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Intersect policing: bringing CompStat to the field level to reduce the fear and incidence of crime

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Intersect policing: bringing CompStat to the field level to reduce the fear and incidence of crime

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INTERSECT POLICING:

Bringing CompStat to the Field Level to Reduce the Fear and Incidence of Crime

by

Edward Allen Pape, Jr.

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC SOL PRICE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF POLICY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

December 2012

Copyright 2012 Edward Allen Pape, Jr.

ii
EPIGRAPH

“One Team, One Mission…To Reduce the Fear and Incidence of Crime.”
~ West Valley Intersect Policing

iii
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my family. For without their love and support, I
would not have achieved all that I have today. Kim, Amanda and Brian, thank you for
your patience and encouragement throughout this long and arduous process. The three of
you are what drives me toward the accomplishment of my goals, and I wouldn’t be the
person I am today without the three of you.

iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writing of this dissertation has been one of the toughest academic challenges
I have ever had to face. Without the support, guidance, help and patience of the
following people, this study would have not been completed. It is to them I owe my
sincerest gratitude.
I would like to start by thanking Professor Harry Richardson for agreeing to chair
my committee. You were the perfect chairperson - calm, encouraging and always
making me realize there was life outside of this dissertation. Thank you for all your help
and support.
I am grateful to Professor David Suárez for being part of my committee. You
always kept me grounded, listening to my ideas and concerns, and providing guidance
along the way. I am truly grateful you agreed to be part of this process.
I am indebted and thankful to Professor Alison Dundes Renteln for always
looking out for my best interest and ensuring the process was fair and rewarding. None
of this would have been possible without your help, support and guidance.
I would like to show my sincerest gratitude to Chief Jim McDonnell – not only
for being a member of my committee - but for being a coach, mentor and friend. You
taught me that law enforcement was a people business, and to always treat people with
dignity and respect – may our work paths someday soon cross again.
I want to send a special thank you to Catherine Burke for her help, guidance and
support; not just during this process, but for everything she has taught me these past four

v
years. You are by far the greatest academic instructor I have ever had the pleasure of
studying under. Thank you for all you have done to assist me academically,
professionally and personally.
This work would not have been possible without the help and support of
Professors Richard Callahan and Robert Myrtle. The two of them introduced me to The
Medici Effect, and opened my eyes to a new type of leadership and policing. My
sincerest thank you to the both of you.
In addition, I need to send out a special thank you to all those who assisted me
toward the completion of this study: Roberta Abner, Kirk Albanese, Ryan Alcantara,
Irma Becerra, William Bratton, Steven Burke, Scott Carr, Rick Culley, Daniel Dail,
Victor Davalos, Victoria DeBellis, John Egan, Randy Goddard, Jeff Godown, Sean Kane,
Maricela Keiser, Sean Malinowski, Edward Medrano, Eduardo Miranda, Brent Morris,
Chet Newland, Kiki Nocella, Damon Ormsby, Sandra Perez, Jay Roberts, Martha Reyes,
Christine Schachter, Mark Slater, Thomas Tenney, Mike Thomas, Craig Valenzuela,
Jeffrey Wigintton, Diane Weber, Mark Yokoyama, and Nick Zingo.
Lastly and most importantly, I need to acknowledge my parents. Thank you for
sacrificing your life for the betterment of your children. I will never be able to repay
your humble generosity or the love you have given to me.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Epigraph ii
Dedication iii
Acknowledgments iv
List of Tables x
List of Figures xiii
Abbreviations xv
Abstract xvi

Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Preview 1
Background 4
Brief History of CompStat 5
Statement of the Problem 6
Purpose of the Research 7
Significance of the Research 8
Setting 10
Literature Review 17
Methodology 19
Limitations of the Study 20
Terminology 21
Organization of the Study 22

Chapter 2: CompStat 25
Introduction 25
Background 27
Performance Management System 28
Charts of the Future 29
Reducing the Fear and Incidence of Crime 30
Four Principles of CompStat 32
Accurate and Timely Intelligence 33
Effective Tactics 35
Rapid Deployment 38
Relentless Follow-up and Assessment 40
Four Levels of CompStat 42
Accountability 47
Conclusion 50

vii
Chapter 3: Process of Organization Change 53
Introduction 53
Principles of Behavior 53
People are not Machines 54
People need to be able to Predict Their Environments 58
Tools of Leadership 62
Common Language and Definitions 65
People’s Behavior is Value Based 68
People Form Cultures Based Upon Mythologies 75
Change is a Result of Dissonance 80
It is as Important to Understand Social Process in Detail, as
it is to Understand the Detail of Technical Process 88
Understand the Difference between Prediction of a
Population’s Behavior and the Prediction of an Individual’s
Behavior 90
It is Better to Build Relationships on the Basis of Authority
rather than Power 91
Clarity of Boundaries is the Basis of Freedom 94
Conclusion 96

Chapter 4: CompStat: History & Mythologies 98
Introduction 98
CompStat Mythologies 104
Mythology No. 1: “CompStat ‘Robs’ a Person of their Personal
Life” 105
Mythology No. 2: “CompStat is Cruel and Unusual Punishment” 109
Mythology No. 3: “CompStat Manipulates Crime Numbers” 120
Conclusion 133

Chapter 5: Human Capability & Organizational Structure 136
Introduction 136
Background 138
Defining Work 140
Organizational Purpose 141
Resources 141
Levels of Work 145
Hierarchy 157
Policy, Systems, and Goals 161
Conclusion 163

Chapter 6: Organizational Learning & The Medici Effect 165
Introduction 165
Background 167
The Intersection 169

viii
Creating the Medici Effect 173
Organizational Learning 176
Double-Loop Learning 180
Conclusion 184

Chapter Seven: Intersect Policing System 186
Introduction 186
Overview of the Chapter 188
Origins of the System 189
The Medici Effect 189
Stratified Systems Theory 190
Achieving the Fourth Level 191
Cultural Change 193
The Physical Intersection 196
Intersection Staffing 200
Limited Tour Assignment 203
Intersection Duties and Responsibilities 203
Daily Intersection Meeting 206
Intersection Meeting Attendees 207
Culture of Transparency 208
Twenty Minutes or Less 209
Respect for People 210
Controlled Chaos 211
Deployment Matrix 211
Utilizing SMART Technology 213
Daily Mission 215
Three Steps to Crime Reduction 221
Analysis 222
Strategies 223
Assessment 235
The Follow-up Doctor Visit 236
Constantly Monitoring the Environment 238
Crime Statistical Information 239
Department CompStat Process 242
CompStat Preparation and Presentation 243
Step One: Initial Identification 244
Step Two: Intersection Meeting 245
Step Three: Conclusion of the Intersection Meeting 249
Step Four: Daily Intersection Follow-up Meeting 249
Step Five: Assessing the Situation 250
Step Six: CompStat Preparation 251
Step Seven: CompStat Inspection 252
Conclusion 257

ix
Chapter Eight: Results and Analysis 259
Introduction 259
Methodology 264
Outline of the Chapter 267
First Year Results of the Study 268
Second Year Results of the Study 275
Overall Results of the Study 281
Improving Employee Morale 286
Easing the CompStat Inspection Process 302
Conclusion 305

Chapter Nine: Conclusion 308
Introduction 308
Lessons Learned 309
Taming the CompStat Monster 310
Common Sense is Not Dead 311
Intersect Policing is Good Strategy 312
You Can’t Please Everybody 316
Future Research 318
Reducing the Fear of Crime 319
Enhancing an Organization’s Ability to Learn 320
Improving Employee Morale 321
Mythologies Associated with Intersect Policing 323
The Effects on Citizens and Others who Participate in
the Intersection 324
Providing iPad Technology to all Police Personnel 324
Conclusion 325

Glossary 328

Bibliography 334

Appendices
Appendix A: LAPD Bureaus and Areas 382
Appendix B: Operations Valley Bureau 383
Appendix C: West Valley Area – Basic Car 384
Appendix D: Citizen Participation Disclosure Letter 385
Appendix E: LAPD Personnel Participation Disclosure Letter 386
Appendix F: West Valley Area Survey No. 1 387
Appendix G: West Valley Area Survey No. 2 388
Appendix H: West Valley Area Survey No. 3 389

x
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Land Area and Police Force Size Selected Cities 2

Table 1.2: Annual Cost of Crime in Los Angeles 9

Table 1.3: Police Personnel Assigned to West Valley Area 2009-2011 15

Table 2.1: Various City, County, State and Federal Resources 36

Table 2.2: Traditional vs. Performance Model 38

Table 3.1: Universal Core Values 72

Table 3.2: Continuum of Control and Order in Systems 94

Table 5.1: Seven Levels of Work 152

Table 8.1: 2006-2011 West Valley Part I Crime Totals 261

Table 8.2: 2006-2011 LAPD Part I Crime Totals 261

Table 8.3: 2009 West Valley Part I Crime Totals 268

Table 8.4: 2010 West Valley Part I Crime Totals 269

Table 8.5: 2010-2009 West Valley Part I Crime Comparison 269

Table 8.6: 2010-2009 West Violent Crime Comparison 270

Table 8.7: 2010-2009 West Valley Property Crime Comparison 271

Table 8.8: 2010-2009 Citywide Part I Crime Comparison 271

Table 8.9: 2010-2009 Citywide Violent Crime Comparison 272

Table 8.10: 2010-2009 Citywide Property Crime Comparison 273

Table 8.11: 2010-2009 West Valley/Citywide Part I Crime Percentage
Comparison 273

xi
Table 8.12: 2010-2009 West Valley/Citywide Violent Crime Percentage
Comparison 274

Table 8.13: 2010-2009 West Valley/Citywide Property Crime
Percentage Comparison 274

Table 8.14: 2011 West Valley Part I Crime Totals 275

Table 8.15: 2011-2010 West Valley Part I Crime Totals 276

Table 8.16: 2011-2010 West Valley Violent Crime Comparison 277

Table 8.17: 2011-2010 West Valley Property Crime Comparison 278

Table 8.18: 2011-2010 Citywide Part I Crime Comparison 278

Table 8.19: 2011-2010 Citywide Violent Crime Comparison 279

Table 8.20: 2011-2010 Citywide Property Crime Comparison 279

Table 8.21: 2011-2010 West Valley/Citywide Part I Crime Percentage
Comparison 280

Table 8.22: 2011-2010 West Valley/Citywide Violent Crime Percentage
Comparison 280

Table 8.23: 2011-2010 West Valley/Citywide Property Crime
Percentage Comparison 281

Table 8.24: 2011-2009 West Valley Part I Crime Comparison 281

Table 8.25: 2011-2009 West Valley Violent Crime Comparison 282

Table 8.26: 2011-2009 West Valley Property Crime Comparison 283

Table 8.27: 2011-2009 Citywide Part I Crime Comparison 283

Table 8.28: 2011-2009 Citywide Violent Crime Comparison 284

Table 8.29: 2011-2009 Citywide Property Crime Comparison 284

Table 8.30: 2011-2009 West Valley/Citywide Part I Crime Percentage
Comparison 285

xii
Table 8.31: 2011-2009 West Valley/Citywide Violent Crime Percentage
Comparison 285

Table 8.32: 2011-2009 West Valley/Citywide Property Crime
Percentage Comparison 286

xiii
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Geographic Challenges of Policing in Los Angeles 3

Figure 1.2: Location of West Valley Area in the San Fernando Valley 14

Figure 1.3: West Valley Area Gang Territories 2011 17

Figure 3.1: Person-Object Relationship 55

Figure 3.2: Person-Person Relationship 56

Figure 3.3: Mythologies 67

Figure 3.4: Universal Core Values: Positive and Negative 73

Figure 3.5: Making Sense of the World through the Mythological Lens 77

Figure 5.1: Individual Relationships to Work Strata 147

Figure 5.2: Managerial Distances in Stratum 148

Figure 5.3: Mental Processing Ability to Level of Work 150

Figure 5.4: Work Stratum to Current and Future Capability 151

Figure 5.5: The Process of Work 163

Figure 6.1: The CompStat Inspection Room 171

Figure 6.2: Single-Loop Learning 180

Figure 6.3: Single-Loop and Double-Loop Learning 182

Figure 7.1: Intersection Friday Comparison Report 195

Figure 7.2: The Intersection 197

Figure 7.3: SMART Board Multi-User Function 198

Figure 7.4: Intersection Levels of Work 201

xiv
Figure 7.5: Intersection Deployment Matrix 212

Figure 7.6: Accessing Dropbox via Smart Technology 214

Figure 7.7: Daily Mission Sheet 216

Figure 7.8: Remarks Section 218

Figure 7.9: Hot Spot Density Mapping for BTFV 223

Figure 7.10: Follow-up Doctor Visit Review Cycle 237

Figure 7.11: Total Part I Crimes by Type, RD, and Basic Car 240

Figure 7.12: Part I Crimes by Time, Day and Watch Assignment 240

Figure 7.13: Violent Crimes by Time, Day and Watch Assignment 241

Figure 7.14: Property Crimes by Time, Day and Watch Assignment 241

Figure 7.15: CompStat Outline 254

Figure 8.1: 2006-2011 West Valley/LAPD Part I Crime Percentage
Average 259

Figure 8.2: Intersect Policing Survey One – Crime Reduction
(January 2010) 289

Figure 8.3: Intersect Policing Survey Two – Crime Reduction
(January 2011) 292

Figure 8.4: Intersect Policing Survey Three – Crime Reduction
(January 2012) 293

xv
ABBREVIATIONS

ABC: Alcohol Beverage Control
ATF: Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
BTFV: Burglary Theft from Vehicle
CIS: Citizenship and Immigration and Naturalization Services
DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
DOC: Department of Corrections
DOJ: Department of Justice
DMV: Department of Motor Vehicles
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
GTA: Grand Theft Auto
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
LAPD: Los Angeles Police Department
NYC: New York City
NYPD: New York City Police Department
UCR: Uniformed Crime Reporting
USC: University of Southern California
VST: Volunteer Surveillance Team

xvi
ABSTRACT

CompStat is a computerized crime tracking system that was introduced by the
New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 1994 and has been adopted by police
departments around the world. The CompStat process acts as an accountability system
that calls for commanding officers to reduce the fear and incidence of crime. While the
nationwide reduction in crime over the past two decades may be partially attributed to
CompStat, the system has also created tension in many police organizations. In addition,
it currently fails to involve line members of the organization, those who actually perform
the work, in the crime reduction process. In many departments, CompStat has morphed
into a bureaucratic monster, creating a culture of fear that has damaged morale and
diminished its effectiveness.
The purpose of this research was to develop a real-time operating system, using
CompStat as a strategic tool, to accomplish the purpose of law enforcement by including
the knowledge and experiences from all sworn officers and others with a stake in
reducing crime. As the Commanding Officer of Detectives assigned to West Valley Area
of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), I instituted a system, which I termed
Intersect Policing.
1
This report describes the development and results achieved through
the use of Intersect Policing.
This work required the use of others’ research including performance
management, principles of behavior, organizational change, systems, core values, human

1
Intersect Policing is short for “Policing at the Intersection,” which was coined from Frans Johansson’s
book (2004), The Medici Effect.

xvii
capability, mental processing ability, mythologies, culture, communication, networking,
and organizational learning. Key elements were based on the CompStat model of
performance management, Macdonald et al. Systems Leadership Theory and Johansson’s
Medici Effect.
The study encompassed two years during which the West Valley Area exceeded
the average reduction in crime of the entire LAPD, which has continued as of this
writing. Although based on a single case, the evidence strongly suggests that Intersect
Policing can assist police departments to achieve the purpose of law enforcement, reduce
the fear and incidence of crime, change mythologies and culture, and improve morale.
Creating an Intersection where all stakeholders in the crime reduction process can
communicate and exchange ideas enables police departments to achieve the purpose of
law enforcement.

1
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION
Preview
Policing has been and always will be a numbers game. The fact of the matter
remains there are more people and property to protect than there are police officers on the
street. According to the most recent data available, there are nearly 309 million persons
living in the United States
2
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), which are being policed by
roughly 794,000 police officers
3
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2012).
In the City of Los Angeles, which has a population of nearly four million
residents, there are less than 10,000 police officers to cover approximately 470 square
miles of territory (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012c; U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a).
That
is less than one officer for every 385 residents, giving Los Angeles one of the lowest
ratios of police officers to residents of any major city in the country (Reaves, 2011).
To illustrate this point, let us compare seven other cities in the United States
(Boston, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and St. Louis,

2
Since the U.S. Census Bureau only collects population and housing data every ten years, with 2010 being
the last official record on file, this number would not reflect the actual number of persons living in the
United States today (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012a). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the resident
population of the United States, projected as of July 15, 2012, would be approximately 314 million persons
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2012b).
3
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, conducts a
national survey every three to four years in order to identify the number of police personnel working at the
federal, state and local levels. The last official study was conducted in 2008, which reported 765,000
sworn personnel (defined as those with general arrest powers) being employed in the United States
(Reaves, 2011).

2
along with the borough of Manhattan in New York City (NYC), in terms of land area and
police force size with that of the LAPD (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Land Area and Police Force Size Selected Cities
City Square Miles Total Officers
Deployed
Officers Per
Square Mile
Boston 48 2,094 43.6
Cleveland 78 1,559 20
Manhattan 23 34,817 1,513
Milwaukee 96 1,936 20.2
Minneapolis 54 880 16.3
Pittsburgh 55 887 16.1
San Francisco 47 2,250 47.9
St. Louis 62 1,363 22
Total: 463 45,786 98.9
Los Angeles 470 9,858 21
Source: Square miles – U.S. Census Bureau (2012c-k); Officers – U.S. Department of
Justice (2010a-h).
4

The City of Boston covers just over forty-eight square miles of territory and has
2,094 police officers (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012d; U.S. Department of Justice, 2010b).
The City of Cleveland has approximately seventy-eight square miles of geography and
1,559 police officers assigned (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012e; U.S. Department of Justice,
2010c), while the borough of Manhattan spans approximately twenty-three square miles
and, because it is policed by the NYPD, the nation’s largest police department, has
34,817 officers at its disposal (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012f; U.S. Department of Justice,
2010d). However, not all NYPD officers are deployed in the borough.

4
At the time this research was completed, 2010 was the last official record on file to be certified by the
U.S. DOJ in terms of the actual number of officers assigned to the police departments listed in Table 1.1.

3
The City of Milwaukee covers more than ninety-six square miles of territory, with
a police force of 1,936 police officers (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012g; U.S. Department of
Justice, 2010e). The City of Minneapolis covers roughly fifty-four square miles of
territory with a police force of 880 police officers assigned (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012h;
U.S. Department of Justice, 2010f), and almost mirrors the City of Pittsburgh, which
covers approximately fifty-five square miles of territory with only 887 police officers
assigned to the city (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012i; U.S. Department of Justice, 2010g).
The City of San Francisco spans approximately forty-seven square miles and has
2,250 officers assigned (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012j; U.S. Department of Justice, 2010a),
while the City of St. Louis has approximately sixty-two square miles with 1,363 police
officers assigned (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012k; U.S. Department of Justice, 2010h).
Figure 1.1. Geographic Challenges of Policing in Los Angeles

LAPD Faces
Geographic
Challenges

4
To put this in perspective, as noted in Figure 1.1, you could fit Boston, Cleveland,
Manhattan, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and St. Louis all within
the boundaries of Los Angeles. For this reason, in order to properly protect and serve
those who live, work and visit the City of Los Angeles, or any other community
throughout the United States, local law enforcement agencies need to take a strategic
approach in order to focus their limited resources toward the purpose of the profession.
Background
Police departments throughout the United States embody a substantial public
investment (Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988). Statistics compiled by the U.S. DOJ estimate
that policing in the United States more than quadrupled between 1982 and 2006
(Gascón & Foglesong, 2010). Since police departments make up the largest percentage
of most city budgets, police executives are responsible for ensuring their agencies
perform up to the standards entrusted to them (Philadelphia Police Department, 1987).
As Moore and Trojanowicz (1988, pp. 1-2) explained in Corporate Strategies for
Policing, “Stewardship over these resources is entrusted to the nation’s police
executives” and, largely, they’re responsible for deciding how best to use those assets
“…entrusted to them in hopes that their organizations will produce greater value for
society.” When properly led, well-trained and sufficiently equipped, police agencies can
substantially reduce the level of crime, restore a sense of security, and enhance the
quality of life for those who live, work and visit their communities (Bratton &
Malinowski, 2008; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1998; Serpas & Morley, 2008).

5
According to the U.S. DOJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, statistics have shown a significant drop in crimes
beginning in 1993 (U.S Department of Justice, 2011). In 2010 violent and property
crimes declined 6% and 2.7%, respectively, when compared with the 2009 official
figures,
5
which marks the fourth consecutive year violent crime has decreased, and the
eighth straight year of property crime reductions nationwide (U.S. Department of Justice,
2010i). When comparing the national crime index rate per 100,000 inhabitants, at the
conclusion of 2010, the crime rate was approximately the same as it was in 1968 (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2010i).
The reason for this decline is still being debated (Blumstein & Wallman, 2000;
Braga, 2001; Bratton et al., 1997; Geoghegan, 2011; Green, 1999; Kelling, 1995; Kelling
& Bratton, 1998; Levitt, 2004; Moore, 2003; Silverman, 1999; Smith & Bratton, 2001;
Spelman, 2000; Starbuck, 2004, 2005; Wilson, 2011). Although we cannot pinpoint all
the possible causes, the introduction of CompStat, first in NYC and then spreading to
other urban police departments around the world, appears to have made a significant
contribution to this trend (Fordham, 2009; Godown, 2009; Shane, 2004, 2007; Smith &
Bratton, 2001; Starbuck, 2004; Walsh, 2001; Weisburd et al., 2003).
Brief History of CompStat
Since its inception in 1994, CompStat has become one of the most popular
policing reforms in the United States (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Dabney, 2010; Maple &
Mitchell, 1999; Rosenbaum, 1994; Silverman, 1999; Silverman & O’Connell, 1999;

5
At the time this research was completed, 2010 was the last calendar year to have crimes certified by the
U.S. DOJ. Although the 2011 crime numbers have been posted, they are listed as “preliminary” only.

6
Weisburd & Braga, 2006; Willis et al., 2010). Initiated by then NYPD Commissioner
William J. Bratton as a means to reduce the high crime rate in NYC (Fordham, 2009),
CompStat is a goal-oriented, performance management system, which uses information
technology, operational strategy and managerial accountability to reduce the fear and
incidence of crime (Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Magers, 2004; Moore, 2003; Vito et
al., 2005; Walsh, 2001; Willis et al., 2010).
The core elements of CompStat consist of four distinct principles: accurate and
timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and
assessment (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Fordham, 2009;
Godown, 2009; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Shane, 2004, 2007; Walsh, 2001; Walsh &
Henry, 2008; Walsh & Vito, 2004).
Statement of the Problem
The CompStat process ensures that leaders within the organization who are
responsible for the service delivery system have a strong understanding of the crime
problems within their command and holds them accountable for developing strategies to
reduce the fear and incidence of crime (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Gascón, 2005;
Fordham, 2009; Godown, 2009; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Moore & Braga, 2003; Vito et
al., 2005; Walsh, 2001; Walsh & Vito, 2004; Willis et al., 2010).
To date, CompStat has largely been used at the higher levels of the organization
(Moore, 2003; Moore & Braga, 2003; Willis et al., 2010), while the rank-and-file remain
largely oblivious to CompStat and it intrudes little, if at all, into their daily police work

7
(Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2003). This despite the knowledge of their territory
held by field officers who have the most direct impact upon crime.
Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this research is to develop a real-time operating system, utilizing
CompStat as a strategic tool, which allows commanding officers to create specific tasks
through organizational learning that accomplish the purpose of law enforcement through
the daily work of police officers. As the Commanding Officer of Detectives assigned to
West Valley Area of the LAPD, I instituted a system, which I termed Intersect Policing.
This report describes the development and results achieved through the use of Intersect
Policing.
Organizations exist to achieve a purpose (Macdonald et al., 2006). The purpose
of law enforcement is to provide a service that ensures the safety and security of people
and property. In order to achieve this purpose, police work needs to be carried out
effectively and efficiently. Organizational systems provide the framework within which
the work is carried out, and it is these systems that drive the behavior of people in the
organization (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
Systems are the specific methodology for organizing activities to achieve a
purpose (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006). Intersect Policing is a system that
uses CompStat technology to derive strategies, which are needed to accomplish the
organization’s purpose. Strategies are formulated in an open forum amongst various
stakeholders, utilizing each individual’s knowledge, experience and situational
awareness, in regards to the identified problem. In doing so, Intersect Policing creates an

8
environment of organizational learning, which enhances job satisfaction and employee
morale. Most importantly, as this research will demonstrate, it enhances our ability to
achieve our purpose – reducing the fear and incidence of crime.
Daily tasks are formulated, based on the strategies, so personnel understand the
work that needs to be completed in order to accomplish the organizational purpose.
Personnel are then required to accomplish the work within the boundaries of
organizational policy (Macdonald et al., 2006).
Significance of the Research
The costs of crime have a large impact on society. Enforcement costs are not the
only factor to consider. In order to figure out how much crime costs society, one must
take into consideration the tangible and intangible costs (Anderson, 1999; Heaton, 2009;
McCollister et al., 2010; Miller et al., 1996).
Tangible costs consist of police budgets, incarceration costs, private security
expenditures, medical treatment for crime-related injuries, property losses, claims
processing costs and lost productivity from injuries (Heaton, 2009; McCollister et al.,
2010). Tangible costs can be measured using accounting information, such as police
department budgets, medical records, insurance claims and payouts, court services costs,
victim services, lost wages, lost days of work/school and other overdeterrence costs
(Heaton 2009; McCollister et al., 2010).
The intangible costs are pain and suffering of crime victims and lost utility due to
fear of crime (Heaton, 2009; McCollister et al., 2010). Intangible costs typically must be
measured indirectly: data on occupational risk and safety help us to value disability/loss

9
of life, data from jury awards provides evidence regarding the monetary cost of pain and
suffering, and survey evidence on citizens’ willingness to pay for particular crime control
polices can also capture intangible costs (Heaton, 2009).
In a study conducted by Paul Heaton of the Rand Corporation (2009), as noted in
Table 1.2, the cost of crime, in 2007 United States Dollars, for the City of Los Angeles
was as follows: murder ($8,000,000), rape ($200,000), robbery ($100,000), assault
($75,000), motor vehicle theft ($7,000), burglary ($12,000), and larceny ($1,000).
6

Table 1.2. Annual Cost of Crime in Los Angeles
Crime Type Cost Per
Crime
Number of Crimes
in 2007
Total Costs
(Millions)
Murder $8,000,000 394 $3152.00
Rape $200,000 867 $173.40
Robbery $100,000 13,445 $1344.50
Assault $75,000 12,831 $962.33
Motor Vehicle Theft $7,000 23,148 $162.04
Burglary $12,000 19,415 $232.98
Larceny $1,000 56,984 $56.98
Aggregate Crime Costs: $6084.23
Source: Heaton (2009). Crime Costs and Public Safety. Paper presented at the meeting of
the California Police Chiefs Association Annual Training Symposium: Pasadena,
California.
Although the costs of crime are high, one cannot argue for more resources to be
devoted to the problem, especially in today’s constrained economic environment, where
police agencies are facing layoffs and budget cutbacks (Adams, 2011). Society must be
confident that the programs put in place by the various law enforcement agencies,

6
At the time this research was completed, Heaton’s (2009) Rand study was the most recent data available
regarding the cost of crime in Los Angeles.

10
nationwide, will actually reduce crime. Thus, what’s needed is a paradigm shift in terms
of strategic focus.
High performance teams must be created whereby personnel work in a
collaborative, cohesive manner that creates a culture of learning where ideas can be
shared amongst all ranks of authority without fear of reprisal or embarrassment. Systems
need to be put in place that are not only conducive to learning, but utilize the tools to
obtain crime information (Macdonald et al., 2006), in real-time, to map the crimes for
patterns and clarity (Maple & Mitchell, 1999), so that the underlying causes of crime can
be identified (Weisburd et al., 2003).
Setting
The LAPD is the third largest police agency in the United States, after the NYPD
and the Chicago Police Department (Reaves, 2011). In terms of police service delivery,
the operational side of the LAPD falls under the jurisdiction of the Office of Operations,
which is headed by the Director of Operations, a three-star Assistant Chief, who, under
the direction of the Chief of Police, exercises line command over the operations of the
organization. The Office of Operations houses the majority of the department’s sworn
personnel, and is responsible for providing the basic service delivery system for the City
of Los Angeles.
The LAPD comprises twenty-one community police stations, which are referred
to as “Areas;” however, they are also commonly known as “divisions.” Each of the
twenty-one community police stations is grouped geographically into four command

11
areas, also known as “bureaus.”
For a complete listing of all LAPD bureaus and Areas
see Appendix “A.”
Each geographic bureau is the under the direction of a two-star Deputy Chief,
who, under the direction of the Director, Office of Operations, exercises line command
over the operations of his or her assigned bureau. The four geographic bureaus are as
follows: Operations Central Bureau, Operations South Bureau, Operations Valley Bureau
and Operations West Bureau.
Operations Central Bureau oversees operations in the following Areas: Central,
Hollenbeck, Newton, Northeast and Rampart. The bureau also consists of a traffic
division, Central Traffic Division, which handles traffic-related duties such as accident
investigation and the issuing of traffic citations. Operations Central Bureau has a
population of roughly 900,000 people, encompasses sixty-five square miles,
7
and
includes such diverse communities as the downtown business district, Eagle Rock,
MacArthur Park, and Griffith Park (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012e).
Operations South Bureau oversees operations in the following Areas: 77
th
Street,
Harbor, Southeast, and Southwest. In addition, Operations South Bureau consists of a
traffic division, South Traffic Division, and the Criminal Gang and Homicide Division.
Operations South Bureau encompasses approximately fifty-eight square miles and has a
population of approximately 640,000 community members. Although Operations South

7
Bureau populations and size has been derived by spatially selecting the U.S. Census Bureau population
data located with each bureau boundary. This process has a small margin of error and, as a result, the total
population and square miles of all twenty-one Areas does not necessarily equal the citywide population or
size.

12
Bureau encompasses much of South Los Angeles, the LAPD does not police Inglewood
or Compton (Los Angeles police Department, 2012f).
Operations Valley Bureau oversees operations in the following Areas: Foothill,
North Hollywood, Van Nuys, Mission, Devonshire, West Valley and Topanga. In
addition, Operations Valley Bureau consists of a traffic division, Valley Traffic Division,
which handles traffic-related duties such as accident investigation and the issuing of
traffic citations. Operations Valley Bureau is the largest of the four geographic bureaus,
encompassing more that 221 square miles in the San Fernando Valley, with a population
of approximately 1.3 million people (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012g). This
study will take place in West Valley Area, which is located within Operations Valley
Bureau; thus, for a complete view of Operations Valley Bureau see Appendix “B.”
Operations West Bureau oversees operations in the following Areas: Hollywood,
Wilshire, Pacific, West Los Angeles and Olympic. Operations West Bureau consists of a
traffic division, West Traffic Division, which handles traffic-related duties such as
accident investigation and the issuing of traffic citations. Operations West Bureau is
comprised of 124 square miles, which covers most of the well-known areas of the city,
including Hollywood and Pacific Palisades, and has a population of approximately
840,000 community members (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012h).
A senior captain, commonly referred to as the Area commanding officer or Area
captain, commands geographic divisions.
8
Areas are composed of a patrol division,

8
In terms of the CompStat inspection, the Area captain is the person held accountable and responsible for
analyzing crime problems, developing a plan to attack crime problems, and measuring the results (Bratton
& Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999; Walsh, 2001).

13
commanded by a junior captain, a detective division, commanded by a senior lieutenant,
and several other support functions including anti-gang, narcotics, vice, and a community
relations unit that report directly to the Area captain (Gascón, 2005).
The Intersect Policing system was introduced and tested in West Valley Area of
the LAPD. The study period began January 1, 2010, and concluded December 31, 2011.
West Valley Area is located in the western portion of the San Fernando Valley within the
City of Los Angeles (see Figure 1.2). West Valley Area serves the communities of
Encino, Lake Balboa, Reseda, Tarzana, as well as portions of Northridge and Sherman
Oaks (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012i).
These areas of the community are apportioned into smaller areas, which are
referred to as Basic Car Areas. West Valley Area is made up of six Basic Car Areas.
The six Basic Car Areas are: 10A3, 10A17, 10A21, 10A39, 10A83, and 10A99. For a
complete list and location of each Basic Car Area, see Appendix “C.” Each Basic Car
Area is assigned a senior lead officer. Although only a police officer in rank, senior lead
officers are, in essence, the officer-in-charge of a Basic Car Area, and provide a valuable
link between the department and the community that helps unite the LAPD with the
communities it serves (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012j).

14
Figure 1.2. Location of West Valley Area in the San Fernando Valley

Source: Los Angeles Times (2012).
The Basic Car Areas are numbered, which correspond with the patrol unit radio
designation. For example, as previously noted, there are twenty-one geographic Areas
within the LAPD. The corresponding number for West Valley area is the numerical
number “10.” The service identification letter “A” represents a two-person Basic Car
unit assigned to a particular Basic Car Area. The numeric number listed after the radio
call code is the Basic Car designation. Thus, when a radio call is generated for police
emergency response, the communications dispatcher will start the transmission by saying,
“Ten Adam Three respond to…” (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).

15
West Valley Area encompasses approximately thirty-four square miles and serves
a population of nearly 194,000 people with an average 250 sworn police officers
9
and
twenty-five civilian personnel
10
(Los Angeles Police Department, 2010a). See Table 1.3
for a complete listing of police personnel assigned to West Valley Area during the study.
Table 1.3. Police Personnel Assigned to West Valley Area 2009-2011
Position 2009 2010 2011 Three Year Average
Captain 2 2 2 2
Lieutenant 6 6 6 6
Sergeant 31 31 27 30
Detective 42 42 40 41
Police Officer 168 167 176 170
Civilian Personnel 31 23 20 25
Total 280 271 271 274
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009d, 2010b, 2011a).
As indicated in Table 1.3, the deployment of sworn personnel remained consistent
throughout the study, whereas the deployment of civilian personnel was reduced.
Civilian personnel play a crucial role in the crime reduction process. When civilian
personnel positions are eliminated due to retirements, furloughs or budget cuts, sworn
police officers are then tasked with performing those duties normally reserved for civilian
personnel, which in turn impacts the basic service delivery system provided to the
community.
West Valley Area is predominantly a property crimes division, and burglary theft
from motor vehicle (BTFV) is the most reported crime. According to the UCR program

9
Sworn police officers include the following ranks: captain, lieutenant, sergeant, detective and police
officer.
10
These numbers fluctuate each deployment period.

16
annual report “Crime in the United States,” the majority of Part I crimes across the nation
are property crimes.
11
These nonviolent offenses include burglary, larceny and motor
vehicle theft (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012).
Each year, as indicated in Table 1.2, community members, not only in West
Valley, but also throughout Los Angeles and the United States, lose millions of dollars as
a result of these crimes. Although West Valley Area is very much a diverse division,
both in terms of ethnicity and wealth, the property crimes that occur are not isolated to
only one location of the division. Rather, these types of crimes occur in all locations of
the division.
Although violent crime does occur in West Valley Area, the numbers are not
nearly as large as property crimes; however, they still have an impact on the overall Part I
crime rate. The majority of violent crimes that do occur in West Valley Area are gang
related; however, West Valley would not be considered, by LAPD standards, to have a
“gang problem” in the division.
There are nine documented gangs, as noted in Figure 1.3, in West Valley Area:
“Original West Valley Gangsters,” “Reseda Southside,” “Reseda Westside,” “West
Valley Crazy’s,” “Pacoima Criminals,” “Bad Boys,” “Logan Heights,” “Haskell Locos”
and “Gangsters Causing Havoc.” The majority of gang problems occur in the middle of
the division, where West Valley Crazy’s, along with Reseda Southside and Westside,

11
Per the UCR Handbook (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), Part I crimes are broken down into two
categories: violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary,
grand theft auto [GTA], BTFV and personal/other theft).

17
claim territory. Coincidentally, these same areas report the highest origin of violent
crime in the division.
Figure 1.3. West Valley Area Gang Territories 2011

Literature Review
An examination of previous research pertaining to CompStat; processes of
organizational change; mythologies and culture; human capability and organizational
structure; and, organizational learning, were the topics of the literature review. These
subjects are separated into individual chapters (two through six), and each chapter builds
upon the last, for ease of understanding to the reader.
Given the nature of the problem, the literature review focuses on examining the
fundamental elements of the CompStat process in order to gain a full and complete
understanding of this performance management system. We will trace the early history

18
of the system, from its origins on a napkin, to how it became one of the most popular
policing reforms to have emerged in the United States. The literature review will
demonstrate how the four principles of CompStat have proven to be extremely successful
toward the reduction of crime, but how the systems design, specifically in terms of its
leadership, has created a culture a fear through interrogation and intimidation.
The research will focus particular attention on changing the confrontational,
interrogation style of management, which currently exists in the CompStat process, with
a new, positive style of leadership, based on an understanding of sound, general
principles of behavior centered around a set of six core, universal values. Tools of
leadership will be examined with particular emphasis on systems that, when used
correctly, will drive behavior toward the creation of a positive police organization, which
in turn helps build a positive society.
Human capability and organizational structure, as it pertains to Stratified Systems
Theory, will be explored. Emphasis will be placed on putting the correct people in role,
based upon their mental processing ability,
12
knowledge, experience, skills and desire, in
order to demonstrate how working at the correct organizational level increases
productivity, lessens stress and improves employee morale. All of which leads to the
creation of a positive organization.

12
Mental processing ability is a person’s ability to make order out of the chaotic environment in which
humans live out their lives, to pattern and construe the world in terms of scale and time, and it is this
processing ability that will determine the amount and complexity of information that we can process in
doing so (Macdonald et al., 2006). This topic will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 5.

19
The research will further explore the history and mythologies
13
of CompStat in
order to understand how the system has created negative cultures in many of today’s
police organizations. Through a series of interviews conducted during the research, three
mythologies surrounding the CompStat system were identified. We will explore these
mythologies and provide ways in which Intersect Policing can assist organizational
leaders change these mythologies and create positive police cultures based on an
understanding of sound, general principles of behavior.
The literature review will conclude by exploring the organizational learning
process. Particular emphasis will be placed on the subject of double-loop learning, and
how bringing all stakeholders in the crime reduction process together can create a
“Medici Effect,”
14
which equates to breakthrough ideas and strategies toward the
reduction of fear and the incidence of crime.
Methodology
The research included both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The design of
the research included observations by the author as an embedded participant observer,
statistical surveys, interviews with subject matter experts, and focus groups with chiefs,
assistant chiefs, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, detectives, police officers and civilian
employees from the following police agencies: Alhambra Police Department, El Cerrito
Police Department, Gardena Police Department, LAPD, Los Angeles County Sherriff’s

13
In terms of this research, mythologies are defined as the underlying assumption and current belief as to
what is positive and valued behavior and what behavior is negatively valued (Macdonald et al., 2006). This
topic will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 3.
14
The “Medici Effect” is what Johansson (2004) referred to as the proliferation of new ideas that come
from the creative thinking of people from different backgrounds and cultures for the betterment of
themselves and others.

20
Department, NYPD, Sacramento Police Department, San Francisco Police Department,
and the Ventura Police Department.
A literature review was also conducted, which drew upon principle texts,
academic journals, technical reports, dissertations, Web Internet searches, and magazine
and newspaper articles.
Statistics were provided from a variety of sources. These sources include the
LAPD; U.S. Census Bureau; U.S. Department of Labor; U.S. DOJ; principle texts;
research journals; Internet sites; and, survey questionnaires provided to law enforcement
officers, civilian law enforcement personnel and community members.
Limitations of the Study
The most significant limitation of the study is that it is essentially a single case
study based in the West Valley Area of the LAPD. The success of Intersect Policing in
the first year led to a request from Devonshire Area, a neighboring LAPD division north
of West Valley Area, to try Intersect Policing. Devonshire Area was not able to adopt all
aspects of the system; however, through the use of daily Intersection meetings, it helped
them to reduce crime in their division.
The LAPD, however, is made up of twenty-one geographic Areas where each
Area has its own unique crime problems and cultures. In essence, each geographic Area
is the equivalent of a mid-sized city police department. Implementing the system into
other geographic Areas would not only answer the question as to if the system could
achieve the purpose of law enforcement by reducing the incidence of crime in other parts

21
of the city, it would also provide insight into whether the success brought about by the
Intersect Policing model was behaviorally driven or systems driven.
The quantitative data used in this study comes from the UCR program, which is
the official keeper of records in terms of crime statistics in the United States. Throughout
this research we identified differences in overall crime numbers being reported. These
discrepancies are individually noted throughout the study. The LAPD attempts to be as
accurate as possible in turning in its figures, but the basic data is developed by police
personnel who can, and probably do, make mistakes. This is, however, the best available
and most widely used data when studying crime.
This project was carried out as “action research.” The author created the Intersect
Policing model and put it into practice in West Valley Area. Obviously the author
wanted this study to succeed and placed a lot of time and effort into the study; thus,
leading by example. Whether or not there would be the level of success achieved in this
case when others are using the system still needs to be tested.
Terminology
Throughout this research we will be comparing various police departments that
utilize the CompStat system. The majority of this work will center on the NYPD and the
LAPD. Although there are some common definitions that are universal to the majority of
police departments, including the NYPD and the LAPD, many are not. For this reason,
there could be some confusion; thus, a glossary of terms has been included for ease of the
reader.

22
Organization of the Study
Chapter 1 has presented the overview of the study, which was explained under the
following headings: Preview, Background, Brief history of CompStat, Statement of the
Problem, Purpose of the Research, Significance of the Study, Setting, Literature Review,
Methodology, Limitations of the Study and Organization of the Study.
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth look into the CompStat system. In this chapter we
will explore the origins of the CompStat system and trace how this performance
management system evolved from “Charts of the Future” into a world-renowned
paradigm for reducing the fear and incidence of crime. In addition, the four principles of
CompStat will be examined in order to understand how the process works and creates a
system of accountability at all levels of the organization.
Chapter 3 will explore the process of organization change and how the creation of
a positive police organization, which fulfills the needs of those working within the
organization, can help to create a positive society. In order to create such organizations,
organizational leaders need to have a basic understanding of the human social processes,
which includes an understanding of mythologies and culture, in order to better understand
how our behavior and the actions of others are viewed along the essential core values
continuum.
Chapter 4 examines the mythologies surrounding the CompStat system and how
these mythologies have impacted the culture of police departments. The study will
attempt to explain how these negative mythologies were developed, and provide insight

23
into how Intersect Policing can assist police departments reach a state of dissonance in
order to change the culture.
Chapter 5 will take an in-depth look at Human Capability and Organizational
Structure. While CompStat has proven to be a useful tool in improving police
effectiveness, it always operates in an organizational setting, which may or may not be
optimal. This chapter will explore some theories of human capability that allow better
placement of people in roles, as well as designing productive organizational relationships
and structure to improve police departments ability to ensure the safety and security of
people and property.
Chapter 6 explores the topic of Organizational Learning and the Medici Effect.
This chapter will examine the Medici Effect and how the creation of an Intersection
brings various stakeholders in the crime-fighting mission together to collaborate and
create innovative and practical solutions to the myriad of crime problems plaguing the
community. In addition, the topics of single and double-loop learning will be discussed,
and how police leaders need to be critical thinkers in the crime-fighting strategy,
constantly asking the question “why” is this problem occurring.
Chapter 7 outlines the Intersect Policing system and provides an in-depth look
into the system. In order to bring clarity to the reader, the chapter will be broken into five
separate sections: Origins of the System, The Intersection, The Daily Intersection
Meeting, Three Steps to Crime Reduction, and CompStat Preparation and Presentation.
Real-life examples will be used to provide clarity to the subject matter; however, no

24
names, case numbers, personal information or any other information that could be
considered confidential or otherwise will be presented in this research.
Chapter 8 consists of the overall results from the study, which included both
quantitative and qualitative data and analysis, in order to find if the Intersect Policing
system achieved the following: an overall reduction in Part I crime

that equaled or
exceeded that of the LAPD average for the same extraction period and to determine if it
improved employee morale.
Chapter 9 contains a summary of the findings from the research. The chapter will
be broken down into the following three elements: Lessons Learned, Future Research and
Conclusions Drawn from the Findings.

25
Chapter 2

COMPSTAT
Introduction
Managing, directing and controlling a twenty-first century law enforcement
organization is a complex and demanding job (Shane, 2004, 2007). In today’s dynamic
environment of public administration, police executives, specifically the chief of police,
are tasked with a myriad of responsibilities ranging from controlling the budget,
managing human resources, deployment of personnel and dealing with political issues –
mayors, city councils, etc. In addition to these responsibilities, police executives are also
expected to control the human phenomenon known as crime (Shane, 2004, 2007).
For years, criminologists and academia posited the police did not factor into the
equation of reducing or preventing the fear and incidence of crime (Bratton & Knobler,
1998; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Shane, 2004, 2007). The reason, according to academia,
was the root causes which increased crime in society were social injustice, racism and
poverty, all of which where beyond the control of the police (Kelling & Sousa, 2001). In
theory, it was believed that the police could do little to reduce or prevent the fear and
incidence of crime (Shane, 2004, 2007).
In the context of public administration, for years, police were viewed strictly as
public administrators, and their role was to enforce the laws set forth by policy makers
(Wilson, 1989). Since the police were not directly involved in the policy making process

26
which, according to academia, had a direct impact on reducing the root causes of crime,
in essence, it was assumed the police did not really matter (Kelling & Sousa, 2001).
According to William J. Bratton, former NYPD Police Commissioner
15
and
LAPD Chief of Police,
16
“Cops Count” (Bratton, 2011; Bratton & Malinowski, 2008) and
when properly led, well-trained and sufficiently equipped, police agencies can
substantially reduce the level of crime, restore a sense of security, and enhance the
quality of life for those who live, work and visit their communities (Bratton &
Malinowski, 2008; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988). Under Bratton’s leadership, Wilson’s
theory was challenged when the NYPD introduced one of the most innovative,
deceptively simple, and economical means to controlling crime and disorder – a
management process known as CompStat (Shane, 2004, 2007).
Since the inception of CompStat, statistics compiled by the United States DOJ
(2012) have shown a significant reduction in crime throughout the United States. The
reason for this decline is still being debated (Blumstein & Wallman, 2000; Braga, 2001;
Bratton et al., 1997; Geoghegan, 2011; Green, 1999; Kelling, 1995; Kelling & Bratton,
1998; Levitt, 2004; Moore, 2003; Silverman, 1999; Smith & Bratton, 2001; Spelman,
2000; Starbuck, 2004, 2005; Wilson, 2011). Although we cannot pinpoint all the
possible causes, the introduction of the CompStat system, first in NYC and then
spreading to other urban police departments, worldwide, appears to have made a
significant contribution to this trend (Fordham, 2009; Godown, 2009; Shane, 2004, 2007;
Smith & Bratton, 2001; Starbuck, 2004, 2005; Walsh, 2001; Weisburd et al., 2003).

15
1994-1996 (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).
16
2002-2009 (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009a; Rubin, 2009).

27
Background
CompStat was introduced in 1994 by the NYPD (Bratton & Knobler, 1998;
Eterno & Silverman, 2010a, 2010b; Giuliani & Kurson, 2002; Godown, 2009; Maple &
Mitchell, 1999; New York City Police Department, 1994, 1997; Rosenfeld et al., 2005;
Shane 2004, 2007; Vito et al., 2005; Weisburd et al., 2001; 2003). According to the
literature, CompStat is one of the most popular policing reforms to have emerged in the
United States (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Rosenbaum, 1994; Silverman, 1999; Silverman
& O’Connell, 1999; Weisburd & Braga, 2006).
Although there are many definitions, CompStat is short for “Computer Statistics”
(Bratton et al., 1997; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Godown,
2009; Kania, 2004; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; New York City Police Department, 1994;
Sherman, 1998; Silverman, 1999; Vito et al., 2005; Walsh, 2001; Willis et al., 2003;
2007). The “comp” stands for “Computer,” just as the “stat” stands for “Statistics”
(Kania, 2004, p. 82).
CompStat has been acclaimed as a new police management paradigm, which has
revolutionized the practice of law enforcement management (Henry, 2002; Maas, 1998;
McDonald et al., 2001; Vito et al., 2005; Walsh, 2001). In 1996, CompStat was awarded
the prestigious Innovations in American Government Award from the Ford Foundation
and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (Moore, 2003;
Vito et al. 2005; Walsh & Vito, 2004). However, despite all the accolades and attention
CompStat has received, it has also been greatly misunderstood (Henry, 2003).

28
Performance Management System
CompStat is not a state-of-the-art computer software program, but rather a method
of management accountability built on a philosophy of crime control (Godown, 2009).
The roots of CompStat can be traced to the theory of performance management (Bratton
& Malinowski, 2008; Moore & Braga, 2003; Shane, 2007), “a systematic process for
improving organizational performance by developing the performance of individuals and
teams” (Armstrong, 2006, p. 10), which gained much attention during the Clinton
Administration
17
(Artley, 2001; Artley et al., 2001; Artley & Stroh, 2001; Beschen et al.,
2001; Gee et al., 2001; Jordan et al., 2001).
CompStat is a goal-oriented, strategic management system, highly focused on
reducing serious crime by decentralizing decision making to middle managers operating
out of districts, holding these managers accountable for performance, and increasing the
organization’s capacity to respond to crime (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; DeLorenzi et al.,
2006; Godown, 2009; Henry, 2002; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Moore, 2003; Nagy &
Podolny, 2008; Neyroud, 2008; Shane 2004, 2007; Vito et al., 2005; Walsh & Vito, 2004;
Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2007).
When viewed from the narrowest perspective, “CompStat can be viewed as a
technical system that collects a particular set of statistics providing quantitative measures
of demands for police services and levels of police activity” (Moore, 2003, p. 470).

17
1993-2001 (Hamilton, 2007).

29
However, when viewed from a broader perspective, CompStat is a “technical and
managerial system that embeds the technical system for the collection and distribution of
performance information in a broader managerial system designed to focus the
organization as a whole, and a subset of mangers who are relied on to exercise leadership
in meeting the organization’s objectives, on the task that the organization faces” (Moore,
2003, p. 470). Regardless of the perspective you choose to view CompStat within, the
system charts the course of direction needed to obtain the organization’s performance
measured goals.
Charts of the Future
At the time CompStat was introduced, Bratton was Commissioner of the NYPD.
Since that time, most authors, researchers and police professionals have synonymously
linked the two together. However, CompStat was not conceived from the mind of
Bratton, but rather from his Deputy Police Commissioner Jack Maple (Bratton &
Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999).
Jack Maple was an aggressive, sharply dressed undercover NYC transit police
detective, who rose from the subways of Times Square and achieved the rank of
lieutenant (Dussault, 1999; Maple & Mitchell, 1999). During his tenure with the NYC
Transit Police Department,
18
Maple started a campaign to rid the subways of NYC from
violent crime, specifically the crime of robbery (Maple & Mitchell, 1999). A student of
military strategy and history, Maple often spoke about how Britain would map out their
progress on a war table in order to attack incoming invaders (Maple & Mitchell, 1999;

18
1970-1993 (Maple & Mitchell, 1999).

30
Martin, 2001). It was this type of reflection that inspired Maple to create “Charts of the
Future” (Maple & Mitchell, 1999).
In order to identify the dates, times and locations where crimes were occurring, as
well as forecasting the direction criminals were migrating, Maple thought back to the
time of the “cave dweller,” who had “scratched lines onto an ox bone to mark the passage
of time” trying to “anticipate the seasonal migration of bison, reindeer, or salmon”
(Maple & Mitchel, 1999, p. 83). Utilizing his metaphoric rock and tablet, Maple’s Charts
of the Future, which covered fifty-five feet of wall space from floor to ceiling, pinpointed
the movement of criminal activity with never before seen accuracy for that time period
(Dussault, 1999; Maple & Mitchell, 1999).
These Charts of the Future helped reduce the crime problem, specifically the
crime of robbery, within the NYC subway system and were the impetus to the CompStat
mapping system. In addition, these charts caught the eye of Bratton who, at that time,
was the Chief of the NYC Transit Police Department.
19

Reducing the Fear and Incidence of Crime
When Bratton was appointed Commissioner of the NYPD, he hired Maple to be
his Deputy Commissioner. Maple’s primary responsibility was to reduce the fear and
incidence of crime in NYC (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999). A
student of strategy, and a renowned tactician, Maple was eager to take on the challenge of

19
1990-1991 (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999).

31
ridding NYC of its crime problem. However, unlike the NYC Transit Police Department,
the NYPD was an organization entrenched in bureaucracy (Cohen, 1980; Nagy &
Podolny, 2008; Manning, 2001a; Silverman, 1999; Willis et al., 2004).
Maple understood that his greatest challenge would not be the crime problem on
the street, but rather getting those inside the organization to take ownership of the crime
problem. As Maple explained, “I understood what was wrong…but I didn’t yet know
how to fix it” (Maple & Mitchell, 1999, p. 28).
The answer came to Maple while sitting in a restaurant with Bratton (Bratton &
Knobler, 1998; DiGiacomo et al., 2011; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Martin, 2001). The
restaurant was called “Elaine’s,” and was considered one of the top “hotspots” in NYC
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998; DiGiacomo et al., 2011).
Maple was amazed at how much information Elaine, the owner of the
establishment, knew about her business; particularly how she was able to keep track of
every detail associated with the “bottom line” on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis
(Maple & Mitchell, 1999). Observing Elaine from “the balcony” (Heifetz & Linsky,
2002), Maple opined that precinct commanders should have the same knowledge of their
commands as Elaine had for her business (Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Schick, 2004). It
was at that moment all of the pieces came together. Maple knew exactly what course of
direction was needed and must be implemented in the NYPD.
While seated at table eight (DiGiacomo et al., 2011), Maple doodled on a napkin
four basic elements to reduce crime (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; DiGiacomo et al., 2011;
Martin, 2001). The four elements were as follows (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 224):

32
1. Where are the crimes happening? Put them on a map. What are
the times by day of the week, by time of day?
2. Here are the crimes, you’ve got them on a map. Let’s coordinate
the efforts between detectives and plainclothes and get there fast
so we can catch the crooks.
3. What are we going to do once we get there? Are we doing
decoys? Are we doing buy-and-bust operations? Are we doing
warrant enforcement? Quality-of-life enforcement? What works?
4. Is it working? The precinct commander is in charge of the plan to
reduce crime in his or her area; is that plan being pushed forward?
Did they know where the crimes were happening? Were the
efforts coordinated? Were the tactics effective? Was crime going
down?
On that napkin Maple had captured the essence of all the strategies to reduce the
fear and incidence of crime (Bratton & Knobler, 2008). The four strategies were
captured in the following four principles: accurate and timely intelligence, rapid
deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment, which became the
cornerstone of the CompStat model (Bratton et al., 1997; Bratton & Knobler, 1998;
Bratton & Malinowski, 2008; Fordham, 2009; Godown, 2009; Maple & Mitchell, 1999;
Shane, 2004, 2007; Walsh, 2001; Walsh & Henry, 2008; Walsh & Vito, 2004).
Four Principles of CompStat
The CompStat philosophy consists of these four basic principles: accurate and
timely intelligence; rapid deployment of personnel and resources; effective tactics; and,
relentless follow-up and assessment. These four principles synergistically work together
to enhance productivity, create accountability, and reduce the fear and incidence of
crime. As Bratton explained in his book, Turnaround (1998), these four principles were
the concepts on which the turnaround of NYPD was built.

33
Accurate and Timely Intelligence
The first step in the CompStat crime reduction process is the obtainment of
accurate and timely intelligence. According to Bratton (1998, p. 224), “If the police are
to respond effectively to crime and to criminal events, officers at all levels have to have
accurate knowledge of when particular types of crimes are occurring, how and where the
crimes are being committed, and who the criminals are.” Having a full understanding of
the “who, what, when and where” allows police to effectively respond and eliminate
crime problems. As Bratton explained (1998, p. 224), “The likelihood of an effective
police response to crime increases proportionally as the accuracy of this intelligence
increases.”
CompStat is an information driven, managerial process, that depends on accurate
and timely intelligence (Shane 2004, 2007; Walsh & Vito, 2004). At the core of each
activity is the use of computer technology, which gathers the information, processes the
data, and provides statistical information in the forms of reports, graphs, charts, and maps
(Godown, 2009; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; New York City Police Department, 1994).
The information provided is gathered from a variety of sources, which include:
calls for service, field interview reports, prisoner debriefings, police reports, UCR
records, and other sources of information that are normally maintained by agencies’
information technology sections (Godown, 2009; Shane 2004, 2007). If the information
provided to the system were inaccurate, the entire analysis and decision-making process
would be tainted. Thus, officers and supervisors reviewing the data must take the time to
ensure its accuracy.

34
The initial police report has various names ranging from an investigative report,
criminal report, to a preliminary investigative report, dependent upon the police agency
being surveyed,
20
as being the primary document for providing information to the
CompStat computer system. “These reports have to be completed accurately in a timely
manner by first responders, and then the information has to be transferred to the agency’s
records management system by data entry personnel before it can be used in the
CompStat process” (Godown, 2009, p. 3).
Accurate intelligence reflects what actually occurred at a given place and time;
thus, supervisory inspection and approval can authenticate accuracy (Shane 2004, 2007).
The LAPD is a system driven organization, and has such a system in place to ensure
accuracy. Prior to an officer submitting a police report, a supervisor reviews the
document to ensure its accuracy. After the document has been reviewed, the supervisor
reviewing places their signature and serial number
21
on the report, signifying the report
has been reviewed (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a). This quality control
mechanism ensures the department possesses crime reports that are as accurate as
humanly possible before publishing or acting upon them (Shane 2004, 2007).
Records personnel who receive the completed reports enter the information into
the agencies records management system. The person entering the information completes
a secondary review of the report to ensure its accuracy. “If attention is not paid to this

20
Police agencies across the nation, and around the world, have various names for their primary crime
reporting mechanism.
21
A serial number is the employee’s identification number within the organization.

35
process, the proverbial ‘garbage in, garbage out’ dilemma will taint the analysis and
decision-making processes” (Godown, 2009, p. 3).
Effective Tactics
In the words of Jack Maple, “Nobody ever got in trouble because crime numbers
on their watch went up…trouble arose only if commanders didn’t know why the numbers
were up or didn’t have a plan to address the problems” (Maple & Mitchell, 1999, p. 33).
As soon as command officers are in possession of accurate and timely intelligence, they
are responsible, and held accountable, for developing and implementing a plan of action,
which includes effective strategies and tactics to eliminate the identified crime problem
(Godown, 2009; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988; Shane, 2004, 2007; Walsh & Vito, 2004).
Effective tactics are prudently designed to bring about the desired result of crime
reduction, and they are developed after analyzing the information gleaned from accurate
and timely intelligence (New York Police Department, 1994). As Jack Maple (1999)
explained in his book, The Crime Fighter, “Effective tactics are any tactics that reduce
crime or improve the quality of life” (p. 32). To avoid merely displacing crime and
quality of life problems, and in order to bring about permanent change, these tactics must
be comprehensible, flexible, and adaptable to the shifting trends identified and monitored
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998; New York Police Department, 1994).
Commanding officers need to devise effective tactics that deal with as much of
the problem as possible (Shane, 2004, 2007), utilizing all available resources at their
disposal (New York City Police Department, 1994). For tactics to be effective, those
responsible for crime reduction must direct specific resources at all aspects of a problem,

36
including existing police resources, as well as resources from the available local, county,
state and/or federal capabilities (Godown, 2009). See Table 2.1 for a list of various city,
county, state and federal resources available.
Table 2.1. Various City, County, State and Federal Resources
Local County State Federal
Housing
Authority
County Police State Police Coast Guard
Sanitation/Public
Works
Department
Prosecutor’s/District
Attorney’s Office
Attorney General’s
Office
FBI, DEA, ATF,
IRS, INS,
22
EPA
Health and
Human Resources
County Sheriff’s
Office
Department of
Corrections (DOC)
Marshal’s Service
Code
Enforcement
Traffic Engineering National Guard Customs Service
Parks and
Recreation
Department
Welfare (Public
Assistance)
Probation
Department
Social Security
Administration
Public Utilities
Company
Substance
Abuse/Mental
Health/Aids
Alcoholic
Beverage Control
(ABC)
Postal
Inspectors/Postal
Service
Fire Department Homeless Outreach Division of Parole Secret Service
Board of
Education
Public Works
Department
Department of
Community
Affairs
U.S. Attorney’s
Office
Economic
Development
Corp
Division of Youth
Services
Department of
Motor Vehicles
(DMV)
Bureau of Prisons
Source: Shane (2007). What Every Chief Executive Should Know: Using Data to
Measure Police Performance, p. 198, as quoted from McDonald (2002), Managing
Police Operations, p. 17.

22
On March 1, 2002, after the Homeland Security Act of 2002 came into law, the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was renamed the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (CIS), which became part of the larger United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).

37
Utilizing the CompStat process, police agencies “can be armed with vital
information regarding emerging crime trends or patterns that enable the creation of
effective tactics and a proactive strategic police response, during stand-alone efforts or in
partnership with other community or government stakeholders” (Godown, 2009, p. 4).
For example, in the case of drug-sales emanating from a fast-food
restaurant that is open 24-hours, the directed patrol strategy must be
augmented by undercover operations (buy-bust operations; street
surveillance), inspections from the Code Enforcement, Fire
Department, and Health Department. If the problem persists, then the
commander can then seek civil enforcement (permanently closing the
establishment since it is an identified nuisance) through the city’s
corporation council. Finally, the police department, through the
municipal council, may seek legislation to regulate twenty-four [sic]
establishments more stringently, such as mandating specific closing
times (Shane, 2007, p. 198).
In order for strategies and tactics to be effective, those responsible for the
deployment of police resources must direct specific police resources, in conjunction with
external resources, toward identified crime problems (Kelling & Moore, 1988;
McDonnell, 2009; Moore et al., 1988; Shane, 2004, 2007).
Whatever strategies commanders eventually devise, CompStat can
provide the impetus for creative mind-mapping sessions where they
can develop responses and gather and commit resources. By having
commanders commit their resources, no delay arises and no excuse
exists for not developing effective tactics. CompStat breeds this
integrated approach, which reflects a departure from the traditional
model of policing where most elements of the department operate
independently (Shane 2004, pp. 15-16). See Table 2.2.

38
Table 2.2. Traditional vs. Performance Model
Traditional VS. Performance Model
Output Outcome
Incidents Problems
Summary Results Feedback
Reaction Prevention
Control of Serious Crime Public Safety
Accountability for Rules Accountability for Problems Solved
Individual attribute-based performance
Evaluation
Unit or agency performance management
Intuition Data
Isolation Integration
Source: Shane (2007). What Every Chief Executive Should Know: Using Data to
Measure Police Performance, p. 199, as quoted from McDonald (2002), Managing
Police Operations, pp. 78-82.
Rapid Deployment
Since CompStat utilizes computer technology to identify patterns, clusters, trends
and hot spots, police personnel can rapidly deploy on a problem and eradicate the issue at
the core of its existence (Braga, 2001, 2005; Braga & Bond, 2008; Manning, 2001b,
2008; Moore, 2003; Nasar & Fisher, 1993; Ratcliff, 2003; Townsley & Pease, 2002;
Weisburd, 2005; Weisburd & Eck, 2004).
As Bratton explained in his book, Turnaround, “Once a crime pattern has been
identified, an array of personnel and other necessary resources are promptly deployed to
deal with it” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 224). Thus, as soon as operational
commanders develop strategies and tactics, which focus resources on events that have the
most negative impact on the community, it is imperative to deploy them as rapidly as
possible (Godown, 2009; Shane, 2004, 2007; Walsh & Vito, 2004).

39
The fact of the matter remains there are not enough police resources, in terms of
personnel, to place an officer on every street corner in every community. For far too
long, police departments have been driven by calls for service and responded with limited
resources in a reactive manner (Bratton et al., 1997; McDonnell, 2009; Schick, 2004).
“Therefore, it is imperative to deploy to where crime is happening now” (Godown, 2009,
p. 5). CompStat strives to identify emerging problems, patterns and clusters in as close to
real-time as possible. This allows police organizations to rapidly deploy resources to the
problem locations before the problem escalates to a larger issue.
“Although some tactical plans might involve only patrol personnel, for example,
experience has proved that the most effective plans require personnel from several units”
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 224). In terms of the LAPD, “…experience has shown that
the most effective plans require several different units working together, and the best
results occur when patrol, investigators, and support personnel bring their capabilities to
focus in a coordinated effort” (Schick, 2004, p. 6). A viable, comprehensive response to
crime or quality of life problem generally demands that patrol personnel, investigators,
and support personnel use their expertise and resources in a coordinated effort (Bratton &
Knobler, 1998; New York City Police Department, 1994).
When used correctly in a collaborative manner, Area captains have a sufficient
number of personnel to focus on the problems identified. “To gain the upper hand,
commanders need to set their plan in motion rapidly and decisively” (Shane, 2004, p. 18).
The use of rapid deployment increases the “likelihood of affecting a problem before it
shifts to another day, time, or area” (Godown, 2009, p. 5).

40
Relentless Follow-Up and Assessment
The majority of police agencies who utilize CompStat find this principle,
relentless follow-up and assessment, the most onerous and time-consuming; however, it
is also found to be the most important (Shane, 2004, 2007). As is the case in any
problem-solving situation, rigorous follow-up and assessment is essential to ensure the
desired results are actually being achieved (Bratton & Knobler, 1998), and to learn from
both success and failure.
An essential element in any operational plan is the need to critically assess the
impact, if any, the implementation of the plan had on the targeted goals (Godown, 2009).
“It is foolish for commanders to design and implement an action plan and trust that others
have carried it out without witnessing the results firsthand” (Shane, 2007, p. 201). As
Jack Maple explained in his book, The Crime Fighter, “You can only expect what you
inspect” (Maple & Mitchell, 1999, p. 185).
This evaluation component permits police agencies to assess the viability of
particular tactical responses and to incorporate knowledge gained into subsequent tactical
development efforts (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). According to Bratton, “By knowing
how well a particular tactic worked on a particular crime or quality of life problem, and
by knowing which specific elements of the tactical response worked most effectively, we
are better able to construct and implement effective responses to similar problems in the
future” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 225).
According to the NYPD, as quoted by Shane (2004), some of the follow-up
methods commanders can use include: touring the confines of their precinct, also known

41
as “management by walking around” (Peters & Waterman, 1982; Phillips, 1992);
reviewing incident reports, as well as unusual incident reports, on a daily basis; talking
often with uniformed personnel about the issues; speaking frequently with the precinct
detective squad supervisor and the detectives about conditions and their investigations;
and, analyzing the CompStat reports for individual performance and performance
compared with other precincts, as well as trends and patterns (Shane, 2004; New York
City Police Department, 1994).
The essence of CompStat is “managing for results,” building a police organization
that can dramatically reduce the fear and incidence of crime (New York City Police
Department, 1996). Thus, success is measured by the absence of crime. The bottom line
with the CompStat process is that it’s driven by results, and everything in the process
must be reviewed and evaluated by the results achieved (Godown, 2009).
Through relentless follow-up and assessment, CompStat provides the opportunity
to continuously review and improve. In addition, it reaffirms responsibility and
ownership of the crime problems within the command structure. Most importantly, “the
follow-up and assessment process enhances managerial accountability and effectiveness
because it lets agency executives and commanders at all levels, assess their results and
change tactics and deployment on what they see and know” (Walsh, 2001, p. 355).

42
Four Levels of CompStat
CompStat evolved as a means to increase the flow of information between police
executives and operational commanders within the NYPD (Bratton & Knobler, 1998;
Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Vito et al., 2005; Walsh, 2001). These weekly, face-to-face
meetings between executive staff and operational commanders allowed all parties
involved in the crime reduction process to discuss emerging crime patterns, strategies
deployed, and the results obtained (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Moore, 2003; Shane, 2004,
2007; Vito et al., 2005; Walsh, 2001).
During the weekly CompStat meeting, divisional commanders are required to
have a strong, working knowledge of the issues in their precinct and, in turn, are held
publicly accountable for this information in an open forum (Bratton & Knobler, 1998;
Buntin, 1999; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Moore & Braga, 2003; Weisburd et al., 2003,
2004). Although Maple alluded to the fact that no one ever lost their job because crime
increased (Maple & Mitchell, 1999), some precinct commanders were reassigned to other
positions for not having the right answers (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). In fact, during the
first year of the CompStat process, Bratton replaced three-fourths of his precinct
commanders, because of their inability to rise to the demands of this managerial system
(Heskett, 1999; Walsh, 2001).
23

Since the meetings were held in a public forum, the CompStat process became
good public theatre, where divisional commanding officers found themselves center stage

23
During Bratton’s first year in office he replaced nearly one-third of the LAPD command staff. Twelve
command officers of the rank of captain and above were promoted and twenty-five were transferred,
including at least two who were reassigned to less desirable positions (Blankstein & Winton, 2003).

43
being interrogated and, at times, ridiculed in front of a live audience (Firman, 2003;
Moore, 2003; Weisburd et al., 2003). Many members of the NYPD, including members
of the executive command staff (Buntin, 1999), believed Maple was unforgiving with
precinct commanders whom he believed were not providing sustained attention to a
specific crime problem (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).
For example, if a problem identified during a previous CompStat meeting
continued into the following week, and Maple thought the precinct commander
responsible for the problem was not responding, Maple, according to Bratton, would
explode (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). During those sessions in which Maple
was “fired up,” the precinct commander being inspected would be responsible for
answering the following barrage of questions (Buntin, 1999, p. 20):
I want to know why those shootings are still happening in that
housing project! What have we done to stop it? Did we hand out
fliers to everybody? Did we put Crime Stoppers tips in every rec
room and every apartment? Did we run a warrant check on every
address at every project, and did we relentlessly pursue those
individuals? What is our uniform deployment there? What are the
hours of the day, the days of the week that we are deployed? Are we
deployed in a radio car, on foot, on bicycle? Are they doing interior
searches? Are they checking the rooftops? How do we know they’re
doing it? What level of supervision is there?... What are we doing
with parole violators?... Of the 964 people on parole in the 75
th

Precinct, do we know the different administrative restrictions on each
one, so when we interview them we can hold their heads? And if not,
why?
While police officials insisted that some precinct commanders were punished, not
for trying something that didn’t work, but for not trying, some commanders found the

44
“barrage” of pointed questions at CompStat to be not just stressful, but down right
threatening (Buntin, 1999).
According to John Miller, Bratton’s former NYPD Deputy Commissioner of
Public Information,
24
he disagreed with the manner in which Maple treated precinct
commanders. Miller believed Maple went too far by “going after people in the public
forum of CompStat,” when he could have said, “Well, I’d like to see a better answer on
that next time” (Buntin, 1999, p. 21).
Although Miller had spoken with Maple about his aggressive, humiliating
behavior toward command staff officers, Maple was un-phased by the criticism and
continued his relentless pursuit of the answers. On one occasion, Miller recalled Maple
responded: “Johnny, I don’t have time…I don’t have time to be nice…These guys have
to know that when they get up there, unless they’re batting home runs or doubles or at
least singles, I’m going to come after them” (Buntin, 1999, p. 21).
When the CompStat system was originally designed, Bratton envisioned the
process to have four levels, which would radiate from the top-down, and encompass the
entire organization (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Walsh, 2001;
Walsh & Vito, 2004). It was Bratton’s belief that the process would engage all members
of the organization, which would in turn create a high performing organization that was
fully engaged in the reduction of crime (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).
At the first level, the “Police Commissioner, with his executive core, first
empowers and then interrogates the precinct commander, forcing him or her to come up

24
1994-1995 (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).

45
with a plan to attack crime” (Bratton and Knobler, 1998, p. 239). As William Walsh
explained, “This forces the commander to analyze problems and develop a plan to attack
crime conditions and measure results prior to the meetings” (Walsh, 2001, p. 352).
During the meetings, the plans, tactics and results become the focal point of the
communication exchange between the executive staff and their precinct commanders
(Walsh, 2001).
At the second level, precinct commanders take on the role of executive staff
members. In turn, precinct commanders interrogate and evaluate their next subordinate
level, the platoon commander, in the same manner in which they were interrogated and
evaluated by the police commissioner and his/her executive core (Bratton & Knobler,
1998; Walsh, 2001). Precinct commanders are required to hold their platoon
commanders accountable for the results they achieve and the resources they use to
achieve them (Walsh, 2001).
At level three of the CompStat system, platoon commanders take on the role of
precinct commanders. During these meetings, platoon commanders “empower, interview
and assess their sergeants as to their strategies and how they are deploying their resources
to address crime conditions in the areas for which they are accountable” (Walsh, 2001, p.
353). Questions such as “what are we doing to deploy on this tour to address these
conditions?” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 239) should be addressed to ensure sergeants
have a strong working knowledge of what needs to be completed.
Lastly, at level four, precinct sergeants take on the role of platoon commander.
During roll calls or any other forum that brings the officers together, sergeants are to

46
interrogate the line officers in order to define strategy and develop crime control
measures for specific street-level crimes occurring (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Walsh,
2001). By doing so, it was Bratton’s belief that everyone in the organization would be
“…empowered and motivated, active and assessed and successful” (Bratton and Knobler,
1998, p. 239).
In theory, the four levels look good on paper but, in practice, the process doesn’t
work well and, in most instances, has never been implemented. Studies conducted by
Weisburd et al. (2003), found that although this level of intense accountability was
commonly expressed by middle managers in CompStat departments, the research found
nothing remotely resembling the format in lower levels of the organization, except on the
rare occasion when a rank-and-file officer was required to make a substantial presentation
at a department CompStat meeting.
There are three issues with the theory that could explain why CompStat has not
been embraced at the precinct level. The first issue is managing, directing and
controlling a precinct is a dynamic, demanding job. Precinct commanders have a myriad
of responsibilities ranging from budget to risk management. In addition, they are
responsible for controlling the human phenomenon known as crime (Shane, 2004, 2007).
When you add on this additional responsibility of controlling crime, there isn’t enough
time in a workday to complete all of the tasks.
The second issue is the manner in which CompStat meetings, at all levels, are
conducted. Nobody wants to be interrogated, embarrassed or ridiculed. This tactic does
not lend itself to organizational learning. Rather, it creates a culture of fear, which

47
negates learning and destroys morale (Argyris, 1999; Eterno & Silverman, 2006;
Glassner, 1999; Rieger, 2011). In order to reduce the fear and incidence of crime, all
members of the organization need to work collaboratively, learning from one another’s
knowledge and expertise (Levitt & March, 1988; Scott & Davis, 2007). This can only be
achieved in an atmosphere conducive to learning, which the CompStat model, as
originally developed in the NYPD and most frequently deployed in other departments,
does not provide.
The third issue is getting the necessary crime information to the officers, in real-
time, or as close to real-time as possible, so they can act immediately on the new data.
Although crime data is entered daily, CompStat information is collected and processed on
a weekly basis (Godown, 2009; Vito et al., 2005). The information gathered in the
seven-day extraction period is helpful when looking at the big picture, but by the time the
information is disseminated to the rank-and-file for action; in essence, they are already
seven days behind the curve. There is an ancient proverb that reads, “Crime Never
Sleeps,”
25
and neither should the police.
Accountability
One of the major drivers of the CompStat philosophy is accountability.
According to Bratton, punishing those who failed to meet the accountability standards of
CompStat, or rewarding those who did, was an important element of internal
accountability in the NYPD CompStat model (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). This
philosophy put all personnel on notice that crime reduction was an important facet of the

25
Author unknown.

48
day-to-day operations and, those who were not interested in crime reduction, were
removed from their position and replaced (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).
According to a study conducted by Weisburd et al. (2003), police agencies that
embraced the CompStat philosophy were significantly more likely to report upholding
accountability structures than organizations that had not embraced the CompStat model.
In addition, the use of punishment, rather than reward, was more apparent in CompStat
organizations to ensure internal accountability (Weisburd et al., 2003).
During the NYPD turnaround, many precinct commanders were replaced for not
meeting the internal accountability standards associated with the CompStat paradigm
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Weisburd et al., 2003). This was
also found to be true in many other police organizations that embraced the CompStat
philosophy (Weisburd et al., 2003). Although this strategy might deliver a motivated
employee to feed the “CompStat Monster,” on the other hand, it tends to create a culture
of fear, whereby stress and internal competition manifest itself in the shadows of
progress.
According to a retired NYPD captain, CompStat was “a legalistic-style numbers
game combined with leadership by fear” (Eterno & Silverman, 2006; p. 223). From the
perspective of this retired captain, and many others within the NYPD, what was needed
for a turnaround became counter-productive. In their view, CompStat was a system that
placed too much pressure on captains and above. “For Captains and above, high pressure
from supervisors to produce ‘impressive’ results so that they (your supervisors) look
good drives Captains out of the Department” (Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 59).

49
One of the problems with the CompStat process is that it relies predominantly on
numbers and percentages to validate performance. Thus, in order for the organization to
be successful, the crime numbers have to continually go down. At some point in time,
which nobody knows when that will be, the laws of decreasing numbers will eventually
hit “rock bottom” (Ferkenhoff, 2008; Oppel, 2011).
When this occurs, or when the organization’s command staff perceives this to be
occurring, the push to continually lower crime via numbers and percentages has the
potential to morph into “fuzzy math,” “cooking the books” or out right corruption (Baker
& Rashbaum, 2011; Buntin, 1999; El-Ghobashy, 2010; Eterno & Silverman, 2012;
Moses, 2005a, 2005b; Rashbaum, 2010; Schmidt, 2004; Serpas & Morley, 2008; Xia,
2010).
For several years, the NYPD has come under pressure from various sources,
especially the media, for allegations of manipulating the crime numbers (Baker &
Rashbaum, 2011; El-Ghobashy, 2010; Moses, 2005a, 2005b; Rashbaum, 2010; Xia,
2010). Although the NYPD denies the allegations, many retired officers and command
staff members have come forward stating the opposite.
According to John Eterno, a retired NYPD captain and associate dean of graduate
studies in criminal justice at Molloy College, went on the record stating, “Those people in
the CompStat era felt enormous pressure to downgrade index crime, which determines
the crime rate, and at the time they felt less pressure to maintain the integrity of the crime
statistics” (Rashbaum, 2010, p.1). When the theory was put forth by Eli Silverman, a
professor emeritus at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and co-author of a study

50
challenging the accuracy of the NYPDs crime statistics, Silverman believed, like Eterno,
the pressure to keep the crime rate dropping led to statistical manipulation (El-Ghobashy,
2010; Rayman, 2011a, 2011b).
In order for any law enforcement agency to be successful there must be full and
complete trust in the organization by all of its stakeholders. This requires full disclosure
and transparency (Bennis et al., 2008). When trust in the police organization erodes,
chaos occurs, not only within the organization, but in the community as well. Thus, it is
vital for all members of a police organization, especially its leaders, to adhere to the
systems in place and ensure the integrity of the department is never brought into question.
As Bryson (1995) explained, leadership is essential within the [CompStat] process to
ensure the system does not engulf itself or the organization as a whole.
Conclusion
CompStat is more than just a state-of-the-art computer program. The CompStat
process creates a management structure; based on the theory of performance
management, which can help law enforcement agencies, large and small, reduce the fear
and incidence of crime in their communities. Utilizing the four principles: accurate and
timely intelligence; rapid deployment of personnel and resources; effective tactics; and,
relentless follow-up and assessment, police agencies can enhance productivity and create
accountability within the organization.
However, the CompStat paradigm, which was built out of the rational model of
thinking, has created too much tension (Firman, 2003; Scott & Davis, 2007; Weisburd et
al., 2003). According to the literature, the majority of police organizations to have

51
implemented the CompStat system utilize punishment, in a larger degree, to maintain
accountability than rewards (Weisburd et al., 2003). The premise of this research
contends that twenty-first century police institutions need to shift their thought process
away from accountability and discipline to collaboration and learning. Accountability is
still inherent in the system, just not the driver of management behavior.
In addition, this research agrees that the CompStat process, which was envisioned
to have four levels, must be implemented on all four levels throughout the organization.
Since crime never sleeps, neither should the police. However, police personnel need to
be valued and recognized for their hard work, not just ridiculed and embarrassed for not
having all the right answers. Thus, rewards, rather than punishment, should be the
predominant tool and driver of the system in order to obtain the organization’s purpose
(Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
Although numbers continue to be the dominant force driving this performance
management system, at some point in time, those numbers will hit rock bottom. At that
time, more importantly, before that time occurs, police leaders need to maintain vigilance
over the system to ensure accuracy of the numbers being reported. Police leaders must
ensure employees are not being manipulated into making false arrests or reporting false
information in order to obtain the organization’s crime reduction goal. The most
important core value between stakeholders and their police organization is trust. Thus,
honesty and transparency are two key components to ensure success.
Ultimately, the chief of police becomes the linchpin of the CompStat process, and
serves as both sponsor and champion of the philosophy (Godown, 2009). Without the

52
support or acceptance of the chief, others within the organization will not view the
process as being important; thus, it will fail. In addition, without the cooperation of the
employees who perform the work to achieve the organizational purpose, the CompStat
process cannot demonstrate its true value. When the leaders of the organization support
the CompStat system and obtain the full and complete support from those who drive the
system, the collective experience, knowledge and creativity generated will propel the
process and help law enforcement agencies, large and small, reduce the fear and
incidence of crime in their communities (Shane, 2004, 2007).

53
Chapter 3

PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION CHANGE
Introduction
In addition to reducing the incidence of crime, the purpose of this research is to
show how Intersect Policing can improve both the quality and effectiveness of police
work and the quality of life for police officers. Intersect Policing changes the way police
leadership and police officers work, so it is important for leaders to understand change
processes and how to use them. Macdonald et al. (2006) have defined the work of the
leader saying it is, “to create, maintain and improve a group of people so that they
achieve objectives and continue to do so over time” (p. 102).
Principles of Behavior
This research is about creating positive police organizations, which enables its
employees and customers to fulfill their basic needs. Such fulfillment is especially
important in police organizations, because police officers spend the majority of their
workday interacting with members of society, and their job satisfaction can affect those
interactions in either a positive or negative manner. Thus, the creation of a positive
police organization, which fulfills the needs of those working within the organization, can
help to create a positive society.
In order to create such organizations, organizational leaders need to have a basic
understanding of the human social processes. This includes an understanding of

54
mythologies and culture, in order to better understand how our behavior and the actions
of others are viewed along the essential core values continuum.
As a species, humans are social creatures, and our survival has been dependent
upon the ability to form and sustain social relationships (Burke et al., 2005). The quality
of our lives is dependent on the quality of work that we carry out in organizations, which
in turn depends upon the quality of the workforce and its leadership (Burke et al., 2005;
Macdonald et al., 2006). Research has found that there are qualities and principles in
human relationships that are not just limited to organizations, but are relevant to all
relationships (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
“Although human beings are adaptable, they are not chameleons…we do not
completely transform as we move from one relationship, say work; to another, say
family” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 11). For this reason, it is incumbent upon leaders to
understand these general principles of human behavior in order to have a general
knowledge of culture and how it is formed. Without this knowledge, “Behavior will
seem either more mystical or technical than it should, and the ability to change our own
behavior and to influence others’ behavior will be diminished” (Macdonald et al., 2006,
p. 11).
People are Not Machines
The work of Macdonald et al. (2006), have stressed the importance of people and
their value to an organization. Thus, the people who make up the organization and
perform the tasks, which are necessary to achieve the organization’s purpose, should not
be treated like objects or machines. Unfortunately, far too often, we observe

55
organizational leaders, especially in the policing profession, confusing the person/object
relationship and a person/person relationship.
In terms of relationships, there are two types, which are fundamentally different.
“The first is our relationship with other people; the second is our relationship with
objects” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 12).
26
In the relationship shown in Figure 3.1
(person/object), a person need not worry about the object’s will or intent. If a person
wishes to act toward an object and require the object to perform his or her will, the person
must take into account only the rules and laws of physics (Macdonald et al., 2006).
Figure 3.1. Person-Object Relationship

Source: Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
Burlington: Gower Publishing Company.
For example, if a person throws a glass bottle into a wall and it breaks, the bottle
will have broken according to the force that was applied to it, the hardness of the wall,
the angle in which the bottle struck the wall, and other variable factors associated with
the act. Thus, the behavior of the bottle was dependent upon a range of factors; however,

26
For an in-depth analysis and discussion of these relationships and their differences, the following
readings are recommended: Isaac & O’Conner (1976). A Discontinuity Theory of Psychological
Development. Human Relations, 29(1), 41-61.

Person Object

56
the one thing the person who threw the bottle need not worry about was the will of the
bottle.
In terms of person/object relationships, the person taking action against the object
need not worry about what the object thinks or makes of the persons actions. The object,
according to the rules and laws of physics, will act accordingly without any behavioral
changes based on the intent of the person. Thus, a person can experiment quite freely on
physical objects and entities (Macdonald et al., 2006).
When dealing with person/person relationships, as noted in Figure 3.2, the
dynamics of the situation changes in relationship to the wills of the persons involved.
Whatever the intent, there are now two wills in operation over and above the rule and
laws of physics; thus, the outcome will be affected by the will and strength of the
individual person.
Figure 3.2. Person-Person Relationship

Source: Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
Burlington: Gower Publishing Company.
For example, if Person A seeks to throw Person B into the same wall in which the
person threw the glass bottle, as noted previously, the rules and laws of physics would
still apply. Unlike the bottle, however, the will of Person B enters into the equation as

!

Person A

Person B

57
well as the person’s view of Person As intent (i.e., “Why did Person A do that?” or
“What was Person As motive?”).
In terms of person/person relationships, unlike the person/object relationship, the
person needs to take into account what the other person thinks or makes of the persons
actions. Although Person B will attempt to make sense of Person As actions, regardless
of the event, the actions of Person A will influence future relationships with Person B.
At the same time, it is not uncommon to observe people behave toward objects as
if they were a person with a will and intent. For example, people are often observed
pleading with a machine (i.e., vehicle, computer, etc.) to start or work faster as if the
machinery were human. “While it may be amusing to reflect on our own or others’
attempts to persuade objects to act reasonably, it is less amusing to reflect on people
being treated as objects” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 13).
As people, especially those who are in leadership positions and afforded the
opportunity to lead, we must understand the importance of not treating people as objects
or machines. Leaders must have the insight to understand what is best for the
organization, as well as an understanding of what is important to their people in terms of
values. Thus, as Macdonald et al. (2006, p. 14) explain:
“…if we are serious in accepting that people are not machines then
each relationship needs to be considered in the following terms:

• What is the other person’s view of an event?
• How does the other person view you?
• How is the other person likely to react now and over time?”

58
This research contends that the more disciplined leaders become in their
understanding of the social processes of human behavior, the less likely they will treat
their employees as objects or machines. Organizational leaders must be able to view the
world, not only through their own eyes, but also from the vantage point of the employee.
“We need to understand not only what the ‘organization needs,’ but what people need
and what they value (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 14). As soon as leaders come to this
realization, organizations will be more effective in introducing change and begin the
process of building a positive organization.
People need to be able to Predict Their Environments
As a species, human beings are constantly trying to predict in order to gain a
better understanding of the environment in which they live, work and play (Bakermans-
Kranenburg & Van Ijzendoorn, 2006; Blakemore, 1998; Burke et al., 2005; Fraser &
Fisher, 1982; Macdonald et al., 2006; Tibbetts & Piquero, 1999). Research has found
that the more proficient people are at predicting their environment, the more comfortable
and confident they become, which ultimately leads to lower stress, higher productivity
and a more positive outlook on life (Arrow, 1962; Burke et al., 2005; Carroll & Roth,
2010; Gallwey, 1977; Leephakpreeda, 2008; Leventhall & Wise, 1998; Macdonald et al.,
2006; Smith et al., 1978).
People predominantly find themselves in comfortable environments. Although a
person may be comfortable, they are also unconsciously scanning the environment
looking for things that are out of the ordinary, such as threats or signs of danger. This
principle resonates particularly with those in the policing profession, because they are

59
trained to “expect the unexpected,” regardless of the environment, while staying poised,
focused and determined (Boydstun et al., 1977; Bristow, 1963; Ellison, 2004; Glen et al.,
2003; Haberfeld, 2002; Hails & Borum, 2003; Helson & Starkes, 1999; Reiser & Geiger,
1984; Toch & Schulte, 1961).
Upon completion of the environmental scan, the human mind processes the
information and tests the feedback against our culture of past experiences and
expectations (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006; Schein, 2004, 2009). People,
for the most part, are unaware of this subconscious activity. It is only when faced with an
exception or surprise, however, that human beings become aware of this subconscious
event.
During a person’s life span, he or she will experience numerous “shocks and
surprises.” Undoubtedly the person will remember particular events, positive and
negative, but the essence of both is that something happens; someone did something that
the other person had failed to predict (Burke et al., 2005). When the shocks and surprises
are pleasant, such as a promotion at work or winning the lottery, we continue on with our
lives and think nothing about the deviation that occurred. If the event were to be
negative, however, such as being terminated from employment or the betrayal of a
spouse, the outcome leaves us in a state of shock, which manifests itself in a variety of
feelings such as anger or despair.
The point I want to emphasize here is that it’s not merely the unexpected
discovery that produces the shock. The shock is at a much deeper level. “It is the shock
of failing to predict” (Burke et al., 2005, Chapter 1, p. 1). Whenever human beings

60
experience or observe an unusual event, they simply can’t ignore it; instead, we must
explain it to ourselves, so that we are not surprised by it again at a later date. As
Macdonald et al. (2006, p. 14) explain:
From virtually the moment we are born, we embark on the quest of
observing and classifying behavior so that we may understand it and
learn how to predict it. This heuristic process helps us figure out from
our experience what makes someone come to feed me, what makes
someone laugh, what makes someone angry. We learn to predict
what encourages generosity, what encourages love, what causes
indifference, what leads to friendship, what to bullying and so on.
“Essentially we are building a methodology – a set of principles and rules for
predicting behavior of people and the physical world around us” (Burke et al., 2005,
Chapter 1, p. 2). All of this is developed through our cultural upbringing, which we learn
from our immediate family, friends, coaches, leaders, mentors, our community, the
media, and the organizations in which we work (Beugelsdijk et al., 2006; Bolman &
Deal, 2003; Burke et al., 2005; Detert et al., 2000; Macdonald et al., 2006; McAdams,
1996; Saffold, 1988; Schein, 2004, 2009).
As Macdonald et al. (2006) explain, “This heuristic methodology results in a set
of principles and rules for predicting behavior of people and the physical world around
us” (pp. 14-15). The process allows us to develop our own theories in terms of human
behavior and the material world in which we live. Although this process is important for
all people in terms of well-being and survival, it especially holds true for police officers,
where if the prediction is wrong, the result could be serious bodily injury or even death
(Kolditz, 2007; Macdonald et al., 2006).

61
In their book, Systems Leadership (2006), MacDonald et al. points out the things
that make us nervous or anxious are most often caused when we are about to go into a
situation where prediction is difficult, but the outcome is critical. Thus, it is not
uncommon to observe people become anxious before having a job interview, a final
exam, a public presentation, a negotiation, an athletic event or, at the extreme end of the
spectrum, before going into a combat situation (Carroll & Roth, 2010; Gallwey, 1977;
Macdonald et al., 2006). Our ability to ease this anxiety and “quiet the mind” (Carroll &
Roth, 2010; Gallwey, 1977) occurs though the reassurance of preparation, which equates
to envisioning the situation, and anticipating the “what ifs” that might occur (Bisheff,
2009; Kolditz, 2007; Macdonald et al., 2006).
The fact of the matter is people take for granted and underestimate the importance
of being able to predict their environment. We expect to see the same people at work on
a daily basis, unless they are on a scheduled day off. At the same time, we expect for
those people to act in a manner that is consistent with the behavior we have become
accustomed to during the working relationship. When this does not occur, our world
becomes unfamiliar and very unsettling.
“It is important to state here that predictability gives a sense of stability and
reassurance even if the situation appears to be counter-productive” (Macdonald et al.,
2006, p. 15). Interestingly, research on the subject of abusive relationships (Cate et al.,
1982; Herbert et al., 1991; Lamberg, 2000; Rhodes & McKenzie, 1998; Rusbult & Martz,
1995) has found that “for most people, a predictable, stable environment even a relatively
unhappy one, is actually preferable to an unpredictable one” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p.

62
26). To most people, this would seem odd to stay in an abusive relationship; however,
that would underestimate the strength of the need for predictability.
This especially resonates with police officers. For example, police officers deal
with individuals and situations that appear to be dysfunctional, yet on the other hand,
could be viewed as stable. During police academy training, which is later reinforced with
in-service training, police officers learn to read the environment; thus, they are better able
to predict a person’s behavior and test it with past occurrences as to what might occur
(Birzer, 1999; Glenn et al., 2003; Radelet & Reed, 1980). Thus, learning has become
knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 2000), which enables the police officer to take control and
de-escalate the situation.
As a species, we must learn to predict our environment so that we don’t have
emotional “roller-coaster” days of constant shock and surprises, which drain our mental
and physical capacity to do positive work. Working and leading in such a dynamic time
in history, people, especially those in the police profession, must manage not only their
time but also, more importantly, manage their energy (Schwartz & McCarthy, 2007).
Being able to scan the environment and predict future behavior allows people to manage
chaos and uncertainty, which in turn manifests itself in a sense of calm, and builds a
positive organization.
Tools of Leadership
This research subscribes to the Systems Leadership (2006) theory that the
“purpose of leadership is to change behavior;” thus, it is incumbent for the leader to
“create a single, productive culture” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 26). To accomplish this,

63
there are three tools every leader has at his or her disposal, which can be used to
influence the behavior of people in organizations: behavior, systems and symbols
(Macdonald et al., 1989; Macdonald et al., 2006; Taylor, 2005).
Behavior is the most obvious leadership tool and easiest for the leader to control;
however, some leaders find this to be difficult. It is essentially “walking the talk” and
“practicing what you speak.” The behavior of a leader sends a powerful message. Since
actions speak louder than words, subordinates are continuously observing and assessing
their leader’s behavior in an attempt to place meaning and value. “People really do
notice and either take heart or are discouraged according to what the leader actually does”
(Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 105). In large organizations, such as the LAPD, the actions of
the chief of police are not always visible to the vast majority of employees; thus, although
behavior is a powerful tool, it is not as powerful as the use of systems.
Karl Stewart coined the phrase, “systems drive behavior,” which has become a
popular phrase, taken up by researchers and academics (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 110).
Systems are the most powerful tool at a leader’s disposal. Unlike the behavior of a
leader, which is only visible during working hours, systems are continuously present,
operating twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The alignment of systems and
behaviors is influential to the organization, because “It is difficult for a leader to counter
bad systems and behavior by behavior alone” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 105).
“Symbols can be used by all leaders but become more significant as the
organizational distance increases between the leader and the employees or team
members” (Macdonald et a., 2006, p. 105). Symbols are expressed in many forms, which

64
include, but are not limited to: behavior, uniforms, flags, logos, office design, rewards
and vehicle parking. As employees move up through the ranks of the organization,
symbols become more important. As Macdonald et al. (2006) explained, “If the systems
and behavior are aligned, symbols can be very positive and helpful” (p. 105).
In terms of systems, Ian Macdonald has identified two broad categories of
systems, which can be found in business organizations, including police departments:
systems of equalization and systems of differentiation (Burke et al., 2005; Burke, 1996;
Macdonald et al., 1989; Macdonald et al., 2006).
Systems of equalization treat people alike rather than differently. For example,
safety rules are a common system of equalization; thus, all persons must wear protective
eye and ear protection when entering a shooting range.
Systems of differentiation are the opposite of equalization; thus, discriminating
among individuals and groups, treating people differently. For example, remuneration or
compensation between ranks of employees (i.e., captain and lieutenant) is one of the most
obvious systems of differentiation.
Research has shown the most dramatic impact of change occurs when a change is
made in a system, which moves across the boundary from differentiation to equalization
or vice-versa (Burke, 1996; Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 1989; Macdonald et al.,
2006). Intersect Policing is a change from differentiation, where Area captains bear the
burden and impose the burden onto their subordinates in terms of crime reduction, to a
system of equalization, where all members of the organization have ownership of the

65
crime reduction process and create the appropriate strategies to accomplish the
organizations purpose.
Neither of the two systems (equalization or differentiation) is inherently better or
worse than the other. The answer as to which system is best for a particular organization
is, “it all depends.” In order to know which system is best for the organization, leaders
must have a strong understanding of values, which are shared amongst all human beings,
and the mythologies they use to interpret behavior (or systems) to decide on the values
that these demonstrate (Burke, 1996).
In order to understand what to change and how to change it, it is necessary to
have a common language and definitions of terms. Without these, we can talk past each
other as we hear one word and interpret it from our own life experiences while someone
else may mean something entirely different. As stated above, understanding the core,
universal values is essential. Then it is important to know how our observations of
behavior, systems and symbols is interpreted to decide whether something is fair or
unfair, respecting human dignity or not.
Common Language and Definitions
The research conducted in this portion of the chapter draws predominantly upon
the work of Catherine Burke
27
, Ian Macdonald
28
and Karl Stewart,
29
from their writings –
The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right (2005) and Systems Leadership:

27
Burke was Professor at the School of Policy, Planning and Development, University of Southern
California (USC). Burke has retired from teaching, but works as an organizational development consultant
(Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
28
Macdonald is founder and director of Macdonald Associates, an international organizational
development consultancy (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
29
Stewart has held various management roles including Managing Director of Comalco Smelting, which is
now Rio Tinto (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).

66
Creating Positive Organizations (2006). In their works, the authors provide a language
for developing, discussing, thinking and working with propositions about organizations
and management. The authors, from a point of necessity, have chosen words that have a
“common social meaning,” but have defined them carefully, “so that those who use them
can have shared definitions” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 6).
Macdonald et al. (2006) stress although the shared definitions used might be
different from other definitions, it does not necessarily mean that other definitions are
wrong; they are simply less useful for their purpose, which is to advance knowledge in
the fields of leadership and organizations. The Systems Leadership authors contend “this
will continue to be a contentious area until there is an acceptance that we need universal
definitions in this field,” similar to those found in the sciences, such as “physics,
chemistry, biology or engineering” (Macdonald et al., 2006, pp. 2-6).
Macdonald et al. (2006, pp. 17-18) define the following terms for clarity and
usage as follows:
Value: Defined as ‘that which has worth to a person or members of a
social group.’
Core, Universal Values: This is a set of ‘six values,’ which are essential
properties of constructive social relationships. They can be
adjectives describing behavior: loving, trustworthy, dignifying,
courageous, honest, fair; or they can be abstract nouns: love,
honesty, trust, respect for human dignity, courage, fairness.
Heuristics: Defined as ‘a method or process of discovery from
experience.’ Our use refers to how we find out and learn from a
range of experiences what is valuable and what is not. It is how we
generate the rules of thumb by which we can judge situations.

67
Mythology: Defined as ‘the underlying assumption and current belief as to
what is positive and valued behavior and what behavior is negatively
valued.’ These are the ‘rules of thumb’ we have learned heuristically, for
example, ‘don’t trust strangers,’ ‘salesman are not honest,’ ‘managers are
bastards.’ These statements are the top of the iceberg; again, heuristically
formed. We build mythologies unconsciously and consciously, for
example, tales of morality, films, lessons from family, friends, and so on;
the media; observation of others. Figure 3.3 visually shows how some
mythologies, like icebergs, are bigger and stronger than others.

Clearly some mythologies can be stronger than others; the ones that have
been built from early childhood or a traumatic experience; thus, Level C is
very large.
Culture: Defined as, ‘a group of people who share mythologies.’ That is, they
share assumptions about behaviors that demonstrate positive or negative
values. Essentially the more mythologies people share, the stronger the
culture.
Figure 3.3. Mythologies

Source: Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
Burlington: Gower Publications Company.

The depth of emotional attachment and how far
this is part of our identity."
Why we say this:
A general explanation as to why we are ‘right’:
‘Because they might hurt you.’
Statements:
What we say about the world:
‘Don’t trust strangers’
"
" Conscious
"
" Semi-Conscious
"
" Unconscious:
Emotionally part of
our identity.
"
A
"
B
"
C

68
We call these assumptions or opinions mythologies because:

1. They are linked to the core values.
2. They are a mixture of mythos (stories with emotional content) and
logos (rationality).
3. Myths are stories that contain a fundamental truth, even if the
‘facts’ are not true, for example, the story of Daedalus and his son
Icarus: Icarus ignored his father’s warning not to fly too close to
the sun or the wax holding his wings would melt and he would fall
and die. Icarus ignored his father’s warning and did fall into the
sea and die. Thus, the fundamental truths – don’t ignore your
father’s warning, and know your limits and don’t try to exceed
them.

As people we do not operate either entirely rationally or entirely
emotionally. In our experience people use the term ‘value’ in many
different ways to describe very different concepts. Many people mix
the concepts of value, heuristics, mythology and behavior and call them
all ‘values.’ For example, someone might say, ‘people don’t value the
old values anymore.’

• As far as we are concerned, values, in terms of the core, universal
values, do not change. Neither are they a matter of choice.
• The way we learn what behavior is valued is a heuristic process.
• Our current assumptions concerning what behavior is of value is
described by our mythologies; stories of explanation. These can
and do develop as we learn and gain more experience. This is
what people often call ‘changing, new or different values.’

Finally, we also acknowledge that people ‘value’ material objects,
goods and services. Whilst we recognize this as an emotional and
important part of society it refers to the ‘person→object’ relationship. I
may value a house but it has no mythology about me. What we are
discussing here is the content of social relationships, that is,
‘person(s)⇔person(s)’ relationship where values and valuing occur
from both parties.
People’s Behavior is Value Based
As we have learned, the value of prediction plays in an important part in our daily
lives, not just in terms of survival, but also in terms of social interaction and association

69
with other people. Since human beings are social creatures and our survival depends
upon our ability to work and rely on others, we are constantly judging behavior. The
question to be asked is, “What are we judging these behaviors against?” I argue, as do
Macdonald et al. (2006), that predictions are measured against a set of universal, core
values that lie deep in the soul of all human beings.
There are many books written on the subject of core values, most of which are
associated with the subject of leadership (Kouzes & Posner, 2007; Logan et al., 2008;
O’Toole, 1996). The law enforcement leaders of today must have a moral compass that
understands right from wrong, good from bad, compounded with a compassion for those
they are committed to protect and serve (Bennis, 2009; Burns, 1978; Cooper, 2006;
Kolditz, 2007; Kouzes & Posner, 2007). Here in lies an important question, however,
what are core values?
The problem, at least in part, surrounds in the meaning of the word value. “Part
of the problem with the word value is that it can be used as an abstract or concrete noun,
an adjective in terms of a quality and a verb in terms of an activity” (Macdonald et al.,
2006, p. 16). While conducting their research, the Systems Leadership authors found that
when talking with employees in a remote mining town where the workplace was
extremely dysfunctional – managers and workers were constantly at odds, they asked the
question, “Why are there so many problems?” The most common answer was, “They
have different values from us” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 18).
Interestingly, when the authors spoke with these same people outside the work
environment in the context of their community (churches, sports teams, etc.) and asked

70
why they could work together so constructively with this group of people, unlike their co-
workers, the most common answer provided was, “We have the same values.”
(Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 18). Yet these were the same people! Their core, universal
values were not different, but there were different stories (mythologies) that explained
behavior in the workplace and in the community. The people used the term value in a
common way that did not allow the researchers to understand what was happening until
they realized that values and mythologies are different. This answer goes to the root of
my assumption that people are not chameleons and do not change their core values just
because they put on a different set of clothing, including a police uniform.
Before we can examine this topic in-depth, however, it is important that we define
the term values. Upon review of the literature we find various degrees in terms of
defining values (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Buchko, 2007; Burke et al., 2005; Despain &
Converse, 2003; Fry, 2003; Gill, 2002; Grojean et al., 2004; Hood, 2003; Kuczmarski &
Kuczmarski, 1995; London, 1999; Lord & Brown, 2001; O’Toole, 1996; Prilleltensky,
2000; Russell, 2001; Sergiovanni, 1992; Shamir et al., 1993; Sosik, 2005; Ulrich et al.,
1999). For the purposes of this research, values are defined as, “that which has worth to a
person or members of a social group” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 17).
On the other hand, core values are universal values. Thus, as the authors of
Systems Leadership explain, there are six universal [core] “values” that are essential
proprieties of constructive social relationships: love, honesty, trust, respect for human

71
dignity, courage, fairness (Macdonald et al., 2006).
30
It is, of course, relevant to ask why
these six core values. Macdonald et al. (2006, pp. 20-21) explain:
Over the years we have had many debates on this topic, both among
ourselves and with others. First, the authors do not posit these as
immutable and unquestionable. They are, however, related to two
criteria. First if there are other, similar words, are they already
covered by the existing six? For example, integrity is a similar term,
but already covered by honesty and trust. Fairness and justice are
very similar, but we prefer fairness because of the possible legalistic
implication of the term justice. We have tested these core values in
different societies including with indigenous groups, in different
continents and in very different types of organizations – multi-
nationals, churches, schools, voluntary organizations, local
authorities, manufacturing, services, finance – and they have survived
so far.
The second criterion is that a person’s behavior may be judged to be
positive in terms of one value and at the same time be judged negative
in another. A manager may admonish a team member publicly for his
or her poor work performance. The manager may be at the same time
being honest, but showing lack of respect for human dignity. A
soldier may admit fear and run away in battle. The soldier is again
honest, but may be cowardly and not to be trusted in combat. Another
person may insist on the exact distribution of resources as authorized,
believing they are acting fairly, but at the same time be indifferent to
the greater or special needs of some individual or group. Thus, no
two values ever (or should ever) correlate perfectly. If they did, they
could be combined.
The six core values: love, honesty, trust, respect for human dignity, courage, and
fairness are values that can be adjectives to describe a person or an organizations
behavior, or an abstract noun. As demonstrated in Table 3.1, “They can be adjectives
describing behavior: loving, trustworthy, dignifying, courageous, honest, fair; or, they

30
The six core values were identified by the Systems Leadership team while working in conjunction with
both the Hamersley Iron Organizational Development teams and Roderick Macdonald (MacDonald et al.,
2006).

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can be abstract nouns: love, honesty, trust, respect for human dignity, courage, fairness,”
(Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 17).
Table 3.1. Universal Core Values
Universal Core Values
Adjectives Noun
Loving Love
Trustworthy Trust
Dignifying Respect for Human Dignity
Courageous Courage
Honest Honesty
Fair Fairness
Source: Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
Burlington: Gower Publishing Company.
As explained earlier, people are not chameleons; thus, we do not completely
change or transform as we transition between relationships. The person at home is still
the same person at work, and their values remain constant with the person, regardless if
they are at home or at work. This research proposes that all people, societies and
organizations actually share the same set of core values, and it is these six values that
make up the set of shared universal core values that are necessary for the continuing
existence of human social groups (Macdonald et al., 2006).
31

The six universal core values, as noted in Figure 3.4, can be either positive or
negative in nature dependent upon the perception of the person involved. “Behavior at

31
The Systems Leadership authors have articulated these core values in various publications and articles,
and they have been tested in public, private and non-profit organizations, as well as in communities and
countries around the world by the authors and their associates (Macdonald et al., 2006).

73
the positive end of the scale strengthens the social group; behavior at the negative end
weakens and will eventually destroy it” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 19).
Figure 3.4. Universal Core Values: Positive and Negative

Source: Burke et al. (2005). The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right. Los
Angeles: Unpublished Manuscript that Preceded Systems Leadership: Creating Positive
Organizations (2006).
When a person’s behavior is at the positive end of the scale, they share the same
universal core values as their co-workers; thus, the individual can be accepted into the
group and relied upon to get the job done in the best interest of themselves, the group and
the organization. This type of positive behavior is critical for the survival of the group
and the organization as a whole. “Without such positive reliable behavior social groups
must fail” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 19).
Macdonald et al. (2006) propose that the six universal core values are the core
values upon which all societies are based, and are the fundamental social qualities that
Honesty
Trust
Courage
Respect for
Human Dignity
Fair
Love
Dishonesty
Distrust
Cowardice
Disrespect for
Human Dignity
Unfair
Indifference
+ -

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underpin relationships. According to Macdonald et al., (2006, pp. 19-20) the basic
propositions are:
1. If a group of people is to maintain a productive relationship that
lasts, then the members of that group must demonstrate behavior
that will be rated at the positive end of the continua of the core
values by the other group members.

2. If a member of that group demonstrates behavior that is judged by
the other group members to be at the negative end of one or more
of the continua of core values, the person will eventually be
excluded (although attempts to change the behavior may be made
prior to the exclusion).

3. If several people exhibit behaviors that are similar, but judged by
the rest of the group to be at the negative end of one or more of
the continua of core values, then the group will break into separate
groups. This often happens with political organizations and
religious organizations whose members break into ‘factions’ or
‘sects.’
Values are intangible; however, they are what we use to judge behavior, not only
in terms of others, but towards ourselves as well. The universal core values of love,
honesty, trust, respect for human dignity, courage, and fairness form part of our overall
predictive value system, which in turn allows us to categorize the behavior being
demonstrated and form a judgment towards that behavior in an expeditious manner.
As groups and individuals, “we do not choose to have these values;” nor do we
pick and choose the values on an individual basis (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 21).
Humans evolved in social groupings, and these core values are what bind groups
together. Without such binding, early hominids on the African veldt would have been
dinner for all the predators that surrounded them. The fact of our survival indicates these
core values are already deeply imbedded inside us, all six of them, and we use them

75
everyday. In essence, “these core values are as oxygen to social groups,” and “we cannot
choose to function without them” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 21).
People Form Cultures Based Upon Mythologies
Culture, like most other definitions, has been used in a variety of topics ranging
from organizations to religion. The topic has been defined in terms of “geography,
religion, ethnicity, food, traditional dress, language, institutions, currency or behaviors
(often called tradition), all of which can be both interesting and confusing at the same
time” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 22).
In terms of this research, we define culture as “a group of people who share
mythologies…thus, they share assumptions about behaviors demonstrating positive or
negative values” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 22). I argue that when culture is defined in
this manner, it is not limited by any of the usual boundaries depicted in the literature.
The ability in which people make decisions or form opinions is incredibly fast.
This is accomplished by the manner in which our minds process information at an
accelerated rate. The human brain is a super computer, which has the capability to sort
through years of collected data in microseconds (Moravec, 1998). In essence, it’s what
Gladwell (2005) describes in his book, Blink, as “The power of thinking without
thinking.” One of the obvious qualities in people is the speed at which they make
judgments, especially about behavior, all of which are associated with our core values
(Burke et al., 2005).
For example, a watch commander has clearly articulated to his or her officers that
absenteeism and tardiness are considered to be unacceptable behavior and, in the future,

76
any person who takes a sick day, without proper cause, will be disciplined. A few weeks
later, a sergeant of police assigned to the watch is late to roll call and then takes an
unauthorized sick the following day. When the sergeant returns to work, the watch
commander reprimands the sergeant; however, after a one-to-one discussion, the watch
commander takes no disciplinary action against the sergeant.
This scenario raises numerous questions. Was the watch commander’s action fair
to the rest of the team? Does the watch commander’s action represent love toward the
sergeant? Was the watch commander’s action cowardly? Will this action taken by the
watch commander likely increase or decrease trust? As is the case in most situations, we
should have more information before making our final decisions; however, intuition
being what it is, people make their decisions based on very little evidence, a process
Gladwell (2005, p. 18) refers to as “thin-slicing.”
So, the question that begs to be asked is, “How is it that people can do this?” The
terminology used to describe this process is called viewing the world through our
“mythological lens” (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006; Schein, 2004, 2009).
The mythological lens is based upon each individuals culture, which consists of their past
experiences (Schein, 2004, 2009). As people, “We learn from every experience, that is,
heuristically: first from our immediate and extended family experiences; from our school,
fellow students and teachers; from our community; from our workmates and bosses; from
the media” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 23). It is this heuristic, “hands on” experience that
shapes our culture, which in turn develops our “mythological lens.”

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Figure 3.5. Making Sense of the World through the Mythological Lens

Source: Burke et al. (2006). The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right. Los
Angeles: Unpublished Manuscript that Preceded Systems Leadership: Creating Positive
Organizations (2006).
All persons wear a pair of these mythological lenses, as noted Figure 3.5. In
organizations we observe systems, symbols and behaviors - the mythological lens refracts
that information, which in turn reflects our views of people and organizations onto the
continuum of shared values (Macdonald et al., 2006). Based upon where the information
is placed along the continua of shared values, which could register on one or more of the
six core values, the individual will view the situation, person or organization as either
positive or negative.
Our mythologies, the assumption of belief that allows us to assign value to
behavior and classify it as positive or negative, provide us with a framework within
which we can begin to organize our world and behavior (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald
et al., 2006). Although our mythological lenses are as unique as a fingerprint, from time-
to-time, there will be some similarities shared between people.
Honest
Trust
Courage
Respect for
Human Dignity
Fair
Loving
Dishonest
Distrust
Cowardice
Disrespect for
Human Dignity
Unfair
Indifferent
+ -
Mythologies
[Culture]
LENS
BEHAVIOR
SYSTEMS
SYMBOLS

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Thus, those persons who share similarities will seek out and form relationships
with other persons who share these mythologies, that is, “share a view about how to
interpret behavior as positive or negative on the values continua” (Macdonald et al.,
2006, p. 24). I argue that this is how cultures are formed.
While the concept of culture I have found to be most useful in my work and
research is that put forward by Macdonald et al. (2006); however, there are many other
meanings of the term you, the reader, may have come across.
The term culture, as used today, began as a central concept in the field of
anthropology, for the study of human societies (Benedict, 1934; Boas, 1940[orig. 1920];
Kroeber, 1948; Mead, 1928). The definition of culture was widely debated with some
arguing it could not and should not be defined (Boas, 1940[orig. 1920]; Boas, 1940[orig.
1932]), while others focused on the observation of specific cultures (Benedict,
1934,1946; Kroeber, 1939; Mead, 1928). They studied culture as a complex whole
including knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, symbolic thought (language), social
learning and habits acquired as a member of society.
The vagueness of the term as used by various anthropologists did not deter others
from using the term for their own purposes in other fields. Beginning in the 1980s, the
term culture has been applied to business and public organizations. The concept has
“captured the imagination of both students and practitioners of management” (Kunda,
1992, p. 8). A growing number of corporate leaders, as well as members of academia
have focused on culture as it relates to organizational effectiveness, each suggesting that
culture can be managed to serve organizational interests and performance (Kotter &

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Heskett, 1992; Marcoulides & Heck, 1993). Nonetheless, research has further indicated
that an organization’s culture, which could be viewed as one of its strongest assets, could
become one of its greatest liabilities (Barney, 1986; Cloke & Goldsmith, 2002).
Although the origins of the study of organizational culture are difficult to
pinpoint, it gained broad attention and interest when Peters & Watermen (1982) wrote, In
Search of Excellence. They theorized organizational success could be attributed to an
organizational culture that was decisive, customer oriented, empowering and people
oriented (Peters & Waterman, 1982). Edgar Schein (2010[1
st
ed. 1985]) has described
organizational culture as having three levels:
1. Artifacts – visible physical elements such as facilities, offices,
visible awards, how members dress, mission statements, slogans
on walls.
2. Rituals – behavior, myths, stories, language, collective
interpersonal behavior, ceremonies.
3. Values – what individual members value such as loyalty,
customer service, and high quality. These he called the professed
culture of the organization. (Note: This is a different definition
than the one I will be using in this research.)
Deal and Kennedy (1982) defined culture as “the way things get done around here.” One
can also look at many other definitions of culture (Chatman & Cha, 2003; Hofstede,

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1984; Kerr & Slocum, 2005; Kunda, 1992; Martin, 2002; Schein, 2004, 2009; Scott &
Davis, 2007; Swidler, 1986).
While the many definitions have something in common, their variety and
ambiguity suggests the study of culture is still in the infancy stages of development.
Nonetheless, academia and practitioners alike have embraced the concept, in addition to
leadership, to improve organizational behavior and performance.
Organizational culture is rooted in a system of shared assumptions, values and
beliefs, which demonstrate to employees what is considered appropriate and
inappropriate behavior within the organization (Chatman & Cha, 2003; Kerr & Slocum,
2005; Macdonald et al., 2006; Schein, 2004, 2009). These assumptions, values and
beliefs are embedded with mythos and logos (Campbell, 1949), which have been created
through stories, rituals and truths handed down from generation-to-generation throughout
the organization (Bolman & Deal, 2003; Macdonald et al., 2006).
Change is a Result of Dissonance
As we grow older and experience new people, places and things, our mythological
lenses continue to develop, which in turn assists us in our daily lives and interactions.
Over time, a person’s predictive ability increases, which enables the person to develop a
stable worldview, at least from his or her own perspective.
This research does not suggest that a stable or predictable world is necessarily
pleasant or productive. For example, people who live in abusive relationships, over time,
learn to identify patterns in those they live with that lead to physical abuse (Cate et al.,
1982). The pattern could be drinking; drug usage or any other behavior that sends up a

81
“red flag” warning to the person that trouble is coming. Thus, a person’s predictive
ability sends out a warning signal, which allows the individual to avoid the situation.
Interestingly, research on the subject of abusive relationships (Cate et al., 1982;
Herbert et al., 1991; Lamberg, 2000; Rhodes & McKenzie, 1998; Rusbult & Martz, 1995)
has found that “for most people, a predictable, stable environment even a relatively
unhappy one, is actually preferable to an unpredictable one” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p.
26). To most people, this would seem odd to stay in abusive relationship; however, that
would underestimate the strength of the need for predictability.
This same theory holds true in terms of people and organizations. Many people
work for managers who are abusive toward their employees. However, in today’s
uncertain economic environment, the loss of a job could be more devastating than the
abuse brought on by the manager. Thus, we learn to predict the manager’s behavior and
avoid him or her when the “red flags” go up.
In order to bring about change, the essential ingredient required is dissonance
(Festinger, 1957; Macdonald et al., 2006). In terms of this research, I define and use the
term dissonance in the same manner as Macdonald et al. (2006), which equates to an
“experience where our expectations or predictions are challenged…the data just doesn’t
fit.” (p. 26). The experience could be major or minor in nature. Regardless of the
severity, the fact of the matter remains that the experience has a caused a “shock” to our
worldview.

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The manner in which we respond to the experience depends on the individual.
According to the research of Macdonald et al. (2006, p. 26), “We have several ways to
deal with the situation depending upon the strength of our attachment to the worldview:
1. Denial. In this case we simply ignore the data. It is cast aside. It
may be described by others that we are ‘blind to his faults.’
Essentially we try to pretend it hasn’t happened. Denial is never
completely successful and requires more and more energy to
sustain, becoming more and more dysfunctional over time.
2. The exception that proves the rule. Here we move from denial but
wish to maintain the original view. Therefore we need to explain
it in terms of a ‘one-off.’ There were unusual circumstances. The
person didn’t realize what they were doing, didn’t mean it, didn’t
see the consequences. If the person is a member of a group, for
example, in an instance of police corruption, we might say that
they are ‘bad apples,’ or an ‘unrepresentative minority.’ In the
example of the manager we may say: ‘he couldn’t help but say
thanks for that,’ or ‘he was probably told to say that by his boss.’
Over time, if the instances continue, we reach a point where the difference
between what we predicted and reality simply cannot be reconciled. Thus, at this point,
the person has reached the state of dissonance and realizes that change has to take place.
Guiding change is arguably the ultimate test of a leader. According to Kouzes
and Posner (2007, p. 164), “The work of leaders is change…and all change requires that
leaders actively seek ways to make things better, to grow, innovate, and improve.” The
fact of the matter is all organizations, regardless of the sector they are associated with,
need to continually reinvent themselves in order to stay ahead of the competition and
survive.

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Change is never easy and rarely comes without any resistance (Hughes et al.,
2006; Kotter, 1996; United States Military Academy, 1988). “Organizations have been
the focus of empirical research for decades…and much of the early research sought to
discover organizational correlates of increased performance, in whatever way
performance might be measured” (Maguire, 2003, p. 9).
There are multitudes of ways to describe organizational change ranging from
“culture change” to “organizational re-engineering.” However, no matter what term a
person uses to explain the type of change an organization is about to embark upon, it
boils down to the fact that leaders within the organization are attempting to find ways to
increase efficiency, increase performance and increase productivity (Macdonald et al.,
2006; Maguire, 2003; Schein, 2004).
According to John Kotter (1995), human nature being what it is, fundamental
change is often resisted mightily by the people it most affects: those in the trenches of the
business. All changes that take place in an organization boil down to the same common
denominator, which all organizations have in common, people. “Without behavioral
change there can be no improvement; thus, all change processes, whether technically or
commercially driven, depend upon people doing things differently” (Macdonald et al.,
2006, pp. 11-12).
“There is a common assumption that people (especially in organizations) are
resistant to change…further, that this resistance is inherent” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p.
26). I argue that people are very much interested in change, which dates back to our
roots as children when we found ourselves hypothesizing, experimenting – trying new

84
things – all the while learning from the results of our rudimentary testing. Because
although we grow from children into adults, as people, we never stop experimenting in
order to build a predictive model of the world in which we live, work and play
(Macdonald et al., 2006). In fact, most people find it difficult, if not impossible; to do the
same task the same way twice, because we can almost always see a better way to do it.
When organizational rules prevent us from improving, we find it debilitating and attribute
it to the rotten bureaucracy.
According to Macdonald et al. (2006), resistance to change is characterized by
three factors (p. 27):
1. There is no dissonance. Our predictive models still appear to
work.
2. There is no association between the change and benefit to the
individual. Why should I, as a person, adopt this new approach
when it appears more difficult and does not appear to result in any
improvement for me?
3. There is a sense of helplessness. ‘Although I do not like the
situation, I feel there is nothing I can do about it.’ For example,
the demise of a business through market changes or a patter of
delinquent behavior or addiction.
In order for change to occur, Macdonald et al., (2006) explain that a person (p. 27):
• Must experience dissonance;
• Must have a sense that the new behavior will improve the
situation (for the individual or social group);
• Must have a sense that he or she is an active player in the process,
that he or she can influence in the process.
Although leaders are tasked with a myriad of responsibilities and duties to
perform, the work of a leader is to bring about change, typically changes in behavior, and

85
all change requires that leaders actively seek ways to make things better (Kouzes &
Posner, 2007). Thus, leading change and building a new culture is an essential task, if
not the essential, task of a leader (Bennis, 2009; Heifetz & Laurie, 1998; Kotter, 1990,
1995, 1996; Macdonald et al., 2006; O’Toole, 1996; Sample, 2002).
There is a large body of literature in academia that speaks about culture change
within organizations in order to enhance performance (Barney, 1986; Chatman & Cha,
2003; Hofstede, 1984; Kerr & Slocum, 2005; Kotter, 1995, 1996; Kunda, 1992; Logan et
al., 2008; Martin, 2002; O’Toole, 1996; Samuel, 2010; Schein, 2004, 2009; Scott &
Davis, 2007; Swidler, 1986).
Organizational leaders need to use their mythological lens in order to realize when
the organization is no longer achieving its purpose. At that time, the leader must use the
tools at their disposal to bring about the desired change for the benefit of the organization
and the persons involved. Interestingly, although there is a large body of research
preaching the need for leaders to bring about cultural change, there is little research
providing a blueprint for how the process should be accomplished.
There are three tools every leader has at their disposal to bring about effective
organizational change. The three tools are: (1) The leaders own personal behavior; (2)
The systems of the organization; and, (3) Symbols (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al.,
2006; Taylor, 2005).
In terms of the leaders behavior, all leaders must “model the way” (Kouzes &
Posner, 2007, p. 31). Thus, the leader must “lead by example,” which comes from a
strong understanding of one’s self (Bennis, 2009; Bennis & Goldsmith, 2003; Covey,

86
2004; George & Sims, 2007; George et al., 2009; Maxwell, 2005; O’Toole, 1996). In
terms of effectiveness, leading by example works best at the line level of the
organization. Leaders who lead by example inspire others; thus, increasing productivity
and improving morale.
Systems are another tool at the leaders disposal when attempting to change the
culture of an organization. “Organizations are, first and foremost, systems of elements,
each of which affects and is affected by the others” (Scott & Davis, 2007). Systems are
the “specific methodology for organizing activities in order to achieve a purpose,” which
involves directing the flows of work, information, money, people, materials and
equipment (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 108). Systems are the most effective and ongoing
way in bringing about change, especially in large, bureaucratic organizations. As Karl
Stewart explained, “Systems drive behavior;” thus, if we get the systems right, a
powerful, positive organization should follow (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 110).
In addition to the leaders own behavior and systems, the third tool at the leaders
disposal is symbols. Although culture is considered predominantly intangible, the
tangible portion manifests itself in the form of symbols or artifacts (Schein, 2004, 2009).
Symbols could be described as the currency of leadership (Burke et al., 2005), which
includes, but is not limited to, badges, insignia, clothing, voice tone, furniture, and so on;
to signify change or consistency (Macdonald et al., 2006; Schein, 2004, 2009).
The LAPD badge, like the historic Parker Center, is an example of the power of
symbols (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012c). The badge worn by LAPD officers is
arguably the most recognized and replicated symbol in all of law enforcement. In fact,

87
the badge, which was created especially for the LAPD was patented with a registered
trademark for protection (Fowler, 2001; Los Angeles Police Department, 2012b).
Symbols are a reflection of values. For example, Alcoa Inc. designed their
headquarters to reflect the values of making people more visible and accessible, which in
turn promoted collaboration (Stegmeier, 2008). Like behavior and systems, symbols are
a powerful tool at a leaders disposal to bring about positive cultural change.
Changing culture and behavior is the essential task of a leader (Burke et al., 2005;
Macdonald et al., 2006). At the core of this principle is dissonance. Leaders who want to
bring about true, groundbreaking change must have a firm understanding of the
organization. Thus, those who have risen through the rank structure have a better chance
of success, not because they are necessarily smarter than a person from outside the
organization, but because they have viewed the situation from all levels of the
organization and have a good understanding of how the line level employee views the
situation (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
The greatest lesson to be learned from this principle is the virtue of being patient.
The change process, organizationally and individually, cannot be rushed, nor be
considered a quick fix. According to Kotter, the change process could take between five
to ten years in order to deliver positive results (Kotter, 1995, 1996). Utilizing these
lessons learned, change in behavior will eventually occur as soon as our expectations
change, which are a direct result of changing our internal predictive model (Burke et al.,
2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).

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It is as Important to Understand Social Process in Detail, as it is to Understand the
Detail of Technical Process.
Since modern society has seen the advancement of scientism (Wilber, 1998) with
the scientific method from the seventeenth century, freethinkers sought to break religious
and metaphysical “dogmas” of the past through “scientific knowledge and empirical
inquiry” (Healey, 2006). This period saw the emergence of science and, with it, came a
new set of technical language, which has helped define and understand the details of the
technical process.
For example, if a person wanted to build a skyscraper in the downtown area of a
suburban city, the architect would be required to demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the
technical process to be used. A common language, based around technical and scientific
nomenclature, would be used to ensure all persons involved in the building process could
understand what was being explained to ensure safety and overall success with the
project.
On the social process side, however, a common language to define terminology
has not been embraced with the same vigor as in physical science. It is not uncommon to
take part in a conversation about social process issues, and realize during the
conversation that the persons discussing the topics are using terminology that has various
meanings. In many of today’s social process conversations, “terms are used with little
definition” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 30). This becomes dangerous, because “there is
an assumption about shared meaning, but it is not tested in any rigorous way”
(Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 30).

89
Systems Leadership asks the question as to why critical decisions are often made
on the basis of such “common sense” and pragmatism, which is so highly prized over
theory (Macdonald et al., 2006). In order to answer this question, Systems Leadership
theorists researched the ideas surrounding the question and developed three main reasons
for this: (1) People-people relations are actually more complex; (2) There is a lack of
shared language; and, (3) We already have our own theories about social process.
In terms of people-people relations, for years, there has been misleading
information equating people issues as being “soft,” whereas technical issues are “hard”
(Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 30). The fact of the matter is people-people issues are hard.
“Unlike objects, we cannot effectively ignore people’s purpose, will, mythologies and
culture” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 30).
While there are universally accepted definitions within the technical science
arena, on the social process side of the spectrum, universally accepted definitions are
lacking. “Instead of a rigorous and agreed set of terms and definitions, social science and
perhaps, particularly organizational theory, is subject to fads and jargon” (Macdonald et
al., 2006, p. 30). By utilizing fads and jargons, one could opine that social scientists are
attempting to make something simple appear harder than what it actually is, or the jargon
is being used to make something unpleasant more palatable or acceptable (Burke et al.,
2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
The fact of the matter remains that all persons, regardless of their age, education
or position within an organization have their own theories about social processes. Thus,
any outside theory of social process or any predictive statement will be judged against

90
our own theory (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006). Since many of our personal
theories are made up of personal values, it is not uncommon to find these theories to be
“emotionally charged;” thus, “to propose an alternative is not an innocent or even purely
rational process” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 30).
In terms of Systems Leadership, developers argue, “until leaders devote
significant time and resources to improving their detailed understanding of social
processes, they will remain confused as to why some apparently technical and
commercial processes fail” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 31).
Understand the Difference between Prediction of a Population’s Behavior and the
Prediction of an Individual’s Behavior
Systems Leadership is about understanding mythologies and culture in order to
have a better understanding of the social processes. However, understanding social
process involves not just explaining behavior, but also predicting likely behavior. Since
nobody likes to be manipulated, leaders need to understand that all persons respond
differently to situations; thus, “it is important to distinguish between predicting behavior
in general and predicting an individual response” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 32).
Nobody has a crystal ball in which to see the future. Thus, it is impossible for any
person to predict another person’s behavior. As individual people, we are unique;
however, at the same time, we are “extraordinarily similar in terms of biological makeup
and our need for food, shelter and companionship (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 32).
Although human beings depend on the predictability of those they associate with or come

91
into contact with on the street, as individuals, we refuse to accept the notion we are
totally predictable.
Since Systems Leadership defines culture as a group of people who share
mythologies, leaders can predict with a certain degree of accuracy how a group of people
will respond to a specific situation or topic. However, no leader can predict with one
hundred percent accuracy an individual’s behavior.
It is Better to Build Relationships on the Basis of Authority rather than Power
The concepts of power and authority are related to leadership simply because they
are part of the influence process; thus, power and authority have the capacity or potential
to influence behavior (Burns, 1978; Emerson, 1962; Foucault, 1982; Hughes et al., 2006;
Northouse, 2007). Organizational leaders, by virtue of their position, have the ability to
influence their employees’ behavior, both positive and negative. When they do, these
leaders are using their power and authority to effect the desired change in the employee
(Hughes et al., 2006; Northouse, 2007).
When a leader uses authority to influence an employee’s behavior, the leader is
acting within the limits known and agreed upon by the other person, whereas the use of
power will breach one or more of these limits (Macdonald et al., 2006). For example, if a
police officer is observed on the firing range by a supervisor without wearing the proper
safety equipment, the officer is fully aware that some type of disciplinary action will take
place. By the authority vested in the supervisor, he or she has been authorized to carry
out this procedure on behalf of the organization. However, if the supervisor decides to

92
overlook the incident, in return for a favor at a later date, this would be considered the
use of power – acting in a way that exceeds his or her authority (Macdonald et al., 2006).
It is not uncommon for authority and power to become blurred making it difficult
to tell the difference. The authors of Systems Leadership have identified three reasons as
to why this difficulty occurs within organizations (Macdonald et al, 2006, p. 34).
1. Lack of Knowledge. In particular circumstances the person may
be using authority but I experience it as power because I am
unaware of his or her rights and my own.
2. Lack of Recognition. Although I know the person has been
“authorized” by his or her organization I do not accept it, for
example, being arrested by a soldier of an occupying country, the
soldier may see it as authority, I see it as power.
3. Lack of Clarity. A situation occurs where neither side has clear
knowledge of their boundaries of authority. There the problem
may lie in the fact that there is actually no policy or role
description. This is not unusual in organizations.
In order to create a positive organization, relationships need to be built upon authority,
rather than power. “The basis of healthy and productive relationships is authorization,
where influence is exerted with mutually agreed and understood boundaries…and the use
of power is the main source of negative mythologies” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 34).
Macdonald et al. (2006) acknowledge that it takes a great deal of work to
construct and operate effective, authorized relationships. According to some theorists,
society is undergoing a revolutionary change process moving from a modern era, to a
post modern era, and ultimately toward an ecological era (Bogason, 2001; Capra, 1996;
Marshall, 2004; Metzner, 1999, 2006; Overman, 1996; Robertson, 2006). Thus, these

93
theorists view authorization as nothing more than old-fashioned (hierarchical and
bureaucratic).
Many of the books and articles written by these transitional authors are filled with
metaphors and analogies abound about organic, flexible, liberated organizations that are
unrestricted by rules and therefore more creative; leaderless teams and unclear authority
abound (Macdonald et al., 2006). However, these types of organizations can quickly
degenerate into power politics by pseudo-transformational leaders (Northouse, 2007) who
manipulate the organization and people overtly and covertly taking advantage of the
confusion (Macdonald et al., 2006). In the words of Herbert Simon, “Metaphor and
analogy can be helpful, or they can be misleading” (Simon, 1962).
Systems Leadership analyzed the work of Mike Church, author of Organizing
Simply for Complexity: Beyond Metaphor Towards Theory, and found the work of
Church to be insightful and consistent with the theory of Systems Leadership. According
to Church, organizations must be constantly striving for a continuum of control and order
(Church, 1999). By doing so, the leader is able to move the organization from a state of
either no control or total control, as noted in Table 3.2, toward a state of coherence,
which is located in the center of the continuum of control and order systems spectrum
(Church, 1999).
Coherence is control without controlling. “At any time, because it is in a
changing environment and made up of people, an organization is moving towards more
order or disorder” (Macdonald et al., 2006). Thus, it is the work of management to
achieve and maintain coherence.

94
Table 3.2. Continuum of Control and Order in Systems
Continuum of Control and Order in Systems
Description
of control
No Control Strange
Attractors
Control
without
Controlling
Command/Control Total
Control
Systems type Random Chaotic Coherent Top-down
command
Mechanistic
and rigid
Relationships Independent
random
relationships.
Randomness
within
underlying
regularities.
Highly ordered
interdependent
relationships in
which the costs
of achieving
order are
minimized,
that is, “order
for free.”
Predominantly
dependent
relationships; order
is controlled from
above with
significant added
costs.
Fully
dependent,
fixed and
immutable
relationships
. Very high
cost to
sustain.

It is the goal of leadership to work toward the center in order to achieve coherence – control
without controlling.

Source: Adapted from Macdonald et al. (2006, p. 35). Systems Leadership: Creating
Positive Organizations. Burlington: Gower Publishing Company. Church (1999).
Organizing Simply for Complexity: Beyond Metaphor Towards Theory. Long Range
Planning, 32(4), 425-440.
Organizational leaders must ensure that authority, rather than power, is the
catalyst toward building strong relationships. By doing so, the organization can achieve
its purpose with the “minimum number of rules (structures and systems)” and cohere
without bureaucracy and red tape (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 35).
Clarity of Boundaries is the Basis of Freedom
All organizations, large and small, must strive to achieve balance in terms of
rules; thus, the goal is to not produce complicated and wasteful systems and procedures.
When this occurs and the balance is not met, the result is “an obstructive, clumsy process
that wastes time and energy, causes frustration and invites people to cut corners and work

95
out ways to get around the system” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 35). In layman terms, too
much complication invites the use of power.
Boundaries are necessary to ensure balance; however, like all good things, they
need to be in moderation. When organizations do not make boundaries clear to their
employees, the employee is left wondering where the boundaries lie. When this occurs,
power is more than likely to follow.
Power is inevitable where there is lack of clarity. It is classic
methodology manipulative people use to blur boundaries. In
organizations people will intimidate or sexually harass others and
claim it was only a joke, an accident, unintentional, and so on.
Racism, too, falls into this category and is most effective when
boundaries are unclear. In child development the lack of boundaries
or rules does not lead to creativity; it leads to power. It causes anxiety
because behavior cannot be predicted and there is severe doubt as to
who is justified to do what (Macdonald et al., 2006, pp. 35-36).
This type of abusive power creates serious risk management issues within the
organization. Not only does this type of unwanted behavior undermine authority, lower
productivity and morale, it leaves the organization and the employee prone to civil
liability.
When boundaries are clear, all employees can work at their optimum level. No
person wants to work in a threatening environment. Good leaders work to remove
obstacles and breakdown barriers (Abrashoff, 2002) in order to reduce anxiety and
uncertainty, so that the strengths of the employee can manifest and blossom
(Buckingham, 2007; Rath, 2007; Rath & Conchie, 2008). Thus, it is incumbent upon
organizational leaders to ensure these boundaries are adhered to so employees are free to

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concentrate on their work. When this occurs, employees are energized, creative and
positive, which in turn leads to a positive organization and a positive society.
Conclusion
Each of the sub-headings in this section of the chapter describes a principle of
human relations that are essential for organizational leaders to understand. Organizations
exist for the benefit of society and play an important role in our modern world.
Organizations need people, and people need organizations. The quality of our work and
the quality of our lives have a direct correlation. Through the creation of positive
organizations, the needs of all people can be fulfilled, which in turn builds a positive
society.
However, positive organizations do not magically appear. Creating these
organizations require hard work and discipline. In addition to the people who make up
the organization, positive organizations are influenced by the manner in which they are
designed, especially in terms of systems. Successful organizations identify the need to
balance leadership and systems, all of which must be based on an understanding of
sound, general principles of human behavior.
Systems Leadership is concerned with how people come together to achieve a
productive purpose and create positive organizations. This requires a new breed of
leaders who live, work and play by a set of universally accepted core values. Leaders
who “walk the talk” and “practice what they preach.” Leaders who understand and
appreciate their employees for who they are, including their strengths and weaknesses.

97
Utilizing their knowledge and experience, Systems Leadership leaders use the
tools at their disposal, which include, but are not limited to, behavior, systems and
symbols to create a positive culture. Placing people in the right positions, rather than just
randomly filling a position, develops the employee for career advancement along the
seven levels of work, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Thus,
leaders create leaders (Priestland & Hanig, 2009), which in turn develops a learning
organization based upon the knowledge, experience and situational awareness of its
employees. The overall job satisfaction, which equates to security, mental satisfaction,
promotion, recognition and overall development, makes for a positive organization,
which in turn builds a positive society.

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Chapter 4

COMPSTAT: HISTORY & MYTHOLOGIES
Introduction
When CompStat “burst” onto the scene in 1994, it immediately gained worldwide
recognition. As John Eterno and Eli Silverman (2010b) explained, “Rarely has a
development in policing evoked such a wide range of attention and opinion in both the
academic literature and popular press (p. 1). Since its inception CompStat has helped
achieve the purpose of law enforcement in many communities throughout the world
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Godown, 2009; Henry, 2002; Kelling & Sousa, 2001;
Silverman, 1999; Silverman & O’Connell, 1999). This was accomplished by
empowering police middle managers, providing them with advanced computer analysis
and mapping, and holding those managers accountable for crime strategies and solutions.
Initial assessments portrayed CompStat as the premier performance management
system, which produced unprecedented crime-reductions, while maintaining strict
managerial accountability (Bratton et al., 1997; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; DeLorenzi et
al., 2006; Eterno & Silverman, 2006, 2010b, 2012; Gascón, 2005; Geoghegan, 2006;
Godown, 2009; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Moore, 2003; Sanow,
2003; Schick, 2004; Silverman, 1999; Walsh, 2001; Walsh & Vito, 2004).
Recent appraisals of the system, however, have offered a different assessment.
Some researchers have expressed their reservations in terms of CompStat’s managerial

99
effectiveness, and the reliability of its crime statistical reporting, both of which are
directly connected (Dabney, 2010; Eck & Maguire, 2000; Eterno & Silverman, 2006,
2010b, 2012; Harcourt, 2001; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Joanes, 2006; Karmen, 2000;
Levitt, 2004; Messner et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 2005, 2007;
Weisburd et al., 2003, 2006).
Others believe the combined overall effect of CompStat, whether intended or not,
appears to reinforce the traditional bureaucratic or paramilitary form of police
organization (Bittner, 1980; Cowper, 2000; Eterno & Silverman, 2006; Goldstein, 1977;
Manning, 1997; Maguire, 2003; Punch, 1983), which equates to command and control of
its employees; thus, creating an enormous amount of stress on those tasked with ensuring
the purpose of law enforcement is achieved (Eterno & Silverman, 2010; Weisburd et al.,
2003, 2006).
Policing has been and always will be a customer service business. The purpose of
law enforcement is to provide a service that ensures the safety and security of people and
property. This purpose is perhaps best symbolized in the motto of the LAPD, “…to
protect and to serve…” which has become one of the most recognizable phrases in law
enforcement, embodying the spirit, dedication and professionalism of the men and
women of the LAPD (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).
The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval
of police existence (Moore et al., 1988, 2000; Schafer, 2000; Trojanowicz et al., 1998;
Wilkinson & Rosenbaum, 1994). This includes the actions and behaviors of the police to

100
secure and maintain public respect. Without mutual respect, trust cannot be established
and the support of the community is diminished (Moon & Zager, 2007).
For the past twenty years, police administrators and criminal justice researchers
from academia have conducted a substantial amount of research in order to examine the
attitudes of community members toward the police
32
(Brandl et al., 1994; Brandl &
Horvath, 1991; Dean, 1980; Erez, 1984; Frank et al., 2005; Koenig, 1980; Mastrofski,
1981; Percy, 1986; Reisig & Correia, 1997; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Sims et al., 2002).
The findings indicate that public perceptions were based on the manner in which specific
officers related to them personally in previous encounters. This was the most significant
determinate of general attitude towards the police, more than any other socioeconomic
variable, including race and income (Dean, 1980; Frank et al., 2005; Scaglion & Condon,
1980; Skogan, 2005). These findings clearly indicate that “cops” need to ensure they are
respectful during their encounters with the public (Bratton & Andrews, 1999).
The majority of police departments are designed around the paramilitary
structure, which is entrenched in bureaucracy and formal rank structure (Cowper, 2000;
Eterno & Silverman, 2006; Manning, 1997). “Although reformers have described
numerous schemes for reorganizing the police, scholars have echoed well-worn
complaints about the paramilitary nature of the police ‘bureaucracy,’ and many have
outlined the flaws of the police rank structure” (Maguire, 2003).

32
Surprisingly, there have been few studies conducted to examine police officers’ attitudes toward citizen
support despite the importance of the issue (DeJong, 2004; Moon & Zager, 2007; Paoline et al., 2000; Sun,
2002; Worden, 1993).

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The combined overall effect of CompStat, whether intended or not, appears to
reinforce the traditional bureaucratic or paramilitary form of police organization (Bittner,
1980; Goldstein, 1977; Punch, 1983), which equates to command and control of its
employees; thus, creating an enormous amount of stress on those tasked with ensuring the
purpose of law enforcement is achieved (Eterno & Silverman, 2010a; Weisburd et al.,
2003, 2006).
There are some critics who claim police middle managers are under substantial
organizational pressure to contain crime in their areas (Eterno & Silverman, 2010b).
These same critics believe that the cause of this pressure is manifested in the
overemphasis of statistical data and performance management (Martin, 2003).
In a recent study of NYPD commanders, the extreme level of pressure brought on
by the CompStat system was clearly expressed, as each of these commanders told their
stories about countless hours spent at their commands, without additional remuneration,
due to upper level CompStat pressures (Eterno & Silverman, 2010a). Many of these
command staff members believe the pressures of CompStat have created additional
stressors to an already stressful occupation (Eisenberg, 1975; Kroes, 1985; Reese, 1986;
Selye, 1978; Violanti, 1985).
There are some researchers; however, who argue police work has not been
adequately compared with other occupations (Terry, 1983), and the claims of extreme
levels of pressure brought on by the CompStat system are neither fair nor an accurate
assessment. Researchers do agree that police officers experience stress-related problems
in their work (Violanti & Aron, 1993), which are caused by, but are not limited to,

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organizational practices and characteristics; however, in order to verify the claims being
asserted by some NYPD commanders needs to be further researched and compared with
other stressful occupations (Aron, 1992; Reese, 1986; Territo & Vetter, 1981).
Eventually these pressures brought on by the CompStat system, which are felt by
command staff members, filter down to the street level officer, whose job is to interact
with members of the community in order to achieve the purpose of law enforcement. As
one retired NYPD precinct commander explained, “When commanders are pressurized,
[sic] lower ranking police officers and eventually the public may receive little or no
respect” (Eterno & Silverman, 2010a, p. 16).
The trickle down effect caused by the CompStat system subjects lower ranking
officers to greater stress as pressure from above increasingly grows. In essence, it’s what
Tom Rath and Donald Clifton (2009, pp. 5-15) describe as “dipping from your bucket,”
leaving the officer feeling negative and burned out; thus, affecting the officer’s
relationships, productivity, health and longevity. As a result, police officers may find
themselves less inclined to reflect a service mentality and, in turn, treat the public in a
manner similar to the way they are treated by higher ranking members of the organization
(Eterno & Silverman, 2010a).
Since people are an organization’s greatest asset, all organizations, especially
police departments, need to ensure their people are treated as such (Lawler III, 2003).
Organizations that treat their employees well usually outperform those organizations that
do not. In essence, it is a case reciprocity. If an organization treats employees well, the

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employee will in turn treat the organization, and its customers, in the same fashion. Case
in point, Southwest Airlines.
Since its maiden voyage that “took off” in 1971, and for the better part of four
decades, Southwest Airlines has been regarded as one of the best airline carriers in the
United States (Bunz & Maes, 1998; Center for Air Transportation Systems Research,
2009; Consumer Reports, 2011; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2002). Although the reasons for
Southwest’s success have been debated (Boguslaski, 2004; Bunz & Maes, 1998; Gillen &
Lall, 2004; Morrison, 2001; Tieman et al., 2008; Yip, 2004), the predominant reason
given by most authorities as to why Southwest Airlines has been successful is its people
(Freiberg & Freiberg, 1996; Logan et al., 2008; Miles & Mangold, 2005; Milliman et al.,
1999; Teitelbaum, 1992).
Interestingly, the foundation of Southwest Airlines corporate message is not that
customers are number one; rather, employees always come first with the company, with
customers a respected second (Miles & Mangold, 2005). Southwest believes that by
creating a positive organization, based on the value of respect for its employees, the
employees, in turn, will respond to the customer with the same respect provided to them.
“The relationship between the police and the public, although a concern since the
formalization of the police function, has taken on added significance under community
policing with its emphasis on police-citizen reciprocity” (Frank et al., 2005, p. 207). The
core value “respect for human dignity” expresses the foundation for all that policing
represents (Macdonald et al., 2006). This begins with the premise that all persons whom

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members of the police department come into contact with, either within or outside the
organization, deserves respect (McDonnell, 2002, 2009).
Since respect is reciprocal, one must never forget that in order to get respect, one
must give respect. All police departments need to create a culture built on the core value
of respect for people. For it is only by giving respect that police departments will regain
the respect that has been lost in many of the communities they protect and serve.
CompStat Mythologies
Over the years people have viewed the CompStat system through their own
mythological lens and have assigned values to it. Their mythologies are filled with a
mixture of “mythos and logos” (Macdonald et al., 2006), but it is important to remember
that for those who believe them, the mythologies are true.
In a series of interviews conducted with police personnel from various agencies,
33

including the LAPD,
34
at the rank of lieutenant or above, as well as with members of the
police community, the three following mythologies were formulated for further
discussion: “CompStat ‘robs’ a person of their personal life;” “CompStat is cruel and
unusual punishment;” and, “CompStat manipulates crime numbers.”
In this section we will address these mythologies, focus on the system and/or the
leadership of the organization in relation to the creation of the mythology, and

33
All persons interviewed outside the LAPD were presented with a letter of disclosure describing the
nature of the research being conducted, and that full confidentiality would be provided to the person for his
or her assistance. See Appendix “D” for a full copy of the letter.
34
All LAPD personnel interviewed were advised of the reason for the interview, presented with a letter of
full disclosure related to the research, and that full confidentiality would be strictly adhered to. See
Appendix “E” for a full copy of the letter.

105
demonstrate how the mythologies of police becomes a culture. In addition, we will
discuss how these cultures can be changed through the use of Intersect Policing.
Mythology No. 1: “CompStat ‘Robs’ a Person of their Personal Life”
Preparation for the regularly scheduled CompStat inspection is a long and arduous
process. In a recent study of the LAPD, the researcher found that each “Area spends
about 300 to 500 hours of personal time”
35
preparing for CompStat inspections
(Malinowski, 2010, p. 7).
36
This time spent preparing for CompStat inspections takes
away personal time from the employee, which could have been spent relaxing, reflecting
or with family and friends.
The LAPD is not the only organization spending an inordinate amount of time
and energy in preparation for CompStat inspections. According to research conducted by
Weisburd et al. (2003), NYPD precinct commanders work between ten to twenty
additional hours, per week, preparing for CompStat inspections. Although the research
indicates an additional ten to twenty hours spent preparing for CompStat inspections, one
could opine that it is closer to an additional one hour per day, which equates to an
additional ten hours per week beyond the average forty hour workweek. As one NYPD
precinct commander explained, “I’ll go home at night after ten hours at work and keep

35
According to the researcher who completed this project on behalf of the LAPD, the term “personal time,”
equates to time spent above and beyond the regularly scheduled work hours, including weekends
(Malinowski, personal communication, June 5, 2012).
36
At the time Malinowski was conducting his research, the LAPD held CompStat inspections on a monthly
basis. The number of people and the amount of time spent working beyond the average workday preparing
for CompStat varied extensively with each of the twenty-one geographic patrol divisions (Malinowski,
personal communication, June 5, 2012).

106
working – 50-60 hours per week on average”
37
(Weisburd et al., 2003, p. 449). Some
police departments, most recently Baltimore, Maryland, decided they could no longer
continue subjecting their personnel to such demanding conditions, and decided to do
away with the process altogether (Fenton, 2010).
Many captains equate CompStat with a “comprehensive examination,” where any
of a possible 100 variables could be addressed (Malinowski, 2010, p. 8). Prior to a
CompStat inspection, the majority of captains responsible for delivering the presentation
spend a great deal of time and energy preparing. Much of that time is spent the day prior
to the CompStat inspection, where it is not unusual to find a captain “burning the
midnight oil” in order to “cram” as much information into memory as possible.
When the day of the CompStat inspection arrives, the captain is mentally and
physically exhausted. Over time these inspections have a direct impact on the employee
and the department, which manifests itself in lower levels of engagement, increased
levels of distraction, high turnover rates, and soaring medical costs amongst employees
(Schwartz & McCarthy, 2007).
The frustrations caused by the CompStat system are then examined through the
mythological lens of the captain. Realizing the amount of time that the system is taking
away from his or her personal life, the captain, in turn, views CompStat on the negative
side of the core universal values continuum as being disrespectful, unfair, unloving and
indifferent. With every passing CompStat inspection, the captain, who is already

37
If a person were to break down the total number of work hours, as explained by the precinct commander,
it would equate to five twelve-hour days, Monday through Friday. Since precinct commanders are salaried
employees, it is not uncommon for them to work additional hours on weekends. This researcher, however,
has concluded, based on his own personal experience as a Detective Commanding Officer, any amount of
time spent working past fifty hours per week seems to be a bit excessive and inaccurate.

107
sensitive to the system notes “…every instance that confirms the pattern;” thus,
“…reinforcing the mythology” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 23). This mythology is then
shared with other captains, who in turn share the same mythology; and, with continual
reinforcement, a culture develops that views CompStat as a criminal act of robbery,
which “robs” a person of their personal life.
Although some with much criticism and disdain have viewed CompStat, there are
qualities to the system, such as accountability, which are positive and much needed in
today’s police organizations. When Bratton was NYPD Police Commissioner, he
“pushed power down” to the precinct level, providing the precinct commander the
authority and autonomy to create innovative and practical solutions to the crime problems
plaguing the precinct (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). With great power, however, comes
great responsibility. In this case, CompStat acts as an accountability system to ensure
precinct commanders are doing their job and accomplishing the purpose of law
enforcement (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Fordham, 2009; Henry, 2002, 2003; Kim &
Mauborgne, 2003; Walsh, 2001; Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2010).
Although accountability is much needed, preparing for a CompStat inspection
should not consume so much of a person’s time and energy as currently required. The
job of a twenty-first century police captain, particularly in a large police organization, is
difficult and demanding. Captain’s are responsible for a myriad of duties, which include,
but are not limited to: budget, human resources, personnel deployment, community
meetings, politics, not to mention controlling the human phenomenon known as crime
(Shane, 2004, 2007).

108
In essence, captains are the equivalent of a mid-city police chief, who are
responsible for a force of “two hundred to four hundred officers in his or her command”
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 230). Thus, today’s law enforcement leaders need a system
that provides them the necessary crime information, in the shortest amount of time
possible, which in turn prepares them for the next CompStat inspection and returns
control of their personal life back to them.
All students, but especially those entering college, are advised not to procrastinate
or put off their studies; instead, they should develop a regular study schedule, which
allows them to study in small increments for better retention (Culler & Holahan, 1980;
Pauk & Owens, 2011; Pease, 1930; Tigner, 1999). “Cramming” at the last minute or
“pulling an all-nighter,” which are the hallmarks of many college students, is neither the
right way, nor the proper way, to learn for full retention (Tigner, 1999).
Unfortunately old patterns die hard, especially when persons with success have
used them for any period of time. Captains need to understand they are not college age
students, but rather seasoned police professionals. Thus, having reached a point of
“dissonance,” captains need to stop being in “denial” and commit to such changes
(Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 26). Intersect Policing is a possible solution to the problem.
Intersect Policing is a system that utilizes CompStat technology to analyze crime
information, in real-time, on a daily basis. Understanding that time is of the essence,
these strategic meetings last no longer than twenty minutes,
38
but cover all the necessary

38
According to the literature, the average adult attention span lasts between five to twenty minutes, and
learning is best achieved during this time frame (Conte et al., 1995; Dukette & Cornish, 2009; Middendorf
& Kalish, 1996).

109
information needed to obtain the “big picture” (Conte et al., 1995; Dukette & Cornish,
2009; Hastie, 2009; Middendorf & Kalish, 1996; Schwartz & McCarthy, 2007).
In addition, Intersect Policing utilizes “best practices” from the field of academia,
which advocate for smaller study periods to better retain information into “long-term
memory” (Baddeley, 1992; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997).
Thus, allowing the captain to perform at the best of his or her ability, each and everyday,
and especially during the CompStat inspection.
The Intersect Policing system enhances the captain’s predictive ability, which
brings comfort, reassurance and stability in terms of preparation for future CompStat
meetings (Macdonald et al., 2006). The system eliminates those last minute cramming
sessions, which drain a person mentally and physically. In essence, Intersect Policing
restores a captain’s life back to him or her. Until captains experience dissonance,
however, the myth that “CompStat ‘robs’ a person of their life,” will continue to thrive
and flourish.
Mythology No. 2: “CompStat is Cruel and Unusual Punishment”
During a CompStat inspection captains will be asked a series of questions, from a
variety of topics, in order to test the captain’s knowledge of his or her command. Some
of the questions include, but are not limited to: crime, productivity, overtime, personnel
complaints, traffic accidents, traffic citations, uses of force, felony filing rates, detective
backlog cases, detective case clearing rates, suspected child abuse reports, and search
warrants (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Shane, 2004, 2007).

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As Bratton explained, “Having given the precinct commanders increased power, I
had to make sure they were handling it properly through accountability and relentless
assessment” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 231). CompStat was the system to ensure
accountability, not just for the NYPD, but also for many others around the world.
CompStat is not a system for the weary or the weak. It was envisioned as a
grueling test of “accountability,” specifically designed to “interrogate” captains, forcing
them to “come up with a plan to attack crime” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, pp. 230-239).
The reality is CompStat is nothing more than affording an opportunity to a captain, so he
or she can tell their story about the work being done in their command. For this reason,
the importance of a captain knowing what’s going on in their command cannot be overly
stressed enough.
The problem, however, is nobody has ever provided training in terms of
CompStat preparation. There are no blueprints or outlines to follow in terms of
presentation. Here in lies a portion of the problem - is there one specific way to present
the information in order to answer all of the questions, while at the same time appeasing
all of the members on the CompStat panel? Without clear direction or guidance,
captain’s often start their presentation, get interrupted, side-tracked or lose focus, and
eventually get “hammered” with a series of follow-up questions from the CompStat
panel.
In reality, most of the captains know the information they are presenting.
However, many captains have a tough time answering the questions due to the large
amount of information crammed into their brains in preparation for the inspection. From

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a psychological standpoint, oftentimes captains suffer from “paralysis by analysis,”
overthinking the question and finding themselves lost in their own translation (Flegal &
Anderson, 2008; Langley, 1995).
There will be situations where captains will be asked a question for which they
don’t have an answer. In these situations honesty is the best policy. When this type of
situation arises, captains are better off explaining they do not have the answer at that
particular moment; however, they will research the matter and get back to the panel by
the end of the day with an appropriate answer. Sometimes this tactic will work and
sometimes it won’t. It all depends on the personalities of the board members, which
make up the CompStat inspection panel for that particular day.
Unfortunately it is during these situations many of the captain’s get into trouble.
Some captains try to utilize “smoke and mirror” tactics in an attempt to provide the
appearance they know what they’re talking about when, in reality, they don’t have a clue
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999). This tactic quickly becomes
apparent to all in attendance; thus, insulting the intelligence of all participants, especially
the CompStat panel, who usually have the answers to the questions in front of them
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Arguably, nobody was better at detecting this sort of
dishonest tactic than former NYPD Deputy Police Commissioner Jack Maple.

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Since 1994 the stories about Maple and the manner in which he interrogated,
grilled and tortured NYPD precinct commanders have become legendary and told by
police officers around the world. Many of these officers tell the stories so vividly you
would believe they were the precinct commanders on the receiving end of the equation.
Maple lived for these moments and relished the opportunity to “interrogate” precinct
commanders who showed a lack of knowledge for their command and disrespect for the
CompStat process (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999).
For example, during one particular NYPD CompStat inspection, Maple was
debriefing a precinct commander from the Fifth Precinct. The were two murders that
occurred in the commander’s district, but it appeared the commander did not have a
strong, working knowledge of the details surrounding the investigation. Since murder is
considered the most heinous type of crime, Maple wanted to know more about the case
and what investigative steps took place (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 231):
‘You have two murders here,’ he’d say to them.

‘Yeah, we’re actively investigating them.’

‘What does that mean, actively investigating them?’

‘Do you really want to go into detail?’

‘Yeah. Let’s go into excruciating detail with this.’

The borough commanders said, ‘Crime is down.’

‘How much?’

‘We’ve made a lot of arrests.’

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‘How many is a lot? Is it a million? Is it fifteen? Is it ten? Maple
was not a master of tact. ‘I see that robberies in the Fifth Precinct are
up fifty percent, chief,’ he said. ‘What’s going on?’

‘Uh, the word is there’s a lot of heroin out there.’

‘What does that mean? Tell me what that means, chief. Where is the
heroin? Who’s bringing it in? Why does that bring up robberies?
What about burglaries? Who are the people we have identified who
are doing them? Are the people who are doing the drug dealing doing
the robberies? What’s the robbers’ method of operation? What are
the detectives doing? Who are the victims?’ The borough
commander didn’t have any answers. This happened a couple of
times, then Maple said, ‘These guys are full of shit. They’re used to
jerking people around.’
In another example, Maple was debriefing a precinct commander during a
CompStat inspection about a “…large number of narcotics complaints coming from the
housing projects in Upper Manhattan,” and why the “…narcotics arrests weren’t
anywhere near the projects?” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 235). Failing to “predict” this
sort of questioning, the commander became frustrated and responded, “Do you know how
hard it is for our undercovers [sic] to buy drugs in those projects?” (Bratton & Knobler,
1998, p. 235). Infuriated by the precinct commander’s lack of knowledge, behavior and
symbolic tone, Maple quickly “fired” back in the form of a question, “If you think it’s
hard buying drugs, how hard do you think it is to live there and raise your children?”
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 235).
After a series of other questions, which the precinct commander continued to have
trouble answering, Maple turned his attention to the issue of shootings, which also had
been occurring in the same housing project (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 235):

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‘Captain,’ he would ask, ‘what are we going to do about the shootings
in those housing projects? How are we doing with the buy-and-busts?
Are we debriefing the prisoners? When you have CIs, are you
bringing them in to look at photos so they can give you the
organizational structure of the criminal element in and about the
housing projects?’

‘Well, the buy-and-bust hasn’t worked,’ the commander answered.

‘What else have you done? Are we doing any quality-of-life
enforcement? Are we doing warrant checks? Have you done the
overlays from the computer with the people with active bench
warrants and parole warrants and systematically gone through them,
arrested them for warrants, and debriefed them to find out who was
engaged in this activity? Have we done that, and if not, why not?’
There was one particular instance where Maple went too far and crossed over the
line. During a CompStat inspection, Maple, along with Louis Anemone who, at the time,
was Chief of Patrol in the NYPD, was questioning Tony Simonetti, who had recently
become the chief of Brooklyn South. While Simonetti was answering the questions,
neither Maple nor Anemone believed his answers and opined Simonetti was lying.
While Simonetti continued reporting, “…up on the projection screens appeared a
computerized drawing of Pinocchio with his nose growing” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p.
237). This type of behavior was humiliating and insulting. When Bratton heard about it,
he raised hell with Maple and Anemone. As Bratton explained, “One of my main rules
is: You don’t intentionally humiliate people in public, and they had violated that, and
they both apologized to Simonetti” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 237).
When viewed through the mythological lens of the precinct commander, Maple’s
actions register along the core universal values as being disrespectful, unloving and
unfair. Precinct commander’s are typically “Type-A” personalities who are driven,

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competitive, status oriented and don’t like to be disrespected or humiliated (Friedman,
1996). And, since this particular precinct commander had observed this type of behavior
from Maple in the past, the commander was already sensitive to the behavior. As time
passes, the precinct commander seeks out and finds other precinct commanders who
share his or her same mythologies that “CompStat is cruel and unusual punishment.”
Thus, with the reinforcement and support of other precinct commanders, a culture is
formed and, in this case, a negative culture.
For the most part, captains, precinct commanders or any other person responsible
for providing the daily delivery system that achieves the purpose of law enforcement
appears to misunderstand CompStat. These individuals do not seem to understand the
power and responsibility afforded to them in terms of managing their commands.
All power and systems need to have an audit mechanism built in to ensure
accountability. An “Audit is different from control in that it first checks from time to
time that the controls are in place and then reviews whether the system is achieving its
purpose and is the best way to achieve the purpose” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 219).
Thus, the reason CompStat exists is to ensure accountability that the purpose of law
enforcement is achieved.
With the exception of the NYPD, which still follows the original format, the
manner and style of CompStat inspections has morphed from the original design, and has
been structured differently in many police departments around the world. Dependent
upon the organization and the make up of the CompStat panel, the inspection could be a
simple person-to-person discussion, where the core universal values are adhered to and

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respected by all parties involved (Macdonald et al., 2006). On the other hand, based on
the research conducted, the majority of police departments to have adopted a CompStat
system have taken on the Jack Maple, NYPD style and approach, where the meetings are
more of a person to object relationship (Macdonald et al., 2006), using interrogation and
humiliation, which are viewed negatively along the core universal values continuum
(Weisburd et al., 2003).
The most important issue in terms of the mythology being assessed is the
understanding of “prediction,” which is a key principle in terms of human social behavior
(Macdonald et al., 2006). The inability of the captain to predict the nature of the
CompStat inspection creates fear and confusion. Area captains and precinct commanders
alike understand full-well CompStat is a testing ground to find the “best and the
brightest” in the organization (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). Knowing this to
be true, those on the “hot seat” realize their performance during the CompStat inspection
may have direct implications on future promotions. Thus, the captain’s failure to predict
presents a “shock” (Macdonald et al., 2006), knowing he or she could be reassigned to
another command or demoted in rank (Buntin, 1999).
Intersect Policing assists captains in terms of predictability. Utilizing CompStat
technology as a tool, captain’s receive the same information, in real-time, that members
of the CompStat panel receive at the end of a seven-day extraction period.
39
In addition
to CompStat technology, Intersect Policing utilizes additional computerized tools, which
track strategies and resources deployed (personnel, overtime expenditures, etc.) to any

39
All CompStat information is collected and published on a “week to date, month to date, and year to date
basis” (New York City Police Department, 1994, p. 5).

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given problem. All of which are monitored and updated on a day-by-day basis; providing
the captain with real-time information, in a manageable format, which can be stored into
long-term memory for later recovery, as needed.
Intersect Policing uses a simple, three-step approach to crime reduction: analyze,
strategize and assess.
40
The information obtained through these three steps is
quantifiable, and able to be placed in an easy to read format for the captain to present at a
future CompStat inspection. Thus, enhancing the captain’s predictive ability in terms of
the CompStat inspection process, lowering his or her stress and anxiety, and providing
the CompStat panel with a factual, complete and professional presentation.
For example, during an Intersection meeting,
41
the CompStat computer system
identifies a small cluster of aggravated assaults occurring in a residential neighborhood.
According to the CompStat figures there have been numerous “loud party” radio calls in
this particular residential neighborhood, and the majority of crimes occurring appear to
be during or shortly after these parties are ending. Based on the crime information
received a strategy is formulated with the collective input from members of the
department as well as the community to rid this neighborhood of the problem.
The strategy includes the creation of a “party car.” A party car consists of two
uniformed officers driving a marked, black and white patrol vehicle. The term party car
is vernacular used by police officers to identify with the type of problem or crime the tool
is being used to eliminate. A party car is a tool to be used for rapid assessment and

40
This three-step approach will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 7.
41
Intersection meetings are daily strategy sessions, which last no longer than twenty minutes, and are an
integral part of the Intersect Policing system. This part of the process is explained in greater detail in
Chapter 7.

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intervention. The party car does not answer to radio calls. The sole mission is to
identify, monitor and take appropriate action against parties occurring in the division;
thus, freeing up other patrol units to carry out their mission of providing the daily
delivery system to the community.
The party car rapidly responds to all parties in the division and makes a quick
assessment of the violence potential. When a problem party is identified, the party car
takes immediate action and shuts down the party before it has a chance to grow into a
violent and possibly deadly situation.
In addition to the party car, the strategy includes an intervention, prevention
(Bratton, 2011) and suppression piece, all of which are tracked in a performance based
management program. These additional strategies include:
• Community meetings with people living in the affected area in
order to have them voice their concerns, listen to their ideas, and
solicit their support.
• A “zero-tolerance” approach toward loud, unlawful parties
(Bratton et al., 1997).
• Loud party enforcement citing.
• A press conference to educate and communicate the department’s
strategy and intentions.
• A meeting with the local council member of the district.
• A presentation of the program at the regularly scheduled city
council meeting.

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• Provide education to students in terms of the law and the
departments intentions in the local schools.
• Liaise with the Board of Education and bring them on board as a
team member in the process.
• Conduct a media campaign to educate the public about the
problem and the reasons for the actions being taken by the police.
• Create partnerships with the schools to intercept “flyer party”
information.
• The monitoring of social websites to gather intelligence as to
where and when parties are occurring in the division.
After a short period of time has past, utilizing the intervention, prevention,
suppression model, the problem is eradicated from the neighborhood. Because of the
additional steps taken to include the community, media, and the school board in the
process, the actions of the police are viewed on the positive side of the core values
continuum. In addition, negative mythologies harbored by the community toward the
police are slowly broken down; thus, creating new, positive working relationship.
When the next CompStat inspection arrives, the Area captain will have a detailed
outline (analysis, strategy, assessment) to present, which will demonstrate his or her
ability to identify a crime problem (analysis), talk about the resources and steps taken to
eradicate the problem (strategy), and the results of the strategy (assessment), which
includes the number of press conferences, community meetings, and school board

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meetings held; citations written; arrests; youth referrals; and, hours spent in the mission
area, including overtime.
Intersect Policing not only puts the captain in touch with his or her command, it
allows all stakeholders to take ownership of the crime problems, while preparing the
captain for future CompStat inspections. Intersect Policing enhances the captain’s
predictive ability, which provides comfort and stability, and changes the mythology from
being “cruel and unusual punishment” to an opportunity to “tell the story” about the fine
work being completed in the command.
Mythology No. 3: “CompStat Manipulates Crime Numbers”
“On October 31, 2009, New York City Police Department personnel, including a
high-ranking deputy chief and a precinct commander forcibly entered the apartment of
one of its officers, Adrian Schoolcraft, who was thrown to the floor, handcuffed, dragged
against his will, and held as a patient in a hospital psychiatric ward for six days” (Eterno
& Silverman, 2012, p. 1). The reason for Schoolcraft’s incarceration is still being
investigated, but many believe it was an attempt by the NYPD to discredit and disgrace
the officer after he brought forth evidence that implicated the department in the
manipulation of crime statistics (Eterno & Silverman, 2012).
42

Since the Schoolcraft incident, the subject surrounding the manipulation of crime
numbers has captured the imagination of many people, including the press, who believe
CompStat is the reason for this trend. The assumption is based upon recent admissions of
crime statistical manipulation from various police departments – not just in the United

42
The New York Daily News first published the story in February 2010 (Parascandola, 2010).

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States, but around the world – that have implemented CompStat-type management styles
as used in the NYPD (Eterno & Silverman, 2010b, 2012; Hallam, 2009; Long &
Silverman, 2005; Loveday, 1999, 2000; Maguire, 2007; Manning, 2001b; Martin, 2003;
Willis et al., 2003; Reiner, 1992a, 1992b).
Some of these agencies to report such discrepancies include, but are not limited
to: Atlanta; Broward County, Florida; Baltimore; Dallas; New Orleans; Washington;
Philadelphia; Australia; and, the United Kingdom (Eterno & Silverman, 2010b, 2012;
Rashbaum, 2010).
The subject of crime number manipulation is not a new phenomenon, and has
been a constant source of debate since the early part of the twentieth century. In 1927,
amidst conflicting definitions and reporting of crimes, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police created a Commission on Uniform Crime Records, which implemented
the UCR procedure that is still in use today (Maltz, 1977).
43

In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson initiated the Presidential Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice study (McIntyre, 1967; Walker, 1978).
The final report of that study, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, reported crime
disparities dating as far back as the 1932 U.S. Wickersham Commission Report (Arantz,
1993; Eterno & Silverman, 2012; Maltz, 1977).
When President Richard Nixon made crime reduction in the District of Columbia
and other cities throughout the United States a priority, a pattern emerged of shifting
reported crime among categories (Eterno & Silverman, 2012). As Donald Campbell

43
Statistical data was first collected in 1930 and the UCR program, administered by the FBI, became the
clearinghouse of all said data (Maltz, 1977).

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(1979) explained in Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change, “It seems to be well
documented – Nixon’s crackdown on crime – had as its main effect the corruption of
crime rate indicators, achieved through underrecording [sic] and by down grading the
crimes to less serious classifications” (p. 85).
For example, burglaries were frequently reclassified as malicious mischief or
vandalism;
44
robberies were often reclassified to the much lesser crime of larceny
(Seidman & Couzens, 1974). In addition, “the largest reductions were in larcenies of $50
or more and the largest increases were in larcenies value at $49,” which allowed the
District to reduce its UCR index” (Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 12).
45

There are those who believe the manipulation of crime numbers is caused by
policy makers in the public sector trying to use performance management strategies,
which were made popular in the private sector. Performance management, which is the
“systematic process for improving organizational performance by developing the
performance of individuals and teams” (Armstrong, 2006, p. 10), gained much attention
and popularity during the 1990s with the Government Performance and Results Act
(Artley, 2001; Artley et al., 2001; Artley & Stroh, 2001; Beschen et al., 2001; Eterno &
Silverman, 2012; Gee et al., 2001; Jordan et al., 2001).
“In American policing, enhancing accountability for performance by adopting
business and professional practices has repeatedly emerged as the holy grail of

44
A forcible entry or unlawful entry in which no theft or felony occurs but acts of vandalism, malicious
mischief, etc. are committed is not classified as a burglary provided investigation clearly established that
the unlawful entry was for a purpose other than to commit a felony or theft (US Department of Justice,
2004).
45
In 1958, upon the recommendation of the Committee on UCR, the FBI incorporated the concept of a
national Crime Index, the total of six Part I offenses and larceny over $50, to serve as a general indicator of
criminality (US Department of Justice, 2004).

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management reform” (Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 12). As Campbell (1979, p. 85)
warned, “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making,
the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.”
Donald Wheeler in his book Understanding Variation: The Key to Managing
Chaos, demonstrating the use of Statistical Process Control to improve quality, noted,
“When people are pressured to meet a target value, there are three ways they can proceed:
1. They can work to improve the system.
2. They can distort the system.
3. Or they can distort the data” (Wheeler, 2000, p. 20).
While officers can control their own behavior, they cannot control the pressures from
above, or the actions of leaders in the CompStat review. Therefore they act to protect
themselves even if it means distortion of the system or the data.
The introduction and spread of business performance management in American
police departments is typified in the post-1993 changes in the NYPD (Eterno &
Silverman, 2012). Under the leadership of then Police Commissioner Bratton, he
reengineered the NYPD utilizing cherished business objectives and standards, such as
“benchmarking” and “best practices” (Bowerman & Ball, 2000; Coe, 1999), which
earned him the nickname, “The CEO Cop” (Lardner, 1995, p. 45).
In 1994, Bratton launched one of the most popular policing reforms to have
emerged in the United States and, arguably, the most popular performance management

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system known to date - a system called CompStat (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Eterno &
Silverman, 2010b; Giuliani & Kurson, 2002; Godown, 2009; Maple & Mitchell, 1999;
New York City Police Department, 1994, 1997; Rosenbaum, 1994; Rosenfeld et al.,
2005; Shane 2004, 2007; Silverman, 1999; Silverman & O’Connell, 1999; Vito et al.,
2005; Weisburd et al., 2001, 2003; Weisburd & Braga, 2006).
The success and popularity of CompStat quickly spread, not only to police
agencies, foreign and domestic, but to non-law enforcement public agencies as well.
Cities like Atlanta (ATLStat); Baltimore, Maryland (CitiStat)
46
; King County,
Washington (KingStat); Palm Bay, Florida (PalmStat); Providence, Rhode Island
(ProvStat); San Francisco (SFStat); St. Louis Missouri (Citiview); Somerville,
Massachusetts (SomerStat); and, Syracuse, New York (SyraStat) all adopted similar
approaches to enhance proficiency and accountability (Abramson & Behn, 2006). By
January 2007, Governing Magazine (Perlman, 2007) referred to the movement as “‘Stat’
Fever,” as more than twenty municipalities had adopted Stat programs, all of which were
modeled after the CompStat system initiated by the NYPD (Abramson & Behn, 2006;
Eterno & Silverman, 2010b; Fels Institute of Government, 2009; Perlman, 2007).
CompStat, however, appears to be a victim of its own success. As its notoriety
has grown in terms of crime reduction, more and more police personnel, ranging from
line-level officers to command staff, have come forward with stories about unethical
practices and leadership in terms of manipulating the crime numbers (Arantz, 1993;
Eterno & Silverman, 2010b, 2012). Critics of the system believe CompStat discourages

46
In 2004, the prestigious Innovations in American Government Award was presented to Baltimore’s
CitiStat ten years after the NYPD’s CompStat received the same award (Abramson & Behn, 2006).

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officers from taking crime reports in order to create a false appearance in the reduction of
community problems (Moses, 2005b). As journalist Radley Balko explained, “Some
recent reports from New York City suggest the program needs some tweaking to guard
against the…underreporting of serious crimes” (Balko, 2010a).
The NYPD has come under pressure from various sources, especially the media,
for allegedly manipulating their crime numbers (Baker & Rashbaum, 2011; El-Ghobashy,
2010; Moses, 2005a, 2005b; Rashbaum, 2010; Xia, 2010). Although the NYPD denies
the allegations, many retired officers and command staff members have come forward
stating the opposite. According to research conducted by Eterno & Silverman (2012), it
has been established that 160 NYPD commanders have indicated they were aware of
manipulation of crime reports, which they attribute to the CompStat system.
One of the most outspoken critics of the NYPDs manipulation of crime numbers
is the NYPD Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association. The Patrolmen’s Benevolent
Association is the NYPD police officers union, which represents the men and women
who protect and serve the people of NYC (Zink, 2004). The Patrolmen’s Benevolent
Association has gone on a campaign to describe in detail how the significant crime drop
in NYC was accomplished.
According to the Recording Secretary of the NYPD Patrolmen’s Benevolent
Association, Robert Zink (2004), as quoted in Eterno & Silverman (2012, p. 27):
…So how do you fake a crime decrease? It’s pretty simple. Don’t
file reports, misclassify crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, under-
value the property lost to crime so it’s not a felony, and report a series
of crimes as a single event. A particularly insidious way to fudge the
numbers is to make it difficult or impossible for people to report

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crimes – in other words, make the victims feel like criminals so they
walk away just to spare themselves further pain and suffering. Some
commanders even prosecute the victims so they stop reporting crimes.
In one case, it is alleged that a precinct commander shut down a fast
food joint because the manager reported a grand larceny – someone
stole a pocketbook. The precinct commander shut the place down for
‘an investigation’ during lunch hour. Do you think the manager of
that establishment, who relies on his lunchtime income, will ever
report a crime again?

The truth is, there are over 5,000 fewer police officers on our streets
than there were in 1999. And there is a lot more work to do because
of the threat of terrorism. And all along, the bosses have been
peddling phony numbers to make everybody feel safe. Our mayor
likes to say that the NYPD has been doing more with less. Perception
becomes reality. But when people are being put at risk and victimized
due to ambitious managers, that’s unacceptable.
In an interview conducted by Eterno & Silverman (2012) with a retired NYPD
police officer, this former officer spoke about an incident he had witnessed where NYPD
officers responded to the scene of a crime and refused to take a crime report:
Respondent: Right next to me was a gentleman with a laptop…Next
thing I know police show up and the guy is telling them that he was
working on his laptop when someone came over and ran off with it.
The officer told him it was lost property and would not take it as a
crime. The officer kept refusing to take it as a crime.

JE/ES: Do you think this is typical behavior?

Respondent: Perhaps it is a lack of training, perhaps they want a
promotion, maybe a lack of interest, but everything you guys have
said is accurate…the message [of CompStat] is being relayed
incorrectly to officers in the street.
The purpose of law enforcement is to provide a service that ensures the safety and
security of people and property. The attainment of this purpose requires all members of

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the organization perform their roles and responsibilities in a manner that is ethical, moral
and consistent with the universal cores values of human behavior.
From the vantage point of the community, their police department should be of
the highest ethical and moral standards, which is why communities nickname police as
being their “cities finest.” The faith people place in their police allows them to better
predict their environment; thus, providing a sense of safety, security and stability – not
only in the community – but also in each individual person’s daily life.
Human beings, however, are quick to make judgments. These judgments are
made through our individual predictive model, which are based upon our mythologies. In
today’s dynamic environment, much of the information that shapes our mythologies
comes from what we read and the people we associate with. In the case of CompStat,
based upon what has been written, the seed has been planted causing people to question
the veracity of the crime numbers being reported.
Even Hollywood appears to be getting involved in the CompStat debate. One of
the central themes of the critically acclaimed HBO series, The Wire, was the pressure
politicians put on police brass, who then apply it to the department’s middle
management, to generate PR-friendly statistics about lowering crime and increasing
arrests (Balko, 2010b; Bttp011).
In the case of the NYPD, individual members of the organization, from a variety
of ranks, have come forward with allegations accusing the NYPD of manipulating the
crime numbers being reported. Each of these members of the NYPD who have come
forward believe the cause of the manipulation is due to the pressures brought upon the

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organization by the CompStat system. When viewed through the mythological lens of
these NYPD employees, CompStat is viewed along the negative side of the core universal
values continuum as being disrespectful, untrustworthy, and dishonest. As time passes,
each member shares their mythologies with other members of the organization, who in
turn share these same mythologies; thus, a culture is formed.
As humans, we are constantly searching out others to tell our story in hopes of
finding companionship and/or sympathy. Since the news media is the best method of
getting a story out to the masses, individual members of the NYPD make contact with
their local news outlet and provide their side of the story. Based on the limited
information provided, members of the press listen to the stories being told and, based on
their mythological lens, refract the information onto the core universal values continuum
as being disrespectful, untrustworthy, and dishonest.
Although none of these allegations have yet to be proven, the allegations resonate
strongly with the columnist based upon his or her core value convictions. Thus, since
none of our judgments are “irreversible” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 22), the columnist
writes a story, based on the limited amount of evidence provided (i.e., thin-slicing
[Gladwell, 2005, pp. 45-46]) telling the mythology about how “CompStat manipulates
crime numbers.”
Since the press has a common link – the Associated Press – individual columnists
begin sharing their mythologies about CompStat with one another. One-by-one, each
member tells their story about other persons who have come forward with these same
allegations. Where there is smoke, there must be fire; and these mythologies grow

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stronger. As time passes, the mythologies form a culture throughout the press core.
Since we live in the communication age, the stories make headlines, not only in NYC, but
also around the world.
Since a person’s mythologies are formed based on a multitude of factors,
including what is read in the media and viewed on television, members of society begin
to question their police department and the CompStat system. As a society, we have
formed the mythology that if information is written in the press, excluding the “gossip
columns” or “rag magazines,” the information must be correct. Thus, the seed has been
planted and people in the community start discussing the situation. As time passes, more
and more people, based on the stories being provided; assume CompStat does in fact
manipulate crime numbers.
As the mythology grows throughout the community and the world, soon thereafter
a person becomes the victim of a crime and has a negative encounter with the police and
the subsequent investigation of the case. The person (victim) then tells their story to
other members of the community, who in turn tell their stories, which are eerily similar,
and the mythology grows. As more and more people share the mythology as a group, a
culture is formed based on the shared assumption that CompStat fosters the manipulation
of crime numbers.
Based on the seriousness of the situation, “This specific relationship and
associated mythology can now, with reinforcement from others (the embryonic culture),
become more generalized” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 23). Thus, the community starts to
build a mythology about members of the police organization, including, but not limited

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to: the chief of police, lieutenants or the line-level police officer, which most members of
the public have contact with on a daily basis. This can grow to officers as a class where
“…all sorts of evidence from history can be used to strengthen the culture and build
mythologies” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 23). Some of these alternative mythologies
might include: “All cops are liars;” “You can’t trust the police;” or, “Police officers are
disrespectful.”
In addition, those associated with the system or the political leaders who support
CompStat could be brought into question. For example, David Chen, a journalist with
the New York Times, after reading the results of the anonymous survey conducted by
Eterno & Silverman (2012), now questions the Mayor of NYC, Michael R. Bloomberg,
who is a staunch supporter of the CompStat system, regarding the reliability of data
underpinning policy decisions on the budget, education, transportation, health and host of
other issues (Chen, 2010).
Until members of the culture reach a state of dissonance, they will continue to
search for evidence to prove their assumptions correct. At times, members of the culture
will come across evidence that might dissuade their thought pattern; however, dependent
upon their attachment to the mythology they will “ignore the data” or explain it as “the
exception that proves the rule” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 26).
Intersect Policing is a system that can be used to change the negativity
surrounding the CompStat culture. Since changing culture is an “essential task of a
leader” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 27), Intersect Policing places the Area captain in a
position to accomplish this task. In order to do this, the Area captain needs to use the

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four-step process for changing behavior: “Identify the mythology and the associate
behavior; Create dissonance; Continue with consistency; and, Don’t expect behavior
change for some time” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 27).
First and foremost, the Area captain needs to understand the mythologies at work.
One of the mythologies we just examined was that “CompStat manipulates crime
numbers.” In addition to this mythology, the Area captain will have to realize his or her
subordinates will view him or her along the negative side of the core universal values
continuum as being untrustworthy, unloving, cowardly, unfair, disrespectful and
dishonest. This is because they assume the Area captain, like all other captains who have
come before, will do anything to promote; thus, he or she will expect their subordinates
to manipulate the numbers and use any means of power necessary to accomplish this
mission and earn a promotion.
Second, the Area captain needs to face this mythology and accept that this is the
mythology of his subordinates, which to them is true, until the Area captain proves he or
she is different. As Macdonald et al. (2006) explain: “This can be painful” (p. 27). As
tough as it might seem, the Area captain must not argue the points surrounding the
mythologies. Rather, the captain must create dissonance by behaving differently than all
other captains who came before him, which starts by setting the expectations – under no
circumstances will crime numbers be manipulated. The Area captain must reward those
who report accurately and punish those who do not in a way that everyone knows he or
she means what he or she says.

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In addition, the Area captain needs to convey to his or her subordinates, as well as
to the community, that he or she understands the negative assumptions surrounding
CompStat and that his or her command will be as transparent as possible in providing
crime stat information (Goldberg et al., 2007). At this time, the captain needs to
introduce the Intersect Policing system to all involved stakeholders and explain how the
system will be used to enhance, as well as restore the credibility of the CompStat process.
After dissonance has been created, the Area captain needs to continue acting with
consistency, “leading by personal example,” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 27) and
answering any and all questions about the Intersect Policing system. This behavior must
be repeated over, and over, and over again.
For example, when a discrepancy involving a crime classification manifests itself,
the Area captain can take the opportunity to discuss it during an Intersection meeting.
The lead detective should be allowed to present the facts of the case to all members of the
group. Then, after all the facts have been discussed, the floor can be opened for
discussion.
Since Intersect Policing encourages people to speak up and voice their opinions,
positive or negative, there is no fear of reprisal toward any member of the group, even if
they go against the ideas of the Area captain. By doing so, members of the organization
understand the mythology to always “do the right thing” in a manner that is ethical and
moral. Upon completion of the discussion, based on a consensus, the report stays or can
be reclassified, based on the facts of the evidence provided and the standard UCR
guidelines.

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Last, but not least, the Area captain must realize that changing culture is never
easy and takes time. As Macdonald et al. (2006) point out, “There will be a lag between
the manager’s new behavior and the building of a new mythology and new
behaviors…don’t be discouraged” (p. 27). The Area captain needs to continue driving
home his or her expectations, and continue leading by example. In addition, as time
passes, the system (Intersect Policing) will be the catalyst that drives the behavior of the
men and women who protect and serve the community. Thus, achieving the purpose of
the organization through the creation of work. “Purpose reveals intent; the policy and
systems provide the boundaries for the enactment of the how of turning intention into
reality” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 107).
Conclusion
Policing has been and always will be a people business. Although there are
systems, such as CompStat, to help police departments achieve the purpose of law
enforcement; the most important tool is the people who make up the organization. For it
is only through people that the purpose of the organization can be achieved, and the brand
messaging reinforced.
Unfortunately, due to the pressures placed upon command staff members by
performance management techniques, police leaders often confuse the person-to-person
relationship with that of the person to object relationship. When this occurs the systems
and behaviors are viewed through a person’s mythological lens, which is made up of past
experiences, and refracted onto a scale of six core universal values. The perceptions are

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then placed somewhere along the continuum of one or more six core values and rated as
either positive or negative (Macdonald et al., 2006).
The perceived negative values associated with CompStat and the behavior of
command staff members are then reflected upon and compared with other past
experiences. Since this is a heuristic process, if the systems and behaviors perceived by
the person have occurred on previous occasions, mythologies are created based upon the
perceived patterns. As time passes, unconsciously, we reinforce the mythology and form
a culture.
Since police departments are made up of people, who are social creatures by
nature, they are likely to discuss their mythologies with other colleagues and be most at
ease with people who share their same view (Macdonald et al., 2006). The more people
who share these same mythologies ultimately form a culture. As time passes, these
specific relationships and mythologies become more generalized and further mythologies
are created.
For all of the success associated with CompStat, unfortunately, there are also just
as many problems associated with the system. Mythologies created that view the system
as robbing a person of their personal life; being cruel and unusual punishment and,
manipulating crime numbers, has a negative effect on the department and the community
as the stressors to continually reduce crime numbers is pushed down the chain-of-
command.
Intersect Policing offers a solution to the problem by creating a system based
upon the social process of human behavior. However, until today’s law enforcement

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leaders reach a state of dissonance, the negative culture associated with the CompStat
model will continue to plague the department and cast a dark cloud over the profession.

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Chapter 5

HUMAN CAPABILITY & ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Introduction
While CompStat has proven to be a useful tool in improving police effectiveness,
it always operates in an organizational setting, which may or may not be optimal. This
research has used some theories of human capability that allow better placement of
people in roles as well as designing productive organizational relationships and structure
to improve police departments ability to ensure the safety and security of people and
property.
We are all aware that organizations play an important role in our modern world,
yet our feelings toward them are often ambivalent. We need their products but we resent
their restrictions on our choices and behaviors. We need them to provide the goods and
services needed for daily living; we also need employment which various organizations –
public, private and non-profit – provide. Whether we work in them, shop in them, love
them or hate them (Maguire, 2003), organizations are the dominant characteristic of
modern society (Scott & Davis, 2007) and thus a topic of continuing research interest to
social scientists trying to better understand them.
Early research usually focused on particular organizations or types of
organizations. Factories were studied as factories, prisons as prisons, and government
agencies as government agencies – not as organizations in general (Maguire, 2003). As

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Scott (1992) pointed out in his book, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open
Systems, researchers rarely made an effort to draw generalizations beyond the particular
types of organizations under study.
The one type of organization that has not been frequently subjected to rigorous
analysis by organizational scholars is police agencies (Maguire, 2003). As Maguire
(2003) pointed out in his book, Organizational Structure in American Police Agencies,
given the organization’s role in promoting public safety, responding to emergency
situations, maintaining public order, and fighting crime, it is surprising that
organizational scholars would pay so little attention to the police.
Prior to Maguire, only a few early organizational scholars applied organizational
theory to the study of police organizations. Two of the most famous organizational
theorists to have written such material are Peter Manning (1977), Police Work: The
Social Organization of Policing, and James Q. Wilson (1968), Varieties of Police
Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities. Although these
two pieces of literature have contributed lasting insights into policing practices,
theoretically oriented studies of police agencies, as organizations, are rare (Maguire,
2003).
The common denominator all organizations share is that they are made up of
people. Organizations need people and people need organizations. Thus, it is not
surprising that for the past four decades the majority of social scientists who have studied
police organizations focus their research primarily on police officers and police work,
rather than police organizations (Maguire, 2003). While this research will focus on

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police officers and police work, it will do so in the context of organization, not just
individual characteristics.
As a species, humans are social creatures, and our survival has been dependent
upon the ability to form and sustain social relationships (Burke et al., 2005). The quality
of our work and the quality of our lives have a direct correlation. As humans, we have
two basic needs which are not always in sync with each other – the need to be creative
and recognized as an individual and the need to belong to a larger organization or group
(Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006). A positive organization is one that enables
its employees and customers to fulfill both these basic needs. Such fulfillment is
especially important in police organizations, because police officers spend the majority of
their workday interacting with members of society, and their job satisfaction can affect
those interactions in either a positive or negative manner. Thus, the creation of a positive
police organization, which fulfills the needs of those working within the organization, can
help to create a positive society.
Positive organizations do not magically appear, however. Creating these types of
organizations requires knowledge, hard work and discipline, not only from its leaders, but
also from the rank-and-file members of the organization. In addition to the people who
make up the organization, positive organizations are influenced by the manner in which
they are designed, especially in terms of their systems (Macdonald et al., 2006).
Background
The underlying ideas about organization originated with Elliott Jaques (1976;
1989) and Wilfred Brown (1960; 1971) known as Stratified Systems Theory – a theory of

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organization and human capability which has been developed out of more than fifty years
of applied research, development and experience through the collaborative efforts of
many other leaders, academics and practitioners from various public, private and non-
profit sectors (Burke, 1985). The two more recent works have expanded upon this
theory, Systems Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations (2006) by Catherine Burke,
Ian Macdonald and Karl Stewart, as well as an earlier version of their book, The Work of
Management: Getting the Basics Right. The logic of these ideas moves from the
definition of work, human capability, to the optimal structure of organization if it requires
work to be done in order to achieve its purpose.
What follows is a discussion of all these elements in order to link human
capability and organizational structure. This enables one to define the work of a specific
organizational role in order to get the right person in the right place. Without this, the
best systems will not reach their potential, and at worst will fail.
At present most police agencies rely for selection on an individual’s education,
years of experience and some form of written examination in conjunction with oral
examinations at the higher levels of the hierarchy (Arvey et al., 1987; Guion, 1967;
Harris, 1998; McDaniel et al., 1994; Moscoso, 2000; O’Hara & Love, 1987; Salgado,
1999; Weekley & Gier, 1987). This works reasonably well as education and experience
are good surrogates for the knowledge and skills needed to do the job. The tests may
allow the individual to demonstrate at least part of that knowledge.
I argue, based on considerable research (Burke, 1985; Burke et al., 2005; Jaques,
1989, 1990; Jaques & Carson, 1994; Macdonald et al., 2006; Stamp, 1978, 1993) that we

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need to go more directly to the elements that are needed to fill a role with a person who
can get the job done. To get this right, we must begin by defining work.
Defining Work
Human survival is dependent upon social organization. As people, we need to
provide for our physiological needs (Lawler III & Porter, 1967; Lester, 1990; Maslow,
1943, 1987). Once this was done by groups of hunters and gatherers, today we have
created complex organizations in order to provide the goods and services we require
(Macdonald et al., 2006). In developed societies, most work in such organizations, so it
is imperative we have a common understanding of the term work, which has been used in
many different ways (Dahrendorf, 1985; Glassman, 2009; Jaques, 1976; Kegan, 1982;
Macdonald, 1990; Schutz, 1972). Macdonald et al. (2006) have found it useful to think
of work as “turning intention into reality” (p. 39).
As they say, “Work is the process by which an idea becomes evident in the
external world and open to recognition.” While this undoubtedly requires effort, it is not
simply the expenditure of effort. Jaques (1976, pp. 100-113) states, “The term work
refers to activity, to behavior, to that human activity in which people exercise discretion,
make decisions and act so as to transform the external physical and social world in accord
with some predetermined goal in order to fulfill some need,” in other words turning
intention into reality. In order to turn intentions into reality, however, people need to be
organized and understand the overall purpose of the organization.

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Organizational Purpose
First and foremost, the leadership of an organization must define its purpose. The
purpose is the organization’s reason for existence (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al.,
2006). For example, the purpose of law enforcement is to provide a service that ensures
the safety and security of people and property. Organizations need to be clear about their
purpose, which then allows them to set a strategy and determine a plan of action to obtain
that purpose. The first step toward obtaining the organizational purpose begins with
resources.
Resources
Organizations have many resources ranging from financial capital to buildings
and vehicles. In this section, however, the concern is with the most important resource
and greatest asset, the people of the organization. Organizational planning needs to start
with people. Although almost any person can perform a given job, only the right person
with the right mindset and skillset will enhance the organization and its overall
performance. As Collins explained in his book Good to Great (2001, p. 13), “first
who…then what.” In order to determine the “who,” it is necessary to first consider
“what” work will be required of the person filling a given role.
For example, detectives serve in a variety of functions. Some investigate auto
related crimes, while others handle narcotic related crimes. Although there is some
overlap in terms of the suspects who commit these crimes – narcotics users often break
into vehicles in order to take property they can quickly pawn or sell to purchase narcotics
– the fact of the matter remains there is a greater difference in the expertise required of

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the detective who investigates and prosecutes these different types of crimes. Thus, a
person who has an extensive auto related crime investigative history would be better
suited to supervise an auto table than a detective who has only worked a narcotics unit.
Since organizations are as different as people, the work that needs to be
completed within an organization will vary considerably. However, in all productive
organizations, there is always work that needs to be done. The type and difficulty of the
work differs in kind: “from designing a new product, to articulating a long-term strategic
plan, to stacking shelves or maintaining equipment” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 45).
Each position within an organization requires a different skillset; thus, each
position requires a specific person with that specific skillset in order to be successful.
Within the structure of Systems Leadership, as Macdonald et al. (2006) point out, “a
positive organization is one where each person’s skills and ability matches the work they
are required to do” (p. 45).
The reasons human beings work is not only to survive, but also to be creative,
recognized and to belong (Burke et al., 2005). We all have a need to both stand out and
be recognized for our contributions as well as feeling part of a larger group or
organization. To find the right “fit” in the organizational hierarchy, it is essential to
match the required work with the capability of the individual to do that work. Macdonald
et al. (2006, pp. 45-50) suggest that all work requires:
Knowledge: Two types – “first, part or all of an accepted body of
knowledge, and second, knowledge that has been produced” by the
individual learning from experience. In police work, an officer must
know the law. In addition, the officer must understand how the law
applies to other related fields such as the vehicle code, health and

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safety code, and the welfare and institutions code. He or she should
have developed an individualized understanding of human
psychology, leadership, political realties of one’s community, and
culture.
Technical Skills: “Proficiency in the use of knowledge.” “It includes
learned routines that reduce the complexity of work required to
complete a task.” “Having a skill makes a task easier.” A typical and
essential skill for a patrol officer is the ability to shoot a gun quickly
and accurately. In other roles, technical skills may include facility
with computers, driving vehicles in dangerous conditions, clear
writing and effective public speaking.
Social Process Ability: “The ability to read social situations, understand
the underlying social processes and to influence those processes
productively.” In police work, this includes everything from reading
the situation in a confrontation with a suspect to the ability to work
effectively in a team situation, to the essential skills to lead others in
day-to-day work as well as crisis situations.
Mental Processing Ability: The ability to make order out of the chaotic
environment in which humans live out their lives. It is the ability to
pattern and construe the world in terms of scale and time. The level
of our mental processing ability will determine the amount and
complexity of information that we can process in doing so.

Mental processing ability is probably the least familiar element of
overall human capability to do work. Although we are aware even as
children that some people are more or less able to understand a
situation or solve a problem, we hesitate to say, as adults, that some
people are smarter than others, though we all know that is reality. We
all have differing abilities to do work. Understanding this can enable
far better selection of people for specific roles and allow them to use
their capabilities most effectively to achieve the purpose of the
organization.
Application: The effort and energy that a person puts into applying the
other elements of capability.

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When knowledge, social process, technical skills, and application are combined
with a person’s mental processing ability, it is then possible to have an idea of, what is
called, an individual’s capability to do work, in the sense of actually solving problems in
the real world. In other words, accomplishing the work the organization needs to have
done (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
The idea is to find the best fit between the person’s mental processing ability,
knowledge, skills, and desire to do the job (application) with the work to be performed.
In such a situation, the employee can use his or her knowledge and creativity to enhance
the work product to achieve the organization’s purpose. This in turn creates a more
positive organization (Jaques, 1976; Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
By putting the right person in the right seat (Collins, 2001), employee’s are able
to thrive in their position, lower their stress and the stress of those around them, enhance
the organization toward the achievement of its purpose, and be recognized for their hard
work (Buckingham, 2007; Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006; McDonnell, 2009;
Rath, 2007; Rath & Conchie, 2008; Sorcher & Brant, 2004; Schwarz & McCarthy, 2007).
The difficulty with all this is that every organization has a variety of tasks that must be
carried out, and it is obvious that not everyone can successfully carry out each and every
task. There are differences in knowledge, skills, and ability to deal with new and
different problems. The differences in mental processing ability allow some people to
work at varying levels of hierarchy.

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Levels of Work
Macdonald and Dadswell (1999) have noted that each of us looks at
the world in our own way. When we look at a problem we have to
solve, different people will come up with different types of
solutions. Some will see the problem as what they see in front of
them, what they can touch and feel, what happens when they change
this or that, and will come up with a solution which deals with what
is right there.

Some people will see the problem as soluble only if you changed
everything around. They will propose that you have to change all
the different systems and outside influences, which have made this
problem happen, before it is possible to make a successful change at
the local level. The difference is in the way different individuals
take in and organize information, how broadly they see the
interrelationships of what is going on, and how much they can
encompass in their vision of the world (Burke et al., 2005, Chapter
11, p. 1).
The work of Macdonald et al. (2006) and the earlier work of Jaques suggests that
the different ways of seeing the world are divided into distinct groupings – a series of
types of mental processing ability beginning at I and going up to VI or VII. Thus, if you
want to get work done, it makes sense to structure the organization in a way that matches
the thinking abilities of the humans who will do that work.
The essential finding of Jaques was that organizations have a depth structure that
is consistent across cultures, nations and time (Burke, 1985). Organizations are layered
and often referred to as levels, such as “line level,” “shop level” or “worker level.”
Supervision is layered and referred to in the same manner, such as “first line managers,”
“middle managers,” or “command staff level.” In terms of civil service, such as law
enforcement, or the armed services there are ranks and grades forming a quite deliberate
hierarchy (Macdonald et al., 2006).

146
During his research, Jaques discovered that organizational strata differed in
patterns of complexity and the amount of time in which would be allowed for an
employee to complete a task of given complexity (Jaques, 1976, 1989). The targeted
completion time of the longest task in role equals the time span of the role, which is a
measure of one property of a manager/subordinate relationship (Burke et al., 2005;
Macdonald et al., 2006). This time span of discretion, as defined by Jaques, increases as
a person moves up the organizational hierarchy.
To be most effective in a role at any stratum, an individual must be able to
effectively exercise discretion at the required level of complexity; thus, the person must
have the capability (knowledge, skills, application, mental processing ability) to carry out
the work and accept accountability for it (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
While working in the role at any given stratum, the employee must have an
understanding of the work associated with the next level up, although he or she would not
be capable to act effectively in the higher role or take accountability for it, while at the
same time having a full and complete understanding of the processes involved at the next
level down (see Figure 5.1).
This does not mean that a manager must have all the technical expertise of their
subordinates; however, it does mean that the manager must be able to articulate the tasks
and their context, so that the subordinates can use their expertise to achieve
organizational purposes (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).

147
Figure 5.1. Individual Relationships to Work Strata

Source: Burke et al. (2006). The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right. Los
Angeles: Unpublished Manuscript that preceded Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems
Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
Each stratum requires a certain minimum capability of work. In turn, each
stratum is best supervised and managed by the person occupying the stratum above.
While this may be intuitive, it is important to understand that the work of a manager must
be significantly different from that of a subordinate. However, too much difference
between the manager’s and the subordinate’s work also causes difficulties, because the
subordinate will not be able to understand the manager’s perspective; thus, the manager,
in turn, becomes impatient with the subordinate’s lack of understanding and inability to
keep up (see Figure 5.2).
Regardless of whether the distance between manager and subordinate is too great
or too small, the result is a work environment that is not well ordered; thus, there is a
waste of effort and energy because subordinates are frequently unsure about what they
Can do and accept accountability for
Can understand
Can articulate
Person
Individual Relationships to Work Strata

148
are to do and which factors are within or outside their authority (Burke et al., 2005;
Macdonald et al., 2006). For this reason, it is incumbent upon management to reduce
uncertainty and anxiety by taking accountability for the work environment.
Figure 5.2. Managerial Distances in Stratum

Source: Burke et al. (2006). The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right. Los
Angeles: Unpublished Manuscript that preceded Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems
Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
In order for this to be accomplished, there must be no more or less than one work
stratum difference between manager and subordinate. When organizations stay true to
this formula, it allows each individual working within the stratum to understand the work
above, generate and accept accountability for the work at his or her own level, and
articulate the work below (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
In organizations where each level of work sets a context for those below, every
level of work adds value and each role acquires dignity for the contribution it makes to
the functioning of the whole; thus, the stabilized environment each level provides to the
Managerial Distances -- Right and Wrong
Mgr
Mgr
Too Distant
Mgr
Mgr
Mgr
Too Close
Mgr
Mgr
Mgr
Mgr
Right Distances
Mgr
Mgr

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one below allows subordinates to concentrate on their own accountabilities and
authorities in completing their tasks (Burke, 1985; Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al.,
2006). The depth structure introduced by Jaques removes the impediments to effective
leadership by providing the necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for an effectively
functioning organization where the purposes are clear, the structure supports the purposes
and people have the necessary space to exercise discretion in the pattern indicated by the
multi-modal distribution of work complexity (Burke, 1985; Burke et al., 2005;
Macdonald et al., 2006).
Within the context of Stratified Systems Theory, work needs to be structured in
levels of increasing complexity within the organization (Burke, 1985; Burke et al., 2005;
Jaques, 1976, 1990, 1994, 1989; Macdonald et al., 2006; Stamp, 1993). While the
explicit formulation of this depth structure was developed by Elliott Jaques, it is based on
the common observation that as people move up in employment organizations, the length
of their assignment grows (Burke, 1985).
The reason for designing an organizational structure with one stratum difference
between manager and subordinate is to align the structure of the organization to the
intrinsic multi-modal distribution of human mental processing ability (Burke et al., 2005;
Macdonald et al., 2006). Managers within the organization need to ensure that the
selection of employees to fill these roles have the mental processing ability to match the
requirement of the level of work in role (see Figure 5.3).

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Figure 5.3. Mental Processing Ability to Level of Work

Source: Burke et al. (2006). The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right. Los
Angeles: Unpublished Manuscript that preceded Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems
Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
Each line in the figure above divides one level of work from the other. The circle
indicates the level of work identified of the role, while the number inside the circle
indicates the capability of the individual in the role.
Things are not always so ideal, however. For example, in the Figure 5.4 below,
the numbers within the circle show the individuals current ability, while the number
outside indicates the person’s potential level of work either now or in the future.
In this example, the individual in the role at IV has a mental processing ability of
III with a maximum potential of III. The person in the III role can handle that work now,
but has the potential to work at IV, just as the person at II has the potential to work at III.
One would predict that the relationship between the individuals at III and IV will not
always be smooth as the subordinate will recognize the need for higher level work that
the manager at IV will not identify, nor appreciate when the subordinate points it out.
The relationship between the persons in the III role and the II role are more likely to be
III
IV
II
II
III
IV
WORK
STRATUM
II

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harmonious as the distance between their current roles and their potential maintain one
level (or stratum) difference.
Figure 5.4. Work Stratum to Current and Future Capability

Source: Burke et al. (2006). The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right. Los
Angeles: Unpublished Manuscript that preceded Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems
Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
When employees are placed in role within the structure of the organization, but do
not have the mental processing ability to match the level of work required for the
position, the person will not be able to carry out all the tasks of the role. Thus, the person
will acquire undue stress and fear that somebody will find out that they don’t know what
they are doing. In addition, neither the employee nor the organization will reach their full
potential. The exception to this rule would be in a rapidly changing environment
whereby it may be necessary to have people whose mental processing ability exceeds the
nominal level of work required of the role due the complexity inherent in change
(Macdonald et al., 2006).
Jaques and Macdonald et al, (2006) have identified up to eight, even nine levels of
work, though except for the largest organizations (i.e., United States Army, IBM) seven
II
III
IV
WORK
STRATUM
III
III
III
IV
II
III

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levels are usually the maximum required (see Table 5.1). A very small organization,
such as a shoeshine stand, might have only one level, while many small businesses
operate quite well with only three levels. The LAPD appears to require seven levels with
the chief of police ideally having a mental processing ability at Level VII. In all these
cases, each of the levels adds value to the organization (Jaques, 1970, 1989). As one
goes up the hierarchy, the complexity of the work increases; thus, posing new conceptual
challenges in the decision making process (Stamp, 1993).
Table 5.1. Seven Levels of Work
Level Description Police Rank
Level I Completing concrete procedural tasks. Probationary Police
Officer
Level II Monitoring and diagnosis of operational process. Police Officer
Field-Training Officer
Sergeant
Level III Designing and optimizing individual systems. Sergeant
Lieutenant
Level IV Parallel processing – integrating and controlling
the interactions between a number of systems.
Lieutenant
Captain
Level V Shaping and managing an organization within its
environment – maintaining the organization’s
systems and processes so that it is self-sustaining
with that environment.
Captain
Commander
Level VI Shaping the organization of the future – creating
the ethic on a national and international basis
that allows entities to function and manages the
relationships between entities of a significantly
different character.
Deputy Chief
Assistant Chief
Level VII Sustaining a successful long-term future by
understanding, predicting and influencing
worldwide trends that will affect the viability of
the organization.
Chief of Police
Source: Adapted from Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems Leadership: Creating Positive
Organizations. Burlington: Gower Publishing Company.

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At Level I, the employee is expected to be “hands on” – completing concrete
procedural tasks (Macdonald et al., 2006). A newly hired police officer, still on
probation, would be expected to perform at this level of work. At Level I, the officer has
direct physical contact with the work being performed. The officer is expected to
complete one task at a time before moving on to another. The tasks are procedural and
completed in a step-by-step process. When problems arise, the officer is expected to call
on his or her past experiences to solve the problem; however, when the problem becomes
too much for the probationary officer to handle, he or she asks their field-training officer
for assistance.
When the employee reaches Level II, the key work is diagnosis whilst observing
people working in established, known systems and processes (Macdonald et al., 2006).
Collecting relevant data, selecting a solution set, and adjusting the pathway as the
situation changes by selection of another solution set solve problems at this level. A
tenured police officer that has completed his or her probationary training would work at
this level. Level II is the first line of supervision, and those working at this level are
required to manage people carrying out tasks of Level I complexity. Police officers
assigned to train probationary officers in field tactics, as well as sergeants work at this
level (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
At Level III the work turns to developing a system by looking at actual data and
finding trends in what is seen (Macdonald et al., 2006). A person in a role that is
characterized by Level III work will be able to observe everything in their work or area,
but not everything at the same time. Leaders at this level are constantly scanning the

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environment looking for trends, problems that are developing, and trying to predict the
likely consequences (Burke et al., 2005). In terms of police departments, sergeants do
perform at this level; however, Level III is predominantly made up of lieutenants.
Managers working at Level III are responsible for leading those working at Level II
complexity.
Once an employee reaches Level IV there is a need to imagine and construct
relationships between systems that are working in parallel – integrating and controlling
the interactions between a number of systems (Macdonald et al., 2006). At this level it is
impossible to observe everything within ones area of responsibility, since part of the
responsibility is to create something that does not yet exist. Leaders working at a Level
IV capacity look for what is missing and meshes the work and demands of Level III
subordinates for best overall performance (Burke et al., 2005). Captains of police are
responsible for managing the business unit, and police productivity and safety; thus, they
work predominantly at Level IV. Because Level IV leaders are responsible for
developing Level III personnel, it is not uncommon to observe lieutenants working at this
level, especially those being groomed for the position of captain.
Level V is about shaping and managing an organization within its environment –
maintaining the organization’s systems and processes so that it is self-sustaining within
the environment (Macdonald et al., 2006). The features of Level V work have a dual
perspective – looking inward to create working systems of the organizational entity,
while looking outward to ensure adaptation to the entity’s environment (Burke et al.,

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2005). Commanders work predominantly at Level V, and are responsible for the
development of those working at Level IV.
The work at Level VI demands direct interaction with the external social, political
and economic environment in order to influence and mitigate any possible negative
impacts on the organization (Macdonald et al., 2006). Level VI leaders influence social
policies through direct engagement with political, social, legislative, technical and
economic entities to moderate the environments of the business entities he or she
manages (Burke et al., 2005). For example, within the LAPD, the Assistant Chief
assigned to the Office of Administrative Services is responsible for working with
members of the Los Angeles City Council, Budget Finance and Committee, Legislative
Officials and other key stakeholders to ensure the interests of the LAPD are aligned with
the strategic direction of the City of Los Angeles.
Upon reaching Level VII the work entails comprehending the fundamental forces
driving changes in the environment (national and international) in order to sustain a
successful long-term future for the organization (Macdonald et al., 2006). Where
necessary, Level VII leaders assign tasks to people at Level VI roles to take action to
modify or mitigate some of the effects of the fundamental forces to give the organization
more time to develop its strategy (Burke et al., 2005).
For example, the chief of police might assign his or her assistant chief to work
with the city controller to delay an audit in order to give the department time to make the
necessary corrections. In addition, leaders functioning at Level VII are responsible for

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networking with other leaders at or above their stature for the betterment of the
organization.
Stratified Systems Theory proposes that higher levels in the organization require
greater cognitive skills (higher mental processing ability) than that which is required at
the lower levels of the organization (Burke, 1985; Burke et al., 2005; Jaques, 1989;
Jaques & Carson, 1994; Macdonald et al., 2006; Stamp & Retief, 1996). For this reason,
the major responsibility of higher-level managers is the coordination of various levels
within the organization. Therefore, when managers are promoted within the
organizational hierarchy, they must posses the necessary cognitive capabilities required at
the different levels of the organization, which is why promotion from within the
organization is often considered imperative to organizational success (Macdonald et al.,
2006).
This is particularly important within law enforcement organizations when officers
promote from police officer to field-training officer, detective, sergeant, lieutenant, so on
and so forth. This promotional track provides the individual with the knowledge and
skills based on their training and experiences required at the different levels of the
organization. It may not, however, change their mental processing ability, which appears
to become fixed sometime between puberty and about age twenty-five.
One other note, most organizations have more titles or salary grades than levels of
work. While the combat commands in the United States Army follow strict stratification,
there are still more ranks of commissioned and non-commissioned officers than there are
work strata. Thus, a company commander is typically a captain, but should the captain

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be killed in combat, a lieutenant or a sergeant may be appointed company commander
with the authority of that command, no matter his or her rank.
Hierarchy
“Organizational structures are multi-dimensional, and though there is some level
of basic agreement throughout the literature on the definitions of structure, the
conceptualization and operationalization of structure has historically been more
problematic” (Maguire, 2003, p. 70). The structure of an organization has a direct
influence on what happens in the workplace; essentially, it is the blueprint for formal
expectations and exchanges among internal players and external constituents (Bolman &
Deal, 2003).
An organizations structure has a direct influence on the organization. The
organizational structure can either enhance the organization or hinder the organization,
causing a negative impact on morale. Organizational researchers have identified
hundreds of particular variables that impact organizations in one way or another;
however, the majority of these variables boil down to four dimensions: the size of an
organization, the age of an organization, the technology an organization uses to produce
its goods or services, and the environment in which an organization is located (Maguire,
2003). As Bolman & Deal (2003) explained in their book, Reframing Organizations:
Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, “If structure is overlooked, an organization often
misdirects energy and resources” (p. 67).
At the core of organizational design are two main issues: differentiation and
integration (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Differentiation equates to “how work is to be

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allocated,” whereas integration is about coordinating “the roles and units once
responsibilities have been parceled out (Bolman & Deal, 20003, p. 49). Police
organizations, by design, are paramilitary organizations; thus, they are structurally
complex (vertically, functionally, spatially) to ensure the work is divided by creating a
variety of specialized roles, functions and units (Maguire, 2003).
The LAPD is differentiated into various functions, units and specialized roles.
The primary mission of the LAPD is to safeguard the lives and property of the people
who live, work and visit the City of Los Angeles, while reducing the fear and incidence
of crime (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a). In order for this mission to be
successful, the service delivery system has to be organized based on time, geography,
process and customer base.
The geographic patrol division is the primary service model of the LAPD. Since
crime never sleeps, patrol units are staffed on a twenty-four hour basis, seven days a
week. In order to provide quality continuous service in the most expedited manner, the
LAPD has divided the City of Los Angeles into twenty-one geographic patrol divisions.
The captain who leads each division needs to have the ability to handle work at Level IV
complexity. Some have a higher mental processing ability, while others may struggle
and feel overwhelmed if they cannot handle work at Level IV. When the head of a
division works well at Level IV, he or she can appropriately assign work and tasks that
allows the LAPD to achieve its stated goals.
Patrol units fall under the integration of vertical coordination with a structured
chain-of-command. Patrol officers report to a sergeant (field supervisor), who in turn

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reports to a lieutenant (watch commander), who ultimately reports to the patrol captain.
It is the responsibility of the sergeant and the lieutenant to ensure the delivery system
deployed meets the “standards” of the captain, which are set forth by the chief of police.
A standard is a benchmark to ensure that goods and services maintain a specified level of
quality, and measurement against the standard makes it possible to identify and fix
problems (Bolman & Deal, 2003). It should be noted that the relationships between
lieutenant and sergeants might sometimes create difficulties, as both roles appear to be
assigned at Level III. Both roles are obviously needed, but the relationships between
them require additional analysis and sorting out to be optimal.
Standard operating procedures are enforced within the LAPD to ensure the safety
of officers and the community in which the organization serves. Using computer
technology, better known as CompStat, planning and control systems are implemented to
forecast and measure crime problems occurring throughout the City of Los Angeles.
Utilizing the performance control approach, the LAPD imposes outcome
objectives, such as reducing crime by a specific percentage each year. Without
specifying how the results are to be achieved, the persons involved in creating the crime
reduction plan are able to think laterally, which ultimately motivates the employees to
take ownership in the program and builds morale.
Since crime comes in many different forms, however, the LAPD delivery system
is customized to its customers. Juvenile crimes need to be investigated by experts in
juvenile law, while gang units investigate gang-related crimes. Like patrol operations,
these specialized units are part of a vertical, hierarchical structure. Although these

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specialized units do not fall under the same chain-of-command as a patrol unit, utilizing
“lateral coordination” these officers can communicate with one another via meetings,
which is the “cornerstone of lateral coordination” (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 53).
There are many different ways in which to organize people to perform work.
Taking this into consideration, Systems Leadership views hierarchies as the predominant
method for organizing people in their completion of work in modern developed societies.
This does not mean that lateral and diagonal relationships are unimportant; the hierarchy
forms a chain of accountability within which the other relationships operate. Systems
Leadership subscribes to Wilfred Brown’s definition of employment hierarchy, which is
a “network of employment roles set up by an association of people to carry out work
required to achieve the objectives of the association” (Brown, 1971, p. 49).
Systems Leadership utilizes Jacques’ Stratified Systems Theory as a foundation, a
starting point if you will, but expands upon the theory to explain precisely what the work
of management and hierarchies should be. Systems Leadership argues that the
organization is made up of numerous components, all of which are based on the
principles of core values. These values must never be taken for granted, and are the
essential building blocks of the organization.
Hierarchy is a natural human development (Burke et al., 2005; Jaques, 1976).
Although people have criticized hierarchy, the roots of hierarchy can be traced back
thousands of years, and still remains the primary organizing mechanism in the public,
private and non-profit sectors (Jaques, 1990). Hierarchy becomes essential when the rate

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of change in the environment creates problems of increasing complexity, which in turn
requires a higher order of thinking to solve the problem (Burke et al., 2005).
Unlike any other organizational form, hierarchy creates a faster decision-making
social structure (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006); thus, it is the most effective
organizational form to deal with a rapidly changing environment if it is structured to
reflect the changing levels of complexity in work as articulated by Jaques (1976; 1989).
Further evidence that supports the effectiveness of well-structured hierarchies as the
dominant organizational structure is apparent in what were considered “excellent”
organizations (Peters & Waterman, 1982) or the organizations that are Built to Last
(Collins & Porras, 1994).
Policy, Systems and Goals
Policy is “a statement that expresses the intended standards of practice and
behavior of an organization.” (Macdonald et al., 2006, p. 108). This includes human
behavior. Since the purpose of an organization can only be achieved through work, the
policies and systems provide the boundaries for turning intention into reality (Macdonald
et al., 2006). As soon as the right persons are selected and placed in the appropriate work
stratum, systems need to be put in place to drive behavior. It was Karl Stewart who first
proposed, “Systems drive behavior.”
47

Organizational systems provide the framework within which the work is carried
out, and it is these systems that drive the behavior of people in organizations.

47
Stewart coined the phrase “systems drive behavior,” which has become a popular phrase, taken up by
many organizational leaders within all sectors (public, private and non-profit) as well as scholars and
researchers in academia (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).

162
Organizational systems are the equivalent of non-verbal behavior (Burke et al., 2005).
Thus, systems need to enact policy, because they are the means by which policy becomes
reality.
Systems are the specific methodology for organizing activities in order to achieve
a purpose, which involves directing flows of work, information, money, people, materials
and equipment (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006). In terms of law
enforcement, systems are the efficient and effective use of resources in crime prevention
and enforcement of law. The system of ‘policing at the intersection’ was developed to
improve the ability of the LAPD in both crime prevention and enforcement of law.
In essence, systems make up the social process of the organization, which are
bound together by core values. Within the system are constraints in which every
organization must attend to in order to carry out the work that needs to be completed for
the obtainment of the organizations purpose. The constraints within the system include,
but are not limited to, resources, politics, social, economic and legal issues (Burke et al.
2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
Systems are vital to any organization. The systems that organizations put in place
provide the framework within which the “flows and tides” of work take place, between
the confines of organizational policies, rules and regulations for the obtainment of
company goals (see Figure 5.5).

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Figure 5.5. The Process of Work

Source: Burke et al. (2006). The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right. Los
Angeles: Unpublished Manuscript that preceded Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems
Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations.
Conclusion
Organizations play an important role in our modern world. As people, we need to
provide for our physiological needs (Lawler III & Porter, 1967; Lester, 1990; Maslow,
1943, 1987). For this reason, people need organizations to obtain goods and services;
however, goods and services don’t just magically appear, so people need to work.
Work is turning intention into reality (Macdonald et al., 2006). However, in order
to turn intentions into reality, people need to be organized and understand the overall
purpose of the organization. This requires resources, and an organization’s greatest
resource is its people.
Each position within an organization requires a different skillset and mental
processing ability. Thus, each position requires a specific person with that specific
Area for
Discretion
GOAL
Limits
Target Completion
Time
Start Time
Limits

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skillset in order to be successful, and a positive organization is one where each person’s
skills and ability matches the work they are required to do (Macdonald et al., 2006).
Elliot Jaques identified seven levels of work or strata, all of which differ in
patterns of complexity (Jaques, 1976, 1989). To be most effective in a role at any
stratum, an individual must be able to have the capability (knowledge, skills, application,
mental processing ability) to carry out the work and accept accountability (Burke et al.,
2005). In addition, the employee must have an understanding of the work associated with
the next level up, although he or she would not be capable to act effectively in the higher
role or take accountability for it, while at the same time having a full and complete
understanding of the processes involved at the next level down.
Each stratum requires a certain minimum capability of work. In turn, each
stratum must be supervised and managed by the person occupying the stratum above.
This requires that organizations be structured in a hierarchical manner, not only for faster
decision-making, but to allow for differentiation and integration (Bolman & Deal, 2003).
As soon as the right persons are selected and placed into the appropriate work
stratum, policies and systems need to be enacted. Organizational systems provide the
framework within which the work is carried out, and it is the systems that will drive the
behavior of people in organizations. Working within the boundaries of policies and
systems, employees are able to be creative in their thinking, which in turn lowers stress
and improves morale, while moving the organization toward the accomplishment of its
goals with the target completion time (Macdonald et al., 2006).

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Chapter 6

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING & THE MEDICI EFFECT
Introduction
When the NYPD introduced CompStat in 1994, it made learning how to deal with
crime an important objective for every precinct commander. This was accomplished
through performance management, holding precinct commander’s strictly responsible for
the crime problems in their districts. However, fearing a poor evaluation and/or public
humiliation during the CompStat inspection, precinct commanders often found
themselves falling back on conventional responses that a police department makes to
particular crime problems; e.g., zero tolerance patrol operations designed to threaten or
make arrests of people committing crimes at particular locations and times, or simply
aggressive preventive patrol efforts (Bratton et al., 1997; Kelling, 1999; Moore, 2003).
Although the CompStat system made learning how to deal with crime an
important objective for every precinct commander, the system itself does not lend to
organizational learning. The CompStat system has evolved into a numbers game
(Dabney, 2010), and the audit process, also known as the CompStat inspection, has
become a public humiliation session for those who don’t produce the desired crime
reduction numbers (Eterno & Silverman, 2012). As Moore (2003) indicated, “The worry,
however, is that although this became the concern of every commander in the force, it

166
does not necessarily follow that the system will produce new ideas about how to deal
with crime” (p. 484).
According to Bratton and Maple, although crime reduction was the most
important element of the CompStat system, those responsible for producing the crime
reduction figures were equally responsible for creating new and innovative methods for
solving the crime problem (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999). Because
fear became the driving force behind the CompStat system (Weisburd et al., 2003), rather
than take the time to create new and innovative strategies toward the reduction of crime,
precinct commanders found themselves trying to find out what the preferred
organizational problem-solving method was in order to replicate it (Moore, 2003). Thus,
CompStat does not necessarily create organizational learning, but rather conformity and
compliance with age-old theories and practices toward the reduction of crime.
One of the emerging trends in organizations today is that of continuous learning
(Callahan & Myrtle, 2008; Karmakar, 2010; Mozenter, 1999). Management strategists
have suggested that the ultimate competitive advantage will be determined by the extent
to which the organization is able to learn faster than its competition (Callahan & Myrtle,
2008). This is what is commonly referred to as a learning organization, and “is much
more difficult than individual learning” (De Geus, 1988, p. 70).
In his book, The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge (1990a, p. 3) explained that
learning organizations are “…organizations where people continually expand their
capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are

167
continually learning to see the whole together.” Regardless of the sector, in today’s
competitive, global environment, “organizations with the best chance to succeed and
thrive are learning organizations that generate, communicate, and leverage their
intellectual assets” (Serrat, 2009, p. 1).
One of the many driving forces behind organizational learning is utilizing the
knowledge and expertise of the organization’s employees, challenging them to view
problems from a different prospective in order to create new and innovative solutions for
the problems of today. For example, what does architecture have in common with
termites? For most people, the common answer to this question would be nothing.
However, out of this seemingly random combination came a groundbreaking idea to
build an energy-efficient, commercial/retail shopping center and office complex in
Zimbabwe (Benyus, 2002; Johansson, 2004; Turner & Soar, 2008).
This groundbreaking idea occurred in what Frans Johansson has termed the
“Intersection,” a place where ideas and concepts from diverse industries, cultures,
departments, and disciplines collide, ultimately igniting an explosion of ideas leading to
extraordinary new discoveries (Johansson, 2004). The proliferations of new ideas that
come out of the Intersection are what Johansson refers to as the Medici Effect.
Background
Frans Johansson, author of The Medici Effect, has lived the majority of his life in
what he refers to as the Intersection. Raised in Sweden by his African-American-
Cherokee mother and Swedish father, Johansson went on to earn a Bachelorette Degree
in Environmental Science from Brown University and a Masters Degree in Business

168
Administration from Harvard University (Global Equity Organization, 2006; The Medici
Group, 2012).
Raised and educated in a blend of different cultures and backgrounds, Johansson
founded two opposite, yet extremely successful companies: a Boston-based software
company and a medical device company operating out of Baltimore, Maryland and
Stockholm, Sweden. (Global Equity Organization, 2006; The Medici Group, 2012).
Johansson has also authored various articles on health care, information technology and
the science of sports fishing, which have been featured on the Cable News Network
(CNN); the American Broadcasting Company’s
48
Early Morning Show; and the
Consumer News and Business Channel’s (CNBC) The Business of Innovation Series
along with Jack Welch and Muhammad Yunus (The Medici Group, 2012).
Johansson has found that some of the best ideas and breakthrough innovations
occur when people from diverse backgrounds, cultures, experiences, skills and expertise
collaborate in one specific location (Johansson, 2004). “When you step into an
intersection of fields, disciplines, or cultures, you can combine existing concepts into a
large number of extraordinary new ideas,” which Johansson refers to as the Medici Effect
(Johansson, 2004, p. 2), a name he coined from a banking family, the Medici’s, who lived
and resided during the fifteenth-century in Florence, Italy (De Roover, 1999).
The Medici family roots can be traced back to the end of the twelfth-century
(De Roover, 1999; Hibbert, 1999; Malaguzzi, 2004; Padgett & Ansell, 1993). As
members of the patrician class, not the nobility, the Medici’s were known as being

48
The American Broadcasting Company is commonly referred to as ABC television. However, in terms of
this research, ABC is the abbreviation for the Alcohol Beverage Control and not to be confused.

169
friends of the common people (De Roover, 1999; Hibbert, 1999). “The Medici family
rose to power against the background of a sound Florentine republic governed by an
oligarchy formed of a few leading families of the mercantile and banking class”
(Malaguzzi, 2004, p. 33).
The Medici’s formed the Medici Bank, which was one of the most prosperous and
respected institutions in all of Europe (De Roover, 1999). The wealth generated from the
bank afforded the Medici’s the opportunity to fund projects for some of the greatest
artists, sculptors, scientists, poets, architects and philosophers the world has ever known
(De Roover, 1999; Hibbert, 1999; Johansson, 2004; Malaguzzi, 2004). “Thanks to this
family…sculptors, scientists, poets, philosophers, financers, painters, and architects
converged upon the city of Florence…there they found each other, learned from one
another, and broke down barriers between disciplines and cultures,” creating one of the
most innovative eras in all of history (Johansson, 2004, pp. 2-3).
Although The Medici Effect is named after the Medici Family, the concept is
neither about the family nor the time period in which they lived. Rather, it is about
breaking down barriers and creating an “explosion of extraordinary ideas,” and taking
advantage of these ideas “as individuals, as teams, and as organizations” (Johansson,
2004, p. 3). All of which begins by stepping into the Intersection.
The Intersection
In order for the Medici Effect to occur, the blending of ideas that culminate in an
explosion of remarkable innovations must first take place at the Intersection. The
Intersection is a place where ideas and concepts from diverse industries, cultures,

170
departments, and disciplines collide, ultimately igniting an explosion of ideas leading to
extraordinary new discoveries (Johansson, 2004). This place where ideas and concepts
explode into remarkable innovations can be located anywhere people congregate and
share ideas with one another. One example of an Intersection is Peter’s Café.
Peter’s Café is located on a hillside in Horta, a port city on one of the Azores
islands in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. “Horta is the one place between the
America’s and Europe where world-traveling sailors stop to take a break” (Johansson,
2004, p. 1). Peter’s Café, also known as Peter Café Sport, has been in existence since
1918, and is considered the “Mecca” or “Holy Grail” for sailors (Peter Café Sport, 2012;
Tripadvisor, 2012). Sailors and tourists from all over the world converge on this
location, bringing with them various backgrounds and cultures, to engage in
conversation, express ideas, or to pick up year-old letters from other world travelers
(Johansson, 2004).
When Johansson visited Peter’s Café for the first time, he realized the serene
environment of the café actually concealed a chaotic universe. “The café was filled with
ideas and viewpoints from all corners of the world, and these ideas were intermingling
and colliding with each other” (Johansson, 2004, p. 1). All persons in attendance
participate in what seems like an almost random combination of ideas, where one
conversation leads to another, and it is virtually impossible to guess what idea will be
thought up next (Johansson, 2004).

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Peter’s Café, however, is not the only Intersection. There are numerous other
Intersections where ideas collide and culminate in an explosion of remarkable
innovations. In fact, if used properly, CompStat could be considered an Intersection.
In the case of the NYPD, CompStat meetings were first held on the second-floor
press room at Police Headquarters; however, the meetings were quickly moved to the
operations room – or the command center, as it was referred to by Bratton – on the eight
floor of headquarters to accommodate the large number of participants and visitors to the
process (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Although the NYPD command center was equipped
with only 115 seats it was not uncommon to have more than 200 people packed into the
room, “including people from the offices of the district attorney and the U.S. attorney,
parole, schools, and the Port Authority police” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 233). The
typical CompStat Inspection Room configuration is noted Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1. The CompStat Inspection Room

Source: Shane, J. (2007). What Every Chief Executive Should Know: Using Data to
Measure Police Performance. New York: Looseleaf Law Publishing, Inc.

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Utilizing the wealth of knowledge and expertise located in the room, new and
innovative ideas for reducing the fear and incidence of crime could be discussed with the
various stakeholders in the crime reduction process. Although persons in attendance
would participate in a more orchestrated series of questioning than that of which you
would find at Peter’s Café, the person orchestrating the meeting could easily ask the
crowd for their ideas in order to help solve a crime problem. Any person within the
organization, or outside the organization, would be allowed to speak up and provide an
answer to the specific problem at hand. Thus, like Peter’s Café, one conversation could
lead to another conversation and it would be virtually impossible to guess what idea
might be thought up next.
The Intersect Policing system has a physical Intersection where persons from
various backgrounds, cultures and disciplines can come together.
49
It is within this
location that breakthrough ideas are created in order to eliminate the fear and incidence of
crime. The Intersection is the “hub” of the Intersect Policing system and, unlike the
traditional CompStat inspection; the core value respect for people is strictly enforced. By
doing so, all attendees feel comfortable enough to provide new and innovative ideas to
the myriad of crime problems plaguing the community; thus, creating the Medici Effect.
However, although the two examples provided are physical locations, there is
another Intersection location where different cultures, domains and disciplines stream
together toward a single point. That Intersection location is inside the human mind
(Johansson, 2004).

49
The amount of space available with the police facility will dictate the physical size of the Intersection.

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The human mind is a super computer, which allows for concepts to clash and
combine, ultimately forming a multitude of groundbreaking ideas (Johansson, 2004;
Moravec, 1998). This blend of ideas, no matter if they take place in a physical location
or in a person’s mind, are in fact occurring at what Johansson refers to as the Intersection,
and the explosion of ideas that come forth from these locations is the Medici Effect.
Creating the Medici Effect
When a person steps into an Intersection of different fields, disciplines, or
cultures, they can combine existing concepts into a larger number of extraordinary new
ideas, which is the phenomenon Johansson refers to as the Medici Effect. The beauty of
the process is that this explosion of extraordinary ideas and new concepts can be taken
advantage of by individuals, teams and organizations. The approach is simple,
straightforward and highly effective, integrating the simple idea that diversity drives
innovation (Johansson, 2004). Case in point, Mick Pearce and the Eastgate
commercial/retail complex in Zimbabwe.
Mick Pearce, like Johansson, has lived the majority of his life at the Intersection.
Pearce was born in Zimbabwe, schooled in South Africa, and trained as an architect in
London (Architects for Peace, 2012; Biomimicry Institute, 2012; Johansson, 2004).
Although an architect by trade, Pearce had a zestful interest in ecology, and was
committed to developing sustainable, low cost, energy efficient buildings for the
betterment of society (Architects for Peace, 2012; Johansson, 2004; Pearce, 2005).
One day an insurance and real estate conglomerate company, Old Mutual,
approached Pearce with a unique and interesting challenge. The request was to build an

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attractive, functioning office building in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, which uses no
air conditioning (Benyus, 2002; Johansson, 2004; Turner & Soar, 2008).
To a person who had never experienced or lived their life at the Intersection, the
task of creating such a facility would appear daunting and impossible. Drawing upon his
skills in architecture, combined with his passion for ecology, Pearce entered into the
Intersection and based his architectural design around the “Macrotermes michaelseni”
termites and their ability to cool mounds of mud and dirt (Architects for Peace, 2012;
Biomimicry Institute, 2012; Dangerfield et al., 1998; Jmhasly & Leuthold, 1999;
Johansson, 2004; Pearce, 2005; Turner & Soar, 2008).
Macrotermes michaelseni termites must keep the internal temperature in their
mounds at a constant eighty-seven degrees in order to grow an essential fungus (Turner &
Soar, 2008). Not an easy job since temperatures on the African plains can range from
over 100 degrees during the day to below forty at night (Johansson, 2004; Turner & Soar,
2008). Still, the insects manage it by ingeniously directing breezes at the base of the
mound into chambers with cool, wet mud and then redirecting the cooled air to the peak
(Benyus, 2002; Dangerfield et al., 1998; Johansson, 2004; Turner & Soar, 2008). “By
constantly building new vents and closing old ones, they can regulate the temperature
very precisely” (Johansson, 2004, p. 4).
Pearce understood this concept based on his architectural knowledge and passion
for ecology; however, there were many other questions he needed answers to, all of
which were outside his area of expertise. Although his passion had led him to this point,
Pearce realized he would need additional expertise to assist him and make his vision a

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reality. Thus, Pearce called upon an engineer by the name of Ove Arup and brought him
into the Intersection (Biomimicry Institute, 2012; Johansson, 2004).
Together, Pearce and Arup “networked” with other experts from a variety of
fields ranging from physiology to electricity and brought them into the Intersection
(Herminia & Hunter, 2007; Milward & Provan, 2006; Turner & Soar, 2008). The result
culminated in 1996 with the creation of Eastgate, the largest commercial/retail complex
in Zimbabwe, and one of the worlds most energy efficient structures (Benyus, 2002;
Johansson, 2004; Turner & Soar, 2008).
The fact of the matter is none of this could have been accomplished if Pearce had
not stepped into the Intersection and combined his architectural design with the processes
of nature (Johansson, 2004). Pearce was determined to turn his vision into a reality.
Rather than trying to accomplish this project on his own and run the risk of failure,
Pearce networked with those who had the necessary knowledge, not necessarily in
architecture, but in disciplines that were vastly different, yet related to his project, in
order to bring the vision to fruition.
In the role of network building, organizational leaders need to view themselves as
what Malcolm Gladwell calls “Connectors” (Gladwell, 2000). Connectors have a
“…special gift for bringing people together” (Gladwell, 2000, p. 38). As Connector’s,
organizational leaders need to understand that it is their responsibility to bring together
diverse groups of intelligent people – or as Gladwell calls them “Mavens” - into the
problem-solving arena (Gladwell, 2000, p. 34). By doing so, new and innovative ideas
are created to help solve complex problems.

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Pearce (Connector) and his team (Mavens) entered into the Intersection and
learned from one another. Together, each member of the group provided their knowledge
and expertise for the betterment of the project and society. This concept is what every
twenty-first century organization needs to embrace. Learning from this case study
demonstrates how individuals and teams can enhance organizational learning by stepping
into the Intersection and creating the Medici Effect.
Organizational Learning
Upon review of the literature it is difficult to find only one definition of learning
(Levitt & March, 1988; Twigg, 1994; Weick, 1991). The most common definitions,
however, center on learning as being the “acquisition of knowledge” (Brown & Duguid,
2000, p. 124), and “Policing, like all professions, learns from experience” (Kelling &
Moore, 1988, p. 1). The Intersection is about learning, and learning can be found in the
relationships between people. Social learning occurs when persons who share an interest
collaborate over time to exchange ideas, find solutions, and build innovations based on
ability, not hierarchical position (Serrat, 2009). Utilizing the collective of all participants
creates the Medici Effect – an explosion of new ideas and concepts - for the betterment of
people, organizations and society.
Organizational learning is the process by which an organization acquires the
knowledge necessary to survive and compete in its environment (Argyris, 1999; Bolman
& Deal, 2003; Farkas & De Backer, 1996; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Kim, 1993; Senge, 1990a,
1990b). This includes the development of knowledge, shared among organizational
employees through conversations and interactions, which leads to effective action and the

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successful forgetting of things that do not work (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Cook &
Yanow, 1993; Easterby-Smith et al., 2000; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Gherardi & Nicolini,
2000; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nicolini & Meznar, 1995; Schwandt & Marquardt, 2000;
Senge, 1990a, 1990b; Wenger 1998). Although there is a successful forgetting of things
that didn’t work, it is still important to remember those things, so that sometime in the
future, when someone suggests the same idea, people will recognize the idea has been
tried before and failed.
Organizational learning explores ways to design organizations so they fulfill their
function(s) effectively, encourage people to reach their fullest potential, and, at the same
time, help make for a better society (Bolman & Deal, 2003; Burke et al., 2005;
Macdonald et al., 2006; March, 1991; Schein, 2004). Although organizational learning is
rooted in various disciplines, system thinking forms the cornerstone (Easterby-Smith et
al., 2000; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Hedberg, 1981; Scott & Davis, 2007; Shrivastava, 1983).
The open system perspective views organizations as “social systems,” which are
“complex” and “loosely coupled” (Scott & Davis, 2007, pp. 88-89). This perspective
views groups as living, active systems that take inputs (people and situations), processes
them (through group structural dimensions and processes), and produces outputs (effects
on individuals, groups, and the organization). If done well, it is during this process, at the
“operational level,” (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 93) when people enter into the Intersection
and information is transformed into knowledge, which equates to the Medici Effect.
In the words of Sir Frances Bacon (1597), “Knowledge is power” (Simpson,
2005). Although “knowledge and information appear as interchangeable terms,”

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knowledge is different than information (Brown & Duguid, 2000, pp. 119). The recent
innovations and continual improvements in technology have made it easier for
organizations to share information. Although this is useful, it’s more effective for
organizations to focus on sharing knowledge, rather than just information.
As Brown and Duguid (2000) explained, the personal attributes of knowledge
suggest that the shift toward knowledge may, or should, represent a shift toward people.
The reason being is knowledge only exists in the human mind. Organizations can do this
by focusing on people using technology, rather than just focusing on technology itself.
For example, through the advent of smart system technologies, police personnel
can exchange information, review criminal information, and observe crime “hot spot”
locations, in real-time, with the touch of a button (Braga, 2001, 2005; Braga & Bond,
2008; CBS, 2011; Manning; 2001b, 2008; Moore, 2003; Nasar & Fisher, 1993; Ratcliffe,
2003; Weisburd, 2005; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Intersect Policing embraces this
technology in order to provide police personnel with up to the minute information, in
real-time, for the betterment of the profession and society. Thus, unlike information,
knowledge needs to be managed.
Knowledge management is the use of technology to make information relevant
and accessible wherever the information may reside. “Knowledge management
incorporates systematic processes of finding, selecting, organizing, and presenting
information in a way that improves an employee’s comprehension and use of business
assets” (Brown & Duguid, 2000, p. 117). People have knowledge, whereas manuals and

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databases have information, and organizations need people to synthesize information in
order for it to be useful.
For example, CompStat, in part, is a technological computer system that provides
crime information to police departments about when, where and what type of crime is
occurring. The information does not provide, however, the name of the person who
committed the crime nor the strategy required to eradicate the problem. What is required
in this situation is the knowledge only a “seasoned” police professional can provide.
Knowledge of the area; knowledge about the suspects who frequent the area; and, proven,
effective police strategies that have worked to eradicate this type of crime problem in the
past.
Utilizing The Medici Effect principle, police personnel from different
backgrounds, cultures, divisions and expertise can be brought into the Intersection to
share their combined knowledge to analyze the technological information CompStat
provides. Based upon the discussion and learning that takes place in the Intersection, the
explosion of ideas to eradicate the crime problem manifests itself in organizational
knowledge, which in turn can be used to reduce the fear and incidence of crime.
Our world is abundantly full of information. For this reason, organizational
leaders must develop a learning culture within their organizations that can take data
management where data (undigested facts) can become information (facts organized by
outside sources but not yet integrated into your thinking), which can become knowledge
(internalized information), and ultimately refined into wisdom (integrated knowledge).

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One way to accomplish this is through a “cybernetic system” process known as “double-
loop learning” (Scott & Davis, 2007, pp. 90-92).
DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING
There are two different kinds of learning in systems theory: “single-loop” and
“double-loop” (Argyris, 1976, 1982, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004; Blackman et
al., 2004; Davies & Nutley, 2000; Greenwood, 1998; Kim, 1993; Korth, 2000; Peile,
2004; Scott & Davis, 2007).
Argyris coined the terms singe-loop and double-loop learning to capture this
crucial distinction (Argyris, 1976, 1982, 1991). In order to better understand the
difference between the two types of learning, Argyris created a simple analogy based on
a thermostat (see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2. Single-Loop Learning

Source: Scott, W. and Davis, G. (2007). Organizations and Organizing: Rational,
Natural, and Open System Perspectives. Uppers Saddle: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Person
Thermostat
Heater
Demand of Person
for Comfort

Sets H1 (Heat Goal)
Signal-Regulator
(on/off)
t

Heat

Fuel
!
Program: Compare t & H1
If t < H1 then Turn on
If t > H1 then Turn off

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In regards to single-loop learning, a thermostat set to seventy-five degrees turns
up the heat, based on a “program” (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 90), whenever the
temperature drops below seventy-five degrees (Argyris, 1976, 1991). According to
Beniger (1986), programs are “any prearranged information that guides subsequent
behavior” (p. 39). Thus, “programs control by determining decisions…the process of
control involves comparison of new information (inputs) to stored patterns and
instructions (programming) to decide among a predetermined set of contingent behaviors
(possible outputs)” (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 90).
In double-loop learning, however, one asks the question as to “why” the
thermostat was set to seventy-five degrees and was seventy-five degrees the optimum
temperature for which the thermostat was set (Argyris, 1991; Argyris & Schön, 1978).
Thus, single-loop learning solves immediate problems, whereas double-loop learning
attempts to address the root causes of problems (Argyris, 1976, 1982, 1991, 1994, 1999,
2002, 2003, 2004; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Greenwood, 1998; Kim, 1993; Korth, 2000;
Peile, 2004; Scott & Davis, 2007).
In terms of policing, the CompStat system lends itself to single-loop learning,
because it focuses on making the organization get better at performing its current tasks.
What this research proposes, however, is a new way of learning. The kind of learning
that Argyris has coined double-loop learning, where the organization learns to reconsider
some of its basic assumptions about its overall purpose and the manner in which it goes
about altering the external environment (see Figure 6.3).

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Figure 6.3. Single-Loop and Double-Loop Learning

Source: Adapted from Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1978). Organizational Learning: A
Theory of Action Perspective. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Some of the factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, reconsidering
whether the best way to deal with crime is through threatening and actually arresting
those who commit crimes rather than trying to find other more preventive modes of
intervening in the large and small social circumstance that tend to create offenders or the
situation that produce offenders; or, it might involve a rethinking about how the police
understand the contributions community members make to their own self-defense, and
what the police can do to help them both reduce crime and deal with their own fears in
ways that strengthen, rather than weaken, community bonds (Moore, 2003).

Governing
Variable
Action
Strategy
Consequences
Single-Loop Learning
Double'Loop*Learning*
(Observe, reflect, decide and do)
(Reconsider, reconnect, reframe and reflect)

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In terms of Intersect Policing, when police professionals are brought into the
Intersection to analyze a crime a problem, together they deduce the problem to specific
points and create a strategy to eradicate the problem. After the strategy has been
implemented, the results (consequences) are analyzed, again, by all of the persons
involved. Based on the lessons learned, either positive or negative, a new strategy is
formulated and continues until the problem is eradicated.
Studies have shown that most highly skilled professionals are frequently very
good at single-loop learning, because they have spent much of their lives acquiring
academic credentials, mastering one or a number of intellectual disciplines, and applying
those disciplines to solve real-world problem (Argyris, 1976, 1982, 1991, 1994, 1999,
2002, 2003, 2004). “But ironically, this very fact helps explain why professionals are
often so bad at double-loop learning” (Argyris, 1991, p.1).
The fact of the matter remains that most highly skilled professionals are almost
always successful; thus, they don’t have the opportunity to experience failure. This poses
a serious problem in terms of learning, because there is much learning that takes place
during a person’s failures. “So whenever their single-loop learning strategies go wrong,
they become defensive, screen out criticism, and put the ‘blame’ on anyone and everyone
but themselves…in short, their ability to learn shuts down precisely at the moment they
need it the most” (Argyris, 1991, p. 1).
Argyris explains that the propensity among professionals to behave defensively
sheds light on a common mistake organizations make about learning, which is the
common assumption that getting people to learn is largely a matter of motivation

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(Argyris, 1976, 1982, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004). The common belief many
organizational leaders buy into is that when employees have the right attitudes, learning
automatically follows; thus, the companies focus on creating new organizational
structures, compensation programs, performance reviews to create motivated and
committed employees (Argyris, 1991, 1994, 2002; Kohn, 1993).
Effective double-loop learning is not about motivation or how employees feel. “It
is a reflection of how they think – that is, the cognitive rules or reasoning they use to
design and implement their actions…a ‘master program’ stored in the brain, governing all
behavior” (Argyris, 1991, pp. 1-2). The fact of the matter is defensive reasoning blocks
learning. Since the human mind is a super computer and, like a computer, can capture a
virus, defensive reasoning creates chaos in the brain, causing the computer to short-
circuit.
Conclusion
Today’s organizations, especially law enforcement, face unprecedented
challenges that require unique solutions. Unlike problems of the past, many of these
issues overlap into various fields and sectors. Thus, the solutions require a new way of
looking at the problem.
Police leaders need to act as Connectors and bring into the Intersection as many
Mavens as possible. Together, these unique groups of people can utilize their combined
knowledge from various fields and cultures to create an explosion of new discoveries and
create solutions to the complex problems facing our communities.

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What today’s leader, especially those in law enforcement, needs to unlearn is that
they cannot be too quick to judge a book by its cover. Just because a person has no law
enforcement experience does not mean the person can’t provide a new insight to a
complex law enforcement problem. In fact, the person from outside of law enforcement
could probably bring about a better solution simply because they are not confined by the
frame of mind which confines most people in a chosen profession. This is what Zander
and Zander (2000) meant in their book, The Art of Possibility, when they explained how
leaders should create “another frame around the data, so that problems vanish, and new
opportunities appear” (p. 14).
Organizational learning is a process for acquiring knowledge, rather than
information, in order to compete in its environment. The goal is to move from a
“network of practice” to a “community of practice” where knowledge, rather than
information, is shared amongst collaborative communities (Brown & Duguid, 2000,
pp. 142-143). This is accomplished through a variety of methods ranging from
“reflection” to double-loop learning (Senge, 1990a, p. 21). Knowledge is power, and the
leader “…who figures out how to harness the collective genius of the people in his or her
organization…by extracting the knowledge…is going to blow the competition away”
(Senge, 1990a, pp. 7-8).

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Chapter 7

INTERSECT POLICING SYSTEM
Introduction
Organizations exist to achieve a purpose. The purpose of law enforcement is to
provide a service that ensures the safety and security of people and property. In order to
achieve this purpose, police work needs to be carried out effectively and efficiently.
The CompStat process ensures that leaders within the organization who are
responsible for the service delivery system have a strong understanding of the crime
problems within their command. In terms of large police organizations, such as the
LAPD, the responsibility for reducing the fear and incidence of crime, as well as the
creation of strategies toward the reduction of crime, belongs to the Area captain.
Area captains are tasked with a multitude of responsibilities, ranging from
deployment of resources to dealing with political issues of the day. In essence, an LAPD
Area captain is the equivalent of a small to mid-city police chief. Although Area captains
are ultimately responsible and held accountable for the reduction of crime in their
respective divisions under the current CompStat process, the realities of the job prohibit
the kind of daily hands-on analysis required to stay on top of the ever-changing crime
picture.
Many police departments throughout the United States, including Los Angeles,
have crime analysts on staff assigned to assist in the crime-fighting mission. Crime

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analysts assist in a variety of ways including, but not limited to, providing timely and
pertinent information relative to crime patterns, providing assistance to operational and
administrative personnel in planning for the deployment of resources toward the
prevention and suppression of criminal activities, aiding the investigative process, and
increasing apprehensions and the clearance of cases (Gottlieb, 2008).
Since the introduction of CompStat to the LAPD in 2003,
50
much of the time
spent by crime analysts has been focused on administrative details, such as crime data
input and retrieval, producing maps, data tables and other statistical data, along with
formatting and printing wanted bulletins and flyers, rather than analyzing crime
(Malinowski, 2010). This presents a problem. If crime analysts are too busy completing
CompStat functions that they cannot analyze crime, and Area captains have too many
responsibilities, which prohibit them from analyzing crime, the question that needs to be
asked is, “who then is analyzing crime?” The answer, plan and simple, is nobody.
The truth of the matter is all police personnel, not just the Area captain, should
play an important role in the crime reduction process. Controlling the human
phenomenon known as crime is much too large a task and responsibility for one person to
accomplish alone. The process requires teamwork and collaboration, not just with
members of the police department, but with the community as well. To date, however,
CompStat has largely been used at the higher levels of the organization (Moore, 2003;
Moore & Braga, 2003; Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2010), while the rank-and-file

50
The LAPD held its first CompStat inspection on April 3, 2003.

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remains largely oblivious to the process (Weisburd et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2003) and
the community has no responsibility whatsoever.
The purpose of this research is to develop a real-time operating system, utilizing
CompStat as a strategic tool, which enables Area captains to create specific tasks through
organizational learning that accomplishes the purpose of law enforcement through the
daily work of police officers. Intersect Policing is a system that utilizes CompStat
technology to derive strategies, which are needed to accomplish the organizations
purpose.
Strategies are formulated in an open forum amongst various stakeholders,
utilizing each individual’s knowledge, experience and situational awareness, in regards to
the identified problem. In doing so, Intersect Policing creates an environment of
organizational learning, which enhances job satisfaction and employee morale. Daily
missions are formulated, based on the strategies, so personnel understand the work that
needs to be completed in order to accomplish the organizational purpose. Police
personnel are then required to accomplish the work within the boundaries of
organizational policy.
Overview of the Chapter
In this chapter we will take an in-depth look at the Intersect Policing system. In
order to bring clarity to the reader, the chapter will be broken into five separate sections:
Origins of the System, The Intersection, The Daily Intersection Meeting, Three Steps to
Crime Reduction, and CompStat preparation and presentation. Real-life examples will be
used to provide clarity to the subject matter; however, no names, case numbers, personal

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information or any other information that could be considered confidential or otherwise
will be presented in this research.
Origins of the System
The Medici Effect
Frans Johansson (2004) wrote a book called, The Medici Effect: Breakthrough
Insights at the Intersection of Ideas, Concepts & Cultures, which described how people
from different cultures, fields and backgrounds were able to come together in one
location, discuss ideas and concepts, and ignite an explosion of extraordinary new
discoveries. Johansson (2004) called this meeting location the “Intersection” (pp. 11-32)
and the proliferation of new ideas that came out of the Intersection was called the
“Medici Effect” (pp. 33-116).
After reading the book, I realized in order to reduce crime, police departments,
large and small, needed to create an Intersection where ideas could be exchanged from
various perspectives (patrol, specialized units, community relations, etc.) to obtain the
Medici Effect. Utilizing the lessons learned from Johansson, I embarked on a journey to
create a system that would utilize all of the best practices law enforcement had to offer,
such as CompStat, along with the combined knowledge, wisdom and expertise of the
various stakeholders associated with the crime reduction process, in order to reduce the
fear and incidence of crime. After three years of research, the result is a system I refer to
as “Intersect Policing.”
51

51
The Intersect Policing research began on June 8, 2008, and concluded on December 31, 2011.

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Intersect Policing is short for “Policing at the Intersection,” which was coined
from Johansson’s book The Medici Effect (2004). In the simplest term, Intersect Policing
is a system for reducing crime in an urban area. This is accomplished by bringing people
together, not just from the law enforcement profession, but also from various sectors of
the community. People from different backgrounds, specialized fields and cultures, come
together in order to exchange ideas and create strategies to reduce crime and improve
quality of life in the community.
Intersect Policing brings together best practice crime fighting techniques and
strategies as well as the latest technological advances, such as CompStat and Hot Spot
Policing, to fully analyze crime in the minutest detail (Braga, 2001, 2005; Braga & Bond,
2008; Manning, 2001a; Nasar & Fisher, 1993; Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 1999; Townsley
& Pease, 2002; Weisburd, 2005; Weisburd & Eck, 2004).
Stratified Systems Theory
Intersect Policing has a system component based on the research of Burke et al.
(2005), The Work of Management: Getting the Basics Right, and Macdonald et al. (2006),
Systems Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations, which expanded upon the work of
Elliot Jaques Stratified Systems Theory of organizational development. While studying
Stratified Systems Theory during a directed research at USC under the tutelage of Doctor
Catherine Burke, I realized the importance of how people need to come together in order
to achieve a productive purpose.
Human survival has always depended upon our ability to form and sustain social
organizations. For many years the police have been viewed as the problem, rather than

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the solution, to many of society’s ills, especially in terms of racial tensions, which have
manifested in negative mythologies and cultures. It is my belief the police could be, and
should be, the catalyst for change in society; however, before the police can create this
change, they must first learn to lead themselves, which starts with the creation of a
positive organization where people can be creative and belong. By creating a positive
police organization that embraces new and innovative methods of learning, as well the
community as a true partner toward the reduction of crime, they can fulfill the basic
social needs required and help to build a worthwhile society (Macdonald et al., 2006).
Intersect Policing takes a Systems Leadership (2006) approach: “a social process
based on the core values of the organization, which requires the understanding of
mythologies with the ability to create culture” (p. 99). Since this research is concerned
with how people from all sectors come together to achieve a productive purpose, Intersect
Policing is built upon an understanding of sound, general principles of behavior.
While the concept ignites an explosion of ideas that is beneficial to the individual,
team and organization (Johansson, 2004), at the core of the system lies clarity in terms of
context, purpose and the formulation, assigning and reviewing of tasks to ensure
accountability (Macdonald et al., 2006).
Achieving the Fourth level
When CompStat was introduced by the NYPD, the system was envisioned by
Bratton to have four levels, which would radiate from the top-down and encompass the
entire organization (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Walsh, 2001;
Walsh & Vito, 2004). Through the creation of this fourth level, Bratton opined all levels

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of the organization would be “…empowered and motivated, active and assessed and
successful” (Bratton and Knobler, 1998, p. 239).
Studies conducted by Weisburd et al. (2003), found that although this level of
intense accountability was commonly expressed by middle managers in CompStat
departments, the research found nothing remotely resembling the format in lower levels
of the organization, except on the rare occasion when a rank-and-file officer was required
to make a substantial presentation at a department CompStat meeting. Nobody can be
certain as to why this illusive fourth level has not been implemented. The fact it was
designed to be an “interrogation” session (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 239) might have
something to do with it; regardless of the reason, however, the implementation of this
level is imperative to reducing the fear and incidence of crime.
Intersect Policing achieves this fourth level by involving all of the various
stakeholders, from the Area captain to the newly assigned probationary police officer as
well as the community member, in the crime reduction process. Unlike the CompStat
system design, which requires organizational leaders to interrogate their subordinates,
Intersect Policing is built upon the six core universal values; thus, ensuring all persons
entering the Intersection are treated with respect and allowed to have a voice in the crime
reduction process. The process results in the manifestation of new and innovative ideas,
which in turn creates an environment of learning, rather than fear, for the betterment of
the person, the organization and society as will be demonstrated in the following
chapters.

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Cultural Change
Intersect Policing is an intervention aimed at creating a cultural change from the
traditional manner in which police analyze, strategize and respond to crime. As learned
during the professional era of policing,
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random focus only creates random results
(Bratton et al., 1997). Intersect Policing provides strategic focus that places “cops on the
dots,” in real-time, through problem solving, resource deployment, and strategy
specifically designed to work in the division, precinct or department where crime is
occurring (Bratton et al., 1997; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Maple & Mitchell, 1999).
Although policing has come a long way in terms of lowering crime since the
advent of CompStat, there is still much room for improvement. Ask any member of
society if they believe the LAPD analyzes crime at the divisional level, odds are you will
likely receive an answer of “Yes.” In reality, many of the duties and responsibilities of
crime analysts have been “watered down,” which prohibit the kind of daily “hands-on”
analysis required to stay on top of the ever-changing crime situation.
This problem is not isolated at the Area level of the LAPD. Many other police
organizations lack the timely and thorough crime analysis that is much needed on a daily
basis. In addition, many police departments lack an immediate, coordinated and
comprehensive response to identified crime patterns and trends.
In terms of police organizations that have embraced the CompStat system, there
needs to be a support element to enhance the use of crime analysts. Since crime never

52
The professional era of policing began in the early 1930s and continued though the 1970s (Bratton et al.,
1997; Fleissner & Heinzelmann, 1996; Fogelson, 1977; Gaines & Kappeler, 2011; Lewis et al., 1999;
Kelling & Moore, 1988; Oliver, 2000).

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sleeps and much of the criminal element is becoming more sophisticated, these changes
can no longer be put off until tomorrow; rather, they need to take place immediately.
Intersect Policing is about creating, as Kotter (1995, 1996) phrased it, “a sense of
urgency.” Police departments cannot be satisfied with the status quo. All members of
the department, not just the Area captains, need to take ownership of the crime problem;
thus, a sense of urgency is crucial.
As Kotter (1995) pointed out in his book, Leading Change: Why Transformation
Efforts Fail, most successful change efforts begin when individuals or groups start to
look hard at a company’s competitive situation, market position, technological trends,
and financial performance. Intersect Policing accomplishes Kotter’s sentiments by
tracking the number of crimes occurring on a daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis,
which are formatted in various dashboards, charts and graphs.
The crime numbers are tabulated and compared against crime numbers posted at
the same time of the previous year. It must be noted, however, that although Intersect
Policing captures and compares information from the previous year, Intersect Policing
focuses more on trends, rather than just year-to-year comparisons, which is most useful
for persons working in a Stratum III level. This reason being is that every year is
different and anomalies do occur (Wheeler, 2000).
This information, however, must be kept current on a daily basis, which is shared
with all Area personnel providing an analysis of where and how their performance
compares with the previous extraction period (see Figure 7.1). In doing so, it provides all
members of the team with a sense of knowing “where they are” in terms of crime

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reduction. This is important because people working at a Stratum II level need weekly,
monthly and yearly comparisons. Trends are less useful for them. Without this sense of
knowing the “score of the game,” police personnel would have no engagement on a
personal level; thus, no sense of urgency.
Figure 7.1. Intersection Friday Comparison Report

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The Intersect Policing concept can be customized to fit any police department,
regardless of its size or geography. The premise is that the Intersect Policing delivery
system remains constant, while the strategies employed vary to fit the unique personality
and crime problems of the division, precinct or department; thus, delivering
unprecedented results in crime reduction, while at the same time creating a culture of
learning, that will reduce crime and provide a better quality of life for all those who live,
work and visit the community in which the police agency protects and serves.
The Physical Intersection
Intersect Policing has a physical location where all things come together. This
location is called the Intersection. The Intersection in this research, in terms of physical
space, was modeled after the White House Situation Room, a conference room
surrounded on three sides by two small offices, multiple workstations, computers, and
communications equipment (Donley et al., 2004).
The design of the Intersection needs to be structured around the needs of the
division, precinct or department. The physical size of the Intersection will vary
depending upon the amount of workspace available within the physical structure of the
police facility. Since there is only so much workspace available in any police facility,
utilizing the lesson learned from the Incident Command System (Bigley & Roberts, 2001;
Buck et al., 2006; Lutz & Lindell, 2008), the Intersection can be tailored to fit any police
facility independent upon the size of the operation.
In terms of the Intersection that was used during this research, see Figure 7.2, the
West Valley Area Community Police Station had been recently rebuilt and was one of the

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most modern police facilities in the LAPD; thus, there was enough space to fit all of the
necessary equipment required to run the operation and provide seating for all Intersection
members. In addition, thanks to the location of the Intersection, there was ample room
located outside the Intersection to provide workstations for all Intersection staff.

Figure 7.2. The Intersection
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The interior of the Intersection used during this research consists of an executive
table, surrounded by ten chairs, located in the center of the room. In the center of the
executive table is a telephone system with conference call capability, along with power

53
The diagram in Figure 7.2 is not to scale.

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outlets. There are no Internet connections located on the executive table, because the
Intersection has wireless Internet connection.
Situated to the west of the executive table is a SMART Board. A SMART Board
is a multi-touch, multi-user interactive whiteboard that allows multiple users to touch or
write anywhere on the boards surface simultaneously utilizing smart touch technology
54

(Baburajan, 2009; SMART Technologies, 2010). Utilizing SMART Pen technology,
multiple users can write anywhere on the SMART Board, in different colors, at the same
time, in order to easily identify crime patterns, clusters and trends (see Figure 7.3).
Figure 7.3. SMART Board Multi-User Function

54
Through the use of smart technology, such as Apple TV, the SMART Board can be wirelessly connected
to smart pads, which allow Intersection members to write on the SMART Board without leaving the
comfort of their chair (Apple, 2012). West Valley Area purchased an Apple TV system and utilized it with
great success. However, in order for multiple users to utilize this feature, the location must have wireless
Internet capability, and the “mirroring” portion of the iPad must be turned to the “on” position.

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Along the east wall of the intersection is a bulletin board/dry erase whiteboard.
The bulletin board allows for the displaying of wanted bulletins, crime alerts, daily
missions or any other information found to be pertinent to the crime reduction strategy
process. Intersection staff members update the information located on the bulletin board
continuously throughout the day to ensure it reflects the most accurate and up-to-date
information possible. The dry erase whiteboard is used for “brainstorming” ideas
(Osborne, 1963) during the Intersection meeting.
Additional seating is located along the north and south walls of the Intersection to
accommodate additional members attending the daily Intersection crime control strategy
meetings. The arrangement of seating can be increased or decreased dependent upon the
number of attendees participating in the daily Intersection meeting.
Situated just outside the Intersection is the Intersection staff working area. This
area consists of six workstations, allowing for each member of the staff to have his or her
own individual workspace. Each workspace consists of a desk, individual floor cabinet,
computer and chair.
In essence, the Intersection is the nerve center of the Intersect Policing operation.
Like the White House Situation Room, the Intersection serves as a centralized location
where all police personnel, sworn and civilian, can obtain crime information, view
resources available, and obtain the most up-to-date strategies and missions, in real-time,
to better combat crime and create policy.

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Intersection Staffing
The Intersection is staffed with a lieutenant, one sergeant, two crime analysts and
two police officers. The lieutenant works in the capacity of officer-in-charge of the
Intersection. The lieutenant is a direct report to the Area captain and is responsible for
ensuring the captain is provided all of the necessary information pertaining to crime, in
real-time, on a daily basis.
The assistant officer-in-charge is a sworn member of the department at the rank of
sergeant.
55
The Intersection sergeant is a direct report to the lieutenant and is responsible
for ensuring the daily operations of the Intersection are completed and the information
provided from the Intersection is accurate and timely.
There are four crime analyst positions assigned to the Intersection. Two of the
positions are filled with civilian crime analysts and the other two positions consist of
sworn police officers. Having a combination of both sworn and civilian crime analysts
provides an extra benefit to the crime fighting equation in the sense of viewing a problem
or situation from a different perspective.
As Johansson (2004) pointed out, problems are solved when viewed from
different perspectives. One of the problems with police officers, like most trained
professionals, is they tend to view a problem or a situation from only one perspective
and, if all you have is a hammer in your toolbox, everything looks like a nail.

55
The reason for the selection of a sergeant, rather than a civilian or detective supervisor, is to bring a
patrol perspective to the equation, and to help bridge the gap between patrol, detectives and other
specialized units assigned to the Area.

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Unlike civilian analysts, however, sworn police officers have real-life knowledge,
experience and situational awareness to draw from. Utilizing their combined efforts,
sworn and civilian, the ability to identify patterns, clusters, trends or a possible suspect is
greatly enhanced, which adds to the organizational learning process.
All positions within the Intersection are based on the level of work and mental
processing ability concept (Jaques, 1989; Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
Working in role at the current stratum, Intersection staff must have an understanding of
the work associated with the next level up, while at the same time having a understanding
of the processes involved at the next level down. Intersection personnel must have the
mental processing ability to work at Levels II through IV (see Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4. Intersection Levels of Work

Source: Macdonald et al. (2006). Systems Leadership: Creating Positive Organizations,
Burlington, VT: Gower Publishing Company (adapted from figure on p. 86).

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Lieutenants assigned to the Intersection work at a Level IV capacity, which is the
equivalent work level for a captain of police. In fact, one way to ensure the lieutenant is
capable of carrying out the work of the role is to select someone who is clearly expected
to make captain within two to three years. In essence, the lieutenant is the eyes and ears
for the captain, providing him or her with the information needed in order to have a full
and complete understanding of the crime situation in the division. The lieutenant
working at this level is constantly checking the environment trying to find what is
missing in order to mesh the work demands of Level III subordinates for best overall
performance. The lieutenant is also responsible for training Level III personnel.
Sergeants assigned to the Intersection work at a Level III capacity, which is
usually reserved for lieutenants. However, since the Intersection is a training ground for
future promotions within the organization, the sergeant must be able to work at this level
and lead those working at a Level II complexity. Sergeants are responsible for reviewing
the actual data received in an attempt to locate crime trends and patterns, while trying to
predict future crime movement. All information gathered by the crime analysts is
provided to the sergeant as an audit mechanism to ensure accountability. In addition, the
sergeant is responsible for training Level II personnel.
Police officers and crime analysts assigned to the Intersection need to have the
mental processing ability to work proficiently at Level II. Personnel at this level will be
required to collect relevant crime data and devise a solution, while at the same time being
flexible enough to adjust the pathways as crime situations change. The crime analysts
assigned to the Intersection serve in a dual training role. In addition to training new

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Intersection employees, they are also required to provide training and guidance to other
police personnel in terms of crime patterns, clusters and trends identified.
Limited Tour Assignment
All personnel assigned to the Intersection enter with the full expectation and
realization that the position is a coveted assignment, which is intended to train and
prepare the employee for future promotion and management positions. For this reason,
each Intersection position is a limited tour assignment not to exceed two calendar years.
56

Intersection personnel may have their tour of duty assignments extended up to an
additional two years with the approval of the Area captain.
Personnel assigned to the Intersection are strongly encouraged to take the
appropriate promotional examination at the next scheduled date. Intersection personnel
are given the opportunity to take up to two examinations during their tour of duty in the
Intersection. If the employee does not receive a passing score on the second examination,
or did not receive a score high enough on the promotional list to be promoted, the
employee will be provided two deployment periods to secure another assignment after the
publication of the promotional list.
Intersection Duties and Responsibilities
The primary responsibility of personnel assigned to the Intersection is to analyze
and identify crime patterns, clusters and trends developing in real-time. To accomplish

56
The LAPD conducts promotional testing every two years, which is the reason for the two-year limited
tour assignment (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a). The time frame associated with the limited tour
assignment can be adjusted to fit the promotional testing process of any police department.

204
this responsibility, information is gathered from a variety of sources. Some of the
sources include, but are not limited to:
• Crime and arrest reports.
• Monitoring the statistical database of reports being inputted by records
personnel.
• Meeting with officers and detectives regarding information obtained from
debriefings of arrestees.
• Reviewing the prior twenty-four hour daily mission sheets.
• Reviewing the prior twenty-four hour Watch Commander Logs.
• Analyzing the daily CompStat generated mapping system.
• Monitoring calls for service.
• Reviewing field interview cards and any other pertinent data subset, such
as parole or probation issues, gun arrests, sex offender registration, etc.
To ensure all categories are provided in real-time, in-depth analysis, the system
separates criminal activity into four categories: homicide/rape; robbery/theft; grand theft
auto/burglary from motor vehicle; and, burglary (residential/commercial).
57
Each crime
category is assigned to one of four Intersection crime analysts for real-time, in-depth
analysis. To ensure equality and continued growth of Intersection personnel, the four
crime categories are rotated amongst the four crime analysts on a quarterly basis.
Breaking down the crime categories into four separate areas, each category can be given

57
These eight crimes make up the total Part-I crime category and are the numbers by which all police
departments in the United States are monitored and ranked (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).

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daily, in-depth, scientific, real-time analysis, which can later be used to devise an
immediate, strategic and comprehensive response by way of a daily mission.
While reviewing the information, Intersection personnel need to be “critical
thinkers” (Paul & Elder, 2005), continually asking themselves, and each other, a series of
questions in order to obtain the big picture and get a better sense of what is actually
occurring in terms of criminal activity. Questions may include, but are not limited to:
• Are there any similarities between reported crimes?
• Is there a specific modus operandi being used?
• Is the suspect description similar in any other crime reports?
• Could an identified suspect also be connected to another type of crime
(i.e., burglary, burglary theft from vehicle, aggravated assault, etc.)?
• What are the demographics of the crime location?
• Is there a particular day of the week or time of day in which the crimes are
occurring?
Although Intersection personnel gather and monitor crime information on a
continual basis throughout the day, the majority of work takes place first thing in the
morning prior to the daily Intersection meeting. Intersection staff members examine all
information pertaining to criminal activity, based on the four crime categories, for the
previous twenty-four hour period from the various sources previous listed.
58
The
information collected is analyzed against criminal activity that took place twenty-four,

58
The twenty-four hour time period starts at 12 a.m. and ends at 11:59 p.m.

206
forty-eight and seventy-two hours prior to gain a more accurate understanding of the
problem.
If it appears a pattern, cluster, series, or a specific problem source is identified, the
information is examined against previous criminal activity for a full seven-day extraction
period. By doing so, Intersection personnel review the information from “the balcony” in
order to obtain the “big picture” as to what is actually occurring in terms of crime in the
division (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002). This in-depth analysis forms the basis and starting
point for the daily Intersection meeting by streamlining the crime analysis portion of the
meetings and allowing Intersection attendees to focus on creating an immediate, strategic
and comprehensive response to the problem identified.
After reviewing the information and obtaining their individual findings,
Intersection personnel conduct a pre-Intersection meeting in order to collaborate and
discuss their individual findings. By doing so, a better understanding of the individual
findings can be made. This meeting helps formulate the big picture as to what type of
criminal activity is taking place in the division. Upon final review of the lieutenant, the
information discussed amongst Intersection staff becomes the starting point for the daily
Intersection meeting.
Daily Intersection Meeting
Each morning an Intersection meeting is called to order at 9 a.m.,
59
inside the
Intersection, to review crime patterns from the previous twenty-four hour period. The

59
The time of day can be adjusted to accommodate the starting times of patrol and other specialized units
assigned to the division, precinct or department. In terms of this research, 9 a.m. was found to be the time
best suited to obtain and distribute the necessary information.

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meetings are modeled after the Presidential Daily Briefings, where summaries of
important events requiring the president’s attention are discussed (Genovese, 2010;
Johnson, 2007).
The information provided at the Intersection meeting begins with an overview of
the current crime situation, which includes the most up-to-date statistics, as well as all
crime problems identified during the pre-Intersection meeting. The information provided
is delivered in an executive summary format in order to save time and energy.
Intersection Meeting Attendees
Intersection meetings are attended by the following employees on a daily basis:
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Area captain, patrol captain, detective commanding officer, gang unit officer-in-charge,
detective table supervisors,
61
vice supervisor, narcotics supervisor, property crimes detail
supervisor, parole compliance unit supervisor, on-duty watch commander, community
relations supervisor, on-duty senior lead officers,
62
and all Intersection staff.
In addition to the above listed employees, any other person, including, but not
limited to, police officers, block captains, neighborhood watch members, community
police advisory members, police cadets, private security representatives, outside agency

60
Compulsory attendance is required of these listed employees unless on a scheduled day off, attending
department approved training, pre-scheduled absence approved by the Area captain, or attending to other
official police business. Personnel not able to attend the regularly scheduled Intersection meeting must
notify the Intersection of the absence prior to the Intersection meeting.
61
The detective table coordinators are broken down into eight specific crime categories: homicide, sex,
robbery, theft, major assault crimes, autos, burglary and crime against persons.
62
The number of senior lead officers will vary dependent upon the size of the geographic patrol division.
In terms of this research, there were six senior lead officers assigned to West Valley Area.

208
representatives, District and/or City attorney representatives, students from local schools
and colleges, and members of the community are invited to attend.
63

Culture of Transparency
In a time when the reputation of an organization or a leader can be shattered by
the click of a mouse, transparency is often a matter of survival (Bennis et al., 2008). For
far too long, the police culture was very insular (Cochran & Bromley, 2003; McDonnell,
2009; Sklansky, 2007). Rather than working collaboratively through networks, police
personnel would horde information, working in “silos,” rather than sharing information
between colleagues (Hoefling, 2001; Keast et al., 2004; Milward & Provan, 2006;
Mitchell & Shortell, 2000; Pearson, 1999; Rhodes, 1998; Waddock, 1991).
The same held true in terms of sharing information with other law enforcement
agencies. Information was provided only on a need to know, right to know basis and,
even then, it was less than forthcoming (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). This lack of
transparency, in conjunction with acts of misconduct that appeared to be covered up in
the eyes of the media and the public, has caused hatred and distrust toward the policing
profession, which is still being felt in many communities today (Frank et al., 2005;
McDonnell, 2009; Weitzer, 2002).
Since crime affects many sectors of society, all stakeholders with a vested interest
need to be involved in the crime solution process (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Kingdon,
2003; McDonnell, 2009; Scheider et al., 2009; Wexler et al., 2007). Intersect Policing

63
There are times when confidential information will be discussed during Intersection meetings. During
those meetings when confidential information is to be discussed, only personnel with a right to know and
need to know the information being discussed are allowed to attend.

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encourages all stakeholders to become intimately involved in the strategic problem
solving process of reducing the fear and incidence of crime. As The Medici Effect
implies, much can be learned from various cultures and professions where established
concepts and ideas can clash and combine, ultimately forming a multitude of new,
groundbreaking ideas (Johansson, 2004).
Any stakeholder who can provide valuable insight into how crime can be reduced
and quality of life enhanced or restored in an urban area is welcomed and encouraged to
attend Intersection meetings (Cozens et al., 2005; Ekblom & Pease, 1995; Goris &
Walters, 1999; Zehr, 2000). Intersect Policing strives to make people part of the solution,
rather than the problem, in terms of reducing the fear and incidence of crime in the
community.
By providing an invitation to all stakeholders involved in the crime reduction
process creates a culture of transparency, which opens up the lines of communication and
creates a culture of trust (Bennis et al., 2008; Grensing-Pophal, 2011). Intersect Policing
opens the lines of communication and enhances the manner in which the police and
community work together to reduce crime, the fear of crime, and address quality of life
issues. Thus, breaking down the negative mythologies and cultures that have developed
over time with new, positive mythologies and cultures built upon the six core universal
values (Burke et al., 2005; Macdonald et al., 2006).
Twenty Minutes or Less
Intersection meetings are a matter of precious time (Hastie, 2009). Since time is a
finite resource, it must be respected and never abused (Schwartz & McCarthy, 2007).

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According to the literature, the average adult attention span lasts between five and twenty
minutes, and learning is best achieved during this time frame (Conte et al., 1995; Dukette
& Cornish, 2009; Middendorf & Kalish, 1996). For this reason, all Intersection meetings
are short and strategic, lasting no longer than twenty minutes.
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As previously noted, the lieutenant assigned to the Intersection chairs all
Intersection meetings. In this capacity, he or she works as a moderator to keep the
meetings focused, on point, and moving forward in an expeditious manner (Baron &
Kenny, 1986; Fisher & Ury, 1991; Goldberg et al., 2007; Parker & Hoffman, 2006;
Zedeck, 1971). By keeping the meetings short and to the point, focus is maintained,
which provides better solutions to the crime problems identified.
Respect for People
During the daily Intersection meeting, crime patterns, clusters and trends, which
have been identified by Intersection personnel, are reviewed and evaluated. Strategies
and tactics are developed based on the ideas of all persons involved in the Intersection
meeting. Rank does not exist within the intersection; however, the core value “respect
for individuals” is strictly enforced.
Intersect Policing believes that any person, regardless of rank or position, is able
to provide valuable insight; thus, leadership capabilities and emotional intelligence are
developed and fostered (Bennis, 2009; Goleman, 2006; Northouse, 2007; Wharam,
2009). Intersect Policing ensures all stakeholders have a voice in the strategy making

64
All Intersection meetings are timed by an Intersection staff member to gauge the average length of a
meeting, and to ensure the twenty-minute time rule is not violated.

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process, which in turn creates a sense of ownership to the Intersect Policing philosophy
and overall crime reduction mentality (Case, 1997; Tannen, 1995).
Controlled Chaos
All stakeholders in attendance are allowed to voice their ideas, opinions or
concerns without any fear of reprisal. In essence, the Intersection could best be thought
of as “controlled chaos,” where all persons in attendance provide and obtain new,
innovative crime prevention/solving methods, strategies and tactics for the betterment of
themselves, the organization and the community (Darling et al., 2005; Eisenhardt et al.,
1997; Tannen, 1995). The breakthrough ideas that come out of the meetings are the
Medici Effect and, these innovative, breakthrough strategies and tactics are translated
into daily missions for police personnel to use over the course of the next twenty-four
hour period.
Deployment Matrix
Intersect Policing understands that law enforcement is one of the most expensive
and complex services provided by a city or county. Available resources limit the quality
and extent of service provided. To ensure that the highest level of service is obtained
from the resources at its disposal, Area captains must make use of the most efficient
management and budgeting techniques.
Keeping with this philosophy, prior to the start of a new deployment period,
Intersection personnel review the divisional days off schedule to obtain the days
personnel are working, which days personnel are off, and how the days off correlate to
the number of officers and supervisors working during the week. This information is

212
placed into a matrix, which lists the work schedules of all Area resources, which can be
mobilized to respond to a specific crime problem (see Figure 7.5).
Figure 7.5. Intersection Deployment Matrix

Realizing days off are subject to change for various reasons; Intersection staff
members update the matrix on a weekly basis to ensure Intersection attendees have the
most up-to-date, accurate information available. Specialized unit supervisors work
closely with Intersection staff members and keep them apprised of any changes in their
units’ deployment and work schedule.

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The Intersection deployment matrix allows Intersection personnel to ensure the
Area has seven-day coverage and balanced resources throughout the deployment period.
The matrix also identifies which units are working on a specific date and time; thus,
enhancing the assignment of missions to divisional personnel. The matrix also includes
all special events, dates when outside specialized units are in the division, and all other
interests to strategic planning.
Utilizing Smart Technology
Since the advent of CompStat, police departments have spent a large amount of
time creating maps, tables, and other documents to monitor and assess the performance of
the organization. Creating these documents not only wastes a great deal of time, which
could be better-spent analyzing crime, but also waste a large amount of paper and ink.
This process incurs costs, not only to the organization in terms of monetary value, but
also to society in terms of waste.
Intersect Policing is about sustainability and conservation, which includes being
as “green” as possible by conserving the amount of paper and ink being used by the
organization (Best, 2002; Curzons et al., 2001; Elzen et al., 2004; Ginn, 2005; Green,
2001). Today’s organizations need to utilize the tools of the twenty-first century in order
to conserve waste. For this reason, Intersect Policing utilizes smart technology to create
and store all documents in electronic form.
All electronic documents created, including maps, daily mission sheets, bulletins,
etc. are stored in individual folders in an electronic system called Dropbox (Dropbox,
2012; Schwartz, 2007). The information contained in Dropbox can be accessed, as noted

214
in Figure 7.6, via a computer, smart pad, smart phone, or any other electronic device with
Dropbox capability.
Figure 7.6. Accessing Dropbox via Smart Technology

215
Utilizing technology has numerous benefits, which include opening the lines of
communication and providing all police personnel with the necessary information
needed, in real-time, to reduce the fear and incidence of crime. It also provides police
personnel with the additional benefit of being able to access information that was once
only reserved for hard copy, such as wanted bulletins, crime flyers and photos of wanted
criminals.
Through the use of electronic resources, rather than paper, these documents can
be sent up and down the chain of command, in real-time, without unnecessary delays or
fear of being lost. There is also a cost savings in terms of monies spent by the
organization and to the environment by reducing the amount of paper and ink being used
to create these documents. Intersect Policing understands the correlation between crime
reduction and protecting the environment. Like crime reduction, the job is too great for
one person alone, and all persons need to play an important role in the process. Intersect
Policing understands this philosophy and ensures police departments do their share in
terms of conservation and sustainability.
Daily Mission
The daily missions are the cornerstones of the Intersect Policing system and serve
as the “marching orders” for police personnel to follow for the next twenty-four hour
period (Maple & Mitchell, 1999). Upon completion of the Intersection meeting, the Area
captain reviews and approves the daily missions, which are then published and placed
into Dropbox. The mission sheets are delivered electronically to all police personnel,

216
including patrol and specialized units, via smart technology, which can be accessed by
anyone at anytime, regardless of their location.
65

The daily missions are tailored specifically to address the crime problems
occurring in specific areas of the division. The information contained on the mission
sheets is short and concise. Color-coding, symbols, arrows and boxes are used to bring
immediate attention to the mission areas and the specific problem to be addressed. If a
particular person or vehicle has been identified in the commission of a crime, photos and
specific information, pertaining to each will be included (see Figure 7.7).
Figure 7.7. Daily Mission Sheet

65
Intersection personnel are the gatekeepers of the Dropbox system, and are the only personnel with read
and write capabilities. All police personnel assigned to the division are provided read only access to the
system. Upon separation from the division, all rights and privileges to the system are revoked.

217
Each watch assignment and specialized unit is provided a mission sheet. This
allows all police personnel working to know exactly what the problems are, where the
problems are occurring, and what strategies and tactics are being deployed to the
problem. If decoy cars are being used as a deterrent against crime, the missions show the
exact location where the vehicles are deployed.
66
If specialized units, such as narcotics,
vice or gangs are working on a particular crime problem, the specific locations of their
whereabouts are noted on the mission sheets to ensure all police personnel are made
aware. Not only does this provide all personnel with a sense of what’s going on in the
division, it also acts as an officer safety mechanism, notifying uniformed officers of the
fact there are plain clothes, undercover officers working which, if undetected, could
result in a deadly situation of friendly fire.
67

The Intersection clarifies purpose so that officers understand what crime problems
are plaguing the community. The daily mission sheets are a tool that identify the what,
where and when in terms of crime, along with providing suggestions to police personnel
as to how best combat the crime problem identified. The missions are only a starting
point and are not created to stifle the collective thinking of those who are assigned to
perform the work.
Research has found that many of the best ideas come from those who perform the
work, which equates to “bottom up” management (Cusumano & Nobeoka, 1998; Nonaka,
1988; Sabatier, 1986; Smeds et al., 2003). Intersect Policing encourages all police

66
Decoy patrol vehicles are unmanned black and white police vehicles parked in strategic locations to
discourage criminal activity and traffic violations (Carrick, 2001; Kaplan et al., 2000; Sallybanks, 2001).
67
Friendly fire is the unintentional shooting of one’s own troop or team member (Shrader, 1985).

218
personnel - watch commanders, sergeants, detectives and police officers - to utilize their
“out of the box” (Adair, 2007) thinking in order to devise personal, specific strategies and
tactics to achieve the purpose of the mission. Police work is never static and constantly
changing. For this reason, it is only logical that police officers would vary their strategies
and tactics dependent upon the environment of the day. Intersect Policing does not stifle
creativity, but rather encourages creativity, providing personnel accomplish the work
within the boundaries of organizational policy.
All changes and strategies deployed must be documented and submitted to the
Intersection for review in order to enhance the organizational learning process. This
includes information regarding intervention, prevention and suppression efforts taken to
reduce crime in the mission area. This information is noted in the remarks section at the
bottom of the daily mission sheet (see Figure 7.8).

Figure 7.8. Remarks Section

In addition to the remarks, officers also complete a daily recap of their activities,
which is located at the bottom of the mission sheet, just above the remarks section, as
noted previously in Figure 7.8. The recap portion of the mission sheet serves three
purposes. The first purpose is to act as a visual dashboard for police personnel, which

219
creates the sense of urgency Kotter (1995, 1996) speaks about in terms of creating
change. This performance management technique provides officers with a visual
indicator to gauge their daily performance in the mission area.
The second purpose of the mission recap is to provide an audit system for watch
commanders and other supervisory personnel to ensure police personnel are completing
the assigned mission in the manner prescribed.
The third purpose is to provide Intersection personnel with the measures of
effectiveness, which are often called upon during CompStat inspections. The recap
portion of the daily mission sheet captures the following information:
• Date of assignment.
• Names of the officers’ assigned the mission.
• Officers’ unit designation assignment.
• Number of pedestrian and vehicle activities completed.
• Number of field identification reports completed (FIs).
• Number of minutes used during the deployment of HIDE.
• Number of stolen vehicles recovered.
• Number of arrests (felony, misdemeanor, juvenile).
• Number of warrant checks completed and the number of arrests
made as a result of the warrant checks.
• Number of citations issued (vehicle and pedestrian).
• The total number of minutes spent working in the mission area.

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At the conclusion of each workday, police personnel working in a patrol capacity,
for example, forward their daily mission sheet electronically to their watch commander
for review. This ensures the watch commander is kept current as to what is occurring
under his or her command.
After the watch commander reviews and approves the information, the statistical
recap information is copied and included in the Watch Commander’s Daily Report,
which is forwarded electronically to the Area captain and other Intersection personnel for
review in real-time.
68
The watch commander then signs his or her name on the electronic
signature line of the daily mission sheet, which is located in the lower left hand corner of
the daily mission sheet, and forwards the information to the Intersection, as noted
previously in Figure 7.8.
69
Because the recap information is placed in the Watch
Commander’s Daily Report, the captain does not receive an electronic copy of the daily
mission sheets.
If officers utilized an innovative strategy or have pertinent information worth
discussing at a future Intersection meeting, they are encouraged to advise the watch
commander, so that the officers can present the information at the next scheduled
Intersection meeting. By doing so, the officer is able to describe the strategy in detail,
answer all questions pertaining to the use of the strategy that other Intersection personnel

68
Previously, the Watch Commander’s Daily Report would be completed and turned in at the end of a
workday. The log would be reviewed by an administrative lieutenant and forwarded to the captain for their
review twenty-four to forty-eight hours later. By submitting logs electronically, there is no lag time; thus,
real-time information is obtained, which can be best used the following day during the Intersection
meeting.
69
Electronic signatures require the installation of PDF Expert, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/pdf-expert-
fill-forms-annotate/id393316844?mt=8.

221
might have, explain the measures of effectiveness, and enhance the overall organizational
learning process.
In addition, the process acts as an award mechanism to the employee by providing
him or her the ability to receive credit for their work. As Macdonald et al. (2006)
explained, “…if a person is working and producing an output, it is a general principle to
say that, if the person receives valid feedback and due recognition, he or she is more
likely to continue to work hard, giving care and attention to the quality and quantity of
what is produced, compared with someone who receives little or no feedback or
recognition” (p. 32).
Specialized units assigned a mission forward their mission sheet directly to their
officer-in-charge for review and approval.
70
This ensures the officer-in-charge of the unit
is kept current as to what is occurring under his or her direct supervision. Upon review
by the sergeant, the information is copied and included in the Sergeant’s Daily Report,
71

which is forwarded electronically to the sergeant’s immediate supervisor (i.e., detective
commanding officer, gang unit officer-in-charge) and the Area captain.
Three Steps to Crime Reduction
Intersect Policing incorporates three steps into the crime reduction process:
analysis, strategy and assessment. At first glance these three steps appear too
rudimentary to be of any assistance in the crime reduction theory; however, they are
critical in terms of the overall crime-fighting strategy and assist the organizational

70
The officer-in-charge could be either a sergeant or detective supervisor.
71
Although the officer-in-charge could be either a sergeant or detective supervisor, the Sergeant’s Daily
Report is the standard from used by LAPD personnel assigned to these positions.

222
learning process by constantly addressing the “why” something is or is not working
(Argyris, 1991). These three steps also work synergistically with the four principles of
CompStat and, when used properly on a daily basis, yield tremendous results as will be
demonstrated in Chapter 8. For this reason, each of the three steps needs to be examined
carefully, because each step is needed for large-scale, continuous crime reduction.
Analysis
Analysis is the first step in the crime reduction process, which is why accurate
and timely information, one of the four principles of CompStat, is so vitally important
(Shane, 2004, 2007; Walsh & Vito, 2004). In order to reduce crime, there needs to be a
full and complete understanding of the crime problems faced. What type of crime is
occurring? Where are the crimes being committed? What days are the crimes occurring?
What time of day are the crimes occurring? What type of property is being taken during
the commission of these crimes? Are there any commonalities between crimes? What is
the modus operandi of the suspects? In order to answer these questions, accurate and
timely intelligence is crucial to the analyzing process (Bratton & Knobler, 1998).
Analyzing crime patterns, clusters and trends is an important part of the crime
reduction process. Intersect Policing not only analyzes current crime patterns, clusters
and trends, but also compares the information against information gathered from years
past to identify any correlation. This information allows Intersection personnel to
identify “hot spots,” high-density crime locations associated with a particular type of
crime, for the deployment of resources into specific areas in order to reduce the fear and
incidence of crime (see Figure 7.9).

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Figure 7.9. Hot Spot Density Mapping for BTFV

Through the use of this computer technology, Intersection personnel are able to
locate these high-density crime locations, which allow police personnel to better predict
their environment by gaining a better understanding of the crime picture in the
relationship to the culture of the affected area. As Bratton (1998) explained in his book,
Turnaround, “If you can predict it, you can prevent it” (p. 111).
Strategies
Armed with the most accurate and up-to-date crime information, strategies can be
developed in order to deploy resources as rapidly as possible to address the current crime

224
conditions. As the ancient proverb reads, “Failure to plan is planning to fail.”
72
Intersect
Policing develops clear, effective strategies to address specific crime problems; however,
the strategies are flexible enough to be changed as crime conditions change. Intersect
Policing develops strategies around five areas of focus: community involvement,
investigative personnel, patrol resources, discretionary resources and outside agencies.
Community members play a critical role in the reduction of crime (Alpert &
Dunham, 1986; Peak & Glensor, 1996; Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994). Police
departments, despite all of the community policing efforts, have been reluctant to utilize
members of the community in the crime reduction process (Moon & Zager, 2007). This
is unfortunate because members of the community are the eyes and ears of the
department and have valuable information to provide in terms of crime. The fact of the
matter is there are not enough police officers to be on every street corner in every
neighborhood of the community. For this reason, police need to work with people, and
people need to work with police.
Intersect Policing embraces this philosophy and understands that community
members are key stakeholders in the crime reduction process. As previously mentioned,
the cornerstone of the Intersect Policing system is the assignment of missions. These
missions are not just assigned to police personnel, but to members of the community as
well. The missions assigned to community members would never place the person in
harms way; rather, they are tailored specific to the crime problem identified in a manner

72
The research was unable to locate the origins or the author.

225
that allows the community to take an active role in the crime reduction process, while at
the same time keeping the community member safe.
For example, for approximately three weeks during the research period, an
unknown suspect was victimizing a local recreation center. The crimes included burglary
and vandalism. Although there was no specific day of the week in which the suspect
would commit these crimes, the hours of occurrence were identified by Intersection
personnel as being between 7 p.m. and 1 a.m.
The neighborhood block captain, along with another member of the community,
was invited to attend a daily Intersection meeting. Since the police lacked the full and
complete understanding of the culture within the neighborhood, the block captain was
tasked with providing strategies to assist in the on-going problem.
One of the suggestions was to have the assigned senior lead officer hold more
neighborhood meetings in the community. Another suggestion called for the creation of
a specialized Volunteer Surveillance Team (VST), which could actively engage members
of the neighborhood in the crime solving process. Based on the feedback received from
the community, a plan was put together and the neighborhood block captain was tasked
with reporting back to the Intersection on the progress and results of strategy.
Senior lead officers conducted regularly scheduled meetings with the community
members, where information was provided and shared pertaining to the crime problem
and other community-identified problems needing attention. A VST was also created.
73

73
All members of the VST were screened and put through a Citizen Police Academy, which included, but
was not limited to, the study of law, private persons arrest, search and seizure, and police radio operation
and communications.

226
Members of the VST were instructed to conduct “roaming shifts”
74
in order to obtain
information regarding suspicious persons and vehicles in the area. Any and all
information obtained was provided daily to the neighborhood block captain, who in turn
reported back to the Intersection with the information. This information was passed
along to divisional detectives for further investigation.
One night a member of the VST observed a suspicious vehicle driving through the
neighborhood. The community volunteer wrote down the vehicle’s license plate number,
which was passed along to detectives. Upon further investigation, the vehicle identified
by the VST member was associated with another burglary crime in a neighboring LAPD
division. Working with the information, a police surveillance team, which consisted of
sworn police officers and members of the VST, was put in place. In just under seven
days, the suspect was observed entering the recreation center, taken into custody, and
later confessed to all of the crimes.
Community members play a key role in the crime reduction process. By working
collaboratively, the community becomes a vital source of information as to what type of
crimes are being committed, where the crimes are occurring, and who is responsible for
committing the crimes. In addition, the community is able to provide feedback as to how
the police are doing and whether the community thinks the strategies deployed are
working to eliminate the crime problem identified. Most importantly, the use of
community members in the crime-fighting missions fosters positive relationships

74
Roaming shifts consist of moving throughout the neighborhood aimlessly and unsystematically in order
to not bring attention to the intelligence gathering process taking place.

227
between the community and the police, which break down negative mythologies and
cultures developed over the years.
Another area of focus pertaining to strategies includes the use of investigative
resources. Investigative resources consist of detectives and other police personnel
working in the capacity of a detective. For far too long police personnel worked in silos,
especially detectives, refusing to share pertinent information between colleagues and
other police organizations pertaining to criminal activity (McDonnell, 2002, 2009).
Intersect Policing works to change that culture by bringing all stakeholders to the table,
including detective personnel, in order to obtain the most accurate and timely intelligence
available.
To reduce crime, police departments need to have the most accurate and up-to-
date information pertaining to criminal activity. Many times those with the most
information are detectives conducting the investigations for prosecution. Detectives and
other investigative personnel (i.e., narcotics, vice, etc.) must communicate information –
not only between each other – but with patrol officers as well.
One of the best methods for obtaining critical information is through the
debriefing of arrested persons. Those involved in criminal activity are very much aware
about what is “going on in the street.”
75
Dependent upon the nature of the criminal
activity and the possibility of other criminals being involved in the acts, suspects have a
motivation to give information to detectives. Thus, the debriefing and interrogation of
criminals is vitally important to the crime reduction mission.

75
“Going on in the street” is police vernacular used to describe a person who has the true, accurate and
inside information as to what is really occurring in an area affected by criminal activity.

228
Beyond being asked about the criminal activity for which the person in question
was arrested, detectives are able to ask other questions about other crimes. Some of those
questions include, but are not limited to:
76

• “Do you know anyone who has been committing burglaries in the
area?”
• “Who is considered to be the shot-caller on the street?”
• “Is there a person or group of persons on the street selling or
buying weapons?”
• “Are there any drug dealers trying to recruit new players?”
• “Do you know anything about a series of robberies occurring at
the local fast-food restaurants in the area?”
As soon as the answers to these types of question are received, the information
must be communicated to patrol officers and other police personnel as rapidly as
possible. The process, however, is a give and take. Investigative personnel provide
information to patrol officers, and patrol officers reciprocate with information to
investigative personnel. In many instances, patrol officers might come across a suspect
that detectives are looking for; however, this will never occur unless information is
shared and patrol officers know whom to look for on the street. By bringing all
stakeholders into the Intersection on a daily basis, the lines of communication are opened
and police personnel are kept current on all matters pertaining to wanted criminals.

76
The questions and types of crimes will vary depending upon the crime problems faced in the community.
These questions are examples only and can be changed to fit the nature of the crime problem identified.

229
Another strategy pertaining to investigative resources is the use of detective
personnel in the field. Although detectives are considered investigators, first and
foremost they are police officers, whose job is to ensure the purpose of law enforcement
is obtained. There are many ways to accomplish this, one of them being detective
initiated patrol days.
77

Detective initiated patrol involves criminal investigators working in a police
uniform driving a black and white police vehicle. In this capacity, detectives act as a
force multiplier to the patrol function, providing the appearance of more officers on the
street. In addition, detectives are able to look for suspects who have been eluding
apprehension or wanted for questioning. The strategy also allows detectives to have a
better understanding of the crime situation in their division; thus, enhancing the
detectives ability to solve investigations.
As radio calls are generated, police officers respond to the scene and immediately
begin investigating the crime. Many times police officers get tied up for hours
conducting an investigation and are unable to provide the basic delivery system to the
public. The truth of the matter is police officers cannot investigate a crime scene with the
precision of a seasoned detective. Although police officers are trained to investigate and
process a crime scene, they do not have the expertise or knowledge of a detective.
Utilizing a medical metaphor, patrol officers are the equivalent of an emergency
room physician, where as detectives are the equivalent of a medical specialist. Patrol
officers, like emergency room doctors, stabilize and treat the patient, but later refer the

77
The author created this strategy during directed research while studying the field of Stratified Systems
Theory at USC in 2008.

230
patient to a specialist (detective) for further treatment. Through the use of detective
initiated patrol, it’s like having a medical specialist in the emergency room ready to assist
the patient, which has a tremendous benefit to the patient or, in this case, the community.
Through the use of detective initiated patrol, investigators respond to the scene of
the crime and immediately begin their investigation. This allows patrol personnel to
return to their primary duty of providing the basic service delivery system to the
community. At the same time, the crime scene can be processed for fresh clues; thus,
enhancing the possibility of apprehending the suspect in the quickest time possible.
The importance of utilizing investigative resources in the overall crime fighting
strategy can’t be stressed enough. Investigators, like community members, play a key
role in crime reduction. By working collaboratively with patrol officers, an important
network is opened for the flow of information to be exchanged. Most importantly, the
use of the investigators fosters positive relationships with patrol officers, which helps
break down negative mythologies and cultures that have developed over time.
Patrol resources are the most visible function of the police department. Patrol
officers provide the basic delivery system to the people who live, work and visit the
community in which the department protects and serves. Lessons learned from the past
have found that random patrol equates to random results (Bratton et al., 1997). To
combat this situation, patrol personnel need to have a “seat at the table” in the overall
crime-fighting strategy meeting. In addition, they need to be provided the specifics (who,
what, where and when) as they pertain to criminal activity. The daily missions

231
accomplish this by providing a set of marching orders for officers to follow over the
course of a twenty-four hour period (Maple & Mitchell, 1997).
Patrol officers can also be utilized as specialized units, from time-to-time, as
deployment needs permit. One of the methods of doing so is called the tandem
configuration.
78
The tandem configuration utilizes patrol officers in a specialized
capacity to help fill a void when specialized units and detectives are not working,
particularly during the early morning hours of the day.
For example, BTFV is the most common type of crime in West Valley.
Combating this type of crime can be difficult, because criminals who commit these
crimes do so in the early morning hours
79
of the day and pray in areas that are extremely
dark and reclusive. In addition, these types of criminals are often looking “over their
shoulder” to identify police vehicles in the area they are criminalizing.
Although specialized units are typically off-duty at these times of the morning,
patrol officers are still available to work the problem. Utilizing four officers – two
officers in plain clothes driving an undercover vehicle or riding bicycles, along with two
officers in uniform driving a black and white police vehicle – the combined strengths of
patrol and undercover units are rolled into one highly effective crime-fighting strategy.
As the name implies, the four officers work in tandem with a myriad of tactical
approaches at their disposal. Officers are deployed to the areas identified as the most
prevalent in terms of BTFV. Plain-clothes officers conduct surveillance in the targeted

78
Deputy Chief Kirk Albanese, LAPD, created the tandem configuration in 2004 when he was assigned as
the Area captain of Foothill Area (personal interview, February 1, 2010).
79
Early morning hours could be considered any time after 12 a.m. until daybreak.

232
areas in order to identify criminal activity. At the same time, the officers in the patrol
vehicle can request immediate static or rolling surveillance. Working together, officers
can approach the situation in a stealth capacity, which provides the element of surprise,
while at the same time providing extra resources and officer safety for all involved.
Patrol operations are often referred to as the “backbone” of the department.
Unfortunately, however, many patrol officers feel as if they are treated like stepchildren.
These mythologies have created a negative culture in many police organizations.
Utilizing patrol officers in a specialized configuration provides a sense of worth and
importance to the patrol position, as well as providing the patrol officer the ability to
build some expertise, which can be utilized to help him or her promote up the ranks.
The use of discretionary resources, which include, but are not limited to gangs,
narcotics and vice officers, should be deployed to combat many of the crime problems
that are perceived to be out of their expertise. Specialized units oftentimes focus only on
their immediate expertise to the exclusion of other crime categories. Many police
agencies, especially large organizations, have become too specialized. One of the
Intersect Policing concepts surrounds the idea that police officers need to be crime
generalists first, and crime specialists second (McDonnell, 2002, 2009).
All police personnel must understand, first and foremost, they are police officers
whose primary responsibility is to achieve the purpose of law enforcement. Regardless
of a person’s rank or position, all police personnel must be disciplined and flexible
enough to work any and all crime problems, anytime, day or night.

233
For example, if a BTFV problem exists, the use of divisional narcotics or vice
officers – based on their undercover expertise - should be utilized to address the problem.
If a series of fatal traffic collisions have occurred, nothing states gang officers can’t
conduct traffic enforcement in order to save lives.
Unfortunately specialized units have not been utilized to their fullest potential. In
today’s tough economic conditions all resources must be utilized wisely and effectively
to achieve the purpose of law enforcement. It doesn’t make sense for specialized units to
focus solely on their respective crime specialty, particularly when many of today’s crimes
overlap and involve the same criminal element.
Lastly, no police agency, division or precinct is an island. All agencies,
regardless of their size, need assistance in the on-going battle against crime. Teamwork
is critical to success. Intersect Policing understands the importance of teamwork and the
value of joint task forces, which consist of personnel from other commands or agencies
(federal, state and local) to address a specific crime problem.
For example, for three years
80
an unknown suspect had been burglarizing
numerous pharmacies in West Valley. Shortly after the initiation of Intersect Policing,
Intersection personnel were able to connect a series of pharmacy burglaries occurring in
Los Angeles County, particularly in the San Fernando Valley, to those that were
occurring in West Valley Area based on the modus operandi of the suspect. Armed with
this newfound information, an impromptu Intersection meeting was called to order in the
Intersection in order to devise a strategy.

80
2008-2010.

234
During the twenty-minute Intersection meeting, a strategy was devised and put
into place, which included the recommendation that additional stakeholders be brought
into the process. Since the suspect was “tunneling” into the structures from the outside,
the California State Contractor’s Board was contacted and was requested to provide
assistance. The Federal Drug Administration (FDA) was also requested to provide
expertise in order to trace the serial numbers from the stolen prescription bottles, as well
as to provide information in terms of any “underground” markets that might buy and sell
these types of drugs. Since multiple surveillance teams would be needed, the LAPDs
elite S.I.S detective tactical squad was requested to assist in the investigation.
After three Intersection meetings with the various stakeholders, a possible suspect
was identified. The break in the case occurred when a West Valley detective recognized
one of the suspects involved from a poor quality surveillance video. When the name of
the suspect was provided to the California State Contractor’s Board representative, it was
found that the suspect’s father recently had his contractor’s license revoked by the State
of California for being associated with criminal activity.
After two nights of surveillance, the suspect, along with his father and brother,
were observed breaking into a pharmacy just outside West Valley division. Through the
collaborative efforts of all parties involved, the suspects were taken into custody and
confessed to more than eighty pharmacy burglaries throughout Los Angeles County.
With the assistance of the FDA, the suspects were convicted and sentenced for their
crimes. Thus, proving the value of teamwork, networking and collaborating with all
stakeholders involved from within and outside the police department.

235
Assessment
Assessment is the third and final step of the crime reduction process. Although
this phase is the most onerous and time-consuming, it is also found to be the most
important (Shane, 2004, 2007). In any problem-solving situation, rigorous follow-up and
assessment is essential to ensure the desired results are actually being achieved as well as
to learn from both successes and failures, which may have occurred during the
operational period (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; New York City Police Department, 1994).
Intersect Policing measures the success of each day’s mission. Although
analyzing crime and creating effective strategies are important, they are not enough.
Assessment of the situation is critical to ensure the purpose of law enforcement is being
achieved and organizational learning is occurring. While analyzing the mission for the
previous twenty-four hour period, if the results were not to the satisfaction of the
Intersection attendees, changes to the strategy are made immediately.
Each day, based on the information received from the previous twenty-four hour
period, a new, fine-tuned mission is published for the following twenty-four hour period.
It must be noted, however, that a daily mission cannot be fairly evaluated if those who are
assigned the mission do not follow the mission as directed.
In order to evaluate if the mission did, or did not, have an impact on the crime
problem identified, each mission must be evaluated on a daily basis. During the
evaluation phase of the process, Intersection personnel need to ask the following three
questions:

236
• “Did the mission achieve its purpose?”
• “Was the mission carried out as prescribed?”
• “Does the mission need to be changed?”
The measure of effectiveness by which the missions are judged is the absence of
crime. Understanding of the process and how the mission was accomplished is an
important part of the organizational learning process. Only by understanding the
successes and failures; thus, modifying the behavior, can an organization truly learn.
Continuously doing the same thing and expecting better results does not equate to
learning. Instead, it is considered to be insanity.
Intersect Policing understands that crime reduction is a continuous and never
ending process, not just a one-time event. Applying these three steps on a daily basis
helps keep the crime-fighting process moving in the right direction and organizational
learning occurring. All of which takes place daily in the Intersection.
The Follow-Up Doctor Visit
Intersection meetings are repeated on a daily basis. Metaphorically speaking, the
meetings could be considered a series of follow-up doctor visits to evaluate the response
of the prescribed medications (missions) provided to the patient (community). During
each daily Intersection meeting crime is, again, analyzed from the previous twenty-four
hour period. If the missions are not working, the system is flexible enough to realize a
new course of antibiotics is needed; thus, missions are updated and changed, as needed.
The daily missions are reviewed and evaluated until a full ten calendar days have elapsed.

237
The theory of ten calendar days is based on the medical journal findings for taking
a full course of antibiotics. According to the literature, as soon as the medicine is
injected to the system, the system should see improvement between twenty-four to
seventy-two hours. However, antibiotics prescribed should be continued for a full ten
days to ensure relapse does not occur (Bonora et al., 1989; Congeni et al., 1987; Franklin,
2006; Pizzo et al., 1982; Zwart, 2000).
By constantly reviewing the information in real-time, based on the missions from
the previous twenty-four hours, organizational learning is occurring (Argyris, 1999;
Levitt & March, 1988). On some occasions, however, based on the information learned,
the missions are left untouched and the process is repeated. Upon review of the Area
captain at the conclusion of the Intersection meeting, the missions are published and the
cycle repeats (see Figure 7.10).
Figure 7.10. Follow-up Doctor Visit Review Cycle

Repeat
Every
24

Hours
for
a
Full
10

Days

Crime
for
the

Previous
24-‐Hour

Period

Intersection
Meeting

(Analysis
&
Strategy

Formulation)

Area
Captain's

Review
of
Missions

Daily
Missions

Published

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At the conclusion of ten days, the crime pattern or problem identified should be
eliminated. At that time, all information obtained from the missions is stored in a
computer database, by number and name, for easy retrieval, in case the pattern resurfaces
or another similar crime pattern is identified that requires past best practices.
Constantly Monitoring the Environment
In addition to the standard daily Intersection meeting, Intersection personnel
continually monitor crime information, in real-time, as the information unfolds during the
workday. If a new pattern, cluster or trend is identified, the Intersection analyst who
identifies the information reports it to their supervisor immediately. Upon a quick review
of the information, the supervisor may call an impromptu Intersection meeting, which
could include all of the previously listed Intersection attendees or just a select few to
discuss the findings. If any changes are made to the missions as a result of the
impromptu meeting, the changes are completed immediately, and an electronic
notification is sent to all personnel to advise of the changes.
Intersection personnel monitor the police radio frequency throughout the day. If a
radio call is generated in a specific crime location that requires necessary information be
provided to the officers, or if Intersection staff believe they could provide helpful
information to the officers responding to the call location, Intersection personnel will
advise those officers of the necessary information in real-time. Upon completion of the
radio call, officers will advise back to the Intersection, as soon as time permits, with the
outcomes, lessons-learned, and any other pertinent information to assist in future crime-

239
fighting efforts. The information provided is logged and tracked by Intersection
personnel and presented, as needed, at future Intersection meetings.
Crime Statistical Information
All crime statistical information is kept current and accurate in real-time. The
statistical information gathered is captured in various charts, graphs and maps for easy
access via Dropbox. Dashboards are utilized using color-coding to provide real-time
feedback as to how the team is doing in terms of meeting the daily, weekly, monthly and
yearly goals.
All statistical information gathered is used for performance management.
However, unlike the manner in which statistical information is used in the CompStat
process, which is negative and humiliating, Intersect Policing uses statistical information
in a positive, productive manner in order to assist police personnel in their performance
management efforts, rather than punishing them for crime increases.
For example, in order to deploy police resources to the proper locations, at the
appropriate times, police leaders need to have real-time information at their disposal.
Utilizing computer technology, Intersect Policing has systems in place to provide the
necessary information in real-time, easy to read formats. Some of the formats include:
total Part I crimes by type, reporting district (RD), and basic car (see Figure 7.11); total
Part I crimes by time, day and watch assignment (see Figure 7.12); total violent crimes by
time, day and watch assignment (see Figure 7.13); and, total property crimes by time, day
and watch assignment (see Figure 7.14).

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Figure 7.11. Total Part I Crimes by Type, RD, and Basic Car

Figure 7.12. Part I Crimes by Time, Day and Watch Assignment

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Figure 7.13. Violent Crimes by Time, Day and Watch Assignment

Figure 7.14. Property Crimes by Time, Day and Watch Assignment

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As previously explained, Intersect Policing adheres to the theory of conservation
and sustainability. For this reason, all information is utilized, stored and sent out in
electronic form. Realizing not everybody has embraced twenty-first century technology;
documents are made available in hard copy, upon request. Although electronic methods
are the preferred choice, there is some information that must be posted in conspicuous
locations throughout police facilities for consistent viewing and reaffirmation, such as
wanted bulletins, crime alerts, goals, employee commendations, and/or dashboards that
represent how the team is doing overall.
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Department CompStat Process
Intersect Policing does not replace a police departments CompStat process.
Rather, it enhances the process by allowing information to be viewed in real-time,
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Intersect Policing assists Area captains by
providing them with real-time information, which not only enhances their understanding
of the day-to-day operations in their division, but also prepares them for the next
scheduled CompStat inspection.
Since all CompStat statistical information is gathered from the geographic Areas,
the information needs to be accurate. On occasion, information has been found to be
inaccurate, which is later exposed during a CompStat inspection. When this occurs, the
Area captain is placed in an awkward and potential embarrassing situation. In addition, it
feeds the mythology that CompStat leads to manipulation of crime numbers.

81
Prior to posting of any document in a police facility, department policies and procedures are strictly
followed.

243
Intersect Policing helps to eliminate these awkward and embarrassing moments
by analyzing crime information on a daily basis, matching the information against the
reports being generated for the previous twenty-four hour period, and double checking
the coding procedures to ensure the information is not only timely, but accurate. This
procedure works as a built in audit system, which ensures that at the conclusion of each
week, the information gathered and provided by the Intersection to the CompStat unit is
accurate. The process also helps break down the negative mythology that CompStat
manipulates crime numbers and, with time, replaces it with a new positive mythology and
culture based on the core, universal values.
CompStat Preparation and Presentation
In addition to providing the Area captain with the most accurate and timely
information pertaining to crime in his or her division, Intersect Policing has an additional
built in benefit of preparing the captain for the next regularly scheduled CompStat
inspection. As we have learned, preparation for the regularly scheduled CompStat
inspections is a long and arduous process. The preparation time required varies
extensively by person and command. The common denominator shared by all captains is
that CompStat preparation requires additional time above and beyond the scheduled
workday, which eliminates a large amount of personal time from a captain’s personal life.
Unfortunately nobody has ever provided training in terms of CompStat
preparation and presentation. There are no blueprints or outlines for a captain to follow.
Most Area captains have had various measures of success and failures during their
CompStat preparations and presentations; however, none of the captains interviewed for

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this research could explain what it was that made them successful leading up to or during
the CompStat inspection on that particular day. One of the additional benefits of
Intersect Policing is that it creates an outline for captains to follow during his or her
CompStat inspection, which provides all the necessary information to appease the
CompStat inspection board.
In order to bring clarity as to how Intersect Policing assists Area captains with
their preparation and presentation for CompStat inspections, we will examine a real-life
scenario that occurred during the research period of the study. Starting from the initial
findings of the identified crime problem, we will complete a step-by-step analysis of the
entire process, ending with the Area captain’s CompStat presentation.
Step One: Initial Identification
During a Tuesday morning pre-Intersection meeting, a crime analyst assigned to
the Intersection observes a cluster of BTFV crimes occurring in a location in the southern
part of the division. Upon further investigation, the analysts identifies the following
information:
• Location of occurrence: reporting district 1045.
• Days of occurrence: Monday and Tuesday.
• Time of occurrence: between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m.
• No suspect description was identified.
• The majority of vehicles burglarized: 1992, Toyota, Corollas.

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• The majority of property taken from the vehicles: small electronic devices,
such as global positioning systems and other computer equipment, such as
smart pads and smart phones.
• The modus operandi found that the suspect entered the vehicles by
smashing the right, passenger door window.
After the initial discovery, the analyst talks about the findings with his or her
colleagues. Upon completion of the discussion, all Intersection staff members concur
with the findings, and agree that the issue needs to be addressed during the daily
Intersection meeting and assigned a mission.
Step Two: Intersection Meeting
The crime problem identified is discussed during the daily Intersection meeting.
All personnel in attendance review the analysis and concur with the recommendation that
the problem needs to be assigned a mission.
During the twenty-minute meeting all persons in attendance engage in an in-depth
analysis and strategy session. Realizing additional resources above and beyond the basic
patrol function will be required; Intersection staff consults the Intersection Deployment
Matrix, which lists the work schedules of all divisional entities that can be assigned to the
problem. A quick scan of the matrix reveals what personnel are available during the next
twenty-four hour period and daily for the remainder of the deployment period.
With a full and complete understanding of the resources available, the Intersection
assigns customized missions to all identified resources. These resources include, but are
not limited to: patrol, investigative, specialized, outside agencies and the community.

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Patrol resources are directed to provide visible enforcement in the area. This
includes getting out of the patrol vehicle and walking a foot beat in the affected area.
Patrol officers are advised to meet with community members, speak to them about any
suspicious activity, and provide them with contact information should they need to report
suspicious or criminal activity. In addition, patrol officers are to engage in consensual
encounters with pedestrians or persons with backpacks in the mission area.
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Watch
commanders are to work with investigative and discretionary resources to provide
additional resources for the use of specialized tactics and strategies, such as the tandem
configuration. Decoy patrol vehicles should also be placed in strategic locations to
provide the illusion of additional police presence in the mission area.
Investigative resources are directed to provide detective initiated patrol in the
mission area. This includes working in a tandem configuration in conjunction with patrol
and other discretionary resources during the early morning hours on Mondays and
Tuesdays.
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Auto detectives are to attend community meetings to provide statistical
information and preventive measures in order to teach the community how to protect
themselves from this type of criminal activity.
Since the crime location identified borders a neighboring LAPD patrol division,
detectives need to work collaboratively with their neighboring colleagues and exchange
information in order to learn more about the suspect with the hope of identifying,

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One of the system components of Intersect Policing is continuous organizational learning. This includes
providing police personnel with the necessary and on-going training and education in terms of search and
seizure law, as outlined in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Police personnel must
never break the law to enforce the law.
83
Police departments that choose to deploy this strategy outside the regular business hours of detectives
must consult their organizations memorandum of understanding between the police officers union and the
department, and be directed by the written bi-laws to ensure compliance.

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capturing and stopping future criminal acts from occurring. Detectives will provide the
necessary information to ensure crime bulletins are created and distributed throughout the
department and with other police agencies throughout the county and state.
Specialized resources include gangs, narcotics, vice and property crimes detail
officers. Gang officers are directed to review their databases to identify any possible
suspects who fit the modus operandi for this type of crime. In addition, gang officers are
to provide visible patrol to the affected area as a force multiplier to patrol operations.
Narcotics and vice officers are assigned to work in an undercover capacity in the affected
area during the indicated times of occurrence. The property crimes detail is directed to
debrief all arrestees to develop intelligence with the hopes of identifying the suspect. In
addition, property crimes detail officers will work in coordination with the various
personnel resources deployed (i.e., narcotics, vice, gangs, patrol and detectives), as
needed, in order to ensure the missions are carried out in the most efficient and effective
way possible.
Senior lead officers are directed to meet with community members and send out
notifications to neighborhood watch groups in the affected area advising them to be “on
the lookout” for suspicious and/or criminal activity in order to “harden the target.”
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Senior lead officers are also expected to provide extra patrol in the mission area, which
includes foot beats and the use of bicycles. During all community meetings, senior lead

84
Harden the target, also referred to as crime prevention through environmental design, is police vernacular
referring to the strengthening of the security of crime locations in order to reduce or minimize the risk of
future criminal activity (Crowe, 2000; Jeffery, 1971; Kelling & Bratton, 1998; Kostanoski, 2007).

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officers are expected to provide community members with contact information should
they need to report suspicious and/or criminal activity.
Air support will be requested to conduct flyovers in the affected area to provide
extra patrol from the air in the mission area. The use of air support will not only act as a
force multiplier, it will also assist the operation in case a suspect is identified and
attempts to evade capture.
Realizing that the police and the people cannot successfully resolve the problems
of crime without the criminal justice system, the District Attorney’s Office will be
contacted to have an attorney assigned to the division in order to assist in the prosecution.
Having a member from the District Attorney’s Office intimately involved in the case
from start to finish enhances the ability to obtain a filing and conviction when a suspect is
apprehended. The close cooperation of the police with prosecutors will assist in the
development of a safer community.
The city’s Department of Street Lighting will be utilized to replace any and all
broken streetlights in the mission area. Since criminals work predominantly in dark,
secluded locations, ensuring the affected area is well lighted will act as a deterrent for
future criminal activity; thus, hardening the target through environmental design.
The news media needs to be contacted and provided with as much information as
possible in order to alert the community and demonstrate the proactive measures being
taken by the police to eliminate this community identified problem. The media can also
assist with an educational campaign by putting out safety tips to the community in an
effort to harden the target.

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In terms of community involvement, the VST will be deployed in the mission area
to conduct random patrol and report suspicious activity. Police cadets will also be
utilized and sent into the affected area with prevention literature in order to harden the
target. The combined efforts of the prevention literature being distributed, in conjunction
with the educational media campaign will help reduce crime not only in the mission area,
but also in other parts of the division and city as well.
Step Three: Conclusion of the Intersection Meeting
Upon completion of the daily Intersection meeting, Intersection staff takes the
information discussed during the meeting and logs the information into a computer file
for future tracking and analysis. This information is updated on a continuous basis until
the mission is completed. The daily mission sheets are formatted and distributed
electronically to all police personnel for immediate use.
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Step Four: Daily Intersection Follow-up Meeting
The following day, based on the feedback provided during the daily Intersection
meeting, missions are fine-tuned and a new mission is distributed to all police personnel
working during the next twenty-four hour period. This cycle continually repeats itself
until a suspect is eventually caught or the crime problem is eliminated from the affected
area.
In this scenario, on the ninth day of the operation, the suspect was observed
breaking into a vehicle by an undercover narcotics officer and taken into custody. Upon
being debriefed by detective personnel, the suspect confesses to the fifteen BTFV crimes

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All missions are completed and distributed to police personnel by 10 a.m. on a daily basis.

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in the mission area, as well as to an additional thirty other BTFV crimes in neighboring
LAPD patrol divisions.
Since the District Attorney’s Office has been intimately involved and updated
regularly with the operation, the hand off between police and the criminal justice system
is seamless. This added step in the mission process not only helps build good will
between the police and the District Attorney’s Office, it also lowers the stress level and
preparation time for all personnel involved in the prosecution.
At the time of the suspect’s arrest, the media is notified of the occurrence. By
having the media involved in the process from the beginning allows the police to tell their
side of the story, rather than allowing false and misleading information to be leaked,
which in turn could cause future negative mythologies toward the police. The openness
and transparency provided by the police toward media personnel breaks down barriers
and enhances the working relationship between the two entities. Over time new
mythologies are created and a positive culture is developed. The police/media
relationship is crucial in the crime-fighting mission in order to enhance intervention,
prevention and suppression strategies.
Step Five: Assessing the Situation
Although a suspect was taken into custody and confessed to the crimes, it does
not negate there might be other perpetrators in the area involved in the same type of
criminal activity. For this reason, police personnel must relentlessly follow-up and assess
the situation, as CompStat recommends, to ensure the problem is eradicated.

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As previously noted in the research, this portion of the process is the most
onerous and time-consuming; however, it has also found to be the most important (Shane,
2004, 2007). For it is only during this portion of the problem-solving process that the
police can be sure they eradicated the problem and learn from both the successes and
failures of the operation, which further enhance the organizational learning process.
Although there is no set time period for this portion of the process to be
completed, after a total of ten days have passed, the Intersection closes the mission and
files the information into a database by number. By doing so, if the problem resurfaces
or another problem arises, which is similar in nature, the lessons learned from the mission
can be revisited; thus, continually enhancing the organizational learning process.
Step Six: CompStat Preparation
As previously noted, CompStat preparation can be a long and arduous process,
creating negative mythologies along the way. Intersect Policing cuts down on the
preparation time needed to prepare for CompStat inspections, which allows Area captains
to have more time to enjoy their personal life.
This is accomplished by tracking all information, in real-time, pertaining to each
mission and logging the information into a computer file for later review, as needed. In
the case we just presented, on the day prior to the CompStat inspection, Intersection
personnel pull up the information, which outlines the analysis, strategies and assessment
information pertaining to the mission.
The day prior to the CompStat inspection, an Intersection meeting is called to
order inside the Intersection to discuss the information. The Area captain reviews the

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information, along with all other Intersection personnel. Since the captain has been
intimately involved in the process, there is clarity and lack of confusion pertaining to the
subject matter. If there are questions or concerns on behalf of the captain, the personnel
involved with the operation are present to answer all questions in a satisfactory manner.
It should be noted there is usually more than one mission to discuss prior to the
CompStat inspection. Regardless of the number of missions to be discussed, in twenty
minutes or less, the captain is prepared for his or her presentation at the CompStat
inspection, which lowers the captain’s anxiety and stress level brought upon by the
CompStat process.
At the end of the Area captain’s workday, barring any pressing matters or police
functions he or she is scheduled to attend, the captain has the rest of the evening to relax,
reflect, and enjoy his or her family. As time passes and the Intersect Policing process
becomes more comfortable, the mythology of CompStat robbing a person of their
personal life is broken down and replaced with a new, positive mythology.
Step Seven: CompStat Inspection
As the Area captain takes to the podium to discuss the crime problem in his or her
division, although there is a sense of nervousness about making the presentation in front
of a live audience, there is also a sense of comfort and calm brought upon by the
preparation that took place prior to the CompStat inspection. As we have learned, people
need to be able to predict their environment, and the better people are at predicting their
environment, the more comfortable and confident they become, which ultimately leads to
lower stress, higher productively and a more positive outlook on life (Arrow, 1962;

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Burke et al., 2005; Carroll & Roth, 2010; Gallwey, 1977; Leephakpreeda, 2008;
Leventhall & Wise, 1998; Macdonald et al., 2006; Smith et al., 1978).
Intersect Policing prepares Area captain’s for the CompStat process, which in turn
allows the captain to better predict the CompStat environment. Rather than stumbling
through a process making up information along the way, the captain remains poised,
focused and confident in his or her ability to recall the necessary information in a timely
manner. Instead of being “bombarded” with question after question by members of the
CompStat panel, the captain is able to dominate the inspection, demonstrating his or her
knowledge of the crime problems in the division, as well as his or her ability to create
strategies toward the solution of the problems. If follow-up questions are asked in terms
of the crimes identified during the CompStat inspection, the captain need only refer to the
written outline provided to him or her prior to the meeting, which is available on his or
her smart pad (see Figure 7.15).
As time passes and the positive reinforcement of the system increases, the
mythology of CompStat being cruel and unusual punishment is broken down and
replaced with a more positive mythology of the process. Utilizing the computer
generated information provided by the Intersection, which is located on the captain’s
smart pad, he or she is able to put together a logical, systematic presentation for all
members in attendance. Although every person’s delivery style is different, in the case of
the crime problem we have been discussing, the Area captain’s presentation could read as
follows.

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Figure 7.15. CompStat Outline

Prepared by Intersection Staff February 1, 2011

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

1. GRAND THEFT AUTO

CURRENT PERIOD PRIOR PERIOD % CHANGE
10 20 -50%

TOP RD’s GTAs
Current Period 1001 1015 1034 1049 1061
Prior Period 1018 1031 1028 1047 1078
YTD 2011 1015 1034 1028 1049 1093

• Top Vehicle: Honda, Accord; 5 incidents (50%)
• Day of Week: Saturday, Sunday; 9 incidents (90%)
• Watch: AM 1; 10 incidents (100%)
• Auto Theft Arrests: 5

II. BURGLARY/THEFT FROM VEHICLE

CURRENT PERIOD PRIOR PERIOD % CHANGE
20 40 -50%

TOP RD’s B/TFVs
Current Period 1045 1047 1063 1072 1093
Prior Period 1039 1052 1067 1075 1081
YTD 2011 1025 1030 1041 1080 1083

• Top Vehicle: Honda, Corolla; 15 incidents (75%)
• Day of Week: Monday and Tuesday; 15 incidents (75%)
• Watch: AM 1; 20 incidents (100%)

III. RECOVERED VEHICLES

TOP RD’s RECOVERED VEHICLES
Current Period 1005 1018 1027 1030 1037
Prior Period 1005 1020 1035 1041 1063
YTD 2011 1005 1020 1027 1049 1071

CompStat 2011
West Valley GTA & BTFV
Crime Summary

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During week two of the extraction period, we observed an increase in BTFV
crimes in the southern end of our division. Our analysis revealed that these crimes were
occurring in RD 1045. The majority of these crimes occurred on Mondays and Tuesdays,
between the hours of 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. Although no suspect description was provided,
the suspect repeatedly burglarized 1992 Toyota, Corollas. The modus operandi of the
suspect was to make entry into the vehicle by smashing the right, front passenger side
window. Once inside the vehicle, the suspect would remove small electronic devices,
such as global positioning systems and other electronics.
During our daily Intersection meetings, my team strategized and formulated a
plan of action to rid the community of this crime and bring the perpetrator to justice.
These strategies were formulated and solidified into daily missions, which allowed
Intersection staff members to track and tabulate our progress.
Our strategies included a variety of measures, ranging from intervention,
prevention and suppression efforts, logging more than 216 hours to the mission.
In terms of intervention measures, we deployed all our patrol, discretionary and
investigative resources to the problem. Senior lead and patrol officers walked foot beats
in the affected neighborhoods, meeting with community members, in order to advise
them of the situation, provide contact information, and build good will. Senior lead
officers also held three community meetings and two business watch meetings to inform
and answer any questions. In addition, we worked collaboratively with the city’s
Department of Street Lighting, replacing burned out and broken light fixtures in the
neighborhood; thus, enhancing the lighting and safety in the neighborhood.

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In terms of preventive measures, in addition to the community and business watch
meetings, LAPD cadet’s walked the streets handing out prevention literature in order to
harden the target. There was also a media campaign with the local news media and their
newspaper affiliates, keeping the community abreast of the problem, and providing them
with helpful safety tips. Through the use of our VST, we were able to bring new safety
awareness to the neighborhood, teaching the value of safety and camaraderie in the
process, which will pay huge dividends for years to come.
In the end, it was our suppression efforts that brought this problem to an end. On
the ninth day of the operation, which coincidentally happened to be an early Tuesday
morning, an undercover narcotics officer observed the suspect breaking into a vehicle.
The suspect was arrested and taken into custody without incident.
During the debriefing procedure, the suspect confessed to being involved in all
fifteen crimes in the mission area, as well as to an additional thirty other crimes in
neighboring LAPD divisions. Our detectives did an outstanding job working
collaboratively with our neighboring detective partners, gathering all the necessary
information to ensure the suspect was held accountable for the forty-five crimes
committed.
I want to say a special thank you to our friends at the District Attorney’s Office,
who worked side-by-side with us from the beginning of this endeavor. Thanks to our
collaborative efforts, the suspect was prosecuted and held to answer for these senseless
crimes, making the streets of Los Angeles a safer place to live, work and visit.

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Since the suspect’s arrest, there has been no other BTFV crimes in RD 1045.
Rest assured, although the problem has been eradicated from the affected area, we
cannot, and will not, rest on our laurels. The area is continually being monitored during
our daily Intersection meetings, and we have scheduled community and business watch
meetings in the community through the end of the year.
That concludes my presentation in terms of this identified problem, and I would
be more than happy to answer any questions you might have at this time.
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Conclusion
Intersect Policing is a real-time operating system, utilizing CompStat technology
as a strategic tool, which enables Area captains to create specific tasks through
organizational learning that accomplishes the purpose of law enforcement. Utilizing a
three-step crime reduction process, strategies are derived in an open forum amongst
various stakeholders, utilizing each individual’s knowledge, experience and situational
awareness, in as little as twenty minutes per day.
The system, by design, creates an environment of organizational learning, which
enhances job satisfaction and employee morale. Through the use of daily missions,
which are formulated based on the strategies derived during daily Intersection meetings,
police personnel are provided with the necessary information required to eradicate crime.
Although missions are provided as a starting point, they are not intended to stifle an

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This portion of the research is not a word-for-word rendition made by an Area captain during a CompStat
inspection. Rather, it is the author’s words based on the information provided by the Intersection, and how
he would deliver the information at a CompStat inspection. However, it must be further noted that this
format has been tested during CompStat inspections with success.

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officer’s creativity; however, personnel are required to accomplish the work within the
boundaries of organizational policy.
Intersect Policing works in partnership with the CompStat process to ensure
leaders within the organization who are responsible for the service delivery system have a
strong understanding of the crime problems within their command. The system prepares
Area captains for the dreaded CompStat inspection by creating a working outline that can
be utilized to provide a professional and polished presentation. Intersect Policing
enhances a captains job performance by providing the necessary information needed,
which in turn enhances his or her predictive ability. This in turn breaks down negative
mythologies and creates a positive culture built upon the six universal core values.
Most importantly, Intersect Policing brings people together to achieve a
productive purpose by creating a positive police organization built upon the sound,
general principles of human behavior. By creating a positive police organization that
fulfills the needs of police officers, in turn, the police can assist in the building of a
worthwhile society free of crime and disorder.
Now that we have an understanding of the Intersect Policing system and the way
it was utilized, it is time to see the statistical results of the study. The goal was to achieve
the purpose of law enforcement, while at the same time reducing overall Part I crime at a
rate equal to, or better than, the LAPD citywide average. In Chapter 8 we will examine
the results of the Intersect Policing system and provide analysis into the findings.

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Chapter 8

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
The results of this study and the use of Intersect Policing are positive. From 2006
through 2009, crime was down, on average, for the entire LAPD. During this same
period, West Valley Area, however, was lower than the citywide Part I crime reduction
average.
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Intersect Policing was instituted in West Valley Area in 2010. The system
was not fully operational until about six months into the year, yet in that year, West
Valley Area equaled or exceeded the LAPD citywide average reduction in all Part I crime
categories. The same was true in 2011 (see Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1. 2006-2011 West Valley/LAPD Part I Crime Percentage Average

Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009b, 2010a, 2011b). U.S.
Department of Justice (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010j, 2011).

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The West Valley Area crime statistics are included in the overall LAPD statistics; thus, West Valley
Area’s results could have a small impact, either positive or negative on the departmental average.

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While cause and effect are difficult to prove in human activities, West Valley
Area did not gain any resources. As noted in Chapter 1, Table 1.3, West Valley Area lost
a total of nine police personnel during the two-year study, primarily from civilian
positions, which had to be replaced with sworn personnel (CBS, 2010; Romero, 2010).
There were no command staff changes during the study. Promotions and pay were frozen
in 2009, which might have had a negative effect on morale and the ability to reduce the
fear and incidence of crime (Willon & Reston, 2009).
Officers and detectives were being sent home for having accumulated too much
overtime, causing investigations to be placed on hold and specialized units shut down
(Rubin, 2010, 2011a). Still feeling the fallout from the Consent Decree,
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gang units
were being dismantled, because officers were required to provide full financial disclosure
of their assets to the department to stay in the unit (Rubin, 2011b). In addition, the
budget was cut, causing divisions, not just West Valley, to go without many of the basic
necessities, such as paper, pens, pencils and printer ink (Linthicum, 2011).
The only real significant change in West Valley Area was the introduction of
Intersect Policing. This strongly suggests that the reductions in Part I crime can be
attributed to the changes brought about by this extension of CompStat into field
operations. The tables and charts that follow provide the specific results. The following
tables (Table 8.1 and Table 8.2) provide an overall picture of how the number of crimes
changed in the West Valley Area for Part I crimes from 2006 through 2011.

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In November (2000) the United States DOJ entered into a Consent Decree, a legally binding contract
with the LAPD, regarding alleged civil rights violations committed by the department (Stone et al., 2009).

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Table 8.1. 2006-2011 West Valley Part I Crime Totals
Violent Crime 2006 2007 2008 2009*
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2010 2011
Homicide 11 6 15 4 3 5
Rape 40 46 40 19 26 22
Robbery 620 569 536 323 277 221
Aggravated Assault 640 626 660 318 268 247
Total Violent 1,311 1,247 1,251 664 574 495
Property Crime 2006 2007 2008 2009* 2010 2011
Burglary 1,880 1,919 1,829 1,109 1,065 969
Larceny-Theft 4,652 5,167 5,152 2,737 2,450 2,409
Motor Vehicle Theft 1,454 1,266 1,230 643 593 500
Total Property 7,986 8,352 8,211 4,489 4,108 3,878
Total Part I 9,297 9,559 9,462 5,153 4,682 4,373
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009b, 2010a, 2011b).
Table 8.2. 2006-2011 LAPD Part I Crime Totals
Violent Crime 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Homicide 480 397 385 312 293 297
Rape 1,059 1,004 949 903 923 828
Robbery 14,353 13,481 13,422 12,217 10,924 10,077
Aggravated Assault 14,637 12,926 11,798 10,638 9,344 8,843
Total Violent 30,529 27,808 26,554 24,070 21,484 20,045
Property Crime 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Burglary 20,359 19,629 19,726 18,435 17,410 17,264
Larceny-Theft 59,711 58,304 58,472 57,414 55,248 53,469
Motor Vehicle Theft 25,389 23,524 22,623 18,391 17,046 15,597
Total Property 105,459 101,457 100,821 94,240 89,704 86,330
Total Part I 135,988 129,265 127,375 118,310 111,188 106,375
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010j, 2011).

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* Represents the adjusted Part I crime totals after West Valley Area was divided, creating the twenty-first
LAPD division – Topanga Area.

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In 2006 the LAPD reduced Part I crime in the City of Los Angeles by 8.8%.
West Valley Area reduced Part I crime by 1.4%, which equates to a 7.4% difference
between West Valley Area and the LAPD citywide average. Although West Valley did
not reduce Part I crime at a percentage rate equal to the LAPD average, the reduction
indicates West Valley achieved the purpose of law enforcement.
The following year, 2007, LAPD reduced Part I crime 4.9%. West Valley,
however, was not able to reduce Part I crime; thus, ending 2007 with an increase of 3.2%
in Part I crime, 7.7% off the LAPD citywide average. Thus, West Valley was unable to
achieve the purpose of law enforcement in 2007.
During 2008, West Valley Area rebounded and reduced Part I crime 1.4%; thus,
achieving the purpose of law enforcement. The LAPD citywide average was 1.5%. Not
only did West Valley do a better job at achieving the purpose of law enforcement, they
nearly equaled the LAPD citywide average by less than one-tenth of a point.
In 2009 the LAPD split West Valley Area into two geographic Areas, paving the
way for the twenty-first geographic LAPD division – Topanga Area. When this
occurred, one-half of West Valley division, including personnel resources, was
transferred to Topanga Area. This allowed West Valley Area, as well as Topanga Area,
to focus their limited resources on a smaller amount of geography. The move proved to
be successful, as West Valley Area reduced crime 7%, almost equaling the LAPD
citywide average of 7.1%. Thus, for the second straight year West Valley Area not only
achieved the purpose of law enforcement, they missed equaling the LAPD Part I crime
average by one-tenth of a point.

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Numbers, however, can be deceiving. When West Valley Area was divided, the
RDs were redistributed, some staying in West Valley and others going to Topanga. If the
LAPD had not split the division, West Valley Area would have finished 2009 with
10,913 Part I crimes.
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That number would have equated to an increase of 1,451 Part I
crimes when compared to 2008, which would have given West Valley Area a 15.3%
increase in Part I crime, 21.8% worse than the LAPD citywide average.
Realizing you can’t compare red apples to green apples, the LAPD modified the
overall Part I crime numbers for West Valley. This was completed to provide a better
representation of the statistical difference in Part I crime in West Valley Area between
2008-2009. The methodology consisted of reviewing all 2008 Part I crimes that occurred
in RDs, which were reassigned to Topanga Area. Those crime numbers were then
subtracted from the West Valley Area, 2008, Part I crime total.
When the modification was completed, West Valley Area’s, 2008, Part I crime
numbers where adjusted from 9,462 to 5,540, which equates to a difference of 3,922
crimes. West Valley Area finished 2009 with a total of 5,153 Part I crimes.
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When this
number is compared against the adjusted 2008 total of 5,540 crimes, West Valley Area
had 387 fewer crimes in 2009, which equates to a 7.0% overall Part I crime reduction.
92

As previously noted in Figure 8.1, West Valley Area had not reduced Part I crime
at a percentage rate equal to, or better than, the LAPD citywide average since 2005. In
fact, in 2007, West Valley not only failed to reduce crime at a percentage rate equal to the

90
This number represents the combined sum total of Part I crimes, West Valley and Topanga Area, 2009.
91
This is the adjusted number as indicated by (*) in Table 8.1.
92
This is the percentage figure indicated by (*) in Figure 8.1.

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LAPD citywide average, it concluded the year with a 3.2% increase in overall Part I
crime. With this kind of record, it seemed to me that West Valley Area was the perfect
place to introduce the Intersect Policing system.
The purpose of this research was to develop a real-time operating system,
utilizing CompStat as a strategic tool, which enabled commanding officers to create
specific tasks through organizational learning that accomplished the purpose of law
enforcement through the daily work of police officers. This chapter will review the
results of the research and provide an analysis of the findings in order to bring clarity to
the subject matter.
Methodology
The methodology used in this portion of the research will be the same used by the
United States DOJ, FBI, UCR program to capture and analyze Part I crime. The
statistical data captured by the UCR program will be used to provide the overall findings
of the study. However, the UCR program does not separate LAPD Areas when providing
its overall findings. For this reason, the information captured in the LAPD Statistical
Digests, which are the primary source documents used by the UCR program to record
overall LAPD Part I crimes in the aggregate, will be used to breakdown the individual
Part I crime numbers associated with West Valley Area.
To date, the UCR program has not certified the 2011 crime numbers reported;
however, the preliminary crime figures have been posted on the UCR program website,

265
and will be the crime statistics used for the 2011 portion of this study.
93
Since the UCR
program has not certified the 2011 preliminary crime numbers, the LAPD has delayed
releasing its 2011 Statistical Digest for publication. For this reason, we will utilize the
2011 preliminary crime numbers posted by the LAPD Information Technology Division,
which are the same figures that will later be incorporated into the 2011 Statistical Digest.
These figures have already been submitted to the UCR program and released for
publication by the LAPD in its 2011 End of the Year Crime Snapshot.
94

The statistical information gathered is compared individually against the previous
years (i.e., 2010-2009, 2011-2010, 2011-2009) in order to obtain the percentage average,
positive or negative, of the overall findings. The information is broken down into the
following components: Part I crime totals, Part I crime comparison, violent crime
comparison, property crime comparison, overall Part I crime percentage comparison,
overall violent crime percentage comparison, and overall property crime percentage
comparison. These numbers are separated into individual components representing West
Valley Area and the LAPD citywide numbers for each phase of the study. The figures
are then compared between West Valley Area and the LAPD citywide average in order to
obtain the results of the study.
The design of this research includes observations by the author as an embedded
observer; thus, some of the opinions drawn by the author are explained and captured. In

93
On July 25, 2012, the author contacted the U.S. DOJ, UCR program and was advised there is no set date
as to when the 2011 preliminary crime numbers will be certified. According to the representative, the
author should continue checking the UCR program website on a daily basis.
94
To date, the LAPD has not sent any revisions to the UCR program in terms of the crime numbers
recorded. Based on past history, the numbers submitted rarely change and, when they have, the overall
figures do not change any one crime category more than a tenth of a point, up or down.

266
addition, statistical surveys, questionnaires, interviews, and focus groups were conducted.
The selection of participants, data collection procedures and analysis were all designed to
yield useful data in order to inform future police recommendations, as well as contribute
meaningfully to the body of knowledge on the subject of Intersect Policing.
After numerous discussions with command staff members at the LAPD, and with
the authorization of the Chief of Police,
95
it was agreed that police personnel, sworn and
civilian, could be randomly chosen to participate in interviews with the author, providing
the participants were advised, prior to their participation, they would be entitled to full
and complete confidentiality. The method of interviews could be completed in-person,
telephonically or via electronic messaging. However, none of the interviews could be
recorded and all electronic correspondence had to be destroyed at the conclusion of the
study.
The author solicited and received a form letter from the LAPD, signed by the
Chief of Police, William J. Bratton, to be used during the solicitation of participants
throughout the research period. The letter, addressed “Dear Member,” meaning member
of the LAPD, stated the department was seeking the participation of a random and
confidential sample of sworn and civilian employees in a study to be conducted by USC
to examine a new system toward the reduction of crime. Participants were encouraged to
contact the university, via the author, and were assured their participation would be kept
confidential. See Appendix “E” for a copy of the original letter provided by the LAPD.

95
At the time this research began, William J. Bratton was Chief of Police and the author was a member of
his immediate staff (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009a; Rubin, 2009). Charlie Beck replaced Bratton
as the fifty sixth Chief of Police for the City of Los Angeles (Los Angeles Police Department, 2009c,
2012d).

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Outline of the Chapter
This chapter is broken into three sections. The first section provides the first year
results of the study (2010). The information gathered from the first year of the study is
compared against that of calendar year 2009 in order to find if the Intersect Policing
system in West Valley Area achieved the purpose of law enforcement and, if so, was it
accomplished with a percentage average that was equal to, or better than, that of the
LAPD citywide average.
The second section discusses the second year findings of the study (2011). Again,
the information gathered from the second year of the study is compared against that of
calendar year 2010 in order to find if the Intersect Policing system in West Valley Area
achieved the purpose of law enforcement and, if so, was it accomplished with a
percentage average that was equal to, or better than, that of the LAPD citywide average.
The third section provides the overall results of the study. The information
gathered is compared against that of calendar year 2009 in order to find if the Intersect
Policing system in West Valley Area achieved the purpose of law enforcement and, if so,
was it accomplished with a percentage average that was equal to, or better than, that of
the LAPD citywide average.
Lastly, the study examines what affect, if any, Intersect Policing had on the state
of morale in West Valley Area. Through the use of surveys, interviews, focus groups and
personal observation of the author, the answers and actions of those participants are
analyzed in order to draw conclusions.

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First Year Results of the Study
Prior to this study, West Valley Area concluded 2009, as noted in Table 8.3, with
a reported total of 5,153 Part I crimes: 664 violent crimes and 4,489 property crimes.
Violent crimes consisted of: four homicides, nineteen rapes, 323 robberies, and 318
aggravated assaults. The breakdown of property crimes was as follows: burglary (1,109),
larceny-theft (2,737), and motor vehicle theft (643).
Table 8.3. 2009 West Valley Part I Crime Totals
Violent Crime 2009
Homicide 4
Rape 19
Robbery 323
Aggravated Assault 318
Total Violent Crime 664
Property Crime 2009
Burglary 1,109
Larceny-Theft 2,737
Motor Vehicle Theft 643
Total Property Crime 4,489
Total Part 1 5,153
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b).
After the first year of this study was completed, as noted in Table 8.4, West
Valley Area concluded 2010 with a reported total of 4,682 Part I crimes: 574 violent
crimes and 4,108 property crimes. All Part I crime was reduced from the previous year.
Violent crime consisted of: three homicides, twenty-six rapes, 277 robberies, and 268
aggravated assaults. The breakdown of property crimes was as follows: burglary (1,065),
larceny-theft (2,450), and motor vehicle theft (593).

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Table 8.4. 2010 West Valley Part I Crime Totals
Violent Crime 2010
Homicide 3
Rape 26
Robbery 277
Aggravated Assault 268
Total Violent Crime 574
Property Crime 2010
Burglary 1,065
Larceny-Theft 2,450
Motor Vehicle Theft 593
Total Property Crime 4,108
Total Part 1 Crime 4,682
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2010a).
When comparing 2010 against the previous year (2009), as noted in Table 8.5,
West Valley Area reduced Part I crime by 9.1%. To put this in perspective, 9.1% equates
to 471 persons. Thus, 471 less people were victimized of a Part I crime in West Valley,
making West Valley a safer place to live, work and visit.
Table 8.5. 2010-2009 West Valley Part I Crime Comparison
2010 2009 +/- % Change
Total Part I Crime 4,682 5,153 -471 -9.1%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2010a).
The overall violent crime comparison (2010-2009), as noted in Table 8.6, showed
a 13.6% reduction, which equates to ninety fewer crimes against persons in West Valley
Area. The individual breakdown of violent crime was as follows: homicide decreased by
one, which equates to a 25% reduction; rape increased by seven, which equates to a 37%

270
increase; robberies were reduced by forty-six crimes, which equates to a 14.2% decrease;
and, aggravated assaults decreased by fifty, which equates to a 15.7% decrease.
As you can see, all violent crime, with the exception of rape, decreased during the
extraction period. Based on an analysis of the findings, all twenty-six crimes of rape
reported were acquaintance related; thus, the victim knew the suspect, ruling out the
possibility of having a serial rapist on the loose in West Valley. In twenty-one of the
reported cases, the named suspect was either the husband or the boyfriend of the victim.
The other five reported cases had a named suspect who was either a friend, or an
acquaintance, of the husband or boyfriend of the victim.
In all twenty-six reported cases, there was no possibility to pre-plan or deploy
resources to a specific location in order to stop the crimes from occurring. Rape, like
homicide, is a crime of passion, which involves the use of power on a victim. Without
detailed information, such as a serial rapist, a specific location (i.e., bar or tavern) or gang
information pertaining to initiation rituals, the crime of rape is not a preventable crime.
Table 8.6. 2010-2009 West Valley Violent Crime Comparison
Violent Crimes 2010 2009 +/- % Change
Homicide 3 4 -1 -25%
Rape 26 19 +7 +37%
Robbery 277 323 -46 -14.2%
Aggravated Assault 268 318 -50 -15.7%
Total 574 664 -90 -13.6%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2010a).
The property crime comparison (2010-2009), as noted in Table 8.7, showed an
8.5% reduction, which equates to 381 fewer crimes against property in West Valley Area.

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The individual breakdown of property crime during this extraction period was as follows:
burglary was reduced by forty-four crimes, which equates to a 4% decrease; larceny-theft
was lowered by 287 crimes, which equates to a 10.5% decrease; and, motor vehicle theft
was decreased by fifty crimes, which equates to a 7.8% decrease.
Table 8.7. 2010-2009 West Valley Property Crime Comparison
Property Crimes 2010 2009 +/- % Change
Burglary 1,065 1,109 -44 -4.0%
Larceny-Theft 2,450 2,737 -287 -10.5%
Motor Vehicle Theft 593 643 -50 -7.8%
Total 4,108 4,489 -381 -8.5%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2010a).
To put this in comparison, as noted in Table 8.8, the LAPD concluded the
extraction period (2010-2009) with a citywide total Part I crime reduction of 6%. That
equates to 7,122 fewer persons having been victimized of a Part I Crime in the City of
Los Angeles; thus, making the City of Los Angeles a safer place to live, work and visit.
According to the United States DOJ, UCR program annual report, at the conclusion of
2010, the City of Los Angeles ranked second, behind NYC, as the safest big city in
America (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010i).
Table 8.8. 2010-2009 Citywide Part I Crime Comparison
2010 2009 +/- % Change
Total Part I Crime 111,188 118,310 -7,122 -6.0%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2009, 2010j).

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The violent crime comparison (2010-2009), as noted in Table 8.9, showed a
10.7% reduction, which equates to 2,586 fewer crimes against persons in the City of Los
Angeles. The individual breakdown of violent crime during this extraction period was as
follows: homicide decreased by nineteen, which equates to a 6.1% reduction; rape
increased by twenty, which equates to a 2.2% increase;
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robberies decreased by 1,293,
crimes, which equates to a 10.6% decrease; and, aggravated assaults decreased by 1,294,
which equates to a 12.2% reduction.
Table 8.9. 2010-2009 Citywide Violent Crime Comparison
Violent Crimes 2010 2009 +/- % Change
Homicide 293 312 -19 -6.1%
Rape 923 903 +20 +2.2%
Robbery 10,924 12,217 -1,293 -10.6%
Aggravated Assault 9,344 10,638 -1,294 -12.2%
Total 21,484 24,070 -2,586 -10.7%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2009, 2010j).
The property crimes comparison (2010-2009), as noted in Table 8.10, showed a
4.8% reduction, which equates to 4,536 fewer crimes against property in the City of Los
Angeles. The individual breakdown of property crimes was as follows: burglary was
reduced by 1,025 crimes, which equates to a 5.6% decrease; larceny-theft was lowered by
2,166 crimes, which equates to a 3.8% decrease; and, motor vehicle theft was reduced by
1,345, which equates to a 7.3% decrease.

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The study was unable to identify the specific cases that caused the increase in rape citywide; thus, no
further analysis can be provided.

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Table 8.10. 2010-2009 Citywide Property Crime Comparison
Property Crimes 2010 2009 +/- % Change
Burglary 17,410 18,435 -1,025 -5.6%
Larceny-Theft 55,248 57,414 -2,166 -3.8%
Motor Vehicle Theft 17,046 18,391 -1,345 -7.3%
Total 89,704 94,240 -4,536 -4.8%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2009, 2010j).
When you compare the overall Part I crime percentages (2010-2009), as noted in
Table 8.11, West Valley Area reduced Part I crime by 9.1%, compared to the LAPD
citywide average of 6.0%, which equates to a 3.1% difference in favor of West Valley
Area. Based on the percentage findings of the study at the conclusion of year one, West
Valley achieved the purpose of law enforcement by reducing Part I crime. In addition,
West Valley reduced Part I crime at a percentage rate better than the LAPD citywide
average. This was the first time West Valley had equaled or exceeded the LAPD Part I
crime average since 2005.
Table 8.11 2010-2009 West Valley/Citywide Part I Crime Percentage
Comparison
One Year % Change
West Valley Area Part I Crime Reduction Percentage -9.1%
LAPD Citywide Part I Crime Reduction Percentage -6.0%
Total Percentage Difference -3.1%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2010a). U.S. Department of Justice
(2009, 2010j).
In terms of overall violent crime (2010-2009), as noted in Table 8.12, West
Valley reduced violent crime 13.6%, compared to the LAPD citywide average of 10.7%.
This equates to a 2.9% reduction in favor of West Valley. Based on the percentages

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found in the study, West Valley reduced violent crime at a percentage rate better than the
LAPD citywide average.
Table 8.12. 2010-2009 West Valley/Citywide Violent Crime Percentage
Comparison
One Year % Change
West Valley Area Violent Crime Reduction Percentage -13.6%
LAPD Citywide Violent Crime Reduction Percentage -10.7%
Total Percentage Difference -2.9%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2010a). U.S. Department of Justice
(2009, 2010j).
When comparing the overall property crime percentages (2010-2009), as noted in
Table 8.13, West Valley Area reduced property crime 8.5%, compared to the LAPD
citywide average of 4.8%, which equates to a 3.7% difference in favor of West Valley.
Based on the percentage findings during the first year of the study, West Valley reduced
property crime at a percentage rate better than the LAPD citywide average.
Table 8.13. 2010-2009 West Valley/Citywide Property Crime Percentage
Comparison
One Year % Change
West Valley Area Property Crime Reduction Percentage -8.5%
LAPD Citywide Property Crime Reduction Percentage -4.8%
Total Percentage Difference -3.7%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2010a). U.S. Department of Justice
(2009, 2010j).

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Second Year Results of the Study
At the conclusion of year one of the study, as noted previously in Tables 8.1 and
8.4, West Valley Area reported 4,682 total Part I crimes: 574 violent crimes and 4,108
property crimes, which equates to an overall Part I crime reduction of 9.1%. As
previously noted, this was the first time since 2005, West Valley Area was able to reduce
Part I crime at rate that was equal to, or better than, the LAPD citywide average.
After the second year of the study was completed (2011), as noted in Table 8.14,
West Valley concluded with a reported total of 4,373 Part I crimes: 495 violent crimes
and 3,878 property crimes. In terms of violent crime, West Valley reported: five
homicides, twenty-two rapes, 221 robberies, and 247 aggravated assaults. The
breakdown of property crimes was as follows: burglary (969), larceny-theft (2,409), and
motor vehicle theft (500).
Table 8.14. 2011 West Valley Part I Crime Totals
Violent Crime 2011
Homicide 5
Rape 22
Robbery 221
Aggravated Assault 247
Total Violent Crime 495
Property Crime 2011
Burglary 969
Larceny-Theft 2,409
Motor Vehicle Theft 500
Total Property Crime 3,878
Total Part 1 Crime 4,373
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2011b).

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When comparing 2011 against the previous year (2010), as noted in Table 8.15,
West Valley Area reduced Part I crime by 6.6%. To put this in perspective, that equates
to 309 less people having been victimized of a Part I crime.
Table 8.15. 2011-2010 West Valley Part I Crime Comparison
2011 2010 +/- % Change
Total Part I Crime 4,373 4,682 -309 -6.6%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2010a, 2011b).
The violent crime comparison (2011-2010), as noted in Table 8.16, showed a
13.8% reduction, which equates to 79 fewer crimes against persons in West Valley. The
individual breakdown of violent crime for the extraction period was as follows: homicide
increased by two, which equates to a 66.7% increase; rape decreased by four, which
equates to a 15.4% decrease; robberies decreased by fifty-six crimes, which equates to a
20.2% decrease; and, aggravated assaults decreased by twenty-one, which equates to a
7.8% decrease.
With the exception of homicide, all other violent crime in West Valley was
reduced during the extraction period. Four of the five homicides were gang related,
which involved gang members who resided outside West Valley Area. At the time of
these occurrences, West Valley had only two police officers assigned to the gang
enforcement detail, which was caused by an issue regarding the signing of financial
disclosures (Rubin, 2011b). For this reason, no gang intelligence was being brought into
the Intersection; thus, West Valley Area did not have the information necessary to deploy
resources to the problem locations.

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Homicides, for the most part, are not preventable crimes, unless there is specific,
articulable information (i.e., gang wars, serial murder, etc.) for the police to work with.
Homicides, like the crime of rape, are personal crimes; thus, the ability to plan and
deploy resources is difficult, because you can’t predict where the crime of passion will
take place.
Table 8.16. 2011-2010 West Valley Violent Crime Comparison
Violent Crimes 2011 2010 +/- % Change
Homicide 5 3 +2 +66.7%
Rape 22 26 -4 -15.4%
Robbery 221 277 -56 -20.2%
Aggravated Assault 247 268 -21 -7.8%
Total 495 574 -79 -13.8%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2010a, 2011b).
The property crime comparison (2011-2010), as noted in Table 8.17, showed a
5.6% reduction, which equates to 230 fewer crimes against property in West Valley. The
individual breakdown of property crimes for the extraction period was as follows:
burglary was reduced by ninety-six crimes, which equates to a 9.0% reduction; larceny-
theft was decreased by forty-one, which equates to a 1.7% decrease; and, motor vehicle
theft was lowered by ninety-three crimes, which equates to a 15.7% decrease.

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Table 8.17. 2011-2010 West Valley Property Crime Comparison
Property Crimes 2011 2010 +/- % Change
Burglary 969 1,065 -96 -9.0%
Larceny-Theft 2,409 2,450 -41 -1.7%
Motor Vehicle Theft 500 593 -93 -15.7%
Total 3,878 4,108 -230 -5.6%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2010a, 2011b).
To put this in comparison, as noted in Table 8.18, the LAPD concluded the same
extraction period (2011-2010) with a citywide Part I crime reduction of 4.3%. That
equates to 4,813 fewer persons having been victimized of a Part I Crime in the City of
Los Angeles.
Table 8.18. 2011-2010 Citywide Part I Crime Comparison
2011 2010 +/- % Change
Total Part I Crime 106,375 111,188 -4,813 -4.3%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2010j, 2011).
The violent crime comparison (2011-2010), as noted in Table 8.19, reported a
6.7% reduction, which equates to 1,439 fewer crimes against persons in the City of Los
Angeles. The individual breakdown of violent crime was as follows: homicide increased
by four, which equates to a 1.4% increase;
97
rape decreased by ninety-five, which equates
to a 10.3% decrease; robberies decreased by 847 crimes, which equates to a 7.8%
decrease; and, aggravated assaults decreased by 501, which equates to a 5.4% reduction.

97
The study was unable to identify the particular cases that caused the increase; thus, no further analysis is
available.

279
Table 8.19. 2011-2010 Citywide Violent Crime Comparison
Violent Crimes 2011 2010 +/- % Change
Homicide 297 293 +4 +1.4%
Rape 828 923 -95 -10.3%
Robbery 10,077 10,924 -847 -7.8%
Aggravated Assault 8,843 9,344 -501 -5.4%
Total 20,045 21,484 -1,439 -6.7%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2010j, 2011).
The property crimes comparison (2011-2010), as noted in Table 8.20, showed a
3.8% reduction, which equates to 3,374 fewer crimes against persons in the City of Los
Angeles. The individual breakdown of property crime for the extraction period was as
follows: burglary was reduced by 146 crimes, which equates to a 0.8% decrease; larceny-
theft was reduced by 1,779 crimes, which equates to a 3.2% reduction; and, motor vehicle
theft was decreased by 1,449, which equates to an 8.5% decrease.
Table 8.20. 2011-2010 Citywide Property Crime Comparison
Property Crimes 2011 2010 +/- % Change
Burglary 17,264 17,410 -146 -0.8%
Larceny-Theft 53,469 55,248 -1,779 -3.2%
Motor Vehicle Theft 15,597 17,046 -1,449 -8.5%
Total 86,330 89,704 -3,374 -3.8%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2010j, 2011).
When you compare the overall 2011-2010 Part I crime percentages, as noted in
Table 8.21, West Valley Area reduced Part I crime by 6.6%, compared to the LAPD
citywide average of 4.3%. This equates to a 2.3% difference in favor of West Valley
Area. These findings marked the second consecutive year West Valley Area equaled or

280
bettered the LAPD citywide Part I crime percentage average. Based on the percentage
findings during the second year of the study, West Valley not only achieved the purpose
of law enforcement by reducing overall Part I crime, they did so by two point three
percentage points better than the LAPD citywide average.
Table 8.21. 2011-2010 West Valley/Citywide Part I Crime Percentage
Comparison
One Year % Change
West Valley Area Part I Crime Reduction Percentage -6.6%
LAPD Citywide Part I Crime Reduction Percentage -4.3%
Total Percentage Difference -2.3%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2010a, 2011b). U.S. Department of Justice
(2010j, 2011).
When comparing the overall violent crime percentages (2011-2010), as noted in
Table 8.22, West Valley Area reduced violent crime 13.8%, compared to the LAPD
citywide average of 6.7%, which equates to a 7.1% difference in favor of West Valley
Area. Based on the percentage findings during the second year of the study, Intersect
Policing reduced violent crime at a percentage rate better than that of the LAPD citywide
average.
Table 8.22. 2011-2010 West Valley/Citywide Violent Crime Percentage
Comparison
One Year % Change
West Valley Area Violent Crime Reduction Percentage -13.8%
LAPD Citywide Violent Crime Reduction Percentage -6.7%
Total Percentage Difference -7.1%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2010a, 2011b). U.S. Department of Justice
(2010j, 2011).

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When comparing the overall property crime percentages (2011-2010), as noted in
Table 8.23, West Valley Area reduced property crime 5.6%, compared to the LAPD
citywide average of 3.8%, which equates to a 1.8% difference in favor of West Valley.
Based on the percentage findings during the second year of the study, West Valley
reduced property crime at a percentage rate better than the LAPD citywide average.
Table 8.23. 2011-2010 West Valley/Citywide Property Crime Percentage
Comparison
One Year % Change
West Valley Area Property Crime Reduction Percentage -5.6%
LAPD Citywide Property Crime Reduction Percentage -3.8%
Total Percentage Difference -1.8%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2010a, 2011b). U.S. Department of Justice
(2010j, 2011).
Overall Results of the Study
At the conclusion of the two year study (2011-2009), as noted in Table 8.24, West
Valley Area reduced Part I crime by 15.1%, which equates to 780 fewer persons having
not been victimized of a Part I crime in West Valley. Based on these findings, it is
conclusive that West Valley achieved the purpose of law enforcement by reducing overall
Part I crime, making the West Valley community a safer place to live, work and visit.
Table 8.24. 2011-2009 West Valley Part I Crime Comparison
2011 2009 +/- % Change
Total Part I Crime 4,373 5,153 -780 -15.1%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2011b).

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The violent crime comparison (2011-2009), as noted in Table 8.25, showed a
25.5% reduction, which equates to 169 fewer crimes against persons in West Valley. The
individual breakdown of violent crime for the extraction period was as follows:
homicides increased by one, which resulted in an overall increase of 25%;
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rape
increased by three, which resulted in a 15.8% increase;
99
robberies were reduced by 102
crimes, which resulted in a 31.6% decrease; and, aggravated assaults were decreased by
seventy-one, which resulted in a 22.3% decrease.
Table 8.25. 2011-2009 West Valley Violent Crime Comparison
Violent Crimes 2011 2009 +/- % Change
Homicide 5 4 +1 +25%
Rape 22 19 +3 +15.8%
Robbery 221 323 -102 -31.6%
Aggravated Assault 247 318 -71 -22.3%
Total 495 664 -169 -25.5%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2011b).
The property crime comparison (2011-2009), as noted in Table 8.26, showed a
13.6% decrease, which equates to 611 fewer crimes against property in West Valley. The
individual breakdown of property crimes was as follows: burglaries decreased by 140,
which equates to a 12.6% decrease; larceny-theft was reduced by 12%, which equates to
328 fewer crimes; and, motor vehicle theft was reduced by 143, which equates to a 22.2%
reduction.

98
An analysis pertaining to the increase in homicides was provided earlier in the chapter.
99
An analysis pertaining to the increase in rapes was provided earlier in the chapter.

283
Table 8.26. 2011-2009 West Valley Property Crime Comparison
Property Crimes 2011 2009 +/- % Change
Burglary 969 1,109 -140 -12.6%
Larceny-Theft 2,409 2,737 -328 -12.0%
Motor Vehicle Theft 500 643 -143 -22.2%
Total 3,878 4,489 -611 -13.6%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2011b).
To put this in comparison, as noted in Table 8.27, the LAPD concluded the same
extraction period (2011-2009) with a citywide Part I crime reduction of 10.1%. That
equates to 11,935 fewer persons having been victimized of a Part I crime in the City of
Los Angeles.
Table 8.27. 2011-2009 Citywide Part I Crime Comparison
2011 2009 +/- % Change
Total Part I Crime 106,375 118,310 -11,935 -10.1%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2009, 2011).
The violent crime comparison (2011-2009), as noted in Table 8.28, reported a
16.7% decrease, which equates to 4,025 fewer crimes against persons in the City of Los
Angeles. The individual breakdown of violent crime was as follows: homicide decreased
by fifteen, which equates to a 4.8% reduction; rape was reduced by seventy-five, which
equates to an 8.3% reduction; robberies decreased by 2,140, which equates to a 17.5%
decrease; and, aggravated assaults were lowered by 1,795 crimes, which equates to a
16.9% reduction.

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Table 8.28. 2011-2009 Citywide Violent Crime Comparison
Violent Crimes 2011 2009 +/- % Change
Homicide 297 312 -15 -4.8%
Rape 828 903 -75 -8.3%
Robbery 10,077 12,217 -2,140 -17.5%
Aggravated Assault 8,843 10,638 -1,795 -16.9%
Total 20,045 24,070 -4,025 -16.7%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2009, 2011).
The property crime comparison (2011-2009), as noted in Table 8.29, showed an
8.4% reduction, which equates to 7,910 fewer persons having been victimized of a
property crime in the City of Los Angeles. The individual breakdown of property crime
for the extraction period was as follows: burglary was reduced by 1,171, which equates to
a 6.4% reduction; larceny-theft was lowered by 3,945 crimes, which equates to a 6.9%
reduction; and, motor vehicle theft was decreased by 2,794, which equates to a 15.2%
decrease.
Table 8.29. 2011-2009 Citywide Property Crime Comparison
Property Crimes 2011 2009 +/- % Change
Burglary 17,264 18,435 -1,171 -6.4%
Larceny-Theft 53,469 57,414 -3,945 -6.9%
Motor Vehicle Theft 15,597 18,391 -2,794 -15.2%
Total 86,330 94,240 -7,910 -8.4%
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2009, 2011).
When you compare the percentages between West Valley Area and the LAPD
citywide average for the same extraction period (2011-2009), as noted in Table 8.30,
West Valley Area reduced Part I crime by 15.1%, compared to the LAPD citywide

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average of 10.1%, which equates to a 5.0% reduction in favor of West Valley Area.
Based on the percentage findings of the study, West Valley reduced overall Part I crime
at a rate better than that of the LAPD average.
Table 8.30. 2011-2009 West Valley/Citywide Part I Crime Percentage
Comparison
Two Year % Change
West Valley Area Part I Crime Reduction Percentage -15.1%
LAPD Citywide Part I Crime Reduction Percentage -10.1%
Total Percentage Difference -5.0%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2011b). U.S. Department of Justice
(2009, 2011).
When comparing the overall violent crime percentages (2011-2009), as noted in
Table 8.31, West Valley Area reduced violent crime 25.5%, compared to the LAPD
citywide average of 16.7%, which equates to an 8.8% difference in favor of West Valley.
Based on the percentage findings of the study, Intersect Policing reduced violent crime at
a percentage rate better than that of the LAPD citywide average.
Table 8.31. 2011-2009 West Valley/Citywide Violent Crime Percentage
Comparison
Two Year % Change
West Valley Area Violent Crime Reduction Percentage -25.5%
LAPD Citywide Violent Crime Reduction Percentage -16.7%
Total Percentage Difference -8.8%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2011b). U.S. Department of Justice
(2009, 2011).
When comparing the overall property crime percentages (2011-2009), as noted in
Table 8.32, West Valley Area reduced property crime by 13.6%, compared to the LAPD

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citywide average of 8.4%, which equates to a 5.2% difference in favor of West Valley.
Based on the percentage findings during the second year of the study, Intersect Policing
reduced property crime at a percentage rate better than that of the LAPD citywide
average.
Table 8.32. 2011-2009 West Valley/Citywide Property Crime Percentage
Comparison
Two Year % Change
West Valley Area Property Crime Reduction Percentage -13.6%
LAPD Citywide Property Crime Reduction Percentage -8.4%
Total Percentage Difference -5.2%
Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009b, 2011b). U.S. Department of Justice
(2009, 2011).
Improving Employee Morale
In most police departments, morale is low and the officers are cynical. Externally
crime and stupidity are never ending, and we have to deal with a lot of bad guys who lie,
cheat and try to hurt us. Internally we have to deal with commanding officers who only
care about getting their “ticket punched” in order to promote to the next level.
For this reason, I was not surprised when entering West Valley division to get
these reactions to my intention to introduce a new way of approaching the problem of
crime:
100

100
All of the following interviews were conducted at West Valley Community Police Station. Prior to the
interview, all participants were advised of the reason for the interview, presented with a letter of full
disclosure related to the research, and that full confidentiality would be strictly adhered to. See Appendix
“E” for a full copy of the letter.

287
West Valley Detective: “When I first heard the concept, I thought,
‘Oh boy,’ another ‘hare-brained’ idea being ‘pushed down our
necks’ by some educated ‘college boy.’”
101

West Valley Sergeant: “Here comes this guy, ‘fresh out of the
building,’ trying to get everybody to drink the ‘Kool-Aid’
about the next greatest idea in policing so he can promote to
chief.”
102

West Valley Police Officer: “The idea about everybody coming
together in some ‘Intersection’ to discuss crime seemed
dangerous to me. I thought to myself, if I speak my mind the
way this guy wants me to do, the only thing I am going to hear
is the sound of a bus running over me in the middle of the
‘Intersection’ being driven by the captain.”
103

West Valley Lieutenant: “When the lieutenant first spoke to us about
the ‘Medici Effect,’ I thought to myself, make this guy take a
drug test…what is he smoking?”
104

101
January 20, 2012, at 8:00 a.m.
102
February 12, 2012, at 11:00 a.m.
103
January 20, 2012, at 8:30 a.m.
104
February 12, 2012, at 11:30 a.m.

288
West Valley Crime Analyst: “It seemed complicated, yet extremely
simple…I just hoped this guy wasn’t full of *$@%!”
105

West Valley Captain: “It’s going to make CompStat easier…this I’ve
got to see to believe.”
106

My purpose for introducing Intersect Policing was to reduce the fear and
incidence of crime, but few believed this could be done. To provide full disclosure, it
must be noted that Intersection meetings, especially at the beginning of the study, were
not fully embraced by West Valley personnel, especially those working a detective
assignment.
107
During the first six months of the study, because the system was new and
personnel were not used to attending daily crime strategy meetings, attendance and
communication were less than desired.
In addition, the majority of sworn police personnel
108
assigned to West Valley had
created the mythology that crime could not be lowered any further without “cooking the
books.” This mythology was brought to the author’s attention after the completion of a
survey, which was distributed to all sworn police personnel assigned to West Valley
Area, and later confirmed through informal interviews with sworn police personnel.

105
January 20, 2012, at 9:30 a.m.
106
January 20, 2011, at 5:00 p.m.
107
At the start of this research, there were 313 police personnel assigned to West Valley Area: two
captains, six lieutenants, forty-two detectives, thirty-one sergeants, 167 police officers, forty-two reserve
police officers and twenty-three civilian personnel (Los Angeles Police Department, 2010b).
108
There were 248 sworn personnel assigned to West Valley Area at this phase of the study: two captains,
six lieutenants, forty-two detectives, thirty-one sergeants and 167 police officers (Los Angeles Police
Department (2010b).

289
At the start of this research, 245 sworn police personnel, excluding the author and
two captains, were requested to participate in a survey, which asked a series of questions,
including, but not limited to, the reduction of crime in West Valley. In all, 238 sworn
police personnel completed and returned the survey, making the error level of the survey
1.4% (CustomInsight, 2009).
Of those 238 sworn police personnel who completed the survey, as noted in
Figure 8.2, 86.1%, which equates to 205 sworn personnel, believed that crime could not
be lowered any further in West Valley. In addition, the survey asked the participants to
select the method they felt would best reduce crime in West Valley, and 59.6%, which
equates to 142 sworn police personnel, believed there was no strategy that could be used,
without “cooking the books,” to reduce crime further in West Valley Area. See
Appendix “F” for a list of all questions asked in the survey.
Figure 8.2. Intersect Policing Survey One – Crime Reduction (January 2010)

290
Since these sworn police personnel had not reached a state of dissonance there
was strong resistance toward change. Having identified the mythology, it was my goal to
create dissonance, and the behavioral tool at my disposal to change this culture was the
Intersect Policing system (Macdonald et al., 2006). Rather than using power to achieve
coherence, I ensured the process continued with consistency, knowing full well that
changing the West Valley culture was going to take time (Macdonald et al., 2006). For
this reason, the “lack luster” response to the Intersect Policing system did not discourage
me.
Unlike most change processes, which could take up to as much as ten years
(Kotter, 1995, 1996), dissonance was created after only seven months, when Intersection
personnel were able to link a possible suspect who had been burglarizing pharmacies in
the San Fernando Valley to that of a suspect who was committing the same crimes in
West Valley for three years. Through the collaborative efforts of all stakeholders
involved, the suspect, along with his father and brother, were taken into custody in less
than seventy-two hours.
109

After the arrest was made, police personnel throughout West Valley Area
appeared to have reached a state of dissonance. The “buzz” around the station, beyond
the congratulatory “patting” on the back of those who were associated with the
investigation, was that maybe there was something to this “Intersect Policing thing.” The
sworn police personnel mindset appeared, at least from my perspective; to go from “the

109
For a full description of strategies and personnel used in this operation, please refer back to Chapter 7.

291
glass was half empty,” to “the glass being half full” and, maybe, that crime could be
lowered in West Valley Area even further in the coming year.
It would be false to say that all West Valley Area police personnel were swayed
to my way of thinking; however, based on my own observations, I believe many of them
where, and many others were on their way. I say this with confidence because, after the
pharmacy burglar arrest was made, Intersection attendance grew and the attendees
became more vocal during the meetings, providing valuable insight to the strategies
deployed.
At the conclusion of the first year of this study, a second survey was distributed to
West Valley personnel.
110
Unlike the first survey, which found the majority of sworn
police personnel believing crime could not be lowered any further in West Valley Area,
this survey found the exact opposite.
At the time the survey was distributed in January (2011), West Valley Area had a
total of 316 police personnel assigned to the division (Los Angeles Police Department,
2011a). There were 251 sworn police personnel assigned to West Valley Area: two
captains, six lieutenants, forty detectives, twenty-seven sergeants, and 176 police officers
(Los Angeles Police Department, 2011a).
Excluding the two captains and the author, 248 sworn police personnel were
provided the survey. The survey asked a series of questions, including, but not limited to,
the reduction of crime in West Valley. In all, 230 sworn police personnel completed and

110
The second survey was distributed in January (2011).

292
returned the survey, making the error level of the survey 2.3% (CustomInsight, 2009).
See Appendix “G” for a list of all questions asked in the survey.
According to the survey, as noted in Figure 8.3, 67.4% of the sworn personnel
assigned to West Valley, which equates to 155 sworn police personnel, believed crime in
West Valley could be lowered even further during calendar year 2011. Thus, proving
that the mythologies and culture of West Valley Area sworn police personnel were
changing toward the positive end of the values continuum. In addition, when asked what
method they (sworn police personnel) felt would best reduce crime in West Valley,
60.9%, which equates to 140 sworn police personnel, believed Intersect Policing was the
best strategy to reduce crime even further in West Valley Area.
Figure 8.3. Intersect Policing Survey Two – Crime Reduction (January 2011)

293
At the conclusion of this study, a third survey was distributed to West Valley
personnel.
111
In January (2012) West Valley Area had a total of 317 police personnel
assigned to the division (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012k). At that time there
were 255 sworn personnel assigned to West Valley Area: two captains, six lieutenants,
thirty-nine detectives, twenty-eight sergeants, and 180 police officers. Excluding the two
captains and the author, 252 sworn police personnel were provided the survey.
The survey asked a series of questions, including, but not limited to, the reduction
of crime in West Valley. In all, 238 sworn police personnel completed and returned the
survey, making the error level of the survey 2% (CustomInsight, 2009). See Appendix
“H” for a list of all questions asked in the survey.
Figure 8.4. Intersect Policing Survey Three – Crime Reduction (January 2012)

111
The third survey was distributed in January (2012).

294
According to the survey, as noted in Figure 8.4, 74.8% of the sworn police
personnel assigned to West Valley Area, which equates to 178 sworn police personnel,
believed crime would continue to be lowered in West Valley during calendar year 2012.
Based on the observations of the author, in addition to the responses received
from the surveys, one could infer that Intersect Policing changed the negative
mythologies and culture of West Valley Area to a positive culture that embraced
organizational learning. Thus, creating a positive organization based on the principles of
human behavior, which ultimately led to the reduction of overall crime.
It appears Intersect Policing, in addition to reducing crime in an urban area, also
improved employee morale. This seems to be a reasonable inference because nothing
was introduced, with the exception of the Intersect Policing system, during the two years
of the study that would lead an ordinary and prudent person to think otherwise. There are
many ideas a person could conjure up to explain the reason for why it is believed
Intersect Policing improved morale. From the author’s perspective, I believe a lot of the
improvement had to do with the daily Intersection meeting.
Through the use of daily Intersection meetings, all stakeholders in the crime
reduction process were able to meet in one central location, the Intersection, in order to
collaborate, communicate and provide innovative and practical solutions to the myriad of
crime problems plaguing the West Valley community. Because these meetings were
short and concise, focus was maintained, which allowed the involved stakeholders to
create the Medici Effect that was later communicated through daily missions.

295
In addition to creating strategies toward the reduction of crime, these meetings
served as “team building” meetings, which brought all stakeholders in the crime
reduction mission closer together. Stakeholders learned from one another and developed
respect for one another’s ideas and dedication to the cause. In addition, at various times
in the crime reduction process, the Intersection was a stress reliever by bringing levity to
the situation.
Through the use of interviews, other Intersection attendees echoed the author’s
sentiments, as well as explained their thoughts and ideas about the system. Some of the
comments made about the system include:
112

Community Member: “It was enjoyable being part of a process I
normally don’t get to see unless watching television…it was
very rewarding to see the fruits of our labor come to fruition in
the form of crime reduction.”
113

Community Member: “I am amazed at how well these meetings are
orchestrated…extremely fast paced, but very informative. I feel
better knowing there are so many officers out there working so
hard to keep this community safe.”
114

112
All of the following interviews were conducted at West Valley Community Police Station. Prior to the
interview, all participants were advised of the reason for the interview, presented with a letter of full
disclosure related to the research, and that full confidentiality would be strictly adhered to. See Appendices
“D” and “E” for a full copy of the letters provided.
113
January 20, 2012, at 10:00 a.m.
114
February 2, 2012, at 10:00 a.m.

296
Community Member: “I enjoyed watching everybody in the room
analyze the problem and engage in healthy conversation.
Although there were differences in opinion, from time-to-time,
you could tell the conversations never became personal…it was
always for the betterment of the team…I worked in the private
sector, running my own business for twenty-five years…I only
wish I had been exposed to this way of thinking years ago.”
115

Community Member: “I think these meetings are great. I enjoy getting
to see everybody, and the meetings are always interesting and
entertaining. Today’s Groundhog Day, but these meetings are
nothing of the sorts.”
116

West Valley Lieutenant: “I have been doing this job for a long time
and have seen a lot of ideas come and go…but this system
really works. It’s not that there is anything special to it…in
fact, I would argue that it is not revolutionary at all…just a
mixture of best practices and common sense.”
117

115
January 20, 2012, at 10:30 a.m.
116
February 2, 2012, at 10:30 a.m.
117
January 20, 2012, at 11:00 a.m.

297
West Valley Lieutenant: “For the first time in my career I was able to
participate in a meeting, that didn’t last forever, and obtain all
the information necessary to run a watch and reduce
crime…best thing to hit West Valley in years.”
118

West Valley Sergeant: “I admit that I thought this was a joke at
first…and did not believe it could help reduce crime…I was
wrong…not only does it help to reduce crime, it brings officers
together in a way you only read about in those “sacred”
leadership books.”
119

West Valley Sergeant: “Intersection meetings were the best idea to
come along in a very long while…I still don’t like USC, but
whatever they’re teaching over there…it works!”
120

West Valley Sergeant: “Prior to Intersect Policing, all I heard from my
subordinates was how crazy CompStat made us…running
around with our ‘hair on fire’ to lower crime…now, it’s the
exact opposite, rather than observing people complain, I see
them talking about strategies and ideas…all because, at least in
my opinion, Intersect Policing.”
121

118
December 9, 2011, at 9:45 a.m.
119
December 8, 2011, at 11:00 a.m.
120
January 20, 2012, at 1:00 p.m.

121
March 5, 2012, at 8:00 a.m.

298
West Valley Sergeant: “I hated CompStat…not just because I thought
it was a way for command staff to prove to us ‘little people”
just how ‘little’ we are, but because it made captains do things
they normally wouldn’t do…. like treat people with disrespect
because crime was up…Intersect Policing has changed that, as
well as my opinion towards CompStat…I understand the
process now, and with the presentation template, the meeting is
fun.”
122

West Valley Detective: “I hated these meetings…I couldn’t stand
having to take twenty-minutes out of my day to attend another
meeting…that thought soon changed, because I realized how
much time these meetings save me in the long run…not to
mention finally putting names to faces I only read in reports.”
123

West Valley Detective: “I hated everything about this program…from
the Intersection meetings to the detective initiated patrol
days…however, it took me awhile, but I realized just how
important all of this is…not to mention how simple it is…in
terms of solving crime…now, bring it on…I’m sold.”
124

122
March 5, 2012, at 10:00 a.m.

123
January 20, 2012, at 3:00 p.m.
124
August 10, 2011, at 1:00 p.m.

299
West Valley Detective: “When I first heard the concept, I thought, ‘Oh
boy,’ another ‘hare-brained’ idea being ‘pushed down our
necks’ by some educated ‘college boy’…with time, however, I
grew to understand the concept and just how powerful this
basic, almost ‘common sense’ approach was to the reduction of
crime…through the use of this system, I was able to provide
important information, in a face-to-face setting with all of the
various police personnel working other assignments, which
assisted in the apprehension of suspects and clearing of
complicated cases.”
125

West Valley Detective: “This system is by far the easiest to
follow…it’s nothing more than common sense.”
126

West Valley Detective: “The way this system brought the team
together was really amazing to watch…I would never have
believed it if I hadn’t seen it with my own eyes.”
127

West Valley Police Officer: “As a probationary officer, very few
people listen to me…but during these meetings, I realize people
are…it’s a great feeling.”
128

125
February 29, 2012, at 10:00 a.m.
126
January 20, 2012, at 2:00 p.m.
127
May 6, 2011, at 4:00 p.m.
128
May 18, 2011, at 10:00 a.m.

300
West Valley Police Officer: “Although I was not a fan at first, I am
now…the daily missions were exactly what was missing…just
look at the crime numbers…they are all the proof you need.”
129

West Valley Police Officer: “I live in the division, so do my parents,
so crime reduction is very important to me…being able to
provide suggestions during Intersection meetings and seeing the
suggestions become part of the daily missions was very
rewarding…for the first time in my career I actually believed
that I was being listened to and was making a difference in the
process.”
130

West Valley Police Officer: “I liked being able to meet with so many
police personnel, at one time in one place, because it helps me
understand and keep up with the crime problems, especially
since I only work three days a week
131
…great system.”
132

129
April 3, 2012, at 1:00 p.m.

130
April 4, 2011, at 10:00 a.m.
131
Patrol personnel, dependent upon their watch assignment, work three, twelve-hour days per week, or
four, ten-hour days per week.
132
May 18, 2011, at 10:30 a.m.

301
Although Intersect Policing resonated positively with some police
personnel, others didn’t find the system as appealing. This was to be expected,
because you can’t please everybody. Some of the comments that did not reflect
positively on the system include:
133

West Valley Detective: “There is nothing different between this and
crime briefings...just a different name.”
134

West Valley Detective: “The department expects us to do so much
work in so little time. I don’t see the value of spending twenty-
minutes, first thing every morning, to go over crime. Just spend
one hour every three days…that’s a better use of time than
this.”
135

West Valley Detective: “I am not sure why detectives are now held
responsible for crime reduction. It’s our job to investigate
crimes, not go out and deter crime.”
136

West Valley Sergeant: “Ideas come and go…this to shall pass.”
137

133
All of the following interviews were conducted at West Valley Community Police Station. Prior to the
interview, all participants were advised of the reason for the interview, presented with a letter of full
disclosure related to the research, and that full confidentiality would be strictly adhered to. See Appendix
“E” for a full copy of the letter.
134
January 6, 2012, at 2:00 p.m.
135
January 6, 2012, at 2:30 p.m.
136
January 6, 2012, at 8:00 a.m.
137
February 8, 2012, at 12:00 p.m.

302
West Valley Sergeant: “This idea is nothing new. In fact, many
believe that this is nothing more than a lieutenant trying to make
a name for himself to make captain.”
138

West Valley Sergeant: “All this does is pile more work on the patrol
officer. When is the department going to learn patrol can’t do
everything?”
139

Police Officer: “The daily missions are useless. There are too many
radio calls to handle to do any of this stuff…it’s a joke.”
140

Police Officer: “This is just another way for the department to
micromanage patrol officers.”
141

Easing the CompStat Inspection Process
Lastly, it must be noted that since the advent of the Intersect Policing system, the
CompStat inspection process has not been as laborious and time consuming. Because
Intersect Policing analyzes crime on a daily basis, the Area captain has a complete
understanding of the various crime problems plaguing the division. When patterns,
clusters and trends are identified, they are immediately assigned a mission that is tracked
and monitored for a full and complete ten days. Once the mission has been accomplished

138
February 8, 2012, at 1:00 p.m.
139
February 8, 2012, at 4:00 p.m.
140
February 16, 2011, at 10:30 a.m.
141
February 16, 2011, at 11:30 a.m.

303
and the pattern, cluster or trend has been eliminated, the information is stored in a
computer database, by number, for easy retrieval.
The information contained in the database places the information in chronological
order, which allows the Area captain to quickly review the information and put a
presentation together in minimal time. In addition, utilizing the chronological format
presented, the information can be presented in a succinct, professional manner during the
CompStat inspection, which enhances the captain’s overall reputation and future
promotions. As one West Valley captain explained, “Growth occurs when you are out of
your comfort zone and, at first, the process took me ‘way’ out of my comfort zone, due to
its simplicity. I remember thinking to myself, I’ll believe it when I see it…well, it has
made a believer out of me.”
142

It must also be noted that Intersect Policing is about team building and allowing
everybody the opportunity to “shine.” Using the team concept, and drawing from the
information gathered during the daily Intersection meetings, lieutenants, sergeants,
detectives and police officers are able to make presentations during CompStat
inspections; thus, enhancing their reputation amongst the various department command
staff members in attendance, and placing themselves in a position for future promotion
within the organization.
I personally recall the first time we utilized the Intersect Policing team approach
in CompStat. The Area captain started the meeting with the overall “snapshot” of the

142
The interview was conducted at the Police Administrative Building on February 1, 2012, at 1:00 p.m.
Prior to the interview, the captain was advised of the reason for the interview, presented with a letter of full
disclosure related to the research, and that full confidentiality would be strictly adhered to. See Appendix
“E” for a full copy of the letter.

304
problems, and then handed the ball off to other team members, flawlessly. Each member
stayed on focus, presenting their information succinctly, which resulted in no follow up
questions from the CompStat panel. In fact, like a football team scoring a touchdown at
the Super Bowl, upon our completion of the inspection, all in attendance gave us an
ovation and congratulated us on a job well done. Other police personnel, predominantly
captains in attendance, approached the Area captain, asking for the secrets to our success.
Although a division or department might find success using portions of the
Intersect Policing system, I urge not trying to piecemeal the process for a “quick fix” to a
larger problem. All of the Intersect Policing pieces work synergistically to provide the
overall desired effect police professionals are looking to achieve. As noted previously,
Devonshire Area was provided the blueprint of the Intersect Policing system, and was
chosen to be a test model in order to compare the system in another LAPD division. For
various reasons, some of which were beyond their control, such as not having enough
physical space to create an Intersection, Devonshire failed to follow the entire blueprint
as directed.
Instead, Devonshire used only “bits and pieces” of the system to fit their current
needs, in order to “stop the bleeding,” so to speak, in terms of reducing the fear and
incidence of crime. However, based upon my own personal observation, as well as
through interviews with Devonshire Area personnel, Devonshire could have achieved so
much more from the system, especially in terms of CompStat inspection preparation and
presentation.

305
According to one Devonshire employee, CompStat preparation is still a laborious
process, because nothing is tracked. This is due to the fact there is no Intersection and
only one crime analyst is assigned to an Intersection position. Although daily missions
are assigned, they are sent out in hard copy, without “visuals” to show officers exactly
where the problems are located. Instead, the officers have to read a “dissertation” in
order to know where to go and what to do. Also, when trying to present the information
at a CompStat inspection, Devonshire stumbles, because they don’t have a template to
work from. Thus, valuable information and success stories are lost in translation.
Since that CompStat inspection, other LAPD divisions have requested
information about the Intersect Policing system, trying to find the “secrets” of its success.
I believe other departments currently using, or thinking about using, the CompStat system
could benefit by adopting the Intersect Policing system to enhance the overall crime
reduction mission. Intersect Policing is not “rocket science,” but rather just plain old
“common sense.” The system provides the blueprint that allows police departments to
focus their attention on what is most important – achieving the purpose of law
enforcement.
Conclusion
Based on the results of the study, the evidence is positive. Intersect Policing
appears to have helped West Valley achieve the purpose of law enforcement, while at the
same time lowering overall Part I crime at a rate that exceeded the LAPD citywide
reduction average for the first time since 2005. While cause and effect are difficult to
prove in human activities, based on the fact nothing else was introduced at West Valley

306
division, nor did the division receive any additional personal, one can infer the success
was caused by the Intersect Policing system.
Unlike the CompStat system, which rules by fear, Intersect Policing is about
leading from a core values perspective. All persons are treated with respect, and all
opinions are appreciated. As Macdonald et al. (2006) have taught us, people have a deep
need to be creative and to belong. Intersect Policing helps police departments achieve
this, which in turn creates positive police organizations, that fulfill these basic needs and
helps build a worthwhile society (Burke et al., 2005). Since police officers spend the
majority of their day interacting with the public, the more positively they are treated by
the organization, the more positively they will in turn treat the community. Intersect
Policing appears, based on the evidence, to create this environment.
Intersect Policing also appears to break down negative mythologies, replacing
them with new, positive mythologies, centered around the six core universal values. This
in turn leads to improved morale. Putting people in the right position based on their
strengths, rather than their weaknesses, makes them more productive, and a productive
employee is a happy employee. Based on the interviews conducted, it appears many of
the police personnel exposed to the system learned from the experience. The evidence
further suggests that Intersect Policing has created a team atmosphere, where
communication is valued and constantly being utilized, even outside of Intersection
meetings. Although further research is needed to definitively prove these assertions, this
study is definitely a step in the right direction.

307
Up to this point we have examined the impetus behind the Intersect Policing
system, addressed the theories of the system and explored the practical side of the
equation as well. The findings of the systems, as noted in this chapter, demonstrate the
results of Intersect Policing are positive. In Chapter 9, we will draw some conclusions
from the research, explore the lessons learned, and provide ideas for future research.

308
Chapter 9

CONCLUSION
Introduction
This project began when I was appointed as Commanding Officer of Detectives in
the West Valley division of the LAPD. While I was working on my doctoral degree in
Policy, Planning and Development at USC, I had learned some approaches to
organization and leadership that seemed to offer an opportunity to improve the way we
worked to reduce the fear and incidence of crime.
I had worked under Chief William Bratton who introduced the CompStat system
in NYPD and the LAPD. My research suggested that it would be possible to improve
upon the CompStat process by extending its reach to the officers in the field; thus,
creating that illusive fourth level Bratton envisioned for the system.
Chapters 1-6 provide an overview of the research. Chapter 7 describes exactly
what I did and how I did it. Of course I did not work alone, and as that chapter indicates,
the key to success was the Intersection where everyone, regardless of rank or sworn
status, could contribute.
Chapter 9 provides the quantitative results, which were positive and have
remained so as of this writing. In addition there are some qualitative results based on my
own observations and reports of others through interviews and questionnaires or through
informal meetings and discussions

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My purpose, as stated in Chapter 1, was to develop a real-time operating system,
utilizing CompStat as a strategic tool, which allows commanding officers to create
specific tasks through organizational learning that accomplish the purpose of law
enforcement through the daily work of police officers.
As the data in Chapter 4 indicates, the first two years after the introduction of
Intersect Policing have had significant results in reducing crime. Although the evidence
is not definitive, it appears morale has improved as we had increasing success in reducing
the incidence of crime. Although initially I wanted to reduce the fear of crime, that may
not be entirely in the hands of the police. Local news media may have more influence as
reports of particularly “ugly” crimes may increase fear even as the incidence of crime
diminishes. In any case, I was not able to document any increases or decreases in the fear
of crime within West Valley Area.
Lessons Learned
This research was an eye opening experience, and brought with it many lessons
learned. Regardless of the subject matter, the most important part of any research
endeavor is to walk away with new lessons learned. For it is only through continuous
learning that we can grow, expand our horizons, and create systems and policies for the
betterment of society and ourselves.
Although there were many lessons learned along the way, there are four that I
would like to highlight and share with you. These lessons are: the CompStat monster can
be tamed, common sense is not dead, Intersect Policing is good strategy, and you can’t
please everybody.

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Taming the CompStat Monster
CompStat is not the monster everybody portrays it to be. The inspection process
is a necessary component to ensure the accountability of those commanding officers
responsible for achieving the purpose of law enforcement and addressing the crime issues
in their command. Part of the problem, I believe, is that commanding officers feel as if
CompStat is “big brother” looking over their shoulder, and that the department does not
trust them to do their job; thus, failing to realize how much trust the organization has
actually placed in them by affording them the opportunity to run a command.
Truth be told, many commanding officers don’t have a clue about what’s going on
in their command. They view the process as too large a job for one person, which causes
some to procrastinate about what they should be doing, rather than putting a plan of
action together and actually doing the job. This mindset causes commanding officers to
become defensive about the CompStat process and view the system through their own
mythological lens as being negative.
Intersect Policing tames the CompStat monster and provides commanding officers
with the tools necessary to showcase their command’s accomplishments. In as little as
twenty minutes a day, commanding officers are provided with all the necessary
information to have a strong understanding about what is going on in their command.
Through the use of the Intersection, teamwork, collaboration and trust are built.
Although not explicitly spoken, the Intersection provides commanding officers with the
reassurance crime reduction is not just their responsibility, and that the responsibility
belongs to every stakeholder in the process, from the line officer to the community

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member. Intersect Policing provides commanding officers with a plan of action, which
stops the procrastination, lowers anxiety and stress, while allowing them and all other
stakeholders to enjoy the process of doing a difficult job well.
Common Sense is Not Dead
A few years ago I read an interesting obituary about the death of common sense.
I laughed while reading it, but found there was some truth in the message. Today, there
are some people who believe that in order for something to work, it must have all the
bells, whistles and gadgets, because without these technological innovations, it’s nothing
more than old ideas.
I don’t buy into this way of thinking, nor do I believe anybody else should either.
Everything has basic fundamentals, and without these fundamentals, none of the
sophisticated, technological advances of today can be used. Take the automobile for
example. Today’s automobiles are technological wonders. You can talk to them and
they will find you an address. With the push of a button, it can drive itself through the
use of cruise control, all the while adjusting the suspension for comfort and safety
dependent upon the road conditions and climate. Strip away all of these technological
systems, however, and you are left with a frame, four wheels and an engine. The same
basic, fundamental frame that Henry Ford put into his Model-T in 1908 (Gross, 1997).
Unfortunately fundamentals are neither fun nor exciting for most people. Take
professional athletes for example, they would rather work on their specialties, their
trademark moves; however, when their performance starts to slip, the first thing a coach
will have the athlete do is return to the basic fundamentals. Law enforcement is no

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different. Police personnel need to consistently work on the fundamentals, everyday,
which is exactly what Intersect Policing is about.
The Intersection is the foundation of the crime reduction process. Utilizing the
three basic steps – analyze, strategize, and assess – police departments are able to combat
crime with precision and accuracy. This is not to say that Intersect Policing does not use
technology. On the contrary, information is gathered and disseminated utilizing twenty-
first century technology, but the foundation of the system is the same, tried and true,
fundamentals that have been used and proven in all types of organizations for years with
tremendous success.
Intersect Policing is the frame and wheels of the vehicle, the daily practice session
required of a professional athlete, and the fundamentals all police departments need to
work on in order to achieve the purpose of law enforcement. As is the case with most
professions, policing constantly reinvents itself, everything old becomes new again,
slightly different, but with a brand new name. Prior to, during and even after this study
was completed, people constantly told me that Intersect Policing wasn’t anything more
than common sense, and they are right. Intersect Policing is not rocket science, it’s just
common sense, which is not dead, we just gave it a new name.
Intersect Policing is Good Strategy
Intersect Policing is about good strategy and tactics, which is required of all
successful organizations. Strategy has been the hallmark of Fortune 500 companies,
professional sporting teams, the United States Military, and numerous successful persons
around the world.

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The word strategy comes from the Greek word “strategos,” a military term used to
describe the art of the general (Harvard Business School, 2005, p. xi). Over the years,
and especially in today’s dynamic and ever changing environment, business has become
a form of strategic warfare. Since businesspeople have always liked military analogies,
they too began to think of strategy as a plan for controlling and utilizing resources
(human, physical, and financial) with the goal of promoting and securing their vital
interests (Harvard Business School, 2005).
The conventional definition of strategy, as described by Coyne & Subramanian
(1996, p. 66) is “an integrated set of actions that leads to a sustainable competitive
advantage.” However, strategy is much more than this. The emerging view of strategy is
that it’s an extraordinarily complex, dynamic and demanding leadership responsibility
that takes place in a highly turbulent and quasi-interconnected world where customers,
competitors and suppliers function as collaborators, complementors and competitors,
often at the same time.
Harvard Business School’s Michael Porter (1980) sharpened this definition,
describing strategy as a broad formula for how a business is going to compete. Later,
Bruce Henderson (1989), founder of The Boston Consulting Group, connected the notion
of strategy with competitive advantage, perhaps borrowing a concept drawn from
economics (comparative advantage). According to Henderson, no two competitors could
coexist if both sought to do business in the same way (Harvard Business School, 2005).
Porter concurred with Henderson’s idea of being different, and further believed that

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competitive strategy was about being different, and deliberately choosing a different set
of activities to deliver a unique mix of value (Magretta, 2002).
Intersect Policing embodies all these elements. In its most rudimentary form,
police departments are locked in a strategic battle of warfare with an unrelenting criminal
element. As previously explained, police departments require a substantial investment,
and make up the largest percentage of most city budgets. Thus to ensure the highest level
of service is obtained from the resources available, Intersect Policing, through the use of
the Intersection and the Intersection deployment matrix, makes use of the most efficient
management and budgeting techniques. This allows police executives to place “cops on
the dots” (Maple & Mitchell, 1999), in order to protect our most vital interests – the
communities we protect and serve.
In conventional terms, Intersect Policing is an integrated set of actions, which lead
to a sustainable competitive advantage in the war against crime. Realizing this war is
taking place in one of the most turbulent, dynamic times in history, Intersect Policing
provides leaders with tools that are necessary to collaborate with complementors, which
equates to community members, and the competition, also known as the criminal
element, all at the same time. Bringing people into the Intersection accomplishes this.
Through the use of community stakeholders, allowing them to take an active role
in the war against crime, these people become the eyes and ears of the department. In
essence, they become the extended arm of law enforcement. Since there are not enough
police officers to be strategically placed on every street corner in the community, with the

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assistance of the community, there is a always a watchful eye to ensure crime gets
reported to the police, so that it is quickly investigated and eradicated.
In addition to the community, Intersect Policing embraces the use of gang
intervention workers. This process and relationship has been, and continues to be,
refined and professionalized. Realizing we are all collaborators, complementors and
competitors, the police need to continue in their efforts to bring any group to the table
that can have an impact on stemming gang violence in our streets (McDonnell, 2009). As
Former LAPD First Assistant Chief and current Chief of Police for the City of Long
Beach, Jim McDonnell, explained, “This overdue relationship has been a tremendous
positive, particularly in dealing with the identification of the gang involved in an assault
and as importantly, in anticipating where the retaliation assault may occur” (2009, p. 46).
Intersect Policing is a different way of doing business. Through the use of
competitive strategy and deliberately choosing different sets of activities (tactics) to
deliver a unique mixture of value provides police organizations the competitive
advantage over its rivals (Harvard Business School, 2005; Magretta, 2002). Through the
use of strategy, Intersect Policing helps police departments understand what it is they do,
what they want to become and, most importantly, allowing them to focus on how they
plan to get there (Harvard Business School, 2005).
Preparation is the key to success, which is exactly what Intersect Policing
accomplishes. As Doctor Rick Culley explained during a lecture on strategic planning at

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USC, “Anybody can out flank anybody with good preparation.”
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Twenty-first century
success will require serious preparation. In today’s dynamic and competitive
environment, leaders and organizations need to bring their “A” game at all times. Those
who do will find success in the competition process. Those who don’t will be left behind.
Intersect Policing ensures this competitive advantage through leadership that is built upon
the universal core values, mastering the fundamentals, while utilizing the technological
advances the twenty-first century has to offer.
You Can’t Please Everybody
Although the Intersect Policing system helped West Valley Area achieve the
purpose of law enforcement at a rate that exceeded the LAPD citywide average for the
first time since 2005, not everybody embraced the system. Those who did not embrace
Intersect Policing were predominantly the same people who have not embraced anything
considered to be “new” in law enforcement. Although there are many reasons as to why
this occurs, it appears from my perspective these individuals have just not reached a state
of dissonance.
During the last few years, law enforcement, especially within the LAPD, has seen
a “changing of the guard.” Many of the “baby boomer” generation (Werner, 2011) have
retired. Those who have not retired have become tired and “cranky” of the bureaucracy
associated with a paramilitary organization. They have seen many changes throughout
their lifetime and career, and have come to realize that although they don’t like the
situation, there isn’t much they can do about it.

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The lecture took place on March 13, 2011, Ralph and Goldy Lewis Hall, Room 219, on the USC campus
in Los Angeles.

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Then there is the new generation, a blend of Generations X, Y and Z (Gardner,
2006; Riedling, 2007; Strauss & Howe, 1992; Tapscott, 2009). For many people of this
generation, law enforcement is a job, not a career. Many people who have entered law
enforcement within the past few years, especially the LAPD, have done so since the
global economic downturn (Lim et al., 2009). They have done so because, like most civil
service positions, police officers make good money, receive health benefits and,
dependent upon the organization and assignment, work a very accommodating and
flexible schedule that requires only three to four days of attendance per week, which still
allows them to hold down another part-time job on the side.
These points were made clear during two particular interviews with police
officers during the study. One officer advised they had been doing this job for more than
twenty years. During that time, they have seen ideas come and go, from FASTRAC
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to
CompStat, and the common denominator all these things have in common is they just
create more work for the officer and more opportunities to punish the officer when things
go wrong.
Another officer, who had just recently been hired by the LAPD, advised that as
soon as the economy rebounds, the officer was going back into the private sector as a
realtor – a position the officer gave up as a full-time job, but still dabbles in on the side.
Based on these answers and others similar to them, tends to lead a person to infer
these people have not reached a state of dissonance. Thus, there is no association

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In late 1997, the LAPD implemented its Focus, Accountability, Strategy, Teamwork, Response and
Coordination (FASTRAC) process (Los Angeles Police Department, 1998). The FASTRAC system was a
watered down, dysfunctional LAPD version of the NYPD CompStat system. The only similarities between
the two systems were the manner in which command staff treated subordinates during the inspection
meetings, which was extremely disrespectful.

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between the change and benefit to the individual (Macdonald et al., 2006). They tell
themselves, why should I adopt this new approach when it doesn’t appear to benefit me.
As much as a person wants to argue the points with these individuals, the fact remains
this is how they view the situation through their mythological lens. It is the job of
today’s leaders to identify the mythology and the associated behavior, rather than argue
the point.
Only with time and consistency will this bring about the dissonance required to
change their mythologies. This will take a great deal of time, although nobody can be
certain how long that time will be. As leaders, we must realize this, as well as the fact
that dissonance may not ever occur. Thus, we can’t please everybody, but we must
continue to explore, grow and move forward for the betterment of the organization and
society.
Future Research
Intersect policing has had a positive effect in one LAPD division. Even partial
use appears to have helped another similar division. These divisions, however, faced
more problems in terms of property crimes rather than crimes of violence. What is
needed now is to extend the systems use into other types of divisions. In the case of the
LAPD, selecting one division from each of the four bureaus would provide a better test of
the system to learn its limitations as well as its benefits.
Implementing the system into other geographic Areas would answer two
important questions: can the system achieve the purpose of law enforcement by reducing
the incidence of crime in other parts of the city, and was the success of the Intersect

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Policing system in West Valley Area behaviorally driven by a committed advocate, in
this case the author of the research, or systems driven.
Future studies on the subject of Intersect Policing should not only address the
limitations of the study previously mentioned, the research should also be formulated to
answer the following questions:
1. Does Intersect Policing reduce the fear of crime?
2. Does Intersect Policing enhance organizational learning?
3. Does Intersect Policing improve morale in the sworn and/or
civilian staff?
4. What mythologies are associated with Intersect Policing?
5. What are the effects Intersect Policing has on citizens and others
who participate in the Intersection?
6. Would the use of iPad technology, if provided to officers, improve
their data analysis and information sharing?
Reducing the Fear of Crime
When people think about crime reduction they usually focus on the quantitative,
rather than the qualitative analysis of the study. Although there are no absolute answers
as to why this occurs, one could argue that it goes back to the theory of scientism and that
there is no way to perfectly measure fear as opposed to the reality of crimes committed
(Garofalo, 1981). In my research I found no study that developed a scientific method to
gather and analyze empirical data on fear (Goldhaber & Nieto, 2010; Sorell, 1991).

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Despite this, there is no dispute that the fear of crime is real (Ferraro & Grange, 1987;
Garofalo, 1981; Hale, 1996; Pain, 2000) and, for some, has created a culture of fear
(Glassner, 2009) where the perception of danger is far greater than it is in actuality.
The fear of crime is what lies in the consciousness of a person’s mind; it is the
fear of being a victim of crime, as opposed to the actual probability of being a victim of a
crime (Ferraro & Grange, 1987; Glassner, 2009; Hale, 1996; Pain, 2000). The fear of
crime can plague a person and society; so much so, they fail to enjoy their life to its
fullest potential, however defined. Some people fear to go out at night, especially women
and the elderly; others avoid some parts of their community or events where “there might
be trouble.”
From a purely scientific standpoint, research on the fear of crime could continue
indefinitely, because there is no critical experiment that will answer all the questions, so
there will always be hypotheses to test and new paths of inquiry to follow (Garofalo,
1981). Future research on the subject matter of Intersect Policing should bring as many
people into the Intersection as possible in order to identify a way in which the fear of
crime can be accurately measured; thus, answering the question of whether Intersect
Policing can also reduce the fear of crime.
Enhancing an Organization’s Ability to Learn
Twenty-first century organizations, regardless of the sector in which they operate,
must embrace the theory of continuous learning. Management strategists have suggested
that the ultimate competitive advantage will be determined by the extent to which the
organization is able to learn faster than its competition (Callahan & Myrtle, 2008). This

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is what is commonly referred to as a learning organization, and “is much more difficult
than individual learning (De Geus, 1988, p. 70).
Many of today’s crime problems are beginning to overlap. A person wanted for
robbery might also be the same person wanted in a series of burglaries. Police personnel
must be able to communicate and share information, as well as knowledge, in order to
“outsmart” today’s criminal. The Intersection allows for this to occur by bringing
together all the best minds policing has to offer. The question is, however, does this
exchanging of information go beyond the individual persons sitting in the Intersection
and radiate out into the entire police organization, or is only the individual participating
in the Intersection meeting learning? As De Geus explained, it is much harder for an
organization to learn than it is for an individual. In order to answer this question, future
research needs to be conducted that specifically address this issue.
Improving Employee Morale
Regardless of the organization type, employee morale plays a large part in terms
of future organizational success. There is an old saying, “A happy employee is a
productive employee.”
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There is also the reverse, “A productive employee is a happy
employee,” which this research suggests is more accurate, since as officers and detectives
were more successful, their morale improved. Employee morale also correlates with
lower stress, which in turns lowers sickness and absenteeism from work; thus, saving
resources in terms of personnel and finance, for both the employee and the organization.

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This study was unable to identify the original author of the saying.

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A few of today’s private sector organizations have done a great job at balancing
the stresses of work with that of the individual’s personal life. For example, it’s been
reported that Google is not only one of the largest and fastest growing institutions in the
world, it is also one of the most stress free places to work (Kelly, 2012). Google has
found a way to blend life and business in such a way that employees don’t realize they
are stepping out of one realm and into another. This is exactly what Macdonald et al.
(2006) explained in their book, Systems Leadership, “Although human beings are
adaptable, they are not chameleons;” (p. 11) thus, they do not completely transform as
they move from one relationship (family) to another (work).
Intersect Policing is about putting the right person in the right role, based on the
knowledge, experience, mental processing ability and desire to perform the duties
required (Macdonald et al., 2006). When done correctly, I believe, as noted in the work
of Burke et al. (2005) and Macdonald et al. (2006), employee morale will improve,
because the employee will be utilizing their leadership strengths (Buckingham, 2007;
Rath, 2007; Rath & Conchie, 2008), rather than their weaknesses, toward the creation of
a positive organization.
In addition, Intersect Policing leads to individual and organizational success.
Winning is always good for morale, which was evident during the study period when
officers arrested the family of burglars targeting pharmacy locations. Intersect Policing
can help to balance the expectations of intensity with that of having fun. This can be
difficult in a paramilitary organization; however, today’s police organizations need to
utilize some of the other private and public sector models to achieve this goal. Future

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studies on the topic of Intersect Policing should develop measures in order to identify if
the system achieves this goal, by enhancing organizational productivity and employee
morale.
Mythologies Associated with Intersect Policing
As time passes, all things develop mythologies. As discussed in Chapter 4, even
CompStat has developed mythologies within police departments, which are largely
negative when viewed along the universal core values continuum. The goal of any
organization is to ensure the mythologies surrounding the systems in place are viewed
positively through the mythological lens of the employee.
Intersect Policing is about leading from the position of core values. Although the
Intersection can be viewed as controlled chaos, the core value of respect for each
individual person is strictly enforced. As people, we sometimes cross that imaginary line
and inflict harm on a person based upon our words and actions. This crossing is
sometimes unintentional and sometimes deliberate. Regardless, action on the negative
end of the scales of universal core values must be minimized in order to create a healthy,
positive work environment, which ultimately transforms to a healthy, positive
organization.
To ensure future success of the Intersect Policing system and the police
organizations that choose to implement the system, organizational leaders must identify
the mythologies and associated behavior associated with the system. Since Intersect
Policing is a new system, which has not been thoroughly tested, this type of future study
will need to take place over time (several years), starting today. This will allow us to

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learn how the mythologies evolve over time, and to notice if or when things start to go
wrong.
The Effects on Citizens and Others who Participate in the Intersection
Intersect Policing is about bringing together all stakeholders in the crime
reduction process and providing them with a voice. As Johansson (2004) touched upon
in his book, The Medici Effect, the Intersection is a place where people from all walks of
life, backgrounds, cultures and professions can meet, collaborate and share new and
innovative ideas toward the solution of problems we face today.
Although citizens and other stakeholders participate in the Intersection, what
effect does their participation have on their lives? Do they feel empowered? Do they
feel involved? Do they believe they are actually making a difference? Does the process
enhance their learning in terms of protecting themselves against being a victim of a
crime? Although this study scratched the surface of this topic, further research needs to
be conducted in order to gain a full understanding.
These are only a few of the questions that need to be answered. There are a
myriad of other questions to be developed as well. However, when we gain a full and
complete understanding of the answers to these types of questions, the Intersection can be
enhanced. This will allow the Intersect Policing system to continually learn and grow,
which will enhance the crime reduction process and contribute toward a better society.
Providing iPad Technology to all Police Personnel
During this study, iPad technology was utilized with detective supervisors, watch
commanders and captains. Although the study did not have the financial resources to

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purchase iPad’s for all persons involved in the study, the use of such technology did
enhance the overall effects of the study with those who were provided such equipment.
While command staff of LAPD can use iPad’s to improve their data analysis and
information sharing (CBS, 2011), the question that needs to be answered is, would it
improve results if all officers have such access? Although this study was able to utilize
iPad technology for a select few members of West Valley Area, which proved to be
successful in terms of data analysis and information sharing amongst detectives, watch
commanders and captains, it was unable to provide this type of smart technology to all
police personnel and answer this question.
Today, any officer with a smart phone can also communicate with the Intersect
Policing system, but not all officers have smart phones. Testing whether smart phones
would be adequate or if iPad’s would be better could be useful to save taxpayer money.
Conclusion
This research suggests that Intersect Policing can improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of police work. Based on the results of the study, the evidence is positive.
Intersect Policing appears to have helped West Valley Area achieve the purpose of law
enforcement, while at the same time lowering overall Part I crime at a rate that exceeded
the LAPD citywide reduction average for the first time since 2005. While cause and
effect are difficult to prove in human activities, based on the fact nothing else was
introduced at West Valley division, nor did the division receive any additional personal,
one can infer the success was caused by the Intersect Policing system.

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In concept Intersect Policing is simple, perhaps even obvious, or just plain old
common sense. The basic three basic steps to crime reduction are as follows:
1. Analyze the data to find where and when crime is occurring, as
well as to identify any patterns, clusters or trends.
2. Develop a strategy to stop those crimes and act upon the strategy.
3. Analyze that data to improve the strategy and tactics.
Nothing that involves humans, their organizations and a complex phenomenon such as
crime is ever simple, but the concept of Intersect Policing provides a framework to
organize the data and act upon it. The system not only has proven to reduce crime, it has
also improved the working lives of police personnel.
Unlike the CompStat system, which rules by fear, Intersect Policing is about
leading from a core values perspective. All persons are treated with respect, and all
opinions are appreciated. As Macdonald et al. (2006) have taught us, people have a deep
need to be creative and to belong. Intersect Policing helps police departments achieve
this, which in turn creates positive police organizations, that fulfill these basic needs and
helps build a worthwhile society (Burke et al., 2005). Since police officers spend the
majority of their day interacting with the public, the more positively they are treated by
the organization, the more positively they will in turn treat the community. Intersect
Policing appears, based on the evidence, to create this environment.
Intersect Policing also appears to break down negative mythologies, replacing
them with new, positive mythologies, centered around the six core universal values. This

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in turn leads to improved morale. Putting people in the right position based on their
strengths, rather than their weaknesses, makes them more productive, and a productive
employee is a happy employee. Based on the interviews conducted, it appears many of
the police personnel exposed to the system learned from the experience. The evidence
further suggests that Intersect Policing has created a team atmosphere, where
communication is valued and constantly being utilized, even outside of Intersection
meetings. Although further research is needed to definitively prove these assertions, this
study is definitely a step in the right direction.
One instance does not prove the case, but it does suggest that police work can be
improved with benefits for both the public and the working officers. Although a division
or department might find success using portions of the Intersect Policing system, I urge
not trying to piecemeal the process for a “quick fix” to a larger problem. All of the
Intersect Policing pieces work synergistically to provide the overall desired effect police
professionals are looking to achieve. This report provides a blueprint for any department
that would like to test Intersect Policing for themselves.

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GLOSSARY

Aggravated Assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of
inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault usually is
accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death or
great bodily harm (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, p. 23).
Area: A term used internally within the LAPD to describe a geographic division of an
operations bureau. The term Area, as used in the LAPD, is always
capitalized. In terms of this research, an Area is the equivalent of an NYPD
precinct (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).
Area Captain: An Area captain is a senior captain assigned to an Area. The Area
captain, under the direction of his or her bureau commanding officer,
exercises line command over the operations of his or her Area (Los Angeles
Police Department, 2012a). In terms of this research, an LAPD Area captain
is the equivalent of an NYPD precinct commander.
Basic Car Area: The LAPD is made up of twenty-one geographic Areas, which allows
the department to deliver the highest quality service to the community it
protects and serves, while at the same time tailoring law enforcement and
public safety efforts to the individual communities. The twenty-one
geographic Areas are further apportioned into smaller community areas,

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which are referred to as Basic Car Areas. There are roughly eight to ten
Basic Car Areas per community (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012j).
Borough: There are eight boroughs within the Patrol Services Bureau of the NYPD,
each headed by an assistant chief (New York City Police Department, 2012).
In terms of this research, the Patrol Services Bureau is the equivalent of
LAPDs Office of Operations, and each borough is the equivalent of an LAPD
geographic bureau.
Bureau: As defined by the LAPD, describes a major segregation, either functional or
geographical, of kindred phases of activities, within the department. There
are four bureaus in the LAPD, each headed by a deputy chief (Los Angeles
Police Department, 2012a). In terms of this research, an LAPD bureau is the
equivalent of an NYPD borough.
Deployment Period: The LAPD does not work on a calendar month schedule. Instead,
the yearly calendar is broken down into thirteen, twenty-eight day
deployment periods (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).
Detective Commanding Officer: The officer-in-charge of detectives within the LAPD,
who holds the rank of lieutenant II. In terms of this research, an LAPD
detective commanding officer is the equivalent of an NYPD detective squad
commander (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).

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Detective Squad Commander: The officer-in-charge of detectives within the NYPD,
who holds the rank of lieutenant or captain. In terms of this research, an
NYPD detective squad commander is the equivalent of an LAPD detective
commanding officer (New York City Police Department, 2012).
Division: This term is used internally within the LAPD, and describes a functional
subdivision of activities within the Office of the Chief of Police, a bureau,
group or Area. In terms of this research, an LAPD division is the equivalent
of an NYPD precinct (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).
Line command: The exercise of the authority of command delegated by the chief of
police to his or her immediate subordinates, and by them to their
subordinates, down the lines of direct command to the lowest level of
authority (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).
Part I Crimes: Part I Crimes are broken down into two categories: violent crimes and
property crimes. Violent crimes include: homicide, rape, robbery and
aggravated assaults. Property crimes include burglary, GTA, BTFV and
personal/other theft (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).
Patrol Captain: A junior captain responsible for overseeing the patrol operations in an
LAPD division. The patrol captain works in a subordinate capacity to the
Area captain (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012a).

331
Platoon Commander: An NYPD platoon commander holds the rank of lieutenant watch
commander and is responsible for overseeing a specific watch assignment
assigned to a geographic precinct. In terms of this research, an NYPD
platoon commander is the equivalent of an LAPD lieutenant watch
commander (New York City Police Department, 2012).
NYPD Police Commissioner: A civilian administrator appointed by the Mayor of NYC,
who is head of the NYPD (New York City Police Department, 2012).
Precinct: Each patrol borough is composed of precincts. Each precinct is responsible
for safety and law enforcement within a designated geographic area. Police
units based in these precincts patrol and respond to emergency calls for
service (New York City Police Department, 2012). In terms of this research,
an NYPD precinct is the equivalent of an LAPD Area or division.
Precinct Commander: Holds the rank of captain or deputy inspector and is responsible
for overseeing control of an NYPD precinct. In terms of this research, an
NYPD precinct commander is the equivalent of an LAPD Area captain
(Bratton & Knobler, 1998; New York City Police Department, 2012).
Robbery: A vicious type of theft in that it is committed in the presence of the victim.
The victim, who usually is the owner or person having custody of the
property, is directly confronted by the perpetrator and is threatened with force
or is put in fear that force will be used. Robbery involves a theft or larceny

332
but is aggravated by the element of force or threat of force (US Department
of Justice, 2004).
Senior Lead Officer: A senior lead officer is an officer in charge of a Basic Car Area
with the geographic division. Senior lead officers provide a link that helps
unite the LAPD with the communities it serves. Senior lead officers are
responsible for monitoring crime trends in Basic Car Areas, working with the
Community Police Advisory Boards and acting as liaisons with detectives to
stay informed of crime trends and special problems within their Basic Car
Area (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012j).
S.I.S.: Is the abbreviation for Specialized Investigative Services, an elite undercover unit
within the LAPD that investigates high profile crimes (Fasano, 2008; Los
Angeles Police Department, 2012a).
Tunneling: A term used by police to describe the actions of a suspect who enters into a
structure by breaking holes into the structures walls, whereby creating a
tunnel by which to make entry and commit the criminal act.
UCR Handbook: Outlines the classification and scoring guidelines that law
enforcement agencies use to report crimes to the UCR Program. In addition,
the handbook contains offense and arrest reporting forms and an explanation
of how to compete them. The handbook also provides definitions of all UCR
offenses (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011).

333
UCR Program: The UCR program compiles crime statistical data from more than
17,000 police agencies across the United States, and acts as a central
repository for all crime statistical data (Maltz, 1977; U.S. Department of
Justice, 2012).
Underground market: A location where goods and/or services that operate outside of
the established markets legitimized by state power are bought and sold (Cook
et al., 2007; Simon & Witte, 1982; Spillane, 1998).
Watch Commander: An LAPD lieutenant who is in charge of overseeing a watch
assignment in a geographic patrol division (Los Angeles Police Department,
2012a). For purposes of this research, an LAPD watch commander is the
equivalent of an NYPD platoon commander

334
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Appendix A: LAPD Bureaus and Areas

Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009e).

383
Appendix B: Operations Valley Bureau

Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009f).

384
Appendix C: West Valley Area - Basic Car

Source: Los Angeles Police Department (2009g).

385
Appendix D: Citizen Participation Disclosure Letter

October 8, 2009

To Whom It May Concern:

The primary responsibility of law enforcement is to reduce crime. As we look
toward the future and the challenges we will face together, it is evident that
collaboration amongst all stakeholders in the crime reduction process will play a
key factor in our overall success. This will require systems be put in place,
based upon a set of universal core values, which will bring people together to
achieve a productive purpose.

As a law enforcement professional with the Los Angeles Police Department and
doctoral candidate at the University of Southern California, I have developed a
theory, which I plan to put into practice and study for a period of two years.
This theory will be documented in order to fulfill the dissertation requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Policy, Planning and Development. Your
cooperation and assistance in this study would be greatly appreciated.

During the study, there will be a series of questions and interviews conducted.
None of the surveys or interviews required will last longer than 30 minutes.
Any participation for which you are involved is completely voluntary and strict
confidentiality will be maintained. There will be no compensation for your time
or efforts.

Although the Los Angeles Police Department has agreed to assist in the study,
they are not responsible for the study or any of its content. If you agree to be
part of this study, a copy of this letter will be provided to you as receipt for your
services.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please don’t hesitate to ask.

Sincerely,

Edward A. Pape, ML
DPPD Candidate
School of Policy, Planning and Development
University of Southern California

School of Policy,
Planning, and
Development

386
Appendix E: LAPD Personnel Participation Disclosure Letter

AN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY – AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER
www.LAPDonline.org
www.joinLAPD.com

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

P. O. Box 30158
WILLIAM J. BRATTON Los Angeles, Calif. 90030
Chief of Police Telephone: (213) 485-3201
TDD: (877) 275-5273
Ref #: 1.1
ANTONIO R. VILLARAIGOSA
Mayor

October 9, 2009

University of Southern California
School of Policy, Planning, and Development
Ralph and Goldy Lewis Hall 111
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626

Dear Member:

The primary responsibility of law enforcement is to reduce crime. Since 2002 the Department
has reduced crime throughout the City; however, we must always look toward the future for new
and innovative methods to enhance our way of doing business. Lieutenant II Edward Pape,
Office of the Chief of Staff, is a graduate student at the University of Southern California (USC),
School of Policy, Planning and Development (SPPD). Lieutenant Pape is developing a new
theory aimed at further reducing the fear and incidence of crime in an urban area, which the
Department will review and test later next year. Your participation in this endeavor would be
appreciated.

The study will not require you to answer questions that focus on specific police related incidents,
nor be of an investigative nature. The study will include the use of surveys and interviews in
order to gain opinions regarding the study in question. The Department will make every effort to
facilitate your participation in this study. All portions of the study, surveys and interviews, will
last no longer than 30 minutes. The use of overtime for members participating in the study will
not be approved. There are no dress code requirements.

Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and confidential. If you are interested in
participating, please contact Lieutenant Pape through USC at (213) 740-3415 to arrange a
confidential appointment.

All the best,

WILLIAM J. BRATTON
Chief of Police

387
Appendix F: West Valley Area Survey No. 1

1/1/2010 West Valley Area Survey No. 1
Survey No. 1

Please answer the following questions yes or no.

Have you heard of a police system called CompStat? Yes No
Does the LAPD use CompStat? Yes No
Have you ever attended a CompStat meeting? Yes No
Does West Valley Area analyze crime on a daily basis? Yes No
Do you believe the LAPD manipulates crime numbers? Yes No
Is CompStat information provided during roll calls? Yes No
Is there an inordinate amount of time spent on CompStat preparation? Yes No
Does a supervisor discuss crime patterns, trends or clusters during roll call? Yes No
Are daily missions assigned to police personnel in order to target a specific crime
location?
Yes No
Do you believe crime in West Valley Area can be lowered? Yes No

My current position is: Lieutenant
Sergeant
Detective
Police Officer
I have worked for the LAPD: < 5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
> 20 years
Which of these methods do you believe should be used to
reduce crime in West Valley:
CompStat
Hot Spot Policing
Community Policing
Policing at the Intersection
No method will reduce crime further
without “cooking the books”

388
Appendix G: West Valley Area Survey No. 2

1/1/2011 West Valley Area Survey No. 2
Survey No. 2

Please answer the following questions yes or no.

Have you heard of a police system called Policing at the Intersection? Yes No
Does West Valley Area use Policing at the Intersection? Yes No
Have you ever attended an Intersection Meeting? Yes No
Does West Valley Area analyze crime on a daily basis? Yes No
Do you believe West Valley Area manipulates crime numbers? Yes No
Has Policing at the Intersection reduced CompStat preparation time? Yes No
Does a supervisor discuss crime patterns, trends or clusters during roll call? Yes No
Are daily missions assigned to police personnel in order to target a specific crime
location?
Yes No
Do you believe crime in West Valley Area can be lowered in 2011? Yes No

My current position is: Lieutenant
Sergeant
Detective
Police Officer
I have worked for the LAPD: < 5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
> 20 years
Which of these methods do you believe should be used to
reduce crime in West Valley:
CompStat
Hot Spot Policing
Community Policing
Policing at the Intersection
No method will reduce crime further
without “cooking the books”

389
Appendix H: West Valley Area Survey No. 3

1/1/2012 West Valley Area Survey No. 3
Survey No. 3

Please answer the following questions yes or no.

Do you believe Intersect Policing, formerly known as Policing at the Intersection,
has helped West Valley Area reduce Part I Crime?
Yes No
Do you receive Intersection crime information via Dropbox? Yes No
Have you ever attended an Intersection Meeting? Yes No
Does West Valley Area analyze crime on a daily basis? Yes No
Do you believe West Valley Area manipulates crime numbers? Yes No
Has Intersect Policing reduced CompStat preparation time? Yes No
Does a supervisor discuss crime patterns, trends or clusters during roll call? Yes No
Are daily missions assigned to police personnel in order to target a specific crime
location?
Yes No
Do you believe crime in West Valley Area can be lowered in 2012? Yes No

My current position is: Lieutenant
Sergeant
Detective
Police Officer
I have worked for the LAPD: < 5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
> 20 years
Which of these methods do you believe should be used to
reduce crime in West Valley:
CompStat
Hot Spot Policing
Community Policing
Intersect Policing
No method will reduce crime further
without “cooking the books”

Abstract (if available)

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Asset Metadata

Creator Pape, Edward Allen, Jr. (author)

Core Title Intersect policing: bringing CompStat to the field level to reduce the fear and incidence of crime

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 09/12/2012

Defense Date 08/28/2012

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag collaboration,CompStat,crime reduction,double-loop learning,intersect policing,mythologies,networking,OAI-PMH Harvest,organizational learning,police culture,policing at the intersection,systems leadership,The Medici effect

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Richardson, Harry W. (committee chair), Burke, Catherine G. (committee member), Dundes Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee member), McDonnell, Jim (committee member), Suarez, David (committee member)

Creator Email epape@me.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-96435

Unique identifier UC11289371

Identifier usctheses-c3-96435 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-PapeEdward-1192.pdf

Dmrecord 96435

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Pape, Edward Allen, Jr.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA