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Habits and policy: the socio-cognitive foundations of foreign policy stability
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Habits and policy: the socio-cognitive foundations of foreign policy stability
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Habits and Policy: The Socio-Cognitive Foundations of Foreign Policy Stability Mariano E. Bertucci University of Southern California Introduction The Missing Link between Formal Institutions and Foreign Policy Stability 1 I. Habits of Foreign Policymaking Habits of Foreign Policymaking as Socio-Psychological Constructs 21 Recovering and Measuring Habits 56 II. Foreign Policymaking Toward the United States in Practice Presidents Rule: Argentina’s Habits of Foreign Policymaking, 1983-2012 86 Planalto and Itamaraty: Brazil’s Habits of Foreign Policymaking, 1985- 2012 118 Stakeholders Matter: Chile’s Habits of Foreign Policymaking, 1990-2012 154 III. Habits and Policy Explaining Foreign Policy Stability toward the United States in South America 172 Habits of Foreign Policymaking as the Socio-Cognitive Foundations of Foreign Policy Stability 186 Bibliography 201 The Missing Link between Formal Institutions and Foreign Policy Stability 2 In August 1990 president George H. W. Bush telephoned president Carlos Menem of Argentina to ask whether the South American country would join the U.S.-led multilateral military mission to expel Iraq out of Kuwait. Menem, without consulting any other actors, gave Bush immediate assurance that it will. Against a century-long history of bilateral diplomatic de-encounters, Menem hung up, picked up the phone again, called the Navy, and ordered them to deploy as soon as possible whatever vessel and personal may be available to go to the Gulf region. Eventually, Menem communicated his decision to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Domingo Cavallo. Cavallo, far from voicing any procedural issues with how the decision was made, visited a number of European countries to make sure Argentina’s policy was perceived positively. Domestically, by the time Congress got to vote on the matter, Argentina’s military personnel was already stationed around Iraq. Despite some opposition lawmakers debating whether it was up to Congress or president Menem to order and approve the deployment of national troops abroad as stated in the National Constitution, for the most part the government’s decision-making process was uncontested and not questioned; particularly after the Gulf War ended a couple of months later. A few years before, by the mid-1980s, Argentina decided to support the Central American peace processes against U.S. interests in the region. Then, it was president Raúl Alfonsín who, just as Menem would do later on, made the decision to back and financially support the region’s peace negotiation processes as a means of averting a military escalation in the region along ideological lines of the type Argentina’s fragile democracy was just coming out of. Alfonsín’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dante Caputo, fully agreed with such policy, but on this and other matters, throughout Alfonsín’s government, Caputo would mainly be in charge of 3 implementing Alfonsín’s decisions, not of making policy or substantially influencing the decision-making process per se. Similarly, more than two decades later, president Néstor Kirchner showed the same inclination of Alfonsín and Menem to make foreign policy toward the United States as he saw fit. When Kirchner decided to have Argentina block U.S.-efforts at re-launching negotiations on the Free Trade Area Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)—after Buenos Aires had championed, together with Washington, the FTAA all along during the 1990s—he had not discussed the issue at all with, for example, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Bielsa. Bielsa only addressed the matter when Kirchner asked him to close the 2005 Summit that would finally bury the hemispheric project. Also, when Kirchner decided to pay in full Argentina’s debt of almost $10 billion to the IMF—a historical decision by all available measures and that consumed, at least, one third of Argentina’s national savings—the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Argentina’s Ambassador to the United States, or Argentina’s Minister of Economy, for example, had no idea—literally—that such decision was coming. And Argentine lawmakers? For the most part they had no influence whatsoever, procedurally or substantively, on any of such dramatic foreign policy decisions; regardless of whether they took place during the government of Alfonsín, Menem or Kirchner. President George H. W. Bush also called his Brazilian counterpart, president Fernando Collor de Mello, to have Brazil join the U.S.-led multilateral mission against Iraq in the early 1990s. But unlike president Menem, Collor de Mello turned around and immediately shared the decision-making process with his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Rezek, and with his foreign policy advisors—all belonging to Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as Itamaraty. President Collor knew exactly well what his policy preferences on the matter were 4 and what policy Brazil should follow. Also, to answer Bush, he was under no legal obligation to share the decision-making process with Itamaraty (or any other actor). Still, it was commonsensical to all policymakers that he did. A decade later, president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Itamaraty also showed a natural predisposition to share with each other the decision-making process regarding Brazil’s policy before the FTAA—as much as president Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Itamaraty did during the previous years. Arguably the most salient issue in Brazil-U.S. relations at the turn of the twenty-first century, Lula and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, would keep alive a FTAA deal with the United States amid rampant domestic opposition to it, and would eventually let negotiations go for good, this time amid criticism of Brazil’s pro-business sectors, when they could not reach what in their opinion was a deal that would deliver on Brazil’s interests as much as on the United States’. As traditionally has been the case in Brazil, it was up to Itamaraty to make the country’s foreign trade policy. In 2010 it was also because of an initiative of Minister Celso Amorim that Brazil sought and actually negotiated, together with Turkey, a last-minute deal with Iran over Iran’s nuclear program. The goal was to head off further sanctions on the part of the United Nations (UN) on the Middle Eastern country. The United States was aware of Brazil’s efforts, but to those in Brazil who disagreed with adding such a sensitive international matter to Brazil-U.S. relations, more involvement of Itamaraty’s permanent bureaucracy in the foreign policymaking process— not less—was necessary and demanded. In Brazil, it goes without saying that critical foreign policy decisions are made by presidents, their foreign policy advisors—more often than not belonging to Itamaraty—and Itamaraty. 5 Since the advent of democracy in 1990, Chile has not had as many opportunities as Argentina and Brazil to make dramatic foreign policy decisions pertaining the United States. Still, when having the opportunity to decide whether, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Chile would support the 2003 U.S. campaign against Iraq—while a Chile-U.S. free trade agreement negotiated during the previous decade was pending final approval at the U.S. Senate—the opportunity to act triggered a fundamentally different process of decision- making to those typically seen in Argentina and Brazil. Even though formally in charge of conducting Chile’s foreign affairs, then Chilean president Ricardo Lagos opened the policymaking process to all domestic stakeholders—e.g. to his advisers at the presidential palace known as La Moneda, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and even to political parties at the time not represented in Congress. This, to president Lagos and the bulk of other actors involved in the making of Chile’s foreign policy toward the United States, was the rather obvious thing to do under the circumstances, and reflects how other foreign policy decision have been made on other less-critical Chile-United States matters. That is, opportunities to make dramatic foreign policy decisions toward the United States trigger, in democratic Argentina, Brazil and Chile, foreign policymaking processes that are fundamentally different to each other. In some cases decision-makers embrace certain practices in which presidents have sole discretion in making policy, whereas in others other actors weigh in. In terms of foreign policy outcomes, Argentina, Brazil and Chile also have had varying degrees of foreign policy stability toward the United States. Whereas Argentina’s foreign policy is unstable, as it tends to change almost every time a new government comes into office, Chile’s 6 and, to a lesser extent, Brazil’s are more stable; their foreign policies towards the United States tend to change only in response to domestic or international shocks, if at all. Indeed, the empirical record shows that, since the advent of democracy in Chile in 1990, its foreign policy toward the United States has been characterized by a relatively stable attempt to engage with the United States on a bilateral and regional basis. Chile retains important differences with the United States on human rights, civil-military relations, and arms procurement policies. 1 Nonetheless, the country’s traditional respect for multilateralism and international law have traditionally shaped Chile’s foreign policy toward the United States and no significant departures from it have taken place in almost a quarter century of democratic governance. Brazil’s foreign policy towards the United States, on its part, has gone through some important alterations since the return of democracy in 1985. Indeed, its foreign policy shifted from “an autonomous policy towards the United States” in between 1985 and 1990 to a new “phase of adjustment regarding U.S. relations that combined a more flexible posture vis-à-vis U.S. expectations with previous premises of an autonomous foreign policy. More recently, since the inauguration of the government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (January 2003) … an affirmative posture has slowly been taking form in U.S.-Brazil relations” 2 that has sought to reaffirm the country’s autonomy vis-à-vis the United States and other great powers through the diversification of Brazil’s international affairs. 3 In contrast, since the advent of democracy in 1983 in Argentina, its foreign policy towards the United States has tended to change almost every time a new government came into office. This is perhaps best reflected in the different slogans that each of the different Argentine 1 Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001). 2 Hirst (2005: xviii). 3 Cepaluni and Vigevani (2012). 7 administrations have used to characterize bilateral relations. Mature, in the case of Raúl Alfonsín’s presidency (1983-1989); preferential and carnal in the case of Carlos Menem (1989- 1999); intense during the government of Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) and right before the Argentine 2001 collapse; and, after the 2001 Argentine crisis, realist with Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) and, again, mature, but also serious and of mutual convenience with Néstor and Cristina Kirchner (2003-incumbent). 4 Available explanations of patterns of policy fluctuation and stability argue that institutions matter. Policy stability is the result of strategic interactions among rational actors as structured by formal political institutions; that is, by “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” 5 It is formal institutions that establish who and how should make policy, and policymakers are portrayed—or assumed—to follow the rules and structure of incentives prescribed in parchment. The higher the number of institutional actors needed to alter the status quo, the more stable policy will be; if only because, changing a given policy is harder among many than among a few. If you want to understand patterns of policy change and stability, you should study formal political institutions. 6 Paying attention to the institutional determinants of policy has illuminated, for example, the ease or difficulty different types of regime may experience in effecting a major change in foreign policy, variations in the way different states respond to similar external challenges, and foreign policy responses clearly at odds with international systemic constraints. 7 4 Russell (2004:262). 5 North (1990:3). Specifically, by formal institutions I mean, following Carey (2000, 735), “parchment institutions ... formal rules of political contestation that are written down somewhere as laws, regulations, constitutions, treaties, and so forth.” 6 Tsebelis (1995), (2000) and (2002). See, also, Cowhey and McCubbins (1995) and Haggard and McCubbins (2001). 7 Welch (2005), Cowhey (1993, 1995) and Milner (1997). 8 However, Argentina, Brazil and Chile have strikingly similar formal institutions of foreign policymaking but varying degrees of foreign policy stability toward the United States. Broadly speaking, in Argentina, Brazil and Chile presidents are in charge of foreign relations and Congresses have an important albeit limited role in the making of foreign policy. Congresses are in charge of approving presidential declarations of war and, without modifications, international treaties negotiated by the executive. Congresses are also in charge of approving, or not, the deployment of national troops abroad and the entrance of foreign troops into national territory. Presidents in all three countries are also subjected to strikingly similar electoral rules—they can all be re-elected to serve for a total of two consecutive periods. Still, in practice, foreign policymaking processes in Argentina, Brazil and Chile are fundamentally different to each other. And, whereas democratic Argentina has had an unstable course in its relations to the United States and the rest of the world, neighboring Chile, and to a lesser extent Brazil, have not. There is, in other words, a missing link between these three countries similar formal political institutions of foreign policymaking and their (theoretically un-expected) varying degrees of foreign policy stability toward the United States. I call such missing link habits of foreign policymaking. By habits of foreign policymaking I mean the systematic behaviors that policymakers repetitively engage in when deciding foreign policy. Habits of policymaking are those practices that are so common that nobody really questions but, instead, follows rather automatically because they are perceived as the self-evident ways for getting things done in a given policy domain. I argue that the reason why countries with similar formal political institutions for foreign policymaking—such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile—have different policy outcomes—e.g. varying degrees of foreign policy stability toward the United States—is because of their different 9 habits of foreign policymaking. Specifically, I propose that where habits of foreign policymaking establish presidents as the only foreign policy decision-maker, the potential for foreign policy change will be higher than where habits of foreign policymaking establish two or more actors as those necessary to alter the status quo. To be sure, a growing body of literature calls mainstream institutional theories into question. Students of Latin American politics, for example, have long recognized that making sense of how democracies in the region work cannot be reduced to the number of institutional veto players as described in the National Constitutions. Indeed, some of the most dramatic policy changes implemented in Argentina in the early 1990s took place through executive decrees of “urgent necessity” not always backed by congressional approval. 8 Likewise, despite being legally sanctioned in the democratic constitution of 1988, the use of executive decrees in Brazil (or medidas provisórias) has “ensured the continuing of one Brazilian political tradition: The executive acts and the legislature reacts.” 9 Albeit with important caveats, institutional rules have been shown to shape the extent and limitations of presidents policymaking authority in a context where executive decrees are tolerated—or even preferred—by legislative majorities. 10 Others have shown, more explicitly, that political institutions rarely operate as assumed, as the link between formal political institutions and the daily activities within them is often very loose. What matters is that “history,” “past events,” “past choices,” and “informal institutions”— i.e. “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced 8 Ferreira Rubio and Goretti (1998), Jones (1997), and Carey and Shugart (1994). 9 Power (1998, 222). 10 Carey and Shugart (1998). For a skeptical view on claims that through such policymaking practices presidentialism significantly adds to the problems of democratic governance and stability (vs. other systems of government such as parliamentarism), see Mainwaring and Shugart (1997). 10 outside officially sanctioned channels”—interact with formal institutions as part of policy- making processes that better approximate how democracy works. 11 Even political economists such as Douglas North recognize that informal institutions and, most importantly, the “shared mental models” that people carry and draw from to make sense of the world around them, is what ultimately “guide choices and shape the evolution of political- economic systems and societies.” 12 Formal institutions matter, but not in the way often assumed by mainstream theories in Political Science. Existing accounts of informal institutions focus on their interactions with formal institutions. Specifically, the informal procedures that are recognized to guide, in actual practice, behavior and policy in present-day developing countries—and even in most countries at other points in history—are conceived as functions of how “effective” or “ineffective,” “weak” or “strong,” “institutionalized or not,” formal institutions are. 13 Though a step in the right direction, these approaches fall short of granting what practitioners do when making policy—systematically and as a matter of practice—the full ontological status their habitual ways of doing and being deserve as drivers of individual and social behavior. Particularly in the foreign policymaking field, 14 Latin American practices of foreign policy decision-making are shaped by a logic of habit not captured in the extant literature. Paying attention to habitual ways of making foreign policy is important because it helps explain why, for example, democratically elected presidents in Argentina have had uncontested power in making 11 Helmke and Levitsky (2006), Levitsky and Murillo (2009), Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2010). 12 North (1990); Denzau and North (1994, 5). Also see Przeworski (2004). 13 Helmke and Levitsky (2006, 14), Murillo and Levitsky (2005), Levitsky (2012), Scartascini and Tommasi (2009), and Caruso, Scartascini and Tommasi (2013). 14 Following Bourdieu (1990), by field I mean a structured social space with its own rules, roles, hierarchies, and range of legitimate views on how things (in the context of this study, foreign policy) get done. 11 critical foreign policy decisions both before and after the known “executive decree” period of the early 1990s. It also helps explain why, for instance, in making those same types of decisions, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally played a key role in shaping foreign policy even though, by law, Brazil’s Congress has more formal foreign policymaking prerogatives than the Ministry itself. And, it also helps explain why the policy preferences of all domestic actors with stakes on any given critical foreign policy matter are relevant in Chile, a country with a hyper-presidentialist constitution where, as much as in Argentina and Brazil, presidents are not legally bound to share much of the country’s foreign policy decision-making process with any other domestic actors. Emphasizing the role of habits in shaping foreign policymaking processes and outcomes also sheds light on why, for the most part, such different policymaking practices take place without any actor, whether intentionally or strategically, assigning any foreign policymaking role to any of its counterparts. Who and how makes critical foreign policy decisions is established automatically, by force of habit and in accordance with how foreign policy, in each country, has traditionally been decided. 15 In short, foregrounding the role of habits of policymaking in shaping who and how systematically gets to make foreign policy helps make sense of the existence of fundamentally different processes of foreign policy decision-making across countries with similar formal institutions of foreign policymaking. 16 15 On the strategic calculus of congresses in Latin America when delegating decree authority to the executive power in areas other than foreign policy, see Carey and Shugart (1994) and (1998, 2). On informal institutions as the outcomes of strategic bargaining processes among actors, see essays by Langston, Eisenstadt, Mejía Acosta, and Samuels in Helmke and Levitsky (2006). On informal institutions as the unintended consequence of a particular historical experience that creates specific and socially shared expectations on how some things are systematically done in a given policy domain, see Stokes (2006). 16 I make no claim about the power of such habits in other policy fields, even within the same country. Indeed, policymaking processes in other policy fields have been found to be shaped by formal rules and institutions and agents’ strategic interactions within them. Mark P. Jones shows, for example, that despite classifications of Argentina as an executive-dominated “Delegative Democracy” where concepts such as formal veto players and gates are of little relevance—and Congress is portrayed as an inconsequential institution—to design and execute the 12 To be sure, policy outcomes are a consequence of the incentive structures in place. But these, as Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North propose, “are in turn a function of the shared mental models and ideologies” that actors use to make sense of the world around them, 17 not necessarily of what formal institutions prescribe in parchment. Habits of policymaking offer one way of theorizing about the existence and effects of such shared understandings on policymaking and policy. After all, Max Weber argued that traditional ways of being and doing are oriented by “ingrained habituation,” by the “almost automatic” reactions people have to “stimuli which guide behavior in a course which has been repeatedly followed.” 18 And Douglass North recognized that 90 percent of daily actions do not require much reflection and, instead, “it is the existence of an imbedded set of [practices] that [makes] it possible for [people] not to have to think about problems or [how] to make ... choices.” 19 There are, in other words, ways of doing things that we take for granted and follow just because we have a sort of natural inclination to do them that way, without much resort to conscious considerations of form and procedure. That is, formal and parchment institutions are just that, written rules; whether they are “effective” or “ineffective,” “weak” or “strong,” “institutionalized or not,” however, is a function of what people do with institutions or formal rules of the game, if anything at all, given their habitual shared understandings of how to actually get things done in a given social context, situation or policy domain. Political economists have long established that policy stability and other desirable policy characteristics such as the credibility of a given policy “depend on a policy’s political country’s most important annual piece of legislation—the national budget—the executive’s plans and preferences were “notably affected” by the Argentine Congress throughout the 1990s (2001, 181). 17 Denzau and North (1994, 27; my emphasis). 18 Weber (1968, 24). 19 North (1990, 22). 13 microfoundations—that is, on the extent to which political institutions facilitate the political agreements necessary to sustain effective public policies.” 20 The emphasis is on process, not on outcomes. Thus, if what we want to understand is how some important policy characteristics such as the stability of a given policy comes about, then analyzing who and how systematically makes policy is the way to go. My approach to foreign policy stability also focuses on processes of policymaking. However, I make no assumption about the role of formal political institutions, the rationality and the strategic interactions of actors making policy within them. This is so because countries with similar formal institutional arrangements for foreign policymaking are found to have different foreign policy outcomes. And, also, because by taking preferences as given, rational choice theory cannot explain why rational behavior has different meanings in different contexts. Despite their strikingly similar formal institutions of foreign policymaking, the foreign policymaking processes of Argentina, Brazil and Chile are very different to each other. And, importantly, virtually nobody in any of these three countries would deem their practitioners’ policymaking behavior irrational or out of touch with reality. My emphasis on habits of policymaking promises to approach the study of politics by primarily focusing—and theorizing about—what policymakers do in actual practice when making policy. Following Guillermo O’Donnell’s call for action, the focus is thus “not so much on the institutions themselves (formal and/or informal) but on how actors “within” these institutions behave.” 21 The goal is not to substitute the study of formal and informal rules and institutions with that of an actor-based approach to politics. After all, the habits of policymaking I foreground are—albeit in general tacitly—common knowledge. Mostly out of common sense, 20 Spiller and Tommasi (2007, 2). 21 O’Donnell (2006, 287). 14 each actor knows what is habitual behavior in a given context or situation, and knows that everybody else, in that relevant context or situation, knows and follows those habits as well. Whether what formal political institutions prescribe in parchment matters in understanding foreign policymaking and stability are treated as empirical questions not to be assumed as a matter of theoretical fiat. I focus on foreign policy change because, as David A. Welch has argued, a theory of foreign policy behavior is basically unworkable. The latter would require to know a lot about a state’s motivations—which IR scholars often define very loosely—and any ancillary theory of interest-formation would work well only in very rare cases and, in consequence, it will create incorrect interests in most other cases. Indeed, even though there exists a number of theories crafted to locate the ultimate sources of state interest at different levels of analyses—e.g. in social contexts of norms and shared meanings, class interests, social interests, bureaucratic rivalries, state-society relations and policymakers belief systems—there is still no compelling reason that any of these could be refined into the powerful predictor of states’ interests needed for an actual theory of foreign policy behavior. An alternative way forward is “to seek to base predictions not on explanations of why states behave the way they do in general—i.e., on a theory of state behavior—but on explanations of why they deviate from their prior behavior— i.e., on a theory of foreign policy change.” 22 Different to Welch, however, I argue that a number of non-trivial facts about the likelihood of changes, or patterns of stability, in foreign policy can be known by focusing on who and how, in actual practice, systematically and habitually makes foreign policy when an opportunity to act opens up. My approach illuminates foreign policy decision-making processes and outcomes that are obscured by Welch’s regime-based approach to changes in foreign policy; 22 Welch (2005, 28). 15 it explains foreign policy outcomes that remain un-accounted for by available theories of foreign policy change; and, it does so without having to rely on what policymakers may perceive as the painful costs of an existing policy, the costs of not changing such policy, and on whether policymakers find that at least one policy alternative is acceptable to them, as Welch theory requires. 23 To be sure, an emphasis on habits of foreign policymaking approaches the study of foreign policy through what practitioners do in actual practice when making policy. And, as much as the established literature on policy change, by policy stability I mean the relative difficulty or easiness any given country has to implement dramatic changes in foreign policy, not change per se. Because the latter, and its direction, is also function of policymakers’ preferences on the policy issue at stake—about which we know very little—even if change is possible it may 23 Even though Welch (2005, 46, 220) acknowledges that whether any given change in foreign policy would ultimately be tenable depending on the threshold for change in each particular country—as established by formal political institutions—he considers that element of his theory to be the “least interesting and least valuable.” This seems unwarranted, however. First, as much as I do, Welch agrees that it makes sense to ask questions about state characteristics when attempting to capture the likelihood of dramatic changes in foreign policy. This is what my approach is set to explain—how likely or not, relative to other cases, changes in a state’s foreign policy may be. But in explaining such outcome, instead of putting formal political institutions front-and-center of my analysis—as Welch suggests doing—I argue that it is necessary to focus on states’ characteristic habits of foreign policymaking as shapers of those same patterns of policy change and stability. Second, it is not necessarily true that the bodies of theories inspiring the claim that policy change should be less frequent among the many than among a few is “more important and more interesting as part of an explanation of [policy] inertia itself than of deviations from it.” The potential of policy change is ultimately a function of the number of actors who, systematically and repetitively, are needed to make policy. If, as a function of how foreign policy is habitually made in any given democratic polity, such number is always one—e.g. democratically elected presidents who can make foreign policy as they see fit— then deviations from previous courses in foreign policy will be quite easy and likely to take place (vis-à-vis other democracies where other actors weigh in the making of foreign policy decisions). Considerable changes in policy can and do follow from recurrent, robust and stable ways of making policy. More counter-intuitively, lots of change can follow from lots of continuity. The case of Argentina in this study is a case in point. Third, if Welch’s theory is “not in a good position to draw the kinds of strong conclusions about likelihood that we would ideally be able to draw” because his “cases provide very limited variation on the dimensions of interest,” this is a problem with Welch’s case selection and not with the body of theory linking the number of actors needed to make policy to policy stability. Fourth, and finally, if the latter body of theory uses the language of “frequency” for quantitatively capturing the “ease” or “difficulty” any given government may experience in effecting foreign policy changes, this is no reason not to use the same language in small-N studies aimed at explaining outcomes that those same theories cannot explain; in particularly, when the small-N approach—as the one offered here—is built around the independent and not the dependent variable. In short, it is not just mere coincidence that (as Welch himself acknowledges!) virtually every case in Welch’s theory confirms that foreign policy changes will be easier among the few than among the many. Different to Welch, however, I take that insight and develop it further to explain how likely changes in foreign will be across countries with similar formal political institutions of foreign policymaking. 16 still not occur. My emphasis on habits of foreign policymaking unearths the necessary but not sufficient conditions to make dramatic changes to an existing policy. The emphasis is on social-cognition because it has to be. As suggested above, a hyper- rationalist approach to foreign policymaking can explain foreign policy behavior within each particular social context. In Argentina it is perfectly rational to have presidents make policy toward the United States as they see fit. In Brazil it makes perfect sense that governments and Itamaraty will call those same shots. And in Chile what is rational when making foreign policy is to have all stakeholders influence the decision-making processes. By taking preferences as given, however, what rational choice theory cannot do is account for why being rational has different meanings in different contexts. What is needed is a psychological approach to policymaking that allows the social environment in question to help give meaning to, in this case, what policymakers do when making dramatic foreign policy decisions. Such approach would not suggest that rational choice theory is wrong; but, as Jonathan Mercer has put it, that the often- marginalized psychological approaches to the study of IR may be right. 24 The cognitive sciences have made tremendous strides in recent decades. 25 Among these are the facts that important parts of judgment and decision-making are done by intuitive and automatic processes, and that it is no longer tenable to assume that people think, feel and see in the same way even when placed before what to the observer are identical situations. Despite its overwhelming prominence in IR discourse, rational choice theory—whether instrumental or value-rational—and its close associate of rational choice institutionalism, cannot make sense of either of such facts about human behavior and, hence, fails to capture outcomes in international affairs that may be associated to them. Even though much of what people do on a daily basis is 24 Mercer (2005). 25 Sun (2012). 17 unconscious and habitual, being such behavior far from random, to date no theory based on the logic of habit is available in IR. 26 The present work on the socio-cognitive foundations of foreign policy stability aims to present one possible way to forging such theory. Plan of the book The first chapter presents a constructivist account of habit. I argue that one of the most distinctive explanatory achievements of the recent practice turn in IR theory—i.e. foregrounding the role of dispositions from where un-reflexive actions follow automatically and habitually— can be furthered enhanced by empirically substantiating the psychological assumptions the theory is already building upon. I draw on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and John Dewey, and particularly on the recent work on habits and automatic behavior of social psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists, to make the case that habits are both individual and social phenomena. I also argue that habits advance a form of “ecological” rationality triggering actions that are in conformity—albeit tacitly—with the social environment within which they are embedded, a move that helps explain why rational behavior may have different meanings in different social contexts. Theorizing habits the way I do—as socio-psychological constructs encompassing elements of repetition, automaticity and identity—is necessary to, as Ted Hopf suggests, offer what is rarely offered in the Social Sciences: a set of empirically grounded microfoundations undergirding a fundamental assumption. 27 Doing so is also necessary to help craft explanations of international outcomes that remain unaccounted for by available theories of foreign policy change. 26 Hopf (2010, 548). 27 Hopf (2011). 18 Chapter 2 discusses a number of qualitative techniques to reconstruct how foreign policy is made in actual practice and to recover policymakers’ inclinations for making policy as it is habitually made. I also present a measuring instrument—the Habit Index of Foreign Policymaking—and a preliminary test—conducted among a representative sample of senior Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean foreign policymakers—aimed at helping establish whether a given country’s enduring pattern of foreign policymaking practices follows from automatically elicited ways of being and doing rather than from conscious consideration about who and how should be making policy. In this chapter I also discuss the research design that will allow me to argue that it is different habits of policymaking, and not other variables—such as policymakers’ strategic considerations given what is prescribed in parchment, or procedural norms, for example—what shapes Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Chile’s varying patterns of foreign policy stability toward the United States. Chapters 3 through 5 discuss democratic Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Chile’s distinctive habits of foreign policymaking. These chapters show that when an opportunity to make a critical foreign policy decision toward the United States opens up, the foreign policymaking behavior of Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean practitioners automatically follow from and comply with their country-specific habitual ways of making foreign policy, rather than being a product of conscious and strategic considerations about who and how should be deciding what policy should be implemented. Within each country, such processes take place irrespective of the issue at stake, the domestic and international context in question, and the substantive policy preferences and party affiliation of the administration in office. In building such accounts, I draw on primary and secondary sources as well as on semi- structured interviews with top foreign policymakers in all three countries—including, but not 19 limited to, former presidents, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, former Ambassadors to the United States and lawmakers. The emphasis is not only on what it is repetitively said and done when making foreign policy, but also on the foreign policymaking practices that never take place, that are never mentioned and that are virtually un-heard and un-thought of when the need to make a dramatic foreign policy decision opens up. Chapter 6 argues that the reason why Argentina, Brazil and Chile—countries with similar formal political institutions of foreign policymaking—have varying patterns of foreign policy stability toward the United States is because of their different habits of foreign policymaking. In some cases decision-makers embrace certain habits in which presidents have sole discretion in making policy, whereas in others other actors weigh in. Albeit tacitly and out of common sense, habits of foreign policymaking establish what is competent foreign policymaking behavior within each country. Who and how calls the shots is established by habitual ways of doing and being, not out of careful considerations on the part of policymakers given what formal political institutions prescribe should be done under the circumstances. Chapter 7 summarizes the argument and discuses why habits of foreign policymaking can be conceived as the socio-cognitive foundations of patters of foreign policy change and stability. It also discusses how habits are different from norms and conventions, and the difference that such distinctions make for how we understand the prospects of change and continuity in IR. In any given polity the easiness or difficulty for making dramatic changes in policy is ultimately a function of the number of actors necessary to alter the status quo. This is not necessarily a function of what is prescribed in parchment in formal institutions, however. Rather, who and how gets to decide what in foreign policy follows automatically from habitual ways of 20 being and doing; which, in turn, makes a non-trivial difference for whether countries with similar formal institutions would have more stable, and hence more credible, foreign policies. Habits of Foreign Policymaking as Socio-Psychological Constructs 22 “there is no more escaping the conclusion that an important portion of judgment and decision-making is done by intuitive and automatic process.” —Ap Dijksterhuis (2010, 254). “We can no longer assume that everybody thinks, feels, and sees in the same way—even when they are placed in what appears to the observer to be identical situations.” —Richard E. Nisbett (2007, 843). If within the same country, different policymakers, with different political preferences, belonging to different political parties, and facing different domestic and international contexts, recurrently behave the same way when making dramatic foreign policy decisions, then there has to be something at the level of the structure shaping their behavior. I call such something habits of foreign policymaking—i.e. the systematic behaviors that policymakers repetitively engage in when having to make a dramatic foreign policy decision. Habits of foreign policymaking are those practices that are so common that nobody really questions but, instead, follows rather automatically because they are perceived as the self-evident ways for getting things done in a given policy domain. “Habits” because the actions at stake are iterated and often non-conscious; actions that follow from strong response dispositions automatically activated by context cues and that run through completion with no or minimal conscious control. These habits are social because there is an intersubjective and commonsensical recognition not only of a specific actor performing a habitual action of type X, but of type-X action as being performable by any other actor to whom such action can be plausibly imputed. The focus is on what people do in actual practice because this is how the dispositions to behave in certain particular ways are primarily enacted, in and through practice, rather than by what people say or think about what they are doing. Importantly, 23 habitual ways of doing things help produce and reproduce, rather non-deliberately, the social dispositions constitutive of habits from which they originally followed. Most people would acknowledge that they have many habits. Indeed, experiments show that at least 45% of everyday behaviors are repeated under the same circumstances every day. 1 Repeated rather than new behavior is the heartbeat of everyday life. We might not be aware of them, but habits are subtly woven into the fabric of activities we engage with on a daily basis. 2 Max Weber recognized that “The great bulk of all everyday action ... is determined by ingrained habituation,” rather than by instrumentally-rational, value-rational or affectual considerations. 3 Douglass North argued that “90 percent of our actions in a day do not require much reflection” 4 and, most importantly, that what guides “choices and shape the evolution of political-economic systems and societies” are the “shared mental models” that people carry and routinely draw from to make sense of the world around them. 5 The notion that habits are dispositions, inclinations and propensities to automatically and recurrently doing the same things under similar circumstances was central to pragmatist philosophers and institutional economists of the early twentieth century such as Thorstein Veblen, William Thomas, John Dewey and Florian Znaniecki. 6 As social psychologist Ap Dijksterhuis makes clear above, at the turn of the twenty-first century all such hunches about the power of habit have proven to be essentially correct—the idea that much of judgment, decision-making and action is habitual, intuitive and automatic, is now rather uncontroversial. 1 Wood, Quinn and Kashy (2002). 2 Verplanken (2010, 68). 3 Weber (1968, 24-5). 4 North (1990, 22). 5 Denzau and North (1994, 5). 6 A notion that, as Geoffrey M. Hodgson stresses, is “now enjoying a revival” in the study of institutional economics (2008, 16). For an example of the study of habits in contemporary institutional economics, see Dequech (2012). 24 The claim that much of what we do as social actors in the world is not conscious or deliberate but automatic, non-reflexive and habitual, is one of the core assumptions of the recent “practice turn” in IR theory. 7 A growing number of IR Constructivists draw upon such assumption to, among other things, analyze cemented constellations of agents across borders, explain the origins and maintenance of an European security and defense policy, re- conceptualize security practices as “cultural strategies” in the international field, and explain why security community developments in Russian-NATO relations are bounded to remain limited. 8 The “practice turn” has thus begun to open space for an alternative logic of social action to those currently dominant in IR theory. Whereas the logic of consequences and appropriateness emphasize reflexive and conscious processes of decision-making and action, practice theorists foreground the dispositions that inform practices of international relations in an inarticulate and un-deliberate fashion. However, that much of an individual’s or group of individual’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions or deliberate decisions but by mental processes that are triggered by features of the external environment—and that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance—is an assumption that, in IR, has only recently begun to be empirically substantiated. 9 In this chapter I join the latter efforts and argue that one of the most distinctive explanatory achievements of the practice turn in IR theory—i.e. foregrounding the role of dispositions from where un-reflexive actions follow automatically—can be further enhanced by empirically substantiating the psychological assumptions the theory is already building upon. In this sense, IR practice theorists are more psychological than they might be willing to recognize. 7 See, most notably, Adler and Pouliot (2011). 8 Adler (2005); Mérand (2008); Williams (2007); Pouliot (2010). Also see Adler-Nissen (2012). 9 The exception is Hopf (2010). 25 And when we shift attention to some of the main shortcomings of the approach, I believe these can be partly corrected by explicitly incorporating social psychological findings in the conceptual framework. 10 I do, however, depart in two important respects from current accounts of the logic of habit in IR, which tend to describe habits as either “fundamentally repetitive” behaviors or automatic, unconscious processes of thought and action. 11 First, I define habits as both repeated and automatic response dispositions for doing things in certain ways given a certain external stimulus to act, and as behavioral repertoires that, at times, reflect how certain things are typically done in a given social setting. Habits are psychological constructs encompassing not only a history of repetition but also features of automaticity—of unconscious thought and behavior—expressing some important elements of an individual or group of people’s identity. Conceptualizing habits as psychological constructs has the twofold advantage of advancing a concept of habit with actual explanatory value—people do many things repetitively but not all of them are habits—and helping design a measure of habit capable of capturing the extent to which a given patterned behavior or practice might be unconscious, automatic, and expressive of identity features, rather than the product of conscious considerations about what to do under certain circumstances. (I address the latter methodological issue in Chapter 2.) Second, differently from current understandings positing that where the logic of habit predominates international relations have “less rationality” than what other logics of action lead us to expect, 12 I argue that habits advance a form of “ecological” rationality triggering actions 10 I follow Goldgeier and Tetlock’s (2001) claim that psychological approaches to the study of international relations work best when integrated to existing IR theories. 11 Pouliot (2010, 21, 33); see also Hopf (2010). Indeed, as it will be suggested below, my account of habits is more in line with the somewhat forgotten but still pioneering discussion of “habit-driven actors” in world politics of James Rosenau (1986). 12 Hopf (2010, 540). 26 that are in conformity, albeit tacitly, with the environment within which they are embedded. Specifically, I argue that habits are adaptive responses to the environment, not just simply iterated behavior that may or may not be related to the social conditions in which they exist. This is a move that opens the possibility to account for the origins of (habitual) preferences on the part of individuals and groups of people. And, importantly, a move that helps explain why rational behavior may have different meanings in different contexts. After all, as Richard Nisbett stresses above, different people and groups of people think, feel, see, and react differently even when placed before identical situations; and, within each context, all such behaviors are deemed reasonable. Thus, drawing upon the work of social theorists John Dewey and Pierre Bourdieu, but particularly on that of psychologists and social psychologists working on habits, I show that IR theorists of practices are more psychological than they think. My goal here is not to offer a definitive answer to the nagging question of whether habit—as theorized by some social psychologists—and habitus—as theorized by Pierre Bourdieu—are the same phenomena. 13 Anthropologists and sociologists are still debating the issue and IR scholars are unlikely to solve this thorny debate while thinking about international affairs. Rather, in this chapter I suggest that thinking of habitus as habit along the lines hereby proposed is both plausible and necessary. It is plausible particularly if done following the work of Bourdieu and Dewey and that of social psychologists theorizing habits as mental constructs rather than as strictly iterated behavior. And, it is necessary, particularly if we aim to empirically ground the nascent “practice” research program in IR theory on a set of solid foundations to help craft explanations of international outcomes that remain unaccounted for by available theories. 13 Crossley (2013). 27 The chapter seeks to advance the research agenda posited by the logic of habit with respect to practices of foreign policymaking and foreign policy stability. In subsequent chapters I argue that national foreign policy practitioners can often have an important, albeit non-deliberate, impact on whether and how particular states systematically engage in major foreign policy changes by determining what constitutes competent foreign policy decision-making behavior given their dispositions for making policy in certain ways but not others, and, consequently, by following and establishing habits of policymaking that either facilitate or render difficult changes in foreign policy responses. A Constructivist Account of Habit Every individual in society has many habits. Each habit has associated with it a collection of characteristic practices including customs and folkways, and a collection of discourses practices including a language with a written or verbal vocabulary. Many of an individual’s habits predominate in particular domains of social life. Because of habits we do a thousand things daily without even thinking about them. But we do appear to know something, namely, how to do them. The product of present and past practices, experiences and history, of the social structures constitutive of particular types of environments, habits are and help establish the socially meaningful, and self-evident, standards for individual and collective activity. While most often experienced at the individual level, habits are inherently social and relational phenomena. Communities exposed to different practices and experiences, histories and material objective structures, develop different habits, different dispositions for doing the same things. These different dispositions or habits produce different practices that are adapted to and in accordance 28 with the social environment within which they are embedded. Habits are anything but random thoughts and actions. Different social practices are not necessarily the product of conscious obedience to formal, explicitly designed rules, institutions or norms, but are enabled and legislate on the conditions of possibility of social action as a matter of habitual, natural, experiential, self- evident and commonsensical ways of doing things. Practices: What People Actually Do, Recurrently and Un-reflexively The recent “practice turn” in IR theory defines practices as socially meaningful patterns of action that follow, un-reflexively, from deep structures of taken-for-granted knowledge, unthinking routines or dispositions that make appear what is being done as commonsensical and self- evident. 14 Agents’ practices appear as complying with social expectations of behavior rather self- evidently. If agents are asked about their source of compliance—after conscious thought—they are likely to answer, “Well, I don’t really know. This is simply how things are usually done in this situation. I guess it’s a habit.” A practice such as marking a linear territorial boundary, for instance, is not reducible to the mere behavior of drawing a line with the intention of separating the authoritative realm of two political communities. Rather, the linear demarcation of limits to the legitimate use of force in a given territory by a given authority is a practice because it follows, rather commonsensically, from the socially meaningful disposition of conceiving territorially bounded states as the proper way of organizing international life in the present international society. After all, at the turn of the twenty-first century, alternative ways to linear demarcation of state boundaries are practically un-conceivable. 14 This definition is in line with Pouliot (2008) and Adler and Pouliot (2011). 29 The “practice turn” primarily draws from the works of social theorist of practices Pierre Bourdieu. 15 Bourdieu stresses that practices, “without any explicit definition of ends or rational calculation of means,” 16 follow from “systems of durable, transposable dispositions” 17 —which Bourdieu calls “habitus”—that are adapted to the situation at stake. 18 Such system of dispositions, which is the product of a collective and individual history, 19 “integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix of perception, appreciation and action, making possible the accomplishment of infinitively differentiated tasks” without “any calculation or conscious reference to a norm” or strategic consideration of means. 20 That is, dispositions or habitus are immanent tendencies and propensities that individuals and groups of individuals have for unconsciously doing certain things in certain ways under some particular circumstance. This is so because, simply put, those certain ways correspond to the natural order of things in a given social setting. Importantly, dispositions are contingent sources of actions because, far from randomly leading in a determinate way to a determined action, “they are revealed and fulfilled only in appropriate circumstances and in a relationship with a situation.” 21 Dispositions and habitus trigger certain particular actions, behaviors and responses only given certain particular context cues. In this sense, dispositions and habitus are also generative sources of action because they incline and dispose individuals to actually doing things in particular ways, not just in any random way. The existence of a disposition or habitus, as Bourdieu would put it, “is a basis for predicting 15 See, for instance, Adler-Nissen (2012). 16 Bourdieu (2000, 138); see also Bourdieu (1990, 63). 17 Bourdieu (1977, 72). 18 Bourdieu (1977, 214 fn. 1). For habitus as the driver of practices see Bourdieu (1977, 17-8, 72-3, 78, 81-2, 86), (1990, Ch 3), and (2000, 146). 19 For instance, Bourdieu (2000, Ch. 4). 20 Quoted in Pouliot (2010, 31). Also see Bourdieu (1990, 58) and (2000, 211). 21 Bourdieu (2000, 149, 138). 30 that, in all conceivable circumstances of a particular type, a particular set of agents will behave in a particular way.” 22 I is not the case that the environment determines behavior; rather, than a certain disposition confers such power upon the environment to have people automatically do what they do. Despite Bourdieu’s insistence on such dispositions, habitus, or structures of know-how as being stored in “cognitive structures” in the brain, 23 IR theorists of practices have thus far chosen to “deemphasize what is going on in people’s head.” 24 This is unfortunate; if only because, whether much of what people do as social actors in the world is not conscious, un-deliberate, automatic, non-reflexive and habitual, is an assumption that in the study of international relations remains empirically un-substantiated. 25 Do people actually engage in un-reflexive decision-making and action? If so, with what consequences for current understandings of patterns of social order and change? Where do people’s dispositions actually originate and how? May consciously learned behavior eventually elicit un-reflexive action? Is habitus the same as habit? How are the dispositions constitutive of habitus social and not just strictly individual phenomena? If dispositions bias people to recurrently doing certain things in certain ways, are such biases necessarily bad or deviations from rational ways of decision-making and action? What is the relationship between habits and rationality? In the remaining of this section I offer some answers to these questions and show that Bourdieu and IR theorists of practice are more psychological than what they may be willing to recognize. In doing so, I seek to contribute to the “practice turn” in IR theory with a set of 22 Bourdieu (1977, 77) and (2010, 149, 155). 23 See, for instance, Bourdieu (1977, 78, 83) and (2000, 148, 176, 183). 24 Pouliot (2008, 274), (2010, 32), Adler and Pouliot (2011). 25 The only exception in IR is Hopf (2010). 31 microfoundations undergirding one of their fundamental assumptions—that much of what people do in and on the world is habitual, automatic, and nonreflexive. Habits as the Cognitive Core of Practices Recent discussions of the logic of habit in IR define habits either as “strictly iterated” and “fundamentally repetitive” behavior, 26 or as “unintentional, unconscious, involuntary, and effortless” thought and action processes. 27 I build upon the latter interpretation and theorize habits as dispositions, propensities, inclinations and tendencies to repeatedly and automatically behaving in certain typical and particular ways given specific context cues to act. Habits are thus knowledge structures giving us ready-made responses for how to behave in certain circumstances. Automaticity—i.e. stimulus driven, unconscious and unintentional processes—a history of repetition, and identity, are all characteristic features and different dimensions of the habit construct. 28 As such, social psychology’s research on habits empirically substantiates Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion on habitus and the logic of practice. Habits, importantly, encompass a form of ecological rationality that facilitates rather than precludes conscious processes of decision-making. As automatic and unconscious thinking processes, habits are better predictors of order than of change. 26 Pouliot (2010, 21). 27 Hopf (2010, 541). Hopf’s discussion of the logic of habit is more concerned with what habits do, where do they come from, how are they maintained, how are they broken and with what consequences for current interpretations of cooperation, security dilemmas, and security communities in international relations, than with what habits are actually about as mental constructs, as I emphasize here and in Chapter 2. 28 I follow Verplanken (2003) in this definition. 32 The Three Dimensions of Habits: Automaticity, Repetition and Identity At the turn of the twenty first century psychologists and social psychologists propose two qualitatively different systems of processing information about the social world: System 1 and System 2. 29 System 1 is the intuitive system. It depicts thinking processes as being fast, unconscious, effortless, likely to happen without voluntary control, and associative. This system is responsible for perception and it captures decision-making, behavior and action that does not feel voluntary but, rather, seems to be caused by the situation we are in. That is, System 1 captures actions that feel automatic. System 2 is the reasoning system and is responsible for thought; it captures a conscious process characterized by slow, effortful, and rule-governed thinking. 30 Habits, socially shared response dispositions that are activated automatically by certain context cues and that run through completion with minimal conscious control, 31 are involuntary, unconscious and effortless thinking and action processes. 32 In this sense, automaticity refers to a specific response being unconsciously and “spontaneously triggered by a specific cue in the environment.” 33 Habits are located in the automatic system of the brain. 34 And, as such, they are acquired propensities or capacities to recurrently and automatically behaving in certain particular ways under the same circumstances, not reflexive considerations about whether and how to react before that same stimulus. (In Chapter 2 I discuss “unintentionality,” “uncontrollability,” “lack 29 See, for instance, Chaiken and Trope (1999), Stanovich and West (2000), Kahneman (2003), and Evans (2008). 30 Kahneman (2003), (2011) and Dijksterhuis (2010). 31 See Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006, 198), even though these authors do not emphasis the social character of habits. 32 Whether contexts cue behavior through the dispositions and associated responses constitutive of habits in the absence of an implicit or explicit goal to act is still being debated; see Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006, 199) and Verplanken (2010, 80-82). 33 Verplanken and Orbell (2003, 1314). 34 Bargh (1997). 33 of awareness,” “efficiency,” “purely stimulus driven” and “fast,” as other attributes of automaticity.) To be sure, repeated behavior is important for establishing habits and a history of repetition is a salient feature of the habit construct; 35 the more we perform a behavior the more likely it will become habitual (even though, in general, there is no theory of how many times a given behavior needs to be repeated to become habitual). 36 But habits and repeated behavior are not the same; a judge may have sent to jail—or let free, for that matter—a lot of people, but one hopes this behavior is not a habit as each case requires a deliberate decision. Still, chances are that the more we perform a behavior, the more exposed people are to how things are and are no repetitively done in a given social setting, the more we consciously and unconsciously imitate and learn from the recurrent behavior of others, the more likely a given behavior will become habitual. Mental habits evolve the same way. Once we see a couple of times a crocodile eat a human, for example, we consciously or unconsciously form a preference for automatically thinking about the entire species in very specific ways—e.g. crocodiles as dangerous animals. In addition to automaticity and a history of repetition, social psychologists have shown that habits also “reflect a sense of identity or personal style.” 37 As pragmatist philosopher and psychologist John Dewey has stressed, habits are part of how we organize everyday life. 38 And, as dispositions for doing things in particular ways under the same circumstances, some habits may be descriptive and express a person’s or community of people’s identity as reflected in some of their typical ways of doing some things. 39 Weddings are not celebrated the same way in all countries, for example. After all, individuals exposed to similar past and present experiences and 35 Verplanken and Orbell (2003, 1313). 36 See, for instance, Nisbett (2007, 839-842). 37 Verplanken and Orbell (2003, 137). 38 Dewey (1922). See also Bourdieu (2000, 144). 39 Dodge (1993, 576-577), Verplanken (2010, 74-78). 34 practices are likely to develop dispositions and habits that will be different to those exposed to different past experiences and histories, who, on their part, develop their own particular dispositions and habits. This is important because, as cultural psychologists show experimentally, people exposed to different recurrent practices and traditional ways of doing things “literally see different worlds” and react differently to the same data. 40 This is partly why, cultural psychologists have established, there is a “Western” and an “Eastern” way of going about doing the same things. 41 Different people and groups of people have different habitual ways of responding to similar situational contexts and stimuli. Chances are, for example, that soccer fans at a stadium in Argentina will energetically insult the referee (and all of his family, whether or not at the stadium) upon a dubious call against their team that they deem unfair or wrong; whereas in the United States, the same situation, would trigger just a “Boo!” These behavioral repertoires automatically follow from distinct response dispositions, “habits of thought,” or “mental habits,” 42 that are generative of tendencies and orientations for behaving in particular ways given certain circumstances. Cognitive neuroscience shows that we actually perceive, feel and act before we think. 43 And, we do so habitually, automatically, and through processes that, at times, express a sense of self-identity and pinpoint who we typically are and are not. 40 Nisbett (2003, 82). 41 Nisbett (2003), Norenzayan, Choi and Peng (2007). 42 Nisbett (2003, 29); Verplanken et al. (2007) and Verplanken (2010). 43 See Bargh and Chartrand (1999) for experimental demonstrations that we act before we think. 35 Habits as Knowledge Structures Habits are thus as systems of dispositions, “unthinking routines,” 44 “knowledge structures,” 45 or “unconscious behavioral guidance systems” 46 that generate a limited number of possible behavioral responses given a certain context cue to act. Experiments show that these structures of knowledge are posited to be latent constructs that automatically drive behavior before certain external stimulus or situations. They refer to memory-stored databases generated by past and present experiences and practices (more on the origins of habits below). 47 Different response dispositions or knowledge structures will trigger different behavioral responses even before the same data. Importantly, a knowledge structure or strong dispositions without an appropriate context cue is not a habit. A context cue to act without a strong disposition is not a habit either. Thus theorized, contra current interpretations in IR, habits are, in short, as contingent and generative phenomena as the habitus referred to by Pierre Bourdieu and IR practice theorists, not just strictly iterated patterns of actions. All of this, in other words, empirically substantiates Bourdieu’s claims that the existence of a strong disposition operates like a “lex insita,” as a “world of already realized ends ... procedures to follow [and] paths to take” for doing things a certain way. 48 As Ted Hopf has aptly put it, habits “imply actions by giving us ready-made responses to the world that we execute without thinking. … We do not apprehend what is out there, and then categorize it. Instead, what 44 Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006, 198). 45 Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000). 46 Bargh and Morsella (2010). 47 Dodge (1993, 573-8). 48 Bourdieu (1990, 53). 36 is perceived as reality is already pre-cooked in our heads.” 49 The dispositions constitutive of habits are like “submerged repertoires of potential behavior” 50 that legislate on the conditions of possibility for individual and collective action, even though, chances are, people might not even be aware of them. 51 Thus, I understand habits as both mental events and overt behavior. Habits need not be confined to overt behavior but can be thought of as mental phenomena as well—i.e. as recurrent and repetitive thinking patterns, “response styles” or simply “repetitive thinking” that, similar to behavioral habits, maybe automatically triggered by specific cues, such as particular people, places or events. 52 Social Habits: Learning, History and Past and Present Practices and Experiences People’s habits and their constitutive dispositions are the product of past and present social relations, practices, experiences and history. In general, social psychologists have paid more attention to the cognitive needs served by habits than to their origins. 53 Still, some have argued that what appears to be individual dispositions or habits are, ultimately, profoundly social phenomena. Lev Vygotsky, for example, stresses that “[a]ny higher mental function [is] external because it was social at some point before becoming an internal, truly mental function.” 54 More generally, cultural psychologists postulate that there is a “dynamic mutual constitution [between] 49 Hopf (2010, 3). 50 Hodgson (2008, 16). 51 For a similar definition of habit as capacities, proclivities and tendencies of people and groups of people for acting in certain ways under certain situations, see Hodgson (2008). See also Ouellette and Wood’s (1998, 55) meta- analytic syntheses of prior research on habits. In IR, see Rosenau (1986, 861-862). 52 On habits as overt action and mental events see, Verplanken (2010, 75-7). 53 Lieberman and Eisenberger (2004, 84), Oulette and Wood (1998). 54 Quoted in Marti (1996, 67). 37 culture and the psyche,” 55 which helps explain why people with different cultural backgrounds react differently to identical data. 56 There is evidence showing that environments in which people live habitually, as well as the environments to which they are acutely exposed, can affect the nature of an individual’s perceptions. 57 Any mental processes that social psychologists deal with, including habits, are creations of the social community within which they are embedded. Habits and dispositions may be acquired through cost-benefit analyses and socialization through norm compliance. But even when people learn this way, the knowledge acquired can become habitual and, eventually, be automatically elicited into action—i.e. without conscious resort to instrumental calculations or normative considerations. 58 Indeed, social psychologists have shown that automatic behaviors such as habits may follow from both “preconscious” and “postconscious” processes. That is, from psychological processes that are unconscious and the information they are based on has been perceived and acquired unconsciously (e.g. as when people’s attitudes toward advertised brands are subtly affected by people’s unconscious passing of advertisements while repeatedly driving on a highway), or from psychological processes that are unconscious but the information this processes are based on has been first consciously acquired and encoded (e.g. as when people try to master driving a car in a given social setting; after a period of practice and exposure to how traffic moves, attention on how to actually drive a car in a given social context becomes automatic or a parallel process whereby multiple stimuli and tasks can be simultaneously attended to.). 59 55 Fiske et al. (1998, 915), Markus and Hamedani (2007, 3). 56 See, for instance, Shweder and Sullivan (1993, 498) and Shweder (1991). 57 Nisbett (2007, 841). For a similar argument regarding how emotions—also automatic and unconscious processes of thought an action—are a social and not just individual phenomena, see Mercer (2014). 58 Evans (2008, 271); Hopf (2010, 3-4). On how “well established” norms elicit automatic and habitual behavior see Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003, 26). See Chapter 6 for a discussion on the differences between habits and norms. 59 Dijksterhuis (2010, 229, 233-4). 38 Moreover, the dispositions constitutive of habits are also, if not primarily and originally, acquired through imitation of what goes around us in the world. Infants, for example, naturally learn much about how to behave by mere exposure to and imitation of fellow children and their adult caretakers. This ability to imitate, as psychologist Andrew N. Meltzoff stresses, represents “a primordial connection between infant and caretaker, with implications for emotional development and intersubjectivity.” 60 Imitation serves a “social-communicative function because copying the actions of others facilitates social engagement. [It also] serves a cognitive function because copying acts on objects helps infants how to use tools and cognitive strategies that are used by experts in the culture.” 61 That infants have the capacity to imitate suggests that such imitation is not strategic but, rather, an outcome of an unconscious tendency to act in harmony with those around us. Mimesis, as Ted Hopf has put it, “need not entail any socialization to a norm, but merely repeated exposure to how things are, and are not, done.” 62 The practical knowledge acquired is what Anthony Giddens has called “practical consciousness” and Pierre Bourdieu “practical sense” 63 —an inarticulate feel for how things are, and are not done, in a given social setting. This practical sense constitutive of habits emerges, as Pierre Bourdieu has argued, at the confluence of dispositions and “the immanent tendencies of the field” or social environment within which people are embedded. 64 This serves to empirically substantiate Pierre Bourdieu’s claims regarding social competence. This is, according to Bourdieu, learnt “bodily,” by the mere exposure to “the 60 Meltzoff (2002, 19). 61 Meltzoff and Williamson (2010, 345). 62 Hopf (2010, 4). 63 Giddens (1984), Bourdieu (1977, 113), (1990, 57, 66-69). In IR see Pouliot (2010, 35). 64 Bourdieu (2000, 139). A field is a limited structured social space with taken-for-granted rules, roles, hierarchies, and range of legitimate views; Bourdieu (1990). 39 ordinary order of things, the conditionings imposed by the material conditions of existence, by the insidious injunctions … of economic and social structures and of the mechanisms through which they are reproduced.” 65 That is, people learn without explicit reflection or knowledge of rules, or even without the normalization that may be exerted through the discipline of institutions. “The world is comprehensible, immediately endowed with meaning, because the body, which, thanks to its senses and its brain, has the capacity to be present to what is outside itself, in the world, and to be impressed and durably modified by it, has been protractedly (from the beginning) exposed to its regularities.” 66 Differently put, humans are the most imitative creatures on the planet, 67 and from the point of view of evolution and adaptation, the best behavioral strategy “depends on what the majority of the population is doing.” 68 As social creatures, we naturally learn from those around us and the “objective” social conditions within which we are embedded because such is the most efficient strategy to secure participation and security in the social world. There is also a growing body of experimental literature showing that the imitative impulses triggered by the perceived behavior of others continues to be activated throughout one’s life, causing both children and adults to have behavioral dispositions and “default tendencies” to act in the same way to those around them. 69 Thus, how people have acted around us in the past, and are acting around us in the present, is yet another unconscious and unintentional influence on how we should and, quite probably, we will act in the future. Experimental research shows just that—“the mere perception of another’s behavior 65 Bourdieu (2000, 141); (1990, 103); (1977, 88). See also Dewey (1922, 24). 66 Bourdieu (2000, 135). 67 Meltzoff and Williamson (2010, 345). 68 Dawkins (1976, 69), quoted in Bargh and Morsella (2009, 9). 69 Bargh and Morsella (2009). 40 automatically increases the likelihood of engaging in that behavior oneself.” 70 Practices—or those socially meaningful patterns of action that make appear what one is doing as self-evident— are key here. As Bargh and Morsella put it, “Not only do people tend to adopt the [social] and physical behavior … of strangers with whom they interact, without intending to or being aware they are doing so, such unconscious imitation also tends to increase liking and bonding between the individuals – serving as a kind of natural ‘social glue’.” 71 That is, what we do repeatedly, automatically and habitually will be, in general, in accordance with tacit, commonsensical, taken-for-granted and natural ways of being and doing in a given social setting. Otherwise, chances are that we would just be performing meaningless behavior that could put us at the brink of social ostracism. As social creatures exposed to social actions and interactions, people’s systems of dispositions or habits are the product of the environment they inhabit, “the product of history,” an immanent law that has been laid down on to them by earlier upbringings. Habitus, as Bourdieu stresses, is “past which survives in the present.” 72 So, on top of being dispositional, constituted by a structure of practical know-how, and social, habits—or Bourdieu’s habitus—are also historical. The dispositions that constitute habits are a function of objective social conditions, of the historical environment in which they have formed and within which they operate. Habits, as John Dewey put it almost a century ago, “are things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions,” 73 which, in turn, actualize history into the present by means of what people do recurrently albeit automatically—i.e. by force of habit. 70 Chartrand and Bargh (1999, 893). 71 Bargh and Morsella (2009, 10). Also see Lakin, Chartrand and Arkin (2008). 72 Bourdieu (1977, 81-82). 73 Dewey (1922, 14, 86). 41 Habitual practices are, in short, no other thing but taken-for-granted socially recognized ways of doing things. The historical character of habits suggests that their constitutive dispositions are, as much as morals, customs, and folkways, immanent and socially shared demands for acting in certain ways. As John Dewey has put it, “Every habit creates an unconscious expectation” and supply collective standards for personal activity. 74 “Collectivities and their organizations,” James Rosenau has argued, “are bound to conduct their affairs through habitual processes that draw on the collective memories, beliefs, and cognitive styles which have cumulated across time.” 75 Habits, in other words, exact social relations. None of the above should be taken to mean that all members of the same community will have the exact same habits. In fact, they do not. Still, chances are that each member of the same community is more likely than any other member of any other community to have been confronted with the experiences and historical circumstances most frequent for the members of that community. 76 It follows that if two people belonging to different political communities have been exposed to different practices and experiences—with resulting differences in the stock of knowledge constitutive of their systems of dispositions or habits—then they may act differently even before the same data. 77 In this sense, different habits or different systems of dispositions or “schemes of thought,” would systematically structure, shape and enable different thoughts, actions and practices. 78 Habits and habitus are “a subjective but not individual system of internalized structures, schemes of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same 74 Dewey (1922, 75); Bourdieu (1990, 109), (2000, 143). 75 Rosenau (1986, 863). 76 Bourdieu (1977, 85). 77 See, most notably, Denzau and North (1994). 78 Bourdieu (1990, 41). 42 group.” 79 The history of an individual is always a specification of the collective history of his community or group. As such, “each individual system of dispositions may be seen as a structural variant of all the other group … habitus.” 80 Habits’ and habitus’ dispositions are, in other words, the product of “collective history” 81 that is actualized into the present through people’s habitual actions. As John Dewey stressed, “all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social.” 82 Speech and honesty, for example, are functions of a person as truly as of his surroundings. Together with chastity, respect, courage, irresponsibility and triviality, just to name a few other examples, speech and honesty “are not private possessions of a person [but] working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces.” 83 Any such dispositional traits require the support of environing conditions, a society or group of fellow individuals who share their meaning—blindly or explicitly—rendering possible the approval, rejection, encouragement or protest of the actions following from them. “Neutrality is non- existent. Conduct is always shared. … It is not an ethical “ought” that conduct should be social. It is social, whether bad or good.” 84 Habits of thought and action are no exception. In sum, habits are social because they are inseparable from society and culture. It is not only that habits are shaped by social practices and political processes, but also that habitual behavior, in practice, also forms the basis of the social experiences, practices and actions that helped constitute them in the first place. The relationship among past and present practices and 79 Bourdieu (1977, 86). 80 Bourdieu (1977, 86; emphasis in the original). 81 See, for instance, Bourdieu (1977, 85) and Bourdieu (2000, 148). 82 Dewey (1922, 10). 83 Dewey (1922, 16). 84 Dewey (1922, 17). 43 experiences, collective history, dispositions, context cues and habitual action (which I further discuss below) is diagrammed in Figure 1. Figure 1. The Habit Loop (Automatic Patterned) Actions Response Dispositions Environmental stimulus Context Cues Collective history Social context and relations Past pracatices and experiences Habitual Behavior as Ecologically Rational Behavior If habitual behavior is a function of, and in accordance with, the social demands of the environment, then it is simply not true that habits “necessarily preclude rationality.” 85 Rather, habitual behavior is a form of “ecological rationality [that exploits] structures of information in the environment” 86 to generate—without conscious calculation—behavioral responses or actions that are adjusted to particular situations or contexts. Habits can trigger as much appropriate behavior as value rationality can, for example; the main (albeit not trivial) difference being that it does so automatically, without the agent thinking too much about it. As James Rosenau 85 Hopf (2010, 1). 86 Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002, 75). 44 speculated more than a quarter-century ago, “The habit-driven actor concept posits specified and consistent dynamics that are anything but impetuous or random” behavior. 87 By rationality I mean, following Elster, finding the best means to a given end. Rational choice is instrumental because it is guided by the outcome of action, rather than by the situation we are in (as norms and habits are). Agents are described—or assumed to be—carefully considering all available information, ranking all alternative options, and making an optimal decision to reaching the given goal. 88 As discussed above, cognitive neuroscience distinguishes between automatic and conscious processes of thought and action. Whereas habits are shaped by automatic processes, the controlled and reflective system is responsible for thought and what we came to known as carefully scrutinized, rational action. This should not be taken to mean, however, that habitual thought and action cannot be substantially rational. One way to think about this is by conceiving habits as biases. After all, if out of habit, under the same circumstances, we are likely to behave in one way but not other, then one can think of habitual behavior as generating biases for behaving in particular ways—e.g. thinking about danger every time we see a crocodile. 89 Traditionally portrayed as pathological and deviating from rational models of decision- making—in IR as much as in Political Science in general—a growing body of experimental research shows that people may automatically engage in appropriate behavior just by following their intuitions or by simply relying on their biases, heuristics or “gut feelings.” 90 Biases, 87 Rosenau (1986, 862). 88 Elster (1989, 22-4). In IR see Bueno de Mesquita (2002) and (2013). 89 On habits as cultural biases see, for example, Barber and Badre (1998), and Bryant and Peters (2005). As Ted Hopf highlights, “One ready-made response habits offer are stereotypes,” and there are such things as “systematically biased perceptions” (2010, 541, 549). 90 Gigerenzer (2007). Bargh and Chartrand (2000, 279) argue that part of the reason why automatic mental processes tend to be “associated with negative outcomes, and conscious mental control with positive outcomes [is because] the 45 heuristics and intuitions, as much as habits, are automatic and mostly unconscious processes that are activated by specific environmental stimulus or opportunities to act. Habits, biases, heuristics, and gut feelings, are all “founded [in] evolved psychological capacities such as memory and perceptual systems,” which store “the most important information” or structures of knowledge that, when having to make a judgment or decision under a certain circumstance, appear “quickly in consciousness [for] underlying reasons we are not fully aware of [but that are] strong enough [as] to act upon.” 91 Evolved capacity means a product of both “nature and nurture—a capacity that is prepared by the genes of a species but usually needs experience to be fully expressed.” 92 Two people with different experiences—e.g. regarding how birthday parties are celebrated in China vs. Uruguay—will develop different capacities, dispositions, or inclinations for how to go about doing the same thing. Such snap mental processes and decisions have been found to generate appropriate and efficient behavior in fields ranging from investment to baseball. 93 The “recognition heuristic,” for example, allows people to arrive at the right answer to a given problem by simply choosing, rather un-reflexively, the option they recognize best. 94 People know what investment option or running path they are choosing for making money or catching a flying ball, but not why or how they are doing so; they just do it. 95 That is, because of our dispositions, biases and gut feelings, natural purview of social psychologists [is] to study social problems, and so the problematic [automatic mental processes] are likely to be overrepresented in the roll call of researched on automatic phenomena. [However,] Habits of thought and behavior can be helpful as well as harmful.” Appropriate behavior, in other words, can follow from habits of thought, biases and intuitions. 91 Gigerenzer (2007, 16-19), Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002, 75). 92 Todd and Gigerenzer (2012, 11). 93 Todd and Gigerenzer (2012, 4-7). 94 Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002). 95 Todd and Gigerenzer (2012, 3-7). 46 people generally know, without thinking, what the most appropriate behavior might be in a given situation. There is power in our dispositions and, bluntly put, in thinking without thinking. 96 Pierre Bourdieu recognized this when arguing that the un-reflexive actions following from habits’ dispositions are generally characterized by their “adaptation to the situation,” as they are, in part, “the product of the structures and tendencies of the world” that individuals inhabit, experience and, in and through practice, people’s actions help reproduce. 97 People are, in short, often well served by their habitual ways of doing things. Because habits are social phenomena, habitual ways of doing things only make sense “when embedded in a context of meaning that frames the activity, and define the rules of irrelevance.” 98 For example, the commonsensical and shared understandings in place when observing a marriage in a Christian church are different to those in Buddhist weddings. Behaviors in accordance with each of those shared understandings are both appropriate and substantially rational, even though, in practice, such behaviors are fundamentally different to each other. Making sense of certain habitual ways of doing things requires “shifting away from the individual ontology that underpins the rational choice literature toward a social ontology [highlighting] how the social rules underlying the game constitute the materiality of objects and bodies.” 99 What individuals do—whether consciously or unconsciously—have meaning only within an inter-subjective structure of explicit or implicit rules belonging to the social environment within which they are embedded; otherwise, people would be just performing random behavior across-the-board (which is not what it is observed in everyday life). 96 Gladwell (2005). 97 Bourdieu (2010, 139, 146, 159, 161), (1977, 72), and (1990, 292 fn.10). 98 Fierke (2013, 63). 99 Fierke (2013, 55). 47 Ecological rationality is key here, because it focuses on the match between a specific decision-making tool—or latent disposition to behave in a particular way—and the particular environment or task in question. Ecological rationality “is about finding out which pairs of mental and environmental structures go together.” 100 It investigates the fit between the two. Given a heuristic or ready-made response on how to do something, ecological rationality asks in what environments such automatic ways of doing and being succeeded. And given a specific environment, it asks what ready-made responses or ways of doing things would succeed as well. (Ecological rationality also asks how heuristics, intuitions and dispositions, together with the environment, co-evolve; but about this third question there is comparative little experimental knowledge.) That is, by putting the social and material environment front and center of the analysis, ecological rationality helps explain why rational behavior has different meanings in different social contexts. By focusing on the social and material environment within which action takes place, it can help answer where individual preferences for behaving in one way but not others come from; something that rational choice theory cannot do as it takes preferences as given. For instance, what is perfectly rational for some policymakers to do when an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision opens up—e.g. in Argentina, having presidents decide in favor of whatever policy they fancy—may not be rational in other democratic contexts—e.g. in Chile, where the habitual social understanding is for presidents to share with other institutional actors and domestic stakeholders what policy should be followed and how. Both practices of foreign policymaking are deemed rational in both places; likely because, Argentina’s takes place against a tradition of “delegative democracy,” 101 whereas Chile’s does 100 Todd and Gigerenzer (2012, 15). 101 O’Donnell (1994). 48 not (more on this in Chapters 3-6). After all, the unconscious guides to habitual behavior do not arise out of thin air. “Our present preferences are derived from those that served adaptive ends in the past.” 102 The brain has the cognitive capacity to exploit, consciously and unconsciously, patterns of information in the environment from where to automatically make fast and frugal decisions on how to better behave in that circumstance. It does so, in part, by automatically drawing upon the structures of knowledge or unthinking routines that, formed by past experiences and practices, are constitutive of habits. Foregrounding the socially shared rules of the game exacting social relations in any given context—i.e. what a given person would do under certain situation—helps make sense of what rational behavior means in such context. Habits have the form, “in circumstance X, Y follows,” whereas rationality posits that, “in circumstance X, you should do Y.” 103 The discussion in this section is of relevance because, as the following chapters show, under the same circumstance X, policymakers in different countries behave in fundamentally different ways. All these different ways make sense and are perfectly rational in each particular social context. Such behavioral differences systematically repeat themselves along time within each country, take place largely out of common sense, and reflect how foreign policy is typically done in each social environment. If we are to make sense of such habitual variation in behavior, then we need to know something about the underlying and socially shared rules of the game; which an ecologically rational approach helps unearth. Also, habits do not necessarily preclude rationality but, rather, facilitate it. As Bas Verplanken highlights, when talking about habits “What really matters is the smoothness and fluency of behavior; that is, the fact that we do not need to think about what we are doing, and 102 Bargh and Morsella (2010, 97). 103 This formulation is Hodgson’s (1997). 49 can do things in parallel,” 104 often focusing our limited conscious capacity in a task that really demands conscious attention. That is, rather than as a zero-sum game, the relationship between habits and rationality can be conceived as one of complementarity. 105 Habits may trigger appropriate or functional behavior given a certain situation as much as conscious processes of thought and action may do. Moreover, habits help make sense of what actual rational behavior is about in any given context. And, also, habits assist conscious thinking processes by freeing mental capacity to be used on what actually needs more careful attention. If people had to consciously process absolutely every single daily action to be undertaken, then conscious life would be simply impossible. 106 Some habits, in short, can facilitate fast, effective and accurate decision-making and action. To be sure, the point is not that thoughts and behaviors based on habitual, automatic processes or simple intuitions are better than rational or optimization strategies of decision- making and action; nor the opposite, as it is often assumed. Not all automatic or optimization strategies are best in all worlds and situations. Rather, from an ecological rationality perspective, what we must always ask is in what environment or situation does a given bias, intuition, or habit, performs better than a complex and conscious strategy, and when is the opposite true. 107 In the latter case, we should find evidence of agents carefully considering, ranking, and deciding 104 Verplanken (2006, 639). For a similar view on habit and automatic processes as parallel and facilitators of conscious processes see Dijksterhuis (2010). For a similar albeit preliminary discussion in IR see Rosenau (1986, 862). 105 See Evans (2008), for example. 106 On psychological approaches, such as the one hereby advanced, explaining more than just deviations from what is prescribed by rationality, see McDermott (2004), Mercer (2005) and Lebow (2008). On what “psychological constructivism” can contribute to the latter agenda see Hymans (2010). 107 Paraphrasing Jonathan Mercer (2005, 91), it is not that rationality is wrong but that psychological approaches to decision-making and action in IR might be right. 50 among alternatives courses of action. 108 Where habits operate, agents’ actions should follow rather commonsensically from self-evident ways of being and doing things. But the question of evidence is one I deal with in more detail in Chapter 2. Conditions under which Habits are likely to be at Work The previous discussion suggests that habits are ubiquitous. Because all optimization strategies rely on some intrinsic rule (of optimization), rational choice cannot account for the origins of those rules without falling into a circular argument. As institutional economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson puts it: “It is necessary to consider additional explanations of their genesis, at least to supplement the optimization story. In search of this ‘first cause’ we are forced to consider explanations other than optimization for the reliance of the individual upon habits [...] This primary reliance on habits [...] limits the scope of rational optimization. This itself must always depend on prior habits or rules as props.” 109 Thus, rationality cannot provide the full account of agents’ decision-making and actions often assumed in Political Science, and the analysis of habits offers one possible way to better approximate how rationality actually works in the real world. The latter does not necessarily mean that all decisions and actions are driven by habits. After all, in principle, habitual behavior can be overcome by conscious efforts and considerations and, many times, they actually are—e.g. as when in a given situation we have a strong hunch or 108 Elster (1989, 24). 109 Hodgson (1997, 668). Indeed, Hodgson argues that habits serve in at least seven types of decisional and action problems, including optimization, extensiveness, complexity, uncertainty, cognition, learning and communication. See, also, Hodgson (1988). 51 inclination for doing A but we end up doing B. That is, the ubiquity of habits does not exclude rationality. Also, it is important to keep in mind that the beneficial consequences of the adoption of a habit do not explain why agents adopt such habit in the first place. Such move would amount to falling into the functionalist mistake of seeing the beneficial functions of a phenomenon as cause of its existence. Rather, in the context of the present study, the automatic foreign policymaking practices that practitioners repetitively follow are only selected when an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States opens up, not just any foreign policy decision (more on this in Chapter 2). And such practices are followed automatically because— given how foreign policy is traditionally and typically made in the given context—they confer a selective and perfectly reasonable advantage to those adopting them as well as to the social environment in general. Habitual ways of doing things are the product of past practices and experiences. And agents’ dispositions are only enacted when matched by specific context cues or environmental stimuli. Thus, for example, Chapter 3-5 show that foreign policymakers in different countries follow different ways of making policy when, specifically, having to decide whether to join the United States in war against a third party or whether to pursue a Free Trade Agreement with that same country. Within each country, each practice of foreign policymaking repeats itself across administrations, issue at stake, and domestic and international contexts; findings that substantiate Ted Hopf’s speculation that, in world politics, we should suspect the logic of habit to be at work whenever we observe patterns of enduring practices. 110 The need or opportunity to make decisions on non high-politics issues—e.g. organizing an international conference on the environment or human rights—would possibly trigger 110 Hopf (2010, 547). 52 different decision-making processes to those that are habitual in the specific situation in question. However, when dramatic foreign policy decisions need to be made, and people’s limited cognitive capacities are naturally put to serve to figure out what policy should be pursued and why, procedural matters such as who and how should participate of the decision-making tend to be left to habitual and routinary ways of making policy. Such procedural and habitual matters are, as the next chapters show, far from trivial for how countries conduct their foreign affairs, decide whether they go to war or not, or sign free trade agreements with the largest consumer market on the planet. Habits, Change and Continuity People’s and groups of people’s habits and dispositions are self-reinforcing, homeostatic systems. 111 Specific social practices, as reflected in what people have actually done and still do, promote specific behavioral dispositions, orientations and tendencies to doing those same things in particular circumstances. Such orientations and tendencies dictate the appropriate habit of thought and action before a certain context cue and, as such, habits of thought and action both justify the disposition and support the social practice at stake. Through and in practice, in other words, individuals and group of individuals are socialized to particular systems of dispositions which, also through practice, help replicate the habitual and commonsensical social setting of their own creation. In Bourdieu’s words, the habitus is “history turned into nature,” 112 which replicates itself through people’s habitual dos and don’ts. People do the things they do as a matter of practices because it feels natural to do so. 111 Nisbett (2003, 38) and Markus and Hamedani (2007, 4-5). 112 Bourdieu (1977, 78), (1990, 54-6, 130). 53 As homeostatic systems, “habits are strong promoters of the status quo.” 113 Even though, in principle, habits can be overridden by conscious considerations guided by the logic of appropriateness, consequences or arguing, when, for example, the costs of following are consciously recognized as too high, it has been found that, precisely because of their un- conscious and automatic character, strong habits are, above all, the most robust predictors of future behavior even when intentions are taken into account. 114 That is, within habitual was of being and doing, everything is possible; beyond these, alternative behaviors are more difficult to come by and even imagine. Moreover, the architecture of the brain helps explain the durability of habits and the practices that follow from them. “Since habits are physiological features of the brain, reflection may override them, but may not destroy them. They remain neural pathways until erode with time, through disuse.” 115 This is why, in general, change in performance contexts is an important ingredient for changing habits, 116 although such may well result in an insufficient strategy to changing habitual behavior and their accompanying practices. In sum, whenever recurring and enduring behaviors are present, it is worth wondering whether habits of thought and action may be at stake, as the answer would make a difference to how easy or difficult certain behaviors or practices may be to alter. 113 Hopf (2010, 5). 114 See, for instance, Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006, 200). 115 Hopf (2010, 5). 116 Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006, 200). 54 Habits of Policymaking in a Nutshell By habits of policymaking I mean the systematic behaviors that policymakers repetitively and automatically engage in when having to make a dramatic foreign policy decision. Following the experimental work of social psychologists—and the study of social practices of political sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu—I have theorized habits as the cognitive core of practices—i.e. of what people do recurrently and un-reflexively. Rather than as strictly iterated behavior, I theorize habits as analytical constructs encompassing elements of repetition, automaticity, and identity. Habits are both individual and social phenomena. As automatic and frequent manifestations of thought and action, I have argued that habits need not be confined to overt behavior but that people may have mental habits too. I have also argued that habits need not be a bad thing and, given their social and relational origins, can guide appropriate behavior as much as rational modes of decision-making and action do. Because of their unconscious character and the fact that people and groups of people tend to be unaware of their habits, habitual behaviors may be particularly difficult to alter. As Ted Hopf has aptly put it, in the social sciences scholars rarely offer a set of empirically grounded microfoundations to support many of the more fundamental assumptions they make in their work. 117 This chapter offers one way to doing just that in relation to the recent “practice turn” in IR theory and its insight that much of what people do in the world is not conscious and reflexive but automatic and habitual. The following chapters show that cross-country differences in habitual practices of policymaking help explain important foreign policy outcomes thus far un-accounted for by available theories in IR. Before doing so, however, I turn to discussing how to recover habits 117 Hopf (2011, 773). 55 qualitatively, how we may go about doing so quantitatively as well, where exactly the habitual behavior in question is located within the foreign policy decision-making process in question, and the research design that allows me to suggest that the reason why countries with similar formal institutions have different policy outcomes is because of their different habits of policymaking. Recovering and Measuring Habits of Foreign Policymaking 57 The recent “practice turn” in IR theory argues that much of what people do on a daily basis is not conscious or deliberate but automatic, unreflexive, and habitual. Missing from this literature is a discussion on how to go about testing whether a given behavioral pattern actually follows from automatic rather than conscious processes of thought and action. This is important because it is one thing to claim that people have certain dispositions for behaving in particular ways under certain circumstances and quite another to show that, when routinely doing what they do, people are automatically drawing upon such dispositions. We are all socialized to some habitual practice. But, when doing what we do, we may or may not be automatically drawing upon it. Drawing on the discussion in the previous chapter, here I discuss habits as psychological constructs. As such, habits encompass elements of repetition, automaticity, and identity. I present a measure—the Habit Index of Foreign Policymaking, HIFoPo—for testing whether a given behavioral pattern is automatic and revealing of a sense of individual and collective identity, rather than the product of conscious mental processes of thought and action. 1 I do so in the context of democratic Argentina’s (1983-2012), Brazil’s (1985-2012) and Chile’s (1990-2012) foreign policymaking processes toward the United States. Preliminary evidence—gathered from a representative sample of senior foreign policymakers including but not limited to former presidents, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and ambassadors to the United States—suggests that Argentina, Brazil and Chile have fundamentally different habitual ways of making foreign policy every time an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision opens up. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the different qualitative techniques IR practice theorists have thus far relied on—and that I use myself in the next chapters—to reconstruct foreign policymaking processes and capture the predispositions and inclinations practitioners presumably draw upon when making policy. Second, I discuss habits as 1 On this, and on designing HIFoPo, I follow Verplanken and Orbell (2003). 58 psychological constructs—rather than strictly iterated behavior—and present a preliminary HIFoPo test. I then turn to discussing the “controlled comparison” research design that, in the last chapter, allows me to argue that the reason why countries with similar formal rules of the game for making foreign policy have varying degrees of foreign policy stability is because of their different habits of decision-making. I also address what I mean by an opportunity to make a “dramatic” foreign policy decision and the different policymaking instances the argument builds upon in the next chapters. I also discuss where, exactly, the habit of foreign policymaking I foreground is located. The chapter closes with a brief discussion of the contribution HIFoPo is set to make to the recent “practice turn” in IR theory. Accessing What Practitioners Actually Do and their Dispositions If what people actually do is the raw material of social science, then researchers must secure direct access to what’s being done and how. 2 Ethnographical participant observation would be the method of choice here because it allows researchers to directly observe people’s actual everyday behavior, as it unfolds in their natural habitat, with minimal interference from the outside. In practice, however, access to the action floor is often not an option for students of international relations. 3 In turn, IR students of practices have been relying on four alternative techniques to direct observation. 4 First, to conduct interviews and ask interviewees to recount their daily practices when having to accomplish X: who do they usually meet, if anybody at all, and where, for how 2 Adler and Pouliot (2011). 3 Two exceptions in IR are Barnett’s (2002) study of the United Nations’ lack of response to the Rwandan genocide and Neumann’s (2012) study of diplomatic practices in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 This discussion draws heavily on Pouliot (2012). 59 long, what type of issues are addressed in those encounters, how decisions are actually made, and so on. These questions help reconstruct the practical space analyzed. Second, researchers can turn interviewees into a kind of participant observer by asking them to describe what and how is that their colleagues and interlocutors do in the action floor. Though certainly an indirect way of “observing,” the advantage of this technique is that it takes place without the reflexivity that generally accompanies scholarship—i.e. interviewees tend to describe in simple terms what, according to them, are rather natural ways of doing their jobs. Third, whenever possible, researchers can recreate part of the practical space under study by conducting group interviews: “all sorts of patterned, meaningful gestures can be gleaned in a semi-natural setting like focus groups because they do not hinge on the interviewer’s input to the same extent as one-on-one interviews.” 5 Finally, researchers can treat interviews as performances themselves, meaning that as they unfold, they are trying to do something in and on the world. It is often the case that top foreign policymakers understand what academic interviews do as instances of knowledge production on a given issue, so they often take the opportunity to perform their professional worlds into being while being interviewed. A complementary strategy for indirectly accessing what policymakers actually do is textual analysis. On the one hand, researchers can select particular genres that offer a window into how things are actually done in a given social setting. Memoirs, for instance, as reconstructed as they may be, offer derivative accounts of how things are likely to have actually gotten done by the author and her interactions, or lack thereof, with colleagues and interlocutors. Other useful genres, when available, include annual reports, diplomatic cables, investigative journalism, meeting minutes, personal diaries, recording and transcripts, and written 5 Pouliot (2012, 49). 60 correspondence, for example. On the other hand, researchers can focus on the “performativity of [texts] and the domination structures that [they] engender.” 6 That is, just as with qualitative interviews, researchers can “treat discourse as [a] practice” that is doing something in and on the world. Discourse analyses and qualitative interviews are not only useful techniques for accessing who and how made what decision. They can also help reconstruct the shared dispositions, inclinations or tacit know-how constitutive of practitioners’ habitual ways of doing things. For instance, researchers can propose hypothetical scenarios to interviewees and ask how they would react were they be put in such situation. This semi-natural position requires of interviewees to think from something rather than about something. Also, questions targeted at probing the existence of the taken-for-granted are prone to unsettle it; a move that would help prove the existence of the taken-for-granted to begin with. 7 Also, in recovering habitual ways of being and doing, as important as it is to focus on what people repetitively do and say, it is to focus on what it is never said, never imagined, never done, never thought of, never deliberated or contested and never invoked. Evidence of the operation of a habit comes from these sources as well. 8 For example, if after hours of semi-structured interviews with top-foreign policymakers on who and how makes foreign policy when an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision opens up, only presidents are mentioned—and Congress is virtually never mentioned— then it is reasonable to infer that in such context what is rather natural is to have only presidents decide what is finally implemented. At the same time, there are grounds to infer that it is quite unconceivable that other actors, such as Congress or intelligence agencies, would actually 6 Pouliot (2012, 49). 7 Garfinkel (1967). 8 Hopf (2002, 11 fn. 11), (2009, 284). 61 influence that same decision-making processes—data that, in turn, can be used to probe the existence of the taken-for-granted during the course of that same interview. The same technique can be used with textual sources. Qualitative interviews and discourse analyses are the two methods IR scholars have mainly relied on as alternative techniques to ethnographic participant observation. And they have proven quite effective in reconstructing the practical environment of foreign policymaking and, with limitations, in unearthing the dispositions people have for doing things in particular ways and not others. 9 These techniques have helped IR scholars to infer assumptions from practitioners’ statements to understand what agents think from when shaping NATO-Russia relations in the post-Cold War era, to investigate natural daily practices of identity formation in Russia during the 1950s and 1960s, and to reconstruct “the shared meanings that historical agents attach to the sovereign state” in different historical international societies. 10 In the context of the present study (see Chapters 3 through 5), both semi-structured interviews with senior foreign policymakers and discourse analyses of primary and secondary sources show that, when having to make a major foreign policy decision toward the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Chile engage in fundamentally different processes of foreign policymaking. Irrespective of the government in office, issue at stake, and the domestic and international context in question, in Argentina it goes without saying that presidents, and no other institutional actors, formulate and decide foreign policy toward the United States. In Brazil, what is natural, commonsensical and takes place every time a major decision needs to be made, is for presidents and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty, to decide what is finally implemented. In Chile, what is normal, self-evident and a common practice is to have all actors 9 Hopf (2011, 773). 10 Pouliot (2010a, 2010b), Hopf (2002), Reus-Smit (1999, 10). 62 with stakes on the matter informing the making of foreign policy. (See the Appendix for the list of textual sources used to recover these foreign policymaking processes and practitioners’ dispositions to making policy in such particular ways and not others.) These are all, in other words, country-specific “social facts” that, in general, people in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile tend to find natural and take for granted. 11 Such are the typical ways in which Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Chile’s foreign policies toward the United States are made. When Argentines, Brazilians, and Chileans are asked why people appear to comply with such ways of making foreign policy, they generally reply something like “Well, I don’t know. I guess this is how foreign policy gets done around here.” However, showing that a foreign policymaker—or group of policymakers—is embedded in this or that structure of taken-for-granted knowledge for making policy, or that they are predisposed or inclined to making policy in certain particular ways but not others, is not tantamount to showing that, when making decisions, practitioners’ foreign policymaking behavior automatically follows from such self-evident ways of making policy. Brazilians in general, for example, may very well take for granted that, when the country faces a dramatic foreign policy decision, presidents and Itamaraty will call the shots. However, it could still be the case that, when actually primed to make such dramatic policy decision, policymakers carefully consider alternative ways and actors for deciding what will be finally implemented. Even though under certain circumstances we are all predisposed to doing some things in some particular ways, many times—after conscious considerations and reflection—we decide to behave differently to what our dispositions and hunches tell us to do. In other words, the recent “practice turn” in IR theory still needs a way to empirically determine—whenever possible—whether a given patterned behavior or enduring practice on the 11 On “social facts” see Durkheim (1895). 63 part of practitioners automatically follows from routinary, natural, and typical ways of doing things, rather than being the product of conscious considerations on how to do what is being done. In what follows I offer such measure and call it the Habit Index of Foreign Policymaking (HIFoPo). Habits as Psychological Constructs and the HIFoPo Theorizing habits as psychological constructs has the methodological advantage of offering the possibility to develop a valid, reliable, and replicable measure to establish how automatic, routinary, and revealing of a sense of individual and collective identity, a given behavioral pattern may be. 12 Identifying the Attributes Habits: Repetition, Identity and Automaticity In the previous chapter I have already discussed the identity and repetition attributes of habits. Here it is enough to say that the way to go about diagnosing these attributes is by establishing whether, in the case of repetition, a given behavioral pattern is routinely done, usually followed and if it has been systematically practiced in the past. In the case of identity, what needs to be established is whether the behavioral pattern is something people identify with, if it is a pattern 12 As of today, social psychologists have successfully used different versions of this Habit Index in a variety of domains such as food and beverage consumption, food safety practices, physical activity, internet use and travel mode choices. In all instances the results suggest that the Index is a reliable and valid instrument for measuring habit strength that assesses not only past behavioral frequency—as the bulk of existing measures of habits do—but also automaticity and, in some cases, identity features; Verplanken (2010, 72). 64 that denotes how things are typically done in the given social context and, if any other actor, belonging to the same community, would also follow it if put under similar circumstances. Habits are also a form of automaticity—the automatic elicitation of a given thought and action upon encountering a specific external stimulus. That is, a behavior should be deemed habitual not only if it is performed repetitively under the same circumstances. But also if it is performed with a smoothness that makes appear what is being done as natural, self-evident and commonsensical. When people travel to other cultures for the first time they immediately feel an urge for learning how to do some very basic things—e.g. getting a cab to the hotel without compromising their physical and financial security. But at their home airport, those same people do not even wonder about how to catch a cab home, they just do it. It is so self-evident how to catch a cab that the behaviors involved—e.g. walking from the terminal to baggage claim, exiting through the “cab-ride” gate, looking left instead of right to grab the attention of the cab driver, and searching for a cab service that has the clearance of the airport’s authority to operate—take place automatically. Automaticity should be diagnosed by looking at behavioral attributes such as unintentional, uncontrollable, lack of awareness, efficient, unconscious, purely stimulus driven, and fast. 13 Intentionality refers to an act that is caused by a conscious goal to behave in a particular way—e.g. having to visit a mother-in-law after six months of not doing so. 14 Although, in principle, habits are controllable—e.g. through conscious deliberation, thinking and planning—in practice it is difficult to overrule strong habits, or any automatic processes for that matter, precisely because people tend to be unaware of them. 15 13 Moors and De Houwer (2006). See also Verplanken and Orbell (2003). 14 Moors and De Houwer (2006, 306, 314). 15 Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000), Bargh (1994), Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006, 200). 65 Automatic processes such as habits are efficient in two ways. First, they free mental capacity to do other things at the same time. And, second, they are efficient in the sense of inclining individuals to doing things in ways that are adapted to a certain social context or state of affairs outside the mind—e.g. helping keep a library quiet upon its entrance, a behavior that the bulk of people seem to follow automatically, out of common sense and, equally important, that everybody seems to accept as the natural order of things in such context. 16 Automaticity suggests unconsciousness meaning that no reflexive or conscious effort is necessary, for example, to remember that in a given social context one has to behave in a particular way—i.e. how many of us really think about being quiet upon entering a library? Also, automaticity refers to purely stimulus driven processes; meaning that merely perceiving a context triggers the associated thought, behavioral response, unthinking routine or disposition to act in a certain particular way before we are even aware of our actual behavior. 17 In sum, a behavior should be deemed habitual or as following from an innate disposition for automatically doing things in certain ways if it is repetitively and spontaneously triggered by a context cue or external stimulus. Some habits would also reflect how certain things are typically done in a given social context. Habits “are submerged repertoires of potential behavior,” 18 a proclivity to automatically behave in particular ways in particular classes of situations. They mediate in the relationship between external context cues and actual behavioral responses. Habits should not be reduced to strictly iterated action or purely context-driven behavior. Rather, habits should be understood as response dispositions that people or groups of 16 Verplanken and Orbell (2003), Dijksterhuis (2010). 17 Neal, Wood and Quinn (2006, 198). Neuropsychology also demonstrates, experimentally, that people really do act before thinking; see, for example, Bargh and Chartrand (1999). Because there is no common threshold available, social psychologists have to rely on common sense arguments for deciding whether the processes under study were “fast” or “slow;” Moors and De Houwer (2006, 318). This is why I include no attribute of “fast” in my HIFoPo. Still, I try to assess as accurately as possible whether the foreign policy decision at stake was made in a fast and frugal manner through qualitative interviews and the analysis of other primary and secondary sources. 18 Hodgson (2008, 16). 66 people have for inadvertently behaving in particular ways given a certain context cue or particular circumstance. Habits are those practices that are so common that nobody really questions but, instead, follows rather automatically because they are perceived as the self-evident ways for getting things done in a given situation. The Habit Index of Foreign Policymaking —HIFoPo HIFoPo is designed to establish whether a given patterned behavior automatically follows from a disposition for doing things in a certain particular way, given a specific context cue to act, rather than the output of conscious considerations regarding how to do what is being, or has been, done. As automatic and unconscious processes, habits are, in principle, difficult to reflect upon. People are often unaware of their habits. HIFoPo does not tap habits by asking interviewees how often a particular behavior in the past has been done by force of habit. (An approach that would confound repeated behavior with habits.) Rather, as a 12-item instrument, HIFoPo breaks up the concept of habit in its three main attributes—i.e. repetition, identity, and automaticity—and their indicators, as these are easier to reflect upon than altogether unconscious process. Figure 1 shows how the different attributes of the concept of habit are captured by HIFoPo. Six items—1, 2, 4, 6, 10 and 12—capture the different indicators of automaticity. Three items—3, 8, and 11—capture repetition; and, the other three—5, 7, and 9—identity. Below is the HIFoPo used in the case of Brazil, where the analysis of primary and secondary sources, as well as semi-structured interviews with senior foreign policy decisionmakers, establish that, in every instance in which democratic Brazil had to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States, it is presidents and Itamaraty that decide what is finally implemented. (In the cases 67 of Argentina and Chile, the foreign policymaking practice under “behavior” is different to those of Brazil, given Argentina’s and Chile’s characteristic patterns of foreign policymaking.) Repetition Identity Primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with senior public officials, suggest that democratic Brazil's foreign policy decision-making process toward the United States is repetitively dominated by Presidents and Itamaraty, an actor that, depending on the issue, may or may not have policy preferences different to those of the President. Note : Each item is accompained by 7-point response scales anchored by strongly disagree/strongly agree . 11. that, in general, has taken place in previous democratic governments as well. A: Unintentional 12. that would require of a big conscious effort to overturn. *The hypothetical scenario is only offered if the interviewee asks to be given an example of an opportunity to make a critical foreign policy decision toward the United States. Such hypothetical scenario has been chosen for two main reasons. First, it is a "hard case," among possible instances of foreign policy decision-making toward the United States, for proving the effects of habits on policymaking. If habits of decision-making appear to operate in such "high politics" issue, then they can be reasonably expected to shape decision-making behavior on less prescient issues as well. Second, all three cases in this study (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) have gone through such decision-making scenario in their dealings with the United States at least once (i.e. during the first Gulf War against Iraq in 1990/1991 and, in the case of Chile, also during the Iraq War of 2003), which allows for meaningful cross- cases comparisons. A: Lack Awareness 6. that starts and finishes before people realize that has taken place. 7. that denotes how foreign policy is typically made in Brazil. 8. that practitioners have been following for as long as you can think of. 9. that, in general and if in office, any other Brazilian would also follow. 10. that Brazilians, in general, expect from their government to follow. A: Efficient A: Unconscious 2. that takes place without people having to think about it. 3. that belongs to Brazil's foreign policymaking routine. A: Stimulus Driven 4. that takes place when major foreign policy decisions need to be made. 5. you feel identified with. Figure 1. The Habit Index of Foreign Policy Decision-Making Brazil Hypothetical Scenario:* The U.S. President calls that of Brazil to ask for Brazil's support for a military campaign the United States will soon launch in a Middle Eastern country because secret intelligence reports have presumably established the existance of WMD. Behavior: Having the President and Itamaraty decide what foreign policy toward the United States Brazil should follow is a practice... A: Unintentional 1. that takes place naturally. Preliminary Study 68 Participants were a representative sample of senior foreign policymakers in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (all males, N = 30) who worked in government during the dramatic foreign policy decision-making instances toward the United States discussed in chapters 3 through 5. The sample of participants was construed following two criteria. First, I built the universe of democratic Argentina’s (1983-2012), Brazil’s (1985-2012) and Chile’s (1990-2012) top foreign policymakers by identifying, in the secondary and primary literature as well as through semi- structured interviews, who and how decided what was finally implemented during each decision- making instance. (See next section for the list of decision-making instances in each country and Appendix for a list of textual sources in English, Portuguese and Spanish used for building each country’s universe of decision-makers.) Second, I had participate of the HIFoPo any of the top foreign policymakers identified through the first criteria who would be able and willing to be interviewed. All decision-making instances in the study are represented in the sample by, at least, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in question. Also, all democratically elected governments in all three countries are represented in the sample by at least one proxy at the level of—or above— General Director of Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chile), or an equivalent position in a different country. The samples include former presidents, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ambassadors to the United States, to the United Nations, lawmakers who chaired Congresses’ Commissions on Foreign Affairs, presidential advisers and spokespersons, and one local IR scholar and a historian. All in all, the percentage of all presidents and Ministers of Foreign Affairs sampled in the data below, per country, is as follows: Argentina, 33 percent; Brazil, 26.6 percent; and Chile, 23 percent. The 10 respondents in all three countries varied across party affiliations, governments they belonged to, major foreign policy issues they had to 69 decide upon or witnessed, and international as well as domestic political and economic contexts. Responses were made on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Scores were recorded such as values above 4 (four) indicate habitual and automatic ways of making foreign policy. by country Automatic / Habitual Conscious Behavior Presidents, Min. FFAA, Fo. Po. Bureaucracy, PPs, CS. Chile Brazil Argentina 3 2 Argentina (1983-2012), Brazil (1985-2012), and Chile (1990-2012) Figure 2. Habits of Foreign Policymaking 6 7 5 4 Types of Foreign Policymaking Practices 1 Argentina Brazil Chile Presidents Planalto + Itamaraty Figure 2 shows whether the different ways in which foreign policy is typically made in Argentina, Brazil and Chile (described in the X axis) every time each country faces an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States, automatically 70 follow from self-evident and habitual understandings of who and how makes foreign policy in each place (values 4 to 7), or if they are the product of conscious processes of thought and action (values under 4). To recap, every time Argentina has made a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States, it has been mainly presidents who, without much influence form other institutional actors, have called the shots. In Brazil, before the same opportunity to act, it has been Brazil’s presidential palace—known as Planalto—and Itamaraty the actors that, in close consultation with each other, decided what was finally implemented. In Chile, a similar context cue triggered a policymaking process that is fundamentally different to that of Argentina and Brazil. In actual practice, Chilean presidents, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, as well as any other domestic actor with stakes on the matter—regardless of whether or not they belong to the government or state apparatus—have participated of Chile’s foreign policymaking process toward the United States. This preliminary data shows that, when making dramatic foreign policy decisions toward the United States, Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean senior policymakers do not just follow repetitive or routinary ways of making foreign policy but, most fundamentally, actual habits of foreign policymaking. The opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States automatically triggers different foreign policymaking processes in different countries. Under such circumstances, among Argentine practitioners what is natural to do is to have presidents alone call the shots. In Brazil, what is natural and habitual is for presidents, their foreign policy advisors—who more often than not belong to Itamaraty—and Itamaraty, to make policy. In Chile, what is natural and goes without saying under the same situation is that all domestic 71 stakeholders will partake of foreign policymaking toward the United States. And, in all three countries, foreign policymakers act according to such habitual ways of making foreign policy. These are foreign policymaking processes that repeat themselves across administrations, that by and large foreign policymakers follow regardless of the issue at stake and regardless of domestic and international contexts. They are, in other words, how dramatic foreign policy decisions toward the United States are typically made. Such processes take place without senior foreign policymakers having to think much about them. What does tend to require a big conscious effort on the part of practitioners is to think about ways of making foreign policy that do not conform to how foreign policy is habitually made. As it will be furthered substantiated in the next chapters, it is unimaginable, for example, to have a Brazilian president make foreign policy as it is made in Argentina. “People that here in Brazil do things in such different ways are called Napoleão de hospício,” because of how off-center they are. 19 These are not only routinary but habitual ways of establishing who and how does what when having to make foreign policy toward the United States. They are the habits of mind that shape and determine, in actual practice, how foreign policy is actually decided. This is so because, upon encountering an opportunity to act and in accordance with how foreign policy is traditionally made (more on the latter in the next chapters) these habits automatically define policymakers’ finite range of possible behavioral alternatives for that occasion. In the case of Argentina, these habits render obvious that presidents make policy; in Brazil, that Planalto and Itamaraty make those same decisions in consultation with each other; and, in Chile, that it is all stakeholders who will influence what policy the country should follow. As it will be shown in 19 Interview with Sergio Fausto, São Paulo, May 17, 2013. 72 the next chapters, alternative ways of making policy in each of these countries are practically unconceivable, unheard and unthought of. These fundamentally different ways of making foreign policy rest on shared, albeit implicit, rules for making policy that all senior foreign policymakers seem to understand out of commonsense. That is, generally speaking, policymakers are of the opinion that such habits of thought and action are performable by any other Argentine, Brazilian and Chilean actors to whom such action can be plausibly imputed. And, that such is how Argentines, Brazilians and Chileans expect their foreign policymakers to act when having to make a major foreign policy decision toward the United States. Otherwise, we should find senior foreign policymakers disagreeing with such otherwise taken-for-granted ways of doing things; or, discourses either protesting existing practices or describing alternative ways of making foreign policy toward the “Colossus of the North.” Such evidence, however, is remarkably difficult to find in all three countries (see Chapters 3 through 5). Habitual practices such as foreign policymaking processes have public meaning and, as John Dewey would put it, exact social relation. 20 These different habits of foreign policymaking help explain why, against the expectations raised by available theories of foreign policy change in IR, countries with similar formal institutions for foreign policymaking have foreign policies toward the United States that vary in terms of their stability. (I address the latter in Chapter 6.) Research Design, Concepts, and Instances of Foreign Policymaking In order to explore how habits of decision-making help explain variation in foreign policy stability, I exploit the “most similar systems” research design offered by the cases of democratic 20 On how habits exact social relationships see Dewey (1922). 73 Argentina’s, Brazil’s, and Chile’s foreign policymaking processes. 21 In their dealings with the United States, these three developing democracies are similar in the theoretically relevant dimension of formal political institutions of foreign policymaking, but not on their habits of foreign policy decision-making. According to the most similar systems design, “Common systemic characteristics are conceived of as “controlled for”, whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables.” 22 That is, it is anticipated that if some important differences are found among otherwise similar cases, then the number of outcomes following from these differences will be sufficiently small as to warrant explanation in terms of those differences alone. 23 Available theories of patterns of fluctuation and stability in foreign policy establish that formal institutions matter. The easiness or difficulty that any given polity will have in changing a given policy is a function of the number of veto players involved in policymaking—i.e. the number of institutional actors whose agreement is required for a policy decision. “Foreign policy change should be less frequent in highly bureaucratic states with democratic regimes than in less bureaucratic states with autocratic regimes” because agreeing on a new policy among several institutional actors is harder than doing so among a few. 24 In the context of Latin American foreign policies toward the United States, the question to be answered is why countries with strikingly similar formal institution of foreign policymaking—i.e. with similar number of institutional veto players whose agreement is required for a policy decision—have varying degrees of easiness or difficulty in making major 21 On the “most similar systems” research design see Przeworski and Teune (1970, 32-34). 22 Przeworski and Teune (1970, 33). 23 This method is often referred to as “controlled comparison;” see, for example, George and Bennett (2005). On the “indispensability” of the controlled comparison method in Comparative Politics when scholars are involved in crafting arguments with general variables or mechanisms, seeking out representative variation, and selecting cases that control over alternative and theoretically plausible explanations, see Slater and Ziblatt (2013). 24 In IR see, for instance, Welch (2005, 217) and Kahler (1997). Also see Tsebelis (1995) and (2002), and Haggard and McCubbins (2000). In Chapter 6 I discuss this literature and the theoretical expectations it raises in more detail. 74 foreign policy changes. These, in turn, undergird varying degrees of foreign policy stability that, in theory, should not be taking place to begin with. Indeed, in South America, countries with similar parchment institutions of foreign policymaking have varying degrees of foreign policy stability. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have strikingly similar political institutions in terms of who and how ought to decide what on foreign policy. The national constitutions of Argentina, Brazil and Chile grant presidents a central role in the making of foreign policy. Presidents are the diplomatic chiefs of the Nation. They are in charge of appointing and removing ambassadors, minister plenipotentiary, and commercial attaches, all with the consent of the Senate. Presidents also conclude and sign treaties to be approved or rejected by Congress, and declare war and order reprisals with the consent and approval of Congress as well. Congress, on its part, is in charge of authorizing the entry of foreign troops into the territory of the Nation and of allowing, or not, the deployment of national troops abroad. Also, presidents in all three countries face roughly similar electoral institutions— they are all elected for four-year periods and can be consecutively re-elected once. 25 More generally, the established literature in political economy in Latin America suggests, for example, that Argentina and Chile have roughly similar macro institutional arrangements in terms of separation of power and purpose; that is, in theory, that their different branches of government are motivated to seek different policy goals. 26 However, Argentina, Brazil and Chile have foreign policies toward the United States that vary greatly in terms of their stability. Whereas Chile, and to a lesser extent Brazil, have had a 25 Constitution of Argentina (1994); Constitution of Brazil (1996); Constitution of Chile (1980). The main difference regarding foreign policymaking among these formal arrangements is that, in the case of Chile, until 2005 presidents had the option to request the advice of the National Security Council (NSC) regarding events that constituted grave threats to national security or the institutions of government. The NSC has met only four times—the first was a “routine matter permitting foreign troops into Chilean territory, and the latter three pertained to the Pinochet detention. The Security Council has never met on a matter dealing with the United States,” Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, 53), and Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010). 26 See, most notably, Haggard and McCubbins (2001, 3-4). 75 relatively stable foreign policy towards the United States, Argentina has not. Argentina’s foreign policy towards the United States has tended to change almost every time a new government comes into office, whereas Chile’s foreign policy towards the United States, and less so that of Brazil, have tended to change only in light of domestic or international shocks, if at all. As the preliminary test of the HIFoPo above suggests, the next three chapters show and the last chapter discusses in greater detail, the reason why the stability of the foreign policies toward the United States of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile vary as much as they do is because of their different habits of foreign policymaking. Each country’s habit establish a different number of actors whose agreement is necessary to make policy. These habits may or may not overlap with what is prescribed in parchment; still, in practice, it is from where foreign policymaking behavior follows when practitioners are prompted to make a dramatic foreign policy decision. Importantly, the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile allow to control over other alternative explanations as well. Power asymmetries between the United States and Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, respectively, are so pronounced that all three countries face, in principle, similar degrees of leeway to inflicting sudden changes to their own foreign policies toward the “Colossus of the North.” Relations with the United States are the most important for the three South American giants, but the United States only has a foreign policy that applies to Latin America in general and to no country in the region in particular (save for the case of Cuba). 27 Also, the available Index of Economic Interdependence with the United States suggests that Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have similar and rather “low” to “moderate” economic interactions with the United States; suggesting very similar margins of action for making sudden changes in foreign economic policy if need be. 28 This means that trade, aid, and immigration patterns with 27 Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001), Norden and Russell (2002), and Hirst (2005). 28 On the Index of Economic Interdependence with the United States see Baker and Cupery (2013a, 115). 76 the United States do not explain, for example, how relatively easy has been for Argentina to embark in sudden and systematic changes of its foreign policy while, for Brazil, it has been relatively more difficult to do so. Moreover, even if there were strong empirical and theoretical reasons to suggest a causal link between public opinion and foreign policy, the former does not seem to be driving Chile’s rather stable foreign policy course and Brazil’s relative instability. 29 Since 1995 until 2010 Argentina has been the most anti-American country in the region; a fact at odds with the country’s foreign policy alignment with the United States during the 1990s. Also, since 1995 until 2010 Brazilians and Chileans have had almost identical pro and anti-American attitudes, even though the stability of their foreign policies toward the United States has varied considerably. 30 That is, the cases of Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Chile’s foreign policy stability toward the United States requires to focus on who and how decided what on any given critical instance of foreign policymaking. The goal is to illuminate how, in practice, foreign policy is actually made. This is important because, as political economists have long established, the question of whether policies are stable and predictable—or unstable and unpredictable—hinges on the policy’s political microfoundations—i.e. on the policymaking behavior of policymakers and the different incentives they respond to. 31 Thus, rather than on what was decided, the focus here is on process, on who and how decided what was finally implemented in each of the instances of foreign policymaking under study. 29 On public opinion and foreign policy see Holsti (1992, 2004). 30 Baker and Cupery (2013b). 31 Specifically, political economists insist on the “institutional determinants” of policymaking behavior, even in the case of Argentina. See, most notably, Spiller and Tommasi (2007, 2). As this chapter and chapters 3-5 show, however, I found no systematic evidence suggesting that, when deciding who and how should make foreign policy, policymakers spend too much time thinking about the matter. Rather, on such issues policymakers seem to automatically follow their (country-specific) habitual ways of making foreign policy. 77 Because the emphasis is on process and not on the substance of policy, in explaining the foundations of foreign policy stability towards the United States, it is not really a problem whether the cases of Argentina’s, Brazil’s, and Chile’s foreign policies towards such country are independent from each other. Chances are that how foreign policy has been decided in one place in one particular instance will not be related to how foreign policy was decided in another country regarding a different or similar instance. This would have been different had the outcome variable of the study had to do with the substance of each country’s foreign policies towards the United States. Indeed, there are good theoretical reasons to expect that what is decided in one case could systematically affect decisions in another case. 32 But this is not what this study is set to explore. Also, since the decision instances identified below take place across two main issue areas—trade and security—a first step towards indentifying whether there are issue-specific effects in establishing why some democracies have more stable foreign policies than others is being taken. Although a priori I do not expect to find any systematic differences across issue areas in the nature of the ultimate decision units within each country’s foreign policy decision- making processes, addressing different issue areas could eventually alert me to the contrary. Finally, the instances of foreign policy decision-making pertaining to Argentina and Brazil take place under different governing parties—which rules out the possibility of “partisan effects” over foreign policy decision-making processes in each country. However, in principle, the same cannot be said for the instance selected regarding the case of Chile. Indeed, since the advent of democracy in 1990, Chile has been governed by a coalition of center-left parties known as the Concertación (the Concert of Parties for Democracy). Since then, Chile has had 32 For an interesting study within the context of South America that discusses the place of Brazil in Argentina’s foreign policy, see Russell and Tokatlián (2003). 78 presidents from the Christian Democrat Party (1990-2000) and Socialist Party (2000-2010). It was only in 2010 that the conservative candidate, Sebastián Piñera, won over the candidate proposed by the Concertación. Still, Chile’s foreign policy towards the United States, either in trade or security related issues, does not appear to have gone through, or be likely to go through, any major changes with the government of Piñera. Whether a plurality of actors including all those with stakes on the matter—as discussed in Chapter 5—are still key components of Chile’s foreign policy decision-making processes towards the United States under Piñera, is an issue that will have to be addressed to the maximum extent possible when discussing the case of Chile. Importantly, the “most similar systems design” offered by the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile ensures variation in the explanatory variable—i.e. habits of foreign policymaking— without regard to the values of the dependent variable—i.e. the potential for foreign policy change towards the United States. To be sure, as suggested above, I do have some information of the different values of the dependent variable for each case. Still, each particular instance of foreign policymaking, as identified below, in and of itself, does not tell much about the outcome to be explained. 33 Also, there are good reasons to believe that the instances chosen are representative of the population of observations to which I want to generalize—i.e. how dramatic foreign policy decisions regarding the United States are actually made in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Indeed, most of the instances chosen took place along different governing parties and encompass different issue areas. Also, these decisions not only take place at the very beginning of the office period of governments—when, it could be argued, new governments may find more leeway in making critical and new decisions regarding an existing policy—but they also take place in the 33 On the relevance in qualitative research of selecting observations on the explanatory variable see King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 140-141). 79 midst of governing periods. To be sure, other instances could have been chosen—e.g. Argentina’s decision to align its United Nations voting pattern with that of the United States in 1991/1992, and Brazil’s decision to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998. But these instances would be unlikely to provide observations that would systematically diverge from the ones discussed in the following chapters. This is so if only because democracy has been a constitutive part of political life in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile for just about three decades; thus, making the task of finding other instances of dramatic foreign policy decisions quite difficult, if not simply impossible. By “dramatic” instances of foreign policymaking I mean “decisions that command headlines and attention, make other states sit up and take notice, generally call for some kind of response or adjustment,” and instances with the potential to “change a threat environment or an opportunity structure.” 34 They are those types of decisions that, in a democratic context, it would be reasonable to expect they would trigger the participation in the decision-making process all actors with stakes on the matter. Decisions to initiate Free Trade negotiations, to go to war with the United States against a third party, to disarm, to go nuclear, or to engage with regional integration projects such as the launching of the Free Trade Area Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), are all examples of dramatic, major, and critical foreign policy decisions. Specifically, in the case of Argentina, the instances of dramatic foreign policy decision- making are: the decision to support the Central American peace process during the Reagan years; the decision to join the United States in the first Gulf War, 1990/91; the decision to block U.S.- led efforts to re-launch the Free Trade Area Agreement (FTAA) in 2005; and, the decision to pay in full the country’s foreign debt with the International Monetary Fund that same year. In the case of Brazil, the instances are: the decision not to join the United States in the first Gulf War, 34 Welch (2005, 61). See also Hermann (1990, 5-6). 80 1990/91; the decision to abandon the FTAA project, 2003-2005; and, the decision to broker a deal with Iran on nuclear weapons in 2010. In the case of Chile, the decision-making instance analyzed is the decision to oppose the 2003 U.S. war against Iraq at the U.N. Security Council, while a Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiated during the last decade was pending final approval at the U.S. Senate. 35 I followed three criteria in sampling such instances of major foreign policy decisions toward the United States. First, I built the universe of democratic Argentina’s (1983-2012), Brazil’s (1985-2012), and Chile’s (1990-2012) major foreign policy instances by identifying, in the secondary and primary literature as well as through semi-structured interviews, what those instances were. (See Appendix for a list of textual sources in English, Portuguese and Spanish used for the recovery of this data.) Second, I chose those instances that, given the high stakes in each of them, could be considered “hard” cases for showing the power of habits in shaping policymaking. Finally, I chose decision-making instances that would open the possibility for cross-country comparisons of the effects of different habits of foreign policymaking on policy, as in the cases of Argentina’s and Brazil’s decisions before the first Gulf War in 1990/91. Where is the Habit? Given that most behaviors of interests to social scientists are very complex, it is important to define as clearly as possible where exactly the habit at stake in this study is located. Indeed, generally speaking, policymaking is a process comprising different stages: the articulation of 35 The other dramatic foreign policy decision that Chile has made regarding the United States since the advent of democracy in 1990 was to seek a FTA with that country upon the launching of the U.S.-sponsored Enterprise for the Americas Initiative in June 1990. Time and resource limitations have not allowed me to research such decision- making process. See Chapter 5 for details. 81 problems—through agenda setting or framing—as political problems, the formulation of policy in a specific course of action, the implementation of policy, and the monitoring or evaluation of policy. The actions at stake in these different stages may or may not be executed in an automatic or un-reflective fashion: planning what the best policy option would be, deciding whether to incorporate other actors to the decision-making process, blocking or facilitating the work of different agencies in the implementation stage, and so on. In the present study I argue that what is habitual in foreign policy decision-making processes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, is who and how decides what is finally implemented when an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States opens up. That is, what is habitual is not the content of policy—e.g. whether or not to support U.S. military actions in the Middle East—but rather the actual behaviors of foreign policymakers, and the expectations elicited on the part of policymaking communities in particular and society in general, on who and how calls the shots every time there is a need to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States. Moving IR Practice Theory Closer to the Mainstream This chapter presents an actual measure—the HIFoPo—and preliminary evidence suggesting that foreign policymaking behavior toward the United States in Argentina, Brazil and Chile automatically follows from socially shared structures of taken-for-granted knowledge regarding who and how gets to decide what when an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision opens up. Because these habits of foreign policymaking apply to a variety of 82 practitioners within each country, in each case the level of construal is not only individual but also social. 36 As I further substantiate in the next chapters, there appears to be an Argentine habit of foreign policy decision-making toward the United States, different from Brazil’s habit of foreign policy decision-making, and different from Chile’s. Indeed, it is very hard to find evidence suggesting that, upon having to make a critical foreign policy decision toward the “Colossus of the North,” foreign policymakers in any of these countries spend much time considering who and how should call the shots. Such issues seem to be decided out of common sense; repetitively and rather automatically. How foreign policy in each country is actually and typically made is largely shaped by force of habit. Interpretive methodologies have helped IR students of the unconscious and habitual make great progress at tapping the taken-for-granted structures of knowledge from where automatic processes of decision-making and action are claimed to follow. This chapter contributes to the latter efforts by offering a measure for testing whether a given patterned behavior can actually be deemed habitual, un-reflexive, automatic, and expressive of some prominent features of a group of people’s or political community’s identity, rather than following from instrumental or normative considerations. As of today, social psychologists have successfully used the Habit Index in such variety of domains as food and beverage consumption, food safety practices, physical activity, internet use and travel mode choices. 37 In all instances, the results suggest that the index is a reliable and valid instrument for measuring habit strength that assesses not only past behavioral frequency— as the bulk of existing measures of habits do—but also automaticity and, in some cases, the 36 On the structural and agential nature of practices, in IR, see Adler and Pouliot (2011). 37 Verplanken (2010, 72). 83 identity features that habitual behaviors may draw from and convey through actual actions. No measure of habit is currently available in IR—or Comparative Politics, for that matter. But, as shown in this chapter, HIFoPo could be easily adapted to test for the presence of current habitual and automatic behavior in any policy domain where patterns of enduring practices are present. For example, since after the War of 1812 there is simply no recollection of the United States ever solving its differences with Canada through the use of military force, U.S. officials— as well as Canada’s—can be asked whether their friendly and ally-like actions toward each other are natural, done without even having to think about them, because it is impossible to act and behave vis-à-vis Canada—and the United States—in other terms, and so on, to determine whether a conception of “friend”—versus one of rival—has become ingrained in policymaking. Likewise, have NATO-Russia relations definitively moved beyond entrenched rivalry at the diplomatic level? That is, do NATO and Russian diplomats no longer even conceive solving disputes with each other through military means? This is the driving empirical question of Vincent Pouliot’s path-breaking work on IR practice theory, and an adapted version of HIFoPo could be used to test whether diplomatic practitioners’ at the NATO-Russia Council have, or not, a taken-for-granted understanding of the other that reflects notions of enemy, rival, or friend. Importantly, HIFoPo is set to capture the dispositions that different groups of peoples may have for habitually doing things in particular ways under certain circumstances. And it does so through a replicable technique. In doing so, the ultimate goal is twofold. On the one hand, the goal is to offer an empirically more compelling account of the nascent research agenda on habits and practices in international relations. On the other, the goal is to help render the study of habits in IR more relevant to the mainstream. As I stressed in the previous chapter, now we know that at least half of what people do on a daily basis is habitual, unconscious, and automatic. And that 84 such fundamental assumption of the recent “practice turn” in IR theory can be firmly grounded on recent empirical findings in Social Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience. Whether IR students like it or not, this fact must have transpired and shaped, in some case and under some circumstance, some important aspect of international relations that remains unaccounted for by available theories. If so, it is imperative for IR scholars to begin to develop a measure to distinguish willful, conscious behavior from that which is habitual and automatic. This makes a difference on how we understand the foundations of foreign policy continuity and change in international relations, as I show next. 85 Appendix Textual Sources in English, Portuguese and Spanish Used for the Empirical Recovery of Foreign Policy Making Practices and the Taken-for-Granted Academic Journals Estudios Internacionales (Chile; N = 8 articles read) Desarrollo Económico (Argentina; N = 2) Foro Internacional (Mexico; N = 1) Contexto Internacional (Brazil; N = 6) Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (Brazil; N = 10) Politica Externa (Brazil; N = 2) Latin American Politics and Society (United States; N = 5) Latin American Research Review (United States; N = 3) Journal of Latin American Studies (United States; N = 1) Review of International Political Economy (United States; N = 4) Memoirs Celso Amorim (in Portuguese) Rubens Barbosa (in Portuguese) Fernando Henrique Cardoso (in Portuguese and English) Domingo Felipe Cavallo (in Spanish) Ricardo Lagos (in Spanish and English) Luiz Felipe Lampreia (in Portuguese) Marcilio Marques Moreira (in Portuguese) Rubens Ricupero (in Portuguese) Newspapers La Nación (Argentina; various years) Clarín (Argentina; various years) Página 12 (Argentina; various years) El Día (Argentina; various years) Folha de Sao Paulo (Brazil; various years) Revista Veja (Brazil; various years) Archives Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina: Archivo de la Cancillería. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil: Biblioteca Azeredo Da Silveira. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile: Archivo General Histórico. Presidents Rule: Argentina’s Habits of Foreign Policymaking, 1983-2012 87 This chapter focuses on who and how, in actual practice, makes democratic Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States every time an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision opens up. 1 I cover the period since Argentina returned to democracy in 1983 until 2012, and four instances of dramatic foreign policy decision-making: the decision to support the Central American peace process in the mid-1980s against U.S. interests in the region; the decision to join the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 1990/1; and, the decisions to block U.S. efforts at re-launching multilateral negotiations aimed at implementing a Free Trade Area Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005, as well as the decision to pay the full amount of the country’s debt to the International Monetary Fund—comprising about a third of Argentina’s total savings—that same year. 2 Contrary to the expectations raised by available theories of foreign policy change, Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States is very unstable—it changes dramatically almost every time a new government comes into office. The foreign policies of other countries in the region, with strikingly similar parchment institutions for foreign policymaking, such as Brazil and Chile, do not have foreign policies toward the United States as nearly as unstable as that of Argentina. 3 In theory, Argentina’s transition to democracy should have put in place more checks and balances on the power of the executive to make policy, both from within government—i.e. different institutional actors influencing foreign policymaking—and from outside government— 1 See Chapter 2 for a definition and discussion of the concept of “dramatic” foreign policy decision. 2 To be sure, Argentina has made other important foreign policy decisions toward the United States since 1983, such as ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. But, as the secondary literature and discussion below suggest, an analysis of Argentina’s foreign policymaking processes during those instances is not likely to yield findings systematically contradicting the rather traditional and habitual role that Argentine presidents have had in determining Argentina’s foreign policy. See Chapter 2 for the criteria used to select the policymaking instances hereby under study. 3 Compare, for example, Norden and Russell (2002), Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001), Hirst (2005). Also see Domínguez and Fernández de Castro (2010, Chs. 6-8). 88 i.e. non-state actors influencing the policymaking process as well. 4 The advent of democracy did make a difference in the substance of Argentina’s foreign policy, to be sure. 5 Procedurally, however, more than three decades of democratic governance do not appear to have made any significant difference on who and how makes foreign policy when an opportunity to make a dramatic policy decision toward the United States opens up. I argue that Argentina’s foreign policymaking behavior is not a function of strategic interactions among policymakers regarding who and how should be making policy given what is prescribed in parchment—as mainstream institutional theories would have it—but of a habit of policymaking establishing presidents as those fully in charge of deciding what is finally implemented. This process is not usually opened to the influence of other institutional actors; rather, the latter are typically replaced, if at all, by an “inner circle” of politically-appointed presidential advisers with preferences no different to those of the executive power. In Argentina, it is up to presidents to make foreign policy toward the United States; a fact that, for the most part, nobody seems to be at odds with because it takes place within a broader context of democratic governance that, for its functioning, relies more on the skills of particularly charismatic personalities than on formal institutional mechanisms. In turn, this habit of foreign policymaking renders changes in Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States more easy than in Brazil and Chile—countries with similar formal political institutions of foreign policy decision-making to Argentina’s, but different habits of policymaking. 6 After reconstructing who and how, in Argentina, made the critical foreign policy decisions listed above, the chapter closes by briefly discussing how Argentina’s habit of foreign 4 Diamond (1999), Kahler (1997). See chapters 2 and 6 for a more detailed discussion on the matter. 5 Russell (1998). 6 See chapters 4 and 5, respectively, for a discussion of Brazil’s and Chile’s habits of foreign policymaking toward the United States. See chapters 1 and 2 for a theoretical and methodological discussion on the meaning and effects of habits and on the different techniques used to qualitatively recover habitual behavior. 89 policymaking helps make sense of the country’s foreign policy instability toward the United States. Dramatic changes in foreign policy in Argentina are particularly easy to take place because these only need an executive power with policy preferences different to those of her predecessor. This is different to the cases of neighboring Brazil and Chile, where different habits of foreign policymaking establish more actors as responsible for foreign policy, which render changes of their policies vis-à-vis the United States less easy to implement. Supporting the Central America Peace Process during the Reagan Years For almost a hundred years since the first Pan-American Conference held in Washington, DC, in 1889, Argentine-U.S. relations have been characterized “more by the issues that divided the countries than those that brought them together.” 7 The last Argentine military government’s approach to the United States epitomized such historical pattern; while bilateral relations were scarred by the junta’s human rights violations, the United States benefited from Argentina’s engagement in the Central American crisis—a series of civil wars that the United States feared would lead to the victory of communist forces—although with the outbreak of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982 war bilateral relations would hit another historical low. The 1976-1983 Argentine military government shared with Washington a strong anti- communism position. Taking the lead over the perceived empty spaces left by the Carter administration in the U.S. struggle against communism in Central America, Argentina provided military assistance and weapons to Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle during the late 1970s and to regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala, both engaged in their own battles against leftist guerrillas. Moreover, after the 1979 Sandinista revolution, the Argentine junta also 7 Norden and Russell (2002, 26); Tulchin (1990). 90 aided Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, helping them “organize and train the dispersed and ill- equipped bands of Nicaraguan guardsmen exiled in Guatemala,” 8 as a means of exporting the expertise gained in their own domestic dirty war in Argentina. Upon the arrival of the Reagan administration to the White House, and the moving to the back burner of the U.S. human rights agenda that during the Carter administration had strained bilateral relations, Argentina’s governing junta consolidated its cooperation with the U.S. through their joint battle against communism in Central America. “Argentine trainers helped to hide U.S. involvement, which primarily consisted of financial support, thereby protecting the Reagan administration from the disapproval of the American public and the wrath of the U.S. Congress.” 9 The anti-communist ideological concurrence of Argentina’s military junta and the Reagan administration “lead to a new model of partnership in which Argentina assumed the role of U.S. surrogate in Central America.” 10 Argentina’s military would do much of the dirty work required by U.S. anti-communist policies in the region. Such cooperation would come to a halt, however, upon Argentina’s defeat in the Falkland/Malvinas war of 1982 against Great Britain, the subsequent implosion of the military junta and, in turn, with Argentina’s transition to democracy and the advent of democratically elected president Raúl Alfonsín to La Casa Rosada. Alfonsín’s government would not only suspend Argentina’s support and training to counterrevolutionaries in Central America but, also against U.S. interests in the isthmus, openly back and support the region’s peace negotiation process, a policy that materialized immediately after Alfonsín’s government was inaugurated. This change in policy rested on two main reasons. On the one hand, Alfonsín’s government had the need to clearly differentiate itself from the complicity of the military junta 8 Armony (1997, 94 and Ch. 3). 9 Norden and Russell (2002, 25). 10 Armony (1997, 63, 172). 91 with Nicaraguan contras. On the other, in the words of then Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dante Caputo, we “care about developments in Central American not only out of solidarity with Central American nations, but also in light of our national interest; if a full war were to take place in that region, its effects would transpire to all of the continent. Polarized and radicalized societies are prone to conflict.” 11 Alfonsín’s government wanted to do everything in its power to avert reproducing the domestic and regional conflicts of the 1970s in his nascent and fragile democracy. 12 There were no disagreements between Alfonsín’s and Caputo’s assessments of the situation in Central America and, as Caputo recalls, they decided that Argentina would lead regional efforts in support of the Grupo Contadora. 13 The Grupo Contadora initiative was launched in January 1983 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia, aimed at mediating in the military conflicts in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. These conflicts threatened destabilizing the rest of Central American and the region as a whole. President Alfonsín and Caputo discussed the issue and immediately decided to support Central American’s countries’ peace negotiations. As Caputo puts it when asked how the decision was made, “Alfonsín and I perceived the situation in Central America as one of great danger, likely to help reproduce in our region and, in consequence, in our country, the East-West conflict that had already taken place in Argentina’s dirty war during the military dictatorship of the previous years.” 14 Indeed, a few hours after Alfonsín was sworn as president, Dante Caputo met with his 11 Caputo (1986, 9), quoted in Paradiso (1993, 187, my translation). 12 On the “total correspondence” between Argentina’s domestic and foreign policy needs and objectives see Caputo (1984, 1). 13 Interview with Dr. Dante Caputo, Washington DC, July 18 2012. 14 Interview with Dr. Dante Caputo, Washington DC, July 18 2012. See also Cisneros and Escudé (2000, 465). 92 Nicaraguan counterpart, Miguel D’Escoto, to let him know that the Argentine government would immediately cancel Argentina’s military support to the contras arranged by the military junta. 15 Argentina’s pacifying efforts in Central America strained bilateral relations with the United States, particularly after Alfonsín’s decision to extend a 45 million dollar credit line to Nicaragua, in March 1984, for the purchase of Argentine agricultural machinery. Frank Ortiz, then U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires, had until then a good relationship with Caputo. After Argentina’s credit agreement with Nicaragua, Ortiz would publicly and repetitively voice the discomfort of the United States with Argentina’s decision. 16 Ambassador Ortiz certainly did not make U.S. policy toward Argentina, but from then on he was convinced “the Argentine government supported the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, which we did not think it was a smart move, and [Argentina] was [also a] pro-Cuban” government. 17 President Alfonsín would also be one of the main implementers of the country’s foreign policy toward the United States. During Alfonsín’s state visit to the United States in March 19, 1985, both Reagan and Alfonsín had been briefed on the contents of each other’s remarks, but Alfonsín noted that Reagan emphasized that “the Nicaraguan people are joining the ranks of the freedom fighters” and that the “free people of this hemisphere must not stand by and watch the Communist tyranny imposed on Nicaragua spread to the free lands of the Americas.” These were remarks not included in the briefing to Alfonsín. In front of the eyes of all attendees, Alfonsín folded the remarks he had prepared for the occasion, put them in his pocket, and replied, amongst the usual statements of goodwill and commitment to democracy, that “I am convinced that it's through dialogue that we will be able to reach peace [in Central America]. And on the 15 Cisneros and Escudé (2000, 523). 16 Morales Solá (1990, 208). 17 Ortiz (2005, 166-167). Argentina continued to cooperate on trade issues with Nicaragua in 1985, through the delivery of 14,000 tons of corn as part of a U$5.000.000 credit to the Sandinista government; see Cisneros and Escudé (2000, 524). 93 basis of the principle—a long-standing principle of international law in Latin America—of nonintervention, that will give us, of course, the possibility of democracy and pluralism in democracy to succeed without extra-continental interventions and affirming, of course, the freedom of man.” 18 There was no question that president Alfonsín made Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States, and that he made it rather autonomously, at times “on the go,” and certainly without necessarily consulting or opening the decision-making processes to other government, institutional or civil society actors in Argentina, including his politically appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Still, Alfonsín remained very much concerned by the potential impact of the Central American crisis on Argentina’s fragile democratic politics. So he sought to steer away from such potentially negative scenario by leading regional efforts at constituting the Grupo de Apoyo a Contadora in July 1985. The Grupo Apoyo a Contadora aimed at having the United States accept a peaceful resolution of the conflict or, at least, to persuade it of not launching a direct military intervention at the risk of finding open opposition in all of Latin America’s new democracies. 19 In a meeting celebrating the inauguration of democratically elected president of Peru Alan García in Lima, Alfonsín and his counterparts of Brazil, Uruguay and Peru would sign into the Grupo de Apoyo. Argentina’s policy would rest on three main pillars: revamping Contadora’s effort at achieving a peaceful solution to the crisis in Central America, rejecting all forms of foreign intervention in the region—i.e. U.S. forms of intervention—and exhorting Nicaragua to strengthen the system of pluralism and democratic government. 20 18 Reagan’s and Alfonsín’s remarks are available at The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38352>, last date accessed January 14, 2012. See also Granovsky (1992, 154). 19 Frohmann (1989, 381). 20 Russell (1986, 30). For other instances illustrating Alfonsín’s preference for Presidential Diplomacy see Russell and Tokatlián (1986, 23). Also see newspaper Clarín, April 9, 1985. 94 In helping Alfonsín implement his foreign policy decision, Caputo held several meetings with representatives of the permanent bureaucracy of Argentina’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with different political parties. However, such meetings were informative in nature and no policy options were discussed. Rather, Caputo was simply communicating what was decided and already being done. 21 Particularly because decision-makers do not generally belittle their own efforts, Caputo’s recollection on the matter is telling: “There was no foreign policy being decided in or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and followed by the president. The president had the real capability to define the country’s priorities in foreign policy. He would define a ‘plan’ and have the rest of government— that is, primarily myself—help Alfonsín implement it.” 22 On its part, Congress limited itself to supporting or criticizing the substance of Alfonsín and Caputo’s policies regarding Central America, not contesting how the decision was made. Part of Congress supported the Executive’s decisions and even urged the government, in May and December 1984, to actively support Contadora, to reject military aggressions in Central America and to support Nicaragua before “U.S. imperialism.” 23 Still, other representatives voiced their disagreement with Alfonsín’s policy of openly supporting Nicaragua’s “Marxist- Leninist” regime and the decision to offer multi-million dollar credits in a context of domestic economic crisis. 24 Also, toward the end of August 1985, Caputo met with representatives of his political party—the Unión Cívica Radical—to discuss final adjustments to Argentina’s position before the incoming meeting of the Grupo Contadora and Grupo de Apoyo a Contadora. 25 But 21 Indeed, due to the open collaboration that many career Foreign Service officers have had with the government of the previous military junta, Caputo had a critical vision of the permanent bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Caputo actually would “promote some young and very capable individuals from that same Ministry” to help him implement the president’s foreign policy decisions, creating much tension in between him and senior Foreign Service officers; Russell (1990, 25). 22 Interview with Dr. Dante Caputo, Washington DC, July 18 2012. 23 Congreso Nacional (1985, 483). 24 Cisneros and Escudé (2000, 524). 25 Russell and Tokatlián (1986). 95 such meetings, as Caputo states, “were merely informative and did not add to the substance of the government’s policy, which had already been decided.” 26 Neither those meetings nor debates were about how the government was going about deciding what was being implemented. The few actors that opposed Alfonsín’s foreign policy voiced discontent with the substance of his policy, not with how the government decided in favor or it. Indeed, no actor invoked the need to have other institutions informing the president’s foreign policymaking process toward the United States. No public or legislative debates took place on the matter; let alone debates about how foreign policy should be decided in a democratic context different to that of the previous military junta. 27 For the most part, having president Alfonsín endowed with a fairly high degree of foreign policymaking discretion seems to have been part of a natural order of things in Argentina. As Caputo puts it: “I know this decision-making processes sounds a bit authoritarian. But, after all, what are presidents for if not to make foreign policy?!” 28 In general, Alfonsín limited himself to instructing Caputo what policy he needed help with implementing. As Joaquín Morales Solá has put it, one of the favorite pastimes of Alfonsín was making foreign policy. 29 The creation, together with Brazil, of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) is a case in point. President Alfonsín called Caputo to the government palace and “limited himself to communicate to me that the integration with Brazil needed to be done. It was a clear message and an actual instruction ... As you can see, it is simply not the case that Ministers of foreign affairs participate in the making of foreign policy. The president instructs what policy needs to be pursued and the rest of the government needs to adapt to such foreign policy direction.” 30 26 Interview with Dr. Dante Caputo, Washington DC, July 18 2012. 27 A partial scholarly exception is to be found in Russell (1990), (1992). See, also, Bertucci (2013). 28 Interview with Dr. Dante Caputo, Washington DC, July 18 2012. 29 Morales Solá (1990). 30 Interview with Dr. Dante Caputo, Washington DC, July 18 2012. 96 And the rest of the government, and the country, adapted to such policy without voicing much disagreement, if any at all, with the policymaking process. According to Caputo, such foreign policy decision-making practice characterized Argentina’s foreign policy decision-making processes all along during the 1980s, not just during those instances regarding regional integration with Brazil or Argentina’s active role in the Central America peace process. “During the period as Minister of Foreign Affairs [all of Alfonsín’s government] the issue was pretty straight forward: there was a general foreign policy instruction given by the president and how to implement such decision was largely my responsibility. The president’s supervision was through outcomes; if I did a good job implementing his policy, good, if not, well... wrong. I would say that all major foreign policy initiatives of Argentina during 1983-1990 followed such general model of decision-making. In only one case, I would say, my position was to suggest a policy that, upon discussing it with the president, we decided to follow; that is, regarding our intent to try to block the East- West confrontation from hindering Argentina’s democratic consolidation process.” That is, “Argentina’s foreign policy was the product of Alfonsín’s brain process. By instructing to me what policy to follow and implement he was consulting with me, I guess. Had I openly disagreed with a given policy I guess we may have debated the different options and having found he was wrong, Alfonsín may have changed his opinion. But this never happened. After all, I believe, there were no differences in foreign policy preferences between Alfonsín and I ... We were two; Alfonsín decided what to do and I helped him implement the policies.” 31 Despite expectations that democracy would open the country’s foreign policy decision- making process to the influence of actors such as Congress, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Economics, and civil-society groups, 32 foreign policy remained the sole policy domain of the president; a feature of Argentine politics that incoming president Carlos Menem would also automatically comply with and follow as he arrived to La Casa Rosada in 1989. 31 Interview with Dr. Dante Caputo, Washington DC, July 18 2012. 32 Russell (1990, 59). 97 Argentina Goes to War: Iraq 1990/1991 Just as Argentine leaders did for almost a hundred years, president Raúl Alfonsín defined Argentina’s international orientation and relationship with the United States in terms of “autonomy.” That is, retaining and exercising, as Argentina’s role in Central America’s peace process illustrates, their right to choose when cooperation and discord with the United States was desirable. To be sure, during Alfonsín’s government the substance of Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States changed dramatically from that of the previous authoritarian period; and, overall, the Southern Cone country had good relations with the United States. Argentina’s young and fragile democracy needed U.S. support at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to deal with its economic and debt crisis, while Reagan’s government needed to show his support to Argentina as a means of demonstrating the democratic purpose of his administration’s policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua. 33 Still, led by president’s Alfonsín foreign policy preferences, Argentina’s nascent democracy did work against U.S. interests in Central America, failed to declare the end of hostilities with the United States’ major ally, the United Kingdom, and to cancel a joint venture with Egypt, Iraq, and Libya for the development of the Cóndor-2 missile project—an intermediate-range guided missile that, if ever fully operational, could offer the possibility of bombing the Falkland/Malvinas islands or Israel. 33 Falcoff (1992, 205). 98 But with the arrival of peronist Carlos Menem to the Argentine presidency in 1989 virtually all attempts at “autonomy” were abandoned. 34 Due to the country’s acute economic crisis, president elect Menem knew well before arriving to La Casa Rosada that his government needed good relations with all countries, but specially with developed democracies and, in particular, with the “Colossus of the North.” 35 Hence, he defined Argentina’s national interest in terms of economic development and, against a hundred years of conflicted Argentine-U.S. relations, aligned the country’s foreign policy to the international positions of the United States. 36 Menem would not hesitate to make the most out of every opportunity he had to implement his foreign policy preferences regarding the United States. Once in government, Menem decided—without really consulting with any other government or institutional actor—to abandon the Non-Aligned Movement and to adopt a clear pro-Western and pro-United States voting profile at the United Nations. Without any major public or institutional debates, he also decided to have Argentina participate in two U.S.-led military missions—the first Gulf War of 1990/1991 and the 1995 invasion and occupation of Haiti—and to present the country as one of the staunchest supporters of the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Menem also instructed his first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Domingo Cavallo, to immediately re-establish diplomatic relations with Britain, as strongly suggested by the United States and 34 With the end of the Cold War the notion of “autonomy” and its significance as an objective national interest disappeared from Latin American political and academic debates in general, not just in Argentina. However, not all Latin American countries replaced foreign policy “autonomy” with foreign policy “alignment” with the United States, as Argentina did. Even by Latin American standards, Argentina’s alignment with the United States would be exceptional; see Russell and Tokatlián (2011). 35 Menem (1990, 44-45); Cavallo (2001, 136-138). 36 On the century long conflicted relationship between Argentina and the United States see Tulchin (1990). 99 other European countries, 37 and to eliminate the Cóndor-2 project and ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). All such policies were the making of president Menem, but one decision in particular gave operational birth to Argentina’s foreign policy alignment with the United States—that of having Argentina join the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 1990-1. 38 Upon Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990, the first official statement on the part of Argentina was not fully in line with the workings of the United States and its allies before the crisis—i.e. implementing an economic and military embargo led by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. 39 Somewhat influenced by the policy preferences of the permanent bureaucracy of Argentina’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—which was of the opinion that Argentina needed to coordinate its response with Brazil, on its part hesitant to get involved— Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Domingo Cavallo made clear that Argentina did not support the use of economic sanctions in international relations. 40 However, such would be the only and last time Cavallo voiced an opinion contrary to U.S. policies and actions in the Middle East (and in the rest of the world, for that matter). Indeed, all available evidence suggests that president Menem, early in the conflict, had made his own mind and decision regarding Argentina’s role in it, and all other government institutions and actors would follow suit with what he decided. That is, supporting U.S. diplomatic efforts and, if 37 Cavallo (1997, 17). 38 Two other decisions that helped implement Menem’s alignment policy toward the United States were the de- activation of the Cóndor-2 missile project, and Argentina’s intervention in Haiti in1994 in support of U.S. plans to depose the government of President Raoul Cédras and facilitate a transition to democracy in that country; Cisneros (1998, 89). 39 The New York Times, “Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting,” August 2, 1990; The Washington Post , “Situation in Brief,”, August 3, 1990; The Washington Times, “Bush, Thatcher call on nations to act together,” August 3, 1990; The New York Times, “Moscow Joins U.S. in Criticizing Iraq,” August 4, 1990. On the U.S. rationale for building a multilateral coalition for dealing with the Iraq conflict see Baker (1995, 277-278). 40 Author’s interview with Dr. Domingo Cavallo, Buenos Aires, November 21, 2012. Also see Página 12, “Argentina en desacuerdo,” August 4, 1990; Clarín, “Nuevos socios para un mercado,” August 2, 1990. The full text of Argentina’s declaration is available in Argentine newspaper Clarín, August 3, 1990. 100 and when war was to be necessary, join U.S. war efforts as well. As president Menem recalls, early on during the crisis “I was in Olivos, in the president’s house, and received a call from [George H. W.] Bush. He tells me about the conflict in the Persian Gulf and asked me if I was opened to collaborate with something. I immediately got in touch with the Armed Forces here in Argentina, the Air Force, the Navy and the Army, to see how Argentina could collaborate. Once Bush asked me for help I decided, before consulting with anybody else, to send something to the war. The Navy people told me they had two warships that were in Italy for repairs but ready to follow my orders. So I ordered them to go to the Gulf region as soon as they were ready and to get under U.S. command. And so… that’s how it was decided—they went to the Persian Gulf and stayed there until the war was over.” 41 As Cavallo puts it, Menem called me in and told me “I am convinced we must participate. If Brazil wants to participate too, fine. But we must be there no matter what.” 42 Indeed, in early August president Menem, together with Cavallo, traveled to Colombia for the inaugural address of president elect César Gaviria Trujillo. There Menem and Cavallo met with U.S. vice-President Dan Quayle. 43 Such was the very first time that government officials from Argentina and the United States—beyond presidents Menem and Bush—discussed developments in the Persian Gulf and the different country responses—including that of Argentina—to the crisis. 44 That is, primed by the need to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, president Menem had decided, rather quickly and certainly without conceiving the need or obligation to consult with other institutions or political actors, what policy Argentina should pursue regarding the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, it is remarkably difficult to find evidence of Minister 41 Interview with president Carlos Saúl Menem, Buenos Aires, November 19, 2012. 42 Interview with Dr. Domingo Cavallo, Buenos Aires, November 21, 20012. 43 See “Los argumentos,” Clarín, August 5, 1990; “Por ahora George Bush no viene,” Clarín, August 6, 1990; and, “Menem busca agilizar el dialogo con EE.UU.,” Clarín, August 8, 1990. See also Menem (1990, 202). 44 Author’s interview with Dr. Domingo Cavallo, Buenos Aires, November 21, 2012; Clarín, “Desmienten el envío de tropas al Golfo,” August 9, 1990. 101 Cavallo—or of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for that matter—voicing discontent or disagreement with such decision-making process. Even when I suggested to Menem that the historical record shows that his brother Munir, then Argentine Ambassador to Syria, met with the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker a few months before the beginning of the war, and whether what was discussed in that meeting might have been part of Argentina’s decision-making processes to joining the United States’ war effort against Iraq, Menem replied: “No, no, no; absolutely not. Such was my decision. And I had the legitimate authority to make such call! And I don’t know if Bush... Well, yes... I’m sure Bush consulted with his Congress.” 45 José Octavio Bordón—a former Argentine Ambassador to the United States and governor of one of the largest provinces of Argentina—also puts it clearly: “Menem had that way of making policy—he would decide what to do and let his Ministers implement what he hadn’t instrumented himself up to that point.” And this was not only a characteristic of Menem’s government, Bordón continues: “The first thing I learned, even being in the private sector, is that Argentines need to overcome a bad behavior, a bad methodology that we Argentines have. I’m not saying that others don’t have it, I just refer to Argentines because this is what I know best. But in other countries I guess it is different... And it is that, in general, we tend to be quite individualistic in how we make decisions. And when I say ‘individualistic,’ this includes the inner-circle of very close friends and, in general, we don’t resort to the institutional memory accumulated in the Foreign Service, in the old Department of International Economic Relations—that later on turned out to be part of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs—in our embassies, ambassadors, let alone our scholarly community. ... So, this is an Argentine drama: we simply do not believe that policy decisions presuppose a decision-making process, a system that could facilitate the implementation of long-term policies.” 46 45 Interview with president Carlos Menem, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 46 Interview with Argentine Ambassador to the United States, José Octavio Bordón, Buenos Aires, November 28, 2012. 102 Just as during the previous decade of democratic governance, having the president decide the country’s foreign policy away from the influence of other institutional actors, was for Argentina’s top foreign policymakers and Argentines in general almost as second nature. Indeed, as the crisis unfolded, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of implementing Menem’s and Cavallo’s instructions; by then, only having to do with evacuating any Argentines living in Iraq and Kuwait. 47 Even though some senior ambassadors did not fully agree with Menem’s decision to military support U.S. policies in the Middle East, none of these same actors appeared to have been at issue with having the president alone deciding in favor of such policy option. In Congress, some Argentine lawmakers did raise concerns regarding not only the substance of Argentina’s position before the conflict but also about some of the government’s foreign policy decision-making practices. Several members of the House drafted a law project petitioning the Executive power “to not deploy Argentine military forces” to the conflict zone. The rationale was simple—such deployment would be equivalent to a declaration of war and, according to Argentina’s National Constitution, deploying troops abroad and engaging in war had to have Congressional approval. 48 However, even though less than a month after Iraq had invaded Kuwait president Menem openly argued that Argentina’s troops were ready to be deployed in the Middle East, the bulk of Congress was by and large concerned with the substance of president Menem’s decision and not with whether the country’s foreign policymaking processes had been carried out according to 47 See, for example, “Fin de la odisea para un grupo argentino que huyó del Golfo,” Clarín, August 26, 1990; “Un informe para el análisis del Presidente,” Clarín, August 19, 1990. 48 Article 67, Inc. 25 of Argentina’s Constitution established that it was an attribution of Congress “to authorize the entrance of foreign troops in national territory and the deployment of national troops abroad.” Constitución Nacional Argentina 1853 y reformas, available at http://www.biblioteca.jus.gov.ar/constitucionargentina1853.html. Also see newspaper Página 12, August 4, 1990, and La Nación, “Regresan argentinos liberados,” August 25, 1990. 103 law. 49 Whereas some lawmakers overtly opposed Argentina’s military participation in the conflict, whether legitimized by UN resolutions or not, others proposed waiting for a U.S. invitation to participate and immediately send troops after that. 50 What is particularly difficult to find is, as during Alfonsín’s government, systematic evidence of disagreements with the country’s centralized way of making policy. That is, by the time when the Bush administration had built enough domestic support around the need to go to war against Iraq, 51 Argentina’s president had already decided to partake of the conflict disregarding, in practice, what is mandated on the matter by the Constitution—i.e. having Congress authorize the decision to deploy national troops abroad. A strong Congressional debate was then to be expected between Menem’s supporters and those lawmakers in the opposition expecting to actually approve or not the deployment of argentine troops in the Gulf region. But despite some voices to the contrary, Congress could never exercise its legal right to decide on the matter. 52 During his visit to the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Doming Cavallo made clear that “I came here to debate nothing; only to communicate the president’s decision,” to send Argentine troops to the Gulf region to participate in the blockade against Iraq. 53 That night, through a public message broadcasted on public radio and TV, Cavallo announced that president 49 Clarín, “Las tropas argentinas ya están listas, aseguró Menem,” August 24, 1990; Página 12, “Mulford bendijo el plan y recomendó constancia,” August 24, 1990. Also see La Nación, “Están dispuestas a participar las FF.AA. argentinas,” August 23, 1990; La Nación, “La Argentina enviaría fuerzas al Golfo Pérsico,” September 18, 1990; and, Clarín, ‘“Firme apoyo” de los EE.UU. al programa económico argentino,” August 24, 1990. 50 La Nación, “Regresan argentinos liberados,” August 25, 1990; Página 12, “Con el Golfo en la mira,” August 24, 1990. 51 Baker (1995, 302). 52 See Página 12, “El Congreso reclama su lugar,” September18, 1990; Clarín, “Áspero debate hubo en Diputados,” September 20, 1990; La Nación, “Debate en el Congreso por el envío de tropas,” September 20, 1990; and, Página 12, “La guerra del congreso,” September 20, 1990; Folha de São Paulo, “Governo argentino se ve no centro das decisoes com o envio de tropas,” September 26, 1990. See also, Diario de Sesiones. Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 36* Reunión, 11* Sesión Ordinaria, September 19, 1990, República Argentina, pp. 3030-3083, and Diario de Sesiones. Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 37* Reunión, 11* Sesión Ordinaria, September 20, 1990, República Argentina, pp. 3087-3132. 53 Página 12, “En el Congreso son de palo,” September 19, 1990. 104 Menem had ordered the deployment of Argentine troops and military equipment to the region (which, according to some estimates, involved “two warships, a cargo plane and as many as 450 troops”). 54 Such decision was implemented by law decree 1871 in September 19, 1990. On its part, the Bush administration openly welcomed Menem’s decision. Bush stated to be “very satisfied” with Argentina’s stance and U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires, Terence Todman, explained that “it is a decision that helps a lot” in the multilateral campaign against Iraq’s usurpation of Kuwait. 55 By the end of November 1990, the UNSC approved the “use [of] all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” 56 And in early December, president George H. W. Bush visited Argentina and the U.S. Ambassador in Buenos Aires celebrated that Argentina’s collaboration in the Gulf Crisis signaled “the first step in a new path in U.S.-Argentine relations.” 57 With Argentine military personnel already stationed in the Persian Gulf, president Menem asked for Congressional approval to have argentine troops logistically support U.S. efforts in the case of actual war. 58 Congress was dominated by the president’s peronist party and, ten days later, president Menem’s petition was approved. Some political actors from opposition parties kept on voicing their discontent with the executive’s policy and with the tacit acceptance, 54 “Argentine Leader Sees Gulf Role as Best Way to Remove Old Image,” The New York Times, October 1, 1990; also see “El crucero del amor,” Página 12, September 19, 1990, and “Fuerzas argentinas intervendrán en el bloqueo militar contra Irak,” La Nación, September 19, 1990. 55 La Nación, “Beneplácito de los EE.UU. por la actitud argentina,” September 20, 1990; La Nación, “Elogió Bush la determinación del Presidente,” September 21, 1990. See also Clarín, “Para Todman, la Argentina “es un socio confiable”,” December 12, 1990, and Página 12, “Todman aseguró que Menem es un socio confiable para Washington,” December 12, 1990. 56 UNSCR 678 (1990). 57 Pagina 12, “Una salva de cañonazos,” December 4, 1990. 58 Página 12, “El Gobierno pide permiso para “apoyar” a EE.UU. en el Golfo,” December 7, 1990. 105 on the part of Argentine lawmakers and civil-society in general, of Menem’s power to deploy troops abroad without the chamber’s consent. 59 By mid-January the U.S.-led multilateral coalition had begun the first Gulf War. Even though Argentina’s public opinion was still strongly opposed to the country’s participation in the war, 60 Argentine troops would only return upon Menem’s orders to do so well after the end of February, when the liberation of Kuwait was finally secured. 61 Menem’s government had good reasons to join the U.S.-led efforts against Iraq. For one, until Iraq invaded Kuwait and the United States decided to restore order in the Persian Gulf, Menem’s government lacked an opportunity to operationalize, in actual practice, the special relationship he wanted to forge with the United States, out of economic convenience and as a means of fully re-inserting Argentina in the new world order. Also, the first Gulf War gave president Menem the opportunity to start re-defining the role of the country’s Armed Forces; an issue that—after the military junta’s implosion due to the defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War—president Alfonsín could never fully solve and caused many threats to the nascent and fragile democratic order. 62 But perhaps most importantly, by the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, Argentina still had to fully dismantle the Condor-2 missile project. If ever fully operational, the missiles being developed would have the capability of reaching Israel from Iraq and the Falklands/Malvinas 59 See Diario de Sesiones. Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 48* Reunión, 4* Sesión Extraordinaria, January 18- 19, 1991, pp. 4011-4102, and Diario de Sesiones. Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 49* Reunión, Continuación de la 4* Sesión Extraordinaria, January 23 and 24, 1991, pp. 4112-4150. La Nación, “El Senado aprobó el permiso para las naves,” December 19, 1991. 60 By late January 1991, 91.7 percent of those polled responded that Argentina “did not have to participate in the war, while 85.3 of respondents stated that Argentine battleships “Spiro” and “Almirante Brown” had to return to Argentina; see Página 12, “El rechazo gana por goleada,” January 24, 1991. 61 Decree 886, Anales de Legislación Argentina 1991, Buenos Aires, La Ley, 1991, p. 1936-1937. The Washington Post, “Kuwait Is Liberated” and “Military Objectives Are Met, Bush Says,” February 28, 1991. 62 For a first approximation to Argentine civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Argentina, see Romero (2001). 106 Islands from Argentina. 63 Participating in a war effort against a former partner in such venture would also be considered a step toward the full dismantlement of the proliferation effort. The war, in short, gave Menem the opportunity to start leaving behind a century-long history of resistance to U.S. foreign policies and international stances with a single decision. However, what was not new in Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States, was the nature of its decision-making process. To be sure, some lawmakers did voice their disagreement with Menem’s highly-centralized foreign policymaking process. But, for the most part, Menem, Cavallo, his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the vast majority of Congress and Argentines in general, did not show to be at odds with such way of making policy. For all such actors, it was as if it went without saying that dramatic foreign policy decisions—such as those pertaining the deployment of Argentine troops abroad—belong to the president, and the president acted accordingly. Importantly, polls denouncing civil-society’s opposition to Argentina’s participation in the war did not even ask whether people supported having Congress not being able to do its job—i.e. authorizing Argentine troops to leave the country as established in the National Constitution. Such policymaking alternative was virtually un-thought of and, for the most part, practically un-deliberated. Just as during the government of Raúl Alfonsín, having the president calling the shots without necessarily opening the decision-making process to other actors appeared to be part of the habitual order of things. The bulk of Argentines followed such practice rather automatically, because it was perceived, albeit tacitly, as the self-evident way of getting things done in such policy domain. The foreign policy decision-making practices of the next democratically elected presidents of Argentina would be no different. 63 See, for instance, Clarín, “Apoyo de Todman al Gobierno,” March 30, 1990; Clarín, “Sombra de Cóndor’, August 9, 1990; and, Clarín, “El secreto del Canciller,” September 19, 1990. 107 Blocking the FTAA and Paying the IMF in Full By early 2005 Argentina had already left behind the worst of its 2001 economic crisis. The latter did not trigger any immediate major change in Argentina’s policy toward the United States. Argentina kept its vote condemning Cuba’s human rights performance at the Annual Session of the UN Commission on Human Right until 2003, supported the U.S. military strategy against terrorism in the Western Hemisphere until that same year, and it didn’t really show major issues with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. 64 After three years of solid economic growth, mainly spurred by the rising prices and world demand for food crops, president Néstor Kirchner could begin to turn his attention to foreign policy matters. As much as Alfonsín and Menem during previous years, Kirchner would also show a strong inclination to making foreign policy toward the United States as he saw fit. One clear instance of Kirchner’s disposition was prompted by Argentina’s need to decide on whether the country would support U.S. efforts at re-launching negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). During the 1990s, Argentina had spearheaded diplomatic efforts, together with the United States, toward the implementation of such hemispheric project. 65 As Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time recalls, in the weeks running up to the multilateral Summit—held in Argentina—that would decide on the matter, president Kirchner instructed Argentine negotiators to join forces with Brazil’s and Venezuela’s to argue that the conditions to negotiate a FTAA were yet to be met. 66 Unless the region’s asymmetries with the United States were explicitly recognized and developed nations’ tariff barriers and 64 Russell (2010, 104), Corigliano (2011, 23). 65 Norden and Russell (2002, 74-82); The Washington Post, “Fracaso in Argentina,” November 8, 2005. 66 Private correspondence of the author with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Rafael Bielsa, Buenos Aires, November 2012. 108 agricultural subsidies were removed, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay (i.e. the MERCOSUR) and Venezuela, would block efforts at re-launching negotiations. 67 Argentina (and Brazil) would not even consider the more balanced approach of Mexico and Chile, suggesting to stay within the FTAA framework to help redress the imbalance and contribute to greater democratization in the hemispheric integration effort. 68 What President Kirchner had in mind for the Summit was discussing how to overcome economic inequality rather than agreeing on a future date to re-launch negotiations on the FTAA. In his opening remarks to the Summit, Kirchner bashed the “Washington Consensus,” attacked the IMF and the World Bank and, to the surprise of Bush and most of the audience, he also attacked the United States for endorsing and promoting policies that had “not only led to misery and poverty but also [to] the fall of democratically elected governments” in the region; Kirchner mentioned the “FTAA” not a single time. 69 The available data suggests that president Kirchner decided to block talks on the FTAA all by himself or, at most, in light of conversations he could have had with his inner circle of closest advisers—i.e. with a very close group of no more than four individuals that were not officially in charge of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Economics, for example. That is, the decision to abandon free trade as a foreign policy and economic development goal was made and implemented in light of Kirchner’s own political preferences on the matter, maybe coordinating some actions with president Lula of Brazil, but certainly not opening the decision-making process to other domestic institutional actors or interest groups inside Argentina. And, as in 67 The Washington Post, “Bush Departs Without a Deal; No Consensus on Reviving Regional Trade Agreement,” November 6, 2005. 68 The Washington Post, “Skepticism Prevails at Trade Talks; Venezuelan Fails to Unite Latin Leaders,” November 6, 2005; La Nación, “Cortocircuito con México por el ALCA,” November 4, 2005. 69 Inaugural remarks of president Nestor Kirchner at the Fourth Summit of the Americas, available at http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/discurso.asp?sCodigo=05-0263; Página 12, “K, antineoliberal,” November 5, 2005; Clarín, “Kirchner le pidió a EEUU que asuma un liderazgo responsable en la región,” November 5, 2005. 109 previous major instances of foreign policymaking, no actors appeared at odds with such decision-making process. Indeed, during the weeks leading to the Summit and in Mar del Plata, Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Rafael Bielsa received only two “instructions” from president Kirchner—“coordinate with the MERCOSUR and Venezuela” and “go, Rafael, give the closing remarks and make clear we are abandoning the FTAA.” 70 Then Argentina’s Ambassador to the United States, José Octavio Bordón, still holds a draft of the final declaration Argentina’s Minister of Economics, Roberto Lavagna, and U.S. Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Lino Gutierrez, drafted together and that, according to Bordón, would have avoided Argentina’s U- turn in policy and the forthcoming tension in Argentine-U.S. relations. “But Kirchner did not pay attention at all to any of such efforts. I have no idea who [Kirchner] discussed these issues with, if with anybody at all. I don’t think he discussed them with Bielsa [...] It was all the making of Kirchner. […] Néstor never let anybody get in the middle of his relationship with the White House.” 71 In Kirchner’s words, “I, together with Bush, manage relations with the United States” 72 — a statement that, as happened during Alfonsín’s and Menem’s governments, no political or civil- society actor seemed to have any major problems with. The other main issues in Argentina’s U.S. agenda during Kirchner’s government would be handled no differently. Indeed, in another U-turn in the country’s foreign policy toward the United States, in December 15, 2005, president Kirchner announced that for the first time in the history of Argentina, the country would cancel the full amount of its $9.8 billion debt with the IMF— 70 Private correspondence with the author, Buenos Aires, November 2012. 71 Interview with Argentine Ambassador to the United States, José Octavio Bordón, Buenos Aires, November 28, 2012. 72 Clarín, “Los secretos sobre cómo Kirchner maneja el poder,” May 23, 2005. See also Morales Solá (2008, 25). 110 comprising a third of the country’s national savings. 73 At and during the public act in which Kirchner made the announcement, the governors, lawmakers, ambassadors and ministers of government that were present, had “no idea whatsoever of what was going on. Nobody knew anything!” 74 After the announcement everybody congratulated President Kirchner as he walked to his office. From there, also according to Ambassador Bordón, watching TV and over the phone, Kirchner would give orders to his ministers to tweak, change, emphasize more or less, or simply modify one or another aspect of the way in which they were communicating the president’s new policy. As Rafael Bielsa puts it, “the decision to pay the IMF was exclusively Kirchner’s. It was an idea he worked on for a very long time and in the most varied ways. [...] The then newly chosen Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taiana, knew nothing about the decision and announcement. In fact, he was out of the country when Kirchner made the historical announcement.” 75 But not only Minister Taiana knew nothing, the bulk of Kirchner’s government, the governors of the different Argentine provinces, and civil-society in general, were overtly unaware of the major decision that was about to be implemented. As Ambassador Bordón recalls, “In December 2005 I was in Buenos Aires with a group of people that I had brought from the United States on an official mission. All of a sudden my cell phone rings and it was my sister. She wanted to know whether I was going to the government palace because all members of government—governors and other authorities—were gathering there. I said “no, I have no idea what is going on.” But after hanging up and discussing the issue with my wife I decided to call Néstor [Kirchner]. I let the president’s personal secretary know that I was in Buenos Aires, hanged up and, after three minutes, I receive the order over the phone to immediately go to La Casa Rosada. When arriving, I see that the chiefs of 73 Página 12, “Todo en un pago y chau al Fondo,” December 16, 2005; La Nación, “Histórico: el país saldará en un solo pago la deuda con el FMI,” December 16, 2005. 74 Interview with Argentine Ambassador to the United States, José Octavio Bordón, Buenos Aires, November 28, 2012. 75 Private correspondence with the author, Buenos Aires, November 2012. 111 the Armed Forces, several governors, and some Ministers of government that were not the most important ones, were also there. And the joke was that many lawmakers were telling me that “we know, we broke bilateral relations with the United States and have pulled out our Ambassador!” I saw Kirchner, he came to me and praised that I was there and made me walk into the Salón Blanco, the largest in La Casa Rosada.” Excuse me, but at that point, did you know why you were there (I asked)? Bringing his eyebrows up and mouth and chin down, Bordón replied: “I didn’t know, the governors didn’t know, the Minister of Defense that was also there didn’t know... Nobody knew anything! A hypothesis was that there was a conflict... but nobody knew anything! And right there Kirchner announced that Argentina would cancel all of its debt with the IMF.” 76 Tellingly, Argentine policymakers in general find nothing unsettling in such ways of making policy. For the most part, nobody seems at odds with such practice. When juxtaposed with previous instances of dramatic foreign policymaking, the latter appears to be the typical way Argentines have for making foreign policy toward the United States. Just as in the case of the decision to block the FTAA, it is remarkably difficult—if not simply impossible—to find any voices against such highly-centralized way of making major foreign policy decisions. To be sure, president Kirchner had very good reasons to bring to a halt Argentina’s participation in the FTAA and to cancel its debt with the IMF—two decisions that helped the government steer clear from the “Washington Consensus” policies and supporting institutions that had done so much to generate Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis. 77 Also, president Kirchner did have an inner circle of confidants with which he handled most of the issues. “This was a table of four plus Kirchner,” as José Bordón recalls and Wikileaks reveal: “Cristina Kirchner [Néstor’s wife], Carlos Zannini [Secretary for Legal and Technical Affairs], Alberto Fernández 76 Interview with Argentine Ambassador to the United States, José Octavio Bordón, Buenos Aires, November 28, 2012. See also Wikileaks in O’Donnell (2011, 248), Página 12, “Todo en un pago y chau al Fondo” and “Lavagna dice que hizo punta,” December 16, 2005, and La Nación, “El día que Néstor perdió el tren de la historia,” July 14, 2013. 77 Blustein (2005). 112 [Kirchner’s Chief of Cabinet], and Julio De Vido [Kirchner’s Minister of Planning and Public Investment]. With them, Néstor traveled around the world, save a very few exceptions, and directly handled relations with the United States. These individuals were more important than the Minister of Foreign Affairs! Néstor never paid much attention to the Ministry” 78 or any other institutions, for that matter. Just as when president Alfonsín decided to support the Central American peace process in the mid-80s, and when president Menem sent Argentine military troops to the Persian Gulf, when president Kirchner had to decide on whether to support U.S. efforts at re-launching the FTAA and cancel the country’s massive debt with the IMF, critics voiced their opinions regarding what was decided but not about how policy was being made. Several non-peronists lawmakers protested whether Kirchner’s government should have had a clearer answer to how it was going to actually fight economic inequality other than through free trade, as proposed by those still supporting the FTAA. 79 But, beyond that, no alternative voices to that of the government was heard; particularly about how the government made the transcendental decision. 80 It is as if alternative foreign policymaking processes to the highly-centralized methods of Alfonsín, Menem and, in this case Kirchner, were practically unconceivable. Although it is too early to fully analyze her presidency, chances are that the government of Cristina Kirchner (2007-incumbent) followed the same habit of foreign policymaking as her predecessors’. Dispatches of the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires describe her as relying on the same “inner circle” of close friends—not institutional actors—in making her decisions, as the 78 Interview with Argentine Ambassador to the United States, José Octavio Bordón, Buenos Aires, November 28, 2012. See also Wikileaks in O’Donnell (2011, 245-253, 349-354), and Corigliano (2011, 27). 79 La Nación, “Duras críticas de la oposición,” November 6, 2005; La Nación, “La oposición agudiza sus críticas,” December 16, 2005. 80 See newspapers La Nación, Clarín and Página 12 of November 6, 7 and 8 where there are virtually no recollections of any opposing voices to Kirchner’s way of making policy. 113 one her husband—former president Néstor Kirchner—shared some issues with. Cristina Kirchner is also described by “all sources inquired” to have defined Argentina’s policy before the 2009 coup d’etat against democratically elected president of Honduras, José Manuel Zelaya, “on the spot.” 81 Tellingly, when a blood clot was removed from her brain in October 2013 and doctors ordered president Cristina Kirchner to rest for a month, the Argentine media begun to ask who was actually doing the governing during such time, to which government officials responded—in a quite uncontroversial way for Argentine expectations and standards—that president Cristina Kirchner was! 82 Habits and Policy: Understanding Argentina’s Foreign Policy Instability This chapter shows that, in actual practice, when Argentina faces an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States, presidents decide—away from the influence of other institutional actors—what policy is implemented and how. To be sure, the Constitution of Argentina does grant presidents a central role in the making of foreign policy. Still, for the most part, in those instances of such great import that one would expect the participation of stakeholders in the decision-making process, in all relevant foreign policymaking instances with the United States during the last three decades, Argentine presidents have been the only meaningful players in Argentina’s foreign policy decision-making processes. 81 O’Donnell (2011, 88-91). 82 See, for example, La Nación, “Desde el Gobierno afirmaron que Cristina Kirchner “es la única que tiene el poder”,” “Un gobierno con dos presidents interinos;” Página 12, “El vice en medio del debate,” October 9, 2013; Página 12, “Al mando de la Presidenta;” Clarín, “La ausencia de Cristina: El Gobierno salió a marcarle en público límites a Boudou,” October 10, 2013. 114 Importantly, the available evidence suggests that such behavior on the part of policymakers repeats itself across administrations and issue areas, takes place irrespective of who is Argentina’s president or its Minister of Foreign Affairs, and independently of the domestic and international context the country is facing. It is also a policymaking behavior that takes place without much recourse to conscious considerations of form and procedure. It takes place, by and large, automatically—i.e. naturally; triggered by the need to make a major foreign policy decision; without many people, if anybody at all, realizing that it is actually taking place; and, requiring of considerable conscious efforts to think of alternative ways of making foreign policy. It is difficult to find evidence of practitioners or the general public spending any meaningful time debating who and how should be calling the shots. And it is, also, a process that, out of common sense, denotes how foreign policy toward the United States is typically made in Argentina. When making critical foreign policy decisions, Argentina has a habit of foreign policymaking establishing that presidents, and just them, rule. All Argentine democratically elected presidents since 1983 have been inclined to sidestep their own bureaucracies when making foreign policy, thereby concentrating policymaking toward the United States in their hands. Irrespective of their party affiliations, policy preferences, issues at stake, and historical contexts, what is habitual and goes without saying in Argentina is to have presidents make foreign policy every time an opportunity to make a critical decision comes about. Albeit tacitly, Argentine presidents understand foreign policymaking that way and the rest of political and civil society actors understands it that way too. As a former Argentine Ambassador to the United States put it, “having the president decide the country’s foreign policy toward the U.S. is like going up the stairs: nobody thinks about how to go up the stairs; people just do it!” 83 83 Interview with Ambassador Alfredo Chiaradía, Buenos Aires, November 29, 2012. 115 In general, in Argentina, it goes without saying that, in practice, it is the president who decides foreign policy toward the “Colossus of the North.” This is simply how foreign policymaking in Argentina is usually decided; out of common sense and in line with the country’s habitual way of making foreign policy. Nobody really doubts who and how should be deciding foreign policy toward the United States. Alternative decision-making processes are simply not mentioned, are un-invoked, and are practically un-conceivable. Indeed, in Argentina, it is perfectly reasonable to have presidents making policy as they see fit because it is a practice ultimately embedded within a broader scheme of democratic governance that, for its workings, relies more on the skills of particular personalities than on formal institutional mechanisms. As Guillermo O’Donnell has argued, the cornerstone of such type of “delegative democracy” is a discretionary executive, presidents that by and large rule virtually free of horizontal and vertical accountability except from post facto electoral verdicts. 84 Thus, when having to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, such broader political environment helps give meaning to—and actually renders rational—the foreign policymaking behavior of Argentine presidents in particular and the compliance with such practice of the broader community in general as well. Otherwise, we should be able to observe some degree of contestation and debate over such way of making foreign policy; but after more than three decades of democratic governance, such debates are remarkably difficult to come by, if they take place at all. One can discuss for two hours with an Argentine practitioner the country’s foreign policymaking process toward the United States but, “Congress,” for example, won’t be mentioned a single time. Primary and secondary sources aimed at illuminating Argentina’s 84 O’Donnell (1994). 116 foreign policy decision-making processes only very rarely, if at all, mention the workings of institutions other than the presidency in making foreign policy. In theory, the return of democracy in Argentina should have rendered the country’s foreign policymaking process more opened to the influence of institutional and civil-society actors beyond the executive power. In practice, however, what Argentine policymakers do when making the country’s foreign policy toward the United States is to have presidents decide, rather autonomously, in favor of whatever policy they fancy. 85 Who and how decides Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States follows rather automatically from the socially-shared expectation of having presidents decide in favor of whatever policy they may prefer; and presidents act accordingly. This fact of Argentine politics is what renders changes in the country’s foreign policy toward the United States considerably easier that in neighboring Brazil and Chile—where what is habitual is to have presidents and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or all actors with stakes on the matter, influence policymaking. Changes in Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States are considerably more easy than in Brazil and Chile if only because not having to agree on a new policy with any other actor—as Argentina’s habitual way of making foreign policy establishes—is more easy than having to agree among many. Indeed, as discussed in more detail later on, the recurrent changes in Argentina’s foreign policy are a function, not of strategic interactions among policymakers regarding who should be deciding what and how given what formal institutions prescribe on parchment, but of a habit of policymaking that establishes presidents as the only foreign policy decision-maker who actually weighs on what policy is finally implemented. 85 Despite some initial optimism on the alterations that the advent of democracy would bring to Argentina’s foreign policy decision-making process, Russell (1998) reaches a similar conclusion to mine for the periods of Alfonsín and Menem. Compare Russell (1990) to (1998). 117 In Argentina, dramatic changes in foreign policy can happen quite easily because, habitually, there are insufficient constraints on the practices of the executive to prevent such changes. Nobody really thinks about who should be making the country’s foreign policy toward the United States. The latter practice is largely determined by force of habit. Only very rarely, if at all, do other political institutions and actors such as Congress play a role in the making of foreign policy. And only very rarely, do these other actors voice discontents with such foreign policymaking practice. For the most part, in Argentina, it goes without saying that foreign policymaking is the prerogative of presidents alone, presidents act accordingly, and nobody seems to be at odds with such order of things. Such structural feature of Argentine politics undergirds the country’s rather erratic foreign policy because it is the personal preferences of one individual only that, in making decisions, systematically matters the most. Planalto and Itamaraty: Brazil’s Habits of Foreign Policymaking, 1985-2012 119 In this chapter I focus on who and how, in actual practice, makes democratic Brazil’s foreign policy toward the United States every time an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision opens up. 1 I cover the period since Brazil returned to democracy in 1985 until today, and some of the most significant decision-making instances on both trade and security related issues. I argue that Brazil’s foreign policymaking behavior is a function not of strategic interactions among policymakers regarding who and how should be making policy given what is prescribed in parchment—as mainstream institutional theories suggest—but of a habit of decision-making that establishes presidents and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—known as Itamaraty—as the two foreign policymaking actors with actual weight on what policy is finally implemented. In turn, this policymaking habit renders changes in foreign policy more difficult in Brazil than in Argentina—where what is habitual is to have just presidents decide what policy is pursued—but more easy than in Chile—where all domestic stakeholders habitually partake in foreign policymaking toward the United States. 2 Every time there has been an opportunity to make a major foreign policy decision pertaining the United States, Brazilian presidents and their special diplomatic advisors on foreign affairs—hereby referred to as Planalto, due to the name of the presidential palace—and Itamaraty repetitively and systematically have decided what policy Brazil would follow. In Brazil, nobody really thinks about who should be making the country’s foreign policy toward the United States; for the most part, it goes without saying that it is Planalto and Itamaraty the actors who should call the shots. Only very rarely, if at all, do other government or non-state actors play a role in 1 See Chapter 2 for a definition and discussion of the concept of “dramatic” foreign policy decision. 2 See chapters 3 and 5 respectively for a discussion of Argentina’s and Chile’s habits of foreign policymaking toward the United States. See chapters 1 and 2 for a theoretical and methodological discussion on the meaning and effects of habits and on the different techniques used to qualitatively recover habitual behavior. 120 the making of foreign policy. And only very rarely, do such other actors voice discontents with such foreign policymaking practice. In general, in Brazil, foreign policymaking is the prerogative of Planalto and Itamaraty because this is how foreign policy has traditionally and typically been done, policymakers act accordingly, and nobody seems to be at odds with such rather natural order of things. Whether on security or trade issues, on those major foreign policy instances of such great import in which one would expect greater stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes, it has been, and still is, Planalto and Itamaraty, the actors who habitually centralize and canalize the making of Brazilian foreign policy. 3 I focus on three dramatic instances of Brazilian foreign policymaking toward the United States: the decision not to join the U.S.-led multilateral mission against Iraq, in 1990/1; the decision to abandon negotiations toward the implementation of the U.S.-led Free Trade Area Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) in 2003-2005; and, the decision to pursue a last-minute deal with Iran over Iran’s nuclear program, in 2010, aimed at averting further sanctions on the Middle Eastern country. 4 The chapter closes by briefly discussing how Brazil’s habit of foreign policymaking helps make sense of the country’s potential of implementing sudden changes in its foreign policy toward the United States, at least when compared to the cases of neighboring Argentina and Chile. 3 Brazil’s increasing insertion in the global economy has led some scholars to highlight societal and political pressures, coming from outside the executive’s office and Itamaraty, on the country’s foreign policy decision- making process; see, for instance, Armijo and Kearney (2008) and Cason and Power (2009). However, such “pluralization” thesis has only been explored regarding the country’s recent trade negotiations at the global and regional levels—i.e. WTO and FTAA negotiations respectively—rests on “still incomplete” evidence—as their proponents acknowledge—and, if any, its meaning for actual foreign policy outcomes are yet to be established. 4 To be sure, Brazil has made other important foreign policy decisions toward the United States since 1985, such as ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998, nearly twenty years after the treaty was opened for signature. But, as the secondary literature and discussion below suggest, an analysis of Brazil’s foreign policymaking processes during those instances is not likely to yield findings systematically contradicting the rather traditional and habitual role that both Planalto and Itamaraty have occupied in the making of Brazil’s foreign policy. See Chapter 2 for the criteria used to select the policymaking instances hereby under study. 121 Sanctions Yes, War No: The Persian Gulf War 1990/1 At the very end of the 1980s Brazil was an economically broken and politically fragile country. Hyper-inflation was rampant—at times reaching 25 percent a month—and the country’s foreign debt crisis, as much of that of the rest of Latin America, had yet to be resolved. Politically, emergence from decades of political constraint under military dictatorship was the main concern. The design and implementation of the new Constitution in 1988 gained priority over other urgent matters as a means of paving the way toward the establishment of Brazil’s New Republic. 5 Whereas Brazil preferred a political solution to the debt crisis, the United States energetically opposed any such initiative. The United States was only opened to partial debt forgiveness within the U.S. Brady Plan launched in 1989, provided that Brazil were to implement market-oriented structural economic reforms in turn. 6 At the same time, while Brasilia aggressively pursued nuclear know-how, Washington actively worked against Brazil’s acquisition of nuclear technology and weapons. More generally, Brazil had no interest in the Cold War as the United States understood it—the United States wanted a more assertive Brazil vis-à-vis Castro’s Cuba and Cuba’s influence in Africa, as well as more Brazilian involvement in Washington’s anti-Communist interventions in Central America. 7 However, such preferences reflected U.S. but not Brazilian interests. Brasilia, at the time, remained embedded in an autonomy framework aimed at implementing a foreign policy disconnected from the Cold War agenda and the international positions of dominant states. This 5 Fishlow (2011, 2). 6 Folha de São Paulo, “Brady diz que Brasil pode ter divida reduzida,” March 15, 1990. 7 Crandall (2011, 142). 122 posture included close ties with the Third World and a strong emphasis on sovereignty, as a means of attempting to end with the constraints imposed by U.S. influence in the region. 8 To be sure, despite little substantive bilateral engagement, Brazil-U.S. relations after Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985 were good; Reagan’s administration needed to show support for Brazil’s fragile democracy to legitimize its anti-Communist crusade in Central America, and Brazil needed U.S. support in international financial institutions to try to effectively overcome its economic and foreign debt crises. As the end of the Cold War unfolded and Brazilian democratization begun to consolidate, the administration of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) prioritized improving Brazil’s economic situation and international competitiveness. In his inaugural address, president Collor announced a series of reforms aimed at modernizing Brazil: the privatization of state enterprises, the opening of Brazil’s market to free trade, the liberalization of investment, and effectively renegotiating the country’s foreign debt. Internationally, Collor also announced that Brazil would aim to reformulate its foreign policy goals by aligning them with the country’s economic modernization project. 9 The goal was threefold: having Brazil participate “in all big international decisions” and events so as to update its foreign policy agenda with the post-Cold War order; building a positive and constructive bilateral agenda with the United States; and, leaving behind the characteristic “third-world” character of Brazil’s foreign policy. 10 Collor’s ideas and 8 Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009) conceptualize such foreign policy period as one of “autonomy through distance,” and differentiate it from subsequent periods of a “quest for autonomy” through “participation”—particularly, in key international institutional settings and projects during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 1995-2003— and from an even later period of autonomy through “diversification”—through contacts with a wider range of state and settings during the Lula administration (2003-2011). Rather than as the recognition of sovereign states as equal units in an anarchical international system, Latin American scholars tend to understand autonomy as a foreign policy free from the constraints imposed by powerful countries. See also Hirst (2005, 8). 9 Azambuja (1991), Lafer (1992, 117). 10 Folha de São Paulo, “Vamos a abrir e integrar o Brasil ao mundo,” March 16, 1990. Hirst and Pinheiro (1995, 6), Marques Moreira (2001, 227-8), Vieira (2001, 246), Bernal-Meza (2002, 57). 123 inaugural address were very much welcomed by U.S. president George H. W. Bush, 11 and the time seemed ripe for close Brazil-U.S. cooperation. But prospects for a closer and more cooperative relationship with the United States would suffer a setback only a few months after Collor’s inauguration, during the 1990/91 Persian Gulf War. The Brazilian government condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and supported the United Nations Security Council’s decision to apply economic sanctions against the aggressor. 12 However, contrary to the expectations raised by president Collor and U.S. hopes, Brazil neither endorsed nor supported the subsequent U.S.-led multilateral military mission set forth to free Kuwait. 13 Such ambiguity on the part of Brazil was puzzling. President Collor wanted the country to break free from its previous decades of “autonomous” foreign policy. And, eliminating the country’s official and secret military links with Iraq—then Brazil’s top market for its military exports and an issue of concern in Brazil-U.S. bilateral relations—was a very handy opportunity to do so. 14 Moreover, all international actions against Iraq were being taken according to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, as Brazil’s traditional respect for international law would have required. That is, when it needed it the most, the Gulf crisis gave Brazil an unparalleled opportunity to effectively insert Brazil in the post-Cold War order and, in particular, to start building a positive and constructive international agenda with the United States as it 11 Marques Moreira (2001, 228-33). 12 Folha de São Paulo, “Brasil se alinha aos EUA em boicote ao Iraque,” August 5, 1990; “Brasil anuncia que vai cumprir as resolucoes das Nacoes Unidas,” August 7, 1990. 13 Hirst and Pinheiro (1995, 7), Hirst (2005, 10), Casarões (2012). 14 Veja, “Ligacoes perigosas. O Brasil e a bomba atomica iraquiana,” August 8, 1990; “Namoro abalado,” August 15, 1990; “Cientista das Arabias,” October 3, 1990; The New York Times, “Confrontation in the Gulf; U.S. Approves Exports of Rocket Parts to Brazil Despite Fears of Link to Iraq,” September 7, 1990; Folha de São Paulo, “Engenheiros de projeto military no Iraque preocupam Itamaraty,” August 28, 1990; The New York Times, “Confrontation in the Gulf; U.S. Approves Exports of Rocket Parts to Brazil Despite Fears of Link to Iraq,” September 7, 1990; “Who’s Making Missiles for Iraq?”, September 8, 1990; Veja, “Limpeza de entulho,” October 3, 1990. 124 wanted to do. However, such would not be the policy course that Brazil would end up implementing. Upon being briefed on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President Collor stated that “We are on Kuwait’s side,” whereas Itamaraty would go beyond the president’s narrow definition and officially condemn the use of military force on the part of Iraq and call for an “immediate and peaceful resolution of the crisis.” 15 Such would be, however, the only instance suggesting differences of opinion or lack of coordination between Planalto and Itamaraty. As the crisis unfolded, and despite the sudden opportunity that the Gulf crisis opened for president Collor’s new international insertion strategy, Brazil’s position would be primarily managed and voiced by the country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Rezek. Through a situation room installed in Brazil’s embassy in Washington, DC—particularly during the first months of the crisis—Itamaraty centralized all information and evaluations regarding real-time developments in the Gulf region because, back then, in Brasilia only a few hotels, and not Itamaraty, carried CNN. 16 More generally, it is remarkably difficult to find public interventions on the Gulf crisis by president Collor; this is true from the very first decision to support, and abide by, UNSC’s resolution condemning Iraq’s attack and implementing an economic embargo on the aggressor, 17 to the decision not to support the U.S.-led multilateral mission—also approved by the UNSC—a few months later. President Collor seemed to have known perfectly well that he would oppose Brazil’s participation in the U.S.-led multilateral military mission against Iraq—as he made clear to 15 Folha de São Paulo, “Brasil condena acao contra Kuwait,” August 3, 1990; Veja, “Namoro abalado,” August 15, 1990. 16 It was, indeed, during the first Gulf War that CNN was first installed in Itamaraty. Until then, the Ministry had to send its personnel to check in rooms in the few hotels in Brasilia with CNN to be updated and informed on a real- time basis; Marques Moreira (2001, 244). 17 Folha de São Paulo, “Brasil se alinha aos EUA em boicote ao Iraque,” August 5, 1990; “Brasil anuncia que vai cumprir as resolucoes das Nacoes Unidas,” August 7, 1990; “Iraque vincula saida de brasileiros a exportacoes,” August 14, 1990. 125 president George Bush over the phone when called to discuss the matter. 18 Still, after that telephone conversation—and even though Collor had the right, as president, to then decide and communicate to Bush that Brazil would not support the U.S.-led military option against Iraq—he turned around and organized a meeting with his Minister of Foreign Affairs and other foreign policy advisors to consider the issue. And, only then, Brazil’s position was finally decided and the chances of joining the United States in a military campaign against Iraq were buried—as Minister Rezek was of the idea that, despite Brazil’s difficulties, the country needed “an autonomous foreign policy from that of the United States” and had to respect its tradition of supporting the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. 19 That is, despite Collor’s impetus to re-insert Brazil in all salient international decisions and events as a means of updating the country’s foreign policy agenda to the incipient post-Cold War order, in this instance the workings of Itamaraty—still embedded in the “autonomous” foreign policy character of previous years—put an effective brake on such plans. As former Ambassador to the United States, Marcilio Marques Moreira, puts it: this “was a typical situation of a transition moment. We were in the midst of things; we had announced a change, but we hadn’t implemented it yet,” and even if president Collor would have chosen to support the mission military, Itamaraty would have blocked such policy option. 20 Indeed, Collor “listened to Itamaraty a lot” and this was a course of action that Minister Rezek, for example, would have not approved. 21 As a top-secret memo of Itamaraty that leaked 18 Casarões (2012, 140). 19 Telephone interview with president Collor’s special advisor—and ghost writer—on foreign affairs, Ambassador Gelson da Fonseca Jr., August 5, 2013. Da Fonseca Jr. also wrote the foreign policy portion of president Collor’s inaugural address referenced above; Fonseca Junior (2008, 2). See also Casarões (2012). 20 Marques Moreira (2001, 248), cf. Vieira (2001) and Casarões (2012). Interview with Ambassador Marcilio Marques Moreira, Sao Paulo, May 8, 2013. 21 Telephone interview with president Collor’s special advisor on foreign affairs, Ambassador Gelson da Fonseca Jr., August 5, 2013. Interview with then Director of Economic Affairs at Itamaraty, Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13, 2013. 126 to the press showed, Minister Rezek and Ambassador Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima—then in charge of negotiating the exit of some five hundred Brazilians from Iraq—were at considerable odds with the double-standard being shown by the Bush Administration during the crisis—that is, on the one hand, mandating the democratization of Latin American countries while, on the other, asking to support non-democratic nations such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 22 Importantly, no other state, governmental, or non-state actor in Brazil appeared at issue with the “Planalto + Itamaraty” formula for deciding and implementing the country’s foreign policy before the first international crisis of the post-Cold War world. At the time, Iraq was the number one destination for Brazil’s military exports and Brazil ranked as the second largest exporter of military equipment, weapons, and foodstuff to Iraq; 23 there were about 450 Brazilian nationals—all linked to Brazilian business interests—stranded in the region; 24 and, the prospects of skyrocketing oil prices put the state-owned giant Petrobras under severe public scrutiny because of the already existing inflationary pressure on the economy. 25 In light of this, Itamaraty had made it clear that, in looking forward, it would thoroughly review all commercial ties with Iraq—military or not—putting a question mark on future Brazil-Iraq trade relations to an already 22 Folha de São Paulo, “Rezek explica no Senado o caso dos refens,” November 14, 1990. See, also, Marques Moreira (2001, 247). That is, the case of Brazil’s decision not to support the U.S.-led military mission against Iraq puts a caveat on the widely held notion that Collor’s “government advanced major changes in foreign policy [driven by the consolidation of democracy at home and the end of the Cold War abroad. Changes that were] aimed at stimulating closer relations with industrialized countries and [at leaving] behind Brazil’s previous autonomous stances in world affairs, most of which had become a source of friction with the United States;” Hirst (2005, 10, 39), Fernandez de Castro and Dominguez (2010), Vieira (2001). Such changes took place regarding trade and nuclear issues, to be sure. But, beyond these, according to some top-foreign policymakers working in Itamaraty at the time, Collor’s stances showed more “voluntarism” than actual substance. On issues such as Cuba, the Middle East, and the Non-Aligned Movement, for example, Brazil’s position remained un-altered. And, in relation to the United States in particular, Collor’s position was, in general, “quite ambiguous.” See Amorim (1997, 1-3); Fonseca Junior (2008, 3). 23 Veja, “Namoro abalado,” August 15, 1990; “A caminho de casa,” September 26, 1990. 24 Veja, “Brasileiros em poder de Saddam,” August 22, 1990. 25 Veja, “Um caminho realista,” August 29, 1990; “O efeito Hussein,” October 3, 1990; Folha de São Paulo, “Brasil perdera ate US$7 bi com crise no Golfo, diz Bird,” September 20, 1990; “No governo, quem estiver destoado deve sair,” October 27, 1990. 127 depressed Brazilian economy. 26 Moreover, top Brazilian foreign policymakers consistently speculated that Brazil could send a peace force to the region—a decision that would require Congressional approval—if the UNSC were to vote and request such course of action. 27 But despite of it all, no voices or preferences other than Itamaraty’s would be heard regarding Brazil’s dealings with the crisis; which was true even when Minister Rezek went to Congress to inform Brazilian lawmakers—and not necessarily to hear their opinion—about developments in the region and Brazil’s policy before it. 28 Brazil’s responses to the crisis reflected exchanges on the matter between Planalto and Itamaraty. And, despite of all that was at stake, nobody appeared at odds with such decision- making practice. Quite the contrary, the role of Planalto and Itamaraty in forging Brazil’s position took place rather naturally, with virtually nobody even noticing how the decision was actually being made or having any reason why the decision-making process should involve other actors. That was, as a matter of fact, an issue dealt with by force of habit. Indeed, in this instance of foreign policymaking Itamaraty’s role was of such utmost importance that—during the time of the crisis—it is virtually impossible to find any statements on the matter on the part of not only Brazilian actors beyond Planalto and Itamaraty, but on the part of president Collor himself. 29 Alternative decision-making options to those embodied in the workings of Itamaraty and Planalto remained un-invoked and un-mentioned, despite the many 26 Folha de São Paulo, “Rezek nega no Japao acordo nuclear com Bagda,” September 5, 1990; “Guerra no Golfo traz mais recessao e inflacao, diz o presidente do BC,” January 11, 1991. 27 Folha de São Paulo, “De fora,” August 12, 1990; “Itamaraty admite Brasil na forca de paz da ONU,” August 18, 1990; “Rezek ja pensa no fim das sancoes,” August 26, 1990; “Itamaraty decide fechar embaixada em Bagda,” January 11, 1991. 28 Folha de São Paulo, “Rezek nao cre em solucao pacifica para crise,” August 24, 1990. 29 See, for example, Folha de São Paulo and Veja, two of Brazil’s most circulated written news outlets, between August 1990 and February 1991. In an interview on September 15, 1990, in Folha de São Paulo, president Collor did discuss the interests of Brazil’s military industry in Iraq, but not his country’s position vis-à-vis the conflict or any other aspects regarding the conflict; see “Poder belico do Iraque foi dado pelo 1 Mundo.” Until recently the conventional wisdom suggested that Itamaraty had been considerably marginalized from president Collor’s foreign policy decision-making process; see, for example, Batista (1993), Lima (1994), and Hirst and Pinheiro (1995); cf. Casarões (2012). 128 Brazilian domestic interests that were at stake and that, at times, were made to comply with Itamaraty and Planalto’s policy preferences. 30 And this was true even when Brazil’s policy before the crisis was criticized as being “timid”—critiques that had to do with the what of Brazil’s policy and not with who and how, in Brazil, had decided what was finally implemented. 31 The latter seemed to follow from a socially shared and deep rooted belief about the role that both Planalto and Itamaraty should play in the making of Brazil’s foreign policy. As Ambassador Amorim puts it, “all Brazilian presidents have had an inclination to certainly listen to what Itamaraty’s bureaucracy had to say” on any given issue. 32 And this was true even in the case of a president that has been known for his personalistic leadership style, having centralized and concentrated—in his own hands—many of the most important decisions made in immediate post-Cold War Brazil. 33 When the First Gulf War took place, and Brazil faced the need to make a major foreign policy decision, the commonsensical thing to do for Brazilian policymakers, domestic stakeholders, and Brazilians in general, was to have both Planalto and Itamaraty decide and implement the country’s foreign policy. Abandoning the FTAA Project: 2003-2005 Since negotiations were launched in December 1994 in Miami during the first Summit of the Americas, Brazil and the United States were positioned as major players in the multilateral efforts to unite the economies of the hemisphere in a Free Trade Area Agreement of the 30 Folha de São Paulo, “Mendes Jr. diz que aceita rescindier contratos,” September 4, 1990. 31 See, for example, Folha de São Paulo, “Itamaraty nao tem sucesso ao elaborar nova politica externa,” February 17, 1990. 32 Interview with Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13, 2013. 33 Weyland (2013, 25). 129 Americas (FTAA). As the leading markets of both the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), without Brazil or the United States no FTAA would be possible. Then Brazilian president-elect Fernando Henrique Cardoso—who had just stepped down as Minister of Finance of Brazil— was invited to the Miami Summit. And, upon arriving in Miami, much to his surprise learned that the Summit’s final declaration included Brazil’s commitment to “begin immediately to construct the [FTAA], in which barriers to trade and investment would be progressively eliminated.” 34 Brazil had also committed to conclude negotiations and implement the FTAA no later than 2005, including helping create new rules to regulate trade on services, intellectual property, investment, agricultural subsidies and government procurement. President-elect Cardoso had no idea of his country’s new commitment to the FTAA. He found out about it in Miami, where he was under the impression that Brazil’s outgoing president, Itamar Franco, also at the Miami Summit, was not well informed either of his country’s new foreign economic policy agenda. 35 Indeed, as then Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim and Itamaraty’s Secretary General Roberto Abdenur recall, the latter agenda was set entirely by Itamaraty upon the initiative of U.S. vice-president Al Gore during a previous meeting in Mexico. 36 Cardoso was not surprised by Itamaraty’s agenda-setting powers in Brazil’s foreign policymaking; after all, he had been Minister of Foreign Affairs two years before and knew very well that Itamaraty had shaped the country’s foreign economic policy for more than four 34 First Summit of the Americas (1994), Cardoso (2006, 611). 35 Lampreia (2009, 182). Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia was Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1993 and in between 1995 and 2001. 36 Amorim (2013, 52). Interview with Ambassador Roberto Abdenur, Sao Paulo, May 7, 2013. See also Cardoso (2006, 611), and Gonçalves (2008, 5). 130 decades. 37 What was surprising, however, was that Planalto did not appear to have been a part of the decision-making process as it traditionally had been case. Substantially, much of Itamaraty reacted with deep skepticism to the prospects of Brazil joining a FTAA. 38 The structure of Brazil’s economy competes rather than complements that of the United States, and it remained to be seen whether the United States would be willing to really give up on its policy of agricultural subsidies that, together with the European Union’s, so much had done to stall free trade negotiations at the global level. Still, the negotiations leading toward a FTAA were “too big and too important of a project” for Brazil not to take part in them. 39 By the mid-1990s, North, Central and South America received more than 55 percent of all Brazilian exports, of which close to 80 percent were manufactures. “Were negotiations to take an inconvenient direction, Brazil’s options in the region would be severely limited.” 40 And, after all, U.S. policymakers were systematically insisting that “all issues were up for bargaining,” agricultural subsidies included. 41 Thus, irrespective of whether Brazil wanted it or not, negotiations over a free trade area agreement in the Americas would turn out to be “the most difficult and salient issue of Brazil’s international relations in the forthcoming decade.” 42 In a quite unprecedented move, Cardoso’s government and Itamaraty responded by stimulating and facilitating an open domestic debate—including trade unions, civil society organizations, business sectors, scholars, diplomats, journalists, and political leaders—on all 37 Lampreia (2009, 167); Cason and Power (2009, 119-120). 38 See, for example, Lampreia (2009, 190), Gonçalves (2008, 6), Barbosa (2011, 167), and Amorim (2013, 51-53). When FTAA negotiations were launched, Ambassador José Botafogo Gonçalves was Itamaraty’s Under Secretary General, and Ambassador Rubens Barbosa was Itamaraty’s Under Secretary General for Regional Integration, Trade and Economic Affairs. Between 1999 and 2004, Barbosa was Brazil’s Ambassador to the United States. 39 Interview with Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13, 2013; Barbosa (2011, 167). 40 Lampreia (2009, 183). 41 Barbosa (2011, 165). 42 Lampreia (2009, 183); Barbosa (2011, 163). 131 aspects of the country’s participation in the FTAA project. 43 It did so, in part, because the opinion of the public in general and of domestic groups in particular was mostly supportive of the position of the government—much of it reflecting strong resistance and skepticism to the FTAA to begin with. 44 And, because the symbolically charged linkage between economic liberalization and alignment with the United States, and the intrusive character of some of the rules of the FTAA on many aspects of what thus far was considered domestic economic policy management, made inevitable the politicization of the issue. 45 Triggering a public debate on the FTAA was a move that departed significantly from Brazil’s habitual practice of foreign policymaking. 46 It is a situation that only finds a precedent in the debates that took place in the 1950s when the issue of the nationalization of oil became a major question in the country’s domestic and foreign policy agendas. 47 But Cardoso’s goal was straightforward—to legitimize and build support for Brazil’s negotiation stance at the hemispheric level which, by the very structure of Brazil’s economy, run generally against the hemispheric project. 48 Bringing the issue up for public debate would not mean that Planalto and Itamaraty would no longer centralize and canalize the country’s agenda setting and decision-making power on foreign economic policy. Indeed, it was Planalto and Itamaraty’s diplomats who encouraged 43 See, for instance, Gonçalves (2008, 13). 44 Armijo and Kearney (2008, 1012); Gonçalves (2008, 6, 16); Presto Santana (2001). 45 Hurrell (2005, 86-7), Souza (2009, 67); Lampreia (2008, 218). 46 It is plausible that Cardoso’s move was driven by his scholarly inclinations—unlike any other Brazilian president since 1985 Cardoso was the only one with a PhD in the Social Sciences. Before arriving to Planalto, as Minister of Foreign Affairs Cardoso had also initiated a debate on the role of Itamaraty in Brazil’s international relations. However, as special advisor on international relations to president Cardoso, Gelson da Fonseca Jr., recalls, those debates did not necessarily translate into actual foreign policies or initiatives; Fonseca Junior (2008, 7). Also see Burges (Burges 2009, 3). 47 Hirst (2010, fn. 17); Armijo and Kearney (2008, 2012). 48 During the 2003 Summit in Miami, president Lula would adopt a similar tactic for legitimizing his rejection of several U.S. proposals within the FTAA project. He invited the affiliated union of the Partido dos Trabalhadores— the Central Unica dos Trabalhadores, CUT— which was fiercely against the liberalization of trade, to join Brazil’s official delegation: “my constituents cannot accept this,” Lula was quoted as having said to his U.S. counterparts; see Armijo and Kearney (2008, 998); and, also, Lampreia (2009, 183), Barros (1998, 20-4), and Souza (2009, 123). 132 the work, around the FTAA, of the Business Coalition of Brazil (CEB), of the Agricultural National Confederation (CAN), of São Paulo’s Industrial Federation (FIESP), of the Confederation of National Industries (CNI), and of the later on created National Section of Issues Related to the FTAA (SENALCA), for example. These groups debated, together with other Brazilian ministries as well, all issues pertaining to Brazil’s participation in FTAA negotiations. 49 And, the bulk of such inter-ministerial debates took place and were coordinated by the state-run and newly created Câmara de Comércio Exterior (CAMEX), originally led by an Ambassador—José Botafogo Gonçalves —precisely to keep Brazil’s foreign economic policy as much as possible under the decision-making orbit of Itamaraty, 50 and to avoid the presence of more than one voice in Brazil’s international negotiating tables. “Itamaraty has had, since the 1950s, a central role in the shaping of Brazilian foreign trade policy,” 51 and FTAA negotiations would not be the exception. 52 Those debates were relevant but did not necessarily translate into actual foreign policies or initiatives. Indeed, they followed the work of Itamaraty only “indirectly.” 53 As special advisor on international relations to president Cardoso, Ambassador Gelson da Fonseca, recalls, both Cardoso and his two Ministers of Foreign Affairs—Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer—had their own and very clear ideas on Brazil’s foreign policy on the matter: 49 See, Gonçalves (2008, 13-5) for a reconstruction of how Itamaraty initiated such opening move. 50 Gonçalves (2008, 22), Barros (1998). 51 Lampreia (2009, 167). 52 Brazil’s negotiations at the Doha Round, for example, would not be the exception either. In his memoirs regarding Brazil’s stance before and during such multilateral negotiations, then Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim does not even mention business groups or non-state actors. Also, Amorim suggests that all it took to make sure that Itamaraty would continue to handle negotiations, rather than having the Ministries of Economics and Agriculture interfere—even when the issue of agricultural subsidies was at stake—was for him to show up and reveal a “presence” at the first and second meetings in Tokyo and Sharm-El-Sheikh, respectively; see Amorim (2013, 80-2). On the primacy, in Brazil, of international “politics” over “economics”—as “good political relations facilitate economic ones”—and the central role that Itamaraty plays in the making of foreign economic policy, see Cardoso (2006, 602-3). Also see Souza (2009, 136). 53 Gonçalves (2008, 14). 133 “Cardoso likes a lot to talk and debate. And, while president, on a quotidian basis he used to discuss with his inner circle of closest advisers [Ambassadors Sergio Amaral, Clodoaldo Hugueney, Gelson da Fonseca Jr., Vilmar Faria, and Luciano Martins] international relations in general and Brazilian foreign policy in particular.” As Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during the previous government of Itamar Franco, president Cardoso “had a fantastic relationship with Lampreia”—a very much respected diplomat of Itamaraty that enjoyed considerable degrees of “power and autonomy” during Cardoso’s government. Decisions were ultimately made “in Itamaraty. I mean, Cardoso had a very easy and cordial relationship with Lampreia” and, as much as in previous governments when other high politics issues were at stake, the Planalto-Itamaraty formula would decide what was finally implemented. 54 Ambassador Sergio Amaral concurs and signals the commonsensical character of the situation: “the affinity of Cardoso with Lampreia and Lafer was absolute; they totally shared the decision-making process among the three of them. That is, the role of Itamaraty and presidents in the making of Brazil’s foreign policy toward the United States is traditional; it is a decision- making process that takes place naturally.” 55 As a Brazilian business leader put it: “When it comes time to negotiate, the business community is not invited to participate. But later, we are the ones who have to live with what has been negotiated.” Another added that while “Americans bring business people to the negotiation room; in Brazil, only government officials walk in;” 56 a situation that was the same for Brazilian union leaders, lawmakers, and media. 57 54 Fonseca (2008, 7-8); Cardoso (2006, 621); Almeida (2004, 177). 55 Interview with Ambassador Sergio Amaral, São Paulo, May 7 2013. Ambassador Rubens Barbosa agrees— “Amaral, Martins and Faria, together with Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lampreia and Lafer, discussed foreign policy in general and Brazil-U.S. relations in particular the most;” Interview with Rubens Barbosa, São Paulo, May 9, 2013. As Celso Lafer puts it, “president Cardoso was very active in relations with the United States, but coordination with Itamaraty as well as with foreign policy advisers such as Amaral” was very close. Interview with Dr. Celso Lafer, São Paulo, May 10 2013. See, also, Burges (2009, 3), and Cason and Power (2009, 128). 56 Both quoted in Souza (2001, 88). 57 As Ambassador José Botafogo Gonçalves, then Itamaraty’s Under Secretary General, recalls, none of those actors could “enter formal meetings because only official delegations could, but I did the following: once the meeting was 134 Indeed, despite the public debate on the FTAA and the workings of powerful non- governmental actors around it, Planalto and Itamaraty were the key Brazilian players setting the agenda and making the decisions on what policy, and when, Brazil should follow. This is also illustrated by how Brazil’s foreign economic policy decisions were made during two other of the most salient instances of the negotiation process: during the Ministerial meeting of 2003 held in Miami that took place amid doubts over the direction that the newly elected government of left- leaning Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva would take; and, during the 2005 Summit of the Americas meeting held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, during which the FTAA was originally scheduled to be implemented. When President Lula arrived to Planalto in early 2003, negotiations over the FTAA had turned into “the most relevant and sensitive bilateral matter between the Lula and Bush administrations.” 58 Brazil had to co-chair negotiations with the United States until their conclusion in a context in which the U.S. Farm Bill had just been passed, generating generous domestic subsidies that run contrary to Brazilian interests and making clear that, regarding the FTAA, not all issues seemed any longer up for negotiation. 59 Added to this, an intra-MERCOSUR consensus still needed to be reached. From inception, Brazil had systematically prioritized MERCOSUR and negotiating the FTAA with a single voice vis-à-vis the United States. 60 But the sub-regional arrangement’s chronic ineffectiveness during the late 1990s, the decrease of intra-MERCOSUR trade, and growing over, I called for a briefing and told them what had just happened. I did that with the [unions], lawmakers that also came with us, and with the media. It was a coordination that took place informally, but very effective, very efficient. So, the media and the unions had a way of following negotiations, albeit indirectly;” Gonçalves (2008, 14). As an example of the latter see Folha de São Paulo, “Empresario de Brasil e EUA pede Alca ampla,” November 18, 2003. 58 Hirst (2010, 128). 59 Barbosa (2011, 170); Amorim (2013, 54). 60 Lampreia (2009, 184), (1998, 12); Cardoso (2007, 259). 135 political difficulties among its members, had made Paraguay and Uruguay prefer a deal with Washington while Brazil and Argentina had begun to lose their interest in that same option. 61 More generally, Lula’s government had reached power amid widespread discontent over the market-oriented economic policies implemented during the previous decade, of which the FTAA was one of its flagships. Indeed, Lula’s political party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores, had systematically campaigned against the FTAA, stressing that its implementation would mean the annexation of Brazil to the United States. It also contributed to the organization of a national—albeit unofficial—plebiscite in which million of Brazilians rejected the FTAA. 62 Still, President Lula made it clear that not everything was said and done regarding Brazil’s participation in FTAA negotiations. “The issue is not ALCA ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ but what’s the ALCA that is in our best interest,” defended Lula a few months after being inaugurated. 63 From then on, led by Celso Amorim—Lula’s Minister of Foreign Affairs—Brazil would keep on being committed to the successful completion of FTAA negotiations, but toughened its negotiation stance and sought a balanced outcome that attended Brazil’s interests as much as those of the United States. As Minister of Foreign Affairs of Itamar Franco (1993-1995), Celso Amorim had welcome Brazil’s participation in the launching of FTAA negotiations. But almost ten years later, many of the original conditions facilitating such negotiations had changed. Most notably, agricultural subsidies were no longer up for negotiation, making even Brazilian pro-business leaders extremely reluctant to lower their own country’s import barriers and, more generally, 61 Hirst (2010, 128-9). 62 Barbosa (2011, 170); Armijo and Kearney (2008, 998). 63 Veja On-Line, “Em profundidade: ALCA e Comercio Exterior,” October 2003 (my translation), http://veja.abril.com.br/idade/exclusivo/alca/frases.html; Almeida (2004, 176-77). 136 making appear the whole FTAA arrangement fairly “unbalanced.” 64 Also, a decade of market- oriented policies had helped turn Brazil into one of the most unequal countries in the world. If all the United States could offer was a regime that would enforce a blueprint for wholesale de- regulation of markets in Latin America, while maintaining advantages for U.S. industries in the same sectors in which countries in Central and South America have the best chance of competing and lifting millions out of poverty, then the prospects of a FTAA were looking very grim. 65 Moreover, the U.S. Congress was less inclined to signing a hemispheric-wide FTAA and U.S. business sectors were also less enthusiastic about the hemispheric project. 66 Despite of it all, as Amorim recalls, “I discussed very seriously [with the United States] the possibility of changing the content of the negotiations in the FTAA. And we almost came to a conclusion in the Miami meeting of 2003. And if we had been able to give some follow up to this, I don’t know how my relationship with Samuel [Pinheiro Guimarães, Amorim’s number 2 in Itamaraty and a staunch opponent to the FTAA] would have played out. Because I was willing, and President Lula too, to go on! If the United States and others, of course, had been able [to deliver]. Of course this is easy to say because we came close, maybe, in conceptual terms, but of course there were lots of discussions around numbers, time frames, and so on. I don’t know if we would have ever come to a final agreement. But anyway, we were very close! Basically, there were two differences: one on the enforcement of intellectual property rules and the question of agricultural subsidies. These were the two basic issues. And it was not impossible at that time, to my mind, to come to an agreement. I don’t know what would have been better for Brazil, that’s something else. But we were doing that seriously, many people think we were just pretending or opposing, but... no, no, we would have been able to go on! And Samuel, of course, you know, was against ALCA altogether. So that, maybe, is a slight difference [between him and I]. But he was very loyal to my... to my... to the line I followed, of course, with approval of President Lula.” 67 64 See interview to Ambassador Adhemar Bahadian, then Brazil’s co-president of the FTAA, at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Relminas/message/2184 . 65 Amorim (2011, 519), (2013, 54). Also, see Folha de São Paulo, “Brasil festeja fim de ‘bangue-bangue’ na Alca,” November 17, 2003, and New York Times, “Brazil May Not Stay Upright on a Shaky Global Stage,” October 6, 2002, and “Free Trade Area of the Americas: Latin America Deserves Better,” November 18, 2003. 66 Lampreia (2009, 309); Amorim (2013, 75-76). 67 Interview with Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13, 2013. See also Amorim (2013, 54-7, 63, 72-3), Folha de São Paulo, “Brasil e EUA tentam defender Alca “light”,” November 17, 2003, “Amorim diz que nao so empresario deve ser ouvido,” November 19, 2003. 137 That is, as much as during previous Brazilian governments, during Lula’s presidency, major foreign policy decisions pertaining the United States were made among the highest echelons of Planalto and Itamaraty. Indeed, “at the time [of the Miami Ministerial meeting], I met with Brazilian business people—by and large against our position [i.e. Amorim and Lula’s]—and I listened to everybody very carefully. I participated of a lunch with media representatives from Brazil and Venezuela, all naturally very interested in reaching an agreement [with the United States]. Everything was very cordial. But, when push came to shove, we kept our line” of trying to reach a more “balanced” deal. 68 During Cardoso’s government, it would be Cardoso, his Minister of Foreign Affairs Luiz Felipe Lampreia, “and his diplomats,” who would determine Brazil’s “single undertaking” stance before the hemispheric project. 69 Virtually every item of the negotiation was part of a whole, a practically indivisible package that could not be agreed separately—that is, nothing would be agreed until everything was agreed. But, during Lula’s administration, it would be Lula and Amorim who decided to keep on seeking a deal, albeit now a “balanced” one, with the United States. And they did so in spite of the fierce criticism that they faced from the bulk of president Lula’s constituents—for still trying to work out a solution within the FTAA framework—and from several of Brazil’s domestic pro-business interests—for having altered the original terms of the FTAA agreement negotiated during Cardoso’s government, thus jeopardizing the implementation of the project. 70 As Amorim recalls, Lula and I were “literally alone [on this] even inside the government.” 71 Still, Amorim and Lula were able to pursue negotiations along 68 Amorim (2011, 509-18). 69 Cardoso (2006, 621). 70 Amorim (2013, 69). As Cardoso stresses, in Brazil the FTAA was being criticized from all flanks of the ideological spectrum, with the exception of those groups that were already prepared to compete internationally or those that would not suffer nor benefit from the implementation of the FTAA; Cardoso (2006, 629). See, also, Amorim 2011 (501-6). 71 Amorim (2011, 500). 138 such lines because, in Brazil, it goes without saying that it is presidents and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs who actually decide what foreign policy is implemented and how. Indeed, despite rampant criticisms from all sectors of Brazil’s political and economic landscape, virtually no Brazilian domestic actor voiced discontent regarding who and how was making the decisions. And, when discontent with the actual decision-making process was voiced, observers demanded more presence of Itamaraty, but not necessarily of other actors. Such critics suggested that, since Lula had arrived to Planalto, Itamaraty had become more ideologically charged and, as a foreign policy bureaucracy, that it was no longer salient in making policy given the role that the president’s special foreign policy adviser, Marco Aurelio Garcia—a longtime member and former Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Partido dos Trabalhadores—played in the decision-making process. 72 As Ambassador Rubens Barbosa suggests, “There is a recognition [among Congress, Brazilian IR scholars and interested people in general] that Itamaraty should prevail as in the past. There’s this idea that Itamaraty is not, but should, do its work on foreign affairs;” that is, counter-balancing or better informing the president’s opinion on foreign affairs. There is, in other words, the general expectation that Itamaraty has to occupy a more prominent role, as it always has done so in the past, in the making of foreign policy. And much of this criticism follows from the natural and self-evident role that Itamaraty has traditionally occupied in the decision-making process, in “99 percent of the time.” 73 But were those criticisms fully accurate descriptions of what actually happened in the action floor, then it would be very hard to explain Brazil’s actual “commitment to the successful 72 See, for example, Ricupero (2010), Lampreia (2009, 340), and Souza (2009, 123-47). 73 Interview with Ambassador Rubens Barbosa, São Paulo, May 9 2013. 139 conclusion of the FTAA negotiations by January 2005” that Minister Amorim signed in Miami in 2003, almost a year after Lula had arrived to Planalto. 74 Whether or not Brazil should work in favor of the implementation of a hemispheric-wide free trade project was widely debated. But claims in favor of moving Brazil’s foreign policymaking practices away from its traditional Planalto-Itamaraty character were not. In fact, the latter option was unheard of, virtually never mentioned and seemingly unconceivable. 75 Non- state actors—let alone Congress—debating the FTAA were dogs that barked but that did not bite, even though by the time Lula came into office they had debated the hemispheric project for years. President Lula had every domestic incentive to turn its back to the FTAA as soon as he arrived to Planalto. He had risen to power amid widespread discontent with market-oriented policies and Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães—Itamaraty’s Secretary-General— systematically “fez a cabeça do Lula,” as Lula’s Ambassador to the United States, Roberto Abdenur, puts it. 76 Still, president Lula and Celso Amorim decided, and were able to, try to move the hemispheric-wide free trade area agenda forward with the United States because, in Brazil, it goes without saying that presidents and Itamaraty make policy. 77 74 Ministerial Declaration, Eight Trade Ministerial Meeting (2003). 75 Compare, for example, Amorim (2013), Lampreia (2009), Barbosa (2011), and Cardoso (2007). Also see, for instance, Folha de São Paulo, “Quinta-coluna, quinta categoria,” October 16, 2003, “Cade o isolamento,” “Empresarios de Brasil e EUA querem Alca ampla,” November 18, 2003, “A Alca e a raposa de la Fontaine,” November 20, 2003, “Um Passo Na ALCA,” “Limites da Alca ‘light’,” November 22, 2003, and “O dialogo entre Brasil e EUA,” November 6, 2005. 76 Interview with Ambassador Roberto Abdenur, São Paulo, May 7 2013. 77 Indeed, back in the year 2000, during the previous government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula’s Partido dos Trahalhadores (PT) had made it clear that it was in agreement with the general contours of Brazil’s foreign policy, including its approach to the FTAA. As Luiz Felipe Lampreia recalls, Professor Marco Aurelio Garcia—who was then responsible for the PT’s international affairs and would later on become Lula’s personal adviser on foreign policy, particularly in relation to issues pertaining to Latin America—visited Lampreia at his office in Itamaraty to let him know that “the PT had no issues whatsoever with the government’s foreign policy and that it was in basic agreement with it;” Lampreia (2009, 204). 140 Eventually, the Brazil-U.S. agreement sought after the Ministerial Declaration of Miami could not be reached, putting an effective end to all FTAA negotiations, at least from a Brazilian standpoint. 78 From then on, Brazil’s FTAA initiatives gained a somewhat obstructionist character not conducive to generating the proper conditions for reaching a satisfactory negotiation outcome; and, Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, would turn out to be very instrumental to that endeavor. 79 If a Free Trade Agreement with the United States had always been “a scenario hard to imagine” for Brazil, 80 by the 2005 Summit of the Americas, when the FTAA was originally scheduled to be implemented, Planalto and Itamaraty were as skeptical as ever about its future prospects. 81 Then, once again, it would be president Lula and Celso Amorim who decided not to support U.S.’ efforts at re-launching negotiations, thus helping sign—together with Argentina and Venezuela—the death certificate of the FTAA. Indeed, as then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Jorge Taiana, recalls, “it was Lula and Néstor Kirchner who decided to change the bilateral relationship from one of mere importers and exporters to one of partnership” before the US’ attempt to re-launch the FTAA. 82 In other words, as much as during Collor’s and Cardoso’s government, in this major instance of foreign policymaking, Brazil’s foreign policy toward the United States was decided and implemented by the President, his closest advisers on international relations—often belonging to Itamaraty—and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As one of Lula’s Ambassador to the United States describes: 78 Barbosa (2011, 167); Amorim (2013, 73-74). 79 Barbosa (2011, 177). On the strategic, economic, political and social downsides that an actual FTAA would have had for Brazil, according to Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, see Pinheiro Guimarães (1999, 119-134). 80 Interview with Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, São Paulo, Brazil, May 6 2013. 81 Interview with Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13 2013. 82 Página 12, “A ocho años del ‘No al ALCA’,” November 5, 2013; Deblock, Turcotte, and Murillo (2005, 6). 141 “During the two years and ten months that I was Ambassador to the United States, I took part or participated in various situations regarding Brazil’s dealings with the U.S., and there always was, under Lula, three people in positions of great influence on these issues: the Minister, Amorim, Itamaraty’s Secreatry-General, Pinheiro Guimarães, and Marco Aurelio Garcia, whose presence from the very beginning was a sort of capitis diminutio for Itamaraty, because for the first time ever, a foreign affairs adviser to the president was not a diplomat. ... Lula knew Marco Aurelio very well, because Marco Aurelio was his, and previously the Partido dos Trabalhadores’, long time adviser in international affairs. [But] Marco Aurelio would become mainly in charge of Brazil’s Latin American affairs and, in the end, his role did not undermine the authority of Amorim, who was a man of Itamaraty. ... So, at different moments, I saw situations in which Amorim made some decisions or had a preponderant opinion, and others in which Samuel would try to put a brake or at least didn’t like rapprochements with the United States; and Marco Aurelio, I don’t believe he has ever had an important or obstructionist participation in relation to Brazil-U.S. issues.” 83 That is, Brazil’s change in policy vis-à-vis the FTAA and the United States was—most fundamentally—facilitated by the fact that, habitually, it is up to both Planalto and Itamaraty to decide the policy course that is finally implemented. When Lula arrived to Planalto, the FTAA was two years away from having to be implemented. The time had come to have Brazil’s interests fully reflected in the hemispheric project or to turn the country’s back to it, as much of Brazil’s domestic actors were claiming from inception that it needed to be done. Lula and Amorim gave a fair chance to a more “balanced” FTAA despite fierce domestic criticisms from all flanks. But they were able to do so because it is a rather natural fact of Brazilian politics that presidents and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs formulate and decide foreign policy. Lula and Amorim acted accordingly—just as other past presidents and foreign policymakers have done— 83 Interview with Ambassador Roberto Abdenur, São Paulo, May 7 2013. Ambassador Amorim concurs: “No real change in how foreign policy is decided was introduced by Marco Aurelio Garcia. He was the alter-ego of Lula and had a very long relationship with him within the PT working on international issues.” It made sense that Marco Aurelio Garcia would occupy the role of the “international affairs adviser of the president,” as all other presidents have had one (the only difference was that Garcia was the first adviser not to come from Itamaraty). But “there have been no issue that Marco Aurelio Garcia dealt with by himself.” Interview with Ambassador Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13, 2013. Ambassador Rubens Barbosa, who preceded Abdenur in Washington, DC, also argues that it was Lula, Amorim, Marco Aurelio Garcia, and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, the group that “gave the thumb-down to the hemispheric integration effort;” interview with Rubens Barbosa, São Paulo, May 9, 2013. 142 and no domestic actors was of the idea of altering such decision-making practice because that would have radically departed from Brazil’s typical way of making foreign policy. In Brazil, alternative ways of making foreign economic policy are practically inconceivable; even regarding an issue around which the previous and Lula’s government had invested so many resources in triggering an open and public debate on the matter. When in disagreement with the presumably ideological character that has been impinged in the country’s foreign policy, observers automatically demanded to have the permanent bureaucracy of Itamaraty, and no other actor, participating more actively of the foreign policy decision-making process. Other actors, such as Congress or business interests, are not even mentioned by anybody as actual or would-be participants in actual decision-making, on this or any other major foreign policy matter. 84 It happened to be the case that Cardoso’s and Lula’s governments were, as much as Brazil’s public opinion, generally skeptical about the prospects of a hemispheric-wide FTA. How policymaking would have looked like had Planalto and Itamaraty had chosen to pursue the FTAA along U.S. terms we would never know. 85 But, what it is known, is that any alteration of Brazil’s traditional practice of foreign policymaking would need to overcome a rather ingrained habit that puts front and center of dramatic decisions the preferences of both Planalto and Itamaraty. 84 For example, in their memoirs regarding FTAA negotiations, Cardoso and Amorim do not mention “Congress” at all, or the role that other political parties could have played, in the decisions to pursue the policies they finally implemented; Amorim (2013, 51-77), Cardoso (2006, 601-72). For a different interpretation, advancing the idea of the rollback of Itamaraty vis-à-vis presidential diplomacy and a plurality of non-state actors that are claimed to now help make Brazil’s foreign policy—based on “still incomplete” evidence and “illustrative” case studies not-directly related to Brazil-U.S. relations and “with particular focus [only] on the Lula government”—see Cason and Power (2009, 129). 85 And, even then, as Ambassador Amorim recognizes: Civil society organizations “played an important role [in] awakening some kind of [public] consciousness over the issue. But I will tell you very frankly: if the government wanted to sign the FTAA at any cost, there could have been, maybe, some protests, but the FTAA would have been signed” anyways; Amorim (2011, 525-6). 143 Since the mid-1990s, despite Itamaraty’s “experimental” efforts to reach out to civil- society organizations as a means of advancing a more “pluralist” foreign policy, it has only been hoped for such initiatives to gain some meaningful levels of institutionalization on first-tier issues. 86 Democracy had raised expectations of an enlarged participation of Congress in foreign trade policymaking, for example. But it is still Planalto and Itamaraty who dominate foreign economic policymaking in general and relations with the United States in particular. Indeed, even though it has been found that more transparent interest aggregation has been taking place within the federal executive, in trade policymaking “policy capture by sectoral special interests has decreased.” 87 Brazil’s decision to turn its back to the FTAA could be argued to have rendered the country’s approach more “public-regarding,” as Lula and Amorim’s decision to give the thumb-down to the FTAA appear as correlating with the preferences of non- traditional civil society actors. 88 But Cardoso and Amorim, and Itamaraty in general, were deeply skeptical of the benefits of a potential FTAA from the very beginning of the process and irrespective of the preferences non-state actors could voice. The idea of a more “balanced” FTAA was Lula’s and Amorim’s goal since Lula had arrived to Planalto, reflected Lula’s electoral mandate, and helped block further FTAA negotiations with the United States only when Amorim (and Lula) realized that the FTAA was not going to deliver on Brazil’s interests, almost a year after Lula took office. Despite mounting pressure from Brazil’s “business coalition” to seal the FTAA deal fast, and from Brazil’s “extreme left” to abandon negotiations immediately, 89 letting go for good the 86 Hirst and Pinheiro (1995, 21), Patriota (2013). Indeed, as Monica Hirst argues, in Brazil-U.S. relations nongovernmental actors and interests have thus far only helped shape Brazil’s position regarding “second tier” issues in the agenda, such as human rights and the environment (2005, 50-59). For a practical example, see Cardoso (2006, 616), and Lampreia (2008, 159). 87 Armijo and Kearney (2008, 991). 88 Armijo and Kearney (2008). 89 Amorim (2013, 69). 144 FTAA was only possible when both Planalto (Lula and Marco Aurelio Garcia, in particular) and Itamaraty (Amorim and Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, specifically) decided to let it go. Such decision did not trigger much substantial or procedural debate because it was in line with the preferences of those non-state actors that, early on, were invited to offer their opinions (and, according to some, because it coincided with a boom in exports from which most of Brazilian producers were considerably benefitting). 90 Thus, as much as during previous years and regarding other major foreign policy issues, Planalto and Itamaraty were the only two actors actually necessary to make Brazil’s foreign economic policy. As Ambassador Carlos Henrique Moojen de Abreu e Silva puts it: “In practice, the president decides with the assistance of the ministry of external relations” what policy toward the United States should be implemented and how. “During Cardoso, foreign policy had his own touch [and] during Lula too—Brazil’s foreign policy toward the United States had the personal touch of the president. However, such policies certainly had the fingerprints of the Ministers of External Relations.” 91 On the face of it, having the executive and Itamaraty opening the debate about Brazil’s participation in the FTAA deviates from Brazil’s characteristic habit of foreign policymaking. But this did not mean that Itamaraty ceased to exert its influence on Brazil’s decision-making process toward the United States, or that non-state actors now set the agenda for both Planalto and Itamaraty. Evidence on the latter still is to be found. 90 Hurrell (2005, 86-87); Cason and Power (2009, 129). Former president Cardoso, naturally, openly disagreed with Lula and Amorim’s “balanced” approach to FTAA negotiations (2006, 629-30). 91 “Dilma [Rouseff], on her part, very much listens to the Minister” (then Ambassador Antonio Patriota), who is “not an ideological but very pragmatic person.” But Dilma, “also listens to Marco Aurelio Garcia [known as MAG], by all means; as well as to Amorim” (who is the Minister of Defense of Rousseff’s government). In short, “Patriota is Dilma’s main adviser but Amorim and MAG also play important roles” in the making of Brazil’s foreign policy toward the United States. Interview with Ambassador Carlos Henrique Abreu, Brasilia, Brazil, May 14 2013. At the time of the interview, Ambassador Abreu was the Director of the Department of the United States, Canada and Inter-American Affairs of Itamaraty. 145 As Sérgio Fausto—one of Brazil’s leading political analysts and adviser to former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso—puts it: “in this sense, president Cardoso and president Lula are identical. One is more institutionalist than the other, but both are negotiators” and, when having to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, they have both shown the same inclinations to share the decision-making process with Itamaraty and their own advisers on international affairs. “Sarney, the exact same thing! Itamar, was a fully mercurial individual but had the sensitivity to appoint Cardoso as his Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Minister of Finance, and he made no major decision without consulting with Cardoso and Itamaraty!” 92 In other words, Cardoso’s government efforts at rendering Brazil’s foreign economic policymaking process more plural went against what was, and still is—as we shall see next— habitual and a commonsensical practice in the country’s foreign policy decision-making process. Whether such trade-related efforts have been a hiatus or a permanent break in the country’s habit of foreign policy decision-making toward the United States remains to be seen. 93 As of today, in Brazil, it goes without saying that the country’s foreign policymaking process is managed by Planalto and Itamaraty; it is simply very difficult to imagine any dramatic foreign policy decision being implemented without any of such actors critically shaping the decision-making process. The changes that the country’s policy regarding the FTAA went through since 2003 were possible because of such structural feature of Brazilian politics; when Amorim and Lula considered they could not longer advance Brazil’s interests on the matter, no other Brazilian actor could prevent the Southern Cone giant from blocking further hemispheric negotiations. 92 Interview with Sérgio Fausto, São Paulo, May 17, 2013. 93 Pasquariello and Passini (2008, 125-30). 146 Brokering a Deal with Iran on Nuclear Weapons To many Brazilians, the beginnings of the 21 st century found Brazil and the United States in one of the best periods of their bilateral relations in recent history. The good relationship between presidents Lula and Bush paved the way for a significant increase in the number of high-level visits and in the number of bilateral consultation mechanisms implemented. As De Castro Neves and Spektor highlight, in March 2003 the first joint cabinet meeting in the history of bilateral relations took place and three months later fourteen new consultation mechanisms were in place; U.S. secretaries of state visited Brazil at least three times between 2004 and 2008; Bush visited Brazil twice during that same time period; and Lula visited the United States four times in between 2002 and 2007. 94 The 2000 decade was no parallel to the years of Brazil-U.S. foreign policy alignment that had taken place immediately after World War II and during the first years of Brazil’s military regime in 1964-67, but at the turn of the century Brazil-U.S. relations were constructive and had an unquestionable positive tone. Despite lacking in actual substance even regarding the promising issue of biofuels, when Barack Obama arrived to the White House the positive bilateral relationship was maintained. However, in 2010 Brazil’s habits of foreign policy decision-making would facilitate the decision and implementation of a fundamentally new course in the country’s foreign policy—this time concerning Iran’s nuclear program—that, amid Brazil’s growing international reputation as an emerging power, would considerably strain Brazil-U.S. relations. 95 Just as the United States was working to convince other permanent members at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to support a new round of economic sanctions over 94 De Castro Neves and Spektor (2011, 44-45). 95 See, for instance, The New York Times, “U.S. is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for Nuclear Fuel,” May 17, 2010, and Folha de São Paulo, “Ira e escolha estranha do Brasil, diz americano,” April 26, 2010. 147 Iran, Brazil was elected to a nonpermanent seat in such multilateral body and Lula and Celso Amorim begun to explicitly resist such policy option. Indeed, Brazil sought to have other countries such as China, Russia, India and South Africa oppose sanctions as well, and openly complained about the lack of “eye-to-eye” discussions between UNSC members—the United States in particular—and Tehran. 96 To be sure, Lula and Amorim were of the opinion that Iran had to be more “transparent” regarding its nuclear efforts and that it had to make a tangible move to “show that its nuclear program was one with only peaceful purposes,” as a means of being able to exercise its right to develop nuclear technology for non-military ends. 97 Still, many in the United States and Europe perceived Brazil’s way of dealing with Iran, and Ahmadinejad’s state visit to Brasilia in November 2009 in particular, as boosting the international status of the Iranian leader and undercutting U.S. and European efforts to pressure Iran to curtail its nuclear program. After all, a few months earlier Ahmadinejad had been re-elected president of Iran amid widespread accusations of fraud—in Iran and abroad—and Obama had publicly called Lula “the most popular politician on earth”. 98 But despite the fierce criticism of many in Brazil, the United States, Europe and Israel, Lula and Amorim proceeded with Ahmadinejad’s state visit to Brazil. 99 “Certainly the position that president Lula took in relation to not only Iran, but the need to have a very independent policy, and being able to deal with other countries irrespective 96 Folha de São Paulo, “Cupula nuclear marca avancos de Obama em sua agenda pessoal,” April 15, 2010. 97 Folha de São Paulo, “Iraniano reivindica autoria de proposta de acordo nuclear,” November 24, 209, “Lula tenta convencer colegas a nao punir Ira,” April 16, 2010; “Amorim exorta Iraa dar garantias nucleares,” April 28, 2010. 98 The New York Times, “Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Votes,” June 13, 2009; “Brazil Elbows U.S. on the Diplomatic Stage,” November 22, 2009; “Brazil Leader Defends Iranian’s Visit,” November 23, 2010; BBC News, “Obama: I love this guy,” April 2, 2009; Folha de São Paulo, “Brasil corteja Ira por voz no Oriente Medio,” “Brasil entra em rota de atrito com americanos,” and “Pais tambem causa polemica no Congreso,” April 23, 2009; Veja, “Noves fora, nada,” December 2, 2009; The Wall Street Journal, “Brazil’s New Standing Threatened by Ahmadinejad Visit,” November 23, 2009. 99 Folha de São Paulo, “Ira da ao Brasil um polemico protagonismo,” May 16, 2010. 148 of their own internal organization and irrespective of what—let us say—the “West” would think, was crucial to that [decision]. Of course [Lula] was not so much aware of the details of the nuclear question in Iran. So, I think, it really developed in our dialogue, my own dialogue with president Lula, saying that ... Iran was always trying to get close to us somehow. We made a point that a visit to Brazil should be a very specific visit that should be put within a circuit or a tour of other countries in the region that president Ahmadinejad wished to visit. And, it was fundamental for us that this nuclear question— because this was a central question between Iran and the international community— should be dealt with. So this was clear [to us], from the beginning!” 100 The meeting helped pave the way to reach a common understanding, together with Turkey, over Iran’s nuclear program; a deal that had been “an issue in the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ agenda for some time... . At the same time I had a meeting with Mr. Solana [then High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union], another one with Hans Blix, and these are people that president Lula didn’t know—not that he didn’t know them—but he didn’t meet with them. So, somehow, the idea that Brazil could play a role appeared more clearly. But, I must say that, in my first visit to Iran—still in preparation for the first visit of president Ahmadinejad to Brazil—I did discuss the nuclear issue with the Foreign Minister [of Iran] and so on. And this was before we got into the nitty-gritty of the question. The nitty-gritty only came about just before president Ahmadinejad visited [Brazil] and then it became clear that it might help breaking a deal. But even before that I had discussions with the Minister of Switzerland, which was also a country that sought to have a positive role. So, it had been [an issue] in the Foreign Minister’s agenda [i.e. Amorim’s] for some time. But on the other hand, on the broader view of president Lula, of having universal relations and be able to discuss with everyone, was a fundamental way to put it forward,” to operationalize such decision. 101 The new deal—known as the Tehran Declaration—was signed in May 2010, only a few months after Ahmadinejad’s visited Brazil. It involved Iran’s agreement to ship to Turkey roughly half of its nuclear fuel—just as it was proposed in October 2009 to Iran by the United States, France, and Russia with the support of the IAEA, but it still left open the possibility for Iran to continue with the enrichment of uranium. The Declaration was received with skepticism by the United States—due to domestic and international constraints—Europe, and Russia. And, according to some in the United States and Brazil, was perceived as an attempt to throw off track 100 Interview with then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13, 2013. 101 Interview with then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, Brasilia, May 13, 2013. 149 efforts at implementing further economic sanctions against Iran and illustrated how little Brazil was actually prepared to play a global role in the new century. 102 That is, striking a last-minute deal over Iran’s nuclear program was one of the ideas that Minister Amorim came up with to operationalize president Lula’s decision to engage with all countries with interests in talking with Brazil. There is no question that during Lula’s presidency “Amorim held great power and called the shots together with Lula;” 103 and that “it was Amorim’s idea to negotiate a deal with Iran” 104 given “the good technical background [he] had on weapons of mass destruction.” 105 This was an idea that Lula decided to support and follow as a means of bolstering Brazil’s international status and, importantly, that no other actor in Brazil could stop Planalto and Itamaraty from pursuing because, in Brazil, it is a common understanding that presidents and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs are typically those in charge of making these kind of high-politics decisions on foreign policy. To be sure, many in Brazil and abroad voiced disagreement with Brazil’s new approach to Iran, given the plausible unintended consequences that it may had on multilateral efforts at having Iran comply with international norms of nuclear nonproliferation and Brazil-U.S. 102 Amorim (2011, 60), Roett (2011, 146), Barbosa (2011, 324), De Castro Neves and Spektor (2011, 52-53). See, also, The New York Times, “U.S. is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for Nuclear Fuel,” May 17, 2010, and Folha de São Paulo, “Politicas internas sao maior entrave a acordo,” May 16, 2010; “Acordo nuclear com Ira nao convence potencias,” “Medvedev diz a Lula que se abriu novo caminho,” “Europa expressa ceticismo; Brasil pede voto de confianca,” May 18, 2010; “Potencias selam acordo sobre novas sancoes ao Ira,” May 19, 2010. To be sure, the Obama administration was not only fully aware of Brazil’s initiative to try to strike a deal with Iran but, also, president Obama encouraged president Lula—in writing—to engage the Middle Eastern country hoping he could make Iran comply and follow all of its international obligations and responsibilities. Folha de São Paulo, “Reacao a carta causa incomodo em Washington,” November 26, 2009; and, “Carta de Obama louvava acordo com Ira,” May 22, 2010. 103 Interview with former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Lafer, São Paulo, May 10, 2013. 104 Interview with former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Rubens Barbosa, São Paulo, May 9, 2013. 105 Indeed, Amorim chaired the UN-sponsored Conference on Disarmament twice, in 1993 and 1999, and was a candidate for the position of IAEA Director General; Interview with former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Rubens Ricupero, Sao Paulo, May 6, 2013; and Wikileaks (May 28, 2009). Other Brazilian senior foreign policymakers interviewed, such as Rubens Barbosa, Sergio Amaral, Roberto Abdenur, and Maricilio Marques Moreira, concur—striking a deal with Iran over its nuclear program was Minister Amorim’s idea and Lula followed suit. 150 relations. However, the bulk of such disagreements regarded the substance of Brazil’s policy but not who and how decided what was finally pursued. 106 And when critics had something to say about the latter—just as it was previously the case regarding FTAA negotiations—they called for a more active involvement of Itamaraty’s bureaucracy, not less—while other actors such as congressional commissions on foreign affairs, for example, remained unmentioned or unthought of as having anything to do with the country’s foreign policymaking process. 107 In other words, the sudden new foreign policy course pursued by Brazil toward Iran and the United States was possible, first and foremost, due to the fact that foreign policymaking is the realm of action of presidents and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Despite the existence of a broad consensus, in Brazil, on the relevance of a Brazil-U.S. strategic partnership in the twenty- first century, a considerable potential for sudden changes in the country’s foreign policy is still latent due to the fact that the actors that habitually have the power to decide what is finally implemented are two and only two—Planalto and Itamaraty. Habits and Policy: Understanding Brazil’s Foreign Policy (In)Stability Recent claims suggesting that Brazil’s foreign policymaking process has begun to democratize attest to the power of habit in establishing Planalto and Itamaraty as the actors who traditionally set the agenda and call the shots on foreign policy. As of today, there is no evidence of Planalto and Itamaraty having decided in favor of a policy they would have not pursued had it not been 106 Indeed, former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States Rubens Barbosa argues that, later on, when the United States implemented further economic sanctions against Iran—with the approval of the U.S. Congress—those sanctions “included, for the first time, restrictions on ethanol sales to Iran and the monitoring of eventual exports” to that same country (2011, 327). Also see Lampreia (2009, Part IV); Folha de São Paulo, “O tropeco do Brasil no Ira,” May 21, 2010; “Acordo, a qualquer preco, e anacronico,” May 22, 2010; Veja, “Os coracoes partidos por Lula no mundo,” May 19, 2010; “Esperteza Atomica,” May 26, 2010. 107 See, for example, Ricupero (2010, 1, 7-8), Azambuja (2010), and Barbosa (2011, 323). 151 for the participation of non-state actors in the decision-making process. On trade issues, for example, while Itamaraty and Planalto have actually encouraged the voicing of opinions of actors such as the Foundation Center for the Study of Foreign Trade (FUNCEX) and the São Paulo Federation Industry (FIESP), since the advent of democracy, “policy capture by special interests has [actually] decreased” and the democratization of the foreign trade decision-making process has been, at best, only “incremental.” 108 The workings of some non-governmental organizations and other civil-society actors have rendered the process of interest aggregation more transparent; but it is only in regards to second tier issues such as human rights and the environment that they could begin to influence actual foreign policy outcomes. 109 Still, these more transparent processes are only taking place almost three decades after the advent of democracy, and it still remains to be seen how and when any of such new actors would be able to shape policy in par with Itamaraty and presidents, or bend the latter’s arm— through signaling that X or Y policy would not gain Congressional approval, for instance—to make Brazil follow a policy that it would not have otherwise pursued. Actors other than Itamaraty and Planalto may have gained more presence around policymaking processes regarding issues such as the environment, human rights, and trade. But as Brazil’s foreign policymaking instances during the first Gulf War, FTAA negotiations, and its attempt to strike a deal with Iran over Iran’s nuclear program show, there is simply no evidence of Itamaraty—or presidents, for that matter—losing their clout over who and how should be calling the shots every time there is an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States. In and through practice, it is still Planalto and Itamaraty who decide what is finally implemented and not referring to their roles in the making of Brazil’s foreign policy, as well as referring to 108 Armijo and Kearney (2008, 991). 109 See, for example, Patriota (2013), and Armijo and Kearney (2008). 152 alternative foreign policy decision-making practices are, as of today, alternatives very hard to imagine. The memoirs of some of Brazil’s senior foreign policymakers and the work of scholars studying Brazil’s foreign policy are a case in point. Regardless of the period covered and issues at stake, not only it is the case that Planalto and Itamaraty are systematically described as the actors who, in actual practice, make Brazil’s foreign policy, it also happens to be the case that non-state actors, or even Congress, are virtually absent from such accounts. Save for the instance of FTAA negotiations—during which actors other than Planalto and Itamaraty helped legitimate Brazil’s policy as per the governments’ initiatives—Congress or non-state actors are, by and large, virtually absent from reconstructions of Brazil’s foreign policymaking and negotiation processes; a fact that, in general, nobody in Brazil seems to be at odds with. Foreign policymaking in Brazil is a realm of decision-making that belongs to the workings of diplomats, presidents, and their foreign policy advisers—who, more often than not, are professionals belonging to Itamaraty. This is a rather natural fact of Brazilian politics upon which, albeit tacitly, there appears to be a general agreement among practitioners and domestic and international students of Brazil’s foreign policy. 110 That is, in Brazil, having presidents make foreign policy together with Itamaraty is the rational thing to do because it is a practice that happens against a tradition that locates the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the helm of foreign policy decision-making. No Brazilian government would be criticized for having Itamaraty influence the country’s foreign policy, but 110 Compare, for example, Amorim (1997), (2011), and (2013), Barbosa (2011), Cardoso (2006) and (2007), Lampreia (2008) and (2009), Marques Moreira (2001), Ricupero (2010), Burges (2009), Hirst (2005) and (2010), Hurrell (2005), Gonçalves (2008), Fonseca (2008), Rego Barros II (2009), Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009), Smith (2010), Casarões (2012), and Crandall (2011). 153 they will be criticized—as they were—if Itamaraty’s permanent bureaucracy does not partake of decision-making as it has been the case traditionally. Mainstream institutional theories in International Relations suggest that, when making policy, the behavior of policymakers is determined by rule-like constraints as established by formal institutions. In making their decisions and maximizing their utilities regarding who and how should decide what is finally implemented, actors are portrayed—or assumed to be—taking into consideration the “rules of the game,” as stipulated in parchment, within which they have to engage with other actors; the preferences of other actors; and, the cost and benefits of any given decision they may make on the matter. 111 However, this chapter shows that, when having to establish who and how is going to make a major foreign policy decision toward the United States in Brazil, this appears to be better understood as a question commonly resolved by how policy is habitually made, rather than by policymakers consciously thinking and debating about who should be making policy and why. In Brazil, what is habitual is to have both Planalto and Itamaraty make foreign policy. And this fact of Brazilian politics renders changes in foreign policy more difficult that in the case of Argentina—where what is habitual is to have presidents implement whatever foreign policy they may see fit. This is so if only because agreeing on a new policy is more difficult among many than among a few; which helps explain why foreign policy changes toward the United States in Chile are considerably more difficult than in both Brazil and Argentina, as we shall see next. 111 See, for example, Cowhey and McCubbins (1995), Haggard and McCubbins (2001) and Tsebelis (2002, 18). Specifically, by formal institutions I mean, following Carey (2000, 735), “parchment institutions ... formal rules of political contestation that are written down somewhere as laws, regulations, constitutions, treaties, and so forth.” Stakeholders Matter: Chile’s Habits of Foreign Policymaking, 1990-2012 155 This chapter focuses on who and how, in actual practice, makes democratic Chile’s foreign policy toward the United States every time there is an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision. 1 Specifically, I cover one of Chile’s most significant decision-making instances involving both security and trade related matters—the decision to oppose, at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the 2003 U.S.-led war against Iraq while a Chile-U.S. free trade agreement was pending final approval at the U.S. Senate. In theory, Chile’s formal political institutions are categorized, even by Latin American standards, as the least conducive to effective democratic governance. Chile has an exaggerated presidential system and weak legislature, and a majoritarian electoral system that, on paper, creates “disincentives for cooperation, coalition formation, and political accommodation.” 2 On foreign policymaking, presidents are expected to do as they see fit, as they are in charge—by and large, as in neighboring Argentina and Brazil—of conducting the country’s foreign affairs. The “1980 Constitution did not alter the traditionally limited role of Congress in this policy arena.” 3 In practice, however, Chile’s foreign policymaking process looks strikingly different to what it should be in theory—as well as fundamentally different from those of Argentina and Brazil. I argue that foreign policymaking behavior in Chile is not a function of strategic interactions among policymakers regarding who and how should be making policy given what is 1 See Chapter 2 for a definition and discussion of the concept of “dramatic” foreign policy decision. 2 Siavelis (2006, 33). 3 Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, 54). Similarly to the cases of Argentina and Brazil, Chilean presidents direct political relations with other powers and organizations and Congress has a rather limited albeit important role in foreign policy decision-making. In theory, it is presidents who direct foreign affairs with other countries and international organizations and who can negotiate international treaties, which are subjected to congressional approval without modifications. It is up to Congress to authorize executive declarations of war and peace and permit foreign troops to enter national territory or to send national troops abroad. Also, it is presidents who designate diplomatic posts and representatives to international organizations and she does not need congressional authorization to travel abroad for less than thirty days. In Chile, until 2005, presidents had the option to request the advice of the National Security Council (NSC) regarding events that constituted grave threats to national security or the institutions of government. The NSC has met only four times—the first was a “routine matter permitting foreign troops into Chilean territory, and the latter three pertained to the Pinochet detention. The Security Council has never met on a matter dealing with the United States,” Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, 53), and Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010). 156 prescribed in parchment—as mainstream institutional theories would have it—but of a habit of policymaking establishing a broad consultation process amongst all political actors with stakes on the matter. This process usually involves the president and her advisors, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, as well as other state and non-state stakeholders. In turn, this habit of policymaking renders changes in Chile’s foreign policy toward the United States more difficult than in Brazil and Argentina—countries with similar formal political institutions of foreign policy decision-making to Chile’s, but different habits of policymaking. 4 Every time there has been an opportunity to make a major foreign policy decision pertaining the United States, Chilean policymakers have repetitively and systematically engaged in a broad consultation process aimed at deciding what policy Chile should follow. Depending on the issue at stake, what may vary in Chile is the influence some actors may have over what policy is finally pursued. The Ministry of Finance, for example, may have more or equal saying to that of Foreign Affairs on foreign economic matters; whereas on security issues Finance may take the back seat in decision-making. Still, even such issue-specific arrangements take place out of common sense. That all actors with stakes on the matter will participate of decision-making—and no single actor makes policy only in light of their own preferences—is a rather obvious and self-evident fact of Chilean politics. This is how foreign policy is typically made, policymakers act accordingly, and nobody 4 See chapters 3 and 4, respectively, for a discussion of Argentina’s and Brazil’s habits of foreign policymaking toward the United States. See chapters 1 and 2 for a theoretical and methodological discussion on the meaning and effects of habits and on the different techniques used to qualitatively recover habitual behavior. To be sure, four out of the five Chilean Presidents since 1990 belonged to the “Concert of Parties for Democracy,” a coalition of center-left political parties that governed Chile for two consecutive decades. Two Concertación Presidents belonged to the Christian Democrat Party (PDC)—Patricio Aylwin (1990-94) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000)—and other two to the Socialist Party (PS)—Ricardo Lagos (2000-06) and Michele Bachelet (2006-10). Currently, the three other Concertación parties are the Party for Democracy (PDD), the Social Democrat Radical Party (PRSD), and the Communist Party of Chile (CPC). The right-wing government of Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014) introduced no alterations to Chile’s foreign policymaking process, at least according to Chilean diplomats; interviews with Ambassadors José Goñi, José Miguel Insulza, Heraldo Muñoz, Juan Gabriel Valdés, and Alberto Van Klaveren. 157 seems to be at odds with such rather natural order of things. In Chile, for the most part, it goes without saying that that is how foreign policy is actually made. In fact, it makes perfect sense that all stakeholders will influence the foreign policy decision-making process because, as such, it is a foreign policymaking practice that is part and parcel of the country’s broader political tradition of power sharing and widespread consultation processes. Indeed, the available data suggests that no actors voice any meaningful discontents with such foreign policymaking practice. The latter, in fact, is largely determined by force of habit. Not supporting the 2003 U.S.-led war against Iraq at the UNSC was not the only dramatic foreign policy decision Chile had to make since the return of democracy in 1990. Another such instance involved the decision to purse a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the United States that same year. Chile’s Finance Minister—Alejandro Foxley—the Minister Secretary General of the Presidency—Edgardo Boeninger—and the Ministry Secretary General of the Government of Chile—Enrique Correa—took the lead on this decision with the approval of president Patricio Aylwin—after President George H. W. Bush announced the launching of the Enterprise Initiative for the Americas—a project that sought to unite the hemisphere “from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego” based on free trade, private investment, and economic growth. 5 But, other than these two instances, the secondary literature and qualitative interviews with senior Chilean foreign policymakers consistently suggest that “the United States was [only] one of multiple areas of interest [to Chile] as the country sought reinsertion into the international 5 Interview with Ambassador and IR scholar Alberto Van Klaveren, Santiago, October 29, 2012. Resources and time limitations have not allowed me to research in full such decision-making process. Systematic attempts to interview former Minister of Finance, Alejandro Foxley, have failed, and none of the main Chilean newspapers—El Merurio and La Tercera, for example—have online archives opened to be accessed from afar. I could locate no secondary literature, in English or Spanish, reconstructing who and how in Chile decided to pursue a FTA with the United States. How such decision was made can be reconstructed, but at this point the task requires more time and resources for further field research in Chile. 158 community after seventeen years of pariah status.” 6 This, combined with Chile’s relative size, has virtually eliminated the possibility of “high politics” issues entering the bilateral agenda. Despite a number of security and economic issues ranging from the lifting of the Kennedy arms embargo, going through the case against Chilean poisoned grapes and accusations of dumping against Chilean salmon exports, to intellectual property rights, in general, Chile’s foreign policy decisions toward the United States have not required critical decisions on the part of its governments. Indeed, from the year 2000 onward, for virtually every issue in the Chile-U.S. bilateral agenda there is an institutional mechanism in charge of it; 7 a situation that has not precluded the participation in decision-making of the Chilean legislative as well as of non-state and transnational actors with stakes on the bilateral relation. After reconstructing who and how, in Chile, influenced the country’s decision not to support the 2003 war against Iraq at the UNSC, the chapter closes by briefly discussing how Chile’s habit of foreign policymaking helps make sense of the country’s foreign policy stability toward the United States. Dramatic changes in Chile’s foreign policy are particularly difficult to take place because these would need to overcome the preferences of the plurality of actors habitually participating of decision-making. This is different to the cases of Argentina and 6 Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, 81). As Ambassador Van Klaveren, puts it: “There were two key decisions in Chile’s foreign policy toward the United States—and a few others that, although important, weren’t key. The two most important ones that we can refer to during these 22 years of democracy were: first, the decision to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. And, second, the decision to oppose the United States in the UNSC re the Iraq 2003 war.” Interview with Alberto Van Klaveren, Santiago, October 29, 2012. Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz (Chile’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2014-incumbent) makes a similar point: “it is as if relations [with the United States] go in ‘automatic pilot:’ there are no big decisions to be made and presidents tend not have to intervene much.” Interview with Heraldo Muñoz, New York, July 12, 2012. See, also, Wilhelmy and Durán (2003, 279-85), Pinheiro (2008), and Fuentes Julio and Aravena (2010). 7 Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010, 153). For example, a review of Michele Bachelet’s government (2006- 2010)—published in the United States—mentions the “United States” only once and in passing; Borzutzky and Weeks (2010, 7). Another one, reviewing Chile’s political and economic developments since the advent of democracy pays the most attention to the United States regarding Chile’s trade agreement with it; Borzutzky and Oppenheim (2006). 159 Brazil, where different habits of foreign policy decision-making establish fewer actors as responsible for foreign policy, rendering changes in foreign policy easier than in Chile. Saying “No” to the 2003 Iraq War at the UNSC With the advent of democracy in 1990, Chile embarked in an effort to mend its international reputation after almost two decades of military rule and human rights violations. Revolving around the issues of democracy promotion and free trade, Chilean foreign policymakers worked toward restoring Chile’s relationship with the United States as a means of helping the country re- insert itself into the chief international fora. President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) was the first Chilean president to visit the United States since 1962, and Chile-U.S. bilateral relations became even stronger during the subsequent administration of Eduardo Frei (1994-1998), when a Political Consultations System “added an institutional foundation to relations.” 8 Indeed, it would take the 2003 war against Iraq to hamper an otherwise solid cooperative friendship. On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved UNSC Resolution 1441, giving Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” as set out in ten previous resolutions approved since 1990. Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in violation of its disarmament obligations and gave the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the power to inspect anywhere, anyone, and at any time Iraq. The goal 8 Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010, 147), Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, 18), and interview with Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Chile, Manfred Wilhelmy, Santiago, October 26, 2012. Although the transition to democracy did not automatically solve all contentious issues in the bilateral agenda (e.g. the Letelier and poisoned grapes cases), “In the 1990s, relations with the United States were probably the best they had been since the mid-1960s;” see Fermandois (2006, 136) and (1991, 450-3), Morandé Lavín (1991) and (1993), Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, xvii), and Durán (1991, 85). 160 was to ensure the verifiable destruction of the country’s weapons of mass destruction and associated infrastructure and support programs. Although Resolution 1441 did not include any automaticity clause with respect to the use of force—in the event Iraq would not comply—it did “warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations,” and decided that the UNSC shall “remain seized of the matter.” 9 In principle, were Iraq not to follow through with the new resolution, the United States would have to seek a second UNSC resolution if it decided to disarm Iraq by force with the approval of the international community. 10 When Chile postulated to join the UNSC as a rotating member a year or so earlier, Chilean policymakers had no idea their tenure at the Security Council would mandate from them to make, arguably, the most dramatic foreign policy decision in Chile’s foreign policy toward the United States anybody could think of. 11 As Chilean President Ricardo Lagos puts it, “It was rare that Chile held so much sway in global affairs.” 12 Indeed, just as the cool-weather season for a U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq set in early 2003, the United States found itself having to court—as it had just done to secure passage of Resolution 1441—the new five UNSC rotating members to gain approval for its plan to disarm Iraq by force. 13 Chile was one of those new five members and, at the same time, had a decade-long negotiated bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States pending final approval at the U.S. Senate. Making matters worse, to U.S. policymakers, Chile was one of the non- 9 UNSC Resolution 1441 (2002). 10 The New York Times, “The Rationale for the U.N. Resolution on Iraq, in the Diplomat’s Own Words,” November 9, 2002. For a more in-depth coverage of the steps referred to here, see Harvey and James (2009, 242-45). 11 Lagos (2012a, 207), Fermandois (2008, 65), and Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010, 139). Interviews with president Ricardo Lagos, Santiago, October 31, 2012, and with then Chile’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Juan Gabriel Valdés, Santiago, October 26, 2012. 12 Lagos (2012a, 227). 13 The New York Times, “New Configuration of Security Council May Force U.S. to Renew Lobby,” January 5, 2003. 161 permanent members whose support for the United States at the UNSC was somewhat clear. 14 According to many in Santiago, if Chile was to decide against supporting the U.S. stance at the UNSC, the risk of endangering the signing of the FTA was real. Within a few weeks of Chile having joined the UNSC in January 2003, it appeared to be that the constructive bilateral relation built during the previous decade—including the prospects of implementing a bilateral FTA— were about to crumble. 15 By early February, President Lagos was both well aware of the situation and had a very strong sense of what his country’s position should be. With or without UNSC backing, the United States would disarm Iraq; a decision Chile would not support unless other UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections establish that Iraq actually held, or was developing, WMD. But, even though by law Lagos was not formally required to do so, he would share his strong preferences and decision-making process with actors ranging from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to political parties that, at the time, did not even have representatives in Congress. After all, Chilean presidents are in charge of conducting Chile’s foreign affairs and not supporting the United States at the UNSC was a decision that did not need congressional approval, or that of any other Chilean political actor. “It was,” in Lagos’ words, “a decision that I took like any other government decision: one doesn’t govern alone!” 16 As Lagos’ minister secretary general of Government, Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, recalls: 14 The New York Times, “U.S. Ready to Back New U.N. Measure on Iraq, Bush Says,” and “How to Win Friends and Influence Small Countries,” February 6 and March 16 (respectively), 2013. 15 Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010, 150), Fermandois (2008, 47), Errázuriz (2003, 117), and interviews with president Ricardo Lagos, Santiago, October 31, 2012, and with Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés and Prof. Manfred Wilhelmy, Santiago, October 26, 2012. 16 Interview with president Ricardo Lagos, Santiago, October 31, 2012. 162 “Every Sunday night Lagos and [the main figures of his] cabinet would get together to discuss the agenda for the week. The Minister of Interior [then former Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Miguel Insulza], the Minister of Finance, myself, Lagos’ Chief of Cabinet, and Lagos himself, would participate. And in those meetings we all certainly discussed the issue. And we were of the opinion that international law needed to be respected, that Chile could not sign a ‘blank check’ to an invasion. I remember that we even speculated on some of the costs that Chile could incur for not supporting the position of the United States, and that I said that if the U.S. was not to sign a FTA with Chile, who would the U.S. sign it with (given that the FTA had already been negotiated, that the U.S. had invested some of its political capital in it, and that the deal was practically done)? So, we concluded that it was worth running the risk. And this was Lagos’ opinion from the very beginning. But he did open the issue up for consultation with all political parties—even including those such as the Communist Party that had no representation in Congress. There, he found ample support for the stance of his government—that is, to say ‘no’ to a unilateral intervention and to give diplomacy a real chance.” 17 To Chilean policymakers, such consultative take on foreign policy decision-making was rather obvious and commonsensical. Then Chile’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Juan Gabriel Valdés, describes it well: “In Chile, it would be unconceivable that a process of decision-making of such dramatic relevance to the country would not trigger a pretty wide process of consultation on the many plausible consequences the country would face given its decision on what policy to pursue ... In Chile, no important foreign policy decision is made without deliberation.” 18 Indeed, Ambassadors Valdés and Muñoz were the ones who helped alert president Lagos of “the importance of the matter to the United States.” Lagos had already “heard a bit about it from [Tony] Blair, with whom [he] had already exchanged opinions on 9/11 [and the war on terror] a number of times.” 19 But Valdés had been briefed on the issue by the U.S. Department of States the months before arriving to the UNSC—and again the second he sat at the UNSC. Muñoz, on his part, had “received an unexpected call in Chile’s presidential palace, La Moneda, from Condoleezza Rice,” telling him that “We would like our friends to be with us on this. Of 17 Interview with Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, New York, July 12, 2012; Muñoz (2008, 9). 18 Interview with Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés, Santiago, October 26, 2012. 19 Interview with president Ricardo Lagos, Santiago, October 31, 2012; Lagos (2012a, 210-11). 163 course, when it comes to a vote in the Security Council, it will not suffice to abstain.” 20 President George W. Bush would ring Lagos for the first time on the matter only a few days later. In securing a second UNSC resolution that would render the use of force to disarm Iraq legitimate before the international community, by mid-February the United States and Britain decided that their strategy would be to persuade 9 of the 15 members of the Security Council, and then challenge France, Russia, and China—the permanent members opposing the use of force—to veto the Council’s majority. It takes nine votes to pass a resolution and, at the time, the United States and Britain had only Spain and Bulgaria on their side. Since Pakistan, one of the six undecided votes, was almost certain to abstain, the U.S. focus was on countries that normally do not command much attention—Angola, Guinea, Cameroon, Mexico, and Chile. 21 If France, Russia, or China vetoed, then the resolution would be killed. As Bush had personally asked president Lagos to do, Lagos was one of the many viewers following live the speech of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell before the UNSC—aimed at convincing skeptical UNSC members that Iraq was working, once again, to deceive U.N. weapons inspectors. As soon as Powell finished his presentation, Bush called Lagos at his office in La Moneda: “ ‘Ricardo, how are you? Vamos a ganar!’ [Bush’s] overconfidence was brash, echoing almost comically over the phone. ‘Did you watch, Ricardo?’ Bush asked eagerly. Yes, [Lagos] told him. I’d seen it all. And? ‘There were interesting moments ...’ [Lagos] hedged. It wasn’t the time to tell Bush that [he] was unconvinced.” 22 20 Muñoz (2008, 8-10). Condoleezza Rice and Heraldo Muñoz had known each other for years, as they attended at the same time the same PhD program at the University of Denver. 21 The New York Times, “Strategy; U.S. Seeks 9 Votes from U.N. Council to Confront Iraq,” and “Diplomacy; Bush Goes Global To Lobby for Votes On U.N. Measure,” February 20 and 26, respectively. 22 Lagos (2012a, 206). 164 Chile’s need to make a critical foreign policy decision had triggered the usual decision- making process. Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés “was called to a meeting in which the Minister of Finance, the president, and José Miguel Insulza as well, participated. [There, Valdés] presented what was the meaning, for Chile, of a flagrant violation of international law and of the same UNSC resolutions establishing the timing for inspections, in a context in which, all the information [he] had— particularly gathered from [his] Middle Eastern counterparts—led to the same conclusion: the war would lead to a catastrophe. After [Valdés] finished [his] presentation, a number of the participants at the meeting—particularly Alejandro Foxley and Edgardo Boeninger—recognized what was going on at the UN. [Still, they] clearly stated that Chile had nothing to do with such issues [and should support the US as a means of securing approval of the FTA]. The only participant who [openly] said something against such stance was José Miguel Insulza [at the time Chile’s Minister of the Interior and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1994-1999] who said a phrase something like: ‘Whenever there are serious political difficulties, the only way of functioning is putting principles first.’ So, a whole debate took place between a more realist and a more idealist position. [This] triggered the participation of Ricardo Lagos who, in turn, begun discussing the matter with Bush, Fox, Blair, and Chirac. He was phoned by these counterparts, and he would phone them as well. Until he called me in and told me he wanted to hear directly from Hans Blix [head of the IAEA] a meeting that I arranged immediately. They talked for about an hour—with an open microphone—and Lagos’ key question was: ‘How much more time do you need to establish whether there are or not WMD in Iraq? 45 days,’ replied Blix. ‘30 days’ insisted Lagos, which was what Lagos proposed to Bush but to no avail.” 23 Such meetings were routinary before and during the decision-making process, and all parties involved perceived this as a rather obvious government practice. Chile’s interests on the matter were straightforward: “Small countries such as Chile needed the international system’s institutions intact. And diplomacy aside, the Iraq war seemed like a terrible idea for which the United States was ill-prepared.” 24 Ambassador Muñoz concurred: “For Chile, it was essential to preserve multilateralism and to avoid a breakup of the collective-decision process in the Security Council. A country traditionally known to be a 23 Interviews with Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés, Santiago, October 26, 2012, with Ambassador José Miguel Insulza, Washington, DC, July 17, 2012, and with Prof. Manfred Wilhelmy, Santiago, October 26, 2012. See also Lagos (2012a, 222), Bush (2010, 247), and The New York Times, “A Latin Vote: Chile Feels the Weight of Its Security Council Seat,” March 10, 2003. 24 Lagos (2012a, 227). 165 promoter of international law and a defender of the UN Charter, Chile had to do the utmost to impede the unilateral use of force.” 25 And president Lagos, facing a domestic public opinion that overwhelmingly opposed the war, would act accordingly. 26 By mid-February, it was clear to Chilean policymakers that they were not alone at the UNSC feeling un-persuaded by the U.S. call to disarm Iraq by force. For example, and despite his unconditional backing to the U.S. stance, Prime Minister Tony Blair needed to actively pursue a second UNSC Resolution not only because this “would reunite the international community, [but also because] UK public opinion was split, [his] party was split, [and he found himself] between numerous rocks and innumerable hard places.” 27 President Vicente Fox of Mexico faced no-less daunting constraints: “As a nation we knew firsthand what it was like to be occupied ... and no true son of Mexico could ever back the invasion of a sovereign country unless that nation was a danger to the rest of the world;” 28 a threat that the United States still needed to prove. Lagos would work closely with Blair, Fox, and Blix to try to secure a second UNSC Resolution. This would give more time to UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections and the other four “Uncommitted Six” countries at the UNSC—Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, and Pakistan—an alternative to simply saying ‘no’ to the United States and Great Britain. 29 All Chile wanted was more time for new inspections to be carried out and to add benchmarks to the resolution to measure Iraq’s compliance, as to give the international community additional information on Iraq’s actual weapons program. 30 But despite his best 25 Muñoz (2008, 57). 26 On Chile’s public opinion and public debates around the Iraq war see Fermandois (2008) and Errázuriz (2003, 118-9). 27 Blair (2010, 421-2). 28 Fox (2007, 287). 29 Lagos (2012a, 216-19); Fox (2007, 282). 30 Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010, 149-50); Interview with Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés, Santiago, October 26, 2012. See, also, The New York Times, “Security Council; Urgent Diplomacy Fails To Gain U.S. 9 Votes 166 concerted efforts with Blair, Blix, and Fox, amid France’s and Russia’s threat to veto any resolution that would lead to war in Iraq, Lagos would not be able to find the opportunity to bring any such new resolution to a vote. 31 On March 8, Bush called Lagos to let him know that time was already up. Then, once again, Lagos would make the natural round to make sure all Chilean political actors were up to date with the decision of his government: “I made the rounds in Chile, calling every political faction of the country, trying to explain what I was planning to do. I wasn’t asking for permission so much as ensuring that no one was caught off guard.” 32 Four days later, Bush called again wanting “to know if he could count on [my vote]. ‘Mr. President,’ [Lagos] said, ‘Chile and the United States have a strong friendship. But if you form a coalition outside the Security Council, Chile can’t participate.” 33 The U.S.-led war against Iraq would start a few days later, on March 19, 2003. In the end, Chile’s open opposition to the United States would only minimally impact bilateral relations. In spite of the obvious discontent of U.S. authorities, the signing of the bilateral FTA only suffered a minor delay. 34 By June 6, 2003, the FTA was signed and Chilean and U.S. policymakers looked forward to finding other opportunities to increase and strengthen bilateral relations. 35 in the U.N.,” and “A Latin Vote: Chile Feels the Weight of Its Security Council Seat,” March 9 and 10 (respectively), 2003 31 See, for example, The New York Times, “France and Russia Ready to Use Veto Against Iraq War,” and “France to Veto Resolution in Iraq War, Chirac Says,” March 6 and 11 (respectively), 2003. 32 Lagos (2012a, 227); Fermandois (2008, 70). 33 Lagos (2012a, 224). See, also, “Security Council; Urgent Diplomacy Fails To Gain U.S. 9 Votes in the U.N.,” The New York Times, March 9, 2003. 34 The New York Times, “U.S. and Singapore Sign Free Trade Pact,” May 6, 2003. 35 Fuentes Julio and Rojas Aravena (2010, 152); The New York Times, “Chile and U.S. Sign Accord on Free Trade,” June 6, 2003; Interview with Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, New York, July 12, 2012. This appears to be another case of “soft linkages” trumping “hard” ones in U.S. foreign policy. As Brian Bow puts it, “Whereas hard linkages generally involve an active change of policy, with actual or potential effects on the target that are readily observed and unmistakably negative ... soft linkages usually take the form of a malign passivity, and the relevant linkages between issues are often indirect and diffuse;” see Bow (2009, 5). 167 That is, despite formal stipulations to the contrary, in Chile the need to make a dramatic foreign policy decision triggered a policymaking process that, at least to policymakers, came across as rather obvious: “Nothing in Chile depends solely on Presidents ... and this is the natural order of things. There is no individual who would try to implement a policy only as he sees fit; in Chile, such person, doesn’t exist.” 36 As Ambassador Alberto Van Klaveren puts it: “Now, I think that the ‘institutionalization’ of Chile’s relations with the United States is at a mid-level; it is not fully institutionalized. This is so because, in practice, there is variation on how consultation takes place across issues. But consultation among a myriad of actors always takes place! For instance, the National Security Council had an important role, in the National Constitution, on foreign policy matters. But it has never been called to act because it is seen as an ‘authoritarian enclave’ that nobody is willing to acknowledge.” 37 Indeed, even at the very beginning of the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, survey data showed that Chilean elites did not expect the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hold the monopoly on foreign policymaking. Rather, it was perceived that foreign policymaking “involved a plurality of instances and political and socio-economic actors—such as parliament, political parties and groups, business lobbies, unions, and social movements in general.” 38 The combination of actors shaping Chile’s foreign policymaking process would and still varies across issues. But, that consultation as a foreign policymaking practice will take place among all stakeholders is a rather obvious fact of Chilean politics. Indeed, it is a social fact that takes place automatically, repetitively and in conformity with what Chileans expect their governments to do under the circumstances. It takes place, in short, by force of habit. 36 Interview with Ambassador José Miguel Insulza, Washington, DC, July 17, 2012. 37 Interview with Ambassador Alberto Van Klaveren, October 29, 2012. On the National Security Council and foreign policy see Mares and Aravena (2001, 52-3). 38 Morandé Lavín and Durán (1993, 604). 168 Alternatives to having a plurality of actors informing Chile’s foreign policymaking process toward the United States are unconceivable, un-thought, and un-heard of. Indeed, the scant literature analyzing Chile’s foreign policy decision-making process refers to the country’s “tradition of debate” before decisions of great relevance. 39 Such debates are the rational things to engage in because they are part and parcel of a broader tradition of “widespread consultation” and “power sharing” in Chilean politics; 40 an order of things that nobody in Chile appears at odds with. Habits and Policy: Understanding Chile’s Foreign Policy Stability This chapter shows that, in actual practice, when Chile faces an opportunity to make a major foreign policy decision toward the United States, a plurality of actors decides—in consultation with each other—what policy is implemented and how. This is true even in those instances in which presidents are in their own right to establish whatever policy they may see fit. Regardless of the issue at sake, when a dramatic foreign policy decision needs to me made, the president, her foreign policy advisers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and other state or non-state actors with stakes on the matter, share the decision-making process on what should be done and how. Importantly, the available evidence suggests that such behavior on the part of policymakers repeats itself across administrations and issue areas, takes place irrespective of 39 See, for example, Fermandois (2008, 47), Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, Ch. 3), and Pinheiro (2008). 40 On “power sharing,” “widespread consultation” processes and the “regularized pattern of democracia de los acuerdos” in Chile, see Siavelis (2006). 169 who is Chile’s president or its Minister of Foreign Affairs, and independently of the domestic and international context the country is facing. 41 It is also a policymaking behavior that takes place without much recourse to conscious considerations of form and procedure. It takes place, by and large, automatically—i.e. naturally; driven by the need to make a major foreign policy decision; without many people, if anybody at all, realizing that it is actually taking place; and, that it requires of considerable conscious efforts to think of alternative ways of making foreign policy. It is difficult to find evidence of practitioners or the general public spending any meaningful time debating who and how should be calling the shots. And it is, also, a process that, out of common sense, denotes how foreign policy is typically and routinely made in Chile. When making critical foreign policy decisions, Chile has its own distinct habit of foreign policymaking. As one of Chile’s most experienced foreign policy practitioners puts it: “There’s an unwritten rule in Chile’s political system that it is very important [to understand how the government makes decisions]: Decisions are always made through the different Ministries. ... Presidents also have their group of advisers—Ricardo Lagos’ ‘second floor’ at La Moneda was well known, for example. But none of these people decided in place of the president; rather, they would advice the president on how to make his decisions with their different Ministries. And this [practice] is what renders foreign policy very institutional.” 42 The latter applies not only to Chile’s relations with the United States but also to Chile’s foreign policymaking in general: “I’ve been involved in no dramatic foreign policy decisions toward the United States, but on others with other countries: and it has always been the same, very open decision- making processes, with consultation instances that are very intense, all the time, and with opinions that vary greatly with the issues. [And] this decision-making process includes a 41 The right-wing government of Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014) introduced no alterations to Chile’s foreign policymaking process, at least according to Chilean diplomats; interviews with Ambassadors José Goñi, José Miguel Insulza, Heraldo Muñoz, Juan Gabriel Valdés, and Alberto Van Klaveren. 42 Interview with Ambassador José Miguel Insulza, Washington, DC, July 17, 2012. 170 bureaucracy—that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—that it is not as legitimated as that of Brazil. But even then, no [Chilean] president will disregard the opinion and preferences of the Ministry. Presidents may criticize the Ministry and vise-versa, but these actors will always consult with each other for sure. Now ... there is variation on how consultation takes place across issues; but consultation among a myriad of actors always takes place!” 43 Indeed, in Chilean politics, the role of consultations in the making of the country’s foreign policy toward the United States rests on a socially-shared and deep-seated belief stipulating that a consensus among actors with stakes on the matter needs to be reached when having to make a critical foreign policy decision. 44 For the most part, nobody in Chile disputes such order of things which, in turn, is more often than not justified out of common sense. Mainstream institutional theories in IR suggest that, when making policy, the behavior of policymakers is determined by rule-like constraints as established by formal institutions. In making their decisions and maximizing their utilities regarding who and how should decide what is finally implemented, actors are portrayed—or assumed to be—taking into consideration the “rules of the game,” as stipulated in parchment, within which they have to engage with other actors; the preferences of other actors; and, the cost and benefits of any given decision they may make on the matter. 45 However, this chapter suggests that, when having to establish, in actual practice, who and how is going to make a major foreign policy decision toward the United States, this appears to be a situation better understood as a question commonly resolved by how policy is habitually made, rather than by policymakers consciously thinking and debating about who and how should be making policy and why. 43 Interview with Ambassador Alberto Van Klaveren, Santiago, October 29, 2012. 44 On this practice of foreign policy decision-making and the cases of Chilean poisoned grapes and accusations of dumping in Chile’s salmon exports to the United States, see Mares and Rojas Aravena (2001, 89 and 99-103). 45 See, for example, Cowhey and McCubbins (1995), Haggard and McCubbins (2001) and Tsebelis (2002, 18). Specifically, by formal institutions I mean, following Carey (2000, 735), “parchment institutions ... formal rules of political contestation that are written down somewhere as laws, regulations, constitutions, treaties, and so forth.” 171 When confronted with the need to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, president Lagos opened the policymaking process because that was the obvious thing to do, and even though the National Constitution granted him the right to pursue whatever policy he might have deemed fit. The debate that took place happened, plain and simple, out of commonsense; to Lagos, to his foreign policy advisors, to the diplomats working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the practitioners at the Ministry of Finance, and so on. In Chile, what is habitual is to have foreign policy as an output of a broad consultation process. And this fact of Chilean politics is what renders changes in the country’s foreign policy toward the United States more difficult that in Brazil and Argentina—where what is habitual is to have presidents and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or presidents alone, implement whatever foreign policy they may see fit. In principle, changes in Chile’s foreign policy toward the United States are considerably more difficult than in Argentina and Brazil if only because agreeing on a new policy among many—as Chile’s habit of foreign policymaking establishes—is more difficult than among a few. Explaining Foreign Policy Stability in South America 173 The reason why countries with similar formal institutions for foreign policymaking have varying degrees of foreign policy stability is because they have different habits of foreign policymaking. Before an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, practitioners’ policymaking behavior automatically follows from habitual and self-evident understandings of doing and being, rather than from careful and strategic considerations about who and how should call the shots given what is prescribed in parchment. In some countries changes in foreign policy are easier than in others because, despite their similar institutions, in actual practice their foreign policymaking processes are very different. In some cases decision-makers embrace certain habits in which presidents have sole discretion in making policy, whereas in others other actors weigh in. By policy stability I mean the potential of foreign policy change in any given setting. The absence of such potential is called policy stability. Policy stability is the relative difficulty or easiness any given country has to implement dramatic changes in foreign policy, not change per se. Because the latter—and its direction—is also a function of the specific choices and preferences of policymakers—about which we know very little—even if change is possible, it may still not occur. An emphasis on foreign policy stability unearths the necessary but not sufficient conditions to make dramatic changes in an existing policy. 1 Available explanations of patterns of fluctuation and stability in foreign policy establish that “foreign policy change should be less frequent in highly bureaucratic states with democratic regimes than in less bureaucratic states with autocratic regimes.” 2 That is, agreeing on a new policy among several institutions is harder than doing so among a few. Democratic policymaking is expected to be characterized, on the one hand, by checks and balances on executive power 1 This definition of policy stability—and its theoretical implications—follows Tsebelis’ (1995), (2000) and (2002). 2 Welch (2005, 217). 174 within the national government and, on the other, by the substantive influence of civil-society actors in policymaking and deliberations. 3 It is such plurality of actors participating in foreign policymaking what renders changes in foreign policy relatively more difficult in democracies than in autocratic regimes. In the latter, at least in theory, a fewer number of policymaking actors are needed to make policy. Rational choice institutionalism, arguably the most visible research strand in both American and British political science, proposes that political institutions like regime types, number of political parties, or decision-making rules, translate into some “veto players” constellation—i.e. a constellation of actors whose agreement is required for a policy decision— that determines the likelihood of change of a political system’s policies. 4 Policy is the result of strategic interactions among rational actors as structured by formal political institutions or the humanly designed constraints that shape human interaction. 5 Indeed, available theories of foreign policy change in IR suggest that, when making policy, the behavior of policymakers is determined by rule-like constraints as established by formal institutions. In making their decisions and maximizing their utilities regarding who and how should decide what is finally implemented, actors are portrayed—or assumed to be—taking into consideration the rules of the game as stipulated in parchment within which they have to engage with other actors; the preferences of other actors; and, the cost and benefits of any given decision they may make on the matter. This means that, when having to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, we should find policymakers carefully considering whether to include or consult this or that other (government 3 Diamond (1999, 11-12), Kahler (1997). 4 See, for example, Cowhey and McCubbins (1995), Haggard and McCubbins (2001) and Tsebelis (2002, 18). 5 North (1990:3). Specifically, by formal institutions I mean, following Carey (2000, 735), “parchment institutions ... formal rules of political contestation that are written down somewhere as laws, regulations, constitutions, treaties, and so forth.” 175 or non-governmental) actor in the decision-making process, what the costs and benefits of including or excluding them would be, and what consequences such choices would have for the policy to be implemented (and the policymakers’ own political careers). Within given formal “rules of the game,” people are portrayed as acting “on their preferences so that they do what they think is best with regard to their own welfare.” 6 After carefully considering all available options, people do what they believe is in their best interest. For instance, when the opportunity to negotiate a future free trade agreement with another country opens up, we should find democratically elected presidents considering whether Congress—and domestic stakeholders—would ultimately approve such policy. Likewise, when having to decide whether to join a multilateral coalition to wage war against a third country, top policymakers should consider whether Congress would ultimately approve the deployment of national troops abroad. According to this “strategic perspective” of policymaking, “what each person chooses to do is influenced by her or his expectations about how others will respond and how those responses will influence the individual’s welfare at the end of the process.” 7 Domestic parchment institutions tell us much about the decision-making rules policymakers should follow. And, if correct, under this strategic approach to policymaking, behavior should reflect similar decision-making practices across countries with similar rules of policymaking. After all, assuming that policymakers would prefer having their own policy preferences turned into actual policy while being able to hold to their relative power position is tenable. 6 Bueno de Mesquita (2006, 308), Elster (1989). 7 Bueno de Mesquita (2006, 173). 176 This strategic perspective on decision-making and behavior has been applied by a myriad of studies aimed at explaining just about every facet of international relations—from explanations of war and peace to explanations of cooperation and collective action problems. 8 However, as the cases of democratic Argentina’s, Brazil’s, and Chile’s foreign policies toward the United States show, in countries with strikingly similar formal rules of the game for making foreign policy—and similar electoral rules for electing presidents, the actors formally in charge of conducting their country’s foreign affairs—their foreign policymakers behave in fundamentally different ways when making dramatic foreign policy decisions. And, in none of these countries, the foreign policymaking behavior of their practitioners is deemed unreasonable or irrational. Indeed, when making critical decisions the policymaking behavior of practitioners is guided by those practices that are so common that nobody really questions but follows rather automatically. These ways of making policy repeat across administrations and embody how foreign policy toward the United States is typically made in each particular polity. They are foreign policymaking practices forged by force of habit. On top of being crucial parts of explanations on why and how a given democracy ends up participating in war, or championing to later on block the negotiation of hemispheric-wide integration projects, such habits of decision-making are associated to presidential democracies’ varying degrees of foreign policy stability. Whereas in Argentina it has been relatively easy to inflict sudden and dramatic changes in foreign policy toward the United States, the same has been virtually impossible to do in Chile. In Brazil, changes in foreign policy have been more difficult than in Argentina, but certainly easier than in Chile. 8 Kydd (2008). 177 In actual practice, foreign policymaking operates at a considerable distance from what is prescribed in parchment. And, importantly, foreign policymaking behavior does not appear to be an output of strategic thinking on the matter. Rather, when needing to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, regarding who and how will call the shots, policymakers seem to follow taken- for-granted and habitual ways of making policy. The cases of Argentina’s, Brazil’s, and Chile’s foreign policymaking toward the United States—and the instances of dramatic foreign policy decisions discussed within each of them—show that such differences are far from trivial. What “rules of the game,” and how, do policymakers follow when making dramatic foreign policy decisions? The typical way in which Argentina’s foreign policy toward the United States is made involves presidents’ preferences and not that of other actors. In general, Argentina’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs are implementers of presidents’ decisions which, for the most part, are made with no other institutional actors influencing the decision-making process. In Brazil, what is typical is to have presidents, her foreign policy advisers—whom more often than not belong to the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty—and Itamaraty, deciding what is finally implemented. This has been the case—as much as in Argentina— regarding both security and trade related issues. Chile’s typical way of making foreign policy toward the United States is fundamentally different to Argentina’s and Brazil’s. In Chile, dramatic foreign policy decisions involve presidents, their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance—although to varying degrees 178 depending on the issue—and all government and non-governmental actors with stakes on the issue in question. Importantly, these habits of foreign policy decision-making take place every time there is an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States. They pertain to high-politics issues such as decisions to go to war, to reach a nuclear deal with countries deemed a threat to the international community, to engage in free trade negotiations, or to pay in full the national debt to the International Monetary Fund. It is the opportunity or need to make a critical foreign policy decision regarding the United States what automatically triggers the different practices of policymaking. And this happens without policymakers—or the public in general—debating much, if at all, about how such decisions need or ought to be made. That is, they are decision-making routines that take place according to the expectations that Argentines, Brazilians, and Chileans in general have, albeit tacitly, about how policymaking should be handled by their own governments in such circumstances. Within each country, each foreign policymaking practice takes place repetitively across administrations, and irrespective of the issue at stake and domestic and international context. For the most part, they are foreign policymaking practices that are unquestioned and not criticized, while alternatives ways of making policy under similar circumstances remain largely un- imaginable, unthought and virtually un-heard of. Within each country, each foreign policy decision-making practice follows from self-evident and rather commonsensical ways of making foreign policy. In Argentina it goes without saying that presidents would generally do as they see fit when making policy toward the United States. In Brazil, it would never occur to anybody that a dramatic foreign policy decision would not consider the input of Itamaraty. And, in Chile, as 179 foreign policymakers themselves acknowledge, a person that would make a critical foreign policy decision without opening the issue up for consultation with other actors and stakeholders “does not exist.” Albeit carried out and enacted by individuals, these are social facts of Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean politics that are shaped by force of habit—they take place repetitively across administrations, automatically, and reflect how dramatic foreign policy decisions toward the United States are typically made in each country. Indeed, in none of the decision-making instances analyzed, policymakers appear as having strategically considered which actors should be part of policymaking, let alone considering alternative ways of making that same decision. Rather, the latter is better understood as a function of self-evident and commonsensical ways of getting things done in the foreign policy domain. It is these socially-shared habits of decision-making—rather than practitioners’ strategic considerations about policymaking—that automatically establish who and how gets to make foreign policy when an opportunity to make a dramatic decision opens up. Whereas in some cases decision-makers embrace certain habits in which presidents have sole discretion in making policy, in others other actors weigh in. These different habits of decision-making, in turn, render relatively easy in Argentina to have presidents make policy as they see fit, and changes in the country’s foreign policy more likely than in neighboring Chile and Brazil, as evidenced in the decisions to join the U.S.-led multilateral mission against Iraq in 1990/91, and in the decision to block U.S. efforts at re-launching negotiations to implement a Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2005, for example. Relative to the cases of Argentina and Brazil, the potential for sudden changes in policy is considerably less in Chile because what is habitual there is to have a constellation of actors 180 influencing foreign policymaking. Given an opportunity to make a dramatic decision toward the United States, any alteration of the status quo would require the agreement among all actors with stakes on the matter. This is what, in principle, rendered Chile’s support to the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 2003 practically impossible—the few, albeit powerful, governmental actors favoring the U.S. position could not overcome the opinion of all the other government and civil society actors opposing war. The necessary conditions—i.e. a relative easiness for Chilean presidents to implement policy as they see fit—for Chile to support the 2003 U.S.-led war against Iraq—and thus, to dramatically depart from its traditional respect for multilateralism and international law—were not present. In Brazil, foreign policy toward the United States is more unstable than in Chile but goes through less dramatic changes than Argentina’s, because in Brazil what goes without saying is that presidents and Itamaraty would ultimately decide what is finally implemented. As much as president Carlos Menem of Argentina, at the very beginning of the 1990s Brazilian president Fernando Collor de Mello also sought to make the most out of the new post-Cold War order. But had president Collor decided to support the U.S.-led multilateral war against Iraq in 1990/1—as president Menem did—such would have been a considerably more difficult decision to make and implement given the traditional role Itamaraty—at the time opposing Brazil’s participation in the war—has had in the making of Brazil’s foreign policy. It was not—as it was the case for president Menem—up to president Collor alone to decide what policy Brazil should follow. The latter is a policymaking option that is virtually unimaginable in Brazil, regardless of who occupies the presidency and issue at stake. Likewise, a majority of Brazilians, business leaders, and policymakers opposed a free trade agreement with the United States. Still as Ambassador Celso Amorim—the Brazilian 181 diplomat who was Minister of Foreign Affairs during two different administrations and spent the most time in that position in the history of Brazil—puts it: “had the government decided to move forward [with the FTAA with the United States], we would have done it.” In Brazil, it goes without saying that it is Planalto and Itamaraty who make foreign policy; and nobody appears to be at odds with such rather natural order of things. Such different foreign policymaking practices make sense in all three countries. It is perfectly rational for Argentine policymakers to have presidents make policy toward the United States because, as a former Minister of Foreign Affairs put it, “that is what presidents are for, no?!” Indeed, Argentina’s foreign policymaking practice toward the United States is embedded in a broader practical scheme of democratic governance that, for its functioning, relies more on the skills of particularly charismatic leaders than on formal institutional mechanisms. Otherwise, on top of recovering alternative ways of making foreign policy—that this study has not been able to find regarding dramatic instances of foreign policy decision-making—we should observe systematic contestation of such foreign policymaking practice. The latter is, for the most part, virtually non-existent and un-heard of, however. Rather, Argentine public commentators speculate that, if the current government of president Cristina Kirchner looses the presidential elections in 2015, Argentina’s foreign policy will, once again, change dramatically; a speculation which’s procedural plausibility nobody finds any reason to question. 9 In Brazil, Itamaraty has traditionally occupied a major role in the making of the country’s foreign policy even prior to the advent of democracy in 1985. 10 It does not occur to anybody to think of a Brazilian president making a dramatic foreign policy decision without the input of the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if only because such an option would be out of touch with 9 See, for instance, “Por qué los presidenciables del pais apuestan a Estados Unidos,” La Nación, April 4, 2014. 10 See, for example, Lafer (2002). For an account on how ingrained in Brazilian culture Itamaraty’s diplomats have become, see Silva (2002). 182 Brazil’s political reality. As former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Lafer, puts it: “It is not only the Constitution that says it, but it is a reality that the president and Itamaraty decide policy” toward the United States. 11 The problem with such assertion is that the National Constitution of Brazil does not mandate Brazilian presidents to consult Itamaraty when conducting the country’s foreign relations. 12 Still, through past experiences and practices, Itamaraty’s role has become so ingrained in Brazil’s political imaginary that it is a habit of mind of Brazilians to automatically think of Itamaraty when referring to the country’s foreign policy. Indeed, when the country’s foreign policymaking process is brought into question, observers demand more—not less—of Itamaraty’s involvement in it. It is such tacit intersubjective expectation on who and how should be making Brazil’s most important foreign policy decisions that gives actual meaning to, and from where it automatically follows, the foreign policy behavior of Brazil’s policymakers. For Brazilian presidents, in other words, it is rational to share the decision-making process with Itamaraty—even though they are not required by formal law to do so—because that is how foreign policy has traditionally been made. It is such traditional way of doing things—determined by ingrained habituation, as Max Weber would put it—that gives meaning and renders reasonable such Brazilian way of making foreign policy. 13 What is rational foreign policymaking behavior in Chile is fundamentally different to what is rational in both Argentina and Brazil. Indeed, Chile’s rather plural foreign policy decision-making process is embedded within a common understanding that no single actor has 11 Interview with Ambassador Celso, Lafer, São Paulo, May 10, 2013. 12 Indeed, Brazil’s National Constitution does not mention Itamaraty even once, and the only instance in which it mentions the “Ministro das Relações Exteriores” is as part of the National Defense Council that it is up to presidents to consult on matters related to the defense of sovereignty and the democratic state order. Constituçao da Republica Federativa do Brasil (1988). 13 On traditional behavior as “determined by ingrained habituation,” see Weber (1968, 25). 183 the power to decide and implement policy as she deems necessary. The latter option is practically un-heard of in Chilean politics. It is not just mere coincidence that “power-sharing,” “widespread consultation,” and a “regularized pattern of democracia de los acuerdos” are salient features of Chile’s contemporary political experience. 14 Having all stakeholders participate of dramatic foreign policy decisions only makes sense against such well established and socially shared plural take on democratic governance. In other words, in all three countries, policymakers’ habitual preferences for doing what they do when making foreign policy are adapted responses to the social environments within which they are embedded, not random behavior. Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Chile’s foreign policymaking processes make sense because they take place against self-evident, socially shared and agreed upon—albeit tacitly—understandings of who and how should be doing what when their countries have an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision. In general, the fact that Argentine presidents are in charge of relations with the United States does not surprise anybody in Argentina. Likewise, Brazilians are not surprised at all that Itamaraty plays such a salient role in their country’s decisions toward the “Colossus of the North.” And, in Chile, that all actors with stakes on the matter would participate of a critical foreign policy decision-making process takes no one in Chile by surprise either. Argentines’, Brazilians’ and Chileans’ compliance with their different foreign policymaking practices appear as strangely lacking in substantive justification. That is how foreign policy is, and is not made, in each country; out of habit. There is, in short, an Argentine, vs. a Brazilian, vs. a Chilean way of making foreign policy toward the United States. Each country has its own common practice of foreign policymaking. These, within each context, are so common that nobody really questions them but, 14 On these, see Siavelis (2006). 184 instead, follows rather automatically because they are perceived as the self-evident ways for getting things done in a given policy domain. It is these different habits of decision-making that foreign policymakers follow when having to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, not what is prescribed on parchment. And it is these different habits what render changes in foreign policy in Argentina more likely than in Brazil and, certainly, than in Chile. Habits of decision-making help explain variation in foreign policy stability outcomes across countries with similar formal rules of the game for foreign policymaking. Habits, Foreign Policy Stability in South America and Beyond The potential of foreign policy change in any given polity is not necessarily a function of formal political institutions but of the habits of decision-making that, in actual practice, guide foreign policymaking behavior. It is simply not true that varying degrees of foreign policy stability will be a function of the number of institutional veto players in any given policy arena. Otherwise, within such approach we should be able to accurately describe and explain policymaking behavior and outcomes across countries with similar formal institutions. This is not what rational choice institutionalism allows us to do, however. Accounting for policy variation across different types of regime is important, to be sure; as much as it is to have different formal political institutions help explain different behaviors and policy outcomes. Still, the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile show that formal institutions matter but not in the ways often assumed by mainstream theories in the Social Sciences. As the number of democratic polities by and large currently surpasses that of other types of regimes, the question of policy variation across countries with similar formal institutional 185 arrangements should be a topic of increasingly relevance to scholars. Understanding how, in actual practice, democracies work is far from trivial; as such practices undergird dramatic policy decisions pertaining to war, peace and international cooperation. The study of habits of decision- making offers one alternative way to how to go about studying such variation in an empirically grounded and testable way. Habits of Foreign Policymaking as the Socio-Cognitive Foundations of Foreign Policy Stability 187 The recent “practice turn” in IR theory stresses that much of what policymakers do as actors in the social world is not conscious or deliberate, but rather unconscious and habitual. However, it can be very difficult to empirically distinguish willful, conscious behavior from that which is habitual and automatic. The previous chapters show the effects of habits in the foreign policies of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, by comparing how, in actual practice, their foreign policymaking processes toward the United States take place. In turn, it is on these countries’ different habits of foreign policymaking upon which their varying degrees of foreign policy stability toward the “Colossus of the North” ultimately rest. Habits foreground a logic of social action that is ontologically different to both instrumental and value rationality; a distinction that makes a difference on how we think of the possibilities of altering patterns of enduring policymaking practices and their subsequent impact on policy. The degree of generalization obtainable with my habit-based explanation of foreign policy stability is open to question. But the shortcomings of available theories of foreign policy change in explaining variation in patterns of foreign policy stability across countries with similar formal institutions it is not. This work shows that detailed historical inquiries and particular analyses of specific polities and policies are likely to be irreplaceable as a basis for further developing theoretical and methodological approaches that could be used to illuminate that and other policy processes and issues. Habits as the Core of What People do Repetitively and Un-reflexively IR practice theorists conceive practices as those actions that people do repetitively, without much resort to conscious considerations and in conformity with self-evident ways of doing things. 188 Practices are those socially meaningful patterns of action that follow rather un-reflexively from deep structures of taken-for-granted knowledge, unthinking routines or dispositions that make appear what is being done as commonsensical and habitual. 1 Theorizing habits as the core of what people do repetitively and un-reflexively is both plausible and necessary. It is plausible if conceiving habits as psychological constructs—and not just as strictly iterated behavior—encompassing elements of repetition, automaticity and identity. Out of habit, people do what they do because such is the taken-for-granted way of doing things. Habitual ways of doing things reflect how things are typically done in a given circumstance, as they are supported by socially-shared and recognizable ways of being and doing. In fact, habitual ways of doing things are so ingrained in people’s cognitive structures that practical alternatives to them are often unconceivable. Locating habits at the core of enduring and recurrent practices is also necessary for two reasons. First, it is necessary as a means of empirically grounding the nascent “practice” research program in IR theory on a set of microfoundations that actually prove that much of what people recurrently do under the same circumstances is automatic and habitual rather than the product of conscious considerations of thought and action. Recent experimental research in Social Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience backs such claim. And, it also shows that people or groups of people with different habits of thought and action will react differently even to the same data. That is, there is no more escaping the conclusion that important parts of judgment and decision-making are done by intuitive and automatic processes such as those constitutive of habits, and that everybody does not think and feel the same way even when they are put to what appears to the observer as objectively similar situations. 1 This definition is in line with Pouliot (2008) and Adler and Pouliot (2011). 189 If these statements are true, and there is every empirical reason to believe that they are, then whether a given behavioral pattern is the product of carefully crafted instrumental or value considerations, instead of ingrained habituation, is an empirical question not to be assumed away as a matter of theoretical fiat—as the IR field has become used to do by explaining, by and large, international affairs only resorting to the logics of consequentialism or appropriateness. 2 Second, theorizing habits as psychological constructs is also necessary to help empirically differentiate between habitual and conscious behavior and, thus, to help craft explanations of outcomes that remain unaccounted for by avaliable theories in IR. Also drawing on the recent work of social psychologists, the Habit Index of Foreign Policymaking (HIFoPo) offers just that: a reliable and replicable measure to help distinguish between willful, conscious behavior from that which is habitual and automatic. Indeed, the preliminary test conducted among a representative sample of senior foreign policymakers of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, shows that these three countries follow fundamentally different habits for doing the same thing— i.e. for making foreign policy toward the United States—and that conceiving alternative ways to making foreign policy is a process that demands considerable conscious efforts on the part of those same policymakers. When having to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States, what is natural in Brazil is to have presidents and the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty, decide what is finally implemented. This is different to what is natural in the case of Argentina where, by and large, it goes without saying that presidents make foreign policy as they see fit. This is also different to what is common practice in Chile, where all stakeholders on the matter 2 The logic of consequentialism in particular has made such headway in explaining virtually every facet of international affairs that whole introductory IR text books are devoted to it and the underlying theory of rational choice by which actors are portrayed as using the best means to achieve given ends. On rationality see Elster (1989), on the rational and strategic “Principles of International Politics” see Bueno de Mesquita (2014) and on the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness see March and Olsen (1998). 190 tend to influence and partake of the country’s foreign policymaking process. Within each country, foreign policymakers feel indentified with such ways of making foreign policy and alternative ways of making decisions are virtually never invoked. Such habitual ways of decision-making are practices that, in general and if in office, other Argentines, Brazilians and Chileans would also follow. That is, far from triggering random behavior, habits offer ready-made responses that are in conformity with the social environment within which they are embedded. For the most part, nobody in Argentina questions or finds odd that, in the country’s dealings with the United States, the preferences of presidents—and not that of any other formal institutional actors—rule. This is so because such foreign policymaking practice is part of a democratic regime that, for its functioning, has tended to rely more on the skills of specific leaders and personalities than on formal institutional mechanisms. 3 In Brazil, it makes perfect sense that presidents would systematically rely on Itamaraty in making dramatic foreign policy decisions because such is how the country’s foreign affairs have traditionally been dealt with. And, in Chile, it makes perfect sense that in making foreign policy decisions pertaining to Chile-U.S. relations all domestic stakeholders would partake of decision-making because it is a practice that is part and parcel of a broader scheme of “power-sharing” and “widespread consultation” processes that, during the last quarter century, has come to characterize Chilean politics in general and not just the making of foreign policy in particular. Thus, habits advance a form of ecologically rational behavior that is characterized by its adaptation to the situation and to the social environment within which it is embedded. Habits are the product of the structures and tendencies of the world that people inhabit, experience and, in 3 O’Donnell (1994). 191 and through practice, people’s actions help reproduce. As such, people are, more often than not, often well served by their habitual ways of doing things. Emphasizing the ecologically rational character of habitual behavior is important because it helps explain why being rational has different meanings in different contexts. The latter cannot be explained by rational choice theory if only because it is a model of decision-making and action that takes preferences as given. All of the above is empirically substantiated in the qualitative reconstruction of Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Chile’s practices of foreign policymaking toward the United States offered in previous chapters. In recovering habitual ways of being and doing, the emphasis is not only on what it is recurrently said and done but also, if not primarily, on what is never said, never invoked or never done when foreign policymakers have to decide who and how should call the shots when in need to make a dramatic foreign policy decision. Habits embody, in short, patterned processes of thought and action that, although stored in cognitive structures of knowledge in the brain, are tacit and socially shared understandings that allows groups of individuals to interpret what is being done along similar standards. 4 The habits of decision-making hereby highlighted are only triggered when an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision toward the United States opens up. Other less-critical foreign policy issues may follow different practices of foreign policymaking. Habits are thus socio-cognitive phenomena because, mediating between the social world of stimuli and the response of the individual, there is a collection of internalized representations of the world that incline and predispose people to behave in particular ways—and not others— under particular circumstances. Under the logic of habit one should not say that a particular 4 On international practices as being patterned processes of competent actions that follow from taken-for-granted knowledge of how to go about doing certain things under certain circumstances (as much as habits do, I argue), see Adler and Pouliot (2011, 6-7). 192 circumstance or historical event determined a behavior but that it had this determining effect because a habit capable of being affected by that particular circumstance conferred that power on it. 5 Thus, habits are material and ideational as well as agential and structural phenomena. They are material because the enactment of a certain habit of mind or habitual action depends on a certain stimulus or need to act found in the environment. Habits are also ideational because the actual content of the habit of mind or overt behavior in question will be a function of the dispositions and structures of knowledge that, acquired through past practices and experiences, constitute habits in the first place. Habits are enacted only given certain context cues and are a basis for predicting that, in all conceivable circumstances of a particular type, a particular set of actors with similar dispositions will behave in a particular way. Habits are agential because they are carried and enacted by individuals. But they are also structural or social phenomena because, as subjective but not strictly individual dispositions that are common and meaningful to all members of the same group, they incline the bulk of people in that group to do the same things under the same circumstances. This is not to claim that all individuals in a given polity, having been exposed to the same past practices, experiences and history will have the exact same habits. Rather, that each member of the same community is more likely than any other member of any other community to have been confronted with the experiences and historical circumstances most frequent for the members of that community and, thus, develop their own particular inclinations for doing the same things. I consider habits as foundational to varying patterns of foreign policy stability across countries with similar formal political institutions because of two reasons. First, because in making dramatic foreign policy decisions as they are habitually made, policymakers abide by 5 I follow Bourdieu (2000, 149) in this formulation. 193 those practices that nobody really questions but follow rather automatically. Such automatic processes, as psychologist Paul Bloom has recently put it, are not an alternative to conscious processes but their foundation. 6 Most of the time, the deep-seated beliefs or structures of knowledge constitutive of habits legislate on the conditions of possibility of human action. Within habitual ways of being and doing everything is possible; beyond them, novel experiences are more difficult to make sense of and abide by. Second, habits of decision-making are foundational to patterns of foreign policy stability because whether changes in foreign policy would be most likely—independently of the direction of the proposed change—is ultimately a function of the number of actors that in practice, recurrently and routinely, are needed to call the shots. Mainstream theories of policy stability are essentially correct—foreign policy changes are more likely where the number of actors required to alter the status quo is lower than where it is higher, if only because agreeing on a new policy is harder among many than among a few. Where such theories get it wrong, however, is in arguing that the actors necessary to change an existing policy are those prescribed in parchment. An emphasis on who and how, in actual practice, systematically makes dramatic foreign policy decisions offers a different picture: where habits of foreign policymaking establish presidents as the only foreign policy decision-maker, the potential for foreign policy change will be higher than where habits of foreign policymaking establish two or more actors as those necessary to alter the status quo. Indeed, the previous chapters show that decisions to go to war and engage with or block hemispheric-wide trade integration projects, for example, have been greatly facilitated or hampered by how policymakers habitually make dramatic foreign policy decisions, not by policymakers carefully following the formal prescriptions on how to make foreign policy as they are described in parchment. The difference is far from trivial. 6 Bloom (2014, 66). 194 For example, a focus on habits of decision-making may help explain why sustained cooperation with several countries in the hemisphere has eluded U.S. policy in the Americas. The negotiation of a hemispheric-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is a case in point. In the early 1990s Argentina broke a historical pattern of diplomatic de-encounters with the United States to spearhead together with Washington the implementation of the FTAA, among other foreign policy goals. By 2003, however, Argentina had not only turned its back to the hemispheric project but also actively worked toward blocking any possibility of continuing negotiating. Even though in the 1990s Brazil embraced FTAA negotiations particularly because it was too big and too important of a project not to participate in it—rather than out of economic self-interest given the potential economic benefits of the regime—at the turn of the twentieth century Brazil had also given up—together with Argentina and Venezuela in particular— negotiating the FTAA any further. Despite much public agitation around the issue, such dramatic changes in policy—i.e. from not, to seeking an agreement with the United States, and back—took place relatively easy and amid presidential initiatives—and, in the case of Brazil, with the active participation of Itamaraty—that were virtually un-altered by the preferences and opinions of other domestic stakeholders. Such countries’ habits of decision-making stress that the potential for those type of changes in international policy preferences is quite considerable in the case of Argentina and less so in that of Brazil, as the number of actors whose agreement is necessary to altering policy is not that significant in either of those countries decision-making processes. The United States should have either aimed from the onset for a less ambitious hemispheric arrangement—perhaps 195 leaving out Brazil, Argentina and the Mercado Común del Sur altogether—or seek to implement the FTAA while those South American governments in favor of it were still in office. 7 In an era when cooperative solutions to common international problems are increasingly needed, the topic of foreign policy stability is of great relevance. Indeed, patterns of policy change and stability have consequences for international bargaining and cooperation, as they influence the credibility of commitments, the risks of defection, and the range of policies that could replace the status quo. A focus on habits of foreign policy decision-making helps unearth the necessary—albeit not sufficient—conditions under which countries may have more or less stable and credible foreign policies than others. It does so by allowing comparisons within the same type of regime—thus illuminating foreign policy decision-making process and outcomes otherwise obscured by available theories of foreign policy change—and by foregrounding a logic of action that, despite growing attention in the neighboring fields of Sociology, Social Psychology, Institutional Economics and Cognitive Neuroscience, thus far has largely been un- accounted for in the study of international affairs. Habits, Norms, and Conventions: How are they Different and What Difference does it Make? Different to rational models of decision-making—guided by the desired outcome of an action— habits, norms, and conventions are shaped and triggered by the situations we are in. Habitual behavior follows from specific context cues or opportunities to act, normative behavior follows socially shared expectations of appropriate behavior in a given context or community, and 7 On how the United States lost the “historic moment” to negotiate and implement the FTAA due to the shift in opinions in Latin American countries regarding hemispheric trade arrangements, see Feinberg (2011, 7). 196 conventions primarily operate under uncertainty, under situations of complete lack of knowledge of the future. Habits and norms, however, are fundamentally different from each other. 8 As Geoffrey M. Hodgson has aptly put it, whereas norms have the form “in circumstance X, you should do Y,” habits have the form “in circumstance X, action Y follows.” 9 The difference is important because, in the context of the present study, it helps explain why some enduring foreign policymaking practices are so robust even though they may be so damaging to the international reputation of some countries—Argentina’s pattern of foreign policy instability, for example, has not helped U.S. policymakers make their mind on whether the Southern Cone country is a trustworthy ally or not. 10 Indeed, the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile show that, in practice, foreign policymaking takes place at a considerable distance from what it is prescribed in parchment. Particularly in those cases in which such practices lead to systematic changes in policy, one could speculate policymakers would find incentives to begin making policy through other means. But this is easier said than done. The foreign policymaking practices at stake are so ingrained in people’s ways of doing and being that such practices are largely unconscious manifestations of competent foreign policymaking behavior in each country. When facing an opportunity to make a dramatic foreign policy decision, policymakers tend not to think much about who and how should call the shots, they just go ahead and make policy according to how policy has traditionally been made. 8 In this section I only focus on the more contentious difference between habits and norms. For a first approach to the differences among formal institutions, norms and habits, see Scott (2008, 51). 9 Hodgson (1997, 664). 10 See, for instance, “El republicano McCain dijo que la Argentina se comporta de un ‘modo antidemocrático’,” La Nación, March 3, 2014, and Morales Solá (2014). 197 If norms rather than habits were driving such behaviors, we should find more contestation and debates over foreign policymaking process and, most importantly, more change of foreign policymaking practices—particularly where the practices at stake have proven so dysfunctional to the international reputation of countries. This is not, however, what it is found in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. In these cases, foreign policymaking practices follow rather un- reflexively from each country’s habitual and traditional ways of making foreign policy, irrespective of the issue at stake, of the party affiliation or substantive policy preferences of the administration in office, and of domestic and international contexts. Such habits are, in other words, systems of well established social rules akin to institutions, broadly defined. The difference with formal institutions is that habits are tacitly agreed upon rules for how to go about, in this case, making foreign policy. Such second-nature character of habits explains why the foreign policymaking practices in question are so robust, persistent and enduring. Also, it should be noted that when situational norms are “well established” and habits are strong, there is virtually no difference in the automatic logic of action following from the structures of knowledge or dispositions constitutive of both habits and norms. In both cases, social psychologists recognize, situations “automatically prime behavior according to an ‘if-then’ rule.” 11 This rule is a fundamentally different logic of action to that advanced by most IR constructivists—who argue that an agent’s compliance has the form “in circumstance X, you should do Y.” 12 In other words, when the structures of knowledge constitutive of habits and norms are considered explanans, as I consider them here, they are both capable of eliciting automatic and unconscious behavior. As such, it is a logic of social action fundamentally 11 Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003, 23). 12 For a discussion of this formulation in the context of IR see Hopf (2002, 12) and Pouliot (2010, 21). 198 different to that advanced by both value and instrumental rationality accounts. In this sense, whether “habitual actions are themselves rooted in an already internalized normative order” 13 is an empirical question that falls outside the analytical task at stake. On the other hand, if the structures of knowledge or systems of dispositions constitutive of habits and norms are considered explanandum, whether habitual action is “norms all the way down” is another empirical question hinging on whether internalization and socialization take place through either conscious or unconscious learning processes, or both. Indeed, experiments show that learning takes place through both conscious and unconscious processes. This means that habits tap into a logic of social action fundamentally different to both “externalist” and “internalist” interpretations of the logic of appropriateness in IR, as the primary focus of study of “internalist” interpretations of norms are socialization processes or norms as explanandum. 14 Thus, the relationship between habitual and normative behavior appears to be more complex than thus far recognized by IR theorists. Still, it is a difference worth emphasizing because the prospects of altering processes of enduring practices will depend on whether behavior is following from habitual and taken-for-granted ways of doing things—in which case altering practices would first require agents to become conscious of them—or reflexively complying with normative expectations of appropriate behavior in a given context—in which case, through arguing, for example, actors could come to understand that some practices are not as appropriate as they ought to be. 15 13 This and the following critique that habits and norms may present “a distinction without a difference” are, respectively, Nick Onuf’s and Peter Katzenstein’s, and they are both presented in Hopf (2002, 11 fn. 44). 14 See, most notably, Wendt (1999) and Checkel (2005). 15 As Adler (2005) notes, Thomas Risse (2000) logic of arguing can be understood as operating within the logic of appropriateness (or consequentialism); that is, actors convincing other actors about doing things differently based on value (or instrumental) considerations. 199 The study of habits can also offer a way of studying conventions. Conventions have been recently defined as “shared templates and understandings, “often tacit but also conscious, that organize and coordinate actions in predictable ways,” and which serve as “agreed-upon, if flexible, guides for economic interpretation and interaction.”” 16 Conventions simplify situations by imposing schemas on the world—as much as habits do—thereby helping as a behavioral guide particularly under conditions of true uncertainty—i.e. when agents have no idea of what the future would bring and, thus, cannot even develop subjective probabilities about future prospects. In such situations, provided they exist in the real word, it is reasonable to follow what other agents are doing or to rely on conventions. 17 “The habit of doing what we have done in the past remains efficacious, despite our uncertainty.” 18 A situation of uncertainty provides the context in which certain habits, patterns of enduring practices, and conventional ways of being and doing may prevail as drivers of behavior, as the way in which Chile’s decision not to support the 2003 U.S.-led war against Iraq at the UNSC shows. In sum, habitual behavior is ontologically different from that posed by norms and value- rationality accounts. The difference in automatic vs. conscious processes of thought and action is important because on it depends what would it take to effectively alter patterns of enduring practices and their consequent impact on policy. Habits may also offer an alternative way of studying conventional ways of doing and being. 16 Nelson and Katzenstein (forthcoming). 17 Keynes (1973, 114, 124). 18 Hodgson (1997, 672). 200 Habits and Generalization The cognitive sciences have made significant strides in recent decades. Particularly regarding discoveries on how the unconscious mind and automatic mental processes rule people’s everyday behaviors. The study of habits of foreign policymaking offers one way of capturing the effects of such automatic ways of being and doing in the study of international relations; in particular, when patterns of enduring practices are at stake. To be sure, none of this is meant to suggest that rational and conscious processes of thought and action are wrong; rather, that psychological approaches to the study of international relations may be right and, most importantly, not only useful in explaining deviations from rationality. There are both rational and unconscious foundations to our everyday lives. The degree of generalization obtainable with my explanation of foreign policy stability is open to question. Unlike mainstream theories in IR based on rational and strategic models of decision-making and action, no single and formal theoretical framework may be possible. However, given the ubiquitous of habits and the greater number of decisions and action contexts they cover, the present work does present a set of concepts and a theoretical approach—and empirical microfoundations undergirding such approach—that are likely to apply to a set of broader and richer sets of contexts, behavioral and policy issues; in particular, where patterns of enduring practices are at play. 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Abstract (if available)
Abstract
This dissertation investigates the effects of habits of decision‐making—i.e. the systematic behavior policymakers automatically engage in when making foreign policy—on foreign policy outcomes. At the turn of the twenty‐first century the “practice turn” in international relations theory stresses that much of what we do as actors in the social world is not conscious or deliberate, but rather unconscious and habitual. However, it can be very difficult to empirically distinguish willful, conscious behavior from that which is habitual and automatic. I show the effects of habits in the foreign policies of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, by comparing their foreign policymaking processes toward the United States. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have strikingly similar formal institutions of foreign policy decision‐making. Yet despite this similarity, the processes are very different. In some cases decision‐makers embrace certain habits in which Presidents have sole discretion in making policy, whereas in others other actors weigh in. That is, when an opportunity to make a critical foreign policy decision opens up, the behavior of policymakers tends to follow automatically from habitual practices of decision‐making, rather than from parchment institutions that, in theory, ought to determine who should decide what and how. This reveals how important habits can be to how countries behave in international affairs and explains why we see more foreign policy instability in some places than others.
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University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Bertucci, Mariano E.
(author)
Core Title
Habits and policy: the socio-cognitive foundations of foreign policy stability
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Program
Politics and International Relations
Publication Date
07/23/2014
Defense Date
05/10/2014
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
(digital)
Tag
argentina,Brazil,Chile,Foreign policy,Habits,North America,OAI-PMH Harvest,policy stability
Format
application/pdf
(imt)
Language
English
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Electronically uploaded by the author
(provenance)
Advisor
James, Patrick (
committee chair
), Rathbun, Brian (
committee chair
), Munck, Gerardo L. (
committee member
), Weller, Nicholas (
committee member
), Wood, Wendy (
committee member
)
Creator Email
marianobertucci@gmail.com,mbertucc@usc.edu
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-446797
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UC11286645
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etd-BertucciMa-2728.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-446797 (legacy record id)
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etd-BertucciMa-2728.pdf
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446797
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Dissertation
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Bertucci, Mariano E.
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texts
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University of Southern California
(contributing entity),
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
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The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...
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Tags
policy stability