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Changing political attitudes and behavior in a diverse America: incorporating individual and contextual determinants

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Changing political attitudes and behavior in a diverse America: incorporating individual and contextual determinants

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CHANGING POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR IN A
DIVERSE AMERICA: INCORPORATING INDIVIDUAL AND
CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS

by

Justin Andrew Berry

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

August 2014

Copyright 2014 Justin Andrew Berry
i

Dedication

To John and Jane Berry, my parents, who fueled my curiosity from a young age,
supported me in tough times, and have always been there to celebrate my
accomplishments.
To Jauna Berry, my sister, who I have always been able to turn to in times of need.
To Andrea and Mike Harrington, the McCann Family, and the Leahy Family, for being
my family away from home.
To all of the students, parents, and teachers I worked with in Los Angeles that continue to
inspire my research.
I feel very fortunate to be surrounded by such incredible people. I love you all.

ii

Acknowledgements

In one of my first graduate school seminars, my professor remarked that no one
gets out of graduate school alone. While I did not initially grasp the gravity of the remark,
I now understand the wisdom in his words. The completion of a doctoral program is a
long and challenging task—at times a sprint and other times a marathon—and were it not
for the support of my family, friends, peers, and professors I surely would not have been
successful. The completion of a doctoral degree is not an individual accomplishment and
thus I wish to share my success with all of those who made it possible.
First, I would like to thank the three exceptional members of my committee—
Jane Junn, Jeb Banes, and Pierrette Hodagneu-Sotelo—for their support of this
dissertation. In particular, I want to thank Professor Jane Junn for being an exemplary
advisor and friend to me throughout my time at the University of Southern California.
She helped my sharpen the many tools required of an academic, while making sure that I
did not lose sight of the central questions that inspired me to pursue a doctorate in
political science in the first place. She has helped me overcome the many hurdles of
graduate school and the job market and I owe much of my success to her. In addition, I
want to thank Drs. Jeb Barnes, Nick Weller, Christian Grose, Gerardo Munck, Ricardo
Ramirez and Ann Crigler. I am very fortunate to have had exceptional professors who
helped me increase my knowledge of the discipline and build a research agenda. I would
also like to thank Cathy Ballard, Veridiana Chavarin, Aurora Ramirez, Jody Battles, and
Linda Cole. In addition to helping me secure funding and navigate the university
bureaucracy, you were always quick to greet me and showed genuine interest in my well-
iii

being. Finally, I am appreciative of the generous funding I received from the Zilpha R.
and Joan A. Main Fellowship and the School of International Relations, which made the
completion of this dissertation possible.
To my fellow members of the Political Science and International Relations Ph.D.
Program at the University of Southern California—both past and present—I wish to pass
along my sincerest thanks. For many, graduate school is a lonely and isolated experience;
fortunately this was not my experience. In addition to being intelligent, ambitious, and
hard-working, you are collaborative, generous, and kind. In particular, I wish to thank
Fabian Borges, David Bridge, Juvenal Cortes, Andrea Ruma Harrington, Michael
Hartney, Parker Hevron, Chin-Hao Huang, Simon Radford, and Nicolas de Zamaroczy
for helping me complete this dissertation and secure a job for next fall. I would also like
to thank Mariano Bertucci, Youssef Chouhoud, Eric Hamilton, Matt Gratias, Josh
Jacobson, Tom Jamieson, Rebecca Kimitch, Peter Knaack, Michel Martinez, Jillian
Medeiros, Jesse Mills, Mark Paradis, Scott Wilbur, and Philip Wilcox. I’m fortunate to
leave USC with not only a degree but also with a special group of friends.
Most importantly, I want to thank my family. My parents, Jane and John, my
sister, Jauna, and my life-long friend, Matthew Garrett, have always been there to
celebrate my successes and assist me through difficult times. You instilled in me an
intellectual curiosity, a work ethic, and a compassion for others that has served as a solid
foundation throughout my life. I am particularly fortunate to have family that extends
well beyond Vermont. To Mike and Andrea Harrington; the McCann Family and the
Leahy Family, thank you for being my extended family. I love you all very much.
iv

Table of Contents
Dedication ........................................................................................................................................ i
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ ii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vi
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... vii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ viii
Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................................................ 1
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1
2. The Role of Race in Public Opinion ..................................................................................... 4
3. Individual-level Determinants of Racial Attitudes ............................................................. 6
4. Group-based Approach ....................................................................................................... 14
4.1 Survey Data and a Group-based Approach ..................................................................... 22
5. Incorporating Contextual Factors ...................................................................................... 24
5.1 Race, Immigration, and Context ...................................................................................... 27
6. The Role of Policy ................................................................................................................ 38
6.1 Making the Case for Immigration Policy ......................................................................... 40
6.2 The Particular Aim and Target of Policy ......................................................................... 41
6.3 Potential for Mobilization ................................................................................................ 47
6.4 Scope and Duration of Effects ......................................................................................... 50
7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 52
Chapter 2 ...................................................................................................................................... 55
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 55
2. Patterns of Linked Fate: Whites, Blacks, Asian Americans, & Latinos ......................... 60
3. Explaining Differences by Race in Linked Fate ................................................................ 66
4. Estimating Antecedents to Pan-ethnic Group Consciousness .......................................... 73
5. Differences in Perceptions of Pan-ethnic Linked Fate by Ethnicity ................................ 84
6. Conclusion: Assimilation and Racialization ...................................................................... 91
Chapter 3 ...................................................................................................................................... 97
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 97
2. Review of the Literature .................................................................................................... 100
2.1 Theories of Public Opinion that Stress Individual-level Determinants ......................... 100
v

2.2 Theories that Stress the Role of Groups in Attitude Formation ..................................... 103
2.3 Incorporating both Individual and Group-level Determinants of Public Opinion ........ 104
3. Theoretical Expectations ................................................................................................... 105
4. Data and Methods .............................................................................................................. 111
5. Modeling Approach and Findings .................................................................................... 117
5.1 Employing a Dummy-variable Approach to Public Opinion on Immigration Policy .... 117
5.2 An Alternative Approach to Measuring Public Opinion for a Diverse Population ....... 123
6. Discussion and Conclusions .............................................................................................. 129
References ................................................................................................................................... 136

vi

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Question Wording of Linked Fate across the Surveys .............................. 62
Table 2.2: Linked Fate by Covariates for Each Pan-ethnic Group ........................... 70
Table 2.3: Question Wording of Independent Variables across the Surveys ............ 74
Table 2.4: Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate by Pan-ethnicity77
Table 2.5: Stylized Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate by Pan-
ethnicity ............................................................................................................................ 78
Table 2.6: Predicted Probabilities of Perceived Linked Fate ..................................... 79
Table 2.7: Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate by Ethnic
Subgroup .......................................................................................................................... 88
Table 2.8: Stylized Table of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate
by Ethnic Subgroup ........................................................................................................ 89
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables ........................................... 114
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates in the Model ................................... 116
Table 3.3: Ordered Logistic Regression Model Estimates of Attitudes toward a Path
to Citizenship ................................................................................................................. 118
Table 3.4: Ordered Logistic Regression Model Estimates of Attitudes toward the
Reduction of the Visa Backlog ..................................................................................... 119
Table 3.5: Predicted Probabilities of Attitudes toward a Path to Citizenship ........ 120
Table 3.6: Predicted Probabilities of Attitudes toward a Reduction in the Visa
Backlog ........................................................................................................................... 122

vii

List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Percent of Pan-ethnic Group Who Express Linked Fate……………… 64
Figure 2.2: Strength of Linked Fate by Pan-ethnicity………………..……………... 67

viii

Abstract
A combination of forces—America’s increasing international presence,
globalization, and the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 which
significantly altered the barriers and pathways to citizenship—has resulted in a dramatic
change in the composition of the American populace. While the American polity in the
early twentieth century was primarily White and native born, today’s society is
increasingly multi-ethnic with a larger percentage coming from families who have
recently immigrated. Ongoing immigration from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean
means that these trends are likely to continue. However, it is not enough to recognize that
the American public is undergoing radical demographic shifts—my research agenda is
motivated by questions regarding the political attitudes of these new populations and the
associated roles of group membership, policy and context.
My dissertation develops a theoretical explanation for variation in political
attitudes across race, ethnicity and immigration status. The dissertation has three
principal components. In the first chapter, I critically analyze the current state of the
literature on public opinion. I argue that while the population has dramatically changed,
the theories and methodological approaches employed to understand public opinion have
not. I argue to strengthen theories of public opinion we must: 1) account for group-level
effects, 2) incorporate factors related to a groups’ reception and experiences in America,
and 3) integrate the role that policy plays in structuring attitudes and behavior. In the
second chapter, I compare perceptions of pan-ethnic linked fate across the four largest
pan-ethnic groups in the United States. My findings suggest that variation in levels of
linked fate across members of distinct pan-ethnic groups may best be explained by
ix

factors pertaining to their groups’ immigration, experiences with discrimination, and
position in the American racial hierarchy. In the third chapter, I utilize newly collected
data to demonstrate that individual attitudes toward immigration policy vary considerably
across race, ethnicity, and policy design. Furthermore, I find that the standard
determinants of political attitudes—i.e. education, income, and partisanship—do not
operate uniformly across groups.

1

Chapter 1
Public Opinion amidst a Tide of Change:
Developing Theory for an Increasingly Multi-Ethnic America

1. Introduction
For scholars, elite actors, and democratic citizens alike, the study of public
opinion is of fundamental importance. In a system of direct democracy, it is expressed
public opinion that determines policy. In representative democracy, public opinion is no
less important, since public opinion is a mechanism through which preferences may be
aggregated, and representatives are authorized or sanctioned (Dahl 1972; Mansbridge
2003, Miller and Stokes 1963, Pitkin 1972). Being that the United States is a hybrid
democracy—it consists of elements of direct and representative democracy—public
opinion serves multiple functions. Furthermore, one can measure the health of democracy
by determining the degree to which public opinion is represented in policymaking.
Democracy in a diverse nation like the United States requires not only policy-making to
generally reflect public opinion, but also that no group or groups are systematically
excluded from representation.
While the importance of public opinion has remained constant, the demographic
composition of “the public” has changed dramatically over the past half century. The
catalyst of this change may be traced back to the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965
(also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act). Spurred on by the Civil Rights
Movement and the discrediting of the “science” of eugenics following the United States
victory in World War II, the Hart-Cellar Act dismantled the national origins quotas that
were previously solidified in the National Origins Act of 1924. In its place the legislation
2

established a point-system based on occupation, family reunification, and increased
diversity. While the passage of the legislation was not intended to have dramatic
consequences, and was largely intended to benefit the families of White European
immigrants who lobbied for its passage, it led to a dramatic shift in the demographic
composition of the incoming immigrant population, and ultimately the United States
population (Daniels 2004; Foner 1999). The majority of immigrants are now arriving
from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean. The foreign born now represent more than
13% of the population, and today more than a third of Americans consider themselves to
be something other than White. This diversity stands in stark contrast to the Black-White
binary (10% African American, 90% White) and high native-born population of America
in the first half of the 20
th
century.
Unfortunately, our approach to the study of public opinion has failed to keep pace
with our rapidly changing population. The principal theoretical and methodological
approaches we continue to use were, for the most part, developed to explain the attitudes
of native-born Whites and were based on samples of White respondents. Similarly, the
leading political theory that explains the political integration of immigrants, straight-line
assimilation, refers to White ethnic immigrants from Europe who arrived during a time
when the vast majority of the population was native born. More recently a broad body of
scholarship has documented systematic differences in the political attitudes of Whites and
African Americans and has developed theories to explain these differences. The recent
wave of immigrants poses significant challenges to these prior theories in two principal
ways. First, the majority of newcomers may not be wholly classified as White or African
American, and their collective experience in the United States differs from these two
3

groups in profound ways. Second, prior theories reflected a Black and White binary,
while today's society is multi-racial and groups compete with one another for position in
the racial hierarchy (C.J. Kim 1999; 2003; Masuoka and Junn 2013). I am not suggesting
that previous theories depicted inaccurate images of the populations and contexts they
sought to explain, but rather that these theories may not be generalizable across time and
across groups. Our “new public” necessitates new theories and approaches to understand
public opinion.
Scholars who share my skepticism have sought to further investigate the
assimilation of recent immigrants and their descendants in an attempt to better predict
their future political trajectory. To what extent are recent immigrants from Latin
America, Asia, and the Caribbean assimilating into American society? Are recent
immigrants maintaining their previous ethnic or national origin identities or are they
adopting new ones? What factors best explain the identity they prioritize and to what
extent does it impact political attitudes and behaviors? How do their political attitudes
and participation differ from native-born Americans?
The majority of studies concerning the political attitudes of Latinos, Asian
Americans, and Afro Caribbeans have tended to focus on a single group. Most empirical
studies of these groups compare and contrast the attitudes of a particular group to those of
Whites, and less frequently to African Americans. Often times these comparisons are
made explicitly by constructing models that insert dummy variables to control for group-
level differences. By employing a dummy-variable approach, scholars attempt to identify
areas in which racial and ethnic groups hold significantly different attitudes. Other times
the comparison is made implicitly. Models that reflect prior theories developed to explain
4

Whites or African Americans are used to test the extent to which these theories apply to a
sample of Latinos, Asian Americans, or Afro Caribbeans. This second approach requires
scholars to make comparisons by contrasting the results from different studies. While
both of these approaches advance our understanding of how public attitudes vary across
groups, they do not help us understand why. Furthermore, minority groups are most often
compared to Whites as opposed to comparing minority groups to one another.
I argue to better understand the contours and antecedents to public opinion we
need to 1) account for group-level effects; 2) incorporate contextual factors related to
groups’ reception and historical experience in America; and 3) integrate the impact that
policy plays in structuring political attitudes. We can strengthen our theories of public
opinion by accounting for both agency and structure and by recognizing the impact that
group membership has on individual attitudes and behaviors. By studying groups in
relation to one another we can identify why public opinion often varies by group.

2. The Role of Race in Public Opinion
Gunnar Myrdal (1944), in his pivotal work An American Dilemma, exposes the
wide disparity of resources between White Americans and African Americans that have
resulted from pervasive discrimination in the United States. The widespread inequality
that African Americans face runs counter to America's core belief of egalitarianism. Yet,
Myrdal was optimistic that racist ideology was on the decline and ultimately the conflict
between ideology and reality would be resolved. However, dreams of a post-racial
America have not materialized and race remains the central cleavage in American politics
(Dawson 1994; 2012; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Tessler
5

and Sears 2010). Since the early work of Myrdal, scholars have sought to identify those
factors or processes that lead to the development of racial attitudes, as well as the effects
of racial attitudes on different aspects of politics.
The vast literature on racial attitudes have highlighted individual-level, group-
level, and contextual explanations. Racial attitudes are those political attitudes that
scholars believe are impacted by perceptions of race. Individuals or groups hold attitudes
toward other racial groups, and these attitudes may indirectly determine their attitudes
toward other political objects such as parties, policies, candidates, or government more
generally. Collectively, scholars have found evidence that members of different races
often hold systematically different political attitudes–such as partisan attachment,
ideology, political trust, the proper role of government, candidate selection, and public
policy preferences–leading many to suspect that these attitudes are also shaped by race.
The bulk of the literature on public opinion provides micro-level explanations
such as prejudice, distinct values and beliefs, or individual traits. A more recent trend in
public opinion research points to the central role of groups in formulating, dispersing, and
maintaining racial attitudes. Finally, a third body of work operates at the macro-level and
identifies various contextual components and institutional arrangements that structure
political attitudes and account for systematic differences across the population. In this
chapter, I will review the state of the discipline on racial attitudes by highlighting micro-,
meso- and macro-level effects on public attitudes. In each area I will point out how
current theory and methodology are limited in their ability to explain the political
attitudes of an increasingly diverse and multi-ethnic population. Finally, I will argue that
dramatic changes in our population require increased emphasis on group-level effects,
6

contextual factors pertaining to immigration, and the attitudinal effects of immigration
policy.

3. Individual-level Determinants of Racial Attitudes
The emergence of the behavioral revolution in political science saw increasing
emphasis placed on the individual as the principal unit of analysis (A. Campbell et al.
1960; Fiorina 1981; Gay 2001; McCloskey and Zaller 1984; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry
1996; Popkin 1991; Riker and Ordershook 1969; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Zaller 1992). Aided by the advent of nationally
representative surveys, increased computing power, and improved statistical techniques,
scholars argued that the best way to understand political attitudes and behavior was to ask
the individuals themselves. One of the forerunning works in this area, The American
Voter, adapted a psychological approach to the question of political attitudes and
behavior. Campbell and his coauthors argue that party-identification—which is
conceptualized as a stable and enduring psychological attachment to one of the two
political parties—is the central factor that explains individual level political behavior and
attitudes (A. Campbell et al. 1960). The second dominant individual-level approach—
what I will refer to as the “economic” approach—uses theories rooted in economics (as
opposed to psychology) to explain political attitudes and behavior. From an economic
perspective, individuals are rational actors who act instrumentally to pursue their self-
interests and maximize their individual utility (Downs 1957; Simon 1983). Thus, attitude
formation may best be explained by determining the relevant self-interests of an
individual.
7

Following the behavioral turn in political science, multiple explanations for racial
attitudes have focused on individual-level factors including: material interests, prejudice,
values and beliefs, and genetic traits or psychological predispositions. The self-interest
theory takes an economic approach (Citrin and Green 1990; Kluegel and Smith 1982;
Olzak 1992) arguing that favorable attitudes toward a member of another culture or race
are largely dependent upon the level of perceived threat that this culture/race has on
valuable material resources. In this “pocketbook logic,” the greater the perceived threat,
the more vulnerable the individual will feel, resulting in the development of more hostile
attitudes toward the out-group. Furthermore, one’s attitude toward another group will
also direct one's attitudes toward public policies that are deemed to be beneficial to the
out-group, and thus detrimental to one's self-interest. While empirical work has, for the
most part, failed to provide evidence that self-interest is a principal predictor of political
attitudes (Citrin and Green 1990; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Funk 1990; Sears,
Hensler and Speer 1979), there is some evidence that self-interest can have a strong
impact as long as the perceived benefits and costs of a policy are large, tangible, and
probable (Chong, Citrin, and Conley 2001; Erickson and Stoker 2011; Sears and Citrin
1985). Although there is limited empirical evidence that individual attitudes are
principally driven by self-interest, there is stronger evidence that individuals often
formulate attitudes on the basis of societal (or “socio-tropic”) concerns (Kinder and
Kiewiet 1981).
Other micro-level theories of public opinion take a psychological approach and
argue that prejudice, as opposed to self-interest, is the principal driving force between
racial attitudes. Prior to the Civil Rights Movement and the passage of civil rights
8

legislation, public opinion scholars illustrated the role of what is now referred to as "old –
fashioned racism.” At this time broad segments of Whites in both the North and South
held prejudicial attitudes toward African Americans. Prejudice toward African Americans
was rooted in pseudo-scientific notions that African Americans were biologically inferior
to Whites (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Foner 1999; Schuman et al. 1997).
However, the events of the Civil Rights Movement, followed by sweeping
changes in legislation, ushered in a dramatic shift in racial attitudes. Public opinion polls
during this time show that White Americans reported more favorable attitudes toward
African Americans, as well as the need for government to intervene on behalf of African
Americans to halt racial discrimination and to ensure the civil rights of all Americans.
While scholars disagree as to whether this shift in attitudes should be attributed to the
actions of political elites (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Zaller 1992) or the action of
movement participants (Chong 1998; Lee 2002), there is general consensus that the Civil
Rights Movement landed a decisive blow to the expression of old-fashioned racism.
However, equally evident is the fact that racial attitudes persisted and Whites and African
Americans continued to hold systematically different attitudes toward race-targeted
policies (Dawson 1994; 2012; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Swain 1993; Tate 2003).
Scholars of public opinion have offered competing explanations for the enduring racial
divide in public opinion.
Some of the more compelling explanations for the persistence of racial attitudes
are typically referred to collectively as “new racism.” The Civil Rights Movement did
not eradicate prejudice in America, but rather altered its rational basis (Kinder and
Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981) or at the very least its expression (Jackman 1994;
9

Jackman and Muha 1984; Mendelberg 2001). New racism differed from its predecessor
in that Whites had become less willing to justify their prejudice on the basis of innate
inferiority, and rather ground racial attitudes on basic American values—principally
individualism. Symbolic racism—one of the principal off-shoots of new racism—is seen
as “a blend of anti-Black affect and kindly traditional American moral values embodied
in the Protestant Ethic” (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416). In the decades following the Civil
Rights Movement many White Americans began to feel that while discrimination was
once a fundamental concern in America, it has largely been resolved. Consequently, it is
believed that the continued lower economic status of African Americans is not
attributable to ongoing discrimination, but rather a lack of work ethic on the part of
African Americans themselves.
By shifting attention from the inequality of treatment in America to the individual
failures of African Americans to capitalize on the freedoms afforded to them, White
Americans are able to justify their beliefs as non-prejudicial or race-neutral, while also
grounding their racial attitudes in central components of the American Creed. Since
inequality is the result of individual failures, as opposed to structural barriers, White
Americans no longer support government intervention aimed to provide African
Americans an equal footing in American society. Race-targeted programs such as busing
(Sears and Kinder 71; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979), welfare (Gilens 2009), and
affirmative action (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996) invoke
racial resentment on the part of Whites who deem these programs to be excessive,
counter to American values, and unfair because they provide advantages to African
Americans (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Kinder 1971). The subtle nature of
10

prejudice makes it far more difficult to detect in public opinion polls because most White
Americans are no longer willing to express overt or explicit racism, instead justifying
their racial attitudes in a non-racial manner (Jackman and Muha 1984; Mendelberg
2001). A broad body of empirical work has provided evidence that symbolic racism—as
well as its more recent cousin racial resentment—are robust determinants of racial
attitudes, even after controlling for self-interest, ideology, partisanship, old-fashioned
racism, and attitudes toward the proper size of government (Bobo 2000; Kinder and
Sanders 1996; Sears and Henry 2005). Furthermore, scholars have demonstrated that
symbolic racism plays a pivotal role in candidate evaluation, candidate selection, attitude
toward race-targeted policies, as well as policies that are race-neutral but are perceived to
be preferential toward African Americans (Gilens 1999; Mendelberg 2001).
Other public opinion scholars contend that attitudes toward race-targeted policies
may not be the result of prejudice but rather principled beliefs. Paul Sniderman and his
colleagues posit that White opposition to race-targeted programs, in particular those
classified under affirmative action, can be attributed to non-racial conservative values,
such as an aversion to big government or an affinity to rugged individualism and
procedural fairness (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986;
Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000). While these scholars do not deny the role of
prejudice in the formation of racial attitudes, they contend that its role has been
overstated and only applies to particular forms of policies (Krysan 2000). Conservatives
are more likely to support policies that promote equality of opportunity or equal
treatment as opposed to those that seek equality of outcomes (Lipset and Schneider 1978;
Sniderman and Piazza 1993). In addition, support for the principle of equality and the
11

belief that it is the responsibility of government to intervene to ensure equality are
strongly correlated with more favorable attitudes toward race-targeted programs. African
Americans and Whites who strongly support the principle of equality are more favorable
of progressive racial and social policies (Brewer 2001; 2003; Feldman 1988; Kinder and
Sanders 1996). Finally, both survey work and lab experiments have found that
individuals who prioritize the values of fairness and procedural justice are more
oppositional to race-targeted programs, especially those that promote equality of
outcomes, as opposed to equality of opportunities (Bobo et al. 1998; Sidanius et al.
2000).
Neither the scholars that stress the role of prejudice, nor those that stress the
impact of principled beliefs, denies that both may partially explain racial attitudes.
Instead, it is a question of direction and relative impact (Krysan 2000). The chief
difficulty in weighing the body of evidence for each of these competing explanations is
that it is extremely difficult to discern among the effects of prejudice, ideological beliefs,
and values. It may be that one's ideological beliefs are rooted in prejudice, or
alternatively. they may be independent of one another. Furthermore, individuals
simultaneously hold multiple values that are likely to direct political attitudes (Feldman
1988; McCloskey and Zaller 1984). Policy decisions typically involve competing values,
and thus individuals may prioritize the value that best provides a rational basis for their
underlying prejudice (Brewer 2003). Finally, values and principles tend to be fluid
concepts and thus interpretation is likely to vary by context and individual. For instance,
while most Americans may equally espouse the belief in equality, how they define the
term and the associated outcomes may differ. Individuals who measure equality in terms
12

of outcomes are more likely to support progressive racial policies that seek to address
racial imbalances. On the other hand, individuals who conceive of equality as equal
treatment may oppose overtly discriminatory policies, but may equally oppose
affirmative action policies.
Additional micro-level theories of political attitudes identify the role of
personality, psychological predispositions, emotions, and even genetic characteristics
(see Clawson and Oxley 2013 for a review). Building off the work of Theodore Adorno
and her coauthors’ work (1950) The Authoritarian Personality, recent scholarship has
sought to establish a causal relationship between personality traits and political attitudes.
An individual who is said to have an authoritarian personality is one who seeks strong
leadership and consequently is both submissive to authority and harshly critical of
individuals or groups who challenge it. More recent work on authoritarianism
conceptualizes it as “an individual predisposition concerned with the appropriate balance
between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and
diversity on the other" (Stenner 2005, 14). Karen Stenner argues that authoritarianism
operates in a similar fashion as ideology in that it is a worldview that organizes an
individual's attitudes toward both groups and policies. Individuals with an authoritarian
personality favor policies that promote "sameness" and stifle diversity, as well as hold
unfavorable attitudes to groups who stray from their perceived norm. In a more recent
work, Gerber and his co-authors identify five additional personality traits that they argue
have a significant impact on citizens’ attitudes toward social and economic policy
(Gerber et al. 2010).
13

Social dominance theory suggests a link between an individual's psychological
desire for group domination and expressed racial attitudes (Levin et al. 1998; Sidanius,
Devereux and Pratto 1992; Sidanius and Pratto 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996;
Sidanius et al. 2000). Sidanius and his colleagues argue that racial attitudes are not solely
based on anti-Black sentiments, but instead are dependent upon one's attachment to the
group to which they identify. Thus, an individual’s level of ethnocentrism is a strong
predictor of their attitudes toward racial groups and race-targeted policies. By providing
an alternative to solely White prejudice projected toward African Americans, social
dominance theory may be applicable to multiple groups, including African Americans.
In addition, scholars have argued that emotions play a central role in the
formation and expression of political attitudes and behaviors (Abelson et al. 1982;
Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008, Brader 2005; Gross 2008; Marcus, Neuman, and
MacKuen 2000; Valentino et al. 2008). Akin to the work on prejudice, scholars have
provided evidence that the warmth or coolness individuals feel toward a group—as
measured by thermometer scales—are strong predictors of their attitudes toward
perceived race-targeted policies (Allport 1954; Brader 2005; Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay 2008; Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew et al. 1998; Valentino, Hutchings, and White
2002). The particular form of policy, the context, and the perceived target of the group
may trigger distinct emotions and consequently lead to the formation and expression of
different political attitudes. The conditional nature of this body of work provides a
possible explanation why prejudicial attitudes seem to vary across different policies,
contexts, and the question wording (Hopkins 2010; 2011; Krysan 2000).
14

Most recently, scholarship has sought to identify whether political attitudes have a
genetic root. John Alford and his co-authors examine the similarity of political attitudes
of identical twins in comparison to similarities shared between fraternal twins (Alford,
Funk, and Hibbing 2005). They argue that if genetics play no role in the formation of
political attitudes then the level of similarity between identical twins—who share an
identical genetic makeup—should be no greater than that shared between fraternal twins.
Their research suggests that identical twins, on average, do share more similar political
attitudes. While their work does not discount the role of socialization, it does
convincingly argue that both nature and nurture impact attitude formation.

4. Group-based Approach
Others political scholars advocate for a group-based approach to understanding
politics. In particular, advocates of this approach pay close attention to the formation,
interaction, and relative influence of groups. One of the early examples of the group-
based approach to politics is found in the writing of James Madison. In Federalist Papers
#10, Madison argues that individuals will naturally organize into groups to pursue their
shared interests (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 1961). Madison feared that groups
may become corrosive to a healthy democracy if they were free to pursue their private
interests at the expense of the public good. However, he felt the damaging effects of
“factions” may be mitigated by promoting the formation of multiple groups who would
compete for power and influence. Madison argued that the diversity of the United
States—both in terms of its people and its geography—coupled with a system of
government composed of separate branches with overlapping power, would promote
15

competition among groups (Barnes 2007). Thus, groups would be forced to compete—
analogous to a bar-room brawl—which in turn would lead to bargaining and compromise.
This group-based approach, which later would be labeled pluralism, became the
principal approach to understanding politics in the early 20th Century. The collective
works of Robert Dahl, David Truman, V.O. Key and E.E. Schattschneider paid close
attention to the formation, interaction, and role of groups within the American political
system (Dahl 1956; 1961; 1972; Key 1964; Putnam 2000; Schattschneider 1935; 1964;
Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Truman 1951). Advocates of pluralism argued that groups
are better able to aggregate preferences, to makes these preferences known to elites, and
to ensure that elites govern in a manner that closely reflects their shared interests. The
debate over whether pluralism leads to favorable democratic outcomes centers on the
extent to which groups have relatively equal levels of potential political resources and
equal access to the political arena. Robert Dahl, one of the chief proponents of pluralism,
argued that both access and resources were relatively well-distributed, and thus policy
was likely to reflect the interests of the broader electorate (Dahl 1957; 1961).
Critics of pluralism highlight the myriad structural barriers in society and
conclude that both access and resources are concentrated into the hands of a relative few,
while the many are left out of the political system (C. W. Mills 2000[1956]; Domhoff
1967; Gaventa 1980; Key 1949; Parenti 1967; Schattschneider 1964). Sounding the alarm
in The Semi-Sovereign People, Schattschneider (1964) writes, "the flaw in the pluralist
heaven is the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent" (p. 35). In addition
to facing normative attacks, the group-based approach to political science was also
challenged on empirical grounds. Normative disputes, problems with measurement, the
16

newly identified collective-action problem, and increased access to individual-level
survey data all contributed to the rapid decline in the group-based approach (Baumgartner
and Leech 1998; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991).
An alternative set of theories, typically referred to as group-position models
employ a group-based approach to explain variation in intergroup attitudes and
intergroup conflict (Blaylock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999). This body of work takes a
sociological approach as opposed to an economic or psychological one. It is grounded in
social-identity theory that argues that in-groups collectively formulate, diffuse, and
maintain collective attitudes toward out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Huddy 2001;
2003). Contrary to the theory of pluralism, one's group membership is typically the result
of ascription as opposed to self-identification; group membership is fixed rather than
fluid; and access to power and resources is unequally distributed. While Schattschneider
highlights how class serves as a basis of exclusion, group-position models highlight the
role of race and ethnicity. Boundaries of group membership are often enforced formally
through law and informally through norms and stereotypes. A group’s attitude toward
other groups is largely determined by the hierarchal position they hold in society, and is
thus “a subjective image of where the in-group ought to stand vis-à-vis the out-group”
(Blumer 1958, 4). An individual's attitude toward their own group, relative to the out-
group, impacts their attitudes toward candidates and policies. Race-targeted programs
most often seek to redistribute or increase access to political or material resources and
thus the placement of one's group will drive individual attitudes toward these policies.
One of the principal shortcomings of early group-based approaches—both
pluralism and group-position models—is that both were developed to explain White
17

attitudes and it is unknown as to the extent to which they apply to multiple groups in a
multi-ethnic setting. While pluralism may have been an effective theory to explain the
functioning of a relatively homogenous democracy, it is unclear whether it remains true
in an increasingly heterogeneous society. In addition, the theory of pluralism is dependent
upon the fluidity of group membership and fails to account for the presence of permanent
insular minorities or what Charles Tilly refers to as “durable inequalities” (Tilly 1998).
On the other hand, group position models were developed to explain White racial
attitudes toward African Americans. To what extent can group-position models explain
minority attitudes toward Whites, other minority groups, or racialized policies?
In Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics, Dawson (1994)
develops a theory to explain why individual attitudes of African Americans vary
systematically from those of Whites. He documents how African Americans continue to
hold strikingly similar political views despite the economic and political strides members
of the group have made following the Civil Rights Movement. Dawson argues that an
enduring history of social segregation, political disenfranchisement, and economic
subjugation has developed a strong sense of "linked fate" among African Americans. He
posits that most African Americans believe that their individual life chances are
inextricably linked to those of the group and that the advancement of their self-interests is
inextricably linked to the advancement of group interests. While perceptions of linked
fate is the direct result of African Americans’ awareness of their ascription into a
racialized group and the group’s marginalized status, the group solidarity it engenders
serves as a potentially powerful political resource. Dawson contends that as long as
African Americans perceive race to be a more meaningful predictor of their success in
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American society than class, they will continue to employ "the black-utility heuristic"
and consequently will maintain homogenous attitudes toward partisanship, candidates,
and policies (see also Tate 1993).
A rather extensive literature has provided strong evidence that African Americans
often hold systematically different attitudes toward politics than White Americans, and
thus race must be controlled for in theories of public opinion. The literature has
developed and tested a variety of measures—including identity, group consciousness, and
linked fate—to capture the impacts race has on a host of political attitudes including:
partisan attachment, candidate selection, ideology, the proper means to pursue collective
interests, and racialized policies (Conover 1981; Chong and D. Kim 2006; Dawson 2001;
Gay 2002; 2004; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996; McAdams
1982; Rogers 2006; Shingles 1981; Swain 1993; Tate 1993; 2003). While scholars in this
area quibble over the degree to which “race matters” in politics—suggesting variation
over time, policy, context, and how the impact of race is measured—they agree that race
remains the central cleavage in American politics (Hutchings and Valentino 2004;
McClain et al. 2009). Yet, some theorized that the election of our first African American
president, President Barack Obama, might signal the beginning of a post-racial America.
However, ongoing residential segregation, economic inequality, disproportional
descriptive representation, and racially charged events such as the Trayvon Martin
shooting, the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, and the recent Donald Sterling
spectacle suggest otherwise (Dawson 2012; Tessler and Sears 2010).
The contributions of Dawson and other scholars concerning African Americans
advance our understanding of the complex dynamics of public opinion in America.
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However, theory and methodological practices concerning racial and ethnic politics have
not kept pace with America's rapidly changing population. While America’s population
was once primarily native born and was made up of a large White majority and a smaller
Black minority, today its population is increasingly multi-ethnic and consists of a large
foreign-born population. And while prior shifts in the population was largely the result of
White immigration from Europe, today the majority of immigrants are non-White and
come from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean. America's shifting demographics
requires that scholars of public opinion move beyond the Black and White binary and
develop theories which explain the interactions of diverse groups in a multi-ethnic
society.
Scholars have begun to examine the political attitudes of Latinos (Barreto 2010;
DeSipio 1996; Garcia 2003; García Bedolla 2005; Hero 1998; Jones-Correa 1998;
Sanchez 2006a; 2006b; Segura & Rodrigues 2006), Asian Americans (Lien, Conway & J.
Wong 2004; Ramakrishnan 2005; J. Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee & Junn 2011), and Afro
Caribbeans (Greer 2013; Rogers 2006; Waters 2000). The literature on the political
attitudes of Latinos, Asian Americans, and Afro Caribbeans is quite large and beyond the
scope of this review. Instead, I focus on the traditional approaches scholars have used to
advance our understanding of these groups. Scholars who were interested in aggregated
public opinion—as opposed to group-level differences—sought to control for racial
differences rather than explain them. Theorizing that systematic differences in political
attitudes were likely, scholars began to add dummy variables for racial minorities to their
models of public opinion and political behavior. While this methodological approach
enables us to determine whether attitudes vary systematically across groups, it does not
20

enable us to determine how or why attitudes vary across groups (Lee 2008). Second, this
approach fails to account for the fact that race is likely to structure both the explanatory
and outcome variables (Masuoka and Junn 2013). Thus, multi-racial models that fail to
include interaction terms may yield biased results for minority respondents, and if the
sample of minorities is large enough, for White respondents as well.
The second common approach is to focus on one particular group at a time.
Individual studies will investigate the political attitudes of Latino Americans, Asian
Americans, and Afro Caribbeans. These single-group studies tend to be cross-sectional
and typically measure the political attitudes or behavior of a particular group, as well as
identify the antecedents to these attitudes and behaviors. While these studies model the
attitudes of racial minorities, in most cases these works are making an implicit
comparison to Whites, and less frequently to African Americans. Typically, models
include the standard variables identified in the public opinion literature, prior theories are
tested, and concluding remarks focus on the extent to which Latinos, Asian Americans or
Afro Caribbeans are similar to Whites or African Americans.
In other cases, single-group studies attempt to explain change over time. These
studies tend to focus on the degree to which immigrants groups are assimilating, and how
the process of assimilation impacts attitudes over time. Once again, Whites or African
Americans tend to be the implicit reference group. Armed with theories developed to
explain differences between Whites and Blacks, scholars have applied assimilation and
racialization frameworks to determine whether these recent groups are more likely to
assimilate in a manner similar to previous White ethnics, or whether they will be
racialized and consequently follow a trajectory more analogous to African Americans
21

(Alba and Nee 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005; Rogers 2006;
Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; J. Wong 2006). One of the challenges of the single-group
approach is that comparisons must be made across studies. It is unlikely that samples,
question wording, or variables are consistent across studies, leaving scholars uncertain if
identified differences are legitimate, historically contingent, or the result of measurement
or sample bias (Junn, Mendelberg, and Czja 2012; Lee 2008; McClain et al. 2009).
A number of reviews on political behavior and public opinion question whether
theories and methodologies developed to describe the differences between Whites and
Blacks may be generalized to other racial and ethnic minorities (C.J. Kim and Lee 2001;
Lee 2008; Masuoka and Junn 2013; McClain et al. 2009; Segura and Rodriguez 2006). In
order to appreciate group differences, while at the same time seeking to develop
generalizable theories, recent work has argued for a “comparative relational analytical
approach” (Masuoka and Junn 2013, 32; see also Chong and D. Kim 2006; C.J. Kim
1999; Lee 2008). This approach builds upon the theoretical underpinnings of group-
position models arguing that groups collectively develop and maintain attitudes toward
other groups based upon their perception of where their group ought to stand relative to
other groups. However, a comparative relational approach moves beyond the standard
group-position models in that it seeks to explain how multiple groups position themselves
relative to one another.
For instance, Claire-Jean Kim’s theory of “racial triangulation” explains how
minority groups are racialized and positioned not in isolation, but rather relative to one
another. The existence of a racial hierarchy structures intergroup conflict because the
collective fate of one group is partially dependent upon the ongoing marginalization of
22

another (C.J. Kim 1999; 2003; see also Masuoka and Junn 2013). In this way, the racial
order is self-perpetuating and racial minorities often become complicit in its reproduction
(Foucault 1977). By analyzing groups in relation to one another, we can begin to identify
the elements of society—such as unequal distribution of resources, institutional
arrangements, public policy, immigrant status, stereotypes and discrimination, and
contextual characteristics of one’s neighborhood—that structure the attitudes and
behaviors of groups. Analysis of the diverse experiences and opinions of groups, as well
as individuals within the group, will potentially enable us to understand the conditions
under which race is most likely to pose a significant constraint on individual attitudes and
behaviors (Chong and D. Kim 2006).

4.1 Survey Data and a Group-based Approach
Innovations in the collection of survey data has advanced our understanding of
group-level effects. The National Politics Study (NPS), the Latino National Survey
(LNS), and the National Asian American Study (NAAS) have provided nationally
representative samples of Blacks, Latino Americans, and Asian Americans. These studies
provide large and diverse samples of populations that were previously underrepresented
in survey data. The size and diversity of the samples enables researchers to compare and
contrast respondents of different ethnicities and national origins. In addition, they include
measures that are essential to understanding the political attitudes of these groups, such
as: measures of identity and group consciousness; discrimination; and factors pertaining
to immigration. Both the LNS and the NAAS also take additional steps to increase the
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representative nature of the sample, by conducting the survey in multiple languages and
ensuring the sample includes respondents who do not live in traditional immigrant cities.
However, further advancements in the study of group-level effects necessitate
additional innovations in survey analysis. Multiple scholars of race and ethnic politics
point to the limitations of comparing results that come from different samples, contain
different models, and include different measures of key explanatory and outcome
variables (Chong and D. Kim 2006; Junn, Mendelberg, and Czja 2012; Lee 2008;
McClain et al. 2009). Variables that are central to the study of race and ethnic politics—
such as group identity, perceived and experienced discrimination, and group
consciousness—are often measured differently across surveys, often resulting in
conflicting findings. In the 1950s, when America was still a population divided between
Blacks and Whites, it made sense for our principal surveys (i.e. American National
Election Study [ANES]) to have samples and measures that reflected our population.
Similarly, today it makes sense for our largest surveys to have samples and measures that
reflect the diversity of our population in terms of race, ethnicity, geographic context, and
factors pertaining to immigration. A single survey that includes both a diverse sample and
a wider range of measures that have been found to be correlated with the attitudes of
minority populations would better enable us to develop and test theories that incorporate
the likelihood of group-level effects (Masuoka and Junn 2013).
Furthermore, we need survey data that enables us to examine outcomes over time.
While the NPS, LNS and NAAS enable scholars to develop and test theories that explain
the political attitudes of each respective group—in addition to exploring variation of
attitudes within the group—their cross-sectional design makes them ill-suited to examine
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change over time. Scholarship on social-identity formation has argued that identities are
both socially constructed and historically contingent. The fluid nature of identities
suggests that the degree to which identities structure attitudes will vary across space and
time (Barreto 2007; Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Nobles 2000;
Ramirez 2013; Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). The fluidity of identities and the
volatility of political attitudes are likely to be most apparent in those groups who are
recent newcomers to the United States (Jones-Correa 1998; J. Wong et al. 2011). The
study of the process(es) of assimilation and its impact on the attitudes of Latinos, Asian
Americans and Afro Caribbeans requires an analysis of change over time. While time is a
critical variable in political processes (Pierson 2004), it is often conspicuously absent in
studies of assimilation and identity. We need time-series, and preferably panel data, to
address this shortcoming in the literature.

5. Incorporating Contextual Factors
While the individual-centered approach has an established place in the study of
political attitudes and behavior, another body of literature provides contextual or
sociological explanations of attitude formation and participation. From a contextual
perspective, individual behavior is best understood when analysis considers the social
context in which individuals are situated (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954;
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). Analysis that is based solely on individual-level
determinants may report biased results since it fails to account for the fact that contextual
characteristics often moderate the impact of individual-level determinants. Rather than
utilizing game-theoretic models or large-N survey methodology, early research in this
25

area of political science tended to conduct community-based case studies that shifted the
analytical focus from the individual to the group. In particular, this body of work
illustrates how social-interaction networks—a network of individuals who were likely to
interact on a regular basis at work or in their neighborhood—play a central role in
political socialization. Individuals are socialized within these networks through the
spread of political information, norms, and shared beliefs.
A contextual approach to political science rejects an “atomistic” conception of
individual utility-maximizers and instead posits that humans are social beings and that
politics is inherently a social act. By focusing on the context in which people live, work,
and go to school, this approach highlights key societal elements that structure beliefs and
behaviors. While individuals may, to some degree, choose with whom they interact and
the degree to which they engage in political discourse, the availability of social
interactions is to a certain degree constrained by context (Baybeck and McClurg 2005;
Cho and Rudolph 2008; Huckfeldt 1979; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; 1995; Mutz
2002). Empirical work in this area has demonstrated that the demographic composition of
one’s social-network in terms of socioeconomic status (Berger 1960; Cho 1999;
Huckfeldt 1979; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987), racial and ethnic composition (Cho 1999;
Hero and Tolbert 1996; Hero 2000; Hopkins 2010; 2011; Key 1964; Oliver & J. Wong
2003), and partisanship (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Mutz 2002) often lead to the
formation of distinct political attitudes.
In addition to the neighborhood and workplace, scholars have investigated a
multitude of distinct agents of socialization including: civic associations, churches, the
family, peer-group, schools, and media coverage of critical events. Each one acts as an
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agent of political socialization transmitting shared values, norms, behaviors and beliefs
across generations. Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol and others have demonstrated that
civic associations socialize its members by dispensing civic skills, developing
generalized trust, and developing shared goals and beliefs (Minkoff 1997; Putnam 1995;
2000; Skocpol 1997; 2004; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; J. Wong 2006; see also
D. Campbell 2013 for a review of literature). Both parents and peers are likely to
significantly impact the development of a range of political attitudes of young adults
including partisanship, ideology, policy and candidate preferences, patriotism, and
general trust in government (Abrahamson 1972; A. Campbell et al. 1960; Greenstein
1960; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; see also Clawson
and Oxley 2013). Schools directly and indirectly serve as agents of socialization by
providing students a civic education, opportunities to participate in service-learning, and
a place in which individuals will come into contact with other potential agents of
socialization, namely peers (D. Campbell 2000; 2006; Delli, Carpini, and Keeter 1996;
Niemi and Junn 2005; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Finally, public opinion may be
shaped by discrete political events such as political campaigns (Valentino and Sears
1998), social movements (Chong 1994; Lee 2003), or salient events that occur in an
individual’s younger, more impressionable years (Abrahamson 1976; Jennings and Niemi
1975; Miller 1992). Furthermore, the impact of these events and experiences on political
attitude formation is mediated by how they are portrayed by one’s parents, the media, and
political elites (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Druckman 2010; Sears and Valentino 1997;
Stimson 2004; Valentino and Sears 1998; Zaller 1992).
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The claim that context has a critical role in attitude formation has been
strengthened by empirical work that depicts a spatial component to political attitudes that
cannot be fully explained by individual-level determinants. The work of James Gimpel,
Wendy K. Tam Cho and their co-authors illustrates how geography may impact political
behavior in ways that differ from social-interaction networks, as well as the spatial
dependency of political attitudes and behavior (Cho & Gimpel 2007; 2010; Cho 2003;
Cho & Nicley 2008; Cho & Rudolph 2008; Cho & Baer 2011; Darmofal 2006; 2008;
Gimpel, Cho, and Wu 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski 2006; Gimpel, Dyck, and Shaw
2004). While the approach of the “Columbia School” was to examine variation in
political attitudes over time, this new approach tests for variation over space. In a recent
review of this literature, Wendy K. Tam-Cho & James Gimpel (2012) identify four
factors that have been forwarded to explain the spatial dependence of political behavior
including: patterns of socialization; mobilization efforts (whether candidate, party, or co-
ethnic based); social-interaction networks; media markets; institutional arrangements
(such as electoral rules, state borders, etc.); and a host of other historical or social
explanations.

5.1 Race, Immigration, and Context
The literature on contextual effects provides compelling evidence that contextual
factors play an important role in shaping political attitudes, as well as moderating
individual-level determinants of political attitudes. In order to understand the political
attitudes of an individual or group, we must examine the context in which an individual
or group is situated. I argue that this is particularly true regarding the political attitudes of
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Latinos, Asian Americans and Afro Caribbeans. Since the majority of these groups are
recent arrivals to the United States, they are likely to arrive with a relatively clean
political slate and are unlikely to hold deeply entrenched political attitudes in matters
concerning public policy, candidate preference, or partisanship. Due to their relative
dearth of political knowledge and experience, the reception they receive and their early
experience in America will play a pivotal role in the development of political preferences,
general attitudes toward government, and identity formation. In order to predict the
political attitudes of these groups, we must focus on the characteristics of the place in
which they settle as well as the reception they receive, both formally in terms of official
immigration policy, and informally in terms of the how the general public treats and
perceives these groups.
In order to theorize on how contextual factors are likely to impact the
development of immigrant political attitudes, it is useful to examine prior theories of
assimilation. One of the early writers on assimilation, Robert Park (1930) defines
assimilation as "the process or processes by which people of diverse racial origins and
different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, achieve a cultural solidarity
sufficient at least to sustain a national existence” (p. 281). Traditional theories of
assimilation suggest that assimilation takes a relatively straight-line path and that the
process, while gradual, is automatic (Gans 1973; Gordon 1964; Park 1930). Proponents
of the traditional view on assimilation argue that over the course of multiple generations
groups will acculturate, will experience economic mobility, and will migrate out of ethnic
enclaves to the suburbs. Once there, they come into increased contact with natives and
are more thoroughly incorporated into social, civic, and political institutions. According
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to this theory of assimilation, acculturation and assimilation are parallel processes, and as
newcomers begin to replace ethnic identities with American ones, the socio-economic
gap will diminish. Alba and Nee (2005) defined assimilation "as the decline, and at its
endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social
differences that express it” (p. 863).
While assimilation theory is rooted in sociology—and thus focuses primarily on
social or economic outcomes—assimilation theory has been adapted by political
scientists to explain political outcomes as well. One of the prime examples of this is
Robert Dahl’s classic work, Who Governs?, in which he traces the successful assimilation
of Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants (see also Wolfinger 1975). Initially, these groups
were cast as “less than White” and lived in segregated ethnic enclaves. However, through
a process of economic mobility and social assimilation they were able to shed their ethnic
identities and acquire full membership in the American polity. The “straight-line” led to
full political assimilation, which in turn, resulted in greater heterogeneity in political
attitudes, candidate preferences, and patterns of voting (Dahl 1961). Over the course of a
few generations, descendants of these immigrants groups became politically
indistinguishable from the remainder of the polity.
Robert Dahl and Raymond Wolfinger’s theory of assimilation and political
integration incorporate elements of both agency and structure. Both authors stress that
recent immigrants’ lack of political influence was not merely the result of their “foreign
stock”, but was largely due to their relative lack of material and political resources
(education, political knowledge, efficacy, and skills) that resulted from their recent arrival
to America (Dahl 1961, 33). In this manner, ethnicity serves as a proxy for class.
30

Secondly, Dahl stresses the importance of contextual characteristics. He argues that
segregated ethnic enclaves prohibits assimilation by encouraging immigrants to maintain
ethnic identities, preserve cultural attributes, and engage in ethnic politics. However, both
authors privilege agency over structure. They argue that these structural barriers are
temporary and that those who choose to acculturate, shed their ethnic identities, and leave
the ethnic enclaves were able to assimilate and gain equal footing in the pluralist system
of government. In fact, it is the very ability of these groups to assimilate that provides
justification for Dahl’s contention that America is best characterized as polyarchy, in
which political resources are relatively equally distributed and access is open to all. In so
doing, Dahl and Wolfinger minimize the structural barriers and inequalities that may
prevent assimilation of certain groups, and ultimately limit these groups’ political
representation (Parenti 1967).
Although Dahl provides a compelling account of how earlier White ethnics were
able to assimilate into mainstream America, it remains to be seen whether Asian
Americans, Latinos, and Afro Caribbeans will follow a similar path. Traditional theories
of assimilation, such as straight-line assimilation, note that generations are “the motor of
change.” Since the legal immigration of these groups was largely prohibited prior to the
passage of the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965, few members of these groups have roots in
America that extend more than a generation or two. While only the passage of time will
tell whether these groups will follow a similar straight path to assimilation, significant
differences in group-level characteristics and the context surrounding their immigration
make me highly skeptical. Whereas Dahl’s view of assimilation ultimately privileges
31

agency over structure, it is likely that the relative impact of each varies across groups and
historical periods.
One of the fundamental structural barriers to assimilation that Dahl highlights is
the characteristics of the community in which immigrants initially settle. Dahl argues that
ethnic communities structure the political preferences and identities of immigrants. As
long as immigrants and their descendants remain in ethnic enclaves, the process of
assimilation is stalled. In many respects, the literature I’ve reviewed on contextual effects
appears to support his findings. While work on native-born Americans suggest that
parents are the central source of political socialization, immigrant parents’ lack of
political knowledge and experience will likely limit their influence. Instead, the
settlement community is likely to serve as a central site of political learning. Immigrants
are likely to project their initial experiences in America to more general attitudes towards
American society and government, as well as their relative position in each.
The settlement community plays such a central role because it determines
immigrants’ exposure to a wide variety of sources of political socialization. In essence,
the settlement community acts as a sorting mechanism determining immigrants’ exposure
to social-interaction networks, schools, media sources, political elites, civic associations,
churches, and partisan mobilization. These sources of political socialization have all been
found to significantly impact the political attitudes of groups (Barreto 2010; Dawson
1994; Gay 2004; Greer 2013; Harris-Lacewell 2004; Jones-Correa 1998; Masuoka and
Junn 2013; Ramirez 2013; Rogers 2004; Tate 1993; 2003; Waters 2000; J. Wong 2006).
Furthermore, these various agents of political socialization strongly impact identity
formation that will further structure political attitudes. The cumulative effects of political
32

socialization may explain the spatial dependence of political attitudes and behaviors
identified by political geographers. Spatial segregation leads to the segregation of other
socializing institutions (Burns and Kinder 2012). Group-level differences in political
knowledge, political engagement, partisan attachment, and ideological consistency may
not be the result of apathy or indifference, but rather the result of a collective lack of
experience in the American political system. Whereas pluralists often equate the absence
of political engagement or political participation of certain communities with
contentment, it is more likely to signal heightened alienation and diminished political
efficacy (Gaventa 1980; Parenti 1967). Ironically, the ethnic community may alienate
immigrants to society and government as a whole, while strengthening their level of
attachment and linked fate to members of their group.
The extent to which characteristics of the community structure the attitudes of
immigrants and their descendants will vary across groups and across time. The recent
wave of immigration differs considerably from the earlier waves of immigration in a
number of ways that are likely to alter their path to assimilation and consequently their
political attitudes (Alba and Nee 2005; Barreto 2010; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005;
Jones-Correa 1998; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Portes and Zho 1993; Portes and Rumbaut
2001; Ramakrishnan 2005; Segura and Rodriguez 2006; J. Wong 2006). Earlier waves of
immigration, such as the one Dahl examines, tended to be short in duration and each
wave tended to bring a new group of immigrants. On the other hand, the flow of
immigration has been greater in size and relatively ongoing since the passage of the Hart-
Cellar Act in 1965. These changes—in addition to a change in immigration policy that
privileges family reunification—have led to a process of “chain migration.” The
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interrupted waves of immigration and the relatively small size of the foreign-born
population in the early 20th Century encouraged the rapid assimilation of immigrants and
the decline of ethnic enclaves. However, the constant flow of immigration and the
relatively large size of foreign-born population make assimilation more challenging and
the existence of ethnic enclaves more enduring.
In addition, recent groups of immigrants face additional barriers that increase the
likelihood that multiple generations will remain in ethnic enclaves. For one, the shift
away from a manufacturing-based-economy might mean that the low-skilled/high-paying
jobs that earlier immigrants could rely on for increased social mobility may no longer be
available. Higher paying jobs often require higher levels of education. The fact that lower
quality schools tend to be located in low-income areas provides an additional barrier to
social mobility. These barriers are even greater for those who lack full citizenship.
Undocumented immigrants lack access to high paying jobs, higher education, as well as a
host of social welfare benefits which collectively increase the likelihood of an enduring
cycle of poverty. Furthermore, the negative stigma of “illegality” perpetuated by mass
public opinion, political elites, and the media is likely to pose a strong psychological
barrier to assimilation. Finally, discrimination may prevent immigrants and their families
from moving to more integrated and higher-income communities.
The theory of segmented assimilation describes how this cycle often becomes
self-perpetuating for many recent immigrant populations (Portes and Zho 1993; Portes
and Rumbaut 2001). The myriad of barriers to social mobility means that recent
immigrant groups are far more likely to encounter other marginalized racial minorities
who have not been assimilated despite their extended time in the United States.
34

Immigrant groups who have a limited reserve of resources; face ongoing discrimination;
and find themselves in close contact with other disenfranchised groups; are not likely to
adopt the norms, values and practices of the dominant culture; nor are they likely to
assimilate into societal institutions. Instead, they are more likely to identify themselves
with disenfranchised minorities and develop the political attitudes and identities of that
group. Minorities struggle with the tension of feeling American yet being perceived as
un-American, and whether to identify with those who have excluded them or with those
who have been similarly excluded (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Schildkraut 2011; Theiss-
Morse 2009). This provides additional reasons why we ought to expect groups to vary
systematically in the political attitudes they hold, the identity they develop, and the path
to assimilation they take.
Additional barriers to the assimilation of recent immigrants are stereotypes and
discrimination on the basis of race or phenotype. Since race is a socially-constructed
concept, the degree to which race acts as a barrier to assimilation will vary across time,
place, and groups. The extent to which race structures political attitudes is contingent
upon an individuals’ level of attachment to the group as well as the groups’ relative
position in society (Masuoka and Junn 2013). Those who may be classified as “White”
have a great deal of latitude on the extent to which they identify with the group, and
consequently the degree to which race structures their attitudes. On the other hand,
individuals whose physical or cultural characteristics are distinguishable from those of
Whites—who continue to maintain a dominant position in American society—have less
agency over their choice of identity and thus identity is more likely to structure their
attitudes.
35

While Dahl’s theory of assimilation was designed to explain the incorporation of
White ethnics, his writing still provides evidence that race poses a significant barrier to
the assimilation of certain groups. Dahl (1961) concludes that "neither ethnic nor class
factors are constraints; on the contrary both are variables” (p. 58). Yet, he remains silent
on the impact of race. Whereas immigrants may have some degree of agency over there
“education, speech, dress, demeanor, [and] skills,” they are unable to alter their race. If
one looks closely, one can find evidence of this in Dahl’s pluralist fable (p. 33). Whereas
he finds that White ethnics are able to overcome economic, cultural and political barriers,
he also notes that African Americans have not. However, the assimilation (or lack
thereof) of African Americans receives little attention in his analysis of New Haven, nor
does it weigh heavily on his determination that America is best characterized as a
pluralist system. Dahl claims that race only provides a significant barrier to African
Americans socio-economically and concludes that “Negroes find no greater obstacles to
achieving their goals through political action” (p. 294). Subsequent work definitively
finds that Dahl’s claim is dubious. Socio-economic factors are strongly correlated with a
wide variety of other political resources—including education, political information,
political knowledge, efficacy, participation in civic organization, and partisan
mobilization—and are strong determinants of political attitudes and behavior. Thus, race
can provide a significant barrier to political influence by structuring access to a host of
political resources (Parenti 1967).
Although it is widely agreed among those who study race and ethnicity that race
is the primary characteristic that structures the political attitudes and behavior of African
Americans (Hutchings and Valentino 2004), it remains a source of debate as to whether
36

race will operate in a similar fashion for Latinos, Asian Americans and Afro Caribbeans.
The vast diversity within these groups—including language, national origin, religion,
skin tone/phenotype, available resources, and level of citizenship—poses a challenge to
their very “groupness.” Furthermore, while African Americans share an extended and
ubiquitous history of racial discrimination, members of these pan-ethnic groups often
arrived at different times and lack an extensive shared history (C. J. Kim and Lee 2001;
Lee 2008; Segura and Rodriguez 2006; J. Wong et al. 2011). It must be remembered that
prior to their arrival in the United States members of these pan-ethnic groups would not
have identified themselves as Latino, Asian, or Black, but rather would have identified
along co-ethnic lines (i.e. Mexican vs. Cuban; Chinese vs. Indian; Haitian vs. Jamaican).
Once again the question of race and ethnicity hinges on the debate of agency vs.
structure. To what extent is racial identity, group consciousness, and/or linked fate the
result of self-identification as opposed to ascription (McClain et al. 2009)? I agree with
Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn (2013) who argue “race is not simply a demographic
characteristics, or product of personal preference but a structural attribute imposed on an
individual with important consequences for individual life chances and political
experiences” (p. 5). Racial identity is principally the result of ascription, but the extent to
which it structures group member’s attitudes and behaviors will vary across time, space,
and groups. While traditional assimilation theorists argue that social-mobility was the key
determinant of assimilation, in today’s multi-ethnic society, “mobility between ascriptive
categories” is of greater consequence. (Chong and D. Kim 2006). And social distance—
operationalized as perceived or subjective distance between groups—may present an
37

equal or larger barrier to the assimilation of recent immigrants than spatial distance
(Massey and Denton 1998; Olzak 1992; Shibutani and Kwan 1965).
The reception that recent immigrant groups receive—in terms of immigration
policy, the characteristics of the community in which they settle, and the level of
discrimination they face—will to a large degree determine the future political trajectory
of each group. In The 21st Century: Public Opinion in the Age of Immigration, Deborah
Schildkraut (2011) argues that "experiencing life in the United States both helps and hurts
the process of becoming American”; acculturation strongly supports the development of
an American identity, but experiencing discrimination or exclusion is an equally strong
deterrent (p. 19). While racial and ethnic identity may not directly impact political
attitudes, when racial identity is politicized by experiences of discrimination or
perceptions of exclusion, it is likely to have powerful political consequences.
The recent wave of immigrants from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean
provide an opportunity to explore the varying magnitude of agency and structure on one’s
path of assimilation, and in turn the development of political attitudes and behaviors.
While these recent groups are immigrants like the Irish, Italian and Jews who migrated at
the turn of the 20th century, they are also racialized minorities like African Americans.
The extent to which class, cultural attributes, race/phenotype, and immigration status
present barriers to assimilation will likely vary across groups. Furthermore, variations in
where and when these groups immigrated provide an additional lens to identify potential
barriers and opportunities for assimilation. We can leverage the unique experiences of
groups in order to identify the structural barriers and opportunities that help explain the
varying degree that race structures their political attitudes and behaviors (Chong and D.
38

Kim 2006). This will enable us to move away from single-group theories and toward
conditional theories that highlight how distinct configurations of structural opportunities
& barriers can explain distinct political trajectories.

6. The Role of Policy
Democratic theory is particularly interested in the relationship between the mass
public and democratic governance. Of fundamental importance is the relationship
between mass political preferences and behavior, and the policies enacted by
governments. The majority of research thus far has taken a “supply-side” approach to
policy, in which the political attitudes and participation of the mass public are seen as
“inputs” and public policies as the “outputs” (Mettler and Soss 2004). Recently scholars
have begun to pay increased attention to measuring the impact that government policy
has on the behavior and attitudes of mass publics. Although a great deal is known about
how mass publics influence policy, far less is known about how policies influence mass
publics. The literature on racial attitudes is no different. Scholars have tended to focus on
individual-, group-, or larger societal-determinants of public opinion or policy-making.
What has not been sufficiently explored is how policy itself may be a determinant of
public opinion. The policy feedback literature suggests that the design of immigration
policy is likely to structure the attitudes of those directly impacted by it, as well as the
public opinion of the population as a whole.
The policy feedback literature, in effect, “completes the circuit” by focusing on
the impact that policy has on mass publics, and in turn, how these effects impact future
policy decisions. As Schattschneider (1935) wisely pointed out decades ago, “policies
39

make politics.” Scholars have built upon this prescient insight and have begun to identify
how distinct forms of policy may have unique and predictable participatory (A.L.
Campbell 2003; 2010; Mettler 2002; Pierson 1996; Skocpol 1992; Soss 1999; Wilson
1973) and attitudinal effects (Kumlin 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Pierson 1996;
Schneider & Ingram 1993; Soss 1999). In addition, this body of literature has examined
how the participatory and attitudinal effects of policy design can impact subsequent
policy decisions (A.L. Campbell 2003; 2010; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Pierson 1993;
1996; 2000; Schattschneider 1935; Skocpol 1992; Wilson 1973).
While scholars have examined a range of policies including: Social Security (A.L.
Campbell 2003), AFDC & SSDI (Soss 1999), veteran benefits (Mettler 2002; Skocpol
1992), and tax policy (A.L. Campbell 2010), a policy feedback framework has not been
applied to immigration policy. By applying the policy feedback framework to
immigration policy, we may provide an additional case through which we can identify
how policy design structures the attitudes of recipients of the policy, as well as the public
at large. In addition, while a policy feedback approach incorporates an additional variable
to explain political attitudes and behaviors—namely policy design—it may also
incorporate micro-, meso-, and macro-level determinants previously identified in the
literature. I will first make the argument why immigration policy is an important case to
examine policy feedback effects. I will then outline how insights from the policy
feedback literature concerning the aim and target of policy; the potential for mobilization;
and the expected scope and duration of effects may help us understand systematic
variation in public opinion.

40

6.1 Making the Case for Immigration Policy
Immigration policy is an increasing salient policy that intimately shapes both the
lives and perceptions of a growing proportion of our population. While the United States
has always seen itself as “a land of immigrants," the recent wave of immigration is
unique in a number of ways (Alba and Nee 2005; Masuoka and Junn 2012; Portes and
Zhou 1993; Ramakrishnan 2005; Schildkraut 2011). Whereas immigration in the United
States has typically followed a pattern of ebbs and flows, we have experienced a
relatively large and ongoing flow of immigration since the passage of the Hart-Cellar of
1965. The recent wave of immigration also differs from the past in that the majority of
immigrants are non-White and originate from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Existing theories may not adequately explain the political behavior and incorporation of
these new groups.
Immigration policy is likely to serve as a central site of political learning for
immigrants because it marks their first interaction with government; it profoundly shapes
their initial settlement in America; and has an ongoing impact on the lives of their future
descendants. Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005) contend that immigration policies may be
conceptualized as institutions of citizenship in that they "set rules for national integration
and communal recognition and send signals regarding social views on diversity.
Immigration policy determines who is eligible to join American society, as well as their
level of membership, and thus has both distributive and constitutive importance.
Immigration status determines one’s access to politics, jobs, education, and a wide
variety of social welfare benefits. In addition, immigration policy is constitutive in that it
determines who is—and is not—worthy of membership (Masuoka and Junn 2013).
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Institutions of citizenship profoundly shape the lives of minorities they regulate by
communicating their level of national belonging, as well as the rights, privileges and
duties that come along with it (Buckley 2013; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Weldon 2006).
Thus it is reasonable to believe that the design of immigration policy is likely to generate
particular immigrant identities, attitudes and behaviors.

6.2 The Particular Aim and Target of Policy
The policy feedback literature provides evidence that the particular design of
policy may yield distinct attitudinal effects. For instance, it would be incorrect to argue
that Americans hold favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward social welfare programs.
The attitudes of recipients and those of the larger public vary depending on the particular
design of the social welfare program (A.L. Campbell 2003; Soss 1999). In a recent article
that surveys work in this area, Andrea Louise Campbell (2010) writes, “The designs of
policies—what they do, to whom they are targeted, how generous they are, and how they
are administered—shape attitudes toward fellow citizens and the role of government,
partisan and ideological orientations, and patterns of political behavior” (p. 1).
Yet literature that examines public attitudes toward immigration policy tends to
rely on vague conceptualizations of immigration policy—principally whether or not
levels of immigration ought to be increased, decreased, or remain the same—as opposed
to examining how public opinion varies dependent on the particular design of the policy.
It is unlikely that such measures will adequately capture public opinion toward the wide
range of actual or proposed immigration policy options. For instance, the public may
favor increased immigration, yet only favor the admittance of immigrants with desirable
42

skills or advanced degrees. Or the opposite may be true. The public may favor decreased
levels of immigration; however, these attitudes may pertain solely to “unauthorized”
immigration. Or perhaps public opinion concerning policy related to “illegal”
immigration is dependent upon the target of the policy. The public may believe that
certain “unauthorized” immigrants, who are deemed deserving, ought to be provided a
path to citizenship.
In one of the seminal works on immigration policy, The Politics of Immigration
Control in America, Daniel Tichenor (2002) provides a detailed history of the fluctuation
of immigration policy over the course of American history. While immigration has
always been a central concern, the design of immigration policy has fluctuated greatly
over time. Tichenor convincingly argues that although economic concerns, partisan
politics, and critical events partially explain the dramatic fluctuation of immigration
policy over time, what is equally important is the design of the policy itself. The issue of
immigration is complex and engenders cross-cutting preferences that may not be neatly
organized along ideological or partisan lines. Thus, the design of immigration policy is
vital since it must respond to a variety of interests in order to construct the diverse
coalition needed to pass comprehensive immigration reform. In order to better understand
the potential opportunities and barriers to immigration reform, we need to measure public
opinion toward a range of potential policy designs.
One of the components of policy design that has been found to significantly
impact the attitudes of recipients concerns the distribution of resources (A.L. Campbell
2003; 2008; D. Campbell 2008; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Mettler 2002; Nie, Junn and
Stehlik-Barry 1996; Soss 1999). The distribution of resources provides individuals with
43

both the incentive and increased capacity to participate politically (Pierson 1993; 1996).
On the other hand, the larger public tends to hold far less favorable attitudes toward
redistributive and targeted policies (A.L. Campbell 2003; 2010). These findings are
consistent with the literature on racial attitudes that documents systematic differences in
White and Black attitudes toward distributive policies. While African Americans tend to
strongly support redistributive policies, these policies spark racial resentment and a
higher level of opposition among Whites (Gilens 1999; 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996).
Like other forms of policy, immigration policies vary considerably in the level
and form of resources it allocates to its recipients. Masuoka and Junn (2013) argue that
immigration policy not only dictates who may enter American society, but also
determines one's level of membership. Immigration policy produces “winners’ and
“losers” who receive varying levels of rights and material benefits. Thus, distinct forms
of immigration policy vary greatly in the resources they distribute, whether it is political
rights, access to jobs, legal protection, and/or access to a vast array of social programs
including: worker protection, social security, education, health care, and driver licensing,
among others. For instance, the Bracero program enabled Mexican laborers to find work
in the United States; however, it did not provide citizenship nor was their welcome
permanent. They received neither political rights, nor access to various material benefits
associated with citizenship. In contrast, Puerto Ricans are granted US citizenship, yet
they are not provided full political rights. They may not vote in presidential elections, nor
do they have full representation in Congress. Thus, for migrants who arrive in America,
immigration policy, as well as those government agencies that regulate and enforce it, act
44

as ‘gate-keepers’ to full-membership into American society and the bundle of rights and
benefits it ensures.
Paying closer attention to the distributive nature of policy may allow us to better
understand why public opinion toward immigration varies across particular policy
designs and groups. Immigration policy acts as a sorting mechanism privileging certain
individuals and groups while restricting others. In this way, the distributive nature of
immigration policy is likely to structure the political attitudes and behaviors of
immigrants both in determining who gains full access and by providing varying levels of
political and material resources. Immigration policy that prioritizes economic skills and
advanced degrees, such as the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965, grants entrance to immigrants
who have full political access, as well as the necessary resources to participate. On the
other hand, individuals who do not fit such qualifications and wish to migrate to the
United States may be forced to enter “illegally” and thus have neither full access to the
political or economic realm, nor are they likely to bring with them sufficient material
resources. Differences regarding levels of citizenship, political and economic access, and
levels of material resources are likely to structure their subsequent immigration policy
preferences (and perhaps preferences more generally), as well as their range of political
options. This insight might help us better understand variation within and across pan-
ethnic groups. In addition, it provides a potential explanation as to why the passage of
more admissive forms of immigration policy—such as a Path to Citizenship or the
D.R.E.A.M. Act—is so rare. Individuals and groups who have the most to gain from such
policy also have the most limited means to advocate for their preferences.
45

In addition to playing a distributive role, policy often plays a significant
constitutive role. The constitutive nature of policy is readily apparent concerning
immigration policy. Whereas the American fable of immigration speaks of a “Golden
door” open to all who are willing to adopt our values, norms and beliefs, the history of
American immigration suggests otherwise (Daniels 2004; Masuoka and Junn 2013;
Schildkraut 2011; Tichenor 2002). Instead, the inclusive nature of our immigration policy
has varied dramatically across time and across groups. The design of immigration policy
at a given time in history, as well as the social categorization of people along pan-ethnic
lines, reflects shifting attitudes toward particular groups of newcomers. The conditional
nature of our welcome is implicitly linked to shifting determinations of who is worthy of
membership (Masuoka and Junn 2013). And thus the design of immigration policy across
time and space is largely reflective of public and elite attitudes toward the perceived
target of the policy (Daniels 2004).
The literature on policy feedback suggests that perceptions of the “target” of
policy may powerfully impact public opinion toward the policy. The degree to which the
public perceives recipients as worthy and deserving of the benefits they receive will
partially determine their attitudes toward the policy (A.L. Campbell 2010; Soss 1999).
This finding is consistent with the literature on racial attitudes. Public opinion toward
race-targeted policies—such as affirmative action and welfare—as well as race-coded
policies—such as crime enforcement and the death penalty—is largely driven by negative
attitudes toward African Americans who are often perceived to be the target of these
policies (Gilens 1999; 2009; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996;
Mendelberg 2001). There is some evidence that public attitudes toward immigration
46

policy are different from attitudes toward immigrants themselves (Segovia and Defever
2010). However, recent experiments suggest that attitudes toward particular immigrant
groups predict attitudes toward immigration policy (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008;
Burns and Gimpel 2008; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Restrictive forms of
immigration policy are implicitly (or often explicitly) targeted toward particular racial or
ethnic groups. The way in which particular immigrant groups are depicted in legislation
is likely to engender or reinforce stereotypes of these groups (Masuoka and Junn 2013).
This may in turn impact public attitudes of the larger pan-ethnic group as well as policy
that is targeted toward this group.
Policy design not only shapes larger public opinion but also powerfully impacts
the attitudes of policy recipients themselves. Political bureaucracies that administer
policy benefits may serve as important sites of political learning. A recipient is likely to
project one’s treatment under a particularly meaningful policy onto the government as a
whole (A.L. Campbell 2003; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Mettler 2002; Soss 1999). In
this way, policy may have particularly powerful “interpretive effects” (Skocpol 1992,
610). Those who feel they have been treated favorably and fairly are likely to develop
more favorable attitudes toward government, their place in society, and the degree to
which government is responsive to their needs (A.L. Campbell 2010; Ingram and
Schneider 1993; Mettler 2002). On the other hand, those who feel they have been
mistreated or ignored are likely to develop unfavorable attitudes toward government, a
demoted sense of their place in society, and the perception that government is unlikely to
respond to their needs (A.L. Campbell 2010; Soss 1999).
47

In this way immigration policy can impact the attitudes of immigrants both
directly and indirectly. Legislation may send a clear message to immigrants that they are
unwelcome, which in turn may be reinforced by the cold reception they receive from the
public. Immigrants’ perception of how they have been received—both by government
policy and by the public—is likely to have a strong bearing on their sense of belonging,
which will in turn impacts social identity formation, subsequent political attitudes toward
government and their level of assimilation. Groups who benefit from favorable
immigration policy and receive a favorable reception are more likely to develop a
stronger attachment to their new national identity and see the formal political system as
an arena in which they may make their voices heard. On the other hand, those who do not
are more likely to develop a stronger attachment to those who have been similarly
slighted and feel that the formal political system is not responsive to their needs. This
may lead groups to remove themselves from political life or alternatively to pursue their
political interests outside the formal political arena.

6.3 Potential for Mobilization
Policy design differs not only in its allocation of resources and the degree to
which it engages its participants, but also in the degree to which it mobilizes its
participants. Different policy designs have varying levels of mobilizing potential for
interests groups, political parties, and bureaucracies alike. The higher the visibility of the
program and socioeconomic levels of the participants, the greater the potential for
mobilization (A.L. Campbell 2003; 2010; Pierson 1993; 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen
1993; Skocpol 1992; 2004; Verba, Schlozman; and Brady 1995). When material
48

incentives exist, special interest groups often crop-up to provide an infrastructure, a
unified voice, and an avenue to advocate for increased benefits (A.L. Campbell 2003;
Minkoff 1997; Skocpol 1997; 2004). On the other hand, programs that do not offer strong
material incentives, nor include individuals with higher socioeconomic levels or
demographics that would indicate political participation, are far less likely to garner the
attention of interest groups or political parties (Pierson 1996; Skocpol 2004; Soss 1999).
Furthermore, policy may lead to the development of a shared identity that can also serve
as a pivotal source of mobilization.
Immigration policy provides a unique case to examine how policy design may
engender differing levels of mobilization. On the one hand, the policy feedback
framework would suggest that admissive forms of immigration policy—such as the Hart-
Cellar Act of 1965—provides an opportunity for positive learning, and should have
profound attitudinal and behavioral effects. The visibility of the newly enacted law was
high. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the act into law in a public ceremony in front
of the symbolic Statue of Liberty at the height of the Civil Rights Movement. The act
stripped away previous racial and ethnic quotas and instead prioritized those who
possessed desirable skills, advanced education, or had close family ties to American
citizens. Thus, authorized immigrants were more likely to enter with higher levels of
education and income and/or pre-existing social networks, both of which would increase
the likelihood of political participation (Verba, Schlozman; and Brady 1995). And while
the nature of immigration policy precludes stable membership, the ongoing flow of
immigration and the persistence of ethnic enclaves suggest that immigration policy would
remain particularly salient for immigrant communities (Barreto 2010). Collectively, these
49

factors suggest that the Hart-Cellar Act is likely to have large attitudinal and behavioral
effects. To what extent do immigrants who immigrated after the passage of this
legislation demonstrate such effects?
On the other hand, the recent wave of restrictive and punitive forms of
immigration policy—characterized by Proposition 187 in California, the proposed
H.R.4437, or the more recent S.B. 1070—have resulted in extensive mobilization. The
punitive nature of the bills, the negative stereotypes they engender, and the discrimination
they promoted provided a powerful source of mobilization (Barreto et al. 2009; Pantoja,
Menjívar, and Magaña 2008; Rim 2009; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). Because
Latinos were often cast under the “frame of illegality”, regardless of their legal status, it
led to a heightened sense of solidarity and linked fate (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Ramirez
2013). Neither the resource model of political participation nor the existing policy
feedback framework would predict mobilization of this sort. The level of individual
resources was low, participants were portrayed as illegal and undeserving, and political
parties played a minor and insignificant role. Yet policy that was designed to limit access
and marginalize a particular group resulted in unanticipated participatory and attitudinal
outcomes.
These two distinct cases lead to a number of important questions. What conditions
allowed for mobilization? Why did we not see similar levels of mobilization for similarly
restrictive forms of immigration, such as the Immigrant Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act? Why do restrictive forms of immigration policy seem to facilitate
greater levels of mobilization than admissive ones? In what ways can the design of
policy serve as a source of mobilization for some, while demobilizing others? Does the
50

mobilization following the passage of threatening legislation increase or decrease levels
of political efficacy and trust in government? Finally, why does mobilization in the form
of protest seem to be effective in blocking unfavorable legislation, but unsuccessful in
promoting the passage of favorable legislation?

6.4 Scope and Duration of Effects
In her review of the policy-feedback literature, Andrea Louise Campbell (2010)
distinguishes between three different patterns of political participation: general, program-
specific, and potential. General participation refers to participation in general matters that
transcend the clearly defined interests of a particular program (A.L. Campbell 2010).
Program-specific participation pertains to participation geared towards extending or
entrenching the benefits that policy has provided its members. Finally, potential
participation conveys the potential mobilization of participants to pursue other common
interests. Research in this area argues that all three of these forms of participation are a
function not only of participants’ preexisting socio-demographic characteristics (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995), but also the distinct features of policy design (A.L.
Campbell 2010, Mettler and Soss 2004). While Campbell's review focuses on
participation, political attitudes may be organized in a similar way.
Although immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean represent a
growing proportion of our population, the vast majority of these groups have not been in
the United States for very long. Current theories of political behavior and attitudes that
were principally developed to describe differences between Whites and Blacks may not
be applicable to these groups. Scholars are left guessing as to the future political behavior
51

and attitudes of recently immigrated groups. Immigration policy, and the distinct ways in
which groups are impacted by it, provides a starting point to make such predictions. Let
me provide three examples.
First, we have evidence that the passage of restrictive and punitive forms of
immigration policy by the Republican Party increased Latino support for the Democratic
Party (Barreto 2005; Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Bowler, Nicolson, and Segura 2006;
Nicolson, Pantoja, and Segura 2005; Pantoja, Menjívar, and Magaña 2008; Segura and
Fraga 2008). Does Latino partisanship reflect an enduring psychological attachment to a
party (A. Campbell et al. 1960) or to its stance on immigration policy? And if
partisanship is instrumental, will Latino loyalty to the Democratic Party persist across
generations or in response to shifts in the Republican Party’s stand on immigration?
Second, the proposal or passage of threatening forms of immigration policy has
triggered widespread mobilization (particularly among Latinos); however, much of this
has been limited to non-electoral forms of participation (Barreto et al. 2009; Cain,
Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Cain, Citrin, and C. Wong 2000; Pantoja, Menjivar, and
Magana 2008; Rim 2009). To what extent will non-electoral forms of participation spill-
over into electoral participation? On one hand, the ability to mobilize effectively may
increase the political efficacy of participants, group solidarity, or the belief among
political parties and interest groups of the potential for electoral mobilization. On the
other hand, many who participate in marches may lack the ability to vote due to their lack
of full citizenship or lack the political resources associated with higher levels of electoral
participation. Furthermore, mass protests may also suggest that particular segments of the
52

population feel that their voices are not be heard in formal political channels, and thus are
unlikely to vote.
Third, many scholars argue that punitive forms of immigration policy and
discrimination have led Asian Americans, Latinos, and Afro Caribbeans to develop
increased levels of group consciousness, shared identity, and/or linked fate (Branton
2007; Greer 2013; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Padilla 1985; Sanchez 2006a; 2006b;
Schildkraut 2011). To what extent will these measures of group attachment persist over
time? Are measures of group consciousness for the recent wave of immigrants merely
temporary or instrumental? Or are pan-ethnic identities more fixed and the result of deep
psychological attachment? To what extent will their shared identity structure attitudes
toward other policies?

7. Conclusion
In a recent review of the enduring relationship between race and politics, Michael
Dawson (2012) definitively states, “we cannot understand contemporary American
politics without understanding the long and continuing dynamics of racial conflict within
the United States” (p. 673). We have not entered a post-racial era; we have entered a
multi-racial era. Politics can no longer be seen in Black and White but instead requires
multi-color lenses. Echoing Dawson’s belief, I argue that we can no longer understand
public opinion without accounting for variation in political attitudes across multiple pan-
ethnic groups.
However, our theories and methodological approaches have not kept pace with
the increased complexity of our population. We are still relying on theories that were
53

developed to explain different groups and in a different context. I have outlined three
potential avenues of public opinion research. Paying greater attention to group-level
effects, contextual factors, and policy effects will allow us to develop more dynamic
theories of public opinion that incorporate elements of both agency and structure.
Furthermore, these approaches force us to consider how attitudes are likely to vary across
time and place. I believe that along with the increased complexity of public opinion
comes increased opportunity. By leveraging the unique attributes and experiences of
different groups, we can begin to identify the structural constraints on political attitudes.
We can develop theories that explain why attitudes vary both across and within pan-
ethnic groups and under what conditions shared attitudes will lead to collective action.
Understanding the dynamics of public opinion has important implications for our
democracy as well. Disaggregating public opinion enables us to measure the degree to
which policy and political representation truly reflects the interests of all Americans.
Although democratic rule cannot ensure that every individual’s desires are reflected in
policy, it ought to ensure that the interests of every individual are considered equally in
the policy-making process. If representation and policy systematically reflects the wishes
of a particular group(s) over another—particularly when group membership is ascribed
and fixed—then democracy fails to live up to its promise. Finally, the increasing size of
the Latino and Asian American populations is likely to shift the balance of power in this
country. As Schattschneider (1964) argued so long ago, “If a fight starts, watch the
crowd” (p. 3). While their recent arrival to the United States helps explain lower levels of
political engagement and participation among these groups, recent immigrant groups
have demonstrated the ability to mobilize around shared interests or perceived threats.
54

The reception that these groups receive—both in terms of immigration policy and their
interaction with the larger public—will likely shape the attitudes of the immigrants
themselves, as well as their descendants.

55

Chapter 2
Assimilation or Racialization? A Systematic Comparison of Linked Fate
within and across Pan-Ethnic Groups

1. Introduction
The pluralist fable of an America polity based in a common creed of democratic
norms and values rather than shared ancestry is exemplified in Robert Dahl’s classic Who
Governs? (1961). Published nearly four decades after federal immigration policy closed
the door to new immigrants with the 1924 National Origins Act, Dahl observed a
recession in the oligarchy of the power elite (Mills [1956] 2000) and instead anticipated
political governance to be characterized by polyarchy (Dahl 1972). An important element
of the empirical basis for Dahl’s normative claim of pluralism was the political
integration of European immigrants and their offspring, some of whom were earlier
maligned as “less than White” during the height of their newcomer status. Rather than
persisting separately in second-class status, Italian, Irish and Jewish immigrants shed
their ethnic identities via a process of economic mobility and social assimilation. This
“straight-line” led next into politics and was visible to Dahl and his colleagues in their
study of New Haven, Connecticut. Once assimilated into the broader pluralist polity,
these former White ethnics lost their identities based in national origin and ethnicity and
exhibited greater heterogeneity in political attitudes, candidate preferences, and patterns
of voting.
Dahl’s pluralist fable remains normatively attractive, for the wish that we engage
in politics on a level playing field is consistent with the American creed privileging
liberty and equality of opportunity at the individual level. That Dahl observed these
56

patterns of political assimilation among White ethnics provided a strong basis for hope
that the same dynamics of integration would greet immigrants in the twenty-first century.
But the political context of the contemporary period is distinct from the period that
informed Who Governs? Dahl’s New Haven study was undertaken during a time in
which the United States population was remarkably non-immigrant; less than 5% of the
population was foreign born in the mid-1960s, and it is the second-generation children of
European immigrants who were the main actors in the story of straight-line assimilation.
The re-opening of the “Golden Door” to immigrants with the 1965 Immigration
and Nationality Act yielded newcomers who were defined by the federal government as
racially distinct from their European counterparts of the previous century. The 1965 Act,
crafted during the height of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement and in the shadow of post-
WWII rejection of genocide and the “science” of eugenics, provided the first opening in
nearly a century to mass migration to the United States from Latin America, Asia, and the
Caribbean. Half a century after its passage (along with policy modifications in the
intervening decades focusing on the regulation of unauthorized immigrants), the U.S.
population has undergone dramatic demographic change. The foreign born now represent
more than 13% of the population, and today more than a third of Americans consider
themselves to be something other than White. This diversity stands in stark contrast to the
Black-White binary (10% African American, 90% White) and high native-born
population characterizing the time in which Dahl wrote about polyarchy.
For a pluralist vision to reflect reality in contemporary U.S. politics, at least two
things would need to be true. First, ethnic and racial group identities would have to be
observed to have receded among groups historically underrepresented in and excluded
57

from politics, including immigrants and racial minorities. Second, institutional barriers
and structural inequalities based in the marginalized statuses of race, gender, and class
would also have to disappear. In other words, pluralism understood as equal contest on a
level playing field requires both the presence of continuously shifting group loyalties à la
Federalist Paper # 10 (and at the expense of consistently-maintained racial group
consciousness), as well as the absence of systematic exclusion from political institutions
and practices based on group status. While dreams of the United States as “post-racial” or
“gender neutral” or “classless” remain persistent fantasies, the continued presence of
structural inequalities and marginalized status sounds a loud wake-up alarm that the fair
play and equal opportunity assumed in a pluralist American democracy remain fiction.
There were skeptics among Dahl’s contemporaries as well, among the most
incisive, Michael Parenti (1967), who argued that Dahl conflated the concepts of
assimilation and acculturation (see also Wolfinger 1965). In straight-line assimilation,
assimilation is a natural outcome that automatically occurs across generations. According
to this theory of assimilation, acculturation and assimilation are parallel processes, and as
newcomers replace ethnic identities with American ones the socio-economic gap will
diminish. Instead, Parenti argued that newly- arrived ethnic groups “became
‘Americanized’ in much of its cultural practices, but this says little about its social
relations with the host society” (Parenti 1967, 719). Dahl’s analysis assumes assimilation
to be a choice made by immigrants, but at the same time, it largely ignores the fact that
structural inequalities and pervasive discrimination can act as significant barriers.
More recent scholars have documented the variation in the “segmented” rather
than straight-line assimilation of new immigrant groups as a function of both individual-
58

level identities as well as structural barriers (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes
and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Ramakrishnan 2005; Waters 2000). Unlike
the theory of straight-line assimilation, segmented assimilation is a conditional theory.
Proponents of the theory argue that both the degree of assimilation as well as to whom
the newly arriving group is assimilated—majority culture versus minority subculture—
are dependent upon the resources available to the group as well as the reception they
receive. Immigrant groups who have a limited reserve of resources, face discrimination
upon their arrival, and find themselves in close contact with other disenfranchised groups
will tend to identify themselves with disenfranchised minorities as opposed to the
majority group. This theory is grounded upon the realization that new coming groups are
often racialized upon their arrival and are not welcomed into society by the majority
culture, which the theory of straight-line assimilation seems to suggest. The conditional
welcome to the American polity given to racialized immigrants along with persistent
discrimination based in race for Black Americans, despite constitutional and statutory
pronouncements of equal rights, signal that we are a long way away from achieving a
pluralist democracy through political assimilation (Masuoka and Junn 2013).
Nevertheless, and as with all complex realities, there is more “truth” to pluralism
for some groups than for others. A pattern of straight-line assimilation did work relatively
well for White ethnics in the mid-Twentieth Century, and no longer is it accurate to
characterize Italian-Americans or Irish-Americans as the captured subjects of one party
(machine) or another. Nor is it the case that Jews are as reliable supporters of the
Democratic Party as they once were (Maisel et al. 2003). At the same time, the classic
pluralist story has never been readily applicable to the experiences of African Americans.
59

High levels of racial group consciousness and perceptions of “linked fate” consistently
characterize individual-level attitudes among Blacks in the United States (Dawson 1994;
2001; 2011). Even the growing diversity within the Black population as the result of
immigration from the Caribbean and Africa does not diminish the perceptions of shared
political interests in recognition of the position that Blacks remain at the bottom of the
American racial hierarchy (Greer 2013; Rogers 2006; Waters 2000). Much less is known
systematically about the relatively newer minority groups of Asian Americans and
Latinos, and the jury is still out as to whether we should expect to see these Americans
adhere to patterns of political assimilation or persistent racialization (Barreto 2010; Junn
and Masuoka 2008; Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; J. Wong et al. 2011).
There are myriad ways to analyze the contours of assimilation and racialization,
and even armed with strong observation of distinctive patterns across groups, firm
conclusions about the broader question of pluralism as fable versus reality remain
elusive. However, what can be said with greater certainty is whether and how groups of
Americans classified by race and ethnicity diverge in their perceptions of linked fate with
others of the same pan-ethnic background. This project utilizes data from three recent and
nationally-representative surveys of Whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans
(National Politics Study (NPS), Latino National Survey (LNS), and National Asian
American Survey (NAAS)) to analyze the contours and antecedents to perceptions of
pan-ethnic group linked fate. Each of these surveys shares similar measures of linked fate
as well as indicators of a host of factors the literature suggests may covary with
perceptions of linked fate. After analyzing the shape of responses to the survey questions
on linked fate by race, I then examine the factors that covary with perceptions of shared
60

pan-ethnic group consciousness. I will employ ordered logistic regression to estimate
models of linked fate for each pan-ethnic group. By comparing similar models for each
group, I am able to compare and contrast the antecedents to linked fate across groups.
Finally, for the three pan-ethnic groups that make-up the lion’s share of incoming
immigrants—namely immigrants arriving from the Caribbean, Asia and Latin America—
I estimate models that include the ethnicity of members of the larger pan-ethnic group
(i.e. Caribbean Americans, Mexican Americans, or Chinese-Americans), as well as
additional variables that are particularly relevant to the group (ethnic media usage and the
perception of common economic or political interests). This additional step enables me to
test whether distinct ethnic groups, who are ‘lumped’ into the broader pan-ethnic group,
vary significantly in their perception of pan-ethnic linked fate.

2. Patterns of Linked Fate: Whites, Blacks, Asian Americans, & Latinos
In his highly influential book Behind the Mule (1994), political scientist Michael
Dawson articulates a theory of linked fate to explain why race remains the most salient
determinant of African American political behavior and attitudes. Incorporating insights
from research on Social-Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981) and
cognitive processing (Gigerenzer 2000, Lupia and McCubbins 2008; Zaller 1992),
Dawson argues that the “black utility heuristic” predicts a high degree of perceptions of
racial group consciousness among African Americans despite increased social mobility
and gains in political representation. He argues that the history of profound
discrimination against Blacks and ongoing economic and political subjugation on the
basis of race—conditions not experienced to the same degree or over a similarly long
61

period of time for White ethnic immigrants—created a context for increased perceptions
of linked fate for African Americans. African Americans continue to perceive their own
fate as directly linked to that of their racial group. A theory of linked fate is politically
consequential in that increased perceptions of linked fate directly leads to shared political
attitudes and may indirectly increase the potential for collective action. Furthermore,
heightened levels of linked fate among racial minorities may point to the presence of
institutional barriers and decreased external political efficacy, which are highly
detrimental to the pluralistic vision of American democracy.
Dawson utilizes two survey questions to measure linked fate. First respondents
are asked whether what happens to other Blacks influences what happens to themselves.
Respondents can answer “yes” or “no” to the question, and only a small proportion of
Black respondents in the survey Dawson analyzes say they did not know or refused to
answer. Then the respondents are asked to what degree they feel a sense of linked fate.
Scholars of race and politics who focus their research on immigrants or minorities of
other racial backgrounds soon began to replicate Dawson’s original linked fate questions
with some modifications (see Table 2.1), as well as measure perceptions of politicized
group consciousness among ethnic and national origin groups (i.e., Mexican-American,
Puerto Rican, or Vietnamese-American). At the same time, specialists in Latino politics
and Asian American politics caution analysts to apply Dawson’s theory of linked fate to
other minority groups with caution, emphasizing the distinctive historical contingencies
and contexts of welcome experienced by various groups (C.J. Kim and Lee 2001;
McClain et al. 2009; Segura & Rodrigues 2006).
62

Table 2.1: Question Wording of Linked Fate across the Surveys

In this section, I document the distribution of the two linked fate questions for
pan-ethnic groups of Whites, Blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos. While the federal
government in its U.S. Census enumeration declares Latino/Hispanic as an ethnicity
rather than a race (combining Cubans and Mexicans, for example), and conversely
separates Americans with Chinese and Japanese ancestry as distinct races rather than as
Asian ethnicity, I focus on the combined ethnicity/national origin groupings of the “big
four” categories (Skrentny 2004). I use data from three nationally-representative surveys
of Americans collected in the mid- to late-2000s. For data on Whites and Blacks, I use
responses from the 2004 NPS. This study included an oversample of Afro Caribbeans in
addition to African Americans. For Latinos, I use data from the LNS whose data were
collected between November of 2005 and August of 2006. While the LNS data are not
fully nationally-representative, the sample represents more than 80% of Latinos residing
in the United States. Finally, data from the 2008 NAAS are used to analyze perceptions
of linked fate among a nationally-representative sample of Asian Americans. Both the
LNS and the NAAS were administered in English as well as languages spoken by
respondents (i.e., Spanish, Mandarin).
Variable Study Question Format
NPS
Do you think what happens generally to [R RACE] people in this country will
have something to do with what happens in your life? [For those who answered
'YES'] Will it affect you a lot, some or not very much?
NAAS
Do you think what happens generally to other Asians in this country affects what
happens in your life?
[For those who answered 'YES'] Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?
LNS
How much does your “doing well” depend on other Latinos/Hispanics also doing
well? A lot, some, a little, or not at all?
Linked fate
63

Of particular importance for the LNS is the time during which the data collection
was in the field. The nine-month period when interviews for this study were being
conducted coincided with the widespread immigrant protest marches of 2006. Late in
2005, H.R. 4437—formally titled the “Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal
Immigration Act of 2005” but known colloquially as the “Sensenbrenner bill” for its
main sponsor Congressman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)—was passed in the House of
Representatives. Demonstrations against this repressive immigration policy reform took
place across the country, beginning with a major protest of an estimated 100,000 people
in the streets of Chicago in March 2006 and continuing in cities including Dallas, New
York, and Los Angeles throughout the spring. Los Angeles was the home of the largest
mass protest, with an estimated half-million people taking to the streets to voice
opposition to legislation that authorized the construction of a fence on the United States-
Mexico border and targeted unauthorized immigrants and their families from Mexico and
other countries in Latin America. Widely perceived as a political move directed explicitly
against Latinos, perceptions of linked fate during this period were likely both activated
and heightened by the immigrant marches during the spring of 2006 (Ramirez 2013;
Zepeda-Millán 2013).
Figure 2.1 documents the distribution of the answers to the question on the linked
fate screener question for all four groups. Consistent with the highly-charged political
context of protest against immigration policy reform, Latino respondents show the
highest proportion of perceptions of linked fate. Nearly eight in ten (79%) agree that their
64

Figure 2.1: Percent of Pan-ethnic Group Who Express Linked Fate

65

individual fate is linked to that of other Latinos. Blacks, surveyed during 2004
(September 2004 through February 2005)—a year in which no credible African
American candidate was running or had attempted to run for national office—had the
second-highest rates of linked fate, with nearly two-thirds agreeing that their individual
fate was linked with other Blacks. These data include all Blacks in the sample, combining
both African Americans as well as immigrant Afro Caribbean Blacks. The latter report a
lower rate of linked fate (53%) than do African Americans (68%).
In contrast, the group with the lowest rate of perceived linked fate is Asian
Americans, and fewer than half (44%) agreed that their individual fate was connected
with what happened to other Asian Americans. At the same time, a higher proportion of
Asian Americans compared to both Blacks and Latinos either responded that they did not
know or refused to answer this screener question on linked fate. Finally, White
respondents in the NPS together had a higher rate of linked fate than Asian Americans,
and more than half (56%) answered “yes” in response to the question of whether what
happened to other Whites had an effect on what happened to them individually. There are
very few empirical survey-based studies of White racial identity, but the C. Wong and
Cho study (2005) documents similar levels of approximately half of White respondents
reporting feeling close to other Whites. While utilizing a different measure of racial
group identity distinct from the measures of linked fate, Wong and Cho’s analysis of
ANES data between 1972 and 2000 showed fairly consistent levels of White racial
identity of roughly 50% over time (2005, 705).
The meaning of linked fate and pan-ethnic group identity for Americans classified
into these four categories can be better analyzed when considering the distribution of the
66

answers to the second question on strength of linked fate. The bar chart in Figure 2.2
displays the proportion of each group of respondents by their answers to this question.
When asked about strength of perception of linked fate, answers diverged among
respondents from different pan-ethnic groups in interesting ways. Latinos again were the
group with the strongest sense of linked fate, with 40% reporting that they felt what
happened to other Latinos and Hispanics influenced what happened in their life “a lot”.
This proportion is larger than for any other group, including Blacks (28%), Whites
(14%), and Asian Americans (8%). On the opposite end of the question, Latinos were
also the least likely to say that they felt no linked fate at all (15%). This stands in stark
contrast to Asian Americans – a group characterized by high foreign-born status – and
nearly half (47%) report feeling no linked fate at all with other Asian Americans. Whites
and Blacks on the other hand, look strikingly similar on this response, with 35% and 34%
respectively reporting perceptions of no linked fate with other members of their pan-
ethnic group.

3. Explaining Differences by Race in Linked Fate
The contours of responses to the linked fate questions across Whites, Blacks,
Asian Americans, and Latinos signal not only variation in political context and the time
in which the data were collected, but also important distinctions between groups in terms
of level of assimilation and degree of racialization. In most studies of racial
consciousness and linked fate, one group in particular is selected for study, and
comparisons are most often made over time rather than between groups (Dawson 2011;
C. Wong and Cho 2005). This project takes a different approach by analyzing linked fate
67

Figure 2.2: Strength of Linked Fate by Pan-ethnicity

68

across the four major pan-ethnic groups in the United States. This comparative analytical
strategy provides the opportunity to theorize about the ways in which the processes of
assimilation and racialization work in similar or distinctive ways for Americans classified
by race. In this section, I discuss how position in the American racial hierarchy influences
racial group consciousness by describing the relationship between indicators of
assimilation and racialization and perceptions of linked fate.
Taking a position distinct from Dahl’s pluralist frame, an important assumption in
my explanation about variation in linked fate between Whites , Blacks, Asian Americans,
and Latinos is the presence and influence of the American racial hierarchy on individual-
level attitudes. The social structural frame I adopt acknowledges the systematic
differences in treatment experienced by groups classified by race where Whites exist at
the top of the hierarchy as the “default category” in politics, society, and economy.
Threats of displacement from this privileged position at the top should be the most
important motivator behind linked fate among Whites. Alternatively, Blacks have long
occupied and continue to exist in the position at the bottom of the hierarchy. Despite
important gains in civil rights, educational opportunities, and social integration over the
last fifty years, African Americans recognize their status as the most racialized and
negatively stereotyped group. Indeed, the broad recognition of this reality is the basis for
Dawson’s theory of the black-utility heuristic.
The overwhelming majority of Whites and Blacks in the United States are
American citizens by birth, and assimilation to language, norms, and culture are less
relevant to the dynamics of linked fate for these pan-ethnic groups characterized by their
native-born status in comparison to more heavily foreign-born groups. It is a common
69

misperception that most Latinos are immigrants. Instead, the majority of American adults
classified as Hispanic or Latino are native born, and this diverse group includes Puerto
Ricans (who are citizens by birth as a function of Puerto Rica’s status as a U.S. territory),
Mexicans, Cubans, Dominicans and those who arrived from or who can trace their
ancestry to South or Latin American countries. In contrast, Asian Americans are heavily
foreign born, and more than three-quarters of the adult population is an immigrant (J.
Wong et al. 2011). For Latinos and Asian Americans, indicators of assimilation including
educational attainment, income, home ownership, generation of migration, language
usage, and political party identification should be related to perceptions of linked fate,
though the direction in which these measures of assimilation covary with group
consciousness will be different for Latinos and Asian Americans. Table 2.2 provides the
proportion of each group of respondents who say they perceive “a lot or some” linked
fate with others of their pan-ethic group, “a little or none,” and the percentage who say
they “don’t know” or refused to answer the question by indicators of assimilation and
racialization.
Despite their status as the most heavily immigrant racial group in the United
States, Asian Americans are not viewed—by policymakers and citizens alike—as the
target of repressive regulatory immigration policy. Instead, federal and state legislation
across the country has implicitly (and in some cases explicitly) identified immigrants
from Latin America as the problem requiring attention. One need look only so far as
recent state legislation in Arizona and Alabama, as well as recall the popularity and
subsequent backlash of California’s Proposition 187 to confirm the notion that it is
70

Table 2.2: Linked Fate by Covariates for Each Pan-ethnic Group

A Lot/
Some
A Little/
None
DK/
REF
A Lot/
Some
A Little/
None
DK/
REF
A Lot/
Some
A Little/
None
DK/
REF
A Lot/
Some
A Little/
None
DK/
REF
Experienced discrimination
Index #0 45 44 11 33 65 2 31 57 12 64 29 6
Index #1 52 36 12 63 35 2 44 49 7 64 32 4
Index #2 50 40 10 47 51 2 47 47 5 63 33 4
Index #3 53 47 0 70 28 3 51 43 5 58 38 4
Index #4 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 37 55 8 61 37 2
Age
18-24 57 37 6 47 52 1 54 38 8 64 33 3
25-34 46 44 10 57 40 3 44 50 6 67 28 5
35-44 43 45 12 60 39 2 38 54 8 65 29 6
45-54 53 34 13 57 40 3 39 52 9 62 32 6
55-64 51 39 10 54 40 6 35 56 9 61 30 9
65+ 41 47 11 57 41 3 27 59 14 56 30 14
Education
No high school diploma 31 59 11 42 53 5 23 54 23 66 26 8
High school diploma 45 47 7 55 43 1 32 59 9 65 30 5
Some college 46 45 9 59 40 1 40 52 8 62 34 4
College degree 50 37 14 51 44 4 38 55 7 54 40 5
Post-graduate degree 51 36 12 76 21 3 42 50 8 56 38 6
Income
#1 44 46 10 48 50 2 30 56 14 69 27 4
#2 46 47 8 59 39 2 32 58 10 66 31 4
#3 49 43 9 63 36 1 39 56 5 59 38 3
#4 49 38 13 63 31 6 45 50 6 50 47 3
Home owner 48 41 11 59 39 2 37 54 9 61 34 6
Does not own a home 44 46 10 52 45 3 36 53 11 66 28 6
Democrat 46 44 11 58 40 2 42 51 6 65 31 4
Not a Democrat 49 41 11 48 48 4 32 56 12 63 30 7
Membership in pan-ethnic org. 50 40 11 61 38 1 49 47 4 67 29 4
No membership 45 44 11 50 47 4 35 55 11 63 31 6
Generation
0 43 46 11 43 52 5 35 55 10 69 25 6
1 42 45 12 50 50 0 40 53 8 55 40 5
2 50 35 14 57 41 2 50 42 8 52 45 3
3 46 45 9 59 39 2 ____ ____ ___ 36 59 5
Foreign-language dominant ____ ____ ____ 53 43 4 36 53 11 70 22 8
English-language dominant ____ ____ ____ 56 41 3 36 54 9 57 39 4
Ethnic media use ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 36 54 10 70 24 6
Limited use ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 36 54 9 50 46 4
Common political interests ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 42 52 7 75 23 2
Do not perceive ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 33 55 12 49 41 11
Common economic interests ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 41 53 6 71 25 3
Do not perceive ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 31 55 14 43 44 13
Caribbean American 45 52 3 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
African American 56 42 2 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
Mexican American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 65 30 5
Central American
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
68 26 6
South American
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
68 25 7
Puerto Rican American
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
55 40 6
Dominican American
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
67 28 5
Cuban American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 56 32 12
Chinese American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 39 49 12 ____ ____ ____
Filipino American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 24 72 4 ____ ____ ____
Indian American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 36 52 12 ____ ____ ____
Japanese American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 33 55 12 ____ ____ ____
Korean American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 53 40 8 ____ ____ ____
Vietnamese American ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 34 53 13 ____ ____ ____
Blacks Whites Asian Latino
71

unauthorized immigrants characterized as Latino that these policies target. This
distinction between Latinos as low-skilled “illegal” immigrants and Asian Americans as
the “model minority” newcomers is the direct result of U.S. immigration policy
(Masuoka and Junn 2013). But prior to the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, Asian
immigrants were among the most heavily maligned groups of newcomers. Immigrants
from Asian countries were considered so undesirable that federal law prohibited the
immigration and naturalization to U.S. citizenship in an “Asiatic barred zone” beginning
in the mid-19th Century. It was not until the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act (1952)
that racial barriers to entry were officially eliminated. Ironically it is the relative dearth of
Asian Americans that created a blind spot in the minds of the reformers of immigration
regarding which immigrant groups would come. But come they did, and precisely
because of the new preference rules, Asian immigrants of the post-1965 era would differ
dramatically from their foremothers and fathers in terms of class and education. The
sheer newness in terms of generation of immigration for Asian Americans today and their
overall and relatively high levels of educational attainment set them apart and in a
different position in the contemporary American racial hierarchy from Latinos, who have
disproportionately low levels of income and education.
This brief rendering of the story of immigrants from countries in Asia and Latin
America might lead one to expect that assimilation should follow a straight-line for Asian
Americans and a segmented one for Latinos. But that is not what I expect to see. Another
important consideration in the dynamics of perceptions of linked fate is the impact of
racialization on the attitudes of Latinos and Asian Americans. What is ironic about race
and ethnicity for Latinos is that the federal government classifies Hispanic and Latinos as
72

an ethnicity rather than a race. If you are from Honduras, you can describe yourself
ethnically as Latino but must declare yourself racially as something else (White, Black,
etc.). In its official enumeration forms and in federal reporting of data, the U.S.
government considers Latino ethnicity and race to be mutually exclusive. This set of
institutional rules allows Latinos—third-generation Cuban Americans, fifth-generation
Mexican Americans, and light-skinned Panamanians, for example—to declare themselves
racially White. However, mitigating this move to a higher spot on racial hierarchy to
Whiteness is the pervasive racialization of Latinos as undesirable and “illegal” subjects.
The extent to which Latinos perceive discrimination and its relationship to linked fate
will reflect how this group sees itself racially.
On the flip side, someone who is 4
th
generation Japanese American must, by the
current and official racial taxonomy of the United States, describe himself as racially
Japanese rather than treat this trait of national origin ancestry as ethnicity. As with
Latinos, race and ethnicity are mutually exclusive, with the important difference that no
one other than those with a Spanish or Latin American heritage can declare ethnicity.
Indeed, the U.S. census forms have long separated Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and
Filipino as distinct races in order to track the movement and location of federally-barred
immigrants from Asian countries in support of Asian exclusion laws on the books until
the mid-20
th
Century. This designation of national origin as race is unique to Asian
Americans alone, and White Italians or Black Nigerians must declare their race as White
or Black in contrast to Americans with Korean ancestry, for example, who must declare
their race as Korean. The implication of the unique racialization of Asian Americans by
national origin combined with the relative recency of their immigrant experience for
73

perceptions of linked fate is the expectation that perceptions of shared racial status should
be more muted. At the same time, the role of experiences of discrimination should have a
positive and strong effect on perceptions of linked fate among Asian Americans due to
the long history of racial discrimination in the U.S.

4. Estimating Antecedents to Pan-ethnic Group Consciousness
In addition to comparing how levels of linked fate are different across pan-ethnic
groups, I am equally interested in identifying how the determinants of these attitudes vary
across groups. As noted earlier, the measure of linked fate is a 4-point ordinal measure,
ranging from “none” to “a lot”. Linked fate is measured in a relatively consistent manner
across my three data sources, which reduces concerns regarding the comparison of
different measures of group consciousness noted by Segura & Rodrigues (2006) and
McClain et al. (2009). Respondents who replied either “don’t know” or “refused” were
excluded from analysis. Since the measure of my dependent variable is both ordered and
categorical, I employ ordered logistic regression to specify the models.
My model includes covariates that may be clustered along four dimensions that
literature suggests impact perceptions of linked fate: socio-demographic (age, education,
income, and home ownership), political (Democratic and membership in a pan-ethnic
organization), immigration (generation and foreign-language dominant), and
psychological (experience with discrimination). When covariates did not have similar
question wording, I did my best to make the measurement of variables as consistent as
possible (see Table 2.3 for variation in question format). Age is originally measured as a
count variable, but was transformed into an ordinal variable in order to examine general
74

Table 2.3: Question Wording of Independent Variables across the Surveys

NPS
We would like to ask about YOU. How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think YOU have faced in the U.S. because
of your ethnicity or race (A lot, Some, A little, None)?
NAAS
Ever been unfairly denied a job or fired? Ever been unfairly denied a promotion at work? Ever been unfairly treated by the police?
Ever been unfairly prevented from renting or buying house? Ever been treated unfairly or badly at restaurants or stores?
LNS
Have you ever been unfairly fired or denied a job or promotion? Have you ever been unfairly treated by the police? Have you ever
been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood (vecindario barrio) because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or
rent you a house or apartment? Have you ever been treated unfairly or badly at restaurants or stores?
Experience
with
discrimination
NPS
To get a picture of people's financial situation we need to know the general range of income of all people we interview. Thinking
about you and your family's total income from all sources, how much did you and all the members of your family living with you
receive in 2003 before taxes? (1) 0-35 (2) 35-50 (3) 50-75 (4) 75+
NAAS
Which of the following best describes the total pre-tax income earned by everyone in your household last year? (1) 0-35, (2) 35-50
(3) 50-75 (4) 75+
LNS
Which of the following best describes the total income earned by all members of your household during 2004? (1) 0-35 (2) 35-45 (3)
45-65 (4) 65+
NPS
How often do you usually attend religious services? Would you say nearly everyday, at least once a week, at least once a month, a
few times a year, or never? [For those who attend] How would you describe the ethnic mix of your place of worship? Would you
say mostly White, mostly black, mostly Hispanic, mostly Asian, or mixed?
NAAS
Other than a religious group or place of worship, is there any other group or organization in your community that you are involved
with? [If yes] And how many members of this group would you say are members of your ethnic group– all of them, most, about
half, some of them, or none?
LNS
Do you participate in the activities of one social, cultural, civic or political group, more than one such group, or do you not
participate in the activities of any such groups?
[If yes] Stop me when I get to your answer. How would you describe these groups? Are they… (Mostly Latino; Mixed Latino
/white; Mostly black; Mixed Latino/black; Mostly White; Mostly Asian; Mixed Latino/Asian; Other; DK/NA; or Mix of all)
NPS
Were you born in the United States or in another country? Was your father born in the United States? Was your mother born in
the United States? Were any of your grandparents born outside of the United States?
NAAS
Were you born in the United States or some other country? Now I want to ask you about where your parents were born. Was your
mother born in the United States? How about your father; was he born in the U.S.?
LNS
Were you born in the mainland United States, Puerto Rico or some other country? Where your parents were born, were they both
born in the US, was one born in the US, and were both born in another country? How many of your grandparents, if any, were born
outside the U.S.A.?
NPS
Do you speak a language other than English? (Only asked of Caribbean) On average, how many days per week do you speak a
language other than English?
NAAS
Are you comfortable continuing the conversation in English? Now I would like to ask about your English language skills. How well
can you speak (and read) English? Very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?
LNS
Would you prefer that I speak in English or Spanish? How good is your spoken English? Would you say you can carry on a
conversation in English very well, pretty well, just a little, or not at all?
NAAS What, if anything do Asians in the United States share with one another? Would you say they share common economic interests?
LNS
Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do you have in common with other
Latinos/Hispanics? Would you say you have a lot in common, some in common, little in common, or nothing at all in common?
NAAS What, if anything do Asians in the United States share with one another? Would you say they share common political interests?
LNS
Now thinking about things like government services and employment, political power, and representation, how much do you have
in common with other Latinos/Hispanics? Would you say you have a lot in common, some in common, little in common, or nothing
at all in common?
NAAS
People rely on different sources for political information. Do you read newspapers for information about politics? Is that Asian-
language, English-language, or both? Do you listen to the radio for political information? Is that Asian-language, English-language,
or both? Do you watch television for political information? Is that Asian-language, English-language, or both? Do you use the
Internet for political information? Is that in an Asian language, in English, or both?
LNS
For information about public affairs and politics, would you say you rely more heavily on Spanish-language television, radio, and
newspapers, or on English language TV, radio, and newspapers? (English more, Spanish more, Both Equally (Bilingual), Other,
DK/NA)
Common
econ
interests
Common
political
interests
Ethnic media
use
Income
Foreign-
Language
Dominant
Membership in pan-
ethnic organization
Generation
75

shifts in attitudes across age groups. Education was measured by asking respondents to
share the highest level of education they completed and was subsequently transformed
into an ordinal variable. Income refers to one’s total annual family income. An ordinal
measure of income was generated by placing responses into categories that are relatively
similar across the three surveys. Home ownership is a dichotomous variable with a “1”
signifying that the respondent owns their home. Partisanship is measured by a
dichotomous variable in which a “1” is given to respondents who self-identified as a
Democrat or were Democratic leaning. My measure for membership in a pan-ethnic
organization was constructed uniquely for each survey. For both Whites and Blacks,
membership denotes attendance at a church in which the majority of the membership is of
the same pan-ethnic group as the respondent. For both Asian Americans and Latinos,
membership measures whether or not they are involved in a non-religious organization of
which the majority of the membership is of the same pan-ethnicity as the respondent.
Generation is an ordinal variable that was constructed by a series of questions in which
respondent was asked if they themselves, their parents, or their grandparents were born in
a foreign country. Foreign-born respondents were given a value of “0”; those who are
native born and had at least one foreign-born parent received a value of “1”; those whose
parents were both born in the United States and had at least one grandparent who was
foreign born received a value of “2”; and finally if both grandparents were born in the
United States they received a value of “3”. Since the vast majority of Asian Americans
are first generation, the NAAS only included questions regarding the nativity of the
respondent and his/her parents; thus, the maximum value for Asian Americans is “2”.
76

Foreign-language dominance measures respondents’ level of English fluency. For both
Latinos and Asian Americans this variable was captured by asking respondents whether
they were comfortable completing the survey in English as well as a follow-up question
that asked how well they could carry on a conversation in English. The NPS does not
include a question of language usage for Whites or African Americans. Afro Caribbean
respondents were coded as dominant in a foreign language if they answered that they
speak in a language other than English on five or more days a week. Finally, personal
experience with discrimination was measured differently across the surveys. Latinos and
Asian Americans were asked in a series of questions if they had been treated unfairly or
discriminated at work; by the police; in the purchasing or renting of a property; or in
businesses or restaurants. An additive scale was created adding the total number of
contexts in which the respondent attested to having faced discrimination. Asian
Americans have a maximum value of “5”, while the maximum value for Latinos is “4”.
The NPS measured the amount of discrimination White and Black respondents faced by
asking if they had faced “a lot”, “some”, “a little”, or “none”. I transformed the variable
to an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3. To standardize the measure of discrimination
across the groups I divided each respondent’s value by the maximum value they could
have received, thus placing each individual’s response on a scale from 0 to 1.
Table 2.4 provides the full results of the ordered logit estimations, while Table 2.5
presents the direction and significance of the factors of linked fate in a stylized fashion. I
will discuss the results of the model estimates for each group, starting first with Whites.
For Whites, my model does a relatively poor job of highlighting the factors that impact
77

Table 2.4: Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate by Pan-ethnicity

β SIG SE OR β SIG SE OR β SIG SE OR β SIG SE OR
Experienced discrimination 0.3178 0.2809 1.37 1.1803 ** 0.2855 3.26 1.0043 *** 0.2774 2.73 0.0875 0.1355 1.09
Age 0.0038 0.0050 1.00 0.0030 0.0054 1.00 -0.0092 ** 0.0038 0.99 -0.0003 0.0020 1.00
Education 0.1778 ** 0.0789 1.19 0.1513 ** 0.0798 1.16 0.0732 0.0494 1.08 -0.0178 0.0282 0.98
Income
-0.0313 0.0806 0.97 0.1126 0.0717 1.12 0.0851 0.0579 1.09 -0.1421 ** 0.0329 0.87
Home ownership 0.1555 0.2510 1.17 -0.1428 0.1680 0.87 -0.2178 0.1365 0.80 0.0718 0.0690 1.07
Democratic
0.0300 0.1663 1.03 -0.0608 0.2323 0.94 0.2576 ** 0.1089 1.29 0.1839 ** 0.0625 1.20
Membership in pan-ethnic
0.2245 0.1701 1.25 0.4892 ** 0.1680 1.63 0.4499 *** 0.1413 1.57 0.3700 ** 0.1416 1.45
Generation
0.0070 0.1048 1.01 0.1562 ** 0.0702 1.17 0.1207 0.1321 1.13 -0.3101 ** 0.0455 0.73
Foreign-language dominant
0.5370 * 0.3240 1.71 0.3465 *** 0.1150 1.41 0.7704 ** 0.0779 2.16
N
χ
2
(d.f.)
Pseudo R
2
Black Asian American Latino White
999 6186
0.040
2679
11.40(7)
715
59.28(8)
0.030
415.45(8)
0.020
44.67(8)
Difference in odds ratio of expressing linked fate when moving variable from lowest to highest value
N is weighted, Robust standard errors
*p<0.10 **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two-tailed test)
0.010
78

Table 2.5: Stylized Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate by Pan-
ethnicity

perceptions of linked fate. Only education is a significant predictor of increased
perceptions of linked fate. Somewhat surprisingly, perceptions of linked fate are
positively correlated with education. Whites who hold a post graduate degree have a 10%
increased likelihood of expressing the highest level of linked fate than Whites without a
high school diploma (see Table 2.6 for the predicted probabilities generated by the
models). None of the other socio-demographic variables in my model, including age,
income or home ownership approach statistical significance. In terms of partisanship,
there is no measurable difference between those who self-identify as Democrats versus
those who do not. Similarly, factors pertaining to immigration appear not to impact
perceptions of linked fate for Whites. This result should not come as surprising
considering the fact that 93% of Whites in the sample are native born. As mentioned
previously, I am unable to assess the impact to English fluency for Whites because the
Experienced discrimination + *** + ***
Age - **
Education + ** + **
Income - ***
Home ownership
Democratic + ** + ***
Membership in pan-ethnic org. + *** + *** + **
Generation + ** - ***
Foreign-language dominant + * + *** + ***
N
χ
2
(d.f.)
Pseudo R
2
White Black Asian American Latino
715 999 2679 6186
(+, -) Signifies a positive or negative effect, a blank cell signifies a nonsignificant effect
N is weighted, Robust standard errors
0.010 0.030 0.020 0.040
11.40(7) 44.67(8) 59.28(8) 415.45(8)
* p<0.10 **p<0.05, ***p<0.01(two-tailed test)
79

Table 2.6: Predicted Probabilities of Perceived Linked Fate

Experienced discrimination None A little Some A lot None A little Some A lot None A little Some A lot None A little Some A lot
0 0.40 0.08 0.37 0.15 0.48 0.09 0.26 0.17 0.54 0.08 0.30 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.42
1 0.37 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.39 0.08 0.29 0.23 0.49 0.08 0.33 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.42
2 0.34 0.08 0.40 0.19 0.30 0.08 0.31 0.31 0.44 0.08 0.36 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.43
3 0.31 0.07 0.41 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.08 0.39 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.43
4 0.34 0.08 0.41 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.44
5 0.30 0.07 0.43 0.20
Age
20 0.41 0.08 0.36 0.14 0.36 0.08 0.30 0.26 0.43 0.08 0.37 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.41
35 0.40 0.08 0.37 0.15 0.34 0.08 0.30 0.27 0.47 0.08 0.34 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.41
50 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.33 0.08 0.31 0.28 0.50 0.08 0.32 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.42
65 0.37 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.32 0.08 0.31 0.29 0.54 0.08 0.30 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.42
80 0.35 0.08 0.39 0.18 0.31 0.08 0.31 0.30 0.57 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.42
Education
No high school degree 0.48 0.08 0.32 0.11 0.42 0.09 0.28 0.21 0.55 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.42
High school degree 0.44 0.08 0.35 0.13 0.38 0.08 0.30 0.24 0.53 0.08 0.30 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.42
Some college 0.40 0.08 0.37 0.15 0.34 0.08 0.31 0.28 0.52 0.08 0.32 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.42
College degree 0.35 0.08 0.39 0.18 0.30 0.08 0.31 0.31 0.50 0.08 0.33 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.41
Post-graduate degree 0.31 0.07 0.41 0.21 0.27 0.07 0.31 0.35 0.48 0.08 0.34 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.41
Income
#1 0.37 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.08 0.30 0.25 0.55 0.08 0.30 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.45
#2 0.37 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.35 0.08 0.30 0.27 0.52 0.08 0.31 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.41
#3 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.32 0.08 0.31 0.29 0.50 0.08 0.32 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.38
#4 0.39 0.08 0.37 0.16 0.30 0.08 0.31 0.31 0.48 0.08 0.34 0.10 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.35
Home owner 0.37 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.35 0.08 0.30 0.26 0.52 0.08 0.31 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.43
Does not own a home 0.40 0.08 0.37 0.15 0.33 0.08 0.31 0.28 0.46 0.08 0.35 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.41
Democrat 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.34 0.08 0.30 0.27 0.47 0.08 0.35 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.44
Not a Democrat 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.33 0.08 0.31 0.28 0.53 0.08 0.30 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.40
Membership in pan-ethnic org. 0.35 0.08 0.39 0.18 0.30 0.08 0.31 0.31 0.41 0.08 0.38 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.27 0.50
Not a member 0.41 0.08 0.36 0.15 0.39 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.52 0.08 0.31 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.41
Generation
0 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.42 0.09 0.29 0.21 0.51 0.08 0.32 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.26 0.45
1 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.38 0.09 0.30 0.23 0.48 0.08 0.34 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.27 0.38
2 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.35 0.08 0.31 0.26 0.45 0.08 0.36 0.11 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.31
3 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.16 0.31 0.08 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.25
Foreign born 0.45 0.08 0.34 0.13 0.45 0.09 0.27 0.19 0.51 0.08 0.32 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.35
Native born 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.17 0.32 0.08 0.31 0.29 0.49 0.08 0.33 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.26 0.46
Foreign-language dominant ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.24 0.07 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.08 0.35 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.51
English-language dominant ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.35 0.08 0.30 0.26 0.53 0.08 0.30 0.08 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.33
Common political interests ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.47 0.09 0.35 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.27 0.48
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.51 0.08 0.33 0.08 0.19 0.21 0.29 0.32
Common economic interests ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.46 0.09 0.35 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.28 0.45
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.53 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.30
Ethnic media use ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.49 0.09 0.34 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.28 0.46
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.49 0.09 0.34 0.09 0.18 0.21 0.29 0.32
Ethnic subgroup
Caribbean (34% of sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.42 0.09 0.29 0.21 ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Filipino (13% of sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.62 0.08 0.25 0.05 ___ ___ ___ ___
Indian (19% of sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.36 0.09 0.31 0.25 0.57 0.08 0.28 0.06 ___ ___ ___ ___
Vietnamese (14% of sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.33 0.08 0.31 0.27 0.48 0.09 0.34 0.09 ___ ___ ___ ___
Japanese (9% of sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.35 0.09 0.31 0.25 0.47 0.09 0.35 0.09 ___ ___ ___ ___
Korean (17% of sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.28 0.07 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.08 0.40 0.13 ___ ___ ___ ___
Central American (9% ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.46
South American (5% sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.12 0.16 0.28 0.45
Puerto Rican (10% sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.35
Dominican (4% sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.11 0.15 0.28 0.46
Cuban (4% sample) ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.13 0.17 0.28 0.41
Asian Americans Latinos Whites Blacks
80

NPS does not question Whites on their language usage. Finally, while experience with
discrimination correlates positively with increased feelings of linked fate among Whites,
it fails to reach statistical significance. Yet, it is interesting to note that those who
experienced the highest amount of discrimination have a 6% increased likelihood of
expressing “a lot” of linked fate than those who have experienced no discrimination. The
fact that experience with discrimination fails to reach significance is driven largely by the
fact that Whites as a whole report fewer experiences with discrimination (50% of Whites
reported “no” discrimination and only 3% reported “a lot”).
The model I estimate for Blacks does a better job of identifying significant
determinants of linked fate. The strongest determinant of heightened levels of linked fate
amongst Blacks is their individual experience with discrimination. Blacks who report
experiencing “a lot” of discrimination and unfair treatment have a 23% increased
likelihood of expressing the highest level of linked fate than those who expressed
“none”.
1
In terms of socio-demographic factors, perceptions of linked fate increases with
both education and income. Blacks who pursue their education beyond a college degree
have a .14 increased probability of expressing the highest level of linked fate than those
who fail to attain the high school diploma. While the impact of income fails to reach
significance, it is also positively correlated with perceptions of linked fate.
2
Although it

1
Previous work on African Americans attitudes has noted that an individual’s perception that their group as
a whole is discriminated—in addition to his/her individual experience with discrimination—leads to a
heightened sense of linked fate. Unfortunately, there is not a consistent measure of perceived
discrimination in all three of my data sources. Since this work seeks to explore the contours of linked fate
across pan-ethnic groups, I chose to exclude perceived discrimination from the models. However, when
perceived discrimination is incorporated in the model for Blacks, I do find that is both positive and highly
significant. Yet, it does not alter the direction or significance of other variables in the model.
2
When education was excluded, the impact of income increased both in terms of the magnitude of the
coefficient and its statistical significance. In addition, the effect of foreign-language dominance also
81

may appear surprisingly that partisanship exerts no significant independent effect on
perceptions of linked fate among Blacks, it perhaps should not be considering the fact
that Blacks almost exclusively identify as Democratic (close to 90%), which limits the
amount of variation that can be explained. In addition, membership in a pan-ethnic
organization is positively correlated with perceptions of linked fate. Blacks who are
members of churches in which membership is majority-Black have a .31 likelihood of
perceiving “a lot” of linked fate, in contrast to a .23 likelihood for those who are not
members. Finally, my model illustrates the important role that immigration status has on
perceptions of linked fate for Blacks. Perceptions of linked fate increase across
generations; those who are foreign born have an 11% increased likelihood of perceiving
no linked fate in comparison to those who have been here for three generations or more.
English-dominant speakers have a 12% decreased likelihood of expressing the highest
level of linked fate than those who are foreign-language dominant. Although it initially
appears inconsistent for English fluency and generation to move in opposite directions, it
is important to note that questions concerning language fluency were asked only of Afro
Caribbeans. Thus, we may only conclude that foreign-language dominance increases
perceptions of linked fate among this subsample of Blacks.
Now turning to Asian Americans, I similarly find that the model does a relatively
good job of identifying significant factors of perceptions of linked fate. Similar to Blacks,
experience with discrimination appears to be one of the strongest determinants of
increased perceptions of linked fate for Asian Americans. While those who experience no

increased in significance (0.1 level). The size of the sample increased very slightly, but the model fit was
slightly reduced.
82

discrimination have a 54% probability of expressing no linked fate, the probability drops
to 30% among those who experience the highest level of discrimination. In terms of
socio-demographic indicators, only age is a significant predictor of increased levels of
linked fate. A one standard-deviation increase in age (approximately 14 years) decreases
the likelihood of linked fate by 2 percentage points. While neither income nor education
reaches significance, it is important to note that similar to Blacks, Asian American
perceptions of linked fate increase with both income and education.
3
Partisan identity
also plays an important role for Asian Americans, with Asian Democrats having a 3%
increased likelihood of expressing “a lot” of linked fate, and a 5% increased likelihood of
expressing “some” linked fate. Similarly, those who are members of a civic
organization(s) that is majority-Asian have a .04 increased likelihood of expressing “a
lot” of linked fate and a .07 increased likelihood of expressing “some” linked fate.
Whereas the number of generations one’s family has been in the United States is not a
significant factor for Asian Americans, those who are Asian-language dominant express a
higher level of linked fate. Those who speak primarily in an Asian language have an 8%
decreased likelihood of expressing no linked fate than those who are fluent in English.
Lastly, I turn to my model of linked fate for Latinos. First and foremost, while
experience with discrimination is a strong predictor of increased linked fate for both
Asian Americans and Blacks, this is not the case for Latinos. Latinos who experience
discrimination are no more likely to express linked fate than those who do not. In terms of
socio-demographic factors, only income exerts a significant impact on perceptions of

3
While neither income nor education reaches significance at the 0.1 level, the direction for both variables is
positive. In addition, the removal of either income or education from the model results in the remaining
variable reaching significance.
83

linked fate. However, in contrast to Blacks and Asian Americans, income is negatively
associated with perceptions of linked fate for Latinos. Latinos who live in households that
earn less than $35,000 have a 45% likelihood of expressing “a lot” of linked fate in
comparison to 35% for Latinos whose family income is greater than $65,000. Although
education is positively associated with heightened levels of linked fate for the other
groups, education is both negative and insignificant for Latinos. Latinos are similar to
Asian Americans in that those who are Democrat or are members of a civic organization
that is majority-Latino express heightened levels of linked fate. Latino Democrats have a
4% increased likelihood of expressing “a lot” of linked fate and those who are members
of a predominantly Latino organization have an even higher likelihood at 11%. Finally,
factors pertaining to immigration prove to be very important for Latinos. Similar to both
Blacks and Asian Americans, Latinos who are English-dominant speakers express lower
levels of linked fate than those who are more proficient in a foreign language. However,
unlike the other groups, English fluency is the most significant predictor of heightened
levels of linked fate for Latinos; Spanish-dominant Latinos have an 18% increased
likelihood of expressing the highest level of linked fate. Even more apparent is how
generation in the United States operates uniquely for Latinos. For both Blacks and Asian
Americans, perceptions of linked fate increase across generations in the United States. In
stark contrast, the longer one’s family has been in the United States, the less likely
Latinos are to express a heightened perception of linked fate. Foreign-born Latinos have a
45% probability of expressing “a lot” of linked fate, in comparison to 25% for Latinos
who are third-generation or more. In fact, Latinos who are third-generation or more are as
likely to express “no” or “a little” linked fate as they are to express “some” or “a lot”.
84

Thus, my model lends support for the hypothesis that Latinos are more likely to follow a
traditional pattern of straight-line assimilation. Perceptions of linked fate are highest
among Latinos who are second-language dominant, recent newcomers, and have low
levels of income. Whereas Latinos who are fluent in English, whose family has resided in
the United States for an extended period of time, and who earn higher levels of income
express lower levels of linked fate.

5. Differences in Perceptions of Pan-ethnic Linked Fate by Ethnicity
Scholars of immigration, as well as those interested in race and ethnicity, have
highlighted the significant challenges that both Latinos and Asian Americans face in the
development of a shared identity and group consciousness. First and foremost, it is
important to remember that neither group has a strong pan-ethnic identity—either via a
process of ascription or self-identification—prior to their arrival in the United States. -
Instead, they identify along ethnic or national-origin lines (i.e. Mexican or Vietnamese).
Thus, while political pundits may point to an immigrants’ maintenance of their pan-
ethnic identity as a sign of their unwillingness to shed their former identity and adopt an
American one, I argue that the adoption of a pan-ethnic identity is a result of their
segmented assimilation into American society. Immigrants do not bring a pan-ethnic
identity with them from their native origin, but rather the development of a pan-ethnic
identity is the result of a process of racialization that immigrants encounter upon their
arrival to the United States. For immigrants from the Caribbean, Asia, and Latin
America, to be Americanized may in fact mean to be racialized. However, rather than
highlighting the significant barrier that race places on assimilation, far too often a groups’
85

delayed assimilation is attributed to the immigrant group themselves. Instead I contend
that the lack of political assimilation of racial minorities ought to be deemed a failure on
the part of the receiving society. Political access in America continues to be drawn along
racial lines and the expression of pan-ethnic linked fate is a symptom of the underlying
racial hierarchy and individuals’ awareness of their marginalized status.
My motivation to conduct further subgroup analysis is driven equally by
theoretical and empirical concerns. First and foremost, scholars of race and ethnicity,
have cautioned researchers from too rashly assuming that Latinos and Asian Americans
share similar political attitudes and behaviors (C.J. Kim and Lee 2001; Segura &
Rodrigues 2006). They point to the wide degree of diversity that exists within the larger
pan-ethnic group. For instance, Latinos vary significantly in terms of measures of social
mobility, religion, nation of origin, citizenship, factors pertaining to immigration, and a
host of other factors that would suggest a diversity of political attitudes and behaviors.
For Asian Americans, the lack of a shared language may pose an additional barrier to the
development of linked fate. As recent immigrants, different ethnic groups had different
reasons for immigrating to the United States, brought with them differing levels of
resources, and encountered differing levels of reception upon their arrival to United
States. Thus, both contextual and individual theories of political attitudes and behavior
would suggest that significant ethnic differences are likely to exist within the larger pan-
ethnic group.
Empirical work on group consciousness and identity formation has found
evidence of such ethnic variation (Masuoka 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; J. Wong
et al. 2011). The descriptive data analyzed in this study also supports differences in pan-
86

ethnic linked fate by national origin. Afro Caribbeans surveyed in the NPS expressed
lower levels of linked fate than African Americans, with only 45% reporting “a lot” or
“some” linked fate in comparison to 56%. The NAAS similarly asked respondents their
ethnicity, and has sizable samples of Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Vietnamese, Korean, and
Japanese. Korean Americans express the highest level of linked fate, with 53%
expressing “a lot” or “some” linked fate. Chinese Americans express the second-highest
level of linked fate, with 39% perceiving a heightened level of linked fate, followed by
Indian Americans (36%), Vietnamese Americans (34%), and Japanese-Americans (33%).
While these groups expressed similar levels of linked fate, only 1 in 4 Filipino Americans
express “a lot” or “some” linked fate. Similar to the NAAS, the LNS also asked
respondents their ethnicity and include sizable samples of Mexicans, Central Americans,
South Americans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans.
4
While the ethnic variation in
perceptions of linked fate is not as great as those of Asian Americans significant variation
exists nonetheless. Mexican Americans, South Americans, Central Americans, and
Dominicans express the highest levels of linked fate, with approximately 2/3
rds
of each
group expressing “a lot” or “some” linked fate. Cubans Americans and Puerto Ricans
express lower levels of linked fate at 56% and 55% respectively.
To test for ethnic differences in perception of linked fate within the larger pan-
ethnic group, I construct models that include dummy variables for each of the largest
ethnic subgroups (see Table 2.7). The inclusion of ethnic dummy variables does not
enable me to fully explore the degree to which the determinants of linked fate vary by

4
Neither Central American nor South American represent national origin or ethnicity but rather represent a
region from which a group emigrated. Individuals whose families originated in these regions were grouped
together so sample sizes would be sufficiently large enough to conduct meaningful analysis.
87

ethnicity. It does, however, allow me to see whether perceptions of linked fate vary
significantly by ethnicity after controlling for psychological, socio-demographic,
political, and immigration factors. For my Asian American and Latino models, I also
include a measure of ethnic media use, as well as two measures that ask the degree to
which individuals felt common economic interests and common political interests with
other members of their pan-ethnic group (see Table 2.3 for question wording). A measure
of ethnic media is included for these groups because ethnic media has been found to play
a significant in role in ethnic mobilization (Pantoja, Menjívar, & Magaña 2008; Ramirez
2013). The additional measures of perceived common economic and political interests
were added to test the degree to which economic and/or political factors are associated
with perceptions of linked fate.
My model for Blacks suggests that Afro Caribbeans have significantly lower
levels of linked fate than African Americans, even after controlling for psychological,
socio-demographic, political, and immigration factors. While Afro Caribbeans have a
21% likelihood of expressing “a lot” of linked fate, they are twice as likely to express no
linked fate (see Table 2.6). Compare that with African Americans who have close to a
10% increased likelihood of expressing the highest level of linked fate. Although the
dummy-variable approach limits my ability to test whether the variables in my model
operate consistently for both Afro Caribbeans and African Americans, we can identify
how the addition of an Afro Caribbean variable to the model alters the direction or impact
of other variables in the model. Table 2.8 displays in a stylized fashion how the
significance and direction of the covariates compares across the models. Controlling for
Afro Caribbeans attenuates the effect of education and generation. In fact the impact of
88

Table 2.7: Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate by Ethnic
Subgroup

generation is no longer significant suggesting that much of the variation between African
Americans and Afro Caribbeans can be attributed to the recent arrival of most Afro
Caribbeans. While just under half of Afro Caribbeans are foreign born, over 90% of
African Americans have been in the United States for three generations or longer. Yet
despite their recent arrival, Afro Caribbeans report similar levels of discrimination (20%
of Afro Caribbeans report experiencing “a lot” of discrimination compared to 23% of
African Americans) suggesting race remains a significant barrier to their assimilation.
β Sig SE OR β SIG SE OR β SIG SE OR
Caribbean American -0.4778 * 0.2548 0.62 ___ ___ ___
Filipino American ___ ___ ___ -0.6011 *** 0.1860 0.55 ___ ___ ___
Indian American ___ ___ ___ -0.3901 ** 0.1934 0.68 ___ ___ ___
Vietnamese American ___ ___ ___ 0.0399 0.1944 1.04 ___ ___ ___
Japanese American ___ ___ ___ 0.0529 0.2067 1.05 ___ ___ ___
Korean American
___ ___ ___ 0.5330 *** 0.1658 1.70 ___ ___ ___
Central American ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.2271 * 0.1209 1.25
South American ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.1631 0.1439 1.18
Puerto Rican American ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ -0.2739 ** 0.1116 0.76
Dominican American ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.1844 0.1740 1.20
Cuban American ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.0011 0.1440 1.00
Experienced discrimination 1.1790 *** 0.2855 3.25 1.0282 *** 0.2965 2.80 0.1127 0.1391 1.12
Age 0.0027 0.0054 1.00 -0.0075 * 0.0039 0.99 0.0032 0.0021 1.00
Education 0.1425 * 0.0800 1.15 0.0440 0.0503 1.05 -0.0234 0.0293 0.98
Income 0.1145 0.0719 1.12 0.1117 * 0.0597 1.12 -0.0934 *** 0.0340 0.91
Home ownership -0.1463 0.1694 0.86 -0.2795 ** 0.1378 0.76 0.0132 0.0711 1.01
Democratic -0.0714 0.2373 0.93 0.2457 ** 0.1106 1.28 0.1588 ** 0.0642 1.17
Membership in pan-ethnic org.
0.4878 *** 0.1688 1.63 0.4854 *** 0.1553 1.62 0.3555 ** 0.1523 1.43
Generation 0.0478 0.1036 0.11 0.0402 0.1400 1.04 -0.1497 *** 0.0508 0.86
Foreign-language dominant 0.6996 ** 0.3362 0.68 0.0061 0.1314 1.01 0.7410 *** 0.0843 2.10
Common political interests ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.1540 0.1225 1.17 0.6708 *** 0.0734 1.96
Common economic interests ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.2622 ** 0.1295 1.30 0.6183 *** 0.0835 1.86
Ethnic media use ___ ___ ___ ___ -0.0156 0.1411 0.98 0.5581 *** 0.0867 1.75
N
χ
2
(d.f.)
df
Pseudo R
2
9
53.24
999
N is weighted
For the Asian and Latino models, Chinese and Mexicans are the reference groups. These two groups were selected because they both represent
the largest ethnic subgroup and their mean level of linked fate were very close to the overall group mean.
Black Asian American Latino
0.070
16
654.10
6012
* p<0.1 **p<0.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed test)
0.040
16
102.44(16)
2588
0.040
89

Table 2.8: Stylized Table of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate
by Ethnic Subgroup

My analysis also suggests variations in Asian American perceptions of pan-ethnic
linked fate by nation of origin. Korean Americans have the highest likelihood of
expressing pan-ethnic linked fate. Korean Americans have a .53 likelihood of expressing
“a lot” or ‘some” linked fate, which is significantly higher than Chinese Americans.
Although Japanese and Vietnamese Americans do not differ significantly from Chinese
Americans, both Indian Americans and Filipino Americans express significantly lower
levels of linked fate. After controlling for other factors, Indian Americans have a 57%
Experienced discrimination + *** + *** + *** + ***
Age - ** - *
Education + ** + *
Income + * - *** - ***
Home ownership - **
Democratic + ** + ** + *** + **
Membership in pan-ethnic org. + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** + **
Generation - ** - *** - ***
Foreign-language dominant + * + ** + *** + *** + ***
Common political interests + ***
Common economic interests + ** + ***
Ethnic media use + ***
Caribbean American - *
Filipino American - ***
Indian American - **
Vietnamese American
Japanese American
Korean American + ***
Central American + *
South American
Puerto Rican American - **
Dominican American
Cuban American
N
χ
2
(d.f.)
Pseudo R
2
0.030 0.040
Full Model
Model with
Ethnic Dummy
999 999
44.67(8) 53.24 102.44(16)
Full Model
Model with
Ethnic Dummy
0.020 0.040
2679 2588
N is weighted, Robust standard errors
Blacks Asian Americans Latinos
* p<0.10 **p<0.05, ***p<0.01(two-tailed test)
(+, -) Signifies a positive or negative effect, a blank cell signifies a nonsignificant effect
Full Model
Model with
Ethnic Dummy
6186 6012
415.45(8) 654.10(16)
0.040 0.070
59.28(8)
90

likelihood of expressing no linked fate, topped only by Filipino Americans at 62%. The
model also suggests that perceptions of linked fate are more highly correlated to
perceptions of shared economic interests than shared political ones. Controlling for
ethnicity attenuated differences by age and increased the independent impact of both
income and home ownership.
Finally, my model provides evidence that perceptions of Latino linked fate are not
wholly consistent across national origin groups. South Americans, Dominicans, and
Cubans all share similar perceptions of linked fate with Mexican Americans after
controlling for the other variables in the model.
5
Central Americans have a slightly
increased likelihood of expressing heightened levels of linked fate, while Puerto Ricans
have a decreased likelihood. Puerto Ricans have a 7% decreased likelihood of expressing
“a lot” of linked fate and a 4% greater likelihood of expressing no linked fate. My model
suggests that lower perceptions of linked fate among Puerto Ricans cannot be fully
attributed to psychological, socio-demographic, political or immigration factors. The
attenuated impact of my political measures—partisanship and membership in a pan-
ethnic organization—suggests that political factors may not operate uniformly across
ethnic groups. Unlike Asian Americans, perceptions of linked fate are tied to both
perceptions of shared economic and political interests. Finally, ethnic media use is a
strong predictor of linked fate for Latino. Latinos who rely on Spanish-language media as
an important source of political information have a 40% likelihood of expressing the
highest level of linked fate, in contrast to 32% for those who rely solely on English-

5
Similar to Chinese-Americans, Mexican Americans were selected as the reference group because they
make up the largest share of Latinos in the United States and their mean level of linked fate was closest to
the mean of all Latinos.
91

language media. This finding suggests that ethnic media may serve as an important
conduit for heightened pan-ethnic linked fate for Latinos. Whereas the diversity of
languages used by Asian Americans may limit the impact of ethnic media on the
development of Asian American linked fate, Latinos may turn to their shared language as
a source of solidarity.
This body of analysis lends support to the hypothesis that perceptions of linked
fate do, in fact, vary along ethnic lines. However, it is important to remember that the
majority of Asian Americans, Latinos, and Afro Caribbean are relative newcomers to
United States. Just as Dawson argued that linked fate for African Americans is the result
of an enduring, shared history of discrimination, we may similarly expect it to take
multiple generations for these groups. In addition, I find that African Americans are no
more monolithic in perceptions of linked fate than are other racial minorities. Afro
Caribbeans, similar to immigrants from Latin America or Asia, are not African American
prior to their arrival in the United States. The reception they receive in America will go a
long way in determining whether or not they developed a similar level of linked fate as
African Americans who have long resided in this country.
6. Conclusion: Assimilation and Racialization
My comparative study of perceptions of linked fate among Whites, Blacks, Asian
Americans and Latinos only begins to scratch the surface of a complex set of historically-
contingent and context-dependent circumstances that influence racial group
consciousness at the individual level. While the results of my analysis cannot make the
strong case that pluralism is a fantasy in American democratic politics, the findings
nevertheless support the position of detractors from Dahl’s vision of group-based
92

pluralism played out on a level field. Instead, individual-level data aggregated across
representative samples of Americans classified by race shows both cross-group variation
as well as high levels of perceptions of pan-ethnic linked fate. Ironically—if only because
they are the one group who are classified by the U.S. Federal Government explicitly as an
ethnicity rather than a race—Latinos have the highest rates of linked fate compared with
Whites, Blacks and Asian Americans. Alternatively, it is Asian Americans—the newest
of the newcomers and heavily immigrant—who report the lowest levels of linked fate.
While there are many interesting comparisons to draw from the comparative data
on the frequency of linked fate perceptions by group, the most important findings from
my analysis speak to the extent to which it is racialization or assimilation at work in
developing perceptions of linked fate. I found that the inferential model specifying
psychological, socio-demographic, political, and immigration factors explained almost
none of the variation among Whites, and only increased education predicted higher levels
of linked fate. This runs counter to the belief that education leads to increased tolerance
and thus would reduce perceptions of racial differences.
6
While it is not surprising that
White respondents reported far fewer experiences with discrimination, it is noteworthy
that those who did were more likely to perceive their individual interests to be linked to
that of their group. The study of White racial consciousness may become increasingly
important as Whites make up a smaller percentage of the American population, and as a
result fear that their position atop the racial hierarchy is threatened.

6
This assertion is further challenged by the negative correlation between Whites’ perception of linked fate
and the degree to which they perceive commonality with Blacks. When asked how close they felt to ideas,
interests and feelings of Blacks, individuals who responded "not very close" also reported significantly
higher levels of pan-ethnic linked fate.
93

For African Americans, the results are consistent with an explanation of
continuing racialization. As Dawson and others previously documented, discrimination
plays a pivotal role in perceptions of linked fate felt by Blacks. Membership in pan-ethnic
organizations, in particular majority-Black churches, continues to play a central role in
heightened perceptions of linked fate. The pervasive effects of racial discrimination are
not tempered by social mobility, and in fact, Blacks with higher levels of education and
income are more likely to express higher levels of linked fate. Although high levels of
racial consciousness among African Americans have been well documented, my work
provides evidence that these high levels are not felt equally by all Blacks in America.
Afro Caribbeans express significantly lower levels of linked fate than their African
American counterparts. A significant part of this story relates to factors pertaining to their
more recent arrival to the United States. Afro Caribbeans have not been subjected to
generations of exclusion and racism as have the majority of African Americans, which
Dawson argues is the driving force behind the development of linked fate. However, my
model suggests they share the same antecedents to linked fate—namely experience with
discrimination, increased education, and membership in Black churches—which suggests
they are likely to follow a similar trajectory as African Americans.
For Asian Americans, the estimates show a more mixed bag, including elements
of both racialization as well as assimilation. Contrary to common perceptions, Asian
Americans showed striking similarities to Blacks. For both groups individual experience
with discrimination is the strongest determinant of linked fate and measures of social
mobility—namely increased education and income—do nothing to decrease perceptions
of linked fate. These findings suggest that for African and Asian Americans social
94

mobility does not provide a sufficient remedy for racialization. Furthermore, while the
majority of Asian Americans are foreign born, making it difficult to measure how
perceptions of linked fate change over the course of multiple generations in the United
States, my model suggests that, if anything, levels of linked fate increase. Collectively,
this evidence stands in stark contrast to the perception that Asian Americans are easily
and quickly assimilating without the need or benefit of civil rights consciousness or
advocacy. These results caution against this conclusion, which has until now been based
too hastily on the demonstration of relatively low levels of pan-ethnic linked fate in this
heavily immigrant group. The recent arrival of most Asian Americans, coupled with the
groups’ extensive diversity—in terms of language, national origin, culture, and, factors
pertaining to their migration—makes it unsurprising that they would initially demonstrate
lower levels of linked fate. I find evidence of significant intragroup differences in
perceptions of linked fate, suggesting Asian Americans have yet to fully coalesce along
pan-ethnic lines. On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind the African
Americans did not develop high levels of linked fate overnight, but rather it required an
enduring and pervasive shared history of discrimination. Although Asian American
linked fate is currently low, personal experience with discrimination is likely to
crystallize their racial identity, as well as make them more cognizant of their
marginalized position on the American racial hierarchy. Whereas my data is not
longitudinal and thus does not allow me to properly assess change over time, my findings
stress the importance of closer study of the integration of Asian Americans, who now
make up the largest share of American immigration.
95

The findings for Latinos are equally interesting because they highlight the
strength of assimilation rather than racialization factors in predicting perceptions of
linked fate. Despite the fact that Latinos report the highest levels of linked fate in
response to the questions on group consciousness, indicators of assimilation such as
education and income are either non-significant (educational attainment) or negative.
This is just the opposite pattern to what we see for Whites, Blacks, and Asian Americans.
Furthermore, perceptions of linked fate are lowest among those whose family have been
here the longest and are fluent in English. At the same time, the recognition of
racialization in terms of group-based discrimination is non-significant for Latinos,
meaning that there is no effect of experiencing bias on perceptions of linked fate. Perhaps
the shared physical characteristics of many Latinos and Whites, coupled with their legal
recognition as “White” makes the impact of race less pervasive for many Latinos.
Collectively, these findings suggest the trajectory of Latinos may be one of
assimilation as opposed to racialization. Similar to European immigrants before them, a
combined process of acculturation and social mobility may lead to decreased perceptions
of Latino linked fate. If Latinos do follow a straight-line path of assimilation, we could
expect both a diminished impact of pan-ethnic organizations, as well as a more equal
distribution along partisan lines. On the other hand, while my model suggests that linked
fate decreases with measures of assimilation for Latinos, assimilation is far from assured.
Latinos did express the highest levels of linked fate, and as we saw in the 2006
Immigration marches, and more recently in the opposition to SB1070 in Arizona, Latinos
have shown the ability to mobilize along pan-ethnic lines in the face of threat. This seems
particularly true in matters pertaining to immigration policy. Immigration policy remains
96

central to matters of identity and group consciousness, in that it both literally and
figuratively serves as a gateway to full membership in the American polity. Thus, the
future course America takes on the issue of immigration is likely to impact the political
trajectory of Latinos. A path to citizenship for some may in fact provide a path to
assimilation for many more.
Taken together the results of my analysis support the notion that the dynamics of
pan-ethnic consciousness is complex and multifaceted. Political context, in terms of time
and place, are significant variants, and perceptions of pan-ethnic linked fate may wax and
wane over time as policies target some groups and favor others. In an age of
comprehensive immigration reform, I expect to see more variation in linked fate as the
“winners” and “losers” of policy reform become apparent.

97

Chapter 3
Does Immigration Policy Look Differently
through Color-Tinted Glasses?
White, Latino, and Asian American Attitudes toward Immigration in
the 2010 California Election

1. Introduction
“Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The
wretched refuse of your teeming shore, Send these, the homeless, tempest tost to me, I lift
my lamp beside the golden door!”

These powerful words are not merely etched on a plaque affixed to the Statue of
Liberty, but rather are etched into our very identity as Americans. Over the course of our
history, we have identified ourselves as a “Land of Immigrants.” However, as we look
back affectionately at our immigrant past, we remain divided over our immigrant future.
In his seminal piece, The Politics of Immigration Control in America, Tichenor (2002)
argues that while immigration has remained an enduring, salient issue throughout our
history, both the design of, and support for, immigration policy have been highly volatile.
Not only has policy continuously shifted from restrictive to expansive, but so too has the
partisan, racial, and class-based coalitions that have pushed for changes in immigration
policy. The ongoing shift in immigration policy, public opinion, and the composition of
our population requires that researchers carefully design research to keep pace with these
changes.
While the federal government is the only body authorized to dictate entry
policy—that is, who may enter the country, when, and with which permissions—states
have some control over abode policies. Abode policies affect the way immigrants live
their daily lives and states can and do prescribe many of the rights and public services to
98

which immigrants do and do not have access. States are provided the authority to regulate
and provide access to key services including health care, education, law enforcement, and
driver licensing. Furthermore, while federal immigration policy may be constant, the
manner in which it is enforced may vary tremendously from state to state. The recent
passage of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act
(SB1070), as well as the subsequent passage of similar bills in a host of other states,
demonstrates that immigration policy is not uniform from state to state. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court, in U.S. vs. Arizona (2012), struck down multiple elements of
SB1070, thus effectively halting similar bills proposed in other states, the Court allowed
Arizona to maintain one its more controversial elements. Law enforcement officers are
still authorized to request legal documentation of citizenship from individuals they
suspect may be undocumented immigrants. In effect, the Court provides states with a
degree of flexibility regarding both the passage and enforcement of immigration policy.
Thus, merely studying public opinion at the national level may mask the wide degree of
variation in both public opinion and policy that exists from state to state. A nation as
diverse as the United States, with a system of federal institutions, requires that we explore
how opinion varies across space and toward a diverse “patchwork” of proposed
immigration policies.
California provides the ideal location to study the diversity of public opinion
toward a host of proposed immigration policies. First, while immigration is a salient issue
throughout the United States, it is particularly relevant to California voters given the
state’s physical proximity to Mexico and because of its status as the state with the largest
immigrant population. Second, the persistent flow of immigration to California has led to
99

a highly diverse population in terms of race and ethnicity, and thus allows for a thorough
analysis of how opinion varies across groups. Third, California has long been a state
where a diversity of immigration policies—ranging from admissive to restrictive—have
been both proposed and enacted. For instance, Proposition 187, which was initially
passed by the California electorate only to be overturned by a U.S. Federal Court, sought
to prohibit undocumented immigrants from accessing health care, public education, and
other social services provided by the State of California. Yet, less than a decade later, on
July 25
th
, 2001 Governor Jerry Brown signed into law AB130, also known as the
D.R.E.A.M. Act. This piece of legislation makes children of undocumented residents
who graduated from a California high school and who are registered at either a California
Community College or a California State University eligible for in-state tuition and
publicly funded financial aid.
This study employs data generated by the USC/LA Times 2010 California
Election Poll to assess the current attitudes of California voters on immigration policy.
My analysis will first examine whether public attitudes vary across two distinct forms of
immigration policy: a path to citizenship and the proposed reduction of the visa backlog.
Second, I will analyze how Whites, Latinos, and Asian Americans as collective groups
hold significantly different attitudes toward these polices. Finally, statistical models of
factors predicting variation in attitudes toward immigration will be estimated. My results
illustrate that pan-ethnic groups differ not only in their level of support for distinct
immigration policies, but also in the antecedents to these attitudes. In so doing, my results
strengthen the case that an accurate understanding of public opinion in an increasingly
diverse population requires an alternative approach. This article will proceed as follows:
100

(1) a review of the relevant literature and my theoretical expectations; (2) a discussion of
my data and modeling strategies; (3) interpretation of the results; and (4) discussion and
conclusions.

2. Review of the Literature
2.1 Theories of Public Opinion that Stress Individual-level Determinants
A great deal has been written on the formation of attitudes towards members of
another race or culture and resulting levels of intergroup conflict. The self-interest theory,
sometimes referred to as the economic threat theory (Citrin and Green 1990; Kluegel and
Smith 1986; Mayda 2004; Olzak 1992), argues that favorable attitudes toward a member
of another culture or race are largely dependent upon the level of perceived threat that
this culture/race has on valuable material resources. In this “pocketbook logic,” the
greater the perceived threat, the more vulnerable the individual will feel, resulting in the
development of more hostile attitudes toward the out-group.
Another model that has been proposed to explain intergroup hostility is social
identity, or the classic prejudice model (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Feldman and
Huddy 2005; Jackman 1994; Katz 1991; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears
1981; Mendelberg 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). The prejudice model
is similar to the self-interest model in that it argues that attitudes are formulated at the
individual level. However, proponents of the prejudice model argue that attitude
formation is an irrational calculus that is primarily driven by one’s psychological
predisposition (Sears and Funk 1990). Hostility toward another group is driven not by a
competition over finite resources, but rather prejudice. Political elites, via the media, may
101

activate prejudice in one’s evaluation of policy by implicit racial cues (Jamieson 1992;
Mendelberg 2001) or by preexisting linkages between race and particular issues and
forms of policy (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 1999; 2002; White 2007). In either
case, advocates of the social identity model argue that opposition to race-conscious
policy is primarily the result of “racial resentment” (Kinder and Sanders 1996), “cultural
threat” (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), or “symbolic racism” (Kinder and
Sears 1981).
7

Both social-identity and economic threat theory have been utilized to explain
public attitudes toward both immigrants and immigration policy. While immigration is
not explicitly associated with any one pan-ethnic group, it has been increasingly
associated with Latino and Asian Americans, who not only make-up the largest
proportion of the total immigrant population, but also as racial minorities are more likely
to have physical characteristics that make them more distinguishable from the majority of
the native population (Ha 2010; Junn and Masuoka 2008). Work by Brader, Valentino,
and Suhay (2008) demonstrates that racial cues—in this case Latino Americans—trigger
oppositional attitudes toward immigration. A multitude of empirical work has sought to
test whether economic self-interest or prejudice provide better explanations of attitudes
toward immigration policy.

7
Sniderman, Crosby, & Howell (2000) contend that White opposition to government programs that assist
African Americans, such as welfare, is rooted in their preference for a small state as opposed to racial
resentment. Thus, racial resentment measures are rooted in ideological as opposed to prejudicial attitudes.
Feldman & Huddy (2005) employ an experimental design to empirically test whether ideology or racial
prejudice is a strong explanatory variable for White opposition to publicly funded educational support.
While they find Whites were less likely to support race-based scholarships—thereby challenging the claim
that racial resentment is based on ideological rather than prejudicial concerns—they also find that racial
resentment measures fail to adequately capture the role of prejudice in attitude formation.
102

Multiple empirical studies on immigration have provided support for three
hypotheses deduced from economic threat theory. First, individuals who are in a more
tenuous economic state, due to either unemployment or because they possess a low-
skilled job, will perceive immigrants as a greater threat and thus will be more
oppositional toward immigrants (Citrin and Green 1990) and increased levels of
immigration (Mayda 2004). Second, individuals may use the state of the national
economy as a heuristic for their individual economic future, and thus be more
oppositional towards immigration when the nation is facing a period of economic
downturn (Citrin et al. 1997; Mayda 2004). Third, individuals who are in a higher income
bracket may fear that new immigrants will be an increased drain on social services, and
thus wealthier individuals will be more oppositional toward immigration due to the
increased tax burden that they face (Passel and Fix 1994; Citrin et al. 1997).
Contrary to these findings, empirical work in Europe (Sides and Citrin 2007;
Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004) and the United States (Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay 2008; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Citrin and Green 1990;
Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Hood and Morris 1997) have found support that social
identity, as opposed to economic self-interest, is a stronger predictor of public support for
more restrictive forms of immigration policy. Sniderman and his colleagues (2004) argue
that the primary causal mechanism driving exclusionary reactions to immigrant
minorities is a need for “positive differentiation”—the desire to elevate evaluations of
one’s own group by downgrading evaluations of other groups. Within the United States
context empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between prejudice toward
Latino and/or Asian Americans and opposition to increased levels of immigration (Burns
103

and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Espenshade and
Calhoun 1993).

2.2 Theories that Stress the Role of Groups in Attitude Formation
An alternative set of theories that attempt to explain intergroup attitudes and
hostility are typically referred to as group-position models (Blaylock 1967; Blumer 1958;
Bobo 1999). Group- position models shift the unit of analysis from the individual to the
group. This line of theorizing argues that in-groups collectively formulate, diffuse, and
maintain collective attitudes toward out-groups (Tajfel & Turner 1979). It is theorized
that these attitudes are largely the result of structural inequalities and may be reinforced
over time. A group’s attitude toward other groups is largely determined by the hierarchal
position they hold in society, and is thus “a subjective image of where the in-group ought
to stand vis-à-vis the out-group” (Blumer 1958, 4). Although this theory was initially
developed to explain White attitudes toward Blacks, recent work has sought to adapt the
theory to explain intergroup attitudes in a multi-ethnic society (Bobo and Hutchings
1996; Hopkins 2010; 2011; Junn and Masuoka 2011; C.J. Kim 1999; 2003; Masuoka and
Junn 2013; Oliver & J. Wong 1993; Sanchez 2006a; 2006b; White 2007).
Whereas a great deal of empirical work has applied these theories to explain
explicit race-conscious policies (principally affirmative action), as well as issues or
policies that have become implicitly associated with race (most notably crime and
welfare), less work has been done to apply these theories to explain attitudes toward
immigrants and immigration policy. One notable exception is the work of Sanchez
(2006b) which tests the impact of group consciousness on Latinos and their subsequent
104

attitudes toward policies that are salient to the Latino community. Sanchez provides
evidence that Latinos are more likely to support an increased level of immigration,
particularly those who express a heightened level of group consciousness.

2.3 Incorporating both Individual and Group-level Determinants of Public Opinion
In The Politics of Belonging, Masuoka and Junn (2013) outline a theory that
incorporates both elements of group position and social-identity theories to explain both
inter- and intra-group variation in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy.
Similar to group-position models, Masuoka and Junn argue that attitudes are collectively
formulated and shared amongst a group. A history of discriminatory policies and the
ongoing presence of negative stereotypes have placed groups on a racial hierarchy and
structure groups toward a process of racial-ordering (see also C.J. Kim 1999; 2003).
While they note the role of individual cognition in the process of attitude formation, they
contend that individuals view newcomers through a “racial prism.” Both the relative
position of their group, as well as the degree to which an individual identifies with that
group, will mediate how inclusive one’s attitudes are toward immigrants. They argue that
by incorporating external structural factors, as well as individual cognition, a theory may
better capture variation both within and across racial/ethnic groups. Finally, they contend
that survey methodology must move beyond a White-Black binary and explore how
attitudes, as well as the determinants of these attitudes, vary across multiple racial and
ethnic groups.

105

3. Theoretical Expectations
This project seeks to contribute to the existing literature on immigration attitudes
in a number of ways. First and foremost, building off the recent work of Masuoka and
Junn I will examine how White, Latino, and Asian American attitudes toward
immigration policy vary across groups. While work has identified significant variation in
Latino and Non-Hispanic White attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy
(Branton 2007; Sanchez 2006b), the attitudes of Asian Americans have not been
sufficiently explored. Employing data gathered in the USC Dornsife/LA Times California
Election Poll of 2010, I will test the following hypothesis:

H1 - White, Latino, and Asian Americans vary significantly in their attitudes
toward immigration policy, controlling for other factors.

Controlling for demographic and political variables that the literature suggests are
significant predictors of immigration attitudes enables me to more effectively test the
degree to which public opinion toward immigration policy is systematically organized
along pan-ethnic lines.
A body of literature on group-based resources suggests that group consciousness
and linked fate may operate differently across minority groups in the United States.
While numerous studies provide theoretical and empirical justification for heightened
levels of group consciousness and linked fate amongst African Americans (Chong and
Rogers 2005; Dawson 1994; Miller et. al 1981; Tate 1993), the evidence for Latino and
Asian Americans has been more inconclusive. Multiple works suggest that a high degree
of heterogeneity among Latinos and Asian Americans—in terms of national origin, mode
106

and period of immigration, culture/language, national history, and citizenship—may act
as a barrier to the development of group consciousness, and caution scholars from
assuming that group consciousness operates in parallel fashion to that of African
Americans (C.J. Kim and Lee 2001; Lee 2008; Segura and Rodriguez 2006; Tam 1995; J.
Wong et al. 2011).
On the other hand, recent work has argued that levels of group consciousness may
be higher for Latino Americans, particularly when confronted with an issue that is
particularly salient to the group such as immigration or bilingual policies (Barreto 2007;
Bowler, Nicolson, and Segura 2006; Branton 2007; Cain, Citrin, and C. Wong 2000;
Fraga et al. 2010; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Jones-Correa 1998; Jones-Correa and
Leal 1996; Ramirez 2013; Sanchez 2006b). However, Asian Americans have typically
been found to express lower levels of pan-ethnic consciousness and linked fate (Junn and
Masuoka 2008; Lien 2001; Lien, Conway, and J. Wong 2004; J. Wong et al. 2011).
8
This
phenomenon may be due to the fact that Asian Americans as a group have achieved a
higher level of assimilation than Latinos across a host of indicators: education, income,
occupation, inter-marriage, and residential integration. As Asian Americans assimilate
into American society, their political attitudes may increasingly parallel those of native-
born Whites. In addition, the modes of entry vary considerably across the groups. Since
Asian Americans are more likely to immigrate legally on the basis of family reunification
and work visas, they may be less sympathetic toward immigration policies that promote
amnesty or increased access to benefits for undocumented immigrants. Coupled with the

8
Espiritu (1992) provides a case study in which Asian Americans were able to mobilize along pan-ethnic
lines to act collectively to pursue shared political and educational interests.
107

fact that “illegal” immigration is typically framed in terms of Latino immigration
(Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008), group-position theory argues that Asian Americans
may seek to distance themselves from Latinos on issues of immigration, particularly
those that surround illegal immigration (Masuoka and Junn 2013). Thus, I predict:

H2 - Latino Americans will be significantly more supportive of both forms of
policy than Asian Americans and Non-Hispanic Whites.

However, it is also possible that Asian Americans will be more likely to support
immigration policy that they feel is more likely to benefit members of their family, as
well as the group as a whole. Due to both physical proximity, as well as the preferences
through which one may successfully be granted legal citizenship—advanced education or
training in a desirable field—Asian Americans are less likely than Latinos to enter the
United States without legal authorization. Thus, Asian Americans are less likely to either
individually or as group benefit from legislation that ensures a path to citizenship. On the
other hand, immigration policy that seeks to reduce the visa backlog may be perceived to
be far more beneficial.

H3 - Both Asian Americans and Latinos will be significantly more supportive of
immigration policy that focuses on the reduction of the visa backlog.

Following the recent work of Masuoka and Junn (2013), Lee (2008), and Chong
and D. Kim (2006), I expect that pan-ethnicity will moderate the effects of individual-
level variables. Individual-level variables such as education, partisanship, and ideology
may operate differently across groups, both in terms of direction and significance. I will
outline my expectations for each beginning with education. As a central component of
108

socio-economic status, higher levels of education have been found to correlate with more
liberal views toward social policies. Social-identity theory suggests that increased
education leads to an increased level of tolerance (Jackman 1978), or at least an effort to
avoid being perceived as bigoted (Jackman and Muha 1984). Economic threat theory
suggests a similar relationship, but argues that individuals or groups with higher levels of
education will be less likely to perceive newcomers as a threat to important jobs and
resources. Empirical work on immigration attitudes has largely supported these
hypotheses, finding education to be positively correlated with more favorable attitudes
toward immigrants (Berg 2009; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990) and admissive
immigration policy (Branton 2007; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1997;
Mayda 2004; Sides and Citrin 2007).
On the other hand, these studies do not measure whether the impact of education
varies for Latinos and Asian Americans. Thus far, the empirical results for Latinos have
been inconclusive. While the work of Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) suggests that
more educated Latino Americans favor restrictive attitudes toward immigration, other
work suggests an insignificant relationship (Branton 2007; Sanchez 2006b). The impact
of education on Asian American attitudes toward immigration policy has not been
sufficiently tested; however, work on Asian American political attitudes and behavior
suggests that education may operate in a unique fashion for this group (Aoki and Takeda
2008; Cho 1999; J. Wong et al. 2011). While education in American schools may act as a
mechanism for increased tolerance for natives, many Asian Americans in California have
been schooled abroad and may have missed out on this form of political socialization
(Cho 1999). Furthermore, whereas education may limit the perceived economic threat of
109

newcomers, it will not necessarily diminish the perception of a political threat felt by
members of a group. Finally, while higher levels of education are often associated with
increased levels of assimilation, a large percentage of Asian Americans enter the United
States with high levels of education as a consequence of immigration policy. Education
may serve more as a prerequisite for immigration as opposed to a measure of
assimilation. Therefore, I do not expect education to be a significant determinant of more
favorable attitudes toward immigration policy.
Prior research has found ideology to be a significant predictor of White attitudes
toward race-conscious policies and immigration policy in particular. Conservatives are
more likely to favor the reduction of levels of immigration (Burns and Gimpel 2000;
Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997), while the impact of party identification is less
significant. Empirical work on Latino attitudes toward immigration has identified no
significant impact of either ideology or party identification (Branton 2007; Sanchez
2006), while the impact of these variables on Asian Americans has not yet been assessed.
Since a significant portion of the Latino and Asian American population are relative
newcomers and are not “fully” assimilated, we would expect lower levels of political
incorporation (DeSipio 1996). Empirical and theoretical work has suggested that Asian
and Latino Americans have weaker partisan attachment (Hajnal and Lee, 2006; 2012; J.
Wong 2000), are less likely to be mobilized or recruited by partisan groups (DeSipio
1996; Fraga and Leal 2004; J. Wong 2006), and have less knowledge and confidence
about the party system and party platforms (Cho 1999; Hajnal and Lee 2006; 2012).
Hajnal and Lee (2006) conclude that for many Latino and Asian Americans there is a
questionable link between ideology, issue preference, and partisanship. Thus, I deduce:
110

H4 - Education, partisanship, and ideology will be more significant and consistent
predictors of Non-Hispanic White attitudes toward immigration policy than they
are for either Latino or Asian Americans.

Finally, this work seeks not only to move beyond the “Black-White binary” but
also to provide increased variation in the outcome variable. Much of the current work
tends to conceptualize attitudes toward immigration as either favorable attitudes toward
immigrants (typically measured by a thermometer scale or measures of prejudice) or
whether or not current immigration levels should be increased, decreased, or remain the
same. Measuring attitudes toward immigration in this manner may be problematic for
two reasons. First, more favorable attitudes toward immigrants may not predict support
for more admissive forms of immigration (Segovia and Defever 2009; Tichenor 2002).
Second, while immigration has been an enduring issue across American history,
immigration policy—as well as public opinion—has varied greatly, ranging anywhere
from highly permissive to high restrictive (Tichenor 2002). Thus, public opinion may
vary considerable depending on the particular design of the policy, as well as the
possibility that distinct policy designs may have different attitudinal effects. Immigration
policy typically leads to a unique configuration of “winners” and “losers” and therefore I
expect public opinion to vary across policy and groups. The current project will include
two proposed immigration measures that have either been initiated or have made their
way into the public debate. These two measures are a path to citizenship and the proposed
reduction of the visa backlog. Inclusion of multiple measures will enable me to test how
pan-ethnic differences vary across multiple forms of immigration policy.

111

4. Data and Methods
Data analyzed in this project is derived from the University of Southern
California/Los Angeles Times Poll. A total of six surveys were fielded over the course of
the 2010 California Election. This project utilizes data from the post-election survey
conducted in the two weeks following the November 3
rd
election. The findings are based
on a random sample of registered voters (N=1,689) that includes oversamples of Latinos
(350) and Asian Americans (338).
9
The inclusion of oversamples of Asian Americans
and Latinos provides me additional leverage to make comparisons between White,
Latino, and Asian American attitudes. By analyzing registered voters, as opposed to the
larger population, I am better able to represent the public opinions of the California
electorate. Due to my particular focus on Latinos and Asian Americans, and the limited
number of individuals who identified themselves as a member of other racial/ethnic
groups, only those who identified themselves as White, Latino, or Asian American were
included in the analysis.
10

Sampling a population as diverse as California—in terms of race and ethnicity,
socio-economic status, language proficiency, and nativity—presents a number of
significant challenges. While Latinos and Asian Americans represent an ever-increasing
percentage of the overall population, as well as the electorate for both California and the
United States as a whole, these groups may often be underrepresented in surveys.

9
External funding from the California Community Foundation and the Asian Pacific American Legal
Center supported the data collection of in-language oversamples of Latino and Asian American voters.
Grants were sought to supplement the small number of interviews collected from African American voters,
but we were unsuccessful in persuading foundations to fund this portion of the data collection. As a result,
there were only a total of fifty-three African American respondents in the sample, which precluded
conducting meaningful analysis on this subpopulation.
10
A process of list-wise deletion was employed to remove any missing cases in regards to both the
covariates and the two immigration measures.
112

Problems of non-coverage for particular groups, due to socio-economic factors and a
diminished number of registered voters, are compounded by the fact that there is an
increased likelihood that members of the group may be proficient in a language other
than English. In regards to non-English speakers, interviewers are often brought in only
after a “language problem” has been identified on a telephone survey. This approach
leads to a higher percentage of terminated interviews, which not only decreases the size
of the respective subsample, but may also bias it toward more fully integrated Asian
Americans and Latinos who may be less supportive of permissive forms of immigration
policy. In terms of Asian Americans, the myriad of Asian nationalities in California
means that a failure to have interviewers who are proficient in a multitude of languages,
may fail to identify attitudinal differences across the multiple nationalities that make up
the larger Asian American community.
The University of Southern California/Los Angeles Times Poll took a series of
steps to address the challenges of surveying a highly diverse population. First, we
oversampled both Latinos and Asian Americans. Latino and Asian American respondents
were first identified and categorized by ethnic surname. Second, Latinos were provided
the opportunity to complete the survey in Spanish, while those in our Asian American
oversample answered the survey questions in their choice of English, Mandarin,
Cantonese, Vietnamese, Korean, or Tagalog. Additional Latino and Asian American
respondents were identified in the main sample, but were not given the option to
complete the survey in a language other than English. These two methodological
approaches better ensure a great degree of variation in my sample population and provide
a more accurate depiction of the Californian electorate.
113

The dependent variable of interest is individual attitudes toward two proposed
immigration policies (see Table 3.1 for the question wording and a summary of the
descriptive statistics). Respondents were read different immigrant policies that have been
proposed by some to handle immigration in our country, and were asked whether they
supported or opposed the policy described. One of the questions asked whether citizens
who were currently living in the United States without legal authorization ought to be
provided the chance to remain here permanently and to seek citizenship. The second
asked whether the time it took for citizens to petition for their family to join them in the
United States ought to be reduced. Responses fell along a four-point ordinal scale
between strongly oppose and strongly support, and those who responded “Don’t Know”
or “Refused” were eliminated from analysis.
My models of individual attitudes toward immigration policy incorporate a host
of covariates that previous literature suggests may be significant (see Table 3.2 for
question wording and descriptive statistics). The pan-ethnic variables were generated
from a categorical variable that allowed respondents to identify themselves as White,
African American, Latino, Native American, Asian American, other, or multi-racial. Two
dichotomous variables for Latino and Asian American were generated. All respondents
who did not identify themselves as Latino, Asian American, or White were excluded from
the model, thus leaving Whites as the comparison group. While the dummy-variable
approach may identify pan-ethnic group differences, any group difference may in fact be
the result of demographic and political differences between the groups. To test whether
there are significant racial differences in the level of support for the three distinct
immigration measures, a number of additional covariates were included that literature
114

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables

Outcome
variables Question wording Obs Distribution Obs Distribution Obs Distribution Obs Distribution
Path to
citizenship
Do you support or oppose
giving many of the
immigrants living in the
U.S. without legal
authorization a chance to
remain here permanently
with legal status and
eventually become U.S.
citizens, if they fulfill
certain obligations such as
paying a fine. (Yes/No)
1163
Strongly support (4)= 42%
Support (3)= 20%
Oppose (2)= 9%
Strongly oppose (1)= 28%
536
Strongly support (4)= 33%
Support (3)= 21%
Oppose (2)= 11%
Strongly oppose (1)= 35%
328
Strongly support (4)= 64%
Support (3)= 17%
Oppose (2)= 5%
Strongly oppose (1)= 14%
299
Strongly support (4)= 35%
Support (3)= 22%
Oppose (2)= 11%
Strongly oppose (1)= 32%
Reduction
of visa
backlog
Next is a question about
immigration. U.S. citizens
can petition to have a
relative in another country
immigrate to the United
States. Do you support or
oppose a policy that would
reduce the length of time
that families have to wait
for their members to be
able to come to the United
States? (Yes/No)
1163
Strongly support (4)= 49%
Support (3)= 27%
Oppose (2)= 10%
Strongly oppose (1)= 14%
536
Strongly support (4)= 35%
Support (3)= 33%
Oppose (2)= 13%
Strongly oppose (1)= 18%
328
Strongly support (4)= 64%
Support (3)= 20%
Oppose (2)= 7%
Strongly oppose (1)= 10%
299
Strongly support (4)= 56%
Support (3)= 25%
Oppose (2)= 9%
Strongly oppose (1)= 10%
Total sample Non-Hispanic Whites Latinos Asian Americans
115

suggests impact individual attitudes toward immigration policy.
In addition to the variables that related to my hypotheses—education, ideology
and party-identification—variables for age and nativity were included in the models (see
Table 3.2 for question wording and descriptive statistics). Studies of Latino attitudes
toward immigration have found that age is positively correlated with more restrictive
attitudes toward immigration policy (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Branton 2007;
Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Sanchez 2006b) and more negative attitudes toward
immigrants (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Hood,
Morris, and Shirkey 1997). Finally, scholars have theorized that nativity significantly
impacts one’s attitudes toward immigration policy. Those who are foreign born are more
likely to have family, friends or close associates who will benefit from admissive forms
of immigration policy (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Tichenor
2002), and/or an increased sense of group consciousness (Branton 2007; Sanchez 2006a;
2006b). The majority of empirical work on immigration attitudes lends support for these
hypotheses (Berg 2009; Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000;
Citrin et al. 1997; Sanchez 2006b; Sides and Citrin 2007). Including these additional
variables in the model not only serves as a control, but also enables me to test whether the
impact of these variables are dependent upon one’s pan-ethnic group.
Before turning to the model results, let me offer a brief description of how each of
the covariates is conceptualized. Age is measured in a continuous manner, and is
generated from one’s voting record as opposed to a survey response. Education is a 5-
point ordinal measure that includes: 1-11
th
grades; graduated high school; attended
classes beyond high school; earned a college degree; and completion of a graduate or
116

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates in the Model

E xplanatory
variables Question wording Min Max Obs Mean/Distribution Obs Mean/Distribution Obs Mean/Distribution Obs Mean/Distribution
Age In what year were you born? 18 98 1163
Average Age= 54
Std. dev. = 18
536
Average Age= 59
Std. dev.= 17
328
Average Age= 47
Std. dev.= 19
299
Average Age= 54
Std. dev.= 17
Education
What is the last year of
schooling that you have
completed?
Six point ordinal variable was
collapsed into a three point
ordinal measure.
1 5 1163
Post-graduate (5)= 20%
College degree (4)= 30%
Some college (3)= 28%
H.S degree (2)= 14%
No H.S. diploma(1)= 8%
536
Post-graduate (5)= 25%
College degree (4)= 33%
Some college (3)= 29%
H.S degree (2)= 12%
No H.S. diploma(1)= 1%
328
Post-graduate (5)= 10 %
College degree (4)= 14%
Some college (3)= 33 %
H.S degree (2)= 19 %
No H.S. diploma(1)= 23%
299
Post-graduate (5)= 21%
College degree (4)= 31%
Some college (3)= 27%
H.S degree (2)= 14%
No H.S. diploma(1)= 8%
Party
identification
Generally speaking, do you
think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, or
what? "Strong Democrat or
Weak Democrat?"
0 1 1163
Strong Rep (5)= 16%
Republican (4)= 21%
Independent(3)= 9%
Democratic (2)= 28%
Strong Dem (1) = 26%
536
Strong Rep (5)= 24%
Republican (4)= 25%
Independent(3)= 8%
Democratic (2)= 20%
Strong Dem (1) = 23%
328
Strong Rep (5)= 6%
Republican (4)= 12%
Independent(3)= 7%
Democratic (2)= 36%
Strong Dem (1) = 38%
299
Strong Rep (5)= 11 %
Republican (4)= 23%
Independent(3)= 14%
Democratic (2)= 36%
Strong Dem (1) = 17%
Liberal
Thinking in political terms,
would you say that you are
conservative, moderate, or
liberal?
0 1 1163
Liberal (1) = 27%
Not (0)= 73%
536
Liberal (1)= 25%
Not (0)= 75%
328
Liberal (1) = 31%
Not (0)= 69%
299
Liberal (1) = 27%
Not (0)= 73%
Conservative
Thinking in political terms,
would you say that you are
conservative, moderate, or
liberal?
0 1 1163
Conservative (1)= 33%
Not (0)= 67%
536
Conservative (1)= 40%
Not (0)= 60%
328
Conservative (1)= 29%
Not (0)= 71%
299
Conservative (1)= 26%
Not (0)= 74%
Foreign born
Were you born in the US or
another country?
0 1 1163
Foreign born (1)= 36%
Native born (0)= 64%
536
Foreign born (1)= 6%
Native born (0)= 94%
328
Foreign born (1)= 46%
Native born (0)= 54%
299
Foreign born (1)= 77%
Native born (0)= 23%
White
What racial or ethnic group
best describes you?
0 1 1163
White= 46%
Not= 54%
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Latino
What racial or ethnic group
best describes you?
0 1 1163
Latino= 26%
Not= 74%
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Asian
What racial or ethnic group
best describes you?
1 1 1163
Asian= 28%
Not= 72%
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Asian Americans Latinos Total sample Non-Hispanic Whites
117

professional degree. The party-identification variable is a 5-point ordinal measure.
Respondents were first asked if they identified themselves as a Democrat, Independent,
or Republican. Those who identified themselves as either a Democrat or Republican were
then asked whether they were a “weak” or a “strong” Democrat/Republican. Gender is a
dichotomous variable for which a value of “1” identifies the respondent as female. The
model includes two dichotomous measures of liberal and conservative. Finally, there is a
dichotomous variable that identifies whether the respondent is native or foreign born,
with a value of “1” signifying foreign born.

5. Modeling Approach and Findings
5.1 Employing a Dummy-variable Approach to Public Opinion on Immigration Policy
In the first stage of analysis I pooled all respondents regardless of race into a
single grouping. I constructed models that include dummy variables for both Latinos and
Asian Americans, as well as factors that correlate with attitudes toward immigration
policy. Separate models were constructed for each of the two measures of immigration
policy. This initial modeling approach enables me to: 1) assess whether the attitudes of
the electorate as a whole vary significantly across distinct forms of immigration policy;
2) identify the factors that most strongly impact the attitudes of the California electorate
as a whole; and 3) identify whether there are significant attitudinal differences between
the groups after controlling for the other covariates in the model.
First, I will discuss the results concerning attitudes toward a path to citizenship
(see Table 3.3), and then I will turn to the model on the reduction of the visa backlog (see
Table 3.4). First and foremost, the model suggests that both Latinos and Asian Americans
118

Table 3.3: Ordered Logistic Regression Model Estimates of Attitudes toward a Path
to Citizenship

vary significantly in their support for a path to citizenship from non-Hispanic Whites. In
fact, both the size of the coefficient and its corresponding significance suggests that
whether one is Latino or not is the strongest predictor of support for a path to citizenship.
Latinos have the highest predicted probability of strongly agreeing with this
β Coef. Std. Error β Coef. Std. Error
Latino 0.8277 *** 0.1678 2.2947 *** 0.7185
Asian -0.4008 ** 0.1755 -1.1078 0.7668
Age -0.0024 0.0033 -0.0054 0.0049
Education 0.0465 0.0517 0.2246 *** 0.0845
Party ID -0.2433 *** 0.0471 -0.3059 *** 0.0746
Liberal 0.1167 0.1445 0.5167 ** 0.2322
Conservative -0.2273 0.1415 -0.1003 0.2146
Foreign born 0.5512 *** 0.1573 -0.1381 0.3599
Latino x Age ____ ____ -0.0128 0.0082
Latino x Education ____ ____ -0.3594 *** 0.1338
Latino x Party ID ____ ____ 0.0763 0.1248
Latino x Liberal ____ ____ -0.7166 ** 0.3644
Latino x Conservative ____ ____ -0.0856 0.3683
Latino x Foreign born ____ ____ 1.3428 *** 0.4571
Asian x Age ____ ____ 0.0192 ** 0.0082
Asian x Education ____ ____ -0.1015 0.1277
Asian x Party ID ____ ____ 0.2685 ** 0.1143
Asian x Liberal ____ ____ -0.7787 ** 0.3494
Asian x Conservative ____ ____ -0.3130 0.3417
Asian x Foreign born ____ ____ 0.0808 0.4404
N
χ
2
(d.f.)
Pseduo R
2
df
BIC
Dummy-variable
model
Interactive model
1163 1163
170.98 223.87
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two-tailed test); N is unweighted; Robust standard errors
0.06 0.08
8 19
-115 -83
119

Table 3.4: Ordered Logistic Regression Model Estimates of Attitudes toward the
Reduction of the Visa Backlog

particular policy measure at (59%), followed by non-Hispanic Whites (38%), and finally,
Asian Americans (21%) (see Table 3.5 for model generated predicted probabilities).
Somewhat surprisingly, Asian Americans hold significantly less agreeable attitudes
toward a path to citizenship than non-Hispanic Whites. In addition to one's pan-ethnic
identity, both one's party identification and nativity are significant factors in one's
β Coef. Std. Error β Coef. Std. Error
Latino 0.4755 *** 0.1669 2.3609 *** 0.7063
Asian 0.0143 0.1773 1.1699 0.8086
Age -0.0094 *** 0.0034 -0.0110 ** 0.0048
Education 0.0008 0.0524 0.2169 *** 0.0812
Party ID -0.1509 *** 0.0478 -0.1506 ** 0.0730
Liberal 0.1977 0.1482 0.4272 * 0.2278
Conservative 0.0026 0.1446 0.2881 0.2125
Foreign born 0.9805 *** 0.1617 0.7176 ** 0.3579
Latino x Age ____ ____ -0.0074 0.0081
Latino x Education ____ ____ -0.2792 ** 0.1326
Latino x Party ID ____ ____ -0.1426 0.1222
Latino x Liberal ____ ____ -0.4640 0.3694
Latino x Conservative ____ ____ -0.4459 0.3623
Latino x Foreign born ____ ____ 0.3057 0.4513
Asian x Age ____ ____ 0.0114 0.0086
Asian x Education ____ ____ -0.4669 *** 0.1351
Asian x Party ID ____ ____ 0.1047 0.1203
Asian x Liberal ____ ____ -0.6174 * 0.3610
Asian x Conservative ____ ____ -0.6702 * 0.3581
Asian x Foreign born ____ ____ 0.2775 0.4451
N
χ
2
(d.f.)
Pseduo R
2
df
BIC
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (two-tailed test); N is unweighted; Robust standard errors
0.05 0.06
8 19
-83 -25
Dummy-Variable Interactive Model
1163 1163
139.10 165.91
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Table 3.5: Predicted Probabilities of Attitudes toward a Path to Citizenship

SD D A SA SD D A SA SD D A SA SD D A SA
Pan-ethnicity
White 0.28 0.11 0.23 0.38 0.33 0.12 0.23 0.32
Asian 0.37 0.12 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.12 0.23 0.33
Latino 0.15 0.07 0.20 0.59 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.63
Age
20 0.24 0.10 0.23 0.43 0.29 0.11 0.23 0.36 0.26 0.10 0.23 0.40 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.64
35 0.25 0.10 0.23 0.43 0.31 0.11 0.23 0.35 0.22 0.10 0.23 0.45 0.14 0.07 0.20 0.59
50 0.26 0.10 0.23 0.42 0.32 0.12 0.23 0.33 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.50 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.55
65 0.26 0.10 0.23 0.41 0.34 0.12 0.23 0.31 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.55 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.50
80 0.27 0.10 0.23 0.40 0.36 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.13 0.07 0.20 0.60 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.45
Education
No high school degree 0.28 0.10 0.23 0.39 0.48 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.45 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.37 0.12 0.23 0.29
High school degree 0.27 0.10 0.23 0.40 0.34 0.12 0.23 0.31 0.42 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.42 0.12 0.21 0.24
Some college 0.26 0.10 0.23 0.41 0.29 0.12 0.23 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.22 0.27 0.45 0.12 0.20 0.22
College degree 0.25 0.10 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.10 0.23 0.41 0.36 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.49 0.12 0.19 0.20
Post college 0.24 0.10 0.23 0.43 0.21 0.09 0.23 0.47 0.33 0.12 0.23 0.32 0.52 0.12 0.18 0.18
Party identification
Strong Democrat 0.19 0.08 0.21 0.52 0.21 0.09 0.23 0.47 0.21 0.09 0.23 0.47 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.55
Democrat 0.23 0.09 0.22 0.46 0.27 0.11 0.23 0.39 0.21 0.09 0.23 0.47 0.20 0.09 0.22 0.49
Independent 0.27 0.10 0.23 0.40 0.33 0.12 0.23 0.32 0.22 0.10 0.23 0.46 0.24 0.10 0.23 0.43
Republican 0.32 0.11 0.23 0.34 0.40 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.45 0.28 0.11 0.23 0.38
Strong Republican 0.37 0.12 0.22 0.29 0.48 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.44 0.33 0.12 0.23 0.32
Ideology
Liberal 0.24 0.10 0.23 0.44 0.26 0.10 0.23 0.41 0.39 0.12 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.11 0.23 0.35
Conservative 0.29 0.11 0.23 0.37 0.35 0.12 0.23 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.11 0.23 0.36
Nativity
Foreign born 0.20 0.09 0.22 0.50 0.37 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.33 0.12 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.67
Native born 0.30 0.11 0.23 0.37 0.33 0.12 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.11 0.23 0.34 0.28 0.11 0.24 0.38
Dummy-Variable
Total population Whites Asian Americans Latinos
Interactive Model
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attitudes toward a path to citizenship. Those who identify as strong Democrats have a .12
increased likelihood of strongly agreeing with a path to citizenship than similarly situated
Independents and a .23 greater likelihood than those who identify as strong Republicans.
Individuals who are born outside of the United States have a .13 greater probability of
strongly agreeing with the measure than those who are native born. Age, education, and
ideology—individual level characteristics that have been found to correlate with attitudes
toward a host of policies including immigration—are not significant predictors of
attitudes toward a path to citizenship.
Now turning our attention to the model that predicts attitudes toward the reduction
of the visa backlog (see Table 3.4), we see a similar pattern of results. Once again,
Latinos hold significantly more agreeable attitudes toward the proposed reduction of the
visa backlog. Latinos have a 57% probability of strongly agreeing with the proposed
immigration measure, which is considerably higher than either non-Hispanic Whites
(45%) or Asian Americans (49%) (see Table 3.6 for predicted probabilities generated by
the model). Whereas Asian Americans are significantly less likely to support a path to
citizenship, their attitudes on immigration policy that focuses on visa applicants do not
differ from that of non-Hispanic Whites. Once more partisanship and nativity are
significant factors in the formation of individual attitudes toward this proposed form of
immigration policy. Individuals who identify as strong Democrats have a .15 increased
likelihood of strongly agreeing with the proposed measure than those who identify as
strong Republicans, and correspondingly a .07 decreased likelihood of strongly
disagreeing with the measure. Foreign-born respondents have a .64 predicted probability
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Table 3.6: Predicted Probabilities of Attitudes toward a Reduction in the Visa
Backlog

SD D A SA SD D A SA SD D A SA SD D A SA
Pan-ethnicity
White 0.13 0.11 0.30 0.45
Asian 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.49
Latino 0.09 0.08 0.26 0.57
Age
20 0.09 0.07 0.26 0.57 0.13 0.10 0.31 0.46 0.10 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.55
35 0.10 0.09 0.28 0.53 0.15 0.11 0.32 0.42 0.10 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.48
50 0.12 0.09 0.30 0.50 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.15 0.12 0.32 0.41
65 0.13 0.10 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.49 0.10 0.08 0.28 0.55 0.19 0.13 0.33 0.35
80 0.15 0.11 0.31 0.43 0.13 0.11 0.31 0.45 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.55 0.24 0.15 0.32 0.29
Education 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.49
No high school degree 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.49 0.29 0.17 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.32 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.33 0.35
High school degree 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.49 0.21 0.14 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.16 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.33 0.32
Some college 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.49 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.17 0.30 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.32 0.30
College degree 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.49 0.14 0.11 0.32 0.43 0.38 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.32 0.29
Post college 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.49 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.48 0.44 0.18 0.24 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.32 0.28
Party Identification
Strong Democrat 0.09 0.08 0.27 0.55 0.14 0.11 0.31 0.43 0.11 0.09 0.29 0.50 0.10 0.09 0.29 0.52
Democrat 0.11 0.09 0.29 0.51 0.16 0.12 0.32 0.40 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.49 0.13 0.11 0.31 0.45
Independent 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.47 0.18 0.13 0.33 0.36 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.48 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.38
Republican 0.14 0.11 0.31 0.44 0.21 0.14 0.33 0.33 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.47 0.22 0.15 0.33 0.31
Strong Republican 0.16 0.12 0.32 0.40 0.23 0.15 0.32 0.29 0.13 0.10 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.16 0.31 0.25
Ideology
Liberal 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.52 0.20 0.14 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.13 0.33 0.36 0.14 0.11 0.32 0.43
Conservative 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.49 0.16 0.12 0.32 0.39 0.21 0.14 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.12 0.32 0.40
Nativity
Foreign born 0.10 0.09 0.29 0.52 0.08 0.07 0.25 0.60 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.65
Native born 0.19 0.14 0.33 0.35 0.18 0.13 0.33 0.36 0.16 0.12 0.32 0.40
Total population Whites Asian Americans Latinos
Dummy-Variable Interactive Model
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of strongly supporting the measure, which is .24 greater than those who are native born.
One noticeable difference in this model is the impact of age; however, the impact is quite
small. A one's standard deviation increase in age (approximately 18 years), on average,
only yields a 2% change in one’s agreement toward the measure. Yet again the model
does not find education or ideology to have a significant impact on public opinion.

5.2 An Alternative Approach to Measuring Public Opinion for a Diverse Population
While the dummy-variable approach enables researchers to identify whether
groups may vary significantly in their attitudes or behaviors, it does not allow us to
explain how or why groups differ along these lines. By merely including a dummy
variable in the model, we are in effect holding constant the effects of all other variables.
In so doing we risk the possibility of falsely assuming that the impact of variables in our
model are consistent across groups. This may result in both false positives and false
negatives. While both of the previous models suggest that partisanship and nativity are
significant factors in holding more favorable attitudes toward immigration policy, this
may not be true for all groups. In addition, while the models suggest that neither
education nor ideology is a significant determinant, this also may not be true for all
groups. In effect, such an approach is akin to an ecological fallacy in which the
characteristics of the larger population are thought to apply to individual groups within
the larger population.
If one believes that racial and ethnic groups are structurally different, not only in
their attitudes, but in the very determinants of these attitudes, then one must turn to an
alternative approach. Masuoka and Junn (2013) and Chong and D. Kim (2006) provide
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theoretical and empirical justification that the magnitude, direction, and significance of
explanatory variables may be moderated by race (see also Lee 2008). One approach they
advocate is to divide the groups along racial and ethnic lines and to model their attitudes
toward the immigration measures separately. In this paper, I follow a similar logic and
interact the terms Latino and Asian American with each of the covariates in the model.
This approach enables me to see how Asian American and Latino attitudes, as well as the
antecedents to these attitudes, differ from non-Hispanic Whites, as well as from each
other.
In this second stage of analysis, I first describe the findings of the interactive
models for each immigration measure and then highlight how the results differ from the
initial dummy-variable models I have described. Since the interactive models include
interaction terms for both Latinos and Asian Americans, the coefficients for age,
education, party identification, liberal, conservative and foreign born now refer to how
these factors impact the attitudes of non-Hispanic Whites. Thus in order to calculate the
effect of any one factor for Whites, I set the remainder of the variables in the model to the
mean values for Whites and set all of the interaction terms to zero. In order to calculate
the effect of any one variable for Latinos, I set the interaction terms corresponding to
Latinos at its group mean, set the interaction terms for Asian Americans at zero, and set
the non-interactive terms to their mean. An identical process is used to estimate the
impact of the factors for Asian Americans. I will contrast the findings of the initial
dummy-variable model with those of the interactive model for each of the proposed
immigration measures. I will begin with the results concerning non-Hispanic Whites and
then proceed to the findings concerning Asian Americans and Latinos.
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For non-Hispanic Whites, party identification, education and ideology are
significant determinants of attitudes toward a path to citizenship. Whites who identify as
strong Democrats have a 15% increased likelihood of strongly agreeing with a path to
citizenship than those who identify as Independents and a 26% greater likelihood than
strong Republicans. Whereas this result is consistent with the preceding dummy-variable
model, the results concerning education, ideology and nativity are not. Whites who earn
their college degree have a .41 predicted probability of strongly agreeing with a path to
citizenship, which is 10 percentage points higher than one who merely earn their high
school degree, and 21 points higher than one who does not complete high school.
Ideology is also a significant determinant of attitudes toward a path to citizenship; Whites
who identify as liberal have a .11 increased likelihood of supporting the measure than
those who identify as conservative. While the initial model suggests that nativity is a
significant determinant, the interactive model finds that the difference between native-
and foreign-born Whites is quite small and fails to reach significance.
The results concerning non-Hispanic White attitudes toward the reduction of the
visa backlog are quite consistent with those regarding their attitudes toward a path to
citizenship. Once again, education, partisanship, and ideology are significant
determinants. Both in terms of the direction and the size of the effect, education and
partisanship operate in a similar fashion as they did regarding attitudes toward a path to
citizenship. Whereas liberals remained more likely to support a reduction in the backlog
of visas than similarly situated conservatives, the difference between these two groups
was far smaller. White liberals have a .52 predicted probability of supporting the
measure, which is only 3 percentage points higher than White conservatives. Although
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age has a negligible impact of White attitudes toward a path to citizenship, it has a far
greater impact on attitudes toward a reduction of the visa backlog. Whites who are 20
years old have a .46 predicted probability of supporting a reduction in the visa backlog,
which is .08 greater than those who are 50 years old. Finally, foreign-born Whites have a
.17 greater likelihood of supporting the measure than those who are native born.
Now turning our attention to Latinos, once again the interactive model suggests
that Latinos vary considerably in their attitudes toward immigration policy than those of
Whites even after controlling for other factors. Holding constant all other variables in the
model at their means, Latinos have a 59% predicted probability of supporting a path to
citizenship, in contrast to 38% for Non-Hispanic Whites and 29% for Asian Americans.
In addition to holding more favorable attitudes towards a path to citizenship, the
determinants of these attitudes differ considerably from that of non-Hispanic Whites.
While the interactive model suggests that party-identity has a similar impact on the
attitudes of Latinos and non-Hispanic Whites, the impact of education, ideology, and
nativity differ significantly across the groups. Although education remains a significant
determinant of attitudes toward a path to citizenship for both Latinos and non-Hispanic
Whites, the direction of the impact is reversed. Latinos who do not complete high school
have a .05 higher likelihood of supporting a path to citizenship than those who complete
high school and a .09 greater likelihood than those who attain their college degree.
Ideology has no measurable impact on Latino attitudes toward the measure; Latinos who
identify as liberals or conservatives have an almost identical likelihood of supporting a
path to citizenship. Finally, whereas nativity has no significant effect for non-Hispanic
Whites, it has the largest independent effect for Latinos. Latinos who are foreign born
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have a 67% predicted probability of strongly agreeing with a path to citizenship, and only
a 10% probability of strongly disagreeing with the measure. In comparison, Latinos who
are native born, have a .38 predicted probability of strongly agreeing with the measure,
and a .28 predicted probability of strongly disagreeing.
The results from the model that estimates Latino support for the reduction of the
visa backlog closely resemble those from the model predicting support for a path to
citizenship. Once again, even after controlling for individual-level characteristics, Latinos
hold significantly more favorable attitudes toward the reduction of the visa backlog than
non-Hispanic Whites or Asian Americans. Latinos have a 62% predicted probability of
supporting the measure, which is 14 percentage points greater than Asian Americans and
26 points greater than non-Hispanic Whites. In addition, the individual level factors that
impact attitudes toward both of these proposed immigration measures are mostly
consistent. Latinos who identify as Democrats or are foreign born are far more likely to
support both proposed measures than are Latinos who identify as Republican or are
native born. In addition, increased levels of education lead to decreased support for both
immigration policies. Latinos who fail to complete high school have a 6% increased
likelihood of strongly agreeing with the reduction of the visa backlog than those who
complete college. While Latino liberals are significantly more likely to agree that the visa
backlog ought to be reduced, the difference between them and Latino conservatives is
quite modest (.03 increased likelihood). The greatest difference between Latino attitudes
toward the two immigration measures is the impact of age. Latinos who are 20 years of
age have a 20% greater likelihood of supporting the reduction of the visa backlog than
Latinos who are 65 years of age.
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Finally, I will discuss the model results for Asian Americans. While Latinos and
Asian Americans are similar in that they are both relative newcomers to the United
States, Asian American attitudes towards a path to citizenship more closely resemble the
attitudes of non-Hispanic Whites. Although the initial model that employed a dummy-
variable approach suggests that Asian Americans hold considerably less favorable
attitudes toward a path to citizenship than non-Hispanic Whites, once we allow the effect
of individual level characteristics to vary by group, this previously identified difference
disappears. However, while Asian Americans and non-Hispanic Whites resemble one
another in their attitudes, they vary considerably in the individual-level characteristics
that impact attitude formation. Age, partisanship, education, and ideology impact the
attitudes of Non-Hispanic Whites and Asian Americans differently. Whereas the impact
of age for Whites is negative and small, its impact on Asian Americans is positive and
large. A fifteen year increase in age is associated with a .05 increased likelihood of
strongly agreeing with a path to citizenship for Asian Americans. Moreover, while
ideology, education, and partisanship are significant predictors of White attitudes toward
a path to citizenship, they do not significantly impact Asian American attitudes toward
this proposed policy. It is only in regards to nativity that Asian Americans demonstrate a
pattern consistent with non-Hispanic Whites. Whereas nativity has the greatest impact for
Latinos, there is no measurable difference in attitudes between native- and foreign-born
Asian Americans.
Unlike those for non-Hispanic Whites and Latinos, the models estimating Asian
American attitudes toward a path to citizenship and a reduction of the backlog of visas do
not closely resemble one another. This suggests that the individual-level characteristics
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that impact attitudes toward these respective immigration policies may operate in a
unique fashion. One consistency across the two models is that while Asian Americans
hold far less agreeable attitudes toward both proposed immigration measures than do
Latinos, there is no measurable difference between their attitudes and those of non-
Hispanic Whites. Once again the impact of ideology and education for Asian Americans
is not consistent with that of Whites. There is no significant difference between Asians
who identify as either liberals or conservative, nor does support for the measure increase
significantly with education. Though both age and nativity has significant impacts on
Asian American support for a path to citizenship, neither has a significant impact on their
attitudes toward the reduction of the visa backlog.

6. Discussion and Conclusions
As the population becomes increasingly multi-racial, and Latinos and Asian
Americans make up a larger percentage of the electorate, it becomes increasingly
important to identify variation in attitudes toward policies across pan-ethnic groups
(Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Hero & Tolbert, 1996). While previous work in political
science focused a great deal on differences between Black and White attitudes,
increasingly scholars are identifying the distinct political attitudes of Latinos and Asian
Americans (DeSipio 1996; Fraga et al. 2010; Lien, Conway, and J. Wong 2004; Uhlaner
and Garcia 2002; J. Wong et al. 2011). This task is particularly important in states with a
high percentage of Latinos and Asian Americans, such as California, and on issues that
are likely to be particularly salient to these groups, such as immigration.
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A better understanding of similarities and differences across pan-ethnic groups
may assist political elites and scholars alike in identifying particular forms of policy that
hold sufficient support amongst the diverse electorate. Furthermore, by disaggregating
public opinion by pan-ethnic group, we may better highlight the potential for the
formation of cross-group coalitions. The Immigrant Marches of 2006 demonstrated the
strong potential for Latino mobilization to block the passage of more punitive or
restrictive forms of immigration reform (Felix, Gonzalez, and Ramirez 2008; Pantoja,
Menjívar, and Magaña 2008). However, the passage of comprehensive immigration
reform, such as the D.R.E.A.M. Act (Development, Relief and Education for Alien
Minors) or a path to citizenship, will likely require the support of a broader coalition
(Johnson and Ong Hing 2007; Rim 2009).
Further research needs to investigate the role of framing in immigration policy.
As we saw in the Immigrant Marches of 2006, framing the issue in terms of civil rights
and group threat may prove effective in mobilizing Latino Americans (Benjamin-
Alvarado, DeSipio, and Montoya, 2009; Félix, Gonzalez, and Ramirez 2008; Pantoja,
Menjívar, and Magaña 2008; Ramirez 2013). However, it may also be limited in its
potential to mobilize other groups (Johnson and Ong Hing 2009; Rim 2009). While
legislation of this kind would not resolve the undocumented status of all, it would remove
a barrier to many, who in turn may have an increased capacity to push for additional
legislation that would benefit a larger portion of their immigrant community (A.L.
Campbell 2003; Mettler and Soss 2004). My findings provide important implications for
those currently advocating for comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level.
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Latino Americans as a group hold significantly more supportive views of both a
path to citizenship and the proposed reduction of the visa backlog. This difference cannot
be explained by variation in levels of education, age, ideology, partisanship, or nativity.
In addition, the difference in Latino attitudes cannot be explained by the potential threats
and opportunities posed by the passage of these policies to individual Latinos in my
sample. Since my sample only includes registered voters, the Latinos in my study are not
individually threatened by the loss of social services, nor are they individually more likely
to benefit from a program of amnesty or increased educational opportunities.
To understand the individual attitudes among Latinos toward immigration policy,
we must turn our attention to matters of group consciousness (Branton 2007; Junn and
Masuoka 2008; Sanchez 2006a; 2006b; Sanchez and Masuoka 2012). In support of
Gabriel Sanchez’s (2006b) work on group consciousness, Latino voters appear to have a
high degree of group consciousness in policy areas—in this case immigration—that are
perceived as highly salient to their larger community. A heightened sense of group
consciousness may in turn provide the opportunity for collective action (Barreto 2007;
Sanchez 2006a).
Asian Americans do not vary considerably from non-Hispanic Whites in their
attitudes toward immigration policy. While initially it appeared that Asian Americans
were even less favorable toward a path to citizenship than non-Hispanic Whites, once the
impact of the various covariates were allowed to vary by racial group this difference
disappeared. There are two possible explanations for why Asian Americans would not
hold more favorable attitudes toward admissive forms of immigration than non-Hispanic
Whites regardless of their recent immigrant status. First, there is considerable
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heterogeneity within the Asian American population in terms of national origin, religion,
socioeconomic status, and level of integration (J. Wong et al. 2011). This heterogeneity
may pose significant barriers to the development of group consciousness, which in turn
may result in diverse and competing attitudes toward immigration within the Asian
American community (Tam Cho 1995; C.J. Kim & Lee 2001; Masuoka 2008; J. Wong et
al. 2011). Add to this the fact that the vast majority of Asian Americans are foreign born
(77 % in my sample); it may be that group consciousness along pan-ethnic lines has yet
to fully develop. An alternative explanation may be found in group position theory
(Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Masuoka and Junn
2013). A group’s attitude toward immigration may largely be determined by the
hierarchal position they hold in society, and thus may reflect “a subjective image of
where the in-group ought to stand vis-à-vis the out-group” (Blumer 1958, 4). Asian
Americans, who traditionally maintain a higher position in the social hierarchy, as well as
a more privileged status in terms of immigration, may seek to differentiate themselves
from their Latino counterparts (C.J. Kim 1999; 2003; Masuoka & Junn, 2013). Coupled
with the fact that immigration policy has been increasingly framed along racial lines
(Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), and that the “costs” of illegal immigration are
increasingly associated with Latinos, Asian Americans may become less favorable
toward more admissive policies they feel are targeted toward others (Rim 2009). This is
further supported by the fact that Asian Americans are more supportive of the reduction
in the visa backlog that may be deemed a more favorable policy for their pan-ethnic
group.
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In addition to identifying variation in intergroup attitudes toward immigration
policy, my work suggests variation in the determinants of these attitudes. Whereas the
standard determinants of attitudes—namely education, ideology and partisanship—
strongly predict non-Hispanic White attitudes toward immigration policy, they are less
effective in predicting the attitudes of Latinos and Asian Americans. While increased
education is associated with supportive attitudes for Whites, it is associated with less
supportive attitudes for Latinos, and is an insignificant factor for Asian Americans.
Latinos follow a similar pattern as non-Hispanic Whites in regards to partisanship—
perhaps suggesting that party attachment may be a result of competing party platforms
concerning immigration—whereas partisanship has no significant bearing on Asian
American attitudes toward immigration. Partisanship is not a reliable predictor of Asian
American attitudes across immigration policies, even amongst registered voters. Party-
identification may be the prism through which White Americans formulate policy
preferences (A. Campbell et al. 1960; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), but it
does not appear that party identification is always as significant a predictor for Asian
Americans (Hajnal and Lee 2011). This may be the result of limited mobilization by
either political party (Frymer, 1999; J. Wong 2006) or due to limited experience and
knowledge about the party system and their platforms (Cho 1999). Finally, ideology does
operates in a unique fashion for non-Hispanic Whites in comparison to Asian Americans
and Latinos. This may be a result of the recent arrival of many Latino and Asian
American and their limited degree of political incorporation or it may be that these
groups do not share the same conception of ideology. These findings add to the recent
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empirical work which argues that race moderates the effect of individual level variables
(Chong & D. Kim 2006; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Lee 2008; Masuoka and Junn 2013).
The broader finding of this work is that the increased diversity of our population
requires a new approach to the study of public opinion. While the composition of the
population we seek to explain is dramatically changing, the strategies we employ to
describe their attitudes has remained relatively static. Much of what we know regarding
public opinion—both regarding the public’s attitudes toward policies, and in terms of the
key determinants of these attitudes—comes from samples that are principally populated
by non-Hispanic Whites. Advancements in public opinion research has sought to identity
how various racial or ethnic groups may significantly differ from that of the larger White
population. However, much of this work has employed a dummy-variable approach and
has thus largely sought to “control for” racial and ethnic differences as opposed to
explaining how and why groups differ in their political attitudes. More recently scholars
interested in race and ethnic politics have studied a particular group and sought to explain
how they differ from the White majority. I seek to build upon a growing body of
literature that attempts to explain both how minority groups differ from Whites as well as
from one another. As opposed to merely “controlling for” race and effectively holding
constant all other factors in the model, as the dummy-variable approach does, we need to
realize that racial and ethnic groups are structurally different from one another and thus
not only vary in their attitudes but perhaps more importantly in the very antecedents of
these attitudes. My findings suggest that employing a dummy-variable approach may lead
to biased results, not only in terms of pan-ethnic minorities but also concerning the White
majority.
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This work might be extended by incorporating additional variables that literature
suggests are associated with attitude formation, such as multiple measures of identity
(Junn and Masuoka 2013), tolerance and prejudice (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al.
1997; Citrin, Reinhold, and Green 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Sanchez 2006b;
Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), and economic threat (Citrin et al. 1997; Mayda
2004). Since my analysis suggests that non-Hispanic Whites, Latinos, and Asian
Americans differ not only in their attitudes but in the antecedents to these attitudes, it is
reasonable to conclude that race may moderate these additional variables as well.
In addition, it would be useful to examine inter- and intragroup attitudes toward
immigration policy in a nationally representative sample. Since the federal government
maintains plenary power over matters of entry, it would be useful to ascertain whether
my findings can be generalized to the United States electorate as a whole. A more
comprehensive comparison of the dynamics of attitudinal formation both within and
across groups will enable us to more accurately identify the barriers and openings for
immigration reform.

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Creator Berry, Justin Andrew (author)

Core Title Changing political attitudes and behavior in a diverse America: incorporating individual and contextual determinants

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Politics and International Relations

Publication Date 07/11/2014

Defense Date 05/12/2014

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag American politics,assimilation,identity,immigration,OAI-PMH Harvest,political behavior,public opinion,race and ethnicity

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Advisor Junn, Jane (committee chair), Barnes, John E. (committee member), Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette (committee member)

Creator Email justinab@usc.edu,justinberry76@yahoo.com

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