University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Land usage rights and hukou reform

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Land usage rights and hukou reform

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LAND USAGE RIGHTS AND HUKOU REFORM

by

Nancy Chao

___________________________________________________________

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)

August 2014

Copyright 2014 Nancy Chao

ii

Dedication

This master thesis is dedicated to the faculty, staff, administrators and graduates at the
University of Southern California. Fight On!

iii

Acknowledgements

Education is a continuous learning process and I am beyond blessed to have shared this
journey with many exceptional individuals.
First and foremost, I am greatly indebted to three phenomenal faculty members at the
University of Southern California, Professor Baizhu Chen, Professor Eugene Cooper and
Professor Brett Sheehan for their insightful advice and continued support. I especially thank
Professor Chen for taking on the task of chairing my thesis committee and guiding me to
constructively analyze China’s complex land and hukou reform. I thank Professor Cooper and
Professor Sheehan for their generous feedback and constant encouragement through countless
revisions.
Additionally, I thank Dr. Zhang Ying at the University of California, Irvine for
suggesting ways in which to conduct comprehensive research using a variety of scholarly tools
and resources. I also thank Professor Emeritus, Frank Marmolejo at Irvine Valley College for
his thoughtful comments and assistance with numerous manuscript edits.
Last but not least, I am extremely grateful for my extraordinary family. My father, a PhD,
motivates me to continuously broaden my knowledge horizons. My mother, an entrepreneur,
inspires me to take risks and never let failure get the best of me. My brother, a double major in
Political Science and Sociology, challenges my every scholarly endeavor with a healthy dose of
sibling competition.
Thank you all for making my master thesis a reality and I truly appreciate your patience
throughout the process.

iv

Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Acknowledgements iii

List of Tables v

Abstract vi

Introduction 1

Section One: Moving Land Rights 5
Land Reform: Pre-1949 5
Land Reform: Post-1949 15
Land Reform Suggestions 21

Section Two: Moving Labor (The Hukou System) 26
Hukou History 26
Hukou Reform History 32
Hukou Reform Suggestions 33

Section Three: Moving Capital (Land Usage Rights and Hukou System) 38

Section Four: Policy Challenges 40

Conclusion 42

Bibliography 45

v

List of Tables

Table 1: Class category of Nanchang (a rural village) in Guangzhou Province, 16
China from 1948-1949

Table 2: Variations on the Premodern Hukou System 19-20
Table 3: China’s Household Responsibility System characteristics post-1980 28-29
Table 4: Major hukou reforms 1984 – 2010 32-33

vi

Abstract

Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) founding in 1921, scholars worldwide have
examined and discussed the Party’s core policies: land usage rights and hukou system. However,
limited analyses have been dedicated to the interrelatedness of these two reforms. Therefore, this
paper reviews origins of the CCP’s land reform in rural China starting with the Jiangxi-Soviet
Republic (early 1930s) to developments during the anti-Japanese struggle (1937-1945) and civil
war with the Kuomintang (1945-1949) and investigates a series of land policies post-1949.
Among many impacts, these land reforms have contributed positively to increased governmental
control in rural regions but negatively to loss of social equity for rural residents.
Similarly, China’s household registration or Hukou （户口）System, an institution
formed to restrict population mobility, contributed positively to the CCP’s central planning but
negatively limited rural dwellers’ access to state-sponsored benefits. Variations of hukou-like
residency systems have been institutionalized in China for thousands of years but post-1949, the
CCP’s goal was to track “targeted people”
1
and thus prevented anti-revolutionary movements.
An unintended consequence of CCP’s hukou system created the distinction between rural and
urban residents. This classification resulted in the uneven economic development between
various regions across China as the CCP policies favored urbanites through social benefits.
For the past three decades, China’s leaders have been reforming both land usage rights
and hukou system. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated these changes, opened China’s market to
the world, and contributed to the country’s unprecedented growth. More recently, in November

1
CCP created profiles to classify anti-revolutionaries, KMT members, or anyone who challenged
its rule.

vii

2013, Chinese Communist Party’s Third Plenary Session of the eighteenth Central Committee,
chaired by President Xi Jinping, marked the thirty-fifth anniversary of Deng’s previous market
reforms. Although the 2013 plenum spoke highly of Deng’s plenum, China’s market was
unevenly developed between rural and urban areas. Xi’s administration aimed to address
cumulative effect of these reforms while building a harmonious modern socialist country. This
paper first examines China’s land policies and hukou system in a historical context, and then
discusses various reform impacts, followed by the analyses of Xi’s policy challenges.

1

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established The People’s Republic of China (PRC),
a single party socialist state, on October 1, 1949 under leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong. In
conjunction with the CCP, Mao began governing this newly founded nation through initiation of
various reforms. In accordance with the CCP’s major policies, Mao solidified his control with
land reform and a household registration, or Hukou System. Initially, Mao used Marxist ideals to
blame China’s backwardness, foreign invasion and oppression on the feudalistic exploitation of
landlords.
2
Then to dismantle such a fundamentally flawed system, rural land was confiscated
from landlords, ownership transferred to the state and land usage rights redistributed to peasants.
Mao’s land reform policies were based on decades of experimentation and dated back to the
Jiangxi-Soviet era (1930s).
Mao’s initial phase of land reform in the 1930s could not be fully executed as the newly
founded CCP lacked political strength and governmental structure. However, during this period,
Mao quickly learned that power resided in the mobilization of masses so he continued to cater
CCP’s land policies to the largest population group, peasants. Although Mao scaled back land
reclamation during the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) collaboration against anti-Japanese war
efforts, he cleverly utilized policies to allow landlords to “loan” their lands to peasants and
introduced a rent reduction of 25 percent. It was not until establishment of the PRC in 1949
which ultimately dismantled the landlord class and radically transformed land usage rights. For
the first time in China, no longer would 10 percent of the population own 90 percent of the land.
Rather, land belonged to the collective (jiti). Landlord resistance existed, even violent at times,

2
C.K. Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1959), 132.

2

but these incidents were no match for the peasant masses. By 1953, virtually all privately owned
rural land in China had been “transferred” to the public domain. This move unfairly eliminated
the landlords’ rights to their privately owned property while peasants gained land usage
privileges at the landlords’ expense. Thus, the CCP’s land reform not only reallocated a great
amount of China’s wealth but also created unanticipated social inequalities.
To further promote collectivization in rural regions, agricultural production across China
was centrally planned by the CCP. This type of collective farming, also known as People’s
Communes, mandated farming quotas for the successful achievement of which farmers received
compensation regardless of market demand. Through this process, farmers lost operational
freedom and their motivations to farm. Consequently, poor agricultural performance followed
which unfortunately coincided with the Great Leap Forward and caused widespread famine
among the rural areas.
3

During this phase of CCP’s land reform, Mao expanded the collectivization of land. By
setting up communes, the CCP essentially reclaimed lands that were initially distributed to
peasant masses and then “transferred” them into the collective. Similar to Mao’s original land
reform, this second wave unfairly eliminated peasants’ usage rights to their previously allocated
land while the CCP obtained land at the peasants’ expense. Thus, the CCP’s land policy once
again shifted China’s wealth and further increased unanticipated social inequalities.
At the same time, the CCP stabilized its regime by implementing a strict household
registration system known as hukou originally used to target anti-Communists. The system

3
Great Leap Forward was CCP’s policy on rural industrialization (1958-1961). It was led by
Mao and aimed to rapidly transform the rural agrarian economy to a more industrialized
economy. Farmers were reallocated to work in non-agricultural industries such as steel
production.

3

required citizens to register with their local authorities, and to secure approvals prior to travel.
However, shortly after hukou’s implementation, the CCP’s goal of distinguishing between rural
and urban residents became more apparent. Not only did hukou target anti-Communists and
restrict population mobility, but it also determined central resource allocation. Those with rural
status were not entitled to state-provided housing, employment, education and other social
welfare benefits. Consequently, hukou’s structural inequalities created uneven development
between rural and urban regions.
Under a centrally planned economy, the CCP simultaneously focused on land reform and
hukou system implementation. Once land and agricultural production was controlled by the CCP,
labor movement had to be restricted as well. This way, the CCP centrally mandated production
quotas per farming household and prevented any dissent by restricting its population’s ability to
mobilize. The CCP carried out its plan for three subsequent decades under Mao, but inefficient
land usage, poor agricultural production and uneven development caused China to economically
stagnate.
It was not until 1978 that Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor, shifted China from a
centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented economy. Deng replaced People’s
Communes with a family-based contract system where farmers were still required to meet a
quota but if they produced beyond it, the additional food could be sold on the market at
unregulated prices. After years of stagnation, agricultural output increased dramatically and
farmer poverty rates reduced significantly.
Another area of Deng’s focus was the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in 1979,
starting with Shenzhen and later along coastal cities where the market economy came to

4

dominate economic transactions.
4
These SEZs attracted foreign investment and provided job
opportunities for rural migrant workers. Consequently, Deng’s administration allowed more
flexible land usage rights, such as – “transfer, negotiation, tender and auction”, and increased
mobility for migrants with rural hukou.
5

Although Deng opened up China’s market to the outside world, his reforms did not
completely solve the cumulative effect of Mao’s policies: inefficiencies in the land market and
uneven development between rural and urban regions. Thirty-five years later, during the Third
Plenary Session of the eighteenth Central Committee, Xi’s administration aimed to improve the
“formation of a land market for both urban and rural regions” ( 建立城乡统一的建设用地市场)
and increase “integration of urban and rural development” ( 健全城乡发展一体化体制机制) by
2020.
I perceive Xi’s 2013 goals as extensions of Deng’s 1978 land usage rights and hukou
reform. The paper first examines origins, developments as well as challenges of China’s land
use policies and hukou registration. It then provides four recommendations for Xi’s
administration: 1) allowing more rural land use rights through marketization of land certificates,
2) assisting rural migrant workers in towns, small and medium sized cities through residency
changes, 3) supporting rural development through reallocation of central government funds and 4)
assessing potential policy challenges.
6
Similar to Deng’s lasting legacy, I believe if these
reforms are handled successfully, reform of both land usage rights and the hukou system could
be the centerpieces of President Xi’s administration.

4
Xing Quan Zhang, “Urban Land Reform in China,” Land Use Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1997)
187.
5
Zhang, “Urban Land Reform in China”, 191.
6
My recommendation framework was modeled after Cheng Li’s article “Hu Jintao’s Land
Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety”, published in China Leadership Monitor.

5

Section One: Moving Land Usage Rights

In the 2013 plenary session, the CCP discussed a modern market system where products
and services are exchanged under competitive conditions. The CCP described this system as
having enterprises’ independence of management ( 企业自主经营) and consumers’ freedom of
choice ( 消费者自由选择). The role of the Party, therefore, was to remove market barriers, raise
efficiency and increase fairness of resource allocation. In order to achieve this modern market
system, the CCP acknowledged that an area of reform surrounded the formation of a more
unified land market in both urban regions and rural areas ( 建立城乡统一的建设用地市场).
7

Land Reform: Pre-1949
To better understand China’s current land usage rights and the significance of changes in
contemporary times, it is necessary to have a basic overview of China’s land policies. Prior to
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, land reform movement has been
categorized into three separate periods: 1930-1934 (Jiangxi-Soviet experiment), 1937-1945
(Sino-Japanese wartime moderation) and 1945-1949 (post-war development).
8
After 1949,

7
Liu and Zhao, “The Third Plenary Session,” 1. Original text: 全会提出，建设统一开放、竞
争有序的市场体系，是使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用的基础。必须加快形成企业自主
经营、公平竞争，消费者自由选择、自主消费，商品和要素自由流动、平等交换的现代市
场体系，着力清除市场壁垒，提高资源配置效率和公平性。要建立公平开放透明的市场规
则，完善主要由市场决定价格的机制，建立城乡统一的建设用地市场，完善金融市场体系，
深化科技体制改革。
8
John Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Institutional Transformation in
Agriculture (New York: Praeger, 1973), 2.

6

numerous phases included the 1950 Agrarian Reform Law, mid-1950s establishment of People’s
Communes, 1978 household responsibility system and 2008 land reform resolution.
9

Zhang Xingquan, a scholar in environmental planning at University of Strathclyde,
argued that the CCP’s land policies were mainly based on Marxist theory and principally
involved the collectivization of land.
10
The widely known three main factors of production were
capital, labor and land. However, Marxists only recognized labor as the sole creator of products
because land had no value unless labor was added.
11
Therefore, those who did not work on their
land but received monetary gain such as rent, income and profit were perceived as exploiters of
labor. Consequently, the CCP explicitly pledged to reform the system of landholding as its first
step in transforming social, economic and political order of the entire nation.
12

During the period from 1930-1934, John Wong, a Lecturer of Economic at University of
Singapore, argued that China’s land reform policy embodied Soviet’s influence and reflected the
CCP’s optimism of an easy solution to the immense rural poverty problem.
13
Based on Marxist
ideology, the Communist leaders believed regional peasant issues resulted from China’s
defective feudal land tenure structure where landlords exploited the workers. Thus, equalization
of land ownership was frequently discussed among the leaders but prior to 1930, lack of the
CCP’s political power prevented advancement of any concrete land reform policy.

9
Cheng Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” China Leadership
Monitor, No. 27, 2009, 1.
10
Zhang, “Urban Land Reform in China,” 188.
11
Zhang, “Urban Land Reform in China,” 188.
12
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 132.
13
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 2.

7

Additionally, Chinese Communist leaders were inexperienced in coping with the agrarian
problem so Wong labeled this phase as the “Jiangxi-Soviet Experiment”.
14
Wong coined this
term to represent various land reform measures during the Jiangxi-Soviet (also known as
Chinese Soviet Republic) from 1931-1934.
15
In May 1930, Li Lisan, a top CCP leader, along
with the party produced the first national land reform law: Provisional Land Law of the Chinese
Soviet. Aside from the law’s nomenclature, the Soviets’ 1928 land program influenced China’s
formulation of land reform policy and contained the following main points:
1. All land belonging to landlords and counterrevolutionaries, and land in the
possession of such rural institutions as ancestral shrines, temples, etc., is to be
confiscated without compensation.
2. For rich peasants, only the land rented out is subject to confiscation.
3. After land redistribution by the Soviet government, land transfers and leases
and mortgages are prohibited.
4. The xiang (administrative village) is the basic unit of land redistribution.
Methods of redistribution are to be determined by the xiang congress of Soviet
delegates: either equal distribution of all land in the xiang or redistribution of
only the confiscated land without affecting the original cultivating peasants; the
redistribution according to either the number of persons or the ability to work.
5. Large farms are not to be broken up but organized as collectives.
6. Allotment of land to the soldiers of the Red Army will have to wait until the
formation of the National Soviet Government.
7. Land need not be allotted to the agricultural laborers, who are already under the
protection of the labor legislation of the Soviet government.
16

Serious dissent over Li’s land reform policies existed among CCP factions because Wong
argued the prohibition of land transactions and formation of “collectives” would alienate peasant
masses. For instance, the CCP believed prohibition of free business transactions: buying and
selling land caused the Soviets to suffer difficult economic conditions. Also, the CCP thought
collective farming and all other premature socialistic measures would consolidate the interest of

14
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 2.
15
Jiangxi was a province located in Southeast China.
16
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 4.

8

rich peasants and neglect other peasant classes.
17
Consequently, the law was revised two months
later and the CCP eliminated the prohibition of land sales as well as creation of collective farms
while granting land to Red Army members without delay.
18
Meanwhile, Li’s land policy
received open criticism from the CCP’s Central Committee during 1930’s plenum and ultimately
he was forced to resign from the Party’s Politburo in November the same year.
As Li fell from grace within the CCP, Mao Zedong (communist leader of the Jiangxi-
Soviet and later Chairman of China) projected himself as a more moderate leader with respect to
China’s land reform policy. Mao’s version was different from Li’s “rightist” ideals but did not
deviate from the Comintern’s central policy line: confiscation of land from landlords and
redistribution among peasants.
19
Mao’s land initiatives also underwent a process of several
revisions and by 1930, Mao’s new Land Law differed from Li’s Provisional Land Law. In
particular, Mao’s land policy did not favor the rich peasant class and was more comprehensive
including provisions on debts, land tax and rural wages.
20
The main features of Mao’s 31-article
Land Law contained the following points:
1. Land belonging to the landlords, bad gentry, rural institutions and rich peasants is to
be confiscated and turned over to the Soviet government.
2. The confiscated land is to be redistributed equally among the people irrespective of
sex or age.
3. In order to destroy the feudal forces and to deal a quick blow to the rich peasants,
land redistribution is to be carried out in accordance with the principles of “take from
those who have better and give to those who have worse” and “take from those who
have a surplus and give to those who have a shortage”.

17
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 5.
18
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 4-5.
19
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 5-6. Comintern was an abbreviation
for Communist International, an international organization initiated in Moscow that fought for
the creation of an international Soviet republic.
20
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 7.

9

4. Members of the Red Amy, of the Soviet government, and of the party are to be
granted land in land redistribution. Land is also not denied to landlords, rich peasants,
and even bad gentry.
21

Wong argued the most significant contribution by Mao in the “Jiangxi-Soviet experiment”
was his introduction of two methods to the land redistribution process: “from the better to worse”
and “from the surplus to shortage”.
22
Ideologically, this equal-share redistribution mechanism
should have eliminated the comparative advantages landlords had in terms of the quantity and
the quality of the land. However, in practice, substantial disparities continued to persist because
neither the reclaim process nor the redistribution structure was sufficiently efficient in the
1930s.
23
For instance, rich and middle class peasants manipulated the distribution process so the
land was never “equally” adjusted. Consequently, Wong claimed these failed attempts led to the
CCP’s pendulum on land reform to swing from the “right” to the “left”.
Another important aspect of land reclamation from landlords and distribution to peasants,
the CCP policy also included the allocation of land to the Red Army. This strategic approach,
employed by the CCP, attracted potential military personnel and communist members which
further strengthened the Party and began to combat its initial land reform issue of weak political
influence across China’s rural regions. In essence, this land move benefited the CCP, its
members, and peasants at the cost of landlords.
In November 1931, the communists adopted the Land Law of the Chinese Soviet
Republic under sponsorship of the Russia-Returned Student Group.
24
Wong claimed the law’s

21
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 7.
22
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 7.
23
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 8.
24
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 8-9.

10

radical and “leftist” nature represented the CCP’s most extremist land reform measures so far.
The 14-article Soviet Land Law can be summarized as follows:
1) All the lands of the feudal landlords, warlords, gentry, etc., irrespective of whether
they are cultivators or rent them out or leases, are subject to confiscation without
compensation.
2) The former owners of the confiscation lands are not entitled to any land allotments in
land redistribution.
3) As the Chinese rich peasants are at one and the same time semi-landlords and usurers,
their land shall also be confiscated. Afterward, they may be given land of poorer
quality.
4) All peasants are entitled to an equal share in land redistribution. Members of the Red
Army, including those who are not natives of the land reform areas, shall also be
given land.
25

The 1931 Soviet Land Law clearly left out Mao’s 1930 land policy which involved two
compensatory adjustment principles during the land redistribution process: quantity and quality
of land. Once again, landlords and rich peasants were depicted as exploiters and the Soviet Land
Law sparked some excessive, harsh treatments against them. In response, Mao introduced more
moderate measures to alleviate the backlash because he was not in favor of execution, but
believed, rather, in transformation. In particular, Mao preferred to transform landlords and rich
peasants into “revolutionary” peasants through political education.
26

Additionally, the CCP’s 1931 policy expanded land entitlement to the Red Army
members who might not be natives of rural regions. This provided more incentives for people to
join and support the Red Army. However, the CCP and its members, once again, further
benefited from the land previously owned by landlords.
The Jiangxi-Soviet land reform experiment lasted until 1934 and Wong claimed that none
of the land reform policies of either Li, Mao or Soviet’s Land Laws were properly implemented.

25
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 9.
26
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 10.

11

For instance, Li’s lenient attitude toward rich peasants was labeled as pro-rich-peasant policy.
By comparison, Mao tried to solve the rich peasant problem faced by Li, but his land reform
policy was unclear on the redistribution process. As for the Soviet Land Law, Wong argued that
it was more of an ideological dissension against Li than an improved version based on actual
circumstances or on the operational experiences of previous land reform activities
27
.
Consequently, Wong characterized land reforms during 1930-1934 as an “experimental stage”.
Wong indicated the second period of land reform occurred during 1937-1945 and labeled
it as Sino-Japanese wartime moderation. As the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the CCP
immediately declared allegiance to the National Government of the Kuomintang (KMT) to
defend China against Japanese invasion. Among other concessions, the CCP announced the
discontinuation of its policy on forcible land confiscation from landlords and rich peasants.
28

Mao claimed the CCP’s shift on land reform policy was initiated in the wake of anti-Japanese
struggle and not from the inaccuracy of previous revolutionary progress. Mao further explained:
…in the present circumstances, there is a possibility that the bourgeoisie will once again
cooperate with us and join in the resistance of Japan… In order to end the internal armed conflict,
the Communist Party is willing to discontinue the policy of forcible confiscation of the land of
the landlords and is prepared to solve the land problem by legislative and other appropriate
means in the course of building the new democratic republic. The first question to be settled is
whether China’s land will be owned by the Japanese or Chinese. Since the solution of the land
problem of the peasants is predicated on the defense of China, it is absolutely necessary for us to
return from the method of forcible confiscation to appropriate new methods.
29

The 1938 Shanxi-Jiangsu-Ningxia Border Area Land Regulations were formulated with
the need to fight against Japanese forces in those regions. This stipulated the CCP’s restoration
of landlord ownership rights and allowed owners to “loan” their lands to peasants. It also

27
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 12.
28
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 16.
29
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 16.

12

reflected the basic principle of the KMT’s land policy which included rent reduction of 25
percent. Both the CCP and the KMT considered this initiative, and the possibility that after such
reduction, the tenant would have to pay no more than 37.5 percent as rent to the landlord.
30

However, the CCP did not implement rent reduction on a large scale until 1940 because it was
more preoccupied with anti-Japanese war efforts.
In 1942, the CCP’s United Front with the KMT had been severely strained by the New
Fourth Army Incident ( 新四軍事件)
31
. In an effort to gain regional support, the CCP instituted
its own rent reduction program.
32
The CCP announced its first major wartime land policy in the
form of a resolution called “Decisions of the Central Committee of Land Policy in the Anti-
Japanese Based Areas.”
33
The three basic principles indicated:
1) Recognize that peasants (including hired farm hands) constitute the basic strength of
the anti-Japanese war as well as the battle of production. Accordingly it is the policy
of the Party to assist the peasants, reduce feudal exploitation by the landlords, carry
out reductions of rent and interest rates in order to improve their living conditions and
enhance their enthusiasm for the anti-Japanese war and for production.
2) Recognize that most of the landlords are anti-Japanese and that some of the
enlightened gentry also favor democratic reforms. Accordingly the policy of the
Party is to help the peasants by reducing feudal exploitation but not to liquidate feudal
exploitation entirely, much less to attack the enlightened gentry who support
democratic reforms. The policy of liquidating feudal exploitation should be adopted
only against stubbornly unrepentant traitors.
3) Recognize that the capitalist mode of production is the more progressive method in
present-day China and that the bourgeoisie represents the comparatively more
progressive social elements and political forces in China today. Therefore, the policy
of the Party is neither to weaken capitalism and the bourgeoisie nor to weaken the
rich peasant class and their productive force.
34

30
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 17.
31
Although the CCP and the KMT had different viewpoints on what exactly happened, both
sides agreed this event signified the termination of mutual cooperation to fight the Japanese.
32
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 17.
33
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 17.
34
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 17-18.

13

The CCP’s 1942 rent reduction policy was vigorously implemented until 1944 but some
peasant activists treated landlords harshly while some landlords failed to follow land rules.
These clashes resulted in physical violence though much smaller compared to the large-scale
upheaval during the Jiangxi-Soviet period. From this experience, the CCP learned that land
reform not based on revolutionary violence, increased its political popularity, and positively
impacted agricultural production throughout the anti-Japanese regions.
35
More importantly, the
rent reduction policy transferred the badly needed capital from landlords to poor peasants for
production, and motivated peasants to produce.
36

During the post-war development period, from 1945 to 1949, the CCP used North and
Northeast China as the new testing ground for its land reform program. These policies were
mainly created under civil war conditions, with activities frequently coordinated with Mao-type
guerrilla warfare.
37
In 1945, the Sino-Japanese War left China badly disorganized and a Civil
War between the CCP and the KMT was imminent. The CCP retained control in 10 bases, or
“liberated areas” and all were predominately situated in Northern China. The CCP’s land reform
continued to pursue rent reduction in its bases including Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and the central
China region.
38

In 1946, the CCP conducted “rent reduction inspection” and found that landlords in some
areas staged fake rent reduction or employed manipulation for the purposes of evasion.
Meanwhile, negotiations with the KMT were breaking down and civil war was on the horizon, so
the CCP issued a secret directive to rural cadres with respect to land policies. Wong argued this

35
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 18.
36
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 20.
37
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 27.
38
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 31.

14

was the CCP’s attempt to mobilize the masses to gain support against the KMT. Under the May
4, 1946 directive, the government purchased surplus land from landlords, issued land bonds in
return and then sold the acquired land to poor peasants at low prices.
39
This policy redistributed
land through a form of market system and Wong claimed it was the CCP’s closest move towards
a genuine peaceful land reform.
Land redistribution financed by government bonds was expensive, and in 1947 KMT
forces took over Yenan, the CCP’s capital and birthplace of its regulations. Thus, the CCP’s
1946 land policy could not have been fully implemented across all regions, and land
redistribution ranged unevenly from 16 percent in Northeast China to 80 percent in Shanxi,
Hubei, Shandong, Hunan border regions.
40
Additionally, the Civil War radicalized the CCP’s
mild land policy and shifted their “soft” agrarian line to a “hard” one. This resulted in the CCP’s
use of military force to violently reclaim land from landlords, and later landlords sought revenge
against the peasants as KMT troops returned. These civil war activities became increasingly
brutal and disorderly.
Large-scale land reform occurred in North and Northeast China from 1947-1948 as the
CCP tried to appeal to peasant masses still under KMT rule. In particular, the CCP promulgated
the Outline Land Law in October 1947 which abolished landownership rights, called for the
cancellation of existing debts and equal land distribution to all.
41
Unlike the 1946 land directive,
this policy not only eliminated the landlord class but also provided no compensation of any kind
to landlords.

39
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 34.
40
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 35.
41
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China. “All” included landlords, rich
peasants, KMT officials, and members of the KMT armed forces.

15

Land Reform: Post-1949
The three land movements prior to 1949 provided the CCP with opportunities to modify
certain key policy issues and refine the techniques of implementation of subsequent land
reforms.
42
It also represented a strategy to garner support for the Party and provided incentives
to join the Red Army. Soon after Communist came into power, land ownership was radically
transformed starting with rural areas and then expanded to urban regions. In the editorial from
People’s Daily (renmin ribao), an official Chinese government newspaper dated June 30, 1950,
the CCP aimed to terminate such exploitation of labor through the elimination of private land
ownership. China’s central government declared:
The general situation is this. Landlords and rich peasants, who account for less than 10
percent of the rural population, own 70 to 80 percent of all the land, while poor peasants,
agricultural laborers and middle peasants, who account for about 90 percent of the rural
population, own only 20 to 30 percent of the land… The peasants in various places have to pay
to the landlord… the greater part of the yield from the land. Consequently, the peasants toil all
year around without getting enough to eat, while the landlords live a parasitic life. This situation
clearly indicates that the system of land ownership based on feudalistic exploitation is at the very
root of our poverty, backwardness and foreign invasion and oppression of our country; it is the
fundamental obstacle against our nation’s democratization, industrialization, independence, unity,
prosperity and being strong.
43

Based on the CCP’s pledge above, the Chinese government intended to abolish private
land ownership. The basic measure of the CCP’s 1950 agrarian reform law was to confiscate
land from the landlord class and redistribute it to peasants with insufficient or no land.
44
Field
investigations conducted during 1948-1949 by C.K. Yang, a sociology professor at University of
Pittsburg, have shown that actual figures in Nanchang, a rural village in Southern China, were

42
Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 27.
43
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 132. Yang’s bibliography indicated
that the June 30, 1950 editorial in People’s Daily (renmin ribao) reflected the basic points in Liu
Xiaoqi’s “A Report on the Problem of Land Reform,” which was the most basic document on
land reform policy after Communist accession to national power.
44
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 133.

16

even higher than People’s Daily report of 70-80 percent individual land ownership. Yang’s data
indicated that private ownership accounted for 93.8 percent of agricultural land in Nanchang.
45

However, landlords and rich peasants represented 13 percent of the population as compared to
less than 10 percent nationally. The following table was constructed by Yang to reflect the
composition of various classes in Nanchang prior to CCP’s 1950 rural land reform policy.
Table 1: Class category of Nanchang (a rural village) in Guangzhou Province, China
from 1948-1949
46

Category Approximate # of families Percentage
Landlords and rich peasants 30 13.0%
Middle peasants 70 30.4%
Poor peasants 100 43.5%
Nonagricultural 30 13.0%
Total 230 100.0%

As Yang noted, land reform started in Nanchang earlier than the rest of the province so it could
“absorb the necessary experiences” for wider application across the whole province.
47

The CCP’s 1950 “Law of Land Reform of the People’s Republic of China” explicitly
indicated that peasants must be liberated from the shackles of landlords’ parasitic existence and
gained rights to work their own lands.
48
Based on Yang’s field work, middle and poor peasant
classes in Nanjing represented roughly two-thirds of the population and Yang believed the CCP
targeted this particular class segment by granting them land. Historically, the Communist party
mobilized masses by gaining support from the majority, a formula that had been proven

45
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 41.
46
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 41.
47
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 133-134.
48
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 132.

17

successful in earlier struggles for power.
49
Consequently, confiscation and redistribution of land
followed immediately. In February 1951, land reform cadres physically showed up at landlords’
houses and informed inhabitants to move out.
50
If anyone refused to leave, their belongings
would be regarded as property of the landlord and taken out for redistribution.
51
The land
seizure from landlords commenced in Nanchang, and later similar land confiscation practices
expanded to other rural villages.
52

From 1950 to 1953, nearly 310 million Chinese were involved in carrying out the land
reform movement in newly liberated areas, and around 300 million peasants with little or no land
were allocated 47 million hectares.
53
The peasants were also relieved of rent payments
equivalent to 35 billion kilograms of grain annually. Although the 1950 act placed great
emphasis on equalization of land holdings, perfect equality was difficult to obtain. For instance,
it was challenging to determine those who earned enough to live on from nonagricultural
occupations such as handicrafts as well as small business, and thus deserved no land allocation.
54

Regardless of these forced confiscations and imperfect distributions, by 1953, virtually all
privately owned rural land in China had been “transferred” into collective and state ownership.
55

49
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 133.
50
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, page 146.
51
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, page 146.
52
Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999). Jean C. Oi, and Andrew G Walder (ed.). Property Rights
and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). Wong, John.
Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Institutional Transformation in Agriculture.
(New York, Praeger, 1973).
53
China Net ( 中国网), “1950: The Land Reform,” September 15, 2009,
http://www.china.org.cn/features/60years/2009-09/15/content_18530605.htm, accessed June 1,
2014.
54
Yang, A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition, 148. Victor D. Lippit, Land Reform
and Economic Development in China: A Study of Institutional Change and Development Finance.
(White Plains: NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1974), 98.
55
Zhang, “Urban Land Reform in China”. 188.

18

After the initial phase of the CCP’s land reform, farmers retained land usage rights but the land
ownership now belonged to the government. Consequently, this marked the elimination of
China’s feudal landlord system and destroyed the landlord class that had existed for more than
2,000 years.
56

A second wave of rural land reform commenced in the mid-1950s. During this period,
the CCP campaigned for further collectivization in rural regions. Individual farmers were
encouraged to join People’s Communes (remin gongshe), a type of rural organization aimed at
collective farming.
57
In the commune, everything was shared including such farm products as
draft animals, grain, and other food items. The communes also assigned different farming
activities on a daily basis and exercised management of rural resources: land and labor. This
policy provided a quota for farmers to produce, for which, they received compensation
regardless of market demand. Consequently, a shift to central planned production prevented
farmers’ operational freedom and discouraged their motivations to farm. As a result, poor
performance followed and famine became widespread among the countryside.
A third phase of China’s rural land reform occurred in 1978 under Deng’s administration.
The CCP launched a family-based contract system, also known as the household responsibility
system. Under this policy, farmers were still given a quota but if they produced beyond it, the
additional food could be sold on the market at unregulated prices. After 30 years of stagnation
(1950s-1980s), growth in agricultural output in the first half of the 1980s accelerated to a rate
several times the previous long-term average. According to the PRC’s State Statistical Bureau,

56
China Net ( 中国网), “1950: The Land Reform,” accessed June 1, 2014.
57
Fu Chen and John Davis, “Land Reform in Rural China since the Mid-1980s,” Sustainable
Development Department (SD), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
September 1999, 124.

19

output of three main products grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops, increased at annual rates of
4.8 percent, 7.7 percent and 13.8 percent respectively from 1978 to 1984.
58
In comparison, the
average annual rates of production increases were 2.4 percent, 1.0 percent and 0.8 percent
respectively from 1952 to 1978.
59
Additionally, the household responsibility system
significantly contributed to farmers’ incomes and reduced poverty rates. For instance, from
1978-2007, the annual net income per capita in rural areas increased from 134 yuan to 4,410
yuan while poverty rate reduced from 30.7 percent to 1.6 percent.
60

Across China, different regions reacted distinctly to Deng’s land reform based on their
own set of economic possibilities. For instance, these rural regions leveraged various
organizational forms and utilized several development strategies to meet their priorities. The
following table summarizes four new models of land reform under Deng’s household
responsibility system.
Table 2: China’s Household Responsibility System characteristics post-1980
61

Location
Household Responsibility System
Characteristics Description
Metian
Fixed Responsibility Farmland with a contract
term
 Located in Guizhou Province
 Farmers were granted the
ability to exchange, sub-rent,
and mortgage land
Pingdu Two-land System
 Located in Shandong Province
 Food land - family consumption
 Contract land - commercial
farming
Shunyi A Collective Farm
 A suburb county located
northwest of Beijing
 Farms operate independently

58
Chen and Davis, “Land Reform in rural China since mid-1980s,” 124.
59
Chen and Davis, “Land Reform in rural China since mid-1980s,” 124.
60
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 3.
61
Chen and Davis, “Land Reform in rural China since mid-1980s,” 128-134.

20

from the state or local
governments
 Any surplus in production were
distributed to employees as
bonuses based on performance
Nanhai Farmland Sharing Cooperative System
 Located in Guangdong Province
 Land is contracted to individual
farmers or farming teams based
on a bidding process

Starting in the 1990s, economic development across China became a colossal engine of
growth. During this period, local government leaders in many areas demanded farmers give up
their land usage rights for sake of the “collective”. Once regional governments reclaimed land
from farmers, they then sold these land usage rights to developers for commercial or industrial
uses. According to Yu Jianrong, a leading expert on China’s rural issues at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the state often paid low prices to collect the land from
farmers and sold it to developers with at much higher market price.
62
For instance, China Youth
Daily reported that in some regions near large and mid-sized cities, the local governments’
compensation to farmers for reclaiming of their land accounted for only 3-6% of the regular
compensation rate for land reclamation by state construction projects.
63
As a result, between
1990 and 2002, approximately 66.3 million farmers nationwide lost their land usage rights
during the collection of land (zhengdi).
64

At the 2008 plenum, Hu’s administration issued another rural land reform initiative, and
its primary objective was to provide farmers’ more financial incentives for various forms of land
usage right transfers. In particular, the resolution stated that farmers were allowed to subcontract

62
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 6.
63
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 6.
64
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 6.

21

(zhuanbao), lease (chuzu), exchange (huhuan) and transfer (zhuanrang) land or be engaged in
joint stock ownership methods (gufen hezuo).
65
Although none of these forms translated into the
privatization of land, Chinese farmers gained additional land rights that had long been denied. In
the words of Lu Xueyi, a distinguished Chinese sociologist, “Chinese farmers have finally
received ‘the admission ticket to the market economy.”
66

With Hu’s 2008 land policy changes, the next five years were filled with widespread
experiences in rural land transactions. For instance, dozens of households in Gumian,
Guangdong Province, took out mortgage loans to build five or six story houses. The sharp
increase in demand for housing resulted from development of bullet-trains that passed straight
through the village. In a November 2013 article, The Economist claimed compensation for the
land taken and housing demolished in the process paid for much of the new building.
67
Another
mortgage example came from Chongqing, Sichuan Province where farmers were allowed to
mortgage their homes starting in 2010. Although the mortgage loans were small and farmers
were “extremely cautious” borrowers, they had the option to do so.
68

Land Reform Suggestions
In essence, the CCP’s land reforms during Mao’s era first reclaimed land from landlords
and distributed among peasants as well as Red Army members. It then “transferred” land into
the collective at the expense of peasants. These moves were based on the CCP’s goal of a
centrally planned economy. However, inefficiencies of land use, poor agricultural productions

65
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 6.
66
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 6.
67
The Economist, “A World to Turn Upside Down,” November 2, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21588873-economic-issues-facing-novembers-
plenum-chinese-communist-party-none-looms-larger, accessed February 17, 2014.
68
“A World Turned Upside Down,” accessed February 17, 2014.

22

and inequalities of land allocation negatively affected China’s growth. Deng’s administration in
1978 shifted China’s centrally planned economy to a more market oriented economy by allowing
farmers additional operational freedom. The land usage rights remained an issue as regional
governments reclaimed the land from collectives and sold the rights to developers. In 2008,
Hu’s administration began to provide farmers with various land usage right transfers to prevent
local land monopolies.
Currently, Xi Jinping’s administration is expanding Hu Jintao’s 2008 land reform. A
policy document on rural issues adopted in December 2012 and made public a month later
indicated that by the end of 2017, farmers should be given certificates showing exactly where
their fields lie. Additionally, similar certificates for their housing land should be handed out “as
soon as possible”.
69
This 2012 policy was a direct extension of Hu’s 2008 land reform because
land certificates (dipiao) were initially introduced in Chongqing by mayor, Huang Qifan and
General Secretary, Bo Xilai. Dipiao allowed farmers to put their land usage rights on the market
and allow developers bid for these certificates. Of the selling price, 85 percent went to the
farmers themselves.
70
Compared to previous land reforms, this was an unusual monetary
recognition and farmers were included in the actual selling process. Chinese media indicated
that Guangzhou was in the process of launching dipiao trading as well.
71

A possible downside of dipiao trading would be the monopolization of rural land by a
small number of “landlords”. For instance, those with financial resources can acquire a
significant portion of dipiao from the open market and once the supply becomes limited, sell at a
higher price to potential buyers. This would result in the continued vulnerability of farmers not

69
“A World Turned Upside Down,” accessed February 17, 2014.
70
“A World Turned Upside Down,” accessed February 17, 2014.
71
“A World Turned Upside Down,” accessed February 17, 2014.

23

being able to truly sell their land usage rights at fair market value. Additionally, more research
and data are needed to analyze the efficiency of the dipiao market. It would be better to have
information on the percentage of the rural land in a particular region that qualify for dipiao, the
number of trades daily and the fair market value of these transactions.
To further promote China’s rural land market, special development zones (SDZs) still
need to be established. These will be structured similar to special economic development zones
(SEDZs) from the early 1980s. For instance, in these SEDZs, business and enterprises enjoyed
special privileges not available in other geographical areas. These advantages included tax
exemption and a special land use rights system. The land use rights system was first developed
to accommodate the needs of foreign direct investment which allowed investors to access land by
leasing it for a certain amount of time.
72
Investors paid up front for these land usage rights so
farmers could utilize the funds for other opportunities.
Similar to SEDZs, an area of major concern with special development zones would be the
“hidden” or “invisible” land market. In particular, rural areas with rapid development and huge
profits provided incentives for illegal land transactions. Previously, individuals took advantage
of cities in SEDZs where loopholes in land regulations and laws existed. They took risks with
little fear for consequences and adversely affected development which increased social
inequality and fueled corruption practices. For instance, Chongqing reported to have lost 13
million RMB of land revenue annually as a result of these “invisible” land markets.
73

72
Chengri Ding, “Land Policy Reform in China: Assessment and Prospects,” Land Use Policy,
Vol. 20, No. 2, 2003, 112.
73
Ding, “Land Policy Reform in China: Assessment and Prospects,” 116.

24

Although both dipiao and special development zones faced various challenges, the CCP’s
move towards a more farmer friendly land use policy cannot be dismissed. Market regulations,
controls and enforcement must be implemented to ensure these concerns are addressed. For
instance, banks or real estate companies should value dipiao prior to it being traded so farmers
are aware of its fair market price. As for illegal land transactions within SDZs, sales should go
through escrow companies where third parties could validate ownership to land usage rights and
prevent potential fraud or possible corruption.
Once the special economic zones regulations are established and enforced, the efficiency
of dipiao transfers can be enhanced. One suggestion would be to model the rural land transfer
system after Shanghai’s tender system. In such a system, the Shanghai government called
worldwide for tenders to lease a piece of land in a special economic zone. Both Chinese and
global organization were allowed to submit offers. By the deadline, a number of tenders were
received and the land was leased to the highest bidder.
74
In rural land transfers, farmers can
similarly request the assistance from their local governments with “selling” their land rights. Of
course, those who prefer dipiao can still choose to utilize that process as well.
An alternative to expanding dipiao and establishing special development zones would be
the CCP’s continuance of its current status quo. As history has indicated, Mao’s land reform
resulted in inefficiencies of production, Deng’s land policies caused uneven development, and
Hu’s dipiao negatively impacted government revenues. Now Xi is in position to advance
China’s land reform and attempt to reverse the cumulative effect of his predecessors. If Xi is
able to manage dipiao and special development zones properly, then farmers will eventually

74
Zhang, “Urban Land Reform in China,” 191.

25

enjoy land usage rights they have long been denied and the CCP will possibly achieve its 2020
goal of a more uniform land market.

26

Section Two: Moving Labor (the Hukou System)

In the 2013 plenary session, the CCP also discussed a better economic system where
governmental functions would be improved under China’s socialist democracy. The CCP
described this system as enabling itself to increasingly advance its modern market system ( 加快
完善现代市场体系 as described under the moving land rights section) and deeply revise its
taxation structure ( 深化财税体制改革). The role of the Party, therefore, was to promote CCP
policies, strengthen governmental checks and balances as well as reinforce the Party’s leadership
over reform. In order to achieve this economic system, the CCP acknowledged the necessity of
addressing another area of reform, integration of urban-rural developments ( 健全城乡发展一体
化体制机制).
75

Hukou History
To better understand China’s current dualistic development strategy between urban and
rural regions, it is necessary to have a basic overview of the household registration or Hukou
System, as well as the ways it has evolved in contemporary times. Primitive forms of population
census existed in the Xia Dynasty (21
st
-16
th
century B.C.) and were initially developed for
purposes of taxation and social control.
76
The subsequent Shang Dynasty (16
th
-11
th
century B.C.)

75
Liu and Zhao, “The Third Plenary Session,” 1. Original text: 全会对全面深化改革作出系统
部署，强调坚持和完善基本经济制度，加快完善现代市场体系，加快转变政府职能，深化
财税体制改革，健全城乡发展一体化体制机制，构建开放型经济新体制，加强社会主义民
主政治制度建设，推进法治中国建设，强化权力运行制约和监督体系，推进文化体制机制
创新，推进社会事业改革创新，创新社会治理体制，加快生态文明制度建设，深化国防和
军队改革，加强和改善党对全面深化改革的领导。
76
Fei-Ling Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2005), 33.

27

held its own records of households and hukou-like institutions, known as xiangsui, which were
devised in the Western Zhou Dynasty (11
th
-8
th
century B.C.)
77
Throughout these dynasties,
populations were categorized into well-defined family or clan structures to record household
registration on an annual basis and were then used for tax collection. The Zhou rulers, in
particular, further divided residential and rural areas into different zones and categories that
moved outwards from a royal center to the far away barbarian lands.
78
Then in the late Spring
and Autumn period (8
th
-5
th
century B.C.) some states, such as Zheng and Qi, extensively
implemented many basic rules quite similar in their effect to China’s post-communist hukou
system: household registration requirements and internal migration limits.
79

By the time of the Qin (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C. -220 A.D.), main features of a
household registration system had solidified into a form recognizable across all of China’s
dynasties.
80
According to Jason Young, a Lecturer of Political Science and International
Relations at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand, Lord Shang Yang (390 – 338
B.C.) was widely believed to be responsible for this formation and was also accredited with
introduction of the baojia system in the Kingdom of Qin.
81
The baojia system, introduced by
Lord Shang Yang, organized families into collective units (bao) and all families in the same bao
shared a common responsibility called lianzuo. If anyone violated the law or migrated illegally,
they brought punishment not only on themselves but the collective, bao as well.
82

77
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 33.
78
Jason Young, China’s Hukou System: Markets, Migrants and Institutional Change (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 30.
79
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 34.
80
Young, China’s Hukou System, 30.
81
Young, China’s Hukou System, 30.
82
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 41.

28

For instance, the Qin Dynasty widely imposed this system with harsh penalties, including
imprisonment, for those in violation of registration and migration. The baojia system also
achieved the objective of stabilizing and expanding the taxation basis for the Qin. Wang (author
of Organizing Through Division and Exclusion) argued that using the baojia system, the Qin was
powerful enough to unify China in 221 B.C. The Han succeeded the Qin in 206 B.C. and further
institutionalized the system by adding hukou officials and issuing identification permits for
travelers.
83
According to Wang, the Qin and Han hukou-like systems were inherited by nearly
all subsequent dynasties with some variations but have remained the core foundation of China’s
current hukou system. The following table summarized the variations of China’s Hukou System
in the premodern era.
Table 3: Variations on the Premodern Hukou System
84

Dynasty Variation
Early period  Replaced individual tax with household tax
Various periods
 Differences in accuracy of records and enforcement of
'vagrancy' (these groups included wandering Taoist monks,
floaters and secret family sects).
 Reallocation of hukou based on place of residence instead
of place of birth due to war or invasion
Sui (581-618) &
Tang (618-907)
 Incorporation of the hukou system into the overall imperial
political structure.
Song Dynasty
(960-1279)
 Creation of more detailed records.
 Introduction of strict protection of hukou data (state
secrets).
Yuan Dynasty
(1279 - 1368)  One She ( 社) equaled fifty households.
85

83
Young, China’s Hukou System, 31.
84
Young, China’s Hukou System, 31.
85
Li Wang, Gudai hanyu ( 古代汉语), Beijing: zhonghua shuju, 1964, first edition, no 4, 1592.
During the 13
th
century, a poet from Yangzhou named Wei Jincheng wrote a poem titled “ 高祖
还乡”. The first line described Yuan Dynasty’s hukou system. 社长排门告示，但有的差使无
推故。社长 = 一社之长。元代五十家为一社。排门告示 = 社长挨门挨户去发通知。

29

Ming Dynasty
(1368-1644)
 Introduction of issuing hukou booklets for households.
 Records collection by both local and central government.
Qing Dynasty
(1644-1912)
 Categorization and treatment of different types of people.
 Delinking of taxation from the hukou system.

In the republican era, the Kuomintang (KMT) government used a baojia hukou-like
system for social-control, tax collection and economic planning. Unlike the Qin’s strict internal
migration restrictions, the KMT’s household registration law (Hujifa in 1931, revised in 1934
and 1946) allowed an outsider to transfer his or her permanent and temporary local residence
status.
86
The process did require three years and six months, respectively for the change to be
valid.
87
However, in regions where anticommunist campaigns existed, population movement
was especially restricted and the baojia system was openly used.
88
In 1946, the household
registration policies under KMT were further revised, resulting in increased internal migration
mobility and the government issued national resident-identification documents. According to
Wang, the 1946 KMT hujiafa law is still largely in use in today’s Taiwan.
89

As the CCP took over major cities from the Japanese and later from the KMT
government, it simply utilized old KMT’s baojia cadres and hukou clerks to update registration
records. Even before the establishment of The People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, hukou
verification process commenced in liberalized, northeast areas. The CCP issued urban hukou
identifications papers in April 1948 and formed special hukou files, listing only targeted
residents (zhongdian renkou) who were considered threatening to the new regime.
90
These

86
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 42.
87
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 42.
88
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 42.
89
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 43.
90
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 43.

30

people’s movements were closely monitored by the new police force with assistance of CCP-
style baojia system. As a result, all internal migrants must show authorities valid hukou
documents or an official travel permit. This, once again, not only restricted internal migrations
but also quickly categorized and controlled special segments of the population.
The PRC’s hukou system was continuously utilized as an effective tool to stabilize
CCP’s regime by monitoring migration patterns and allocating scarce resources. In August 1950,
the newly established Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued its first national regulation of the
hukou system surrounding “Provisional Regulations on Management of Special People”
(targeted residents) which aimed to control information on its population.
91
This policy further
divided targeted residents into various categories and provided ways in which to deal with each
individual group. By 1951, MPS issued “Provisional Regulations on Urban Hukou Management”
and adopted the classification of urban household. CCP’s 1951 policy stipulated freedom to
migrate but urban residents must obtain official permission to move.
Then in 1953, PRC’s first census facilitated the establishment of urban hukou system and
created new rural hukou files.
92
The distinction between urban (fei nongye) and rural (nongye)
status eventually led to China’s contemporary structure of hukou system and required strict
enforcement mechanisms in these regions. As a response, in 1955, the CCP initiated a
comprehensive network of public security bureaus and police stations across China which aimed
to monitor migration in both urban and rural areas.
93
By January 1956, the PRC’s Regulations
on Household (Hukou) Registration became law nationwide with Chairman Mao Zedong’s
signature at the First National People’s Congress. Around the same time, PRC implemented

91
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 44.
92
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 45.
93
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 45.

31

tonggou tongxiao policy which guaranteed food rations to those with urban hukou at a fixed
price while excluded those with rural hukou. Wang claimed this differential treatment between
urban (fei nongye) and rural (nongye) resource allocation became significant during the
disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958-61) because national famine wiped out an estimated twenty
to thirty million people, mostly from rural areas.
94

For nearly six decades (1960s – present), the Chinese hukou system served to regulate
and restrict population mobility as well as resource allocation.
95
It not only limited or even
eliminated the right to internal migration, but also created social injustice and economic
inequality in an unevenly developed nation. For instance, the designation of urban status entitled
the bearer to state-provided housing, employment, grain rations, education and access to medical
care as well as other social welfare benefits.
96
The rural residents were expected to be largely
self-sufficient and received very limited, if any, state provided services. These structural
inequalities within the hukou system caused urban status to be highly desired throughout the
country.
97
As a result, the CCP strictly controlled the transfer from rural to urban status
(nongzhuanfei) and the process was utilized largely as a tool for labor allocation within the
centrally planned economy.
98
However, those who are not legally entitled to stay in urban
locations (also known as non-hukou migrants) have been at their destinations for years.
Consequently, they are left out of the state welfare obligations in their respective regions. Today,
China’s hukou system remains one of the most important mechanisms determining entitlement to

94
Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion, 45.
95
Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou
System,” The China Quarterly, No 139, (Sep., 1994). Wang, Organizing through Division and
Exclusion.
96
Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” China
Quarterly, 195 (2008), 588.
97
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 588.
98
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 588.

32

public welfare, urban services and, more broadly, full citizenship.
99
Structurally, the system
continues to favor the urban and exclude rural residents.
Hukou Reform History
Criticisms of the hukou system and various reform recommendations paved the way for a
variety of changes and new policies since the 1980s.
100
In particular, China’s Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) directives gradually delegated administrative powers related to hukou to lower-
level governments. This included regional governmental control to grant local hukou, mainly to
professionals, in their respective jurisdictions.
101
The following table summarizes major hukou
reforms in China from 1984-2010.
Table 4: Major hukou reforms 1984 - 2010
102

Year Key policy changes
1984 Temporary Migration - allowed migrants temporary residence permits
Late 1980s
"Selling of Hukou"- many local governments accepted large sums of
money from rural residents as a way of raising revenue, sometimes to the
dismay of the central government
1997-2003
Hukou reform in small cities and towns - pilot scheme to grant urban
hukou to rural migrants with stable job and resided in selected cities/towns
for greater than two years.
2001-2004
Hukou reform in large cities - varied from one city to another but the larger
the city, the more difficult it is to obtain local hukou.
2005
Hukou classification - some provinces (Anhui, Gansu, Hunan & Hubei)
and large cities (Guangzhou & Nanjing) - eliminated the hukou distinction
between urban and rural. However, hukou location continued to define
one’s access to resources and opportunities.
2010 Hukou transfer - allowed rural hukou holders to transfer to urban hukou

99
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 587.
100
Cindy C. Fan, China on the Move: Migration, the State, and the Household (London; New
York: Routledge, 2008), 49.
101
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 591.
102
1984-2005 from Fan, China on the Move, 50-51 and 2010 from Young, China’s Hukou
System, 160.

33

holders without relinquishing their “old” rural land rights. The idea was
for them to maintain these for at least 3 years while at the same time
gaining the “new rights” of urban hukou status.

Beginning the 1980s, new measures and guidelines described above reflected the CCP’s
attention to reforming China’s hukou system. These changes commenced with temporary
residence permits, then reform in small cities and towns, followed by reform in large cities.
More recently, hukou classification became less important and hukou transfer allowed more
flexible migration. Although the Party’s official endorsements indicated that the central
government became increasing concerned with tackling issues related to hukou and migration,
these limited opportunities allowed only the most educated and highly skilled to obtain urban
residency.
103
Consequently, hukou reform, thus far, failed to alleviate the inequalities between
rural dwellers and urbanites. Therefore, President Xi needs to continue these changes and
provide comparable access of state-sponsored benefits to rural residents.
Hukou Reform Suggestions
On June 6, 2014, President Xi at a committee meeting indicated that hukou reform efforts
would focus on towns and small to medium sized cities. A press release found on Sina ( 新浪),
the Chinese media company tailored to global Chinese communities, indicated the CCP’s general
policies required liberalization of hukou regulations in towns and small cities ( 总的政策要求是
全面放开建制镇和小城市落户限制) while progressively opening medium sized cities in an
orderly fashion ( 有序放开中等城市落户限制) and strictly controlling urban population in
large-scale cities ( 严格控制特大城市人口规模). These desired hukou reforms were directly
related to discussions at The Third Plenary Session of the eighteenth Central Committee of the

103
Fan, China on the Move, 53.

34

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2013, specifically the integration of urban and
rural developments.
104

In order to rebalance the inequality between urban and rural developments, China’s
hukou system should provide equal state provided socio-economic benefits such as education,
job opportunities, and social security to rural and urban residents. In May 2001, the State
Council stipulated that local governments became responsible for providing nine-year
compulsory education for migrant children through the public school system.
105
By 2006, a few
cities enrolled 62% of 370,000 migrant children in public schools and 25% in unauthorized
migrant schools.
106
However, serious problems remain. Migrant children, for example, often had
to pay school fees several times that of local residents, and a significant portion of them were
placed in sub-standard schools.
107
To combat these issues, the CCP needs to reallocate
government funds so migrant children have the same access as local residents to quality schools.
In particular, public schools in towns and small cities should be charging students the same
tuition fee, regardless of rural or urban hukou status.
Supporting education for rural migrants is an important initiative for the CCP. However,
with limited financial resources: schools, teachers, and funding, the problem might be adverse

104
Sina News, “President Xi Jinping: Widely Open Townships and Small Cities Hukou Policies,”
( 习近平：全面放开建制镇和小城市落户限制) June 6, 2014,
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/201406-06/171930309259.shtml, accessed June 8, 2014.
Original text: 习近平强调，推进人的城镇化重要的环节在户籍制度，加快户籍制度改革，
是涉及亿万农业转移人口的一项重大举措。总的政策要求是全面放开建制镇和小城市落户
限制，有序放开中等城市落户限制，合理确定大城市落户条件，严格控制特大城市人口规
模，促进有能力在城镇稳定就业和生活的常住人口有序实现市民化，稳步推进城镇基本公
共服务常住人口全覆盖。
105
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 600.
106
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 600.
107
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 600.

35

effects of urbanites’ access to education when rural migrants’ ability to attend urban schools is
increased. To address this concern, the CCP should research and collect data to further analyze
this situation. Clearly, there will be trade-offs between educating rural dwellers versus urban
residents but having a more educated work force will benefit China’s future developments.
To promote hukou reform, in 2006, the State Council issued a 40-point document related
to rural migrant rights, and more importantly, abolished the hukou requirement in hiring of civil
servants.
108
On the surface, these positions are now open to all citizens, including rural residents
regardless of their hukou status. However, this positive move was only applicable to the more
educated workers and left out all others. Once again, even contemporary hukou reforms
continued to stratify the Chinese population based on skill sets. Additionally, the State Council’s
document requested local governments to make entry conditions easier for rural migrant workers
(mingong) to settle in towns and cities. For instance, “model workers” and highly skilled
workers should be given priority.
109
Although the rhetoric of these pro-migrant workers set a
positive tone for creating more job opportunities and better work conditions, it was difficult to
implement these “good intentions” consistently across China’s localized hukou administration.
To resolve these issues, the CCP needs to create a commission, independent from both
central and local governments, to monitor the progress of these reforms. In particular, the
commission should be responsible for collecting data in regards to migrant workers’ job
information (function and industry), and analyze it for migration patterns across various regions.
By doing so, the commission could serve as a buffer of checks and balances within state and
regional governments while providing visibility to issues related to rural-urban development.

108
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 601.
109
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 601.

36

Consequently, better regulation and possibly more effective reform among various regions could
be achieved.
Another aspect of hukou reform attempted to provide social security to rural residents. In
the early 2000s, several provinces and cities started to set up limited social security schemes to
cover rural migrant labor. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2006), roughly 14% of
rural migrant workers joined some form of pension scheme by the end of 2005.
110
The
participation rates in these schemes are low because coverage was still very partial, far less than
similar policies for urban workers.
111
Also, all the schemes required a significant contribution by
the workers, and subscribers must have worked in one fixed local for 15 years before being
eligible to collect any pensions.
112
Both conditions were difficult to satisfy since many migrants
faced high turnover rates with employment and thus would not meet the requirement for pension
collections in later years. To mitigate these issues, the CCP needs to reallocate government
funds so migrant workers can enjoy comparable retirement coverage as urban workers. In
particular, the pension or social security policies should be made portable to migrant workers so
they are no longer required to be in one fixed locality for 15 years before they can collect in later
years.
Once again, the reallocation of state funds to rural dwellers could adversely affect social
security of urbanites. Also, the CCP needs to determine the phases in which these changes are
implemented and the number of years a rural migrant must work to quality for state sponsored
retirement. These concerns should be addressed by the CCP with further research and analysis.
Additionally, the CCP needs to prepare for potential policy protest and resistance from various

110
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 600.
111
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 600.
112
Chan & Buckingham, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” 600

37

groups: urban hukou holders, local governments and retirees. When challenged with public
dissent, would the CCP govern with an iron fist, similar to Mao’s era or employ a more moderate
approach?
An alternative to hukou reform with respect to increasing rural residents’ access to
education, job opportunities and social security would be the CCP’s continuance of its current
status quo. As history has indicated, Mao’s hukou reform resulted in the classification of urban
and rural status which favored urbanites through state-sponsored benefits, Deng’s residency
policies caused uneven development, Hu’s hukou transfer increased mobility to certain regions.
Now Xi is in position to advance China’s hukou reform and attempt to reverse the cumulative
effect of his predecessors. If Xi is able to manage rural dwellers’ access to education, job
opportunities and social security, then migrant workers will eventually enjoy the same rights as
their urban neighbors and the CCP will potentially achieve its 2020 goal of an integrated urban
and rural development.

38

Section Three: Moving Capital (Land Usage Rights and Hukou System)

The recommendations on land usage rights: land certificates, special development zones
and tender system are short-term fixes. The suggestions on hukou system: education, job
opportunities and social security are also short-term fixes as well. In order to provide long-term
solutions to both issues, the CCP needs to increase its financial resources to support rural
development through investments in rural infrastructure projects. This capital move should
integrate both regions: rural and urban into a more efficient market economy.
In 2008, when China’s stimulus plan was revealed at the Third Plenary Session of the
seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the total expenditures
amounted to 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion U.S. dollars).
113
The largest portion, 45 percent (1.8
trillion yuan), was budgeted for transportation: railways, roads and airports. A significant
amount, 1.2 trillion yuan, was allocated to the building of railways. According to Lu Chunfang,
vice minister of railways, a total of 150 railways were under construction which included
Beijing-Shijiazhuang, Shijiazhuang-Wuhan, Nanjing-Guangzhou, and Tianjin-Qinhuangdao.
114

In particular, the Nanjing-Guangzhou route had 23 new railway stations that connected to
previously underdeveloped agricultural counties.
115
Thus, completion of these railways should
help transport agricultural products from rural areas to market centers in a more efficient manner.
Compared to the CCP’s stimulus on transportation, only 9.3 percent (370 million) were
designated for rural infrastructure projects. For instance, funds were used for the establishment
of 40 additional rural banking institutions; county-level financial institutions were required to

113
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 8.
114
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 8.
115
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 9.

39

utilize bank deposits as the primary source of loans to rural areas and other such financial
instruments.
116
The capital budgeted for rural development increased from the 1990s because
historically, rural infrastructure only accounted for 2.8 percent of China’s total investment.
117

Although the establishment of new methods to finance rural development was helpful, rural
regions continued to require infrastructure projects such as water, gas, electricity, roads, schools
and hospitals.
118

Redistribution of governmental funds is a challenging task as the reforms of land usage
rights and hukou policies will determine the amount allocated for rural development, the timing
of the adjustment, and possible adverse effects on urban projects. Additionally, the CCP could
potentially face strong opposition from urban governments and deal with possible corruption
from rural regions. These are all valid concerns that the CCP needs to address prior to policy
implementation.
An alternative to reallocation of state’s funds would be the CCP’s continuance of its
current status quo. As history has indicated, Mao and Deng’s focus on urban development
resulted in social inequalities among urban and rural residents. Now Xi is in position to progress
China’s land usage right and hukou reform which are aimed to reverse the cumulative effect of
his predecessors. If Xi is able to properly manage both reforms simultaneously, then the CCP
will potentially achieve its 2020 goal of a more uniform land market and integrated urban-rural
development

116
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 8.
117
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 4.
118
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 10.

40

Section Four: Policy Challenges

To a great extent, the land usage rights and hukou reform suggestions constitute a
profound redistribution of wealth and power in China. Hence, both constitute significant legal
and policy challenges. Among the possible negative results of such reforms, we might consider
those deriving from three particularly important areas: 1) policy interpretation; 2) policy
implementation; and 3) policy enforcement. These areas require serious attention.
Concerns about policy interpretation relates mainly to the opaqueness of the CCP’s rule.
Both land usage rights and hukou reforms require collaboration among central and local
governments. However, policy interpretation could vary between the two levels. For instance,
hukou management has been delegated to local governments and under Xi, the central
government has mandated strict control of household registration in large cities. It is
understandable that cities such as Beijing and Shanghai will continue to have migrant workers
but how will the local government interpret “strict control”? Would this mean no migration or
limited migration? Also, how will the central government react to local governments’ actions or
inactions?
With respect to policy implementation, previous rural land usage rights reform had been
widely accepted in areas such as Chongqing and Gumian. Not all regions embraced reform and
resistance came from some local governments because in the past decade, the sale of land
remained a significant amount of their annual revenue. Hence, some officials knowingly
violated national laws and regulations in their implementation of central government policies.
Going forward, it would be interesting to witness the interactions between state and local
governments in their continued efforts to implement reforms.

41

Lastly, policy enforcement largely depends on the first two challenges: interpretation and
implementation. If the two levels of government fail to interpret policies consistently with the
inability to implement them across China, then reforms will not be properly enforced. In
particular, the land usage rights and hukou will require both levels of government to first
communicate effectively with each other, then draft an execution plan and later agree on
enforcement strategies. Also, these meetings should incorporate standards and benchmarks as
guidelines to keep both sides accountable for their actions.

42

Conclusion

Since the founding of the CCP in 1921, China has undergone various reforms including
land ownership rights (1930s-present), the establishment of People’s Communes (mid-1950s),
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), the household responsibility system (1978) and the Hukou
changes. These policies aimed to transform China into a more modern socialist nation but the
country remained closed to rest of the world. It was not until the 1978 plenum that Deng’s
administration initiated market reforms which opened China’s doors to the outside world and
contributed profoundly to its unprecedented economic growth. However, China’s phenomenal
GDP increase favored urban development, further contributed to social inequalities, and caused
more uneven development between rural and urban regions. Thirty-five years later, during the
2013 plenum, Xi’s administration indicated deepened reforms were required to equalize rural
and urban development. Therefore, Xi still needs to focus on land usage rights and hukou reform.
Currently, Xi’s administration has taken steps to deepen reform of land usage rights. For
instance, land certificates (dipiao) were created in Chongqing under Hu’s administration (Xi’s
predecessor) but are being expanded into other regions such as Guangdong and Zhejiang. These
land certificates allowed developers to bid for rural land, and provide farmers with funds to build
better homes. Also, the ability to mortgage land usage rights in Gumian and Chongqing gave
farmers more options to transfer, lease, and exchange land. These reforms should continue to
increase rural development and assist with Xi’s objective of achieving a more uniform land
market in both urban and rural areas ( 建立城乡统一的建设用地市场).
With Xi’s land usage rights reform underway, more integration of urban-rural
development should follow. For nearly six decades, China’s household registration, or Hukou

43

System restricted population mobility as well as resource allocation. The status of one’s hukou
not only limited or eliminated the right to internal migration but also created social injustice and
economic inequality in an unevenly developed nation. In particular, the status of one’s hukou
determined the bearer’s access to state-provided benefits such as education, employment and
social security. In June 2014, Xi’s administration indicated that its policies were to liberalize
hukou regulations in towns and small cities while progressively opening medium sized cities, and
strictly controlling urban population in large scale cities. These policies mandated by the central
government, if implemented successfully by local governments will help alleviate the inequality
between urbanites and rural dwellers.
So far, all of Xi’s policies are short term fixes, and in the long term, Xi needs to
reallocate state government funding for rural development. For instance, the central government
budgeted 9.3 percent designated for rural infrastructure projects in its 2010 plan, up from 2.8
percent in 1995.
119
However, rural regions continue to require the building of infrastructure --
gas lines, roads, schools and hospitals. Additionally, rural hukou holders remain at a
disadvantage because they pay more for schools of lesser quality, are limited in their job
opportunities, and face social security restrictions as compared to urbanites. Consequently, Xi
needs to rebalance state funds to support both rural dwellers and urbanites alike with respect to
government sponsored benefits.
Xi is determined to leave a lasting legacy of reform similar to that of Deng. The land
usage rights and hukou reforms are currently proceeding in the right direction. However,
implications of both measures will largely depend on how reform policies proceed. Potential
funding challenges and possible local resistance are valid concerns the CCP should address.

119
Li, “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety,” 6-9.

44

Going forward, Xi should refer to Deng’s well-known quote, “it does not matter if a cat is black
or white, as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat” ( 不管黑猫白猫，捉到老鼠就是好猫) because
it does not matter if Xi uses socialist or capitalist reform, as long as the changes promote an a
more uniform land market and integrated urban-rural development, then the reform is good.

45

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Creator Chao, Nancy (author)

Core Title Land usage rights and hukou reform

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 07/25/2014

Defense Date 07/24/2014

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag hukou history,hukou reform,hukou reform history,land reform history,land usage rights,OAI-PMH Harvest

Format application/pdf (imt)

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Advisor Chen, Baizhu (committee chair), Cooper, Eugene (committee member), Sheehan, Brett G. (committee member)

Creator Email nancyschao@gmail.com,nchao@usc.edu

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Rights Chao, Nancy

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA