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Hurricane Katrina: framing leadership through communication

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Content FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

i

HURRICANE KATRINA:

FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

by

Laura A. Farmer

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(COMMUNICATION)

August 2014

Copyright 2014 Laura A. Farmer

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DEDICATION
To my husband, Bruce Farmer, who both loved and believed in me -
To the time we had together

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank my adviser, Patricia Riley, and my committee members, Ian Mitroff,
Stephen O’Leary, and Thomas Goodnight who stuck with me all these years. I also
wish to thank Lee and Jean Farmer and my dear friend Yasanthi Perera without whose
encouragement I might have given up and Anne Marie Campian whose unfailing
support and help kept me going.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... viii
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................ix
Chapter 1: Hurricane Katrina: Framing Leadership Through Communication ................ 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................... 7
Leadership Communication ................................................................................... 8
A short history of leadership and communication. ........................................ 8
Current and future views. ........................................................................... 11
The changing landscape. ................................................................... 12
Current theories. ................................................................................. 16
Public Leadership ................................................................................................ 21
Disasters, Crises, and Risks ................................................................................ 30
Disaster research. ...................................................................................... 30
Crises and risks. ......................................................................................... 32
Katrina as disaster and crisis. ..................................................................... 35
Background on New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina ........................................... 36
Theoretical Underpinning ..................................................................................... 41
Chapter 3: Methods ...................................................................................................... 46
The Case Study Approach ................................................................................... 46
Hurricane Katrina: Communication Case Study .................................................. 48
Analysis ............................................................................................................... 85
Quality, Credibility and Generalizability. ..................................................... 87
Chapter 4: Analysis and Discussion .............................................................................. 93
RQ1. How did leaders frame their communication to define a context in terms of
the dangers posed for the people of New Orleans at the start of Katrina?........... 94
Signification. ............................................................................................... 94
Legitimation. ............................................................................................... 95
Domination. ................................................................................................ 96
Knowledgeability. ........................................................................................ 97
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RQ2. Did the leaders communicate responsibly concerning the choices open to
the people of New Orleans? ................................................................................ 98
Signification. ............................................................................................... 99
Legitimation. ............................................................................................... 99
Domination. .............................................................................................. 100
Knowledgeability. ...................................................................................... 101
RQ3. Did the leaders communicate clearly what outcome they wanted? Did the
leaders communicate clearly how they intended to achieve that outcome? ....... 101
Signification. ............................................................................................. 101
Legitimation. ............................................................................................. 102
Domination. .............................................................................................. 103
Knowledgeability: ...................................................................................... 104
RQ4. Did leaders use strategic crisis communication tactics to dynamically re-
define the situation for the people of New Orleans (e.g., changing exigencies call
for changed communication)? ............................................................................ 105
Signification. ............................................................................................. 106
Legitimation. ............................................................................................. 106
Domination. .............................................................................................. 107
Knowledgeability. ...................................................................................... 107
RQ5: Structures of signification will be utilized more by Mayor Nagin and
Governor Blanco than by Michael Brown or President Bush to convey the
seriousness of the situation to the citizens of New Orleans ............................... 108
RQ6: Leaders will draw on the structures of legitimation to encourage citizens to
evacuate New Orleans. ...................................................................................... 109
RQ7: Leaders will predominately rely on the structures of domination to inform
citizens of the changing situation and to advise them what actions they need to
take. ................................................................................................................... 110
RQ8: Leaders will give reasons for their orders that draw on their stocks of
shared knowledge differentially according to their proximity to New Orleans. ... 111
RQ 9: Does leader communication during Hurricane Katrina reflect a re-creation
of institutional rules and resources or of shared knowledge? ............................ 112
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Research .......................... 113
Defining the Context .......................................................................................... 114
Redefinition of the situation ................................................................................ 119
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Responsible Communication ............................................................................. 121
Structuration in General ..................................................................................... 123
Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 125
Limitations of the study ...................................................................................... 128
Appendix A: Rationale for Interviews Used ................................................................ 172
Appendix B: Coding Document .................................................................................. 180
Context Definition............................................................................................... 180
Clearness of Outcome ....................................................................................... 180
Responsible Communication ............................................................................. 181
Redefinition of Situation ..................................................................................... 181
Signification ....................................................................................................... 181
Legitimation ....................................................................................................... 182
Domination ......................................................................................................... 182
Appendix C: Coding Results ...................................................................................... 184
Context Intersections with Structures ................................................................. 184
Context intersections with signification. .................................................... 184
Context intersections with legitimation. ..................................................... 187
Context intersections with domination (authority and allocation). ............. 187
Context intersections with knowledge (discursive and tacit). .................... 196
Outcome Clarity Intersections with Structures ................................................... 199
Outcome clarity intersections with signification. ....................................... 199
Outcome clarity intersections with legitimation. ........................................ 200
Outcome clarity intersections with domination (authority and allocation). . 201
Outcome clarity intersections with knowledge (discursive and tacit). ....... 204
Situation Redefinition Intersections with Structures ........................................... 205
Situation redefinition intersections with signification. ................................ 205
Situation redefinition intersections with legitimation.................................. 206
Situation redefinition intersection with domination (authority and allocation).
................................................................................................................. 206
Situation redefinition intersections with knowledge (discursive and tacit). 207
Responsible Communication (Choices) Intersections with Structures ............... 208
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Responsible communication (choices) intersection with signification. ...... 208
Responsible communication (choices) intersections with legitimation. ..... 208
Responsible communication (choices) intersections with domination
(authority and allocation). ......................................................................... 208
Responsible communication (choices) intersections with knowledge
(discursive and tacit). ................................................................................ 210
Appendix D: Leader Biographies ................................................................................ 211
Clarence Ray Nagin, Jr. ..................................................................................... 211
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco ............................................................................... 212
Michael D. Brown ............................................................................................... 213
George W. Bush ................................................................................................ 216
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Analysis of Leader Communication During Hurricane Katrina ..................... 87
Table 2: Context Definition Synopsis......................................................................... 98
Table 3: Responsibility Synopsis ............................................................................. 101
Table 4: Outcome Clarity Synopsis ......................................................................... 105
Table 5: Redefinition of Situation Synopsis ............................................................. 108

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Abstract
Anthropogenic climate change is likely to put ever larger populations at risk for loss of
life or injury due to crises and disasters. It therefore becomes imperative for leaders at
all levels to both understand the importance of and to become adept at handling
communication directed at those publics most likely to be affected. Since Hurricane
Katrina was the worst natural disaster to hit the US in many years, it is important to
better understand the communication of four key leaders involved in the crisis. The
public messages of these four leaders were analyzed to ascertain whether or not those
leaders understood how to frame effective and appropriate messages using the
concepts of signification, legitimation, domination, and knowledgeability from Giddens’
structuration theory, combined with Fairhurst’s rules for reality construction. These
messages were examined with regard to how they defined the context for the people of
New Orleans, whether they responsibly addressed choices available to the different
populations, and whether they clearly delineated the outcomes leaders wanted.
Because the breeched levees constituted an escalating crisis situation, communication
was studied to determine how leaders addressed the changing exigencies caused by
the massive flooding. Speeches given by four public leaders, Mayor C. Ray Nagin,
Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, FEMA Director Michael Brown, and President
George W. Bush, were studied to determine the differences in messages and
messaging according to the varied levels of government service. The results of this
research indicate that leaders at all levels missed communication opportunities that
might have resulted in less loss of life and reduced levels of suffering for the people of
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New Orleans. This study highlights the need for proper training and strategic
communication support for leaders in crisis and disaster communication.
Keywords: Hurricane Katrina, disasters, crises, structuration, framing

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Chapter 1: Hurricane Katrina: Framing Leadership Through Communication
Many questions about crisis leadership during major disasters have arisen in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a category four hurricane that struck the Gulf Coast in
August 2005. Experts and laypersons alike share the perception that leaders at every
level failed in their efforts to organize the evacuation and provide subsequent care and
provision for the residents of New Orleans (Ink, 2006; Menzel, 2006; Select Bipartisan
Committee, 2006). The Select Bipartisan Committee (2006), an investigative group
created by the U.S. House of Representatives to study these failures, declared that
Hurricane Katrina had been a crisis, and more specifically, a crisis of leadership. In the
years since Katrina there have been significant other major crises and disasters in the
United States; such as Hurricane Ike (2008), the BP Deepwater Horizon (2010) drilling
rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, the Upper Big Branch mine disaster in West Virginia
(2010); Hurricane Irene (2011), and the Arkansas floods (2010). In addition there have
been multiple cases of tornados, floods, and fires.
Not only have there been many such disasters and crises, but the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is predicting an increase in flooding, extreme tropical
cyclones, and high seas between now and the year 2100 (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency). More importantly than this is the consensus among experts that
more people and property are at risk from extreme weather than ever before due to
increasing numbers of people living and working in high risk areas such as coastal
plains (Easterling et al., 2000; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012).
This means that leaders who must deal with disasters and crises must become better
able to handle these events.
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Unfortunately crises and disasters are unpredictable. Crisis often occur with little
or no warning to those most at risk, and natural disasters follow uncertain and
changeable patterns and time-tables. In addition, these types of events often trigger
other disasters and crises (e.g., the flooding due to levee breeches during Hurricane
Katrina, or the nuclear reactor meltdown in Japan after the tsunami). In these cases,
leaders have to deal with rapidly changing situations and with communicating
information about these situations to those likely to be effected. In the case of
Hurricane Katrina exigencies ranged from whether or not the hurricane was actually
going to hit the city and whether to call for a mandatory evacuation, to knowledge that
the levee breaks were inundating large areas in the city with flood waters and many
people had not evacuated. Fortunately television and radio stations were still operating
so information could be disseminated, but most other communication systems failed,
making it difficult to find out what was happening as well as to pass that information
along to others. There was a breakdown not only of communication but also of
cooperation between the City, the State, and the Federal Government (in the form of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency). Thus Hurricane Katrina provides a perfect
scenario to examine how leaders use communication to disseminate information and to
persuade people to take proper precautions during such changing and difficult
scenarios.
A large number of studies have focused on leadership and crisis communication
during Hurricane Katrina including portrayal of authority by the media (Littlefield &
Quenette, 2007), image repair (Benoit, 2006; Benoit & Henson, 2009; Liu, 2007), and
reception of leader communication based on demographics (Gordon, 2009; K. Lachlan
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& Spence, 2007; K. A. Lachlan, Burke, Spence, & Griffin, 2009). These studies have
typically focused on the results of the communication and on how different populations
responded. One area that has not been studied would look at the framing of messages
from the leader’s perspective and the rhetorical appropriateness of those messages. In
addition, there have been no studies examining whether the leaders were able to adapt
messages to the changing exigencies of the situation. A study of the appropriateness of
messages as well as an investigation as to whether there is a need to change strategy
to adapt to changing exigencies will expand our basis for understanding what happens
during crises and disasters. To this end, this study examines the strategic
communication of several public leaders in light of the changing circumstances of
Hurricane Katrina, focusing specifically on how those leaders framed their
communication as the disaster unfolded.
The value of this study is to highlight the importance of and add to our
understanding of leadership as enacted through communication during crises and
disasters. It also serves as an initial test of Fairhurst’s (2011) Rules of Reality
Construction as a roadmap for leaders facing the uncertainty of crises and disasters.
Finally, this study examines whether leader communication changed as the exigencies
of the situation changed. In order to accomplish these things the following research
questions are posed:
RQ1. How did leaders frame their communication to define a context for the
people of New Orleans at the start of Katrina?
RQ2. Did the leaders communicate responsibly concerning the choices open to
the people of New Orleans?
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RQ3. Did the leaders communicate clearly what outcomes they desired?
RQ4. Did leaders use strategic crisis communication tactics to dynamically re-
define the situation for the people of New Orleans (e.g., changing exigencies call
for changed communication)?

This research proposes a two-part analysis of the communication of four leaders
during the Hurricane Katrina crisis: New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco, FEMA Director Michael Brown, and U.S. President George
W. Bush. The first part comprises a historical case study of their leader communication
during the Hurricane Katrina Disaster. The second is a close critical analysis of the
public speeches made by these leaders using structuration theory as a lens to examine
how these leaders framed messages directed towards the citizens of New Orleans. The
research aims to determine if leaders utilized strategically planned communication in the
optimum manner to affect the outcomes of the Hurricane Katrina disaster.
The data for this study is taken from press conferences and interviews given by
the above mentioned leaders prior to, during, and immediately following landfall of
Hurricane Katrina. There are a number of reasons for choosing this particular data.
First, the exigencies of the emergency situation means that even though their
communication will still be scripted in many cases, there is less time for the language
used to be as tightly managed and vetted as may occur during non-crisis periods and
interviews require responses to emerging circumstances. Second, the disaster
unfolded over a number of days wherein the primary crisis in the form of Hurricane
Katrina gave way to an even worse crisis as the levees protecting the city were
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breeched and flooded large portions of New Orleans, leaving many people stranded.
These events invite an examination of whether and how leaders changed their rhetoric
to meet the changing exigencies.
Third, the information is readily available. TV crews proved themselves more
capable of being on-the-spot than did government agencies and videotapes of most of
these press conferences and interviews are accessible. One limitation of this study is
lack of access to entire press conferences and interviews although pains were taken to
be sure the most complete videos were used. Of course, there is a lack of objective
data to show how each individual message was received by those audiences most
affected by them. However, this is not a reception study and reviewing responses is
beyond the scope of this study.
Effectively managing crises and disaster situations is extremely important at a
time when the population of the United States has increased to the point that natural
causes and terrorist attacks alike can cause significant loss of life and property, not to
mention significant disruption to the country as a whole. One way to understand how
leadership functions during a crisis is to investigate how leaders frame their
communication when faced with a crisis or disaster. This, in turn, can provide insights
necessary to leadership training that may better prepare leaders for tomorrow.
The following chapters provide pertinent information on leader communication,
crisis, disaster, and risk communication, and a discussion on the research that has been
done on leader communication and Hurricane Katrina. A methods section follows
discussing Hurricane Katrina as a unique case of leadership communication that
provides the basis for an analysis that sets Fairhurst’s (2005) framing principles against
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actual practice. A conclusion follows. Additionally, appendices are included that
delineate the data collection and organizing procedures, a listing of video and audio
clips selected for analysis, and brief biographies of the leaders involved.

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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The Select Bipartisan Committee (SBC), appointed by the House of
Representatives to investigate events immediately prior to and during Hurricane Katrina,
found that “too many leaders failed to lead” (2006, p. 360). Donald Mensel, referring to
the title of the SBC’s report, A Failure of Initiative, writes that “A failure of initiative is
another way of describing a failure of leadership” (2006, p. 808). These reports, as well
as the press and other authors, criticize the Mayor of New Orleans, the Governor of
Louisiana, the Head of FEMA, and the President of the United States for numerous
leadership failures before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina made landfall slightly to
the east of New Orleans. According to Dwight Ink (2006), “it is difficult to understand
how so many serious shortcomings could have occurred during the same disaster” (p.
802).
The list of these failures includes behavioral issues such as lack of follow-
through on insights gained during the 2005 Hurricane Pam simulation and failure to
organize adequate plans, personnel and supplies in advance of the storm (Select
Bipartisan Committee, 2006). This research investigates leadership as a
communication phenomenon and thus analyzes the messages presented by leaders
during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. In order to understand the communication of
these leaders, we need to understand the history of how communication in government
and organizations has been conceptualized since many of these early concepts affect
how organizations currently respond to disasters and crisis. It is also important to
understand the rapidly changing face of leadership in today’s global economy and how
these views of leadership work for and against leaders during disasters
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Research on appropriate communication concerning risks, crises, and disasters
is still in the early stages, with scholars from different disciplines now compiling those
practices that work best in specific areas and those practices that are more general (P.
A. Andersen & Spitzberg, 2006). While the study of natural disasters as a set of
sociological issues began shortly after World War II (Gilbert, 1998), it was only in the
late 1980s that organizations began to understand the importance of being prepared for
crises. This perspective emanated from the work of Mitroff and his associates (Mitroff,
Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987). Their conclusions indicated that communication, both
internal and external, is a foundational component of preparedness. In addition, risk
communication is an area of study that had previously developed in concert with the
notion that the government was responsible for protecting the general population from
harm along with separate lines of research in public health and environmental concerns
(Plough & Krimsky, 1987). The following sections review the history of leadership
communication followed by brief summaries of crisis, risk, and disaster communication.
Leadership Communication
A short history of leadership and communication.
Bass (1990a) traces leadership to pre-written history, dating back some 5,000
years with the Iliad and the Odyssey, Egyptian hieroglyphics and Confucianism.
Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle addressed the training of leaders during the 3
rd
and 4
th

centuries B.C. (Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990).
In the Renaissance, around 1513, Machiavelli (1947) wrote The Prince as a
treatise on leadership and power maintaining that the Prince could act as either a lamb
or a lion but leadership was primarily about ‘great men.’ During the industrial revolution,
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the nature of work changed, and management and leadership became intertwined. In
this context, the importance of communication began to become apparent and was
addressed by early writers such as Henri Fayol and Chester Barnard. Fayol
(1916/1949) was explicit in delineating communication patterns that should follow a
chain of command while acknowledging the need for upward communication from
workers to managers, as well as communication that occasionally crosses command
lines. Later he addressed the need for increased communication competence in
individuals as they rose higher in the management ranks of an organization (Fayol,
1923). At about the same time, German sociologist, philosopher and political economist
Max Weber (1947/1987) posited that in a perfect bureaucracy, each position carries its
own responsibilities and authority. This is important in that it links the authority to give
orders with the responsibility to see that they are carried out (Morrison, 2006, p. 362).
Those at the “executive” level must coordinate action across the entire organization.
Coordination is accomplished through effective communication at all levels of an
organization.
In 1967 and 1968 Phillip K. Tompkins (1977) was asked to look for “systemic
communication problems” as well as investigate the communication practices that were
working well at NASA’s highly successful Marshal Space Flight Center under the
direction of Werner Von Braun. Tompkins’ (2006) findings reaffirmed the importance of
upward and lateral communication and drew attention to the importance of
communication structures. While later reviewing the official reports and conducting
interviews with engineers at NASA concerning the 1986 loss of the space shuttle
Columbia along with her crew, Tompkins determined that most of the best
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communication practices instituted by von Braun had been discontinued concluding
that, “communication was the main cause of the accident” (2006, p. 277). Additionally,
in 1987, Tompkins analyzed NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System and discovered
that ,“between 60 - 70% of the near accidents involved miscommunication” (2006, p.
278).
After investigating student deaths during the Kent State University riots,
Tompkins and Anderson (1971) determined that the riots were caused, at least in part,
by lack of communication between the office of the President of the University, the
students, other administrators, and the faculty. Much of this stemmed from the lack of
communication from the President himself (Bills, 1982). The work by Tompkins clearly
indicates not only the importance of communication in the workplace, but also the
necessity for leaders to understand the problem and strive to create the capacity for
optimum communication at all organizational levels. Within this frame, leaders must
learn to communicate effectively themselves. Barge (1985) empirically determined that
effective and ineffective leaders communicate differently.
An analysis by Barge, Downs, & Johnson (1989) revealed that effective
conversations by leaders were viewed as “positively versus negatively valenced,
coherent versus incoherent, and facilitating versus inhibiting the accomplishment of
work-related and personal goals” ( p. 377). Barge (1994b) argues that leadership must
be “re-grounded” in the knowledge that leaders need about their particular organizations
and how to coordinate and manage interdependencies among organizational members.
He grounds the ability to do this in the communication process, considering this the
primary way one leads. Barge (1994a, 1996) also maintains that due to the increasing
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complexity of the world, leaders must know the needs of the environment as well as
those of their organizations. To this end, leaders must be adaptable and flexible in
managing complex situations in order to coordinate between diverse groups of
constituents. The complexity in today’s global economy, the breadth of current
organizational reach, and the rapidly changing workplace are of great concern to both
organizational and leadership scholars who are looking at today’s organization and
theorizing about tomorrow.
Current and future views.
Peter Drucker maintained, "a leader is someone who has followers," who sets an
example, gets results, and takes responsibility (1995, p. xii). According to John Work
(1996), “even though we cannot define what constitutes leadership we do seem to think
that we know leaders when we see them: they are those individuals who, in their
inimitable ways, inspire confidence, undermine despair, fight fear, initiate positive and
productive actions, light the candles, define the goals, and paint brighter tomorrows" (p.
73). Further, many people, both in and out of academia, believe that rapidly advancing
technologies, especially in the areas of communication and transportation, have
changed the environment so significantly that new types of leaders and leadership are
necessary (Bass, 1990b; Bennis, 1999; Bornstein & Smith, 1996; Bridges, 1996;
Goldsmith, 1996; Helgesen, 1996; Hickman, 2010; Mandl & Sethi, 1996; Noer, 1996;
Ulrich, 1996). On the other side of this argument, some scholars maintain that there are
core leadership qualities, including characteristics, traits and capabilities that do not
change across time (Bathurst & Monin, 2010; Blumer, 1969; Kanter, 1996; Wilhelm,
1996). Some see the need for the traditional leader at the top, albeit augmented with
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leaders throughout the organization (Bardwick, 1996; Handy, 1996; Poole, 1999; Smith,
1996). Others suggest that leadership, even at the top level, must be shared (O'Toole,
Galbraith, & Lawler, 2002; R. Townsend, 1970). It is clear that communication, both
within the organization and out into the larger environment, has become more complex
due to new technologies and globalization of the economy. The next section focuses on
the exigencies of this discussion, then examines current theories offering guidance for
action in this rapidly changing milieu.
The changing landscape.
Rapid changes in technology over the last several decades have bridged time,
space, and overcome economic barriers to connect different parts of the world
(Bardwick, 1996; Bathurst & Monin, 2010; Bridges, 1996; Mandl & Sethi, 1996).
Networks change the structure (Monge & Fulk, 1999) and flow (Castells, 1996) of
communication in and between organizations. A message can be experienced by
anyone, anywhere, as soon as it is sent (Bridges, 1996; Monge & Fulk, 1999). Handy
states, “virtuality means managing people you cannot see and cannot control in any
detail” (1996, p. 6). Understandably, these changes affect areas that relate to
management and leadership processes.
Information is available on a wide scale (Castells, 1996; Helgesen, 1996) that
was previously accessible only at the top of the bureaucracy (Helgesen, 1996; Mandl &
Sethi, 1996; Monge & Fulk, 1999). In fact, there is so much information now that one
person cannot possibly know all there is to know or keep up completely with rapid
changes in world and market conditions (Goldsmith, 1996; Hickman, 2010; Ulrich,
1996). In addition, tasks are too complicated, information too distributed, and cultures
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13
too different for one person, or even for a management team, to manage everything
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2005) . For this reason, many people believe that the old
“command and control” vertical structures no longer suffice – that leadership needs to
be spread throughout the organization (Bennis, 1999; Helgesen, 1996; Hickman, 2010).
This is often referred to as systems leadership, although some scholars characterize it
as distributed leadership (Ancona & Backman, 2010; Ancona & Bresman, 2007; Thorpe,
Gold, & Lawler, 2011). The difference is that in a systems view, leadership emerges
from the “interactions among agents” at any level of the system (Hazy, Goldstein, &
Lichtenstein, 2007, p. 8) such that it results in “unintended changes at higher levels
within and beyond the focal organization” (Lichtenstein & Plowman, 2009, p. 617).
At the same time, there are certain challenges and decisions that still must be
addressed by a single leader (Bardwick, 1996; Pinchot, 1996; Smith, 1996). MacMillan
( 2010, March 1) notes that leaders “bear sole responsibility for the decisions they
make” (p. 35). Jeffrey A. Stoops, CEO for SBA Communications, reports, “‘At the end of
the day the CEO has to pick a path and take it’” (MacMillan, 2010, March 1, p. 35).
Leaders must continue to “define the business of the business” (Bardwick, 1996, p.
136), “set direction, make tough decisions and choices, and inspire commitment from
those who follow them” (Smith, 1996, p. 201). They must define and shape the culture
of the organization (Bass, 1990b; Bathurst & Monin, 2010), and be the glue that holds
the entire organization together (Handy, 1996). Thus leaders today have a complicated
job as the rapidly changing landscape affects both internal and external roles that the
leader must negotiate (Helgesen, 1996). Presidents, chairmen of the board, and others
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14
must be able to stand alone when tough decisions must be made, but they also must be
able to work well with and share leadership tasks and roles with others (Ulrich, 1996).
One method for dealing with this complexity involves having a focus person, a
leader, or an executive team at the top, but augmented with leaders throughout the
organization (Bridges, 1996; Hesselbein, 1996; Hickman, 2010; Huff & Moeslein, 2005).
This allows top leadership to determine strategy and set the direction of the company,
but with management then serving those who must do the day to day work (Drucker,
1995). However both Blanchard (1996) and Bridges (1996) emphasize that those
involved in creating the vision and direction for the organization must also be involved in
implementation of those policies. Locke (2003) maintains that leaders must be active
listeners and seek information from those within the company as well as those without
in order to create viable strategies that the organizational can fulfill. Bennis and Nanus
(2003) suggest that there needs to be a constant interplay between leaders and
followers in order to create a unified focus.
In spite of the compelling global and strategic demands on organizations, the
most important tasks facing leaders involve directing organizational members and
building productive relationships (Bar-On, 2006; Bathurst & Monin, 2010; Bennis, 1999;
Bornstein & Smith, 1996; Copleston, 1993; Creswell, 1994; Hesselbein, 1996). As
organizations become more consumer driven, Hegelson (1996) discusses the
increasing importance of employee interaction with the public to the success of any
organization. In addition she notes that rank and file members of any organization are
responsible for a majority of the functions of the business (Helgesen, 1996). Armstrong
maintains that as “driver[s] of value,” employees are more important than “capital,
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15
technology, or systems” (2005, p. 288) and that “shared values, common
understanding and accountability have to replace power, turf and “ownership” (p. 291) .
According to Hesselbein (1996) not only are people “the organization’s greatest asset”,
but “the three major challenges CEOs will face have little to do with managing the
enterprise’s tangible assets and everything to do with monitoring the quality of:
leadership, the workforce, and relationships” (p. 121-122).
Peter Swinburn, President and CEO of Molson Coors since June 2008,
corroborates this sentiment maintaining that his first priority and greatest triumph
involved “forging a cohesive corporate culture” among 15,000 employees located on
three continents. He points to this as being responsible for increasing both employee
satisfaction and output (MacMillan, 2010, p. 38). Writers and scholars suggest that in
order to succeed, leaders must exhibit good “character.” They must be honest and
trustworthy with integrity, values, and principles (Bardwick, 1996; Bass, 1990b; Bennis
& Nanus, 2003; Blumer, 1969; Bornstein & Smith, 1996; Hesselbein, 1996; Kouzes &
Posner, 1996). They must act fairly, show respect for others, and be good at listening
(Bardwick, 1996; Bennis, 1999; Bennis & Nanus, 2003; Blumer, 1969; Bornstein &
Smith, 1996; Pinchot, 1996). In addition leaders must be competent, accept
responsibility, be adept at dealing with a diverse workforce and outside partnerships,
and have vision (Bennis, 1999; Blumer, 1969; DeCrane, 1996; Handy, 1996;
Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2005; Melendez, 1996; Noer, 1996). A number of current
and future looking theories have been developed to address these issues and will be
covered next.
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16
Regardless of how leadership is conceptualized, where they exist in the
organization structure, or what he or she must do, the ability to communicate well is
perhaps the most important ability a person can develop. It is impossible to have
followers, coordinate activities, or share an inspiration without being able to
communicate well. Leadership theories developed in light of the changing environment
discussed above and their implications for communication will be covered next.
Current theories.
Current leadership theories include those based on transformational leadership
as well as charismatic, strategic, visionary, shared, servant, and authentic leadership.
There are also theories based on emotional intelligence and adaptive intelligence. Many
of these are based in the visionary work of James MacGregor Burns (cf. Bass (1990);
Bennis and Nanus (2003); Luthans and Avolio (2003), and Gardner & Luthans (2006)).
Burns (1978) is credited with introducing the terms, and the distinction between,
transactional and transformational leadership, including a moral component in
transformational leadership that is unusual for most theories (p. 4). Transactional
leadership primarily involves an exchange between leader and follower while
transformational leaders are “fully sharing leaders [who] perceive their roles as shaping
the future to the advantage of groups with which they identify, an advantage they define
in terms of the broadest possible goals and the highest possible levels or moralities”
(Burns, 1978, p. 448). Research by Bass and his associates (Bass, 1990a, 1998)
indicates that leadership is a combination of the two, with transformational leadership
augmenting transactional. Bass considers transformational leadership an overarching
concept that includes aspects of charismatic and inspirational leadership. While these
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17
two types are similar to each other, more attention is paid to the charismatic leader in
the literature.
Charismatic leadership, introduced by Max Weber, focuses on the ability of the
leader to attract devoted followers who base beliefs in the leader’s exceptional abilities,
especially in times of crisis (Bass, 1990a; Nelson & Quick, 2005; Weber, 1947/1987;
Yukl, 2006). In contrast, followers of an inspirational leader are drawn more to “goals
and purposes” rather than to the figure her or himself (Bass, 1990a). Communication is
perhaps more important in the case of the former than the latter, since followers of
charismatic leaders are drawn to the person as much or more than to the cause. In
their review of leadership theories that address charisma and vision, Baum and Locke
(1998) found that “communicating a vision” was one of the major components in
charisma although indirect effects were often more important than direct effects.
Closely related to transformational is that of authentic Leadership, developed by Avolio
and his associates (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Avolio & Luthans, 2006; Avolio,
Walumbwa, & Weber, 2009).
In a 2004 working paper, Avolio, Luthans, and Walumba (2004) define authentic
leaders as “’those who are deeply aware of how they think and behave and are
perceived by others as being aware of their own and others’ values/moral perspectives,
knowledge, and strengths; aware of the context in which they operate; and who are
confident, hopeful, optimistic, resilient, and of high moral character'” (as cited in Avolio
and Gardner, 2005, p. 321). According to Avolio and Gardner (2005), one of the
primary differences between transformational and authentic leadership is that the
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18
authentic leader is less concerned with influencing associates and subordinates than
with remaining true to his or her authentic self.
Authentic and transformational theories of leadership are not the only ones that
stress self-awareness. Daniel Goleman (1998) argues that leadership is dependent
upon emotional intelligence, which is composed of emotional “self-awareness, self-
regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill” (Goleman, 1998, p. 2). Less broad
than the self-awareness of Authentic Leadership, the work on emotional intelligence
does not include an understanding of intellectual, physical, or other abilities. Although
transformational and authentic leaders have the development of others as part of their
goals, all of the theories discussed so far maintain a “man or woman at the top”
perspective. In contrast, servant and shared leadership provide radically different ways
of looking at leadership with servant leadership prioritizing the need to serve over that of
gaining power (Greenleaf, 2002), and with shared leadership involving “patterns of
reciprocal influence” as leadership is distributed rather than focused in one person
(Avolio, et al., 2009, p. 431)
Robert K. Greenleaf (1977/2010) maintains that true leadership comes from a
“servant’s heart” and stresses the importance of helping others improve their
capabilities and reach their goals. Others believe in “shared leadership.” According to
Allen et al. shared leadership encompasses “participatory, collective, collaborative,
cooperative, democratic, fluid, inclusive, roving, distributed, relational, and post-heroic”
types of leadership (2010, p. 248). Shared leadership, defined by Pearce and Conger
as “a dynamic, interactive influence process among individuals in groups for which the
objective is to lead one another to the achievement of group or organizational goals or
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19
both," can appear at any level, from work and executive teams to interorganizational
partnerships or alliances (2010, p. 167) .
As Connelly (2007) and others (Judge & Ryman, 2001; R. Townsend, 1970)
point out, working with other people is not easy. It involves cooperation and
collaboration in order to reach a shared common objective. The main considerations
required for successful shared leadership are trust and shared values (Connelly, 2007;
Judge & Ryman, 2001; Pearce & Conger, 2010; R. Townsend, 1970). Connelly also
notes that prior exposure to shared power situations as well as a belief in the
effectiveness of sharing power help make such relationships work. Those who have
fought their way to the top may find it difficult to collaborate with others since focusing
on goals that benefit both parties is an essential part of working together (Judge &
Ryman, 2001). A final area of leadership research that has obtained prominence
focuses on the leader and his or her relationships to the long term goals, direction,
profit, and survival of the organization (Chandler, 1962, 1997; Hambrick, Cannella, &
Pettigrew, 1993; Yukl, 2006).
Strategic leadership is leadership “of” the organization, rather than leadership “in”
the organization (Boal & Hooijberg, 2000). According to Hambrick (1993), strategic
leadership refers only to leadership at the top of the organization where resources
necessary to implement any strategic plan or change are located (Chandler, 1997).
This differentiates it from leadership that can occur at other organizational levels,
although some (e.g., Shivastava & Nachman, 1989) would dispute this. The top
leadership can be by one individual or by a top management team (Boal & Hooijberg,
2000; Hambrick, et al., 1993; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Ronald Heifetz, Grashow, &
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20
Linsky, 2009). Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that long-term plans for the
organization are so strongly influenced by the characteristics of the leaders responsible
for the plans, that the characteristics of the leader or leaders are reflected in the
organization as well as in any change efforts. Successful implementation of strategic
planning, according to Boal and Hooijberg (2000), requires three things: (1) absorptive
capacity, or the capacity to learn; (2) adaptive capacity, the capacity to be flexible and
change; and (3) managerial wisdom (discernment regarding the environment and social
actors, and the ability to take the “right action” at the right time). Heifetz (1994; 2009)
refers to this as adaptive intelligence, or the ability to recognize not only external forces
affecting an organization, but also internal forces that will make it resistant to change,
and the ability to make the difficult choices necessary for organizational adaptation to
changing situations. Thus the combination of position in the organization along with the
capability to focus on the organization’s position in the outside world differentiate those
leaders at the top of the organization from those whose responsibilities involve the
everyday running of the organization (Chandler, 1997). Bennis and Nanus (1985)
maintain that the ability to develop and implement strategic plans hinges on the ability of
the leadership having a coherent vision for the organization. Implementing this vision
requires buy-in from both internal and external stakeholders and this depends on
effective communication by the leadership of the organization. Not only do they have to
utilize deliberate forms of persuasion, but they must also be aware of the impact of the
words and symbols they use on a daily basis and how those words affect their listeners
(Barge, 1994a; Hackman & Johnson, 2004).
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21
The above discussion looks at leadership primarily from a business, or
organizational point of view. Yukl considers organizational leadership to be different
from “parliamentary leadership, leadership of social movements, or emergent leadership
in informal groups” (2006, p. XV). Since this study focuses on political leadership, and
particularly the leadership of people who were in elected or appointed positions, it is
important to note the distinctive conditions that pertain to these positions.
Public Leadership
Interest in public or political leadership goes back almost as far as interest in
leadership in general. Isocrates opened the first academy to train young men for public
life four hundred years B.C.E. (Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990) followed by Plato’s Academy a
few years later (Benoit, 1991). According to Bass (1990a), Plato developed “the first
typology of political leaders,” which included timocratic (ruling by pride and honor),
plutocratic (ruling by wealth), democratic (ruling by popular consent on the basis of
equality), and tyrannical (ruling by coercion)” (p. 22). Modern typologies mentioned by
Bass (1990a) include works by Bell, Hill, and Wright who differentiated “formal leaders
(who hold official positions, either appointed or elected)” from reputational, social, and
influential leaders; by Haiman who identified ‘the executive, the judge, the advocate, the
expert, and the discussion leader” (p. 22); by Kotter & Lawrence who categorized city
mayors based on agendas, networks, and tasks accomplished; and by Burns who
described legislative leaders based on doctrines, popular needs, careers,
parliamentarians and mediators.
Terry (1995) discusses the current bureaucratic structure in the United States
where public agencies are led by elected or appointed officials. This structure dates
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22
back to the Constitution which separates power into the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches in order to create a system of checks and balances among the three
bodies. As the need for support and administrative staff grew, particularly in the
legislative and executive arenas, concern that an individual could gain too much power
was transferred to the organization of these staffs (Terry, 1995). As a result many
agencies are directed by leaders who are appointed by the President, but who must
also be approved by Congress. Each of the fifty states operates in a similar manner
although they each have a slightly different structure. In each, governors appoint heads
of many state departments and agencies (Rosenthal, 1990).
According to the U.S. Department of State (Rose, 2005, February 04), positions
requiring Congressional (Senate) approval include “top Cabinet appointees - - the
attorney general, the department heads with the title of secretary, including the deputy,
under and assistant secretaries, and certain other top positions, such as the U. S. trade
representative.” Rose goes on to say, “These political appointees will be the managers
who direct the government bureaucracy to implement new administration policy” (2
nd
pp,
1 & 2
nd
sentence). Of these, cabinet secretaries report directly to the President (Michael
Chertoff was in this category); deputy and undersecretaries (Michael Brown was
undersecretary to Michael Chertoff) help the Secretary with administrative duties, and
assistant secretaries direct major programs (Burns, Peltason, Cronin, & Magleby, 2000).
In 2004, out of over nine thousand possible political appointments that range from entry
level clerical positions to high level executive ones (Rose, 2005, February 04), there
were between 500 and 600 appointees requiring Senate approval (Gilmour & Lewis).
These political appointments are often given to friends and political supporters of the
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23
elected official as part of the “spoils system” instituted by President Andrew Jackson
who believed that a newly elected president needed to be surrounded by friends and
other supportive people (Burns, et al., 2000). In the late 1800’s a merit testing and
evaluation system was instituted as a counter to the spoils system (Burns, et al., 2000)
Within this system, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 created the Senior
Executive Service (SES) comprised of career officials who do not require Senate
approval (Burns, et al., 2000). The SES was designed to provide the Government with
a pool of experienced executives to draw upon who were committed to public service
and who could be immediately tapped for most positions. Ink (2006) argues that the
advantages of using these senior career officers over political appointees is that they
have a better understanding of the how the agencies in the federal government are
organized and the necessary skills to effectively coordinate actions not only between
internal agencies but also between internal and external agencies. A study by Gilmour
and Lewis (2006) found that career managers scored higher in three out of four
managerial areas than appointed managers on a rating system developed by the Office
of Management and Budget. However career SES employees did no better than
noncareer SES employees. Of the 214 programs for which data were available, 165
were run by political appointees, 20 by career SES employees, and 29 by noncareer
SES employees. Career SES employees go through a rigorous rating and ranking
process that culminates in a approval by the SES Qualifications Review Board and
results in tenure for the employee ("United States Government: Policy and supporting
positions," 2008). Noncareer SES employees are not required to meet these
requirements. Gilmour and Lewis (2006) include high turnover, less managerial
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24
experience, and less substantive expertise in the managed area as possible reasons for
the failure of appointees to score well. As far as noncareer SES employees doing as
well as career employees, Gilmour and Lewis suggest the possibility that the noncareer
executives are drawn from a different population, may have more federal experience
and have a “less politicized view of their job” (2006, p. 36) than career SES executives.
A highly critical study of the SES by Booz Allen Hamilton (2009), in conjunction with the
Partnership for Public Service, indicated that in 2008 there were 1455 political
appointees, and nearly 7000 SES executives working for the federal government. In
addition, there were another 665 positions within the SES that were filled by
appointment. Among other issues Booz Allen Hamilton determined that career SES
executives were not given adequate developmental or leadership opportunities. In
addition to mixed results on the efficacy of filling governmental positions with career
officers, whether those vetted by the SES or not, the continuing concerns of power
accumulation and Presidential support keep this a controversial issue.
Rusaw (2001) and Van Wart (2005) note that, until recently, the public
administration field has shown a relative lack of interest in organizational leadership with
Van Wart pointing out how leadership in the policy making arena differs from leadership
in the public organization itself. Van Wart found that the most prominent ongoing issue
in the public leadership literature focused on the degree of discretion agency
administrators should have. From the late 1880s to the mid 1900s administrators were
expected to tend to the day to day operations of an agency and leave policy making to
the political appointee. In other words, political leaders were expected to make the
decisions; administrators were expected to carry them out. Gradually scholars
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25
acknowledged the overlap in these two areas and the discussion moved to the
responsible use of discretion by administrators. The reform agenda of the 1990’s thrust
the idea of entrepreneurial change into the government sector. Change requires more
creativity and discretionary power as the focus moves away from maintaining the status
quo (Van Wart, 2005). While the increase in size of the federal bureaucracy during the
20
th
century has increased fears that expanding discretionary power will threaten the
constitutional checks on power, Terry (1995) asserts that administrators cannot fulfill
their responsibilities without such power. At the same time, he maintains that the
primary function of the federal bureaucracy is that of stewardship, or conservatorship, of
public values and tradition behind the American governance system. Terry argues that
while administrators need discretionary power to make decisions and changes when
necessary, they also need to keep in mind that people find reassurance in the stability
of government, especially during difficult times. Donahue (1999) echoes this sentiment
and includes businesses, state and local governments, and even foreign governments
as entities relying on the stability of federal agencies. Misztal discusses governmental
stability in terms of “the ability of the system to maintain conditions and to perform its
function” and its relationship to what she refers to as depersonalized trust (1998, p. 21).
Ingelhart (1999) notes that there has been a massive decline in trust in government
over the last forty or fifty years, particularly in the United States and the Pew Research
Center ("Public trust in government: 1958-2013," 2013, October 18), showed trust in the
government at an all time low just prior to the agreement in October, 2013 to end the
government shutdown.
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26
Along with the issue of administrator’s discretionary power, the federal
government presents a number of other unique difficulties. In 1996 there were 17
million government employees working in “14 cabinet-level departments and in the more
than 50 independent agencies embracing about 2,000 bureaus, divisions, branches,
offices, services, and other subunits of government" (Burns, et al., 2000, p. 415). Most
agencies are created by legislative action and must be responsive to the legislature, the
President, outside interest groups, and the constituencies they serve. Thus the sheer
size and complexity of the government makes leadership and administration difficult. In
addition, congressional bills are often purposefully vague to avoid arguments over their
passage, which, along with the large diversity of issues dealt with by the government,
leads to a lack of clarity of purpose (Donahue, 1999). Therefore it falls upon agency
leaders and administrators to interpret what Congress wants. Although theoretically the
agency should follow the direction of the political appointee, personal ideological
differences as well as differences in the President’s concerns and those of Congress
can create conflicts between the appointee and administrators. In reality, an
administrator who disagrees with the appointed head of his agency can often simply
“wait out” the appointee’s time in office (Gilmour & Lewis, 2006). Complexity of issues
plus inconsistency in leadership exacerbates problems relating to interconnectedness of
missions, problems with coordination, and turf issues between agencies (Donahue,
1999). Delays in department appointments after elections are not uncommon and add to
intra-agency problems by disrupting working relationships and creating uncertainty in
jointly conceived programs between agencies (Gilmour & Lewis, 2006).
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27
Donahue (1999) also discusses problems that arise from lack of competitive
pressures on government offices and the lack of accountability due to the lack of a
"direct link between resources and results" (p. 7). Allocation of tax dollars is often
based more on the "perceived importance of an agency’s mandate than with how well
that mandate is pursued" (p.7). This leaves funding subject to the whims of the
government as opposed to it being directly tied to outcomes. Added to the all of the
above are the "accretion of checks and double checks, rules and regulations,
restrictions, guarantees, legally mandated administrative procedures, and so on”
(Donahue, 1999, p. 10) that must be followed. According to Burns and his associates,
routines and standard operating procedures exist for purposes of efficiency and
productivity but reduce flexibility (2000).
As the review above indicates, leadership in public administration, while including
many of the same issues facing other organizations, is burdened by a number of distinct
issues including the use of discretion, excessive rules, lack of consistent objectives, and
perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the conjoining of political, appointed and
administrative leaders. Politicians must become adept at public speaking and
persuasive campaigns to both gain and keep office (Hackman & Johnson, 2004). They
must be able to not only influence but also understand the needs of their constituents
which makes the ability to listen important (Stivers, 1994). They must be able to
coordinate within their agency or office, with other agencies or offices, with other
officials, and with higher ranking offices (Rosenthal, 1990). In addition, according to
Rosenthal (1990), they must be able to deal with the media and with becoming media
personalities. These skills all involve the ability to communicate well in different
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28
modalities. Non-elected public officers must deal with the same communication issues,
just not to the same degree as the elected official. Panday and Garnett (2006), noting
that research on communication performance in the public sector is scarce, have shown
through their research that goal clarity and an organizational culture that supports open
communication are the most important factors in interagency communication
performance, explaining some 47% of variance. However these same factors were not
nearly as robust when tested on external communications. In his research on the
connections between public agencies and the media, Lee (2005) has found that
specialized staff members, often known as public information officers are increasingly
being used by pubic administrators to deal with the media.
Finally, Liu and her associates (Horsley, Liu, & Levenshus, 2010; Liu & Horsley,
2007; Liu, Horsley, & Levenshus, 2010; Liu & Levenshus, 2010; Liu, Levenshus, &
Horsley, 2012) have developed and empirically validated a model of public
communication called the Government Communication Decision Wheel. Primary
differences in public and private organizational communication were developed through
an analysis of literature from the communication, public administration, and public
relations fields (Horsley, et al., 2010). Testing and refinement of the GCDW shows that
government communicators report higher levels of political influence and impact of
governmental privacy policies on their daily jobs as well as frequent communication with
the public, with other governmental agencies, and with media than private sector
communicators(Horsley, et al., 2010; Liu, et al., 2010). While Liu’s work and that of her
associates point out some of the differences in organizational and public communication
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29
in particular, researchers have long looked at the way in which different situations affect
leader behavior and communication.
A number of scholars believe that leadership behavior and communication
should change to fit different situations. Hersey and Blanchard’s situational leadership
theory (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982; Hersey, Blanchard, & Natemeyer, 1979) felt the
leader should change her or his interaction with followers or employees according to the
employee’s individual needs. Vroom and Yetton (Vroom, 2000) developed the
normative decision model to help leaders know what type of communication would work
best under a number of different circumstances. One of the most heavily researched
situational models (Bass, 2008) is Fiedler’s contingency model (1972, 1976) which
maintains that the success of the leader in any particular situation depends upon the
match between the situation and the leader’s preferred style. Important concepts in
this theory are: (a) the amount of power a leader has due to her or his position in the
organization, (b) how structured the task requirements are, and (c) the relationships a
leader has with his or her followers. Among other updates to the contingency model are
those of Chemers (2000) and of Miller, Butler and Cosentino (2004), who extended the
theory to “followership effectiveness.” According to these theories, a leader who can
change his or her communication behavior to fit various environmental contingencies
will be more successful in influencing followers. However, there are times when leaders
do not have time to think through these different aspects of communication such as
under crises or disaster situations.

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Disasters, Crises, and Risks
Disaster research.
Disasters and crises are unique situations that require leaders to quickly
assimilate data about complex situations and make decisions about how to
communicate with all affected stakeholders. As such, they offer unique opportunities to
study leader communication. Historically disasters have been studied from the
standpoint of natural acts of nature that cause loss of life and/or damage to man-made
structures (Alexander, 1993; Gilbert, 1998; Porfiriev, 1998; Prince, 1920), although the
distinction between disasters and crises is being eroded as scholars such as Mitroff and
Anagnos (2001) consider disasters as types of crises, which have typically been
considered as having human causality (Pauchant & Douville, 1993). Hurricane Katrina
qualifies as both due to the levee failure. Regardless of the terminology used,
leadership communication during these times can make the difference in life and death
for thousands of people
Prince ‘s 1920 analysis of an explosion in Halifax, Canada signaled the beginning
of research on disasters from a human standpoint rather than a geological one
(Scanlon, 1998). Prince refers to this event as a catastrophe, or “'an event producing a
subversion of the order or system of things, 'and such as 'may or may not be a cause of
misery to man'" (1920, p. 14). He argues that an appropriate level for studies like this is
the community because their smaller size makes research more manageable than
would state or nationwide levels of analysis. Dynes agrees with this assessment
because the community level is a “universal form of social life” and because it is from
the community that the initial aid for the disaster will come (1974; 1998, p. 109). While
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31
Prince focuses on events occurring after a catastrophe, Carr (1932) was one of the first
analysts who thought it important to look at events before, during and after a disaster to
get a complete picture of how such events function as a catalyst for change in society.
Carr’s (1932) main thrust was the development of a general theory of
catastrophic social change which he referred to as sequence-pattern theory. The first
stage is the “preliminary or prodromal period” during which “the forces which are to
cause the ultimate collapse are getting underway” (p. 211). The second phase is the
“dislocation and disorganization phase" (p. 211) that occurs during the actual event.
The third phase involves “readjustment and reorganization” (p. 214) where people must
deal with the changes that have occurred. This disruption of routines effects more than
just established behavior, it also affects the very ways in which people make sense of
their lives and what is happening to and around them (Gilbert, 1998; Moore, 1956).
Thus leaders must be sensitive to the mindsets of stakeholders before a catastrophe in
order to warn them of impending danger, as well as to the ways the extreme changes
and disruptions of normal routines during and after the disaster affect people in order to
give them needed information concerning what to do next. Carr’s intent was to show
that there is no single act that stands in isolation from either what comes before or what
follows. Another important contribution Carr made was in advancing the concept that
disasters differ according to “the speed, scope, complexity, and violence of the
catastrophes that cause them” (Carr, 1932, p. 210).
Disasters can vary in their onset times, however they often occur with little
warning. This creates a number of communication difficulties as different agencies and
emergency personnel scramble to organize and coordinate an effective response to the
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32
disaster. Not only must organizations deal with an increased need for internal
communication, they must often ignore traditional routines in order to process
information more quickly and disseminate it more broadly (Quarantelli, 1984). In
addition organizations at all levels have to interact with other organizations that they
may or may not be familiar with in order to coordinate resources, personnel, and rescue
operations. This creates organizational boundary issues, disrupts normal operating
procedures, and frequently causes confusion as to who has authority. Thus we see the
magnified need for effective communication during disasters. Next we will look at the
underpinnings of crisis and risk management and show how they are interrelated.
Crises and risks.
Ian I. Mitroff, who has done extensive work in organizational crisis management,
and his associates maintain that it is not a matter of “if” crises will occur, but rather
“when,” due in part to increasing population density, technology sophistication, and the
resulting interconnectivity between people, technology, and organizations (Mitroff, 2004;
Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington, 1996; Mitroff, et al., 1987; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). As
such systems become more interconnected, and thus more complex, breakdowns are
more likely to occur (Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001). Mitroff and his associates are speaking
about “man-made or human-caused crises” as the focus of crisis management as
opposed to “natural disasters” [italics in the original] (2001, p. 6). However, they include
natural disasters in the types of crises for which organizations need to be prepared.
Typically crises and disasters have referred to areas of study by researchers in
different disciplines. Crises are often referred to as man-made situations while “acts of
God or nature” are called disasters (Pauchant & Douville, 1993). The possibility of crisis
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33
(Harvard Business Essentials, 2004) or disaster is referred to as risk and has often
been used to describe medical or health related issues (P. A. Andersen & Spitzberg,
2006). Andersen and Spitzberg (2006), however, suggest that all of the situations
described by these terms have commonalities that indicate they should be not studied in
isolation from each other: All involve potentially harmful consequences, all involve
principals who must deal with the situations and the people involved. The rest of this
section will discuss definitions and the myriad of ways crises have been conceptualized
in the literature.
According to Karl Weick, “crises are characterized by low probability/high
consequence events that threaten the most fundamental goals of an organization”
(1988, p. 305). This definition emphasizes that a crisis is not something that occurs on
a regular basis; indeed it might not ever happen at all. But, once it does, it has major
consequences for the organization, threatening the very organization itself. Bergman
says a crisis is “a turning point for the better or the worse" (1994, p. 21), whether
personal, organizational or governmental, and that it has two components. The first
involves an emergency which is a “sudden, relatively unexpected occurrence that
demands serious attention and prompt action" (Bergman, 1994, p. 21). Second, it must
be severe enough to cause damage that is difficult to recover from and which causes
examination, analysis, and reform in order to avoid another crisis of the same sort.
Thus Hurricane Betsy in 1965 would be considered a crisis because the “Orleans Levee
Board raised the existing levee” (Global Security) afterwards, but neither Hurricane
Georges in 1998, or Hurricane Ivan in 2004 would be because they did not force the
issues of inadequate levee systems to the attention of those with the power and
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willingness to address changes. Hurricane Katrina is an obvious crisis by Bergman's (or
practically anyone’s) definition, because it caused enough damage to make recovery
difficult and forced a number of issues into the national limelight. In addition, re-building
the City of New Orleans without addressing these issues would be an effort in futility
since another hurricane could again destroy major parts of the city.
Heath’s definition is similar to Bergman’s (1994) except that Heath maintains that
“a crisis is a risk manifested” (2006, p. 245). He notes there are opportunities to predict
and control risks before they become crises, and that they can have either “positive or
negative consequences of varying magnitudes” (2006, p. 245). While Heath and
Bergman use emergency and risk in almost the same manner, “risk” implies that the
possibility of the event has been known, while “emergency” indicates something sudden
and unexpected. The inclusion of “positive” consequences by Heath is unusual in the
crisis literature as most definitions only involve the possibility of negative consequences
to the organization. In addition, Heath suggests that a crisis can have consequences of
varying magnitudes. Weick (1988) says the results of a crisis must be consequential
and Bergman maintains that a crisis has not occurred unless it creates change in
behavior. Mitroff, Pearson, and Harrington, while stressing the importance of
considering every possible negative occurrence, suggest a crisis is “an event that can
destroy or affect an entire organization (1996, p. 7). Mitroff (2004) further elaborates by
claiming that an event, “must exact a major toll on human lives, property, financial
earnings, the reputation, and the general health and well-being of an organization” (ch.
7, p.14-15). He also maintains that crises are difficult to pin down since each one is
different and each may be caused by or cause other types of crisis.
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Almost all of the definitions of crisis maintain that the possible outcome must be
consequential and that there must be either threat to the continuity of the organization
or to its reputation. Weick’s definition stresses that there is a low probability of any
particular crisis occurring while Mitroff and his associates maintain that the risk of crises
are increasing and that most organizations will face some type of crisis if not more than
one and that these may occur simultaneously. Most of the definitions also recognize a
turning point or period where the risk may or may not manifest itself and many
researchers in crises management stress that there are actions that can be taken to
avoid entirely or mitigate the losses from a crisis.
Katrina as disaster and crisis.
The situation in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina fits most of the above
conceptualizations of both crisis and disaster. There was a risk period in which
decisions were made about whether or not to evacuate the city. The possible
consequences were severe, ranging from total demolition of the city to extreme loss of
life. And there were a number of turning points as Hurricane Katrina changed direction
avoiding a direct hit on the city, as well as when the storm surges began topping
numerous levees and ultimately breeched a number of them. These factors all qualify
Hurricane Katrina as both a crisis and a disaster.
Hurricane Katrina itself was the precipitating event, the outside force that,
through its winds, rain, and water surges, caused the disaster. Without this event or
one like it, this particular damage scenario including loss of lives and property would not
have occurred. Obviously had there been no people living in the area, there would have
been no loss of life or social disruption. However, people have chosen to occupy this
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space despite known risks and reoccurring loss of property and life to physical
occurrences since at least the early 1700’s. Had the myriad of levees not been the
result of years of argument, piece-meal planning, and poor management there would
have been significantly less damage from the storm according to experts (van Heerden,
2005) . A computer modeling simulation conducted by the American Society of Civil
Engineers shows that if the levees had not failed, “nearly two-thirds of the deaths would
not have occurred” and that property damage, while still extensive, would have been
less than half the actual losses (C. F. Andersen et al., 2007). Likewise, van Heerden
(2005) maintains that the loss of surrounding wetlands to business development was a
major factor in the effect of the storm surge on the levees. Examples of human
contribution to the situation are endless; the point here is that the damage caused by
Hurricane Katrina was a result of both natural and social causes.
Background on New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina (HK), formed as a tropical depression in the Atlantic on August
23, 2005. On Thursday, August 25, shortly after it made landfall in Florida, the National
Hurricane Center (2005) first listed the possibility of HK striking New Orleans as it
moved over Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. The next day, Louisiana Governor Kathleen
Blanco (1996) declared a “State of Emergency” for the state of Louisiana. Why was HK
such a threat, when hurricanes routinely hit portions of the gulf coast? Ivor van
Heerdon (van Heerden & Bryan, 2006), then deputy director of the Louisiana State
University Hurricane Center, says officials at every level have known for years that New
Orleans could suffer drastically if hit by a hurricane because close to 95% of the city lies
an average of five feet below sea level. It is protected from flooding by the Mississippi
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River and Gulf of Mexico storms by a hodgepodge of levee systems, most built under
the auspices of the Army Corps of Engineers, although certain parts have been
constructed by the individual parishes in whose territory they sit. The levees are
maintained by the different parishes and have been the subject of criticism for years as
being insufficient to handle a direct hit from a major hurricane (van Heerden & Bryan,
2006). Hurricane Katrina promised to be that major hurricane, reaching category five
status as it moved from Florida across the Gulf of Mexico. Shortly after HK hit parts of
Florida, FEMA director Michael Brown was urging people along the Gulf Coast, from the
Florida Panhandle to Louisiana, to take the impending second landfall seriously and get
“ready for what could be a very major storm” (2005, August 26).
By Saturday, HK had strengthened to a category three hurricane. President
Bush took the unprecedented step of declaring a “State of Emergency” for the state of
Louisiana (2005, August 29). This is the first time in history the U.S. has made such a
declaration before a disaster has occurred. Early Sunday morning HK strengthened to
a category 4 hurricane with winds of 145 miles per hour (National Weather Service:
National Hurricane Center, 2005). At 9:30 that morning, New Orleans Mayor C. Ray
Nagin issued a mandatory evacuation order for everyone except essential personnel in
New Orleans (2005, August 28). An estimated 1.2 million people evacuated, leaving
some two hundred thousand residents in the city (Cooper & Block, 2006). Fortunately,
HK passed to the east of New Orleans proper making landfall first at Buras, Louisiana,
some 55 miles south of New Orleans, and then again near the Louisiana/Mississippi
border (National Weather Service: National Hurricane Center, 2009). Parts of the
Mississippi coast received “storm surges,” walls of water pushed by the strong winds, of
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up to 25 feet, but it is estimated that the storm surges that hit New Orleans were only in
the 12 foot range (Cooper & Block, 2006), although van Heerdon and Bryan (2006)
maintain that confluences of levee designs and winds caused actual surge levels to be
between fourteen and eighteen feet.
These storm surges, combined with high winds, were enough to breech many of
the levees and floodwalls that surround New Orleans, allowing massive amounts of
water to flood the city (Cooper & Block, 2006). Some 25,000 people were evacuated to
the Superdome, the only designated evacuation center in New Orleans, another 25,000-
30,000 congregated outside the Morial Convention Center, a spot that avoided flooding,
and untold others were deposited on dry overpasses by rescuers (Cooper & Block,
2006). Over 1100 people died in New Orleans (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006), 1
million people were displaced (Kaufman & Rein, 2005), and damages were estimated to
be $75 billion or more (National Weather Service: National Hurricane Center, 2009).
Many books and articles have already addressed a number of the important
leadership and communication failures that occurred during Hurricane Katrina (Cooper
& Block, 2006; Ink, 2006; Menzel, 2006; van Heerden & Bryan, 2006). However, a
different way of approaching the issues raised as a result of this catastrophe would be
to examine the narrative framing of public communication messages by leaders
involved in managing this disaster. As mentioned in the introduction, this has the
potential to provide new insights into the materialities of leadership communication
during times of crisis or disaster that may have helped mitigate the problems that arose
during Katrina for future disasters. For this purpose, a two stage analysis of the public
communication of the top four high-profile leaders is presented. First a historical case
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study looking at Hurricane Katrina from the prospective of leader communication will be
offered. This is followed by a close critical analysis of the public communication of New
Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, FEMA Director
Michael Brown, and U.S. President George W. Bush using Giddens’ structuration theory
as a lens to incorporate the larger communication sphere while examining the leaders’
messages according to Fairhurst’s (2011) rules of framing. Future studies will then
need to investigate individual leader communication in more depth, looking at structural
issues as well as leader understanding of disaster communication when constructing
their messages.
According to Fairhurst and Sarr, “communication is the central function of
leadership (1996, p. xiv). Leaders should spend time thoughtfully considering all the
members of their audiences and assessing the differing situations that those members
face. They need to consider the actions they, as leaders, can take, the actions they
wish their varying constituencies to take, what additional information is needed, and
what limitations exist (Fairhurst, 2011). This includes considering all the stakeholders in
a situation, thinking about what information differing groups might need and the abilities
of those groups to take the requested action. This is referred to as “responsible
communication” and leads to research question one:
RQ1. Did the leaders communicate responsibly concerning the choices open to
the people of New Orleans?
One of the responsibilities of leadership is to interpret a critical situation facing
their constituents in such a way that those constituents not only understand the
significance of the situation but become willing to follow the directions given by their
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leaders (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996). According to Fairhurst, leaders do this through
“framing”, or “shaping the meaning of a subject, to define its character and significance
through the meanings we include and exclude, as well as those we emphasize when
communicating” (Fairhurst, 2011, p. 212). It involves defining the situation as it “exists
here and now" and connecting it to the people most involved in such a way as to take
into account previously similar or dissimilar situations (2011). Part of this is to interpret
uncertainty; to focus the confusion and indecision in the situation. Lachman and
Spence (2010) note that risk communication should reduce, not add to uncertainty
experienced by potentially affected audiences. In addition, Lachlan, Burke, Spence, &
Griffin (2009) maintain that "the public needs instructions concerning how to manage
the crisis at a personal level. The public will then understand the urgency of the threat (if
the hazard is correctly addressed) and will be motivated and able to take the
appropriate action" (p. 297).
This leads us to the following three research questions concerning leadership during
Katrina:
RQ2. How did leaders frame their communication to define a context in terms of
the dangers posed for the people of New Orleans at the start of Katrina?
RQ3. Did the leaders communicate clearly what outcomes they wanted?
RQ4. Did leaders use strategic crisis communication tactics to dynamically re-
define the situation for the people of New Orleans as the crisis escalated (e.g.,
changing exigencies call for changed communication)?
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Theoretical Underpinning
Giddens (1979, 1984) developed the theory of structuration as a means to
connect human agency to the social systems in which people live and work. According
to this theory, social systems are created and re-created by people recursively drawing
on the rules and resources of the system. These rules and resources supply a fluid
structure that allows the social system to be both maintained and modified by the
behaviors of those in the system. This creates, at one and the same time, a stable
system but one that allows for change. The recursiveness of this process is referred to
as the “duality of structure” meaning that the structures (rules and resources) are both
the medium and the outcome of interaction in social systems (1979). Systems become
‘institutionalized’ as they function over time creating deeply embedded structures and
gaining in breadth as they spread across a broad spectrum of society (Giddens, 1979,
1984). Giddens explicates three central but interactive dimensions that constitute the
rules and resources that make up social institutions. They are: signification,
legitimation, and domination.
Signification (Giddens, 1979, 1984), as a structural property of institutions,
involves the assignment of meaning via shared ‘stocks of knowledge’ and ‘interpretative
schemes’ constituted by the signs and symbols people use in communicating with one
another. These can often be detected via the “metaphors, myths, rumors, and names”
people use in conversation, such as referring to New Orleans as the “Big Easy” (Riley,
1983, p. 420). Signification involves more than transmitting meaning; it also serves as
part of the context of the situation, involved in determining what a situation is, rather
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than just in its description. In this regard, it is a “constitutive feature” of any interaction,
along with the elements of legitimation and domination (Giddens, 1979, p. 96).
Because hurricanes have always posed a major threat to New Orleans, there is a
significant history of prior hurricanes that have hit the city (Camille in 1969) and those
that have threatened the city, but veered off without causing major damage (Georges in
1998, Ivan in 2004). This history will provide local leaders with shared language and
interpretations to use when apprising citizens of the imminent danger comprised by
Hurricane Katrina. Due, in large part to time-space distanciation, the different leaders
would be expected to draw on this resource differently with Mayor Nagin expected to
utilize it the most and President Bush the least.
RQ5: Structures of signification will be utilized more Mayor Nagin and Governor
Blanco than by Michael Brown or President Bush to convey the seriousness of
the situation to the citizens of New Orleans
Legitimation employs the use of sanctions to reward or punish those who break
societal norms (Giddens, 1979). Norms may come about as a mix of custom,
convention, or law (Weber, 1955/1978), but regardless of how they arise, they become
part of a societal system through their recursive nature even though they may not be
held in the same manner by all, or even a majority, of people in the system (Giddens,
1979). Giddens maintains that the norms of dominant groups may prevail as a means
to hold the society together even when other groups in the system have norms based
on other value standards. It is difficult to tell whether norms are being violated or upheld
in any particular action because actions cannot always be directly seen, but they can be
understood through the signification processes surrounding those actions. Since the
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history of New Orleans is replete with stories of loss of life and property from hurricanes,
leaders can draw on this material to warn citizens of the consequences of remaining in
the city. Nationwide the President and Michael Brown have directly seen the damage
caused by natural disasters, so they would also be expected to call on structures of
legitimation when speaking to the citizens of New Orleans, although Mayor Nagin and
Governor Blanco would be expected to utilize more local norms than Michael Brown or
President Bush.
RQ6: How will leaders draw on the structures of legitimation to encourage
citizens to evacuate New Orleans?
The third dimension discussed by Giddens (1979, 1984), domination, involves
the “transformative capacity” of action through the resources of authorization and
allocation. As with all dimensions in social structures, those of domination are produced
and reproduced in social interaction. This requires that all parties to interactions to have
some power even if some have very little as compared with others. This constitutes the
“dialectic of control” which connects human agency to power relations. Power in
relationships can be determined by the “facility” with which some individuals can
influence others to do their will. According to Weber, submission to others can be a
result of economic, affective, legitimate, or simply because-it-has- always-been-that way
motives (Weber, 1955/1978). In terms of structuration theory, domination relies upon
the use of sanctions and the resources of authorization (authority), or “command over
persons”, and allocation, or “command over objects or other material phenomena”
(Giddens, 1979, p. 100). Thus preferable job assignments or equipment could be given
as a reward or removed as punishment. Since leaders need to advise the public of the
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situation and of actions they, the citizens, need to take, structures of domination will be
the predominate mode leaders will use in their communication.
RQ7: Leaders will predominately rely on the structures of domination to inform
citizens of the changing situation and to advise them what actions they need to
take.
Along with these three dimensions, a central proposition of structuration theory is
that people are knowledgeable about the rules and resources in the social systems to
which they belong and about the reasons for their actions (Giddens, 1979, 1984).
Giddens separates knowledge into three types: unconscious, practical, and discursive,
although he primarily focuses on the latter two. Practical knowledge is a form of tacit
knowledge, or knowledge that people know how to apply but may not be able to
articulate. Discursive knowledge is that knowledge that people are able to organize and
talk about with others. This is the knowledge people use to give reasons, or accounts,
of their behavior and why they do what they do. Both of the two latter types fit into the
stocks of knowledge shared by members of a social system. Stones (1991) therefore
maintains that it is important to study knowledgeability along with the other dimensions
of social systems to understand how people draw upon these stocks of knowledge in
their interactions with others. As in structures of signification, Mayor Nagin and
Governor Blanco would be expected to have more stocks of shared knowledge with the
people of New Orleans than Michael Brown or President Bush.
RQ8: Leaders will give reasons for their communication that draw on their stocks
of shared knowledge differentially according to their proximity to New Orleans.
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People around the world watched in disbelief as one of the world’s most
advanced countries was unable to quickly and efficiently take care of the victims of
Hurricane Katrina. For days, government officials argued about who was responsible
for doing what. This failure to respond was not attributable to any one level or location
of government, but instead indicates failure at a systemic level. A natural disaster that
should not have caused much damage became a crisis that involved loss of life,
destruction of a major portion of the City of New Orleans and the displacement of a
million people. The long term factors that led to the levee failures and the destruction of
the city are beyond the scope of this dissertation but they set the scenario for the chaos
that resulted in a larger death count than might otherwise have been.
Errors in judgment, problems with bureaucracy, and squabbles between political
factions created the situation that spun totally out of control during the critical period
when lives were at risk and being lost. These same problems contributed to the lack of
effective disaster relief and recovery at local, state and federal levels. The question is,
given what was known about the vulnerability of New Orleans, the preparations in place,
and the advance notice that the hurricane, in all likelihood, would strike close enough to
New Orleans to do significant damage, why weren’t the leaders in charge able to
effectively manage the situation?

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Chapter 3: Methods
Disaster and crisis communication is difficult to study by traditional means
because, by their very nature, they cannot be controlled, nor to any exact degree, can
they be predicted. According to Gouran and Seeger (2007), this causes a number of
problems such as getting to the site in a timely fashion and dealing with a dangerous
situation. In addition, people at the site are often too busy to talk to researchers or even
discuss researcher involvement (Gouran and Seeger, 2007). Gouran and Seeger also
mention the difficulty in getting institutional review board approval during a crisis and
say some researchers are trying to get approval in advance in order to conduct
observations and interviews. This means that most researchers must use methods that
can address important issues without the researcher actually being at the site. One
such method, the use of video tapes and their transcripts, has been used successfully
by Mitroff (2004) in his analysis of the 1996 ValuJet airliner, the 2000 Ford/Firestone tire
crises, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This research will also rely on
transcripts and videos, and similar to Mitroff’s analyses, will situate the research within a
case study approach. The case study will serve to provide an empirical basis for the
following in-depth analysis (Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg, 1991). This analysis will provide
an in-depth look at selected leader communication using a theoretical lens based on
Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1979, 1984) and informed by Fairhurst’s (2011) Rules of
Reality Construction.
The Case Study Approach
Qualitative research is generally utilized when the research concern is on
understanding a particular phenomenon rather than on verifying an existing theory
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(Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Turner, 1983), or when the researcher has little control over a set
of events (Yin, 1994). Within the qualitative research paradigm, the case study
approach allows for an in-depth investigation of a phenomenon when “boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994, p. 13). Scholars
such as Turner (1983) and Glazer and Strauss (1967) maintain that one of the primary
functions of case study research is to build theory. Others, such as Yin (1994) maintain
that case studies can also be used to verify and test hypothesis, a position that Lee
(1998) has also taken. Eisenhardt and her associates (S. L. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997;
Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) have used the multiple-case
method extensively, advocating for multiple case comparisons and the use of both
qualitative and quantitative data. However, others such as Dyer and Wilkins feel that the
use of multiple cases loses “the essence of case study research, the careful study of a
single case that leads researchers to see new theoretical relationships and question old
ones” (1991, p. 614). They go on to say that one of the purposes of case study
research is to “highlight a construct by showing its operation in an ongoing social
context” in order to provide an in depth understanding of the construct in that particular
setting (p. 614). This view has been taken by such diverse scholars as Dutton and
Dukerich (1991) in their research on identity construction at the Port Authority of New
York and by Kahn (1999) in his analysis of caretaker needs in nursing home situations.
Because this research is intended to examine leader communication in one
specific context, it will follow the four principal government leaders in a holistic design
instead of an embedded one (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 1994). Finally, because this
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study relies on archival documents, primarily transcripts of video tapes and other
reports, it falls under the category of a historical case study (Yin, 1994).
Hurricane Katrina: Communication Case Study
Hurricane Katrina began as a tropical depression in the Bahamas 350 miles east
of Miami, Florida on Tuesday August 23, 2005. By Wednesday it had moved 120 miles
closer to Miami and developed into a tropical storm. On Thursday, Katrina gained
hurricane strength and came ashore on Florida’s southeastern coast with top winds of
80 miles per hour. As it crossed the State of Florida on Friday, Hurricane Katrina lost
strength and was reclassified as a tropical storm, but quickly regained strength as it hit
the Gulf of Mexico (Drye, 2005).
At noon on Friday, August 26, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) reported that
Katrina had strengthened into a category two hurricane with sustained winds near 100
MPH and was expected to reach category 3 or more by Saturday (National Hurricane
Center, 2005, August 26, 11:30 AM EDT). By the 5:00 p.m. briefing, the NHC predicted
that Katrina would reach category 4 status over the weekend. A category 4 hurricane
has winds between 130-156 mph capable of causing “catastrophic damage” (National
Hurricane Center, 2012). The 11:00 p.m. briefing was the first to indicate that Katrina
might impact the Gulf States in a severe manner describing it as “about 460 miles
southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River,” moving at about eight miles per hour in
a west-southwest direction (National Hurricane Center, 2005, August 26, 11:00 PM
EDT). In response, the Gulf States began preparations anticipating that the hurricane
would turn in a northerly direction.
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Late Friday afternoon, Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco declared a State of
Emergency for Louisiana and activated the Louisiana Emergency Response and
Recovery Program “under the command of the director of the state Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness,” Col. Jeff Smith (Blanco, 2005, August 26a, p.
1). By Friday afternoon, the State’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was “up and
running with its full staff compliment” (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 64).
Mandatory evacuations were issued for some low lying areas of Louisiana but were
voluntary for the City of New Orleans as per Louisiana’s evacuation plan. Governor
Blanco (2005, August 26b) told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that state agencies were preparing
for the storm and were in direct contact with the National Weather Service. When
asked about evacuation, she mentioned that the State had a procedure to follow, but
primarily stressed the need for coordinated action among local, state, and federal
agencies.
FEMA Director Michael Brown (2005, August 26), speaking on Larry King Live
about the damage caused in Florida, expressed concern about the readiness of people
in the Gulf for a category 4 hurricane, and warned them to make necessary
preparations. He also discussed FEMA’s advance preparations, such as prepositioning
goods and discussing potential evacuation plans with state governors.
By 10:00 a.m. Saturday, August 27, a hurricane watch was issued for
southeastern coast of Louisiana, including New Orleans and Lake Ponchartrain. A
hurricane watch means that “hurricane conditions are possible within the watch area”
within 36 hours (National Hurricane Center, 2005, August 27, 10:00 AM CDT). During
the day Katrina strengthened to a category 3 hurricane; by 10 p.m. the NHS had
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increased its advisories to a “warning” level indicating that landfall was expected in
within 24 hours, with possible storm surges of 15 to 20 feet higher than normal. The
agency advised that “preparations to protect life and property should be rushed to
completion” (National Hurricane Center, 2005, August 27, 10:00 PM CDT). By Saturday
afternoon, airlines were announcing flight cancellations for the following day (Mowbray,
2005, August 28, 6:34 PM). On Saturday evening, Max Mayfield, Director of the
National Hurricane Center, personally called both Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin to
warn them about the intensity of the impending hurricane and to urge them to call for
mandatory evacuations, something he had never been done before (Select Bipartisan
Committee, 2006).
Governor Blanco canceled plans to attend the Southern Governors’ Conference
and sent a formal request to President George W. Bush for a declaration of emergency
for the State of Louisiana (Blanco, 2005, August 27d). St. Charles Parish and
Plaquemines Parish declared mandatory evacuations while Jefferson Parish made
evacuations mandatory for coastal areas but voluntary for the rest of the parish (The
Times-Picayune, 2005, August 27). St. Bernard Parish recommended evacuations to
all residents, and Plaquamines Parish began picking up special needs citizens and
taking them to shelters (The Times-Picayune, 2005, August 27). To this end, the
Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Department of Health and
Hospitals issued a news release announcing that citizens requiring special needs
sheltering must call ahead and check-in in order to access the shelter. They were also
informed that they must be accompanied by caretakers and bring all necessary supplies
including bedding.
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During the day, the number of residents evacuating in anticipation of the
projected Monday landfall increased and CNN News correspondents reported that
some gas stations were already out of gas, and that hotels and motels as far as 150
miles away were completely booked. However, residents who were partying in the
older parts of the city, particularly Bourbon Street, indicated they would weather the
storm in place (CNN News, 2005, August 27). Later Friday, Jonathan Freed, CNN
Correspondent, (2005, August 27) reported that the “contraflow” highway system had
been invoked dedicating more freeway lanes as outgoing instead of incoming, but that
many were confused about how to negotiate them.
The Louisiana Emergency Operations Center initiated five calls on Saturday with
“all state agencies, key parishes, federal agencies, other states, and the Red Cross to
coordinate pre-landfall activities among the different authorities” (Select Bipartisan
Committee, 2006, p. 64). In addition, state agencies prepared for the hurricane by
moving key assets northward, stockpiling critical supplies, and positioning teams to do
post-landfall damage assessments. The Louisiana Department of Fish and Wildlife
coordinated with the Louisiana National Guard to pre-position boats at Jackson
Barracks in New Orleans for possible search and rescue missions following expected
flooding.
On Saturday morning, Governor Blanco told CNN’s Betty Nguyen that Louisiana
would “probably take the brunt of this hurricane” and that they were “recommending that
people in the low-lying areas begin evacuation plans and actually start moving out”
(2005, August 27b). She maintained that a mandatory evacuation would be based on
the progression of voluntary evacuations. At a noon press conference with Mayor
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Nagin and various parish presidents, Governor Blanco said that it was impossible to
predict the hurricane’s path but that everyone should be prepared and know where they
would go in the event that the hurricane affected their particular area of the city. She
also discussed traffic flow and asked people to be patient drivers (Blanco, 2005, August
27a). On Saturday evening, Blanco expressed concern about those who had not heard
about the severity of the situation and expressed her hope that they would get the
message to evacuate, mentioning that those who do not might not survive if a 15 to 20
foot storm surge accompanied the storm. When asked about those who did not have
the means to leave, Blanco noted that officials were asking neighbors to take care of
each other and said that she believed Mayor Nagin was arranging for some
transportation (2005, August 27c). Saturday night, Blanco asked her Assistant Chief of
Staff to start calling African American ministers requesting they call church members
that night and ask them to leave immediately. She also suggested that at Sunday
services they tell their congregations to “Pack and pray” (Blanco, 2005, August 27c) .
At the Saturday noon press conference Mayor Nagin told citizens, “This is not a
test. This is the real deal. . . . Things could change, but as of right now, New Orleans is
definitely the target for this hurricane “ (2005, August 27e). Nagin also urged “officials
to follow the state evacuation plan, which calls for low-lying coastal areas to evacuate
first” (2005, August 27e). New Orleans has very few exit routes and the evacuation
plan was designed to let those who live in the most vulnerable areas leave first to cut
down on gridlock on the highways. The plan calls for evacuation of the lowest lying
coastal areas 50 hours before a tropical storm is expected to make landfall; of
susceptible areas south of the Mississippi at 40 hours; and finally, of the New Orleans
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53
Metropolitan Area at 30 hours before expected landfall. These timelines were
compressed during Hurricane Katrina because the threat to Louisiana was only
identified 30 hours before landfall (Mitchell, 2006), although this figure is controversial.
At about 4:00 PM Saturday afternoon a contraflow plan was placed into effect directing
all traffic lanes outward away from the city. Nagin told residents in low-lying areas of
the city, "We want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving - right now, as
a matter of fact" (Foster, 2005, August 27). He said that the Superdome would be
opened “as a shelter of last resort” for evacuees with special needs. His instructions for
those planning to go to the Superdome was, "No weapons, no large items, and bring
small quantities of food for three or four days, to be safe" (Foster, 2005, August 27). In
addition to their own food and drink, Nagin advised citizens to regard this as if they were
going camping and to bring any other comforts they would need.
Also on Saturday, President Bush declared a State of Emergency for the State of
Louisiana beginning on August 26, 2005 (Bush, 2005, August 27). This was an
unprecedented event, the first time a President had declared a state of emergency prior
to an event occurring. Under-secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response
Michael Brown, discussing the damage and deaths caused by Hurricane Katrina in
Florida on national TV, often segued to his concern for the people in Louisiana and
Mississippi, and urged them to make preparations and leave when asked by governors
(2005, August 27a). Later in the day, Brown reiterated the need for the people to make
their own preparations saying, “Tomorrow and Monday is going to be too late” (2005,
August 27b).
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Overnight Katrina went from a category three to a category five hurricane, with
sustained winds near 175 mph (National Hurricane Center, 2005, August 28, 1:00 AM
CDT, 2005, August 28, 2005 7:00AM CDT). The Slidell Office of the National Weather
Service predicted severe damage to homes and businesses and said the City would
probably be uninhabitable for weeks or longer (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006).
Airline flights out of New Orleans were cancelled and rental cars were sold out as were
many gas stations (CNN, 2005, August 28). However, as CNN’s Jeanne Meserve
reported, many residents believed that the storm would either veer at the last minute or
that they would be able to ride it out. Radio station owner Fred Westernberger said that
the only shelter he heard about for the elderly or infirm was the Superdome (CNN,
2005, August 28).
Early Sunday morning the Louisiana National Guard Special Reaction Team,
MEDCOM personnel, and security personnel arrived at the Superdome, the shelter of
last resort (U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 2006). With over nine thousand MREs (meals ready to eat) and thirteen
thousand liters of water stocked, the shelter opened at noon; by the end of the day it
housed approximately 500 special needs patients and 2,500 evacuees (U. S. Congress
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). Governor
Blanco asked President Bush, “to declare an expedited major disaster for the State”
which he did on Monday (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 63). The contraflow
plan out of New Orleans continued (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006) and at 10:30
a.m. the State initiated the contraflow plan for interstate highways (NOLA). Mayor
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Nagin and Governor Blanco jointly announced a mandatory evacuation at approximately
11:00 o’clock (Nagin, 2005, August 28).
In a joint press conference with Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin (2005, August
28) read the legal mandatory evacuation order, then told the people of New Orleans that
he wished he “had better news” and that they were “facing a storm that most of us have
feared.” He went on to say that he didn’t want people to panic, but to take the threat
seriously, saying that the “storm surge will likely topple our levy system” and that the
City was preparing to deal with that eventuality. Nagin also announced that the
Superdome would open at noon as a shelter of last resort and emphasized that “the first
choice for every citizen is to figure out a way to leave the city.” He said the city would
consider other buildings as possible shelters, but declined to say which ones, saying
that he hoped people who had been waiting to leave would do so. Nagin then listed ten
pickup locations the city had established for transit service to the Superdome. Finally,
Nagin asked everyone to check on their neighbors (Nagin, 2005, August 28).
Governor Blanco (2005, August 28d) reiterated that New Orleans was in a
precarious situation with potential flooding presenting the worst case scenario. She
noted that President Bush had called her expressing his concern and asking her to
ensure that a mandatory evacuation would be called for. From there Blanco expressed
hope that Hurricane Katrina would shift direction but, in reiterating that everyone should
evacuate, she provided information on driving conditions on the city’s exit routes. In
interviews later that day, Blanco (2005, August 28a) expressed concern about those not
evacuating and urged everyone to get to safety while there was still time to do so,
saying, “we’re telling [people] to get out of harm’s way,” especially those in low-lying
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56
areas and those in the City of New Orleans (2005, August 28c). She discussed the
possibility of storm surges inundating the city with 15 to 20 feet of water and stressed
patience on the roadways as they were packed with people evacuating (Blanco, 2005,
August 28b). When asked about the Superdome as a shelter for those who either could
not evacuate or refused to do so, Blanco reiterated that it was a refuge of last resort and
that, “We need people to get out” (2005, August 28c). Additionally she mentioned that
the transit system would be utilized with buses and trains being available to evacuate
people. However a lack of coordination with Amtrak meant that train services were not
used and the New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan was altered
to transport people to the Superdome instead of out of town. That evening at 6:00 PM,
Mayor Nagin ordered a curfew and by 6:54 the Times-Picayune reported that the streets
were almost deserted (Russell, 2005, August 28, 6:54 PM ). Emergency services were
discontinued due to high winds. (NOLA).
In a televised White House Briefing, President Bush said that he had spoken with
Governor Blanco as well as with the governors of Mississippi, Alabama, Mississippi and
Florida concerning the in-coming hurricane. He indicated that he had signed a disaster
declaration for Mississippi in addition to the one signed earlier for Louisiana, stating that
these declarations would allow “federal agencies to coordinate all disaster relief efforts
with state and local agencies” (Bush, 2005, August 28). He urged citizens to move to
safe ground due to the fact that remaining in their homes would put them in personal
danger.
Also on Sunday, FEMA Director Brown (2005, August 28a) conducted an intense
on-line briefing regarding emergency preparations with his staff; President Bush; Deputy
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57
Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Jackson, Max Mayfield of the National
Hurricane Center; other meteorologists and hydrologists, and representatives from
potentially affected states. Mayfield, while showing slides indicating that the hurricane’s
large presence was already affecting areas of the coast, speculated on its possible
effects especially in the New Orleans area (Federal Emergency Management Agency,
2005, August 28). Representatives of various states reported on emergency plan
progress and the Texas representative told Brown that the State already had shelters
up and ready to accommodate evacuees from Louisiana. Brown told his staff he
wanted, “to see that supply chain jammed up just as much as possible” with needed
commodities (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005, August 29, p. 29). He
also expressed concern about the Superdome being the only shelter being offered by
the City of New Orleans given its location (12 feet below sea level) as well as doubts
about the roof being able to withstand category four or five winds (p. 35). Moreover,
Brown expressed concern about mandatory evacuations not having been ordered in a
timely manner for New Orleans and what that could mean for those unable to move on
their own (p. 36). He ordered an advisory putting all FEMA employees on call and
again called for keeping the supply lines “jammed up” with any requests that they
received. He told his staff to reach out to colleagues in other government departments
because he believed they would need everyone’s help and cooperation (p. 36-37).
Brown also told his staff to do whatever it took even if they didn’t have proper authority
and that he would justify their actions later (p. 37).
On national TV, Brown assured CNN’s Betty Nguyen that FEMA was ready for
the storm but that he was more concerned “about the individual people in Louisiana,”
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saying that if he were a New Orleans resident, he “would be getting out of there” and
that he hoped residents were evacuating “now” in spite of the fact that mandatory
evacuations had not been ordered (2005, August 28b). Brown went on to say that it
typically took 48 hours for rescue crews to reach everyone after a disaster.
Sustained winds of 150 miles per hour with gusts up to 190 MPH started creating
havoc in New Orleans hours before Katrina made first landfall in Buras, LA at 6:00 a.m.
on Monday, August 29 (National Hurricane Center, 2005, August 29, 4:00 AM CDT).
The City of New Orleans lost power around 4:00 a.m., leaks were observed in the
Industrial Canal gates at 4:30 a.m., and portions of the MR-GO levee started to crumble
before dawn (Swenson & Marshall, 2006). As Katrina made landfall, a storm surge 21
feet high inundated Plaquemines Parish. Between this first landfall and the second
landfall near Slidell around 9:45 a.m., levees protecting Eastern New Orleans were
overtopped, several wall panels failed on the 17
th
Street Canal levee, the Industrial
Canal was first overtopped then breached on both sides, storm surges from Lake
Borgne crossed the 40-Arpent Canal levee; the Orleans Avenue canal was overtopped,
and I-wall panels on the London Avenue Canal failed (Swenson & Marshall, 2006).
The second landfall near Slidell resulted in a storm surge of 15 feet in Lake
Pontchartrain sending water up to five miles inland, flooding St. Tammany Parish and
leaving Lake Pontchartrain water levels higher than many parts of New Orleans. This
meant that water would continue flooding into the city from the lake until flood and lake
water equalized (Swenson & Marshall, 2006). At noon, Max Mayfield (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2005, August 29) of the National Hurricane center
maintained that high winds and the resulting storm surges would continue for several
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59
days because of the size of the hurricane even though it had moved on and diminished
in strength. At its closest, Katrina passed approximately 35 miles east north-east of
New Orleans (National Hurricane Center, 2005, August 29, 10:00 AM CDT) and by 4
PM the hurricane was almost 130 miles north of the city and had diminished to a
category one hurricane. Even from that distance, however, Katrina was still pummeling
NO with sustained winds of over 75 mph. Also at noon, FEMA Director Brown said that
he had dispatched a Coast Guard helicopter from Baton Rouge to see how close they
could get to New Orleans, but that he did not want to risk sending crews on search and
rescue missions until the winds abated enough to make it safe to do so (2005, August
29a).
By Monday afternoon, according to the LA National Guard, the Superdome
sheltered between 10 and 12 thousand evacuees (U. S. Congress Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). Mayor Nagin, however,
claimed there were closer to 30,000 evacuees at that time (2005, August 29b). During
the day several holes appeared in the Superdome roof and evacuees were moved from
stadium seating into the Plaza level walkway and other secure walkways. Search and
rescue (SAR) operations by the Louisiana National Guard began at 3:00 Monday
afternoon from the Superdome and from Jackson Barracks which was itself flooded.
Guardsmen at Jackson waded through floodwaters to cut boats loose from the trailers
they were floating on. From the Jackson Barracks location, people were taken to the St.
Barnard Courthouse where other evacuees had gathered. More than 150 National
Guard helicopters were in the air by late Monday afternoon with additional aircraft
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60
provided by other branches of the military Army (U. S. Congress Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).
Early Monday morning, Governor Blanco said that the levees being overtopped
was her biggest worry, that she hoped the Superdome would withstand the winds, and
that the hurricane would shift or lose strength before coming ashore. She said,
The evacuation in the city was pretty good. We always have a few people who,
who could not get out and I believe that most of them are in shelters. I pray that
those who are not in shelters and who couldn't get out are in safe buildings.
That's the best we could do. We worked really hard in a very short timeline to get
as many people out as we possibly could (Blanco, 2005, August 29b).
In a late-afternoon press conference, Blanco (2005, August 29a) noted that she
had deployed boats to pickup stranded residents and that she had ordered search and
rescue missions as soon as weather conditions permitted. In addition, she ordered
transportation personnel to clear roadways so medical and utility crews could get to
affected areas. Finally she asked the over one million evacuees not to attempt to return
yet because, “The roads are flooded, the power is out, the phones are down, and there
is no food or water, and many trees are down. So chances are, if you try to come in, you
wouldn't be able to get your vehicle through anyway” (Blanco, 2005, August 29a). Later
Blanco said that first responders were in “full search and rescue mode. . . . [with] miles
and miles” of flooded houses” (2005, August 29c).
In an early interview, Mayor Nagin, in restating his view that the Superdome
housed 30,000 evacuees, noted that he was “sure there are lots of individuals who are
doing that [sheltering in their homes] right now. They're probably regretting their
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61
decision right now because this storm is still very powerful. I am at one of the local
hotels downtown, and we have had at least 50 windows to blow out in this hotel” (Nagin,
2005, August 29b). When asked about flooding, Nagin responded that he had already
had reports of “water coming over some of the levee systems” and of one of the
pumping stations failing, so he expected “significant flooding” (2005, August 29b). In a
late night interview with WWL-TV, Nagin said:
You know, my heart is heavy tonight. I don’t have any good news to really share,
other that at some point in time the federal government will be coming in here in
mass. But, you know the city of New Orleans is in a state of devastation. We
probably have eighty percent of our city under water; with some sections of our
city the water is as deep as 20 feet. We still have many of our residents on roofs,
still waiting to be repaired [sic]. We have firemen, policemen, just about
everybody that you can think of out there trying to rescue individuals from their
roofs. We have an incredible amount of water in the city. Both airports are under
water. We have the Twin Spans in New Orleans East have been totally
destroyed. They’re gone. (Nagin, 2005, August 29a)
During the 3:00 PM news conference FEMA Director Brown (2005, August 29b)
praised Governor Blanco for having a “tight knit” team and making the right call in
asking people not to attempt returning until it was safe to do so. He said that conditions
were too dangerous to bring in any search and rescue or medical teams, but maintained
that FEMA would respond to direct requests by Governor Blanco as soon as they were
able to do so. Brown noted that FEMA had the responsibility to respond to other cities
and states that were also affected by Katrina. In later interviews, Brown commented
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that while FEMA was supplying generators to “critical infrastructure,” they were not
providing that kind of help to individuals, primarily because “most individuals affected,
particularly in southern Louisiana, can`t even get back to their homes yet” (M. Brown,
2005, August 29c). Brown also spoke of reports of homes flooded up to their roofs and
suggested it would be “weeks and months before people are able to get back into some
of these neighborhoods” (2005, August 29c).
By 10:00 AM Tuesday morning, August 30, Katrina had weakened from a tropical
storm to a tropical depression and had moved more than 550 miles away from New
Orleans. However, the hurricane’s effects on the City of New Orleans continued. With
water pouring into the city from breaches in the 17
th
Street Canal (Blanco, 2005, August
30a), the Louisiana National Guard (LANG) converted a Superdome parking lot into a
heliport for search and rescue flights and repositioned all LANG aircraft to New Orleans
(U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
2006). LANG’s Major General Landreneau initiated communication about joint
operations with Lt. General Honoré from the Department of Defense. Roof top rescues
and evacuations from area hospitals continued even as running water and plumbing
failed in the Superdome due to the power outage. The one generator still supplying
limited power to that structure had to be sandbagged against rising floodwaters. While
Marty Evans from the Red Cross estimated that the organization’s 200 open shelters
housed approximately 70,000 people (Blanco, 2005, August 30c), LANG distributed
over 300,000 MRE’s and 397,000 liters of water (U. S. Congress Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006) .
Governor Blanco opened a press conference early Tuesday afternoon by saying:
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Well, we have witnessed the most extraordinary devastation; it’s very difficult to
describe the extent of it. First of all I want the citizens of Louisiana who
evacuated the area to know that the roadways are impassible, the interstates are
impassible. There is no access from hardly any point into the area and that
includes Jefferson Parish as well as St. Tammany Parish, and everything in
between. We, we saw block after block, neighborhood after neighborhood,
community after community inundated. We saw neighborhoods where you saw
just the rooftops . . . .
We also know that there are many evacuees -- I mean, many people are
being rescued and brought to the Superdome. So the dome population is
growing. They do not have the facilities to accommodate the people who are
there, particularly those with medical needs. So we are in the planning process
right now of attempting to locate appropriate places to try to evacuate those folks
who stayed in the city. The plans are not firm yet. We're working with FEMA. We
are grateful that FEMA is by our side. The magnitude of the situation is
untenable. It's just heartbreaking. (Blanco, 2005, August 30b)
Later In the press conference Blanco (2005, August 30b).spoke about the
difficulties in first rescuing people surrounded by flood waters, then in planning for their
relocation. She worried about those who had “lost their lives” while emphasizing that
the focus had to remain on reaching those who could still be rescued. Blanco thanked
rescue workers who had tirelessly worked long hours and faced difficult situations.
On Larry King Live later Tuesday evening, Blanco told King:
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The situation is terrible. There's no electricity anywhere in the city. It's very hard
to make people comfortable anywhere. They're in desperate need of water, of
supplies. We're ferrying in as much as we can. It's not enough because the
situation is so vast, and it's unfathomable (2005, August 30c).
Blanco called for those still in New Orleans, as well as those in Jefferson and St.
Bernard Parishes, to leave because the flood waters were continuing to rise, and
because of the lack of utilities in the foreseeable future. But she acknowledged that
leaving would be difficult not only because of the floodwater surrounding many homes,
but also because of the impassible roadways.
Mayor Nagin’s (2005, August 30a) primary concern on Tuesday was the growing
unrest and instability in the city caused by the escalation of hungry people searching for
food into vandals looting stores for firearms and electronics. He indicated that a
“significant, significant portion of the people who need to be rescued have been
rescued”, and that the police and National Guard would “turn their attention to public
safety” (Nagin, 2005, August 30a). Even though he had declared martial law, Nagin
maintained that the situation was not overwhelming but said that the Superdome was “a
very difficult issue.” He estimated that people would be at the Super Dome for another
week saying:
I walked through that area earlier today. There's lots of anxious people there.
They're frustrated, they're hot, they're tired. We're taking care of their basic
needs with water and food and all the necessities but they're starting feel very
cooped up and we've allowed them to come out on the plaza level of the
Superdome to at least get some fresh air and enjoy the sunshine. The biggest
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challenge they have and as we don't have a video system or an audio system
that constantly gives information, so they're information starved and that's adding
to their frustrations. (Nagin, 2005, August 30a)
Things at the Superdome were also frustrating for FEMA employees. Philip E.
Parr, a Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for FEMA who was taken by helicopter to
the Super Dome Tuesday morning, told the U.S. Senate that he was only able to make
contact with the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge, LA once during the day
because the phone lines were “saturated” beyond capacity. (U. S. Senate, 2005,
December 8). He had to resort to using the National Guard phones when they were
available. Parr was, however, able to communicate with the Texas and the Washington
FEMA offices, and together with the LA National Guard they worked out an evacuation
plan for the Superdome that was to begin Wednesday morning and have it cleared by
mid-day Thursday. Before they were able to implement the plan however, Parr was
notified by the National Guard that General Honoré had taken charge of the evacuation
and their plans were put on hold. Subsequently, evacuations did not begin until 24
hours later thus leaving people in the intolerable situation at the Superdome for another
day.
In a late night telephone interview with local TV Station WAPT, Nagin (2005,
August 30b) vented his frustration at the lack of coordination between different agencies
stating that the Army Corp of Engineers was supposed to close the levee breach on the
17
th
Street Canal, but that helicopters had been diverted to rescue operations. Leaving
the breach open allowed flood waters to continue inundating the city, and, according to
Nagin, closing it should have been of the highest priority. The Times-Picayune (Shea,
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66
2005, August 31) reported that efforts to close the breach had gone on all day, but had
been unsuccessful. While they also reported on the lack of coordination in rescue
efforts, they noted significant numbers of diverse responders including firefighters,
police, Coast Guardsmen, and ordinary citizens.
FEMA director Brown (2005, August 30a, 2005, August 30b) talked with various
networks about the seriousness of the situation in the Gulf states as a result of Katrina.
He indicated it could be weeks before residents could return and even then felt it would
be “incredibly dangerous” due to structural damage to homes, diseases brought on by
flooding, and chemicals that might have been released (2005, August 30b). Brown also
emphasized that FEMA was still involved in supplying food and water to people who
were stranded. He urged citizens to be patient saying, “this is going to be a very long
and difficult process under some difficult and extreme weather” (2005, August 30a).
Earlier that day, President Bush (2005, August 30b) opened a press conference in
California by acknowledging the suffering and difficult situations faced by those citizens
who had been affected by Katrina. Even while urging everyone to follow directions by
state and local authorities, Bush told the nation that search and rescue was still the
main priority and asked people to donate to the Red Cross or Salvation Army.
With a national TV newscaster announcing that “it's still too early to tell if the Big
Easy can actually be saved” (Chen, 2005, August 31), search and rescue operations
continued on Wednesday, August 31, with the deployment of additional military aircraft
and National Guardsmen to New Orleans (U. S. Congress Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). Eleven thousand National
Guardsmen participated in search and rescue and distributed nearly 300,000 MRE’s
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67
and over 250,000 liters of water. Six busloads of special needs patients were relocated
even as rumors circulated that the general Superdome population had planned riots
and/or fires if they were not moved to other locations.
Governor Blanco (2005, August 31a), surrounded by religious leaders who
offered prayers for all those affected by Katrina, declared Wednesday a day of prayer in
Louisiana. In a short interview with CBS’ Julie Chen, Blanco (2005, August 31b)
discussed priorities in terms of the worsening flood situation, search and rescue,
continuing evacuations, and the lack of success in closing breached levees. When
asked by MSNBC’s Matt Lauer about looting in the city, Blanco reiterated that, while no
one had any tolerance for looting, the bigger issue was taking care of the breeched
levees which could worsen allowing in more water and killing those who remain in the
city, including the looters. She said, “I just keep wondering where are these people are
going with all of these material goods. I can’t imagine what they think they are going to
do with them in the next days and weeks” (Blanco, 2005, August 31c). Later Blanco
(2005, August 31d) while discussing criticisms of the relief efforts with PBS’ Jim Lehrer,
spoke about the “primitive” conditions facing workers, the magnitude of what needed to
be done, and how much had been accomplished, including evacuating over a million
people from the city. Venting her frustrations, Blanco stated,
We begged all of those people, the mayor begged the people; the parish
presidents begged people to get out. The people who stayed chose to stay in
some cases and in other cases had limited resources. But they were given --
even those with limited resources - were given opportunities and perhaps the
communications network did not filter rapidly enough (Blanco, 2005, August 31d).
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She went on to say how furious she was with both the “petty” and the “hardened”
criminals who were taking advantage of the “good people” of Louisiana by taking up
resources that are needed elsewhere (Blanco, 2005, August 31d).
Mayor Nagin, (2005, August 31b), in an early morning interview, described the
situation as “pretty challenging” but indicated he had reports that the breaches had
been closed and the water was stabilizing. He was very upbeat about rescue efforts
saying, “We’ve got police, fire, wildlife and fisheries, National Guard. We probably had a
couple of hundred boats in the water, you know, going after people. We had helicopter
support. You name it, we had it” (Nagin, 2005, August 31b). Nagin also maintained that
the issue of looting was primarily in the city and had been overplayed by the media. In
a second interview that morning, Nagin said the water was rising and could reach up to
20 feet deep in parts of the city. He said, “I am, we are looking for help. There's
supposedly 3,000 National Guard troops that are on their way. We're starting -food is
starting to become an issue” (Nagin, 2005, August 31a). He discussed how bad the
situation was at the Superdome but said they were unable to evacuate very many
people due to most roads out of the city being damaged or blocked. In a later interview
that morning, Nagin (2005, August 31c) discussed the difficulty of communication and
coordination of relief efforts because of the number of agencies involved and the lack of
functioning communication systems. He expressed concern as to whether all the
agencies had the same understanding of the most urgent priorities. He again discussed
the difficulty in evacuating people when all available aircraft were being used for search
and rescue. Finally, Nagin stated that both the federal and state governments were
working well with the City.
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69
President Bush flew over the affected areas before first meeting with Cabinet
Secretaries and then later holding a press conference (Bush, 2005, August 31; Loven,
2005, August 31). Loven (2005, August 31), of the Associated Press, reported that
there was not much conversation on the plane as the President sat, fists clenched and
face grim, listening to commentary on what he was seeing. Comments made by the
President were, “It’s totally wiped out,” and “It’s devastating, it’s got to be doubly
devastating on the ground” (Loven, 2005, August 31). White House spokesman Scott
McClellan opened the press conference by saying that an “Incident of National
Significance” would be declared in order to activate a new national emergency plan that
would allow the government to better coordinate between agencies. However,
McClellan also said that neither state nor local officials had formally declared that the
disaster was beyond their control. During the press conference, the President affirmed
that this was, “one of the worst natural disasters in our nation’s history” and that
“recovery will take years.” He said he had “directed Secretary of Homeland Security
Mike Chertoff to chair a Cabinet-level task force to coordinate all our assistance from
Washington . . . . [and] to ensure we’re helping, not hindering, recovery efforts” (Bush,
2005, August 31). He then outlined the Federal Government’s priorities: 1) saving
lives, including evacuating people from New Orleans, 2) sustaining lives by providing
supplies and equipment, and 3) recovery, starting with infrastructure. Bush concluded
by saying:
The folks on the Gulf Coast are going to need the help of this country for a
long time. This is going to be a difficult road. The challenges that we face
on the ground are unprecedented. But there's no doubt in my mind we're
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going to succeed. Right now the days seem awfully dark for those affected
-- I understand that. But I'm confident that, with time, you can get your life
back in order, new communities will flourish, the great city of New Orleans
will be back on its feet, and America will be a stronger place for it. (Bush,
2005, August 31) .
As U.S. Congressmen and women returned to Washington to address an
appropriations bill to fund Katrina relief efforts, the United Nations took the
unprecedented step of offering both monetary and expert aid to the United States
(2005, September 1). Search and rescue continued and evacuation of the
approximately 30,000 evacuees at the Superdome began, with Texas agreeing to take
75,000 refugees, including those who had sheltered elsewhere (U. S. Congress Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). FEMA and the
National Guard were notified that between 15,000 and 20,000 people had gathered at
the Morial Convention Center and crews were sent there to provide aid and security.
Some of these people had been at the Convention center for up to three days without
supplies, facilities, or shelter from the 90 degree temperature. FEMA’s Parr (U. S.
Senate, 2005, December 8) said FEMA had not made earlier efforts towards helping
people at the Convention Center because they were unaware of their existence,
echoing the position of the National Guard. According to Parr, FEMA first became
aware of these individuals after national news reports generated questions from
Washington about the issue. He said his team had been taken directly into the
Superdome by helicopter so they were unable to see what was happening on the
ground and had not been given any information about venues other than the
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71
Superdome being used for shelter. Parr also said that FEMA pulled its people out of
Superdome on Thursday after the National Guard informed him that it could no longer
protect them from expected violence (U. S. Senate, 2005, December 8, pp. 91-92).
CBS News reported that the city had “sunk into anarchy. . . with looters shooting at
rescue helicopters and boats, and fires burning throughout the city” (Schieffer, 2005,
September 1). According to Schieffer (2005, September 1), Homeland Security Director
Mike Chertoff was asking people to be patient because help was on the way, but
Schieffer noted that it is difficult to be patient when you are waiting for food and water
on overpasses or crowded into a building that has no working sanitary facilities.
According to Mayor Nagin (2005, September 02b), however, Military Police were
expected to arrive Thursday evening to help restore law and order.
Even with the violence, there was good news. The Times-Picayune reported that
flood waters were finally beginning to equalize and had begun draining back into Lake
Ponchartrain, lowering water levels by as much as two feet overnight ("Engineers
punching holes in levee to speed draining," 2005, September 1). The Army Corps of
Engineers, who had canceled a sandbagging operation due to obstructing power lines,
detailed an alternate operation, estimated to take close to two months, to close the
entrance to the 17
th
Street levee and to begin pumping water out of the city (Moller &
Schleifstein, 2005, September 1). President Bush sent more federal troops to help with
search and rescue so that National Guardsmen could concentrate on ending the looting
and “restoring public order.” Bush also authorized the draw-down of petroleum reserves
to offset the production lost to Katrina ("Engineers punching holes in levee to speed
draining," 2005, September 1). Private citizens from nearby states continued to
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72
volunteer personal boats and to participate in search and rescue operations even as
stories of seeing dead bodies floating in the water made news. Amidst this activity,
approximately 475 buses began systematically transferring evacuees from the
Superdome to Houston’s Astrodome, a trip that normally took seven hours.
Blanco (2005), who was frustrated because the FEMA buses hadn’t arrived,
signed a bill authorizing the seizure of school buses across the state of Louisiana.
Ultimately, however, these buses were not used due to difficulties finding drivers willing
to venture into New Orleans because of the reported violence and lawlessness in the
City. She announced that 300 National Guardsmen from Arkansas were in the city
saying,
These troops are fresh back from Iraq, well trained, experienced, battle-tested
and under my orders to restore order in the streets. They have M-16s and they
are locked and loaded. These troops know how to shoot and kill and they are
more than willing to do so if necessary and I expect they will. (Blanco, 2005,
September 1).
Blanco (2005) asked President Bush for forty thousand federal troops,
suggesting that there might be up to 300,000 more residents stranded across Louisiana.
In addition, Louisiana hired James Lee Witt, a former FEMA Director, to help the state
deal with the federal bureaucracy and cut red-tape (Blanco, 2005).
In an additional sign that local officials were finding themselves unable to cope
with the situation, Mayor Nagin (2005, September 02b) sent a “desperate SOS” via a
written statement to CNN stating that “the Convention Center is unsanitary and unsafe,
and we are running out of supplies.” He also indicated that residents from Plaquemines
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73
Parish were coming into New Orleans looking for help and said “We are overwhelmed
and out of resources, but we welcome them with open arms and will figure this out
together” (Nagin, 2005, September 02b). He directed people gathered at the Morial
Convention Center to travel by foot across the Crescent City Bridge into Jefferson
Parish due to the poor conditions at the Center. However, police from Gretna, on the
other side of the bridge, blocked the bridge, not letting evacuees enter Jefferson. This
was apparently a reaction to earlier evacuees having set the local mall on fire although
the Gretna Police Chief attributed the blockade to a lack of manpower and fuel to keep
the city safe.
Mike Brown, the FEMA Director, was on the defensive at a press conference and
in other interviews as commentators asked him why more people were not being helped
faster. He repeatedly mentioned the scope of the disaster, pointing out that there were
millions of people affected, not just those from New Orleans, but in other parts of
Louisiana, in Mississippi, and in Alabama (M. Brown, 2005, September 1b, 2005,
September 01a, 2005, September 01c). He maintained that Katrina’s effect on New
Orleans was unlike most hurricanes where rescuers could enter the affected zone as
soon as the hurricane passed. Continuing flooding caused this disaster to be on-going,
with transportation and communication problems hampering relief efforts. Additionally,
FEMA was simultaneously attending to people’s immediate needs as well as planning
where to send the evacuees and how to take care of them once they had been
evacuated from New Orleans. Brown reminded everyone that FEMA had deployed
rescue teams after Katrina only to recall them as the city flooded (2005, September 1b).
He noted that a decision to keep rescue teams on the ground would have been
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74
irresponsible under the prevailing conditions and would have turned rescuers into
victims needing rescue themselves.
With respect to leadership, Brown was asked why there did not seem to be
anyone in charge. He responded it was “amazing to me how much communications
have been broken down. There literally is no communications within the city of New
Orleans” and made a point that it is hard to coordinate activities when you have no way
of communicating with anyone (M. Brown, 2005, September 01c). Brown repeatedly
reiterated that people at the Superdome, contrary to some reports, had received meals
and water every day. However, he acknowledged that he had had no knowledge of
people at the Convention Center (M. Brown, 2005, September 1b). He also
acknowledged being surprised at just how many people needed to be rescued and said
that there just was no efficient way to move people off of flooded overpasses when
helicopters were unable to land. However, Brown said that President Bush had made it
clear to his Cabinet that FEMA was to have any resources they needed and had sent
General Honoré to help as well as having ordered military resources into the area.
When asked about the looting and violence, Brown (2005, September 01c) said
that it was easy to focus on the few troublemakers when most of the people were doing
everything they could to help others. He also criticized the press for showing more of
the violence than the orderly progress, saying,
You know, there's some really bad people out there that are causing some
problems, and it seems to me that every time a bad person wants to scream or
cause a problem, there's somebody there with a camera to stick it in their face.
What they don't see is that mother in the other part of the room that's sitting there
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75
very quietly that is not engaging in that. That is being patient and understands. Is
getting in the line, getting on the bus, and being evacuated. (M. Brown, 2005,
September 01b)
When asked to estimate the numbers of dead, Brown responded, “I think the
story that you need to report is that we are out there doing rescue missions and we are
out there doing -- making sure that the food and the water and the meals ready-to-eat
are being delivered to the people that need it” (2005, September 01b). Brown (2005,
September 01a) told CNN’s Paul Zahn that everyone needs to understand just how
catastrophic this event has been, that plans are constantly changing as the situation
changes. He also says that the President has “demanded” that people get the help they
need.
On Friday, September 2, five days after the hurricane landed and four days after
flooding from the breached levees inundated New Orleans, the National Guard began
dropping food and water wherever large groups of people were identified. They
estimated that 397,000 meals and 1,013,000 liters of water were distributed during the
day (U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 2006). Evacuation of the Superdome continued with over 30,000 people
evacuated even as thousands more individuals arrived at the facility seeking help
(Blanco, 2005). Amidst some 50 other fires that had started across the city, a large
explosion occurred in the city’s railroad district, possibly destroying one or more tanker
cars. After spending up to 12 hours on buses filled to capacity, evacuees were being
turned away at Houston’s Astrodome, some with no redirection as to where to go
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76
(O'Brien, 2005, September 02). Eventually these individuals were sent to other shelters
in Houston or other cities in Texas.
Early Friday morning, Governor Blanco appeared exhausted as she responded
to questions about everything from explosions in the city to the circumstances where
she would expect the National Guard troops to shoot citizens. Blanco (2005,
September 2a) addressed the need for armed National Guardsmen to restore law and
order and said that there were people, probably on drugs, who were shooting at relief
workers. She said that the armed troops were there to deal with those people, not ones
who were just trying to get food and water. When asked about the slowness of the
response, Blanco discussed the magnitude of the disaster and how the situation kept
changing before saying that “getting supplies in seems to be an arduous exercise,”
along with how frustrated she was over the slow arrival of the buses (2005, September
2a). When asked about how the situation could have gotten so bad by CBS’ Harry
Smith, Blanco responded:
When your whole civilized system goes down, Harry, this is pretty much what you
get left with. We have no communications. We have no running water. We have
no electricity. We have no real help. We had--we were inundated with water. We
were locked down from every angle of access into the city. Ramping up has just
been a monstrous task. I'm grateful for the help we're getting. I think things are
finally getting to the point where we're seeing some difference, but every minute
counts. That's the heartbreaking side of it. Our people are suffering. (Blanco,
2005, September 2b)
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77
Blanco (2005, September 2b) told Smith that she was “begging for more help”
and that she had asked for “everything the government could give me” on Tuesday. In
a letter to President Bush, Blanco (2005) requested that the Louisiana National Guard
Troops stationed in Iraq be returned home to help with recovery efforts. She asked for
federal aid to help re-build the communications grid, as well as firefighting support,
military vehicles, generators, medical supplies and personnel, mortuary aid, and help
with injured and dead animals.
When Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin and other officials met with President Bush
aboard Air Force One later that day to discuss the situation, Mayor Nagin, pounding his
fist on the table, demanded that Governor Blanco and President Bush resolve the chain
of command issue that he saw as complicating and slowing rescue efforts. Bush
suggested that Blanco federalize the National Guard to put all forces under one chain of
command. One problem with this, as seen by Governor Blanco, was that under the
Posse Comitatus Act, Federal troops were prohibited from law enforcement activity,
while National Guard troops were not. Moreover, Blanco (2005) felt that the situation
was stabilizing and that, while she requested federal troops to be directed by Lt.
General Honoré, “unity of effort” had already been achieved under the dual command
structure with all National Guard troops under her command through NG Major General
Landreneau. She maintained that Landreneau had established a satisfactory working
relationship with Honoré that would continue as the President gave Honoré command
over the Military Assistance to Civil Authority Mission and authorized the deployment of
Federal troops. However, Blanco told the President that she would discuss his
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78
reorganization proposal with her aides although she had no intention of following it
(Blanco, 2005).
In an interview with WWL’s Garland Robinette, Mayor Nagin vented his
frustrations with the situation saying he told President Bush, “I need everything . . . I
need reinforcements, I need troops, man. I need 500 buses” (Nagin, 2005, September
02a). Nagin continued by telling Robinette:
You know, one of the briefings we had, they were talking about getting public
school bus drivers to come down here and bus people out here. I'm like, you got
to be kidding me. This is a national disaster. Get every doggone Greyhound bus
line in the country and get their asses moving to New Orleans. That's -- they're
thinking small, man. And this is a major, major, major deal. And I can't emphasize
it enough, man. This is crazy. (Nagin, 2005, September 02a)
Nagin complained that the people in Washington, including President Bush,
didn’t have a clue about what was happening in New Orleans and that looters and drug
addicts had gotten out of control because every resource the city had was focused on
search and rescue efforts. He bemoaned the failure of the government to understand
how important it was to close the 17
th
Street levee breaches as quickly as possible and
how lack of action on that not only caused important pumping stations to flood, but also
and destroyed much of the city’s infrastructure for water delivery.
When asked about whether he thought federal delays were a result of the State
of Louisiana not making requests for help in accordance with certain laws, Nagin
replied,
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79
Well, did the tsunami victims request? Did it go through a formal process to
request? You know, did the Iraqi people request that we go in there? Did they
ask us to go in there? What is more important? And I'll tell you, man, I'm probably
going get in a whole bunch of trouble. I'm probably going to get in so much
trouble it ain't even funny. You probably won't even want to deal with me after
this interview is over…. But we authorized $8 billion to go to Iraq lickety-quick.
After 9/11, we gave the president unprecedented powers lickety-quick to take
care of New York and other places. . . .Now, you mean to tell me that a place
where most of your oil is coming through, a place that is so unique when you
mention New Orleans anywhere around the world, everybody's eyes light up --
you mean to tell me that a place where you probably have thousands of people
that have died and thousands more that are dying every day, that we can't figure
out a way to authorize the resources that we need? Come on, man. . . .
I don't want to see anybody do anymore goddamn press conferences. Put a
moratorium on press conferences. Don't do another press conference until the
resources are in this city. And then come down to this city and stand with us
when there are military trucks and troops that we can't even count. Don't tell me
40,000 people are coming here. They're not here. It's too doggone late. Now get
off your asses and do something, and let's fix the biggest goddamn crisis in the
history of this country. (Nagin, 2005, September 02a)
When Mike Brown was asked why the response had not been better given
FEMAs concern and pre-planning for New Orleans, he responded that the total lack of
communication had not been anticipated and that he had only been getting news from
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80
his teams on the ground who were focusing on the Superdome and on search and
rescue (2005, September 02c). He mentioned his frustration with the inability to provide
food and water to more people, but said the situation in New Orleans had come down to
one of “literally going individual” with workers handing meals and water out one at a
time (M. Brown, 2005, September 02b). Brown said the “lawlessness and the –the-the
crime that was occurring,” had surprised them and had slowed search and rescue
(2005, September 02b). With federal troops arriving, Brown predicted that things would
get “dramatically” better over the next few days.
President Bush, in a White House Press Conference stated that while progress
was being made in helping the people of New Orleans, “the results are not acceptable”
(2005, September 02b). He assured the nation that the government would get the
situation under control even as it was simultaneously planning for the long range care of
thousands of displaced people. Then, starting in Alabama, Bush embarked on a tour of
the affected areas.
In Alabama, Bush thanked the Coast Guard and the governors before talking
about the federal government’s responsibility first to save lives and to stabilize the
affected areas before helping with cleanup and rebuilding. He noted,
Now we're in the darkest days, and so we got a lot of work to do. And I'm down
here to thank people. I'm down here to comfort people. I'm down here to let
people know that we're going to work with the states and the local folks with a
strategy to get this thing solved” (Bush, 2005, September 02a).
Bush thanked Mike Brown, saying, “and Brownie, you’re doing a heck of a job,”
but noted that “if it's not going exactly right, we're going to make it go exactly right. If
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81
there's problems, we're going to address the problems. And that's what I've come down
to assure people of” (2005, September 02a).
In Mississippi, Bush commented on the uplifting spirit of the people he had met.
He thanked Governor Haley for his “strong leadership” and said, “He set some clear
parameters, and has followed through on helping calm everybody’s nerves” (Bush,
2005, September 01b). When asked about the impact of Katrina, Bush replied “I don't
think anybody can be prepared for the vastness of this destruction. You can look at a
picture, but until you sit on that doorstep of a house that used to be, or stand by the
rubble, you just can't imagine it” (Bush, 2005, September 01b). In Louisiana, Bush
assured people in the outlying parishes that they had not been forgotten, discussed
securing the Convention Center so food and water could be delivered, and talked about
the evacuations from New Orleans by buses. He said that Mayor Nagin had been
telling him first by telephone and now in person how important it was to get the 17
th

Street Levy fixed. After touring the levee site, Bush commented:
A lot of folks are working hard to repair that levee. They've been working around
the clock, 24 hours a day. People from the federal government and the state
government and the local government are working to breach that -- to fill that
breach. . . . the people of New Orleans have got to understand there's a lot of
people working hard, and they're making good progress (2005, September 01a).
Bush ended his visit on this note:
You know, I'm going to fly out of here in a minute, but I want you to know that I'm
not going to forget what I've seen. I understand the devastation requires more
than one day's attention. It's going to require the attention of this country for a
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82
long period of time. This is a -- one of the worst natural disasters we have faced,
with national consequences. And therefore, there will be a national response.
And I look forward to continuing to work with the governor and the mayor and the
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives to do our duty to help
the good folks of this part of the world get back on their feet. Here's what I
believe. I believe that the great city of New Orleans will rise again and be a
greater city of New Orleans. (Bush, 2005, September 01a)
On Saturday, September 3, evacuations of both the Superdome and the Morial
Convention Center were completed (U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). The Times-Picayune reported that as buses
evacuated refugees, federal troops and trucks filled with supplies poured into New
Orleans. Search and rescue operations continued as route clearance and debris
removal began (U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 2006). By September 7
th
, power was restored to parts of the
Central Business and Warehouse Districts in New Orleans, and phone service was
restored to much of Louisiana, although officials said they would have to wait for water
to recede before phone service could be completely restored in the City of New Orleans
(Nolan, 2005, September 7). The 17
th
Street levee break had been closed and no
additional water was coming into the city, although there was still “significant water in
New Orleans East and in the lower 9
th
Ward” (Nagin, 2005, September 06).
At a press conference on the following Tuesday, September 6, Mayor Nagin
(2005, September 06) reaffirmed that the mandatory evacuation was still in effect due to
the toxic conditions in the city. However, he sought to reassure citizens that he had not
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83
ordered the National Guard to withhold food or water from them in an effort to force
them out. He said he understood that people didn’t want to leave, but told them,
It's OK. Leave for a little while. Let us get you to a better place. Let us clean the
city up. And once we clean it up, I promise everybody that you will be able to
come to a city that's safe and a city that's better. (Nagin, 2005, September 06)
The following day, September 7, Nagin ordered a complete evacuation of the
city, but rescuers faced scores of residents who had survived the storm and did not
want to evacuate (Anderson & Duncan, 2005, September 8). Nagin took his family to
Dallas after ordering the evacuation, and was out of town until Saturday, September 10.
(Russell, 2005, September 11). Amid the outcry against FEMAs poor performance,
Brown was recalled to Washington on September 9, “to resume oversight over
operations for the arrival of Hurricane Ophelia and the immediate response efforts”
("Admiral takes over Katrina relief," 2005, September 09). He was replaced by his
assistant Coast Guard Vice Admiral Thad Allen. On September 15, Brown resigned
from FEMA.
September 14, Governor Blanco spoke to “the brave and resilient people of
Louisiana: those of us thankful to be here at home, those in Louisiana shelters, and
those temporarily dispersed across the nation in shelters from Texas to Tennessee and
in homes and hotels in faraway states” (Blanco, 2005, September 14). Blanco spoke of
the families who were “ripped apart” and who had yet to find each other. She pledged
that she would “not rest until every Louisiana family and community is reunited”
(Blanco, 2005, September 14). She spoke of the magnitude of the destruction, of the
heroism of individual volunteers as well as trained emergency responders, and the
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84
failure of the government at all levels to adequately respond to the disaster. Finally
Governor Blanco called on the Federal government to step up to the plate to expedite
the recovery of New Orleans and Louisiana in every way possible.
In an address to the nation on September 15, eighteen days after landfall,
President Bush spoke of the distress suffered by American citizens during the
Hurricane Katrina disaster, saying, “
You need to know that our whole nation cares about you, and in the journey
ahead you're not alone. To all who carry a burden of loss, I extend the deepest
sympathy of our country. To every person who has served and sacrificed in this
emergency, I offer the gratitude of our country. And tonight I also offer this pledge
of the American people: Throughout the area hit by the hurricane, we will do what
it takes, we will stay as long as it takes, to help citizens rebuild their communities
and their lives. And all who question the future of the Crescent City need to know
there is no way to imagine America without New Orleans, and this great city will
rise again. (Bush, 2005, September 15)
Bush noted that rescue operations were largely completed and that recovery was
underway, with electric power restored in Mississippi, major pipelines back in operation,
and shipping beginning to resume in New Orleans. He pledged help in areas that
included job training, child care and health care as well as both temporary and
permanent housing. The President then conceded that the government response had
not been adequate, stating that “the normal disaster relief system was not equal to it
[the storm]” and that, “the system, at every level of government, was not well-
coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days” (Bush, 2005, September 15).
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85
Bush followed up by saying, “When the federal government fails to meet such an
obligation, I, as President, am responsible for the problem, and for the solution. . . . This
government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina” (2005, September 15).
More importantly than being the nation’s most destructive and expensive disaster
(F. F. Townsend, 2006), Hurricane Katrina became a showcase for the human suffering
that can result from poor leadership and poor leader communication. More than one
million people evacuated the city before the hurricane made landfall (Blanco, 2005; F. F.
Townsend, 2006) resulting in an evacuation rate of nearly 80%, which was above the
expected rate (van Heerden & Bryan, 2006). However, close to one hundred thousand
people failed to evacuate and between one thousand and fifteen hundred died, most of
them poor and elderly (Brunkard, Namulanda, & Ratard, 2008). Between twenty-five
and thirty thousand people waited for evacuation at the Superdome for four days with
no sanitation, or relief from the heat, before being evacuated. Nearly nineteen thousand
more waited at the Morial Convention Center with no sanitation, shelter from the sun, or
even food and water. Many Citizens waited for days in attics and on rooftops for rescue
and often suffered separation from their children and families once they were rescued.
Once rescued from their homes, many of these were taken to the nearest high ground,
such as a highway overpass, where they waited days for evacuation.
Analysis
Structuration theory provides a conceptual means to understand how individual
agency creates and re-creates the social systems that create institutions, and Giddens
(1979) proposes that it also provides a method for the study of social systems. This is
done by conducting either an analysis of the “strategic conduct” of people in the system
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86
or an “institutional analysis.” The former considers how people utilize the rules and
resources of the system in their daily interactions while bracketing the institutional
properties of those rules and resources. The later focuses on the institutional properties
of rules and resources while bracketing the strategic conduct of members of the system.
This study will look at leader communication during Hurricane Katrina through a lens
focusing on the strategic conduct of those leaders while bracketing the institutional
properties of the rules and regulations and the stocks of knowledge that leaders call
upon for their communication during a crisis situation. During a disaster when normal
modes of behavior are disrupted, leaders would be expected to make choices that
modify, at least temporarily, the existing institutional rules and regulations.
RQ 9: Does leader communication during Hurricane Katrina reflect a re-creation
of institutional rules and resources or of shared knowledge?
These structuring elements of society along with Fairhurst’s rules of framing
provide an overarching approach for the analysis of leader communication during
Katrina since Fairhurst believes, in a similar manner to Giddens, that communication is
more than sharing information or meaning, but that it is part of the creation of “shared
reality” among participants (2011, p. xiv).
Following the method employed by Riley (1983) in her groundbreaking research
utilizing structuration theory, I will employ a four by four matrix with one axis containing
“legitimation”, “signification”, “domination”, and “knowledgeability” from Giddens’
structuration theory, and the other containing “responsible communication,” “context
definition,” “redefinition of situation,” and “clearness of outcome” from Fairhurst’s rules
of framing (see Table 1).
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87
Table 1
Analysis of Leader Communication During Hurricane Katrina
Symbols
Structures

Context
Definition
Clearness of
Outcome
Redefinition of
Situation
Responsible
Communication
Signification
(Interpretative
Scheme)

Domination
(Facility)
Authorization
& Allocation

Legitimation
(Norms)

Knowledgeability
Practical
Discursive

Quality, Credibility and Generalizability.
Miles and Huberman (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1984) bring
up some social scientists’ concerns about problems with the quality, credibility and
generalizability of qualitative methods. And Yin discusses “lack of rigor” as a problem
plaguing the acceptance of case studies as research method (p. 9). Problems of rigor
stem from “sloppy” work allowing “equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the
direction of the findings and conclusions” (Yin, 1994, p. 9). Miles and Huberman
propose that both rigor and bias problems can be mitigated by concretely explicating the
methods of analysis used as well as instituting “systematic, coherent process[es] of data
collection, storage, and retrieval” while conducting research (Huberman & Miles, 1994;
Miles & Huberman, 1984; Plamondon, 1996). This is a view shared by Phil Tompkins
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88
(1994) who maintains that creditability comes through documentation and consistency
along with accuracy of quotations and sources used.
For this research, transcripts and video clips of press conferences and media
interviews with the principle subjects, New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco, FEMA Director Michael Brown and U.S. President George
W. Bush are used to construct the case study from a strategic communication
perspective. Data were collected through a comprehensive search of individual network
news archives, the LexisNexis Academic database, the InfoWeb database, the Bush
White House and FEMA Web sites, the Times-Picayune Katrina Archive, as well as
various web archiving sites. Google and You-Tube were also searched as they
sometimes provided clues for new search terms. Searches were date delimited from
August 26
th
, 2005 through September 15
th
, 2005 using individual leader’s names,
names and titles, and names plus Katrina. Because interviews and press conference
data were retrieved from multiple sources, videos and transcripts were examined
numerous times by the researcher to determine those which contained the most
complete coverage. Transcripts provided by news services were downloaded when
available and were matched against the video files with only major discrepancies noted
since these transcripts typically do not include filler words. Transcripts or videos were
transcribed verbatim by the researcher into Microsoft Word using a process of re-
transcribing to ensure accuracy. Following the method suggested by Powers (2005),
videos were transcribed a sentence at a time, then the tapes re-listened to and re-
transcribed until the transcription matched what was spoken word for word. Filler words,
false starts, stutters, and repeated words were deleted for purposes of readability in the
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case study (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). Video files were downloaded into Replay
Video Capture. As each video was watched, it was checked against the transcript and
listed on an excel spreadsheet. It was checked for completeness, whether or not it had
sufficient content to analyze, and the main content of the recording was captured.
These were then used to construct the case study in a day by day progression focusing
on the leaders’ communications during that day.
Once the case study was completed, data were chosen for the secondary
analysis based on communication directed towards the people of New Orleans as well
as the exigencies of the situation. For example, press conferences from Aug 27 and
Aug 28 featuring Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin were chosen because they
contained important information about the evacuation process and about how citizens
should view the impending storm. Many of the press conferences and interviews were
primarily recapitulations of what had been done and were directed more towards
answering press questions than towards providing new information to citizens. Thus
subsequent press conferences and interviews by Blanco and Nagin, and those selected
for analysis by President Bush and Michael Brown, were based on whether or not they
contained communication directed towards the citizens of New Orleans.
For each leader, either a press conference or an interview was chosen after the
risk was identified but prior to landfall, thus providing excellent material for analysis of
how the leaders framed their communication to define the situation, the outcomes the
leaders wanted, and the degree to which leaders recognized and addressed
constituent’s situations and viable options. At least one press conference or interview
was chosen from either August 29
th
or 30
th
, after landfall but prior to the massive
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flooding from the breeched levees. In the same manner, at least one press conference
or interview was selected from September 1
st
or 2
nd
when the situation was at its worst.
Press conferences and interviews with Michael Brown and C. Ray Nagin after that point
were primarily defensive in nature and contained little information for citizens of New
Orleans. President Bush’s September 14 press conference was his longest
communication concerning Hurricane Katrina and contained context information and
outcome information for citizens. Appendix A contains the rationale for why each
individual press conference or interview was selected. Transcripts from chosen
segments were imported into MaxQDA and coded according to concepts developed
above.
After selection of data for analysis, a codebook was created utilizing the terms in
the matrix listed above and based on the structure developed by McQueen et al. (1998)
and modified by DeCuir-Gunby, Marshall and McCulloch (2011). Thus the structure for
this codebook included the code name, a full definition of the code, and an example or
examples. See Appendix B for the Codebook. Two coders, the researcher and a
colleague, coded the first interview separately, then compared results, resulting in an
initial intercoder reliability of 77%. Reliability was determined based on Miles and
Huberman’s (1994) formula of calculating the number of agreements and dividing by the
number of agreements plus disagreements. Discrepancies were discussed and
resolved and the codebook and examples were revised accordingly. A second and a
third interview was coded following the same process. The initial reliability tests on
these two coding passes were again 77% for the second interview and 80% for the
third. This is perhaps not surprising as, according to DeCuir-Gunby, Marshall, and
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McCulloch, “the theory-driven approach involves difficulties, often resulting in lower
inter-rater reliability (i.e., lower consistency of judgments) and lower validity. . . . [since]
theory-driven codes are relatively more sensitive to projection on the part of the
researcher” (2011, p. 35). A second colleague was then asked to code an interview.
Based on discussions from resolving the discrepancies in the second and third interview
as well as with the third coder, the codebook was again revised. This time definitions of
signification, legitimation, and knowledgeability, initially planned to capture culture from
a prospective of the citizens of New Orleans, were broadened to account for national
culture. Considering that two of the four leaders were not from Louisiana or New
Orleans, this is not surprising. Additional codes were created to account for
expressions of concern and those of gratitude. Inter-coder reliability for the next two
interviews coded was just over 91 and 92% respectively. The researcher re-coded all
the interviews according to the new criteria, occasionally re-checking a previously coded
interview to maintain internal consistency (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Finally data was
analyzed using Krippendorf’s Alpha. Coding information was entered into the
appropriate matrix and uploaded to the online utility created by Deen Freelon (2010,
2013). Results were above 87% for all variables except “context” and “signification”.
Krippendorf (2004, 2009) maintains that an alpha greater than or equal to 80% is
generally acceptable with those greater than or equal to 67% sufficing in situations
where tentative conclusions are acceptable. In the case of signification, the alpha was
low, only 72%, and is accounted for by one phrase being coded multiple times by one
coder and not at all by the other. For context, also low at 77%, one coder included
statements pertaining to orders given while the other did not. Even at these low
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numbers however, alpha still was in the range where tentative conclusions are
acceptable. In the following discussions, examples and a synopsis of the coded
information will be presented. See Appendix C for full coding results.

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Chapter 4: Analysis and Discussion
It may be assumed that leaders at all levels shared a goal of insuring the safety
of the people of New Orleans as Hurricane Katrina approached the Gulf Coast. The risk
factors included the possibility that Katrina would veer suddenly one direction or another
and completely miss New Orleans, through various degrees of “near” hits, causing
different degrees of damage, to a direct hit which would have catastrophic results.
Available storm tracking information from the National Hurricane Center projected that
the hurricane would either make a direct hit or pass close enough to cause severe wind
and storm surge damage. Because of the size of Katrina, in addition to its wind speed,
the likelihood that New Orleans would be missed completely was very small. Therefore
leaders faced decisions of whether or not to call for evacuations, whether to make them
mandatory, and when to call for them. But that was not the only decision they faced.
The Hurricane Pam simulation the year before had shown that there were thousands of
people in the city that didn’t have the means or ability to evacuate. There are always a
number of people that prefer to “ride out the storm” and choose not to evacuate.
Therefore there were different sub-groups of people that leaders needed to
communicate with, defining the parameters of the situation and persuading them to take
recommended actions to insure their safety (Fairhurst, 2011). The following examination
of leader communication during Katrina uses structuration theory as a lens to analyze
concepts communication during crises and disasters developed from Fairhurst’s work.
An analysis of the data will be presented first, followed by a discussion of the results,
and finally, limitations of the study.
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RQ1. How did leaders frame their communication to define a context in terms of
the dangers posed for the people of New Orleans at the start of Katrina?
People want information about impending risks from varied and multiple sources
to confirm the reliability of the messages they receive (P. A. Andersen & Spitzberg,
2009; Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1993). These sources should include local and officials,
experts on the subject, and other high credibility individuals (P. A. Andersen &
Spitzberg, 2009). According to Fairhurst (2011, p. 7) the”uncertainty, confusion, and
undecidability” of a crisis or disaster situation is precisely what allows leaders the
opportunity to frame it in such a manner as to persuade people to follow their directions.
Accordingly, it was up to Nagin and Blanco first, as leaders in the city and the state,
then to Michael Brown and President Bush, to define the situation for the people of New
Orleans.
Signification.
Because signification looks at the codes and language in use by the people in an
area, it often surfaces the richest and most interesting communication in any given
situation. However, there was little evidence of this in any of the communication by the
leaders in this study. This is surprising because Mayor Nagin was born and raised in
New Orleans and Governor Blanco was born and raised in Louisiana (see Appendix D).
However, Nagin’s communication showed little evidence of that other than in asking
people “to buddy up” and “to check on senior citizens and those who don’t have the
means to leave”. He also called on structures of signification when ordering the last
remaining holdouts to leave the city during the cleanup phase when he said, “And I
understand the spirit that's basically, “I don't want to abandon my city.’ It's OK. Leave
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for a little while. Let us get you to a better place. Let us clean the city up.” Governor
Blanco tended to use very formal language even while acknowledging the importance of
local leaders as she told citizens “please listen to your parish leaders as to the guidance
for when you should depart your respective regions.” She acknowledged the religious
background of many of the people when she said, “We need to pray, of course, very
strongly, that the hurricane force would diminish.” Blanco also invoked vivid imagery in
saying, “the people of Louisiana stand tall, and I am proud to stand with you” at her
address to the Louisiana Legislature in the middle of September. Michael Brown’s use
of signification showed when he asserted, “The people in Mississippi and Louisiana,
and Alabama may think ‘oh this is no big deal, I don’t have to worry about it.’ This is a
very big deal.” He also referred to New Orleans as a “major American city, a major
urban area that has been totally demolished” which may have resonated as much with
the rest of the country as it did with locals. President Bush drew on one of the local
names for the city when he stated, “all who question the future of the Crescent City
need to know there is no way to imagine America without New Orleans, and this great
city will rise again.” The rest of his communication in this mode was tied more to the
country generally than to the people of New Orleans when he spoke of professionals
“gather[ing] the dead. . . and preparing them for their rest,” and in talking about racial
discrimination that had “cut off generations from the opportunity of America.”
Legitimation.
Legitimation was the least utilized structure in framing communication across all
variables for Hurricane Katrina. The use of norms along with sanctions could serve as a
valuable tool in persuading people to either evacuate or to take necessary precautions
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to be safe, especially in an area like New Orleans where the threat of being hit by a
hurricane is ongoing. However it was utilized in only a few instances, once in context
definition where Michael Brown commented that “people ought to take it seriously,”
implying that bad things might happen if they did not. Another involved redefining the
situation when Mayor Nagin ordered the remaining holdouts to evacuate after the
flooding by saying, “Now, I also emphasize that I would like for everybody to get out
because it's a health risk.”
Domination.
Not surprisingly, domination was the structure most utilized by the leaders.
Primarily it was used to give both information and direction to the citizens. However, it
was also drawn upon to indicate resource allocation. Mayor Nagin told people that, “we
may call for a voluntary evacuation later this afternoon or tomorrow morning to coincide
with the instatement of contraflow” on Saturday. He then “ordered” everyone to
evacuate the city on Sunday. He informed citizens that he could commandeer private
property if needed for city use, and he advised those who couldn’t leave that the city
would provide ten sites for bus pickup at no charge. Governor Blanco told people about
the contra-flow system and told them which routes they should use in leaving town.
She admonished everyone to drive safely to avoid accidents and asked people to listen
to parish leaders for instructions on when to depart in order to avoid gridlock. Brown
enjoined citizens to evacuate saying, “if evacuations are ordered, I want people to
leave. This is a very serious storm.” He told people the “the storm is not over yet . . . be
patient. Be calm.” Brown also discussed the assets that were being brought in for care
and comfort of those needing them. President Bush signed the disaster declaration
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allowing “federal agencies to coordinate all disaster relief efforts with state and local
officials” and urged “everyone in the affected areas to continue to follow instructions
from state and local authorities.”
Knowledgeability.
When drawing on stores of shared knowledge to define the context, Mayor Nagin
noted, “The storm surge most likely will topple our levy system.” Before Katrina this
probably would not have had the same significance for people outside of New Orleans
as it did for those who have lived there. He also invoked tacit knowledge, telling
everyone, Do everything to prepare for a regular hurricane, but treat this one differently
because it is headed our way” Governor Blanco spoke about the possibility of the
flooding everyone feared saying, “There may be intense flooding that will be not in our
control, which would be ultimately the most dangerous situation that many of our people
could face.” Later in the press conference she said, “We're hoping that it does not
happen that way. We need to pray, of course, very strongly, that the hurricane force
would diminish.” She also talked about evacuation saying, “When the contraflow is in
place, if indeed it's called for -- and we believe later this afternoon it would probably be
justified -- it's not going to make things as easy as some people might assume. It's
going to mean that there are more cars, moving along on our highways.” She also
shared this, “just before we walked into this room, President Bush called and told me to
share with all of you that he is very concerned about the citizens.” In building new
common knowledge, Nagin acknowledged, “I just tell you that it's really hard to
understand the devastation and the challenge that we face, unless you're here.
Governor Blanco said, “The destruction is almost beyond comprehension: We've lost
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hundreds of our loved ones. Entire communities have been destroyed. Businesses,
wiped off the map.” And President Bush spoke about the “devastation that this city has
gone through.” In terms that both echoed of embedded knowledge and of new
knowledge, Bush said, “The work of rescue is largely finished; the work of recovery is
moving forward. . . The breaks in the levees have been closed, the pumps are running,
and the water here in New Orleans is receding by the hour.”
Table 2
Context Definition Synopsis
Structures Nagin Blanco Brown Bush
Signification Little use of
common
language
Formal Concern Directed
towards the
nation as a
whole

Legitimation Persuasion N/A Concern N/A

Domination Instruction and
orders
Informative Directive
informative
Directive

Knowledgeability

Danger and
preparation
Danger N/A The old and
the new

RQ2. Did the leaders communicate responsibly concerning the choices open to
the people of New Orleans?
Communicating responsibly includes considering all the stakeholders in a
situation, thinking about what information differing groups might need and the abilities of
those groups to take any requested action. It involves persuading those people to take
the necessary actions. According to Lundgren and McMakin (2004) the group that has
the highest risk for loss or endangerment of life should be the primary audience for
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disaster communication. In New Orleans that group would be those without the ability
or opportunity to evacuate on their own.
Signification.
According to Fairhurst, “if you know how your stakeholders have been influenced
culturally through ‘the language they speak’ (cultural Discourse), you can translate what
you are saying into terms, arguments, and logics that they will understand” (2011, p.
41). Thus signification was expected to pay a large part in how leaders framed their
communication to those who needed the most help in preparing for the storm.
However, this wasn’t so. Mayor Nagin did ask people to “find members in their
congregations” to buddy up with, and to check on others “who may not have the means”
to evacuate. He also made use of what appears to be a local variation of lickity split
(lickety-quick) to describe fast government action when government decides it is
appropriate, as well as Governor Blanco also asked people to help each other, and
said, “I'm actually encouraging the ministers, whose flock may be showing up for
services in the morning, to encourage their people say a prayer and send them home
packing, and help each other get out of town.” The only comment by Brown regarding
people’s choices was that “while the government is taking it very seriously, we have to
emphasize that the people need to take it seriously.”
Legitimation.
The structure of legitimation was also expected to be used in communicating the
choices people had. However, this structure was utilized infrequently, again showing
where the leaders missed a strong rhetorical opportunity.
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Domination.
Although the structure of domination was utilized in other areas, like all of the
structures it was underutilized in communication about choices. Mayor Nagin offered
The Superdome to the citizens by stating, “At noon today, the Superdome will then be
opened up as a refuge of last resort, where we will start to take citizens that cannot
evacuate.” Earlier in the day he had directed, “if no other alternative is available, to
immediately move to one of the facilities within the city that will be designated as a
refuge of last resort.” This opened up the expectation that there would be other centers
open, possibly adding to the confusion that resulted in people going to the Convention
Center. Nagin also listed the ten sites where buses would pick up people who had no
other way to leave their neighborhoods without offering other instructions to those who
might be unable to get to the RTA stops. Blanco suggested that the drive out of the city
would be less frustrating if people drive carefully and courteously to avoid accidents. A
telling comment by Blanco was, “I think the mayor's also arranging for some
transportation measures [for those who don’t have their own].” Blanco Aug 27. This
indicated her lack of involvement in planning for the poorer people in the city. Brown
emphasized that people should “leave now,” but did not offer suggestions as to how
people should accomplish that. He did offer suggestions on how people could avoid
injury after the hurricane, telling people, “be careful. Don't get in that water. Watch for
downed power lines.” Not surprisingly, President Bush was not engaged with the
people around these critical issues at all.
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Knowledgeability.
There were few uses of discursive knowledge structures and responsible
communication about choices, although Governor Blanco did say, “We're hoping that it
does not happen that way. We need to pray, of course, very strongly, that the hurricane
force would diminish.” This seems to suggest that prayer is an option when strategizing
about proper precautions.
Table 3
Responsibility Synopsis
Structures Nagin Blanco Brown Bush
Signification Help each
other
Help each other Concern N/A

Legitimation N/A N/A N/A N/A

Domination Underutilized Superficial Practical N/A

Knowledgeability

N/A Prayerful N/A N/A
RQ3. Did the leaders communicate clearly what outcome they wanted? Did the
leaders communicate clearly how they intended to achieve that outcome?
A hallmark of disaster communication is clarity of outcome in order “to guide
people to take what is considered to be the best protective action” (Mileti & Fitzpatrick,
1993, p. 41).
Signification.
Very little local vernacular or other modes of “communication in use” was utilized
by the studied leaders in discussing the outcomes they wanted. Contrast Governor
Blanco saying, “It's to keep everybody safe and so that you can come back” to Jefferson
Parish. Sheriff Harry Lee’s comment, "You have an obligation to yourself and your
family to haul ass and get out of here and I'm telling you to get out now" ("New Orleans
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102
hurricane could spell disaster," 2005, August 28). Mayor Nagin’s communication during
the early part of the disaster was very subdued and factual showing little identification
with the people of New Orleans. He delivered the mandatory evacuation notice in a
low-key almost emotionless voice, and while his words stressed the need to leave, his
voice did not convey the same urgency or concern. Michael Brown’s communication
about desired outcomes was also practical and to the point, with the exception of this
comment, “Well, one, that's what I like to see. I mean, I'm very happy for the mandatory
evacuations because that, in the end, saves lives.” Governor Blanco talked about
citizens who were affected not having “an easy time” ahead of them due to the
devastation, later offering words of encouragement and hope by saying, “Slowly,
gradually, we will recover. We will survive. We will rebuild”. Much like Governor
Blanco, President Bush’s communication was supportive as he said things like, “I
believe that the great city of New Orleans will rise again and be a greater New Orleans”
and “the passionate soul of a great city will return.”
Legitimation.
Legitimation was not utilized by any of the selected leaders although Andersen
and Spitzberg maintain that creating messages containing “salient, graphic, and
specific” images of harmful outcomes is more motivating than messages that are
“vague, diffuse, or intangible” (2009, p. 216). It was understood by leaders that Katrina
had the potential to be a catastrophic storm which could have also provided them
motivational material (P. A. Andersen & Spitzberg, 2009).
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Domination.
All leaders used the structure of domination to specify outcomes. On Sunday,
Mayor Nagin stated that “the first choice for every citizen is to figure out a way to leave
the city” before directing people with medical conditions to “expeditiously move to the
Superdome.” For those using the Superdome as a refuge of last resort, Nagin
specified, “No weapons, no large items, and bring small quantities of food for three or
four days, to be safe. In another spot he told people, “to look at their hurricane plans,
get their supplies, get their medications in order, clean up storm drains and get ready.”
Governor Blanco was less direct, urging people to “make your plans, make them
thoughtfully, and then just be calm,” then the next day said, “right now, I think it's
important that we all get out as expeditiously as possible.” During the flooding, when
talking about moving people who needed to be rescued into shelters, Blanco was again
indirect in her communication saying, “We're going to try to get the people in shelters,
because they're isolated by water, in most cases, but we're going to try to get those
people relocated as soon as we possibly can get a plan together.” President Bush dealt
with a range of goals, including: “Our first commitment is to meet the immediate needs
of those who had to flee their homes and leave all their possessions behind,” and “our
goal is to get people out of the shelters by the middle of October,” which was a much
more direct message than Blanco’s earlier comment. Bush stated that cities needed to
be rebuilt “quickly” and “in a sensible, well-planned way.” In addition, Bush proffered
emergency monetary help to families to “pay for food, clothing, and other essentials.”
Michael Brown directed, “all available resources to get to that Convention Center to
make sure they have the food and water, the medical care that they need.” His
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communication showed compassion and remorse when he stated, “we are going to
make certain that this city is safe and that that poor mother that has the children, that
family unit that's just trying to get to a shelter, they are going to be protected”.
Knowledgeability:
As in the majority of his communication to the public, Nagin was restrained when
calling on shared knowledge for expressing outcomes, indicating that people should
“get their supplies, get their medications in order, clean up storm drains and get ready.”
However, he did tell the people that, “This is an opportunity in New Orleans for us to
come together in the way that we've never come together before. This is a threat that
we've never faced before. And if we galvanize and rally around each other, I am sure
that we will get through this.” Governor Blanco drew on the importance of family when
she told citizens, “You're leaving to protect yourselves and your family.” Much like
Nagin, Brown was very commonsensical, “We always tell people to be prepared, to wait
in your homes for upwards of 48 hours because it may be a while before a firefighter or
a first responder can get to you. In this case, if the storm continues to grow, the
devastation is widespread as we anticipate it to be, it will be even longer. Some areas
may be cut off where we have to use boats and other means to get into some of the
areas.” In this instance, Brown’s comment was a mixture of legitimation, reminding
people of the consequences of remaining in their homes as well as of knowledgeability,
emphasizing the need for both preparation and patience. This information was given
during the press conference where Nagin and Blanco called for a mandatory
evacuation. While Mayor Nagin and America wondered why the rescue was taking so
long, it seems that FEMA’s timeline was not far off track from what really occurred.
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Table 4
Outcome Clarity Synopsis
Structures Nagin Blanco Brown Bush
Signification N/A Supportive,
Encouraging
N/A Encouraging

Legitimation N/A N/A N/A N/A

Domination Directive Indirect Remorseful
concern
Sensible

Knowledgeability

Restrained Family
orientation
Common
sense
N/A

RQ4. Did leaders use strategic crisis communication tactics to dynamically re-
define the situation for the people of New Orleans (e.g., changing exigencies call
for changed communication)?
There were two distinct periods that called for changed communication. The
extent of flooding that would come as a result of the breeched levees was not known for
nearly two days after the storm as flood waters continued to pour into New Orleans until
the water in the city equalized with the water in Lake Ponchartrain. Those most in need
of information were those trapped on their roofs, in their attics, or otherwise in their
homes or apartments. Some of the people trapped in attics and on roofs had radios
and working cell phones, and others whose situation was not so dire, had TV. These
people needed information on what to do and how to get rescued. Those who could
leave during the early part of the flooding needed to know whether to stay in their
homes or, if they left, where to go. Those who left and became stranded at the Morial
Convention Center and on highway overpasses needed to know when help would come
and in what form. Those at the convention center needed information about the extent
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of the flooding and how long they had to remain there. Those who had evacuated
needed information about when they could return. Those who were creating problems
needed to know that law and order would return. And everyone needed information
about their relatives and loved ones.
The second period that called for changed communication was after the people
in the Superdome, the Convention Center, and overpasses had been evacuated out of
New Orleans. Those who remained need to know what the situation was as far as
livability of the city and those who had evacuated and who had been evacuated needed
to know when they would be able to return and where they could go in the meantime.
Signification.
The most abstract and bureaucratic use of signification came from President
Bush who addressed the nation and those who had evacuated on September 15
th
by
saying, “I’m speaking to you from the city of New Orleans – nearly empty, still partly
under water, and waiting for life and hope to return.” Mayor Nagin did however address
his comments to those remaining in the city when he announced, “I also emphasize that
I would like for everybody to get out because it's a health risk” due to the remaining
water, gas leaks, and fires. No noteworthy use of signification by Governor Blanco was
found. Brown’s only comment utilizing the structure of signification concerned the
conditions in the city after flooding when he stated, “it’s going to be incredibly
dangerous.”
Legitimation.
Mayor Nagin utilized legitimation when urging people to leave because of the
health risks posed by “toxins in the water. . . gas leaks where we may have explosions,”
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ongoing fires, and lack of running water.” Michael Brown used it as well when he talked
about how “devastating” the situation was after the flooding and said, “That's how
devastating this is. And that's why we're bringing in the National Guard. That's why the
Coast Guard will continue to run missions all night with night vision. That's why the First
Army is here.”
Domination.
Leaders had trouble changing gears when the situation went from bad to worse.
Their communication became even less directed at those who most needed it. On
August 31, Nagin commented “Yes, but you have to understand the priorities of our
challenges. We had thousands of people. We evacuated probably close to a million
people in the metropolitan area. But there were still a couple hundred thousand still
here.” Brown acknowledged worsening conditions by saying “Well, it's pretty bad. . . I
started getting reconnaissance reports from some of our folks in the field last night. . . .
For example, this morning we have a hospital that's beginning to flood, and so we're
having to move some of those patients into the Superdome.” Brown continued, “That's
why the American public needs to understand exactly how catastrophic the situation is
in New Orleans.” Obviously at this point Brown was beginning to focus on the criticism
he was receiving in his messages instead of on those most affected by the storm.
Neither Governor Blanco nor President Bush redefined the situation in any definitive
manner.
Knowledgeability.
Because Katrina caused devastation beyond what most of the people of New
Orleans had experienced before, and because none of the leaders were particularly
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good at drawing on shared knowledge in any of the areas investigated, it is not
surprising that there were no incidences of it found in redefining the situation using
shared stocks of knowledge.
Table 5
Redefinition of Situation Synopsis
Structures Nagin Blanco Brown Bush
Signification Persuasion N/A Warning Setting the
scenario

Legitimation Persuasion N/A N/A N/A

Domination Dispassionate N/A What was
happening
N/A

Knowledgeability

N/A N/A N/A N/A
RQ5: Structures of signification will be utilized more by Mayor Nagin and
Governor Blanco than by Michael Brown or President Bush to convey the
seriousness of the situation to the citizens of New Orleans
Surprisingly, structures of signification were used very little by any of the leaders
studied even when while urging people to leave town. The strongest use of it in that
arena was Mayor Nagin telling citizens, “We are facing a storm that most of us have
feared.” Governor Blanco reminded people, “do listen to your parish leaders because
they know best,” prior to the storm. However her strongest use of signification was after
the storm when addressing the LA legislature and offering hope and encouragement to
those affected by the storm. In one moving, almost ministerial passage, she said
You will be secure, and will not fear. You will forget your misery. You will
remember it as waters that have passed away. And your life will be brighter than
the noonday; its darkness will be like the morning. And you will have confidence,
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because there is hope. You will be protected and take your rest in safety.
(Blanco, 2005, September 14)
Michael Brown used some of the strongest language prior to the storm when
talking about a “nightmare scenario” when he stated, “people in Mississippi and
Louisiana, and Alabama may think “oh this is no big deal, I don’t have to worry about it.”
This is a very big deal. This can be very serious for those states and they need to think
about getting ready now.” All of President Bush’s communication utilizing structures of
signification were after the storm when he was offering encouragement and a vision of
the future, when he made comments like, “Here's what I believe. I believe that the great
city of New Orleans will rise again and be a greater city of New Orleans”.
RQ6: Leaders will draw on the structures of legitimation to encourage citizens to
evacuate New Orleans.
Structures of legitimation were the least used by leaders. Again, Michael Brown
showed the strongest use of legitimation to encourage citizens to evacuate when he
said, “Let me put it this way. I've got rescue teams, urban search and rescue teams,
swift water teams that are moving in there right now to be prepared. You don't want
them to have to come and rescue you. So you need to get out of the way of the storm
now.” Mayor Nagin indicated that if we did not “galvanize and rally around each other, I
am sure that we will get through this.” And Governor Blanco, during the days
immediately after the flooding, said, “We're not going to put up with petty criminals or
hardened criminals doing their business. This is not a time or a place for any of that
behavior,” indicating that those misbehaving would be penalized. The only use of
legitimation by President Bush at all came during his September 15 press conference
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when he told the story of “one resident of this city who lost his home was asked by a
reporter if he would relocate, he said, ‘Naw, I will rebuild -- but I will build higher.’”
RQ7: Leaders will predominately rely on the structures of domination to inform
citizens of the changing situation and to advise them what actions they need to
take.
Because of the immensity of the flooding, there were no structures of signification
or common knowledge to draw upon, so leaders were expected to rely primarily on
structures of domination to communicate with citizens.
The structure of domination was the primary one utilized by all the leaders
included in this study. However, most of it was directed towards the initial evacuation or
towards explaining what was being done with little communication directed at redefining
the situation or advising citizens what to do. As an example, Mayor Nagin disclosed,
“There was, you know, I was expecting the levee to be plugged with some 3,000-pound
sandbags, and it didn't happen. So we have command centers that are spread out in
different locations, and this morning we're going to bring all of our command centers
together so that we can get all of the varying opinions in one room.” He did, however,
use domination to remind people who had not left that they needed to, saying, “So
anybody who's out there, my mandatory evacuation is still in effect” and to clarify the
National Guard’s orders, saying, “Now, there are some rumors going out there that I met
with the National Guard and I told them to withhold water and food to people that
wanted to stay in spite of the mandatory evacuation. That is absolutely a false rumor.”
Governor Blanco’s use of domination was primarily focused on allocation other than in
discussing the lawless behavior that was happing. She said, “Then in the next phase,
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we'll be looking for places to evacuate the rest of the folks who found themselves at the
Superdome,” and “We have been sending food and water supplies in to them.” When
speaking about the looting and violence she said, “And now we've got people that it's
bringing out the worst in. And we're going to restore law and order. We are not going to
put up with the kinds of things that we have heard. Likewise, Brown primarily focused
on allocation, saying, “Well, first and foremost, our primary response right now is to
save lives and protect property,” and “our focus is making certain that shelters have all
the commodities: working very close with the American Red Cross and the Salvation
Army to feed people; making certain that we have medications and medical teams
ready to help people.” President Bush urged “everyone in the affected areas to
continue to follow instructions from state and local authorities” and talked about the
“national response” that would “help the good folks of this part of the world get back on
their feet”.
Unfortunately, leaders seemed stunned and incapable of coordinating their
messages or the need for continuing communication with the people of New Orleans.
RQ8: Leaders will give reasons for their orders that draw on their stocks of
shared knowledge differentially according to their proximity to New Orleans.
Mayor Nagin referred to shared hurricane knowledge but indicated why Katrina
was different by saying, “Do all things you normally do for a hurricane but treat this one
differently because it is pointed towards New Orleans." He told them to, "start to look at
their hurricane plans, get their supplies, get their medications in order, clean up storm
drains and get ready,” because “the storm surge most likely will topple our levy system.”
Governor Blanco referred to shared knowledge about the risk of flooding and specified
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how that would affect people who didn’t evacuate, “the shelters will end up probably
without electricity or with minimum electricity from generators in the end. There may be
intense flooding that will be not in our control, which would be ultimately the most
dangerous situation that many of our people could face.” Blanco also said, “We had
what we would call ‘expected hurricane damage’ in a lot of other parishes. But what
we're dealing with now is -- it's not what I would call normal hurricane.” Michael Brown
did not attempt to identify specifically with the people of New Orleans. President Bush
called on universal shared knowledge when he said, “We cannot stress enough the
danger this hurricane poses to Gulf Coast communities. I urge all citizens to put their
own safety and the safety of their families first by moving to safe ground. Please listen
carefully to instructions provided by state and local officials”.
RQ 9: Does leader communication during Hurricane Katrina reflect a re-creation
of institutional rules and resources or of shared knowledge?
The leaders investigated in this study enacted stereotypical behaviors, rarely
stepping out of scripted communication. One instance of new shared knowledge did
appear however, as documented under Context Definition and Knowledgeability, is that
of referring to the “devastation of New Orleans.” A Google search for those terms today
will pull up information and images of Hurricane Katrina.

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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Research
This research analyzes leader’s communication during Hurricane Katrina to
determine if communication failures might have contributed to the nearly 1000 deaths
and untold suffering by the people of New Orleans. While nothing may have prevented
all the deaths, or all of the suffering, absent alternative structural decisions and a much
more sophisticated approach to evacuating citizens, this research indicates that leaders
missed many communication opportunities to better prepare the local population for
Katrina. Mileti and Fitzpatrick maintain that the primary goal of risk communication is to
guide people to take the “best protective action” (1993, p. 41). Leader communication
during Katrina stressed evacuation which was obviously the best action people could
take with over a million people successfully evacuated. But there was little
communication, plans, or government support directed towards the elderly, poor, and
infirm (or their caregivers and families) who did not have the means or ability to
evacuate instantly. These were exactly the people who needed more information and
guidance according to Andersen and Spitzberg (2009) who note that minorities and
those who are uneducated, illiterate, or poor are less likely to receive messages and are
less likely to trust the messages they do receive. In addition, these residents are the
least likely to own or have access to an automobile, according to Alan Berube, of the
Brookings Institute and his associates (Berube, Deakin, & Raphael, 2006). For the year
2000, they calculated that there were roughly 175,000 citizens without access to an
automobile in New Orleans (Berube, et al., 2006). Of these, over 123,000 people lived
in the central city areas of New Orleans. They conclude that it is ineffective to expect
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people to evacuate when they are poor and living in segregated areas where their
neighbors are also unlikely to have access to automobiles. Those who were able to
travel were directed to take buses to the Superdome, but there was little or no
communication directed to those who were infirm or unable to get to the bus pickup
points. Research by Brunkard, Namulanda, and Ratard (2008) showed that roughly one
half of the fatalities were inflicted on people over the age of 75 and most of them lived in
the traditionally poorer sections of New Orleans, including the Lower Ninth Ward of
Orleans Parish, St. Bernard, and Jefferson Parishes. This number has to be modified
by the nearly 70 fatalities caused by the failure of nursing homes to evacuate their
patients, but it still leaves a disproportionate number of deaths among the elderly. The
following paragraphs will discuss communication during Katrina in terms of best
practices in risk and disaster communication in more detail.
Defining the Context
Mileti and Fitzpatrick maintain that, “People are information-hungry in a warning
situation and should, therefore, be provided with all the information they need” in
“detailed and frequently repeated warnings” (1993, p. 42). As Andersen and Spitzberg
point out, however, people are “skeptical of threats, threat warnings, and
recommendations ” (2006, p. 13). They assert that, to be effective, messages
concerning threats to public health and safety must come from high credibility sources
and be repeated frequently through various media. And, according to agreed upon best
practices, all sources must provide the same information and warnings (P. A. Andersen
& Spitzberg, 2009; Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1993). This was a problem during Katrina. On
the one hand, Michael Brown, relatively unknown to Louisiana citizens, was urging them
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to “get ready” (2005, August 26) and “get ready now” because this storm “is a big deal”
and they “need to take it seriously” (2005, August 27a). On the other hand, the
governor of the state, Kathleen Blanco was saying that:
We know that it can shift, little east, little westward. No one really knows exactly
where it's coming. But I think it's very wise for all of us to be well-prepared and
for each individual and each family to know exactly where they're going to go. I
believe it's important to stay calm and to also to listen to your parish leaders
because they know best [in regards to timing for the staged evacuation] (Blanco,
2005, August 27a).
While Brown’s words and demeanor indicated urgency and seriousness,
Blanco’s message portrayed the possibility that the storm would shift direction and so,
while citizens should get ready, there was no urgency. Mayor Nagin’s communication
was conflicting in and of itself, as he said, “Things could change, but as of right now,
New Orleans is definitely the target for this hurricane" . . . so “take this a little more
seriously and start moving - right now, as a matter of fact” (2005, August 27c) But he
continued to say that the city might only “call for a voluntary evacuation later this
afternoon or tomorrow morning to coincide with the instatement of contraflow” (2005,
August 27 -b). While on the one hand, this put the onus on citizens to take care of
themselves and “start moving right now;” on the other it indicated that the city was not
all that concerned, not to mention that the phrase “coincide with the instatement of
contraflow” probably meant nothing to the 69% of the citizens of New Orleans without a
college education (Fussell, Sastry, & VanLandingham, 2010).
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One of the things all of their communication leaves out is a coordinated
explanation of the phased evacuation process that the city and state were trying to
implement in order to minimize the highway congestion that had happened the previous
year during an evacuation called for during Hurricane Ivan. While it was addressed in
some of the leader communication, it should have been communicated as part of the
context on a continuous basis, so as not to dilute the seriousness of the situation. Only
with this drumbeat of communication would it be likely for citizens to take action and be
ready to evacuate when called upon to leave the city.
Another element in defining the context for the various stakeholder groups
involves acknowledging the uncertainty of the situation (Seeger, 2006), but focusing on
what is happening, here and now, in relationship to past history (Fairhurst, 2011). While
Andersen and Spitzberg (2009) note that warnings which occur too frequently can
cause apathy in the intended audiences, Mileti and Fitzpatrick (1993) maintain that this
is less likely to happen when they are informed about the differences between those
previous “misses” and the current risk the citizens are facing. Because of New Orleans’
proximity to the Gulf of Mexico, the city is subject to frequent hurricanes and to frequent
misses by those hurricanes. Residents were asked to evacuate in 2004 for Hurricane
Ivan, which did minimal damage to New Orleans. Therefore, warnings about the storm
needed to be clear about why Katrina needed to be taken seriously and exactly why
people were being asked to evacuate. Governor Blanco continuously acknowledged
the uncertainty in the predictions regarding how badly Katrina might affect New Orleans.
She called on the structure of signification in the form of prayer, saying,” “we need to
pray, of course, very strongly, that the hurricane force would diminish,” (2005, August
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27e) and “that would be -- we would be blessed if that happened (2005, August 28d).
Perhaps we can pray very hard that the intensity will weaken. We don't know what it's
going to be yet” (2005, August 27a). That prayer is a common response to hurricane
risks is pointed out in this comment in the National Geographic Magazine: “Instead of
rebuilding smarter or surrendering, New Orleans is doing what it has always done after
such disasters: bumping up the levees just a little higher, rebuilding the same flood-
prone houses back in the same low spots, and praying that hurricanes hit elsewhere”
(Bourne, 2007, August, p. 5). That is, of course, offset by Blanco’s more objective
comments about the danger: “And I just want to say, we need to get as many people out
as possible,” as “waters could be as high as 15 to 20 feet. That is what the Miami
National Weather Service, the National Hurricane Center, has shared with us. That
would probably be ultimately the worst situation” (2005, August 28d). Blanco
recognized the danger her citizens were in but she failed to capitalize on calls from the
Director of the National Hurricane Center and from President Bush asking for a more
urgent response. Both of these calls were unprecedented in storm history.
Blanco did recognize that the NHC’s predictions of storm surges and possible
flooding “would probably be ultimately the worst situation” (2005, August 28d), but she
failed to address loss of life that could accompany that flooding. In a similar manner,
Mayor Nagin recognized Katrina as a “major hurricane,” “the real deal,” (2005, August
27d) and that “New Orleans was definitely the target” for the hurricane, although he
added the caveat that “things could change” (2005, August 27c). On Sunday, the day
before landfall, and less than eight hours before winds would shut the city down, Nagin
used the credibility of technical experts, saying, “there's not a meteorologist or an expert
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that I have talked to that says that this storm will not impact New Orleans in a major
way” (2005, August 28), as he called for a mandatory evacuation. He spoke about the
storm surge damaging the levee system, but like Governor Blanco did not go into further
detail as to what that would mean.
Clarity of Outcomes
Mileti and Fitzpatrick (1993) maintain that if people do not receive clear, rational
instructions from officials, they will act on advice from others or simply go on according
to their natural predispositions. Information must be “timely, accurate, specific,
sufficient, consistent, and understandable,” and be information “that can be practically
implemented under the circumstances” according to Andersen and Spitzberg (2009, pp.
15-16). Governor Blanco issued directions to people who were able to evacuate, urging
them “to be courteous, patient drivers, to be very, very careful, as you move along.
Remember your goal. Your goal is to be safe. Your goal is to move along carefully,
respect the other drivers. If someone is being impatient, don't respond in like kind. Be
patient alongside” (2005, August 27a) and telling them which routes were best, “Take
the northern routes. People could go east. There's minimal traffic going east right now.
And you can go east, north, and then you can go west” (2005, August 28d). However,
there was little or no information given to those who did not have the means to
evacuate.
Nagin was somewhat more specific in his instructions telling people to “board up
your homes, make sure you have enough medicine, make sure the car has enough gas”
(Nagin, 2005, August 27b). And for those planning to use the “refuge of last resort,”
Nagin told people, “no weapons, no large items, and bring small quantities of food for
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three or four days, to be safe” (2005, August 27c). He listed the ten regional transit
authority pickup sites, and gave a toll-free number for people to call who were looking
for out of town shelters. However, he also made it clear to people that they were
basically on their own when he stated, “but let me emphasize, the first choice for every
citizen is to figure out a way to leave the city” (2005, August 28). Both Mayor Nagin and
Governor Blanco missed opportunities here to expound on what could happen to those
who did not evacuate by communication that would draw more often on legitimating
structures and calling on stores of shared knowledge that would better create possible
disaster scenarios. Michael Brown was the only leader studied who regularly used
legitimation to encourage people to leave in order to avoid specific consequences such
as needing to be rescued. For example he said, “I've got rescue teams, urban search
and rescue teams, swift water teams that are moving in there right now to be prepared.
You don't want them to have to come and rescue you. So you need to get out of the
way of the storm now” (2005, August 28b).
Redefinition of the situation
An interesting aspect to this research was investigating whether or not a leader’s
communication needed to change as a result of the changing exigencies of the
situation. One of the important results is in noting how the division of stakeholders into
different subgroups changed as the exigencies of the situation changed. As the
flooding worsened the situation, the number of subgroups more than doubled as
discussed in the analysis of RQ4. Once rescue and evacuation of the majority of the
population had been completed, the subgroups again changed. Thus the demands on
leaders from citizens underwent two major realignments. The basic communication
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principles remained the same, but leaders responded differently at different times. Early
on, Brown was saying that “it's going to take a long time to clean up and get ready and
make it safe for people to get back to those neighborhoods” (2005, August 30b), citing
the long timeframe needed to clear the floodwater, deal with contaminations from the
flooding, and insure that homes were structurally sound and livable. Blanco became
more matter of fact, telling citizens they couldn’t return because:
There's no electricity and won't be any for quite a while. It's impossible to even
begin to estimate. There's no water. There's a 50-inch main that severed in the
city. In many, many neighborhoods, there are no passable streets. You cannot
drive on streets, there's so much water on them. And there's no food to be had.
We are having to bring shipments of food in to the emergency personnel and to
those people who are in shelters. (Blanco, 2005, August 30b)
At the same time, Blanco shared her frustration with the situation in a manner
that may have caused additional stress for those who were missing relatives when she
said, “a lot of people are calling in knowing that their relatives were in certain houses.
We've got addresses. But I will tell you, addresses mean nothing right now because
street signs are underwater in so many places” (2005, August 31d). Mayor Nagin
presented a more hopeful view when he said, “The good news in the city is that our
rescue efforts have been tremendous, and we've saved thousands of people that have
been on top of roofs and stuck in attics” (2005, August 31c). However he sounded
rather casual when saying, “unfortunately, we do have that rising water problem” (2005,
August 31c). These disparate views of what was happening in the city point out the
need for leaders to coordinate their communication in ways to give constituents
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accurate information. It also highlights Sellnow and Ulmer’s point that most leaders are
so affected themselves by “the threat, surprise, and urgency surrounding crisis
situations” (2004, p. 251) that they are unable to identify and communicate needed
messages to their constituents. Another problem, identified by Quarantelli (1984) is
that internal communication often overloads the system with normal communication
channels slowing the movement of information in the system. “Consequently,
organizations often appear ambiguous or vague in their crisis communication” (Sellnow
& Ulmer, 2004, p. 251), leaving the public “forced to ascertain the extent of the danger,
what is required of them during the evacuation, and where it might be safe to relocate”
(Quarantelli, 1984, p. 15). Quarantelli also points out that leaders may believe that the
public already has the same information that the leader does. All of these points were
validated in the inefficacy of leader communication concerning the redefinition of the
situation.
Responsible Communication
Most of the communication from leaders concerning Hurricane Katrina was
directed towards evacuating the citizens and from this standpoint it was partly
successful as over one-million people left the city prior to landfall. However, there were
close to a hundred thousand people who either chose not to leave or did not have the
means to evacuate. Warning messages need to be personally relevant to those in the
intended audience (P. A. Andersen & Spitzberg, 2009), and according to Seeger (2006)
messages need to leave people with a sense of self-efficacy, or the feeling that they
know what to do and are able to do it. Both Seeger (2006) and Heath (2006) maintain
that messages should show “compassion, concern, and empathy,” although Heath
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suggests that this goes against legal advice. However, he recognizes that the
persuasion research (Bettinghaus & Cody, 1994) indicates that people need to know
that their well-being is of concern to those in charge. More communication that gave
explicit information regarding the preparations people could take if they were not going
to evacuate could possibly have prevented some of the deaths or at least mitigated
some of the suffering. Brown did suggest on Friday night that people get on the internet
and go to FEMA.gov or Ready.gov to get information on what they needed to do. This
message strategy, however, totally overlooked the point that many poorer or elderly
people either do not know how to use computers or do not have ready access to one.
Nagin’s advice to: “do everything to prepare for a regular hurricane, but treat this one
differently” (2005, August 27 -b) did not adequately explicate what people needed to do
for a regular hurricane, much less what additional precautions they should take to be
ready for Katrina. The only choices he offered were to buddy up with neighbors or to go
to one of the ten RTA bus pickup locations to be taken to the Superdome. While Nagin
did ask people to take care of their neighbors, somehow his admonition to make sure
elderly neighbors were “not too frightened, and [to] assist them before we take off”
(2005, August 28) seems woefully inadequate although at least he acknowledged that
there were people who might be unable to evacuate. Governor Blanco’s
communication on the other hand, was solely directed towards the evacuation. Michael
Brown’s communication, while showing compassion, also was primarily directed toward
evacuation:
I'm more concerned right now, not about our readiness, but about the individual
people in Louisiana. I understand that there are, you know, voluntary evacuations
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right now. I'll tell you this personally. If I lived in New Orleans, I'd be getting out of
there. I think it's time to leave now. (M. Brown, 2005, August 28b)
It should be noted that many of Brown’s early comments were given while being
interviewed about Katrina’s effect on Florida and the record is unclear about whether
they were all aired in the New Orleans area and thus might not have reached many of
those living in that city.
Overall, leaders displayed a lack of understanding or ability to speak to the varied
needs of the people of New Orleans that may have contributed to the loss of life and
suffering by those people.
Structuration in General
While the individual structuring systems are discussed according to each
research question above, there are a number of general points that this research
highlights in regards to the application of structuration theory to disasters. From a
structuration perspective, Katrina demonstrated that traditional frameworks for “going
on” in the world may fail during disasters. Structures become deeply layered over
generations of use and are spread over a wide spectrum of society such as the United
States but they may be articulated differently and more narrowly based in limited social
systems, as in sections of a city such as New Orleans (Giddens, 1979). These deeply
layered systems become institutionalized as people draw on them for knowledge about
how to go on in the world, in turn recreating the institution that they called on, or
modifying it by changing behaviors over time. A catastrophic disaster creates a sudden
disruption to the system, leaving people at loss for information on what to do, and
looking to their leaders for guidance and support. This study has shown the need for
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leaders to better understand how to address the changing needs of citizens under such
conditions, creating new structures of knowledge for those citizens to draw upon. To do
this successfully, they must understand that not all citizens inhabit the same institutions,
or, in other words, not all citizens have the same stocks of knowledge to draw upon.
Therefore, communication must be explicit, in simple language that all affected citizens
can understand. Leaders must also understand the constraints that are imposed on
them by the very institutions that enable them to do their work.
According to structuration theory, each leader was constrained in differing
degrees by the demands and restraints of the official position they held. Examples of
this as evidenced during Katrina include Mayor Nagin’s reluctance to call for another
evacuation after Hurricane Ivan missed New Orleans the previous year and ended up
costing the city millions of dollars in lost revenue. As Jones remarks, "business
demands get special attention in the councils of government because ‘economic well
being’ is one of the things officials will be held accountable for" (1989, p. 6). Nagin was
also constrained by his inability to obtain financial support for a number of projects he
had proposed that would have provided better sheltering for those who needed it.
Brown discussed how he was supposed to follow the “talking points” of the day and he
was supposed to spin the events (2006, August 28). A restructuring of FEMA under the
Department of Homeland Security had not only decimated FEMA but had also changed
the reporting structure and supply approval structures from what Brown was used to
dealing with which also created problems for him. President Bush was constrained by
the posse Comitatus act which limited how much help the government could offer
without the state first requesting it. Blanco and Nagin were also hampered by this act
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and because of their lack of understanding of how it would affect the process of
requesting aid.
Conclusion
It became clear during Hurricane Katrina that leaders were unable to coordinate
their communication across organizational entities or with the other primary actors.
Instead of acting interdependently, they each spoke as separate entities, creating
inconsistent messages for those needing guidance in preparing for the storm. This led
to a lack of vision for and effective strategic communication towards the differing
populations of New Orleans. Where leaders had coordinated activity, in regards to the
staged evacuation, their efforts proved very successful with over a million successfully
evacuated, but left tens of thousands without guidance. Disaster research has shown
that minorities and those who are among the poorest citizens are exactly those who
need the most attention.
Leaders need to understand that one person alone cannot handle all the
contingencies endemic to a disaster such as Katrina and they must do the planning
necessary to effectively coordinate and work together for the benefit of their constituents
even though it can be difficult. Not only must leaders be able to coordinate with those
outside their organizations, but they must be willing to cede authority and share
information with those within the organization who may understand the complexities of
managing communication in all directions and with all stakeholders. Leaders must
develop both emotional and adaptive intelligence to enable them to be flexible enough
to recognize and take necessary action to deal with changing exigencies as disasters
expand or change nature.
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In addition, leaders in the public sector must recognize constraints on their
communication, both those imposed by positional lack of discretion, and that imposed
for political reasons, and they must learn to adjust their communication to serve the
immediate needs of the people relying upon them for complete and appropriate
communication.
This research indicates that the use of structuration theory can afford leaders a
framework to work from in planning and designing crisis and disaster response. It also
moves the application of structuration theory from that of more tightly defined
organizational structures into the realm of looser knit structures encompassing multiple
levels of society at large. This study demonstrates the need for leaders to understand
and call upon embedded structures of signification, legitimation, and domination, as well
as stocks of shared knowledge, in order to communicate effectively during crisis and
disaster events. In addition, as Fairhurst’s (2011) rules for framing indicate, leaders
need to understand the importance of their communication in defining the context,
dealing with uncertainty, and communicating to those most at risk during these events.
In addition to showcasing missed communication opportunities, this research has
brought up a number of possibilities for future research.
Normally structures of society change gradually over time. One area of research
would be to look at subsequent hurricanes to see if lessons from Katrina changed
subsequent leaders’ public communication or transformed relationships within the
system. Has there been a change in the amount of responsibility the government takes
for citizens during disasters and has there been a change in the reliance citizens place
in New Orleans have on the government? Have there been changes in the structures of
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domination within the city/state/federal relationships or have people settled back into old
routines?
From this study, it appears that leaders in higher political positions will have more
constraints placed on their communication than those in lower positions. Research into
these relationships and how those constraints might affect the effectiveness of
leadership in those positions could further our understanding of leadership. While this
research looked at the most visible leaders, the communication of other leaders at the
parish level and below, such as at the level of first responders—police, fire fighters--and
civic or religious leaders, would add depth to the understanding gained by this study. In
addition, while both press conference and media interviews were utilized in the analysis,
the author believes a comparison between the communication in those two venues
would be valuable. Other areas of research could include topics such as interagency
coordination, communication and collaboration could also yield valuable insights.
Finally, as noted by Callahan (2002, 2004), structuration theory does not
specifically address how and where emotions fit into the structures of society.
According to Callahan (2004) emotions play a significant role in the dynamic
interactions between systems and structures. She maintains they bridge the gap
between self and others and should therefore be treated as a separate form of
structuration instead of assimilated as a separate structure in the existing theory.
Future research in this area could shed light on how the expression of emotions affect
constituents prior to and during a disaster.
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128
Limitations of the study
Drawbacks to this study include data not being collected in real time due to the
nature of disasters, lack of knowledge of some of the politics behind the scenes and the
interactions of the participants, and lack of researcher knowledge of some subcultural
differences that existed in New Orleans in 2005. Thus the research relied on local
newspaper reports, books on Katrina, broadcast news and other archival services which
are all valuable but they provide incomplete evidence and would not necessarily explain
the situation on the ground in a Cajun neighborhood. Also, it turns out that little archival
data from the four local radio stations was available for “before the storm” messages;
three of those four lost their transmitters during the storm, leaving only WWL TV and
Radio able to continue broadcasting (Thomas, 2005). While the researcher made every
attempt to find the most complete information available, the available transcripts and
videos of press conferences and interviews do not cover the full spectrum of resources
that were available, especially before the storm. Furthermore, it is not possible to
determine the reactions of the people of New Orleans to leader communication in any
organized manner. The lack of power, telephones, newspapers, and general risk to life
and health meant that no one was doing systematic research or even spot polls on how
well the pre-messaging on evacuation worked, although there are a lot of retrospective
stories of those who stayed and those who were contacted in Houston or elsewhere.
Research has shown that later recall is subject to errors due to a “tendency to simplify,
invent, rationalize, and conventionalize past actions” (Wolfe & Jackson, 1987, p. 124),
and from “cognitive processes such as rationalization, self-presentation, simplification,
attribution, or simple lapses of memory” (Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, & Sutcliffe, 1990, p.
FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

129
302). Finally, without prior access to and understanding of each differing subculture
involved, our understanding of structures and knowledge in use is incomplete.

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130
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Appendix A: Rationale for Interviews Used
The many interesting aspects to leader communication in this case made it
difficult to limit the number of interviews chosen to analyze. However, since the focus of
this study was on leader communication directed towards those most affected by the
disaster, that was the main criteria by which press conferences and interviews were
chosen. That there weren’t more instances of communication aimed directly at those
audiences is perhaps indicative of why leaders at all levels failed.
Mayor Nagin
A complete transcript of Mayor Nagin’s comments during the August 27
th
press
conference was not available. However, those comments attributed to Nagin in the
form of direct quotes by news sources were considered important since they convey a
sense of the context and specific suggestions of what people should do. Quotes were
used from the following documents and videos for August 27
th
.
Nagin, R. (2005, August 27a). Evacuations starting in advance of Hurricane
Katrina. Associated Press State & Local Wire. Retrieved from LexisNexis
Academic
Nagin, R. (2005, August 27b). Louisiana residents told to pack up and get out as
Hurricane Katrina heads for coast. AP Associated Press, Mary Foster
Retrieved from Factiva doi:APRS000020050827e18r0004p
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Nagin, R. (2005, August 27c). Mayor urges storm preparations, from
http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2005/08/mayor_urges_storm_prepa
rations.html
Nagin, R. (2005, August 27d). Ray Nagin: New Orleans Mayor. Fox News
Heartland. Retrieved from
http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=blanco+nagin+youtube&qpvt=Blanc
o+Nagin+you+tube&FORM=VDRE#view=detail&mid=5673D598D7B5BC7
3FF505673D598D7B5BC73FF50
Nagin, R. (2005, August 27 -a). DJ Louisiana Coast evacuates ahead of
Hurricane Katrina. Dow Jones Newswires. Retrieved from Factiva doi:
OSTDJ00020050827e18r001xh
Nagin, R. (2005, August 27 -b). Mayor Nagin urges citizens to prepare for
Hurricane Katrina. US States News. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic
The press conference held on August 28 ordered the mandatory evacuation.
Mayor Nagin’s comments during his portion of the press conference indicate what he
deemed important for the people of New Orleans to know about the situation and the
actions he hoped they would take.
Nagin, R. (2005, August 28). New Orleans mayor, Louisiana governor hold press
conference. CNN Breaking News. Retrieved from
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html
Mayor Nagin spoke on WWLTV after Katrina made landfall. WWLTV is a local
station that was still broadcasting at this time, although rising floodwaters required them
to evacuate later. This interview was chosen due to its immediacy to landfall and
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174
because it was on the local station which would be the station tuned into by residents
who still had media access.
Nagin, R. (2005, August 29a). Nagin on day of landfall: 'My heart is heavy'.
WWLTV Katrina Archived Videos. Retrieved from
http://www.wwltv.com/katrina-anniversary/archived-stories/Nagin-My-
heart-is-heavy-101330709.html
Although the overtopping of the levees and initial breeches were visible on
Monday, it wasn’t until Wednesday that the seriousness of the flooding and on-going
destruction began to sink in. The August 31 interview on CNN with Mayor Nagin offered
the most wide-ranging discussion on his part of the changed exigencies.
Nagin, R. (2005, August 31c). New Orleans mayor: Trying to get everybody in
synch. CNN Weather with Soledad O'Brien. Retrieved from
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/08/31/nagin/index.html?iref=storyse
arch
The September 06 media availability is significant because it contains information
directed to citizens still in New Orleans about the door to door mandatory evacuation
being implemented, as well as health issues and the basic situation. It is perhaps one
of the best examples of a leader speaking directly to the citizens.
Nagin, R. (2005, September 06). Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, holds a
media availability. Congressional Quarterly. Retrieved from LexisNexis
Academic

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175

Kathleen Blanco
Because the press conferences of August 27 and 28th were directed primarily
towards the people of New Orleans, giving them information both on the storm and on
preparations being made by the State both were used for both Kathleen Blanco
Blanco, K. B. (2005, August 27e). August 27 press conference. CNN In the
Money with Jack Cafferty. Retrieved from Retrieved from Infoweb
Blanco, K. B. (2005, August 28d). New Orleans mayor, Louisiana governor hold
press conference. CNN Breaking News. Retrieved from
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html
The August 30 press conference given by Governor Blanco was selected
because it contained information on the new challenges faced by the city and the state
as well as directing information to those who had evacuated.
Blanco, K. B. (2005, August 30b). Governor Kathleen Blanco (D-LA) holds a
news conference regarding Hurricane Katrina. CQ Transcriptions.
Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic
Blanco’s August 31 interview with PBS was selected because it is less scripted
than most of her other communications, and is very rich in signification and legitimation.
Blanco, K. B. (2005, August 31d). Hurricane Katrina: Louisiana Governor
Responds. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/july-
dec05/blanco_8-31.html#
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On September 2, Governor Blanco re-defined the changing situation with CBS
news.
Blanco, K. B. (2005, September 2b). Kathleen Blanco, Governor of Louisiana,
discusses disaster response in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.
CBS The Early Show with Harry Smith. Retrieved from LexisNexis
Academic
Finally, Blanco’s September 15
th
address to the Louisiana Legislature was
chosen because of its information for the people of New Orleans.
Blanco, K. B. (2005, September 14). Address to a joint session of the Louisiana
State Legislature. C-Span. Retrieved from
http://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/kathleenblancokatrina.htm

Michael Brown
Brown’s August 27
th
interview on MSNBC was selected his worry about the lack
of a mandatory evacuation in New Orleans kept breaking through his commentary about
recovery efforts in Florida
Brown, M. (2005, August 27a). Bearing Down. MSNBC. Retrieved from
http://video.msn.com/video.aspx?mkt=en-us&vid=6cb06a4
Brown reiterates his concern about people leaving in his August 28 interview with
CNN, obviously not willing to criticize the Mayor and Governor for not calling a
mandatory evacuation earlier, but giving reasons why people should not wait.
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177
Brown, M. (2005, August 28b). State of Emergency declared in Louisiana. CNN
Breaking News with Betty Nguyen. Retrieved from
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.03.html
The August 29th press conference with Governor Blanco was held after Katrina
made landfall, but before the flooding became widespread. Brown speaks to citizens
about what they should do at that point.
Brown, M. (2005, August 29b). Governor Kathleen Blanco (D) Louisiana holds
news conference on Hurricane Katrina. Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic
Brown’s August 30 interview with CBS addresses the flooding and how that
changes what people need to do and be aware of.
Brown, M. (2005, August 30b). Mike Brown, director of FEMA, on their federal
assistance program in the hurricane damage area. CBS The Early Show
with Julie Chen. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic
Brown’s September 01 interview with CNN occurs as FEMA begins receiving
criticism for not being better informed, better prepared, and better able to deal with the
situation.
Brown, M. (2005, September 01a). Desperation in New Orleans: Interview with
FEMA Director Mike Brown; Interview with Louisiana Senator Mary
Landrieu. CNN Paula Zahn Now. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic
By September 02, Brown had become very defensive in response to criticisms
that FEMA, and therefore Brown, had not done its job. Newscaster’s were berating him
for everything from poor planning to failure to get National Guards troops in earlier (M.
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Brown, 2005, September 02a), to failure of the government to improve the levees (M.
Brown, 2005, September 1a). At this point Brown’s communication was aimed at
explaining and giving accounts rather than communicating to the citizens of New
Orleans, so no interviews after this date were used.

President Bush
The August 28, White House Press Conference was the only communication
from President Bush directly to the public pre-landfall.
Bush, G. W. (2005, August 28). President discusses Hurricane Katrina,
congratulates Iraqis on draft constitution (Transcript and video file).
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050828-1.html
While focusing primarily on veteran’s topics, Bush’s V-J Day speech did directly
address the citizens of New Orleans, advising them not to return until they were directed
that it was safe.
Bush, G. W. (2005, August 30a). President commemorates 60th Anniversary of
V-J Day. Retrieved from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050830-1.html
The September 2 address given in New Orleans provided an opportunity for
President Bush to address the people waiting for rescue or evacuation that had access
to media, as well as those who had evacuated and were waiting for news.
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Bush, G. W. (2005, September 02c). President remarks on Hurricane recovery
efforts (Transcript and video file). http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050902-8.html
The September 15 press conference was held in New Orleans and was one of
the longest communications given by President Bush on Hurricane Katrina and
contained context information and outcome information for citizens.
Bush, G. W. (2005, September 15). President discusses hurricane relief in
address to the Nation. Retrieved from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html
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Appendix B: Coding Document
Code in “thought groups”. If a paragraph seems to fit only one code, code the whole
paragraph with that code. If one sentence within that paragraph calls for a different
code, use the different code for that sentence only. Items may be coded with more than
one code. An item may call on shared knowledge (signification) at the same time it is
defining the context; Example: “We have all been through this before, but this time will
be worse”. Code positive examples as well as negative examples. A negative example
under context definition is “this could change” which, while acknowledging the truth of
hurricanes, is ambiguous.
Where quotes are embedded in text, only code quoted material.
Context Definition
Communication that defines the situation “here and now”. Did leaders explain
what was happening well enough so that citizens were clear on the situation?
Did leaders “interpret uncertainty” in the situation so citizens understood the
danger inherent in the storm? Also includes communication that links this event
to similar events in the past. Examples “This is the same as, or different from
[the past]”, “Katrina will impact New Orleans.”
Clearness of Outcome
Communication that focuses on preparation and actions the leader wants the
stakeholders to take as well as what final outcomes the leaders are looking for.
Ex. of preparation and action are “pack up your family”, “put gas in your car”,
“plan where you are going to go”. Outcome communication could be “we want
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everyone to be safe”, “we want everyone to leave the city”. Other examples:
“Don’t try to take the xyz highway, go xx instead.”
Responsible Communication
Communication that reflects thoughtful consideration of the differing needs of and
situations faced by the citizens. Should reflect choices or options for the citizens
to consider and give citizens a sense that they know what to do and how to do it.
Examples: – “if you choose to stay. . .”; “for those that don’t have transportation”;
“take care of your neighbors who may not have transportation”. “Get in your cars
and leave” ignores those who don’t have vehicles, and is a negative example of
responsible communication.
Redefinition of Situation
Communication that speaks to how the situation changed after the hurricane had
passed and as flood waters from the breeched levees began flooding the city.
What do people need to know now? What do people need to do now? Example:
“Do not try to return to your homes yet”. Also after most people had been
rescued and evacuated.
Signification
Interpretive schemes that signify varied layers of understood meaning:
Communication that relies on shared language and interpretations to convey
meaning. “The signs by which members of a culture make sense of their world”
(Barley, 1983, p. 396) . Look for “metaphors, myths, rumors, and names given in
the naming process” (Riley, 1983, p. 420). Example: “We have been through
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this before”, “New Orleans is used to dodging hurricanes”, or “This is the big one”
to refer to a hurricane that makes a direct hit on New Orleans.
Legitimation
Normative regulation: Communication of implied or covert sanctions to reward or
punish those who break social norms. Communication that reflects “the
actualization of rights and the enactment of obligations” (Riley, 1983) Look for
communication that indicates correct behavior (the right or wrong way to do
something) or expected behavior. Example: “Bring your own food and water” is
indicative of a norm of taking care of one’s self, implying you will be thirsty and
hungry if you don’t. “Shelter of last resort” indicates a norm of the government
providing for those who can’t provide for themselves. “We’re staying right here”
is an example of a norm of people who are proud of not leaving during
hurricanes.
Domination
Communication invoking wanted behavior by use of authority or of allocation of
resources: (a) Authority – Communication exhibits control over people or things:
examples: “leave the city”, “take care of your neighbors”, (b) Allocation –
communication involves provision of resources. Examples: “Buses will be
picking up people”. Or “The city will not provide shelter” (negative form).
Knowledgeability
May be of two forms: (a) Practical – tacit knowledge that people know how to
apply but not able to articulate. Example: “we are hurricane savvy people”
implies that the people have necessary knowledge about dealing with hurricanes.
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This would also be an example of signification, (b) Discursive – knowledge that
people are able to organize and talk about with others – often appears as
accounts or reasons why people do what they do. Example: “Our worst fear is
the levees being breeched.”

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Appendix C: Coding Results
Context Intersections with Structures
Context intersections with signification.
New Orleans is definitely the target for this hurricane (Nagin, 2005, August 27c)

Because it looks as if we're going to get hit," (Nagin, 2005, August 27d)

But I do want the citizens to understand that this is very serious, and it's of the highest
nature. And that's why we are taking this unprecedented move (Nagin, 2005, August
28)

. . . asking them to buddy up, to find members in their congregations, to check on the
senior citizens or a citizen who may not -- who may not have the means and is totally
reliant upon public transportation to get around (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

Please (Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

They're putting more and more survivors into the Superdome, and the conditions there
are very difficult (Blanco, 2005, August 30b).

the people of Louisiana stand tall, and I am proud to stand with you (Blanco, 2005,
September 14).

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So that's a little bit of good news for you today, I hope (M. Brown, 2005, August 29b)

And I have instructed my team to keep those supply lines jammed up totally, (M. Brown,
2005, August 29b)

I mean, we have a major American city, a major urban area that has been totally
demolished (M. Brown, 2005, September 01a)

This is a devastating storm. This is a storm that's going to require immediate action now
(Bush, 2005, September 02b)

And some very sad duties are being carried out by professionals who gather the dead,
treat them with respect, and prepare them for their rest (Bush, 2005, September 15).

That poverty has roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations
from the opportunity of America (Bush, 2005, September 15).

New Orleans is definitely the target for this hurricane (Nagin, 2005, August 27c)

We probably will be pulling the trigger later on today and advising people to evacuate
(Nagin, 2005, August 27 -a)

Because it looks as if we're going to get hit (Nagin, 2005, August 27a)
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And I understand the spirit that's basically, "I don't want to abandon my city." It's OK.
Leave for a little while. Let us get you to a better place. Let us clean the city up (Nagin,
2005, September 06).

And once we clean it up, I promise everybody that you will be able to come to a city
that's safe and a city that's better (Nagin, 2005, September 06).

perhaps we can pray very hard that the intensity will weaken (Blanco, 2005, August
27a).

But now it looks like we're going to have to bear some of the brunt of this storm (Blanco,
2005, August 27a)

We need to pray, of course, very strongly, that the hurricane force would diminish
(Blanco, 2005, August 27a)

people in Mississippi and Louisiana, and Alabama may think “oh this is no big deal; I
don’t have to worry about it.” This is a very big deal. This can be very serious for those
states and they need to think about getting ready now (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a).

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And all who question the future of the Crescent City need to know there is no way to
imagine America without New Orleans, and this great city will rise again (Bush, 2005,
September 15)
Context intersections with legitimation.
People ought to take it seriously (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a)

Context intersections with domination (authority and allocation).

I want to make sure that you understand that there is a major hurricane that is in the
Gulf of Mexico (Nagin, 2005, August 27d)

We want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving - right now, as a matter
of fact (Nagin, 2005, August 27e)

We may call for a voluntary evacuation later this afternoon or tomorrow morning to
coincide with the instatement of contraflow (Nagin, 2005, August 27 -b).

We're doing everything we can to make sure our city is safe (Nagin, 2005, August 27 -b)

As a result of that, I am, this morning, declaring that we will be doing a mandatory
evacuation. And I'm going to read the evacuation order to the public (Nagin, 2005,
August 28)

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every person is hereby ordered to immediately evacuate the city of New Orleans(Nagin,
2005, August 28)

Please listen to your parish leaders as to the guidance for when you should depart your
respective regions (Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

And we've got a little time left (Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

I am asking people to look at alternate -- alternate routes(Blanco, 2005, August 28d)

But you know, it's a lot easier to drive a little longer where you can drive. Right now, you
cannot drive in the city itself, up on I-10. We did see, though, that the traffic was moving
very well past the urban center area. It -- Kennar -- it blocks up. But after you leave
Kennar, if you have enough patience -- and you have to be patient -- then you will have
an easy going for the rest of your trip (Blanco, 2005, August 28d).

So, I want to encourage those folks in Mississippi and NO to spend the next 48 hours
getting ready for this storm (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a)

If evacuations are ordered, I want people to leave. This is a very serious storm. People
ought to take it seriously (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a).

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We often tend to forget that we had hurricane-force winds still blowing through
downtown New Orleans as short a time as an hour ago. And so you're making the right
decisions about encouraging people not to move back in yet, to stay away (M. Brown,
2005, August 29b).

The storm is not over. Again, because of my unfortunate experience with hurricanes,
everyone in Louisiana is going to get tired. You're going to get worn out. And so I say to
everyone, be patient. Be calm (M. Brown, 2005, August 29b).

Well, first and foremost, our primary response right now is to save lives and protect
property. So we have, for example, at Camp Beauregard, we have medical teams,
urban search and rescue teams. They're moving in behind the state teams so they can
join up with them as quickly as possible (M. Brown, 2005, August 29b)

We've been trying to get a disaster medical assistance team into the Superdome, but,
frankly, until it was safe to actually move them in we have not done that. So that
movement has begun to start (M. Brown, 2005, August 29b)

We have been doing the evacuations from the Superdome for several days. We are
taking people out from the Superdome to Houston and to San Antonio. The people in
the Superdome have been fed. There are convoys of trucks moving food in there to
feed them even tonight. We're taking the Coast Guard and we are taking care of the
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people who have just appeared on the bridges and the interstates, to get them water
tonight. We're doing all of those things (M. Brown, 2005, September 01a).

I urge everyone in the affected areas to continue to follow instructions from state and
local authorities (Bush, 2005, August 30b).

The Governor and the Mayor of New Orleans, Senator Landrieu, Senator Vitter and
Congressman Jefferson, Congressman Jindal and General Blum and I have just
completed a tour of some devastated country. I started in Alabama, and worked our way
down through Mississippi, and ended up here in one of America's great cities, and saw
first-hand the devastation that this city has gone through (Bush, 2005, September 02c).

Our third commitment is this: When communities are rebuilt, they must be even better
and stronger than before the storm. Within the Gulf region are some of the most
beautiful and historic places in America. As all of us saw on television, there's also
some deep, persistent poverty in this region, as well. That poverty has roots in a history
of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the opportunity of America (Bush,
2005, September 15).

Yes, but you have to understand the priorities of our challenges. We had thousands of
people. We evacuated probably close to a million people in the metropolitan area. But
there were still a couple hundred thousand still here (Nagin, 2005, August 31c)

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Now, I also emphasize that I would like for everybody to get out because it's a health
risk. There are toxins in the water. There are gas leaks where we may have explosions.
We're fighting at least four fires right now and
we don't have running water (Nagin, 2005, September 06).

Well, it's pretty bad (M. Brown, 2005, August 30b).

I started getting reconnaissance reports from some of our folks in the field last night. I've
been, of course--I've been on my computer all night reading the e-mails from the folks
that are getting the information back to me. For example, this morning we have a
hospital that's beginning to flood, and so we're having to move some of the those
patients into the Superdome and, at the same time, we're moving additional medical
personnel into that area to take care of those patients (M. Brown, 2005, August 30b)

That's how devastating this is. And that's why we're bringing in the National Guard.
That's why the Coast Guard will continue to run missions all night with night vision.
That's why the First Army is here. That's why the American public needs to understand
exactly how catastrophic the situation is in New Orleans (M. Brown, 2005, September
01a)

I also want to know all the facts about the government response to Hurricane Katrina.
The storm involved a massive flood, a major supply and security operation, and an
evacuation order affecting more than a million people. It was not a normal hurricane --
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and the normal disaster relief system was not equal to it. Many of the men and women
of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States
military, the National Guard, Homeland Security, and state and local governments
performed skillfully under the worst conditions. Yet the system, at every level of
government, was not well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days. It is
now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader
role for the armed forces -- the institution of our government most capable of massive
logistical operations on a moment's notice (Bush, 2005, September 15)

We probably will be pulling the trigger later on today and advising people to evacuate,
probably at daybreak tomorrow (Nagin, 2005, August 27 -a)

So we are preparing to deal with that also. So that's why we're ordering a mandatory
evacuation (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

And make sure, make sure, that you check on your neighbors. It's very important,
particularly the senior citizens, that we check on them to make sure that they're OK and
that they're not too frightened, and that we assist them before we take off (Nagin, 2005,
August 28)

So anybody who's out there, my mandatory evacuation is still in effect. We're going to
modify it in the next few hours. I'm going to be meeting with a city attorney, and we will
be removing some of the exemptions that were in initially that are no longer necessary.
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But this mandatory evacuation on the east bank of Orleans is still in effect (Nagin, 2005,
September 06)

I said, "Do not, do not harm anyone, do not allow anyone to starve, do not allow anyone
to go without water, and always treat everyone with respect (Nagin, 2005, September
06)

So again, I'm urging people to be courteous, patient drivers, to be very, very careful, as
you move along (Blanco, 2005, August 27a)

Citizens on the West Bank need to go -- if they need to go west, they need to take
Highway 90, as opposed to trying to get up on I-10. And we are seeing cars coming in
from the West Bank, getting onto I-10, just creating more gridlock. Take the northern
routes. People could go east. There's minimal traffic going east right now. And you can
go east, north, and then you can go west (Blanco, 2005, August 28d)

So, I want to encourage those folks in Mississippi and NO to spend the next 48 hours
getting ready for this storm (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a)

This is a very serious storm (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a)

They need to think about getting ready now (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a)

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I'm just saying that I think, regardless, because the size of the storm, its rapid
intensification, you need to get on that highway and start leaving now (M. Brown, 2005,
August 28b)
And all who question the future of the Crescent City need to know there is no way to
imagine America without New Orleans, and this great city will rise again (Bush, 2005,
September 15)

The city may commandeer any private property, included but not limited to, buildings
that may be designated as refuge of last resort and vehicles that may be used to
transport people out of the area (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

And I'm asking all of the churches asking them to buddy up, to find members in their
congregations, to check on the senior citizens or a citizen who may not -- who may not
have the means and is totally reliant upon public transportation to get around (Nagin,
2005, August 28)

But if you can't leave, here are the 10 sites, that starting at noon, that you will be able to
go to and there will be RTA buses that will pick you up for free (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

We've been trying to get a disaster medical assistance team into the Superdome, but,
frankly, until it was safe to actually move them in we have not done that. So that
movement has begun to start (M. Brown, 2005, August 29b)

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The other thing that we'll do is we will respond to -- under the disaster declaration -- we
will respond to direct requests from the governor. As the local officials get into these
affected areas and find out what they need, they'll make the request to the state EOC
right here, those requests will be passed on to us, and if we have the resources, the
teams, we will put them in place and let the state utilize those (M. Brown, 2005, August
29b)

And I have instructed my team to keep those supply lines jammed up totally, so that we
always have at least a three- to five-day supply of commodities moving into this state,
so whatever the needs are, we can fulfill those needs (M. Brown, 2005, August 29b)

Yesterday, I signed a disaster declaration for the state of Louisiana, and this morning I
signed a disaster declaration for the state of Mississippi. These declarations will allow
federal agencies to coordinate all disaster relief efforts with state and local officials. We
will do everything in our power to help the people in the communities affected by this
storm (Bush, 2005, August 28)

But if you can't leave, here are the 10 sites, that starting at noon, that you will be able to
go to and there will be RTA buses that will pick you up for free (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

Now, there are some rumors going out there that I met with the National Guard and I
told them to withhold water and food to people that wanted to stay in spite of the
mandatory evacuation. That is absolutely a false rumor.
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Context intersections with knowledge (discursive and tacit).
The storm surge most likely will topple our levy system (Nagin, 2005, August 28).
FEMA is on the ground. I talked to the director of FEMA. He assured me that everything
that we needed would be taken care of. I just tell you that it's really hard to understand
the devastation and the challenge that we face, unless you're here. So now that we
have people on the ground, I'm sure we will pick things up (Nagin, 2005, August 31c).

When the contraflow is in place, if indeed it's called for -- and we believe later this
afternoon it would probably be justified -- it's not going to make things as easy as some
people might assume. It's going to mean that there are more cars, moving along on our
highways (Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

This is a very dangerous time. Just before we walked into this room, President Bush
called and told me to share with all of you that he is very concerned about the citizens
(Blanco, 2005, August 28d).

But I'll tell you right now, it's [traffic] creeping and somewhat stopped in the urban center
(Blanco, 2005, August 28d)

The destruction is almost beyond comprehension: We've lost hundreds of our loved
ones. Entire communities have been destroyed. Businesses, wiped off the map.
Families separated. More than a million people displaced from their homes. But even as
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we continue to recover from the worst natural disaster in our nation's history, the people
of Louisiana stand tall, and I am proud to stand with you (Blanco, 2005, September 14).

I have just completed a tour of some devastated country. I started in Alabama, and
worked our way down through Mississippi, and ended up here in one of America's great
cities, and saw first-hand the devastation that this city has gone through (Bush, 2005,
September 02c).

The work of rescue is largely finished; the work of recovery is moving forward. In nearly
all of Mississippi, electric power has been restored. Trade is starting to return to the Port
of New Orleans, and agricultural shipments are moving down the Mississippi River. All
major gasoline pipelines are now in operation, preventing the supply disruptions that
many feared. The breaks in the levees have been closed, the pumps are running, and
the water here in New Orleans is receding by the hour. Environmental officials are on
the ground, taking water samples, identifying and dealing with hazardous debris, and
working to get drinking water and waste water treatment systems operating again. And
some very sad duties are being carried out by professionals who gather the dead, treat
them with respect, and prepare them for their rest (Bush, 2005, September 15).

The storm surge most likely will topple our levy system (Nagin, 2005, August 28).

And you have so many agencies working down here (Nagin, 2005, August 31c).

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. . .and we believe later this afternoon it [contra-flow] would probably be justified
(Blanco, 2005, August 27a)

But now it looks like we're going to have to bear some of the brunt of this storm (Blanco,
2005, August 27a).

There may be intense flooding that will be not in our control, which would be ultimately
the most dangerous situation that many of our people could face (Blanco, 2005, August
28d).

Waters could be as high as 15 to 20 feet. That is what the Miami National Weather
Service, the National Hurricane Center, has shared with us. That would probably be
ultimately the worst situation. We're hoping that it does not happen that way. We need
to pray, of course, very strongly, that the hurricane force would diminish. But just
remember, even if it diminishes to 1, there were six people lost in Florida when it was a
Category 1 hurricane. So there's still eminent danger. There seems to be no real relief
in sight, and it has been startling to see how accurate the path was predicted, and how
it is following the predicted path (Blanco, 2005, August 28d).

I just need to remind people: There's no electricity and won't be any for quite a while.
It's impossible to even begin to estimate. There's no water. There's a 50-inch main that
severed in the city. In many, many neighborhoods, there are no passable streets. You
cannot drive on streets, there's so much water on them. And there's no food to be had.
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We are having to bring shipments of food in to the emergency personnel and to those
people who are in shelters(Blanco, 2005, August 30b)

And as we eliminate the water from the streets and from the houses, people will be able
to go back in (Blanco, 2005, August 31d)

Well, local officials will tell them. But I want to caution folks that, you know, I'm afraid it's
going to be quite awhile before they can come back in, particularly in those areas close
to downtown New Orleans (M. Brown, 2005, August 30b).

Now downtown itself is not flooded, but the visuals that I've seen and the reports I've
had from the field--that we have literally tens of square miles, if not more, of areas that
floodwaters were up to the roofs of homes. It's going to be weeks at least before people
can get back in those areas (M. Brown, 2005, August 30b).

And all who question the future of the Crescent City need to know there is no way to
imagine America without New Orleans, and this great city will rise again (Bush, 2005,
September 15)
Outcome Clarity Intersections with Structures
Outcome clarity intersections with signification.
It's to keep everybody safe and so that you can come back (Blanco, 2005, August 27a)

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This is not going to be an easy time for any of our citizens who've been affected in
southeast Louisiana by this storm. The dimensions are unfathomable (Blanco, 2005,
August 30b).

But slowly, gradually, we will recover. We will survive. We will rebuild. It's going to take
some time. And this cannot happen overnight (Blanco, 2005, August 30b)

Many of you, as I said, have lost your homes, and we will worry with you (Blanco, 2005,
September 14).

I believe that the great city of New Orleans will rise again and be a greater city of New
Orleans (Bush, 2005, September 02b).

I believe the great state of Louisiana will get its feet back and become a vital contributor
to the country (Bush, 2005, September 02b).

The streets of Biloxi and Gulfport will again be filled with lovely homes and the sound of
children playing. The churches of Alabama will have their broken steeples mended and
their congregations whole. And here in New Orleans, the street cars will once again
rumble down St. Charles, and the passionate soul of a great city will return (Bush, 2005,
September 02b).
Outcome clarity intersections with legitimation.
No intersections found
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Outcome clarity intersections with domination (authority and allocation).
We want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving - right now, as a matter
of fact (Nagin, 2005, August 27c)

No weapons, no large items, and bring small quantities of food for three or four days, to
be safe (Nagin, 2005, August 27c)

People should "start to look at their hurricane plans, get their supplies, get their
medications in order, clean up storm drains and get ready (Nagin, 2005, August 27a)

every person is hereby ordered to immediately evacuate the city of New Orleans
(Nagin, 2005, August 28)

If you have a medical condition, if you're on dialysis or some other condition, we want
you to expeditiously move to the Superdome (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

The first choice for every citizen is to figure out a way to leave the city (Nagin, 2005,
August 28).

The only other thing I will add before I turn it over to the governor, is that, you know,
take precautions on your home. You may want to fill your bathwater -- your bathtubs up
with water, just in case when you come back to your homes, if there's no running water,
so that you have something to come back to (Nagin, 2005, August 28)
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And make sure, make sure, that you check on your neighbors. It's very important,
particularly the senior citizens, that we check on them to make sure that they're OK and
that they're not too frightened, and that we assist them before we take off (Nagin, 2005,
August 28)

And so we urge you to make your plans, make them thoughtfully, and then just be calm
(Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

And I just want to say, we need to get as many people out as possible (Blanco, 2005,
August 28d).

Right now, I think it's important that we all get out as expeditiously as possible (Blanco,
2005, August 28d).

Use alternate routes. Highway 61, which is Airline Highway, and others (Blanco, 2005,
August 28d)

And we are going to make certain that this city is safe and that that poor mother that has
the children, that family unit that's just trying to get to a shelter, they are going to be
protected (M. Brown, 2005, September 01a)

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203
Our first commitment is to meet the immediate needs of those who had to flee their
homes and leave all their possessions behind (Bush, 2005, September 15)

When communities are rebuilt, they must be even better and stronger than before the
storm (Bush, 2005, September 15)

so that we are better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could
threaten our people (Bush, 2005, September 15)

This morning, the Superdome has already opened for people with special needs. If you
have a medical condition, if you're on dialysis or some other condition, we want you to
expeditiously move to the Superdome (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

The first choice for every citizen is to figure out a way to leave the city (Nagin, 2005,
August 28)

We're going to try to get the people in shelters, because they're isolated by water, in
most cases, but we're going to try to get those people relocated as soon as we possibly
can get a plan together (Blanco, 2005, August 30b)

My guarantee to you is that FEMA will stay here as long as we need to be here to help
you in every way possible that we can help you. And you've got a good team; you've got
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204
a good start. Let's say that right now you're on the road to recovery (M. Brown, 2005,
August 29b)

Our goal is to get people out of the shelters by the middle of October (Bush, 2005,
September 15)

And the federal government will undertake a close partnership with the states of
Louisiana and Mississippi, the city of New Orleans, and other Gulf Coast cities, so they
can rebuild in a sensible, well-planned way (Bush, 2005, September 15)

Federal funds will cover the great majority of the costs of repairing public infrastructure
in the disaster zone, from roads and bridges to schools and water systems. Our goal is
to get the work done quickly. And taxpayers expect this work to be done honestly and
wisely -- so we'll have a team of inspectors general reviewing all expenditures (Bush,
2005, September 15)

Outcome clarity intersections with knowledge (discursive and tacit).
. . . get their supplies, get their medications in order, clean up storm drains and get
ready (Nagin, 2005, August 27a).

You're leaving to protect yourselves and your family (Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

And our goal is to save as many lives as possible (Blanco, 2005, August 31d).
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205

We always tell people to be prepared, to wait in your homes for upwards of 48 hours
because it may be a while before a firefighter or a first responder can get to you. In this
case, if the storm continues to grow, the devastation is widespread as we anticipate it to
be, it will be even longer. Some areas may be cut off where we have to use boats and
other means to get into some of the areas (M. Brown, 2005, August 28b)

It's going to take a long time to clean up and get ready and make it safe for people to
get back to those neighborhoods (M. Brown, 2005, August 30b).

Situation Redefinition Intersections with Structures
Situation redefinition intersections with signification.
Now, I also emphasize that I would like for everybody to get out because it's a health
risk. There are toxins in the water. There are gas leaks where we may have explosions.
We're fighting at least four fires right now and we don't have running water (Nagin,
2005, September 06).

Well, it's pretty bad (M. Brown, 2005, August 30b).

Well, it's going to be incredibly dangerous (M. Brown, 2005, August 30b).

I mean, we have a major American city, a major urban area that has been totally
demolished (M. Brown, 2005, September 01a).
FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

206

I'm speaking to you from the city of New Orleans -- nearly empty, still partly under water,
and waiting for life and hope to return. Eastward from Lake Pontchartrain, across the
Mississippi coast, to Alabama into Florida, millions of lives were changed in a day by a
cruel and wasteful storm (Bush, 2005, September 15).

Situation redefinition intersections with legitimation.
Now, I also emphasize that I would like for everybody to get out because it's a health
risk. There are toxins in the water. There are gas leaks where we may have explosions.
We're fighting at least four fires right now and we don't have running water (NBC, 2005,
September 06).

Situation redefinition intersection with domination (authority and
allocation).

Now, I also emphasize that I would like for everybody to get out because it's a health
risk. There are toxins in the water. There are gas leaks where we may have explosions.
We're fighting at least four fires right now and we don't have running water (Nagin,
2005, September 06)

I have signed an order providing immediate assistance to people from the disaster area.
As of today, more than 500,000 evacuee families have gotten emergency help to pay
for food, clothing, and other essentials. Evacuees who have not yet registered should
FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

207
contact FEMA or the Red Cross. We need to know who you are, because many of you
will be eligible for broader assistance in the future. Many families were separated during
the evacuation, and we are working to help you reunite. Please call this number: 1-877-
568-3317 -- that's 1-877-568-3317 -- and we will work to bring your family back
together, and pay for your travel to reach them (Bush, 2005, September 15)

In addition, we're taking steps to ensure that evacuees do not have to travel great
distances or navigate bureaucracies to get the benefits that are there for them. The
Department of Health and Human Services has sent more than 1,500 health
professionals, along with over 50 tons of medical supplies -- including vaccines and
antibiotics and medicines for people with chronic conditions such as diabetes. The
Social Security Administration is delivering checks. The Department of Labor is helping
displaced persons apply for temporary jobs and unemployment benefits. And the Postal
Service is registering new addresses so that people can get their mail (Bush, 2005,
September 15)

And so, I have directed that we have all available resources to get to that Convention
Center to make certain that they have the food and water, the medical care that they
need (M. Brown, 2005, September 01a)
Situation redefinition intersections with knowledge (discursive and tacit).
No intersections found

FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

208
Responsible Communication (Choices) Intersections with Structures
Responsible communication (choices) intersection with signification.
. . . asking them to buddy up, to find members in their congregations, to check on the
senior citizens or a citizen who may not -- who may not have the means and is totally
reliant upon public transportation to get around (Nagin, 2005, August 28).

We want people to help each other. I'm actually encouraging the ministers, who's flock
may be showing up for services in the morning, to encourage their people say a prayer
and send them home packing, and help each other get out of town. I think the mayor's
also arranging for some transportation measures (Blanco, 2005, August 27c).

Well, I would suggest that we have a day of prayer tomorrow (Blanco, 2005, August
30b).

And, while the government is taking it very seriously, we have to emphasize that the
people need to take it seriously (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a).

Responsible communication (choices) intersections with legitimation.
No intersections found
Responsible communication (choices) intersections with domination
(authority and allocation).
And make sure, make sure, that you check on your neighbors. It's very important,
particularly the senior citizens, that we check on them to make sure that they're OK and
FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

209
that they're not too frightened, and that we assist them before we take off (Nagin, 2005,
August 28)

And so we urge you to make your plans, make them thoughtfully, and then just be calm
(Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

But we're going to try to eliminate as much frustration as possible. But we cannot
guarantee that it will be frustration-free. Again, that will be up to you to help us to make
it as frustration- free as possible. If we have to accidents and we keep traffic moving,
then I think it will be the best of all worlds (Blanco, 2005, August 27a)

And, while the government is taking it very seriously, we have to emphasize that the
people need to take it seriously (M. Brown, 2005, August 27a)

I think it's time to leave now (M. Brown, 2005, August 28b)

So I would say to all folks in Louisiana as you return to your homes when you're allowed
to return to your homes, be careful. Don't get in that water. Watch for downed power
lines. If you're going to use a chain saw, know how to use the chain saw. If you're going
to have a generator, know how to exercise and how to operate the generator (M. Brown,
2005, August 29b).

FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

210
if no other alternative is available, to immediately move to one of the facilities within the
city that will be designated as a refuge of last resort (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

At noon today, the Superdome will then be opened up as a refuge of last resort, where
we will start to take citizens that cannot evacuate (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

And I'm asking all of the churches (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

But if you can't leave, here are the 10 sites, that starting at noon, that you will be able to
go to and there will be RTA buses that will pick you up for free (Nagin, 2005, August 28)

Responsible communication (choices) intersections with knowledge
(discursive and tacit).
We're hoping that it does not happen that way. We need to pray, of course, very
strongly, that the hurricane force would diminish (Blanco, 2005, August 27a).

FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

211
Appendix D: Leader Biographies
Clarence Ray Nagin, Jr.
Born on June 11, 1956, in New Orleans, LA; married Seletha Smith Nagin with three
children: Jeremy, Jarin, Tianna.
1978 – Tuskegee University, BS, accounting
1994 – Tulane University, MBA
1978 – General Motors, Detroit, MI
1981 – Associates Corp, Dallas, TX
1985 – Cox Communications, controller, then vice president and general manager
2002 – Mayor of the City of New Orleans
Memberships:
Orleans and Jefferson Parish Business Councils; Greater New Orleans Education
Foundation; Covenant House and United Way, past board member; United Negro
College Fund Walkathon, past chairman; Louisiana Cable Television Association, past
president; 100 Black Men of Metro New Orleans, past president.
Awards:
Better Business Bureau, Excellent Customer Service Award, 1993; Louisiana State
Board of Education, Distinguished Business Partner Award, 1994; Young Leadership
Council, Diversity and Role Model, 1995; Spirit of Greatness Award, 1997; Gambit
Weekly, New Orleanian of the Year, 1998; National Telly Award (for Tiger Woods
exclusive interview), 2001
(Henderson, LaBalle, & Pendergast, 2007)
FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

212
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Born on December 15, 1942 in Coteau, Iberia Parish, LA; married Raymond Blanco with
six children, seven grandchildren
1964 – University of Louisiana at Lafayette, BS, business education
1964 – Taught business education at Breaux Bridge High School
1984 – First woman from Lafayette elected as representative to state legislature
1989 – First woman elected to Public Service Commission
1993 – Chair of Public Service Commission
1995 – Elected lieutenant governor
1999 – Reelected lieutenant governor with 80% of the vote – increased tourism by 41%
as supervisor of Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism
2004 – First woman governor of Louisiana -- with focus on education and economic
development
2007 – Blanco decides not to run for a second term
Blanco served on the National Governors Association’s Center for Best Practices board
as well as on two NGA committees: Natural Resources; and Education, Early
Childhood, and Workforce
(National Governors Association; Neumann, 2011)

FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

213
Michael D. Brown
1

Born in Guyman, Oklahoma, November 8, 1954; married with children
B.A. in Public Administration/Political Science, Central State University, Oklahoma
J. D. from Oklahoma City University School of Law. 1981
Active in state, local, and national politics
1977 – First intern then Assistant City Manager, City of Edmond, OK - overseeing the
emergency services divisions and involved in creating an emergency response
program, later city council member
1978 – Oklahoma State Senate Finance Committee; board member, Secretary, then
Chairman of the Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority
1980 – Private practice
1988 – In-house general counsel for Dillingham family (Dillingham Insurance, Suits
Drilling, Suits Rig, Latigo Energy, Dillingham Ranch and Dillingham Enterprises include
cite, Enid, Oklahoma “working in energy, insurance, land use and environmental law, as
well as drafting legislation and managing campaigns.
1989 – Spring and summer semesters; Adjunct Faculty Oklahoma City University
School of Law teaching State and Local Government, and Legislation, respectively.
1991 – Commissioner of the International Arabian Horse Association
2001 – Executive Director for the Independent Electrical Contractors trade association
in Colorado.

1
The information on Brown has been difficult to piece together and to verify. Adding to
the problem is an article in Time (Fonda & Healy, Sept. 08, 2005) that questions Brown’s
qualifications. However, in his Statement to the Senate Committee, Brown (Brown, 2005,
Sept. 27) addresses that article and supplies notarized letters and other documents
confirming the questionable items on his bio.

FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

214
2001 (February) – General Counsel of FEMA (“principal legal advisor to [agency head]
and head of the Office of General Counsel” with staff of approximately 30 attorneys
[who] provide legal services to all of FEMA's program and support offices and represent
the agency in litigation” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011).
2001 (September) – Appointed as Acting Deputy Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency
2001 – (December) – Nomination to Deputy Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency; later confirmed
2003 – Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Department
of Homeland Security
2005 – Resigned his position as Under Secretary of Homeland Security
Since resigning as Undersecretary of Homeland Security, Brown has been involved in a
number of activities including:
Starting Michael D. Brown, LLC., a disaster and preparedness consulting firm in
Boulder, CO ("Former FEMA head to start consulting business on emergency planning,"
2005, November; McGaw, 2007)
Becoming a principle in Resilient Corp., a Washington, DC corporate emergency-
planning consulting agency (Hammer, 2006, September; McGaw, 2007)
Working “as a consultant and public speaker about disaster preparedness” (Denver
Business Journal, 2009, September 10):
Joining “Cold Creek Solutions as VP of disaster and recovery practice” (Denver
Business Journal, 2009, September 10)
FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

215
Teaching a course on the Patriot Act at the University of Denver (Sturm College of Law
& University of Denver, 2009, December 7)
Hosting “The Michael Brown Show on Clear Channel Communication’s KOA Radio”
(850 KOA News Radio, 2011)
Founder and Chief Counsel for Apokalyyis, an analytical and computer enhancement
consulting firm based in Colorado (850 KOA News Radio, 2011; "Apokalyyis Executive
Team," 2011)

FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

216
George W. Bush
Born on July 6, 1946 in New Haven, CN; married Laura Welch Bush with two children:
Jenna and Barbara
1968 – Bachelors degree in history from Yale University
1968 – Pilot in Texas Air National Guard until 1973
1975 – MBA from Harvard Business School
1977 – Bush started Arbusto Energy, Inc.
1982 – Arbusto’s name changed Bush Exploration
1984 – Bush Exploration merged with Spectrum 7 with Bush as Chairman and CEO
1986 – Spectrum 7 merged with Harken (aka Harken Energy)
1989 – Co-owner and managing partner of the Texas Rangers baseball franchise
1994 – Elected 46
th
Governor of Texas
1998 – First Governor in Texas to be elected to two consecutive terms
2000 – Elected President of the United States
2004 – Reelected President for a second term
("Biography of President George W. Bush," n.d.; Lardner & Romano, 1999, July 30)

References

Brown, M. D. ( 2005, Sept. 27). Statement of Michael D. Brown at Hearing on Hurricane
Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select
Comm.: Retrieved from
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/09_27_05/brown092705.pdf.
FRAMING LEADERSHIP THROUGH COMMUNICATION

217
Fonda, D., & Healy, R. (Sept. 08, 2005). How reliable is Brown's resume? Time U.S.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract Anthropogenic climate change is likely to put ever larger populations at risk for loss of life or injury due to crises and disasters. It therefore becomes imperative for leaders at all levels to both understand the importance of and to become adept at handling communication directed at those publics most likely to be affected. Since Hurricane Katrina was the worst natural disaster to hit the US in many years, it is important to better understand the communication of four key leaders involved in the crisis. The public messages of these four leaders were analyzed to ascertain whether or not those leaders understood how to frame effective and appropriate messages using the concepts of signification, legitimation, domination, and knowledgeability from Giddens’ structuration theory, combined with Fairhurst’s rules for reality construction. These messages were examined with regard to how they defined the context for the people of New Orleans, whether they responsibly addressed choices available to the different populations, and whether they clearly delineated the outcomes leaders wanted. Because the breeched levees constituted an escalating crisis situation, communication was studied to determine how leaders addressed the changing exigencies caused by the massive flooding. Speeches given by four public leaders, Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, FEMA Director Michael Brown, and President George W. Bush, were studied to determine the differences in messages and messaging according to the varied levels of government service. The results of this research indicate that leaders at all levels missed communication opportunities that might have resulted in less loss of life and reduced levels of suffering for the people of New Orleans. This study highlights the need for proper training and strategic communication support for leaders in crisis and disaster communication.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Farmer, Laura A. (author)

Core Title Hurricane Katrina: framing leadership through communication

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Communication

Publication Date 08/05/2014

Defense Date 06/23/2014

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag crises,disasters,framing,Hurricane Katrina,OAI-PMH Harvest,structuration

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Riley, Patricia (committee chair), Goodnight, Gerald Thomas (committee member), Mitroff, Ian (committee member), O'Leary, Stephen D. (committee member)

Creator Email lafarmer@q.com,lhawkins@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-453108

Unique identifier UC11286840

Identifier etd-FarmerLaur-2767.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-453108 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-FarmerLaur-2767.pdf

Dmrecord 453108

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Farmer, Laura A.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

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