma Rho gave him the Golden Jubilee Citation in 1956 "honoring these who are examples of the best traditions of Delta Sigma Rho."® The Problem Statement of the problem.--Students of public address are familiar with the classic divisions of rhetoric which are frequently called rhetorical canons. They repre sent "the basic pattern of all rhetorical and critical investigations into the art and practice of speaking." ^A. Craig Baird, Representative American Speeches: 1944-1945 (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1945), XVIII, 191. ^Rueben Frodin, "Bibliography of Robert M. Hutchins, 1925-1950," The Journal of General Education, 4:303-24, July, 1950. ®Milton S. Mayer, "Hutchins of Chicago," Harper1s Magazine. 178:354, March, 1939. ^David Potter (ed.), Argumentation and Debate (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), p. 489. O "Golden Jubilee Awards," The Gavel, 38:101, May, 1956. These divisions are inventio, dispositio, elocutio, g memoria, and pronnntiatio. This dissertation has attempted to use certain parts of these canons in evaluating the speaking of Robert Maynard Hutchins. An effort has been made to concentrate primarily on inventio. especially since the effects of a living speaker1s public speeches can not be accurately assessed in a historical sense. The other phases of organ ization, delivery, and memoria have also been considered, plus a criticism of the immediate effects in Hutchins1 ethos, style, and the responses to his ideas. It was the purpose of this study to investigate four main areas in the public speaking of Robert Maynard Hutchins. Each of the areas was divided into sub-areas as is indicated below. I. What were the characteristics in the content of the speeches? A. What were the speakers basic premises?^ II. What were some of the immediate effects of Hutchins1 public addresses? ^Lester Thonnsen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), pp. 78-81. ■^Alan Nichols, Discussion and Debate (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), pp. 270-72; Speech Criticism, pp. 338-39; Marie Kathryn Hochmuth (ed.), A History and Criticism of American Public Address (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1955), p. TfT A. What type of ethos did the speaker estab lish with his audience? B. Did the iconoclastic ideas contribute to his reputation as a speaker? III. What were the main characteristics of Hutchins rhetoric in operation? A. How did the speaker choose his subject? B. What was the relationship between his preparation for speeches and that of his writings? C. What was the nature of his style? D. What were the significant aspects of his bodily movement? E. What were the distinguishing features of his voice? IV. Were there any unique elements in the Hutchins rhetoric? A. What type of organization was evident in the speeches? B. What was the proportion of emphasis on the various types of evidence? The foregoing standards of evaluation were applied to the nine addresses selected as representative of Hutchins’ ideas and the types of audiences before which they were given. It was not implied that other standards 5 could not have been successfully employed, however, the present criteria tended to concentrate primarily on the ideas contained in the speeches. The rationale of contemporary rhetorical criti cism. --There has been little written in The Quarterly Journal of Speech concerning the wisdom of conducting investigations into the speaking of contemporary speakers. This has been true in spite of the fact that the Speech Monographs have shown there are numerous contemporary doctoral dissertations completed or in progress. The num ber indicated in process during the respective years follows: 1953 (8); 1954 (9); 1955 (11); 1956 (9); 1957 (14); 1958 (9); and 1959 (6). The advantages of contemporary rhetorical studies are shown by the two articles written in The Quarterly Journal of Speech: (1) Studying speeches as they are delivered is valuable training for a student working toward a higher degree; (2) there can be a more exact reporting of the speech, especially the immediate response of the audience; (3) irony, on the part of the speaker, depends largely on delivery; (4) hearing the speech delivered and comparing it with related documents may lead to a useful contribution to rhetorical theory; (5) preservation of speech materials, e.g., movies and recordings, will increase the reliability of future studies on the speaker; 6 (6) material for the critical evaluation of twentieth century speakers will become available;"^ (7) interviews with the speaker can be conducted; and (8) letters of per- 12 sonal inquiry and reply can be employed. Thompson's 1947 article was summarized in the introduction to his more recent one: Basic to that article was the insistence that studies utilize the opportunity for gaining first-hand materials. Pre-appointed reports by rhetorically trained scholars, interviews with speakers and their colleagues, and personal letters of inquiry and reply are resources available only to the contemporary critic; their neglect is both a permanent loss to scholarship and a needless limitation on the data of a study. Moreover, the research worker should take advantage of his opportunity to study the speech as delivered, for the actual characteristics may differ from those inferred from analysis of a printed text.1^ The disadvantages of the contemporary rhetorical investigation are also apparent: (1) There may be a lack of objectivity on the part of the investigator; (2) judg ment of the soundness of the speaker's ideas must be tenta tive; (3) the speaker's long-range effectiveness cannot be ascertained; and (4) all the relevant information, viz., personal papers and correspondence will not always be ^Jayne N. Thompson, "Contemporary Public Address as a Research Area," The Quarterly Journal of Speech. 33:274-83, October, 1947• 12 Wayne N. Thompson, "Contemporary Public Address: A Problem in Criticism," The Quarterly Journal of Speech. 40:24-30, February, 1954. 13Ibid.. p. 24. 7 available to the person doing the research. Thompson has indicated some of the values and liabilities of the contemporary rhetorical study: A primary consideration in choosing evaluative methods should be the advantages and the limitations of contemporaneousness. Failure to meet this test leads to conclusions based on partial data and robs subse quent scholars of the materials which can be secured only contemporaneously. The present-day critic should consider himself as a part of a continuing process and should try to perform those functions which represent his portion in an optimum division of labor between him and future scholars. One difficulty is probably an unverbalized, inner confusion concerning the purposes of scholarship and citizenship. To serve the latter function, the best- trained rhetorical minds should test the content of current speeches, and these analyses should be pub lished wherever their impact will be the greatest. To serve democracy, a man is required only to exercise as much wisdom and honesty as the immediate situation permits. From the viewpoint of scholarship, however, such an analysis is valuable only as evidence of how someone thought at a specific time.^-^- The candidate obtained an interview with Hutchins on December 28, 1954. He assisted in providing materials whenever they were requested. Frequent correspondence was exchanged and several addresses were available through this means that otherwise would have been inaccessible. A tape- recorded interview was held in 1958 and an informal confer- t ence with the speaker took place in June of 1959. 14Ibid., p. 28. Definitions of Terms Used The term "persuasion" has persistently been a difficult one to define. There has been a traditional dichotomy between its rational elements and if s non- rational, or emotional elements. A brief survey of current definitions will indicate the differing interpretations of the processes of "persuasion." Baird and Knower describe "persuasion" as "a label for the emotive functions of language." Parrish gives the following definition: Typically, a speech is an utterance meant to be heard and intended to exert an influence of some kind on those who hear it. Typically, also the kind of influence intended may be described as persuasion. Brembeck and Howell provide this definition of "persuasion." "It is the conscious attempt to modify thought and action by manipulating the motives of men toward predetermined ends."^ Their emphasis is upon emotional appeal, appeals to facts, and logical reasoning. ^■*A. Craig Baird and Franklin H. Knower, General Speech (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p. 377. 16 Wayland Maxfield Parrish and Marie Hochmuth, American Speeches (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), p. 3. 17 Winston Lamont Brembeck and William Smiley Howell, Persuasion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 24. Persuasion as defined for the purpose of this study. "Persuasion is "the process of securing acceptance of an idea or an action, by connecting it favorably with 18 the listeners' . . . attitudes, beliefs and desires." Methods.— An orderly procedure of process is the 19 typical definition of "method." The terms "persuasive methods" would then mean those processes by which a speaker attempts to secure the acceptance of an idea or an action. Review of Previous Studies Done on Hutchins The candidate located six investigations concerning some aspect of Robert Hutchins* ideas in educational reform. A seventh study, a Master of Science in Education done at the University of Southern California in 1949 was missing. The thesis was done by J. W. Crosby and compared the educational views of John Dewey and Hutchins. Richard Hoyme completed a project in Education on 20 Hutchins' theories of the Great Books. The problem 18 Henry Lee Ewbank and J.. Jeffrey Auer, Discussion and Debate (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 240. / ^ Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1956), p. 529. 20 Richard Gjermund Hoyme, "History and Philosophy of the Great Books Movement in America from Erskine to St. John's College" (unpublished Master's project, The University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1954), 41 pp. 10 consisted of two facets: (1) Is Hutchins' theory of the great books embodied in the curriculum of St. John's? (2) Was the St. John's experiment a success or failure as indicated by the literature? The conclusion concerning the first question was "Yes," though the Great Books courses were taught somewhat differently at Chicago; the evidence answering the second question was inconclusive. A dissertation for the Doctorate in Education was 21 done by Robert Zunzer of Stanford. This study related only to Hutchins' ideas on the functions and structures of higher education. The conclusions were: (1) Hutchins believes higher education should meet primarily an intel lectual function; (2) he prefers a 6-4-4-3-3 system of organization [six years in elementary school; two years each in junior high and high school; four years in under graduate collegiate status; three years each as a Master's and Doctoral student]; (3) general education should be completed by the end of the normal sophomore year in col lege; (4) the universities should primarily engage in conceptual or idea studies, placing the accumulation of facts in a subordinate position; and (5) the training for teachers should vary from that of researchers. 21 Robert F. Zunzer, "Robert Maynard Hutchins' Conceptions of the Functions and Structures of Higher Edu cation" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, 1951), 200 pp. 11 Elizabeth McQuade of the University of Chicago Divinity School completed a Master's study on the implica- 22 tions of the educational thought of Hutchins. The four conclusions were as follows: (1) The emphasis on the intellect in education poses the problem of transferring knowledge into actual practice. (2) Identification of the good through reason implies a commitment to a value system. (3) Man does not maintain virtue through the intellect alone. (4) The educational philosophy of Hutchins attaches too much to the common elements of the culture and too little to the unique elements. John William Vlandis completed a Master's thesis on two of Hutchins' educational speeches delivered in the 1933-1934 period.^3 Most of the arguments were from cause to effect and there was no significant use of ethical and emotional proof. The delivery is one of the most com mendable features of Hutchins' speaking. His thinking has stimulated educators in their efforts to re-evaluate their thinking, philosophies, and programs of studies.24 22l,The Ethical Implications of the Educational Thought of Robert Maynard Hutchins" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1955), 63 pp. 23 "Analysis and Criticism of Selected Speeches on Higher Education by Robert Maynard Hutchins as President of the University of Chicago" (unpublished Master's thesis, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, 1956), 126 pp. 24Ibid., pp. 99-104. 12 The most significant investigation for rhetoricians yet completed on Hutchins is that of George William Ziegel- 25 mueller analyzing speeches given between 1930 and 1940. Hutchins reportedly lacks clarity because the language is abstract and the chains of reasoning are brief, but con ciseness is evident and so is overstatement. He also lacks persuasiveness since there is little specific audience adaptation, except in addresses to laymen. The delivery is austere and impersonal and almost completely lacking in emotional proof. The logical and ethical appeal is strong, though factual evidence is almost completely lacking. Audiences have a widespread predisposition in favor of Hutchins due to his reputation for intelligence and ability, despite his speaking deficiencies. Hutchins is one of the few modem speakers who discusses the problems O f L of education and life thoroughly. Martin Pierce, a graduate student in the History Department at the University of Wisconsin, is writing a Master’s thesis entitled, "Robert Maynard Hutchins and Intellectual Freedom." The investigation is directed by 25 "An Analysis of Selected Speeches by Robert Maynard Hutchins on Education" (unpublished Master's thesis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 1954), 86 pp. ^Ibid., pp. 56-61 and 65-69. 13 27 Professor Howard K. Beale and Is scheduled for completion during fall of 1959.28 The most relevant study to the present investiga- 29 tion is the one currently in process by Cleburne Farr. He planned to analyze fourteen addresses given by President Hutchins at the annual trustee-faculty dinner up till 1945. The research was to be pursued along the following lines: 1. His background and training as a speaker. 2. His methods of preparation and delivery. 3. The situations in which the trustee-faculty speeches were given. 4. The effects of these speeches (insofar as this can be learned). 5. His position as a spokesman for educational reform. Methodology and Procedures Hutchins' greatest contributions appear to be in the fields of education and civil liberties.8® Farr's study concentrates on the immediate impact of Hutchins' speeches on the University of Chicago faculty and trustees, in addition to his influence as an educational spokesman. Therefore, it seemed appropriate to consider the more 27 'Correspondence with Mr. Beale, dated October 31, 1958. 28 ^Correspondence with Marguerite Christensen of the University of Wisconsin Library, dated August 12, 1959. ^Correspondence with Farr dated January 17, 1957. 30 See the citation from the Sidney Hillman Founda tion Award of January, 1959, Chapter II, footnote 199. 14 mature pronouncements of the educator, and particularly his persuasion as an administrator in the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic. This afforded an analysis of a greater number of speeches given during Hutchins' mature years, as well as those demonstrating the role of education in a civil liberty milieu. Hutchins' educational philosophy was fully de veloped, except for minor modifications, by 1946, and the 1940 to 1955 period provides an excellent sampling of both his educational and civil liberty ideals. Furthermore, this period shows the application of his attitudes toward the problems of education and war. The rationale of the scope of the study was based on these assumptions. An examination of approximately one hundred of the speakers' addresses revealed that three general themes were evident in Hutchins' speechraaking during the fifteen year period. Education was the most frequent, with its relation to war as a close corollary in the early 1940's. During the 1950 interim his attention switched primarily to civil liberties because of the work undertaken by the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic. Hutchins forged the direction of much of this foundation work, both as an administrator and a speaker. Hutchins typically spoke before educators, stu dents, laymen, and persons interested in civil liberties. 15 The nine addresses chosen as the primary focus of this investigation represent some of his best known speeches covering war, education, and civil liberties. They were chosen not only because of the audiences before which the speeches were delivered, but fundamentally because they are obviously important in the speaker's opinion. This is shown by their inclusion in his books and by the fact that they are frequently found in part in numerous addresses. The speeches also represent a fairly even time distribution throughout the years covered in the study. The audiences hearing the Hutchins' addresses were reasonably typical of those hearing his remarks. Six speeches were presented to groups primarily in the educator category, while two also contained students. One address concerning war was broadcast on the radio to the general public; the other was delivered before educators. His civil liberty speeches were usually presented to laymen, but two of the four selected for this study were given to atypical audiences; one to newspaper editors and one to an audience of intellectuals. These audiences seemed to pro vide representative groups attending Hutchins' speeches. Procedures for locating the research areas.--The research was initiated by looking up all articles on or about Hutchins in the Guide to Periodical Literature and the Education Index from 1940 to the present. All his 16 speeches found in Vital Speeches of the Day and Baird's Representative American Speeches were read. More than one hundred speeches were studied before the nine appearing in Appendix A were selected as representative. The New York Times Index subsequent to 1929 also provided a rich source of information. An extensive bibliography listing all of Hutchins' writings from 1925-1950 compiled by Rueben Frodin was located. Materials collected from newspapers and magazines added to the data. The ten books which Hutchins published as a result of his lectures provided a rich vein of the Hutchins rhetoric. Materials from the Fund for the Republic and the Reece Report also assisted. An examin ation of numerous articles about the speaker which were written in the late 1930's giving some insight into the reactions to Hutchins' speeches and articles was accom plished. The Hutchins Papers located in William Rainey Harper Library at the University of Chicago contain eight hundred twenty seven Hutchins speeches, spanning the 1921 to 1951 interim. The Daily Maroon, the undergraduate news paper , provided reactions to addresses which were otherwise unavailable. Selection of the basic approach in the problem.-- The evaluation of public addresses, never a simple task, requires that the rhetorical critic examine several 17 alternatives before employing a certain methodology. This is especially true in the investigation of a contemporary speaker. Thonssen and Baird list six measures of effective ness for evaluating a public speaker. Their standards include the immediate surface response, how well the speech read when reported, its technical perfection, the wisdom of the speaker in judging the trends of the future, changes in belief or attitude, and the long-range effects upon the 01 social group. Only the first three criteria, and the second from the last can be used in the study of a con temporary speaker. McBumey and Wrage level serious criti cism at what they call the "results1 1 theory of evaluating speeches: In every speech situation, the causes that operate to produce results are extremely complex. These other factors may be sufficient in themselves to guarantee success or failure; they may militate against the speaker or they may make it easier for him. In some cases they are largely beyond the control of the speaker. Even though the purpose of speech is response, the failure to get the desired response is not necessarily a sign that the speech was bad, nor is a favorable response a sure indication that the speech was good. We must look further for standards of judg ment. Baird, who tends to stress the historical and • ^Speech Criticism, pp. 455-58. oo J<Mames H. Me Burney and Ernest J. Wrage, The Art of Good Speech (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), p. 24. 18' biographical method of evaluating speakers, warns of some dangers in the method. He says, "As historians and logicians, we will pronounce with caution. At the bottom, 33 our judgments depend upon our standards of value. ..." If one rejects the extensive emphasis on the his torical and biographical method of rhetorical criticism, what path does one follow? Redding gives a clue by sug gesting, (1) "that studies be encouraged which present a shift in emphasis toward a more thorough analysis of speech content"; and (2) "that more attention be paid to develop- ing appropriate techniques for executing such analysis." He further indicates that the ideas within the speech it self should be carefully analyzed along the lines of con tent analysis as one possible method for the use of the rhetorical critic. The content analysis technique was used in examining the forms of support located in Chapter VI. Two recent writers attempting to shift the emphasis from excessive evaluation of "results" are Parrish and Hochmuth. Parrish warns the critic not to go too far into fields related to rhetoric, such as, history, sociology, or biography. In other words, the rhetorician's expertness O O JJA. Craig Baird, American Public Addresses 1740- 1952 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), p7”l3. Charles Redding, "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Criticism," Western Speech, 21:101, Spring, 1957. 19 lies mainly in the analysis of the ideas in the addresses themselves. Parrish writes this concerning the critic*s obligation: It is even more important that the critic not be diverted into an attempt to assess the result of a speech except as its effect may help us to judge the quality of the speech itself. Rhetoric, strictly speaking, is not concerned with the effect of a speech, but with its quality, and its quality can be determined quite apart from its effect. This is apparent when we consider that a properly qualified rhetorician should be able to analyze and to judge a written speech before it is delivered, and so before it can have had any effect. So also he should be able to criticize it after it is delivered without paying any attention to its effects. It cannot be too often repeated that the effect of a speech may bear little relation to its intrinsic worth. A speaker’s success in achieving a desired response from his audience is not necessarily proof that he has spoken well, or his failure, that he has spoken ill. His objective may have been too easy, or his audience may have responded as he wished despite the fact that they were actually repelled by his pleas. . . . ... If the results of a speech are measurable, it is the job of the rhetorician to analyze the causes of its alleged success or failure as these are discoverable in the speech itself.35 What is the method of internal criticism of the content of Robert Hutchins' addresses employed in the present investigation? The basic premises were located and criticized in each of the nine representative speeches which were examined. The forms of support were categorized in such a manner that the percentage of paragraphs devoted 35 Parrish and Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 7. to each was ascertained. The forms of support provided by Monroe were used as the statistical categories for this content analysis. The conclusions of Hutchins were also evaluated. As Hochmuth has written, "The critic's function is to examine the speaker's premises, stated or implied, 36 and to examine the truth of those premises." The attempt was made to test the validity of the ideas in the speeches. It was not an attempt to judge the content through the means of content analysis, by a quali tative method. The only statistical analysis was that done on the percentage of paragraphs devoted to the various forms of support used by Hutchins. The main focus of the dissertation was on inventio, which is generally considered one of the main aspects of speaking. The same suggestion is provided by Albert J. Croft: . . . [Criticism] must enter the field of making specific value judgments of the appropriateness and rightness of the idea adaptation to be found in speeches; criticism must evaluate speeches. Criticism should provide the much needed monographs from which to construct an "idea-centered" history of public address. . . .37 The contemporary nature of the speaking situation dictated certain choices in performing the rhetorical criticism. For example, the long-range influence of ^Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 16. 37"The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," The Quarterly Journal of Speech. 42:291, October, 1956. Hutchins' speaking could not be determined accurately due to insufficient lapse of time. Careful criticism of the internal content of the addresses seemed to be the most fruitful rhetorical approach. The speaker was extremely controversial throughout his entire public career. This indicated that his ideas or the reaction to his personality probably caused some of the controversy; perhaps, it was a combination of both. Invention is also generally considered to be one of the most important elements in rhetoric, and it was felt that a thorough evaluation of the ideas in the speeches would form an intelligent and defensible type of criticism. Do the speaker's iconoclastic ideas contribute to his controversial nature? What is the relationship of Hutchins' ideas to other leading thinkers of the present? These were the questions asked about Hutchins' invention. Selecting and criticizing Hutchins' premises.--It was possible to evaluate Hutchins' invention by selecting the premises which were fundamental to the total content of the examined speeches. How were the premises selected? How were they criticized? The central idea was discovered by reading and out lining each of the nine addresses. A premise was defined as a proposition, fact, opinion, or conclusion which directly relates to the central idea. A list of twenty one 22 premises was selected which was fundamental to Hutchins’ philosophy forming the bedrock of his rhetoric. A study of the biographical evolution of the iconoclast aided in locating the premises. They typically appeared in many of his speeches, and almost always in his ten books. The criticism of the premises was the next pro cedure. This task extended over a two year interval and proved to be the most difficult aspect of the study. The reactions of other experts to the ideas expressed by Hutchins were carefully gathered, eliminating those which were not relevant to the evaluation. Here the testimony of the leading pragmatist educators formed much of the criti cal comment. This was supplemented by those few adherents to a rationalist philosophy similar to that of the speaker. The framework of the respective philosophies compared with each other provided a test of the validity or truthfulness of Hutchins' rationalist rhetoric. Another important element in persuasiveness is the impression made by the speaker’s personality and charac- 38 ter. This appears in his delivery (pronuntiatio) and the audience reactions to the speaker, or the ethos established by him. Audience adaptation may be demonstrated by the structure of the speech or its dispositio, plus the style in language usage, the elocutio. O Q J Parrish and Hochmuth, op. cit., p. 13. 23 This type of rhetorical analysis cuts across the Aristotelian division of ethical, pathetic, and logical proofs, plus the Roman divisions of invention, disposition, 39 style, and delivery. In order to take advantage of a contemporary ele ment, a tape-recorded interview with Hutchins was held in an effort to provide information concerning his methods of preparing addresses. This afforded an opportunity for greater accuracy in judging his preparation than would have been available from inferences drawn without the aid of the speaker. Hutchins gave seven speeches which were heard by the candidate and two conferences were held with him to obtain greater insight into the rhetoric. Two appearances were analyzed from tape recordings and two radio speeches were also taped and criticized. It is apparent from the above remarks that the selection of the fundamental approach in the statement of the problem has been governed by certain circumstances. The nature of the contemporary rhetorical study dictated a de-emphasis of the effects of Hutchins' speeches in com parison to a study of a deceased speaker. This, in turn, :indicated that an internal criticism of the content of the addresses would be more fruitful than an extensive examina tion of some of the non-verbal elements in the speaking 39Ibid., p. 19. 24 situation. Thus, some of the rationale of a critical study on a contemporary was combined with the Aristotelian con cept of concentrating on the ideas in the speeches them selves. The time delimitation, the three themes, the varied audiences, the location of the research areas, an analysis of invention through criticizing premises, and the descrip tion of speech preparation, delivery, organization, and types of evidence formed the major rationale of this study. A brief reconstruction of Hutchins1 biographical influ ences, his ethos, and the use of style (language choice) in speaking, completed the rhetorical criticism. Organization of the Remainder of the Study Chapter I contains the statement of the problem and a sketch of the methodological procedures employed; Chap ter II presents the biographical background of Hutchins and his ethos as a speaker. Chapter III examines the speeches Hutchins gave on the relationship of war and education. Chapter IV contains an analysis of his civil liberties addresses. A criticism of the educational speeches of Hutchins is found in Chap ter V. These three chapters consider the Hutchins’ premises in the topic-areas indicated. Chapter VI analyzes the preparation and delivery, 25 style, types of evidence used, and the organizational structure. The Summary and Conclusions are found in Chapter VII. CHAPTER II THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "CRUSADING METAPHYSICIAN" Robert Maynard Hutchins was bom in Brooklyn, New York on January 17, 1899, the son of William James Hutchins and Anna Laura (Murch) Hutchins. William Hutchins was a Presbyterian minister at the time, but by 1907 he had be come a professor of homiletics at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio.1 The Education of Hutchins The life of Robert Hutchins divides itself con veniently into three phases: (1) from the years 1899-1929, while he was receiving his education; (2) from 1929-1951, during his administration at the University of Chicago; and (3) from 1951, in connection with his positions in the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic. William Hutchins graduated from Yale, Oberlin Theo logical Seminary,^ and received the Doctor of Divinity Marjorie Dent Candee (ed.), "Robert Maynard Hutchins," Current Biography (New York: H. W. Wilson Com pany, 1954), p. 356. ^"The Presidency of the University of Chicago," School and Society. 29:566, May 4, 1929. 26 degree from Union Theological Seminary.^ His wife was a graduate of Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massa chusetts. Robert Grosvenor Hutchins, Robert Maynard's grand father, was a famous Congregational minister and a trustee of Oberlin College. Hutchins' childhood.— Robert was the second of three boys in the Hutchins family. His older brother, 4 William, a Yale graduate, was a master in Westminster School, Simsbury, Connecticut in 1929, and the younger brother was head of the 1 1 'Yale-in-China1,1 association during the same period;-* he succeeded his father as the President of Berea College.** There is little evidence available on the childhood of Hutchins. William Benton, former Vice-President of the University of Chicago wrote, Hutchins "was the normal son of a normal college professor^ Benton attributes this ^"The Hutchins Family in Education," The Review of Reviews, 83:97, February, 1931. ^Don Eddy, "Dr. Hutchins Rebel of Education," Coronet, 25:166, March, 1949. ^School and Society, loc. cit. **Maxine Block (ed.), "Robert Maynard Hutchins," Current Biography (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1940), p. 417. ^William Burnett Benton, "The Boy Veteran," Ladies' Home Journal, 55:23, September, 1938. 28 statement to Hutchins. "'I’ve been in education since I was eight years old when my father became a university professor and I started telling him what to do.,M The independence which Robert Maynard Hutchins was to rely upon so much during his adult life was apparently germinated while living in the Hutchins family tradition. His father's family was descended from a long line of Connecticut doctors or ministers and his mother's from a long line of sea captains from Maine. Hutchins says: My childhood was nourished by the stories of their independence--my maternal grandfather went to sea in a sailing ship at the age of eleven and was on the voyage for four years--and I began to think at an early age that the ideal American was the perpendicular man. These ancestors of mine were all stubborn, and some of them were vain. Their notion of success did not seem to involve material goods as much as it did holding on to their own convictions in the face of external pres sure. I remember that when I was about fourteen my father received for Christmas a portrait of a friend who had amassed a great deal of money and power by concentrating on doing so, and who looked it. My father put the photograph on the piano and said, "I will put this here to remind us of the things we are fighting against." I have sometimes thought that if I were to write my autobiography I would call it The Picture on the Piano.8 When Robert was ten years old he is said to have gagged when he saw his grandfather show his congregation how Lincoln prayed. He still gags at emotionalism g Robert M. Hutchins, Freedom. Education, and the Fund: Essays and Addresses, 1946-1956 (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 13-15. according to Milton S. Mayer.^ Robert admired his father’s speaking, but thought his sermons were "much too senti mental" and that he told too many stories.^ He attended church two times each Sunday while at home, but does not attend anymore. * A student at Oberlin.— Robert lived in Oberlin from eight years of age till he went into the army at eighteen. His college preparation took place at Oberlin Academy and 12 he entered Oberlin College in 1915 at age sixteen. Oberlin was "a Puritan island in the Middle West." The motto of the College was "'Learning and Labor,'" and poverty, work, and service were the ideals President Henry Churchill King held before students. He called it "Rational Living." The principal ideal was "non conformity" and Oberlin was the first college to admit women and Negroes. Hutchins reports, "We seriously be lieved that the greatest thing in the world was to lay down your life for your principles. ..." He continued: ^Milton S. Mayer, "Hutchins of Chicago," Harper's Magazine. 178:345, March, 1939. •^Appendix B, "An Interview with Robert Maynard Hutchins," p. 578. •^Adolph E. Meyer, "Hutchins of Chicago University," American Mercury, 58:451, April, 1944. ^School and Society, loc. cit. 30 At home and in the College I lived in an atmosphere of discussion. It was not an accident that the leading extra-curricular activity of the College was debating. There were no fraternities; their place was taken by the literary societies. We were not merely free to talk about everything; we were required to. You were entitled to your opinion, but only if you were willing to submit it to examination and to change it if it could not survive rational scrutiny. Neither the army, in which I conducted a successful private war against all attempts to make a soldier of me, nor Yale, then a stronghold of conformity, nor a lifetime devoted to money-raising and other forms of compromise, has been able wholly to eradicate the atti tude formed by these early influences. I still cherish the view that the independent individual is the heart of society [emphasis supplied], that his independence is his most precious attribute, and that discussion is the essence of democracy. . . .-*-3 Robert was a member of the debate team at Oberlin Academy where he made his first speech at age fourteen. Speaking was difficult for him, though he was the commence ment orator. Debating seems to have played a relatively small influence on his rhetoric according to his own testimony.^ Having completed the first two years of college by 1917, Hutchins enlisted as a private in the ambulance 15 service of the United States. He served with his unit in Italy and was awarded the Italian Croce di Guerra in 1918 1 5 • ‘ •“'Freedom, Education, and the Fund, loc. cit. ^See Appendix B, p. 579. 15 Current Biography, 1954, loc. cit. 31 1 6 for "bravery under fire.,fi Hutchins refers to his receipt 17 of the medal for being '"poisoned by a can of sardines.111 ' Yale and a young administrator.— The ex-private resumed his college training by attending Yale, his father's alma mater. His father had become President of TO Berea College in Kentucky in 1920. Robert was hard up, 19 he worked eight hours a day in a factory, swept floors, washed dishes, waited on tables, set up a tutoring bureau, 20 kept books, sold clothes lines, and was a lumberjack 21 while supporting himself as an undergraduate at Yale. 22 Hutchins, who studied law during his senior year, re ceived the Bachelor of Arts with honors in 1921 and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. 16 School and Society, loc. cit. ■^"Worst Kind of Troublemaker," Time, 54:63, Novem ber 21, 1949. ■ ^Review of Reviews, loc. cit. •^Robert Maynard Hutchins, "Where Do We Go From Here in Education?" Vital Speeches of the Day, 13:731, September 15, 1947. 20»fDr. Hutchins' 10 Years Have Revitalized Chicago University," Newsweek, 14:26, November 27, 1939. ^"Robbing the Cradle for a University 'Prexy, The Literary Digest, 101:44, May 18, 1929. ^Robert Maynard Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), pp. 6-7. 32 The young veteran won the DeForest prize for writing, with an oration called ’ ’our contemporary ances tors," dealing with the people of the mountains near Berea College where his father was President; Robert had de- p Q veloped as a speaker during his junior and senior years. J He was voted the student most likely to succeed by his class. In his commencement speech, he told the professors what was the matter with Yale.^ Robert, a "fraternity man" in his days at Yale, a o c member of Alpha Delta Phi, J later said that fraternities 26 and sororities were unimportant. ° He was Captain of the Yale debate team and reflected considerable luster in public speaking.^ The integrity of Hutchins was demonstrated early in his career by an incident at Bates College. This probity was to become evident frequently in later years. Brooks Quimbly related what happened during a debate between C. G. Poore, "Youth at the Helm of a Great Uni versity," New York Times, May 12, 1929. ^Current Biography. 1954. loc. cit. New York Times, April 26, 1929. ^Robert m . Hutchins, "Why Go to College?" The Saturday Evening Post, 110:72, January 22, 1938. 27 Meyer, op. cit., p. 450. 33 28 Bates College and Yale University. A New Haven newspaper editor said Yale would have to take dogsleds to get from Portland to Lewiston (Bates College). The editor of the Bates student newspaper quoted the New Haven writer and there was a packed hall for the debate. When the decision was announced, Bates was the winner. An excited Bates freshman shouted, "'I guess that will let ’em [Yale and/or the New Haven editor] know we aren't hicks.*" Immediately one of the Yale debaters stepped to the platform and expressed regret at any such references being made by a New Haven paper which had no connection with Yale. The debater said he himself was a native of the hills of Kentucky, and would not call another person a "'hick!He said that Yale debaters had learned to respect Bates teams for their excellence and that this team was no exception. "'His remarks were greeted with tremendous applause. He had lost the debate, but he had won the audience.1" That debater was Robert Hutchins. It is apparent from the brief sketch of Robert’s life up to 1921 that he was a man of exceptional bril liance, energy, and versatility. Already, he had exhibited characteristics of candor and courage. OQ Lionel Crocker, "Intellectual Combat," Vital Speeches of the Day, 25:338-39, March 15, 1949. 34’ September 10, 1921, Robert Hutchins and Maude Phelps McVeigh were married at Bay Shore, Long Island. She was a talented sculptress and the daughter of Warren 29 McVeigh of the New York Sun. She was a graduate of the Yale School of Fine Arts and received her Bachelor of Arts degree from Yale in 1926.^ Hutchins then began teaching History and English Composition at Florida Preparatory School, Lake Placid, New York, in the Fall of 1921, while commuting to Yale Law School. His teaching continued at Lake Placid for a year and a half, then he was appointed Secretary of Yale Univer- 31 sity in December, 1922, at age twenty three. The young educator received the honorary Master of Arts from Yale at this time, since each faculty member had to have an ad- 32 vanced degree. During the 1923 to 1925 interim, Robert was the full-time Secretary and a student in the Law School simultaneously, taking 8:00 A. M. classes daily. Hutchins was brought to Yale to raise money. When asked what his occupation was at Yale, he replied, "’I am doing oratorical work with Yale University.He was so successful at New York Times, May 28, 1948. on JUPoore, loc. cit. Ibid.; Education for Freedom, pp. 8-9. 32 Conference with Hutchins, December 28, 1954. \ I 35 raising money for Yale, the University of Chicago wanted him to become its President partly for this same reason.^ Poore reported, "Hutchins always speaks effectively and his career has called for many speeches." The Young Yale "Hell-Raiser" Robert graduated from Law School in 1925, receiving the LL. B. magna cum laude and was awarded membership in n / the Order of the Coif because of his scholastic record, 35 the best in his class. Hutchins told this candidate that he had outlined his courses, outlined the outlines, and memorized the latter. He stated, "You get very good grades O £ that way, but you don’t learn anything."'JD Hutchins reported that he was not a historian because he could not remember anything; he was not a mathe matician because he could not add; he could not think, therefore, he was not a philosopher. He went on to add, "’I went for law for you didn't have to know anything at all. ’"37 33Milton S. Mayer, "Rapidly Aging Young Man," The Forum and Century. 90:308, November, 1933. ■ ^School and Society, loc. cit. 33Eddy, loc. cit. Of: ■^Conference with Hutchins in Pasadena, Decem ber 28, 1954. ^7Eddy, op. cit., p. 166. 36 Charles E. Clark, currently judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals,'*® and Hutchins' successor as Dean of the Yale Law School, "found him as a pupil, more the teacher than taught," during the time when Clark was a young law instructor at Yale.®^ A law lecturer came down with appendicitis just before Robert graduated from law school and the day after Hutchins received the LL. B., he was teaching law. He taught public service law and evidence as a part-time lecturer, then in September, 1925, he started to teach full-time.^® By 1927, Hutchins had become a full professor of law while doubling as Yale University's Secretary.^ Dean Thomas W. Swan was appointed to the Circuit Court of Appeals during the Spring of 1926. Professor Hutchins took Swan's position as acting dean, even though he had not yet been admitted to the Connecticut Bar. The appointment was normally for one year, but the young administrator proved so capable, he was kept in the posi- 42 tion, and by the time he was twenty nine was Dean of Law. 38 Freedom, Education, and the Fund, p. 17. ®^Charles E. Clark, "The Higher Learning in a Democracy," The International Journal of Ethics, 47:320, April, 1937. ^Poore, loc. cit. : Education for Freedom, p. 10. / 1 School and Society, loc. cit. ^Poore, loc. cit. 37 At the end of Hutchins* first year of teaching law, the man who was teaching the law of Evidence resigned and Robert replaced him as the instructor in that particular subject. Hutchins had not studied the law of evidence in or out of school. It was difficult for him to understand, since he knew nothing of the disciplines of psychology and logic, on which the law of evidence is founded. Hearing that there was a young psychologist, logician, and philoso pher at Columbia University who was studying the seven volumes of Wigmore on Evidence, the young dean contacted 43 the youthful instructor. Mortimer Adler was mentioned to Hutchins by Charles K. Ogden in 1928.^ Adler came to Yale on a hot day in 1927 at the request of the young law dean. That meeting was the first of many which exerted a profound influence on 45 the philosophy of Robert Hutchins. I found that Mr. Adler was just as uneducated as I was, but that he had begun to get over it, and to do so in a way that struck me as odd. He had been teach ing for several years in John Erskine's Honors Course in the Great Books at Columbia. / Q Education for Freedom, pp. 10-12. ^Introductory remarks of Hutchins in a speech ("World Revolutions") at The Modem Forum in Beverly Hills High School, January 31, 1958. ^•*See Appendix B, pp. 580-81. ^Education for Freedom, loc. cit. 38 Out of this meeting came "a challenge aimed at everything that many United States colleges had come to hold estima ble."^ It was the beginning of a friendship which was to have a significant influence throughout the life of Robert Maynard Hutchins. Dean Hutchins began reorganizing the law curriculum by adding courses in psychology, economics, and social AO science. People began calling him "The Boy Wonder." "A quality of administrative courage that rarely succeeds in an academic community— began to have full play when he was Secretary. The youthful dean raised the law school entrance requirements and established an honors program for quali fied students in their final year.’ ’® Chief Justice William Howard Taft had warned that Hutchins would wreck Yale, but in two years the dean had made it one of the outstanding 51 law schools in the country. During these early years of the Hutchins educa tional career the germination of the rationalist rhetoric ^Time, November 21, 1949, p. 58. ^Eddy, op. cit., p. 167. 49 Poore, loc. cit. -^Meyer, loc. cit. • ^Harper’s Magazine, March, 1939, p. 345. 39 was occurring. The works of Aristotle, Plato, and Thomas Aquinas were starting to make an impression on the speaker1s ideas. There was already a foundation of speak ing techniques learned in forensic and legal training, upon which was later erected the philosophic superstructure forming the blueprint of a program of reform in American higher education. Aristotle informs us that a speaker's ethos, or his character, demonstrated in the speech itself, "is the most potent of all the means of persuasion."-^ This would seem to be particularly true in the case of a person who is as "controversial" as is Robert Maynard Hutchins. Probably the core of his assets and liabilities as a speaker lies primarily in this area, along with his unique ideas. The attempt has been made to provide a thorough analysis of his ethos in this biographical chapter. It would seem that an accurate evaluation of Hutchins' ideas naturally divides itself into two parts: (1) the general reactions toward him or his writings; and (2) the direct impressions of his character and personality as shown in the speaking situation, namely his ethos. It will be noted that he has written over three hundred 52 Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), pp. 8-9. 40 articles from 1925 to 1955, and more than one hundred fifty during the fifteen year interval encompassed by the present study. Most of his writings are the direct result of his speeches. Though the present work attempts to evaluate the speaking of Hutchins, his writings certainly must pre dispose some of his listeners to respond in a particular manner. There is a strong tendency for the ideas of Hutchins* (either spoken or written) to divide his sup porters and opponents into definite categories. There seems to be little "objective’ ' reaction to the educational reformer and civil libertarian. The responses extrinsic to his speaking are labeled as "general reactions" and are further classified into "favorable" and "unfavorable." This appeared to give a more accurate over-all picture of Hutchins as a "contro versialist." His ethos has been divided into the same pro and con categories. Favorable general reactions.--It has already been mentioned that Robert Maynard Hutchins was regarded as "refreshingly precocious" at the age of twenty nine when he was Dean of Law.^ The flashy way of getting his ideas ^^See Appendix B, p. 580. ■^"Hutchins to Ford," Newsweek, 37:51, January 1, 1951. 41 55 rolling had earned him the title of "boy wonder." He had been known as a "trouble-maker and a hell-raiser" during his deanship.-*^ It could be stated with safety that Hutchins did not consider the status quo a sacred system! He was out to improve it as rapidly as possible. Favorable ethos.— C. G. Poore reported that Hutchins looked like an undergraduate and got a lot done in a short time by talking like one if this was the most effective way. "Mr. Hutchins always speaks effectively and his career has called for many speeches." The young dean was said to have gotten the great educational foundations to grant Yale more money than any man at the University.^ Dean Hutchins was a young man in a hurry, full of ideas, an extremely effective speaker, and a person of courage and integrity. The combination made him an ad- 58 ministrator with "an extraordinary executive ability." The Administration of a Rebel at Chicago The second phase of Robert Hutchins' life began in 1929, when he was thirty, after receiving the Presidency of “ ^"Chicago Loses Its Wonder Boy," Life, 30:49, February 19, 1951. C £ Meyer, op. cit., p. 450. ~^New York Times. May 12, 1929. *^Eddy, op. cit., p. 163. 42 the University of Chicago. Mayer reported, "He was already learning to think."^9 Hutchins himself reported, M,I was young and completely uneducated, but unaware of it. 60 . . .,,,ou Thirty years later he reported that he had not formulated a new idea since 1929.^ His appearance at this time was striking, with his slender physique towering six feet three inches. In appearance, he compared "favorably with a Greek God." His eyes were blue and his "classic profile" could melt from a 69 smile into "stony disdain." Hutchins* dark hair was always parted in the middle and he frequently wore a bow tie.63 Hutchins came to the University of Chicago under unique circumstances: He was asked to speak at a meeting of law teachers at Chicago. The next day Hutchins was invited to lunch with several local nabobs. After picking his brains assiduously, they offered him the presidency of the University of Chicago. "I accepted," he reports gravely, "before they could discover their horrible mistake!" 59 Harper’s Magazine. March, 1939, p. 354. ^Newsweek, November 27, 1939, loc. cit. ^Informal conference at Los Angeles City College, June 18, 1959. ^Meyer, op. cit., p. 451. ^Meyer, loc. cit. ^Eddy, loc. cit. 431 The first educational reform, known as the Hutchins Plan, or the Chicago Plan, was adopted almost without 6 s discussion by the faculty in twelve minutes, in 1930. The Hutchins Plan included abolition of the credit system and compulsory attendance in classes. An independent Board of Examiners was formed to give tests and determine place ment of students. Comprehensive examinations were adminis tered to students whenever they thought they could pass them. Thus, a few widely publicized students received their degrees in two years, but the typical student took four.66 Milton Mayer reported that the Chicago Plan had been dreamed of by "hesitant educators for twenty years." President Meiklejohn had written of it at Wisconsin; schools such as Swarthmore, Harvard, Columbia, Yale, and 67 Stanford had also suggested facets of it. But Hutchins succeeded in placing the plan in operation. President Hutchins, writing in 1931, gave four reasons for setting up the plan: (1) Students would be educated in independence with ample advisement; (2) general ^ Harper's Magazine. March, 1939, p. 345. ^Robert m . Hutchins, The State of the University. 1929-1949 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1949), pp. 4-5. 67 Forum and Century, November, 1933, p. 308. 44 examinations will test the ability of the student to organ ize ideas, to create, and to think; (3) the faculty will be compelled to think in setting up new courses of study to meet the plan's objectives; and (4) the University will be 68 reorganized to meet the needs of the individual student. Another phase of the 1930 reorganization was the establishment of the College to provide the general educa tion. Along with this provision, four divisions in the University were established; they were Humanities, the Biological, Physical, and Social Sciences. The College ended its work at the conclusion of the sophomore year and the Divisions provided the advanced and professional train- ing.69 Mortimer J. Adler came to the University of Chicago shortly after Hutchins was President.70 A telegram from Hutchins to Adler dated December 16, 1929, indicates the latter was hired to become effective during the academic year of 1930-1931.7*- They discussed the Great Books for two years and at thirty two Hutchins' education began in 68 "A Great University Embarks on a New Educational Plan," New York Times, March 8, 1931. 6^The state of the University, 1929-1949, pp. 2-3. 70Time, November 21, 1949, p. 58; "The University of Chicago," Fortune, 16:145, December, 1937. 7^Personal correspondence between Hutchins and Adler, University of Chicago Library. 45 72 earnest, by reading Aristotle's Ethics. Adler, affec tionately called "The Great Bookie,by Hutchins, told him "the sole reading matter of university presidents was the telephone book." Adler intimated that unless Hutchins were to read the Great Books, he would close his educa tional career "a wholly uneducated man."^ Adler dragged Hutchins against his will into teach ing the Great Books course. This was in 1931, and the two taught this course together four hours weekly at such diverse levels as high school, the College, the Humanities Division, the Department of Education, and in the extension division. This experience was to have a great influence on the formulation of the liberal arts educational philosophy of President Hutchins as his educational viewpoint emerged in speeches and articles. For twenty one years these two gadflies of higher education taught the Great Books course at Chicago. What were the reactions to Hutchins and his edu cational reforms during the early years of his presidency? There was considerable variation as the succeeding pages indicate. 79 Freedom. Education, and the Fund, pp. 18-19. ^ Life, February 19, 1951, p. 50. ^Education for Freedom, pp. 12-13. 46 Favorable general reactions.— Writing in 1933, Mayer described Hutchins as "sour and supercilious . . . and a man wonder." Hutchins possessed a "crusading sar casm, cold evangelism, and impudent humility." Mayer called him the "Great Uncompromiser" and "too honest to be warm, too ambitious to be tactful." The faculty did like the former dean for urging salary increases, even during the Great Depression. He has the "luxurious habit of being right."75 Later, Mayer wrote this concerning Dr. Hutchins: . . . Yet beneath the stony surface, safely repressed by a constitutional mind, a legalistic training, and an intellectual contempt for flamboyance, there bums the "dogmatism and intolerance and insincerity of the Pilgrim Fathers". . . .7® The press called him the "Chicago Wonder Child, the Wise Young Man From Yale," and the "Boy President." Pro fessor Adolph Meyer believes Hutchins says what he thinks, even if it irritates the trustees, although he "excells in amiable kidding."77 Unfavorable general reactions.— Mayer said the "Old Hats" (older faculty members) "resent the whippersnapping boy wonder." They called him a "young fool or a young 75Forum and Century, November, 1933, pp. 308-313. 7^Harper's Magazine, March, 1939, p. 352. 77Meyer, op. cit., pp. 452-55. 47 despot." His stoniness perturbed a highly congenial 78 faculty and disappointed a "worshipful student body."'0 President Hutchins "holds the world's record among university presidents for being called a Communist." He told the members of a downtown Chicago Club that he was not a "Communist." The Hearst press called him "an accomplice of Communists and murderers" after he had ruled in favor of a striking bus drivers' union. Educators, e.g., the "uneducated specialists" (Ph. D.s), could not understand the philosophical abstractions of Hutchins and his oppo nents outnumbered his supporters in the journals.^ Unfavorable ethos.— The Hutchins’ abstractions were vague to his opponents simply because most of the educators were meeting abstractions for the first time. Many of the opposition were empiricists, and Hutchins' language was strange to them. Hutchins was their "irritating fellow, 80 brusque, cryptic, and arrogant." John U. Nef, formerly a professor at the University of Chicago, indicates the persuasive situation which Hutchins faced. He described the President as a man of action who had to accomplish three things. (1) He had to ^Forum and Century, November, 1933, pp. 308-312. ^ Harper's Magazine. March, 1939, pp. 346-51. 8QIbid., p. 349. 48 build up a reputation outside the university as an educa tional leader and pioneer; (2) he had to gain the support of a substantial minority on the University of Chicago faculty; and (3) he had to separate realizable reforms from 81 others which could not be achieved. Time reported in 1939 that Robert Hutchins had soured his faculty by trying to remake Chicago on a Q O medieval pattern. Professor Thomas V. Smith, of the philosophy department, was particularly critical in 1936, when he linked Hutchins’ philosophy to that of Joseph 83 Goebbels and the leadership of Mussolini. In 1933, President Hutchins stirred up his faculty by saying Mwe have confused science with information, ideas 84 with facts, and knowledge with miscellaneous data.” The battle of facts versus ideas raged on the campus for months. It appeared to some of Hutchins' critics that he wanted only the philosophy of Aristotle, Plato, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Harry D. Gideonse, formerly a Chicago Associate Professor of Economics, and now the President of ^"The University of Chicago and the World, 1929“ 1951," The Review of Politics, 13:415, October, 1951. ^"President’s Week," Time, 33:56, June 12, 1939. ^"The Chicago School," The International Journal of Ethics, 46:379, 385, April, 1936. ^Current Biography, 1954. loc. cit. I 49 Brooklyn College, carried on a running debate with the Q C editor of the Chicago Maroon [student newspaper]. The following paragraph is an extract from these debates which came out in book form in 1937. The clamor for a rational order, for a compre hensive set of first principles with due subordination of historical and current empirical material selected with an eye to illustration of confirmation of the metaphysics, is essentially a claim to intellectual dictatorship . . . [emphasis supplied].^o The faculty feelings were so intense that one hundred nineteen of them signed a manifesto protesting Hutchins' views. Some of them called him "St. Robert of the Midway."®^ Hutchins had no idea of revolutionizing Chicago overnight, but to some he seemed to be doing just that. He once remarked that a successful university presi dent had to accomplish his achievements during the first 88 five years in the position, or not at all. On another occasion he remarked, "Every great change in American edu cation has been secured over the dead bodies of countless professors. 8 Time, November 21, 1949, p. 60. 86 Harry D. Gideonse, The Higher Learning in a Democracy (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1937), p. 30. 8^Time. November 21, 1949, loc. cit. 88Ibid., p. 58. 8^Forum and Century. November, 1933, p. 308. 50 Hutchins looked back over his thirty three years as an administrator in 1955. He concluded "lack of patience was one of my principal disqualifications as an adminis trator." He was interested "in effecting permanent im provements in American education, not in keeping the University of Chicago in an uproar." He should have known of "the existence of a large and embittered minority" which felt its viewpoint had not been sufficiently considered, "The amount of patience a university administrator must have passes the bounds of my imagination, to say nothing of my temperament." Yet, Hutchins says if he had it to do over again, he might propose even more basic reforms than he did at Chicago. The action which President Hutchins took that en deared him to the faculty occurred during 1935. Charles Walgreen, the head of the drug store chain, found that his niece had been reading Russia’s New Primer in one of her courses at the University of Chicago. Walgreen, the Hearst 91 press, and the Chicago Tribune^ instigated an Illinois Senate investigation into the university’s alleged "com- 92 munist menace." ^Freedom. Education, and the Fund, pp. 185-87, in a speech entitled "The Administrator Reconsidered: Univer sity and Foundation." ^Eddy, op. cit., p. 167. 92 Meyer, op. cit.. p. 455. 51 The Senate exonerated the University of Chicago, but demanded the retirement of Professor Robert Morss Lovett.^ Professor James W. Linn told the president, "Bob, if the trustees fire Robert Lovett, you'll get twenty resignations from the faculty in twenty four hours." 94 Hutchins replied, "'No I won't. My successor will.'" Lovett stayed on at the university. Hutchins reminded the people that Athens missed Socrates after he had been accused of corrupting the youth. Yet some people would visit the same fate upon American educators. "'Those who have made the charges are either 95 ignorant, malicious, deluded, or misinformed.'" Hutchins' opponents in education "rose to a man to 96 cheer." Dean Charles E. Clark of the Yale Law School wrote that Hutchins' "defenses of freedom of thought and of expression are noble additions to our priceless heritage of intellectual liberty. This was the first defense, of the many Hutchins was to make in future years, in behalf of academic freedom. q*5 Harper's Magazine, March, 1939, p. 352. 94 7 John Gunther, Inside USA (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 377. ^^Harper's Magazine. March, 1939, p. 346. ^Milton S. Mayer, "Hutchins of Chicago," Harper's Magazine. 178:547, April, 1939. ^Clark, loc. cit. 52 Walgreen and Hutchins later became personal friends and the University received $550,000 from the druggist.^ Hutchins published his first two books in 1936. No Friendly Voice was a collection of twenty four speeches given throughout the nation in the first years of his presidency. He scored colleges for the accumulation of useless data.^ Thomas Vernon Smith of the University’s philosophy department wrote an extremely hostile review of the book. Smith wrote: Fumbling as all science is, it remains the abiding conviction of liberals . . . that service of science is less wasteful than surrender to Hutchins' dogma and much less dangerous than devotion to emotional fixa tion. J-CK) Smith implied that Hutchins believed the world was "a place 101 primarily for dialectical self-exhibitionism." The Higher Learning in America was a "veritable Gone with the Wind among serious educational treatises" and sold over eight thousand five hundred copies. It was serialized in the Saturday Evening Post a few years later and there were over nine hundred letters in response to it, 98 Meyer, op. cit., p. 456. 99 77Robert Maynard Hutchins, No Friendly Voice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 31. lOOThe International Journal of Ethics. April, 1936, p. 387. lOlnciear and Distinct," Time, 27:51-52, May 4, 1936. 53 more than any similar non-fiction articles ever precipi tated in that magazine. Hutchins' higher learning would consist of three faculties in the university, metaphysics, social science, and natural science. The students would study a classic curriculum of the great books of the Greeks and Medieval period including "grammar, or the rules of reading, rhetoric, and logic, or the rules of writing, speaking, and reasoning."^*4 The Higher Learning in America aroused much criti cism of Hutchins' educational philosophy, including that from his arch-rival, John Dewey. Dewey was critical be cause Hutchins allegedly had "completely neglected" the natural sciences in his educational scheme. Dewey's critique was probably the most influential on the critics of Hutchins. Dewey said Hutchins believed in the existence of "fixed and eternal authoritative principles and truths that are not to be questioned." The Columbia University professor who left the University of Chicago in 1904, said the remedy Hutchins offered for chaos in higher education ^ ^Harper's Magazine. March, 1939, p. 348. ■l-O^Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Haven: Yale University Pressi 1936), p"! 116. 104Ibid.. p. 83. 54 was "the greatest possible aloofness of higher learning from contemporary social life." For this, Hutchins could not escape being "authoritarian" by calling principles "truths." Then Hutchins received the barb which was to prick him frequently when used by others: . . . I would not intimate that the author [Hutchins] has any sympathy with fascism [emphasis supplied]. But basically his idea as to the proper course to be taken is akin to the distrust of freedom and the consequent appeal to some fixed authority that is now overrunning the world. There is implicit in every assertion of fixed and eternal first truths the necessity of some human authority to decide in this world of conflicts just what these truths are and how they shall be taught. Dewey felt other people might prefer Hegel, Marx, Musso lini, or the Nazis to determine definite "truths." The editors of The Social Frontier requested that President Hutchins reply to Dewey in the next issue. The Chicago President said that Dewey stated Hutchins' own position so as to lead him (Hutchins) to think he could not write; Dewey's own position had been stated so inadequately that it made "me suspect that I cannot read." There fol lowed a point-by-point rebuttal of the charges Dewey had made, the ammunition coming largely from additional quota tions from the Hutchins' book. Finally, the acid-tongued President wrote: l-O^John Dewey, "President Hutchins' Proposals to Remake Higher Education," The Social Frontier. 3:103-104, January, 1937. 55 Mr. Dewey’s dexterous intimation that I am a fascist in result if not intention (made more dexterous by his remark that he is making no such intimation) suggests the desirability of the educational reforms I have proposed. A graduate of my hypothetical uni versity writing for his fellow-alumni would know that such observations were rhetoric and that they would be received as such. As a matter of fact, fascism is a consequence on the absence of philosophy. It is pos sible only in the context of the disorganization of analysis and the disruption of the intellectual tradi tion and intellectual discipline through the pressure of immediate practical concerns. One effect of the education I propose might be that a philosopher [Dewey] who received it would be willing to consider arguments. He would not assume that his appeal must be to the prejudices of his audience. • ‘ •06 Philosopher Dewey replied that Hutchins had not hit the main issues, but had adopted the method of legal foren sic s. He admitted Hutchins had not used truths as "fixed and eternal,M but that was the way Plato and Aristotle had 107 conceived them according to Dewey. Charles Clark, lecturing at the University of Chicago in December, 1936, remarked about Hutchins: . . . He does not fit into brackets anyhow. The very incongruity of the bracketing, however, may give point to the questions which are troubling me concerning a philosophy to which both [Nazis and Hutchins] appear to be appealing. lO^Robert M. Hutchins, "Grammar, Rhetoric, and Mr. Dewey," The Social Frontier. 3:137-39, February, 1937. •^^John Dewey, "The Higher Learning in America," The Social Frontier, 3:167-69, March, 1937. ■^^Clark, loc. cit. 56 Thus, Clark, Dewey, and T. V. Smith were influ ential critics who considered Hutchins, if not a fascist, very close to being one. Referring to Dean Clark’s asser tion, Commonweal reported that it was "absurd to suggest" that Hutchins’ theories sprung from the same philosophy as 1 f)Q that which formed the basis of fascism or nazism. Edward A. Richards, Associate Director, University Extension, Columbia University, said that Hutchins' edu cational system would create a "class of professional Tin intellectuals." President Dexter M. Keezer of Reed College referred to Hutchins’ statement that the character istic of higher education was "chaos" as a "gargantuan generalization" and that the generalizations were "a pre- 111 lude to an educational dictatorship. . . Professor William Cowley, later President of Hamilton College, told an audience, "Hutchins' theories came from Germany, but were considered so bad there that even the Nazis kicked them out."^^ Some of the Hutchins opposition called him ■^•^Ruth Byms and William O'Meara, "Concerning Mr. Hutchins," The Commonweal, 32:115, May 31, 1940. ^••^Edward A. Richards, "Consuming Education," Harper’s Magazine. 55:603, May, 1937. •^•*-"All is Not Chaos That Confuses Mr. Hutchins," The Journal of Higher Learning. 9:448, November, 1938. 112 Robert Maynard Hutchins, "Hutchins Answers Hutchins," The Saturday Evening Post. 211:23, September 24, 1938. 57 113 "'a dangerous young man in a hurry backwards.tM Some of the Chicago faculty did not trust the President completely, according to one professor: . . . A large majority of the faculty are distrustful of Dr. Hutchins' motives. They believe he has an insatiable lust for power, without any clear idea of what he will do with it, if he is successful in attain-, ing his goal. The American Association of University Professors made a report in 1938 which stated that Hutchins and his deans had too much power over appointments, promotions, and salaries. The faculty senate voted forty two to thirty four to in vestigate the report and made the President the committee chairman. The "Terrible young man" was "a breaker of shibbo leths, an iconoclast, and to boot, not afraid to express himself." He was a veteran among college presidents by 115 1940, having seniority on all but eight. At forty, Hutchins was "still knife-tongued, mentally tireless, and physically lazy." His prestige ranked with President Conant of Harvard among university presidents. Hutchins had done more to "uncloister" educa tion than any of them and was sick of being called the 113 J. P. McEvoy, "Young Man Looking Backwards," The American Mercury, 45:484, December, 1938. ^■^"Dr. Hutchins and Power," Newsweek. 11:18, June 20, 1938. •*~^Current Biography. 1940, p. 417. "Boy Wonder."116 Time considered Hutchins "liberal-minded," but others called him a "Fascist."11^ The Christian Century said this was "the simplest way to deal with a man lilce Hutchins," but declared that he was not guilty of the charge.11® Mayer wrote, "At forty, he is the most dangerous man in American education" and is not as lonely a philoso pher as he had been ten years prior in 1929. Harvard scientist Birkhoff tended to agree with Hutchins that social justice cannot be achieved with science alone, but 119 must have philosophy as an aid. Educators thought he existed just to stir up 120 trouble. Some of them considered him a "brilliant, stimulating, but unstable character, who . . . has con verted the intellectual style of the campus to the medieval. ..." He served as the "Devil's advocate in 116Newsweek, November 27, 1939, p. 26. 1^^Eddy, op. cit., p. 167; Harper's Magazine, March, 1939, p. 348. 11®"Spoiling a Good Case," The Christian Century, 57:1576, December 18, 1940. 11^Harper's Magazine, March and April, 1939, pp. 345, 546. 120Time, November 21, 1949, p. 59. 59 American higher education, always an irritant, never a sedative.”121 By 1937, the University was allowing students to enter at the end of the conventional sophomore year of high school, so they could be graduated with a Bachelor of Arts four years later. The first baccalaureate degrees were awarded on this basis in 1942, not without some faculty opposition. Thus, a student received his bachelor's degree 199 at the end of the traditional sophomore year of college.^ President Hutchins abolished intercollegiate foot ball at the University in 1939. He believed the purpose of a university was to teach students "to think and to think straight if possible." Inter-collegiate football, as it was practiced, was basically immoral and encouraged cheat ing in his opinion. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Robert Hutchins favored a non-interventionist foreign policy. He remained loyal to Roosevelt, except regarding our possible 1 9^ entry into the war. It was widely believed he was an 121 Dixon Wecter, "Can Metaphysics Save the World?" The Saturday Review of Literature. 31:7, April 10, 1948. 122Robert Hutchins, The State of the University. 1929-1949. p. 7. Meyer, op. cit.. p. 457. 124 isolationist. This was true to some extent, but his feelings arose out of the belief that we had to settle our numerous domestic problems before we should get involved in international disputes. Hutchins’ words before ' ‘America’s Town Meeting of the Air," in the debate with Colonel William J. Donovan, on May 22, 1941, stated his position. "I am not an isolation ist. I have not joined the America First Committee. I do not like its name. I should like to join a committee for Humanity First."3*25 Student reactions to President Hutchins.--His manner with students collectively was "sardonic," but in dividually he "hailed them with friendly disdain."126 students generally worshipped him and Hutchins returned the compliment. "'The faculty does not amount to much, but 127 the president and the students are wonderful." Much of the talk centered on the latest activities of the Presi- 128 dent, though he was rarely seen on campus. He once ■^^Gunther, loc. cit. 125 A. Craig Baird (ed.), Representative American Speeches: 1940-1941 (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1941), XV, 45. 126 McEvoy, op. cit., p. 483. 197 Harper's Magazine, March, 1939, p. 349. 128current Biography, 1940. p. 419. spoke to the senior class to dispel the rumor that he did not exist.12^ In his Great Books course, teacher Hutchins was impatient with foolish answers.13® Favorable ethos.--Much of the comment during the late 1930's and early 1940's was favorable to the speaking of Robert Hutchins. The Christian Century reported that Hutchins’ writings and speeches had "profoundly rocked the entire academic community" in his advocacy of metaphysics 1 which put the finger on the weakness of education. J "The ideas of President Hutchins, and the didactic way in which he states them, have brought a storm of controversy upon him."132 Richard McKeon, one of the Hutchins' men brought to Chicago along with Adler, believed the President's words had sometimes betrayed him: . . . Hutchins has indicated a task to which the uni versities must address themselves if they are to con tinue to serve the function in society which has been their's for centuries.133 12^Time, November 21, 1949, loc. cit. Ibid.; Harper's Magazine. March, 1939, loc. cit. 131The Christian Century. December 18, 1940, p. 1575. 132Current Biography, 1940. p. 417. •^SMjjjducation and the Disciplines," The Inter national Journal of Ethics. 47:381, April, 1937. 62 Mayer wrote: . . . If a dynamic figure in American life like Hutchins should be found guilty of speaking with the voice of God, it might be well to remember, if fixing his punishment, that it is the voice of Caesar that defends the world today.134 Education for Freedom was the third book authored by the "Chicago Wonder Child," and came out in January, 1943. It went through the sixth printing by May of 1944. Three critics were favorable to the book. Margaret Meagher, writing in The Catholic World, said, Hutchins "combines a delightful humor with wholesome hard hit ting. "135 Philip J. Gucker of Brooklyn Technical High School, defended President Hutchins against Collins' attack.x Gucker felt that Hutchins revealed himself as an "idealist who differs sharply with the principles of Progressive Education." His writings deserved rational treatment on educational and philosophical grounds and not 137 persecution. Alexander Meiklejohn, the President of Amherst College, was the most favorable to Education For Freedom. He believed Hutchins called the attention of educators to ■ ^Harper's Magazine. April, 1939, p. 552. 13f>! l Education Qn jts Deathbed?" The Catholic World, 159:355, July, 1944. •^•^See footnote 154. 137"^ Defense of Mr. Hutchins: A Reply to Mr. Collins," High Points. 26:16-19, April, 1944. i fundamentals which they ignored. Meiklejohn felt the only weakness of the book was that Hutchins had presented no theory of the universe upon which to ground his education. But the real contribution of Mr. Hutchins was that 1 1 he has acquired the art of separating the essential from the accidental. It is his practice of this art which makes his contribution to American education a very significant one."138 Unfavorable ethos.--Most experts agree that Harvard and the University of Chicago have the "two best faculties in America. The bitterest opposition to Hutchins has come from within his own faculty, but he has taken it in stride."139 Milton Mayer viewed Hutchins as "a moral and political philosopher, and not a stuffed shirt university president at all" who was trying to revolutionize the modem world but would not succeed. Sarcastically, he wrote, "I believe that Mr. Hutchins is a menace to all the sacred concepts that have produced the glorious civiliza tion we are now enjoying. He bears watching."1^® 133"Mr. Hutchins’ Dogma," The New Republic. 109:147-48, August 2, 1943. 139,1 University of Chicago," Life. 19:71-77, July 16, 1945. 140mCommando Hutchins," The Progressive. 8:18, May 1, 1944. 64 Favorable general reactions.--Don Eddy observed that Hutchins had an abhorrence of precedent, and an almost priest-like concern for humanity and individualism. This was combined with the "easy suavity of an international diplomat" which made him appear lighthearted when he was seething inwardly. He had "a precisely logical mind, an extraordinary executive ability, a homey earthiness and an indomitable courage." According to John Gunther, Hutchins is sensitive, often wrong headed, stubborn, and one who will talk back to God, Mammon, or the devil. He is an egotist to the point it is sometimes difficult for him to be a participant. He "boils with vision, likes idiosyncrasy, and is absolutely fearless, honest, and independent." Hutchins was once described as a "cosmic mountaineer" and has a curious juvenile streak which makes him like to affront dull people and say things he does not mean. Norman Cousins felt Hutchins was contributing much to science at the University of Chicago, even though he surrounded himself with paradoxes by saying one thing and doing another. "For whatever the state of the humani ties may be at Chicago today, humanitarianism rules the l^Eddy, pp. cit. , p. 163. ^^Gunther, op. cit.. pp. 375-77. 65 roost. This was a reference to the Committee to Frame a World Constitution.Cousins was also a strong sup porter of world government. Some of the educational efforts of Hutchins’ were recorded in Time: . . . Hutchins, as perhaps no other university head of his time, has brought the basic issues of education into the open forum. "The worst kind of a trouble maker," says he with vast approval, "is the man who insists upon asking about first principles." It is that sort of trouble Robert Hutchins has been making for the last 20 years.145 Chancellor Hutchins.— The President resigned the office he had held for sixteen years on July 2, 1945 and Ernest Colwell, a forty four year old New Testament scholar, became President. Hutchins expanded the Great Books course to adult classes in 1 9 4 6 . He took a leave from the University from October 1, 1946, to June 30, 1947, to take over as 143,.The Case of Robert Maynard Hutchins," The Saturday Review of Literature. 31:19, May 1, 1948. •k^See footnotes 150 and 156 for Hutchins’ part in urging world government. 145 Time. November 21, 1949, p. 64. 146nup Hutchins," Newsweek. 26:76, July 16, 1945; Hutchins, The State of the University, 1929-1949. pp. 11-12. Current Biography, 1954. p. 356. 66 the editorial chairman of Encyclopaedia Britannica, spend ing full-time in Britannica's Chicago loop office preparing the essays introducing The Great Books of the Western World. T h e s e were the fifty four volumes from Homer to Freud and were to form the basis of an adult education program. Fifty thousand Americans are now hashing over the Great Books which are "becoming a nation-wide middlebrow vogue. Hutchins became chairman of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution in 1945, along with its ten member committee made up of distinguished e d u c a t o r s . Hutchins had abandoned his "isolationist" stand and moved to the forefront of the "internationalists." On August 12, 1945, on the University of Chicago Round Table Discussion, he stated, "The atomic bomb may frighten us into . . . those positive political steps necessary to the creation of 148 "Hutchins On Leave from Chicago as Board Chair man of Britannica,1 1 Publishers' Weekly. 150:1985-86, October 5, 1946; "No Time for Infants," Time, 48:67, Sep tember 30, 1946. 149Time, November 21, 1949, p. 63. ■^■^University of Chicago members included: G. A. Borgese (Literature); Adler (Law); Albert Guerard (Language); Wilbur G. Katz (Law); Robert Redfield (Chair man, Anthropology); Rexford Guy Tugwell (Political Science); Stringfellow Barr (former St. John's College President); Harold A. Innis (Chairman, Political Economy, University of Toronto); Charles H. Mcllwain (Oxford, retired); and Erich Kahler (New School of Social Research). "A Proposal to History," The Saturday Review of Literature, 31:7, 26-27, April 3, 1948. 151 a world society . . . now.1 1 He also called for the 1 c 9 international civilian control of atomic energy. Unfavorable general reactions.--Denton L. Geyer, Chicago Teachers College, was one of two hostile reviewers 153 of Education For Freedom. He believed Hutchins’ educa tional theories held "a threat of the revival of class rule and the elimination of modem democracy.” Geyer felt that John Dewey's educational philosophy appeared likely to meet the requirements of education in America. The second critic, Harold Collins of Fort Hamilton High School, was even more critical, ”... Mr. Hutchins does not believe in freedom at all . . . his heart lies with authority . . . in no way different in essence from that of Hitler.”154 Once again, the University faculty was stirred up; this time, after the address of President Hutchins to the faculty-trustee dinner of January, 1944. He had said the University should crusade for ”'a moral, intellectual, and 151Current Biography. 1954. p. 357. 15^Ibid. 153”Three Types of Education for Freedom," School and Society, 66:407, November 29, 1947. l54"Mr. Hutchins and Education," High Points. 26:20, February, 1944. 68 I C C spiritual revolution.’ The faculty Senate unofficially voted eighty four to eighty two rebuking him for this posi tion. The only moral commitment they wanted to maintain was to "truth." Hutchins "drew the fire of extreme nationalists everywhere" according to Coronet when he became Chairman of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution. There were some who suspected him of a sympathy with Communism, but an April, 1949 radio address put an end to this feeling. Professor Wecter, describing himself as "a hardened critic of Mr. Hutchins"said that some of the faculty who had left Chicago felt the university had declined into the bush league in English, ancient and modem languages, and literature under Hutchins. JO Hutchins also chaired another committee which caused a good deal of criticism and some praise of him. Time, Inc. gave $200,000 and Encyclopaedia Britannica pro vided $15,000 for a study to ascertain whether there were any threats to freedom of the press in the United States. ■^■’"Chicago Commando," Time, 43:56, June 5, 1944. •^■^Eddy, op. cit., p. 64. ■l-^Dixon Wecter, "Commissars of Loyalty," The Saturday Review of Literature, 32:52, May 13, 1950. •*~-^The Saturday Review of Literature. April 10, 1948, loc. cit. The Commission on the Freedom of the Press was composed of 159 ten other famous educators, plus two laymen. Typical of the reactions were those of Time. It felt there were contradictions in the report and for the time, money, and caliber of the men on the commission Mit 1 was a disappointing report." Walter Lippmann was one of the few people who praised the Report, though he disagreed with some of its recommendations, e.g., that the press should criticize itself. His final conclusion was that people who wish to work at criticism of the press "will find this report by 1 fil Mr. Hutchins an admirable introduction to the subject." OJ- Robert Hutchins, the "controversial" educator, helped the University of Texas and the University of 159ha pree and Responsible Press," Fortune [Supple ment], 35:1, April, 1947. Hutchins, Chairman; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Vice-Chairman (Law), Harvard; John M. Clark (Economics), Columbia; John Dickinson (Law), University of Pennsylvania; William E. Hocking (Philosophy), Harvard; Harold D. Lasswell (Law), Yale; Archibald MacLeish, Formerly Assistant Secretary of State; Charles E. Merriam (Political Science), University of Chicago; Reinhold Niebuhr (Ethics and Philosophy of Religion), Union Theo logical Seminary; Robert Redfield (Anthropology), Univer sity of Chicago; Beardsley Ruml, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Arthur M. Schlesinger (History), Harvard; and George N. Shuster (President), Hunter College. Freedom Ring True," Time, 49:67-68, March 31, 1947. 16:L"0n Criticism of the Press," Los Angeles Times. March 29, 1947. Chicago combine their astronomy departments. He estab lished an inter-library center with fourteen other campuses 169 in the Mid-West. In 1948 exchange professorships were established between the University and the University of Frankfort. The Chancellor received the honorary Doctorate 161 of Economics and Social Sciences for this achievement. OJ Hutchins had an ambitious daily routine while at the University. He normally got up at 5:30 A. M., the 164 11'pernicious habit'" acquired from his father. He feigned illness or told white lies to get to bed by 10:00 P. M. If he could not sleep, he read detective stories in German. The Chancellor brewed his own pre-breakfast coffee and arrived at the office by 8:00, where he worked at a desk covered with manuscripts till 5:00, and then took a stack of "reading material" home every night. He spent 1 6 S four nights a week with donors. J The president usually ate lunch at his residence on campus with his wifel^ The Broyles Commission of the Illinois Senate, which had been granted $75,000, held an investigation into Current Biography, 1954. loc. cit. ^ %ew York Times, May 19, 1948. 164ihe Associated Press Biographical Service, Sketch number 3510, issued April 15, 1949. ^ %arper's Magazine. March, 1939, p. 352. ■^■^^Eddy, op. cit.. p. 168, 71 the alleged "subversive activities" at the University of Chicago in 1949. "Subversive activities" meant that some professors were "radical, un-American" or followers of the Communist Party.Once again Hutchins stoutly defended academic freedom. His prepared statement to the legis lature stated this: Nobody ever ventured to say that any member of the faculty of the University of Chicago is a Communist. It has sometimes been said that some members of the faculty belong to some so called "Communist-front" organizations. The University of Chicago does not believe in the un-American doctrine of guilt by associ ation. The fact that some Communists belong to, believe in, or even dominate some of the organizations to which some of our professors belong does not show that those professors are engaged in subversive activities. • • • Hutchins at the Foundations Ford Foundation Associate Director.--The third phase in the life of the "controversial" educator, Robert Maynard Hutchins, began with his appointment as Associate Director of the Ford Foundation, announced on December 19, 169 1950. He actually took over his new position on 167 Howard Mumford Jones (ed.), Primer of Intel lectual Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 6-10. 168Ibid. 169 A. Craig Baird (ed.), Representative American Speeches: 1951-1952 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1952), XXIV, 129. January 1, 1951, while on leave from Chicago as Chancellor. His resignation from the University became effective on June 30, 1951.170 One student remarked, "How can a myth resign?" Yet, Hutchins had done just that. The Board of Trustees had urged him to stay, and so had the academic senate. 171 Hutchins replied, "'The University needs a new face.'" In twenty one years of turbulence at Chicago, the former law professor had turned the University upside down,^7^ Time reported, "Hutchins seemed to want to revolutionize education all by himself . . . he had, as much as any man, forced United States educators to re examine their purposes." The same magazine continued, "Hutchins might turn out to be as good a salesman of his 1 7^ ideas [at the Ford Foundation] as ever." He had brought $93,000,000 to Chicago during his administration.^7^ Paul Hoffman, former Marshall Plan Administrator, and an old friend of Hutchins, was the Director of the Ford Foundation. The Foundation had as its purpose "the 170'ijjutchins to Ford," Newsweek. 37:51, January 1, 1951. 173-"New job. for A Salesman," Time. 57:49, Janu ary 1, 1951. ■^^Life, February 19, 1951, p. 49. • ^Time. January 1, 1951, loc. cit. ^Newsweek, January \y 1951, loc. cit. 73 dispensing of funds for world peace, education, and the 175 study of all factors governing human behavior." The Hutchins family moved to Pasadena, California in 1951. From the Ford Foundation office, then in Pasa dena, as well as New York, Associate Director Hutchins persuaded the Ford trustees to set up the Fund for the Advancement of Education and the Fund for the Adult Educa tion. Hutchins, the most "controversial" Associate Director, according to Dwight Macdonald, did not shun con troversy; nor did Hoffman, in fact, they both seemed to thrive on it. Both took part in the controversy of the Los Angeles City School System in the issues of UNESCO and the rejection of a $335,000 Ford grant offered to Los Angeles by the Fund for the Advancement of Education to train liberal arts teachers. Fortune reported that Hutchins "was a prime assur- 177 ance the [Ford] foundation will never lack ideas." Hutchins described himself as suffering from "an ’intel lectual deterioration' that suggested itself by ’a kind of 1 75 Ibid.; The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1952. p. 9. 176owight Macdonald, "Profiles," The New Yorker, 31:51, December 17, 1955. 1 77 "The Men of the Ford Foundation," Fortune, 44:116-17, December, 1951. involuntary mellowness'in 1953. The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society appeared in 1953. It was a combination of the lectures Hutchins had delivered at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, in 1951, and those given at the University of Toronto in 1952. When Professor Robert Ulich of Harvard reviewed the book, he agreed with most of the basic pre mises, but wondered how the Great Books could educate citi zens since almost fifty per cent of adult Americans do not read books. The Walgreen lecture was delivered at the Univer sity of Chicago during the Spring of 1953, and came out in book form as The University of Utopia the same year. Associate Director Hutchins dealt with industrialism, spe cialization, philosophical diversity, and social and political conformity. This book probably represents his most advanced idealistic thinking regarding higher educa tion. President Harold Taylor of Sarah Lawrence College was critical of The University of Utopia, stating that it did not go beyond abstractions and get to the reality of i 178nHappy Hutchinsland," Time. 61:75, April 22, 1953. 179"a Liberal Education for All," Saturday Review. 36:28, September 12, 1953. 75 American education. There was continuous overstatement and Hutchins had once again shown an elite philosophy of edu cation. Much the same comment came from one of Hutchins' traditional opponents, Professor Sidney Hook, Chairman of the Philosophy Department at New York Univer sity, and an admirer of Dewey. Hook said that what Hutchins really says is accept the rule of an elite or give 1 81 up democracy. The last page of Great Books, on which Hutchins spent nine months writing the essay introducing the Adler- edited fifty four volumes, carries this evaluation: . . . Dr. Hutchins is best known for his bold and pioneering concepts in educational theory and adminis tration, his indefatigable crusade for Great Books as the foundation of liberal education, his editorial and research projects in association with Encyclopaedia Britannica, his courageous and sometimes militant advocacy of controversial and unpopular causes, and his brilliant, witty and fearless public utterances. President Hutchins at the Fund for the Republic.-- The Fund for the Republic was authorized by the Trustees of the Ford Foundation in October, 1951, by a grant of $1,000,000. In February, 1953, the grant was supplemented 180nA Conservative Educator," The New Republic, 130:16-17, March 22, 1954. 18LtModem Education and Its Critics," The American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education Yearbook, 1954, pp. 139“60. l^Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), n.p. 76 to include a total of $15,000,000 and the Fund was given its own Board of Directors, with the specification that the Fund was completely independent of the Ford Foundation. Clifford P. Case, a former Republican member of the House of Representatives from New Jersey, was elected to its Presidency in May of 1953 and took office in August. He resigned on April 1, 1954, and ran successfully for the Senate. Hutchins became the second President of the Fund for the Republic on June 1, 1954. The Board of Directors of the Fund made public this statement concerning the purpose of the Fund in February, 1953: . . . The major factor affecting civil liberties today, in our opinion, is the menace of Communism and Com munist influence in this country. Coupled with this threat is the grave danger to civil liberties in methods that may be used to meet the threat. We pro pose to undertake research into the extent and the nature of the internal Communist menace and its effect on our community and institutions. We hope to arrive at a realistic understanding of effective procedures for dealing with it. We regard the sphere of operation of the Fund as including the entire field of freedom and civil rights in the United States and take as our basic charter the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. . . . Out of our discussions has come a preliminary con clusion that the attention of the Fund should at this time be concentrated in the following five areas. . . . *^**Robert M. Hutchins, Report of The Fund For The Republic, May 31, 1955, pp. 9-10. 77 1. Restrictions and assaults upon academic freedom; 2. Due process and equal protection of the laws; 3. The protection of the rights of minorities; 4. Censorship, boycotting, and blacklisting by private groups; 5. The principle of guilt by association and its application in the United States today. The nature of the very purposes of the Fund indi cated its activities would be highly "controversial." The awareness of this was manifested by President Hutchins in an interview with the noted news analyst of the National Broadcasting Company, Chet Huntley. The broadcast was televised over NBC-TV, Sunday, December 18, 1955: Mr. Huntley: Did you anticipate from the beginning that the Fund for the Republic would come under attack? Is this something we may expect auto matically any time you start working in the area of civil liberties? Mr. Hutchins: Everybody who was concerned with the foundation of the Fund knew from the beginning that it would come under attack. The Fund was established as an independent corporation with a very carefully selected board, all of whom were warned that they would come under attack. They accepted membership only after this warning. The President of the Fund has been in the news frequently since the release of the first annual report during the summer of 1955. Maxine Greene, of the School of Education, New York University, wrote that Hutchins "has • ' • ^Freedom, Education, and the Fund, p. 214. •^■^Transcript furnished through the courtesy of Mr. Hutchins and the Fund for the Republic. 78 constantly been in the lime-light" since he became presi dent. Newsweek reported that the Fund was probably the "most controversial foundation" and that it grew more 1P7 "controversial" when Hutchins became its President. Favorable ethos.--President Hutchins spent some time in England during the Fall of 1954 delivering lec tures. He was very critical of the "McCarthyism" tenden cies in the United States. The London Times concluded the verdict on his speeches was that they were "rather fright ening."188 Evaluating the influence of Hutchins' addresses during 1955, Professor Maxine Greene of New York Univer sity, observed: . . . His words make a difference in the practical world. . . . In every one of his addresses he has had something to say about education. This makes him, in a sense, the schoolmen's emissary to the outside world; and, if for this reason alone, attention must be paid. Robert Maynard Hutchins, then dragon and saint, holy man and soapbox orator, reflects the integration as well as the contradictions in our culture. . . . i°9 18 6 "Robert Maynard Hutchins, Crusading Meta physician," School and Society. 83:164, May 12, 1956. 187mThe Prodigy Grown Older and the Strings He Holds on Fund’s Millions," Newsweek. 48:20, July 2, 1956; "Controversial Man," Newsweek. 46:65, November 7, 1955. 188 The Times Educational Supplement. October 24, 1954. 18^School and Society. May 12, 1956, pp. 165-66. i 79 During November, 1955, Hutchins appeared on "Meet the Press.'1 The program was reviewed by David R. Ebbitt of The New Republic. Most of the program centered on whether Hutchins would be willing to hire a Communist to work for the Fund. Hutchins refused to answer "Yes1 1 or "No" to the question. He did not explode or collapse under the barrage of hostile questions, but looked very tired when the show went off the a i r . - ^ O Reacting to the above article, the noted drama critic, John Crosby described the Fund's Presi dent as "a very literate man who can defend himself.1 1 -^1 Awards received by Mr. Hutchins.--Robert Hutchins is probably one of the most honored former university presidents living today. This is the list of institutions which awarded honorary degrees, usually the LL. D.: Univer sity of West Virginia, Lafayette College, and Oberlin, all in 1929; Williams College, 1931; Berea College, 1931; Harvard University, 1936; Tulane, 1938; University of Copenhagen, 1946; University of Illinois, 1947; Litt. D.: University of Frankfurt, 1948; University of Stockholm, 1949; Rollins College, 1950; ^2 Chicago, 1951.^3 The 190«iTeievision,1 1 The New Republic, 134:21, Janu ary 23, 1956. 3-91lqS Angeles Mirror News. February 15, 1956. *-92Current Biography. 1954. p. 358. ^■^Los Angeles Times. October 21, 1951. 80 University of Chicago announced an anonymous $300,000 gift 194 to provide a professorship in Hutchins1 honor. 7 Associate Director Hutchins was one of the nine Americans among the twenty eight nominated for the 1951 Nobel Peace Prize. He was nominated as a result of being Chairman of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution and 195 in connection with his duties at the Ford Foundation. The American Veterans Committee awarded him the Bill of Rights Award on October 7, 1955.^^ The 1,1 Chicago Post No. 170, The American Legion, gratefully awards this cer tificate of Appreciation to Robert Maynard Hutchins in 197 recognition of distinguished service. . . . The American Jewish Congress, Women1s Division of Chicago awarded him the annual award for 111 furthering the consti- 198 tutional principles of freedom and equality.1" 7 The Sidney Hillman Foundation presented its tenth Annual Award for meritorious public service to President Robert Maynard Hutchins," Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1954), pp. 344-45. ^ ^ Los Angeles Times. February 24, 1951. 1 96 Dwight Macdonald, The Ford Foundation, The Men and the Millions (New York: Reynal and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 78; Washington Post and Times Herald, October 8, 1955. 1 97 Walter Goodman, "That Dangerous Mr. Hutchins," The New Republic, 130:10, October 17, 1955. ^ ^New York Times, December 4, 1956. 81 Hutchins in January of 1959 for his . . . outstanding record in the fields of education, civil liberties, and civil rights. As Professor and Dean of Law at Yale and as President and Chancellor of the University of Chicago he enlarged the boundaries of academic freedom and initiated programs which helped make education a more effective servant of democracy. The Sidney Hillman Foundation salutes the Fund for the Republic and its outstanding leader for its leadership, integrity, and courage. The Fund has advanced indi vidual liberty through research, education, and pub lication. 1^9 Biographical summary: The influence on the Hutchins rhetoric.--The tradition of independence in the Hutchins family apparently shaped the personality and character of Robert Hutchins. Some of the vanity which critics were to note in Robert probably resulted from his brilliance and the pattern of independence set in his home. His non conformist conscience was nurtured both at home and later at Oberlin College. He still cherishes the "view that the independent individual is the heart of society" and the independence is his most precious attribute. Surely another result of family life was the religious fervor with which William Hutchins, Robert's father, resisted material ism. Though the evidence of religious ideals in Hutchins is relatively scant, there is, as Brigance has 199 The remarks of President John Lombardi, Los Angeles City College, in introducing Dr. Hutchins at the commencement address "What Next?" June 18, 1951. 2QQEducation for Freedom, pp. 13-14. 82 mentioned, some of a modem Savonarola in his moral fer- 201 vor. The next experience of Robert which made its impact was the meeting and close association of the peppery little philosopher, Mortimer Adler. Hutchins admits his formal education began in his senior year at Yale while taking law, but his education "began in earnest" at age thirty two Of)0 when he started reading the Great Books. Adler affected Hutchins’ philosophical position "very deeply" and this resulted in their teaching the Great Books course for twenty years at the University of Chicago.203 Aristotle’s Ethic5 have made a great impression on Hutchins according to the latter’s introduction to Freedom, Education, and the Fund.204- "In practical matters the end is the first principle" resulted in Hutchins asking what the purpose of education was. Apparently the religious fervor joined with the idealism of the young President of Chicago. He concluded the only valid end of college and university education was the development of the intellect. Yet, he feels that moral education is more important than 201uyear Decision in Education," Vital Speeches of the Day, 13:246, February 1, 1947. ^ ^Education for Freedom, p. 13. 203See Appendix B, p. 581. ^O^Hutchins, op. cit., p. 18. 83' intellectual education. Hutchins says that the whole world should practice Aristotle's Ethics, though this could not be done without "the support and inspiration of religious faith." The ideal man whom Aristotle "holds up to our admiration is almost divine Hutchins is fond of repeating the Aristotelian dictum that man is a rational animal. His speeches and writings frequently call for a "moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution." Chapter V presents an examination of this important phrase. The origin of this idea appears to be Aristotle's Ethics and his Politics. Aristotle, Plato, and St. Thomas Aquinas have made the greatest philo sophic imprint on Hutchins. Credit for the eventual dis covery of these philosophers by Hutchins goes to Adler. The last significant shift in the philosophy of Hutchins occurred during the period of 1940 to 1945 in his attitude toward entry into World War II when he felt we were not morally prepared for war. Then after the ex plosion of the atomic bomb, the liberal educator swung to a position favoring world government. He believed the moral basis for a world community has been established simply because nations could destroy themselves with ^**See "Morals, Religion, and Higher Education" in Freedom, Education, and the Fund, pp. 87-91. ^^See Chapter III, pp. 99-100. 907 nuclear power. The staunch defenses of academic freedom and the activities of Hutchins in the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic are in the early tradition of the then young University President. The independence of his ideas was applied to universities and colleges whose only purpose is to act as ''centers of independent thought and criti cism." Civil liberties had long been a concern to the former law student and professor. During the 1950 decade they became the prime concern of Hutchins as the Fund for the Republic financed studies investigating the ends of various American institutions, especially the "basic issues underlying a free society." ^^See Chapter III, footnote 59. CHAPTER III THE SPEECHES ON WAR AND EDUCATION Introduction The first major theme on which Hutchins spoke con sisted of speeches concerning war and education. During the 1950's he spoke primarily on civil liberties related to his capacity in the Ford Foundation and in the Fund for the Republic. Throughout the 1940's Hutchins spoke on the reforms needed in higher education and those addresses are analyzed in Chapter V. The present chapter attempts to provide a thorough criticism of the speeches on war and education, contrasting Hutchins' attitude prior to and after World War II. The focal point of this discussion has been on "The Proposition is Peace" and "The Issues in Education: 1946," both of which are found in full text in Appendix A. Citations from other speeches by Hutchins on war and education are also included. i The chapter is divided into a brief description of 5 the social milieu during the period when the speeches were ; delivered. The immediate audience situation in which the 85 861 |two addresses were presented is indicated. Next, the premises of Hutchins’ remarks were analyzed, including the statement of the premise, its source in his thinking, and the use made of the premise in the speeches. The reactions of the critics were then utilized to provide an objective |framework for the detailed criticism. An explanation of the significance of the premises in public speaking is in order. Hutchins has been noted for his unconventional ideas regarding education. These ideas are probably what has kept him in the forefront of educational reformers and as a spokesman for civil liber ties. The next section explains the importance of the premises and the method by which they were discovered in the rhetoric of Hutchins. Importance of evaluating the premises.--Thonssen land Baird indicate the importance of analyzing a speaker’s i basic assumptions: j The prospective aspect of logical analysis also is furthered by determining the premises from which the speaker argued. Did the speaker exercise wisdom in selecting the basic postulates upon which his reasoned | case rests? The critic who searches out these premises ! will, of course, find that their isolation can be j effected only through a thoughtful study of the his- ! torical pattern in which the speeches are set. Not j only that, but the accuracy with which the fundamental i tenets of a man’s reasoning are uncovered will depend ! upon penetrating insight into the orator himself, his I training, social conditioning, and relation to and ! attitude toward the complex problems of his time. And 87 in all of this inquiry, the critic must act dispas sionately and with detachment. He must survey the thought of others in the light of conditions operative at the time. 1 Much the same attitude toward premises is demon strated in the words of Parrish. "The main proposition (or propositions) may nowhere be specifically stated, but it should be ferreted out by the critic and clearly formu lated, and the supporting arguments should be marshaled under it to form a logical brief." Nichols reminds us an "evidentiary premise may be either a statement of fact or conclusion; and whether it is a fact or conclusion depends upon the inferential risk involved between the sense impressions of the original o witness and the statement of the authority. Bryant and Wallace make the following statement: . . . Often the starting point in reasoning is referred to as the premise (or premises) and the end point as the conclusion. Sometimes the premise is a matter of fact or opinion, and thus evidence is the starting point of reasoning.4 ^•Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criti cism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 337. ^Wayland Maxfield Parrish and Marie Hochmuth, American Speeches (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), p. 14. 3 Alan Nichols, Discussion and Debate (New York: jHarcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), pp. 303-304. ^Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamentals iof Public Speaking (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), p. 328. .. n 88 Hochrauth's writings, after which must of the pres ent study is modeled, suggest the following: The critic's function is to examine the speaker's premises, stated or implied, and to examine the truth of those premises. Inevitably he must ask such ques tions as: Does the orator argue from an abiding con cept of the nature of things? from a conception of expediency? from the authority of history? from similitudes? from the transcendental grounds? There are conventional means for evaluating the quality of premises. Does the premise presented correspond to data which may be revealed to the senses of observers? Does the truth of a premise yield to a pragmatic test? Is the truth of a premise believed by the many? Is the truth of a premise self-evident? However much the critic may wish to escape discriminat ing among values, as an effective rhetorical critic he cannot do so.5 Definition of a premise.--For the purposes of the present study the following definition of a premise has been used: A premise is a proposition, a fact, an opinion, 1 or a conclusion which is laid down by the speaker and is assumed, supposed, or proved; it serves as a ground or !starting point for the reasoning which attempts to reach a !conclusion and is directly related to the central idea of 'the speech. Selection of the premises.--The selection of a premise in any speech is somewhat arbitrary on the part of ^Marie Kathryn Hocbmuth, A History and Criticism of American Public Address (New York: Longmans, Green |and Co., 1955), III, 16. i ... 89 a rhetorical critic. Repeated examination of the speeches given by Hutchins resulted in the reduction of the premises or propositions to a limited number in each topic area. Elimination of premises which were repetitious in the war and education speeches reduced the number of premises to five, in civil liberties to nine, and in education to seven. Those twenty one premises provided a framework on which Hutchins erected his arguments and evidence. The conclusions of the rationalist educator and civil liber tarian have their taproots in this philosophic sub-soil. How were the premises located? Approximately one hundred of Hutchins' speeches were read before it became apparent that the three themes of war and education, civil liberties, and education were the major areas on which he concentrated his speaking. The nine addresses located in Appendix A were then selected as typical of these three areas and analyzed thoroughly. The analysis was made with a consideration of the rhetorical development of Hutchins from his early youth to his mature years as an educator and civil libertarian. It was determined what the central idea was in each of the nine speeches, then those premises bearing most directly were listed, with the original list considerably longer than the final twenty one premises. Next, the premises were checked to eliminate those which seemed 90 repetitious. Certainly a primary consideration also was whether or not the premise appeared in more than one address. Another screening device was the check made on Hutchins' ten books to see whether the premise was found there too. Presumably the books were lectures the speaker felt were his most crucial in his educational and civil liberty crusade. Incidentally, the nine speeches were selected before all his books were carefully scrutinized; later it was noted that only "The Proposition is Peace" did not appear in his books, probably because the war outdated the speech and Hutchins did not publish a book during that particular period. This then, was the method by which the premises were chosen. The study of Hutchins' background, the re duction of the primary speeches to nine in Appendix A, and the elimination of repetitious premises appeared to give a reasonable rationale for the location of those analyzed. The corroboration of these premises in the speaker's books and other addresses also aided the selection process. The reader may find the total pattern of the premises in Chap ter VII.6 Where possible, the reactions of members of the immediate audience were used as a basis of criticism. In 6See Chapter VII. many instances there were no responses available from the particular audience which heard the speech. Much of the criticism of the Hutchins ideas has come from those people who have read the speeches and reacted to them. Nearly all of the Hutchins addresses are found in print, either in periodicals or in his books. The next section presents a brief sketch of the social milieu during the 1940 to 1947 period. Only those events with a close relevance to the speeches of Hutchins are here described. At best, the historical sketch is subject to the inadequacies of historical interpretation which does not include a sufficient lapse of time to pro vide an accurate perspective. Since there is little material in the addresses of Hutchins related to the con duct of World War II, there is no attempt at portraying wartime conditions. Social Milieu, 1940-1947 Isolationism prior to the war.--Hutchins had main tained essentially an isolationist viewpoint before the war. He believed we should settle our domestic problems and stay out of any military conflict. Chicago was a stronghold of isolationist feeling and the America First Committee, which had the support of the Chicago Tribune, attained a membership of over one million members after 92 being formed in September, 1940.^ Hutchins also believed the United States would become totalitarian during the war, yet this did not occur. The American Civil Liberties Union® reported a year and one half after Pearl Harbor that Mour democracy can fight even the greatest of all wars and still maintain the essentials of liberty." We had con tinued open discussion of our national policy and there was little hysteria regarding Germans. Japanese, however, were placed in relocation centers outside of prohibited areas of the Pacific Coast.^ The primary effect of the war on education was to shorten the period for attaining the bachelor's degree. Much of the work done in colleges and universities con sisted of the Army and Navy Specialized Training Programs which streamlined course requirements so they could be completed more rapidly. Also, many of the faculty left their teaching positions to become members of the Armed Forces. The Manhattan Project at the University of Chicago ^Dwight Lowell Dumond, America in Our Time (New :York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), p. 601. ®Cf. post. Appendix A (111:196-98). o ^Horner Carey Hockett and Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Land of the Free (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 679. 93 resulted in the first chain atomic reaction on December 16, 1942. The consequences were the explosion of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico on June 16, 1945. The following August 6th this dreaded weapon was employed on Hiroshima and assisted in rapidly ending the war.^® The previous April the United Nations Conference had met at San Fran cisco and formed the basis of a world confederation. Post-war education.--The most significant change in higher education took place with the passage of the G. I. Bill of Rights entitling veterans to government-sponsored educational benefits. By July of 1951 $14,000,000,000 had been expended on the program. The college enrollment in 1949 was 2,456,000 compared to 1,364,000 a decade earlier. The Hutchins idea of Great Books education was hotly debated both at Chicago and in the educational world gener ally, and was rejected in most institutions.^ The War and Education Speeches The five premises found in the war and education addresses are presented here so the reader may view the total framework from which Hutchins argued. The specific citations to the speeches are provided in the detailed ■^Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr., and Nelson Manfred Blake, Since 1900 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), pp. 844-49. n lbid.. pp. 849-51. evaluation of the premises in the succeeding pages. (1) Until the United States is engaged in military action we must hope that we can avoid war. (2) We must show the world a nation which understands, values, and practices the four freedoms. (3) The alternatives before us are peace or the death of civilization. (4) Civiliza tion can be saved only by a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution to match the scientific, techno logical, and economic revolution in which we are living. (5) We know the fundamental problems of our time are philo sophical. The premises have been numbered in the order in which they appear in the speech. Whenever it was feasible to cite other Hutchins1 speeches than those in Appendix A containing the same, or a similar premise, citations appear in the regular footnote form. Citations to speeches found 1 0 in Appendix A follow by the means indicated. ^ The first premise follows: (1) "Until we are engaged in military action we 12 •^Citations to the specific address and the exact .lines are made in this manner. For example, "The Proposi- -tion is Peace" is the third speech found in chronological sequence in Appendix A. Thus, a citation such as (111:20) refers to line twenty of that particular speech. Since each address has its lines starting from one, the Roman numeral indicates the chronological order of the nine speeches located in Appendix A and the Arabic numeral its specific lines. must continue to hope that we can avoid the ultimate catastrophe1 ’ (111:28-30). Evaluation.— There was little direct evidence in early 1941 that the United States would be attacked, but by the end of the year it had become an accomplished fact. There was growing interventionist sentiment at the time of Hutchins* broadcast. The House and Senate had just passed the Lend-Lease Act by a two-to-one majority which author ized arms for Great Britain. There were many people who thought the United States could assist the democracies and still remain out of the conflict.^ Reaction to the speech was considerable and strongly felt on the Chicago campus. Jerome Kerwin, Pro fessor of Political Science, said Hitler would decide whether we would be drawn into war;^ thus, the United States had little control over its fate. An editorial in the Daily Maroon, the University of Chicago undergraduate newspaper, said it resented Hutchins' habit of placing the burden of proof on the opposition.^ The speaker had said "the burden of proof rests on those who claim we are about 1 ^ ■ ‘ -’ Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt. 1932-45 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, :1957), p. 118. • ^Daily Maroon [Supplement], April 8, 1941. ■^Daily Maroon, April 1, 1941. 96 to be1 1 attacked. Perhaps the time limits of a thirty minute broadcast resulted in Hutchins* challenging his opponents for proof, rather than bearing that burden him self. Hutchins debated William J. Donovan in Atlantic City before more than 30,000 Americans, most of whom were attending the national convention of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, on "America’s Town Meeting of the Air." Hutchins said he was for aid to Britain, but "against naval or military intervention in this war." The date was May 22, 1941.^ According to the New York Times of May 23, the arguments of Hutchins were better than those of Donovan as indicated by frequent applause for Hutchins, and at times he did not wait for it to subside. The proposition under debate was, "Shall we do whatever is necessary to insure a British victory?" Donovan had said, "We are in danger if Hitler wins." He said the greatest danger after Hitler had won the war in Europe would be from indirect 1 7 strikes through South America. ' The unique feature of "The Proposition is Peace" is the Hutchins attack on the alleged inevitability of war and 16 A. Craig Baird (ed.), Representative American Speeches: 1940-1941 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1941), XV, 41. 17Ibid., p. 36. his rebuttal concerning the suffering that would be conse quent. There is the attempt of the debater to make the "interventionists” prove that the United States would be attacked. Since Hutchins could not prove his side of the argument by specific evidence, he could only use the hypo thetical syllogism or an enthymeme to counter the growing feelings in favor of war. There are twenty nine instances of hypothetical reasoning in the address. Hutchins attempts to combat the "interventionist" tide with a rational appeal based on an historical comparison of the post-World War I era and the early 1940’s. Chicago was a stronghold of isolationist feeling prior to World War II. Such scholars as Dixon Wecter, Dwight Macdonald,^9 and John Gunt h e r ^ considered Hutchins a pacifist. Hutchins himself denied he was a member of the 21 America First Committee and said the extreme position of the pacifist is not tenable. Two of his speeches reminded Americans that man must be ready to die for the principles ■^"Can Metaphysics Save the World?" Saturday Review of Literature, 31:7, April 10, 1948. Profiles," The New Yorker. 31:59, December 17, 1955. John Gunther, Inside USA (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 377. 21 Representative American Speeches, XV, 45. of his community.22 He spoke on NBC radio during the intermission of the opera on December 29, 1940 stating this opinion. The University of Chicago convocation of June 11, 1940 was the other occasion at which he said, "We can detect the error in the extreme pacifist position." Hutchins maintained the burden of proof was on those persons stating the United States was about to be attacked. These individuals could only argue from cir cumstantial evidence as did Colonel William J. Donovan who had been the official observer in Europe for Secretary of Navy Frank Knox. Donovan alleged a victorious Germany would deal with South America precisely as she had done in the Balkans, penetrating first economically and politi cally, then by military conquest. He cited the march of Germany during the last eighteen months and eighteen days and said, those who say "we are not in danger, have every 23 factual presumption against them." Hutchins answered by saying we should deal justly with South America and adopt Secretary Frank Knox's proposal for an immediate customs 9 A union with them. ^ Less than nine months after the 22"What Shall We Defend?" Vital Speeches of the M , 6:546-49, July 1, 1940; New York Times, December 29. 0. 23 Representative American Speeches, XV, 38. 2^Ibid., p. 44. 99 convocation address was given at the University of Chicago, we were attacked by Japan on December seventh. Donovan had been more accurate historically than had Hutchins. Hutchins said that the election of 1940 gave the people no chance to vote for or against war since both Willkie and Roosevelt “declared for peace." This statement is correct according to Dumond. "Both [candidates] agreed to keep the country out of war unless we were attacked, and to aid Great Britain in every way short of war.M^ Perhaps one of the most effective arguments used by Hutchins asks the question, "What are we going to war for?" (1X1:77-179). The question closely related to the belief of the speaker "that in practical matters the end is the first principle," that recurrent Hutchins thought found in Aristotle's Ethics.^ There are eleven paragraphs devoted to this idea (111:77-179). Hutchins spoke as a private citizen over the radio in January 23, 1941 in opposition to Roosevelt's foreign policy. The speaker stated that he had supported Roosevelt up till this time, but now the United States was morally and intellectually unprepared to execute the moral mission Roosevelt outlined. Roosevelt had given his four freedoms 25 America in Our Time, p. 601. ^Robert Maynard Hutchins, Freedom, Education, and the Fund (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 18. 100 ' speech the same month and Hutchins said the country was attempting to evade its moral responsibilities by going to war. He asked, ’ ’What are we going to war for?" This same idea recurs several times in "The Proposition is Peace." The young president said that the aims of a democratic community are moral, i.e., devotion to law, equality, and justice for all its citizens. We should practice the four freedoms at home before we attempt to 27 force them on other nations. The rebuttal of five university of Chicago faculty members to "The Proposition is Peace" was broadcast over Chicago station WGN on Sunday, April 6, 1941. The follow ing professors spoke on the half hour broadcast: Jerome Kerwin of Political Science, Archibald MacLeish of Modem History, Richard McKeon, Dean of Humanities, Paul H. Douglas of Economics, and William Spencer, Dean of the 28 Business School and Professor of Business Law. Other faculty reactions were recorded in the Daily Maroon of April 1, 1941. The most vitriolic comments directed at Hutchins came from Archibald MacLeish, one of Roosevelt's speech ^"The Path to War," Vital Speeches of the Day, 7:258-61, February 15, 1941. ^®See Daily Maroon [Supplement] of April 1, 1941. 101 29 writers. MacLeish reminded the speaker that Turkey, Greece, and China were saving us from aggression even if they are not "worth saving or helping." He also accused Hutchins of wrenching from context the comments of Anthony Eden and Lord Halifax in speeches which actually gave the exact opposite of the implication given their quotations by Hutchins. MacLeish described this as "highly disingenu ous ." One of the most effective arguments used by Hutchins implies that Roosevelt advocated the restoration of pre-war boundaries in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France. MacLeish said this assumption was "totally 30 unsupported by evidence." Hutchins reminded his radio audience that the boundaries established after World War I on the principle of self-determination fell apart in twenty years. He also stated Roosevelt surely was not contem plating forcing the four freedoms (of worship, of speech, from want, and from fear) on the entire world because this would mean "perpetual war." A key paragraph concerns the Hutchins prediction that the United States would become totalitarian in on 3Waldo W. Braden and Mary Louise Gehring, Speech Practices (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 19. 30 Daily Maroon [Supplement], August 8, 1941, loc. cit. l 102 fighting against Germany, since it was totalitarian. MacLeish criticized the speaker for confusing the meaning of "total'1 with "totalitarianism." The editor of the Daily Maroon of April 1, 1941 said Hutchins did not tell what he meant by "totalitarianism,1 1 and defied him to prove that we would become as totalitarian as Germany was then. Hutchins was challenged to demonstrate that democracy would suffer more than a temporary set-back in the event victory was achieved. If he did not prove that, then he had not proved his major thesis, according to the Daily Maroon editor. Hutchins asserted that in victory our government would "scarcely [be] distinguishable" from those we fought against (111:220-22). This has proven to be a historical exaggeration. Though rationing and price controls were utilized during wartime, the nation did not become un democratic even though there was some loss of individual 31 freedom. Nor did capitalism perish as Hutchins pre dicted, As Anton J. Carlson, the famed physiologist at Chicago said, the world was in a plight because the fault lies in human nature and not in the capitalistic system. ^ "America is evolving a tertium quid [mediating factor] ■^See Daniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 218. • ^Daily Maroon. April 1, 1941, loc. cit. 103 between an unmanaged capitalism and a tightly planned and managed socialism," according to a leading economic his torian, Max Lemer.^ A critical letter came to Hutchins from Lombard, Illinois. It said the argument that economic exhaustion would occur if we entered the war was not intel lectually sound due to inconsistency. Yet, the speaker had A / decried materialism in the society. Hutchins predicted we would have over ten million unemployed after the war (111:212-15). We have not had over five million so far. "The spirit of peace will be determined by the spirit of the countries which make it" (111:288-89). Hutchins continues, "No country can win a democratic victory unless it is democratic" (111:293-94). In view of the settlement of World War II, particularly in Europe, Hutchins appears to be historically accurate in his first statement. England, France, Russia, and the United States were the Big Four in determining the peace terms. The spirit of conciliation dominated the negotiations, but the conflict in ideology between the Western World and Russia soon manifested itself in the form of the Cold War. Hutchins, the idealist and moralist, predicted that the •^America As A Civilization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 344. 3^"The proposition is Peace," folder of critical letters, The Hutchins Papers, William Rainey Memorial Library, University of Chicago. 104 spirit which ensued World War I would follow World War II. Though there have been notable improvements toward inter national unity through the United Nations, the spirit of conflict in political and economic ideology still exists between the West and the East. Three of the Big Four countries were democracies, but Russia was not, and its aims would not be considered democratic. Even the Big Three have not lived up to the near-perfect ideals Hutchins apparently envisions in a true democracy. "A perfect theory of democracy can be made out of the metaphysical and ethical writings of Aristotle." Because men are men, i.e., they are fallen from grace and can not bring the good life and the good society to pass on this earth.^ The speaker often advocates that we practice the four freedoms, because they are the ideals by which a democracy should live. He tells why this is so in the next premise. (2) "We must show the world a nation which under stands, values, and practices the four freedoms" (III: 269-71). Evaluation.--The second premise refers to Roosevelt’s famous four freedoms speech of January, 1941. 35 "Morals, Religion, and Higher Education," in Freedom, Education, and the Fund, pp. 91-92. Freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom from want and from fear were the liberties enumerated by him. The President’s speech was delivered to Congress in January of 1941 in which he contrasted the new Nazi order with the kind of world the United States wanted. The latter was founded on the four freedoms. Freedom from want meant a healthy peacetime life through the economic understandings of all countries. Freedom from fear meant the reduction of armaments so no nation could oppress another. A Committee to Defend America by aiding the Allies headed by William Allen White of Kansas "carried on a widespread campaign to O £ support the President’s course."0 Hutchins reminded the citizens of the United States that they still suffered from both want (the Depression) and from fear of war. According to the speaker, this country preferred going to war rather than facing up to its domestic responsibilities for improving the existing society. Generally the faculty reaction at Chicago was di rected against the perfection of the domestic situation at the expense of the deteriorating international scene. "Hutchins . . . has been misled by his love of perfection into adopting a role which plays directly into Hitler’s 36 Hockett and Schlesinger, op. cit.. p. 668. 106 hand," said Jerome Kerwin. Philosopher Richard McKeon believed Hutchins turned away from an international crisis which affected the domestic scene. The defeat of Hitler would give us a chance to perfect the domestic environment was the view held by William Spencer, Dean of the Business 37 School and a professor of law. "If we would change the face of the earth we must first change our hearts." This phrase was adapted from the O Q noted Catholic philosopher, Jacques Maritain. Perfection seems to be an ideal toward which Hutchins usually points and his view is derived from Aristotle's Ethics. The ideal man is "almost divine" according to the interpretation 39 given to Aristotle. Hutchins' belief, that the nation must perfect itself domestically before trying to improve the international situation, seems related to the idea that society may be improved through the individual rather than through social reform brought about by education.^® •^Daily Maroon [Supplement], April 8, 1941, loc. cit. 38 Robert Maynard Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), pp. 43-44. 39 See Robert Maynard Hutchins, "One Last Chance," Chicago Maroon, June 14, 1946. ^Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Conflict in Educa tion in a Democratic Society (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 69. 107 The general appeal is unquestionably pointed at the isolationist feelings existing in the nation in 1941. The isolationists had such well-known spokesmen as Senators Gerald Nye, Burton Wheeler, and Robert Taft, The Chicago Tribune and the Saturday Evening Post. Interventionists formed another important segment of public opinion. "Mid way between these groups was the dominant opinion of the / 1 country represented by the White House." As late as October, 1941 American public opinion showed "reluctance to wage open warfare" against the Germans.^ Hutchins, the believer in perfection of man along Aristotelian ideals, was not typical of the isolationists. He believed we were not morally ready for war, and should put our domestic house in order first. His isolationism was not of the type that Senator Burton Wheeler’s was.^ Hutchins himself stated, "I am not an isolationist. I have not joined the America First Committee. . . . I should like to join a committee for Humanity First. , . Max B. Hagedom, Jr., a University of Chicago faculty member, said ^Hockett and Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 667-68. ^Richard Hofstader, The American Political Tradi tion (New York: Vintage Books! 1958), p.~346. / Q Adolph E. Meyer, "Hutchins of Chicago Univer sity," American Mercury. 58:457, April, 1944. ^Representative American Speeches. XV, 45. 108 that Hutchins favored neither "isolation nor appease ment."45 "Our fear is the result of ignorance. Our funda mental error is the overwhelming importance that we attach to material goods" (111:321-24). This is a key concept in the philosophy of the rational idealist, Robert Hutchins. He is a strong non-materialist as his writings and addresses demonstrate. Material prosperity is the means of cultivating the intellect. Of course, the contemplative life is the highest activity of man in which he uses his reasoning powers. The Higher Learning in America carried this message: . . . If education is rightly understood, it will be understood as the cultivation of the intellect. The cultivation of the intellect is the same good for all men in all societies. It is, moreover, the good for which all other goods are only means. Material pros perity, peace and civil order, justice and the moral virtues are means to the cultivation of the intellect. 46 • • • A comparison of the ideals concerning education and materialism is appropriate here. To what extent do the tenets of Hutchins* educational ends conform to the reali ties of a pragmatic American society in the twentieth cen tury? Max Lemer gives some insight into the actual life 45"Mr. Hutchins and Absolutism," The New Republic, 104:439, March 31, 1941. 4^Robert M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 67. 109 goals and the pursuit of happiness: . . . By the turn of the twentieth century a new pat tern of life purposes emerged. Its components were success, prestige, money, power, and security. . . . It might be better to call it simply the five-goal system, since each of the goals has enormous pull for the American imagination and a sovereign place in the constellation as an equal among equals.4' The ideals advocated by Hutchins are certainly not very evident in our culture. Perhaps this is because the ideals of Aristotle, from which Hutchins’ philosophy pri marily springs are too high for men of less brilliance than the speaker. Max Lemer says the central stream of Ameri can philosophy has probably been that of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, who were all pragmatists. The philosophic "Right" in religion, Reinhold Neibuhr, and Hutchins in education, have challenged these ideals.48 The philosophy of Hutchins was not practiced during this century to any great extent. Referring to education, Lemer comments: . . . The Hutchins group may be too self-consciously intellectual and has laid itself open to the charge of nostalgic archaism. But its critics are in danger of forgetting that the transmission of the cultural herit age itself may become a radical instrument for a new approach to education in a mass democracy. . . .4* The American tradition never accepted the idealism of the ^America as a Civilization, p. 689. 48Ibid., p. 724. 4^Ibid., p. 748. i 110 "'elitist* rationalism as represented" by Hutchins, accord ing to Professor John Brubacher.^ "It is our task in this country to realize the true ideals of human life, the true organization of human society, the true democracy" (111:362-64). "Society exists to promote the happiness of its members and that happiness consists in the development of the highest powers of men" (111:367-69). In the Gottesman Lectures delivered at the University of Upplsala, Sweden, in 1951, and in the Mar- fleet Lectures given at the University of Toronto during 1952, Hutchins explained these ideas more fully. He said, "Only democracy, in which all men rule and are ruled in turn for the good life of the whole community, 51 can be an absolutely good form of government." Earlier in the same lecture he stated: . . . A sound philosophy in general suggests that men are rational, moral, and spiritual beings and the improvement of men means the fullest development of their rational, moral, and spiritual powers. All men have these powers, and all men should develop them to the fullest extent.*2 Richard McKeon, Dean of the Humanities at Chicago voiced this reaction in rebuttal to "The Proposition is ■^John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Educa tion in Transition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 377. 51 The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, p. 70. - ^Ibid., p. 69. Ill Peace.1 1 Hutchins has stated the problem in terms of false alternatives which can not be stated in terms of action. He turns from international crises which affect our domes tic action. Hutchins' "proposition is unrelated to the facts of the case, and the reasons by which he supports his proposition are unsuited to the solution of a practical problem. Part of the appeal in "The Proposition is Peace" was presumably directed at the one hundred twenty five University of Chicago faculty members who sided with Roosevelt. The New Republic rebuttaled the Hutchins' speech of January 23rd as that of "the absolutist" and linked him with Communists, Socialists, pacifists, and Nazis who speak and think in terras of frozen moral cate gories.-*^- Hutchins was staunchly opposing the foreign policy of Roosevelt, whom he had supported until January, 1941. Hutchins apparently demonstrated some courage in voicing his opinion in opposition to the dominant majority of public opinion. - * ■* Listener responses were evident in ~*^Daily Maroon [Supplement], April 8, 1941, . loc. cit. -*^"Hutchins and the Absolute," New Republic. 104:132, February 3, 1941. -*^See Hockett and Schlesinger, op. cit.» p. 668. 112 the letters sent to Hutchins. A Chicago woman described the speech as a "courageous stand in opposition to war." A Ford dealer from the same city said, "Thank God that this country has leaders like you who are unafraid to voice the sentiment of the majority of our people." A professor of religion from Lafayette College in Pennsylvania described the speech as the "truest and finest utterance of these trying times." Not all the letters were favorable. A Chicago attorney remarked that if the Nazis survived, the nation could have no peace. A person from New York said Hutchins was deluding the American people. Another Chicago person said, "Appeasement, defeatism," while another fellow towns man of Hutchins said his arguments are "scarcely ever relevant to the subject. The greatest weakness of the speech was the lack of concrete evidence to prove the generalizations. The bitter rebuttal of MacLeish is unquestionably overstated, but contains a significant amount of truth: . . . Hutchins says the proposition has "nothing but its reason to recommend it." This language must mean that the proposition is clearly stated, that its main points are proved, and the argument gives due con sideration to present realities. For a man who lays C £ The Hutchins Papers, William Rainey Harper Library, University of Chicago. 113 such store by reason, Mr. Hutchins shows strange dis regard for the meaning of words and the accurate statement of facts.57 One can conclude the reasoning in "The Proposition is Peace" is brilliant, but the factual accuracy and pre diction is rather weak. There is little doubt that the appeal was meant to reach the rational side of man. "The Issues in Education" is the second address Hutchins presented relating education to war in the series of nine speeches which were analyzed in the present study. No other address provides a better insight into Hutchins’ educational philosophy, with the exception of "Reminis cences."^^ The special significance of the speech is the contrast with Hutchins' earlier remarks in "The Proposition is Peace." The former represented an isolationist view point, while the latter demonstrates the internationalist view of the speaker. As Current Biography recorded, Hutchins called the isolationist position "an 'anachronism' in the atomic age."^ This speech is one of the first in which Hutchins directly advocated a world government and discussed the problems of leisure. ^ Daily Maroon [Supplement], April 8, 1941, loc. cit. -*®See Chapter V for a detailed criticism. -^Marjorie Dent Candee (ed.), Current Biography. 1954 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1954), p. 357. 114 (3) "The alternatives before us are . . . peace or the death of civilization" (V:11-12). Evaluation.--Two alternatives are presented, but other possibilities are neglected. During the Korean War, for example, we did not have peace, yet we did not have the death of civilization. Hutchins assumes the absolutes of either peace or the death of civilization while recent history demonstrates that "limited wars" are the instru ments of diplomacy and aggression. We have maintained the "balance of terror" vis-a-vis Russia, but thus far have averted the nuclear destruction which might result in the death of civilization. Thus, the disjunctive enthymeme employed by Hutchins is historically invalid because other probabilities can arise, and did. However, thirteen years after the speech, the issue of survival of man on this planet is still paramount. The distinguished geochemist, Harrison Brown, made these remarks in an address at the University of Illinois: . . . We have got to face the fact that we are simply not well-educated to survive in this modern world. . . . The answers to these questions [those concerning education and survival] may well determine whether man continues to inhabit our planet. . . . Professor Brown and other leading experts of education apparently agree that education and the problem of survival ^^"Point of No Survival," Saturday Review, 41:18, December 27, 1958. 1X5 are deeply interwoven. Hutchins' argument seems to have met the test of thirteen years time, even though it neglected the contingency of "limited wars." Hutchins debated George Earle, the former governor of Pennsylvania, on America’s Town Meeting Broadcast of April 25, 1946. The immediate audience was at Town Hall in New York City. Hutchins argued that an A-bomb race with Russia could only lead to world suicide and that we would be defenseless when she had the bomb too. Hutchins says our economic and political systems will undergo terrific strain if we do survive (V:22-23). This is a key argument under the premise. The whole economy has not yet fallen to pieces in the "era of leisure and abundance." We have reached the "affluent society," but economically we are not falling apart. In fact, some of the leading economists are criticizing us for not pro ducing more. Typical of them during the 1958 recession was Leon H. Keyserling, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers. These are his thoughts con cerning productivity. "During the past five years, our total economic growth in real terms has averaged little better than half of the needed growth for full prosperity. H 62 . * • * ^New York Times, April 26, 1946. 69 "The Road Back to Prosperity," The Progressive, 22:7, April, 1958. 116 Hutchins says that the whole economy may fall to pieces because of the use of atomic power. Private enter prise would not control this energy. It should be remem bered that thirteen years after this speech, the economy has not been disrupted by utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. There are several privately owned plants working on the development of this type of power, but there is no government monopoly today. However, we can not predict accurately what may happen in the future con cerning the influence of atomic energy on the economy. Another key argument is that ’ ’the principal prob lems of the government will be security and boredom" (V:62-64). The topic of leisure is becoming more important as the work week is gradually declining in length. In President Grant1s day the seventy hour week was common, while today forty five per cent of office workers put in less than forty hours. We can not tell whether we are headed for a cultural revolution or "for a hell of mass boredom modified by home carpentry, hi-fi, plush motels, and ping-pong." Bendiner believes high school graduates of today can look forward to a twenty four hour week by retirement age. The idea of security as a goal was criticized by ^Robert Bendiner, "Could You Stand a Four-Day Week?" The Reporter. 17:10, August 8, 1957. 117 Hutchins in a commencement address at the University of Chicago delivered on June 15, 1945. Apparently the reiteration of this idea was made in the section quoted above from "The Issues in Education." Yet, "security" is the important newcomer of the five goals in the pursuit of happiness evident in our contemporary American society. It is not only economic security, but psychic security as well. Max Lemer states the problem skillfully: "The real tragedy lies rather in the psychic insecurity which carries with it a yearning for a secure niche in a known and orderly structure and thereby strips the individual of his individuality. . . ."65 Hutchins' second most important premise is the next one. "Man is a rational animal" is the only other assump tion of greater importance to the speaker. The following triple-faceted statement about man's nature is directly related to the modem technological society. (4) "Civilization can be saved only by a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution to match the scien tific, technological, and economic revolution in which we are living" (V:99-102). 6^"The New Realism," Vital Speeches of the Day, 11:601, July 15, 1945. ^Lemer, op. cit., p. 692. i 118 Evaluation.— The speeches of Hutchins frequently call for a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution, though this is the first time they are combined with the scientific, technological, and economic revolution. The premise, one of the major ones in Hutchins’ thinking, apparently originates in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The relationship between morals and intellect is stated: Virtue, then being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). For two decades the liberal educator reiterated "the Aristotelian dictum that man is a moral, intellectual, and spiritual being.An admirer of the speaker, Milton Mayer, who is prone to exaggeration, says Hutchins is "try- 68 ing to revolutionize the modern world." Immediate re actions of the American Council of Education are largely inaccessible, however, the University of Chicago faculty responded to Hutchins’ "moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution" unequivocally. His January speech at the 66 Richard McKeon (ed.), Introduction to Aristotle (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), il03a, 14-19. ^Maxine Greene, "Robert Maynard Hutchins, Crusad ing Metaphysician," School and Society. 83:163, May 12, 1956. ^"Commando Hutchins," The Progressive. 8:18, May 1, 1944. 119 faculty-trustee dinner brought out faculty opposition to any moral commitment other than that dedicated to the truth.^ Professorial opposition came partially due to the proposal made by Hutchins that the faculty should turn over money earned outside the University to the school. It is difficult to criticize the all-encompassing nature of the Hutchins generalization regarding the three revolutions. What he means by the moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution is difficult to ascertain. He be lieves society can be improved only "by the improvement of the individuals who compose it. . . . The individual is the heart of society."Education is a secondary, dependent subject . . . [where] the philosophy of education is merely 71 moral and political philosophy." There is an echo of 72 Platonic philosophy in these sentiments. The most specific Hutchins has been regarding his "moral, spiritual, and intellectual revolution" was a convocation address in Rockefeller Memorial Chapel on ^"Hutchins' Revolution," Newsweek, 23:91, June 5, 1944; "Chicago Commando," Time, 43:56, June 5, 1944. 70 The Conflict of Education in a Democratic Society, p~ 6; Greene, loc. cit. ^Robert Maynard Hutchins, The University of Utopia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 33. 72 '^Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit.. pp. 376-77. i 120 June 16, 1946. Aristotle maintained that the ideal man 73 should be almost divine. The "tentative and hesitant approaches to the lines which a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution might follow" were enunciated by Hutchins in the White Lectures on Citizenship at Louisiana State University in 1941. The moral and spiritual reformation demands a rational view of man, the state, and the order of goods. Unlimited acquisi tion of material goods is not consistent with the basic law of human nature which calls for sufficiency only. Wisdom and goodness are the desired ends, not unbounded posses- 74 sions. The basic law of human society is the development of man's highest powers the intellectual virtues. The state is the means to the end, that is the virtue and in telligence of the people who seek happiness. The state is held together by justice for the common good consisting of "peace, order, and an equitable distribution of economic goods." The political order is supreme over the economic order since it is the obligation of the state to provide for the common good. Sufficiency of economic goods is all that each man should derive according to the laws of ^"A Moral, Spiritual, and Intellectual Revolu tion," The Journal of Higher Education, 18:235-38, May, 1947. ^Education for Freedom, pp. 44-48. 121 nature. "Every act of man is a moral act, to be tested by moral, and not economic, criteria."^ The moral, intellectual, and spiritual reformation for which the world waits depends, then, upon true and deeply held convictions about the nature of man, the ends of life, the purposes of the state, and the order of goods. One cannot take part in this revolution if one believes that men are no different from the brutes, that morals are another name for the mores, that free dom is doing what you please, that everything is a matter of opinion, and that the test of truth is im mediate practical success. Precisely these notions lie at the bottom of the materialism that afflicts us; precisely these notions are used in the attempt to justify man’s inhumanity to man. The revolution to which we are called must end in the destruction of these notions and their power over individual and political action. Those who are called most clearly to this revolu tion are the people of this country, who may yet have time. We must, by reconstructing our own lives, begin the reconstruction of economic, social, and political life. This means that we must reconstruct education, directing it to virtue and intelligence. It means that we must look upon economic activity, not as the end of life, but as a means of sustaining life, a life di rected to virtue and intelligence. It means, too, that economic activity must be ordered to the common good, the good of the political society, the aim of which is virtue and intelligence. It means, in short, the per sonal. ,rather than the economic, rationalization of life. ^6 The Bedell Lecture given by Hutchins entitled "Morals, Religion, and Higher Education" on October 24, 1948 at Kenyon College provides some insight into the mean ings of the triple revolution. By morals Hutchins means ^•*Ibid.. p. 46. 7^Ibid., pp. 47-48. 122 good habits appropriate or good for the organism. He believes the mass media are "the most important factor in moral and cultural development." Though he stresses in tellectual development as the primary function of the college and university, the liberal educator feels moral education is more important. Higher education should dis cover the means by which education can promote the forma tion of good habits. "Aristotle's Ethics [can not be practiced] without the support and inspiration of religious faith. . . . The moral virtues cannot be consistently prac ticed without divine aid." He concludes by saying, "A moral act is one performed in the right way under the right circumstances." ^ The "moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution" is the premise which occurs more frequently in the ad dresses of Hutchins than any other. The only other premise which appears as frequently or significantly is the Aristo telian dictum that man is a rational animal. Considering the frequent use of the terms moral, intellectual, and spiritual, it is indeed unfortunate that Hutchins did not define them more precisely. Whether this is intentional in ,the Hutchins rhetoric, it is impossible to tell. Perhaps this is a phrase which gets a favorable reaction because I ^^Freedom, Education, and the Fund, pp. 81-100. 123 it is so abstract that the audience does not question what it means. Or more probably, the philosophic base is so complex that Hutchins does not attempt to explain it either in his speeches or his writings. When one attempts to clarify the meaning of a moral revolution, it apparently means a world in which good habits are performed. Evidently it is those habits which are good in relation to the end or purpose of the organ ism. The moral act is performed the right way under the right circumstances. The intellectual revolution is apparently the ideal of having people all over the world studying from the Great Books. Naturally the liberal education forms the ideal type education for a common civilization according to Hutchins. Since the rational powers are the highest powers of man and those which differentiate him from animals, it follows that the pursuit of rationality is the end of life 78 which results in happiness. The spiritual revolution apparently rests on the possession of religious inspiration. Hutchins admits he has been influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas. The speeches of the liberal educator frequently call for practicing the 78 For a full consideration of man as a rational animal, see Chapter V. 124 79 brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God. I Hutchins explains the relation of the government, society, and the schools in achieving man's highest powers. This is as near as he has come in defining the "moral, spiritual, and intellectual revolution." . . . Only democracy, in which all men rule and are ruled in turn for the good life of the whole community, can be an absolutely good form of government. The community rests on the social nature of man. It requires communication among its members. They do not have to agree with one another; but they must be able to understand one another. And their philosophy in general must supply them with a common purpose and a common concept of man and society adequate to hold the community together. Civilization is the deliberate pursuit of a common ideal. The good society is not just a society we happen to like or to be used to. It is a community of good men.°0 He continues by explaining the relation of learning to world government: . . . The world of law and justice for which we yearn, the world-wide political republic, cannot be realized without the world-wide republic of learning. The civilization we seek will be achieved when all men are citizens of the world republic of law and justice and of the republic of learning all their lives long.°l The phrase "scientific, technological, and economic revolution in which we are living" is not at all concrete. However, it seems most people would agree we are living in ^"The Issues in Education" (V:127-29). ^The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, p. 70. 81Ibid., p. 76. I 125 it. At least Adlai Stevenson concurs that we are living in "a time of ferment in technology" and in "a period of 82 revolution in science." Apparently Hutchins feels the intellectual revolu tion is the most important of the three. "The cultivation of the intellect is the same good for all men in all socie ties. It is moreover, the good for which all other goods are means.In other words, the intellectual revolution is necessary to bring about world community to bind the civilization together. If liberal education is vital in forming the basis for world community, then there would seem to be little hope for a long time in such an achievement. Particularly since there is so much disagreement regarding the need and content of liberal education in the United States. It seems apparent that the world at large is hardly practicing the type of education advocated by America's leading ex ponent of the Great Books curriculum. England and Europe persist in the use of the classical curriculum generally OA similar to that Hutchins advocates. H ^"Morality and Politics," Saturday Review, 42:38, February 7, 1959. 0 9 The Higher Learning in America, p. 67. 84 Hyman G. Rickover, Education and Freedom (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 170-71. 126 Hutchins believes the purpose of the university is to increase the rational powers of man so that they may be used for good ends. Thus, education should cultivate the intellectual virtues through the development of reason. It is especially significant that this is the first speech in which Hutchins advocated world government as a consequence of the three revolutions. The development of nuclear energy through the Manhattan Project at the University con vinced Hutchins that man must attain common goals. A supporting argument employed by Hutchins is that he believes in world government. This is a significant contrast from the isolationist attitude evident in "The Proposition is Peace." As early as September 15, 1943, he was telling an audience at the fiftieth anniversary of the Field Museum in Chicago that a world organization was on 85 the way. In a speech to the National Association of Visual Dealers in Chicago on August 5, 1947, Hutchins said films "can do more than any single thing to unite the world.He told students at the University of Chicago on V-E Day that we must treat Germany and Japan with jus tice and that it was impossible to have world government ®-*"The Value of the Museum," Science, 98:334, October 15, 1943. Q £ "Portrait," Saturday Review of Literature, 30:18, September 13, 1947. 127 87 without paying for it. At the Modern Forum in Beverly Hills High School on November 18, 1946 Hutchins said that a world government must be promoted on the basis of a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution throughout the world.®® Up till the time of the detonation of the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 Hutchins believed no moral basis for a world state existed. After that event, he felt world government was the only hope of QQ abolishing war. 7 An important chain of Hutchins' reasoning is the following: "Community requires communication, communication requires understanding, and if understanding is not to lead to hatred and fear, the ambitions of the peoples of the earth must be such as not to arouse hatred and fear" (V:119-24). Community normally "implies 'belonging' as well as associating; it involves a sense of common destiny and imposes the obligation of loyalty," according to I. B. Berkson. Community implies common ideas and aspirations.^® ®7"In the Name of Our Dead," Christian Century; 62:626, May 23, 1945. 88"jhe state of the Nation," New York Times, iNovember 19, 1946. ®^University of Chicago Roundtable discussion reported in the New York Times of August 13, 1945. 9®The Ideal and the Community (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 283. 128 Hutchins says, men, being social animals, live in communi- ties and 1 1 their philosophy in general must supply them with 91 a common purpose . . . but "they do not have to agree with one another. In other words, community in the world means a common desire on the part of nations to survive the dangers magnified by atomic weapons. Communication must exist between the nations to achieve world understanding. This would not necessarily imply they must agree, but they must have the common purpose of survival. World government "can live and last only as it institutionalizes the brotherhood of man" (V:128-29). Berkson says world organization requires two condi tions of unity, that of the material and an area of common beliefs. Nations must work toward "the development of a basic unity of belief and a sense of community with all mankind." It can rest only on an ethical ideal, such as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.^ It will be remembered here that Berkson is an extender of John Dewey's philosophy. Hutchins argued that world government and world 9^xhe Conflict of Education in a Democratic Society, p. 70. 92loc. cit. ^The Ideal and the Community, pp. 175, 179. 129 community must come about together in a speech before an audience at the University of Denver on October 13, 1947. He said he disagreed with the leading theologian, Reinhold Niebhur, that the world community must precede world government. Hutchins maintained the two must interact with each other. The United Nations is a means of bringing Q A about world government. ^ Chancellor Hutchins presented the Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University in Milwaukee under the auspices of the Aristotelian Society during 1949. He said, "The- only perfect community is a world state. It is the only com munity that is self-sufficing. Every smaller community requires, in the phrase of St. Thomas, the help of another. A moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution "is necessary, and therefore possible" (V:152-53). The weak ness of the argument is quite obvious. Hutchins is arguing the three revolutions are possible, yet the danger of world-wide suicide is probable. Or at least it would seem to be. Therefore, what he really balances off against each other is possibility and probability. Or, perhaps he is setting the long-range ideal. ^ " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Foundations of World Order," Congressional Digest. 27:202, September, 1948. St. Thomas and the World State (Milwaukee: Mar quette University Press, 1949), p. 40. 130 "We must regard the continuing education of our people throughout life as our principal responsibility" (V:209-211). This must be done according to Hutchins to save us from boredom and to bring about world community. Robert Bendiner reminds us that adult education has largely been neglected in our society, in spite of the prospects of a four day week in which leisure will be abundant and nearly universal. The need is for more than adult classes or exten sion courses such as we now have. It is for a fresh concept altogether--a national interest in continuous education, through a combination of formal institu tions, specialized television, discussion groups like the Great Books, and perhaps above all, the ancient method of person-to-person instruction. If leisure makes it possible for more and more people to learn, it can also provide more and more people to teach. Even a leading pragmatist educational philosopher agrees with Hutchins concerning continuous learning: . . . We should reconstruct our whole traditional con ception of the learning-span. We should insist that education dare not cease with the termination of primary, secondary, or even college training. We should see that the perplexities of life usually in crease rather than decrease with adulthood, and that only democracy has the full power to provide facili ties for their intelligent solution.97 Jacques Maritain, the leading Catholic philosopher, ^The Reporter. August 8, 1957, p. 14. 97 Theodore Brameld, Ends and Means in Education: A Midcentury Appraisal (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 135. 131 pointed the direction for education's responsibility con cerning leisure nearly twenty years ago: . . . The education of tomorrow must provide the common man with the means for his personal fulfillment, not only with regard to his social and political activities in the civil commonwealth, and to the activities of his leisure hours.98 Adults must be educated in liberal education be cause Hutchins believes only they would have the influence to "affect the course of events" in the next few years. Apparently this idea arose from the Great Books course for Q Q adults established at Chicago in 1946. 7 This educational experience combined with the Hutchins belief that liberal education should provide the common intellectual heritage on which world community, in the form of world government, should be established. The philosophical roots of the position maintained by Hutchins are explained by Mortimer Adler. He described the primary function of the mind as the "essential ability to reason." In the intellectual tradition (the Great Books written mostly by laymen), he "discerns an unbroken— and unbreakable--thread of continuity." He sees "in all men an essentially common and essentially constant nature. ^ E d u c a t i o n at the Crossroads (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 90. 99Current Biography. 1954. p. 356. •^^Mortimer j. Adler and Milton Mayer, The Revolu tion in Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 172-73. 132 "It is impossible to rely on institutions which have no community within them to lay the foundation for a community in this country or a community in the world" (V:292-95). This quotation from Hutchins seems to refute previous remarks. In effect, the speaker says that world community must be based upon the liberal arts and a common intellectual tradition. Yet, later in the speech, he argues that the universities are not providing the com munity of ideas because scientific development has provided the consequent specialization. The specialization negates possible communication because there is not a common under standing among the specialists who tend to diversify knowl edge rather than unify it. Reacting to "The Issues in Education," Norwood Brigance attempted a rebuttal before the opening of the Convention of the Speech Association of America in New York, 1946. Brigance characterized Hutchins as "a curious cross between Peck's Bad Boy in education, and a lonely, austere Savonarola who thunders, ’Repent ye, or be doomed.'" Referring to the Great Books curriculum, he says, "Hutchins' plan of bookworm education fails in the ;test of historic reason." Brigance then cited the case of China's education of 2,500 years ago which he alleged stilled the spirit of inquiry. Part of the obligation of education is to train a student "to be able to do l 133 something, as well as know something.Both Brigance and Hutchins agree discussion should be a primary method in teaching and reaching decisions. Professor Baird described the speech as one in the general tradition of the Hutchins principles. . . . His tenets and programs of educational action, nevertheless, were here stated with fresh vigor. . . . He has steadily matured as a platform leader. He has readiness of ideas and of language, abundance of per sonal and emotional proof, analytical and organiza tional power, and extempore ability. He is especially resourceful in adapting his ideas to various types of audiences, including radio listeners. **-02 Hutchins says that liberal education must be given so man can achieve the habitual vision of greatness. Chapter V, containing Hutchins' educational speeches, pre sents detailed criticism of this theory. Alvin C. Eurich, Director of the Fund for the Advancement of Education, reviewed four recent books in education, all of which urged a greater emphasis on intel lectual excellence. Eurich was hopeful the books would contribute to greater clarity in American education: . . . As a nation we might actually clarify our goals, intensify our concern with the fullest development of our human resources for sounder, more imaginative 101»Year of Decision in Education," Vital Speeches of the Day, 13:246-49, February 1, 1947. 102 Representative American Speeches: 1945-1946 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1946), XIX, 262-72. 134 solutions to critical problems, and thereby reshape our destiny. The stakes are high.103 Hutchins believes fundamental problems go to first prin ciples, that is, to the ultimate causes. For this reason he places great reliance on philosophy and the last premise in this chapter demonstrates it. (5) "We know the fundamental problems of our time are philosophical" (V:361-62). Evaluation.— This premise would more than likely be accepted by nearly everyone. Sometimes the phrase "the struggle for men's minds" denotes the same concept. One needs to recall that Hutchins has frequently reminded us that education is a secondary subject dependent on the primary subject of philosophy. Even John Dewey, not noted for his friendship with the Hutchins educational or philosophical viewpoint, wrote in 1950 that philosophy needed re-shaping: . . . The alternative is a generalized reconstruction so fundamental that it has to be developed by recog nition that while the evils resulting at present from the entrance of "science" into our common ways of living are undeniable they are due to the fact that no systematic efforts have as yet been made to subject the "morals" underlying old institutional customs to 103"Lesson for Survival," Saturday Review, 42:27, February 14, 1959. 135 scientific inquiry and criticism. Here, then, lies the r^gjmstructive work to be done by philosophy. « • • The "post-Sputnik" period has demonstrated that indeed our problems are philosophical. The lack of a co herent and consistent philosophy in higher education mani fested itself in the continuous examinations of its objectives. The Rockefeller Report states, "No inspired and inspiring education can go forward without powerful undergirding by the deepest values of our society." That is another way of saying our problems in education are partly philosophical. Surely the conflict between the Western and Communist Worlds consists of philosophical ingredients other than those of merely an economic nature. Hyman Rickover, a leading critic of the "post- Sputnik" period, says that our nineteenth century educa tional philosophy is as outdated as the horse and buggy. "Nothing short of a complete reorganization of American education, preceded by a revolutionary reversal of educa tional aims, can equip us for winning the educational race with the Russians. 104 Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, 1950), p. 18. IQ^The Pursuit of Excellence (Garden City: Double- day and Company, Inc., 1958), pi 49. ^■^^Kermit Lansner (ed.), "Educating for Extinc tion," in Second-Rate Brains (Garden City: Doubleday News Book, 1958), p. 43. 136 Professor John Brubacher of Yale University’s Edu cation Department says today's educational problems are not stated in bald philosophical terms. However, he goes on to say: . . . The nature of knowledge, of value, of man, of society, and of the world must each be met before a satisfactory conclusion can be formed of what to do next in our present predicament [of conflict in edu cational philosophy]. ■*•07 One of the nation's leading educational philosophers con curs with Hutchins that the educational debate is predi cated on philosophical assumptions. Commenting on the conflict in educational philoso phy evident in the Harvard Report, General Education in a Free Society published in 1945, Brubacher wrote: . . . It took the two regnant theories of Hutchins and Adler on the one hand and Dewey on the other and tried to strike a mean between them. . . . Trying to weave such incompatible strands of doctrine together balked any idea of real synthesis. The best that could result was an eclecticism and a rather contradictory one at that. It was probably of most significance at mid-twentieth century that in one way or another many people were seeking a both/and rather than an either/or answer to the philosophical problems of higher education.1^8 Mortimer Adler, the philosophic mentor of Hutchins, states his view concerning the fundamental philosophical Nelson B. Henry (ed.), Modem Philosophies and Education: The Fifty Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 16T ^^Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., pp. 294-95. 137 problems of our time. The great disputes in educational theory go beyond education to questions of moral and political thought-- and beyond them to ultimate issues in science and philosophy and the relationship of the two. . . . This is, by all odds, the greatest issue of all and is rarely argued--or even recognized--outside the small circle of professional philosophers. We must argue it here if we are going to discharge our obligation to go to the bottom of the controversy in American edu cation. 109 A key argument supports the premise that today’s problems are philosophical. Liberal education should give us "an education appropriate to man . . . dealing pri marily, in a world of rapid change, with values independ ent of time and place" (V:371-74). This education should be made up of the intellectual masterpieces of mankind from the beginning of time. The above concept quoted from Hutchins demonstrates the absolute thinking of the speaker which first appeared ii o in The Higher Learning in America. According to this conception, truth is not relative, but fixed in its rela tion to the common humanity of man, which is changeless. Hutchins footnoted the source of his thinking as that of Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. Part II, Question 94, Article 4. The quotation used by Hutchins reads in full: ■^^Adler and Mayer, op. cit., p. 63. H^Hutchins, op. cit.. p. 66. I 138 . . . It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or practical is equally know uy oxx. Thus, Hutchins attacked the relativism inherent in the pragmatist philosophy of education. Dewey's philosophy held that "truth did not lie in absolutes or in mechanical formulas but in the whole operative context of individual 119 growth and social action in which the idea was embedded. Hutchins was therefore attacking the dominant practice of education, particularly in levels below the college and university work. Lawrence College was probably in the audience when Hutchins spoke. If he was not, his remarks in a letter to the editor of the New York Times indicated he had read the remarks of Hutchins. Taylor said that the problem of living with the A-bomb was "not that so few people have read Aristotle," but that so few understand or care about the structure of contemporary society. The problem is a practical one "rather than a discussion of moral ideals by people who need only great books." Education may not be a strong enough tool to maintain the survival of civiliza tion, but one can look for more than Hutchins' "pious hope reason, truth and Harold Taylor, the pragmatist President of Sarah ^•^■^Anton C. Pegis (ed.), Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: The Modern Library, 1948), p. 641. n 9 Lemer, op. cit.. p. 723. 139 113 that if we go down, we will go down talking." Summary. - -There are five premises in the war and education speeches. Until we are engaged in military action we must hope we can avoid the ultimate catastrophe. The premise has proved historically to be invalid because the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. We did not have time to improve ourselves morally before we entered World War II. We must show the world a nation which tinderstands, values, and practices the four freedoms. These ideals are still valid today, as we have a long way to go before we attain the perfection advocated by Hutchins. Freedom of speech particularly needs strengthening during times of crises. The alternatives before us are peace or the death of civilization. The premise leaves out the alternative of "limited war" like the type we had in Korea. Yet survival of man on this planet is paramount today as it was thirteen years ago. Civilization can be saved only by a moral, intel lectual, and spiritual revolution to match the scientific, technological, and economic revolution in which we are 113"Ho w to Live With the Bomb," Time. 50:71-72, September 29, 1947. 140 living. We do not yet know what will save civilization. The abstract character of Hutchins' words makes it diffi cult to find his meaning. He is undoubtedly stating the ideal toward which man should aspire. The materialism evident in the society may make it difficult to attain the intellectual virtues he urges. We probably are having the latter three revolutions. We know the fundamental problems of our time are philosophical. Not many persons would dispute this assump tion. The pragmatist would say that philosophy must uti lize the empirical scientific method, but Hutchins advo cates a combination of it with traditional philosophical methods. The disagreement goes to first principles and the means of attaining truth. Neither side can validate its arguments by a common method. Both methods appear to be needed in order to solve our fundamental problems. i CHAPTER IV THE SPEECHES ON CIVIL LIBERTIES Introduc tion The iconoclasm of Hutchins was demonstrated in his speeches on civil liberties during the 1950's. His ideas in this area have given him speaking fame, or some would say infamy, only slightly less than his rationalist stand in higher education. The combination of his educational philosophy and his legal training joined to form the ideals which revealed themselves in his vigorous defense of aca demic freedom during "the difficult years,” the period of McCarthyism. Hutchins' contention that a Communist professor should be permitted to teach in the university has been a major area in which he has frequently spoken. He appeared in the national limelight as a speaker and a scholar in advocating rationalism in education. This stand was opposed by the more numerous supporters of John Dewey. The Hutchins-Dewey controversy in educational philosophy is discussed in Chapter V. Hutchins' rationalism was especi ally significant in his activities as President of the Fund 141 142 for the Republic and in the Ford Foundation. The concept of the Communist *s civil liberties in relation to the society, functioning particularly in the university, has been the core of Hutchins’ "controversial” reputation during the fifties. His speeches on the issue of Com munists as teachers have received considerable attention. The Intellectual Milieu: 1945-1955 The succeeding pages present some of the signifi cant social milieu in which civil liberties were attacked and defended. Those freedoms most closely related to intellectual freedom are described. Post-war conditions in the United States.--The American people desired a return to normalcy after the sacrifices of World War II. They thought we could dis mantle our military strength, but growing friction with Russia soon indicated this was a mistake. China had fallen to the Communists by August, 1949, while we rested in com placency with our monopoly of atomic bombs; but this con fidence was shattered on September 23rd of that year when President Truman announced the Russians had exploded their own bomb. During the early stages of the Cold War there was a trend toward conservatism as was demonstrated by the election of a Republican Congress in 1946. It even came 143 as a surprise to much of the nation that Harry Truman was elected over Thomas Dewey as President in 1948. The dramatic trials of State Department official Alger Hiss, starting in May of 1949 and ending in January, 1950 attracted national attention. During the latter month President Truman ordered the development of the H-bomb. The fear of domestic Communism on which Senator McCarthy was to feed was kindled. The re-kindled flame of intoler ance, negativism, and the destruction of traditional free doms was symbolized by McCarthy’s extremist speeches. Academic freedom came under serious attack. President Harold Taylor of Sarah Lawrence College remarked that charges of Communism were being hurled to beat down independent thinking. He defined the patriotic American as: . . . "One who tells all his secrets without being asked, believes we should go to war with Russia, holds no political view without prior consultation with his employer, does not ask for increases in salary or wages, and is in favor of peace, universal military training, brotherhood, and baseball."2 Politics and "McCarthyism."— Senator Joseph McCarthy startled the nation on February, 1950 with his ^Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade, 1945-1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopfl 1956), pp. 98-112. ^Ibid., p. 101. 144 statements before a Republican Club in Wheeling, West Virginia. He alleged that Secretary of State Acheson knew of the presence of two hundred five Communists in the State Department. Later the number was changed to fifty seven. The speech caught national headlines and launched the national neurosis known as "McCarthyism," a term coined by 3 the liberal cartoonist Herbert Block. "McCarthyism1 1 became the term synonymous with un supported charges of disloyalty. The conspiracy theory of Communism accompanied the fears of domestic Communistic penetration after the Hiss trials. It became common for people to attribute any weakness in governmental policy to a diabolical conspiracy of individuals devoted to the sup port of a foreign power, namely Russia. Thus, New Dealers, since Hiss had been one high in government, were thought to be conspiring to ruin our society. The defense of Hiss by Truman and Acheson resulted in a lack of confidence in the Democratic Party by many people. The conspiracy theory was lent credence by the attack of North Korea. The United States on June 25, 1950, intervened and later so did the United Nations. As the Korean War dragged on to a stalemate, McCarthy increased his attacks on prominent Americans, including former ^Ibid., pp. 137-44. I 145 Secretary of State George Marshall and Professor Philip Jessup, a Truman nominee as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. The "more reckless McCarthy be- came, the more his influence mounted."4 On April 11, 1951 President Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur for disobeying orders as Commander of the United Nations Forces. The Gallup Poll reported sixty nine per cent of the population supported MacArthur, while only twenty nine per cent backed Truman. Truman had fired MacArthur upon the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. * * The 1952 Presidential campaign saw General Eisenhower pitted against the relatively unknown Adlai Stevenson. The latter was described by John Alsop as an "egghead," a new political term which foisted negative connotations upon intellectualism. The term came to mean a man who was a scatterbrain, impractical, and out of touch with the facts of life.^ The simple, smiling personality of Ike took on new luster, coupled with the "time for a change" argument as he netted thirty nine states in his Republican victory. 4Ibid.. p. 212. 5Ibid.. pp. 202-203. f l Merle Curti, American Paradox: The Conflict of Thought and Action (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1956), p. 76. 146 The Korean War had dragged on for thirty seven patience-rending months at a cost of twenty two billion dollars and one hundred forty thousand casualties, includ ing twenty five thousand American dead. On Sunday, July 27, 1953 the prolonged negotiations between the Chinese Communists and the United Nations over armistice terms were completed and the United States emerged from a "limited war" it had neither won nor lost. President Eisenhower had gone to Korea shortly after his election to attempt to speed the negotiations.^ The intellectual climate of the 1950's.--The decade opened with the Hiss conviction and the beginnings of McCarthyism. It continued the anti-intellectual momentum so that Historian Henry Commager could pronounce there had never been such a broad official and unofficial attack upon Q non-conformity since the ante-bellum South. McCarthy went to greater extremes month after month, unchecked by the new ' ‘ Administration. Librarians began removing unorthodox books from their shelves. Dartmouth commencement speaker Eisen hower warned, "Don’t join the book burners" in June of 1954, but his subsequent press conferences tended to ^Goldman, op. cit., pp. 245-56. ^Henry Steele Commager, et al., Civil Liberties Under Attack (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 1. confuse the issue even further.^ During the early part of 1954, the Army-McCarthy hearings into the promotion of an Army dentist, Major Irving Peress, captured much of the nation's attention. Edward R. Murrow had shown film clips of McCarthy in action in a television program on February 24th and the eclipse of the bare-knuckled Senator started setting in. Max Lemer called it "the most important single program in the history of TV so far."^ The hearings were described by one historian as "the monkey trials of the 1950's . B y June the drama was concluded and both the Senator from Wisconsin and Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens had dis credited themselves. In November McCarthy had been cen sured by his Senate colleagues by a vote of sixty seven to twenty two.^ The most feared man in America had run his fearsome course, a broken and desperate man. Ideas were not very laudable during the 1950's and even Eisenhower defined an intellectual as late as September, 1954 as "a person who takes more words than necessary to say more than ^Goldman, op. cit., pp. 250-54. •^Max Lemer, America As A Civilization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), pi 838. ^Professor Arthur Kooker, History 484 lecture. ■^Goldman, op. cit., pp. 270-88. he knows. While McCarthy was frightening the nation, the attacks on education were severe. Albert Einstein was urging his correspondents to resort to non-cooperation before Congressional Committees. A member of the State Textbook Commission in Indiana charged there was a drive by Communists to stress the story of Robin Hood because he 14 robbed the rich to distribute money to the poor. Ortho doxy had become as commonplace as the American hot-dog! Guilt by association.--The doctrine of guilt by association achieved the status of federal law by 1940 under the Alien Registration Act but became much more per vasive under Truman*s Loyalty Order of March 22, 1947. Both the Attorney General and Congressional Committees went about compiling long lists of groups and individuals who were considered suspect because of their associations.^ Teachers who were allegedly former Communists and used the traditional protection of the Fifth Amendment when called Ifi before Congressional hearings were generally fired. ° Curti, op. cit., p. 69. ^Goldman, op. cit.. pp. 257-58. ■^Henry Steele Commager, Freedom. Loyalty, Dissent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 95-97. •^Robert M. Hallett, '*Teacher Fate Varies in Probes," The Christian Science Monitor. July 21, 1953. 149 Assaults on civil liberties.--There were numerous cases where Individuals had become the victims of the Federal Government’s Loyalty-Security program. John Paton Davies of the Department of State was dismissed, Dr. Edward Condon was discharged as the Director of the National Bureau of Standards, and Wolfe Ladejinsky, another State Department official was denied a clearance by the Depart ment of Agriculture. The case which received the most attention was that of J. Robert Oppenheimer, a consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission.^ Professor Oppenheimer had been cleared of dis loyalty for his associations with Communists, but he had been denied further access to restricted governmental data 18 on June 29, 1954. This decision was reached in spite of his great assistance in developing the atomic bomb while he headed the laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico. He had failed to urge the development of the H-bomb with suffi cient enthusiasm in 1949 and his independence cost him his security clearance. After a careful examination of the transcript of the case, Curtis wrote: ^Charles P. Curtis, The Oppenheimer Case (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. ix-xi. 18Ibid.. p. 1. 150 . . . If there is any excuse, any justification for this decision, it lies in the worship of a [loyalty- security] system which stultifies our good judgment by subjecting it to the artificial presumption of a doubt. A great and responsible nation, the greatest and there fore the most responsible is telling itself to fear itself, advising itself to stand on suspicions, to mistake caution for courage and to take prudence to be better than wisdom. The worst infringements in civil liberties occurred during the late 1953 to early 1954 period in a time of optimum prosperity. Sociologist Seymour Lipset wrote: . . . Its [the radical right] principal current signi ficance, and perhaps permanent impact on the American scene, lies in its success in overstimulating popular reaction to the problem of internal subversion, in supplying the impetus for changes which may have last ing effects on American life, e.g., the heightened security program, political controls on passports, political tests for schoolteachers, and increasing lack of respect of civil and juridical rights for unpopular minorities and scoundrels.20 Much the same opinion was registered by Patrick Murphy Malin of the American Civil Liberties Union in his analysis of the same period: . . . It is not necessary to be a blind optimist in order to take more satisfaction from the last six months than from any corresponding period for several years. On the other hand, it is not necessary to be a confirmed pessimist in order to remain basically anxious.21 •^Ibid., p. 276. ! ^Daniel Bell (ed.), The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 217. ^"America1s Need: A New Birth of Freedom," 34th Annual Report— American Civil Liberties Union. July 1, 1953 - June 30, 1954, p. 4. 151 A year later the same author reported, "It will be many a long year before we can be comfortable about freedom in the public schools and colleges and universi ties. . . ."22 why Were the attacks on freedom of thought so successful during the 1953-54 interim? Professors Nathan Glazer and Lipset point out the reason conservative defenders of civil liberties did not defend them earlier was that it had become largely a party issue. The con servative upper class, including Eisenhower and the South ern Democrats, finally stepped in and were more successful than the previous attempts of liberals to halt restrictions 23 on traditional individual freedoms. The Reece Committee Investigation of Tax-Exempt Foundations.--Representative B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee, Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations, and his four associates were given $50,000 to begin a study into the uses of tax-free monies by founda tions. The investigation was launched on August 1, 1953 as the continuation of a previous inquiry headed by the late 22i'ciearing the Main Channels," 35th Annual i Report--American Civil Liberties Union. July 1, 1954 June 30, 1955, p. 5. ^Bell, op. cit., pp. 162-63. 152 Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia.The Reece Report, as it was called by the press, received mixed praise and condemnation, mostly the latter. Reese concluded that foundations were attempting to change the social order into 25 a system which ’ 'was basically socialistic in nature." Two of the five members dissented from this viewpoint. Hutchins appeared before the Cox Committee on November 25, 1952 while he was Associate Director of the Ford Foundation. He stated, "’As an officer of the Founda- O f L tion, I would not support the Communist Party.’" Later, the public utterances of Hutchins severely criticized the Reece Committee. These subsequent statements are located in a later section of this chapter. Fifteen years of social change.— The fifteen years following World War II to 1955 produced significant changes in the economic fabric of American society. Prosperity had been generally diffused to an extent unknown before. Coupled with this, by 1950, thirty three per cent of women worked and twenty seven million families depended on the ^United States Congress, House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, Tax-Exempt Foundations, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings on House Resolution"217 from May 10 - December 16, 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 1-3. 25Ibid., p. 167. 26Ibid., p. 300. 153' income of both the husband and wife. The population also increased rapidly, partly due to the increased longevity, especially among the women. Urbanization took place at a faster rate as machinery reduced the need of numerous farm laborers. Migrations continued to other parts of the nation, especially to California and other West Coast areas. ^ The movement from the centers of cities to "suburbia" was accelerated. Physical mobility became easier as over forty five million cars thronged the streets and highways by 1950. Combined with this mobility, the status of the Negro had steadily improved, propelled upward by the wartime need of labor and the post-war urgency for racial reform consequent upon the pressures of international Communism. Seventeen million Negroes were elevated somewhat above second class OQ status. The school integration decision of the Supreme Court delivered on May 17, 1953 had opened the way for a better education for many Negroes, though it would take some time to put integration into practice in numerous Southern school districts. Scientific advancement induced by the impetus of ^Louis M. Hacker and Helene S. Zahler, The United States in the 20th Century (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, Inc., 1952), pp. 622-23. ^Goldman, op. cit.. pp. 293-94. 154 war mushroomed into a more significant role in the American culture. The discovery of a chain reaction in atomic physics had been paralleled by the development of radar. Hydrogen fusion for military purposes was discovered in 1949, about the time automation was getting a good start in industry. Science and technology brought increased spe cialization to the point where one man was rarely an expert nq in two unrelated fields. Automation promised relief from some of the specialization of labor, although some worker dislocation might take place. The influence of the mass media on a relatively prosperous citizenry was manifested in what some observers believed was a dangerous conformity. David Riesman felt the middle classes were in danger due to an attitude of "other-direction." Their behavior was guided by friends, peers, and the mass media, rather than by parental influ- 30 ence and individual judgment. Television also con tributed to the standardization of tastes and values and by 31 1958 there were forty eight million sets in the country. OQ 7Leland DeWitt Baldwin, The Meaning of America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955), pp. 268-90. 30 David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denny, The Lonely Crowd (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955), p. 37. 31j^iies McMillin, "Congress and the FCC Shenani gans," The Progressive, 22:15, April, 1958. 155 The number of newspapers declined though their circulation 32 went up; the reading of comic books increased, which lowered the quality of material read. The influence of noted newspaper columnists such as Walter Lippmann, David Lawrence, Drew Pearson, and Walter Winchell had increased and possessed a greater impact on society than the news paper editorials.^ The majority of the press had moved toward the political right while the people moved toward Q / the left up till 1952. Then conservatism began to 35 achieve respectability once again. Civil Liberties Speeches During the 1950's The preview of the premises.--There are nine prem ises in the civil liberty speeches of Hutchins. They are presented here in toto, then analyzed individually in the succeeding pages. (1) A university should be a center of independent thought and criticism. (2) Professors may en gage in legal activities. (3) A professor who thinks independently though he is a member of the Communist Party should be permitted to teach in a university. (4) The arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for ^Hacker ancj zahler, op. cit.. pp. 624-25. 33 Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr., and Nelson Manfred Blake, Since 1900 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), pp. 851-53. ■^Baldwin, loc. cit. 3S Goldman, op. cit.. p. 259. 156 freedom of speech. (5) Tax-exemption places no duties on colleges and universities except that they should conduct teaching and research to the best of their judgment. (6) The greatest aggregation of educational foundations is the press itself. (7) The First Amendment was designed to protect the content of the press, not the cash return from it. (8) Differences of opinion about the Fund for the Republic must result from misinformation. (9) The Fund for the Republic is for the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. "Education and Independent Thought" is the most important address given by Hutchins on academic freedom during this decade. The version found in Appendix A may have been somewhat modified by Arthur A. Cohen, the editor 3 6 and publisher of Meridian Books. The first part of the speech is largely taken from the Sidney Hillman Lecture Hutchins delivered at Columbia University on November 21, 37 1950. The speaker made "an attempt to straighten out the OQ relations of the university to the community." — — — ■ - * Hutchins did not have an original text when it was requested. 37 See Hutchins, "The Freedom of the University," International Journal of Ethics. 61:95-104, January, 1951, reprinted in The American Association of University Pro fessors Bulletin. 37:238-52, Summer, 1951. 38 Robert Maynard Hutchins, Freedom, Education, and the Fund (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. TT. i 157 The address was presented in Bamum Hall, Santa Monica, California, on February 20, 1952. It was announced in the Santa Monica Evening Outlook of the same date that tickets were on sale for the lecture. However, the Outlook carried no reports on it afterward, nor did any of the major Los Angeles newspapers. The audience was probably comprised of laymen especially interested in education and civil liberties. The purpose of the address was shown by Hutchins: . . . The speech was written at a time when various public bodies and private organizations were trying to control the universities in various misguided ways. I believe— perhaps I am misguided— that the thesis of this speech [the university should provide independent thought and criticism for the community] offers the only hope of resisting attempts to complete the trans formation of our universities into service stations.39 (1) "The best definition of a university that I have been able to think of is that it is a center of inde pendent thought" (VI:1-3). Evaluation.--Robert Hutchins has been a vigorous defender of academic freedom throughout his entire career.^ His statement above is deduced from the nature of man and of truth as Hutchins sees it. He favors the rigorous development of man's highest powers; those of •^Loc. cit. 4.0 ^uCf. Chapter II, pp. 50-52 and 70-71. 158 a rational nature.4* * The unique institution in society to increase man's intellectual powers is the school, college, and university. The colleges and universities exist for the purpose of examining and criticizing the culture in an unbiased manner according to the speaker.42 Their function is to discover and disseminate the truth so that society can be improved. The university should be a center of independent thought and criticism; therefore, it should not adapt to the environment, since this would tend to mirror and mag nify the misconceptions and inadequacies of the culture. Maintaining friendly public relations should never be the purpose of a university according to Hutchins because this would distort and diminish the effects of truth. Gaining the financial support to finance its program should always be secondary to the main end of discovering and perpetu ating truth. The university should not attempt to take on the functions of the home, the church, or an organization devoted to entertainment] If the university achieves its purpose satisfactorily it will have no time to devote to pursuits other than increasing the rationality of man. Historian Henry Steele Commager, a pragmatist 41Cf. post, Chapter V, pp. 257-285. ^Freedom, Education, and the Fund, loc. cit. I 159 follower of John Dewey and Justice Holmes, is a scholar opposed to absolutes. Yet, his views on the purpose of the university are very similar to those of Hutchins: It is nothing less than absurd to embrace the notion, now achieving some popularity, that universi ties are not primarily a place for the cultivation of the mind, but for other things— social graces, perhaps, of football! . . . the virtues of adaptation . . . should be cultivated elsewhere than in the universities or the laboratories. . . . What we need is not more agencies to fit the individuals to groups, but some agency to fit the group to,the individual, and fit the society to the individual. The ideal set by Hutchins for the function of a university is Jeffersonian in that this education should be for individuals who can meet demanding intellectual stand ards. The Jacksonian ideal would open the universities to all high school graduates because it was assumed their mentalities were equal. Hutchins "directed his most effec tive attacks" at the latter ideal.^ Yet the United States was not ready to accept the elitist rationalism represented by the Hutchins philosophy of education.^ John Dewey probably would not agree that universi ties should be centers of independent thought and criti cism, for they might be too aloof from contemporary ^An address to the Adult Education Association at their 1954 Convention reported in "The Tests of a Free Society," Adult Leadership. 3:3, February, 1955. ^Lemer, op. cit., p. 748. ^John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Educa tion in Transition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 377. society. Hutchins stated the idea after Dewey stopped writing. In The Higher Learning in America, Hutchins said the chaos of education resulted from surrendering to cur rent public sentiment. Dewey replied Hutchins' educational philosophy demonstrates "the greatest possible aloofness from contemporary social life," and contributes to the divorce of the intellect and practical experience. Independent thought is especially valuable in a crisis (VIII:23-24). That idea is an argumentative pillar to the premise which says universities should be centers of independent thought and criticism. Hutchins explains the statement by saying, "True education is the improvement of men through helping them learn to think for themselves" (VIII:51-53). Yet, he admits Americans "do not yet set a proper value on independent thought" (VI:43-44). These arguments go deep into the philosophy of Hutchins. He believes education should seek the truth. Truth is every where the same and the inspiration for that idea comes 47 primarily from St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica. Hutchins says, "If education is rightly understood, it is the same at any time, in any place, under any political, A £ "President Hutchins' Proposals to Remake Higher Education," The Social Frontier. 3:104, January, 1937. ^Robert M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in I America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 66, citing Summa Theologica, Part II, Question 94, Article 4. 161 48 social, or economic conditions.” Hutchins "drew upon absolutes from Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas about the nature of man, the nature of 49 truth, and the nature of value." A more detailed analy sis of the bedrock of the speaker's educational philosophy appears in Chapter V. However, the speaker believes that man is a rational animal, as did Aristotle. He concludes the highest powers of man are his ability to reason. The results of this reasoning should not be modified by the social pressures of a crisis. The absolutes provide a standard for judging the relativism which is evident when independent thought is compromised by social pressure. Reason should prevail over the temporary panic during times of crises. The philosophy of Hutchins indicates his belief that "the ideal American is the perpendicular man" who engages in the Socratic dialogue by questioning the status 50 quo. The ideal man in the University of Utopia is always given the "Most Controversial Person" award, because Utopians set "no limits on discussion," since the way of ^Loc. cit. 49 ^Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 286. -^See "The Bill of Rights: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," delivered to the Liberal Party in New York City on February 18, 1956, in Freedom, Education, and the Fund, p. 14. ! 162 SI life there is rational. According to Hutchins the university is the only institution whose function is to examine truth dispassion ately. No other institution in our society has its members devoting full-time to the process of thinking and reason ing. The object of professors is to seek the truth and teach their students to do the same. One can see the in fluence of Aristotle’s dictum "in practical affairs the end is the first principle." The university should provide truth for the community through the means of a rational, critical examination of the society and its ideals. The opinion of the majority should not be forced on university professors, for "this is thought control" (VIII:70-71). The Committee on Government and Higher Education headed by Milton Eisenhower concluded the medieval univer sity was independent, just as the modem one should be. . . . Political authorities [have attempted] to force it into conformity with the conventional wisdom of the day. Each intrusion, even if a minor one or made with beneficent intent, is erosive. Thus, an enlightened society must be alert to them at the outset, and atti tudes and practices must be built which will regard all intrusions as unwise and impossible. . . .52 ^Robert M. Hutchins, The University of Utopia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 92, 96-97. 52 John Lear, "Efficiency of Freedom," Saturday Review, 42:22, May 23, 1959. 163 In a speech delivered at the University of Cali fornia on October 5, 1950, Hutchins upheld the opposition to the loyalty oath requirement. He said oaths tended to intimidate the faculty in its search for truth. A popular education is a contradiction in terms, because what is 53 popular is seldom education. From the Hutchins definition of a university springs the next major supporting argument for the first premise. . . . Loyalty oaths portend an effort on the part of the government, or of the public or its representa tives, to assume control over the course of study, the program of research, and the qualifications of the members of the faculty. (VIII:84-88) Hutchins has long been a critic of education which teaches adjustment to the environment and "Education and Independent Thought" is one of his eloquent defenses of academic freedom. Maxine Greene of New York University, commenting on the speech, says Hutchins believes only a debate on the basic ideas "will lead to the improvement of man and the securing of the absolute values defined by 54 philosophy." A leading civil libertarian, Louis Hacker of Columbia University, says professors must nurture the 53 New York Times. October 6, 1950. ■^"Robert Maynard Hutchins, Crusading Meta physician," School and Society. 83:164, May 12, 1956. 164 public's information by an articulate defense of academic freedom. He states: . . . Professors have been slow to act as citizens within and without the university; and they have per mitted its complete governance to fall into the hands of nonacademic trustees and regents, legislative authorities and an ever-growing body of university administrators— who both apply and succumb to pres sures when times are out of joint. The next supporting argument explains the purpose of tenure in relation to independent thought (VI:157-70). The search for truth must go on with a minimum of pressure for professors to conform to the wishes of the administra tion or to pressure groups. Hutchins protested the imposi tion of a loyalty oath on the University of California in the early 1950's. He was one of the few university heads who did so. His position was not new, but consistent with the philosophy he expressed at Chicago in 1935 and again in 1949 before the Broyles Commission. The latter group was a legislative committee set up by the Illinois legis lature to investigate alleged subversive influences in edu- cation. Hutchins also explained the need for academic freedom when he was an Associate Director of the Ford -^"Plight of Professors During the 'Difficult Years,"' Saturday Review, 41:20, November 29, 1958. **^Howard Mumford Jones (ed.), Primer of Intel lectual Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949),pp. 6-10. 165 Foundation.^ Another statement drew a rebuttal from Sidney Hook. Hutchins said professors everywhere are " silenced by the general atmosphere of repression that now prevails" (VIII: 180-84). Hook describes this technique as the fallacy of accent in "giving such a disproportionate emphasis to some details rather than others" in which the whole picture is distorted. "The strategy of overstatement and misstate ment" is used by Hutchins. Hook reminded the speaker that American professors "have actually been more outspoken in behalf of academic freedom and in protest against its violations than at any time in their history." Hook him self presents no evidence to warrant his generalization in CO The New Leader article. The study of Paul Lazarsfeld surveying two thousand four hundred fifty one social scientists in one hundred sixty five colleges and universities during the spring of 1955 hardly corroborated Hook's contention. Hacker's review of the study revealed the following: . . . Not only did at least one-half of those inter viewed detect a decline in intellectual or academic freedom; worse still, pressure, suspicion, and 57 Tax-Exempt Foundations, p. 300. ^®"Six Fallacies of Robert Hutchins," The New Leader, 39:27, March 19, 1956. I 166 hostility created states of mind which had deleterious psychological and social consequences.^9 Another reviewer of the Lazarsfeld survey con cluded, "The study would seem clearly to refute the asser tion in 1954 by Hutchins that 'the spirit of the academic fin profession' was being crushed by McCarthyism. ..." The differences between Hacker and Wrong apparently reflect conclusions from differing parts of the data. Hutchins says a professor may say, do, or join any thing that other citizens do (VI:190-94). Not only do these sentiments come from the absolute philosophy of the speaker, but Hutchins' academic training was gained pri marily in law school. The formal education of the liberal educator began in Law School at age twenty one with an introduction to the liberal arts.^ He says Charles E. Clark, his successor as Dean of Law at Yale, was responsi ble for his legal training and activities as a teacher and dean.^ Charles R. Walgreen precipitated the investigation at the University of Chicago in 1935 which "forced me to ^^Hacker, Saturday Review, p. 19. ^Dennis H. Wrong, "McCarthy and the Professors," The Reporter, 19:34, December 11, 1958. ! £1 Robert Maynard Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), ip. 7. cn Freedom, Education, and the Fund, p. 17. 167 think about the relation of the university to the com munity."*^ The teaching of the Great Books course with Mortimer Adler resulted in Hutchins' developing a philoso phy which espoused absolutes. For example, there are such permanent values as Truth and Justice. ^ Hutchins has maintained a consistent view on aca demic freedom since 1935, as the next premise demonstrates. (2) "As long as his [the professor's] activities are legal, he may engage in them" (VI:233-34). Evaluation.— One can hardly disagree with Hutchins on this premise, but there is frequently a question of the legal interpretation on what constitutes lawful activities. Legal ambiguity is particularly apparent in matters con cerning loyalty oaths and dismissals due to insubordination for refusal to answer questions asked of a professor by legally constituted bodies, such as Congressional and legislative committees. Insubordination or refusal to testify has cost £ C numerous teachers their positions. A study of college social science teachers reported by Paul Lazarfeld in which .charges of alleged Communism were made is significant in 63Ibid.. p. 19. 64, ’Fusilier," Time. 59:76, March 17, 1952. ^^Hallett, loc. cit. I 168 relation to Hutchins' premise. The report showed sixty- four per cent of those professors who refused to cooperate with Congressional committees were dismissed or forced to 66 resign. One hundred eighty eight were dismissed and 67 forty were forced to resign. Thus, legal interpretation of a professor's rights before investigative agencies 68 usually resulted in the dismissal of the professor. The refusal of professors to testify about their own political beliefs should result in their dismissal from teaching or governmental positions according to Sidney Hook: . . . Where an individual refuses to answer questions concerning such membership in the communist party on the ground that a truthful answer would tend to in criminate him, he should be barred from government positions. . . . The professor does not have an ethical right to be on a public payroll according to Hook. The popular position which Hook took was the common American practice during the 1950's. The American Associ ation of Universities, the organization of college and 66 Joseph P. Lyford, "Social Science Teachers and the 'Difficult Years,'" American Association of University Professors Bulletin, 43:639, December, 1957. ^Hacker, Saturday Review, loc. cit. 68 For a detailed description of the practices see John W. Caughey, In Clear and Present Danger (Chicago: ;University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 148-60. 69 Hook, The New Leader, p. 23. I 169 university presidents, held in effect, that the professor must not claim the Fifth Amendment. 7® Hook and the Ameri can Association of Universities were not the only adherents to the doctrine of "guilt by silence." Fifty per cent of the American lawyers interviewed by Samuel Stouffer said they were almost sure a man refusing to tell a Congres sional committee whether or not he was a Communist indi cated evidence of his guilt.7^ The Academic Freedom Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union re-examined the 1953 policy of the Association of American Universities in 1957. The civil liberties group concluded this: . . . The Association of American Universities failed to recognize that the teacher has "ordinary rights as an ordinary citizen, and that he does not surrender those rights because he holds an academic position. He has the right to be irritating, foolish, socially unpalatable, or politically extreme. His educational institution has no jurisdiction over his life as a citizen; on the contrary, it has the obligation to make clear that unfavorable social judgments outside the university will not be allowed to affect his institu tional status."72 70 Caughey, op. cit.. p. 157. 71 John Lord O'Brian, National Security and Indi vidual Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 70, citing Samuel A. Stouffer's, Communismt Conformity. i and Civil Liberty (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 234. 72"Union Urges Association of American Universities to Re-Examine Policy of McCarthy Period," Civil Liberties l [published by the American Civil Liberties Union], 155:2, October, 1957. 170 Justice William Douglas reminds us that Mthe Fifth Amendment was designed for the protection of the innocent as well as the guilty." Douglas is the leading expert and 73 spokesman for the Bill of Rights today. All the justices of the Supreme Court ruled in Slochower v. Board of Educa tion. 350 U. S. 551, that Slochower, a teacher at Brooklyn College, did not confess his guilt by using the Fifth Amendment. "The invocation of the privilege in using the Fifth Amendment therefore is no measure of the fitness of a person for public employment.Academic freedom pro tects thoughts, utterance and beliefs under the First Amendment, but does not protect a violation of academic 75 ethics. The case of Beilan v. Board of Education of Phila delphia illustrates the legal ambiguities of using the privilege against self incrimination. Beilan had refused to answer questions put to him by the Superintendent of Schools and by the Un-American Activities Committee. The Supreme Court concurred in the School Board’s opinion that Beilan*s behavior constituted "incompetency" because of ^Fred Rodell, "A Gallery of Justices," Saturday Review. 41:37, November 15, 1958. ^The Right of the People (Garden City: Doubleday and Company^ Inc., 1958), p. 146. ^Ibid., pp. 106-109. 171 insubordination in refusing to answer the Superintendent's questions. Justices Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented from the majority ruling. Douglas states his opinion in part: . . . The fitness of a teacher for her job turns on her devotion to the priesthood, her education, and her performance in the library, in the laboratory and the classroom, not in her political beliefs. . . . [Making] qualification for public office turn solely on a matter of belief--[is] a notion very much at war with the Bill of Rights.7° The next premise contributed more to making Hutchins controversial than any other statement during the 1950's. It was a minority viewpoint advocated only by avant garde civil libertarians in or out of education. (3) "A professor who is a member of the Communist Party and still thinks independently should not be dis qualified from teaching in the university" (VI:282-86). Hutchins has written the following: . . . The presumption is strong that there are few fields in which a member of the Communist Party can think independently. But what if we should find a member of the Com munist Party, who, in spite of this presumption, did think independently? The fact of membership cannot and should not disqualify him from membership in the faculty of a university in view of the additional fact that he does not act as members of the Party are sup posed to act. . . . (VI:277-86) ^^Robert K. Carr, "Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Professors and the United States Supreme Court," American Association of University Profes sors Bulletin, 45:22-24, Spring, 1959. 172' Evaluation.--The above position taken by Hutchins has been the most controversial idea the speaker has voiced or written during the decade of the 1950's. It has re sulted in more attention having been paid to his speaking than otherwise would have been the case. Because it is such a minority opinion when contrasted with the apparent majority beliefs, it also lowered Hutchins' prestige with most of his critics. Such liberal groups as the American Association of University Professors, the American Civil Liberties Union, and individuals such as the late Senator Taft, and Presi dent Harold Taylor of Sarah Lawrence College concurred with the speaker. Other groups and individuals remained in the majority believing a Communist could not be an independent thinker, therefore he should not be permitted to teach. The attitude of Hutchins toward the hiring and retention of a Communist seems to have evolved during the years of "McCarthyism." Perhaps this was in response to a crisis, much as Hutchins had done in 1935 in defending the University of Chicago from the attack of Charles Wal green. ^ At the University of Chicago convocation on June 17, 1949, Hutchins spoke on "What Price Freedom?" He I had appeared before the Broyles Committee the previous 7^Freedom, Education, and the Fund, pp. 18-19. l 173 April 21. The Chancellor told the students that legis lative investigations across the country had turned up four or five Communist professors, but being a member of the party was not illegal. He stated the need for "criticism and independent thought" and reminded the graduating stu dents that the educated man "must be prepared to pay the penalty of unpopularity. He must hold fast to his faith in freedom."78 J. B. Matthews, staff investigator of the Broyles Committee, said, "When it comes to the distortion of truth, Hutchins is a perfectionist." Matthews also charged that about one hundred fifty members of the University of Chicago faculty collaborated with Communist-front organiza tions.7^ Hutchins said Senator McCarthy was "the most frightening figure since the emergence of Adolph Hitler" in a speech delivered on February 26, 1954 at DePauw Univer sity. He said that people "do not appear to worry about demagogues."88 The President of the Fund for the Republic held a two hour press conference in the Fund*s New York office on 7®Robert Maynard Hutchins, American Association of I University Professors Bulletin. 35:213-15, Summer, 1949. ^ " C o m m u n i s m Colleges," American Mercury, 76:133-35, May, 1953. ^Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1954. 174 November 8, 1 9 5 5 . Fulton Lewis, Jr. said the real pur pose of the news conference "was to try to better the low estimate in which the public generally holds the Fund." The conferees "generally regarded [Hutchins’] explanations as vague and unsatisfactory." Russell Turner of the Lewis 82 staff was present at the press conference. Hutchins said, "I wouldn’t hesitate to hire a Communist for a job he was qualified to do provided I was in a position to see he did it." Hutchins actually did hire Amos Landman for a part-time temporary press relations job, an ex-Communist who left the party in 1939. Landman had used the Fifth Amendment before a Senate sub-committee the previous sum mer. He was employed with the Fund from July 28, 1955 to DO November 1st. Hutchins was interviewed on Meet the Press on November 29, 1955. Most of the program was devoted to whether or not Hutchins was willing to hire a Communist, with the panel members demanding "a flat and immediate 'Yes’ or ’No!'" He would not say "Yes" or "No" to the question. Hutchins did not explode or collapse but he ^Peter Kihss, "Hutchins Condemns Red Party But Would Give Job to Member," New York Times, November 8, '1955. 82 "Criticism Worries Fund," Lafayette Journal and Courier, November 14, 1955. ^^Kihss, loc. cit. 1 175 OA looked ’ 'very tired” as the show went off the air. John Crosby said the panel lost sight of the purpose of journal ism when it attempted ”to confine the question almost ex clusively to a single inflammatory and controversial sentence once uttered by Mr. Hutchins." Crosby said the purpose of journalism should be to "get at the truth" and 85 to enlarge the public's understanding. Raymond Moley asserted Hutchins "was obviously evading" the questions on Meet the Press during "the un comfortable thirty minutes of Dr. Hutchins" on the program. Moley said that reporters are more at home with the broken English of Foreign ministers of Egypt and India "than they were with this gobbledygook of this home-bred product of Oberlin and Yale." He continued, "Hutchins is a social scientist of a new and quite common order, and his language is encumbered by the obscurity of a new and quite fantastic jargon."86 Time reacted to the Hutchins statement saying he would hire a Communist if he were qualified for a job. The Luce publication stated: 8^David R. Ebbitt, "Television," New Republic. 134:21, January 23, 1956. ' Q C Los Angeles Mirror News. February 15, 1956. 86"Well-Hidden Meaning, If Any," Los Angeles Times. December 8, 1955. 176 Such superb self-confidence is almost out of this world. And so, indeed is Robert Maynard Hutchins. . . . Most recent attacks on the Fund for the Republic are nonsense. The others [attacks], which may keep the Fund in the headlines, have to do with the personality of Robert Hutchins, scholar and debater, and, by his own choice, a displaced person. Earlier in the article, Time concluded, "Hutchins is so brilliant a controversialist that he sometimes seems to be looking for fights in which to display his debater's skill."87 Hutchins wrote a letter to the Editor of Time say ing he was "a kind of 18th century conservative" who be lieved in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu tion, and the Bill of Rights. "If an American who holds these views is a displaced person, the country is worse off than I had supposed." Then the leading spokesman for civil liberties remarked: Your statement that I had said I wouldn't hesitate to hire a Communist omits one of my qualifications and omits the point. I was discussing a theoretical possi bility, not something I had done or planned to do. I said that any such appointment would have to be made by the board and that I did not know what the Board would do if the question arose. The reason I was willing to answer a hypothetical question about a theoretical possibility is that the point is basic. The practice of judging people in terms of labels rather than in terms of themselves 87"Displaced Person," Time, 66:18, November 28, 1955. 177 is contrary to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. It may deprive a man of his livelihood and reputation without regard to his individual case and without due process of law. The practice of disposing of people by condemning the organizations, churches, nationali ties and races to which they or their relatives or acquaintances belong is contrary to the American tradi tion of fair play. It cost A1 Smith the Presidency. It cost Emmett Till his life. Individuals vary widely in their understanding and adherence to the purposes of organizations they belong to. Jobs vary widely in their 1 1 sensitivity." There is a theoretical possibility that I might sometime meet some sort of Communist qualified for some sort of job. I have not met one yet and do not expect to. Yet the possibility exists. . . Chet Huntley referred to the above letter on a television interview with Hutchins. Huntley said, "It is not only good prose, it contains some very good ideas. The Catholic magazine America was not so impressed. "Un fortunately we are forced almost daily to wince for those who suffer at every clever remark by Hutchins." Mentioning matters dealing with Communists, the magazine reported, "Into this arena of delicate rights and obligations Mr. Hutchins brings the talent of the nimble phrasemaker." It asserted that balance and caution was needed, yet Hutchins calls a press conference and "jousts with well- turned phrase and off-hand remarks for two hours." None ^Time, 66:6, December 12, 1955. 89 "^Transcript of an "Interview Between Chet Huntley and Robert Hutchins," broadcast December 18, 1955 and furnished by the courtesy of Robert Hutchins. 1781 of his colleagues at the Fund stepped forward to defend his 90 statements. Sidney Hook enters a vigorous dissent from the viewpoint of Hutchins: . . . It is unreasonable to assume that anyone familiar with the nature of the Communist party, with the estab lished fact that it owes its primary allegiance toa foreign government, and with its specific instructions to its teacher members, could believe that membership in such an organization is irrelevant to serving in a governmental and/or teaching post. . . Hook reacted to the specific premise of Hutchins. The position taken by Hutchins on Meet the Press on Novem ber 20, 1955 was combined with the one above in the Hook rebuttal. He accused Hutchins of the "abandonment of evidence when confronted by the problem of formulating a reasonable policy" based on the probability of the corn- 92 petence of a Communist. The position of Hutchins concerning the independ ence of a Communist professor implies some interesting questions. Can a Communist professor think independently? Or, phrasing the question differently, are all members of the Communist Party under iron-clad discipline which pro hibits independent thinking? ""Ominous Silence at the Fund," America, 94:262, [December 3, 1955. 9-4took, The New Leader, loc. cit. 92Ibid.. pp. 21-22. 179 Professor Sidney Hook, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at New York University, does not believe it is probable that a Communist professor can think independ ently. He believes they should not be employed as teach ers : . . . it is apparent that the more skillful a [Commun ist] teacher is, the more effectively he can indoc trinate, the more he is able "without exposing himself to inject Marxism-Leninism into every class." (The last phrase is from official Communist instructions. Relative to the issue of whether or not a Communist is trustworthy, Hook states, Further, I am prepared to grant that, although the Communist movement is a conspiracy, it does not there fore follow that every man jack in it is a hardened conspirator prepared to do anything. But since one cannot tell in advance who will not obey his party instructions . . . it is elementary common sense not to employ them in positions where they can violate their trust. . . .94 A rather vigorous disagreement with Hook comes from Philosopher Journet Kahn of the University of Notre Dame: . . . the case of the faculty member discovered to be a member of the Communist party offers no special problem other than directing our attention towards a re examination of his professional integrity, with the possibility of a favorable judgment by no means ex cluded. Membership in an organization dedicated to indoctrination and distortion of truth can reasonably lead us to suspect professional incompetence, but to conclude to such conviction without examination of the individual case by a group of professionally qualified 9^Ibid., p. 24. 94Ibid., p. 25. 180 peers, is pure injustice. The reasoning of Sidney Hook that ideas are plans of action and that, therefore, intellectual commitment to political ideology that demands distortion of natural truth ipso facto involves the committed to the practice of such intellectual sub version, assumes a metaphysical link between belief and action foreign to both the scholastic conception of the prudential order and to human experience itself. Between the simple entertaining of an idea involving no issuance in action and the efficacious belief which is the conclusion of practical reasoning, there lies an area of sincere conviction perfectly compatible with non-activity along practical lines. The reasons for such ineffectiveness in the latter case may be acci dental, but very often it occurs by virtue of a natural reason and conscience sufficiently strong to escape the demands of total political commitment. Consistency has never been the outstanding characteristic of human nature, and to argue, as does Mr. Hook, from the uni versal— the clearly stated academic aims of interna tional Communism--to either the guilt or unrealiability of every American party member in academic life, is to conceive of ethical science as involving no more than the subaltemation of particulars to universal. Such a device saves a good deal of time and effort, but when justice is at stake, it is well to be equipped with something more than formal logic. One comes to the clash of conflicting viewpoints concerning the retention of a Communist professor on a university faculty. Hook says that the Hutchins stand results in the "abandonment of evidence'* in relation to assessing the competence of a Communist professor. On the other hand, Kahn says Hook confuses "the subalternation of particulars to universals." Hook assumes that all members 95 Joumet Kahn, "The Threat to Academic Freedom," reprinted from the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, The Catholic University of America, 1957, p. 8. of the Communist Party are incompetent because they allegedly have surrendered their independence to the doc trine of the party. It would seem from the foregoing ideas that some Communist professors could think independently, however, it would be unwise to generalize without examination of the specific cases. Perhaps this section can best be concluded by quoting Justice Douglas, one of the leading exponents of free speech: . . . From reading many records in cases involving Communists, I gather that many who joined may not have had subversion as a purpose. Some seemed to be sheer sentimentalists; others seemed utterly confused. Yet there has been a readiness to identify all who joined the party at any period of its existence with all of the aims espoused by it. This is guilt by associ- ation--a concept which is foreign to our history. A second important question is implied by the posi tion maintained by Hutchins. Is guilt by association a valid ground for dismissing a professor? "The University of Chicago does not believe in the un-American doctrine of guilt by association."^ This question normally arises out of the argument that a person employed by the public and taxpayers must demonstrate his trust to them. The "com plete candor and perfect integrity" clause of the American Association of Universities is apparently based on an ^Right of the People, p. 93. 97 Jones, op. cit.. pp. 6-10. 182’ assumption that the professor must preserve the trust of the citizens in him.98 The argument is that it is a privilege for a person to teach and by remaining silent regarding his associations he forfeits his job. This con cept has been explored in a later section of the present chapter." Suffice it to say here that the practice of firing under this dictum, which has been done at numerous universities, places professors in a second-class citizen status.100 Five reputable sources provide rebuttals to the doctrine of guilt by association. Dean Hacker of Columbia said the professor has "ordinary rights as an ordinary citizen."101 The American Association of University Pro fessors believes that it is not necessarily academically or morally blameworthy to remain silent about associ- 102 ations. The position was taken in opposition to the Association of American Universities. John O'Brian reminds us that guilt by association is "at variance with the American conception of fair play." 98See footnote 118. "cf. post pp. 199-202. 100Caughey, op. cit., pp. 157-58. 101Civil Liberties, October, 1957, p. 2. 102 "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for INational Security," The Bulletin of the American Associ ation of University Professors. 42:99, Spring, 1956. I 183 He opposes its extension into the jurisprudence of con temporary affairs.^03 Commager vigorously challenges guilt by association on five bases: (1) It is unsound in logic, e.g., that good causes become bad if supported by bad men; (2) it is wrong legally, since guilt is personal and not collective; (3) it is wrong practically because of its very vagueness and ambiguity; (4) it is wrong historically for voluntary association is "perhaps the most characteristic of all American institutions"; and (5) it is wrong morally because it assumes a far greater power in evil than in virtue. Similar criticism comes from the words of Douglas: (1) Joining is an innate American habit which has roots in the First Amendment; (2) the Communist Party has been illegal in only four states, and only since 1955; (3) guilt is personal under our system of law; and (4) the government should have no concern with thoughts or beliefs under the First Amendment. The evidence seems rather overwhelming that guilt by association is vicious doctrine if one understands the historical development of human freedoms. However, many 103 v National Security and Individual Freedom, pp. 47-48. ^-O^Freedom, Loyalty. Dissent, pp. 98-126. •*•05 T h e Rjght of the People, pp. 91-94. 184 of us do not understand our traditional safeguards and in a crisis influenced by the 1 1 international conspiracy" we are prone to ape some phases of totalitarian systems. Not a single case of a proved Communist has been found in academic ranks, but hundreds have lost their positions under guilt by association.^^ Though not all persons would agree, it appears that each case of an alleged Communist professor's behavior in the classroom should be examined specifically if there is a question of a lack of independent thought. The facts should be analyzed by a competent academic committee to determine the fitness of the professor to continue teaching at the college or university level. There is a third implication in the ideas of Hutchins, the liberal educator. Should a democratic society allow a professor in a college or university to teach who is attempting to change the society by persuasion toward a totalitarian government? This is an extremely complex and difficult question, yet it must be answered in connection with academic freedom and the security of the nation. Before the question can be given a tentative ianswer, we must recall the theoretical concept of democ racy. Justice Douglas does an admirable job of stating it: ^^Caughey, op. cit., pp. 148-49. 185 . . . It is, I think, true that freedom of expression is one of the last political rights which any people may acquire. When sovereignty rests in a man or in a majority, suppression of a minority may be necessary to protect and safeguard the status quo. But when sovereignty is in the people, it is distributed equally and indivisibly among every member of the group. The con formists and the nonconformists alike can claim the privilege. So can the reactionaries and the revolu tionaries, those who believe in laissez faire and those who believe in the dictatorship of the prole tariat. That, at least, is the theory. And freedom of expression is as integral a part of the rights of sovereignty as running for office or voting, Continuing the same theme, Douglas reminds us, "If the people are to be wise sovereigns, there must be no restraints or limits on cultural, scientific, artistic, or 1 0 8 intellectual endeavor.*' Borrowing from the late Pro fessor Zechariah Chafee, formerly a leading exponent of free speech in this country, Douglas concludes, "Teachers must be allowed to pursue ideas into any domain. There must be no terminal points on discourse.1 1 Alexander Meiklejohn, the former president of Amherst College, believes colleges and universities "have failed to meet their deepest obligation" of justifying academic freedom for the purposes of a self-governing society by not teaching what freedom is, how it can be •*•07The Right of the People, p. 23. 108Ibid., p. 25. 109Ibid.. p. 26. 186' 110 won, or how it can be lost. Historian John Caughey agrees in stating that academic freedom "stands as the 111 summation and the keystone of freedoms in general." "Academic freedom . . . is an admirable and necessary adjunct to democracy. It is something in which every per- 112 son in the country has a stake." Historian Henry Commager words the concept in posi tive terms: That government which most scrupulously protects and encourages complete freedom of thought, expression, investigation, criticism is the one which has the best chance of achieving security and progress. The above liberal opinions might be characterized in a single sentence. The expanding freedom of a democracy requires maximum freedom of investigation and expression, particularly for professors. A democracy would appear to be able to take the risk of unpopular opinion being ex pressed in higher education, i.e., the exposure of Commun ist ideas in the classrooms, out of which some of the future voters would make their judgments. It seems un likely that Communist ideology would soon become so popular Alexander Meiklejohn, "The Teaching of Intel lectual Freedom," Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors. 38:24. Spring, 1952. Ill In Clear and Present Danger, pp. 26-27. ■^•^Ibid., p. 141. • ^ Freedom, Loyalty. Dissent, p. 91. I 187 in the United States that it could win a majority at the polls.114 As Professor Max Lemer has said: . . . Every educational system must learn how to pre sent the claims of rival social systems without fear or propaganda . . . the courses dealing, for example, with Marxist thought grew scarce [in the past decade]. America had not yet developed the quiet belief in their own system that would enable them to regard in tellectual nonconformism with calmness. The Committee on Government and Higher Education took the following position in the spring of 1959: The reasons for guaranteeing the security of higher education and keeping it firmly anchored against the winds of intolerance and momentary folly ought to be familiar to all who recognize the pre-eminent position of the university as a citadel of freedom. . . .11° A widespread conservative opinion regarding a pro fessor’ s obligations comes from the American Association of Universities, the organization of university presi- 117 dents. Referring to a professor’s invocation of the controversial Fifth Amendment, the presidents stated on March 24, 1953: "As in all acts of association, the professor accepts conventions which become morally binding. Above all, he owes his colleagues in the university complete candor and perfect integrity, precluding any kind of clandestine or conspiratorial activities. He 114Cf. post, footnote 124. TIC • ‘ • ■ ‘ • “'Lemer, op. cit., p. 746. 11/ : Lear, op. cit.. p. 22. 11^Caughey, op. cit.. pp. 157-58. t l owes equal candor to the public. If he is called upon to answer for his conviction it is his duty as a citi zen to speak out. . . ."118 The National Education Association, the American Association of Universities, the Association of American Colleges, and a majority of the public do not believe a Communist should be permitted to teach in higher educa tion. -^9 Most conservative individuals and groups would not trust their sons and daughters within a classroom in 120 which a Communist professor was teaching. Can a line be drawn between ideas and acts? Hook says, "a pinch of common sense in preventing such viola tions [of trust where acts are committed] is worth more than a ton of indictments and prosecutions afterward to 121 punish violators.1 ' Hook does not feel society can run the risk of being harmed by overt acts of conspirators of the Communist PartyI Hook really makes his case one for preventive law or justice. However, a distinguished conservative attor ney, John Lord O'Brian, in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard ■I I Q Peter Barhrach, Problems in Freedom (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1954), p. 381. ■^•■^Harold Taylor, On Education for Freedom (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954), p. 289. 120Cf. post, pp.190-191. 121 Hook, The New Leader, p. 25; cf. ante, 189 in 1955 said: . . . In recent years, however, as you will see, puni tive remedies against unorthodox political ideas have been increasingly imposed, on the theory that unless such preventive action is taken the communication of such ideas will be the direct cause of acts which are wrongful of themselves.122 O’Brian opposes preventive justice because of its conflict with traditional freedoms. . . . Because of the peculiar sanctity of individual freedom in a democratic society, governmental inter ference with the expression of thought has usually been entirely forbidden, whether that interference be pre ventive or punitive in character. -*-23 There is a danger that in the era of "McCarthyism" we have adopted attitudes which are essentially new- totalitarian in nature. Perhaps our faith in freedom has not persisted in the context of crisis. Justice Douglas states the ideal of freedom in a democracy: . . . Being close to American affairs in the 1950's, I cannot conceive that the communist's advocacy of the violent overthrow of government has convinced more than a handful of the American public. "Clear and present danger" has become merely a convenient excuse for suppression. Yet in my view the only time sup pression is constitutionally justified is where speech is so closely brigaded with action that it is in , essence a part of an overt act [emphasis added 1.124 One should ask two more questions: (1) Should a society use preventive law to protect itself from potential 1 99 John Lord O'Brian, op. cit.. p. 24. 123Ibid., p. 23. 124.jhe Right of the People, p. 54. i 190 antisocial acts? and (2) Can a majority of students or citizens be trusted to make wise decisions regarding Com munism? Few constitutional experts would apparently say we should employ preventive law to prohibit radical ideas, unless we wish to weaken democracy drastically. A democ racy should punish illegal acts after they have occurred, not attempt to suppress ideas which could conceivably result in action. We have little evidence indicating parents trust the judgments of their college sons and daughters concern ing Communism. However, what evidence we have does not give cause for optimism on the point. Sociologist Samuel 125 Stouffer of Harvard headed a study into attitudes toward Communism during the Spring of 1954 when the Army-McCarthy hearings were in progress. To the question, "Should the Communist [professor] teaching in college be fired?" came the following responses: Yes No Opinion No Community leaders 86% 3% 11% Cross-section of cities 91% 5% 4% National cross-section 89% 5% 6% •*-^Stouffer, pp. cit.. p. 43. 191 Most people apparently do not believe their off spring should be exposed to the teachings of a Communist professor because most parents do not react to intellectual nonconformity calmly. The results of the survey tend to 19 6 demonstrate Lerner’s last statement quoted above. Parental views seem to contrast vividly with the view of Justice Douglas, though the latter did not make his state ments concerning a Communist teaching in the college or 127 university. The paradox of parental attitudes toward exposure of their children to the teachings of a Communist is well illustrated by Robert Maclver: Are we then afraid to let the student judge for himself? Such a fear can surely be entertained by those who have no trust in the virtues of our own system, no faith in democracy. Such people doubly deny their professed faith. On the one hand, they reject the open forum for ideas that is the inherent condition of democracy in operation; on the other hand, they seem to fear that the ideas of one communist are more potent than the ideas of a thousand noncommunists. . . .J-28 The fourth major question is: Should political beliefs and opinions be made the basis for either hiring or firing a professor? This question is in effect answered by such groups as the National Education Association, the 126Cf. ante, footnote 115. 127Cf. ante, footnote 124. 128 Robert M. Maclver, Academic Freedom in Our Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 190. Association of American Colleges, and the American Federa tion of Teachers.These groups apparently believe Communists are all part of the "international conspiracy" and are not fit to remain in the teaching profession. This 130 view is shared by Sidney Hook. Professor Caughey states that hundreds of teachers and researchers have been dis missed because of refusal to take oaths, or to answer ques tions about their past or present political affiliations and beliefs. Hook’s position on ousting Communist professors formed the basis of the popular practice. The University of Washington’s experience under President Raymond Allen had served as the academic precedent for most institutions. Allen had stated he would not keep a Communist teacher 132 because the professor was not a free man. Thus, with the prevailing practice adopted, the status quo position was not frequently argued by its supporters. In a prag matic society the practice of the present does not neces sarily have to be validated by rational debate. Sometimes the status quo is considered sacrosanct. ■^•^Taylor, Xoc. cit.; Corliss Lamont, Freedom Is As Freedom Does (New York: Horizon Press, 1956), p. 241. *^®Cf. ante, footnote 94. 1 In Clear and Present Danger, pp. 148-49. ^••^Maclver, op. cit. , pp. 158, 179-82. Arrayed against this position were individuals in cluding Hutchins, Senator Robert Taft, Presidents James Conant and Nathan Pusey of Harvard, and President Harold Taylor of Sarah Lawrence College. Concurring organizations were the American Philosophical Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Association of University Professors, 133 and a "minority of liberals." Each of these people or groups felt the professor should have a hearing before peers to ascertain his fitness to teach, if it was chal lenged. Senator Taft's view as a trustee of Yale Univer sity states the classic conservative position shared by Hutchins. "As a member of the board of trustees of a uni versity, I would not favor firing anyone simply for being a Communist unless I was certain he was teaching Communism or having some effect on the development of the stu dents. President Taylor of Sarah Lawrence also makes his position clear: . . . [A Communist] . . . should not be dismissed be cause of political affiliation, but that his case should be judged on its individual merits through the regular faculty procedures with standards applied by a constituted faculty committee. 133 •^Caughey, op. cit.. p. 157; Taylor, op. cit.. p. 289; and Lament, loc. cit. ^^Caughey, op. cit.„ p. 156. 194 . . . the fact of former or present membership must be accompanied by some evidence of the abuse of his post to inject communist policies, to follow a communist line, to act dishonestly, on behalf of the party, or to lower standards of his profession and his institution by his political conduct.133 The danger of making political belief the basis of either hiring or firing is that it inhibits freedom of speech and independent thinking. ". . . Scholars all over the world spoke out against the political test as ruinous to academic freedom” in the University of California loyalty oath issue of 1949 and 1950.^^ Douglas states, 1 1 If a person is to be deprived of his livelihood because of any association . . . with a subversive group, then a great damper is placed on the free pursuit of knowledge." He goes on to state that under these conditions the "free spirit so necessary for research and teaching is greatly limited." Historian Caughey cautions that the tendency to suppress unpopular political beliefs, i.e., Communism, in cludes those persons who believe in Socialism, the New Deal, the Welfare State, the United Nations, and inter- 1.38 nationalism. The tendency is great, especially during eras of hysteria, to equate an opponent*s dissent with ■^■’Taylor, op. cit.. pp. 288-89. ■^Caughey, op. cit.. p. 150. 13 ^ The Right of the People, p. 134. 13&In Clear and Present Danger, p. 138. i 195' unorthodox political beliefs.139 It is frequently easier to label an opponent than to meet his arguments under the rules of rational debate. Three expert sources, all professors, believe a professor’s political opinions should not be held against him as long as he is competent. All of them hold it is possible for a professor to be competent and yet hold 140 membership in the Communist party. Have teacher loyalty oaths served their purposes? These laws require the professor to swear he is loyal to the United States and that he is not a Communist. Some of them specify a given number of years prior to the taking of the oath that the teacher has not been in any organization which advocates overthrowing the government. Presumably the oath has been used as a screening device to keep Com munists out of teaching positions. James P. Baxter, III, the President of Williams College, maintains the loyalty oath for Communist profes sors is "less effective than a toy pistol" because they would lie in taking it. He also believes oaths may keep 139 O’Brian, op. cit., p. 55. •^^Maclver, op. cit., p. 200; Theodore Brameld in iEmest 0. Melby and Morton Puner (eds.), Freedom and Public Education (New York: Praeger, 1953), p. 131; I. B. Berkson, I The Ideal and the Community (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 262-63. 196 persons with conscientious scruples out of teaching, though 1/1 he favors keeping Communists out of teaching positions. Caughey, a historian on the University of California Los Angeles campus, points out the consequences of the oath have been the stifling of controversy while "fear has stalked the classroom and laboratory." Historian Robert Maclver says loyalty oaths suppress free inquiry and in "no democratic country is the threat so clamorous as in our own."^ The Association of American Law Schools considers anti-Communist oaths ineffective and conducive to belief of a standard pattern which ends freedom of scholarship.143 Commager concludes, "The search for subversives results in the intimidation of the independent, the original, the imaginative, the experimental-minded. Loyalty oaths dis courage independence of thought in teachers and students alike."144 Perhaps the teacher loyalty oaths have given the American public the illusion of security, while sacrificing some of the impetus in ideas. Alan Barth, an editorial writer for the Washington Post, comments: 141Clair Wilcox (ed.), Civil Liberties under Attack ;(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), pp. 139-40. Maclver, op. cit., p. 187. 143Ibid., pp. 195-96. l44Freedom. Loyalty, Dissent, p. 88. . . . to subject them [teachers] to any political test or to threaten them with political censure from the outside is to silence and shackle them. Men in fear that they may lose their jobs for unorthodox opinions or unconventional associations cannot teach freely. ^ Who should determine the qualifications of com petence for a professor? The answer would seem to be pretty obvious if one thinks of the medical and legal pro fession. The professional peers, or experts, should be the best available judges of a man’s skill and worth in a teaching and research situation. About the only indi viduals who apparently disagree with this are members of Congressional committees and pressure groups. The medical and legal professions would hardly let laymen in public office remove them from their jobs. The teaching profes sion has done just the opposite, though some academic organizations have attempted unsuccessfully to protect their colleagues. Perhaps the common idea that any layman is an expert about education because he has been exposed to some during his lifetime is a factor! The axiom that ideas are a dangerous thing may also possess relevance. What are the criteria for a competent professor? This is not an easy question, but an intelligent answer is likely to come from academic peers. There seem to be no educational authorities in disagreement on this point and 145 Alan Barth, Government by Investigation (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), p. 187. the Supreme Court upheld it in Slochower v. Board of Edu- 146 cation. 350 U. S, 551. Caughey suggests the tests of personal character and honesty in scholarship should be 1 / *7 considered. Some of these questions would seem perti nent to the issue of loyalty. Does the professor engage in controversy? If so, are there at least two sides presented in the attempt to preserve a sense of objectivity? Has he acted honestly? Has he attempted to improve his profession or increase the knowledge in his subject area? Has he obeyed the laws like an ordinary citizen should? If there is a question of a professor's fitness to teach and there is an investigation into his alleged "sub versive" acts in the classroom, the following should be considered: Does the administration bring forth written charges against the professor? Does it provide time for him to secure counsel and prepare his defense? Is there concrete evidence of Communist indoctrination sufficient to warrant dismissal? Is due process observed by providing a hearing for the faculty member before his colleagues? Does the faculty endorse the procedure prior to the occurrence of the case? Are all the professor's constitutional rights 146xhe Right of the People, p. 146. 1 / * 7 In Clear and Present Danger, p. 147. 199 1 &.R as an ordinary citizen upheld? Does the administrative officer execute whatever recommendation the faculty com mittee makes regarding retention of the professor? Are the questions pertinent only to his teaching responsibilities? Perhaps the issue of competence can be re-evaluated by Professor Hook's words. He is a widely respected philosopher and an opponent of Hutchins' views on Commun ism. These remarks were made in direct rebuttal to "Aca demic Freedom" by Hutchins. . . . The objection to Communist party teachers is not on the technical ground of their competence or in competence in the skills of teaching a specific subject matter, but on grounds of their moral and professional integrity in accepting instructions to use their skills to indoctrinate and recruit.149 Hook believes that a teacher or government worker exercises a privilege in working at a specific job in which he must keep the confidence and general trust of the pub- 150 lie. In other words, the teacher has the privilege of working in his profession so long as he does not resort to the constitutional guarantees of a citizen in refusing to disclose political beliefs and associations. Caughey states that two bases on which professors were dismissed, no "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security," pp. 58-60. ^^Hook, The New Leader, p. 24. 150Ibid.. p. 23. 200 after the University of Washington precedent, were associ ation and unresponsiveness. The latter consisted of refusal to answer questions which were not pertinent to teaching duties through use of the privilege of silence under the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amend- 151 ment • Hook seems to approximate stating one is morally guilty until he proves himself morally innocent by refuting inferences drawn because of his unresponsiveness. Caughey calls this type of thinking "the doctrine of guilt by 152 silence." Hook states: Even outside a political context, moral guilt by intimate voluntary association in behalf of common goals [desire of the Communist Party to overthrow the government] may be legitimately inferred where there is no evidence of dissociation. . . .-**53 Hook would permit a Communist to teach only if he convinced a committee of academic peers he was trustworthy. The more skillful a teacher is the more he can indoctrinate without exposing himself. Earlier in the same essay, Hook wrote, . . . [A Communist Party member should be required] to refute the presumption of unfitness, i.e., to convince ^ • • ^In Clear and Present Danger, pp. 154-55. 152Ibid.. p. 157. Hook, The New Leader, p. 26. ■^^Ibid., p. 24. Cf. footnote 93. 201 an elected academic committee of his peers that, des pite his voluntary membership in an organization which gave him instructions to act dishonorably, he was worthy of being retained as a teacher. If anyone at this point retorts: "A man must be considered innocent until he is proven guilty,'1 the answer is twofold. First, this is not a court. . . . Second, a man who is proved to be a member of a group which gives him dis honorable instructions is ipso facto under a cloud. That fact itself constitutes weighty if not decisive evidence of guilt. He must then prove to our satis faction that be doesn't intend to carry out the in structions. 155 Hook's reasoning seems to open up the issue of com petence to six possible counter arguments. It is analyzed here because it is the popular conviction and is directly opposed to the Hutchins view: (1) It assumes that all professors associated with the Communist Party attempt to indoctrinate their students; (2) it assumes the professor loses his constitutional guarantees of silence regarding his political beliefs and association in order to retain the privilege of teaching; (3) this, in effect, operates outside the law in an institution supposedly devoted to the discovery of truth and the exercise of justice in connec tion with its faculty; (4) it places the burden of proof on the faculty member to prove he is not indoctrinating, otherwise Hook sees the presumption of unfitness thus re versing the long-accepted Anglo-Saxon legal tradition; (5) it requires the professor to guarantee his future acts 155Ibid., p. 24. 202 will be acceptable to the faculty committee; and (6) it opens the door to constant investigation of the professor so long as someone spreads gossip about his alleged Com munist affiliation. If the above six arguments are reliable, caution should be used in ascertaining the competence of a profes sor, and by all means, legal rules and procedures should be used in so far as possible. The question of a citizen's rights and a professor's privileges may be an issue of due process of law. Since we apparently all have a stake in academic freedom and need all the competent teachers we can get, we ought to retain the competent and encourage those who can think independently. All of us should have the freedom to learn, whether as teachers, students, or citi zens. Surely we should not operate our colleges and uni versities on the principles of guilt by association, in view of our long, successful legal history without such an immoral doctrine. The best book on academic freedom written by a historian carries this conclusion. Professor Robert Maclver is on the faculty at Columbia University. His words regarding who should determine the competence of a professor follow: . . . to propose that any non-educational body, par ticularly any political body, should as it were police 203 our universities in order to assure that they live up to their educational responsibilities is mere foolish ness . - * - 5 ° Hutchins makes the following statement regarding principles and crises: . .A principle is no good unless it is good in a crisis and unless it applies to those who hold views opposite to yours as well as to those who share your opinions" (VI:376-79). These views are consonant with the life-long philo sophy of Hutchins. He reminds us there should be debate on 157 the basic issues, but we do not have to agree. He also indicates his belief in universities as centers of inde pendent thought springs from the attempt to define the ideal (VI:392-94). Here the philosopher and administrator join in the attempt to define the purpose of the university and the faculty operating within the specialized institu tion. The institution must specialize in discovering the truth without regard to extraneous pressures outside the university. An outgrowth of the philosophical underpinnings of Hutchins is that the most important liberties we are fight ing for are those of freedom of thought, speech, and association (VI:419-21). He says we are engaged in the ^■^Maclver, op. cit., p. 235. •^^University Qf utopia, p. 67. 204 struggle for "the loyalty and adherence of mankind” and must be clear about what our principles are. Hutchins believes that freedom of expression is a precious right of a democracy and we must practice it if we expect other countries to follow the democratic ideal. The argument here is strikingly similar to a parallel in "The Proposi tion is Peace.” We must live up to our moral responsi bilities by practicing our great democratic traditions according to the speaker. John Brubacher supports the stand of Hutchins: . . . Fearlessness is a quality of academic work which is as fragile as it is indispensable for the scholar, not only in making amendments to an accepted social frame, but in fundamentally re-examining the frame of reference itself. 3-58 The next supporting sub-argument is that the quality of the university is determined by the quality of the faculty (VI:455_56). This leads into an explanation of function of the board of trustees, who are to criticize the university, but not to manage it as representatives of the community (VI:502-503). Chancellor Hutchins "carried his trustees with him” for over twenty years by daring and through his "mastery of men” in dealing creatively with them.159 158 Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 316. 15Q ^Lerner, op. cit., p. 745. 205 "Uncriticized groups inevitably deteriorate" (VI:505-506). Adlai Stevenson shares much the same con viction as does Hutchins: Here in the West our traditional attitude is that criticism is neither a menace nor an abberation. It is an essential principle of social development. . . . Criticism is simply the method by which existing ideas and institutions are submitted to the test of princi ples, ideas, and possibilities. Criticism, in its fairest and most honest form, is the attempt to test whether what is, might not be better. Unless one assumes that a group is perfect, the group will undoubtedly need criticism in order to make changes for the better. If on the other hand, no attempt at criticism is made, there can hardly be any result but a maintenance of the status quo or a decline in the quality of the group. Independent criticism is an essential in gredient of any dynamic organization. The public speeches and writings of Hutchins uphold the expanding tradition of academic freedom. He believes in the right of discussion for all. He would permit a professor who is a Communist to teach in a university if he retained his independent thinking. Similar concepts of freedom of speech and academic freedom are skillfully related by Justice Jesse W. Carter of the California Supreme Court: ~^^What I Think (New York: Harpers, 1956), p. xii. 206 But the most important aspect of freedom of speech is freedom to learn. All education is a continuing dialogue--questions and answers that pursue every prob“ lem to the horizon. That is the essence of academic freedom, of all scientific inquiry.161 Independent thought must flourish through freedom of speech. Freedom of speech relies on the intelligent criticism by colleges and universities on the assumption they will contribute to the improvement of society. Justice Douglas reminds us that to "regain the values 'of the age of debate1 . . . is one of the great problems of 1 f>2 this generation." Law Professor Fred Rodell reminds us that William Douglas is "the nationKs> chief high-office- 1 holding spokesman for the Bill of Rights." The second argument concerning the right of silence of a citizen and the privilege of teaching needs additional examination. Very little specific information on the crux of the rights versus privilege issue is available. Attor ney John O'Brian touches on the issue in the analogous case of governmental workers dismissed on security grounds. He criticizes security hearing procedures that are justified by the "cliche that no one has a legal right to work for 161mjudge Carter Calls High Court 'Great,'" The Open Forum [published by the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California], 35:1, August, 1958. 162^6 Right of the People, p. 84. 163m^ Gallery of Justices," Saturday Review, 41:37, November 15, 1958. 207 the government" since dismissals are frequently made "with out a fair hearing for a cause which imputes disgrace, lack of honor, loss of reputation, or lack of patriotism on the part of the dismissed." Justices Hugo Black and Robert H. Jackson have implied this type of firing violates due pro- cess.164 The answer regarding the dilemma of a citizen's silence and the privilege of teaching has not been answered by the courts. Caughey believes the professor should not be accorded second-class citizenship status, have his privacy violated on matters not necessarily pertinent to professional duties, or be deprived of the right of self- defense which is recognized in court. One question remains. Can we trust students seven teen years old and above to resist the ideological inroads of Communism if they encounter a professor who is a Com munist? If we can not trust the students to accept good ideas in preference to those not socially desirable in our culture, indeed education is of little valueI Echoing a thought of John Milton concerning books (there may be some parallel with classroom ideas), how can we know the good ones if we have not also read the bad? In addition, since a student is exposed to the ideas of forty to fifty 1 fii l National Security and Individual Freedom, pp. 34-37. 208 professors in college, are we naive enough to suppose that a few will poison a student's total political philosophy? If we are, we are over-estimating the influence of a teacher and under-estimating the independence of the stu dent. A professor should use reason and evidence in the area under discussion so that "at the college and univer sity level complete freedom of opinion should be encouraged to the point of erring on the libertarian side."^^^ Berk- son and Brameld, both modernists concur, however, Hook another leading modernist does not. "Academic Freedom" was delivered in Philadelphia to the convention of the American Academy of Political and Social Science on April 2, 1955. The New York Times did not carry any mention of the speech, nor did any other sources which were available. The July, 1955, issue of The Annals carried the speech in full, while devoting the entire publication to the problems of Internal Security and Civil Rights. The speech was delivered at the closing session of the two-day meeting. Excerpts were carried in the Philadelphia Bulletin, but no audience reactions were recorded. There are two premises which are peculiar to ~^~*The Ideal and the Community, p. 260. ■^^Correspondence with William B. Dickson, Managing Editor, dated March 17, 1959. 209 "Academic Freedom." (1) The arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for freedom of speech; and (2) tax- exemption places no duties on colleges and universities except that they should conduct teaching and research to the best of their judgment. The detailed discussion of these premises follows. It can easily be seen that freedom of speech is paramount in Hutchins’ ideal and independent university. It facilitates the dialogue pursuing truth. (4) "The arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for freedom of speech . . (VII:1-2). Evaluation.--This premise is rather self-evident because of the belief that the knowledge or opinion of one man may be one of the most precious attributes of a democ racy. The essence of a free society is the relationship of majority versus minority rights. Freedom of speech and academic freedom are corollaries so that minorities may reveal the error or falsity of the majority. Henry Commager states the situation brilliantly: . . . a free society cherishes non-conformity. It knows that from the non-conformist, from the eccentric, from the dissenter have come many of the great ideas of freedom. . . . A free society must fertilize the soil in which non-conformity and dissent and individualism grow. . . .167 167»iThe Tests of a Free Society," p. 3. 210 Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote this in the Sweezy case. The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self evident. . . . Teachers and students must always be free to inquire . . . .otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.168 Academic freedom is necessary "particularly in schools and colleges where above all freedom of thought must be preserved," according to the brilliant late com mentator Elmer Davis. Freedom of speech, press, and academic freedom are closely related according to a leading historian, John Caughey. "Quite apart from its bearing on popular sovereignty this freedom, more formally known as 'intellectual,' and in the trade by the less appealing name 'academic,’ stands as the summation and the keystone of freedoms in general."I?8 Hutchins has defended academic freedom from 1935 till the present. His appearance before the Broyles Com mission of the Illinois Legislature in 1949 is character ized by the words of the leading American historian of intellectual freedom, Robert Maclver: • ^ ■ 8837th Annual Report of the American Civil Liber ties Union (New York: American Civil Liberties Union), pp. 56-57. ^ ^ But We Were Bom Free (Indianapolis: The Bobbs- Merrill Company, Inc., 1952), p. 202. ^•^In Clear and Present Danger, pp. 26-27. 211 . . . The statement and subsequent responses of (then Chancellor Hutchins) constitute perhaps the most signal deliverance of the principles of academic freedom that any political investigating body has ever heard--but it obviously had no influence on the commission. A concluding comment concerning academic freedom is in order. This freedom must be defended by the board of trustees, the administration, the faculty, the students, and the alumni. Since intellectual freedom "is closely interwoven with the primary freedoms of the whole people, it should be the concern of all who care for the democracy we inherit.1 '^72 Justice Douglas states the relationship of academic freedom and the First Amendment, while dissenting in a loyalty oath case regarding a teacher. . . . This system of spying and surveillance with its accompanying reports and trials cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom. It produces standardized thought, not the pursuit of truth. Yet it was the pur suit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to protect. . . .3-73 The view of Douglas is more fully explained: My thesis is that there is no free speech in the full meaning of the term unless there is freedom to challenge the very postulates on which the existing 3-73-Academic Freedom in Our Time, p. 186. 172Ibid., p. 271. 173 /JCited in R. Freeman Butts and Lawrence A. Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953), p. 557. 212 regime rests. It is my belief that our First Amendment must be placed in that broad frame of reference and construed to permit even discourse or advocacy that strik^^at the very foundation of our institutions. • • • The right of a professor to search for the truth wherever it may lead is as ancient as Plato. Yet, even as late as this century "the professional right to academic freedom had not received an altogether secure lodgement in the pattern of American thinking. Hutchins seems to have captured one of the basic underlying currents of emotions, which expressed itself in the fear of ideas. Joseph P. Lyford expressed the situ ation in these words: . . . It Lthe Lazarsfeld report of college social science teachers' fears] is a painstaking narrative, in the victims' own words, of a protracted assault on America's system of higher education without parallel in our history. And the damage it has done to the teaching profession will not be wiped out in a decade nor will the damage even be undone until the community at large and college administrators accept the propo sition that the First Amendment is the keystone of education.176 The Hutchins philosophy is succinctly stated in the second paragraph (VII:18-26). Man is a rational animal and the state attempts to increase the virtue and intelligence of the people by education. The best means of carrying on ^ ^The Right of the People, p. 18. 17S Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 296. 17 fi ' American Association of University Professors Bulletin, December, 1957, p. 645. 213 the education is through the method of discussion which has as its object the discovery of the rational principles undergirding the universe. It is the civilization of the Logos, or dialogue. The entire series of arguments in the speech flow from this Hutchins philosophic sub-structure. He borrows from Aristotle in saying the "intelli gent citizen and the good citizen are identical." Educa tion depends on the examination of conflicting viewpoints in the eternal search for truth. All of these ideas form the philosophic frame of reference for the later supporting arguments. The argument that a teacher should be competent is the same as in "Education and Independent Thought." Com petence does not shift according to the exigences of the times. The aloofness of the traditionalist position from the immediate concerns of the present is evident. Hutchins made a minor factual error in stating that students were prohibited from debating the entry of Red China into the United Nations (VII:65-67). Actually what some colleges and universities did not debate in 1955 was that Communist China should be granted diplomatic recognition by the United States. "The standard of competence means that there must be some relation between the charges against a teacher and the quality of his teaching" (VII:95-98). Hutchins 214 believes the political opinions of teachers are irrelevant to the competence of a teacher. Yet, the actual practice was to dismiss teachers for activities which were not on- the-job, but refusals to sign loyalty oaths or talk about 177 their political affiliations. Indeed, Hutchins seems correct in saying we are "so afraid of ideas that we are afraid of people who are said to have ideas" (VII:141-43). Hutchins says the Fifth Amendment is "one of the more important advances in law" and that questions should be relevant and proper. Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard Law School, an expert on the Fifth Amendment, describes the self-incrimination law as "one of the great landmarks in 178 man's struggle to make himself civilized." The Supreme Court validated the Hutchins position regarding the rele vance of questions before legislative committees in Watkins v. United States. The Court said the legislative committee must demonstrate to the witness that the question it was 179 asking was pertinent to the investigation. One of the Hutchins arguments is the following: "If the President were to refuse to employ bald-headed men •^^Caughey, op. cit., pp. 145-49. 178ihe Fifth Amendment Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 54. •^^Carr, American Association of University Pro fessors Bulletin, Spring, 1959, pp. 14-15. 215 in the Federal establishment, the Supreme Court would find, I believe, that the bald had been deprived of their consti tutional rights" (VII:190-94). Sidney Hook reacted to the foregoing passage in this manner: . . . [That] Hutchins should believe that [the rele vance] of one's duties as a Government employe or teacher as is baldness is astonishing. It can be explained not in terms of Hutchins's total political depravity but only to his total political innocence. . . . It is unreasonable to assume that any informed person could believe that a question from a legally authorized source, designed to elicit an answer about membership in such a group, is improper. . . . Whether or not the refusal of a teacher to answer a question put to him by the Board of Education justifies his dismissal appears rather ambiguous. Under Pennsylvania law the United States Supreme Court held in Beilan v. Board of Education of Philadelphia that the refusal to answer the Superintendent's questions constituted "incompetency." In contrast, the case of Slochower v. Board of Higher Educa tion of the City of New York illustrates that under some circumstances a professor may decline to answer questions of a legislative committee without dismissal. A hearing before educational peers had to be provided under the due 181 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hook also reacted to the Hutchins illustration of 180^6 New Leader, p. 23. •^■*-Carr, op. cit. , pp. 10, 20-21. 216 Pastor Niemoeller's late opposition to the Nazis (VII: 195-210). He says Hutchins assumes "an equation between the legitimate efforts of democrats to prevent conspirators from destroying freedom and the criminal outrages of the Nazis against their opponents." Further, Hook felt Hutchins assumed that "to save democracy from fascism and Communism [we] must end in one or the other." Hook con tinues : . . . Hutchins is no help at all. In one mood, he says we should do nothing lest we become like our enemies. In another mood, he advises us to wait until the worst happens and the infiltrator strikes. His speeches are a creative solution of The succeeding premise seems to be in refutation to leading "ultra-conservative" critics, such as Fulton Lewis, Jr. Some journalists charged Hutchins with pre determining the conclusions of studies by making statements before the research was undertaken. universities except that of conducting teaching and re search according to their best judgment of what good teach ing and research are" (VII:271-74). tax-exempt foundations must meet in order to operate. It full of slogans, with (5) "Tax-exemption imposes no duty on colleges and Evaluation.--Hutchins stated the legal requirements •^^The New Leader, pp. 24-25. 217 is evident that he believes the great advantage of founda tions is the independence which they are able to enjoy. Their finances are not subject to the whims of the general public or those of legislative committees. The speaker used essentially the same paragraph (VII:266-77), in a speech before the Hospital Adminis trators in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on September 19, 1955.^®^ Hutchins stated, "The administrator of a founda tion has to have a vision of the end," the recurrent think ing of Aristotle’s Ethics in its modern manifestation. Independence from the pressure of majorities in the con ducting of research and teaching is a Hutchins watchword. Maxine Greene states the Hutchins credo: . . . It is this peculiar approach to "independence," therefore, which lies at the heart of the Hutchins approach to academic freedom. This, too, is the point at which administrator, philosopher, and crusader find common ground. The argument against restrictions on freedom, against loyalty oaths, against local and federal interference in the life of the school is built upon this founda tion. Only independence of thought (stemming from imperviousness to public pressure) can make possible the clarification of "basic ideas" required for the determination of what the public should have. Only in an atmosphere of untrammelled freedom can the "con versation aimed at truth" proceed. Only such a con versation will lead to the improvement of man and the securing of absolute values defined by philosophy. 1 RR See "The Administrator: Leader or Officeholder?" in Freedom, Education, and the Fund, pp. 190-93. • ^ - ^School and Society, May 12, 1956. 218 Hutchins stated the following: Freedom of teaching and research will not survive unless the people understand why it should. They will not understand if there is no relation between the freedom that is claimed and the purpose it is supposed to serve. (VII:398-402) Hutchins said the Reece Committee was attempting to gain acceptance of the "proposition that tax-exempt money is public money" and that it is therefore "subject to a special variety of public surveillance" (VII:254-56). The text of the Reece Report validates the statement: . . . Tax exemptions are acts of grace, the government may clearly impose such conditions on the exemptions as may be calculated to prevent abuse of the privilege and to prevent the use of the exempted funds against the public interest.^85 A leading Catholic magazine described the Reece Report as "one of the worst displays of Congressional ig norance and arrogance in recent years," at a time when there was plenty of other Congressional competition. The Committee's attempt to say what is "good" or "bad" in political thoughts "is profoundly hostile to our tradi- . • , i 186 txon." What are the purposes of academic freedom? Probably many laymen would say this freedom is only for "ivory tower" professors who are not very practical and 185 Tax-Exempt Foundations, p. 4. ISb.’The Reece Report," The Commonweal. 61:349-50, December 31, 1954. 219 187 are somewhat "absent-minded."xo/ Possibly we should look into the opinions o£ some "eggheads" to get their conceptions of intellectual free dom. Referring to the relationship between academic and social freedom, Commager observes: . . . There is no real choice between freedom and security. Only those societies that actively encourage freedom--that encourage, for example, scientific and scholarly research, the questioning of scientific and social orthodoxies and the discovery of new truths-- only such societies can hope to solve the problems that assail them and preserve their security. . . .188 Translated simply, Commager believes that academic freedom and the security and progress of a society are in separable. It is the concomitant of universal suffrage and progress. In Historian Caughey's words, to stand against tyranny over men's minds is the very meaning of America. ". . .To stand for freedom is an act of highest patriot ism."189 The late Elmer Davis, Rhodes Scholar, and "the most honored commentator in radio history," the exemplar par excellence of the independent mind, compared Russian and Western ideas in 1953: . . . What makes Western civilization worth saving is the freedom of the mind, now under heavy attack from 18^Curti, op. cit., p. 76. ISSpreedom, Loyalty, Dissent, pp. 79“80. 189In Clear and Present Danger, p. 27. 220 the primitives--including some university graduates-- who have persisted among us. If we have not the courage to defend that faith, it won't matter much whether we are saved or not.-*-90 He concludes his book by saying, "This republic was not established by cowards; and cowards will not preserve it." Philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn of Amherst Col lege, believes academic freedom is the cornerstone of a self-governing society. He continues: . . . an institution which limits intellectual freedom is not a university . . . a man who assumes the social responsibility of a scholar, a teacher, a preacher, must first of all, establish, in the minds of the people whom he serves, the assurance, the certainty, that his beliefs, his utterances, are independently his own [emphasis added]. They must be sure that he is a man whom no one, not even themselves, can compel to believe this or say that, can forbid to believe that or to say this. Anyone who submits, under pressure to coercive control over his thought or his speech, in so far ceases to be a scholar searching for truth, ceases to be a teacher, leading pupils toward honest and fearless inquiry and belief. He becomes a hired man thinking what he is paid to think, saying what he is hired to say.- * - " • * - The ideal of academic freedom has been well stated by the Regents of the University of Wisconsin in 1894: . . . "In all lines of academic investigation it is of the utmost importance to follow the indications of truth wherever they may lead. . . . We believe that the great State University of Wisconsin should ever en courage the continual and fearless sifting and winnow ing by which alone the truth can be found."-*-92 But We Were Bom Free, pp. 228-29, and the book j acket. 191 The American Association of University Profes sors Bulletin, Spring, 1952, pp. 14, 23. ■^^Curti, op. cit., p. 88. 221 It appears that academic freedom is one of the vital arteries of ideas and communication in a democracy; yet, the country in the 1950's seemed to suffer from a construction of those very arteries. We tended to weaken the superstructure of freedom for all by undermining part of the intellectual foundation through dismissals based upon guilt by association. We did not "feel very free" and we certainly did not manifest the last of Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, freedom from fear, especially in education. Academic freedom apparently has two purposes, to encourage teachers to follow truth wherever it may lead, so that the second aim, popular sovereignty can be better maintained. Voting demands an intelligent comprehension of the truth. Academic freedom is not well understood by laymen because "educators have no time and little inclination to explain" it to the public (VII:371-74). Hutchins says administrators have not explained this essential freedom for fear of losing financial support. Academic freedom will not survive "unless people know why it should" (VII:398-99). The leading expert historian on academic freedom provides these remarks: . . . It would indeed seem as if our educational insti tutions must do more to educate the public in this respect. If in the process they suffer somewhat, is it not true that all freedom entails some risk of loss in the very act of defending it? There is no freedom, any more than there is achievement, without risk. 193 ■^^Maclver, op. cit. , p.. 235. 222 Hutchins gave the keynote address "Freedom and the Responsibility of the Press: 1955," at the three-day annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D. C., on April 20, 1955. James S. Pope, President of the Society and executive editor of the Louis ville Courier-Journal, introduced Hutchins as the "hair shirt" of the American Press. Then the keynoter "renewed iq A his good-natured assault" on the press. The reactions to the address were much more numerous than the other speeches analyzed. This can probably be attributed to the occasion at which it was given and especially to the fact that Hutchins had severely attacked one of the nation’s major mass media. There are two premises in Hutchins' two major addresses on the function of the press. (1) The greatest aggregation of educational foundations is the press itself; and (2) the First Amendment was designed to protect the content of the press, not the cash return from it. (6) "The greatest aggregation of educational foundations is the press itself ..." (VIII:11-13). Evaluation.--Hutchins assumes the primary function of newspapers is to enlighten their readers on significant ■^^Richard t . Maloy, "Editors Debate News Cover age," Washington Post and Times Herald, April 22, 1955. 223 matters. The function of entertaining the public should be left to other media according to Hutchins. Hutchins believes the newspapers constitute a col lection of educational institutions. However, if one decides that their purpose is to enlighten in the field of sports and provide entertainment through comic sections, he denies the broad educational value of newspapers. Or, in an age of the digest of reading materials into short cap sules, the significance of papers may be negligible. Tele vision may also turn some persons into non-newspaper readers. Therefore, they could have no appreciable edu cational effects even if they wanted to enlighten. Johnathan Daniels, editor of the Raleigh News [North Carolina] stated that Hutchins had missed some of the greatest faults of newspapers: "Our greatest real dangers are that as we have become fat and proud, we have also become dignified and docile. Today newspapering as a business is as anxious as any other business not to make anybody in the immediate neighborhood mad. My own feeling, Dr. Hutchins, is that we do not need to get any closer to that notion that we are edu cators running educational institutions, but farther from it. . . . The American press will serve democracy best when it understands that freedom is a local story. do that job well no one could ask that we do more."i95 •*~^Los Angeles Mirror News. April 21, 1955. 224 Max Lemer, a columnist for the New York Post, as well as a professor, expresses his ideas concerning the enlightenment achieved by the press. "The double visage of the news in an American paper is that of the violent and the familiar." Thus, Americans are "spottily informed and basically bewildered." The declining number of papers in a given town results "a shrinkage in the steadily vanishing market place of ideas" which is serious for a democracy. The press is "imaginative as to means but not as to ends."^^ Or, as the distinguished New York Times reporter James Reston said in a television interview, "The facts show quite obviously that they [Americans] are more in clined to purchase the newspapers that amuse and entertain than the papers that concentrate upon informing."^7 The Chancellor headed a thirteen member commission of scholars who investigated the freedom of the press in deliberations over a three year period. Hutchins delivered an address to the Annual National Conference of the United States’ Editorial Writers at their luncheon meeting in Louisville on November 19, 1948. "The pot roast was tender and tasty, but for all the effect it had on Hutchins, it •^^^America -as a Civilization, pp. 750-58. ■^^Transcript of "Washington and the Press," The Press and the People [telecast over Station WGBH-TV, Massachusetts], reprinted by the Fund for the Republic, 1959, p. 7. 225 might have been fire and brimstone." Time made the addi tional comment that Hutchins "gave the banqueting journal- 198 ists hell, with bells on." There were no reactions indicated, though there were more than one hundred writers in thirty two states present at the time the remarks were 199 delivered. Both sources carried brief excerpts of the speech. Hutchins argued that a university or newspaper "must be judged in terms of its purpose." Both of these institutions "should aim at public enlightenment." In fact, he said the newspapers "are teachers," though they were not good ones.^OO This is merely another way of say ing that the newspapers are great educational foundations, or at least they should be. Hutchins described this speech as his favorite because the audience was made up of the editors from whose writings he quoted. "The fact that they allowed me to escape from the room alive is a tribute to the broad-minded tolerance of American editorial writers. Or perhaps they didn't care."2^ 1 QQ "A Reprimand from Teacher," Time, 52:59, Novem ber 29, 1948. ■^^"Editorialists Urged to Profit by Criticism," Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1948. 2(^ Freedom, Education, and the Fund, pp. 46, 51. 2Q1Ibid., p. 28. 226 The next statement is based upon the speaker's legal training and his chairmanship of the Commission of the Freedom of the Press in 1947. It also reflects his torical knowledge. (7) "The First Amendment was to protect the content of the press, not the cash return from it" (VIII:174-75). Evaluation.--On October 26, 1774, the Continental Congress issued this message: The last right we shall mention, regards the free dom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal senti^g^ts on the administration of Government. • • • Meiklejohn considers the purpose of the Amendment in relation to content: When men govern themselves, it is they--and no one else who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfair ness and danger. . . . Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill- balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. 202 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech and Press (New York: Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, Inc., 1955), p. 40. 203Ibid., p. 42. 227 Meiklejohn clearly implies the Amendment was designed to protect the idea content of the press through freedom of speech. Professor Chafee reports that this was the first direct evidence concerning free speech. Man had learned that one of the most precious rights was the freedom to communicate information and truth. One needs only to re call the history of the struggle in Parliament for free speech to realize that governments themselves had put severe limitations on freedom of communication. The First Amendment was designed to spread ideas as Hutchins insists, not to guarantee profits to the owner of the newspaper. "Of course we have a one-party press in this country, and we shall have one as long as the press is big business, and as long as people with money continue to feel safer on the Republican side" (VIII:183-86). Gerald John son, the liberal practitioner of independent thinking, dissented with Hutchins' views that an editor should write independent of the publisher's wishes. Though he may have the courage to print his own convictions, he would usually not do so, "because the financial risk falls, not upon him, but upon the owners of the newspaper." Commenting on the speech, Johnson wrote, "Hutchins, a dovecote-flutterer with few equals and no superior currently in practice, operated with conspicuous success" in the keynote address before 228 204 the American Society of Newspaper Editors. James Wechsler, editor of the pro-Democratic New York Post, points out that the "one-party press" is a mis nomer and the "one-interest press" should replace the 20 5 term. The "one-interest press" refers to the preference of newspapers for the conservative viewpoint, not neces sarily only that of the Republican Party, but for conserva tive Democrats as well. Wechsler calls for another type of coverage: What I plead for is the restoration of our great tradition of free debate, fair arguments, a readiness to discuss all issues on their merits, a responsiveness to fresh unorthodox ideas. Let us live by the rule of political irreverence. . . .206 "The purpose of a newspaper, and the justification for the privileges of the press, is the enlightenment of the people about current affairs" (VIII:282-84). Hutchins’ premise is once again self-evident. Lerner says the news paper "has had the same experience as the drugstore: its original purpose has been swallowed up by its accre- 207 tions." Surely no one would argue that the main purpose of a newspaper is to entertain the public, though some ^O^Gerald w. Johnson, "The Superficial Aspect," The New Republic, 132:6, May 2, 1955. 2<"^James A. Wechsler, "The One-Interest Press," The Progressive, 21:9, May, 1957. 206Ibid., p. 11. ^O^America as a civilization, p. 752. 229 papers apparently give the public what the publishers think it wants. For example, the Los Angeles Times has used the circular argument that if people do not like what appears in the Times, they can stop taking the paper. This means in Los Angeles that they take a paper even more inadequate, or none at all! When people have a choice between no paper and an inadequate one, they normally take the inadequate one by default. Frank Eyerly of the Des Moines Register and Tribune said Hutchins "'couldn’t demonstrate any instance in which people suffer because of single ownership newspapers.’" J. Montgomery Curtis of the American Press pointed to his organization as an example that newspapers want criticism 908 and wish to improve themselves. James Pope told a reporter he thought most editors would take kindly to inde- 209 pendent criticism by an organization of integrity. Ben Reese, formerly of the St. Louis Post Despatch. rose to challenge Hutchins' assertion that the press had led the troops from the rear in attacking McCarthy. Hutchins cut him off by saying the Despatch had done its 210 duty in this as in all other cases. 2®®Coleman B. Jones, "Stassen Calls on Editors To Aid in Quest for Peace," New York Herald Tribune, April 22, 1955. 2(^ Los Angeles Times, loc. cit. 21QIbid. 230 Jack Thompson of the Clifton Forge Review [Virginia] challenged the idea of no competition in one- paper towns. He said that there was competition from larger towns and from radio stations. Another editor, who was unidentified, suggested that those experienced in "getting out the paper" were more competent to deal with 211 newspaper problems than Dr. Hutchins. Gerald Johnson, noted for his dissents in journal ism, states his opinion: . . . To lash out boldly in defense of what is right but unpopular is to subject human nature to an un bearable strain. The more honest the man [an editor] the more keenly he feels his responsibility to his stockholders, and that responsibility drives him to play it safe. Espousing anything but safe. . . . "In the overwhelming majority of communities there can be no debate among rival editors" (VIII:155-57). Com petition has been one of the great attributes of the Ameri can society, but competition in ideas is largely stifled in the newspaper industry. Though we believe strongly in the value of a two-party system of government, we do not have a vigorous two-party newspaper debate. Hutchins is correct in stating there is a great concentration of pro-Republiean newspapers in the United States. However, there is some debate among rival editors, ^npopular men and causes is ^•^New York Times. April 22, 1955. 91 9 Johnson, loc. cit. 231 even those which adhere to Republican viewpoints. He is correct in saying there will only be one editorial voice in a one-paper town. Certainly there is not much disagreement and debate among newspaper editors in general. Palmer Hoyt, the distinguished publisher of the Denver Post says, "The monopoly press is a very dangerous thing for democracy." Yet, he insists that television and radio still afford competition for newspapers in one-paper cities. In fact, Hoyt alleges there "are better newspapers 9 - | o today than there were ten years ago." James Reston of the New York Times says the majority of papers are owned by Republicans, though the majority of reporters tend to be Democrats.Thus, there is some disagreement among the press, but the editor or publisher is likely to be Repub lican. For that reason, the press is largely sympathetic to Republican politics and does not reflect the continuous debate and dialogue Hutchins prefers. "Monopoly may in the present state of affairs be a necessary evil, but let us not pretend that it is not an evil" (VIII:166-68). A democracy needs dissent in order to progress and when the newspapers do not stimulate it, the ^^Transcript of "The Public and the Publisher," The Press and the People [telecast over Station WGBH-TV, Massachusetts J, reprinted by the Fund for the Republic, 1959, p. 11. ^^"Washington and the Press," loc. cit. 232 potential of creative ideas is not fully realized. Conformity in ideas is not a condition conducive to crea tivity. Hence, a monopoly in the newspaper business is an evil because it contributes to complacency and smugness in society at large. The independent thinker, such as a Jefferson or a Lincoln, forms the very nucleous of an im proving culture. Yet, the present status of newspapers does not encourage an independent thinker in an editorial position nor a citizen at large. Lerner describes the impact of monopoly press in three areas. Power is concentrated in the hands of "a few aggregates . . . with a decisive influence on opinion." The product of the press becomes standardized, thus more conformist. Finally, the integrity the editor owes should be to the idea he writes, rather than to the publisher for 215 whom he works. Eric Sevareid says, "There was a time when editors lambasted each other and seemed to enjoy it. These days very few of them seem to relish the role of 91 f\ lambaster or lambastee." "The great issues of our time are peace and free dom. A new critical agency might appraise the performance of the newspapers in correcting, or contributing to, our ^•^America as a Civilization, pp. 760-61. 216„The Press in a Rose-Colored Mirror," The Reporter, 14:25, May 17, 1956. 233 vast confusion on these subjects” (VIII:367-70). The idea that a new independent agency should criticize the press and its ability to provide enlighten ment grew out of the three-year study of the Commission on the Freedom of the Press which Hutchins headed in 1947. Since the Commission's proposal had never been acted upon by the press, Hutchins renewed the idea. A. M. Piper, editor of the Council Bluffs Nonpareil [Iowa] asked Presi dent Hutchins whether one of the big foundations would take an interest in setting up an independent agency to criti cize the press. Hutchins replied that they would only if 217 the editors requested it. No request has been made. Even the highly respected Walter Lippmann does not believe newspapers should criticize each other, since he 218 maintains professors do not criticize one another. Lippmann is in error in stating that professors do not criticize each other's ideas. This mutual criticism is carried on constantly in the professional journals and sometimes in conventions. Lippmann does agree that best criticism comes from sources outside the press and he was the only critic who praised the Commission on Freedom of 217 Washington Post and Times Herald, loc. cit. o 1 p Walter Lippmann, "On Criticism of the Press," Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1947. 234 the Press on which Hutchins was the chairman. The impact on the conscience of newspaper craftsman of the Hutchins 219 Commission is still difficult to estimate. The American Veterans' Committee in Washington, D. C. requested that Hutchins speak to them regarding the Fund for the Republic.On October 7, 1955, Hutchins received the Annual Bill of Rights Award from the American Veterans' Committee at a dinner meeting. Harry P. Cain, Subversive Activities Control Board Chairman, also received a similar award which was accepted by his wife. There were no reactions or descriptions of the audience reported in 221 the newspapers. The following Hutchins opinion grows out of his conception of truth concerning civil liberties during the McCarthy era. (8) "... differences of opinion about the Fund for the Republic . . . must result from misinformation" (IX:16-18). Evaluation.--It appears that differences of opinion concerning the Fund not only result from misinformation, 219 Lemer, op. cit. , p. 763. 2 20 Freedom, Education, and the Fund, p. 99. 221"Fear of Truth Seen Key to Critics of Risk Study," Washington Post and Times Herald, October 8, 1955; Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1955. 235 but from different value systems. Since many of the Fund's activities are highly "controversial," it is not surprising that disagreement exists. Hutchins himself pointed out that activities in the civil liberties field are bound to 99 9 offend certain people. Much of the unfavorable pub licity of the Fund springs from the influence of Fulton Lewis, Jr. As The New Republic reported, the attempt of Lewis to "misrepresent" the Fund has not been completely C n 223 unsuccessful. The Congressional investigation by the Reece Com mittee also resulted in much criticism of the Fund. The Gallup Poll of 1954 and 1955 indicate typical opinions toward the parent organization, the Ford Foundation. The 224 comparisons follow: 1954 1955 Never heard of the Ford Foundation 63% 60% Indifferent 13% 11% Favorable 23% 27% Hostile 1% 2% 999 Los Angeles Mirror News, October 25, 1955. 223"The Fund for the Republic," The New Republic. 136:5, June 24, 1957. 224 Dwight Macdonald, The Ford Foundation, the Men and the Millions (New York: Reyna1 and Company, 1956), pp. 34-35. 236 There was an increase in the percentage hostile to the Ford Foundation, yet there were more who became favor able than there were in the hostile category. It probably would be safe to conclude the Fund's popularity would be similar to that of the Ford Foundation. The Legion stirred the board of directors of the California Republican Assembly, which met at San Pedro, to the point where they urged a Congressional investigation of the Fund for the Republic. The following is the resolution passed by the board of directors: The American Legion has stated that the Fund for the Republic is trying to propagandize Americans into believing Communism never has been, and is not now, a serious danger, and is seeking to discredit those fighting Communism and intimates the security measures taken by this administration [the Eisenhower Adminis tration] are un-American.225 Fulton Lev/is, Jr., the Mutual Broadcasting Company news commentator, was also alarmed about the Fund's activi ties and devoted some forty five broadcasts subsequent to August 22, 1955 to attack on it.^^ Lewis wrote, "The more I delve into this Fund for the Republic, the more amazed I am at the many similarities between its program and that of the Communist Party."227 ^-^Los Angeles Mirror News, October 10, 1955. ^^Dwight Macdonald, "Profiles," New Yorker, 31:63, December 17, 1955. 227nS;j _ m;Qarities to Party Line," Los Angeles Examiner, October 5, 1955. 237 The newly elected National Commander, J. Addington nno Wagner endorsed Collins' criticisms of the Fund. Wagner said in a speech at Los Angeles in January, 1956: "'In the objectional activities of the Fund for the Republic, the American Legion sees a most serious threat to America's success in the life and death struggle with Communism."1 He went on to say that the Legion believed the Fund's 229 activities were "'a form of anti-anti-Communism.'" J. B. Matthews said, "When it comes to the distor- 230 tion of the truth, Hutchins is a perfectionist." At age fifty five he is "still in his ideological swaddling clothes" regarding Communism. Matthews was troubled by Hutchins' testimony before the Broyles Commission of the Illinois Senate in 1949 when Hutchins said he did not know whether the Communist Party was a "'conspiratorial fifth OOI column operating in the interest of a foreign state.'" Much the same opinion of the Fund for the Republic's pro jects was expressed by Harold Lord Varney. The Fund was 228npunci Tor the Republic; Criticisms Mount," The American Legion Magazine, 59:36-37, December, 1955. 229 Los Angeles Mirror News, January 4, 1956. 230 J. B. Matthews, "Communism and the Colleges," The American Mercury, 76:133, May, 1953. 231 J. B. Matthews, "Hutchins to Investigate Com munism?" The American Mercury. 80:73, June, 1955. 238 a "slanted supporter of the so-called civil liberties side . . . to swing the American people over to the anti- McCarthy and pro-American Civil Liberties side in the 23? present national battle of ideas." The Fund for the Republic drew the criticism of Senators McCarthy and James Eastland and the persons men tioned above. "A sector of the press gleefully spread the poo charges." The Reece Committee alleged the Fund was try ing to move public opinion in a leftist direction and that certain of the Fund's activities were "subversive." "To the thoughtful this report was neutralized by its heavy 234 load of bias." Referring to the people who controlled and directed the Fund's operations, Fulton Lewis labeled them "as fine a collection of ultra-liberals, outright leftists and apologists for Communists as ever could be gathered to- 235 gether under one tent." Washington columnist Marquis Childs reports that Hutchins is usually dubbed "brilliant i and provocative." In refutation of the allegation that 232'"jhe Egg-Head Clutch on the Foundations," The American Mercury, 78:36-37, June, 1954. ^■^Caughey, op. cit., pp. 171, 182. ^^^Loc. cit. 235"The Constitution Means What It Says," Los Angeles Examiner, September 15, 1955. 239 the Fund for the Republic had a "left-wing'1 bias, Childs reminds the critics of the Fund that its board of directors o o fi has "a wide range of occupation and political outlook." William H. Stringer, Chief, Washington Bureau, of The Christian Science Monitor, shares much the same opinion. . . . One catalytic, sanity promoting agency in this [civil liberties] field is the Fund for the Republic, of which Dr. Hutchins is the present head. . . . It may help the nation to think its way to full recovery from the miasma [of hysterical fear of Communism].237 Probably Newsweek was reasonably accurate when it reported: A man's attitude toward Mr. Hutchins' fund is thus, in many instances, a sign of his attitude toward some of the most thorny problems in politics. Men divide on the fund question along lines of profounder import than the fund itself. Under the guidance of Robert Maynard Hutchins the Fund for the Republic has become something toward which few Americans can feel neutral.^38 "The professors who direct these studies have com plete freedom" (IX:157-59). The argument apparently arose as a rebuttal to the criticism of Fulton Lewis, Jr. and Professor Raymond Moley. Lewis had reported in his syn dicated column that there was an apparent attempt by the 236„Fund for Republic Pattern for Truth," Los Angeles Mirror News, October 19, 1955. 237"The Road Back," January 31, 1955. 238 JO"Controversial Man," Newsweek. 46:66, Novem ber 7, 1955. 240 Fund to prescribe the conclusions of Fund-sponsored 239 studies. Moley had written in his column that Hutchins "never makes an investigation without announcing the re sults beforehand." Lewis believed the Fund's activities were of an 0/1 anti-anti-Communist nature. Therefore, from the highly controversial area of domestic Communism, it was easy for him to conclude the Fund studies were deliberately slanted toward an "anti-anti-Communist" viewpoint. From this assumption, it followed that Hutchins deliberately had the Fund’s projects distorted toward a pre-conceived conclusion favoring Communism. The absurdity of the above reasoning is obvious to those who have read the Hutchins defenses of academic free dom as early as his inaugural address of 1929 at Chicago to the latest speech on the same topic in 1955. Hutchins believes scholars should be free to pursue the truth wher ever it may lead and he has been most critical of the uni versities for their failure to protect academic freedom. Raymond Moley wrote: 239itFoun(jat:j _ on Rep0rts Urged," Los Angeles Examiner, October 7, 1955. ^^^"Hutchins Goes Hunting for Fear," Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1955. 9 A 1 Los Angeles Examiner, October 5, 1955, loc. cit. 241 . . . Hutchins has a certain puckish [mischievous] way of overstating things to get effect. Unkind people call him a "smart aleck." . . . Such distinctions [Secretary of Yale at 24, Dean at 28, and President at 30] were a real trial for the ego of one so young. Somehow a sense of prodigiousness lingered on. Fulton Lewis, Jr., Mutual Broadcasting Company commentator, believed the Fund was attempting to "conduct its vast anti-investigation, anti-anti-Communist propaganda n / O campaign." David Lawrence was suspicious of the Fund’s investigation of the loyalty-security program during the Eisenhower Administration. ". . . It is apparent that most of these [Fund projects] are concerned with an attempt to discredit, and ridicule, if not abolish, the present security system." Lawrence said the Fund’s assertion that ideas and freedom of thought were being suppressed was a lie.244 An extract from the American Legion’s Publications Commission indicated the Legion's feelings toward Hutchins prior to the 1955 national convention: Hutchins has never at any time shown the slightest interest in, or concern over, Communist subversion. ^^"Now They're Hunting for Fearful Teachers," Los Angeles Times, January 29, 1955. Los Angeles Examiner, September 15, 1955, loc. cit. 244"The Fund Against the Republic," Los Angeles Mirror News, September 19, 1955. 242 Nowhere in any project or activity of the Fund is there a hint that the objectives of Communists include the destruction of all civil liberties. Communists are treated merely as nonconformists, not as conspirators. National Commander J. Addington Wagner made a speech in Los Angeles in which he remarked, "'Hutchins has proved to be his own worst witness and the best proof that the activities of the Fund have pleased and profited the oAg Communist Party. Newsweek voiced somewhat the same opinion. It was critical of the Fund for giving a grant to a Quaker library in Plymouth, Pennsylvania which had kept one of its employees after she had used the Fifth Amend ment. The article stated: . . . By such pixilated handouts, Hutchins constantly embarrasses the Ford Foundation, the Ford family, and the Ford Motor Company. But they are powerless to stop him; the fund has no legal or financial connection with the Fords.247 Arthur H. Dean, who had helped negotiate the Korean Armistice was one of the Fund's trustees. He reportedly resigned after Hutchins had hired ex-Communist Amos Landaman as a public relations man and told the trustees ^•^Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1955. ^^Paul Weeks, "Legion Head Hits UNESCO," Los Angeles Mirror News, September 4, 1956. 247 "The Prodigy Grown Older and the Strings He Holds on Fund's Millions," Newsweek, 48:21, July 2, 1956. afterward. Two "liberals" also attacked Hutchins. Sidney Hook said Hutchins was generating confusion, not shedding light on the Bill of Rights. Professor Philip Taft, an economist at Brown University, announced, "’Hutchins had made the liberal cause look ridiculous by going out of his way to 949 side with a Communist or a suspected Communist.’" A similar viewpoint was expressed in School and Society. "It is equally significant that, at the same time [1949], he claimed no knowledge of the workings of the Com munist Party; and he has continued to plead ignorance on that score."250 The conclusion of Hutchins concerning critics of the Fund is interesting. "I can only conclude that they [the critics of the Fund] are afraid of the truth" (IX: 170-71). The issue of loyalty has undoubtedly been one of the most perplexing domestic issues during the past decade. The methods of handling domestic Communism since 1947 have attracted wide attention, even though there is general agreement that Communists have represented some degree of internal danger to our society. Thus, the truth in such ^ ^The Ford Foundation, the Men and the Millions. p. 158. ^^Ibid.; Newsweek, July 2, 1956, pp. 20-21. 250 Greene, op. cit., p. 165. 244 a complex and controversial area is not easily attained. Once it is discovered, the truth is easily distorted by those whose reputation has rested upon confusion concerning Communism. The "ultra-conservatives” had built their reputations on their stand as staunch anti-Communists. Hutchins says these people and the philosophy they support are interwoven with the loyalty-security program. (9) "The Fund is for the principles of the Declara tion of Independence and the Constitution" (IX:263-65). Evaluation.--The Fund, and especially Hutchins, favors the continuing operation of laws through the inter pretations of the Constitution by our courts. Hutchins does not view the Constitution as a static instrument, but rather as an evolving document whose fresh interpretation should extend the boundaries of freedom. For example, the Fund has opposed guilt by association inherent in black listing by sponsoring John Cogley's study into blacklisting in radio and the movies. The study into the injustices in the loyalty-security program directed by Attorney Lloyd Wright was concluded in 1957. The Fund had also sponsored studies into the nature of Communism by Theodore Draper, Samuel Stouffer, and Arthur Sutherland. The Fund "wants to conserve the Republic by con serving its essential attributes, which are freedom and 245 justice" (IX:286-88). The Fund wants to protect academic freedom and the freedom to think; it wants to protect the rights of man under our Constitution. It does not seek popularity by warping its investigations to fit misconcep tions. It attempts to preserve the rights of individual men in the face of the pressures of the majority or the emotions of a frightened minority. Hutchins has shown concern for freedom and justice throughout his entire career. He felt the lack of analysis and construction of the concepts basic to justice in the 251 Fund’s program as recently as 1956. After over a year's debate among the Directors and Officers of the Fund, the basic issues program was initiated. The attempt to "seek to identify and clarify those fundamental issues that underlie most of the tumult concerning questions of freedom 252 and justice in our contemporary society" was begun. Eugene W. Landy, a Yale law student who had been temporarily denied a Navy commission because of his mother’s previous Communist affiliations wrote a letter to Hutchins praising him as "'one of the few free men of our 251 Freedom, Education, and the Fund, p. 231. 252 See the Fund for Republic’s "Freedom and Jus tice: The Basic Issues," July, 1957. ^•^Los Angeles Times, December 16, 1955. 246 "Our reliance is upon the intelligence and charac ter of the independent individual" (IX:309-10). The United States believes in the capacity of the individual to think for himself even if the thought expressed is unpopular. We act according to the will of the majority, yet we protect the rights of a minority, even a minority of one, by allow ing freedom of speech. We permit freedom of inquiry so the independent individual can think for himself and ex press his ideas accordingly. Ours has been a society where the individual's dignity has been supreme. We trust the individual to make a choice which will benefit the society as a whole, thus permitting representative government to express the will of the people. William H. Stringer of the Christian Science Monitor reports the contribution of the Fund to civil liberties: How can the sense of free inquiry, the fearless ness, and, yes, the trust in free institutions be further restored, that spirit which is inherent in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the amendments extending equality and suffrage? One catalytic, sanity promoting agency in this field is the Fund for the Republic, of which Dr. Hutchins is the present head. 254 "The Road Back," Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 1955. 247 Summary: The Hutchins position on civil liberties in perspective.--The following premises are those which are found in the speeches on academic freedom: A university is a center of independent thought and criticism. Professors may engage in legal activities. Freedom of thought, speech, and association are the most important liberties. The arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for freedom of speech. A Communist who thinks independ ently should not be disqualified from teaching in a uni versity. There is not much disagreement with Hutchins on the premise that a university should be a center of independent thought and criticism. Dewey says the concept results in "the greatest possible aloofness from contemporary social 255 life." Sidney Hook also disagrees with Hutchins, but other educators do not seriously dissent with the liberal educator. Conservative individuals and organizations do not agree that a professor may engage in legal activities if the dispute is connected with loyalty. Or, at least the conservative draws a more narrow interpretation of what is legal than does a civil libertarian. The National Educa tion Association, the American Federation of Teachers, and ^-*The Social Frontier. January, 1937, p. 104. 248 the Association of American Universities draw the narrow interpretations. Civil libertarians such as Hutchins, Harold Taylor, John O’Brian, William Douglas, and John Caughey would permit greater latitude for the teacher in areas of intellectual freedom. Organizations like the American Association of University Professors and the American Civil Liberties Union would permit more profes sorial freedom, particularly as an ordinary citizen in the off-campus phase of life. There is general agreement among defenders of civil liberties that freedom of thought, speech, and association are extremely important liberties. The arguments for these freedoms are indeed very similar to those contentions favoring freedom of speech. Caughey says academic freedom "stands as the summation and the keystone of freedoms in o £ - / r general." The purpose of academic freedom in the uni versity is to allow both students and teachers to inquire 257 into the truth. Conservatives who believe in guilt by association oppose the views of Hutchins and his sup porters. The most controversial Hutchins premise is that a Communist who thinks independently should be allowed to 2 S6 In Clear and Present Danger, pp. 26-27. 257 •"Cf. ante, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion cited in footnote 168. 249 teach in the university. This position contrasts with the dominant practice in higher education during this decade. Apparently a majority of citizens and administrators do not wish to have a Communist, or an alleged Communist, teach in higher education. Hook has directed the most withering attack at Hutchins1 stand concerning the reliability, of a Communist. Hutchins is supported in his minority viewpoint by several prominent men in public affairs. Conant, Pusey, Berkson, Meiklejohn, Brameld, Caughey, Lemer, and Douglas say that a Communist should be given an opportunity to teach in higher education. Senator Taft concurred. How ever, they have not spoken so frequently in the national limelight as the former Chancellor has. The Hutchins posi tion appeared radical during the period of McCarthyism due to the fear and intimidation evident in the teaching pro fession. The second civil liberties area in which Hutchins has spoken involves the responsibility of the press. There are two premises. The greatest aggregation of educational foundations is the press and the First Amendment is designed to protect the content of the press, not its cash return. Hutchins believes the newspapers should enlighten the people on the affairs of democracy, because their in fluence is more pervasive than the educational system. 250 Some experts agree with him, yet the common practice of newspapers is far from the ideal set for them by Hutchins. The Commission on Freedom of the Press, chaired by Hutchins in 1947, came to the same conclusion. There is evidence that the First Amendment’s pur pose was to insure the content of the press, but in a pragmatic business-dominated society, frequently the profit motive is primary. Monopoly has reduced the dialogue of debate in the newspapers. It is thought by many that the press must be sensational in order to sell and numerous papers could hardly raise the mass cultivation through their content. The last area in civil liberties dealt with by Hutchins concerns tax-exempt foundations where he has spent eight of his recent years. Experiences at the Ford Founda tion and the Fund for the Republic have been influential. There are three premises. Tax-exemption imposes no duty other than conducting teaching and research. Differences of opinion about the Fund for the Republic must result from misinformation. The Fund is for the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Educational foundations are a recent development in our society and not much has been written about them. There is little tradition as to their function. They are supposed to conduct teaching and research. The projects 251 initiated by the Fund have come under bitter attack from conservatives such as Lewis, Reece, and Moley. These men have objected to the liberal flavor of the research in civil liberties during the time when individual freedoms have undergone considerable undermining. Foundations were allegedly using tax-exempt money to move the public opinion in a "left-wing" direction. It was a clash of restricted personal freedoms versus almost unlimited civil liberty. Differences of opinion about the Fund must result from misinformation. The entire scope of civil liberties is exceptionally controversial because the underlying philosophy goes to the primary conflicts of democracy. Perhaps the conservatives who have smeared the Fund have a different value system. The bias of persons with a narrow interpretation of civil liberties collides with the liberals in their relatively unrestricted feelings favor ing maximum individual freedom. The final premise concerns the support of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution by the Fund. Many give lip service to both documents, however, when a concrete meaning is attached to these abstract con cepts dissent frequently appears. The legal and philo sophical education of Hutchins tends to make him a firm believer in the eighteenth century ideals. He wishes to have new interpretations of the concepts and public debate about them. It shows his faith in rational debate about the most important philosophy of our government and the purposes of our institutions in the contemporary society. CHAPTER V SPEECHES ON EDUCATION Introduction Hutchins has been a leading spokesman for educa tional reform for nearly three decades. His advocacy of rationalism in education has clashed with the prevailing practice in higher education. There has been the continu ing debate between the adherents to the Hutchins theory of higher education and that of John Dewey, the founder of the modernists.^ Hutchins spent "most of his time acting as a missionary for his own educational doctrines, in speeches, 2 conversations, and magazine essays." A brief sketch of the educational background in the United States is presented here. Additional educational perspective is woven into the criticism of Hutchins educa tional theories. ^Mortimer J. Adler and Milton Mayer, The Revolution in Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 147. 2 "Dr. Hutchins' Ten Years Have Revitalized Chicago University; He's Still 'Boy Wonder,'" Newsweek, 14:26, November 27, 1939. 253 The Intellectual Landscape The educational system underwent growing pains never before experienced with three fourths of the states having insufficient classroom space by the 1950's. Adult education increased and so did the number of students in higher education which had been swelled by former service men under the G. I. Bill of Rights. Yet, with the veterans gone, the enrollment climbed toward the three million figure by 1955. Perhaps the most significant impact on higher edu cation was the use of the scientific method. The late 1930's brought the debate of the Dewey philosophy against the liberal arts philosophy articulately espoused by Hutchins and Mortimer Adler. Specialization through the scientific method was challenged by the value system of truth reached through rationalism unverified by empirical data. In this intellectual collision, the scientific method won out, though serious attacks on progressive edu cation were made in 1953 by Arthur Bestor, Mortimer Smith, and Albert Lynd.^ Life adjustment courses were beginning to come under serious attack. Adjustment tended to become ^Louis M. Hacker and Helene S. Zahler, The United States in the 20th Century (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, Inc., 1952), pp. 630-32. ^Paul Woodring, A Fourth of a Nation (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957), p. 8. 255 a cultural goal to the point where "the pursuit of hap piness came to be defined as the pursuit of conformism and the avoidance of neurosis.Integration of knowledge began to take place during the 1940’s according to Louis Hacker.8 Baldwin provides the best description of higher education during a decade and one half of transition. He termed the curriculum a ’ ’rope of sand formed with the in tention of informing rather than teaching to think.M The social and professional skills were taught "while the intellectual aim was touted but rarely honored in prac- tice--there wasn't time!"^ Education no longer provided a formal social and moral basis, but an economic goal de signed to teach the student how to make money. The church, family, and other social institutions were reluctant to share in the training of the child. Quantity education had Q taken precedence over quality education. A similar attitude is voiced by Max Lemer: . . . Actually there is a strain of anti-intellectual- ism inherent in the American belief in education. Americans emphasize not so much the training of the ^Max Lemer, America as a Civilization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957)/ p. 694". ~ £ Hacker and Zahler, op. cit., p. 273. ^Leland Dewitt Baldwin, The Meaning of America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1955), pp. 233-34. 8Ibid.. p. 273. 256 intellect as they do some marginal value such as voca tional skill or "citizenship" or becoming an "interest ing" person— or almost anything except creativeness." Lemer goes on to point out that collegiate education gives lower-middle-class individuals a better social standing even if they remain on the same income level. Thus, many people make severe sacrifices in order that their children may share in this social prestige. In spite of the great efforts to attain collegiate education, "Americans had not yet developed the quiet belief in their own social system that would enable them to regard intellectual nonconformism with calmness.The teachers themselves were caught in the dilemma of intellect versus the practical goals of the non-collegiate world. Lemer suggests there are two American ideals operative in education. The Jeffersonian goal would make higher education available to all those who meet demanding intellectual standards. The Jacksonian goal would treat every mind as equal and open the colleges to every high school graduate regardless of his capacity. ^ The Educational Speeches Preview of the premises. Hutchins argues from ^Lemer, op. cit., p. 734. ^Ibid., p. 476. Ibid., p. 748. 257 seven premises which are basic to his educational philoso phy. (1) I thought we wanted a rational order in education and in politics. (2) There is a relationship between meta physics, education, morals, and intellect. (3) General education should be given between ages fifteen and twenty. (4) Everything is relative since everyone’s opinion is as good as everyone else’s opinion. (5) Democratically con trolled education is not a means to a different spiritual world. (6) Every citizen should have liberal education in proportion to his ability to receive it. (7) A university is an institution devoted to scholarship, advanced study, and the preparation for learned professions. Hutchins’ first educational premise formed the basis for his reasoning in addresses delivered at the Yale Phi Beta Kappa Lawn Club, Columbia Teachers College, Louisiana State University, and in Sweden and Canada, plus 12 in numerous speeches given at the University of Chicago. ^ (1) "I had always thought that what we wanted, both in politics and education, was a rational order rationally arrived at" (1:37-39). 12 See the Hutchins Papers in William Rainey Harper Memorial Library at the University of Chicago; Columbia Spectator, April 25, 1940; Mew York Times, April 26, 1940; and Robert M. Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1943), p. 20. 258 Evaluation.--Hutchins is distinguished as a believer in Aristotle's philosophy, especially that which is taken from Nicomachean Ethics.^ In this source Aristotle developed his philosophy concerning rational principles or the virtues of the soul or intellect. Hutchins believes, "If we are to have a philosophy of edu cation, it has to rest on a rational conception of man and society."^ Further, he maintains, "The aim of an educa tional system is the same in every age and every society where such a system can exist; it is to improve man as IS man." The improvement of man comes through perfecting his rational powers, that is, his ability to reason. The traditionalist view of man was stated by Hutchins in the Storrs Lecture at Yale in 1936. One purpose of education is to draw out the ele ments of our common human nature. These elements are the same in any time or place. The notion of edu cating a man to live in any particular time or place, to adjust him to any particular environment, is there fore foreign to a true conception of education. Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge is truth. The truth is every where the same. [Footnoted to St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part II, Question 94, Article 4.] 13 Richard McKeon, Introduction to Aristotle (New York: The Modern Library, 1947), Book VI, Chapters 1-13. ^The University of Utopia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 54. is - ' The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 68^ i 259 . . . I suggest that the heart of any course of study designed for the whole people will be, if education is rightly understood, the same at any time, in any place, under gny political, social, or economic conditions. Hutchins reminds us, ". . . We must remember that the fundamental questions today are those with which the Greeks were concerned; and the reason is that human nature has not changed" (1:517-20). The modernist philosopher, Sidney Hook, rebuttals the idea that education will always be the same everywhere: . . . Before we inquire on what evidence Mr. Hutchins knows this to be true, let us see what it implies. For one thing, it implies that human nature is completely independent of change in the world of physical nature with which the human organism is in constant inter action. Now, certainly, Mr. Hutchins cannot know that the world of nature "is, always has been, and always will be the same everywhere." He therefore must believe that no transformation of the physical basis of human life can possibly affect human nature. His assertation further implies that man's nature is com pletely independent of changes in the human body, par ticularly the brain and nervous system. At one stroke this calls into question the whole evolutionary approach to the origin and development of the human species. Finally it implies that the habitation of man's nature in a human body is unaffected by changes in society and social nature. . . . For anything which operates in the world does so in interaction with other things that help shape its character. . . . For Aristotle man can become a rational animal only because he is also a social and physical animal. But Mr. Hutchins admits all the facts of physical and biological change as well as historical and social development in man's environment. yet insists that 1 fi Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), p7 66. 260 man's nature cannot change or develop. It is only when we realize that he is not talking about empirical, historical, suffering man but about a mystical, super natural entity, which has a temporary abode in the human body, that the peculiarities and ambiguities of his language are understandable. . . . The true education of man must include the edu cation of his soul by the one true metaphysics and theology. In the writings of Mr. Hutchins this con clusion is obliquely expressed, but it is explicitly drawn in those of his mentor, Mr. Adler. "Sacred theology is superior to philosophy, both theoretically and practically. . . ."I" The Hutchins argument is brought up to date by the following words delivered in Sweden and Canada in 1951 and 1952. . . . It will be argued that a program of liberal edu cation for all ignores the most important thing about men, and that is that they are different. I do not ignore it; I deny it. I do not deny the fact of indi vidual differences; I deny that it is the most import ant fact about men or the one on which an educational system should be erected. . . . Men are different. They are also the same. And at least in the present state of civilization the respects in which they are the same are more important than those in which they are different. . . . Hutchins believes the common humanity and nature of man is constant and largely changeless. He believes the essential feature of man is his ability to reason, that is, to use his rational powers which distinguish him from Sidney Hook, Education for Modem Man (New York: The Dial Press, 1946), pp. 19“21. 1 Q xoThe Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, p. 89. 261 other animals.^ The idea rests in Aristotle’s conception of man as a rational animal. Man’s reasoning capacity is the highest form of activity and he should seek wisdom. The rational powers should be developed to the fullest possible extent, which means utilizing the great intel lectual heritage of mankind as a basis of understanding and experience. Philosopher Sidney Hook, a student of Dewey’s, gives a direct rebuttal to the proposition "by way of meta physics students may recover a rational view of the uni verse" : The philosophic presumption of this passage vies with its atrocious logic. To deny the proposition "by way of the universe" is certainly not to assert that "a rational view of the universe . . . is no better than an irrational one or none at all." The denial of the first proposition implies that students cannot get a rational view of the universe by way of metaphysics; it leaves open the possibility that they may get a rational view of the universe by the study of other disciplines, e.g., the sciences, social studies, literature, and history. It emphatically does not imply that a rational conception of the universe is worthless or worth no more than an irrational one. I pass over the additional confusion of identifying a rational conception of the world with the conception that men are rational and the world rationally ordered. A rational conception is one warranted by evidence and a conception of the world may be rational jLf the evi dence points to the fact that more are irrational and the world chaotic. I am not saying they are but con testing the relevance of an a priori metaphysical deduction of these questions. . . .20 Adler and Mayer, op. cit., pp. 172, 174. 20 Education for Modem Man. p. 23. 262 Mortimer Adler states the educational philosophy which should form the basis of higher education. Man is a rational animal, and in possessing rationality, which is not just animal intelligence to a higher degree, he is essentially, that is, specifi cally, different from brutes. Man has all the powers possessed by brute animals; he has vegetative powers; he has sensitive, appetitive, and locomotive powers. But in addition he has an intellect, and this power, the power of understanding, of abstracting, judging, reasoning, no other animal has. It is by the exercise of this power that man is an artist, a scientist, a philosopher; that he lives socially by conventions determined by himself, rather than instinctively as other social animals do; that he has a syntactical language for the communication of knowledge and com mands; that he is able freely to choose the means by which he attains the end he desires because he under stands it to be good.21 Hook challenges the isolation of man's rational faculty from his emotional make-up. . . . The notion that the education of reason can or should be carried out independently of the education of the emotions has been called by Whitehead "one of the most fatal, erroneous and dangerous conceptions ever introduced into the theory of education." At any rate what is clear is that we can go from the nature of man to the conclusion that we should educate for reason only because some selective principle has been intro duced. The basic educational issues, like the basic ethical issues, pose problems of choice. The nature of man is always relevant; but just as relevant is our decision as to what we want to make of it, what we want men to become. At this point no metaphysical deduc tion, whether proceeding from materialistic or spiritu alistic premises concerning the nature of "reality," can guide us. 21 Mortimer Adler, "The Crises in Contemporary Edu cation," Social Frontier, 5:140-45, February, 1939, quoted from John T. Wahlquist, The Philosophy of American Educa tion (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1942), pp. 188- 89. 263 What, after all, is meant by "the nature of man" whenever we speak of relating educational ends to it? The phrase masks a certain ambiguity that makes it difficult to tell whether its reference is empirical or metaphysical. A great deal of philosophical profundity consists in shifting back and forth between these two references and not being found out. When the neo- Thomists speak of the nature of man as a basis for educational ideals, their concern is not primarily with biological, psychological, historical and social features of human behavior. For since these items designate specific processes of interaction between an organism and its environment, it would be risky to choose any set of traits as fixing forever the nature of human nature, and therefore the nature of education. But the position we are examining is concerned pre cisely with a conception of human nature which will permit the deduction that, in the words of Mr. Hutchins, "education should everywhere be the same." Everywhere and at every time? Everywhere and at every time. In a weakened form, Mr. Adler repeats this: "If man is a rational animal, constant in nature through history, there must be certain constant features in every sound educational program regardless of culture and epoch. . . ."22 Hook asserted that education must be appropriate to the whole of man’s nature, not just to its intellectual part. The Greeks sought the harmonious development of "all o o human faculties." Harold Taylor, formerly the president of Sarah Lawrence College, expresses his philosophical position: . . . Very few modern philosophers can find the courage, in the face of direct challenge by modem medical, psychological, and social science to refer to man as a rational animal. There is, in any case, ^Education for Modem Man, pp. 18-19. O Q JSidney Hook (ed.), Modern Education and Its Critics, Seventh Yearbook (Chicago: The American Associ ation of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1954), p. 149. 264 no categorical opposition between reason and emotion, since the passions, not the least of which is one we call intellectual curiosity, are aspects of human wants which give us the creative energies, qualities, and colors for the life of mind. . . .24 In a later issue of the same periodical, Taylor says that traditional education emphasizes the training of the mind. But, "what the mind is and how it can be trained" is important. The way to determine how the mind can be trained "can never be determined accurately by a priori judgments. These judgments must be empirical. i i 25 # • « Sidney Hook asks these questions: . . . Are moral principles, "the received idea of the good" grasped as true rational insight independent of the checks of experience? Are they a priori synthetic propositions? The recognition of the existence of something that may be called the power of rational insight must not be confused with a particular theory about what it is capable of disclosing and whether its disclosures are infallible truths. . . .26 Raphael Demos, the noted Platonist philosopher of Harvard University, says there are two types of educational theory evident today in higher education. The one repre sented by Hutchins and the traditionalists is essentially ^Harold Taylor, "Philosophical Aspects of the Harvard Report," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 7:234, December, 1946. O C ^JHarold Taylor, "Some Questions and Answers," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7:448, 452, March, 1947. 9 f i "Synthesis or Eclecticism?" Philosophy and Pheno menological Research, 7:281, December, 1946. 265 theological or quasi-theological in which reason or rationalism is stressed. Fixed premises and deductions from them form this theory. In contrast, the naturalistic school of educational theory represented by John Dewey, Hook, and Taylor believes in spontaneous growth and associ ates with pragmatism the empirically-minded scientific temper.^ Harry Gideonse, then on the Chicago faculty, and currently the president of Brooklyn College, wrote in 1937: The clamor for a rational order, for a compre hensive set of first principles with due subordination of historical and current empirical material selected with an eye to illustration or confirmation of the metaphysics, is essentially a claim to intellectual dictatorship. Reason, however, is not necessarily a principle of order. It is analytical; it discriminates and distinguishes. Order historically is the fruit either of authority or of shared values. The clamor for a rational order, therefore, boils down to a demand for submission to the particular metaphysical dogma that is advocated. Hook states his opinion regarding the fixity and change of man’s nature and its relationship to education: Education should be adequate to man. Man’s nature shows a pattern of development in which both constant and variable elements may be discerned. Therefore an 27 'Raphael Demos, "Philosophical Aspects of the Recent Harvard Report on Education," Philosophy and Pheno menological Research, 7:193-94, December, 1946. 28 Harry Gideonse, The Higher Learning in a Democ racy (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937), p. 30. 266 education adequate to man will reveal a pattern that ' reflects this development. So the experimentalist educator.29 Hook, Taylor, and Dewey do not see the essential nature of man is his rational element. Or, at least they do not believe the rational element is changeless, nor do they think education should be devoted exclusively to in creasing the rationality at the expense of man's emotional make-up. Whitehead may be correct in saying that one of the great fallacies in education is the assumption that emotions and reason should be isolated in education. How ever, if he is right, some significant consequences follow. Assuming, as Hutchins does, that the colleges and universities are the sole institutions devoted to perfect ing man's rational powers, what is the result if schools are responsible for the emotional and social side of man? j Higher education then must split its ends into three parts ■ with the danger that none of them will be accomplished, or less quality will result in each area. The reductio ad jabsurdum would be that collegiate institutions will lose or weaken their intellectual function as specialized agen cies. In Hutchins' paraphrased words, they will become |country clubs and service stations meeting every need of jthe student except the one for which they were founded, i , ■ ■ , ■— ....................................................... ■ i. — i. . . . . i... , , ■ - ■ . i - ........................................ . ■ | 00 Education for Modem Man, p. 26. I 1 i ! " " " 267 I ! that is the perfection of his intellectual powers. It can be granted that man is not entirely rational, but can it be supposed universities should limit their attempts to make him more so? The modernist would ■have the rationality increased primarily through the em- (pirical scientific method, with the emotional elements con- ! isidered in the student's welfare. Hutchins would primarily ■ emphasize the rational end, but would utilize a combination jof philosophy and empirical science. The modernist tends i to rely on philosophy to a lesser degree by using the experience of the empirical method. John Dewey's philosophy indicates that the nature :of man, or his mind, is not constant, but a continuing ■evolutionary development. | . . . [Intelligence is not a] . . . "faculty" for lay- ! ing hold of ultimate truths. It is a shorthand desig- i nation for great and ever-growing methods of observa- | tion, experiment and reflective reasoning which have in a very short time revolutionized the physical and to a considerable degree, the physiological conditions of ; life, but which have not as yet been worked out for | application to what is itself distinctively and basi- ! cally human. . . .30 In other words, intelligence is not a faculty for developing rational powers, but a biological instrument for 0-1 i making organismic responses in and to the environment. ■^John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: The New American Library, 1950), p"! 10~! ^Cf. I. B. Berkson, The Ideal and the Community (New York: Harper and Brothers^ 1958), p. 79; Adler and Mayer, op. cit., p. 162. 268 I The nature of man changes as his environment changes in a | :social interaction of the two. "Fixity is unrealism. Change--in the observed and in the observer--is the central 32 fact of life," according to the modernist view. Thus, the nature of man is relative and not absolute or fixed. As early as 1916 Dewey wrote in reference to pragmatism: . . . Its essential feature is to maintain the con tinuity of knowing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment. . . . Only that which has been organized into our disposition so as to enable us to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge. . . .33 Dewey believed that the unchangeable is not in herently superior to the changeable. He opposed a fixed status for men, basing his philosophic beliefs upon modem concepts of relativism. Thus far we have seen the deep disagreement of the I traditionalist belief in the constant nature of man com pared with the modernist view that man interacts in con- i !stant change with his environment. It is difficult to ■resolve this dilemma between the two systems of philosophy which so significantly affect education. As Woodring ;observes: f j 30 ] Adler and Mayer, op. cit., p. 160. ! oq JJJohn Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: |The Macmillan Company, 1946), p. 400. 34 John Dewey, "Challenge to Liberal Thought," Fortune, 30:180, August, 1944. 269 Stated in its simplest form, the classic view of education is this: man is a rational being; the proper aim of education is that of improving his ability to reason. Some of the recent criticisms of the schools have been restatements of this thesis, while others have been counterattacks upon the antithesis, upon the new views of man, of the nature of mind, and of the learning process from which stems the "whole child" concept. This is much more than a debate over educa tion; rather, it is the dilemma of modem man. Most of us find ourselves tom between the two points of view, and if we read the critics, we find that they too are tom. Even while restating the thesis, they make important concessions to its antithesis.^5 It appears that a wise observation has been made by Education Professor I. B. Berlcson of the City College of New York, who considers himself a reconstructionist with new interpretations and extensions of Dewey's doctrines. Referring to the issue of change (modernist) versus change lessness (traditionalist), he states: The exaltation of change to the position of a first and highest principle is another metaphysical absolute as dogmatic as the opposite idea of a universe of un changing reality. . . . Meanwhile the criticism of education goes on based upon the assumptions of the nature of man. It is to be hoped that a resolution of the problem will eventuate, how ever, in the interim the conflict will probably continue. We shall see how the disagreement permeates valid methods 37 ;of inquiry into truth or knowledge. o c Woodring, op. cit., p. 30. JOBerkson, op. cit., p. 47. 37Cf. post, pp. 292-302. 270 Hutchins and Dewey would probably both agree the rational phase of man is the highest power; however, Dewey correlates the rational ("intelligence" is the term he OQ uses), with acting or doing through experience. Hutchins correlates the rational powers with being and maintains they are higher powers than those found in experience or doing.^ The traditionalist would base education on the accumulated experience of the human race, rather than that of an individual operating in an interaction with his con temporary environment. Professor Theodore Brameld, a reconstructionist himself, points out that Hutchins’ philosophy rests on the idealistic foundations of Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas and is based on a priori categories which are beyond the process of scientific verification.1 ^ Should higher education be based upon a rational conception of man which is primarily unchangeable? Since colleges and universities are the only institutions in a democracy whose sole responsibility ought to be intellec tual endeavor, Hutchins says the main function of education ^Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 10-11. j "^Robert Maynard Hutchins, "The Promise of Educa tion," The Spoken Arts Incorporated, 1956. Adler and Mayer, op. cit.. p. 169. i ,, j Theodore Brameld, Ends and Means in Education: ! A Mid-Century Appraisal (New York: Harper and Brothers, j1950), p. 24. 271 is to increase man’s rational powers.If man's highest powers are rational, then we should attempt to improve them. Does this then mean that individual differences of rationality should be largely ignored in education as / *5 Hutchins proposes? Woodring criticizes the traditionalist philosophy for under-estimating the importance of individual differ ences. ^ At higher educational levels the modernists have given too much emphasis on intellectual differences, thus 45 weakening the content necessary for leadership. Woodring believes the purpose of education is "to prepare the indi vidual to make wise decisions" and "the fact that something is important or socially necessary does not make it an educational aim per se."^ The theory of incidental learn ing, for example, social behavior, should operate only after the primary aim has been achieved. The traditionalists have not taken adequate account of individual differences in their educational philosophy, while these same differences have over-dominated the con ceptions of the modernists. Berkson reminds us the latter 42cf, '"phe promise of Education," Side No. 1. 4^Cf. ante, footnote 18. 44A Fourth of a Nation, pp. 47, 100. ^Ibid., p. 101. 46Ibid., pp. 111-12. 272 has taken place because "experimentalism overemphasizes the function of mind in its instrumentalist aspect as a means of survival and adaptation." Man's nature can be inferred from institutions developed for his biological f 7 needs and his aspirations for truth and goodness. The controversy over the nature of man manifests itself in a disagreement between the traditionalists and modernists concerning the ends of education. An examina tion of the purposes of liberal education adhered to by both philosophical groups is germane to the previous dis cussion. A phrase regarding the definition of liberal arts is necessary. They are the "arts of communication" which A Q teach one how to "read, write, speak, and figure. Hutchins contends: . . . The reason he needs a liberal education is that he is a man and a citizen, and the major premise of this book is that every man and every free citizen needs liberal education. . . .4-9 Hutchins stated in his Walgreen Lecture at the University of Chicago in 1953: Civilization is the deliberate pursuit of a common ideal. Education is the deliberate attempt to form men 4^The Ideal and the Community, pp. 282-83. ^The University of Utopia, p. 35. 49lbid., p. 33. 273 in terms of an ideal. It is the attempt of a society to produce the type of man that it wantsr - - -->0 • « • ♦ The justification for liberal education follows: Liberal education was the education of rulers. It was the education of those who had leisure. Democracy and industry, far from making liberal education irre levant, make it indispensable and possible for all the people. Democracy makes every man a ruler, for the heart of democracy is universal suffrage. If liberal education is the education that rulers ought to have, and this I say has never been denied, then every ruler, that is every citizen, should have a liberal education. If industry is to give everybody leisure, if leisure, as history suggests, tends to be degrading and danger ous unless it is intelligently used, then everybody should have the education that fits him to use his leisure intelligently, that is, liberal education. If leisure makes liberal education possible, and if in dustry is to give everybody leisure, then industry makes liberal education possible for everybody.51 The above statement is nothing more than Aris totle1 s ideas stated in Politics, and Ethics, but phrased in modem terms. The two essential ends of liberal educa tion are for citizenship and the wise use of leisure time 52 according to Adler and Mayer. "The aim of education [in a democracy] is wisdom, and each of us must have the chance CO to become as wise as he can." "The aim of an educational system is the same in every age and in every society where 50Ibid.. p. 52. 51 J The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, p. 84. 5 9 J The Revolution in Education, p. 97. C O Robert M. Hutchins, Great Books (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 25. 274 54 such a system can exist: it is to improve man as man.” The Dean's statement from St. John's College where Hutchins is a trustee discusses the highest powers of man: . . . The intellectual powers of man--of any man--are his highest powers. They make him what he is. To educate a man means, then, above everything else, to help him develop these powers, to help him acquire intellectual v i r t u e s . What is the modernist position regarding the ends of education? Dewey states them in two of his later works: . . . I shall say that when and only when develop ment in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing.5 6 In 1948 in Dewey's last writings before his death in 1952, he wrote: . . . the continuous reconstruction of experience, is the only end. If at whatever period we choose to take a person, he is still in process of growth, then edu cation is not, save as a by-product, a preparation for something coming later. Getting from the present the degree and kind of growth there is in it is education. This is a constant function, independent of age. The best thing that can be said about any special process of education, like that of the formal school period, is that it renders its subject capable of further educa tion: more sensitive to conditions of growth and more able to take advantage of them. Acquisition of skill, possession of knowledge, attainment of culture are not ends: they are marks of growth and means to its con tinuing. 54The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, p. 68. 55 The St. John's Program: A Report (Annapolis: St. John's Press, 1955), pp. 131-32. C £ JOJohn Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 29~. 275 . . . The heart of the sociality of man is in educa tion. The idea of education as preparation and adult hood as a fixed limit of growth are two sides of the same obnoxious untruth. . . .^' Dewey’s doctrine is that the experience must be continuously adapted to the environment so that the indi vidual will maintain constant growth toward a greater good. The basis of the growth should be for a better social relationship. Experience should be gained through the empirical methods of science which condenses "the results of continued prior experience and inquiry, and on the other hand direct further fruitful inquiry whose con clusions in turn test and develop for further use the CO working principles used." In another source Dewey states this, . . . Education in order to accomplish its ends both for the individual learner and for society must be based upon experience--which is always the actual life-experience of some individuals. . . .^9 Dewey's end of education is growth, which can be judged in relative terms. It is a continuing attempt at reciprocal adaptation of man and environment. Hook says the growth must have a social frame of reference in a democracy for two reasons. The democratic ideal is in compatible with fixed social divisions and continuous 57 Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 146-47. ^Fortune, August, 1944, p. 186. •^Experience and Education, p. 113. 276 growth is more probable where diversification and enrich ment of experience can take place.^ Thus, there is a biological-social interaction which aids in the growth. 61 For "growth itself is the only moral ’end.'" Adler reminds us this is "an amoral education for amoral men in 69 an amoral world." What criticisms can be made of the traditionalists' belief that education should prepare man for citizenship and the wise use of leisure? "The task of education is to a make rational animals more perfectly rational." Since education is a secondary subject, dependent on philosophy, Hutchins believes "the aims of an educational system are the aims of the society in which it is conducted. Dewey's direct rebuttal to the Hutchins theory of education follows: . . . Consequently, whatever the level of experience, we have no choice but either to operate in accord with the pattern it provides or else neglect the place of intelligence in the development and control of a living and moving experience. 60 Education for Modem Man, pp. 8-9. 61 Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 141. 62 The Revolution in Education, p. 171. 63 Robert Maynard Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), p. 37. 64 The University of Utopia, p. 33. 6 S ^Experience and Education, p. 112. Ill There is no place for education for universal suffrage and leisure explicit in Dewey's theory of educational experi ence. Berkson's ideal education would emphasize ends, but not those outside the realm of human experience. He explains his new reconstructionist education would stress universals, but not in an absolute sense: . . . When something of the rational and ethical ardor that moved Plato invests philosophy, the reconciliation it achieves [in striving for a harmony between the actual and the ideal] will never be reduced to a prac tical and static compromise. It will direct the existing social order toward the ideally conceived republic. . . .66 President Gordon Chalmers of Kenyon College points out that modernist education has confused means for ends, though he does not agree entirely with the philosophy of the traditionalist.^ Woodring also criticizes the modern ists for not having a priority of goals. The goal he would /IQ stress above all others is the rational aim of education. This end would approximate an absolute, if not completely so. Philosopher Jacques Maritain believes education must prepare now for the activities of man's leisure hours. ^The Ideal and the Community, pp. 280-81. f i 7 Gordon Keith Chalmers, The Republic and the Per son (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), pp. 220-37. Fourth of a Nation, p. 27. 69 Education at the Crossroads (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 120. 278 Just what was the aim which Dewey believed educa tion should achieve? Since the modernists believe in a relativist philosophy, Dewey's end of education is "growth itself is the only moral 'end.'" Dewey’s belief in growth arose out of his conception of democracy. This conception stressed the kinship of democracy with . . . the principle of continuity of experience as a criterion of discrimination [of inherent values of dif ferent experiences]. At bottom, this principle rests upon the fact of habit, when habit is interpreted biologically. . . .70 Dewey felt the main value of democracy is the democratic spirit in human relations, coupled with the technological control of the energies of nature in behalf of humane ends. 7 - * - Dewey states his interpretation of the disagreement between the educational philosophy of the traditionalists and the modernists: . . . It presents the difference between an outlook that goes to the past for instruction and for guidance, one that holds that philosophy, if it is to be of help in the present situation, must pay supreme heed to movements, needs, problems, and resources which are distinctly modem. . . .72 Dewey believed that science and technology have changed the society in the twentieth century so that study ^Experience and Education, p. 26. ^Fortune, August, 1944, p. 184. 72, Loc. cit. 279 of the past was nearly irrelevant. His belief in shared decisions in a democracy would break down the fixed rela tionships between people of status and those who labored. Fundamentally his philosophy rested significantly on shared 7 3 materialism through the interaction of social experience.'J This manifested itself in a vague political liberalism com bined with an educational system which stressed means, not ends. As Alexander Meiklejohn has written, Dewey's inter pretation of democracy is "misleading and incomplete," and Berkson says Dewey defined democracy "only in broad terms. What are the valid criticisms of growth as an end in education? Can reconstructed experience provide for an adequate basis of education? These questions can only be answered in connection with the inter-relation of Dewey's three concepts of growth. They are experience as the source of growth, the reconstruction of experience as the continuing aim, and intelligence as the method of continu- 75 ous reconstruction. The weakness of growth as an end is that it repre sents no hierarchy of values because growth can proceed in TO ' Berkson, op. cit., p. 29. ^Alexander Meiklejohn, "A Reply to John Dewey," Fortune, 31:219, January, 1945; Berkson, op. cit., p. 29. 7 5 ^Berkson, op. cit., p. 25. 280 7 f i any direction, not necessarily intellectual. The French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain responds that growth as an end in education gets away from the real art of edu cation due to its own spontaneous spread in any or all directions; secondly, it risks being enslaved to the trends which may develop into a collective life and society.^ The direction of the growth may be either for good or bad, and there is no standard by which to determine which of the two it is, since the modernists do not have any fixed values and in a changing society values are somewhat un stable. Berkson, the new reconstructionist, is the harshest critic of growth as an end. Experimentalism establishes no clear social aims or definite criteria of value and tends to promote egoistic individualism, and because it does not provide well defined aims or principles of action, Berkson believes Dewey's doctrines fall short of fulfilling the essentials of educational philosophy.^ . . . Experimental!sm, confusing the definite idea with the fixed idea, deters from the clear expression of the 7 fi Woodring, op. cit.. p. 27. 77 Education at the Crossroads, pp. 17-18. ^Woodring, op. cit. . p. 58. ^ The ideal and the Community, p. 60. 281 principles and objectives of the good society. It induces an easy readiness to accept the new without setting forth the criteria of acceptance. . . . Should education reform the society? This issue illustrates the difference between Hutchins' and Dewey's educational philosophy. Hutchins echoes Plato when he says: Society is to be improved, not by forcing a program of social reform down its throat, through the schools or otherwise, but by the improvement of the individuals who compose it. . . . The individual is the heart of society. To develop fully as a social, political animal man needs participation in his government. . . . Only a democracy, in which all men rule and are ruled in turn for the good life of the whole community, can be an absolutely good form of government. The opposition view is stated by Dewey in two sources: . . . Full education comes only when there is a respon sible share on the part of each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs. This fact fixes the significance of democracy. . . . Dewey's emphasis is on the social interaction of the individuals throughout the culture and is to be gained by the school's promotion of social reform. Criticizing 80Ibid., p. 281. 81 The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, p. 69. 82Ibid., p. 70. ^ Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 162. 282 the theory of the traditionalists, particularly Hutchins', Dewey states: . . . The attempt to reestablish linguistic skills and materials as the center of education, and to do it under the guise of "education for freedom" or "liberal" education, is directly opposed to all the democratic countries cherish as freedom. . . . ^ Dewey believed the heart of political democracy is adjudication of social differences by discussion and the exchange of views, which is roughly comparable to the Q C method of experimental science. Hutchins' assumptions are that education must set the ideal for the nation or society and the individual should promote the improvement of the society through the perfection of his rational powers. The reliance on reason is "the principal means by which society is to be ad- 86 vanced." In other words, the ideal man should become universal in the good democratic society. Social reform in the colleges and universities would lead to a distortion of the truth into an inevitable "form of propaganda; it cannot be truly liberal, and in the long run will make for the 87 establishment of a new dogmatism." ^Fortune, August, 1944, p. 157. 85Ibid., p. 188. 88The University of Utopia, p. 102. 87Cf. Woodring, op. cit.. p. 121; William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (Garden City: Doubleday and Com pany, Inc., 1956), p. 106. 283 The Hutchins ideal would be difficult to challenge if it were in existence; however, it is not significantly practiced in America. Perhaps this is because of the type of higher education we have developed. Only at the Univer sity of Chicago and St. John’s College has anything similar to the liberal arts advocated by the traditionalist been in operation. St. John’s has no experimental data to indicate the success of its graduates, but they are pleased with 88 their results. Since pragmatism has been the most flour ishing philosophy this century, and appears to continue to be so, one can not look for a great change in higher edu cation in the immediate future.^ Dewey’s belief in the school as an agency of social reform rested on two concepts of interacting experience between man and the environment through ordinary human ex perience combined with a testing of experience by scienti fic methods utilized in both science and philosophy.®® He stated the relationship between individual capacities, society, and the educational system: 88 Correspondence from Dean Curtis Wilson, Septem ber 10, 1959. Some graduates teach at Harvard and St. John’s, but they are equally happy with some students who have not taken graduate work. ^Woodring, op. cit. , pp. 59-60. QfJ Berkson, op. cit.. p. 32. 284 . . . The best guarantee of collective efficiency and power is liberation and use of the diversity of indi vidual capacities in initiative, planning, foresight, vigor and endurance. Personality must be educated, and personality cannot be educated by confining its opera tions to technical and specialized things, or the less important relationships in life. Full education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs [emphasis suppliedT. This fact fixes the sig nificance of democracy. . . Berkson agrees that social reform is a partial function of the schools; however, he feels experimentalism has its limitations: . . . The scientific method is questionable and mis applied to social affairs. . . . In so far as it denies the necessity of definite assumptions, clear principles of action, and well defined aims, as it tends to do in current formulations, it falls short of fulfilling the essentials of a philosophy of education.92 The inadequacy of social reform as an end in edu cation is thus well described by one of Dewey’s adherents. The program of reform will frequently have no standards of value by which to judge progress due to the system of relativism on which it is predicated. Contrasted, the Hutchins ideal of no commitment to organized social reform is likely to result in the very gap between ideals and practice which Dewey so frequently condemned. | The nature of man and the ends of education have 91 Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 162. ^Berkson, op. cit. , p. 60. 285 been discussed. The next key argument in the controversy between the traditionalist and the modernist is the role of metaphysics in education, which brings us to the second Hutchins educational premise. It demonstrates the phi losophical position of the speaker combating the more modem empirical trends in science and education. (2) "I am interested in education, in morals, in intellect, and in metaphysics. I even go so far as to hold there is a necessary relation among all these things” (I:101-104). Evaluation.--The Higher Learning in America offered the Hutchins explanation for the relevance of education and metaphysics: . , . Now Greek thought was unified. It was unified by the study of first principles. Plato had a dialectic which was a method of exploring first principles. Aristotle made the knowledge of them into the science of metaphysics. Among the Greeks, then metaphysics, rather than theology, is the ordering and proportioning discipline. It is in the light of metaphysics that the social sciences, dealing with man and nature, take shape and illuminate one another. In metaphysics we are seeking the causes of the things that are. It is the highest science, the first science, as first, uni versal. It considers being as being, both what it is and the attributes which belong to it as being.93 According to Aristotle, "The most exact of the 93 The Higher Learning in America, pp. 97-98. 286 94 sciences are those which deal with first principles." John Dewey, calling for the "release of philosophy from its burden of sterile metaphysics and sterile epistemology" urged that the "realm of Being" be rescued from the dualism of the material and spiritual. Scientific method must be the type of inquiry utilized to break down the dichotomy between the active (material) and the reflective (spiritu- 95 al), according to Dewey. The Hutchins metaphysics (science of being and first causes) is entrenched in the a priori absolutes of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas "about the nature of man, the nature of truth, and the nature of value." This sweeping 96 absolute of Hutchins applies to essentials in education. In Hutchins’ view, John Dewey’s educational phi losophy is expressed in the following sentence: "The sub ject matter of education is what one needs to know in order to do what one is interested in doing." Hutchins believes education should point the way to what one ought to know in order to do. According to him, "being includes doing, but 94 Introduction to Aristotle, Metaphysics. 9829, 25-26. ^ Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 17, 108-109. 96 John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, Higher Edu cation in Transition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 286. 287 97 doing does not include being." Doing emphasizes the external, while being emphasizes the mind and character. Hutchins treats rationalism (reason) as an end while Dewey QQ and his followers consider it as a means. Dewey declared, "Reason is experimental intelli gence, conceived after the pattern of science, and used in 99 the creation of social arts. ..." His landmark work, Democracy and Education, indicated the educational philoso phy in which he believed: The theory of the method of knowing which is ad vanced in these pages may be termed pragmatic. Its essential feature is to maintain the continuity of knowing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment. It holds that knowledge in its strict sense of something possessed consists of our intel lectual resources--of all the habits that render our action intelligent. Only that which has been organized into our disposition so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge. . . .100 Reason is to be utilized in an active process of modifying the environment so the latter is improved. Reason is linked directly to action based on an empirical observation. The end of education, i.e., the use of intel ligence according to Dewey was for growth. "... I shall ^"The Promise of Education," Side 1. 98 Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit.. p. 293. 99 ^ Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 89. ^ ^ Democracy and Education, p. 400. 288 say that when and only when development in a particular line conducive to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing." John Dewey and Hutchins carried on a written debate in Social Frontier late in 1936 and in early 1937 after the publication of The Higher Learning in America. Dewey main tained that a university with a department of metaphysics, as advocated by Hutchins, "could not help being more authoritarian than others not so constituted." He said the highest truths had to be fixed and eternal in order to 102 "perform the authoritative function ascribed to them." w American undergraduate colleges would not return to the metaphysical and literary course of study advanced by Hutchins, according to America’s leading philosopher of this century. His vantage point was eight years after the in'} publication of Hutchins’ book. "For Deweyites theory was an instrument of in quiry." Theory and practice went hand in hand, whether the investigation was into facts or values.Here was the real philosophical clash between Dewey and Hutchins. It ^Experience and Education, p. 29. in? "The Higher Learning in America," The Social Frontier, 3:168-69, March, 1937. ■^~*John Dewey, "The Problems of the Liberal Arts College," American Scholar, 13:392, Autumn, 1944. ■^^Brubacher and Rudy, loc. cit. 289 was the conflict of the relativist position pitted against the authority of absolutes. The flexible premises of democracy, liberalism, and pragmatism were juxtaposed alongside the constancy of "the nature of man, the nature of truth, and the nature of value."105 The educational battle returned to the metaphysical concepts which rest on the a priori assumptions of Hutchins and the empirical beliefs of Dewey. Dewey’s student, Sidney Hook, says it is not necessary to agree on first principles in order to have i n f i a viable philosophy of education. It can be seen that the philosophical controversy between Hutchins and Dewey returns to assumptions incapable of being verified through the scientific method.107 The dispute recedes into what Mortimer Adler considers the core of disagreement, namely, the nature of valid inquiry into 108 truth. The theory of "learning by doing" crashed into the theory of concentration on general aspects of think ing in a long-range theoretical perspective advocated by 109 Hutchins. Activity, that is doing, came into conflict with reflective thought as an educational ideal. 105Ibid.. pp. 286, 291. 106Cf. Education for Modem Man, p. 69. 107Cf. post, pp. 292-302. 108^he Revolution in Education, p. 167. 1 09 Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit.. p. 288. 290 The educational theory advocated in The Higher Learning in America was not practiced at the University of Chicago. The College at Chicago provided the general edu cation of students, at first, on a two year basis. Then, with the admission of high school juniors and seniors as of January 12, 1933, general education became a four year process.The faculty resolution of the College passed on April 21, 1934 "sought to deal educationally with the whole person--with men and women as knowers and doers and 111 appraciators." Thomas Vernon Smith of the Chicago philosophy re viewed No Friendly Voice and found it vague as to the content of the Hutchins higher education. Smith defended the role of science in higher education in opposition to the study of classics: . . . Fumbling as all science is, it remains the abiding conviction of liberals . . . that service of science is less wasteful than surrender to dogma and much less dangerous than devotion to [Hutchins'] emo tional fixation. ^ - - * - 2 The most direct and detailed criticism of the Hutchins metaphysics came from Harry Gideonse, then an ^■^See "The Chicago Plan," in No Friendly Voice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 193. ^Gideonse, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 112 "The Chicago School," The International Journal of Ethics, 46:382-87, April, 1936. 291 economics professor at Chicago, and currently the Presi dent of Brooklyn College: . . . The Great Tradition in metaphysics, to which Mr. Hutchins seeks to recall the modem university, seemed to hold that after confrontation with a certain amount of data it could reach first principles which were absolute and subject to no further verification. And so under the emotional seduction of having achieved absolute truth, an early and in itself noble state of thought to considered the final stage of thought. Gideonse also noted considerable ambiguity in the metaphysical principles advocated by Hutchins. He asserted that Hutchins could make an even greater contribution by suggesting the "specific character of the metaphysical principles which would bring the ’rational order’ out of our free ’chaos.’" Gideonse said science and philosophy should both be utilized for arriving at truth in con junction with experience: . . . To stress first principles without the constant challenge of experience is to produce intellectual conceit and reactionary attitudes. Plato— to whom Mr. Hutchins refers so often--drew back from such ex tremes. The students in the Platonic Academy were carefully grounded in the arts and sciences. Gideonse concluded, "To know in general is as easy as Aristotle indicated; but to know the when, the where, the wherefore, the thereunto, and the how much--this, as Aris- 115 totle concluded, is the final test of a wise man." ^--^Gideonse, op. cit., p. 6. 114 Ibid., pp. 3-29. 115Ibid., p. 26. 292 John Pilley, a visiting professor from England, said Hutchins’ Great Books are not expected to reveal ab solute truth. Pilley criticized Adler and Scott Buchanan as "old-fashioned theologians in modernistic guise. Their systems of metaphysics are in fact nothing but the theolo gies which they find it expedient not to call by that name." The pragmatists hope to free mankind from all forms of authoritarianism and consider Hutchins’ liberal arts 11.6 conducive to leading to an absolutist philosophy. Woodring reminds us that "educational philosophy draws its content from metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political science, sociology, and history. The argument between the traditionalists and the modernists concerning metaphysics moves the dispute into more complicated philosophical grounds. What should be the role of science in modem education is the heart of the debate. What are the valid methods of inquiry into truth? The clash of the empirical method and the philosophical method is explored here to indicate the implications of the disagreement. The Christian Century reported that Hutchins' meta physics had "shocked the university community and the ^•^Wahlquist, op. cit. , p. 201. Fourth of a Nation, p. 189. 293 scholarly profession generally." His speeches and writings have "profoundly rocked" the entire academic community "from the lips of a then youthful president." The weakness of education was the absence of metaphysics, with the re sulting lack of unity. Mortimer Adler states that the effect of science on educational philosophy has engendered a controversy "more cataclysmic than all other issues of American education together.If this is true, the issues of the tradi- tionalist-modemist debate should be explored. Hutchins has written: How much difference can experimental science make? If it is true that the truth can be discovered only in the laboratory, then we can know very little indeed about education; for we cannot know even whether the statement is true that truth can be discovered only in the laboratory. The truth of that statement cannot be and has not been proved in the laboratory. The ques tions that science can answer are questions of fact about the physical world. They deal with the material conditions of existence. What is called social science cannot tell us what kind of society we ought to aim at. It is doubtful whether it can even tell us what the consequences of a given social policy will be. The reason, again, is the enormous number of variables that enter into any social situation. . . . . . . What is a good life? What is a good society? What is the nature and destiny of man? These questions and others like them are not susceptible of scientific investigation. . . . 1 1 Q "Spoiling a Good Case," Christian Century, 57:1575-77, December 18, 1940. 119The Revolution in Education, p. 146. 120 The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, pp. 78-79. 294 Hutchins believes the methods of experimental science are not applicable to philosophical and moral ques tions. In short, different subjects should be explored by methods appropriate to the given investigation. The two main methods of inquiry are scientific and philosophic of inquiry was stated by Dewey in 1948: . . . scientific men worked out a method of inquiry so inclusive in range and so penetrating, so pervasive and so universal, as to provide the pattern and model which permits, invites and even demands the kind of formula tion that falls within the function of philosophy. It is a method of knowing that is self-corrective in oper ation; that learns from failures as from successes. The heart of the method is the discovery of the identity of inquiry with discovery. Within the spe cialized, the relatively technical, activities of natural science, this office of discovery, of uncover ing the new and leaving behind the old is taken for granted. Its similar centrality in every form of intellectual activity is, however, so far from enjoy ing general recognition that, in matters which are set apart as "spiritual" and "ideal" and as distinctively moral, the mere idea shocks many who take it as a matter of course in their own specialized work. It is a familiar fact that the practical correlate of dis covery when it is scientific and theoretical is inven tion, and that in many of the physical aspects of human vention of inventions. . . . Here, then, lies the philosophic crux of the fight between Dewey and Hutchins. Dewey says the only valid inquiry. The modernist position regarding the valid method affairs there is now method for the in- ^■^Adler ancj Mayer, op. cit. , pp. 164-65. 1 00 Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 22. 295 method of inquiry is the scientific method employed by the 123 empirical sciences. Another Dewey statement says much the same thing: . . . experiences in order to be educative must lead out into an expanding world of subject-matter, a subject-matter of facts or information and of ideas. This condition is satisfied only as the educator views teaching and learning as a continuous process of re construction of experience. This condition in turn can be satisfied only as the educator has a long look ahead, and views every present experience as a moving force in influencing what future experiences will be. I am aware that the emphasis I have placed upon scien tific method may be misleading, for it may result only in calling up the special technique of laboratory research as that is conducted by specialists. But the meaning of the emphasis placed upon scientific method has little to do with specialized techniques. It means that scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live. It means that scientific method provides a working pattern of the way in which and the conditions under which ex periences are used to lead ever onward and outward.424 Hutchins says that the scientific method cannot be applied to philosophy, but the appropriate method of in- 125 quiry is a philosophical one. Philosopher Mortimer Adler states the philosophic position of the traditionalists versus the modernists con cerning the role of scientific method as a valid method of inquiry into truth: 193 Adler and Mayer, op. cit., p. 158. •^^Experience and Education, pp. 111-12. 193 Robert M. Hutchins, "Education for Freedom," The Christian Century, 61:1315, November 15, 1944. . . . It can be said a priori that this dispute will never be decided by any common method of discovery, because its decisive element is a view of the nature of life and of thought--of the nature of the universe as well as that of man, his genesis, his purpose, and his destiny. It goes to what the ancients called "first principles"--those which proceed from no other and from which all others proceed. The traditionalists believe the two major valid methods of inquiry are scientific and philosophic method. What are the claims upon which Hutchins and his followers base their beliefs? Three claims are made for philosophi cal knowledge: (1) It is knowledge and is as valid as scientific knowledge; (2) it is independent of empirical sciences because the latter1s methods are incapable of answering or refuting philosophical conclusions; and (3) it is superior to empirical knowledge both theoreti cally and practically--theoretically in its concern with the ultimate nature of things compared to scientific con cern with phenomenal aspects; it is superior practically with the ends or goals of human life and society, while science operates with technology as a means of achieving 127 man’s destiny enroute to these ends. It is agreed by both sides that the controversy regarding philosophy and scientific methodology rests on a priori assumptions incapable of scientific verification. •^^Adler and Mayer, op. cit.. p. 146. •^^Ibid. , p. 167. 297 128 The traditionalists speaking through Adler and the 129 reconstructionist (modernist) writings of Brameld agree the philosophical dispute concerning truth and the nature of valid methods of inquiry goes to a priori assumptions. Brameld criticizes Adler's philosophy: . . . Adler, quite understandably believes that the major issues confronting modem life can be settled largely in favor of the traditional doctrines of Aristotle and Thomas. For what this resolution of the philosophy-science controversy actually does is to satisfy a habitual propensity of human nature to dis solve all uncertainties and questionings in a meta physical sea of supposedly perennial, intuited reali ties. Thus philosophy becomes once more the queen of the sciences--a sovereign queen by virtue of her power to determine truth, value, eternal law, unassisted by any authority other than herself— and God.1-^ These assumptions in turn hinge on the differing concep tions of man's nature. Thus the debate deadlocks signi ficantly in the issues analyzed in the earlier portion of this chapter. Dewey believed that only the experimental scienti fic method could arrive at truth. For him experience should be modified as a consequence of experimentation and 128Ibid., p. 146. 129 Ends and Means in Education: A Midcentury Appraisal, p. 24. Ibid., p. 49. Wlcf. ante, see the material under the first premise concerning the rational nature of man. 298 reconstruction of experience should come about. He be lieved experimentalism could be applied to moral, ethical, 132 and philosophical questions. Is experimentalism in science based on a priori assumptions as is the traditionalist’s philosophy? Profes sor Berkson, the new reconstructionist, states the follow ing relative to the use of reasoning, i.e., rational powers and experimentation: Connected with this overemphasis on the importance of personal experience is the rejection of reasoning on the basis of a priori assumptions as the negation of scientific method. . . .183 The hypotheses of the scientific investigator are a priori in the sense they rest on accumulated knowledge to the enterprise at hand. Berkson states that the scientific method applied to morals and ethics would require "revolu tionary changes in economics, politics, and the general social structure several times in a generation." "The ex perimentalists have not indicated what their techniques of 134 social study should or could be." Dewey urged the scientific method for reconstruction two decades ago and 13 3 the philosophy is still incomplete. J 132 - ‘ ■-'^See Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 18-23. • ^ 33The Ideal and the Community, pp. 52-53. 134Ibid., p. 57. 13 5 Brameld, op. cit., p. 17. 299 Is the experimental method the only valid method of ascertaining truth? Berkson does not believe experi mentalism can be used as the sole method of investigation because a "significantly different mode of investigation and of constructive thinking is appropriate" to each sub ject. Discussion, scarcely an exact science, is fre quently the best method for inquiring into philosophical and moral questions. One problem remains in the debate between the traditionalists and the modernists. What role should be played by fact and value in education? Facts can be dis covered by scientific method more adequately than other types of inquiry so long as the questions concern real existence. J' When values are considered, the traditionalists believe education must teach values or it is not education. In fact, Hutchins says, "There is a hierarchy of values. The task of education is to help us understand it, estab lish it, and live by it."^® Apparently the values are derived from Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas and are the intellectual virtues which stand at the apex of values as 136The Ideal and the Community, p. 246. ■^^Adler and Mayer, op. cit., pp. 166-63. •^°The Conflict of Education, pp. 71-72. 300 a means of achieving happiness. The five intellectual virtues distinguished by the ancients and enumerated by Hutchins in his Yale Lectures are: . . . the three speculative virtues of intuitive knowl edge, which is the habit of induction; of scientific knowledge which is the habit of demonstration; and of philosophical wisdom, which is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of things highest by nature, first principles and first causes. To these they add the two virtues of the practical intellect: art, the capacity to make according to a true course of reasoning, and prudence, which is right reason with respect to action.139 By intellectual virtues, Hutchins means good intellectual habits. His address of June 18, 1959 explained the "best things there are": . . . It seems altogether likely that these are art and education, freedom and justice, courage and com passion- -the things the ancients summed up under the three heads of truth, beauty, and goodness. And what are these but the fullest development of man’ s..highest powers in their individual and social aspects? One educational book states the modernist case explicitly: . . . Experimentalism turns the Aristotelian hierarchy on its head. The primary goal of human intelligence is to improve conduct and to solve the practical prob lems of life from the most lowly and simple problems to the most elevated and complex. Theory is not an in tellectual virtue to be valued for its own sake, but no The Higher Learning in America, pp. 62-63. ■^^"What Next?" as the Commencement address at Los Angeles City College; text furnished by the courtesy of Mr. Hutchins. 301 theory and ideas are to be highly valued for the aid they give in improving human experience. As intel ligence operates within experience and is not external to it, intelligence is empirical and not rationalistic as the intellectualists defined it. Science can not teach values, only facts, according to Woodring. The values must be rationally derived. The experimentalists are absolute in their commitment to no values other than the absence of values. The search for 143 truth is always in the ever-receding present. The consequences of the modernists' educational program are that it cuts off much of the intellectual tra dition of the Western culture. Dewey warned against this tendency in 1938 by stating that the past was a means of understanding the present, however, he cautioned against making the past an end in itself due to the need for trans mission of the cultural heritage. Berkson himself criticizes experimentalism "by fusing values with a quality of action, it undervalues the function of historical ideals 145 as norms by which to evaluate existing conditions." The traditionalist position states "knowledge is 1/1 R. Freeman Butts and Lawrence A. Cremin, A His tory of Education in American Culture (New York: Henry Holt, 1953), p. 498. ~^^A Fourth of a Nation, p. 35. ■k^Brameld, op. cit., pp. 22-23. ^ ^Experience and Education, pp. 94~95. 145 The Ideal and the Community, p. 250. 302 essential to cultural continuity, and cultural continuity is essential to civilization."^^ Both the traditionalists and the modernists have a philosophical heritage out of 1 / *7 which their respective educational programs have grown. The modernists have been more inclined to teach facts through scientific method and have cut off some of the cultural continuity. The new reconstructionist view appears sound. Liberal education, it should be clear, is not con cerned with a preservation of the past as such but with the enrichment of the present and the advance toward the future. There must be a cultural link between the past and the present for intelligent action in the contemporary society. Hutchins explains the type of education which should be given with a philosophic base of metaphysics. He indicates the age of the students when it should be achieved. (3) "General education should, then, absorb the attention of students between the ages of fifteen or six teen and nineteen or twenty" (I:254-56). Evaluation.— The term "general" education here 146 Woodring, op. cit.. pp. 35-36. ^^Adler and Mayer, op. cit., pp. 187-88. ^^Berkson, op. cit.. p. 291. 303 149 apparently is synonymous with liberal education. What the speaker actually advocates is four years of liberal education extending from the beginning of the traditional junior year of high school and ending at the traditional sophomore year of college. The proposal is unique in that it suggests four years of general or liberal education prior to specializa tion in professional courses. Perhaps it is significant that one of the leading lay educational critics, Hyman Rickover, agrees with Hutchins that general education must be completed "no later than age eighteen. Rickover models his ideal educational system after that of European • 151 countries. The issue of general versus specialized education is frequently debated by educators. Some clarification is provided by Clarence H. Faust formerly of Stanford Univer sity. . . . If general education is the development of wisdom for the solution of those problems with which all men 1AQ Cf. Appendix A, IV, "The University of Chicago and the Bachelor’s Degree." •^^Kermit Lanser (ed.), "Educating for Extinction," in Second Rate Brains (Garden City: Doubleday News Book, 1958), pp. 44-45. 1 See "Mass Education and Merit," in Rickover’s Education and Freedom (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1959), pp. 131-57. 304 are confronted as human beings, rather than as spe cialists performing the various tasks which arise in their various occupations and professions, the college must provide them with more than an array of facts. • • • Faust says general education prepares young men and women to deal with personal and political problems which all men face in a democracy.153 Yet, the survey course, with its piece of information, will not give the student the balanced understanding he needs. The major inadequacy of the present Hutchins prem ise is the lack of desire by educators to put liberal edu cation into appreciable practice in American institutions of higher learning. Liberal education carries "such an invidious connotation of obsolete aristocracy" that general education, an even more ambiguous term, replaces it.'*’ 33 William H. Whyte says general education does not combine the parts of knowledge because survey courses eliminate these parts. "The proliferation of such 152 "General Education: Its Nature and Purpose," in Horace F. Morse (ed.), General Education in Transition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1951), p7 61. ^33Ibid., p. 60. ^3^Ibid., p. 64. ^33Richard Hofstadter and C. DeWitt Hardy, The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 210-12. ^3^The Organization Man, p. 104. 305 [utilitarian] courses risked endless trivialization," 157 particularly in the junior colleges. Paul Woodring provides the best recent description of the dilemma of liberal and general education. The term "general education" is used "so broadly and variously as to have no single meaning." It may mean anything from the Great Books program to education which meets the immediate and practical needs of the student. From broad survey courses at first, general education most recently has moved "toward a multiplicity of new approaches to integration" of knowledge. Academic scholars in higher education frequently opposed general education on the grounds that it destroyed the classic thesis of education. Content and logic were sometimes sacrificed to more pragmatic approaches. "Much of the leadership of general education has fallen into the hands of individuals thoroughly committed to the pragmatic view." Woodring reminds us that general education should not prepare a student for a single trade or vocation: . . . All good general education, like all sound liberal education, is designed to develop complete human beings, free of the limitations of ignorance, prejudice, and provincialism, who are capable of taking their full part in a free society. General education in the best sense, and liberal education in the best sense have identical aims. -*-58 ^••^Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 256. ^•-^Woodring, op. cit. , pp. 227-31. 306 The inadequacy of general education is stated in one educational source: . . . This is an ambitious scheme [of general educa tion] that tends to look better on paper than in prac tice; for it strains against Ortega y Gasset's rule of economy in education--only teach a student what he can know well--and Whitehead1s commandment--"What you teach, teach thoroughly." With these admonitions in mind, one sees that general education runs the grave risk of running into superficiality and discursiveness, that to raise "programs of general education to an in tellectual dignity and an immediacy of meaning equal to that of the professional or vocational curriculum" is a task demanding great talent from the teacher and from the student.159 Brubacher and Rudy provide a reasonable evaluation of general education: Basically, of course, general education did not differ in kind from liberal education. But it did make an important difference in emphasis. Like liberal edu cation, it sought to make a man by drawing on the rich heritage of the race. Yet, while liberal education tended to draw on heritage by studying it as an end in itself, general education drew on it as a means for understanding problems of current living. The former selected values hallowed by the past, the latter values made significant by issues of the day. . . . Thus general education was to continue an interest in per sonal and community health, lay the basis for a satis fying family life, develop an informed citizenship, choose a personally gratifying and socially useful vocation, cultivate skills in oral and written com munication, and encourage critical examination of one’s social values.150 The plan of general education adopted under ^59-rhe Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States, p. 222. lfin Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit.. pp. 254-55. 307 Hutchins at the University of Chicago has not survived. Students were permitted to enter the College at the begin ning of the junior year of high school and transferred to the graduate divisions after their traditional sophomore year of college. Students had to pass comprehensive examinations in fourteen required general education courses. Next fall students in the College at Chicago will be able to pursue their Major specialty within the college, instead of transferring in their junior year to a graduate division. "The administrative machinery of the Hutchins plan was totally dismantled. Graduate schools "were already ignoring Chicago applicants in favor of students with traditional majors" by 1951 when Hutchins joined the Ford Foundation. "Young (30) brilliant Idealist Hutchins launched a campus revolution that forced United States higher education to re-examine its purposes" for nearly two decades. "Some of the Hutchins-era glamour has been lost in the process" of re vising the college, but the enrollment is going up in the college at Chicago. Student reaction to the more flexible college plan divided along pro and con attitudes toward the Hutchins ^^"University of Chicago Ends Hutchins' System," New York Times, May 21, 1959. 1-62"Chicago Rumble," Time. 63:51, June 1, 1959. 308 regime. Most of the pro-Hutchins group said the new plan was likely to lower academic standards. Those opposed to the old plan of general education said it produced "not intellectuals but real phonys [sic]." The executive secre tary of the Chicago Alumni Association "discovered some 163 real enthusiasm for the revived college." Closely linked with general education was the Hutchins idea of granting the Bachelor of Arts at the con clusion of the traditional sophomore year of college (1:295-96); (IV:146-47). The audience reactions in the symposium where Hutchins defended the award of the Bachelor's degree are indicated below. Walter Crosby Kells’ remarks indicated he thought the Hutchins proposal was undesirable, unnecessary, and "that it is unfortunate, perhaps even unpatriotic, in its proposal in time of war, tending to lead to educational disunity when unity is more important than ever before. The former president of the University of Texas, Homer P. Rainey, agreed with Hutchins that it was desirable to award the Bachelor of Arts at the conclusion of the 163nstudents Stirred by Chicago University Plan," New York Times, May 31, 1959. ■ * * ^Walter Crosby Eells, "The Bachelor’s Degree-- from the Junior College Standpoint," The Educational Record, 23:585, July, 1942. 309 16 S normal sophomore year of college. President William Tolley of Allegheny College characterized Hutchins' proposal as "his fifth-column attack on the bachelor’s degree" and was surprised "that Chicago finds it either necessary or desirable to offer a " \ c c counterfeit bachelor's degree." Dean Herbert Hawkes of Columbia University believed that granting the Bachelor's Degree at the end of the sophomore year "could only lead to 'academic chaos."1 "Though the audience obviously agreed with the critics [of Hutchins], and laughed and applauded at their gibes, 167 Hutchins did not stand alone." ' President Rainey was in agreement with him. The American Council of Education took no action at the meeting on the University of Chicago pro posal. What are the Hutchins arguments for a general edu cation based on the Great Books? In his speech before the Columbia University audience, he said, "I do not see how he can reach this understanding unless he understands the ■^^Homer P. Rainey, "The Devaluation of the Educa tional Currency," The Educational Record, 23:592, July, 1942. ^66„a Counterfeit Bachelor's Degree," Educational Record, 231:596-97, July, 1942. ■^^"Hutchins Rides Again," Newsweek, 19:78, May 11, 1942. 310 great books of the Western world, beginning with Homer and coming down to our own day" (1:402-405). The remainder of the address details the object of the Great Books curricu lum for which Hutchins is famous. He describes the kind of education necessary to qualify for the bachelor’s degree at the University of Chicago. A detailed analysis of this curriculum is presented in the succeeding pages. Hutchins spent nine months writing the introductory essay to the Great Books which The Encyclopaedia Britannica 1 £g published. Some of his most compelling arguments for the use of intellectual masterpieces are found in the 169 essay. Though I do not recommend great books as a panacea for our ills, I must admit that I have an exceedingly high opinion of them as an educational instrument. I think of them as the best educational instrument for young people and adults today. The idea that liberal education is the education everybody ought to have, and that the best way to a liberal education in the West is through the greatest works the West has produced, is still the best educational ideal there is, He describes the result of studying the Great Books: The method of liberal education is the liberal arts, and the result of liberal education is discipline in those arts. The liberal artist learns to read, ■^^"Hutchins Finds Hope Only in Adult Education," Christian Century, 63:1204, October 9, 1946. • ^ Great Books, pp. 6-7. •^^Ibid., p. 7. 311 write, speak, listen, understand, and think. He fleams to reckon, measure, and manipulate matter, quantity, and motion in order to predict, produce, and exchange. The Great Conversation is a Socratic-type dialogue of the greatest minds interacting as they probe the funda mental issues of mankind. The Great Conversation symbolizes that Civilization of the Dialogue which is the only civilization in which a free man would care to live. It promotes the reali zation of that civilization here and now. Great books help us in attaining clarification and understanding of the most important issues, as stated by the greatest writers of the West, through continuous discussion. They project the Great Conversation into the future. The community to which great books contribute is the community of free minds. - 1 *72 The criteria for selecting the Great Books are stated by Mortimer Adler who first read them in John Erskine's General Honors course at Columbia University. The Great Books are: (1) those which everybody recommends and nobody reads; (2) popular and written for laymen and are not pedantic; (3) always contemporary; (4) the most readable; (5) the most enlightening because they are origi nal communications; and (6) those which deal with the per- 173 sistently unresolved problems of human life. What are the criticisms of Hutchins' content of ^7^Ibid. , p. 30. 172Ibid.. pp. 98-99. 173 How to Read a Book (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940), pp. 328-35. 312 liberal education? Most of the critics are indeed hostile to the Great Books curriculum. Irving Adler, a supporter for the restoration of content in education, says Hutchins' assumption that contemporary problems can be solved prin cipally by studying the classics is not necessarily cor rect. Hutchins assumes there is a direct application of the classics to modern problems, and this Adler believes is not always the c a s e . ^ ^ Professor Leland Baldwin reminds us that studying the Great Books is a worthy pursuit, though they contain a certain amount of twaddle and lead to 175 a system of absolutes. The most frequent argument against the Great Books is that they are impractical and essentially unrelated to the modern world. Dewey believed the idea that an adequate education can be obtained from one hundred books "is laugh able when viewed practically" because even the Greeks exer- 1 7 f i cised intelligence on a first-hand empirical basis. It is a system for divorcing the intellect from practice and experience and represents a philosophic trust in "fixed and eternal" authority. •^^Irving Adler, What We Want of Our Schools (New York: John Day Company, 1957), p. 188. ^Baldwin, pp. cit., p. 274. ^ ^Fortune, August, 1944, p. 157. ■^^John Dewey, "President Hutchins' Proposals to Remake Higher Education," The Social Frontier, 3:103, January, 1937. 313 St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland carried on the most radical experiment in the Great Books curricu lum. The idea of going back to the Great Books as a course 178 of study was rejected in most quarters. The dean at St. John’s reported, "It is no exaggeration to assert that the College has succeeded in keeping alive the intellectual curiosity of its students, in providing for the opportunity of their work, and in fostering the spontaneity of their learning." Sidney Hook has been one of the most vocal critics of the Great Books plan of education. He criticizes St. John’s for not studying the social problems of this century while students labor in the problems of Greek to post-Renaissance readings. He also admonishes that study of language, mathematics, and science from the classics becomes largely ineffective due to lack of transfer in learning from one subject to another. Hook does not be lieve the ordinary student (the type that enters St. John's according to its admission), can comprehend books which a specialist reads only after a lifetime of preparation. He feels modern science can be better taught through experi mental means than through reading Great Books in science. •^^Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr., and Nelson Manfred Blake, Since 1900 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 851. 179 The St. John’s Program: A Report, pp. 138-39. 314 Teachers need to have much more skill in interpreting the classics to the students than would be necessary in the conventional curriculum. Finally, Hook accused the 180 St. John's group of intellectual snobbism. George Geiger makes this attack on the use of in tellectual masterpieces. . . . To argue that the study of Great Books is the only way contemporary questions can be understood and met is, at best, pedantry and, at worst (as in the obscurantism of Mortimer Adler), a bald apologia for medieval theology. ■ L8- L An examination of the Education Index shows almost a total absence of criticism on the Great Books curriculum. Dixon Wecter, a well-known historian, says the "study of the Great Books by the diet average mind will produce 182 little save the Great Bookworm. Obviously Wecter be lieved most persons read few difficult books. Ben Redman says every person of average intelligence can not learn from the Great Books without tutoring, nor can the books be read without supplements. He also said the Socratic method ^ ^ Education for Modem Man, pp. 205-29. ■^•^Nelson B. Henry (ed.), Modem Philosophies and Education: The Fifty Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 152. C a n Metaphysics Save the World?" Saturday Review of Literature, 31:30, April 10, 1948. 315 183 is not the best method for students with limited time. J The President of the Adult Education Council of St. Louis says the average man can understand and profit from the Great Books. The community needs first principles to hold it together and the Great Books provide perspective for 18& "current aberrations of the human mind and spirit." Brubacher reports the hierarchy of values of Hutchins is such that the larger the rational content of the subject matter in the liberal arts, as exemplified by 185 the Great Books, the better. He also states the prag matists "were willing to read the 'great books' too, but as a means of shedding light on current problems and not 186 just as an aesthetic end in themselves." Henry Seidel Canby said study of the Great Books is a valuable attempt to restore communication through these storehouses of culture and religion. He held some hope that the books might prevent self-destruction through 183ua Debate on the Great Books Program, No: Not Without Socrates," Saturday Review of Literature. 33:32, December 9, 1950. ■*-®^Raymond H. Wittcoff, "Yes: Bootstraps of Free Man," Saturday Review of Literature. 33:7-8, December 9, 1950. 185 Modem Philosophies of Education (New York: McGraw-Hill" 1950), p. 319. ■^fyjigher Education in Transition, p. 291. 316 187 atomic attack by keeping ideas moving. Dwight Macdonald was not so impressed by discussion of Great Books, about one fifth of which are impenetrable to the lay reader, or at least to Macdonald. He also criticized Hutchins and Adler for preferring minor works by major writers, rather 1 88 than vice versa. Even the Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society at Harvard would not ’ ’pass judgment'’ upon the entirely prescribed Great Books curriculum of St. John's. The Harvard Committee pro duced one of the most widely read reports on Education published since World War II. Jerome G. Kerwin, Chairman of the Walgreen Founda tion, comments on general education. Mr. Hutchins' outstanding contributions to American education in theory and practice are producing profound changes in higher education. In most of our colleges and universities some plan of general education prior to specialized training has already been, or is in the process of being, established. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this movement owes as much to Mr. Hutchins as to any person in American life to- 1^7,'pipe Lines to Hope," Saturday Review of Litera ture, 31:20, April 24, 1948. 188”xhe Book-of-the-Millennium Club,” New Yorker, 28:172-75, November 29, 1952. ^9paul Buck (ed.), General Education in a Free Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 182; Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit., p. 294. ■^^Foreword, University of Utopia, p. vii. 317 Some perspective on the Great Books curriculum and movement is provided by Woodring. Today it is clear that the [classic] thesis has a toughness and resilience all its own. In recent years it has caught a new lease on life and seems now to be entering into its renaissance. New and vigorous state ments of principles from a few liberal arts colleges, the Great Books programs, the emphasis on truly liberal education in many of the new programs of teacher edu cation sponsored by the Fund for the Advancement of Education--all have given the thesis a new resurgence of power. It seems likely that many more Americans today are sympathetically aware of the existence of the classic view than was the case a quarter of a century ago. Yet the thesis has inherent limitations which will not allow it, without important alterations, to meet the educational problems of the coming years. The contrast of the traditionalist curriculum and that of the modernists leads to another consequence. The relationship of liberal education and vocational education is the next area of dispute. Hutchins has been critical of the inclusion of vocational education in higher education during much of his career. Vocational education has two consequences according to Hutchins. Students get so entranced by this education that they take only vocational subjects, thus getting no real education, but a cut-rate type of on-the-job training in school. Secondly, this training affords no knowledge 192 in the wise use of leisure. ? The rapid technological •^•^A Fourth of a Nation, p. 46. 192The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, pp. 17-19. 318 progress in a fluid industrial society prevents the success 193 of vocational education due to obsolescence. The job is outmoded before the student's education is completed. "The ordinary American university presents an array of vocational schools of incredible variety and insignificance [emphas is added]." The modernist has a totally different philosophy on the content of liberal education. Dewey agreed as late as 1944 that education lacked unity of aim, material, and method. He believed liberal education should be integrated with the technical and vocational areas. The vocational parts of education should be given in connection with edu cation in the social, moral, and scientific context of modem democracy. Dewey believed morals should not be separated from science and the scientific method, nor should morals be considered superior to science. We should accept the method of empiricism and first-hand experience to achieve the promise of modem democratic ideals. The fixed status of birth and economic inequalities should be overcome. The means of doing this is to break down the walls between things purely intellectual and spiritual and the lower 193 University of Utopia, p. 15. ^Fortune, August, 1944, p. 156. 319 193 things of a practical nature. One has to examine his attitude toward vocational education, to understand Dewey's criticism that linguistic education is impractical. He believed liberal education must be integrated through study of it in connection with education in the social, scientific, and moral contexts. The gap between the practical and material life must be narrowed to "technological control of the energies of 19 6 nature in behalf of humane ends." Alexander Meiklejohn, formerly the president of Amherst College, disagreed with Dewey regarding the need for vocational education. "Liberal education must be deeply concerned with the vocations of men. It is an al together different thing to say that the liberal learning must be centered on the specific vocation of that pupil. . . ." The ideas and facts of science and technologies must be understood by all free citizens in a free society, but vocational education should be resisted by all good 197 colleges. Communication between men who are vocational specialists becomes nearly impossible due to the lack of a common intellectual experience. The technical vocabulary itself is a barrier to understanding and communication. •^^Ibid. t pp. 155^ 184, 190. 1 Qfi Fortune, August, 1944, p. 157. ^Fortune. January, 1945, p. 219. 320 Walter Lippmann, the noted political thinker, states that colleges which do not attempt to teach a rational order of knowledge end up instructing the student how to make a success of his career. Reason becomes the instrument for this success and all subjects unrelated to this end are considered superfluous. "There is no such thing as a general order of knowledge and a public philoso phy, which he [the student] needs to possess in typical higher education.""^® William H. Whyte, Jr., an editor of Fortune, makes some significant and astute observations concerning Ameri can higher education. He observes that Americans thrived on practicality long before William James and Dewey formed pragmatism into a philosophical system. "American educa tion will always lean toward the practical, toward the larger number than the smaller, and no reformation can ever 199 succeed that runs counter to this tradition." Evidence of the unpopularity of the liberal arts curriculum, not necessarily through Great Books, was indicated in a 1949 poll taken by Elmo Roper. College graduates wanted their children to follow the liberal arts course in higher 198 Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (New York: American Library, 1956), p. 65. •^^The Organization Man, p. 106. 321 education to the following extent: Per cent of college graduates Per cent of time their children should spend in liberal arts 7 100 7 75 50 30 25 28 10 0 Whyte calls for a restoration of intellectual content in education based on its utilitarian grounds of social use dispute in the collegiate curriculum. Its direct relevance to earning a living in a society which worships science and technology makes a vocational course immediately practical, which pleases a pragmatic American society dedicated to "know-how." Even such a staunch advocate of intellectual- ism as Dean Jacques Barzun of Columbia University does not think we should "provide the liberal arts to all" students because they are allegedly incapable of absorbing them. James Conant concurs with Barzun and both disagree with 201 Hutchins and Adler on the point. fulness in wise and intelligent decisions. The place of vocational education has long been in ^Q^Ibid., p. 447. ^0-^The House of Intellect (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 95-96. 322 The four recent books which were drawn on exten sively for the analysis presented here show a split in the preferences for vocational education in higher educa- 202 tion. The first two sources favor vocational education and the latter two oppose it. Significantly little space is devoted to it by the proponents and a thorough analysis is proved by Adler and Mayer. The traditionalist opposes the direct teaching of vocational education because it tends to replace education dedicated to making wise decisions in citizenship duties, leisure, and the humanization of labor. Since all men are allowed to vote, liberal education is supposedly education for freedom enhancing intelligent activities in those responsibilities. Humanization of labor means the attempt to educate people so they enjoy leisure which improves them morally, even though their position may be a boring one as a necessary adjunct to an automated machine. The problem of finding satisfaction in one's work in an industrial democracy is more than an enigma of education, it is a problem of the entire society. The traditionalist says undiluted liberal education must be given to everybody. He admits it has never been done and that he does not know ^^Cf. Berkson, op. cit.. p. 234; Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit.. p. 387; Woodring, op. cit., pp. 152-54, and Adler and Mayer, op. cit., pp. 95-106. 323 how it should be accomplished. He maintains, however, if "we cannot give liberal education to every child, political democracy is a delusion" based on a citizenry too uneducated to make this form of government operate satis factorily. The modernist thinks he has an answer to the natural intellectual inequalities of students. He believes in the integration of liberal and vocational education: . . . The modernist admits that the difficulties of giving organizational form to this integrated cur riculum are tremendous. But they must be faced for democracy's sake. Without a schooling that prepares the child for industrial democracy, in which labor and the problems of labor are as important as citizenship and the creative activities of leisure, democracy in an age of industry and science is impossible. One solution to the integration of vocational and liberal education can be based on differentiation. This provides for different kinds of schooling after a basic period is completed. At what age or place the basic education is completed is important in this proposal. Can it be at the end of elementary school, high school, junior college, or college? The dilemma confronting the modernists if voca tional education takes the place of liberal education is apparent. There could be no integration with the liberal education shoved out by easier more practical courses 203Adier and Mayer, op. cit., pp. 97-102. ^Q^Ibid.. pp. 104-105. 324 directed at making a livelihood. Education for citizenship is lost under these conditions. How can it be decided when the vocational emphasis must take over? What proportion should be vocational and liberal in the education of students with varying abili ties? These indeed are pertinent questions which the modernist has not answered. Experimentation, according to 205 Adler, is certainly needed to ascertain these facts. Perhaps at this point a summation regarding voca tional courses in the collegiate curriculum is needed. Probably liberal education should be given during the last two years of high school for all students, with vocational courses permitted in junior college. Hutchins favors allowing all students to complete junior college and his Chicago Plan comprised a four year liberal or general edu cation ending with the traditional sophomore year. The junior college would be an all-purpose institution offering O f \ c both vocational and general education curricula. The experience of Los Angeles City College, the largest junior college in the world, suggests that all of a highly hetero geneous student body cannot profit from "general educa tion." Some vocational or "semi-professional" courses ^O^Ibid., p. 193. 206The writer is indebted to Paul Woodring’s A Fourth of a Nation, p. 152, and to my four years of ex perience at Los Angeles City College for this proposal. 325 should be afforded if students weak in linguistic and written skills are to succeed. The inadequacy of the Great Books may be in their being too unrelated to the immediate problems of the col lege student. However, there appears to be a greater danger in the modernist insistence that vocational courses should be combined with liberal education. The practical consequence is likely to be that intellectual content is driven out of the curriculum by practical courses more 207 palatable to both the faculty and students. The rigor of the intellectual activity of Hutchins' Great Books course makes him a severe critic of the "rela tivist" standards evident in Dewey's educational philoso phy. This can readily be seen in the next premise. (4) Everything is relative. "Since everything is a matter of opinion, it follows that everyone's opinion is as good as everyone else's opinion" (11:16-18). Evaluation.--Hutchins has been noted for his ad herence to Aristotelian absolutes and his attack is aimed at the pragmatist's philosophical system in which the ?ClR ethical criterion is relative not absolute. u He de livered the premise before the American Association for 207 "" Woodring, op. cit., p. 146. ^^Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 393. 326 209 Adult Education in convention at New York. Hutchins says the fallacy of relativism is its inability to provide reasonable standards by which to judge actions. Since everything is relative, force and power (might) win out. Immediate practical success becomes the only criterion in the measurement of truth and justice. Naturally, Hutchins does not believe each person* s opinion is equal to another's opinion. Max Lemer says political liberalism demonstrates a weakness in its alliance with pragmatic thought: . . . The "open mind" sometimes became a drafty cave of the winds, the questioning spirit became merely ironic, the revolt against past codes became an extreme rela tivism which left no standards by which to measure values. Eric Goldman has pointed out how this rela tivism, a scourge with which to lash the conservatives of the 1890’s, turned into an engine of disillusionment in the 1920*s. . . .2i0 Rebuttal to two implicit charges in the Hutchins attack comes from Professor George Geiger of Antioch Col lege. He says the two charges are that experimental!sm provides nothing stable on which to base education or ethics, and that experimentalism leads to moral anarchy. Geiger says growth as an end in education "cuts across any block between ends and means." He continues: 20%ew York Times, May 21, 1940. 210 America as a Civilization, p. 729. 327 . . . Growth cannot be a means to any ulterior end except more growth; the same holds for life itself, and for education. . . . Growth WUSt signify growth in general, a continuing of growth. Geiger's idea echoes Dewey's concept that growth is the only end in Education. As Woodring says, "values [in pragmatism] are relative, and in a changing'society, some what unstable. " It might be here noted that Dewey's experimentalism is a refinement of the pragmatism of 213 William James and Charles Peirce. Geiger says human wants are plural and plural value criteria must be developed to satisfy the wants. He indi cates fruitful work by Clyde Kluchohn and his associates at Harvard has resulted in the discovery of some of the values.This is one specific case in which the value criteria are being erected by experimentalism. Lerner states the nature of the counter-attack on Dewey's pragmatism: The most recent phase of the cyclical swing has been a revolt against the pragmatic revolt. It has taken the form of an attack on the "pragmatic acqui escence," as Mumford called it, including chiefly the Henry, op. cit., p. 148. ^•^A Fourth of a Nation, p. 58. ) I O ‘ £ , J -JAdolph E. Meyer, The Development of Education in the Twentieth Century (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1949), p. 41. ^•^Henry, loc. cit. 328 phases of American culture that vulgarized the meaning of pragmatism, reducing truth to whatever "works/ 1 thereby casting out other standards of value. As in religion, American intellectuals have been groping for a transcendental philosophic belief, turning against the pragmatic on the ground that it ignores the depth of the psyche and the tragic dimensions of life. . * * ^ ^ Pragmatism is likely to continue as the dominant American philosophy according to Woodring: Pragmatism is compatible with the American way of life because it is more concerned with results than with abstraction, because it rejects absolutes and allows for wide diversity, and because it uses ideas and theories only as a guide to action. Despite the sharp attacks upon it, no philosophy yet proposed seems likely to replace it in this country in the im mediate future.216 The defense of relative truth in pragmatism is clearly made by Professor Boyd H. Bode: . . . Sciences are pointing to a theory of truth which is divorced from these ghostly absolutes of the past. . . . Absolutes are . . . human prejudices invested with a halo and put on ice. . . . Our [the prag matists’] tests and standards are not derived from elsewhere but are constructed as we go along. 1/ A similar view of pragmatism is revealed by Pro fessor Adolph Meyer: The pragmatist is noted for his view of truth. Like the Sophists of ancient Athens he rejects the notion of absolute truth or reality. He asserts that all truth is relative, depending on time and place, ^•^America as a Civilization, p. 723. ^^One Fourth of a Nation, pp. 59~60. 21 7 Progressive Education at the Crossroads (New York: Newson and Company, 1938), pp. 34-35. 329 and that what is apparently true in our own era may not be the truth tomorrow. The pragmatic test of truth is: "Does it work?"2iy The controversy between absolute truth and relative truth goes back into the history of philosophy. Relativism is apparently the more acceptable theory this century. Agnes E. Meyer, the wife of the owner of the Washington Post and a former student of Dewey’s, says, "the fact that all truth is relative does not mean that it cannot be distinguished from error. . . ."219 Berkson describes the philosophy of Dewey and its relation to truth: . . . Moreover, knowledge, truth, and values have mean ing in relation to particular occasions in life--are "relative" in the sense that they are related to definite situations, to time, to place, to special concerns. There are no absolute truths--that is, there are no propositions which are valid for all times, places, and persons or which, once determined, are no longer subject to revision. . . .220 Harvard Philosopher Raphael Demos comments on rela tivism: . . . The moralist's pattern of the hierarchy of values and even the scientists' patterns of physical laws are declared to be convenient fiction. All this has led to 218 The Development of Education in the Twentieth Century, pp.- 43-44. 2^ Education for a New Morality (New York: Mac millan Company, 1957), {T 85~. 220^6 Ideal and the Community, p. 34. 330 subjectivism and relativism, as exemplified in the pragmatic and sociological schools of today. . . . Lerner comments on the relativism inherent in the philosophy of Dewey's educational program. . . . Progressive education, which for a time was based on a too-optimistic view of human nature, seems to have learned from its worst mistakes. It is no longer content to pose questions without offering at least tentative answers, or to underline the relativism of all standards without trying to shape operative standards.^22 Clifton Fadiman, an educational critic, says the current controversy in education goes to one's view of the nature of man. If one believes man is essentially animal, contrasted with the belief that man is both animal and rational, then differing educational consequences follow. Fadiman takes the Aristotelian view that man is essentially rational, similar to that concept which Adler and Hutchins defend. He goes on to say we are in a crisis period over education: . . . It is marked by the absence of any general, tacit adherence to an agreed upon system of values. It is in such a crisis period that we live. . . . But most of us waver between the two [the animal or animal and rational theory] or have never reflected on either. Our present educational system quite properly mirrors this uncertainty of the majority. It mirrors our own mental chaos. This is nothing else it can do, for 221 "Philosophical Aspects of the Recent Harvard Report on Education," p. 198. ^^America as a Civilization, p. 741. 331 ours is a democratic society, and all our institutions are representative.223 Paul Woodring says we should scorn the educator who finds value judgments and ’’refuses to decide whether his tory, literature, and science are more important in the curriculum than badminton, basket weaving, and fly- 224 fishing." Yet, we have found quite a few utilitarian courses on a comparable par in our high schools since the ascension of Sputnik. The widely praised Rockefeller Report on Education published in 1958 carried this statement: In the context of the present discussion, there should be a general recognition that development of the individual's potentialities occurs in a context of values. Education is not just a mechanical process for communication to the young of certain skills and in formation. It springs from our most deeply rooted convictions. And if it is to have vitality both teach ers and students must be infused with the values which have shaped the system. ^5 There seems to be little question that most things are not relative to the point where a value judgment cannot be made. There are standards by which to evaluate, even if sometimes they are only probable and not certain. In a world that seems to be providing a choice between competing 223.,Today's Lost Generation," Saturday Review, 42:13, September 12, 1959. 224a FoUrth of a Nation, p. 5. 225'’The Pursuit of Excellence," in The Rockefeller Report on Education (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 48-49. 332 ideologies, e.g., Democracy and Communism as one instance, it does not appear that all truth is relative. Some opinions apparently are more valuable than less informed ones! The next premise demonstrates the relation of values and the improvement of education. The writings and speeches of Hutchins do not reveal consistency and clarity on the next premise. Whether it is probable that a democratic society can improve its educa tion, is hard to tell from the speaker’s statements. (5) Democratically controlled education "is not a means by which society may lift itself by its own boot straps into a different spiritual world" (11:56-59). Evaluation.--The idea comes from Economist Frank Knight of the University of Chicago and is closely related to Plato’s dictum, "What is honored in a country will be cultivated there." Hutchins frequently quotes the latter phrase. He said our educational system demonstrates the "weakness of American ideals" in the Edward White Lectures on Citizenship delivered at Louisiana State University in 1941.226 Sidney Hook reacts to the assumption of Hutchins: The moral is that there is no hope of changing the character of education to any significant degree 22^See Education for Freedom, pp. 48-49. 333 unless the country is changed. And so the circle com pletes itself from educational utopianism, "society can be changed only by changing its system of education," to educational defeatism, "no change in education is possible without changing society." . . . [Hutchins] advocates the transformation of society by a spiritual revolution led by men of superior theological and meta physical insight. . . .227 True education would stress the immediate needs only after the highest goods are considered. This "will be 2 9R the only effective means of reforming the society. Development of the moral, intellectual, and spiritual powers is the greatest good. Economic well-being and the common good through peace, order, and justice are subsumed under the summum bonum of the highest development of the 229 moral, intellectual, and spiritual powers. The thinking of Hutchins concerning the role of education in improving a democracy seems to have lacked clarification. He has maintained the educational system reflects the ideals of the society, but that it is diffi cult to change those ideals through the educational system. His Walgreen Lecture at Chicago in 1953 expresses his thoughts on the reciprocal relationship between ideals and education: 227 Education for Modem Man, p. 35. 228i*he Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society, p. 72. ^ ^ Education for Freedom, pp. 88-89. 334 . . . It is possible for a country to make up its mind to have a kind of education that it never had before and to lift itself by its own bootstraps into a dif ferent spiritual world. This does not mean that the educational system can achieve these results behind the back of the population or against its wishes. It does mean that, if a country decides to move into a differ ent spiritual world, it can use the educational system to help it get there. The educational system is a means to the achievement of the country's ideals. The decision about the ideals is made by the country, not by the educational system. In the United States, that richest and most power ful of countries, is it possible to have the educa tional system and the University of Utopia? Not unless the people want them. Do they want them? It is hard to say. I think that in a kind of basic, unconscious way they do. In a kind of basic, unconscious way everybody everywhere would rather be wise than foolish. But think of the cost of the journey to Utopia. Think of the thought, the effort, and the drastic reorganiza tion of our educational institutions. The most formi dable task of all is that of persuading Americans to believe that they ought to want to become Utopians.230 One may conclude that Hutchins believes the country can achieve true education only through the knowledge of ideal education. He has dedicated himself to speechmaking in an effort to show what heights of moral, intellectual, and spiritual achievement are possible. Yet, he admits he has failed in these efforts. The reason Hutchins and Adler have not succeeded is that the culture contains inherent weaknesses which could not be halted by their educational crusade.^ 1 ne described the American reaction to Sputnik 23C>The University of Utopia, pp. 100-101. 231 Hutchins' response to a question at the Modern Forum, Beverly Hills, January 31, 1958. He said that the tide of pragmatism in education overwhelmed the opposition to it. 335 as a case where our complacency "has been temporarily nudged." He maintains we shall have to change our awards for the properly educated man: It is not too difficult to change the symbols of a culture. This would have to be done if we are ever to get the kind of educational system that I should regard as at all satisfactory for a country of this type. You have to provide the incentive in the culture that leads the family and the child and the environment to attach importance to intellectual achievement. Hutchins says "that thoroughgoing educational re direction may be possible only in a period of national 933 humiliation." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., calls the reconstruction of our educational system one of the twelve most vital problems for the 1960's. He reminds us periods of intellectual discontent, such as we are now witnessing, 234 are precursors to political action. If the foregoing two statements are correct, we certainly should observe some changes in American higher education during the coming years, particularly in the area of intellectual quality. Sputnik may provide the impetus for us to revitalize our educational ideals and adjust them somewhat above our present life-adjustment goals. poo Transcript of the Mike Wallace Interview with Robert M. Hutchins reprinted by the Fund for the Republic, 1958, p. 12. 2 33 University of Utopia, loc. cit. 234nThe Coming Shape of American Politics," Progressive, 23:24-27, September, 1959. 336 William H. Whyte, Jr. suggests the relationship between democracy and education: . . . This brings us to what ultimately is the single greatest vehicle for constructive change--education. The many points against social adjustment emphases now prevailing are being vigorously sounded, and it is right that they should be, but one point needs to be made much more emphatically. The case for a rigorously fundamental schooling can be made on the utilitarians’ own grounds: social usefulness. There are better reasons for the development of the individual, but until this point is made more clearly we seem by de fault to leave the debate on the either/or grounds of "democratic education" versus a highly trained elite. This is false antithesis. The great bulk of people will face organization pressures as inhibiting for them as for the few, and they need, as much if not more, to have the best that is within them demanded early. Is it "democratic" to hold that the humanities can have no meaning for them? They do not have to be taught to shake hands with other people; society will attend to this lesson. They have to be taught to reach. All of them. Some will be outstanding, some not, but the few will never flourish where the values of the many are against them.235 Hutchins has upheld the ideal contained in the premise for many years. He believes the success of democ racy rests on the assumption of intelligent citizenship. (6) The University of Chicago "has conceived of liberal education as that education which every citizen should have in proportion to his capacity to receive it" (IV:7-9). Evaluation.--"The major premise of this book is 2^5The Organization Man. p. 447. 337 that every man and every free citizen needs liberal educa- tion." In a recent speech Hutchins said, "If our hopes of democracy are to be realized, every citizen of this country is going to have to be educated to the limit of his capacity." All men must be "sufficiently educated and informed to take part in making" the necessary decisions 237 in a free society. Hutchins explains the assumption at greater length: . . . Democracy makes every man a ruler, for the heart of democracy is universal suffrage. If liberal educa tion is the education that rulers ought to have, and this I say has never been denied, then every ruler, that is every citizen, should have a liberal education. If industry is to give everybody leisure, and if leisure, as history suggests, tends to be degrading and dangerous unless it is intelligently used, then everybody should have the education that fits him to use his leisure intelligently, that is liberal educa tion. . . .238 The rationale of his educational philosophy is further explained: . . . When I urge liberal education for all, I am not suggesting that all people must become great philoso phers, historians, scientists, and artists. This does not seem to me an unattainable goal. If it is, un less some better kind of liberal education can be in vented than the one that I have described, we shall be forced to abandon universal suffrage; for I do not believe that men can solve the problems raised by their 236ihe Conflict of Education in a Democratic Society, p. 35. 9 0 7 "Is Democracy Possible?" Saturday Review, 42:15-17, February 21, 1959. 23^The Conflict in Education, p. 84. 338 own aggregation unless they can learn to think for themselves about the fundamental issues of human life and organized society. . . . The alternatives are democracy, with liberal education for all, and aris tocracy, with liberal education for the few. . . .zjy Sidney Hook recognizes that all citizens in a democracy are entitled to the best education they can get. "It is not likely that one procedure or curriculum will be universally valid." He advocates the integration of voca- 240 tional and liberal education. Jacksonian ideals increased the egalitarianism in higher education and reduced its average quality. This tide reached its height about 1950, but greater Jeffer sonian selectivity was becoming evident through the renewed 241 interest in opportunities for superior students. Woodring seems to approximate Hutchins' belief in universal liberal education for democratic responsibility. . . . If choice is not possible, democracy becomes meaningless, for democracy implies that the individual can make political decisions. If there is no choice, there is no justification for any education, for it is impossible to choose between the educated man and the uneducated. All educational philosophy must be based upon the assumptions that the individual can choose and that choice is important. The fact that an education must be intellectual does not mean that it will be available only to indi viduals of superior intelligence. All human beings ' ^ Ibid.. p. 88. ^ ^ Education for Modern Man, p. 143. ^■^Brubacher and Rudy, op. cit. . pp. 291-92. 339 must make decisions. All can choose, though not with equal wisdom, because all cannot learn to think with equal clarity. It is the purpose of the schools to enable each individual, whatever his level of ability, to make the wisest decisions of which he is potenti ally c a p a b l e . 2^2 Jacques Maritain states the purpose of liberal edu cation for all: Basic liberal education does not look upon students as future professors or specialists in all the branches of knowledge and the liberal arts taught in the cur riculum. It does not look upon them as future gentle men or members of the privileged class. It looks upon them as future citizens, who must act as free men and who are able to make sound and independent judgments in new and changing situations, either with respect to the body politic or to their own particular task. The modernist and traditionalist are "on the whole," insistent that the same kind of quality of education be given to every child. The need for liberal education in the traditionalist's view is for wisdom in citizenship responsibilities and in the use of leisure. The modernist holds that problems of labor in an industrial society are equally important with citizenship and creative activities in leisure. Both groups admit they do not know how to accomplish a quality liberal education for all. However, the democratic idealists (Adler groups both the tradition alist and the modernist here on this issue), disagree on oa o One Fourth of a Nation, p. 114. ^^Henry, op. cit. , pp. 82-83. 340 the role of vocational education in liberal education. The modernist can not specify "the means, methods, and materi als of integrating liberal and vocational education," but maintains this must be the first order in experimental education.244 The philosophical controversy ends in the respective attitudes toward the place of science and 245 philosophy in education. Hutchins’ educational philosophy has frequently been attacked for allegedly favoring an intellectual elite group. He responds by saying that the type of liberal edu cation he favors "can be mastered by, and should be mastered by every citizen . . . by the age of eighteen." It is the type of education which was limited to an intel lectual elite during the flourishing Greek civilization. An address at the University of Chicago on Decem ber 12, 1948 contains clarification of the above position. Hutchins charged educators with this syllogism: Everybody has the right to an education; only a few are qualified for a good education; therefore, those who are not qualified for a good education must be given a bad (specialized or vocational) education, because everyone has the right to 244 Adler and Mayer, op. cit., pp. 101-106. 245Cf. ante, pp. 292-302. 24^See Appendix B, p. 581. 341 education. "Anyone who favors a good education, must, therefore, be antidemocratic, because only a few are quali fied for a good education." Those who believe in the capacity of the people are called "reactionary" and "anti democratic," whereas those who doubt the capacity of the O / " 7 people "revel in the name of democrats and liberals." Viewing the American scene from a historical stand point, one can note that our democracy has worked rela tively well without a liberal education for all. The average education of Americans today is ten and eight tenths years and this could hardly be called liberal edu- OA Q cation. Even those students attending college fre quently do not take liberal education majors. Yet, the complexity of civilization during the nuclear age may compel us to provide the type of education urged by Hutchins. Mortimer Adler states the case for universal liber al education: . . . The old distinction between the few and the many (as it affected educational opportunity) rested upon social and economic, not natural inequality. So did the distinction as regarded the franchise. This dis tinction having been removed from the franchise, it 247 Robert Maynard Hutchins, "Education and Democ racy," School and Society, 69:425-28, June 18, 1949. 248 ^ See Sylvia Porter's column, Los Angeles Mirror News, September 4, 1959. 342 should be removed from education. The aim of the liberal education of the few was the enrichment of the free life of citizenship, learning, and leisure, when only the few were destined for those blessings. Now that every child is so destined, the education that was appropriate for the few is appropriate for all. Only if the least gifted (or those who now appear to be least gifted) are offered as much of the same kind of schooling as the most gifted and leave school only when they have absorbed as much of it as they can— only thus is the democratic principle of equal educational oppor tunity satisfied.249 Hutchins and his followers admit the problem of providing liberal education for all is immense. It has never been approached and the traditionalist admits he does not know how to do this. However, the problem of giving an undiluted liberal education to every child, the solution to which is the cornerstone of educational and political 250 democracy, is vital to our society. (7) The University of Chicago "has conceived of a university as an institution devoted to scholarship, ad vanced study, and the preparation of men and women for scholarship and the learned professions" (IV:4-7). Evaluation.--Max Lerner concedes the German uni versities were influential in forming the scholarship standards in their American counterparts. However, the relationship of the university to the state was not adopted Adler an(i Mayer, op. cit. , p. 96. 250Ibid., p. 102. 343 in the United States. The government and educational institutions are largely independent of each other in this 251 nation. One of the functions of the university is the con tinual synthesis of findings which are indispensable to the advancement of the whole of knowledge.2^2 American profes sors have been more narrow in their domains, having fol lowed extreme specialization. They have not proceeded in the footsteps of such generalists as Alfred North Whitehead and Arnold Toynbee.^53 Woodring calls for a new synthesis in education in which the university will be distinct from the college through confinement to only graduate and pro fessional schools.His model apparently is patterned after the University of Chicago plan. By definition, then, the university should not be an institution which engages its students and professors exclusively in narrow specialization. As Lerner says the ideal university must develop a philosophic and humanist approach so that the student can discover the particular fact in the context of total life. The best kind of re search deals with specialized problems "gnawing at the ^America as a Civilization, p. 745. 2~^2The Revolution in Education, p. 181. ^^Lemer, op. cit., p. 742. A Fourth of a Nation, p. 154. 344 scholar, but it can yield fundamental results only if it moves from the special problem to broadly theoretical ques tions.'’255 The problems of specialization, education, and the culture are well stated by one of America’s leading spe cialists who is the Director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University. Professor Robert Oppen- heimer states, . . . I think that the three weaknesses--in our educa tion, in our faltering view of the future, and in our difficulties in the formulation of policy--have some common grounds; but they are not the same, and to follow them all is not the purpose of this paper. Certainly egalitarianism and our traditionally cher ished tolerance of diversity precisely on the most fundamental issues of man's nature and destiny, his salvation and faith, certainly these qualities, long held as virtues, have much to do with our troubles in education, where they define, as it were, the insoluble problem; they have much to do with the difficulties of prophecy and policy, which traditionally rest on con sensus precisely with regard to those matters where we are dedicated to difference. . . . Our weaknesses, of course, have a touch of irony. It is our very confidence in education, our determina tion that it should be available to all, our belief that through it man will find dignity and freedom, that have played so lai*ge a part in reducing our educational system to the half-empty mockery that it now is.256 Hutchins upholds the Jeffersonian ideal of educa tion, namely that university training should be available 255 Lemer, op. cit. , p. 743. 25^Lansner, "An Inward Look," pp. 89“90. 345 only to those who meet rigorous intellectual qualifica tions. He believes the universities must be centers of o C7 independent thought. Equality of opportunity for higher education at the university level does not imply that the intellectual training should be watered down. Philosophy Professor James Feibleman says Hutchins and Mortimer Adler deserve credit for having asked the country the fundamental question of what a university should be. The question must be directed at a high level of abstraction, however, Feibleman says both Hutchins' and Adler's answers are wrong. Feibleman believes "the func tion of the university is the communication and the ad vancement of inquiry into culture." The university should 9 SR achieve "right thought, right feeling, and right action." A summary of the educational premises of Hutchins.— The premises in the addresses on education are enumerated here, then each one is summarized separately. (1) I thought we wanted a rational order in education and in politics. (2) There is a relationship between metaphysics, education, morals, and intellect. (3) General education should be given between ages fifteen and twenty. (4) Every thing is relative since everyone’s opinion is as good as 9^7 The University of Utopia, p. 87. ^^Henry, op. cit. . pp. 365-69. 346 everyone else’s opinion. (5) Democratically controlled education is not a means to a different spiritual world. (6) Every citizen should have liberal education in propor tion to his ability to receive it. (7) A university is an institution devoted to scholarship, advanced study, and the preparation for learned professions. Hutchins believes that man is a rational animal, therefore the purpose of education is to increase the rational powers. The reliance on reason is the "principal means by which society is to be advanced." A university must be an institution specializing in seeking the truth. The essential truth of man is changeless and the rational principles of the intellectual masterpieces transmit the wisdom of a common humanity. That man is rational is a Hutchins premise par excellence. Dewey and his modernist followers deny that man is exclusively rational, since his nature contains non rat ional or emotional elements also. The modernist main tains man’s nature changes in mutual reciprocation with the environment. The way to modify the environment is not through rational principles, but through the methods of seeking truth by the empirical means of science. Education should therefore concentrate on the social and emotive aspects of man’s nature, as well as on the rational ones. The means of doing so is a combination of experience and 347 the scientific method. The end of the education is growth, not the rationality of an intuitive nature. Hutchins believes that metaphysics and education are closely related, since the latter is a secondary sub ject dependent on philosophy. The best education is a philosophical one which provides a framework of ideas. Metaphysics deals with the ultimate causes of being and is based on the absolute values of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Dewey deplored the a priori assumptions of Hutchins and his followers. John Dewey, America's leading philoso pher of this century, believed that philosophy should be based solely on the empirical method of discovering truth. Even morals and religion should be scrutinized by utilizing the scientific method which made metaphysics an obsolete system for entrenching fixed authority. The modernist believes that only scientific method can be the valid method of inquiry, whether it is investi gation into facts or values. Hutchins reminds them that science can not tell what should be the nature of the state, society, or even whether there is a God. He main tains the two methods of discovering truth are philosophi cal and scientific. The next Hutchins premise is one with which his educational program at Chicago has been closely identified. 348 General education should be given between the ages of fifteen and twenty. This means four years of content derived primarily from the Great Books, the storehouses of rational principles undergirding the universe. General education is to prepare the student for his citizenship and leisure responsibilities in a democracy. The bachelor’s degree should mark the conclusion of this education at the end of the traditional sophomore year of college. The modernist does not oppose general education, but he would limit it to two years and would integrate some vocational elements into it. Great Books would be utilized to a limited extent, though experimental science would occupy a greater portion of the student's time. Vocational education would be combined within the framework of general education in the context of its social, scientific, and moral contexts. Hutchins says everything is not relative, otherwise we have no standards by which to judge values. There is a hierarchy of values, and education should not be judged by its immediate practical success. The highest development of the moral, intellectual, and spiritual powers consti tute the summum bonum, under which economic well-being and the common good are subsumed through peace, order, and justice. Dewey held that truth was relative to the condi tions in the environment. The truth could be found by 349 using empirical science to verify hypothetical assumptions in a reconstruction of experience. Democratically controlled education will not pro duce a different spiritual world according to Hutchins. The object of education is not social reform because propa ganda is the probable result. The individual is the means of improving the society through the highest development of his moral, intellectual, and spiritual powers. Education should shape the society's ideals. The reconstruction of experience was for Dewey a means of reforming the society through the schools. Growth, his end in education, took place in a social con text allied with vocational education. The breakdown of rigid social classes was a corollary to education in an industrial culture. Liberal education should be given to every person in proportion to his capacity to receive it. Both the traditionalist and the modernist agree on this premise. The only question is how can it be achieved through the curriculum. The modernist would stress vocational educa tion and the role of labor in the industrial complex. The traditionalist would keep vocational education out of col leges and universities to preserve the function of training the mind, the unique purpose of institutions of higher learning. 350 The last premise examined here is that a university should be devoted to scholarship, advanced study, and preparation for the learned professions. Hutchins says it is "a center of independent thought and criticism." Few would disagree with him, however, some would advocate more specialization. Others would question the degree of aca demic freedom Hutchins desires in the university. Dewey criticized him for an educational ideal too aloof from contemporary problems. I CHAPTER VI HUTCHINS IN ACTION AS A SPEAKER This chapter analyzes the speaker from the stand point of preparation and delivery, style in the addresses, the organization, and the types of evidence employed. Each of these separate phases of the Hutchins rhetoric is examined in the successive subdivisions of the chapter. Preparation and Delivery of the Hutchins Speeches The material contained in Appendix B provides a significant insight into the manner in which Hutchins pre pares his speeches. This information was gained from a tape-recorded interview made in New York on November 24, 1958, in response to questions written by the candidate. They were read to Hutchins by a staff member of the Fund for the Republic. The speaker prepares his lectures first and these have formed the basis of his books and articles.^ The University of Chicago Library collection houses eight hundred twenty seven of Hutchins' speeches delivered from ^See Appendix B, p. 580. 351 352 1921 to 1951. Approximately ten per cent of these were extemporaneous and the remainder were available in the verbatim text which Hutchins read from manuscript. The time interim stretched from June 21, 1921, the date of Hutchins’ valedictory speech, to June 17, 1951 when the Chancellor left the University of Chicago for his posi tion as Associate Director of the Ford Foundation. There are about thirty additional speeches available up to the end of 1955, the cut-off of the present study in a chrono logical sense. From the foregoing, it can be seen, Hutchins’ addresses have formed the flesh of his books and articles. Before a criticism of Hutchins’ methods of prepara tion is undertaken, one should consider the influences of his early speaking career which are indicated in Appendix B. These circumstances should be considered in relation to Chapter II in which the speaker's biography and ethos were analyzed. Robert Hutchins made his first speech at age four teen and found it a difficult experience. He began de bating at Oberlin and gave a commencement speech there, later continuing debate work at Yale University following service in World War I. His debate coach was John Chester Adams, a professor of English, and Hutchins never enrolled 353 2 in any formal speech classes. The "gadfly" of higher edu cation said that his teachers have served as "models or as horrible examples." Legal briefing also exerted some effect, though there is no indication of the specific nature of the result. Later experience on the University of Chicago Roundtable discussions may have contributed to the ability to adapt ideas to a radio audience. The development of the ideas of President Hutchins was greatly influenced by Mortimer Adler whom the speaker 3 met during the summer of 1927. In fact, Hutchins dedi cated a book to Adler who had a very deep effect on his philosophy.^ The liberal educator formed the philosophy for which he is internationally renown as an educational reformer by teaching the Great Books course with Adler for twenty years at Chicago. The impact of the ideas of Aristotle, Plato, and Thomas Aquinas have formed the philo sophic foundation for Hutchins. Charles Clark of the Yale Law School, Clarence Faust, Dean of the College, and Robert Redfield of Social 9 John William Vlandis, "Analysis and Criticism of Selected Speeches on Higher Education by Robert Maynard Hutchins as President of the University of Chicago" (un published Master's thesis, State University of Iowa, 1956), p. 15. ^"Worst Kind of Troublemaker," Time, 54:58, Novem ber 21, 1949. ^See Hutchins, St. Thomas and the World State (Milwaukee: Marquette Universit"y 'Press", 1949), and Appendix B, pp. 580-81. 354 Sciences at the latter institution helped modify the edu cational theories of Hutchins. The only American philoso pher other than Adler to make a philosophic impression was Alfred North Whitehead, though Hutchins dissents signi ficantly from his views. The general subject of the address is frequently 5 chosen by the demands of the audience. Otherwise, the speaker talked of matters currently on his mind. The con tent of the introduction, Hutchins admits, must attempt to make an abjective impression on the audience due to the "controversial" reputation attributed to him. Hutchins writes out his general ideas on a subject, typically in outline form, subsequently not referring to the notes or outline as he writes the draft out in full. Significantly, several sources indicate Hutchins has a photographic-type memory which perhaps aids him in recall ing the pattern of development as he writes the final draft.^ The speeches are easy to outline in their general nature. When Hutchins is composing rapidly, he writes about two hundred fifty words an hour. Thus, a short address such as "What Kind of Society Do We Want" [nine hundred and ninety words] would take a minimum of seven to ^Appendix B, p. 582. ^Comment of Charles E. Clark in interview with Vlandis, loc. cit. 355 eight hours to prepare because of the compact nature of the time limits. While a long speech, such as ’’Education and Independent Thought," would require about eighteen hours for completion. The organization of Hutchins' speeches apparently develops in outline fashion, usually with a modified type of problem-solution structure. Frequently there is a statement of the problem, immediately followed by the solu tion Hutchins advocates. There may be from two to four major ideas in a given speech, depending largely on the time limitations of the lecture. The tape-recorded inter view does not indicate any incisive answer regarding or ganization, except that Hutchins consciously does not employ a definite number of sub-heads in proving a proposi tion.^ Apparently Hutchins feels the organization of his lectures is the most difficult part of preparation because of the need for over-simplifying vast amounts of knowledge. A significant feature of the rhetoric of Hutchins is the style utilized. This is determined initially by the fact that the speaker feels more comfortable reading from manuscript to avoid excessive misquotation in the press. In addition, Hutchins knows in advance through the speaking invitation that his remarks will be published and he has ^Appendix B, p. 583. 356 had well over three hundred separate periodical articles Q printed during his career from 1925 to 1955. Hutchins prefers giving an extemporaneous address, although the nature of the occasion and the position of prestige from which he spoke as a reformer of higher education and a civil libertarian dictated careful stylistic preparation. Significantly, these circumstances have resulted in a compilation of seven drawers of vertical files for the Hutchins Papers in the William Rainey Harper Memorial Library on the University of Chicago campus. Perhaps the style of Hutchins gives considerable insight into the speaker's personality, in relation to the speaking situation. He concedes irony has been overworked as a stylistic device. Probably the use of irony has been a stylistic release for part of his feelings of failure in the attempt to reform American higher education. There is little question that Hutchins, the rationalist educator, uses too little emotional appeal for maximum persuasive ness. This, in turn, apparently results from a reaction to what Hutchins felt was too much pathetic appeal in the q preaching of his father and that of his grandfather.7 ^See Reuben Frodin, "Bibliography of Robert Maynard Hutchins, 1925-50," The Journal of General Education. 4:303-24, July, 1950. a Appendix B, p. 578. Milton Mayer, "Hutchins of Chicago," Harper's Magazine, 178:345, March, 1939. 357 What is the attitude of Hutchins regarding the teaching of speech courses? Nowhere does Hutchins ex plicitly state his opposition to the teaching of speech in the manner common to many colleges and universities today. The closest he comes to stating his position is in Appendix Here, he says the ideal speaker should "get the best education" and then practice speaking. Signi ficantly, the University of Chicago does not contain a Department of Speech. Yet there is a parallel to the view of Hutchins concerning the teaching of speech and that of Plato. The closest analogy made by Hutchins is that con cerning journalism: The first question we must ask about activity con ducted in the educational system is: Has it intel lectual content, and has it such in its own right? If the activity has not intellectual content, it does not belong in education. . . . For example, journalism as such has no intellectual content in its own right. It is an occupation that demands intellectual training and intellectual power. These qualifications may be obtained, in so far as an educational program can supply them, in a good college of liberal arts. I estimate that 85 per cent of the curriculum in schools of journalism is an inadequate imitation of the program in liberal arts. . . . A comparison of this type of education and the ideal liberal education is quite clear. •^Appendix b , pp. 581-82. • ^The University of Utopia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 38. 358 In the West this education has gone by the name of liberal education. It has consisted of the liberal arts of reading, writing, listening, speaking, and figuring, and of the intellectual and artistic tradi tion we inherit. . . . * * * 2 In other words, there is a very definite emphasis on the idea of skilled speaking, however, it is not learned through the techniques without the concomitant intellectual content. The Hutchins delivery.--The criticism of Hutchins’ delivery in the succeeding pages is based on my personal observation of the speaker unless otherwise shown by foot notes to the evaluations of others. I heard the ’ ’gadfly" of higher education speak on seven different occasions during the December, 1952 to June, 1959 period. In addi tion, I observed Hutchins speak on television two times. The personal appearance lectures were given before civil liberty supporters, three layman audiences at the Modern Forum in Beverly Hills High School Auditorium, to teachers at Pasadena City College, to graduate students and faculty at the University of Southern California, and for the Com mencement of Los Angeles City College. The Pasadena City College speech was extemporaneous and will be criticized in the concluding paragraphs of this section. All of the remaining addresses were read from manuscripts. 1 7 The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p." 80. 359 The analysis of the speaker's delivery is based on 13 the criteria suggested by Thonssen and Baird. The method of delivery, physical factors conducive to effectiveness, bodily action, and the voice as an instrument of persuasion were considered. The description of the speaker by John R. Tunis appears accurate: . . . When you first see him, you think he’s too good- looking to be intelligent.^ To be anything but a movie star. Watching him in action, on a platform of pro fessional educators, he stands out like Radio City. He has something to say and, when he speaks, American edu cation listens whether it wants to or not.14 The liberal educator shows slight tendencies toward nervousness before the speech while he awaits the movement to the speaker's stand. Hutchins moves his hands slightly, though his fingers are normally laced together before and during much of the address. Sometimes prior to his remarks there is some drumming with his fingers. Dwight Macdonald, a critic formerly on The New Yorker staff mentions the 15 Hutchins "Olympian brow." Hutchins occasionally raises his massive eyebrows to acknowledge someone in the front of Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 435 ff. ^"Who Should Go to College?" Ladies' Home Journal, 55:23, September, 1938. ~^The Ford Foundation, The Men and the Millions (New York: Reynal Company, Inc., 1956), pi SlTI 360 the audience while he sits waiting on the platform, or he uses his brows to emphasize an important idea. He admits to nervousness before his speeches, but even from the plat form on which he spoke, there was no overt indication of it in the Los Angeles City College performance. Hutchins towers above the rostrum, usually attired in a dark blue suit. He gestures with both hands just above the speaker's stand, but his reliance is primarily on the left hand for this purpose. Most gestures are about waist level and are kept close in toward his body. The percentage of time spent with eye contact on the audience varies typically from about fifty to seventy. It comes in short, frequent spurts, as the triple-spaced manuscript is read with the aid of horn-rimmed glasses. Occasionally there is a wrinkling of the forehead as Hutchins emphasizes a point. Don Eddy says the facial expression gives a subtle indication of the Hutchins rhetoric. . . . A large share of his rhetoric lies in facial ex pressions: A subtle but unmistakable indication of whether his words are to be taken literally or figura tively is apt to be conveyed by a twinkle, a lifted brow, a faraway glance, or a rasp of the voice. But whatever the explanation, he has a magnificent gift for antagonizing humorless people who believe majestic problems should be approached with reverent solemnity. To a few, he appears to wear the divine mantle of an Old Testament prophet; to most, he is.a lonely voice crying in a wilderness of preoccupation. - * - 6"Dr. Hutchins Rebel of Education," Coronet. 25:168, March, 1949. 361 While interviewing Hutchins concerning loyalty oaths for teachers, Horace B. Powell of The Kansas Teacher, . described the "indignation in his eyes" when he talked to 17 him. The glow of his eyes and his facial expressions are great assets for his platform appearances according to A. Craig Baird.^ Baird comments, "Not the least of Mr. Hutchins’ skills has been his decisive and mature delivery. He is completely at home with audiences and 19 knows how to influence them." Vocal variety is extremely good when Hutchins re cites dialogue. It comes from variations in pitch, loud ness, and prolongation. A few pauses break the monotony and emphasize major transitions. Final words in phrases are frequently emphasized by greater volume and higher pitch. Emotion is manifested by a heightened volume and rate. The address at Pasadena City College was extempo raneous, as Hutchins later indicated. He appeared to be reading from manuscript, but was actually speaking extempo raneously at the request of his wife who was in the audi ence. She prefers this type of delivery, however, Hutchins ■^Hutchins, "Thought Control for Teachers," Wisconsin Journal of Education, 82:3, October, 1949. ■^Vlandis, op. cit., p. 91. 19 ^Representative American Speeches: 1942-1943 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1943), XVI, 235. 362 20 likes manuscript better to avoid greater misquotation. His competent friends tell him that he is more effective in the extempore style. The Pasadena occasion was a teacher institute at four o’clock in the afternoon and about ten per cent of the audience was asleep. Hutchins said it was "too bad" that the candidate had heard the speech. The delivery is the most effective in the forum period where Hutchins demonstrates his greatest skill. His sense of humor combines itself with a more varied vocal pattern manifesting greater conversational qualities. His bass voice also carries his ridicule exceptionally well. He answers questions succinctly and without any hesitancy, while maintaining a bearing showing a good deal of con fidence. Then too, he knows that the person asking the question is definitely interested in what he has to say on the issue. Hutchins says he would never make a speech if he had his preference, because he desires to answer ques- 71 tions. Hutchins on television.--The President of the Fund for the Republic appeared on the Mike Wallace interview of July 20, 1958 where the television cameras showed his 20 Conference with Mr. Hutchins in Pasadena on December 28, 1954. 71 Cf. the "Rehearsal and Delivery" section of Appendix B. 363 facial expression in great detail. He was seated and gestured with the right hand compared to left hand gestures in his speeches. He still fidgets with his hands as a manifestation of nervousness, or holds them folded. His hair is curly and the profile is excellent, showing the cleft in his chin. While speaking in the close-up shots his head moves far enough to get partially off the screen at times. The speaker's mouth is large and the eyebrows give a good deal of expression and emphasis to the delivery. Facial expression is more mobile than in per sonal appearances. The speaker appeared to be at ease in the choice of words, though there were almost imperceptible pauses in which "uh" was heard several times. These in stances did not in any way distract from the sense of the ideas and the content came through in simple, clear terms. Style in the Addresses Robert Hutchins delivers over ninety per cent of his speeches from manuscript, which permits a skilled and polished preparation. His lectures are usually written with the advance information that they will be published after they are presented. One of Hutchins' most prominent abilities in rhetoric is his language choice. Robert Hutchins' speaking style was nurtured in his home in an atmosphere of discussion, especially so, since his father was a professor and a minister. From his senior 364 year onward to his law degree, legal training assisted Hutchins in developing a concise style. His father had won the DeForest prize for writing, as did Robert. Debating at Yale under the direction of John Chester Adams, a professor of English, also sharpened his style. Hutchins enrolled in no formal speech classes.^ He reflected considerable 23 luster in public speaking while at Yale. The brilliant young law professor first began his teaching career at Lake Placid, New York, teaching history and English. Professor John U. Nef of the University of Chicago explained this experience helped him achieve the "habit of clear and forceful writing and speech, lightened by the charm of apt anecdote." His writing is marked by "a terse inevitability . . . with a moral integrity per sonal to him. His teaching was combined with law school and in 1922 he was appointed Secretary of Yale University. The major function was to make speeches raising funds for the university. This secretariat was later combined with a professorship in law, and culminated in the position of Dean of Law. Judge Charles E. Clark, an influential Yale 22 Vlandis, op. cit., pp. 14-15. ^Adolph E. Meyer, "Hutchins of Chicago Univer sity," American Mercury, 58:450-57, April, 1944. 24 "The University of Chicago and the World, 1929- 1951," The Review of Politics, 13:408, October, 1951. 365 Law Professor to whom The Higher Learning in America is dedicated, said Hutchins was always in a hurry and covered only the high spots thoroughly. Clark said Hutchins "care- 25 fully prepared and memorized" his speeches. Clark re ported he writes lucidly and simply, but is difficult to understand because he uses words and ideas discarded O £ c enturie s ago.^ ° Hutchins writes "some of the sharpest prose in 27 America" according to Justice Holmes. News analyst Chet Huntley describes a Hutchins letter written to Time in no November, 1955 as "good prose." Philosopher Thomas V. Smith of the University of Chicago, a dedicated philoso phical opponent of Hutchins, says his speeches are prepared with care, "especially as to style." His style is "heavily touched with the facetious" and Hutchins can "so stylize thought as to give its expression the semblance of liquid ized action." The speeches are "cleverly articulate, 29 pungently brief, and unapologetically bold." Hutchins 25 Vlandis, op. cit.. pp. 15, 87. ^Harper's Magazine, March, 1939, p. 348. 27Xbid. ^NBC-TV Interview between Chet Huntley and Robert Hutchins, December 18, 1955. Transcript furnished by courtesy of NBC-TV. ^ T . V. Smith, "The Chicago School," The Inter national Journal of Ethics. 46:378-79, April, 1936. 366 connects his desire for action with the skill in style mentioned by Smith. The frequent use of irony by the educational re former is significant. Perhaps an explanation is that Hutchins finds it difficult to accommodate his uncommon 30 ideas to audiences by "talking down" to them. Since he finds it hard to find common terms for the audience, "he 31 resorts to his peculiar sharp humor." Probably his belief in developing the rational powers of man provides a rationale for the frequent use of irony or ridicule. This permits him to avoid the emotionalism he abhors, however, 32 it drains his speeches of much potential pathetic appeal. A significant factor in the development of the style demonstrated by Hutchins is his extensive writing. His first article appeared in 1925 and within fifteen years he had written one hundred forty nine. At age fifty five, the period at which the present study stops, Hutchins has published well over three hundred articles and authored 33 nine books. This large body of published works afforded him an excellent opportunity to refine his skillful use 30 Milton Mayer, "Hutchins of Chicago," Harper* s Magazine, 173:549, April, 1939. ■^Eddy, loc. cit. on Cf. Harper * s Magaz ine, March, 1939, p. 345. ■^Frodin, loc. cit. of style. Hutchins, an ’’adroit phrasemaker,” possesses a "crusading sarcasm, cold evangelism, and imprudent hu- 34 mility." His way of saying what he means involves such violence and hyperbole that the effect on most people ranges from flat misunderstanding to gaseous confusion. Simple and direct, his language nevertheless requires translation in an age which is hearing a philosophical barker for the first time.-^ Additional comment is in order on the continuous overstatement evident in Hutchins’ speaking and writing. President Harold Taylor of Sarah Lawrence College in his review of The University of Utopia and The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society voiced the same criti cism. A graduate of the University of Chicago who is a professor of Philosophy concurred that Hutchins does generalize excessively and may do it for effect, however, he believed this did communicate the main arguments to 37 1ayman audienc es. ^Milton S. Mayer, "Rapidly Aging Young Man," The Forum and Century, 90:312-13, November, 1933. ^^Harper’s Magazine, April, 1939, p. 543. ■^"A Conservative Educator," The New Republic. 130:16-17, March 22, 1954. 37 Conference with Professor Robert Brackenbury of the School of Education at the University of Southern California, July 30, 1958. 368 George Ziegelmueller's outstanding study on Hutchins recorded the following conclusions on his style: The choice of words did not lend themselves to clarity. Words such as "grammar, rhetoric, and logic" were not appropriate to the occasion. Though he has a vigorous and concise style, the words employed were frequently not in common usage. Too many periodic sentences prevented a variety in sentence structure and there were no verbal em bellishments, such as figures of speech and tropes. Terms O O were frequently ambiguous and undefined. Stylistic criteria.--The study of style involves considerable complexity and for the purpose of this analysis has been partially over-simplified. Five stand ards for evaluating style provided an adequate basis for cogent criticism. They were adapted from Professor 39 Parrish's essay in American Speeches. The five standards used in this chapter follow: Was the style immediately clear to the audience? Was there sufficient vividness and vivacity to hold attention? Tech niques of retaining attention include the use of concrete ■^George William Ziegelraueller, "An Analysis of Selected Speeches by Robert Maynard Hutchins on Education" (unpublished Master's thesis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 1954), pp. 61-64, ^^Wayland Maxfield Parrish and Marie Hochmuth, American Speeches (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1954), pp. 17-19. 369 wording, illustrations, metaphors, rhetorical questions, parallelism, conciseness, contrasts, and variety. Was the style appropriate for the speaker, the audience, and the occasion? Was the style suitable for oral presentation? This is achieved by using personal pronouns, a simple sentence structure, and words and phrases which can be easily uttered. Finally, did the style possess sustained nobility and beauty which sometimes lifted the oratory into the realm of poetry? The most convenient, and probably the most thorough way of illustrating Hutchins' style is to apply one ele ment, e.g., immediate clarity and criticize it. This is done by citing specific speeches in the order in which they appear in Appendix A. Some classifications of style permit criticism of the entire group of addresses, rather than citations to all speeches. This appears to be the case for immediate clarity, the first stylistic component. Wherever appropriate, brief descriptions of the audience are provided. All citations to specific lines of speeches are made in the same manner as was used in Chapters III through V. Citations refer first to the speech, then to the exact lines. Five addresses were given before educators or stu dents. The "Proposition is Peace" was delivered before students, but was broadcast over the radio. "Education 370 and Independent Thought” and "The Fund for the Republic" were presented to laymen. "Freedom of the Press" was spoken from the platform at the convention of newspaper editors. "Reminiscences" contained the terms metaphysics, wisdom, goodness, and the good life, all of which are philosophical terms lacking in concreteness. Hutchins did not bother to define these words. Metaphysics is an exceedingly abstract word meaning the science of being and of first causes. It is not in the common vocabulary of most educators, many of whom are not steeped in philosophi cal understanding! Richard McKeon, Professor of Philosophy at Chicago and a close philosophic friend of Hutchins, says words like metaphysics and the trivium have sometimes betrayed him.^ Henry Canby says, "The word metaphysics has stuck in the crops of Mr. Hutchins' critics. The rest of the speech appears immediately clear to the student and faculty audience. "What Kind of Society Do We Want?" is understandable, except for the abstractness of a good and a bad society (11:94-100). Time limitations may have forced this in a short speech. ^"Education and the Disciplines," The Inter national Journal of Ethics, 47:381, April, 1937. ^"A Call for Aristotle," Saturday Review of Literature. 14:10, October 24, 1936. 371 The moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution is not nearly so clear as the juxtaposed scientific, tech nological, and economic revolution (V:99-103). The pos sible reason that Hutchins is not as easily comprehended in educational speeches is the nature of the speaking occasion as he sees it. He says the most important thing is to define the ideal in education, which he insists is rationality. Since education is a secondary subject, dependent upon philosophy, he attempts to give educational audiences the philosophical treatment. The terms are used, but are vague and abstract. By contrast, the layman speeches generally show excellent clarity throughout. Hutchins is quite concrete in all addresses, with the exceptions noted above. Vividness is the second quality of style and one of its constituents is conciseness. Henry Canby says The Higher Learning in America was too short for adequate com prehension due to conciseness, though Hutchins' arguments are "impeccable in outline.Hutchins is a master at terse style, which is particularly evident in "What Kind of Society Do We Want?" One characteristic in the speeches involving bedrock educational philosophy or civil liberty concepts is the vividness of the style. Vividness is / O Saturday Review of Literature, loc. cit. 372 brought about by the use of illustrations, analogies, parallelism, antitheses, and variety. "Reminiscences” is Hutchins’ most vivid address dealing solely with educational philosophy. He used trivi ality, vocationalism, obsolescent information, and con fusion as illustrations of the inadequacies in education, set in the framework of a parallelism (1:14-33). President Eliot of Harvard is described as a "criminal who applied his genius, skill, and longevity to robbing American youth of their cultural heritage" (1:172-75). Universities are "ineffectual trade schools . . . where nice boys have a nice time under the supervision of nice men in a nice en vironment" (1:195-97). Another illustration is the "progressivism, utilitarianism, and diffusion" which beset education" (1:629). When we have read all the "comic books, traveled all the miles, seen all the movies, and drunk all the liquor we can stand" is a graphic illustration (V:42-45). Adult education should not be for "third-rate bookkeepers who want to learn how to become second-rate bookkeepers" (V:215-16). Members of the faculty club are "composed of narrow departmental specialists engaged in training narrow departmental specialists" (V:263-65). One of the most vivid series of illustrations in a paragraph occurs in Hutchins' speech to the editors. 373 Guidance clinics, interference with travel, the Attorney- General* s list, censorship by the Post Office Department, the blacklist, wire-tapping, kept witnesses, and labeling people Fifth Amendment Communists are all encroachments on civil liberties (VIII:390-407). Hutchins says we are so afraid of ideas that we fear "people who associate with people who are said to have ideas" (VII:142-43). He describes empiricism facetiously as "the fountain head of the subversive tendencies now engulfing the country" (VII: 243-44). Probably the most vivid of Hutchins* recent speeches is the one given before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Should the community have several papers to offer "a greater variety of comic strips, break fast menus, and cheesecake" (VIII:139-41)? In one-paper towns "the debate has become a soliloquy" (VIII:159-60). "Television and suburbanization are driving ahead fast" (VIII:223-24). A good paper may be deficient in "astrolo gy, menus, comics, cheesecake, crime, and Republican propa ganda" (VIII:288-89). Perhaps Hutchins is particularly sarcastic in this address because the editors had not established an independent agency to criticize the press as the Commission on Freedom of the Press, which he chaired, recommended. Parallelism and antithesis are the next facets of 374 style considered. The former is used occasionally to introduce paragraphs dealing with the same general theme (1:10-33) and (V:197-217). Generally Hutchins employs it in consecutive phrases. Cumulative effect is obtained in "before the depression, before the New Deal, before the Newspaper Guild, before the suburbs, before they charged for newsprint, before the atom, and before television" (VIII:4-7). A poetic parallelism is "the choice between co-existence and no existence, the choice between . . . purchase and intimidation . . ., the choice between com peting nationalism and world law" (VIII:375-79). Antitheses are found in the speeches frequently. Impoverishment, terror, and suppression are results when freedom from want and fear are desired, plus freedom of worship and speech (111:200-203). Blind faith and blind rage are compared in one speech (IV:259-60). Editors con fuse their private interests and those of the public (VIII:70-71). The cash return of the papers is compared with the content (VIII:175). Hutchins does not rely on antitheses to any appreciable extent in his addresses. Several miscellaneous attention-holding devices are ,found in the speeches. The magic three or four are evident many times. Hutchins is interested in education, morals, intellect, and metaphysics (1:101-102). His magic three par excellence is "moral, intellectual, and spiritual," 375 which goes to the depth of his philosophy (1:128-29). Many times the attack on aimlessness in education is worded in "triviality, mediocrity, and vocationalism" (1:207-208). This device occurs in atypical frequency in "Reminis cences." "Geographical, military, and psychological" is another magic three (V:16). We must "understand the nature, the works, and the destiny of man" (V:397-98). Guilt by association is attacked because the beliefs and activities of one’s "relatives, associates, and acquaint ances" are irrelevant (VI:288-89). Investigations into alleged Communism should not open "unmapped areas of in vestigation, recrimination, and confusion" (VII:224-25). Alliteration is another component of style. The "menace of metaphysics" (1:84), "a superficial shower from a survey course" (1:556-57), and "the merest moron" are examples (VIII:136). The curriculum is described as "a medley of miscellaneous courses" (IV:89). "The check of competition can of course" (VIII:225-26) and "sonorous sentences" are additional adroit phrases (VIII:365). Yet, none of these alliterations are found frequently enough to reduce their effectiveness. Rhetorical questions are the last element con sidered here which relate to vividness. Some are used in "Reminiscences" (I:139-43, 387-93, 555, and 612). A series 376 of rhetorical questions communicates Hutchins' ideas exceptionally well (11:37-48). Doubt about the desira bility of going to war is expressed as the opening sentence in several of the paragraphs in "The Proposition is Peace" (111:77, 101, 111, 143). Many more rhetorical questions occur in this address than is typical. Four successive questions are persuasively worded (IV:336-45). There are almost no questions in another speech delivered to laymen (VI:511-13). Only three instances are evident in the speech for newspaper editors (VIII:10, 104-105, 372-80). Hutchins attains vividness through frequent irony; in fact, it is a unique quality of his language usage. He possesses an outstanding sense of humor, both latent and / *5 overt. The "devil's advocate" in higher education com bines his humor with an impatience for improvement in the intellectual aspects of education, at the same time he demonstrates considerable bitterness. This combination of "a delightful humor with wholesome hard hitting"^ makes 45 him "an irritant, never a sedative." Occasionally there is some hyperbole. ^ Representative American Speeches: 1942-1943. loc. cit. ^^Margaret Meagher, "Education on its Deathbed," The Catholic World, 159:335, July, 1944. ^Dixon Wecter, "Can Metaphysics Save the World?" Saturday Review of Literature, 31:7, April 10, 1948. 377 An author who agrees with Hutchins regarding intel lectual honesty, the ability to think clearly, and the moral qualities is labeled "subversive" (1:55). Hutchins is "a university president guilty of moral idealism" (1:64) and the term "’logical1 is a term of reproach" (1:71-72). A president believing in moral idealism "must expect the severest condemnation from those who have the true inter ests of our country at heart" (1:80-82). The defense against the attacks on metaphysics as a unifier of the university is made in these ironic words. "Knowing that there is nothing true unless experimental science makes it so, the wise man knows that metaphysics is simply a technical name for superstition" (1:98-99). Chaos is so rampant in higher education that only a bright man can get "an education he wouldn't really need" (1:181-82). Ridicule forms the basis of the statement that Hutchins' curriculum "is difficult for the professors but not for the students" (1:444). Hutchins testifies, though not "very scientifically," that students thrive on the Great Books (1:474-75). "Reminiscences" is unquestion ably one of his most sarcastic and important educational speeches. "Everyone's opinion is as good as everyone else's .opinion" (11:17-18). Large amounts of ridicule concerning relativism in pragmatic education is found in two l 378 successive paragraphs (II j37-48). Only one instance of irony is located in a radio address (111:162-63). A war time course in "wild turkey hunting" is ridiculed as a dilution of an accelerated curriculum (IV:185). "What was important was not what went on in the school, but the fact that the pupils had been there" is an attempt to achieve irony in attacking the absence of a sound curriculum (V:88-90). Vocational education is satirized in another paragraph (V:217-32). A liberal arts college "usually denotes an institution in which the liberal arts are not taught" (V:236-37). During a Cold War "the country often goes into an ecstasy of tribal self-adoration" (VI:13-14). Some pro fessors "may incorrectly be suspected of the ability to think" is a sarcastic reference to faculty members who do not illuminate the frontiers of knowledge (VI:165-66). There is much emotional content in the statement "the in finite proliferation of courses is repulsive" (VI:580-81). Hutchins says the country could build a sound edu cational system "with half of the energy we have put into being scared to death" by charges of alleged subversion in the schools (VII:113-14). "The appraisal of courses of study or of the performance of teachers is a professional job, not to be undertaken by the naive and unskilled" politicians (VII:292-94). 379 The speech containing concentrated irony and ridicule (contemptuous banter) was delivered to newspaper editors. The former is shown in the assertion that nothing professors said about newspapers was of importance, "al though it might be dangerous" in the views of the editors (VIII:44-45). "I hope you will read" the Report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press sometime (VIII:51). Life has been hard for you lately and may get worse, for "reading is an anachronism" (VIII:87). Looking and listen ing to television is easier than reading newspapers (VIII: 85-105). Gardner Cowles’ opinion as an owner of news papers, "that sensationalism and entertainment are not good for business" is really ironic according to Hutchins. "What can be done to save [publishers’] freedom from the consequences of their irresponsibility?" The foundations of the Christian Science Monitor are in heaven, thus even an endowed paper will not follow its example (VIII:248-54). The bitter taunt in that paragraph is openly indicated! "A publisher's willingness to establish a trust shows that he could be trusted without it" consists of much irony (VIII:275-76). Much ridicule is found in two key statements. "You have watched the erosion of freedom without a twinge" (VIII:383-84). "You are educators, whether you like it or not" (VIII:408). 380 Hutchins is censorious of the statesmen, columnists, and commentators whose "hustle and bustle . . . of cleans ing the Commonwealth of influences that threaten the posi tions on which they have built their reputations" (IX: 20-23). He ironically describes numerous reputable groups as "conspiratorial agencies" (IX:111). One "does not have to take the word of legislative committees about the prevalence of witches" (IX:300-302). The rather complete cross-section of Hutchins' irony, ridicule, and sarcasm drawn from the speeches indi cates its frequency. He admits the device is employed too often,^ yet one can conclude it is an effective means of communicating both his ideas and his emotional feelings toward events. The total impact of the speeches does not appear to suffer from this concentration of irony and ridicule. The third major criticism of style is the appropri ateness of the language for the speaker, audience, and the occasion. The evaluations made here follow the topical sequence of war and education, civil liberties, and edu cational speeches respectively. "The Proposition is Peace" was given in Rockefeller Chapel at the University of Chicago and broadcast over ^See Appendix B. 381 radio. The language is simple and generally well adapted to a radio audience, as well to the immediate auditors who were students and their relatives. Vague phrases such as the "good life and the just society" and "barren cul tural, intellectual, and spiritual wastes" were not de tailed. It appears that they are too high on the abstrac tion ladder for concrete understanding. There is little emotional appeal, which is peculiar to the Hutchins rationalist philosophy. The speech is an apparent attempt to get the audience to consider the alternatives to war objectively. Yet the style did result in hundreds of letters sent to Hutchins, with a ratio of twenty two to one concurring with him.The general appeal must have caught the emotions of those opposed to United States' entry into the war. The faculty reaction is found in Chapter III.48 "The Issues in Education" is a contrast through its open appeal to an internationalist spirit, rather than an isolationist one. The relationship of leisure, world responsibilities, and the education of all adults is the significant content of the speech delivered to the American 4^The Hutchins Papers in William Rainey Harper Memorial Library at the University of Chicago contains twenty two manila folders sympathetic to the speech and one folder of critical letters. 48See Chapter III, pp. 95-113. i 382 Council on Education. The pathetic appeal is great in this address due to the urgency of the Hutchins message. The speech is a philosophic panorama demonstrating the place of education in a dynamic atomic era. The pathos is subtly suggested, not directly stated. However, there were no audience reactions available in the Chicago newspapers or in any educational journals. The persuasiveness seems to be strong in spite of the absence of response. The four civil liberty speeches present some of Hutchins' most complex thoughts. Some of his language in these addresses contains his most beautiful and noble passages, which are presented at the end of the section on A Q style. "Education and Independent Thought" is the crucial speech in this group, though no audience responses were reported in the Los Angeles area papers, although it was delivered in Santa Monica. It was therefore given before a layman audience. The vocabulary is commensurate with the intelligence of an above-average American layman. Hutchins was attempting to enlighten the general public about the relationship of the community and the univer- sity. w His arguments are especially cogent, although their origin lies deep in his philosophy of academic free dom. ^cf. post, pp. 390-392. ^ Freedom, Education, and the Fund (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p^ TT. 383 The general construct of the contentions is de finitely a rational appeal, but examples show the abbera- tions of contemporary society regarding intellectual freedom. These are effective pathetic means for advocating Hutchins' ideal university as a "center of independent thought and criticism." Guilt by association, a key basis for the dismissal of teachers, is described as "the creep ing miasma of intimidation" preparatory to thought control for all. It is a roadblock to "the progress of mankind." Social pressure must not inundate the independence of either the university or the individual, according to the civil libertarian. "Academic Freedom" was given as one of thirteen scholarly papers before the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia. The audience was probably erudite and the vocabulary is on a higher educa tional level than the previous speech. It is "the classi cal position on academic freedom . . . designed to show that this position is correct in any atmosphere, even in, 51 perhaps especially in, recent years." The former speech looks at the university from the perspective of the ideal community, while the latter shows the perspective from within the independent university not surrendering to ~*^Ibid., pp. 27-28. 384 ' external pressure groups. Though the Hutchins philosophy is built on the rationalism of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas,^ the tone of this address contains much emotional appeal through the illustrations used. The intrusions into the independence of the university and the encroachments of intellectual freedom generally are cited. The plea is for a reliance on laws to protect the integrity and independ ence of professors. "The Fund for the Republic" is not in the noble category of the two other academic freedom speeches. It is a rebuttal to "right-wing" critics of the Fund at the time. The speech was prepared for a layman group of the American Veterans Committee. Audience response was not available in the Washington papers. The major portion is almost ex pository in nature, while the last page and one-half is persuasive (IX:238-315). The language seems to be appro priate for the occasion at which Hutchins received the Bill of Rights award for upholding civil liberties. "Freedom of the Press" is the most colorful speech and was the keynote address at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The remarks held attention, however, there was rebuttal to Hutchins during ■^Maxine Greene, "Robert Maynard Hutchins, Crusad ing Metaphysician," School and Society, 83:162-63, May 12, 1956. 385 the question period.^ The attack of the intellectual indolence of the editors is indeed severe and demonstrates more pathetic appeal than any other speech criticized here. Hutchins feels very deeply that the news media are not meeting their essential function of enlightening people about current affairs. The outstanding characteristic of style in the speech is the series of illustrations running all through it showing where the press failed to meet its responsibilities. Nevertheless, the editors apparently have done nothing to correct the Hutchins criticisms since the speech. Maxine Greene describes the impact of Hutchins: . . . His fight against restrictions on freedom, visible as it is to vast audiences throughout the land, makes him a power in American education. His words makes a difference in the practical world; and few of us are anti-pragmatic enough to deny that significance. . . . In every one of his addresses he has something to say about education. This makes him, in a sense, the schoolmen's emissary to the outside world; and, if for this reason alone, attention must be paid. The fourth criterion of style is the oral nature or the "speak-ability" of the language. The use of simple c c sentences and personal pronouns are considered here. Good style, according to Thonssen and Baird, consists of “ *^See Chapter IV, pp. 222-226. ■^Greene, op. cit., p. 165. 55 American Speeches, p. 18. i 386 an interaction of periodic and balanced sentences. Peri odic sentences present the complete idea and grammatical structure only after the end of the sentence is reached and balanced sentences are compound, setting each other off or C £ answering each other. It was not feasible to examine all paragraphs in Hutchins’ addresses for the types of sentences. This appeared to be true particularly because the emphasis on the study explored style only as an element subordinate to ideas. Therefore, the medial paragraph in each page of Appendix A was analyzed to provide a consistent and de limiting factor. Where two paragraphs were both near the middle of the page, the larger of the two was criticized for a more adequate sample. The speeches on war and edu cation, civil liberties, and education are respectively examined. Hutchins' use of personal pronouns is considered as a corollary to the types of sentences employed. Gener alizations are made about each speech, even though all medial paragraphs were scrutinized. Sometimes specific examples are cited. ‘ 'The Proposition is Peace" contains mainly simple sentences, probably since it was a radio address. Approxi mately one eighth of the paragraphs show a periodic 5 6 Speech Criticism, p. 418. 387 sentence and "you" and "we" are the primary personal pronouns employed. The sentence structure appears to be easily understood due to its simplicity, with few of them longer than two lines. Only the occasional periodic sen tences show longer variations. The style is direct and to the point. Balanced sentences are limited to one or two. "The Issues in Education" demonstrates many more balanced sentences, perhaps due to the educator audience made up of the American Council on Education. The balanced type is found in about half of the paragraphs, while peri odic sentences are evident in nearly all of them. The length of all sentences is about the same as they were in "The Proposition is Peace." Hutchins does not use "I" in the paragraphs criticized. The clarity appears comparable to the previous speech in terms of sentence structure. The civil liberty speeches represent the most com plex Hutchins’ thoughts because they probe the relationship of the individual to society and its ideals. "Education and Independent Thought" was delivered to laymen. Though there are many simple sentences, the remainder are approxi mately equally distributed between periodic and balanced types within the sampled paragraphs. The former may have ireduced the clarity of expression, especially so, since some periodic ones were ten or eleven lines long (VI: 466-76, 517-26). Many sentences, even the simple ones, 388 exceed the two lines which were typical of the war speeches. However, the various types of sentences are well disbursed, which provide an effective variety. "I" is found frequently and gives a directness and personal flavor to the civil libertarian's ideas. "Academic Freedom" contains many simple sentences and a few more balanced sentences compared to those of a periodic nature. Only one long sentence of eight lines is found in these paragraphs (VII:259-65). Personal pronouns are abundant, particularly "I" and "we." The speech seems to be more clear than "Education and Independ ent Thought" because of the sentence simplicity, though it was presented to a scholarly audience. "Freedom and the Responsibility of the Press" was delivered to literate editors of the nation's newspapers. The address is a proportionate mixture of balanced and periodic sentences sprinkled between simple ones. Clarity mingled with the sarcastic tone is an outstanding attribute of the remarks. Certainly the listeners could understand the message, though they ignored the exhortations. This speech is more direct than most because of the many per sonal pronouns and their immediate applicability to the editor audience. "The Fund for the Republic" was delivered for lay men and shows only two or three balanced and periodic 389 sentences. The clarity is definite through the choice of sentences, most of which are simple. ''You," "he," and "I" are found in the sampled paragraphs and provide some directness, though not as much as in the remarks for the editors. The audience for the educational addresses was well-educated individuals. "Reminiscences" contains about one periodic sentence per paragraph and less than half that number of the balanced type. Typically the length is not more than two lines long. The personal pronoun utilized here is "I" and occurs more frequently than in any other speech. In fact, Hutchins' words are the supreme mani festation of his personal rationalist viewpoint in educa tional philosophy. If there is a lack of clarity in the style, it is due to the complexity of the educational philosophy and is not inherent in the sentence structure. Conciseness makes "What Kind of Society Do We Want?" more brief than the usual speech. There is a peri odic sentence in each paragraph analyzed and only one balanced sentence in the examined paragraphs. The struc ture of the sentences contributes to both clarity and brevity. Pronouns occur about once in a paragraph. "The University of Chicago and the Bachelor's Degree" is a symposium speech and contains nearly two periodic sentences in every criticized paragraph. These 390 presumably maintained the suspense of Hutchins' contro versial proposal to award the bachelor's degree at the end of the traditional sophomore year of college. Simple sen tences are the most common, and no balanced ones appear. Personal pronouns are largely absent apparently because Hutchins wished to appear detached in the presentation of his educational program. The ideas are cast in such form that easy understanding is assured. The final criterion of style is the sustained nobility and beauty of passages which lift the oratory into the realm of poetry. Brief sections are shown with a con cluding comment at the end of the total passages. * Hutchins describes the Great Books curriculum to the Columbia University audience: Those who think that this is a barren, arid pro gram, remote from real life and devoid of contemporary interest, have either never read the books or do not know how to teach. Or perhaps they have merely for gotten their youth. These books contain what the race regards as the permanent, abiding contributions its intellect and imagination have made. They deal with fundamental questions. . . . (1:477-84) Some of the moral fervor of Hutchins is contained in the restatement of his speech with a quotation adapted from Jacques Maritain. But I urge you to remember that if we would change the face of the earth, we must first change our habits; and that if educators would change the face of educa tion, they, too, must change their own habits. (11:111-14) 391 The ideals of humanity are held up by the speaker: . . . It is our task in this country to realize the true ideals of human life, the true organization of human society, the true democracy . . . based on the premise that society exists to promote the happiness of its members and that happiness consists in the development of the highest powers of men. . . . (111:362-69) Hutchins couples the framework of his second most important premise with world community and brotherhood. A world state demands a world community, a world community demands a world revolution, moral, intel lectual, and spiritual. World government is not a gadget, which in one easy motion will preserve mankind. It can live and last only as it institutionalizes the brotherhood of man. (V:124-29) The moral example the United States should set for the rest of the world is indicated. . . . Since the struggle in which we are engaged is one for the loyalty and adherence of mankind, the clarity and conviction with which we hold our own principles are at least as important as our military strength. The question of freedom of thought, speech, and associ ation is much more than an academic question. (VI: 423-29)- The relationship of rationalism and the function of the university is shown: The university should be the symbol of the highest powers and aspirations of mankind. Mankind aspires to achieve human felicity through the exercise of reason. Independent thought is the ultimate reliance of the race. Abandoning vanity and sham, the universities should dedicate themselves to their great symbolic task. Upon their performance of this task rests their claim to freedom. (VI:624-31) Some of Hutchins' sarcasm concerning the purpose of academic freedom is evident in this passage: 392 . . . Freedom of teaching and research will not survive unless the people understand why it should. They will not understand if there is no relation between the freedom that is claimed and the purpose it is supposed to serve. If the teacher of today is the nursemaid of yesterday, he does not need academic freedom--at least the nursemaid never did. (VII:398-404) Hutchins tells the newspaper editors what is their obligation in a democracy with the ideal of freedom of the press. Enlightenment means telling the people where they are in time and space. It means engaging in systematic criticism. The criticism of current affairs has to be made in the light of some standard. This must be something more than a set of partisan slogans. The standard by which the American press must judge current events is derived from ah understanding of and sympathy with the deepest aspirations of the American people, those for peace and freedom. . . . (VIII:419-27) The speaker states his philosophy in relating it to the fear evident during "McCarthyism." Our reliance is upon the intelligence and character of the independent individual. The greatest dangers to the ideals that we cherish are fear and conformity. Courage and independence are the best guarantees of freedom and justice. We cannot feel free and feel frightened. The motto of the Fund for the Republic is: Feel free. (IX:309-15) The passages of sustained nobility and beauty occur about once per speech, but there are none in "The Univer sity of Chicago and the Bachelor's Degree" because it was a symposium address. The sustained nobility presents it self in the fundamental issues and not too frequently in the choice of pathetic appeals. An illustration is the description of the ideals of humanity (111:362-69). i 393 Sometimes the beautiful sentiments conclude the speech and carry considerable emotional appeal. This is evident in the paragraph stating the task of the university (VI: 624-31). Hutchins prepares his speeches carefully, since they are almost always read from manuscript. The moral fervor of his philosophy and his position of prestige blend in well to achieve thoughts in the poetic realm. His own rationalist philosophy and his abhorrence for emotionalism prevent excessive pathos. The extract from Maritain (11:111-14) regarding world government and institutional izing the brotherhood of man (V:124-29) shows Hutchins’ rhetoric in operation in its most sensitive and subtle state. It seems probable that if his speeches are remem bered, it will be due to the universal issues with which he dealt, rather than the wording of them. It is quite clear that his poetic utterances relate to academic freedom, justice, rationality, and the intellectual tradition. A summary of the Hutchins style.--Robert Hutchins delivers most of his addresses from a manuscript and the practice results in an outstanding style. Hutchins' style is immediately clear, with the exception of words such as metaphysics, the good life, or the moral, intellectual and spiritual revolution. The element in which the speaker excels most is 394 vividness. This is achieved through terseness, many illus trations, some alliteration, very few antitheses, some parallelism, and rhetorical questions. The most unique quality of Hutchins’ style is the frequent use of irony, perhaps too much for maximum effectiveness. This tends to express his logic and humor to a great extent, and appears to mirror his personality accurately. Another very skilled device found often in the addresses is the magic three or four. The "speak-ability" of the speeches seems to be adequate. There are many periodic sentences, particularly in the civil liberty addresses. Also there are numerous simple sentences and a few of the balanced type. There is a modest amount of personal pronouns such as you, we, and I. The sustained beauty and poetry of the rhetoric is evident about one paragraph per speech, achieved primarily through the discussion of eternal ideals that are mani fested in a subtle pathetic appeal. The choice of words is excellent for the moral fervor of the crusading meta physician. Hutchins is often quoted due to his skill in the use of style. The Organization of Hutchins’ Speeches Robert Hutchins says "the most difficult thing about speaking, at least for me, is the matter of 395 organization." Notes form the basis of the first frag mentary draft which is converted into outline form as the first draft is composed.^ Hutchins has an exceptionally good memory according to his former professor and can 58 memorize a page practically at a glance. This may ex plain his not referring to the original notes as he out lines the speech for the complete first draft. The introduction in the addresses is Hutchins’ customarily abrupt contact with the audience, typically consuming only a paragraph of about eight lines. The only long introduction is "The Proposition is Peace" delivered over radio where the introduction runs four paragraphs. All other speeches manifest a one paragraph introduction, perhaps indicating the brevity of the speaker's remarks, just as his correspondence demonstrates the same terseness. There is one general variation on the introduction through the use of a preview, usually containing the two main points found in the body. "What Kind of Society Do We Want?" "The University of Chicago and the Bachelor's Degree," and "The Issues in Education" are in this cate gory. Occasionally the first main point of the body is stated deductively as in "Education and Independent -^See Appendix B, p. 582. -*^See Vlandis, op. cit. . pp. 86-87. 396 Thought” and "Academic Freedom." The pattern of the introduction evidences no typical difference between edu cator and layman audiences. Hutchins typically has two major ideas in the body of his speeches, though the sub-points may vary from four to eight supporting each. "Reminiscences" deviates from the usual by containing four main ideas, which may be due to the complexity of the educational philosophy the speaker was enunciating, plus its being a long speech. "The Issues in Education" and "Independent Thought" have a good deal more supporting points under the main ones, probably due to the extremely complex nature of the ideas contained there in. The speaker apparently employs no special types of organization such as stock outlines. His ideas are de veloped in rather clear-cut outline fashion and it is not difficult to outline the remarks. The general nature can be classed as a problem-solution type. In fact, Hutchins outlines his ideas as he writes the draft, which is in essence really a revised copy several drafts removed from the original notes which started the formulation of the speech. His brilliant analytical and reasoning ability imanifest themselves in a smooth-flowing, logical stream of thought. The topics are organized in the sequence of the subject matter, not in a mechanical organizational form. 397 Frequent summaries, restatement, and transitions assist in the clarity of the organization and reinforce the thought content. The conclusion is nearly always one paragraph and it often contains a maximum amount of pathetic appeal, affording an excellent climax. The delivery of the con clusion is frequently so abrupt that it is a surprise to realize Hutchins is through, but this does not show in the manuscript itself. Variation from the length in the con clusion is found in "The Proposition is Peace" of three paragraphs and the symposium speech "The University of Chicago and the Bachelor’s Degree" of two paragraphs. A short conclusion will vary from four to ten lines, while a long one may take about half a page of manuscript. Summing up, it can safely be stated that no one has accused Hutchins of delivering disorganized speeches. They are built on a tight logical framework embracing the topic under discussion. The problem is stated, following im mediately by broad suggestions for the solution. The ideas flow easily and evenly along, with an excellent lubricant of restatement and transition at appropriate places. The ,introduction and conclusion are typically very brief and !the body often provides two main ideas supported by from four to eight subordinate points. 398 A Content Analysis of the Forms of Support This section contains a content analysis of the nine selected addresses of Hutchins. Content analysis is defined by Irving L. Janis in the following terms: "Content analysis" may be defined as referring to any technique a) for the classification of the sign- vehicles b) which relies solely upon the judgments (which, theoretically, may range from perceptual dis crimination to sheer guesses) of an analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles fall into catego ries, c) on the basis of explicitly formulated rules, d) provided that the analyst's judgments are regarded as the reports of a scientific observer.59 The initial problems of any attempt to apply con tent analysis to any body of materials is the determination of reliability and validity. To what extent do the data "remain constant throughout variations in the measuring process?"^ Would another analyst get the same results as the original investigator? If he does, there is said to be a high degree of reliability in the judgments of content made by the first analyst. To what extent do the results of content analysis constitute an accurate measurement of the content? See Chapter IV, "The Problem of Validating Con tent Analysis" in Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and Associates, Language of Politics (New York: George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949), p. 55. ^ Ibid., Abraham Kaplan and Joseph M. Goldsen, "The Reliability of Content Analysis Categories," Chapter V, p. 84. 399 Validity is indicated if the measuring instrument, e.g., the form of support, "measures what it purports to measure; it is said to have reliability if it gives the same results 61 consistently." Categories and units must be carefully 69 defined for maximum validity. The problem of validity "translates itself into a matter of definition . . . reliability in content analysis is almost synonymous with obi ectivity. . . ."63 A common classification of content employed in the field of Speech is known as a form of support. For the purposes of the present study the categories provided by Alan Monroe appear satisfactory.^ They are widely used in the profession and provide precision in definition. The nine speeches have been examined to determine the types and proportions of the various forms of support used by Hutchins. Each paragraph of every address was analyzed to ascertain the type of evidence therein. The paragraph, ^Ibid., Irving L. Janis, "The Problem of Vali dating Content Analysis," Chapter IV, p. 58. 69 Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communica tion Research (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), p. 125. ^W. Charles Redding, "A Methodical Study of 'Rhetorical Postulates,1 applied to a Content Analysis of the 1944 Campaign Speeches of Dewey and Roosevelt" (unpub lished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern Cali fornia, Los Angeles, 1957), pp. 1239-40. ^Principles and Types of Speech (Chicago: Scott Foresman and Company^ 1955), pp. 222-34. l 400 as utilized by Redding, constitutes the basic recording unit.^ Records were kept of times a given support, e.g., illustration, was used in the speech. These frequency recordings were compiled into the raw data, or total Sup- port Counts. Because the paragraph constituted the basic recording unit, it was not considered significant if the same type of support appeared more than once in the record ing unit. That form of support was given a raw data value, 66 or Support Count of one (1). The proportion of each form of support in relation to the total number of paragraphs is designated Support Density. Thus, Illustration occurred in thirty two of the forty paragraphs in "Reminiscences." This represents a Support Density of eighty per cent, indicating that illus tration is contained in eighty per cent of the paragraphs. The terms Support Counts and Support Densities are adapted 67 from the Redding study mentioned above. The Support Densities are presented in graphic form in pages 405 to 421. Significance of the forms of the support.--Ideas are demonstrated by evidence which amplifies, clarifies, or ^Redding, op. cit., pp. 1239-40. 66Ibid., pp. 1236-37. 67Ibid.. Chapter IV, pp. 1450-53. 401 proves the main arguments or points. Thus, the frequency of varying types of evidence may have a significant bearing on the validity of the arguments presented. The present chapter does not attempt to test this validity, but rather to describe in proportion the emphasis given to each form of support in a given address. The importance of the present chapter is in showing the trends of the various forms of support in each speech and in the addresses in toto.^ Definition of the forms of support.--Monroe lists seven forms of verbal support, for which a condensed ver sion of his definitions follow.^® Explanation is a "simple, concise exposition, setting forth the relation between a whole and its parts or making clear an obscure term.1 1 Explanation frequently in cludes other forms of support within it. Analogy or comparison is "pointing out similarities between that which is already known, or believed, and that which is not." An illustration is a detailed "example of the idea or statement to be supported." A factual illustration ^Monroe, op. cit. , p. 221. ^Redding, op. cit., p. 1190. ^Monroe, op. cit. , pp. 221-34. 402 :tells a story and the details are "vividly described." The hypothetical illustration is an imaginary narrative, but it must be consistent with the known facts. Specific instances are condensed forms of the factual illustrations or undetailed examples. Statistics are numbers which are compared to show the relationship of two or more quantities. Testimony is usually the quotation of someone alleged to be expert. Restatement "consists of saying the same thing, but saying it in a different way." Procedure for reliability in content analysis.--The reliability problem in content analysis is characterized by the difficulty of setting up categories (forms of supports) which yield consistent results. Consistent results may be obtained by repetition of the process by the same investi gator, or by verifying the data through utilizing several 71 analysts. The latter method was not feasible, thus the study included two separate analyses by the investigator of the forms of support found in the Hutchins speeches. The first analysis was completed before an in tensive criticism of the organization of the addresses and t ^See Chapter V, "The Reliability of Content Analysis Categories," by Abraham Kaplan and Joseph M. Goldsen in Language of Politics, p. 83. 403 the detailed investigation of the reasoning was made. Only the premises of the speeches had been isolated prior to the first analysis. The second analysis was performed some four months after the first analysis and followed a rather intensive examination of the relation between the main contentions and the detailed supports. Since it was dis covered that illustration was the type of evidence most frequently used, it was especially important to consider the total elements of proof in relation to the major con tentions of the speaker. The comparison of the specific percentage of supports on the first and second analysis is shown below: First Analysis Second Analysis Differer Explanation 29% 37% + 8 Analogy 33 17 -16 Illustration 72 86 +14 Specific Instance 16 29 +13 Statistics 4 5 + 1 Testimony 20 22 + 2 Restatement 21 13 - 8 The advantage of performing a second content analysis is that it sharpens the definitions of the cate gories used, in this instance the forms of support. Greater reliability is also a consequence. The proportion 404 of two forms of support shifted considerably in the second analysis when compared to the first. Analogy and comparison, following the classifica tion of Monroe, were considered one type of support in the first analysis. The second analysis was done considering analogy only as a single category. This resulted in a more clear definition of that support category. Consequently, a shift occurred in the second analysis with analogy de creasing sixteen per cent; illustration increased fourteen per cent, mainly because of the apparent inclusion of com parison in the illustration group. The categories were more clearly delineated in the second analysis because the premises in the speeches were carefully analyzed in their relationship to the supports. The combination of a greater familiarity with the whole address and the supporting evidence united to form a more accurate analy.sis of the Support Counts. Figure 1 indicates the descending rank order of Support Densities employed in all the speeches given by Hutchins. The Support Density, it will be remembered, is the percentage of times a particular support occurs in the : speeches relative to the total number of paragraphs in the ; address. In Figure 1 the densities represent the occur rence of a form of support relative to all nine addresses in toto. 405 Supports Illustration Explanation Specific Instance 29 Testimony Analogy Restatement Statistics Cent I Fig. 1. Descending rank order of the j forms of support used by Hutchins in nine j selected speeches. " Reminiscences'' 406 Figure 2 shows Illustration, the favorite support of Hutchins, was evident in eighty per cent of the para graphs, compared with the average of eighty six in all speeches. He often uses deductive evidence, however, here it is modified to largely empirical proof since the "Deweyites" favor this method. His ideas could be easily illustrated by this type of evidence and it is especially significant that analogy is used over twice as much in the speech as is typical. Perhaps the analogies were a simpli fied form of proof used in a complex subject. The audience was composed of Teachers College faculty and students and this may have accounted for slightly less explanation than a typical address of Hutchins does. Statistics, testimony, and specific in stances are in about the same proportion as is usual. Re statement occurs somewhat more frequently, possibly due to the complexity of the educational ideas. "What Kind of Society Do We Want?" Figure 3 shows the next Support Densities. This speech is unique in its brevity. The University of Chicago Library script was missing, therefore, no check on textual authenticity was available. Illustration is reduced by twenty four per cent, while explanation remains constant. 407 Supports Per Cent Explanation 33 Analogy 43 Illustration 80 Specific Instance 35 Statistics Testimony 25 Restatement 20 Fig. 2. Reminiscences Note: Delivered before faculty and students at Columbia University on April 25, 1940. 100 408 Supports Explanation Analogy Illustration Specific Instance 15 Statistics Testimony Restatement 60 80 100 Fig. 3. What kind of society do we want? Note: Delivered before the American Association for Adult Education at the Hotel Astor in New York City on May 21, 1940. 409 Analogy, a simple support lending itself to conciseness, is nearly doubled, while specific instances are half as frequent as normal. Restatement is apparently used to re enforce the broad generalizations and the reasoning is more deductive in this speech than any other. Generally adult- education specialists are not as well educated as college faculty and this may account for a lesser degree of em pirical proof. "The Proposition is Peace" The conditional enthymeme is frequently resorted to in the text and the nature of any opposition to our in volvement in the World War II dictated much deductive reasoning. Figure 4 shows the proportion of supports. Illustration remains relatively constant while testimony increases nearly twice as much as is typical. All the remaining supports are above average in frequency. The speech was delivered in a convocation address and the audience consisted mainly of students and their rela- 72 tives. In many respects the material is directed exclu sively to laymen. "The University of Chicago and the Bachelors Degree" The most typical proportions of the forms of ?2Cf. letter of University of Chicago official Joanna McWilliams to John Vlandis, p. 5. 410 i Supports Per Cent Explanation 28 Analogy 15 Illustration 75 Specific Instance 30 Statistics 8 Testimony 38 Restatement 18] Fig. 4. 100 Fig. 4. The proposition is peace Note: Delivered before students and faculty in Rockefeller Memorial Chapel at the University of Chicago on March 30, 1941. 411 support are located in this address given to the American Council on Education; they are shown in Figure 5. The only departure from the norm is the trebled use of statistics. The speech was given to an organization composed mainly of college and university presidents and was part of a sym posium. "The Issues in Education: 1946" The American Council of Education again provided the audience for another Hutchins speech, but this time the relation of education to world affairs was stressed. Figure 6 represents the graph. Illustration and explana tion make up about the usual density and are very nearly the sole forms of support. Analogy, restatement, and statistics are about typical in proportion, but testimony is greatly diminished by approximately half. Probably Hutchins could not quote experts stating that liberal edu cation could prevent the world from nuclear devastation. Specific instances dx?indled to about twenty per cent of the customary proportion. "Education and Independent Thought" Hutchins delivered this speech to laymen and it is the most complex in terms of content delivered before such a group. Figure 7 provides the chart. Illustration, 1 412 ; i Supports Per Cent Explanation 39 Analogy 17 Illustration 83 Specific Instance 33 Statistics 17 Testimony 17 Restatement 17 Fig. 5. The University of Chicago and the Bachelor's Degree Note: Delivered at the Hotel Stevens in Chicago before the American Council on Education on May 2, 1942. 413' , i Supports Per Cen .Explanation 37 Analogy 14 Illustration 91 Specific Instance 6 Statistics 3 Testimony 9 Restatement 11 Fig. 6. The issues in education: 1946 Note: Delivered at the Hotel Stevens in Chicago before the American Council on Education on May 3, 1946. 414 Supports Per Cent Explanation 38 Analogy 11 Illustration 92 Specific Instance 24 Statistics 0 Testimony 3 Restatement J Fig. 7. Education and independent thought I Note: Delivered before the general public in Barnum Hall, Santa Monica, California on February 20, 1952. 415 explanation, specific instance, and restatement make up the respective densities in nearly the same proportion as in other addresses. Statistics are not employed because Hutchins was talking about academic freedom. Testimony is about one fourth of the normal amount because the speaker maintained a minority position that some professors who are Communists should be permitted to teach in the university. Analogies are about one third as frequent, since the pre vailing practice at that time prohibited a Communist pro fessor from teaching in a university. "Academic Freedom' * There is a great similarity between the percentages of supports in this (see Figure 8) and the previous speech, both of which dealt with academic freedom, but the address on "Education and Independent Thought" was delivered to educators. There are two noticeable differences in that explanation nearly doubles in the latter speech and testi mony increased to nearly ten times the amount in "Academic Freedom." Explanation probably occurs because Hutchins was amplifying the relationship of academic freedom to the whole of society; testimony would be expected to be espe cially convincing to the scholars at their convention. When compared to the "normal" Hutchins speech the present one shows similar proportions of evidence devoted I I Supports Per Cent Explanation 66 Analogy 10 Illustration 93 Specific Instance 48 Statistics 0 Testimony 28 Restatement 7 80 100 ; Fig. 8. Academic freedom | t Note: Delivered before the American Academy of Political and Social Science in Philadelphia on April 2, 1955. 417 to illustration and testimony. Specific instances are found twice as often and both analogy and restatement are evident about fifty per cent of the time. The evidence appears to be chosen specifically to persuade the scholars in the social science field that they should hold firm against the incursions of MMcCarthyism." "Freedom and the Responsibility of the Press: 1955' * This speech was presented to newspaper editors, primarily then an intelligent audience of laymen. It is shown in Figure 9. Illustration, explanation, specific instance, and statistics are approximately the normal pro portion for one of Hutchins’ addresses. Restatement drops from a typical thirteen per cent to only three, while testimony goes up from twenty two to twenty nine. Hutchins apparently surmised that the editors were familiar enough with his ideas, so he avoided much restatement, but he did quote frequently from the statements of newspaper editors. Analogy was employed about half as often in this speech as in other addresses. "The Fund for the Republic" i Another non-academic group, composed of veterans, imade up this audience. Figure 10 shows the types of evi dence. Illustration, specific instance, and testimony are 418' Supports Explanation Analogy Illustration Specific Instance 29 Statistics Testimony Restatement 100 Fig. 9. Freedom and the responsibility of the press: 1955 l j Note: Delivered at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D. C. on April 20, 1955. 419 t Per Cent Supports Explanation Analogy Illustration 83 Specific Instance 35 Statistics 13 Testimony 22 Restatement 4 100 Fig. 10. The Fund for the Republic ! Note: Delivered before the American Veterans' Committee ! in Washington, D. C. on October 7, 1955. 420 found in the normal densities. Explanation decreased from thirty seven to twenty six per cent. Significantly, per haps, there is not a single analogy used in the speech. Statistics are nearly trebled, while restatement diminishes to one third of normal. Since the speech was essentially a rebuttal to "right wing" criticisms of The Fund for the Republic the ideas were relatively simple and did not appear to require extensive repetition. A comparison of Support Densities before educators and laymen.--The Support Densities found in addresses given before educators compared to those presented to lay audi ences are contained in Figure 11. The significant element (or relationship) in the graph is the variation in audience adaptation that occurs when Hutchins appears before these two major types of audiences. There were one hundred thirty five paragraphs delivered to educators and one hundred thirty four to laymen. The most frequent support, illustration, is found in the same proportion in both audience situations. Sta tistics are identical in density in both types and are the least frequently used form of support. The latter fact is probably due to the unmathematical bent of Hutchins' mind, and the fact that he apparently feels one does not have to 421 Supports Illustration Explanation Analogy Testimony Restatement Statistics Laymen m Per Cent 0 84 84 41 32 28 20 40 60 Us im Specific Instance 30 ■■■ / / / / / A 24 10 20 22 15 11 5 5 Educators Fig. 11. A comparison of the support densities before educators and laymen audiences 422 73 "think" in utilizing quantitative measurement. Explanation is used forty one per cent of the time for educators and only thirty two per cent for laymen. This is probably due to the circumstances under which Hutchins frequently delineates the role of education in influencing the surrounding culture, whereas he does not do this so frequently for laymen. Explanation appears to be second in frequency. Specific instance occurs with similar density in speeches given to educators and laymen, there being only a two per cent increase for laymen. Analogy, the form of support fifth in density, shows the most dramatic change in the comparison of audience adaptation. In speeches before educators it is evident twenty four per cent of the time and only ten per cent in other addresses. It is possible that analogies are more effective with educators than with laymen. The remaining supports, testimony, and restatement, show little variation. Testimony is found two per cent more of the time in remarks for laymen. Restatement is used four per cent more frequently in the presence of edu- icators. ^Robert Maynard Hutchins, Education for Freedom (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), p. 32; The Mike Wallace Interview of July 20, 1958. 423 One may conclude there is no really important vari ation in the Support Densities of the proofs utilized by Hutchins in speeches prepared for educators and laymen. So far as forms of support are concerned they are generally found in approximately the same proportion for both laymen and educator audiences. This contrasts with the conclusion of George Ziegelmueller that Hutchins demonstrates more audience adaptation when speaking to laymen; however, Ziegelmueller was generalizing about total audience adapta tion and not just concerning himself with the types of evidence.74 Summary.--Monroe1s seven forms of support (evi dence) were used to determine the types of proof utilized by Hutchins. Two analyses were made four months apart for greater reliability. The Support Densities are the pro portions of the respective forms of support appearing in the paragraphs of the speeches. Hutchins employs illustration, explanation, spe cific instance, testimony, analogy, restatement, and statistics in the respective descending frequencies indi- 75 icated earlier in Chapter VI. No appreciable variation 74Cf. Ziegelmueller, op. cit., p. 56. 75See Figure 1, p. 405. i 424 in the Support Densities V7as found in the remarks delivered to educators when compared with speeches presented to lay men. CHAPTER VII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Introduction Robert Maynard Hutchins has made a significant impact on American higher education from 1925 to the pres ent. Perhaps more than any single man, he has forced edu cators to examine and state the purposes of collegiate and university training. Hutchins has helped to define the ideal end of higher learning through approximately one thousand public addresses which have appeared in his ten books and in hundreds of articles. Indeed, he has been America's leading spokesman for educational reform for over three decades. The present investigation attempts to evaluate the quality of Hutchins' rhetoric. The five canons of rhetoric devised by the Romans have largely formed the basis of the study, with particular emphasis on the inventio (ideas) of the speaker. The statement of the problem is found in the succeeding questions. 1. What were the significant influences in the development of the Hutchins rhetoric? 425 426 2. What were the speaker’s basic premises? 3. What type of ethos did the speaker establish with his audiences? 4. Did the iconoclastic ideas contribute to his reputation as a speaker? 5. How did the speaker choose his subject? 6. What was the relationship between his prepara tion for speeches and that of his writings? 7. What was the nature of his style? 8. What were the significant aspects of his bodily movement? 9. What were the distinguishing features of his voice? 10. What type of organization was evident in the speeches? 11. What was the proportion of emphasis on the various types of evidence? The questions were answered by delimiting the scope of the study to speeches given between 1940 and 1955, con centrating on addresses on war and education, civil liber ties, and education. An analysis of invention, the primary focus of the investigation, was accomplished through criti cism of Hutchins1 premises. The description of the bio graphical influences on Hutchins, his ethos, and style was provided. An exposition of the speech preparation, 427 delivery, organization, and the types of evidence employed was also included. Conclusions What were the significant influences in the de velopment of the Hutchins rhetoric?--Independence against the pressures of conformity was cherished as a family tradition in the Hutchins household, the lineage dating back to Connecticut sea captains, doctors, and ministers. Hutchins' father was a professor of homiletics and Presi dent of Berea College in Kentucky. Discussion was a constant activity in Robert's home and at Oberlin College. The Hutchins family philosophy was highly moralistic with little emphasis on material ends. Robert was a debater at Oberlin, and for Yale in upper division classes, but he asserts it had a negligible influence on his speaking. His first public speech was made at age fourteen, though speaking has always been dif ficult, particularly the matter of organization. Aristotle and Hutchins’ own father affected his rhetorical practices. Skill in writing demonstrated itself early in his under graduate days, combining with a brilliant mind. Law school teaching resulted in Hutchins perfecting his remarkably accurate reasoning powers and he started on a teaching and administrative career in education. It also brought Mortimer Adler's acquaintance providing a personal friendship which deeply affected Hutchins' philosophy. By age thirty the young dean's skill at speaking and raising money contributed to his going to the University of Chicago as its President, later bringing Adler there too. The two superb minds taught the Great Books course for twenty two years and this experience formed the rationalist philosophy which was a factor in Hutchins’ controversial reputation. Significant changes were made in the organization and cur riculum of Chicago University, Legal training combined with philosophy forming the bedrock of the Hutchins civil liberties pronouncements at the Ford Foundation and the Fund for the Republic. The philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas was articulately expressed by him for three decades. What were the speaker's basic premises?--Hutchins' premises are presented in the war and education speeches first, then each is analyzed separately. The wording is simplified for brevity. (1) We must hope to avoid war until we are engaged in military action. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor prevented our improving ourselves morally before entering the war. Hutchins' premise appears historically invalid. (2) We must understand, value, and practice the four freedoms. The freedom of speech and religion, plus 429 the freedom from want and fear are still valid ideals; freedom of speech particularly needed strengthening during the McCarthy period. (3) The alternatives before us are peace or the death of civilization. This categorization leaves out "limited war," but we do have the choice of peace, the Cold War, or nuclear disintegration. (4) Civilization can be saved only by a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution. The second most important Hutchins premise originates in Aristotle's works, but the speaker does not provide the precise meaning of each revolution. Assuredly it is the statement of the ideal man. A moral man practices good habits which are performed the right way under the right circumstances. What these philosophical conditions are is not indicated. The intellectual revolution means that man must become rational by perfecting his reason or his intel lectual virtues. Rational ends are superior to economic means, since the object of man is happiness. The spiritual revolution apparently rests on religious inspiration and demands practicing the brotherhood of man and the father hood of God. (5) The fundamental problems of our time are philo sophical. Few would disagree with this assumption, how ever, what philosophy will solve the problems is in 430 dispute. The pragmatist says empirical science is the method, while Hutchins and the traditionalist assert it must be a combination of empiricism with traditional philosophic rationalism through discussion. The civil liberty premises follow: (1) A university should be a center of independent thought and criticism. Hutchins here attempts to define the ideal institution of higher education and there is not significant debate directed at the ideal, but rather at the degree of independence which should be practiced. John Dewey and Sidney Hook believe universities should not be too aloof from contemporary affairs. Many administrators apparently disagreed on how much independence should be afforded in view of the wholesale dismissal of professors on loyalty grounds during this decade. This is Hutchins1 third most important assumption. (2) Professors may engage in legal activities. This appears to be almost self-evident, but what the courts consider legal activity in loyalty cases is not always clear or consistent. Conservative individuals draw a narrow interpretation and liberals tend to permit more freedom of speech and association. The administrative !organizations advocate a limited freedom of expression and association, while faculty groups, such as the American Association of University Professors, uphold a broad concept of free speech and association. (3) A professor who is a Communist and thinks independently should be permitted to teach in a university. This is the most controversial of Hutchins’ premises this decade. The typical assumption is that no Communist can think independently due to adherence to a noxious political doctrine. The majority of laymen and administrators oppose the Hutchins dictum, while a good many noted civil liber tarians agree with the speaker. Since universities are supposed to be citadels of freedom, it seems worthwhile to err on the libertarian side in a nation of expanding civil rights. The key distinction is belief and acts, particu larly whether the thinking is independent of Communist ideology. Faculties should decide if there is a question, not a group outside the university. (4) The arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for freedom of speech. Academic freedom is based on freedom to learn; if freedom of speech is curtailed in higher education, the depth of learning is also restricted. The disagreement comes in the degree of application con cerning freedom of speech. During emergencies, or while ithe Cold War raged, intellectual freedom became somewhat jconstricted. | (5) Tax-exemption is for the purpose of permitting i higher educational institutions to conduct the best 432 teaching and research in their judgment. The only problem in this premise concerns what good teaching and research is. The criticism of the Fund and Hutchins is that grants were made for "left wing" studies, the charge usually made by "ultra-conservatives." Tax-exemption laws are designed to permit private organizations to perform functions which otherwise would have to be tax-supported. Independence in research should be upheld. (6) The greatest aggregation of educational founda tions is the press itself. Possibly the press could achieve this ideal, but there seems to be little inclina tion to do so. Informing the public through the presenta tion of the truth should be the purpose, but this is often secondary to profit. Distinguished journalists Jonathan Daniels and James Reston do not agree that newspapers should be educational foundations. (7) The First Amendment was designed to protect the content, not the cash return from the press. The former purpose apparently was the function the founding fathers had in mind; monopoly has frequently made the content sub servient to profit. (8) Differences of opinion about the Fund for the iRepublic must result from misinformation. This statement jmay not be accurate. More probable is a different philoso phy which motivates critics of the Fund, They are more in 433 favor of national security manifesting itself in limited individual freedom when compared to the civil liberty position. (9) The Fund for the Republic is for the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The question is, "What are the principles?" The Basic Issues program of the Fund Is trying to bring them to light. Courts, of course, are continuously interpreting the Constitution. Most persons agree on the generaliza tions supporting the historical documents, but many dis agree on the specific principles. The succeeding premises are those Hutchins upheld in his educational philosophy. (1) We want a rational order in education and poli tics. Hutchins' most important premise is that man is a rational animal, therefore the object of education as a specialized function is to increase man's reasoning capacities, which are his highest powers. Hutchins seems to be on strong ground philosophically; the modernist fol lowers of John Dewey do not concur. They assert man's nature changes in a reciprocal adaptation with the environ ment and their concept of man's essential quality is more : social and emotional than Hutchins admits. Dewey believed growth was the end of education, not rationality. Hutchins says the rationality can be increased by 434 studying the Great Books, the intellectual masterpieces of mankind. Dewey asserts science will teach man to use his reasoning, emotional, and social talents wisely. The modernist believes only empirical science can discover truth, while Hutchins advocates a combination of philoso phical discussion and scientific method. (2) There is a relationship between metaphysics, education, morals, and intellect. Hutchins alleges educa tion is a secondary subject dependent on philosophy. Meta physics stresses ultimate being through concentration on mind and character, and is based on the hierarchy of ab solute values advocated by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Dewey called for the release of philosophy from a sterile metaphysics so the empirical method can break down the split between the active (material) and reflective (spiritual). His premises were based on the flexible assumptions of democracy, liberalism, and pragmatism. Hutchins replies that science cannot tell us what is the good life, the destiny of man, or the good society; he relies on the a priori assumptions incapable of scientific verification. Dewey's experimentalism rests on a priori iassumptions antecedent to the empirical hypotheses. Adler reminds us the dispute goes to first principles, the iultimate nature and causes of things. (3) General education should be given between ages 435 fifteen and twenty. The University of Chicago plan of general education embraced the last two years of high school and the first two of college in a four year program; it was designed to give each student a general education through the study of Great Books aiming at the goals of citizenship responsibilities and the wise use of leisure. The modernist usually advocates two years of general education, with the possibility of some vocational courses integrated into it to cope with individual differ ences. He would allow students to read some Great Books, but these would not be the main curriculum. Vocational courses would be integrated into liberal education in the context of social, scientific, and moral affairs. Hutchins opposes vocational instruction, except in an indirect manner. (4) Everything is relative since everyone's opinion is as good as everyone else's opinion. Hutchins is ob viously attacking pragmatism which he maintains provides no standards by which to measure truth. The speaker says there is a hierarchy of values with the moral, intel lectual, and spiritual powers constituting the summum ibonum, under which the common good is subsumed through peace, order, and justice. Education must teach values according to Hutchins. Dewey held that truth is relative to the conditions 436 in the environment and is to be ascertained by empirical science. Pragmatism utilizes a philosophical system in which the ethical criterion is relative, not absolute. It is the dominant philosophy this century. (5) Democratically controlled education is not a means to a different spiritual world. Hutchins says edu cation is the expression of a country's ideals, and the best chance for improvement is during periods of national humility. He avers that the society can be improved through the improvement of the individual, not by social reform. Modernist Sidney Hook says Hutchins' theory means educational defeatism, with little hope for the improvement of the culture. The reconstruction of experience through social reform is the means of elevating the culture in Hook’s opinion. (6) Every citizen should have a liberal education in proportion to his ability to receive it. Hutchins assumes democracy will work effectively only when every voter has liberal education so he can exercise his wisdom, and consume his leisure time intelligently. The tradi tionalist admits it has never been achieved, nor does he iknow how it can be. The modernist responds that individual ;differences make universal liberal education impossible unless it is integrated with vocational education. 437 (7) A university should be devoted to scholarship, advanced study, and the preparation for learned profes sions. It must be interested in questions which are broadly theoretical, synthesizing knowledge as a whole. Some educators desire more practical intellectual activi ties in higher education. Dewey cautioned against educa tional institutions which become too aloof from contempo rary society. Others favor more educational specialization than does Hutchins. What type of ethos did the speaker establish with his audiences?--President Hutchins was dubbed the "Boy Wonder," but was not admired by a majority of the Chicago faculty who did not always approve of his attempt to revolutionize education. However, he incurred their ad miration for his rigorous defense of academic freedom as early as 1935. Students generally worshipped him, but pragmatist educators, including John Dewey, generally resented his crusading metaphysical dogmas. This occurred after publication of Hutchins’ first two books in 1936. The reaction was partly the battle of science upheld by the pragmatists, versus the reverence of philosophy advocated t by the rationalists. The didactic manner in which Hutchins i phrased his exaggerated generalizations caused some contro versy. He was an articulate spokesman for unpopular ideas, 438 which roved over a nearly-unlimited philosophical land scape, and he had an unquestioned probity. His handsome face and athlete-like stature were assets to his ethos. The pragmatists found Hutchins irritating, brusque, cryptic, and sometimes arrogant. Some thought he wanted to become an educational dictator; others believed his educa tional philosophy was akin to Fascism or favored an intel lectual elite. No one questioned his intellectual ability, but his philosophy was often held in disdain by critics. Civil liberties subjects constituted the core of Hutchins’ controversial ethos in the 1950’s. Much of the criticism came from "ultra-conservatives,” who viewed him as an apologist for Communism. Observers with a more moderate or liberal political philosophy felt he was a sane influence in a nation obsessed with the phantom of internal security. Did iconoclastic ideas contribute to Hutchins* reputation as a speaker?--The answer is an affirmative one. His advocacy of rationalism in education made him an op ponent of John Dewey’s philosophy of modernized pragmatism and empiricism. Hutchins concedes that describing man as a rational animal is not very popular any longer. His i curriculum stressing the Great Books and awarding the iBachelor's Degree at the end of the traditional sophomore year at Chicago kept him in the national limelight as an 439 educational gadfly. His strong support of philosophy in an era when science and technology were ascendant drew much attention. Hutchins expressed a truly minority educational philosophy in the midst of a pragmatic, modernist majority. His educational ideals rocked academic foundations for two decades. His crusading moralism urging that we stay out of war in the early 1940’s contributed to his reputation, though he was unable to translate his arguments into a majority of public opinion. During the rampant McCarthyism of the 1950's he was castigated for upholding the right of some Communists to teach in the university. He was con troversial due to the accident of the times. His view points which were brilliantly expressed have kept him in the focus of the nation, but not many of his ideals are in operation, though he has made an impact on a pragmatic society according to Maxine Greene, a professor of Educa tion. How did the speaker choose his subjects?--Hutchins indicated he is asked to speak on certain topics by the organizations to which he speaks. He also knows his re- 'marlcs will be published and most of his writings are the ! result of speeches. Otherwise, his subject is whatever is currently on his mind. 440 What was the relationship between his preparation for speeches and that of his writings?--The speeches were typically antecedent to his published works. Occasionally the speaker wrote essays to modify his lectures or to integrate them into his ten books. What was the nature of his style?--Typically the language is immediately clear to audiences; there is much vividness through terseness, some alliteration and paral lelism, a few antitheses, many illustrations, and occasion al rhetorical questions. The unique stylistic element is irony which expresses Hutchins’ logic and indignation, plus the skilled use of the magic three (a series of three words beginning with the same letters). The style is appropriate except for a lack of pathos. This reduces the potential persuasiveness con siderably, but reflects Hutchins’ abhorrence for emotional ism. The "speak-ability1' of the language is satisfactory. There is about one paragraph per address containing sustained and noble thoughts near the realm of poetry. What were the significant aspects of his bodily movement?--! observed Hutchins in seven different speaking isituations. Few gestures are used, but if they are, it is normally with one hand as the manuscript is read. Much of the time the hands rest easily on the rostrum. Eye contact 441 varies from thirty to seventy per cent. The posture is alert and dignified. The raising of the eyebrows for emphasis is the primary facial change while speaking. What are the distinguishing features of his voice?--It is bass, well modulated, and a decidedly favor able aspect of the speaker's presentation. Sometimes it is a little monotonous while reading, though more varied during the forum period. Emphasis is frequently achieved by prolonging the vowel elements. Hutchins’ voice is reasonably conversational when reading, though to a lesser degree than in extemporaneous remarks. What type of organization was evident in the speeches?~-Hutchins says the organization is the most dif ficult thing for him in preparing a speech because he has to forge vast amounts of information into communicable form. His structure follows a general problem sequence with suggested solutions immediately following. Transi tions and summaries form an excellent lubricant for the smooth-flowing brilliant reasoning. The introduction and conclusion are both short and the body usually contains two ;major ideas. The speeches are outlined in composition and iare consequently easy for a critic to outline. What was the proportion of emphasis on the various types of evidence?--Alan Monroe’s forms of support were 442 used as the basis for constructing the categories of evi dence used in analyzing Hutchins1 speeches. The percentage of paragraphs in which the respective supports were found is shown below: Per cent Illustration 86 Explanation 37 Specific Instance 29 Testimony 22 Analogy 17 Restatement 13 Statistics 5 It is apparent that Hutchins uses a varied assortment of evidence and relies on extensive illustration to prove his statements. Recommendations and Summary Students of intellectual history, as well as rhe toricians, will find the Hutchins career and philosophy comprise a rich vein of research materials. Future scholars might well explore the activities and findings of the Center for Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara chaired by Hutchins. Other scholars might compare the educational philosophy with that of John Dewey, or trace Hutchins' philosophy to its origins in Plato, Aristotle, 443’ and Aquinas. The influence of Hutchins as a teacher in Great Books classes should be considered. The civil liberty concepts of the liberal educator should be compared in detail with those of other expert civil libertarians. One can conclude that Hutchins exemplifies a high quality of educational rhetoric. It is brilliant, suc cinct, deeply philosophical, inspiring for intellectual excellence, well-adapted to the great issues of a contem porary society, and phrased in a skillful stylistic manner, yet it has failed to revolutionize modern educationI Bru- bacher reminds us the speeches and writings of the liberal educator have focused more attention on the philosophy of higher education than anyone has been able to in over three hundred years. Hutchins* response to a question at the Modem Forum in Beverly Hills High School where he de livered "World Revolution," January 31, 1958, appears to be fairly accux-ate: Why have you and Dr. Adler failed? [laughter] You could say it was because of the inadequacies of Dr. Adler*s partner Llaughter], but this I don't really believe Llaughter]. I believe that the forces that have been carrying American education, pushing American education down the toboggan are forces that are--that are inherent in the society and it would have been practically impossible to do more than to call attention to the fact that American education was on its way to the everlasting bonfire. You could call attention to it, but you couldn't arrest it. Mr. Adler and I appeared on the educational scene in our modest way just as the moment when everybody had decided to go to high school, almost everybody had decided to go to college, and when almost everybody had almost all the 444 resources that were necessary for these two high ambi tions to be accomplished. It would have been possible to say that we are going to take all these people in, but we*re going to insist that they get a good educa tion. After all, this is done in every European country and it's done most spectacularly in recent years In Russia. Everybody goes into the ten year school at the age of seven to seventeen. Those who don’t make the grade drop out into other activities, or other institutions. But in the ten years school in Russia, from seven to seventeen, I haven't the slight est doubt, that a better education is acquired by those who survive than is achieved in the United States by the age of twenty two, in any college or university in this country, including Chicago. It would have been possible to do this, but it would have been possible to do this only by the most rigorous insistence upon high educational standards, and only by the clearest de finition of purpose and only by the most pertinacious activity on the part of educational leaders, who instead of devoting themselves to public relations, money raising, and advertising, would have been re quired to explain to the American people, what educa tion is all about. This has been the trouble, we have enormously expanded American education, we have set our eyes on this expansion without any recognition of the possibility and the necessity of insisting upon a clear definition of standards and purpose. BIBL IOGRAPHY 445 BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES ON HUTCHINS 1 446 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books by Hutchins Hutchins, Robert M. Education for Freedom. Baton Rouge Louisiana State University, 1943. 108 pp. _______ . Freedom, Education, and the Fund: Essays and Addresses, 1946-1956. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. 241 pp. _______ . Great Books. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954. 115 pp. _______ . No Friendly Voice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. 197 pp. _______ . Some Observations on American Education. London: Cambridge University Press, 1956. 112 pp. _______ . St. Thomas and The World State. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949. 53 pp. _______ . The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. 112 pp. _______ . The Higher Learning in America. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936. 119 pp. _______ . The State of the University: 1929-1949. Chicago: University of Chicago, September 21, 1949. 44 pp. _______ . The University of Utopia. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953. 103 pp. 448 Addresses by Hutchins Anderson, Harold A. (ed.) "Educational News and Editorial Comment," The School Review, LIV (September, 1946), 383-84. Hutchins, Robert M. "America and the War," The Journal of Negro Education, X (July, 1941), 435-41. _______ . "A Moral, Spiritual, and Intellectual Revolution," The Journal of Higher Education, 18:235-238, May, 1947. _______ . "A Peace that Will Last," The Texas Outlook, XXX (October, 1946), 12-13, 46. _______ . "Constitutional Foundations of World Order," Congressional Digest, XXVII (August-September, 1948), 200, 202, 204. _______ . "Dark Hours in Our History," Vital Speeches of the Day, VII (July 1, 1941), 569-70. _______ . "Democracy and Education: Millionaires or Ditch-Diggers,1 1 Forum and Century, 103:15-17, January, 1940. _______ . "Education and Democracy," School and Society, LXIX (June 18, 1949), 425-28. _______ . "Education and Independent Thought," Freedom, Education, and the Fund. New York: Meridian Books, 1956, pp. 152-66. _______ . "Education and the Duration," The Christian Century, LX (February 10, 1943), 162-64. _______. "Farewell for Students," A. Craig Baird, editor. Representative American Speeches, 1951-1952. XXIV, New York: H. W. Wilson and Company, 1952, pp. 129-37. _______. "Films Can Be World Saving Force," School Management. XVII (February, 1948), 44. 449 Hutchins, Robert M. "For World Peace - A Revolution Needed! " The American School Board Journal, CXIII (July, 1946), 49. _______ . "Freedom and the Responsibility of the Press: 1955," New York Times, April 22, 1955. _______ . "Freedom Requires Responsibility," Vital Speeches of the Day, 15:175-78, November 19, 1948. _______ . "Haverford College Commencement Address," The Association of American Colleges Bulletin, XL (December, 1954), 503-511. _______ . "In the Name of Our Dead," Christian Century, 62:626, May 23, 1945. _______ . "Is Democracy Possible?" Saturday Review, 42: 15-17, February 21, 1959. _______ . "’Last Call’ for World Peace," Arizona Teacher- Parent, XXXVI (December, 1947), 8-9, 40. _______ . "Locksley Hall: A College for the Future," School and Society, 87:334-338, September 12, 1959. _______. "Morals, Religion, and Higher Education," Freedom, Education, and the Fund. New York: Meridian Books, 1956, pp. 81-100. _______. "One Last Chance," Chicago Maroon, June 14, 1946. _______. "Reminiscences," The Mathematics Teacher, XXXIII (October, 1940), 243-251. _______ . "Shall We Do Whatever Is Necessary to Insure a British Victory?" A. Craig Baird, editor. Repre sentative American Speeches, 1940-1941. XV, New York: H. W. Wilson and Company, 1941, pp. 41-48. _______. "The Administrator," The Journal of Higher Education, XVII (November, 1946), 397-407. 450 Hutchins, Robert M. "The Administrator Reconsidered: University and Foundation," Freedom, Education, and the Fund. New York: Meridian Books, 1956, pp. 185- 188. _______ . "The American Way of Life," School and Society, LXX (August 27, 1949), 129-31. _______ . "The Bill of Rights: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,"Freedom, Education, and the Fund. New York: Meridian Books, 1956, pp. 30-36. _______ . "The Crisis of Our Time," A. Craig Baird, editor. Representative American Speeches, 1944-1945. New York: H. W. Wilson and Company, 1945, pp. 199-201. _______ . "The Fund for the Republic," reprinted by the Fund for the Republic, Incorporated. _______ . "The Fund, Foundations, and the Reece Report," Freedom, Education, and the Fund. New York: Meridian Books, 1956, pp. 201-212. _______ . "The Issues in Education, 1946." A. Craig Baird, editor. Representative American Speeches, 1945-1946. IXX, New York: H. W. Wilson and Company, 1946, pp. 262-72. _______. "The Meaning and Significance of Academic Freedom," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCC (July, 1955), 72-78. _______. "The New Realism," Vital Speeches of the Day, 11:601, July 15, 1945. _______. "The Path to War," Vital Speeches of the Day, 7:25.8-61, February 15, 1941. _______. "The Proposition Is Peace," Vital Speeches of Day, 7:389-392, April 15, 1941. _______. "The University in War and Peace," A. Craig Baird, editor. Representative American Speeches, 1942-1943. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1943, pp. 235-47. 451 Hutchins, Robert M. "The University in War and Peace," The American Association of University Professors Bulletin, XXIX (February, 1943), 22-23. _______ . "The University of Chicago and the Bachelor's Degree," The Educational Record, XXIII (July, 1942), 567-573. _______ . "The University of Chicago: Its Past Record and Its Future Mission," School and Society, LXII (August 4, 1945), 65-69. _______ . "The Value of the Museum," Science, 98:334, October 15, 1943. _______ . "Toward a Durable Society," The American Associa tion of University Professors Bulletin, XXIX (October, 1943), 467-82. ______. "What Kind of a Society Do We Want?" Journal of Adult Education, XII (October, 1940), 359-361. _______ . "What Next?" Los Angeles City College Commence ment, June 18, 1959. _______ . "What Price Freedom?" The American Association of University Professors Bulletin, XXXV (Summer, 1949), 211-15. ' "What Shall We Defend?" Vital Speeches of the Day, 6:546-49, July 1, 1940. _______. "Where Do We Go From Here In Education?" Vital Speeches of the Day. 13:591-594, June 15, 1947. _______. "World Revolutions," Modern Forum, Beverly Hills High School, January 31, 1959. 452 Articles by Hutchins Hutchins, Robert M., et al. "A Free and Responsible Press," Fortune [Supplement], 35:1-21, April, 1947. Hutchins, Robert M. "A Plan to Meet 'The Crisis in Educa tion'," The New York Tiroes Magazine, XI (June 9, 1946), 53-54. _______ . "A Reply to Professor Whitehead," The Atlantic Monthly, CLVIII (November, 1936), 582-88. _______ . "Battlefield of Learning," Holiday, X (October, 1951), 110-111. _______ . "Blueprint for Wartime Education," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXV (August 15, 1942), 17, 69, 71-72. _______ . "Design for Living," The Nation, CLXXVII (February 20, 1954), 152. _______ . "Double Talk," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXXI (July 17, 1948), 7-8, 30-31. _______ . "Do We Want Permanent Conscription?" Colliers, CXV (June 9, 1945), 15, 27. _______ . "Editorial Comment," The Journal of General Education, IV (July, 1950), 241-42. _______ . "Education After Mustering Out," The Journal of Education, CXXVII (January, 1944), 18, 20. _______. "Education at War," The North Central Association Quarterly. XVII (October, 1942), 173-79. _______. "Education for Freedom," The Christian Century, LXI (November 15, 1944), 1314-1316. _______• "Education in the Army," The Christian Century, LXVIII (December 19, 1951), 1474-1475. 453 Hutchins, Robert M. ''Education--What and How?" The Journal of Higher Education, XXIII (January, 1952), 27-36. _______ . "Ethics, Politics, and Education," School and Society. LIV (October 4, 1941), 257-61. _______ . "Grammar, Rhetoric, and Mr. Dewey," The Social Frontier. Ill (February, 1937), 137-39. _______ . "Higher Education and Freedom," The American Association of University Professors Bulletin, XXXV (Winter, 1949), 606-607. _______ . "Hutchins Answers Hutchins," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXI (September 24, 1938), 23, 34, 36. _______ . "If I Were a Newspaper Editor," The American Press, LXVI (December, 1947), 32. _______ . "In the Name of Our Dead," The Christian Century, LXII (May 23, 1947), 625-26. _______ . "Jose Ortega y Gasset," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXIX (May, 1945), 217-20. _______ . "Learning to Live," Ladies Home Journal, LXIII (April, 1946), 24-25, 209. _______ . "Let's Split the Education Atom," Colliers, CXVIII(December 7, 1946), 80, 87. _______ . "On Service and Self," The Rotarian, LXVI (March, 1945), 8-9. _______ . "Radio In the United States: Soap, Toothpaste and Cereal," Musical America, LXX (August, 1950), 20. _______ . "Religion and Higher Education," The Commonweal, LXIV (June 29, 1956), 321-23. _______ . "ShallWe Have Compulsory Military Training?" Senior Scholastic, XLVII (October 15, 1945), 15-16. 454 Hutchins, Robert M. "Social and Political Conformity," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, IX (May, 1953), 105-8. _______ . "The Atomic Bomb Versus Civilization," The Association of American Colleges Bulletin, XXXII (March, 1946), 34-42. _______ . "The Atomic Bomb Versus Civilization," The Journal of the National Education Association, XXXV (March, 1946), 114-17. _______ . "The Bomb Secret Is Out!" The American, CXLIV (December, 1947), 24-5, 134-138. _______ . "The Challenge of the Market Place," Nation1s Business, XXIX (February, 1941), 25-26, 49. _______ . "The College and the Needs of Society," The Journal of General Education, III (April, 1949), 175-81 _______ . "The Department of Astronomy of the University of Chicago," Science, CVI (September 5, 1947), 195. _______ . "The Education of an American," House and Garden, CIV (August, 1953), 61, 94-98. _______. "The Freedom of the University," The American Association of University Professors Bulletin, 37: 238-252, Summer, 1951. _______. "The Freedom of the University," The International of Ethics. LXI (January, 1951), 95-104. _______. "The High Cost of Prejudice," Phylon, XII (1951), 101-105. _______. "The Junior College and Terminal Education," The Junior College Journal. XI (May, 1941), 547-54. _______. "The Newer Orthodoxy," The New Republic, CXXXII (February 7, 1955), 14-16. 455 Hutchins, Robert M. "The Next Fifty Years," Science, XCIV (October 10, 1941), 333-35. _______ . "The Outlook for Education," The Phi Delta Kappan, XXVI (September, 1943), 3-8. _______ . "The Spirit Needed for the Times," The Journal of Higher Education, XVIII (May, 1947), 235-37, 280. _______ . "The Threat to American Education," Colliers, CXIV (December 30, 1944), 20-21. _______ . "Thought Control for Teachers," Wisconsin Journal of Education, LXXXII (October, 1949), 3-4. _______ . "Train Minds to Meet Problems," The Rotarian, LXVIII (September, 1946), 14, 62-63. _______ . "University for Utopians," Saturday Review, XXXVI (October 17, 1953), 11-12, 59-61. _______ . "What America's Leaders Think of the P.T.A.," National Parent-Teacher, XLI (February, 1947), 17. _______ . "What Every School Girl Ought to Know," Woman1s Home Companion, LXIX (February, 1942), 13, 42-43. _______ . "Why Go to College?" The Saturday Evening Post, CX (January 22, 1938), 16-17, 72, 74. Recordings and Transcripts Hutchins, Robert M. questioned in a tape recording by George Dell through a staff member of the Fund for the Republic, New York City, November 24, 1958. _______ . "The Promise of Education," Spoken Arts, Inc. - 714, Distinguished Teachers Series, New York, 1956. Langer, Howard. "Interview with Dr. Robert M. Hutchins," Folkways Records - FC 7351, New York, 1958. 456 Murrow, Edward R., narrator. "The Hidden Revolution," Robert M. Hutchins, et al., on a CBS radio broadcast, February 18, 1959. Sevareid, Eric, narrator. "The Great Challenge," a symposium with Robert M. Hutchins, John Kenneth Galbraith, Chancellor Litchfield and George Bundy broadcast over CBS radio, March 3, 1959. Transcript of television interview between Chet Huntley and Robert Maynard Hutchins over NBC TV, New York City, December 18, 1955. BIBLIOGRAPHY SECONDARY SOURCES ON HUTCHINS 457 BIBLIOGRAPHY Fund for the Republic Materials "Freedom and Justice: The Basic Issues," The Fund for the Republic Bulletin, July, 1957, pp. 1-5. "Report of the Fund for the Republic," 1st Annual Report. New York: The Fund for the Republic, Inc., 1955. 46 pp. "The Fund for the Republic," Three-Year Report. New York: The Fund for the Republic, Inc., May 31, 1956. 82 pp. "The St. John's Program: A Report," Annapolis: St. John's Press, 1955. 139 pp. Transcript, "A Mike Wallace Interview with Robert M. Hutchins" [telecast over American Broadcasting Company], reprinted by the Fund for the Republic, 1958, pp. 1-14. Transcript, "The Public and the Publisher," The Press and the People [telecast over Station WGBH - TV, Massa chusetts], reprinted by the Fund for the Republic. 1959, pp. 1-13. Transcript, "Washington and the Press," The Press and the People [telecast over Station WGBH - TV, Massachusetts], reprinted by the Fund for the Republic, 1959, pp. 1-13. Books Adler, Irving. What We Want of Our Schools. New York: John Day Company, 1957. 256 pp. Adler, Mortimer J. How to Read a Book. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940. 398 pp. ________. , and Mayer, Milton. The Revolution in Education. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958. 224 pp. 458 459 Baird, A. Craig. American Public Addresses: 1740-1952. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956. 301 pp. Baird, A. Craig, and Knower, Franklin H. General Speech. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949. 500 pp. Baird, A. Craig (ed.). Representative American Speeches: 1940-1941. Vol. 15. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1941. 319 pp. Baird, A. Craig (ed.). Representative American Speeches: 1942-1943. Vol. 16. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1943. 319 pp. • _____. Representative American Speeches: 1944-1945, Vol. 18. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945. 327 pp. _______ . Representative American Speeches: 1945-1946, Vol. 19. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1946. 287 pp. _______ . Representative American Speeches: 1951-1952, Vol. 24. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1952. 197 pp. Baldwin, Leland Dewitt. The Meaning of America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955. 319 pp. Barck, Jr., Oscar Theodore and Blake, Nelson Manfred. ' Since 1900. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. 903 pp. Barhrach, Peter. Problems in Freedom. Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1954. 468 pp. Barth, Alan. Government by Investigation. New York: The Viking Press, 1955. 231 pp. Barzun, Jacques. The House of Intellect. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. 276 pp. < 460 Bell, Daniel (ed.)* The New American Right. New York: Criterion Books, 1955. 239 pp. Berelson, Bernard. Content Analysis in Communication Research. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952. 220 pp. Berkson, I. B. The Ideal and the Community. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. 302 pp. Berns, Walter. Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. 264 pp. Bode, Boyde H. Progressive Education at the Crossroads. New York: Newson and Company, 1938. 128 pp. Braden, Waldo W., and Gehring, Mary Louise. Speech Practices. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. 168 pp. Brameld, Theodore. Ends and Means in Education: A Mid- century Appraisal. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. 244 pp. Brembeck, Winston Lamont, and Howell, William Smiley. Persuasion. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952. 488 pp. Brown, John Mason. Through These Men. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952. 302 pp. i Brubacher, John S., and Rudy, Willis. Higher Education in Transition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. 494 pp. Brubacher, John S. Modern Philosophies of Education. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950. 349 pp. Bryant, Donald C., and Wallace, Karl R. Fundamentals of Public Speaking. 2nd Edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953. 493 pp.. i I 461 Buck, Paul H. (ed.)* General Education in a Free Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946. 267 pp. Butts, R. Freeman, and Cremin, Lawrence A. A History of Education in American Culture. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953. 628 pp. Caughey, John W. In Clear and Present Danger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. 208 pp. Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. Freedom of Speach and Press. New York: Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, Inc., 1955. 59 pp. Chalmers, Gordon Keith. The Republic and the Person. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952. 270 pp. Childs, John L. Education and Morals. New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950. 299 pp. Commager, Henry Steele, et al. Civil Liberties Under Attack. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. 155 pp. _______ . Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. 155 pp. Cooper, Lane. The Rhetoric of Aristotle. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932. 259 pp. Curth, Merle. American Paradox: The Conflict of Thought and Action. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1956. 116 pp. Curtis, Charles P. The Oppenheimer Case. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955. 281 pp. Davis, Elmer. But We Were Born Free. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1952. 229 pp. Dewey, John. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. 434 pp. _______ . Experience and Education. New York: The ; Macmillan Company, 1938. 116 pp. 462 Dewey, John. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Mentor Books, 1950. 168 pp. Douglas, William 0. The Right of the People. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958. 238 pp. Dumond, Dwight Lowell. America in Our Time 1896-1946. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947. 715 pp. Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951. 412 pp. Ewbank, Henry Lee, and Auer, J. Jeffrey. Discussion and Debate. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951. 492 pp. Gideonse, Harry D. The Higher Learning in a Democracy. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937. 34 pp. Goldbloom, Maurice J. American Security and Freedom. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. 84 pp. Goldman, Eric F. The Crucial Decade, 1945-1955. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. 298 pp. Gunther, John. Inside U.S.A. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. 979 pp. Hacker, Louis M., and Zahler, Helene S. The United States in the 20th Century. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, Inc., 1952. 695 pp. Henry, Nelson B. (ed.). Modern Philosophies and Education: The Fifty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for Study of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. 374 pp. Hochmuthe, Marie Kathryn (ed.). A History and Criticism of American Public Address. Vol. III. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1955. 554 pp. Hockett, Homer Carey, and Schleslnger, Arthur Meier. Land of the Free. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. 765 pp. 463 Hocking, William Ernest. Freedom of the Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. 243 pp. Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition. New York: Vintage Books, 1958. 381 pp. Hofstadter, Richard, and Herdy, C. DeWitt. The Development and Scope of Higher Education in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. 254 pp. Hook, Sidney. Education for Modern Man. New York: The Dial Press, 1946. 239 pp. Jones, Howard Mumford. Primer of Intellectual Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949. 191 pp. Kirk, Russell. Academic Freedom. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. 210 pp. Lamont, Corliss. Freedom Is as Freedom Does. New York: Horizon Press, 1956. 322 pp. Lansner, Kermit (ed.). "Educating for Extinction," in Second Rate Brains. Garden City: Doubleday News Book, 1958. 96 pp. Laswell, Harold D., Nathan Leites and Associates. Language of Politics. New York: George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949. 398 pp. Lerner, Max. America as a Civilization. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957. 1036 pp. Lippmann, Walter. The Public Philosophy. New York: American Library, 1956. 144 pp. Lynd, Albert. Quackery in the Public Schools. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953. 282 pp. Macdonald, Dwight. The Ford Foundation, The Men and the Millions. New York: Reynal and Company, Inc., 1956. 186 pp. 464 Maclver, Robert M. Academic Freedom in Our Time. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. 329 pp. Maritain, Jacques. Education at the Crossroads. New Haven: Yale University, 1943. 120 pp. McBurney, James H., and Wrage, Ernest J. The Art of Good Speech. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953. 584 pp. McKeon, Richard (ed.). Introduction to Aristotle. New York: Modern Library, 1947. 667 pp. McWilliams, Carey. Witch Hunt. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950. 361 pp. Melby, Ernest 0., and Puner, Morton. Freedom and Public Education. New York: Praeger, 1953. 314 pp. Meyer, Adolph E. The Development of Education in the Twentieth Century. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1949. 609 pp. Meyer, Agnes E. Education for a New Morality. New York: Macmillan Company, 1957. 91 pp. Monroe, Alan H. Principles and Types of Speech. Fourth Edition. New York: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1955. 680 pp. Morison, Samuel Eliot. Freedom in Contemporary Society. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956. 156 pp. Morse, H. T. (ed.). General Education in Transition. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1951. 310 pp. Nichols, Alan. Discussion and Debate. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941. 569 pp. O'Brian, John Lord, National Security and Individual Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955. 84 pp. Parrish, Wayland Maxfield, and Hochmuthe, Marie. American Speeches. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1954. Tl8 pp. 465 Pegis, Anton C. (ed.)* Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas. New York: Modern Library, 1948. 690 pp. Perkins, Dexter. The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 1932-45. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. 194 pp. Potter, David (ed,). Argumentation and Debate. New York: The Dryden Press, 1954. 503 pp. Rickover, Hyman G. Education and Freedom. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1959. 256 pp. Riesman, David, Glazer, Nathan, and Denny, Reuel. The Lively Crowd. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955. 359 pp. Rockefeller, Nelson A. (Chairman). "The Pursuit of Excellence," in The "Rockefeller Report" on Education. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958. 49 pp. Sarett, Lew and Foster, William Trufant. Modern Speeches on Basic Issues. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1939. 445 pp. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957. 557 pp. Stevenson, Adlai. What I Think. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. 240 pp. Stouffer, Samuel A. Communism. Conformity, and Civil Liberties. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955. 278 pp. Taylor, Harold. On Education and Freedom. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954. 320 pp. Taylor, Telford. Grand Inquest. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955. 358 pp. Thomas, Norman. The Test of Freedom. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1954, 211 pp. 466 Thonssen, Lester, and Baird, A. Craig. Speech Criticism. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948. 542 pp. University of Chicago Faculty Members. The Idea and Practice of General Education. Chicago: The Univer sity of Chicago Press, 1950. 333 pp. Wahlke, John C. (ed.). Loyalty in a Democratic State. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1952. Ill pp. Wahlquist, John T. The Philosophy of American Education. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1942. 407 pp. Wecter, Dixon. The Age of the Great Depression 1929-1941. Vol. 13 of A History of American Life. Edited by Schlesinger, Arthur M., and Fox, Dixon Ryan. 13 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. 434 pp. Whyte, Jr., William H. The Organization Man. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956. 471 pp. Wilcox, Clair (ed.). Civil Liberties under Attack. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. 155 pp. Woodring, Paul. A Fourth of A Nation. New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957. 255 pp. Periodicals "Academic Freedom and Academic Responsibility," The American Association of University Professors Bulletin. 42:517-529, Autumn, 1956. "Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security," The American Association of University Professors Bulletin. XLII (Spring, 1956), 49-100. Adler, Mortimer J. "The Chicago School," Harper1s Magazine. CLXXXIII (September, 1941), 377-388. 467 Adler, Mortimer J. "The Crises in Contemporary Education," Social Frontier, 5:140-5, February, 1939. "'All Men Are Human1," Time, XLV (May 21, 1945), 19. "A Proposal to History," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXXI (April 3, 1948), 6-12, 26-27, 37-39. "A Reprimand from Teacher," Time, LII (November 29, 1948), 59. "Atomic Force Its Meaning for Mankind," The University of Chicago Round Table, No. 386 (August 12, 1945). Bagley, William C. (ed.). "The Attitude of President Hutchins Toward Vocational Education," School and Society, LX (November 25, 1944), 339-40. Bay, James C. "Our Public Schools Are They Failing?" The Nation, CLXXVIII (June 26, 1954), 539-541. Beaumont, Henry. "Mr. Hutchins Assumes . . .," Educational Administration and Supervision, XXVI (September, 1940), 401-414. - Bendiner, Robert. "Could You Stand a Four-Day Week?" The Reporter, XVII (August 8, 1957), 10-14. Benton, William Burnett. "The Boy Veteran," Ladies Home Journal, LV (September, 1938), 23. Bestor, Arthur. "We Are Less Educated Than 50 Years Ago," U.S. News and World Report, XLI (November 30, 1956), 68-89. Brigance, W. Norwood. "1946: Year of Decision," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIII (April, 1947), 127-33. Brigance, W. Norwood. "Year of Decision in Education," Vital Speeches of the Day, XIII (February 1, 1947), 246-49. Brown, Harrison. "Point of No Survival," Saturday Review, ; 41:18, December 27, 1958. 468 Byrns, Ruth, and O'Meara, William. "Concerning Mr. Hutchins," The Commonweal, XXXII (May 31, 1940), 114-116. Canby, Henry S. "A Call for Aristotle," Saturday Review of Literature, 14:10-11, October 24, 1936. Canby, Henry Seidel. "Pipe Lines to Hope," The Saturday Review of Literature. XXXI (April 24, 1948), 20. Carmichael, Peter A. "Deep in Dead Coon Hollow," The Journal of Higher Education. XXIII (January, 1952), 36-38. Carr, Robert K. "Academic Freedom, the American Associa tion of University Professors and the United States Supreme Court," AAUP Bulletin, 45:22-24, Spring, 1959. Champlin, Nathaniel, Villemain, Francis T., et al. "Dewey and Creative Education," Saturday Review. 42:19-25, November 21, 1959. Chase, Harry Woodburn. "Hutchins' 'Higher Learning1 Grounded," American Scholar. 6:236-44, Spring, 1937. "Chicago Commando," Time, XLIII (June 5, 1944), 56. "Chicago Loses Its Wonder Boy," Life, XXX (February 19, 1951), 49-50. "Chicago Rumble," Time, 73:51, June 1, 1959. Citron, Abraham F. "Experimentalism and the Classicism of President Hutchins," Teachers College Record, XLIV (May, 1943), 544-553. Clark, Charles E. "The Higher Learning in a Democracy," The International Journal of Ethics, XLVII (April, 1937), 317-35. "Clear and Distinct," Time, XXVII (May 4, 1936), 51-52. Cogley, John. "Varieties of Americanism," The Commonweal, LXI (February 18, 1955), 527. 469 Collins, Harold. "Mr. Hutchins and Education," High Points, XXVI (February, 1944), 20-26. Commager, Henry Steele. "The Tests of a Free Society," Adult Leadership, III (February, 1955), 2-4, 32-33. "Controversial Man," Newsweek, XLVI (November 7, 1955), 65-66. Cousins, Norman. "The Case of Robert Maynard Hutchins," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXXI (May 1, 1948), 18-19. Crocker, Lionel. "Intellectual Combat," Vital Speeches of the Day, XV (March 15, 1949), 338-341. _______ . "Vital Speeches as a Teaching Device," Vital Speeches of the Day, XIII (September 15, 1947), 725-35. Croft, Albert J. "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 42:283-291, October, 1956. Dean, Arthur. "Youth Takes the Helm," The Journal of Education, CIX (June 24, 1929), 704. "Dear Editor," The New Leader, XXXIX (April 2, 1956), 28-29. Demas, Raphael. "Philosophical Aspects of the Recent Harvard Report on Education," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7:187-263, December, 1946. Dewey, John. "Challenge to Liberal Thought," Fortune, XXX (August, 1944), 155-157, 180-190. _______ . "President Hutchins' Proposals to Remake Higher Education," The Social Frontier. Ill (January, 1937), 103-104. _______ . "The Higher Learning in America," The Social Frontier, III (March, 1937), 167-69. i 470 Dewey, John. "The Problems of the Liberal Arts College," American Scholar, 13:391-392, Autumn, 1944. "Displaced Person," Time, 66:18, November 28, 1955. "Dr. Hutchins and Power," Newsweek, XI (June 20, 1938), 17-18. "Dr. Hutchins1 10 Years Have Revitalized Chicago Univer sity; He's Still 'Boy Wonder*," Newsweek, XIV (November 27, 1939), 26. Drucker, Peter F. "The New Philosophy Comes to Life," Harper's Magazine, CCXV (August, 1957), 36-40. Ebbitt, David R. "Television," The New Republic, 134:21, January 23, 1956. Eddy, Don. "Dr. Hutchins Rebel of Education," Coronet, XXV (March, 1949), 163-169. "Editor's Corner," The American Legion Magazine, LIX (October, 1955), 6. "Editor's Corner," The American Legion Magazine, LX (January, 1956), 6. Eells, Walter Crosby. "The Bachelor's Degree - from the Junior College Standpoint," The Educational Record, XXIII (July, 1942), 574-585. Eurich, Alvin C. "Lesson for Survival," Saturday Review, 42:27, February,14, 1959. [Fadiman, Clifton. "Today's Lost Generation," Saturday | Review, 42:13-15, 55-56, September 12, 1959. ! i jFrechtman, Bernard H. "Mr. Hutchins and Education," ! High Points, XXVI (February, 1944), 16-20. i t iFrodin, Reuben, "Bibliography of Robert M. Hutchins, 1925-50," The Journal of General Education, IV (July, 1950), 303-24. 471 "From Harper to Hutchins," The Christian Century , LVII (October 23, 1940), 1304-1306. "Fund for the Republic," The New Republic, 136:5, June 24, 1957. "Fund for the Republic: Criticism Mounts," The American Legion Magazine, LIX (December, 1955), 36-37. "Fusilier," Time, 59:78-84, March 17, 1952. Gallagher, Buell G. "Mr. Hutchins and Mr. Dewey," The Christian Century, LXII (January 24, 1945), 106-107. Geiger, George. "Preface to a Consistent Philosophy of Education," Saturday Review, 42:17-18, November 21, 1959. Geyer, Denton L. "Three Types of Education for Freedom," School and Society, LXVI (November 29, 1947), 406-409. Gideonese, Harry D. "Benjamin-Hutchins1 Show," The Journal of Higher Education, XXIII (January, 1952), 38-39, 57-58. "Golden Jubilee Awards," The Gavel, XXXVIII (May, 1956), 101. Goodman, Walter. "That Dangerous Mr. Hutchins," The New Republic, CXXXIII (October 17, 1955), 9-10. Greene, Maxine. "Robert Maynard Hutchins, Crusading Metaphysician," School and Society, LXXXIII (May 12, Griswold, Erwin N. The Fifth Amendment Today. Cambridge: | Harvard University, 1955. 82 pp. | jGucker, Philip J. "In Defense of Mr. Hutchins: A Reply ! to Mr. Collins," High Points, XXVI (April, 1944), 16-19. 1956), 162-66. Hacker, Louis. "Plight of Professors During the 'Difficult Years'," Saturday Review, 41:19-20, November 29, 1958. Hagedorn, Max B., Jr. "Mr. Hutchins and Absolutism," The New Republic, CIV (March 31, 1941), 439. Hale, William Harlan. "Culture with a Sun Tan High in the Rockies," The Reporter, XVII (August 8, 1957), 24-28. i _______ . "This Year of Such Great Change," The Reporter, j 17:30-32, December 26, 1957. "Happy Hutchinsland," Time, LXI (April 22, 1953), 75. i Hillbruner, Anthony. "The Rhetorical Critic's Role in Society," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44:100-102, February, 1958. Hook, Sidney. "Six Fallacies of Robert Hutchins," The New Leader, XXXIX (March 19, 1956), 18-28. _______ . "Synthesis or Eclecticism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7:214-225, December, 1946. "Hook vs. Hutchins," America, XCIV (March 31, 1956), 708. "How to Live With the Bomb," Time, 50:71-72, September 29, 1947. "Hutchins and the Absolute," The New Republic, CIV (Feb ruary 3, 1941), 132. "Hutchins at the Bridge," Time, XLI (March 1, 1943), 35-36., "Hutchins Finds Hope Only in Adult Education," The Christian Century, LXIII (October 9, 1946), 1204. "Hutchins on Leave from Chicago as Board Chairman of Britannica," Publishers' Weekly, CL (October 5, 1946), 1985-86. "Hutchins Rides Again," Newsweek. XIX (May 11, 1942), 78. 473 | "Hutchins's 'Revolution'," Newsweek, XXIII (June 5, 1944), 91-93. "Hutchins to Ford," Newsweek, XXXVII (January 1, 1951), 51. "Hutchins vs. Cowley," Scribner's Magazine, CV (January, 1939), 66-67. Johnson, Gerald W. "The Superficial Aspect," The New Republic, 132:6, May 2, 1955. I "Judge Carter Calls High Court 'Great'," The Open Forum [published by the American Civil Liberties Union of j Southern California], 35:1, August, 1958. i Kahn, Journet. "The Threat to Academic Freedom," reprinted from the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, The Catholic University of America, 1957, pp. 8-14. Kallen, Horall M. "Education and Its Modifiers," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7:249-263, December, 1946. Keezer, Dexter M. ."All Is Not Chaos That Confuses Mr. Hutchins," The Journal of Higher Education, IX (November, 1938), 440-48. Keyserling, Leon H. "The Road Back to Prosperity," The Progressive, 22:7-11, April, 1958. Lear, John. "Efficiency of Freedom," Saturday Review, 42:22, May 23, 1959. | "Let Freedom Ring True," Time, XL (March 31, 1947), 67-68. ! j"Los Angeles: Pink Ford?" Time. LXII (July 27, 1953), 51. j jLyford, Joseph P. "Social Science Teachers and the j 'Difficult Years'," The American Association of University Professors Bulletin, 43:636-645, December, 1957. Macdonald, Dwight. "Profiles," New Yorker, XXXI (December 17, 1955), 40-69. 474 i i | Macdonald, Dwight. "The Book-of-the-Millennium Club," The New Yorker, XXVIII (November 29, 1952), 171-88. Matthews, J. B. "Communism and the Colleges," The American Mercury, LXXVI (May, 1953), 132-135. _______ . "Hutchins to Investigate Communism?" The j American Mercury, LXXX (June, 1955), 71-81. i _______ . "The Doctor's Dilemma," The American Legion | Magazine, LX (March, 1956), 18-19, 50-53. j Mayer, Milton. "Byanby," The Progressive, 22:24-26, February, 1958. j _______ . "Commando Hutchins," The Progressive, 8:18, j May 1, 1944. i _______ . "Hutchins of Chicago," Harpers Magazine, CLXXVIII (March, 1939), 344-355. _______ . "Hutchins of Chicago," Harpers Magazine. CLXXVIII (April, 1939), 543-552. _______ . "Rapidly Aging Young Man," The Forum and Century, XC (November, 1933), 308-13. i McEvoy, J. P. "Young Man Looking Backwards," The American ' Mercury, XLV (December, 1938), 482-484. ! McKeon, Richard. "Education and the Disciplines," The International Journal of Ethics, XLVII (April, 1937), 370-381. i McMillin, Miles. "Congress and the FCC Shenanigans," The Progressive, 22:12-15, April, 1958. Meagher, Margaret. "Education on Its Deathbed?" The Catholic World, CLIX (July, 1944), 352-356. Meiklejohn, Alexander. "A Reply to John Dewey," Fortune, 31:207-219, January, 1945. _______ . "Mr. Hutchins' Dogma," The New Republic, CIX (August 2, 1943), 147-148. Meiklejohn, Alexander. "The Teaching of Intellectual Freedom," The American Association of University Professors Bulletin, 38:10-25, Spring, 1952. Meyer, Adolph E. "Hutchins of Chicago University," The American Mercury. LVIII (April, 1944), 450-457. Nef, John V. "The University of Chicago and the World, 1929-1951," The Review of Politics, 13:399-429, October, 1951. j "New Job for a Salesman," Time, LVII (January 1, 1951), 49J "No American Legion Conventions in Recent Years Faced j So Many Major Controversial Issues," The American Legion Magazine, LIX (November, 1955), 29. "No Time for Infants," Time, XLVIII (September 30, 1946),67. "Ominous Silence at the Fund," America, XCIV (December 3, 1955), 262. Perry, Charner. "Education: Ideas Are Knowledge," The International Journal of Ethics, XLVII (April, 1937), 346-5-9. "Philanthropoid No. 1," Time, LXIX (June 10, 1957), 60-68. ■ "Philanthropy," Time, LXVI (November 28, 1955), 18. "Portrait," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXX (September 13, 1947), 18. , i "President Robert M. Hutchins on the Limitations of Tech nology," School and Society, LVI (October 3, 1942), 29L "President Robert M. Hutchins on the Present Task of Educa tion," School and Society, LVI (July 4, 1942), 11. "Presidents' Week," Time, XXXIII (June 12, 1939), 56. Rainey, Homer P. "The Devaluation of the Educational Currency," The Educational Record, XXIII (July, 1942), 586-592. 476 : j Ratner, Sidney. "A Salute Around the Globe," Saturday Review, 42:18, 53, November 21, 1959. "Rebel," The American Magazine, CXVII (March, 1936), 46. Redding, W. Charles. "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Criticism," Western Speech, 21:96-103, Spring, 1957. Redman, Ben Ray. "A Debate on the Great Books Program, No: Not Without Socrates," The Saturday Review j of Literature, XXXIII (December 9, 1950), 6-7, 32-35. j j "Resignation of President Hutchins from the New York Stock Exchange," School and Society, XLVIII (December 24, 1938), 819. ! Richards, Edward A. "Consuming Education," Harpers Magazine, LV (May, 1937), 597-604. "Robbing the Cradle for a University 'Prexy'," The Literary Digest, Cl (May 18, 1929), 44. Rodell, Fred. "A Gallery of Justices," Saturday Review, 41:9-11, 36-37, November 15, 1958. Rossiter, Clinton. "The New American Conservatives," Harpers Magazine, CCXIV (April, 1957), 75-82. Rostow, Eugene V. "Needed: A Rational Security Program," Harpers Magazine, CCXV (July, 1957), 33-40. Rovere, Richard H. "The Kept Witnesses," Harpers Magazine,; CCX (May, 1955), 25-34. ! Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur. "The Coming Shape of American Politics," Progressive, 23:22-29, September, 1959. ! | "Schooling for a Speaker," Time. LXIII (June 14, 1954), 54. Sevareid, Eric. "The Press in a Rose-Colored Mirror," The Reporter, XIV (May 17, 1956), 25. i Sister Marie Theresa. "Two Moderns and Aquinas," Catholic Educational Review, XLIII (March, 1945), 159-169. 477 , i Smith, Thomas V. "The Chicago School," The International Journal of Ethics, 46:378-87, April, 1936. "Spoiling a Good Case," The Christian Century, LVII (December 18, 1940), 1575-1577. Stevenson, Adlai. "Morality and Politics," Saturday Review^ 42:11-13, 38-39, February 7, 1959. Stoddard, George. "Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Annual j Meeting of the American Council on Education," Educational Record, XXIII (July, 1942), 602-609. I i I Stouffer, Samuel A. "What Are We Worried About?" Look, ' 19:25-27, March 22, 1955. "Straight Talk to American Editors," The Nation, CLXXX (May 7, 1955), 388. I Taylor, Harold. "A Conservative Educator," The New Republic, CXXX (March 22, 1954), 16-17. _______ . "Philosophical Aspects of the Harvard Report," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7:234, December, 1946. • "Some Questions and Answers," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 7:448, 452, March, 1947. "The Controversialist," Time, 66:6, December 12, 1955. "The Deeper Problem in Education," Life, 44:82, March 21, 1958. i"The Fund for the Republic," The New Republic, 136:5, I June 24, 1957. I I"The Hutchins Family in Education," The Review of Reviews, j LXXXIII (February, 1931), 92, 97. j i "The Men of the Ford Foundation," Fortune, XLIV (December, j 1951), 116-17. I"Theology in the University," The Christian Century, ! LX (November 17, 1943), 1326-28. 478 , "The People's Forum" (letters to editor), The Progressive, XXI (April, 1957), 30. "The Presidency of the University of Chicago," School and Society, XXIX (May 4, 1929), 566-67. "The Prodigy Grown Older and the Strings He Holds on Fund's Millions," Newsweek, XLVIII (July 2, 1956), 20-21. i "The Reece Report," The Commonweal, LXI (December 31, 1954), 349-50. "The University of Chicago," Fortune, XVI (December, 1937), 140-157. i Thompson, Wayne N. "Contemporary Public Address: A Problem in Criticism," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 40:24-42, February, 1954. _______ . "Contemporary Public Address As A Research Area," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIII (October, 1947), 274-283. Tolley, William Pearson. "A Counterfeit Bachelor's Degree," The Educational Record, XXIII (July, 1942), 593-601. "Too Late to Agitate?" The Catholic World, CLXXX (May, 1941), 137. "Tribunes of the People," Time, XXXII (October 10, 1938), 56. Tunis, John R. "Who Should Go to College?" Ladies Home j ; Journal, LV (September, 1938), 22-23, 75-77. | Turner, Russell. "The Ladies and the Pamphleteers," j I The American Legion Magazine, LX (June, 1956), j 14-15, 57-59. "Twenty for Hutchins," Newsweek. XXXIV (November 21, 1949), 87-88. i | ' Ulich, Robert. "A Liberal Education for All," The i Saturday Review, XXXVI (September 12, 1953), 28. 479 "Union Urges Ass'n of American Universities to Re- Examine Policy of McCarthy Period," Civil Liberties, 155:2, October, 1957. "University of Chicago," Life, XIX (July 16, 1945), 71-77. "University of the Future Envisioned," The Literary Digest, CXXII (October 31, 1936), 24-25. "Up Hutchins," Newsweek, XXVI (July 16, 1945), 76. Varney, Harold Lord. "The Egg-Head Clutch on the Founda tions," The American Mercury, LXXVIII (June, 1954), 31-37. Villemain, Francis T. "Dewey and the Critical Faculty," Saturday Review, 42:26, 52, November 21, 1959. Wechsler, James A. "The One-Interest Press," The Progressive, XXI (May, 1957), 9-11. Wecter, Dixon. "Can Metaphysics Save the World?" The Saturday Review of Literature, XXXI (April 10, 1948), 7-8, 30-32. _______ . "Commisars of Loyalty," The Saturday Review of Literature, 32:8-10, 52-53, May 13, 1950. Whitehead, Alfred North. "Harvard: The Future," The Atlantic Monthly, CLVIII (September, 1936), 260-270. Wittcoff, Raymond H. "Yes: Bootstraps of Free Man," The Saturday Review of Literature, 33:7-8, December 9, 1950. "Who's Who Among World Government Planners," Senior Scholastic, LIII (October 20, 1948), 20. Wolfson, Martin. "How to Think about Education: Mr. Collins and Mr. Frechtman," High Points, XXVI (May, 1944), 55-57. 480 "Worst Kind of Troublemaker," Time, LIV (November 21, 1949), 58-64. Wrong, Dennis H. "McCarthy and the Professors," The Reporter, 19:34-36, December 11, 1958. Newspapers "A Great University Embarks on a New Educational Plan," New York Times, March 8, 1931. Alexander, Holmes. "Fulbright and Foundations," Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1955. Childs, Marquis. "Fund for Republic Pattern for Truth," Los Angeles Mirror News, October 19, 1955. Columbia Spectator, April 25, 1940. Cowley, W. H. "Cowley Assails Hutchins' Plan," New York Times, May 31, 1942. Daily Maroon, April 9, 1940. Daily Maroon, April 1, 1941. Daily Maroon [Supplement], April 8, 1941. Daily Maroon, September 19, 1941. 1 Daily Maroon, May 12, 1942. !"Editorialists Wiged to Profit by Criticism," Christian | Science Monitor, November 20, 1948. |"Fear of Truth Seen Key to Critics of Risk Study," j The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 8, 1955. j Hallett, Robert M. "Teacher Fate Varies in Probes," l Christian Science Monitor, July 21, 1953. Hartmann, Robert T. "Hutchins Attacks Press 'Monopolies1," Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1955. Hutchins, Robert M. "A Great University Embarks on a New Educational Plan," New York Times, March 8, 1931. Jones, Coleman B. "Stassen Calls on Editors to Aid in Quest for Peace," New York Herald Tribune, April 22, 1955. Kihss, Peter. "Hutchins Condemns Red Party But Would Give Job to Member," New York Times, November 8, 1955. Lawrence, David. "The Fund Against the Republic," Los Angeles Mirror News, September 19, 1955. Lewis, Fulton, Jr., "Constitution Means What It Says," Los Angeles Examiner, September 15, 1955. . "Criticism Worries Fund," Lafayette Journal and Courrier, November 14, 1955. . "Foundation Reports Wiged," Los Angeles Examiner, October 7, 1955. . "Similarities to Party Line," Los Angeles Examiner. October 5, 1955. Lippmann, Walter. "On Criticism of the Press," Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1947. London Times [Educational Supplement], October 24, 1954. Los Angeles Daily News, July 22, 1953. I Los Angeles Daily News, July 24, 1953. | Los Angeles Daily News, July 27, 1953. i ! Los Angeles Mirror News, April 21, 1955. t j Los Angeles Mirror News, October 10, 1955. I I Los Angeles Mirror News, October 25, 1955. 482 j Los Angeles Mirror News, January 4, 1956. Los Angeles Mirror News, February 15, 1956. ; Los Angeles Mirror News, September 4, 1959. Los Angeles Times, March 26, 1946. Los Angeles Times, December 25, 1948. Los Angeles Times, February 24, 1951. I i Los Angeles Times, October 21, 1951. J Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1953. j Los Angeles Times, February 27, 1954. j Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1955. Los Angeles Times, September 20, 1955. Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1955. Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1955. Los Angeles Times, November 13, 1955. Los Angeles Times, November 21, 1955. Los Angeles Times, December 16, 1955. Los Angeles Times, January 26, 1958. Maloy, Richard T. "Editors Debate News Coverage," Washington Post and Times Herald, April 22, 1955. Moley, Raymond. "Hutchins Goes Hunting for Fear," | Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1955. I ________. "Now They're Hunting for Fearful Teachers," * Los Angeles Times, January 29, 1955. ! ________• "Well-Hidden Meaning, If Any," Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1955. New York Times. April 26, 1929. New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, New York Times, May 12, 1929. June 8, 1929, February 27, 1940. April 26, 1940. May 21, 1940. December 29, 1940. May 23, 1941. May 3, 1942. June 9, 1942. June 16, 1945. August 13, 1945. April 26, 1946. May 4, 1946. November 19, 1946. January 22, 1947, May 17, 1947. August 25, 1947. May 19, 1948. May 28, 1948. July 9, 1948. May 11, 1949. October 6, 1950. April 22, 1955. New York Times, November 8, 1955. New York Times, December 4, 1956. Poore, C. G. "Youth At Helm of a Great University," New York Times, May 12, 1929. "Robert Maynard Hutchins," The Associated Press Biograph ical Service, Sketch 3510, issued April 15, 1949. Santa Monica Evening Outlook, February 20, 1952. Stringer, William H. "Free Press Alerted," Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 1955. _______ . "The Road Back," Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 1955. "Students Stirred by Chicago University Plan," New York Times» May 31, 1959. "University of Chicago Ends Hutchins' System," New York Times, May 21, 1959. "Warning from America," The Times Educational Supplement, MMLXI (October 24, 1954), 1017. Weeks, Paul. "Legion Head Hits UNESCO," Los Angeles Mirror News, September 4, 1956. Publications of the Government, Learned Societies, and Other Organizations "America's Need: A New Birth of Freedom," 34th Annual Report. New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1954. 128 pp. "Clearing the Main Channels," 35th Annual Report. New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1955. 144 pp. 485 "Nor Speak with Double Tongue," 37th Annual Report. New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1956. 112 pp. The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1952. New York: The Ford Foundation, December 31, 1952. 70 pp. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations. Tax-Exempt Foundations. Hearings on House Resolution 217, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session from May 10-December 16, 1954. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955. 432 pp. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield: G. and C. Merriam Company, 1958. 1174 pp. Encyclopedia Articles Block, Maxine (ed.). "Robert Maynard Hutchins," Current Biography, 417-19. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1940. Candee, Marjorie Dent (ed,). "Robert Maynard Hutchins," Current Biography, 356-358. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1954. Hook, Sidney (ed.). Modern Education and Its Critics. Seventh Yearbook, 139-160. Chicago: The American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1954. Yust, Walter (ed.). "Robert Maynard Hutchins," Britannica j Book of the Year, 346. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952. i IYust, Walter (ed.). "Robert Maynard Hutchins," Britannica i Book of the Year, 344-5. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1954. i jYust, Walter (ed.). "Robert Maynard Hutchins," Britannica ! Book of the Year, 335. Chicago: Encyclopaedia i Britannica, Inc., 1956. Unpublished Materials Hoyme, Richard Gjermund. "History and Philosophy of the Great Books Movement in America from Erskine to St. John's College." Unpublished Master's project, The ! University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1954. 41 pp. McQuade, Elizabeth. "The Ethical Implications of the j Educational Thought of Robert Maynard Hutchins." Unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Chicago, ; Chicago, 1955. 63 pp. j Redding, W. Charles. "A Methodical Study of 'Rhetorical Postulates,' Applied to a Content Analysis of the 1944 Campaign Speeches of Dewey and Roosevelt." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1957. 1960 pp. Vlandis, John William. "Analysis and Criticism of Selected Speeches on Higher Education by Robert Maynard Hutchins as President of the University of Chicago." Unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, August, 1956. 126 pp. Ziegelmueller, George William. "An Analysis of Selected Speeches by Robert Maynard Hutchins on Education." Unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Southern Illinois, Carbondale, June, 1954. 86 pp. Zuner, Robert F. "Robert Maynard Hutchins' Conceptions of the Functions and Structures of Higher Education." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, 1951. 200 pp. Correspondence Beale, Howard K., of the University of Wisconsin, October 31, 1958. 487 Christensen, Marguerite, of the University of Wisconsin Library, August 12, 1959. Dickson, William B., of the Philadelphia Bulletin, March 17, 1959. Farr, Cleburne, of the University of Iowa, January 17, 1957. Personal correspondence between: Hutchins, Robert Maynard and Mortimer J. Adler, University of Chicago Library. Wilson, Dean Curtis, of the St. John's College, September 10, 1959. Citing Oral Discourse Opinion expressed by Professor Arthur Kooker at a History 484 lecture, at the University of Southern California, July, 1955. Statement by Professor Robert Brackenbury, of the School of Education at the University of Southern California, July, 1958. Statements by Robert Maynard Hutchins at an informal meeting at Los Angeles City College, June 18, 1959. Statements by Robert Maynard Hutchins, personal inter view, December 28, 1954. APPENDIXES 488 APPENDIX A THE ADDRESSES OF ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS ) 489 APPENDIX A THE ADDRESSES OF ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS I. REMINISCENCES1 Four years ago I had the honor of addressing my fellow Yale men on the Higher Learning in America. Since the lectures had of course a very narrow sale, the effect they would otherwise have produced did not follow. Instead, all the movements they were designed 5 to arrest, all the attitudes they were calculated to change, went rushing onward, in the case of the move ments, or became more firmly entrenched, in the case of the attitudes. I attacked triviality, and forty-two students 10 enrolled in the Oklahoma University short course for drum majors. I attacked vocational!sm, and the University of California announced a course in cosmetology, saying, "The profession of beautician is the fastest growing 15 in this state." I deplored a curriculum of obsolescent infor mation, and my colleague Professor Ogburn concluded that our information was increasing so rapidly that in order to get time to pour it all into our students 20 we should have to prolong adolescence at least until age forty-five. I asserted that higher education was primarily intellectual, and the President of the New York State College for Teachers said, not in reply, for he had 25 of course never read my book, "Education is not even primarily Intellectual, certainly not chiefly intel lectual. It is the process by which the emotions are socialized." Robert M. Hutchins, "Reminiscences," The Mathematics Teacher. 33:243-51* October, 1940. (Address delivered be fore faculty and students of Teachers College, Columbia Uni versity on April 25* 1940.) 490 491 I lamented the confusion that besets American 30 education and the President of a college not a hun dred miles from here, announced that chaos was a good thing. Though I should prefer chaos to an order im posed by force, I had never supposed that chaos was an ideal toward which all right-thinking men should strive. 35 Chaos had always seemed to me something you tried to get out of. I had always thought that what we wanted, both in politics and education, was a rational order rationally arrived at. One professor who had never read my book acci dentally agreed with me. He made the following out rageous remarks in a book of his own: "There will al ways remain," he said, "certain permanent values which education must cultivate, such as intellectual honesty, love of truth, ability to think clearly, moral quali ties." The fact that he was on this faculty and could be assumed to be only teasing, did not save him. He was sharply rebuked by a professor from Ohio State Uni versity who said that here he must "part company with the author of this indisputably significant volume for the suspicion grows that the author is still something of an absolutist." The author actually wanted educa tion to cultivate intellectual honesty, the love of truth, the ability to think clearly, and the moral qualities. How subversive. Now I will not conceal from you that one or two people did read my book. They had to. And they got it free in the course of their trade as book reviewers. One of these, who in his spare time is a professor, summed the whole thing up by saying that the trouble 60 with me was my intense moral idealism. Such a quality would naturally distort anybody’s view of education. A university president guilty of moral idealism? What is the world coming to? By some process of association of ideas I am reminded of the remarks of one of our 65 alumni who in a recent discussion at the University of Chicago said that everything I had said about football was logical, perfectly logical, very logical indeed. "But," he said, "if the University abolishes football, my son, now fifteen years old, will not want to go 70 there. In other words, "logical" is a term of re proach, and the University of Chicago should be illogi cal because one of its alumni has an illogical child. I have even heard the word "educational" in the same slurring connotation, as when a Princeton graduate 75 wrote to Woodrow Wilson saying, "I will have nothing 40 45 50 55 492 more to do with Princeton. You are turning my dear old college into an educational institution." A university president who is suspected of an interest in morals, in intellect, or even in education must expect the sever- est condemnation from those who have the true inter ests of our country at heart. But all these things are as nothing compared with the menace of metaphysics. I had mildly suggested that metaphysics might unify the modern university. I knew it was a long word, but I thought that my audience of learned book reviewers would know what it meant. I was somewhat surprised to find that to them metaphysics was a series of balloons, floating far above the surface of the earth, which could be pulled down by vicious or weak-minded people when they wanted to win an argument. The explosion of one of these balloons or the release of the gasses it contained might silence, but never con vince a wise man. The wise man would go away mutter ing, "Words, words, words," or "Anti-scientific," "Re actionary," or even "Fascist." Knowing that there is nothing true unless experimental science makes it so, the wise man knows that metaphysics is simply a tech nical name for superstition. Now I might as well make a clean breast of it all. I am interested in education, in morals, in in tellect, and in metaphysics. I even go so far as to hold that there is a necessary relation among all these things. I am willing to assert that without one we cannot have the others and that without the others we cannot have the one with which all of us here are pri marily concerned, namely, education. I insist, moreover, that everything that is happening in the world today confirms the immediate and pressing necessity of pulling ourselves together and getting ourselves straight on these matters. The world is probably closer to disintegration now than at any time since the fall of the Roman Empire. If there are any forces of clarification and unification left, however slight and ineffectual they may appear, they had better be mobilized instantly, or all that we have known as Western Civilization may vanish. Or if we assume that the United States can stand alone while the world goes to pieces, we must grant that our country is afflicted with problems which, though apparently.insoluble, must be solved if 80 85 90 95 100 105 no 115 120 493 this nation is to be preserved or to be worth preserv ing. These problems are not material problems. We may have faith that the vast resources of our land and the technological genius of our people will produce a sup ply of material goods adequate for the maintenance of that interesting fiction, the American Standard of Liv ing. No, our problems are moral, intellectual, and spiritual. The paradox of starvation in the midst of plenty illustrates the nature of our difficulties. This paradox will not be resolved by technical skill or scientific data. It will be resolved, if it is re solved at all, by wisdom and goodness. Now wisdom and goodness are the aim of higher education. How can it be otherwise? Wisdom and good ness are the end of human life. If you dispute this, you are at once entering upon a metaphysical contro versy; for you are disputing about the nature of being and the nature of man. This is as it should be. How can we consider man's destiny unless we ask what he is? How can we talk about preparing men for life un less we ask what the end of life may be? At the base of education, as at the base of every human activity, lies metaphysics. So it is with science. As Dr. H. S. Burr of the Yale Medical School has put it, and no one has put it better: "One of the primitive assumptions of sci ence is that we live in a universe of order; order de termined by, and controlled through, the operation of fundamental principles capable of elucidation and rea sonably exact definition. This assumption states that there is a metaphysics, a body of universal laws which can be grasped by the human intellect and utilized ef fectively in the solution of human problems." So it is with ethics and politics. We want to lead the good life. We want the good state as a means to that life. Once more, to find the good life and the good state, we must inquire into the nature of man and the ends of life. The minute we do that we are metaphysicians in spite of ourselves. Moreover, if ethics is the science of human freedom, we must know at the beginning whether and in what sense man is free. Here we are metaphysicians once again. And the sound ness of our moral conclusion depends on whether we are good metaphysicians or bad ones. So the preposterous positions of Mill's Essay on Liberty originate in his mistaken or inadequate analysis of the doctrine of free 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 494 will; and Aristotle's defense of natural slavery re sults from his failure to remember that according to Aristotelian metaphysics there can be no such thing as a natural slave. So it is with education. Here the great crimi nal was Mr. Eliot, who applied his genius, skill, and longevity to the task of robbing American youth of their cultural heritage. Since he held that there were no such things as good or bad subjects of study, his laudable effort to open the curriculum to good ones naturally led him to open it to bad ones and finally to destroy it altogether. So today, though it is pos sible to get an education in an American university, a man would have to be so bright and know so much to get it that he wouldn't really need it. So today the young American learns to read and write only if he goes to law school, where the principal, if not the sole merit of the case method is that it compels the development of powers that should have been perfected long before. Today the young American comprehends the intellectual tradition of which he is a part and in which he must live only by accident: for its scat tered and disjointed fragments are strewn from one end of the campus to the other. Our university graduates have far more information and far less understanding than in the colonial period. And our universities present themselves to our people in this crisis either as rather ineffectual trade schools or as places where nice boys have a nice time under the supervision of nice men in a nice environment. All this is the result of bad metaphysics or of no metaphysics other than that of an instinctive vari ety. The crucial error is that of holding that noth ing is any more important than anything else, that there can be no order of goods and no order in the in tellectual realm. There is nothing central and noth ing peripheral, nothing primary and nothing secondary, nothing basic and nothing superficial. The course of study goes to pieces because there is nothing to hold it together. Triviality, mediocrity, and vocational- ism take it over because we have no standard by which to judge them. We have nothing to offer as a substi tute for a sound curriculum except talk of personality, "character," and great teachers, the slogans of educa tional futilitarianism. We see, then, that metaphysics plays a double 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 part in higher education. By way of their metaphysics educators determine what education they shall offer. By way of metaphysics their students must lay the foundations of their moral, intellectual, and spiritu al life. By way of metaphysics I arrive at the con clusion that the aim of education is wisdom and good ness and that studies which do not bring us closer to this goal have no place in a university. If you would take a different view, you must show that you have a better metaphysics. By way of metaphysics students, on their part, may recover a rational view of the uni verse and of their r6le in it. If you deny this prop osition you take the responsibility of asserting that a rational view of the universe and one's r6le in it is no better than an irrational one or none at all. Since I take it that nobody here will take this responsibility, let us attempt to apply these notions to a dark and dubious field of education. Let us see how a program in general education of this variety should be organized, and let us see what its subject matter might be. I believe that general education should be giv en as soon as possible, that is, as soon as the stu dent has the tools and the maturity it requires. I think that the program I favor can be experienced with profit by juniors in high school. I therefore propose beginning general education at about the beginning of the junior year in high school. Since I abhor the credit system and wish to mark intellectual progress by examinations taken when the student is ready to take them, I shall have no difficulty in admitting younger, students to the program if they are ready for it and excluding juniors if they are not. The course of study that I shall propose is rig orous and prolonged. I think, however, that the ordi nary student can complete it in four years. By the ingenious device I have already suggested I shall be able to graduate some students earlier and some later, depending on the ability and industry that they dis play. General education should, then, absorb the at tention of students between the ages of fifteen or six teen and nineteen or twenty. This is the case in every country of the world but ours. It Is the case in some eight or nine places in the United States. 495 215 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 496 Where the high school and the junior college are part of a large city school system, the organization has been successful. Where, as at the University of Chi cago and Stephens College, the institution has either a small high school or none at all, the insignificant size of the first two years of the program and the large size of the last two create great difficulties. If you have seventy students entering the four year unit at the junior year in high school and 700 enter ing at the freshman year in college, it is absurd to talk about a coherent four-year program. You must have a curriculum that the 700 can enter in the middle without being handicapped because they did not enter at the beginning. If in such institutions as my own the scheme I advocate is to succeed, we shall have to convince the local parents, at least, that it is wise for them to send their children to us two years earlier than they have been accustomed to sending them. I think that if parents cannot be persuaded to do this the Univer sity of Chicago should abandon collegiate work alto gether and give up its freshman and sophomore years. Those years at present are a foreign body in the other wise admirable constitution of the university. The students in them have different ambitions from those in the divisions above; the teachers have different ambitions, too. But if ties cannot be found for these two years above they must be found below; for I do not believe that two years at any level is long enough to provide an adequate education. It is suggestive that two year units do not exist anywhere else in the world; they are known only in the United States. I may mention at this point one aspect of the organization of general education which ought to be trivial but in this country is most important. I fa vor awarding the bachelor's degree in recognition of general education; I favor awarding it about the end of the sophomore year. This suggestion is not so startling as many people think. President Butler of Columbia advocated it in his annual report for the year 1901-1902. In Prance the baccalaureat is used to indicate the satisfactory completion of general education. The reasons for giving it the same sig nificance here are first that it now has no signifi cance at all. The bachelor's degree means four years in college. As the president of Hiram has lately said, "To most college students who sit long enough 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305 497 and patiently enough and docilely give hack a modicum of the wisdom that has flowed past their ears, there will come in time the reward of their long-sitting, sheepskins to cover their intellectual nakedness. . . . The usual requirements for graduation, a minimum of 120 hours with additional credit for physical educa tion may represent little more than hours of painful but patient sitting. Their blood relationship to achievement is so far removed as to make the claimed relationship laughable 1 But it is not only the credit system and the examination-by-the-teacher who taught-the-course sys tem that make the B. A. certify merely to four years of sitting. It is also and I think principally the fact that the standard four-year college of liberal arts is and must be concerned with both general and specialized education. Even in some of the oldest and most conservative of these colleges you will find that the student may indulge in extreme specialization at an early stage. Yet the preparation with which stu dents enter these colleges is such that the colleges must also give them a general education. These two aims can only confuse the colleges and hence confuse the significance of the degree that they offer. Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Chicago and several other places have attempted to meet this situation by dividing the first two years from the last two. Some institutions have even given them different staffs and administrations. Here we face again the problems raised by two year units. The first two years is not long enough for general education; the last two is not long enough for advanced study. The remedy would seem to be a four-year unit beginning with the junior year in high school and leading to the bachelor's degree, and after that a three-year unit beginning with the junior year in college and leading to the master's de gree. The bachelor's degree would then indicate an adequate general education and the master's an adequate experience in advanced study. This master's degree should also indicate that the holder is qualified for a teaching position in which research is not expected or required. The last two years of the present college of liberal arts is left stranded when the college is di vided into upper and lower divisions. We have found at Chicago that one of our more difficult problems is 310 315 320 325 330 335 3^0 345 350 how to provide any intelligible plan of advanced study in the junior and senior year. Some of our depart ments have succeeded in persuading students to plain their courses beginning with the junior year for three years to the master's degree. These departments have been able to effect notable improvements in both the general cultivation and the specific training of their graduates. I recommend the award of the bachelor's degree at the end of the period of general education, that is about the end of the sophomore year, for the sake of advanced study as much as for the sake of gen eral education. It may be objected that many students will not want to add a year to their program of advanced study. This in my view is an argument for the plan. The edu cational system will be compelled to accommodate the youth of the nation up to the end of the junior col lege, that is, to about nineteen or twenty. There is no reason why it should accommodate them after that. Beginning with the junior year, education should be limited to those who are able and willing to profit by it. We should rigorously select our students at the university level, by which I mean at the beginning of the junior year. Since, therefore, many students should terminate their education at the end of the sophomore year, one problem is how to induce them to do so. I think they will stay on and, through sheer im portunity, get themselves a degree unless they can re ceive some recognizable and popular insignia at the end of the sophomore year. The bachelor's degree is recognizable and popular. Since it serves no useful purpose at present, I believe it should be made to serve the very useful one of persuading students to get out of education who should not be permitted to re main in it. If general education is to be given between the beginning of the junior year in high school and the end of the sophomore year in college and if the bach elor's degree is to signify the completion of it, the next question is what is the subject matter that we should expect the student to master in this period to qualify for this degree? Now I do not hold that general education should be limited to the classics of Greece and Rome. I do not believe that it is possible or desirable to insist that all students who should have a general education 498 355 360 365 370 375 380 385 390 395 499 must study Greek and Latin. I do not hold that tradi tion is important in education; that the primary pur pose of education, indeed, is to help the student un derstand the intellectual tradition in which he lives. I do not see how he can reach this understanding un less he understands the great books of the western world, beginning with Homer and coming down to our own day. If anybody can suggest a better method of accom plishing the purpose, I shall gladly embrace him and it. Nor do I hold that the spirit, the philosophy, the technology, or the theology of the Middle Ages is important in general education. I have no desire to return to this period any more than I wish to revert to antiquity. - Some books written in the Middle Ages seem to me of some consequence to mankind. Most Ph.D.'s have never heard of them. I should like to have all students read some of them. Moreover, medieval schol ars did have one insight; they saw that in order to read books you had to know how to do it. They devel oped the technics of grammar, rhetoric, and logic as methods of reading, understanding, and talking about things intelligently and intelligibly. I think it can not be denied that our students in the highest reaches of the university are woefully deficient in all these abilities today. They cannot read, write, speak, or think. I do not suggest that we should attempt to in troduce the trivium and quadrivium into the American college. I do say that we must try to do for our own students what the seven liberal arts did for the medi eval youth. If the Middle Ages have any suggestion to make on this point, we should welcome them. We need all the help we can get. I should like to remark in passing that in the Middle Ages people went to universities at thirteen or fourteen. They read books and experienced disciplines that are regarded as far too difficult for university professors today. Most of the great books of the west ern world were written by laymen. Nothing reveals so clearly the indolence and inertia into which we have fallen as the steady decline in the number of these books read in our schools and colleges and the steady elimination of instruction in the disciplines through which they may be understood. And all this has gone on in the sacred name of liberalizing the curriculum. 400 405 410 415 420 425 430 435 440 The curriculum I favor is not too difficult even for very ordinary American students. It is 500 difficult for the professors but not for the students. And the younger the students are the better they like 445 the books, because they are not old enough to know that the books are too hard for them to read. Something like the course of study I should favor is now in force at St. John's College, Maryland. There an unselected group of Indifferently prepared students are studying 450 these books with tremendous enthusiasm thirty-five hours a week. They read last fall ten dialogues of Plato and voted to have extra classes so that they might read and discuss the rest of them. In connection with the reading, they are going through a formidable 455 course of instruction in grammar, rhetoric, logic, and mathematics. The entire freshman class at Columbia is I hear now reading and discussing twenty-five of the great books in philosophy and literature. I understand that 460 Rushing Week was a failure because the students were too interested in the reading to be interested in fra ternities, that the books are the chief subject of discussion at all informal student gatherings, and that the only complaint comes from teachers in other 465 courses who feel that their work is suffering from the excitement the books in the Humanities course arouse. For eight years and more I have taught these books to unselected pupils in our University High School, and to freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors in col- 470 lege. Not one of them has suggested that the books were too hard or that they were not worth reading. I can testify from this experience, though not, of course, very scientifically, that students who can read any thing thrive on these books and that the younger they 475 are the more they thrive. Those who think that this is a barren, arid program, remote from real life and devoid of contempo rary interest, have either never read the books or do not know how to teach. Or perhaps they have merely 480 forgotten their youth. These books contain what the race regards as the permanent, abiding contributions its intellect and imagination have made. They deal with fundamental questions. It is a mistake to sup pose that young people are interested only in football, 485 the dramatic association, and the student newspaper. I think it could be proved that these activities have grown to their present overwhelming importance in pro portion as the curriculum has been denatured. Students resort to the extracurriculum because the curriculum 490 is stupid. Young people are interested in fundamental questions. They are interested in great minds and great works of art. They are, of course, interested in the bearing of these works on the problems of the world today. It is, therefore, impossible to keep out of the discussion, even if the teacher were so fossil ized as to want to, the consideration of current events. But these events then take on meaning; the points of difference and the points of similarity be tween then and now can be presented. Think what a mind of references to what is now going on in the world is Plato's Republic or Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. If I had to prescribe an exclusive diet for young Americans, I should rather have them read books like these than gain their political, economic and so cial orientation by listening to the best radio com mentators or absorbing The New York Times. Fortunate ly we do not have to make the choice; they can read the books and listen to the commentators and absorb The New York Times too. I repeat: these important agencies of instruction--the radio and the newspaper-- and all other experiences of life, as a matter of fact— take on intelligibility as the student comes to understand the tradition in which he lives. Though we have made great advances in technology, so that the steam turbine of last year may not be of much value in understanding the steam turbine of 1940, we must re member that the fundamental questions today are those with which the Greeks were concerned; and the reason is that human nature has not changed. The answers that the Greeks gave are still the answers with which we must begin if we hope to give the right answer to day. The answers they gave have affected human histo ry so profoundly that we cannot approach the issue of the purpose of the state, for example, without uncon sciously reflecting their views. We may apply to these early thinkers the words of Cardinal Newman about Aristotle: "Do not suppose, that in thus appeal ing to the ancients, I am throwing back the world two thousand years, and fettering philosophy with the rea sonings of paganism. While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. 'He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think cor rectly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his 501 495 500 505 510 515 520 525 530 535 502 disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it." Do not suppose that in thus including the an cients in my course of study I am excluding the mod erns. I do not need to make a case for the moderns. I do apparently need to remind you that the works of the ancients lie at the foundation of the tradition in which we live. Do not suppose, either, that because I have used as examples the great books in literature, phi losophy, and the social sciences I am ignoring natural science. The great works in natural science and the great experiments must be a part-and an important part of general education. Here again I am not concerned with the method; I am concerned with the end. The student should understand the leading ideas in the natural sciences. Do you think he does today? On the contrary, what he gets today is either a super ficial shower from a survey course or professional instruction from the first day of the freshman year, based apparently on the notion that every member of the class is going to be a chemical engineer. General education is not professional education. The curric ulum must be designed to prepare the student for in telligent citizenship. The type of scientific in struction that I received in college has no place in the kind of college I am proposing. As for survey courses of the usual variety, they have no place either. They degenerate too easily into a rapid tour of all the facts known in physics, chemistry, and bi ology. The basis of the scientific program should be the great landmarks of scientific work, the books and the experiments. Neither at Columbia nor at Chicago has anybody interested in the kind of curriculum I am suggesting had the facilities for the kind of scientific instruc tion we have wanted to give. At St. John’s College those facilities are available and are now being used. It appears that between a half and a third of the course of study will be mathematics and natural sci ence. In fact, St. John's is the only major college in the country in which every student must take labo- atory science for four years. Another problem that has disturbed those who have discussed this issue is what books I am going to cram down the throats of the young. The answer is that if any reasonably intelligent person will 540 545 550 555 560 565 570 575 580 585 503 conscientiously try to list the hundred most important books that have ever been written I will accept his list. I feel safe in doing this because (a) the books would all be worth reading and (b) his list would be almost the same as mine. There is, in fact, startling unanimity about what the good books are. The real question is whether they have any place in education. The suggestion that nobody knows what books to select is put forward as an alibi by those who have never read any that would be on anybody's list. Only one criticism of this program has been made which has seemed to me on the level. That is that the students who cannot learn through books will not be able to learn through the course of study that I propose. This, of course, is true. It is what might be called a self-evident proposition. I sug gest, however, that we employ this curriculum for students who can be taught to read and that we con tinue our efforts to discover methods of teaching the rest of the youthful population how to do it. The undisputed fact that some students cannot read any books should not prevent us from giving those who can read some the chance to read the best there are. I could go on here indefinitely discussing the details of this program and the details of the attacks that have been made on it. But these would be de tails. The real question is Which side are you on? If you believe that the aim of general education is to teach students to make money; if you believe that the educational system should mirror the chaos of the world; if you think that we have nothing to learn from the past; if you think that the way to prepare students for life is to put them through little fake experiences inside or outside the classroom; if you think that education is information; if you believe that the whims of children should determine what they should study, then I am afraid we can never agree. If, however, you believe that education should train students to think so that they may act intelligently when they face new situations; if you regard it as important for them to understand the tradition in which they live; if you feel that the present educa tional program leaves something to be desired because of its "progressivism," utilitarianism, and diffusion; if you want to open up to the youth of America the treasures of the thought, imagination, and accomplish ment of the past, then we can agree, for I shall gladly 590 595 600 605 610 615 620 625 630 accept any course of study that will take us even little way along this road. 505 II. WHAT KIND OP SOCIETY DO WE WANT?2 We see about us today the logical consequences of the Intellectual development of the last two hundred years. Europe, as we have known it, seems fated to dis appear; and, whether or not the United States enters the European war, the repercussions of that conflict 5 upon our social and economic structure are bound to be severe. We are thus confronted with two basic ques tions: first, what are the intellectual beliefs that underlie the structure in which we have been brought up, the structure that is now toppling; and second, what 10 foundations shall the survivors of the Impending catas trophe seek to lay for the new order that Is to come. If we can determine what those foundations are to be, we shall have little difficulty, I believe, in discover ing what type of education we shall require. 15 Since everything is a matter of opinion, it fol lows that everyone’s opinion is as good as everyone else's opinion. And so, as Karl Marx puts It, When rights are equal, force decides. In this scheme of things, morals are, of course, but another name for 20 mores. Truth and justice fare no better. Truth Is tested by immediate practical success. Therefore, the stronger, as Napoleon said, has truth on his side. Freedom is doing what you please, or in other words do ing what you are strong enough to do. Freedom, truth, 25 morals, then, all belong to the powerful. Might is right. In a society founded on these principles, the state is a purely conventional arrangement for the or ganization of power. Harold D. Laswell, one of my col- 30 leagues in the University of Chicago, recently wrote a serious book, which he called, Politics: Who Gets What. Why. How. Mr. Laswell is in the Department of Politi cal Science. Others of my colleagues, who teach eco nomics and sociology, describe the state simply as an 35 independent, autonomous, economic machine. O Robert Maynard Hutchins, "What Kind of Society Do We Want?" T h e Journal of Adult Education. 12:359-61, October, 1940. (Delivered before The American Association of Adult Education, Hotel Astor, New York City, May 21, 1940.) 506 What can the final conclusion from these premises be except that man is no different from the brutes? Then why should he not be treated as Hitler; Mussolini; and even Stalin, I understand, are treating him? Why 40 not brutalize him further? Why not slaughter him? It is in such a setting as this that we have the unparalleled effrontery to ask, What is the educational base of our national culture? Can any one fail to see that, in the existing regime, if education has any ob- 45 ject at all other than perfecting the propaganda for this regime, it is adjustment to the environment, wheth er that environment be good or bad? The question to which we should be seeking an answer, it seems to me, is not what is the educational 50 base of our national culture, but what is to be the cultural base of our national education. In the words of Frank Knight, Professor of Economics in the Univer sity of Chicago, education, democratically controlled, is a means of ensuring the continuity of accepted val- 55 ues, or even of accentuating these values. It is not a means by which society may lift itself by its own bootstraps into a different spiritual world. Or, as Plato had it, What is honored in the country will be cultivated there. 60 What then is to be honored in the United States? What kind of society do we want? Let us say, in the first place, that we want justice. And, since justice is of all the virtues most clearly social in its application, if we attain this 65 virtue we shall have a society in which everyone will receive his due share of all things, including economic goods. Then let us say, in the second place, that no state, no political organization, is an end in itself. If a state does not secure happiness to every citizen, J O or is not at least directed toward that end, it is a bad state. Now, as we all know, citizens do not find happiness solely in the possession of large quantities of material goods; they achieve it by developing their specifically human powers to the fullest possible extent. 75 Happiness comes through the cultivation of tolerance and reason and the power of rational choice. Courage, temperance, liberality, honor, justice, wisdom, and un derstanding are still the virtues that we, as rational human beings, all desire. 80 507 Thus, you see, if we are going to try to discover the cultural base of our national education, we must be gin with the nature of man, the nature of the individu als who constitute our society and who are to receive the education that we offer. It is ridiculous to talk about educating the whole man, unless we know what man is. It is ridiculous to talk of preparing, or educat ing for life, unless we know what life is for. I submit that the end of human life is happiness and that the means of achieving happiness on this earth is the building up of good habits. This brings us to education and gives us as the aim of education the de velopment of good habits. It Is clear that we can not have a good educa tion, except by accident and in very limited quanti ties, in a bad society. It would seem to be obvious that we can not improve a bad society by a good educa tion against its will. If a nation is willing to have a good culture, then, and only then, can it have a good system of education. It may be that the present international crisis, and the fear that is sweeping the western world, will have one very desirable by-product. It may be that we shall all be so terrified that we shall be willing to improve it. It may be that the dangers of the kind of society in which we have been living, and the kind of education we have been giving and receiving, are so ob vious to all of us that educators will now have an op portunity to work out a new cultural basis for our na tional education. But I urge you to remember that if we would change the face of the earth, we must first change our habits; and that if educators would change the face of education, they, too, must change their own habits. 85 90 95 100 105 n o 508 III. THE PROPOSITION IS PEACE3 We hear on every side, that war is inevitable, even that we are at war, and that there is nothing we can do about it. Things look black. The President now calls for "total victory" over "the enemy" and urges upon us the 5 determination needed to win. Still there is a chance that these remarks are for foreign consumption and do not mean what they seem to mean. They seem to mean that the British, Chinese, and Greeks are our allies. If this is so, it is im- 10 moral to let them die for us while we sit safely at home. We should have been in the war from the start. We should fight now. And if we are actually to press on to total victory, we must fight. We are not justi fied in hoping that the Axis will suffer total defeat 15 without full American participation in the war. Two days after war broke out in Europe the Pres ident assured the nation that he would do everything he could to keep it at peace. He has repeated these assurances again and again. Every speech he made dur- 20 ing the campaign contained a pledge to keep the country out of war. The night before the election he said, "We propose and expect to continue our lives in peace. Two weeks ago he said, "Do not let us waste time review ing the past or fixing or dodging the blame for it." 25 But I cannot believe that this means that he wants us to forget his promises to pursue a policy of peace. Until we are engaged in military action we must continue to hope that we can avoid the ultimate catas trophe. We stand on the brink of war. But we have not 30 been attacked. The burden of proof rests on those who claim we are about to be. We have not lost the power to decide for peace or war. We still have a chance to catch our breath, reflect a little, and take a last look around before we plunge into the abyss. The 35 ^Robert M. Hutchins, "The Proposition Is Peace," Vi tal Speeches of the Day, 7:389"92, April 15, 1941. (Deliv ered in Rockefeller Memorial Chapel, Chicago, March 30, 1941.) 509 President is a democratic leader. One of his greatest qualities is his sense of responsibility to the people. If he is moving toward war, he must be doing it in the conviction that the people want him to. If this is his conviction, he is mistaken. The people have never 40 had a chance to express themselves on the issue of war or peace. The election gave them no chance. Both parties declared for peace. Both candidates declared for peace. No one should know better than Mr. Roosevelt 45 that the newspapers are not always a reliable index of public opinion. Even if most of the newspapers are for war, it is no more significant than that only a third of them were for Roosevelt in 1936 and only a fifth of them for him in 1940. 50 The Gallup Poll shows that the people are for peace and that they trust Mr. Roosevelt to keep them at- peace. The Gallup question published ten days ago was, "if you were asked to vote on the question of the United States entering the war against Germany and 55 Italy, how would you vote--to go into the war or to stay out of war?" Eighty-three per cent of those asked said they would vote to stay out. The percentage voting to stay out was higher than it was a year ago. On the other hand, when the question has been, "Do you 60 favor aiding Britain at the risk of war?" the majority of those asked have said yes. We can only infer that the people want peace and that relying on Mr. Roose velt’s promises of peace they have been willing to help Britain at the risk of war. The risk of war, with Mr. 65 Roosevelt at the helm, was too slight to worry about. The country wants to defend itself, aid Britain, and stay out of war. We have been told over and over again that we could do just that. During the hearings and debates on the Lease-Lend Bill man after man an- 70 nounced that this was a bill to keep the country out of war. Mr.Wlllkie said that was why he was for it. Sen ator George, who led the fight for the bill, said that was why he was for it. The passage of this bill gave the President no mandate for war. The people want 75 peace. If we go to war, what are we going to war for? Mr. Roosevelt tells us we are to save "the democracies." The democracies are, presumably, England, China, Greece, and possibly Turkey. Turkey is a dictatorship. Greece 80 510 is a dictatorship. China is a dictatorship. As to Eng land, in 1928 Mr. Anthony Eden, now Foreign Secretary, speaking in behalf of a bill extending the suffrage, felt it necessary to say to the House of Commons, "We have not got democratic government in this country to day; we never have had it and I venture to suggest to hon. Members opposite that we shall never have it. What we have done, in all the progress of reform and evolution of politics, is to broaden the basis of our oligarchy." There can be no doubt that the people of this country prefer the government of Britain to the govern ments of its allies or its enemies. Britain is a con stitutional state and has been the inspiration of many constitutional states. We prefer the governments of China, Greece, and Turkey to those of the Axis. But we cannot use the word democracy to describe every country that is or may be at war with the Axis. If Russia is attacked by Germany, will she be welcomed into the choir of the democracies? If we go to war, what are we going to war for? The British propose to defeat the Axis. What they pro pose to do then they do not say. They have repeatedly refused to say. Yet the United States is entitled to know. Are we to rush to arms every time the British Empire is in danger? If so, we are entitled to know what the future policy of the British Empire is to be. Are we to put down every tyrant that arises in Europe? If so, we are entitled to know what is to be done to keep each tyrant from being worse than the last. If we go to war, what are we going to war for? The only specific statement the President has made on the course we are to pursue after the war is found in two sentences in his last speech. He said, "We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the in herent right to its own nationhood." To the same ef fect he said, "There never has been, there isn't now, and there never will be any race of people fit to serve as masters over their fellow men." Do these statements imply the restoration of pre-war boundaries in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, Danzig, Poland, France, China, and Rumania? Is this undertaking to be world-wide? If so, how do we induce Russia to restore the pre-war boundaries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland? 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 511 If we succeed In re-establishing these boundaries how do we know they will last? The boundaries we helped lay down the last time fell apart in twenty years. And we tried to lay them down on the same principle that the President proposes now: the principle of self-determi nation. And what do we do about the countries which were victims of aggression before 1939? Is everybody who stole anything before that date to keep it, and every body who stole anything after it to give it up? What do we do about Hong Kong, the Malay States, the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, Africa, and, above all, India? If there never has been, isn't now, and never will be any race of people fit to serve as masters over their fellow men, how can we tolerate the mastery of the white race over our yellow, brown, and black fellow men throughout the world? If we go to war, what are we going to war for? We are stirred, but not enlightened, by the great phrase--the four freedoms--whieh the President has used as the general statement of our aims. Freedom of wor ship, freedom of speech, freedom from want, and freedom from fear--if we go to war, we go to establish these four freedoms everywhere. The President cannot literally mean that we are to fight on till the four freedoms ring everywhere. If we are to be responsible for the four freedoms everywhere, we must have authority everywhere. We must force the four freedoms upon people who might prefer to do without them rather than accept them from the armed missionaries of the United States. This new im perialism, this revised conception of the White Man's Destiny is a repudiation of the presidential teaching that there never has been, isn't now, and never will be any race of people fit to serve as masters over their fellow men. Of course, we must extend the four freedoms to our "allies" as well as our "enemies." We must see to it that British possessions throughout the world have them. The hopes held out to India during the last war, disappointed after it, and now held out again must be fulfilled. China, Greece, and Turkey must reform, too. In the Latin-American countries we shall have no easy task. Few of them have the four freedoms now. From Mexico to Patagonia we must send our legions to convert 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 512 our good neighbors by force of arms. The President cannot mean this, for it is a pro gram of perpetual war, war in Latin-America, war in the Far East, war in the South Seas, and even war with Britain. Mr. Roosevelt must mean that by defeating the Axis we shall rid the world of those governments at present most aggressive in their attack on the four freedoms. The first step is war. Here, then, is the real issue. Is the path to war the path to freedom? This war, if we enter it, will be long, hard, and bloody. We do not have the choice between a short war abroad and a prolonged period of militarization at home. The "enemy now controls all of Europe and part of Asia, and is not yet driven from Africa. We have no evidence that the totalitarian regimes will fly to pieces when their opponents get superiority in the air, or even that superiority can be achieved. Total war for total victory against totalitarian states can best be conducted by totalitarian states. The reason is simple. A totalitarian state is nothing but a military machine. A totalitarian state will be more effective in war than any other kind of state. A democratic state is organized for the happiness of its citizens. But their happiness cannot be considered in total war. Every one of them must become a cog in the military machine. If the United States is to proceed through total war to total victory over totalitarian states, it will have to become totalitarian too. Is total war, then, the path to freedom? We seek freedom from want, and we impoverish ourselves. We seek freedom from fear, and we terrorize ourselves. We seek freedom of worship and freedom of speech, and we suppress them. And when total victory has been won, will the totalitarian administration end? We may find a clue in England. A responsible member of the British Cabinet, Sir Archibald Sinclair, publicly supports a proposal that there shall be no elections in England for three years after the war. The reason is clear. Poverty and disillusionment will make democracy dan gerous . What will be America's fate after a long, hard, and bloody war? In times of peace we have had ten 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 513 million unemployed; we shall have at least that many again. We shall have an enormous debt. Repudiation 215 and inflation may rid us of that— and at the same time of the middle class. Having exhausted our resources in getting guns, we shall .have none for butter, houses, relief, social security or education. We shall have want and fear, and we may have the maintenance of or- 220 der by a government scarcely distinguishable from those which we went forth to fight. We may have the kind of freedom proclaimed by one of Napoleon's marshals to the German towns. He said, "My friends, I bring you perfect liberty. But be prudent. I shoot the first 225 man who stirs. There are those who say, "Of course, if we go to war, we shall have totalitarianism in this country. But if we try to stay at peace, we shall have all this and Hitler too. Unless we go over and get Hitler, 230 Hitler will come over and get us." Lord Halifax on Tuesday said that Hitler could never invade England. If he can never invade England, he can never conquer the Western Hemisphere. We in America have a chance to save democracy if we build 235 our defenses and stay at peace. If we enter upon total war to total victory, we lose that chance, even if we win the victory. War, except in self defense, is a counsel of despair, despair because the world is bad, despair be- 240 cause peaceful change is too slow and hard. It was the counsel of the nihilists, the Russian revolution aries described by Dostoyevsky. They believed In progress by catastrophe. Our modern American nihil ists want catastrophe because they despair of getting 245 progress in any other way. They think that everything will be wonderful after the war because such things as capitalism, which they dislike, will be destroyed. I think it fairly certain that capitalism will not survive American participation in this war. And 250 since it is the vehicle of the materialism that has brought us to our present pass, I am not altogether sure that It deserves to. But experience after the last war in Germany, Italy, and Russia does not sug gest that catastrophe is the road to something better. 255 The trouble with the doctrine of progress through catastrophe is that you can be sure of the 514 catastrophe, but not of the progress. So of war as the path to freedom. You can be certain of the war. The freedom is another matter. If we enter this war, we shall lose what we have of the four freedoms. We shall lose the hope of realizing them. What we have, in this country, is hope. War, for this country, is a counsel of despair. It is a confession of failure. It is na tional suicide. We have far surpassed most other nations in our advance toward the four freedoms. We and we alone have the hope of realizing them. We must bravely and hopefully face the task of realizing them. We must show the world a nation which understands, values, and practices the four freedoms. This is America's destiny. We cannot run away from our destiny because it is hard. We cannot avoid it by claiming that we must have the British fleet to protect us. We cannot evade it by pleading fatigue from our futile efforts to meet the depression, suggesting that we would like an ocean voyage to recuperate. We cannot be like Stendhal's hero, who at the age of sixteen ran away to join Napo leon to escape from the sorrows that were poisoning his life, especially on Sundays. We must stay here and fight. As Mr. Wilkie said so truly during the campaign, "America's battle for liberty is right here at home." The path to war is a false path to freedom. It is a false path to freedom for America. It is a false path to the four freedoms everywhere. War is for the sake of peace. The spirit of the peace will be deter mined by the spirit of the countries which make it. An Englishman, J. Middleton Murry, said of England, "This country, as it is, is incapable of winning a Christian victory, because it simply is not Christian." This general principle is sound. No country can win a democratic victory unless it is democratic. Only those who understand, value, and practice democracy know what a democratic peace would be. Only those who understand, value, and practice justice can make a just peace. Only those who understand, value, and practice the four freedoms can make a peace to estab lish them everywhere. Fear and ignorance wrote the last peace: the fear of the French and British, the Ignorance of all 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 515 the nations. From this fear and ignorance sprang a peace that made this war inevitable. There is no less fear and certainly no less ignorance today. Have we the courage and the wisdom to bring the world to a peace that shall establish the four freedoms everywhere? If we have, we should do it, no matter what the cost in blood or treasure. We want to serve humanity, and in her cause we should be proud to sacrifice our fortunes and our lives. We cannot seriously believe that what we have of the four freedoms we owe to our courage and our wis dom. We owe it rather to the courage and wisdom of our forefathers who wrote our constitution and to the Divine Providence that placed enormous resources at our disposal at a distance from the conflicts of the Old World. Do not misunderstand me. We have accom plished much; but when we appraise our opportunities and our obligations we see that it is only a beginning. We are fearful and we are ignorant. Our fear is the result of our ignorance. Our fundamental error is the overwhelming importance that we attach to material goods. Money is the symbol of the things we honor. Only in war can we be united by the call to sacrifice billions for the welfare of mankind. Only at such a time could Mr. Jesse Jones say without bitter protest from the taxpayers, "We are preparing for war. When you do that, you must throw money away." We are frightened and confused by our inability to use our vast resources to obtain a constant flow of more and better material goods. We are dismayed by the long depression and the collapse of our attempts to deal with it. We are easy marks for those who tell us that the way out of our troubles is to march to Berlin. Are we so ignorant that we think the way to de feat a doctrine we hate is to shoot at it? Are we so naive that we believe that rearrangements in the mate rial order--land, mines, and waterways--will solve the problems of the world? Are we so child-like as to suppose that the overthrow of the Nazis will bring a just and lasting peace? Are we so frightened as to think that if only the British Empire can be preserved, if only the Germans can be crushed, all the ills that have beset us will automatically disappear? But if we go to war, and preserve the British Empire, and crush the Germans, our fundamental prob lems will remain. We do not face our fundamental 305 310 315 320 323 330 335 340 345 516 problems by going to war; we evade them. We do not make a just and lasting peace by writing into another treaty the fear, ignorance, and confusion that have marred our efforts to build a democratic community at home. If we would change the face of the earth we must first change our own hearts. Hitler was right in holding before the German people an ideal higher than comfort. He knew he could not give them that. He offered them instead a vision of national grandeur and "racial" supremacy. These are false gods. Since they are false, they will fail in the end. But Hitler was half right. He was right in what he condemned, and wrong in what he offered in its place. It is our task in this country to realize the true ideals of human life, the true organization of human society, the true democracy. It is our task to work out a new order in America not, like Hitler's, based on slavery and degradation, but based on the premise that society exists to promote the happiness of its members and that happiness consists in the de velopment of the highest powers of men. The good life and the just society--not the luxurious life of the powerful state--these are the goals toward which Ameri ca must strive. It is America's destiny to reach these goals. It is her duty to the world to struggle toward them. The war to which humanity calls America is the war against poverty, disease, ignorance, and injustice. We must win this war in America, now. We can hardly be content with a society in which almost half the people are living below the minimum level of subsist ence. We cannot be proud to learn that 250*000 babies were born last year without benefit of medical care. With one-room school houses, scanty libraries, non existent art museums, and undernourished churches, vast stretches of our country are barren cultural, in tellectual, and spiritual wastes. And too often American justice is the interest of the stronger writ ten into law. We must fight on if we are to win America's war. To win this war we must have peace. Edmund Burke said to the House of Commons: "Judging of what you are by what you ought to be, I persuaded myself that you would not reject a reasonable proposition be cause it had nothing but its reason to recommend it . . . The proposition is peace." 350 355 360 365 370 375 380 385 390 517 The proposition has nothing but its reason to recommend it. The war to total victory over poverty, disease, ignorance, and injustice has none of the glamour and draws few of the cheers that accompany a war of mutual extermination. But though tyrants may be put down, tyranny cannot be destroyed by airplanes and tanks. Tyranny can be destroyed only by creating a civilization in which people will not suffer so much that they will trade their liberties for the pitiful security which the tyrant offers. The war to create this civilization is our war. We must take advantage of every day we have left to build a democracy which will command the faith of our people, and which, by the light of its example, will restore the democratic faith to the people of the world. America has been called the arsenal of democracy. It has been called the larder of democracy. Let us make it the home of democracy. This is America's destiny. 395 400 405 410 518 IV. THE UNIVERSITY OP CHICAGO AND THE BACHELOR'S DEGREE^ For fifty years the University of Chicago has been struggling with two problems: how to be a univer sity and how to develop and administer a liberal educa tion. It has conceived of a university as an institu tion devoted to scholarship, advanced study, and the 5 preparation of men and women for scholarship and the learned professions. It has conceived of liberal edu cation as that education which every citizen should have in proportion to his capacity to receive it. Long ago the university settled for itself the 10 relation between these problems. It determined that no student could enter upon university work until he had had a liberal education. When in 1927 the School of Business dropped the instruction of freshmen and sopho mores, the university completed the job of making its 15 formal organization reflect this determination. When the College of the university was established in 1930* the content of courses in the freshman and sophomore years was changed to make them part of liberal educa tion instead of first steps toward the Ph.D. degree. 20 In 1932 the last two years of University High School was incorporated in the program of the College so that the College might have time to assist the student to get a liberal education. An institution which wishes to disentangle the 25 university and the college must fix the point at which the college ends and the university begins in conformity to some notion of the aim of collegiate as distinguished from university work. The University of Chicago has consistently followed the views of its first president 30 on these issues. In 1903 Mr. Harper said: "To preserve the college is (a) to fix and en force a standard of admission which can be met normally by a combined elementary and secondary school course of Robert M. Hutchins, "The University of Chicago and the Bachelor's Degree," The Educational Record. 23:567-73. (Delivered before The American Council on Education, Stevens Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, May 2, 1942.) 519 not more than ten years well spend, and (b) to keep out 35 of the baccalaureate course purely professional subjects pursued for professional ends by professional methods. The college course should be constructed for Itself alone and for the intellectual, moral, and spiritual needs of the youth of our time, without reference or 40 regard to specific careers." Such a college course, based on ten years of schooling, the University of Chicago now has. There is another conception of the college course. It was popular in Mr. Harper's day. It is 45 popular now. According to this conception, a college course consists, after twelve years of schooling, of four years more, or 120 hours plus physical education. Since the first two years of such a program are largely spent in making up for the deficiencies of preliminary 50 education and the last two often spent in professional work, it follows that the true college course for which Mr. Harper hoped may be totally missing from institu tions on this plan. At about the time Mr. Harper spoke, the North Central Association of Secondary Schools and 55 Colleges began to accredit institutions of learning. It framed its first standards in 1909* Standard number one read as follows: "The standard American college is a college with a four years' curriculum with a tendency to different!- 60 ate its parts in such a way that the first two years are a continuation of, and supplement to, the work of secondary instruction as given in the high school, while the last two years are shaped more and more distinctly in the direction of special, professional, or universi- 65 ty instruction." This was an accurate statement. It is accurate still. The condition it describes is no more desirable now than it was thirty-five years ago. Prom the beginning the University of Chicago de- 70 termined to try to give a liberal education by the end of the sophomore year. This would mean that the stu dent would get the kind of education every citizen ought to have by the age of 20, as compared with 19 in England and Germany and 18 in Prance. This ambition did not 75 seem excessive and has not proved to be. Of course to achieve it the institution must 520 resolutely face the question of what Is important and what not. It cannot teach everything that any student thinks he would like to hear about or that any teacher thinks he would like to talk about. It cannot pile course on course in the naive belief that it is thereby "raising standards." It must set up clear and compre hensive goals for its students to reach. It must artic ulate its courses, squeezing out waste, water, and duplication. It cannot tolerate education by the adding machine, that system by which we mark the intellectual progress of the young by the arithmetical averages they have achieved on a medley of miscellaneous courses, a system which operates, according to Mr. Learned, under the slogan, "Save your coupons and get a diploma." More than all, a university that wishes to solve the problem how to develop and administer a liberal educa tion must have a faculty devoted to this task. All these conditions the University of Chicago has endeav ored to meet. When the College of the University of Chicago was created in 1930, its faculty was charged with the responsibility of figuring out what a liberal education ought to be. Recognition was promised to its members in terms of their contribution to this effort. The credit system was abolished. General examinations, now under the direction of the leading expert in the field were substituted for it. Syllabi of all courses were written and, together with copies of the general examinations, made available to the students. Since the emphasis throughout was on the accomplishment, not on time, students were admitted to the conventional freshman year, if they were thought competent to do the work, at the end of the junior year in high school. Twenty-five years ago the university schools were recognized to create an eleven-year program from the first grade to the conventional freshman year in college. The entire university was reorganized between 1930 and 1932; four hundred courses were eliminated; the last two years of University High School became part of the College; and it was found possible to frame a ten-year program leading to the beginning of collegi ate work. In view of this long history, it is not sur prising that when the college faculty revised its cur riculum in February and March of this year, it found that it had ample time at its disposal to give a liber al education and to accommodate the individual interests of students, and to do this, in the case of students 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 521 with decent preparation, even for those entering in the middle of the course, that is, at the beginning of the conventional freshman year. For many years the Division of the Humanities, the Division of the Social Sciences, and the School of Business of the University of Chicago have been advis ing students not to take the bachelor's degree, but to proceed from the beginning of the junior year to the master's. The bachelor's degree has been a handicap to the development of a coherent and intelligible plan of advanced study. More and more of the professional schools have been admitting students at the beginning of the junior year. The Graduate Library School has adopted a curriculum starting at that point and leading to the B.L.S. The Law School has a curriculum starting at that point and leading to the J.D. In such profes sional schools as these the B.A. is granted for purely professional study and is conferred, in fact, only be cause it is the insignia which every young American who has ever graduated from anything is supposed to have. A university that wants to be a university must drop the B.A. A university that wants to develop lib eral education must mark its completion by that degree. In the last three months many educational associations have adopted an identical resolution, which, they have all told me, does not refer to the University of Chi cago. It merely warns everybody else not to follow its example. With one phrase in the resolution I agree. It is the phrase which speaks feelingly of the univer sally recognized and time-honored bachelor's degree. The degree is universally recognized as something everybody ought to have if he can scrape up the time and money to get it. It is time-honored in the sense that people have wanted it for a long time. It is not universally recognized as meaning anything except grad uation from some kind of college. It is not time- honored in the sense that it is honored today for the same reasons as at an earlier time. But that it is recognized and honored there can be no doubt. This is just the trouble with it. Since it is conferred at the wrong point for the wrong reasons, the recognition and honor it commands serve to thwart and have served for many years to thwart the rational reorganization of American education. It has proved impossible to develop a terminal program of liberal education without the bachelor's degree at the end of it. It has proved impossible to operate an intelligent scheme of advanced 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 522 study when the bachelor's degree pops up in the middle of it. To these considerations, which make this action necessary at any time, we must now add the war, which makes it imperative. Young men are going to have to leave us at the age of 20. It is our duty to give them before they go the education every citizen should have. The two additional years which the standardizing agen cies yearn to give them they can no longer get. They will spend those years in the army. So obvious is this that programs of acceleration, many of them ill-con ceived and ill-considered, are sweeping the country. We first dilute the curriculum with so-called war courses--the last one I saw was wild-turkey hunting-- and then crowd it, unchanged except for the dilution, into a shorter period of time. Acceleration is a means of preserving the status quo and evading the obligation which results upon us to reorganize and revitalize edu cation. The bachelor's degree, full of recognition and honor, had little meaning before the war. It has even less now. It cannot now mean four years after high school, because many standard colleges now offer the degree in two and a half years. It cannot imply grad uation from high school, because many institutions will now admit students who have not graduated from high school. It can have no special significance for grad uate study, for Harvard, among others, no longer requires it for admission to the graduate school. It cannot 200 even mean 120 hours plus physical education, for this time is cut down by programs of acceleration and by the credit commonly given for service in the armed forces. But the degree is universally recognized and time-honored. The thing to do with it, therefore, is 205 to give it meaning and function and to use the recog nition and honor in which it is held for good educa tional ends. Like the baccalaureat in France and French Canada, like the old school tie in England, It can indicate the completion of that formal education 210 which every intelligent citizen ought to have. The baccalaureat and the tie reflect in these countries the satisfaction of the social ambitions, as well as the educational needs, of those young men and women who do not want or do not qualify for advanced study 215 or preparation for scholarship or the professions. In England, for example, not more than 40 per cent of the 175 180 185 190 195 523 graduates of the public schools go on to the university. The rest are content with the old school tie. In this country the moral equivalent of the old- school tie is the bachelor's degree. What, then, should a university do which has or ganized itself to complete liberal education by the end of the sophomore year and which finds the bache lor's degree a stumbling block to the execution of its plans in liberal education, professional training, and preparation for scholarship? Should it negotiate, con fer, and discuss in the hope that many other institu tions will join in taking the step which ought to be taken? The University of Chicago has done this. It has done it off and on for fifty years through the writings and oratory of its officers. Together with Dr. Wilbur, I formally presented the subject at the meeting of the Association of American Universities six years ago. ' As a recent article in The Educational Rec ord has shown, for ninety years the leaders of American education, Eliot, Gilman, Butler, Jordan, Folwell, White, Hall, and many others argued for such change and were defeated by the inertia of the system. My conclu sion is that since all the arguments have been heard, the time for action has arrived. If an Institution is ready to offer a liberal education which may be com pleted by the end of the sophomore year, and if it de cides that it must relocate the bachelor's degree in order to achieve its aims in liberal education and uni versity work, it must act. If other institutions act too, so much the better. If they do not, then the one which is prepared to act must go its way alone. This, then, is the solution which the University, of Chicago has reached to some of the most perplexing aspects of its problems: how to be a university and how to develop and administer a liberal education. It may not be the best solution. It may not be the only one. But I am bound to say that it Is the only one that has been proposed. Certainly the maintenance of the status quo is not an alternative. The status quo cannot be maintained. It Is sometimes Intimated that the federal government will subsidize the status quo. It is true that our people have had a blind faith in education. But It Is likely to turn to blind rage if we try to persuade them to carry, in addition to the colossal obligations the war will place upon them, the burden of an Indefensible educational scheme. 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 524 We must save ourselves by our own efforts. We must disentangle liberal education and university work. 265 We must articulate the high school and the college, and the college and the university. We must overcome the inevitable weaknesses of two-year units as we see them now in two-year junior colleges and two-year sen ior colleges. We must find some meaning for the B.A. 270 beyond so many hours in the classroom and so many hours of calisthenics. We must make the M.A. mean something more than a one-year addendum needed to get a high school teaching job. We must exorcise the evil spirit of specialization in liberal education. We must justi- 275 fy every year, even every day, that we keep the young American in college. We must see to it that our stu dents have a chance to get a true liberal education be fore they are called into armed forces. We must offer our people a scheme of education which commands our in- 280 tellectual allegiance and is entitled to theirs. The answer which the University of Chicago makes to these demands is before you. If anybody has a better one, the university will be glad to adopt it. V. THE ISSUES IN EDUCATION: 19465 525 The great problems before us are, first, can we survive, and second, what kind of life are we going to lead if we do. Our monopoly of the atomic bomb will end within three to five years. There is no defense against the 5 bomb, and there never will be. It can be brought into this country in any number of ways. If it is brought into this country in any way it will destroy all our cities, no matter what our superiority in military pow er, including atomic bombs, may be. The alternatives 10 before us are no longer peace or war; they are peace or the death of civilization. When other countries have atomic bombs, the iso lated, impregnable position in which the United States has luxuriated will be lost forever. This country will 15 be in the geographical, military, and psychological situation of Czechoslovakia before the war. We may sur vive, but we shall constantly be wondering how long we are going to. And one false step in foreign policy, a field in which heretofore aimless blundering has been a 20 harmless pastime, may precipitate universal destruction. If we do survive, our economic and our political systems will undergo terrific strain. Virgil Jordan exaggerates very little when he says, "We can now make anything out of anything or nothing, anywhere in the 25 world, in any amount, almost without measurable cost." When atomic power is available, and it will be any min ute, distance and the scarcity of fuel and raw materials will cease to influence the location of industries and communities. New industries and new communities can be 30 created anywhere because the cost of transporting the sources of atomic energy is negligible. These develop ments will be accompanied by the rapid dissolution of old industries and old communities. The whole economy, which has rested on work and scarcity, may fall to 35 ^A. Craig Baird (ed.), Representative American Speeches: 1945-1946 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1946), XIX, 262-72. (Address before The American Council on Educa tion, at the Stevens Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, on May 3, 1946.) 526 pieces in the era of leisure and abundance. We may yearn for the depressions and unemployment we have known as though they were the good old days. If we survive, the leisure which the atomic age will bring may make peace more horrible than war. We 40 face the dreadful prospect of hour after hour, even day after day, with nothing to do. After vie have read all the comic books, traveled all the miles, seen all the movies, and drunk all the liquor we can stand, what shall we do then? All of us here are old enough to 45 testify that all forms of recreation eventually lose their charm. These changes in the economy will be matched by similar strains on our political system. The acceler ated rate of technological change will make for great insecurity. Only a powerful central government, it will be supposed, can supply stability. The physical forces with which we are dealing are so tremendous that we shall be unwilling to intrust them to private persons. Nobody has suggested that atomic energy should not be a governmental monopoly. The only question has been which branch of the government should monopolize it. Moreover, the duties of citizenship, which we have been able to take very lightly, will now be so complicated and burdensome that many people will feel that they can not carry them; they will leave government to the gov ernment. We may even hear that we need a leader. The principal problems of the government will be security and boredom. And so the world comes back again to bread and circuses. What has all this to do with American education as we have known it? Very little. These problems are of the utmost seriousness and urgency. American educa tion has been happily free from any sense of either. Apparently our people have wanted it so. I know that 70 education is the American substitute for a national re ligion; but many countries have been able to reconcile financial support of a religious establishment with com plete disregard of its principles. There has been no particular reason why American educators or the American 75 people should regard education as serious or urgent. Our country was rich, secure, and powerful. It was a country which even the grossest immorality and stupidity could not ruin. The American people have therefore been at liberty to devote themselves wholeheartedly to 80 getting ahead. And though it was clearly possible to 50 55 60 65 527 get ahead very nicely without any education at all, a social prejudice was fortunately established that you could get ahead a little better if you went to school a little longer. The more expensive and famous the school the greater the advantage it conferred. It fol lowed, of course, that what went on in the school was of little importance to anybody. What was important was not what went on in the school, but the fact that the pupils had been there. In this atmosphere all of us in American educa tion have grown up. To these purposes our institutions, for the most part unconsciously, have been dedicated. Now we face a new and totally different world, which has come upon us with incredible suddenness. We may not know what will hold this new world together; but we do know what will make it explode, and that is the pur suit of those policies and ideals which have character ized our country, and most others, in the past. Civil ization can be saved only by a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution to match the scientific, tech nological, and economic revolution in which we are now living. If American education can contribute to a mor al, intellectual, and spiritual revolution, then it of fers a real hope of salvation to suffering humanity everywhere. If it cannot or will not contribute to this revolution, then it is irrelevant, and its fate is immaterial. I believe in world government. I think we must have it, and have it soon. But the most ardent advo cate of a world state will not claim that it can be maintained, or perhaps even achieved, without the moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution to which I have referred. The prospects of World War III are only a little less attractive than those of a world civil war. For a world state to come into being a higher degree of world community must exist than we can see at pres ent, and for it to be maintained a still higher degree must be reached. Community requires communication, com munication requires understanding, and, if understand ing is not to lead to hatred and fear, the ambitions of the peoples of the earth must be such as not to arouse hatred and fear. A world state demands a world community, a world community demands a world revolution, moral, intellec tual, and spiritual. World government is not a gadget, which in one easy motion will preserve mankind. It can 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 528 live and last only as it institutionalizes the brother hood of man. You will say that the task before us is impossi ble, and I admit it looks so. We must try to arrive at our destination in not more than five years. We must educate all Americans, for who can tell which Americans will have the decisive voice in the formation of our policies? We must try by example to lead the rest of the world to educate itself; for, if education succeeded in changing the hearts of Americans, and the hearts of other peoples remained unchanged, we should merely have the satisfaction of being blown up with changed hearts rather than unchanged ones, I do not expect an American audience to have enough faith in the immortality of the soul to regard this as more than a dubious consolation. You may feel that there is a certain dispropor tion between the means I have chosen and the end I have in view. You may suggest that I have myself pointed out that little in the record of American education in dicates that it is interested in or qualified for lead ership in a moral, Intellectual, and spiritual revolu tion throughout the world. My answer to all objections is the same: this revolution is necessary, and therefore possible. We do not know what heights men can achieve if they under stand that it is necessary for them to reach them. We do not know what education can accomplish, because we have never tried it. We never had to. Now education is a serious and urgent business. Consider the question of time. I decline to take advantage of the opportunity for recrimination on the subject of the Chicago bachelor's degree and con tent myself with asking whether anybody honestly be lieves that it is impossible to complete a program of liberal education in less than four years. Or is there anybody who can prove that Father Gannon of Fordham is wrong in saying that liberal education should and can be completed by the age of 18, that is, four years ear lier than is normally the case? Under present condi tions the burden of proof is on those who would pretend that we have time to waste. 130 135 140 143 150 155 160 165 Consider the question of education for all. One 170 of the most amusing features of the educational 529 situation is the outraged cries of educators at the spectacle of the hordes of people clamoring for educa tion. It is as though the bench of bishops should adopt a resolution complaining because too many people wanted to go to church. Isn't this the opportunity we have been waiting for? Don't we believe in education? Don't we agree that in a democracy we must educate everybody or abandon universal suffrage? If we understood, and could make our people un derstand, that education is the most serious and urgent business in the world, could we have any doubt that we could find the means to carry on the work? And as for the geographical scale on which education must now op erate, we may remind ourselves that the problem before Unesco, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, is not more difficult under modern conditions of transportation and communication than that which Horace Mann faced in Massachusetts a hundred years ago. The imaginative use of the instru ments which technology has given us, for education rather than destruction, could give education a scope of which our ancestors could not dream. Think of the chance we have now in adult educa tion, and the responsibility, too. Work is the enemy of education, and we are entering an age in which there will be unprecedented leisure for all. Leisure and recreation are not the same. Leisure is that portion of the individual's time which he devotes to his moral and intellectual development and to participation in the life of the community of which he is a part. The more leisure there is the better for civilization. If we want to help save the world within the next few years, we must attend to the education of adults, for only they will have the influence within that period to affect the course of events. If we want to save adults in the atomic age from the suicidal tendencies which boredom eventually induces, if we want to build a world community, we must regard the continu ing education of our people throughout life as our principal responsibility. It can no longer be looked upon as a casual ac tivity conducted by a university for the purpose of helping underpaid instructors gain, a little extra in come, and attended by third-rate bookkeepers who want to learn how to become second-rate bookkeepers. 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 530 Think of the time, thought, effort, and money we have wasted on vocational training. Its relevance to a moral, intellectual, and spiritual reformation is certainly remote. And its relevance to the task of earning a living, which was always open to question in view of the obvious superiority of training on the job, will reach the vanishing point in the atomic age. When we can make anything out of anything or nothing, anywhere, in any amount, almost without measurable cost, the fraction of our lives that will go into mak ing things will be about the same as that which for tunate savages devote to picking their daily diet off the breadfruit trees, and the training needed for the job will be about the same, too. The vocational educa tion the world needs is education for the common voca tion of citizenship. This is liberal education. In the United States the phrase "college of lib eral arts" conveys no meaning to the mind. Certainly it does not mean that here is an institution devoted to liberal education. It usually denotes an institu tion in which the liberal arts are not taught. The on ly other definition that would cover almost all, but probably not all, of the enterprises called colleges of liberal arts is that they are institutions which do not award the Ph.D. degree. The trouble with this - definition is that It does not differentiate these col leges from kindergartens, elementary schools, and high schools. We do not know what these colleges could ac complish if they organized themselves to give a liber al education and then proceeded to give it, without regard to the demands of graduate schools, parents, football coaches, and academic vested interests. Many colleges boast that they have a highly di versified curriculum, or indeed none at all, in order to develop the special aptitudes of their students. I have the impression that this kind of program results from the special interests of professors rather than the individual interests of students. Students can be interested in anything that is made important to them. A liberal college should have no difficulty, in the present world situation, in making liberal education important to the young people committed to its charge. If the student-centered college is really a professor-centered college, its curriculum, if any, is unlikely to add up to a liberal education. The gradu ate schools which prospective professors must pass 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 531 through to gain entrance to the faculty club are com posed of narrow departmental specialists engaged in training narrow departmental specialists. Such narrow specialization is a necessary ingredient of the ad vancement of knowledge; it must be maintained for the purpose of advancing knowledge. But it has nothing to do with liberal education. For liberal education we need a new type of teacher, and hence a new type of graduate school. It should be liberal, too. That is, it should be com posed of teachers and students who have had a liberal education and who are eager to help others to acquire one. The members of the faculty should not be se lected in terms of their competence in specialized fields, but in terms of their capacity to see knowl edge as a whole, to engage in candid and intrepid think ing about fundamental problems, and to guide the stu dent in his efforts to do such thinking for himself. 280 It should be a community devoted to integration, to unification, to synthesis, to bringing order and intel ligibility out of the chaos of the modern world. The colleges and universities today are charac terized by the loss of community within them. Since 285 everybody is a specialist, nobody can communicate with anybody else. The conversation among the students is about athletics and among the faculty about the weather. Both students and faculty lose the sense of communal support in their intellectual enterprise, a sense which 290 is of tremendous advantage in a college with a pre scribed curriculum. But what is worse, it is impossi ble to rely on institutions which have no community within them to lay the foundation for a community in this country or a community in the world. The antics 295 of alumni at reunions suggest that no community can be established among the products of the higher learning except by artificial exhilaration, and such community as .results can hardly be described as moral, intellec tual, or spiritual. 300 Some of the most venerable of our institutions of learning have now endorsed the movement to restore community to higher education. One of them has actual ly gone so far as to require the reading of eight of the great books of the Western world. Another suggests 305 that a few of them might be read in the summer. We are getting on. The movement is now respectable, and it is to be hoped that it will gain momentum. But we 265 270 275 532 may hope also that this movement will not fall a prey to the popular tendency to substitute names for things. For many years we have attached the name education to anything that went on in an educational institution, and the name research to anything that reflected the curiosity, however idle, of those who had found their way into academic life. Now we seem likely to attach the name liberal to anything that is not science and technology. It is true that we do not tend to emphasize the Importance of science and technology. Now that they have won a war for us, the tendency of American stu dents and American philanthropists to flock into these fields will be accentuated. It is true that our great est problems are not how to improve the material con ditions of existence and how to exploit the forces of nature. Our greatest problems are how to exist at all in the world which science and technology have made, and how to direct the power they have placed in our hands. Upon these problems science and technology shed little light. In the atomic age they cannot even de fend us from the atomic bomb. Nevertheless, natural science is a necessary part of a liberal education, for the citizen must un derstand the natural environment In which he lives. Though scientific research can contribute little to moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution upon which the future of civilization depends, the scien tific method and the scientific spirit have a consid erable part to play in it. Moreover, to say, we have had too much natural science; let us have more social science and humanities, is, in the present condition of the higher learning, to substitute names for things. Does the student in the humanities and the so cial sciences learn the arts of communication? Does he learn to read and write? Does he master the dis ciplines which for centuries have been regarded as in dispensable to the attack on any intellectual task? Does he come to understand the ideas and ideals which have animated mankind? Does he learn how to tell the good from the bad, the true from the false, the beauti ful from the ugly? Does he discover what the ends of ■ life are and what are the purposes of organized socie ty? 310 315 320 325 330 335 340 345 350 Does he understand the tradition in which he 533 lives? Does he learn how to be human, see the connec tion between man and man, and fit himself to become a member of a community which shall embrace all men? We know that ideas, understanding, criticism, and ethical and political theory have almost vanished from the hu manities and the sociai sciences, to have their places taken by miscellaneous information, tours of the stock yards, and data collecting. We know that the fundamen tal problems of our time are philosophical. Yet phi losophy has disappeared from-the social sciences. In stead of underlying all studies in the humanities, phi losophy is confined to one department, which is stead ily losing influence as language, literature, art, and history vainly try to become scientific. What the world needs, then, is a liberal educa tion worthy of the name. This would be an education educating a man's humanity, rather than indulging his individuality. It would be an education appropriate to man, offering him the habitual vision of greatness, and dealing primarily, in a world of rapid change, with values independent of time or place. I believe that such an education is supplied by a curriculum consist ing of the great works of the mind and the liberal arts. As the Manchester Guardian said editorially the other day, "The more we understand the forces of nature, and so increase human power, the more important it is that we should understand human character and draw inspira tion from the great civilizing writers and thinkers of the past. For the changes that simplify man's rela tions to nature complicate man's relations to man. To day, when we have achieved intoxicating triumph over nature, the nations of the world are more afraid of each other than at any time in their history." Still, I do not insist upon the great civiliz ing writers and thinkers of the past. If anybody can suggest a curriculum that is more likely to achieve the objects I have named than the one I have proposed, I shall gladly embrace him and it. The new kind of graduate school needed to pro duce the new kind of teacher which this program re quires would not be concerned with the training of de partmental specialists in the traditional fields, but with the education of men who were eager to qualify themselves to understand and to help others understand the nature, the works, and the destiny of man. 355 360 365 370 375 380 385 390 395 534 We must now engage in the liberal education of everybody, of all adolescents and all adults. Of these two adult education is the more important. In fact, one of the principal purposes of the liberal education of adolescents should be to prepare them to go on with liberal education throughout their lives. This program requires drastic changes in our educational institutions. But these changes are not impossible. They are those which should have been made years ago, for everything that I have suggested is something we should have been doing all along. Until these changes are made, we cannot claim that the task which history has imposed upon us is beyond human achievement. All we can say is that we do not care enough about it to attempt it. By a clear definition of our purpose and a relentless exclusion of the ir relevant, the frivolous, and the trivial we may hope to reach the goal. We may hope to help our fellowmen to survive and to lead the good life if they do. It is better to try and fail than to decline the challenge. 400 405 410 415 6 VI. EDUCATION AND INDEPENDENT THOUGHT The best definition of a university that I have been able to think of is that it is a center of inde pendent thought. Such centers are indispensable to the progress, and even to the security, of any society. Perhaps the short lives that dictatorships have enjoyed 5 in the past are attributable as much to this as to any other single thing: dictatorship and independent thought cannot exist together; and no society can flourish long without independent thought. Independent thought implies criticism, and criti- 10 cism is seldom popular in time of war or danger of war. At such times every effort is made to compel conformity of opinion of the entire population, and the country often goes into an ecstasy of tribal self-adoration. This loss of balance is unfortunate for the country. 15 The United States suffered more from the elimination of Germanic studies during the first World War than Germany did, and we have had to do a quick about-face in our attitude toward Japan and Germany since the second War. If war is for the sake of peace--and no one will contend 20 that it is an end in itself--then we have to think, when war is imminent, where we shall be and what we shall do when it is over. Such thinking is difficult to do amidst cries of "unconditional surrender" ad dressed to the enemy and "traitor" addressed to those 25 citizens who disagree with the majority opinion of the moment. Independent thought is valuable, even in a cri sis. Perhaps it is especially valuable then. But to appreciate its value, even in such "normal" times as we 25 enjoyed before 1917* requires a degree of understanding of education, universities, and intellectual activity in general that the American people do not yet seem to have attained. I do not underestimate the tremendous contribution America has made in originating and apply- 35 ing the doctrine of education for all, nor the gener osity with which her citizens have supported her edu cational institutions. When education is defined, Robert M. Hutchins, Freedom, Education and the Fund (New York: Meridian Books, 1956)/ PP* 152-66. (Delivered in Barnum Hall, Santa Monica, California, February 20, 1952.) 536 however, as a means to a better job or a higher social position and intellectual activity is appraised in terms 40 of its immediate material benefits, popular support of education does not compel revision of my suspicion that the American people do not yet set a proper value on in dependent thought. We have a great tendency to substi tute names for things. The American people are devoted 45 to the name of education. If they can find something that they can call education, but that is really some thing else, like schooling or training or housing or exercising the young, they will enthusiastically support it, and at the same time they will be indifferent to, 50 and even fearful of, true education. True education is the improvement of men through helping them learn to think for themselves. Since a university faculty is a group set apart to think Independently and to help other people to 55 learn to do so, it is fatal to force conformity upon it. Nobody would agree that all professors must be members of the Republican Party; but we seem to be ap proaching tine point where they will all be required to be either Republicans or Democrats. I do not claim 60 that the status of university professor should entitle a man to exemption from the laws. But I do say that imposing regulations that go beyond the laws is imprac tical and dangerous. There are fashions in opinion as well as in behavior. We have just emerged from an era 65 in which a schoolteacher could lose her1 job by smoking, dancing, or using cosmetics. We should avoid entering one in which a professor can lose his post and his repu tation by holding views of politics, economics, or in ternational relations that are not acceptable to the 70 majority. This is thought control. The suggestion that professors should take spe cial oaths or make special statements of their loyalty causes resentment in university faculties because of the dangers to which I have referred in going beyond 75 the laws. If there are spies or traitors on the facul ties of universities, they can be dealt with under laws already on the books. Such persons, if there are any, will gladly take oaths and sign statements attesting their loyalty. 80 Perhaps the most important reason for the re sentment of university faculties at the proposal that they should be given special tests for loyalty is their fear that it portends an effort on the part of the 537 government, or of the public or its representatives, to assume control over the course of study, the program of research, and the qualifications of the members of the faculty. In view of what is going on in many parts of the country, this fear is not unjustified. Since aca- demic bodies have from time immemorial asserted their right to the sole determination of these matters, since this is their most sacred and essential prerogative, and since the transfer of this prerogative to any ex ternal agency might lead to the disintegration of the university and the collapse of its standards, the ob jections of faculties to anything looking in this di rection are comprehensible and correct. I do not attach much importance to the argument sometimes advanced by professors that in an age of spe cialization only a professor of engineering can ap praise an educational program, or a research project, or another professor, in engineering. Anybody who has had any experience in academic administration knows that there is such a thing as departmental self-adora tion and that it is not confined to the good depart ments, The votes of faculties sometimes seem to re flect the competition of vested interests rather than a considered judgment on educational policy. It is true that the extreme specialization of our day makes it hard for one outside the field to form an intelli gent estimate of the work and the workers within it. It is equally true that specialization has divorced the specialist from the understanding of fields outside his own and hence from a comprehension of the problems and policies of other departments and of the university as a whole. Nevertheless, if we have to choose between the myopic egocentricity of internal control and the blind bumbling of external control, I should prefer the former. External control by definition prevents univer sities from being centers of independent thought. By definition, if they are dominated by outside agencies or Influences, they are not independent and can engage in independent thought only by sufferance. Such suf ferance is likely to be short-lived in the absence of a clear understanding and a strong tradition support ing Independent thought. As I have said, there are few traces of this understanding and this tradition in the United States. It does not make very much differ ence where the legal control of a university lies if the tradition governing its exercise requires that the 85 90 95 100 105 no 115 120 125 130 538 wishes of the faculty in regard to curriculum, research, and staff must be respected. A commission in Great Britain and one in the United States have recently studied the press and come to the same conclusion, that what is needed is not control, but criticism. The freedom of the press is too important to be lost; the irresponsibility of the press is too dangerous to be ignored. Unlike the press, the universities are subjected to a good deal of criticism, most of it from the press, and much of it haphazard and uninformed. I do not know of any ir responsible universities, though the Oxford described ~ by Gibbon and Adam Smith shows that such a thing is not impossible. In our day the gross error of the univer sities is not that they luxuriate in slothful self admiration but that they are too responsive to public whims. Behind every deplorable aspect of university life, and there are a good many of. them, is some public pressure. An extreme example is the criticism that was visited in the columns of a newspaper of large cir culation upon the University of Notre Dame for wasting its money in expanding its educational plant when it should be enlarging its stadium. This may suggest to us that there is a difference between responsible and being responsive. In order to guarantee the independence of mem bers of the faculties most universities give them per manent tenure when they reach a certain rank. This is in recognition of the fact that their purpos'e in life cannot be achieved if their thinking is subject to the control of presidents, chancellors, trustees, regents, or the public. Of course mistakes cannot be avoided in the appointment of professors to permanent tenure. Some men may incorrectly be suspected of the ability to think; others may stop thinking when they have ar rived at life tenure. This is the price that is paid for the independence of professors, which is another way of saying that it is part of the price that is paid for the greatness of a university. Tenure is valuable, for, like an insurance poli cy, it is a provision for unpleasant contingencies. Like an insurance policy, it cannot provide for all contingencies, and, in the worst, it is quickly swept away. Runaway inflation or general bankruptcy will wipe out the protection of insurance; mass hysteria will do the same to tenure. The record shows that the 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 539 professors at the University of California were entitled to think that they had tenure; it was a great talking poing, but at the last it turned out to be nothing but a talking point. The professors lost their positions. And everywhere in the United States, university profes sors, whether or not they have tenure, are silenced by the general atmosphere of repression that now pre vails. The legal protection of tenure should be re tained; but its limitations should be recognized; and it should be recognized, too, that those limitations cannot be overcome by any legal devices, but only by informing and arousing public opinion. In addition to being a member of a university faculty a professor is a citizen. When a man becomes a professor, he does not become a second-class citizen, disabled from saying, doing, or joining anything that other citizens may legally say, do, or join. The uni versity assumes no control over his activities as a citizen and takes no responsibility for them. Since the professor is always referred to by his title, the university is brought into his activities as a citizen and its public relations may suffer as a result. Of course, they may also benefit. Whether they suffer or benefit will depend in part on the temper of the times. The public relations of Columbia and Johns Hopkins doubtless benefited when Professor Jessup and Profes sor Lattimore began to serve the country. They doubt less suffered when Senator McCarthy presented his charges against them. I think it will not be argued that a professor should decline to take a public post or to express himself on a controversial question for fear that Senator McCarthy or someone like him may call him a Communist. What then are the limitations on the freedom of the faculty? They are the limitations on independent thought. These should be nothing more than the laws of logic and the laws of the country. I would hope that the laws of the country would not seek to control thought. I do not believe that any legislative body can repeal or amend the law of contradiction. I do not see how It is possible to say that the same thing is both true and not true at the same time In the same respect, and I should think it difficult to conduct any communication within the community of scholars un less they all accept the law of contradiction. I should not suggest any other limitations, and if any professor wanted to show, as some of my colleagues do, 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220 1 540 that the lav/ of contradiction has been repealed by mod- 225 ern scientific advances, I should encourage him to pur sue his outrageous course. If a professor can think and make his contribution to a center of independent thought, that is all that is required of him. One might wish that he were more agreeable or more conven- 230 tional; but he cannot be discharged because he fails to measure up to desirable standards in these respects. As long as his political activities are legal, he may engage in them. As to Communism, we see first that it is a sub- 235 ject that is worth thinking about and should be studied in universities. Almost everybody agrees to this. The opposite point of view is sufficiently dealt with by the story of the university president who met an alumnus who said, "Well, Mr. President, still teaching 240 Communism in the College?" The President replied: "Yes, still teaching Communism in the College and can cer in the medical school." Must we say that Communism can be taught only by those who are opposed to it, as the professors in 245 the medical school are opposed to cancer? We would not appoint a professor in medicine who was earnestly trying to see to it that every member of the community got cancer. Can we permit the appointment of a man who is trying to make us all Communists? If he is a 250 spy or advocating the overthrow of- the government by violence, we cannot. But convinced and able Marxists on the faculty may be necessary if the conversation about Marxism is to be anything but hysterical and superficial. It may be said that a Marxist cannot 255 think and that therefore he is not eligible for mem bership in a university community according to my def inition of it. I admit that the presumption is to this effect; but I must add that regarding the presumption as irrefutable comes dangerously close to saying that 260 anybody who does not agree with me cannot think. I do not know a great deal about the inner work ing of the Communist Party in America. It is repre sented as a conspiracy, with everybody in it under iron discipline, which I take to mean that its mem- 265 bers and supporters have given up the privilege of in dependent thought and have surrendered themselves en tirely to the Party. If this is so, a member of the Communist Party cannot qualify as a member of the uni versity community in any field that is touched by 270 541 Party policy, tradition, or discipline. The Party has apparently taken a strong line in biology, music, and literature; and I suppose that at any time it could lay down what should be believed in astronomy and archae ology, if it has not done so already. If a man is not 275 free to think independently, he is no use to a center of independent thought. The presumption is strong that there are few fields in which a member of the Com munist Party can think independently. But what if we should find a member of the Com- 280 munist Party, who, in spite of this presumption, did think independently? The fact of membership cannot and should not disqualify him from membership in the faculty of a university in view of the additional fact that he does not act as members of the Party are sup- 285 posed to act. I cannot insist too strongly that the primary question in every case is what is this individ ual man himself, not what are the beliefs and activi ties of his relatives, associates, and acquaintances. When the life of the individual has been exposed be- 290 fore us for many years, and when he has neither acted nor taught subversively, the doctrine of guilt by as sociation can have slight value. A man who is a bad member of the Communist Party may conceivably be quali fied to be a professor, because he has retained his 295 independence; and a good member of the Party may be qualified to be a professor if he retains his independ ence in the field in which he teaches and conducts his research. I use these examples to make my position clear 300 and not because they ever occurred in my experience. Whether I would have had the courage to recommend to our Board the appointment of a Marxist, or a bad mem ber of the Communist Party, or a good member whose field was not affected by the Party line is very dubi- 305 ous indeed. But in the most unlikely event that such persons ever came over my academic horizon, uniquely qualified to conduct teaching and research in their chosen fields, I ought to have had the courage to say that they should be appointed without regard to their 310 political views or associations. The reason why I ought to is that it is of the first importance to in sist that the popularity or unpopularity of a man's political views and associations shall not determine whether or not he may be a professor. If we once let 315 go of the Constitution and the laws as marking out the area in which a professor is free to operate as a 542 citizen and of the ability to think independently as establishing the standard he must meet as a scholar, we are lost. What I have said of course applies with greater force to those members of university faculties who have joined so-called Communist front organizations. I have never, so far as I know, joined one of these, but the fact that I have to say "so far as I know" suggests the dangers now involved in joining anything. When a man is asked by a person he trusts to join an organi zation for stated purposes which he shares, it seems pusillanimous not to accept. Hardly a day passes that I do not feel pusillanimous, because I now refuse to associate myself with anything without knowing the po litical views of every other person who is associated or who may later become associated with the movement. This is, of course, the most lamentable aspect of the present situation. It is the creeping miasma of in timidation. If one believes, as I do, that the prog ress of mankind depends upon the freest possible ex pression of diverse points of view, one must feel that we have come to a sort of halting place in American history. The American people, with a revolutionary tradition, a tradition of independence and toleration, now find themselves blocking the revolutionary aspira tions of oppressed peoples abroad and declining at home to permit the kind of criticism that has been our glory, and I think our salvation, in the past. How do we determine whether a professor can think? The competence of a professor in his chosen field should be determined by those who are qualified to have an opinion. If a professor is held to be in competent by those admittedly expert in the field, he cannot complain that it is unjust to relieve him of his post. The activities of a professor as a citizen, however unpopular they make him of the university, can be called in question, like those of other citizens, only by the duly constituted public authorities, and they can act only under the law. Education and re search require the best men. They will not enter aca demic life if it carries special disabilities with it. Even when a professor's peers believe that he is incompetent and recommend his dismissal great care must be taken to see to it that he is not a victim of the prejudices of his colleagues. Professors do not like unconventional people any better than the rest of 320 323 330 335 340 345 350 355 360 543 the population does. A professor has, or is likely to have, a vested interest in his subject, or even in his point of view about his subject. The man who is break ing new ground, and who consequently thinks that most of his colleagues are wrong in their points of view, will hardly be the most popular member of the faculty. Geniuses have had a hard time as professors in America. Every effort must be made to protect the originality as well as the independence of the thinking in a uni versity . Like most other chancellors and presidents I spent a considerable part of my life defending profes sors with whom I did not agree. A principle is no good unless it is good in a crisis and unless it ap plies to those who hold views opposite to yours as well as to those who share your opinions. It makes no difference, therefore, whether or not the chief execu tive of a university likes and agrees with a professor; he must defend his independence becaus’ e the life of the university is at stake. Professors are not em ployees, either of the chief executive or of the board of trustees. They are members of an academic communi ty. The aim of the community is independent thought. This requires the defense of the independence of its members. I know, too, that by my standard no perfect uni versity exists in the United States. This is merely saying that, human institutions being what they are, they must always fall short of the ideal. What I am seeking is the definition of the ideal, which is the criterion by which universities must be measured. If we know where we ought to be going, we can tell whether we are on the right path. The perfect university can not arise unless we know what a perfect one would be. The indispensable condition to the rise of the perfect university is the guarantee of the independence of the university and its members. The infringement of the independence of the universities and professors that we have today means that we can never get the kind of universities and professors we should have. I do not claim that professors are the only people who can think or the only people who do. I merely say that unless a man can and will think he should not be a professor, and that professors are the only people in the world whose sole duty is to think. To require them to stop thinking, or to think like 365 370 375 380 385 390 395 400 405 everybody else, Is to defeat the purpose of their lives and of their institution. I recognize, too, that these are dangerous times and that the state must take precautions against those who would subvert it. I do not suggest that those who want to force conformity upon academic bodies do so from any but the most patriotic motives. I do say that they are misguided. The methods they have chosen can not achieve the result they seek. They will, on the contrary, imperil the liberties we are fighting for, the most important of which are freedom of thought, speech, and association. If we cannot ourselves under stand and apply our own principles, we cannot expect the rest of the world to rally to them. Since the struggle in which we are engaged is one for the loyalty and adherence of mankind, the clarity and conviction with which we hold our own principles are at least as important as our military strength. The question of freedom of thought, speech, and association is much more than an academic question. How can we reconcile this conception of a uni versity with the facts of its legal control? The legal control, we find, is not so important as the manner and degree of its exercise. Oxford and Cambridge are in effect operated by their own faculties, though subject to occasional governmental investigation and criticism. The European universities are operated by the govern ments, though the governments are restricted by public opinion to a kind of management that preserves the an cient rights of the faculties. Both kinds of control require a high degree of responsibility on the part of those who have legal or quasi-legal control. The American universities are organized on the model of the big business corporation, which leads to all kinds of temptations to analogize them in every re spect to such corporations. But there are important differences. The American endowed university is like the United States Steel Corporation in that it has a board of directors and a management; but it is differ ent in that there are no stockholders, there is no profit-and-loss statement, and there are, on the aca demic side, no employees. The responsibility of the' board of trustees, as long as it stays within the law, is to its own conscience. The measure of the prosper ity of the institution cannot be found in any report of its financial condition. The quality of the 544 4io 415 420 425 430 435 440 445 450 455 545 university is determined by the quality of its faculty, whom the board of trustees cannot select and whose work they cannot direct. Obviously a high degree of responsibility for bearance, and understanding are required of trustees under the American system if they are to allow it to become a center of independent thought and are not to follow the natural lines suggested by the fact that a large university looks like any other large corpora tion. The complete legal control of the board of re gents or trustees is undoubted. But as the Minister of Education in a European country is required to re strain the impulse to use his legal powers because of the traditional rights of faculties, and the faculties of Oxford and Cambridge are not irresponsible, though they might be if they wished, so the American board of trustees, in spite of its legal control of the univer sity, should limit itself to criticism of the educa tional and scientific program of the university, to the conservation and development of its funds, and to the interpretation of the university to the public. Those who have the legal control should be wise enough to re frain from exercising it. In this view the trustees become not the managers of the university, but its best friends and severest critics, laymen, who are inter ested in the university, who believe in it, and who wish to assist it. I do not subscribe to the notion that the board should operate the university as the representative of the community. Nor do I subscribe to the notion that the board is a kind of supreme court that should decide educational issues brought before it. This would mean that the Board would be determin ing the educational policy of the institution, some thing that even the best boards are not qualified to do. An extreme statement of this position would be that the faculties could ask the trustees or regents to take an oath supporting the aims of the faculties, since the principal duty of trustees and regents is to further those aims, but that the trustees and regents could not exact such expressions from faculties in re gard to the aims of trustees and regents. To put the extreme position another way: a trustee, or a board of trustees, who did not like what the faculty or a faculty member was doing should resign. It should never occur to trustees that faculty members should resign because they do not share the opinions of trus tees. The most important right that the trustees have 460 465 470 475 480 485 490 495 500 546 is the right of criticism. I think that two proposi tions are true: first, a university is a center of in dependent thought, and second, uncriticized groups in evitably deteriorate. The solution of the problem lies, then, not in regulation or in control, but in criticism. The difficulty is money. Universities always need money. Even those which have the most can always see ways in which they could use more. How can they get more except by being responsive to public whims? How can they get it if they are independent? The tax- supported universities must get their money from legis latures. The endowed universities must get their from contributors, and the contributors who could do the most are those.with the most money. The present prima cy of public relations in the management of universi ties, the view that they must ingratiate themselves with the public, and in particular with the most wealthy and influential portions of it, the doctrine that a university may properly frame its politics in order to get money and that it may properly teach or study whatever it can get financed--these notions are ruinous to a university in any rational conception of it. They are on a par with what is perhaps the most widely held and most erroneous notion about university management, that the principal duty of the chief execu tive is to raise money. The principal duty of the chief executive of a university is to produce a university that deserves support. His secondary duty is to raise the money to support it. So public relations are secondary. The policy of the university should not be formulated with a view to its public relations. Its public relations should be formulated with a view to its policies. A univer sity should not adopt a policy because it will bring money. It should work out its program and then get it financed. In the long run difficulties encountered in financing a good program will be less embarrassing than success in financing a bad one. Most of the discussion of higher education in the United States is about money. Money is very im portant; but we ought to think once in a while about the things that money cannot do. The only problems that money can solve are financial problems. Money cannot make a great university; it can only supply the means to one. We know that millions are spent annually 505 510 515 520 525 530 535 540 545 547 on enterprises called educational that have no educa tional value. Money cannot even buy men, because the 550 best men will not stay long in an institution that has nothing but money. If an institution has an idea, it can use money to realize it. If it has no ideas, all the money in the world will not help it. The important problems of American education are intellectual, not 555 financial. In this situation there is grave danger in money, for there are numerous instances in which money has been spent for purposes that could not be achieved or that should not be achieved, with the result that the institution where it was spent and the educational 560 system as a whole have been deformed. We all know that beautiful buildings and expen sive equipment do not make a great university. Some of the best work at the University of Chicago came out of the poorest quarters. Which would be better, a 5^5 faculty of a thousand, average fair; or a faculty of five hundred, average excellent? A large and mediocre faculty will cost more than a small but superior one. Its effect is diffuse; its example is uninspiring, and consequently it is difficult to rally the public to 570 its support or its defense. With transportation what it is today, I do not see why every university should try to teach and study everything. Some subjects do not seem to me to have reached the teaching stage, yet we are ardently en- 575 gaged in teaching them. Other subjects have not the staff available for instruction everywhere. Others can be adequately dealt with if they are studied in a few places. The present passion for cyclotrons seems to me excessive. The infinite proliferation of 580 courses is repulsive. There is a great deal of evi dence, I think, that the educational system as a whole needs less money rather than more. The reduction in its income would force it to reconsider its expendi tures. The expectation that steadily increasing funds 585 will be forthcoming justifies the maintenance of ac tivities that ought to be abandoned; it justifies waste. Some waste is inevitable; but the amount that we find in some universities is disgraceful. These institutions carry on extravagant enterprises that by 590 no stretch of the imagination can be called education al, and then plead poverty as the reason for their fi nancial campaigns. The self-interest of professors, the vanity of administrators, trustees, and alumni, and 548 the desire to attract public attention are more or less involved in these extravagances. Yet the result of them is that the institution is unintelligible and, in every sense of the word, insupportable. The California loyalty oath originated in the desire of the administration to get money from the legislature. As this genesis suggests, the chief dan ger to American education is that it will sell its birthright for a mess of pottage. The danger to it is that in seeking money it will sacrifice the purposes for which it exists. I have enough faith in the in telligence and generosity of the American people to believe that they will understand and support univer sities that have principles, that will try to make them clear, and that will stick to them. Every time a uni versity takes another step in the direction of the service-station conception, or the public-entertain ment conception, or the housing-project conception of the higher learning, every time it makes a concession to public pressure in order to get money, every time it departs from the idea of a university as a center of independent thought, it increases the confusion in the public mind about what a university is and makes it more difficult to present any rational appeal for the independence vhat true universities are entitled to. The universities are themselves largely responsi ble for the lack, of understanding of education and of universities and of intellectual activity of which I have complained. The university should be the symbol of the high est powers and aspirations of mankind. Mankind aspires to achieve human felicity through the exercise of rea son. Independent thought is the ultimate reliance of the race. Abandoning vanity and sham, the universities should dedicate themselves to their great symbolic task. Upon their performance of this task rests their claim to freedom. 595 600 605 610 615 620 625 630- VII. ACADEMIC FREEDOM7' 549 The arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for freedom of speech, and they rest on the same foundation. These are the familiar words of John Stuart Mill: "if all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, man- 5 kind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justi fied in silencing mankind . . . The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of one opinion is, that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the exist- 10 ing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchang ing error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is al most as great a benefit, the clearer perception and 15 livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error." Man is a learning animal. The state is an asso ciation the primary aim of which is the virtue and in telligence of the people. Men learn by discussion, 20 through the clash of opinion. The best and most pro gressive society is that in which expression is freest. Mill said, "There ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be 25 considered." The civilization we seek is the civiliza tion of the dialogue, the civilization of the Logos. In such a society the intelligent man and the good citizen are identical. The educational system does not aim at indoctrination in accepted values, but 30 at the improvement of society through the production of the intelligent man and the good citizen. Education necessarily involves the critical examination of con flicting points of view; it cannot' flourish in the 7 Robert M. Hutchins, "The Meaning and Significance of Academic Freedom," The Annals of The Academy of Political and Social Science. 300:72-78, July, 1955- (Remarks of Rob ert M. Hutchins, before The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 2, 1955.) 550 absence of free inquiry and discussion. 35 In a democracy what the public needs to know about the teachers in the educational system is that they are competent. The competent teacher knows the subject he is teaching and how to communicate it to his pupils. Unlike the teacher in a totalitarian state, he 40 is not supposed to purvey the prevailing dogma. He is supposed to encourage his students to use their own in telligence and to reach their own conclusions. The definition of competence does not shift with every wind of prejudice, religious, political, racial, 45 or economic. If competence had been the issue at Brown University during the' Free Silver controversy, the Pres ident would not have been asked to resign because of his premature distaste for the Gold Standard. The mod ern note was struck there. What was requested of the 50 President was "not a renunciation of his views, but a forbearance to promulgate them." And the reason was that these views were "injurious to the pecuniary in terests of the University." On the other hand, the standard of competence did protect a professor at the 55 University of Chicago who was a leading critic of Sam uel Insull and other local oligarchs of the time. He was doubtless injurious to the pecuniary interests of the University, but he and it lived through it, and he is today the senior Senator from Illinois. 60 We have been stifling education in this country because we have been asking the wrong questions. If you are asking the right questions, you ask about a subject of discussion whether it is important. You don't forbid students to discuss a subject, like the 65 entry of Red China into the U. N., on the ground that it is too important. The right question is whether com petent scholars believe that the subject should be in vestigated and that this is the way to investigate it. You don't permit the Post Office Department to protect 70 the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies from Izvestia and Pravda. The right question about a textbook is whether competent people think it can make a contribution to education. You don't ask whether incompetent people are going to be offended by 75 passages taken out of context. The right question about a research man on unclassified work is whether he is competent to do it. You don't act like the United States Public Health Service and weaken the country by withdrawing contracts from research workers on unstated 80 551 grounds that can only be grounds of loyalty. As I have said, the right question about a teach er is whether he Is competent. If we had been asking about competence we would have had quite a different atmosphere In the case of teachers who were Communists, who refused to testify about themselves, or declined to discuss the political affiliations of others. V/e have been so busy being sophisticated anti-Communists, detecting the shifts and devices of Communist infiltra tion, that we have failed to observe that our educa tional responsibility is to have a good educational sys tem. We do not discharge that responsibility by invad ing civil liberties, reducing the number of qualified teachers available, eliminating good textbooks, and in timidating the teaching staff. The standard of compe tence means that there must be some relation between the charges against a teacher and the quality of his teaching. The standard of competence would have pro tected us against teachers following a party line or conducting propaganda. If a teacher sought to indoc trinate his pupils, which is the only circumstance under which he could be dangerous as a teacher, he would be incompetent, and should be removed as such. The standard of competence would have saved us from the excesses of the silly season, such a^ the refusal of the University of Washington to let Professor Op- penheimer lecture there on physics, and from the con sequences of concentrating on the negative task of preventing one particular unpopular variety of infil tration. If we had used the standard of competence, we would have been free to fix our minds on the posi tive responsibility of building an educational system, and with half the energy we have put into being scared to death we might have built a great one. Since our guilty conscience tells us that there ought to be some connection between what a man does and the punishment visited upon him, we often try to pretend that this is the rule we are following. The Attorney-General of the United States, speaking in New York three weeks ago, said that schools are not sanc tuaries or proving grounds "for subversives shaping the minds of innocent children." This picture of subversives shaping the minds of innocent children has nothing to do with the case. The teachers who have lost their jobs in the campaign against subversives have not been charged with doing 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 anything to the minds of any children. The case of Goldie Watson here in Philadelphia is typical: testi mony about the good she had done the minds of the chil dren in her classes was rejected as impertinent. The only evidence allowed was as to whether she had de clined to answer questions about her political affili ations. She had, and she was fired. The same proce dure seems to be followed everywhere, even at Harvard. When a professor there is called on the carpet, the issue is whether he is a member of something or other, or whether he has lied or refused to answer questions about such membership. The matter of his competence in his field or what he has done to the innocent minds of the Harvard students is never referred to. We are getting so afraid of ideas that we are afraid of people who associate with people who are said to have ideas, even if they themselves have not expressed them. The State Curriculum Commission of California is now studying investigators' reports on the authors of 23 textbooks. Dr. C. C. Trillingham, Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools and a member of the Commission, said, "if an author is aligned with the Communists, we don't want his text book, even if there is no Red propaganda in it." We regard what a man says as irrelevant in de termining whether we will listen to him. What a man does in his job is irrelevant in determining whether he should continue in it. This amounts to a decision that people whose ideas or whose associates' ideas we regard as dangerous cannot be permitted to earn a liv ing or to make a contribution in any capacity to the well-being of the community. The Supreme Court of California has just taken this logical next step: it has held, in effect, that a Communist can have no contractual rights that the rest of us are bound to respect. Not long ago at a dinner of the senior members of the faculty of the University of Birmingham in England, I sat across the table from a professor who is a member of the executive committee of the Commu nist Party of Great Britain. The British appear to be getting value out of a scholar whom none of the great American universities could appoint. One of the more important advances in law and government effected by the struggles of our ancestors 552 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170, 553 is that proclaimed by the Fifth Amendment. Why should the government demand that a man convict himself out of his own mouth instead of requiring the prosecution to make the effort to establish the charges that it has brought against him? All the Fifth Amendment means is: prove it. Injury is added to insult if there is no pretence that the questions asked must be relevant or proper. In some public school systems refusal to an swer any questions by the Board of Education or any other public body is insubordination; insubordination justifies dismissal. Surely the issue is whether the questions are legitimate. It cannot be insubordination to refuse to answer illegitimate questions. We have gone far under the influence of one of the rollicking dicta of Mr. Justice Holmes, that there is no constitutional right to be a policeman; but not so far that public employment can be denied on a ground that has nothing to do with the duties to be performed. If the Presi dent were to refuse to employ bald-headed men in the Federal establishment, the Supreme Court would find, I believe, that the bald have been deprived of their constitutional rights. You must.say that the issue I am discussing is academic in every sense: there is no use in talking about the right of Communists, ex-Communists, or per sons who decline to answer questions about their po litical affiliations to teach in the United States. Milton Mayer in his forthcoming book, They Thought They Were Free, tells the story of the way history passed Martin Niemoeller by. When the Nazis attacked the Communists, he was a little uneasy, but he was not a Communist, and he did nothing. When they attacked the Socialists, he was uneasy, but he was not a So cialist, and he did nothing. They went after the schools, the press, and the Jews, but he was not di rectly affected, and he did nothing. Then they at tacked the Church. Pastor Niemoeller was a churchman. He tried to do something, but it was too late. I hope it is not too late to point out where our preoccupation with public relations and our fail ure of courage and intelligence may take us. The New York Times on March YJ and The New York Herald Tribune on March 19 published editorials on the question whether teachers who decline to testify about others should be dismissed. The significant thing about the 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 554 editorials is this: they both, perhaps unconsciously, extend the limits of the prevailing boycott. The Times condemns "adherence to Communist doctrine," thus adding theoretical Marxists to those automatically disquali fied. The Herald-Tribune comes out against Communists "or any other brands of subversives," thus opening vast new unmapped areas of Investigation, recrimination, and confusion. These two newspapers bitterly attacked the Reece Committee, appointed in the House to investigate foundations] but they appear to have succumbed to its influence, which is another evidence that if you say something outrageous authoritatively, loudly, and of ten enough you will eventually find yourself quoted in the most respectable places. The Reece Committee includes among the subversive almost anybody who dif fers with the two members of the Committee who consti tute the majority. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., said at the University of Oregon last October, "The word 'sub versive' has no precise definition in American law. It is as vague as 'heretical' was in the mediaeval trials which sent men to the stake." Leading the list of Reece Committee subversives are those who do not share its philosophical prejudices. The Committee con demned a philosophical doctrine, empiricism, and those who hold it as the fountain head of the subversive ten dencies now engulfing the country. If a philosophical position can be treasonable, particularly one as harm less as a preference for fact over theory, and if ,two politicians can make it treasonable, freedom of thought, discussion, and teaching may not be with us for long. By repetition the Reece Committee is obtaining unconscious acceptance of another proposition, which, coupled with the proposition that politicians may de clare a doctrine and its adherents subversive, still further imperils freedom of teaching and inquiry. This is the proposition that tax-exempt money is public money and that a tax-exempt institution is therefore subject to a special variety of public surveillance. An extension of this proposition is found in the Cali fornia statute requiring all claimants of tax-exemp- tion to take a non-disloyalty oath. If carried to the logical limits hinted at in the Reece Report, this no tion of the public control of private, tax-exempt cor porations could deprive the independent educational institutions of this country of their autonomy, that characteristic which has given them their value in the 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 555 development of the American educational system. 265 Tax-exemption is conferred for the purpose of facilitating the performance of a public task by a private agency. A corporation that carries on educa tion and research to that extent relieves the taxpay ers of their obligation to finance such work in state- 2J0 supported institutions. Tax-exemption imposes no duty on colleges and universities except that of conducting teaching and research according to their best judgment of what good teaching and research are. It does not impose the duty of making sure that the teaching and 275 research conform to the views of the majority of a legislative committee. Consider what those views might be. Richard E. Combs, Chief Counsel for the California Senate Commit tee on Un-American Activities, testified two years ago 280 before a sub-committee of the United States Senate. He gave an account of how Communists reorient courses of instruction. He thought it worthwhile to report that the name of a course at a California university had been changed from public speaking to speech, and 285 the books had been changed from Robert Louis Stevenson, Masefield, and Kipling to John Stuart Mill. The sub versive nature of these changes may not be clear' to you, but it was clear to Mr. Combs and, from all that appears, to the California committee that employs him 290 and the committee of the United States before which he testified. The appraisal of courses of study or of the performance of teachers is a professional job, not to be undertaken by the naive and unskilled. Consider the role of the California Senate Com- 295 mittee on Un-American Activities in the administration of California institutions of higher learning. The Committee claims that a chain of security officers on campuses has been welded by its efforts. If its claims are correct, and they have been disputed, professors 300 and students at eleven institutions are being continu ously spied upon for the benefit of a legislative com mittee. The Committee has an arrangement whereby it passes on the qualifications of members and prospective members of the faculties from the standpoint of their 305 Americanism. The reason for this is said to be that the colleges and universities are not competent to as sess the Americanism of their teachers, and the Commit tee is. According to the Committee at least 100 mem bers of these faculties have been forced to resign and 310 556 at least 100 prospective members have failed of appoint ment because of the Committee's work. It is too bad that the Committee has not disclosed the information that led to the interdiction of its victims. One shud ders to think that it may have been enough to have been heard quoting John Stuart Mill. But the issue of legal control is not basic. Academic freedom comes and goes because of some con viction about the purpose of education on the part of those who make decisions in society. The Kaiser gave professors freedom of research because he believed that this was one way to make Germany strong and pros perous. This freedom did not extend to professors who wanted to engage actively in politics on the wrong side, the side of the Social Democratic Party. The Kaiser did not set a high value on independent criti cism. In a democratic community the question is what do the people think education is and what do they think it is for? I once asked a former Minister of Education of the Netherlands what would have happened if he had exercised his undoubted legal authority and appointed professors of whom the faculties of the Dutch univer sities did not approve. He said, "My government would have fallen." He meant that the people of Holland would not tolerate political interference with the uni versities: they understood the universities well enough to recognize interference when they saw it and felt strongly enough about it to make their wishes effective. The public officers and businessmen who are the trustees of the provincial universities in the United Kingdom have legal control over them, but would never think of exercising it in any matter affecting educa tion and research. They limit themselves to business. The tax-payers now meet more than half the cost of Ox ford and Cambridge, but no Englishman supposes that this entitles the government to exert any influence in their academic affairs. If the people believe that independent thought and criticism are essential to the progress of society, if they think that universities are centers of such criticism and that the rest of the educational system is intended to prepare the citizen to think for him self, then academic freedom will not be a problem, it will be a fact. Under these circumstances teachers 315 320 325 330 335 340 345 350 355 557 would not be second-class citizens subject to limita tions of expressions and behavior that show the public thinks the teacher of today is the nursemaid of yester day. A teacher would be appointed because he was cap able of independent thought and criticism and because he could help the rising generation learn to think for itself. He would be removed only if those who ap pointed him proved to be mistaken in these matters. The proof of their error would have to be made to per sons who could understand the issue--an out-of-hand ad ministrative removal approved by a board of laymen without participation by academic experts is a denial of academic freedom. The people of this country think that education is a perfectly splendid thing and have not the faint est idea of what it is about. The reason that they are in this condition is that educators have had no time and little inclination to explain. After all the great desideratum of American education in the last thirty-five years has been money. If you want money, you do not talk about independent thought and criti cism; you do not engage in it too obtrusively; you may even suppress it if it becomes too flagrant. To get money you must be popular. "He thinks too much" is a classical reference to an unpopular man. Or as a great industrialist once remarked to a friend of mine, You are either a Communist or a thinker." I have no doubt that much of the trouble of re cent years about academic freedom has been the result of the Cold War and our panic about it. As Professor Chafee has said, "Freedom of speech belongs to a people which is free from fear." But the basic issue is public understanding. If public understanding were serious and complete, the Cold War could not have thrown us off our balance. I do not deny that many eloquent statements of the purpose of American education have been made. They cannot offset the impression created by the official propaganda of educational institutions, by their fatu ous efforts to please everybody, and by their emphasis on the non-intellectual and even anti-intellectual ac tivities associated with education in this country. Freedom of teaching and research will not survive un less the people understand why it should. They will not understand if there is no relation between the freedom that is claimed and the purpose it is supposed 360 365 370 375 380 385 390 395 400 to serve. If the teacher of today is the nursemaid of yesterday, he does not need academic freedom--at least the nursemaid never did. Academic freedom is indispensable to the high calling of the academic profession. If the profession is true to the calling, it will deserve the freedom, and it will get it. 559 VIII. FREEDOM AND THE RESPONSIBILITY 8 OF THE PRESS: 1955 Twenty-five years ago, almost to the day, I last had the honor of addressing this society. The quarter of a century between has been the longest in history. That was a different world, before the depression, be fore the New Deal, before the Newspaper Guild, before 5 the suburbs, before they charged for newsprint, before the atom, before television. It was a world in which you were powerful and numerous. You are powerful still; but some 800 papers that were alive then are gone now. Twenty-five years hence, when I am 8l, where will you be? 10 When I was here last, I said, "The greatest ag gregation of educational foundations is the press it self . . . Indeed I notice that in spite of the fright ful lies you have printed about me I still believe everything you print about other people . . . If the 15 American press does not need or cannot get the leader ship of some endowed newspapers, we must fall back on the long process of education through educational insti tutions, hoping that in the long run we may produce a generation that will demand better things of you. This 20 process will be tedious and difficult, because of the power of the press itself over the minds and habits of those whom the educational institutions produce." You paid no attention. Well, I would merely re mind you that a great many men who paid no attention 25 then are not here now. I joined in another effort in your behalf in 19^7* when the Report of the Commission on the Freedom of the Press appeared. The Commission felt a little sad. It said, "The outstanding fact about the commu- 30 nications industry today is that the number of its units has declined." It expressed a high opinion,of your role in life, for it said, "Freedom of speech and free dom of the press are moral rights which the state must Robert M. Hutchins, "Freedom and the Responsibility of the Press: 1955*" (Delivered before The American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D. C., April 21, 1955. Text furnished by the courtesy of Mr. Hutchins.) 560 not infringe." And again, "We must recognize that the 35 agencies of mass communication are an educational in strument, perhaps the most powerful there is." You were furious. Your president issued a state ment in six paragraphs, in three of which he said that the members of the Commission were "left-wing," and in 40 all of which he stated his conviction that, since most of the members of the Commission were professors with out experience in the newspaper business, nothing they said could be of any importance, although it might be dangerous. At the meeting of this society in 1947* to 45 which I had expected to be invited to receive your con gratulations, the only thing that saved me from condem nation was the expressed unwillingness of your commit tee to "dignify" me by such action. All over the country you attacked the Report. 50 I hope you will read it sometime. But for fear you won't, I shall quote a passage from it that will give you the main idea: "If modern society requires great agencies of mass communication, if these concentra tions become so powerful that they are a threat to 55 democracy, if democracy cannot solve the problem simply by breaking them up--then those agencies must control themselves or be controlled by government. If they are controlled by government, we lose our chief safe guard agqinst totalitarianism--and at the same time 60 take a long step toward it." A kind of neurotic sensitivity is characteris tic of the press throughout the English-speaking world. The British papers were outraged by the report of the Royal Commission on the press, which was almost as 65 mild as ours. I don't know what makes you feel this way.• After all, in this country you have a special amendment to the Constitution, and the first one at that, protecting you. Perhaps it is this special dig nity that sometimes leads you to confuse your private 70 interests with those of the public. One of the most celebrated managing editors in the country told our Commission that the only threat to the freedom of the press was the Newspaper Guild and that all we had to do was to adopt a resolution denouncing the Guild and 75 go home. Most papers saw Marshall Field's suit against the AP as the end of freedom of the press. All he wanted to do to the AP was to join it. About once a week you break out in exasperation against anybody who tries to keep anything from you, for reasons of state 80 561 or for any reason at all. You are the only uncriticized institution in the country. You will not criticize one another, and any suggestion that anybody else might do so sets you to muttering about the First Amendment. I know that lately life has been hard for you. And it may get even worse; for it may turn out that reading is an anachronism. When I was a boy, reading was the only established and available path to knowl edge, information, or even entertainment. But the other day in Hollywood I met a man who was putting the Great Books on records. Everything else has already been put on records or films. One glance at the chil dren making for the television set on their return from school is enough to show that this is a different world. The habit of reading, which my generation fell into be cause there was not much else to do, may now not be formed at all; it may have too much competition. The competition may win. Gresham's Law of Cul ture is that easy stuff drives out hard. It is harder to read, even after Dr. Flesch has finished with the printed page, than it is to look and listen. I do not believe that newspapers can do what comic books, pic ture magazines, motion pictures, and television can do in glorious technicolor. Since they can do this kind of thing better, why should you do it at all? You may say it is the only way to survive. John Cowles suggests it may be a way to die. In his Sigma Delta Chi speech he said newspapers have realized that complete and fair coverage builds circulation. With few exceptions, he said, those newspapers which "have had the heaviest circulation losses are not papers that regard full and fair news presentation as their primary function and reason for existence." If so good a businessman as Mr. Cowles can think there is any chance that sensationalism and entertainment are not good for business, a layman may perhaps be forgiven for being impressed. Emboldened by his example, I will say that news papers should do as well as they can the things that they can do best, and they should leave to others the responsibility of entertaining the public. If you are worried about who is going to discharge that responsi bility, read the March 21 issue of Newsweek, which says that television is abandoning "Johns Hopkins Science Review," "Princeton, '55," and "The Search." These 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 562 programs have won many honors and audiences that look large to people who do not work in advertising agencies. A couple of years ago Henry Luce was discussing the monopoly newspaper. He said the argument against it was that it deprived the community of differing presentations of news and opinions. He went on, Like so many high-brow discussions about newspapers I notice that journalists invariably use the word "high-brow" when referring to criticisms of the press, even when, as in this case, the truth of the criticism is self- evident to the merest moron this one is fine, except that it ignores the actual nature of a newspaper. Does any one feel strongly that a city ought to have several newspapers in order to offer the community a greater variety of comic strips, breakfast menus, and cheesecake?" If this is the actual nature of a news paper, the fewer papers the better. Certainly the spe cial constitutional protection thrown about them seems no more warranted than such protection would be for acrobats, chefs, beauty parlor operators, and astrolo gers . What the framers of the First Amendment had in mind was debate, a great continuing debate, with the people hearing all sides and getting all the facts. If government could be kept from interfering with this debate, nothing could interfere with it; for a man who differed with the existing papers could start one of his own. The Founding Fathers did not foresee that 94 per cent of American cities and eighteen American states would be without competing papers. In the over whelming majority of communities there can now be no debate among rival editors. The editor in a one-paper town has the only voice there is, and the only one there is likely to be. The debate has become a solilo quy. Talk about the virtues of monopoly is the flim siest rationalization, as is shown by the poor quality of the papers in many monopoly towns. Monopoly cannot be a good thing. At its best It can be like a benevo lent despotism, good while the benevolence lasts, but an accident in any case. Monopoly may in the present state of affairs be a necessary evil, but let us not pretend that it is not an evil. Rising costs have put the publisher in the driv er's seat, where he has no business to be. The First 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 563 Amendment was not instituted to give a preferred posi tion to people who were making money out of papers as against those who were making money out of other arti cles of commerce. The Amendment was to protect the content of the press, not the cash return from it. The reason the publisher is in the driver's seat is that it costs so much money to own and operate a newspaper, and more all the time. If the soliloquy is that of one of the richest men in town, it is more than likely that it will sound the same political note as other soliloquies in other towns, rendered by other rich men. This is the basis of the phrase, "a one-party press." Of course we have a one-party press in this coun try, and we shall have one as long as the press is big business, and as long as people with money continue to feel safer on the Republican side. For sheer psalm- singing sanctimoniousness no statement in recent years has surpassed that of Charles F. McCahill, president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, when he was asked to comment on Adlai Stevenson's polite re marks on a one-party press. Mr. McCahill said, and I quote him: "It is the responsibility of the individual editor and publisher to decide what is printed in a particular newspaper. Fortunately, there is no power in this country to standardize the editorial views of any editor or publisher." Here in two sentences Mr. McCahill managed (l) to say what everybody knew al ready; (2) to be completely irrelevant; and (3) to prove Mr. Stevenson's point for him by making the par tisan insinuation that Mr. Stevenson wanted the power to standardize editorial opinion. How you get along with these publishers is more than I can understand. Lord Beaverbrook, when he was asked by the Royal Commission on the Press what his purpose in life was, replied under oath: "I run the paper purely for the purpose of making propaganda, and with no other mo tive." (There is apparently less cant among publishers in England than we are accustomed to here.) Lord Beaverbrook's propaganda collides wherever it goes with the counter-propaganda of numerous local and national voices. The popular press in Britain is the most sen- sational in the world, but an Englishman who doesn't want a sensational newspaper does not have to take the Mirror. Because of the geography of England he can get anywhere, inexpensively, and usually with his break fast, a presentation of the news as fair as an editor can make it and as full as the restrictions on news- 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 I \ t 564 i print will allow, together with serious commentary upon it. In the absence of some new technological revo- 220 lution the number of -papers per community in this country seems unlikely to increase. Nothing suggests that costs will fall. Television and suburbanization are driving ahead as fast as they can go. As monopoly continues to spread, the ancient check of competition 225 can of course no longer be relied on. This should lead to the burial of that consol ing reference to Jefferson's Second Inaugural, an ever-present refuge in time of criticism, which made its last formal appearance here in the report of the 230 committee reporting on the Report of the Commission on the Freedom of the Press. Jefferson said, in effect, that the people would make their views of a newspaper felt by refusing to read, believe, or buy it. The theory that the daily test of the market-place is an 235 expression of public criticism, and all that is needed, is reduced to absurdity when the public has no option, when it has to buy the newspaper that is offered or go without. If we cannot look to competition to keep pub- 240 Ushers from getting out of hand, what can we do to save their freedom from the consequences of their ir responsibility? My youthful suggestion of some en dowed newspapers was designed to execute some publish ers pour encourager les autres. The object was to set 245 some standards that publishers of unendowed newspapers might be held to. I take this proposal less seriously than I did twenty-five years ago. -The Christian Sci ence Monitor undoubtedly has a good influence on the press of this country, but the conditions under which 250 it operates, with its foundations in heaven rather than on earth, are so different from the ordinary that any publisher has an adequate excuse for not following the Monitor1s example. So I fear it would be with an en dowed newspaper. 255 A trust such as that which controls the future of the Washington Post regulates the selection of stockholders, but gives the editor no explicit protec tion. The British trusts usually have the same ob ject, that of preventing the ownership from falling 260 into unsuitable hands. Although the British trusts reflect an attitude that an editor would find reassuring, 565 no trust covering a daily newspaper leaves him formally any better off than he would be if there were no trust. The most that the Royal Commission was willing to say was, "A trust does not necessarily convert a newspaper from a commercial to a non-commercial concern or give it quality which it did not possess . . . A trust can be, however, a valuable means of preserving quality where quality already exists. We accordingly welcome the action of public-spirited proprietors who have taken such steps as lie in their power to safeguard the character and independence of their papers; and we hope that the number of papers so protected will grow." A publisher's willingness to establish a trust shows that he could be trusted without'it; still it is a way of extending the benevolence of the benevolent despot beyond the limits of his own life. When you have a newspaper worth protecting, a trust will help you protect it; but a trust does not guarantee you a newspaper worth protecting. The purpose of a newspaper, and the justifica tion for the privileges of the press, is the enlighten ment of the people about their current affairs. No other medium of communication can compete with the newspaper in the performance of this task. A news paper that is doing this job well is a good newspaper, no matter how deficient it may be in astrology, menus, comics, cheesecake, crime, and Republican propaganda. A newspaper that is doing this job deserves protection against government, and it will certainly need it. A newspaper that is doing this job will have to bring before its readers points of view with which it disagrees and facts that it deplores. Otherwise in monopoly towns the people cannot expect to be enlight ened; for television and radio are unlikely to be in the same class with a well-run newspaper in telling what is happening and what it means. Television and radio are, moreover, controlled by a governmental agen cy, and one that does not inspire much confidence today. A good many newspapers take seriously their re sponsibility to enlighten the people about current af fairs. It is generally agreed that the best American papers are as good as any in the world and that the average is high. Our question is how to maintain the good newspapers in the faith and how to convert the • ' others. 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305 566 I think you should reconsider your opposition to the principal recommendation of the Commission on the Freedom of the Press. That was that a new agency he established to appraise and report annually upon the performance of the press. The Commission said, "It seems to us clear that some agency which reflects the ambitions of the American people for its press should exist for the purpose of comparing the accomplishments of the press with the aspirations which the people have for it. Such an agency would also educate the people as to the aspirations which they ought to have for the press." The Commission suggested that this agency be independent of government and of the press; that it be created by gifts; and that it be given a ten-year trial, at the end of which an audit of its achievement could determine anew the institutional form best adapted to its purposes. The fact that the British Commission independently reached an identical recommendation seems to me highly significant. Such an agency should contain representatives of the press; it should also contain laymen. My guess is that the weakness of the Press Council in Sweden results from the fact that it is composed entirely of representatives of the newspapers. I believe that the British Council will go the same way because the press rejected the recommendation of the Royal Commission that the Council should have lay members and a lay chairman. If its first report is suggestive of its future, this group is likely to manifest i.ts fearless and high-principled character by speaking sternly to newspapers on trivial subjects. ; The Nieman Reports, the Press Institute state ments, A. J. Liebling's "Wayward Press," Bob Lasch in jfche Progressive. occasional studies by schools of journalism, these are all we have in this country. They are too casual and limited, and, since most of them are directed at the press, they do not perform one function that the Commission on the Freedom of the Press regarded as essential: they do not "educate the people as to the aspirations which they ought to have for the press." Your own efforts to act as a critical agency have come to nothing. You appointed a committee in 1949 "to examine the desirability of sponsoring an ap praisal of the self-improvement possibilities of Ameri can newspapers." The Committee reported in 1950 as 310 315 320 325 330 335 340 345 350 567 follows: "Our Committee recognizes and reiterates that the American Society of Newspaper Editors is, itself, and must he, a continuing committee of the whole on self-examination and self-improvement. But, in addi tion, we urge the Society to call upon its Board of Di rectors to take whatever action may be necessary from time to time to clarify understanding of American newspapers by the public, and to keep editors alert to their responsibilities in fulfilling the public's right to an adequate, independent newspaper press." That sounds as though it was written by a public relations man. In these sonorous sentences we hear the cadence of the Psalms. The great issues of our time are peace and free dom. A new critical agency might appraise the perform ance of the newspapers in correcting, or contributing to, our vast confusion on these subjects. We know that the peoples of the earth are now equipped to turn one another into radioactive cinders. Can you say that you have given Americans the material they need to reach a conclusion on the course they should follow, on the choice between co-existence and no existence, the choice between seeking peace through purchase and intimidation and seeking it through total, enforceable disarmament, the choice between competing nationalisms and world law? And what of freedom in the garrison state? Since most of you take the official line, that the only important fact of life is our imminent danger from the international conspiracy, most of you have watched the erosion of freedom without a twinge. When the official line permitted, you have sallied forth, as when you gallantly led the troops from the rear in a belated at tack on Senator McCarthy. You have filled the air with warnings of the sinister figures on the Left, but have printed almost nothing about the fat cats on the Right. You have allowed things to get to such a pass that some government departments now have guidance clinics in which the employee is taught how not to look like a se curity risk. Look at the Passport Division, interfer ing with the travel of Americans on their lawful occa sions; at the Attorney-General's list, ruining the lives of thousands on the basis of hearsay; at the Post Office Department, saving us from Pravda and Aristoph anes; at the State Department, adding the name of Corsi to those of Davies and Service and countless others. 355 360 365 370 375 380 385 390 395 568 See the blacklist spreading in industry, merging with 400 proposals that American Communists should be starved to death. Listen to the wire-tapping, to the cry of Fifth Amendment Communist, to the kept witnesses roam ing the land. The most distressing part of it is not that these things happen, but that the free press of 405 this country appears to regard them as matters or routine. You are educators, whether you like it or not. You make the views that people have of public affairs. No competition can shake you from that position. You 410 will lose it only if you neglect or abandon it. As the number of papers per community declines, the re sponsibility of each one that remains increases. This is a responsibility that is discharged by being a newspaper, by giving the news. The editorial function 415 is to make sure that it is given in such a way that it can be understood. The people must see the alterna tives before them; otherwise they cannot be enlightened. Enlightenment means telling the people where they are in time and space. It means engaging in sys- 420 tematic criticism. The criticism of current affairs has to be made in the light of some standard. This must be something more than a set of partisan slogans. The standard by which the American press must judge current events is derived from an understanding of and 425 sympathy with the deepest aspirations of the American people, those for peace and freedom. A press that serves its country in this way need have no concern about the future. 9 IX. THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC 569 I think I should tell you at the outset that the only other award I ever received was from the American Legion. It was from Chicago Post 170. Perhaps that post is a bunch of mavericks, but I prefer to regard it as more representative of the rank and file of the Le- 5 gion than the kingmakers in Indianapolis are. I joined the Legion, after 35 years as an unattached and skepti cal veteran, because of my admiration for the program of the Illinois Department under the leadership of Irv ing Breakstone. I was happy to learn that the National 10 Commander endorsed this program in February last. I was sorry to see him cross himself up six months later by condemning the Fund for the Republic, which had fi nanced the program he had endorsed. It is embarrassing to have one’s commander make slips of this kind. 15 I am surprised that there should be any differ ences of opinion about the Fund for the Republic. They must result from misinformation. Or perhaps they arise out of that confusion which overtakes statesmen, colum nists, and commentators in the hustle and bustle in 20 which they perform their task of cleansing the Common wealth of influences that threaten the positions on which they have built their reputations. Congressman B. Carroll Reece, for example, who made his reputation as chairman of a congressional in- 25 vestigation into foundations, announced, almost before the Fund was organized, that its object was to investi gate congressional investigations. As a matter of fact, less than one per cent of the Fund's expenditures have been devoted to this subject; and this money was 30 spent through a committee' of the American Bar Associa tion, the report of which was adopted by a large ma jority of the House of Delegates at the meeting of the Association fourteen months ago. In February, 1953, the Ford Foundation made a 35 9 Robert M. Hutchins, "The Fund for the Republic." (Remarks on receiving The Bill of Rights Award, American Veterans Committee, Washington, D. C., October 7 > 1955. Text furnished by the courtesy of Mr. Hutchins and The Fund for the Republic.) I 570 considerable grant to the Fund for the Republic, and the umbilical cord between them was severed. At that time the Board of- Directors of the Fund made a public state ment that said, "The major factor affecting ciVil. lib- 40 erties today, in our opinion, is the menace of Commun ism and Communist influence in this country. Coupled with this threat is the grave danger to civil liberties in methods that may be used to meet the threat. We propose to undertake research into the extent and nature 45 of the internal Communist menace and its effect on our community and institutions. We hope to arrive at a realistic understanding of effective procedures for deal ing with it. "We regard the sphere of operation of the Fund 50 as including the entire field of freedom and civil rights in the United States and take as our basic char ter the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu tion . . . "Out of our discussions has come a preliminary 55 conclusion that the attention of the Fund should at this time be concentrated in the following five areas 1. Restrictions and assaults upon academic freedom; 60 2. Due process and equal protection of the laws; 3- The protection of the rights of minorities; 4. Censorship, boycotting, and blacklisting by private groups; ( 5- The principle of guilt by association and 65 its application in the U. S. today." I call your attention to the fact that this statement was issued at a time at which I had no con nection with the Fund. Of the original directors those who are still , 70 serving are Paul G. Hoffman, Chairman of the Board; George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College, Vice- Chairman of the Board; Charles W. Cole, President of Amherst College; Russell L. Dearmont, attorney of St. Louis; Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of the Harvard Law 75 School; William H. Joyce, Jr., Chairman of the Board, 571 Joyce, Inc.; Meyer Kestenbaum, President, Hart Schaffner & Marx; M. Albert Linton, Chairman of the Board, Provi dent Mutual Life Insurance Co.; John Lord O'Brian; J. R. Parten, President, Woodley Petroleum Co.; Elmo Roper; Mrs. Eleanor B. Stevenson; and James D. Zellerbach, President, Crown Zellerbach Corporation. They were later joined by Harry Ashmore, Executive Editor of the Arkansas Gazette: Chester Bowles; and Robert E. Sher wood. This group, which I have seen described as "left- wing," supervises the execution of the program announced by the Board two and a half years ago. This program is just what it started out to be, no more, no less. But you would never guess it from some of the things you hear and read these days. For example, the Annual Report, which, by the way, is given away free to anybody who asks for it, shows that almost a third of the money appropriated up to the date of the Report had gone into race relations. The Catholic In terracial Council of Chicago, the Methodist Church, the National Council of Churches of Christ, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Southern Regional Council have received grants to assist them in the pro tection of the rights of minorities. One of the most serious problems these minorities face is that of hous ing. The Fund has established a commission on this subject headed by Earl B. Schwulst, President of the Bowery Savings Bank of New York, and including such men as Father John Cavanaugh, of Notre Dame; Elliott Bell, of Business Week: Clark Kerr, Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley; Stanley Marcus, of Neiman-Marcus; and Henry R. Luce, of Time. Inc. Not even in the South has any responsible criticism of these activities appeared. In the criticisms of the Fund no mention of these activities appears. For such conspiratorial agencies as the Congre gational Christian Church, the Universalist Church, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., the American Friends Serv ice Committee, the League of Women Voters, the Ameri can Heritage Council, and Columbia University the Fund has appropriated approximately a quarter of a million dollars to help promote the discussion of the basic ideas and documents in American history and political theory; $50*000 of this is being used to bring the good news of these ideas and documents to my embattled comrades in the Illinois Department of the American Legion. Although these expenditures are set forth in detail in the Annual Report, which has been circulating 80 85 90 95 100 105 n o 115 120 572 for almost two months, I do not often hear or see them mentioned by those who think less well of the Fund than I do. It may surprise those of you who derive your in formation from such sources to learn that the Fund has made grants to the Common Council for American Unity to expand its work in protecting the legal rights of aliens, to the University of Pennsylvania to study the interference of the Post Office Department with the flow of information and opinion, to the National Book Committee for a study of the right to publish and to read, and that it has assisted various bar associa tions and legal organizations that are trying to see to it that indigent and unpopular defendants are ade quately represented by counsel. Pursuant to its original resolution the Board of the Fund had devoted almost a third of its expendi tures up to the date of the Annual Report to the study of various aspects of Communism in the United States. Professor Arthur E. Sutherland of the Harvard Law School directed the compilation of the first complete digest of the principal legal proceedings in which the Communist Party has been involved. Professor Samuel A. Stouffer of Harvard conducted a national opinion survey in order to discover what the attitudes of the American people toward Communists and radicals were. Professor Clinton Rossiter of Cornell, with the assist ance of twelve experts and a large staff, is making the definite study of what the Communist Party has amounted to in this country and what it amounts to now. The Stanford University Law School has received a grant to make an objective analysis and critical summary of testimony of the principal witnesses in the most impor tant Communist trials. The professors who direct these studies have complete freedom. They are given the money and asked to recruit their own staffs and work out their proj ects in their own way. If you want to complain of what they do, you have to argue that they are incompe tent or that they are crooked. Nobody has suggested that they are incompetent. But it has been insinuated that in return for money from the Fund they will oblige by digging up facts to support any prejudice that any officer or director of the Fund may have. This insinuation is so outrageous that it must arise out of acute alarm on the part of those who make it. 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 573 What are they afraid of? I can only conclude that they 170 are afraid of the truth. Consider the excitement displayed in some quar ters about the work the Fund has financed on the loy al ty-security programs. In the first place, it was natural that this apparatus, which is estimated to af- 175 feet 10 to 12 million people, should attract the at tention of an organization concerned with freedom and civil rights. Everybody knows that freedom and civil rights are restricted by the loyalty-security system. The American Legion Magazine bitterly attacked the in- 180 justices in the system in January, 1955* For many months appeals have gone up for some kind of public or private investigation that might discover the precise facts and lead to recommendations for action. As a result the Humphrey-Stennis Resolution, calling for a 185 bi-partisan commission on the subject, passed both houses of Congress by almost unanimous votes and was signed by the President. In the second place, the organization that has received money from the Fund to study the loyalty- 190 security system is one of unimpeachable competence and integrity, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. On the committee that it has chosen are leading lawyers of New York, Chicago, Washington, New Orleans, and Los Angeles. The staff director is a 195 distinguished professor of lav/ at Columbia University. The Association, like all other grantees of the Fund, has absolute independence in conducting its study. This brings me, in the third place, to the col lection of cases made at the expense of the Fund under 200 the direction of Adam Yarmolinsky of the District of Columbia Bar. Fifty of these episodes in the opera tion of the loyalty-security program have been pub lished and have attracted a good deal of attention. Mr. Yarmolinsky has been careful to state that he has 205 obtained the official records and all other information he has published from counsel for the defense. He has also made it clear that what he has published is a random sample of the cases that counsel were willing to have published. Since Mr. Yarmolinsky dealt with fewer 210 than four hundred cases, and since there are thousands of them, it was evident that fie. Yarmolinsky1s collec tion was not, could not be, and did not purport to be a comprehensive study of the operations of the loyalty- security program. It purported to be just what it was: 215 574 a presentation of fifty cases on the basis of material . supplied by one sids-v-'-But what this material adds up to is the entire publi'c record of each case. It Is presented factually, without comments or recommendations. One object of Mr. Yarmolinsky1s work was to ob tain data that might expedite the study of the Associ ation of the Bar of the City of New York or any other that might be made of the loyalty-security system. Another object was to shed light on the importance or lack of it, as the case might be, of a comprehensive investigation such as that to be undertaken by the bi partisan commission under the Humphrey-Stennis resolu tion and that now being conducted by the Association of the Bar. The Yarmolinsky cases raise a presumption that gross injustice has at least occasionally been done in the execution of the presidential orders in this field. Since this is so, a comprehensive invest! gation is urgent. It ought not to be necessary for me to add that if the Yarmolinsky cases had raised .the presumption that the system was operating perfectly, the Fund would have published them just the same, and would have done so with great relief. I can only conclude that those who fear impar tial investigation of the loyalty-security programs do so because they are afraid of the truth. The posi tions they have taken and the reputations they have built are interwoven with those programs. As John Lord O'Brian says in his book, National Security and Individual Freedom. "The great misfortune is that is sues of loyalty and security have been seized upon by unscrupulous politicians and used as political weapons by selfish partisans." Such people do not want the system looked into, because they fear that it may be found defective, and their attitudes and reputations may appear defective, too. It may be said that the Fund has a point of view. Of course It has. It believes that the princi ples of the Declaration of Independence and the Con stitution are important. It believes that Communism and the methods of dealing with it are important. It 255 believes that academic freedom, the protection of the rights of minorities, censorship, boycotting, and blacklisting by private groups, guilt by association, and due process and the equal protection of the laws are important. The Fund believes that the facts about 260 these issues should be brought to light and that the 240 245 250 220 225 230’ 235 575 facts and the issues should be discussed. I will go further. The Fund is for the princi ples of the Declaration of Independence and the Consti tution. It is against Communism. It is for methods 265 of dealing with Communism that safeguard the princi ples of the Declaration of Independence and the Consti tution. It is against censorship, boycotting, and blacklisting by private groups, and against guilt by association. It is for academic freedom, the protec- • 270 tion of the rights of minorities, and due process and the equal protection of the laws. The Fund' is' per- ' fectly aware that a tax-exempt organization must not seek to influence legislation, and it does- not attempt to do so. The Fund has confidence that if the Ameri- 275 can people know the facts and understand the issues they will reach conclusions compatible with the princi ples of the Declaration of Independence.and the Consti tution. To quote the final words of Mr. O'Brian's book, "The public, with the issues clarified, will . . . re- 280 spond to the sense of moral responsibility, and out of the present confusion will come a rededication to the cause of freedom in our time. In this confident belief must be our hope." / The point of view of the Fund for the Republic 285 is conservative. It wants to conserve the Republic by conserving its essential attributes, which are free dom and justice. These ideas and the constant strug gle to realize them in daily life have made our country strong and great. These ideas rest on a conception of 290 man. According to that conception the ideal man is one who is willing to learn, but who thinks for him self; who respects the convictions of others, but who will stand up for his own against any power whatever. In this country we do not have to take anybody's 295. word for anything. The citizen does not have to take the word of diplomats about foreign policy, of military men about military power, of policemen about security, of informers about the disloyalty of persons, or of the Attorney General about that or organizations. He 300 does not have to take the word of legislative commit tees about the prevalence of witches. Though he is supposed to take the word of the Supreme Court about what the law is, he does not have to stop trying to get it to change its mind; and in America we recognize 305 the claims of higher law. We have only to recall Thoreau to be reminded that civil disobedience has a 576 long and honorable history in this country. Our reliance is upon the intelligence and char acter of the independent individual. The greatest dangers to the ideals that we cherish are fear and conformity. Courage and independence are the best guarantees of freedom and justice. We cannot feel free and feel frightened. The motto of the Fund for the Republic is: Feel free. 310 315 APPENDIX B .AN INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS 577 APPENDIX B AN INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS The following interview was tape-recorded in New York by Robert Hutchins and a staff member of the Fund for the Re public on November 24, 1958. The questions were written by George W. Dell. Background and Training Were there any childhood experiences which had sig nificant results in the development of your public speaking? That depends on what is meant by my childhood. I made my first public speech when I was fourteen. I sup pose I was a child. All that this did for me was to in dicate how difficult public speaking was. Did your father's sermons or addresses influence your own speaking? I suppose they did. I thought my father's sermons were much too sentimental and I also thought that he told too many stories. I suppose this has had an effect on me in making me, not sentimental enough and not tell ing enough stories. What part did discussions in your family play in pre paring you for public speeches? I am unable to say except that public speaking was taken very seriously in my family, since both my grand father and father made their living by this activity. Was public speaking easy for you during your early experiences? Certainly not. 578 579 Were there any experiences at Oberlin Academy which shaped your speaking? I was a member of the debating team and I was an ora tor at our commencement. I suppose the criticisms that I received from the .coaches that I had and the associ ates that I had, had some effect, but I don't remember anything specific. Did you debate at Oberlin, as well as at Yale? Yes, I did. ' Has inter-collegiate debating assisted you in the de velopment of speaking'skill? How can-I tell? I suppose it,has, assuming that I have any speaking- skill. ' The one thing one has to do in inter-collegiate debating is to try to forecast what the other side, is going to say and be prepared to answer it. I, also suppose that any speaking experience has some ef fect on all later speaking experience. In both these respects, therefore, I suppose that inter-collegiate de- .bating has affected the development of the way I speak. Did you debate on only one side of a proposition, or did you alternate affirmative and negative? The- latter. Have any of your teachers influenced your speaking practices? I can only suppose that all of them have in one way or another, either as models or as horrible examples. What experiences connected with writing have aided you? Did legal briefing assist you? I suppose the most difficult thing about speaking, at least for me, is the matter of organization. Again with enormous quantities of material or stray ideas and the problem is to got this into communicable form to be de livered in the time that is allotted to you. That is one way in which legal work of all kinds does get you into the right habits, I suppose. Another thing about legal work is that you have to be able to support what you say. That is every statement, from a decision of a court is supposed to carry with it a footnote which 580 shows what the decision was and I suppose that the habit of accuracy is developed by legal briefing. Has your preparation of books and articles helped? I have almost never prepared books and articles--my books and articles are nothing but speeches. Has editorial work with Encyclopaedia Britannica ex erted any effects? I [laughter] have discovered occasional references in Britannica that I have used with rhetorical effect. But otherwise I can think of nothing. Has your legal training influenced the ideas you have expressed? I suppose it has. I should think that there was no doubt of it. I don't know exactly in what respect. Did the fact that you were young for a university president pose a handicap for you as a speaker? The fact that I was young was a handicap to me as a university president but the fact that I was young as a university president was an advantage to me as a speaker. What philosophers have had the most profound effect on your ideas? Editorial theorists? Great scholars? Edu cational administrators? Aristotle and Plato have had the greatest effect upon my ideas and I suppose that I should add Thomas Aquinas. I can think of no editorial theorists who have had any particular effect on my ideas or great scholars. I wish I could think of an educational administrator who has had some effect on my ideas, but I suppose I would have to limit myself to Charles E. Clark who was the Dean of the Yale Law School after me and to Clarence Faust, Dean of the College at Chicago, Robert Redfield, Dean of the Division of the Social Sciences at Chicago. Mortimer Adler, who I suppose should be included in the list of great scholars. Whitehead has affected me somewhat. I think that would be about the list. Has Mortimer Adler's friendship affected your philo sophical position? 581 Very deeply. Are there any rhetorical theorists that have influ enced your speaking practices? None, except Aristotle. When did you stop teaching the Great Books course at Chicago? I stopped teaching the Great Books course at Chicago when I left Chicago, which was in January of 1951• •' Has the .Great Books adult educational program been •successful in your opinion?; Very. ■ ■ ' • . • . Would you care to react to the charge made, by some • . educational critics that the type o.f education you advocat'e is for a n . , elite 'class? ' I repeatedly made- it clear that' I believe in. the doc- ■ trine of education for all and I think it is the most important contribution' that our-country has made to the- theory and practice of democracy, .i do 'not; believe in ,an. education for ah elite class, ,as a basic liberal gen eral education. I b.elieye that the. kind of education that I advocate is. one that is--can be--mastered by, and should be mastered by every citizen. I- believe that this type of education should be completed and cah.be ■ completed by the age of eighteen-" After that, of'course, educational entrance to educational institutions, and graduation from educational institutions should depend on the ability that has been demonstrated by the indi vidual up to that point. All education, all prolonged education, all specialized and professional education is in the nature of the case, an education for an elite. I don't know of anybody who proposes to admit every Ameri can citizen just because he is an American citizen to a university. There has to be some selection somewhere and when you begin to select, then you are talking about an elite. But as to basic, general or liberal education, this is the education that every citizen ought to have. Ideally, how would you suggest that a "great speaker" should develop his skill? I would suggest that he get the best education that 582 he can get and then that he practice speaking. Methods of Speech Preparation How do you choose the topic for a given address? ^ Usually, the speaker has no choice. He is told, at least in general terms what the audience wishes to have him”speak about. When I am free to choose what I speak about, I speak about what is currently on my mind. Since you are generally considered "controversial," does this quality influence your introduction % or any oth’ er part of your speech? ¥ • * • i Certainly it does. In the first place, one has *to establish in view of his’ general deputation that one-is not partisan, prejudiced or biased and every effort has to be made to adopt both a tone and a content that con tributes to this impression.' . . . . ’ •.How limg do.es it take you to prepare a typical ad dress which laBt's 'about forty-five, miriutes? That depends on’ the* subject. Forty-five’minutes is an easier length of time than twenty'. It takes me twice as long to prepare a twenty-minute speech as it does a forty-five minute speech. I would say that when I .am composing very rapidly I compose at the rate of about two hundred and fifty words an hour. Do you outline the speech first, then write out the ' • complete draft? What I write out first can hardly be called an out line. I write down everything.I can think of on the subject that I have selected. I gradually try to get it into outline form but I have often— in fact, this is the usual case--I usually do not refer to the notes I have made or the outline I have made after I begin to write the speech. Do you prefer any special organizational pattern? I don't understand the question well enough to answer it. . Was your preparation for the University of Chicago 583 Round Table discussion different from other addresses? In the nature of the case there could be no prepara tion for the University of Chicago Round Table discus sion beyond the preliminary conversations among the per sons who were to go on the program. These conversations were sometimes very long, lasting over a week. But they were usually two or three hours before the program. Are there certain types of supporting evidence which you favor? . No. I- belieye that any kind of suppor.ting evidence that is really 'supporting .is evidence that is useful. • • • Do you prefer deductive oyer inductive proof? • • • • No. I do not’admit the’validity of the, distinction. Is there a typical- number of mal.ri ideas •used in your speeches? _ ' ” • I think not. . " About how many subheads do you usually employ under each, main point? ' I have never thought about the matter, and ha‘ ve never given any attention .to the number of subheads under-each main point when I was preparing a speech. ’ . Do‘you favor any stylistic.devices, e.g., irony? I. [laughter] favor any stylistic device that seems to * • -be effective. I believe‘that I have overdone irony- in my time. . • . • How many drafts are prepared in a typical speech be fore you consider it polished enough for presentation? Sinpe I write very slowly, I do not ordinarily make more than one draft in the' sense that I will write out the draft--the first draft--so slowly that I am in es- sense writing several drafts as I proceed. If, as is frequently the case, the first draft that I write is il legible, I will make another one so that my secretary can copy it. Have your world-wide travels as an educational 584 lecturer modified your educational philosophy? There is no doubt that they have, but I am at a loss to indicate the specific ways in which they have. Rehearsal and Delivery Are your speeches which are read from manuscript re hearsed in advance? No. Does your wife criticize your text or delivery? I have too much affection for my wife to subject her to this experience. If you were not quoted so frequently, would you rath er deliver a speech from manuscript or extemporaneously? The real reason for writing out a speech is that if you do not write it out you will be more misquoted than if you do write it out. If I were not afraid of being even more misquoted than I have been, I would prefer on all occasions to speak extemporaneously. There is the additional difficulty that a great many of the speeches I have made have been published and I have been told be fore--! have been told in the invitation that I received --that they were going to be published. Therefore, I had to write them out. But there is no question in my mind that an extemporaneous speech is more effective than one read from manuscript. Do you experience appreciable nervousness before de livering a speech? I do. Is there a particular audience attitude (hostile, in different, or favorable) toward your subject which you enjoy the most? I enjoy friendly audiences much more than I enjoy any other kind. Are you conscious of any over-stating of ideas or facts In an attempt to get effect? 585 I have no doubt that I have been guilty of this, but if I try to figure out where and when I have some prob lems about it. Any presentation of any material has to be selected. I have no doubt that I select the materi als that I think will be most effective. In doing this I undoubtedly omit materials that are less effective or even contrary to the position that I am trying to set forth. I would also concede that my speeches are the speeches of an advocate and not those of a judge and that I am undoubtedly— like all advocates--I have exag gerated from time to time. Is there any speech which you consider the most sat isfying of all those you delivered from 1940 to 1955? , I think the most satisfying speech I ever made was to the graduating class in Chicago, but it was long before 1940. Approximately how many -public speeches have you given? I have no idea. There were.hundreds. Were you satisfied with your participation on Meet the Press in November of 1955? I have never been satisfied with any presentation that I ever made, particularly I have never been satisfied with any presentation or participation in a radio or television discussion program. It is impossible under those circumstances to make a reasoned case--I'm afraid it is almost impossible to make a reasonable statement. Who was the best speaker you have ever heard? Why do you consider him so? I suppose the best speaker that I ever heard was George Vincent, who was formerly President of the Uni versity of Minnesota and President of the Rockerfeller Foundation. He was the best after-dinner speaker I ever heard. I suppose the reason that I considered him so was that he had a highly individual style. He was extremely entertaining and at the same time he always had some thing serious that he was trying to communicate. The number of really good speakers that I have ever he«.rd, I am sorry to say, is extremely limited. My father, sub ject to the statements I have.made above, was probably the best speaker that I ever heard, as an orator on se rious occasions. I am trying to distinguish between him 586 and George Vincent because George Vincent's peculiar talents lay in his ability as an after-dinner speaker. Do -you prefer reading a manuscript over replying to questions after an address? I much prefer to answer questions rather than to make a speech of any kind. Why? I much prefer an extemporaneous speech to a speech read from manuscript. The reason is that while you are making a speech, even if it is an extemporaneous speech, you run very serious risks with regard to your audience. I always feel that the audience is not particularly in terested in what I have to say, and that I feel that all the time I am speaking I am trying to get the audience interested in what I have to say. When I am answering questions I know that there is one person in the room who is interested in what I am trying to say. That is why I prefer to answer questions. If I had my choice I would never make a speech. I would always answer ques tions and I did this on one occasion at Wellesley when I was asked to lecture there. I said I would not do so, but that I would send them a lecture. I sent them a lecture a month ahead of time and then I went to the college and answered questions about it that the girls had been working out in the month between the time when they received the lecture and the time that I appeared. Was it successful? It was much more satisfactory than a formal presenta tion followed by questions because the questions were much better than they would have been if I had made a statement which they didn't expect and to which they had to react instantly in an unpremeditated way.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

A Historical Study Of The Speechmaking At The Abilene Christian College Lectureship, 1918-1961

PDF

A Descriptive-Analytical Study Of Ethical Standards In Contemporary American Public Address

PDF

Christian Science and the rhetoric of argumentative synthesis

PDF

Emerson'S Philosophy Of Rhetoric

PDF

A Historical And Critical Study Of The Public Address Of James Harvey 'Cyclone' Davis (1853-1940) Of Texas

PDF

An Experimental Study Of An Application Of Game Theory To The Selection Of Arguments By College Debaters

PDF

An Experimental Study Of The Effect Of Listener Feedback On Speaker Attitude

PDF

Clement Attlee'S Advocacy Of Democratic Socialism: A Reasonable Rhetoricof Revolution

PDF

An Experimental Study Of The Accuracy Of Experienced And Inexperienced Speakers In Identifying Audience Behavior As Indicative Of Feelings Of Agreement, Indecision, Or Disagreement

PDF

Rhetoricians On Language And Meaning: An Ordinary Language Philosophy Critique

PDF

An Analysis Of Selected Presage Criteria Of Reciprocal Student And Teacher Ratings In Beginning College Speech Classes

PDF

An Analytical-Historical Study Of The Factors Contributing To The Successof Mark Twain As An Oral Interpreter

PDF

The Rhetoric Of The Methodist Camp Meeting Movement: 1800-1850

PDF

An Experimental Comparison Of Spoken Communication Developed Individually and Interindividually

PDF

The rhetoric of the inward light: an examination of extant sermons delivered by early Quakers, 1671-1700

PDF

Kennedy-Khrushchev Strategies Of Persuasion During The Cuban Missile Crisis

PDF

An Experimental Study Of The Effects Of Interaural Temporal Delays And Intensity Differences On Intracranial Localization Of Spondee Words

PDF

California Land Grant Disputes, 1852-1872: A Rhetorical Analysis

PDF

A Phonemic And Phonetic Description Of The Speech Of Selected Negro Informants Of South-Central Los Angeles

PDF

An Empirical Study Of The Behavioral Characteristics Of Sincere And Insincere Speakers

Asset Metadata

Creator Dell, George William (author)

Core Title An Intensive Rhetorical Analysis Of Selected Speeches Of Robert Maynard Hutchins: 1940-1955

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Speech

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Theater

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Seal, Forrest L. (committee chair), Kooker, Arthur R. (committee member), McBath, James H. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-60513

Unique identifier UC11357558

Identifier 6002069.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-60513 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6002069.pdf

Dmrecord 60513

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Dell, George William

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA