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Identity is the lens through which moral values predict action
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Identity is the lens through which moral values predict action
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Content
Running head: IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 1
Identity is the Lens Through Which Moral Values Predict Action
Kate Marie Johnson
University of Southern California
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 2
Table of Contents
Abstract 3
Identity is the Lens Through Which Moral Values Predict Action
4
Study 1 11
Study 2 19
Study 3 27
General Discussion
32
References
37
Appendix:
Scales and measures utilized in this research.
44
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 3
Abstract
Research on moral convictions has shown that moral (vs. nonmoral) attitudes are uniquely
resistant to persuasion attempts and predictive of behavior (Bauman & Skitka, 2009). Further,
the moral values individuals hold are strongly tied to their cultural and familial backgrounds, and
help bind individuals into communities of shared values (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Three studies
directly investigate the relationship between social influences and moral convictions as part of a
broader effort to integrate individual- and group-level processes underlying moral convictions. In
Study 1, the tendency to identify with social groups was associated with moralization across
multiple moral domains. In Study 2, social group identification was associated with increased
moralization of political issues and higher levels of reported voting behavior in a nationally
representative sample. More specifically, political identification—but not overall group
identification—explained the relationship between moralization of political issues and voting
behavior. In Study 3, invoking superordinate identities (e.g., school identity) had a motivating
impact on energy-saving purchase intentions. Social identities provide contextual information
through which people identify moral concerns and decide how to act to pursue moral and social
goals.
Keywords: morality, social influence, identity, politics, religion.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 4
Morality and Identity as Motivation to Act
From dinner tables to street protests, people will tirelessly defend their beliefs when their
moral convictions are at stake, even when they are faced with strong arguments against their
positions. Moral values and convictions elicit high emotional reactivity (Greene, Sommerville,
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen , 2001; Mullen & Skitka, 2006), are held as objective facts that are
universally applicable, and are resistant to persuasion attempts (Skitka, 2010; Skitka, Bauman, &
Sargis, 2005). Previous research has found that moral convictions are also strongly correlated
with moral behaviors (Skitka & Bauman, 2008), intolerance towards those who do not hold
similar attitudes, and a subsequent decreased conflict resolution (Skitka, 2010). These
convictions also mediate willingness to defer to authority and judgments about whether
authority’s rulings are right and fair (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, Lytle, 2009).
When values are held as sacred, they are no longer subject to typical economic tradeoffs or
compromises (Dehghani et. al., 2010). How do these moral concerns help guide individuals
outside of the psychological laboratory setting?
At the broadest level, moral values can be understood as social contracts which help us to
effectively cooperate and integrate with the members of our communities. Haidt (2008) defines
moral systems as “interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological
mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible”
(p. 70). The moral concerns and values individuals endorse coincide with those of their society
across the lifespan (Forsyth, Boyle, & McDaniel, 2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2008). Social groups
and social identities give individuals a common framework within which they can assume
specific roles and interact with other group members to uphold shared obligations (Belk, 2005;
Cohen, Malka, Rozin, & Cherfas, 2006).
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 5
Empirical research on interdependence and social identity have each provided unique
(and sometimes competing) insights into the ways in which social groups affect their members’
attitudes, preferences, and goals (Bourhis, Turner, & Gagnon, 1997; Stroebe, Spears, &
Lodewijkx, 2007). Theory on interdependence has emphasized that people who are more
chronically sensitive to those around them respond to situations in a more group-promoting way
than those with independent mindsets who endorse personal autonomy. Social identity theories,
however, state that this overarching mindset is not enough to explain variations in people’s
behaviors across contexts. Instead, they state that individuals’ salient social roles or social
identities given situation provides crucial information about what goals and beliefs should be
pursued. Little of this research has focused directly on the relationship between social groups,
identification, and moral concerns. Understanding how overall affiliative tendencies and specific
social identities each relate to moral convictions can help to explain both how these values are
adopted and how they affect behavior in complex social situations.
Interdependence and Collectivism
Research on social influence has provided evidence for the effects of collective or
interdependent thinking on judgments and behaviors often categorized as moral. Interdependent
mindsets cause individuals to expand their self-concept to include close others and important
social groups (Markus & Kitayama, 2010; Oyserman & Lee, 2008), and thinking about one’s self
as part of a collective strongly influences individual’s to prefer and protect group interests.
Individuals with higher levels of interdependence show greater cooperation in group tasks (Liu
& Li, 2009), greater emphasis on benevolence (Schwartz & Ros, 1995), and stronger
commitment to collective goals (Yu & Yang, 1994). Experimentally-induced feelings of
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 6
collectivism also increase prosocial behaviors and feelings of obligation toward others
(Oyserman & Lee, 2008).
However, interdependence does not always lead to better, more helpful, or more
normatively moral outcomes. Countries with high levels of collectivism and interdependence
also have greater levels of corruption (Li, Triadis, & Yu, 2006; Mazar & Agarwal, 2011; Wated
& Sanchez, 2005), because individuals are less likely to punish leaders who act immorally for
the benefit of the group (Joshi & Fast, 2014). Katherine White and Darren Dahl (2006) found
that when asked to evaluate two objects--one which was associated with an in-group and one
which was associated with an out-group--people were significantly biased towards their in-
group's product regardless of its quality. Strongly identified individuals are more likely to
participate in group-based activism regardless of whether they believe the outcome will be
successful (Blackwood & Louis, 2012), and stronger group identification predicts positive
feelings toward group norm conformity (Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004).
Individuals also use contextually-primed information about the social identity of a speaker in
drawing inferences about the meaning of a message, leading to more favorable interpretations
and attitudes toward messages endorsed by in-group members (Cohen, 2003).
Interdependence as a mindset provides important cultural norms that emphasize
connection—and attentiveness—to others needs and interests (Adams, Anderson, & Adonu,
2004). This focus is in direct contrast to people who adopt independent mindsets, which
emphasize personal agency and separation of self from others. Because these mindsets shape
how individuals perceive themselves as a part of a community, and communities endorse
particular values, feelings of interdependence or independence may affect the domains with
which people show of moral concerns. Interdependent individuals who feel chronically
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 7
connected to those around them may focus on different moral domains when making decisions
about how to act than interdependent individuals who look to set themselves apart. It is possible
therefore that interdependent mindsets do significantly affect moral concerns by increasing the
attention paid to the moral acts of others across situations, since the importance of others to the
self is much higher. Interdependent mindsets may also bias individuals towards preferring group-
focused values over individual-focused values. .
Social Identity
Insights from social identity theory, however, state that interdependent mindsets may not
be enough to explain moral behaviors and concerns. Since interdependence is often not domain-
or identity-specific, this type of broad worldview may not be fine-grained enough to tell the
individual what they should do in a specific situation where they have a role or identity to fulfill.
Individuals have many different schematic social identities that come in and out of focus
depending on the situation. By choosing to integrate themselves within certain groups,
individuals choose to adopt the socially-maintained personal identities given to them (Emler,
2002). Oyserman (2009) states that social identities are “contextualized; they include traits,
characteristics and goals linked to a social role or social group that the person was, is or may
become a member of” (p. 251).
The individual's place within a social group provides them with normatively defined roles
ranging from broad group identities (e.g., Democrat) to smaller unit roles (e.g.,
mother). Because each of these schematic social identities is tied to specific values, goals, and
motives, the social identity most accessible at a given time should elicit identity-congruent
attitudes, values, and behaviors. In contrast to interdependency mindsets which would favor
group-based behaviors and judgments, specific identities each contain their own set of values and
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 8
goals which may or may not align with group interests. The effectiveness of an object to fulfill
the needs or goals of any one of an individual's identities directly affects their perceptions and
preferences for that object (Kirmani, 2009; Oyserman, 2009; Shavitt, Torelli, & Wong,
2009). Individuals are therefore able to adopt the specific roles most pertinent to each situation
in order to have guidelines for behavior.
Identity and Morality in the Political Domain
Much of the research at the intersection of social identity and morality has focused on
politics, and more specifically, on systematic differences between American liberals and
conservatives (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, and Stone et al., 2014, for
reviews). However, a smaller body of literature has also provided evidence for the similar
impact of shared moral values on individuals’ judgments and behaviors across political
divides. For instance, Lavine and colleagues (1997) found that values play a critical role in
structuring political beliefs and creating attitudinal consistencies in both political novices and
experts.
Additionally, feelings of social connectedness and shared values with one’s political
group can increase behaviors such as political participation (Schemer, Wirth, & Matthes, 2012),
whereas feeling like one’s own values do not align with one’s group leads to explicit intentions
to not vote (Johnson et al., 2014). The extent to which an individual’s ideological beliefs match
their community can predict how happy they are in that community and whether or not they
would like to move to a new community in the near future (Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, &
Nosek, 2014). Overall, findings from prior research have illuminated the important role that
feelings of moral, communal connectedness can play for both structuring moral concerns and
motivating moral behavior.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 9
The Current Research
The current research attempts to explore how individual-level moral beliefs are related to
the tendency to affiliate with groups overall (similar to interdependent mindsets) and
identification with domain-specific social groups. Additionally, we hope to test how a tendency
to affiliate overall, specific identification, and moral values each affect moral judgments and
behaviors. Study 1 assessed Hypotheses 1 and 2, which both test the relationship between the
tendency to identify with social groups and different kinds of moral concerns. Study 2 sought to
replicate the results from the first study using a nationally representative data set and also
assessed Hypotheses 3 and 4, which tested the relationship between social group identification,
moralization, and behavior within a specific domain (politics). Finally, Study 3 attempted to use
identity framing and important social group saliency to motivate conservation behavioral
intentions, testing Hypothesis 5.
Specifically, we sought to test the following hypotheses:
H1: The tendency to identify with social groups will predict generalized moralization.
Because interdependent individuals are more sensitive to and aware of those around them
(Markus & Kitayama, 2003), we hypothesize that individuals who identify more strongly with
social groups on average will have more domains with which their groups could find morally
relevant and thus will show stronger moral concerns in general, everyday situations.
H2: The tendency to identify with social groups will predict group-focused moral concerns.
Additionally, because interdependent mindsets and ingroup identification strength predict
group norm preferences and behaviors (Liu & Li, 2009), we predict that individuals who tend to
identify more strongly with social groups will also show higher concern for values that are
group-oriented over other types of values which focus on the individual.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 10
H3: The tendency to identify with social groups will significantly predict moralization within
specific social domains (i.e., politics).
As an extension of Hypothesis 1, we also expect that the tendency to identify with social
groups—and not just domain-relevant social identification— will predict higher moral concern
within specific domains, such as politics. We hypothesize that this tendency is sufficient to
predict the extremity of political moral concern because of the heightened moral sensitivity
expected from this type of affiliative tendency, despite the fact that overall tendency to affiliate is
not tied to specific identity goals or values.
H4: Identification with one’s political party--but not overall tendencies to identify with social
groups--will predict voting behavior.
Because social identities are each strongly tied to unique goals and values (Oyserman, 2009), we
expect that people with highly important social identities within a specific domain (i.e., politics)
will be more likely to participate in domain relevant activities than those who do not have
important social identities. Additionally, because social identities provide a focus for values and
goals, we expect that the importance of a social identity within a domain will explain the
relationship between one’s values and one’s actions. Specifically, we expect that political party
identification will mediate the relationship between moralization of political issues and past
voting behavior. However, if domain-specific identification is necessary to explain behavior as
social identity theory would suggest, we would expect that overall group identification (similar
to interdependency) would not explain the relationship between values and behavior.
Importantly, this would also provide evidence for effects of social influence on the expression of
moral values through behavior, qualifying prior moral conviction literature.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 11
H5: The effects of prevalence estimates will be even stronger when the behavior is framed as an
identity instead of as an action.
Prior research in social influence has shown that when individuals will be more likely to
engage in a behavior (e.g., alcohol use) when they believe that the typical ingroup member or
most ingroup members engages in that behavior (Gibbons, Helweg-Larsen, & Gerrard, 1995).
Additionally, framing an action as a desired identity has been shown to increase motivation and
behavior (Bryan, Walton, Rogers, & Dweck, 2011). As an extension of these findings and H4,
Study 3 used an experimental manipulation to test for effects of important, superordinate social
group prevalence estimates and identity-framing on conservation behavioral intentions. If
important social identities are the link between values and behavior, we would expect that
perceptions of high ingroup behavior prevalence should motivate the individual to act.
Additionally, we expect that if two important identities are tied together (i.e., school identity and
conservation identity), the effects of prevalence will be even stronger.
Study 1
Given that interdependency increases concerns for and attention to other people, can the
tendency to identify with social groups predict the extremity and content which individuals
moralize? In order to explore how social groups affect individuals’ moral concerns, Study 1
assessed the relationship between the tendency to identify with social groups and individuals’
moral concerns (Hypotheses 1 and 2).
Methods
Participants. 1,244 adult participants (45.5% female, median age 26) completed an
online questionnaire through the website YourMorals.org (see Graham et al., 2011). Participants
were primarily from the U.S. (73.3% from U.S., 5.2% from Canada, 4.1% from U.K., 17.4%
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 12
from elsewhere), Caucasian (66.8% White), liberal (619 liberals, 125 moderates, 198
conservatives, 118 libertarians, 77 other/don’t know), and 42% had completed at least college or
university.
Procedure. Participants completed demographic information when they signed up to use
the YourMorals.org website. At the time of the study, participants completed the Moralization
of Everyday Life scale, Moralization of Sports scale, and identity questions. A large subset of
participants also completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (N = 1,049), and a smaller
subset of the participants (N=54) also completed the individualism/collectivism scale some time
between having taken the current study measures and signing up to use the website.
Average group identification and demographic measures. To assess group
identification, participants answered the question “How important to your sense of identity is…”
for eight different identities on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at all important) to 5 (Extremely
important; see Appendix A for full list of items). Party affiliation was assessed with a single item
that asked participants to place themselves on a 7 point scale ranging from 1 (Extremely liberal)
to 7 (Extremely conservative) with additional options for libertarian, don’t know/not political,
and other. Subjective social class was assessed using the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social
Status (Adler et al., 2008), which presents individuals with a picture of a 10 rung ladder and asks
them to place an X on the rung of the ladder which most closely reflects their social standing in
comparison to the rest of the people in the United States. Participants also completed a measure
of their highest level of education on a 9-point Likert scale from 1 (Some High School) to 9
(Completed Graduate or Professional Degree).
Moralization of everyday life scale. The Moralization of Everyday Life Scale (MELS;
Lovett, Jordan, & Wiltermuth, 2012) is used to assess the amount that individuals moralize
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 13
everyday actions that people often do in their daily lives. First participants were presented with
the following text:
“Many people are used to thinking about morality as it relates to a few controversial
public-policy issues: abortion, gay marriage, gun control, the death penalty, etc. This
survey is instead about the things that people do in their own daily lives. Below you’ll be
presented with a variety of situations and be asked to say whether certain behaviors in
those situations would be morally wrong.”
They then were asked to rate each of the twelve items on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all
wrong; has nothing to do with morality) to 7 (Very wrong; an extremely immoral
action). Example items include “Lying about a test score when reporting performance to a
teacher” and “Ignoring a driver whose car is stuck in the snow” (see Appendix B for full list of
items).
Moral foundations questionnaire. Moral Foundations Theory posits that the moral
concerns expressed by people across cultures can be categorized into five domains: Care/harm
(sensitivity to the suffering of others), Fairness/cheating, (reciprocal social interactions and the
motivations to be fair and just when working together), Loyalty/betrayal (promoting in-group
cooperation, sacrifice, and trust), Authority/subversion (endorsing social hierarchy), and
Purity/degradation (promoting cleanliness of the soul over hedonism; Graham et al., 2011).
Care/harm and Fairness/cheating are often referred to as individual-focused foundations as they
are primarily focused on relations between individuals, whereas Loyalty/betrayal,
Authority/subversion, and Purity/degradation are often referred to as group-focused moral
foundations since the group is the locus of moral concern.
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) was developed to assess the
extent to which individuals use and endorse each of five moral domains when making decisions
about right and wrong. Participants were asked to respond to 30 questions total, with 6 items
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 14
reflecting each moral domain (see appendix C for full list of items). In part 1, participants were
asked, “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the
following considerations relevant to your thinking?”. Then then rated 15 statements on a Likert
scale from 0 (not at all relevant; this consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right
and wrong) to 5 (extremely relevant; this is one of the most important factors when I judge right
and wrong). Example items include “Whether or not someone suffered emotionally” reflecting
the Care domain and “whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty” reflecting the Loyalty
domain. In part 2, participants were asked to “Please read the following sentences and indicate
your agreement or disagreement”. They then rated 15 statements on a Likert scale from 0
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Example items include “I would call some acts wrong
on the grounds that they are unnatural” reflecting the Purity domain and “Justice is the most
important requirement for a society” reflecting the Fairness domain (see Appendix C for full list
of items.
Individualism/collectivism. Participants completed the 32-item Individualism and
Collectivism Scale, which was designed to assess vertical and horizontal components of
collectivism and individualism (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). There were 8
items for each of the 4 subscales: Horizontal Individualism (seeing the self as autonomous from
the group, and believing that individuals should all be equal), Vertical Individualism (seeing the
self as autonomous from the group, but acknowledging and accepting that there is inequality
between individuals), Horizontal Collectivism (seeing the self as a member of the collective
equal to all other members), and Vertical Collectivism (seeing the self as a member of the
collective with accepted hierarchy and inequality within that collective). Participants first read
the following text:
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 15
“Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each
according to your attitudes, beliefs and experiences. Please respond by clicking the circle
after the appropriate number according to the following scale:”
Then, they answered each item on a 9-point Likert scale from 1 (never or definitely no) to 9
(always or definitely yes). Example items include “I'd rather depend on myself than others”
reflecting the Horizontal Individualism subscale and “Parents and children must stay together as
much as possible” reflecting the Vertical Collectivism subscale. The average score for each
subscale and the average for all items were then computed.
Results
Average group identification predicts moralization. First we sought to test whether the
tendency to identify with social groups (average group identification) would predict the amount
that individuals moralize everyday situations (Moralization of Everyday Life scale). We
regressed average group identification on MELS scores, and in support of Hypothesis 1, average
group identification was significantly related to MELS scores, B = .41, p <.001, and average
group identification explained a significant amount of the variance in MELS scores, R
2
= .12, F
(1,1240) = 172.19, p < .001. Additionally, individuals with higher average group identification
were more likely to endorse the three MFQ group-focused foundations, B = .71, p <.001, and
less likely to endorse the two MFQ individual-focused foundations, B = -.10, p <.01
Figure 1.
Moral scale endorsement as a function of average group identification for YourMorals.org
(Study 1).
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 16
Average group identification predicts moralization controlling for demographics:
First we sought to identify whether the tendency to identify with groups could be predicted by
typical demographic variables. These analyses would allow us to test for independent effects of
average group identification on moralization by identifying covariates which should be included
in our models. Conservative ideology was positively related to average group identification R =
.36, p < .001.
Figure 2.
Average group identification by political affiliation for YourMorals.org (Study 1).
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 17
Participants’ subjective socioeconomic status also positively predicted average group
identification, B = .05, p < .001, though subjective SES explained a much smaller proportion of
the variance in average group identification scores than did ideology, R
2
= .02, F (1,1122) =
21.38, p < .001, such that individuals who placed themselves higher in social ranking were more
likely to identify with groups. Participants’ education level negatively predicted average group
identification, B = -.02, p <.05, such that individuals who were more educated were less likely to
identify with groups. However, like with SES, the proportion of the variance in average group
identification scores predicted by education was small, R
2
= .01, F (1,760) = 4.896, p < .001.
We also conducted exploratory analyses on a small subset of the participants who had
completed both the measure of individualism and collectivism as well as our group identification
measures. Average group identification was positively predicted by both Vertical Individualism,
B = .21, p <.05, and Horizontal Collectivism, B = .31, p < .01. Horizontal individualism and
vertical collectivism were negatively related to average group identification, though not
significantly (p =.061 and p=.093 respectively). Additionally, overall individualism (p=.430) and
overall collectivism (p=.623) did not predict average group identification.
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
All Liberal Moderate Conservative
Average Group Identification
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 18
We then used a stepwise multiple regression analysis to test whether average group
identification would significantly predict moralization of everyday life scores even after
controlling for demographic measures that were significantly related to our measure. After
controlling for subjective socioeconomic status and education, average group identification
remained a significant, positive predictor of both MFQ binding concerns, B = .62, p <.001 and
MELS, B = .35, p <.001. However, MFQ HF was no longer significant, B= -.07, p =.11.
Unfortunately, there were not enough participants who had completed all of the scales for us to
run multiple regression analyses assessing how individualism, collectivism, and average group
identification simultaneously predicted moralization.
Discussion
Results of Study 1 provided initial evidence for the relationship between overall social group
identification tendencies and self-reported moral concerns, supporting H1: The tendency to
identify with social groups will predict generalized moralization. Specifically, individuals with
higher group identification also reported higher moralization for everyday situations as well as
the group-focused moral foundations of Authority, Purity, and Loyalty from the Moral
Foundations Questionnaire, supporting H2: The tendency to identify with social groups will
predict group-focused moral concerns. Additionally, the more that participants identified with
social groups, the less likely they were to endorse the individual-focused moral concern domains
of Care and Fairness. These results held even after controlling for typical demographic measures
of social class such as self-placement on a social ladder and education level. These results
provide initial evidence that social identification and moral values may be more closely related
than prior literature in the domain of moral psychology may predict.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 19
Individuals with higher education were less likely to identify with groups, and individuals
who placed themselves higher on the social class ladder or who identified as conservative were
more likely to identify with social groups. However, our sample was primarily liberal and well-
educated, which could bias our conclusions about the effects of social class and ideological
indicators on group identification and morality across the SES spectrum. While we did have
preliminary evidence for the relationship between certain types of individualism and collectivism
and average group identification, not enough participants had completed the individualism and
collectivism scale for us to be able to test for mediational effects between these variables for
moralization. Additionally, we did not collect any behavioral or domain-specific measures,
which limited our ability to test for differences between overall group identification and specific
social identities on outcomes and values. Study 2 was intended to address these concerns.
Study 2
Study 2 used a nationally representative data set to test whether the relationship between
the tendency to identify with groups and moral concerns could be replicated with a more diverse
population. To further explore how this relationship might differ between group identification
tendencies and specific social identification, Study 2 addressed two additional hypotheses:
H3: The tendency to identify with social groups will significantly predict moralization within
specific social domains (i.e., politics). While there was a relationship between general
moralization of everyday situations and binding concerns, Study 1 did not address whether or not
this relationship exists between average social group identification and moralization within a
specific domain. Because this type of interdependency was related to moral concern more
broadly, we also expected that it would be related to more moral concern with specific content
domains, even after accounting for the individual’s identification with a group within that
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 20
domain. To address this concern, Study 2 included a measure of moralization within the political
domain.
H4: Identification with one’s political party—but not overall tendencies to identify with social
groups—will predict voting behavior. Prior research has indicated that heightened moral
concerns across moral domains (and about voting specifically) positively correlate with voting,
as measured by both retrospective reports and prospective behavioral intentions (Johnson et al.,
2014; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). However, prior research found an important caveat to this
relationship; specifically, a moral mismatch between the individual and their self-identified
political group led to intentions not to vote in the future (Johnson et al., 2014). To motivate
behavior such as voting, the moral values and goals salient in a specific context should be
congruent with those of an individual’s social identity. Specifically, we would expect the
relationship between moralization of political issues and voting behavior to be mediated by
identification with one’s political party. We did not expect, however, that generalized average
group identification would mediate this relationship, since overall interdependent mindsets do
not provide specific goal-directed actions.
Method
Participants. 1,519 adult participants (51.8% female, median age 47) completed the
Measuring Morality survey in 2012. Participants were adults drawn from a nationally
representative panel maintained by Knowledge Networks
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp).
Procedure. Participants completed measures of individual differences in moral concerns
both within a specific domain (e.g., politics) as well as more generally (e.g., everyday scenarios).
The also completed demographic information, social identity importance measures, and reported
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 21
their past voting behavior. (For more information, see
http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/attitudes/resources/measuring-morality/.)
Social identity importance. Participants completed the same questions assessing social
identity importance as were used in Study 1 (see Appendix A).
Moralization of everyday life scale. Participants completed the same scale as was
completed in Study 1 (see Appendix B).
Moralization of politics. The Moralization of Politics Scale (MOPS; Skitka, 2012) was
used to measure the extent to which individuals moralize a range of political social issues. First,
individuals were presented with a list of 12 social issues (e.g., abortion, health care reform) and
were asked to indicate “which two issues are the MOST important challenges you think our
country is dealing with today” and “which two issues are the LEAST important challenges you
think our country is dealing with today” by clicking on a check box (See Appendix A for full list
of social issues). Next, on a separate page, they were asked to answer the question “To what
extent is your position on each of the following a reflection of your core moral beliefs and
convictions?” for the four issues that they had just selected as well as two randomly assigned
issues they had not selected from the first list (1-5 Likert scale from 1(Not at all) to 5 (Very
much). Each participant’s traditional MOPS score was then calculated as the mean of the two
“middle-important” issue responses. Additionally, we calculated a high-importance MOPS score
from the mean of the two issues selected for the “most important” question and a low-importance
MOPS score from the mean of the two issues selected for the “least important” questions (see
Appendix D for complete measure instructions).
Moral foundations sacredness scale. The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale asked
participants to “Indicate how much money someone would have to pay you, (anonymously and
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 22
secretly) to be willing to do each thing.” Participants completed 18 items on a Likert scale from
1($0, I’d do it for free) to 8 (never for any amount of money) reflecting each of the 5 moral
foundation domains from Moral Foundations Theory (Graham & Haidt, 2012). Example
questions include “Burn your country’s flag, in private (nobody else sees you)” reflecting the
Loyalty domain and “Sign a secret-but-binding pledge to only hire people of your race in your
company” reflecting the Fairness domain (see Appendix E for full item list)
Results
Average group identification predicts moralization. First, we sought to replicate our
results from study 1 which supported Hypotheses 1 and 2 by testing the relationship between
average group identification and moralization for everyday situations (using the MELS) and for
group-and individual-focused moral domains (using the MFSS in the place of the MFQ). We
regressed average group identification on the amount that participants moralize everyday
situations (Moralization of Everyday Life Scale; MELS). Replicating the results found in Study
1, higher average group identification positively predicted moralization of everyday situations
(MELS), B = .47, p <.001, R
2
= .09. Also replicating the results from study 1 using the MFQ,
MFSS individual-focused moral concerns were negatively predicted by average group
identification, B = -.10, p <.001, R
2
= .01, and MFSS group-focused moral concerns were
positively predicted by average group identification B = .18, p < .001, R
2
= .01. Additionally,
effects were still significant after controlling for religiosity, education level, and political
identification for the MELS, B = .40, p < .001, R
2
= .12, MFSS individual-focused moral values,
B = -.15, p < .001, , R
2
= .02, and MFSS group-focused moral values, B = .09, p < .05, R
2
= 06.
We then sought to test Hypothesis 3 which addresses whether the relationship identified
between social identity importance and generalized, everyday moralization of actions would
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 23
apply to a more specific moralized domain: politics. Following the same analysis trajectory used
in the above analyses for study 1, we first conducted a regression to test whether social group
identification would predict the amount that individuals moralize political issues (Moralization
of Politics Scale; MOPS). Results of this analysis also showed higher moralization for
participants with stronger average group identification, R
2
= .05, B = .18, p < .001.
Figure 3.
Moral scale endorsement as a function of average group identification for Measuring Morality
Survey (Study 2).
Average group identification predicts moralization controlling for demographics. Next, we
tested for effects of typical demographic variables on our variable of interest, average group
identification. Again, conservative ideology was positively related to average group
identification, B = .06, p < .001, and explained a significant proportion of average group
identification score variance, R
2
= .02, F (1488) = 21.155, p < .001. Education also predicted
average group identification, B = - .03, p < .01, though this relationship was negative and
explained less variance than did ideology, R
2
= .01, F (1511) = 8.857, p < .01. Additionally,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moral Scale Endorsement
Average Group Identification
MELS
MOPS
MFSS Binding
MFSS
Individualizing
*
*
*
*
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 24
those who identified as religious had significantly higher average group identification than those
who were non-religious, t (1498) = 10.34, p <.001.
Figure 4.
Average group identification by political ideology and religious affiliation for Measuring
Morality Survey (Study 2).
However, the difference between the average group identification for all liberals, conservatives,
and moderates was only 0.2 on a 5 point scale, ranging from 2.9 to 3.1, and the difference
between religious and non-religious individuals in average group identification was no longer
significant when religious identification importance was removed, p = .715.
A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to evaluate whether average group
identification predicts MOPS scores even after controlling for religiosity, ideology, and
education. At step one of the analysis, religiosity entered into the regression equation and was
significantly related to MEL scores, B = .10, p < .001, though both ideology B = -.03, p = .075,
and education, B = -.02, p = .079, did not significantly contribute. The combination of ideology,
religiosity, and education explained approximately 3% of the variance in MOPS scores, R =
.17. At step two of the analysis, average group identification was also entered into the regression
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
All Liberal Moderate Conservative Religion No Religion
Average Group Identification
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 25
equation and was significantly related to MOPS scores, B = .23, p < .001. The addition of
average group identification also increased the explained variance in MOPS scores from 3% to
6%, R = .26
1
.
Political identity, average group identity, and moralization predict voting.
Finally, we sought to test Hypothesis 4 in which moralization of political issues would
predict specific behavioral outcomes (voting in the 2008 election) through political group
identification but not average group identification. For analyses, participants who said they
voted in the last election were coded as 1 and those who said they did not vote in the last election
were coded as 0. Results from a binary logistic mediational regression model (Hayes, 2012)
showed that Moralization of Politics scores were significantly related to both the proposed
mediator (political group identification; R = .16, B = .12, p < .001) and the outcome variable
(Voting in the 2008 elections; Cox & Snell R
2
=.02, B =.39, p < .001). Political party
identification predicted voting in the 2008 election, R
2
=.03, B =.42, p < .001, and this
relationship remained significant even while controlling for Moralization of Politics scores, B =
.42, p < .001. Importantly, the relationship between MOPS scores and voting dropped to non-
significance in this analysis (B= .16, p = .072) compared to the direct relationship (B = .39),
suggesting full mediation.
Figure 5
Moralization of politics’ effect on voting mediated by political identity (Study 2).
1
When identification with all seven groups were included simultaneously as predictors in
the regression model (instead of the averaged group identification independent variable), we
found the same results for both the MELS, F(8,1448) = 25.33, p = .000, and the MOPS,
F(8,1448) = 13.325, p = .000 .
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 26
Moralization of Politics scores were also related to average group identification, B = .26,
p < .001, and average group identification predicted 2008 voting behavior, B = .29, p <
.01. However, average group identification was no longer significant when controlling for
Moralization of Politics scores, B = .15, p = .178, and the relationship between Moralization of
Politics scores and voting behavior remained significant, B = .23, p < .05. Therefore, average
group identification did not mediate the relationship between Moralization of Politics and voting
in the 2008 election.
Discussion
Replicating the findings in Study 1, the tendency to identify with social groups (average
group identification) significantly predicted moralization of group-based moral foundations and
everyday life situations for a nationally representative data set. However, the relationship
between behavior, identification, and moralization was more specific, supporting social identity
theories. These results provide support for the important relationship between individuals’ social
identities and their moralization of political issues as well as group-congruent behaviors (i.e.,
voting), regardless of ideological background, education, and religiosity. Independently,
Political
Identity
Past Voting
Behavior
Moralization
of Politics
B = .39, p < .001
(B = .42, p < .001)
(B = .16, p = .07)
B = .42, p < .001
B = .12, p < .001
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 27
moralization of political issues, average group identification, and political group identification
each predicted the likelihood that an individual would have voted in the 2008 presidential
election. However, only political identification, and not overall average group identification,
mediated the relationship between moralizing political issues and voting. Thus, the effect that
moralization of political issues has on voting behavior can be explained by the importance the
person places on being a member of their political party. In other words, identity is the lens
through which values predict action. Identification with a specific group provides information as
to what goals one should strive towards, and which behaviors will help one achieve these
goals. Study 2 did not, however, address the direction of this relationship experimentally, as
these data were cross-sectional. Study 3 was conducted to test whether invoking an important
social identity can imbue specific, desired behaviors with value relevance in order to motivate
those behaviors.
Study 3
Study 3 sought to apply social identity motivation techniques in an attempt to
experimentally test how identification can motivate behavior. We built upon research by Bryan
and colleagues (2011), which motivated desirable behaviors (e.g., voting) by invoking the self.
When a behavior is a reflection of the kind of person you are, instead of just another behavior, it
provides an important self-relevant context by fulfilling an identity goal (Bryan, Adams, &
Monin, 2013). When behaviors are framed as reflective of a desired social identity, people are
more motivated to engage in that behavior. For example, a 10-item online survey given the day
of an election asking people to “be a voter” (identity framing) instead of asking them “to vote”
(action framing) increased voter turnout by 13% (Bryan, Walton, Rogers, & Dweck, 2011).
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 28
In Study 2, we found evidence for the importance of specific identities for predicting
behavior. In Study 3, we sought to test whether the identity invoked in identity-framing has to
be directly tied to the action (i.e., “voter” for voting), or if the motivation to act can come from
invoking an important superordinate identity in the absence of a salient outgroup. Expanding
upon our findings and the above research, we sought to experimentally manipulate identity
salience and framing effects to test the following hypothesis:
H5: The effects of prevalence estimates on behavior will be stronger when the behavior is
framed as an identity instead of as an action.
Because prevalence estimates provide information about important ingroup members’ normative
actions, understanding how identity framing can change these effects is important for specifying
the contexts within which identity framing will be more or less motivating for behavior. We
expect a main effect of prevalence feedback, where individuals who believe that ingroup
members endorse an identity or action will be more likely to act in ways that support that identity
or behavior. However, because of the importance that specific identities have on outcomes
found in Study 2, we also expect that prevalence information will have stronger effects on
behavior intentions when the normative behavior is framed as an identity than when it is framed
as an action. We expect that when a superordinate identity endorses the adoption of a second
identity, that second identity should be even more important for the individual to uphold.
Methods
Participants. 220 undergraduate students (77.1% female, median age = 21) at the
University of Southern California completed the study online through the Psychology
department subject pool for course credit. 30% of participants lived in campus housing. 26%
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 29
stated that they were 1st years, 37% were 2nd years, 22% were 3rd years, and 14% were 4th
years. All but 3 participants were fluent or very comfortable with English.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects
conditions in a 2 (high vs low prevalence) by 2 (identity vs action framing) design. First,
participants read, “In a recent survey, (87%/only 22%) of Trojans considered themselves to be
(energy savers/saving energy).” Next, to reinforce the framing manipulation, participants
answered 10 questions used in prior studies by Bryan and colleagues (2011) which participants
responded to on a 5 point Likert scale. Each question included the words “energy saver” in the
identity condition and “saving energy” in the action condition.
Intent to purchase. In order to assess a behavioral outcome of our manipulation,
participants read the following passage:
One easy way to save energy is to use a "smart strip." These strips prevent a major cause
of energy waste: "phantom energy drain," from laptop and phone chargers that typically
remain plugged in even when they are not charging the device. Smart strips cut off power
when the charger is disconnected from the phone or computer.
They were then presented with a screen shot of a real smart strip currently available on
Amazon.com with product details and descriptions.
Figure 6.
Amazon.com smart strip graphic used for behavioral prompt in Study 3.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 30
Participants then answered the likelihood that they would purchase a smart strip like the one
described in the next 48 hours on a 7 point Likert scale from 1(very unlikely) to 7 (very likely).
Results
203 participants were included in the analyses after excluding 3 participants who were
not fluent in English and 14 participants for failing attention check items. On average, students
of this population rated Trojan identification as very important to their identity (3.89 on a 5-point
scale), as collected during a prescreen
2
.
An independent-samples t-test indicated a main effect of type of residence, with people
who live off campus being significantly more likely to intend to purchase a smart strip in the
next 48 hours than those that live on campus, F (1,195) = 4.073, p = .045.
A two (identity framing vs action framing) by two (high prevalence vs low prevalence)
independent groups ANOVA indicated that there was not a significant main effect of framing
condition (p = .723). There was also not a significant main effect of prevalence condition on
2
Results presented do not control for how seriously the participants took the survey, though controlling for
this variable produces even stronger results in the same directions.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 31
intent to purchase (p = .812). However, there was a significant interaction between prevalence
condition and framing condition, F (3,195) = 5.02, p < .05, R
2
= .04. Specifically, people in the
high action (M = 3.7, SE= .308) and low identity (M=3.7, SE=.28) conditions were the most
likely to intend to purchase a smart strip in the next 48 hours compared to those in the low action
(M = 2.7, SE = .308) and high identity conditions (M = 3.1, SE = .298).
Figure 7.
Average intent to purchase a smart strip in next 48 hours by experimental condition (Study 3).
This effect was mostly driven by differences between conditions for campus residents,
though the same pattern emerged for those who lived off campus; there was no interaction
between type of residence and condition. Additionally, neither current ownership of a smart strip,
Wilke’s Lamda = .992, p = .470, nor year in school, Wilke’s Lamda = .969, p = .437, predicted
intent to purchase.
Discussion
The results of our analyses in Study 3 did not support our Hypothesis 5, which stated that
the effect of prevalence information will be stronger for identity framing than for action framing
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
22% Saving 87% Saving 22% Saver 87% Saver
Purchase Likelihood
22% Saving
87% Saving
22% Saver
87% Saver
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 32
conditions. As was predicted, superordinate identity (Trojan) motivated behavioral intentions
more when people thought that other Trojans also save energy (high prevalence). However, and
unexpectedly, this relationship flipped when superordinate identities were used in conjunction
with identity framing. When participants thought that not very many of their fellow Trojans
identified as “energy savers,” they were more likely to intend to purchase a smart strip. This
unexpected result may provide important information about the effects of pairing two identities
together. Specifically, identity/identity pairings may have different implications for motivation
than pairing an identity with an action.
General Discussion
The current studies provide evidence that important social groups have a significant
effect on how values motivate behavior. While prior research on moral convictions has shown
that these convictions are resistant to persuasion or social influence effects (Bauman & Skitka,
2009; Skitka, Bauman, Lytle, 2009; Skitka & Bauman, 2008), our research showed a strong link
between moral concerns and social identification both within specific domains (i.e., politics) and
more broadly across everyday scenarios. The tendency to identify with social groups, similar to
interdependent mindsets, increased concern for the morality of interactions with others and their
behaviors. Importantly, this relationship did not require that a specific domain-relevant social
identity to be salient; the type of person to identify with many social groups also moralizes the
world around them to a higher degree than those who do not identify as strongly with social
groups.
Additionally, while our results supported prior research showing that moral values predict
behavior (Skitka, 2010), this relationship was fully mediated by the extent to which individuals
internalized a social identity within that domain. We found support for our hypothesis that group
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 33
identification is an important component when attempting to explain engagement in group-
endorsed moral behavior. Importantly, the overall tendency to identify with social groups did
not mediate the relationship between values and behavior. These results support social identity
theories which stress the importance of specific identity goals and norms for behavior prediction.
These findings illuminate the need to take social factors into consideration when predicting how
values will motivate behavior within specific contexts and domains. They also show that there
are important differences in the ways which specific identities and overarching affliliative
tendencies are related to the expression of moral values. While both specific and general group
identification can predict moral concern extremity, only specific group identification can explain
how those values predict behavioral outcomes.
Finally, we found evidence that superordinate identities motivate energy-saving behavior
when individuals believe that it is the social norm for people like themselves to act. However,
we also found that when an individual believes that their ingroup members have already adopted
an energy saver identity, they are less likely to be motivated to act than if they believe that others
of their social group do not identify as energy savers. It is possible that tying these two identities
together provides a situation wherein the group identity automatically affords the individual the
energy saving identity. However, because these results were unexpected, further research would
have to explore these relationships to better understand why identity pairing motivates differently
than typical prevalence information or identity-framing techniques.
These results lay the groundwork for exploring the systematic differences between
individuals who identify strongly with groups and those who have weak group identification.
Most of the prior literature on the effects of extreme in-group affiliation has focused on racial
prejudices and the ways in which majority groups derogate out-groups (McCoy & Major, 2003).
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 34
However, very little research has previously explored how group identities of extreme personal
importance affect morality. Azzi and colleagues (2010) found that group identities do affect
moral concerns, but the current research expands upon those findings by indicating that
individuals who strongly identify with their group have significantly different patterns of
moralization than those who only slightly identify with a group or those who do not identify with
a group. These results extend the literature for the impact of social identities on the extremity of
moral judgments and behaviors, and provide support for social psychological theories which
indicate that morality serves an important social function by binding individuals together into
communities of shared values and concerns (Forsyth, Boyle, & McDaniel, 2008; Graham &
Haidt, 2010).
Additionally, morals can be broken down into individual-focused and group-focused
moral beliefs (Emler, 2002; Graham et al, 2011). Individual-focused moral beliefs are beliefs that
set one apart from the group and help to bolster one’s need for uniqueness. In comparison,
group-focused moral beliefs help bring communities together and endorsement of these beliefs
should increase the likelihood that an individual will feel like they are an important part of a
group. Snyder and DeBono’s (1985) research on the function of different types of attitudes
suggest that those group-focused moral convictions might be more affected by social primes than
individual-focused moral convictions.
Limitations and Future Directions
Despite the consistent pattern of results across moralizing identities and content, this
study does have limitations in its generalizability. We used a cross-sectional design, which only
allowed us to see the participants’ current beliefs and group identification and how these
constructs interact. Because of this design, we can only infer correlation, and not
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 35
causation. Therefore, further research would need to be conducted in order to determine the
causal direction of the relationships between moral concern, group identification and moral
behaviors. It is possible that these three constructs interact bi-directionally: moral concerns
which line up with specific social groups and moral behaviors congruent with those groups are
mutually reinforcing.
One way that future studies could attempt to address the causal mechanisms behind these
relationships is by experimentally manipulating group identity to look at effects for moralization,
and conversely manipulating moralization to look for its effects of group
identification. Because value systems and concerns are so deeply tied with our communities,
and feelings of shared values can motivate behavior, it would be important to test whether
thinking about morality can also lead to an increase in social identity importance. In order to
address whether the relationship between morality and identity is bi-directional, researchers
could present moralization questionnaires followed by social group identity affiliation strength
questions to see if thinking about one’s moral concerns can also increase one’s sense of group
importance.
Future studies should also experimentally address the effects of both specific social
identification and interdependent mindsets on moralization and behavior, since our initial
findings indicate that these two types of affiliative tendencies can have differing implications for
behavior. While either overall group mindsets or social identity importance are related to
moralization across domains, only specific social identities predicted how moral values affect
behavior. However, since our studies addressing these constructs were not experimental, we
were not able to manipulate these mindsets. Follow up research should test these relationships
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 36
directly in order to understand the mechanism by which morality and identity motivate
behaviors.
Finally, additional research would need to be conducted to explore the unexpected flip in
identity-framing motivation we found in Study 3. By experimentally manipulating the presence
of the superordinate identity (i.e., Trojan Identity) with high and low prevalence information,
follow up research could help explain why tying two identities together would have different
effects than tying an action to an identity.
Conclusion
Value-laden situations and decisions permeate every level of the social and psychological
world. The peoples we come into contact with have expanded to include many different cultures and
ways of life. With this change, it has become increasingly important for scientists to understand how
morally charged decisions are made so that societies can adapt to the plurality of different (and often
conflicting) cultural value systems. Understanding how social contexts interact with individuals’
moral values can help researchers develop effective communication methods for interactions in
pluralistic social situations. How morality motivates through identity can perhaps explain why
we sometimes seem hypocritical, as whether you believe you should act or not may depend not
on whether acting is moral in the abstract, but on what it means to act in the moment as a
member of a community.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 37
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IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 44
Appendix A
Social Group Identification Measure
How important to your sense of identity is …
1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Somewhat important
4. Not very important
5. Not at all important
1. being a citizen of the United States?
2. your job?
3. your home town?
4. your home state?
5. your religion?
6. your social class?
7. your preferred political party?
8. your favorite sports team?
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 45
Appendix B
Moralization of Everyday Life Scale (MELS)
Many people are used to thinking about morality as it relates to a few controversial public-policy
issues: abortion, gay marriage, gun control, the death penalty, etc. This survey is instead about
the things that people do in their own daily lives. Below you’ll be presented with a variety of
situations and be asked to say whether certain behaviors in those situations would be morally
wrong. Please use the following scale from 1 to 7, to indicate the degree to which you judge the
behavior to be wrong (if at all).
Not at all wrong; Very wrong
has nothing to do an extremely
with morality immoral action
1 -------------- 2 -------------- 3 -------------- 4 -------------- 5 -------------- 6 -------------- 7
1. Lying about a test score when reporting performance to a teacher.
2. Faking an injury to collect on insurance.
3. Parking in a handicapped parking spot when not handicapped.
4. Using someone else’s toothbrush without his or her permission.
5. Packing for a trip at the last minute.
6. Choosing to wake up late, despite having a busy day ahead.
7. Ignoring a woman struggling to carry bags of groceries.
8. Ignoring a driver whose care is stuck in the snow.
9. An 18-year-old girl breaking an abstinence vow to have premarital sex.
10. Drinking 10 beers at a party and vomiting several times.
11. Defecating, not washing one’s hands, and then preparing dinner for oneself.
12. Wearing a pair of pants for three weeks without washing them.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 46
Appendix C
Moral Foundations Questionnaire
Part 1. When you decide whether something is morally right or wrong, to what extent are the
following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:
[0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and
wrong)
[1] = not very relevant
[2] = slightly relevant
[3] = somewhat relevant
[4] = very relevant
[5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I
judge right and wrong)
______Whether or not someone suffered emotionally
______Whether or not some people were treated differently from others
______Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country
______Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority
______Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency
______Whether or not someone was good at math
______Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable
______Whether or not someone acted unfairly
______Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group
______Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society
______Whether or not someone did something disgusting
______Whether or not someone was cruel
______Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights
______Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty
______Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder
______Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 47
Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:
[-3] [-2] [-1] [1] [2] [3]
Strongly Moderatel Slightly Slightly Moderately Strongly
disagree disagree disagree agree agree agree
______Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.
______When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that
everyone is treated fairly.
______I am proud of my country’s history.
______Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
______People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.
______It is better to do good than to do bad.
______One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.
______Justice is the most important requirement for a society.
______People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something
wrong.
______Men and women each have different roles to play in society.
______I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.
______It can never be right to kill a human being.
______ I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children
inherit nothing.
______ It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.
______ If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey
anyway because that is my duty.
______ Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 48
Appendix D
Moralization of Politics Scale (MOPS)
Please indicate which two issues are the MOST important challenges you think our country is
dealing with today.
Please indicate which two issues are the LEAST important challenges you think our country is
dealing with today.
1. Abortion
2. The unemployment rate
3. Illegal immigration
4. Education
5. Same sex marriage
6. The environment
7. Social security
8. Health care reform
9. The deficit
10. The housing crisis
11. Income inequality
12. Taxes
[Show two most important issues, two least important, and two randomly selected issues.]
To what extent is your position on each of the following a reflection of your core moral beliefs
and convictions?
Not at all ------------ Slightly------------- Moderately ------------- Much ------------- Very Much
IDENTITY, MORAL VALUES, AND ACTION 49
Appendix E
Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale
Try to imagine actually doing the following things, and indicate how much money someone
would have to pay you, (anonymously and secretly) to be willing to do each thing. For each
action, assume that nothing bad would happen to you afterwards. Also assume that you cannot
use the money to make up for your action.
1. $0 (I’d do it for free)
2. $10
3. $100
4. $1,000
5. $10,000
6. $100,000
7. $1 million dollars or more
8. never for any amount of money
1. Cheat in a game of cards played for money with some people you don’t know well
2. Throw out a box of ballots, during an election, to help your favored candidate win
3. Sign a secret-but-binding pledge to only hire people of your race in your company
4. Say something bad about your nation (which you don't believe to be true) while calling in,
anonymously, to a talk-radio show in a foreign nation
5. Break off all communications with your immediate and extended family for 1 year
6. Burn your country’s flag, in private (nobody else sees you)
7. Curse your parents, to their face. (You can apologize and explain one year later)
8. Make a disrespectful hand gesture to your boss, teacher, or professor
9. Throw a rotten tomato at a political leader you dislike. (remember, you will not get caught)
10. Sign a piece of paper that says “I hereby sell my soul, after my death, to whoever has this
piece of paper”
11. Get a blood transfusion of one pint of disease-free, compatible blood from a convicted child
molester
12. Attend a performance art piece in which all participants (including you) have to act like
animals for 30 minutes, including crawling around naked and urinating on stage
13. Sit in a bathtub full of ice water for 10 minutes
14. Wear a sign on your back for one month that says, in large letters, “I am an idiot.”
15. Experience a severe headache for two weeks
16. Kick a dog in the head, hard
17. Make cruel remarks to an overweight person about his or her appearance
18. Stick a pin into the palm of a child you don’t know
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
Research on moral convictions has shown that moral (vs. nonmoral) attitudes are uniquely resistant to persuasion attempts and predictive of behavior (Bauman & Skitka, 2009). Further, the moral values individuals hold are strongly tied to their cultural and familial backgrounds, and help bind individuals into communities of shared values (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Three studies directly investigate the relationship between social influences and moral convictions as part of a broader effort to integrate individual‐ and group‐level processes underlying moral convictions. In Study 1, the tendency to identify with social groups was associated with moralization across multiple moral domains. In Study 2, social group identification was associated with increased moralization of political issues and higher levels of reported voting behavior in a nationally representative sample. More specifically, political identification—but not overall group identification—explained the relationship between moralization of political issues and voting behavior. In Study 3, invoking superordinate identities (e.g., school identity) had a motivating impact on energy‐saving purchase intentions. Social identities provide contextual information through which people identify moral concerns and decide how to act to pursue moral and social goals.
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Johnson, Kate Marie
(author)
Core Title
Identity is the lens through which moral values predict action
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
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Master of Arts
Degree Program
Psychology
Publication Date
08/28/2014
Defense Date
06/18/2014
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