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Optimism when imagining the future in old age influences the positivity effect in memory
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Optimism when imagining the future in old age influences the positivity effect in memory
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Running head: AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE
Optimism when imagining the future in old age influences the positivity effect in memory
A Thesis Presented
By
Kelly A. Durbin
To
THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Subject of Psychology
August 2016
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE
Copyright © 2016 Kelly A. Durbin
All rights reserved.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE iii
Abstract
People tend to have an optimistic view of their own future in old age, but also have implicit
negative attitudes towards older adults. In this study, we investigated how younger and older
adults rate the projected relevance of positive and negative words in reference to either their own
future or the average person's future in very old age. Participants then viewed a series of
emotional pictures to examine how being primed with thoughts of life in very old age affects
emotional memory performance. Both younger and older adults gave higher relevance ratings to
positive words when imagining their own life in very old age, but rated negative words as more
relevant to the average person’s life in very old age. After individuals were primed with thoughts
about their own future in very old age, there was no age-related difference in the recall of
positive and negative pictures. However, after imagining the average person's life in very old
age, older adults recalled proportionately fewer negative pictures relative to younger adults,
demonstrating a positivity effect in memory. These findings suggest that compared to the
positive thoughts that might coincide with thinking about one’s own future, imagining the
average person’s life in very old age could prompt more negative thoughts about aging, thereby
eliciting a positivity effect on subsequent memory tasks.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE iv
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest thanks to my advisor and mentor, Mara
Mather. She has been incredibly supportive, encouraging, and inspirational, and it is truly an
honor to be her graduate student. I also want to thank our collaborator, Sarah Barber, who shared
her expertise and has been enormously helpful on this project. I would also like to thank the
members of my committee, Daniel Nation and Margaret Gatz, for their insightful feedback and
support.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE v
Table of Contents
Abstract p. iii
Acknowledgments p. iv
Introduction p. 1
Method p. 8
Results p. 15
Discussion p. 19
References p. 26
Footnotes p. 34
Tables p. 35
Figures p. 36
Supplementary Materials p. 40
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE
6
Optimism when imagining the future in old age influences the positivity effect in memory
Introduction
Imagining the future is an essential part of everyday life that allows individuals to engage
in goal-directed planning, mentally prepare for a number of possible outcomes, and visualize
what novel experiences might be like in the distant future. Over the past decade, there has been
considerable interest in understanding how individuals imagine, or simulate, events that could
possibly occur in the future (for reviews and discussions, see Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Gilbert &
Wilson, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar,
Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). Although thoughts about the future can be positive or negative,
research has found that most people tend to be positive and optimistic when thinking about their
future (D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011; Newby-Ross & Clark, 2003; Sharot,
Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007).
A growing number of studies have investigated whether positivity and optimism about
the future changes across the lifespan and have found that as age advances, older adults tend to
be less optimistic and anticipate greater declines on various aspects of well-being, especially
relative to younger adults (e.g., Chessell, Rathbone, Souchay, Charlesworth, & Moulin, 2014;
Kotter-Grühn & Smith, 2011; Ryff, 1991, but see, Gallo, Korthauer, McDonough, Teshale, &
Johnson, 2011). However, in studies that directly compared younger and older adults’ thoughts
and feelings about the future, younger and older adults were not asked to project to the same age
or stage of life (e.g., Chessell et al., 2014; Gallo et al., 2011; Ryff, 1991). Thus, a key question is
whether younger and older adults’ optimism about the future would differ, if at all, when both
age groups forecast to a similar time point in the future, such as very old age (e.g., 85 years old).
Despite younger and older adults’ perception that older age is associated with greater declines,
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 7
less desirable changes, and proportionately more losses than gains (Heckhausen, Dixon, &
Baltes, 1989; Heckhausen & Baltes, 1991), evidence suggests that both younger and older adults
are positive and optimistic when imagining themselves in old age. For example, Packer and
Chasteen (2006) asked younger adults to write about what they imagine their life will be like at
70 years old and found that 78% of younger adults’ written responses had valence levels at or
above neutral. Furthermore, Chessell et al. (2014) found that older adults imagined more positive
than negative “future self-images” (e.g., “I will be a grandmother”) and simulated a greater
number of positive events that would be associated with their future self-images.
Positivity about one’s own future in old age is in contrast to how individuals generally
perceive other older adults. Both younger and older adults’ attitudes towards older adults are
more negative than their perceptions of younger adults (for meta-analysis, see Kite, Stockdale,
Whitley, & Johnson, 2005; for reviews, see Barber & Mather, 2014; Hess, 2006; Levy & Banaji,
2002). In fact, implicit biases (i.e., unconscious and automatic negative attitudes and prejudices)
towards older adults are seen in both younger and older adults (for discussion, see Levy &
Banaji, 2002). For instance, one study assessed younger and older adults’ implicit and explicit
age biases and found that explicit attitudes towards older adults became more positive as
participant’s age increased (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Yet, implicit negative attitudes
towards older adults did not differ between younger and older adults. Interestingly, Nosek and
colleagues (2002) found that the magnitude of younger and older adults’ implicit negative
attitudes towards the elderly was actually stronger than other stereotype biases (e.g., racial).
Thus, regardless of age, individuals seem to have implicit negative biases towards older adults.
Taken together, there is an interesting discrepancy between the propensity to be positive
and optimistic when thinking about one’s own future and the tendency to have an implicit
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 8
negative bias towards older age. To reconcile this, individuals may exhibit a downward social
comparison, such that individuals have much more positive views of their own aging compared
to their peers. In support of this notion, when Pinquart (2002) exposed older adults to a negative
description of competency in older age, older adults’ perception of themselves improved and
their perceptions of other older adults worsened. Correspondingly, research has shown that older
adults perceive themselves as having fewer problems than other older adults, including domains
such as health and stress (e.g., Heckhausen & Brim, 1997, see also Heckhausen & Krueger,
1993). However, other evidence has shown that when participants were asked about expectations
for age-related memory decline, individuals anticipated the same degree of memory decline for
themselves as they did for the average older adult (Ryan & Kwong See, 1993). In regards to
predicting what life might be like as an older adult, one study found that younger adults
predicted less change between their current personal preferences (e.g., jazz, adventurous
vacations) and what their future preferences would be like as an older adult, than they predicted
for their peers (Renoult, Kopp, Davidson, Taier, & Atance, 2016). Despite these previous
findings, it currently remains unclear whether younger and older adults’ thoughts would differ
when both age groups think about their own future in very old age and how these thoughts
compare to their predictions for the average person’s future in very old age.
The effect of stereotypes on performance
A substantial body of research has examined how the awareness of age stereotypes
impacts cognitive performance (e.g., memory), motor function (e.g., handwriting), physiological
factors (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure), and age group identification (for reviews, see Barber &
Mather, 2014; Levy & Banaji, 2002; Meisner, 2012). One domain that has received considerable
attention is how age stereotypes impact older adults’ memory performance. Research has shown
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 9
that age-related memory declines are exacerbated when older adults are primed to think about
negative age stereotypes (Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam, & Hasher, 2005; Hess,
Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003, Hess, Hinson, & Statham, 2004; Hess, Emery, & Queen,
2009; Thomas & Dubois, 2011). For example, Hess and colleagues (2003) found that after
reading about memory declines in old age, older adults performed worse on a recall memory test
than younger adults. Yet, interestingly, when recall memory was assessed after participants read
an article declaring that memory abilities were maintained in older age, there was no difference
between younger and older adults’ recall memory performance. The authors concluded that older
adults essentially conformed to their stereotype (i.e., older adults have poor memory), an
outcome regularly seen in studies investigating a phenomenon known as stereotype threat (cf.
Steele & Aronson, 1995). However, it is relatively unknown how exposure to age stereotypes
differentially affects younger and older adults’ emotional memory performance.
Research has demonstrated that older adults attend to and remember a greater proportion
of positive than negative information relative to younger adults, a phenomenon referred to as the
positivity effect (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; for recent reviews and discussions, see Reed &
Carstensen, 2012; Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014). More specifically, the positivity effect is
conceptualized as the relative difference between younger and older adults’ memory for positive
versus negative information (Reed & Carstensen, 2012). Thus, compared to younger adults’
enhanced memory for negative information, a positivity effect in memory would also be said to
occur even if older adults remember equal amounts of positive and negative information. The
positivity effect in memory is robust and has been found using multiple stimulus modalities,
including pictures (e.g., Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Knight, 2005) and
words (e.g., Leigland, Schulz, & Janowsky, 2004; Thomas & Hasher, 2006). Explanations for
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 10
why this positivity effect occurs in memory are most often based on socioemotional selectivity
theory, which posits that older adults prioritize socioemotional goals and their own emotional
well-being upon realizing that time remaining in life is limited (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, &
Charles, 1999). Theoretically, stereotype threat should activate thoughts that negative life events
may be on the horizon and that time remaining in life is limited. Thus, awareness of the negative
aspects of aging and negative age stereotypes should prompt the age-related positivity effect in
memory to emerge.
Although the positivity effect is a robust finding, there are circumstances where the
positivity effect in memory does not emerge (e.g., Grühn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005; for a meta-
analysis, see Reed et al., 2014). Reviews of the literature have concluded that the positivity effect
in memory is more likely to manifest under certain experimental conditions, such as
unconstrained encoding tasks, and experimental constraints that directly influence older adults’
emotional goals, attention, and cognitive resources moderate the effect (Reed & Carstensen,
2012; Reed et al., 2014). Thus, in theory, if experimental conditions prompted older adults to
view the amount of time remaining in life as more expansive, rather than limited, or believe that
positive experiences and possibilities are available in the future, then older adults might not
exhibit a positivity effect. Supporting this notion, Kellough and Knight (2012) manipulated the
perceived amount of time remaining in life and found that the positivity effect shown in older
adults’ perception of emotional facial expressions was eliminated when older adults perceived
time remaining in life as expansive. Perhaps older adults’ positivity and optimism when
forecasting and imagining their own future would also eliminate the positivity effect. In the only
study that has investigated how negative age stereotypes might affect emotional memory,
negative age-related adjectives (e.g., senile) were presented subliminally either before the
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 11
encoding of emotional words or just prior to the recognition memory test (Krendl, Ambady, &
Kensinger, 2015). When hit rates, false alarms, and corrected recognition scores were examined,
memory for positive and negative words was not impacted by the subliminal presentation of
negative age stereotypes. However, experimental conditions (e.g., self-referential encoding task,
recognition memory test) could have interfered with the likelihood of observing a positivity
effect under threat conditions.
The Present Study
The current study had three primary aims. First, we investigated whether there are any
age-related differences in how individuals view their own life compared to the average person’s
life in very old age. To do so, we randomly assigned younger and older adults to either rate the
relevance of positive and negative words in reference to their own life or the average person’s
life in very old age (i.e., 85 years old). Since individuals tend to be optimistic when forecasting
their own future, we predicted that across both age groups, higher relevance ratings would be
given to positive than negative words when participants thought about what their own life might
be like at age 85. In contrast, given that both younger and older adults have implicit negative
attitudes and biases toward older adults (Levy & Banaji, 2002; Nosek et al., 2002), we
anticipated that higher relevance ratings would be given to negative than positive words when
individuals imagined what the average person’s life would be like at age 85. To approximate any
changes in mood that may have occurred when participants thought about their own life or the
average person’s life during this word-rating task, we assessed participants’ baseline mood and
their mood immediately after completing this word-rating task. We predicted that, regardless of
age, participants would show a greater decline in mood after rating words in reference to the
average person’s life at age 85, compared to their own life at age 85. To our knowledge, this is
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 12
the first study to directly compare younger and older adults’ thoughts about their own future in
very old age (e.g., age 85), so we did not make any specific predictions about whether the greater
endorsement of positive words when evaluating one’s own life compared to the average person’s
life at age 85 would differ between age groups. For instance, it is possible that older adults would
be more optimistic about their own life in very old age than younger adults based on the
positivity effect, yet it is also plausible that older adults would be less optimistic than younger
adults since they may first-hand experience with the more negative aspects of aging.
Second, we were also interested in examining how encoding positive and negative words
in reference to either one’s own life or the average person’s life in very old age would affect
subsequent recognition memory of these words. Since we anticipated that higher relevance
ratings would be given to positive than negative words when participants were asked to imagine
what their own life would be like in very old age, we predicted that these positive words would
be more deeply and elaborated encoded. Thus, we predicted that both younger and older adults
would recognize a greater proportion of positive than negative words when words were encoded
in reference to their own life at age 85. Likewise, since we predicted that higher relevance ratings
would be given to negative words when participants rated words in reference to the average
person’s life at age 85, we anticipated that both younger and older adults assigned to this
condition would recognize a greater proportion of negative than positive words.
Third, we aimed to investigate how thinking about life in very old age affects younger
and older adults’ emotional memory performance on a subsequent picture recall task. After being
primed to think about either their own life or the average person’s life at 85 during the word-
rating task, participants were asked to passively view a series of positive and negative pictures.
This particular set of emotional pictures has been used in previous studies investigating age-
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 13
related differences in emotional memory and older adults demonstrated the positivity effect by
recalling a greater proportion of positive than negative pictures (e.g., Charles et al., 2003). We
predicted that the group of older adults assigned to rate words in reference to the average
person’s life at age 85 might have activated more negative thoughts about aging. Consequently,
we anticipated older adults would recall a greater proportion of positive than negative pictures
relative to younger adults when participants were primed to imagine what the average person’s
life would be like at age 85, demonstrating a positivity effect in memory. In contrast, evaluating
words in reference to one’s own future at age 85 might prompt positive thoughts about aging and
activate hopes and aspirations for the future. As a result, we predicated that older adults would
display a pattern of memory that is similar to younger adults after being primed to imagine their
own life in very old age, thereby diminishing the positivity effect in memory.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited online using Amazon’s TurkPrime (www.TurkPrime.com).
Eighteen participants dropped out of the study before any demographic information could be
obtained. Of the 99 people who completed the study, three younger adults were excluded for
answering the validity question incorrectly (i.e., “If you are reading this question, please select
the number 4 as your answer.”) and one younger adult was excluded for not completing the 45-
minute study in a timely manner (i.e., over 100 minutes). Accordingly, 44 younger adults (age
range = 19–25 years, M = 22.64, SD = 1.60, 20 female) and 51 older adults (age range = 60 – 69
years, M = 64.86, SD = 2.34, 37 female) were included in the final sample (see Table 1 for
additional demographic data).
All participants provided informed consent and were paid for their
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 14
participation in accordance with a protocol approved by the University of Southern California’s
Institutional Review Board.
Materials
Word stimuli. The stimuli consisted of 240 words (120 positive, 120 negative) from the
Affective Norms for English Words database (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). On the basis of
normative ratings of valence and arousal provided by Bradley and Lang (1999), the mean
valence of positive and negative words was 7.25 (SD = 0.61) and 2.65 (SD = 0.58), respectively.
Positive (M = 5.54, SD = 0.84) and negative (M = 5.65, SD = 0.93) words were equated for
arousal level, t(238) = .95, p > .10. Positive and negative words were also equated for the
number of letters and syllables, part of speech, and word frequency based on scores provided by
the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981; all ps > .09). In order to minimize the
likelihood of heuristic responding based solely on the age-relevance of words, there was an equal
amount of words stereotypical of young adults (e.g., agility, selfish), stereotypical of older adults
(e.g., wise, illness), and words not stereotypically related to a person’s age (e.g., vacation,
spider) within each valence category. Ratings of stereotypicality (1 = more typical of young
adults, 3 = equally typical, not related to age, 5 = more typical of older adults) were obtained
from a separate sample of younger and older adults.
1
Only words where younger and older
adults’ ratings of stereotypicality did not differ were chosen for inclusion in the current study (all
ps > .10). Ratings for each stereotype category were significantly different from each other, F(2,
237) = 305.49, p < .001.
For some negative words, such as abduction and assassin, it may not be plausible to view
these words as self-relevant, regardless of age. In order to minimize the difference between
positive and negative words along the dimension of self-relevance, another separate sample of
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 15
younger and older adults rated the self-relevance of words (1 = not at all relevant, 3 = somewhat
relevant, 5 = very relevant).
1
Care was taken to try and equate the self-relevance of positive and
negative words as much as possible; however, since positive words are more likely to be
endorsed as self-relevant or self-descriptive than negative words (e.g., Denny & Hunt, 1992;
Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006), it was not possible to fully equate
valence categories, t(238) = 4.19, p < .001, given the other constraints (e.g., arousal level). Two
lists of words were created so that one list (120 words) could be presented during the rating task
and the other list (120 words) could be used as lures during the recognition test, counterbalanced
across participants. The two lists were matched across all word characteristics (e.g., valence,
letters, stereotypicality).
Picture stimuli. A series of 20 pictures (8 positive, 8 negative, 4 neutral) from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) were used.
Emotional (positive, negative) pictures were the same emotional images used in Charles et al.
(2003; Experiment 1). The four neutral pictures were included to serve as a buffer against
primacy and recency effects.
Self-report measures. A questionnaire was administered to collect basic demographic
information, including age, gender, and education. A four-item health questionnaire was used to
collect data on self-rated physical health and emotional well-being. Ratings of current (i.e.,
today) and general (i.e., over the past year) physical health were evaluated using a 5-point Likert
scale (1 = poor, 5 = excellent). Current and general emotional well-being were also assessed
using a 5-point scale (1 = depressed, 5 = nearly always happy and upbeat).
To assess participants’ perceptions about the future, the Future Time Perspective Scale
(FTP; Carstensen & Lang, 1996) was used with lower scores suggesting that a person views their
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 16
future as more limited and higher scores reflecting that one perceives their future is open-ended
and expansive. A one-item measure was administered that asked participants to predict the
number of years they had remaining in life. A three-item measure was also included to evaluate
how younger and older adults imagined their own health at the age of 85. Participants were asked
to rate (a) “How do you imagine your health and physical well-being will be when you are 85
years old?” using a 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent) scale; (b) “How do you imagine your mental and
cognitive ability will be when you are 85 years old?” on the same 5-point scale; and (c) “How do
you imagine your emotional well-being will be when you are 85 years old?” using a 1
(depressed) to 5 (nearly always happy and upbeat) scale. These three items were averaged to
create an overall “predicted health at 85” composite score, with higher scores representing better
health (younger adults: Cronbach’s α = .85, older adults: Cronbach’s α = .85).
Current satisfaction with life was assessed using the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS;
Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). A five-item questionnaire to assess perceived
stereotype threat was administered to determine the extent to which participants believe that their
own memory ability is judged based on their age (Chasteen et al., 2005). Higher scores indicate
greater perceived stereotype threat. A five-item measure was used to evaluate how strongly
individuals identify with their own age group with higher scores reflecting greater identification
with one’s own age group (Gartska, Branscombe, & Hummert, 1997; see also, Garstka, Schmitt,
Branscombe, & Hummert, 2004). A five-item measure was included to assess how participants
perceive both the valence (i.e., positive or negative) of their own age with higher scores
reflecting more positive valence and the saliency of one’s own age on their self-concept with
higher scores indicating that their age is more incorporated into their self-concept (Weiss &
Freund, 2012). The frequency and quality of contact with older adults over the age of 80 was
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 17
also assessed with higher scores reflecting greater frequency and better quality (Schwartz &
Simmons, 2001).
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants provided a baseline measure of mood
using a sliding scale from 0 (very negative mood) to 100 (very positive mood). Next, participants
were randomly assigned by the online software system to one of two writing task conditions (i.e.,
“self” or “other”) in order to facilitate thinking about life in very old age before the word-rating
task. For the self-writing task, participants (n
younger
= 22, n
older
= 22) were instructed to spend two
minutes writing what they imagine their own life will be like at the age of 85. Participants were
asked to write in as much detail as possible and to consider a variety of factors (i.e., “Think
about what kind of person you will be, how you will feel, and what types of things you will be
doing. Consider all different aspects of life including family/relationships, career, health, leisure,
and finances.”). Participants assigned to complete the other-writing task (n
younger
= 22, n
older
= 29)
were given the same instructions, except they were asked to write about what they imagine the
average person’s life will be like when they are 85 years old. Participants were instructed to type
their responses into a text box on the computer screen so that their written responses could be
recorded (see Supplementary Table 1, for a summary of the text analysis on participants’ written
responses).
2
Immediately after the writing task, participants were shown a series of words.
Participants who had completed the self-writing task were instructed to rate how self-relevant
each word will be to their own life when they are 85 years old, whereas participants who had
completed the other-writing task were instructed to rate how relevant each word will be to the
average person’s life when they are 85 years old. For both conditions (i.e., self and other),
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 18
participants were instructed to “consider a variety of factors and life domains, such as behaviors,
personality, people, environment, work, hobbies, and physical characteristics” when judging the
degree of relevance. All ratings, regardless of condition, were self-paced and made on a 5-point
Likert scale where 0 = not at all relevant and 4 = very relevant.
Immediately after the word-rating task, participants rated their mood using a sliding scale
from 0 (very negative mood) to 100 (very positive mood). Next, all participants were told that
they would be viewing a series of pictures. Pictures measured 360 pixels X 270 pixels and each
picture was displayed for 5 seconds. Two neutral pictures appeared at the beginning and two
neutral pictures appeared at the end of the slideshow to buffer against primacy and recency
effects. Positive and negative pictures were presented in a random order. Each picture was shown
with either a red or yellow border frame, counterbalanced across participants. To ensure that
participants were attending to the pictures, participants were instructed to indicate the color of
the border that surrounded each picture. Across all participants, there was 98.9% accuracy for
this border task.
After approximately 3 minutes dedicated to the incidental picture-encoding task, a
surprise, self-paced word recognition test was administered. Half of the words during this
recognition test were the positive and negative words seen during the word-rating task, while the
remaining half were similar-matched lures, counterbalanced across participants. Participants
were asked to make an old/new judgment for each word by responding “yes” if they had
previously seen the word during the rating task (old) or “no” if they believe the word was not
presented during the rating task (new). Immediately after completing the word recognition test,
participants were asked to recall as many pictures as they could remember seeing during the
previous border task. Participants were instructed to write down a brief description of each
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 19
picture and to provide enough detail so that the descriptions could be matched to the
corresponding picture. Following the picture recall test, participants completed a demographics
questionnaire and a series of self-report measures.
Data Analysis
Given that we administered the self-report measures after all of our experimental tasks, it
would be impossible to discern whether any differences between experimental conditions on
these self-report measures (e.g., predicted years remaining in life, future time perspective) could
be attributed to our task manipulation (i.e., imagining one’s own or the average person’s life at
age 85) or a result of randomization into the two conditions. As a result, we only evaluated
whether there were any age group differences on these self-report measures using a series of
independent t-tests to learn more about the characteristics of our particular sample of younger
and older adults (see Table 1 for mean scores and tests of statistical differences between age
groups).
Before testing our main hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (Age: younger, older) X 2
(Condition: self, other) univariate ANOVA on baseline mood scores and mood change scores.
Mood change scores were calculated by subtracting an individual’s mood score after the word-
rating task from their baseline mood score, with negative values representing a decline in mood.
To address our primary hypotheses, we conducted a series 2 (Age: younger, older) X 2
(Condition: self, other) X 2 (Valence: positive, negative) mixed ANOVAs with age and
condition as between-subjects factors and valence as a within-subjects factor. These mixed
ANOVAs were conducted on mean relevance ratings in the word-rating task, word memory
(hits, false alarms, corrected recognition scores), and the mean number of pictures recalled.
Corrected recognition scores for word memory were calculated by subtracting false alarm rates
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 20
from hit rates (i.e., hits – false alarms) to account for any differences or biases in response
criteria among participants. To calculate the mean number of pictures recalled, two separate
coders (blind to participant condition and age) matched each written response from the recall
memory test to a corresponding picture from encoding. The picture used during instructions and
the pictures that were included to buffer against primacy and recency effects were excluded from
the analyses. There was a 93.56% agreement between coders, and any discrepancies between
coders were discussed until a consensus was reached. A subset of responses were excluded
because participants’ written response did not correspond to any picture that was shown during
the encoding phase or the response was overly vague and a specific picture could not be
determined (e.g., “man”). The number of unmatched responses did not significantly differ
between age groups or experimental conditions and the interaction between age group and
condition was not significant (Fs < 1, ps > .10).
Results
Mood
We first examined whether baseline mood differed between age groups and whether there
were any systematic differences in baseline mood as a result of randomization into the two
experimental conditions (i.e., self, other). The difference between younger (M = 73.32) and older
(M = 78.25) adults’ baseline mood was not significant, F(1, 91) = 1.86, p > .10, η
p
2
= .02.
Additionally, baseline mood did not differ between the two conditions and the Age X Condition
interaction was not significant (Fs < 1, ps > .10).
To investigate whether thinking about one’s own life or the average person’s life at age
85 affected younger and older adults’ mood, we next examined participants’ change in mood
after completing the word-rating task. A main effect of Age was observed, F(1, 91) = 5.05, p <
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 21
.05, η
p
2
= .05, revealing that, across conditions, younger adults’ mood (M = -6.66) declined more
than older adults’ mood (M = -1.35). The main effect of Condition was also significant, F(1, 91)
= 5.56, p < .05, η
p
2
= .06. Participants who evaluated whether words were relevant to the average
person at age 85 showed a greater decline in mood (M = -6.35) than participants who judged
whether words would be relevant to their own life at 85 (M = .86), t(93) = 2.15, p < .05. The Age
X Condition interaction was not significant (p > .10).
Word Rating
We next examined whether younger and older adults’ relevance ratings of positive and
negative words differed depending on whether they evaluated words in reference to their own
life or the average person’s life at age 85 (results are illustrated in Figure 1). There was a
significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 91) = 5.99, p < .05, η
p
2
= .06, with higher relevance
ratings when words were judged in the context of the average 85-year-old (M = 1.31) than in the
self-referent condition (M = 1.08). A significant main effect of Valence was also observed, F(1,
91) = 26.93, p < .001, η
p
2
= .23, with higher ratings given in response to positive words (M =
1.43) than negative words (M = .98). However, these main effects were qualified by a significant
Valence X Condition interaction, F(1, 91) = 28.57, p < .001, η
p
2
= .24. Specifically, when
participants were asked to predict the relevance of words in reference to their own life at age 85,
positive words (M = 1.57) were rated as more relevant than negative words (M = .58), t(43) =
7.53, p < .001. However, the relevance of positive (M = 1.30) and negative (M = 1.32) words did
not differ when words were judged in reference to the average person at age 85, t(50) = .12.
Moreover, participants’ ratings showed that they judged positive words to be more relevant to
their own life at age 85 than to the average 85-year-old, t(93) = 2.15, p < .05. In contrast,
participants rated negative words as more relevant to the average 85-year-old than to themselves
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 22
at age 85, t(86.52) = 5.68, p < .001. The main effect of age was not significant and no other
interactions were significant (all ps > .10).
Word Memory
Hits. An analysis of hit rates revealed a significant main effect of Valence, F(1, 91) =
13.73, p < .001, η
p
2
= .13, that was qualified by a significant Valence x Condition interaction,
F(1, 91) = 5.54, p < .05, η
p
2
= .06 (see Figure 2a). Follow-up comparisons indicated that positive
words (M = .83) were better recognized than negative words (M = .77) when participants had
encoded words by judging whether words would be self-relevant to their own life at 85, t(43) =
4.05, p < .001. However, there was no difference in the recognition of positive (M = .80) and
negative (M = .79) words when participants had previously judged the relevance of words to the
average 85-year-old during encoding, t(51) = 1.13. No other main effects or interactions were
significant (Fs < 1.7, ps > .10).
False Alarms. When we examined the false alarm rates, only a main effect of Valence
was observed, F(1, 91) = 57.05, p < .001, η
p
2
= .39, revealing that the false alarm rate was
significantly higher for negative (M = .23) than positive (M = .16) words (see Figure 2b). This
pattern suggests that negative words were more likely to be misremembered as seen during
encoding than positive words regardless of age group or experimental condition. Possible
explanations for this finding will be raised in the discussion. No other main effects or
interactions were significant (Fs < 1, ps > .10).
Corrected Recognition. An analysis of corrected recognition scores (see Figure 2c)
revealed only a main effect of Valence, F(1, 91) = 97.04, p < .001, η
p
2
= .52, with positive words
(M = .65) recognized better than negative words (M = .55) regardless of age or experimental
condition. No other main effects or interactions were significant (Fs < 2.8, ps > .10).
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 23
Picture Memory
We next examined whether being primed to think about one’s own life or the average
person’s life at age 85 would differentially affect younger and older adults’ emotional memory
performance on a subsequent picture recall task (see Figure 3). We found that the main effects of
Age, F(1, 91) = .003, and Condition, F(1, 91) = .03, were not significant, suggesting that the
total number of pictures recalled did not differ between age groups or experimental conditions.
The main effect of Valence was significant, F(1, 91) = 40.40, p < .001, η
p
2
= .31, as participants
recalled a greater number of negative pictures (M = 1.95) than positive pictures (M = 1.01).
There was a significant Valence X Age interaction, F(1, 91) = 4.77, p < .05, η
p
2
= .05, but this
two-way interaction was qualified by a significant Age X Condition X Valence interaction, F(1,
91) = 5.43, p < .05, η
p
2
= .06.
A 2 (Age: younger, older) X 2 (Valence: positive, negative) mixed ANOVA was
conducted within each condition (i.e., self, other) to decompose this three-way interaction. For
participants who had been primed to think about their own life at age 85 (i.e., the self condition),
there was a main effect of Valence, F(1, 42) = 16.42, p < .001; both younger and older adults
recalled more negative than positive pictures. Both the main effect of Age and the Age X
Valence interaction were not significant (Fs < 1.5, ps > .10). However, as Figure 3 shows, we
found that after participants had been primed to think about the average person’s at 85, a
significant main effect of Valence, F(1, 49) = 24.75, was qualified by a significant Age X
Valence interaction, F(1, 49) = 10.38, p < .01, η
p
2
= .18. Younger adults recalled a significantly
greater number of negative (M = 2.55) than positive pictures (M = 0.77), t(21) = 5.40, p < .001,
whereas older adults did not show any significant difference between the recall of positive (M =
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 24
1.10) and negative (M = 1.48) pictures, t(28) = 1.34. The main effect of Age was not significant
(F < 1.37, p > .10).
The Age X Condition X Valence interaction on the number of pictures recalled remained
significant even when participants’ mood change scores were entered as a covariate in the
analyses, F(1, 91) = 5.29, p < .05, η
p
2
= .06, suggesting that the pattern of results for picture
recall could not be explained by differences in mood prior to the encoding of pictures.
3
Discussion
This study examined how younger and older adults imagine what their own life and the
average person’s life will be like in very old age and how these thoughts influence subsequent
emotional memory performance. Based on the notion that people have an optimism bias when
forecasting their own future (Sharot, 2011), we hypothesized that both younger and older adults
would be more positive and optimistic when thinking about their own future in very old age,
compared to the average person’s future. Our results confirmed this hypothesis. When
participants were asked to decide how relevant a word would be to their own future at age 85,
significantly higher relevance ratings were given to positive than negative words. In contrast,
equivalent amounts of positive and negative words were rated as relevant to the average person’s
life at age 85. These findings fit well with prior research demonstrating that younger adults’
forecasts for life as a 70-year-old were at or above neutral (Packer & Chasteen, 2006) and that
older adults had positive projections for their future (Chessell et al., 2014). Our study extends
these findings by demonstrating, for the first time, that both younger and older adults are still
optimistic about their future even when they are explicitly instructed to project to an age that has
been associated with the more negative aspects of aging, such as health deterioration,
dependency, and closer proximity to death (Kornadt & Rothermund, 2014). To our knowledge,
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 25
this was also the first study to systematically examine age differences when younger and older
adults forecasted to the same age and stage of life. Our results suggest that the magnitude of this
optimism for the future in very old age is similar for younger and older adults.
We found that participants gave higher relevance ratings to positive words and lower
relevance ratings to negative words when referencing their own life compared to the average
person’s life at age 85. Additionally, participants had a greater decline in mood when thinking
about the average person’s life in very old age, compared to thinking about their own life. These
findings support the idea that older adults engage in downward social comparison as a possible
way of protecting their own self-esteem and psychological well-being (Heidrich & Ryff, 1993).
The lack of optimism for another person’s future in old age did not differ between age groups,
which provides additional support for the notion that implicit negative biases towards older
adults does not differ between younger and older adults (e.g., Levy & Banaji, 2002; Nosek et al.,
2002). Our results extend previous findings that older adults have a more positive view of
themselves compared to other older adults (e.g., Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993; Heckhausen &
Brim, 1997) and supports the idea that people anticipate having a more positive aging experience
in very late life than they predict for the average person. However, our results are in contrast
with the finding that individuals anticipate the same degree of age-related decline for everyday
memory problems as their peers (Ryan & Kwong See, 1993). One possibility is that the idea of
everyday memory problems in old age may seem inevitable given the widespread belief that
memory worsens with age, so individuals may be more realistic about certain age-related
changes than other changes. Our word-rating task included positive and negative words from a
multitude of age ranges and life domains. Future research should assess the boundaries of this
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 26
optimism bias for life in very old age and whether the specificity of questions influences the
effect.
Our second aim for this study was to examine how encoding positive and negative words
in reference to one’s own life or the average person’s life in very old age would affect
recognition memory. Our hypothesis was supported when hit rates were used in the analyses.
Specifically, we found that positive words were better recognized than negative words when
words were encoded in reference to one’s own life at age 85, yet negative words were better
recognized than positive words when words were encoded in reference to the average person’s
life at age 85. These findings provide evidence to suggest that positive words might have been
more deeply and elaborately encoded when encoded in reference to one’s own future in very old
age. However, the significantly higher false alarm rate among negative words eliminated this
pattern of results when corrected recognition scores were used in the analyses. There are several
possibilities for the significantly higher false alarm rate among negative words. One possibility is
that the increase in false alarm rates for negative words emerged because words that were high in
negative valence were not likely to be attributed to either one’s own life or the average person’s
life, which could have resulted in these words being easily dismissed and not as deeply encoded.
As a result, participants could have had difficulty distinguishing which negative words had been
previously seen during encoding, thereby leading to a higher false alarm rate. Another possibility
is that there may have been a higher degree of semantic or conceptual relatedness among
negative words, compared to positive words, which could have increased the false alarm rate
among negative words (e.g., Gallo, Foster, & Johnson, 2009).
The third aim of this study was to examine how imagining the future in very old age
influences younger and older adults’ emotional memory performance on a subsequent picture
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 27
task. Extending previous findings that older adults’ memory is impacted after exposure to
negative stereotypes about aging and memory (Chasteen et al., 2005; Hess et al., 2003, 2004;
Thomas & Dubois, 2011), our findings suggest that being primed with negative thoughts about
aging can also influence subsequent emotional memory performance. When younger and older
adults were primed to imagine the average person’s future in very old age, younger adults
recalled a greater number of negative than positive pictures. In contrast, older adults recalled an
equal number of positive and negative pictures, demonstrating a positivity effect in memory.
However, when individuals were primed to think about their own life in very old age, older
adults displayed a memory pattern that did not differ from younger adults (i.e., enhanced
memory for negative pictures). Thus, supporting our prediction, we found that an age-related
positivity effect in memory emerged when older adults were primed to activate more negative
thoughts about aging, but the effect was diminished when individuals were primed to think about
more positive hopes and expectations for their own future in very old age.
Why would the positivity effect emerge after older adults imagined the average person’s
life in very old age, but not when thinking about their own life? As Barber and Mather (2014)
discuss, one possible mechanism that underlies cognitive changes after stereotype threat is an
increased need to regulate one’s negative mood state following the threat. Moreover, the
positivity effect is considered to be a byproduct of older adults’ implementation of emotion
regulation strategies (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Thus, it is conceivable that our findings
provide evidence to suggest that the positivity effect in memory is an adaptive strategy to
regulate one’s emotions in response to the threatening effects of negative age stereotypes. The
positivity effect that emerged in our study could also be reflective of older adults’ implicit desire
to distance themselves from the negative aspects of aging that were activated when they thought
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 28
about the average person’s life in very old age. It is possible that activation of these negative age
stereotypes prompts the motivation to disengage attention from any negative stimuli. Since both
younger and older adults were imagining what life might be like at age 85, both age groups were
theoretically evaluating an out-group; however, older adults may more be cognizant of the fact
that they will soon become members of this out-group. In contrast, the positivity effect in
memory did not emerge when older adults were positive about their own future in very old age,
which is consistent with previous research that when older adults view the amount of time
remaining in life as expansive, rather than limited, or believe that many positive experiences and
possibilities are available in the future, the positivity effect can be eliminated (Barber, Mather, &
Gatz, 2015; Kellough & Knight, 2012).
It should be noted that the only other study to assess emotional memory after subliminal
stereotype threat did not find an interaction between valence and threat conditions (Krendl et al.,
2015). Although their study suggests that age stereotype threat may not always elicit a positivity
effect in memory, their study design was different from the current study in two distinct ways.
First, we asked participants to identify the color of the picture’s border, which did not prompt
evaluation of the stimulus content in any particular way. However, Krendl et al. (2015) asked
participants to encode stimuli using a self-referential task, which prompts the motivation to
process and remember positive and negative information differently in order to protect an
inherently positive self-image (D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2005;
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Sedikides & Green, 2000). In fact, Krendl et al. (2015)
found that for corrected recognition scores, positive words were remembered better than negative
words, which is the same pattern we found when our words were processed for future self-
relevance. Thus, their pattern of results might be more consistent with the encoding specificity
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 29
principle (i.e., the processes activated during retrieval to make an accurate memory judgment
may be the same processes engaged during encoding; Tulving & Thompson, 1973). In support of
this idea, our pattern of results for positive and negative words on the word recognition test
paralleled our participants’ pattern of relevance ratings during encoding. Second, research has
found that the effects of observing preferential memory for positive over neutral stimuli are
larger in recall than recognition studies (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008), so an additional
consideration may be the fact that Krendl and colleagues (2015) used a recognition test, whereas
we used a recall test. Future research is needed to determine how experimental conditions play a
role in emotional memory performance following thoughts about aging and age stereotype threat.
Overall, the results from our study have potentially important implications. There is
evidence to suggest that individuals who have positive views of their own aging have better
functional health, increased longevity, and show an increase in active preparation for age-related
changes (Kornadt et al., 2015; Levy, Slade, & Kasl, 2002; Levy, Slade, Kunkel, & Kasl, 2002).
However, the implications of generating optimistic forecasts of the future in old age may be
more complex. Our findings suggest that thinking about the negative, or perhaps realistic, aspects
of aging elicits the positivity effect in memory, which is considered an adaptive and positive
aspect of aging (for discussions, see Charles & Carstensen, 2010; Reed & Carstensen, 2012). Our
results do not allow for us to disentangle whether individuals are unrealistically optimistic about
their own future or whether they overuse implicit negative age stereotypes in their projections of
the average person’s future as an older adult, or a combination of both. Future research is needed
to explore the relative contributions for each of these possibilities.
In summary, both younger and older adults were positive and optimistic when imagining
their own future in very old age as evidenced by our word-rating task, despite this age being
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 30
more associated with declines in well-being and health deterioration. Yet, there was a lack of
optimism when individuals thought about the average person’s life in very old age. We found
greater recognition for positive than negative words among hit rates, which could possibly reflect
the encoding specificity principle and the possibility that positive words were more deeply
encoded and elaborated upon when processed in reference to one’s own future. Positive thoughts
about one’s own future in very old age eliminated age-related differences in emotional memory
performance on a subsequent picture recall task, whereas exposure to negative thoughts about
aging elicited the positivity effect in memory. Older adults’ optimistic forecasts for the future in
very old age and the belief that many positive experiences and possibilities may be still available
might reduce the need to engage in the emotional and motivational processes that underlie the
positivity effect.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 31
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AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 39
Footnotes
1
Twenty-four younger adults (age range = 18–24 years, M = 20.08, SD = 1.35, 10 female) and
24 older adults (age range = 59–69 years, M = 63.46, SD = 3.53, 18 female) were recruited from
Amazon’s TurkPrime and randomly assigned to judge either the age-relevance of words (n
younger
= 12, n
older
= 13) or the self-relevance of words (n
younger
= 12, n
older
= 11). The stimuli consisted of
630 words (350 positive, 280 negative) from the ANEW database. None of these participants
completed the main study.
2
One younger adult and 8 older adults assigned to write about the average person’s life at age 85
provide responses that indicated that they wrote about their own life at age 85. Given that this
task was separate from the word-rating task and our pattern of findings were the same even when
these participants were excluded from the analyses, these participants were not excluded from
the study.
3
Given that this was an online survey study, it was not possible to determine how much of a
retention delay occurred between the picture encoding task and the picture recall test, however,
our pattern of results would not be able to be explained by any variations in the retention
interval.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 40
Tables
Table 1
Mean Scores (SDs) for Demographic and Self-Report Measures and Tests of Significant
Differences Between Age Groups
Note. FTP = Future time perspective; SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale; OA = older adult.
Three younger adults and one older adult did not provide a numeric response for the predicted
number of years remaining in life. *
p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001.
Younger adults
Older adults
Measure
M
SD
M
SD
t
Years of education
14.84
1.61
15.41
2.63
1.29
Today’s physical health 4.09 0.80 3.90 0.94 1.04
General physical health 3.86 0.98 3.78 1.01 0.39
Today’s emotional well-being 3.84 0.99 4.00 0.96 0.80
General emotional well-being 3.30 1.13 3.86 0.94 2.67
*
Predicted health at age 85 3.00 0.98 3.27 0.94 1.39
Predicted # of years remaining 58.95 19.56 22.21 8.10 11.26
***
FTP 52.34 12.58 36.98 13.11 5.80
***
SWLS 21.09 8.32 23.33 7.10 1.42
Perceived stereotype threat 8.09 4.14 14.22 5.04 6.41
***
Age group identification 26.09 6.45 24.51 6.01 1.24
Valence of one’s age 0.07 2.05 -0.01 1.82 0.20
Saliency of age on self-concept -0.22 1.44 0.77 1.59 3.17
**
Frequency of OA contact 1.80 2.10 2.86 2.56 2.23
*
Quality of OA quality 3.64 0.92 4.02 1.01 1.92
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 41
Figures
Figure 1. Younger and older adults’ mean relevance ratings (and standard errors) of positive and
negative words by condition (self, other). Positive words were given higher relevance ratings
than negative words when participants judged the relevance to their own life at age 85, whereas
the relevance of positive and negative words did not differ when rated in reference to the average
person’s life at age 85. Positive words were rated as more relevant to one’s own life than the
average person’s life at age 85, yet negative words were rated as more relevant to the average
person’s life than one’s own life at age 85.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE
42
Figure 2. Memory for words separated by (A) hits, (B) false alarms, and (C) corrected
recognition. Error bars represent the standard error of that mean. For hits, positive words were
A.
B.
C.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 43
better recognized than negative words among words encoded in reference to their own life at age
85. The hit rate between positive and negative words did not differ among words encoded in
reference to the average person’s life at age 85. False alarm rates were higher for negative than
positive words and positive words were recognized better than negative words, regardless of
condition, when corrected recognition scores were used.
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 44
Figure 3. Number of positive and negative pictures recalled by age (young, older) and condition
(self, other). Error bars represent the standard error of that mean. Both younger and older adults
recalled more negative than positive pictures after being primed with thoughts about their own
life at age 85. After being primed to think about the average person’s life at age 85, younger
adults recalled more negative than positive pictures, whereas recall between positive and
negative pictures did not differ among older adults. ** p < .01.
**
ns
AGE AND IMAGINING THE FUTURE 45
Supplementary Materials
Supplementary Table 1
Means (SDs) for the linguistic context of written responses by Age and Experimental Condition
and Tests of Significant Differences between Conditions
Note. Participants’ responses on the writing task were analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count program (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007). Word count refers to the
total number of words written. For all other categories, values represent the percentage of words
written that correspond to that linguistic category. *
p < .05; **p < .01.
Self
Other
Linguistic Category
Younger
Older
Younger
Older
t
Word Count
86.91 (34.48)
99.41 (50.03)
83.82 (29.04)
113.34 (63.06)
0.75
Biological processes 2.75 (2.06) 2.95 (2.25) 2.87 (1.73) 5.34 (2.05) 3.14
**
Body 0.19 (0.54) 0.13 (0.34) 0.31 (0.61) 0.68 (1.02) 2.60
*
Health 2.05 (1.71) 2.29 (2.14) 2.28 (1.50) 3.93 (1.90) 2.67
**
Family 2.62 (2.05) 1.14 (1.32) 1.48 (1.60) 1.34 (1.50) 1.38
Friends 0.29 (0.59) 0.32 (0.54) 0.33 (0.66) 0.55 (0.68) 1.14
Work 1.96 (1.89) 2.01 (1.56) 1.86 (1.42) 2.37 (2.17) 0.44
Home 2.14 (1.62) 0.73 (1.17) 1.80 (2.06) 1.52 (1.31) 0.62
Leisure 2.61 (1.82) 1.58 (1.75) 3.40 (2.46) 2.61 (2.17) 1.98
Money 1.12 (1.17) 1.14 (1.09) 1.46 (1.59) 1.24 (1.17) 0.79
Death 0.08 (0.26) 0.09 (0.31) 0.20 (0.66) 0.11 (0.37) 0.74
Positive emotion 6.54 (4.30) 5.78 (3.07) 4.27 (2.26) 4.76 (2.82) 2.42
*
Negative emotion 0.89 (1.21) 1.60 (4.50) 1.58 (1.75) 1.46 (1.79) 0.50
Anxiety 0.13 (0.33) 0.07 (0.23) 0.53 (0.85) 0.18 (0.45) 2.29
*
Anger 0.28 (1.13) 0.07 (0.24) 0.09 (0.41) 0.06 (0.24) 0.83
Sad 0.23 (0.56) 0.84 (3.04) 0.43 (0.68) 0.56 (0.90) 0.10
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
People tend to have an optimistic view of their own future in old age, but also have implicit negative attitudes towards older adults. In this study, we investigated how younger and older adults rate the projected relevance of positive and negative words in reference to either their own future or the average person's future in very old age. Participants then viewed a series of emotional pictures to examine how being primed with thoughts of life in very old age affects emotional memory performance. Both younger and older adults gave higher relevance ratings to positive words when imagining their own life in very old age, but rated negative words as more relevant to the average person’s life in very old age. After individuals were primed with thoughts about their own future in very old age, there was no age-related difference in the recall of positive and negative pictures. However, after imagining the average person's life in very old age, older adults recalled proportionately fewer negative pictures relative to younger adults, demonstrating a positivity effect in memory. These findings suggest that compared to the positive thoughts that might coincide with thinking about one’s own future, imagining the average person’s life in very old age could prompt more negative thoughts about aging, thereby eliciting a positivity effect on subsequent memory tasks.
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Durbin, Kelly A.
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Optimism when imagining the future in old age influences the positivity effect in memory
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Psychology
Publication Date
07/21/2016
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