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Contracting for special education: a case study of a charter school contract for special education

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Contracting for special education: a case study of a charter school contract for special education

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Content 1

“CONTRACTING FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION ”: A CASE STUDY OF A CHARTER
SCHOOL CONTRACT FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION

by

Ilene Fernandez Ivins

__________________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC ROSSIER SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

August 2014

Copyright 2014 Ilene Ivins
i

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my husband, Brien, who inspires me daily to ask
questions, laugh and make better. Thank you for feeding my heart and soul
through this dissertation process.
I also dedicate this to my supportive parents, Erik and Jessie, whose life work
models a commitment to constant learning and serving the community through
innovation and whose belief in my abilities never faltered.
Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my talented sister, Letitia. Thank you for
being an equally thoughtful and joyful best friend.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My stalwart team of educators, psychologists, speech pathologists, principals,
parents and special education leaders who encourage me to think harder, grow
daily and find new ways to change the course of education for students with
disabilities.
My mentors, Sue, Pam and Roberta for recognizing strengths, working through
growth and for modeling leadership.
My dissertation group, whose shared learning was instrumental to this process:
Acacia, Jim, Ryan, Michael, Donna, Jason, Jen and Veronica.
Chair and advisor, Dr. Guilbert Hentschke, whose brain and wit encouraged us to
cheerfully dive deeply into this work at a steady pace.
Committee member Dr. Katharine Strunk for encouragement and support.
Committee member Dr. Patricia Burch.
Participating staff of Big City Unified School District and Ascent CMO.

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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Research Question One Themes 59
Figure 2: Organization of the MOU 72
Figure 3: Instances of Codes for Research Question Two 73
Figure 4: The Two Types of Governance in the MOU 74
Figure 5: Research Question Three Themes 82

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Abstract
This qualitative case study uses the framework of transaction cost economics
(TCE) to investigate the contracts written between governing special education agencies
and charter schools. This case study seeks to understand the benefits and losses for
charter schools and governing special education local plan areas (SELPAs) in negotiating
the responsibilities of the federal disability law by examining the contract between the
two organizations. The unit of analysis in this study is the written contract between a
large urban school district and a charter school management organization and associated
interpretations of the contract that are held by leadership within the organizations. The
study also seeks to identify partnership opportunities for improving special education
services in charter schools and in the SELPA afforded by the contract. Findings suggest
that in the case of a large urban school district and a charter school management
organization, the benefits and losses focus on disparate organizational priorities. Findings
also suggest that while that the contract is mutually understood by both organizations,
partnership opportunities are hindered by trusting, reciprocal relationships that grow over
time and by problem-solving specific cases. Implications and recommendations are
discussed.
Keywords: special education, charter schools, transaction cost economics,
partnership

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

LIST OF FIGURES iii

ABSTRACT iv

CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 2
Background of the Problem 5
Conceptual Underpinnings 8
Statement of the Problem 10
Purpose of the Study 11
Hypothesis 12
Limitations, Assumptions, Design Controls 13
Definition of Key Terms 14
Summary 17

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 18
Introduction 18
Special Education in Charter Schools 20
Transaction Cost Economics 28
Transaction Cost Economics in Charter Schools 33
Summary 39

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 40
Introduction 40
Problem and Purpose Overview 42
Research Hypothesis 44
Population 44
Sample 47
Instrumentation 48
Data Collection & Analysis 50
Summary 54

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION 56
Organization of Data Analysis 56
Description of Respondents 57
Shifting Political Context 58
Research Question 1 60
Research Question 2 71
Research Question 3 82
Summary 89
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS 91
Introduction 91
Discussion of Findings 93
Conclusions 101
Implications 103
Recommendations 104
Closing 105

APPENDICES 107
Appendix A: Interview 107
Appendix B: Interview Codebook 109
Appendix C: Interview Matrix 110
Appendix D: Document Authenticity Protocol 111
Appendix E: Categorizing Tool 112
Appendix F: Survey 113

REFERENCES 116

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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Gloria waited for the numbers 32 and 33 to be called by the announcer. She could feel
several shifts in the tense room as parents gripped small pieces of paper with lottery numbers.
Gloria exhaled a sigh of relief upon hearing 32 and approached the front office to start the
paperwork for her daughters to enroll in the charter school that had gained a reputation for safety
and academics since the school’s founding five years ago. She hoped that her daughters would
get more attention, have smaller classes, and be in a school with less fights on the playground.
Gloria turned in the paperwork and watched the office manager examine her written responses.
Flashing a puzzled look, the office manager said, “we won’t be able to enroll the fourth grader,
we don’t have a program for students who are deaf.” Gloria was stunned. “You’ll have to return
to your previous district school or talk to their special education department.” Gloria nodded; she
was crestfallen but not shocked. As a parent of a deaf student, she was accustomed to being
turned away from activities like swimming or summer tutoring. She considered the new decision
presented to her, keep both daughters at the local public school or split them up so that her non-
disabled daughter could benefit while her deaf daughter remained at the district school. Gloria
weighed the choice in her head.
School choice emerged from the desire to increase options for parents of school-age
students, increase school autonomy and formalize a shift of K-12 education to a market climate
in hopes that competition would improve academic outcomes for students (McLaughlin & Rhim,
2007). A feature of school choice is the ability of a parent to choose from a variety of schools
based on factors such as program offerings, proximity and safety (Drame, 2011). Charter schools
birthed out of the accountability and choice movements to provide publicly run and privately
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managed school options to parents who might chose an alternative than the neighborhood school
(Chubb & Moe, 1990). Because of charter schools’ enrollment procedures, they have an added
layer of accountability built into their model; charter schools are accountable to parents and
students as well as to authorizing agencies and state and federal policies (McLaughlin & Rhim,
2007). This added layer of accountability to the parent population is precisely the type of reform
that Chubb and Moe (1990) identify as essential to breaking down the inefficiency of
bureaucracy in public education.
The number of charter schools increase annually and more than two million public school
students attend over 5000 public charter schools in forty states and the District of Columbia
(Garda, 2012). In 18 school districts over 20% of students attend charter schools (2012). Charter
schools might offer specialized curriculums, the promise of physical safety or smaller learning
communities that appeal to parents who seek alternatives to traditional residence schools
(Swanson, 2005). Charter school closure is one way that charter schools are beholden to the
parent market; falling enrollment impacts the funding streams and fiscal stability of a school
(McLaughlin & Rhim, 2007). School closures resulting from declining enrollment demonstrate
the charter school’s reliance on parent satisfaction, a form of external market accountability
(Chubb & Moe, 1990).
Charter schools have multipronged accountability outcomes. Charter schools are also
bound to state and federal accountability that requires adherence to federal policies such as No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (Rhim,
Ahearn & Lange, 2007). These two policies maintain external accountability for charter schools.
Charter schools may not discriminate against any student based on disability (Swanson, 2005).
State agencies that accept federal special education funding must ensure that all local education
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agencies comply with IDEA, and in order for a state to receive federal charter school grant funds,
a school’s governing board must agree to abide by the mandates of IDEA (Swanson, 2005).
Therefore, charter schools are charged with meeting the federal accountability requirements of
IDEA while concurrently meeting the academic outcomes outlined in NCLB and concurrently
satisfying the market accountability of parents. Charter schools have multipronged accountability
outcomes.
Charter schools are intended to foster innovation and systemic reform (Lake, 2010;
Lubienski, 2004; Chubb and Moe, 1990). The expectation for innovation, paired with a
multipronged accountability provides a space to forge new ideas for educating students with
disabilities in charter school settings. However, charter schools have struggled to serve this
population of students (Ahearn, 2001; Swanson, 2005). Compliance with IDEA and enrollment
of students with disabilities are lower in charter schools in comparison to traditional public
schools (Ahearn, 2001; Swanson, 2005; Howe and Welner, 2002). Charter schools across the
nation enroll a lower percentage of special education students than traditional public schools
(U.S. Department of Education, 2000). As a reform effort intended to subvert the inadequacies
and inequities of public school institutions, charter schools are charged with increasing access to
historically underserved populations and yet routinely fail to meet the needs of our nation’s
students with disabilities (Lubienski, 2004; Chubb and Moe, 1990; Garda, 2012). Understanding
the reasons for charter schools’ lower enrollment of students with disabilities is essential to
ensuring equity in this popular and growing school reform.

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Background of the Problem
Charter schools have received recent attention and reputation for turning away students
with disabilities (Ahearn, 2001; Swanson, 2005; Howe and Welner, 2002). Ahearn (2001), in a
study funded by the U.S. Department of Education, found that charter schools enrolled less
students with significant disabilities than non-charter schools and may counsel parents of
students with disabilities against enrolling in a charter schools. Charter advocate Chester Finn
deemed special education the “dangerous landmine buried on the charter schools’ property”
(Garda, 2012, p. 659). This statement emphasizes that special education may be precisely the
issue that undercuts the school choice movement. Charter schools, a reform effort intended to
increase access for underserved students, excludes special education students (Lubienski, 2004;
Howe & Welner, 2002). This paradox is problematic for charter schools, as it can lead to the
closure of charter schools due to discriminatory practices, violation of federal law and a
damaging public image (Swanson, 2005; Howe & Welner, 2002). This special education
challenge also negates the premise of parent choice in charter schools; parents of students with
disabilities are excluded from charter schools (Howe & Welner, 2002). This challenge special
education in charter schools demonstrates an inequity in the school choice movement and
undermines the inclusionary spirit of IDEA (Estes, 2000).
Charter schools are legally required to educate students with disabilities. Charter schools
are authorized by a school district, non-profit, university or state after both the authorizer and
charter leadership sign a charter, or contract, that outlines the mission, goals and plans for each
school (Rhim, Ahearn & Lange, 2007). The authorizing agency oversees the implementation of
the charter contract and bears responsibility for regularly monitoring fiscal solubility and
academic outcomes stated in the charter contract and compliance with state and federal laws
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(Swanson, 2005). As schools that receive federal funding, charter schools must agree to follow
the mandates of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as a component of every
contract in order to open a charter school (Swanson, 2005).
One identified barrier to implementing special education in charter schools lies within
charter school governance. Although IDEA responsibilities are described in the charter contract
initially signed between the authorizer and the charter operator, they are not always fully
understood by charter operators (Swanson, 2005; McLaughlin & Rhim, 2007). Ahearn (2001)
described a lack of adequate funding, strained relationships with local districts and lack of clarity
in the contracting process as reasons why charter schools did not understand their responsibilities
to meet IDEA. Charter school leadership were unfamiliar with funding and governance for
special education and therefore, unable to understand the contracts with their local districts for
special education funding, services and governance (Ahearn, 2001). Ahearn (2001) uncovered
that charter school leaders do not have sufficient understanding of IDEA mandates and of how to
develop, nurture and improve special education programs, which in turn, impacts a charter
school’s ability to enroll and educate students with disabilities.
Educational services for students with disabilities in public school settings are outlined by
IDEA, legislation passed by Congress in 1990 and reauthorized in 2004. IDEA states that
students with disabilities must be included in the general education environment to the maximum
extent possible, a concept deemed least restrictive environment (LRE) (Rhim, Ahearn, Lange,
2007; Garda, 2012). School districts interpret this provision by providing a continuum of
educational environments, from fully included in general education, inclusion, to the assistance
of an adult aide or a specialized school for students with similar needs (Swanson, 2005; Estes,
2000). Per IDEA, each public school that receives federal funding must provide educational
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benefit for students with disabilities in their respective LRE (Swanson, 2005; Garda, 2012;
Ahearn, 2001; Drame, 2011). In addition to LRE, public schools are required to create an
individualized education plan (IEP) annually for a student with a disability; the IEP must be
written in strict adherence to the IDEA mandates and must document that the student with a
disability has made growth, is being educated in his or her LRE, and that the student is receiving
appropriate services to meet their needs (Drame, 2011).
Investigating charter schools’ special education programs presents a challenge due to the
variance of charter schools and the agreements that are made with special education authorizers,
called special education local areas (SELPAs) in California. Factors such as parent decision and
the disparate charter school models, operators, programs and governance summate the inherent
problem with analyzing charter schools’ effectiveness (Rhim, Ahearn & Lange, 2007). Because
of the spirit of autonomy, no two charter schools are alike (2007). A wide lens examination
presents limitations in identifying pointed reasons why charter schools struggle to recruit, retain
and education students with disabilities, as a wide lens may fail to consider the missing
information, hidden costs or hazards that lie within a contract between a charter school
authorizer and a charter school.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) considers the contract as a unit of analysis and
employs a narrow lens to examine the nature of the contract and any associated perceptions or
behaviors as a result of the contract (Williamson, 2008). Swanson (2005) identified that many
charter school leaders do not fully understand the contracts for special education services. Drame
(2011) identified that the problem with charter school special education programs derive from
confusing or incomplete contracts between authorizer and charter school. I will use the TCE lens
to examine the benefits and losses of a charter school special education contract.
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This inquiry employs transaction cost economics to investigate the understanding of
special education mandates at a specific charter school management organization (CMO),
Ascent, and large urban school district, Big City Unified School District (BCUSD). This case
study describes the specific relationship between Ascent and special education governance by
BCUSD by examining the contractual agreement for the provision of funding, legal and
programmatic mandates for special education and the instruction of students with disabilities.
This analysis of the contracting relationship, when described through the lens of transaction cost
economics, unearths the factors that afford Ascent’s failures or successes in special education
compliance and programming.
Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study
Transaction cost economics (TCE) grew out of the need to understand how humans
organize themselves as a result of a transaction between a firm and a vendor (Williamson, 1973).
The TCE framework considers any and every relationship between individuals or firms as a type
of transaction, regardless of the presence of a formal contract. Within the framework of TCE,
every relationship is a transaction and every transaction has costs, either a positive or negative
consequence (Williamson, 1973).
TCE theorist Oliver Williamson (1973) espoused that transactions are irrevocably flawed
because humans are imperfect and determined these human imperfections as uncertainties that
interfere with any and every transaction. Thus, every contract or transaction carries hazards and
costs. Williamson (1973; 2008) describes human as rational to a point but not infallibly rational.
Because of bounded rationality, human actors seek opportunities to help oneself until at some
point, human rationality expires and gives way to self-interest (1973; 2008). At the rationality
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cut-point, human actors are no longer aware that they are acting irrationally, a secondary result
of bounded rationality (1973; 2008). The convergence of these two aspects of human fallibility
can poison both the creation and implementation of a contract.
The TCE framework investigates and identifies human factors in a given transaction.
Williamson (1973) contends that the faithful presence of human uncertainties might be the
precise reason for market failures or the depletion of organizations. Williamson (1973) qualifies
that human uncertainties might also include the human capacity to perform a given task, staff
culture, how tasks are delegated, monitored and enforced within an organizational structure.
Human uncertainties complicate any transaction, and render the results and implications of the
transactions unknowable (1973). By framing a transaction between firm and vendor around TCE,
economists and scholars seek to understand the ways that firms organize themselves to mitigate
transaction costs. As a reaction to transaction costs, a firm might decide to produce a service in-
house rather than use an outside vendor. Other firms may decide to create a hierarchy or chain of
command to mitigate human uncertainties.
While the TCE framework is predominantly applied to a market setting, educational
organizations are neither strictly vertically integrated nor a pure market exchange. Public school
systems might be more popularly described as hierarchies than markets. However, the emergence
of charter schools and increased outsources has changed the traditional hierarchical slant. In
California’s charter schools, special education lies somewhere between the market and hierarchy
polarity; charter schools are a hybrid governance model, in which the market exchange factors
interplay with hierarchy. For example, while a school or district develops contracts for special
education funding with the state, both organizations maintain goals that are aligned to comply
with federal special education outcomes. The federal government, specifically the office of
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special education programs (OSEP), coordinates and oversees state, district and school
outcomes, aligning the goals of each special education program and allowing for increased
ownership throughout the hierarchical chain. In this study the TCE lens will uncover associated
costs of a hybrid governance model for special education.
I use TCE to employ an analysis of costs and benefits for special education, and considers
organizational structures, institutional values, and the hybrid governance model that complicates
the charter and district relationship. Macher and Richman (2008) identify the predominance of
qualitative case studies in TCE analyses because this methodology reveals institutional details
and rich descriptions of transactions, both formal and informal (Macher & Richman, 2008). The
research questions reflect foundational theories of TCE of opportunism, hybrid governance and
potential partnerships, in order to examine reasons why charter schools might struggle to serve
special education students.
Statement of the Problem
Charter schools have undergone criticism and scrutiny for failing to provide the
provisions of IDEA and for failing to educate students with disabilities while experiencing many
barriers to fulfilling the mandates of federal disability law (Ahearn, 2001; Swanson, 2005; Howe
& Welner, 2002). In fact, special education has been identified as the “landmine” waiting to
negate and undercut the charter school movement (Garda, 2012). Identified barriers to special
education reside in the areas of school leadership capacity, unclear or incomplete contracts
between authorizers and charter schools and in hiring of skilled and knowledgeable staff (Rhim,
Ahearn & Lange, 2007). In an investigation of charter schools, Finn, Manno and Vanourek
(2000) found that charter schools lack experience, expertise and resources to meet the needs of
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students with disabilities. Ahearn (2001) found that policymakers at all levels struggle to
understand their respective roles and responsibilities in implementing the mandates of IDEA.
Strained relationships between charter schools and special education governing bodies and an
unclear contract and contracting process exacerbate the challenges for charter schools to
implement special education mandates (Ahearn, 2001).
Special education failures in charter schools may be rooted in the contracts, contracting
process, interpretation of responsibilities per the contract and relationships between the
governing special education agency and charter operator. Clearly written contracts,
organizational structures and skilled and knowledgeable personnel may factor into the
implementation of a special education and IDEA responsibilities. Organizational factors, such as
values, trusting relationships and partnerships may also factor into the implementation of special
education. Analysis of charter school and special education agency agreements may serve as a
powerful tool for improving charter schools’ special education services.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative case study is to identify and investigate transaction costs
when a charter school contracts with a SELPA for special education services. This study seeks to
explain why charter schools might fail to meet the provisions of IDEA by analyzing the contract
between a charter school and SELPA through a transactional cost economics framework.
Specifically, this case study will unearth differences between the two organizations in the
following areas: interpretation and understanding of the contract, perceived benefits or losses of
the contract, each organization’s respective reactions to the contract that mitigate identifies
losses, and perceived opportunities for partnership that enhance any benefits of the contract.
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The research questions for this study are as follows:
(1) How do leaders at BCUSD and Ascent describe what their organizations give and
what they get in the charter school contract for special education? What among these do
they identify as benefits and losses for their respective organizations?
(2) How does the contract with the vendor instantiate the firm’s responsibility to meet
IDEA, state and local mandates for special education?
(3) How does this contract favor partnership between charter schools and SELPAs in
contrast to alternatives in the market?
Hypothesis
The charter school movement is characterized by autonomy, accountability and choice
(Garda, 2012; Rhim, Ahearn Lange and McLaughlin, 2004). Because charter schools receive
federal and state funding, charter schools are must adhere to special education laws and
mandates, thus compromising autonomy in order to meet legal obligations. The contract for
special education is one domain of compromise for charter schools, as the contract requires
charter schools to employ very specific and highly regulated special education practices
regardless of their chosen curriculum, model or pedagogy (Garda, 2012). This case study will
reveal how special education mandates create pain points for charter administrators’ autonomy in
the areas of staffing, compliance reporting and value streams. This case study will also identify
language that is unclear and leads to disjointed understandings of responsibilities between
SELPA staff and charter school staff. This case study may also point to tasks that are not housed
within either organization, and thus, contribute to a perceived failure of one organization to meet
the mandates of IDEA. The participants in the study may identify knowledge gaps, either about
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charter school leadership and workflow or about special education responsibilities. Lastly, the
case study will identify an overarching tension between federally regulated special education and
the ethos of autonomy and parent choice espoused by charter schools.
Limitations, Assumptions, and Design Controls
Limitations
A descriptive case study allows a researcher to conduct an in-depth study of a single
entity rather than explain the causation or existence of phenomena but is limited in its ability to
generalize descriptions of the phenomenon (Maxwell, 2013). This case study can only serve to
describe the contract and implications at Ascent CMO and cannot explain the phenomena of
educating special education students in all charter schools. The literature on transaction cost
economics supports the use of a qualitative case study for investigating the complex nature of
contracts, incentives and asset specificity. Williamson (2010) states that case study inquiry
enables research to anchor theories in practice. The conceptual framework of TCE employs
qualitative case study in order to take a deep look into the human uncertainties and associated
organizational responses that result from imperfect contracts.
Another limitation lies within the accessibility and biases of research respondents.
Participants who are employed by a charter school or BCUSD will carry biases from their
respective settings and experiences within those environments. Additionally, if a
disproportionate number of individuals being surveyed may work for charter schools, and thus,
may perceive special education contract as harmful for charter schools. Since less response is
anticipated from BCUSD staff, balanced of descriptions could be limited. My role is also a
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limitation; my history and experience as an employee of both of the researched firms may
threaten the credibility of the study.
Assumptions
An overarching assumption of this study is that each the reality for each individual is
their truth (Merriam, 2009) Thus, individual subjectivity will cause participants to interpret the
case differently. Survey questions will explore these subjectivities to help understand the
complex partnership and elements of human error in the special education contract. Another
assumption is that the descriptive narrative form, or thick description, will accurately portray
perspectives of those interviewed and create vicarious participation for the readers.
Design Controls
The research will account for these limitations and assumptions though the use of
purposeful sampling; both charter school leaders and BCUSD leaders will be asked to describe
the nature of the contract. The data will be gathered from multiple sources and triangulated to
generate credibility.
Definition of Key Terms
Local education areas (LEA): governing entity that provides public education settings and
services, synonymous with a school district. Charter schools can act as their own LEA or they
can be part of a district or state LEA.
State education plan area (SELPA): California’s governing structure for the provision of
special education funding and services. Most districts in California are within regional SELPAs,
although BCUSD is it’s own SELPA.
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Free and appropriate public education (FAPE): identified in IDEA as the assurance that all
students with disabilities will receive a free, public education in the appropriate manner that suits
the student’s disability
Least restrictive environment (LRE): the educational program that allows a student with a
disability to participate with general education peers to the maximum extent possible.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): passed by Congress in 1996 then re-
authorized in 2004, this is the federal law that describes how states and LEAs will provide
special education to students with disabilities
Individualized education plan (IEP): legal document that outlines the disability of a student,
the strengths and needs of the students, annual goals that pertain to educational access, and
supports and related services, updated annually and written by a team comprised of a general
education teacher, special education teacher, administrator and parent
Eligibility: IDEA defines a student with a disability as meeting one of the following eligibility
categories: special education, the thirteen federal eligibilities include specific learning disability,
other health impairment, autism, speech and language impairment, intellectual disability,
multiple disabilities, deaf-blindness, hard of hearing, deafness, orthopedic impairment, traumatic
brain injury, emotional disturbance, visual impairment
Modified consent decree (MCD): implementation and monitoring outcomes for special
education in BCUSD required by a federal court order
Compliance: the extent to which a school or LEA adheres to the mandates of IDEA, as
evidenced by annual reporting to the local governing agency for special education
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Child-find: the provision that schools will actively search and identify students with disabilities
that require special education services
Mainstream: the process of moving a student with a disability into the general education
environment from a special education classroom
General education: non-special education setting can include a classroom, playground, elective
activity, or field trip setting
Transaction cost economics (TCE): a theory of economics that allows researcher to consider
human error, opportunism, and other human as contingencies to a contract between a firm and a
vendor
Transaction cost: the literal or figurative cost of a transaction; ideally, the costs of any contract
are minimized for at least one party
Hazard: a negative consequence of a contract due to the nature of the contract or implicit or
explicit rules of the transaction
Incentive: elements of a transaction that make the transaction more appealing to firm or vendor
Symmetry: when both parties in a contractual relationship have the same information, a
precondition for acting rationally within the transaction
Asymmetry: when parties in a contractual relationship have different information, resulting in
contractual hazards or costs for one party
Traditional school: a K-12 school created by and managed by a public school district or LEA
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Networks: conceptual framework for describing a contracting relationship that is neither a
market or hierarchy, particularly useful in analyzing the exchange of services when the value of
goods cannot be easily measured (Powell, 1990)
Partnership: contracting relationship that lies on a continuum of trust, somewhere between a
mandated, or trust-free, partnership and a commitment that both parties will follow through with
commitments, either formal or informal
Hybrid mode: when a contracting relationship is neither within a hierarchy nor a market, but
maintains elements of both market and hierarchical organization
COP: charter operated programs, a sub-division of the division of special education within the
BCUSD SELPA that works only with special education in district charter schools.
Summary
Special education in charter schools is neither consistently implemented nor clearly
described in the contracts between charter schools and SELPAs. This lack of clarity supplants a
collision of a charter school culture founded on autonomy and the regulatory state and federal
special education mandates. A lack of qualified personnel to interpret the contractual outcomes
compounds the challenge for charter schools. This qualitative case study will investigate the
language, outcomes and perspectives of the special education contract through the lens of
transaction cost economics. The aim of this research is to describe the contractual language, staff
perceptions, partnership, including possible reciprocity, within contract between a charter
schools and authorizing SELPA. One intended outcome is to identify aspects of the contract that
inhibit or enable charter schools to run special education programs in compliance with IDEA.
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A review of the literature in chapter two investigates the problem of special education
implementation in charter schools. This discussion includes a description of the mandates of
IDEA and identified barriers to charter schools’ implementation of special education law. The
review of literature also explores the framework of TCE, fleshing out two contingencies of
human uncertainty, bounded rationality and opportunism. These two contingencies are applied to
charter school special education challenges and demonstrate the relevance of TCE to an analysis
of charter school special education contracts.
Chapter three describes the methodology that guides this qualitative case study and
includes an in-depth profile of the population and sample. Research questions, associated
instruments and rationale are described and connected to conclusions from chapter two. Chapter
three includes methods of data collection in order to answer the research questions posed in
chapter one. Finally, a description of data analysis explains how data will be culled, reviewed,
coded and undergo validation and triangulation to accomplish the goals of this study.

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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Charter schools enroll lower proportions of students with disabilities than traditional
public schools (Ahearn, 2001; Swanson, 2005; Howe & Welner, 2002). One particular area of
challenge for charter schools lies in contracts for special education that are written between a
charter school and the authorizing agency’s special education governing body (Ahearn, 2001). In
California, the governing body is called a SELPA (special education local plan area), who
allocates federal and state funding to schools and districts, monitors compliance with legal
mandates and oversees all programming for students with disabilities (State Board of Education,
2009). Each charter school is required to sign a contract to provide special education services in
accordance with IDEA and cannot discriminate against students with disabilities (Swanson,
2005). However, charter school leaders are often unaware of their special education
responsibilities or do not have knowledge of how to implement special education activities
described in the contract, which leads to the shortfalls in special education implementation
(Ahearn, 2001; Swanson, 2005; McLaughlin & Henderson, 1998). Gaps in knowledge for charter
school leaders are exacerbated by policy and organizational differences, which hold charter
schools and federal and state special education mandates in binding tension (Ahearn, 2001;
Garda, 2012). While charter school law is governed at the state level and promotes autonomy,
special education law derives from federal mandates and enforces regulation and compliance
(Garda, 2012).
This qualitative case study employs transaction cost economics (TCE) to understand the
responsibilities outlined in a contract for special education between a SELPA and a charter
school and perceived benefits and losses as a result of this contract. The literature review first
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20
describes the current state of special education in charter schools, including the complex issue of
legal identity and identified barriers to special education implementation in charter schools. The
second section of the literature review discusses the elements of TCE that are relevant to this
study, opportunism and bounded rationality. The second section also explains how organizations
mitigate the hazards of a transaction by adapting the way that they organize themselves. The
third section of the literature review outlines cultural differences between charter schools and the
regulatory environment created by special education mandates. Section three also explores the
criteria of creating partnerships between SELPAs and charter schools and outlines criteria for
successful partnership and reciprocal relationships.
Special Education in Charter Schools
This section of the literature review discusses charter school obligations to meet the
federal requirements of IDEA. First, I discuss the parameters of autonomy within the context of
federal regulation then I describe the provisions of IDEA to serve students with special
education. I include the specific IDEA mandate around LEA status that describes who is
responsible for providing an LRE. I review the literature on disproportionality of students with
special education needs in charter schools as an example of charter schools’ failure to comply
with IDEA. Then I identify a lack of knowledge of the contracts and of special education law as
an area that requires further investigation, per this case study.
Charter Schools and Federal Law
A charter school is a state-driven reform initiative in which individual states pass charter
school laws that define the legal status and operation parameters of the school (Rhim, Ahearn &
Lange, 2007). Depending on state law, a school district, a state agency, a non-profit or a
university may authorize a charter school (2007). Regardless of the authorizing agency, a charter
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21
school is a public entity that is funded by public tax dollars (Swanson, 2005). While charter
schools may be exempt from some local or state regulations, they are still accountable for
academic results and may be closed by the authorizer if they fail to produce satisfactory results
(Manno, Finn & Vanourek, 2000). The distinguishing characteristic of charter schools is that
they are free to produce academic results through self-governance (2000). Additionally, charter
schools were created to infuse innovation into the public education sector, under the premise that
autonomy breeds innovation and increases student outcomes (Rhim, et. al, 2007).
While charter schools are afforded certain exemptions from state and federal
requirements, all charter schools, as publicly funded entities, must meet the requirements of
federal statues such as standards-based reform from No Child Left Behind (NCLB), Title I,
magnet schools and special education (McLaughlin & Rhim, 2007). IDEA describes the
responsibility of the states to ensure that students with disabilities receive an appropriate
education at no cost to them in the least restrictive setting, or FAPE. Local districts receive a
combination of federal, state and local funds, as Part B of IDEA allocates federal funds to each
state based on a standard formula and describes how the dollars will float to the states, although
how the states funds charter schools differs from state to state (Rhim et. al, 2007). Relative to the
aforementioned federal laws, state and district leaders have less experience interpreting charter
school policies for special education (Rhim et. al, 2007).
Provisions of IDEA
IDEA clearly outlines a school’s responsibility to provide a free and appropriate public
education (FAPE) in a least restrictive environment (LRE). Charter schools are bound to these
two principles, which can look different depending on the student’s individual needs and the
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educational context (Rueda, Gallego & Moll, 2000). LRE and FAPE should attempt to include
the student with a disability in the general education curriculum as much as possible, and can
include the student for 100% of the school day or might involve the student going to a
specialized residential school (Rhim, 2008). LRE and FAPE reside on a continuum of classroom
placements and specialized services, such as academic instruction, speech therapy and 1:1 adult
assistance (Rueda, et al., 2000; Rhim, 2008). Multi-disciplinary teams that are required to
include a special education teacher, general education teacher, site administrator and parent write
an individualized education plan (IEP) for each student with a disability that must be in
accordance with these two prongs of special education law, LRE and FAPE. Charter schools,
because of federal education policy, must follow the IEP process and must recommend and
implement both LRE and FAPE for all students with disabilities (Howe & Welner, 2002;
Swanson, 2005).
LEA status. IDEA Part 2 statutes, re-authorized in 2004, further describes the levels of
special education responsibility contingent on whether a school is part of an LEA or its own LEA
(Rhim et. al, 2007). Only state law determines when a charter school is a stand-alone LEA, and
as such, the state holds the charter school entirely responsible for enrolling students with
disabilities, offering a continuum of services, providing FAPE and funding special education
programs and services (Rhim et. al, 2007). However, when a charter school is part of an LEA,
the LEA defines the school’s special education responsibilities, programs and services (Rhim et.
al, 2007). In the later scenario, the LEA’s relationship with the charter school has the potential to
impinge on the autonomy of the charter school or the cultural differences between a state-
governing boy and the charter school may cause friction between the two organizations. Rhim
(2004) in a case study analysis of LEA relationships to charter schools found that a relationship
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between a charter school and LEA could bolster special education programming in a charter
school. This critical distinction between a charter school as a stand-alone LEA versus affiliated
with a governing LEA heavily impacts the special education responsibilities held by a charter
school. The LEA context, charter school-based leadership and contract for special education
services emerge as key factors that impact whether a charter school has capacity to fulfill IDEA
requirements.
Enrollment Disproportionality
The disproportionality of students in charter schools versus traditional public schools is a
theme in the literature. In a national examination of special education proportionality in charter
schools, Rhim (2008) found that children with disabilities represent approximately 11.51% of the
total enrollment in public schools nationwide while 10.6% of charter school students were in
special education for the 2003-2004 school year. An analysis of enrollment in California
documents that student enrollment in charter schools differs from state averages; charter schools’
enrollment of students with disabilities includes more students with specific learning disabilities
(61% at charters versus 55% in non-charters) and fewer students with mental retardation (2% at
charters versus 6% at non-charters) (Rhim, 2008). In addition, charter schools tend to service
their students in the general education classroom more than non-charter schools, with at least
73% of students with disabilities in the general education classroom for at least 80% of the day
as compared to 50% of students with disabilities in traditional public schools (Rhim, 2008).
One identified reason for disproportionality is enrollment practices. Fiore, Harwell,
Blackorby and Finnigan (2000) conducted a national study that found that charter schools,
nationally, discouraged students receiving special education from enrolling by explaining to
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parents that the school’s curriculum and instruction would not meet the needs of students
receiving special education. The national study found that in California, slightly fewer students
with disabilities enrolled in charter schools but that more students with disabilities were
mainstreamed in an LRE of a general education classroom (2000). Howe and Welner (2002)
examined Boulder, Colorado’s school choice program of open enrollment and identified hidden
means of excluding students with disabilities by creating admissions criteria and elite schools
counseling out students with special education. Ahearn et al. (2001) described the
disproportionality as a failure to fulfill the obligations of IDEA.
Legal Identity
Challenges to meet IDEA mandates are rooted in the disparate types of legal identity of
charter schools. A local education agency (LEA) functions as a school district, receives federal
and state funding and oversees special education governance. Some charter schools are an LEA
while others may be schools within a LEA; moreover, other charter schools fall in between the
two extremes and may have ties with an LEA yet maintain some autonomy (Ahearn, 2001). LEA
and charter school relationships, regardless of where a school falls on the LEA or affiliated LEA
continuum, is further complicated by wide variance in state laws on charter schools’
responsibility to serve students with disabilities (Rhim et al., 2007). A 2000 study of charter
schools and special education by the U.S. Department of Education concluded that barriers for
charter schools include a lack of adequate funding, strained relationships with local districts, and
lack of data with regards to special education students (Ahearn, 2001). Moreover, the study
found that most charter school operators have limited understanding of federal and state laws and
special education funding models, particularly when the charter school is an LEA and un-
affiliated with an LEA (Ahearn, 2001). If charter school leaders lack critical understanding of the
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legal identity of the charter, i.e., LEA status, the funding formula, responsibilities to local
districts and their special education mandates, there are implications for special education
program development.
Estes (2006) found that charter schools that experience more success with educating
students in special education when states that clearly delineate special education responsibilities
in state charter law. Drame (2011) analyzed the contracts for special education between state
agencies and charter schools in Texas and found that a rigorous application process paired with
heightened accountability over fiscal allocations created a context for charters to be aware of
their obligations to meet the needs of more students with disabilities. Estes (2006) recommends
that states write explicit policy guidelines within state charter law that requires a charter
application to include a statement on nondiscriminatory enrollment, special education referral,
assessment and services, special education disciplinary procedures. Estes (2006) anticipated that
when charter operators are required to address IDEA requirements at the onset of the school’s
opening in the charter application, the solid special education plan influences programming and
hiring, and ultimately improves capacity for charter schools to meet the needs of students with
disabilities.
Drame (2011) found that charter school operators, overall, are not knowledgeable about
the funding formulas for their state and for their authorizing district or LEA. Drame (2011)
recommends local professional development and training from school districts so that charter
schools are provided with clearly outlined, detailed summaries of special education funding,
including the amount of reimbursement payment back into the district and the cost of
psychological or speech services. Workshops and technical assistance to support a greater
understanding of special education funding allocations should be available to all charter leaders
SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CHARTER SCHOOLS

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from the charters’ authorizing LEA (Drame, 2011). It is also recommended that in states where
charters can be their own independent LEA, such as Wisconsin or California, operators receive
access to special education technical assistance and fiscal support, either from a charter advocacy
organization, a governing special education plan area (SELPA) or from the state (Drame, 2011).
Staff capacity
Estes (2006) identified that the lack of qualified special education teaching staff in
charter schools remains a barrier to the implementation of IDEA provisions. Special education
teachers are the hardest teachers to recruit and retain (Boe, Bobbit & Cook, 1997). An estimated
600,000 un-filled special education teaching positions presents an impending national teaching
crisis (Robertson & Singleton, 2010). This critical shortage of special education teachers results
from higher attrition rates and lower retention rates than their general education counterparts
(2010). Additional credential requirements mandated by No Child Left Behind (NCLB) adds
extra burden on special education teachers, who must hold a special education credential and
prove a competency in the subject matter that they teach (e.g. a teacher with a credential for deaf
and hard of hearing who teaches biology must prove subject matter competency in life sciences).
Low performing schools with predominantly minority students, including charter schools, have a
particularly difficult time recruiting high-quality teachers (Estes, 2006; Watlington, Shockley,
Guglielimino & Felsher, 2010). The national shortage of qualified special education teachers
impacts the ability of charter schools to carry out the instructional and compliance aspects of
IDEA.
In addition to the lack of special education teachers, charter schools struggle to build
leadership capacity for special education programming (Rhim, 2010). Traditional public schools
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also struggle with special education, although charter schools struggle as a result of a different
set of factors; charter schools are new, have small staffs and have a specific mission (Rhim,
2010). Rhim (2010) found that charter school leaders lack technical knowledge of IDEA
mandates to support special education teaching staff. Lack of capacity for training and
supervising special education staff, funding special education materials and understanding IDEA
may cause many charter schools to turn away students with disabilities. The lack of capacity is
exacerbated by a confusing legal identity if a charter school is an LEA and not part of a larger
LEA (Rhim, 2010; Swanson, 2005).
Summary
Charter schools are required to fulfill the mandates of federal special education law
because they receive federal funding, however they are serving less students with special
education than their non-charter school counterparts. Each state has different charter school laws,
resulting in different kinds of legal identities for charter schools. While some charter schools are
their own LEA, others are part of a larger LEA. LEA status determines the extent to which a
charter school is fiscally and programmatically responsible for providing a continuum of special
education placements. One specific challenge with complicated and variant legal identities is that
charter school leadership do not always have the knowledge to be able to fully understand
special education legal identity, funding, IDEA terminology and their responsibilities to IDEA
that are outlined in the charter school contract. The lack of clarity within charter school contracts
for special education foreshadows barriers to successful implementation of special education for
charter schools.

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Transaction Cost Economics
The TCE framework compounds social science, organizational and business theories to
address the innate costs in every transaction, whether formal or informal. This section of the
literature review will describe TCE then focus on three critical aspects of the TCE framework:
bounded rationality, opportunism, and hybrid modes. Bounded rationality is the underlying
assumption of TCE, while opportunism the behavior that manifests as a result of bounded
rationality. The two human contingencies, bounded rationality and opportunism cause
organizations to re-organize as a result. A brief discussion of how TCE might impact public
sector organization explores criticisms of TCE. Finally my discussion will explore how hybrid
modes, or partnerships, offers a model of how organizations might respond to the hazards
brought on by bounded rationality and opportunism.
Definition of the Framework
TCE is an outgrowth of classical economics that has been naturally progressing since the
1930s (Williamson, 2010). TCE operates under the assumption all contracts as effectively
incomplete and provides a lens for researchers and economists to identify and consider the
associated costs of an incomplete contract, particularly how those costs that are imposed, either
purposefully or accidentally, by human error or organizational demands (Williamson, 2008;
Macher & Richman, 2008). In the TCE framework, a transaction is the unit of analysis. A
transaction can take the form of a written contract, an informal agreement or by a relationship
between people or organizations. According to TCE theorists Williamson (1973; 1999; 2010)
and North (1999), the unit of analysis, the transaction, is complicated by human contingencies
such as opportunism or bounded rationality. An investigation of contingencies, conducted
primarily through the use of qualitative case studies, allows researchers to identify foundational
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problems with how firms interact and how firms are organized (Williamson, 2010). Qualitative
case studies help to anchor TCE theory into practice and by providing rich description of the
organizational reactions to any transaction cost (2010). In this research study, I will examine the
organizational structures, values and behaviors of a SELPA, which endures a regulatory climate
aligned with special education policy, in contrast to a charter school, which maintains a climate
of autonomy and innovation. Using the TCE model, I understand every transaction, formal or
informal to have associated costs. In this research investigation, I will apply the vocabulary and
concepts of costs, bounded rationality, opportunism, hybrid modes and partnership from TCE to
answer the research questions posed in chapter one.
Two Types of Costs
TCE theorists identify two major cognitive failures made by human actors within any
transaction as bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 2008; North, 1999). However,
TCE also suggests that once the cognitive failures are identified and addressed, organizations can
compensate for these two failures by designing the organization differently (Williamson, 2008).
The notion of bounded rationality, as employed by Williamson and his colleagues, stems from
cognitive load theory, in which the brain’s working memory can only process limited
information until the brain becomes overloaded with information and unable to function
(Kushner, 2011). Williamson (1973) uses cognitive load theory to explain why human brain
cannot receive, store, retrieve and process without error. By invoking psychology to describe the
imperfect nature of human-created transaction, Williamson (1973) contends that the standard
economic analysis of contracts deserves an examination human cognitive limitations, or hazards,
for each party within the transaction.
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Opportunism arises primarily in the execution or renewal stage of the transaction and
accounts for human behavior in ways that promote self-interest (Williamson, 2008). When one
party has more information than another, or asymmetrical information, the party with more
information does not enforce limits on themselves to behave responsibly and may take the
opportunity to maximize advantage from the transaction (Williamson 1973). However, in
Williamson’s (1973) view, firms can adapt their design and structure to mitigate for human urge
to act to benefit one’s own advantage. Firms adapt to opportunism by either enforcing stronger
compliance or encouraging increased competition through autonomy and enterprise (Williamson,
2008). In essence, these two reactions, hierarchy or autonomy, mirror the spectrum that describes
how public school systems and charter schools have reacted to Williamson’s “imperfect”
transactions.
TCE in the Public Sector
Several critics warn against using TCE to understand the organization of public agencies
such a school systems. Factors such as elections, majority rule, and the separation of powers
auger against efficiency, presenting challenges to understand the transaction as the unit of
analysis (Williamson, 2012). Public bureaucracies are massive and overformalized, and make
laws that “exceedingly hard to enact” (2012, p. 309). Terry Moe argues that the public sector,
bounded by compromise, coercive authority and high value on expediency instead of efficiency,
cannot be analyzed through TCE (2012). Further, North suggests the public sector does not
function like a market since public institutions focus on serving the interests of constituencies;
public institutions are less focused on efficiency (2012). However, Wilson and Dixit (2012)
contend that TCE can be useful to understanding the public sector because extract the multiple
objectives, such as equity and accountability, involved in government programs. A public firm,
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unlike a private one, will create an internal governance structure that addresses any hazards of
bounded rationality or opportunism within its bureaucracy (2012). The public agency, who is
more likely to make it’s own production and goods, has incomplete contracts even between it’s
own bureaucratic departments (2012). Thus, public agencies do benefit from a TCE analysis
because TCE identifies the costs of inter-organizational transactions and potential solutions to
mitigate identified costs.
Often public and private agencies have several inter-departmental transactions built into
one organization; this hybrid governance mode structure is neither a pure market nor hierarchy,
but a network of departments or firms (Powell, 1990). Since most contemporary organizations
organize to compensate for transaction costs, most organizations lie somewhere on the market-
hierarchy continuum (1990). The hybrid governance mode leads to relationships that resemble
networks. The networks within and between firms do require considerable effort to establish and
sustain, or credible commitments, but by creating interdependence and pooling resources, firms
work together towards a common goal, thus abating opportunism (1990). Public entities such as
charter schools and SELPAs have network relationships. School sites are lead by a principal and
operate independently, however sites are managed, regulated and organized by a central district
office.
Networks
The costs and hazards of any transaction can be mitigated when the organizations adapt
their structures. Organizations are typically described within two polar modes, either hierarchies
or markets (Jung & Lake, 2011). In a market mode, transactions happen between strangers,
creating higher risks of opportunism (2011). However, in a hierarchy mode, the boundaries of a
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firm expand to internalize transactions that are managed from within (Powell, 1990) When
organizations are neither entirely a market or hierarchy, they are hybrid models, or networks.
Networks can emerge out of the need to bring organizations and personnel together less than one
common goal, to abet opportunism (1990). Working towards a common goal is one characteristic
of a network. A second characteristic of a network is that both parties anticipate gains by pooling
resources (1990). A third characteristic of a network is that the absence of competition that
results from an open sharing of information back and forth between organizations (Jung & Lake,
2011). When information is shared reciprocally between parties, loyalty is formed between the
network partners, leading to a repeated transaction between the parties, called transaction affinity
(2011). Networks mitigate the opportunism of a transaction because open, reciprocal information
sharing and the pooling of resources create a sense of loyalty to the other organization, and to a
common goal.
A partnership is a network that employs reciprocal relationships. Davies and Hentschke
(2006) describe networks between firms as a partnership, qualifying that while partnerships do
intend to mitigate transaction costs, they can be messy in their formation and implementation.
Some partnerships, like networks, are built off an assumption that both parties will gain more
than they give by entering a partnering relationship (Davies & Hentschke, 2006). Partnerships
require a certain context and set of interpersonal skills: complementary strengths,
interdependence, identifying a shared concern around a real problem, specific and clear roles and
responsibilities, and the ability to confront problems and use them as opportunities to build
relationships, among them (2006). Essentially, two components are required for successful
partnerships: communication and small-group processes, or the particular circumstances that
exist between the partnering parties (2006). Partnerships are a hybrid mode, somewhere between
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market and hierarchy, that identifies specific criteria, organizational values and communication,
that addresses transaction costs by aligning personnel within and between each party to reach a
common goal (2006).
Summary
Transaction costs exist within any contract or relationship since all contracts created by
imperfect composers, humans. Two human errors contribute to costs, bounded rationality and
opportunism. Bounded rationality describes the human brain’s limitations, which leads to
behavior that benefits oneself or in the case of the market system, one’s party. While the use of
TCE has been questioned in the public sector because public sector discourse is hefty with
external causes for behavior such as majority consensus and public emphasis on formalization of
rules rather than efficiency, TCE theorists argue that public agencies do engage in reorganization
to mitigate costs, just as private agencies do. One strategy for mitigating transaction costs is
partnerships, which relies on strong communication and specific contextual factors to rally
parties around a common goal.
Transaction Costs of Special Education in Charter Schools
TCE concepts illuminate specific challenges in the charter school special education
problem. One problem between the charter school movement and special education is the notable
differences between charter school culture, which is characterized by autonomy, and special
education policy, which relies on compliance and regulation (Rhim, 2010; Garda, 2012).
Because charter schools were conceived as autonomous entities, they function under a premise
that is antithetical to that of federal regulation associated with special education (Rhim, 2010).
Garda (2012) argues that charter law and special education law struggle to work together under
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the same schoolhouse. The cultural differences that belie charters and special education law are
manifested in the implementation of special education contracts. Contracts written under
information asymmetry, the imbalance of knowledge that may exist between a special education
governing agency and a charter school, and allow opportunism for one party to act in a way that
benefits their interests (Hentschke & Wohlstetter, 2004). Finally in this section of the literature
review, I will address how asymmetry and cultural differences can be addressed by creating a
context and communication bridge that fosters partnerships (Davies & Hentschke, 2006;
Swanson, 2005).
Culture Clash
The challenges with implementing IDEA in charter schools and special education derive
from a vast difference in organizational context and goals. Charter schools were birthed out of
public school choice theory (Lubienski, 2004). Public choice theory suggests parents, the
consumers of schools, will exert an exit decision if parents feel that schools are not providing a
sufficient education (2004). Public choice scholars believe that regulation serves to protect
existing institutions, and that regulation is not compatible with innovation (2004). Public choice
theorists argue that administrators, school board members, teachers and unions are so entrenched
in the current educational institutions that these actors prevent reform, thus, reform can only
derive from deregulation and enhanced autonomy (2004). Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that
parent choice will demand that schools strive to attract parents and create a competitive, market
environment. Charter schools grew out of public choice theory, that de-regulation and autonomy
would push innovation, which would improve outcomes for students who have been historically
marginalized by educational institutions (Lubienski, 2004). Charter schools are built on the
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assumption that autonomy will push innovation, which will, in turn, produce more academic
results for students (Lubienski, 2004; Rhim, Ahearn, Lange & McLaughlin, 2004).
Differences in charter school and special education policy manifests in disparate origins,
foundational assumptions and organizational goals. Garda (2012), in a legal analysis of special
education in charter schools, pronounces the intersection of autonomy and regulation as a
“culture clash” (Garda, 2012, p. 661). Charter schools are founded on the premise of autonomy
whereas special education is rooted in a policy of compliance and procedures, a stark contrast
that enables IDEA regulations to undercut the freedom of a charter school and it’s mission
(2012). According to Garda’s (2012) analysis, special education law outlines that an LEA must
provide a range of services within a range of schools for students with disabilities. However,
charter schools, especially those that are LEAs, write a specific mission statement that describes
how the charter school, in the spirit of innovation, will bring new curriculum and instructional
practices to the education market (2012). In essence, IDEA asks that charter schools, especially
those who are LEAs, to compromise on fulfilling the charter’s specific mission in order to
comply with IDEA’s mandate to serve a range of students with varying educational needs (Rhim,
Ahearn, Lange & McLaughlin, 2004). Charter schools have reacted to the pressure to “be all
things to all students” by failing to implement IDEA, (i.e. counseling out students with
disabilities, enrolling less students with disabilities and in some cases, failing to implement IEP
mandates) (Swanson, 2005). Garda (2012) argues that negotiating the contrasting goals of
innovation and compliance will continue to be a challenge in supporting charter school special
education programs.

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Imperfect Networks
Within a TCE framework, charter schools and special education governance are not
entirely in a hierarchy or market, but are a forced network relationship (North, 1990). Network
relationships are characterized by individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually
supported actions and networks allow both parties to pool resources for mutual benefit (1990).
Charter schools, unlike pure market firms, have no exit rights in their network relationship with
special education governance agencies; because charter schools receive federal funding they
must implement IDEA (Swanson, 2005; North, 1990). However, the network relationship
between charter schools and special education governance agencies, SELPAs in California, is
marred by stark differences in their cultures and organizational goals. North (1990) warns against
the assumption that networks are entirely based around reciprocity, trust and harmony.
Networks, over the course of several years, can undergo many changes, based on personnel,
contractual changes and shifts in organizational goals.
The network relationship between a charter school and a special education governance
agency both determines a charter schools’ capacity for special education programming. Rhim,
Ahearn, Lange and McLaughlin (2004) investigated the network relationships between charter
schools and their associated special education agencies and found that a charter school’s legal
identity and contract for special education are critical factors in whether or not the charter school
meets IDEA requirements. Rhim, et al. (2004) concluded that a charter school could bolster its
ability to meet IDEA mandates by linking itself with a local district, or LEA, for the purposes of
special education. Linkage by means of a contract with a local district depends on state charter
school law; in California, most charter schools are partially linked to a SELPA whereas in
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Colorado and Connecticut, charter schools are not associated with a local district for special
education (Rhim, et al., 2004).
In California, when a district authorizes a new charter school is authorized the default is
for the charter school to become a part of the district’s LEA or SELPA. However, there is
another route. Charter schools can give the SELPA notice to leave and join a different SELPA or
they could negotiate the contract for special education services. Such a negotiation would
determine how the charter and the SELPA might share funding, responsibilities and
programming, which can be an awkward process, according to Rhim, et al. (2004). This
awkward network negotiation is exacerbated when charter school operators do not have a
working knowledge of special education and their roles and responsibilities (Rhim, et al., 2004).
As previously cited in section two of this literature review, complying with IDEA requires a deep
set of knowledge about special education procedures and instructional practices (Ahearn, 2001;
Rhim, et al, 2004; Rhim, 2010; Drame, 2011). Charter school operators who lack a working
knowledge of special education are vulnerable to information asymmetry, in which the
imbalance of relevant information may lead to a contract that favors one party over another, or
opportunism (Hentschke & Wohlstetter, 2004). In order to avoid opportunism, Rhim (2010)
recommends clearly stated contracts that enumerate each organization’s role and responsibility
supplanted by functional interpersonal relationship.
Partnerships
Charter schools and special education governing agencies, SELPAs for California, have
different origins and goals (Garda, 2012; Rhim, 2010). However, networks are required between
the two organizations so that charter schools can receive authorization and federal funding.
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While the network between charter schools and special education governing agencies is required,
some charter schools, particularly those in California, can negotiate the terms of the contract
(Rhim, 2010). While this negotiation has been described as awkward, the negotiation process can
help forge a reciprocal relationship; the sharing of organizational mission, practices and goals
increases trust and mutual understanding (Rhim, 2010; Powell, 1990). Increased collaboration
transforms the network relationship into a partnership, as the two organizations might find ways
to come together under a common goal (Davies & Hentschke, 2006).
Successful partnerships are forged when the characteristics and goals of two firms
overlap and comingle (Davies & Hentschke, 2006). Rhim and Brinson (2010) investigated
practices and four case study charter schools and found that charter schools that have effective
special education programs posit a mission statement to serve all students, not just special
education students. These successful missions are not unlike the LEA responsibility to meet the
needs of all learners, as stated by IDEA. Therefore, the preponderance of one unifying goal, that
overlaps with IDEA proved to enable charter schools to gain success with implementing special
education mandates (Rhim & Brinson, 2010). Overlapping missions are one component of a
successful partnership. Other aspects of a successful partnership include: complementary
strengths, interdependence, identifying a shared concern around a real problem, specific and
clear roles and responsibilities, and the ability to confront problems and use them as
opportunities to build relationships (Davies & Hentschke, 2006). This research study will employ
the aforementioned components of partnership as a framework for further understanding the
relationship between charter schools and SELPAs.

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Summary
This review of literature identifies barriers in charter school capacity for housing special
education programs and meeting federal and state mandates. Vague or confusing contracts,
compounded by a lack of expertise contribute to the barriers for charter schools. Further review
of contracts and the definitions of responsibilities for special education are required to
understand how a charter school might better serve students with disabilities.
The second part of the review defines TCE as a lens for analyzing the barriers that exist
for charter schools. TCE, based on the idea that contracts are always imperfect due to human
limitations, employs vocabulary and factors that might tamper with the enactment and
implementation of a contract. Organizational partnering is posed as a means to mitigate
transaction costs.
Thus, this literature review located a lens for analyzing the contracts, transaction cost
economics. TCE affords an analysis of human opportunism and values, both factors that
contribute to the “imperfection” of a contract. This study will seek to identify the human factors,
or costs, associated with the contract for special education between firm and vendor, Ascent
CMO and BCUSD.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This study identifies factors that hinder or enable a charter school to meet the
requirements of IDEA by examining the contract between a charter school and SELPA through
the lens of transaction cost economics (TCE). TCE posits that contracts are never perfect because
of human participation in deriving and implementing the contract (Williamson, 2012). Thus, this
qualitative case study defines those imperfections in the contract for special education, in effort
to parse out both the intended and unexpected consequences for charter schools’ special
education programs.
TCE provides a framework for analysis of the contractual language in addition to a
consideration of the human contingencies that make the contract imperfect. For the purpose of
this research, the contract between Ascent and BCUSD is the unit of analysis and data source,
supplanted by perceptions and understandings of the contract by leaders of both organizations. In
this case, the leaders of Ascent and BCUSD unearth the human contingencies to more richly
contextualize the opportunism, partnerships and commitments of this relationship. A qualitative
case study employs deep analysis of the contract as the focal artifact from which associated data
will emerge. Case studies are critical to economic research because the rich description that
offers insight on institutional and transactional details that statistical analysis cannot provide
(Macher & Richman, 2008).
The contract in this case study between charter schools and BCUSD does not fall into a
traditional market or hierarchical arrangement, but is a forced network contract (Powell, 1990).
Charter schools must create contracts for special education funding and governance in order to
receive authorization and federal funding (Swanson, 2005). California charter schools may be
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authorized by the state board of education or a school district, an LEA. A charter school
management organization (CMO), such as Ascent may govern the curriculum and operations of
the schools within its organization, however a CMO is not the authorizer of the school. In this
case study, the authorizer is BCUSD, who also serves as the SELPA of the charter schools in a
major California city. When the six schools were granted charters by BCUSD, an MOU for
special education was presented and a signature was required, bundled into the transaction for
authorizing the charter school. The contract, in essence, is a component of the overarching
contract to open a charter school authorized by BCUSD. Therefore, the MOU for special
education did not undergo a market process by which alternatives or insourcing may have been
considered. Ascent did not exercise exit rights in order to change or deny the contract. The
context and arrangement for this contract is not uncommon; special education contracts are
folded into the larger chartering process in many instances (Estes, 2006). It is precisely because
of the frequency of this type of non-market contract that this qualitative research study bears
significance to both special education leaders and charter school reformers.
For funding and governance in adherence with the state master plan for special education,
the state split into special education plan areas (SELPAs). Most SELPAs are either one large
district or several smaller districts within geographic proximity that join together to develop a
regional special education service delivery system. SELPA offices provide training, technical
and legal support for educational programs for students with special needs between 3 and 22
years old.
Ascent currently holds agreements with three different SELPAs across California, which
covers the municipalities of Oakland, East Palo Alto, Sacramento, Stockton, Modesto and Los
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Angeles. BCUSD operates as a single-district SELPA; the same district office oversees charter
school authorizations and special education governance and services.
In 2007, the state board of education (SBE) authorized three non-geographic SELPAs to
provide special education funding allocations, programmatic support and instructional models to
charter schools; a county office of education in Placerville piloted this unique exception to state
law in which local education agencies (LEA) must be within a SELPA’s geographic region and
created a SELPA just for charter schools, (EDCOE). In the subsequent years, Ascent moved
many of its 34 schools into EDCOE SELPA between 2007 and 2011, with a few exceptions.
Currently, 28 of Ascent’s schools are in EDCOE, while six remain in the BCUSD SELPA.
In both 2010 and 2011, BCUSD introduced a district-wide reform to allow charter
schools to apply to take-over or inherit BCUSD buildings. In both the 2010 and 2011 cycles of
the reform effort, Ascent was granted brand new facilities from BCUSD at no cost to Ascent.
However, as a requirement to receive the free BCUSD facilities, Ascent was required to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with BCUSD SELPA for the five new charter school
sites. The Ascent high school is also part of the BCUSD SELPA. Thus, six Ascent schools are in
BCUSD SELPA while the remaining five are within the charter school SELPA.
Problem and Purpose Overview
Special education has been coined a “landmine” for the charter school movement because
of inconsistent implementation of special education programs for students with disabilities
(Garda, 2012). Charter schools, a reform effort that grew out of the need to generate choice for
parents and students, operate on the premise that a localized control may achieve stronger
academic results. However, charter schools are still required to meet federal education mandates,
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including IDEA. The tension between federal control and local authority fuels an unsympathetic
climate for charter schools to implement special education laws. Nonetheless, charter schools
operate special education programs within contracts with local governing districts, called
SELPAs in California. The contracts between charters and SELPAs are not always fully
understood by charter leaders (Ahearn, 2001).
This case study explores transactional costs when a charter school contracts with a
SELPA for special education services. This study describes why charter schools might falter in
its obligation to meet the provisions of IDEA and garner political scrutiny for special education
services. In analyzing the contract between a charter school and SELPA through transactional
cost economics, the case study discusses cultural, organizational and value differences between
the two organizations. The study also identifies areas of improvement, particularly in drafting in
bridging organizational differences, with the aim of better educating students with disabilities in
charter school settings.
This study employs the following research questions to investigate the Ascent’s contract
with BCUSD for special education:
(1) How do special education administrators at BCUSD and Ascent describe what their
organizations give and what they get in the charter school contract for special education?
What among these do they identify as benefits and losses for their respective
organizations?
(2) How does the contract with the vendor instantiate the firm’s responsibility to meet
IDEA, state and local mandates for special education?
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(3) How does this contract favor partnership between charter schools and SELPAs in
contrast to alternatives in the market?
Research Hypotheses
While it is common for charter schools to be described in literature as a monolithic entity,
each charter school is different. (Swanson, 2005). Because of the innate heterogeneity of charter
schools, across states, cities and even within charter management organizations, caution should
be granted when defining a charter schools’ role in special education. Status as an LEA or a
partnership with an authorizing district bears heavily on a charter schools’ IDEA responsibilities.
Transaction cost economics also values heterogeneity as it provides a lens for analyzing
relationships between entities through a distinct confluence of transactional factors such as
opportunism, bounded rationality, organization cultural and the presence of hierarchy, or
partnership, within a market exchange. Because of their propensity towards inimitability, both
charter schools and transaction cost economics generates problems adequately addressed through
a qualitative case study. A case study allows for deep investigation of the transaction as the unit
of analysis, in which organizational structures, values and opportunism can be revealed specific
to the relationship between charter schools and authorizing district in California.
Population
The Firm
Ascent is a charter school management organization (CMO) based out of Oakland,
California. Ascent runs 37 schools across the state of California, twelve of which are in Big City.
Ascent’s mission is to provide kindergarten through 12
th
grade program for first-generation
college-going students from communities of low socio-economic status and to prepare 100% of
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45
graduates for admittance to a 4-year college. Ascent currently operates 12 schools in the Big City
region, seven of which have contracts with BCUSD SELPA for special education.
The population for my sample includes Ascent principals, program specialists, special
education director and assistant director and local area superintendents. This population was
chosen based on knowledge of key terminology of IDEA, supervision of special education
program, compliance and staff, and familiarity with the contract for special education with
BCUSD.
The Vendor
Big City Unified School District (BCUSD) is a large urban school district that spans the
city and county of Big City with an enrollment of over 694,000 students in 878 K-12 schools and
centers (Weintraub, Myers, Hehir and Jaque-Anton, 2008). As of 2008, approximately 41,000
students attend district-authorized independent charter schools (Weintraub, et al.). While most
BCUSD schools and charter schools use a traditional track calendar, 141 schools with heavy
enrollment remained on multi-track calendar as of 2008. In a multi-track calendar, a cohort of
students occupy classrooms while other students are not in school in order to maximize physical
space for densely populated sites. In 2000, BCUSD initiated a school construction program as a
result of Proposition BB, a voter-approved 19.3 billion bond measure to relieve overcrowding in
the district’s most crowded schools and return all schools to a traditional track calendar
(Weintraub et al., 2008). BCUSD completed construction in over 90 new school facilities in
2012, opening up traditional district schools and charter schools in the facilities.
BCUSD provides special education services to more than 84,000 students with
disabilities from pre-school through age 21 (Weintraub, et al., 2008). The majority of students
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receiving special education are Hispanic (64%), followed by African-American (15.5%) and
White (11.3%) and almost 50% of the students receiving special education have a primary
eligibility of specific learning disability (SLD) (2008).
In 1993 BCUSD underwent a class-action law suit in which the plaintiffs headed by the
parent of a student named Chanda Smith, contended that the district pervasively failed to search
for, identify, track and serve the educational needs of children with disabilities (Weintraub, et al.,
2008). The resulting court order required the district to assemble a fact-finding team to identify
areas of non-compliance with IDEA, resulting in 11 areas of improvement for meeting special
education laws and mandates (2008). The implementation plans for improving special education
services were published under the title, modified consent decree (MCD) and outline eighteen
focus areas for improving outcomes and services for students with disabilities in BCUSD (2008).
In order to monitor improvement outcomes, BCUSD was required to design a data collection
system entitled Welligent for the purpose of developing and managing IEPs and routine review
by the court-appointed monitoring agency.
Because BCUSD is both an LEA and a SELPA, all federal and state special education
funding goes directly to the central office; the division of special education provides fiscal and
programmatic oversight to the range of education settings, including pre-school, work centers
and residential placements. The division of special education also oversees the MCD outcomes
and compliance of all charter schools authorized by BCUSD, as charters are required to meet the
outcomes and monitoring plan of the MCD, including using the online data system of Welligent,
mainstreaming more students with disabilities into general education classes, and reducing
suspension and expulsion rates. In the 2012-13 school year, BCUSD opened a sub-division of the
special education division for the purpose of supporting charter schools with MCD and federal
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compliance entitled the charter operated programs (COP). Staffed by two administrators, two
program specialists and two behavior specialists, the special education charter office’s nascent
program aims to support charter schools with compliance and special education programming.
The population for this study includes administrators, program specialists and behavior
specialists in the special education charter school sub-division. These participants interface with
charter school leaders, students and programs on a daily basis, and can speak to the benefits,
losses and potential partnerships within the MOU for special education.
Sample
This case study analyzes the contract for special education between BCUSD and Ascent,
a charter school management organization with seven schools that receive special education
funding and governance through the BCUSD SELPA. As a qualitative case study, the sampling
represents actors who are the most familiar with my research topic, thus, my sample is non-
random and purposeful (Merriam, 2009). Participants are familiar with the SELPA-charter
relationship between Ascent and BCUSD in order to develop an adequate description,
interpretation and explanation of this specific case (Maxwell, 2013). The specificity of this
qualitative case study and narrow sample protects from inappropriate generalization and help
identify diversity amongst individuals and settings with the intention of focusing on the specific
beliefs, actions and events espoused by BCUSD and Ascent (2013).
This site-specific case study investigates the responses of both Ascent and BCUSD
leaders. For the purposes of this case study, I employ purposeful, nonrandom sampling and
identify leaders who hold a management role that meets one of the following criteria: oversees
special education, influences the development of the special education contract, familiar with key
terminology of IDEA, supervises special education staff. The population includes school site
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48
leaders such as principals or vice principals or central office personnel. Identified respondents
may oversee and influence non special education domains. However, the population must have a
working knowledge of key terminology that pertains to special education and IDEA such that
individuals can comprehend the language of the contract. In addition, special education
supervision and decision-making must be part of their assigned responsibilities.
The interview elicits two respondents from each organization who meet the
aforementioned criteria. Access was gained by attending an in-person training or meeting within
each organization in order to identify a potential gatekeeper within the organization to help
facilitate introductions to my research and the nature of my interview (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003).
After in-person conversation with staff from BCUSD and Ascent, I used a snowballing strategy
and asked if other staff members who met my population criteria might be recommended for
further interviews or the survey of my study. (Merriam, 2009).
Instrumentation
Research questions were addressed through surveys, interviews and document review.
Data sources included the MOU and the perspectives and interpretation of the contract from
leaders in BCUSD and leaders in Ascent.
Interviews
Interviews afford more depth and diversity in the data, and are appropriate for qualitative
case studies (Weiss, 1994). A semi-structured interview posed open-ended questions to leaders
within BCUSD and Ascent, to garner descriptions of the MOU, associated benefits and losses for
each organization and partnership opportunities as a result of the contract. A pilot protocol was
administered to identify strengths and weaknesses in the protocol and the semantics of certain
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questions were subsequently changed (Merriam, 2013). An interview protocol (see Appendix A)
first asked participants describe the contract, the process of obtaining the contract and the most
salient points, in their opinion, of the contract. Subsequent questions in the protocol will asked
for respondents to describe partnerships between the two organizations and factors that might
support or negate trusting partnerships, and use characteristics of Davies & Hentschke’s (2006)
framework for successful partnerships. I used open-ended follow-up questions to probe for
anecdotes to describe strengths and weaknesses in the transaction between organizations, and
make recommendations for future improvements.
Document Review
Document reviews allow for the “accidental uncovering of valuable data” (Merriam,
2009). I reviewed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) to extract the contract’s description
of federal and state special education mandates and to identify any transaction hazards or
embedded opportunities generated by the contract. A document authenticity protocol was applied
to the document to ensure authenticity of origin and relevance to the research.
Surveys
Surveys are effective tools for gathering data from a moment in time, among a larger
group of participants (Fink, 2013). A pilot survey was administered to test for content validity to
verify that the survey addressed the indented areas of focus (2013). In the pilot administration,
theories of transaction cost economics and partnerships were tested against pilot survey questions
to ensure that the survey gleaned answers to the research question regarding partnership
components such as trust, interdependence and the existence of a common goal. Survey items
with close-ended questions and rating scales probe special education leaders at Ascent and
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50
BCUSD about attitudes and expectations of partnership between the two organizations. The
surveys, which will generate data on partnership and competition, utilize rating scales to analyze
the expectations of each organization around moving forward with increase partnership or
competition.
Data Collection & Analysis
Data collection was set to work within a timeline that allowed for institution approval,
gaining access, administration of my two instruments, re-administration to gather more survey
responses, member checks and analysis within the following timeline:
April 2013: Application for BCUSD research approval
May 2013: Qualifying oral examination, acceptance for BCUSD research, IRB exempt
status submission
June 2013: Continued revisions to BCUSD research division

July 2013: Pilot instruments and make any changes, gain access by attending in-person
meetings or trainings
August – September 2013: Approval granted by BCUSD research division

October 2013: Conduct interviews, administer surveys

November 2013: Member checks and interview transcription
December 2013: Data analysis and write narrative
The BCUSD research approval process changed my initial timeline, as it took two
months longer than I had anticipated due to the numerous drafts and feedback cycles. However,
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in this time, I began gaining access to participants by attending meetings and trainings at Ascent
and BCUSD headquarters.
Data was collected using three data collection methods to ensure triangulation and to
broaden the range of possible answers to the research questions: interviews, surveys and
document analysis. Triangulation allows different methods of data collection to check one
another so that conclusions are not biased towards one method (Maxwell, 2013; Merriam, 2009).
In order to answer the research question about how special education administrators comprehend
the charter school MOU for special education, I utilized three data collection methods within the
allotted research period time.
Research question #1, how do leaders at BCUSD and Ascent describe what their
organizations give and what they get in the charter school contract for special education? What
among these do they identify as benefits and losses for their respective organizations?
The first research question seeks to investigate the views of actors from both firms,
drilling down on how each actor perceives the costs and benefits of the MOU for special
education between Ascent and BCUSD. Personnel in a leadership roles were asked to participate
in an in-person interview to be recorded and transcribed. In adherence to the BCUSD research
division, I prepared a letter of introduction to each potential participant to describe the nature of
the research and identify the level of commitment required by participating in the study in order
to access at least two to three participants for an in-person interview. Interviews were recorded
and last 35-45 minutes. No follow-up interviews were conducted. Interviews were transcribed
from the audio recording within 48 hours of the interview using an online transcription service,
Rev, and the transcription was received within 24 hours. After receipt of the interview
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transcription, I listened to the interview again and fixed any transcription errors within 24 hours
or receipt. Within 24 hours after the interview, I reviewed field notes and organized my
observations into four organizational categories: Ascent benefits, Ascent losses, BCUSD
benefits, BCUSD losses (Maxwell, 2013).
Data analysis of the interviews began with an initial reading, in which I wrote general
notes and impressions. I followed this initial reading with my first pass of open coding, in which
I wrote repeated words in the margins of each transcript. This process of in vivo coding allowed
me to look for repeated words or phrases and note any patterns (Creswell, 2009). After my first
round of in vivo coding, I created a preliminary qualitative codebook, based on the transaction
cost economics framework of benefits and losses: Ascent benefits, Ascent losses, BCUSD
benefits and BCUSD losses. However, as I reviewed the notes from in vivo coding, secondary
codes emerged, such as MOU description, organizational gaps and alternatives in the market (see
Appendix B). Reliability was established through writing codebook definitions and by cross
checking transcripts for mistakes (Creswell, 2009).
Subsequent to an initial categorization, I will used Microsoft Excel to chunk quotes from
interviews by their codes and organized the quotes in two ways, by organization and by code.
Appendix C is the theoretical categorization matrix by which I looked at benefits and losses, as
identified and articulated by members of the two organizations. I wanted to ensure that I kept the
organizational membership of each responded distinct as I analyzed patterns. The inductive
process of categorizing responses and looking at patterns identified emerging theories from the
interview process (see Appendix C).
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Research question #2, how does the contract with the vendor instantiate the firm’s
responsibility to meet IDEA, State and local mandates for special education? The second
research question examined the language of the MOU for special education, particularly how the
contract describes the responsibilities of a charter school to comply with federal IDEA and local
MCD outcomes. Data collection in relation to this research question employed document
analysis, which allowed me to uncover meaning, develop understanding and discover insights
related to the research problem (Merriam, 2009).
The MOU was retrieved from the Ascent special education department, followed by a
protocol to consider the authenticity of the document (see Appendix D). Authenticity and
accuracy of documents is imperative for establishing the origins, reasons for being written,
author and context (Merriam, 2009). In the context of this case study, the MOU document is
considered a primary source, since the document will be used to understand the specific
responsibilities and demands of document as it pertains to the two organizations in this analysis.
I conducted an initial reading of the document without coding, then a second reading with open,
in vivo coding. Codes derived from the document, in which I pulled out words from the
document that were repeated. The third time I read through the document, I generated a list of 21
codes from repeated words in the text. Then I uploaded the document to ATLAS.ti, a document
review software, to create code families, resulting in a reduction of codes to only 11 categories.
The most frequent code, and largest category was the governance of the SELPA, followed by
working together, charter school decision-making and funding. ATLAS.ti software created a
network map that described the relationships between the 11 categories (see Appendix D).
The visual model generated three levels of categories, most frequent to least: level one is
the SELPA membership, level two is working together and charter school decision, and level
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three is due process and compliance and personnel, budget, enrollment and program. The visual
model enabled me to ascertain the relationships and governance structure suggested by the MOU
document. Codes from the interview questions were also derived to inform research question
two. A question that asked respondents to describe the MOU elicited descriptions from Ascent
and BCUSD leaders. The interview coding allowed for crosschecking of codes, to ensure
qualitative validity (Creswell, 2009).
Research question 3, how does this contract favor partnership between charter schools
and BCUSD SELPA in contrast to alternatives in the market? The third research question
explores whether the MOU encourages partnership between a charter and BCUSD, or whether
alternatives may prove to be more beneficial to either party. A survey was developed to collect
data for this research inquiry and sent to special education leaders within BCUSD and school-site
or district-level leaders within Ascent. Access was gained in-person during meetings, trainings
and site visits from August 2013 through October 2013. An introductory email followed up the
in-person conversation, which included a link to an online survey using Qualtrics. The survey
was sent to 10 leaders from Ascent and 10 leaders from BCUSD. 17 total responses were
captured using Qualtrics, 7 from BCUSD and 10 from Ascent. Results were analyzed by
producing two different Qualtrics reports: results by organization and results that combines the
answers from both organizations. Open-ended answers were coded using open coding.
Summary
This case study identifies the transaction costs, including opportunities, benefits and
losses, with the contract for special education services between Ascent CMO and BCUSD in
order to evaluate the capacity of charter schools to meet the federal and state mandates of special
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education. Three central research questions drive the focus of the research study that probe the
leaders’ perceptions of the contract, the language of the contract and the possible partnerships
within the contractual relationship.
Data has been sourced from multiple methods, interviews and field notes, surveys and
document analysis to ensure triangulation of findings. Data analysis methodology employs open
coding and substantive categorization to identify patterns for constructing theories from the data.
Data and analysis corroborates and contrast the varied responses from the two organizations’
interpretation of the contract and seek to include description and quotations from interviews and
surveys since this research study is specific to the setting of Ascent and BCUSD. Additionally,
all data analysis tools reflect concepts from the theoretical framework of transaction cost
economics as a conceptual anchor for generating new theories about the relationship between the
two organizations.

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CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents findings from a qualitative case study that employs transaction cost
economics (TCE) to investigate the contracts written between governing special education
agencies and charter schools. This research seeks to understand the benefits and losses for
charter schools and governing special education local plan areas (SELPAs) in negotiating the
responsibilities of the federal disability law by examining the contract between the two
organizations. The study focuses on three research questions: how do leaders identify and
describe benefits and losses of the contract for their respective organizations, how does the
contract itself describe the responsibilities to meet special education requirements, and how does
the contract favor partnership between the two organizations.
Organization of Data Analysis
Data results from the interviews, document review and surveys are organized by research
question. This chapter will present each research question, followed by related themes that
answer the research question, supported by specific findings. Tables and figures are included to
summarize the themes and to describe the data. Research question one, which looks at the
benefits and losses of the contracting relationship between the charter school and the SELPA,
employs TCE as grounded theory and includes descriptive narratives from interviews and
surveys. Research question two addresses the contracting document’s language and provisions of
roles and responsibilities for the charter school and corresponding data analysis takes the form of
categorical comparisons. Research question three describes how leaders describe partnership and
alternatives to the MOU using data from both the interviews and open-ended survey responses
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and, using grounded theory, explores the perceived partnership opportunities between the two
organizations, the perceived hindrances to collaboration.
Description of Respondents
Participants in this study are from Ascent, a CMO, and the charter authorizer and
SELPA, BCUSD. Interview and survey protocols for both respondent groups were identical.
The participants’ positions and responsibilities varied based on organizational structure. Ascent
respondents came from three different regional clusters and included an area superintendent that
oversees all school operations and instruction for the region of Big City, an Ascent special
education assistant director who is based on the San Francisco Bay area, a special education
director who is based in the Stockton area and program specialists who support programming
and teacher development in the Big City region, and Big City school. The BCUSD interviewees
included the director of charter-operated programs (COP), who oversees the special education
programs in charter schools, including Ascent, and a coordinator of the SELPA COP; both
BCUSD respondents worked in the newly established COP department that that resides within
the division of special education at BCUSD. Survey respondents from BCUSD included program
specialists, behavior specialists, directors and principals. Both survey and interview protocols
asked respondents to identify their organization, role and title and their interaction with the
special education program. The Ascent population was chosen based on knowledge of key
terminology of IDEA, supervision of special education program, supervision of personnel,
monitoring role in compliance and familiarity with the contract for special education with
BCUSD. BCUSD respondents were chosen based on their knowledge of IDEA requirements,
past experiences working with charter schools within the SELPA and their familiarity with the
MOU for special education.
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Shifting Political Context
Since the initiation of this qualitative study, a shift has changed current climate of
contracting between BCUSD SELPA and charter schools in which a viable market alternative
emerged for charter school contracting. Charter schools that are authorized with BCUSD now
have the option of choosing what kind of MOU they would like to sign with the SELPA. This
choice is called, “option 1, 2 or 3” and each option is associated with a different funding rate and
varying degrees of support. The creation of three options sprung out of a collaboration between
the advocacy group, the California charter schools association (CCSA), and the BCUSD division
of special education. The executive director of special education for the SELPA and
representatives from CCSA created the reorganization plan so that charters schools had
flexibility to choose an MOU relationship that reflects their level of support or autonomy in
relation to the SELPA (Plate, 2013). The SELPA reorganization birthed a division of BCUSD
entitled charter operated programs (COP). A total of 47 participating schools and 27,000 students
entered the alternative market option, “option 3” on July 1, 2013 (2013). The COP was staffed
with a COP director, coordinators and specialists to support charter school programs and
services.
This parallel SELPA structure hoped to “empower charter schools to serve a greater
number of students with unique needs and provide innovative high-quality services to a broader
range of students,” (Special education: Lessons learned in restructure of BCUSD, PowerPoint,
July 1, 2013). The second goal of offering services to a broader range of students includes access
to a full continuum of LRE placements for students with disabilities, an area in which charter
schools have historically faltered (Lubienski, 2004; Rhim, Ahearn, Lange & McLaughlin, 2004).
The predicted benefits for BCUSD include availability of more placements and services for
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higher-needs students with disabilities and the potential benefits for charter schools are increased
funding and autonomy within option 3 that allows for more programs for a moderate/severe
special education population. In essence, the COP was created to be a win-win for both
organizations.
A report from CCSA published a year after the reorganization demonstrated that charter
schools were indeed serving a broader range of students. The percentage of students with
moderate to severe disabilities increased by 21.9% as COP schools added more than 100 new
students with more intensive disabilities to their charter school programs (Plate, 2013). In a
presentation at the National Charter School Conference in July of 2013, the executive director of
special education and a representative from CCSA presented a slide that included that a COP
Advisory committee would include two representatives and three SELPA representatives, to
increase charter school participation in governance over the COP. Its founders described the
reorganization as groundbreaking because of its consideration of the conflicting interests of
charter autonomy and Federally-mandated SELPA assurances of compliance and funding
(http://www.calcharters.org/blog/2013/08/new-report-on-lausds-special-education-
reorganization-shows-promising-results.html2013). The reorganization aimed to increase charter
schools’ access to funding and to governance while assuring that charter schools meet the needs
of more students with intensive needs. The respondents in this study were asked to speak in
relation to their participation in MOU option 2, under which charter schools operates as schools
part of the district LEA. However, it is worth noting that the option 3 market alternative was
built in response to market competition, with the promise of increased autonomy and funding for
charter schools.

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Research Question One
Research question #1, how do leaders at BCUSD and Ascent describe what their organizations
give and what they get in the charter school contract for special education? What among these
do they identify as benefits and losses for their respective organizations?
Research question one investigates the views of actors from both firms to uncover the perceived
costs or benefits from the MOU. Based on the research question, four initial codes identified
perceived losses or benefits from two data sources, the interviews and surveys (Maxwell, 2013).
The initial codes included: Ascent benefits, Ascent losses, BCUSD benefits and BCUSD losses.
From the initial and subsequent codings, themes emerged that described the perceived benefits
and losses of the MOU, from the perspective of each organization (see Appendix B). This
section will describe the three emergent themes from research question one.

Figure 1. Research question one themes.
What
are
the
benefits
and
losses

resul0ng
from
the
MOU?

Organiza0onal
priori0es
play
a

role
in
iden0fying
benefits
and

losses

Placement
in
least
restric0ve

environment
is
a
moral
hazard

Educa0on
is
a
factor
in

determining
benefits
or

losses

SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CHARTER SCHOOLS

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As discussed in chapter two, the priorities of IDEA and charter schools lie in tension
because of incongruent fundamental principles; while IDEA is a top-down federal mandate,
charter schools are borne out of the notions of autonomy and accountability (Lubienski, 2004;
Rhim, Ahearn, Lange & McLaughlin, 2004). Differences in charter school and special education
policy manifests in disparate origins, foundational assumptions and organizational goals. In some
instances, researchers determined the federal special education mandates deter charter schools
from specific missions that are written into their charter petitions (Rhim, Ahearn, Lange &
McLaughlin, 2004). Charter schools have been seen as failing to meet the standards of IDEA by
counseling out students with disabilities, enrolling less students with disabilities and in some
cases, failing to provide a continuum of special education placements for students with more
impacting disabilities. The themes that derived from research question one invoke the theoretical
groundwork of chapter two, building off the tension between the organizational goals and
priorities of charter schools and IDEA.
Organizational priorities play a role in identifying benefits and losses
Identified benefits and losses are contextualized in the organizational priorities of the
respective organization. This mission of the SELPA and the mission of the charter school are not
always aligned; this misalignment factors into the identification of a loss or benefit. While the
SELPA has local, state and federal mandates, the charter school may have a very specific
mission written into its charter documents. The leadership who responded to surveys and
interview questions identified that the organizational priorities and extrapolated on how the
organizational priorities may be hindered or enhanced by the MOU for special education.
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Charter and SELPA alignment for LRE. The first finding that supports the theme of
organizational priority is that SELPA leaders identified charter programs as supporting the
current SELPA goal of moving special education students out of specialized placements outside
of the general education setting. The charter programs and SELPA goals were in alignment,
according to SELPA leadership. SELPA leaders identified this as a benefit for the SELPA.
Placements include special day programs that are smaller class size and only include students
with disabilities. The director of charter school programs at the SELPA indicated that most
charter school special education programs identified themselves as full-inclusion in their charter
petition but, in reality, implement a modified version of full inclusion because students with
disabilities are pulled out of the general education classroom.
I think that a lot of charters initially wrote their petitions to say full inclusion not
really knowing what that meant to fully include every student with an IEP. I think
that some people have modified their program to best support students which is
why I think you see a lot of them have some type of pull out service through they
say they are full inclusion...you find a mix of your typical resource students mixed
in with some students coming from a traditional special day class who probably
have a higher level of need and there are some types of hybrid programs at the
schools where there is a specialized intervention program or an elective class at
the secondary level that is specific for students with disabilities. You see a lot of
learning center models in these types of schools.
The director of charter-operated special education programs comes from a different SELPA and
has a history of working with charter schools in her previous SELPA. She indicates that she
prefers that charter schools use their autonomy to innovate and create programs that reject former
program models.
Each charter school, when applying to the district, includes a description of the special
education program that the school intends to implement, in accordance with IDEA mandates.
The director describes a program model that does not place students in special education
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classrooms with a special education teacher, but rather moves students into specialized
instruction as needed. The director extrapolates on her preferences for program models by
describing an independent charter school opened up a class for students with disabilities, referred
to as a special day class.
It’s [special day classes] not my model of choice, I think that they [special day
classes] are low-performing high cost models and [I] prefer the hybrid in between,
a lot of people are really at least listening to that and taking the lead of the district
in trying to reduce the number of special day classes that they have.
The coordinator for SELPA charter special education also referred to the SELPA goal of
closing down special day class programs.
With the district moving away from special day, programs that were truly for
[behavior] management in most cases was a way to look at numbers and manage.
So when you’re looking at a student who might be specific learning disability in a
resource specialist program and in a special day program, what’s the difference?
Of course, the difference is in the amount of time they spend with that special
education teacher. But if you dig a little deeper, it could have been because the
SDC teacher’s norms were low and the principal knew that if they fail, that that
class was going to be closed.
Both interviewees from the SELPA indicated that the traditional special day class was not
a preferred program model to meet the needs of students with disabilities and that the SELPA
was currently moving away from the previous, self-contained model.
Charter school’s autonomy leads to quality. Charter school interviewees identified a
loss of quality programming for students with special education as a potential pitfall of the
contract. The assistant director of special education for Ascent indicated that there was a
possibility for the contract to poorly serve the students at Ascent simply because the contract
inculcated an outside vendor.
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There is a possible moral hazard when you are entering into an MOU or a contract
with another party outside of your team, like what’s the trade-off in terms of the
quality of the service delivery for our kids.
The assistant director explained that this moral hazard doesn’t only relate to the BCUSD SELPA
but could be applied to other outside organizations that in any way operate differently due to
different organizational characteristics, such as size or region, when autonomy is not a priority
for the SELPA.
Part of the philosophy and approach of this organization [the CMO] is to give
schools that autonomy. So a school that’s operating in South Gate, LA and a
school that’s operating in Stockton have the ability to make decisions independent
of each other even though they’re both part of Ascent that are more appropriate
for their kids. I’m not sure to what extent the limitations of being able to do that in
our BCUSD schools because of the MOU that we have with BCUSD.
The assistant director implicates that autonomy is precisely the factor that creates quality
programs for students with disabilities because the school special education program can respond
to the discreet needs of the school community, and that a limitation of autonomy might lead to a
trade-off for quality programming.
Data reporting and monitoring. Both charter and SELPA respondents identified that
data reporting and monitoring for special education requirements is burdensome and tedious for
charter schools. However the respondents from the two groups cited different organizational
contexts and different reasons for the barriers to data collection and monitoring.
The area superintendent of Ascent identified the data and reporting as a reflection of a
contrasting organizational mindset.
I think right now the SELPAs view charter schools as a way to get you.
They’re coming to make sure you’re doing everything right and say, “We
got you,” […] the overall the structure is set up so that we’re [SELPA]
going to get you, we’re going to find out where you’re not compliant and
scold you.
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The area superintendent deemed this attitude as a conflict in mindset difference between charter
schools and their SELPAs. In her discussion of the connection between data reporting and the
special education mission of the charter, she conveyed that the two are not necessarily aligned.
I don’t think following guidelines and key dates sets up for disserving kids. I
think it’s much more of a mindset of how can we serve the students within these
boundaries the best way…you’re set up to not serve kids well if you follow the
guidelines.
This is contrasted with the SELPA’s perception that the charter’s non-compliance in data
reporting was loss for the SELPA. The director of charter operated special education programs at
the SELPA discussed charter schools’ data reporting responsibilities to the SELPA as requiring
additional SELPA support
Don’t think you can just put more responsibility on the charters without having
the right supports in place for them to do that work. I would say that I think that
the data collection is a little cumbersome and that’s something that I think that
being a huge organization that you run up against, but I am actively working with
the data department to streamline some of those processes…adding students
removing students is very difficult on both sides, not just for the charters but for
the district as well, first three months of service tracking is atrocious and it’s not
anyone’s fault. It’s a systems type of issue that we had to tackle.
Technological barriers impacts both charters and district schools’ ability to meet local and
Federal reporting requirements.
Placement back to the SELPA
BCUSD leaders identified a moral hazard for charter schools in the current contract;
rejecting students because of their disabilities by placing them back into district schools. Placing
students with disabilities back into district programs might involve several possible scenarios: a
charter school might enroll a student with a disability that has specific educational needs but the
charter school can’t obtain the services, the charter school may not have staffing or programs for
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a student with cognitive or behavioral needs, or a charter school may counsel out students by
urging families to dis-enroll from the charter school and re-enroll in their neighborhood school.
In either scenario, the charter school has the option of calling up the SELPA personnel to receive
assistance with placing into a special day class program that is not at the charter school, but
rather at the district school. The data shows that leaders felt that the option and availability of
placing students back into district schools was a moral hazard derived out of the current MOU.
Placement as opportunism. The director of charter operated special education programs
in BCUSD stated that one aspect of the MOU contract that warrants revision is the process of
placing students back into the district placements.
I would like to see it be more difficult for charters to just send kids back to the
district. I think that as a charter movement, the idea was to improve public
education for all students no matter where those students attended school. If we
are truly holding to that mission, I think that means that we serve all students no
matter what disability they have to the best of our ability in the least restrictive
environment. I think that I would look at that.
Her description of the additional clarity to the MOU was in response to a question about any
moral hazards that are a result of the MOU. The director explains that charter schools’ practices
of sending students back to the district on the basis of disability implies that the charter school is
not supporting the general ethos of the charter movement. Because the director would like the
placement to be more difficult, it is implied that contract is currently not explicit with regard to
sending students into district placements out of charter schools. In the director’s opinion, charter
schools are taking advantage of the opportunity to refuse services to certain students in special
education.
Placement as a lack of capacity. The coordinator of special education at BCUSD stated
that placement of students from charters back into district programs was one aspect of the
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contract she would alter or change. The coordinator views the struggles that charter schools
experience around students who challenging behavioral needs.
I think what I would like to see…I wish there were fewer…there is a number of
kids, but not huge, of students that we’re aware of who return to the district. That
doesn’t mean that there aren’t kids that come back, or because parents haven’t
complained or said anything, that it doesn’t occur. The reason why people are
asking for a change of placement is around behavior. It’s not around the student
requires too many services because they’re really ID [intellectual disability] and
they don’t know how to differentiate. People are great at differentiating, but I
don’t think that necessarily do the job we need to do when it comes to behavior. I
think, there are so many layers to behavior, we just don’t know. Then, when a
student starts to begin to act out, I think everyone’s emotions, depending on how
explosive it becomes, everybody is on guard.
The coordinator identifies ‘explosive’ behavior as challenging for charter school personnel,
implying that personnel lack training or skills to manage challenging student behavior.
Lack of education
Both charter leaders and SELPA leaders identified that a lack of education and
subsequent steep learning curve is a required additional component, though not specifically a
loss, for their organizations. The lack of education can hinder special education programs in
charter schools or the ability of the governing SELPA to carry out their responsibilities, as
outlined in the MOU. Charter school leadership identified that charter school staff lack
information about how to follow-through on special education requirements. SELPA leaders
identified that many SELPA staff have misconceptions or missing information about charter
schools.
Charter leaders lack special education training. The assistant director of special
education described her learning curve for special education in her changing role from a teacher
to a special education leader for the charter school. She began her career as a special education
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teacher with a California teaching credential for mild/moderate disabilities. She describes her
training as ‘trial by fire,’ in her 3 years as a special education leader for the charter school
organization.
When I first started it was trial by fire. There wasn’t much direct instruction or
support in my initial experiences, which I think in some ways forced me to find a
lot of answers on my own…[I] developed the skill and strategy of, this is
something that you have an itty bitty understanding around and you need to delve
deeper into this and make sure you’re comprehensively understanding these
[special education] requirements…that set me up to develop a kind of approach
which is really applicable in charters given that often times there’s people with
very new and limited understandings of things as specific as special
education…and you’re the person people are looking to have a lot of information
and you have to learn how to gather than information and synthesize it and share
it.
Training for the charter school staff on special education requirements occurred for the assistant
director on a case-by-case basis as laws were updated and student issues arose.
For the area superintendent, special education training occurred collaboratively by
seeking consultation from the organization’s experts around specific cases. The area
superintendent was an elementary school teacher by training, then an elementary school
principal.
I would say a lot of the special education I learned when I was a principal and then as
I’ve gone into this role, I think I’ve learned probably…from talking to you, [the special
education director], our special ed team. Then when problems come up, learning
about…thinking out loud about how we could solve them, hearing, “oh no, we can’t do
that because of this,” I guess the experts in our organization.
The experts in Ascent include a special education director, assistant director, four regional
managers in the four regions of the country, and program specialists or instructional coaches, all
hired by Ascent. The area superintendent did not indicate that she learned about special
education through the governing SELPA trainings or through consultation. The Ascent special
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education leadership staff of six individuals with special education teaching backgrounds make
up the aforementioned, ‘team of experts.’
Limited training for special education leaders or associated general education leadership
was not identified as a loss or a gain for charter staff, though the charter school leaders were
grateful for the opportunity to learn on the job as cases or problems arose. However, limited
training was perceived as a loss for the SELPA staff.
SELPA staff lack knowledge of charter schools. SELPA leadership that works with
charter school operated special education programs indicated that misconceptions about charter
schools was a hindrance to developing a working relationship with charter schools. The
SELPA’s department of charter-operated programs is three years old and finding staff that was
both familiar with charters and familiar with special education was difficult. The director recalls
the process of adding more personnel to the SELPA charter-operated program staff.
It’s probably the most difficult for [our staff] having been the SELPA employees
for so long to learn the charter piece. It was really a lot of education back on to
the basics. Here is the difference between an affiliated or an independent
[charter]. Here is what a CMO is and a lot of my first work has been just that. I
have done a lot of in-house trainings for the different departments around the
[SELPA] division of special education and to other district departments about
here is what charters are.
The director is referring to the types of charter relationships that exist between a charter school
and the district that authorizes the charter. While some charter schools are independent charters,
meaning that they have maximal autonomy from the district, others are affiliated, meaning that
for specific governance areas, such as personnel, union affiliation and operation services. The
charter petition to the district determines the type of affiliation that the school will have.
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The coordinator at the SELPA also discussed misconceptions that she held when she first
took the position to work with charter school special education.
When I first started in the position I had no idea that there was such hostile
feelings on both parties. I had no idea that it was so political. I didn’t know that
people weren’t talking to each other, and I didn’t know that there was this stress.
Early on, I remember being introduced at a meeting and I said something about,
‘and then there’s public schools, schools in the district and then there’s charter
schools.’ [A charter principal] took me out and said, ‘don’t ever say that again,
we’re all public schools.’
The coordinator added that she knew the special education piece when she took the job six years
previous to the interview, however she had to learn the charter school part on her own. She
attended conferences and recalled that she “found out a lot from conferences” by going into
sessions on charter schools that had little to do with special education but had more to do with
how charter schools were organized. She also attended authorizer meetings at the state level to
find out how charter schools receive their authorization to open up, and what components help
them stay open. Now, as a leader of special education within charters she said that she contacted
the California charter school association (CCSA) to inquire about trainings that SELPA staff
could attend so that they might learn more about the bigger picture of charter schools.
In both interviews, it was apparent that SELPA staff were required to train themselves on
charter school governance, policy and culture in order to carry out the relationships demanded by
the contract. Neither respondent identified the added training as a loss, though the additional
training is a consequence of the MOU.
Discussion
Research question one delved into the perceived benefits and losses that result from the
MOU relationship and the MOU itself. There were three emerging themes from this research
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question: (1) organizational priorities factor into perceived benefits or losses, (2) placement is a
perceived loss for the SELPA and (3) that added education about each others’ organization was a
consequence of the MOU, in implicated benefit since special education activities increase mutual
understanding of each others’ organizational priorities. Both charter and SELPA leadership
identified that familiarity with the organization’s key goals and mission was imperative to
helping create networks of support for one another in providing special education services to
students with disabilities. Moreover, training and education is a key lever in bridging any
organizational gaps between the SELPA and charter schools.
Research Question Two
Research question two: How does the contract with the vendor instantiate the firm’s
responsibility to meet IDEA, state and local mandates for special education?
Research question two focuses on the written contract, the memorandum of
understanding, and leaders’ descriptions and associated interpretations of the written contract.
The inquiry aims to find out whether leaders from both the charter school, the firm, and SELPA,
the vendor, have a similar or divergent understanding of the contract. In addition, the second
research question looks directly at the language of the contract to determine whether the
provisions of IDEA, state and local regulations, as well as each party’s responsibilities are
clearly articulated in the document. Two emergent themes were revealed in the document and
transcript analysis. The first theme is that leaders from both organizations described the MOU in
the fairly similar terms. The second theme is that the contract covers IDEA requirements, State
reporting requirements and local reporting requirements by insisting that charter schools and the
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SELPA work together while allowing charter schools to maintain autonomy by determining
budget, personnel and program model decisions.
The emergent themes from research question two draws on Powell’s (1990) theory that
networks can be borne when organizations unite under a common goal in order to abet
opportunism and pool resources. The findings of this research indicate that the leadership of both
organizations has few gaps of understanding therefore information asymmetry does not present a
moral hazard in contract. In fact, the contract itself abates opportunism by clearly stating the
terms of SELPA participation.
The contract organized to describe collaborative or charter decision-making
The document that was reviewed is titled “memorandum of understanding by and
between the [SELPA] and Option 2 [name and California code of charter school] regarding the
provision of special education services.” The document is eight pages long, single-spaced and
includes nine sections. Section seven is for signatures from both the SELPA and charter school
to agree on the previous six sections of the document. The titles and sub-sections are included in
Figure 2 and are written in narrative format. According to the director of charter-operated
programs at the SELPA, the document is primarily written by the SELPA’s legal counsel, with
input from special education and charter school personnel from within the district or SELPA.
While few interview respondents could summarize all parts of the document, all four respondents
had seen or given a cursory glance to the MOU. In the MOU, the SELPA is referred to as the
district, since it is a both a school district or LEA and a SELPA.

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Sections of the MOU
1. Charter school Special education
requirements
a. General Requirements
b. Transferring students
c. Assessments
d. Alternative Placements
e. Least Restrictive Environment
f. Staffing requirements
g. Student discipline/inclusion
2. Procedural Safeguards/Due Process
Hearings

3. Complaints
4. Special education local plan area
(SELPA)

5. Funding special education services
6. District responsibilities relating to
charter school special education
program
a. Least Restrictive Environment
b. Consultation from Autism Program
Support Office
c. Behavior Intervention supports
7. Notices
8. Modifications
9. Term
Figure 2. Organization of the MOU.
In the document analysis, I used in vivo coding while reading through the document to determine
emergent themes or meanings. Upon second review using the analysis software, the instances of
the codes revealed that special education program was the most frequent word in the document,
followed by Federal law and funding, as demonstrated by Figure 3.

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Code Instance
Budget 1
charter petition 3
Charter school
decision
4
complaint 3
compliance 7
District forms 6
due process 6
enrollment 4
equitable 2
Federal law 10
funding 10
IDEA 2
MCD 6
personnel 6
Program 11
Requesting a service 3
reviews 4
SELPA 6
timeline 2
Welligent 2
work together 6
TOTALS: 104
Figure 3. Instances of codes for research question two.
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Figure 4., generated from ATLAS.ti software, presents a visual model that describes the
frequency of each code, with the most frequent codes at the top and least frequent at the bottom.
When I linked code families, I found that the contract reveals that there are two predominant
working governance structures in the MOU; the charter and SELPA working together and the
charter school’s autonomy to make independent decisions. Figure 5. demonstrates that the MOU
indicates that due process, state complaints and compliance reporting are collaborative efforts
between the SELPA and the charter school, while decisions on budget, programming, services
and personnel are charter school decisions.

Figure 4. The two types of governance in the MOU.
In summary, IDEA accountability requirements such as due process, complaints and reporting
are collaborative activities while IDEA requirements for program development, including
budget, personnel and services are charter-based decisions.
IDEA accountability requirements are collaborative projects. In the MOU, the
following activities require that the charter school work with the SELPA: in the event that a
parent or guardian initiates due process, investigation and documentation of all parent complaints
to the state, compliance monitoring and reporting, changing the option elected or charter petition,
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student needs that require a level of service that cannot be provided by the charter school and any
modifications or changes to the MOU. Within the due process and complaint components of the
MOU, the district adheres to state and Federal timelines and will work with the charter to
manage any fiscal consequences of a legal proceeding. The MOU contains language that states
that the charter will be fiscally responsible for any charter-related IDEA failures, while the
district will be responsible for any district-related IDEA failures, as decided by a due process
hearing officer.
The district will determine policies so that the charter schools can uphold IDEA
compliance items, such as adhering to Federal timelines, providing services and communicating
with families regarding assessments and progress towards IEP goals. The district and charter
relationship will be marked by the district disseminating policies and procedures to charters “to
the same extent as they are provided to other schools in the district.” The language assures that
any revision or change in Federal, state or local policy for special education will be
communicated to charter schools, followed by technical assistance for implementation of the
new policy.
Charters decide personnel, budget and programming. Figure 4 indicates that the
MOU allows charter schools to make their own decisions around hiring qualified, certificated
personnel, determining whether a student is eligible for special education, writing the IEPs and
deciding on goals and program, including staffing models and methodology, and making
decisions on how to interpret the IDEA tenant of free and appropriate public education (FAPE).
Therefore, the MOU affords the charter school with authority pedagogy and practices of special
education. The charter has the option of requesting a service, such as occupational therapy,
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physical therapy, from a district department to support a student with disabilities, but this is up to
the charter school staff and IEP team.
The other component of charter school decision-making is the enrollment process. When
applying for a charter school, referred to as “petitioning” for a charter in the MOU document,
charter schools indicate their process for enrollment. While the MOU states that charter schools
cannot discriminate based on disability, as per Federal law, they can develop their own
enrollment protocol to be approved or revised by the authorizing organization, in this case the
district/SELPA.
The MOU also includes language about how the charter school will contribute to
district’s general fund. This is the associated cost of using the vendor, the SELPA, for the
provision of special education. The MOU states that 20% of the general fund contribution rate
per average daily attendance (ADA) will be paid from the charter schools’ general purpose block
grant. Each subsequent fiscal year, the rate will increase by 5% until the rate caps at 35% and
will remain 35% until the charter school’s petition period ends. The MOU also includes that if
the special education funding allocation is not spent, the amount allocated for the following
school year “will be reduced in an amount equal to the unspent special education funds from the
previous fiscal year.” The MOU also includes the option to audit special education funding at
any time. While the allocation of special education funding is determined by the MOU with the
district, the charter school has authority to manage fiscal responsibility for special education
programs.

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Leaders have similar descriptions of the contract
The interview protocol asked participants to summarize or describe the MOU in their
own words. While three of four interviewees admitted that they had not read the MOU closely,
they summarized main points. The fourth interviewee explained that she had not memorized the
MOU, though she had read it thoroughly. The leaders were asked to recall what they were able to
at the time of the interview. Subsequent to comparing answers and open coding the interview
transcripts, the emergent theme of similarity demonstrated that leaders generally had similar
ideas about the contents of the MOU. The director of charter operated programs at the SELPA
described the MOU as a “thou shalt” type of document that lays out the roles and responsibilities
of the district and the charter schools. The area superintendent was most familiar with the fiscal
components of the MOU but also described it as a guiding document to guide how the
relationship will work between the charter and the SELPA. She added “there hasn’t been any
concern or any issues that come up because of the way that the MOU was written.” The assistant
director of special education in the charter described the emphasis on policies and procedures
that the charter school must adhere to as a participant in the SELPA. The first finding reflects the
similar perspectives from both organizations that the MOU guides roles and responsibilities on a
logistical level. The second finding is that the MOU could be more complete if it accounted for
organizational or “mindset” differences between the two organizations.
Both organizations understand funding and procedures. Interview respondents
identified that the purpose of the MOU is to define the relationship between the charter and the
SELPA. This clarity about the purpose of the MOU included the need for a charter school to
adhere to local policies as well as state and Federal policies, which includes abiding by the
outcomes required by the modified consent decree (MCD). These outcomes are the local
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requirements, as stated and monitored by a court-appointed independent monitor, resulting from
the 2003 Federal court of appeals case in which the SELPA was found to systemically fail to
provide students with special education their free and appropriate public education rights. All
four respondents invoked the MCD requirements as an articulated component of the MOU.
The second mutually understood aspect of the logistics of the MOU relationship is the
funding. The MOU states that the charter returns a portion of their general block grant back to
the SELPA, and deems this a “fair-share” contribution. The area superintendent of the charter
school understood this component of the MOU the most. The assistant director of special
education at the charter school added that this was clearly relayed in the MOU as well. The
SELPA director of charter operated programs described the fair share contribution in further
detail.
Charters now get 100% of their special education dollars and then pay that fair
share contribution. It’s no longer based on if I hire a teacher or related service
provider I now how to prove to the district that I spent my money on this and they
are going to reimburse me. You get your money in monthly distributions and can
spend it on whoever and however you want to spend it on, on behalf of students
with disabilities.
The SELPA director is referring to a funding model from the previous school years that required
that charter schools use their general purpose block grant for special education expenditures and
then prove to the SELPA that they required reimbursement, through a system of reporting
through the SELPA online system. While the SELPA director was able to speak to the change in
the funding, the other respondents did not describe the funding in such detail. They understood
that the MOU addresses funding and gives clarity to the process for resource allocation.
Completing the MOU. The interview protocol included a question that asked
respondents to indicate what they might add to the document to make it more complete. The
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charter school special education director indicated that she would like the opportunity to use
internal, charter-specific accountability structures to demonstrate how the organization is
meeting the requirements of the court-appointed consent decree.
If we had some ownership over that process [data reporting] how the information
is sorted… looks like, then we could pair those things in a way that is really
meaningful for the work that the teachers are doing and applicable to the more
comprehensive professional development that we structure for the team.
Connecting data reporting to the overall charter school special education program, would, in her
opinion allow the MOU to address the goals of both organizations, the development of teachers
and the MCD requirements. The charter school area superintendent also alluded to a potential
revision of the MOU to include more inclusion of how a charter school staff member might
weight in on decision-making within the SELPA. She indicated that charter and SELPA
governance collaboration to occur, however, alignment of mission and beliefs would be
paramount, and that trust in the other organization would be required.
The SELPA coordinator also discussed alignment and trust. The SELPA coordinator
described the MOU as very black and white in clarity, with areas of grey. However, she
continued that greyness can be a benefit if there is relationship between the two parties and both
parties are trying to do what’s best for kids. She described the consequence of lack of trust.
If there is no relationship, if there is no trust, then that greyness gets very very
muddy and very messy and could lead to some heated conversations and
contentious situations. That’s the con side of [greyness].
She continued to remark that policies and procedures are black and white, and clearly stated in
the MOU, however, when it comes to student needs, there is the element of grayness, that is
provided by FAPE, and could be interpreted differently based on organizational affiliation or
role. She stated that, “an attorney could interpret it very differently than an educator.” An MOU
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that included more explicit information about the vision of the SELPA for serving particular
student needs could help to abate the greyness in times when greyness is not helpful for solving
problems, she added.
Discussion
Research question two investigated the MOU document, the contract, to find out how the
document explained and articulated the roles of firm and vendor in upholding the mandates of
Federal disability law, IDEA. The MOU document analysis revealed several themes. The MOU
is split up into two ways of working, SELPA-only oversight and collaborative oversight. The
SELPA oversees issues that involve fiscal responsibility, policies, procedures or data-reporting.
In sum, the SELPA oversees logistics. The charter school decides how to use the budget, how to
hire and the special education pedagogy and curriculum. However, compliance management may
cover a variety of pedagogical or curriculum choices, if and when the SELPA decides to change
the topics in their compliance oversight process. While the MOU describes roles and
responsibilities, interview responses indicate that specific circumstances or cases may arise that
blur responsibilities. Shared responsibilities or collective decision-making may lead to increased
partnership and trust may emerge from a case-by-case negotiation of how to implement services,
compliance or instructional practices.
A second theme demonstrates that charter school and SELPA leaders generally have the
same understanding of the contract. While the contract has some gaps that could be articulated
further, such as data reporting or how to manage student needs, the MOU instantiates the charter
school obligations.

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Research Question Three
Research question 3, how does this contract favor partnership between charter schools
and BCUSD SELPA in contrast to alternatives in the market? The third research question
explores whether the MOU encourages partnership between a charter and BCUSD and explores
any alternatives to the current MOU stipulations. Research question three garnered data from two
data sources; interview questions and a survey. Survey questions asked respondents to answer
open-ended questions about factors that foster partnerships and factors that inhibit partnerships.
A survey question also asked respondents to rank the feasibility of three alternatives to the
current MOU, a co-written MOU, the charter schools’ ability to choose between three MOU
options, and a charter school using litigation to dispute components of the MOU. The second
option is currently part of the shifting SELPA plan as discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
Research question three derives from the TCE concept of networks. While the network
between a SELPA and charter school is required, it is possible to negotiate the terms of the
contracting relationship (Rhim, 2010). While this negotiation has been described as awkward,
the negotiation process can help forge a reciprocal relationship; the sharing of organizational
mission, practices and goals increases trust and mutual understanding (Rhim, 2010; Powell,
1990). TCE theorists espouse that networks that involve collaboration and reciprocal
relationships develop into a partnership that brings both firm and vendor to work towards a
common goal (Davies & Hentschke, 2006). When charter schools and SELPAs share a goal, then
they achieve greater success in implementing special education mandates (Rhim & Brinson,
2010).
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Survey and interview data indicates that charter schools and BCUSD SELPA partnership
opportunities can be fueled by increased choice, increase participation in governance, by
clarifying roles and responsibilities, in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Research question three themes.
Alternatives as increased choice and voice
Respondents indicated that alternatives to the current MOU would not negate the MOU
between the charter and SELPA, but would add elements of increased choice or added charter
voice to the governance of the special education programs within the SELPA.
Increased voice in governance. Two respondents, the director of special education at the
SELPA charter-operated programs and the area superintendent for the charter, felt that added
voice in special education governance would increase partnership between the two organizations.
The area superintendent interacts with three SELPAs within the charter school network. Two
SELPAs are regional and participation is a result of the chartering district that authorized the
charter. The El Dorado County Charter School SELPA is a non-regional SELPA and does not
authorize charters but provides special education funding and governance for charter schools
Alterna)ves
would

increase
choice
and

voice

Partnering
Ac)vi)es:

LRE
and
trainings

Factors
in

partnerships:
trust

and
knowing
who

does
what

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across the stage. Essentially, El Dorado SELPA is a market alternative to participation in a local,
regional SELPA. However, in the interview with the area superintendent, she did not refer to El
Dorado as a feasible market alternative. Instead, she described the features that make El Dorado
an attractive partner. The first feature was the transparency in SELPA decision-making, the
second element was her participation on an executive committee.
There’s a CEO council, so all the CEOs meet, theoretically, four times a year.
Then there’s a sub-committee of the executive committee that is a matrix between
geography, a mix between CMOs and stand-alones, elementary and secondary.
There’s probably 8 or 10 of us on it. So [El Dorado SELPA] will say, “here’s
what we’re thinking about,” or “here’s the new mental health, we have this, were
thinking about this process, what do you think?”
Participating on the CEO council allows charter school leadership to provide input on
how to allocate funding and set up programs that respond to the needs of charters and the
changing local, state and Federal special education requirements.
Increased choice in MOU options. Another alternative to the current MOU is the
options that exist in the current MOU structure for the SELPA. The director of charter operated
programs at the SELPA described three options for charter schools to pick from; Option 1
enables the charter to use the district for all special education personnel and services, as if the
school “were a school of the district.” Option 2 is the version of the MOU for this case study
research, and includes access to SELPA training, case-management support for difficult cases,
due process support and LRE placement support if a charter school cannot meet the needs of a
student with a disability in their school. Option 3 allows for more charter school autonomy,
accompanied by increased special education funding at a rate of 80% of special education
dollars, in which 10% goes into a fair share contribution to the district and 10% is dedicated to a
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budget only for charter schools that choose option 3. The budget could include training, services
or case management support.
I think that the additional funds for option 3 schools get to have allowed them to
be more creative in how they provide services…we have not had one option 3
school place [a student with a disability] back to the district for a typical special
day.
The choice between options allows charter schools within the BCUSD SELPA to assess
their need for support, their readiness for autonomy, their current and prospective special
education budget and student need to exert a choice about what kind of MOU relationship they
would like to be in for the provision of IDEA mandates. Survey respondents indicated that a
charter school’s opportunity to choose between three types of MOUs was the most feasible
alternative to the current MOU, with 92% of respondents choosing this answer.
Features of partnership
As previously discussed, partnership was not defined for respondents. Instead the
respondents were asked to articulate elements of partnership. Thus, the formation of a definition
of partnership was inferred in this research question. The results demonstrate that partnership
between a charter school and SELPA have two main components: trust and organizational
knowledge of who does what tasks within each organization.
Trust is a factor. The concept of trust was referenced several times in the interviews and
survey responses in a variety of contexts. One survey respondent indicated that trust was built by
having clear access to current information from the SELPA. Another survey response explained
that trust involved knowing the setting and background of the charter school. In another response
trust was tied to vulnerability for another survey respondent who wrote that charter staff had to
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be open to sharing concerns and asking for help. Another survey respondent indicated that finite
resources or conflicting interests might create competition that erodes trust.
Respondents revealed that working on a specific case or program induced a trusting
relationship between charter and SELPA staff. A charter school principal indicated that when the
site needed support with facilities or Free & Reduced Lunch Program questions, the district staff
provided resources and technical support. A charter school program specialist shared about a
specific case where the charter school called the SELPA to support a student with challenging
behaviors and a behavior specialist from the SELPA came to the school to learn about the case
and help problem-solve. In-person problem solving around school-based or urgent case helps to
build trust between personnel at charter schools and at the SELPA.
The presence of a trusting relationship or institutional trust is a factor in creating
partnerships between charter schools and SELPAs. The absence of trust may be due to the
second finding, confusion about the organizational structure of the SELPA or vice versa, at the
charter.
Knowing who does what. One element of building trust knowing which personnel to
access to get needed support or information. One survey respondent said that partnerships were
hindered by the size and unclear systems and procedures at the SELPA, explaining that “too
many cooks in the kitchen at [SELPA], discreet jobs not a lot of cross over between
departments.” Another survey respondent from the SELPA indicated that charter schools should
identify one point-person to be the liaison to the SELPA. Both charter school and SELPA
respondents shared that the frequently changing staff has in impact on building partnership.
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“When staff changes so often, it’s hard to get to know the staff and build a relationship with
them.”
Partnerships are based on relationships that involve trust. As the SELPA coordinator
shared in her interview, a trusting relationship can solve many problems, whereas a distrusting
relationship can be very concerning for the SELPA and the charter school. While some
relationships come from specific cases and experiences outside of special education, others grow
out of a mutual understanding of the right personnel in respective offices to call for support or
resources. The final theme for research question three will examine partnership activities that
were elicited from respondents.
Partnership Activities
Partnership relies on a trusting relationship between individuals from SELPAs and the
charter school and can be borne out of experiences working together towards one common goal.
Two areas of partnership were discussed in the survey and interview responses: training and the
development of a least restrictive environment.
Training. The survey responses yielded a clear outcome on the most feasible partnership
opportunity, SELPA training. 13 out of 14 respondents indicated that the SELPA trainings for
charter schools on special education compliance and programming was the most feasible
partnership opportunity from the MOU relationship. In the open-ended questions, two
respondents referenced the online training modules that are currently provided by the SELPA
and can be accessed by any charter school staff. Training by charter school staff for SELPA
participants was also an option on the survey, however was not rated as feasible.
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Least restrictive environment. Least restrictive environment (LRE) refers to the IDEA
concept that each student with a disability will be educated in an environment that allows the
student to be with general education, non-disabled students to the maximum extent possible.
These environments can look like a general education classroom, a learning center for small
groups to attend for portions of the day, or a special education classroom or school. LRE is
decided when the IEP team convenes, with a minimum one meeting annually.
The survey included one question where respondents were asked to rank the feasibility of
a partnership project between a charter school and the SELPA. SELPA and charter collaboration
to open a class for students with emotional and behavior challenges on a charter school campus
ranked as the second most feasible option, second to SELPA training charter staff.
The SELPA coordinator of special education programs shared a hope that the SELPA and
a charter could work together to create an LRE for behaviorally-challenged students.
If you were able to do something collaboratively to create some wonderful models
to support students with more behavioral challenges that have the freedom to be
able to go back and forth between charter [LRE] and the district, I think that
would be great.
The SELPA direct of charter operated programs also referenced creating new types of models by
leveraging the autonomy and sense of innovation brought by the charter schools. She stated that
the option 3 MOU, which allows for more autonomy and increased funding, might allow for the
type of program development that would move away from the traditional special day class
model, and create an improved LRE on behalf of students with disabilities. Generally, SELPA
respondents were more hopeful that LRE models might be explored through the MOU
partnerships.

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Discussion
Neither survey or interview protocol sought to define partnerships or alternatives but
rather asked respondents for examples or factors that promoted or hindered partnerships. The
responses were focused around three main themes as described in Figure 5: alternatives that
increased charter voice and choice, trust and organizational structure as factors in promoting
partnership and training and LRE as two specific kinds of partnering activities. As a result of the
three themes and associated findings, a definition of partnership emerged that included elements
of organizational structuring, the opportunity for increased ownership and building trusting
relationships.
Summary
This chapter reviewed the themes and findings from three central research questions that
set out to address the research problem of imperfect contracts between charter schools and
SELPAs. The first research question sought to find out the perceived losses and benefits of the
MOU for special education. The second research question investigated the MOU contract
language and leaders’ understanding of the document through document analysis and interviews.
The third question probed leadership about possible alternatives to the MOU or partnerships that
could strengthen the relationship between the SELPA and the charter school. Across the three
research questions, several emergent themes arose.
The themes link research questions and all sections of this chapter and reveal essential
findings from this research. First, leaders from both organizations perceive that the MOU is
generally complete with the exception of two areas; LRE placements for students with
challenging behavior or emotional needs and language that accounts for prevailing cultural
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differences between the organizations. Secondly, the MOU does, in fact, mitigate most
transaction costs because of its clarity of roles and responsibilities. Regardless, two aspects of the
MOU were identified as incomplete; LRE and organizational differences create opportunism and
a sense of cultural dissonance between the two organizations. The MOU could be more complete
by explicitly encouraging trust-building partnership between the two organizations.
The research problem for this study states that contracts for special education funding and
governance may be the root cause of charter schools’ inability to proportionately meet the needs
of students with disabilities. Subsequently, charter schools fail to comply with Federal
requirements for special education. The clarity of the contract in concert with organizational
structure, reciprocal and trusting relationships and partnership opportunities do factor into the
ability of the charter school to understand the terms of the contract and follow-through with
meeting the needs of special education student while also maintaining a sense of autonomy and
flexibility. Chapter five compares the findings with prior research and the framework of TCE,
discusses the implications of the findings future research recommendations, all based on the
themes and findings of this chapter.

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CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the research findings by comparing
them with the application the transaction cost economics (TCE) framework. This chapter applies
the TCE framework and previous research findings to the findings from my qualitative case
study and will be organized by research question and theme, followed by a discussion of how the
findings confirm, extend or rebut other findings from the field. The chapter concludes with a
summary of the implications and recommendations for future research.
Introduction
TCE Framework
TCE describes each contracting relationship between a firm and vendor as riddled with
imperfections humans consciously or unconsciously act in their own self-interest (Williamson,
1970). Williamson attributes this inherent self-interest, or bounded rationality, to the
opportunism embedded in each contract (1970). Therefore, each contract has associated costs
and benefits, as authors of the contract, who are human, will fold in opportunistic components
into the contract. However, organizations acknowledge opportunism, and predict that the
contract will inevitably invite losses to their own organization. In anticipation of the losses,
organizations may respond in by doing several things, according to Williamson: re-organizing to
increase compliance management, adding competition into the market, or by forging partnerships
or networks (Williamson, 1970; Powell, 1990).

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Special education in charter schools
Charter schools, like many public agencies, are required to enter contracts for special
education funding and governance. In California, a charter school contracts with a special
education local plan area (SELPA) for the provision of special education, sometimes the SELPA
is the same district that authorized the school’s charter. Other times, the charter has the option to
leave the local SELPA and join a different SELPA. Charter schools have been found to come
short of the federal mandates to provide special education to students with disabilities (Ahearn,
2001). One factor in this failure is information asymmetry, in which charter school personnel do
not fully understand the content of the contract, and that charter school staff lacks special
education expertise (Drame, 2011). Drame (2011) found that when the contracts between charter
schools and governing agencies for special education include clearly written roles and
responsibilities, charter schools are more likely to meet federal special education requirements.
An added factor in increasing outcomes for special education in charter schools is to forge
partnerships even when the organizations have different goals (Swanson, 2005; Garda, 2012).
Summary of the study
This study uses Williamson’s notion of the imperfect contract, written by humans’ with
their attendant bounded rationality, to examine the contracts between charter schools and special
education governing agencies. The study uncovers associated losses or benefits from the contract
between BCUSD and Ascent, the ways in which the contract mitigates potential loss, and the
partnership opportunities or alternatives that help to ensure that the contract works to improve
special education in charter schools. This study employed a qualitative case study to investigate
the research questions. TCE research often uses case studies to explore the complexities of
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economic relationships as not merely fiscal, but as nuanced by institutional and psychological
factors (Macher & Richman, 2008). A qualitative case study acknowledges that costs or benefits
of a specific contract may not be easily generalized (2008). This methodology of this case study
includes three data collection instruments, interviews, surveys and document review. The
participants in the study were leaders from both BCUSD and Ascent. They were chosen based on
the criteria that they oversee special education, had influence over the decision to go into the
contract, have working knowledge of special education, supervise special education staff or
monitor compliance and reporting for special education. The two organizations of this case study
have different leadership structures and thus the respondents varied in roles and responsibilities.
Discussion of Findings
This section of the chapter links the findings from chapter four to the literature on TCE
and charter school special education, organized by research question and theme.
Benefits and losses
Research question one examined perceived benefits and losses that result from the MOU
between the charter school and SELPA. There were three emerging themes from this research
question: organizational priorities factor into perceived benefits or losses, placement in LRE and
data collection are perceived losses and that reciprocal training was also a perceived need to help
to mitigate losses. Alignment of goals and mission had an impact on whether the leaders
perceived the MOU to be beneficial for their organization or a hindrance to their organization.
Leaders from both organizations identified that data collection was a loss. SELPA leadership
identified that managing data collection at charter schools created extra work for their team while
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the charter leadership indicated that data collection was burdensome and misaligned with the
goals of providing quality programming to students with disabilities.
Disparate goals. The data collection finding speaks to a set of disparate goals held by the
two organizations. While the SELPA is responsible for compliance mandates and reporting, the
charter schools’ premise of autonomy and specific mission makes it more oriented towards a
specific academic program, as outlined in its charter (Garda, 2012). This research finding that
data collection is a perceived loss extends the position that often the cultures of charter schools
and the culture of a governing SELPA have conflicting sets of immediate needs and work styles.
Organizational gaps create more work for the governing SELPA, which has to train charter
schools on how to use the data collection tools and persuade the charter personnel that data
collection is important. This organizational gap creates a perceived burden on charter personnel,
who view the SELPA’s emphasis on data collection as a means to play “gotcha” and point out
the charter school’s faults. Moreover, charter school personnel view the data collection
requirement as a divergent process that does not support the larger mission of the charter school.
The data collection finding confirms that disparate goals exacerbate the moral hazards within a
given contract.
The organizational gaps that belie a charter school and a SELPA are a result of the
overarching tension between an organization built upon autonomy, charter schools, and an
organization build on regulatory governance, the SELPA. This tension is neither surprising nor
abstruse, as each organization holds explicitly different priorities, described by Garda (2012) as a
culture clash. While reciprocal training could bridge the gap in understanding between the
disparate goals, cross organization training would serve to increase the benefits for each
respective organization, towards their distinct goals.
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Common goal around LRE. BCUSD respondents identified the absence of continuum
of placements for students with behavioral challenges as a moral hazard that results from the
contract. Both the coordinator and direction of SELPA COP expressed that they felt that the
MOU could include more barriers to the practice of charters turning students with high levels of
need back to district placements. The director indicated that this practice is antithetical to the
charter school movement, which can leverage flexibility and autonomy to improve outcomes for
students.
The literature review in chapter two identifies that federal special education law, IDEA,
pressures charter schools to be ‘all things to all students,’ which is a stark departure from the
initial idea of charter schools (Lubienski, 2004; Ahearn, 2001). This argument suggests that
charter schools are sacrificing the specific mission that is articulated in their charter petition for
the mandates of IDEA. The conflict between universal access, as posited by IDEA, and specific
mission, as posited by choice theory creates a clash of cultures and identities (Garda, 2012).
However, Rhim and Brinson (2010) found that when charter schools include a mission to serve
all students, the schools were better able to meet the needs of students with more challenging
behaviors and moderate disabilities, and thus, did better at meeting the IDEA requirements. A
possible area of future research might be to investigate the missions of charter schools to find out
where the goals of charter schools derive, and to probe into where the “all students” element fits
into their goals. The moral hazard, or perceived loss, of LRE placements supports the current
research that charter schools with inclusive mission statements increase IDEA outcomes (Garda,
2012; Rhim & Brinson, 2010; Lubienski, 2004; Ahearn, 2001).
A limitation to this finding is that the sample size for the interviews and surveys are small
and not easily generalizable. The case study focuses on the perceptions of leadership at Ascent
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and BCUSD, both are specific organizations with contexts that vary greatly from other charter
schools and SELPAs. BCUSD is one of the largest SELPAs in the state, and Ascent is the largest
CMO in the state. The large scale and staffing support in the central offices of both organizations
allows each organization to re-structure and hire special education experts to address and
problem-solve potential losses or benefits from the MOU. A smaller SELPA or stand-alone
charter may not have the capacity to address losses from the MOU with dedicated staff or
organizational restructuring.
The MOU
Research question two examines the contract between the SELPA and the charter school,
the MOU, and leaders’ understanding of the MOU, including all IDEA-related roles and
responsibilities. Research question two used data from interview questions and a document
analysis to examine any gaps in understanding of the contract or whether the contract language
lent itself to confusion or information gaps. Two themes emerged from this research question.
The first theme is that both organizations describe the MOU in similar terms, revealing a shared
understanding of the contract. The second theme is that the MOU provides for a balance of
charter-school decision-making and collaborative decision-making. Charter schools are able to
make independent decision in the areas of hiring and programming budgets, while the charters
and SELPA work together on accountability activities, such as compliance and procedural
reporting and special education funding from the state and federal government. Leaders from
both organizations indicated an understanding of these distinct ways of working.
An incomplete MOU. In chapter one, I hypothesized that potential gaps in understanding
might be attributed to information asymmetry, in which the imbalance of relevant information
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may lead to a contract that favors one party over another (Hentschke & Wohlstetter, 2004).
Drame (2011) determined that contracts that do not clearly outline roles and responsibilities may
un-intentionally favor SELPAs over charter schools, whose personnel may have less knowledge
about special education mandates and responsibilities. In the case of Ascent, because it is a CMO
with a designated special education leadership staff, the special education and school site leaders
are generally informed about the contract and about special education responsibilities.
Asymmetry of understanding the IDEA mandates and local requirements did not present an
imbalance of information that favored one party over another with regards to the IDEA
compliance responsibilities and requirement to meet student needs. However, the interview and
survey responses indicate that priorities and values are different between Ascent and BCUSD,
which can impact the manner in which programs, compliance and mandates are enacted.
Examples of this may include how chose a curriculum or IEP pathway for a student with a more
moderate or severe disability. Another area that the MOU does not address is the issue of
behavior management for students with disabilities. While the language of the MOU is described
as straightforward and clear, the MOU is not complete because of the aforementioned missing
components. In fact, the missing components are precisely those areas that BCUSD and Ascent
respondents identified as losses. It could be argued that the losses around least restrictive
environment, sending charter-enrolled students back into district special education classes, are
opportunism openings creating by the incomplete MOU. Another area of opportunism is the
charter schools’ freedom choose pedagogical approaches, service delivery model and curriculum,
The openness created by the MOU works as an information asymmetry by design, to allow
charter schools to create and implement programs independently.
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Research question two invokes Powell’s (1990) position that collaborative networks
facilitates mutual understanding and common goals and Rhim’s (2004) finding that a charter
schools’ linkage to a governing agency, like California’s SELPAs, and a clearly written contract
enable charter school success with regards to IDEA requirements. The findings of this research
question indicate that while a contracting relationship can include moral hazards, such as data
collection or LRE in research question one, the contract can also do much to facilitate mutual
understanding and mitigate moral hazards. This suggests that a revision to the contract to include
more explicit information on data collection or LRE may help to alleviate the perceived moral
hazards in the future.
External validity is a limitation to this finding because of the small scale of the case study
that focuses on one contract and one charter school organization. A study that includes multiple
SELPA contracts and multiple charter schools might extend more validity to the investigation of
SELPA contracts in charter schools.
Partnerships
Research question three examines the partnership or alternative opportunities by
examining two data sources; interview and survey responses. The findings allude to the
importance alignment in organizational goals, shared practices and explicit trust building
between staff members to promote outcomes for students with disabilities in the charter school
setting (Rhim, 2010; Powell, 1990).
Alternatives include increased choice and voice. Interviews and surveys indicated that
two alternatives to the MOU would include increased participation of charter school leaders in
SELPA decisions and more options for choosing how the charter will enter a contracting
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relationship with the SELPA. The SELPA in this case study, BCUSD, currently offers three
options for how charter schools can contract for special education services, in attempt to
differentiate for varying needs of charter schools. This increased choice and voice are
alternatives to the MOU. These two strategies extend Powell’s (1990) theory of networking to
mitigate opportunism and increase market competition. The addition of increased SELPA MOU
options keep the charters that are authorized with BCUSD within their SELPA in contrast to
optioning for another SELPA, such as El Dorado. The increased voice that El Dorado offers can
be attained through choosing the “Option 3” MOU, which allows for charter participation on an
executive committee.
Reciprocal Relationships. The notion of trust as a component to reciprocal relationship
emerged as a finding for research question three. Trust was garnered through knowing whom to
call within each organization through clear communication of roles. The second way that
respondents described trust building was by having specific experiences of supporting a case at
the school site that promoted trust between staff members. Cases could involve special
education students or other, non-special education situations in which the charter school needed
support. However, the SELPA’s large size, not knowing who to call, shifting staffing and
differing mindsets were identified by charter school leaders as hindrances to building trust.
Partnerships are borne out of the comingling of goals and priorities, according to Davies
and Hentschke (2006). Successful partnerships include: complementary strengths,
interdependence, a shared concern around a real problem, clear roles and responsibilities and the
ability to confront problems and use them as opportunities to build relationships (2006). Rhim
and Brinson (2010) found that when the SELPA and charter worked together on activities, the
experience facilitated a sense of mutual trust and paved the way for higher outcomes students
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with disabilities in charter schools. When respondents were asked to describe potential
partnering activities, they indicated that co-building an LRE to support students with behavioral
or emotional needs or receiving training from BCUSD were the most feasible activities. The
findings indicate that reciprocal relationship between BCUSD and Ascent for the purpose of
special education could be supported by more clarity of organizational structure, who does what
and increased understanding of the other organizations’ setting and goals through reciprocal
training.
Personnel factors at both charter schools and in the SELPA impacts feasibility of
building trusting, reciprocal relationships. This finding extends the findings of Davies and
Hentschke (2006) that partnerships, inherently messy and complex, must include one key
element, the right mix of participants. Respondents from both BCUSD and Ascent identified
that successful partnerships between the charters and the SELPA were dependent on the
individual relationships between special education staff members. The retention of special
education and site-based leaders poses a threat to building partnerships. For example, if a charter
and SELPA work to solve a problem that has urgency and relevance to both organizations and
successfully builds reciprocal trust, then staff members change the following year, the trust and
institutional knowledge leaves with that staff member. Survey responses indicated that staff
changes often or there is confusion on who to call for what kind of support. The flux in personnel
poses a threat to building the type of ongoing reciprocal relationships between charter and
SELPA that lead to institutional trust between the two organizations. In this case study, the
individual actors build reciprocal relationships when they found the right mix of participants,
however the partnerships were not grounded in organization affiliation or role affiliation. Further
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investigation into the retention of special education leadership is warranted to rate the feasibility
of reciprocal relationships through the lens of human resources.
A limitation is to the finding is the causal relationship between alternatives and
successful special education outcomes. Not enough information can be derived from this
research study to support the link between alternatives such as increased voice and a higher level
of trust in a partnering relationship. Further research might look at how charter school
participation in the COP or SELPA executive committee might breed increased trust between the
two organizations.
Conclusions
This research study examined the contract between BCUSD SELPA and Ascent, a
charter management organization, in order to identify any transactional costs presented by the
contract or leaders’ interpretation of the contract. Associated costs might impede a charter
schools’ ability to meet the needs of students with disabilities and inhibit the charter school from
fulfilling the mandates of federal law. The findings lead to several conclusions about the contract
in this case study.
The first conclusion is that organizational priorities create gaps in understanding, which
can be perceived as losses to each organization. The perceived loss from charter schools is the
sacrifice of quality in exchange for a requirement to emphasize data reporting, coupled with a
perceived loss that participation in a large-scale organization impedes the focus on the charter
school’s mission of special education. The perceived loss from the SELPA is that charter schools
easily turn away students when the students’ disabilities present challenging behaviors or require
services that the charter school lacks capacity to provide. This loss prevents charter schools from
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upholding their IDEA responsibilities, as charter schools lean heavily on the SELPA to teach
students who may be more challenging to serve.
The second conclusion is that the MOU between Ascent and the SELPA is mutually
understood and clear. The MOU clearly articulates which activities are collaborative and which
activities are charter-based only. While mindsets from charter leaders and SELPA leaders may
differ due to the SELPA’s accountability to compliance and funding and monitoring and the
charter school’s accountability to its pre-set mission, as outlined in the charter petition, the
mindsets can be mitigated through a clearly written MOU.
The third conclusion is that trust between the two organizations can mitigate
opportunism, however, the trust is highly dependent on the consistency of personnel. When roles
are unclear or the staff changes frequently, trusting relationships take more time to form.
Trusting relationships form from working together to solve problems or to develop projects such
that individuals will be motivated to work together again because they have a sense of what to
expect from their charter or SELPA colleagues. However, a constantly shifting staff can’t benefit
negates the inherent motivation of expectancy theory, as new personnel may not carry over the
expected working styles and trust from one individual to another.
The three conclusions speak to the complex nature of contracting, as the TCE literature
suggests. Contracts are written by human beings, whose psychological imperfections impact how
the contract is written and enacted (Williamson, 1970). Human failures can also present as
strengths, as explored in the tension between the federal legislation to serve students with
disabilities and the project of creating charter schools with specific missions, which in some
cases, do not explicitly include students with disabilities.
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Implications
After analyzing the findings from the case study, the following implications inform
practice on the ground for charter school and SELPA contracting. The findings are limited by the
nature of the study as a qualitative case study that analyzes one contracting relationship and a
specific time and place. The implications in this section address a large SELPA and large CMO
in the state of California. However, the factors enumerated in this section may be considered for
application in charter schools and governing special education agencies throughout the country,
across settings but caution should be taken considering the nature of this case study.
Reciprocal training
Reciprocal training on the background, mission and organizational goals of the two
contracting agencies, firm and vendor, should explicitly take place so that each party has a
deeper understanding of overlapping areas and areas of divergence. This training could take the
form of site visits, document review, interviews or online modules. However, the most impactful
training may be the collaboration in order to solve a specific problem (Davies and Hentschke,
2006).
Least restrictive environment
Findings of this research question indicate that while a contracting relationship can
include moral hazards, such as data collection or LRE in research question one, the contract can
facilitate mutual understanding and mitigate moral hazards. This suggests that a revision to the
contract to include more explicit information on the steps to open up more LRE options may help
to alleviate the perceived moral hazards that charter schools cannot adequately meet the needs of
students with disabilities that have emotional or behavioral challenges.
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Recommendations
Three recommendations for future research emerged from discussion of the findings from this
research study.
First, charter schools and governing special education bodies may benefit from case study
examples of collaborative LRE placements, such as the opening of a program for students with
low-incidence disabilities, such as deaf and hard of hearing or visual impairment or a classroom
or program for students with mental health needs who qualify for special education under
emotional disturbance, autism or other health impairment. Such examples could identify the
factors that foster success for these students in the charter school setting. The case study
examples could also identify leadership qualities that enable reciprocal relationships and that
help to bridge the organizational differences, or mindset differences of the parties involved in the
interest of serving student needs. Second, further investigation into the retention of special
education leadership is warranted to rate the feasibility of reciprocal relationships through the
lens of human resources. When staff changes frequently at charter schools and at special
education governing SELPAs, the opportunity for building partnerships is threatened. Third, the
MOU can be highlighted by addition of voice to SELPA governance, according to the research
findings for question two. Further research on the impact of added participation on COP advisory
committees or executive councils might allow leaders to find out whether such participation had
an effect on building trust and overcoming any mindset differences that results from the variance
in organizational priorities.

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Closing
Charter schools have an obligation to expand their programs so that they can fulfill their
IDEA obligations and frankly, to do right by students who learn differently. Charter schools are
publicly funded, which enforces this obligation. Moreover, charter schools are tasked with the
expectation for innovation and reform for education entities, to offer the public a sense of choice
in how students are educated. The tension between choice and federal requirements have
historically impeded charter schools’ special education programs, due to lack of training, funding
and ultimately, incomplete contracts between charter schools and governing entities for special
education.
The contract is a lever. A contract that is clearly stated, allows for a combination of
flexibility and accountability and considers the distinct cultural differences between the two
organizations can fill the special education gaps in charter schools. As Williamson and TCE
theorists espouse, contracts are imperfect because humans are imperfect and bounded by these
limitations. An organization must review and reflect on the contract, conducting annual analyses
of whether the contract includes components to mitigate human imperfections. Such components
identified in this study are reciprocal training opportunities, clearly stated roles and
responsibilities, a deeper definition of least restrictive environment, and how personnel are
encouraged to build trust with one another.
Charter schools are continuing to grow as the incidence of students with disabilities is
also growing. Parents like Gloria in the vignette in chapter one seek to ‘have it all’ for their
children, despite their disabilities. And for parents like Gloria, that means the small size and
features of a chosen charter school and the specialized services for her daughter with deafness.
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The future of special education in charter schools will determine the trajectory of the
charter school reform movement.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A: Interview Protocol

Special Education Contracting in Charter schools
Interview Protocol: SELPA Administrators
Interviewer: ______________________ Date:____________________
Interviewee: _____________________ SELPA:__________________
Job Title:________________________ Phone: ___________________
Start Time:____________ End Time: _________ Email: _______________

Introduction:
Hello my name is Ilene Ivins and I’m a doctoral student at USC Rossier School of Education. I’m
conducting this research study for my dissertation. The purpose of my study is to look at how
administrators from charter schools and from a SELPA / district understand the responsibilities of charter
schools to meet the requirements of IDEA, State regulations and local regulations like MCD.
During this conversation, we are hoping to learn more about your views and your experiences
with charter schools, their ability and responsibility to implement special education programs and meet
compliance needs. Specifically, I’d like to ask you about the federal and local mandates. The study’s
ultimate goal is to make recommendations for improving the relationship between charter schools and
their governing SELPAs, and to suggest partnership opportunities.
I would like to tape record this interview in order to have an accurate record of our conversation.
Is that ok with you? Thank you again for allowing me to record this interview. Everything that you share
will remain completely confidential and your name or district will not be used in my study. Notes and
recordings will only be shared with USC for the purpose of this research study and with no one else.
Just a reminder that your participation is voluntary and you do not have to respond to any
questions that you do not want to. Please let me know at any time if you choose not to participate
The interview should take approximately 30-40 minutes. Do you have any questions before we
begin?

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Interview Questions:
1. Can you describe your role within the district/SELPA?

2. Are you familiar with special education in charter schools? If so, can you describe
programs within a charter?

3. How would you describe your familiarity with the responsibilities of charter schools
to meet special education requirements? Local requirements? federal requirements?

4. How did you learn about the responsibilities of charter schools?

5. Have you seen or read the contract/MOU? If so, can you summarize the MOU
requirements? If not, what should it say?

6. What are the key special education responsibilities for all schools? Charters?

7. If you could change one aspect of the charter schools’ responsibilities, which
component might you change? Why?

8. What component of the MOU would you keep the same? How might this component
be enhanced?

9. How could charter school special education requirements be more beneficial to your
organization?

10. Is this MOU complete, in your opinion? What might you add that isn’t captured in
the MOU?

11. What moral hazards might be included in this arrangement? Are there opportunities
that might be benefit one organization more than another?

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APPENDIX B
Interview Codebook
Prelminary
Codes:

Ascent Benefits
Any identified benefit, from the perspective of the speaker, to the relationship or
contract with the SELPA
Ascent Loss
Any moral hazard, loss, sacrifice, weakness identified by the speaker that results from
the contract with the SELPA
Selpa Benefits
Any identified benefit, from the perspective of the speaker, to the relationship or
contract with charter schools
Selpa Losses
Any moral hazard, loss, sacrifice, weakness identified by the speaker that results from
the contracting with Charter Schools

Secondary Codes
Alternatives
alternatives to the market, includes contracting with different SELPAs, writing
different kinds of contracts, adding or deleting components of the current contract
MOU the respondent's description of the contract
Organizational
gaps description of the perceptions of differences between the two orgs

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APPENDIX C
Interview Matrix
Benefits Losses
SELPA Organizational Priority alignment: Program
model of LRE in charters supports SELPA
goals and program model
Reciprocal Training: SELPA can learn
from charter models of service delivery and
programming
Placement of students with disabilities back to
SELPA placements is a moral hazard
Reciprocal Training: SELPA staff required to
learn & become familiar with charter schools
Charter
school
Support from SELPA, including trainings,
access to services (fee-for-service model)
and due process

Data collection and reporting
Organizational priorities mis-alignment is a
moral hazard

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APPENDIX D
Document Authenticity Protocol (Merriam, 2009)

1. What is the history of the document?
2. How did it come into my hands?
3. What guarantee is there that it is what it pretends to be?
4. IS the document complete, as originally constructed?
5. Has it been tampered with or edited?
6. If the document is genuine, under what circumstances and for what purposes was it
produced?
7. Who was/is the author?
8. What was the author trying to accomplish? For whom was the document intended?
9. What was or is the maker’s bias?
10. To what extent was the writer likely to want to tell the truth?
11. Do other documents exist that might shed additional light on the same story, event,
project, program, context? If so, are they available, accessible?

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APPENDIX E
Categorizing Tool (ATLAS.ti software)

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APPENDIX F
Survey

Special Education Contracting in Charter schools
Survey Protocol: SELPA Administrators

Introduction:
Thank you very much for choosing to participate in this survey of special education
administrators. The purpose of my study is to look at how administrators from charter schools and from a
district understand the responsibilities of how charter schools will meet the requirements of IDEA, State
regulations and local regulations like the modified consent decree (MCD).
Specifically in this survey, I’d like to ask you about the capacity of charter schools to partner with
their SELPA to meet local and federal mandates and to create opportunities programming for students
with disabilities. The study’s ultimate goal is to make recommendations for improving the relationship
between charter schools and their governing SELPAs.
This survey should take no longer than 15 minutes. Your participation is voluntary and you do
not have to respond to any questions that you do not want to. At any time, you may choose to end the
survey.
Everything that you share in this survey will remain completely confidential and your name or
district will not be used in this study. The results will only be shared with USC for the purpose of this
research study and with no one else.

Please verify that you agree to the terms listed above. [Verification box]

Again, thank you very much for participating in this study.

Survey questions:
1) Please choose the best description of your organization
a. charter school
b. SELPA/District

2) Please describe your role in your organization
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Program Specialist
Behavior Specialist
Manager
Director
Principal
Other

3) Please indicate who should be responsible for the following IDEA requirements [charter,
district or both]

a) Hiring credentialed special education staff [charter, district or both]
b) Training special education staff [charter, district or both]
c) Hiring special education leadership staff [charter, district or both]
d) Training special education leadership staff [charter, district or both]
e) Conducting compliance reviews [charter, district or both]
f) Reporting IDEA outcomes to the state [charter, district or both]
g) Providing a continuum of LRE placements [charter, district or both]
h) Receiving special education funds from the State and federal government [charter, district
or both]

4) Please describe a partnership between BCUSD and a charter organization (does not have to
pertain to special education).

5) Please identify and describe what factors promoted the partnership described above.

6) Please rate the following scenarios on a scale of (1-not feasible, 2-most likely not feasible, 3-
neutral, 4-possibly feasible, 5-feasible)
i) BCUSD and a charter open a class for students with emotional disturbance on a
charter campus
ii) A charter school trains BCUSD staff on special education compliance and
programming.
iii) BCUSD trains a charter school on special education compliance and programming.
iv) Charter school staff sits on annual compliance review panels.

7) What qualities hinder partnership between BCUSD and charter schools in regards to special
education?

8) What is the most feasible alternative to the current MOU between charter schools and
BCUSD

a) Co-write an MOU with both organizations’ input
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b) Charter schools authorized by BCUSD can choose a SELPA option
c) Organizations use litigation to negotiate a SELPA agreement

9) Why did you choose the option above?

Closing:
Thank you very much for your time and for your thoughtful responses. Neither your identity nor your
responses will be shared with anyone in your district, and will only be shared with the researchers at USC
Rosier School of Education.

If you have any questions, please contact me at ivins@usc.edu or 415-312-9009.

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Abstract (if available)

Abstract This qualitative case study uses the framework of transaction cost economics (TCE) to investigate the contracts written between governing special education agencies and charter schools. This case study seeks to understand the benefits and losses for charter schools and governing special education local plan areas (SELPAs) in negotiating the responsibilities of the federal disability law by examining the contract between the two organizations. The unit of analysis in this study is the written contract between a large urban school district and a charter school management organization and associated interpretations of the contract that are held by leadership within the organizations. The study also seeks to identify partnership opportunities for improving special education services in charter schools and in the SELPA afforded by the contract. Findings suggest that in the case of a large urban school district and a charter school management organization, the benefits and losses focus on disparate organizational priorities. Findings also suggest that while that the contract is mutually understood by both organizations, partnership opportunities are hindered by trusting, reciprocal relationships that grow over time and by problem‐solving specific cases. Implications and recommendations are discussed.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Ivins, Ilene Fernandez (author)

Core Title Contracting for special education: a case study of a charter school contract for special education

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Education (Leadership)

Publication Date 09/02/2014

Defense Date 04/15/2014

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag charter schools,OAI-PMH Harvest,partnership,Special Education,Transaction Cost Economics

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Hentschke, Guilbert C. (committee chair), Burch, Patricia E. (committee member), Strunk, Katharine O. (committee member)

Creator Email ilene.ivins@aspirepublicschools.org,ileneivins@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-467305

Unique identifier UC11286909

Identifier etd-IvinsIlene-2868.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-467305 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-IvinsIlene-2868.pdf

Dmrecord 467305

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Ivins, Ilene Fernandez

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA