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A study of Chinese environmental NGOs: policy advocacy, managerial networking, and leadership succession

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A study of Chinese environmental NGOs: policy advocacy, managerial networking, and leadership succession

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Content 1

A STUDY OF CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS: POLICY ADVOCACY,
MANAGERIAL NETWORKING, AND LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION

By
Hui Li

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT)
August 2016

i

DEDICATION

TO

My family
For their unconditional love and support

ii

Acknowledgements

Five years ago, I came to USC, feeling uncertain about my Ph.D. study in an unknown place, a
place that I barely know anyone. Now five years have passed, the uncertainties and loneliness
faded away, because of the many people I have met. Without their help and support, my great
learning and life experience would not have been possible.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Shui-Yan Tang, Dr. Terry
L. Cooper, and Dr. Nicole E. Esparza, without whom this dissertation would not have been
possible. I am extremely grateful to my advisor, Dr. Shui-Yan Tang, for his endless support and
encouragement. Dr. Tang is a prolific writer. He is very efficient, and he always gives me very
helpful advice. He has helped me survive and grow in academia. I would also like to thank Dr.
Terry L. Cooper. I have been working with him since the beginning of my doctoral study. He has
always been supportive, both intellectually and emotionally. Dr. Nicole E. Esparza is like a
friend. She has provided valuable support and advice throughout my doctoral study.

The data for this dissertation were derived from a larger project headed by Dr. Carlos Wing-
Hung Lo at the Department of Management and Marketing, the Hong Kong Polytechnic
University. I am indebted to him for his generous support during both the data collection process

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and the dissertation writing stage. I thank Xueyong Zhan for his assistance in designing the
questionnaire and conducting some of the interviews.

I would like to thank the USC US-China Institute for providing financial support for my field
work. With its support, I was able to travel back to China twice and conduct interviews with
leaders of environmental NGOs.

Thanks also to my friends and to the people I met at the Price School. I still remember the
bachelorette party my cohort organized for me. I still remember the several celebration parties
we had together. These are all unforgettable moments. My family in China also provided me
with invaluable emotional support in the past five years. Although they are on the other side of
the world, their love is always all around.

Last but not the least, I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to my
little family for their unconditional love and unfailing encouragement and support. My husband,
Jiasheng Zhang, is my partner both in life and at work. I am forever indebted to him for his
assistance in completing this dissertation. His help ranged from model construction to qualitative
data coding. My love also goes to our little baby, Chenyu, who was born in April 2016. It is
difficult to tell whether writing a dissertation is harder than having a baby or vice versa. It is
definitely so much harder, if not impossible, when you are doing both of them at the same time. I
was only able to sleep at most three hours a night during the final weeks of writing. But despite

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this, I was so happy to have her around. She has made my life so much more joyful, and I believe
she will continue to do so in the future.

v

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ ix
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ x
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... xi
Chapter 1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 3
A Growing NGO Sector in China............................................................................................ 3
Relevant Previous Research .................................................................................................... 9
Data Sources ............................................................................................................................ 16
Outline of Each Chapter ......................................................................................................... 19
Chapter 2 Nonprofit Policy Advocacy under Authoritarianism ............................................ 21
Policy Advocacy of Environmental NGOs in China: ........................................................... 24
Framework and Hypotheses ................................................................................................... 24
Government Funding ............................................................................................................. 29
Government Affiliation: GONGOs versus Civic NGOs ....................................................... 31
Foundation Funding ............................................................................................................... 33

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Peer Collaborations................................................................................................................ 35
Data and Methods ................................................................................................................... 36
Measurement ......................................................................................................................... 36
Analytic Technique ................................................................................................................ 40
Results ...................................................................................................................................... 40
Government Funding ............................................................................................................. 45
Government Affiliation: GONGOs vs. Civic NGOs ............................................................. 46
Foundation Funding ............................................................................................................... 49
Peer Collaborations................................................................................................................ 51
Control Variables ................................................................................................................... 52
Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 52
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 55
Appendix: A Summary of Environmental NGOs Interviewed ........................................... 57
Chapter 3 The Dynamics of Networking: Antecedents and Performance Effects ................ 59
The Development and Management of Chinese NGOs in Authoritarian China .............. 61
Theory and Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 64
The Antecedents of Managerial Networking ......................................................................... 64
Managerial Networking and NGO Performance ................................................................... 70
Data and Methods ................................................................................................................... 73
Measurement ......................................................................................................................... 73

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Analytical Procedures ............................................................................................................ 79
Results ...................................................................................................................................... 79
The Antecedents of Managerial Networking ......................................................................... 82
The Performance Effects of Managerial Networking ............................................................ 87
Discussion and Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 90
Chapter 4 The Performance Implications of Leadership Succession .................................... 96
Theoretical Framework .......................................................................................................... 99
Organizational Life Cycle ................................................................................................... 101
Resource Dependence Theory ............................................................................................. 102
Institutional Theory ............................................................................................................. 103
Research Setting .................................................................................................................... 105
Data and Methods ................................................................................................................. 108
Data Sources ........................................................................................................................ 108
Data Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 110
Findings .................................................................................................................................. 113
Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................................... 124
Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 126
Chapter 5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 127
Theoretical Contributions .................................................................................................... 127
Understanding NGO Development and State-Society Relations in China .......................... 127

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The Study of Chinese NGOs and the General Nonprofit Literature ................................... 130
Methodological Improvements............................................................................................. 131
References .................................................................................................................................. 133
Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 150
Appendix 1 Survey Instrument ............................................................................................ 150
Appendix 2 Interview Protocol ............................................................................................ 172

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 The Growth of Environmental NGOs (2007-2012) ........................................................ 6
Table 2.1 Comparison of Resource Dependence and Institutional Theories ................................ 28
Table 2.2 NGO Policy Advocacy under Authoritarianism: A Framework .................................. 29
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations ......................................................................... 41
Table 2.4 Regression Results ........................................................................................................ 42
Table 2.5 Summary of Interview Findings ................................................................................... 44
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix ............................................................... 81
Table 3.2 The Antecedents of Managerial Networking ................................................................ 83
Table 3.3 The Impact of Managerial Networking on NGO Performance .................................... 88
Table 4.1 Development Stages in Organizational Life Cycle..................................................... 102
Table 4.2 Characteristics of Formal and Informal Organizations ............................................... 107
Table 4.3 Selected Organizations and Data Sources .................................................................. 110
Table 4.4 A Quantitative Evaluation of Each Succession Event ................................................ 123

x

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 The Growth of NGOs in China (1995-2013) ................................................................ 5
Figure 1.2 Frequently Used Words in Existing Studies on Chinese NGOs: A Word Cloud .......... 9
Figure 1.3 Dissertation Project Design ......................................................................................... 15
Figure 2.1 Predicted Use of Insider Tactics by Government Funding
by Government Affiliation .......................................................................................... 48
Figure 2.2 Predicted Use of Outsider Tactics by Government Funding
by Government Affiliation .......................................................................................... 49
Figure 4.1 Leadership Succession and NGO Performance: A Framework ................................ 104
Figure 4.2 Data Structure ............................................................................................................ 112

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Abstract

China‘s NGO sector has experienced tremendous growth since the 1990s. This has led scholars
to examine the role of NGOs in China‘s governance reform, in areas as simple as greater
accountability or as overarching as democratic transition. Most scholarship has applied Western
logic, such as the civil society perspective, the corporatist approach, or social movement theory.
These studies, however, neglect factors unique to the authoritarian context of China. In addition,
they mostly use evidence from case studies and cross-sectional data in major cities at a single
time point, limiting the robustness of the research findings.

This dissertation focuses on the development of Chinese environment NGOs, the most active
civil society groups that have strived to secure resource flows, sustain cooperative efforts, and
influence environmental policies. By examining their political advocacy, managerial networking,
and leadership succession, the study contributes to the understanding of the dynamic and
symbiotic relations between NGOs and government under authoritarianism. Specifically, three
empirical questions are examined,
1) Given the specific context of authoritarianism, how do various institutional forces—the
government, foundations, and the nonprofit sector itself—affect NGOs‘ advocacy activities?
2) What factors affect eNGOs‘ networking behavior? And how does managerial networking
relate to eNGO performance?

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3) What are the mechanisms through which leadership succession affects nonprofit performance?

The data for the dissertation come from a nationwide survey and in-depth interviews, which are
collected specifically for the study and form the basis for the three empirical chapters. The first
empirical chapter examines NGOs‘ advocacy behavior, including their advocacy investment and
use of insider and outsider tactics. Drawing on resource dependence and institutional theories, it
highlights how resource and institutional factors—government funding, government affiliation,
foundation funding, and peer collaborations—shape NGO advocacy in China. The second
empirical chapter examines the dynamics of managerial networking and assesses its connections
to the performance of Chinese environmental NGOs. It underscores how three institutional
variables–the regulatory environment, government ties, and government affiliation—shape
eNGO leaders‘ networking behavior, and how two types of networking—peer and political
networking—relate to NGO performance in varying ways. The third empirical chapter examines
how leadership succession affects NGO performance. By analyzing the conditions, actions, and
outcomes of ten succession events across three Chinese environmental NGOs, the study proposes
that the fit between pre-succession conditions and successor actions affects NGO performance. It
suggests ways to overcome succession crisis and facilitate long-term organizational development.

Overall, the study contributes significantly to the literature on Chinese NGOs and nonprofit
studies, both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, this dissertation not only
enriches understanding of NGO development and state-society relations but also contributes to
the nonprofit literature in general. Methodologically, by combining robust quantitative analysis

xiii

with systematic analysis of the qualitative data, the study provides a good and solid example for
future research on Chinese NGOs.

1

Chapter 1 Introduction

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are citizen-initiated, self-governed, not-for-
profit groups that are independent of the market and the government. They are often called
nonprofit organizations, civil society organizations, civic associations, or the third sector. No
matter how they are named or defined, all the literature recognizes their important role in
providing services and shaping policies (Anheier & Salamon, 2006). While nonprofits‘ service
role has traditionally been the major focus, their policy advocacy function has been increasingly
recognized among both practitioners and scholars who consider these groups a critical channel to
represent citizen interests, check power, and advance governance (Fung, 2003).
In the 1990s, studies on Chinese NGOs emerged and have since then increased. At the
beginning, many scholars applied Western logic and expected that the emergence of NGOs
would transform governance, or lead to a regime change. However, their expectations have not
been borne out in spite of the growth of the NGO sector. To explain this puzzle, scholars have
used the civil society perspective, a corporatist approach, or social movement theories to help
understand the dynamics between the government and the society in China. One group of
scholars argues that political change will come, sooner or later, because these civil society
groups are striving to challenge the present governance structure (R. R. Moore, 2001; Morton,
2005; White, Howell, & Shang, 1996; G. Yang, 2005). A second group proposes that democracy
is not going to emerge because the state is using either direct or indirect tools to monitor,
coordinate, or coopt those NGOs (Kang & Han, 2008; Thornton, 2013; Whiting, 1991). The last

2

emphasizes the ―contingent symbiosis‖, ―negotiated‖, or ―embedded‖ nature of the state-society
relationship (Ho, 2007; Saich, 2000). For example, Spires (2011a) argues that grassroots groups
can survive only insofar as they help promote the social welfare goals of the state and do not
push the government too far.
Although these studies all have merit, the contentious question still remains: To what
extent and in what ways can these NGOs contribute to China‘s governance reform or
democratization? I argue that the existing state of the conversation about Chinese NGOs—its
single-minded focus on NGOs‘ potential capacity to promote democracy—obscures the first-
order question of their organizational development. Rather than look for the immediate
democratic implications of NGOs, one needs to employ an organizational perspective to examine
what types of NGOs there are, how they are structured, what activities they are engaged in, how
they obtain funding, and what kinds of strategies and tactics they use in interacting with the
government.
To answer these questions, I focus on environmental NGOs, which are the oldest civil
society groups in China. As they are viewed as ―politically less harmful‖ by the government,
they have been able to gain sufficient space to grow. Thus, in the past two decades,
environmental groups have been very active in environmental education, natural conservation,
species protection, and various forms of political advocacy.
The study uses a mixed-method approach, and it combines both quantitative and
qualitative data collected specifically for this study in 2014-2015. The quantitative data are
derived from a large-scale survey that was administered throughout the country. The
questionnaire consists of forty-seven questions which cover environmental groups‘ basic

3

organizational information (such as size, age, and registration), funding, governance, and
activities. The qualitative part consists of thirty-nine semi-structured interviews with eNGO
leaders in major cities in China. These interviews are used not just to confirm what the survey
results reveal but also to complement the quantitative data so that a more in-depth analysis of the
questions under study can be presented.

Background
A Growing NGO Sector in China
China's NGO sector has grown in size and widened in focus in the past two decades. In
1988, there were only 4,446 registered NGOs, whereas by the end of 2013, the number had
increased to 547,000 (Bureau of Social Organization Administration 2015). These groups, which
are often called social organizations
1
, cover a wide range of activities, such as social welfare,
disaster relief, HIV/AIDS prevention, and environmental protection. According to the current
regulatory framework, there exist three types of NGOs: social groups, private nonprofit
enterprises, and foundations. Social groups, which have the largest share among the three,
include various associations, societies, foundations, chambers of commerce, and federations.
Private nonprofit enterprises include those income-making social entities that are organized by
enterprises, institutions, social groups or individuals to engage in nonprofit social or professional
services, such as education, health care, or social welfare. Foundations are those that use
donations to conduct philanthropic activities.

1
The literal translation of non-governmental organization—fei zhengfu zuzhi— means anti-government
organizations, which assumes a conflictual relationship between the government and the society. Thus, in 2007, at
the Six Plenary of the 16
th
CPC Central Committee, the government officially named NGOs as social organizations.
Hereafter, I will use the term social organizations, social groups, and NGOs interchangeably.

4

Figure 1.1 shows the growth pattern of the three types of organizations. As for social
groups, in 1995, there were 182,000 organizations, but by 2001, this number had dropped to
129,000. In 2004, they began to rebound and, by the end of 2013, they had steadily increased to
289,000. The drop coincided with the change of government policy--the implementation of the
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Groups in 1998, which strictly
tightened registration. According to this regulation, if an organization planned to register as a
social group, it needed to 1) find a sponsoring agency for approval prior to registration; 2) have
over 30 organizational members or over 50 individual members; 3) have a fixed address,
specialized staff corresponding to its scope of activities, and legal financial resources of over
100,000 RMB for a national or 30,000 RMB for a regional (provincial level and lower) social
group; 4) and ensure that there are no other similar social groups within the same administrative
area (Article 9-13, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1998). The purpose of finding a sponsoring agency,
which is often called ―mother-in-law‖ by NGO practitioners, was to monitor NGOs‘ activities to
prevent them from violating the law or disrupting social stability. This rule was designed to
increase the difficulty of establishing new social groups so that the number of NGOs is always
controllable. The purpose of preventing ―similar‖ organizations to co-exist in the same
jurisdiction is to control the total number of social groups (Saich, 2000). Thus, these
requirements were trying to intentionally constrain the growth of civic organizations. In recent
years, some of these restrictions have been eased in certain provinces. For example, since 2011
four types of social organizations, including industry associations, science and technology
organizations, charities, and community service organizations, can be registered without a
sponsoring agency.

5

Unlike social groups, which have existed since the 1950s
2
, Private Nonprofit Enterprises
have not come to existence until the enactment of the Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Private Nonprofit Enterprises in 1998. Following the regulation, new groups
have been developed, and the number increased from 6,000 in 1999 to 255,000 in 2013. A
similar pattern occurred in foundations. The regulations on foundations were announced in 2004.
After that, the number of foundations rose from 892 in 2004 to 3549 in 2013.

Figure 1.1 The Growth of NGOs in China (1995-2013)
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, Statistical Bulletins on the Development of Social Services from 1995 to 2013.
www. chinanpo.gov.cn. visited on Sept. 3, 2014.
Despite the growth of all social organizations, the percentage of environmental NGOs,
which is the main focus of my study, did not exceed 2% of the total sector. This makes sense

2
In the 1950s, the State Council announced the Interim Procedures on the Registration of Social Groups
(shehui tuanti dengji zanxing banfa). This is the first attempt that the government made in order to manage these
organizations. Later on, due to the political turbulence from the 1950s to the 1970s, this regulation was barely
implemented. In 1989, the State Council abandoned this policy and enacted a new one—The Regulation on the
Registration of Social Groups—and updated it in 1998. Therefore, social groups have been existed since the 1950s,
and they have been able to grow quickly after 1998. However, as the government did not have a comprehensive
compilation of the statistics on social groups, I was not able to find any statistical data that shows social groups‘
development before the 1990s.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013
# of Foundations
# of Social Organizations and Private Nonprofit
Organizations (in thousand)
Year
Social Organizations Private Nonprofit Organizations Foundations

6

because, even in the U.S. where the environmental movement is much more mature,
environmental groups account for a relatively small share (National Center for Charitable
Statistics, 2012). As Table 1.1 shows, in 2007, the number of environmental groups totaled
5,709, but by the end of 2012, this number had steadily increased to 7,928, of which the lion‘s
share is social groups (6,790). Second is Private Nonprofit Enterprises (1078), and the smallest is
the foundations (60). These organizations vary from hierarchic, top-down public lobbies that
work from within the bureaucratic system, to participatory, grassroots groups that employ
various outside strategies to educate the public or challenge the government.
Table 1.1 The Growth of Environmental NGOs (2007-2012)
3

Year\Type
Social
Groups
Private
Nonprofit
Organizations
Foundations Total
% of the total
Social
Organizations
2007 5530 345 34 5709 1.48
2008 6716 908 28 7652 1.85
2009 6702 1049 35 7806 1.81
2010 6961 1070 47 8078 1.81
2011 6999 846 64 7909 1.73
2012 6790 1078 60 7928 1.61

Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, Statistical Bulletins on the Development of Social Services from 2007 to 2012.
visited on Sept 6, 2014.

The significant growth of these environmental groups is a result of the changing social
economic terrain and the increasing social and institutional need to improve environmental
governance. Specifically, China‘s forty years of economic development has led to the rise of a
strong middle class. People in this class are not only pursuing sustained economic growth but
also new ways to participate in public affairs. Some of them focus particularly on the field of

3
Available statistics only report the overall trend of the NGO sector as a whole, without detailed breakdowns into
different fields. The numbers I reported here are the best I could find.

7

environmental governance. According to Reusswig and Isensee (2009), members of the middle-
class have been very active in leading environmental NGOs, and their influence can be defined
in three ways. As citizens, they contribute their human capital, skills, and values, and they are
leading the development of the NGOs. As consumers, they are advocating for green products and
attached values. And as professionals who take leading positions in the public and private sectors,
they are incorporating their environmental consciousness into their day-to-day business and
government practices, which may lead to bigger social and institutional change. Therefore, the
emerging middle class in China has great potential in further influencing environmental
governance.
A second reason for the growth of eNGOs is the worsening environmental degradation.
The rapid economic development has taken a significant toll on its natural resources and
environment. Among other issues, forest resources have been depleted; water has been
contaminated; air has been polluted. The degrading environment has brought about serious
public health problems. The costs on health, combined with economic loss and others resulted
from environmental pollution and degradation, are estimated to account for 8 to 12 percent of
China‘s GDP (Economy, 2011). Moreover, the rapidly increasing pollution in recent years has
led to mounting environmental complaints and social unrest. Mass incidents sparked by
environmental pollution have occurred widely and more frequently. According to the 2012
Chinese Environmental Statistical Bulletin, environment-related petitions numbered 1,052,973.
The serious environmental woes and the associated social unrest constitute what Jenkins (2006)
call ―widespread grievances‖ in disturbance theory, which argues that the strains and social
discontinuities prompt groups to form organizations to bring about social and political change.

8

Once strains reach a sufficient scope and intensity, this theory argues, a relevant organization
will spontaneously form.
A third is expanding political opportunities. Eventually, the central government has
realized that without effective pollution control and protection measures, environmental
problems will limit economic growth and threaten social stability. To ameliorate the situation,
the government has shifted its commitment to sustainable development and has built up a
comprehensive corpus of environmental laws and regulations (Ho, 2001). For example, in 2008,
the State Environmental Protection Agency was not only elevated to ministry-level status but
also became one of only five ―super ministries‖
4
in government institutional restructuring. The
central government has also realized that the current fragmented and decentralized political
structure has been strong in promoting economic development but weak in facilitating
environmental protection. This is mainly because local governments receive more credit if they
develop local economy well. In contrast, protecting the environment does not seem to be a cost-
effective deal. Even if the local environmental protection bureaus expect to protect the
environment, they can hardly compete with economic development agencies, which are often
strong in resources and personnel. To resolve this dilemma, the government has started to rely to
some extent on environmental NGOs to gain more political leverage. For example, some EPBs
have collaborated with local eNGOs to monitor firms‘ pollution levels. Thus, governments‘
recognition of and collaboration with eNGOs has facilitated the growth of these organizations.

4
The five super ministries include the ministry of industry and information, the ministry of human resources and
social security, the ministry of environmental protection, the ministry of housing and urban-rural construction, and
the ministry of transport. The super ministries status indicates that these agencies have a bigger say in government
policy-making.

9

Relevant Previous Research
Along with the growth of Chinese NGOs, studies on them are also increasing. To
understand the state of the existing literature, I conducted a systematic search of studies on
Chinese NGOs. I found 53 articles in total. Using the word frequency query in Nvivo, I
identified the top frequently used words in the literature. Figure 1.2 shows the pattern in the word
cloud. It illustrates two major points. First, among all fields of NGOs in China, organizations
focusing on environmental issues are the most studied groups. Second, most studies have
examined the relationship between the state and the society, and the impacts of government on
NGO development are emphasized.

Figure 1.2 Frequently Used Words in Existing Studies on Chinese NGOs: A Word Cloud

10

In studying state-society relations, scholars frequently draw on insights from three
perspectives: the civil society, corporatism, and social movement. The civil society literature
assumes that free and voluntary associations of all kinds can potentially act as a countervailing
force against the oppressive government or illegitimate authority (Fung, 2003). For example,
Diamond (1999) argues that the contributions of associations to democratic reform depend on
their capacity to check, monitor, and restrain the exercise of power and hold the officials
accountable to the law and public expectations. Foley and Edwards (1996) highlight the
importance of political context and proposed two varieties of the ―civil society argument‖,
among which the first emphasizes the ability of associational life in fostering ―patterns of civility
in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity‖, while the second underscores its potential in
―energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime‖ (p. 39).
Applying this perspective, a number of China scholars and observers attempted to unfold
the dynamics between the state and the society in China. Many viewed with hope and excitement
that a sign of a nascent civil society was emerging. For example, White et al. (1996) wrote, ―one
can argue that there is a strong and growing intermediate sphere of social association in China
which embodies, in different ways and do differing degrees, the basic characteristics of a ‗civil
society‘—those of voluntary participation and self-regulation, autonomy and separation from the
state.‖ (p. 37) R. R. Moore (2001) argued that although happening in an evolutionary manner, a
strengthened and increasingly autonomous civil society in China is fledging, and it will not only
encourage reform at the top but ensure that the reform is firmly rooted in the Chinese society.
Morton (2005) showed that a small but growing number of independent NGOs are working to
represent citizen interests and influence public policy, and as the vanguard of civil society, these
groups can act as a stimulus for democratic reform. Using a field perspective, G. Yang (2005)

11

analyzed the interactions between eNGOs, the media, and the state, he then proposed that these
environmental groups are ―both sites and agents of political change‖ as they constantly test the
limits of politics. Cooper (2006) studied NGOs in southwest China and concluded that these
groups are not only tackling environmental issues but also transforming the state-society
relations. Teets (2009)‘s examination of those groups involving in disaster relief showed that
participation in these efforts has strengthened civil society.
However, as more and more NGOs emerge, many scholars realized that the majority of
these groups possess what Ho (2001) called ―a female mildness‖. Moreover, the radical political
change does not happen in China; the state remains authoritarian. Why is this so? Some scholars
argue that the precondition of a functioning civil society lies in the autonomy of these social
organizations, which is a questionable characteristic in China. For example, Knup (1997) was
among the earliest who called into question the genuineness and credibility of Chinese NGOs.
Ma (2002) pointed out, compared to NGOs in democratic countries, Chinese NGOs do not
command much autonomy.
Questioning the autonomy of civil society in China, many authors thus turned to a
corporatist framework to illuminate the mechanisms (either direct or indirect) that the Chinese
government uses to limit and control the political impact of NGOs. For example, Whiting (1991)
drew on Bratton‘s typology of government control, including monitoring, coordination,
cooptation, and dissolution, and discussed their use in authoritarian China. She argued that the
dual registration system is a monitoring strategy, and government officials‘ attempt to
incorporate some of the NGOs‘ activities into government plans is a coordination technique. The
co-option strategy refers to those acts that intend to incorporate autonomous NGOs into the
umbrella of official organizations, and the dissolution methods include those government actions

12

that involve canceling NGOs‘ activities, forcing groups to reorganize, arresting NGO leaders, or
closing the organizations. Indeed, these techniques are widely used in China. For example, A.
Moore and Warren (2006) reported that while NGOs, lawyers, and other representatives of civil
society were pushing the government to disclose environmental impact information, they were
often subject to different forms of retaliation, such as media blackouts, personal scrutiny,
harassment, or arrests. Pearson (1994) proposed a ―socialist corporatism‖ to describe the crucial
role that the state plays in preempting the emergence of the autonomous groups. Like Pearson,
Unger and Chan (1995) studied industrial associations and argued that the corporatist approach
provides a more accurate description of the state-society relations. Kang and Han (2008)
proposed the concept of a ―system of graduated controls‖, in which the state exerts various
control strategies over different types of social organizations in order to contain their capacity to
challenge the state. Heurlin (2010) argued that the dual registration system, which requires a
supervisory agency, is the best evidence of the corporatist strategy. Thornton (2013) reported
Shanghai‘s initiative to encourage Party-organized non-governmental organizations, which is
designed to encourage the formation of civic groups, but at the same time draw these groups‘
development under the aegis of the Party‘s control. Thus, the corporatist perspective suggests
that the state is using different strategies to maintain its control over civil society groups.
The civil society and corporatism approaches are useful, however, as many scholars
argue, both perspectives assume that the state and the society are two dichotomous entities that
have clear-cut boundaries, which is often not the case in contemporary China. As Saich (2000)
commented, the two explanations oversimplify the complexities of the dynamics between the
state and the society, and they fail to capture important elements of change. Thus, some scholars
began to construct new concepts, such as ―negotiating the state‖, ―embedded activism‖,

13

―contingent symbiosis‖, or ―consultative authoritarianism‖, to capture the complex relations
between the state and the society. Saich (2000) proposed that each social organization is trying to
negotiate with the state and define its own niche, and as a result, some organizations are deeply
embedded with the state, while some may eventually comply or evade interaction. Similarly, Ho
(2007)‘s concept of ―embedded activism‖ shows that Chinese green activism is characterized by
a series of fragmented, localized, and non-confrontational activities and by a set of deeply
embedded ties with the state, which enables environmental groups to wield their influence in a
more effective way. Spires (2011a)‘s concept of ―contingent symbiosis‖ describes in more detail
grassroots NGOs can survival only if they promote welfare goals and limit political claims; these
groups are far too weak to be the democratic agents. Unlike these authors, who examined the
complex relations from the organization‘s end, Teets (2013) looked at local official‘s ideas about
civil society and proposed a ―consultative authoritarianism‖ idea in that the local government
strategically encourages the expansions of a fairly autonomous civil society, but at the same time,
it is developing more indirect tools of state control.
Although all these studies have merit, none of them has provided a completely
satisfactory answer to the state-society relations in China. This is because they used a macro
perspective, asking such big questions as whether there is a civil society or what this growing
civil society implies in terms of political change. I argue that these questions are important, but
in order to answer them, we must first understand the organizations under study. Therefore, this
dissertation takes an organizational perspective and attempts to answer three research questions:
1) Given the specific context of authoritarianism, how do various institutional forces—the
government, foundations, and the nonprofit sector itself—affect NGOs‘ advocacy activities? 2)
What factors affect eNGOs‘ networking behavior? And how does managerial networking relate

14

to eNGO performance? 3) What are the mechanisms through which leadership succession affects
nonprofit performance?
Figure 1.3 shows the design of the dissertation project. Overall, the goal of the
dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the dynamic and symbiotic relations between
NGOs and government under authoritarianism. To achieve this goal, it focuses on three research
questions. These questions are approached through resource dependence, institutional, and life
cycle theories. Theory testing and theory development are both used. The data for the study
come from two sources: a nationwide survey and in-depth interviews. Additional data, such as
organizational annual reports and news articles, are also used. The triangulation of multiple data
sources and the comparison of the study findings with existing studies increase the robustness
and validity of the dissertation study.

15

Figure 1.3 Dissertation Project Design
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How do various
institutional forces affect
NGOs‘ advocacy activities?
2. What factors affect
eNGOs‘ networking
behavior? And how does
networking relate to eNGO
performance?
3. What are the mechanisms
through which leadership
succession affects NGO
performance?

GOALS
Examine NGOs‘
organizational
development
Comparative
perspectives on NGO-
Government Relations
THEORIES
Resource dependence
theory; Institutional
theory; Organizational
life cycle
METHODS
Nationwide survey
Semi-structured
interviews
Document analysis
VALIDITY
Triangulation of sources,
methods, and theories.
Search for discrepant
evidence. Comparisons
with findings in the
existing literature

16

Data Sources
This dissertation uses data from two sources: a nationwide survey and in-depth interviews.
When designing the survey instrument, I consulted existing questionnaires on Chinese NGOs as
well as the relevant nonprofit literature (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007; Hildebrandt, 2013; Mosley,
2011; Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008; Zhan & Tang, 2011; Zhang & Guo, 2012). To ensure the
validity of the theoretical constructs and measurements, I invited several researchers who had
studied Chinese NGOs to comment on the draft questionnaire. I also sought feedback from
eNGO leaders during our interviews. After several rounds of revision, the final questionnaire
consisted of 47 questions, relating to basic organizational attributes (e.g., age, size, and
registration), governance, funding, activities, and collaboration. The survey was administered
throughout China with staff support from the Media Survey Lab at Tsinghua University. Unlike
the U.S., where governments compile comprehensive lists of nonprofits, China does not have an
official list. I developed my own directory by consulting multiple sources, including websites,
the NGO directory compiled by the China Development Brief, and the list gathered by the All-
China Environmental Federation
5
. I then edited the list based on online search and past research
experience. I deleted those that were no longer in operation and those that did not focus primarily
on environmental protection. The final list consisted of 634 GONGOs and 581 civic eNGOs.
This list is by no means all-inclusive but is by far the most comprehensive researchers have ever
developed.

5
China Development Brief was founded in 1996. It serves as a support center to NGOs, foundations, and
researchers, providing communication, research, and networking opportunities to NGO practitioners. The All-
China Environmental Federation is a GONGO that focuses on environmental protection. It was founded in
2005, and its supervising agency is the Ministry of Environmental Protection. This organization compiled a list
of eNGOs in 2008. We obtained this list through personal connection.

17

Each NGO on the list was contacted by phone. I introduced the purpose of the project and
then invited eNGO leaders to participate in the survey. Upon obtaining consent, I sent them an
email with a link to the survey. The questionnaire was sent to two leaders per organization so
that I could cross-check their responses. The data collection process started in October 2014 and
concluded in January 2015. A total of 316 organizations (632 responses) responded through an
online portal, with a response rate of 26 percent. I used several criteria to assess the quality of
these responses and to select the most credible response for each organization
6
. Despite these
efforts, however, 49 organizations were still deleted because their responses were so poor: they
either had too many missing values or their answers to attitudinal questions were the same across
all the items. In general, responses from grassroots NGOs had better quality than those of
GONGOs. Our final dataset consisted of 267 eNGOs, including 150 GONGOs and 117 civic
eNGOs. The unit of analysis was each organization.
In addition to the survey, I conducted 39 semi-structured interviews with leaders of
selected eNGOs from Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Guangzhou in 2014-2015. I
gathered contacts through multiple sources, such as snowball sampling and personal connections.
Among the 30 organizations that were actually interviewed, three were GONGOs, and 36 were
civic eNGOs. I had significantly more interviews with civic eNGOs than with GONGOs,
because the latter were often much more difficult to approach. In contrast, civic eNGOs tended

6
First, I classified respondents into four tiers of positions (top management, administrative, staff, and part-time
level). In general, I considered the responses from those with a higher position to be more credible. Second, I
compared the responses by examining their answers to basic organizational attributes. If two responses were
consistent according to the above criteria, I chose the one with more complete answers (with few or no missing
data); if the responses were inconsistent, I checked the organization online and chose the one that was more
consistent with the online information. Third, I examined the answers to several open questions. Compared to
those with no answers or very short responses, questionnaires with longer responses to open questions were
retained. If all the above criteria did not work, I followed up with eNGO leaders by phone.

18

to be more receptive to researchers. I also interviewed two government officials from the
Chengdu Environmental Protection Bureau.
Prior to the interviews, I developed an interview protocol, which covered several topics,
including founding and registration processes, major projects, organizational development, and
performance. I solicited additional information as needed during the interview. Each interview
lasted about 40 to 100 minutes. The purpose of these interviews was to understand how eNGOs
operate and interact with local governments and to help shed light on the quantitative findings.
The interviews conducted in June and July of 2014 also helped me to further refine the survey.
These interviews may not be representative of the study population, but representation
was not the goal. Rather, the goal was to achieve data saturation (Yin, 2013). The interviews
proceeded sequentially: I started with the first case, from which I gained new information, and
then I moved on to the second, and the third. From each case I asked similar questions and added
certain new ones. I stopped the fieldwork when I felt that not much new information could be
gained. Through this sequential process, I obtained an in-depth understanding of the cases under
study.
I recorded and transcribed all the interviews. Nvivo 10, a program designed for
qualitative research, was used to facilitate data management and analyses. I then developed a
coding framework and coded each interview. The framework consisted of several main
categories, such as government funding and advocacy tactics, and many subcategories. The data
analysis from these qualitative interviews was used to triangulate the quantitative results in the
policy advocacy and managerial networking chapters. The interviews were the primary source of
data for the leadership succession chapter.

19

The data I have developed in this dissertation project represent the first and most
comprehensive dataset that has ever collected on Chinese NGOs thus far. The data analyses from
the dataset form the basis of the three empirical chapters, which I describe below.

Outline of Each Chapter

Chapter 2. Policy Advocacy
Despite the increasing volume and significance of research on nonprofit advocacy, most
studies have mainly focused on the phenomenon in Western countries. This chapter expands the
scope of the literature by examining the advocacy activities of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in authoritarian China. I focus on three aspects of advocacy behavior: advocacy
investment and use of insider and outsider tactics. The data analyses highlight how resource and
institutional factors—government funding, government affiliation, foundation funding, and peer
collaborations—shape NGO advocacy in China. The findings also suggest ways in which various
institutional actors may help enhance NGOs‘ capacity for policy advocacy.
Chapter 3. Managerial Networking
This chapter examines the dynamics of managerial networking and assesses its
connections to the performance of Chinese environmental NGOs. I highlight how three
institutional variables–the regulatory environment, government ties, and government
affiliation—shape eNGO leaders‘ networking behavior, and how two types of networking—peer
and political networking—relate to NGO performance in varying ways. The findings show that
China‘s restrictive political environment suppresses NGOs‘ peer networking but is not associated
with political networking. Environmental NGOs with leaders who have government work

20

experience network more than those without. Compared to civic eNGOs, government-organized
NGOs (GONGOs) network less with other NGOs and government agencies. In addition, peer
networking is positively related to NGOs‘ organizational development, and political networking
contributes to positive NGO-government engagement. Theoretically, these findings point to the
importance of the political and institutional context in which managerial ties are embedded.
Empirically, this study provides the first set of quantitative data demonstrating how managerial
networking benefits NGO performance under authoritarianism.
Chapter 4. Leadership Succession
This chapter examines how leadership succession affects NGO performance. By
analyzing the conditions, actions, and outcomes of ten succession events across three Chinese
environmental NGOs, the study proposes that the fit between pre-succession conditions and
successor actions affects NGO performance. When an NGO‘s internal structure is premature and
its external environment unfavorable, a complier who conforms to existing organizational rules
and norms will bring positive outcomes. In contrast, when an NGO‘s internal structure is mature
and its external environment favorable, an influencer who attempts to shape organizational
strategies and actions will produce good performance. When both conditions are at the medium-
level, a buffering strategy is the best option. The study suggests ways to overcome succession
crisis and facilitate long-term organizational development.
Chapter 5. Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the major theoretical and methodological contributions this
dissertation made.

21

Chapter 2 Nonprofit Policy Advocacy under Authoritarianism
7

Policy advocacy is broadly defined as any attempt to influence government decisions
through both direct and indirect means, including contacting government, educating the public,
and grassroots mobilization (Reid, 1999) . While many nonprofits engage in policy advocacy,
they vary in their advocacy investment and tactics (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 1998; Jenkins,
2006; Mosley, 2011). Nonetheless, the existing literature has focused mainly on the advocacy
activities of nonprofits in Western democratic states (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014; Kim & Kim,
2015), with very little attention paid to NGO
8
advocacy in authoritarian regimes. This article
expands the scope of the literature by examining empirically the following research question:
Given the specific context of authoritarianism, how do various institutional forces—the
government, foundations, and the nonprofit sector itself—affect NGOs‘ advocacy activities?
Government officials in authoritarian states have mixed views on NGOs. On the one hand,
they may impose severe constraints on the development and operations of NGOs, partly driven
by their fear that free-wheeling civic NGOs may become vehicles for challenging authoritarian
rule (Heurlin, 2010; Spires, 2011a; Wiktorowicz, 2002). As Bratton (1989) notes, ―NGOs may
sow seeds of political discontent and provide organizational channels through which opposition
can be mounted against an incumbent regime‖ (572). NGOs in Kenya, Indonesia, Thailand,

7
This chapter is a coauthored work with Dr. Shui-Yan Tang and Dr. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo. It has been
accepted by the Public Administration Review. The actual article may be slightly different from the one
presented here.
8
According to Anheier and Salamon (2006), compared to the term nonprofit organization, the term NGO is a
narrower concept mostly used in the developing world. It denotes a more conflictual view of NGOs, which are
often seen as vehicles for organizing citizen protests against power elites. In this article, we use the term
―nonprofit‖ in the Western context and the term ―NGO‖ in non-Western contexts.

22

Chile, and Vietnam, for example, have mobilized to protect and expand democratic space
(Clarke, 1998). In response, many regimes have used various tools to regulate NGOs. In
Kazakhstan, for example, the Civil Code limits political activities by narrowly defining NGOs as
social or philanthropic organizations (Wiktorowicz, 2002). In recent years, however, several
authoritarian regimes have begun to realize that NGOs can potentially help support service
delivery and resolve social conflicts (Teets, 2013). In China, for example, two distinct types of
NGOs coexist: civic NGOs that were initiated by private citizens, and government-organized
NGOs (hereafter GONGOs) that were either spinoffs from government-affiliated service
organizations or direct creations of government agencies (Tang & Lo, 2009). Both types of
NGOs have used government funding to provide collective goods. GONGOs have traditionally
been funded by the government; in recent years, civic NGOs have also begun to receive
government funding. Since NGOs in the West are seldom formally affiliated with the
government, there is virtually no discussion as to how these two types of NGOs may differ in
advocacy. While Western literature has examined the impact of government funding on
nonprofit advocacy, it has not empirically examined the interactive effect between government
funding and government affiliation under authoritarianism.
In addition, international organizations and foundations have favored NGOs as
development aid recipients (Banks, Hulme, & Edwards, 2015). For example, 86 foundations
from the U.S. made 2583 grants to 658 distinct grantees in China between 2002 and 2009, for a
total value of $442,925,349 (Spires 2011, p. 317). Meanwhile, Chinese domestic foundations
have been growing and supporting local NGOs (Spires, Tao, & Chan, 2014). While Western
studies have had mixed reports on how foundation funding relates to policy advocacy, with some
showing positive while others showing negative associations (Bartley, 2007; Brulle & Jenkins,

23

2005; Delfin & Tang, 2008), they have generally assumed that foundations operate in an
environment without overt government influence. Yet as argued by Mosley and Galaskiewicz
(2014), even in Western contexts, foundation program officers, board members, and staff
consider the political environment when making funding decisions. Under authoritarianism, it is
unknown whether foundations would be even more careful in avoiding funding NGO activities
that may cause political trouble.
Despite institutional barriers, NGOs in authoritarian regimes seek to collaborate with
each other in advancing common causes (Ru & Ortolano, 2009). While Western literature
suggests that collaborative networks facilitate nonprofit advocacy (Leroux & Goerdel, 2009), the
extent to which collaborations help NGOs under authoritarianism to advocate is unknown.
In this article, we examine the institutional influences on policy advocacy of eNGOs‘ in
the world‘s largest authoritarian country, China. We focus on three aspects of policy advocacy:
advocacy investment and use of insider and outsider tactics (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007; Mosley,
2011). Advocacy investment is defined as the extent to which an eNGO invests its resources,
time, and efforts in policy advocacy. Insider tactics refer to those that require ―working openly,
even collaboratively, with decision makers‖ (Mosley, 2011, p. 437). Examples include
participation in the drafting and revising of regulations, participation in government commissions
and committees, and providing testimonies on policy issues. Outsider tactics involve those
outside the formal policy process and focus primarily on shaping the climate around policy
making, such as disseminating policy information, writing letters or reports to the media, and
engaging in politically disruptive activities.
We focus on eNGOs for several reasons. First, being increasingly viewed as ―politically
less harmful‖ (Ho, 2007, p. 193) by the government, they have been able to gain political space

24

to grow in recent years. In the past two decades, eNGOs have been very active in environmental
education, nature conservation, species protection, and various forms of policy advocacy. Second,
although eNGOs are the most studied social organizations in China (e.g., Ho, 2007; Ru &
Ortolano, 2009; Tang & Zhan, 2008; G. Yang, 2005; Zhan & Tang, 2011), most of the studies
use a case-based approach or focus on groups in major cities, limiting the robustness of the
research findings.
Our study is more robust by using a mixed-methods approach that combines data from an
original nationwide survey and semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014-2015. Our findings
highlight how several key resource and institutional variables—government funding and
affiliation, foundation funding, and peer collaborations—work in the authoritarian context of
China in shaping NGO advocacy. The findings also suggest ways in which various institutional
factors relate to NGO investment and tactics in policy advocacy under authoritarianism.
In the rest of the article, we will first highlight the political and institutional context of
Chinese eNGOs and their recent development. We then present our conceptual framework and
hypotheses. After that, we describe the data, methods, and findings of the empirical study. We
conclude by discussing implications for understanding NGO advocacy in China and in other
authoritarian states.

Policy Advocacy of Environmental NGOs in China:
Framework and Hypotheses
While studies on nonprofit advocacy are abundant, most are based on human service
nonprofits, which rely heavily on government funding. Studies that focus specifically on eNGOs,
which depend more on other funding sources (e.g., foundations) and face distinct policy

25

environments (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007), are limited. In the Western literature, a sizable number
of existing studies examine environmental advocacy, but most examine the issue from a social
movement perspective or focus on the operations of a few large environmental advocacy
organizations (K. T. Andrews & Caren, 2010; Bartley, 2007; Brulle & Jenkins, 2005). In the
literature on China, a few studies have examined eNGOs, but their major focus is not on
advocacy activities (e.g., Ho, 2007; Ru & Ortolano, 2009; G. Yang, 2005). Because of these
limitations, we cannot rely exclusively on the current eNGO literature to develop hypotheses on
eNGO advocacy in China. In this article, we draw on resource dependence and institutional
theories to develop a theoretical framework that helps connect various institutional influences to
NGO advocacy investment and tactics.
Before introducing the framework, however, it is important to first outline the
development of the NGO sector and the broader political environment in China. In the past two
decades, China‘s NGO sector has grown tremendously. The total number of registered NGOs
had increased from 4,446 in 1988 to 547,000 by 2013 (Bureau of Social Organization
Administration, 2015). Yet, the Chinese government considers NGOs a security threat that may
potentially undermine national sovereignty (Spires, 2011a) and has thus devised various tools to
manage or control the development and operations of NGOs (Heurlin, 2010; Kang & Han, 2008;
Teets, 2013). To formally register as a social organization, for example, an NGO must find a
sponsoring agency and ensure that no other similar social groups exist within the same
administrative area (Article 9-13, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1998). Since 2013, four types of
social organizations
9
have been exempted from having a sponsoring agency (The Central

9
The four types of NGOs that are exempted from having a sponsor agency include industry associations,
science and technology organizations, charities, and community service organizations.

26

Committee of the Communist Party, 2013), but many NGOs, especially those that conduct
politically sensitive activities (such as those related to HIV/AIDS or labor rights), still face
difficulties in meeting registration requirements. Registered NGOs are not allowed to establish
local branches and are required to pass annual government reviews (Ministry of Civil Affairs,
1998). In addition to legal restrictions, several nuanced and indirect mechanisms have also been
used. Typical examples include incorporating certain NGOs‘ activities into government plans,
providing funding or training, requiring NGOs to establish party-units, and cutting off the supply
of critical resources (Kang & Han, 2008; Teets, 2013; Thornton, 2013). As Heurlin (2010) noted,
the Chinese government has shifted its NGO management strategies from simple exclusion to a
corporatist approach, allowing for some NGOs to develop under strict government guidance.
While the authoritarian state remains resilient, it is fragmented, creating meaningful
opportunities for NGOs to operate (Mertha, 2009; Nathan, 2003). In the environmental arena, for
example, government officials at different levels have begun to recognize the potential
contributions of eNGOs to environmental protection; some local environmental protection
bureaus (EPBs), for example, have collaborated with environmental groups to monitor industrial
pollution. Thus, the number of eNGOs had increased from 3,000 in 2005 to 7,928 in 2012
(Bureau of Social Organization Administration, 2015). In recent years, these eNGOs have used
various tactics to engage in advocacy. Some contact officials directly or file public interest
lawsuits to help pollution victims, while others work with the media to disclose multinational
firms‘ pollution activities, mobilize the public to block infrastructure projects, halt pollution, or
demand policy change (Hildebrandt & Turner, 2009; Ho, 2007; Zhan & Tang, 2011).
Resource dependence and institutional theories are often used to explain nonprofit policy
advocacy in the West (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014; Chaves, Stephens, & Galaskiewicz, 2004;

27

Mosley, 2011). Both theories suggest that organizations are constrained by multiple pressures
from the external environment, and the ways in which they respond to external demands and
expectations determine their survival and development. The two theories, however, differ in
several important ways (see Table 2.1). While resource dependence theory focuses on the task
environment, institutional theory focuses more on norms, beliefs, and political pressure from the
institutional environment. The two theories suggest different loci of external power: in the
former, power is held and exercised by key resource providers; in the latter, it is held by those
who shape and enforce institutional rules and beliefs. According to resource dependence theory,
organizations seek to manage resource flows and cope with interdependencies by maximizing
others‘ dependence on them or minimizing their own dependence on others. In contrast,
institutional theorists argue that organizations conform to existing institutional rules, cultural
norms, and political pressure by imitating what appears to be prevalent and appropriate.

28

Table 2.1 Comparison of Resource Dependence and Institutional Theories
Resource Dependence Theory Institutional Theory
Contextual focus Task environment Institutional environment
Loci of external power
Those who control scarce
resources
Those who shape and enforce
institutional rules and beliefs
Decision criteria Resource alternatives
Institutionally and culturally accepted
schemas, e.g., rules, norms, routines
Degree of choice Active choice behavior Non-choice behavior
Appropriate responses
to the environment
Managing resource flows;
coping with interdependencies
Adhering to rules and norms;
conforming to collective norms and
beliefs;
Outcomes Adaptation Isomorphism
References: Malatesta and Smith (2014); Oliver (1991); Pfeffer and Salancik (2003)

Applying resource dependence and institutional theories to nonprofit policy advocacy
under authoritarianism, we argue that NGOs in China face resource and institutional constraints
from three sets of external actors: government, foundations, and peers. When making advocacy
decisions, they must consider two major issues: one is how to generate enough resources from
the external environment to sustain their operations, and the other is how to reduce risks for a
political crackdown by government. The management of these two major threats drives the
policy advocacy investment and strategies of eNGOs in China. In particular, managing resource
availability and dependence affects the extent to which eNGOs invest in policy advocacy;
managing political risks is the driving force of their tactical choices. Below we relate each
institutional factor to eNGOs‘ resource and political considerations and explicate how they affect
their advocacy investment and tactical choices in China (See Table 2.2).

29

Table 2.2 NGO Policy Advocacy under Authoritarianism: A Framework
Key Factors
Managing Resource Availability
and Dependencies
Managing Political Risks
Government
Funding
NGOs with more government
funding are more motivated to
invest in policy advocacy in order
to broker more resources. (H1)
Closer collaboration with government
signals government approval of a NGO,
making it use more insider tactics and
less outsider tactics; but collaboration
may also create mutual suspicion,
making it use less insider tactics and
more outsider tactics. Thus no definite
effect of government funding on insider
or outsider tactics.
Government
Affiliation
GONGOs enjoy more institutional
benefits and can acquire more
resources than civic NGOs. Thus,
they invest more in policy
advocacy. (H2)
Compared to GONGOs, civic NGOs use
more insider and outsider tactics when
receiving more government funding,
which is a sign of government
recognition of their operations (H2a &
H2b)
Foundation
Funding
Programmatic funding from
foundations makes NGOs less
likely to invest in policy advocacy
(H3)
Foundations seek to avoid political
trouble, making them less likely to fund
policy advocacy. Thus NGOs with more
foundation funding are likely to use less
insider and outsider tactics (H3a & H3b)
Peer
Collaborations
Collaborations among NGOs help
overcome resource barriers for
engaging in advocacy. Thus, more
peer collaborations lead to higher
advocacy investment (H4)
Peer collaborations form a bigger voice,
which reduces potential political risks
for individual NGOs. Thus more peer
collaborations mean more use of both
insider and outsider tactics (H4a & H4b)

Government Funding
From one perspective, nonprofits relying on government funding may be reluctant to
―bite the hand that feeds them‖ because they worry that policy advocacy may endanger their
relationship with the government and drive away government funding. Government funding may

30

also shift organizational attention to securing governmental support, driving nonprofits to be
more formalized and professionalized, thus reducing their political activities (Chaves et al., 2004;
Onyx et al., 2010). Hence, government funding may have a negative impact on advocacy
activities, especially those that are confrontational (Guo & Saxton, 2010; Schmid et al., 2008).
Most empirical studies, however, find that government funding works the other way
around (Berry & Arons, 2003; Chaves et al., 2004; Donaldson, 2007; Kelleher & Yackee, 2009;
Leech, 2006; Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Mosley, 2011, 2012). Organizations with government
support are motivated to advocate more to protect their existing funding streams or broker more
resources. Through formal contracting, nonprofit leaders can access new pathways to interact
with public officials, and gain a more nuanced understanding of specific policy issues (Berry &
Arons, 2003; Kelleher & Yackee, 2009; Leech, 2006). These empirical studies suggest that
nonprofits play an active role in managing the resource dependence arising from a reliance on
government funding.
These results appear to be compatible with the situation in China, where local
governments have been increasingly involving NGOs in service delivery. NGOs have, in turn,
started to seek funding from the government. In 2013, the third plenary session of the 18
th

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution to increase government
purchases of public services. Accordingly, NGO-government collaboration has been increasing,
providing NGOs with more meaningful opportunities to influence public policies; NGOs are able
to better manage their resources and enhance capacity. In some circumstances, eNGOs have
benefited from such a trend and decided to invest more in policy advocacy.
H1: ENGOs with more government funding invest more in policy advocacy.

31

Government funding, however, may not have a definite effect on eNGOs‘ advocacy
tactics. One the one hand, government funding may signal government approval of an NGO and
create a new venue for it to weigh in during the policy process, leading to more use of insider
tactics and less use of outsider tactics. On the other hand, NGO-government collaboration may
create mutual suspicion: government officials are concerned about NGOs threatening social
stability, whereas NGO leaders fear that their activities may antagonize the government, leading
to organizational shutdown (Spires, 2011a).Thus, through working with the government, NGOs
may find it difficult to deal with government officials or may lose trust on them, resulting in less
use of insider tactics and more use of outsider tactics
10
[3]. Overall, government funding may not
have a definite correlation with the use of insider and outsider tactics.
Government Affiliation: GONGOs versus Civic NGOs
GONGOs in China are usually set up by the government to cope with the growing
internationalization of environmental governance, channel international funding and expertise,
and absorb government officials who were laid off during administrative reform in the 1990s
(Wu, 2003). As offshoots of government agencies, GONGOs are often led by retired government
officials working with environmental scientists, scholars, practitioners, and international experts,
who tend to have the necessary expertise and institutional channels for expressing policy ideas.
In contrast, civic NGOs, which are similar to Western nonprofits, are organized around a group
of committed individuals who often struggle to keep the organization running. Personal savings
and donations from business entrepreneurs and foundations are usually their major funding

10
Outsider tactics refer to those involving such mild activities as information dissemination and coordinated
efforts with other organizations; overt oppositional activities are not included because these are the activities
that eNGOs seek to consciously avoid (Ho, 2007).

32

sources. Most civic NGOs have no or only a few full-time staff, with most of their work carried
out by part-time staff and volunteers (Spires et al., 2014). Therefore, many civic NGOs barely
have any resources to invest in advocacy.
H2: Compared to civic eNGOs, GONGOs invest more in policy advocacy.
It is less clear as to how the distinction between GONGOs and civic NGOs relates to the
use of alternative advocacy tactics. This is partly because many GONGOs have become in the
past decade significantly more autonomous in finance and staffing (Tang & Lo, 2009)
11
, and
civic NGOs have also started to collaborate more with the government. Thus, the scope of
activities and tactics chosen by GONGOs and civic eNGOs can sometimes be quite similar to
one another (Ho, 2001). GONGOs may mainly work from within the bureaucracy, but they may
also use civic participation and community action to achieve their goals. Some civic eNGOs may
want government recognition, and seek to strengthen their ties to government officials. It is
likely that government funding interacts with government affiliation to affect eNGOs‘ use of
advocacy tactics. Specifically, as government funding increases, civic eNGOs are likely to
increase their use of insider tactics more so than GONGOs, because government funding not
only signals government recognition, but also provides civic eNGOs new formal channels to
work with the government. On the other hand, as government funding increases, GONGOs may
become more government-like and may decrease their use of outsider tactics; however, civic
eNGOs may be able to enhance their organizational capacity in networking and thus increase
their use of outsider tactics.

11
Since the 1990s, led by the slogan ―small government, big society,‖ the Chinese government has initiated
extensive reform efforts to restructure government bureaucracy and reshape state-society relations. One of the
efforts was to turn GONGOs into self-financing, private, nonprofit organizations. As a result, many GONGOs
have become more autonomous in financial and personnel arrangements.

33

H2a: As the percentage of government funding increases, civic eNGOs’ use of insider tactics
increases more than that of GONGOs’.
H2b: As the percentage of government funding increases, civic eNGOs’ use of outsider tactics
increases more than that of GONGOs’.
Foundation Funding
Through their funding programs, foundations can affect nonprofit advocacy. They may
use programmatic grants to select or ―cherry pick‖ those with moderate goals. This selection
process supports only organizations with missions consistent with preferences of the dominant
social class. Thus, the advocacy practices of nonprofits relying heavily on foundation funding are
affected by their patrons‘ ideological orientations (Brulle & Jenkins, 2005). Through their
funding strategies, foundations may help build an organizational field that fosters inter-
organizational networks and defines particular conceptions of appropriate actions. Bartley (2007),
for example, shows that foundations distribute money to an array of inter-connected
organizations, thereby transforming traditionally radical environmental social movement
organizations to ones that use market-based alternatives and institutional means to interact with
firms.
Even in democratic states where foundations generally operate in an environment without
overt government influence, foundations may discourage nonprofit advocacy. In authoritarian
regimes this dampening effect is arguably more significant. This is because governments in these
states often equate civil society with political opposition and impose stringent regulations on it
(Banks et al., 2015). Therefore, sponsors‘ abilities to fund contentious programs or priorities are
greatly restricted; when distributing grants, they often tend to support program-oriented and

34

apolitical activities. Furthermore, donors‘ narrow emphasis on ―results‖ may constrain NGOs
and transform their activities from being confrontational to palliative (Jalali, 2013).
In China, for example, eNGOs rely heavily on grants from both international and
domestic foundations. In the early 2000s, when local foundations were scarce, international
foundations played a critical role in supporting eNGOs. Foreign foundations not only offered
financial support, but also provided information and expertise by organizing conferences,
workshops, and lectures (Hildebrandt & Turner, 2009; Tang & Zhan, 2008; G. Yang, 2005). In
the past few years, however, domestic foundations have grown rapidly in size and influence, and
they have become major benefactors of eNGOs (Spires et al., 2014).
No matter whether they are foreign or domestic, most foundations share similar
preferences: they try to survive under authoritarianism and to garner more positive national
publicity for their individual donors (Spires et al., 2014). To achieve these goals, they need to
deal with politics carefully. They manage to avoid potential political controversies by directing
funding to politically neutral projects, such as those concerning environmental education and
species conservation (Tang & Zhan, 2008). Indeed, many foundations funnel their money
through government entities (Hildebrandt, 2012; Spires, 2011b). Although some funds go
directly toward eNGOs, they are project-based, requiring short-term and measurable outcomes
and imposing heavy oversight on eNGOs. With these requirements, eNGOs that rely heavily on
foundation funding tend to focus on programmatic activities and are likely to be less involved in
policy advocacy, in terms of investment and the use of both insider and outsider tactics.
H3: ENGOs with more foundation funding invest less in policy advocacy.
H3a: ENGOs with more foundation funding use insider tactics less frequently.
H3b: ENGOs with more foundation funding use outsider tactics less frequently.

35

Peer Collaborations
Peer collaborations are prevalent within the nonprofit sector; they provide information,
resources, and learning opportunities to participating organizations, making advocacy easier
among them. Specifically, collaboration enhances organizational learning. Through partnerships,
nonprofits can learn from each other about how to manage resources efficiently, deal with
competing contexts and demands, build effective support networks, and use the most effective
advocacy tactics (Leroux & Goerdel, 2009). In other words, collaboration helps increase a
nonprofit‘s capacity for policy advocacy (Schmid et al., 2008; D. J. Wang & Soule, 2012).
Collaborative networks also help member organizations to build organizational infrastructures
for mobilizing members, resources, and volunteers. Baldassarri and Diani (2007), for example,
show that civic organizations not only have close ties to their peers, but also serve as bridging
ties by connecting them to civil society. These civic networks enhance nonprofits‘ mobilization
capacity.
Collaborative efforts may be more important for NGOs in authoritarian regimes than their
counterparts in the West, because in the former, the political environment is more restrictive, and
NGO capacities are in general lower. As noted by Schmid et al. (2008), when NGOs form
coalitions in Israel, they attain more power and resources, which enable them to engage more in
political activities.
Environmental NGOs in China have increasingly collaborated with one another. They
work together to collect signatures and petitions for certain policy issues; they go to each other‘s
meetings or salons to offer intellectual and material support; they also borrow from each other‘s
expertise or guanxi networks to influence policymaking (Ru & Ortolano, 2009). Sullivan and Xie
(2009)‘s study on eNGOs‘ virtual networks, for example, finds that these organizations are well

36

connected to one another both online and offline. Collaborations among eNGOs have helped
them overcome resource barriers and foster collective action. Peer collaborations also form a
bigger voice, which reduces potential political risks for individual NGOs.
An often-cited example concerns eNGO advocacy to halt dam construction projects on
the Nu River in 2003. According to Xie and Mol (2006), Ms. Wang, leader of the Global
Environmental Volunteers, acquired substantive environmental information on how the policy
debate was unfolding within the government through her contact—a senior staff at the then State
Environmental Protection Agency. In addition, Friends of Nature, a leading eNGO in China,
used its access to political institutions to present scientific reports to the National People‘s
Political Consultative Conference. These NGOs eventually succeeded in halting the project.
H4: ENGOs with more peer collaborations invest more in policy advocacy.
H4a: ENGOs with more peer collaborations use more insider tactics.
H4b: ENGOs with more peer collaborations use more outsider tactics.

Data and Methods
Measurement
Dependent variables. The three dependent variables include advocacy investment,
insider tactics, and outsider tactics. Following Child and Grønbjerg (2007), we measure
advocacy investment as the extent to which an organization had contributed its resources, time,
and efforts to policy advocacy. Respondents were asked to assess their organization‘s investment
in advocacy on a scale of 1-5, for which 1 refers to minimal investment, and 5 refers to a
significant amount of investment. The average score is 3.71 out of 5.

37

The second and third dependent variables capture different advocacy venues. While there
is no consistent measure of advocacy tactics among scholars, most agree that they fall into two
categories: insider versus outsider tactics (K. Andrews & Edwards, 2005; Mosley, 2011; Reid,
2006). In our questionnaire, we follow Mosley (2011) and asked respondents to report the extent
to which they had used each of the eight advocacy tactics over the past three years, based on a
scale of 1-5 where 1 means rarely used, and 5 means very frequently used. These items were
categorized into two groups: insider versus outsider tactics. The measure of insider tactics
includes four items: 1) communicating policy ideas with government officials privately; 2)
participating in policy formulation and revision; 3) serving on government-organized guidance
committees; 4) engaging in environmental public litigation. The Cronbach‘s alpha for this
variable is .85, and principal factor analysis shows that the eigenvalue for these four items is 2.25.
The third dependent variable—outsider tactics—captures the extent to which eNGOs used
strategies to engage the public, the media, and other NGOs to shape the policy environment. It
encompasses four items: 1) submitting policy/research reports to the media; 2) organizing
collective activities like co-signing or writing letters; 3) announcing research/policy reports to
the public; 4) collaborating with other organizations to influence public policy. Here, we did not
ask eNGOs whether they engaged in protests of any kind to avoid biased responses because
protests and collective actions are illegal and strictly prohibited in China. The Cronbach‘s alpha
for outsider tactics is 0.80, and principal factor analysis shows that the eigenvalue for these four
items is 2.52. Overall, outsider tactics were used slightly more frequently (3.15) than insider
venues (2.97). The two variables were correlated at r=0.69.
Receipt of government funding. This continuous variable measures the extent to which
an organization depended on government funding. It is calculated by averaging government

38

contributions and grants (e.g., government subsidies, contracts, or government‘s purchases of
social services) as a share of average total revenues over the past three years
12
[5]. On average,
eNGOs received 22 percent of their funding from the government. Some interviewees indicated
that this percentage is relatively low in comparison to NGOs in other fields, such as human
services.
Government affiliation. This dummy variable measures whether an organization is a
GONGO or civic organization. Here, GONGO equals 1, 0 otherwise
13
[6].
Foundation funding. This variable measures the proportion of donations an eNGOs has
received from foundations (versus individuals and firms) over the past three years. Ideally, we
should have a direct measure for foundation grants, but we were worried that asking detailed
financial information may render a low response rate. Given the fact that eNGOs in China rely
largely on foundations for survival and development (Spires et al., 2014), we believe that
donations can serve as a meaningful proxy for foundation funding.
Peer collaborations. This variable measures the extent to which an eNGO had
collaborated with its peers in sharing information, implementing projects, attending/organizing

12
Most of the previous studies on nonprofit policy advocacy treated government funding as a binary variable
and examined whether the presence/absence of government funding affects policy advocacy. Here, our
measure of government funding is a ratio because we thought it might be more interesting if we could look at
the dependence of government funding on policy advocacy. Nonetheless, we did follow the previous studies
and examined the effect of government funding as a dummy variable. We found that holding other variables
constant, eNGOs with government funding invest more in policy advocacy (beta=.46, p<.01) compared to
those without such support. In addition, government funding as a binary variable is positively associated with
eNGOs‘ use of insider and outsider tactics (beta=.68, p<.001; beta=.38, p<.01). These results are consistent
with what the Western literature finds. Our findings here—that government funding as a continuous variable is
positively associated with eNGOs‘ advocacy investment but does not have a definite effect on tactical
choices—is more interesting given the restrictive nature of the authoritarian context.

13
As two distinct types of NGOs in China, GONGOs and civic NGOs exhibit different characteristics.
According to our sample, GONGOs on average are older than civic eNGOs. Their average ages are 14.31 and
9.83, respectively. GONGOs often have more staff than civic eNGOs. On average, for a typical GONGO, 28
percent of its funding comes from government support, whereas for a typical civic eNGO, 15 percent of its
funding is from the government.

39

meetings, applying for financial support, improving environmental governance, holding officials
accountable, and monitoring firms‘ polluting behaviors. Respondents were asked to rate the
extent to which they had collaborated with their peers in the above seven areas on a scale of 1 to
5, in which 1 means minimal collaboration and 5 means extensive collaboration. The Cronbach‘s
alpha for the seven items is 0.88, and principal factor analysis shows that the weight for each
item is similar. Therefore, the average of the seven items is used.
Control variables. The first control variable is organizational age, which is measured by
the number of years an eNGO had existed as of 2014 since its founding. Older organizations are
expected to invest less in policy advocacy because they tend to be more conservative. The
second is organizational size, which is measured by the natural log of the size of full time staff in
an eNGO. Larger organizations are expected to invest more in advocacy, and they may use
insider tactics more frequently. Registration status is a dummy variable measuring whether an
organization is registered with the government. We expect that registered organizations are likely
to invest more in advocacy, and they may use insider tactics more frequently because they are
more legitimate players. Organizational location is a binary variable measuring whether the
organization is based in Beijing. Located in China‘s political and cultural center, Beijing-based
eNGOs are more advantaged in raising public attention, using social media, or lobbying the
government. They are also more likely to connect with officials in the central government and
help them deliver policy messages to local governments (Zhan & Tang, 2011). Thus, eNGOs in
Beijing are expected to be more likely to engage in policy advocacy than those outside of it.

40

Analytic Technique
We use ordinary least squares regression models with robust options to test the
association between the independent variables and the three measures of policy advocacy
14
[10].

Results
Table 2.3 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for each of the variables
described above. Most of the key independent variables are not highly correlated, thus providing
some confidence that these predictors are indeed quite distinct and that they tap into different
institutional factors
15
[8].
Table 2.4 shows the nine regression models.

14
The Heckman selection models may seem appropriate for our research because one presumably should first
determine factors affecting whether or not eNGOs engage in advocacy and then examine why they invest in
advocacy and use tactics differently. However, this analytic technique is not a good fit here because 1) sample
selection is not a serious issue in our data, meaning that policy advocacy (which is defined broadly) is a
popular practice among eNGOs, and 2) the variables affecting whether eNGOs engage in advocacy as well as
why they invest in advocacy and select tactics differently are almost the same, making the selection equation
and the outcome equation almost identical. Nonetheless, we tried the selection models and found that the
selection model and the outcome model are not significantly different. This justifies that the Heckman
selection models are not appropriate with our data.

15
We also ran regressions with centered variables. The correlation table shows that the correlation between
government affiliation and the interaction term is much smaller (r=0.19), but the correlation between
government funding and the interaction term remains high (r=0.79). The regression results are similar to the
ones with un-centered variables except that the coefficients for government affiliation and intercepts are
different. Also, no matter whether we center or not, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are both below 2,
suggesting that multicollinearity should not be a major concern.

41

Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1
Advocacy
investment
3.71 0.99 1

2 Insider tactics 2.96 0.84 0.47* 1

3 Outsider tactics 3.17 0.76 0.46* 0.69* 1

4
Government
funding
0.22 0.21 0.52* 0.26* 0.26* 1

5
Government
Affiliation
0.56 0.5 0.29* 0.20* 0.06 0.30* 1

6
Foundation
Funding
.47 .28 -0.18* -0.13* -0.04 -0.29* -0.01 1

7
Peer
Collaborations
3.54 0.71 0.41* 0.34* 0.50* 0.24* 0.10 0.09 1

8 Organization age 12.35 6.62 0.17* 0.11 -0.02 0.27* 0.34* -0.10 0.00 1

9 Organization size 1.87 0.98 0.25* 0.28* 0.21* 0.12 0.17* 0.14* 0.04 0.27* 1

10 Registration status 0.77 0.42 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.11 0.27* 0.11 0.09 0.25* 0.11 1

11
Organization
location
0.15 0.36 0.08 0.14* 0.14* 0.03 -0.21* -0.08 0.02 0.07 0.17* -0.14* 1
* p<.05
N=267

42

Table 2.4 Regression Results

Dependent Variables Advocacy Investment Insider Tactics Outsider Tactics
Independent
Variables
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
Government funding

1.70 *** 1.98***

0.30 1.05*

0.51 1.26**

(0.29) (0.38) (0.28) (0.45) (0.32) (0.41)
Government affiliation
(GONGO=1)

0.35 ** 0.45 **

0.25 * 0.49***

0.02 0.27*

(0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13)
Foundation funding

-0.39 + -0.38+ -0.43* -0.39*

-0.20 -0.17

(0.23) (0.23)

(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Peer collaborations

0.45 *** 0.45 ***

0.35*** 0.37***

0.53*** 0.55***

(0.09) (0.09)

(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Government Funding
X Affiliation

-0.46

-1.23*

-1.23*

(0.50)

(0.51)

(0.51)
Control variables

Organization age
0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
+
-0.01
+

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Organization size (log)
0.22*** 0.19 *** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.18** 0.17*** 0.15***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Registration status
(registered=1)
-0.22 -0.37 ** -0.37 ** -0.17 -0.25* -0.25* -0.08 -0.17 -0.17
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Organization location
(Beijing=1)
0.06 0.1 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.17
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
Constant
3.22*** 1.67*** 1.60*** 2.6*** 1.52*** 1.35*** 2.97*** 1.19*** 1.01***
(0.18) (0.33) (0.35) (0.16) (0.28) (0.29) (0.16) (0.28) (0.29)
R-Squared
0.0818
0.4463 0.4482 0.0956 0.2719
0.2934
0.0622 0.3306
0.3507
F statistic 6.09*** 18.85*** 17.16*** 5.95*** 13.50*** 12.86*** 3.31* 13.6*** 12.66***
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; + p<.10; N=267

43

The first three models examine advocacy investment. Model 1 examines the effect of
control variables on advocacy investment. Together these variables explain 8.18 percent of the
variance in advocacy investment. In Model 2, we added our key independent variables. Overall,
the incremental variance explained by Model 2 relative to Model 1 is substantial—the full model
explains 44.63 percent of the variance in advocacy investment. Model 3 integrates the interaction
effect between government funding and government affiliation, and the main results of Model 3
are similar to those of Model 2. Models 4 through 6 focus on the use of insider tactics. Our key
independent variables, in combination with the control variables, explain 29.34 percent of the
variance in the use of insider tactics. Models 7 through 9 examine the use of outsider tactics. All
independent and control variables combine to explain 35.07 percent of the variance in outsider
tactics. In the following, we explain in detail how the hypothesized resource and institutional
factors affect eNGOs‘ advocacy by drawing on the quantitative results (Table 2.4) and
information obtained from interviews (Table 2.5).

44

Table 2.5 Summary of Interview Findings
Categories Description # of Orgs % of Orgs
Government
Funding
ENGOs with government funding (e.g., mainly used to support eNGOs to conduct
environmental education, facilitate rural planning and development, or conduct research)
19 63
Government funding fosters collaboration and trust, encourages advocacy investment 4 13
Government funding not necessarily related to specific advocacy tactics:
 bureaucratic hierarchy, difficult to reach gov‘t officials 7 23
 sense of uncertainty about the overall political environment 12 40

Government
Affiliation
GONGOs: considered as more legitimate and trustworthy; more resources, including financial
and staff support
3 10
Civic eNGOs not well positioned in policy advocacy 27 90
 Struggle to survive; do not have enough capacity to advocate 9 30
 Concerns that advocacy may bring trouble 7 23

Foundation
Funding
ENGOs with foundation funding 22 73
Foundations' grant-making criteria are restrictive, e.g. limited overhead and volatile foci, and
discourage advocacy
14 47
Certain eNGOs start to explore support from multiple sources, such as societal support,
government funding, and income-generating venues.
7 23

Peer
Collaborations
ENGOs collaborating with peers: "no single org can succeed alone" 23 77
Peer collaboration encourages policy advocacy
 Collaboration builds capacity 20 67
 Collaboration forms bigger voice 9 30

45

Government Funding
We proposed that government funding is positively related to eNGOs‘ advocacy
investment (H1). In our main effects models, H1 is supported. That is, eNGOs with more
government funding are likely to invest more in advocacy (beta=1.70, p<.001). This result
indicates that the conventional interpretation of resource dependence theory—that government
funding suppresses advocacy—does not work here. Rather, the result supports what most
empirical studies in the advocacy literature suggest: nonprofits‘ efforts to influence their resource
flows and shape their resource environment are the driving force for advocacy investment.
As expected, the coefficients of government funding on the use of insider and outsider
tactics are not significant, indicating that government funding is not related to eNGOs‘ use of
insider and outsider tactics. This is somewhat contrary to what the Western literature finds. Like
the situation in the U.S., government funding in China may create an additional channel for
NGOs to interact with the government. B14, for example, helps local conservation zones to
promote environmental education, and 70 percent of its revenue is from the government. The
leader believes that ―collaborating with local governments, getting them to know us, and
building mutual trust are important for civic NGOs.‖
Nonetheless, increased collaboration between eNGOs and the government does not
necessarily lead to more frequent use of specific tactics. A possible reason relates to the
hierarchical nature of bureaucracy. One eNGO leader said that they did work with the local EPB,
but it was a lower-tier staff who managed the contract. This leader tried to talk to the higher-level
officials, but she had spent three months in vain. These officials either believe that NGOs are too
trivial to be worth their attention or that NGOs are troublemakers who cause social instability.

46

Another possible reason, or probably a more important one, regards eNGO leaders‘ sense of
uncertainty about the overall political environment. The executive director at A7 explained,
In the authoritarian context of China, government officials usually have significant
amounts of power to exercise discretion, and their discretionary decisions are directly
related to the overall political environment. When the environment is relatively loose,
these officials will give NGOs more space to grow and conduct activities. However, once
the environment is tightened, NGOs may be in trouble.

This sense of uncertainty has been planted deep in the minds of many eNGO leaders,
leading them to be extremely careful in their choice of tactics. To eNGO leaders, seeking public
funding and working on government-supported programs are ways to establish government
connections, but gaining meaningful access to the government and navigating the uncertain
political environment seem to be more difficult. This sense of uncertainty about the political
environment was expressed explicitly in one form or another by 40 percent of our interviewees
(see Table 2.5). As summarized by an eNGO leader, ―to be a good advocate, you need to assess
the situation and be strategic in tactics. It is not just about using a specific tactic forever; it is
about choosing the right tactic at the right time.‖
Government Affiliation: GONGOs vs. Civic NGOs
In the second set of hypotheses, we proposed that compared to civic NGOs, GONGOs
invest more in advocacy (H2). Consistent with our expectations, the results show that GONGOs
devote more efforts to policy advocacy (beta=.35, p<.01), probably because they have more
preferential access to the government, and they are equipped with more expertise and resources.
Even though many GONGOs have become autonomous in finance and personnel, they are still
well connected to the government. They are also considered by government officials as more
trustworthy. As vividly described by the department chief at A11, a GONGO in Beijing,

47

China is a government-led socialist state. Most of the work is done by the government.
We as a GONGO are strongly connected to the government, and we can easily draw on
many resources. Actually, when many local government agencies are dealing with civic
organizations, they are a bit scrupled because they are not very familiar with civic NGOs,
and thus are concerned about their motivations and goals. Hence, local governments
would be reserved. However, we have a strong government background, and are
considered as more trustworthy. This is obviously a great advantage for us.

Clearly, civic eNGOs do not have this advantage. Most government officials do not know
what NGOs are and what they do. The Vice President at A14 has worked in the nonprofit sector
for over 10 years, and her observation is,
Among government agencies, the security department worries that NGOs may potentially
threaten social stability; civil affairs agencies deal with NGOs directly, but most other
agencies are indifferent. What they care about is government itself and enterprises. The
number of NGOs in China is just so tiny that these officials could not see.

Thus, civic eNGOs are not well positioned for policy advocacy. As Table 2.5 shows,
among the 30 organizations we interviewed, nine leaders expressed that they do not have enough
capacity to advocate, and seven worry that advocacy may bring trouble.
For hypotheses H2a and H2b, we proposed that government funding and government
affiliation interact to affect eNGOs‘ use of insider and outsider tactics. Interestingly, Model 6
shows that by adding the interaction term, government funding is significant (beta=1.05, p<.05),
government affiliation is more significant (beta=.49, p<0.001), and the interaction is statistically
significant and negative (beta=-1.23, p<0.5). This supports H2a. That is, GONGOs use insider
tactics more frequently than civic eNGOs, but when taking into account the effect of government
funding, the increase for civic eNGOs is stronger. To further demonstrate the impact of
government funding and government affiliation, we predicted eNGOs‘ use of insider tactics (see
Figure 2.1). The graph shows that when the amount of government funding is relatively low
(around 40 percent or below), GONGOs use insider tactics more frequently than civic eNGOs.

48

However, as the percentage of government funding goes beyond 40 percent, civic NGOs use
insider tactics more frequently.

Figure 2.1 Predicted Use of Insider Tactics by Government Funding by Government
Affiliation

Consistent with H2b, Model 9 shows that government funding is significant (beta=1.26,
p<.01); government affiliation is significant (beta=.27, p<.01), and its interaction with
government funding is negatively associated with eNGOs‘ use of outsider tactics (p<.05). Figure
2.2 illustrates this finding. Overall, it shows the divergent impacts of government funding on
outsider tactics for the two types of eNGOs. As the percentage of government funding increases,
GONGOs tend to use outsider tactics less frequently probably because they become more like
government agencies, while civic eNGOs use outsider tactics more frequently probably because
government funding helps signal their legitimacy and build their organizational capacity.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Predicted Use of Insider Tactics
Government Funding (%)
GONGOs Civic

49

Figure 2.2 Predicted Use of Outsider Tactics by Government Funding by Government
Affiliation

Foundation Funding
Consistent with H3 and H3a, the results show that eNGOs with more foundation funding
invest less in policy advocacy and use insider tactics less frequently (beta=-.39, p<.10; beta=-.43,
p<.05, respectively). But H3b, which predicts that eNGOs relying more on foundation funding
use outsider tactics less frequently, is not supported. This differs from what we learned from
some of our interviews that a heavy reliance on foundation funding discourages NGO policy
advocacy. This difference is probably caused by a measurement limitation, i.e., using donations
as a proxy for foundation funding.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Predicted Use of Outsider Tactics
Government Funding (%)
GONGOs Civic

50

In our interviews, many eNGO leaders reported that they rely extensively on foundation
funding. The founder of A13, for example, said that the lion‘s share of his organization‘s revenue
comes from foundations. Among the 20 different sources of project funding, 15 are from
foundations. The founder of A15 reported that his organization relies primarily on foundations
for financial support. Indeed, consistent with what previous research has found, foundations have
played a fundamental role in supporting NGO development (Hildebrandt & Turner, 2009; Spires
et al., 2014; Tang & Zhan, 2008).
Nonetheless, foundations‘ grant-making criteria are often restrictive. The administrative
officer at A12, for example, complained that most foundations only cover 5-10 percent overhead
costs, which is barely enough to support a full-time staff. Certain foundations do not cover
overhead costs at all. Another problem with foundation grants is that they are mostly project-
based, with very detailed and sometimes complicated reporting requirements. Indeed, as Table
2.5 shows, 47 percent of the interviewees complained that many foundation-supported projects
are short-term, with frequently changing grant-making foci. For instance, the founder of B7 said,
Many eNGOs are resource-based. That is, if a foundation says that it is going to support
those that work on climate change, then this eNGO will work on climate change; but
tomorrow, if the foundation shifts its focus to air pollution, then all the eNGOs start to
target air pollution. Civic eNGOs are just following what foundations focus on. This is a
vicious cycle. Civic eNGOs cannot achieve anything if they just follow foundations.

In response, certain eNGOs have started to restructure their funding sources. The
executive director at A7 noted that his organization had broken out of the traditional donor-
driven pattern and developed one with clear missions and strategies. Seven out of 30 eNGO
leaders all mentioned that they had realized the problem of relying too much on foundations and
had started to explore new funding sources. Currently, however, most civic eNGOs remain

51

dependent on foundations for survival. Foundations‘ short-term vision and grant-making
strategies have negatively affected eNGOs‘ policy advocacy.

Peer Collaborations
Collaboration is positively related to all the three aspects of policy advocacy. ENGOs
with higher levels of collaboration invest more in policy advocacy and use both insider and
outsider tactics more frequently (p<.001). This confirms what we learned from the interviews.
Almost all organizations reported that peer collaborations are prevalent in such activities as
holding conferences, signing letters, conducting projects, or mobilizing collective events.
As Table 2.5 indicates, 67 percent of the interviewees expressed that peer collaboration
helps build organizational capacity. For instance, A5 provides legal assistance to other civic
eNGOs in public litigation. The founder said,
As eNGOs, you need to understand laws. Or how are you going to argue with others? If
you claim that the government makes a mistake, you need to point out what the mistake
is. You need to ground your argument on the basis of laws and regulations.

He realized that most civic eNGOs lack solid legal knowledge, and they cannot afford to
hire lawyers. Thus he organizes annual legal training for eNGO practitioners. He also appoints
lawyers to work closely with eNGOs in public litigations.
Indeed, most civic eNGOs are embedded in some form of networks in which they know
each other well, learn from each other, and draw on each other‘s expertise. For example, A8 is an
organizer of a formal climate change network that consists of over 20 organizations. A9 has a
senior staff managing a network of eNGOs in order to enhance NGO capacities and
collaborations. A10 organizes a group of organizations that focus on river protection. A15 is a
member of Green Choice Alliance, which is organized by the Institute of Public and

52

Environmental Affairs to facilitate green supply chains and production. These formal and
informal networks have built up organizational infrastructures, based on which eNGOs can
mobilize resources and support. Nine out of the 30 interviewees expressed that peer
collaborations help form a bigger voice (See Table 2.5). Overall, collaboration encourages civic
eNGOs‘ policy advocacy.

Control Variables
Among the control variables, organization size is positively associated with eNGOs‘
policy advocacy. Holding other factors constant, larger organizations (measured by the size of
full time staff in log) invest more time, effort, and money in policy advocacy (p<.001), and they
use both insider and outsider tactics more frequently than smaller organizations (p<.001 and
p<.001, respectively). Compared to unregistered NGOs, registered ones invest less in policy
advocacy (p<.01) and use insider tactics less frequently (p<.05). This challenges Hildebrandt‘s
(2012) argument that registered organizations have higher autonomy than unregistered ones, and
thus are likely to advocate more.

Discussion
This article examined nonprofit policy advocacy under the authoritarian context of China.
Extending the application of resource dependence and institutional theories in Western contexts
to authoritarian regimes, we argued that NGOs in China face resource and institutional
constraints from three sets of external actors: government, foundations, and peers. When making
advocacy decisions, they must consider two major issues: one is managing resource availability
and dependencies, and the other is managing political risks. In particular, the former

53

consideration affects eNGOs‘ advocacy investment, and the latter drives their tactical choices.
We then explained how each of the four resource and institutional factors—government funding,
government affiliation, foundation funding, and peer collaborations—connects to eNGO
advocacy investment and tactical choices.
Based on the data analyses of an original nationwide survey of 267 eNGOs and semi-
structured interviews with 30, we found that eNGOs with more government funding are likely to
invest more in advocacy. However, this does not necessarily lead to more use of either insider or
outsider tactics. The hierarchical nature of bureaucracy and NGO leaders‘ sense of uncertainty
about the political environment are possible explanations. In addition, compared to civic eNGOs,
GONGOs devote more efforts to policy advocacy because they are considered by government
officials as more trustworthy. As the percentage of government funding increases, civic eNGOs‘
use of both insider and outsider tactics increases more than that of GONGOs‘. Moroever,
foundations‘ grant-making criteria discourage NGOs‘ advocacy investment and tactics. Lastly,
peer collaborations enhance NGOs‘ organizational capacity and collective influence, and thus are
positively related to their policy advocacy.
Overall, our study suggests that a particular interpretation of resource dependence
theory—that government funding suppresses advocacy—does not work in China. Rather, our
study supports what most empirical studies in the advocacy literature suggest: nonprofits‘ efforts
to manage their resource environment are the driving force for advocacy investment. Our study
also shows that the authoritarian setting in China has shaped foundation funding priorities and
strategies in such ways that they have a dampening effect on NGO advocacy. This is consistent
with the arguments in the Western literature—that foundations discourage policy advocacy.

54

More importantly, the study shows how institutional environments shape the
development and activities of the nonprofit sector (Smith & Gronbjerg, 2006). Under extreme
versions of authoritarianism, a political regime may seek to destroy civil society by closing off
institutional opportunities for individuals and social groups to organize for mutual benefits and
common political purposes (J. C. Scott, 1998). However, as exemplified by the case of China,
many authoritarian regimes in the contemporary world have adopted a softer approach; they
allow for a limited development of civil society, but use various means to strictly control it. In
order to survive and grow, NGOs in these regimes must navigate a government-dominated
institutional environment (Zhan & Tang, 2016). NGOs seek to engage in policy advocacy, but
they strategize in response to the types and intensities of pressure they face from the institutional
environments.
Specifically, government affiliation signals institutional benefits and legitimacy. Thus,
compared to civic eNGOs, GONGOs invest more in policy advocacy. Government affiliation
also interacts with government funding to affect advocacy tactics. As such, government
affiliation is an important institutional variable. As NGOs in the West are seldom formally
affiliated with the government, and the discussions on GONGOs and civic NGOs in authoritarian
states are often isolated, our study opens up a new venue of research.
Even though the distinction between insider and outsider tactics is an important issue in
the Western literature, in the context of China, at least in its current stage of development, the
distinction seems to be less important in some respects than others. For example, if the key
concern is about how to avoid political trouble, an eNGO will likely be steering away from both
insider and outsider tactics. If foundations want it to stay away from political trouble as a
condition for funding, an eNGO is likely to avoid using both insider and outsider tactics, both of

55

which carry some political risk. In relation to government affiliation and government funding,
the issue is less about avoiding political trouble, but more about gaining government approval
and building capacity to participate in the policy process. In this respect, the distinction between
insider tactics and outsider tactics becomes more important; for example, as our empirical
analysis shows, as government funding increases, civic eNGOs‘ use of insider tactics increases
more than that of GONGOs.
Our study adds to the emerging discussion on collaborative networks and shows that in
an inhospitable political and institutional environment in which information acquisition is
difficult and overall NGO capabilities are low (W. Wang, 2016), collaborations help mitigate
resource barriers and build mobilization capacity, leading to more policy advocacy.

Conclusion
This article has examined potentially key elements for a theory of NGO policy advocacy
under authoritarianism. It analyzes how government funding, government affiliation, foundation
funding, and peer collaboration affect the way Chinese eNGOs manage resource dependencies
and political risks. It also shows the limitations of using exclusively a narrow interpretation of
resource dependence theory to understand NGO advocacy under authoritarianism. While
resource considerations may shape advocacy investment, political and institutional pressures
often play a more significant role in shaping NGO advocacy tactics in such a setting.
The study carries important policy implications. First, NGOs can play a role in
facilitating peaceful transitions of authoritarian regimes. Government officials in these
transitional regimes need to realize that social and political landscapes are changing, and the old
system may not be able to cope with many emergent challenges. A vibrant civil society is not a

56

threat to the Party-state but rather a bridge between government and society. Allowing more
NGOs to operate and giving them more support are reasonable strategies for improving
governance. Second, no matter whether they are international or domestic, foundations operating
under authoritarianism must be careful to avoid political trouble. It is difficult to expect them to
turn suddenly to supporting highly politically sensitive issues. Yet within the existing political
constraints, foundations may still play a more active role as change agent, especially by building
NGO capacity through the strategic use of multi-year grants and provision of more generous
overheads to deserving NGOs. Lastly, NGOs themselves need to pay special attention to
building internal organizational capacity and external channels for participating in the policy
process.
These are no easy tasks, especially in the authoritarian context of China, in which some
kinds of government affiliation and support have always been key factors for policy
advocacy. Yet there has been increasing evidence suggesting that NGOs may be able to leverage
collaborative efforts among themselves as a way to enhance their overall engagement in policy
investment and advocacy. Further exploration, however, is needed to determine what types of
peer NGO collaborations are feasible in China‘s authoritarian context and more efficacious in its
policy process.
The study has several limitations. First of all, the quantitative analyses of this study were
mainly drawn from a survey, which may result in self-reporting and common-source biases
(Groves et al., 2011). Another limitation is that our study focuses exclusively on environmental
NGOs, and one may wonder whether these groups are representative of the whole nonprofit
sector in China. We share this concern, but we believe that as the leading civil society groups in
China, the political and institutional environment eNGOs are facing as well as the difficulties

57

they are encountering are similar to NGOs in other fields. Nevertheless, future research may
study NGOs in other policy fields and examine how resource and institutional considerations
affect their advocacy behavior. In addition, cross-national comparisons are needed to examine
how variations in political regime features affect NGO advocacy.
As the data are cross-sectional, we are unable to capture change in the institutional
contexts and in the development of the NGO sector over time and cannot claim causality. For
future research, it is better to build a panel dataset so that systematic change in eNGO advocacy
and factors causing this change can be examined. Lastly, the study has focused mainly on
eNGOs‘ advocacy investment and tactics; it did not address the efficacy of policy advocacy, i.e.,
whether eNGOs are making a difference in the current authoritarian state. As Jenkins (2006)
points out, advocacy is a question of articulating a position and mobilizing support for it, a topic
different from actual influence. For future research, we will look into the impact of NGO
advocacy under authoritarianism.

Appendix: A Summary of Environmental NGOs Interviewed
Organization Year Location Organization Position

58

ID Founded Type
A1 1991 Panjin Civic Founder, ED
A2 2003 Beijing Civic Project Manager
A3 2000 Beijing Civic Project Manager
A4 1998 Beijing Civic ED
A5 1998 Beijing College Institute Founder, ED
A6 2003 Beijing Civic Office Director
A7 1993 Beijing Civic ED
A8 2007 Beijing Network Manager
A9 1992 Beijing GONGO Project Manager
A10 1996 Beijing Civic Office Director
A11 2005 Beijing GONGO Department Chief
A12 1996 Beijing Civic Office Director
A13 2007 Shanghai Civic Founder, ED
A14 2006 Shanghai
Nonprofit
Incubator
Vice President
A15 2012 Suzhou Civic Founder, ED
A16 2009 Beijing Civic Senior Staff
B1 2005 Chongqing Civic Founder, ED
B2 2009 Chengdu GONGO Chair
B3 2003 Chengdu Civic Office Director
B4 2013 Chengdu Civic Founder, ED
B5 2014 Chengdu Civic ED
B6 2013 Chengdu Civic Senior Staff
B7 2004 Chengdu Civic Founder, ED
B8 2013 Chongqing Civic Founder, ED
B9 2014 Chongqing Civic Founder, ED
B10 2012 Chongqing Civic Founder, ED
B11 2000 Chongqing Civic ED
B12 2012 Chengdu Civic ED
B13 2012 Chengdu Civic ED
B14 1995 Chengdu Civic Senior Staff
C1 N/A Chengdu
Government
Agency
Division Head
C2 N/A Chengdu
Government
Agency
Division Head

59

Chapter 3 The Dynamics of Networking: Antecedents and Performance Effects
16

Managerial networking refers to managers‘ efforts to build and use connections with
other organizations to leverage resources, information, and knowledge to support their own
organization and tasks (Hicklin, O'Toole, & Meier, 2008; Luo, 2003). As a strategic tool, it has
received significant attention in public management research (see Hu, Khosa, & Kapucu, 2016;
Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2010 for a review). While some studies focus
on the structural characteristics of collaborative networks (Isett et al., 2010; Milward, Provan,
Fish, Isett, & Huang, 2009; Provan & Milward, 1995, 2002; W. Wang, 2015), others examine the
behavioral manifestations of networking and its impact on organizational performance (Johansen
& LeRoux, 2012; Meier & O'Toole, 2003; O'Toole, 2004; O‘Toole & Meier, 2014). It is widely
recognized that managerial networking is beneficial to the performance of public organizations
and programs because of its potential in reducing transaction costs, buffering environmental
uncertainty, and tapping external resources.
These studies, however, have mostly limited their focus to Western contexts (O‘Toole &
Meier, 2014). The performance implications of managerial networking are likely to differ across
varying contexts. In authoritarian regimes, restrictive political environments and weak
institutional support may shape managers‘ networking behavior differently, with varying effects
on organizational performance. For example, a sizable number of studies in the business
literature have documented that in China‘s transition economy, which is characterized by a lack

16
This chapter is a coauthored work with Dr. Shui-Yan Tang and Dr. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo. It is currently
under review at a major public administration journal.

60

of well-established legal framework and property rights enforcement, managerial networking has
been frequently used to compensate for these institutional inadequacies and to enhance firms‘
economic and operational performance (Luo, Huang, & Wang, 2012). Yet, few theoretical or
empirical works have been done to examine the dynamics and consequences of managerial
networking in public and nonprofit organizations under authoritarianism.
In this study, we seek to fill a gap in the literature by examining the antecedents and
performance effects of managerial networking among environmental NGOs (hereafter, eNGOs)
in authoritarian China. Our research questions are: 1) what factors affect eNGOs‘ networking
behavior? And 2) how does managerial networking relate to eNGO performance?
To address these questions, we follow Peng and Luo (2000) and distinguish two types of
managerial networking: ―peer networking‖ characterized by horizontal connections with other
NGOs and ―political networking‖ characterized by vertical connections with various levels of
government agencies. As argued by Torenvlied, Akkerman, Meier, and O‘Toole (2013),
organizational leaders engage in different networking activities with different types of
organizations, expecting to draw on varying sources of support. Similarly, eNGOs differ in their
motivations for engaging in peer versus political networking, and the two types of networking
may have divergent implications on their performance. Drawing on resource dependence,
institutional, network and social capital theories, we develop and test hypotheses regarding the
antecedents and performance effects of peer and political networking by analyzing a nationwide
survey of 267 eNGOs in 2014-2015 and by triangulating findings from quantitative data with
those from in-depth interviews.

61

Our findings highlight how several key institutional variables—the regulatory
environment, government ties, and government affiliation—shape the dynamics of NGO
networking in the authoritarian context of China, in which the party-state has constantly been on
guard against potential threat of any large-scale collective action organized by NGOs. The study
also shows the potential contribution of managerial ties to NGO performance after controlling
for other institutional and organizational level factors. Empirically, our study distinguishes from
other research on Chinese NGOs that mainly uses the case studies approach, calling into question
the generalizability of their findings (e.g., Ho, 2001; Kang & Han, 2008; Wu, 2013).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly introduce the
development of Chinese eNGOs and their relations with the authoritarian state. After that, we
present our theory and hypotheses. Next, we describe our empirical methods. We then present
the result of the study. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications as
well as the limitations of the research.
The Development and Management of Chinese NGOs in Authoritarian China
Over the past two decades, China‘s NGO sector has grown significantly in both size and
scope. The number of NGOs had increased from 4,446 in 1988 to 547,000 by 2013 (Bureau of
Social Organization Administration, 2015). These statistics only measure registered groups; most
scholars believe that the number of active groups far exceeds the numbers reported here (Teets,
2009). A hallmark of China‘s NGO sector is the coexistence of two distinct types of NGOs:
government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) and civic NGOs. Most GONGOs were originally set
up by the government
17
to channel international funding and expertise and to absorb retired

17
Some GONGOs are established by the central government, and their sponsoring agencies are usually
ministry-level agencies. However, other GONGOs are set up and administered by the provincial or municipal

62

government officials from the administrative reform in the 1990s (Wu, 2003). In contrast, civic
NGOs are mostly organized by individual citizens who are devoted to a specific social cause. As
semi-governmental organizations, GONGOs have been enjoying various institutional benefits,
such as extensive financial support and special personnel arrangement. In contrast, civic NGOs
have been institutionally discriminated against in many areas.
The Chinese government, for example, uses legal registration to control the development
of civic NGOs. If an NGO seeks to register with the government, it must find a sponsoring
agency—a government agency that serves the role of so-called ―mother-in-law‖—and ensure
that no other social organizations focusing on similar issues exist within the same administrative
jurisdiction (Article 9-13, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1998). Due to these onerous registration
requirements, many active groups are unable to register with the government. Some are
unofficially associated with a university; some register as businesses; others operate informally,
relying on the goodwill of local officials (Hildebrandt, 2012). Since 2013, four types of social
organizations
18
have been exempted from having a sponsoring agency (The Central Committee
of the Communist Party, 2013), but many NGOs, especially those that conduct politically
sensitive activities (such as those working on HIV/AIDS, legal reform, or labor rights issues),
still face difficulties in meeting registration requirements. To limit NGOs‘ autonomy, registered
NGOs are prohibited from establishing local branches and required to pass annual government
reviews (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1998). Unregistered NGOs may face administrative
interferences, police surveillance, or sometimes political crackdown.

governments. GONGOs at different levels have frequent communication, but local-level GONGOs are not
necessarily controlled or governed by those with higher administrative ranks.
18
The four types of NGOs that are exempted from having a sponsor agency include industry associations,
science and technology organizations, charities, and community service organizations.

63

Overall, the Chinese government is ambivalent about NGO development. On the one
hand, it considers NGOs a potential threat to its rule. Many officials are concerned that the
strengthening of civil society may create social disorder and erode their own power and authority
(Teets, 2013). Most do not understand what role NGOs play and what capacity NGOs have and
are uncertain over which groups are appropriate to cooperate, leading to general distrust of the
overall NGO sector. Controlling NGO registration, checking their activities, and suppressing
NGOs‘ coordinated actions are illustrations of government officials‘ fear (Heurlin, 2010; Kang
& Han, 2008). On the other hand, the government recognizes that NGOs have contributed
significantly to China‘s development in the past two decades through sharing of knowledge and
expertise, and has thus loosened its control over civil society groups, providing NGOs with some
political space to grow. In the environmental field, for example, certain local governments have
recognized eNGOs‘ role in monitoring firms‘ polluting activities and have sought to collaborate
with them. As a result, the number of eNGOs had significantly increased from 3,000 in 2005 to
7,928 in 2012 (Bureau of Social Organization Administration, 2015).
Organized by well-educated professionals, such as lawyers and journalists, some eNGOs
have sought to promote nature conservation and environmental protection by collaborating with
other NGOs and government. Networking is thus a strategic tool for many eNGOs. G. Yang
(2010), for example, states that Chinese eNGOs are polycentric and networked, constituting a
dynamic structure in which extensive interaction and learning occur. Ru and Ortolano (2009)
report that eNGO leaders often use their guanxi networks with government officials to smooth
the way to registration. Xie and Mol (2006)‘s case studies illustrate how extensive networking
within the green community helps mobilize coordinated actions and affect political authorities.
These studies also show that eNGO leaders utilize their networks differently, producing varying

64

impact on their organizations. The questions are: Under what circumstances are NGO leaders
more likely to mobilize their networks? And how do varying types and extents of networking
affect NGO performance? Below we draw on several theories to examine the dynamics of
managerial networking and their effects on NGO performance.
Theory and Hypotheses
A vast body of literature has documented that organizations network to countervail
uncertainties in their resource and institutional environments, and this networking behavior
affects organizational performance (Brass, Galaskiewicz, & Greve, 2004; Hicklin et al., 2008;
Johnson & Ni, 2015; Luo, 2003; Meier & O'Toole, 2003; O'Toole, 2004; O‘Toole & Meier,
2014). However, in the broad-ranging and heterogeneous literatures, no single theory can fully
explicate the antecedents and performance effects of managerial networking. Below, we draw on
resource dependence, institutional, network and social capital theories to explain factors
associated with managerial networking and how networking relates to NGO performance.
Before moving on, we propose two delimiting assumptions underlying our research. First,
we assume that organizations make conscious, intentional decisions to establish ties with their
environment. These decisions result from their rational calculations of the specific constraints
and opportunities they face. Second, although most ties occur mainly at the individual level, we
take an organizational perspective and consider NGO executives‘ networking behavior at the
organizational level.
The Antecedents of Managerial Networking
Organizational theorists have long argued that economic, social, political, and
institutional factors account for the formation of network ties (Brass et al., 2004; Gulati &

65

Gargiulo, 1999; Oliver, 1990). For example, Galaskiewicz (1985) proposes that inter-
organizational relationships are driven by four motives, namely, acquiring resources, reducing
uncertainty, enhancing legitimacy, and attaining collective goals. Similarly, Oliver (1990) argues
that organizations form relationships with others based on multiple contingencies, including
necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy. Thus the intensity and
nature of network ties depend on internal factors associated with resource needs and external
factors associated with environmental contingencies. In the Chinese context, which is
characterized by strict party control, political and institutional factors may play a larger role in
determining NGOs‘ networking activities. When considering whether and how to conduct a
certain activity, including managerial networking, Chinese NGOs‘ overriding concern is to avoid
getting into political trouble and to enhance its survival chance in a largely uncertain, and
sometimes hostile, political environment. While Chinese NGOs must give the highest priority to
navigating institutional pressure from the political environment, they do need resources to
operate and grow. Resource dependency considerations, though of secondary importance, have
an effect on their managerial networking strategies. But when conflicts emerge between resource
and political considerations, the latter will be given a higher priority. Below, we examine three
political and institutional variables—the regulatory environment, government ties, and
government affiliation—and explain how each, together with related resource dependency
considerations, shapes NGOs‘ managerial networking.
The Regulatory Environment
Resource dependence theory predicts that organizations seek to build network ties with
other organizations in order to manage external dependencies and uncertainties in their resource

66

environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). As institutional uncertainty increases, managers are
more eager to turn to others for key resources and legitimacy. Networking is thus a coping
strategy to reduce uncertainty (Oliver, 1990). From this perspective, when compared with their
Western counterparts, NGOs in China face more uncertainty and may network more with their
peers to share information, facilitate coordinated actions, and broker resources. They may also
seek to develop relationships with government agencies to gain preferential access to resources
and information, and to demonstrate legitimacy.
By contrast, institutional theory focuses more on the pressures and constraints of the
institutional environment (North, 1990; Oliver, 1991; Powell & DiMaggio, 1983). When legal
coercion is high, and when the consequences of nonconformity are highly punitive and strictly
enforced, acquiescence and avoidance may be the best strategy for organizations (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Powell & DiMaggio, 1983). From this perspective, NGOs facing
such a restrictive environment may choose to refrain from networking activities because of the
potential political risks. Ho (2007), for example, argues that China‘s restrictive political
environment has restrained NGOs from developing intimate linkages with other NGOs and
international donors. Similarly, Hildebrandt and Turner (2009) argue that the government is wary
of strong ties between groups, and if individual NGOs want to continue to work, they are better
off keeping to themselves.
H1: ENGOs under a more restrictive regulatory environment are likely to network less with their
peers.
The regulatory environment, however, may not have a definite impact on eNGOs‘
political networking. On the one hand, political restrictions may dampen eNGO leaders‘

67

networking activities with the government because they distrust government officials or are
worried about unwanted government attention (Spires, 2011a; Teets, 2013). On the other hand,
they may network with the government regardless because of their increasing mutual dependence
on each other: eNGOs need various sources of government support to survive, and local
governments rely on eNGOs to curb environmental pollution (Ho, 2001; Teets, 2013).
Government Ties
According to resource dependence theory, an organization‘s ties to the government can
help absorb the uncertainty created by government regulation (Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003). Sitting on the board of directors, government officials act as boundary spanners who can
bring in valuable policy information and build effective collaboration between the organization
and government. They can also facilitate alliance formation between organizations (Gulati &
Westphal, 1999).
While the impact of government ties are often examined in the context of interlocking
boards in the Western context, it may not apply to the Chinese NGO sector, an emerging
organizational field dominated by informal connections, in which boards of directors play a
minor role in NGO governance (Xie & Mol, 2006). In China, many NGO leaders have
government ties by being former or current researchers, academics, journalists, and government
officials (Zhan & Tang, 2016). Cooper (2006), for example, finds that among the twelve eNGOs
she studied, nine organizational leaders have previously worked for the government. These
leaders usually know the nitty-gritty of the policy process and have access to various government
agencies. Nee and Opper (2010) find that managers with a previous career as a government
official can systematically build on their insider networks to cultivate political connections in

68

order to secure government contracts. Spires (2011a)‘s interview with a former government
official who later became an NGO activist illustrates that a leader‘s government background
enables NGOs to communicate more with government officials, allowing the government to
familiarize with NGOs‘ work and giving NGOs better survival chances. The ex-government
official may also have extensive ties with the media and other NGOs, giving the eNGO an edge
over those without such a leader. Therefore, eNGOs with government ties are likely to network
more than those without such ties because of the former‘s easy access to insider knowledge
about government processes and NGO partnerships.
H2a: ENGOs with government ties are likely to network more with the government than those
without these ties.
H2b: ENGOs with government ties are likely to network more with their peers than those
without these ties.
Government Affiliation
As semi-governmental organizations that perform social or public functions, GONGOs
used to be funded mostly by the government. Their top leaders are likely to be appointed by the
state, their budgets soft, and their compensations not directly linked to performance. However,
since the 1990s, led by the slogan ―small government, big society,‖ the Chinese government has
initiated extensive reform efforts to restructure government bureaucracy and reshape state-
society relations. One of the efforts was to turn GONGOs into self-financing, private, nonprofit
organizations. As a result, many GONGOs have become more autonomous in financial and
personnel arrangements (Tang & Lo, 2009). Yet they continue to have relatively easier access to
government officials and resources. They are also considered as more legitimate organizations

69

by local government agencies. As a result, GONGO leaders may be less motivated than their
civic NGO counterparts to cultivate good government ties.
In contrast, civic NGOs initially suffer from a lack of legitimacy as new organizations.
Executives in these organizations are strongly motivated to improve managerial ties to
compensate for their ―liability of newness‖ (Stinchcombe, 1965). Such a motivation may be
especially strong in authoritarian China, which lacks formal institutional support for civic NGOs.
Moreover, civic NGOs often have limited financial capacity to ensure survival; many rely on
founders‘ personal savings to continue operation. Therefore, civic NGO leaders are inclined to
network in order to gain useful information and knowledge. By networking with their peers or
more established NGOs in the field, these leaders can learn about possible funding sources and
knowledge on how to manage NGOs (Ru & Ortolano, 2009; G. Yang, 2005). By networking
with government officials, they may smooth their way to registration, government funding, or
other institutional support. Thus, leaders of civic NGOs may be strongly motivated to invest
more time and efforts in the two types of ties, which are valuable, unique, and intangible
resources (Barney, 1991) that could help civic NGOs in many meaningful ways. Teets (2013),
for example, points out that civic NGOs working on community development issues
intentionally forge government ties to access funding and to obtain recognition and influence.
H3a: Compared to GONGOs, civic eNGOs network more with their peers.
H3b: Compared to GONGOs, civic eNGOs network more with the government.

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Managerial Networking and NGO Performance
Several theories, such as social capital theory, resource-based view, social network theory,
and structural holes, have been used to explain the networking-performance link (Hu et al., 2016).
Some of these theories, such as various forms of network and structural holes theories, are
premised on a close examination of specific network configurations (W. Wang, 2015). In our
empirical research, we did not have an opportunity to explore specific network structures; thus
we focus the theoretical arguments here on how insights from different theoretical perspectives
may help identify how two general forms of managerial networking—political and peer--affect
eNGO performance in China.
Social capital and its closely related social structure theories (e.g., Burt, 2009; Coleman,
1990; Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 2002; Uzzi, 1997) have had substantial impact on network
research in public administration scholarship (Hu et al., 2016). Social capital can be understood
broadly as resources engendered by the fabric of social ties (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Lin, 2002). In
other words, investing in social relationships helps accumulate social capital through which
resources and other benefits can be accessed. Broadly speaking, social capital generates three
benefits. First, it provides access to a wide range of quality and timely information that can help
organizations overcome environmental uncertainty and control their environment (Borgatti &
Halgin, 2011; Brass et al., 2004; Burt, 2009; Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006;
Granovetter, 1973; Podolny & Page, 1998). This information may be technical or it may be about
the larger field, industry, or community environment; it helps managers to formulate more
effective strategies and plans. Uzzi (1997), for example, found that social embeddedness allows
apparel firms to exchange fine-grained, tacit, and holistic information, which helps them forecast
future demands and anticipate customer preferences. Second, social capital accrues influence,

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control, and power, enabling organizations to attain their goals (Burt, 2009). Some social ties,
due to their strategic locations (e.g., structural holes), carry more valued resources and exercise
greater power (Lin, 2002). Burt (2004)‘s case study of managerial networks in a large American
electronics company reveals that managers with more structural holes—a form of social capital--
have more influence and control, which are demonstrated by higher compensation, more positive
performance evaluations, and ideas being evaluated as more valuable. Third, strong social norms
and beliefs derived from social capital encourage compliance and reduce the need for formal
control (Ostrom, 2015). Boix and Posner (1998), for example, argue that social capital helps
reduce the cost of rule compliance by giving citizens more optimistic expectations about the
behavior of their fellow citizens.
From this standpoint, social and political ties and networks formed by NGO executives
with other NGOs and government officials create social capital. By accumulating and
maintaining social capital, NGOs attain information, control, and solidarity benefits, which are
all conducive to NGO performance.
Specifically, NGOs‘ ties with their peers can help mobilize useful resources and develop
an organizational field in which extensive learning occurs. NGOs in China lack general formal
institutional support; network ties thus become convenient conduits through which resources,
such as funding, facilities, and personnel, flow across organizational boundaries. Through peer
networking, eNGOs can share among themselves a wide range of information, including policy
alerts or regulatory changes, potential funding opportunities, third-party reports on staffing or
performance problems with an organization, or early warnings on unusual incidents that might
potentially harm their organizations. Network ties can also provide examples of strategic
alternatives. As W. R. Scott (2008) describes, network connections provide organizations with

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"information regarding the ways in which other organizations are dealing with one or another
problem" (p. 143). This learning process constitutes one of Powell and DiMaggio (1983)‘s
explanations for organizational homogeneity—mimetic pressure—that managers look for
successful models to learn how to effectively deal with critical environmental contingencies. Ru
and Ortolano (2009), for example, find that many eNGO leaders are highly connected with one
another and with international NGOs, and these connections are conduits for diffusing widely
accepted NGO management practices (e.g., fundraising, project management, staff and volunteer
recruitment) among Chinese eNGOs. Wu (2013) also argues that grassroots eNGOs in China are
essentially nurtured by the networks of peer organizations and activists, from whom they can
draw on mutual support and learn successful management and advocacy practices.
H4: ENGOs’ peer networking is positively associated with their organizational development.
NGOs‘ ties with the government can be regarded as an informal governance mechanism
for coping with the absence of a formal and reliable system of laws and regulations. In China,
there is limited level of transparency, and the government is less tolerable of civic associations
and organized assistance; under these circumstances, political networking can reduce barriers to
participation ―by opening channels for censored materials to circulate, diffusing the risks of
association and, most broadly, substituting for a public sphere‖ (Sullivan & Xie, 2009; Vala &
O'Brien, 2007, p. 80). Through extensive networking with government officials, NGOs can gain
privileged access to insider knowledge and information, preferential opportunities to government
contracts, and enhanced legitimacy. Political networking facilitates communication between
NGOs and the government. Furthermore, through political networking, NGOs can grasp the
subtle, nuanced, and sometimes, conflicting views that government officials hold. They can take
advantage of ambiguous rules and regulations and push fuzzy and frequently shifting political

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lines wherever possible (Spires, 2011a). Government officials may get to know what NGOs are
doing and provide a more enabling environment for NGO development. Wu (2013)‘s
comparison of NGOs in Guangdong and Guangxi illustrates that extensive networking with local
governments helps promote more collaborative and benign NGO-government relationships. In
addition, political networking enables NGOs to collaborate more with government agencies in
specific programs to promote environmental protection. Embedded in a semi-authoritarian
context that restricts, but sometimes tolerates, civil society, NGOs need to navigate uncertain
political waters and identify appropriate strategies for survival (Ho & Edmonds, 2007). By
engaging government officials, NGO leaders can establish a positive relationship with the
government in which the former can gain legitimacy and political influence granted by the state,
and the latter contacts with civil society and potential performance credit (Ho, 2007; Spires,
2011a; Teets, 2013). Ho (2007) argues that eNGOs‘ informal ties with the party-state have
enabled them to gain considerable political leverage and play an increasingly critical role in
environmental governance.
H5: ENGOs’ political networking is positively associated with positive engagement with the
government.
Data and Methods
Measurement
Managerial Networking
Various measures exist to capture executives‘ networking ties. One line of research uses
the name-generator approach (Valente, 2010), which asks respondents to name their contacts.

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However, this approach was often found to be ineffective in field studies because managers often
consider their contacts as business secrets and refuse to disclose them (Peng & Luo, 2000). Some
studies operationalize politically connected firms as those with members of their top
management who are former government officials, or delegates to the People‘s Congress or the
People‘s Consultative Conference19 (Ang & Jia, 2014; Hongbin Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou,
2008). This measure captures the status of organizational members rather than organizational
action seeking to build ties. A more widely used measure of managerial networking in public and
business management research is based on perceptions of top managers who are asked to assess,
on a Likert scale, their networking frequency with other organizations and government officials
(Hicklin et al., 2008; Johansen & LeRoux, 2012; Haiyang Li & Zhang, 2007; Luo et al., 2012;
Park & Luo, 2001; Peng & Luo, 2000). Following this approach, we asked respondents to
describe the extent to which they have interacted with other NGOs and various levels of
government agencies over the past three years. This is measured on a scale of 1-5, where 1=
―seldom in contact,‖ 2= ―yearly,‖ 3= ―monthly,‖ 4= ―weekly,‖ and 5= ―daily.‖
Peer networking is defined as interactions with other NGOs. It is a single item measure
on how frequently eNGOs communicate with each other. The mean for this measure is 2.44,
representing a frequency somewhere between yearly and monthly contact. Political networking
refers to interactions with government agencies at the district, municipal, and provincial levels.
This variable consists of three items, with each item representing one level of government. Its
Cronbach‘s alpha is .76, suggesting a reasonable level of internal consistency. Principal factor
analysis indicates that the three items load on a single factor, with an eigenvalue of 2.04,
explaining 67.92 percent of the variation. Its mean is 1.46, with a standard deviation of 0.59.

19
These are the two political organs at the national and local levels that parallel legislatures in democracies.

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Compared to peer networking, eNGOs network less with government officials. In addition, the
correlation between peer networking and political networking is 0.58, indicating that the two
variables capture different aspects of networking behavior.
NGO Performance
We asked eNGO executives to report their perceived effectiveness on six items:
improving communications with the government, collaborating with the government to facilitate
environmental protection, making strategic decisions, increasing organizational funding,
promoting the organizations‘ social recognition, and enhancing organizational capabilities and
performance. These items are measured on a scale of 1-5, where 1= ―not at all effective,‖ and 5=
―very effective.‖ We categorized these six items into two factors, with one measuring eNGOs‘
organizational development and the other their relations with the government. ―Organizational
development‖ consists of four items (Cronbach‘s alpha=0.86): 1) making strategic decisions, 2)
increasing organizational funding, 3) promoting the organizations‘ social recognition, and 4)
enhancing organizational capabilities and performance. ―Positive engagement with the
government‖ consists of two items (Cronbach‘s alpha= .75): 1) improving communications with
the government, and 2) collaborating with the government to facilitate environmental protection.
Although self-reported measures of organizational performance have limitations, they are
commonly used in public and nonprofit management research (Garnett, Marlowe, & Pandey,
2008; Herman & Renz, 1998; Johansen & LeRoux, 2012; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005). Our
research follows this tradition. Although self-reported assessments are potentially biased, other
measures are not without drawbacks (Stewart, Bing, Davison, Woehr, & McIntyre, 2009). In the
case of NGO performance, asking staff to assess overall organizational performance may create

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biased responses for two reasons: first, the staff may not have a comprehensive picture about the
organization‘s performance; second, they may have insufficient knowledge to assess
performance because they have not worked for the organization for long. As the Chinese NGO
sector is emerging, most NGOs are relatively young; NGO staff have high turnover rates (Hsu &
Jiang, 2015) and may be unable to provide accurate assessments on performance. In contrast,
NGO leaders know more about the organization and can assess its performance more accurately.
Thus self-reported data may not necessarily be inferior to other types of data, and it is more
about identifying the right people to make the assessments.
The Regulatory Environment
In the survey, we asked eNGO executives to indicate the extent to which they agree with
the following two statements: 1) my organization faces much administrative interference from
the government; and 2) the government does not have an effective governance system to manage
NGOs, preventing my organization‘s development. These two items are measured on a scale of
1-5, where 1= ―strongly disagree,‖ and 5= ―strongly agree.‖ The Cronbach‘s alpha for the two
items is 0.84, suggesting a high level of internal consistency. Principal factor analysis shows that
they fall into one factor, with an eigenvalue of 1.72, explaining 86.09 percent of the variation.
The two items are averaged and a composite measure of the regulatory environment is created.
Its mean is 2.89, suggesting that most eNGO executives believe that the regulatory environment
is somewhat unfavorable.
Here, we are using a subjective measure of the regulatory environment. Although some
empirical studies question the accuracy of perceptual measures, most agree that objective and
subjective measures of political and institutional environments have their respective advantages

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and disadvantages (K. Yang & Pandey, 2009). Archival measures contain less perceptual bias
and random error, but they may not be able to measure what the research intended to measure. In
contrast, perceptual measures are better able to capture internal psychological processes salient
to decision making and individual behaviors. When studying organizational phenomena, one
may not claim that archival measures are always superior to perceptual ones or vice versa. Rather,
one needs to determine which measure is more theoretically appropriate for the research at hand
(Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993; K. Yang & Pandey, 2009). We believe our measure of the
regulatory environment is appropriate here because we are interested in how NGO executives‘
perception of the regulatory environment affects their managerial action, which involves
information search and decision-making processes.
Government Ties
This is a dummy variable measuring whether eNGO executives are former or current
government officials. It is coded 1 if an NGO executive had work experience in the government,
0 otherwise. Overall, 49 out of 267 eNGO leaders held government jobs before turning to NGO
management.
Government Affiliation
This binary variable measures whether an eNGO is a GONGO or civic organization
20
.
Here, GONGO equals 1, 0 otherwise.

20
As two distinct types of NGOs in China, GONGOs and civic NGOs exhibit different characteristics.
According to our sample, GONGOs on average are older than civic eNGOs. Their average ages are 14.31 and
9.83, respectively. GONGOs often have more staff than civic eNGOs. On average, for a typical GONGO, 28
percent of its funding comes from government support, whereas for a typical civic eNGO, 15 percent of its
funding is from the government.

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Organizational Variables
Organization age is measured by the number of years an eNGO had been in operation as
of 2014—the year of our survey—since founding. Organization size is measured by the natural
log of the size of full time staff. Registration status is a dummy variable measuring whether an
eNGO is registered with the government. It is coded 1 if it is registered, 0 otherwise. Executives‘
education measures the highest educational level an eNGO executive had received. It consists of
5 categories in which 1= ―middle school or below,‖ 2= ―junior college,‖ 3= ―college graduate,‖
4= ―master,‖ and 5 = ―Ph.D.‖ We expect that executives with more education are likely to
network more with both peers and government agencies.
We also include funding diversity in the networking-performance models. Existing
studies have shown that funding diversity is positively associated with organizational
performance because organizations with more diverse funding sources are more capable of
managing risks and buffering against environment uncertainty (D. A. Carroll & Stater, 2009;
Chang & Tuckman, 1994). Following previous research, we measure funding diversity using a
Herfindahl Index (HHI), which is calculated by summing and squaring the proportion of each of
the funding sources reported by the organization. In the survey, we asked each eNGO executive
the proportions of three funding sources (government contributions and grants, donations, and
service revenue) in their average total revenues over the past three years. Funding diversity
ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 0 signaling greater revenue diversity and values closer
to 1 greater concentration. The mean HHI in our data is 0.47.
Organizational location is a binary variable measuring whether an eNGO is based in
Beijing. We expect that eNGOs in Beijing are more likely to network with government agencies

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because they have more resources and are more willing to connect with officials in the central
government. ENGOs in Beijing also tend to network more with their peers too because they need
to form a bigger voice to raise public attention and lobby the government.
Analytical Procedures
We applied several regression models with robust options to test our hypotheses on
managerial networking and its relationships with NGO performance. Models 1 and 2 tested
hypotheses 1-3 for networking with peers and with government agencies. We adopted a
hierarchical procedure to test the relative impact of each construct; Models 1b, 1c, and 1d are
compared with the base Model 1a, which includes only control variables for peer networking,
and Models 2b, 2c, 2d are compared with Model 2a to examine factors associated with eNGOs‘
political networking. Models 3 and 4 tested Hypotheses 4-5 on NGO performance; we included
the antecedent variables on managerial networking as control variables, as these variables may
also be related to NGO performance. The values of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) range from
1.1 to 1.28 for Models 1 and 2 and from 1.24 to 1.4 for Models 3 and 4, indicating no significant
sign of multicollinearity.
Results
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients for the
variables. The correlation matrix shows that both regulatory environment and government ties
are significantly correlated with peer and political networking, respectively (p<.05), but there is
no significant correlation between government affiliation and either peer or political networking.
Table 3.1 also supports our argument on the networking-performance link. ENGOs‘ networking
with other NGOs and with government officials are both significantly correlated with the two

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aspects of organizational performance—organizational development and positive NGO-
government engagement (p<.05).

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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix

Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1
Organizational
Development
3.61 0.74 1 5 1.00

2
NGO-
Government
Engagement
3.72 0.76 1 5 0.71* 1.00

3
Peer
Networking
2.44 1.07 1 5 0.27* 0.32* 1.00

4
Political
Networking
1.46 0.59 1 4 0.22* 0.33* 0.58* 1.00

5
Regulatory
Environment
2.89 0.98 1 5 -0.26* -0.31* -0.36* -0.19* 1.00

6 Gov't Ties 0.18 0.39 0 1 0.31* 0.38* 0.21* 0.18* -0.37* 1.00

7 GONGO 0.56 0.50 0 1 0.15* 0.13* 0.03 -0.03 -0.27* 0.32* 1.00

8
Organizational
Age
12.35 6.62 0 35 0.15* 0.15* 0.03 -0.03 -0.22* 0.28* 0.34* 1.00

9
Organization
Size
1.87 0.98 0 6.22 0.16* 0.01 -0.17* -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.17* 0.27* 1.00

10
Registration
Status
0.77 0.42 0 1 0.17* 0.30* 0.34* 0.26* -0.23* 0.26* 0.27* 0.25* 0.11 1.00

11
Executives'
Education
3.13 0.77 1 5 0.27* 0.21* 0.30* 0.19* -0.44* 0.16* 0.22* 0.28* 0.17* 0.11 1.00

12 HHI 0.47 0.24 0 1 -0.02 0.00 0.27* 0.28* -0.10 0.09 -0.05 -0.12* -0.12* 0.14* 0.00 1.00

13
Organization
Location
0.15 0.36 0 1 0.07 0.00 -0.14* -0.10 0.10 -0.04 -0.21* 0.07 0.17* -0.14* 0.05 -0.05 1.00
n=267
p<.05

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The Antecedents of Managerial Networking
Table 3.2 models the antecedents of managerial networking. Model 1a through Model 1d
examine factors associated with peer networking. All the models are significant, with F statistics
significant at p<.001. The full model—Model 1d—explains 23.01 percent of the variance in peer
networking.
Model 2a through Model 2d focus on factors associated with political networking. The
full model explains 10.65 percent of the variance in political networking. Compared to the model
on peer networking, Model 2d has less explanatory power.

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Table 3.2 The Antecedents of Managerial Networking
Dependent
Variables Peer Networking Political Networking
Independent
Variables M1a M1b M1c M1d M2a M2b M2c M2d
Regulatory
Environment

-0.28 *** -0.23 ** -0.24 **

-0.07

-0.04

-0.05

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Government
Ties

0.34 * 0.40 **

0.23 ** 0.27 **

(0.15)

(0.15)

(0.08)

(0.08)

Government
Affiliations

-0.24 +

-0.16 +

(0.14)

(0.08)
Control
Variables

Organization
Age
0.00

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01 + -0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Organization
Size
-0.23 *** -0.20 *** -0.21 *** -0.19 ** -0.05

-0.04

-0.04

-0.03

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

Organization
Location
-0.34 + -0.25

-0.24

-0.32 + -0.15 + -0.13

-0.12

-0.18 +
(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.18)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.10)

Executives'
Education
0.48 *** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** 0.35 *** 0.17 *** 0.13 * 0.14 * 0.15 **
(0.07)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.08)

(0.04)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

Constant
1.42 *** 2.72 *** 2.55 *** 2.59 *** 1.09 *** 1.43 *** 1.31 *** 1.34 ***
(0.26)

(0.42)

(0.42)

(0.42)

(0.15)

(0.29)

(0.29)

(0.28)

R-Squared 0.1569 0.2086 0.2207 0.2301 0.0612 0.0732 0.0924 0.1065
F Statistic 15.49 *** 17.40 *** 14.63 *** 14.19 *** 5.73 *** 6.48 *** 7.31 *** 6.96 ***
N=267
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; + p<.10

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In our first hypothesis, we proposed that eNGOs tend to network less with peers when the
regulatory environment is more restrictive. This hypothesis is supported. In other words, when
eNGO leaders perceive regulatory environment as unfavorable to their organizational growth,
they reduce their networking activities with other NGOs (beta=-0.24, p<.01). This finding runs
counter to what resource dependence theory predicts—that managerial networking serves as a
coping strategy for organizations to reduce environmental uncertainty. Rather, it speaks to
institutional theory (Oliver, 1991), which proposes that higher legal coercion and an inhospitable
political environment leads to organizational acquiescence and avoidance, which in our case
means less networking with other NGOs. This finding is supported by our interviews in which
several eNGO leaders expressed their concern about the current restrictive and uncertain
regulatory environment and how it has stifled peer networking. For example, a leader said,
After assessing the potential political risk in participating in the broader environmental
movement like organizing a bunch of eNGOs to stop the government from developing
the coastal area, many eNGOs choose not to participate. There is so much risk involved.
The government does not want to see you organized together. Once you are in, your
organization may face survival problems: you may be shut down, or you may not be able
to pass the annual government review. [Interview A7]
ENGO leaders‘ perception of the regulatory environment is not associated with their
networking activities with government officials. One possible explanation is that regardless of
their perceptions of the regulatory environment, eNGOs usually find it difficult to network with
government officials. Several eNGO executives, for example, mentioned that they seldom
interact with the government because they do not have meaningful access to it (Interview A2 and
B11). Most government agencies (except civil affairs agencies and security departments) do not
know exactly what NGOs do and are indifferent to their work (Interview B1, A14, and B8).
Among those with limited understanding of NGOs, most consider them ―troublemakers‖

85

(Interview B5, B3, A3, and A11). Therefore, many eNGOs are not willing to network with
government officials because what they receive from the government is perfunctory at most.
As expected in Hypothesis 2, government ties are associated with both peer and political
networking (beta=0.4, p<.01; beta=0.27, p<.01, respectively), holding other institutional and
organizational factors constant. In other words, eNGOs with government ties are more likely
than those without to engage in managerial networking. Ex-government officials consider the
state as the best source of resources for their NGOs. Consequently, they choose to develop
alliances with state actors in order to access these resources. Hsu and Jiang (2015), for example,
argue that NGO founders with party-state experience tend to build NGOs around alliances with
government agencies. They also network extensively with other NGOs, too. This finding is
echoed by our interviews during which many NGO leaders said that it is much easier for
someone with government work experience to run an NGO. NGO leaders with such experience
are boundary spanners who can bring to the organization substantial government support, insider
policy information, and potential government subsidies or contracts; they also know how to build
effective partnerships with other NGOs and society at large. For example, the leader of B3 is a
retired government official who, according to his staff, is well connected with officials in water
management and environmental protection and with media reporters and other NGO leaders.
With these resources, this NGO is able to network well with both government and the NGO
community. Teets (2009), for example, documented this organization‘s efforts in collaborating
with government officials and coordinating approximately 30 NGOs to establish the Non-
Governmental Relief Service Center after a major earthquake in Sichuan Province.
Our third institutional variable—government affiliation—is statistically significant at
p<.10 (beta=0.14), weakly supporting Hypothesis 3. Compared to civic eNGOs, GONGOs are

86

less likely to engage in managerial networking. As offshoots of government agencies, GONGOs
have strong support by the government. As one department chief from a GONGO (Interview
A10) in Beijing admits, ―As an organization with strong government background, we can take
advantage of many resources.‖ He is concerned about the upcoming service organization reform,
which requires GONGOs to eventually detach themselves from their supervising agencies, thus
diminishing their government resources and identity (Interview A10 & B2). His concern reflects
the embedded advantages that GONGOs have been enjoying. Thus GONGOs report less
networking with the government, and as semi-government organizations they maintain some
distance from other NGOs. In contrast, civic eNGOs have been institutionally discriminated
against in registration and operation. In order to register, eNGO leaders need to communicate
with government officials to show their eligibility. They also network extensively with their
peers to gain useful information on how to start up and manage the organization. To keep their
organizations running, they need to be well-rounded so that they can gain support from
foundations, government, and the NGO community. Therefore, networking is a strategic tool for
civic eNGOs to mitigate their environmental disadvantages.
Among the control variables, organization size is negatively associated with eNGOs‘ peer
networking (beta=-0.19, p<.01). In other words, larger organizations tend to network less with
their peers. This is consistent with Stinchcombe (1965)‘s argument that smaller organizations are
likely to network more to overcome their liability of newness and smallness. Contrary to what
we expected, Beijing-based eNGOs network less with both their peers and government officials.
This is probably because government agencies in Beijing have higher administrative ranks and
are more difficult for NGOs to gain access to. Our interviews also reveal that eNGOs in Beijing
tend to collaborate with NGOs in other provinces instead of forming a cohesive community in

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Beijing. Executives‘ education is proven to be a significant predictor for both peer and political
networking. Leaders with higher levels of education tend to network more (beta=0.35, p<0.001).
The Performance Effects of Managerial Networking
Table 3.3 presents the regression results for Models 3 and 4, which test the effect of
managerial networking on NGO performance while controlling for institutional and
organizational factors. Model 3a through Model 3c examine the association between the two
aspects of managerial networking and NGOs‘ organizational development. Model 3a explains
16.98 percent of the variance in NGO development. In Model 3c, both networking variables and
control variables are included. In total, they explain 20.28 percent of the variance in NGO
development.
Similarly, Model 4a through Model 4c focus on whether managerial networking has
facilitated NGOs‘ communication with the government and their work in environmental
governance. The full model—Model 4c—explains 27.42 percent of the variance in NGO-
government engagement. Overall, in both Models 3 and 4, the increases in R-squares are
substantial but not dramatic, suggesting that although managerial ties are important, other
institutional and organizational level characteristics such as government ties and executives‘
education are also critical to NGO performance.

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Table 3.3 The Impact of Managerial Networking on NGO Performance
Dependent Variables
Organizational Development Positive NGO-Government Engagement
Independent
Variables
M3a M3b M3c M4a M4b M4c
Peer Networking

0.14 ** 0.11 *

0.13 * 0.06

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.06)

Political Networking

0.10

0.26 **

(0.09)

(0.09)

Control Variables
Regulatory
Environment
-0.07

-0.04

-0.04

-0.10 + -0.08

-0.08
(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

Government Ties
0.45 *** 0.43 *** 0.42 ** 0.55 *** 0.53 *** 0.50 ***
(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.11)

Organization Age
0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Organization Size
0.08 + 0.11

0.11 * -0.03

0.00

-0.01
(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Registration Status
0.14

0.04

0.03

0.38 ** 0.29 * 0.26 *
(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.13)

(0.12)

(0.12)
Executives'
Education
0.17 ** 0.12

0.12 + 0.10

0.05

0.04
(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

HHI
-0.18

-0.29

-0.32

-0.24

-0.35

-0.43 +
(0.22)

(0.21)

(0.22)

(0.22)

(0.23)

(0.23)

Constant
3.06 *** 2.84 *** 2.81 *** 3.53 *** 3.33 *** 3.24 ***
(0.38)

0.38

0.38

(0.35)

(0.37)

(0.36)
R-Squared 0.1698 0.1985 0.2028 0.2244 0.2485 0.2742
F Statistic 9.76 *** 10.13 *** 9.03 *** 12.69 *** 11.16 *** 10.75 ***
N=267
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; + p<.10

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Models 3 support Hypothesis 4, which states that peer networking is positively associated
with NGOs‘ organizational development (beta=0.11, p<.05). Research in business literature finds
that firms‘ networking with their task environment has a positive impact on market expansion,
but not internal operation (Park & Luo, 2001). Our study, however, shows the opposite: NGOs‘
peer networking enhances their internal operation. Through peer networking, eNGOs can share
with one another valuable information and such resources as volunteers, personnel, and facilities.
They can also learn from the emerging organizational field successful management and advocacy
practices. During our interviews, many eNGO leaders highlighted the importance of peer
networking. One leader summarized succinctly, ―to effectively run an NGO, you first need to
know people.‖ (Interview A1) In fact, the eNGO community constitutes a small social circle in
which everyone knows everyone. They go to one another‘s meetings, salons, and activities.
During our interview, these eNGO leaders often asked us whom we had interviewed and kindly
offered to help contact the eNGOs they knew.
In Models 4, eNGOs‘ political networking is positively associated with positive
engagement with the government (beta=0.26, p<.01), supporting Hypothesis 5. More networking
with government agencies at various levels enables both parties to know each other better.
Government officials may eventually learn that NGOs are not troublemakers but potential
helpers in solving entrenched social and environmental problems. NGOs may acquire insider
policy information and government support, and use them for goal attainment. Through political
networking, eNGOs may also enhance their ability to navigate the uncertain political
environment and to partner with the government to facilitate environmental protection. The
following quotation supports this point,

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Our collaboration with the local EPB is quite subtle. It is based on mutual support. As a
social organization, we need the government to help implement environmental policies
and punish polluting firms. The local EPB, on the other hand, have limited staff and
capacity, and they need us to monitor polluting firms and disclose pollution information.
(Interview A15)

The regulatory environment is not associated with either dimension of NGO performance.
Government ties, which are measured by whether eNGO leaders have work experience in the
government, is positively associated with both NGOs‘ organizational development and positive
engagement with the government (beta= 0.42, p<.01; beta= 0.50, p<.001, respectively). Larger
organizations tend to develop better (beta= 0.11, p<.05). Registered organizations are more
likely to have positive engagement with the government (beta= 0.26, p<.05).

Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we examined the dynamics of managerial networking and assessed its
connections to the performance of Chinese eNGOs. We proposed that the regulatory
environment, government ties, and government affiliation combine to affect eNGO leaders‘
managerial networking. We also linked managerial networking to NGO performance,
hypothesizing that two types of networking are associated with NGO performance in different
ways. Based on the data analysis of a nationwide survey of 267 eNGOs and in-depth interviews
in 2014-2015, we found that a more restrictive regulatory environment stifles peer networking.
This finding counters the prediction of resource dependence theory but is consistent with
institutional theory, with the latter arguing that a coercive institutional environment prompts
organizations to adopt avoidance and conformity strategies. The regulatory environment,
however, has no definite effect on eNGOs‘ political networking. One possible explanation is that
regardless of how restrictive eNGO leaders think of the regulatory environment, they avoid

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networking extensively with government agencies due to mutual suspicion. In addition, we found
that eNGOs with government ties are likely to network more with both their peers and
government officials. This is probably because organizations with leaders having government
work experience can access more channels to network with government officials and other
NGOs. Compared to civic eNGOs, GONGOs network less with the NGO community and
government agencies because they already have solid government support. In contrast, civic
eNGOs are more motivated to network in order to broker more resources and support.
We found that managerial networking has varying impacts on different dimensions of
NGO performance. Peer networking is positively associated with eNGOs‘ organizational
development. Through networking with other NGOs, an eNGO can make better strategic
decisions, raise more funds, and enhance their social recognition and organizational capabilities.
On the other hand, political networking contributes to positive NGO-government engagement.
By networking more with government agencies, an eNGO may develop a more benign
relationship with the government and contribute more to environmental protection.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, following Peng and Luo
(2000) and Torenvlied et al. (2013), we assume that managers differentiate their networking
activities with different types of external actors and organizations. We distinguish two aspects of
managerial networking—peer and political networking—with each being related to a specific
type of support from the environment. Our results indicate that the regulatory environment
affects eNGOs‘ networking orientation in varying ways. When the regulatory environment is
restrictive, eNGOs tend to keep to themselves and reduce networking activities with their peers.
However, the regulatory environment does not directly affect eNGOs‘ networking with
government officials. In addition, the impacts of the two types of managerial networking vary

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across the two dimensions of NGO performance. These results suggest the need for scholars to
differentiate these two types of managerial ties, especially when undertaking research in an
authoritarian context where the influence of political and institutional environment is substantial.
Second, our study responds to O‘Toole and Meier (2014)‘s quest for more studies on
management and performance in varying institutional contexts by extending the literature on
managerial networking to an authoritarian setting. Although resource dependence theory has
been the most commonly used theoretical framework for nonprofit studies in the U.S., our study
shows that institutional theory has stronger power in explaining the dynamics of NGO
networking activities in authoritarian settings. Under restrictive and uncertain political
environment, eNGOs do not treat networking as a coping strategy to reduce environmental
uncertainty, but are more concerned about the potential political risks networking may induce. In
an authoritarian state like China where the political environment is generally unfavorable to civil
society and collective action, eNGOs‘ peer networking is often politically suppressed.
Organizations with some kind of institutional embeddedness, such as having leaders with
government work experience or having been established by the government, are more
advantaged politically. It is reasonable to expect that these factors also hold in other similar
authoritarian states. Our study thus opens up a new avenue of research by which scholars can
examine how the broader political and institutional environments affect public and nonprofit
management under authoritarianism.
Third, we were able to identify both the efficacy and limitations of managerial
networking. Networking serves as a strategic tool for improving organizational performance by
securing information, power, and solidarity benefits for the organization. Nonetheless, as Table
3.3 showed, when only control variables were included, the models explained 16.98 percent and

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22.44 percent of the variance in organizational development and positive NGO-government
engagement, respectively; when managerial networking variables were added to the models,
their R-squares increased to 20.28 percent and 27.42 percent, respectively. These are not
dramatic increases, suggesting that although managerial ties are important, other institutional and
organizational level characteristics such as government ties and executives‘ education are also
critical to NGO performance. Therefore, connections alone are necessary but not sufficient for
good performance.
Overall, in this study, we managed to acquire a relatively large and diverse sample in
comparison to those used in the current literature. We also triangulated the quantitative findings
with qualitative data. These efforts represent major methodological improvements over previous
studies on Chinese NGOs, leading to more robust, finer-grained, and more generalizable results.
Although it is generally acknowledged that a vibrant nonprofit sector and civil society are
key elements for a well-functioning open, democratic society, developing these elements in an
existing authoritarian system is tricky business. Political constraints under an authoritarian
regime inevitably shape the development of the nonprofit sector and civil society. NGOs
operating under these constraints are so suppressed that they are afraid of any political risks their
actions may carry; acquiescence and avoidance thus become their strategic response to the tight
political and regulative environment. If the government wants to build harmonious and benign
state-society relations, it needs to realize that NGOs are not troublemakers but potential helpers
in solving entrenched social and environmental problems; it also needs to loosen its control over
civil society and create a more enabling environment for NGOs to grow. On the other hand, if
the NGO sector wants to form a bigger voice, NGOs themselves need to collaborate with and
learn from each other because extensive peer networking helps build NGO capacity. Nonetheless,

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the political restrictions over NGO development seem to have been tightened recently. The
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee issued a new regulation requiring
all domestic NGOs to establish ―Party groups.‖ In 2015, the National People‘s Congress drafted
the ―Overseas NGO Management Law,‖ according to which, a foreign NGO must find an
appropriate supervising agency prior to registration. In addition, domestic NGOs are not allowed
to accept any funding from unregistered foreign NGOs or to conduct activities on their behalf.
Further, the proposed law transfers responsibility for the registration and supervision of foreign
NGOs from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the Ministry of Public Security. It gives the police
considerable and unchecked power, allowing them to vet an NGO‘s work plans, annual reports,
audits, bank accounts, funding sources, and personnel information. It remains to be seen how the
increasingly restrictive political environment is going to affect NGO development and
networking.
Our study has several limitations. First, due to the cross-sectional nature of our data set,
we were unable to claim that the statistical associations between managerial networking and
NGO performance are causal. It is possible that executives at better-performing NGOs have
more resources and are more attractive, leading to more networking than those at less successful
NGOs. Given this inherent limitation, we used Mplus program—statistical software used to
conduct SEM—and performed structural equation modeling with a MLM estimation method. We
found that managerial networking leads to NGO performance, but not the other way around. This
suggests that the relationships between managerial networking and NGO performance are causal
to some extent. Second, we relied primarily on perceptual measures of managerial networking
and performance variables, and were unable to collect archival data, calling into question the
objectivity of the analysis. But the widespread use of perceptual measures in public management

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research and the informal nature of managerial ties suggest that subjective measures will
probably continue to be used in future studies. Thus, the issue is not to denigrate the use of
perceptual measures but to suggest ways to enhance the reliability and validity of these measures.
Third, although we touched upon the limitations of managerial networking, we were unable to
identify its costs and benefits and to examine under what circumstances the former outweigh the
latter. For future research, one may seek to investigate when managerial networking is effective
and when it creates more burdens than help. Lastly, scholars have argued that as the Chinese
society modernizes and government control lessens, the significance of political connections will
decline (Guthrie, 1998). Nee and Opper (2010), for example, find that political connections
played a more important role for business success in China when the market was under tighter
government control, and their importance has diminished after the development of a more
competitive product market. It is unknown whether this holds true for the NGO sector. For future
research, scholars may collect longitudinal data and examine the evolution of managerial
networking and its changing effect on NGO performance.

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Chapter 4 The Performance Implications of Leadership Succession

Leadership succession, defined as the replacement of key officials, is an event that
almost all organizations confront at some stage of their life cycle (G. A. Boyne, James, John, &
Petrovsky, 2011; Dyck, Mauws, Starke, & Mischke, 2002). In some cases, where the incumbent
of a leadership position dies, retires, or resigns, succession is something that is forced upon an
organization. In other cases, where the incumbent is fired, promoted, or relocated, succession
can be predicted and planned. Regardless, succession is inevitable. A smooth and successful
transition is critical to an organization‘s performance and sustainability; conversely, a failed
attempt in transitioning its leadership is detrimental to the organization (Balser & Carmin, 2009;
G. R. Carroll, 1984; Haveman, 1993). How to make successful leadership transitions thus
becomes particularly important.
While not everyday occurrences, leadership succession has been quite common. A 2002
study of 119 community foundations, for instance, found that 55.3 percent of the executives
expected to transition in the next five years. A 2004 survey sponsored by the Annie E. Casey
Foundation found that 57 percent of 2,200 nonprofit organizations had experienced a transition
during the ten years before 2009 (Adams, 2004). As Tierney (2006) points out, as baby
boomers retire, leadership change has become a serious challenge in the nonprofit sector.
However, theoretical and empirical research on leadership succession is thin. As stated
by G. Boyne and Dahya (2002), leadership succession is a new academic territory waiting to be
explored. Among the few exceptions, Block and Rosenberg (2002), for example, argue that as

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nonprofits grow, some may eventually suffer from ―founder‘s syndrome‖, with the founders
exercising too much power and influence over the organizations. They propose that a healthy
and viable governance structure where founders can step away and professional executives take
over is necessary. Hernandez and Leslie (2001) present a case study of a human service
nonprofit transitioning its leadership from a charismatic founder to a more professional
executive director. Their story shows that this organization has encountered serious resistance
and obstacles during its transition process. Similarly, Balser and Carmin (2009) illustrate the
identity crisis that ensued among staff members when the founder of Friends of the Earth, a
nonprofit environmental organization, stepped down.
Overall, from these anecdotes and descriptive case studies, we know that when facing
leadership transition—a critical managerial junction—nonprofits oftentimes experience
resource deficits, power resistance, and identity crises. However, what we do not know is how
this process unfolds and how it affects nonprofit performance. This paper attempts to fill a gap
in the literature by addressing the following research question: What are the mechanisms
through which leadership succession affects nonprofit performance?
To examine the succession-performance link, I draw on insights from life cycle,
resource dependence, and institutional theories and conduct a comparative case study of
environmental NGOs (hereafter eNGOs) in China. Chinese eNGOs represent an interesting case
for studying leadership succession. Theoretically, the study of eNGOs helps highlight the
effects of contextual variables—internal structures and external environments—on NGO
leadership succession and performance. Practically, it offers meaningful insights on leadership
transition. Founded in the 1990s, many eNGOs have played a pioneering role in the NGO sector
in China. These organizations were often led by such aspiring leaders as journalists, academics,

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and ex-government officials who played a critical role in organizational founding and
development. As these leaders step down, succession becomes an issue, and organizational fates
are unknown. Therefore, examining leadership succession within eNGOs and determining
critical elements leading to their post-succession performance have broad and important
managerial implications—it helps NGOs that are experiencing or will experience leadership
succession to be better prepared for these events.
Data analysis from in-depth interviews shows that the fit between pre-succession
conditions and successor actions affects post-succession performance. Here, pre-succession
conditions are defined by NGOs‘ internal structure and external environment. Successor actions
are categorized into three types: compliance, buffer, and influence. Organizational performance
examines how NGOs perform along three aspects: internal morale, organizational funding, and
organizational influence. The findings reveal that when internal structure is premature and
external environment unfavorable, a compliance approach would render satisfying NGO
performance. In contrast, when internal structure and external environment are both in favorable
conditions, an influencer who seek to shape organizational values and strategies will produce
better outcomes. A buffering strategy helps mitigate internal conflicts and external threats,
leading to average performance.
In the following, I will first review existing literature on leadership succession and its
performance effects. I then explain how the three theories, including life cycle, resource
dependence, and institutional theories, help guide my research. After that, I will briefly
introduce the focus of this study—Chinese environmental NGOs—by explaining their broader
political environment and defining developmental characteristics. Data and findings are then
presented. I conclude by proposing the theoretical and practical implications of the study.

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Theoretical Framework
The study of leadership succession can be traced to the 1940s when Max Weber
discusses the transformation of authority from charismatic leaders to a more routinized and
bureaucratic leadership within organizations (Weber, 1947/2009). Since then, research on this
topic has been increasing. Scholars have sought to understand why leadership succession occurs,
what patterns it has, and how it affects organizational performance (Dyer & Handler, 1994;
Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Wortman, 1994).
Among studies on the succession-performance link, three arguments exist. The first
proposes a succession-adaptation argument, meaning that succession provides a conduit for
external information and enables an organization to become better attuned to environmental
demands (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Singh, House, and Tucker (1986), for example, find that
chief executive succession improves the rate of organizational survival. Virany, Tushman, and
Romanelli (1992) argue that executive succession can fundamentally alter the knowledge, skills,
and interaction processes among senior managers, improving their capacity to examine and act
on changing environmental conditions.
In contrast, a second group of scholars proposes a succession-crisis hypothesis. They
argue that succession diminishes organizational performance because it disrupts work routines,
interrupts command, and increases employee insecurity (Gouldner, 1954; Grusky, 1960, 1963).
G. R. Carroll (1984), for example, studies the dynamics of publisher succession in newspaper
organizations and finds that their death rate increases in the period following founder
succession. Similarly, Dyck et al. (2002) present an in-depth analysis of a failed succession in a
small family-owned firm and conclude that sequence, timing, baton-passing technique, and
communication are important to succession.

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The third argument lies somewhat in between the adaptation and crisis propositions. It
shows that succession does not have a definite impact on organizational performance because
managerial action is purely symbolic (Meindl, 1995; Pfeffer, 1981). Daily and Dalton (1992),
for example, study founder succession and find no difference in financial performance between
firms managed by founders and those managed by non-founders. Thus, it is not succession, but
organizational structure and external forces that substantially influence organizational
performance.
To summarize, prior research on leadership succession and organizational performance
is equivocal, and despite the volume of the research, it has several limitations. First, almost all
studies examine business firms; very few have focused on the similar phenomenon in NGOs in
which leadership succession has been a common occurrence with significant performance
implications. Most firms are often well established, with structures more formalized and rules
more institutionalized. In contrast, most NGOs are small and informal; leaders play a critical
role in defining organizational strategies and directing their development. When leaders leave a
small NGO, they take along a great deal of tacit operational and organizational knowledge,
exposing the NGO with higher risks. As new leaders assume their positions, they bring with
them new modes of actions and new priorities. Thus, each succession event may restart the
NGO‘s ―liability of newness‖ clock (Haveman, 1993). Thus, leadership succession within
NGOs merits more scholarly attention. Second, existing studies have generally assumed that
leadership succession is an instantaneous event that comes and goes very quickly (except for
example Morris, Williams, Allen, and Avila (1997) and Handler (1994)). Very few have looked
at the actual processes which may stretch over a long period of time. Furthermore, although the
existing literature has specified conditions (e.g., timing, successor origin, context, etc.) under

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which succession affects performance (G. R. Carroll, 1984; Dyck et al., 2002), systematic
theoretical frameworks have rarely been established. In the following, I draw on the life cycle,
resource dependence, and institutional theories to guide the development of a theoretical
framework. Although with divergent focuses, the three theoretical approaches all emphasize the
impacts of internal and external environments on organizational actions. These approaches help
identify the connections between pre-succession contexts and successor actions in NGO
leadership succession.
Organizational Life Cycle
Organizational life cycle theory recognizes the dynamic and changing nature of
organizations. It proposes that all organizations evolve naturally, consisting of several
identifiable but overlapping stages of development (inception, growth, maturity,
decline/revival). At each life cycle stage, they face unique pressures, challenges, and
opportunities in their external and internal environments, and are thus likely to have different
needs, in terms of resources and leadership. A firm founded by an entrepreneur who is
interested in the initial development of a product or a market, for example, may have limited
managerial interests or capacities (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). Therefore, leadership changes
are inevitable and necessary, and the goal is to find the best fit between development stages and
leadership skills and actions.
As Table 4.1 shows, at the start-up stage, nonprofits are controlled by founders who are
sole decision makers, but as they grow, a division of labor begins, and internal and external
environmental demands require higher management capacities. Once nonprofits enter the
maturity stage, well-rounded professional managers are needed. Therefore, leadership

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succession is an event that confronts all NGOs at a certain stage of their life cycle. The match
between leadership actions and development stages is key to NGO success.

Table 4.1 Development Stages in Organizational Life Cycle
Start-up Growth Mature Decline/Death
Leadership
Founder-controlled,
sole decision-
making
Begin division of
labor;
Management facing
both internal and
external demands
Need for well-rounded
executive director;
sometimes ―founders‘
syndrome‖
Founders likely to
leave; major conflict
within the
organization

Reference: Simon and Donovan (2001)

Resource Dependence Theory
Resource dependence theory offers a compelling rationale as to why leadership
succession influences organizational performance (Pfeffer and Salancik (2003). It suggests that
organizations operate in an open system and are constrained by a network of interdependencies
from the external environment. These interdependencies create risk and uncertainty, which in
turn affects performance. To reduce uncertainty, organizations seek to form linkages with
important sources of external actors (Pfeffer, 1972) which buffer organizations from
environmental fluctuations (Thompson, 2011).
Resource dependence theory highlights the pivotal role top managers play. According to
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), in order to minimize environmental dependencies, managers can
take five actions: mergers/vertical integration, joint ventures, political action, executive

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succession, and board interlocks. In illustrating the application of resource dependence theory
to public management, Malatesta and Smith (2014) propose that nonprofits may use merging,
forming alliances, and coopting to obtain critical resources. These actions are all aimed at
aligning organizational behavior with the environment. From this perspective, nonprofit leaders
play a fundamental role in navigating the external environment and managing dependencies,
and the extent to which they define environmental demands and strategically respond to those
demands affect organizational performance.
Institutional Theory
Similar to resource dependence theory, institutional theory also highlights the influence
of external environment on organizational behaviors, but it focuses more specifically on the
pressures and constraints of the institutional environment. According to this theory,
organizations seek to obtain stability and legitimacy by adhering to external rules and
expectations from the state and the society. Thus, the institutional environment has a profound
influence on organizational structures and actions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991).
Organizations, in turn, respond to institutional pressures by adopting strategies like acquiesce,
compromise, avoid, defiance, and manipulation.
Nonprofit organizations are subject to influences from the government. In the U.S., for
example, government funding affects nonprofit advocacy (Mosley, 2012). In authoritarian
regimes like China, NGOs focusing on what government considers sensitive activities, such as
labor rights, face political crackdown. From this standpoint, the extent to which an NGO can
accommodate political and institutional pressures affects its performance.

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Internal Structure:
* Founder Influence
* Board
* Professionalization
External Environment:
* Task environment
* Political environment
Fit
Condition Action Outcome
Internal Moral
Organizational
Funding
Organizational
Influence
Comply: obeying rules
and accepting norms
Buffer: lessening or
moderating turbulence
Influence: shaping
values and strategies
To summarize, organizational life cycle theory highlights the dynamic and evolving
nature of organizations and the match between their internal structures and developmental
stages. Resource dependence and institutional theories emphasize the influence of external
environments, both task and institutional, on organizations; to respond to external
environmental pressures, organizations may take various actions, such as compliance or
manipulation. Although these theories are not necessarily related to leadership succession, they
provide meaningful insights for studying the issue. Guided by these theories, I systematically
analyzed data collected from in-depth interviews and developed a theoretical framework for
leadership succession and NGO performance (see Figure 4.1).

As Figure 4.1 shows, when examining the succession-performance link, three key
themes merit attention: succession contexts, successor actions, and post-succession outcomes.

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Succession contexts describe an NGO‘s internal conditions and external environments before
leadership succession. Internal structure examines the structural characteristics within an NGO;
it is captured by the influence of founders, the role of the board, and the degree of
professionalization. External environment consists of both task and institutional environments.
Successor actions are the actions taken by the successors. My data analysis reveals that these
actions fall into three different categories: compliance, buffer, and influence. Post-succession
outcomes describe how an NGO performs along three aspects: internal morale, organizational
funding, and organizational influence. I propose that the fit between pre-succession conditions
and successor actions affects NGO performance. Below I draw on the in-depth interviews and
other supporting data to explain each element in the framework in detail.

Research Setting
Before explaining how leadership succession affects NGO performance, it is necessary
to briefly introduce the broader political and institutional environment for Chinese NGOs and
their development.
Chinese NGOs have experienced a tremendous growth in the past two decades. The
number of registered NGOs has increased from 4,446 in 1988 to 547,000 in 2013 (Bureau of
Social Organization Administration 2015). They have been active in such areas as social
welfare, disaster relief, HIV/AIDS prevention, and environmental protection. This significant
growth originates from the changing socio-economic terrain and the increasing political
opportunities. Well-educated professionals, such as lawyers, news reporters, and business
owners, have led the development of NGOs; they have gained widespread support from the
larger society (Spires et al., 2014). Moreover, the policy process has become increasingly

106

pluralized, which creates opportunities for savvy policy entrepreneurs like NGO leaders to
carve out spaces for survival and participation (Mertha, 2009).
Despite these positive signals, however, NGOs still operate in a precarious position.
Some government officials consider NGOs a security threat. They have developed a set of
sophisticated tools to monitor and control the development of NGOs (Kang & Han, 2008; Teets,
2013). Controlling registration, requiring a sponsoring agency, and imposing pressures on
certain NGOs‘ financial and personnel arrangements are typical examples. In addition to the
unfavorable political environment, NGOs face other challenges. The lack of resources, such as
financial support, social recognition, and a large constituency, has to somewhat limited NGOs‘
capacity to act independently and influentially.
With these constraints, Chinese NGOs exhibit unique characteristics. A defining one is
their informal structure. Compared with civic associations in the West, which are often part of
an established institutional arena for facilitating collective action, civic NGOs in China are
often built informally around critical leaders. Xie and Mol (2006) distinguish informal
organizations from formal ones based on three dimensions (see Table 4.2). In the former, the
distinction between insiders and outsiders is unclear, flexible, and dynamic. Actors who
originally do not belong to an NGO may easily get involved in its activities or even work for it
for a short period of time. Second, due to the fluid and dynamic boundary among members and
non-members, responsibilities of individual members are not defined clearly. NGOs usually do
not have a solid membership system; they also do not have professional departments and tasks
in place. Lastly, in informal organizations, mechanisms for internal decision making is absent
or poorly established.

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Table 4.2 Characteristics of Formal and Informal Organizations
Formal Organizations Informal Organizations
Group
boundaries
Clear Unclear
Responsibilities/
position
specification
Clear Unclear
Relationships
among members
Defined by regulations and
internally institutionalized
Defined by rules in moral
sense
Reference: Xie and Mol (2006)

Within these informal, young, and immature NGOs, leaders are particularly important
because they not only are responsible for bringing in resources but also represent the identities
of the organizations. As one NGO practitioner said, ―leaders have special resources, special
influence, and special status, which equip NGOs with unique conditions in founding and
development.‖ The fact that leaders are critical is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it
facilitates the founding and development of NGOs in China. On the other hand, it makes
leadership succession difficult. As the above leader commented, ―as many NGOs rely heavily
on leaders with special resources, they experience great difficulties when transitioning
leadership. When leaders leave, they may experience a serious shock or even collapse.‖
Overall, as an emerging field, Chinese NGOs are informal and immature in nature. It
explains why it is difficult to build long-lasting civic organizations in China. In order to move
toward the next stage, and for civic associations to persist, leadership succession is critical: only
by successfully transforming its leadership and building formalized structures and
institutionalized rules within the organization can an organization continues to survive and
grow. However, leadership succession is not easy, and the performance effects of leadership

108

succession vary across organizations. The comparative case study below clearly illustrates this
point.
Data and Methods
To examine leadership succession and its performance implications, I employ a
qualitative approach, which is appropriate for two reasons. First, the leadership changes
observed in an organization constitute a complex process in which the dynamics were not
immediately apparent. Such dynamics are best captured through in-depth interviews by which
the transition processes and contributing factors can be asked. Second, although studies on
leadership succession are abundant, most have focused on for-profit firms, and the theoretical
frameworks developed in the business literature may not be appropriate to examine similar
phenomena in the nonprofit sector. Therefore, given the scant research and limited theoretical
understandings on nonprofit leadership succession, the primary motivation for my study is to
use case-based, empirical evidence collected from field research to explore the mechanisms
through which leadership succession affects nonprofit performance.
Data Sources
The primary source of the data comes from a larger project in which I conducted thirty-
nine in-depth interviews with leaders of selected eNGOs in major cities in 2014-2015. Contacts
were gathered through multiple sources, including snowball sampling, other researchers‘
referrals, and personal connections. Prior to the interview, I developed an interview protocol,
which covered several topics, including founding and registration processes, leadership
transitions, organizational development, and performance. I solicited additional information as
needed. During the interview, I asked NGO leaders whether their organizations had experienced

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leadership succession or whether they have some succession planning. If an organization had
leadership succession, I would ask them how the process unfolded, whom the incumbents and
successors were, what professional and education backgrounds they had, and what changes had
occurred in the organizations before and after succession. If an organization had not
experienced one succession event, I would ask leaders to talk about their observations on other
organizations‘ succession and their planning on successfully transitioning leadership. Each
interview lasted about 40 to 100 minutes. The interviews were all recorded and then transcribed.
Among the 39 organizations, six had experienced at least one leadership succession, and
considering the suitability of the cases in illuminating and extending relationships between
succession and performance (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), I chose three NGOs because
compared with other organizations, they constitute ―information-rich‖ cases from which I can
learn a great deal about issues of organizational management and leadership succession (Patton,
1990). These three were founded in 1994, 1995, and 2003, respectively. Two were based in
Beijing, and the third in Chongqing. FON experienced eight succession events; GV and BI each
had one succession. The outcomes of leadership succession in the three organizations vary:
FON eventually developed into a professionally managed, clearly structured, and influential
NGO in China. However, GV experienced great difficulty in securing resources and carrying on
their work immediately after the succession. BI sits somewhat in between. This variation helps
to vividly illustrate the performance implications of leadership succession.
Clearly, having only one interview from each organization is not sufficient to present a
detailed and in-depth case study. To complement the interviews, I collected additional data
from multiple sources (See Table 4.3). The first came from two interviews from a published
book—Oral History for NGOs in China—in which the editor collected 19 interviews, of which

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2 covered the same organizations (FON and BI) that I selected for this study. One was with the
founder of FON, and the other was with the then executive director of BI in 2007. These two
interviews present rich description on the organizations‘ development in the past. The second
source of data is from archival sources, such as organizational websites, annual reports, and
news articles. All these sources combine to help depict a more complete picture of the
succession processes and organizational development. The unit of analysis is each succession
event. The number of succession events across the three organizations totals ten. Thus, I have
ten cases in the study.
Table 4.3 Selected Organizations and Data Sources
A —FON B —BI C —GV
Location Beijing Beijing Chongqing
Founding year 1994 2003 1995
Data from
various sources
• Interview with the
current ED
• Annual report
(online)
• Interview with the
founder (book)
• Official website
• News articles
• Other online
information
• Interview with a
project manager
• Interview with an
ED (book)
• Official website
• News articles
• Other online
information
• Interview with the
current ED
• Interview with the
founder
• Official website
• News articles
• Online information

Data Analysis
To facilitate data analysis, I used the constant comparative method. This method,
together with theoretical sampling, forms the core of qualitative analysis in the grounded theory
approach (B. Glaser & Strauss, 1967; B. G. Glaser, 1965; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The main

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intellectual tool for this method is comparison, which almost runs through each stage of the data
analysis, including categorizing, coding, delineating categories, and connecting them.
I began the analysis by identifying the initial concepts in the data and grouping them
into categories (open coding). By doing so, I specified the conditions, actions, and outcomes of
each succession event. I then summarized the core of all succession events, trying to develop a
conceptual profile for each of them. Next, I engaged in axial coding, wherein I searched for
relationships between and among categories developed in open coding. This process helped
assemble the categories into higher-order themes. Finally, I gathered similar themes into several
overarching dimensions that make up the basis of the emergent framework. For example, codes
on morale, funding, and organizational influence are all aspects of organizational performance.
The analysis is not linear, but, instead, formed a ―recursive, process-oriented, analytic
procedure‖ (Locke 1996, p. 240) that continued until I had a clear grasp of the emerging
relationships.

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2
nd
Order Themes
Selected 1
st
Order Codes
Internal
Structure
Founder influence
We have a very important leader who transcends the levels of
governance and management
Board We have a group of responsible board members.
External
Environment
Professionalization
Task environment
Political environment
Performance
Internal Moral
Organizational
Funding
Organization
Influence
We don‘t have a professional fundraiser
We worked with other NGOs to advocate for social and
policy change.
We were forced by the Ministry of Civil Affairs to fire a
leader because his actions irritated the government.
The whole organization was filled with frustration and
suspicion.
Recently, we rejected several donors because their
requirements are not consistent with our mission.
Up until now, we have proposed 17 environmental public
interests litigation, of which 12 were filed.
Aggregate
Dimensions
Successor
Actions
Comply
I may do some minor adjustments, but I won‘t change these
programs
Buffer
He first cut expenses and programs in the first few months.
He then tried to save the organization from turbulence.
Influence
He proposed to focus on the theme of livable cities. He then
changed the funding and structure to suit this purpose.

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Findings
Figure 4.2 is the precursor to the theoretical framework presented earlier. It shows the
three main themes emerged from the analysis. Internal structure captures the structural
characteristics inside an NGO. External environment examines the conditions outside the
organization. Successor actions categorize the actions successors take into three types:
compliance, buffer, and influence. Organizational performance examines the performance
implications of leadership succession. It consists of three different aspects, including internal
morale, organizational funding, and influence. Below I will explain each theme in detail.
Internal Structure
Founder influence. Founders are the initial architect of NGOs‘ strategies and
development. In this role, they define the organizations‘ mission, structure, and behavior for
other members to follow. FON was founded by a famous historian with a shining family
background (son of two distinguished architects and grandson of a renowned reformer in the
Qing dynasty). A member of the Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference, he used his
connections to protect the organization and convey policy ideas. His status enabled him to
successfully achieve domestic and international recognition and funding for FON. As a
traditionalist, he did not agree with the eye-catching actions favored by Greenpeace. Instead, he
believed that planting green seeds in people‘s hearts was a more practical way to better
environment. Thus, raising environmental awareness was the approach that FON used. As one
interviewee said, ―As a founder, his opinions and actions determine the directions of our
organization.‖ Similarly, GV was founded by a veteran who had personal connections with the
government and brought vital resources and recognition to the organization. A staff admitted,
―given his fame and image, not everyone can take on his role…he passed away so quickly, and

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the charisma and resources he brought in suddenly disappeared.‖ The fact that NGOs are
founded by charismatic founders with critical political and social capital is not uncommon.
Among all the organizations I interviewed, over 70 percent of founders are such social elites as
ex-government officials, journalists, or lawyers.
Founders‘ influence varies across organizations and across development stages within
an organization. At FON, the founder chose to step out of the organization. His influence was
very strong in the first several succession events, but it worn away eventually as the
organization grew. In contrast, at GV, the founder had been dominant until his death. The
degree of founders‘ influence affects how NGOs perform after leadership succession. When
founder influence is strong, succession is difficult, and performance may be compromised.
Board. Boards of directors play a critical role in NGO governance. They set
organizational goals, monitor executive directors‘ performance, and bring in external resources.
The three organizations all have a board. Yet, the influence of boards varies across
organizations; in each organization, it varies across time. FON used to have a board with over
20 members, but it was not functioning effectively. Eventually, the size of the board got smaller.
In 2007, 17 members existed, and in 2010, there were 9 members sitting on the board. A
functioning and effective board emerged. As the executive at FON claimed, ―we have a group
of responsible board members. They are experienced and knowledgeable, and they know
exactly what they should do.‖ In contrast, the board at BI played a minor role. Board members
rarely gathered to discuss organizational issues. The founder made all the important decisions
solely. GV has a board too, but its function sat somewhat in between. Board members were not
as involved as those at FON, but they provided necessary counsel as needed. The current

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executive director at GV told us that she would seek advice from board members when making
decisions.
The extent to which a board functions affects post-succession performance. When a
board is effective, with board members setting organizational strategies and monitoring
executives‘ actions, successors may consult with board members when making decisions. This
may lead to better fit between successor actions and organizational conditions, producing good
NGO performance.
Professionalization. Professionalization examines the extent to which an NGO has a
division of labor and specification of responsibilities and positions. FON did not have a clear
structure in its early years. The founder was responsible for raising funds, recruiting staff and
volunteers, and managing relations with the environment. As the founder eventually stepped
down and the board became effective, the organizational structure became clearer. They have
an executive director; they also have professional teams managing different events, such as bird
watching, garbage collection, and environmental education. BI is not professionalized. As the
project manager admitted, ―we don‘t have a professional fundraising staff. Most of our staff are
young girls with little experience and few resources. They do not know how to do it.‖ Office
space is a problem too. GV‘s office was provided by a professor at a university, but it was taken
away. The organization is now renting an apartment. The current executive director at GV also
mentioned that they do not have enough professional staff.
The variation in the degree of professionalization affects post-succession performance.
Successors in more professionalized organizations can quickly figure out the structures and
responsibilities of each position or department within organizations. With this knowledge, they

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can mobilize more resources and staff for effective implementation. Successor #8 was able to
quickly get into his role because FON had established professional departments and tasks when
he assumed leadership. BI did not have a professional fundraiser, and the organization
encountered serious funding deficit soon after its founder‘s departure. Many of its projects were
unable to proceed.
External Environment
Task environment. Task environment examines an NGO‘s relations with donors, firms,
and other NGOs. The three NGOs all have a relatively favorable task environment. As a pioneer
in the field, FON worked extensively with other NGOs in advocating for social and policy
change. They also helped local groups around the country to build their own environment
groups. BI worked with natural conservation bodies and local NGO groups to promote
environmental education. GV helped firms to do environmental impact assessments. Favorable
task environment may buffer the shock brought by leadership succession, mitigating negative
performance. For example, GV had a sudden succession, but its extensive collaboration with
other eNGOs enabled it to continue working on environmental litigation, an agenda promoted
by the predecessor. This consistency sustained GV‘s influence in policy advocacy.
Political environment. Political environment examines the attitudes that the
government has towards NGOs. NGOs operate in an unfavorable political environment,
especially in the late 1990s. In 2003, FON was pressured by the Ministry of Civil Affairs to
expel one of its leaders because he published a book in which he denounced the Communist
Party. To avoid political crackdown, the other leaders fired him. Similarly, BI was planning to
organize an event in a cafeteria but was rejected by the owner last minute because the owner

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was pressured by the security department who considered events like this dangerous.
Nonetheless, the political environment is improving. ―Now if you talk about environmental
problems in public, you would not have a problem. It is not like the old days. The openness of
government officials‘ attitudes and the tolerance they can take from questioning and criticisms
have increased,‖ a leader said.
Successor Actions
The actions that successors take can be categorized into three types: comply, buffer, and
influence.
Comply. Compliance denotes a more passive approach wherein a successor does not
change much his/her predecessor‘s goals, strategies, and policies. Three successors chose to
comply with existing situations. Successor #9, for example, continued the projects that the
founder developed. Successor #10 chose a similar strategy. She said, ―Mr. Wu [founder,
predecessor] has done a great job. Our organization focused on environmental education, public
interests litigation, and environmental impact assessment. I may do some minor adjustments,
but I will not change these focuses.‖
Buffer. Buffering seeks to lessen or moderate environmental turbulence. Three
successors chose this strategy. Facing a series of problems left by his predecessor, successor #3
started with cutting programs and expenses in the first few months of his term. He then
communicated effectively with the staff and the board to help them understand the situation. By
clarifying structures and programs, he was able to buffer the organization from serious
turbulence. Similarly, successor #5 assumed her leadership suddenly. She thus began with

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understanding the situation by studying the strategic plan that the organization just drafted at
that time. She then participated in the revision of the strategic plan.
Influence. Influence is a more active approach. The successor may assess the situation
and redefine the organization‘s agenda and policies. Out of the ten succession events, four
successors took an influence approach. Successor #2, for example, was a passionate idealist
who believed that strong interest groups were the ones who should be responsible for serious
environmental pollution. He thought that fighting against these interest groups was an effective
way to protect the environment. Therefore, as soon as he assumed his position as an executive
director, he started to advocate radically. This radical approach ran counter to what his
predecessor—the founder—had been practicing, a soft approach that focused on environmental
education. Successor #6 redefined the organization‘s strategies and proposed a new issue focus,
livable cities. He then changed the overall funding and organizational structures to suit this
issue focus. Several new themes were proposed, including low carbon development and green
commuting.
Performance Implications
Internal morale. Internal morale looks at the degree of confidence that employees
jointly have in achieving a common goal. Leadership succession may bring down
organizational morale. Immediately after the departure of successor #2, the whole team was
filled with frustration and suspicion. People were worried about the future of the organization.
Succession may also boost organizational morale. Facing crisis, successor #3 adopted a
buffering strategy. He began by cutting expenses and programs. He then clarified organizational

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mission and strategies. His actions took effect. Team morale was restored. The whole staff
became confident again, and the organization was back on its track.
Organizational funding. Succession may cause funding problems. The departure of
leader #2, for example, led to a serious funding deficit. ―We did not even have enough money
to pay for wages and rent,‖ a leader said. Due to lack of funding, the number of employees at BI
decreased from over 10 people to 6. Several employees continued to work for the NGO for a
while, receiving no pay, but they eventually left the organization. GV had trouble raising money
because both the founder and his successor were reluctant to partner with foundations. On the
other hand, succession may increase organizational funding. This is because succession can
help clarify organizational mission and strategies, which may enhance organizational capacity
in fundraising. Successor #8, for example, said, ―We do not have much difficulty in fundraising
now. We can raise four to five million RMB per year. In the past several months, we rejected
over 1 million RMB from foundations because their requirements did not match ours.‖ This
suggests that FON has eventually walked out of the traditional donor-driven cycle and
developed into a mission-driven NGO.
Organization influence. Leadership succession helps promote organizational influence.
One area of influence is involvement in policy advocacy. FON participated in the revision of
environmental laws. It was also very active in public interest litigation. Until 2015, it has
proposed 17 public interest lawsuits, of which 12 were filed. This can be partly attributed to a
series of leadership succession in the organization which helped clarify organizational mission
and strategies and enhance capacity. GV has also helped pollution victims to file lawsuits.
Indeed, given its influence in the field, a district local court in Chongqing invited it to file
litigation cases. A second area of influence occurs within the organizational field. The two

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organizations have helped many local environmental groups in the country to develop into
registered NGOs. FON has fostered over 40 environmental groups nationwide. BI focuses on
working with local conservation groups to promote environmental education, but is has limited
influence in the field.
Linking Leadership Succession and NGO Performance
The analysis of the succession events reveals that the fit between conditions and
successor actions is critical to post-succession performance. Specifically, when an NGO‘s
internal structure is premature, which is manifested by its founder‘s dominant influence, a less
functioning board, and a low degree of professionalization, compliance is the best action that a
successor shall take, buffering the second, and influence the last. An influencer may lead to poor
NGO performance. Successor #2, for example, assumed his leadership in 2002. At that time,
FON was led by its founder who ―transcended governance and management,‖ its board consisted
of over 20 members who were not very dedicated to governance issues, and the NGO did not
have a clear structure of positions and responsibilities. Overall, internal structure was immature.
The successor overlooked these conditions and chose to reform the organization at his will. He
was a passionate idealist who believed that strong interest groups were at fault and fighting
against them would cure environmental problems. He did not take the soft, mild, and subtle
approach that his predecessor, the founder, had been using. Instead, he formed a professional
team and used lawsuits and other radical means to publicly criticize the government. This
approach was strongly felt and opposed by the founder and his followers who believed in the
efficacy of the traditional soft approach. They worried that a radical approach would antagonize
the government and cause political crackdown of the organization. Serious conflicts between the
successor and the founding team arose. The NGO fell into a mess: It was filled with frustration

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and suspicion. Many employees were unsure whether the organization would continue to survive.
Existing programs were disrupted, and several critical donors withdrew their funding. The
NGO‘s influence in environmental litigation and policies issues suddenly disappeared. The poor
performance was caused by a lack of fit between the NGO‘s internal structure and successor
actions. In contrast, a good fit may produce positive outcomes. Successor #8, for example, was
better positioned. After several times of succession, the NGO has eventually established a
modern governance structure: minimal founder influence, an effective board with dedicated
members, and a clear specification of positions and responsibilities within the organization. He
clarified existing programs. He also proposed to cultivate green citizens and influence public
policies, trying to bring the organization to the next stage. Under his leadership, the NGO is able
to jump out of the traditional donor-driven cycle and become more mission-driven. In the first
six months of 2015, it rejected over 1 million potential funding because it did not match its
current focuses. The NGO is also active in policy advocacy. It partners with local environmental
groups to file public interest lawsuits. The organization is the pioneer in the field.
The fit between external environment and successor action is also critical to NGO
performance. Although I included two aspects of the environment (task and political) in the
analysis, I focused more on the political environment. When the political environment is
unfavorable, but a successor chooses an influence strategy, the NGO may be in trouble.
Successor #1, for example, was an influencer. He collaborated with journalists and initiated a
nationwide investigation on environmental problems. His action was influential, but it displeased
local governments. In addition, he published a book on sensitive issues, which antagonized the
central government. The Ministry of Civil Affairs thus forced the NGO to fire him, or the
organization would be shut down. This case illustrates a poor fit between external environment

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and successor actions; this poor fit nearly led the organization to face political crackdown.
Successor #8 faces a more favorable political environment. As he said, ―the government has
become more open to public criticism and questioning. Now, if you talk about environmental
problems with government officials, you may receive positive feedback.‖ His actions are more of
an influence type. Under his leadership, the NGO engages more in public litigation; they also try
to push the government to be more transparent by disclosing more information. These actions do
not bring trouble to the organization; rather, they make it more influential. Therefore, a good fit
between external environment and successor actions may bring positive performance outcomes.
To further determine how the fit between internal and external conditions and successor
actions affects NGO performance, I assessed each theme on a 7-point scale and created
composite measures for internal structure, external environment, and organizational performance,
respectively. Internal structure varies from 1 to 21. External environment ranges from 1 to 14,
and organizational performance 1 to 21. Higher scores along these dimensions suggest that
internal structures are more mature, external environment more favorable and performance better.
To increase credibility, I invited a doctoral student to read all the materials and code each
succession event. Our scoring results were quite consistent. We discussed the inconsistencies in
our scoring and came to an agreement in the end. The Appendix shows the details of the scoring.

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Table 4.4 A Quantitative Evaluation of Each Succession Event
Successor
Actions
Succession
Events
Internal
Structure
(1-21)
External
Environment
(1-14)
Organizational
Performance
(1-21)
Influence
#1 3 4 6
#2 3 4 4
#6 14 9 18
#8 20 11 20

Buffer
#3 3 4 12
#5 11 8 13
#7 17 10 14

Comply
#4 5 5 9
#9 7 7 10
#10 6 6 9

Overall, four successors are characterized as influencers. For each successor, their
conditions and performance were evaluated. The pattern in the scoring suggests that when
internal structure is premature and external environment is unfavorable, an influencer would
cause poor organizational performance. In contrast, when the internal structure is relatively
mature and the external environment favorable, successors who try to shape organizational
values and strategies would create positive performance outcomes.
Three successors employed a buffering approach. When internal structure and external
environment are both poor, a buffering strategy would lead to average performance, but when the
internal structure and external environment are both in good shape, buffering may not be a
superior approach. It would render a medium-level performance, but an influence approach
would lead to better performance than buffering.

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Three successors were compliers. If an NGO‘s internal structure and external
environment are both in bad conditions, a compliance approach would not lead to poor
performance, but an average one.
Discussion and Conclusion
NGO leaders play a significant role in navigating the complex social, institutional, and
political environment and in shaping organizational rules and norms. However, as NGOs grow,
the pressures, challenges, and opportunities they face from the internal and external
environments may differ, requiring different resources and managerial skills. Thus, leadership
succession is inevitable and necessary. Nonetheless, studies on the effects of leadership
succession on organizational performance have been inconclusive and the mechanisms through
which leadership succession affects NGO performance are unclear.
This study contributes to the nonprofit management and leadership literature by
examining the performance implications of leadership succession in Chinese environmental
NGOs. It helps clarify two important questions that scholars have long been interested in and
sought to address. The first question is—do managers make a difference? And the second is, if
managers do make a difference, how does leadership succession affects performance? (Haveman
1993) This study shows that leaders do make a big difference. By comparing and analyzing the
characteristics of ten succession events, the study specified the conditions, actions, and outcomes
of leadership succession. NGOs‘ internal structure and external environment constitute the
conditions or the context of leadership succession. Specifically, the internal structure looks at the
influence of the founder, the effectiveness of the board, and the degree of professionalization
within an NGO. External environment focuses on an NGO‘s task and political environments.
Successor actions are categorized into three types: comply, buffer, and influence. Linking

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conditions and actions together, I propose that the fit between succession contexts and successor
actions determines post-succession performance. When an NGO is characterized by immature
internal structure and unfavorable external environment, a compliance approach wherein the
successor conforms to existing rules and norms leads to good NGO performance, compared to
buffer and influence approaches. In contrast, when the internal structure is more mature and
external environment more favorable, an influence strategy in which the successor shape
organizational values and development produces positive outcomes. The performance effects of
buffering sit in between compliance and influence approaches.
The study also delivers important practical implications. Most nonprofits today are
concerned about sustainability. One of the most fundamental ways to achieve this goal is to
effectively manage leadership succession. NGO founders shall understand that leadership
succession is necessary; knowing when to step down and withdraw influence is critical to
organizational development. When assuming leadership, a successor needs to do a thorough
assessment of the NGO‘s internal structure (including the influence of the founder, the
effectiveness of the board, and the degree of professionalization) and external environment
(including both task and political environment). After this assessment, the successor shall choose
the strategy that fits the conditions the NGO faces. Only by finding the right fit between the
conditions and the actions can a successor bring about positive outcomes to the organization.
A common problem in case study research is the degree to which the findings are
generalizable to a broader sample. This study does not attempt to resolve this issue. Future
studies may build a larger sample and examine whether leadership succession affects NGO
performance.

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Appendix

Succession
events
Internal Structure External Environment
Successor
Actions
Organizational Performance
Founder
Influence
Board Professionalization
Section
Total
Task
Environment
Political
Environment
Section
Total
Internal
Morale
Funding Influence
Section
Total
1 1 1 1 3 3 1 4 influence 1 1 4 6
2 1 1 1 3 3 1 4 influence 1 1 2 4
3 1 1 1 3 3 1 4 buffer 5 5 2 12
4 2 1 2 5 3 2 5 comply 3 3 3 9
5 4 4 3 11 5 3 8 buffer 4 5 4 13
6 5 5 4 14 5 4 9 influence 6 6 6 18
7 6 6 5 17 5 5 10 buffer 5 4 5 14
8 7 7 6 20 5 6 11 influence 6 7 7 20
9 1 4 2 7 2 5 7 comply 3 2 5 10
10 3 1 2 6 3 3 6 comply 3 3 3 9
All dimensions are examined on a scale of 1-7. For example, if a founder plays a critical role before the succession, then founder
influence would be 1, but if founder has minimal influence, then it is 7. If an organization has a strong board, then it is 7, but if the
influence of the board is minimal, it is coded as 1.
Successor actions are categorized into three types: influence, buffer, and comply.

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Chapter 5 Conclusion

In this dissertation, I built and analyzed a large-scale data set, which consisted of an original
nationwide survey and in-depth interviews. I focused on eNGOs, the most active civil society
groups in China, and examined their political advocacy, managerial networking, and leadership
succession. These efforts represent major improvements over previous studies on Chinese NGOs,
both theoretically and methodologically.

Theoretical Contributions
Theoretically, this dissertation not only enriches understanding of NGO development and
state-society relations, but also contributes to the nonprofit literature in general.
Understanding NGO Development and State-Society Relations in China
From the three empirical chapters, the dissertation highlights that NGOs are shaped by
forces from three institutional sources: the party-state, the market, and the NGO industry. The
tug-of-war between these top-down and bottom-up forces shapes the development of NGOs
under authoritarianism.
Consistent with previous studies on Chinese NGOs, the dissertation shows that the party-
state has played a dominant role in NGO development. The government sets up NGO
registration restrictions; it requires NGOs to establish party branches; it also attempts to limit
foreign NGOs‘ activities. Nonetheless, previous studies have been descriptive rather than
analytical. It did not specify the specific institutional factors at play, let alone empirically test the

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degree of their influence. In my study, I propose that the influence of the party-state can be
examined through such variables as the regulatory environment, government funding,
government affiliation, and government ties.
The regulatory environment examines the extent to which 1) NGOs face administrative
interference from the government, and 2) the current NGO management system restricts NGO
development. As the chapter on managerial networking shows, most eNGO executives believe
that the regulatory environment is somewhat unfavorable. A more restrictive regulatory
environment stifles peer networking, but it does not have a definite effect on eNGOs‘ political
networking probably because eNGO leaders avoid networking extensively with government
agencies due to mutual suspicion. Government ties measure whether eNGO leaders have
previous government work experience. The results show that eNGOs with government ties are
likely to network more with both peers and government officials. This is because government
ties help eNGOs access more channels to network with government officials and other NGOs. In
the policy advocacy chapter, government funding is found to be positively associated with
eNGOs‘ advocacy investment, but it does not necessarily lead to more use of either insider or
outsider tactics. Lastly, government affiliation looks at how government-organized NGOs and
civic NGOs differ in policy advocacy and managerial networking. The empirical analysis shows
that GONGOs devote more efforts to policy advocacy because they are considered by
government officials as more trustworthy. As the percentage of government funding increases,
civic eNGOs‘ use of insider and outsider tactics increase more than that of GONGOs‘.
Compared with civic eNGOs, GONGOs also network less with the NGO community and
government agencies because they already have solid government support.

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Overall, the party-state has profound influence on NGO development. However, its
impact is not unidimensional, but rather can be decomposed into various dimensions, including
government funding, government ties, government affiliation, and the regulatory environment.
This dissertation not only identified these important factors, but also empirically tested the
effects of each factor on NGO activities. From this perspective, this study opens up a new avenue
of research.
Furthermore, the dissertation not only highlighted the overt influence from the
government, but also emphasized the impacts of institutional forces from the bottom-up.
Foundations and the NGO industry constitute two major institutional forces. As change agent,
foundations have played a critical role in NGO development. They not only provide financial
support, but also organize conferences, workshops, and lectures to enhance NGO capacity.
However, their grant-making criteria discourage NGOs‘ advocacy investment and tactics. Within
the NGO industry, peer collaborations and networking are prevalent. NGOs work together to
collect signatures and petitions for certain policy issues; they go to each other‘s meetings or
salons to offer intellectual and material support. The extensive collaborations among NGOs help
enhance NGOs‘ organizational capacity and collective influence, and thus are positively related
to policy advocacy. Peer networking is also positively associated with eNGOs‘ organizational
development. Another institutional force is from within the NGO. Leadership succession affects
NGO performance. Disentangling factors contributing to the succession-performance link is thus
critical. In the last chapter, the dissertation endeavored to this effort and found that the fit
between succession contexts and successor actions affects NGO post-succession performance.
In summary, the dissertation argues that Chinese NGOs evolve simultaneously within
three institutional contexts: the party-state, and the market, and the NGO industry. The party-

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state constitutes institutional pressures from the top-down. It can be understood through
analyzing the impacts of institutional factors like government funding or affiliation. Although the
party-state has played a dominant role for a long period of time, its influence is challenged by
institutional forces from the bottom-up. As the Chinese society is getting increasingly open,
more actors stepped in to influence the development of Chinese NGOs. Foundations from both
international and domestic communities have shaped NGO policy advocacy in a way that they
discourage advocacy investment and NGOs‘ use of both insider and outsider tactics. Peer
collaborations among NGOs have mitigated information and resource barriers and enhanced
NGOs‘ mobilization capacity. Therefore, when studying NGO development and state-society
relations in China, we need not only examine the influence of the party-state, but also the
impacts of such bottom-up forces as foundation funding and peer collaborations.
The Study of Chinese NGOs and the General Nonprofit Literature
In the public and nonprofit management literature, scholars have called for more studies
on management issues in various institutional contexts. This dissertation responded to this quest
by extending the nonprofit literature to an authoritarian setting. It examined the application of
resource dependence and institutional theories to eNGOs‘ policy advocacy and managerial
networking activities. In the networking chapter, for example, it showed that although resource
dependence theory has been the most commonly used theoretical framework for nonprofit
studies in the U.S., institutional theory has stronger power in explaining the dynamics of NGO
networking activities in China. Under restrictive and uncertain political environment, eNGOs do
not treat networking as a coping strategy to reduce environmental uncertainty, but are more
concerned about the potential political risks networking may induce. In the advocacy chapter,
eNGOs‘ concerns for managing resource availability drive their advocacy investment, and their

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concerns for managing political risks affects tactical choices. In the succession chapter, a lack of
fit between external environments (both task and institutional) and successor actions leads to
poor performance outcomes. These findings all suggest that context matters. When examining
nonprofits in a different political and institutional setting, one needs to take into account the
profound impacts of contextual variables. This study examined the specific contexts of
authoritarianism and its effects on NGO development. It paved the way for future studies to
develop more general theories about nonprofit operations and development under
authoritarianism.
Methodological Improvements
Existing studies on Chinese NGOs mainly use a case-based approach or focus on groups
in major cities, calling into question the generalizability of their findings. In this dissertation, I
surveyed eNGOs nationwide. The finalized data set consisted of 267 eNGOs, including 150
GONGOs and 117 civic eNGOs. I also conducted 39 interviews with eNGO leaders in five major
cities. Through these extensive efforts, I was able to build the first and most comprehensive
dataset that has ever collected on Chinese NGOs thus far. With this data set, I performed
quantitative data analysis and triangulated the findings with qualitative interviews in the
advocacy and networking chapters. In the succession chapter, I employed a grounded theory
approach and developed a theoretical framework to understand the mechanisms through which
leadership succession affects NGO performance. The robust quantitative analysis, as well as the
systematic analysis of the qualitative data, provides a good and solid example for future research
on Chinese NGOs. These efforts represent major methodological improvements over previous
studies on Chinese NGOs, leading to more robust, finer-grained, and more generalizable results.

132

For future research, one may build upon this rich data set and develop a longitudinal data
set to examine whether systematic change occurs in NGO development and identify factors
contributing to the change.

Conclusion
Overall, by building and analyzing a large-scale data set which consists of an original nationwide
survey and in-depth interviews, this dissertation combined Western frameworks with factors
unique to the Chinese context and examined eNGOs‘ policy advocacy, managerial networking,
and leadership succession. These are all critical issues to NGO development in China. Thus, this
dissertation advanced our understanding of NGO development and contributes to the general
nonprofit literature. it also pushed the study of Chinese NGOs to a more quantitative and
systematic analysis approach, moving NGO studies to a stronger and more robust stage.

133

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Zhan, X., & Tang, S.-Y. (2016). Understanding the implications of government ties for nonprofit
operations and functions. Public Administration Review, n/a-n/a. doi: 10.1111/puar.12515
Zhan, X., & Tang, S. Y. (2011). Political opportunities, resource constraints and policy advocacy
of environmental NGOs in China. Public Administration, 1-19.
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responsive government? Australian Journal of Public Administration, 71(2), 221-232.

150

Appendices
Appendix 1 Survey Instrument

A National Survey of the Development of Chinese Environmental NGOs

Dear Organizational Leaders,

Thank you so much for taking the time to participate in the survey. This study is conducted by
the Department of Management and Marketing at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. The
purpose of the survey is to examine the development of environmental NGOs and their role in
environmental governance. Your responses are very important to our study. Please read each
question carefully and provide the most appropriate answers. It should take approximately 45
minutes to complete the survey. Your responses are anonymous and will be used solely for
academic research. Should you have any questions about this survey and our research, please do
not hesitate to contact me.

Again, thank you so much for your contribution to this important research!

Carlos Wing Hung Lo
Head & Professor
Department of Management and Management
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 2766 7385
Fax: (852) 2765 0611
Email address: mscarlos@polyu.edu.hk

151

Before the survey, please fill out the following information:
Organization Name: _____________________________________________________________
Founding date (year): ________________
Address: ______________________________________________________________________

Instructions:
In the following questions, "your organization" refers to the environmental NGO that you are
currently working at; please choose the answer that best matches your organization.
PART 1 ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION

Q1. Is your organization registered at the government agency?
 Yes
 No (Skip to Q5)

Q2. In what year was your organization registered? ____________________

Q3. As which type of organization is your organization currently registered?
 Social Organization
 Private Non-Enterprise Organization
 Foundation
 Enterprise
 Affiliation to schools/universities
 Registered as other types of organizations (please specify____________)

Q4. At what level of government agency is your organization registered?
 Central government-level
 Provincial-level
 Municipal-level
 County- or district-level

152

Q5. The following descriptions are related to different aspects of NGO registration. Please read
each item carefully and specify the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of them. 1
refers to strongly disagree, and 5 strongly agree.
1
Strongly
disagree
2
Somewhat
disagree
3
Not sure
4
Somewhat
agree
5
Strongly
agree
If registered, an NGO can
attract more participants
    
If registered, an NGO can
be free from government‘s
intervention/disturbance
    
If registered, an NGO can
be more independent so
that it will not be affected
much by shifts in political
winds
    
If registered, an NGO can
build formal relationships
with government agencies
    
Registration is not
necessary; we can
continue operation without
registration
    
If an NGO has already
developed good
relationships with the
government, then it does
not need to register
    
The registration process is
very complicated
    
Having difficulty in
finding a sponsoring
agency is one of the major
obstacles for NGO
registration
    
If registered, an NGO
would receive more
control from the
government
    

153

Q6. Does you organization have a sponsoring agency?
 Yes
 No (Skip to Q9)

Q7. What is the name of your sponsoring agency? _____________________________________

Q8. The following descriptions are related to the relationships between NGOs and the sponsoring
agency. Please specify the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of them. 1 refers to
strongly disagree, and 5 strongly agree.
1
Strongly
disagree
2
Somewhat
disagree
3
Not sure
4
Somewhat
agree
5
Strongly
agree
We submit annual report
to our sponsoring agency;
other than that, we do not
have many interactions
    
Our sponsoring agency
monitors/directs our
organization‘s activities
    
Our sponsoring agency
affects our organization‘s
personnel arrangement
    
Our sponsoring agency
provides useful
information regarding
funding and administrative
support
    
Overall, our sponsoring
agency has provided
sufficient support to our
organizations
    

154

Q9. The follow items describe the conditions that NGOs possibly have. Please check ―Yes‖ if the
items apply to your organization, ―No‖ otherwise.
Yes No
Our organization is a nonprofit that is eligible for
tax exemption.

Our organization has a strategic development plan
Our organization has written organizational rules
Our organization conducts independent financial
audit every year

Our organization often evaluates programs we run
Our organization hires consultants to offer
guidance on organizational development

Our organization has professional/part-time
accountants
scientific/policy analysts
lawyers
a staff managing public
relations

a staff managing/soliciting
donations

at least one staff who can
speak English

Our organization has a website recorded in the
government

Our organization has our own blog/micro-
blog/wechat.

155

Q10. The following table lists the extent to which an NGO discloses its various kinds of
information. Please think about your organization and select the most appropriate answer. For
example, if your organization discloses its financial information to board members and staff, you
can check ―the board‖ and ―staff‖.

Board Staff
Organizational
Funders
Other
NGOs
The
Public
The
Sponsoring
Agency
Government
Agencies
None
of the
above
Use of funds
report
       
Annual report
       
Information
on project
operation and
organizational
performance
       
Organizational
Activities
       

PART 2 STAFF AND FUNDING

Q11. How many paid staff does your organization have? __________
Q12. How many volunteers and part-time staff does your organization have? ___________
Q13. How many members does your organization have? _________

Q14. Over the past three years, how much money does your organization have on budget? (RMB)
 Less than 100,000
 100,000 to 500,000
 500,000 to 1 million
 1 million to 3 million
 3 million to 5 million
 Over 5 million

156

Q15. Over the past three years, overall, how has your organizational budget changed?
 Significantly increased
 Slightly increased
 Did not change much
 Slightly decreased
 Significantly decreased

Q16. Please describe the relative share (%) of the following three funding sources in your
organizational budget over the past three years? (If your NGO does not have funding from a
certain source, please write 0%)
Government funding __________%
(Including grants, contracts, subsidies, and any other sources of support)
Donations ___________%
(Including those from individuals, enterprises, and foundations)
Service revenue ___________%
(Including sale of organizational products, service fees, membership fees, and any other
revenue earned from business activities and investment)

Total 100%

PART 3 ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT

Q17. Does your organization have a board?
 Yes
 No (Skip to Q23)

Q18. How many board members does your organization have? _____________

157

Q19. Does your board hold elections on a regular basis?
 Yes
 No

Q20. How often does your board hold meetings?
 About once a week
 About every two weeks
 About once PER month
 About once per quarter
 About every half year
 About once a year
 Has never held one
 None of the above (please specify_______)

Q21. What kinds of responsibilities does your organizational board have? Please check all that
apply.
 Fundraising
 Financial oversight
 Selecting organizational leaders
 Evaluating the CEO/executive director's performance
 Setting organizational rules and plans
 Monitoring programs
 Managing public relations
 Influencing public policy
 Facilitating collaboration with other NGOs

Q22. Overall, to what extent has your board fulfilled its governance responsibilities?
1
Did not fulfill
most of them
2
Did not fulfill
most of them
3
Not sure
4
Partly fulfilled
5
Fulfilled well
    

Q23-Q29 are related to the executives and founders of your organization. Here, organizational
executives refer to those who manage organizational affairs, and organizational founders refer to
those who established the organization.

158

Q23. Does your organization executive work full time at the organization?
 Yes
 No

Q24. Does your organizational executive collect remuneration/payment from the organization?
 Yes
 No

Q25. Is your organizational executive also a founder of the organization?
 Yes (Skip to Q28)
 No

Q26. What is the professional background of your organizational founder? (If your
organization has more than one founder, you can think about the most important one. You may
pick multiple choices)
 Government officials
 Lawyers
 Journalists/reporters
 Businessmen
 Scholars/ researchers
 Others (please specify___________)

Q27. What is the highest educational level your organizational founder has achieved?
 High school or below
 Technical secondary school/Junior College
 College Graduate
 Masters Graduate
 Ph.D.

159

Q28. What is the professional background of your organizational executive? (If your
organization has more than one executive, you can think about the most important one. You may
pick multiple choices).
 Government officials
 Lawyers
 Journalists/reporters
 Businessmen
 Scholars/ researchers
 Others (please specify___________)

Q29. What is the highest education level your organizational executive has?
 High school or below
 Junior College
 College graduate
 Masters graduate
 Ph.D.

PART 4 ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Q30. Some organizations focus more on nationwide a, whereas other organizations focus more
on local issues. In the past year, which category best describes most of your organizational
activities? Please check only one category.
 Rural environmental issues
 Urban environmental issues (municipal/community)
 Provincial-level environmental issues
 Nationwide environmental issues
 International environmental issues(e.g., global warming)

160

Q31. The following table lists the approaches that environmental NGOs often use in
environmental protection. Please specify the extent to which your organization has used each of
them. 1 refers to rarely used, and 5 refers to frequently used.

1
Rarely
used
2 3 4
5
Used
frequently
Conducting environmental
scientific studies
    
Educating the public on
environmental issues
    
Using media to publicize
environment issues
    
Participating in policy making
and advocating for policy change
    
Engaging in environmental
lawsuits
    
Implementing environmental and
ecological protection programs
    
Monitor firms‘ activities, such as
pollution in the production
process
    

If the approach that your organization has used is not listed in the above table, please list it here
_______________________________________

161

Q32. In what areas has your organization focused in protecting the environment? Please check
all that apply.
 Land conservation
 Ecology/biodiversity protection
 Water resources and rivers/lakes/wetlands/marine protection
 Urban air quality
 Urban and rural community development
 Energy use and conservation
 Global environmental change
 Natural disaster and emergency prevention
 Others (please specify___________________)

Q33. Overall, to what extent has your organization contributed to policy advocacy (including
financial and human resources and efforts made, etc)? 1 refers to minimal investment, and 5 a
significant amount of investment.
1
Minimal
investment
2 3 4
5
A significant
amount of
investment
    

162

Q34. The following table lists the tactics that NGOs use in policy advocacy. To what extent has
your organization used each of the following advocacy tactics? 1 refers rarely used, and 5 used
frequently.

1
Rarely
Used
2 3 4
5
Used
Frequently
Communicating policy ideas with
government officials privately
    
Participating in policy formulation and
revision
    
Serving on government-organized
guidance committees
    
Engaging in environmental public
litigation
    
Submitting policy/research reports to
the media
    
Organizing collective activities like
co-signing or writing letters
    
Announcing research/policy reports to
the public
    
Collaborating with other organizations
to influence public policy.
    

163

Q35. The following table lists different aspects of organizational effectiveness. Please specify the
extent to which your NGO is effective in each aspect. 1 refers to not that effective, and 5 very
effective.

1
Not that
effective
2 3 4
5
Very
effective
Gain government trust
    
Improve interactions with the
government
    
Make strategic decisions
    
Increase organizational funding
    
Promote social recognition
    
Improve organizational capacity
and performance
    
Realize organizational mission
    
Impact policy decision making
    
Facilitate environmental
governance
    

164

PART 5 INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION

Q36. The following table lists NGOs‘ interactions with organizational funders. Please consider
your organization‘s relationships with the most important funder (e.g., foundations) and specify
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following descriptions. 1 refers to strongly
disagree, and 5 strongly agree.

165

1
Strongly
disagree
2
Somewhat
disagree
3
Not sure
4
Somewhat
agree
5
Strongly
agree
The funders usually
intervene/direct our
organization‘s operation
    
The funders usually require us
to submit use of funds report
    
The funders often evaluates
our organization‘s
performance in using their
funds or running programs
    
The funders have affected
our or gan izat ion ’s
mission and orientation
    
The funders have affected
our organization ’s
financial situation
    
The funders have affected
our organization ’s
human resources
    
The funders have affected
our capacity in policy
advocacy
    
The funders have affected
our public recognition
    

166

Q37. Overall, over the past three years, how frequently has your NGO interacted with each of the
following individuals or organizations?
Rarely
About
once
per
year
About
once per
several
months
About
once per
month
About
once
per
week
About
once
per
day
Other NGOs
Businesses
Foundations
County level government
Municipal-level
government

Provincial government
agencies

National-level government
agencies

National People‘s
Congress

National Political
Consultative Committee

Local People‘s Congresses
Local Political
Consultative Committees

Schools/colleges/universiti
es/research institutes

The media
Community
Foreign
Groups/Organizations

167

Q38. The following table lists different aspects of NGO peer collaborations. Please specify the
extent to which you agree with each of the following descriptions. 1 refers to strongly disagree,
and 5 strongly agree.

1
Strongly
disagree
2
Somewhat
disagree
3
Not
sure
4
Somewhat
agree
5
Strongly
agree
Our organization frequently
communicates with other NGOs
regarding information on
environmental protection

Our organization frequently
collaborates with other NGOs to
conduct projects or activities

Our organization often collaborates
with other NGOs to attend or hold
conferences/meetings

Our organization often collaborates
with other NGOs in applying funding

Our organization often collaborates
with other NGOs to improve
government's work on environmental
governance

Our organization often collaborates
with other NGOs to push government
officials to take responsibility for
environmental pollution

Our organization often collaborates
with other NGOs to monitor/criticize
firms‘' environmental pollution
behavior/accidents

Q39. Please list five NGOs that your organization has collaborated the most over the past five
years. Please list their names in order.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

168

Q40. The following table lists several possible issues that NGOs may encounter. Please think
about your organization and specify the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the
following descriptions.

1
Strongly
disagree
2
Somewhat
disagree
3
Not sure
4
Somewhat
agree
5
Strongly
agree
The organization faces much
administrative interference
from the government
    
The government does not have
a complete and effectual legal
system to manage NGOs,
preventing our development
    
The organization does not have
a clear mission and vision
    
The organization does not have
adequate human resources; the
structure and quality of our
current staff is not sufficient
for organizational development
    
The organization does not have
enough money to effectively
run the organization
    
The organization does not have
a sound governance
mechanism, and the capacity
of the organization is low.
    
The organization does not have
enough public recognition and
support.
    

In addition to the above issues, what other issues does your organization have? Please list
them here___________________________________________

169

Q41. The following table lists the relationships between human beings and the nature. Please
specify the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following descriptions. 1
refers to strongly disagree, and 5 strongly agree.

1
Strongly
disagree
2
Somewhat
disagree
3
Not
sure
4
Somewhat
agree
5
Strongly
agree
We are approaching the limit of the
number of people the earth can support

Humans have the right to modify the
natural environment to suit their needs

When humans interfere with nature it
often produces disastrous
consequences

Human ingenuity will insure that we
do NOT make the earth unlivable

Humans are severely abusing the
environment

The earth has plenty of natural
resources if we just learn how to
develop them

Plants and animals have as much right
as humans to exist

The balance of nature is strong enough
to cope with the impacts of modern
industrial nations

Despite our special abilities humans
are still subject to the laws of nature

The so-called "ecological crisis"
facing humankind has been greatly
exaggerated

The earth is like a spaceship with very

170

limited room and resources
Humans were meant to rule over the
rest of nature

The balance of nature is very delicate
and easily upset

Humans will eventually learn enough
about how nature works to be able to
control it

if things continue on their present
course, we will soon experience a
major ecological catastrophe

PART 6 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Q42. What is your age _________
Q43. What is your gender?
 Male
 Female

Q44. What is your current position at this organization? __________________

Q45. What is the highest grade or level of schooling you have completed?
 High school or below
 Technical secondary school/junior college
 College graduate
 Master graduate
 Ph.D.

171

Q46. In what ways do you think the government can improve to effective facilitate the
development of environmental NGOs?
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

Q47 Would you like to receive a copy of the survey results?
 Yes (Please leave your name and email address) ____________________
 No

End of the Survey
Thank you so much for your help!

172

Appendix 2 Interview Protocol
The Development of Environmental NGOs: Interview Protocols
Dear Organizational Leader,
I am Hui Li, a doctoral student in the Price School of Public Policy at the University of
Southern California. I am currently working on a project which examines the development and
management of environmental NGOs (eNGOs) in China. This project is conducted by the
University of Southern California and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. It aims to examine
eNGOs‘ main activities, funding sources, and major difficulties. It will help identify the success
and failure in the development of NGOs. Your participation is very important to our research. If
you are willing to participate, would you please try your best to answer the following questions?
1. Founding and development
When was your organization founded? Would you please talk about the founding and
registration process as well as the recent development of your organization?
2. Major area of work and field of activities
What are the main approaches that your organization has been using in protecting the
environment? Would you please talk about the major projects that your organization has
been doing?
3. Funding sources
What are the major sources of funding that your organization has received? What
percentages?
4. Inter-organizational collaboration

173

How many organizations, including government agencies, nonprofits, or private
enterprises, have your organization collaborated with? For what purpose do you
collaborate? How do you collaborate, for example, exchanging information, sharing
resources/office space, and securing funding, etc.?
5. Main barriers and future direction
What are the main obstacles that your organizations are currently facing?
6. External environmental and organizational development
In your opinion, what role do environmental NGOs play in facilitating the growth of civil
society and in promoting environmental governance in China?
The interview will last about 45-60 minutes. The data collected for this research will be used
solely for research purposes; they will not be used for any business purpose. All the interviews
will be analyzed collectively so that we can examine the general trend; we will not reveal the
identity of any single organization. Again, thank you very much for your participation in this
important research. If you are interested in our research, we will send you our preliminary
research findings upon the completion of our project. Should you have any questions, please
don‘t hesitate to contact me.

Hui Li
University of Southern California
Cell: 134 6663 1656
Email: lihui@usc.edu

Abstract (if available)

Abstract China’s NGO sector has experienced tremendous growth since the 1990s. This has led scholars to examine the role of NGOs in China’s governance reform, in areas as simple as greater accountability or as overarching as democratic transition. Most scholarship has applied Western logic, such as the civil society perspective, the corporatist approach, or social movement theory. These studies, however, neglect factors unique to the authoritarian context of China. In addition, they mostly use evidence from case studies and cross-sectional data in major cities at a single time point, limiting the robustness of the research findings. ❧ This dissertation focuses on the development of Chinese environment NGOs, the most active civil society groups that have strived to secure resource flows, sustain cooperative efforts, and influence environmental policies. By examining their political advocacy, managerial networking, and leadership succession, the study contributes to the understanding of the dynamic and symbiotic relations between NGOs and government under authoritarianism. Specifically, three empirical questions are examined: 1) Given the specific context of authoritarianism, how do various institutional forces—the government, foundations, and the nonprofit sector itself—affect NGOs’ advocacy activities? 2) What factors affect eNGOs’ networking behavior? And how does managerial networking relate to eNGO performance? 3) What are the mechanisms through which leadership succession affects nonprofit performance? ❧ The data for the dissertation come from a nationwide survey and in-depth interviews, which are collected specifically for the study and form the basis for the three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter examines NGOs’ advocacy behavior, including their advocacy investment and use of insider and outsider tactics. Drawing on resource dependence and institutional theories, it highlights how resource and institutional factors—government funding, government affiliation, foundation funding, and peer collaborations—shape NGO advocacy in China. The second empirical chapter examines the dynamics of managerial networking and assesses its connections to the performance of Chinese environmental NGOs. It underscores how three institutional variables—the regulatory environment, government ties, and government affiliation—shape eNGO leaders’ networking behavior, and how two types of networking—peer and political networking—relate to NGO performance in varying ways. The third empirical chapter examines how leadership succession affects NGO performance. By analyzing the conditions, actions, and outcomes of ten succession events across three Chinese environmental NGOs, the study proposes that the fit between pre-succession conditions and successor actions affects NGO performance. It suggests ways to overcome succession crisis and facilitate long-term organizational development. ❧ Overall, the study contributes significantly to the literature on Chinese NGOs and nonprofit studies, both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, this dissertation not only enriches understanding of NGO development and state-society relations but also contributes to the nonprofit literature in general. Methodologically, by combining robust quantitative analysis with systematic analysis of the qualitative data, the study provides a good and solid example for future research on Chinese NGOs.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Li, Hui (author)

Core Title A study of Chinese environmental NGOs: policy advocacy, managerial networking, and leadership succession

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Public Policy and Management

Publication Date 07/14/2016

Defense Date 05/23/2016

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag advocacy,China,environmental NGOs,leadership succession,networking,OAI-PMH Harvest

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Tang, Shui-Yan (committee chair), Cooper, Terry L. (committee member), Esparza, Nicole E. (committee member)

Creator Email lihui@usc.edu,lihui412@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c40-268863

Unique identifier UC11281246

Identifier etd-LiHui-4547.pdf (filename),usctheses-c40-268863 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-LiHui-4547.pdf

Dmrecord 268863

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Li, Hui

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA