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Global governance of sport in a digital age: the political economy of sport integrity regulation

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Global governance of sport in a digital age: the political economy of sport integrity regulation

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Content GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF SPORT IN A DIGITAL AGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPORT INTEGRITY REGULATION by Rook Campbell ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) August 2012 Copyright 2012 Rook Campbell ii Dedicated to Jocee Hudson. iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to my doctoral committee chairs, Manuel Castells and Alison Dundes Renteln, whose support, intellectual feedback, and absolute kindness have been fundamental to this project and my academic development. I am thankful for numerous scholars whose review and engagement have been so important. Among those so generously giving me their time and sharp feedback are Janelle Wong and Michael Messner. I am indebted to the University of Southern California’s Politics and International Relations programme that truly values interdisciplinary research and has entrusted me with flexibility and choice to work with top scholars from across and beyond the university. I am thankful for the help and example of exceptional professors whose teaching has gone far beyond the seminar table like Stanley Cohen, Richard Sennett, Geoffrey Wiseman, Patrick James, and Dan Lynch. Special thanks to the Gold Family Fellowship that enabled me to take to international fieldwork and gather primary data necessary for this work. Additionally, I am thankful for Institut d'études politiques de Paris – Sciences Po – whose invitation to me as a visiting scholar and faculty enabled me to engage with brilliant scholars and students who taught me so much. Special mention of thankfulness goes to Ivan Manokha. I am also thankful to so many athletes and individuals in the sport world who made themselves available to me through interviews or institutional invitation. In particular, I want to thank the Olympic Studies Centre, Autorité de Régulation des Jeux en Ligne, SportAccord, and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. I want to extend a special thanks to Hein Verbruggen and Wayne Wilson. There are many unnamed individuals and iv institutions in both the private sector and sport world who generously gave of themselves and expertise in helping me. The inspiration and wealth of positive feedback that I have received from friends is immeasurable. First, I want to thank Jocee Hudson for her love, patience, and intelligence that fueled so many parts of this project and its overall pace and becoming. My dear friend, Dorit Cypis overflows in beautiful creativity in seemingly endless provocative challenges and playfulness that stir real seeing and action. I could not do without this. I am thankful for my friend Peter Knaack, who never tired of engaging in conversations about grounded, living, breathing global theory and social justice. I have grown from his boldness, our loving differences, and his gift of ready-steady, robust back and forth healthy debate. Rachel Churner is an ace of a life long friend whose editing sharpness and cultural savvy made me dismiss made-up words and smile in the quest for easy flowing descriptions of abstract concepts that have such material impact. To be sure, I want to acknowledge the editing help and contributions of Joan Miller. Thank you to Laura Geller for embedding me in a community of full-hearted support, guidance, strength and friendship. The support, love and help of family and friends is invaluable: thank you Jane Sheldon, Gene Sheldon, Carol McCollough, Bobbe Salkowitz, Dmitri Ponomarev, Elijah Hawken, Bob and Marie Rasner, and Rebecca Samson. Authorship is a socially connected and indebted process that has me humbled in gratitude to so many people. v Table of Contents Dedication ii Acknowledgements iii List of Tables vii List of Figures viii Abbreviations ix Abstract x Introduction: Global Governance and the Global Entertainment Industry 1 Chapter Two: On Sport Integrity and the Challenge of Sport Betting 20 Sport Integrity and the Playing Fields, Fair Play, and Logic of the Game 24 Sport Integrity and Sport Governance and Legitimacy at the Institutional Level 33 Sport Integrity and Remote Gambling Operators 53 Chapter Three: A National Response to Transnational Challenges: Sport Integrity and Sport Betting Regulation in France 60 Chapter Four: Global Governance: Property, Fair Return, and Regulation 110 Sport Betting Rights as Intellectual Property 114 Sport Betting Rights as Redistributive Mechanism 140 Sport Betting Rights as Regulatory Mechanism 151 Chapter Five: Sport Integrity: Network Actors, Objects, and Informational Flows 153 Sport Integrity Monitoring and Investigation: Experts, Tools, Place-Times 155 Sport Betting and the Sport-Media Complex 178 Sport Integrity: Lex Sportiva and Basic Rights 193 Conclusion: Tools, Times, and Places of Becoming a Global Governance Actor 205 List of Interviews 232 Primary Resources 243 Comprehensive Bibliography 245 vi Appendices Appendix A: Fieldwork Conducted 278 Appendix B: Web Resources 280 vii List of Tables Table 1.0: Gross Gambling Revenue in the European Union. 65 Table 2.0: Gross Gambling Revenue as percentage of state GDP in 2008 81 Table 3.0: Olympic Marketing Revenue 126 Table 4.0: Total Online Sport Betting Wagers in France, June 2010- June 2011. 147 viii List of Figures Figure 1.0: In the Bleachers, Steve Moore 26 Figure 2.0: Sport Gambling Market France in 2005 75 Figure 3.0: Geographical Mapping and Distribution of Top Remote Gambling Operators By Jurisdiction in 2012. 80 Figure 4.0: Geographical Mapping of Top Offshore Jurisdictions by Number of RGO in 2005 82 Figure 5.0 Percentage of Sport Betting Wagers by Sport Discipline in France, June 2010 - June 2011. 148 ix Abbreviations Association Française du Corps Arbitral Multisports AFCAM Amaury Sport Organisation ASO Autorité de Régulation des Jeux en Ligne AJEL Court of Arbitration for Sport CAS Intellectual Property IP International Cricket Council ICC International Olympic Committee IOC Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques IRIS Early Warning System EWS European Sport Security Association ESSA Fédération Internationale de Football Association FIFA Financial Fair Return FFR Federation Française de Tennis FFT Française des Jeux FdJ Major League Baseball MLB National Football League NFL Olympic Studies Centre OSC Remote Gambling Association RGA Remote Gambling Operators RGO Sport Event Holder SEH Sport Governing Bodies SGB Sport Betting Right SBR Tennis Integrity Unit TIU Tour de France TdF Union des Associations Européennes de Football UEFA Union Cyclist International UCI x Abstract This dissertation deals with questions of regulatory power in a global age. Contradictions of national and global authority are discussed along the lines of the global entertainment industry and its regulation. From an inquiry of two giant global industries, the sport industry and the sport betting industry, these research findings tell a story about the authority of the nation-state and its connection to sport governing bodies via the subject of sport integrity and sport betting. To specify the global characteristics of these markets and regulatory challenges, this dissertation explains and maps the topography of remote gambling operators and the risks they pose to sport integrity. To obtain regulatory purchase over challenges of match-fixing and sport corruption requires political economy maneuvering and inventive governance techniques. Based on a selected body of political science, sociology, international relations, and communications literatures and a number of case studies, this dissertation argues that new relationships between authority and production are emerging. This dissertation puts forward an argument on the nature and capacity of what some call, thin air products. It traces the legal, judicial, state, and commercial actors involved in the production one particular thin air product – sport betting rights. 1 Introduction Global Governance and the Global Entertainment Industry This research project is about global authority. Global governance is frequently analyzed collectively as overall state governance. International relations scholars have thus largely approached global governance as a centralized set of agglomerated institutions (Keohane 1984), whereas, in fact, global governance operates more through decentralized formations in specific geographical regions or specific sectors such as finance, environment, or human rights (Berman 2002, 2005; Slaughter 1997, Raustiala 2002; Rosenau 1992). Efforts to reconceptualize global governance more comprehensively have fallen short on two counts. First, globalization literatures tend to frame their discussions of global governance as either issue-specific (e.g., financial or environmental regulation) or institution-specific (e.g., the United Nations). Second, literatures of globalization falter because of excessive abstractions. By taking up an inquiry on the global sport sector, I expect to further open rich interdisciplinary conversations that will increase knowledge and understanding of globalization, production processes, and global governance. I intend to concretize and simplify these abstract theoretical concepts through a spatially situated and temporally conscious examination of how these processes play out in specific, observable, and measurable contexts. To date, sport governance has not been regarded as a legitimate subject of globalization inquiry, despite being a sector of critical importance in terms of its participant numbers, economic size, importance of issues, and history of international 2 cooperation. In this dissertation, I approach questions of regulation concerning processes that, while global, are also rooted in national institutions. Sport is particularly relevant, not only because of the value of this human activity in terms of the social, cultural, and identity issues recognized in the sociology literature, but also because of two issues transforming national authority (Allison, 1998; Houlihan, 1997; Maguire 1999; Tomlinson 2005). First, sport is of empirical interest because the commercialization of sport activities provides an opportunity to examine national and global regulation deferring to business interests and, second, digitalization of sport makes it possible to identify and elucidate interactions among technological change, business activity, and globalization. I focus on the key processes of global regulation and sport. Specifically, this inquiry addresses the regulation of sport betting as a threat to sport integrity. Rather than analyzing sport integrity as a philosophical question of meta-ethics, I approach sport integrity as a compound of social, political, and economic interests. Sport integrity is about global commercial interests, any analysis of global sport governance inevitably also involves the global entertainment industry, of which sport is a dominant part. Thus my study of sport integrity doubly examines the global entertainment industry by looking at both sport and sport gambling industries. The story of the relationship between sport integrity and sport gambling is one of a struggle to obtain authority and involves some relatively surprising transnational actors, laws, and institutions. When gambling activities go digital, operating in real time from virtually anywhere, the territorial, political, legal, and social glue that keeps these markets intact with regulatory responsibilities comes undone. Moving beyond existing literatures on gambling as a criminological study of deviance or moral peril, my analysis begins at 3 the intersection of sport and the online sport gambling sectors and emphasizes the importance of these economic and political activities in the cultural domain. As a fundamentally transnational challenge, sport betting involves financial flows, technologies, global geographies, and multi-layered public and private laws that confront national courts, legislation, and law enforcement with renewed imperatives for transnational cooperation. I intend to show patterns in both governance challenges and regulatory innovations that commonly arise across many sectors of global governance. While sport gambling regulatory challenges are global, we continue to witness regulatory strategies emerging on a national basis. More and more, regulation on a national basis is crafted with an eye to projecting authority transnationally; yet national strategies alone cannot control these market flows. To study global sport and sport gambling regulatory challenges and transformations of authority, I have chosen a case study of France. While I am careful not to extrapolate general trends on the basis of a single case study, France is an especially important regulatory landscape for investigating these global processes. Having been at the forefront of founding and organizing sport institutions, France has been an international leader in the sport sector for a long time. In addition to feeling national pride in having birthed the modern Olympics, France celebrates its authorship of many other important sport institutions, including International Federations for, e.g., football (Fédération Internationale de Football Association, 1904), fencing (Fédération Internationale d'Escrime, 1913), and cycling (Union Cycliste Internationale, 1900). It is this additional social-cultural context and heritage that, I argue, better reveals more common global regulatory tensions of balancing competing social, national, and 4 economic interests. By studying global sport regulation in France, the contradictions of the national and global become vividly pronounced in a manner that enables specifying processes of globalization. I have chosen a national context in which the state tries to regulate everything. In France, to address or conceptualize social problems is to think of the state. In France there is this thoroughly globalized activity of sport and sport gambling, and yet there is the state. By looking at contemporary national governance transformations, including the 2010 liberalization of online gambling markets in France, I expect to show the relationships between national authority and global markets. The French gambling situation merits attention because of the ways that national gambling regulations formally reconnect to the global sport sector. From this case analysis, I present empirical evidence for answering questions on the mechanisms for obtaining authority in global contexts. Research Questions My research effort focuses on the transformation of sport activities under the influence of the entertainment industry, namely global sport and sport-gambling industries. These commercial influences are global, so institutions whose mission is to regulate sport and sport gambling have to go global as well. However, regulation to date is not perfectly global. Sport integrity provides an important context of regulatory dispute through which I will specify the character of global processes. By looking at the regulation of sport integrity, I examine the contradictions that global sport and sport gambling markets bring up for both state and non-state authorities. From my analytic framework, I raise a number of key questions. 5 What are the relations of politics and interest groups involved in the governance of sport integrity? To answer this question, I examine sport integrity in terms of its global governance contestations and the causeways of how disputing interests manifest, where resistance happens, who is included in or excluded from participation, and how interests interrelate. What are the characteristics of global risks and regulatory challenges? By studying the social and technological mechanisms of sport integrity risks (vis-à-vis global sport and global sport betting markets), I expect to clarify the nature of the crisis of control confronting regulatory institutions. What is the relationship between global production and global authority? My effort focuses on the creation of new products – their actors and social conditions – to understand how the materialization of abstract objects as properties transforms relations of production and authority. To what extent are regulatory mechanisms of sport governance able to keep pace with changing opportunities for deviance and rule bending that global networks and technologies enable? Characterized by and functioning through multiple culturally relative legal systems, global sport governance contains points of both cooperation and conflict as it operates vis-à-vis systems of legal pluralism. To assess the situation of sport global governance requires understanding its social, legal, political, economic, and technological network capabilities. These questions have very real significance to nation-states, in terms of social and cultural practices (e.g., the form of sport), economic interests, and protection of fundamental economic, social, and political liberties. While my research answers 6 particular questions on trends in and challenges to sport integrity important for the global sport and sport gambling industries, the discussion also raises new questions that will encourage global governance scholars to engage these findings. Analytic Framework To approach this topic and answer the questions that I have posed, I start from a specific analytical framework. First, I am concerned to understand the contradictions that led national public and semi-public institutions to have certain vested interests rather than more general ones; these vested interests are private, commercial interests that penetrate governance and politics. 1 However, this inquiry also enlarges the globalization literature’s hyper-focus on economic domains to include social and cultural sectors as well (Held; Beck; Sassen; Calhoun; Roberts; Hesmondhalgh). Through a sport-specific global governance sector study, I aim to inform conceptualizations of global governance through macro-sociological and political economy analysis of these global market processes. Sport transnationalism opens space for conceptual innovation and working through broader dilemmas of global governance. Sport governance reveals points of both convergence and contestation for issues of legal regulations, political authority, economic interests, and social norms. I examine questions on the relationship between globalization and global governance through an institutional and political economy analysis in the areas of sport and sport gambling. There is a transformation of these activities by globalization, but these global processes and consequences are mediated by international institutions. 1 Like other sectors of global governance, sport regulatory bodies struggle with difficulties in mediating conflicting political (national and transnational), economic (commercial), and social (civil society) interests and values. 7 Global Sport and Commercial Interests As a second analytic lens, I approach this study through an interest in the social conditions and context in which we witness a commercialization of all activity. All activity, especially including cultural activities like sport, transform to business. To understand sport requires understanding its political economy as part of the global entertainment industry. Sport is entertainment business. Global professional sport is increasingly directed by corporations, not teams. Aside from some professional sports’ configurations of teams as corporations, both athletes and teams connect to multinational corporations through advertising and sponsorship contracts. Commercialized sport is supported and conducted on a number of platforms: TV, media, advertising, and gambling – all ways of making money off this activity. Regulating global sport markets requires regulating multinational corporations and global capital. Because of this commercialization, corruption, bribery, and financial “doping” threaten fair play and stability of teams, leagues, international sport institutions, as well as domestic and global economies. However, even though regulating sport integrity requires acknowledging the reality of global markets, professional sport remains connected to global sport governance structures whose authority is based on states. Professional sport leagues, teams, and events must connect through an International Federation (IF) sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). While professional teams represent the commercial sport model, remnants of the state model persist in framing the professional game as “national.” Systematic academic analysis of these matters is very rare, a gap the present inquiry is designed to begin to fill. 8 Global Governance of Sport: Regulating Sport Integrity A third lens through which I view this analysis involves an effort to better recognize the need to guard the value of sport as comprising multidimensional global interests. Sport integrity regulation ultimately works to protect sport against being undermined economically. Regulatory processes and relations of politics and interest groups concerned with sport integrity encounter a number of obstacles to global versus national regulation. International sport institutions maintain tremendous power over both the industry and over the state. This global sport governance level of control consists of institutions such as IOC, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Union Européenne de Football Association (UEFA), and World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). International federations are based on nation-states yet exercise power over nations in multiple substantive areas. Through an analysis of global sport, I will identify the converging and contradicting processes and structures of global governance institutions. Theoretically, international sport institutions operate with a core mission to develop sport as a cultural good. A cultural ambassadorial zeal distinguishes these global cultural institutions. Sport governing bodies push forth in dedication to a seemingly universal ideology, an Olympic Spirit that self-declares this sector as apolitical. Sport’s “hagiographic” character, as Paulsson calls it, “seeks to portray sports as something so uniquely exalted as to merit equiparation with religion, the implications being that no authority outside the relevant federation should have any respect to disciplinary action” (Paulsson, 2006: 41). As the globally largest volunteer sector, sport benefits from its not- for-profit image, in spite of the reality that sport is hugely commercial (Forster and Pope, 2004: 103). Forster and Pope describe sport governing bodies as operating with a 9 “means-ends inversion,” yet these institutions “have moved from being purely governance mechanisms to being production mechanisms” (Forster; Pope, 2004: 77). These parapublic entities, operating as nongovernmental organizations with a civil society mission, are also bureaucratic institutions that respond to multinational corporate, media broadcast, and nation-state interests, while also pursuing self-referential elite interests. Methodology To address the questions posed, this doctoral thesis brings together a multilevel analysis that uses a mixed methodology to better describe and understand the processes of transnational sport and its regulation. These methods include unstructured and semi- structured interviews with informants and experts, media data, governmental and institutional data, international case law, and secondary academic literatures important to global sport and sport gambling markets and their regulation. 2 Although I group categories of informants and experts as if conceptually and functionally distinct, these actors often cross and blur such neat boundaries. My research design relies upon qualitative methods and data analysis to answer central questions on global governance, sport, markets, and nation-state authority. To better synthesize my analysis of the situation of authority in a global age, my research design pairs methods and findings in social, labour, corporate, state, transnational, and sport institutional levels to provoke and guide questions, while also drawing out the connections between these multilevel agents and structures. 2 See Appendix A for List of Interviews. 10 My preliminary research efforts began by developing a contact list of athletes, coaches, and other sport experts. From my home university location in Southern California, I obtained access to a variety of national and commercial sport resources, experts, and competitors. These local research sites and resources included the athletic expertise within the University of Southern California and the University of California, Los Angeles, as well as other sport experts, athletes, and international teams and individuals taking advantage of regional training grounds and climate. Other sport- resource-rich sites that were important for beginning my fieldwork included the United States Olympic Training Centre in Chula Vista and the local LA84 Foundation – formerly the Amateur Athletic Foundation of Los Angeles. I interviewed a number of current and former Court of Arbitration for Sport arbitrators and IOC members on rules and policy regarding transnational athletes, sport regulation, and sport integrity. These resources and experts directly and indirectly provided me access to a variety of important individuals and sport institutions through this preliminary research phase. Throughout my fieldwork, I used this snowball technique of working from an initial roster of informants and experts to obtain access to an expanded sample size or more elite closed settings. An additional source of preparation and access in conducting research on global sport and the Olympic Movement came from my own experiences as an athlete. Competing as a scholarship collegiate athlete, followed by a four-year professional cycling career (domestic and international), as well as talent development with USA Cycling, prepared me to engage in critical discursive research in Olympic sport spheres. These experiences as an athlete in elite competition and training not only made obtaining 11 access to elite sport contexts easier, but also provided a critical sensitivity to hearing, seeing, and understanding what each of my research subjects, spaces, and texts revealed. My academic and personal background put me in an advantageous position to move agilely between these sites of inquiry with individual athletes, teams, sport governing bodies, and regulatory (national and transnational) spheres in a way expeditious to data collection. Preliminary research with Southern California-based elite athletes and sport institutional experts provided valuable feedback opportunities to recalibrate questions in advance of more extensive international fieldwork. I began my international fieldwork by conducting research with social and labour actors through interviews with athletes, seigneurs, mechanics, referees, coaches, team directors (directors sportifs), and team executives. Some of these actors represented multiple level interests – labour, corporate, and/or regulatory institutions. By directly engaging athletes through a series of formal and informal interviews, I gathered primary data about labour experiences and the impact of global markets on labour, social, and other fundamental rights protections. While I interviewed athletes from multiple professional sport disciplines, including football, tennis, fencing, athletics, basketball, swimming, and volleyball, I most exhaustively collected data in professional cycling. I selected professional cycling not merely because of my personal experience but more because of its particular relevance to the issues of sport integrity, both globally and in France, which I examine in this project. I followed two elite professional cycling tours (i.e., classic or grand tour stage races), in which I was granted access to the media, organizing administrators, sport entourage, and athletes for over a consecutive week’s time. Through these intensive interviews with athletes and team entity representatives, I 12 gathered data for analyzing the impact and consequences of sport integrity regulation on sport activities and the securities, freedoms, and rights of sport participants. Building upon academic data, I also conducted primary research at the sport institutional level. In Lausanne, Switzerland, I consulted the Olympic Studies Centre (OSC) collections of data collection and communication between National Olympic Committees (NOC), International Federations (IF), national sports associations, and IOC. Having access to such a large, centralized archive of Olympic Movement correspondence greatly facilitated my research. From work within the OSC archives of the IOC’s external relations, I was able to find important communications between public administrations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, the media, and private companies and bodies that revealed regulatory responses and efforts on questions of sport integrity. Access not only to the extensive archives but also to global sport institutional experts based in or near Lausanne was critical for understanding how international organizations respond to competing challenges, interests, and normative pressures. In and beyond Switzerland, I conducted further interviews with regulatory institutions to better understand which archival documents inform interests, circulate as decision guides, or serve in agenda-setting efforts. I interviewed sport bureaucrats, sport integrity experts, regulatory intelligence teams, and lawyers within or directly associated with a number of sport governing bodies (SGB). I met with IOC members in the Ethics, International Relations, Juridical, Athletes, TV Rights and New Media, and Marketing Commissions. Among various IFs, but in particular with the Union Cycliste International (UCI), I worked with legal, media, doping, and communication departments 13 to gather data on transnational regulatory challenges in global sport. To specify the sources and particular processes and structural constraints encountered in sport global governance, I asked probing questions centring on the kinds of ties regulatory institutions maintain with owners, teams, gambling operators, multinational corporations, states, and athletes. To analyze the situation of regulatory authority with SGB, I identified and interviewed informants to detect positions, attitudes, and strategies on regulatory issues of sport betting, sport integrity, labour, authority, and financial transparency. Through these interviews with key sport governance actors, I tested and verified hypotheses on priorities, mechanisms, and capabilities in negotiating and regulating sport, state, commercial, and social interests. By interviewing current and former presidents of IFs, I learned about sport-discipline-specific challenges, as well as the challenges among SGB that interconnect the sport sector with the global gambling market, states, and transnational governance actors. While I conducted interviews mostly in official SGB headquarters, I also met with many informants in private or public spaces. 3 In observance of agreements for confidentiality, some interviews or portions of interviews are cited anonymously. Perching simultaneously timed fieldwork at multiple levels of analysis not only helped lay out an efficient schedule and mapping for data collection but also provided a critical means to better identify and trace the dynamics of change in these dilemmas of 3 Some interviews required innovative research techniques. On one occasion, traffic due to the international theatre Festival d’Avignon proved so frustrating to my interviewee that he called admitting he might have to cancel our appointment. I proposed that I find him in the gridlock and conduct the interview on the road rather than lose the opportunity. Running full speed through the city in a suit and carrying a briefcase, I somehow made the impromptu rendezvous point – at an intersection before the bridge – and jumped in a car that matched the description given to me. I conducted the interview while my informant battled thespian traffic and then continued driving out of town. Two hours later, we finished our conversation at a Quickie burger in some place entirely unknown. I declined the generous offer for bus fare back. The interview was worth it. 14 sport transnational markets and their regulation. As I concentrated my specific research questions on the relationship between global production and regulation, my research methods focused on sport commercial actors. In interviewing key corporate team personnel, sport executives, and corporate affiliates, I asked questions on sport regulations, specifically inquiring about revenue generation, sport properties, and sport betting challenges to sport integrity. Interviews with sport event owners and organizers – as well as analysis of communications and contracts between these sport event owners and athletes, teams, media broadcast agents, advertising sponsors, investors, and regulatory institutions – helped bring to light the processes of global market interests and regulations posed by my research questions. By including interviews with elite sport event owners and corporate representatives, I became informed about the processes and structures of sport markets in which corporate, regulatory, sport institutional, labour, and media interests converge and collide. This research with business actors overlapped my sport regulatory institutional analysis; oftentimes, a sport event owner is both the sport property owner and regulator. In addition to in-depth international sport law analysis of cases involving match- fixing, sport integrity, corruption, and other international-relations issues involved in global sport practices, I also interviewed CAS arbitrators and legal counsel representing private sport event owners, SGB, state gambling regulators, and sport ministries. I conducted interviews through a social-legal lens which recognized how social norms and practices both shape and are shaped by the customary and codified rules of domestic and international systems. My legal analysis involved asking questions to penetrate beyond the official rules, in order to discover how rules are, in actuality, practiced in areas of 15 sport adjudication, disputes, interpretation of norms, sanction implementation, and enforcement. Though I relied heavily on secondary commercial and regulatory data for my analysis of the sport gambling sector, I also conducted primary research with sport gambling operators and the national and transnational regulatory bodies concerned with their regulation. I interviewed executives of the top globally ranked online gambling bookmakers, gambling consultants, and lawyers working in this sector. Over the course of a year of fieldwork in France, I regularly interviewed and maintained active dialogue with the French gambling regulatory authority, Autorité de Régulation des Jeux en Ligne (ARJEL). Through this more embedded research, I obtained access to and developed research relations with a number of private sport event owners and National Federations, as well as the Ministère des Sports (French Sport Ministry). Through participant observation in international working table discussions and conferences on sport integrity, I became informed of the challenges of sport betting regulatory innovation, as well as of legislative and sport governance process details. I also interviewed experts working in sport integrity investigative units and conducted interviews with transnational governance actors involved in regulatory questions of sport betting, including the United Nations, as well as with private transnational law enforcement and intelligence experts. Research Design On the basis of these methods, my findings are analyzed through a research design in which I trace the dynamics and interests that bring global private and public stakeholders together in this arena. While I may appear to be writing a description of 16 various actors, I in fact map where and how these many actors stand in relation to one another. This relational structure is key. Through global technologies of communication, information, and exchange, new relational dispositions and spaces join and disjoin actors in transformed situations of authority that are also global. In order to provide an account of how sport governance really works in practice, I trace the regulatory processes to determine policy formation and implementation arising through converging and diverging interests. Beyond the structural arrangement of institutions, I examine the key decision makers shaping law, institutional policy, and the form of sport. While focusing on the particular global sectors of sport and sport gambling, I examine a cross section of issue areas that represent challenges exhibiting global network characteristics common across global governance sectors. I am concerned with the efficiency and efficacy of global governance of sport integrity and its implications for states, processes of production, and society. By developing an empirically based theoretical analysis of the processes involved in sport integrity and betting, I expect to answer the questions that I have raised on the relationship of global change and authority. In the following chapters, I specify the global characteristics that newly challenge sport integrity, as both licit and illicit sport betting actors become endowed with financial and digital information technologies that spread and accelerate their market’s reach in ways not matched by regulatory authorities. In Chapter 2, On Sport Integrity and the Challenge of Sport Betting, I assess the nature and scope of the risks of betting to the integrity of sport. This chapter addresses the following two questions: What is sport integrity, and to what extent do the various actors’ interests in regulating sport integrity converge? In addition to proposing an 17 explicit social actor mapping, the chapter expands the issue to the fundamental question of global governance. The goal is two-fold. First, from a detailed profile of the central actors engaged in sport integrity efforts – a playbill of the protagonists and antagonists, as it were – readers can begin to detect attributes that link up and have meaning as sources of social, political, cultural, and economic capital in the social field of sport. Then, from these specific details of governance in the sport context emerges an understanding of some of the dynamics and regulatory mechanisms by which actors across global governance sectors acquire regulatory authority. To substantiate the argument that these processes and devices of authority are socially, temporally, and spatially constituted, I present an illustrative case study of SGB regulatory response to the pedestrian and straightforward threat to sport integrity presented by sport betting, laying the groundwork for detecting both common and distinct attributes of concomitant threats to global sport integrity. Revisiting theories of authority to illuminate the spatial- temporal dimensions of this issue serves to establish a critical platform from which to approach and comprehend contemporary challenges of sport integrity and sport betting. This trialectical social, spatial, temporal account of authority is fundamental to the overall argument about global governance. The chapter opens with a conceptual and philosophical inquiry into sport that sets the stage for naming and orienting the actors in this field, then provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the relevance of sport integrity to the subsequent analysis on global governance. Then, to answer questions of governance capacities to regulate these challenges, Chapter 3, Sport Betting in France: A National Response to Transnational Challenges, presents a case study by which to examine the ways nation-states attempt to control 18 online gambling by creating new institutions and new legislation. Through this case study of the French regulatory approach, I also describe and assess how SGB rules, investigative units, policies, enforcement mechanisms, and disciplinary capacities – predominantly private disciplinary and arbitration rules and laws – interact with state regulatory efforts. This chapter delves into the nitty-gritty of gambling regulatory change in France, showing sport integrity and sport gambling regulation to be more and more a thickly embedded transnational economy matter rather than an insular national issue with a few transnational links. The following two questions are addressed: How effective is the State in addressing transnational challenges? Do we witness a willingness to cooperate and acknowledge authority through transnational networks and global governance relations, institutions, and technologies? Chapter 4, Global Governance: Property, Fair Return, and Regulation, more closely interrogates the emergence of sport betting rights. I draw upon and develop an argument about the creation of new products, what some call “thin air products,” to show how actors create, assert, and exchange these devices to perform, distinguish, and acquire particular authorities. Globalization advantages actors with properties that can move or flow unencumbered by strict time-space-defined regulatory environments. The materialization of abstract properties such as sport betting rights may prove effective in not only extending property claims over time and space but also by endowing actors with critical resources of political, social, and economic capital. Intellectual properties are devices that possess such characteristic capacities and show a potential to transform relations of authority. 19 Chapter 5, Sport Integrity: Network Actors, Objects, and Informational Flows focuses on the practical, day-to-day interactions of these so-called global governance networks. By examining the social institutional network relations through which stakeholders cooperate in efforts aimed at sport integrity monitoring, surveillance, and enforcement, I will present evidence with which to assess existing political and legal literatures of global governance scholarship. In this chapter, I am methodical in identifying the actual nuts and bolts interconnecting actors and objects in network relations. This chapter empirically substantiates what I intend when naming these forms of authority by the term, global networks. The final chapter, The Tools, Times and Places of Becoming a Global Governance Actor, synthesizes my arguments from within the specific sport and gambling sectors and particular French national experience as they pertain to struggles occurring across all sectors of global governance. 20 Chapter 2 On Sport Integrity and the Challenge of Sport Betting This chapter delineates the multiple interrelated levels at which sport integrity matters, with their sometimes converging, sometimes colliding, interests, norms, and rules. Distinctions are also drawn among how different actors speak about and pursue sport integrity. Whether and how SGB and other regulatory actors prioritize and attempt to balance related social, economic, and political interests have profound effects on the form of the game. Sport as a cultural activity, its performance we know and experience, is shaped by these decisions. Sport integrity issues interconnect SGB to public policy, law, and markets. As rules to assure sport integrity are political, they can be elucidated by a global political economy analysis, which this chapter undertakes to present. Given the virtual ubiquity of sport gambling made available through digital media platforms, a vital question arises: What is the connection between sport gambling and the integrity of sport? Examples of match throwing, corruption, bribery, and insider information illustrate the scope and diversity of the ways sport gambling interests can penetrate and distort the game and consequently undermine confidence in its integrity. As frenzy gathers around sport integrity, this issue necessitates putting aside the sensationalism for a careful examination of the fittings of sport integrity. Although this chapter focuses on sport betting, it is only part of a broad repertoire of threats that can and do undercut sport integrity. 4 Bookmakers are especially keen to make this point in 4 Further examples of threats to sport integrity include the following areas of (dis)advantage: technology (e.g., cheetah legs, as with Oscar Pistorius), doping, and gender (e.g., chromosomes and hormones, as with 21 favor of widening the lens for viewing sport integrity challenges to include doping or bribery for sporting gain incentives (i.e., championship or league qualification) rather than the singularly demonizing sport gambling. Khalid Ali, Secretary General of the European Sport Security Association – a leading sport integrity monitoring body set up by the leading global online bookmakers – insists that, all too often, conversations on sport integrity have become “synonymous with sport betting – but this is wrong. Sport integrity goes all the way to FIFA bribing scandal, to Rugby and Bloodgate, to Formula 1 and Crashgate. These are integrity issues, too. Not just betting” (Khalid Ali, ESSA). The Festina Affair, Operación Puerto, and BALCO Laboratories affairs are but a few other scandals that have corroded confidence in the integrity of the game. Beyond doping scandals, SGB have also been called to the dock to answer accusations of collapsed institutional integrity, and, since sport integrity is also about good governance, cases of bribery and differential rule enforcement hit at a second level of sport integrity, the institutional level. 5 Too often, scholars fail to contextualize sport betting as an issue that shares common features with other sport integrity challenges. To remedy this error, I will propose a framework for analyzing the relevant global characteristics and mechanisms of governance. How SGB and their different stakeholders assess the risks Caster Semenya). Sport integrity threats involve not only actual threats to sport integrity, but also the perception and mere confidence in sport integrity. 5 For further discussion of SGB institutional examples of sport integrity qua corruption, see McLaren (2011). In the last decade, sport federations have drafted new codes of play and erected good governance rules and measures of oversight to create a stronger appearance of transparency. The issue of SGB impartiality was central to two widely discussed disputes: The impartiality of the IOC and its drug testing laboratories was called into question in the ECJ’s review of Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission (2006), and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court’s decision in Grundel v. Int’l Equestrian Federation (1993) involved the impartiality of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. While both of these public court decisions ultimately ruled in favour of the sport organizations, the decisions left sport governing bodies with concerns that sport autonomy was susceptible to external review and curtailment (Chappalet 2010). 22 presented by sport betting is critical to understanding the strategies that develop to control these risks. 6 By reconsidering theories of sport, I will specify the basic sport integrity principles understood to be sport’s essence – the basic premises or principles of what is at stake in the rules of the game. These principles constitute the logic of sport, its universe of codes, norms, rationales, and communication apparati. I will then show how these rules square with the regulatory institutions charged with their enforcement. As essential as rules of the game are for the integrity of a given competition, I argue, integrity issues transcend what happens on the playing field. To be sure, rules of play are important. However, my larger concern is how poor regulatory capacity to control certain kinds of threats – of which online sport betting is a prime example – carry the potential to unravel or even, collapse, the entire basis by which SGB operate. Through claims of specificity of sport, SGB establish a relatively autonomous system of governance that oftentimes garners exemptions from compliance with national and European Union (EU) rules (Chappallet 2010). 7 Essentially, this is a question of authority. By examining rules of fair play, I show how sport integrity matters not only to athletes and fans but also to private market actors, as well as to other public and semi-public governance actors. In this context, we witness activity gathering, sometimes scrambling to preserve or bolster authority. These activities include innovating techniques that might assure that a given actor remains the regulator. This growing movement around sport integrity – the 6 When sport integrity is seen as an issue of ethics, as opposed to criminality, regulatory efforts may focus on rules and sanctions, whereas actors that frame sport integrity as a matter of crime or security may also adopt techniques for social control. And methods of control may differ entirely when stakeholders are more interested in sport integrity as an economic value. 7 Sport specificity asserts that sport as cultural right merits exception from some public regulation. Sport- specificity arguments in their strongest form make comparisons to religious exceptions that require special treatment to ensure fundamental human rights and freedoms. 23 rustlings of new actors, orientations of space-time, and objects – vividly illustrates processes fundamental to understanding how global networks operate. Despite a shared language of sport integrity, within conversations and agendas of sport integrity lies a rather complex array of interests and priorities. For different stakeholders, the term denotes quite diverging interests. For SGB, sport integrity generally means maintaining conditions that ensure the observance of sport’s technical rules, its rules of play. For these SGB, it also refers to executing custodianship duties fairly (procedural rules). Yet, stakeholders working toward sport integrity guarantees intersect in these so-called shared aims without necessarily possessing mutually or tightly coalesced interests. Taking care not to oversimplify the interests, this chapter describes the field’s different stakeholders and what they mean when speaking about and working toward the realization of sport integrity goals. Identifying the nuances in sport integrity perspectives is crucial for conceptualizing the ways in which actors come together, cooperating or not, in governance and market networks. How an actor perceives and prioritizes risks to sport integrity informs, constrains, or may even, as is often said, “compel” policy selection, actions, and liaisons. I intend to better show the interconnection of quite complex interests at stake in questions of sport integrity risks vis-à-vis sport gambling. In the following sections, I elaborate a framework of sport integrity from the playing field level up through the sport institutional level before then, reconnecting these sport sector based concerns with other national and transnational governance interests. 24 Sport Integrity and the Playing Fields, Fair Play, and Logic of the Game Matters of integrity in sport operate at multiple levels. A first level of sport integrity encompasses the everyday bounds of playing fields. 8 In a now classic sociological study, Man, Play, and Games, Roger Caillois develops a typology for play and games that is quite important for contemporary studies of sport and especially pertinent for this inquiry into sport integrity. The integrity of sport pivots upon rules that ensure equality. A type of equality of opportunities and starting points makes for the game’s uncertainty of outcomes. Whether or not this equality is artificial is not at issue here, but rather that participants believe, and act as if, these rules of equality are real. 9 Participants acknowledge and acquiesce to the logic that sport rules set forth. As Caillois notes, “Rules themselves create fictions” (Caillois, 8). These rules, or fictions, are compelling. At a basic level, integrity of sport might reduce to fairness of play, which ensures a sense of level playing fields – equal opportunity and uncertainty of outcomes. The premise of equal opportunity or equal starting points is an important component of sport rules: athletes want to compete from the same starting line at the same time. Another important sport rule premise is that there be an uncertainty of outcomes. Uncertainty means that the outcome is not slated, scripted, or rigged beforehand in advance of a race or competition start. According to international sport, legal scholar Richard McLaren, the “difference between sport and entertainment is the unpredictability of sporting outcomes versus the planned and executed event that provides entertainment” (McLaren, 2008: 15). Sport is different from the dramaturgy of scripted sports such as 8 This level constitutes sport integrity’s most common core of shared interests. Actors at all levels depend upon and care about minimum standards and rules (and perceptions of the rules) at the playing field level. 9 Not just so-called factual fairness, but the perception of fairness matters, too. 25 ProWrestling. The fact that the competition, battle, or race is a contest of merit (i.e., strength, power, speed, endurance, size) is what makes for a meaningful victory. At a basic level, integrity of sport means fairness on the field of play. Distortions or ruptures to sport rule’s premises of uncertainty of outcomes or equality threaten integrity at this level. 10 Like a social contract, rules bind participants among one another, creating expectations for behavior and a basis for cooperation. 11 A cheat denounces neither referee authority nor the validity of rules. Rather, the cheat attempts to gain advantage that would not exist without the enforcement of the very rules he or she means to circumvent. Both the game and a cheat’s ends would come undone without the preservation of the rules. The rules of the game enact and preserve a critical logic, ordering competitor actions and relations. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of illusio helps clarify and orient what is going on with this sporting logic (Bourdieu, 1984: 77-78). By and through the rules of the game, victory comes to meaningfully designate superiority over vanquished competitors or conditions (Caillois). 12 The observation of both formal and informal rules constructs and maintains the basis for this sporting illusio. Largely, integrity of sport requires controlling cheating. Frequently recognized by their black-and-white striped tops, whistles, clocks, and flags, referees represent in- 10 Threats to fairness of play at this level can involve rule breaking related to the player, equipment, or officials. Examples include doping, gender doping, passing or bluffing, technological trickery (e.g., waxing, shaving, or rigging), and artificial or false performances (e.g., point shaving or diving). 11 Seemingly paradoxically, the cheat acknowledges the rules. According to Caillios, the cheat does not pose the primary threat to sport integrity; rather, it is the spoilsport – the one who refuses to acknowledge the terms of play or the game itself, its universe. 12 Sport heroes are often seen as having triumphed in epic battles against terrain, weather, or other natural elements. 26 field – that is, at time of live play – figures of discipline, charged with controlling fairness. Referees restore fairness by detecting and controlling instances in which athletes jump the gun, overstep boundary lines, play beyond shot clock or regulation time, or make illegal moves such as traveling (basketball), handballs (in football), or high sticking (hockey). At the playing field level, sport integrity is about cheating. Steve Moore’s regular cartoon series, In the Bleachers, captures contemporary controversies, celebrations, and changing relations of sport and society. In one such commentary, Moore depicts a group of tortoises at the starting line. At the gun’s “bang,” one tortoise sprints ahead, leaving his own shell – and the other contestants – at the line. Figure 1.0: In the Bleachers, Steve Moore. One tortoise asks, “Can he do that?” 13 While coming out of one’s shell – even running naked – might psychologically be encouraged as boldness and daring that can achieve new personal feats and records, the cartoon speaks to this topic of fairness. What is the relationship between changing technologies and the rules of the game? Athletes arrive in 13 Illustration: Moore, Steve. “In the Bleachers”. Los Angeles Times. 1 November 2011. 27 the starting blocks after intensive preparation expecting to compete according to known and very specific standards. Nowadays, competing at the elite level involves highly scientific preparation, study, and expertise: an athlete’s performance is measured in distance, height, weight, speed, and wattage; an athlete’s biorhythmic index, weight, and fat-to-muscle ratio are studied, adjusted, and reviewed. 14 Sport excellence becomes a highly calibrated science, reliant upon sophisticated training regimens and systems of athletic training, sport nutrition, sleep, oxygen/breathing (tents), medical observation, and surveillance. Any deviation from a sport’s highly specified and standardized rules cannot be tolerated (Guttman, 1992; Brohm, 1978). 15 According to sport sociologist, Allen Guttman, athletes of modern sport train and compete in an increasingly rationalized, scientific, number-driven sport sphere. With these changed characteristics of modern sport, the athlete’s relationship to performance transforms from what Guttmann describes as one of ritual to one of record (Guttman, 39). The athlete’s training regimen shifts as it aligns with these characteristics of modern sport such that social control appears increasingly to wield power through sport. Sport competition entails a level of social control exerted through measurable apparati that bind participants in sport institution disciplinary systems. These regulatory standards are the same standards by which 14 The goals of the Olympic motto – Citius, Altius, Fortius (faster, higher, stronger) – become more minutely measurable with the growth and intensification of global sport science and technology industries. 15 Jean-Marie Brohm analyzes sport as a vehicle of economic and class domination. Brohm fears the “repressive aspects of sport” whereby sport “transmits stereotyped and one-dimensional bodily techniques” (Brohm, 42). Sport prioritizes a set of body techniques over others that are racial, cultural, and regional in origin. As a mechanism of cultural imperialism, western sports replace traditional sports throughout the world. With the increasing commercialization of sport, financial interests also entangle sport and its regulations with interests of economic domination and exploitation. In this way, deviation from established, regulatory sport forms cannot be tolerated as it threatens to disrupt class and commercial interests that sport comes to support. Whether sport rules reflect neutral scientific drives to calibrate and measure cultural and sport value or whether sport rules reflect hegemonic scientific benchmarks and interests, the breaching of sport rules cannot be tolerated, as these upset expectations for uncertainty and equality of opportunities that Caillois shows to be fundamental to sport. 28 achievement is distinguished, elevated, and celebrated. Moore’s cartoon of the tortoise race captures the moment in which actors adhering to sport rules, traditions, and expectations temporarily become caught out, disadvantaged, or seemingly cheated. When actors streak forth in new postures or body movements, the rules and regulation of the game change. Recall the then shocking, now commonplace Fosbury Flop, the backwards high jump. 16 When Dick Fosbury first vaulted backwards for an Olympic record 2.24 meters to take the Gold in the 1968 Olympics, audiences were bewildered and awed. The same is true when new technologies carve out other performance advantages. The sport world freezes in uncertainty as to whether to celebrate or shame the debut of new techniques and technologies. Many fans celebrated the savvy of Greg LeMond’s 1989 Tour de France victory, which after 3,285 kilometers and 21 racing stages, he won by a margin of 8 seconds after equipping his bicycle with aero-bars and donning an aero-dynamic helmet for the race’s final time trial. 17 Fans of vanquished Laurent Fignon expressed a sense of being slighted or duped by these equipment innovations. The adoption of technologies that obtain advantage, shaving off seconds or tenths of seconds that critically matter, often ignites a consternation as to fairness and creates a dilemma for the sporting world. Such sport technologies often lead to cascades of record-shattering performances. During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, controversies over the fairness of buoyancy and compression advantages of Speedo’s 16 In basketball, when Kareem Abdul Jabbar began to skyhook – this shot later became known as his trademark -- the conventionalist said, ‘”No you can’t do that,” while the Dead Poet Society of those in a spirit of getting outside the framings of things applauded. After the basketball high priests of the National Basketball Association met, the skyhook was deemed legitimate. The expression, ”Oh, you are skyhooking,” has become a generic term for a process innovation. 17 The time trial is also known as the race of truth because it pits the athlete against the objectivity of the clock. The all-out effort required in this racing form is thought to reveal an athlete’s true physical and mental strength or weakness. 29 LZR Racer full-body swimsuit gathered a world profile when twenty-five world records were reset, affecting 21 distinct swimming records. 18 Fairness becomes a concern not only to athletes competing in the same time and place but also to athletes compared across time, inter-generationally. 19 The issue of changing technologies as a threat to sport integrity is not new, but its challenges have become global. I argue that global technologies strain sport integrity in ways that more traditional space-time framed authority fails to master. This fact will become clear as I profile the nature of sport integrity risks involved in sport gambling activities. Techniques for balancing sport integrity lack a clear fulcrum. Authority and regulation must shift and so also, sport itself transforms. With increasingly sophisticated techniques of cheating, new systems of verification arise to ensure rule compliance. 20 Each of these challenges – similar to the challenge of sport betting with which I am concerned – involve sources and actors beyond easily refereed sport spaces and times. 21 18 Speedo-sponsored athlete Michael Phelps also won a record fourteen gold medals, the most ever obtained in a single Olympics – another example of a sport integrity controversy erupting over the aerodynamic or hydrodynamic advantages of new technologies. For a legal review of the Speedo debates within SGB see Blackshaw (2003). 19 Technologies can also be thought to undermine sport form and the value of sport achievements in terms of the ability to compare sport results. While winning a given race is important, real recognition is achieved through the setting and breaking of Olympic records or world records, through being the best over and across all times-spaces (Guttman). Baseball’s steroid scandal (e.g., Barry Bonds) wreaked havoc on homerun records. The United States Olympic Committee’s anti-steroid “Don’t Be an Asterisk” campaign demonized performance-enhancing drugs in an effort to restore a sense of commitment and a perception of fairness to sport. Following the Major League Baseball disaster, there was a clear sense of indignation among sport fans. Whether sanctioned or unsanctioned (licit or illicit), performance-enhancing technologies assault long-held benchmarks and cherished narratives that embody team and sport identities. In this way, sport fairness unfolds through aspects of intergenerational justice. 20 Sport involves highly sophisticated forms of both cheating and regulation: to combat blood doping and masking agents, a global anti-doping regime subjects athletes to a surveillance system requiring blood and urine samples for testing, analysis, and even blood passports; to combat gender-bending advantage against sport rules, athletes may be required to undergo chromosome or hormone testing. 21 Sport betting is a prime example of an off-field, out-of-regulation time/place sport integrity challenge. 30 Sport integrity and the logic and authority of sport rules depend upon social, political, and legal sources of power. These orientations and techniques of authority are also inevitably spatially and temporally constituted. For Caillois, [P]lay is essentially a separate occupation, carefully isolated from the rest of life, and generally is engaged in with precise limits of time and place…the game must take place within the agreed boundaries. The same is true for time: the game starts and ends at a given signal…in every case, the game’s domain is therefore a restricted, closed, protected universe: a pure space (Caillois, 6-7). Sport, according to Caillois, operates within bounded spheres of play. Sport’s spatial boundaries include stadiums, line boundaries (e.g., a chalked pitch), buoys, shot clock lines, touching walls, end zones, goal box, and partenza/arriva (start/finish) lines. These spatial boundaries and material symbolic features of sport rules are integrally temporal features, too. Besides marking rules of play, these spatial boundaries separate fans from participants. Locker rooms designate off-limits spaces to fans and the general public. Sport rules and rituals preserve sport space-time boundaries. As technologies unveil seemingly endless opportunities for presence/absence regardless of geographic proximity, enabling new encounters and interfaces between all sorts of sport “participants,” the so- called integrity of sport boils in unanticipated, and sometimes unwanted or dangerous ways. The delineations of space and time determine which participants contest amongst one another, when, where, and how. It is this additional spatial and temporal qualification on which Caillois’ theory pivots that, I argue, is compelling in analyzing the 31 challenges confronting governance bodies. Changes in sport time and place perhaps pose the underlying problem in sport integrity struggles. 22 A sport’s particular points of vulnerability for cheating vary tremendously. In cycling, for example, competitors frequently “gift” wins to teammates or even to competing teams’ racers who collaborate in racing strategy. Astutely matching individual team members’ talents for climbing, sprinting, endurance, and overall fitness to a given racing stage’s terrain and conditions, teams designate individual racers as leaders or domestiques (workers). Domestiques’ primary duties typically involve controlling the race by chasing break-aways (offensive attacks by other racers), setting a rigorous pace for the peloton (racing field of contestants), sheltering the team leader from cross or headwinds, or even standing ready with food, water, or equipment as needed. In professional cycling, there is much self-sacrifice, dealmaking, and even gifting of victory. Fans understand and even expect these behaviors as part of the sport and its racing strategy. To be sure, this was not always the case. In 1920’s Tour de France (The Tour), this practice caused a stir for race organizers keen on preserving the integrity of sport. In fact, in 1930, the Tour director, Henri Desgrange was so outraged by what he saw as collusive racing strategy that he overhauled The Tour rules. In an effort to keep at bay what Desgrange deemed corrupting incentives, from 1930 to1962, only national and regional – not trade or commercial – teams would be invited and admitted to compete in the Tour. Since that time, trade teams are back in the fold: cycling race strategy and 22 Within what I designate as global sport are the characteristics of modern sport standardization that Guttman distinguishes. However, with modern global sport, we also see new actors, new forms of sport rule derogation, new breaches of sport times-spaces, new regulations, and so also changing forms of sport. The quantitative drive to measure modern sport performance lends itself to increasingly more sophisticated betting forms. As technologies transform the scale of betting access, integrity issues become global issues because of a sport betting market that operates around the world and around the clock, nonstop. 32 custom have evolved, producing a sport form that now embraces its elaborate and rich informal system of dealmaking and collaboration. However, what might be cheered or celebrated as sportsmanly conduct and astute racing strategy in cycling simply does not fly in other sports. In the 2010 German Grand Prix, when Formula One (F1) fans witnessed what was perceived to be a victory gifting collusion between racers Fernando Alonso and Felipe Massi of Team Ferrari, fans, media and sport authorities stood aghast. After opening a clear lead, Massi received and followed a coded message from team leadership, permitting Alonso to pass him for the race victory, which also came with ranking points toward the overall F1 season’s circuit and world champion honours. In F1, neither the formal nor informal rules contain such a sporting code or tradition to make sense of – much less, cheer on – such tactics. Since this controversy, F1 has implemented “team orders” bans, prohibiting such dealmaking. Certainly, this regulation could change. Fairness is culturally relative and contextually specific to a sport discipline. I want to emphasize that sport rules that incorporate the concept of sport integrity at the level of play rely upon and arise through social, spatial, and temporal dimensions. These social, spatial and temporal aspects of authority are also true at the second level at which sport integrity matters, the institutional level. For Caillois, sport depends upon clearly demarcated and limited boundaries of time and space. 23 Yet, today, sport labour, finance, symbolic capital, meaning and politics involve flows that increasingly transcend such sport time-space boundaries. Sport regulatory bodies scramble to corral all sorts of manifestations from these sorts of global age challenges. However, regulatory response 23 In Caillois’s typology of games, sport appears as a subset that he identifies as agôn. While there are differences between games and sport, I use the terms interchangeably as I build an analysis in keeping with Caillois’s typology. 33 tends to exact measures that are too heavy handed. More and more frequently, such regulatory reply oversteps what might be regarded as a neatly distinguished sport governance realm, separate from everyday life. Caillois asks, “What becomes of games when the sharp line dividing their ideal rules from the diffuse and insidious laws of daily life is blurred?” (Caillois, 43-44). Offering his own reply, he rather definitively asserts: sport “certainly cannot spread beyond the playing field (chess or checkerboard, arena, racetrack, stadium or state) or time that is reserved for them, and which ends as inexorably as the closing of a parenthesis” (Caillois, 43-44). Sport plays out, according to Caillois, in limited times and places. Yet challenges such as those involved in betting and sport integrity complicate and extend sport regulatory reach beyond nicely chalked sport times and places. Sport in a digital age does not close like a parenthesis. This is crucial to my larger arguments about governance and space-time. Devices of governance fundamentally operate vis-à-vis spatial-temporal sources of power. Governance authority both constitutes and depends upon spatial-temporal sources of power, and these are increasingly global. Sport Integrity and Sport Governance and Legitimacy at the Institutional Level In the previous section, I introduced aspects of sport integrity at the level of the playing field. In this section, I concentrate on how regulatory dimensions of space-time carry over and matter for sport integrity at the SGB institutional level as well. This second and co-constitutive level of sport integrity involves the system of sport governance. SGB – such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), International Federations (IF), World Anti-Doping Agency, and Court of Arbitration of 34 Sport – must guarantee that technical and procedural rules of the game are applied and enforced equally (Nafziger 2004). 24 By putting in place structures and processes for linked but independent oversight, SGB attempt to ensure that any disputes are settled impartially. Essentially, SGB erect institutional divisions of labour that separate regulatory areas of expertise. Since 1984, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has matured in arbitral jurisdiction and significance. Initially erected by the IOC to resolve disputes arising during the Los Angeles Olympic Games, CAS now stands as a permanent body, vested with the authority to ensure that procedural rules of the broader sport system are observed and applied equally and without differential enforcement. 25 Dispute resolution must be fair. The integrity of the entire organization of sport – not just its rules of play – is essential to what happens on the playing fields. What is the reach of sport governance? More than the mere institutional expansion of sport governance through proliferation of new institutions and branches, sport governance – the reach of sport governance, its authority – actually unfolds in and through spatially and temporally anchored maneuvers. As will become clear, this issue of regulatory space-time is critical to my argument on sport betting and sport integrity. The extension and blurring of boundaries of sport space and time are key to understanding sport governance challenges and transformations. Authority is a social process that plays out as spatial and temporal. Space and time are not muted features of authority. An actor’s power does not simply play out in context of a container-like, neutral, indifferent, or muted spaces and times. Rather, 24 IFs draft technical rules and credential referees for executing technical rules. 25 CAS provides arbitration for sport disciplinary appeals, conflict resolution, and advisory opinions. CAS’s concern is with the procedural rules being crafted and applied fairly and equally. International Federations are charged with technical rules. 35 space-time comes to serve particular interests. Global authority as witnessed in activities in the sport field leaves trace instances in which actors can be seen maneuvering, affirming, resisting, exchanging, or innovating spatial, temporal, or social meaning and advantage to garner authority. To link up my argument about authority and space-time, I offer a few examples of sport integrity challenges in which regulatory power can be largely seen as spatial-temporal activities. In the context of sport gambling, one important illustration of the ways sport betting strains SGB authority can be seen through endeavors to develop rules to prevent conflicting interests between sport participants and punters. Rules that bar sport participants from gambling activities may sound like a simple solution to prevent conflicting interests. However, as I will show, executing rules to curtail any potential conflict of interest proves highly frustrating. Each sport federation must define the boundaries of its competitions and the scope of all relevant persons. Can a player of one sport bet on another sport? Can a player bet on a match of the same sport in which she is not a contestant or has no sporting stake? Can a contestant bet on herself to win?! 26 A dilemma arises as the range of relevant persons transcends the boundaries of sport as a separate activity, a bounded and limited realm, and it becomes more difficult to sustain authority through reciprocal obligations tying participants into a system of sanctions and incentives that are contingent upon rule observance. Through athlete licensing and accreditation, SGB establish a rather straightforward social control technique. To compete, an athlete must consent to private rules. Similar accreditation or licensing formulae can also enjoin coaches, managers, or 26 Tennis player Federico Luzzi received sport disciplinary sanctions for placing sport bets in tennis, including one of his own matches in which he bet €3 that he would win the match! See Luzzi v. ATP Inc. (2008). 36 collective entities such as teams with responsibilities that become roped within SGB jurisdiction. However, it is more difficult to ensure that other relevant sport actors such as family members, doctors, physical therapists, trainers, mechanics, and support staff are also bound within the system of sport governance. To be sure, these seemingly tertiary sport participants matter: The coach is in a decisive position because he can alter the composition of the team, in other words, put players in unaccustomed positions and make detrimental changes. The medical staff also have access to the players and can – for example- drug them so that they are not at peak physical fitness. Lastly and most unexpectedly, games can be fixed by secondary (e.g., maintenance) staff. This was the case in 1997 when several championship matches in the English Premier League were interrupted by electricity cuts. The stadium technicians had switched off the lights in order to freeze the score of the match (on Asian betting sites, if the match is interrupted for technical reasons, the score at the moment of the interruption is considered to be the final score) (Boniface et al., 17). Global sport and global betting complicate the task of defining sport participants. The following National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and National Football League (NFL) examples highlight the connection between sport form, regulation, and global integrity challenges that involve a broadened roster of sport participants. With mega-bets at stake, obtaining any edge of information on team tactics or athlete strengths and weaknesses – including health and injury status – translates into big bucks. Having long wanted to just purely and simply win, teams have employed a variety of information-defensive strategies. For example, to guard sport information, 37 sport teams, governing bodies, and other actors have erected fences around training grounds (the US Olympic Training Centers use hand scan technologies on premise for entry), prohibited cameras on training grounds, coded radio communication systems for live play strategy calls, and developed coded playbooks (and scrambled in-field radio communication systems) as defense devices for information and privacy. This interest in protecting sport information for sporting strategic advantage persists, so that risks to sport integrity in relation to sport betting give rise to pressure for regulatory innovation. Departing from a former policy position that dealt with issues such as student health information by prohibiting a university from making public statements on students’ health, regardless of whether the student was a student-athlete or not, without specific consent, many university health and press policies have shifted to mimicking the NFL’s athlete health and medical press-release standards. Essentially, through quick, upfront, and direct press releases about an athlete’s health – for example, an injured star player – the NFL or the NCAA university averts potential corruption or leaks of insider information from medical, physical training, or other experts in the sport entourage. 27 In the NFL, the explicit concern is with preventing sport betting corruptive practices. In the NCAA, these concerns are acknowledged very little. Instead, as one NCAA legal counsel informed me, universities are expected to “give the media what they want – these are sport details and stories. We give them this, and we get media attention. Athletes like this; they think they are celebrities; and they want the show” (Interview, 2012: 0012SB). Such a NCAA university policy may needlessly and dangerously waive 27 To fulfill Health Information Privacy and Protection Act requirements, universities do take care to obtain athlete waivers, but, from what I learned in interviews with NCAA compliance officers, athletes typically receive these forms as part of a thick welcome packet of legal documents that they sign upon entry to university. No instances of refusal to sign these release forms have ever been reported. 38 student athlete rights to privacy. Although universities may welcome media coverage, these practices ultimately reflect underlying global political economy pressures from gambling markets and threats to sport integrity. The policy – albeit indirectly through the NFL’s mimetic effect – illustrates dilemmas of controlling sport integrity with rules capable of reining in less direct or primary sport participants. Insider information threats to sport integrity create regulatory difficulties. Efforts to develop a common framing, a universal standard to define sport participants continue: The category of person to be covered will be different from sport to sport. In general, however, it is anticipated that participant will be defined in such a way as to be sufficiently wide ranging to catch all relevant persons under the control of the sport concerned (Bailey, 2011: 6). The task of qualifying categories of sporting participants subject to sport rules and SGB jurisdiction proves tricky. To illustrate how space-time constitutes and orients authority, I discuss two recent sport-related – albeit not sport betting-related – examples that capture the mechanisms important to my argument. In the first example, I review forms of NCAA regulation of student athlete-agent relations. In the second example, I consider the IOC’s regulation of athlete eligibility to compete in the Olympic Games. The two examples – the NCAA and IOC – express the spatial-temporal dimensions that I argue become especially strained as global markets, technologies, and relations upset loci and relations of regulatory authority. I will conclude this section by reconnecting these case details to relationally map the interest sets that interconnect institutional level actors, SGB, with other sport integrity stakeholders. 39 Regulation of NCAA Student Athlete-Sport Agent Relations In 2010, the NCAA sanctioned the University of Southern California (USC) for its derogation of agent and amateur student-athlete rules. 28 After investigating USC’s football, basketball, and tennis programs, the NCAA found a “lack of institutional control, impermissible inducements, extra benefits, exceeding coach staff limits, and unethical conduct by an assistant football coach” (National Collegiate Athletic Association 2010: 1). In 2011, seeking to implement new rules to prevent any activities that might compromise compliance status, the USC Athletic Department Office of Compliance amended its code for sport athlete and agent relations. Particularly interesting in this example of NCAA compliance enforcement is the reach of these rules. To control athlete-sport agent relations, USC’s new compliance policy expands beyond its student athletes to encompass the larger student body. In fact, USC’s Athletes and Agents policy requires all faculty, staff, employees, and students, as well as third parties doing business with USC or entering its campus, sport training grounds, or competition venues, to comply with disclosure procedures: Anyone holding themselves out to directly or indirectly represent student-athletes for the purposes of marketing their athletic ability or reputation, or who have certification, licensing or registration as a sport or athletic agent or any person working for or at the direction of such individuals (“Agents”) must immediately 28 NCAA sanctions stripped USC football of its 2005 NCAA national championship victory, forcing it to vacate its season standings. Moreover, the NCAA banned USC from participation in all postseason games and championships for an additional two years in football and one additional year in basketball, while extending a probation period of four years. NCAA penalties also retracted twenty scholarship positions. Alongside these direct hits, such penalties cost USC immeasurable sums of lost revenue, notably the forfeiture of NCAA Basketball Championship revenues. 40 provide written notification to the Vice President for Athletic Compliance (University of Southern California 2011: 2). Here again, as this example indicates, assuring sport integrity increasingly involves entities that are neither direct participants nor necessarily physically present within sport’s tightly delineated time-space boundaries. In the collegiate case, NCAA compliance rules might more smoothly be accepted. 29 Universities, by and large, exist as non-profit private membership communities in which members are bound by a variety of codes 30 . As rules reach beyond the traditional sport participant, beyond the student- athlete, and even beyond the larger student body, a university manages to assert itself via its private, exclusive membership status. The idea that members willingly acquiesce to certain restrictions that would otherwise be liberties guaranteed in public law as inscribed rights is the subject of ongoing debate and litigation. In everyday, observable ways, sport rules select and sort qualified competitors via categories of gender/sex, weight, (dis)ability, and age. These (dis)qualifying categories are explicitly prohibited according to national and international labour and human rights law. To be sure, the leeway that sport bodies enjoy – and claim as entitlement – for taking exceptions from public law, remains a subject of debate. However, in the case of sport governance, the ability to govern vis-à-vis private rules faces demands to justify its authority. SGB must provide an account for the ways in which its rules are seen to collide with public law (social control and freedoms). It is in these instances of colliding or conflicting authority that we can detect the spatial- temporal dimensions of authority. We witness something similar in sport betting-related 29 The notions of a private membership community and private property (i.e., university campus) are socially recognized exceptions with solid legal standing. 30 University codes and rules elaborate responsibilities sometimes over and above basic public laws. 41 integrity regulation as SGB redraw the boundaries of regulatory purview to include athlete families, friends, and entourage in sporting rules’ ambit. Before narrowing the discussion of the spatial-temporal dimensions of authority in sport integrity as connected to betting, I offer another example that will better draw out these seemingly abstract dimensions that come to have very real material and social power. Osaka Rule and Space-Time Boundaries of the Olympic Games Regulation A second example of garnering authority to meet integrity challenges through re- orientating space-time dimensions appears with the IOC’s regulation of Olympians. Theoretically, the IOC concerns itself only with the Olympic Games. On more than one occasion while interviewing Olympic committee members, I encountered a dismissive attitude with respect to accusations that Olympic rules might disregard or derogate public laws and rights. Essentially, IOC members perceive these worries about public law conflicts as matters beyond the space-time of the Olympic Games, and as such, are not areas trod upon by IOC activities, which are, at least theoretically, neatly and exclusively confined to the Games. One IOC member articulated the IOC’s perspective through a catch-all disclaimer, with the following pronouncement: “We are the Olympics. We only care and involve ourselves with the Olympic Games. Period” (Interview, 2010: 0004OC). As if to temper any appearance of arrogance, this member offered evidence, in the form of a little drama. I was led to stand gazing up at a solidly framed and mounted copy of the Olympic Member Oath. Taking it down from its hook and walking back to an enormous desk, the member instructed me to sit down and listen to each every single word read 42 aloud, to ensure that I would have no excuse for ignorance. Despite this performative “proof,” there is good reason for calling the tidiness of IOC authority into question. Inscribing the IOC’s authority as exclusive sovereignty internal to the space-time of the Olympics is a fiction. To participate in the Olympics, all competing athletes must obtain Olympic credentials. Beyond simply operating as a personal identification, verification, or security badge, controlling times and spaces of authorized access to food, housing, competition, media, and social sites within the Olympic Village, Olympic credentials serve a number of other important international legal and political functions. Remarkably, Olympic credentials have even superseded, or stood in lieu of, a nation- state’s visa requirements (Nafziger 2004; Brownell 2007). Olympic credentials are one technique by which the IOC has been able to ensure that its Olympic host – city and nation-state – acknowledges and admits athletes from all nation-states regardless of potentially conflicting diplomatic recognition. Here, the IOC exercises political authority, pulling rank in an area typically exclusive to nation-states. Moreover, there are further ways in which Olympic credentialing takes the wheel from public governance institutions and actors. Olympic credentials function as a legal mechanism by which athletes waive legal recourse to public courts. They entail a legal contract by which athletes consent to a binding arbitration clause that keeps any disputes or disciplinary actions internal within the private sport system, in which CAS stands atop a disciplinary system as a world sport court. 31 According to a global SGB structure that 31 As SGB respond to global sport integrity risks, their regulatory purview expands. For example, sport rules not only prohibit athletes from betting but also disallow athletes’ family members from engaging in betting. 43 delegates the day-to-day sport authority decision-making and governance to National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and International Federations, the IOC attempts to position its authority as exclusively in the times and spaces of the Olympic Games (Pope and Forster 2004; Chappalet 2010). Thus far, these institutional relations lend support to the idea and aspiration of the sport world as separate. Acknowledging all this, there appear flaws in such a spatially-temporally contained basis of sport authority. Authority is dynamic and relational, not possessed. Amendments to the Olympic Charter reflect an IOC wriggling uncomfortably in the face of integrity challenges that whittle away at a squarely intact position of authority. For example, seeking to safeguard sport integrity from doping threats, in 2008 the IOC amended the Olympic Charter. The Charter’s Rule (re)articulated Rule 45, the Osaka Rule, to read in accordance with Rule 19.3.10. It declared: Any person who has been sanctioned with a suspension of more than six months by any anti-doping organization for any violation of any anti-doping regulations may not participate, in any capacity, in the next edition of the Games of the Olympiad and of the Olympic Winter Games following the date of expiry of such suspension (Olympic Charter, Rule 19.3.10). 32 At first glance, the Osaka Rule might appear consistent with the IOC’s self-professed tight stance of regulatory purview limited to the Olympic Games. However, as a doping related regulation, the Osaka Rule nests within the global anti-doping regime. As such, 32 It is interesting to note the wording of Rule 45, which reads not just “athletes” but rather “any person.” Whether intentionally or not, this wording might have allowed a more broad interpretation to include non- athlete participants (i.e., athlete entourage, other credentialed experts, or support staff). 44 the rule involves an apparatus potentially more expansive and intrusive in the private sphere, the personal time-spaces of athletes. 33 During one interview with a member of the IOC juridical department, I asked whether there were worries about how the Osaka Rule specifically, or other rules that rested upon all sorts of surveillance, investigative, enforcement, legal, and putative mechanisms, processes, and structures outside the space-time of the Olympic Games might be incompatible with a variety of nationally and internationally protected individual rights. My question interrupted the breakfast rhythm of muesli-yoghurt stirring and inhaling. The topic seemed to strike a nerve or, perhaps, light a light bulb. After jotting a few notes for later consideration, this top-tier international sport lawyer, as if to shrug off the question, rotely and wryly recited his version of the maxim of how Olympic Charter rules do not involve matters beyond the Olympic Games. Then, breakneck speed, breakfast resumed. Shortly after this interview, formal disputes arose when a number of United States Olympic Committee (USOC) athletes fell under the likely negative application of the Osaka Rule. 34 Both the USOC and IOC willingly turned to CAS for arbitration. The standoff boiled down to the USOC’s rejecting the Osaka Rule as an illegitimate, unfair, and disproportionate punishment. Included within its lengthy and poignant submission to 33 The court was asked to decide whether the Osaka Rule is exclusively an eligibility rule or also a punishment. 34 While the USOC challenged the Osaka Rule on behalf of athletes Harrison Jones, Thomas Freeman, LeShawn Merritt, and Jessica Hardy, the dispute had repercussions for athletes across the globe: "Athletes identified in the parties' briefs who may be affected by the IOC Regulation and are not otherwise mentioned in this decision include Brazilian cyclist Flavia Oliveira (USADA v. Oliveira, 2010), the Hungarian wrestler Balaz Kiss, the US diver Harrison Jones and the US athletics competitor Thomas Freeman" (USOC v. IOC, 2011). Problems with sanctioning politics arise: National Olympic Committees (NOC) often impose sanctions just before the cutoff dates for upcoming global showcase events such as the Olympics or Tour de France. NOC desire and are under pressure to put forth national champions that will bring home the gold to their respective countries. 45 the court, the USOC railed against what amounted to double jeopardy, ne bis in dem, in how the Osaka Rule slapped athletes with additional punitive measures beyond any initial sanctions determined by NF, IF, or CAS arbitral or disciplinary review. Interestingly, the IOC refused to rebut these charges. Without offering counterarguments to defend a right to sanction, the IOC insisted the Osaka Rule was, in actuality, not a sanctioning but rather an eligibility rule. In 2011, after a review of both parties’ substantive arguments and a host of amicus curiae briefs, including an independent amicus curaie brief from the World Anti- Doping Agency, deliberations began as CAS established its jurisdiction, reviewed the merits of claims, and assessed the scope and application of IOC regulation. 35 On 4 October 2011, CAS pronounced its award, finding in favour of the USOC. CAS explained its legal reasoning thusly: …the Panel is of the view that the IOC Regulation is more properly characterized as a sanction of ineligibility for a major Competition, i.e., as a disciplinary measure taken because of a prior behavior, than as a pure condition of eligibility to compete in the Olympic Games (USOC v. IOC, 2011: 18). 36 CAS continued, justifying its conclusions by which it called upon the IOC to renounce the Osaka Rule as incompatible with the IOC’s regulatory obligations under and partnered with WADA: “By virtue of imposing an additional consequence that is over 35 Along with the USOC brief, CAS also received a number of witness statements and amicus curiae briefs from various national anti-doping agencies, National Olympic Committees (Netherlands; Hungary), university sport law institutes, and National Federations (i.e., Russian Biathlon Federation; Spanish Cycling Federation). Rather smugly, the IOC legal counsel neither countered with expert submissions nor offered equivalent amicus briefs. For the IOC, all of the USOC submissions were deemed irrelevant. 36 See USOC v. IOC (2011). 46 and above the consequences that are already provided for in the WADA Code, the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the WADA Code” (USOC v. IOC, 2011: 19). 37 Here, what is important for my argument is the way the Osaka Rule involves enforcement, detection, and punitive processes and institutions extending beyond what might be accurately described as a separate, curtailed, and exclusive time-space of the Olympic Games. The Osaka Rule undermines the IOC’s insistence that it contents itself exclusively in the space-time of the Games. Instead, we witness a space-time creep of authority. Sport integrity challenges, whether in the Olympics or other global elite events, put a premium on far-reaching regulatory maneuvers. CAS’s award produces implications important for sport integrity and authority at the institutional level. On the one hand, the decision might appear to undercut the IOC’s authority. 38 Yet, on the other hand, this award resolves or may avert a potential clash of sport governance colliding with public law in ways that very well might have incited an external intervention much more serious and threatening to SGB authority. Thus, CAS’s decision sturdies the corpus of SGB authority (CAS, WADA, and even IOC). No doubt, CAS strengthens the perception of SGB legitimacy and independence. In this way, the award’s implications are quite paradoxical. While deciding against the IOC, CAS might actually endow the IOC with greater legitimacy. By re-nesting the IOC within these global governance structures, CAS’s award favourably contours the situation of sport governance as a private, and more autonomous, global governance. While CAS has the power to offer advisory opinions, this power has previously been met with backlash. 37 CAS leaves open the possibility that such a rule could become legally viable and consistent with international law and obligation if incorporated through WADA Code. To enact such a sanction would require engaging and following global anti-doping regime rule making processes. 38 CAS determined that the Osaka Rule violated the IOC’s obligations to WADA, as well as its own Charter. 47 According to IOC legal counsel, CAS does have this power to act as a check on sport governance, including the IOC, through its ability to offer advisory opinions “but only when asked”: the mentality of the IOC toward CAS is that “CAS needs to know its place”(Interview, 2010: 0009OC). One CAS arbitrator described an example of the IOC- CAS institutional governance dynamic: “when we issued an advisory letter to the IOC regarding the Vancouver bobsled team [and race opportunities as a concern of fairness of opportunity], we received a nasty letter telling us ‘you aren’t a legislative body. Just make the rulings!’” (Interview, 2010: 0006SB). Yet, in this award regarding the Osaka Rule, CAS casts off doubts about its status as an IOC puppet institution by asserting its power to check and balance, retract or endow, SGB authority, including the IOC’s power. This dispute shows the limits of IOC mechanisms of control by which it binds its athlete- participants to rules of its own Olympic Games’ jurisdiction. This is crucial for my argument of space-time dimensions of authority. Sport integrity is thus also about a crisis of control, a challenge to SGB authority. To be seen as the authority, SGB must be seen to have a handle on sport integrity. 39 To have its sphere of autonomy retracted threatens to undermine a larger basis of its authority. Maintaining, and being seen to maintain, the integrity of sport is a core function of sports governing bodies. All sporting competition has to be based and seen to 39 While SGB concerns for integrity of sport might be seen as (relatively) internally prompted and focused concerns, the sport integrity issues involved in sport betting also attract attention and pressure from outside the sport sector. When inquiring what put the issue of sport betting on the SGB agenda, I was surprised to hear a recurring answer. SportAccord, like many other stakeholders, attributed the wake-up call to Declan Hill’s book, The Fix: Soccer and Organized Crime. Hill’s top seller gave new impetus to paying attention and being seen to respond to perceived or real threats to sport integrity. In Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management, Michael Power describes the relationship between risk and legitimacy, writing, “Organizations must be seen to act as if the management of risk is possible” (Power, 2007: 6). 48 be based upon true and fair competition between participants playing within the rule of their sport and to the best of their ability. If this is not the case then the commercial and participatory value of a sport is threatened (Bailey, 2011: 4). On the one hand, CAS keeps disputes within a private sport governance system. Over the past twenty-five years, CAS has proven effective in settling disciplinary, eligibility, doping, and commercial disputes. CAS resolves confrontations that might whittle away or even rapidly collapse SGB autonomy in which separate rules and juridical logic operate by placing and maintaining sport governance authority apart from and sometimes over states. Confidence in the integrity of SGB rules – of which CAS decisions play a critical part – circles back and co-constitutes the very strength of SGB’s ability to facilitate cooperation among stakeholders with diverging and often colliding interests. A sense of integrity in SGB rules is fundamental to how this system of governance works. On the other hand, like doping-related sport integrity regulation, betting integrity regulation involves actors and places well beyond the regulatory space-time of playing fields. In response to such boundary-indifferent threats, we witness SGB extending further into public spaces and times in which national and international laws and policies operate. Later in this chapter, I examine how states and other transnational authorities enter this picture and voice additional sport integrity concerns. For now, I will continue sketching how SGB exercise authority in the face of actors and challenges that increasingly appear beyond any such neatly bounded sporting space-time. 40 40 These challenges involve transnational financial, labour, and informational flows. While unique in particular detail in each realm of governance, whether finance, environment, security, or sport, the challenges and the roster of their potential solutions share common global characteristics. 49 Crafting “Common” Standards for Sport Space-Times Returning to the topic of sport integrity, I examine the onus upon SGB to calibrate and implement rules to deter sport integrity threats. Can SGB shore up sport’s vulnerability to betting related integrity through SGB-wide directives? Contexts of vulnerability and needs for assuring integrity may not easily be remedied through setting universal standards common to all sport disciplines. Integrity vulnerabilities are often relative, requiring individuated evaluations of a sport discipline’s rules. Below, I discuss the challenges of formulating minimum common standards that here connect with issues of cultural relativity of sport and the cultural relativity of gambling. 41 As sport governance leaders such as SportAccord work to develop a common code of minimum standards for sport betting, the difficulty of overcoming culturally relative sport norms as well as culturally relative legal traditions informing gambling laws sharpen. SportAccord speaks about the ability to produce universal rules that its members can simply “copy-and-paste,” yet awareness of the ways that sport rules connect to culturally relative and sport-discipline-specific normative and legal traditions makes such copy-and-paste approaches shaky solutions (Beutler 2011). As discussed in the previous section, sport rules often vary across sport disciplines and across cultures. Developing a common approach, a mutual solution, requires overcoming not only sport disciplines’ culturally relative rules and traditions but also culturally relative gambling regulations that manifest particularities of a state’s 41 It is not certain whether universal rules can set common standards and definitions of fair play/cheating without imposing standards that collide with culturally and sport-relative rules. 50 moral, social, philosophical, and legal traditions within its criminal codes and policies. 42 To set and implement common integrity standards requires deciding what acts and by whom constitute cheating. To deter cheating related to sport betting, three basic types of rules appear: rules prohibiting athletes from betting, athlete-intermediaries from betting, and anyone from exchanging or disclosing insider information. To prevent artificial or fraudulent outcomes such as match-fixing or point-shaving, SGB must identify all relevant participants capable of influencing, or corrupting, the sporting result. 43 Even with diligent and prudent regulation of sport participants to prevent corrupt sport results, SGB must understand the nature of sport results that are prone to corruption. Sport betting interests might not align at all with most critical sport objectives of scoring or winning. For example, there is a current trend of betting on referee line calls. Following the International Tennis Federation’s review and approval of the Hawk-Eye real time computer system of visual imagining and timing data in 2005, many elite professional tennis tournaments such as Wimbledon, the Australian Open, and the US Open implemented this technology to improve accuracy in line calls. 44 Not only did the introduction of this technology change the game’s form, with the introduction of rules empowering players to challenge referee calls, but the technology had some unintended 42 This brief comparative illustration helps draw attention to the culturally relative basis of gambling law and policy. 43 This issue of identifying sport participants circles back to the insider information issues that I discussed earlier. The roster of entities relevant to sport integrity varies among different sport disciplines. More than just the contesting athletes, actions important to sport integrity may involve coaches, entourage, managers, family, friends, trainers, doctors, mechanics, masseurs, or referees. 44 Hawk-Eye technologies are also used in a number of other sports, most notably cricket, in which Hawk- Eye visual tracking and prediction enables projecting the course of bowls, even with obstacles. In tennis, the average error, or measure of deviation, is 3.6mm, or 5% with respect to a tennis ball measuring 67mm,– roughly corresponding to tennis ball fuzz (Collins 2008, 2011). Even though the Hawk-Eye margin of error is low, some IFs, like FIFA, want perfection. 51 consequences, too. 45 Among sport integrity experts and lawyers, there is amazement in discovering what the introduction of Hawk-Eye has birthed: “in Asia, when [a] player asks for a challenge [with Hawk-Eye], the Asian [punters] go crazy and bet on this!” (Montane 2011). More than an entertaining betting peculiarity, betting on tertiary acts – whether a line call review will overturn an “in” or “out” (a 50/50 probability) result, whether a player will move left or right; touch his hair – introduces an endless spectrum of interests in sport that can alter the form of the game and the way it is regulated. The introduction of regulatory technologies changes the game and also expands the possibilities for gambling products. 46 Controversies over proposals for videos in the goal box as a means of enhancing football refereeing illustrate one aspect of technologies and sport rules changing the form of the game. Defenders of a traditional game form prefer the game with its known human errors of refereeing over a game refereed through more technologically enhanced review systems. Whether questioning these referee technologies as improvements in accuracy or not, traditionalists accuse these technologies of interrupting and distorting the form and rhythm of plays. SGB are not so quick to embrace change; they are conservative. There are concerns that access to such referee technologies is not equally available globally. Access, cost, and technological demands of what amounts to not just 45 It was not until 2008 that tennis’s four primary organizing bodies – Internat ional Tennis Federation, Association of Tennis Professionals, Women’s Tennis Association, and Grand Slam Committee – harmonized a rule allocating a standard number, three, of challenge allocations. 46 Hawk-Eye technologies required attention to rule-craft and standardization across sport. When Hawk- Eye was first introduced, the number of challenges allotted to athletes varied among competitions. Hawk- Eye can ensure that referee skills – line watching and line calling – are good and honest. Through umpire technologies, Hawk-eye provides a technique to control or at least deter corrupt refereeing (any incentives referees might have to collude with sport fixers), yet such technologies may incubate further potential for betting-related threats to sport integrity. 52 one or two videos in the box, but rather a number estimated to be closer to fifty, cause many to view video as an infeasible option for enhancing refereeing on the pitch (Vajda 2011). Advances in technology must be tempered with fairness, but relying on the media’s cameras is a severely biased option. Which camera angles are employed and when such video coverage is available for review are inconsistent, whereas referee technologies must be universal (accessible and supportable in the game’s infrastructures of stadiums and training grounds globally). At times, media interests fuel and finance the laying of technological infrastructures that then come to pressure evolutions in refereeing. As Steen observes, “[T]he high cost of these tools, hitherto borne by the television companies, bred difficulties, and hence inconsistency. What were once merely useful gadgets to inform viewers [become] intrinsic to the game” (Steen, 1432). As these technologies can be seen to alter the form of sport, the way the game is played and regulated, they can hinder or enhance sport integrity efforts. Waking up to the enormity and complexity of global sport betting challenges, SGB admit, “We need to better understand what bets are interesting. We need new staff and expertise. Asians bet differently than French, than English. We don’t know what’s going on!” (Montane 2011). Asian punters not only select out different details of the game to wager upon – such as Hawk-Eye line calls – but also wager in different betting forms. For example, gamblers in Asia favour …two types of bets in particular: Asian total and Asian handicap. The first corresponds to the number of goals scored in a match. A gambler will therefore bet on whether there will be more than 2.5 goals, or less than four, etc. Asian handicap is appealing when a team or athlete meets an opponent that is 53 supposedly stronger. The operator then gives a ‘handicap’ to the favourite team, which means that to win the bet, the favourite team must win the match with a difference of over a certain number of points (depending on the size of the handicap). Asian handicap bets have a number of technical variants, but the goal difference between the two teams is central to the betting (Boniface et al, 44). For now, the primary regulatory technology on the football pitch is the stopwatch. The point I want to emphasize is that the way regulatory or umpire technologies enter the game can come to have unintended consequences that can, as in the Hawk Eye example, breed further betting-related risks and challenges. Knowing the portfolio of bet types is essential to being able to implement appropriate and effective sport integrity rules. Lacking laws and law enforcement capacities to control integrity threats, SGB become caught in a situation that requires re-vesting authority through transformed partnerships and networked governance. Global authority also requires new objects, properties, and resources. Sport betting regulation represents one particularly difficult regulatory threat for which SGB authorities must retool. As this analysis develops through a case study of online gambling regulation in France, I will link these claims in details and empirical evidence. I will show how French regulation instills new incentives and rent-extracting capacities. Sport Integrity and Remote Gambling Operators (RGO) In the above sections, I have shown how issues of sport integrity look at both sport playing field and the sport institutional levels. Both of these perspectives arise from within the sport world: these perspectives reflect this sector’s own internally generated 54 and sustained logic. When SGB speak of sport integrity, preservation of regulation times and spaces are the primary concerns. By assuring playing field integrity, SGB also defend against external claw-back of a sport sector’s autonomy. Yet SGB are not alone in sport integrity interests. We cannot understand the sport integrity challenges involved in betting risks without attention to the sport gambling sector. How does the gambling sector articulate its interests in sport integrity? For betting operators, the risks of sport integrity are, perhaps, if not entirely different issues, at least differently prioritized sets of issues. When betting operators talk about sport integrity, they worry about how sport integrity threats undermine market efficiency, profit, and worth. “Sport integrity for us [is] only one element: betting and match fixing to commit fraud over our members” (Khalid Ali). For gambling operators, sport integrity risks are operational, legal, and reputational risks. Asserting mutual interests in the integrity of sport, betting operators see and affirm that they are also dependent upon sport’s uncertainty of outcome. From the perspective of gambling operators, distorted sport results – whether because of doping or match fixing related to betting – are one and the same: expensive. Fraudulent results deliver costly blows to betting operators while also disrupting market continuation and efficiency (Davies 2011). When results are retracted, whether because of doping, match fixing, point shaving, or other manipulated efforts, operators must nullify payouts, cancel winnings, or eat the losses. 47 In professional cycling, ongoing doping scandals especially make visible betting operators’ sensitivity to and dependency on sport integrity. Following the 2007-2009 doping scandals in cycling, Nordic operators halted all betting 47 Such was the case in the Sopot tennis match scandal, with Betfair’s decision to nullify payout. I more thoroughly analyze this case and its implications in Chapter 5. 55 exchange services on cycling (Kalb 2011). In China, when the notion of fair play and expectations for uncertain, unrigged outcomes in its professional football league became seen as complete fabrications, online gambling operators pulled out of these markets. According to an Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques study, sport gambling corruption scandals are financially devastating: Like the Albanian League, the Chinese, Malaysian, and Singaporean Championships no longer bring in any money, although they were extremely popular in the early 1990s. Sponsors and the media no longer wish to support cheating, thereby contributing to all the more to the deterioration of the championship. China is an iconic example of this. Over the past two years, a succession of scandals has led to the arrest of a number or referees and players, and several members of the Chinese Football Federation, including the President himself. In April 2011, the championship opened without its principal sponsor – Pirelli – which had refused to renew its contract with the Chinese League. The national broadcaster, China Central Television, also refused to broadcast matches. In Asia, the plummeting popularity of local championships led the population to turn instead to European competitions, which were perceived as cleaner and appeared to better preserve the uncertainties of sport (Boniface et al., 45). Exiting the Chinese or larger Asian markets altogether might seem an unlikely or nonviable corporate decision; however, finding an available, substitute market no longer proves so tough. To retain these same Asian punters or attract new ones, operators simply offer betting services on other global sports, sports competitions beyond Asia. The Internet and digital streaming technologies provide 24/7 access to unlimited sporting 56 events. Operators can pick and choose from global sport event options for promoting bets. Sport Integrity for States and Transnational Actors As I build my argument about the ways sport integrity interests constitute and become shaped by global markets and global patterns of law and governance, I emphasize the situational dynamics in which authority appears and really matters. I now examine state and transnational actor interests. The topic of sport integrity vis-à-vis sport betting interconnects stakeholders whose priorities often diverge despite using the same language. Traditionally, nation-states have concerned themselves with regulating gambling on account of interests in safety (protecting minors), public health (preventing addiction or compulsive gambling behavior), consumer protections (privacy safeguards against fraud, phishing, and spyware), public revenues (tax generation), and morality. To be sure, these interests persist and remain worthy of study. Academic literature across disciplines, but especially in sociology, criminology, and psychology, well documents these public policy concerns. This section considers how traditional state interests in the gambling sector become intertwined with global interests in sport integrity. Not just for states, betting and sport integrity also involve primary security concerns for transnational governance actors. Below, I consider the involvement of two transnational actors recognized to have clout in global governance spheres beyond sport. 48 As space-time boundaries of sport authority blur, extending sport governance actors, institutions, and 48 Limited by the scope of this analysis, I do not exhaustively or equally describe other global governance actors who converge on these issues. For example, I omit nonprofits and civil society actors except in connection to specific actions or debates discussed in later chapters. 57 policies further into the everyday public sphere, the presence of state and transnational actors makes itself known. In the context of renewed impetus to regulate financial flows following the 2009 financial crisis, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) attention began to focus on the sport field. To assess the sport sector as a vulnerability or risk to larger international security – to wit, financial security – the FATF drafted a summary report of its chief concerns. In its report, “Money Laundering through the Football Sector,” the FATF sized up the breadth, flows, and positions of the sport sector’s (football sector) financial transactions in terms of its global financial security ramifications (2010). Another rather heavyweight global governance actor more typically seen working in the governance challenges of transnational crime and security is the United Nations Office of Drugs and Narcotics (UNODC). The UNODC recently became involved in sport governance and issues of integrity through a particular arrangement between the IOC and UN. In 2009, the United Nations conferred official Observer Status upon the IOC. Acknowledging this relationship, Dimitri Vlassis, chief of the Corruption and Economic Crime Branch of the UNODC carefully emphasizes that the UNODC’s activity in sport integrity follows from a mutual relationship rather than one of oversight, audit, or intervention. For Vlassis, it is important to remember that “there is self regulation in sport, so as an organization, we [UNODC] could only be involved by invitation and this is the first time” (Vlassis 2011). Emphasizing that the UNODC has been “asked to work with and to establish support for the working group at the IOC,” Vlassis goes on to explain that the reason is the UNODC’s role as “guardian of two conventions: one on organized crime and the other convention on corruption.” As custodian of the 58 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and the Convention Against Corruption (Merida Convention), the UNODC examines the question of how to apply this pre-existing international legal arsenal to these risks involved in sport integrity issues. This international protocol remit is the UNODC’s stated relationship basis, and it is the “[UNODC’s] only involvement, and it is by request” (Vlassis 2011). Vlassis summarizes the UNODC role and interest as consisting in its “experience with the two conventions – its knowledge and implementation, experience as a convening organization, and experience with legislation and drafting advice” (Vlassis 2011). How the UNODC perceives its interests and authority profoundly affects the form(s) of governance. This liaison acknowledges the IOC as a global governance actor, and this governance network solders relations beyond a state based international system of authority. 49 The IOC-UN partnership nests a governance relation beyond the state level, and as such manifestly pushes for a reconfiguration of authority relations and processes. Despite amicable relations, this partnership between the UNODC and the sport world, the issues on the table involve interests more densely intertwined with potential tensions between the private sphere of sport and the public sphere of law, social control, and security. Cautious to elevate certain roles or acts, the UNODC prudently keeps the governance situation as one unfolding: We must see who are actors. What is balance between self-regulation and governance, between sport self-regulation and external governance? Then we discuss conventions. Issues will come up traditionally with those in sport world 49 We witness what seems to be temerity among global governance actors, who only feign autonomy or any real decoupling of their authority from nation states. Their fear of stepping on the sovereignty or even recognized authority of big cultural and economic players such as the IOC incapacitates their authority. 59 and ministers of sports who are not familiar with issues that pertain to justice ministry. [The] common concern is anti-corruption involving the private sector (commonality of this concern of balancing is also found in issues of regulation and private sector). And we must determine – as they say, what’s the space? –the balance between autonomy and governance, the specificity of sport here (Vlasis). 50 Sport integrity issues also prick attention beyond state borders at the European Council level (Hörnle 2010, 2011). Concern for commercial protections inscribed in the Rome Treaty are at heart driving Council of Europe scrutiny and review of a number of complaints, cases and reports. Like the FATF, fundamental international security concerns also underline this discourse. The active presence of such governance actors as the FATF and UNODC represent a transnational range of interests – issues of international security and law enforcement – involved in sport integrity. For these actors, sport integrity involves matters well beyond the bounded space-time of sporting fields. Throughout the foregoing chapter, I have mapped the basic sources and content of sport integrity concerns. By no means an exhaustive list, the actors and interests I have described comprise the specialized networks that interconnect on topics of sport integrity and betting regulation at a transnational level. As I move forward and more squarely take on and develop the issue of sport integrity and betting regulation, I will further contour the relations among these stakeholders. 50 In asking about the balance between autonomy and governance, this question invokes arguments on sport specificity. 60 Chapter 3 A National Response to Transnational Challenges: Sport Integrity and Sport Betting Regulation in France As various actors concerned with sport integrity seek to obtain regulatory bite over global challenges, there are some rather surprising and, perhaps, contradictory transformations of authority. In this chapter, I trace the multiple and sometimes diverging social, economic, and political interests of sport integrity stakeholders through an intensive case study of online gambling regulation in France. Having developed in the previous chapter a theoretical foundation for assessing and guiding a discussion on sport integrity, I can now elaborate a political-legal analysis of these global challenges as they play out locally in the contexts of French sport betting markets. In addition, having set the stage with the main characters who are scripting sport integrity debates, I can now offer a thesis that specifies and explains the global workings of governance involved in online sport betting. To do this, I focus upon a single case study of sport betting and its regulation in France. Though inferring general trends from a single case is perilous, the experiences in France illustrate how regulatory innovations and technologies interconnect stakeholders, resources, and regulatory regimes. In the previous chapter, I profiled the key actors and their orientations to one another in these markets. Newly emerging network forms of authority prove not only effective, but also necessary for asserting control over global challenges. 61 Alongside sport governance institutional transformations and changed relations between public and private stakeholders, we witness patterns of law consistent with what globalization theory predicts (Raustiala; Cross; Cutler; Berman). 51 Though the scope of the present analysis prevents developing a fully international – much less, a properly global – comparative analysis of online gambling law, I contextualize French online gambling regulation alongside other prominent national and transnational legal developments. While recognizing the innovativeness of French strategies, I am sensitive not to generalize based on its particularities. Nonetheless, I argue that a case study of the French approach provides a lens for seeing the kinds of common challenges that are inadequately tackled by a strictly national approach. I identify and describe instances in which France attempts to tap into global technologies and networks to mobilize new social, economic, political, and legal controls in the face of these global challenges. The French gambling regulatory situation merits special attention not only because of its connection to my arguments on global governance in the sport sector, but also because of the ways France perceives itself as a leader and positions its laws as a model for the Council of Europe. Since the 2012 Olympic host bid, France has shown itself particularly concerned with its sporting legacy and identity. Proud that its cultural heritage gave birth to a number of modern sport organizations – including “le Rénovateur,” Pierre de Coubertin’s recreation of the Olympic Movement in 1894 – France refuses to stand idle as the globalization of sport 51 Scholars such as Paul Berman have keenly observed that global governance takes place not only through formal international or transnational law but also through informal law, memoranda of understanding, and agreements between non-traditional international actors. 62 obscures its French roots, form, and leadership. 52 A number of sport law and policy directions indicate that France is dissatisfied and resistant to globalization’s generic or quasi-trans-cultural version – a non-French-reverent version – of global sport. This is not the global culture or sport cosmopolitan form France desires. In 2009, the French Sport Ministry, various National Federations, and other sport experts gathered at the Palais du Luxembourg, the French Senate. Convened in urgency, the deliberations grappled with the task of promoting French culture and preserving the French language as an officially recognized and most importantly, officially used language of the Olympic Movement. Participants lauded the idea of strengthening the Francophone Games created in 1989 as a way to enliven sport competitions with rituals and foster a collective memory through which the particular French traditions and cultures of sport – from France, North Africa, Canada, and the Caribbean – might be celebrated, enacted, and passed on to future generations. France is displeased that the Olympics has more and more adopted English as its lingua franca. Once an equal or lead language for all Olympic communications and ceremonies, French has been relegated to the status of a merely ceremonial language. 53 France worries about its waning role in global sport. More than mere nostalgia, this sport cultural heritage matters to present and future oriented French identity and international policy. This social-political identity informs the selection of France’s international politics and lobbying platforms. As one sport integrity expert concerned with sport and gambling policy notes, “France [has been] very proactive going around Brussels to promote their model. They have been the 52 Both the IOC and FIFA, as well as a host of formerly French-based and French originating sport institutions have emigrated from France to Switzerland. 53 Language defense is always about economic market protection (Bourdieu, 1991: 57). 63 initiator of sports, FIFA [Fédération Internationale de Football Association], the IOC, so they have some caché” (Interview 2011: 0001GG). This is a story about the authority of the nation-state and its connection to SGB via the subject of sport integrity and sport betting. Working from this case study of sport integrity and sport betting in France, I show the transnational nature of sport integrity risks. Thus this story is an authority-legitimacy discourse about the relationship between economic and political capital. Through this study of French gambling regulation, I will bring forth the important features of the relationship between property and authority. Lest the attention accruing to sport gambling and integrity seem inflated or out of proportion to its material and political worth, I introduce a few indicators of the market’s size. These figures help comparatively contour the magnitude and significance of regulatory challenges involved in these financial flows. Over the past decade, online-gambling markets have boomed with rising Internet access and now boast formidable growth figures. The European Commission’s Green Paper on the Online Gambling in the Internal Market (Green Paper) estimates Europe’s 2008 “annual revenues generated by the gambling service sector, measured on the basis of Gross Gaming Revenues (GGR) (i.e., stakes less prizes but including bonuses)…to be around €75,9 bn” (European Commission, 2011b: 8-9). Of this GGR in Europe, the “on- line gambling services accounted for annual revenues in excess of € 6,16 bn, i.e., 7,5 % of the overall gambling market. ” (European Commission, 2011b: 8). For 2011, the EU online-gambling sector is expected to produce gross revenue of € 9.08 billion (European Commission, 2011b:128). Of this hefty figure, sport betting (including horseracing) comprises 32% of GGR of online gaming revenues. H2 Gambling Capital estimates this 64 market’s global GGR for online sports bets at €16.4 billion in 2004 and €32.6 billion in 2008, a revenue gain of roughly 100% in just four years (Remote Gambling Association, 2010). The online sport betting market’s global GGR is expected to reach €50.7 billion in 2012 (Remote Gambling Association 2010: 9). Table 1.0: Gross Gambling Revenue in the EU (European Commission, 2011b: 8). In The Leisure Industries, sociologist Ken Roberts offers a superb treatment of commercial, voluntary, and publicly provided forms of leisure. Observing the intermeshing of sport and gambling leisure industries, Roberts draws attention to the state’s promotion of gambling industries coincident with the growing interest in national projects through elite sport. Roberts writes, …since the 1970s many Western governments have adopted their own (usually weaker) versions of the communist elite sport system. Since National Lottery money became available in the mid-1990s…the UK has developed a National Sports Institute (a network of elite coaching centres) and has introduced World 1.903 0.705 0.677 0.601 0.575 0.373 0.295 0.25 0.167 0.148 THE 10 LARGEST NATIONAL ON-LINE GAMBLING MARKETS IN THE EU IN 2008 (GGR) GGR on-line gambling (EU top in 2098) €bn 65 Class Performance Programmes (which contribute to talented athletes’ training and travel costs) (Ken Roberts, 92-93). Roberts’ example is important for contextualizing the transformations of authority that I am describing in the relationship between sport and gambling. Historically, condemnations of gambling have been multifaceted and deeply rooted. It has variously been seen to squander or undermine the work ethic – Protestant invective against waste and idleness (Weber, 1958; Downes et al., 1976:); exhibit irrational behavior – Enlightenment vision disdainful to gambling as contrary to reason, the deck is always stacked against you (Nibert, 2006; Cosgrave 2001:); breed crime and reek havoc – criminological theory prioritizing social control over licentiousness (Fabian, 1992:); practice pagan rituals – Reformation deeming gambling as associated with lot casting, fortune telling, and religious heresy (Reith 1999); or indicate illness – medical model rendering gambling as addiction or pathological (Castellani, 2000). Now we are living in an era in which gambling is being revitalized. More confident, the gambling industry is rebranding its public image by normalizing itself as a leisure, entertainment, and social activity. In keeping with attempts to restore this its respectability, this industry now refers to itself not as the gambling industry but as the gaming industry. Previously marred by moral stigma, the gambling industry is coming to be seen as a welcomed and valued peer, a global market contributor. The state’s relationship to gambling industries has radically shifted: The global expansion of the industry, accelerated by the influence of technology and the impact of sophisticated communication systems, its increasing popularity as a mass leisure activity and its incorporation into state fiscal policy looks set to 66 change centuries of condemnation, bringing gambling into the fold of ‘legitimate’ business enterprise (Reith, 89-90). In fact, the state’s door has opened more widely for gambling, such that the state has “[positioned] itself not as a beneficiary of production (the traditional fiscal base of the state) but as a generator of consumption” (Young, 260). What was a predominant state interest in limiting gambling now surfaces in a topsy-turvy fashion. 54 As Miers notes, “Certainly there has never been any significant public interest issue in the maintenance, for example, of a vibrant local authority lottery market, or of a financially strong bingo or machines industry. But the picture is now very different” (Miers, 22). Recognizing that the gambling sector has the potential to draw such revenues, we can more easily see how state interests in gambling change and expand, thus behooving a state to groom pleasant gambling market environments. Having sized up the financial weight that this sector throws, I now trace through some recent changes and challenges in the national sport betting regulatory situation in France. Pari en Ligne: A French Online-Gaming Regulatory Approach Four basic approaches characterize state responses to gambling markets: prohibition, monopoly, limited licensed access, or global authorization. From 1539- 2010, gambling markets in France were more or less controlled as a state monopoly. Since the 1930s, two bodies have enjoyed exclusive authorization to promote bets in France: Pari Mutuel Urbain (PMU) has organized horseracing punts, and Française des Jeux (FdJ) has run the French lottery. Now, however, the regulatory situation in France 54 For a discussion of the state’s pursuit of fiscal policy through the gambling industry see Kingma (1996: 212); McMillen(1996); Nibert (2000); and McMillen (1996: 281). 67 has fundamentally changed, both reflecting and affecting larger relations of law and society. Changing market regulation in sport gambling affects law and society relations in and beyond the sport-cultural domain. Throughout the last decade, a variety of cases began to draw attention to conflicts between French gambling laws and EU law. 55 In 2007, a clash erupted when professional cycling-event organizer Amaury Sport Organisation (ASO) denied ProTour Team Green Cycle Association (GCA) invitation to all its races. ASO races make up 80% of elite cycling events. As a licensed ProTour team, Team GCA’s exclusion from competing in ASO-owned races, including the Tour de France and the sport’s other most prestigious races such as the Spring Classiques, threatened the continuance and value of an entire professional cycling circuit of point and award linked races, known as the “ProTour”. 56 A central organizing premise of the ProTour includes the guarantee of all ProTour teams’ participation in all ProTour races. 57 To deny a team access to any, much less multiple ProTour races undermined the circuit’s coherency. In the context of ASO’s more longstanding, singular, and sharp resistance to similar issues of relinquishing the Tour de France’s team invitation rights to the ProTour, these disputes expanded to include races in other state territories. 55 This is a case of legal pluralism, but it is not yet one that is harmonized. 56 In 2007, the ProTour consisted of sixteen teams licensed to compete in twenty-seven races. As a ProTour-credentialed team, Unibet’s season commitments, obligations, and expectations followed the UCI statutes/rules establishing a team’s calendar declarations by 31 December prior to the racing season opening. Unless declared and granted waiver, all ProTour Teams would be/were expected to race in all ProTour races. The UCI ProTour is now known as the UCI WorldTour. 57 The organization of professional cycling in this then-new ProTour format introduced a set league in an effort to shore up much of the financial uncertainty characteristic of the sport, in which sponsors could not be guaranteed in advance which races their team (and thus team advertising kit and presence) would appear. The ProTour tried to solidify the sport-product value of teams by making the product better known in terms of details of when and where a team would compete. This plan was expected to make teams more marketable to sponsors in advance of the season’s commencement. 68 The erosion of cooperation between ASO and the Unione Cycliste Internationale (UCI) – the International Federation governing cycling and this ProTour – involved a complexity of national and international legal issues. The cited basis of excluding Team GCA involved the team’s title sponsor, UNIBET. Based in Malta, UNIBET – formerly MrBookmaker – provides online gaming services. Having purchased the team title sponsor position, UNIBET received the team naming rights as well as the predominant advertising rights on team kits (i.e., jerseys, shorts, helmets), equipment (i.e., bicycles), and vehicles. It was this advertising platform that tripped a wire, attracting legal concern: UNIBET’s advertising stood in violation of French laws enacted in 1836 and 1891 that prohibited the advertising of gambling products and facilities. The prohibition included both direct and indirect facilitation of gambling advertising. Between 2005-2007, French gaming group Pari Mutuel Urbain (PMU) launched successful legal action in French courts against a variety of online bookmakers (Sportingbet, Bet and Win, Mr. Bookmaker (UNIBET), and Zeturf). The French Professional Football League (La Ligue de Football Professsionnel) announced bans on gaming advertisements: French football teams most directly effected were Monaco, Toulouse, and Nantes – teams with the respective gaming shirt sponsors Bwin, 888, and Gamebookers (Wallop 2006). In 2006, after announcing the renewal of its football sponsorship of Team Monaco, the chief executive officer of Bwin was arrested. Other fines and suspensions were handed to French-based sport actors advertising gambling sponsors. 58 Having witnessed such activities as evidence of renewed state intention to enforce gambling laws, ASO’s legal department determined that significant risk of 58 In October 2007, UNIBET CEO Peter Nylander was detained in Holland on a French warrant. 69 corporate liability outweighed indifference or leniency in admitting Team GCA’s participation in its races. 59 Scrambling to find a way around the impasse in order to compete, Team GCA proposed a change to its jerseys and team signage: to wit, the “UNIBET” logo would be replaced by a big “?”. ASO rejected this proposal. Among fans, media, and sport actors, Team GCA was known by the name of Team UNIBET. With the season’s first ASO race, Fleche-Wallonne, in Belgium approaching, ASO issued a statement of its right to exclude any participants on the basis of threats to business interests, reputation, or security. Legal liability to respect gambling advertising prohibitions existed in both France and Belgium. Suspicious of the sincerity of ASO’s legal concerns, the UCI doubted legal liability was a real concern rather than a convenient scapegoat to garner legitimacy in a matter perceived as reneging on a contract. 60 Whether a legalistic maneuver or not, the complexity of ensuring cooperation with a newly formatted global sport circuit such as the ProTour brings up several important issues regarding legal harmonization, global capital, and regulation. To crack down on illegal gambling operations, France attempted to finagle century-old national laws to obtain leverage upon global information-technology challenges. Yet, as France quickly discovered, the challenges of global gambling markets are not easily tackled through national efforts alone. The Tour de France-UNIBET loggerheads and football disputes centering upon gambling sponsors of professional teams both based in or 59 ASO lacked dispensing power to ignore or obviate the law, especially at a time of a renewed and active law enforcement stance. 60 While the ProTour hagglings appeared to be concerns about liability for illegal gambling advertising underlying these criminal liability concerns were important commercial struggles that involves the bundling of broadcast rights and sales and potentially shifting –away from ASO toward the UCI – sport proprietary locations. 70 competing in France appeared as one aspect of deeper abrasions of national gambling law rubbing against free movement of services and the market protections inscribed in the Rome Treaty. In these disputes, questions of legal harmonization between national and EU law gathered primarily around Article 49. Gambling operators appealed to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a positive rendering in which Article 49 might be acknowledged as applying to and protecting the gambling sector as it would any other market sector. Beyond the question of the extent to which national and EU gambling laws collide, the ECJ also looked to determine and clarify what, if any, basis might exempt national gambling regulatory law and policy from compliance with strictures of the Rome Treaty. Instead of a single court ruling establishing clarity, a rather recent but long history of cases has emerged, contouring the outer limits by which national gambling regulatory stringency might be tolerated. Within these ECJ cases are “important questions about the circumstances in which national restrictions on foreign service providers can be justified” (Arnull, 441). For example, in the Placanica case, the ECJ dealt with the issue of the measure of a state’s overriding interests as a basis for a restricted or limited opening of this market. 61 In a legal analysis of the Placanica case, Arnull crisply captures the challenges of social, cultural, political, and economic rights in tension: The ECJ declared that, in the context of betting and gaming ‘…a certain number of reasons of overriding general interest have been recognized by the case-law, such as the objectives of consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and incitement to squander on gaming, as well as the general need to preserve 61 Tribunale di Larino and the Tribunal di Teramo v. Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese, and Angelo Sorricchio (2007). 71 public order. In that context, moral, religious, or cultural factors – as well as the morally and financially harmful consequences for the individual and for society associated with betting and gaming – may serve to justify a margin of discretion for the national authorities; sufficient to enable them to determine what is required in order to ensure consumer protection and the preservation of public order.’ The ECJ accepted that Member States were at liberty to adopt their own policies on betting and gaming and to determine the appropriate level of protection, as long as any restrictions imposed satisfied the principle of proportionality and were applied without discrimination (Arnull, 442). 62 In its Schindler, Zenatti, and Anomar decisions, the ECJ recognized that Member States have a discretional competence to impede the cross-border provisions of gambling services throughout the European internal market, provided that the imposed restrictions are: i) not discriminatory, ii) justified by imperative reasons of general interests; and iii) proportional and necessary to achieve the objectives pursued (Verbiest and Keuleers, 10). 63 Yet, determining what grounds might satisfy these provisions of exception is not as easy as states have expected or might prefer. The idea of restricting online gambling markets because of generating revenues for a public good fails these criteria: “the court affirmed in its Läärä,and Zenatti decisions, that the re-allocation of profits to public funds or charitable activities cannot be a sufficient justification to override the freedom to provide services through the European Union” (Verbeist and Keuleers, 11). Looking to clarify 62 Demonstrating a law’s proportionality and nondiscriminatory impact has, in fact, proved quite difficult. 63 See Läärä v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (1999); Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jorg Schindler (1994); and Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti (1999). 72 the issue for its Member States, the Green Paper’s summary analysis of the ECJ case law highlights what might be considered an object and purpose test for national gambling legislation: Restrictions are only acceptable as exceptional measures expressly provided for in Articles 51 and 52 TFEU, or justified, in accordance with the case-law of the Court, for reasons of overriding general interest…[Restrictions] must bring about a genuine reduction of gambling opportunities and be applied in a consistent and systematic manner to all service offers in the area…restrictions must be applied without discrimination and be proportionate [while] comply[ing] with the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination and with the consequent obligation of transparency (European Commission, 2011b: 11). 64 Here the ECJ offers to meet its Member States “halfway”, allowing for national sovereign discretion in gambling policies, while at the same time the ECJ tightens the qualifications for such allowances so significantly in terms of baseline market priorities that this half- meeting point really gives in very little. Recognizing that its laws were at odds with EU law, while also seeking to better control these markets, France acceded to pressures to reform its legislation. 65 On 12 May 2010, France scrapped its former monopolistic gambling landscape and replaced it with a nationally regulated, limited licensed-access market. The Online Betting and Gambling 2010-476 Act (Gambling Act) legalized online gambling markets for table games (jeux de 64 The gambling market is a solid example of selective market deregulation. As I have already discussed, the sport sector has long been the subject of debate in its claims to exception from public law. 65 To be sure, a state’s reformulation of gambling laws comes from a real eagerness to capitalize on gambling tax revenues. 73 cercle), horses, and sport betting. 66 To oversee the newly legal online gambling sector, France erected a regulatory body, Autorité de Régulation des Jeux en Ligne (ARJEL). When actors such as SGB, gambling operators, or sport ministers speak about and refer to these legal changes, they commonly refer to the “liberalization” or “opening” of the French gambling market. Yet, for ARJEL, this description is wrong. Quick to correct such misperceptions, ARJEL Juridical Director, Rhadames Killy insists that “the market was there, so we did not really open it” (Killy 2011). The problem was that online gambling existed but was not regulated. Rather than French law “opening” the market, in reality, French authorities were racing to catch up with what was already open for business. For Killy, the opening of the gambling market was necessary: “[gambling operators] were there and they – Betwin, Betfair, Unipublic -- thought they were legal before EU law” (Killy 2011). Across all sectors of governance, states are champing at the bit to get a handle on global problems and markets that are thriving within their borders. Through 2011, ARJEL had granted 35 operators a total of 48 licenses (25 for poker, 8 for horse racing, and 15 for sport betting), allowing the promotion of bets in accordance with approved result types on designated events. 67 Charged with regulating online gambling markets in France, ARJEL’s remit involves the following basic directives: issue online-gambling-operator licenses and ensure their compliance; protect minors; guard 66 Table games include games like poker. 67 “Since the opening of the market (up to Dec. 31 st 2010), ARJEL has issued 48 licenses to 34 operators. Among them only four (Betclic, Pari Mutuel Urbain, Unibet and Eurosportbet) have all three licenses for online games. Twenty-six operators having applied for and obtained a license for online poker and many of them are specialists, offering only this kind of product. In contrast, only 16 licenses have been issued for sport betting. In most cases (11), the operators hold licenses for other products, too (poker or horse pools or both of them)” (MAG, 14-15). 74 against obsessive gambling; ensure fairness in gambling operations by preventing and prosecuting illegal gambling operations; and institute financial security measures to prevent fraud and money laundering (Killy 2011; Vilotte 2011). Reading the current number of ARJEL-licensed operators against the statistics of the black or grey gambling market presents a stark reality-check that should temper the urge to too quickly or proudly tout the success of regulatory scope and efficiency in France, where, in 2005, the legal revenue of sport gambling totaled €110 million. 68 This legal market paled in comparison to the estimated €300-400 million revenue garnered by the black/illegal market, which carried 76% of the total French gambling market (CERT LEXSI, 2006: 16). Figure 2.0: Sport Gambling Market France, 2005 (CERT LEXSI, 2006: 16). Ernst and Young documented similar figures for this shadow economy in France, writing that “France has been confronted with a proliferation of illegal gaming for several years. In 2008, 25,000 illegal websites were accessible in France, drawing 75% of Internet bets 68 In 2005, the only legal gambling in France were Paris Mutuel Urbain and Française des Jeux. Illegal RGO (offshore) 76% Française des Jeux 9% Paris Mutuel Urbain 15% 2005 SPORT GAMBLING IN FRANCE 75 placed in the French market” (Ernst and Young, 2011: 25). Even as this market has changed with the liberalization of French gambling markets, this skewing to the illegal side is a real worry for ARJEL. The EU Green Paper rounds off the situation, claiming that, for every legal or licensed operator, five illegal operators also compete in the European market. In 2006, Casino City, Inc’s survey of 2,005 of the then estimated 10,000 worldwide online operators found that only 14% of operators were operating without a license of any sort (CERT LEXSI, 2006: 4). To wit, of the global market, 86% of RGO operate on the black market. 69 With the number of licensed online-gambling operators representing such a small percentage, a real question of effectiveness and legitimacy arises. Just as the economy of online-gambling markets transcends the French territorial nation-state jurisdiction, so also do the market’s capabilities of being used, intentionally or not, for deviant or harmful ends. The regulatory track record suggests that controlling these challenges requires transnational governance capacities. As a national regulatory framework, ARJEL’s regulatory strategy endeavors to maintain a handle upon challenges that are, in fact, transnational. What mechanisms of control are available to state or sport governance actors concerned with the ways betting may spawn incentives threatening to corrupt sport integrity and a variety of social goods? While this section begins to answer this question, the subject is elaborated in Chapter 5. By examining ARJEL’s regulatory reach, I will show the global nature of both sport and sport betting market regulatory challenges. I begin by describing what online-gambling regulation entails in France, enabling us to see how France tags the gambling sector and its sport integrity connection 69 I return to this subject of the black market in terms of the global political economy and regulatory challenges of sport integrity in Chapter 5. 76 as national interests. The important point is how in the pursuit of these national interests the state attempts to reposition itself as a global authority. Transnationalizing National Authority In France, regulation via licensing requires that operators submit annual reports and comply with intermittent audit demands. Like other sectors, licensing is not a one- time-for-all-time invitation to freely roam the market. Licensing functions as a regressive poll tax for supporting a variety of state endeavors. A number of important public goods, as well as sources for filling state coffers, are wound up in the regulation of gambling markets. These interests include the following: health assurances, consumer protections, protections of minors, and sport integrity guarantees. Further priorities of preventing fraud, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism also steer state initiatives. Oftentimes, but not always, strategies for achieving these different interests converge. Complying with basic know-your-customer protocols not only protects against the soliciting of minors, by ensuring that all punters are over a specified age, typically eighteen, but also enacts important anti-money laundering directives. 70 As a basic health provision, gambling-addiction prevention standards are expected of all operators. 71 Licensed operators are required to post gambling-addiction hotlines, restrict betting losses to wagers placed, and implement cutoff mechanisms. Predominantly, such strictures illustrate straightforward oversight techniques between the state and the private 70 Know you customer reviews are mechanisms for tracking financial flows, making money movements more transparent. 71 Gambling Act specifies public interest in controlling online gambling in terms of its relationship to addiction/compulsive behavior, money laundering, and a few other causes. 77 sector. While important, these regulatory challenges do not capture characteristics particularly interesting as a study of globalization. Going further, my task is to show what truly global characteristics are active in these betting challenges and regulatory efforts. Mapping the topography of remote gambling operators helps illustrate global market incentives that draw operators to locate or at least nominally incorporate in particular jurisdictions, that may, and typically do, differ from an operator’s primary sport or betting clientele locality. Distinctive offshore patterns of where online gambling operators incorporate reveal a market imperative to find or innovate opportunities to capitalize upon expanded margins of profit through global geopolitical maneuvers. A global political-economy analysis captures the logic of these markets and their regulatory challenges. Similar to geographic patterns of banking and finance, offshore jurisdictions become especially appealing to this online gambling sector. 72 States too devoted to social service provisions that might require strident public funding drawn from tax levies find themselves caught out and feeling the brunt of political-economy decisions outside their national borders. Local and national regulatory decisions are being undermined and determined from afar through global processes and movements. Gambling markets exhibit global characteristics that globalization scholars describe as time-space compression and hypermobility (Harvey 2002; Sassen 2000). These phenomena can be more simply understood: gambling market activity taking place at a distance has bearing 72 Roberts describes a short term gambling tax strategy benefit: “In 2011, the UK government abolished its 9 per cent tax on betting shop and similar stakes (which punters could avoid by placing bets online or by telephone with overseas-based bookmakers) and replaced it with a 15 per cent tax on the firms’ gross profits. Following this change, UK bookies’ turnover rose by 40 per cent. This gives an indication of the amount of gambling that is internationally footloose nowadays” (Roberts, 168). Yet, it has also been reported that operators have chosen to circumvent this 15% gambling tax levy by opting for so-called white territories. 78 on local markets. The time-space compression or convergence of globalization that David Harvey characterizes means that distance becomes less significant. As Saskia Sassen writes, “proximity is deterritorialized…a proximity relation not predicated on geography” (Sassen, 2000: 226). This reality upturns contradictions in political authority inscribed on the basis of local or territorial nation state basis. What Anthony Giddens observes of national media-regulatory efforts also rings true in these sport and gambling markets: Placing limits on who can own what, and what forms of media technology they can use, might affect the economic prospects of the media sector. A country which is too restrictive might find itself left behind – the media industries are one of the fastest growing sectors of the modern economy (Giddens 2001: pp 483- 484). Offshore territories keen to attract these global-market-savvy sectors frequently legislate tax standards and/or privacy-protection environments sufficiently attractive to prize away gambling operators from so-called onshore jurisdictions. To give an example, of the top 70 global gambling operators, 60 are located in specialty offshore jurisdictions. Only ten bookmakers remain European-incorporated (Comparative Directory of Online Bookmakers 2012). 79 Figure 3.0: Geographical Mapping and Distribution of Top Remote Gambling Operators By Jurisdiction in 2012. 73 Harvesting niche commercial activities like those involved in the online-gambling sector yields significant, oftentimes vital, revenues for many small offshore territories and countries. For example, Gross Gambling Revenues as a percentage of GDP for France and most EU member states falls near or below 1%. However, for Malta, the gambling industry comprises over 7% of GDP (European Commission, 2011b: 9). During one interview within the International Relations department (Bureau des Relations Internationales et des Grands Événements Sportifs Internationaux) at the French Sport Ministry (le Ministère des Sports), I was told that countries such as San Marino or Malta rarely are seen or even remembered to exist at the European Council. Yet “Malta – they came four people to tell us at the European Council (Malta has 400 operators) their interests in sport gambling regulation!” (Interview, 2011: 0016NS). With the gaming 73 Illustration maps data available in the Comparative Directory of Online Bookmakers (2012). 80 question on the table, these countries touted themselves as quite important. France received them – though from the tone I gathered from interviews, scoffing or laughing accompanies this formal reception. Sport Minister humour aside, this is serious business. As my informant within the French Sport Ministry explained “sport betting is an issue because there is so much money and it is way to finance sport” (Interview, 2011: 0016NS). More than just the worth of online gambling for a particular offshore territory’s or country’s GDP, how a state uses sovereign authority to foster legislative climates ripe for this sector and then interconnects with gambling markets and their regulation in other localities globally is vitally important. Table 2.0: Gross Gambling Revenue as percentage of state GDP in 2008 (European Commission, 2011b: 9). What are the consequences of the differing standards of oversight in which RGO incorporate in offshore territories while gaming the globe? These offshore maneuvers circumvent traditional nation-state-inscribed authority and regulatory mechanisms devised to restrict the gambling sector’s presence, scope, size, and range. Furthermore, 7.82% 1.38% 1.30% 1.22% 1.18% 1.13% 1.09% 1.02% 1.00% 0.68% GGR AS A % OF NATIONAL GDP (2008) 81 these offshore strategies undercut the viability of national fiscal policies such as those designed to stream funds extracted from levies toward a variety of public goods. 74 Because offshore operators solicit bets from punters in national markets across the globe, nation-states awake to a crisis of control (Migdal 2001; Scott 1998). Figure 4.0: Geographical Mapping of Top Offshore Jurisdictions by Number of RGO (2005) 75 As different actors select, give meaning to, and make use of digital technologies in gambling markets, a new spectrum of deviant behaviors waxes. Offshore maneuvers become commonplace as digital information-communication technologies, the Internet, and global financial networks make possible new social, informational, financial, and political relations. As Sally Gainsbury observes, “Interactive gambling in all its forms (computers, smartphones, wireless devices, and, to a lesser extent, interactive television) is revolutionizing the delivery of gambling products” (Gainsbury, 267). At present, online gambling involves technologies that favour free, unregulated uses – a situation of 74 Locating offshore, RGO surface in differential standards of oversight. 75 Illustration maps data available from Laboratoire d’Expertise en Securite Informatique report (CERT LEXSI 2006). 82 liberty –over limited, regulated uses – a situation of social control. To be sure, RGO oftentimes flagrantly disregard national law. However, even if RGO observe – or appear to observe –national gambling laws, punters keen to play often activate a variety of techniques to circumvent national prohibitions. The way online technologies enable punters to disguise their identities is just one example of how digital technologies can frustrate efforts to trace punting activity origins to an actual territorial locality, where betting may or may not be legal. By obtaining Internet Service Provider (ISP) email addresses or user registration that appear to originate from legal markets, punters tap into and accelerate this market’s flows, its characteristic global footlooseness. Enhancing flexible social and market networks, technologies give upper-hand advantage to the remote gambling industry as a more or less unregulated market. Thus sport betting markets are in reality global. Punts can be placed on any sport, anywhere, from anywhere, and anytime. While ARJEL may prove effective in regulating its 35 licensed operators or make headway by cracking down on a few illegal online betting operators providing services within French territory, the mechanisms of detection and enforcement simply have not yet matched the market flows or their respective forms of threat. Even with a tight national sport gambling regulatory apparatus to help shore up betting-related threats to integrity, sport remains exposed to betting-linked risks that may be entirely geographically removed. A regulatory tightening of the screws may happen within the territorial state without producing any real deterrent effect. Judging by national gambling-wager volumes in a lower-division French Cup football game in January 2011, this fixture might have appeared of little interest to sport gambling, posing little or no risk to match-fixing incentives. However, when authorities 83 discovered that in Asia, the legal betting volumes for this same French Cup game tallied over one million Euros, a ready-alert monitoring effort was launched (l’Equipe 2011). As one informant noted, when close to “€900,000 is bet in Korea and only €900 bet in France on a French Cup game between some fifth division and first division French teams, we [French authorities] were sent in to observe, and then no problem, but this is how it works, this is funny business” (Interview, 0010SB, 2011). The people with interests in sport outcomes not only amplify in number as the number of bets increases globally, but digital technologies expand the localities of gambling bet shops and casino halls to virtually anywhere. Global gambling interests in sport outcomes complicate the task of monitoring and safeguarding sports from increased incentives to corrupt sporting outcomes. When talking about gambling vulnerabilities and risks, the Federation Française de Tennis takes on a worried tone, exclaiming “gaming manipulation interests [are] outside France! For the French Premier League [football], revenues are generated [from within] France. But this is not the same for Roland Garros. We fear our game and business can be prone to [more external] manipulation” (Montane 2011). Thus, national regulators must be savvy and ever attentive to external, transnational betting markets where RGO and punter activities lack any national legal, economic, social, or political footing in France. Competing Against a Global Black Market Getting a handle on the situation may seem impossible. In addition to offshore- incorporated betting operators, a formidable black market sets the pace for global gambling markets and the nature of the challenges regulators confront. Gambling operators in China raise particular concerns for regulation: reports estimate the ratio of 84 legal to illegal bets in China at 1:10 – the illegal revenues are estimated to have amounted to €7 billion in 2007 (Boniface et al., 43). The problem is that these black markets are global, working online where they can “offer a particularly high rate of return to the player (around 97%), the low margin being offset by the very high volume of bets. By avoiding all regulation, these operators are able to offer an extremely wide range of competitions and types of bets and accept particularly large bets” (Boniface et al., 43). As I already noted, not only does the global estimate of legal betting operators (1,400 in 2006) pale in comparison to illegal betting operators (8,600 in 2006), but, as might be expected, the economic weight of this black economy sets the global market competitive standards. This comes to have important consequences for multiple aspects of sport integrity regulation. The legal, regulated market offer – in France and everywhere – must compete against these black market offers. To be sure, this black market matters to the global political economy of sport betting markets. As an IRIS study observes: The sport betting economy is currently dominated by the Asian sites, which concentrate the greatest liquid assets and define the market trends. In fact, European operators generally open bets several days before the Asian operators, but change their odds to bring them into line with those offered by the Asian operators…The weight of the Asian sites on the world market testifies to their financial power and proves their ability to absorb fraudulent bets, even substantial ones, without endangering their financial stability” (Boniface et al., 48) “These [black] markets [like in Asia] can ‘afford’ big payout rates, and this is a problem. At 99.5%, sport betting operator payout rate for Nadal-Federer fixed 85 odds betting, these operators hedge with European companies. They don’t stay in Asia. Money moves through the system. [It might] start at a betting exchange – a specific betting Internet platform where someone plays bookmaker role and bets against [some sporting occurrence], then someone else as punter role and backs the bet. [Then these] Asian companies, if [they are] with risk on Nadal, they will play on European market to have no risk, but bet against. This way, grey money goes to the European market (Kalb 2011). Betting against risk, an operator can transfer risks to other operators. Through hedging of bets, this money inevitably moves through the global market. This strategy produces globally diffused and volatile risks: “the extreme liquidity of this market also enables operators to hedge risks between themselves and thus accept ever larger bets, at ever- more advantageous odds” (Boniface et al., 42). 76 Thus, this shadow economy creates and amplifies financial risks and insecurities, facilitates transnational criminal activity though enabling the circulation of illegal monies (money laundering), and hits the nation-state with a crisis of control in areas such as fiscal regulation. The global black market undercuts regulatory strategies that work via licensing of tax levies, controlled betting product portfolios, and payout caps, for these enhance the appeal of the black market payout rate which legal offers of licensed operators cannot match. Online sport betting in Europe necessarily involves global licit and illicit markets. Online gambling markets exemplify actors globally endowed with attributes of agility, allowing for an endless readiness to take advantage of extraterritorial opportunities. As I 76 This becomes a concern for sport integrity, financial security and thus, international security. These black markets pose substantial risks to financial security. The problem for licensed operators is this: the legal offer must compete with black market offer. 86 focus on sport betting regulation in France, these markets inevitably matter. Like other global markets, sport betting markets and their regulatory challenges transcend any tidily bounded territorial nation-state’s ability to regulate. These are global challenges to state governance, and these are global challenges to sport governance. How can national efforts in one state, France, regulate market flows that are properly transnational and determined by actors and relations well beyond a territorially inscribed nation-state? States may strive to attain extra territorial jurisdiction by reining in activities as if they were within national borders. This robust approach inflates a weightless state power. In chapter 5, I will show the obstacles and opportunities of transnational cooperation in regulating the sport integrity interests involved sport and sport gambling markets. Alternatively, partnering with other global governance actors may yield opportunities for re-vesting national power through global governance networks that may, or may not, ultimately serve to strengthen national interests and the very relevance of the nation-state. Global Networks and Transnational Regulation of Sport Gambling/Integrity By spelling out ARJEL’s rules for licensing, I will show how states attempt to get a handle on issues, markets, financial flows, and technologies that are properly transnational, not national. Here, I also discuss the global interrelationship between different national regulatory apparatuses. Changing enforcement status –from indifference to seemingly sudden vigilance–vividly illustrates the interconnection between governance and market. What happens in distant geographies in terms of law enforcement matters locally; globalization always happens locally (Latour 2005). This is certainly the case with what we witness in global betting markets and their regulation. 87 National regulatory efforts turn up divots in international legal harmonization. Whether lax or vigilant, regulatory approaches in local jurisdictions produce economic and political consequences globally. Because these markets are global, gambling law and law enforcement inevitably reverberate globally in consequence. The ways in which changes in local regulation can destabilize distant markets relates to what we witness in other sectors. French law and ARJEL policy involve a mixed approach. 77 In its effort to re- territorialize these transnational market flows, ARJEL requires RGO to locate a duplicate server of its IP address data within France. Online gambling and betting operators licensed in accordance with Article 21 shall be obliged to archive, in real time, on a medium stored in mainland France, all data mentioned in Article 38, 3. All data exchange between the player and the operator shall be recorded on the said medium (Gambling Act, 2010: Article 31). ARJEL beams confidently in describing the global technological astuteness of its policies, yet there is also already sharp anticipation about how its legislation wording may require revision to account for mobile media platforms and changing gambling market opportunities. These sorts of regulatory strictures are basic legal dimensions for establishing a social control framework with rules that prevent or deny rule derogation. By grounding a shadow Internet Provider address within France, ARJEL better assures itself access to critical information for monitoring betting activity. As a mechanism for strengthening accountability, this law also is a mechanism by which to bootstrap 77 The state neither possesses the confidence to retract its regulatory reach by sharing authority globally nor possesses the medal to tower over and contain such assaults on its economic, cultural, or political legitimacy. 88 jurisdiction over RGO. ARJEL perceives its “Internet Provider environment criteria [as] quite drastic; all operators must set up mirror in France with live, real-time data recorded and safeguarded in vault, safeguarded by ARGEL” (Killy 2011). ARJEL must discover or innovate techniques capable of preventing illegal online gambling operators from keeping their digital doors open for business. Another dimension to bulwark a robust regulatory edifice includes putative strategies. By coupling putative with preventive social control techniques designed to deny deviant activities any opportunity to happen at all, ARJEL has within its arsenal tools of response for when RGO break the rules. Through First Instance Court Paris, ARJEL relies upon judicial power to issue injunctions to deny unlicensed operators French market access. Sending out cease-and-desist letters has proven quite effective. For ARJEL, as Killy emphasizes, “Illegal operators are a problem that must be fought.” (Killy 2011). To date, ARJEL has directed an aggressive prosecutorial approach, with the result that most operators actually complied with the cease-and-desist letters and stopped admitting French players! According to ARJEL, this effort has been quite “effective from a purely psychological view” in that operators recognize the legitimacy of ARJEL and act with a sense of obligation to this authority – at least when the legal mechanisms are clearly shown to be on the table. Killy accounts for this legitimacy, saying, “[There was] quite a lot of publicity with the first case and they [operators] don’t want to be seen as bad guys when they have legitimate business in other places like the UK.” Gloating, he adds, “Yeah, so our letters are effective” (Killy 2011). Rulings favorable to ARJEL in 89 2011 included Tribunal de Grande Instance decisions against the 5Dimes and Stan James websites. 78 Globally, enforcement strategies vary tremendously. Prior to the Gambling Act, French enforcement strategy groped about with century-old laws to hold advertisers criminally liable for promoting illegal gambling products. Advertising and media restrictions for gambling products continue to offer a carrot and stick means of regulation. Licensed operators receive public marketing and advertising privileges that are seen as lucrative perks in efforts to attract and retain customers. Unlicensed operators are denied this access. Should an unlicensed operator advertise illegally, the state has applicable penal codes by which to initiate criminal justice processes. As an alternative regulatory strategy, states can block Internet Provider addresses as a deterrence technique to deny illegal operators the opportunity to even have a chance of materializing. This regulatory technique is common in Germany and is also present in the French strategy: “In 2010, ARJEL requested the ban of 125 black market websites, mainly based on information provided by licensees” (MAG, 33). Another, albeit more complicated, technique targets illegal operators by intervening in the financial flows. To date, this regulatory approach has been the predominant one in the United States. 79 In an excellent international political-economy 78 ARJEL was successful in receiving court injunctions to have Internet Service Providers block these unlicensed operators websites. ARJEL celebrated similar successes against RGO Oddsmaker, Digibet, and Bet4Fight. In 2011, proceedings were brought against licensed operators Betclick, Ztuel, and Ricup. 79 One problem confronting US enforcement efforts is availability of rightly calibrated legal tools. The Wire Act prohibits the transfer of knowledge, money, or betting across state lines. The US has attempted to achieve extra territoriality over these global challenges on this basis. One such offshore territory example in which the US employed such a strategy appeared in Antigua. Yet, Antigua refused to accept the US’s evocation and application of the Wire Act and ultimately went as far as the WTO with its disputer. In a remarkable David and Goliath like victory, the Antigua received a favourable WTO award (Andrew Cooper). 90 analysis of gambling markets, Internet Gambling Offshore, International Relations scholar Andrew Cooper emphasizes how the U.S. regulatory battles with global gambling operators has largely adhered to a strategy of moral condemnation and stigmatization of the gambling sector. Simultaneously, such enforcement techniques as in the U.S. homes in on third parties as a strategy calibrated to control what otherwise exists in flows beyond the territorial state’s jurisdiction. By targeting third parties, state regulators apply pressure on payment processors, courier services, marketers, money transfer services, banks and advertisers. 80 Despite these regulatory innovations, the global mobility of online gambling markets escapes traditional state capacities to solidly control. In 2011, ARJEL met with its licensed operators to discuss financial and reputational repercussions of the U.S. Department of Justice’s heat upon remote gambling operators. Commonly referred to as Black Friday, the U.S. enforcement sweep shook the global gambling market. The indictments of a number of remote gambling operator CEOs including PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker, and Absolute Poker signaled the end of online gambling market leniency in the U.S.: The websites and their chief executives were accused of a variety of crimes, ranging from bank fraud to running an illegal gambling operation. The [Department of Justice] seeks $3 billion in compensation from the online 80 Without legislation specific to online gambling, the United State’s attempt to apply Wire Act to gain jurisdiction over offshore gambling operators has initially achieved mixed results. On the one hand, enforcement sweeps are able to reek havoc in isolated cases. On the other hand, these regulatory flexings create problems for other national regulatory systems –where these same operators are legal. In the Black Friday example, the consequences for effective regulation of the legal market offer in France was serious. Black Friday created political and economic turbulence for France and its legitimacy of authority! Ultimately, these national sweeps/busts do little to prevent/stop the larger global market from keeping its doors open. National laws and regulatory tools are out of sync with technological capacities (i.e., Internet) and flows of these global gambling markets. 91 companies, and up to 65 years of prison time for some of the 11 defendants (Silver 2011). In terms of the global economic ramifications of this law enforcement crackdown, H2 Gambling Capital, a global gambling consulting agency, reports: Black Friday (and subsequent actions) occurring in the U.S.…have decimated the scale of the Internet poker industry in that market. At this stage we have calculated that the impact will equate to as much as €765 million of lost market value this year and a further €100 million loss next year (H2 Gambling Capital: 2011). 81 Though I provide a full discussion of these global regulatory and law enforcement dimensions in Chapter 5, here I continue describing how SGB have become more thickly intertwined in the state’s sport betting regulatory relations in France. SGB: Sport Rules as Regulatory Device With the arrival of SGB as an additional interest holder and governance actor in matters of sport betting, the more traditional regulatory model between the state and private sector reconfigures. France has two especially valuable national and global sport events, the Tour de France and Roland Garros, part of the tennis “Grand Slam.” Keeping these nationally important stakeholders happy with the government is important. Though 81 In addition to attributing the market deceleration to US Department of Justice crackdown, H2 Gambling Capital forecasts highlight the ways natural disasters, such as the Japanese earthquake disrupt not only local markets (due to damaged social and telecommunication infrastructures), but also impacts markets well beyond Japan. To free up communication networks for emergency use, Japanese Racing Association betting services abruptly halted. 92 here I focus on how SGB join the state in its more traditional national authority governing the gambling sector, I will come back to this subject of the state and sport industry relations later in this analysis. One formal way SGB enter the regulatory picture happens through the review and authorization of approved sporting events and types of sporting results for which RGO may promote bets. ARJEL designates and relies upon SGB to set betting criteria. This authority arises through national law but looks outward to SGB, namely sports’ International Federations, rather than National Federations, for standard setting. There is a sense that each sport discipline vis-à-vis its International Federation possesses the expertise to evaluate its game rules and participants to determine which conditions are vulnerable to betting-related integrity issues. For SGB, this state- conferred power to determine betting criteria constitutes a safeguarding mechanism against the corruption of fair play, i.e., against the game’s rules and integrity. The following reasoning underlies this invitation of SGB to decide which types of bets or events that RGO may promote: if incentives to cheat outweigh mechanisms of detection and punishment, then it is prudent to deny such betting activities all together. As discussed in the previous chapter, negotiating common standards as a guard against match-fixing or betting-related cheating proves especially tricky. To determine permissible or impermissible bet types, a sport governing body must understand what types of bets are popular or common and what correlative details of its particular sport discipline are vulnerable to these betting forms. It is one thing to calibrate sport betting rules by defining categories of allowed bet types and events with respect to a local or national demographic betting cultures and habits, but to do this globally requires knowledge of culturally relative betting trends globally, across the world. For SGB, 93 fathoming the betting scenarios in order to draft rules to ensure sport integrity becomes impossible when global betting markets offer diverse and derivative betting products. Exchange betting is one example of how bet proposals enable punters to wager on endless creative details or particular phases of a game, such as number of penalties, red (or yellow) card issuances, the identity of a first, second, or third substitute, the timing of a substitute, identity of scorers, throw ins, lets (tennis), ball possession sequences, or even injuries. It is thought dangerous to allow operators to solicit derivative or creative bets that SGB (those charged with making sport rules) cannot imagine or anticipate through astute and prudent rules that safeguard sport integrity (at the playing field level). 82 Such betting types may increase incentives for rigging matches via point shaving or timed scoring. These activities are particularly difficult, sometimes impossible, to detect and prove. Distinguishing or judging gradations of tanking is also difficult to impossible (Gunn & Rees, 2008: 2). With exchange betting and live betting, creative proposal bets concentrate on details and phases of the game. These offers have become especially attractive on the gambling market: “Operators have therefore progressively refined their offering and now offer the opportunity of betting on certain details or different phases of a match: for example the number of cards, number of corners, identity of goal scorers, first throw-in, winner of a certain phase of the game, etc.” (Boniface et al., 38). Live betting as a sport integrity danger is prone to spot fixing. Spot fixing is much trickier to detect than throwing or rigging an entire match or fixture. Essentially, spot fixing enables 82 Earlier, I introduced two popular derivative betting formulas: Asian Total and Asian Handicap. Other common derivative bets include “correct score,” “half time/full time,” and “1X2 King Formula” (SportAccord 2011: 14). 94 irregular/corrupt play during given phases or stages of play without it necessarily effecting the overall outcome. The kinds of sporting activities upon which these bets are wagered are thought susceptible to bribes. When an athlete is not asked to throw a game but merely asked to do something odd or peculiar, it is thought easier to recruit match- fixing accomplices. An example of spot fixing can be seen in a 2010 cricket scandal in which Former Pakistan captain Salmon Butt and players Mohammad Asif and Mohammad Amir were bribed to bowl three precisely timed no-balls in a test match against England (Scott 2011). An l'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) study on sport integrity vulnerability to betting types determined that some betting types are more risky than others: “they can encourage the committing of specific frauds judged ‘harmless’ by the targets of the corruption because they do not alter the essentials, i.e., the final results of competitions” (Boniface et al., 68). Moreover, when creative bets occur through exchange betting, where bets are proposed by one punter and backed by another rather than the house standing to gain or lose, the “operator does not suffer any loss if a match is rigged, because all it does is put gamblers in touch with one another” (Boniface et al., 40). Thus, an operator has less at stake in the event of fraudulent behavior such as match-fixing. Examples of restricting betting criteria include prohibitions against betting on youth sporting events, lesser or smaller sports, or events without TV coverage, because these sports are thought to lack the informal social control effect of being in the public eye. Betting types that put a premium on insider information are also banned. For example, there are restrictions on betting on certain cycling events. Betting on sprints or other certain phase awards (e.g., hill summit awards and point rankings) is not allowed; 95 in cycling, the team dynamic by which a leader is designated could also be vulnerable to manipulation. Even if another racer is stronger or capable of advantage, some team strategies curtail or prioritize times/places in which top performances might differ from a given rider’s actual capability in such context. This makes detecting underperformance or artificial efforts especially difficult to detect. In 2012, ARJEL’s schedule of events permissible for betting included 30 sport disciplines. For each of these sanctioned sport disciplines, ARJEL further specifies the permissible betting types. The difficulty with regulating sport integrity in this manner is that restricting legal market offers undercuts this market’s ability to compete against the black market. To be sure, this is the position of a leading lobbying and representative group for gambling operators that warns, “Any limitation to the product portfolio reduces the impact of initiatives to control and repress. Therefore, limitations on the product portfolio make any efforts to reduce the size of the black market less effective when online gaming is regulated” (MAG, 21). According to this perspective, to ensure the competitiveness of the legal offer (gambling product portfolio), the market needs to be able to make its product appealing. Sport Integrity Regulatory Crisis: Ignoring, Regulating, or Escalating Risks SportAccord leads an effort for SGB to alert its members about the urgency to overcome a sport governance blind spot. According to SportAccord, there is a widespread crisis, yet SGB remain either ignorant of or naïve about the risks of sport betting. The IOC has been a latecomer to seeing sport betting as a pervasive concern or even as a relevant worry at all for the Olympics. The denial of the problem has slowly 96 and only recently eroded. As one sport governing body lawyer recalls: “The IOC, they [were] saying, at first, they weren’t concerned, saying that when people play for their country, they have feelings, national feelings. They don’t want to drop [‘throw a match’] their game. But now they know this is the case” (Interview 0002SB, 2011). Oh, but were it true! Even those inspired and filled with Olympic spirit folly. Olympians and other Olympic referees, judges, and participants have shown themselves mortal, lacking armor capable of resisting temptations of economic gain, lures and hooks of matchmakers’ cudgeling incentives and promises (Ramos; McLaren 23, 31). SportAccord’s message is clear: sport governance must better understand these problems and develop swift policy through a unified response. I want to emphasize that the kinds of sport integrity issues that are ultimately perceived as being at stake here are actually quite diverse. These sport integrity risks are those which I showed in the last chapter’s model as being located at the playing field level as well as among sport governance, private, national, and transnational actors. 83 At the institutional level, for SGB, sport integrity may boil down to a concern for authority and legitimacy. Keen and determined to undertake an internal sport governance solution, SportAccord’s calls for implementation of common standards for sport integrity are about protecting sport autonomy. For SGB, the idea of external governance intervention is intolerable. Any sort of external oversight seriously threatens its very basis of authority: It would be disastrous if the politicians took over the governing of sport, since a lot of their decisions would be taken not to benefit sport but to benefit all other 83 These sport integrity threats also come from outside sport spheres –from FATF, UNODC. Beyond sport, sport integrity is seen to involve risks to financial security (i.e., global market volatility), crime (i.e., transnational criminal networks), and money laundering. These are integrity issues ignite concerns among national and transnational governance actors. 97 purposes…National governments and international institutions – like the United Nations and the European Union –can give guidance to sports movements, but it is up to each international and national federation to decide their own rules. Only if actors in the sport movement act illegally, must the authorities intervene and punish the person and institutions that violate the laws (Nygaard 2011). By exercising power to restrict certain types of bets, SGB control gambling products. To be sure, RGO find little palatable in this market curtailment. Extracting licensing and other fees already hampers the profitability. Player payout depends upon calculating odds, costs, and needed margins of profit. In addition to licensing fees, licensed operators remain subject to a transformed, but nevertheless active, regressive poll tax, which scaffolds public causes, namely sport. In France for 2010, The average payout made by operators licensed to accept fixed-odds sport bets is assumed to have been around 79% of turnover. In sport betting, the tax rate is 7.5% on turnover and a further 1.3% dedicated to the Centre National pour le Dévelopment du Sport. The latter levy will be increased to 1.5% on turnover in 2011 and level off at 1.8% in 2012 (MAG, 11). The impact of this aggressive tax scheme on competitiveness of the legal gambling offer against illegal market offer may be more harmful to effective regulation if licensed operators cannot offer payouts more on par with the 85-99% payout rates consistently available on the black market. Moreover, further clamping down on the legal market offer by restricting betting product types may cap this market’s profit levels (MAG; Boniface et al., 2011; Davies 2011). Doing so may also weaken the competitive viability of this market against grey and black markets. Licensed RGO find themselves with a 98 constrained market in which some innovative betting formulas and services are locked out as prohibited. For RGO, this harms the competitiveness of the legal gambling entertainment industry by stripping it of products that show real promise as breadwinning financial gainers. Sport integrity, as RGO see it, is a political rhetoric that has ultimately given them –the gambling industry– short shrift. The potential expansiveness, for RGO, becomes artificially unattainable, unrealized, and thus is bad for business, as well as bad for regulation. By raising incentives for these black market offers, such regulatory strategies drive gambling activities underground. Sport Betting Right/Financial Fair Return I have shown the ways that SGB attempt to safeguard sport integrity through rule implementation for its participants as well as the ways that SGB enter the sport betting regulatory picture in partnerships with ARJEL through a power to decide permissible bet types criteria. As important as these two roles are for understanding sport integrity authority, SGB acquire a third linkage and mechanism of authority within these sport gambling regulatory and market networks. Since 2010, the Gambling Act not only closes the distance between French and EU laws but also goes further by asserting the notion of sport betting rights (SBR). 84 The French statutory framework requires betting operators to apply, purchase, and comply with national accreditation-licensing criteria and also obligates them to negotiate and obtain gambling rights. Though the Gambling 84 Sport betting rights are specified in the Sport Code (Articles L.333-1 and L.333-1-1 of the “Code du Sport”). Sport betting right are emerging rights. Currently, France, and Australia (State of Victoria) are the only two states with fully and formally articulated legislative case law enshrining these rights. In 2004, Victoria became the first state with this inventive legislation. While I adopt the term sport event holder, this stakeholder, is frequently and interchangeably referred to as the sport event owner. 99 Act disperses the political and economic capital formerly concentrated in the state’s former monopolistic regulation of this sector, it does so while cushioning France’s loss of power. SGB are the primary benefactor of this dispersed state authority. The Gambling Act dampens the nation-state’s crisis of control in yet another dimension by divesting power in a manner that nests the state, and the state’s interests, into global governance networks. By entrusting an intermediary actor, a sport governing body vis-à-vis its status as a sport event holder, with a device – a sport betting right – that can have a say in how these markets work, the state reconfigures itself and its relevancy. There is a power game in these national policies. The state via SGB nests itself within both transnational governance and market networks. As a global project, sport promotes the social, political, and economic interests of the state. France cares about showing its athletic prowess on the global stage but seems insecure about having no recent French overall winners in either the Tour de France or Roland Garros. Yet there is more direct economic maneuvering in the state’s venture on sport, the installation of SGB in sport gambling regulatory matters. Here is an important instance of national industrial policy whereby the state selects industry champions (i.e., Germany and Deutsche Telekom; France and Airbus; United States and General Motors) that have favorable synergies with the State. France cannot afford to ignore the online sport gambling economy that is alive and thriving within its borders. Sport can be seen as a “national champions” industrial policy move for France. Both Roland Garros and The Tour de France have special status. France shows itself willing to intervene in sport gambling markets to foster the growth and development of its sport industry. As benefactors of the state’s largesse, SGB become elevated as champion industries. The State bets on these 100 national champions, these industrial players, as ventures for global economic might and projection on the global map. 85 French case law and legislation establish a national basis by which a limited licensed approach to the sport gambling market also fits with an important notion of sport betting rights. The subject of this section revolves around the creation and application of SBR. The notion of sport betting rights is also known as financial fair return (FFR). 86 This additional regulatory dimension provides an opportunity to see the mechanisms of economic and political capital in action, repositioning and exercising authority. The French Gambling Act formalizes the sport event holder (SEH) as a regulatory partner with a special proprietary status. For example, with an event such as Les Internationaux de France de Roland-Garros (Roland Garros), which is owned by the Federation Française de Tennis (FFT), SBR appear as a resource that potentially enriches the national federation (NF). 87 On the other hand, with an event such as the Tour de France, owned by Amaury Sport Organisation, revenues generated through a sport betting right 85 France chooses to update its handle on gambling activities in a direction that endows sport; thereby France obtains a favourable position of authority in both these markets. Paradoxically, I argue, France may ultimately come to defer to global sport’s authority. I will develop this argument later. It is interesting to note that Victoria, Australia –the only other political jurisdiction with a protected sport betting right–is home to the Australian Open (Grand Slam). It is a critical global export and global image- maker for this state. 86 Though these terms are used interchangeably, I will predominantly refer to this notion as sport betting rights. In the next chapter, I will analyze sport betting rights more closely, as I make an argument on kinds of tools necessary for global authority. I will then doubly but differently use both terms, sport betting rights and financial fair return to emphasize different characteristics of this same tool. 87 Les Internationaux de France de Roland-Garros is also known as Tournoi de Roland-Garros. Throughout this paper, I will refer to this tennis tournament by the following names: Roland Garros, The French Open, or The Open. 101 endow a private sector entity. 88 Though I will later return to a discussion of the differences between private and quasi-public ownership of a sporting event, for now I will continue looking at SBR as in the instances linked to SGB. 89 Through this legislation, SGB’s authority reconfigures gambling sector relations. In addition to authorizing bet types and events, SGB again tie into gambling sector relations in both market and regulatory roles. Calling the Lines Between Sport and Gambling Products: Unibet v Federation Française de Tennis According to Killy 2011, rather than singly innovating this notion of a sport betting right, the Gambling Act essentially enshrines a right articulated in recent French judicial decisions. 90 The Gambling Act together with this French case law redraws the boundaries of SGB authority by re-conceptualizing a fundamental resource of political and economic capital. Like the gambling advertising controversies that ripped through the global professional road-cycling landscape, polarizing private, sport governance, and state stakeholders in 2007, a remote gambling operator, Unibet, again features as a central 88 Typically sport event holders are SGB. National or international federations typically own their sports’ signature events. For example the FFT –a National Federation- owns Roland Garros while FIFA –an International Federation- owns football’s World Cup. Beyond these two possibilities, a sport event may also be privately owned. This is the case with Amaury Sport Organisation’s ownership of the Tour de France. Later, I discuss the consequences of these different rights holding positions of private versus semi public, SGB. 89 As SGB employ SBR to protect game’s integrity, this ultimately comes to protect its governance legitimacy and autonomy. In the remainder of this chapter, I present data to support and clarify this position. Waking to the global reality, SGB find they must compete. Economic power is necessary to ensuring one’s political power. To stay the regulator, to have legitimacy, there is an economic imperative. And this economic imperative is global. 90 For an extended conversation on the development of the French Sport Code and case law, see Vilotte (2011) and Gardiner (2006: 263). 102 character in disputes erupting between French and international law. One major decision that re-qualified property and thus transformed authority in these sport and sport gambling sectors arose in the Paris Court of Appeals ruling, Unibet International Ltd v Federation Française de Tennis (October 14 2009). 91 By briefing and analyzing this case, I expect to make clear the role courts play in this emergent sport betting right. During the 2007 Roland Garros tournament, the Federation Française de Tennis (FFT) became aware that Unibet International Ltd (Unibet), a Maltese-incorporated remote gambling operator, was soliciting and organizing bets on The Open. For example, Unibet’s homepage advertised the following: Bet on the French Open…Carefully follow how events unfold on this new day at the French Open. Bet today on the two men’s semi-finals between Roger Federer and Nikolay Davydenko and Novak Djokovic and Rafael Nadal: a betting schedule stating: 070609 [sic] Saturday 3.00 pm, Roland Garros women’s final, 070610 [sic] Sunday 3.00 pm, Roland Garros Men’s Final (French Court of Appeal, 2009: 2). Other Unibet web pages tagged Roland Garros through advertisements and announcements of betting services such as the following: “Tennis - Grand Slam - Roland Garros - Sports bets;” “Tennis - Grand Slam - Doubles Roland Garros;” “Tennis - Grand Slam - Roland Garros - Ladies:” or “Tennis - Grand Slam - Roland Garros” (French Court of Appeal, 2009: 3). Moreover, there were earlier instances of bet soliciting vis-à- vis the Roland Garros brand. In 2008, Unibet advertised the chance to win a trip to Roland Garros by betting on the Australian Open. Seeking damages for unauthorized use 91 Unibet International Ltd v Federation Française de Tennis (2009). 103 of its product, FFT claimed an exclusive right to exploit its name and reputation, including its gambling right. Defending itself and its market prerogative against these charges and any curtailment, Unibet attempted to nullify the FFT’s standing by pointing to the fact that French law did not at that time allow the exploitation of this right. Even should the French Sport Code be read as inscribing gambling rights as exclusive rights of SEH, Unibet argued, they lacked any legal basis for its sale. Rejecting Unibet’s argument, the court ruled that even though FFT could not at that time organize bets, it did, in fact, possess the authority to control betting activity. The FFT has the capacity to and the interest in preserving its legal right to exploit the event it organizes from any infringement. This interest and this right subsist independently of the lawful or unlawful nature of the facts comprising this infringement involving other norms relating to the organization of online betting and foreseeable opening of this market (French Court of Appeal, 2009: 4). Supporting its conclusion, the court cited the manner of petition by which la Française des Jeux (FdJ) seeks FFT authorization for its gambling products that involve Roland Garros themes, such as a Roland Garros themed lottery card, prior to organizing of such lottery games. 92 As Unibet failed to request authorization or notify the FFT, there were opportunities neither to revoke nor to deny Unibet’s assembling bets on its sporting product. Thus, the Court dismissed Unibet’s counter that FFT had erected monopolistic barriers contrary to EU law. The Court reasoned that the FFT lacked any chance to act in a discriminatory fashion, as it had never been petitioned for the betting rights in advance 92 This notification or request also appeared when FdJ produced Tour de France themed lottery scratchers. 104 by Unibet. Ultimately, the Court concluded that even prior to a sport betting right as sellable in an open legal betting market, this right must first be obtained from the right holder. 93 While the Court berated Unibet for a marketing campaign that parasitically preyed upon the FFT’s sport event product, Roland Garros, neither the reasoning nor implications of the case award are entirely clear. 94 The Court offers the following reasoning for its decision by which the abstract object of a sport betting right becomes (re)conceptualized: Whereas Unibet unsuccessfully argues that as the bets concern the results (whether the winner, the length of the meeting, the number of games, the number of faults, or the winning points of each of the players) which are unknown not proprietary data as factual, they are inevitably outside the scope of the exploitation right. Whereas the purpose of the bet is obviously not the known result, but the hazard which only exists whilst the event is running and which by definition ends when its finishes, the result stopping the economic flow generated by the organization of the bets, illustrating that this flow is an exploitation of the sports event which is its support. The sophistry Unibet uses to argue that the organization of online betting must be assimilated to electronic information to the public by online means pursuant to article L333-7 of the Sports Code, and thus, 93 This case fails to render a bright line test for recognizing and navigating the limits of IP exploitability. 94 The language of the Court’s decision is replete with an indictment of Unibet of having obtaining unfair commercial advantage for “free riding” and “parasitism”. 105 have the same freedoms as a press company will not be accepted (Unibet International Ltd. v. Federation Française de Tennis, 2009: 5). 95 The Court decided that Unibet had, in fact, exploited the “Roland Garros” trademark, a situation of flagrant “free riding.” Unibet profited in the wake of FFT’s know-how, expertise, and product development without incurring any costs of rents or investment. The Court decision exudes an annoyance with Unibet’s sense of entitlement, by which it derived huge margins of profits for nothing. The lack of partnership and financial investment was deemed unsupportable. One example cited in the ruling was how the Roland Garros name added Internet priority pull-up worth on search engine results that boosted Unibet’s website valuation. For the courts, this constituted “cheat-like” behavior, or what it called “parasitism”. 96 Whether zipping Unibet to the top of search engine results or not, FFT cares about the ways the Roland Garros name is, in advertising world parlance, “merched.” How FFT’s brand is merchandised, visually displayed alongside, experienced, and circulated among other products and services is critical. Consultancy research estimates the worth of the Roland Garros logo at €17.1 million (Fédération Française de Tennis 2011). For a 95 The Court fined Unibet €400,000 for breach of exclusive gaming rights of FFT; €300,000 for trademark infringement; and €500,000 for damages of parasitism -FFT had sought €1.5 million on this count!. Additionally, the court ordered Unibet to file public notification through media announcements (responsible for fees of up to €5,000) in five media or newsprint journals of the FFT’s choice. In Sté Paris Saint Germain v. Sté Bwin and Internet Opportunity Limited (2010), this same court upheld a decision in favour of Bwin, finding that the use of “PSG” name/brand was necessary to identify the subject. The court found that the use of the team name (trademark) was not parasitic or without undue benefit. The court found the use of the team name as a necessary designation of event in which no other name could have been used. These cases in France and the EU are about the right to information versus copyright. 96 Implicit in the court’s decision and criticism Unibet for ‘sophistry’ in submitting that it should be entitled to same privileges and freedoms as press company is a distinction between sport facts for commercial and noncommercial purposes. The degree of Unibet’s dependency and profit making upon FFT’s product that the court described as “parasitic” assaulted the property system rules and principles by which the cultural industries – of which sport is a substantial part – depend. 106 sport event holder such as the FFT, the public image of its tightly coiffed and marketed sport event production is everything. Much like what Lash and Urry observe in the recording industry, the labour of SEH primarily involves distinguishing a product vis-à- vis its packaging, its branding: What (all) the culture industries produce becomes increasingly not like commodities but advertisements…as with advertising firms, the cultural industries sell not themselves but something else and they achieve this through ‘packaging’. Also like advertising firms, they sell ‘brands’ of something else. And they do this through the transfer of value through image (Lash & Urry 138). To be sure, FFT cares about protecting and propelling Roland Garros, its sport property, as broadly and sustainably as possible. Like service and hospitality industries, public image and relations in sport are fundamental to sustaining and building value. 97 SBR become bundled as part of the ambit of these others, established and recognized as exclusive sport rights. SBR become devices for achieving a number of ends: ensuring the integrity of sport rules of play, legitimizing sport institutional authority, monitoring financial flows, and protecting sport property reputation image and worth. 98 The FFT-Unibet ruling is important to FFT. It is also important to proprietary claims gaining momentum globally across the sport sector. Within the FFT, there is a real sense of relief and confidence in these decisions: 97 Service marks are essential to building value for commercialized sport. 98 SGB have longstanding concerns about association with gambling activities. As noted above, not until recently has gambling discarded its reputational draping as morally derelict engagement suspected of being wasteful of time, talent, and money. In a word, the gambling leisure realm has been thought dangerous. Consequently, sport have vigilantly patrolled and sought to distance themselves from any association with betting (McLaren 2011). 107 Now we have this case law and this case law brought up in Parliament. We won on three counts: (1) exploitation of right without Roland Garros, there would be no betting on Roland Garros; (2) economical profits out of another activity that Unibet was packaging betting product with chance to win trip to Roland Garros or [some] such taking advantage of Roland Garros image to expand their activities; and (3) [the] weakest point, on trademark infringement (Montane 2011). The Court’s reasoning has a bearing on sport rights controversies worldwide, a subject I develop further in the next chapter. 99 Hidden within the juridical speak of the FFT- Unibet decision lies a choice concerning the public and private realms of products and sport product authorship, and thus ownership. Essentially, such decisions are about discerning and declaring what constitutes an intellectual property (IP). 100 When and where should sport products be protected by IP status? Is a sport product (i.e., sport production event) a public good, open to free access? Are SBR absolute or restricted public or private rights? 101 The FFT-Unibet case study is helpful for understanding how courts determine at what point the sport product (in this case the Roland Garros image and event product) crosses a line from a private domain, where sovereign authority to name the form, times, and places of a product’s availability are most intact, and becomes opened or released as a public domain product. What features demarcate a sufficiently independent and 99 Although the court failed to reach a substantive conclusion on whether or not FFT’s trademark and intellectual properties were exploited, the case raises and reframes questions regarding the boundaries between sport as a private property versus sport as a public good. 100 Copyright typically involves decisions about protecting literary, artistic, informational, and creative works. 101 The ways these answer these questions are decided has very real, material consequences for the allocation and access to resources. These are matters of political and economic rights. 108 differentiated product? Unibet’s position, and that of the gaming industry at large, is that this demarcation happens quite early in the sport production chain. These are central questions about abstract properties, about IP. 102 The answers to these questions are particularly important in these global sport betting-sector struggles and they are important for global governance. The FFT-Unibet decision is an instance of activity in rights redefinition and expansion that significantly impacts social relations. Where courts draw boundaries around products – in this case, sport’s IP products – has huge implications for markets and social relations. Certainly in France, but also transnationally, the notion of SBR fundamentally transforms authority in both sport markets and sport gambling markets. For my argument on property and global authority, the important consideration is how the Court’s reasoning contains important indicators for tracing and specifying the corporealization, or the materialization, of this sport betting right. The Court re- conceptualizes the boundaries of sport betting rights, distinguishing what constitutes a sport product and its reproduction from other existing or totally new, differentiated products. Legal decisions are critical aspects that mold schemes of perception that inform and enable actions. The institutional origins of SBR that I have described in France involve loci of legal change and innovation that refute political legal scholarship that views law and the judiciary as situated outside processes of social change. The Court decision in FFT- Unibet offers an important illustration of the ways the judiciary shapes, even initiates, 102 IP is the generic name to a legal regime that includes trade secrets, patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Intellectual property law covers a diversity of fields of human activity, including but not limited to environment, biomedical, cultural, and financial actions. Intellectual property rights theory is a legal doctrine. 109 law and legal discourse, rather than merely reviewing or enforcing the law. Law and society scholars have drawn attention to how judicial actions and rulings come to constitute and re-constitute particular forms of social control and governance. The notion of a judiciary completely detached from legislative or social political processes is a myth. The representation of a judiciary that exclusively or blindly applies legal reasoning and expertise to disputes brought before its courts obscures the ways in which judicial actions change, redirect, or create new relationships between law and society. Judicial actions enable particular forms of governance, which is critical because courts are increasingly called upon to decide matters involving abstract objects. The FFT-Unibet decision signaled and made possible a political and legal climate in which the authority of SGB might come to have real authority to regulate the global threats of sport betting. This court ruling paved a way for materializing the notion of sport betting rights. 110 Chapter 4 Global Governance: Property, Fair Return, and Regulation In this chapter, I examine the multiple emerging bases of sport betting rights in France and then propose some hypotheses for understanding the shifting relations between global capital and authority. Though frequently used interchangeably, the terms sport betting rights and financial fair return have nuanced distinctions important for understanding the different interests that steer policy choice. Examining the bases for and implications of these emergent rights, I select the terms SBR and FFR to depict two different aspects of what is, in fact, a common social, legal device. Without desiring to set these two aspects in strict dichotomy, I draw attention to the connection between the different ways SBR are used as devices that effect the direction of transformations in governance. 103 On the one hand, SBR arguments are made to fit within – while simultaneously attempting to extend the substantive scope of – traditional intellectual property rights. In this fashion, the rationale for SBR is market-based. On the other hand, these rights arise as part and parcel of long-asserted cultural rights claims for sport’s specificity (Vilotte 2011; Chappelet; Boniface et al.). 104 Drawing from interviews with ARJEL, RGO, sport lawyers, referees, IFs, the IOC, global gambling 103 Perhaps surprisingly, the innovation and development of this new IPR, sport betting rights, emerged from the state. FFT and SBR are interdependent, correlative aspects of a single, common device. 104 Borja Garcia discusses the illusiveness of “sport specificity”. Despite being frequently claimed, there is little consensus of the social and legal contours of sport specificity. For Garcia sport organizations have yet “ to produce a clear definition of what the specificity of sport is. Very broadly speaking, the so-called specificity of sport can be understood as the inherent characteristics of sport, both as a social and economic activity, which can justify a tailored application of EU law and policies. The most common example is that of the necessity of balanced competitions” (Garcia, 2007: 7). 111 consultants, and the French Ministry of Sport, I develop a typology that identifies three general rationales and applications by which emerging SBR function: as potential rent- extracting properties (i.e., intellectual properties), as redistributive techniques (i.e., a social policy or civil society/public sphere tool), and as regulatory mechanisms. This analysis of SBR eschews abstract global jargon by describing the ways in which globalization works locally in day-to-day, everyday places. SBR arise and function with attributes consistent with what these globalization theories predict. In building an argument on globalization, I will specify the “global” and “transnational” aspects of each of these attributes. By studying SBR, I will show the real, material features and mechanisms of what Manuel Castells calls an information society. Below, I work through the three purposes for which SBR operate and draw out the diverging implications of these devices that become manifest in and transform relations of authority. SBR in a Global Information Economy The economy of global sport markets depends less and less on the collection of live venue gate receipts from fans seeking to celebrate athletes on the pitch or in the arena, but rather accrues from the global broadcast reproductions of these sport spectacles. The product of both sport broadcast and betting markets is digital information and its reproduction. With information as the product, all sorts of global geopolitical maneuvers can be used to overstep any particular local market regulation. Information producers can reposition themselves alongside flows of labour, resource, production, and capital in order to extract maximum economic advantage. Ultimately, these information 112 bits become the global sport markets’ fundamental product. By specializing in informational industries, new players – state and non-state actors – discover opportunities to obtain a quick or decisive edge. In fact, information has come to constitute both the primary labor resource (raw material) and the end product of these markets. Globalization, according to Castells, can be understood as an information society paradigm that involves social, technological, and labour processes: In the new, informational mode of development the source of productivity lies in the technology of knowledge generation, and symbol communication. To be sure, knowledge and information are critical elements in all modes of development, since the production is always based on some level of knowledge and in the process of information. However, what is specific to the informational mode of development is the action of knowledge upon knowledge itself as the main source of productivity (Castells, 2000: 17). While globalization scholars primarily evidence this information society through studies of hi-tech research and development or of financial industries, the fundamental aspects of an information economy are also present in creative industries where the mainstay products are intellectual properties that circulate in culture and entertainment industries. In music, film, and publishing, knowledge production of artists’ and authors’ works circulate vis-à-vis intellectual properties. IP are the result of imbuing abstract objects with social, economic, and legal anchorage by which to enter markets of exchange and consumption, and sport, too, participates in these entertainment industries. As technologies create opportunities for productivity and profitability, they inevitably shift or strip established proprietary relations. Take, for example, the way 113 online gambling recasts the physical and social relations of brick and mortar gambling venues. 105 With Internet gambling, bookmakers no longer rely upon local storefronts to gather high volumes of punts from a global population of punters. SBR also re-qualify relations of production. Submitting abstract objects as intellectual property requires creating an object’s expressibility. Through careful attention to the creation of SBR, I present evidence of how abstract objects become embodied beliefs and products. SBR represent a cadre of products that might be dubbed thin air products. 106 To be sure, such thin air products link up with and produce material resources and capital. After a while, we come to take such thin air products for granted, as given and real. Circulating as common symbolic and material currency, these products enter our vocabulary. Eventually, thin air products come to have currency. Through the articulation of emerging sport betting rights, these thin air products become rent-extracting devices, useful for demanding compensation for product or service access. More than poetic description, such language orients labour and consumption relations. This chapter is about how agents come to hold – both seeing that they hold and are seen to hold – such devices. A social account of thin air products is fundamental to understanding the production of new properties that, I argue, reveal and propel changed relationships between property and authority in a global age. In terms of authority, SBR have political and economic purchase for meeting challenges of sport integrity, and the production of SBR has serious political, legal, and economic implications. 105 Brick and mortar type betshops are also known as “land-based channels” versus “online channels.” 106 Broadcast rights can also be thought of as thin air products. We know what we mean when we talk about broadcast rights, and others defer and pay when we demand compensation for broadcast rights. 114 Sport Betting Rights as Intellectual Property I begin this section by looking at SBR as property devices. Courts are increasingly called upon to decide whether or not it is desirable to apply old laws to maintain or extend given property relations. SBR partially emerge from the judicial processes that legal scholar Peter Drahos describes: “In order to make the decision, judges are necessarily involved in a process of abstraction in which they, as it were, create the abstract object that then forms the basis of their identity judgment” (Drahos, 154). Through the conceptualization of SBR, French courts and legislation endow sport event holders as having what Drahos describes as “access to capital resources” (Drahos, 153). With a case law and the Gambling Act’s legalization of the French online betting markets, a new resource for political and economic capital came up for grabs. SBR quickly became seen as a property imbued with significant rent-extracting potential for a SEH. Codifying the competition organizer’s rights, the Gambling Act sets forth the following ownership formula that extends the Sport Code: “Sports associations and the organizers of sports events…are the owners of the exploitation rights of the sports events or competitions which they organize” (Sport Code, 1984: art. L333-1). 107 ARJEL Juridical Director, Rhadames Killy affirms SBR as intellectual property, insisting that this …notion of sport property is not a novelty in French law. The [French] courts asserted and protected this [right], then later [it was] codified. No matter the exploitation, [sport betting] requires being granted the right to run betting services. This was with hospitality, images, ticketing, broadcasting, and now 107 This law modifies the articles of the Sports Code that deal with the rights of sporting event organizers (Law 92-652, July 13 1992). 115 [with] gambling. In 2007, arose the question whether this applied to gambling. The FFT-Unibet case, this case is critical…this ruling became enshrined in law, 12 May 2010 [the Gambling Act]. The law is a restatement of this court ruling and property right (Killy 2011). Sport betting rights are seen to derive from the ambit of these exploitable rights. As I show how actors apprehend and come to use, whether through acceptance or resistance, SBR as property, these documents become fundamental to identifying power relations of states, society, and transnational actors. With each favourable court ruling, ARJEL’s strides lengthen, and it steps more confidently in its regulatory remit. The 2010 legislation and regulatory system gave rise to a number of lawsuits, as gaming operators contested the legitimacy of SBR. For ARJEL, these court rulings and law are foundational evidence by which it sees and anchors SBR as a property-based right. What has been the reaction of other voices within SGB and the Olympic Movement to emerging SBR? One might be forgiven for assuming the idea of SBR to have arisen from sport movement impetus. However, for a number of reasons, this was not the case. Not only did SGB not innovate or initially lobby for SBR, but some SGB actively opposed SBR. In 2005, the IOC sought assurances from the 2012 Olympic Games soon-to-be host city London for a law enforcement crackdown upon gambling (Davies 2011). Gathering little or no momentum internationally, and not even a stir nationally in the UK, these calls for an earnest law enforcement effort floundered. As indicative of the IOC perspective on sport gambling activities less than a decade ago, this example shows the IOC’s reaction to sport betting in its typical, more prohibitionist posture. I use this example to raise and answer two questions worth emphasizing. First, 116 how can we explain and understand the IOC’s failure to mobilize political or legal action in light of its success in other cases that might be considered similarly weighty and related? Second, what explains the changing IOC position with respect to betting? Prior to awarding Beijing hosting honours for the 2008 Games, the IOC put pressure on China to implement intellectual property rights laws, pressure that proved effective in bringing about desired legal change. In 2002, China’s Regulations on the Protection of the Olympic Symbols stands as an important example of the weight that the IOC can bring to bear as a transnational actor (Mitten, 21). Remarkably, China acquiesced on an issue on which other states and transnational actors previously and repeatedly failed to gain ground. In contradistinction, the issue of gambling regulation vis-à-vis petitioning law enforcement reveals real limits to the IOC’s ability to shape the international regulatory landscape. As a global governance force, the IOC shows itself as an able norm carrier, capable of helping spread norms of importance across sectors. While pushing China to implement IP legislative protections is an example of the transnational power that the IOC can bring to bear in effecting change for desired law and policy, these processes are not entirely supportive of a total global governance thesis – an absent or totally withered state thesis. 108 Even as this is an important example of a non- state actor capable of agenda setting, pressuring a state to erect law and policy measures more in harmony with an international legal landscape, there is a caveat. China’s implementation of IP protections happens through internal, national protections vis-à-vis national IP registry rather than any adoption, acceptance, or membership in an international IP legal regime or network of transnational governance. This difference 108 In Chapter 5, I will further develop this subject of SGB as norm carriers and transnational actors. 117 matters: rather than contributing to a global governance network, these IP laws reinforce a state-by-state compartmentalized international legal system. The IOC’s inefficacy on this issue of sport gambling regulation may be attributed to a lack of state capacity or volition. Unable to deter gambling through tactics of ramping up national legislation, the IOC’s stance on sport gambling has shifted. As global market imperatives empty these moralist endeavours of devout followers, these projects run out of steam. Sport gambling conversations among sport governing bodies indicate an evolving perspective more favourably disposed toward connections between sport and sport betting. In fact, a tone of real eagerness, applauding a positive relation between sport and sport betting, resounds more and more nowadays. For SGB, there is real interest, not only in understanding but also perhaps even in capitalizing on regulated sport betting. Expanding intellectual property holdings to include SBR opens an avenue that might bolster SGB authority. 109 Yet, to be accurate, the IOC has been more reluctant to welcome SBR than have some of its members. Materialization of Sport Broadcast Rights In the section below, I briefly sketch the sources constructing and asserting this new sport product: sport betting rights. As technological innovations change the nature of sport and its audiences, SGB retrofit the architecture of their property holdings to 109 The global market of sport properties produces some rather disruptive social and political consequences in different locations. Amara captures social and economic sport tensions that erupted with on Arab Sport as Emirates seeking inclusion in WTO and suddenly were made to adopt new IP “rights” by which exclusive broadcasting sales and practices closed out free-to-air access (Amara 2010). One of two legal disputes that erupted involved Al Jazeera. (Amara, 2010; Hylton 2011) 118 handle new challenges and seize new opportunities (Steen). 110 Technologies expand the availability and type of sport viewership for local and global audiences. As media platforms create seemingly endless sport viewing offers for audiences anywhere, anytime, media technologies enhance the entertainment as a participatory medium, creating novel opportunities for viewer interaction. For example, mobile technologies (e.g., phones), GPS, real time statistical analysis (algorithm), and live streaming with interactive video technologies enable digital audiences to interact in the sport experience. Such technologies may allow sport viewers to toggle between tennis court or stadium views or select camera angles. Interactive platforms are good for fans and also good for fans qua punters. The demand for these new technologies changes sport consumption practices. Within the foundational shifts in the SGB edifice that have accompanied and enabled new property relations in the past, there are both important commonalities and differences in what we witness in how SBR disrupt authority at a global level. The technique by which the sport sector reins in the betting sector unfolds with features in common with the transformations witnessed in an earlier era of technological innovation. Developments between the sport betting and sport sectors must be read alongside shifts witnessed in sport-media relations as innovations in television, satellite, and digital broadcast re-oriented actors and created new opportunities for acquiring social, political, and economic capital. By examining what scholars frequently refer to as a sport-media 110 Technology changes sport places, times, and content-form of sport participation and viewership. The relationship between sport and media has attracted attention of scholars who have drawn attention to the way time outs and pause of play are synchronized or instituted to coincide with commercial breaks (Jeanrenaud and Kesenne, 2006). One example in American National Football League (NFL) occurred in 2009, when the new Dallas Cowboys stadium’s HD jumbotron dimensions were so large and low hanging that players kept kicking the ball into it during punts: the NFL was forced to introduce a new rule – commonly known as the "boink rule" – about what happens and how to resume play when the ball hits the jumbotron. 119 nexus, I offer a backdrop for viewing these developments and challenges with the global gambling sector (Andrews; Rowe 2000; Boyle 2002, 2009; Nicolson, 2007). By the 1960s, sport broadcast had shown itself to be a hot commodity, and networks were seeking exclusive access to differentiate themselves to audiences. SGB realized that open or broad access devalued an event’s ability to command top price tags. 111 Without legal protection, sport broadcast is vulnerable and prone to mass circulation, by which the sport production can spread beyond creator or source author’s reach. Thus sport, like any creative or leisure industry, depends upon legal protections and limitations controlling such total circulation and reproduction of their products. When the Olympic Movement first attempted to claim broadcast rights, a debate erupted. 112 Yet, even before substantial public debate or legal review, network claims to free, public access to Olympic coverage stopped dead in its tracks when the IOC declared that sport was not merely news or information. Instead, the IOC declared that sport and sport coverage, or at least the Olympics, were entertainment. Barney, Wenn, and Martyn trace the details of these sport-media stewings. Following the Melbourne Games, the IOC amended the Olympic Charter, Rule 49, to expand the scope of its publicity rights and the nature of its sport properties. (Slater, 53). Rule 49 declared, The direct, or what is commonly called Live Television Rights, to report the Games, shall be sold by the Organizing Committee, subject to the approval of the International Olympic Committee, and the proceeds from this sale shall be 111 For a discussion on changing sport media relationships see Slater (1998) and Whannel (2009). 112 There also arose an interesting debate on media and technology changes in the history of the Tour de France over the last century. For a discussion of The Tour’s changing relations with the advent of radio, cinema, and broadcast technologies, see The Tour de France, 1903-2003: A Century of Sporting Structures, Meanings, and Values (Dauncy and Hare 2003). 120 distributed according to its instructions (Olympic Charter, Rule 49). Making way for the sale of broadcast rights, this change “clashed with the position of foreign television and newsreel network executives who championed the rights of their companies to enjoy open access to the Olympics as a news event, access traditionally extended to the print media” (Barney; Wenn; Martyn, 62). Nonetheless, from the 1960 Rome Games onward, television networks that desired to broadcast the Games were required to pay. There were exceptions, however. Networks were granted an allowance of three minutes for free-to-air news coverage. Newspapers, media, and even gambling markets are what Ken Roberts calls “secondary sport-related markets” (Roberts, 2004). As I have been arguing, these information and entertainment industries are interrelated, with highly contested boundaries. These industries have a mutually beneficial relationship. News or information allowances are about a public good, but these are about synthesized commercial relationships, the sport-media nexus. This reformulation of broadcast policy was partially intended to draw top broadcast rights revenues by being able to sell exclusive broadcast rights. Ultimately, Olympic Charter, Rule 49, reformed proprietary relationships by reconceptualizing broadcast rights. This wrangling between sport and media to distinguish the boundaries of information versus entertainment revamped property and authority relationships. This sport media story is fundamental to understanding SBR. Herein lies an instance of thin air production. In this example, sport broadcast rights appear as if from nowhere. These IOC and broader sport governance changes proved to be monumental: sport broadcasting became not only linguistically reframed but also economically and politically 121 repositioned for the IOC in a way that demonstrates yet again the significance of language (Foucault 1991). Known in sports studies as the Rome Formula, such an example allows us to better see that the ways in which actors articulate their interests matters to how these actors lay claim to sources of power. While the sport-media story differs from current concerns about sport betting and sport governance relations, there are some similarities. The sport-as-entertainment distinction reappears and makes inroads into gambling operators’ turf because SBR declare that the raw materials involved in sport betting are not, in fact, public realm products, free to public access, like information. Rather, advocates of SBR posit sport betting products as proprietary stuff, sport entertainment stuff, belonging to SEH. SEH mix their creativity, expertise, research and development, and financial investment to produce a distinctly valuable property meriting legal protections. For proponents of SBR, there is something inherently unfair for later market entrants to simply reap profit by nicking a ready-made sport entertainment product at the reproduction stage. As an IP, SBR secure access to resources across time and space, access which is essential in a global age. This is especially the case in the leisure or cultural industries, including the sport sector. Scott Lash and John Urry describe the mechanisms by which actors muster authority by tightly controlling access: “only when firms are able to exclude other entrepreneurs and consumers from rights to use the cultural objects can the cultural industries survive” (Lash & Urry, 134). Sport betting rights require what Drahos calls a process of ”corporealization” (Drahos, 153). In cultural industries, Lash and Urry identify a similar requirement of materializing abstract objects. As such, these “objects are not yet ready for market. First, they must become intellectual property. That is, firms 122 can exploit or make money from cultural objects, when they have been juridically converted into intellectual property” (Lash & Urry, 135). Something similar happens with emerging SBR; however, the process is not always linear. In the case of sport betting products, these thin air products already circulate, but they do so without property contours. SBR reconceptualize and remake one cultural industry’s – the sport gambling industry’s – input as the proprietary stuff, the production objects of another and earlier in the production chain industry, the sport event industry. IP rights do this well, for they limit the free circulation and reproduction of a work. Traditionally, IP debates are cast as tensions between proponents of access as public goods and defenders of sovereign or proprietary rights. Conferring IP status upon a property inevitably restricts circulation and reproduction. 113 Intellectual property rights are about “establishing boundaries around a given product” (Halbert, 144). As often said by IP scholars, an IP right is a “right to exclude the world” (Drahos 1996). The information-versus-entertainment distinction ultimately involves a struggle between access and sovereignty. Accepting or acknowledging the designation of a sport event as entertainment paves the way for IP claims-making. The sport-as-entertainment argument becomes amenable to sport betting rights assertions. According to SGB, sport’s specific entertainment form pivots upon rules that ensure uncertainty of outcomes; these rules are critical to sport’s entertainment value. By virtue of having organized, 113 IP status is about building barriers to entry for other products. While common understanding and parlance about copyrights and other intellectual properties see these rights as innate protections of an original creator, an artistic spark or genius, scholars of copyright have demonstrated that copyright has not always been about protecting creative genius or origins of an artist or authors. Rather, copyright law evolved as a mechanism to protect the market exchange or investment of third parties. Having a copyright guarantees a means to capital over changing times and places. For example, rather than an author, it is the printer or publisher who has invested in a work with an eye to redistributing the product who acquires a writ, this thing called copyright. The copyright ties this third party’s labour and investment in with the power of control over the product. 123 marketed, and produced a sport event, as well as having mixed labour – vis-à-vis the setting and refereeing of rules to insure sport integrity – SGB attest to being the rightful stewards of SBR. Essentially, this argument posits that production and governance roles constitute an original authorship. Sport event production or governance is the creative authorship of the sport movement, market, and industry showcase events. Accordingly, SBR cannot be usurped as resources freely available to any open market actor – such as betting-service/operator actors – eager to repackage, recast, and resell this product. From what I learned through interviews with several sport governing body legal teams, the legal work of sport business and sport contracts is similar to legal work in media. One IF attorney shredded the sport mystique – the revered “sport is special” credo – describing world renowned signature events such as the Olympics, FIFA’s World Cup, Wimbledon, Roland Garros, and Tour de France as “basically entertainment. Sport is entertainment, mostly” (Interview, 2011: 0017MM). According to this attorney and IF legal team, there was little special about sport, at least in terms of how sport is run and produced. Having worked on global media network legal teams, as have so many international sport lawyers, this attorney found many grounds of commonality. In sport, it was a matter of being on the flip side on media rights: in sport, you …sell instead of buy. [Though], selling PR spaces and [stadium sites] is like selling advertising slots. Yet, betting is [a] unique sport challenge that’s not at NBC, when you work in fiction entertainment. It is [all] the same mechanisms, I meet all the same people here. We do a lot of production here…the same as production for fiction. We work with photo producers [and with] same mechanisms as TV (Interview, 2011: 0017MM). 124 By identifying the disjunctions and shared fittings between SBR and other IP augmentation to SGB authority, the transformed character of global authority will become clearly related to these changing relations of property and authority. Understanding the evolution of SGB’s acquisition of intellectual properties is key. First, I want to re-emphasize the importance of sport’s branding. Marketing studies have found that, worldwide, the Olympic rings are the most recognizable symbol, ranking even ahead of Shell and McDonald’s brand marks (Meenaghan, 1997). Enjoying exclusive rights to be associated with these Olympic rings comes with a significant price tag. Over the twenty years from the 1988 Seoul Games to the 2012 London Games, the total revenues generated from exclusive partnership deals --The Olympic Partner (TOP) Programme -- rose from $95 million to $957 million (International Olympic Committee, 2012: 6). In 2012, such TOP partners include the following transnational corporations: Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Acer, Dow, Omega, VISA, P&G, Panasonic Samson, GE, and Atos. Through vigilance to prevent free riding, pirating, or ambush marketing, the IOC protects its value. 114 The IOC takes its image and brand quite seriously. 114 For further examples and consideration of SGB efforts against ambush marketing see Hoek (2003). 125 OLYMPIC MARKETING REVENUE Source 1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2012 Broadcast 1,251 1,845 2,232 2,570 3,914 TOP Programme 279 579 663 866 957 OGOC Domestic Partnership 534 655 796 1,555 TBD Ticketing 451 625 411 274 TBD Licensing 115 66 87 185 TBD Total 2,630 3,770 4,189 5,450 TBD Table 3.0: All Figures in the USD millions (International Olympic Committee, 2012: 6). 115 For example, robust anti-ambush marketing campaigns have become commonplace elements of the Games. During the Vancouver Games (2010), the “Coke Red Zone” designated not only the purchased advertising rights and privileges Coca Cola had exclusively secured for its beverages in all of the Games’ venues but also an effort to ensure that all private vendors in public spaces between private sport arenas and ceremonial spaces sold only Coca Cola products. This Red Zone campaign sought to make sure that all visual and marketing iconography speak and elevate one and the same thing, Coca Cola. A successful Coke Red Zone would ensure that the smallest advertising details were controlled: even parasols opened over tables to shade sport tourists while dining should advertise only the “right” beverages. The goal was to replace any and all potential blue Pepsi insignia or other competitor brands with Coke’s 115 All figures rounded to the nearest 1 million. OGOC are the Olympic Games host city domestic partnerships (Olympic Games Organizing Committee). 126 red. To achieve this Coke Red Zone, various incentives and diplomatic bargaining strategies were offered to encourage markets, cafes, and restaurants to embrace Coca Cola, at least temporarily. Serving a beverage on a competitor-branded coaster or having a doormat with competitor-beverage insignia might have been an unintentional, leftover, everyday remnant of consumer spaces not necessarily schemed to free ride on the Games’ consumer worth, but these “alien” marketing coasters and doormats became concerns that breached the Coke Red Zone ideal. This drive to secure exclusive right over the total consumer landscape remains the same today. Exclusivity is everything. Yet, surprisingly, the IOC only relatively recently registered the Olympic rings as a trademark. Not until 1982 did the IOC obtain international legal recognition of its five interlocking rings through a World Intellectual Property Organization convention, The Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol (Barney, Martyn, and Wenn, 158-160). 116 Commercial protections of sport properties are aspects of sport integrity. Protecting and guarding the commercial value and reputation of sport and sport institutions is vital. Sport integrity is a commercial asset. Over time, the IOC has come to expect to hold a monopoly over all aspects of the Olympic Games, including its production (Halbert, 145). For IP scholar Debora Halbert, the sport sector, like many other cultural producers, evinces an inflating self-perception of its proprietorship. Halbert offers the following example to support her claim of the sport movement’s broadening proprietary grab: “the International Olympic Committee 116 By the time the IOC moved to obtain the legal right to its five interlocking rings, the IOC’s trademark registration effort clashed with other Olympic Family members’ sense of entitled property right. The World Intellectual Property Organization registry entailed an out and out political maneuver in which the IOC used its leverage over some countries, namely Kenya, to push forward its agenda (1981). 127 (IOC) sued the San Francisco Arts and Athletics Committee over the use of the phrase ’Gay Olympics,’ arguing the IOC held exclusive rights to the word ‘Olympics’” (Halbert, 160). 117 Despite the differential laxity in enforcing restrictions on the use of the word “Olympics,” the court found in favour of the IOC. As I have shown above, SGB have long understood that granting exclusive broadcast rights to networks or exclusive advertising privileges that co-link corporate marks with sport brands and productions generates top revenues. Through such astute business strategies, the sport sector has become a nationally and globally powerful industry. In the United Kingdom, “in the 19 years since the formation of the Premier League, the value of the competition’s television rights has gone from £304m to a staggering £3.2bn. It is one of the country’s most successful exports” (Bond 2011). Estimates for the IOC’s broadcast earnings for the 2010 Vancouver through 2012 London Games are on the order of €2.7 billion, and the IOC’s global broadcast revenues are expected to exceed €2.79 billion between 2014 and 2016. These are but a few illustrative indicators of the global financial worth of commercialized sport. Yet as technological advancements amplify the scope and magnitude of broadcast coverage globally, the market price of entertainment broadcast varies radically. 118 By selling broadcast rights on an exclusive basis – typically on a territorially exclusive basis that effectively partitions markets nation by nation – sport event owners garner top margins from multiple but differentially priced markets. 117 International Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts and Athl., 781 F.2d 733 (9 th Cir. 1986). The United States Olympic Committee had allowed “Dog Olympics,” “Rat Olympics,” and “Police Olympics,” but not “Gay Olympics.” 118 It is now possible to fill the demand for global broadcast coverage without hindrance or diminishment of product caused by time lags. Technologies overcome barriers of time delay and spatial projection. 128 It is interesting and important to note that while France chooses to acknowledge SEH as possessing SBR, elsewhere such property rights are being retracted. In the UK, for instance, broadcast rights have proven quite contentious. A number of legal cases have sought protection for sport viewing rights as a public good and cultural right (Andrews; Toby Miller, 2007; Malkawi, 2007). To wit, the UK’s Listed Events protect broadcast rights as a cultural right against property claims of private or semi-public SEH. The UK appears to re-vest itself in authority. While perhaps cutting at sport governance authority, the UK reclaims the cultural good of sport as a national cultural right. Listed events are communal events. For the UK, sport as a cultural good is about national heritage and collective identity. The 1998 Department for Culture, Media and Sport Free-to-Air Listed Events includes the following events: The Olympic Games, The FIFA World Cup Finals Tournament, The European Football Championship Finals Tournament, The FA Cup Final, The Scottish FA Cup Final (in Scotland), The Grand National, The Wimbledon Tennis Finals, The Rugby World Cup Final, The Derby, and The Rugby League Challenge Cup Final. These listed events are up for review in 2013. Similar listed events that designate “special sporting events that must be broadcast for free television have been identified in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom” (Hylton, 2011: 55). While sport governance often points to its social role or public good functions such as sport solidarity, SGB rules do little to guarantee open access for viewers. As Gordon Hylton observes, “while the World Cup is carried on free-to-air television in most countries, FIFA rules do not contain a requirement that games be broadcast on free television” (Hylton, 2011: 59). 129 Being a Listed Event establishes a legally defendable cultural right, a public- access viewing right that is seen to supersede proprietary claims (Rowe, 2004). 119 Thus, being included on this list precludes an event owner’s ability to exploit a sport property through any exclusive selling of broadcast rights to private networks. 120 In different ways, both France and the UK can be seen to recognize sport as a cultural good. On the one hand, through a requalification of SBR, France anoints SEH as protectors of this cultural good. For the most part, SBR mean that SGB receive and then go on to produce this newly materialized resource. However, there are exceptions. Though a SEH may be a semi-public body, it may also be a private one. Any social- political philosophy of public good underlying France’s law and policy may have unintended consequences or come undone through this choice of property mechanisms to enshrine a public good. There is a paradox in these mechanisms of authority: both the state and SGB increasingly rely on intellectual property and private market and contract law to sustain a public good whose premises might be thought of as having originated in and been infused with a project for an alternative logic. On the other hand, the UK differently re-qualifies the scope of sport property: instead of further substantiating or extending property rights, the UK’s Listed Events restricts these. Following the court’s decision in Karen Murphy, one news journal article entitled “Sad Day for Rights Holders” prompted me to anticipate reading a discussion of viewing or cultural rights, but 119 David Rowe argues more strongly that sport broadcasts rights entail fundamental cultural rights. 120 France’s sport betting legislation enacts measures positive for sport event owners to further capitalize on intellectual property rights – financial fair return. The cultural right (cultural good of sport) becomes indirectly strengthened. France attempts to seed the sport sector with a device advantageous in helping it stay on par, helping it keep up with other big hitters: private sector giants. 130 I discovered, this “sad day” referred not to cultural rights holders but to shareholder rights. At the EU level, there is evidence that fewer allowances for exception will hold water when market rules are derogated. The clout of SGB’s long-standing trump card claim of a “specificity of sport” diminishes. One legal decision, whittling away at SGB’s property claims, comes from the ECJ. This important case, Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd., involved an English publican’s satellite broadcast of English Premier League (Premier League) games. The confrontation erupted in 2006 when pub owner Karen Murphy circumvented BSkyB’s national pay-to-view fees for Premier League games by purchasing a decoder that enabled her to tap into “foreign” – i.e., Greek – satellite broadcast subscriptions. Murphy became the subject of criminal proceedings when the Football Association Premier League (FAPL) launched legal action. After lengthy and heated legal and public debate, the ECJ decided in October 2011 in favour of Murphy. Overturning the UK court’s ruling, the ECJ held that “national legislation which prohibits the import, sale or use of foreign decoder cards is contrary to the freedom to provide services and cannot be justified” (Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd., 2011). Erecting differential broadcast rates on a national basis violates common market laws. The court dismissed the merit of granting any exception from these laws based on sport’s specificity. In a co-joined case, Football Association Premier League and Others v QC Leisure, the Court went further, declaring that “the FAPL cannot claim copyright in the Premier League matches themselves, as those sporting events cannot be considered to be an author’s own intellectual creation and, therefore, to be ‘works’ for the purposes of copyright in the European Union” (Football Association Premier League and 131 Others v. QC Leisure, 2011). The Murphy decision indicates where the ECJ might stand in respect to the matter of sport betting rights. For one, the court better specifies the boundaries of sport IPs: As regards the questions asked concerning the interpretation of the Copyright Directive, the Court notes first of all that only the opening video sequence, the Premier League anthem, prerecorded films showing highlights of recent Premier League matches and various graphics can be regarded as ‘works’ and are therefore protected by copyright. By contrast, the matches themselves are not works enjoying such protection (ECJ Press Release N° 102/11, 4 October 2011). Here are decisions about what constitutes creative proprietary material and what more or less remains open as common, public or cultural good – what might correspond to the “information” rather than the “entertainment” status that I have already considered. This ruling does not bode well for the emergent SBR in France. The longevity of a notion of SBR requires breeding further transnational harmonization. SBR require enforcement mechanisms capable of going between and beyond national borders. Sport gambling markets are global, mobile markets. National legal and law enforcement systems are simply incapable of keeping up with this market’s global financial flows to levy taxes or restrict its market product portfolio over time and space without bumping shoulders endlessly with other national laws. Beyond France, the question remains unanswered as to whether SBR will fly or not. Leaving the certainty of SBR aside, this section has shown how actors articulate, materialize, and exchange abstract properties. This story of SBR in France drops a breadcrumb trail for tracking and coming to understand the creation of thin air products. 132 I have shown how court rulings – such as the FFT-Unibet case -- enshrine new properties through the (re)interpretation of laws. These laws go on to steer all sorts of public policies. Further, SGB begin to harmonize in projecting a lobbying voice that helps bring this product into market circulation. Chiseled into form, SBR gain heft as SGB re-hone technological media and information tools to innovate opportunities and prevent disruptions to its authority. Just as SGB adjusted to TV and satellite technologies, eventually coming to materialize and exchange broadcast rights, a similar process begins to unfold as digital media technologies change sport and sport betting relations. SBR are a response, redrawing property lines and, thereby, redrafting authority. This property relationship between sport and gambling sectors begs an account of why this linkage has not previously materialized as a protected IP environment. Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman explain the persistence of low or no IP environments by what they call a “piracy paradox” (Raustiala & Sprigman 2009). Through a social- political-legal analysis of the fashion industry, Raustiala and Sprigman argue that the piracy paradox explains the IP negative space of industries, like fashion, in which unlimited access fuels industry innovation cycles. In fashion, according to Raustiala and Sprigman, original creative producers stand to mutually benefit from their products’ appropriation by counterfeit producers. As faux Louis Vuitton, Chanel, Armani, Dior, or Paul Smith purses, belts, suits, shoes, sunglasses, or wallets make their way to street markets, the brand’s popular iconography or cultural caché both heightens and flames out the status of exclusivity or rarity of the original, what Raustiala and Sprigman designate as “induced obsolescence” (Raustiala & Sprigman, 2006: 1203). As these black market pop-up shops thrive, fresh demand for the next and newer season’s trend springs up. By 133 and large, this sort of symbiotic relationship between cultural goods producers is uncommon. Although in most instances cultural producers ensure their brand’s worth by seeking to block all product circulation that is uncompensated, the piracy paradox explains the exception. The economy of global sport depends upon controlling its properties. In common with the broader entertainment industry, sport market profits hinge upon the production and reproduction of sport images (i.e., team images and marks, league marks, athlete identities). Sport has enjoyed and still enjoys a mutually beneficial relationship with sport gambling. For example, sport betting participation may pique and sharpen fan loyalty and interest. In this way, sport betting creates greater demand for sport, including lesser or obscure teams and players. Yet, as the sport gambling industry becomes more lucrative, SEH refuse to stand idle as their pie is being eaten without them so much as receiving an invitation to the party. Sport as the played game may not revolve around IP rights, but sport depends upon and produces market scaffolds undergirded by their ability to protect IP. “Intellectual rights are the main form of capital in the culture industries”: in sport, intellectual properties have included media image, brand, and hospitality protections (Lash & Urry 136). The scope of IP protections becomes recast to bundle in SBR. A sport betting right qua intellectual property secures and bolsters sport image and event production as a revenue generating property. 121 We now witness emerging struggles over legal rights to sport results. Are sport results aspects of sport images and entertainment production rather than mere result 121 In the United States, the primary case ruling to enshrine a right to publicity in sport appeared in 1953 Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. In this case, the court supported the image right or right of celebrity status as a personal, identity right of athletes. To wit, an athlete holds a right to commercialize upon his or her fame (Quiming, 315). 134 details akin to news or public information? In this way, the sport-media nexus in its intricately networked relations vis-à-vis broadcast properties has relevancy for gambling operators seeking to exploit sport results for productive, market purposes. A recent dispute brought before Indian courts regarding mobile technologies used to send live sport results to subscription clients illustrates another instance in which the judiciary stands prepared to protect SEH proprietary rights similarly to these emerging SBR that I am describing. Sport legal scholar Hayden Opie describes Marksman Marketing Services Ltd. v. Bharti Tele-Ventures Ltd., writing: The purported rights holder for India and Pakistan obtain an interim injunction to restrain other mobile telephone companies from transmitting scores, alerts, and other updates to their subscribers. Upon an application to vacate the interim injunction, the Chennai High Court regarded the unauthorized transmissions as ‘pirating information’ and infringing a ‘quasi-property right’ (Opie, 121). 122 Does sport betting build upon a public access good, or does it siphon off from a creative entertainment industry a product that is distinct from news or mere fact? Outside of France, the accrual of sport property rights has taken different directions. While the Indian High Court’s reasoning appears compatible with SBR, another example of different legal reasoning on sport property and betting rights appears in the 122 Though the case was dismissed because the court deemed the claimant lacked standing to bring this case to the fore, the case brings up important issues. Moreover, it is interesting to note how national courts look for direction and sometimes defer to international legal precedent or transnational law (i.e., private sport law, lex sportiva, as built through Court of Arbitration awards. As Opie observes, “In coming to this conclusion, the court referred to American legal authority, although it appears to have been prepared to go further in protecting the rights holder than the American courts. In any event, the interim injunction was vacated because the plaintiff was unable to prove that it was the rights holder as claimed. The case is continuing to trial, but without urgency because the cricket market have concluded” (Opie, 121). 135 United States. Through a legal analysis of sport property law in the United States, Gary Quiming offers two interrelated and important cases for understanding the demarcation of sport product and betting right boundaries. In National Basketball Association v. Motorola, (Motorola) (1997), “the court reasoned that the underlying games, like facts, were not copyrightable” (Quiming, 312). Motorola’s SportsTrax pager device “was simply transmitting facts from the games, and not the copyrightable expression of the games’ broadcast” (Quiming, 312). Looking at disputes between Major League Baseball and fantasy baseball betting, Quiming examines the case law supporting sport IP in the American system. In C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. (CBC) v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. (CBC) (1997), the court was asked to determine whether Major League Baseball (MLB) player names and statistics are proprietary products belonging to MLB, or its players, or whether these are free access, public goods. In analyzing how the court’s decision in which it allowed that, “while the players’ names and playing records in the context of CBC’s fantasy games are arguably within the subject matter of copyright,” Quiming argues that the court ultimately concluded that these names and player records “are un- copyrightable, because they lack even the basic, essential element of copyright, which is originality” (Quiming, 315). As CBC neither relied upon nor coloured its site or advertising spaces with player photos or team marks, the subject of dispute centred upon the issues of player names/identities and statistical profiles. MLB (joined by the Players’ Association) asserted both a right to publicity – a right to commercially exploit one’s fame or celebrity status – and an intellectual property right to players’ statistical profiles. To use players’ statistical profiles for purposes of commercial gain seemed an abusive 136 exploitation of the MLB’s sport properties. The Motorola and CBC decisions in the United States indicate that American courts are not ready to admit or protect such IP. 123 The ECJ has also delivered rulings with implications for the possibility of SBR beyond France. In Football Dataco and Others v. Yahoo! Uk and Others, the Court was asked to decide whether the setting up of football fixture lists, detailing season dates and venues for all matches, should be protected under the UK’s Database Directive and copyright laws. 124 The ruling refused the claimants’ petitions for extending copyright protections, deciding that “the fact that setting up of a database required…significant labour and skill on the part of its author does not justify, as such, the protection of it by copyright if that labour and that skill do not express any originality” (Football Dataco and Others v. Yahoo! UK and Others, 2012: §42). Although this ruling shows that the ECJ does not seem prepared to grant that the mere listing and structural setup of fixture teams and places constitutes proprietary material, it is possible the ECJ could render a different ruling regarding the use of game results. For this sort of protection, SGB could expect to have to prove that game’s regulatory maintenance constitutes originality that should be protected. 123 The US Court’s rendering in CBC stands in contradistinction to the direction of French courts in their interpretation of sport rights. Judging from this ruling, there is little evidence that the US courts would be willing to support or extend IP protections to sport event owners’ claims that having mixed their creative hand in sport through governance roles constituted an original authorship and grounds for property protection of sport betting rights. In CBC, the court decided that team and player statistics are data publicly available. Sport governance is not originality (the form of game is not proprietary material), but CBC’s work of culling, processing, and number crunching of raw public data through sophisticated software and algorithm was a labour of authorship and originality distinct from free-riding or exploiting a sport event owner’s product. The court distinguished between facts of the game and expressions of the game. 124 Football Dataco Ltd, Football Association Premier League Ltd, Football League Ltd, Scottish Premier League, PA Sport Ltd. v. Yahoo! UK Ltd, Stan James (Abingdon) Ltd, Stan James pic, and Enetpulse ApS. (2012) 137 Yet the situation with these emerging SBR is different in France. As IP mechanisms, SBR harness network power over risks and subjects. Property is a resource for extracting economic and political capital for SGB. For SGB, SBR provide a means to exercise power over an external but certainly interconnected sector. These are law- dependent mechanisms. At least for now, SBR predominantly advantage a SGB-linked sport model rather than a private-league sport model. In some respects, SBR show that the state still matters. SBR are an example of the state adjusting to a global informational economy, enacting legal and policy measures to guide or advantage certain types of informational resources and productions that are also social goods. Like other intellectual properties, actors can draw rents on these emerging SBR. Through SBR, the state gives preference to certain sets of social relations and conditions. Different from material objects, abstract objects contain socially and politically transformative characteristics. Flexible and adept, SBR are particularly well tuned as global mechanisms. As Drahos recognizes, “the range of power based on abstract objects is potentially global” (Drahos, 160). SBR can, therefore, support authority claims across space and time, vaulting property holders into global markets where production, labour, and supply-and-demand sources exist as transnational flows. Here, in these global markets, the product is information, and it is exchanged at high speeds, virtually instantly, among actors not necessarily commonly located or bound by reciprocal rights and obligations. One can admit that IP rights arise through a legal fiction without denying the very real, material weight that they bring to bear as resources and mechanisms of power. SBR are consistent with what Drahos notes about abstract object characteristics that “have the effect of qualitatively expanding the commodity production possibilities of 138 capitalism” (Drahos, 109). SBR rejuvenate and expand capital, and so, like any good capitalist, SGB welcome these devices because, like other IP rights, SBR increase productivity while drawing actors together in positions of privilege and responsibility that shape markets in network patterns. SBR are socio-technical arrangements rendered through French judicial and legislative decisions. These decisions coddle SGB and sport industry players like the Tour de France (Amaury Sport Organisation) and Roland Garros (Federation Française de Tennis). SBR are further perpetuated by SGB. By paying attention to the dynamics of transformation, the qualities and arrangements of these abstract products as devices and commodities with very real material worth and impact become visible. Examples of the emergence and development of sport broadcast rights showed how asserting broadcast rights as a sport property first pivoted upon re-conceptualizing sport information or news as entertainment for materializing a basis for claiming and extracting broadcast rents. Sport listed events, as in the UK, illustrate alternative social-legal devices by which to constrain sport property rights. After a sequence of legislative, legal, and social acts, the sport betting product reconfigures both what gambling is and what sport is. SBR illustrate how what economic social network theorists call “market devices” come into being; they appear through an “economic agencement”, which Callon, Millo, and Muniessa define as an act that …renders things, behaviors and processes economic…The fact that an institution, an action, an actor or an object can be considered as being economic is precisely the result of this process of economicization…The reality of this process is as 139 hard as the trials it imposes and the resistance that it triggers (Callon, Millo, & Muniesa, 2007: 3). Through processes of transformation – qualifying and re-qualifying – a market device comes into being (Callon, Méadel, & Rabeharisoa 2002). As thin air products, these emerging sport betting rights appear as products, as properties, that reconnect state, SGB, and gambling operators in changed relations to access this product’s means of social, political and economic capital (Foster, 2007: 713). SBR are market devices. Distinguishing the particular attributes of market devices, Callon et al. posit that “these objects can be considered as objects with agency: whether they might just help (in a minimalist, instrumental version) or force (in a maximalist, determinist version), devices do things. They articulate actions, they act or they make others act” (Callon, Millo, & Muniesa 2007: 2). Emerging SBR involve what Callon et al., call “conflicts and negotiations around the qualifications of goods” (Callon, Méadel, & Rabeharisoa, 2002: 197). SBR are critical (re)qualifications of goods that are at “the heart of economic competition and the organization of markets” (Callon, Méadel, & Rabeharisoa, 2002: 200). SBR illuminate a powerful relationship between authority and production. SBR become mechanisms by which SGB may be able to secure new revenues. We witness greater premiums on such innovation of IP. 125 125 This is consistent with what legal scholars have argued are global patterns of private law vis-à-vis intellectual property rights (Berger 2001; Berman 2005). SBR represent both an extension and departure from contemporary intellectual property rights theory because of the additional ways that SBR function as devices of regulatory control and redistribution. 140 Sport Betting Rights as Redistributive Mechanism In addition to property roles, sport betting rights can also emerge from and come to designate a set of dimensions that involve social justice or redistributive commitments. To emphasize its redistributive functions, SBR might better correspond to its second term of reference, financial fair return (FFR). Financial fair return claims indicate actions striving to shape a certain type of equity. FFR may be seen as calling for market intervention to stimulate and guide social priorities that might not be secured or satisfied through market mechanisms alone. 126 In the previous section, “Sport Betting Rights as Intellectual Property,” I showed how the conceptualization of SBR as property lays claim to economic and political capital. Here, I emphasize the social justice dimension of this device, which intertwines with the property conceptualization. 127 While the social justice dimension may seem to appear at a far end of the spectrum from the conception of SBR as IP rights, in fact, these two are correlative and interrelated. Redistributive assertions must also be seen as dimensions of IP. Stakeholders interchangeably use the terms FFR and SBR without attention or effort to linguistically pair or match one term over another with one’s main policy position or objectives. For the sake of drawing attention to the relationship of these different aspects and (re)conceptualizations of abstract properties that shift relations of authority, I choose to separate the two terms, SBR and FFR. I remain cautious not to 126 SGB justify FFR by referring to sport’s specific cultural character that merits exception in order to protect and promote its value as a public good. Ultimately, FFR is a compulsory contribution. 127 As an IP, SBR less involve classic IPR tensions between public access and sovereignty that embroil other IP areas where access to knowledge becomes critical to basic rights (Halbert 1999; Naomi Roht- Arriaza 1995). The notion of broadcast rights or viewing rights as cultural rights recasts the lens for viewing these properties with their social fittings. Who holds or has access – rentership or ownership – to these thin air products has huge implications for authority. 141 exaggerate these terms’ correlative aspects as a binary. Ultimately, my conclusions synthesize the multiple aspects of this device. As the latest extension of the “specificity of sport” argument, FFR helps assure sport’s autonomy from political oversight or dependency. Global sport as organized in SGB and the Olympic Movement occupies and performs public realm functions. SGB justify their authority, insisting that the public good of sport cannot be met by market mechanisms alone. It is important to remember a few aspects of sport as a public good. First, SGB largely rely upon a volunteer engine that characterizes it more as a public realm activity. Second, sport receives state subsidies as well as solicits commercial endorsement. In 2008, sport federations in France received public financial assistance of almost €89 million, as well as additional provision for “1,671 managerial staff for local, regional and national levels of sport” (Chappalet, 2010: 58). Third, as a semi-private- public body, SGB undertake guardianship or custodianship of public rights to sport. One fundamental example of this role occurs through a redistribution of funds. By making facilities, funding, equipment, and sport expertise globally available (i.e., “sport for all” programmes), SGB’s work exemplifies a mandate rooted in and projecting from values and aspirations not reducible to market mechanisms. Streams of Funding Whether in the Olympic Family across multiple sport disciplines or in International Federations that co-join elite and grassroots sports, sport solidarity entails financial and social solidarity to open sport opportunities as a shared cultural good of and for all. The doxa of sport solidarity is like that of a family: there is a suspension of 142 competitive market logic and emphasis on resource sharing that nourishes the whole, at least in theory. The Olympic Movement’s sport solidarity functioning is made even more explicit in its name, the Olympic Family. Aside from a sport body’s self-generation of revenues through commercial ventures, sport receives subsidy from states. Increasingly, transnational sport subsidiary opportunities appear. Transnational governance actors such as the EU recognize sport as a technology for promoting health, participation of persons with disability, social integration of vulnerable or disadvantaged, women in leadership, and other diplomatic and transnational links. I agree with Chappelet and Kubler-Mabott in finding it interesting to note that the “Council of Europe’s policies on sport have developed from those concerning the entire populations (“sport for all”) towards a greater focus on elite sport, sport as entertainment, and the governance of sport” (Chappelet; Kubler-Mabott, 2008: 116). SGB streams of funding are important. To understand and explain the structural funding relationships between SGB and states, I will show how a sport’s financial health and sustainability relate to the global economy of sport markets. As sport betting regulation changes, traditional nation-state-derived funding streams – largely extracted through gambling levies – become uncertain. Ongoing research within the Council of Europe seeks to illuminate the relationship between forms of both national and European gambling legislation and the way sport is organized and supported. Between 2004 and 2007, 3.8% of Française des Jeux funds (totaling €4.9 million) went to sport (Sport Business 2008: par. 5 sec. 2). Of these state-subsidized funds to French sport federations, 33.3% were distributed to grassroots sport and 66.7% to performance, elite sport. Essentially, there is concern about the impact of liberalizing online gambling markets 143 upon state lotteries and their respective sport funding streams. A real anxiety underlies SGB’s assessment and strategies of securing robust financial streams. As state resources become strapped, uncertainty rises as to who will pay, how and from where revenue will come. Though SGB such as the IOC tout themselves as apolitical, sport continues to rely upon securing earmarked revenues from nation-states. Yet, global sport, including the Olympic Movement, admits to a global capitalistic market logic that is indifferent to nationalism, and, with the issue of gambling, a market logic of global economic imperative takes over (Hobsbawm). The contingent loyalties of sport governing bodies to states shift to transnational actors with more advantageous global network positions of power. To maintain formerly robust financial flows levied through the State’s gambling monopoly and interest in directing that to sport as a public cause, SGB recognized a necessity of tapping into global financial flows. The EU’s study of the relation of sport funding streams and betting markets concluded that the sustainability of grassroots sport really depends upon “creating the right transnational networks,” not merely upon strengthening national financial streams and support (European Committee Report, 2011: 27). These changing, funding streams partly answer the question of the relationships among gambling markets, regulation, and public goods. As the state becomes less of a be-all and end-all, SGB need to secure new sources for political, legal, economic, and social authority; to wit, SGB must seek global mechanisms. This wrestling for authority shows itself in the contestations and transformations involved in sport integrity and the regulation of online sport gambling. Heeding pressure to compete as market players, SGB grope for new properties while simultaneously vocalizing claims of sport’s 144 specificity (Garcia 2007). At this point in the story, SBR appear. Sport betting rights promoted as FFR capture both the commercial and cultural specificity bases for legitimizing SGB authority. These are two separate but interrelated devices for authority. 128 Asserting sport betting rights relies primarily upon commercial property and contract law regarding IP to muster power and extract rents. Asserting FFR designates the sport movement as meriting special consideration and thus a financial return because of its guardianship and promotion of a public good or more strongly claimed, a fundamental human (both individual and collective) right, a sport right. Sport Specificity: Sport Redistributive Justice The concept of FFR implies a unity of interests between sport and sport gambling markets and recognizes the mutual moral and legal concerns of these two leisure sectors. FFR intervenes in the production relations in the sport gambling sector to rectify what is deemed an unfair accumulation of wealth. The interesting thing is how both the state and SGB skim the sport betting sector. Negotiated through SEH and RGO contract, FFR is calculated on a turnover basis and typically represents 1% of bets. In 2011, FFR captured €530,000 from the betting market activity in France. How do the state and SGB justify taking a slice of the RGO pie? Debates flare up as sport betting operators fervently reject every aspect of this notion of a sport betting right; they insist, “no other, no other market or product in the world works like this!” (Davies 2011). SGB counter, arguing that redistribution principles are essential characteristics of the specificity of sport. Sport 128 More and more, to be the regulator, one must be a market competitor. With changing and declining state-linked funding streams, SGB seek and may come to rely upon alternative sources of power. The Sports Right Owner Coalition strongly advocate for creating income through SBR (Gunn & Rees, 2008: 41). 145 requires collective funding streams to ensure fair, equitable, and just opportunity. Increasingly, SGB attach significance to SBR/FFR as part and parcel of ends essential to sport’s specificity. Financial fair return ultimately brings up questions of the European sport model and questions of redistribution. 129 As eager operators welcome the newly liberalized gambling terrain in France, the notion of FFR remains contested. Admitting there is a relationship, a gambling-sport synergy, operators reject the onus upon them to funnel funds back. FFR, according to one former gambling operator executive is ridiculous: “Funnel back funds? Yes, of course, we do this. We do this through sponsorships and advertising” (Interview, 2011: 0003GO). Operators are exasperated at having to deploy primary-school-level business wisdom: “companies know and believe that market mechanisms reward effective and perceived as sincere public relations investments. That is enough” (Interview, 2011: 0003GO). The persistent debate is over whether sport can be left to market mechanisms or whether sport inherently involves public goods that merit further care. Are sport specificity’s redistribution claims a myth? Even admitting FFR on the basis that sport’s specificity merits a proportion of revenues, further questions must be decided as to whether SBR/FFR entail the rights of each individual sport governing body to its own revenues (betting-generated revenues) or whether SBR/FFR are sport-family-wide rights to collective and then redistributed revenues. 130 As a rough estimate of the SBR returns in France during their debut year of 2010 “something like €540,000 was taken in from betting rights in France, and 60% went to French football” (Ali, 2011). For 129 By and large, these redistributive components of sport characterize the European sport model in contradistinction to characteristics of an American sport model. 130 SGB point to the notion of sport solidarity and their role in the redistribution of funds to grassroots sports as part of its hallowed distinctive sphere. 146 example, should football pay back and support other, or perhaps all, sports? How these questions are decided matters significantly to sport’s form. If financial and resource redistribution is intended to promote diverse sport globally without discrimination to gender, race, nationality, or disability, then SGB redistribution may be more myth than actuality. At least, suspicion runs rampant among gambling operators and many in linked private sectors. While acknowledging a synthesis between sport and sport gambling, operators absolutely and fully reject SBR. 131 Table 4.0: Total Online Sport Betting Wagers in France, June 2010-June 2011 (ARJEL, 2011: 5). 131 According to the French referee association, Association Française du Corps Arbitral Multisports (AFCAM), perspective on the vulnerability of little or lesser-known (less popular) sports, there are additional protectionist or regulatory purposes that justify FFR. These concerns are about grassroots sport, vulnerability to manipulation. AFCAM president, Patrik Vajda explained that smaller sports lack the financial support to stave off corrupting incentives of match-fixing propositions. Additionally, as smaller sports play without TV coverage, there is less pressure from the presence of being under a public eye that informally keeps these sport activities in line with social control strictures. With a global sport gambling market capable of betting on everything at any level of sport, there is fear of betting incentives “corrupt[ing] small sports or small divisions [maybe] those without means to protect [themselves], those without a sufficient or any financial return” (Lacarrière 2011). 27 10 19 29 45 187 423 Other Sports Handball Rugby V olleyball Basektball Tennis Football TOTAL ONLINE SPORT BETTING WAGERS IN FRANCE JUNE 2010-JUNE 2011 Wages in m€ 147 Figure 5.0 Percentage of Sport Betting Wagers by Sport Discipline in France, June 2010 - June 2011 (ARJEL, 2011: 5). Against worries about the extent to which sponsor and advertising investments from the sport betting industry disproportionately advantage only a few elite sport disciplines, operators appear confident in their arguments that there is a positive financial mutualism between sport and sport betting. 132 According to the European Sport Security Association, which represents the sport integrity interests of global gambling operators, betting has been important to the development of sport over the last two decades by …pouring money in it. Betting money goes into…volleyball, table tennis, [and] badminton: they benefit from the live streaming that sport betting provides. Big 132 RGO investment and return to sport are seen as disproportionately promoting elite male sport, namely football. Football; 57% Tennis; 25% Basketball; 6% V olleyball; 4% Rugby; 3% Handball; 1% Other Sports; 4% SPORT BETTING WAGERS BY SPORT DISCIPLINE 148 sports can sell their broadcasts, but minor sports must buy broadcast time, pay to be broadcast. Betting helps minor sports showcase [themselves] (Ali, 2011). For RGO, sport gambling is the benefactor to grassroots sport, and this commercial patronage is enough. These small or lesser known sports lack the revenues to buy broadcast rights necessary to project themselves into the global market, but gambling interests in these sports might be thought of as real value added. In a study of the regulation of gambling, legal scholar David Miers discusses claims similar to FFR in horseracing: The nature of the economic relationship between horseracing betting and bookmaking is a contentious, even acrimonious issue. The racing industry has for many years argued that it receives an insufficient share of the turnover generated by the bookmakers, given that without the horses, there would be no racing on which to bet. Its view is that the fundamental problem with the horserace betting levy (the bookmaker’s statutory contribution to racing) is that the price is set not by the seller of the opportunity to bet (the racing industry), but the buyer (the bookmaking industry). For their part, the bookmakers reject the argument that there is a unity of interest between racing and betting… What both positions miss is that ‘horseracing’ is, of itself, not a commercial leisure activity that is in substantial demand. Stripped of the opportunity for mass third party betting, horseracing would, as it was in the eighteenth century, be a leisure pursuit engaged in by those who enjoy the company of horses and are wealthy enough to maintain a racehorse, and watched (at a price) by a small number of like-minded enthusiasts (Miers, 40). 149 Miers’ criticism of these quibbles leaves open the question of whether or not social policy and market intervention in the form of a FFR ought to support the sport base or not. Perhaps horseracing and its predominantly bourgeois history and contemporary participants do not evoke sympathy or sensitivity to social justice claims of sport as a public good to the same degree as other sport examples. Ultimately, the position of private sector operators is that market mechanisms are sufficient to compensate sport as the gambling market booms. Financial fair return is about the connection between sport and sport betting. Existing academic literature typically approaches the sport betting sector as if it were entirely separate from sport forms and organization. Moreover, SGB have tended to narrate a wide divide between sport and betting. Only recently are SGB and other policymakers acknowledging the complex interdependencies and pressures between these sectors. The way these two sectors forge a sport-gambling nexus that is reshaping sport markets, cultural forms, and its regulation demands attention. 133 What McKelvey observed in the United States sport market in legal land-based gambling is similar in global sport-sport betting markets: the growth of the legalized gambling entities industry, coupled with the desire of professional sport organizations to generate new revenue streams, has resulted in a gradual evolution in the rules and policies that the major U.S. professional sport leagues have adopted with respect to advertising and sponsorship arrangements with legalized gambling entities (McKelvey, 28). 133 Just as scholars such as David Andrews have raised important questions regarding the ways media shape the games we play and come to know, making for what the literature refers to in calling sport a mediatized event, so also scholars need to better understand the connection between sport and sport betting fields. While the relationship of gambling and sport is not new, global technologies, markets, and labour flow transform the structures and mechanisms of these sectors, renewing cause to examine the ways these sectors interrelate. In Chapter 5, I discuss and develop an analysis of this sport-sport betting. 150 An independent report, Sports Betting Legal, Commercial, and Integrity Issues, prepared for the Remote Gambling Association (RGA) highlights the ubiquity of enormous sums of gambling sector investment in sport (Remote Gambling Association, 2010). As illustration of this sport gambling market presence in the form of sport sponsorships, during the 2009/2010 Champions League and European League seasons, AC Milan, Genoa CFC, Real Madrid, Valencia CF, and Sevilla FC respectively carried the Bwin, Euro Bet/Gala Coral, Bwin, Unibet, and 12Bet gambling companies as title, shirt sponsor (Remote Gambling Association, 2010: par 5. Sec 1). The size of gambling marketing deals varies: over four seasons, Bwin’s sponsorships reported cost up to €75 million for AC Milan; whereas, Euro Bet’s shirt deal cost €1 million per season. In the 2008 top English, Spanish, Italian, French and American football shirt sponsorship market, RGA determined that €72 million of the total €512 million shirt sponsorship earnings were from gambling companies (Remote Gambling Association, 2010: par. 5, sec. 134). 134 The RGA goes on to note this gambling marketing injection in these economies is even more remarkable in that nearly half of these markets were legislatively closed off to private gambling operators. The dilemma for SGB is how to further forge financial claims – property or FFR claims – while continuing to benefit from commercial-associated boosts that gambling market advertising and sponsorship partnerships offer. And stakeholders become polarized on the question of whether sport betting rights – a financial fair return – should serve a redistribution role, funneling funds to grassroots sports. 134 RGA relies upon data analysis from 2009 SportsPro Magazine study of global sport sponsorship deals. 151 Sport Betting Rights as Regulatory Mechanism In addition to SBR serving as economic devices or as redistributive mechanisms, there is a third basis of SBR embedded in the French statutory scaffolding: SBR might also be seen as regulatory mechanisms. By funneling money from betting operators to competition organizers, SBR function as a regulatory device for sport integrity. On this basis, SBR build and sustain necessary integrity and a regulatory apparatus for both the state and SGB. The justification is one of security rather than property. Sport betting rights, according to Jean-Fraçois Lamour, French special rapporteur on the Gambling Act, are a “tool of governance” (Boniface et al., 69). More and more, SBR are discussed as regulatory mechanisms, yet this more security framing has not always been so predominant or clearly articulated. The notion of a sport betting right qua property right lacked persuasive punch and France recognized a need to attach to SBR additional dimensions. According to Killy, the sustainability of SBR claims seemed uncertain: Operators made a stink in Brussels, so [the] French government [then] to ease Brussels, decided to give, spin, and reinforce the integrity dimension by adding all the language of money to fight corruption and procedures to fight corruptions. So the whole dimension of making it an instrument to fight corruption was actually formulated in law by reason to appease Brussels. But [the] original idea was [that] it was a sport property right, ownership. So, only then [later], the perspective of betting right became [an] instrument to fight corruption. Operators saw this at their expense (Killy 2011). 152 Thus, sport integrity became securitized as an interest to crime and security (Foucault, 1979, 1991; Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). The massive money movement of gambling markets – whether this money represents illegal proceeds, money laundered through placement, layering, and integration into the financial system or not – poses, in itself, a danger to financial stability and, thus, security. 135 The French statutory framework forges a direct regulatory relationship with sport betting operators while also formalizing a relationship between these operators and SEH. Yet, in France, this right remains conditional, depending upon the satisfaction of reciprocal responsibilities made explicit in a statutory relationship. Namely, the sport betting right obligates SEH to assure the integrity of the game. Charged with social responsibilities to prevent the corruption of sport integrity, SEH are beginning to answer these imperatives by developing safeguards and educational platforms. 136 By enrolling athletes, coaches, and other licensed sport participants in programmes to alert them to the presence and techniques of recruiting or coercing complicity in point shaving, match- fixing, corruption, or other sport fraud, the aim is to combat their occurrence. As not all instances of corrupting the integrity of the game can be denied, other newly honed tools and institutions capable of detecting and punishing fraudulent play are seen as essential to sharpening SGB’s edge over these threats to sport integrity. 135 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the financial volatility of global gambling markets, hedging, and the shadow economy. 136 Professional tennis introduced the Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme in 2009. Beginning in 2012, all athlete participants in any tennis Grand Slams are required to have completed this training programme. 153 Chapter 5 Global Governance: Sport Integrity Network Actors, Objects, and Information Flows This chapter zeroes in on the actual nuts and bolts of sport global governance. To substantiate my argument that these are transnationally networked forms of authority, I specify the global characteristics of these governance forms and processes. I then develop a theoretical analysis of the global regulation of sport integrity and sport gambling markets based on empirical data and field interviews. Ultimately, this chapter pulls together the arguments of the previous chapters and reconnects the actors and objects (properties and technologies) to show how authority exists in flows and networked relations rather than remaining situated in static, hierarchical institutions of governance, as in an international state-based system. Beyond a simple – albeit important – descriptive model of an instance of global governance, this chapter assesses the consequences of regulatory policy and action selected to meet arising global risks to sport integrity and examines the emerging regulatory devices and relations involved in sport integrity work. As I build this analysis, I also make explicit the connections to sport betting rights as sources of political, economic, and social capital. Although the political and legal jurisprudence of SBR currently exists only in France, the French model might come to have purchase beyond France. 137 SBR put premiums on SGB to ensure sport integrity. In fact, SBR are granted as conditional, qualified rights that require SGB qua 137 Victoria, Australia, also has legislated a basis for SBR. 154 their status as SEH to ensure sport integrity. 138 According to Article 63 of the Gambling Act, SBR are intended to fund these sport integrity monitoring measures (Lebon, Pelletier, & Verbiest, 2011: 405). In this chapter, I present evidence for my arguments on shifting social, spatial, and temporal bases of global authority and conclude by returning to the critical issue of balancing regulation and freedom. We cannot accurately assess global sport governance without attention to the status of individual rights and the labour situation. One especially important sport integrity and betting investigation arose in the world’s third largest betting sport discipline, professional tennis (Ramos, 203). 139 Incidents surrounding the 2007 Sopot Tennis Tournament in Poland in which the early retirement of fourth world-ranked Nikolay Davydenko to eighty-seventh ranked Martin Vassallo Arguello marked a turning point shaping stakeholders’ perception of sport integrity. 140 After betting exchange Betfair detected irregular betting activity, in which second-round match wagers were ten times the amounts typical on such matches, Betfair became suspicious. Standing to lose $1.5 million of the $7 million wagered, Betfair 138 The Tennis Integrity Unit is reported to cost the “FFT €150,000. This is what [the] FFT say they spend on monitoring –minus salaries and legal issues. This [is] to set up proper IT environment” (Killy 2011). 139 Horseracing and football are the largest and second largest sport betting disciplines, respectively. 140 Daveydenko’s early retirement was on cause of injury. In tennis, early retirement is the euphemistic equivalent of quitting or giving up. Typical causes include injury sustained during play, dehydration, or injury prevents. Colloquially, early retirement in other sports is also known as “throwing in the towel”. Like the informal rules I described in chapter 2 by which different sport disciplines embrace, or not, collusive strategy or gifting wins, depending on the sport discipline, fans typically express outrage when athletes’ performance suggests they do not seem to care about the outcome of a given match. There is real annoyance when athletes chose to save themselves for another upcoming tournament other than the one at play. This is prevalent in the Tour de France, when riders ‘race’ with a strategy to save fitness levels for an upcoming and anticipated stage (i.e., a sprint course more favourable to an athlete’s specialization) or different race altogether (i.e., waiting for the Vuelta Espana). In cycling, this is known as “saving one’s legs”. 155 alerted the Association of Tennis Professionals (Drape, 2008; Ramos). Through voluntary information sharing, an investigation was launched. The Sopot scandal captured media attention and shook SGB by shining a spotlight on the risks to sport integrity posed by match-fixing. This case is important because it illustrates what global governance looks like in action. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe and analyze the institutional actors, tools, and relations involved, both up front and behind the scenes, in sport integrity crises such as Sopot. Within both sport and sport betting, I show how sport integrity monitoring, investigation, and enforcement processes rely upon critical legal linkages – formal and informal – among private, SGB, state, and law enforcement actors. I further argue that the specific regulatory mechanisms and actors involved in efforts to regulate sport integrity make this study of sport governance important for understanding global governance more generally. Sport Integrity Monitoring and Investigation: Experts, Tools, Place-Times As state and EU authorities assess the balance between private and public regulation, SGB have frantically conscripted working commissions to find a sport “in- house” sport integrity solution. 141 Several SGB have erected investigative units to detect corrupt play connected to sport betting incentives. Below I more thoroughly consider two examples of such investigative units, the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU) and Early Warning Systems (EWS). As described in the previous chapters, pressure to protect sport 141 In-house-solution proposals are basically about self-regulation (Play the Game, Khalid Ali 2011). 156 integrity has come from multiple directions and interests. 142 Yet, at least in France, the liberalization of the online gambling market, coupled with its legally recognized emerging SBR, has shifted SGB into action. SGB cannot afford to be lax in regulatory vigilance. Both financial and political authority are at stake in this matter of legitimacy. To remain the regulator, SGB must demonstrate effective control over these challenges. Sport Integrity Experts: Investigative Units (Surveillance) Arising in 2008 through a joint initiative of the International Tennis Federation (ITF), the Association of Tennis Professions, the Women’s Tennis Association, and the Grand Slam Committee, the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU) provides sport integrity expertise for global elite tennis. The TIU is charged with educating, preventing, detecting, and investigating betting-related threats to sport integrity. 143 Such integrity units are built upon highly specialized expertise. For instance, TIU’s Director of Integrity, Jeff Rees, is a former London’s New Scotland Yard senior detective. 144 Beginning in 2005, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) set up an early warning system to monitor sport integrity and betting. FIFA formalized a 142 These intelligence experts come from both within and beyond the state, with expertise in crime, finance, and security. Leading sport integrity bodies include the European Sports Security Association (ESSA), EWS (International Sports Monitoring when working with the IOC), the Anti-Corruption and Security Unit (ACSU)) for International Cricket Council (cricket also maintains the Betting Fraud Detection System), and SportRadar (privately contracted by UEFA). In 2010, SportAccord set up its Sport Integrity Unit. 143 The French Federation of Tennis (FFT) is a member of the International Tennis Federation, as well as the Grand Slam Committee qua its Grand Slam, world-class tournament, Roland Garros. 144 Rees also worked anti-corruption investigations in Cricket. Rees’s investigation unit includes former police officers Nigel Willerton and Dee Bain, who operate as intelligence and investigation field agents, and data analyst Elli Weeks, who gathers, analyzes, and interprets betting data. EWS comprises similar caliber experts: the former Director of Security at EWS, Chris Eaton, came from Interpol. In 2012, FIFA appointed Ralf Mutschke, a former top German police and security officer and a former Interpol agent, as Director of Security. 157 more enduring and explicitly mandated investigative unit in 2007 with the launching of Early Warning System GmbH (EWS). According to its website, EWS introduces itself quite simply as a “neutral non-profit company with the objective of protecting the integrity of sport” (FIFA). 145 In actuality, EWS – like other sport integrity investigative units – performs rather complex investigative surveillance work that involves global and especially elusive, fast-moving financial and information other data. EWS has cooperative agreements for information-sharing on irregular betting activities with more than 400 bookmakers worldwide. Working with this rather impressive number of partners to obtain financial market data, EWS distinguishes itself as the pre-eminent expert in betting market surveillance and analysis, making a major contribution to monitoring the integrity of football – currently the world’s second largest sport betting discipline. EWS’s experts describe their mandate as consisting of three main investigative processes: “we analyze information, we analyze odds, and we collect data” (Martens, 2011). 146 EWS’s forensic financial analysts and sport integrity intelligence agents have also been conscripted by other SGB. In addition to FIFA sport integrity work, EWS provides fulltime monitoring of European professional football with the Union des Associations Européennes de Football. Beyond football sport integrity monitoring, EWS has worked with the IOC to monitor sport betting risks – irregular betting patterns – for the Olympic Games. The IOC contracted with EWS’s independent sport betting integrity experts, International Sports Monitoring, for the first time beginning with the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 145 Available online at: www.fifa-ews.com, viewed March 2012. 146 In 2005, FIFA first set up an early warning system that it formalized as a standing investigative unit in 2007, with the launching of EWS. 158 Despite the expertise of some specialized monitoring units, it is not always possible to apply techniques effective for monitoring sport integrity in one sport to another. Recognizing that its techniques of monitoring sport integrity in football may not be common or calibrated to other sport disciplines, EWS is careful to admit the limitations of its monitoring methods: [I]f you compare different sports, individual sport versus football [team sports], [the differences] in the referees, team dynamics, and competition are huge. The way of tackling these different challenges at TIU [for example], they must go on investigative level. Or table tennis, you could never tell in these fast moving sports. Then on other side, you have football, [and] you can go to information and data, to the books. You can use grand numbers of regular and irregular movements. You can say ‘we have found something’ by the sporting activity, and you have facts. You can send a report. But in tennis, you cannot do this. You cannot prove it from a purely information background (Martens 2011). The European Sports Security Association (ESSA), which represents the top global online gambling operators, reported that in 2010 its members …raised a total of 58 alarms; that’s 58 instances where bookmakers were concerned that the betting activity could be fraudulent. Of these, however, only on [sic] four alerts were regarded as suspicious. This is a very small figure, especially when you consider that match-fixing is regarded by some as a bigger threat than doping (Ali 2011). The insinuation is that there is more sensationalism than substance in worries about sport integrity. Reports on suspicious sport and gambling play may be the result of a moral 159 panic in which integrity threats are distorted or amplified by media framing (Cohen, 2002). Alternatively, differential citations of suspicion and warning alarms may be a factor of economic interests at hand. Gambling operators are keen to paint their industry in a favourable light. In contrast, an independent report in 2008 for the Council of Europe conducted by Transparency International found, in just one integrity review for one sport discipline, that “45 professional tennis matches from 73 matches examined in past five years required further review because of suspicious betting patterns” (Bures, 7). These specialized sport investigative bodies are transnational and composed of transnational elites. Their experts have backgrounds in information-communication technologies, intelligence, law enforcement, international security, and finance. They know each other and work together regularly. Through my inquiries into intelligence partnerships, I learned about these formal committees and working groups. Yet, the important ties between these investigative regulators exist more through informal closeness: “I won’t say we talk every week with horse racing – British Horse Racing – cricket or other sport [intelligence bodies] but we know these guys. Let’s just say in the integrity part of sports, we are always in contact” (Interview, 2011: 0005GG). Most of these special sport investigative units also work in unison and keep regular contact with Interpol. Sport Integrity Tools and Techniques The Environmental Review of the Integrity of Professional Tennis sketches the nature of these global challenges and proposes the type of regulatory response necessary to ensure sport integrity. Describing the demands for erecting a tennis integrity unit, this 160 review captures a few of the global market challenges that SGB confront: An issue for the new Unit will be the global nature of international tennis with information/betting data being generated over a 24 hour period. Real time analysis and action on betting patterns, for instance, will depend on the office being staffed at the time. However, it is envisaged that most of the information/intelligence and the data collected there will be used to build up an intelligence picture for the creation of targeted operational action against a player or other person. This will entail pain-staking analysis for subsequent investigation and evidence gathering and, therefore, loss of real time monitoring/activity is not a major problem (Gunn & Rees 2008: 25). The regulatory picture as described by Gunn and Rees requires expert intelligence actors, cooperation, and technologies if SGB are to keep up with and ahead of these risks. What are the mechanisms of sport integrity surveillance and what do they look like on the ground, in action? One rather bizarre surveillance technique –seemingly pedestrian in terms of sophistication– is what I call clapping surveillance. Clapping surveillance involves scanning live venue grandstands to detect spectators whose attendance might be more for illegal betting information scouting rather than for mere tennis entertainment or leisure. Betting operatives often infiltrate live sport venues for purposes of betting intelligence reconnaissance. Individuals working in service to this cause may bring in special equipment or simply use mobile devices or laptops by which to transmit the game’s officiating calls instantaneously. Investigative units have discovered that disengaged fans –those not clapping– provide a strong indicator of deviant purposes at hand. Focused attention on line-calling and information transmitting 161 typically preoccupy such persons and prevent them from standing, clapping, or cheering in unison with the crowd. During the 2012 Heineken Open in Auckland, New Zealand, reports of suspicious activity in the bleachers grabbed headlines as the work of the TIU ejected two spectators for illegal betting. 147 Though the details about the spectators ejected from the Tournament were not publicly released –as this was a private TIU investigation not coordinated or linked with Auckland public police through the submission of any criminal charges– news journals reported one suspect to be a Spanish man previously observed in attendance at 2010 Wimbledon. While this activity may not be indicative of match-fixing per se, it is problematic for SGB. The TIU is vigilant to root out prohibited gambling-related activities and services from within the sport space-time of tennis competitions as a necessary part of protecting the integrity of the sport. This is also about protecting property. Sport integrity monitoring protects both a sport event holder’s physical and intellectual properties. Sport integrity is really about protecting sport and sport institutional reputation from damages to the commercial value of these sport activities. What is the value of such information scouting? This sort of sport betting intelligence via the infiltration and transmission of live-play referee calls is honed for live betting. Live betting – also known as in-play betting – as its name implies, entails betting on events as they unfold during regulation play. Examples include betting on who a next 147 Betting-information scouting is serious business. It is highly professional and makes an enticing career opportunity. Effective monitoring tools require understanding the criminal modus operandi of match- fixing and cheating at betting. Attempts to produce a typology of sport corruption have identified the roles of referees, players (current and former), staff, coaches, agents, and other sport participants in match-fixing (Hill, 2010; Vilotte, 2011; Boniface et al., 2012). 162 goal scorer will be or when a goal or foul will occur. This dynamic live-action betting is especially attractive to punters who sense they have a read on the game, and the interactivity provides an additional commercial platform for sport fans. Interactive gambling cajoles fans by making available further ways to express their sport loyalties and identity. In this way, cultural identity and performance are commercialized: consumers pay to play, so that the gambling product is just another leisure purchase (Findlay, 1986: 92). Rather than winning being about the actual stakes, the purpose is entertainment. Moreover, money proffered from a win comes to validate opinion and identity. This interactive gambling of a sport fan can aptly be described as putting your money where your mouth is: sport gambling combines chance and skill, encourages participation through calculation, and offers a consumer a forum for inclusion and validation (Veblen, 1953; Walker 1999; Cosgrave 2008). Live betting is about being in the “flow of the game,” about knowing and anticipating the game and player strategies, capabilities, and opportunities. These identity and interactive aspects of live betting are aspects of its financial lure and depth. While betting on final results –what is known as ante-post or futures betting– gathers punters together in a gambling-odds scenario where information may not be factually equal–not all fans have the same information or analytic tools to interpret information– the information is assumed or accepted to be equally accessible and publicly available. 148 At minimum, there is a common wager period: bet collection 148 Ante-post betting, or future betting, is a type of fixed-odds betting. While the terms are frequently used interchangeably, ante-post betting typically designates bets places well in advance of horse-post announcement. To wit, in ante-post betting, a punter may bet on an event, such as the World Cup championships, months or even years in advance without knowing the condition or roster of the potential lineup of eligible players or teams. In this way, the odds are much greater, and thus a successful bet more sizably rewarded. More or less, the betting scenario of information is controlled. 163 windows shut at a designated time, typically in advance or at the start of sport play. 149 However, with live betting, information on referee calls and the game’s conditions (e.g., player fatigue, weather, etc.) unfolds live, during regulation play, and punts stream in real time, instantly and globally. Thus the benefit from an information edge becomes tremendous. Since the quality and thoroughness of broadcast network coverage varies, the availability and timing of information is inconsistent. By implanting human and technological scouts in live sport venues, big-stakes punters and betting operations oftentimes can overcome the time lag of media coverage and catch hold of decisive information milliseconds in advance of other punters or betting houses. Besides seeking to obtain advantage over a time lag, these techniques attempt to leverage key live information often simply not available via media coverage. Media camera angles, scoreboard updates, and commentator narratives emphasize some details, while distorting or missing others altogether. 150 What, when, and how one broadcast network is able or chooses to report may or may not coincide at all with what is of value to certain punters. Perhaps similar to high frequency stock trading, obtaining critical information fractions of a second faster than others sufficiently advantages punters with an edge promising lucrative returns. Beginning in 2009, the media began to draw attention to unfair advantages culled by financial brokerage firms able to co-locate on the stock 149 Live betting may allow betting to flow alongside a continually streaming broadcast or real time of play period. Alternatively, live betting may set time frames, such as a betting window opening/closing at half time, by which to solicit bets during play but within limited parameters. In futures betting, the sports book (betting window or register of bets) is closed by the bookie (bookmaker). According to Sportradar, live betting is estimated to comprise 90% of tennis and 70% of football betting markets (Boniface et al., 38). 150 To be sure, the media is not blind to punter’s sport interests: this population accounts for a sizable segment of is readership and viewership. Gambling also constitutes one of media’s largest consumers of advertising sales. 164 exchange floor. By wiring up brokerage firm computers alongside the same servers as the stock exchange, a seemingly insignificant technological convenience translated into sizable financial profits, an advantage distorting expectations for a level market playing field (Chapman 2009; Jeffs 2010). As much as global technologies enable financial trading to take place anywhere and instantaneously, indifferent to place, it seems that technological differences in micro- or even sub-micro-seconds add up to tremendous margins of profit. These markets work by advantages of global time: as Castells writes, “time is critical to the profit-making of the whole system. It is the speed of the transaction, sometimes automatically preprogrammed in the computer to make quasi- instantaneous decisions that generate the gain –or the loss” (Castells, 2000: 466). Just as wiring up financial trading alongside in-house servers has rendered the ideal of equal starting points an illusion, infiltrating sport venues to transmit live-play data via mobile technologies has created a parallel phenomenon within sport gambling. Nowadays, it is live betting that crystallizes the most risks, because match-fixers know that the speed of the system prevents vigilance from being as effective for live as for pre-match betting. In fact, the instantaneous nature of live betting coupled with the large quantity of traffic makes control much more complex. Most operators in the market now concentrate on live betting, because it enables them to expand their offering and thereby substantially increase betting volumes. The margins realized by the operators on pre match bets are also becoming increasingly small, because of the competition between operators on rates of return to players, and also because many gamblers are professionals who are at least as expert as the odds-fixers. As a result of this situation, the operators are 165 setting up sophisticated, fully computerized matrix systems which give a finer appreciation in the event of a suspect movement and can be used to identify fraud after the event (Boniface et al., 71-72). Sport gambling markets –both licit and illicit– reconfigure applications of technologies. Sport gambling actors capitalize on digital information and financial technologies for new purposes. This reconfiguration of technology is what Castells describes as a “diffusion of technology” that amplifies the power of technology “as it becomes appropriated and redefined by its users” (Castells, 2000: 31). Effective regulation of sport integrity requires anticipating the diffusion of technology. ARJEL has been attentive to these challenges in seeing online gambling as also an issue of multiple and expanding mobile betting technologies. ARJEL assesses their attentiveness to technological challenges thusly: We must approve software, including mobile devices. [We have an] upcoming- technologies working group because these impact how we regulate. For now, [we are] ok, fine. This gives us more work, but not too complex. Because of the way the law is posed: bets [are] only allowed through URL. Whether we will be able to maintain this before the law –as it is now or change…[this will remain to be seen] (Killy 2011). Both technologies and the products of the information economy are malleable products. New actors reconfigure applications of technologies, sometimes threatening or splintering off from smoothly perimetered relationships of authority (Scott, J. 2001; Migdal 1998; Castells 2011). The gambling industry represents such versatility of actors whose 166 adaptation of technologies rescales markets on a planetary scale. Overcoming space and time really means harnessing the way space and time have meaning and for whom. The challenge is how to retool regulatory apparati and their relations to technology, space, and time to keep up with these high speed and agile global challenges. More than the simple and pedestrian detective work of watching a crowd’s applauding behavior, sport integrity and betting regulation demand capable technologies and transformed relations of authority. The sophistication of technology and expertise required to monitor and to detect irregular and suspicious betting and sport conduct is tremendous. Monitoring sport betting requires experts and expert systems that operate via sophisticated algorithms paired with live monitoring of sport betting legal and illegal/black sport betting markets to cull data on global betting patterns. 151 Asking how these experts avoid false positives, I learned that experts are often of two minds, as they express both confidence in and uncertainty about the sharpness of their investigative tools. At the end of the day, after all the mathematical formulations, consistency matrices, and digital decipherings, the calls that sort suspicious and irregular betting come down to the judgment of human experts. 152 These investigative units must make sense of all the information that is gathered and turned over to them. It is one thing to amass information, but it is another to translate this information into knowledge, what 151 To obtain black market data, these investigative bodies recruit informants that enable tagging estimates of black market money movement and betting directions (see Kalb 2011). These sophisticated monitoring systems eventually become known to those seeking to circumvent detection. All sorts of counter- intelligence efforts arise, complicating the task of mere numbers detection of deviant activities. 152 In sport integrity regulation, referees occupy a double role: they are both experts (helpful in final intelligence phases of review) and common suspects. 167 the intelligence world calls “graded intelligence” (Gunn & Rees 2008: 23). 153 Sport integrity intelligence involves five primary and interrelated avenues: “(i) betting evidence; (ii) first-hand knowledge from watching the match; (iii) telecommunications data; (iv) evidence from interviews; and (v) expert analytical evidence” (Ramos, 219). These five techniques are interrelated and integral components necessary for successful regulation. Global Betting Regulatory Networks: Information Sharing and Accountability Each of the specialized units daily engages in intensive dialogue and information exchange with networks of public and private sector actors. Between SGB and RGO, networks of information sharing and governance begin to make inroads into sport betting- related deviance. With a common interest in preventing match-fixing, RGO regularly and voluntarily share information with SGB-partnered sport integrity units. For RGO, the need to monitor betting volumes and risks is not entirely new. Operators develop “monitoring systems that serve both to optimize their risk management (i.e., for fixed odds betting, approaching as closely as possible to their target margin despite the uncertainties linked to sporting results) and the detection of irregular bets” (Boniface et al., 52). In France, this information sharing is by a statutory relation: In order to ensure integrity and avoid fraud in wagering operations, betting operators are required to provide ARJEL with ongoing access to all personal data of customers (including the customer’s name, sex, age, date, and place of birth, physical address, electronic address, login, profile), all gaming events recorded 153 Despite having access to an abundance of information, a common challenge in this information society age is making the information intelligible. 168 for the customer for every type of game and all activities which result in any change to the customer’s balance (Camilleri & Manasterski, 2011) . . Information of suspicious betting market activity has, on occasion, enabled SGB to preventively activate defensive mechanisms. This tactic has been employed in football when sport integrity intelligence leads have prompted referee changes or delays in the announcement of officiating referees until the last minute. 154 In this way, information sharing works as a deterrence technique, preventing the possibility of crime rather than just threatening punitive action. A great deal of hope and confidence elevates information sharing as a key solution to remount regulatory authority. On the one hand, a thickly interwoven and impressive range of private and public actors has come together, cooperating vis-à-vis information sharing. The extensiveness of this webbing of cooperation is remarkable. On the other hand, there are problematic gaps in information- sharing agreements. Sport integrity investigative experts depend upon access to private sport betting information –sums, sources, and flows of punts. RGO are being asked to turn over detailed demographic and service profiles. These revenue accounts are typically highly protected fiduciary parts of a company’s working strategy and formula. Integrity units want information on betting patterns, geographies of gambling market clients, volumes of bets, chancing odds scenarios, and money movements. Yet it is precisely this corporate financial material that SGB’s sport integrity units require. This information is private and sensitive for competitive advantage against competing firms. Nonetheless, through a rather impressive number and range of memoranda of understanding, SGB and RGO become joined as regulatory partners in sport integrity 154 This technique works in cases of suspicion of referee corruption or vulnerability to corruption. 169 efforts. 155 According to a Remote Gambling Association (RGA) commissioned report, there is a bit of chaos in Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) relations: “there are various forms of MOUs established by individual operators, trade associations and sporting bodies, and these continue to grow in number and in an uncoordinated fashion” (Remote Gambling Association, 2010: 115). Elaborating on this shortcoming, the report points to the multiplicity of information sharing agreements in professional football in which “separate MOUs have been required to be agreed with FIFA, UEFA and then many national governing bodies in football, which can all differ” as increasing the potential for inconsistency in reporting (Remote Gambling Association, 2010: 115). The problem with the current sport integrity MOU webbing is its inconsistency and inefficiency. Yet at the end of the day, perhaps “these non-statutory information sharing arrangements, whilst not perfect…deliver the most practical and coherent global integrity mechanisms at this time” (Remote Gambling Association, 2010: 109). As a RGA- commissioned report this regulatory portrait’s recommendations unsurprisingly favourably paint RGA members as essential global network actors and nodes for bringing about a necessary, harmonized approach at a global level. Moreover, RGO express discomfort at the amount of information shared with SGB. RGO lack feedback or response as to what is being done with the information they share. When asking experts from sport integrity monitoring units and private corporations such as EWS, ESSA, Cricket’s Betting Fraud Detection System, and 155 The sport and sport gambling industries share commercial interests in protecting their base resource, a perceived-to-be-clean sport integrity. European Sport Security Association has MOUs with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, Union des Associations Européennes de Football, English Professional Football League, The Football Association (England), Deutscher Fussball Bund, Association of Tennis Professionals, International Tennis Federation, and the World Tennis Association. 170 SportRadar about this, I detected real doubt and frustration about the lack of response following the turning over of intelligence and data to SGB. Pressing these investigative experts further on this, I discovered something unexpected: whether to stave off despair or shirk responsibility, investigative units carry an it’s up to the next guy mentality. Sport integrity investigative experts identify risks and report suspicious cases, but, as they see it, it is up to others –to a next level- to do something about it. There is disappointment when this does not happen –when nothing happens. For some, a coping mechanism can be found by rearticulating the industry job description: “We as an industry, our role is to monitor irregular betting. We hope they use this information, that they do something with it. We cannot do more. That is not our remit” (Ali 2011). The emerging sport integrity regulatory network’s independence of actors does not necessarily translate to effective regulation. Put differently, this perspective was shared by other sport integrity investigative experts: We have strong sport experts, if we find any irregularities, we report…and then at one point, we say that’s our bid [job]. Then [the sport governing body], Interpol, UN -they do the rest. We have a perspective: we know it is not done all with reporting (Interview, 2011: 0005GG). Accountability loosens in network structures of governance, but, as much as network governance may be to blame for releasing actors from strict accountability, there may be further causes or motivations short-circuiting regulatory strategies. RGO suggest a more political perversion of sport integrity regulation. After a sport integrity investigation, alert, and report, 171 there is also sport politics. [It] comes back to questions of reporting incidents. You can never say, “yes, FIXED”. But you write up that there were ‘irregularities’, ‘movements on the market’, ‘very suspicious’. It’s sport politics. Then, you just have to let it go. If you want to hurt yourself, you can read the media the next day, the day after, but you won’t read anything about it (Interview, 2011: 0005GG). Nothing happens. To be sure, there are stop-gaps in network accountability. Sometimes these stop-gaps are simply failures of intelligence, yet the suggestion here is that sometimes these are political decisions. SGB may posture vigilance and differentially apply sport integrity regulatory mechanisms. Networked relations of governance allow regulatory progress to be stopped at will, by volition. Amenable to a variety of (mis)uses, the rise of network governance tends to relate inversely to accountability. Toward Transnational Sport Integrity Law and Law Enforcement SGB and private security actors, with their efforts to maintain control through information sharing and accountability, are not alone in these regulatory worlds. ARJEL is there. National and international laws and law enforcement actors are still there, still present. They do not disappear. States appear through ARJEL and through any activation of criminal processes. Global market regulations like those involved in sport integrity and sport betting transform relations between state or public law enforcement, SGB, and the private sector. In keeping with the traditional nation-state based approach of crime control, some encourage an extension of a French penal code that can be used to stiffen (even double) 172 penalties for physical assaults against civil servants – such as firefighters, paramedics, doctors, and police officers – to also include referees (Vajda 2011). However, SGB are cautious and resistant to making sport integrity a criminal issue in a way that would activate public law and judicial processes. Some hope that the penal code might be interpreted to include attempts to corrupt or bribe referees as equivalent to physical assaults against civil servants (Bures 2008). In this way, regulators seek to give modern interpretations to old laws in order to obtain control over new risks. Proponents of this re-interpretation and application of the civil servant protection code take a perspective that sport integrity might be better secured via deterrence strategies that ratchet up punishment to sway potential deviants to think twice before engaging in match-fixing. A more widely embraced and circulating sport integrity-crime control proposal calls for a new category of crime, sport fraud. Such proposals look to legislative innovation to draft new criminal law for a specific category of sport crimes of cheating and match-fixing. In France, no such penal infraction for match-fixing or sport fraud exists yet; no specific juridical penal disposition allows police or courts the means to gather match-fixers into the criminal process fold. As of 2012, sport fraud as a criminal offence existed in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; however, “the absence of the offence of fraud in sport does not suggest a total impossibility of prosecution, although its existence can be a deterrent (for corruptors), and above all provide a stimulus (for public justice and police authorities)” (Boniface et al., 66). For example, while Great Britain’s “Gambling Act 2005 provides a specific criminal offence of cheating at gambling,” countries without similar legislative and criminal investigative powers by police typically adapt general fraud and conspiracy-to-defraud laws to allow 173 some regulatory means of dealing with these ‘crimes’ (Gunn & Rees, 2008: 31). Sport fraud might also become reined into the criminal-process fold through the application of financial and stock market penal code offences such as insider trading, market manipulation, or spreading false information (Boniface et al., 58). Law enforcement and investigation of the acts involved in the corruption of sport integrity, however, are cumbersome and complicated because they cross territorial state boundaries –differences in penal codes mean that what is criminal in one state may not necessarily be so in another. Furthermore, police tools and procedures are limited by locally specific laws. To think that a national approach can bring to bear an effective remedy is naïve: It can take many months to gather together all the evidential strands and, in tennis, such enquiries are exacerbated by worldwide venues of matches, players based in different countries and traveling around the world, language difficulties and problems of gathering some evidence (e.g., telephone data) in different jurisdictions (Gunn & Rees, 2008: 9). To move beyond national legal codes to signpost which acts that breach sport integrity also constitute crimes or public order infractions, some suggest that the question of sport crime vis-à-vis sport integrity should be taken up at a Europe-wide level. Since criminal investigation has traditionally happened at national and local levels, questions of whether criminal categories can happen at the EU level are questions regarding policing and powers of investigation not previously delegated to the EU. To be sure, these are interest areas fundamental to state security. States are resistant to even the mere suggestion of releasing what has been an exclusive sovereign power of security and crime control 174 (Deflem, 2006; Fijnaut, 2000; Anderson, 1989). Whether the EU settles upon a crime control model to regulate match-fixing and other sport betting and integrity issues at a community-wide level or not, the larger questions of how to regulate sport and sport betting markets have increasingly stirred other concerns within the EU. The EU has primarily been concerned with harmonization of national laws that turn up conflicts in issue areas of common market rules. In Chapter 3, I discussed challenges of legal harmonization for gambling laws. Here, I want to draw attention to the additional regulatory difficulties of regulating features of digital economy industries such as online gambling. “Considering the de facto borderless nature of e-gaming services and the need to regulate the information society from a higher level than that of the Member States, the adoption of a European regulatory framework for e-gaming services seems to be appropriate” (Verbeist & Keuleers, 13). There is no EU-wide penal code specific to match-fixing or betting-related integrity breaches. Instead, a multitude of secondary laws apply to this sport gambling sector: Gambling services are not regulated by sector-specific regulation at EU level but nevertheless are subject to a number of EU acts. In other cases gambling services have been explicitly excluded from the scope of EU law. In addition to benefiting from horizontal rules such as those pertaining to IPR protection, the following texts are noteworthy in this respect: the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Distance Selling Directive, the Anti- Money Laundering Directive, the Data Protection Directive, the Directive on privacy and electronic communication, the e-commerce Directive and the 175 Directive on the common system of value added tax (European Commission, 2011b: 13). The EU also cares about sport and sport gambling sectors and sport integrity not only as a matter of cultural rights but also as a matter of financial and market regulation. Sport and sport gambling stakeholders express dissatisfaction with the European Council as a proper locus for the solution. For Vlassis, [The] geographic approach fails: [these approaches] are too narrow and utterly incompetent. EPAS [Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport], the European Council, as expected, they are producing high quality and thorough work [on the subject], but [it is] too narrow, not global. It is difficult to look at matters geographically because of technology. [We] need some harmonization of rules, regulations globally around the world. Need countries to come together and get on board with certain standards because you are dealing with an area attracting more criminal groups, transnational criminal groups. This is difficult – particularly [with] online betting (Vlassis 2011). EPAS now recommends that sport integrity regulation requires effort through international convention, but international conventions fail to enable a truly transnational regulatory authority. When I asked Killy about ARJEL’S work with transnational authorities beyond France, Killy initially expressed enthusiasm as he described prospects of working with Interpol. Yet, as he recalled details and evaluated the working relations to date, Killy tempered his optimism, admitting that the truth was that cooperative options were more 176 constrained. In fact, ARJEL had to be careful “not to step on any toes.” ARJEL’s regulation requires …gendarme, customs, and police – yes, but we need specialized international [units] to fight it, too. We need specialized experts to understand gaming [gambling], sport, and Internet. We do this at French level and [we] need to do this at the EU level. But [our] Interpol meeting was premature: we didn’t want to cross French police by going to them (Killy 2011). ARJEL’s regulatory remit is strained by contradiction. A matter of pride seems to get in the way of the state’s enabling effective control. ARJEL’s reluctance to cooperate with Interpol is a manifestation of the problem of maintaining national authority under global conditions. Everyone must cooperate. A mutual approach is necessary. On its own France is not sufficient. We push for a strong state approach in every EU state. In addition, a strong mutual framework is necessary for an international agency that [can] re- group sport, operators, and states. How to finance? By whom? I don’t know. But, it requires putting minimum standards at the EU level (Killy 2011). As much as ARJEL recognizes the global nature of the challenges it confronts, its mechanisms of authority are predominantly state configured. While thinking and seeking to act transnationally, ARJEL ultimately appears strapped to a nation-state foundation of authority. This adherence to a national basis of authority confronts global challenges in a manner that may work nicely for national sovereignty in theory, but, in fact, this regulatory strategy situates France behind the eight ball. France both desires to project itself nationally through its regulatory model and fears its own undoing and irrelevancy. 177 ARJEL attempts to deploy a regulatory approach that could become a leading model enlivening a sector of global governance, yet the problem is that ARJEL short-sales its authority. The consequence of ARJEL’s delayed partnering with transnational governance actors such as Interpol, as a way forward until a time ripe for nation-state interest, negatively impacts its enforcement capability. While a national mentality restrains ARJEL, SGB, by and large, increasingly do look beyond the state. The IOC, for example, often stands in contradistinction to other more commercial Olympic Family member International Federations. With globalization, the national model of sport organized on a basis of athletes representing nations (e.g., the Olympics, World Cup) begins to shift. SGB recognize that real authority and power to respond to and control these global challenges and market pressures require transnational partnerships and governance. In 2011, FIFA directed $20 million to Interpol to take up this issue of betting-related sport integrity. FIFA’s endowment strongly encouraged Interpol to amend its transnational police agenda to include the subject of sport integrity as a matter of crime control. The sums involved in just this one endorsement indicate how seriously SGB perceive this problem. 156 In spite of the difficulties of trying to tie these actors together through their formal legal responsibilities, the governance of sport integrity is also networked through more informal mechanisms. For example, MOUs among private, state, and transnational actors knit them together in regulatory relations. The direction of regulatory authority is a mix of national and transnational threads that are not entirely compatible, and state or 156 The extensiveness of sport integrity regulation is quite remarkable: “In the space of one month during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, over 5,000 people were arrested in Asia (China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) and over $10 million was seized” (Boniface et al., 64). 178 transnational law enforcement agencies shape and are shaped by the global pressures of sport and sport gambling markets. Looking to identify and understand these processes of global regulation, I now focus on the emerging supervisory direction for addressing the deepening commercial entanglement of sport and sport gambling sectors. Sport Betting and the Sport-Media Complex Just as telecommunication technologies made possible new media markets that – with the help of favourable government policies and liberalization of broadcast markets – accelerated the commercialization of sport, so also we are witnessing something similar in global gambling markets. With the liberalization of gambling markets comes a new player, sport gambling operators, capable of expanding what scholars have identified as a sport-media complex (Roche 2000; Slater 1998; Nicolson 2007; Boyle & Haynes, 2009). This sport-media complex is a type of power concentration distinguished by its global characteristics. As Ken Roberts argues, these media conglomerates are not new (see Murdoch and Godling, 1977) but the giants of media industries (such as Time-Warner/AOL, Disney, Viacom, Vivendi- Universal, Bertelsman, and News Corporation) are now bigger than ever and have stakes in television, radio, newspaper, magazines, books, films, and the internet. Nowadays these businesses operate on global scale (Roberts, 144). This sport-media complex, or sport-media nexus, unfolds globally through both the horizontal and vertical integration of sport and media industries (Andrews 2003; Nicolson 2007). As Whannel observes, 179 television transformed sport into a set of commodified global spectacles, producing huge audiences and massive new sources of income. Sport in turn provided television with an endless supply of major spectacular events and an enduring form of pleasurable and popular viewing (Whannel, 2009: 206). The sport-media nexus is about this mutual relationship consolidating and commercializing together. We have Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation as a prime example. In 1999, News Corporation’s bid to purchase the English Premier League team, Manchester United, prompted statutory intervention. The concerns were for both the financial wellbeing of the broader sport and media markets, as opposed to a monopolistic concentration of productive power, and for cultural rights. In what I have described with emerging SBR, we are witnessing prime conditions for a further “extensivity” of this complex (Held and McGrew, 1999: 16). As SBR deepen commercial incentives for sport event holders, the potential for conflicting interests heightens. In SBR, sport event holders discover an additional commercial asset. SGB’s regulatory or management roles become further intertwined with competitive drives as sport betting properties enter the fray of interests to protect, promote, and exploit. As the betting industry further merges formally or informally with the already present and powerful sport-media complex, I argue, this triad of sport-media-gambling interests can be expected to further alter the form of sport. To be sure, ARJEL has been attentive in establishing rules to prevent such conflicting interests. As a safeguard against collusion and other conflicts of interest, France anticipated abuses arising through this tendency toward concentrating power. France’s regulatory policy puts in place explicit rules to prevent the replication of the 180 state’s former monopolistic regulatory field from landscaping in the courtyards of sport event owners, namely SGB. With the “commercialization of this right, the owner of event’s right,” there are stipulations: “first, the owner of event cannot commercialize on an exclusive basis and second, the fee must be a percentage rather than flat fee for competition law issues. A percentage makes it possible for all operators [to compete]” (Killy 2011). This fee has typically amounted to 1%. As a check on the free market, Article 39 of the Gambling Act restricts private ownership and collusive practices. Further, Article 32 of the Gambling Act sets forth a conflict of interest clause that requires transparency and a separation of commercial stakes or proprietary roles between betting operators and event owners (Vilotte 2011). Having learned about Amaury Sport Organisation’s first commercial venture in French online gambling, I became concerned about the potential for a conflict of interests. In light of ASO’s controversial legal haggling with the UCI regarding its decision to ban Team Unibet from its races in 2007 –a decision reported to be about a concern to keep clean hands by neither directly nor indirectly illegally promoting gambling advertising– ASO’s contracting with Bwin to create a private white label online betting platform in France, Sajoo, seemed a bit ironic. ASO organizes a number of internationally renowned motor, equestrian, golf, athletics, and cycling sport events that include the Tour of Dakar, Paris Marathon, and Barcelona Marathon. In addition to the Tour de France, ASO’s cycling ownership rights include the following sport event properties: Liege-Bastogne-Liege, Tour d’Avenir, Tour de Picardie, Criterium Internationale, Paris-Roubaix races, and 49% of the Vuelta a España. 157 Furthermore, 157 Since 2010, the Vuelta a España is 49% percent owned by ASO and 51% by Unipublic –Spanish corporate media and sport giant. 181 ASO provides the primary logistical, technical, and expertise partnerships in new and rising important races such as the Tour of Qatar and the Tour of California and, formerly, the Tour of Oman. ASO also stands atop and operates as an expansive media conglomerate. ASO ownership also includes daily newsprint journals L’Equipe, Le Parisien, and Aujourd’hui en France; magazines L’Equipe Magazine, Football France, Vélo Magazine, and Journal du Golf; TV channel L’Equipe TV; digital sites lequipe.fr and leparisien.fr; and radio LTN/L’Equipe, Editions, and L’Equipe&Co. With ASO’s sport and media properties in mind, I was surprised at how unanticipated and surprising my questions about the potential for conflicting interests appeared to be. Though experts acknowledge potential for conflicts, I discovered no real sense of alarm. One sport gambling consultant admitted that, with “Sajoo and ASO and all this, [there] certainly [is] possibility of a conflict of interests. But Sajoo [is] not allowed to offer bets on cycling. Still, ASO gets a large fair return -so there is a conflict of interest” (Kalb 2011). In the case of ASO’s entry into the sport gambling market, it is interesting to note how ASO opted for a white label, Sajoo, for the new gambling service’s trademark. Creating a new sport-gambling-operator mark that fits a local context may make economic sense, but it is also a handy way to obscure the thickness of global sport-media-gambling vertical and horizontal integration. To be sure, l’Equipe sells advertisements to sport gambling operators, eager to reach sport audiences for marketing their services. As l’Equipe promotes sport gambling, ASO ‘s sport properties stand to gain. The market works nicely for these consolidated players acting in concert and globally webbed; however, these aspects of this entertainment industry are left as backstage dealings, left less 182 transparent to the public since knowledge of the scope of collusion might damage the perception of sport integrity and thus, its commercial value. To date, the remote gambling sector has remained in its own orbit, with primarily vertical acquisitions and mergers. Ernst and Young’s 2011 “Betting and Gaming Outlook” reports that this media market continues to be ripe for consolidation…the Bwin/Partygaming merger was completed in Q1 2011. Furthermore, William Hill has entered the US market with the acquisition of three Nevada/Delaware land-based gaming operations, namely American Wagering, Inc., the Club Cal Neva Satellite Race and Sportsbook Division and Brandywine Bookmaking LLC (Ernst and Young, 2011: 5). The remote gambling industry indicates that it can be expected to follow the same global capitalist logic by which transnational productions and labour processes normally converge and consolidate in ways advantageous to controlling supply and demand. I argue there is cause for concern. As Camilleri and Manasterki admit, “No collusion between media groups, betting operators and/or organizers of sporting events has come to light but the relationships raise doubts in the minds of the general public and cynicism about the role of money and the media in society” (Camilleri and Manasterski, 2011). Capitalizing on Sport Betting Rights Beyond the State Paradoxically, SBR have bite because of and through states. SBR were set in motion through French legislation and judicial decision, yet SBR can also be seen to obtain life independent of the state. SBR are mechanisms by which states and SGB 183 might acquire global political capital. Proud of French sport leadership and ingenuity in the Olympic Movement and global sport, France fights to reassert itself. The special stature of sport as a cultural sector informs France’s decision to regulate sport gambling in this particular fashion that co-links with SGB vis-à-vis sport betting rights. The economic strength of the sport industry coincides with French national interests. By fostering SGB economic wellbeing, France initially stands to gain from SBR. Yet, as SGB come to see the political and economic purchase of SBR, a different project of global ambition may seize SBR as a means to obtain global currency. The trick of recalibrating global authority requires freeing SBR from dependency upon national legislation and networking authority through global political and legal mechanisms. While there is little explicit mention or admission of a scheme to disregard or circumvent the state, transnational ambitions are clearly simmering. For SBR to have teeth at a global level requires further political and legal transformation. The potential development of SBR parallels the narrative of the struggle to regulate sport integrity. In the sections below, I first trace the relations and capacities of SGB’s attempts to act on a global level and then conclude with a discussion on the situation of SGB legal mechanisms and individual rights protections. The IOC is what IR scholars describe as a norm carrier (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Legal scholar Paul Schiff Berman characterizes the legal context of such norm carrying capacities as having shifted in a post-Cold War era of law to now consist of a “transnational legal process” (Berman, 2005: 487). The IOC’s norm carrying capacity entails the ability to generate, diffuse, and facilitate the cooperation needed for implementing new norms. In the case of sport integrity, the IOC surveys the prospects of 184 spreading sport betting rights. Seeing itself with these norm carrying capacities informs the IOC’s perspective on SBR and its possible horizon for sustainability beyond France. 158 Evidence of rapport and soft power among other transnational governance actors is difficult to measure but actively present. During one conversation with a United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Programme Specialist in the Communication and Information Sector, I asked about the importance of working with the IOC. My informant explained that, in 2010, there were discussions about the IOC registering with the UNESCO World Archives: raising his voice, he exclaimed, this would have been “a real coup! Others would see [the] IOC there and would want to register. It would build legitimacy for us and [for] them. Oh, this [would be] a very good thing. We don’t solicit, but this is a desired thing…and we told them this” (Interview, 2010: 0008GG). The IOC’s importance as a transnational actor transcends the sport sector of global governance. Since 2009, the IOC’s official UN Observer status has provided it with distinct social and political capital. This seemingly invisible or token status matters. For one, UN Observer status grants the IOC speaking rights on the UN floor. Moreover, UN Observer status orients how others perceive, defer to, call upon, and engage with the IOC. The IOC has long been involved in transnational partnerships to promote sport projects and sees sport as a vehicle for promoting a variety of social and cultural interests globally. The IOC’s transnational moves most strongly commenced in the 1990’s through co-operation agreements with United Nations agencies such as the following: 158 SGB such as the IOC are transnational actors who promote and enjoy a sport “halo effect” that enables them to push certain their agendas transnationally (Hoberman 2001). 185 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 1992), the World Health Organization (WHO, 1993), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF, 1994), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 1995), the World Meterological Organization (WMO, 1996), the World Bank (1996), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1996), the Universal Postal Union (UPU, 1997), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1997), the International Labout Organization (ILO, 1998), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1998 and 2004), the World Tourism Organization (WTO, 1999), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCRCS, 2003). Joint activities also undertaken with the High Commission for Refugees, [and] the International Telecommunication Union, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (Chappelet & Kubler-Mabott, 111-112). These transnational legal practices are important. Legitimacy or power increasingly calls up global authority that is not simply power based in or in relation to nation states (Hurrell, 2007: 86-89). Should the EU give positive, welcoming signs for recognizing sport betting rights, the IOC has declared itself prepared, albeit somewhat quietly, to go global, carrying forward a norm that would give force to SBR. According to one informant on the IOC’s Illegal and Irregular Betting Task Force, “The IOC said something very important, the IOC said [that] if Europe goes this way with regulation with a sport betting right, we will follow and put the standard worldwide” (Interview, 2011: 0013PS). Boasting of taking sport betting rights global is not just posturing. The IOC admits to interests in protecting 186 its properties and sees itself as having a special status capable of bringing about the legislative changes needed for protecting sport property rights. While conducting interviews with IOC legal counsel, I learned that the IOC feels confident of its recognition as an able and important transnational actor: “WIPO [World Intellectual Property Organization] sees [the] IOC and FIFA as having influence to move forward certain agenda internationally…this is mutually important for us and states” (Stupp 2011). The IOC holds substantial normative force. The IOC power as a norm carrier evidences legal pluralism. The IOC commands legitimacy as a transnational actor – oftentimes, the IOC commands greater legitimacy than other national or official government sponsored entities (Berman, 2005: 538). Earlier in this chapter, I have already discussed the IOC’s efficacy in establishing IP protections in China in time for the Beijing Olympics. Another instance in which the IOC can be seen as a norm carrier is in the rapid construction and development of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999, in response to the doping integrity crisis. WADA now stands as a hybrid public-private body, funded by and representative of both national and sport institutional bodies. WADA’s ability to control doping by setting standards, developing testing technologies, and administering controls for doping in sport on a global level stands as a model of transnational governance in which actors can rapidly facilitate broad cooperation in new relations and institutions capable of effecting change at a global level. WADA is a recognized, successful model of governance happening beyond the state level and has increasingly become the subject of scholarship exploring the workings and implications of public-private partnerships (Casini 2009). It is interesting to consider the transnational 187 institutional relations and processes that helped WADA garner its political punch, its persuasive, even coercive, power to facilitate cooperation. The scaffolding of the anti- doping regime led by WADA has derived much of its authority by networking with other transnational governance actors, primarily the United Nations. Rather than acquiesce to the WADA Code alone, international treaties have also set up reciprocal responsibilities and rights for participants via an international system very much centered upon a nation- state basis. States became roped in and bound to WADA Code compliance through a UNESCO Convention. It is “under the UNESCO Convention [that] these government parties formally agree to equally fund WADA with the Olympic Movement” (Ramos, 233-234). However, the UNESCO Convention does more than financially commit states to support WADA. WADA’s political legitimacy, as Lorenzo Casisi elaborates, operates via a global governance network: “governments instead are not asked to be signatories to the Code, but rather to sign the Copenhagen Declaration (2003) and ratify, accept, approve or accede to the UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport” (Casini, 2009: 434). 159 In this way, WADA centers itself as an expert regulator and “global standard setter” for the global anti-doping regime while also embedding itself into a larger global governance network (Casini, 2009: 433). As a part of this global governance network, WADA is further set up as an institution expected to work in conjunction with a number of other international bodies. Of particular importance is the International Standard for Protection of Privacy and Personal Information (Casini, 2009: 434). Even as the state is included in the global anti- 159 “In October 2005, an international treaty, the International Convention against Doping in Sport, was unanimously approved by 191 governments at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s General Conference” (Casini, 436). This ability to elicit a unanimous approval from so many nations is remarkable. 188 doping regime, WADA shows that the nation-state-based system of law has shifted: “international law lost its privileged place as the primary conceptual framework for understanding cross-border development of norms” (Berman, 2005: 555). New, transnational-actor-led governance networks are articulated through bureaucratic institutions such as the IOC, WADA or other SGB that are also subject to pressures of powerful private interests. Moreover, these transnational governance institutions possess their own commercial interests. Sport is an important example of law-making activity left to non-state entities (Berman, 2005: 493). The IOC works as an international actor in an international system of states via mechanisms of state and international law, but the IOC is also outside this system, operating as a transnational actor more or less indifferent to national interests. In its sport-specific and interrelated global governance spheres, SGB, like the IOC, can be seen to transform the state. 160 Sport global governance may compel state complicity as sport bureaucratic institutions implement and bolster cultural/sport policies that enshrine commercial, market interests. General interests and politics are made secondary as social interests acquiesce or defer to these economic priorities. In addition to coupling with other global governance actors such as UNESCO, WADA got off the ground as a specialized global authority with the help of the IOC. As a transnational actor in its own right, the IOC threw its weight of incentives offered or withheld by making candidacy qualification to host the Games contingent upon a state’s 160 Customized legal frameworks and expert justice bind sport parties/stakeholders together internally, where dispute resolution and rule enforcement appear through private arbitration systems. “Courts in the United States also have been reluctant to find either express or implied rights of action in challenges by individual athletes against sport associations and have generally deferred to private processes for resolving disputes” (Nafziger, 2004: 72) 189 signatory status to the International Convention Against Doping in Sport (Ramos, 236). In seeming support of these carrot/stick techniques, Ramos goes on to insist that “it should be a condition of the Olympic Movement and all tennis governing authorities that a country undertake these conditions if that country wishes to host a tennis tournament of any sort” (Ramos, 236). The politics of hosting sport mega-events such as the Games has become commonplace, yet SGB occupy contradictory positions when insisting that sport is, after all, apolitical. States pander to the prestige, limelight, jobs, tourism, rebranding opportunities, and anticipated economic boon of hosting the Games, and the Olympics, for their part, also do not desire to lose potential hosting clients. The IOC position toward sport integrity regulation, then, according to one informant who participated in the IOC Sport Integrity Conference in March 2011, recognizes …a need to exchange information but like [in the] WADA processes rather than requiring too much mandatorily. The IOC solution for sport integrity and betting is [like] a vision of WADA. The IOC wants to work with states. This is her – IOC’s Ethics Commission, Pâquerette Girard Zappelli’s – position (Interview, 2011: 0015EG). The Olympics exemplify an enduring sport model that is a national model –teams representing nations rather than businesses. Because of this strong national basis, the IOC solicits states, commercializing nationalism. The IOC remains a state-strengthening “international” sport organization, and this commitment works nicely for states such as France. Yet the IOC also presents itself and works as a transnational body and a commercial player. This transnational character connects with the IOC’s promise to “box its weight” in the global arena and work to spread a sport betting right norm, if all EC 190 signs say “yes.” The instances in which the IOC willingly admits or affirms this political identity and role vary. Before the Beijing Olympics, political activists and states began to consider the possibility of boycotting the Games because of China’s relationship with atrocities taking place in Darfur, Sudan. SportAccord president Hein Verbruggen admitted that the situation was horrible, but argued that the Olympics were simply not the correct forum: “we are like Greenpeace: when Amnesty [International] came to us before Beijing Olympics [asking], ‘why do you go to China!’ [we said] ‘we are like Greenpeace: they do environment with everyone. We do sport with everyone’” (Verbruggen 2010). The underlying conviction is that sport is not political, that it must single-mindedly focus on sport promotion. This “neutrality” or disinterest works quite well for commercial interests. Dissemination of norms that become globally harmonized in law in ways that promote basic rights might be cause for optimism (i.e., disability, sustainability), but the interests that SGB laud and impress upon its members and hosting nations may not be entirely so benign. A more suspect instance of norm carrying can be seen in FIFA’s pressure upon Brazil to revoke legislation prohibiting the sale of alcohol in sport venues. After awarding World Cup 2014 hosting honours to Brazil, FIFA found Brazilian alcohol consumption laws in conflict with the interests of one of its title sponsors, Budweiser. Caught in a bind, FIFA launched a sharp lobbying effort to have the national laws banning alcohol sales and consumption in sport venues revoked. Sport governing bodies have found it more financially profitable to shed their Dudley-Do-Right image that has kept things like tobacco, alcohol, and gambling at bay. More and more, global commercial sport lifts its blanket prohibitions that have categorically disqualified such 191 corporate sponsorships. We witness this process with states, too: “In Sweden, widespread gambling advertising is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the 1970s, the promotion of lotteries and gambling was deemed inappropriate by the authorities responsible for the regulation of gambling. In Sweden, gambling companies’ investment in advertising in 2006 was over four times higher than in 1995” (Binde, 2011: 173). Sport institutional rules, policies, and deal-making, such as those for hosting nations, are hewn to satisfy commercial interests. SGB claim to represent a global polity, sport as a global public good, yet the selection of policies and policy techniques promulgate interests that are commercial, not social. Mounting all sorts of sport sanctions and threats, FIFA insists that the national legislation for social order via regulation of alcohol must give way to what it perceives as ultimately more serious economic stakes. The liberalization of markets does, in fact, indicate a changed moral milieu. However, this moral change can be explained by a political economy analysis. Like Susan Strange’s now well-known treatment of the international relations, which she describes as a situation of “casino capitalism” and similar to what Ulrich Beck describes as the “risk society,” Martin Young recognizes the global expansion of the gambling markets as part and parcel of global political economic strategies. The state is very much an actor in these global economic conditions. For Young, “the involvement of the state, with its massive advertising budgets, suggests that the commodification of chance has not been caused by a change or expansion in the aleatory principle per se, but by the increasing aggressive forces of agôn (i.e., the state and industry) that reframe and repackage alea to encourage mass consumption” (Young, 260). 161 Young puts 161 Young hearkens back to other parts of Caillois’s typology of game, which characterizes games of chance such as sport gambling as alea; Caillois characterizes competitive skill-based games such as sport as agôn. 192 responsibility on states for the competitive sporting drive in global commercial markets as also a propelling force in the global expansion of chance or gambling industries that now occupy such a dominant place in the global entertainment industry. SGB have independence as an expert body at the transnational level. SGB can be understood as what Peter Haas calls an epistemic community. i.e., “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” (Haas, 1992: 3). Thinking of the IOC or SGB as an epistemic community is helpful up to a point, but not sufficient. Despite possessing the sharpness to scrimshaw details of global standards, norms, and rules, SGB cannot muster adequate authority to control sport integrity without further incursion into public law enforcement fields. Moreover, conceptualizing SGB as an epistemic community is furthermore deficient because the IOC and SGB are transnational entities that both govern and commercially compete on a global level. As an in-house SGB solution, some, such as FIFA’s Sepp Bladder, have called for the creation of a world sport police, but SGB working-groups have begun to consider the less fantastical and more tapered option of a World Anti-Betting Agency (WABA). While this sort of mega-agency, a global private-governance solution, may seem ludicrous, the idea of a WABA has a precedent and model. The WADA-led anti-doping regime offers a successful example of a quickly erected set of norms and institutions, forged of strong public-private partnerships, which linked disparate public, private, and state actors in a global network, backed by mechanisms with real bite – UN Conventions. The WADA system represents and reinforces a sport-specific logic of governance and 193 achieves a legal basis for a sport in-house solution by tying states into its system of authority. However, while seemingly dependent upon states, WADA reconfigures how state and non-state actors obtain and exercise power. In this manner, WADA garners legitimacy while simultaneously departing from a nation-state-centered international system and introducing an alternative – and very serious – mechanism of networked global authority. The model provided by this global anti-doping regime may point the way toward meeting the challenges of global gambling regulation, but whether a similar institutional solution can be crafted for dealing with challenges of global gambling markets remains to be seen. Sport Integrity: Lex Sportiva and Basic Rights Sport integrity structures and processes produce transnational repercussions that require extra care in evaluating their compatibility with human rights protections and freedoms enshrined in national and international law. We must consider the impact of these governance forms and techniques upon the labour situation and upon the lives and rights of the athletes and other sport participants and entities that would be affected by SGB rules. Investigative units and mechanisms employed to prevent or detect match- fixing have consequences for such fundamental rights, including rights to privacy, work, and due process. 162 Basic rights concerns appear in multiple phases of these sport integrity regulatory efforts. Rights can be made vulnerable during monitoring, surveillance, investigative, judicial, and punishment processes. The Sopot Scandal 162 These rights are protected by a number of international human rights treaties, including International Labour Organization conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 194 involving tennis player Davydenko that I introduced at the beginning of this chapter illustrates the difficulty of balancing social control with freedoms. Though the Sopot scandal impressed a sense of urgency upon SGB to pay attention to sport integrity threats, the case ought also be heard as a call to reconsider sport integrity regulatory processes in terms of rights protections. Sport lawyers working within the national and international federation of sport law system told me they had mixed feelings of both obligation to push forward in mounting legal actions against suspected deviants and doubt that the system of sport law may be incompatible with public law. In an off-the-record-like undertone, one lawyer explained his doubt in situations like Sopot, saying My opinion on French Tennis – its investigative unit and all – is that it would not under any circumstance pass light under EU Convention of Human Rights. Any player determined to fight would have a home run in pulling down the system because of the type of investigative measures and clearances. And it goes beyond the players, to coaches, families: the [investigative] circle is broad. Though CAS could rule in favour to enforce [it]. Sport [governing bodies] have no notion of the world (Interview, 2011: 0007SB). In the Sopot scandal, the investigative probe came to a screeching halt during the evidence collection phase. As TIU investigators sought to obtain phone records for Davydenko, as well as for family members suspected of match-fixing complicity, the sport investigation came into conflict with public law. German privacy and data protection laws effectively stopped the investigations. 163 In this case, the difficulty of fact collection translated into the impossibility of successful disciplinary action or 163 German laws required that all such records be destroyed by phone companies after the passage of a designated, short duration of time. 195 criminal prosecution. After months of investigation, suspicion, and media attention that harmed Davydenko’s public image and reputation, Davydenko was officially “cleared” of match-fixing suspicion. French Tennis does not want to be the black sheep. It must go with the IF and that is with IOC and with CAS and these laws. [In] sport thinking, there is a view that is unaware of public policy issues of countries where these laws apply. [The] notion of lex sportiva? I am skeptical of this approach, this lex sportiva perspective... Players [are] put in a difficult position because it is either challenging the sport body with a risk of being suspended [or] banned or dealing with and making do with the situation. Unless banned for life or impaired from competing, I doubt there will be real challenges. Davydenko, he was pointed out, stigmatized as having cheated. With all regulation, power, and capability, they prove nothing, and he threatened to sue for defamation!” (Interview, 2011: 0007SB). According to this informant, the contemporary system of sport governing authority “depends if there will be a national or ECJ court decision that put a halt on lex sportiva or not” (Interview, 2011: 0007SB). I discussed the situation of lex sportiva with international human rights lawyer Luc Misson, whose landmark representation of Jean- Marc Bosman at the ECJ upset global football labour relations when the Court decided that sport, like other labour sectors, must not discriminate on a national basis (i.e., teams were no longer permitted to decide rosters on the basis of national quotas) in player transfers but must comply with Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome (Garcia 2007). The Bosman case determined that sport markets are, in fact, labour markets; fundamental 196 labour rights protections could not be circumvented for ulterior sport rule or organizational preferences, or on the basis of the notion of sport specificity. For Misson, the opportunity to challenge lex sportiva is his career dream. 164 Beaming, Misson confessed, Like Martin Luther King, I have a dream too. This is my dream: I would like to lose in front of [the] Swiss courts and have the possibility to go before the European Court of Human Rights. The European courts cannot say that TAS [CAS] is impartial, and she [the court] will have to say it is illegal and then states will have to follow the law (Misson 2010). For Misson, sport integrity regulatory processes collide with fundamental rights protections, and these rights are matters that should be exclusively subject to public legislative and judicial processes. Sport integrity investigatory and disciplinary actions primarily remain sequestered within the private sport governance system. Dispute resolution authority ultimately resides in CAS which has been set up according to a “supreme court for world sport” vision. Within this sport governance system, private legal and judicial mechanisms of due process become stylistic features of arbitration principles rather than constitutional guarantees. Without questioning the sincerity or well-meaning intentions of these arbitration principles, these private legal processes stand distinguished from public rights mechanisms and guarantees that structurally protect basic rights as non-derogable. Misson explains, “A major problem today is that athletes have to sign conventions or contract with the federations and [with the] IOC saying [that] they [athletes] will never go 164 Union Royale Belge des Sociétès de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman (1995). 197 to national court” (Misson 2010). Sport international institutions have real teeth. FIFA, for example, maintains an article to punish extra-FIFA legal jurisdiction legality; Article 64 of the FIFA statutes states: Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations. To ensure the foregoing, the associations shall insert a clause in their statutes stipulating their clubs and members are prohibited from taking a dispute to ordinary courts of law and are required to submit any disagreement to the jurisdiction of the association, the appropriate confederation or FIFA (FIFA, 2009). 165 The problem is that private law is replacing public law rather than acting as an adjunct or supplement. With sport integrity regulation a type of legal harmonization crystallizes. Yet the direction of this legal harmonization is one that occurs by broad swath substitution of public law and legal processes with private governance and legal processes. According to Misson and other human rights proponents, these kinds of private legal processes are dangerous to fundamental freedoms. 166 In discussing the balancing act between investigative powers and basic rights protections, sport integrity experts frequently bring up the 2005 German football Bundesliga match-fixing scandals involving referee Robert Hoyzer. The Hoyzer case is used equally as a poster example of success and as an exception which was a success despite fundamental flaws. Privacy and individual rights disputes have yet to arise, but 165 FIFA now recognizes the Olympic Movement’s Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 166 In Quelle justice voulez-vous?: Comment Réformer la Justice, le Barreau et le Justiciable?, Misson raises provocations to reconsider how regulatory decisions in all spheres, including the sport cultural spheres, determine which kinds of justice will be available and enjoyed (Misson, 1997). 198 sport integrity regulators may be biding their time. Pointing to the Hoyzer case, one expert implied the existence of regulatory tensions, saying, “Like in German referee case: [there were] manipulated matches, a big scandal, [but the] issue of overstepping privacy never came up because he [Hoyzer] admitted it!” (Interview, 2011: 0005GG). The insinuation, later made explicit, was that “this was luck” on the part of SGB (Interview, 2011: 0005GG). While many encourage the stiffening of sport integrity penalties from what is currently seen as little more than a slap on the wrist to more serious sanctions, even lifetime bans, as a promising deterrence technique, there is cause for caution and a need to better think through the consequences of social control policies and laws. So far, SGB disciplinary reaction to match-fixing has included sanctions, revocation of credentials and access to venues, fines up to $250,000, and ineligibility as severe as lifetime bans. Beyond SGB disciplinary action, when public authorities are involved, match-fixing and sport integrity violations may involve criminal sentencing and prison terms. Recent match-fixing scandals in South Korean football, baseball, and volleyball have grabbed media attention with the extensiveness of these match-fixing schemes and criminal networks. Half of one of South Korea’s K-League professional football squads received lifetime bans, and in 2012 one of the K-League’s more famous athletes, Choi Sung-Kuk, also received a lifetime ban. This same year, South Korean volleyball match-fixing scandals involving professional and military teams resulted in fifteen lifetime bans, including two bans for female volleyballers. In 2011, professional tennis match-fixing scandals resulted in lifetime suspensions for Serbian David Savic (formerly ranked 659 th ) and Austrian Daniel Kollerer (formerly ranked 55 th ). A match-fixing scandal known as 199 “Asiagate,” involving “national friendly” football matches in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand, has implicated the Zimbabwe national team. With the launching of a sport integrity probe, Zimbabwe suspended eighty players. As match-fixing and betting- related sport integrity scandals become more publicized, SGB disciplinary reactions of increasingly severe nature also become well known. As with other transnational legal processes in which matters more traditionally located in public courts and legal processes have been relocated to private governance institutions and processes, the severity of these sanctions blurs boundaries between private penalty/award settlement and criminal processes. Sport sanctions such as lifetime bans bring up questions as to whether punishments are condign. These private disciplinary and arbitration matters involve punishments that may violate other basic rights, as well as notions of proportional justice. 167 In addition to sport law, lex sportiva, Ken Foster examines four other legal principles that CAS mediation is said to employ: “good governance, procedural fairness, harmonisation of standards between international sporting federations, and equitable treatment” (Foster, 2006: 1). 168 CAS is dedicated to ensuring that its arbitration is “fair, fast, and free” (Lenard, 2010). CAS mediation provides specialized arbitration proceedings designed to deliver “speed justice” decisions that track with the fast pace of sport (e.g., matters of athlete eligibility sometimes cannot be decided next week or next year, when the event competition dispute matters to a 167 The issue of sport discipline proportionality in relation to betting was brought up in DiMauro tennis betting case. (McLaren 2008). (Alessio Di Mauro v. ATP Tour Inc., 2007). 168 In April 2010, CAS upheld UEFA match-fixing sanctioning on a Macedonian club, FK Pobeda, that included an eighty-year ban on the club from competing in UEFA, as well as a lifetime ban on the club’s owner, Aleksandar Zabrcanec. However, CAS overturned the ban on footballer Nikolce Zdraveski, as CAS determined the level of proof was inadequate. 200 competition such as the Olympics that might be taking place immediately). CAS is internationally renowned for its ability to deliver such speed justice decisions. Beyond responding to sport’s recognizable and particular demands for immediacy, CAS exemplifies transnational legal processes that have grown in importance as a legal response suited to the urgent demands of global markets. What we witness in CAS is consistent with larger transnational legal trends and provides another instance of what Sassen observes: “Different forms of arbitration entail discrepant temporal orders, as can be immediately seen in the way in which the avoidance of national court systems ensures quick adjudications and settlements” (Sassen, 2000: 224). Chapter Conclusion The foregoing discussion of sport integrity law enforcement and disciplinary action is about legal and judicial processes taking place outside of governmental institutions. Now I want to return to Berman’s treatment of global governance as a transnational legal process. For Berman, the state transforms as it digests and internalizes transnational norms that may have been generated by non-state, non-traditional actors or other states (Berman, 2005: 487). As SGB extend further and further into public spaces and times through sport integrity work that overlaps public and criminal process, we witness contradictions between transnational and national authority. These findings have relevance for understanding general processes of global governance, in which we witness the delegation and relocation of governance powers from public authorities, including law enforcement and judicial powers, to private actors (Cutler, 2010; Kahler and Lake, 2003; Keohane et al., 2001). 201 In this chapter, my effort has focused on sport integrity regulatory actions and mechanisms. The regulatory incentives and relationships interwoven in these areas of sport integrity and sport betting are not reducible to the notion of SBR, even though they are becoming amplified or more important because of SBR. Yet we cannot understand the situation of sport integrity regulation without understanding the potential of SBR and their relationship to current sport integrity regulation. This chapter has shown what sport integrity governance and intelligence gathering looks like in terms of some of its actual working tools. Some of the mechanisms are mundane, such as good old-fashioned detective work (e.g., crowd observation and clapping surveillance); some of the mechanisms are highly sophisticated, driven and guided by algorithms. Global gambling markets pose threats that are symptomatic of dilemmas and crises of legitimacy that both nation-states and sport regulatory institutions confront in shifting loci of power that reconfigure with emerging global technologies. 169 The regulatory problem is that sport betting solicits, takes in, and pays out bets in times and spaces not easily controlled by traditional sport governance oversight. Globalization accentuates the limits of state-centred or territorially defined jurisprudence. Without a global government structure or universally accepted international legal mechanisms of adjudication and enforcement, increasing political, social, and economic interaction on a global scale turns up shortcomings, incapacities, and contradictions of law and regulation inscribed on a territorial state basis of authority (Sassen 2006). While the de-territorializing of certain processes may facilitate social 169 Global gambling markets link to powerful incentives to corrupt sport form, but also produce massive money movements that regardless of whether representing the criminal economy or not, as is oftentimes the case, in themselves can introduce global market volatility. In this manner, global gambling markets and sport integrity are concerns of global financial stability. 202 control and prove emancipatory for some, this same dynamic makes vulnerable a host of fundamental liberties. Beyond the actual and perceived dangers to sport integrity, nationalistic retrenchment, responding with state-centred tools, misunderstands both threats and solutions. Anxiety over losing authority can exacerbate tensions and lead to the enactment of social control mechanisms that are heavy handed and oppressive. As sport gambling markets have become globalized, no commensurate globalization of regulation has yet been able to keep up, to control these activities (Braithwaite and Drahos 2001). Global sport gambling markets pose intersecting regulatory challenges to both states and sport governing bodies. Increasing activity among states, private actors, and SGB show competing interests attempting to obtain advantage in the crafting of regulatory response to sport integrity threats. States are caught in a dilemma when choosing to balance benefits of private versus public regulation. States are neither alone nor the predominant governance actors concerned with sport integrity and betting. Sport governing bodies (SGB) are present and ready to assert and preserve their sphere of sport autonomy against threats to sport integrity. SGB preemptively lead aggressive social control initiatives to prevent any public encroachment in the sport sector. Within the sport movement, the regulation of sport betting provokes debates for expanding its private governance powers. Having established how SGB enjoy and defend a specificity of sport that serves to legitimize a host of exceptions from public law, I showed the limitations and contradictions of SGB efforts to corral sport integrity threats vis-à-vis any effectively compartmentalized regulatory approach. 203 Conceptualizing SGB as an epistemic community with norm-carrying capacities instructs us in the processes by which SGB act transnationally. The subject of sport integrity regulation illustrates the global working processes and capability of SGB. The reliance upon information sharing agreements (MOUs) and other informal and private legal mechanisms, what Berman calls “jurispersuasion,” contour a governance sphere taking place beyond the state and beyond state-anchored political and legal mechanisms (legal pluralism) (Berman, 2005: 529-530). Yet sport governing body regulatory apparatus for surveillance, monitoring, investigative, and disciplinary processes designed to uphold sport integrity raises concerns about a possible disregard for fundamental rights, rights enshrined in national and international law. The contradictions of sport’s specificity make the belief in sport as apolitical – or separable from everyday life, politics, and economy – increasingly unsustainable. Concomitant with the sharpening of SGB regulatory authority in sport integrity are emerging SBR. These devices draw sport and sport gambling actors together in new commercial and regulatory relations. Whether conflicts of interest occur directly within or adjacent to SGB, we witness an intensification of sport property relations. I have shown the contouring for what might become a sport-media-gambling nexus of commercial interests. This formation has relevance and implications for the form of sport activities as a social and leisure good. The ways sport global governing institutions respond to global risks reaches well beyond the sporting pitch or separated leisure spheres that might be considered outside of or independent from a more integrated political sphere. Sport governance institutions and activities comprise complex relations that come to pattern social life. Sport global 204 governance shapes particular forms of international law, global civil society, and global labour-production relations. 205 Conclusion In this inquiry on global governance, I have shown how sport integrity is inextricably interconnected with matters of global political economy. Pushing further to unpack this seemingly basic sport principle, I have shown the multiple intersecting actors and interests wound up in regulatory concerns of sport integrity. Sport integrity strategies are about repositioning these economic, political, and cultural institutions. At the end of this intellectual journey I will summarize what I have found, answer my research questions, and then establish the relevancy and implications of these conclusions. Findings Beginning with an analysis of sport integrity at the level of the playing fields, I have shown that sport rules can no longer rely upon tight physical time-space delineations of authority to control the game and ensure the game’s integrity. The basic elements or defining principles of sport depend upon regulatory assurances of equality and uncertainty of outcomes. Rules of play are established through space-time delineated and enacted apparati of social control. In building and developing a model of sport integrity, I have shown the multiple interests and loci of interests bundled in sport integrity. More than nostalgia for a pure and honest cultural form, my model shows how sport integrity must be understood as interwoven social, political, and economic interests. With global sport, the commercialization of this activity has inevitably knit sport’s cultural dimensions more 206 tightly together in interconnectivity and dependency with economic and political dimensions of globalization. The presence of transnational global governance actors like the UNODC and FATF at the sport integrity regulatory working table alongside sport governance actors, the state, and private industry actors testifies to this. 170 Devices of governance fundamentally operate vis-à-vis spatial-temporal sources of power. Authority both constitutes and depends upon spatial-temporal sources of power, and these are increasingly global. More and more, the kinds of acts capable of corrupting the sport sphere, its game, and commercial value arise from outside the so- called bounded sport times and places of stadiums, pitches, and venues of live play. Sport betting is the prime and most challenging example of activities confronting sport integrity regulation. As sport has bolstered states, proving useful for nationalism, states have pillowed the sport industry, namely the Olympic Movement and its relatively independent scaffolding of sport governing bodies. Partly due to this state relationship, SGB encounter a rather delayed structural crisis of legitimacy. Yet, with the global commercialization of sport, the interests and challenges of sport regulation confront SGB with contradictions of their mixed national and commercial bases of authority. Sport betting related integrity risks present properly global risks that have SGB scrambling to innovate new relations and mechanisms for obtaining authority. I have shown how the regulatory challenges of online sport betting interests involve digital technologies operating and obtaining advantage by high speed –instant– 170 Sport integrity is a serious matter of global cultural, economic (i.e., size of economy), and political (i.e., national sport identity, social control) worth. Sport integrity interests become securitized to involve even international security interests (i.e., transnational criminal networks, money laundering, financial security). 207 flows of information and money. The geography of these markets can be explained by a global political economy analysis, in which betting operators appear in localities, typically offshore, to take advantage of differential tax and privacy laws. Through offshore maneuvers, betting operators establish favourable climates for incorporations, selectively touching ground, obtaining necessary Internet Service Provider addresses and licensing by which to then go on to play and move more foot loosely in global markets. The Internet’s ability to digitally send and receive information and financial flows fundamentally transforms the characteristics of these markets. Persuaded by principles of lowest cost locations, remote gambling operators’ migratory trails form global topographical patterns, what Sassen calls “a grid of strategic locations” (Sassen 2000). Rather than destinations attractive because of particular climate, terrain, language, or social features, offshore destinations are enticing because they provide fertile neo-liberal market climates for sport gambling operators. Seeking incorporation within offshore territories, gambling operators are attracted to legal climates favourable to profit (low or no tax) and privacy (low or no regulation). Territories such as Antigua, Antilles, Macau have become niche corridors for the gambling industries. 171 Offshore moves are strategic economic circuit moves. These specialized nodes and territorial patterns are consistent with what network theory predicts (Sassen 2001; Castells 2011). Through my case analysis of sport gambling regulation in France, I have shown how national regulatory strategies are informed by global political economy interests. I have shown how the state asserts itself – choosing to intervene or retract itself – in 171 The mobility of the global gambling market works nicely for some states while proving to negatively amplify contradictions of national governance for other states. 208 regulatory matters between sport and sport gambling sectors. 172 I have shown how the global gambling market –including offshore and black markets – undercuts nation-based sport integrity regulatory strategies. When states attempt to regulate a legal gambling offer via the licensing of tax levies, controlling betting product portfolios, and the capping of payout rates, the state’s fiscal restrictions on the legal offer enhance the appeal of the black market payout rates. The legal gambling offer of licensed operators cannot compete. Regulatory enforcement on a national basis not only fails to manage these markets or market “externalities” but also proves to destabilize and make vulnerable regulation in other markets. I illustrated how changing local law enforcement vigilance like that which mounted in a regulatory crackdown in the United States on offshore operators comes to destabilize global gambling markets and its regulation globally without achieving any durable progress to control illegal gambling in local or national markets. As betting markets are global, so also must regulatory strategies be informed and act globally to manage these risks effectively. By paying close attention to the role of judiciary in transforming law and society relations, I discovered efforts to renovate both sport governing body’s authority and the nation-state’s authority. These efforts involve the production of sport betting rights which in additional to their potential to expand sport property holdings are used to perform crucial regulatory and redistributive roles. On the basis of my analysis, I have found that sport betting rights are qualified rights that make sport event holders responsible for ensuring sport integrity. Sport integrity intelligence units and other sport betting regulatory institutions arise as part and parcel of these emerging rights. By 172 One aspect of shifting national authority is brought up by the role of offshore and black markets as regulatory challenges. 209 analyzing common techniques for preventing and intervening in activities perceived as dangerous to sport integrity, I have specified the nature and limitations in national and transnational regulatory strategies. The global characteristics of sport integrity challenges involve global flows of money and information that require wholly recalibrating regulatory apparatus and relations. To control these risks to sport integrity, a rather impressive range of public and private actors are brought together at a transnational level. Unlike in other sectors of global governance, I found that the particular character of sport governance –the so- called specificity of sport– when coupled with these emerging sport betting rights, injects a source of authority and legitimacy to the possibility of a global governance network to address these sport integrity challenges. Answers to My Research Questions At the onset I raised a number of questions about the contradictions that have led to changes in governance. I asked how states and cultural institutions like sport institutions balance competing political, social, and economic interests. I wanted to understand the character of global regulatory challenges and the mechanisms of authority required to match these. On the basis of my findings and the relevancy that I have assigned to them, here are my answers. 173 The relations of politics and interests groups involved in the governance of sport integrity are multiple, global, and thoroughly economic. Sport integrity efforts are about 173 The answers to these questions that I have raised are interconnected. Regulatory authority in the situation of sport integrity involves a struggle between state, private, sport, and transnational actors. In describing the actors engaged in sport integrity struggles, I have emphasized the relational interactions among these actors. 210 protecting the cultural form of sport –its rules and basic organizing premises of equality and uncertainty of outcomes. However, to apprehend the regulatory struggles involved in sport integrity as primarily informed by cultural preservationist inspired efforts to secure sport’s ideal form is naïve. Sport integrity is about cultural, political, and economic capital. The regulation of sport integrity promotes particular actor’s interests. 174 Sport integrity is also a commercial asset for SGB. Sport integrity is the mythical cultural asset by which SGB are able to capitalize on in selling of sport products through a number of platforms. Advertising, sponsoring, gambling, and other media revenues are all drawn on the basis of a desired and esteemed image of sport authenticity. These commercial interests further embed global capital interests into the fabric of sport regulatory decisions. SGB regulatory authority depends on being seen to control these threats. Regulatory supervisory practices are not simply ways to keep the integrity of an event but ways to keep power and commercial advancement. SGB regulatory authority depends upon being able to commercially compete globally. Sport integrity is a global commercial matter of institutional legitimacy. Sport integrity regulation is an instrument of power. For private actors like sport gambling operators, sport integrity is less nebulously about promoting commercial interests. 175 Operators cannot afford the costs of its sport resource suffering disrepute. A basic faith and assurance in sport integrity –its premises 174 This is not to deny that SGB are concerned with governing the form of the game by implementing and enforcing rules. As parapublic entities, SGB profess a disinterested dedication in sport. Perhaps, in aristocratic legacy from what Pierre de Coubertin imparted in his prouesses “feats of power” zeal to the Olympic Movement, SGB endeavour to promote a social good through institutional regulation of this cultural activity (MacAloon, 6). 175 Sport integrity is about private gambling operators’ profit. A clean game that has not fabricated results protects some operators from having to back fraudulent punter payouts. Sport integrity is a commercial asset for this sector. 211 of equality and uncertainty– are also the basis by which gambling’s premises of chance are wagered. Betting operators concerned with financial profit do not desire to be on the losing end of payouts caused by fraudulent sport results. Betting operators depend upon minimum assurances of a game’s integrity to prevent punters from seeking alternative betting markets. This private sector both stands to gain and lose from sport integrity governance vigilance, and its lobbying reflects mixed sincerity in concern for the sporting form or the deepness of what they mean and intend by commitments to sport integrity. Moreover, there is an additional aspect to this whole regulatory situation of sport integrity in France. France use to be the culture source and leader of sport, but now its cultural heritage has become the reason or excuse for steering certain economic policy decisions. France’s decisions to regulate or not regulate sport gambling involve specific national interests in promoting sport. 176 France desires to promote economic national champions (i.e., sport industry) and athletic national champions (i.e., sport champions and athletic prowess) on the global stage. These national projects are global projects. The governance of sport integrity is important for ensuring the value of France’s industrial strategies as well as its national image and soft power globally. The governance of sport integrity is a struggle wrought of contradictions of authority under conditions of globalization. Sport integrity regulatory decisions involve contestations between cultural, economic, and political priorities that significantly impact the consumptive practices, production relations of the global entertainment industry, and the cultural sphere. 176 Sport has long been recognized as a national technology, but the subject of sport integrity and betting reveals additional dimensions and maneuvers of state and sport interests in a global age. 212 Global technologies strain sport integrity in ways that more traditional or territorial space-time framed authority is no longer capable of matching. Sport integrity is threatened by risks that have planetary reach. No longer are tightly time-space delineated boundaries and basis of authority capable of authority. Sport betting involves financial flows that are global in scale and operate at accelerated speeds, even seemingly instantly. As gambling markets are global, sport betting operators are able to pick and choose jurisdictions advantageous to profit making. This hollows out the state’s ability to control activities taking place within its borders. 177 The Internet and digital information and communication as well as financial technologies enhance the sport gambling market in characteristics of speed, hypermobility, and flexibility. The impact of this global betting market –including its shadow economy market leader– is tremendously destabilizing to authority. While these global activities confront the state with a crisis of control, the state does not disappear. The way French courts reinterpreted sport event holder rights to also include sport betting rights is a critical part of techniques for obtaining regulatory authority in these global markets. 178 While the FFT-Unibet is a seminal case for understanding the set of economic relations between sport and sport gambling markets, it is also important because of how this decision makes possible the reconfiguration of national authority transnationally. The FFT-Unibet decision shifted stakeholders’ ability 177 A state’s lack of control against these global economies undermines its social policies and fiscal strategies. These are instances in which globalization confronts states with the changed its power capacity over fiscal, monetary, and social policies which can no longer properly be see as in state’s hands. The intensity of global gambling financial flows and economy of production is no longer bounded in nation- state authority are requires governance innovations to invest new kinds of political structures capable of acting with equal footing of speed, distance, and adaptability. This lesson holds true for sport and sport gambling market risks and for all the multidimensional global phenomena. 178 Courts are important interlocutionary agents in the creation of thin air products like SBR. 213 to use or make proprietary claims about sport products (i.e., sport results). This court decision becomes interwoven with a variety of French legislative and policy decisions that materializes a basis for regulatory demands in transnational markets. I have emphasized the importance of how France exerts its authority to protect sport betting rights. I argue that the emergence of sport betting rights happens as a response to a crisis of control in which political and material power are increasingly uprooted by global dynamics. Though the French judiciary possesses the power that initially corporealizes these emerging rights, these abstract products have potential as political, economic and social capital capable of working transnationally –over space-time in critical ways different, perhaps, even autonomously, from traditional state-based properties and capacities. These activities and transformations occurring in French law and court decisions have transnational implications. Intellectual properties are products or devices that enable actors to overcome the cumbersomeness of territorially bindings of authority. Abstract or intangible objects like intellectual properties possess characteristics especially potent for harnessing network power, that is, power leveraged through global mechanisms, through flows of global finance and information. This is critical to my argument: abstract objects like sport betting rights are resource rich global assets. SBR are transformative regulatory devices that help the State and sport governing bodies keep up, stay relevant, have a say, and still matter in the global market place of flows, in a global society. 214 Waking to the global reality, governing bodies find that they must compete as global market players. 179 For both states and SGB, sport betting rights serve this end nicely. Economic power is necessary to ensuring political power. To stay the regulator, to have legitimacy, there is an economic imperative. And this economic imperative is global. Intellectual properties are important devices of global authority. Emerging sport betting rights possess the characteristics necessary to compete and leverage authority in a global age. They are abstract rights, devices incisively calibrated to the information economy. They are its worth –its raw material resources– and its production. These devices are agile and able to carry claims authoritatively across time and space because of the way these rights attempt to saddle up with or become propped up by the neo-liberal market geared global private governance regimes of market, property, and contract law. Thin air products like sport betting rights are social economic innovations that answer pressures for market expansion and control. National authority must jettison certain systems and set up new ones – transnationally adept systems. SBR help vault and critically position SGB within global markets and global governance networks that are also advantageous to France. 180 Sport betting rights have arisen in France in the context of particular sets of social relations and actor interests involved in the creation of these thin air products. The state’s enhancement and protection of SBR as an IP is a way to protect the cleanness of sport in global markets. 179 This is a common crisis of control that nation-states confront in facing challenges of globalization (Beniger). 180 SBR support France’s national champion industry –the sport entertainment industry. SBR also renovate ailing strategies to tax globally mobile transnational business such as the gambling entertainment business. To be sure, France is anxious to keep a handle upon the gambling sector that have long-filled national coffers. 215 Globalization possesses a distinctly characterized set of economic relations. Under conditions of globalization, there are new methods of productions and new products. Through national law, SBR become a commodity. This makes SGB a producer of something. Already, SGB were producers of sport broadcast rights, but SBR dramatically expand the potential productive capacity of SGB. SGB become a source of innovation and thus, a locus of economic accumulation. Sport integrity governance transforms production processes in a number of ways. Sport integrity rules relocate operators’ expected discretionary power to design betting formula and select events for its betting offers and thereby further curtails its profit and correlative rate of return available to its clients. SBR more directly unsettle production relations by shifting ownership positions of who can make rent-extracting claims. For betting operators, SBR result in having a greater piece of their profit pie pre-sliced and served to others. 181 Now gambling operators must negotiate with sport governing bodies that demand to be compensated for access to their sport betting rights. This economic capital is also a source of social and political authority. By examining the materialization of SBR and the transformations brought about by the creation of these thin air products, I have shown the value of abstract products for global authority. We cannot understand property and authority relations in a global age without understanding the processes of thin air production. Power in a global information society is mobilized through abstract objects. This global information 181 Gambling operators have long been made to defer to the state’s long-held gambling monopoly by which it levied substantial taxes. The liberalization of the gambling market changed the form of these taxes into a open market of tax via the licensing system. 216 society is characterized by a set of social conditions in which there are premiums on intellectual properties that are corporealized rights built upon abstract objects. In sport, there is evidence of an emerging regulatory network capable of mediating global risks. Regulatory efforts to put in place social, economic, or political controls over these online betting markets require global governance solutions and cooperation. These sport market challenges share in common with other global governance sectors an urgency to innovate efficient global network solutions. Within sport integrity regulatory assemblages there are common demands for information sharing, flexibility, legal harmonization, expert systems, and global technology. 182 The situation of sport integrity and global sport governance distinguishes itself in marked success –at least, initially– by deriving authority through production relations that further commercialization and entertainment production of its cultural good. Some states, like France, have shown themselves willing or even eager to (re)forge sources of authority by welding SGB within global governance networks via the use of national law to create and protect political and economic resources such as those involved in SBR. IP are sharp and especially critical assets in a global age. IP are particularly well-tuned commercial and regulatory assets in the global information economy. The state tries to make globalization as nice as possible: landscaping nice legislative (tax and privacy) climates favourable to attract businesses (virtual or otherwise) or by coiffing property laws attractive to its select, premier industry players. While SBR may emerge from underlying motivations that are national, SBR produce implications that stimulate and 182 The regulation of sport integrity draws together a number of global epistemic communities as SGB take lead in global standard setting while acting in capacities as norm carrier to spread and diffuse these regulatory standards globally. Rather than working through formal state linked and based law, the regulation of sport integrity relies upon and comes to strengthen informal, private law and processes. 217 strengthen organizational patterns that are not invariably or necessarily state-centred. As global devices, SBR may enrich more private, rogue, or breakaway sport leagues organized independently from SGB and sport models still organized on a basis of nation states (i.e., the World Cup or Olympics). From my analysis of sport gambling regulation in France, I presented data by which to see the state divesting its authority. Yet, the state does not disappear. In efforts to regulate sport integrity, the state is present and active in these global processes. In fact, as Saskia Sassen describes, “the state itself has been a key agent in the implementation of global processes, and it has emerged quite altered by this participation” (Sassen, 1996: 29). Offshore states show themselves active in the global through the crafting of legislative and policy advantages favourable to global gambling operators. Globalization works nicely for some states and not for others. SBR strive to shape a particular globalization favourable to France. The nation state remains significant, even as it is significantly transformed by these global processes: “States themselves shape these interactions, and not merely by resisting them” (Sassen, 2000: 227). Relevancy More than an anecdotal account, my findings impact our understanding of the political economy of the global entertainment industry and our understanding of global governance. My empirical findings bring to light the nature of the regulatory crisis to control sport integrity threats. These struggles to defend against dangers to sport integrity are aspects of the political economy of this global entertainment industry. As sport becomes increasingly susceptible to influences and incentives outside the traditional 218 purview of sport regulatory institutions, findings such as mine are critical. The penetration of business interests in politics sways cultural governance in directions heavily geared to economic profit angling. This happens both directly and indirectly. As the state accedes to business and profit making incentives, frequently co-opting civil society priorities, the state’s selection of certain policies of regulation or non-regulation then grooms cultural and entertainment spheres, including sport. Whether such policies and laws concern sport markets or sport gambling markets, the impact of neo-liberal driven politics is the same. These are globally interconnected markets. In this way, global capital interests indirectly frame and reframe the very sport activities and forms themselves. Global business interests also shape sport more directly. This is true in global sport, where these activities are simultaneously global cultural and commercial activities. Global sport governing bodies are commercial institutions with vast sport properties. These sport properties are vital to their cultural, political, and economic legitimacy. In the case of sport gambling, the global business pressures upon sport are explicitly acknowledged as containing dual forms, both licit and illicit economies. As gambling regulators directly acknowledge their struggle, and sometimes failure, to control the black market side, regulatory challenges to sport integrity complicate. 183 The sport gambling industry advantages the most adroit operators, those with the seemingly greatest informational and technological capability to move through the global system. These markets have massive liquidity and ability to operate from anywhere, anytime. To understand the global political economy of sport gambling requires understanding the 183 Licensed operators with domestic market privileges in a given jurisdiction dislike the regulatory inability to maintain their exclusive market access against the penetration of remote “illegal” gambling operators. 219 global gambling shadow economy. Like other activities supported and conducted on a number of platforms that prove elusive to regulation, sport gambling regulatory challenges are not sector specific challenges. Not only do these regulatory struggles reveal characteristics common in what we witness across all sectors of global governance, but these regulatory challenges are also in themselves cross-sector challenges. Sport integrity risks are risks of financial integrity, international security. These risks are about a general and more pervasive crisis of control that nation-states confront in the face of globalization. This crisis is about threats that are global in nature. Sport integrity as a regulatory concern of global gambling markets is an instance of the kinds of threats to state-centred power and legitimacy brought on by globalization. Both national and SGB sport integrity strategies are efforts to reposition these economic, political, and cultural institutions. Sport integrity regulation fundamentally involves the connection of shifting authority and multi-dimensional global phenomena. Sport and sport gambling markets involve global production and investment. These production processes are no longer made submissive to the nation-state. The regulatory demand upon states and also upon SGB that fancy maintaining sport autonomy is to devise regulatory relations and mechanisms capable of acting on an equal footing of speed, distance, and adaptability with these global market threats. France recognizes that it must anticipate and react in the face of these global challenges. French sport gambling laws and institutions as represented by ARJEL and cases such as FFT-UNIBET testify to this. These are global moves that happen and have impact at a local level. This is not merely acting locally or nationally, but globally. 220 These local law and policy choices are informed by thinking well beyond the borders of the territorial state. Implications For Theory These conclusions have implications for our understanding of social theory, processes of globalization, industry relations, and cultural activities. The answers to each of the questions that I raised at the beginning of this analysis all begin or overlap in focus on sport betting rights qua intellectual properties. The differences in these conclusions are nuances about how SBR look and work differently as technologies in different actors’ hands. In common with other studies of globalization, I have drawn forth the attributes of global information and communications technologies by which sport and sport gambling market activities globally operate. My conclusions have implications that will provoke reconsidering the opportunities for steering and empowering global technologies to better secure and strengthen general interests of social representation within political institutions and processes. I agree with Ulrich Beck’s audacious call for remaking a “hegemony of politics”: there is a need to hone global technologies to re-politicize politics, to wit, to sturdy politics to become concentrated in political rather than commercial interests (Beck 2005). While sport and sport gambling markets are global, regulation has not yet globalized. Regulatory power requires playing by the same tune as its threats. The relationship between global production and authority is one in which authority requires (property) ownership in production process. The state is a part of these contradictions of the global. I have shown evidence symptomatic of this crisis in the regulation of sport 221 integrity. While SGB appear to get a leg up on these risks, they do so by encouraging and accepting special treatment from the state as a national champion industry (and as an autonomous cultural field), including the state’s interlocutionary agency in the production of a thin air product, SBR. Uncannily, SBR show themselves as able devices and resources for economic, political, and social capital. The story of sport integrity is a one of subversive regulation. State decisions to regulate or not regulate can be understood as global political economy decisions. This is also true for SGB. Connecting economic and political dimensions of globalization, global sport markets – the regulation of sport integrity – operates with particular state and SGB commercial interests. I have shown SBR to arise in response to global contradictions and the crisis of legitimacy nations confront. SBR are important devices that foster sport multinational corporations and the commercial aspects of global sport. Regardless of whether sport is organized directly through sport governing bodies (e.g., Roland Garros is organized by Federation Française de Tennis) or private sport holding (e.g., Tour de France is organized by Amaury Sport Organisation), commercial aspects of sport are dominantly present in the choices of policy to shape the wellbeing of sport. France chooses to support its sport industry as an expression of industrial power to be a player in the global arena. Sport integrity regulatory decisions and innovations reflect and are a part of a desire to push certain players to compete at the global level. To rise globally, France endows its cultural sport sector with commercial power to hit on par with its counterpart global competitors. France uses sport – a major component of the global entertainment industry – to promote the national culture and identity, enrich public coffers (industry 222 growth), and maintain regulatory relevance in other areas of the global economy, namely the global gambling and entertainment markets. Sport integrity is a field in which SGB, states, and private gambling operators all flex economic, political, and cultural power. My argument is that the tension between sport governing bodies and the global gambling market has been negotiated through an economic device, sport betting rights, in that SBR dampen the sport integrity threats that SGB experience. To wit, these emerging sport betting rights are devices that re-order processes of production. The regulation of sport integrity is a story of economic struggle between sport and gambling sectors. It is also about contradictions between the national and global. SBR mediate the crisis of control that nation-states confront when attempting to regulate global market activity that takes place beyond the bounded territorial state’s authority. While operating from afar, global market activities pose proximate risks that nonetheless undermine local financial, political, and social policies. 184 By endowing SBR as IP, the state puts in place mechanisms that might network the state vis-à-vis the sport event holder (namely SGB) with means to cull revenues from global gambling operators. Moreover, the state piggybacks mechanisms to reinforce the state’s political relevancy. SBR are a means to latch tax levies onto gambling operators through the private law and contract systems in which sport properties – now expanded to include SBR – are negotiated, mediated, and enforced. SBR are thus power moves to secure authority for the state and sport governing bodies. The emergence of sport betting rights in the French situation of global regulation of sport and sport betting markets has implications for understanding authority under 184 SBR transform the ability of the state to manage these market players. 223 conditions of globalization. Moves to create and institutionalize SBR are social and political actions meant to shape a particular and desirable form of globalization. The abstractness of such intellectual properties is, I argue, in fact, helpful for rectifying fallacies in conceptualization of the global that have overemphasized the economic and technological characteristics of globalization. By apprehending the fabrication of these properties, we become better prepared to understand the processes by which we vest and extract meaning and power from other global technologies. It has been my task to show the processes by which thin air properties such as SBR come into being. By tracing the social, legal, economic, and political processes by which thin air products such as sport betting rights emerge, I have rebutted economic deterministic interpretations of globalization. Sport betting rights are global technologies by which to identify relational loci of agency. Sport betting rights emerge as an instance of social, political, and legal inventiveness. These thin air products appear in the context of nation states’ contradictions of the global. SBR are technologies by which states and SGB can be seen affirming or resisting competing specific political, social, and economic interests. Technologies transform the processes and locations of production and, thereby, transform relations of authority. To be sure, technologies do not determine social conditions. Social and political actors continually intervene, redrawing the sources and meaning by which certain times, places, and actors are included or excluded from resources whose benefits are enabled through technological innovations. Information technologies make possible shifting geographies of production on a planetary scale. 185 SBR are an example of social inventiveness. The introduction of SBR unsettles social, 185 With global geographies of production, there are shifts in labour and surplus locations. 224 political, and economic relations by introducing a new resource. With the corporealization of SBR, there is a shift in who has access to resources. The creation of SBR (re)stakes and seizes formerly possessed resources. As such, relations between authority and property transform. SBR enable the state and SGB to compete in technologically derived opportunities and advantages. France intervenes in the production process by determining new rules for the appropriation, distribution, and use of the surplus supply. IP laws (re)establish rules important in qualifying modes of production and its social relations. Discourse on globalization has a tendency to overemphasize the technological aspects of economic and political phenomena without recognizing how globalization is a process. Intent to correct this error, Castells has defined the global economy as “an economy whose core components have the institutional, organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time, or in chosen time, on a planetary scale” (Castells 2000: 100). Implicit in this definition of the global economy is that globalization is a process. Globalization is a social phenomenon. Globalization is not homogenization or standardization of all parts, places, and people everywhere. Globalization is not similitude. No withering of the state is inevitable, though power, authority, citizenship, and a variety of state capacities are challenged and changed by a global world. Resignation to globalization as structure or technology denies the very real human policy priorities that vigilantly go into ensuring the survival of profitability for some at the expense of others. My findings have important implications for understanding globalization. As thin air products, sport betting rights – whether ultimately sustainable 225 at a global level or not – are social technologies exerted as strivings to shape a particular form of globalization. SBR do not yet impart biases or partialities exclusive to one kind of actor or another. SBR may just as easily strengthen private market interests as they may fortify and promote public or semi-public interests. In my analysis of these emerging rights, I concentrated on SBR as property holdings of SGB rather than of a private sport entity. The justifications of SBR use the logic of sport as a cultural activity (i.e., sport as cultural heritage, sport legacy, sport spirit, and the Olympic Movement; sport as public good) for this socio-political legal innovation. My conclusions also have implications for the status of social and cultural rights. Transformations in relations between production and authority indicate changing dispositions and capabilities to promote and protect cultural rights. 186 Sport betting rights stand as one example illustrative of larger trends in which rights-claiming capacities transform. By materializing abstract objects, relations, rituals, and activities in the cultural sphere, cultural rights become defended, contoured, and enjoyed through property exchange – defended as property relations and rights, rather than as cultural rights. Through a process of commodification, claims of property rights replace cultural rights. However, commodifying all cultural activities suffocates the commons, cultural rights enjoyments, and the public sphere. To be sure, cultural goods have long circulated alongside and as commercial products. Cultural activities such as sport have existed as commodities in market relations. Yet global markets further “shape and shove” the direction and extent of commercial, economic interests over cultural (Tilly 1992). 186 The status of cultural rights qua cultural authority declines and becomes endangered when cultural protections rely upon economic and property rights mechanisms of authority. 226 Cultural actors must compete through producing goods, offered and exchanged through supply and demand of neoliberal structures/scaffolds of the global market. Agencement, the creation or innovation of new products, makes possible a reconfiguration of a sector whose authority might more or less have formerly derived from cultural devices and capital. At least, sport might be one of the most optimistic examples of a cultural sphere enjoyed, represented, and promoted on a world scale. The ushering in of techniques of governance that rely upon devices that have economic sway favours a particular set of economic relations and production processes. This commodification of cultural devices elevates economic value and authority over cultural. Culture rights as commodities are not new, but we are witnessing new global versions and embeddings of these products in political economic relations. Sport governing bodies take to SBR as a stronger candidate, a substitute device to acquire authority that it previously merited on basis of social rights claims. This mechanism of authority is garnered through embracing this type of intellectual property and its mechanisms. With globalization, relationships of property and authority transform, and in the process transform the cultural realm as well. Proponents of a new legal IP regime steer sport in this property-reliant vein. There is inadequate attention on or awareness of how this basis of authority might be incongruous or incompatible with SGB’s long-standing cultural basis of authority. There are real dangers in deriving political capital from economic capital. 187 Initially, governance actors – states or sport governing bodies – may discover success in expanding cultural rights opportunities 187 Rights protection mechanisms become more constricted and unidimensional when social justice or redistributive priorities become filtered through market mechanisms rather than being brought forth by actors capable of having these cultural or public interests recognized in their own right, a worrisome development in that it may signal the waning of social rights defense. 227 through market mechanisms. On the one hand, economic rights boost the legitimacy of cultural autonomy and ability to promote rights enjoyment. However, ultimately, the cultural good and basic social political theoretical underpinnings erode. Furthermore, the ratcheting up of private rules and investigative powers to secure sport integrity deepens trends of compartmentalized and private-law-driven forms of governance that are often sequestered from or indifferent – if not, harmful – to fundamental rights protections. I am concerned about how the use of property mechanisms to bolster authority, by lending economic, political, and social legitimacy, may steep governance forms in a democratic deficit. The trick is to push toward greater participation, accountability, and transparency. 188 There is serious cause for caution before celebrating global governance power that too stridently prioritizes models of social control over rights. This subject of sport integrity captures processes of regulatory innovation in which we are witnessing possibilities of new global regulatory power via tools such as intellectual properties that better position regulatory actors in times and spaces that global markets enrich. The combination of these private regulatory regimes with the potential commercial bite of emerging sport betting rights – as IP rights – opens one way for obtaining authority on a global level. Yet, there are real problems in these global sport integrity and social control efforts. I have shown how social, economic, and political technologies are made to work for particular actors and interests. In this respect, my conclusions have empowering implications. However, the situation of sport betting rights and global sport and sport 188 Although there is global governance, the distance between global governance and local needs or participation or response is huge (Calhoun; Held). 228 betting markets also has implications that are disconcerting, even alarming, in that it tells a tale in which we have scripted social and political priorities that are primarily driven by economic, neoliberal values. Both the state and cultural regulatory institutions such as SGB rescind their allegiance as public representatives as they become geared to economic priorities. Whether SBR are a dead-end political craft or have legs with potential for standing beyond France at transnational levels remains to be seen, yet it is important to ask whether SBR serve private or general interests. The processes by which SBR appear are heavily reliant upon dispersed state authority spheres of private law. These legal processes and spheres may be harmful to public interests and rights. SBR may be used to either deepen or disrupt hegemonic interests and power. Too often abstract debates of globalization oscillate between assessments of specific institutions and general abstractions. In this project, I have brought the specificity of a global domain – sport – into the framework of global governance. Globalization amplifies contradictions of authority defined on a territorial basis. In response to a crisis of authority, states and SGB have mediated tensions through a socio- political device that is rooted in neoliberal ideologies rather than social principles. On the basis of my findings and conclusions, I reject procrustean contouring of sport integrity regulation as a narrowly defined moral commitment to preserve the cultural essence of sport. Sport integrity is a global issue not because SGB are virtuous and desire to thoroughly clean sport. To be sure, sport form and cultural expression are important, but sport needs to be clean so people continue to follow and practice it as consumers. The regulatory reaction to threats of sport integrity can be explained by a global political economy analysis. To make inroads on the threats involved in global 229 sport gambling markets, states and SGB have turned to SBR as an economic device which reinforces the economic bases of authority. The political legitimacy of the nation- state and social institutions recoils. Social or cultural rights organized and promoted through market devices do not offer optimistic prospects for cultural autonomy. Smoothing the pocks of globalization by adopting global market tools further invites business into the drivers seat of politics. This version of transnationalizing authority is deeply problematic. Regulatory authority qua commodified sport products is not emancipatory. While IP may enhance the clout of sport institutions to compete in global markets, IP instantiate particular social structures that fragment the individual from more socially embedded forms of community. IP ingratiate the myth of an asocial individual as an original creator who comes to possess a sovereign right to an abstract property in its material form. This social structure is premised upon exclusive and exclusionary rights. A social, political system so dependent on property devices for social freedoms emanates from and perpetuates an explicit normative character. This normative and axial principle is accumulation. The concentration and conglomeration of commercial interests in sport as a global entertainment industry, as I described, dissolve cultural, expressive gestures of sport. Despite nostalgic yearnings, sport spheres are no different from spheres of labour and production. Thoroughly global, and thereby thoroughly global capitalistic, sport is about production/consumption. Conducted through a number of innovative media platforms and global technologies, sport expressions are commercially configured products contoured and sustained in the striving for profit rather than progress. New alliances between the entertainment industry and institutional regulators macadamize a cultural field cemented not only by production for producers, but also by regulation for 230 production (i.e., regulation for regulators who are also producers). The overlap of competition and governance roles contradicts demands for autonomy of political and cultural fields. Rather than rebuilding regulatory authority by prising the cultural sector away from commercial or political strongholds, the fix to this crisis of control becomes molded from the same substance. I argue that this commercial move is necessitated by the penetration of money and material production into sport. Regulation and business more and more look like each other and have common interests. To maintain regulatory control requires commercially competing, batting with global commercial swing. SBR have recast the state and SGB as global authorities, at least temporarily. Yet this innovation is ultimately retrogressive. Social life does not universally flourish under this type of political authority. Relying upon a property and being guided by global markets to endow authority fragment the whole. These institutions and cultural processes do not create possibilities for an expansive social life. There is, therefore, nothing specifically French about this; these are global manifestations of contradictions of a social structure configured by, and not merely coexisting alongside, global markets. In and beyond the global sport domain, there is a developing social mystery of globalization. Social and political spheres appear toppled by business interests to which there seems to be no alternative. Yet we are ultimately the authors of these global forms. Globalization is what we have done, even as we appear ignorant about exactly how to accept or understand the processes and possibilities by which to intervene. Contrary to the seemingly irrevocable myth of globalization, this social system is not the only one possible. To choose which globalization we will enjoy, it is 231 time to do away with impulses which mistake rights holders for shareholders and instead, rebuild social structures that will be dogmatically wedded to politics and society. 232 List of Interviews Research Ethics Interviews were voluntary and took place in open or mutually agreed places. All research was overt: I did not rely upon any misrepresentation or deceptions in interacting with participants. Interview participants were informed of the study’s purpose, as well as their rights to refuse to answer any questions or terminate the interview at any point without having to give an explanation. To protect the anonymity of certain interviewees, citations are coded. In most instances, I have identified the type of institutional affiliation and title of the interviewee rather than the specific title. Additionally, the location and exact date of coded interview are omitted to prevent possibility of deductively identifying the exact institutions or interviewee identity from other details specified in documentation of List of Interview or Fieldwork Conducted (Appendix A). Summary of Interviews Interview Category Number of Interviews Sport Gambling Industry & Gambling Regulators 6 Sport Integrity Regulators 6 Academic & Other Experts 5 Legal and Judicial Counsel 11 French Sport Ministry 4 National Olympic Committees & National Federations 9 233 Media 12 United Nations 3 International Olympic Committee 7 International Federations 9 Court of Arbitration for Sport 4 Private Sport Event Holders (owners) 5 Miscellaneous 5 Professional Athletes 36 Professional Teams 26 Total: 148* *The above 148 interviews listed represent interviews with 138 discreet individuals. Sport Gambling Industry & Gambling Regulators Davies, Mark. Camberton, financial and leisure consultant; Betfair, former external affairs executive; UK Sports Minister panel on sport integrity, member. London, 15 June 2011. Foley-Train, Jason. Remote Gambling Association (RGA), Head of Communications & Betting Advisor. Telephone Interview, 4 July 2011. Kalb, Christian. CK Consulting, director; la Francaise des Jeux, former communication director. Paris, 6 June 2011. Killy, Rhadames. Autorité de Régulation des Jeux en Ligne (ARJEL), Directeur Juridique; Former general counsel for French Tennis Federation. Paris, April-July 2011. Interview 0003GO. Remote gambling operator, executive. Summer 2011. Interview 0013PS. Remote gambling operator, former executive; sport betting consultant and expert. Spring 2011. Sport Integrity Regulators Ali, Khalid. European Sport Security Association, Secretary General. Telephone interview,18 July 2011. 234 Martens, Friedrich. Fédération Internationale de Football Association – Early Warning System GmbM (EWS), Manager Competition Analysis and Media. Telephone interview, 20 July 2011. Interview 0001GG. Sport integrity monitoring unit, director. Spring, 2011. Interview 0005GG. Sport integrity investigative unit, expert, Spring, 2011. Interview 0011GG. International Olympic Committee Working Group On the Fight Against Irregular and Illegal Sports Betting, informant; sport integrity expert. Paris, spring 2011. Interview 0021SB. International Olympic Committee Working Group On the Fight Against Irregular and Illegal Sports Betting, informant; sport integrity expert. Paris, spring 2011. Academic & Other Experts Chappelet, Jean-Loup. University of Lausanne – Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration, professor. 12 July 2010. Desbordes, Michel. University of Paris XI, professor and sport marketing expert. 4 November 2010. Lacarrière, Sarah. Institute Relations International and Strategic (IRIS), researcher. Paris, 24 June 2011. Nafziger, James. Willamette University, professor and international sport law expert. 13 May 2010. Interview 0015EG. European Union sport betting expert; International Olympic Committee Working Group On the Fight Against Irregular and Illegal Sports Betting, informant; sport integrity expert. Paris, summer, 2011. Legal and Judicial Counsel Misson, Luc. Misson Cabinet d'Avocats Sprl, international human rights and labour lawyer, Union Royale Belge des Sociétès de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman, legal counsel Bosman. Liège, 5 August 2010. Montane, Emilie. Federation Française de Tennis (Roland Garros) legal counsel. 14 April 2011. Morand, Ottelie. Union Cycliste Internationale, law department manager. Lausanne, 15 July 2010. 235 Mosk, Stanley. California Supreme Court Justice. Los Angeles, 20 May 2010. Verheyden, Delphine. Vivien & Associes, sports and entertainment attorney; Sciences Po, associated professor. Paris, 13 April 2011. Interview 0002SB. International Federation, legal counsel. Spring 2011. Interview 0007SB. International Federation, legal counsel. Spring 2011. Interview 0009OC. International Olympic Committee, legal counsel. Summer 2010. Interview 0012SB. National Collegiate Athletic Association, legal counsel. Spring, 2010 and spring, 2012. Interview 0020SB. National Collegiate Athletic Association, legal counsel. Spring 2012. Interview 0017MM. Media network, legal counsel. Spring 2011. French Sport Ministry Toussaint, Michèle. Ministère des Sports, Deputy Head of the Bureau for International Relations and International Major Sporting Events. Paris, 10 June 2011. Interview 0016NS. Ministère des Sports, international relations representative. Summer 2011. Interview 0018NS. Ministère des Sports, legal counsel. Summer 2011. Interview 0019NS. Ministère des Sports, legal counsel. Summer 2011. National Olympic Committees & National Federations Al Kaabi, Nasser. Qatar Cycling assistant, Lausanne, 15 July 2010. Al-Hemaidi, Ahmed. Qatar Cycling Coach, Lausanne, 15 July 2010. Blackmun, Scott. United States Olympic Committee, Chief Executive Officer. London, 7 April 2011. Bailey, Darren. The Football Association (England), Director of Football Governance and Regulation; United Kingdom Department for Culture, Media and Sport – Sport Integrity Panel, member; international sport lawyer, London, 5 April 2011. Engleman, Mike. United States Cycling, Director. Telephone interview, 6 May 2010. Fasulo, Robert. United States Olympic Committee, legal counsel. Telephone interview, 10 May 2010. Miller, Jim. United States Cycling Federation, Director Sportif Women. Telephone interview, 8 May 2010. 236 Ruger, John. United States Olympic Committee, Ombudsman. Telephone interview, 16 June 2010. Interview 0010SB. French Olympic Committee, member; French National Federation, leader. Paris, spring 2011. Media Barbieri, Francesco. GiroDonne (Giro d'Italia Femminile), race general secretary. Trieste Caerano San Marco, Orta and San Giulio, Como (Italy), 4-8 July, 2010. Bartali, Andrea. GiroDonne (Giro d'Italia Femminile), race general secretary. Trieste Caerano San Marco, Orta and San Giulio, Como (Italy), 4-8 July, 2010. Brunel, Delphine. RCS Gazzetta dello Sport, Giro d'Italia, professional cycling freelance media and race translator (120 race days per annum), Trieste Caerano San Marco, Orta and San Giulio, Como (Italy), 4-8 July, 2010. Bowler, Heather. Eurosport, Global Communications Director. London, 5 April 2011. Festa, Teri. Nielson Ratings, Nielson Sports executive. Telephone interview, 16 June 2010. Scarbrough, Neal. Versus Network (Comcast), chief digital officer. Telephone interview, 4 and 16 June 2010. Fredreik, Tobias. Union Cycliste Internationale, Marketing and TV. Lausanne, 13 July 2010. Gruber, Nicole. Union Cycliste Internationale, Marketing and TV. Lausanne, 14 July 2010. Peris, Ximo. Crystal CG International, digital media team, Beijing and London Olympics. London, 5-7 April and 14-15 June 2011. Pestes, Richard. Pezcyclingnews.com editor and sport journalist. Telephone interview, 13 May 2010. Wieslo, Laura. Cyclingnews.com editor, publisher, and sport journalist. Telephone interview, 17 June 2010. Interview 0017MM, Network Broadcast Company (NBC), former legal counsel. Spring, 2011. 237 United Nations Vlassis, Dimitri. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Chief of the Corruption and Economic Crime Section Division for Treaty Affairs. Telephone interview, 20 July 2011. Beutler, Ingrid. United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace, former head; SportAccord – Sports’ Social Responsibility, manager. Telephone interview, 9 July 2011. Interview 0008GG. UNESCO, Programme Specialist in the Communication and Information Sector. Paris, fall, 2010. International Olympic Committee DeFrantz, Anita. International Olympic Committee Women's Commission expert, International Olympic Committee member & former vice president. Los Angeles, 6 May 2010. Girard Zapelli, Paquerette. International Olympic Committee Member; Head of Ethics Commission; Former French Judge, Lausanne, 13 July 2010. bin Addullah Al Thani, Sheik Khalid bin Ali Qatar Cycling Federation, President. Lausanne, 15 July 2010. Stupp, Howard. International Olympic Committee, Director of Legal Affairs. Lausanne, 19 July 2010. Oswald, Denis. University Neuchâtel-International Centre for Sport Sport Studies, Director, Court of Arbitration for Sport arbitrator, International Rowing Federation, president, International Olympic Committee member; Chairman of Summer Olympics 2012 Coordination Commission. Neuchâtel, 19 July 2010. Interview 0004OC. International Olympic Committee, Executive Board member. Summer, 2010. Interview 0022OC. International Olympic Committee, Executive Board member. Summer, 2010. International Federations Calori, Ophelie. Union Cycliste Internationale, Road Commission. Lausanne, 14-16 July 2010. Chovelon, Marc. Union Cycliste Internationale, Road Commission. Telephone interview, 15 May 2010. McQuaid, Pat. Union Cycliste Internationale, President. Lausanne, 15 July 2010. 238 Rossi, Francesca. Union Cycliste Internationale, Head of Anti-Doping Foundation. Lausanne, 15 July 2010. Rumpf, Alain. Union Cycliste Internationale, ProTour, former director; Global Cycling Promotions, Director. Lausanne, 15 & 16 July 2010. Zorzoli, Dr. Mario. Union Cycliste Internationale, Anti-Doping Foundation, Chief Medical Officer. Lausanne, 15 July 2010. Delfini, Davide. Union Cycliste Internationale, Anti-Doping Foundation, legal counsel. Lausanne, 15 July 2010. Barber, Florence. Union Cycliste Internationale, assistant to president. Lausanne, 15 July 2010. Interview 0014SB. International Federation, former president. Summer 2010. Court of Arbitration for Sport Lenard, Michael. International Council of Arbitration for Sport, board member. Los Angeles, 7 May 2010. McLaren, Richard. Court of Arbitration for Sport, arbitrator. Telephone interview, 1 June 2010. Dubey, Jean-Philippe. Court of Arbitration for Sport, counsel. Lausanne, 13 July 2010. Interview 0006SB, Court of Arbitration for Sport, arbitrator. Summer 2010. Private Sport Event Holders (owners) Amaury, Jean-Etienne. Amaury Sport Organisation, President. Paris, 23 October 2010. Bambrilla, Sara. Epinike; GiroDonne (Giro d'Italia Femminile), President. Trieste, Caerano San Marco, Orta and San Giulio, Como (Italy), 4-8 July, 2010. Burlot, Benjamin, Tropicale Amissa Bongo (Tour du Gabon), Marketing Director and Race Coordinator; Amaury Sport Organisation, former coordinator. Paris, 11 July 2011. Genniges, Valéry. Amaury Sport Organisation, Deputy Director. Paris, November-July 2011. Rivolta, Giuseppe. GiroDonne (Giro d'Italia Femminile), owner. Como, 8 July 2010. 239 Miscellaneous Dolley, Mark. International Committee of Sports for the Deaf, chief executive; International Olympic Committee, former head of communications; London Olympic Host Bid Committee, consultant. London, 5-7 April 2011 and Paris, 17 April 2011. Puig, Nuria. Olympic Studies Centre, Head of University Relations. Telephone consultation, 6 May 2010. Supovitz, Frank A. National Football League, Senior Vice President of Events. London, 7 April 2011. Vajda, Patrick. Association Française du Corps Arbitral Multisports (AFCAM), President; Referee Commission of International Fencing, Marsh Sports and Events, Head of Global Events Practice; former risk management consultant for Athletic World Championships, World Cup, and Olympics; European Manager for Sports and Events. Paris, April-June 2012. Verbruggen, Hein. SportAccord, President; Union Cycliste Internationale, former president. Avignon, 23 July 2010 and London, 5 April 2011. Professional Athletes Interview PA0001. National champion; world champion; Olympic gold medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0002. National and world champion. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0003. Multi-time national and world champion; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0004. Multi-time national champion; world champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0005. Multi-time national champion. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0006. National champion. Summer, 2010. PA0007 (multi time national champion; world champion; Olympian) Interview PA0008. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0009. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0010. National champion; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0011. National champion; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0012. National champions; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. 240 Interview PA0013. Multi-time national and world champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0014. Multi-time national champion; world champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0015. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0016. National champion; professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0017. National champion; world champion; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0018. National champion; world champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0019. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0020. National champion. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0021. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0022. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0023. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0024. National champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0025. National champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0026. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0027. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0028. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0029. National team; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0030. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0031. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0032. National champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0033. National team. Summer, 2010. 241 Interview PA0034. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0035. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0036. National team; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Professional Teams Interview PT0001. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0002. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0003. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0004. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0005. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0006. Professional team, directeur sportif; National team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0007. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0008. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0009. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0010. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0011. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0012. Professional team, directeur sportif; national team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0013. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0014. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0015. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0016. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0017. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0018. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0019. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. 242 Interview PT0021. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0022. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0023. Professional team, directeur sportif; National team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0024. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0025. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0026. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. 243 Primary Resources List of Documents BSC Beat Steinegger Consulting, 2009, “Study on international sports: with special consideration of the issue of ‘rival leagues’”, SportAccord, independent report, Lausanne, 16 December. Les Chiffres-clés du sport, 2010, Ministère des Sports, December. Ernst and Young, Market Overview, The 2010 Gaming Bulletin Amaury Sport Organisation, 2010. Présentation Projet d’étude Orsay, September. ---- 2006. Présentation Tour de France 2006. ---- 2007. Présentation Tour de France 2007. ---- 2008. Présentation Tour de France 2008. Fédération Française de Tennis, 2011. Droit Medias, Stratégie de commercialization. Global Cycling Productions, 2010. Case Study: Tour Down Under, presentation slides, June. Olympic Review: Official Publication of the Olympic Movement, no. 78, January, February, March 2010. Social Group Profile: Lottomatic Social Group Report, 2010. Sportcal: Special Feature, 20 Years of Sport, no. 21, March 2011 Sport Accord, 2010. 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The International Cycling Union Devoted to Cycling. ---- 2011. Instructions for the Registration of 2011 Union Cycliste Internationale Road Teams, First and Second Division. ---- 2010e. Letter to race organizer (a), Sport and Technical Department, Aigle 15 July. ---- 2010f. Letter to race organizer (b), Sport and Technical Department, Aigle 15 July. ---- 2010g. Le monde change, le cyclisme également, UCI ProTour, CUPT, Bruxelles April. ---- 2010h. Organigramme CADF, internal document 26 May. ---- 2010i. Organigramme Hiérarchique CMC Exploitation, internal document, 21 June. ----2011b. ProTour 2005-2011, presentation slides. ---- 2010j. Road Race Organiser’s Guide. ---- 2010k. Situation des Équipes UCI, Commission Route, Genève, 9 April. ---- 2010l. UCI Financial Obligations. ---- 2009c. Union Cycliste International Cycling Regulations, version 22.12.09, joint agreements. ---- 2010m. Union Cycliste Internationale Events Calendar 2010, internal document. ---- 2010n. 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Interview PA0011. National champion; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0012. National champions; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0013. Multi-time national and world champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0014. Multi-time national champion; world champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0015. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0016. National champion; professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0017. National champion; world champion; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0018. National champion; world champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0019. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0020. National champion. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0021. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0022. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0023. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0024. National champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0025. National champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. 261 Interview PA0026. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0027. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0028. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0029. National team; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0030. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0031. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0032. National champion; Olympian. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0033. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0034. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0035. National team. Summer, 2010. Interview PA0036. National team; Olympic medalist. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0001. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0002. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0003. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0004. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0005. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0006. Professional team, directeur sportif; National team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. Interview PT0007. Professional team, directeur sportif. Summer, 2010. 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Lausanne, 15 July 2010. 278 Appendix A Fieldwork Conducted Research Design & Schedule Research Phase Timeframe Spring 2010 Prospectus Defense 04.10 Preliminary Research (Los Angeles) 05.10-‐06.10 Questionnaire (design) IRB Application Informed Consent Forms (implied consent drafts) Drafted Credential/Introduction-Access Letters Secured Affiliate University Support Abroad (Sciences Po and Paris 8) Requested Olympic Studies Centre Archive Access Contacted Teams/Athletes (interview set up) Contacted Institutional Experts (interview set up) Preliminary Phase Interviews (IOC members; CAS arbitrators; Sport Experts; Athletes) Phase I: Regulatory Institutions Summer 2010 279 Expert Interview/Archival Research (IOC; FIFA; FFT; UCI, CAS) Phase II: Commercial Sport: Teams, Sponsors and Athletes 07.10-‐09.10 Ethnographic Fieldwork/Interview (Elite Cycling -Women and Men) (Holland, Switzerland, Italy, France, Belgium, & United Kingdom) University Paris (VIII), Research Affiliation 07.10-‐09.10 Phase III: Sciences Po, Paris, Visiting Research Fellow 09.10-‐09.11 Dissertation Writing and Continued Research Fall 2010 Field Research Analysis Media Broadcast Analysis 09.10-‐11.10 Sciences Po, Paris (Affiliated Professor, Sociology and History Departments) 01.11-‐06.11 Additional Sport Institutional Research: FFT; ASO; French NFs, NOCs, Sport Minister SportAccord Convention, London 04.04-‐08.11 Phase IV: Global Gambling Markets and Regulation (ARJEL; remote gambling operators; sport betting and integrity consultants) Winter 2011 Dissertation Writing 02.11-‐03.11 Political Economy Analysis International Case Law Analysis Summer 2011 05.11-‐03.12 Dissertation Defense Spring 2012 280 Appendix B Web Sources Sport Governance Bodies and Sport Integrity Regulatory Institutions Court of Arbitration for Sport http://www.tas-cas.org/ International Cricket Council, Anti-Corruption and Security Council: http://icc-cricket.yahoo.net/anti_corruption/overview.php European Sport Security Association http://www.eu-ssa.org/ Fédération Internationale de Football Association, Early Warning System GmbH http://fifa-ews.com/ International Olympic Committee http://www.olympic.org/ National Collegiate Athlete Association: http://www.dontbetonit.org/ SportAccord, Global Programme to Stop Match-Fixing in Sport: http://integrity.sportaccord.com/en/ SportRadar http://www.sportradar.ag/ Tennis Integrity Unit http://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/ National and Transnational Sport Institutions Autorité de Régulation des Jeux en Ligne (ARJEL) http://www.arjel.fr/ European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/gambling_en.htm Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport http://www.coe.int/t/DG4/EPAS/default_en.asp Ministère des Sports 281 http://www.sports.gouv.fr/ United Kingdom Department of Culture, Media and Sport http://www.culture.gov.uk/ United Kingdom Gambling Commission http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/ Gambling Industry Associations and Directories Remote Gambling Association http://www.rga.eu.com/ Comparative Directory of Online Bookmakers http://www.top100bookmakers.com/ European Gaming and Betting Association http://www.egba.eu/en Sport Research Institutes and Experts LA84 Foundation http://www.la84foundation.org/ Play the Game, Danish Institute for Sport Studies http://www.playthegame.org/ SportingIntelligence http://www.sportingintelligence.com/ Institute Relations International and Strategic (IRIS) http://www.iris-france.org/ TMC Asser Instituut http://www.asser.nl/ The Centre for Law and Economics of Sport http://www.cdes.fr/

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Asset Metadata

Creator Campbell, Rook (author)

Core Title Global governance of sport in a digital age: the political economy of sport integrity regulation

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Politics and International Relations

Publication Date 06/25/2013

Defense Date 05/01/2012

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag betting,communications,digital,France,Gambling,global governance,Globalization,media,OAI-PMH Harvest,Sport,sport integrity

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Castells, Manuel (committee chair), Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee chair), Messner, Michael A. (committee member), Wong, Janelle (committee member)

Creator Email rook276@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-50725

Unique identifier UC11288924

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Legacy Identifier etd-CampbellRo-906.pdf

Dmrecord 50725

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Campbell, Rook

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

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