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The Japanese demonstratives ko, so and a

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The Japanese demonstratives ko, so and a

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Content TUI: JAPANESE DEMONSTRATIVE KO, SO AND A by Misa Nishikawu A Thesis presented to the FACULTY OF THF, GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS ( EAST ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CULTURES) DECEMBER 1994 Copyright 1994 Misa Nishikawa UNIVERSITY O F S O U T H E R N C A LIFO R N IA T H I Q R A D U A T C S C H O O L U N IV K M IT Y P A R K L O S A N O C L U . C A L IF O R N IA tO O O Y This thesis, written by M isa N is h ik a w a under the direction of h.GiZ,...Thesis Committee, and approved by all its members, has been pre sented to and accepted by the Dean of The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M a ste r o f A r t s Dtmm D ate..M .-.U -3.± THESIS COMMITTEE Acknowledgements 1 am deeply grateful for all the help, encouragem ent, an d criticisms given by the m em bers of my thesis committee, Professor llajmte Iloji, Professor Nam-kil Kim and Professor Mieko S. Han. They have e a c h contributed in m any ways to my understanding of Japanese and Japanese linguistics and the ideas and arguments in this thesis. first 1 would like to express my most sincere gratitude to Prolessor llajime Iloji, the chairm an of my thesis com m ittee, who generously provided constant advice and patient assistance and stimulated my thinking with m an y insightful observations and ideas, and his support guided this thesis to its present form. I am truly thankful to him for the many hours he spent discussing the topic with me a n d giving me m an y fruitful suggestions as well as moral support. I am especially grateful to Professor Nam-kil Kim, the second m em ber of my thesis committee, who has provided me with both academic and moral su p p o rt. Professor Kim was the first professor of linguistics in my graduate life at USC and he taught me basic linguistics and gave me w arm en co u rag em en t thereafter. 1 am also especially grateful to Professor Mieko S. Han, the third m em ber o f my thesis committee, for whom I was a teaching assistant and a n assistant lecturer at USC. Professor Han was also my g rad u ate academic advisor and 1 have greatly benefited from her im portant com m ents on the thesis in which m any of the improvements m ade are owed to her. She also pro v id ed me with consistent advices and support th ro u g h o u t my entire g rad u ate life. I am thankful to her for teaching me m any things a b o u t ii language education, phonetics and o th er subjects concerning Japanese language and education. Special thanks are due to all the professors at Departm ent of hast Asian languages and Cultures and Department of linguistics. Professor I’eler Nosco who provided me with helpful suggestions and warm encouragem ent as d e p a r tm e n t chair, Professor A udrey Li w ho gave me w a r m e n c o u r a g e m e n ts an d support for my thesis, Professor John Hawkins, Professor John Rutherford. I am also indebted to the following people who provided me with th o u g h tfu l advice and generous assistance in my ways th ro u g h im graduate years: I-bony Bostic, Xiao Yu, Kyung-an Kim, Yasuko Koshiyama, Kaoru Horie, Shin W atanabe, Noriko Mizuno, Yumiko Shiotani, Yuki Matsuda, Keiko Miyagawa, Kanzo Takemori, Maki W atanabe an d Chisato Shuyama. These people have always provided me with valuable com m ents as well as kind assistance whenever I needed. I am extrem ely grateful to Lbony Bostic for her consistent warm encouragem ents and support, w ho has given generously of her valuable time for proofreading. I would also like to express my gratitude to professors in Japan for their i instruction, intellectual guidance and warm en co u rag e m e n t thereafter: President Kazuaki Kurozawa, Professor Yoko Matsudaira, Professor Mitsuko Shim oda at Shoin Woman's University where I worked as an instructor of Japanese language and a coordinator. And I am grateful to Professor Nobuko llasegawa who consistently gave me warm en couragem ents and support throughout the years and I am thankful to Professor Hideaki Okawa who was my supervisor at Shoin University. i i I finally, I would like to give my sincere thanks to my parents Kootaro Iwabuchi and Sachiko Iwahuchi, my brother Masahide Iwabuchi and my in-laws Koto Nishikawa and Aiko Nishikawa for their love an d support. I also would like to thank my husband Makoto Nishikawa from deep inside my heart for his love, patience and warmest support. While all of these people have contributed m aterially to this study, responsibility for any kind of errors or omissions is mine alone. TABU: OF CONTI-NTIS a c k n o w i j : i x ;f:m e n i s .......................................................................................................................... i ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ iv CHAPIER PACE I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 1 1 . DEFINITION AND JUNCTION OJ; JAPANESE DEMONSTRATIVES...................... 5 2. 1. Introduction of Chapter Two ............................................................ 5 2. 2. Definition of Japanese Demonstratives ......................................... 5 2.3. Function of Japanese Demonstratives ........................................... 7 2. 4. The uses of Demonstratives — Deistic and Anaphoric Use--... ‘) ill. CURRENT UNGUISTIC TREATMENT ....................................................................... 15 3. 1. Introduction of Chapter Three .................................................. 15 5. 2. The theory of Personal Classification — Distance and Personal Pronouns — .............. 10 5.5. The theory of Territory ......................................................................... 17 5. 5. 1. Sakuma's Theory of Territory of WA and Territory of NA .... 1 7 5 .5 .2 . Mikami's Theory of Double Binary ............................. IB 5. 5.5. Sakata's Theory of Territory of We ................................................... 20 5.4. Kuno's Common Knowledge Hypothesis ......................................... 24 5. 4. 1. Hearsay Knowledge and Directly Experienced Knowledge 24 5. 4. 2. Sakata's Counter-Examples against Common Knowledge Hypothesis.... 25 5. 5. Kuroda's Theory of Territories of Directly Experienced Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge ................................ 27 5. 5. 1. Defining Anaphoric Demonstratives SO and A without The Notion of the Hearer ............................ 28 5. 5. 2. Kuroda's Criticism on Kuno’s Common Knowledge Hypothesis ....... 28 IV. FURTHER STUDY ON ANAPHORIC DEMONSTRATIVES SO AND A ............... 52 4. 1. Introduction of Chapter Four ..................................................................52 4. 2. Takubo's Observation on the Relationship between Modality and the Direct or Indirect Experience ... 54 4. 5. Anaphoric A of Direct Experience ........................................................ 5b 4. 3. 1. Assertive Sentence ...................... 50 4. 3. 2. Exclamatory Sentence..................................................................................57 4. 5. 3. Sentence of Surprise ...................................................................................38 4. A. 2. lixclamatory Sentence............................................................................... ,-(7 4. 8. 8. Sentence of Surprise ..................................................................................88 4. 4. Anaphoric SO of Indirect Experience ................................................. 8 V ) 4 .4. 1. Sentence Impressing Inference ............................................................. V) 4. 4. 2. Conditional Sentence .............................................................................. 4 1 4. 4. A. Question Sentence ................................................................................... 42 4. S. lexicon — I'hc Choice of Demonstrative Vocabulary— ........... 44 4. 6. Syntax — The l-orm of Sentence — ....................................................... 4b V. ITIRTIILR S'lllDY ON KURODA’S THIiORY ON DIRliCTNESS AND INDIRIXriNliSS ....... 4‘> 5. 1. Introduction of Chapter hive ................................................................ 4 ‘) S. 2. Takubo's Anaphoric A and SO and Discourse Context ............... SO S. A. Akatsuka’s JYoposal of Lpistemie Scale -Newly learned Information and Realized Information- .. SL 5. 4. The Definition of Anaphoric A and SO — Application of Takubo's and Akatsuka’s Theory to Kuroda’s Definitions— ... 54 S. 4. 1 The IXTtnilion of Anaphoric A ........................................................... 5 5 5.4. 2. The Definition of Anaphoric SO .......................................................... 5 5 5. 4. A. Application of the Definitions to Hoji’s Sentence .......... 55 VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS........................................................................................ 58 RITLRLNCES .......................................................................................................................................... (.0 v i IJSTOP CHARI'S AND DIAGRAMS CHARI' PAGli Chart 1 The Primary Demonstratives in Japanese ............................................. 1 Chart 2 Varieties or KO, SO and A .............................................................................. (> Chart 3 ('lassie and Contemporary Demonstratives and Personal JYonouns ........... 1 7 DIAGRAM I’ AG I Diagram 1 Distance between the Speaker and the Object and between the Hearer and the Object 1 3 Diagram 2 The Territories of the Speaker and the Hearer ................................ I S Diagram 3 The Dimensions of KO and SO, and KO and A ......................... 1 * ) Diagram 4 The Territory of We ................................................................................... 22 Diagram 5 The Realms of Realis and Irrealis............................................................ S 2 v i i CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCIION The purpose of this thesis is to study and examine the major theories <>n Japanese demonstratives, namely, KO. SO and A- h is generally known that Japanese demonstratives KO, SO, and A are used to point out or to indirate a specific person, thing, matter, or direction. The following chart shows the prim ary demonstratives in Japanese. Chart 1 The Primary Demonstratives in Japanese THING pi ace: DIRECTION KO - series KORE KOKO K(x:hira SO - series SORE SOKO SOCH1RA A - series ARE ASOKO ACHIRA The Ko - series is used to refer to whatever is close to the speaker. The SO - scries is used to refer to whatever is close to the hearer. The A - series is used to refer to whatever is some distance from the speaker and the hearer. However, the above definition is not necessarily true in every case and th ere are m any theories which define and show the functions of the dem onstratives. It is also known that there are basically two uses of the dem onstratives, which are deictic use and anaphoric use. In deictic use, 1 demonstratives are used to refer to the referent which is visible while the referent which is referred to is invisible or conceptual in anaphoric use. In this thesis, we will study the current linguistic treatm ents of the three dem onstratives KO, SO, and A, especially anaphoric SO and A, and will discuss the advantages and the disadvantages of each theory, by doing so, I would like to make clear the fu n d am en tal ch aracteristics of eat h dem onstrative, which 1 hope is beneficial to linguists who want to studs Japanese demonstratives as well as instructors of the Japanese language. C hapter One is the introductory chapter, which in tro d u ce s what Japanese demonstratives in general are. In Chapter Two, I will first see the different theories of categorizing the Japanese demonstratives and I will see the general idea of the (unction and the uses of the Japanese demonstratives. In Chapter 'l'hree, I will look at the current linguistic treatments of the three demonstratives KO, SO and A proposed by Sakuma (1936), Mikarni (1970), Sakata (1971), Kuno (1973), Kuroda (1979), and Kamio (1993), in terms of how we define KO, SO and A and how we determ ine when to use them. In this chapter, I will introduce over-all treatm ent of the research on Japanese dem onstratives, and exam ine each th eo ry and discuss advantages and disadvantages of each treatment. In Chapter l our, I will only focus on the anaphoric demonstratives of SO and A, and I will examine how the following three linguistic aspects of a sentence are related to or affects the choice of dem onstrative for a sentence. In other words, I would like to show how each linguistic aspect listed above determines the choice of either A or SO. And in the first two 2 sections in this chapter, I will tentatively use the definitions of anaphoric St) and A of Kuroda’s theory, that is, defining SC) and A by the natures of directness and indirectness. In Chapter live, I will again focus on the anaphoric uses of the two demonstratives SO and A and will see Takubo’s (1991) observation on the two dem onstratives and discourse context and Akatsuka's (19S5) proposal of hpislemic Scale and will apply the ideas to Kuroda's theories of directness and indirectness in o rd e r to explain what is directly experietu ed knowledge and what is indirectly experienced knowledge. Chapter Six is the concluding remarks of this thesis. Abbreviations used in glossary are as follows: TOP topic marker SUB subjective marker COP copula DO direct object marker IO indirect object marker ixx: locative marker NOM nominalizer POSS possessive marker PAS'!’ past NhC negative SP sentence particle HON honorific PASS passive bX exclamatory particle I NT interjection QUI-; question marker CON contrastive marker PI. plural PRC progressive form VOI. volitional suffix The example sentences in the entire thesis are basically made by the au th o r unless otherwise indicated. 4 CHAI'lliR [WO DITINI I ION AND FUNCTION Ol JAPANESE DliMONSTRATIVIS I. 1. Introduction of Chapter Two In this chapter, I will summarize how Japanese Demonstratives have been defined and treated by contemporary Japanese linguists. 1. I. Categorization of Japanese Demonstratives In Japanese, it is impossible to categorize demonstratives as just one part of speech. It is widely understood that Japanese dem onstratives can be categorized as varieties of parts of speech such as noun, pronominal or adjective and adverb. In other words, demonstratives KO, SO, A and IX) form a broader group of words which includes several parts of speech. There are four morphemes, KO, SO, A and DO, which are the bases of a series of demonstratives. These morphemes systematically form various words. Tor example, KORE meaning "this," which is treated as a noun, is produced when m orphem e KO and RE are combined. In the same way, another noun KOKO meaning "here," a prenominal or adjectival KONO meaning "this,” which is always followed by a noun, and an adverb KOO meaning "this way," are made with a morpheme KO. Depending on how the speaker views the referent in terms of physical or psychological distance from where the speaker is situated, it is generally known that the KO series is assigned when referring to an item closer to the speaker than to the hearer, and that the SO series is assigned when an item is closer to the hearer than to the speaker, while A is used to identify the item that is away from both the speaker and the listener. The IX) series is used when marking interrogative words. I‘he item is usually called a referent which is referred to by a demonstrative. Keferents could be persons, physical objects, places and abstract matters. In this thesis, I will focus only on KO, SO and A, and I will discuss the appropriateness of the above statement of KO, SO and A, and try to grasp the characteristics of each demonstrative. The following ( hart shows Makino's ( l ()l).-5) categorization of all the varieties of demonstratives KO, SO and A. (.'hart I Varieties of KO, SO and A .vhat is being talked about >referent) is: closer to the speaker closer to the hearer distant Trom botl the speaker & the hearer Demonstrative Pronoun KORE KOCHIRA SORE SOCH1RA are: ACHIKA location KOKO KOCHIRA SOKO SOCH1RA ASOKO ACHIKA Direction KOTCHI KOCHIRA SOTCHI s(x:hira ATCHI ACHIRA Demonstrative Adjective KONO SONO ANO Kinds KONNA SONNNA ANNA Manner KCX) SOO AA The above chart of the varieties of KO, SO and A, categorizes KONO, SONO and ANO as Demonstrative Adjectives whereas some linguists categorize them as prenominals. Demonstrative Pronouns KORE, SORE and ARE and Location Demonstratives, KOKO, SOKO and ASOKO and Direction Demonstratives KOTCH1, SOTCHI and ATCHI are categorized as Non-Modifiers. As opposed to the Non-Modifier category, Makino sets up a Modifier Category which includes Demonstrative Adjective and Kinds and Manner. Some linguists call these Demonstrative Adjectives and Kinds "prenominals" and they cull m anners "adverbial equivalents." In conclusion, the definition of Japanese dem onstratives is as follows. Japanese dem onstratives are com bination of each m orphem e, KO, SO and A and other m orphem es to form several parts of speech, such as nouns, adjectives or prenom inals, an d adverbs. And each Japanese dem onstrative marks or refers to a word, a phrase, or a sen te n c e before o r after a dem onstrative eith er within or outside a sentence, and the referent is a physical object or an abstract matter. 2. 3. Function of Demonstratives The function of a dem onstrative in its deictic use is to indicate the relationship between the referent and the speaker as well as the referent and the hearer in discourse. Maynard (1993) says "The KOSO-A-1X) system is useful in distinguishing items in a defined conceptual universe o f discourse." And it is com m only assum ed that a referent m ark ed by a dem onstrative forms territory. The basic idea on which it stands is derived I from the study of territory in animal behavior.1 The Theory of Territory proposed first by Sakuma (1930), developed and expanded by Kamio ( 1993), assum es that hum an territory is also reflected in the use of language and systematically controls the use of language. The territory is a realm which 1 Bbl-Eibesfeldt (1975) says that man is also disposed to take possession of land to delineate between himself o r his group and o th er individuals and groups. Group members respect the territorial claim of ano th er group m em ber. 7 clearly shows how the referent is physically or psychologically related to the speaker and the h earer in discourse. Kamio ( l ‘)c J^) shows that the T heory of Territory is based on the notion of psychological distance between a given piece of information and the sp eak er and the hearer. Many linguists agree that a d e m o n strativ e w hich m ark s a referent indicates some kind of territory though the way they classify territories varies. 1-or example, it is commonly known that in discourse, when the speaker uses the deictic demonstrative KO to mark a referent, the referent should be physically o r psychologically closer to the speaker himself rather than to the hearer. ITtus, it is generally said that a referent marked by KO belongs to the territory of the speaker. And in deictic use, if the speaker wants to express that the referent is closer it) the h earer rather than to the speaker, he has to use SO instead of KO. A referent marked by SO indicates that the referent belongs to the territory of the hearer. And the dem onstrative A in deictic use is used when a referent is physically some d istan ce from both the speaker and the hearer. The following is an example of each demonstrative in deictic use. hxample 1 A: SONO seetaa no iro, totemo kirei ne! that sweater POSS color, very pretty SP (The color of the sweater is very pretty.) B: ara, doom o arigatoo. demo, KORfi, hontooni yasukatta no! why thank you. but this really cheap SP (Why, thank you. But it was really cheap.) 8 lixample 2 A: ANO hito dare? that person who (Who is that person over there?) B: aa, ANO hito - wa watashi no piano - no sensei yo. oh, that person TOP I POSS piano K)SS teacher SI’ ( That person over there is my piano teacher.) In lixample I, person A is talking about the sweater which person B is wearing and uses SO hecause the sweater ( = lhe referent) is in the territory of the hearer. However, since the sweater belongs to the hearer's territory, the hearer uses KORE In lixample 2, both person A and person B use ANO to mark "hito" (=person) because the person is distant from both the speaker and the hearer. In this case, the referent which is marked by ANO belongs to neither the territory of the speaker nor the territory of the hearer. It is thus understood that a demonstrative is the key which indicates a territory of a referent marked by a demonstrative which clearly shows the relationship between a referent and the speaker, and between a referent and the hearer. This is the function of demonstratives. We will discuss the idea of territories more in 3. 3. 9 2. 4. 1 1 1 1 .’ Uses of Demonstratives — Deictic Use and Anaphoric Use — It is generally understood that there are basically two uses of Japanese d e m o n stra tiv e s, deictic use a n d a n ap h o ric use.^ In deic tic use, dem onstratives are used when a referent is physically perceivable by five senses, namely, the senses of sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste. However, in deictic use of Japanese demonstratives, a referent which is distant from the speaker and the hearer could be recognized only by the senses of sight and hearing but not by other senses. In anaphoric use, demonstratives are used when a referent cannot be perceived. Mikami (1970) gives an interesting account on deictic' and anaphoric uses of the three demonstratives. Although Kuno (1969) and many other linguists consider that KO, SO and A have both deictic and anaphoric uses, Mikami classifies KO and A as deictic and he says that only SO has "pure" anaphoric use as well as deictic use. Kuno’s (1969) definitions of anaphoric KO and anaphoric A is as follows. Definition 1 A ---> A is anaphorically used when both the speaker and the hearer personally know the referent(person(s), thing(s) or matter(s)), or when the speaker knows that both the speaker and the hearer have the common or the same experience about the referent. In lixample 3, since person A and person H both know who Momoe Yamaguchi is, ANO is used. ^ The following are the four uses of Japanese demonstratives, according to Horiguchi (1978b): i) deictic use, ii) anaphoric use, iii) conceptual use, and iv) absolute use. 10 lixample A A: Yamaguehi Momoc tte shiiteru? Yamaguehi Momoc QUO know (IX) you know Momoc Yamaguehi?) B: mochiron! ANO hilo - wa hontooni kirci ne! of course that person TOP really pretty SP (Of course! I'hal person is really pretty, isn't she?) Definition 2 KO -> KO is anaphorically used as if the person(s), thing(s) or matter(s) were in front of the eyes of both the speaker and the hearer, which gives vividness to the conversation. Lixample 4 is an example of anaphoric KO. lixample 4 A: uchi-de neko-o katte iru n desu ga, KONO neko - wa hontooni home IjOC cat IX) keeping COP and this cat TOP really kawaii no. cute SP (I keep a cat at home and this cat is really cute.) B: ara, soo. oh, so (Oh, is that so?) According to Mikami (1970), A in deictic use refers to perceivable person(s) or thing(s) physically distant from both the speaker and the h e a re r while a n ap h o ric A also refers to non perceivable p e r s o n ( s ) , things(s), matter(s) in time or in space distant from both the speaker and the hearer. In case of KO, even in its anaphoric use, person(s), thing(s) or m atter(s) are deictically taken into the scene of discourse by using KO to give the vividness of the referent. (See Definition 2.) Thus, Mikami claims 11 that both of A and KO arc always interpreted as demonstratives having only deictic function but in fact not having "pure" anaphoric function. Now we go on to the SO of anaphoric use. According to Mikami ( 1970), only SO has a pure anaphoric as well as deictic function. The SO is called "SO of mutuality." Now let us look at Kuno's (197.4) def inition. Definition .4 SO — > Anaphoric SO is used either when the speaker knows the referent but thinks that the hearer does not know the referent or when the speaker does not know the referent. 1’ he following is an example sentence of Kuno's definition of anaphoric SO. lixample 5 A: USC-ni, Komonzu tie iu kafeteria-ga arundakedo, SOKO - wa USC L()C Common's QUO call cafeteria SUB exist and that place TOP totemo takakute oishiku nai no. very expensive delicious not SP (There is a cafeteria called Common's at USC and that place is very expensive and the food is not delicious.) B: Ara, soo. oh, so (Is that so?) In lixample 5, since person A does not think that person B knows the existence of Commons, anaphoric SO is used, lixample 0 A: Kinoo, Tanaka-sensei-ni o aishimashi ta. yesterday, Tanaka prof. IO meet (HON) PAST (I met Prof. Tanaka yesterday.) B: SONO kata donata? that person(HON) who( HON) (Who is that person?) 12 In l-xample (>. since person B does not know who person A is talking about, anaphoric SONO is used. In conclusion, only SO has deictic and anaphoric use while A and KO do not have anaphoric use. Now do we really need to set up at least two categories of use in order to give accurate definitions of Japanese demonstratives, KO, SO and A? Isn't it possible to com bine deictic or anaphoric use? If it is, it will be much simpler and easier to grasp the characteristics of each dem ons)rati\e. lakahashi ( l ‘J5(>) proposes a totally new way of treating Japanese d e m o n strativ es. It is based on an idea that no h um an being can be completely objective. In the process of recognition, no hum an being can perceive the way things actually are in the outer world. In other words, nothing can be observed purely objectively, but subjectively through the eyes of humans, lakahashi sets three steps in the process of recognition, hirst, there is an object which exists in a completely objective and non- linguistic world. Second, as soon as the speaker sees an object, it becomes an object in the speaker's recognition. It is no longer in the objective nor n o n -lin g u istic w orld, but in the subjective, psychological and physiological world which is recognized by the speaker. And third, by that recognition of the speaker, a statement is made. In other words, an object which objectively exists is perceived first and then recognized subjectively, psychologically and physiologically by the speaker. A statement concerning the object made by the speaker is controlled by the subjective, psychological and physiological recognition of the object. Takahashi calls these steps of process i) BAMEN, actual or objective scene -> ii) BA, situation -> iii) HATSUGhN, statement. We can no doubt apply this 13 idea to dem onstratives in anaphoric use where an object is invisible. It is obvious that the choice of dem onstratives is m ade by the speaker's subjective recognition of the object. Now let us try to apply this idea to the choice of deictic demonstratives. Suppose there is an object right in the m iddle betw een the speaker and the h earer as the following diagram shows. ^ Diagram 1 Distance between the Speaker and the Object and between the Hearer and the Object speaker n object -M hearer There is a case where the speaker perceives the object closer to the speaker (=1) than to the hearer (=YOU) regardless of the actual position of the object. On the other hand, the speaker recognizes that the object is located in the position closer to the hearer (=YOU) than the speaker ( = 1), in which case the speaker uses SO in describing the position of the object. As the above example shows, dem onstratives do not locate the object in the precisely objective world, but in the world recognized by the speaker, which is the subjectively, psychologically and physiologically stru c tu re d world. Thus Takahashi's (1956) approach solves the problem of combining the two uses of Japanese demonstratives into one. 3 This is BAMI-N, the actual and objective scene. 1 4 ClIAITER THREE CURRENT UNGUIS l it; TRliATMENT i. 1. Introduction of Chapter Three It is generally thought that Sakuma (1936) played a pioneering role in the contem porary study of demonstratives for the following reasons. I irst, in contrast with the traditional categorization of Japanese dem onstratives, Sakuma categorized them not as demonstrative pronouns < shiji duimcishi) but as demonstratives (=shijishi). Sakuma claims that it is necessary that we differentiate dem onstratives from p ro n o u n s because not all the dem onstratives are pronouns nor can they be categorized as n o u n s . Rather, they are categorized as one of the parts of speech, such as pronouns, adverbs and prenominals. Second, it is Sakuma who claimed that the distinction of the distance (near, neither n ear nor far, far) and persona] pronouns ( the first person, the second person, the third person) interact respectively. It is called Theory of Distinction of Person ( = n in sh o o ku b u n -setsu). (See 2. 2. for details.) Third, lie discovered the anap h o ric use of SO. Fourth, he claim ed that the choice of the demonstratives KO, SO and A is determined not only by the factors such as time, space and psychological elements, but also by the relationship among the speaker, the hearer and the referent. Fifth, he made a d e a r distinction between the anaphoric ( = bu n m ya ku shiji) use and deictic (=#e/iba shiji) use of demonstratives. These discoveries and the systematization of the characteristics of Japanese dem onstratives became the foundation for the co n tem p o rary 15 study of Japanese dem onstratives. In the following sections in this chapter, wc will study and discuss current linguistic treatments ot Japanese demonstratives proposed by Sakuma and other linguists. 3. 2. ITieory of Personal Classification — -Distance and Personal Pronouns— Due to the uncritical acceptance of the concept applied to languages in the West that all demonstratives should he treated as the third person, it was com m only believed by m any traditional linguists, for example, kim ura {1983), that KO, SO and A are the third persons in the category of the part of speech, personal pronoun. However, it has been gradually realized that the notion of distance (near, neither near nor far, far) interacts with th e persons (first, second, third person). . In fact, Sakuma (1930) already pointed out that the notion of distance (near, neither near nor far, far) for Japanese demonstratives (KO, SO, A and DO) and personal pronouns (the first person, the second person, the third person) interact with one another. Sakuma claims that KO, SO, A interacts with the relationship to the first, the second and the third person in discourse. The following chart shows that there are similarities between demonstratives and personal pronouns in terms of relative locations of the speaker and the hearer. Sakuma discovered through observation ol discourse that there is a territorial relationship between the speaker and the hearer. This discovery eventually led Sakuma to propose a th e o ry called Theory of Territory (= nawabari riron). 16 Chari i Classic and Contemporary demonstratives and Personal Pronouns Referent Person Classic — >Contcm norun Objects < S r Matters Ihinus belonging to Sneaker refers to himself WA watasht Sneaker KO Sneaker refers to 1 learer NA -> unuta I learer SC) Speaker refers to Oihers/ Other thinus KA ano-hito ano-dhinu) Other/Others A .S . i. 'Iheory of Territory Kamio (1993) proposed a theory in pragmatics called the Theory of Territory of Information.4 Kamio claims that the basic idea on which the theory stands is derived from the study of territory in animal behavior. Just as m any animals, human beings have territory of which they claim ownership. Kamio says that the use of human language is controlled by a notion of territory. The theory of territory assumes that hum an territory is also reflected in the use of language and it systematically controls the use of language. Kamio's theory of territory is based on the notion o f psychological relationship am ong a given piece of inform ation, the speaker and the hearer. 3.3. 1. Sakuma's ITieory of Territory of WA and Territory of NA The key concept of the Theory of Territory proposed by Sakuma ( 193(>} who is a psychologist as well as a linguist, is also based on the assum ption 4 Kamio applies this theory of territory not only to demonstratives and but also to many other aspects in the grammars, pragmatics and politeness in conversations of hum an language. 17 that the discourse scene consists of the territories of "I" ( = WA, a classical word in Japanese for "I") and "YOU" (=NA, a classical word in Japanese for "you"). The territory of "I” and the territory of "YOU" form one binary and the territory of both the speaker and the hearer in opposition to outside this territory form the other binary. In Japanese, the territory of "I" is named " Territory of WA," and physical objects and abstract matters w h ich are considered to belong to this territory are expressed by the KO-series. The territory of "YOU" is nam ed "Territory of NA" and a p ie c e ol information which belongs to this territory is expressed by SO. A piece ol information which belongs to " Territory of Others" is expressed by A. In other words, there are two dimensions in Japanese demonstratives: o n e dimension where KO versus SO oppositional relationship holds, and the other dimension where the oppositional relationship of KO and SO in group versus A in the other holds. IJiis means that KO, SO, and A should not be treated in the same dimension. The diagram below explains Sakuma's theory of KO, SO and A. Diagram 2 The Territories of the Speaker and the Hearer KO SO Territory of WA A ----------- Territory of Others 18 .- S . .-5 . I. Mikami's Theory of Double binary Mikami (1970) followed Sakuma's theory of two dimensional nature of Japanese dem onstratives and developed it in a way that SO disappears (sh o o kyo ku ku in Japanese) when the two dimensions, KO versus SO on one hand, and A on the other, are against eaeh other and becomes dimensions of only KO versus A. Mikami clearly says KO, SO an d A can never be considered as three things of the same dimension. The dimension ui KO vs. SO and the dimension of KO versus A are totally different in quality f rom each other, and there is no way for SO to intervene in the dimension of KO versus A. It is called Theory of Double Binary. The following diagram s explain Mikami's theory. Diagram i The Dimension of KO and SO and The Dimension of KO and A As shown above, KO, SO and A do not share the same dimension, while KO and SO, as well as KO and A share the same dimension. Mikami supports the above treatm ent by giving the following examples of expressions which are combinations of two of the three demonstratives, KO, SO and A. Some of the examples are as follows: 19 lixam p lc 7 i) A & KO ~> ACHIRA-KCXIHIKA, KAR1--KOK1:, KOKO-KASmKOS , AKH-KOKh. there here that this here there that this (here and there),(approximately),(here and there),(this and that) ii) SO & KO -> SOKO-KOKO, SOO-KOO suru uchini, there here, that way this way as one does, (here and there), (as one does this way and that way) SOR1: - to KORl; - wa hanashi ga chigau. that and this TOP issue/story SI IB different (That issue and this issue have nothing to do with each other.) As shown above, there is tit) expression which consists ol a combination SO and A. Mikami says that this fact proves that SO and A do not share the same flat surface dimension. 3 .3 .3 . Sakata's Theory of Territory of We Sakata (1971) points out that there are counter-examples against the Theory of Territory proposed by Sakuma (1936). Opposing Sakuma's definition that KO as the territory of the speaker and SO as the territory of the hearer, Sakata gives many counter-examples. To summarize Sakata's explanation briefly, i) even when the referent is definitely considered to belong to the hearer, there is a case where the speaker could use KO instead of SO, ii) when the referent which is obviously considered to belong to the speaker, there is also a case where the speaker can use SO instead of KO. The following are examples for these cases. 5 KASHIKO is a classical word for ASOKO. 2 0 lixample 8 A: KONO pendanto, totemo kawaii ne! This pendant, very cute SP (1'his pendant is very cute.) B: Ara, soo? I)oomo Arigatot). Oh, is that so thank you {Is that so? Thank you.) According to Sakuma, the speaker can never use KO for the things which belong to the other party, but he has to use SO. However, when you point out the things which are physically close to the other party, he ran use KO. Example 9 A: KOKO& - ga kayui no? here(this spot) SUB itchy SP (Do you feel itchy here?) B : Soo, Soo, SOKO, SOKCX right, right, right there(that spot), right there(that spot) (That's right. It's right there.) Now let us consider Example 9. According to Sakuma's (198(>) and Mikami's (1970) theory, SO can be used only for the things which belong to the hearer. However, although the spot the speaker (= person B) feels itchy is somewhere on his own back, it is possible for the speaker to use SO because we consider that the hearer is now in charge of the speaker’s back. Therefore, the speaker's back is in the territory of the hearer in this case. b KOKO of Example 9 is another good example of case 8. 2 1 There is another example which shows that the treatm ent of SO proposed by Sakuma and Mikami is not sufficient. In Japanese, deictic SO is also used for the referent in a middle distance. The following is its example, lixample 10 A: SOKO - no kado de magarun desu ne? there lYiJSS corner l.OC turn copula SI’ ( I should turn at that corner, right?) IV . Hai, SOKO desu. Yes, there copula (Yes, it's right there.) According to Sakuma's and Mikami’s treatm ent of SO, it is impossible to explain why b o th the speaker and the hearer can use the deictic SO. In lixample 10, suppose person A is a taxi driver giving a ride to person IV Although person A seems to know how to gel to the destination, person A m akes sure an d confirms where to make a tu rn as he gets closer to the p a rticu lar corner. In this case, the particular c o rn e r where they are supposed to make a turn is equally distant from both the speaker and the hearer. Therefore, we cannot say that the concept of Territory of YOU covers all the uses of SO as Sakuma and Mikami claim. To improve Sakuma's model of KO, SO and A, Sakata creates a new dimension called "Territory of We" (= warewarc no nawabari''). Sakata's model is as follows. 2 2 Diagram 4 The Territory of We KO Territory of We (- warevwtre no nawabari) SO A Sakata(1971) creates a new dimension of "Territory of We" (= ware wart* no nawabari) which is a combination of "Territory of I" (=wa no nawabari) and "Territory of YOU" (= na no nawabari). In this way, we now know that there is a case where the speaker ( = 1) can use SO for things belonging to the speaker ( = 1), and that the speaker ( = 1) can use KO for things belonging to the hearer (=YOU). Moreover, as we have just seen in lixample 10, there is also a case where both the speaker (=1) and the hearer (=YOU) can use SO, which also supports Sakata's claim ii). These examples clearly show that the concept of the territory of YOU does not cover all the possible uses of SO.7 The two clear distinctions which Sakata makes between Sakuma's and Mikami's model and her own model are as follows: first, Sakata claims that KO an d SO do not necessarily oppose each o th er as we have already discussed. Second, Sakata treats KO, SO and A in the same dimension while 7 SO of middle-distance is discussed in 3.3.3. 23 Sakuma and Mikami claim Double Binary, that is, one binary for KO versus SO, and the other binary for KO versus A, but no binary lor SO versus A. Namely, Sakata thinks it is possible to posit the binary relatioship, for SO and A, In lixample 11, the choice of ANO or SONO depends on how close or familiar person B feels to the daughter. The choice of ANO expresses person B's closeness or familiarity to the daughter whereas the choice o| SONO expresses person B’s less closeness or familiarity to the referent, lixample 11 A: Yamada san - no musume san - wa USC desu. kono musume sail- wa Yamada Mr. POSS daughter TOP USC COP this daughter TOP totemo yuushuu desu. very excellent COP (Mr. Yamada's daughter goes to IJSC. Phis daughter is an excellent student.) B: ANO/ SONO musume san - wa nan nen see desu ka? That the daughter TOP what year student COP SP (What grade is that/the daughter in?) 3. 4. Kuno's Common Knowledge Hypothesis When we examine sentences in which KO, SO or A are used, there are cases where either KO or SO, either SO or A, and either A or KO can be felicitously an d contextually a p p ro p ria te but the choice of either d em o n strativ e p roduces a different nuance. The following are the examples of the statement mentioned above. 24 lixample 11 A&SO A: Watashi-wa hachigatsu-ni Baajinia-ni hikkosu tsumnri desu. 1 TOP August in Virginia to move intend copula ( I plan to move to Virginia in August.) B : ANO/SONO shuu-wa Washinton D.C.-no tonari deshot)? th a t/th a t state TOP Washigton D.C. IX)SS next copula (Isn’t that state next to Washington D.C.?) The sentence in person B’s part is felicitous yet the choice of demonstratives makes a difference in meaning. When ANO is used, person B implies that he is familiar with the state of Virginia while the choic e ol SONO gives an impression that Person B does not know about the state very well. In other words, the meaning of the sentence depends on the choice of either demonstrative, A or SO. 3. 4. 1. Hearsay Knowledge and Directly lixperienced Knowledge Kuno (1973) explains the difference in the use of A and SO by proposing Common Knowledge Hypothesis. This hypothesis focuses on the quality of the knowledge. Namely, it focuses on how personally the speaker and the hearer know or experience the matter under discussion. More specifically, Kuno distinguishes the hearsay knowledge which you have not known or experienced before the conversation from the knowledge which you have already known or experienced before the conversation. According to Kuno, even if you talked about something with someone in conversation, it does not mean that you are really familiar with the referent. The quality of knowledge of the referent, namely, how much you experienced or how close you are to the referent, determines the choice of demonstrative either 25 SO or A. The following is Kuno's definition of the two demonstratives SO and A according to his Common Knowledge Hypothesis. Definition 4 SO -~> SO is anaphorically used either when the speaker knows the referent well but the speaker thinks that the hearer does not or when the speaker does not know the referent. A —> A is anaphorically used when both the speaker and the hearer personally know the referent. d. 4. I. Sakata’s Counter-lixamples Against Common Knowledge Hypothesis Despite Kuno's valuable approach focusing on the quality of knowledge, Sakata (1971) gives counter-exam ples against Kuno's definition ol anaphoric A. The following is one of the counter-examples which cannot be explained by Kuno's definition. lixample 1 A: boku-wa Showa hito keta dakara, sensoo-o keikenshite iru n desu. 1 TOP Showa-period one digit since, war IX) experienced copula ANO koro-wa labemono-ga nakute-ne, itsumo onaka - ga suite imashita. that time TOP food SUB lack SP, always stomach SUB empty was ( Since I was b o m some time in the first decade of Showa period I have experienced World War II. At that time, there was not enough food, so I was always hungry.) B: soo desu - ka. Boku-wa SONO tooji umarete inakatta kara wakara nai na. right copula SP I TOP that time b o m was not so know not SP (Is that right? I was not bom yet then, so I don't know about it.) lixample 14 A: senshuu nihon-ni itta toki, kaboeha-raamen te iu no - o last week Japan to went when, pumpkin-noodle QUO called thing IX) hajimcic tabe ta n da kedo, ARP - wa zehi mata for the first time eat PAST COP and that (one) TOP by all means again tabe tai - na. eat want SP 2 6 (When I went to Japan last week, I ate noodles railed pumpkin-noodlcs, and I surely want to eat that again.) B: Kabocha-raamen? Kiitakoto nai naa! nante iu mise-de tabe ta - no7 pumpkin-noodles have heard not SI* what call shop l.(Xi eat I’AS'I' OUI; (I’umpkin-noodles? I have never heard of it. What is the name ol the store where you atc7) In lixample 13, when Japanese people say sensoo ("war"), they usually mean World War II. Since person B was not born at the time of the war while person A actually experienced the war, it is ohvious that person B did not know much about the period because he did not experience the period. Therefore, it is natural that B uses SO and there is no contradiction to Kuno's definition of SO. However, ANO in lixample 13 is contrary to what Kuno defines anaphoric A because according to Kuno, when we use A, both the speaker and the hearer know the referent well or have experienced the period before their conversation. The same thing is true with lixample 14. In lixample 14, according to Kuroda's theory, SONO as well as ANO can be used for the same reason as lixample 13. However, Kuno's theory does not allow ANO to be used in this case because the knowledge about the referent (=kabocha raamen) is not shared by both the speaker and the hearer as an experience. Thus, Kuno's definition thus does not cover all the cases of anaphoric A. One thing in common with lixample 13 and 14 in the use of A is the context where the speaker recalls the things which he experienced in the past and express emotions and feelings such as hatred, nostalgia, love, surprise, despise, and so on. The following is an example sentence when A is used to express the above emotions. In Example 15, person A expresses his surprised or despised feeling on person B by using A. 27 Lixample 15 A: ashiia Maikeru Jakuson-ga USC-ni kimasu yo. tomorrow Michael Jackson SUB USC to come SP (Tomorrow, Michael Jackson will come to USC.) B: Maikeru Jakuson tte dare? Michael Jackson QUO who (Who is Michael Jackson?) A: e? anata ANO hito - o shira nai no? What you that person IX) know not SP (WhaD You don't know that man?) 3. S. Kuroda's Theory of Territories of Directly lixperienced Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge In this section, we will consider Kuroda's (1979) criticism on Kuno's (1973) Common Knowledge Hypothesis and discuss the plausibility of both Kuno's and Kuroda's definitions of demonstratives SO and A. 3. 5. 1. ITefining Anaphoric Demonstratives SO and A without the Notion of the Hearer In the linguistic studies on Japanese demonstratives, anaphoric SO and A have always been defined according to the relationship of the referent and both the speaker and the hearer, Kuroda (1978) is the first scholar who elim inated the involvement of the concept of the hearer in the defining anaphoric SO an d A. He carefully considers w hether the notion of the h e a re r is necessary for the definitions by exam ining the case w here a p erson is talking to himself. If a person differentiates the uses of anaphoric SO and A, when talking to himself, that is, in a case where there 28 is no involvement of the hearer, it will not be necessary to consider the relationship between the hearer and the referent in order to define the two demonstratives. Kuroda came to the conclusion that it is unnecessai > to take the notion of the hearer into c o n s id e ra tio n in d efin in g demonstratives. 3. S. 2. Kuroda's Criticism on Kuno's Common Knowledge Hypothesis Kuroda (1 7(J> examined Kuno's definition of anaphoric SO and A in detail. Kuroda basically agrees Kuno's definition which says that whether we should use SC) or A depends on the quality of knowledge of the referent, that is, how much one has experienced or how close one is to the referent determines the choice of demonstrative, either SO or A. However, Kuroda also points out that Kuno's (1973) definition of SO and A is not sufficient. And Kuroda revises Kuno's definition of SO and A by eliminating the concept of the hearer (=You) from the definition. In other words, in the treatm ent of anaphoric SO and anaphoric A, there is a clear distinction between Kuroda's (1978) theory of Directly Hxperienced Knowledge an d Indirect Knowledge on one hand and other theories such as Kuno's Com m on Knowledge Hypothesis on the other. That distinction is the t involvem ent of the hearer. I will give some examples which seem to illustrate Kuroda’s claim against Kuno's definition of anaphoric SO and A. first, back in hxample 13, both ANO and SONO are f e l i c i t o u s k appropriate. According to Kuroda's theory, when ANO is used, the speaker treats the referent(=the time before World War II) as an experience which the speaker directly experienced while the speaker treats the referent just as an objective and conceptual m atter when SONO is used. However, 29 according lo Kuno's theory, ANO is not to be used in this case, because, h\ the context, it is obvious that the hearer did not experience the referent directly. Therefore, Kuroda's theory covers lixample 1.4 and Kuno's d oes not Also in lixample 14, according to Kuroda's theory, SONO as well as ANO can be used for the same reason as lixample 14. However, Kuno's theory does not allow ANO to be used in this case because the knowledge a b o u t the referent( = kabocha raamen) is not shared by both the speaker and the hearer as an experience. Therefore, Kuroda's theory also covers this case and Kuno's theory does not. Although he came to a conclusion that he cannot do it completely in all cases, by the concept of direct experience and conceptual knowledge, Kuroda has succeeded in giving definitions of SC) and A without the notion of the hearer. The following is Kuroda’s definition of anaphoric SO and A. Definition 0 SO — > is used when the object is the knowledge which the speaker knows or has experienced indirectly. A — > is used when the object is the knowledge which the speaker knows or has experienced directly. The following are example sentences which seem to show clearly that Kuroda's definiton of anaphoric A is more plausible than Kuno's. Example 16 A: kyoo USC-no tonari no makudonarudo-de, kaji-ga atta - yo. today USC POSS next door POSS McDonald's 1X)C, fire SUB there was SP ANO kaji no kotodakara, nannin -mo shinda to omou - yo. that fire POSS considering as many people as died QUO think SP ( There was a fire at McDonald's next to USC. Considering the scale of the fire, I think that many people died.) 3 0 H : ee! sore - wa taihen da! soko - de boku no tomodachi - ga hataraite iru Oh that TOP terrible copula.lhere [XX! I IY)SS friend SUB work PK -n da. SONO kaji-wa nanji goro ni aita - no/ COP that fire TOP what time around at break out SP ( Yes. That's too bad. My friend works there! What time did the fire break out? ) According to Kuno, person A cannot use ANO because person B -the hearer) does not know about the fire or because person A does not think person B knows about the fire. All person A says in the first sentence in lixample I (> is that there was a fire at a certain place. Literally, person A does not m ention whether he actually saw the fire or w hether he knew how big the fire was or how' much damage McDonald's has had. The choice of the dem onstrative ANO in the second sentence in person A’s p a rt, however, indicates that the speaker somewhat knows or has experienced the fire directly, for this reason, the speaker was able to go on to draw an inference or conjecture based on the knowledge which he directly obtained or experienced. In other words, with SO, inference or conjecture can never be drawn because in this case, the speaker does not have any direct knowledge to be based on. Thus Kuroda suggests that the concept of directness and indirectness is the determ ining factor in the choice of demonstratives whereas Kuno’s definition of anaphoric A does not give us an explanation as satisfactory as Kuroda's. 31 CHAITIiR IOIJK ITJRTHl-R S'lUPY ON ANAPHORIC DPMONSTRATIVliS SO AND A 4. 1. Introduction of Chapter tour In this chapter, we will only focus on anaphoric demonstratives of SO and A. As to the choice of demonstratives, it is interesting to see that there is an obvious relationship between the choic e of demonstratives ( Kt ), SO < > i A) and the following linguistic aspects: i) the choice ol the type of a sentence, ii) the choice of a nominal to which a demonstrative is attached ( = lexicon) and iii) the choice of the structure of a sentence or sentences (=syntax). We will examine how these three linguistic aspects of a sentence is related to and affects the choice of demonstrative for a given sentenc e. In examining and giving an illustration of the three aspects i) - iii), anil w e will tentatively use the definitions of anaphoric SO and A of Kuroda's theory, that is, defining SO and A by the natures of directness and indirectness. (See S.5.) What I mean by i) - iii) is as follows: Structure 1 S l [ NP[ A/SO + (a> 1 J In Structure 1, what I mean by i) type of a sentence is the type of the sentence (=S1) in which a demonstrative (=A/SO) and the nominal (=(“’) to which a dem onstrative is attached, are combined to form a noun phrase (=NP). Namely, the types of sentence (=S1) are as follows: assertive sen ten ce, exclam ato ry sentence, sentence of surprise, sentence of inference, conditional sentence and question sentence. Next, what 1 mean by ii) a nominal to which a demonstrative is attached (=t“> ) is a referent to 32 which a demonstrative refers. However, a dem onstrative (=A/SO) and a nominal (=(«') often become one word, for example, one of the A-series "Al'I’SU" means "that guy or fellow,” and one of the SO-series "SOKO" means "there or that place," and each word has a function of both a demonstrative (=A/SO) and a nominal lastly, let us look at the following Structure 2 which illustrates what 1 mean by iii) the structure of sentence (=synta\) is as follows. Structure 2 a) Sl| 1 b) Sl[ S2| ) ] c) S3[ Sl| 1 + S2[ U d) SI [ 1 S2 1 1 As shown in Structure 2, "structures of sentence" m eans i) w hether a sentence (=S1 in a)) is a simple sentence or a sentence (=S2 in b)) is em bedded in another sentence (=S3 in b )> , or ii) w hether two sentences linked with coordinate conjunction are em bedded in another sentence or these two sentences (=S1 and S2 in d)) are not embedded. As we have seen in the previous chapters, in Japanese, demonstratives play an important role to indicate a territory where the referent belongs. In other words, it is demonstratives that clearly show the relationship between the referent and the speaker or between the referent and the hearer. This is how we have been looking at the Japanese demonstratives or the function of the demonstratives so far. However, when we change the angle to look at things and focus on the types of the sentences with dem onstratives in them and observe the types of the sentences and the 33 choice of demonstratives for the referent within the sentence, there seems to be a correlation between the choice of demonstratives and the types of the sentences. That is, the choice of demonstratives is determ ined by the type of sentence in which the referent is included. Moreover, it seems that the choice of a nom inal to which a demonstrative is attached to form a noun phrase ( = NP) affec ts the choice n| demonstratives. It also seems that the choice of the structure of sentences also influences the acceptability of demonstratives. More specifically, when anaphoric demonstrative A, but not SO, is felicitous to refer to a referent in a certain sentence, it seems possible for SC) to sound better within the sentence if we make the sentence embedded. In the following sections in this chapter, we will study the relationship betw een the choice of dem onstrative and the types of sentences by examining various types of example sentences such as assertive sentences, exclam atory sentences, sentences of surprise, sentences of inference, conditional sentences, question sentences. 4. 2. Takubo's Observation of the Relationship between Modality and the Direct or Indirect Hxperience Takubo (1991) observes that in Japanese, it is obligatory to mark the referent which is newly introduced in a sentence with in o rder to show what territory the referent belongs to. Takubo m ade a very interesting observation on the similar function of the choice of demonstrative and the modal expression within a sentence, both of which show what territory the 34 referent belongs to. The following are the exam ple sentences Takubo gives, which effectively illustrate his above statement, lixample 1 7 a) watashi - wa samui. 1 TOP cold ( I am cold.) b) * kimi - wa samui. you TOP cold ( You are cold.) c) kimi - wa samui yoo da no. you IOP cold seem/look copula Si* { You look cold (to me).) Sentence b) in lixample 17 is infelicitous while a) is felicitous because the h e a re r's in n er state (= w hether the hearer is cold o r not) can n o t be experienced directly by the speaker so that the speaker cannot assert that the hearer is cold.8 However, c) is felicitous because a modal expression ’'yoo" meaning "to seem, to look" is used within the sentence. Thus in Japanese, the state or condition which the speaker is able to experience only in d irectly or conceptually, is not to be described in a sen ten ce w ithout a m odal expression. In other words, the things or the natures of the things which you are able to experience directly, can only be described in assertive sen ten ces w ithout m odal expressions. T akubo (1 9 9 1 ) ap p lied t h e 8 There are some exceptions as the following sentence in the following situation: when a m other is looking at a baby who is not yet able to speak to express his feeling, the m other puts a blanket on the baby and says, "Maa- chan, samui, samui!", meaning "Maa-dear, you are cold, you are cold!" 35 phenom enon quoted above to the discussion of the direct or indirect or conceptual nature of the Japanese demonstratives, A and SO.** 4. 4. Anaphoric A of Direct Experience As we have seen in the previous chapter, K uroda (1979) defines anaphoric A as a demonstrative for direct experience (See 4. S.). And we have also seen that Takubo (1991) points out that when the speaker has experienced the referent directly, there is no modal expression within the sentence. In 4. 3. 1. - 4. 3. 3., we will combine the two theories m entioned above, and will look at various types of sentences1 9 such as i) assertive sentence, ii) exclam atory sentence, and iii) sentence which expresses surprise or amazement, which require A, but not SO, for a demonstrative within the sentences, and will see the relationship among the choice of d e m o n stra tiv e s and directness of the speaker's experience with the referent in assertive sentences, exclamatory sentences and sentences of surprise, and the use of modal expression. 4 .3 .1 . Assertive Sentence Ilie following are example sentences for the case of assertive sentences. Example 18 a) saikin Miura Ayako - no "Hyooten" - o yonda kedo, recently Ayako Miura - POSS "Hyooten" LX) have read and f ANO 1 hito - wa shoosetsu - ga totemo umai. [ *SONO / that person TOP novel SUB really skillful 9 We have to remember how Kuroda( 1979) defines anaphoric A and SO and based on the idea of directness and indirectness. (See 3. 5.) *0 Structure 2 in 4. 1. explains what "the type of sentences" means. 36 (Recently, I have read "Hyooten" written by Ayako Miura. Thai person is really skillful in writing novels.) b) scnshuu eki - no soba - de kaji - ga alte in last week station POSS nearby l.(XJ fire SUB there was SI J ANO 1 kaji - wa sugo katta. ^ *SONO J fire TOP terrible PAS T (last week, there was a fire near the station... That fire was terrible.) In sentence a) in lixample 18, it is obvious front the context that the speaker has a direct experience or contact with the referent. In this case, it is impossible to say "SONO hon." Because of the n ature of So (^indirectness), "SONO" contradicts with the context and it has to be "ANO." The same thing can be said to sentence b). The speaker has a direct experience of the fire, so that only ANO is appropriate in this case and we cannot say "SONO kaji" for the same reason as the case of sentence a) unless we change the type of the sentences to the kind with modal expressions as " o m o s h iro k a tta kam o shire nai." m eaning, "It might have been interesting." or "sugokatta yoo da." meaning, "It seem ed te r r ib le ." Therefore, we can conclude that when it is obvious from the context that the speaker has a direct experience of the referent within an assertive sentence which has no modal expression, only A, but not SO, can be used. 4. d. 2. lixclamatory Sentence Next let us look at the relationship between an ap h o ric A and exclamatory sentence, fixample 19 f A N ol r s o N o J ANO I hito- wa hontoni kireina hito SONO J datta nun! that person TOP really beautiful person copula PAST liX 37 ( She was such a beautiful lady!) h)j ANO jotoko - wa nanle surmw) - ga tsuyoi n dan hi ! ^SONOJ that man - TOP what sumo-wrestling SI Hi strong copula (What a strong sumo-wrestler that man is!) In case of exclamatory sentences, we do not even need to create a situation just as we did for the example sentences in lixample 1‘). And in each sentence a) and h), it is obvious that each speaker has directly experienced each referent. And it is impossible to place SO to refer each referent anti A is the only appropriate dem onstrative in each case and there is no modal expression in either sentence. Therefore, we are able to conclude that w hen it is obvious from th e context that the sp eak er has directly experienced the referent within exclam atory sentences with no modal expression, only A, but not SO, can be used. 4, d. 3. Sentence of surprise Now let us go on to the case of sentence of surprise. Pxample 20 a) kimi-ga f ANO 1 sensei - o shira nai to wa ne! \*SONOj you SUB that professor - DO know not QUO TOP SP (It is amazing that you don't know that professor.) b)(ANO 1 kaisha - ga tsubure ta nan te ne! rSONOj company SUB bankrupt PAST copula QUO SP (I cannot believe that com pany was bankrupted.) Sentences of surprise are very similar to exclamatory sentences in a way that the speaker expresses his feeling of deep impression. However, it seems that there is a difference between the two in the following points: i) the degree of intensity of surprise or am azem ent and ii) the fact that 38 sentences of amazement can be a questions, such as a) "ano sense -n shira nai no?" and b) "ano kaisha -ga tsubure la no?" which mean exactly the same as the original sentences and the question sentences are still exclamatory sentences. In sentence a) in lixample 20, it is obvious from the context that the speaker appeals and expresses 1) the fact that the speaker has a direct experience or direct contact with the referent, and 2) surprised feeling about the hearer not knowing the referent. In sentence b) it seems that the speaker has known the company well and he has even evaluated the com pany highly, which means that the speaker has directly experienced the referent. And it is impossible to replace A with SO in both sentences. Therefore, we can conclude that when it is obvious from the context that the speaker has a direct experience of the referent within a sentence of surprise with no modal expression, we are able to use only A but not SO. 4. 4. Anaphoric SO of Indirect lixperience Now we will consider the relationship between anaphoric demonstrative SO and types of sentences. What types of sentences does SO go along with? Do they need modal expressions? In this section, we will look at three types of sentences, namely, 1) sentence expressing inference, 2) conditional sentence and 3) question sentence, which seem to re q u ire a n ap h o ric dem onstrative SO but A, and see the relationship am ong the choice of demonstratives, indirectness of the speaker's experience with the referent in sentences of inference, conditional sentences and question sentences, and the use of modal expressions. 39 4. 4. 1. Sentence of Inference The following are example sentences expressing inference, lixample 2 I a) rainen, uchi - no kaisha -ni Tanaka-san tie in hito - ga next year home TOSS company to Mr. Tanaka QUO named person SUB hailte kuru n da kedo.JSONOl hito - wa yuunoo na hito rashii vo. 1* ANO } enter come COP and that person TOP capable person seem SP (Next year, a person named Tanaka will join us and he seems to be capable. I b) ani - no kaisha - ni Suzuki-san tte iu moto misu older brother TOSS company I.OC Ms.Suzuki QUO named former miss nihon - ga iru rashii n da kedop jS O N o\hito - wa sazokashi kirei (*ANO J Japan SUB be seem copula and that person TOP for sure pretty dar<x) ne. probably SP {There is form er Miss Japan nam ed Suzuki in my older brother's company and she must be pretty.) In sentences a) and b) in Example 21, we can tell from the context that each speaker has only indirect experience with its referent and it is only SO that is appropriate to refer to each referent and A cannot replace SO. Notice that there are modal expression in both sentences, which are "rashii" i m eaning "seem," and "chigainai" m eaning " m u s t." 11 Therefore, we can conclude that when we use SO, but not A, the speaker has only indirect ex p erien ce of th e referent, in sen ten ces of in feren ce with m odal expressions, w hich co n firm s T a k u b o ’s (1 9 9 1 ) o b serv atio n of the U These modal expressions can be replaced with other modal expressions such as "soo-da" meaning" seems", "das-oo-da", meaning "I hear or heard that", "miiai-da" meaning "looks like", "no-yoo-da" meaning "looks like or seems like." 4 0 relationship among the use of demonstratives, indirectness of the speaker's experience with the referent in sentences of inference, and the use of modal expressions. 4. 4. 2. Conditional Sentence Now we will look at the case of conditional sentences. The following sentence a) in Example 22 is an example given by lakubo (1 *J‘) 1). lixample 22 a) Yoshida - san - wa ki soo ni nai kedo, f.SONo') baai - wa |*ANO{ Yoshida Mr. TOP come seem not and that case CON dot) shimasu ka. how do QUP (It seems that Mr. Yoshida will not come, and in that case what would you do?) b) kono fukeiki - de, Takahashi - san - ga, kaiko - sareru this recession because of Takahashi Mr. SIJR unemploy PASS mitai da kedo, moshijSOO 1 nat ta ra, go kazoku - no kata - mo I *AA f seem COP and if ^ so become PAST if HON family of person(s) also taihen ni naru wa ne. tough to become SP SP (It seems that Mr. Takahashi will be laid off because of the recession and if so, it will be tough for his family, too.) In sentence a) in Example 22, from the context, it is obvious that the speaker is not sure w hether o r not Mr. Yoshida w ould come. Since the referent in this case is a condition that Mr. Yamada to m es and the speaker is talking about things which m ay or may not happen in the future, there is no way for the speaker to experience the referent directly and there has to be a modal expression such a sentence as a) in Example 22. Therefore, 41 "SONO," but not "ANO," is used.*2 In sentence b) in lixample 22, it is also certain from the context that the speaker is not quite sure that whether Mr. Takahashi will really be laid off or not, which implies the indirect n a tu re of the speaker’s experience with the referent, because of the nature of conditional sentence, a modal expression such as "milai-da" meaning "seem or look like” is used. Therefore, from the above example sentences, we can conclude that when it is obvious from the context that when the speake r has only indirect experience with the referent within a con d itio na l sentence, there is a tendency that a modal expression is used. In that case, demonstrative SO is used, and not A. 4. 4. d. Question Sentence In this section, we will study question sentences. let us look at the following sentences in lixample 2d. lixample 2d a) f SONOlhon, omoshiroi no? 1* ANO J that book interesting QUli (Is that book interesting?) b) f SORE,) donna iro desu ka? \ *ARE) that what color COP QJJE (what kind of color is that?) In each sentence, it is clear from the context that the speaker does not have direct experience with its referent if demonstrative SO in a sentence is used 12 Modal expression "soo” meaning "seem" can be replaced with other modals as "das-oo-da", meaning "1 hear or heard that", "mitai-du” meaning "looks like", "no-yoo-da" meaning "looks like or seems like", "k am o - shirenai" meaning "may" and "ni-chigainai" meaning "must." 42 anaphorically. ANO in sentence1 a) or ARE in sentence h) is not appropriate because of the nature of directness of the A-series. And when we look at the type of the sentences, it is not difficult to consider the reason wh> the SO-series is used in question sentences. It is because questions are used to draw the knowledge or information from the hearer, which the speaker does not have and which the hearer has. Therefore, we conclude front lixample 23 that there is a tendency in question sentences that anaphoric SO is used instead of anaphoric A because of the nature of both question sentences and indirectness of SO. By the way, one might object that in sentence a) in lixample 2 3, it is possible to replace SO with ANO as follows: lixample 24 ANO-hon omoshiroi no? that book interesting QUE (Is that book interesting?) 1'he sentence in lixample 24 is also felicitously perfect. Moreover, we easily find that there is a similarity between the two sentences a) in lixample 2 A an d Example 24, that is, both sentences are apparently questions. However. A in sentence in Example 24 has a n u an ce of surprise, am azem ent or disagreement while a) in Example 23 does not. It might be the case that the speaker of the sentence have had a concept that that book must be boring and he expresses his feeling of surprise, am azem ent or disagreement b> saying "Is that book (really) interesting?" This sentence can be replaced by "1 did not know that the book was interesting." or "1 don't think that the book is interesting." Thus now it is clear that sentence in Example 24 is not a pure question while a) in Example 23 is in this sense. 43 4. 5. lexicon — The Choice of a Nominal to Which a Demonstrative Is Attached— It seems that the choice of a nom inal to which a dem onstrative is attach ed forming a noun p h rase( = NP), * also influences the ch o ic e o! demonstratives. let us look at the following example, lixample 25 a) Yamamoto tte iu hito - ga kimi - no tokoro - e it lu ra, Yamamoto QUO named person St IB you 1Y)SS place to go [’AS I if ( SONOI hito - o yoroshiku tanoinu yo. *ANO / that person IX) please ask SP I SOITSU J - o yoroshiku tanomu yo. | 7AITSU J that guy/fellow IX) please ask SP (If a person named Yamamoto comes to see you, please take care of that perso n /th at guy.) b) Yamamoto tte iu hito - ga mancaichi kimi - no tokoro - e Yamamoto QUO named person SUB by any chance you POSS plat e to it ta ra, 77A1TSU - o yoroshiku tanom u yo. go PAS'!' if that guy/fellow DO please ask SP (By any chance a person named Yamamoto should come to see you, please take care of that person/that guy.) c) Yamamoto tte iu hito - ga kimi - no tokoro - e kuru kara. Yamamoto QUO named person SUB you POSS place to come since AflSU - o yoroshiku tanomu yo. that person/guy DO please ask SP (A person named Yamamoto will come to see you. So please take care of that guy.) *3 What a nominal to which a demonstrative is attached to form a noun phrase(=NP) is, are explained in Structure 1 in 4. 1. 4 4 In lixample 25, it is not felicitous to say "ANO hito” to refer to the person nam ed Yamamoto and it is felicitous to use ”SONO hito" instead. Of course one of the SO-series "SOI'I'SU" meaning "that guy or fellow" is also felicitous. However, when we use "AII'SU", which is a n o th er dem onstrative word of the A-series, meaning "that guy or fellow," it sounds a little better and a little more felicitous than "ANO hito." The choice of "ANO hito" or "A1ISU" changes the degree of formalness. In discourse, it is often the case that expressing casualness appeals the directness or closeness or the intimate feeling toward the referent. It sounds even belter if we change the word "hito" m ean in g "person" to "yatsu" m ean in g "guy" in the p h r a se "Yamamoto tte iu hito" in sentence a) in lixample 25. Thus, although both the "ANO hito" and "AII'SU" belong to the A-series, the choice of "ANSI!" sounds better than "ANO hito." However, as shown in sentence b) in lixample 25, if wre insert a word "m angaichi" meaning "by any chance that he should come to see you" into sentence a) in lixample 25, the degree of felicitousness in using "AiTSU" instead of "SOITSU" or "SONO hito" decreases. It seems that the certainty of the speaker's attitude towards the event to h ap p en affects the degree of felicitousness of "AITSU" in the above case. To prove the above statement, let us change the sentence from a conditional sentence to an assertive sentence by replacing "ta r a " meaning "if" in sentence a) in lixample 25, with "kara" m eaning "since." in the assertive sentence c) in lixample 25, "AITSU" sounds norm al and it also sounds better if we change "Yamamoto tte iu hito" to "Yamamoto tte iu yatsu." Therefore, we can conclude that the certainty of the speaker’s 45 attitude towards the event to happen seems to affect the decree < > | felicitousness of ’’AI I'SU." 1 4 4. (). Syntax - ITie Structure of Sentence — It seems that the choice of the structure of sentences also influences the choice of dem onstratives. More specifically, when a n a p h o r i c demonstrative A, but not SO, is felicitous to refer to a referent in a certain sentence, it seems possible for SO to sound better within the sentence il we make the sentence embedded. The following are the example sentences which illustrate the point, lixample 26 a) sono hon - wa , boku - ga mukashi Naoki-shoe rot ta ano hon that book TOP I SUB before Naoki prize ' cm PAST that book da yo. I ANO I hon - wa wakai hito - ni ninki - ga atte ne. COPSP |*SONOjbook TOP young person to popularilly SUB be SP (That book is the one by which I won the Naoki-prize before. That book is popular among young people.) b)sono hon - wa , boku - ga mukashi Naoki- shoo - o tot ta ano hon that book TOP 1 SUB before Naoki prize IX) win PAST that book da yo. COP SP f ANO [ hon - ga wakai hito tachi - no aida - de ninki - ga aru \ ?SONO J that book SUB young person PI. of among popularity SUB be riyuu wa totemo kantan da. reason TOP very simple COP ( The reason why the book is popular among young people is very simple.) 14 This observation is directly related to what we have seen in 4. 4. 2. 46 in sentence a) in lixample 2(>, it sounds strange to use "SONO" instead < > l "ANO" because once A is used to refer to a referent, it is normally the case to keep using A. 15 However, when we make the second sentence in sentence a) an em bedded sentence as sentence b), it is not so bad to use "SONO" instead of "ANO." Thus, it seems that there is a tendency that the more the structure of a sentence gets complex like an em bedded sentence, the more acceptable SO becomes while SO was not felicitous in a simple sentence. Next, the following sentences are examples of c) and d) in Strut lure 1. (See 4. 1.) lixample 27 a) Tokyo-ni -wa Yoshida tte iu boku-no yuujin -ga imasu kara, Tokyo LOG TOP Yoshida QUO named I KISS friend SUB be so zehi / SONOJhito - ni atle kite kudasai. (*ANO J by all means that person lO meet come please (In Tokyo, there is a friend of mine named Yoshida, so by all means, please meet that person before you come back.) b) Tokyo - ni - wa Yoshida tte iu boku- no yuujin - ga iru n desu vo. Tokyo LOG TOP Yoshida QUO named 1 POSS friend SUB be GOP SP zehi j SONu| hito ni atte kite kudasai. by all m eans / ANO person IO meet come please (In Tokyo, there is a friend of mine named Yoshida. By all means, please meet that person before you come back.) Sentence a) in lixample 27 is the case where SO is grammatically perfect and A is not. However, if we divide the sentence into two as sentence b), A 15 We will not talk about this point in details in this paper. See Kinsui and Takubo (1992) for details. 47 sounds much better and is in fact perfect as well as SO. Thus, h> dividisentence into two, it becomes felicitous to use A instead SO. In S. I., by examining what Kuroda's directness and indirectness is all about, we will see the reason why phenomena as lixample lit and lixample 21 occur. 48 CIIAPI'liR i i v i : HIRTHHR STUDY ON K. RODA'S TMl-ORY O f DIRKJTNINS A N D INDIRI-.CTNINS S . 1. Introduction of Chapter l ive As I went on to study some other scholars' papers, such as A k atsu k a’s (1985) "Conditionals and I-pisticmic Scale" and Takubo's (1 99 1) "Deixis and the Structure of Discourse,” 1 realized that their theories might he benefic ial for us to define anaphoric A and SO. Namely, Takubo's { 10*11 > observation of anaphoric A and SO and discourse context seem to be able to explain what Kuroda's theory of directness and indirectness to a referent in experience is. What is directness? What is indirectness? The notion of epistemic scale of the informational value proposed by Akatsuka (1985) seems to explain Kuroda's theory of directness and indirectness as well as the theory of territory. What is the territory of the speaker? Mow is it determ ined w hether or not a referent belongs to the territory of the speaker? What does it mean by "the speaker knows or experienc es a referent directly and indirectly?" T akubo (1991) observes the difference in the use of the two dem onstratives as follows. SO is used just to refer to the referent which is inside the discourse context while A is used to refer to the referent when the speaker has information or experience outside the discourse context. Ihis observation seems to reveal another unique function of the two demonstratives. Akatsuka's proposal of epistemic scale shows the difference between the speaker's awareness of the information of the referent and the speaker’s 4 9 realized knowledge of the referent. That is, the choice of either anaphoric A or SO depends on whether or not the information of the referent is fully processed to become the knowledge in the speaker's realization. In this chapter, we will first look at Takubo's (1991) observation on anaphoric A and SO and discourse context, and then Akatsuka( 1 9 8 S ) \x proposal of epistemic scale. Hased on Akatsuka’s ( 198S) and Takubo's (1 J) theories, we will finally define the two anaphoric demonstratives A anil SO. S. 2. Takubo's Anaphoric A and SO, and Discourse Context Takubo (1991) gives an interesting observation on anaphoric A and SO and discourse context as follows. When one hears som ething only in discourse, it does not mean that he has a direct experience with th e referent although he actually has gotten the information. This is also true with a hypothetical situation, which does not have any actual contact with the real world. (See conditional sentence of 4. 4. 2.) In both situations, the referent is introduced only by words, and the speaker or the hearer does not have a direct experience with the referent. Therefore, the speaker has to use SO.16 (See Kuroda (1979) in 3. 5.) On the other hand, A refers to a referent both inside and outside the discourse context. When the speaker refers to the referent and if he has a direct experience with the referent, he is thinking about information or experience concerning the referent in his memory, not just about the referent previously m entioned in 16 It seems that this is the reason why SO has a function to refer neutrally to the referent in the previous clause or seninere in discourse context. 5 0 discourse. Namely, if ihc speaker has a direct experience of the referent, he associates the referent in the discourse context with the information or experience which he has had in the past, concerning the referent in his memory which is outside the discourse context. In other words, the speaker can identify the referent in the discourse context by collating it with the information or experience he has in his memory, which is outside the c o n te x t. *7 The following example clearly explains the process of associating or identifying the referent with the information or experieiu e the speaker has had before, lixample 28 Nitani Yurie? aa, (loo Hiromi to kekkonshi ta ANO hito ne. Nitani Yurie? Oh, C»oo Hiromi with marry PAST that person SI’ (Yurie Nitani? Oh, she is the one who married Hiromi Goo, isn't she?) In lixample 28, the speaker could not identify who Yurie Nitani is in the first sentence. However, in the second sentence, by associating or identifying the name with the information the speaker had in his memory that the person married Hiromi (loo, he now remembers who Yurie Nitani is. Therefore, we can conclude that anaphoric SO is used just to refer to the referent previously mentioned in discourse and anaphoric A is used when the speaker has had some inform ation or experience in the past concerning the referent. In other words, SO is used just to refer to the referent which is inside the discourse context while A is used to refer to the 17 Kamio (1993) also points out that whenever anaphoric A is used to refer to a referent, the speaker has had some information or experience in the past concerning the referent. 51 referent when the speaker has information or experience outside the discourse context. S. d. Akatsuka's proposal of l-pistemic Scale --Newly learned Information and Realized Information— In the previous section, we have seen that anaphoric A refers not only to the referent previously mentioned in the discourse context, but also to the inform ation or experience concerning the referent, which the speaker has outside the discourse context while anaphoric SO simply refers to the referent which is previously mentioned in discourse. In this section, we will see the notion of epistemic scale proposed by Akatsuka (1985) which also seems to be very helpful when we define the two anaphoric dem onstratives A and SO. The following is A katsuka’s diagram of realis and irrealis, which also clearly shows the difference betw een newly learn ed in fo rm atio n and realized or e x p erien c e d inform ation. Diagram 5 Realis and Irrealis Realis Irrealis know <-------- get to know (exist x) not know (exist x) / \ newly-leamed information know not (exist x) / \ counter- factual 52 Although Akatsuka (1985) gave the above proposal of hpistemic Si a b originally to show the interaction between hypothetical meaning and the informational value of the content of the conditional clause, this proposal seems to be applied to the nature of the two anaphoric dem onstratives A and SO. In Diagram 5, realis is the realm or territory w here the speaker has in co rp o rated or processed the inform ation as tru e into the speaker's dom ain of knowledge. And as opposed to realis, there is a n o th er realm called irrealis where the newly learned inform ation which the speaker o b tain ed has not yet fully incorporated or processed as tru e into the speaker's dom ain of knowledge. According to Akatsuka, these two realms form a continuum but there is a border between the two realms. As Kamio (1993) comments on Akatsuka's proposal, it is very interesting to see that according to Akatsuka, although newly learned inform ation is realized as truth by the speaker, the information is still placed in the realm of irrealis an d will not be placed in the realm of realis until the information is fully incorporated o r processed as true into the sp ea k e r's dom ain of knowledge. In o th e r words, even if the newly learned in fo rm a tio n originally belongs to the territo ry of the speaker, the information is first placed outside of the speaker's territory. And when it is fully processed , the information is placed in the territory of the speaker. Ljet us see the following example and consider the above proposal. lixample 29 is quoted from Takubo (1991). This is the situation where one was talking with his friend, and then his secretary cam e to him and told him that a meeting will start soon. 53 lixam ple 29 kaigi- ga aru mitai da kara , shitsureisuru yo. meeting SUB there is seem COP since excuse(me) SP (It seems that we will have a meeting, so please excuse me.) Although the speaker is pretty sure that the information is true, the speaker still uses a modal expression "mitai" meaning "seem," because the information has not yet fully been processed or incorporated as true into the speaker's domain of knowledge. Thai is why a modal expression "mitai" is used. Thus, Akatsuka's proposal is clearly explained by the above example. In the next section, we will apply Takubo's (1991) observation and Akatsuka's proposal to the definitions of anaphoric A and SO. S. 4. The Definition of Anaphoric A and SO — Application of Takubo's and Akatsuka’s Theory to Kuroda’s IXfiniiions- In 5. 2. 1., we have seen SO is used just to refer to the referent which is inside the discourse context while A is used to refer to the referent when the speaker has information or experience outside the discourse context. Lei us apply this notion to Kuroda’s (1979) theory of direct and conceptual or indirect experience. (See i . 5. Tor details.) The speaker has an direct experience or knowledge of the referent when the speaker has had some past experience or knowledge with the referent in his memory. In 5. 2. 2., we have seen that to learn or even to know the information is not good enough to determ ine whether or not the speaker has a direct experience with the information. In order to be referred to as a referent with which the speaker has a direct experience, the information should be processed or incorporated as true into the dom ain of the speaker's 54 knowledge. This is to know or experience the referent directly. It seems that we can conclude what we have seen in this section as follows. A is used w hen the speaker has inform ation o r know ledge which has heen incorporated into the domain of the speaker's knowledge while SC) is used to refer to a referent of which information or knowledge has not yet been incorporated into the domain of the speaker's knowledge. As shown above, we have applied Akatsuka (1985) and Takubo's (1990) theories to Kuroda's {197*)) definitions of anaphoric A and SO, S. 4. 1. Ibe Definition of Anaphoric A Anaphoric A is used to refer to a referent of which inform ation or knowledge, has been fully incorporated into the dom ain of the speaker's knowledge. 5. 4. 2. The Definition of Anaphoric SO Anaphoric SO is used simply to refer to a referent of which information, has not yet been incorporated into the dom ain of the speaker’s knowledge. 5. 5. Examinations of the Definitions of Anaphoric A and SO In the previous sections in this chapter, we have defined the anaphoric A and SO based on Kuroda's (1979) definitions of the two demonstratives in a n ap h o ric use by applying the notion of epistem ic scale proposed by Akatsuka (198S) an d Takubo's (1991) observation on the r e la tio n s h ip between the notion of the direct and indirect or conceptual Experience and discourse context. In other words, by their proposal and observation, we have been able to make clear what directness is an d what indirectness is, when we are able to say a certain piece of inform ation or knowledge is 55 experienced directly or indirectly or conceptually. Hy making clear the notion of directness and indirectness in experience which Kuroda says, in this thesis, we might be able to explain the following phenom enon. I will quote Hoji's latest example sentence.1* 1 lixample 30 a) kanari - no kazu - no jidoosha gaisha - ga , / S O K o ] - no l*ASOKOJ considerable of num ber of automobile companies SUB there POSS roodtx) kumiai - o taos (m) - to shite iru. labor union IX) overthrow VOL QUO do PRO (Quite a large num ber of automobile companies are trying to overthrow their own labor unions.) “SOKO" in lixample 30 refers to each automobile com pany in the context. Namely, it means that each com pany m entioned in the context is trying to overthrow its own labor union. Hoji (1994) explains the above statement as follows. Diagram 8 Company A its own labor union Company B its own labor union Company C its own labor union Qpite a number of 'Choir own automobile companies labor unions 18 The sentence in lixample 30 is introduced in Hoji's lecture at DSC in Call, 1994. 56 As clearly shown in Diagram 8 given by Hoji, the above example sentence m eans that each com pany is trying lo overthrow its own com pany. In o th er words, each com pany has its own labor union to overthrow. Ibis phenom enon is just like a mathematical notion of a function. Next let us find out what type of sentence the above example sentence in lixample 30 is. Although the sentence appears to be an ordinary assertive sentence, it is ac tually a kind of conditional form, because of the nature' < > | the sentence, if you pick up one company out of all the com panies in the context, you will have only' one labor union to overthrow, lo r example, if you pick Com pany A, there will be only one labor union, which is lab o r Union A, to be overthrown. If we pick up C om pany B, then it is lab o r Union B, a n d so on. Actually, the sentence does not talk about the com panies as a group but each individual com pany. Not corporately but individually. According to Hoji, the above sentenc e is conceptual rather than real and thus it is considered to be a conditional sentence. And here we have to rem em ber what we have seen in the section of conditional sentences in the previous chapter. In 4. 4. 2., we have concluded that there is a tendency t that th ere is a n ap h o ric SO ra th e r than A to refer the referent in a conditional sentence when the speaker has only a conceptual or indirect experience with the referent. Thus we might be able to say that in case of l-xample 30, anaphoric SO is used to refer to the referent because the type of the sentence is conditional. And in conditional sentences, it is usually the case that the referent is experienced indirectly by the speaker who refers to the referent. This is why “SOKO" is used instead of "ASOKO." 57 CIIAITFR SIX concluding rlmarks In Chapter Three following the first two introductory chapters, we have surveyed the major current treatments on Japanese Demonstratives, KO, SO and A. We discussed the following three theories: ’ITieory of Territory first proposed by Sakuma ( l ‘M(>), revised by Sakata (1970), and explained and detailed by Kamio (199.1), of which the basic idea is derived from the study of animal behavior. It is assumed that hum an territory is also reflected in the use of language and systematically controls it. I he territory is a realm which clearly shows how the referent is physically or psychologically related to the speaker and the hearer in discourse. A demonstrative marks a referent and shows what territory (the territory of the speaker, the territory of the hearer, or the territory of both, the territory of neither) a referent belongs to. Kuno's (197.^) C o m m o n K n o w led g e H y p o th esis, which d efin es Jap an ese D e m o n strativ es according to the quality of knowledge, that is, how familiar the speaker and the hearer with or how well you know the referent determines the choice of demonstratives, Kuroda's (1979) 'ITieory o f Knowledge of Direct and Indirect Experience which shows that w h e th er or not the speaker knows or has a direct experience of the referent determines the choice of demonstratives. In Chapter Four, based on what we have seen in Chapter Three, we have focused on the anaphoric uses of dem onstratives A and SO and have observed the relationship among i) the choice of demonstratives, ii) the 58 types of sentences, that is, assertive sentences, exclam atory sentences, sentences of surprise, sentences of inference, conditional sentences and question sentences, and iii) the use and the function of modal expressions. We have draw n the following conclusion. Because of the natures of directness and indirectness of anaphoric A and St) there is a tendency that anaphoric A, rather than St), is found in assertive sentences, exclamatory sentences and sentences of surprise and anaphoric SO, rather than A, in sentences expressing inference, conditional sen te n c es and q u e s tio n sentences. SO seems to have a similar function to modal expression, which m arks a referent in the hearer's territory, namely, the speaker has only indirect experience of the referent in question. In C hapter hive, by examining the relationship between the choice of d em onstratives of anaphoric use and the types of sentences as well as examining the similarity of anaphoric SO an d Japanese modal expressions in term s of indirectness of the speaker's experience of the referent in question, we have defined the two dem onstratives of a n ap h o ric use as follows. Anaphoric A refers to a referent of which inform ation has been fully incorporated into the speaker’s dom ain of knowledge o r realization whereas anaphoric SO refers to a referent of which inform ation has been newly learned, and the information is not in the dom ain of the speaker’s knowledge o r realization. Although fu rth er research is needed, I hope that the present study of the relationship between the choice of d e m o n stra tiv e s a n d the three linguistic aspects (=sentence type, lexicon and syntax), and the study of Kuroda's theory of directness and indirectness in o rd e r to develop the 5 9 definitions their sem antic-functional properties of anaphoric SO and A, have shed a little more light on the study of Japanese demonstratives. 6 0 References Akatsuka, N. 1985. Conditionals and epistemic scale. la n g u a g e Ul. liibl-Iibesfeldt, I. 1975. i:thoiogy: The biology o f behavior, 2nd edition. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Horiguchi, K. 1978b. Shijigo no hyoogen sei. N ihongo, n ih o n b u n k a 3. Osaka Gaikokugo Daigaku. Kamio, A. 1998. Joohoo no nawabari riron. Taishuukan Shoten. Kimura, H. 1982. N ihongo, ch u u g o ku g o taioo h y o o g en y o o re ish y u u shijisbi. Nihongo to chuugokugo taishoo kenkyuukai. Kinsui, S. & Takubo, Y. 1992. Danwa kanri riron kara mita nihongo no shijishi. N ihongo k e n k y u u sh iryo o sh u u d a iikki dai nana kan. Hitsuji Shoboo. Kuno, A. 1973. N ihon B unpoo K enkyuu. Taishuukan Shoten. Kuroda, S. 1979. Kosoa ni tsuite. H ayashi Heichi k y o o jy u ka n reki kin en ro n b u n sh u u eego to N ihongo to. Kuroshio Shuppan. Maynard, S. 1993. A n in tro d u ctio n to Japanese Gram m ar and C om m unication Strategics. The Japan limes. Makino, S. & Tsutsui, M. 1993. A d ictionary o f basic Ja panese G ram m ar. The Japan Times. Mikami, A. 1970. Kosoado shoo, Bunpoo shooron sh u u . Kuroshio Shuppan. Sakata, Y. 1971. Shijigo ko so a no kinoo ni tsuite. N ihongo k e n k y u u sh iry o o sh u u d a iikki n a n a kan Shijishi 54. Hitsuji Shoboo. Sakuma, K. 1936. Gendai nihongo no hyoogen to gohoo. N ihongo k e n k y u u sh iryo o sh u u da iikki nana kan Shijishi 32. Hitsuji Shoboo. Takahashi, T. 1956. Kotoba to shinri. Kooza n ih o n g o — m in zo k u to kotoba. Ootsuki Shoten. 1 ‘ akubo, Y. 1991. Daikushisu to danwa koozoo. N ihongo to n ih o n g o k yo o ik u 12. Meiji Shoin. 61 INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is d ep en d en t upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 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Asset Metadata

Creator Nishikawa, Misa I. (author)

Core Title The Japanese demonstratives ko, so and a

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Languages and Cultures

Degree Conferral Date 1994-12

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag language, linguistics,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Hoji, Hajime (committee chair), Han, Meiko S. (committee member), Kim, Nam-Kil (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c18-7195

Unique identifier UC11356913

Identifier 1376496.pdf (filename),usctheses-c18-7195 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 1376496-0.pdf

Dmrecord 7195

Document Type Thesis

Rights Nishikawa, Misa I.

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Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA