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Water security, national security and MCIWest: a grounded theory for operationalizing risk management

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Water security, national security and MCIWest: a grounded theory for operationalizing risk management

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WATER SECURITY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND MCIWEST:

A GROUNDED THEORY FOR OPERATIONALIZING RISK MANAGEMENT

By

John Simpson

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC PRICE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF POLICY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

August 2016

Copyright 2016 John Simpson

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Epigraph

“Humanity today is like a waking dreamer, caught between the fantasies of sleep
and the chaos of the real world. The mind seeks but cannot find the precise place
and hour. We have created a Star Wars civilization, with Stone Age emotions,
medieval institutions, and godlike technology. We thrash about. We are terribly
confused by the mere fact of our existence, and a danger to ourselves and to the rest
of life.”

E. O. Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth

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Dedication

To the Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, Airman, and Civilians, who embody the full
diversity of our society, and our ideologies, and who put mission ahead of tribalism
to rise above the “manufactured ignorance” of our politics to place themselves in
harm’s way every day to support and defend the national interests of our country
and our allies.

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Acknowledgments

Without Dr. Debbie Natoli and her keen understanding of how the human mind works
and how to communicate exactly what I needed to hear at the moment I was ready to
walk away from the program (because of a USC Professor’s complete lack of
professionalism), I would not have fulfilled this life’s goal and I would have greatly
regretted that. There are no words to express my gratitude to her for what she has
meant to me.

My esteemed doctoral committee, Dr. Hilda Blanco, Chair, Dr. Peter Robertson and Dr.
Brian Brady provided the exact right amount and nature of guidance and the exact right
times throughout this process to make this endeavor challenging, rewarding and a
growth experience. My special thanks to Dr. Peter Robertson who has been a mentor
and a friend throughout the process and whose guidance, direction, questions and
editing are responsible for the quality of this product. And my special thanks also to
Brain Brady who made time to be on my committee and always made time when I
needed an industry sanity check or an intellectual’s feedback on my thinking.

The logistics and management of the DPPD program are the responsibility of Dr. Debra
Natoli and Ashley Coelho and I would like to express my extreme gratitude to them for
their absolute professionalism and assistance. There were many times over these four
years that things would have been significantly more frustrating if they had not been
there to go above and beyond to solve to whatever issue I faced, whenever I faced it.

My mentors and role models who were kind enough to provide the recommendations
that got me into the DPPD program:
Amory Lovins, co-founder of Rocky Mountain Institute - an undisputed genius and one
of the kindest and most gracious human beings to every walk the earth.
Martha Johnson, former GSA Administrator - a brilliant, visionary, and tireless leader
whose sacrifice to the “gods” of politics was a terrible loss to us all.
Dr. Ray Levitt, Stanford Professor and my graduate school advisor – a consummate
professional whose leadership and inspiration has been a force-multiplier (through his
students) across the engineering industry.
RADM(ret) David Nash, former Chief of Civil Engineers – one of the finest Naval Officers
that I have ever known and a man who continues to demonstrate all of the qualities that
lead to the U.S. Navy Civil Engineer Corps to promote him to their highest position.

My boss, friend and mentor for more than twenty years, Steve Wolfe, as always his
leadership and unflappable nature inspired me, like it has so many others, during the
most stressful times during this process.

To my wife Sherri, and my two beautiful daughters, Emily and Jessie who put up with
me working through holiday weekends and my aggressive nature when stressed, thank
you. I love you and I look forward to making up for lost time.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Epigraph……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. ii

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………………………..... iii

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………………. iv

List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………………………… viii

List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………………….. ix

Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………………………….. xii

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………… xiii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….
B. Current State of Global Water Resources……………………………………………..
1) Global Water Crisis…………………………………………………………………..
2) Key Factors Contributing to Water Issues…………………………………
C. Conceptualizing “Water Security” ……………………………………………………….
1) Water Security Definitions are “Worldview-Dependent” …………..
2) Global, National, and Local Perspectives……………………………………
3) Complexity and Governance……………………………………………………..
D. Research Context………………………………………………………………………………..
1) Professional Doctorate Versus a PhD………………………………………..
2) Study Setting – Overview of MCIWest………………………………………
i. Water Sources for MCIWest………………………………………..
ii. Water Security Directives……………………………………………
E. Research Focus
1) The Intersection of Water Security and Worldviews…………………..
2) Assessing Risks to MCIWest Water Security………………………………
3) Operationalizing Risk Management…………………………………………..

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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

A. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….
B. Philosophical Orientation……………………………………………………………………
C. Study Design………………………………………………………………………………………
D. Methods of Analysis……………………………………………………………………………
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1) Literature Review……………………………………………………………………
2) MCIWest Water Security Stakeholder Survey……………………………
3) Institution Review Board (IRB) ……………………………………………….

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CHAPTER 3: WATER SECURITY DEFINITIONS AND FRAMEWORKS

A. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….
B. Single Issue Frameworks…………………………………………………………………….
1) Risk ………………………………………………………………………………………...
2) Legal………………………………………………………………………………………..
3) Virtual Water…………………………………………………………………………...
4) Groundwater……………………………………………………………………………
C. Integrated Frameworks………………………………………………………………………
1) Multi-dimensional and Multi-scalar………………………………………….
2) Multi-dimensional and Single-Scalar…………………………………………
D. Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………..

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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON WATER SECURITY

A. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….
B. Global Impacts……………………………………………………………………………………
1) Food Security…………………………………………………………………………..
2) Instability and Conflict……………………………………………………………..
3) National Security……………………………………………………………………..
4) Equity……………………………………………………………………………………...
5) Environmental…………………………………………………………………………
C. Local Impacts……………………………………………………………………………………...
1) U.S. Southwestern Region…………………………………………………………
2) California…………………………………………………………………………………
D. Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………...

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CHAPTER 5 – STAKEHOLDER WATER SECURITY WORLDVIEWS

A. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….........
B. Political…………………………………………………………………………………..................
C. Institutional Worldviews…………………………………………………………………….
1) Federal Government…………………………………………………………………..
i. Department of Defense (DoD) …………………………………………..
ii. Other Federal Agencies…………………………………………………….
iii. Executive Branch…………………………………………………………….
2) California State Government………………………………………………………..
D. Business…………………………………………………………………………………................
1) Commercial and Industrial…………………………………………………………..
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2) Agricultural……………………………………………………………………………….
3) Lawyers…………………………………………………………………………………....
4) Engineers………………………………………………………………………………….
E. Non-profit Sector………………………………………………………………………………..
F. General Public………………………………………………………………………………….....
G. Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………..........

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CHAPTER 6 – WATER SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS

A. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….........
B. Risk Identification……………………………………………………………………………….
C. Risk Analysis………………………………………………………………………………….......
D. Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………..........

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CHAPTER 7 – INSTITUTIONS, MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

A. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….........
B. Institutions…………………………………………………………………………………...........
C. Management…………………………………………………………………………………........
D. Governance…………………………………………………………………………………..........
E. Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………..........

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CHAPTER 8: TRANSLATING THEORY INTO PRACTICE

A. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….........
B. Water Security Equals National Security for MCIWest………………………….
C. Water Security is Ultimately a Matter of Supply and Delivery……….….…...
D. Grounded Theory - Water Security Assessment and Management Process……
a. Use of Risk to Understand and Manage Water Security for
MCIWest………………………………………………………………………………….
b. Overview of the Process……………………………………………………………
c. Identifying the Hazards, Threats and Impacts to Water Security...
d. Establishing the Risk Evaluation Criteria and Process……………….
e. Developing Impact, Likelihood, Velocity and Vulnerability Scales.
f. Risk and Vulnerability Assessments………………………….……………...
g. Filtering, Re-categorizing and Prioritizing Risks and
Vulnerabilities………………………………………………………………………….
E. Summary and Next Steps…………………………………………………………………….
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CHAPTER 9: MCIWEST WATER SECURITY STAKEHOLDER SURVEY

A. Purpose of the Survey…………………………………………………………………………
B. Choice of Participants…………………………………………………………………………
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C. Results and Interpretation………………………………………………………………….

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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….
B. Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………..
1) Water Security for MCIWest is Vital to National Security……………
2) Framing Water Security in Terms of Risk is the Best
Methodology……………………………………………………………………………
3) Risk Criteria Based on Water Supply and Delivery Systems……….
4) Climate Change and Overpopulation are the Greatest Risks……….
5) Stakeholder Worldviews have Significant Impacts on Water
Security……………………………………………………………………………………
6) The MCIWest Definition for “Water Security” ……………………………
7) The Process for Assessing and Managing Water Security Risks…..
8) MCIWest has Very Limited Risk Preemption/Mitigation Capacity
C. Recommendations………………………………………………………………………………
1) Operational and Administrative Risk………………………………………...
2) Risk Response Strategies………………………………………………………….
3) Systemic Risks…………………………………………………………………………
4) Installation Risk Response Strategies……………………………………….
D. MCIWest Water Security Strategy……………………………………………………….

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REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………………………..

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APPENDICES

A. Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandum…………………….…………….
B. MCIWest Commanding General’s Policy Letter 1-15……………………………..
C. Informed Consent for Non-Medical Research Form………………………………
D. Memorandum to Committee on IRB Requirement………………………………..
E. MCIWest Water Security Stakeholder Surveys…………………………………….
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List of Tables

Table 1: MCIWest Installations Overview…………………………………………………..
Table 2: Literature Review Chapters…………………………………………………………
Table 3: Simpson Dissertation Survey Participants……………………………………
Table 4: PPIC Reports………………………………………………………………………………
Table 5: SWRCB Water Quality Control Board Focus Areas……………………….
Table 6: U.S. Army - Types of Water Security Risks Posed…………………………
Table 7: Risk Management Process Summary…………………………………………..
Table 8: Summary of Water Vulnerability Assessment Tools Table……………

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Table 9: Five Key Themes for Water Security……………………………………………
Table 10: Core Principles of Managing Under Uncertainty…………………………
Table 11: Resilience Principles…………………………………………………………………
Table 12: Four Principles of Drought Policy Areas…………………………………….
Table 13: Key Areas for Effective Water Disaster Management………………….
Table 14: “Bridges” Enabling Institutional Adaptive Capacity……………………
Table 15: “Barriers” to Institutional Adaptive Capacity……………………………..
Table 16: MCIWest Water Security Assessment and Management Process…
Table 17: MCIWest Water Security Hazards, Threats, and Impacts……………..
Table 18: Water Security Hazard & Threat Impact Ratings Scale………………..
Table 19: Water Security Hazard/Threat Likelihood Ratings Scale…………….
Table 20: Water Security Risk Speed of Onset Rating Scale………………………..
Table 21: Water Security Vulnerability Assessment Scale………………………….
Table 22: MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton Risk Filter and Prioritization…………
Table 23: MCAS Miramar/MCRD San Diego Risk Filter and Prioritization…..
Table 24: MCAS Yuma Risk Filter and Prioritization………………………………….
Table 25: MCLB Barstow Risk Filter and Prioritization………………………………
Table 26: MCAGCC 29 Palms Risk Filter and Prioritization…………………………
Table 27: MCMWTC Bridgeport Risk Filter and Prioritization…………………….
Table 28: MCIWest Water Security Survey Participants………………….................
Table 29: Stakeholder Survey Results – Worldviews………………………………….
Table 30: Stakeholder Survey Results – Water Security Definitions……………
Table 31: Stakeholder Survey Results – Challenges/Risks………………………….
Table 32: Stakeholder Survey Results – Domestic or International
Dominance………………………………………………………………………………………………
Table 33: Stakeholder Survey Results – Dominate Hazards………………………..
Table 34: Water Security Stakeholder Survey Response Summary……………..
Table 35: MCIWest Water Security Assessment and Management Process….
Table 36: MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton Risk Response Strategies……………….
Table 37: MCAS Miramar/MCRD San Diego Risk Response Strategies………...
Table 38: MCAS Yuma Risk Response Strategies………………………………………..
Table 39: MCLB Barstow Risk Response Strategies……………………………………
Table 40: MCAGCC 29 Palms Risk Response Strategies………………………………
Table 41: MCMWTC Risk Response Strategies…………………………………………...
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List of Figures

Figure 1: Global Water Stress……………………………………………………………………
Figure 2: Top 10 Global Risks 2016…………………………………………………………...
Figure 3: Global Risks Interconnections Map 2016…………………………………….
Figure 4: MCIWest Installations Overview…………………………………………………
Figure 5: Summary of Water Elements of EO 13693…………………………………..
Figure 6: Summary of OSD Water Security Memo Tasks……………………………..

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Figure 7: Literature Review Map………………………………………………………………
Figure 8: Simpson Dissertation Survey Instrument……………………………………
Figure 9: Human Subject Regulations Decision Chart…………………………………
Figure 10: Professional Discipline and Definitions of Water Security………….
Figure 11: Global Web of National Water Security…………………………………….
Figure 12: Water Security Index………………………………………………………………..
Figure 13: Water and Growth S-curve……………………………………………………….
Figure 14: Understanding the Climate-Water-Security Nexus…………………….
Figure 15: Water-Food-Energy Nexus…………………….…………………….…………...
Figure 16: Global Water Security………………………………………………………………
Figure 17: Water Resources Management in California…………………….………..
Figure 18: DWR and SWRCB Regional Boundaries…………………….………………
Figure 19: RWQCB Locations…………………….…………………….……………………….
Figure 20: Water Rate Determining Factors…………………….………………………..
Figure 21: System Dynamic Model of Future Water Supply Scenarios…………
Figure 22: Water Utility Risk Management…………………….…………………….……
Figure 23: Hazards, Threats and Consequences to Water Utilities………………
Figure 24: “Special Interests” Water Security Worldviews…………………………
Figure 25: Risk Tolerance Graphic…………………….…………………….………………..
Figure 26: Three step process – ‘know the risk’, ‘target the risk’, ‘manage
the risk’…………………….…………………….…………………….…………………………………
Figure 27: Risk Management Process (Curtis & Cary) …………………….…………
Figure 28: Illustrative Impact Scale Graphic…………………….………………………..
Figure 29: Illustrative Likelihood Scale Graphic…………………….………………….
Figure 30: Illustrative Vulnerability Scale…………………….…………………….…….
Figure 31: Illustrative Speed of Onset Scale…………………….………………………..
Figure 32: Sample Risk Interaction Map…………………….…………………….……….
Figure 33: Sample Heat Map…………………….…………………….………………………..
Figure 34: Sample MARCI Chart…………………….…………………….……………………
Figure 35: Addressing the Six Major Decision Challenges…………………………..
Figure 36: Seismic Risk Graphic…………………….…………………….……………………
Figure 37: Sample Seismic Risk Curve…………………….…………………….…………..
Figure 38: Water vulnerability Indices – Proposed Framework…………………
Figure 39: Sample Vulnerability Graphics…………………….…………………………..
Figure 40: Adaptive Water Security Management…………………….……………….
Figure 41: Drought Preparedness = Drought Adaptive Capacity…………………
Figure 42: Building and Mobilizing Adaptive Capacity…………………….………….
Figure 43: Drought Adaptive Capacity Principles…………………….…………………
Figure 44: 10-step Drought Planning Process…………………….………………………
Figure 45: Water Disasters by type, 2000-2010…………………….…………………...
Figure 46: Governance Adaptive Capacity Indicators…………………………………
Figure 47: Overview of Hazards and Threats to MCIWest Water Security…..
Figure 48: Risk Assessment Flow Diagram…………………….…………………………
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Figure 49: Example of Water Security Risk Incorporating Speed of Onset….
Figure 50: MCIWest Water Security Risk Assessment Calculations…………….
Figure 51: MCIWest Water Security Risk Assessment Graphic……………………
Figure 52: MCIWest Water Security Risk Interactions Matrix……………………..
Figure 53: MCIWest Water Security Vulnerability Assessment…………………...
Figure 54: Results of Risk Filter and Prioritization Process………………………...
Figure 55: MCAS Miramar/MCRD San Diego Filtered Vulnerability
Assessment…………………….…………………….…………………….……………………………
Figure 56: MCAS Yuma Filtered Vulnerability Assessment…………………………
Figure 57: MCLB Barstow Filtered Vulnerability Assessment…………………….
Figure 58: MCAGCC 29 Palms Filtered Vulnerability Assessment……………….
Figure 59: MCMWTC Bridgeport Filtered Vulnerability Assessment…………...
Figure 60: Risk Response Strategies…………………….…………………….……………...
Figure 61: MCIWest Water Security Risk Response Strategies……………………
Figure 62: MCIWest Water Security Strategy Statement…………………………….

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ABRBREVIATIONS

ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy
ATFP Anti-Terrorism Force Protection
BoR Bureau of Reclamation
CG Commanding General
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CO Commanding Officer
CUP Conjunctive Use Project
CWA Clean Water Act
CWAA Clean Water America Alliance
CWRMA Cooperative Water Resources Management Agreement
DASN Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
DoD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOI Department of Interior
EI&E Energy Installations & Environment
EO Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESA Endangered Species Act
FPUD Fallbrook Public Utilities District
GPD Gallons Per Day
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management
MCAGCC Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center
MCAS Marine Corps Air Station
MCB Marine Corps Base
MCIWest Marine Corps Installations West
MCLB Marine Corps Logistics Base
MCRD Marine Corps Recruit Depot
MGD Million Gallons Per Day
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MCWTC Mountain Warfare Training Center
MWD Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
NAVFAC Naval Facilities
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
O&M Operations and Maintenance
OCONUS Outside the Continental United States
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
RCWD Rancho California Water District
REC Regional Environmental Coordinator
SDCWA San Diego County Water Authority
SME Subject-Matter Expert
SRM Sustainment Restoration and Modernization
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAEC U.S. Army Environmental Command
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
USGS U.S. Geological Survey

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ABSTRACT

The operational forces of Marine Corps Installations West (MCIWest) are vital
components of U.S. national security. A March 2014 Office of the Secretary of
Defense memorandum directs that DoD must “plan and manage its water resources
to ensure the sustainment of our mission and enhance our water security” (OSD,
2014). Thus, within the DoD, water security ensures mission security, which
ensures national security. The installations of MCIWest compose 40% of the combat
power of the Marine Corps, and account for 85% of the force’s land. Thus, the fact
that all eight installations are located in Southern California and Southern Arizona,
an area that a National Intelligence Agency study classified as “extremely high water
stress”, is of great concern (DNI, 2012). While the major systemic problems of
climate change, overpopulation, and the natural aridity of the region, are the biggest
risks to MCIWest’s water security, the concept goes beyond drought. Societal threats
like the undervaluation of water and decisions (i.e. not funding planning, projects or
maintenance of infrastructure) made based on tribalism and ideology compound
physical threats from flooding, contamination and acts of terrorism. These societal
threats must be operationalized along with the meteorological, geological,
institutional and physical threats. This dissertation utilizes a grounded theory
methodology to develop a process for accomplishing this task. Following a
comprehensive literature review to develop a “body of knowledge” on all of the
aspects and complexities of water security, the concept of risk was chosen as the
best method for pursuing water security for the installations of MCIWest. The

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decision-makers within the military chain-of-command are very familiar and
comfortable with using risk to evaluate various courses of action. Thus, a process for
quantifying qualitative data and concepts was developed and framed in terms of
risk. This process is based on industry best practices (Curtis & Cary, 2012) and
tailored to the requirements and constraints of MCIWest. This dissertation tests the
process by using it to conduct a full risk assessment for each installation and to
develop risk response strategies based on those assessments. Several conclusions
were drawn from this research and validated by a survey of MCIWest water security
stakeholders within the military chain-of-command and from the water industry.
This study illustrates that the funding processes of the federal government have the
most significant impact on MCIWest’s adaptive capacity. Thus, the final MCIWest
Water Security Strategy is to engage local, state and federal stakeholders in any
opportunities for public-public partnerships, or with private entities in public-
private partnerships that circumvent the constraints inherent to the federal
government.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the concept of “water security”
and explain why it is a vital element of the mission security of Marine Corps
Installations West (MCIWest). An understanding of why water security is so vital to
MCIWest begins with the elucidation of the current state of global water resources.
This is followed by an explanation of the most significant factors affecting water
security and of the concepts associated with the term water security.
The next section of this chapter establishes the context of this research
project beginning with the important differences between an “academic” and an
“academic practitioner”. Following that explanation, an overview of MCIWest and its
installations establishes the study’s settings and boundaries. The overview also
elucidates the system of directives that led to the establishment of MCIWest’s water
resources program, the tasks that it must accomplish and the reasoning behind
these tasks.
The final section of this chapter establishes the focus areas of this research
study beginning with the concept that there is an intersection between the pursuit
of water security and the “worldviews” of those pursuing it. This is followed by a
discussion of “why” assessing risks to MCIWest’s water security is important and
“how” to operationalize the results of that risk assessment.

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B. Current State of Global Water Resources

1) Global Water Crisis

Figure 1: Global Water Stress (Source: DNI, 2012)

Figure 1 illustrates the current global conditions with regards to water
stress. The term water stress is defined as “the ratio of total freshwater withdrawals
to annual renewable freshwater supply” (DNI, 2012, p. ix). The emphasis is on
“freshwater” because, while billions of people lack access to adequate quantities of
“any” water, it is the looming crisis in access to “affordable” freshwater that should
concern us all. As seen in Figure 1, many locations, including the locations of all

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eight Marine Corps Installations West (MCIWest) bases, stations, and centers are
experiencing “extremely high water stress”.
The Global Risks Report 2016, 11th Edition from the World Economic
Forum (WEF) goes beyond the DNI report to elucidate the risk of our current global
water resources conditions becoming a global water crisis. They rank water crisis
number nine in their list of top ten most likely risks and number three in terms of
risks with the most impact (WEF, 2016).
Figure 2: Top 10 Global Risks 2016 (Source: WEF, 2016)

Further, the WEF report categorizes water crisis as a profound “Societal”
risk along with rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases; profound social
instability; large-scale involuntary migration; food crisis; and failure of urban
planning. In their map (Figure 3) of the interconnections between the global risks,
they place water crisis at the center of the societal risk section representing it as
the main driver for food crisis (lack of irrigation water), large-scale involuntary

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migration (water availability can no longer support the current population),
spread of infectious diseases (waterborne viruses and bacteria), all resulting in
profound social instability.
Figure 3: Global Risks Interconnections Map 2016 (Source: WEF, 2016)

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2) Key Factors Contributing to Water Issues

The most prevalent factors contributing to today’s global water issues are the
effects of climate change and overpopulation (IPCC, 2008; CNA, 2014; Zastrow,
2015; WWAP, 2012; et al.).
Among its extreme weather impacts, climate change is increasing the
frequency, duration and severity of drought – especially in semi-arid locations like
the American southwest (Cayan et al., 2010). Its impacts on the Sierra snowpack
also illustrate the other extreme – more frequent and severe flooding (DWR, 2013).
This cycle of more severe drought and flooding is overwhelming global water
resource management systems that were designed and built to deal with a much
less extreme hydrologic cycle (Kallis & Zografos, 2013). Thus, the impacts of climate
change on the variability of precipitation (supply and flooding) and the vulnerability
of infrastructure systems (delivery and protection) is a key factor contributing to
the current water crisis (WEF, 2016).
The impacts of climate change are significantly compounded by population
growth (WWAP, 2012). The growth of population in arid areas around the world, is
far beyond the natural hydrologic carrying capacity of the region, is coupled with
the rapid growth in the consumption of all manner of products – the vast majority of
which require some form and amount of water to produce them (Arrow et al.,
2004).

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The course of human development has not necessarily followed natural
patterns of sustainability; rather, the sustainability of water resources has in
many locations been overwhelmed by the continually expanding human
activities associated with socio-economic development, including
agricultural production, urbanization and industrialization (WWAP, 2012, p.
135).

For example, the most populous state in the U.S. is California, and the most
populous area of the state is southern California. The greater Los Angeles area, with
its 17.8 million people (2010 U.S. Census, 2012) and its 18.67 inches of annual
precipitation (U.S. Climate Data, LA, 2016) is at significant risk from the
compounding impacts of climate change and overpopulation. The Imperial Valley,
just 250 miles inland in the Colorado Desert is also at significant risk. In the Imperial
Valley, farmers seek to meet the demands of our ever growing population by
siphoning the Colorado River to grow alfalfa, lettuce, sugar beets and carrots,
alongside large dairies and “feed lots” for beef production – even though its average
annual rainfall is just 2.96 inches (U.S. Climate Data, Imperial, 2016). Both locations
directly depend on California’s massive and complex water infrastructure systems
to bring the water that they require to function. These systems require very
significant expenditures to operate and maintain and are significantly impacted by
the extreme variability in precipitation resulting from climate change.

C. Conceptualizing “Water Security”

The concept of “water security” began as a political concept in the 1940s
used by governments seeking to connect access to adequate quantities of water with

7
economic growth and societal stability (Garrick & Hall, 2014). While those
connections are accurate and vital, the concept of water security has continued to
grow in complexity, comprehensiveness and popularity (Cook & Baker, 2012).
Whether the term is being used by the Global Water Partnership, the World
Economic Forum or the Department of Defense, the concepts now encompassed by
“water security” include: political, economic, social, technological, legal and
environmental systems. Thus, definitions for the term have evolved and will
continue to evolve.

1) Water Security Definitions are “Worldview-Dependent”

As illustrated by the authors in Water security: Debating an emerging
paradigm (Cook & Baker, 2012), the way “water security” is defined and what
concepts are included in that definition depends on the “professional discipline” of
those defining the term. The authors elucidate clear differences between the water
security focuses of engineers versus farmers versus fisherman versus public health
personnel. The terminology and concept that I use to understand these distinct
differences is “worldview”.
In their publication Envisioning the Agenda for Water Resources Research
in the Twenty-First Century (NRC, 2001), the National Academy of Sciences’ Water
Science and Technology Board (WSTB) states, “that individual perceptions and
social values greatly influence public decisions” (NRC, 2001, p 38). And the authors
of Managing and Organizations: An introduction to theory and practice (Clegg et

8
al., 2012) describe the foundation of those individual perceptions and social values
as the processes that individuals and organizations go through as they “make sense”
of the world.
Thus, the water security definition resulting from an engineer’s worldview, is
understandably different from the water security definition resulting from a wildlife
biologist’s worldview. Anyone seeking to assess and manage water security across
political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental systems, must
develop a thorough understanding of how these differences impact the goals and
objectives they seek to achieve.

2) Global, National, and Local Perspectives

The concepts of water security are also “scalar” in nature (Zeitoun, 2011). An
individual’s water security worldview will be different (e.g. focused on the quantity
required to support individual health) from that of a country (e.g. focused on the
quantity required to support economic growth and societal stability). Thus, anyone
seeking to assess and manage water security must develop an understanding for
how many “scales” their goals and objects need to consider to ensure success. For
example, the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) operates statewide
water infrastructure that moves water from Northern California via the State Water
Project (SWP) to regional wholesalers like the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California (MWD). MWD blends that water with water from the Colorado
River delivered by the Bureau of Reclamation (federal government) via the Colorado

9
River Aqueduct and sells the blend to cities and local special districts for delivery to
their residential customers. Thus, a drop of water that fell in the Rocky Mountains of
Colorado is consumed in the home of a Los Angeles school teacher after passing
through many “scales” of water security management.

3) Complexity and Governance

Contemporary water managers have to deal with an increasingly complex
picture. Their responsibilities entail managing variable and uncertain
supplies to meet rapidly changing and uncertain demands; balancing ever-
changing ecological, economic and social values; facing high risks and
increasing unknowns; and sometimes needing to adapt to events and trends
as they unfold. In short, the management of water increasingly focuses on
risk and uncertainty, and the emerging range of drivers and impacts often lie
outside the traditional water arena (WWAP, 2012, p. 136).

As a water manager at both the regional and installation level, the above
passage encapsulates what I deal with on a daily basis. As one of the 24 agencies
that make up the San Diego County Water Authority, and as one of the 1,286 water
purveyors with statutory authority in the state of California, the Camp Pendleton
Water Resources Division is intimately familiar with complexity. Like all water
purveyors in the state, we must manage one of the most variable water supplies in
the world while complying with a complex system of federal, state and local laws,
regulations, policies and mandates.
The authors of Water Security and Adaptive Management in the Arid
Americas (Scott et al., 2012) assert that the complexity and ever changing
requirements of today’s water industry requires institutions capable of adaptively

10
managing water resources. The foundation of their adaptive management
framework is the ability to effectively monitor their water systems from supply
through delivery, and to utilize that data in scenario planning that include real-time
feedback loops that continuously seek to optimize the use of water resources. While
this framework, or similar versions of it, have proven effective in some situations, it
is far from industry standard. In fact, my experience as a water manager supports
the assertion that “global water problems can be traced to a deficit of governance
resulting from a lack of appropriate institutions at all levels, and the chronic
dysfunctionality of existing institutional arrangements” (WWAP, 2012, p. 141).
Thus, at a time when climate change and population growth pose
unprecedented risks to our water security that can only be mitigated by flexible,
adaptive, institutions, this study will describe how the dysfunction of our federal
government and its funding mechanisms exacerbates the risks instead of mitigating
the risks.

D. Research Context

1) Professional Doctorate Versus a PhD

There is a significant difference between the Doctor of Policy, Planning and
Development (DPPD) program and a traditional PhD program. A PhD student
performs a literature review of a topic to refine their understanding of that topic
and to inform themselves of what has already been done in that field in order to

11
identify a “gap” in the existing research that their research can then be designed to
fill (as their contribution to knowledge). A “professional doctorate” student often
utilizes a comprehensive literature review as a “method” for developing their
“innovation to practice.” This illustrates the difference between an “academic” and
an “academic practitioner” and why the requirement to be a proven expert
practitioner in your field exists for the DPPD program. Thus, there will be products
developed during this research project such as: 1) a grounded theory for the
development of a process to assess and manage risks to MCIWest’s water security,
2) a water security risk assessment for MCIWest, 3) a system of proposed risk
response strategies for each installation, and 4) a MCIWest Water Security Strategy
Statement.

2) Study Setting – Overview of MCIWest

This study is bounded by the geography, military hierarchy, and water
security stakeholders associated with MCIWest. MCIWest plays a significant and
vital role in U.S. national security. This regional command consists of five direct
reporting installations and three supported installations (these distinctions will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 10). Together, these installations compose 40% of the
combat power of the Marine Corps, and account for 85% of the land held by the
Marine Corps. The integration of these eight installations forms an interconnected
sea, land and air capability for the Marines to “train as they fight”. The fact that 95%
of deploying Marines utilize the facilities of MCIWest prior to going overseas is a

12
testimony to the value and significance of its installations and ranges. Installation
missions, size and population are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: MCIWest Installations Overview (Source: Simpson (h), 2016)
Installation Mission Facts
Marine Corps Base
(MCB) Camp Pendleton,
CA
Support I Marine Expeditionary
Force (I MEF) through the provision
and maintenance of the capability to
conduct Marine Air Ground Task
Force training exercises and
deployments.
Acreage: 195 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 41,554
Civilian Employees: 2,712
Marine Corps Air Station
(MCAS) Camp
Pendleton, CA
Provide I MEF with naval
expeditionary ship to shore training
operations and the training and
deployment of a significant portion
of its combat helicopter assets.
Acreage: 0.7 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 4,465
Civilian Employees: 52
MCAS Miramar, CA Provide “a central location between
inland air-to-ground ranges and
littoral air-to-air ranges for rotary
and fixed wing aircraft.”
Acreage: 36 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 9,747
Civilian Employees: 1,686
Marine Corps Recruit
Depot (MCRD)
San Diego, CA
Inducts more than 17,000 Marine
recruits per year through a 12-week
course culminating in a 54-hour
“Crucible” team evaluation event.
Acreage: 0.5 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 1,674
Civilian Employees: 846
Mountain Warfare
Training Center
(MWTC) Bridgeport, CA
“Conducts unit and individual
training courses to prepare Marine
Corps, Joint and Allied forces for
operations in mountainous, high
altitude, and cold weather
environments.”
Acreage: 97 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 226
Civilian Employees: 76

Marine Corps Air
Ground Combat Center
(MCAGCC)
Twentynine Palms, CA
“Conduct live-fire combined-arms
training, urban operations, and
Joint/Coalition level integration
training” – including training in a
mock-city the size of downtown San
Diego.
Acreage: 935 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 13,800
Civilian Employees: 3,150

Marine Corps Logistics
Base (MCLB)
Barstow, CA
Provide primary source of repair for
equipment returning from overseas
and 33million square feet of covered
and open storage of equipment with
direct access to rail lines for rapid
deployment to ship and air departure
locations.
Acreage: 8.7 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 160
Civilian Employees: 2,381
MCAS, Yuma, AZ Provide 2.8million acres of bombing
training ranges to support 80% of
the Marine Corps’ air-to-ground
aviation training.
Acreage: 4,382 sq. miles
Number of Active Duty
Military: 4,427
Employees: 2,172

13

a. Water Sources for MCIWest

The installations of MCIWest get their water from the following sources:
surface water, groundwater, desalinated water and reclaimed water. Additionally,
their water is produced under a variety of surface and groundwater rights. The
systems that delivery water from these sources also varies from groundwater water
wells located on the installation, to being drawn directly from the Colorado River
Aqueduct, to being provided by city and special district water infrastructure. Thus,
MCIWest must understand all of the public health regulations, water law
applications, and water resource engineering aspects associated with the various
water sources and the systems to deliver water in both California and Arizona. This
research study has been used to develop a thorough understanding of the water
sources and systems that provide water security for each installation within
MCIWest and informs the installation water security assessments and risk
management strategies.

14
Figure 4: MCIWest Installations Overview (Source: Simpson (i), 2016)

SDCWA – San Diego County Water Authority
IID – Imperial Irrigation District
Desal – Carlsbad Desal Plant
(S) – South; (N) - North
Met – Metropolitan Water District of Southern
SWP – State Water Project
*SMR – Santa Margarita River with artificial
recharge from Colorado River

b. Water Security Directives

The water resource related “directives” that drove the development of a
comprehensive water security strategy for MCIWest come from three main sources:
1) presidential executive orders, 2) office of the secretary of defense memoranda,
and 3) presidential memoranda.
A summary of the pertinent water resource requirements from Presidential
Executive Order 13693, Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade

15
(released 19 March 2015) comes from the MCIWest Commanding General’s Policy
Letter 1-15 (Appendix B).
Figure 5: Summary of Water Elements of EO 13693 (Source: Simpson (j), 2016)
EO 13693 improves agency water use efficiency and management, including storm
water management by:

(1) Reducing agency potable water consumption intensity measured in gallons per
gross square foot by 36 percent by fiscal year 2025 through reductions of 2 percent
annually through fiscal year 2025 relative to a baseline of the agency's
water consumption in fiscal year 2007;

(2) Installing water meter s and collecting and utilizing building and facility water
balance data to improve water conservation and management;

(3) Reducing agency Industrial, Landscaping, and Agricultural (ILA) water
consumption measured in gallons by 2 percent annually through fiscal year 2025
relative to a baseline of the agency 's ILA water consumption in fiscal year 2010; and

(4) Installing appropriate green infrastructure features on federally owned property
to help with storm water and wastewater management.

Thus, while the installations of MCIWest do not fall under the Governor of
California’s recent mandatory water use reductions, this Executive Order (EO)
illustrates the federal government executive branch’s directed mandatory
reductions.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued a Policy Memorandum
Subject: Water Rights and Water Resources management on Department of
Defense Installations and Ranges in the United States and Territories (Appendix
A) on 23 May 2014 “seeking to ensure that the Department of Defense (DoD) has
taken adequate measures to plan, prepare, and provide for an adequate water
supply to meet its mission needs.” The specified tasks within the OSD memo were

16
transmitted to MCIWest via the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN -
EI&E) and the Navy and Marine Corps Installations Commands.
Figure 6: Summary of OSD Water Security Memo Tasks (Source: Simpson (k), 2016)
Each installation and range shall:
1. Locate and retain existing documentation of its water resources and rights;
2. Be prepared to assert and preserve its water rights under Federal and State
law as is necessary to support the mission requirements; and

3. Identify, as needed, additional water quantities required to meet reasonably
foreseeable mission requirements and water resources that may be available to
fulfill the requirements.

To ensure consistent implementation of the above stated policy:

a) Within six months of the issuance of this policy, Military Departments shall
ensure that each installation has compiled a permanent record containing all
existing documentation establishing its water rights.

b) Within six months of the issuance of this policy, in those jurisdictions where
water is officially allocated by a legal authority, Military Departments shall
determine the amount of water used at each installation and range.

c) Within one year of the issuance of this policy, Military Departments shall
require each installation and range to identify its water sources (including both
(1) water produced on-site from surface, ground, or alternative sources; and (2)
water procured from a third party, including the governmental entities and/or
utilities that regulate or manage the water resources for the installation, as well
as how those governmental entities and/or utilities define the water resources
that they regulate or manage).

d) Within two years of the issuance of this policy, Military Departments shall:

(1) identify what processes or procedures are in place to resolve conflicts
between water requirements and availability, and
(2) identify the processes or procedures for prioritizing water usage at each
installation and range during periods of scarcity.

e) Within two years of the issuance of this policy, in those jurisdictions where
water is officially allocated by a legal authority, Military Departments shall
identify how much water is available to support the projected water usage at
each installation and range.

17
Prior to the OSD memorandum and the declaration of the drought emergency
condition by the Governor of California, MCIWest did not have a water resource
management program. This directive, driven by the realization that water security
equates to mission security, was the origin of my research and my position as
Director for the MCIWest Water Resources Program.
The Presidential Memorandum: Building National Capabilities for Long-
Term Drought Resilience (2016) illustrates that drought has sensitized the entire
federal government to the vital, variable and vulnerable nature of water resources.
Water security is a complex issue that is “worldview-dependent” (e.g. a real estate
developer typically “views” water security differently than a director of an
environmental non-profit) and the Executive Branch of the United States Federal
government must strive to have a multi-dimensional, multi-temporal, water security
worldview. This memorandum directs the heads of all executive departments and
agencies to “sustain and expand efforts to reduce the vulnerability of communities
to the impacts of drought.” Further, it establishes that it is the policy of the Federal
Government “to coordinate and use applicable Federal investments, assets, and
expertise to promote drought resilience and complement drought preparedness,
planning, and implementation efforts of State, regional, tribal, and local institutions.”
The memorandum, and the 22 March 2016 White House Water Summit associated
with it, also stressed the need to build strong public-private partnerships while
building drought resilience capacity. As part of its referenced “Federal Action Plan”,
the memorandum establishes goals, actions and partnerships across the federal

18
government. The memorandum established the National Drought Resilience
Partnership with the DoD Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy as the first
member listed.
Thus, it is clear that because of the substantial role that the operational
forces supported by MCIWest play in U.S. national security, and because of the
geographic (natural aridity), and climate change risks that predispose MCIWest’s
installations to frequent, extended, severe drought, there will be significant “high-
level” engagement in the development of a Water Security Strategy for the region.
It is also clear from these directives that the management of water resources,
including water rights, has been recognized as vital to the mission security of DoD
installations. Thus, the translation of this research into practice will have a direct
impact on national security.

E. Research Focus

The focus of this research was the development of a thorough understanding
of the concepts of water security and how those concepts could be used to inform
the goals and objectives of the MCIWest Water Resources Program. By focusing on
water security versus conservation and demand management, the MCIWest Water
Resources Program has developed a more holistic perspective regarding the
potential impacts to the water supply and delivery systems of its installations.

19
1) The Intersection of Water Security and Worldviews

As discussed previously in this chapter, an individual’s and organization’s
approach to managing water security is determined by their worldviews – system of
knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions (NAS, 2001). Thus, this research study
focuses on building a thorough understanding of the intersection of water security
and worldviews through a comprehensive literature review of water security
definitions and frameworks (Chapter 3), and stakeholder water security worldviews
(Chapter 5), and through an MCIWest Water Security Stakeholder Survey (Chapter
9). Understanding this intersection will inform MCIWest’s strategic engagement
strategy with water security stakeholders up and down the MCIWest chain-of-
command, from other federal government agencies, from the state governments of
California and Arizona, from local city governments and water special districts, and
from the various professions across the water industry (i.e. legal, engineering, public
health, environmental non-profit, et al.).

2) Assessing Risks to MCIWest Water Security

Because the assessment and communication of risk is such a familiar and
effective vehicle to inform military leader’s decision processes, a process for
assessing and managing risks to MCIWest’s water security was developed using the
grounded theory methodology. This became the ultimate focus of this research. A
unique aspect of the risk assessment process developed and implemented in

20
Chapter 8, is its ability to integrate risks associated with the concept of “worldview”
into the analysis. As shown, the impacts associated with the societal risks of
tribalism, ideology and ignorance can be qualified and then quantified through the
development of rating scales. This allows for a more holistic assessment of the risks
to MCIWest’s water security than the standard checklist of quantities, qualities and
alternative sources. For example, I have experienced the significant negative
impacts to Camp Pendleton’s water security of decisions made based on interest
group membership and affinity rather than a critical and unbiased examination of
the facts (March & Heath, 1994). The “derogatory” term, tribalism, is used to
capture the “negative” effects on water security that these “very strong feelings of
loyalty to a political or social group, so that you support them whatever they do”
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2016) had on Camp Pendleton’s water systems.
Additionally, the tribalism currently gripping the U.S. Congress continuously
threatens the ability of MCIWest’s installations to fund their pursuit of water
security. Thus, tribalism represents a clear risk to MCIWest’s water security and this
process is designed to assess the severity of this risk to each installation.

3) Operationalizing Risk Management

The final focus area of this study was the operationalization of the risk
assessment and management process. This entailed the actual application of the
complete water security assessment process to the eight installations of MCIWest,
including the development of a risk interactions matrix and a vulnerability analysis.

21
During the conduct of the risk assessment, it became clear that the global list of
water security risks, while extremely informative, would need to be filtered to
include just those that could be operationalized at the installation level. Thus, a
filtering methodology was developed and became part of the process.
The results of the installation water security risk assessment were further
operationalized through the development of risk response strategies for each
installation (Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations). These strategies
inform the overall risk management process that is the foundation of the MCIWest
Water Security Strategy.

22
Chapter 2: METHODOLOGY

A. Introduction

The methodology utilized for this study is “Grounded Theory.” The choice of
this methodology was based on the desire to develop a process for assessing and
managing water security risk across the installations of MCIWest. While grounded
theory is a “qualitative” methodology, its use in this study enabled the
“quantification” of water security risk for the Marine Corps region. The following
paragraphs describe in detail the philosophical orientation that led to the choice of
this methodology and the design of the study itself, including the specific
methodologies used to develop the theory.

B. Philosophical Orientation

My philosophical orientation is based on my philosophical beliefs in
epistemology defined as "what counts as knowledge and how knowledge claims are
justified" (Creswell, 2012). What counts as knowledge for me and how these
knowledge claims are justified for this study will be the professional experiences
that I have had, and/or that other subject matter experts in the field (literature
review) have had, and that have shown to produce repeatable results. These facets
of my philosophical orientation no doubt flow from my life experiences: in the U.S.
Navy, as an engineer, as a consultant, and as a civil servant. Additionally, my
cognitive biases flow from my pragmatic worldview. A worldview that sees "truth

23
as what works at the time," believes that "research always occurs in social,
historical, political, and other contexts" and is not committed to any "one system of
philosophy and reality" (Creswell, 2012). This philosophical orientation and
background is why I have chosen to pursue the development of a grounded theory
for operationalizing a risk assessment and management process for MCIWest’s
water security. Like myself, most military leaders are pragmatic decision-makers,
and the development of this process will enhance their understanding of the risks to
their installation’s mission capability associated with water security, thus enabling
them to more effectively manage the inevitable trade-offs and make fully informed
water security investment decisions in infrastructure, personnel and services.

C. Study Design

The research methodology chosen for this dissertation is Grounded Theory.
The following quotation from Creswell illustrates why this methodology is the
appropriate choice for my research.
“The intent of a grounded theory study is to move beyond description and to
generate or discover a theory…for a process or an action. Participants in the
study would all have experienced the process, and the development of the
theory might help explain practice or provide a framework” (Creswell, 2012).

The intent of my research is to generate a theory for how to ensure water
security for the eight installations of MCIWest. Additionally, because of my
practitioner positions within the water industry, I have experienced the current
processes for ensuring water security across the industry and the theory that I am

24
developing will “help explain practice and provide a framework” for strategically
implementing risk responses.
As a water resources engineer and southern California water industry
executive, I will be engrossed in the study. There is no way to truly separate myself.
Thus, I will embrace the interaction with my colleagues and will present data “partly
based on participant’s perspectives and partly based on my own interpretation,
never clearly escaping a personal stamp on the study” (Creswell, 2012).
In keeping with my pragmatic worldview, I will be utilizing multiple
methods of data collection, interviews, literature reviews, multi-media sources (i.e.
websites) in my pursuit of developing my grounded theory. The questions I pose to
my interviewees will be open ended or semi-open ended, and I will allow them to
change and become more refined during the research process – reflecting my
increasing understanding.
My validation strategy will be confirming the risks faced by each installation
through a formal water security Risk Identification process (literature review), a
formal Risk Assessment process developed from my review of (Curtis & Carey,
2012) conducted for each installation. The risk assessments form the foundations
for developing risk responses, plans and strategies for ensuring water security
across MCIWest and also inform the water security worldview questions posed to
the focus group interviewees whose answers corroborated and validated, the data
gathered during the comprehensive literature review, and my personal and
professional experiences and perceptions.

25
Thus, this research has been designed to produce a grounded theory for a
process to operationalize water security risk assessment and management that
integrates, physical, institutional and societal risks to better inform decision-makers
enabling more effective policy development and investment decisions.

D. Methods of Analysis

1) Literature Review

The comprehensive nature of the literature review for this dissertation
represents a unique aspect of the Doctor of Policy Planning and Development
program at the University of Southern California. Rather than the typical review of
pertinent literature to identify a gap in the existing research on a topic, the
literature review contained in this dissertation represents the process of gathering
and categorizing a "body of knowledge" that informs the development of a grounded
theory for the water security risk assessment and management process that will be
directly translated into practice.
One of the defining features of grounded theory methodology is that “the
researcher focuses on a process or an action that has distinct steps or phases that
occur over time” (Creswell, 2010). My primary task as the Director of MCIWest’s
water resources program is to ensure the water security of its eight installations. In
order to accomplish this task, I must thoroughly understand which are the most
effective processes and actions for doing that.

26
The method for developing this required thorough understanding, began
with an initial literature and data search on the topic of water security. One of the
major characteristics of grounded theory methodology is “memoing” and I used this
technique extensively during my entire research process.
Memoing…part of developing the theory as the researcher writes down ideas
as data are collected and analyzed. In these memos, the ideas attempt to
formulate the process that is being seen by the researcher and to sketch out
the flow of this process. (Creswell, 2012)

The memos I produced during my initial research phase informed the
characteristics of my data analysis. From Creswell’s work on grounded theory, I
learned that:
Data analysis can be structured and follow the pattern of developing open
categories, selecting one category to be the focus of the theory, and then
detailing additional categories (axial coding) to form a theoretical model.
(Creswell, 2012)

My coding began with the selection of water security as my overall
category, with the choice of my additional categories (axial coding) being driven by
the questions: is there a universally accepted definition for the concept of water
security, and if so, what are the accepted best practices for achieving it? Searching
for answers to these question lead to the selection of Water Security Definitions
and Frameworks as my first additional category.
What I learned from this initial comprehensive literature review and from
my own professional practitioner experience lead to the selection of my next
additional category, the Impacts of Climate Change on Water Security. While the
findings of my initial literature review will be discussed in detail, including the

27
development of sub-categories, in chapter 3, it was clear that climate change would
impact every aspect of my pursuit of water security for MCIWest, and therefore, I
needed to build a thorough understanding of the physical, technical, and societal
(worldview) aspects of those impacts in order to incorporate the development of
responses to them into my grounded theory process.
Taking what I had learned from my first two comprehensive literature
reviews (and from one of the most significant aspects of my day-to-day professional
experience) I broadened my focus and applied the concepts of Charmaz’s
constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006).
Charmaz advocates for a social constructivist perspective that includes
emphasizing diverse local worlds, multiple realities, and the complexities of
particular worlds, views, and actions…Charmaz places more emphasis on the
views, values, beliefs, feelings, assumptions, and ideologies of individuals
than on the methods of research (Creswell, 2013).

It is exactly “the complexities of particular worlds” and the “emphasis on the
views, values, beliefs, feelings, assumptions, and ideologies of individual’s” that I
experience every day that makes the management of water resources throughout
the MCIWest region a much more complex and challenging task. Thus, I selected as
my next category for literature review and survey, Understanding Stakeholder
Water Security Worldviews.
Having developed the foundations for the MCIWest definition for water
security, a thorough understanding of the international and domestic impacts of
climate change on water security, and the ability to articulate the worldviews of a
broad spectrum of water industry stakeholders and decision-makers, my task was

28
now to develop a way to operationalize what I had learned. From my literature
review, media studies and professional experience to this point, I determined that
the most effective way to operationalize the impacts of climate change and
stakeholder worldviews on water security would be to incorporate them into the
development of a risk management framework. With this task in-mind, I developed
the Water Security Risk Analysis category for the next phase of my research.
Near the end of my comprehensive literature review of risk and uncertainty,
I developed a survey instrument that was administered to water industry leaders
and decision-makers to gather data on the intersection of their worldviews with
their perceptions of risk (a more detailed description of this survey instrument will
be discussed in the next section of this chapter). Additionally, it became clear that
understanding the complex risk profiles of each installation and developing
responses to those risks would require a vehicle to strategically implement this
knowledge and action. In order to develop this vehicle, I utilized “selective coding” a
process “in which the researcher takes the model and develops propositions (or
hypotheses) that interrelate the categories in the model or assembles a story that
describes the interrelationship of categories in the model” (Creswell, 2012) to
analyze for the intersection of all my previous categories. This intersection became
the full expression of my grounded theory. The category I selected for this final
comprehensive literature review was Management and Governance because
having a thorough understanding of the processes and actions of the world’s water
resources management institutions and systems would enable me to develop the

29
most effective organizational construct for MCIWest and the most effective system
for making policy and investment decisions.
Thus, because my research goal is to develop a contribution and/or
innovation to practice rather than a contribution to knowledge, my extensive
literature review accounts for a significant portion of my methods of analysis. This
literature review will be covered in detail over the next five chapters.
Table 2: Literature Review Chapters (Source: Simpson (d), 2016)
1. Definitions and Frameworks
2. The Impacts of Climate Change
3. Understanding Stakeholder Worldviews
4. Water Security Risk and Uncertainty
5. Management and Governance

To aid in visualizing the extent of this literature review and the processes
used to analyze the intersections between categories, a literature review map has
been developed and is displayed in Figure 7.

30

31
2) MCIWest Water Security Stakeholder Survey

As discussed earlier, from my literature review and my day-to-day
experience as an executive working in the water industry, one of the key factors
influencing the identification of risks to water security and determining the success
or failure of implementing the responses to those risks is stakeholder worldviews.
Thus, the following survey instrument was developed to gather data from water
industry leaders and decision-makers on the intersection of identified water
security risks with their worldviews.
Figure 8: Simpson Dissertation Survey Instrument (Source: Simpson (f), 2016)
WATER SECURITY AND WORLDVIEWS QUESTIONNAIRE

Ralph and Goldy Lewis Hall, Room 111
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
Name: ___________________________________________________

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?

32
5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations
of MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to
evaluate hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards
(i.e. contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack
of investment, changing regulatory requirements, water rights = property rights);
and Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you
expect any of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

Unlikely
Very Likely
Significant Impact
No Impact

33
The survey was administered to stakeholders shown in Table 3. The results,
analysis and how they validate my risk assessment will be elucidated in the final
chapter of this study.
Table 3: Simpson Dissertation Survey Participants (Source: Simpson (g), 2016)
Organization Leader/Stakeholder
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy,
Installations and the Environment
E. Rebecca Patton
Climate Change Adaptation Policy
Program Manager
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations and the Environment
Honorable Dennis V. McGinn,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Marine Corps Installations West/Marine Corps Base Camp
Pendleton
Brigadier General Edward Banta
Commanding General, MCIWest
Bureau of Reclamation, Southern California Area Office Jack Simes
Project Manager
California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) Felicia Marcus
Board Chair
San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) Mark Weston
Board Chair
San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) Maureen Stapleton
General Manger
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) Jeff Kightlinger
General Manager
City of San Diego, Public Utilities Department Halla Razak
Director
Fallbrook Public Utilities District, Fallbrook, CA Jack Bebee, P.E.
Assistant General Manager
Stetson Engineers, Carlsbad, CA Steven Reich, P.E.
Principal
Waterkeepers Mathew O’Malley
Legal & Policy Director

The interviews were conducted via email accept for the interview with ASN
McGinn which was conducted in person. All personnel interviewed filled out the
Informed Consent for Non-Medical Research Form shown in Appendix C.

3) Institutional Review Board (IRB)

Based on the chart shown in Figure: 9 from the Health and Human Services

34
Website, Human Subject Regulations Decision Charts, and per USC’s Office for the
Protection of Research Subjects, Office of the Provost publication, Is Your Project
Human Subjects Research? A Guide for Investigators, my research is not human
subject research and does not require me to submit my survey instrument to the
IRB for review. My notification to my doctoral committee of this fact, including my
full analysis, was submitted in the form of a Memorandum for the Record and is
shown in Appendix D.
Figure 9: Human Subject Regulations Decision Chart (Source: Simpson (rr), 2016

35
CHAPTER 3: DEFINITIONS AND FRAMEWORKS

A. Introduction

Building the foundation for an MCIWest definition of “water security” was
the goal of this chapter. The first step in building this foundation is to develop a
complete understanding of the concepts behind the term water security. Thus, a
comprehensive literature review was conducted to determine, who was using the
terminology; what were the existing definitions and concepts associated with the
terminology; and whether there was agreement and alignment across academia,
industry and government with regards to the existing definitions and concepts.
With these objectives in-mind, my initial literature review search was
conducted. Utilizing the ‘memoing’ process, two subcategories were developed –
Single Issue Frameworks and Integrated Frameworks. The sub-categories were
further broken down by how those definitions and frameworks manifested
themselves across the industry. The subcategory of Single Issue Frameworks
represents those frameworks that defined water security and explained its concepts
by focusing on a single issue (e.g. risk, legal, groundwater). Following logically from
that nomenclature, Integrated Frameworks represents those frameworks that
integrated multiple issues into their definition and conceptualization of water
security (e.g. worldview, social equity, integrated water resource management, food
security, national security, risk, energy nexus, etc.).

36
B. Single Issue Frameworks

1) Risk

In Water Security and Society: Risks, Metrics, and Pathways (Garrick &
Hall, 2014), the authors seek to define water security, and then operationalize the
concept using Risk as both the lens through which to view water security and the
framework through which to manage it. This article is reviewed first because it
informed and altered my concept of water security. While this article does focus on
risk as the “single issue” (risk) used to address water security, its application of the
concepts associated with risk are multi-dimensional. Risk can be used to address
water supply issues from many different angles simultaneously – geographic
insufficiency, water quality, and climate extremes. Additionally, the authors address
what I interpret as the worldview issue in their discussion of how “the social
construction and perceptions of risk affect the tolerability of risks and the
willingness to undertake investments in institutional reform and infrastructure to
reduce vulnerability” (p. 633). How our local, state or national decision-makers
tolerate and respond to risk is a function of their worldview. An illustration of this
fact is the tragedy that occurred in Flint, Michigan in April 2014 when “a series of
public decisions, driven by misguided management practices and ideological
principles that backfired, converged…to poison the city’s drinking water and cause
one of the most severe public health threats in the United States” (Kozacek, 2016,
Jan 11). In this circumstance, the worldview that cost-savings always drives risk

37
tolerance did substantial harm to public health and resulted in the Governor of
Michigan requesting the President to declare this a state of emergency on 16 Jan
2016 so that federal aid could be used to respond to those areas most affected by
the contaminated water. This tragedy may not have occurred if, as the authors argue
that, a thorough evaluation of the “water-related hazards and vulnerability” drove
the decision process. The final way in which this article makes the case for defining
and managing water security using a risk-centric framework is through its
elucidation of metrics for water-related risk analysis. Their proposed metrics are
described in terms of multi-dimensional water security indicators that employ
measurement techniques across the “complex social and natural attributes” of water
resource management to provide decision-makers with a logical, justifiable
framework for their decisions (p. 633). All of the concepts and tenets of this article
are foundational to my development of the grounded theory for a process for water
security risk assessment and management for MCIWest.
In Brief No. 1 - Water Security as a Defining 21st Century Challenge (Grey
& Garrick, 2012), we see one of the authors of the first article reviewed laying the
foundation for his future work. The focus of this article is that water security should
be defined as “a tolerable level of water related risk at any scale and for any actor”
(p. 1). Further, one of the most useful aspects of this article is its consideration of
water security as a three dimensional concept expressed through the “multiple
values of water, scale and actors” (p. 1). The term “values of water” in this context
means that water for drinking has a different value from that used for food

38
production, energy production, etc. The term “scale” in this context means water
security at the local, state, national or international scale. And the term “actors” in
this context means who water security is being evaluated for, an individual, a city, a
corporation, a nation, etc. This framing directly informs my approach to MCIWest’s
water security – it needs to consider the multiple values of water (worldviews),
differing strategies need to be applied at different scales (region vs. installation),
and depth of focus on risk will depend on the actors involved (CG vs. Installation
CO). And finally, in making its Cases for science, government and civil society,
business and global consideration, the article provides a very useful summary for
why water security is the issue with the most comprehensive and potentially
significant impacts on our way of life that we face today.
In Water Security, Risk and Society – Key Issues and Research Priorities
for International Development (Hope et al., 2012), the scope and scale for the
application of risk as a framework for water security is expanded to the
international level. Proposals are made related to metrics, politics, and institutions,
but the boldest proposals center around a case for a “global water security goal” (p.
9). The elevation of water security to a global risk is not new, but the emphasis on it
being more than an equity issue is an interesting twist on the UN’s goals. Indeed, if
there is a way to make the achievement of global water security an affordable,
equitable, for-profit enterprise, this wicked social problem could be eliminated
very quickly.

39
In the World Economic Forum’s, The Global Risks Report 2016 (WEF, 2016),
water security is framed in terms of the already existing water crisis. The impacts
of that crisis are felt throughout the world with specific attention paid to how it
affects the global economy. The report mirrors the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI, 2012) report in many ways by relating global instability to the effects of
climate change and institutional mismanagement on water security which in turn
drives the loss of food security and economic opportunity. The accompanying report
from the World Economic Forum, Resilience Insights (Global Agenda Council of
Risk and Resilience, 2016), focuses first on building resilience to the water crisis in
the face of the failure to address and mitigate the impacts of climate change. As one
would expect, the recommendations for how to build resilience to the water crisis
are economically centric. The first recommended innovation is to make water
resource decisions based on scientific evidence. This is clearly addressing the
impact of the worldview that climate change does not exist – based on ideology. By
couching this recommendation as an “innovation” they are making a significant
statement in a very sophisticated, but completely transparent way. Their second
innovation is to invest in risk understanding, which gets us back to our original
category under single issue frameworks and ties directly into their third innovation
which is creating a new decision-making support system – centered around risk
management. Their final innovation, “identify effective practices and assess
scalability” fully supports the other articles within this theme and enhances the
validity of risk as a way to operationalize water security.

40
2) Legal

In my opinion, Dan Tarlock is the preeminent legal scholar on all water rights
issues and thus his article with Patricia Wouters, Reframing the Water Security
Dialogue (Tarlock & Wouters, 2010), has been used to represent the theme of a
single issue framework from the legal perspective, and as an illustration of how two
renowned lawyers view the concept of water security – their worldviews. In fact, the
authors use the phrasing “through the prism of international law” to signal that they
are communicating their worldviews on water security. They begin by reiterating all
of the items listed in the introduction of this study that have led us to our current
global water crisis – overpopulation, climate change, contaminated water supplies,
competition among powerful interest groups. But then they diverge dramatically.
They express their skepticism about the claim that profound and prolonged water
insecurity will lead to armed conflict and instead suggest a radical reframing of
the dialogue around the concept of water security. In their minds, what is actually
needed is some “innovative thinking” about new legal rules, management regimes
and project funding – all founded on the fundamental premises of the rule of law.
Unfortunately, the authors’ case for a radical reframing based on “security of
entitlement” versus water security begins to breakdown as they drift into a
rambling dialogue about ancient civilizations, complete with quotes from the Bible.
Their next contention is that water stress is actually a management and justice
problem, because we have not seen enough violent conflict result from extreme

41
water stress in the past. On page 57, the crux of their argument comes into focus.
Hidden near the middle of the article is their contention that, “the rule of
international law: freedom from external or internal wars or acts of aggression as
the foundation for addressing water stress” is the key to preventing armed conflict
over water. This contention is predicated on the notion of the United Nations
passing and enforcing global laws. The rest of the article builds on this foundation
and thus offers significantly more realistic insight into a lawyer’s worldviews on
water security than it does on why we should reframe the dialogue about the
concept.
While covering a single article does not qualify as a “literature review” of the
legal perspective on water security, it is offered as example of a truly single issue
framework for the concept. The views of Tarlock and Wouters are indicative of the
other legal-based articles that I reviewed on the topic of water and water security.
Likewise, the next two articles discussed are representative of their single issue
framing of water security and are not meant as a comprehensive literature review of
that single issue. They are indicative of the literature that I found on each topic.

3) Virtual Water

In ‘Virtual Water’ – Real People: Useful Concept or Prescriptive Tool
(Warner, 2007), the author explores the concept of virtual water (the water
embedded in products and services – i.e. food) in a manner that describes how it can
be used to counter “water scarcity equals water wars” dogma. The premise is that

42
locations without access to enough water to supply all of their needs, can rely on
locations with an abundance of water to produce and provide all of the goods and
services that require embedded water beyond their capacity. The author’s
discussion of how this system would work focuses on two interlinking perspectives
– political economy and sustainable livelihoods. The concepts behind political
economy focus on the power relationships within modern society. They discuss the
role of institutions as the entities that establish the rules of the game and base them
on maintaining the system of “entitlements, security, vulnerability and livelihoods”
(p. 64). The concept of sustainable livelihoods enabled by institutions is meant to
complement the concept of the political economy. It does this by acting as a scaling
mechanism that completes the national level continuum of institutions designed to
address household level virtual water needs. The concept of virtual water can be
summed up in the author’s contention that it can be “a self-restoring mechanism in a
world out of equilibrium due to the sharply unequal global water distribution
picture” (p. 74). Thus, while this is a very interesting framing for some of the
concepts of water security, it is not directly applicable at either the regional or
installation level for MCIWest.

4) Ground Water

In The “water security” dialogue: why it needs to be better informed about
groundwater (Foster & MacDonald, 2014), the authors discuss the fact that
typically groundwater is only tangentially part of the water security discussion even

43
though most water security strategies emphasize the need for significant
investment in increased water storage – most in the form of built reservoir capacity.
The authors then make a very strong case for groundwater basin’s superior storage
capacity and their lack of evaporative losses when compared to surface water
storage. The overall objective of the article appears to be arming hydro-geologists
with a compelling argument for convincing their clients to store water underground.
As a worldview, the mindset that we can trap a great deal of water and get it
underground with ease, is a gross oversimplification. If it was that easy, nature
would already be doing it. And diverting water into a surface reservoir will always
be easier and cheaper than injecting it into the ground.

C. Integrated Framework

1) Multi-Dimensional and Multi-Scalar

In Water security: Debating an emerging paradigm (Cook & Bakker,
2012), the authors have created one of the most cited works on the concept of water
security that this literature review found. Perhaps it is the fact that Cook and Bakker
themselves are doing a literature review of how water security is being defined
across academia, non-governmental organizations and industry that is driving this,
but I believe that it is the fact that they use that literature review as the foundation
for their own theories on how water security should be thought of that makes this
article so powerful. The authors compile a database of 95 articles to analyze. They

44
broke the articles down into four Types – Empirical, Modelling, Conceptual and Lab-
based. Their analysis produced the table below showing that how water security
was defined, and what concepts were focused on, was directly related to the
professional discipline of those applying the term – their worldview.
Figure 10: Professional Discipline and Definitions of Water Security (Source: Cook & Baker, 2012)

Additionally, the authors show how those worldviews have changed over time. For
example, water security definitions in the 1990s focused on “specific human
security issues, such as military security, food security and (more rarely)
environmental security” (p. 97). Then in the early 2000s, the influential Global
Water Partnership integrated affordability into their definition and shifted the
collective worldview to a more needs and health based perspective over the
previous security centric perspective. As shown in the authors’ table, the
perspective today has shifted to a more discipline-based definition, however they
also illustrate that there is a new current advancing an “integrative,
interdisciplinary approach” – the position that they are advocating for (p. 97).

45
Overall, their research identifies four interrelated water security themes: “water
availability; human vulnerability to hazards; human needs (development related,
with an emphasis on food security); and sustainability” (p. 97). These themes codify
my personal experience and will have a significant part in the development of a
comprehensive water security strategy for MCIWest.
Perhaps an even more salient feature of this article is the authors’
exploration and critique of existing implementation frameworks for water security.
Their analysis of the dominance of the Integrated Water Resource Management
(IRWM) framework produced a very significant insight. A clear tension exists
between the conceptual and operational framings of water security. Their
observation is that the broad, holistic, integrated (conceptual) framing of water
security, as with the IRWM, is best applied at the paradigmatic level, whereas, the
operationalization of water security occurs at the programmatic level. The authors
cite examples (Zeitoun, 2011) of research seeking to operationalize water security
at the nation-state scale, and while acknowledging the capability of drawing
important and useful conclusions at this scale, they point out that it precludes the
fine-grained analysis required to make decisions and take informed action at the
local level. The authors are careful not to seek to privilege the “local (or indeed any)
scale” nor are they arguing that “all analyses must be multi-scalar” (p. 99).
However, they “simply observe that the choice of analytical scale implies analytical
trade-offs, which is particularly relevant in the integrated study of water, insofar as
different disciplines tend to prefer different scales of analysis” (p. 99). The authors

46
have clearly made the case that the application of water security concepts and
frameworks are worldview dependent. They conclude by recommending that there
is a symbiotic relationship between the broad, integrative framings of water
security that produce good governance and the narrow, discipline-specific framings
that produce implementable actions. Their challenge is finding an organization with
the capability to bridge both of those concepts at both of those scales. MCIWest is
that organization. Because of its scope, scale, roles, responsibilities, levels of
authority and levels of accountability, it is exactly the right place to conduct such an
experiment.
The article The Global Web of National Water Security (Zeitoun, 2011) is a
foundational article for my research and for the development of the MCIWest
Strategy. The reasoning behind this, is that the author articulates the fact that water
resources are most often “treated in isolation” with the only emphasis placed on
“physical scarcity thresholds” instead of being treated as a multi-dimensional
system that involves significant tradeoffs between the “social and biophysical
processes.” The author has developed a conceptualization tool he calls the web of
water security. This tool enables the visualization of water security as a central
concept surrounded by the dynamic forces of the physical and social processes
inherent to water resources. As seen in Figure: 11, the global web of national water
security also addresses the important questions, water security for who and water
security – how.

47
Figure 11: Global Web of National Water Security (Source: Zeitoun, 2011)

These questions are addressed at a national level in the article,
demonstrating the scalar nature of water security. Some aspects of the web transfer
easily up and down the scale (i.e. climate change) but others (i.e. food security)
would require extreme circumstances to affect MCIWest at the single installation
scale. Thus, while there will be different elements making up the web at different
scales across the water resources management spectrum, the concept will continue
to frame water security as an interdependent system of distinct security areas that
seek to balance natural resources (biophysical) with political/economic (social)
opportunities and constraints.
In ‘Ways of knowing’ water: Integrated water resources management
and water security as complementary discourses (Gerlak & Muktarov, 2015), the

48
authors make the case for how the traditional concept of the Integrated water
resources management system (IRWM), which is “narrowly construed as a
prescriptive way of knowing water based largely on technical–scientific knowledge”
(p. 257) is in fact complementary to the concepts of water security which have “a
greater consideration of human values, ethics and power” (p. 257). The strengths of
one system fill in the voids left by the weaknesses of the other system.

2) Multi-Dimensional and Single Scalar

In Water Security: Old concepts, new package, what value? (Lautze &
Manthrithilake, 2012), the authors seek to introduce an index that moves the
conceptualization of water security beyond the completely qualitative to a more
quantitative methodological concept with a specific set of criteria that can be used
to provide a more universal evaluation at the country scale. The five criteria: (i)
basic needs; (ii) agricultural production; (iii) the environment; (iv) risk
management; and (v) independence are shown in Figure 12 along with how they are
used to produce an overall water security score. The authors’ proposed index has
many aspects that inform this research study. The index is multi-dimensional,
scalar, and even contains elements of Risk Management as a component. This
makes the article a very useful tool in the development of the conceptual definition
of water security for MCIWest.

49
Figure 12: Water Security Index (Source: Lautze & Manthrithilake, 2012)

The authors of Sink or Swim? Water security for growth and development
(Grey & Sadoff, 2007) have produced one of the most cited articles on the concepts
of water security in my literature review. One of the main reasons for this is the
opening premise, that our societal imperative has been to at once harness the
productivity of water while limiting its destructive power. This is the essence of
water security. The article focuses on three “typologies” (hydrologic circumstances):
1) countries that have harnessed their hydrology; 2) countries that are hampered
by their hydrology; and 3) countries that are hostage to their hydrology. With this
as their foundation, the authors seek to illustrate the dynamics between the
typologies by creating a hypothetical water and growth S-curve. The curve is used
to show how “a minimum platform of investments in water institutions and

50
infrastructure can produce a tipping point” where water starts to make significant
positive contributions to economic growth and water security. The curve also
demonstrates the authors’ contention that the location of the tipping point is a
matter of which typology the country falls into.
Figure 13: Water and Growth S-curve (Source: Grey & Sadoff, 2007)

The article concludes with a discussion of the significant challenges inherent
to achieving water security at the country scale. The biggest challenges come from
the level of investment in both the institutions that manage water resources and in
the infrastructure they use to manage it. The significant investment requirements
greatly inhibit poor countries’ efforts to pursue water security, while at the same
time, the economic growth necessary to generate the investment to pursue water
security is inhibited by not having water security. Thus, this article demonstrates
that water security at the country scale should be classified as a wicked problem
globally.

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D. Conclusions

This review of salient literature on the topic of water security definitions
and frameworks demonstrated that there are many definitions and frameworks
associated with the term water security. Further, from this literature review, I posit
that the formulation and use of these definitions and frameworks by water industry
stakeholders is determined by their worldviews and the scale of the lens through
which they view water security. This literature review illustrated that definitions of
frameworks developed to address water security at a global or national scale
demonstrated significant differences from the definitions and frameworks
developed to pursue water security at a local scale. Additionally, those with a clear
bias (e.g. farmers for food security; engineers for infrastructure building) tended to
favor single issue definitions and frameworks rather than integrated definitions and
frameworks encompassing the multi-dimensional, spatial and temporal aspects of
water security.
This initial work has greatly informed the development of a definition of
water security for MCIWest that will be produced for the Chapter 9: Translating
Theory into Practice. Given the fact that MCIWest’s roles, responsibilities, levels of
authority and levels of accountability are driven by both the international and
domestic aspects of water security, its definition needs to be multi-dimensional,
multi-scalar, risk-based, and wide-lens worldview dependent. Additionally, this first
literature review has instigated a deeper more concentrated review of the literature

52
pertaining to the worldviews of key stakeholder interest groups across the water
industry.

53
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON WATER
SECURITY

A. Introduction

There are no doubt natural aspects to our current experience with climate
change, however, there is also no doubt that the anthropogenic acceleration of
climate change is having impacts that pose exceptional risks to water security. Thus,
this chapter will review the impacts of climate change through the specific lens of
water security so that the thorough understanding of these impacts can be used in
the development of both a MCIWest Climate Action Plan and the comprehensive risk
profile of each installation.
During the initial literature review and ‘memoing’ process, the category of
Climate Change Impacts on Water Security was further divided into
subcategories according to whether their impacts should be seen through a Global
or Local lens. These sub-categories were further sub-divided according to what
sectors and regions of the water industry they impacted.

B. Global Impacts

1) Food Security

In, Climate change, water and food security (Turral et al., 2011), the
authors discuss the complexity of modern agricultural production, making it clear
that “water availability (from rainfall, watercourses, and aquifers) will be a critical

54
factor” (p. xv). They then utilize work from the International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) and others to discuss the predicted impacts that climate change will
have on water availability. Further, they discuss their conclusions that water
management beyond the concept of availability will also be critical. Optimal food
production requires optimal soil moisture conditions and the predicted more
frequent and longer duration droughts will have significant impacts on soil. As
droughts persist, the depth of soil that completely dries out grows deeper and dry
soil is extremely susceptible to wind erosion. Also, the extreme weather patterns
associated with climate change have caused, and are predicted to continue causing,
cycles of increased flooding. This flooding also washes away large amounts of soil.
Finally, the authors discuss perhaps the most significant impact associated with
climate change that poses a significant risk to food security – temperature rise. The
impacts of the increase in average global temperature will significantly impact both
water availability and soil moisture conditions – simultaneously reducing both.
Thus, even though they discuss some potential adaptation mechanisms, the authors
elucidate a clear system of significant impacts that will have a very negative chain of
impacts flowing from climate change through water management to lower food
production and a less food secure world.

2) Instability and Conflict

Climate change and conflict (Nordas & Gleditsch, 2007) is one of the early
works on the topic of mapping climate change to conflict around the globe. As such,

55
the authors are cautious about drawing direct parallels and instead spend a great
deal of time developing support for the concept of human caused climate change
itself. Their wariness is based on the precision of the climate change prediction
models and the conflict prediction models available at the time. The authors
identify the challenges in being able to analyze whether the conflict being studied is
more climate change based scarcity driven or state driven (government
corruption or incompetence induced scarcity). Additionally, the authors point out
that there will be winners and losers with respect to the impacts of climate change
and they feel that any comprehensive study about whether climate change leads to
conflict needs to include the negative and positive impacts of the phenomenon.
Reviewing this nine-year-old article was very enlightening in regards to how
cautiously most academics approached the issue of climate change – especially as it
related to conflict and causation.
Hydro-climatic change, conflict and security (Kallis & Zografos, 2014)
serves as a significant update of the previous article’s point of view. In this article
the authors discuss the vast improvements to the modeling tools and the near
universal acceptance of human caused climate change. However, they also stop far
short of directly connecting the impacts of climate change on water with societal
conflict and security. Their point of view is that any discussion of climate change
and conflict must acknowledge the “multi-faceted nature of conflict” (p. 69), the
adaptive actions taken and not taken, and the “crucial intricacies of security” (p. 69)
itself. As proof, the authors offer evidence that “cooperation trumps violent conflict

56
by far” (p. 71) in transboundary basin situations. These circumstances seem the
perfect incubator for water wars, but the authors point out that thus far, the only
evidence they found that a fight over water was the catalyst for war happened in an
“event 4,500 years ago” (p. 71). The authors utilize a number of different
illustrations to make their case about the complexity of the “climate-water-security
nexus” and finally summarize them with a proposed model of their own shown in
Figure 14.
Figure 14: Understanding the Climate-Water-Security Nexus (Source: Kallis & Zografos, 2014)

This model is used to illustrate how conflict can be caused by many combinations of
factors including Hydro-Climatic Change and Hazards. But, there are also many
ways that Hydro-Climatic Change and Hazards can be mitigated by good governance
and adaptation. Thus, this far more up-to-date article maintains the conclusions of
the (Nordas & Gleditsch, 2007) article while adding some sophisticated supporting
evidence that the impacts of climate change on water do not guarantee increased
conflict.

57
The previous article is followed by an even more current article which does
seek to link the impacts of climate change on water directly with a regional conflict.
In Climate change implicated in current Syrian conflict (Zastro, 2015), the
author discusses how the drought in Syria from 2007 to 2010 set the stage for the
social unrest that lead to the civil uprising that has now become a “full-blown civil
war.” For evidence, the author cites a study by Kelley et al. (2015) that details how
climate change has impacted the “Fertile Crescent” to the point of destroying the
food security and economic opportunity for millions of people living in Syria.
Further, the author uses the Bruke et al. (2009) article that references sixty studies
showing that climate change was a causal factor for “conflict over a broad span of
time periods and geographies” in Africa. This backs up the evidence from the Kelley
et al. (2015) study that showed a distinct, direct, linkage between the impacts of
climate change on water resources and conflict. Thus, the author, with
corroborating evidence from Burke et al. (2009) and Kelley et al. (2015), has made
the case for how the devastation of Syria’s “breadbasket” region that displaced 1.5
million people into already stress urban areas spawning discontent over the
mismanagement of groundwater and harmful agricultural policies exacerbated the
Syrian crisis we see today.

3) National Security

The subcategory, National Security, is exceptionally pertinent to this study
because of its connections to the military and the concept of worldviews. In its

58
original report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (CNA, 2007),
the Military Advisory Board (MAB), made up of very accomplished, former high
ranking military officers and DoD civilian personnel, make the case that the
ramifications of climate change pose a threat to U.S. national security. This report
stands in stark contrast to the cautious nature through which academics (Nordas &
Gleditsch, 2007) view that world and the potential impacts of climate change. The
main threat to national security elucidated in the report comes from the climate
refugees created by the erosion of the economic and environmental conditions
necessary for adequate food production and disease prevention. The main driver
behind this erosion will be the increasing scarcity of water for food production,
economic activity and sanitation. As conditions deteriorate, weakening
governments, the circumstances that foster “internal conflicts, extremism, and
movement toward increased authoritarianism and radical ideologies” will evolve.
According to the MAB, this will result in the U.S. being drawn into situations to help
provide stability where our interests or those of our allies are threatened. The main
question they do not answer in their findings and recommendations is, if climate
change driven water insecurity was the original causal factor that started a
governmental decline, what can the U.S., after moving in to stabilize the situation, do
to reverse this situation? Or do the U.S. and its allies become the world’s
authoritarian ruler, deciding who wins and who loses to climate change?
Interestingly, the MAB also addresses the climate change risks to water in the
United States. They discuss the potential impacts of our continued overdraft of the

59
Ogallala aquifer which underlies much of the central southern U.S. and conclude that
our own food security is at risk from this practice. Thus, will the pending impacts on
food production, economic activity and sanitation lead to extremism and a move to
increased authoritarian rule in the U.S.? Only time will tell.
In 2014, CNA updated their vaunted study on the threats to national security
of climate change. In National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate
Change (CNA, 2014), a MAB was once again convened to look at the most significant
issues associated with climate change and analyzed what had changed since the
2007 study. One of the most interesting aspects of the new study was that it actually
regressed in its views on anthropogenic climate change compared to the 2007 study
– even though many of the MAB members were the same people. As the title
illustrates, the word Threat was downgraded (in military terms, a threat is more
dangerous than a risk) to Risk. And within the study’s foreword, the following
statement is made:
Even though we may not have 100 percent certainty as to the cause or even
the exact magnitude of the impacts, the risks associated with projected
climate change warrant taking action today to plan and prepare for changes
in our communities, at home and abroad. (p. i)

This statement, from the 2014 study, is careful to point out a lack of
“certainty” about the “cause” of climate change that was absent from the 2007 study.
The reason for the MAB’s 2014 uncertainty appears politically motivated as seen in
its “bipartisan call to action” to combat the projected impacts from climate change.
Pursuing bipartisan action would require the support of a republican lead Congress,

60
the majority of whom deny the existence of climate change (Anderson, 2015).
Further, the foreword mentions the “analytical prism” (worldview) through which
the senior military personnel came together in 2007 to address the impacts of
climate change. Sadly, they admit in their 2014 report to being “dismayed that
discussions of climate change have become so polarizing and have receded from the
arena of informed public discourse and debate” (p. iii). They further plead that
“political posturing” and budgetary austerity should not be allowed to derail action
against the ever increasing threat that climate change poses to our national security.
The following graphic from the study illustrates the water-food-energy nexus while
painting a bleak picture of our future.
Figure 15: Water-Food-Energy Nexus (Source: CNA, 2014)

61
However, the saddest statement within this study comes at the end in the summary
section.
We who have served on the MAB are concerned that while the causes of
climate change and its impacts continue to be argued or ignored in our
nation, the linkage between changes in our climate and national security has
been obscured.

This is the most important conclusion to take from the update of the CNA 2007
study. In the seven years following the original study’s call to action, we have
actually lost ground in our efforts to preempt, mitigate or adapt to the impact of
climate change on U.S. national security.

4) Equity

The article Risk analysis and climate change (Pidgeon & Butler, 2009) was
reviewed because of its direct connection to the evaluation of risk as a lens through
which to view climate change and water security. The authors illustrate the
limitations of risk-based decision-making in the management and governance of
climate change-related threats. The most significant limitation is that risk-based
approaches only work when you have the capacity (wealth) to characterize risks,
prioritize them and then invest the human and financial capital necessary to
preempt, mitigate or adapt to this risk portfolio. Therefore, the opportunity to use
risk as a tool to assess and implement solutions to the impacts of climate change on
water resources is best suited for affluent Western democracies and lacks the
equitable applicability across the majority of countries.

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In the World Bank report, Social Dimensions of Climate Change – Equity
and Vulnerability in a Warming World (Mearns & Norton, 2010), the authors
propose that climate change policy and action does not need to lack global equity.
They outline a “dual-track approach, giving equal emphasis to both aggressive
mitigation and pro-poor adaptation” strategies. Focusing on how effective and
equitable climate change responses can be integrated into existing development
strategies, the authors pursue immediately implementable adaptation
methodologies that seek to minimize the “potentially adverse social consequences of
climate policy.” The ties between the most significant impacts of climate change and
water security will be disproportionately experienced in the poorest people living at
the margins across the globe. These people depend on ecosystems such as “tundra,
boreal forests, mangroves and salt marshes, coral reefs and sea ice biomes” – all of
which will be significantly impacted by sea level rise, increased variations in rainfall
and much higher rates of evapotranspiration. Thus, as we’ve seen in previous
articles and reports, achieving water security through adaptation requires
significant resources and a stable system of governance – luxuries that the majority
of people around the world do not have.

5) Environmental

The most appropriate place to begin understanding the environmental
impacts of climate change (specifically on water) is the IPCC Technical Paper VI,
Climate Change and Water (Bates et al., 2008). The paper discusses both the

63
already observed changes to our hydrologic systems resulting from climate change,
and the projected future changes that will occur. Because it is a foundational
document and was cited by most articles in this study, the observed environmental
effects of climate change on water are well known – extreme variations in
precipitation, sea level rise, reductions in soil moisture, etc. Likewise, the projected
environmental impacts of climate change on water are the worsening of the
currently observed conditions as global temperatures rise. While the main purpose
of this paper is to catalog and discuss environmental impacts, its most significant
contributions to my study come through the in-depth coverage of the “impacts of
climate change on costs and other socio-economic aspects of freshwater” and
through the breakdown of the impacts by sector (i.e. ecosystems and biodiversity,
agriculture and food security, human health, water supply and sanitation,
settlements and infrastructure, economy, etc.) and region. This knowledge is
directly applicable to building a MCIWest water security worldview. It develops a
thorough understanding of what the impacts of climate change on our water
resource system are, what future impacts are most probable, and how different
sectors in different regions of the world will feel and view these impacts. Thus, it
will assist in preparing a strategy to pursue domestic water security based on a
thorough knowledge of global water security.

64
C. Local Impacts

1) U.S. Southwestern Region

The best source of current information on the impacts of climate change on
water security in the southwestern United States can be found at Southwest section
of the National Climate Assessment 2014 website
1
. The impacts on the region’s 56
million people will be most severely felt through the stress on its water resources.
The site highlights the ever increasing competition “among farmers, energy
producers, urban dwellers, and plant and animal life for the region’s most precious
resource” – water. The impacts discussed are the same as previously identified in
this study, but the severity of the direct impacts on MCIWest is what makes the
review of this site prescient. Following the IPCC’s format of observed and projected
impacts, the site focuses on the impacts to the mountain snowpack, which
previously acted as the very large (and free) water storage reservoir that enabled
the population explosion across the southwest. The climate assessment states that
the loss of snowpack is projected to continue and even worsen in the coming years.
The site elucidates five key messages along with the associated implications and
impacts. The first key message is a detailed discussion of Reduced Snowpack and
Streamflows, and the ramifications of this reduction on the reliability of the
Southwest’s water supply. The second key message deals with the Threats to

1
Website: http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/southwest

65
Agriculture. The “Southwest produces more than half the nation’s high value
specialty crops,” thus the significant impacts of climate change on the water-food
nexus will fundamentally affect the diets of people across the country while
facilitating major increases in regional unemployment and the displacement of
agriculture workers. Key message number three deals with impacts of Increased
Wildfires. The beneficial aspects of the natural cycle of wildfires, maintaining
healthy tree densities, enabling seeds to germinate and the reduction of pests, are
projected to be drastically overshadowed by the harmful impacts of excessive
wildfires – property loss and damage, and public health hazards from air quality
and water contamination. The fourth key message addresses the impacts of Sea
Level Rise and Coastal Damage. While this is clearly a California-centric issue, the
state’s position as the largest economic driver in the region makes it a significant
concern – the site discusses that the estimated impact to California from this issue
will be $46 billion annually. Finally, key message number five addresses the Heat
Threats to Health that will be experienced across the region. “The Southwest has
the highest percentage of its population living in cities of any U.S. region. Its urban
population rate, 92.7%, is 12% greater than the national average.” This exposes
substantial proportions of the region’s population to the threat of heat stress as
heat waves become longer, more frequent and more intense. Additionally, as
droughts become longer, more frequent and more intense, the trees and other flora
that help reduce the impacts of heat waves die off, thus compounding the impacts of
climate change on the health of people in the Southwest. Thus, the 2014 National

66
Climate Assessment (Southwest), website is the best resource for current, detailed,
information about the impacts of climate change on water resources and the overall
quality of life of the region. This information will inform the development of the
MCIWest water security worldview and strategy.

2) California specific impacts

While California has long been a leader in climate change policies to address
greenhouse gas emissions, “the state is only in the early stages of developing water
policies that help adapt to a changing climate in areas such as supply, flooding, and
ecosystem” (Mount et al., 2015, p.1). However, given the state’s history of leadership
on climate change, there is no doubt that its response to the 2011-2015 historic
drought will lead to the same innovation and commitment to water resources
management that have been so effective on greenhouse gas reduction.
One of the most comprehensive and up-to-date sources of information
related to climate change and water security in California comes from the Public
Policy Institute of California’s (PPIC) series of reports and briefs shown in Table 4
compiled from the Institute’s website.
Table 4: PPIC Reports (Source: Simpson, 2016)
Report Title Date
California’s Future: Water - policy brief outlines water management challenges
for California.
Jan 2016
Allocating California’s Water Nov 2015
California’s Water Quality Challenges - A fact sheet on the state’s diverse
pollution challenges and solutions.
Oct 2015
What if California’s Drought Continues? - study summarizes likely impacts of a
few more years of drought on farms, urban areas, rural communities, and the
environment.
Aug 2015

67
California’s Water - briefing kit outlines nine long-term issues for California
water policy.
April 2015
California’s Water: Climate Change and Water - policy brief outlines climate
change challenges for water management.
April 2015
California’s Water: Managing Drought - policy brief outlines ways to improve
our ability to weather droughts.
April 2015
Policy Priorities for Managing Drought – policy brief pinpoints the four areas
for drought management improvement.
March 2015
California’s Latest Drought – a fact sheet on the current drought’s impacts. Jan 2015
Water Use in California – a fact sheet o water use from 1998-2010 July 2014
Paying for Water in California – study describing water system funding and
solutions to fill critical gaps.
March 2014

The most pertinent brief from the table above is California’s Water: Climate
Change and Water (Mount et al., 2015). In this brief, the authors elucidate the
current and projected impacts of climate change on California’s water security
systems. They discuss how the warming trends will continue and worsen, and how
the impacts to California’s “free reservoir” of mountain snowpack will
fundamentally change how urban, agricultural and ecosystem water demands are
met. Additionally, the authors elucidate how the impacts of sea-level rise and more
frequent severe flooding will interact with population growth along the coast and
across the state to highlight infrastructure vulnerabilities.
As with most PPIC publications, the authors propose potential solutions to
this myriad of challenges and risks. However, these proposed solutions “will require
a concerted public- and private-sector effort that involves all levels of government”
– at a time of historic polarization within our society. Thus, the fact that the
implementation of these proposed solutions from this esteemed policy institute
hinges on a large, diverse, group of stakeholders with divergent worldviews coming
together to agree on a system of significant tradeoffs that will have some level of

68
negative impacts on endangered species, real estate development, tax breaks and
shareholder value, seems extraordinarily optimistic.
In the California Water Plan Update – Investing in Innovation &
Infrastructure (Natural Resources Agency, 2014), the myriad of authors seeks to
chart a path to water security by communicating a sense of urgency across federal,
state and local water governance entities. They discuss their three-themed approach
to pursuing California’s water future. The themes are: 1) Commit to Integrated
Water Management; 2) Strengthen Government Agency Alignment; and 3) Invest in
Innovation and Infrastructure. One of the most pertinent sections within this
comprehensive and voluminous plan is found in volume 1, chapter 3, page 3-24. I
have discussed the following quote with Natural Resources Secretary John Laird,
State Water Resources Control Board Chair Felicia Marcus, and Senior Advisory to
Governor Brown, Wade Crowfoot, and all reiterated its validity and indicated that it
expresses important aspects of their organizations’ worldviews.
Military Activities
Military activity is part of the fabric of California. With 30 major military
installations and numerous other minor installations, Department of Defense
(DOD) activities in California currently employ approximately 236,000
personnel and contribute more than $56.7 billion to the state economy.
Military installations can also assist in the recovery of threatened and
endangered species, improve water quality, and provide buffers against
urban sprawl.
Much of California’s high technology economy and infrastructure is a
consequence of the DOD presence and activities in the Golden State. The
California military installations of yesterday protected the nation during all
of the major conflicts dating back to World War I, and the state continues to
host some of the nation’s most critical military bases and training facilities. It

69
is imperative that State, regional, and local governments specifically consider
the national security mission and economic significance of DOD activities in
California during their natural resource planning efforts. Military training
and the infrastructure that supports it cannot be sustained without access to
sufficient quantities of high-quality water.

As seen in the quotation, these leaders feel it is imperative that military
installations receive appropriate consideration within the water resource planning
efforts of the “State, regional and local governments” because it is a matter of
national security. Thus, leveraging this sentiment through an engagement strategy
makes state and local water governance entities partners in MCIWest’s national
security mission will become my focus as I develop this new organization.

D. Conclusions

From this comprehensive literature review, it is clear that the impacts of
climate change on water security are far reaching and substantial. The most
substantial are the current and projected impacts that have instability, conflict and
national security ramifications. As discussed, MCIWest’s mission is influenced by
both international and domestic water security issues. My review found that many
authors believe that there is a direct connection between water security, food
security, equity and conflict. As an example, if climate change exacerbates the
severity, frequency and duration of drought in a country, that country can be pushed
past its tipping point. Sectors of the population will now be so severely impacted by
their lack of access to sufficient quantities freshwater, that their economic
opportunities will collapse and their physical health will be in danger. This

70
circumstance leads to an extraordinary high probability that their society will
devolve into chaos and conflict.
These points were made succinctly in the initial CNA study, National
Security and the Threat of Climate Change (CNA, 2007), but significantly
downplayed in the subsequent study, National Security and the Accelerating Risks
of Climate Change (CNA, 2014). My discussion of this change illustrates the
dynamic internal political environment in which MCIWest must operate.
The fact that MCIWest is a military organization and is thus susceptible to all
aspects of the current dysfunction within our political system must be factored into
the development of its regional Water Security Strategy. Additionally, the fact that
the installations of MCIWest are all located in California and Arizona dictate that
significant effort should be invested in scenario planning around the impacts of
climate change on the already severely challenged circumstances in this region –
inherent aridity (frequent and severe droughts) and overpopulation.

71
CHAPTER 5: STAKEHOLDER WATER SECURITY WORLDVIEWS

A. Introduction

The NAS report, Envisioning the Agenda for Water Resources Research in
the Twenty-first Century (WSTB, 2001) elucidates the need to understand a
person’s or an organization’s worldview in order to effectively manage water
resources. The first step in this process is seeking to understand their system of
knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions and where these components of their
worldview come from. Based on my research, the components are arranged in order
from left to right as they logically flow from one to the other. A person, or a new
organization, acquires knowledge through experience and from those in a position
to influence them. This knowledge is then tested by individuals and organizations to
evaluate whether it is useful to them (e.g. gains them increased status, provides
them with validation and/or affinity) (March & Heath, 1994). Useful knowledge
evolves into beliefs. Beliefs serve as the foundation for the judgment of their day-to-
day experiences that come together to form an individual’s or organization’s system
of values. Thus, the individual or organizational system of knowledge, beliefs, and
values creates the lens through which the world is perceived – their worldview.
The question becomes, why should the development of a Water Resources
Program for a United States Marine Corps Regional Command consider a concept as
complex and dynamic as stakeholder and interest group worldviews? The answer is,
because the pursuit of water security is much more than the expression of a water-

72
balance equation
2
– especially across eight installations in the extremely water
stressed area of the southwest. MCIWest cannot conserve its way to water security.
It must develop and implement a comprehensive strategy with the goal of achieving
and sustaining perpetual water security for its installations. Doing this will require a
comprehensive understanding of the complexity and dynamism of the physical,
social, environmental, political, economic, technological, and legal systems required
to manage water resources in California and Arizona. Every aspect of these systems
is heavily influenced by the leaders’ and decision-makers’ (stakeholders)
worldviews.
Thus, the task becomes determining how to best pursue the comprehensive
analysis of stakeholder worldviews. MCIWest will not have the staff, the time, nor
the expertise, to implement a program that develops and utilizes an understanding
of stakeholder worldviews on par with true academics, thus a process that
operationalizes stakeholder worldviews must be developed. The process for
operationalizing worldviews will be built on the following foundations.
We begin by recognizing that MCIWest will be focused on stakeholders at the
organization/institution level. However, because “organizations are systematically
arranged frameworks relating people, things, knowledge, and technologies, in a
design intended to achieve specific goals” (Clegg et al., 2011), developing an

2
𝑃+ 𝑄
%&
= 𝐸𝑇+ ∆𝑆+ 𝑄
,-.
: from Healy, R. W. (2007). Water budgets foundations for effective water-
resources and environmental management. Reston, VA: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey.

73
understanding of organizational worldviews begins with understanding the
individual.
The first step in developing a comprehensive understanding of worldviews is
the acknowledgement of the limits to rationality. Theoretically, decisions should be
made based on a logical assessment of alternatives followed by the selection of the
best alternative that rationally maximizes the opportunities facing the individual or
organization. However, “pure rationality strains credulity as a description of how
decisions actually happen” (March & Heath, 1994 p. 5).
Although decision makers try to be rational, they are constrained by limited
cognitive capabilities and incomplete information, and thus their actions may
be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions and efforts
(March & Heath, 1994 p. 9).

According to the authors, this is true at both the individual level and the
organizational level. Thus, decisions that significantly impact the effectiveness of the
management and governance of our incredibly complexity water resources systems
will be made based on incomplete information sets and by individuals with human
limitations to their cognitive capabilities. March and Heath, 1994 explain that the
typical ways that decisions are made by individuals or organizations are through
coping strategies. They describe a typical framework for a coping strategy as
follows:
They abstract “central” parts of a problem and ignore other parts. They adopt
understandings of the world in the form of socially developed theories,
scripts, and schemas that fill in missing information and suppress
discrepancies in their understandings (March & Heath, 1994 p. 11).

74
This passage informs our foundational understanding for what an individual
worldview is, and how it is developed. Our understanding is further informed by the
Clegg et al. 2011, concept of individuals’ inherent requirement to “make sense” of
the world around them. This concept is expanded to the organizational level by
Clegg et al. 2011 in their discussion of how individuals assembled into an
organization then inherently seek to create a “common sense” through which to
interpret the world around them – both internal and external to the organization.
The authors (Clegg et al., 2011) further contribute to our understanding of
the concept of organizational worldview through their explanation for why
organizations often appear to act against their own interests - “at the operational
level what it makes sense to do is what appears to be in a department’s best
interests rather than that of the organization as a whole”.
Thus, MCIWest’s strategic engagement plan will be informed by a
foundational understanding and appreciation of individual and organizational
worldviews. Further, knowledge of these concepts will be “operationalized” through
engagement activities like meeting with the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) to develop an understanding of its worldview regarding a potential
indirect potable-water recharge (IPR) project at MCB Camp Pendleton, followed by a
meeting with the Region 9 Water Quality Control Board (R9WQCB) to determine if
the SWRCB and R9WQCB worldviews regarding IPR are in alignment. Developing
this understanding of the worldviews of the significant stakeholders for major

75
initiatives like IPR through strategic engagement and informed analysis will be
invaluable to the implementation of MCIWest’s regional water resources program.

B. Political

The worldviews of the politicians that lead our governmental water
organizations (federal, state, local) are very important because they are the
stakeholders with the most significant impact on water security. Also, in the U.S., it
is the politicians who are charged with making some of the most significant
investment decisions for our society. Thus, when politicians have the worldview
that the risks associated with climate change are extremely exaggerated (Anderson,
2015) they are very unlikely to make or support any investment decisions aimed at
preemption, mitigation or adaptation based on those risks.
The diverse water security worldviews of the stakeholder interest groups
(i.e. Surfrider Foundation; Chamber of Commerce; etc.) in California mean that
politicians (seeking to retain their elected position) often appear to support
divergent positions on the same issue. Thus, while politicians, because of their roles
as water-security-related investment decision-makers, are amongst the most
important stakeholders, determining their true water security worldview is a
difficult task. And, even if you believe that you have accomplished this task, you
should not believe that a politician’s water security worldview is their permanent
worldview. Because, while some politicians are stringent ideologues, and thus easy
to understand and predict, the nature of the profession requires most politicians to

76
have multiple fluid worldviews.
In The Politics of Water Scarcity in the Western States (Davis, 2001), the
author elucidates the spectrum of often “contradictory” worldviews held within a
single interest group. For example, they discuss how the same citizen group will
have some members who value economic development above all, while other
members will value environmental protection above all. Additionally, conflict within
governing bodies caused by differences in laws at the state and federal level are
common. Unfortunately, our water resource management challenges are
compounded by our decentralized political system which encourages interest
groups who lose their initial policy-shaping battle to continue pursuing their agenda
across a multitude of other venues (e.g. lose a battle in the state legislature, continue
the fight in the courts, or the Congress, or seek to influence the agency with the
responsibility to implement the policy). The following quotation from the article
illustrates how our system of water resource management and governance
inherently creates conflict amongst interest groups and agency worldviews.
Furthermore, there are several types of water policy (distributive, allocative,
redistributive, and cooperative) that vary according to who pays costs and
receives benefits, the level of conflict, the openness of decisionmaking to
interested parties, and the level of government which dominates (Davis,
2001, p. 527).

77
C. Institutional Worldviews

1) Federal Government

i. Department of Defense (DoD)

Because of the pertinence and direct connection to MCIWest, the first federal
government institutional stakeholder interest group worldviews that will be
reviewed are those of the DoD and its subordinate Departments.

In the article, Top Five Threats to National Security in the Coming Decades
(Erwin et al., 2012), the authors outline one prominent DoD worldview regarding
climate change and water security. By ranking climate change alongside biological
weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber-attacks and transnational crime, the authors
elucidate how seriously the impacts of climate change are being taken by the DoD.
“The water-food-energy nexus caused by climate change is going to be a rising
challenge for the military and the national security strategy reflects that” (p.9).
The Army water security worldview is expressed in Environmental Factors
in Forecasting State Fragility (AEPI, 2010) and Army Water Security Strategy
(Kodack et al., 2011). These two documents illustrate the U.S. Army’s worldviews
regarding the dangers that both international and domestic water insecurity pose.
The first report is clearly outward facing, describing the methodology that the Army
uses to categorize foreign countries according to their fragility with respect to the
stresses of climate change and geopolitical forces. The second document is focused

78
both internally and externally; first on the development and implementation of a
strategy to ensure domestic water security, and second on a strategy to ensure
deployed Army units develop and maintain water security. Thus, the second article
elucidates a prominent Army worldview – that water security is key to their
mission security and they must invest significant financial and human capital into
ensuring its achievement both internationally and domestically.
A prominent Navy water security worldview is expressed in the report,
National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces (NRC,
2011). While this report covers a multitude of the impacts of climate change on the
missions of the U.S. Navy, it also clearly expresses the Navy’s views on the role that
water security plays in geopolitical stability, and on how the U.S. should align itself
with other countries and their Navies to combat these impacts. Because of the
nature of its mission, the Navy spends much more time and is much more concerned
with sea-level rise and the melting of the ice sheets than the Army. Additionally,
because of its dependence on water-front infrastructure; and the because of its
ship’s ability to desalinate water, the senior leadership of the Navy sees climate
change as an infrastructure threat rather than a water supply threat. Thus, this
publication interprets the prominent Navy water security worldview as one focused
on international (especially arctic) instability, and domestically on the impacts of
sea-level rise.

79
ii. Other Federal Agencies

The water security worldview of our intelligence agencies is elucidated in
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) study, Global Water Security (DNI,
2012). The study opens with the following assessment:
Figure 16: Global Water Security (Source: DNI, 2012)

As seen in Figure 16 and the study itself, the intelligence community
conducted this assessment because in their worldview, water insecurity poses a
national security threat to the United States. They cite the risks associated with
“shortages, poor water quality, or floods” as destabilizing factors to many countries
across the globe. The study describes the complete loss of economic opportunity,
and the physical health threats to the citizens of countries whose governments are
too corrupt or too weak to deal with the ramifications of more frequent, prolonged,
and severe droughts, as a major factor in this destabilization. The authors provide
details about how a drought can devastate a country’s economy, their ability to

80
produce power, and their food security. This situation greatly increases the
probability of the country devolving into chaos and instability, threatening their
neighboring countries, and presenting a considerable risk to global security. The
global water security risks and ramifications illuminated in this study will drive the
international missions of the operational forces supported by MCIWest.
Prominent U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) water security
worldviews are elucidated through many sources. First, its Water Security website
3

focuses on the physical security aspects of water systems, and second, its Drinking
Water and Wastewater Resilience website
4
focuses on assessing risk to water and
wastewater infrastructure and the development of resiliency plans for minimizing
service interruption following an emergency situation. The next aspect of EPA’s
water security worldview can be seen in their publication Water Security
Initiative: Interim Guidance on Developing Consequence Management Plans for
Drinking Water Utilities (EPA, 2008). While the physical security website
addresses a number of contamination issues, this publication shows just how much
of a focus EPA has on drinking water contamination. This illuminates the fact that
the U.S. EPA views water security through the lens of physical protection of
infrastructure, the contamination of drinking water and how resilient to both these
contingencies a (drinking water/wastewater treatment) provider is.
In 2009, Congress passed the Secure Water Act. This law established the

3
Website: https://owpubauthor.epa.gov/infrastructure/watersecurity/#main
4
Website: http://www.epa.gov/waterresilience

81
authority for a number of federal agencies to “work together with the States and
local water managers to plan for climate changes and the other threats to our water
supplies, and take action to secure our water resources for the communities,
economies, and the ecosystems they support.” The lead federal agencies for the
Secure Water Act are the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) and the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS). From its website
5
numerous documents can be accessed that clearly
illustrate water security worldview of BoR and its leaders. First and foremost, water
security requires a risk assessment. And first among those risks, in BoR’s
worldview, are the risks posed by climate change – especially to the Western
United States. As the entity that plans, builds, operates and maintains the water
supply infrastructure that supplies the majority of the western United States
demands, BoR’s water security worldview is one of supply projection and
protection. Thus, the agency focuses on risk evaluation and mitigation as the key
elements of their water security strategy. Additionally, because of its roles and
responsibilities with regards to national/state scale water projects, BoR’s ability to
effectively pursue and achieve water security is foundational to the country’s water
security.
Prominent Department of Energy (DOE) water security worldviews can be
seen through its Water-Energy Nexus Report (DOE, 2014) and its Water
Management Course and Series (DOE, 2015). These sources information illustrate

5
Website: http://www.usbr.gov/climate/secure/

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that DOE sees water security as an energy security issue and, through its training
arm, as an education issue. One of the roles and responsibilities of the DOE is to
provide training classes to other federal agencies and the public through its Federal
Energy Management Program (FEMP). One of the focus areas for FEMP’s training
program is water resources (e.g. the course Managing Water Assessment in Federal
Facilities - https://www4.eere.energy.gov/femp/training/training/managing-
water-assessment-federal-facilities). Thus, this elucidates why water security is
both an energy and education issue to the DOE.

iii. Executive Branch

The final federal entity to be discussed with respect to their worldview is the
current White House administration. In its Water Resource Challenges and
Opportunities for Water Technology Innovation (The White House, 2015) report,
the administration elucidates its views on water security issues. This document
illustrates that the administration seeks to address the challenges to water security
through public-private ventures and partnerships. The administration seeks to
“engage industry” through a Water Summit at the White House on 22 March 2016
with the goals of gaining commitments from the private sector, and stakeholder
interest groups, around the concepts of innovation and strategic implementation.
This summit will highlight the funding commitments that are being made by the
administration to seek solutions to the water industry’s biggest challenges. Thus, the
current administration’s water security worldview can be seen as one of believing

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that the key to future water security is private-public sector investments and
ventures.

2) California State Government

Figure 17 was developed to illustrate the organizational structure of the
water resources management and governance system in California.

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Figure 17: Water Resources Management in California (Source: Simpson (a), Dec 2015)

Figure 17 illustrates the significant complexity of California’s water
management structure. As shown, there are numerous state agencies with water
related responsibilities, as well as 1,286 local level water purveyors with statutory

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responsibilities. The two most influential agencies with water security
responsibilities at the state level are the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) and the Department of Water Resources (DWR).
The differences between the two organizations with regards to their
worldviews can be seen in the way they draw their regional boundaries. The DWR,
an engineering-centric organization draws its boundaries according to the physical
hydrologic zones (watershed boundaries and flow zones), whereas the SWRCB, a
more lawyer-centric organization, draws its boundaries with more of a political
bent. Thus, there are ten DWR regions and only nine SWRCB regions as shown in
Figure 18.
Figure 18: DWR and SWRCB Regional Boundaries (Source: Freeman, 2008 pp. 8,9)

The worldview of the SWRCB will be analyzed by surveying the Board’s
Chair, Felicia Marcus (Chapter 8), and by reviewing its website (SWRCB, 2016). The

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SWRCB’s mission statement from its website below illustrates the organization’s
worldview.
To preserve, enhance, and restore the quality of California’s water resources
and drinking water for the protection of the environment, public health, and
all beneficial uses, and to ensure proper water resource allocation and
efficient use, for the benefit of present and future generations.

The SWRCB is authorized to implement the federal Clean Water Act and
along with the nine Regional Water Quality Control Boards (RWQCB), it
administers three major programs: 1) Water Quality; 2) Financial Assistance; and 3)
Water Rights. The Water Quality program consists of the major focus areas listed
in Table 5.
Table 5: SWRCB Water Quality Control Board Focus Areas (Simpson (b), Feb 2016)

SWRCB Water Quality Major Focus Areas:
1. Stormwater
2. Wastewater treatment
3. Water quality monitoring
4. Wetlands protection
5. Ocean protection
6. Environmental education
7. Environmental justice
8. Clean up contaminated sites, including brownfields
9. Low-impact development
10. Underground Storage Tank Cleanups
11. Groundwater Protection

The SWRCB Financial Assistance Program provides loans and grants to
help “local agencies and individuals prevent or clean up pollution of the state’s
waters” (SWRCB, 2016). The Water Rights Program is solely administered by the
SWRCB and allocates all surface water rights in the state. The nine RWQCBs
referenced previously are located across the state based on watershed boundaries
as seen in Figure 19.

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Figure 19: RWQCB Locations (Simpson (c), Feb 2016)

The RWQCBs are semi-autonomous entities (their Board members are
“appointed” by the Governor just like the SWRCB) that make and enforce water
quality decisions for their regions (i.e. issue wastewater discharge permits,
determine compliance with those permits and take any required actions associated
with non-compliance). Because of this semi-autonomous relationship, the SWRCB’s

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worldview must be viewed in conjunction with the RWQCBs’. The SWRCB views
water resource issues in California as a whole with responsibilities beyond water
quality to include water rights and financial assistance, whereas the RWQCBs focus
solely on water quality within their boundaries. Additionally, the SWRCB consists of
full-time personnel who are charged with reviewing petitions contesting the actions
of the part-time RWQCBs. Thus, the dynamics of the state and regional Boards’
worldviews are substantially different and sometimes conflicting. Overall, the
SWRCB’s worldview is one of education, assistance and advocacy, whereas the
RWQCBs’ worldviews are ones of compliance and enforcement.
California’s Department of Water Resources (DWR) is “charged with
managing and protecting California’s water” by working “with other agencies to
benefit the state’s people, and protect, restore, and enhance natural and human
environments” (Torgersen, 2015). DWR’s Deputy Director, Carl Torgersen, sums up
the organization’s worldview in his opening of DWR’s Fall 2015 Magazine. He states,
“our common goal is to make our state a better place, where all species, human,
aquatic, terrestrial, and avian can thrive” (Torgersen, 2015).
As shown in Figure 17, there are 1,286 Special Districts (i.e. County Water
Agencies, Irrigation Districts, Public Utilities, Cities, Municipalities, Joint Power
Authorities, Sanitation Districts, etc.) in the state of California focused on managing
water resources. As these special districts are the final purveyors of water to the
MCIWest installations that do not have their own groundwater supply, their
worldviews will have significant and direct impacts on the Marine Corps. Therefore,

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a thorough understanding of their structure and governance must be developed and
used to inform the water strategy of MCIWest. Developing this thorough
understanding begins with an explanation of how special districts are formed. There
are two mechanisms under which a water special district is formed: 1) under a
general water district act; and 2) by a special act of the California legislature. This
means that some districts were formed under a set of general terms and conditions
that apply to many districts, and some districts were formed by an act specifically
passed for them with special terms and conditions, that specifically apply to their
organization. In California, the vast majority of water special districts have been
formed under a general act and thus have very similar terms and conditions (LAO,
2002).
As with any institution or organization, the worldviews of its leaders are the
foundation of the worldview of the organization. There are two ways in which the
leadership of a special district is established: : 1) as a dependent governing body –
with the local city council or county board of supervisors acting as the governing
board; or 2) as an independent governing body – representatives directly elected by
the voters or directly appointed for a fixed term. Whereas a city council or county
board of supervisors (dependent body) has the governing of water resources as
“one” of the many duties they were elected to perform, the directors of independent
governing bodies were solely elected to govern water resources. Thus, the
worldviews of independent special districts are more focused on water resources
and more sensitive to the direct connection between water rates and their position

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on the board. The majority of water special districts in California are independent
governing bodies (75%) and they account for (90%) of the total water activity
revenues (LAO, 2002). This circumstance and the fact that water sales equal
revenue for local water districts are the major factors shaping the worldviews of
these organizations. A person elected to be a decision-maker on a water district
board of directors may or may not have any experience in water resource
management. Often, water rates are the genius of an individual’s decision to pursue
a position on a water district board. For example, Rancho California Water District
in Temecula, California has seven board members. The board has historically been
split between members from the agriculture business and the real estate
development business. Water rates are the focus of the agriculture business board
members and water quantity (and permitting) is the focus for the real estate
development business board members. In drought prone California, this creates a
tension between the two worldviews and often leads to individuals from the
worldview in the minority pursuing election to the board with the goal of shifting
the balance in their favor. And because local water districts use multiple sources of
funding for their required capital improvement and and operations and
maintenance projects (i.e. revenue bonds, cash on Hand, state grants and loan
funding, etc.), individuals do not always have a thorough understanding of what
costs the local water rates cover and why. Figure 20 illustrates the factors that drive
the cost of water at the local level.

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Figure 20: Water Rate Determining Factors (Source: Freeman, 2008)

Because local water districts seem to favor revenue bonds supported by local
user fees (Freeman, 2008), the typical nonagricultural water bill consists of three
categories: 1) capital projects (user fees to pay for the projects); 2) debt service (the
finance charges incurred from the Bond issuance); and 3) operating expenses
(which can be further broken down into water distribution and system
maintenance, source of supply costs, and water treatment). Thus, a new water

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district board member whose pursuit of their position was based on reducing water
rates finds out very quickly that special districts are governing entities that have
very limited control over the rates that must be charged to meet their obligations.
With this in mind, local installation Commanders and MCIWest water resources
program staff must actively engage and stay engaged with their local water
providers to develop a sense of their worldview and how that worldview will affect
the Marine Corps.

D. Business

1) Commercial and Industrial

In Corporate Water Stewardship (Jones et al., 2015), the authors elucidate
the pursuit of corporate sustainability over water stewardship. For the major
food and beverage companies, reducing water consumption through investment in
water efficiency technologies is a politically agnostic vehicle through which to
propagandize water stewardship while ensuring continued economic growth. Thus,
the authors of this article make it clear that the worldview of these food and
beverage multi-nationals is more about sustaining their corporate profit and sector
dominance than about pursuing social equity and true whole system sustainability.
The authors of Industrialized Watersheds have Elevated Risk and Limited
Opportunities to Mitigate Risk Through Water Trading (Reddy et al., 2015),
illustrate another aspect of the water-business nexus. In this article, the authors use

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the Brazos River Basin in Texas as an example of an industrial and municipal area
for their hydro-economic modeling. Within this area, there is little excess water
supply that can be put on the market through leased storage or by trading with “low
value users (agricultural)” to make up for shortages in overall supply. Thus, the
worldview of business in the Brazos basin of Texas, like other water insecure parts
of the U.S., is one of risk analysis and risk mitigation.
The next commercial/industrial perspective to review is water privatization.
In Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Facts on Water Sector Privatization:
The Greek Case Against European and Global Trends (Gialis et al., 2011), the
authors elucidate the significant social problems with declaring water a market
commodity. Business entities within the market economy must seek an “integrated
productivity-enhancing strategy, based on inter alia, increasing customers and
expanding networks, rising water, sanitation and wastewater tariffs and finally,
decreasing number of employees” (Gialis et al., 2011 p. 1717). However, water
supply by nature, is a natural monopoly – the legal rights to supply, the reception of
the supply, the significant investment in the treatment and distribution of supply
and the public health regulatory requirements all create staggering barriers to entry
that absolutely prevent water supply from functioning according to the tenets of
typical market based competition. Thus, as seen in the Greek case, even if the
worldview of these corporate water supplier begins as a “state-led privatization
seeking high profitability”, the authors conclude that it cannot help but devolve into
a private monopoly water provider structure and worldview.

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2) Agricultural

The next perspective within the business community is that of the
Agriculture business. In Sustainable intensification: overcoming land and water
constraints on food production (Chartres & Noble, 2015), the authors discuss the
projections that, based on population growth and current consumption rates, food
production will have to grow by 60-70% by 2050. An increase of this magnitude will
require agribusinesses to develop a food production system that sustainably
intensifies crop yield. In the past, the worldview of our local and commercial
farming industry has been one of chemistry and consumption. Water has been used
ineffectively and discarded and/or contaminated. Indeed, one the hallmarks of the
green revolution has been its “negative environmental implications” (Chartres &
Noble, 2015 p. 243). Given the history of the green revolution, the authors elucidate
an agribusiness worldview that understands climate change and its imposition of
significant constraints on natural resource systems; the need to change how water is
used from a pure consumption/contamination mode to a maximize “crops per drop”
and capture/treat/reuse mode; and need to support a legislative and governance
system that makes decisions based on equitable distribution, trade and dietary
needs versus wants.

3) Lawyers

The next perspective that will be analyzed is the legal perspective. In Water

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Security: Global, regional and local challenges (Wouters, 2010), as one would
imagine, the author sees water security as a physical problem (resource variability,
vulnerability and ineffective use) that can only be solved by the application of and
adherence to the international rule of law and through enlightened policy and good
governance. While this is a very logical worldview and no doubt the key enabler for
water security, the article itself points out the significant flaw that has prevented the
system of “hydro-solidarity” discussed from coming to fruition.
Implementing such an approach raises many challenges, and as one scholar has
noted, the task facing an (imaginary) ‘water tsar’, even at just the national level,
requires the sage-like ability to, at once, understand fully the big picture and
have information, knowledge and resources to act prudently, taking into account
everyone’s interest (Wouters, 2010 p. 11).

I would add that, in addition to what is clearly stated above, one of the most
significant problems is that any potential water tsar, in attempting to take into
account everyone’s interests, would inevitably find that his own interests become
a central factor in his decision-making process. Thus, while the legal (lawyer)
worldview of an egalitarian system of just policies, laws and enforcement, would
ensure water security at the local, state, national and international levels, it would
require the vast majority of human beings to evolve beyond their overriding loyalty
to their stakeholder interest groups (tribalism) and their own self-interests to make
this a viable global solution.
A discussion of the legal worldview would be incomplete without a
discussion of water rights. In The Property Theory of Federal Reserved Water
Rights (Bockstiegel, 2012), the author elucidates the theory of water as property

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and all of the intricacies and complexities that concept entails. The legal system sees
the difficulties associated with the common property aspects of water rights and
the implications of those aspects to the identified five property rights (typical
forms of property entail nine distinct rights) that constitute traditional ownership –
1. Entry (right to own or ability to purchase permit); 2. Withdrawal (right to take
units of the resource out of the system or permit to extract units); 3. Exclusion
(ability to exclude others from using resource); 4. Management (right to change
physical structures within the system); and 5. Alienation (right to sell your ‘rights’
to another party). Because of the dynamic nature, variability, vulnerability and non-
substitutable nature of water supplies, the application of property rights laws and
typical property management is very difficult. Thus, the legal system has developed
numerous doctrines, theories and enforcement vehicles in its pursuit of water
security for all. The author discusses the Rise of Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) as a
possible solution to addressing all of the conflicting interests within water resources
management.
The public trust doctrine (PTD) gives a state the authority to enforce water
quality standards to protect natural resources that take precedence over vested
water rights. It also imposes a duty on a state or government entity to protect
the heritage of a variety of natural resources for public purposes. Moreover, the
PTD offers a framework for resource management and decision making that
allows resource managers to consider both the short-term and long-term needs
of water users. It also promotes water uses that are ecologically and
economically beneficial (Bockstiegel, 2012 pp. 15-16).

Thus, the legal worldview once again sees a metaphorical Water Tsar,
however, this time in the form of the state, as the answer to enlightened, egalitarian,

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management of water within our society.

4) Engineers

The next worldview to be investigated within the Business sub-category of
stakeholder interest groups, is that of the engineering community. In Bridging the
Water Supply–Demand Gap in Australia: Coupling Water Demand Efficiency
with Rain-Independent Desalination Supply (Sahin et al., 2015), the authors take a
quantitative modeling approach to addressing water security. They use Systems
Dynamic (SD) modeling with three sub-models (Demand, Supply, Desalination)
imbedded within the system. SD’s capability to model complex behaviors allows the
authors to evaluate multiple scenarios of climate change and population growth for
how the use of desalination along with demand management and increased
efficiency compares with other water supply enhancements such as additional dam
construction. In the end, it is the author’s engineering informed worldview that
having desalination as an insurance policy against the significant variability of
precipitation in the face of climate change, and the inevitable intensification of
competition for water resources driven by population growth, is a prudent measure
that should be implemented in Australia and in other wealthy countries looking to
ensure economic growth in an ever more resource constrained future.

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Figure 21: System Dynamic Model of Future Water Supply Scenarios (Source: Sahin et al., 2015)

In Water security and science agenda (Wheater & Gober, 2015), the
authors make a cogent argument that engineering and science are part of the
solution to future water supply issues. The authors’ worldview is that engineers
need to drive a trans-disciplinary approach to water science, one that “engages
and integrates the natural sciences, engineering and the social sciences” (p. 16).
Rather than viewing the challenges to local and regional water security as simple
linear systems of decisions made based on the logic of maximizing utility, the
authors posit that a focus on implementing system dynamics that interrelate
human and environmental system needs while seeking to “manage, not control, the
uncertainties that underlie” (p. 16) both systems will yield the optimal results for

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any water security management system. Thus, the authors display a worldview that
understands that we cannot engineer our way to water security. We must find a way
to harmonize the physical sciences with the social sciences that allows us to manage
a resource as dynamic as water.
The final engineering worldview article reviewed is A Review of Water
Balance Application in Water Supply (Klingel & Knobloch, 2015). The American
Water Works Association is considered by myself and my fellow water resource
engineers to be the preeminent water science organization in the U.S. As such, this
article, published by them, represents both typical and ‘a-typical’ engineering
worldviews of water supply. The water balance has long been the standard
methodology for calculating water loss within a system in order to pursue its
minimization. However, the authors elucidate that the water balance calculation, as
currently applied across the industry, produces rough estimates that are of limited
value to managers. Instead, the application of water balances is much better when
calculated at a zonal scale where available information that is much more accurate
and timely can be gathered. To this end, it is their worldview that industry leaders
should focus on providing engineers in the field with the tools and support systems
that make the calculation and implementation of cost effective (human and
financial) zonal water balances a priority.

E. Non-profit Sector

Dr. Lester Brown and the Worldwatch Institute have a long history of

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working across stakeholder interest groups to address water security issues. The
name of the Institute itself encapsulates the organization’s worldview – they exist to
“inspire action” and “accelerate the transition to a sustainable world that meets
human needs” (Worldwatch Institute, 2013). With this mission in-mind, How water
scarcity will shape the new century (Brown, 2001) elucidates Worldwatch’s view
that current levels and methods of water use are unsustainable. The techniques and
technologies used in irrigation need to be improved, better choices need to be made
about the types of crops grown and we cannot sustain current levels of animal
protein production. Worldwatch, as with many environmental non-profit groups,
sees itself as society’s collective conscience. It sees its mission as exposing the
current, most often profit driven, bad decisions of our global societies along with the
projected consequences of those decisions. And as the title of this article illustrates,
Worldwatch’s worldview about water security is that it will shape the new century.
The next environmental group reviewed is the Council of Canadians –
Canada’s leading social action organization (Council of Canadians, 2016). The
organization advocates for “clean water, fair trade, green energy, public health care
and a vibrant democracy” (Council for Canadians, 2016). The organization’s national
chair person is Maude Barlow, who also has leadership positions in Food and Water
Watch, International Forum on Globalization, and World Future Council. Her
article, Commodification of water – the wrong prescription (Barlow, 2001)
expresses both her long held worldview and the worldviews of the organizations
that she represents. It is her contention, and that of her organizations, that in today’s

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globalized economy “everything is for sale, even those areas of life once considered
sacred, like seeds and genes, culture and heritage, food, air and water” (Barlow,
2001 p. 80). Indeed, the article makes it clear that the “forces of private greed” have
commoditized everything within our global society – even those things that are
clearly public goods. Barlow goes on the state that this should not be allowed to
stand and that access to water should be a basic human right guaranteed across all
levels of government. Further, she does not advocate for business-as-usual water
management with regard to consumption. She makes the point that how water is
used and consumed must dramatically change. But, that change should not be led by
business for profit. Barlow believes, as seen in this and other articles, that water is
too vital, variable, and vulnerable to trust to market forces.

F. General Public

The next sub-category within stakeholder interest groups are the citizens
within our society. One of the most powerful expressions of a general public’s water
security worldview, comes from the citizens of our most populous state. In Section 1
of California Assembly Bill 685 the law states, “it is hereby declared to be the
established policy of the state that every human being has the right to safe, clean,
affordable, and accessible water adequate for human consumption, cooking, and
sanitary purposes” (AB 685, 2012) With the passage of this law, California became
one of the few states to put their worldview that “water is a human right” into law
(Francis, 2012).

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The article, Human-Water Harmony Index: A New Approach to Assess the
Human Water Relationship (Ding et al., 2014) thoroughly examines the tensions
between human beings (citizens), the environment, and the free market. In doing so,
the authors portray the worldviews of typical citizens with respect to water
security as a basis for the development of their Human-Water Harmony Index
(HWHI). While the article explores the historic relationship between humans and
water, the most cogent sense of a typical citizen’s worldview is that water is an
integral part of every aspect of life, and as such, it is a human right.
Additional documents such as the article, Exploring the Textured
Landscape of Water Insecurity and the Human Right to Water (Gerlak & Wilder,
2012) and the book Water and the Future of Humanity – Revisiting Water
Security (Braga et al., 2014) both portray the worldviews of our citizenry as ones
that see water as a common good for all and as a human right for all. The documents
also make it clear that the human beings writing these publications clearly believe
that we as citizens must take an active role in governing and managing this vital,
variable and vulnerable common good.

G. Conclusions

The concept of worldviews and how they guide individual and organizational
water security decisions is central to this research. Depending on an organization’s
(government, industry, academic, non-profit environmental) lens through which it
views its water resource, use, management and governance responsibilities, its

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worldview will represent a risk, a response or some combination of both to the
pursuit of water security. As discussed, the limitations of rationality, and the politics
of power and profit, are driving the commodification of water as they have with so
many natural resources. However, unlike many other natural resources, water is
fundamental to our existence. Thus, the pursuit of monopolizing its production and
distribution as a vehicle to maximize shareholder value will continue to meet with
resounding resistance.
The concept of a ‘human right’ to water is a very powerful one. However, the
most significant risk to the world’s water balance is overpopulation (Ehrlich &
Ehrlich, 2013). This fact will make the concept of a human right to water (sufficient
quantity and quality for optimal health) mathematically impossible within this
century (Weiler, 2012) using current technologies and policies.
For some form of collapse within our very complex, water resource intensive
global society not to be a part of our foreseeable future, the water security
worldviews of our governmental and industrial decision-makers must come into
alignment with our environmental non-profits, academics and individual citizens
(Weiler, 2012; Brown 2001; Hardin, 1993; Meadows et al., 2004). From this
literature review, it appears that the best vehicle through which to align contentious
water security worldviews is through the application of a risk management
framework.
With this in mind, the development of the MCIWest comprehensive water
security strategy will employ a risk management framework informed by a

104
stakeholder value chain analysis to ensure the mission security of its installations
– which, by proxy, equates to national security for the United States.

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CHAPTER 6: WATER SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

The previous chapters have proved that the development of an enlightened,
implementable, MCIWest Water Security Strategy should be founded on a
comprehensive risk assessment for each installation. Correspondingly, during the
initial literature review of the material for this chapter, I identified two sub-
categories designed to inform that development: 1) Risk Identification and 2) Risk
Analysis. The literature I sought out for this chapter was chosen to provide a
thorough understanding of both the mechanics and philosophies of state-of-the-art
risk assessments and risk management frameworks. The knowledge gained from
this chapter will be utilized to develop the table of water related risks that the
installations of MCIWest are exposed to. It will also provide a framework for the
remaining steps in a comprehensive risk assessment. Thus, the information in this
chapter will be central to my overall translation of research into practice.

B. Risk Identification

In, Water Utility Security: Multiple Hazards and Multiple Barriers (Grigg,
2003), the author categorizes the hazards and threats to water utilities providers
and society as natural hazards, human-caused threats and business risks. A
graphical representation of the author’s categorization is shown in Figure 22.

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Figure 22: Water Utility Risk Management (Source: Grigg, 2003)

The author elucidates the nature of the hazards and threats (which he shows
as human caused hazards in Figure 22) in Figures XX .
Figure 23: Hazards, Threats and Consequences to Water Utilities (Source: Grigg, 2003 p. 83)

As seen in Figure 23, natural hazards are those that present a naturally
occurring risk to water security because of extreme weather or geological activity.

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Human caused risks on the other hand are those that only exist as a result of human
activity (i.e. malicious attacks, design flaws, etc.). The levels of risk posed by these
hazards and threats is a function of their probability and their resultant
consequence (severity).
In the Army Water Security Strategy (Kodack et al., 2011), the authors
develop the definition for water security for the U.S. Army as part of crafting a
strategy to pursue that definition. As with Grigg’s, their approach includes a
discussion of the risks to water security and points out the differences between
hazards and risks. The authors discuss all of their water security issues in terms of
hazards, which in turn have defined probabilities and severities, which are
combined to illuminate the risks they pose. Following a detailed discussion of the
hazards to water security facing the U.S. Army, without completing the actual risk
assessment, the authors discuss “several overarching risks that will affect the
Army’s ability to perform its mission.” These risks are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: U.S. Army - Types of Water Security Risks Posed (Source: Kodack et al., 2011, p. 17)
Type of Risks Description of Effect
Costs

Army installation water costs are increasing substantially, especially
with aging water infrastructure. Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
budgets are not keeping pace with these increases. This causes funds
to be diverted from maintenance and repair projects, increasing
deferred maintenance problems.

Mission Performance
Degradation/Continuity

Restricted water availability due to droughts, habitat protection
requirements, and competition from other users can constrain or
prevent future mission growth.

Health

Testing and inspection of ice machines, water storage tanks, and
water buffaloes at less than recommended intervals due to staffing
constraints can increase the risk of transmitting water-borne diseases
to Army troops, employees, and dependents. Lack of timely

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maintenance of water distribution and storage systems also can
increase health risks by allowing contaminants to enter the potable
water supply through cracks and deterioration of system
components.

Public Relations

Army installation water requirements are not systematically shared
with the general public or with state officials. This limits effective
water requirements planning and can contribute to disagreements
over future water use. State officials are unaware of critical Army
water requirements and do not include them in drought contingency
plans.

Inefficient Use of Scarce
Resources

Uniform, Army-wide water reduction requirements can force
installations that have already achieved major reductions to invest
disproportionate amounts of funds to achieve further water savings.
This diverts funds from projects with greater potential water savings
or higher returns on investment at other installations.

The authors discuss “institutional” issues such as the fact that the short
duration leadership assignments, standard across the military, “are not conducive to
the pursuit of long-term water resources solutions” (p 14), and the fact that many
installations focus solely on inside the fence line water security, but they do not
treat either the short duration assignments or the sole focus on inside solutions as a
hazard to be included in their risk assessment. Thus, while the authors provide a
military prospective on water security, the lack of an operationalized risk
assessment does not provide the level of rigor and validity necessary for this study.
In Analysis on Seismic Risk of Urban Water Supply System (Lu et al., 2009),
the authors describe in detail one of the most consequential risks facing southern
California water security – earthquakes. While their focus is on an earthquake that
happened in China, the consequences they describe show that any assessment of
risk for the installations of MCIWest must give significant weight to seismic risk.

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In DHS Domestic Municipal End-to-End Water Security Architecture Study
(Porco et al., 2008), the authors address the human caused threat of terrorist
attacks on our water systems. They illuminate the potential delivery techniques for
chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) attacks on “water distribution systems of
varying sizes” along with the methodology for assessing the risk of these attacks.
Because of the military’s role in combating terrorism, the consequences to a
successful CBR attack in the water supply of a military installation would be
especially severe. Thus, military installations are higher value targets for this type of
attack and have the associated higher levels of probability and risk.
In Hydrocomplexity: Addressing water security and emergent
environmental risks (Kumar, 2015), the author elucidates the risks associated with
“the confluence of unanticipated interactions from evolving interdependencies
between complex systems, such as those embedded in the water cycle.” Along with
the significant natural hazards of flooding and drought, the author illuminates the
concept of “emergent risks.” The term “emergent” refers to the fact that these risks
have significant levels of probability and severity, but little historical precedence.
The author also introduces the concept of cascading impacts as the most significant
threat to water security posed by these emergent environmental risks. He cites the
example of how “subsidies for power use in agriculture in India led to extensive
groundwater pumping to support the cultivation of water intensive paddy (rice)
crops in a region (Punjab) where paddy was not extensively cultivated otherwise.”
As could have been expected in a region not naturally suited for this type of crop,

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this lead to severe groundwater overdraft to the point of near collapse of the
system. Thus, the cascading effect is illustrated by India’s decision to deal with its
rapid population growth issues, by subsidizing power to allow the pumping of
groundwater to grow a cheap serial crop in an unsuitable location, which in turn led
to overdraft of the aquifer. The author summarizes cascading risks to water security
as, the “systemic propagation of undesirable outcomes, which often pose threat to
lives or property, or result in significant short or long term monetary costs are
characterized as emergent risks.”
The authors of Risks to the Shared Water Resources of the Murray-Darling
Basin (Van Dijk, et al., 2006), reiterate the list of risks associated with water
security: drought; flooding; climate change; competition among interest groups;
deforestation; groundwater overdraft; surface and groundwater contamination;
naturally occurring ecological contaminants; bush fires; erosion; policy; etc. The
only major risk not addressed is earthquake. In the author’s analysis, climate
change’s all-encompassing and overwhelming impact on water security represents
the most significant risk faced in the Murray-Darling basin.
In, Flood Trends: Not higher but more often (Hirsch & Archfield, 2015), the
authors address one of the most significant risks to water security – flooding. Their
research shows that the impacts of climate change on one of the most flood prone
areas of the world, the central United States, have been to make flooding more
frequent versus more severe. Indeed, the severity of flooding in this area was
already significant, but concerns that climate change would greatly increase the

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levels of severity seem not to be supported by the last twenty years of data. Thus,
while the future impacts of climate change on flooding have yet to seen, the article
makes the case for a preemption, mitigation and adaptation framework based on
increased frequency versus severity.
The next series of articles addresses the risk factor that is the single biggest
global stressor on water resources and all resources – overpopulation. When a
species’ population grows beyond the carrying capacity of its habitat, the system
will self-correct. Human beings are extraordinarily adept at expanding and
extending the resources they depend on for survival. However, even the sun’s
energy is not infinite, and the resources currently or foreseeably required for
human survival are much less infinite than the sun’s. Indeed, the three biggest issues
for water security, quantity, quality and access, would be far easier to address if
global, regional, national and local population growth were not impacting the
quantity issue as significantly as it is. Thus, human overpopulation across all scales,
locations and circumstances is the single biggest risk to our species’ water security
and to the water security of the other ecosystems with which we share this planet.
However, while acknowledgement of this fact is a must to establish the intellectual
honesty of this study, overpopulation is a “wicked problem” and will not be the
focus of this study but will be treated as a significant risk.
A wicked problem is a social or cultural problem that is difficult or
impossible to solve for as many as four reasons: incomplete or contradictory
knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, the large economic
burden, and the interconnected nature of these problems with other

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problems.
6

In, Global Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and
Population Growth (Vorosmarty, et al., 2000), use quantitative analysis of
population growth and climate change impacts on volumetric water availability to
develop graphic models of global water stress. Their analysis shows that climate
change will reduce the liquid water available for use at the same time as population,
especially urban population, is experiencing significant growth which will result in a
dramatic increase in the global areas experiencing extreme water stress. The
equation is very simple – more people with less water equals more stress.
Two of the preeminent researchers on the topic of population are Dr. Paul
Ehrlich and Dr. Anne Ehrlich from Stanford University. In their article Can a
collapse of global civilization be avoided? (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013), they discuss
the dire impacts of overpopulation, and the resultant overconsumption (water, land,
minerals, vegetation, etc.), on the “two gigantic adaptive systems: the biosphere
system and the socio-economic system.” While they elucidate their beliefs that
avoiding the collapse of complex society is possible, citing the example of
humanity’s reaction to the risk of nuclear conflict, they make it clear that the
psychological barriers to self-imposed struggle today for the benefit of unknown
people in the future make avoiding collapse highly improbable.
In Are We Consuming Too Much? (Arrow et al., 2004), the authors, including

6
Wicked Problems. (n.d.). Retrieved March 13, 2016, from https://www.wickedproblems.com/l_
wicked_problems.php

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Dr. Paul Ehrlich, utilize quantitative analysis, including the calculus of present value
maximization and cost benefit optimization, to illustrate how significantly we are
underpricing our consumption of natural resources relative to their true social cost.
Their research demonstrates that nonlinearities (i.e. overpopulation) compound
the uncertainty within their calculations; and that these uncertainties in turn can
mask the critical threshold beyond which the bifurcation (splitting into two parts)
of the natural resource systems occurs. Once beyond this critical threshold, the
biophysical impacts on our natural resource systems move from relatively benign to
immense almost immediately – for example, the flipping that occurs as a previously
clear shallow fresh water lake initially absorbs phosphorus runoff with little affect
until the resultant algal blooms at the surface block sunlight from penetrating to the
plants on the bottom which in turn die and release an immense amount of new
phosphorus into the system causing the lake to bifurcate (flip) from clear to turbid.
Thus, the article quantitatively illustrates the impacts of overpopulation and other
significant uncertainties on our rate of consumption of resources and when those
resources pass beyond the point of being able to naturally regenerate to present the
ultimate risk to water security and all forms of resource security for our society –
collapse.
The next risk that will be addressed is funding. Because the water security
of military installations, the state of California and its municipalities depends
directly on our governing institutions’ ability to appropriate the funding necessary
to plan, construct, operate and maintain the water systems that provide safe

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drinking water, treat wastewater and preserve the environment, our society’s
inability to develop priorities and make funding decisions in an ever increasingly
fiscally constrained environment represents a risk to everyone’s water security.
In The Costs of Budget Uncertainty (Joyce, 2012), the author focuses on the
impacts of both the underfunding and late funding of critical projects and services,
and of the threat of a government shutdown. The impacts of underfunding are
straightforward and logical. For example, new infrastructure (i.e. water pipelines)
necessary for growth and security do not get built, and the maintenance (i.e. water
pipeline valve exercising) required to keep the systems running and safe does not
get done. In turn, deferred projects and maintenance compound over time with
significant impacts to the efficiency, effectiveness and safety of the systems we
depend on to provide our lifeline services. There are also concatenating effects to
underfunding. For example, in the water industry, as our society’s aging workforce
retires, the funding to hire their replacements is also being cut, which results in the
roles and responsibilities of the retiree being reassigned or no longer addressed.
Thus, the efficiency and effectiveness of the organizations tasked with providing
safe drinking water and the treatment and disposal of wastewater is caught in a
continuous downward spiral. Similarly, the annual threat of a federal government
shutdown results in new infrastructure projects, repair projects, maintenance
projects and the hiring of replacement personnel being delayed until the last
moments of the fiscal year. This has significant impacts on the ability to plan and
execute effective water security programs at all levels of government. Thus, funding

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and our society’s system of governance presents a clear and measurable risk to
water security.
In Water Security Risk and Response - The Logic and Limits of Economic
Instruments (Garrick & Hope, 2013), the authors take “a pragmatic look at
economic instruments through the lens of risk science and institutional economics”
(Kindle Locations 5194-5195). They do this by focusing on a risk-based framework
based on the “concepts, categories and dimensions of risk”; and the logic and limits
associated with using risk as the vehicle through which to manage water security.
The main limitations in using a risk-based framework for managing water security
come from the requirements placed on governing institutions, and investment
decision-makers to have the right amount and kind of political will to respond to
the risk assessments. In order to develop their framework, the authors establish
what their view of risks to water security entails. While emphasizing that risks to
water security are multi-dimensional and scalar, the authors frame them in a typical
manner – quantity, quality, climate risks and reliability of services. The major
risks specified were drought, flooding, water pollution, water rights and climate
change as a compounding factor. This framing is completely compatible with the
preceding definitions of risks to water security and will inform my final selection of
risk framing categories. The authors do add an additional category, “erosion of
existing infrastructure and institutions”, which actually fits under the reliability of
services risk category versus being its own category. Within this framing, the
concept of chronic and episodic risks is introduced to assist in the overall

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assessment and the development of appropriate responses, as is the idea that the
impacts of climate change and ecosystem degradation lead to tipping points beyond
which any response may be futile. Any and all risk responses have to be developed
and implemented by organizations – public institutions or private water purveyors.
As such, the worldviews of the organization and its decision-makers will inform
their choices of risk response and the level and type of transaction costs associated
with the implementation of their responses. Thus, the authors illustrate their
concept for defining the risks and externalities associated with managing water
security in a manner that will have significant influence on my final MCIWest Risk
Assessment framework.

C. Risk Analysis

In the Global Water Partnership publication, Water Security: Putting the
Concept into Practice (van Beek & Arriens, 2014), the authors are consistent in
their identification of the major risks to water security as: drought, flooding,
quality and quantity. They emphasize that the pursuit of water security is a never
ending endeavor because our hydrologic system dynamic across both space and
time are ever changing. The two approaches they advocate for in this pursuit of
water security are: developmental (combination of policies and projects), and risk-
based (managing and reducing vulnerabilities from climate change and water
related disasters). Further, in their expert opinions, water security can only be
achieved by utilizing both these approaches “simultaneously in a balanced manner.”

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The authors discuss the need to quantify water security, beginning with identifying
its dimensions (i.e. household water security, environmental water security,
economic water security, physical water security, etc.). This task is followed by
selecting the “indicators that reflect the main characteristics of the key
dimensions”, which is in turn followed by measuring the indicators with these
scores combined for each dimension. This process is used to operationalize the
concept of water security – identify dimensions, set targets and plan the actions
required to achieve these targets. One of the pitfalls inherent to the developmental
approach is its susceptibility to how “special interests” define water security (their
worldviews). The authors include a table to illustrate the differences among special
interest groups which perfectly aligns with my theory for how worldviews are a
significant aspect of understanding water security risk.

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Figure 24: “Special Interests” Water Security Worldviews (Source: van Beek & Arriens, 2014)

In their elucidation of their proposed risk-based approach, the authors
distill the meaning behind the approach as “how societies cope with variability.” The
variability of most concern is the source of the majority of water used across the
globe – rainfall. The most significant aspect within this approach is the
determination of the level of risk that is acceptable. This will apply to both the base
level of risk and to the residual risk after any action is taken to respond to the risk.
These levels are also variable and depend on the circumstances and the makeup of
the population exposed to the risk. Exercising this approach requires three distinct
steps: 1) assess the risks; 2) set targets for reducing or eliminating the risks; 3)
implement the policies, procedures, actions and investments to achieve those

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targets. As stated above, the more challenging aspect of the authors’ risk-based
approach is determining risk acceptability or tolerance. They present a very useful
graphic to depict the relationship between risks, probability and impact that has
risk tolerance superimposed upon it.
Figure 25: Risk Tolerance Graphic (Source: van Beek & Arriens, 2014)

The authors address another area directly applicable to my research focus –
climate change. Their discussion centers around the fact that while we are dealing
with the current risks of climate change (more severe drought, flooding and sea-
level rise), the future impacts of climate change introduce significant uncertainty
and society’s perceptions and perspectives (worldviews) of this uncertainty
compound the overall risk. Thus, designing a response to preempt, mitigate or adapt
to the future impacts of climate change becomes a complex endeavor that is best
done through scenario simulation and game theory.

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This leads to the authors’ discussion about the challenges involved in
harmonizing “public and private sector perspectives on risk.” While more and more
businesses are being forced to deal with water related risks to their bottom-line,
and are thus seeking to partner with local and state governments, they still “speak
different languages when addressing water security, IWRM, and risk management.”
This provides further evidence that worldviews about water security have an
independent impact on how risks are perceived and acted upon, and thus pose an
independent risk themselves.
One manner in which the risk posed by divergent worldviews manifests itself
is through the concept of Coping Capacity. The development or enhancement of
water security coping capacity “requires a combination of technical, economic,
operational, legal, and institutional interventions.” The perspective on how to
prioritize and invest in these interventions will be driven by the worldviews of
those investing. This innate competition among alternative approaches will have an
impact on the robustness and effectiveness of the public or private entity’s eventual
water security coping capacity. With this in mind, “the traditional approach for
quantitative assessment was to mobilise groups of experts, consultants and
university academics, rather than involve stakeholders” in the process of developing
water security coping capacity. However, this approach carries the risk of not being
accepted by the stakeholders and thus of becoming very difficult to implement and
is not recommended by the authors.
Finally, the authors distill their risk-based approach into the four most

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significant elements of water security risk (p. 44):
1. Risk of shortage (including droughts): a lack of sufficient water for
beneficial uses (households, businesses, and the environment).
2. Risk of inadequate quality: a lack of water of suitable quality for a
particular purpose.
3. Risk of excess (including floods): an overflow or destructive
accumulation of water over areas that are not normally submerged.
4. Risk of undermining the resilience of fresh water systems: exceeding
the coping capacity of water systems, possibly reaching tipping points
and causing irreversible damage to system functions.

The following figure is used to systemize the management of the above risks.
Figure 26: Three step process – ‘know the risk’, ‘target the risk’, ‘manage the risk’ (Source: van Beek
& Arriens, 2014)

Knowing the risk, involves analyzing it from a scientific, technical, scalar and
also perception perspective. One of the most difficult tasks is determining how
important the majority of people consider the risk to be. Additionally, “all risks
should be taken into account: the normal, most visible risks; the low probability,
high impact risks; and the slowly developing risks with cumulative high impacts.”

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The need to both consider all risks and adjudicate what risks society will perceive as
most important adds significantly to the complexity and comprehensiveness of this
approach while making the task of setting acceptable targets for water security
risks appreciably more challenging. One trap a practitioner must avoid is the
pursuit of completely eliminating all risks. This task is usually neither technically or
financially possible under the given constraints. Once all appropriate risks have
been identified (known) and appropriate targets have been established, the
management of these risks begins by establishing measures to indicate when
targets have been met. The measures can be actions like infrastructure in-place,
market-backed or public funding in-place, etc. These measures are synonymous
with previously discussed risk responses. The authors use the terminology
“measures” to represent actions taken in the same way that “responses” represent
actions taken. Similarly, the authors use the terminology “identified” in ways that
make it synonymous with “assessed”.
This Global World Partnerships publication has been covered in detail
because of the group’s prominence in the water industry and because its concepts
are foundational to the development of a comprehensive, implementable MCIWest
Water Security Strategy.
The next foundational article to be reviewed is the research project, Risk
Assessment in Practice (Curtis & Cary, 2012). While this document is directed at
the management of business risks, it is my contention that its principles and
practices are directly applicable to water security strategic management and to the

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development of my MCIWest system for water security risk assessment. As in the
previous article, the authors state that we cannot eliminate all risks and therefore
managing exposure to risk becomes the primary managerial responsibility. In their
view, there is an optimal risk-taking zone where stakeholders incur just the right
levels of exposure to the right kinds of risks to “effectively pursue their strategic
goals.” In developing their risk management process, the authors emphasize that
any successful process must be practical, sustainable, easy to use, and tailorable to
an organization’s size, complexity and geographic region – which makes it an ideal
system to inform the development of the MCIWest system.
The focus of the first half of this chapter on understanding and defining risks
to water security was to inform the development of a risk matrix for MCIWest. This
matrix represents the first box in this article’s risk management process graphically
show in the figure below.
Figure 27: Risk Management Process (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012, p. 2)

Some water security risks are dynamic and require continual ongoing
monitoring and assessment (political will, manufactured ignorance – institutional,
societal) and some are static and require periodic assessment with established
triggers that would cause a deviation from that cycle (earthquake, accidents,
mineral contaminants – physical, geological). The following table represents a

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summary of the actions represented in the graphic shown in Figure 27.
Table 7: Risk Management Process Summary (Source: Simpson (vv), 2016)
1. Identify Risks - produce a comprehensive list of risks organized by category and sub-
category
2. Establish the risk assessment criteria – likelihood and impact + vulnerability and speed of
onset.
3. Assess risks - by assigning “values” to each using criteria – initially at the qualitative level for
all then moving to quantitative for most important.
4. Assess risk interactions – (compound, concatenate, cascade) – bowtie, risk interaction
matrices (climate change)
5. Prioritize Risks – by comparing the level of risk against target risk levels and tolerance
thresholds – not just by probability and impact but by subjective criteria (i.e. health and safety
impact, reputational impact, vulnerability, and speed of onset)
6. Respond to Risks - (accept, reduce, share, or avoid), cost-benefit analyses performed, a
response strategy formulated, and risk response plans developed. (preempt, mitigate, adapt to
climate change)

Within the table above the concept of speed of onset is introduced. The
calculation of risk is not just the quantification or qualification of its likelihood and
impact, as the speed with which that impact occurs could have a significant effect on
whether that impact is catastrophic or whether the initial response can act to blunt
the worst of the impact. Likewise, how vulnerable an organization is to a risk
further compounds the calculation of that overall risk. This concept is similar to the
concept of risk exposure discussed in the review of the last article. Along with the
dimensions of impact, likelihood, vulnerability and speed of onset, the
determination of how quickly an organization can return its operations to a
predetermined level of performance following a risk event, is a major factor in
assessing that risk. This introduces the concept of resilience, which has a direct
connection to the concept of risk tolerance, in that determining the acceptable
level of performance that an organization must return to following an event will be

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determined by its tolerance for the impacts of that risk.
The authors of this document emphasize that any risk management system
must be scalable, and customizable to the industry’s complexity and culture. Thus,
worldviews once again insert themselves into the assessment of risks. In fact, in a
qualitative risk assessment, the culture of those identifying the risks (choosing
which risks matter) and the myriad of the other choices that will be made within the
risk assessment, will be deeply influenced by the worldviews of those making those
choices. In an effort to systematize qualitative risk assessments across any industry,
the authors illustrate a methodology for logically quantifying the dimensions of the
risks. For example, the impacts of a risk need to be assigned a scale by which the
effects of that risk can be judged and quantified as part of the assessment and
response development process. The impacts will be assessed according to chosen
criteria (i.e. financial, environmental, safety, operational, regulatory, etc.) and the
scale of the impact will be proportional to their effect (i.e. reduce capability, cause
catastrophic loss of capability, etc.) on each of the appropriate criteria.

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Figure 28: Illustrative Impact Scale Graphic (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012)

As shown in the Figure 28, this process quantifies (1-5) and qualifies
(incidental-extreme) the impact of a risk on an organization. This methodology is
extremely powerful in developing a system to manage complex collections of risks.

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Figure 29: Illustrative Likelihood Scale Graphic (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012)

The next dimension to be addressed is likelihood (probability) of the risk
event occurring. Similarly, a five-point scale is developed to quantify this dimension
of risk.
As seen in the figure, there are two ways of differentiating likelihood
(frequency, and probability as shown), but the ultimate goal is to be able to assign a
number between 1 and 5 to that likelihood so that it can be used in the overall
assessment of that risk. For a water security risk assessment, or any more
qualitative risk assessment, the use of probability seems more challenging than the
use of frequency because of the level of uncertainty that will be introduced in
specifying a probability range versus being able to utilize historical records for
annual frequencies.
The next dimension addressed by the authors was vulnerability. This
dimension has significant direct applicability to a water security risk assessment as
illustrated by the number of academic articles that focus on developing indices
solely around vulnerability. The authors develop a measure of preparedness scale

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for vulnerability by relating it to impact and likelihood. For example, California is
very likely to experience droughts that have significant impacts on the state’s
economy, thus the state is very vulnerable to drought. California’s preparedness
scale will then assess how much water they have stored in reservoirs and
underground. In this way, assessing vulnerability becomes more of a measure of risk
management performance than a dimension of the risk itself. As we will see in
future article reviews, the art and science of assessing vulnerability is an entire topic
in and of itself.
Figure 30: Illustrative Vulnerability Scale (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012)

The final dimension of risk requiring scale development prior to the
assessment process is speed of onset. As stated earlier, this dimension is a
significant factor in “developing risk response plans.”

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Figure 31: Illustrative Speed of Onset Scale (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012)

Thus, the preceding review illustrates the first step in the authors’ risk
assessment process - taking the initial qualitative screening of the most important
risks and applying quantification techniques to them so they can be used in an
evaluation model. This model is designed to assist decision-makers in planning,
implementing and measuring the success of their investments in risk preemption,
mitigation and adaptation.
As illustrated in Figure 27, the next phase in the authors’ risk assessment
process involves assessing the interactions between risks. Assessing risks
independently would result in an incomplete analysis of risk that could have
potentially significant effects on risk response plans. For example, the risks
associated with climate change can cascade (a sequence of events in which each
produces the circumstances necessary for the initiation of the next), concatenate
(be linked together in series) or compound (will result in the creation of other
risks). Thus, developing a risk response strategy for water security without
assessing risk interactions could lead to serious investment, environmental,
political, etc. consequences. The authors propose a simple risk interaction matrix in
which the risks are listed on the X and Y axes and the ones that interact are captured

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graphically.
Figure 32: Sample Risk Interaction Map (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012)

The risk interaction matrix for water security will no doubt be more complex
given the need to understand not just if the risks interact, but how they interact, in
order to design an appropriate risk response strategy.
The final feature of this lengthy and invaluable article that will be used in the
development of MCIWest’s Water Security Strategy, is the section on Risk Mapping.
This graphic representation will allow the communication of installation risk
profiles to individual Base Commanders and the communication of MCIWest’s
overall risk portfolio to the Commanding General. “These maps are usually two-
dimensional representations of impact plotted against likelihood” (Curtis & Cary,
2012). One of the most useful mapping formats is the heat map. This type of map

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can be used to illustrate the relationship between impact and likelihood while also
adding a third variable through the sizing of the data point graphics (larger data
point graphics representing more risk) – speed of onset, vulnerability, etc.
Additionally, a “common way to prioritize risks is by designating a risk level for each
area of the graph such as very high, high, medium, or low, where the higher the
combined impact and likelihood ratings, the higher the overall risk level.” Further,
the boundaries of these areas can vary depending on assessed risk appetite. Prior
to developing the heat map, the risks must be prioritized. In the following figure,
twelve risks were characterized as very high and plotted in the upper right hand
section in red. The color of the dots reflects the assessed impact of the risk. Overall
sixty risks were plotted on the graphic making it an outstanding executive
communication tool.
Figure 33: Sample Heat Map (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012)

Another graphic representation tool is the MARCI chart (Mitigate, Assure,

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Redeploy, and Cumulative Impact). This system of mapping is especially suited for
illustrating the effects of risk responses, and thus could prove to be a very valuable
tool in the development of MCIWest’s water security strategy. In the authors’
example, the MARCI chart focuses on the twelve highest priority risks to further
refine their prioritization (the last step in/of the process) while evaluating the type
of response that is most appropriate. The graph is divided into four quadrants
(whose colors are insignificant) according to the magnitude of risk. Once again, the
size of the data point was used to represent speed of onset and graphically depicts
what risks can manifest themselves with the least amount of warning. An interesting
point associated with this representation methodology is that, as an engineer, the
table that accompanies the graph is just as informative if not more so to me because
it shows the numeric values for impact, likelihood, vulnerability and speed of onset
which elucidate a deeper understanding of the facets of each risk.
Figure 34: Sample MARCI Chart (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012)

This article was reviewed at such length and detail because, during my initial

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memoing phase, I identified it as the article that would provide the most
comprehensive and useful methodology for performing and presenting the risk
assessment section of the MCIWest Water Security Strategy.
In Incorporating Value Trade-offs into Community-Based Environmental
Risk Decisions (Gregory, 2002), the author addresses the challenges associated
with stakeholders and risk-management. The author begins by positing “why trade-
offs are difficult.” His explanation points out that this process is one that “the
world’s religions” deal with on a daily basis, and then delves into the “four major
strands of thought” that help us understand why people find this process difficult.
The author discusses how economists see people as rational maximizers;
psychologists see people struggling through their individual “cognitive dissonance”;
sociologists/anthropologists see people “balancing moral and ethical
considerations”; and decision scientists feel people just need to be presented with
disaggregated problems that clearly expose their “explicit trade-offs across
weighted attributes.” This discussion illustrates how the worldviews of economists,
psychologists, sociologist/anthropologists, and decision scientists make sense of the
worldviews of the people they study in an effort to explain their behavior. While I
will not present an in-depth review of the author’s six challenges and how they
correspond directly to the concepts of worldview, I will utilize his very good
summary of his thoughts and research, showing the six challenges alongside
potential techniques to address those challenges in my risk response planning
process.

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Figure 35: Addressing the Six Major Decision Challenges (Source: Gregory, 2002)

The author’s research clearly supports my position that worldview is such a
significant aspect of decision-making that it should be considered a potential threat
to water security and should be formally addressed using techniques similar to
those posited in this study.
Because the installations of MCIWest face significant earthquake risk, I will
need to address their individual exposure to seismic risk. In Risk Assessment,
Modeling and Decision Support (Bostrom et al., 2008), the authors discuss and
explain, in great detail, how to conduct a seismic risk assessment. While my eventual
addressing of this risk will not be comprehensive enough to involve the use of
industry specific software packages like HAZards US-Multi-Hazard (HAZUS
®MH
) or

135
HAZUS
®
, I will utilize the authors’ processes and techniques to assess seismic risks
and plan mitigation strategies. “While earthquake hazard has a relatively narrow
scope of simply the physical effects (faulting, shaking, liquefaction, landsliding,
tsunami etc.)” (p. 6) our dependence on the infrastructure that supports our lives
and the accomplishment of the MCIWest mission that can potentially be
catastrophically affected by earthquakes demands that this hazard be addressed as
a high priority. The authors have developed a very good graphic to communicate
seismic risk.
Figure 36: Seismic Risk Graphic (Source: French et al., 2008)

Seismic risk cannot be eliminated, only managed. Thus, an appropriate level
of risk tolerance must be developed for the installations of MCIWest. Because each

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installation houses various national security assets and faces varying levels of
imminent seismic risk, each installation will have its own level of risk tolerance.
Establishing these tolerances will be done at a macro-level initially, because
conducting a detailed analysis of the seismic threats facing each installation would
require the development of “seismic risk curves (loss vs. annual frequency of
occurrence)” which is beyond the scope of my research, and will become a topic for
follow-on study and development.
Figure 37: Sample Seismic Risk Curve (Source: French et al., 2008)

However, in developing the MCIWest risk response to the seismic hazards at
each installation, the effects of worldviews must once again be considered. As the
authors state, “whether particular mitigation measures will be viewed as worth
adopting is not a foregone conclusion” (p. 242). This is because of three of the
typical aspects of decision-maker worldviews that are applied to considering

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seismic risks: 1) people typically think and make decisions across short time
horizons; 2) people desire a quick return on investment; 3) the lack of perception of
added economic value from the investment. Thus, even though military facilities are
seen as critical life-line nodes in a disaster, seismic risk response plans must be
tempered to account for both the aspects of the risk curve (plots the annual
frequency that a seismic event’s forces will exceed the structure’s capacity to
withstand them) and the worldviews of the typical infrastructure investment
decision-makers.
As stated earlier, a major aspect of risk assessment is vulnerability. The
authors of A Systematic Review of Water Vulnerability Assessment Tools
(Plummer et al., 2012) discuss the findings from their own literature review of the
topic and propose that:
Significant opportunities exist to enhance the efficacy of water vulnerability
assessment tools by incorporating indicators and operational
measures for social considerations (e.g., adaptation, institutions, governance)
that are developed outside the context of water (p. 4327).

Further, they define water security vulnerability as, “the susceptibility of a
system (individual, community, place) to damage as a function of exposure to
external forces (shocks, stress, disturbances), sensitivity of the system, and the
ability of the system to respond (cope, recover, adapt).” This definition drives the
aspects that the authors deem most important to a water security vulnerability
assessment system – it must be, holistic, scalar, and “combine both physical and
social indicators.” In their synthesis of their literature review, they develop a table

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illustrating the dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators used to assess water
vulnerability.
Table 8: Summary of Water Vulnerability Assessment Tools Table (Source: Plummer et al., 2012)
Dimension Sub-dimension Most Frequent Indicator
Water resources
Resource/supply
Groundwater availability;
availability
Access Population with access to sanitation
Use Industrial water use
Quality Presence of coliforms(total, fecal)
Infrastructure
Storage; treatment technology scale
(primary, secondary, tertiary)
Other physical
environment
Climate change Evapotranspiration; precipitation levels
Environmental pressures
Industrial organic pollutants; water
stress
Environment
Land use; land cover; aquatic life;
vegetation; biodiversity
Economics
Economic capacity Human Development Index (HDI)
Labor No indicator
Equity Inequality (GINI Coefficient)
Demographics
Population; children under five
mortality rate
Livelihood Hydropower potential
Human health
People affected by diarrheic diseases;
access to healthcare
Education Literacy; education levels
Institutions
Governance Land set aside in protected areas status
Conflict No indicator
Political Political stability
Social
Engagement No indicator
Cultural capacity No indicator
Knowledge Capacity No indicator
Technical Capacity No indicator

This table also creates a good summary of the risks to water security and will
be useful in developing the comprehensive table of risks for MCIWest. Further, this
table reinforces that authors’ claims that any effective vulnerability assessment
must be holistic, and their conclusions that it will require significant efforts across
disciplines, institutions and society in general to fully understand and implement
water security vulnerability assessments.

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In Problematizing Water Vulnerability Indices at a Local Level: A Critical
Review and Proposed Solution (Grosbois & Plummer, 2015), Plummer joins his
coauthor in taking the next step discussed in the previous article. They elucidate
their thorough analysis of seven well known water vulnerability indices and find
that all of them lack some critical element of their development and transferability
criteria. The authors then utilize their analysis to develop and propose an approach
for constructing a water vulnerability index that is more comprehensive and
implementable than any they have studied. Their proposed process is shown in
Figure 38 below.

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Figure 38: Water vulnerability Indices – Proposed Framework (Source: Grosbois & Plummer, 2015)

While risk analysis and the development of a vulnerability index are
integrally linked, my thorough analysis of utilizing vulnerability rather than risk for
the development of MCIWest’s strategy has determined that the application of risk
and response will be more useful than vulnerability in communicating actionable
data to decision-makers and to the development of an implementation plan. This

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article has provided an outstanding example for communicating risk status data and
potential risk response data to decision-makers. The graphics below will be
customized for use in the MCIWest Water Security Strategy (e.g. showing how
different responses change the shape and size of the dotted line graphics will
illustrate the overall effects of the responses).
Figure 39: Sample Vulnerability Graphics (Source: Grosbois & Plummer, 2015)

The decision not to utilize the development of an MCIWest Water Security
Vulnerability Index is supported by, Indicators of Vulnerability and Adaptive
Capacity: Towards a clarification of the science–policy interface (Hinkel, 2012).
Even though the author discusses tacit support for applying some vulnerability
process to local level systems, his overall conclusion is that there is a bewildering
sense of overlap among the array of terms (i.e. risk, sensitivity, fragility) or their
inverse (i.e. resilience, adaptability, adaptive capacity and stability) and a
substantial amount of normative value judgement required to utilize the concept

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of vulnerability. The IPCC and other esteemed groups have used, and will continue
to use, the concept of vulnerability, defining it as:
the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to
cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate
variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the
character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation
to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive
capacity (McCarthy et al., 2001, p. 995).

However, for the purposes of this research project, the use of risk assessment will
be utilized.
As a follow up to a discussion of the theoretical nature of the term
vulnerability, we will revisit the evolving nature of the term water security. In
Water security: from abstract concept to meaningful metrics: an initial overview
of options (Manson & Calow, 2012), the authors discuss moving the terminology
from “theoretical and qualitative” to a much more “meaningful tool to guide policy
and practice.” The focus of their effort is to bridge the often significant divide
between politics and technical/operational requirements. The authors see
important continuing ties between “longer-established concepts” like national
security, human security, scarcity and risk on their way to developing a pragmatic
metrics framework for water security. As they move through their discussion of the
“competing framings” of water security, scarcity, risk and security, the authors
develop five key themes.

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Table 9: Five Key Themes for Water Security (Source: Manson & Calow, 2012 , p. viii)

Theme Explanation
1 Water security goes beyond
immediate physical availability
Water in the atmosphere, on the surface and below
ground interacts in complex ways, with different
responses to human impacts; availability in any given
period or place is furthermore moderated by the
economic and social capacity to access water.
2 Water security requires us to address
variability and risk
While water security implies permanence, spatial and
temporal variability is inherent to water systems. As
variability amplifies, and where we do not have the
capacity to adapt, it translates into water-related
risks, including flood, drought and pollution.
3 Water security needs a human focus To be real and meaningful, beyond technical and
policy circles, water security has to focus on the needs
of individuals, especially the poor and vulnerable. The
water security of all matters equally, irrespective of
social, economic or political disparities.
4 Water security also requires us to
meet environmental needs
Whether viewed as intrinsically valuable, or valuable
for the services they provide, freshwater ecosystems
require protection. Ecosystem water requirements
may vary over time, and must be met in terms of both
quantity and quality.
5 Water security requires management
of competition and conflict
Given the breadth of human and environmental needs
which must be met, there are inevitable tradeoffs,
particularly in those areas where water is intensively
used, or where withdrawals are rapidly accelerating.
The institutional capacity to avoid or resolve these
tradeoffs, and mediate between the claims of
competing users through rules-based systems rather
than force or coercion, is therefore essential.

During their focus on scarcity, the authors discuss their views that while
there is definitely a “limited absolute availability” of freshwater in the earth’s
hydrologic system that is being heavily impacted by “continuing population growth,
changing patterns of consumption” and climate change, the conceptualization of
scarcity as inevitable is an oversimplification. There are still many “political, social
and economic inequities” that have a significant impact on scarcity and cannot be
ignored. This reality is central to their discussion of groundwater and its role in the
world’s water supply. Groundwater makes up approximately one-third of the

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available (non-ice) freshwater resources on the earth, but because of the highly
technical and expensive methodologies required to accurately characterize it, most
discussions of scarcity do not elaborate on its role. The authors do include
groundwater terms that are directly applicable to MCIWest and the Marine Corps
Air Ground Combat Center in 29 Palms California (e.g. fossil groundwater and
planned depletion).
The authors’ discussion of water security risk has significantly informed my
thinking on the concept. “Risk analysis encourages us to think about a whole range
of possible future conditions, from the everyday to the extremely unlikely. That’s an
important feature in aquatic systems, which are inherently variable” (p. 12). They
point out that the use of risk analysis as a water management tool is mainly being
driven by the private sector response to “water supply crises”. Businesses must
have a methodology for evaluating how, where and why to invest their money and
time strategically – to maximize profits. With the exception of profit, the U.S. Marine
Corps has the same need. The authors state the standard elements of risk evaluation
already discussed in this dissertation (i.e. likelihood, magnitude of harm, ability to
moderate effects) but add the dimension of trust. The level of trust individuals and
society have in the source of risk information will determine how much they are
willing to invest in preemption, mitigation or adaptation. Additionally, the authors
elucidate the need for a new paradigm when it comes to risk and uncertainty. All
decision-makers, both private and public, dislike uncertainty – especially when
making significant infrastructure investment decisions. While prior water resource

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uncertainty could be dealt with through statistical analysis of historic data, the
uncertainty associated with climate change and the impacts of overpopulation on
our planet’s physical and biological systems will require a fundamental change in
our water resource planning and management paradigm. The authors recommend a
scenario-based adaptive management approach to water security which is in
complete alignment with my development of the MCIWest strategy.
The authors’ treatment of the concept of water security is similar in many
ways to their conceptualization of risk. Security, like risk, implies that there are
circumstances that need to be preempted, mitigated and/or adapted to (i.e. flooding
or drought). Because the question of “what risks matter” must still be asked and the
term “society” means different things to different people, water security takes on a
more complex and significant role in the management of water resources. With that
in mind, the authors seek to use the 2012 U.S. National Intelligence Council report
on Global Water Security, to convince readers that the concept will not become the
sole province of defense and foreign policy analysts, by stating its additional
conclusions that “improved water management (including pricing, allocations and
virtual water trade) and investments ‘afford the best solutions for water problems’”.
The authors conclude by proposing a comprehensive system of water
security indicators tied to the five key themes discussed earlier. While these
indictors will inform the development of my water security risk analysis system,
their global nature limits their direct applicability to my work because my risk

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assessment process focuses on the operationalization of risk management at the
installation level.

D. Conclusions

The focus of this research is to review existing systems being employed to
diagnose water resource challenges across the southwest as a foundational element
for developing coherent, implementable plans and strategies for ensuring the water
security of MCIWest. The knowledge gained through the “memoing” process and the
detailed review of the journal articles, books, and other reference materials will be
used to develop the MCIWest tables of hazards and threats that will be translated
into risks according to their impact, likelihood, and speed of onset. This will allow
for the production of a priority list of risks and the development of appropriate risk
responses. The criteria that will be used to evaluate the risks are: quantity, quality,
delivery and the interactions between them. A five-point scale will be used to
quantify the risks’ impacts on the criteria. This process will be exceptionally useful
in translating qualitative risks like worldview into quantifiable terms that can be
used to normalize all risks to a standard unit of measure.
Climate change, and the unparalleled levels of uncertainty it introduces into
nearly every aspect of water resource management, will be addressed separately
using the knowledge gained from Chapter 3 (Climate Change Impacts on Water
Security) and this chapter to analyze and communicate, in terms of risk, its most
probable and most catastrophic effects.

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The one threat that will have the most significant impact on our society’s
water balance, but will not be addressed separately because the scope and scale of
any proposed responses are far beyond the scope of this research, is
overpopulation (Manson & Calow, 2012). Overpopulation and affluence drive
overconsumption and massive inequities across the globe (WWAP, 2012). These
inequities will continue to grow with population while the water in the hydrologic
cycle remains finite. Once a tipping point is reached, the inequities will grow
exponentially as we shift from our current relatively low energy water production
system to a very high energy water production system (i.e. desalination). This shift
will not come without a greatly increased risk of conflict (DNI, 2012).
The water security risks to the installations of MCIWest, because their
purpose is to support the training and deployment of Marines, represent national
security risks. The knowledge gained in writing this chapter and in conducting the
survey of water industry leaders have enabled my development of a coherent, risk-
based strategy for insuring water security for MCIWest that can be communicated
clearly and graphically to decision-makers and stakeholders throughout the chain of
command.

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CHAPTER 7: INSTITUTIONS, MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

A. Introduction

During the initial review of literature and coding phase of my research, this
chapter developed from the progression of questions relating to my research goal –
developing a clear, comprehensive, coherent, strategy for ensuring MCIWest’s water
security. Having, developed an MCIWest definition for water security, a thorough
understanding of the impacts of climate change on water security, a broad
understanding and appreciation for the worldviews of the profuse water industry
stakeholder interest groups, and for the complexities of risk identification,
assessment and communication, the final question was: what governance and
management framework (strategy) would be most successful at implemented it all?
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to inform the development of the grounded
theory for a process for assessing and managing the risks to MCIWest’s water
security. The chapter begins by reviewing the pertinent literature focused on water
management “institutions” and how their design, processes and procedures affect
water security. This is followed by reviewing “management” systems and best
practices that are applicable to the pursuit of water security. And finally, how these
institutions apply management concepts to govern water resources will be
addressed under the title of “governance”.

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B. Institutions

In Chapter 5: Water Management, Institutions and Capacity Development
(Connor et al., 2012), the authors spend a substantial amount of effort emphasizing
the complexity and comprehensiveness behind the concept of water resource
management. In their view, the concept has evolved significantly over the past
century and must continue to do so if it is to adequately describe the requirements
for institutions to adeptly manage an ever increasing portfolio of uncertainties and
risks. After all, institutions must deal with the fact that, “water is a fugitive resource,
flowing through space and time across landscapes and through economies. All
benefit from it, but few understand how it is actually managed (p. 135).”
The institutions that exist today to manage water resources (1,286 special
districts in California alone), have changed little since their creation. They are
characterized, especially in the western U.S., by their “infrastructure approach” to
water management. They were designed to enable the massive population boom in
the west, but not to manage its water needs ex-ante. The focus was on large
infrastructure projects built to capture and store flood water and snow melt in
reservoirs, and on huge dams built to control wild rivers while generating the
electricity that the multitudes of newcomers would need to live and to expand their
economic capacity. There was very little attention paid to the needs of natural
ecosystems or to their harm. They were seen as “sinks” where waste, the byproduct
of this huge economic boom, could be disposed of and forgotten. The structure of

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these institutions, their staffs and boards of directors, has changed little since their
birth, but the complexity, rate of change, levels of uncertainty and social values that
they must deal with on a daily basis have changed exponentially.
Rather than a simple focus on meeting the supply needs of its stakeholders,
modern water management institutions find ways to eliminate or reduce all manner
of uncertainty and risk. They must become experts in predicting human behavior
and reactions to water governance processes and systems. Their actions must be
designed to manage our most vital, variable and vulnerable resource through a
thorough understanding of “cultural values, water pricing, water conservation,
water reallocation, economic incentives/disincentives, and social recognition for
reducing inefficient water use practices, diversifying water sources and similar
activities” (p. 137).
The authors’ vision for a twenty-first century water management institution
is one that is integrated, flexible, diversified, collaborative and operated with the
utmost “integrity, transparency and accountability”. While that vision sounds
utopian, the authors seek to operationalize it by expounding on the mechanisms and
virtues of adaptive management implemented through an Integrated Water
Resource Management (IRWM) system. They feel that the best way to deal with the
monumental tasks of responding to climate change, overpopulation, and the human
capacity for short-range thinking, is through adaptive management and its
mechanisms for real-time modeling of best case and worst case scenarios. If
decision-makers can be presented with tangible models of possible futures, they will

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be much more comfortable making investment (time and money) decisions that
they themselves may not reap any measureable benefit from. Additionally, if models
can be constructed to show the full range of catastrophic results from not investing
in a preemptive or mitigation measure (resiliency), decision-makers will be much
more comfortable “buying the insurance” associated with those scenarios.
Thus, it is the job of our water management institutions to establish,
implement and enforce the “rules of the game”. And those rules must be based on a
thorough understanding of the complexity of the risks and uncertainties
surrounding today’s hydrologic systems, technologies, cultural values, and politics.
But, just as importantly, those rules cannot be “carved in stone”, they must be ever
evolving and capable of adapting to whatever “unknown, unknowns” are waiting
just out of sight of our key decision-makers.
In Chapter 11: Transforming water management institutions to deal with
change (Edwards et al., 2012), the authors describe the actions necessary to
transform our archaic water management institutions into the integrated and
adaptive ones required to meet today’s very complex challenges. While the chapter
is from a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
publication, and thus by definition has a global worldview, the most important
principles and practices championed by the authors will be very challenging to
implement at MCIWest. The authors make the irrefutable case that the complexity
and integration of the water resource issues we face today can only be managed and
governed by institutions that:

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Table 10: Core Principles of Managing Under Uncertainty (Edwards et al., 2012)

• Seek robust projects or strategies, and substantially revise the current
economic and optimization decision rules routinely used in water
resources management.

• Employ adaptive strategies to achieve robustness; near-term strategies
should be explicitly designed to be revised as better information becomes
available.

• Use computer-aided processes to engage in interactive exploration of
hypotheses, options and possibilities.

Further, it is the authors’ contention that our institutions and decision-
makers must adhere to the Precautionary Principle as part of their social
responsibility to us all.
The precautionary principle states that if the impacts resulting from an
action or policy may cause harm to people or the environment, in the
absence of scientific consensus on a probable outcome, the burden of proof
that an action or policy is not harmful falls on those taking the action
(Edwards et al., 2012, p. 294).

The management system that the authors, and the water industry in general,
believe should be adopted to enable these capabilities is adaptive management.
Further, the system of adaptive management should be implemented through the
Integrated Water Resource Management (IRWM) program. As with the other
aspects of water resource management that this research project has discussed, the
difficulties in implementing adaptive management systems are significantly
dependent on scale. While a local water district with its locally elected or appointed
Board of Directors (decision-makers) who have and maintain a direct connection to

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their stakeholders (rate payers), and have a local/direct funding mechanism (water
rates and local bonds), inherently possesses the flexibility and responsibility
necessary to adaptively manage their supply, demand and delivery systems, the
Federal Government and specifically the United States Military is a very different,
much less adaptive institution.
However, the historic drought across the southwestern United States and the
the newly developed understanding that water security equates to national
security both internationally and domestically (DNI, 2012; OSD, 2014), may become
the catalyst for institutional change that allows at least some aspects of adaptive
management to be implemented in MCIWest.
Institutional changes within water management occur due to endogenous
factors (water scarcity, performance deterioration and financial non-
viability) as well as exogenous factors (macro-economic crisis, political
reform, natural calamities and technological progress). Together, these raise
the opportunity costs of institutional change, reduce the corresponding
transaction costs, and create an institutional culture that is conducive to
reform (Edwards et al., 2012, p. 301).

On 22 March 2016, the White House published the The Federal Action Plan
of the National Drought Resilience Partnership for Long-term Drought
Resilience (United States, 2016). This document espouses many of the same
adaptive management principles and practices elucidated in Edwards et al. (2012),
including the significant collaboration between government and private industry,
and between government agencies. It establishes lead and supporting government
agencies along with goals and implementing actions.

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However, while it does establish lead agencies, centers of excellence and
strategies to develop significant drought resilience, this White House plan cannot
authorize or appropriated any funding for these activities. That responsibility and
authority resides in Congress, and the majority party’s worldview regarding climate
change and initiatives generated by the White House is clear, a matter of public
record and openly hostile to both. Thus, while Chapter 11 does discuss political
will and heavy reliance on public involvement, the authors do not hypothesize about
ways in which our current federal government institutions can transform
themselves into bodies capable of adaptively managing water resources – even
under the current extreme drought crisis in the southwest.

C. Management

While MCIWest will not have the mechanisms to adaptively manage climate
change available to local or state water purveyors, the installations of the regional
command will be subject to those mechanisms. Thus, building a thorough
understanding of those mechanisms by reviewing, Climate change adaptation and
water resource management: A review of the literature (Olmstead, 2014) is a
prudent exercise. The author focuses on analyzing the economic impacts that
climate change will have on water resources and the levers that will be employed by
state and local water purveyors to adapt to those climate impacts. His conclusion is
that while water end-user responses to “water prices, non-price water conservation
policies, water trading, investment in and operations of storage and conveyance

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infrastructure, and transboundary water allocation mechanisms” (p. 500) are well
known, the information needed to generate the “supply curves” that should inform
what combination of these levers will be most effective is still missing. Further, the
author concludes that without these curves, the Integrated Assessment Models
(IAMs) that are integral to developing economic policy responses will be suboptimal
at best.
Thus, this article has been very useful in illustrating the economist’s
worldview regarding the economic levers available to, and typically used by, the
state and local water purveyors who supply MCIWest’s installations. This
knowledge will be integrated into the development of the comprehensive, coherent
MCIWest Water Security Strategy.
Because MCIWest includes two installations, Marine Corps Base Camp
Pendleton and Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, that get 98% of their
water supply from local groundwater and have seventeen miles of coast line, the
article, Operationalising a Resilience Approach to Adapting an Urban Delta to
Uncertain Climate Changes (Wardekker et al., 2010) provides knowledge that is
directly applicable to the development of a comprehensive water security strategy.
The focus of this article is resilience and how to operationalize the concept.
The authors define resilience as: “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and
reorganise while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same
function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.” They also state the concept’s defining
characteristics as follows (p. 988):

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1. The amount of change the system can undergo and still retain the same
controls on function and structure.
2. The degree to which the system is capable of self-(re)organization to
accommodate external changes.
3. The ability to build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation.

This concept and many of its tenets will become the corner stone of the
MCIWest strategy. In order to operationalize the concept, the authors further state
the six associated “resilience principles” derived from a thorough knowledge of
system dynamics as follows:
Table 11: Resilience Principles (Source: Wardekker et al., 2010)

1) Homeostasis: multiple feedback loops counteract disturbances and stabilise
the system.
2) Omnivory: vulnerability is reduced by diversification of resources and means
(financial and human capital).
3) High flux: a fast rate of movement of resources through the system ensures
fast mobilization of these resources to cope with perturbations.
4) Flatness: the hierarchical levels relative to the base should not be top-heavy.
Overly hierarchical systems with no local formal competence to act are too
inflexible and too slow to cope with surprise and to rapidly implement non-
standard highly local responses.
5) Buffering: essential capacities are over-dimensioned such that critical
thresholds in capacities are less likely to be crossed.
6) Redundancy: overlapping functions; if one fails, others can take over.

Principles like flatness and high flux will be challenging for MCIWest to
operationalize, but scaled down versions or alternative approaches to their concepts
will add value to the Region’s management system.
The authors introduce an additional concept that will add value to the
MCIWest water security program. The application of the concept of “wildcards
(imaginable surprise scenarios)” to MCIWest’s planning efforts will greatly increase

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the resiliency of the system. The vision of wildcards described by the authors is that
they will come from one of three sources: “(type-1) extreme forms of expected
trends, (type-2) opposites of expected trends, and (type-3) completely new issues”
(p. 995). The overall inclusion of wildcards into the planning efforts of MCIWest will
be done through the adaptive management process and its scenario development
systems. Thus, the review of this article has resulted in increased knowledge and
operational capabilities that will be directly applicable to MCIWest.
Because introducing the concepts of adaptive capacity, resiliency,
vulnerability, etc. to the strategic planning systems of MCIWest will require a
nuanced approach, reviewing the article Linkages between vulnerability,
resilience, and adaptive capacity (Gallopin, 2006) will be useful by illustrating a
vision for how this could be done. Foundational to an understanding of the terms
referenced in the title is the concept of a Socio-Ecological System (SES). “An SES is
defined as a system that includes societal (human) and ecological (biophysical)
subsystems in mutual interaction” (p. 294). While the military has a great deal of
affection for acronyms, the concept of bounding a military region using the
academic term SES could meet with some resistance. The reason for the resistance
is found in the term’s definition. The human aspect (the sense of social justice and
equity portrayed by the author) will have a tendency to be perceived as “too soft”
for the traditional military (strict, calculating, prepared for sacrifices) strategic
planning processes.

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The author describes vulnerability as having broad applicability across
multiple scales for ecological subsystems to SESs, and is most often conceptualized
as representing exposure, and/or sensitivity to perturbations and external stresses
beyond the system’s capacity to adapt. The author defines “social resilience as the
ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as
a result of social, political, and environmental change” (p. 297).
Thus, for the purposed of MCIWest, the focus will remain on building
resilience through policy, planning and building systems with adaptive capacity,
while vulnerability will be represented by its major component exposure.
In Water Security and Adaptive Management in the Arid Americas (Scott
et al., 2013), the authors immediately demonstrate how flexible and adaptive their
terminology surrounding resilience is by strategically transforming the traditional
Socio-Ecological-System (SES) acronym into Societal-Ecosystem-Hydroclimate
(SEH) to better represent their worldview of resilience and water security. Beyond
this opening demonstration of adaptive capacity, this article has direct applicability
to my research by virtue of specifically addressing water security and adaptive
management in the “arid Americas” – the location of all of MCIWest’s installations.
The authors make a very strong case that the principles and practices of
adaptive management are the best way to pursue and achieve water security. They
acknowledge two of the critiques of adaptive management: 1) assumptions by
proponents that key decisions over water allocation, infrastructure, and outcomes
are apolitical; and 2) the ambiguity over the end goal of adaptive management. The

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authors then elucidate how their operationalization of adaptive management
answers those critiques. Their system once again focuses on resilience to deal with
the inherent uncertainties and risks (e.g. climate change) impacting the SEH system.
The authors define adaptive water management as “the science–policy process to
plan interactively for societal, ecosystem, and hydroclimatic uncertainties; initiate
responsive action; and iteratively assess water security outcomes in societal and
ecosystem resilience terms” (p. 282). They even acknowledge that our innate
tribalism and worldviews will impact our abilities to adaptively manage our water
security – “National interests, domestic politics, economic imperatives,
communication gaps, varying perspectives and values, and personality differences
can and do emerge during such dialogues” (p. 283). To illustrate how, using the
principles of adaptive management (planning interactively and iteratively), the most
significant challenges can be overcome, they cite several U.S.-Mexico and Central
American examples where stakeholders (citizens, scientists, policy makers) came
together under dire conditions of drought, flooding and pollution to collaborate on
solutions that benefited all sectors of the SEH system. Further, the authors
acknowledge three conundrums that arise from their work on adaptive water
management: “1. water is both a resource and a hazard; 2. infrastructure
simultaneously represents and adaption tool and a threat to water security (e.g.
desalination is a source of new water, an environmental hazard, and exacerbates
climate change through increased energy use compared to traditional water
treatment); 3. the urgency of many global change challenges militates against the

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drawn-out planning time-frame needed for broad-based science–policy processes”
(p. 287).
With these facts in mind, the authors lay out their vision for adaptive water
management of a SEH system. They have produced a graphic that leads a reviewer
through the impacts across the three SEH sectors of water resource management
during an El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle. The authors use different color
arrows to illustrate the points they make throughout the article (e.g. increasing
population and the devaluation of ecosystem services leads to stresses on water
quality and quantity while simultaneously increasing the dangers of fire, landslides
and soil moisture).

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Figure 40: Adaptive Water Security Management (Source: Scott et al., 2013)

It is clear that the authors feel that the only way to effectively manage water
resources in the face of the uncertainty and risks we are exposed to is through a
collaborative, science-policy based, iterative, adaptive management system and
their many examples of that level of cross-border, cross-cultural, successful pursuit
of water security validates their beliefs. The tenets and operational techniques
illustrated in this article will be utilized in the development of the MCIWest

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organizational construct, its communications plan, its knowledge management
system and its strategic engagement plan.
Throughout this research project it has been clear that the most significant
threat to water security is drought. In Mechanism and Comprehensive
Countermeasure for Drought Management from the View of Catastrophe Theory
(Wang et al., 2014), the authors show that both the frequency and intensity of
drought has been increasing across the globe. With special emphasis on China, the
authors illustrate the connections between “population growth, per-capita water
use, urbanization, economic development” and drought. All of this has had a
devastating impact on the Chinese “economy and food security”.
Thus, the need to identify mechanisms to enable adaptive water management
practices has become critical. To meet this need, the authors have turned to
catastrophe theory. If droughts are taken as “discontinuities or abnormal
behavior…catastrophe theory represents a universal method to explain transitions
through discontinuities and unexpected changes.” While the reasoning behind the
application of catastrophe theory stems from the fact that the combination of
natural and anthropogenic changes (e.g. climate change, population growth) with
sudden changes and transitional phenomenon (e.g. earthquakes, landslides) “turns
the systematic behavior space into non-differentiable space” (the structure of space-
time is no longer flat) and thus exceeds the capability of calculus to explain, the
actual explanation is much simpler. Catastrophe theory has the ability to perform
continuous calculations of quantitative changes as they evolve into qualitative

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changes. While the sophisticated calculations in the article will not be discussed in
this dissertation, the results will. The authors have proven mathematically that
focusing on the supply-side of drought is destined to fail. The future we face with all
of its discontinuities can only be managed by addressing the demand-side (for
water) of drought. And while they do not mention it in their paper, overpopulation
is by far the most significant driver of demand-side water resources management.
The role of drought preparedness in building and mobilizing adaptive
capacity in states and their community water systems (Engle, 2013), was a
transformational article for my research. Through this article I realized that my
research should focus, according to the tasking received through the chain of
command from the Secretary of Defense and the President, on drought and
adaptive capacity. The bottom-line for MCIWest is “sufficiency” – enough of the
appropriate quality water to meet its mission requirements. And the number one
threat to sufficiency in California and Arizona is drought. Therefore, building
drought adaptive capacity is the number one mission of the MCIWest water
security program.
The author defines adaptive capacity as “the ability of a system to prepare
for stresses and changes in advance or adjust and respond to the effects caused by
the stresses” (p. 293). Further, he states that “one important set of factors assumed
to significantly influence adaptive capacity is governance, institutions, and
management, for they either facilitate or inhibit adaptive capacity building” (p. 293).
Thus, he makes it clear through his findings in this article and the many references

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he uses, that the people (and their worldviews) who are the stakeholders and
decision-makers across the water industry spectrum (federal, state, and local
governments, businesses, academics and citizens) will ultimately determine the
adaptive capacity of our society to drought.
As with any endeavor hinging on the worldviews and performance of
stakeholders, there are inherent tensions within the pursuit of drought adaptive
capacity. Because the state and local water suppliers inherently have different
drought worldviews based on their business models and proximity to the end-user
(rate payer), it is natural that they also have different priorities and definitions for
what adaptive capacity is. Local water suppliers may feel the state has imposed too
much regulation/legislation on them and thus has constrained their adaptability, or
conversely, they may feel that the state has not provided enough of the ‘right’ kind of
regulation/legislation to give them the tools they need to drive the adaptations
they need to make during the drought. Thus, “the challenge for building adaptive
capacity through management, governance, and institutions in the context of
drought preparedness, becomes finding the appropriate balance between
structure/guidance/policy certainty (i.e., predictability) and flexibility across scales”
(p. 294). Towards this end, the author introduces the term regulated flexibility.
The author states that building adaptive capacity at any institutional or
organizational level centers on “drought preparedness” which he defines as having
“three basic categories, monitoring and early warning/prediction; risk/impact
assessment; and mitigation and response” (p. 294). These elements are all

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foundational to the MCIWest Water Security Strategy. To aid in the transfer of
knowledge, the author has developed a graphic and associated table to
communicate how to build drought adaptive capacity through drought
preparedness across the institutions of Arizona.
Figure 41: Drought Preparedness = Drought Adaptive Capacity (Source: Engle, 2013)

CWS – Community Water System
IWRM – Integrated Water Resources Management
IRP – Integrated Resources Plan

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Figure 42: Building and Mobilizing Adaptive Capacity (Source: Engle, 2013)

In Figure 42 above the author provides the heuristics that he has developed
for assessing the adaptive capacity of an institution. These heuristics along with the
principles described in Figure 43 below will be used to build the adaptive capacity
of the MCIWest Water Security Program.
Figure 43: Drought Adaptive Capacity Principal (Source: Engle, 2013)
1. Delegate drought preparedness to the local level;
2. Allow flexibility in triggers, plans, and monitoring;
3. Provide a comprehensive planning and informational support system;
4. Offer iterative regional forums for (or at least remove limitations to)
collaborating between systems and locales;
5. Consider climate change in their planning processes; and
6. Establish boundary organizations, such as the RISAs*, that are accessible and
active in water management and drought planning efforts.
* Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (RISA)

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Fortunately, (or unfortunately depending on your worldview), the
installations of MCIWest are located in California and Arizona, two of the states with
the most robust drought adaptive capacities. Many aspects of what the author
elucidates in his article already exist in both states and across their boundaries.
Thus, the challenge will be to design, staff and fund an MCIWest water security
organization that has the capability to integrate with the appropriate federal, state
and local water management institutions/organizations; align assessment, planning
and implementation strategies and programs with those institutions/organizations;
and find ways to innovate across traditional functional lines to build maximal
adaptive capacity.

D. Governance

Flooding, earthquake, terrorist attacks and the other aspects of water
security can be dealt with preemptively or adapted to as discrete events through
crisis management. However, drought is a different category of water security risk,
and dealing with it through crisis management is not only ineffective, but it leaves
the population more vulnerable to future droughts (Wilhite et al., 2014). Climate
change will increase the frequency and severity of droughts (Sivakumar, 2012;
Peterson et al., 2013) and it will take the integration of stakeholders (institutions,
businesses, academics, non-profits) and policy to effectively prepare for and manage
the impacts of drought. Because of the scope and scale of this required integration,

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only federal, state and local governments, working together, have the resources and
infrastructure to accomplish the task.
The authors of Managing drought risk in a changing climate: The role of
national drought policy (Wilhite et al., 2014) point out that “drought, like all
natural hazards, has both a natural and social dimension” (p. 5). And while exposure
to drought is a temporal and spatial factor, vulnerability to drought is significantly
driven by social factors – “population changes, population shifts (regional and rural
to urban), demographic characteristics, technology, government policies,
environmental awareness and degradation, water use trends, and social behavior”
(p. 5). Thus, the policies and actions employed to deal with a drought this year may
or may not be effective in dealing with the next drought. With these factors in mind,
governing institutions like MCIWest must seek to develop and implement drought
preparedness plans and policies “which would include organizational frameworks
and operational arrangements developed in advance of drought and maintained
between drought episodes” (p. 8). The authors recommend four principle drought
policy areas that every governing institution should implement and they will be
utilized in the development of the MCIWest updated Drought Policy.
Table 12: Four Principles of Drought Policy Areas (Source: Wilhite et al., 2014)
1) Risk and early warning, including vulnerability analysis, impact assessment,
and communication.
2) Mitigation and preparedness, including the application of effective and
affordable practices.
3) Awareness and education, including a well-informed public and a
participatory process.
4) Policy governance, including political commitment and responsibilities.

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As stated previously, the installations of MCIWest are located in California
and Arizona. Thus, all aspects of the authors’ recommended 10-step drought
planning process shown in Figure 44 are being implemented at the state and local
levels. All MCIWest has to do is determine how best to integrate its new water
security program into the existing network of water resource (drought)
professionals and governing institutions.
Figure 44: 10-step Drought Planning Process (Source: Wilhite et al., 2014)

The authors’ intention in doing this research and producing this paper is to
inspire and instruct the movement of governing entities from drought crisis
management to drought planning and mitigation management. With the mission
security of MCIWest highly dependent on its water security, adopting this paradigm
will be mandatory.
The drought planning principle of early warning is a significant aspect of a
pro-active vs. reactive governance system. With that in mind, the article
Information systems in a changing climate: Early warnings and drought risk
management (Pulwarty & Sivahumar, 2014) was reviewed. The authors’ main

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assertion is that “in a pro-active approach, early warning systems are important as
they are central to integrated risk assessment, communication and decision support
system of the drought information systems” (p. 20). While I share this view, my
contention is that because of the compounding, cascading and concatenating
impacts of overpopulation, climate change, and natural aridity on the installations of
MCIWest, there is no need for a distinct early warning. Our circumstances dictate
that we govern and operate as if we are in a constant state of drought.
The author of Water and Disasters: A review and analysis of policy aspects
(Gopalakrishnan, 2014) provides the quantitative data to emphasize what is at stake
in governing for drought preparedness and other “water disasters”. Figure 45
illustrates the numbers of people impacted and the cost to the world’s economy of
those impacts.
Figure 45: Water Disasters by type, 2000-2010 (Source: Gopalakrishnan, 2014)

From his research, the author identifies five key policy areas (shown in Table
13) that are associated with managing water disasters effectively.

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Table 13: Key Areas for Effective Water Disaster Management (Source: Gopalakrishnan, 2014)
1) Risk management
2) Vulnerability assessment
3) Capacity building and resilience
4) Disaster risk reduction–development linkage
5) Institutional design

All of these key areas will be addressed in development of the MCIWest
Water Security Strategy. The mixture of installations that make up MCIWest will
illustrate how the application of these effective policy areas will differ greatly across
the region. The eight installations face different risk and vulnerability profiles that
will necessitate different vehicles through which to pursue capacity building and
resilience, and disaster risk reduction. While the focus of this research is to inform
the institutional design of the MCIWest water security organization and its policies,
the very significant constraints that flow down the chain of command from Congress
to Headquarters Marine Corps to MCIWest will seriously impact its ability to
develop the flexibility and adaptability recommend by the author of this article and
of all the articles reviewed. Thus, while every aspect of effective water security
management will be evaluated for implementation, MCIWest will inherently be a
sub-optimized organization.
In Adaptive Capacity of Water Governance Arrangements: A comparative
study of barriers and opportunities in Swiss and US states (Clarvis & Engle,
2015), the authors elucidate the barriers that will drive the sub-optimization of
MCIWest. As a federal government entity and a military organization, the MCIWest

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water resources management organization will have a dual personality. It will be led
by a Commanding General, who has dictatorial powers at the regional and
installation level, but his funding for adaptive capacity building and implementation
comes through a bureaucratic “chain-of-command” with Commanding Generals at
each level above his with the same dictatorial powers over him, ultimately leading
to the U.S. Congress which has to first authorize and then appropriate any funding
for adaptation, resilience, and risk reduction. Thus, MCIWest will have the capability
to make policy and operational decisions unilaterally at the region and installation
level, giving it decisive flexibility to make adaptive decisions and allowing
organization staff to concentrate on building the networks to support and
implement those decisions based on the knowledge gained through iterative
analysis and communication with subject matter experts that enable the
integration of its collaboration across stakeholders to design its policies, actions
and timelines. As shown in Figure 46, MCIWest will have the capability to design an
institution at the local level according to the authors’ indicators of adaptive
capacity.

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Figure 46: Governance Adaptive Capacity Indicators (Source: Clarvis & Engle, 2015)

While the indicators shown in Figure 46 are proven metrics of adaptive
capacity across industry and academia, the authors have developed a more nuanced
set of institutional mechanisms (bridges) that they posit more effectively describes
the factors enabling adaptive capacity.
Table 14: “Bridges” Enabling Institutional Adaptive Capacity (Source: Clarvis & Engle, 2015)
1. Trust and actor relationships
2. Regional collaboration and partnerships
3. Leadership
4. Regulatory and legislative mechanisms

While MCIWest will be able to design a water resources governance
organization that builds the first three bridges to adaptive capacity, again at the
local level, the regulatory and legislative mechanism that MCIWest faces, including

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the funding of any risk reduction actions, is so bureaucratic and siloed that this
mechanism is actually a barrier versus a bridge for MCIWest. The authors discuss
the fact that the regulatory and legislative mechanism can be a bridge or a barrier
depending on the how the institution is designed and the system it operates in.
Table 15 illustrates the types of barriers to institutional adaptive capacity identified
by the authors.
Table 15: “Barriers” to Institutional Adaptive Capacity (Source: Clarvis & Engle, 2015)
1. Political
2. Regulatory and Legislative
3. Perception and Cognitive

Unlike most water management institutions in California and Arizona,
MCIWest will be directly impacted by the political barriers created at both the
state and federal government levels. Precipitation is the main source of water,
whether it directly irrigates crops and lawns, collects in rivers and is used as surface
water or diverted to reservoirs, or recharges groundwater basins. This fact makes
the watershed and hydrologic zones within the state the most logical and effective
place to manage water. Because of this, water management and governance has
traditionally been a state-led issue. Because all water production at the installations
of MCIWest must be done under the regulation and oversight of the states of
California and Arizona, and because all water purchased by the installations of
MCIWest must likewise be produced and/or purveyed under those same regulations
and oversight systems, MCIWest is directly impacted by the local and state water
politics. However, whereas state and local water purveyors are subject to the same

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system of federal water laws and regulations as MCIWest, they are not subject to the
barriers created by having their entire funding stream subject to the political
brinksmanship of the U.S. Congress. Nor are they subject to the complex, inflexible
and extraordinarily slow (6 yr.) Military Construction (MILCON) process. Thus,
there will clearly be more, and higher, barriers to institutional adaptive capacity
for MCIWest than authors explored in their article and that fact must be accounted
for in the institutional design of the new organization.
The authors’ inclusion of perception and cognitive barriers is another
example of how worldviews influence the pursuit of water security. Their example
of how the community water systems perceived “it is the state’s responsibility to
plan for future water, negating their own need and responsibility to implement
certain management approaches, such as the use of climate information” (p. 524),
illustrates how their worldview was a barrier to their own water security. This, and
many other examples, validates the fact that a stakeholder’s, especially a decision-
maker’s, worldview can be a threat to water security.
To effectively deal with the potential threats posed by decision-maker
worldviews, the staff of MCIWest must develop expertise in analyzing and
understanding where these worldviews come from, and how [and if] to influence
them. With this in mind, the authors of Measure, model, optimise: Understanding
reductionist concepts of value in freshwater governance (Tadaki & Sinner, 2014)
have analyzed several “approaches to freshwater governance frequently focused on
the identification, elicitation and measurement of diverse and competing

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stakeholder ‘values’ related to water resources” (p. 140). The particular framework
they researched was a “reductionist framework”.
A reductionist framework of value carries implications for governance,
including issues around representation (whose values matter?), and risks
excluding emergent concepts of place in both biophysical and sociocultural
dimensions (Tadaki & Sinner, 2014, p. 140).

Using this framework, the authors attempt to build an understanding for the
“underlying epistemological, institutional and political underpinnings, as well as the
management challenges facing agencies” (p. 140). Their research illustrated that
values can be linked to political ideologies rather than the rational analysis and
interpretations of facts (Tadaki & Sinner, 2014, p. 146). Thus, the reductionist
framework (reducing the complexities involved in managing water resources) is a
vehicle through which to implement an ‘antipolitical’ system of defining and
measuring values (worldviews) that can be communicated in a non-threatening
way with the goal of prioritizing the most significant elements of water resource
management to better inform adaptive decision-making. This article and the system
eluscidated by the authors will become a foundational element in building the
thorough understanding of stakeholder worldviews that will need to be considered
in the day-to-day and future planning operations of the MCIWest water resources
management organization.

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E. Conclusions

While it would seem natural for the new MCIWest water resources
management organization to wrap itself in the blanket of national security and
attempt to build an institutional fortress around its water security, attempting to
do so would make powerful enemies across the water industry. As we’ve seen in this
literature review, the worldviews of different water industry stakeholders vary
greatly according to their own special interests. The one thing they all have in
common are their logical and well thought out reasons for why their water security
is paramount to the local population, the state and the nation. Thus, rather than
designing an institution to wage a never-ending battle with fellow water security
stakeholders, MCIWest will endeavor to lead a collaborative effort to integrate itself
into the complex and combative world of water resources management and
governance in California and Arizona. Additionally, with its unique position in the
water industry, having federal, state, and local roles and responsibilities as a water
purveyor and purchaser, the opportunity to build bridges to adaptive capability
through a thorough understanding of the worldviews of the other stakeholders and
through the application of frameworks like the reductionist framework to de-
politicize decisions and initiatives as much as possible will be pursued.
As discussed, the compounding of climate change, overpopulation, and
geography (aridity) will make the pursuit of MCIWest’s adaptive water management

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and governance capacity the fundamental mission of its new water resources
organization.

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Chapter 8: TRANSLATING THEORY INTO PRACTICE

A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to fully describe the grounded theory for the
process developed to assess and manage the risks to MCIWest’s water security. The
chapter begins by discussing why water security for MCIWest equates to national
security for the U.S. This elucidation is followed by a discussion of the criteria by
which all risks addressed within the process will be judged. They will be judged
according to their impacts on MCIWest’s water supply and delivery systems. The
remainder of this chapter contains the development of the grounded theory process
itself. It begins with a discussion of why “risk” is the most appropriate concept to
utilize for managing MCIWest’s water resources and the associated systems. This is
followed with an overview of the process and then elucidations of each step,
including the formulation of MCIWest specific hazards, threats, ratings scales,
vulnerability assessments, filtering and prioritization processes.

B. Water Security Equals National Security for MCIWest

While several authors (e.g. Zeitoun, 2011; Cook & Baker, 2012; Garrick &
Hope, 2013; Tarlock & Wouters, 2010) have argued that water security does not
directly correlate to national security, MCIWest as a military organization, does have
that direct connection. The DNI (2012) report on Global Water Security elucidated
the clear connection between the “water problems – shortages, poor water quality,

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or floods – that will risk instability and state failure” and U.S. national security. Many
of the forces called upon to respond to the ramifications of this instability will come
from MCIWest. Thus, MCIWest has a direct national security connection to
international water security.
At the same time, several authors (e.g. CNA, 2007 & 2014; DNI, 2012;
Treverton et al., 2012) make it clear that there is a direct connection between
climate change and national security. While this is a major driver of international
water security, as the DNI (2012) report illustrates, the aspects of “extreme water
stress” related to climate change impacts all eight installations in MCIWest. Thus,
the systemic risks of overpopulation, climate change, and geography create a direct
national security connection to MCIWest’s domestic water security.

C. Water Security is Ultimately a Matter of Supply and Delivery

Ultimately it is whether an installation has a sufficient supply (access to,
right to, appropriate quality) of water and the ability to deliver (functional
infrastructure in the appropriate locations) that supply to its users (operational
units for training and administration; base support systems; base commercial
tenants; etc.) that determines its water security and by proxy, mission security.
Thus, the two most important water security risk assessment criteria are – Supply
and Delivery.

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D. Grounded Theory - Water Security Assessment and Management Process

1) Use of Risk to Understand and Manage Water Security for MCIWest

MCIWest and its installations are military organizations led by senior
military officers who have spent their careers analyzing and making risk-based
decisions. This process has significantly shaped their worldviews. Thus, developing
a risk-based water security assessment and management process provides a proven
and familiar system for communicating the complex array of water resource issues
facing MCIWest and its installations. This familiarity and inherent confidence in the
system will allow them to quickly prioritize strategic water security investments.
Additionally, this risk-based process will generate graphical communication tools
that will provide senior decision-makers with the ability to quickly judge the
effectiveness of their investments.

2) Overview of the Process

“The intent of a grounded theory study is to move beyond description and to
generate or discover a theory…for a process or an action” (Creswell, 2012, Kindle
Location: 1808).
Along with my professional practitioner expertise, interactions with water
industry and military senior managers and decision-makers, a comprehensive
literature review was conducted to inform the development of the Water Security
Assessment and Management Process for MCIWest. Table 16 summarizes this

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process which was significantly informed by Figure 27 on page 123 (Curtis & Cary,
2012).
Table 16: MCIWest Water Security Assessment and Management Process (Source: Simpson (l), 2016)
MCIWest Water Security Assessment and Management Process
E. Identifying the Hazards, Threats and Impacts to MCIWest's Water Security
F. Establishing the Risk Evaluation Criteria
G. Developing the Impact, Likelihood, Speed of Onset and Vulnerability Rating Scales
H. Risk and Vulnerability Assessments
I. Filtering and Prioritizing Risks and Vulnerabilities
J. Developing the Risk Responses
K. Measures of Effectiveness

3) Identifying the Hazards, Threats and Impacts to Water Security

While Chapters 3 through 5 provided the foundation for the entire process, it
was the completion of the comprehensive review of the industry and government
documents focused on identifying and categorizing the risks to water security,
Chapter 6, that informs this first step in the process. Numerous articles like (Grigg,
2003; Kodack, 2011; Kumar, 2015; Hirsch & Archfield, 2015; Ehrlich & Ehrlich,
2012; Rodrigue, 2012; etc.) were invaluable to the development of a unique listing
and categorization of the risks to MCIWest’s water security.
The first aspect in developing this understanding of the risks to water
security was to understand the differences between a hazard and a threat. To
differentiate between the two in the case of MCIWest water security risks, I define a
hazard as a naturally occurring dimension of risk caused by a non-human
controlled process, cycle or element. I define a threat as a dimension of risk that has
been caused by a human induced or controlled process. I further differentiate

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between hazards and threats by discussing the inherent causes of the natural
hazards, vs. the manifestations of the human threats which are the resultants or
indicators of that threat.
Figure 47: Overview of Hazards and Threats to MCIWest Water Security (Source: Simpson (m), 2016)

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As shown in Figure 47, I used my literature review and professional expertise
to develop a categorization scheme for the hazard and threat dimensions that I
identified as most useful for my analysis of MCIWest’s water security profile.
The first category that I identified as a dimension of the natural hazards
was meteorological (pertaining to meteorology or to phenomena of the atmosphere
or weather
7
). I used this terminology to account for the aspects of weather that
represent hazards to water security (i.e. drought reduces supply, flooding, lightning
and extreme wind can damage infrastructure) and for the most pertinent systemic
drivers of those aspects (i.e. climate change – extended and more frequent
droughts, increased severity of flooding, extended and more severe heat waves, etc.;
aridity – the natural weather pattern associated with MCIWest’s geographic location
leading to increased susceptibility to drought). The next dimensional category that I
utilized was geological. This category allows me to capture the hazards to water
security presented by the movement of the earth’s tectonic plates, the additional
hazards presented by inundation, landslides, subsidence and by the naturally
occurring mineral and immunological contaminants found within the earth’s crust –
all of which have the potential to impact water supply and delivery systems.
I have broken human threats to water security into three dimensions
consisting of six categories and their associated threat manifestations. The first

7
Source: The definition of meteorological. (n.d.). Retrieved May 14, 2016, from
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/meteorological

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dimension includes the physical threats which come in the form of attacks and
accidents. The second dimension includes the institutional threats which come in
the form of governance and management threats. And the final dimension are the
societal threats which come from worldviews and overpopulation.
I have developed Table 17 to provide a more detailed explanation of this
comprehensive list of the hazards and threats alongside their associated causes,
manifestations, and impacts as the foundation for the remaining steps in my
MCIWest Water Security Assessment and Management Process. The impacts
associated with each hazard or threat were derived from my education and
experience as a professional civil engineer, from my experience as the senior water
resource manager at Camp Pendleton and from my comprehensive literature review
of the risks to water security. Additionally, Table 17 begins the process of
identifying why climate change is a systemic risk to water security and how it
interacts with the other risks to water security. For example, when climate change
leads to more severe drought it creates more “fuel” for potential fires started by
vehicle accidents, construction accidents, operator error, equipment failure, etc.
Thus, climate change has a “cascading” impact on water security.

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190

191

192

193

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4) Establishing the Risk Evaluation Criteria and Process

The water security risk evaluation criteria that will be used in MCIWest’s
Water Security Assessment and Management Process are supply and delivery. As
shown in my definition of water security for MCIWest, having sufficient water, in
quantity and quality (supply) matched by the capacity to access it and use it
(delivery), to resolve trade-offs, and to manage water-related risks, including flood
(impacts supply and delivery), drought (supply) and pollution (supply and delivery)
demonstrates the appropriateness of this choice of criteria.
In the risk assessment process elucidated by Curtis and Cary (2012), the
components of the risk are: impact; likelihood; speed of onset; and vulnerability. I
have tailored their methodologies and those of other authors to develop the
MCIWest Water Security Assessment and Management Process.
Figure 48: Risk Assessment Flow Diagram (Curtis & Cary, 2012, p. 2)

5) Developing Impact, Likelihood, Velocity and Vulnerability Scales

Most risk calculation systems begin by developing rating scales for the
impact and likelihood of the hazard or threat which are then used to quantify risk by
multiplying the rating for impact by the rating for likelihood to arrive at a numeric

196
value for each individual risk that can then be compared across the entire portfolio
(e.g. Curtis & Cary, 2012; Grigg, 2003; Kodack et al., 2011).
The scale for rating the impacts of the hazards and risks was developed using
the concepts from Curtis and Cary (2012), my professional experience and my
comprehensive literature review (Chapters 3-7). The water security risk criteria for
rating impacts are supply and delivery.
Table 18: Water Security Hazard & Threat Impact Ratings Scale (Source: Simpson (p), 2016)
Impact Rating Scale
Rating Descriptor Definition
5 Extreme • Probable of loss of life
• Probable forced relocation
• Probable long-term installation mission failure
• Complete contamination of supply requiring >$10million to treat
and/or remediate and/or >$5million in additional O&M costs
• Loss of rights to water supply
• Supply completely consumed (e.g. water mining, reservoir drained,
aquifer collapse)
• Supply allocation reduced to minimum for health and mission
• Complete failure of delivery system infrastructure that will take >18
months and/or cost >$5million to rebuild
• Complete lack of funding and/or funding mechanisms to respond to
emergencies
• Complete lack of trained personnel to plan, operate, maintain delivery
systems and respond to emergencies
4 Major • Possible loss of life
• Possible forced relocation
• Possibility of installation long-term mission failure
• Severe contamination of supply requiring >$5million to treat and/or
remediate and/or >$2million in additional O&M costs
• Loss of rights to water supply that will require significant investment
(time and money) to get them back
• Supply very nearly consumed (e.g. water mining, reservoir drained,
aquifer collapse) <5 years of supply left a minimal usage
• Supply allocation harms mission capability and economic activity
• Significant failure of delivery system infrastructure that will take >12
months and/or cost >$3million to repair/rebuild
• Significant lack of funding and/or funding mechanisms to respond to
emergencies
• Significant lack of trained personnel to plan, operate, maintain
delivery systems and respond to emergencies

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3 Moderate • Long-term reduction in installation mission capability
• Contamination of supply requiring >$2million to treat and/or
remediate and/or >$1million in additional O&M costs
• Rights to water supply open to or experiencing challenges in court
• Viability of Supply <20years
• Supply allocation does minimal harm to mission capability and
economy
• Failure of delivery system infrastructure that will take >6 months
and/or cost >$1million to repair/rebuild
• Lack of funding and/or funding mechanisms to respond to
emergencies
• Lack of trained personnel to plan, operate, maintain delivery system
and respond to emergencies
2 Minor • Average probability of loss of life
• Average probability of installation long-term mission failure
• Contamination of supply requiring >$500k to treat and/or remediate
and/or >$250k in additional O&M costs
• Viability of Supply <50years
• Supply allocation disrupts mission and economy
• Damage to delivery system infrastructure that will take >1 month
and/or cost >$200k to repair/rebuild
• Limited funding and/or funding mechanisms to respond to
emergencies
• Limited number of trained personnel to plan, operate, maintain
delivery system and respond to emergencies
1 Incidental • Contamination of supply that will require some treatment and/or
remediation
• Damage to delivery system infrastructure that will require
investment of time and money to repair

The ratings scales for likelihood and speed of onset were taken directly from
Curtis and Cary (2012) and applied to the water security hazards and threats. For
example, under the definition for “Annual Frequency” a natural hazard that occurs
“once in 2 years up to once in 25 years” is considered “likely” in the system and
receives a rating of “4”. According to (Cook et al., 2007), drought in the southwest
definitely meets these criteria and thus should have a likelihood rating of “4” on this
scale.

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Table 19: Water Security Hazard/Threat Likelihood Ratings Scale (Source: tailored to water security
assessment from Curtis & Cary, 2012, p. 5)

Water Security Hazard/Threat Likelihood Rating Scale
Rating
Annual Frequency Probability
Descriptor Definition Descriptor Definition
5 Frequent
Up to once in 2 years
or more
Almost
certain
90% or greater chance of
impacting supply and/or
delivery
4 Likely
Once in 2 years up to
once in 25 years
Likely
65% up to 90% chance of
impacting supply and/or
delivery
3 Possible
Once in 25 years up to
once in 50 years
Possible
35% up to 65% chance of
impacting supply and/or
delivery
2 Unlikely
Once in 50 years up to
once in 100 years
Unlikely
10% up to 35% chance of
impacting supply and/or
delivery
1 Rare
Once in 100 years or
less
Rare
<10% chance of impacting
supply and/or delivery

Curtis and Cary (2012) further develop rating scales for the velocity (speed
of onset) of the hazard or threat and for the vulnerability of the organization to each
risk. The speed of onset of the hazard or threat will only affect its impact. I have
accounted for this concept in my risk calculation by averaging the rating numbers
for impact and speed of onset before multiplying that number by the rating number
for likelihood. Figure 49 illustrates the application of this concept.
Figure 49: Example of Water Security Risk Incorporating Speed of Onset (Source: Simpson (o), 2016)

Speed of onset ratings scales are generic enough to be somewhat constant
across risk analysis systems. Thus, the rating scale I will employ for speed of onset
(velocity) has been taken directly from the Risk Assessment in Practice article.

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Table 20: Water Security Risk Speed of Onset Rating Scale (Source: Curtis & Cary, 2012, p. 7)
Water Security Risk Speed of Onset Rating Scale
Rating Descriptor Definition
5 Very High Very rapid onset, little or no warning, instantaneous
4 High Onset occurs in a matter of days to a few weeks
3 Medium Onset occurs in a matter of a few months
2 Low Onset occurs in a matter of several months
1 Very Low Very slow onset, occurs over a year or more

The final ratings scale that must be developed prior to the Risk Assessment
phase of this process is for the concept of vulnerability. Unlike speed of onset, the
concept of vulnerability both flows from, and will compound, impact and
likelihood. “The more vulnerable the entity is to the risk, the higher the impact will
be should the event occur. If risk responses including controls are not in place and
operating as designed, then the likelihood of an event increases” (Curtis & Cary,
2012, p. 6). Additionally, conducting the vulnerability assessment is somewhat
independent of the risk assessment. Instead of directly assessing the risks
themselves, it gauges the exposure and resilience of an entity (e.g. an MCIWest
Installation) to a portfolio of risks. Thus, vulnerability becomes a key element in
designing risk responses and in measuring the effectiveness of those risk responses.
Once again, my vulnerability assessment scale format has been patterned after the
work of the industry leading risk analysts at Deloitte and Touche LLP (Curtis & Cary,
2012, p. 6). Also, consistent with the other aspects of the MCIWest Water Security
Risk Assessment and Management Process, this scale has been developed using
supply and delivery as the evaluation criteria.

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Table 21: Water Security Vulnerability Assessment Scale (Source: Simpson (q), 2016)
Water Security Vulnerability Assessment Scale
Rating Descriptor Definition
5 Very High • No alternative sources/supplies of water available
• Existing sources of supply extraordinarily vulnerable to climate
change, drought, contamination, overpopulation, intense competition
• No rights and/or preferential rights to any amount of water supply
• Water supply comes from a provider with no water rights and low
priority to available water
• Delivery system has not been maintained and is subject to significant
physical risk of failure
• Delivery system is exposed to very significant risk of physical attack
• No risk analysis and scenario planning performed to understand the
exposure of supply and delivery to the portfolio of risks they face and
how severely they will be impacted by those risks
• Lack of enterprise level/local/process level capabilities to address
risks (limited to no resilience to risks)
• No funding to implement any risk reduction plans
• No, or extraordinarily slow, funding mechanisms to address risks,
and/or react to attacks or accidents
• No risk reduction responses implemented
• No contingency or crisis management plans in place
• There is a severe shortage of personnel to manage supply and
delivery systems, and those in-place lack the training/experience to
plan, operate, maintain, and protect the systems

4 High • Very limited alternative sources/supplies of water available
• Existing sources of supply very vulnerable to climate change, drought,
contamination, overpopulation, intense competition
• Limited water rights and/or preferential rights with suppliers to the
amount of water necessary for mission capability
• Water supply comes from a provider with limited water rights and
low priority to available water
• Delivery system has been very poorly maintained and is subject to
physical risk of failure
• Delivery system is exposed to a high risk of physical attack
• Very limited risk analysis and scenario planning performed to
understand the exposure of supply and delivery to the portfolio of
risks they face and how severely they will be impacted by those risks
• Very limited enterprise level/local/process level capabilities to
address risks (very limited resilience to risks)
• Very limited funding to implement any risk reduction plans
• Very slow, funding mechanisms in-place to address risks, and/or
react to attacks or accidents
• Very limited risk reduction responses implemented
• Very limited contingency or crisis management plans in place
• There is a significant shortage of personnel to manage supply and
delivery systems, and those in-place have very limited

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training/experience in planning, operating, maintaining, and
protecting the systems
3 Medium • Limited alternative sources/supplies of water available
• Existing sources of supply vulnerable to climate change, drought,
contamination, overpopulation, intense competition
• Water rights and/or preferential rights with suppliers to the amount
of water necessary for mission capability subject to “curtailment”
during severe drought
• Water supply comes from a provider with water rights and priority to
available water subject to reduction during drought “allocations”
• Delivery system has been poorly maintained leading to frequent
breakdown of capability to access supply
• Major portions of delivery system are exposed to a risk of physical
attack
• Limited risk analysis and scenario planning performed to understand
the exposure of supply and delivery to the portfolio of risks they face
and how severely they will be impacted by those risks
• Limited enterprise level/local/process level capabilities to address
risks (limited resilience to risks)
• Limited funding to implement any risk reduction plans
• Funding mechanisms in-place to address risks, and/or react to
attacks or accidents easily overwhelmed
• Limited risk reduction responses implemented
• Limited contingency or crisis management plans in place
• There is a shortage of personnel to manage supply and delivery
systems, and those in-place have inadequate training/experience in
planning, operating, maintaining, and protecting the systems

2 Low • Some alternative sources/supplies of water available
• Existing sources of supply have low vulnerability to climate change,
drought, contamination, overpopulation, intense competition
• Water rights and/or preferential rights with suppliers to the amount
of water necessary for mission capability have limited exposure to
“curtailment” during severe drought
• Water supply comes from a provider with water rights and priority to
available water has limited exposure to reduction during drought
“allocations”
• Delivery system has been moderately maintained limiting breakdown
of capability to access supply
• Minor portions of delivery system are exposed to a risk of physical
attack
• A risk analysis and scenario planning has been performed to
understand the exposure of supply and delivery to the portfolio of
risks they face and how severely they will be impacted by those risks
• Moderate enterprise level/local/process level capabilities to address
risks (moderate resilience to risks)
• Modest funding in-place to implement any risk reduction plans
• Funding mechanisms are in-place to address risks, and/or react to
attacks or accidents
• Some risk reduction responses implemented

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• Contingency or crisis management plans in place and have had some
rehearsals
• There is a modest shortage of personnel to manage supply and
delivery systems, but those in-place have adequate
training/experience in planning, operating, maintaining, and
protecting the systems

1 Very Low • Alternative sources/supplies of water available
• Existing sources of supply have very limited vulnerability to climate
change, drought, contamination, overpopulation, intense competition
• Water rights and/or preferential rights with suppliers to the amount
of water necessary for mission capability have not exposed to
“curtailment” during severe drought
• Water supply comes from a provider with water rights and priority to
available water has no exposure to reduction during drought
“allocations”
• Delivery system has been well maintained and breakdown of
capability to access supply very infrequent
• Delivery systems has very limited exposure to a risk of physical attack
• A risk analysis and scenario planning has been performed to fully
understand the exposure of supply and delivery to the portfolio of
risks they face and how severely they will be impacted by those risks
• Robust enterprise level/local/process level capabilities to address
risks (robust resilience to risks)
• Adequate funding in-place to implement any risk reduction plans
• Funding mechanisms are in-place, and personnel are trained to
address risks, and/or react to attacks or accidents
• All identify risk reduction responses implemented
• Contingency or crisis management plans in place and are exercised
regularly
• There is no shortage of personnel to manage supply and delivery
systems, but those in-place have the training/experience in planning,
operating, maintaining, and protecting the systems to do so in an
effective manner

6) Risk and Vulnerability Assessments

In order to reduce the uncertainty inherent to choosing a rating for the
impact, likelihood, speed of onset, and vulnerability associated with each hazard and
threat, when necessary, I utilize ranges of numbers and take the average value. For
example, using the scale I developed to evaluate the impacts of flooding, I know that

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depending on the circumstances, flooding can result in extreme (5), major (4),
moderate (3) or even minor (2) impacts. Thus, to limit the uncertainty of my choice,
I perform the following calculation (5+4+3+2)/4 = 3.5 and use this value represent
the impact of flooding in my risk assessment. Additionally, if it can be determined
with a high degree of certainty that the variable in question rates a certain number,
say 2 or 5, for the preponderance of its probable occurrences, then an average will
be calculated for the impact, likelihood, or speed of onset of that hazard or threat.
Of course, there are hazards and threats for which a single rating number can be
chosen with a high degree of certainty. For example, the speed of onset of a terrorist
attack clearly deserves a rating of (5).
Another important operation that needs to be performed during the
assessment phase of this process is to analyze the interactions between the
hazards/threats. This analysis will identify any of the hazards and threats that
compound, concatenate, or cascade with other hazards and threats, and also which
ones interact with a significant number of the other hazards and threats (some
hazards/threats will interact in ways that do not compound, concatenate or
cascade). This process will illuminate if there are any systemic risks to MCIWest’s
water security.
The final step in the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment is to look at the
hazards and threats through the lenses (worldviews) of the individual installations.
The current comprehensive list of hazards and threats to water security applies to
all water resource management entities whether they are at the local, state, national

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or international levels. Thus, in order to operationalize this risk assessment, the
comprehensive list must be filtered through the lenses of the eight installation
Commanders and their staffs. The installations directly support the operational
forces and have significant constraints on their funding for personnel and projects
to ensure the water security (mission security) of their bases and stations. With that
in mind, the hazards and threats may need to be combined and re-categorized to
allow for the prioritization of risk at the installation level.
Figure 50 summarizes the first step in the process. The ratings scales
developed previously have been used (with ranges to decrease uncertainty) to
develop numbers for impact, likelihood, and speed of onset. These numbers were
used to calculate a quantitative value for risk by multiplying a hazard’s/threat’s
impact times its likelihood. The same process was conducted modifying impact with
speed of onset and the results are show in Figure 50.

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Figure 51: MCIWest Water Security Risk Assessment Graphic (Source: Simpson (s), 2012)

This figure illustrates that:
• The most significant Risks to MCIWest’s regional water security come from – Overpopulation
driven overconsumption; climate change; aridity (geography); governance (funding, political will,
decision paralysis); over allocation (of the Colorado River and groundwater); and personnel (lack
and/or shortage of people, training and expertise)
• When the speed of onset is factored into the calculation, it reduces the overall risk to supply and
delivery posed by hazards and threats that have manifested themselves over long periods of time
(e.g. the over allocation of the Colorado River and groundwater) and those that will manifest
themselves over a long period of time (e.g. climate change, overconsumption/overpopulation)
• Conversely, when the speed of onset is factored into the calculation, it increases the overall risk to
supply and delivery posed by threats like physical attacks (terrorism, arson, etc.) and accidents
(vehicle, construction, operator error)
• Speed of onset will have more impact at the installation level where physical, institutional
operations, flooding, and landslide risks happen quickly and dramatically

The next element of the MCIWest water security risk assessment is the
development of the Risk Interactions Matrix.

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Again, Figure 52 illustrates that the most significant risks to MCIWest’s water
security come in the form of institutional, societal and the obvious meteorological
risks. Institutional (governance) threats such as funding interact with nearly all
other hazards and threats. For example, funding availability and levels directly
impacts the region’s and installation’s ability to hire the appropriate number of
appropriately skilled personnel to do the policy and project development, the
contracting and construction oversight, to preempt, mitigate or adapt to: drought;
climate change; hurricanes/tornados (winds); sea-level rise; earthquake; mineral
contamination; terrorist attacks; equipment failures; new regulations; etc.
Thus, the elements of the risk assessment, including the risk interactions
matrix, have clearly validated that some hazards and threats are systemic (drought,
climate change, aridity, overpopulation) and identified the key areas that will need
to be emphasized in the development of my risk responses.
The final element of the assessment process is the MCIWest Water Security
Vulnerability Assessment. MCIWest, as a region, has macro-level vulnerabilities
driven by the systemic risks to water security, while each installation directly incurs
the vulnerabilities associated with the hazards and threats to water security. With
this in mind, I have conducted an installation-by-installation vulnerability
assessment. This assessment is based on my professional expertise/experience, my
comprehensive literature review, and my daily interactions with federal, state, and
local water industry decision-makers. Again, to minimize uncertainty, I have utilized

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ranges for the ratings that I developed in Table 21: Water Security Vulnerability
Assessment Scale.
Figure 53: MCIWest Water Security Vulnerability Assessment (Source: Simpson (u), 2016)

This figure illustrates that:
• Once again, overpopulation is an overwhelming systemic vulnerability – except for MCAGCC 29
Palms – because the installation is mining fossil water at a rate that gives it a projected aquifer life-
span of 200 years, therefore, the installation is not currently vulnerable to the systemic risks of
drought, overpopulation, climate change, and natural aridity

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• While water mining is in no way a sustainable practice, it does create an approximately 200-year
timeframe during which MCAGCC is MCIWest’s most water secure installation
• Additionally, because MCAGCC is one of the three Training installations (MCRD San Diego and MWTC
also), it has an additional (higher-level) and more stream-lined funding mechanism for projects,
operations, and maintenance of its delivery systems
However, because of its location (true desert), MCAGCC does have inherent challenges attracting and
retaining personnel with water resource management expertise

7) Filtering, Re-categorizing and Prioritizing Risks and Vulnerabilities

Thus far, the portfolio of risks identified through my comprehensive
literature review and organized according to my professional experience and
expertise have been focused at the MCIWest level. As a regional command
responsible for engagement at the local, state and federal levels, MCIWest’s water
security worldview needs to be holistic and it needs to have the depth and breadth
of understanding to resolve trade-offs amongst water-related policies and projects,
and manage the highest level water-related risks for each installation and for the
mission of the Marine Corps. These risks include systemic risks like the natural
aridity of the southwestern United States, overpopulation driven overconsumption,
anthropogenic climate change and the associated more frequent, more severe and
longer duration droughts. MCIWest’s worldview must include an understanding of
the worldviews of other significant water resource management and governance
organizations, like the California State Water Resources Control Board, the Arizona
Department of Water Resources, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. EPA, etc.
Developing this worldview and maintaining it will be the focus of the MCIWest
Water Resources Program Director and was the focus of the Stakeholder Survey

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completed for this research. As important as the development and maintenance of
this externally focused worldview is, MCIWest must also have a thorough
understanding of the risk portfolios of its individual installations and of the
worldviews of their Commanders and water resource management staffs.
While MCIWest is focused on strategic region-wide investment decisions and
risk responses, the installation Commanders and their staffs are focused at the
tactical and operational levels, making trade-offs and water-related investment
decisions that directly affect the installation’s capability to support its operational
forces. Thus, the comprehensive listing of local, state, and federal level risks must be
filtered, prioritized and operationalized for each installation within MCIWest.
The MCIWest Commanding General holds two positions simultaneously. He
is the Commanding General for Marine Corp Installations Command (West), and he
is the Commanding General for Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. Like the CG, I
hold two positions simultaneously. I am the Program Director for Marine Corps
Installation Command (West) Water Resources Program, and I am the Director of
Camp Pendleton’s Water Resources Division. This gives me a unique perspective
regarding the development of a strategic regional water security worldview and a
tactical/operational installation water security worldview.
The system of (43) hazards and threats that where categorized into:
meteorological, geological, physical, institutional, and societal risks according to
their impact and likelihood, is too comprehensive to be addressed at the installation
level. It would not be realistic nor effective to have installation Commanders and

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their staffs attempt to address this many risks and vulnerabilities across all levels of
government. Thus, the full list of risks will be filtered, re-categorized and prioritized
into an operationalized listing that can be used by the installation Commanders and
their staffs to make trade-offs and manage water-related investments that best
support their operational forces.
The first installations that will be addressed are Marine Corps Base (MCB)
and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Camp Pendleton. Because MCAS is an Air
Station within MCB, and its water supply and delivery systems are owned and
operated by MCB, both installations will be addressed simultaneously.
Table 22: MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton Risk Filter and Prioritization (Simpson (w), 2016)
Installation:
MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton (MCB - source of supply and delivery for MCAS)
Risk Filter and Priority
Meteorological
Drought
• A systemic risk associated with the natural meteorology of the southwest
• Risk exacerbated by climate change – more frequent, more severe, longer
• Installation source of supply is groundwater
• The installation’s southern system receives legally mandated recharge water
from upstream water district resulting from 1951 legal action
• Upstream water district susceptible to allocation during a drought which could
lead to reduction or cessation of mandated recharge flows
o This represents significant risk for the installation as the majority of
water is used in the southern section of the installation
• Northern section of the installation is experiencing dropping groundwater
levels due to the drought and has no secondary source of supply
o This represents significant risk for the installation
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 1 - Address potential for continued severe drought

Flooding
• Installation has experienced severe flooding (with loss of life) in the past
• Flooding potentially exacerbated by climate change
• Thus, flooding represents a risk to the supply and delivery systems for the
installation
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with other “Physical Risks” to
supply and delivery system
*Priority 2 – Installation has emergency action procedures in-place and exercised
them in 2016

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Wind
• No significant wind damage (hurricanes or tornados) recorded at installation
• Nor has the upstream water district experienced wind damage
• Thus, wind does not represent a risk to the supply and delivery systems for the
installation
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Temperature
• The risk to the installation is the macro-level risk (exacerbated by climate
change) to the Colorado River and the Sierra snowpack which could impact
upstream water district and recharge of southern aquifer system
• Risk will be addressed while addressing the systemic risk of climate change
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Lightning
• While the drought has made the risk from brush fires (which can damage supply
and delivery systems) on the installation more severe and lightning can cause
brush fires, this has not been a significant issue at the installation
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Climate
Change
• A macro-level systemic risk that significantly impacts many other risks
• Each installation will deal holistically with the impacts of climate change to its
supply and delivery systems and not with it as a solitary risk
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Aridity
(geography)
• The inherent risk to water security posed by having an installation in the
southwest where climate change is making the impacts of drought, temperature,
fire and flash flooding more severe is significant
• However, again this is a macro-level systemic risk and its impacts on this
installation’s supply and delivery systems will be addressed through MCIWest’s
regional strategy
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Geological
Earthquake
• While earthquakes represent a significant risk to all of California and to MCAS
Yuma, the depth and breadth of the existing effort to deal with this risk (seismic
sections of building codes, mandated seismic retrofits, detailed earthquake
planning in-place and being exercised, and disaster response and recover plans
in-place at every level of government) mean that MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
and the other installations can do very little to further reduce the risk to their
supply and delivery systems.
• Thus, while there remain risks associated with earthquakes, they have already
been accepted by our society and the military.
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Inundation
• MCB utilizes groundwater from (4) coastal aquifer systems – each of which are
at risk from the seawater infiltration that will result from sea-level rise and
inundation (risks to supply)
• MCAS is not on the coast, MCB is the installation’s sole water provider and thus,
they share the risk of seawater infiltration associated with climate change
induced sea-level rise and inundation
• For clarity this risk will be changed to seawater infiltration

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*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment - combine with other “Physical Risks” to
supply and delivery system
*Priority 2

Landslide/
Mudslide
• The risk of landslides/mudslides accompanies the risk of flooding
• Climate change is driving more severe weather which will lead to more severe
flooding, and thus more risk of landslides/mudslides
• Landslides/mudslide have the potential to physically damage delivery systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment directly associate with flooding -
combine with other “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery system
*Priority 2 – analyze the locations where there is a potential for a
landslide/mudslide that would damage delivery system

Subsidence
• Due to the geomorphology (sand and clays) of the (4) aquifer systems utilized at
Camp Pendleton, the aquifers would have to be completely dewatered to cause
significant subsidence that could threaten the installation’s delivery systems
• This act would take a long period of time during which it would be subjected to
significant scrutiny and would require many senior decision-makers to violate
current Marine Corps, Department of the Navy and Department of Defense
policies or change them to allow the destruction of a natural resource system
• This action is possible but beyond extremely improbable
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Mineral
Contaminants
• The risk of encountering existing, but previously un-encountered, geologic
contaminants – mineral (e.g. arsenic), radionuclides (e.g. chromium 6), or
bacteria (E coli) – is directly related to the necessity extract larger and larger
quantities of groundwater during an extended period of drought
• MCB Camp Pendleton has experienced significant reductions in groundwater
levels reaching near historic lows and various contaminants are known to exist
within the geomorphology of the installation
• Thus, this circumstance represents a potential risk to MCB/MCAS water supply
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under risk of encountering
“Groundwater Contaminants”)
*Priority 1 – directly threatens supply

Radionuclides
Bacteria and
Viruses
Volcano
• This is not a relevant risk for MCB/MCAS
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Physical /Attacks
Terrorism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Vandalism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Arson
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Cyber
• MCB/MCAS does not currently have a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) that could be used to effect its supply and delivery systems in such a
way that would cause harm to anyone or significant damage
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

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Physical/Accidents
Vehicle
• MCB/MCAS has minor water delivery infrastructure that is exposed to vehicle
accidents, but this vulnerability has been mitigated as much as economically
feasible
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Construction
• MCB/MCAS currently mitigates this threat as much as economically feasible
through required training and inspection of all construction contractors who
work on the installation – thus, this risk has been mitigated as much as
economically feasible
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Fire
• MCB/MCAS has experienced significant damage from fires in the past, and has
developed and invested in a robust system to preempt accidental fires wherever
possible and to deal with those that start and threaten the water supply and
delivery systems – thus, this risk has been mitigated as much as economically
feasible
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Operator
Error
• The water supply and delivery systems for MCB/MCAS depend on the
installation’s state certified operators for the continued provision of their
services
• MCB/MCAS have robust training and safety programs in-place to mitigate these
risks as much as economically feasible
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Equipment
Failure
• The water supply and delivery systems for MCB/MCAS depend on the
functionality of its equipment
• MCB/MCAS have a robust maintenance and repair system in-place, however, the
maintenance requirements for this equipment are habitually underfunded and
thus equipment failure represents a risk to the water supply and delivery
systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Infrastructure
Failure
• Like equipment, maintenance of infrastructure is habitually underfunded and
thus represents a failure risk that could further mitigated
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2

ICS Failure
• The existing Industrial Controls Systems at MCB/MCAS are not well maintained,
calibrated or repaired and thus represent a risk to the water supply and
delivery systems of the installations
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2

Institutional/Governance
Legal
• There are two legal court decisions that represent risk to the water supply
(groundwater recharge) of MCB/MCAS – the Cooperative Water Resources
Agreement (CWRMA) and the Settlement Agreement of the court mandated
physical solution to Case 1247 – the Conjunctive Use Project

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• The water supply risk associated with the CWRMA comes from extreme drought
conditions where the upstream water district that currently provides a
prescribed amount of water on a prescribed schedule under the agreement sees
choosing to “opt out” of the agreement and go back to court as their best option
– leaving the installation with only storm-water flows to recharge its southern
aquifer
• The supply risk associated with the CUP come from the requirement for MCB to
provide Fallbrook Public Utility district with a prescribed amount of water on a
prescribe schedule even if MCB’s delivery system has failed for a reason not
covered in the Settlement Agreement
• Additional legal risks to MCB/MCAS water supply and delivery comes from new
laws or amendments adding new contaminants to the list that has to be
monitored and/or treated for, or from making existing regulations more
stringent (lowering Maximum Contaminant Levels)
• In either case, MCB/MCAS water supply or delivery systems (treatment) could
be significantly impacted by the funding and procurement systems of the
federal government
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

Funding
• All new construction projects costing >$750k must follow the Military
Construction (MILCON) process which is a minimum 6-year process from
generation of requirement to project completion
• The vast majority of water supply and delivery projects will require funding
through the MILCON process
• Thus, the ability to of MCB to effectively adapt the installation’s supply and
delivery systems to new regulatory requirements or any other risk interaction
(e.g. sea-level rise, physical risk, etc.) is significantly impacted by the length of it
takes to fund projects
• The funding for operations and maintenance of MCB’s supply and delivery
systems is appropriated by the U.S. Congress and is thus subject to intense
political and ideological debate resulting in the installation not receiving the
necessary funding to maintain its infrastructure, equipment and personnel
• The Continuing Resolution Appropriation process that does not allow any “new
requirements” to begin and locks funding levels at the previous year’s is also a
risk to the supply and delivery systems of the installation as it significantly
curtails planning, preempting, mitigating and even adapting to water security
challenges
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment as separate Risk
*Priority 1

Political Will
• Political will represents a risk to the MCB/MCAS water supply and delivery
systems because it represents the driving force/or lack of driving force to make
funding and investment decisions
• The lack of the political will from Congress to fully fund the government (DoD
etc.) represents a significant risk to MCB’s ability to operate, maintain and
protect its water supply and delivery systems
• The lack of the political will to “reclama” (DoD term - A request to duly
constituted authority to reconsider its decision or its proposed action) new
policies from higher headquarter that make the operations, management,
maintenance and protection of the supply and delivery systems less effective

217
• The effects that political will has on funding represent the most significant
aspects of this risk, therefore cover under funding
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Legal, Decision Paralysis,
System Design and Complexity into “Institutional Risks”
*Priority 3

Decision
Paralysis
• The risks of climate change and overpopulation are so far reaching, complex and
require “society-level” decisions and investments
• Decision-makers addressing “wicked problem” often find themselves unable to
make a decision because no action seems to adequately address the problem
• This inability to action or make investments represents a risk to MCB/MCAS
water supply and delivery systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Legal, Political Will,
System Design and Complexity into “Institutional Risks”
*Priority 3

System
Design
• (WSTB, NRC. 2001) discusses the fact that water resource institutions, and
specifically those in the southwest, were designed in the 19
th
century to enable
population growth in the west and their design has changed relatively little
since that time
• Based on this fact, our water management and governance institutions are
poorly designed to dealing with climate change and overpopulation in the west
• Thus, the policies, procedures and actions of these poorly designed institutions
represents a risk to MCB/MCAS water supply and delivery systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Legal, Political Will,
Decision Paralysis and Complexity into “Institutional Risks”
*Priority 3

Complexity
• With 1,286 local entities with water resources legal responsibilities aside the
state and federal government entities in California alone
• This complexity impacts policies, procedures, regulations etc. as well as
MCB/MCAS ability to interface and engage with “right” levels and personnel to
effectively manage the installation’s supply and delivery systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Legal, Political Will,
Decision Paralysis and System Design into “Institutional Risks”
*Priority 3

Over
allocation
• This risk is the “over allocation” of the Colorado River under the 1922 Compact
that threatens the MCB/MCAS by threatening the supply and delivery systems
of Rancho California Water District who purchases water that is supplied to the
installation under the CWRMA
• RCWD purchases its water from Metropolitan Water District who gets a
significant portion of its water from the Colorado River
• The threats associated with the over allocation of the Colorado River are
significantly exacerbated by climate change and overpopulation (“wicked
problems”)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment and address under the larger systemic
“wicked problems”

Institutional/Management

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Planning
• This risk refers to the lack of supply and delivery system planning being done by
MCB/MCAS due to lack of funding, personnel and water resources expertise
• Failure to properly plan for repair and replacement of systems, any projected
growth in system requirements, and for physical threats represents a risk to
MCB/MCAS water security
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Operations,
Maintenance, Personnel, and Engagement into “Management Risks”
*Priority 1

Operations
• This risk refers to the lack of funding to provide for fundamental operational
elements of MCB/MCAS supply and delivery systems like Supervisor Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, training for personnel, maintenance of
equipment, etc.
• Not having adequate operational controls systems or trained personnel to
operate and maintain the installation’s water supply and delivery systems
represents a significant risk to it water security
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Planning, Maintenance,
Personnel, and Engagement into “Management Risks”
*Priority 1

Maintenance
• This risk refers to the lack of funding for preventative and routine maintenance
activities and for hiring and training the personnel necessary to accomplish
these activities
• Poorly maintained facilities and equipment fail and/or breakdown more
frequently and more severely than those that are regularly and properly
maintained
• Thus, lack of maintenance of the supply and delivery systems for MCB/MCAS
represents a risk to the installations’ water security
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Planning, Operations,
Personnel, and Engagement into “Management Risks”
*Priority 1

Personnel
• This risk refers to the lack of funding to hire the appropriate number of
personnel with the appropriate skill-sets to operate, manage and maintain the
water supply and delivery systems for MCB/MCAS
• The risk also refers to the lack of funding for training the existing personnel
currently tasked with operating, managing, and maintaining the systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Planning, Operations,
Maintenance, and Engagement into “Management Risks”
*Priority 1

Engagement
• This risk refers to the lack of engagement with local, state, and other federal
entities to understand their water security “worldviews” and capabilities and
how those manifest themselves as threats or opportunities to the water supply
and delivery systems of MCB/MCAS
• The lack of engagement is often associated with the lack of personnel, and with
the lack of personnel with the knowledge and experience in water resources to
successfully engage with water industry professionals
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Planning, Operations,
Maintenance, and Personnel into “Management Risks”
*Priority 1

219

Societal/Worldview
Tribalism
• This risk refers to the impacts that occur when leaders base their decisions on
their membership in special interest groups (political party, professional
association, religion, etc. – tribe) on whether they support their personal
identity and/or affinity for a political position rather than on what is analytically
and unemotionally determined to be best for ensuring water security for the
installation
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with ideology,
Undervaluation, and Ignorance into “Societal Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the scope of
this study

Ideology
• This risk refers to decisions made based on unsubstantiated beliefs and dogma
vs. critical analysis
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Tribalism,
Undervaluation, and Ignorance into “Societal Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the scope of
this study

Under-
valuation
(Water)
• This risk refers to the fact that the “true costs” of water (e.g. there is no
substitute for it in the most important aspects of life) lead to the benefit cost
ratio or savings to investment ratio calculations not justifying water supply or
delivery projects
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Tribalism, Ideology, and
Ignorance into “Societal Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the scope of
this study

Ignorance
• This risk refers to leaders, stakeholders and decision-makers lacking the
education, experience, (knowledge) to prevent them from succumbing to
hoaxes, misinformation disseminated by interest groups and from the general
panic regarding water related health concerns
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with Tribalism, Ideology, and
undervaluation into “Societal Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the scope of
this study

Over-
population
• This is the most significant risk to the water security of MCB/MCAS, MCIWest
and society, however, it is a “wicked problem” and must be dealt with as such
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment and address under the larger systemic
“wicked problems”

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As shown in Table 22, the systemic risks to Camp Pendleton’s water supply
and delivery, are significant and not within the installation’s capabilities to
effectively address. Thus, the process (based on the comprehensive literature
review and my professional experience/expertise) elucidated in the table has been
used to filter, re-categorize, and prioritize the comprehensive list of risks into the
installation-specific risk and vulnerability profile shown in Figure 54.
Because the water supply for MCB comes from its own groundwater, its top
risks and vulnerabilities come from drought and increased exposure to potential
groundwater contaminants resulting from drawing down aquifer levels that will
pull water from previously untapped areas. This process has already resulted in the
cessation of pumping from a well in the central area of the base as laboratory results
now show water samples exceeding the chromium six maximum contaminant levels
(MCL). The process of re-categorizing is illustrated by consolidating all manner of
groundwater contamination (mineral, radionuclide, bacteria/viruses) under the
category of groundwater contamination. Similar processes were used to consolidate
management risks, physical risks, institutional risks and societal risks. The
quantification of these risks and vulnerabilities was accomplished by taking the
average of the assessed vulnerability values of the risks prior to consolidation. A
sensitivity analysis was conducted on any consolidated risk where its component
risks had a single outlier value of a 5 or a 1. If removing the outlier from the
calculation of the average changed the value by less than 1, the original average
value for the consolidated risk was retained.

221
The chart in Figure 54 illustrates that the two most significant risks to
MCB/MCAS are funding and institutional risks. While funding does not have a
significant impact on the MCB/MCAS water supply, it has very significant impact on
the operations and maintenance of its delivery systems, on whether the installation
has enough trained personnel to manage their water resources, on how prepared it
is for physical risks to their delivery system, and on the installation’s capability to
analyze, understand and put in-place responses to extended drought, seawater
intrusion of its aquifers and overall climate change. Therefore, funding is a priority 1
vulnerability. Institutional risks significantly impact all of the same aspects of Camp
Pendleton’s delivery systems as funding with the addition of the legal aspects
associated with MCB/MCAS’s longstanding water rights lawsuits. MCB/MCAS
groundwater is continuously recharged because of a federal court decision that
instructs Rancho California Water District (RCWD) to send 2/3 of the natural flow of
the Santa Margarita River to Camp Pendleton. If RCWD ever chooses to re-litigate
this decision, the impact to MCB/MCAS will be significant while the case makes its
way through the ponderously slow bureaucracy of the federal court system.
However, while this is a very high-level vulnerability for MCB/MCAS, nothing but
engagement at the MCIWest level can be done until RCWD acts to challenge the
decision. Therefore, it is a priority 3 risk/vulnerability for the installation.

222
Figure 54: Results of Risk Filter and Prioritization Process (Simpson (x), 2016)

The next installations to be addressed through the risk filtration, re-
categorization, and prioritization process are MCAS Miramar and MCRD San Diego.

223
These installations will be addressed together because their sources of supply are
identical and delivery is operated and maintained on their installations by Navy
Base San Diego utilities business line personnel. Risks that will be addressed in the
same manner as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton are listed as such in Table 23.
Table 23: MCAS Miramar/MCRD San Diego Risk Filter and Prioritization (Simpson (y), 2016)
Installation:
MCAS Miramar/MCRD San Diego (same source of supply and delivery)
Risk Filter and Priority
Meteorological
Drought
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 1 - Address potential for continued severe drought

Flooding
• Risk to outside installation shared with Southern California water industry
and not real risk of flooding on either installation
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment
Wind
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Temperature
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Lightning
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Climate
Change
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Aridity
(geography)
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Geological
Earthquake
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Inundation
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Landslide/
Mudslide
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Subsidence
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

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Mineral
Contaminants
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Radionuclides
Bacteria and
Viruses
Volcano
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment
Physical /Attacks
Terrorism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Vandalism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Arson
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Cyber
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Physical/Accidents
Vehicle
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Construction
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Fire
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Operator Error
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Equipment
Failure
• The water supply and delivery systems for MCAS/MCRD depend on the
functionality of its equipment
• MCAS/MCRD through Navy Public Works Organization have a robust
maintenance and repair system in-place, however, the maintenance
requirements for this equipment are habitually underfunded and thus
equipment failure represents a risk to the water supply and delivery systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Infrastructure
Failure
• Like equipment, maintenance of infrastructure is habitually underfunded and
thus represents a failure risk that could further mitigated
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2

ICS Failure
• The existing Industrial Controls Systems at MCAS/MCRD are not well
maintained, calibrated or repaired and thus represent a risk to the water
supply and delivery systems of the installations
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)

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*Priority 2

Institutional/Governance
Legal
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Funding
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment as separate Risk
*Priority 1

Political Will
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Decision
Paralysis
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

System Design
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Complexity
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Over allocation
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment and address under the larger systemic
“wicked problems”

Institutional/Management
Planning
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because accomplished by the Navy
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Operations
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because accomplished by the Navy
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Maintenance
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because accomplished by the Navy
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Personnel
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because accomplished by the Navy
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Engagement
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because accomplished by the Navy
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Societal/Worldview

226
Tribalism
• Supply and delivery system investment decisions exposed to the innate
“tribal” conflicts for funding between the Navy and Marine Corps
*Retain risk but combine into “Societal Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 3
Ideology
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Under-
valuation
(Water)
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Ignorance
• Investments in technologies and policies surrounding Direct Potable Reuse
(new source of supply for installations) is threatened by the “ignorance” and
“manufactured ignorance” of people in San Diego
*Retain risk but combine into “Societal Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 3
Over-
population
• Not a direct risk for MCAS/MCRD because the installations are “reimbursable”
customers for the Navy (they pay the Navy for their utility services)
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment and address under the larger systemic
“wicked problems”

Figure 55: MCAS Miramar/MCRD San Diego Filtered Vulnerability Assessment (Simpson (z), 2016)

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As seen in Figure 55, the difference in the risks/vulnerabilities between the
two installations is in the area of funding. Because, MCRD San Diego is the initial
entry point for approximately 17,000 Marines per year and thus the foundation for
the Marine Corps, the installation’s access to and ease of getting funding for its
facilities is greater than that of MCAS Miramar.
The results of the application of the risk filter, re-categorization, and
prioritization process to MCAS Yuma are seen in Table 24.
Table 24: MCAS Yuma Risk Filter and Prioritization (Simpson (a), 2016)
Installation:
MCAS Yuma
Risk Filter and Priority
Meteorological
Drought
• Presents direct risk to Colorado River which is the primary source of
supply for the installation
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 1 - Address potential for continued severe drought

Flooding
• Risk of flash flooding, but not in areas that could interrupt supply or
delivery
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment
Wind
• Not a significant Risk for the installation
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Temperature
• Already very hot in the desert location of Yuma Arizona, therefore not a
significant additional Risk for the installation
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Lightning
• Not a significant Risk to the installation supply and delivery systems
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Climate
Change
• Addressed by MCIWest, as a risk to Colorado River
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Aridity
(geography)
• Addressed by MCIWest
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Geological
Earthquake
• Risk accounted for in building codes and emergency action plans
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

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Inundation
• Not a direct risk for MCAS Yuma
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Landslide/
Mudslide
• Not a direct risk for MCAS Yuma
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Subsidence
• Not a direct risk for MCAS Yuma
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Mineral
Contaminants
• Not currently a direct risk for MCAS Yuma, but could become one if they
are ever forced to mine their local ground water supply
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment
Radionuclides
Bacteria and
Viruses
Volcano
• Not a direct risk for MCAS Yuma
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Physical /Attacks
Terrorism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Vandalism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Arson
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Cyber
• Not a direct risk for MCAS Yuma
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Physical/Accidents
Vehicle
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Construction
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Fire
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Operator Error
• Same as MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Equipment
Failure
• The water supply and delivery systems for MCAS Yuma depend on the
functionality of its equipment
• MCAS Yuma main supply is the Colorado River Aqueduct and therefore it
relies on its equipment to transfer and move water from the canal to the
installation
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2

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Infrastructure
Failure
• Like equipment, maintenance of infrastructure is habitually underfunded
and thus represents a failure risk that could further mitigated
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2

ICS Failure
MCAS Yuma does not currently have a robust or dependable ICS system
therefore they have no risk of it failing
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Institutional/Governance
Legal
• MCAS Yuma does have the 4 priority to the its water source (CO River) but
during times of extreme drought, all priorities are subject to risk of
curtailment and challenge
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

Funding
MCAS Yuma does compete for funding for its supply and delivery systems
and thus, is exposed to the constant challenges associated with
Congressional dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment as a separate Risk
*Priority 1

Political Will
• MCAS Yuma is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

Decision
Paralysis
• MCAS Yuma is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

System Design
• MCAS Yuma is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

Complexity
• MCAS Yuma is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

Over allocation
• MCAS Yuma is directly exposed to this because it draws its water supply
directly from the Colorado River Aqueduct
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

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Institutional/Management
Planning
• MCAS Yuma operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
planning and personnel to do the planning exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2

Operations
• MCAS Yuma operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
operations and for trained personnel to operate the systems exposes the
installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2

Maintenance
• MCAS Yuma operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
maintenance and for trained personnel to maintain the systems exposes
the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2

Personnel
• MCAS Yuma operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for the
hiring of adequate numbers of personnel (and their training) to operate
and maintain the systems exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2

Engagement
• Engagement with external water resource organizations conducted for
MCAS Yuma by MCIWest
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment

Societal/Worldview
Tribalism
• Tribalism is one of the major driving forces behind institutional
dysfunctions and all of the second and third order affects associated with
that – which is especially present between the states who signed the 1922
Compact for the Colorado River
• This dysfunction represents a significant risk to MCAS Yuma
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

Ideology
• Ideology is also a driver for making decisions that negatively impact the
supply and delivery systems of MCAS Yuma (e.g. Climate Change denial)
Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

231
Under-
valuation
(Water)
• Systemic Risk being addressed for MCAS Yuma by MCIWest
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment
Ignorance
• Ignorance, especially special interest group driven “manufactured
ignorance” is leading to water resource management decisions that
negatively impact the supply and delivery system of MCAS Yuma
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

Over-
population
• Will be addressed by MCIWest
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment and address under the larger
systemic “wicked problems”

The results of the filtering, re-categorizing and prioritizing of
risk/vulnerabilities for MCAS Yuma are summarized Figure 56. While MCAS Yuma
gets its water supply directly from the Colorado River and is thus vulnerable to the
significant impacts of climate change and the over-allocation (whose risk rating
remains a 5 for Barstow also) of the river, the installation’s comparatively very
small demand and high priority to the water give it a lower vulnerability to drought
than other installations on the coast or with their own groundwater sources. Thus,
over-allocation is an institutional risk and a priority 3 for the installation.

232
Figure 56: MCAS Yuma Filtered Vulnerability Assessment (Simpson (bb), 2016)

The next installation to be addressed using the process will be Marine Corps
Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow, California. The risks that will be addressed by
MCIWest in its role as the regional command (climate change, natural aridity,
overpopulation, over-allocation of the Colorado River) and some of the risks
associated with climate change (wind, temperature, lightening) will be removed
from the process because the installations have no ability to preempt or mitigate
them, only to adapt to them. Additionally, the risks from earthquake, inundation,

233
landslide/mudslide, volcano will be removed from the process because they are
covered under the building code, under existing emergency plans or do not apply.
The accident risks from vehicles, construction, and fire will also be removed because
there are already processes and procedures to deal with them at the installation
level. The results of the application of the risk filter, re-categorization, and
prioritization process to MCLB Barstow are seen in Table 25.
Table 25: MCLB Barstow Risk Filter and Prioritization (Simpson (cc), 2016)
Installation:
MCLB Barstow
Risk Filter and Priority
Meteorological
Drought
• Because MCLB has two different sources of water supply for the two
sections of the installation, Yermo and Nebo, the risks from a prolonged
drought are significant
• Nebo gets its water from the City of Barstow through the Golden State
Water Company who get it from the Mojave Groundwater Basin which has
a very slow recharge rate and is thus very vulnerable to drought
• Yermo gets it water directly from the Mojave Groundwater Basin and thus
is directly exposed to the vulnerabilities of this desert basin
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 1 - Address potential for continued severe drought
Flooding
• The installation, has taken significant precautions with respect to flash
flooding, but its supply and delivery systems (its own or through Golden
State Water Company) are still exposed to measurable risk and
vulnerability
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 2 – combine with other “Physical Risks”
Geological
Subsidence
• The Mojave and Morongo groundwater basins have suffered significant
enough depletion to require adjudication
• This depletion has led to measurable subsidence in the region which
reduces the future storage capacity of the basins and exposes supply and
delivery systems to physical damage
• MCLB’s ability to influence this risk is minimal and will require MCIWest
engagement
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 2 – combine with other “Physical Risks”
Mineral
Contaminants
• MCLB has existing groundwater contamination from the improper
disposal of industrial compounds (Volatile Organic Compounds –VOC) and
use Liquid Granulated Activated Carbon (LGAC) to treat
Radionuclides

234
Bacteria and
Viruses
• The plume of VOCs, added by drought driven overdraft of the basin, is
moving into previously uncontaminated sections of the aquifer
• This will increase the risk and vulnerability of MCLB’s water supply
systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 1 – re-categorize as “Groundwater Contamination Risk”
Physical /Attacks
Terrorism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Vandalism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Arson
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Cyber
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Physical/Accidents
Operator Error
• Because MCLB depends on the treatment of its groundwater for VOC, it is
exposed to a significant risk if operator error impacts the ability of its
LGAC treatment systems to remove this dangerous contaminant
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Equipment
Failure
• Failure of MCLB’s equipment could likewise lead to the inability to remove
VOC and the interruption of the installation’s water supply
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Infrastructure
Failure
• Because MCLB produces some of its own water supply from the Mojave
groundwater basin, the installation is exposed to the risk and vulnerability
of failure of its water supply and delivery infrastructure
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
ICS Failure
• MCLB depends on a sophisticated LGAC treatment system to remove VOCs
from its groundwater supply, therefore the installation’s water supply
system is vulnerable to Industrial Controls Systems failure
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Institutional/Governance
Legal
• The source of water supply for MCLB is the Mojave River basin
• The Mojave River basin is an adjudicated basin with a history of legal
conflict
• The California Supreme Court Mojave River Basin Decision (Sept/Oct
2000) has set precedent in the management of California groundwater
• The court said that it could impose overdraft restricts on the basin without
establishing individual pumping limits
• This represents a risk and vulnerability to MCLB’s water supply and ability
to pump its groundwater
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Funding
• As with all MCIWest installations, the dysfunctional funding processes and
the dysfunctionality of the U.S. Congress represent a significant direct risk
to MCLB and its ability to hire and train personnel to manage its water

235
supply and delivery systems, and to the installation’s ability to operate and
maintain its systems
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment as a separate Risk
*Priority 1
Political Will
• MCLB Barstow is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3
Decision
Paralysis
• MCLB Barstow is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3
System Design
• MCLB Barstow is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3
Complexity
• MCLB Barstow is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3
Institutional/Management
Planning
• MCLB Barstow operates and maintains its own supply and delivery
systems therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate
funding for planning and personnel to do the planning exposes the
installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2
Operations
• MCLB Barstow operates and maintains its own supply and delivery
systems therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate
funding for operations and for trained personnel to operate the systems
exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2
Maintenance
• MCLB Barstow operates and maintains its own supply and delivery
systems therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate
funding for maintenance and for trained personnel to maintain the
systems exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2
Personnel
• MCLB Barstow operates and maintains its own supply and delivery
systems therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate
funding for the hiring of adequate numbers of personnel (and their
training) to operate and maintain the systems exposes the installation to
risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2

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Engagement
• Engagement with external water resource organizations conducted for
MCLB Barstow by MCIWest
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment
Societal/Worldview
Tribalism
• Tribalism is one of the major driving forces behind institutional
dysfunctions and all of the second and third order affects associated with
that dysfunction
• This dysfunction represents a significant risk to MCLB Barstow
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study
Ideology
• Ideology is also a driver for making decisions that negatively impact the
supply and delivery systems of MCLB Barstow (e.g. Climate Change denial)
Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study
Under-
valuation
(Water)
• Systemic Risk being addressed for MCLB Barstow by MCIWest
*Remove from Vulnerability Assessment
Ignorance
• Ignorance, especially special interest group driven “manufactured
ignorance” is leading to water resource management decisions that
negatively impact the supply and delivery system of MCLB Barstow
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

The most important differences in the filtered, re-categorized and prioritized
risks and vulnerability profile for MCLB Barstow in comparison to the other
installations is the severity of the risk to their groundwater supply from
contamination by volatile organic compounds, the physical risk associated with
subsidence, and the higher-level exposure to the institutional (legal) risks that
threaten their supply. The results of Table 25 are summarized in Figure 57.

237
Figure 57: MCLB Barstow Filtered Vulnerability Assessment (Simpson (dd), 2016)

The next installation to be addressed using the process is Marine Corps Air
Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), 29 Palms, California. As Table 26 shows, there
are many aspects of MCAGCC’s water supply and delivery systems that make it

238
inherently resilient (less vulnerable) to the systemic risks of climate change,
geographic aridity, overpopulation, over-allocation and drought – at least for many
years to come. The California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 118 (updated
in 2003) calculated that the 29 Palms Valley Groundwater Basin, while being
continuously “water-mined”, contains enough fossil water to meet current demands
for the next 947 years. One of the largest sources of uncertainty for MCAGCC’s water
supply and delivery systems comes from its vulnerability to earthquake (Li &
Martin, 2011).
The Twentynine Palms area is situated along the intersection of the Mojave
Desert right-lateral fault set and eastern Transverse Ranges left-lateral fault
set, specifically the northwest-trending, dextral Mesquite Lake Fault and the
east-trending, sinistral Pinto Mountain Fault (USGS, 2012).

As with MCLB Barstow, only the risks that pertain to MCAGCC have been
retained in the assessment table. The results of the application of the risk filter, re-
categorization, and prioritization process to MCAGCC are seen in Table 26.
Table 26: MCAGCC 29 Palms Risk Filter and Prioritization (Simpson (ee), 2016)
Installation:
MCAGCC 29 Palms
Risk Filter and Priority
Meteorological
Flooding
• There is a significant risk to MCAGCC’s delivery systems from flash
flooding, but the installation has invested significantly in mitigating this
risk
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to delivery system
*Priority 2
Geological
Earthquake
• As discussed, earthquake exposes MCAGCC’s supply and delivery systems
to high-levels of risks and vulnerability
*Retain risk
*Priority 1
Subsidence
• MCAGCC and the surrounding water users are water mining the aquifer
systems beneath them, thus, they have a high level of risk and vulnerability
to the impacts of subsidence

239
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to delivery system
*Priority 2
Groundwater
Contamination
• The aquifer systems of MCAGCC have significant levels of groundwater
contamination and as they continue to water mine the systems they will be
exposed to higher levels of risk and vulnerability to increased
contamination requiring advanced treatment
*Retain risk
*Priority 1
Physical /Attacks
Terrorism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Vandalism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Arson
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Cyber
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Physical/Accidents
Operator Error
• MCAGCC supplies and delivers its own water from groundwater source on
the installation
• The groundwater sources are contaminated and require treatment
• The opening of the Deadman basin will require advanced water treatment
• The complexity of MCAGCC’s water treatment and delivery systems
exposes the installation to the risks and vulnerabilities associated with
operator error
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Equipment
Failure
• The same circumstances that result in increased risks and vulnerabilities
from operator error pertain to equipment, infrastructure and ICS failure
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Infrastructure
Failure
• The same circumstances that result in increased risks and vulnerabilities
from operator error pertain to equipment, infrastructure and ICS failure
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
ICS Failure
• The same circumstances that result in increased risks and vulnerabilities
from operator error pertain to equipment, infrastructure and ICS failure
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Institutional/Governance
Funding
• While MCAGCC is a TECOM installation and thus has a higher priority for
funding than non-TECOM installations, it does still compete for the limited
funding for its supply and delivery systems and thus, is exposed to the
constant challenges associated with Congressional dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment as a separate Risk
*Priority 1
Political Will
• MCAGCC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

240
Decision
Paralysis
• MCAGCC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

System Design
• MCAGCC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

Complexity
• MCAGCC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

Institutional/Management
Planning
• MCAGCC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
planning and personnel to do the planning exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2

Operations
• MCAGCC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
operations and for trained personnel to operate the systems exposes the
installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2

Maintenance
• MCAGCC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
maintenance and for trained personnel to maintain the systems exposes
the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2

Personnel
• MCAGCC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for the
hiring of adequate numbers of personnel (and their training) to operate
and maintain the systems exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Management
Risks”)
*Priority 2

241
Societal/Worldview
Tribalism
• Tribalism is one of the major driving forces behind institutional
dysfunctions and all of the second and third order affects associated with
that
• This dysfunction represents a significant risk to MCAGCC
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

Ideology
• Ideology is also a driver for making decisions that negatively impact the
supply and delivery systems of MCAGCC (e.g. Climate Change denial)
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

Ignorance
• Ignorance, especially special interest group driven “manufactured
ignorance” is leading to water resource management decisions that
negatively impact the supply and delivery system of MCAGCC
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

The notable missing risks from MCAGCC’s vulnerability assessment are
drought and legal. While water mining an aquifer system is not a sustainable
practice, it is an acceptable practice and it insulates MCAGCC from the impacts of
drought (groundwater recharge from precipitation is measured in millennia),
climate change (a two-degree increase in average temperature will be barely
noticeable), overpopulation (the perception of lack of water resources and other
factors keeps population and overconsumption down), and geographic aridity (no
effect on water mining). Additionally, the fact that the main sources of water supply
for the installation are contained within its 935 square miles insulates MCAGCC

242
from the risks and vulnerabilities prevalent throughout the surrounding
groundwater basins. The results of Table 26 are summarized in Figure 58.
Figure 58: MCAGCC 29 Palms Filtered Vulnerability Assessment (Simpson (ff), 2016)

The final installation that will have the risk filtering, re-categorization, and
prioritization process applied to it is Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training
Center (MCMWTC) Bridgeport, California. With elevations varying from 6,800 to

243
11,500 ft. above sea-level in the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range (National
Geographic, 2016), MCMWTC illustrates the extraordinary diversity of climates and
capabilities of the installations of MCIWest. The alpine terrain of the installation
makes it especially susceptible to the impacts of climate change in the form of more
frequent, longer duration and more severe drought. The significant reduction in
snowpack threatens both the installation’s water supply and its mission – a
substantial portion of which is cold weather survival training. The results of the
application of the process are seen in Table 27.
Table 27: MCMWTC Bridgeport Risk Filter and Prioritization (Simpson (gg), 2016)
Installation:
MCMWTC Bridgeport
Risk Filter and Priority
Meteorological
Drought
• The main source of water supply for both the housing area and the
installation is the Walker River whose flows have been significantly
affected by the climate change driven reduction in snow pack and the
resulting drought
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 1 - Address potential for continued severe drought

Flooding
• The Walker River flows through the installation and thus exposes it to the
risk of flooding in very wet years
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Lightning
• Lightening in the mountains is more frequent and more dangerous
exposing the installation’s water delivery system to increased risk of fire
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Geological
Groundwater
Contamination
• The geomorphology of the Walker River alluvial area has proven to have
both arsenic and uranium contamination – both of which have impact the
water supply for MCMWTC
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment
*Priority 1 - Address potential for continued severe drought
Physical /Attacks
Terrorism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Vandalism
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2

244
Arson
*Retain risk but combine into “Physical Risks” to supply and delivery
*Priority 2
Physical/Accidents
Operator Error
• MCMWTC operates and arsenic removal system for its water supply in the
Coleville housing area, thus, operator error represents a significant risk to
the installation
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Equipment
Failure
• The water supply and delivery systems for MCMWTC depend on the
functionality of its equipment
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Infrastructure
Failure
• Like equipment, maintenance of infrastructure is habitually underfunded
and thus represents a failure risk that could further mitigated
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (unify under “Physical Risks”)
*Priority 2
Institutional/Governance
Legal
• Because the Walker River flows through Nevada and California, the fact
that the two states have very different water law doctrines (Nevada does
not recognize riparian water rights) exposes MCMWTC’s water supply to
significant risk
• The Walker River in Nevada is adjudicated and has a federally appointed
Watermaster
“Basically, the courts have in the past ruled that all of the Walker
River, from its headwaters to its final sump in Walker Lake, is fully
‘adjudicated,’ or apportioned among claimants eligible to any of its waters.”
(Hall et al., 1992)
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment as a separate Risk
*Priority 1
Funding
MCMWTC competes for funding for its supply and delivery systems and
thus, is exposed to the constant challenges associated with Congressional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment as a separate Risk
*Priority 1
Political Will
• MCMWTC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3
Decision
Paralysis
• MCMWTC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3
System Design
• MCMWTC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3
Complexity
• MCMWTC is directly exposed to the risks associated with institutional
dysfunction
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 3

245
Institutional/Management
Planning
• MCMWTC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
planning and personnel to do the planning exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2
Operations
• MCMWTC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
operations and for trained personnel to operate the systems exposes the
installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2
Maintenance
• MCMWTC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for
maintenance and for trained personnel to maintain the systems exposes
the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2
Personnel
• MCMWTC operates and maintains its own supply and delivery systems
therefore, institutional dysfunction that prevents adequate funding for the
hiring of adequate numbers of personnel (and their training) to operate
and maintain the systems exposes the installation to risk
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment (combine into “Institutional Risks”)
*Priority 2
Societal/Worldview
Tribalism
• Tribalism is one of the major driving forces behind institutional
dysfunctions and all of the second and third order affects associated with
that
• This dysfunction represents a significant risk to MCMWTC
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study
Ideology
• Ideology is also a driver for making decisions that negatively impact the
supply and delivery systems of MCMWTC (e.g. Climate Change denial)
Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study
Ignorance
• Ignorance, especially special interest group driven “manufactured
ignorance” is leading to water resource management decisions that
negatively impact the supply and delivery system of MCAS Yuma
*Retain risk in Vulnerability Assessment – combine with into “Societal
Risks”
*Priority 3 – these risks must be understood and accounted for, as the
development of potential methods to address them directly is beyond the
scope of this study

246
Figure 59 summarizes the results of Table 27 and illustrates that exposure to
the ramifications of the legal, climatic and morphologic systems associated with the
Walker River are the most significant vulnerabilities for the installation.
Figure 59: MCMWTC Bridgeport Filtered Vulnerability Assessment (Simpson (hh), 2016)

E. Summary and Next Steps

Utilizing the grounded theory research methodology, a process for
operationalizing a risk management system was developed using a comprehensive

247
literature review of: the concepts of water security; climate change impacts on
water resources; the implications of differing water security worldviews; industry
best practices for risk assessment; and my personal experience and expertise in the
water industry.
The process began by categorizing and identifying a comprehensive list of
hazards and threats, followed by the establishment of risk evaluation criteria. The
criteria were used in the development of the system of rating scales which formed
the foundation of the risk and vulnerability assessments. The original assessments
produced a regional level view of the risks to MCIWest water security, including
some systemic risks that have significant impact at the installation level but are
beyond their capability to effectively operationalize. Thus, the final section of this
chapter performed the process of filtering the comprehensive list of risks into the
ones that were most pertinent for each installation. Building this list required some
consolidation and re-categorization of the risks that were then prioritized according
to potential severity of impact and the ability of an installation Commander and
his/her staff to effectively address them.
The next step will be to utilize the data compiled thus far in this process to
develop a risk response strategy – both at the regional (MCIWest) level and at the
installation (operational) level. To enable this, the risk profiles and graphics
developed for each installation will be utilized to educate the installation
Commanders, and the MCIWest Commanding General, on the risks to their water

248
security so that they can make informed strategic investment decisions about
preempting, mitigating or adapting to the potential impacts of these risks.

249
Chapter 9: MCIWEST WATER SECURITY STAKEHOLDER SURVEY

A. Purpose of the Survey

The purpose of surveying the stakeholders/decision-makers most pertinent
to MCIWest’s water security was three-fold. The first purpose was to compare the
list of the most significant challenges/risks to water security developed in this study
with the perceptions of the most significant challenges/risks held by MCIWest’s
military chain-of-command; the California State Water Resources Control Board; the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Watermaster for the Colorado River); local (City and
Special District) water providers; wholesale (SDCW and MWD) water providers; a
representative from the environmental NGO community; and a representative of the
business community. The second purpose of the survey was to develop an
understanding of the water security worldviews of these key stakeholders/decision-
makers to ensure MCIWest’s water security worldview is aligned with its chain-of-
command and the leading stakeholders within the water industry. The third
purpose of the survey was to inform the development of MCIWest’s risk response
strategy, and its strategic industry engagement plan.

B. Choice of Participants

Table 28: MCIWest Water Security Survey Participants (Source: Simpson (ii), 2016)

Organization Leader/Stakeholder
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy,
Installations and the Environment (OSD)
E. Rebecca Patton

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Climate Change Adaptation Policy
Program Manager
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations and the Environment (ASN E,I&E)
Honorable Dennis V. McGinn,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Marine Corps Installations West/Marine Corps Base Camp
Pendleton (MCIWest)
Brigadier General Edward Banta
Commanding General, MCIWest
Bureau of Reclamation, Southern California Area Office
(BoR)
Jack Simes
Project Manager
California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) Felicia Marcus
Board Chair
San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) Mark Weston
Board Chair
San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) Maureen Stapleton
General Manger
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) Jeff Kightlinger
General Manager
City of San Diego, Public Utilities Department (San Diego) Halla Razak
Director
Fallbrook Public Utilities District (FPUD), Fallbrook, CA Jack Bebee, P.E.
Assistant General Manager
Stetson Engineers, Carlsbad, CA (Stetson) Steven Reich, P.E.
Principal
Waterkeepers Mathew O’Malley
Legal & Policy Director

As discussed in Chapter 1 and seen in Appendix A, MCIWest’s duties and
responsibilities with regards to water security flow from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations and
Environment to the Marine Corps and its regional commanders. Thus, comparing
the water security worldviews of Ms. Becky Patton, Assistant Secretary McGinn, and
BGen Banta will illustrate the level of alignment down the chain-of-command to
MCIWest. Likewise, comparing the water security worldviews of representatives of
major water providers (MWD, SDCWA, City of San Diego, Fallbrook Public Utility
District) within California’s water supply and delivery systems will illustrate the
alignment between operational level industry stakeholders. Further, analyzing
worldview differences and similarities between the SWRCB, wholesale and retail

251
water providers, and the business and NGO communities will illustrate whether
drought responses are in alignment across the water industry. Thus, the choice of
the above participants was designed to test the validity of the results of this study
regarding water security risks and vulnerabilities while enhancing the development
of responses to those risks and and the development of targeted engagement across
the MCIWest water security environment.

C. Results and Interpretation

The survey instrument, original stakeholder responses, and informed
consent forms can be found in Appendix C.
The concept of worldview and its influence on the perception of, and
response to risk, is central to this study, and to the development of MCIWest’s
strategic engagement plan. As discussed in Chapter 5: Stakeholder Water Security
Worldviews, my definition of the term “worldview” is – an individual’s or
organization’s system of knowledge, beliefs, and values that creates the lens (filter)
through which they perceive world. A person, or an organization, acquires
knowledge through their experiences and from those in positions that influence
them (teachers, family, media outlets, regulatory agencies, etc.). The knowledge that
proves useful (validates their perspectives, provides affinity, etc.) evolves into
beliefs. Beliefs serve as the foundation for the judgment of data and events that
come to define their values.

252
Given this definition, the first questions that need to be answered regarding
the stakeholder’s survey responses is: how do the stakeholders define the concept of
“worldview” and how do their definitions compare with one another and with my
definition? The answers to the first question are summarized in Table 29.
Table 29: Stakeholder Survey Results - Worldviews (Source: Simpson (jj), 2016)
Stakeholder/Org Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to
you.
Patton (OSD)
• Individual worldviews are derived from their local experience and
more broadly from information and educational sources
McGinn (ASN)
• The lens through which an individual or organization views the world
around them developed through education and observation
Banta (MCIWest)
• Worldview is how people view, think about or perceive things based on
their education, geographic and ethnic/racial backgrounds, values, and
general life experiences
Simes (BoR)
• Views developed through exposure to the world around you via
personal experiences from their formal education, travels, work
experiences, chosen media outlets
Marcus (SWRCB)
• Worldview comes from a person's experiences - home, school, work,
world and if empathy for others was encouraged - the context through
which one looks at the facts
Weston (SDCWA)
• Worldview is a way of understanding the world as a finite system of
resources that must be managed if we are going to have equity without
conflict
• It includes a larger contextual, and holistic view of society and fellow
agencies - one agency's water security cannot come at the cost of
another's
Stapleton
(SDCWA)
• Worldview is the way a person, organization or culture thinks about or
perceives the world as a whole - which can change over time and can
also be focused on more discrete ideas at the national, regional or local
levels
• An organization’s worldview is generally the result of consensus-based
decision making
Kightlinger
(MWD)
• Having a “worldview” is to look at issues from a broad perspective, to
address issues and challenges in a holistic manner. It also means
avoiding short term “fixes” that lead to either foreseeable problems in
the future or that would cause harm to third parties
Razak (City of
San Diego)
• Worldview means that way someone sees their environment and
everything that is surrounding them or potentially impacting them
Bebee (FPUD)
• Worldview is my perception of global events and how they affect me, I
feel these systems are acquired from an individual’s experiences and
past actions and results. The cultural environment in which an
individual was raised also likely strongly effects and individual’s
worldview

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Reich (Stetson
Engineers)
• “Worldview” implies a multi-faceted opinion based on cultural,
political, scientific, and economic factors. Typically, the importance, or
weight, of each of these factors is subjective and based on each
individual’s core beliefs and values.
• Each individual’s system of beliefs may affect an organization’s “water
security worldview” through planning and project development -
Specifically, organizations controlled by elected boards may be made
up of individuals with similar or varied worldviews
O’Malley
(Waterkeepers)
• A person’s (or group’s) worldview is that person’s system of beliefs and
ideas that are developed throughout their life based on experience,
background, and intake of new information, and a person’s or group’s
worldview may – and likely will – change throughout life based on
these experiences and new information

Table 29 shows that stakeholders across the water supply and delivery
industry, as well as the DoD (including myself), are very well aligned on the
concepts of worldview. From the table it is clear that stakeholders believe that
individuals and organizations acquire their worldviews through their experiences,
including their educational, workplace, family and travel experiences. It is also clear
that there is consensus around the concept that individuals and organizations
interact with each other and everyone else according to their worldviews.
The next of question to be answered by the stakeholder survey is: how do the
participants define water security and how aligned are those definitions?
Table 30: Stakeholder Survey Results – Water Security Definitions (Source: Simpson (hh), 2016)

Stakeholder/Org Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your
organization.
Patton (OSD) • Water security is having access to sufficient water quantity of
appropriate quality to satisfy current and future needs (mission
capability) of the Department. Key to this concept is definition of
water needs and the capacity to support those needs
McGinn (ASN)
• Sufficient access to reliable sources of water to do our mission
Banta (MCIWest)
• Water Security means assured access to stable supplies of clean water
to meet our current and future needs. Water Security is instrumental to
ensuring mission readiness and the future viability of our installations
Simes (BoR)
• Long-term water reliability to sustain health, economies, ecosystems

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Marcus (SWRCB)
• I think we would frame it in terms of building resilience to deal with
what the future brings. That is a combination of looking at available
supplies—quantity, how interruptible through force of law or nature,
and measures for demand reduction, supply augmentation (e.g.,
recycling, purchases), etc.
Weston (SDCWA)
• Water security means developing long term water supply reliability
which incorporates the following: meets demands; minimizes risk;
maximizes diversification; provides flexibility, affordability, and
adaptability; and repairs and protects local and adjoining environments
Stapleton
(SDCWA)
• Our mission as an organization is to provide a safe and reliable supply
of water to our member agencies throughout the San Diego region.
Water Security encompasses both of these concepts. Securing a safe
supply of water means keeping the water up to drinking water quality
standards, and protecting the supply from potential threat of harmful
chemical or biological introductions. Water Security is also being able
to secure a reliable supply of water to ensure the demands of the
people and local economy are available.
Kightlinger
(MWD)
• Water Security means achieving and maintaining a high degree of
water supply and quality reliability for today and for the foreseeable
future. It does not mean 100% reliability at all times under all
circumstances.
Razak (City of
San Diego)
• Water Security is the elimination of the risk of lack of water for all
uses; industrial, residential, commercial and environmental. It is also
referred to as reliability
Bebee (FPUD)
• Securing a long term drought proof water supply. The primary focus
is securing local and regional supplies and providing a buffer against
drought conditions. The secondary concern is maintaining our
infrastructure by completing proper levels of replacements of aging
infrastructure
Reich (Stetson
Engineers)
• Water Security is based on an organization’s ability to meet the long-
term water quantity and water quality need’s if its existing and future
customers. Factors such as sustainability, water independence, self-
reliance, and resiliency affect each organization’s “degree” of water
security
O’Malley
(Waterkeepers)
• Water Security means water management – both in terms of water
quantity and water quality – sufficient to meet current and future
environmental, human, and social justice needs of a community

The MCIWest definition for Water Security developed through this study and
discussed in Chapter 8: Translating Theory into Practice is:
Water security means having sufficient water, in quantity and quality, for the
needs of MCIWest’s Operational Forces, all supporting activities and installation
ecosystems, matched by the capacity to access and use it, resolve trade-offs, and
manage water-related risks, including flood, drought and pollution.

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Table 30 illustrates the finding from Chapter 5: Stakeholder Water Security
Worldviews – defining water security is worldview-dependent. The military chain-
of-command, OSD, ASN, and CG MCIWest, define water security by its impacts on
mission capability. The state regulator, SWRCB and the water wholesalers, BoR,
SDCWA, and MWD focus their definitions on resilience and reliability – to support
economic activity. The “point of delivery” suppliers, the City of San Diego and FPUD,
see water security through the lens of risk management and drought proofing.
Stetson sees water security through the lens of how their technical expertise can
help their clients achieve as much water independence and self-reliance as possible.
And finally, Waterkeepers, as an environmentally focused non-profit, sees water
security through the lens of social justice and the needs of the community. Thus, this
element of the stakeholder survey corroborates the findings from the literature
review and further informs the development of the MCIWest strategic engagement
plan.
The next aspect of the Stakeholder survey to be analyzed is the group’s views
on the most significant challenges and risks to water security.
Table 31: Stakeholder Survey Results – Challenges/Risks (Source: Simpson (jj), 2016)
Stakeholder/Org What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or
risks, to Water Security?
Patton (OSD) • The Southwestern US is a victim of its own success. The water resource
management efforts grew without any good long term understanding
of climatic changes and the impacts associated with them. We’ve (the
US Government) has made some really poor decisions on water
management practice and those are now coming home to roost. Access
to fresh, potable water is seen as a basic human right but it doesn’t
come without a cost and a whole lot of planning. The situation in Flint,
Michigan is an example of penny wise and pound foolish. And it has
and will happen again…Many people feel it is just a question of money,

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but it really is more than that. We need to be better stewards of
water. The Department of Defense has instituted multiple water
conservation efforts and we have far surpassed our goals. But if
everyone doesn’t conserve, it won’t matter…We need to change the
way we think about and use water. This is as much a behavioral issue
as a technical challenge.
McGinn (ASN)
• I would say evening out (dealing with the variability of precipitation)
the bad times and good times of access to water and affordability of
water…figuring out…obviously…how you get the most mission benefit
and quality of life benefit from whatever water is available…but
also…being able to manage throughout the water cycle ways that you
don’t find yourself in flood/drought type situation…and I think those
challenges grow with climate change…where we are going to have
areas of the world…areas of the country…that are going to have an
over-abundance of water to some extent…through flooding…providing
disease vectors etc…or droughts as California is experiencing.
Banta (MCIWest)
• I think climate change and extended periods of drought will continue
to pose challenges to water security on a global scale, as will pollution
and increased demand based on population growth and higher
demand for agricultural and industrial use. We already see water
scarcity as a driver for conflict and human migration, and I expect to
see this trend continue.
Simes (BoR)
• The two primary challenges that we face internationally and here in the
Southwest are: continuing impacts from climate change and
population growth.
Marcus (SWRCB)
• I’ll focus on the southwest. I think complacency and pride are our
human risks. Drought and climate change are our physical risks.
• We have a challenge of agencies (and engineers in particular for some
reason) being understandably proud of the incredible infrastructure
miracles they have produced… On the other hand, that is at risk given
climate change and population growth and folks pride is keeping
many of them from thinking of the next generation of big leaps in as
robust a manner as we need to.
Weston (SDCWA)
• The greatest challenges to Water Security are the following:
o Changing hydrology (reduces from climate change)
o Institutional (governance) obstacles: lack of cooperation agency-
to-agency
o Supply availability (overuse or over subscription of existing
supplies)
o Increasing demand (population growth)
o Regulatory requirements which do not meet local and regional
conditions
o Environmental restrictions
o Contamination
o Natural disasters
o Lack of Commitment to invest in future water supplies
o Failure to Operate and Maintain existing water systems

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Stapleton
(SDCWA)
• One of the current major challenges, both internationally and
domestically, is water scarcity…recent years have seen drought
conditions that have shed light on the supply-demand imbalances when
continued hydrology and climate change impacts availability of those
supplies…Factors that impact both the supply and demand side must
be considered long term when looking at the risks: climate change,
hydrology, diversity of supply sources, drought proof supplies,
population growth, etc.
Kightlinger
(MWD)
• The greatest long-term threat to Water Security is climate change.
The challenges in dealing with this threat are the institutional divisions
within the water management industry and a lack of leadership on the
tough choices to be made.
Razak (City of
San Diego)
• Climate change, severe drought, terrorism, cyber-terrorism
Bebee (FPUD)
• The greatest challenge and risks are securing long-term reliable water
supplies. Many issues can be addressed regionally and domestically,
such as investments in new water supplies, storage and recycled water.
The largest international challenge is the potential long-term impacts
from climate change and changes in precipitation amounts and
patterns that must be addressed globally.
Reich (Stetson
Engineers)
• Internationally: Climate Change. Large movements of people will
occur when previously fertile lands are no longer arable. These
movements ultimately result in political and economic instability that
may manifest itself as violent conflicts.
• Domestically: Climate Change. Changes in political and economic
worldview from the post-war era will result in how economic resources
are assigned from one region of the United States to another. Changes
in climate will require costly engineering solutions required to
maintain the existing status quo. While the U.S. was traditionally a
nation comprised of a mobile workforce (as demonstrated in the 70s
and 80s migration to the “sunbelt”), maintenance of existing lifestyles
and local economies may prove to be costly if growth continues in
locations were water is scarce.
O’Malley
(Waterkeepers)
• Among the greatest challenges are uncertainties that have resulted and
will continue to result from climate change and more common and
severe droughts. Further, there exists uncertainty that will result from
expected increased severe weather rain events that are expected to
result in flooding. These events occurring locally and internationally
are likely to cause political instability (if they have not already). It is not
hard to imagine instability in a region causing ripple effects worldwide.

It is very clear from the survey that these leaders from federal, state, and
local government, business and the environmental non-profit sector view climate
change and population growth as the two biggest challenges/risks for water
security. This corroborates my professional experiences, and the findings from my

258
literature review. Climate change and overpopulation represent what I’ve described
in Chapter 8: Translating Theory into Practices as “systemic risks” – meaning they
have system-wide impacts on every aspect of water security. This is seen in Figure
52: MCIWest Water Security Risk Interaction Matrix. The focus of this study is
developing a grounded theory for operationalizing risk management. Given the
enormity and societal implications of the risks to water security from climate
change and overpopulation, the risks themselves cannot be operationalized – only
their second, third, fourth, etc., order effects can reasonably be operationalized by
MCIWest and its installations. Examples of those effects have been elucidated in
Chapter 8 (drought, overconsumption, flooding, etc.) and very clearly in the survey
response of Mark Weston, Chair of the San Diego County Water Authority in Table
31. Thus, while acknowledging the impacts of climate change and overpopulation,
the development of risk responses for MCIWest and its installations will focus on
the filtered and prioritized risks illustrated in chapter 8.
Because MCIWest is a military organization and the military worldview is
that water security equates to mission security which equates to national security,
the survey participants were asked to discuss their views on whether international
or domestic water security dominated their thinking about the concept of water
security. The goal of this question was to gain a deeper understanding of whether
the stakeholders routinely consider the ramifications of international water security
and its impacts on the mission of the DoD during their dealings with MCIWest water
resources program staff or the installations as water purchasers. This

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understanding will directly inform the development of the strategic engagement
plan.
Table 32: Stakeholder Survey Results – Domestic or International Dominance (Source: Simpson (kk),
2016)

Stakeholder/Org Do you feel either the international or domestic water
security challenges/risks are more dominant?
Patton (OSD) • This is a hard call. We need to get our own house in order but at the
same time, we have to respond to support our partners and allies. We
have always been seen as the land of plenty, but that is changing. We
are depending more and more on foods coming from abroad. Could we
live without them? Yes. Would we be happy about it? Not likely.
McGinn (ASN)
• I would say both…my worldview is informed by domestic because I
know more about it here…but…I would say that you can’t think about
water without thinking about energy.
Banta (MCIWest)
• From my perspective we are clearly concerned with the local
challenges and risks of water security in mission readiness aboard our
installations… as well as in our local communities upon which we rely
heavily to support our families and the supporting infrastructure and
industrial base. I am also concerned with international water security
challenges and risks, as they will define regions of potential conflict and
possible future operating environments.
Simes (BoR)
• No, regional demographics may shift due to economic realities (e.g.,
Syria) but the international challenges remain, especially with
addressing impacts from climate change and continued population
growth.
Marcus (SWRCB)
• Not sure I understand the question. I follow international challenges
and they are certainly more severe already than ours are. No question.
That said, I’m not sure what dominant means. In CA, the local ones
are more dominant.
Weston (SDCWA)
• Domestic water security challenges/ risks are more dominant for our
economy and quality of life. International water security challenges are
more dominant for geopolitical stability.
Stapleton
(SDCWA)
• As a representative of a domestic local water supply agency, the
domestic water challenges seem more prevalent since I face them every
day. However, our local issues can seem very inconsequential when
looking at some of the international issues and the overall lack of clean
water supplies and infrastructure in many parts of the world.
Kightlinger
(MWD)
• I believe the risks to Water Security are the same internationally and
domestic but the planning and preparation for addressing risks varies
widely.
Razak (City of
San Diego)
• Domestic risks are what I care most about.
Bebee (FPUD)
• Domestic challenges are more dominant
Reich (Stetson
Engineers)
• My worldview would suggest that international water security is a
bigger challenge and threat to maintenance of long-term lifestyle and

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economic security on a scale of 30 years or more. On a time-line of less
than 30 years, my southern California short-term business worldview
would suggest that domestic water security presents greater challenges
in day-to-day life.
O’Malley
(Waterkeepers)
• In the United States we are better equipped and situated to address
our local and national water security challenges, in large part due to
our resources. As such, I believe international challenges related to
water security (and scarcity) are more difficult to address, as they are
broader in scope both geographically and situationally. A lack of water
security comes with risks beyond the borders of that location and
potentially presents much larger issues on a global scale.

The stakeholder responses to this question illuminate some significant
factors that will be very useful to the development of the MCIWest water resources
program. The DoD chain-of-command was challenged by the question. As leaders
who have to make domestic water security decisions every day that have
international ramifications (the impact on our military’s capability to respond to a
global crisis), they clearly see the two scales as integrally linked. As does the BoR
representative. However, as one would expect from a worldview perspective, the
focus begins to shift at the SWRCB level and the wholesale and retail water
providers see the issue of water security in purely domestic terms. This illuminates
a clear opportunity for the MCIWest strategic engagement plan. If MCIWest can
make the SWRCB, water wholesale agencies, and the local retail water agencies see
themselves as key players in the U.S. national security mission, it could result in new
levels of cooperation and collaboration across the water industry. Additionally,
while the water resources consultant business community and the environmental
non-profit community already see international water security as the dominant
issue over domestic, I doubt that they see themselves, and their roles as
stakeholders in MCIWest’s pursuit of water security, as enhancing U.S. national

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security. Thus, the stakeholder survey has made a significant contribution to
MCIWest’s developing organization.
The final question in the survey was designed to determine if the
stakeholders, given a notional risk assessment that produced three categories of
risk: 1) Human Caused Hazards; 2) Institutional Hazards; and 3) Natural Disaster
Hazards, viewed any of these categories as dominant.
Table 33: Stakeholder Survey Results – Dominate Hazards (Source: Simpson (kk1), 2016)
Stakeholder/Org Given a notional risk assessment produced three
categories: 1) Human Caused Hazards; 2) Institutional
Hazards; 3) Natural Disaster Hazards; would you
expect any of these categories of hazard to dominate? If
so which one(s) and why??
Patton (OSD) • I guess I would first have to ask you to identify risk to what? Is it risk to
mission capability? Is it risk to the carrying capacity of the
installation? And I would need to think about what your risk tolerance
is. How often have you dealt with these risks in the past? When does
the risk become too great – what is the tipping point for each of these?
Finally, which of these do we have control over? Can we mitigate the
risk by being more resilient, better planning, smarter investment
(okay, any investment)? Risk assessment is a first step – risk
management (mitigation, avoidance, resilience) is the hard part.
McGinn (ASN)
• Intuitively you would think it would be natural disasters…but in
terms of natural disasters…we’ll put it in terms of if that were
true…human and institutional management water can make you
either more or less resilient to the natural disasters…You can have a
synergy of human caused and mother nature caused
hazards…whereby…if you are not managing your water and you have
a dam failure or something like that…
Banta (MCIWest)
• We’re already seeing Natural Disaster hazards (e.g. climate change
induced drought) impacting our installations, as well as lack of
infrastructure investment to mitigate the impact of these hazards…
we don’t control the climate and will remain reactive to that. We can
address infrastructure investment, but must generate the institutional
will to do so… and that will be challenging. I think we’re getting better
at recognizing and regulating human caused hazards (in terms of
pollution), but will continue to see the effects of population growth.
Becoming more water wise/efficient will help counter the effects of
population growth by decreasing water intensity… but that takes
education and in many cases fundamental cultural change.
Simes (BoR)
• It is very likely all of these Marine installations will have potential
impacts from Human Hazards, i.e., contaminated groundwater, due to

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prior and current military activity and natural occurring soil substance
build-up like salts which are increasing and could eventually impact
local groundwater sources… All of these installations have
Institutional Hazards, e.g., DoD budgets are getting reduced and
priorities are shifting.
Marcus (SWRCB)
• Since most of the facilities are in southern California I would say the
risks are a combination of human caused and natural disaster.
Groundwater management, or lack thereof can be a challenge because
without it the well may literally run dry.
Weston (SDCWA)
• All three categories would appear in the highly likely/significant
impact quadrant to some degree.
Stapleton
(SDCWA)
• I think that either Human Caused Hazards or Natural Disaster
Hazards would dominate, with Natural Disasters as the biggest threat.
Kightlinger
(MWD)
• Natural Disaster, then Institutional Hazards, then Human Caused
Hazards.
Razak (City of
San Diego)
• Human caused, then Institutional, then natural disaster hazards.
Bebee (FPUD)
• I would suspect natural disaster hazards to be the most significant
given the current drought conditions in California and the southwest.
While the other hazards are important, they can be addressed in
shorter time frames by replacing personnel or adjusting policies.
Reich (Stetson
Engineers)
• Institutional Hazards would likely dominate because it is most
affected by the unpredictability of multiple individuals with varying
worldviews. Without modeling individuals’ behavior due to their
worldview, it is possible that they may represent a greater risk when
compared to natural disasters caused by climate change.
O’Malley
(Waterkeepers)
• This question is difficult because each hazard is so connected. For
instance, current institutional hazards exist (in my mind) that either
allow for, or encourage, over-use of water resources. This may be seen
both a human caused hazard and inability of the institution to address
that hazard. In this existing situation, natural disaster caused hazards
may pose a greater risk than they would otherwise if over-use was not
present and additional resources were available in such an instance.
• Under that reasoning (interconnectedness of each hazard and system),
I would not expect any one hazard to dominate overall, but I would
suspect a single hazard to dominate at any one given place in time
based on existing situations.

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Table 34: Water Security Stakeholder Survey Response Summary (Source: Simpson (tt), 2016)

The overall theme of the stakeholders’ responses was that the hazards were
all interconnected and that determining which one would dominate, would be very
situationally dependent. Another theme was the view that mitigating human caused
and natural disaster hazards will require institutional will and capability. This

264
supports my view that our institutions, as collections of individuals organized for a
purpose (governance, profit generation, management, oversight, etc.), are only
capable of playing whatever role in preempting, mitigating or adapting to our water
security risks, that we as a society allow them to. The DoD chain-of-command makes
a very salient point by discussing their concerns about how the lack of investment in
water security infrastructure and management exacerbates the risks from both
natural disaster hazards and human caused hazards. This point corroborates the
conclusions of my risk assessment and management process – funding is a first
priority risk for every installation within MCIWest.
MCIWest’s water security stakeholder survey has corroborated many of the
elements of my grounded theory process, shown that water security definitions are
indeed worldview dependent, demonstrated complete agreement regarding climate
change and population growth as the most significant risks to water security, and
revealed that the “institutional-will” to fund preemption, mitigation, and adaptation
efforts is the key to managing risk across the water industry. This survey has made
significant contributions to the development of MCIWest’s water security strategy.

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Chapter 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Introduction

This chapter discusses the eight most significant conclusions of this study.
The progression of the conclusions mirrors the progression of this study’s grounded
theory development. The basis for this research study is the premise that the water
security of the installations of MCIWest is vital to national security. In recognition of
this conclusion, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has directed all military
installations to develop systems to ensure their water security. The conclusions that
follow 1) water security for MCIWest is vital to national security, represent the
progression of the development of the process to assess and manage the risks to
MCIWest’s water security. This section culminates in the conclusion that as a
military organization, MCIWest has very limited risk preemption or mitigation
capacity. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that MCIWest has numerous
significant constraints on its ability to fund and implement projects and strategies to
mitigate risk.
Following the conclusions section of this chapter is the recommendations
section. In this section, an installation-by-installation risk response strategy is
discussed. The section begins with an explanation of the intricacies of the military
command and control structure and how those intricacies affect any proposed risk
response. Tables describing the details of the risk response strategies for each
installation are followed by a summary table that illustrates the overall risk

266
response strategy for MCIWest. The final element of this chapter is a brief
description of the MCIWest Water Security Strategy showing how MCIWest will
utilize the conclusions of this study to implement the proposed recommendations.

B. Conclusions

1) Water Security for MCIWest is Vital to National Security

The OSD memorandum affirms that the mission capability of DoD’s
installations is dependent on water security.
It is imperative that each installation and range collect and maintain
information associated with its water rights, and that DoD plan and manage
its water resources to ensure the sustainment of our mission and enhance
our water security (OSD, 2014).

The mission of MCIWest’s installations is to provide the operational Marine
Forces with all the services they require to dwell, train and deploy to support and
defend U.S. national security interests. Therefore, water security for MCIWest is vital
to national security
It is imperative that State, regional, and local governments specifically
consider the national security mission and economic significance of DOD
activities in California during their natural resource planning efforts. Military
training and the infrastructure that supports it cannot be sustained without
access to sufficient quantities of high-quality water (Natural Resources
Agency, 2014).

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2) Framing Water Security in Terms of Risk is the Best Methodology

a. While other frameworks such as the “Global Web of National Water
Security” (Zeitoun, 2011) and “Integrated Regional Water-Resource
Management” system (Cook & Baker, 2012) are comprehensive,
multi-dimensional, multi-scalar frameworks that could address the
regional, integrated, multi-scalar, multi-dimensional requirements of
MCIWest, framing water security in terms of “risk” is the most
appropriate methodology. MCIWest is a military organization and the
concepts and management strategies associated with “risk” are
familiar to decision-makers up and down the chain-of-command and
have a proven track record of framing the information necessary to
make “trade-off-based” investment decisions quickly and effectively
(CNA, 2014; CNA, 2007; Kodack et al., 2011; NRC, 2011).

3) Risk Criteria Based on Water Supply and Delivery Systems

As discussed in Chapter 8, the assessment of risk requires criteria that are
used to evaluate levels of impact. The criteria chosen for evaluating the impacts on
MCIWest’s water security are supply and delivery. The water security of MCIWest’s
installations depends on there being a sufficient supply of appropriate quality water
that can be reliably delivered from its storage location to its end-user. Risks to water
supply and delivery systems come from meteorological, geological, physical,

268
institutional and societal sources. And while these sources of risk can be further
broken down into their constituent dimensions, hazards and threats, the final
assessment of risk can be calculated based on the impacts to the supply and delivery
systems that access the water and move it to the end-user.

4) Climate Change and Overpopulation are the Greatest Risks

Numerous sources cited in this dissertation identify climate change as the
greatest risk to water security [e.g. Global Water Security (DNI, 2012); Global
Risks Report 2016, 11th Edition (WEF, 2016); National Security and the
Accelerating Risks of Climate Change (CNA, 2014); Climate Change and Water
(Bates et al., 2008); et al.]. The findings of these studies were supported by the
stakeholder survey conducted for this dissertation, in which all water industry
leaders surveyed identified climate change as the greatest risk to water security.
Overpopulation is a major driver of climate change and overconsumption of
resources (IPCC, 2012; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2013; Vorosmarty et al., 2012; Arrow et
al., 2004). The population of the southwest (where all MCIWest installations are
located) far exceeds the carrying capacity of its natural water supply systems. Thus,
very significant infrastructure projects must be built, operated and maintained to
move water from its sources and storage locations (e.g. Northern California, Lake
Oroville; Lakes Powell and Mead). This requires significant political will to
continuously fund the personnel and activities associated with the extensive and
complex systems. The grounded theory process for assessing water security risks

269
across the installations of MCIWest identified funding, institutional and societal
risks as the most significant risks across the region. Funding, institutional and
societal risks are all negatively impacted by overpopulation, thus this study
supports the finding that overpopulation is one of the greatest risks to water
security.

5) Stakeholder Worldviews have Significant Impacts on Water Security

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recognized the influence that an
individual’s worldview has on the perception of water-related risks and his/her
decision-making process to deal with them. In their report, Envisioning the agenda
for water resources research in the twenty-first century (NAS, 2001), the Water
Science and Technology Board elucidates the issues as follows:
Over the past 25 years, there has been a growing awareness that individual
perceptions and social values greatly influence public decisions (Fischhoff, 1995).
Perceptions of experts, stakeholders, and the public about the risks, benefits, and
mitigation options affect risk management processes. Each party's knowledge,
beliefs, and overall perception of the decision process can significantly change the
results of that process (Fischhoff, 1995). However, management strategies are only
infrequently based on a systematic assessment of the knowledge, perceptions, and
beliefs of differing parties (NAS, 2001, p. 38).

Chapter 5 of this study, Stakeholder Water Security Worldviews, elucidates
the worldviews of stakeholders across the water industry (e.g. DoD, BoR, EPA,
California state government, the engineering and legal professions, environmental
non-profits). In my professional experience, each of these entities (through their
leaders) directly supports the findings of the NAS that “knowledge, beliefs, and

270
overall perception of the decision process” does significantly impact perceptions of
risk and their associated trade-off and investment decisions. Thus, the MCIWest
water security risk assessment and management process is informed by “a
systematic assessment of the knowledge, perceptions, and beliefs of differing
parties” (NAS, 2001).

6) The MCIWest Definition for “Water Security”

The MCIWest definition has been adapted from the definition found on page
18 of Water security: from abstract concept to meaningful metrics: an initial
overview of options (Manson & Calow, 2012).
Water security means having sufficient water, in quantity and quality, for the
needs of MCIWest’s Operational Forces, all supporting activities and
installation ecosystems, matched by the capacity to access and use it, resolve
trade-offs, and manage water-related risks, including flood, drought and
contamination.

This definition is designed to address the issues associated with the supply
and delivery of water to the installations of MCIWest. It addresses the issues of
quantity, quality and capacity to access, which addresses both the legal (water
rights) and the physical (operable infrastructure from supply point to end-user)
issues. Additionally, this definition includes the ability to “resolve trade-offs” among
investment opportunities and to manage risks to water security – the driver behind
the development of the MCIWest water security risk assessment and management
process.

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7) The Process for Assessing and Managing Water Security Risks

Having demonstrated that water security for MCIWest is vital to national
security and that water security can be framed in terms of risk to the supply and
delivery systems of its installations, a grounded theory for a process which assesses
risk comprehensively (e.g. climate change, stakeholder worldviews, groundwater
contamination, etc.) to enable effective management of risks at both the regional
and installation level was developed. This process has been adapted from industry
best practices (Curtis & Cary, 2012) for use by MCIWest staff and senior military
leaders to inform policies, procedures and investment strategies designed to
enhance MCIWest water security.
There are no “one-size-fits-all” policies, procedures or investment strategies
that will ensure water security for the region. Therefore, the “concepts” of this
process are “scalar” and can be used at the installation level and at the regional
level. The concept of “filtering” risks did not come from an industry best practice
and was developed during this study to provide the “scalar” nature of this process.
This development was based on the need to have a single MCIWest process that
could be well understood and effectively utilized by decision-makers with dual
regional and installation responsibilities.
Table 35: Risk Management Process Summary (Source: Simpson (vv), 2016)
MCIWest Water Security Assessment and Management Process
C. Identifying the Hazards, Threats and Impacts to MCIWest's Water Security
D. Establishing the Risk Evaluation Criteria
E. Developing the Impact, Likelihood, Speed of Onset and Vulnerability Rating Scales
F. Risk and Vulnerability Assessments – including confidence ranges, risk interactions

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G. Filtering and Prioritizing Risks and Vulnerabilities – Systemic Risks, Worldview Influences
H. Develop the Risk Responses
I. Measures of Effectiveness

This grounded theory process has already been translated into practice for
MCIWest as the foundation for the region’s Water Security Strategy.

8) MCIWest has Very Limited Risk Preemption/Mitigation Capacity

The United Nations World Water Program (UNWWP) elucidates a number of
water security risk response strategies (WWAP, 2012). The first strategy is to
reduce uncertainty through: 1) monitoring, modelling and forecasting; 2) adaptive
planning in anticipation of fluctuating risk; and 3) proactive management. Due to
extensive cyber-security restrictions beyond those of the other services, the U.S.
Marine Corps has severely inhibited MCIWest’s ability to monitor its water resource
systems. Its largest installation, Camp Pendleton, does not have a Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to monitor and manage its 200
square mile area. Due to significant funding constraints and cyber-security
restrictions, MCIWest does not have, nor can it acquire, the personnel, training and
technology to employ the key concepts and principles of adaptive planning and
management: “(1) conceiving management actions as experiments; (2) conducting
several plans/experiments at once for fast learning; (3) monitoring being the key;
and (4) learning by doing” (WWAP, 2012, p. 329). With regards to “proactive
management”, MCIWest like all federal government institutions, must deal with
perpetual budget uncertainty. The current dysfunctionality of the U.S. Congress with

273
regards to its budgeting responsibilities is particularly pronounced (Joyce, 2012).
Instead of the ability of a special district to issue bonds or utilize the “pay-go”
system for rate payer funding, MCIWest must utilize the Military Construction
(MILCON) funding process. The minimum timeline for this process from
identification of the requirement to completion of the project is six years. And
because all projects in excess of $750,000 must obtain congressional approval
followed by a congressional appropriation of funds specifically for that project,
congressional dysfunction and austerity policies severely inhibit “proactive
planning”. The second UNWWP strategy for “reducing exposure and minimizing
risks” is by making prudent and timely investments in infrastructure. For the
reasons already discussed, this is not a viable strategy for MCIWest.
Thus, MCIWest, with very limited risk preemption/mitigation capacity, must
utilize the process for assessing water security risk developed by this study to
inform “risk scenario” projections that can be utilized to develop “post-failure” plans
for responding to risks. These plans will likely take the form of best case, worst case,
and most probable case scenarios.
C. Recommendations

1) Operational and Administrative Risk

In order to understand the development of the proposed water security risk
responses for MCIWest, it will be necessary to discuss some of the complexities
within military doctrine and reporting relationships. This is necessary because the

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military and civilian hierarchy and the funding mechanisms within the DoD are
unique when discussing the development and implementation of water security risk
responses. The concepts of operational risk and administrative risk will be
introduced to provide a more comprehensive understanding and clarification of
how risk response strategies can be employed by MCIWest.
As the Program Director for MCIWest Water Resources, my role is to provide
subject matter expertise and advice on all water-related policies, procedures,
decisions and tasking to the Commanding General and to the installation
commanders. While the Commanding General has delegated “by-direction”
authority to me on some functions, the final decision-making authority regarding
investment decisions (i.e. infrastructure project prioritization and funding) and
tasking of installation commanders is by law, not delegable, and thus, the following
risk response strategies will take the form of recommendations. Likewise, by law,
the Commanding General assumes all risk for his command as do his installation
commanders for their bases, stations and centers. Thus, the proposed risk responses
for the installations are also recommendations by me that will be evaluated by the
installation commanders and acted upon as they see fit.
The installation commanders of MCRD San Diego, MCAGCC 29 Palms and
MCMWTC Bridgeport report both operationally and administratively to the
Commanding General of the Training and Education Command (TECOM) versus the
Commanding General of MCIWest. The distinction between “operational and

275
administrative control” is a facet of military doctrine that is also important to
developing a complete understanding of the recommended risk responses.
Operational Control (OPCON)…is the authority to perform those functions of
command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing
commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving
authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint
training necessary to accomplish the mission (JP1, 2013, p. V-6).

Administrative Control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over
subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and
support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and
equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training,
readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not
included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other
organizations (JP1, 2013, p. V-12).

Another aspect of military doctrine that is important to developing a
complete understanding of the recommended risk responses is the concept of
support.
Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a
common superior commander between subordinate commanders when one
organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force (JP1,
2013, p. V-8).

The MCIWest Commanding General has OPCON over the installation
commanders of: MCB Camp Pendleton, MCAS Camp Pendleton, MCAS Miramar,
MCAS Yuma, and MCLB Barstow. This means his role is that of “assigning tasks,
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction” to these installations. As
stated above, he does not have OPCON or ADCON of the three TECOM installations.
However, the first “common superior commander” in both the CG of MCIWest and
the CG of TECOM chain-of-command, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, has

276
“established” a support relationship between MCIWest and the three TECOM
installations. MCIWest will “aid and complement” the installation commanders of
MCRD San Diego, MCAGCC 29 Palms and MCMWTC Bridgeport in the execution of
their infrastructure planning, building, operating and maintaining missions. In
summary, the CG of MCIWest will make water security risk response strategy
decisions for the five installations under his command, while making water security
risk response strategy recommendations for the three TECOM installations.

2) Risk Response Strategies

Figure 60: Risk Response Strategies (Source: RIMPL, n.d.)

Figure 60 illustrates the standard response strategies to risks. As discussed
in the conclusions, not all of these response strategies are available to MCIWest. For
example, because of significant funding and other constraints, MCIWest will have

277
very little ability to eliminate uncertainty or modify exposure by investing in
infrastructure or personnel to avoid or mitigate risks. Additionally, because of the
nature of command, in most cases MCIWest’s ability to transfer or share risks will
only apply to administrative risks. For example, under the definition of ADCON, the
MCIWest CG could transfer to his/her higher headquarters the administrative risks
associated with not providing the “resources, equipment and personnel” that he has
identified as critical to ameliorating a risk. However, by law the CG will always
maintain the responsibility for the operational risks to his mission accomplishment
– even if they are outside his ability to control. Thus, for the remainder of this study,
it should be clear that any discussion of risk response strategies that includes the
transfer or sharing of risk applies to administrative risk only.

3) Systemic Risks

Systemic water security risks are risks to, and derived from, our society that
impact the entire water supply and delivery systems of the southwest (i.e. climate
change, overpopulation, geography [natural aridity], earthquake, undervaluation of
water and over-allocation of water sources [e.g. Colorado River]). These risks are
shared across our society. For example, earthquake risk is shared through the
seismic building code and federal, state, and local emergency management systems
within the states of California and Arizona. The risks associated with the over-
allocation of the Colorado River are shared by Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, under the 1922 Colorado River Compact (Hoover,

278
1923), all of the people who consume the vegetables and meat produced in the
Imperial Valley of California, and the urban populations of Arizona and southern
California. While these risks are “shared” across our society, for the purposes of this
study, the risk response strategy that will be applied to them is to “accept” them and
subsume them into the water security risk baseline for MCIWest, its subordinate
installations and its supported installations.

4) Installation Risk Response Strategies

The following tables represent the recommended water security risk
responses for each installation. The development of these risk responses is step six
in the process developed by this study to assess and manage water security risks for
MCIWest. The process utilized grounded theory methodology to gather and analyze
data from numerous sources (i.e. peer-review of journals, institutional and
organizational internet content, a stakeholder survey, day-to-day interaction with
water industry leaders, et al.). These risk responses will be submitted to the
Commanding General of MCIWest and the installation commanders of all eight U.S.
Marine Corps installations in the southwest. They will evaluate them and direct
action as they see fit. The development of measures of effectiveness, step seven in
the process, is a topic for follow-on research by the staff of the MCIWest Water
Resources organization. The final deliverable from this study is the MCIWest Water
Security Strategy.

279

Table 36: MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton Risk Response Strategies (Source: Simpson (ll), 2016)

MCB/MCAS Camp Pendleton
Risk Response Strategies
Priority 1
Drought 1. Share risk with RCWD, FPUD and SDCWA
a. RCWD through the CWRMA which purchases water
through the MWD system to recharge the groundwater in
the Santa Margarita River Basin
b. FPUD will provide emergency water from the SDCWA
through its system to the southern half of Camp Pendleton
c. Camp Pendleton has 15,000 AF of emergency supply
through SDCWA
2. Mitigate risk to northern section of the installation by
developing projects to drill new wells west of existing wells
in order to access the deeper and larger sections of the San
Onofre and San Mateo basins
3. Mitigate risk by developing a project to conduct Indirect
Potable Recharge (IPR) from the Southern Tertiary
Treatment Plant to the Lake O’Neill groundwater recharge
ponds (provide a “new” source of water)
4. Avoid risk by partnering with the SDCWA on the proposed
Camp Pendleton Ocean-water Desalination Plant that will
provide “new” drought-proof supply of water
5. Transfer administrative risk to MCIWest by prioritizing all
water projects as Camp Pendleton’s highest priorities for
funding
Groundwater
Contaminants
Accept risk caused by increased groundwater pumping caused
by drought while pursuing risk response strategies to drought
a. Analyze groundwater basins for most probable location of
future contamination and develop a contingency plan
Funding Transfer administrative funding risks to MCIWest by developing
and submitting detailed and justified (through risk analysis)
requirements and for:
a. Funding of projects designed to mitigate risk
b. Funding for appropriate number of personnel to
effectively manage, operate and maintain all water supply
and delivery systems
c. Funding for training personnel to effectively manage,
operate and maintain water supply and delivery systems
d. Funding for required maintenance and repair of all water
supply and delivery systems

280
Priority 2
Management
Planning,
Operations,
Maintenance and
Personnel
Transfer risk to MCIWest as administrative funding risk
Engagement
Transfer risk to MCIWest as a Water Resource Program staff
responsibility
Physical
Flooding Accept risk and subsume into baseline for emergency
preparations and management
Inundation 1. Accept risk and develop projects to relocate/protect affected
infrastructure
2. Transfer risk for funding developed projects to MCIWest by
including them in top priorities of the installation
commander
Landslide/Mudslide Accept risks and subsume into baseline for emergency
preparations and management
Terrorism,
Vandalism and
Arson
Accept risks and subsume into baseline for Mission Assurance
inspections of water supply and delivery systems designed to
identify vulnerabilities
Equipment,
Infrastructure, and
ICS Failures
Accept risks and repair or replace as required following failure
Priority 3
Institutional
Legal Accept risk and be prepared to assert water rights as per OSD
direction
Political Will,
Decision Paralysis,
System Design, and
Complexity
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
federal, state, and local entities on installation’s behalf
Societal
(Worldview)

Tribalism, Ideology,
and Ignorance
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
external risks to the installation’s water security on your
behalf

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Table 37: MCAS Miramar/MCRD San Diego Risk Response Strategies (Source: Simpson (mm), 2016)

MCAS Miramar and MCRD San Diego (Navy provides supply, and operates and
maintains delivery systems)
Risk Response Strategies
Priority 1
Drought Transfer risk to Naval Facilities utilities business line managers
who will share the risk with the City of San Diego et al.
Funding Transfer risk to Naval Facilities utilities business line managers
who have the responsibility for operating and maintaining the
water supply and delivery systems funded through reimbursable
water rates to the installation
Priority 2
Physical
Terrorism,
Vandalism and
Arson
1. Accept risk and subsume into baseline for Mission Assurance
inspections of water supply and delivery systems designed to
identify vulnerabilities
2. Transfer
Equipment,
Infrastructure, and
ICS Failures
Transfer risk to Navy who will repair or replace as required
following failure
Priority 3
Societal
(Worldview)

Tribalism,
Ideology, and
Ignorance
Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage external
risks to the installation’s water security on your behalf

Table 38: MCAS Yuma Risk Response Strategies (Source: Simpson (nn), 2016)

MCAS Yuma (Source of Colorado River Aqueduct )
Risk Response Strategies
Priority 1
Drought 1. Accept all systemic risks to Colorado River and subsume into
baseline emergency use of installation groundwater planning
2. Mitigate risk by developing project to optimize groundwater
resources on base if access to Colorado River is lost
Funding Transfer administrative funding risks to MCIWest by developing
and submitting detailed and justified (through risk analysis)
requirements and for:

282
a. Funding of projects designed to mitigate risk
b. Funding for appropriate number of personnel to effectively
manage, operate and maintain all water supply and
delivery systems
c. Funding for training personnel to effectively manage,
operate and maintain water supply and delivery systems
d. Funding for required maintenance and repair of all water
supply and delivery systems
Priority 2
Management
Planning,
Operations,
Maintenance and
Personnel
Transfer risk to MCIWest as administrative funding risk
Engagement Transfer risk to MCIWest as a Water Resource Program staff
responsibility
Physical
Terrorism,
Vandalism and
Arson
Accept risks and subsume into baseline for Mission Assurance
inspections of water supply and delivery systems designed to
identify vulnerabilities
Equipment,
Infrastructure, and
ICS Failures
Accept risks and repair or replace as required following failure
Priority 3
Institutional
Legal Accept risk and be prepared to assert water rights as per OSD
direction
Political Will,
Decision Paralysis,
System Design, and
Complexity
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
federal, state, and local entities on installation’s behalf
Societal
(Worldview)

Tribalism,
Ideology, and
Ignorance
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
external risks to the installation’s water security on your
behalf

283
Table 39: MCLB Barstow Risk Response Strategies (Source: Simpson (oo), 2016)

MCLB Barstow
Risk Response Strategies
Priority 1
Drought 1. For the Nebo Main Base, Transfer risk to the City of Barstow
2. For the Yermo Annex, Share and Mitigate risk (funded
through the superfund program) with EPA and NAVFAC
Southwest through the continued remediation of
groundwater
3. Share risk with Mojave Water Agency under the adjudication
of groundwater in the area
Groundwater
Contaminants
1. Continue to Mitigate groundwater contamination via
superfund projects continuously underway since 15 Nov 1989
Funding Transfer administrative funding risks to MCIWest by developing
and submitting detailed and justified (through risk analysis)
requirements and for:
a. Funding of projects designed to mitigate risk
b. Funding for appropriate number of personnel to effectively
manage, operate and maintain all water supply and
delivery systems
c. Funding for training personnel to effectively manage,
operate and maintain water supply and delivery systems
d. Funding for required maintenance and repair of all water
supply and delivery systems
Priority 2
Management
Planning,
Operations,
Maintenance and
Personnel
Transfer to MCIWest as administrative funding risk
Engagement
Transfer to MCIWest as a Water Resource Program staff
responsibility
Physical
Flash Flooding Accept risk and subsume into baseline for emergency
preparations and management
Terrorism,
Vandalism and
Arson
Accept risks and subsume into baseline for Mission Assurance
inspections of water supply and delivery systems designed to
identify vulnerabilities
Equipment,
Infrastructure, and
ICS Failures
Accept risks and repair or replace as required following failure
Priority 3
Institutional

284
Legal
Accept risk and be prepared to assert water rights as per OSD
direction
Political Will,
Decision Paralysis,
System Design, and
Complexity
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
federal, state, and local entities on installation’s behalf
Societal
(Worldview)

Tribalism,
Ideology, and
Ignorance
1. Accept risks and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
external risks to the installation’s water security on your
behalf

Table 40: MCAGCC 29 Palms Risk Response Strategies (Source: Simpson (pp), 2016)

MCAGCC 29 Palms
Risk Response Strategies
Priority 1
Earthquake Accept as a systemic risk and subsume into baseline for
emergency preparations and management
Groundwater
Contaminants
Mitigate risk by developing projects to build advanced water
treatment capability for Surprise Springs and Deadman
groundwater basins
Funding Transfer administrative funding risks to TECOM (with advocacy
by MCIWest) by developing and submitting detailed and justified
(through risk analysis) requirements and for:
a. Funding of projects designed to mitigate risk
b. Funding for appropriate number of personnel to effectively
manage, operate and maintain all water supply and
delivery systems
c. Funding for training personnel to effectively manage,
operate and maintain water supply and delivery systems
d. Funding for required maintenance and repair of all water
supply and delivery systems
Priority 2
Management
Planning,
Operations,
Maintenance and
Personnel
Transfer to TECOM as administrative funding risk
Engagement
Transfer to MCIWest as a Water Resource Program staff
responsibility

285
Physical
Flash Flooding Accept risk and subsume into baseline for emergency
preparations and management
Subsidence 1. Accept and develop projects to relocate/protect affected
infrastructure
2. Transfer risks for funding developed projects to TECOM by
including them in top priorities of the installation commander
Terrorism,
Vandalism, Arson
and Cyber
Accept risks and subsume into baseline for Mission Assurance
inspections of water supply and delivery systems designed to
identify vulnerabilities
Equipment,
Infrastructure, and
ICS Failures
Accept risks and repair or replace as required following failure
Priority 3
Institutional
Political Will,
Decision Paralysis,
System Design, and
Complexity
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
federal, state, and local entities on installation’s behalf
Societal
(Worldview)

Tribalism,
Ideology, and
Ignorance
1. Accept risks and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
external risks to the installation’s water security on your
behalf

Table 41: MCMWTC Risk Response Strategies (Source: Simpson (qq), 2016)

MCMWTC Bridgeport
Risk Response Strategies
Priority 1
Drought Accept as a systematic risk related to the impacts of climate
change (loss of snow pack) on the Walker River system
Groundwater
Contaminants
Accept risk caused by increased groundwater pumping caused by
drought while pursuing risk response strategies to drought
a. Analyze groundwater basin for most probable location of
future contamination and develop a contingency plan
Funding Transfer administrative funding risks to TECOM by developing
and submitting detailed and justified (through risk analysis)
requirements and for:
a. Funding of projects designed to mitigate risk

286
b. Funding for appropriate number of personnel to effectively
manage, operate and maintain all water supply and
delivery systems
c. Funding for training personnel to effectively manage,
operate and maintain water supply and delivery systems
d. Funding for required maintenance and repair of all water
supply and delivery systems
Legal Accept the risk posed by the Walker River Adjudication (Nevada
Federal Court) to riparian water rights at MCMWTC and subsume
into preparations for asserting installation water rights
Share the risk with the Department of Justice and OSD by
engaging them through MCIWest Water Resources Program staff
Priority 2
Management
Planning,
Operations,
Maintenance and
Personnel
Transfer risk to TECOM as administrative funding risk
Engagement
Transfer risk to MCIWest as a Water Resource Program staff
responsibility
Physical
Flooding Accept risk and subsume into baseline for emergency
preparations and management
Lightning Accept risks and subsume into baseline for emergency
preparations and management
Terrorism,
Vandalism and
Arson
Accept risks and subsume into baseline for Mission Assurance
inspections of water supply and delivery systems designed to
identify vulnerabilities
Operator error,
Equipment Failure,
Infrastructure
Failure
Accept risks and repair or replace as required following failure
Priority 3
Institutional
Political Will,
Decision Paralysis,
System Design, and
Complexity
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
federal, state, and local entities on installation’s behalf
Societal
(Worldview)

Tribalism,
Ideology, and
Ignorance
1. Accept and subsume into baseline understanding of the
impacts to the water supply and delivery systems with
regards to policies, procedures and the funding of projects

287
2. Share risks with MCIWest through its mission to engage
external risks to the installation’s water security on your
behalf

Figure 61: MCIWest Water Security Risk Response Strategies (Source: Simpson (xx), 2016)

288
D. MCIWest Water Security Strategy

Because the full write up of the MCIWest Water Security Strategy will contain
numerous sections of this study it would be redundant to provide the full document
here. Thus, the MCIWest Water Security Strategy Statement has been provided to
summarize the final product of this study.
Figure 62: MCIWest Water Security Strategy Statement (Source: Simpson (ww), 2016)

MCIWest Water Security Strategy Statement

As stated in the 23 May 2014 OSD Memorandum regarding Water Rights and Water Resource
Management, “DoD installations depend on water security to fulfill their missions”. Consequently,
MCIWest has developed the following approach to ensuring the water security of its installations.

GOALS:
A. Ensure the perpetual Water Security of MCIWest Installations
B. MCIWest installations meet/exceed all EO 13693 requirements
C. MCIWest becomes the DoD model for Regional Strategic Water Security Management

OBJECTIVES:
A. Define “Water Security” for MCIWest
B. Develop a “thorough understanding” of all installation water rights and water resource
management
C. Develop processes or procedures to resolve conflicts between water requirements and
availability
D. Develop processes or procedures for prioritizing water usage during periods of scarcity
E. Develop a thorough understanding of the risks to water security and how to assess, prioritize
and manage them for each installation

ACTIONS:
Define Water Security for MCIWest:
“Water security” means having sufficient water, in quantity and quality, for the needs of
MCIWest’s Operational Forces, all supporting activities and installation ecosystems, matched by
the capacity to access and use it, resolve trade-offs, and manage water-related risks, including
flood, drought and pollution.

Water Security Strategy - (4) Components
1. SUPPLY: Through data gathering and analysis, develop a thorough understanding of:
a) Sources (locations, type, quality, quantity)

289
b) Water Rights (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary) and capability and readiness to Protect
and Exercise these rights
c) Infrastructure – Existence, Capacity, Condition; Plan for O&M, repair/replacement, future
needs
d) Alternate Sources – Rainfall harvesting; Stormwater capture; Graywater, Recycled
Wastewater; Desal; “Living Machine” Wastewater processing
2. DEMAND: Through data gathering and analysis, develop a thorough understanding of:
a) Current water uses – quantity, quality, location
b) Projected water needs and how to integrate water assessments into strategic decisions
c) How to optimize water demand by implementing (14) FEMP/EPA Best Management
Practices
3. DELIVERY:
a) Identify the Risks to the water supply and delivery systems of each installation
b) Conduct a Water Security Risk Assessment for each installation
c) Develop a Water Security Risk Response Plan for each installation

4. LEADERSHIP:
a) Establish MCIWest Water Security Program and Organization – i) provide guidance, and
promulgate policy; ii) Develop and sign an MOA with NRSW; iii) plan and implement
staff assignments and alignment strategies; iv) Camp Pendleton SDCWA seat on the
Board of Dir becomes DoN seat
b) Collect and Analyze Data to – i) produce required reports, briefs and information to CG,
MCICOM, OSD; ii) inform investment and other water security related decisions
c) Provide Training and Expertise – i) Develop and maintain a deep understanding of
latest water related technologies; ii) Pursue funding for, and implementation of,
appropriate pilot projects; iii) Develop and maintain training modules for installation
"water resource managers"; iv) Provide Water Resources Subject Matter expertise to
installations
d) Knowledge Management System – i) Develop and implement a robust knowledge
management system, a maintenance plan for that system, a communications matrix and
schedule contacting stakeholders
e) Engage, Advocate and Collaborate – i) proactively engage internal and external local,
state and federal entity stakeholders that have roles in the protection, use and long-
term viability of installation water supplies to ensure that the criticality and viability of
the installation’s mission is clearly understood by all decision-makers
(Water Security = Mission Security = National Security)

290
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AB 685. (2012). California Assembly Bill No. 685 a.k.a "human right to water bill"
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Allouche, J. (2011). The sustainability and resilience of global water and food
systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource
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(CG) COMMANDING GENERAL'S POLICY LETTER 1-15 [Letter to MCIWest Staff
and Installation Commanders]. (2015). In MARINE CORPS INSTALLATIONS
WEST-MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP PENDLETON DROUGHT RESPONSE
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APPENDIX A: Office of Secretary of Defense Memorandum

317

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APPENDIX B: MCIWest Commanding General’s Policy Letter 1-15

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APPENDIX C: Informed Consent for Non-Medical Research Form

Ralph and Goldy Lewis Hall, Room 111
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626

INFORMED CONSENT FOR NON-MEDICAL RESEARCH

WATER SECURITY AND WORLDVIEWS

You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by John Simpson,
Doctoral Candidate, (Committee - Dr. Hilda Blanco, Chair, Dr. Peter
Robertson, Dr. Brian Brady) at the University of Southern California, because
of your leadership role within your organization and your organization’s
pursuit of “water security.” Your participation is voluntary. You should read the
information below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand,
before deciding whether to participate. Please take as much time as you need to
read the consent form. You may also decide to discuss participation with your
family or friends. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to sign this form.
You will be given a copy of this form.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study is designed to explore the concepts surrounding the water resources
terminology – Water Security. It seeks to determine how an individual’s or
organization’s Worldview affects how they define the term and pursue the
concepts associated with the term.

STUDY PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to fill out a brief
questionnaire that will be used to explore how your organization views the
concepts of water security, what actions you take to pursue it; what your
organization sees as the biggest challenges to water security; what it sees as the
biggest opportunities; and what your organization perceives the worldviews of
other selected organizations to be. If you prefer, your answers will be recorded
as an audio file or transcribed for you by the interviewer.

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POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
There are no anticipated risks/discomforts associated with this study.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
You have been chosen to participate in this study because you will be a
stakeholder that will interface with new Marine Corps Installations West
(MCIWest) Water Resources Organization. Thus, your participation in this study
which is designed to assist in the development of a policy and investment
decision-making roadmap will greatly benefit both of our organizations.

PAYMENT/COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
There will be no financial payment/compensation for participating in this study.

CONFIDENTIALITY
We will not be collecting any confidential data for this study. If you feel that you
have disclosed any confidential information, please advise the interviewer and he
will remove it from any records and it will not be used in this study.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation is voluntary. You may withdraw your consent at any time and
discontinue participation. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or
remedies because of your participation in this research study.

INVESTIGATOR’S CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to
contact John Simpson, josimpso@usc.edu, 951-375-2658

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT – IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research
participant or the research in general and are unable to contact the research
team, or if you want to talk to someone independent of the research team,
please contact the University Park Institutional Review Board (UPIRB), 3720
South Flower Street #301, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0702, (213) 821-5272 or
upirb@usc.edu

I have read the information provided above. I have been given a chance to ask
questions. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to
participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

AUDIO – If you have chosen audio transcription, please check below

□ I agree to be audio transcription

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Name of Participant

Signature of Participant Date

I have explained the research to the participant and answered all of his/her
questions. I believe that he/she understands the information described in this
document and freely consents to participate.

Principal Investigator

Signature of Principal Investigator Date

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APPENDIX D: Memorandum to Committee on IRB Requirement

Memorandum For The Record
11 January 2016

From: John Simpson, Doctoral Candidate, USC Price School of Public Policy
To: Dr. Hilda Blanco, Dr. Peter Robertson, Dr. Brian Brady, Dr. Debra Natoli
Cc: Ashley Coelho

Encl: USC “IS YOUR PROJECT HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH?”

Subj: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) REQUIREMENTS

1. This memorandum serves as notification to my Doctoral Committee and
the Director of the DPPD program of my intent not to submit my survey
instrument to the IRB for approval based on my review of materials from
the USC Office of Human Subjects Research.

2. Upon a thorough analysis of the requirements for submitting research
survey instrumentation proposals to the IRB, I have developed the
following reasoning for why my research does not require submission:

a. From the Heath and Human Services Website, Human Subject
Regulations Decision Charts
(http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/checklists/decisioncharts.html):

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The data I will be gathering from the interviews that I will be conducting
will not “develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge” – defined as
knowledge intended to have an impact (theoretical or practical) on others
within one’s discipline.

In fact, my Case Study is designed to obtain specific knowledge that will be
applied to my specific organization (MCIWest) for the purpose of
developing a recommended definition of Water Security for MCIWest and a
recommendation for an associated comprehensive Water Security
Strategy specifically for MCIWest.

MCIWest is the only entity in the world with its specific set of the
constraints, structure, and locations. Thus, while others within “my
discipline” could look at my Case Study and gain insight into the concepts
of Water Security, these insights will not be “generalizable” and will
require tailoring any application of these concepts to whatever situation
they are applied to.

b. Per USC’s Office for the Protection of Research Subjects, Office of the
Provost publication IS YOUR PROJECT HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH?
A Guide for Investigators:

Thus ->

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From the publication:

DEFINING RESEARCH

“Research” generally does not include…studies for internal
management purposes such as program evaluation, quality
assurance, quality improvement…”

My Case Study is specifically for “internal management purposes” with
the specific purposes stated above.

STUDIES THAT ARE NOT HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH

Studies that fit any of the categories below do not need IRB review.

3. Information-gathering interviews where questions focus on
things, products, or policies rather than people or their thoughts
regarding themselves. Example: canvassing librarians about inter-
library loan policies or rising journal costs.

I will be researching my topic by asking "open-ended" questions like the ones
below so that I can develop a thorough understanding of their “organization’s
water security worldview”. I will utilize that understanding to develop
MCIWest’s water security worldview, communications and engagement plans.
Basing these products on my information-gathering interviews will allow me to
align MCIWest’s worldview with our most significant stakeholders, integrate
our organizational policies and procedures with our stakeholders, and
wherever possible, seek to innovate across traditional functional lines.

Thus, I will be conducting my studies (information-gathering interviews) for
“internal management purposes such as program evaluation, and quality
improvement” and my questions will focus on things and policies, and will
result in products that will become my innovation to practice.

Sample questions:

To Maureen Stapleton, General Manger of the San Diego County Water
Authority:

1. Using the definition for ‘Worldview’ of “the lens through which an
organization views the world”, does the Water Authority have a Water
Security Worldview? If so, what is it?
2. If not, as a senior leader within the organization, give me an example of

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a Water Security Worldview for the SDCWA.
3. What, local, state, federal, and private organizations/Institutions does
the Water Authority interact with most?
4. As a senior leader within your organization, what is the SDCWA’s
interpretation of the water security worldviews of the organizations
you listed?

Within the analysis section of my Case Study, I will utilize the answers from
my information-gathering interviews, the organization’s website, other
organization’s interpretation of their worldview, and my own water industry
professional interpretation of what the organization’s water security
worldview was prior to my interview, to triangulate what the organization’s
“most probable actual” water security worldview is, and use that to develop
the recommendations for how MCIWest should integrate this knowledge into
“its” water security worldview.

3. Thus, for the reasons listed above, I do not intend to submit my research
survey instrument to USC’s IRB.

J. O. Simpson

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APPENDIX E: MCIWest Water Security Stakeholder Surveys

The first survey will show the complete document with the USC heading and
graphics associated with the questionnaire. Subsequent surveys will only show the
questions and answers.

WATER SECURITY AND WORLDVIEWS QUESTIONNAIRE

Ralph and Goldy Lewis Hall, Room 111
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626

Name: ___Elsa Rebecca Patton________________________________________________

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.

Worldview is a broad, all-encompassing term that includes your own
country/nation/government as well as everyone else. Everyone has their own
worldview which may be limited by their personal knowledge. Organizations have
their own worldview that reflects their interests.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

Water security is having access to sufficient water quantity of appropriate quality to
satisfy current and future needs of the Department. Key to this concept is definition
of water needs and the capacity to support those needs.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”

Individual worldviews are derived from their local experience and more broadly
from information and educational sources. An individual may never personally
experience the water scarcity issues associated with the droughts in the Middle
East, but they can learn about them. In the same vein, individuals may never
personally experience the drought in California, but the second and third order
effects – diminished produce supplies, higher prices, may become personal.

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In addition, gaining an understanding of the implications of water security is critical
to understanding the root cause of many societal issues, both historic, current (and
if we don’t learn from these) future.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?

The Southwestern US is a victim of its own success. The water resource
management efforts grew without any good long term understanding of climatic
changes and the impacts associated with them. When California became the dairy
capital of the US, it should have been a wakeup call that this simply couldn’t last.
Minnesota and Wisconsin have plenty of water albeit crappy winters (yes, that is
technical term). Grass thrives there and so do dairy cows. Hay is cheap to grow. It
is economically (and pretty much technically) infeasible to pump water from the
Midwest to the desert Southwest. We’ve (the US Government) has made some really
poor decisions on water management practice and those are now coming home to
roost. Access to fresh, potable water is seen as a basic human right but it doesn’t
come without a cost and a whole lot of planning. The situation in Flint, Michigan is
an example of penny wise and pound foolish. And it has and will happen again.
Washington DC went through a similar exercise 10 years ago. Many people feel it is
just a question of money, but it really is more than that. We need to be better
stewards of water. The Department of Defense has instituted multiple water
conservation efforts and we have far surpassed our goals. But if everyone doesn’t
conserve, it won’t matter. The news reports that Beverly Hills refuses to comply
with the conservation requirements that the governor mandated because they can
pay the fines is just unsatisfactory. We need to change the way we think about and
use water. This is as much a behavioral issue as a technical challenge.

Internationally, fresh, potable water is in limited supply. There is plenty of water on
the earth – it just takes a lot of effort (read money, energy, and technology) – to
make it usable. And it is an absolute requirement for life. Water has been compared
to oil, but never competitively priced. Access to water has traditionally been used as
a means of controlling people and that continues today. Water security is a key to
fragility in many areas of the world today, whether it is scarcity, inundation or salt
water intrusion. If we look at the Middle East as an example, water availability (or
lack thereof) may be the root cause for the current hostilities. Crop failures forced
people into cities that have no safety net or resources to support them. Hungry,
thirsty, unemployed people are unhappy people who demand more from their
governments than they can provide. Whether it is civil war that leads to mass
migration or simply trying to find a better life for their families, the underlying
cause may be traceable back to water.

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5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

This is a hard call. We need to get our own house in order but at the same time, we
have to respond to support our partners and allies. We have always been seen as
the land of plenty, but that is changing. We are depending more and more on foods
coming from abroad. Could we live without them? Yes. Would we be happy about
it? Not likely.

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to evaluate
hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards (i.e.
contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack of
investment, changing regulator requirements, water rights = property rights); and
Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you expect any
of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

Unlikely
Very Likely
Significant Impact No Impact

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I guess I would first have to ask you to identify risk to what? Is it risk to mission
capability? Is it risk to the carrying capacity of the installation? And I would need to
think about what your risk tolerance is. How often have you dealt with these risks
in the past? When does the risk become too great – what is the tipping point for
each of these? Finally, which of these do we have control over? Can we mitigate the
risk by being more resilient, better planning, smarter investment (okay, any
investment)? Risk assessment is a first step – risk management (mitigation,
avoidance, resilience) is the hard part.

Honorable Dennis McGinn, ASN E,I&E (Interview conducted 25 Jan 2016)

In your own words, define water security.

For the purposes of the Dept of the Navy, water security is having sufficient access
to reliable sources of water to do our mission. And that would be various classes of
water…access to various parts of the water cycle. Obviously the most critical one is
potable water for human needs, secondarily, water for waste treatment and then
third, water for taking care of equipment and for helping to manage the
environment in which we live and work.

Similarly, if you were going to define the concept of worldview, both individually
and organizationally, how would you define it? What is your water security
worldview?

We are all citizens of space ship earth, and we have finite resources, a one of the
critical resources we have is water, and if we don’t manage it properly it can cause
us a lot of problems…health being number one…bad water is one of the number one
causes of suffering throughout the world…the business that we are in…the Dept of
the Navy…Navy and Marine Corps…as part of the overall defense infrastructure…we
have to be very mindful of it…we are called upon so often to do humanitarian
assistance, disaster recovery…and if you could only bring one thing to that scenario,
water…potable water would be it…we saw examples of this last year in
Guam…commonwealth of the norther marinas where we had a typhoon came
through…especially on Saipan…number one we wanted to get water there. So, the
other thing is, to the extent…through my worldview…to the extent that we can…not
just deal in reactive terms…in terms of water…but proactive where there are fragile
societies and fragile governments around the world…that can act really, really badly
under terrible circumstances of not having enough water…so to the extent that we

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can provide access and affordability for potable water…it eliminates and
unbelievable amount of disease vectors and you have a healthier population that can
work agriculture and can work…just the day-to-day activities of human life and
economic development…and it’s a much higher quality of life and a much more
stable situation that will be making less demands on our capabilities to react to
humanitarian crisis.

Do you think of your [water security] worldview as more dominantly global,
domestic or both?

I would say both…my worldview is informed by domestic because I know more
about it here…but…I would say that you can’t think about water without thinking
about energy. That water energy nexus…and it works both ways, there are costs
throughout the water cycle that can be measured in many ways with
energy…pumping water out of an aquifer requires energy…purifying water from any
source…just about…to make sure it becomes potable relies on energy…wastewater
treatment requires energy and moving water…storing water…conditioning
water…there’s energy…you flip it around and with the exception of wind and solar
power…energy production requires water…thermal power plants, including
nuclear…fossil fuel require water for cooling…water as a medium to produce steam
and drive turbines…so it works both ways…you can have energies that are water
intensive…or less water intensive…and you can have types of water and water
management throughout the water cycle that are energy intensive and yet you have
to be very very careful about how you do that…desalinization is one of most energy
intense forms of conditioning…but yet there are times and places the you are going
to want to do that…so of it is going to be…very tactical…very focused in a small
area…other times it’s going to societal…like building a large desal plant under the
initiatives that some of the Gulf countries have done.

What would you say the biggest challenges (globally, domestically or both if you
want) for us and water security?

I would say evening out the bad times and good times of access to water and
affordability of water…figuring out…obviously…how you get the most mission
benefit and quality of life benefit from whatever water is available…but also…being
able to manage throughout the water cycle ways that you don’t find yourself in
flood/drought type situation…and I think those challenges grow with climate
change…where we are going to have areas of the world…areas of the country…that
are going to have an over-abundance of water to some extent…through
flooding…providing disease vectors etc…or droughts as California is experiencing.

I’ve done a risk analysis and looked at the risks to water security from least
impact to most impact and from least likely to most likely…broken the risks into

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human caused risks…be they a terrorist attack an accidental dumping into a
surface water source…contamination of groundwater through past practices
and then into institutional risks…be they tribalism…be they new
standards…new regulations…and final one is the natural disasters…which are
compounded by climate change…more fires…and then earthquakes…between
human caused, institutional caused and natural disasters what my research has
shown, is the greatest threat to us comes from institutions…what do you think
about that?

Intuitively I you would think it would be natural disasters…but in terms of natural
disasters…we’ll put it in terms of if that were true…human and institutional
management water can make you either more or less resilient to the natural
disasters…so I think that…I’ll us the example of what happened in the Animus River
last year…where you had an unplanned toxic release from mine waste in Colorado,
north of Durango and it affected literally thousands of people downstream in that
watershed not to the point of lethality, but to the point of an interruption of
economic activity in some cases…whether it’s recreational or agricultural just
because of the uncertainty of that…we’ve had others where these coal tailings can
do the same thing…there was an inadvertent spill in West Virginia that did the same
thing…so not human caused or institutionally caused but real bad problems. You can
have a synergy of human caused and mother nature caused…whereby…if you are
not managing your water and you have a dam failure or something like that…which
can be real bad too…

Name: _Ted Banta__________________________________________________

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.

To me an individual’s worldview is how they view, think about or perceive things
based on their education, geographic and ethnic/racial backgrounds, values, and
general life experiences. I think we all have biases – some subliminal – that
influence how we think about and perceive the world around us.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

Water Security means assured access to stable supplies of clean water to meet our
current and future needs. Water Security is instrumental to ensuring mission
readiness and the future viability of our installations.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,

332
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”

As mentioned earlier, I think individuals acquire their system of knowledge, beliefs,
values and perceptions over the course of their lives, and that where they’ve lived or
travelled to helps shape that system. And that will clearly affect a person’s Water
Security Worldview. For example, growing up in a desert region and having served
in desert environments, I tend to pay attention to water as a scarce and valuable
resource… I suspect more so than if I lived or operated in a tropical environment
where access to water is not as challenging.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?

I think climate change and extended periods of drought will continue to pose
challenges to water security on a global scale, as will pollution and increased
demand based on population growth and higher demand for agricultural and
industrial use. We already see water scarcity as a driver for conflict and human
migration, and I expect to see this trend continue.

5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

I think both are important and are not mutually exclusive. From my perspective we
are clearly concerned with the local challenges and risks of water security in
mission readiness aboard our installations… as well as in our local communities
upon which we rely heavily to support our families and the supporting
infrastructure and industrial base. I am also concerned with international water
security challenges and risks, as they will define regions of potential conflict and
possible future operating environments. But we must also recognize opportunities
associated with water security… to become more efficient, to properly price water
resources in the marketplace, to invest in water infrastructure that’s designed for
the current (and changing) environmental conditions, and develop technology that
increases water supplies and provides clean water. There’s a lot to do!

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to evaluate
hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards (i.e.
contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack of
investment, changing regulatory requirements, water rights = property rights); and
Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you expect any
of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

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We’re already seeing Natural Disaster hazards (e.g. climate change induced drought)
impacting our installations, as well as lack of infrastructure investment to mitigate
the impact of these hazards… we don’t control the climate and will remain reactive
to that. We can address infrastructure investment, but must generate the
institutional will to do so… and that will be challenging. I think we’re getting better
at recognizing and regulating human caused hazards (in terms of pollution), but will
continue to see the effects of population growth. Becoming more water
wise/efficient will help counter the effects of population growth by decreasing
water intensity… but that takes education and in many cases fundamental cultural
change.

Name: Jack Simes, Planning Officer, Bureau of Reclamation, Southern California Area
Office

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you. To me, it’s a high-level
(global perception) understanding of ‘our’ world that we learn through exposure to
all of its philosophies, values, ethics, and the many, many different nationalities and
languages. Information comes to us through various media (print, electronic, and
TV), personal experiences, nightly/daily news posts, and personal engagement to
help shape our view.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization. Water
security is long-term water reliability and quality for our communities and farmers
here in the arid Southwest. It is needed to sustain their health, economies, and eco-
systems. It fosters sustainability practices, environmental protection, and provides
positive benefits to support our way of life.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?” Most of my learning comes from a
‘Western view’ of our world that I acquired from formal schooling, personal travels,
and various work experiences in addition to reading and seeing news reports and
stories on other parts of our world, like the wars in the Middle East, growth of Asia,
especially China, the uncertainty in North Korea, and continuing famine in parts of
Africa, to name a few.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest? The two primary challenges that
we face internationally and here in the Southwest are: continuing impacts from
climate change and population growth.

334

In particular, the climate here in the Southwest has gotten hotter, our snowpack less
and our population is projected to grow. How do we sustain Life without sufficient
water?

5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant? No, regional demographics may shift due to economic realities
(e.g., Syria) but the international challenges remain, especially with addressing
impacts from climate change and continued population growth.

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to evaluate
hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards (i.e.
contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack of
investment, changing regulatory requirements, water rights = property rights); and
Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you expect any
of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

No, based on the relative similarity of scores in my analysis of the hazards you’ve
described. It is very likely all of these Marine installations will have potential
impacts from Human Hazards, i.e., contaminated groundwater, due to prior and
current military activity and natural occurring soil substance build-up like salts
which are increasing and could eventually impact local groundwater sources,
especially on Camp Pendleton, which is near the Pacific Ocean and susceptible to sea
water intrusion.

The Yuma installation is also reliant on Colorado River, a surface source of water
supply; so if that supply is reduced it is likely that could eventually adversely impact
the base. The degree of that impact is hard to determine at this time, but paying for
augmented supplies, e.g., treated groundwater or wheeling water purchases will be
expensive.

All of these installations have Institutional Hazards, e.g., DoD budgets are getting
reduced and priorities are shifting. Change is inevitable and its likely water rights
will remain challenging in the future but not insurmountable. It will take
cooperation and collaboration with water retailers to future meet demands.
Changes in the clean water act and other regulatory requirements, i.e., stormwater
and Low Impact Development implementation could also impact groundwater
supplies.

Six Southern California bases and the Yuma base are likely to experience Natural
Hazards like earthquakes in the immediate future, but the degree and damage to

335
their infrastructure is an unknown but the cost for back-up systems/processes for
sustainable water supply will be significant.

Also, fires are likely and could impact all of these installations, but Barstow,
Miramar and Yuma are in desert areas with less native vegetation and therefore less
likely to be adversely impacted. Bridgeport, however, is more than likely to
experience serve damage if fire consumes parts of that installation where trees are
prevalent. Range fires on all installations are possible and more likely on Camp
Pendleton, as history has shown. Climate change will make conditions potentially
drier and increase the likelihood.

Being in the arid Southwest, these installations are all prone to droughts and will
very likely be exposed to them in the future and beyond due to on-going climate
change and growing uncertainty due attributed to population growth around the
majority of these installations, which exacerbates the situation - placing more
demand on limited water supplies.

Name: _______Felicia Marcus____________________________________________

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.

Worldview means the context in which one looks at the facts presented in a given
situation. People have very different contexts for how they look at a given issue.
For example, in the public policy context, sometimes people’s view or context is
based purely on how the discussion affects them, given their view of their position
or needs. Other times, people can see the issue within the context of what other
people’s needs might be. Other times, people can see the issue within the context of
what the decision maker needs and what they are dealing with. Still others see
everything in a big picture ideological context, or in a precedential context, but can’t
see the smaller details that might really affect them or another party.

The ideological context can be political, or even spiritual. Or, it can do with the scale
at which folks see things. I could give you DOD examples vs. EPA examples to
illustrate.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

We see water security in the context of Californians vs. our organization. I think we
would frame it in terms of building resilience to deal with what the future brings.
That is a combination of looking at available supplies—quantity, how interruptible

336
through force of law or nature, and measures for demand reduction, supply
augmentation (e.g., recycling, purchases), etc. What is the need and what is the
realistically available response? The drought has tested our sense of the duration
for which communities may need to be secure. Now we know that three years may
not be enough. We do know, however, that urban water supplier actions ( a
combination of efficiency and supply augmentation) have made a three or four year
drought manageable. What a better time horizon might be given that we know 3-4
years may be a model from the last relatively wet 100 years or so is an open
question.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and
perceptions, where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how
does that (if it does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”

Well, it comes from that person’s experience—in home, school, work, world and
whether there was any encouragement to consider the views and needs of others, or
any experience of changing communities where others didn’t necessarily share the
same views. My water security worldview comes from having been in agencies,
NGO, and private sector jobs that were very different. Since I’ve been in a water
agency, I know how hard it is and what the pressures are and same for other
sectors. I also have a broad view of California’s varied people and interests, and
have worked at the national and international level, so I know these things come in
various shapes and sizes. So, in sum, I think water security depends on the situation
in a given place.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?
I’ll focus on the southwest. I think complacency and pride are our human risks.
Drought and climate change are our physical risks.

We have a challenge of agencies (and engineers in particular for some reason) being
understandably proud of the incredible infrastructure miracles they have produced.
Storage and conveyance that have literally let the desert bloom into a miracle of
economic and social development that is agriculture in the Central or Imperial
Valley and urban areas across the states. We’ve conveyed water for hundreds of
miles and done such a good job that the majority of our people don’t know where
their water even comes from and can take it for granted. That’s a miracle of modern
civilization that has not happened at this scale since the Roman aqueducts were
built. On the other hand, that is at risk given climate change and population growth
and folks pride is keeping many of them from thinking of the next generation of big
leaps in as robust a manner as we need to. Conservation, efficiency, recycling,
stormwater capture, groundwater management, and desal in appropriate situations

337
as just a few of the list, are not getting their due compared to wanting to repeat the
grand infrastructure projects of the past. In the modern era, the big thinkers and
doers need an “all of the above” strategy, and need to engage the public in
understanding their systems so they will support the next stage of investment.

5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

Not sure I understand the question. I follow international challenges and they are
certainly more severe already than ours are. No question. That said, I’m not sure
what dominant means. In CA, the local ones are more dominant.

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to
evaluate hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused
Hazards (i.e. contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional
Hazards (i.e. lack of investment, changing regulator requirements, water rights
= property rights); and Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought,
fires) – would you expect any of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so
which one(s) and why?

Since most of the facilities are in southern California I would say the risks are a
combination of human caused and natural disaster. Groundwater management, or
lack thereof can be a challenge because without it the well may literally run dry. I
can’t say the exact circumstance at each place though, but that would be something I
would look at. Imported water on the other hand, which much of So Cal relies on, is
at terrible risk from climate change. With climate change both the Colorado and the
Delta systems will face greater shortages as snowpack dwindles. The earthquake
scenarios for the Delta are low probability but high risk, so need to be on the list.
Regulatory challenges are routinely overblown. That said, one would have to do an
assessment based on the specific water supply for each base.

Name: __Mark Weston_________________________________________________

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.

Gross estimates suggest that 1 billion people in the world have inadequate water
supplies. This statistic amounts to 1/7 of the world’s population struggle everyday
with having the basic element to sustain life. A resource shortage of this magnitude
will lead to geopolitical conflicts as well as creating opportunities for exploitation of
available resources. Without a “Worldview” for water, trends that exacerbate the

338
water shortages will be ignored and the problem will worsen. Early worldwide
resource availability modeling conducted in the early 1970’s (Limits of Growth)
revealed that depletion of resources was highly likely in the early 21
st
century. This
modeling has come true in parts of world and will continue to grow creating more
conflicts over a limited resource. A “Worldview” of water resources drives policy
and decision makers to create additional water through sustainable resource
development, conservation and technology and reverse that potential growing
shortages.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

Regionally and locally, “Water Security” means developing long term water
strategies, infrastructure, resource development, and conservation that will assure
water sustainability for decades without damaging water resources for adjoining
regions. Our society (California) has a rich history of over developing resources to a
point of crisis and than developing sustainable strategies to manage the resource
after damaging the underpinnings of the resource.

An example of this pattern and impact is easily seen in the San Joaquin Valley of
California. This area in the 1800’s had an abundance of surface and groundwater
supplies. In the 1900’s farming practices that overused the available surface water
were depleting the surface water supplies. Farmers then began supplementing their
supplies developing more local surface supplies and by importing other surface
waters from outside the region as well as developing the groundwater supplies of
the area. By the late 20
th
century these water supplies did not meet the demands.
Aquatic water systems were permanently damaged or lost. In addition the
groundwater basin was in overdraft and the aquifer geologic structure began
collapsing (subsidence) damaging infrastructure on the ground surface such as
roads, utilities and canals and permanently damaging the aquifer itself. In addition
the farming practices have severely compromised the water quality of the aquifer.
State Legislation in 2014 began to address this problem by collecting data but the
groundwater is still in overdraft. Avoiding this pattern of over development,
damaging the resource, followed by repairing the damage needs to be replaced with
sustainable management practices before a crisis is created.

Water security means developing long term water supply reliability which
incorporates the following: meets demands; minimizes risk; maximizes
diversification; provides flexibility, affordability, and adaptability; and repairs and
protects local and adjoining environments.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it

339
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”

Sustainability of water supplies to one organization must be defined in the larger
context. Creating sustainable water supplies within ones organization at the cost of
another organization fails the test of a worldview. Sustainable water supplies must
be achieved by all agencies, which drive a holistic approach to problem solving
rather than agency-by-agency or region-by-region. Agencies may solve their local
water supply sustainability challenges, but each solution should incorporate a clear
understanding how it affects adjoining agencies and systems.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?

The greatest challenges to Water Security are the following:
• Changing hydrology (reduces from climate change)
• Institutional (governance) obstacles: lack of cooperation agency-to-agency
• Supply availability (overuse or over subscription of existing supplies)
• Increasing demand
• Regulatory requirements which do not meet local and regional conditions
• Environmental restrictions
• Contamination
• Natural disasters
• Lack of Commitment to invest in future water supplies
• Failure to Operate and Maintain existing water systems

5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

Domestic water security challenges/ risks are more dominant for our economy and
quality of life. International water security challenges are more dominant for
geopolitical stability.

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to evaluate
hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards (i.e.
contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack of
investment, changing regulatory requirements, water rights = property rights); and
Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you expect any
of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

All three categories would appear in the highly likely/significant impact quadrant
to some degree.

340

341

Name: _______________Jeffrey Kightlinger____________________________________

342
1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.
Having a “worldview” is to look at issues from a broad perspective, to address issues
and challenges in a holistic manner. It also means avoiding short term “fixes” that
lead to either foreseeable problems in the future or that would cause harm to third
parties.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

Water Security means achieving and maintaining a high degree of water supply and
quality reliability for today and for the foreseeable future. It does not mean 100%
reliability at all times under all circumstances.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”

I believe it is the job of management to transmit organizational values to the staff.
This requires leadership and communication throughout the organization.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?

The greatest long-term threat to Water Security is climate change. The challenges in
dealing with this threat are the institutional divisions within the water management
industry and a lack of leadership on the tough choices to be made.

5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

I believe the risks to Water Security are the same internationally and domestic but
the planning and preparation for addressing risks varies widely.

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to evaluate
hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards (i.e.
contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack of
investment, changing regulatory requirements, water rights = property rights); and
Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you expect any
of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

For the Southern California area as shown on the map, I would place Natural
Disaster Hazards in the upper right quadrant. Southern California has a robust

343
water system that is well developed and resilient but large earthquakes and fires are
inevitable.

We have historically always risen to challenges of Institutional Hazards; they are
real problems but our institutional structures are designed to meet that challenge.

Human Caused Hazards, such as groundwater contamination, rapid growth and
development, etc., have occurred many times in Southern California and to date our
institutions have proven to be up to the task of meeting that challenge.

344

345

346

Name: _____Jack Bebee______________________________________________

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.

347

My interpretation of the term worldview is my perception of global events and how
they affect me. My worldview is more strongly influence by local and regional
events.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

The primary concern for our organization related to water security is securing a
long term drought proof water supply. The primary focus is securing local and
regional supplies and providing a buffer against drought conditions. The secondary
concern is maintaining our infrastructure by completing proper levels of
replacements of aging infrastructure. These are the two top priorities for
maintaining water security for our organization. Concerns over protecting our
infrastructure from attacks or sabotage are less of a concern given our more report
location and the limited overall impact of these actions.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”

I feel these systems are acquired from an individual’s experiences and past actions
and results. The cultural environment in which an individual was raised also likely
strongly effects and individuals worldview. While individuals may have vastly
different worldviews, I believe that the range of water security worldview’s is likely
more strongly related to the individuals geographic location. For example, an
individual in California or Arizona is likely focused on reliable water supply, while
an individual in the Midwest is more focused on infrastructure replacement needs
or water quality.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?

The greatest challenge and risks are securing long-term reliable water supplies.
Many issues can be addressed regionally and domestically, such as investments in
new water supplies, storage and recycled water. The largest international challenge
is the potential long-term impacts from climate change and changes in precipitation
amounts and patterns that must be addressed globally.

5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

Domestic challenges are more dominant

348

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to evaluate
hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards (i.e.
contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack of
investment, changing regulator requirements, water rights = property rights); and
Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you expect any
of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

I would suspect natural disaster hazards to be the most significant given the current
drought conditions in California and the southwest. While the other hazards are
important, they can be addressed in shorter time frames by replacing personnel or
adjusting policies. The long-term planning and investment that is required to
address water scarcity, not only has the most substantial potential impacts, but also
takes the most time to address.

Name: __________________________________Stephen Reich_________________

1. Briefly describe what the term Worldview means to you.

The term “Worldview” implies a multi-faceted opinion based on cultural, political,
scientific, and economic factors. Typically, the importance, or weight, of each of
these factors is subjective and based on each individual’s core beliefs and values.
While “Worldview” varies from one individual to another, based on the subject, each
individual’s “worldview” is shaped by their long-term experience, education, and
beliefs. As a generalization, while an individual’s world view may change over time,
it is largely shaped during early development periods affected by family and
community.

2. Briefly describe the concept of Water Security for your organization.

Water Security is based on an organization’s ability to meet the long-term water
quantity and water quality need’s if its existing and future customers. Factors such
as sustainability, water independence, self-reliance, and resiliency affect each
organization’s “degree” of water security. Developing each of these factors allows a
water purveyor to meet the needs of its existing and future customers as natural
and anthropogenic impacts, such as drought, system failures, and emergency
Unlikely
Very Likely

349
stresses, affect their ability to serve.

3. Given that organizations are just an assemblage of individuals, if Worldview is
described as an individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values and perceptions,
where and how do you feel these systems are acquired; and how does that (if it
does) affect your “Water Security Worldview?”
The individual’s system of knowledge, beliefs, values, and perceptions are acquired
through their family, friends, and colleagues over time. Initial “systems” are
developed during early development by surrounding family and friends; then later
in life through education and colleagues (but likely to a lesser degree). Each
individual’s system of beliefs may affect an organization’s “water security
worldview” through planning and project development. Specifically, organizations
controlled by elected boards may be made up of individuals with similar or varied
worldviews. In my experience, those organizations with boards that have similar
worldview may be more likely to have less “water security” than those with varying
worldviews. For example, a group of individuals, or elected board, may have a
worldview affected by “entitlement”, thus choosing to believe that the “tap will
never run dry” and self-reliance and system resiliency is not a high priority. Other
individuals may allow their worldviews to place these issues on a higher level of
importance; hence, their level of water security will likely be different.

4. What do you feel are the greatest challenges, and/or risks, to Water Security –
internationally and domestically in the Southwest?

Internationally: Climate Change. Large movements of people will occur when
previously fertile lands are no longer arable. These movements ultimately result in
political and economic instability that may manifest itself as violent conflicts.

Domestically: Climate Change. Changes in political and economic worldview from
the post-war era will result in how economic resources are assigned from one
region of the United States to another. Changes in climate will require costly
engineering solutions required to maintain the existing status quo. While the U.S.
was traditionally a nation comprised of a mobile workforce (as demonstrated in the
70s and 80s migration to the “sunbelt”), maintenance of existing lifestyles and local
economies may prove to be costly if growth continues in locations were water is
scarce.

Southwest: Climate Change. See above. Competition for limited supplies will result
in the need for large expenditures to meet the needs of interested parties, including
the environment. As migration to the southwest continues, water agencies will be
required to spend more to work with a finite resource.

350
5. Do you feel either the international or domestic water security challenges/risks
are more dominant?

My worldview would suggest that international water security is a bigger challenge
and threat to maintenance of long-term lifestyle and economic security on a scale of
30 years or more. On a time-line of less than 30 years, my southern California short-
term business worldview would suggest that domestic water security presents
greater challenges in day-to-day life.

6. If I told you that I had done a Risk Assessment for each of the (8) Installations of
MCIWest shown above, creating (4) quadrant charts like the one below to evaluate
hazards by breaking them into (3) categories – Human Caused Hazards (i.e.
contaminated groundwater, overpopulation); Institutional Hazards (i.e. lack of
investment, changing regulator requirements, water rights = property rights); and
Natural Disaster Hazards (i.e. earthquake, drought, fires) – would you expect any
of these categories of hazard to dominate? If so which one(s) and why?

Institutional Hazards would likely dominate because it is most affected by the
unpredictability of multiple individuals with varying worldviews. Without modeling
individuals’ behavior due to their worldview, it is possible that they may represent a
greater risk when compared to natural disasters caused by climate change.

351

352

353

354

355

356

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The operational forces of Marine Corps Installations West (MCIWest) are vital components of U.S. national security. A March 2014 Office of the Secretary of Defense memorandum directs that DoD must “plan and manage its water resources to ensure the sustainment of our mission and enhance our water security” (OSD, 2014). Thus, within the DoD, water security ensures mission security, which ensures national security. The installations of MCIWest compose 40% of the combat power of the Marine Corps, and account for 85% of the force’s land. Thus, the fact that all eight installations are located in Southern California and Southern Arizona, an area that a National Intelligence Agency study classified as “extremely high water stress”, is of great concern (DNI, 2012). While the major systemic problems of climate change, overpopulation, and the natural aridity of the region, are the biggest risks to MCIWest’s water security, the concept goes beyond drought. Societal threats like the undervaluation of water and decisions (i.e. not funding planning, projects or maintenance of infrastructure) made based on tribalism and ideology compound physical threats from flooding, contamination and acts of terrorism. These societal threats must be operationalized along with the meteorological, geological, institutional and physical threats. This dissertation utilizes a grounded theory methodology to develop a process for accomplishing this task. Following a comprehensive literature review to develop a “body of knowledge” on all of the aspects and complexities of water security, the concept of risk was chosen as the best method for pursuing water security for the installations of MCIWest. The decision-makers within the military chain-of-command are very familiar and comfortable with using risk to evaluate various courses of action. Thus, a process for quantifying qualitative data and concepts was developed and framed in terms of risk. This process is based on industry best practices (Curtis & Cary, 2012) and tailored to the requirements and constraints of MCIWest. This dissertation tests the process by using it to conduct a full risk assessment for each installation and to develop risk response strategies based on those assessments. Several conclusions were drawn from this research and validated by a survey of MCIWest water security stakeholders within the military chain-of-command and from the water industry. This study illustrates that the funding processes of the federal government have the most significant impact on MCIWest’s adaptive capacity. Thus, the final MCIWest Water Security Strategy is to engage local, state and federal stakeholders in any opportunities for public-public partnerships, or with private entities in public-private partnerships that circumvent the constraints inherent to the federal government.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Simpson, John O. (author)

Core Title Water security, national security and MCIWest: a grounded theory for operationalizing risk management

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 07/26/2016

Defense Date 06/10/2016

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag climate change,Marine Corps Installations West,national security,OAI-PMH Harvest,overpopulation,risk assessment,risk strategies,tribalism,water security

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Blanco, Hilda (committee chair), Brady, Brian J. (committee member), Robertson, Peter (committee member)

Creator Email josimpso@usc.edu,jsimpson681@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c40-280204

Unique identifier UC11281544

Identifier etd-SimpsonJoh-4621.pdf (filename),usctheses-c40-280204 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-SimpsonJoh-4621.pdf

Dmrecord 280204

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Simpson, John O.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA