Community development agreements: addressing inequality through urban development projects

PDF

Download

Open document

Transcript (if available)

Content

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS:

ADDRESSING INEQUALITY THROUGH URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

by

Jovanna Pearl Rosen, M.C.P.

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
URBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

MAY 2016

ii

Copyright 2016

by

Jovanna Pearl Rosen

All rights reserved.

iii

To my Grandma and my Mom
iv
ABSTRACT

Beginning in the early 2000s, community development agreements emerged as a land development
innovation intended to foster equitable development and enhance community control. Under community
development agreements, including community benefits agreements and project labor agreements with
community workforce provisions, stakeholders leverage urban growth to promote community development
and facilitate urban development. These agreements enter into a long history of land use exactions and
bargaining for development, but introduce a new way of governing urban development, one that can either
circumvent or supplement existing land use approval and policy formulation procedures, in favor of
deliberation directly between stakeholders to create local benefits distribution policies through agreement.
However, early evidence indicates that many community development agreements are not producing
all of their promised outcomes to community stakeholders, and little research has explored how
implementation occurs. Existing theory on consensus building and deliberative governance overlooks
implementation, but provides reason to believe that these agreements may systematically fail to deliver
substantive change to marginalized groups, including community stakeholders, despite good faith
deliberation and consensus. In this dissertation, I use four case studies to examine agreement
implementation, to examine how, and the extent to which, community development agreements produce
outcomes, and how stakeholder interests and incentives may shift during implementation and influence
outcomes delivery.
I find that community stakeholders may have little direct control over outcomes delivery, and rely
on other stakeholders to realize their benefits. Community outcomes are among the last to materialize, after
other stakeholders may have achieved their original goals and retain little incentive to produce community
outcomes. In such cases, community stakeholders can use indirect tactics, including community monitoring
and enforcement, to induce other stakeholders to produce community outcomes, but at a significant cost.
This implies that community development agreements offer a fundamentally limited, though potentially net-
positive, strategy for generating lasting community change.
v
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Conceptual Model 5
Figures 2 and 3: Abandoned Properties 93
Figure 4: Mercedes-Benz Stadium Construction 107
Figure 5: Lindsay Street Park 113
Figure 6: Empty Community Benefits Plan Committee Meeting (after plan approval) 123
Figure 7: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan Structure 127
Figure 8: Park East Map 138
Figure 9: Milwaukee School of Engineering parking structure and soccer field 139
Figure 10: Avenir apartments construction 139
Figure 11: Aloft Hotel with vacant Park East parcels in the background 140
Figure 12: Western Park East Parcels with Brownfield Issues 142
Figure 13: RFP for final Park East parcels 147
Figure 14: Park East Redevelopment Compact Structure 157
Figure 15: Ideal Community Benefits Agreement Structure 166
Figure 16: Old Yesler Terrace Residences 168
Figure 17: Yesler Terrace New Construction 170
Figure 18: Community Signs on Construction Sites 173
Figure 19: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement Structure 186
Figure 20. Map of Los Angeles Light-Rail System, including Crenshaw Line Under Construction 200
Figure 21. Map of Crenshaw Line 201
Figure 22: Metro’s Eat, Shop, Play Crenshaw Initiative Signage 204
Figure 23: Disrupted Pedestrian Access along Crenshaw Blvd 204
Figure 24: Disrupted Businesses along Crenshaw Blvd 205
Figure 25: Eat, Shop, Play on Metro website 205
Figure 26: Jobsite Visibility Issues Facing Community Monitors 214
Figure 27: Metro Project Labor Agreement Structure 216
Figures 28 and 29: Metro Construction Site Billboards 220
Figure 30: Ideal Project Labor Agreement Structure 228

vi
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Typology of Land Use Agreements 45
Table 2: Community Benefits Agreement Case Study Characteristics 50
Table 3: Interviews for Community Benefits Agreement Cases 51
Table 4: Archival documents for Community Benefits Agreement Cases 51
Table 5: Project Labor Agreement Case Study Characteristics 52
Table 6: Interviews for Project Labor Agreement Cases 54
Table 7: Archival documents for Project Labor Agreement Cases 55
Table 8: Atlanta Neighborhood Demographics 90
Table 9: Atlanta Reported Crimes in 2015 (in parenthesis: % change from 2014) 91
Table 10: Projects Funded through Invest Atlanta’s Community Improvement Fund 114
Table 11: Westside Neighborhoods Prosperity Fund Grants 116
Table 12: Crenshaw Area Demographic Characteristics 202
Table 13: Current Outcomes According to Jobs Coordinator Reporting 207

vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication iii
Abstract iv
List of Figures v
List of Tables vi
Acknowledgments viii
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Community Development Agreements: A Land Use Innovation 4
Chapter 3: A Theoretical Foundation for Community Development Agreements 57
Chapter 4: Managed Philanthropy: The Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan 83
Chapter 5: Managerial Disconnect: The Park East Redevelopment Compact 129
Chapter 6: Implementation Analysis: Community Benefits Agreements 160
Chapter 7: Community Bypass: The Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement 167
Chapter 8: Fragile Accountability: The Metro Project Labor Agreement in South Los Angeles 194
Chapter 9: Implementation Analysis: Project Labor Agreements 223
Chapter 10: Conclusions 232
References 241
Appendix 1: Yesler Terrace Outcomes 271
Appendix 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan 273
Appendix 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding 283
Appendix 4: Park East Redevelopment Compact 291
Appendix 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement 296
Appendix 6: Metro Project Labor Agreement 381

viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am fortunate to have been guided by the very best, the type of scholars who remind you of why
you want to pursue this path and who help you move forward, sometimes circuitously, but always forward. I
am particularly grateful for my brilliant advisor and mentor, Lisa Schweitzer, who never gave up on me, and
who always helped me form my own vision. To Lisa: thank you for everything that you have invested in me.
I can only hope to repay your patience, wisdom, generosity, and countless hours of advice and meticulous
feedback by paying it forward in kind. Thank you for inspiring me to do better, for helping me get there,
and for always seeing the best in my work, even if it wasn’t there yet. Thank you for always taking my
struggles, academic and otherwise, as seriously as you do. I could not have done this without you.
To each of my dissertation and qualifying exam committee members: thank you for pushing me and
inspiring me to think more carefully, argue more soundly, write with precision, read everything at my
fingertips, work harder and produce better work. To Malo Hutson, my mentor since Berkeley: thank you for
always reminding me of the person and scholar that I want to be, for your optimism and encouragement,
and for seeing the best in me. Your passion, for cities and for life, is contagious. To David Sloane: thank you
for your invaluable advice, and for helping me to constantly re-think my work, question my assumptions,
and aim higher. To Tridib Banerjee: thank you for your brilliant insights, and your patience while I sifted
through the many layers of your wisdom. To Nicole Esparza: thank you for all of the insight, support,
hilarity, and for everything else. I really appreciate you. To Sandra Ball-Rokeach: thank you for shaping my
worldview and research approach. I also want to thank my former supervisor at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Gail Thomas: thank you for your effusive intellectual curiosity, and for teaching me to endlessly ask
questions and seek answers. Your enthusiasm continues to rub off on me.
This research was only possible because of all of the committed individuals in Los Angeles, Seattle,
Milwaukee and Atlanta, who took the time to share their experiences, and show me the world through their
eyes. Thank you for taking the time to speak with me and for entrusting me with your perspective. I also
want to recognize the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation, the Labor Research and
ix
Action Network, and the Judith and John Bedrosian Center on Governance and the Public Enterprise at the
University of Southern California for funding this research. Thank you for believing in the potential of my
work and for making it possible.
In writing this dissertation, I leaned on my family and friends countless times, and they were always
there. To my friends: thank you for keeping me sane, for helping me put everything in perspective, for
reminding me of who I am when I forget, and for making my life so rich. I am beyond grateful. To my
cohort and fellow doctoral students, and in particular, Vincent and Sarah: thank you for your constant
support, for challenging me, and for pushing me in new directions. I especially want to thank Sarah
Esquivel: you are the best friend that I never expected to make. Thank you for understanding me.
I want to thank my family for always being there, and for the endless (though not always easy)
support. Thank you to my mom, who always encourages, inspires and patiently supports me while I strive to
live an authentic, balanced academic life. To my cousin Skip, my roommates Meredith and Nicole, my
cousins, my brother and Uncle Mitch, thank you for constant entertainment in my daily life, for all of the
food, spontaneity and fun, and for making my life in Los Angeles so vibrant. Finally, these
acknowledgments would be incomplete without recognizing my Grandma, who passed away during my
second year at USC, but who remains a constant presence in my life. Of course you’ll never read this, but I
want to thank the universe for you. More than anyone else, my grandma and mom have helped me become
the person that I am, and for that I will always be grateful.
I am also grateful for the San Francisco Giants, for becoming a dynasty by winning two World
Series Championships during my time in Los Angeles. Thank you for making my life in Los Angeles,
surrounded by countless insufferable Dodger fans, so much more enjoyable.

1
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

American cities are changing rapidly and facing significant pressure for growth. Particularly in
strong-market cities, new large-scale urban development projects and megaprojects are transforming the
built, social and natural environments, and frequently in historically disinvested communities (Hutson,
2015). While these projects will produce enormous change, including threats of gentrification and
displacement for disadvantaged residents, they also constitute a significant investment in under-resourced
communities, and therefore bring an enormous potential opportunity. Community residents and activists,
government representatives, developers and other stakeholders recognize the threats and potential
opportunities, positioned within a legacy of past planning failures in disadvantaged urban communities,
including decades of disinvestment. Within this context, community, government and real estate
stakeholders have begun to work to explicitly use urban growth to direct some development benefits to
historically marginalized residents and communities, to produce equitable development.
In this dissertation, I argue that community benefits agreements and project labor agreements with
local benefits provisions constitute a new land development innovation, which emerged in the early 2000s.
Subsequently, this innovation has proliferated in urban development. These agreements can be classified as
community development agreements, an innovation in which stakeholders engaged in or affected by a
project attempt to leverage urban growth and the land development process to promote community
development and social justice (Saito & Truong, 2014).
1
In so doing, this approach constitutes a new way to
govern urban development, one that can either circumvent or supplement existing land use approval and

1
Similarly to Liegeois and Carson (2003), here leverage refers to the use of influence, opportunities and/or resources to achieve,
or attempt to achieve, a desired outcome.
2
policy formulation
2
procedures, in favor of deliberation
3
directly between stakeholders to create policies
through agreement (Been, 2010; Erie, Kogan & MacKenzie, 2010; Wolf-Powers, 2010).
In the second chapter, I position community development agreements within the larger land use
history in which they have arisen, as local government has worked sought to transfer the costs of
development onto developers, particularly within an increasingly hollowed-out state context. As a result,
land development has shifted toward a negotiated model with the emergence of development agreements, to
reduce risk for developers and dedicate more benefits to local governments. Community development
agreements enter into this history, as the latest form of negotiated land agreement, and one in which local
community stakeholders participate directly, to advocate for local benefits. In this way, community
development agreements differ significantly from previous forms of land development, as community
activists use these benefits redistribution agreements to push for equitable development.
However, early evidence indicates that these agreements are not producing all of their promised
outcomes to community stakeholders, and little research has explored how implementation occurs. Existing
theory on consensus building and deliberative governance overlooks implementation, but provides reason to
believe that these agreements may systematically fail to deliver substantive change for marginalized groups,
including community stakeholders, despite good faith deliberation and consensus. And yet, planning
practice is clearly moving forward with this strategy, with efforts across the nation to scale community
development agreements to multiple projects and to the city ordinance level, a move toward ensuring that
more and more large-scale projects produce benefits for local community residents. For this reason, it is
increasingly important to understand the outcomes produced by this new land development strategy,
including whether the intended community beneficiaries receive the benefits promised to them, and how
this process occurs.
In this dissertation, I use four case studies to examine community development agreement
implementation. I seek to understand how, and the extent to which, community development agreements

2
As discussed in further depth in the Chapter 3, implementation scholars view policymaking as occurring in three stages: policy
formulation, implementation and reformulation (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).
3
Margerum (2011) defines deliberative processes as “allowing everyone to fully explore and debate the issues” (p. 7).
3
produce outcomes, and how the stakeholder interests and incentives may shift during implementation and
influence outcomes delivery. I find that community stakeholders may have little direct control over
outcomes delivery, and rely on other stakeholders to realize their benefits. Community outcomes are among
the last to materialize, after other stakeholders may have achieved their original goals and retain little
incentive to produce community outcomes. In this process, other stakeholders can neglect their original
commitments during consensus, unless motivated to remain engaged in the mutual dependence that
characterizes consensus-building deliberations.
To this end, savvy community stakeholders can use indirect tactics, including community monitoring
and enforcement, to induce other stakeholders to remain accountable to their original commitments and
work to produce community outcomes. However, this effort comes at a significant cost to communities that
are, by definition, under-resourced. Consistent with the neoliberal critiques of communicative planning
theory, this circumstance leaves marginalized stakeholders with the burden of systems change, and with few
resources to do so. This implies that community development agreements offer a fundamentally limited
strategy for generating lasting community change, though the incremental benefits promised by these
agreements may represent the most that communities can get within the existing, neoliberal urban political
framework.

4
Chapter 2

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS:
A Land Use Innovation

In this chapter, I establish community development agreements as a new agreement type, related to
development agreements, but different in important ways. I begin by describing how development
agreements originated as a means to address weaknesses within the traditional, government-regulated land
use approval process. Next, I review the literatures related to community benefits agreements and project
labor agreements to understand these agreements as related to, but distinct from, development agreements.
I introduce community benefits agreements and project labor agreements as community development
agreements, a new agreement type that evidences important distinctions, including greater involvement from
community stakeholders. These differences influence how community development agreements become
implemented and the outcomes they produce. In subsequent chapters, I explore the tensions and related
conflicts that community development agreements raise, since they occur through more informal processes.
Throughout, I emphasize that the distinction between development agreements and community
development agreements matters, since community development agreements may either enhance or reduce
inequality, depending on each context, stakeholder behavior and the extent to which they address the larger
institutional arrangements in which they occur (Valentini, 2012; Young, 1990). I conclude by identifying my
case studies and methods, which provides the basis for my empirical analysis and theoretical development.
2.1. INTRODUCING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
Community development agreements emerged from the land use regulation tradition and
innovations from this model, including bargaining for benefits. I diagram the conceptual model for this
evolution in land use decision-making in Figure 1, then define the terms used throughout the chapter.

5
Figure 1: Conceptual Model

Community development agreements differ from development agreements in consequential ways,
including that these agreements expressly seek to ensure (more) equitable development through local
benefits provision. Community development interventions generally employ either a “people-based” or a
“place-based” strategy, such that resources are either directed toward improving communities through
spatially targeted benefits to disadvantaged areas, to address the spatial distribution of resources, or the
residents that live in them, to combat individual poverty. While strategies may differ on how they address
inequality, both people and place-based community development interventions aim to mitigate spatially
concentrated sources of inequality, including poverty, housing, unemployment, and health (Crane &
Manville, 2008). In this way, community development agreements undertake community development, as
they employ either a people and/or place-based strategy to generate community-level, positive change.
Community Benefits Agreements Project Labor Agreements
Community Development
Agreements
Development
Agreements
Land use
bargaining
Land use
regulation
Development agreements (DAs) are enforceable agreements in which local government and
project developers negotiate to freeze existing land use regulations in exchange for the developer agreeing to
certain terms, generally local benefits provisions (Canon, 2014).
Project labor agreements (PLAs) are “collective bargaining agreements between contractors, or
owners on behalf of contractors, and labor unions in the construction industry” (U.S. General Accounting Office
or GAO, 1998). Specifically, this research concerns project labor agreements with community workforce
provisions, or specifications within the agreement that attempt to ensure local benefits, such as geographically
or economically targeted hire.
Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are “a documented bargain outlining a set of
programmatic and material commitments that a private developer has made to win political support from the
residents of a development area and others claiming a stake in its future” (Wolf-Powers, 2010, p. 141).
I argue that community development agreements (CDAs), which include project labor
agreements and community benefits agreements, are agreements between stakeholders that attempt to use
large-scale, adjacent urban development projects to generate local, community benefits.
6
In so doing, community development agreements involve community residents and organizations as
an important, recognized stakeholder, which may alter implementation. At the same time, these agreements
enable stakeholders to circumvent the public protections and constraints embedded within the land use
approval process controlled by local government. Community development agreements vary significantly in
form, and include no systematic, and often no formal role, for government. Consequently, the agreement
terms, implementation and oversight can vary dramatically between projects and regions (Marantz, 2015;
Saito & Truong, 2014; Hutson, 2013; Figueroa, Grabelsky & Lamere, 2011; Belman & Bodah, 2010; Nadler,
2010; Wolf-Powers, 2010; Salkin & Lavine, 2008).
In theory, community development agreements enable community stakeholders to become
influential participants in the development process and to employ community resources to determine the
agreement specifics and ensure local benefits (Parkin, 2003). This community-engaged approach explicitly
intends to build upon lessons learned from urban renewal and disinvestment, in which marginalized
residents did not have meaningful input into the development projects that disrupted their communities.
Whereas such process exclusion has contributed to urban development projects that have often harmed
local residents and communities, community development agreements aim to avoid this path through
community advocacy and organizing to shape the projects themselves and their impacts on local residents
and the built environment (Lucas-Darby, 2012).
Both community benefits agreements and project labor agreements that include local benefits began
in California and are becoming increasingly common throughout the United States. The first significant
community benefits agreement occurred in 2001 in Los Angeles. It governed the $2.5 billion Staples Center
development in downtown Los Angeles, and included $390 million in public subsidies and tax rebates (Saito
& Truong, 2014; Wolf-Powers, 2010). Other prominent projects include the $1.8 billion Yankee Stadium
project, the $11 billion Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) expansion and, more recently in Los
Angeles, the $1 billion USC University Village project (Saito & Truong, 2014; Saillant, 2012; Wolf-Powers,
2010).
7
In contrast, project labor agreements have a longer history. PLAs have existed since the 1930s,
though the trend to use PLAs to foster community development can be traced to the Port of Oakland
Project Labor Agreement, formulated in the early 2000s (Johnston-Dodds, 2001; Perritt, 1996). Subsequent
to this agreement, PLAs are increasingly employed to attempt to enhance regional equity through
geographically targeted hire, workforce development and disadvantaged business utilization (Figueroa,
Grabelsky & Lamere, 2011). In Los Angeles, influential PLAs currently exist around the Port of Los
Angeles, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and, most recently, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (Metro). The Obama Administration formally advocated for more PLAs related to
public infrastructure expenditures, such that PLAs will likely become even more common (The White
House, 2009).
The research to date suggests that many CBAs and PLAs experience only partial implementation
and fail to achieve their articulated goals, and deliver only marginal benefits to communities (Marantz, 2015;
Saito & Truong, 2014; Hutson, 2013; Saito, 2012; Chimienti, 2010; Nadler, 2010; Salkin & Lavine, 2008;
Gross, 2007; Parkin, 2003). Even though these agreements have become important to urban development,
little research so far has examined how these agreements come about, their implementation, or their
outcomes for community development. Existing research on these agreements almost exclusively focuses on
CBAs, but has largely overlooked agreement implementation and how CBAs relate to similar agreement
types. This research also generally tends not to distinguish between different political and deliberative
processes undertaken to arrive at the final agreement (Saito & Truong, 2014; Wolf-Powers, 2010). Urban
planning research, in particular, has largely ignored project labor agreements. Rather, PLA research generally
concerns legal issues such as labor and bargaining, and neglects to examine agreement processes and their
connection to community and local economic development. Further, existing literature either obscures how
these agreements relate to the land use literature, or fails to distinguish these agreements from development
agreements (e.g. Figueroa, Grabelsky and Lamare, 2011; Belman & Bodah, 2010; Garland & Suafai, 2002;
Langworthy, 1995).
8
In this dissertation, I address these literature gaps by examining how these community development
agreements relate, occur, and the extent to which they alter benefits distributions and foster community and
local economic development. I begin by explaining the emergence of community development agreements
historically, to understand how these agreements relate to, but differ from, previous land use governance
arrangements.
2.2. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
Development agreements can be traced to land use regulation innovations in the early 1900s. In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, local government exercised its control over development
approval to regulate land subdivision and sought to enable the process. Local government required that
developers file subdivision plats, as a public recording, before selling subdivided land. This process
formalized local government approval as a precursor to land development, setting the stage for the
exactions that local government would later require from developers as a condition of development
(Rosenberg, 2006; Ryan, 2002; Smith, 1987).
4

After local government facilitated land subdivision in this way, and in conjunction with significant
economic and population growth in many American cities, land speculation abounded through the 1920s.
However, public infrastructure provision did not match the speed at which subdivision took place, such that
many subdivisions were poorly suited to development; plats were frequently too small, far from urban
centers, and lacked necessary infrastructure such as streets and utilities (Rosenberg, 2006; Been, 1991).
Subdivision exceeded demand, and land began to be over-subdivided. These problems imperiled local
government, which historically undertook public improvements before developers paid the fees necessary to
provide services to the subdivided land. The situation for local government worsened when developers

4
Like Canon (2014), I use “the term “developers” to refer to “the diversity of individuals and entities, and combinations of those
individuals and entities that enter into development agreements with local governments. Developers may be individual property
owners, financers, or developers under contract with property owners, partnerships of property owners and financers, or holding
companies that include combinations of these different parties” (p. 782).
9
failed to pay during the 1920s and Great Depression, forcing local governments to bear these costs
(Rosenberg, 2006; Ryan, 2002; Been, 1991; Smith, 1987).
5

In response, local governments sought to transfer the financial burden associated with development
back onto the developer through on-site dedications, off-site dedications, fees-in-lieu-of-dedication and
impact fees.
6
Thus, the practice of assessing fees as a condition of land subdivision arose as a means to
ensure that developers bore the burden of public improvements that were required by development, and
which could benefit the developer (Ryan, 2002; Cullingworth, 1993; Been, 1991; Marsh, 1989). In theory,
such exactions deliver significant benefits for the public, and encourage developers to use infrastructure
more efficiently, since developers at least partially fund the development expenses they create. As such,
exactions can promote public infrastructure construction and “redistribute wealth from the developer or its
customers to others, or to prevent the developer from appropriating wealth created by the activities of the
local government” (Been, 1991, p. 483).
In 1926, as subdivision speculation proliferated and before fee assessment became so widespread,
the Supreme Court upheld zoning as legal in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
7
Subsequent to this ruling,
zoning became a common local land use tool that restricted how development could occur. Municipalities
had used comprehensive plans since the early 1900s to create an “overarching development strategy for the
locality” (Camacho, 2005, p. 10). Comprehensive plans, combined with zoning, afforded local government

5
Rosenberg (2006) traces this process, “First, developers often abandoned the under-sold, under-developed and under-improved
subdivision after an initial period of marketing success. This resulted in many real estate tax delinquencies with the ultimate
ownership of the parcels reverting to local governments through tax foreclosure. Secondly, municipal bonds issued to secure
financing for subdivision improvements often went into default during the thirties due to the devastating economic effect of the
Great Depression. Bond interest and principal repayments were set based on the assumption of the new homeowner’s regular
payment of special assessments tied to subdivision improvements. With the collapse of the suburban real estate market during the
Depression, residential building lots did not sell, resulting in the non-payment of the existing assessments, leading to substantial
defaults on municipal bonds” (p. 197-198).
6
Been (1991) distinguishes between these types. With an on-site dedication, a developer “dedicate[s] land within the subdivision
on which the community could construct streets, sidewalks, utilities, and other such facilities…. [or] construct[s] and dedicate[s]
these facilities to the community. Communities initially required dedications only for such basic facilities as streets and sidewalks,
but many communities eventually demanded that developers dedicate land within the subdivision for schools, fire and police
stations, and parks or open space. Land or facilities within a subdivision were not always ideally suited to meet a particular need,
so local governments began to impose off-site dedications, which required developers to dedicate land or facilities not located within
the subdivision. They also began to charge fees-in-lieu-of-dedication, giving developers the option of contributing money to the
community rather than dedicating land or facilities. Because fees-in-lieu-of-dedication typically could be applied only to
subdivisions, many local governments implemented broader impact fees, which assess developers for the costs that the development
will impose upon the government’s capital budget for public services” (p. 478-480).
7
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
10
significant regulatory influence over how development could occur. While deviations from zoning were
permitted with approval, bargaining did not occur. This process, combined with additional design standards
issued by the Department of Commerce in the Standard State Planning Enabling Act (1928), heightened the
importance of local government approval, in the form of building permits for projects that adhere to
existing zoning regulations (Rosenberg, 2006; Camacho, 2005). Further, the Standard State Planning
Enabling Act established that developers had the responsibility “to provide physical infrastructure such as
streets, water mains, sewer lines, and other utilities within the boundaries of the subdivision as a condition of
regulatory approval” (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 200). The combination of these events set the stage for additional
future exactions, and similarly restricted development (Rosenberg, 2006; Camacho, 2005).
By the 1950s and 1960s, the zoning map, and rezoning for individual projects that did not meet the
existing zoning standards, dominated as the means for determining how development projects could occur.
However, developers sought a different way to govern development approval, one that could accommodate
for new types of market-driven development, including cheaper, clustered housing and suburban shopping
centers (Bosselman & Stroud, 1985). Developers created planned unit developments, or PUDs, to enable
these new development forms. Essentially, the PUD concept enabled an entire development, designed and
built in coordination, to be approved through a “master development plan” involving “more flexible
evaluation” in which “each development of substantial size deserved to be evaluated on its own merits”
(Bosselman & Stroud, 1985, p. 383). Thus, PUDs moved the development approval process away from
zoning maps and rezoning for each development project. PUDs introduced a method, now commonplace,
in which developers and local government bargained to establish how development would occur, which has
contributed to more flexible development and land use regulation. This practice has led to a more
predictable process for developers, though sometimes less predictable built environment outcomes (Canon,
2014; Camacho, 2005; Bosselman & Stroud, 1985).
Bargaining for municipal services proved successful for local governments seeking to reduce risk,
and it became increasingly common to require improvements and/or fees as a development condition. By
11
1958, improvements were generally provided through this practice (Smith, 1987). Beyond these exactions,
local government also began to require developers to pay impact fees, in which developers cover public
improvement costs related to development; this practice seeks to ensure that development bears the burden
of the services it will require in the future, such as utilities, parks and streets (Rosenberg, 2006; Smith, 1987).
While these fees are a more politically feasible means to increase revenue in an economic climate where local
governments cannot provide sufficient infrastructure without private assistance, the fees generally do not
account for all expenses related to new development (Cullingworth, 1993; Barnebey et al., 1988; Smith,
1987).
Regardless, infrastructure provisions and impact fees increased development costs, as local
governments required that developers pay for a wide range of services, from road, solid waste, water and
sewer infrastructure and improvements to facilities such as parks, schools, libraries and police and fire
stations (Callies et al., 2003). This requirement increased development risk, since developers frequently
incurred infrastructure provisions early in the development process (Marsh, 1989). Developers sought relief
in the courts, and questioned whether municipalities could legally assess exactions (Callies et al, 2003; Been,
1991; Smith, 1987). The courts generally upheld on-site improvements, and municipalities soon began to
seek off-site improvements. The requirement for off-site improvements and cash-in-lieu payments were
largely upheld, but less so than with on-site improvements (Smith, 1987). The courts have also upheld
impact fees, so long as they are “levied upon a development to pay for public facilities, the need for which is
generated, at least in part, by that development” (Callies et al., 2003, p. 11).
Through this historical trajectory, the development approval process has evolved to a point where
local government retains significant control over how development occurs, and frequently requires that
developers pay for public improvement costs associated with development. These payments have expanded
in scope over time, and some have argued that development agreements have driven up or shifted the costs
associated with development (Callies et al., 2003; Landis et al., 2001). Project approval, however, continues
to include significant risk because developers do not gain a right to build (an entitlement known as a
12
“vested” right to develop) until late in the development process.
8
In California, the prominent 1978
California court case Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission
9
established that vesting
occurs late in the development process. In Avco, the court ruled that developers needed a building permit in
order to gain the right to develop in the state. This ruling clarified that developers did not gain vested rights
until they had already expended the significant resources necessary to gain a building permit, and not before
this investment occurred. This high threshold deterred development, as developers faced considerable
uncertainty and risk, and could lose their investment if local government withdrew project support
(Schwartz, 2001; Cullingworth, 1993; Delaney, 1993; Curtin & Edelstein, 1992).
10

While the Avco case was specific to California, late vesting is common throughout the U.S. Vesting
generally occurs after either the municipality has granted a building permit or the developer gains the “last
discretionary approval” that development requires; this latter requirement is referred to as the “last
discretionary approval rule” (Curtin & Edelstein, 1992, p. 764). The California context is important,
however, because Avco, combined with political and economic factors, laid the groundwork for development
agreements to emerge in the state. Given that developers only gain the right to develop very late into the
development process, developers face significant risk within the land use approval process, particularly those
seeking to undertake large-scale development projects. Developers have no guarantee of project approval,
or stability of current land use and development regulations and arrangements, until far into the
development process.

8
Curtin and Edelstein (1992) define vested right in the following way: “Where a right is so completely settled in a person that a
newly erected retrospective law cannot be used to deprive one of that right, the right is said to have vested. “Vested right” implies
an interest in which it is proper for the state to recognize and protect, and in which the individual cannot be deprived arbitrarily
without injustice” (p. 761). Callies et al. (2003) further clarifies, “Vested rights technically focuses only upon whether a landowner
has acquired sufficient real property rights to proceed with a development project, or some phase thereof, unaffected by
subsequently promulgated government regulation. Equitable estoppel, sometimes called zoning estoppel, focuses on the conduct
of government and whether it would be equitable under the circumstances to permit government to repudiate some official action
upon which the landowner has relied to proceed with a land development project. The former is often said to be based upon
common law and constitutional principles dealing with rights in property, whereas the latter is said to be derived from equitable
principles” (p. 129).
9
17 Cal.3d 785
10
Callies et al. (2003) specify the range of governmental acts that vest rights, which vary between states; building permits are the
most “secure” (p. 131).
13
At the same time, the land use approval process also proved insufficient for local government, at a
time where local government increasingly depended on exactions. Legal constraints limit the exactions that
local government can seek from developers within the approvals process. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution prohibits takings without just compensation, which restricts government from placing
significant demands upon developers as conditions for project approval (Callies et al., 2003; Curtin &
Edelstein, 1992).
11
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, case law placed additional restrictions on government
takings. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard
12
(1994) further restricted the
conditions that local government could impose on development to factors that directly and proportionally
relate to the development permit sought. Otherwise, the action constitutes a taking (Callies et al., 2003).
13

These cases arose in response to concerns that exactions can “extort” developers (as cited in Been, 1991, p.
486).
In sum, this regulatory process deterred development for both developers and government, who
were both driven to find an easier way to undertake development. In California, developers and politicians
conferred to create legislation to address the late vesting rule and to protect the developers’ interests and
promote growth. Initial efforts stalled as several legislative attempts failed in the legislature or were vetoed
by then California Governor Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown. Local government was initially reticent due to
concern that their influence over the development process would decline (Holliman, 1981).
Local government’s outlook changed, however, after voters approved Proposition 13 in 1978, which
capped property taxes to one percent of the assessed property value, with no more than two percent annual
growth. This circumstance, combined with fewer federal infrastructure grants and higher interest rates
driving costs up, significantly undermined the basis for state public infrastructure expenditures (Canon,

11
As Callies et al. (2003) clarify, “In Agins v. City of Tiburon the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “the application of a general zoning
law to a particular property becomes a taking if the ordinance either (1) “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests”
or (2) “denies an owner economically viable use of his land”” (p. 10).
12
483 U.S. 825 and 512 U.S. 374.
13
Callies, Curtin & Tappendorf (2003) explain that in Dolan, “The Court essentially adopted a three-part test: (1) Does the permit
condition seek to promote a legitimate state interest? (2) Does an essential nexus exist between the legitimate state interest and the
permit condition? And (3) does a required degree of connection exist between the exactions and the projected impact of the
development?” (p. 668).
14
2014; Landis et al., 2001; Cullingworth, 1993; Kessler, 1985; Holliman, 1981). After Proposition 13, local
governments in California were forced to become more creative and entrepreneurial in seeking revenue, and
so they generally sought growth (Canon, 2014; Landis et al., 2001; Cowart, 1989). These factors drove local
government to support development agreements as a means to fund public infrastructure and services, and
predict local investment.
In 1979, California became the first state to pass a statute enabling local governments to enter into
development agreements; this statute became law in 1980. This provided local governments with a new
means to fund local infrastructure and amenities in an era of increasingly scarce public resources. In part due
to this circumstance, development agreement legislation quickly became a popular local government tool to
provide the new infrastructure required by large development projects (Holliman, 1981, p. 44).
14
Its
popularity with local government was particularly unexpected, since local government was initially so
hesitant to reduce their influence in the development process (Holliman, 1981).
Thus, development agreements were first created, and continue to persist, because they enable both
local government and developers to avoid the central challenges that they face within the land development
approval process. Inadequacies within the land use approval process and the historical context dovetailed to
create an imperfect regulatory context in California, which drove local government and developers to
innovate new ways in which development projects could gain approval.
Development agreements were intended to reduce uncertainty and improve flexibility in the
development process by enabling developers and local government to bargain to reach agreements about
the project land uses and the benefits that developers will exchange for greater “predictability” in the
development process (Canon, 2014, p. 789; Larsen, 2002; Cullingworth, 1993; Wegner, 1987). Development
agreements can stipulate greater exactions than the courts would allow under the land use approval process
and the Nollan and Dolan precedent because both parties enter into development agreements voluntarily
(Callies, Curtin & Tappendorf, 2003). Development agreements enable land use practices to deviate from

14
Holliman (1981) describes the legislative process for arriving at the development agreement statute in California.
15
existing zoning regulations, to the benefit of both developers and public agencies, though still in accordance
with existing general and specific plans (Larsen, 2002).
15
In so doing, development agreements alter
interactions between government and development from adversarial to including “some measure of
cooperation” (Callies et al., 2003, p. 3). Development agreements can also simplify an otherwise convoluted
and time-consuming development process, to the benefit of both developers and local governments (Canon,
2014).
After their inception, DAs spread quickly beyond California, as declining local fiscal revenue, greater
municipal competition for investment, and development uncertainty characterized many state development
contexts (Canon, 2014). Hawaii passed development agreement-enabling legislation after a court case similar
to Avco (Callies et al., 2003).
16
Florida, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado and Minnesota also adopted some form
of development agreement legislation in the years subsequent to the California legislation (Callies, Curtin &
Tappendorf, 2003; Marsh, 1989). Based on the California development agreement legislation, the Florida
development agreement legislation emerged due to case law that made development more difficult (Taub &
Rhodes, 1989). Some states have what is called “early vesting,” in which the developer gains a vested right to
build early in the development process, before significant investment. States with early vesting, such as
Pennsylvania, relied less on development agreements, though developers in these states sometimes sought
development agreements to increase development certainty (Schwartz, 2001; Kessler, 1985).
Within California, development agreements multiplied quickly due to their success in expediting
development. A 1985-1986 survey by UC Berkeley, the League of California Cities and the County
Supervisors Association of California found that,
“[i]n four years, the number of jurisdictions with adopted agreements increased nearly fourfold, to at
least 154 jurisdictions or over 30 percent of all local government. The number of reported projects
under contract from 43 in 1982 to 333 in 1986 with another 141 projects under negotiation, for a
total of at least 474 projects using agreements in 1986. Over half (256) of California municipalities
reported some type of local activity to implement the statute; they were either using development

15
“Development agreements will often include the creation of planned use development (PD or PUD) designations to ensure
flexibility as to…act as their own zoning designation” (Canon, 2014, p. 782-783).
16
Kauai County v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co., 653 P.2d 766 (1982), established that a developer could not prevent a
referendum to prevent development, despite expending substantial resources to that end (Callies et al., 2003).
16
agreements, had adopted local enabling legislation or were considering it, or expected developers to
request local legislation” (Cowart, 1989, p. 10-11).

The agreements were initially generally concentrated in urban areas and areas experiencing growth, possibly
due to expertise, sufficient staff to develop the agreements, and a more robust market for development.
However, despite this general trend, many development agreements occurred in smaller cities and areas with
limited growth. Development agreements did not just include the long timeframe, large-scale projects
initially envisioned; they addressed projects ranging in size, scale, use and timeframe. Consistent with their
underlying rationale, early development agreements largely sought to provide public benefits. In a sample of
these early agreements, over half included provisions for infrastructure and/or public facilities, about one
third included land dedications, and only ten percent included no special conditions (Cowart, 1989).
Early efforts to understand the effects of development agreement raised questions related to how
these agreements get formulated, since DAs depart from the traditional land use approval process in
meaningful ways. No standard bargaining framework existed, and procedures varied significantly. Further,
early research revealed that no California municipality “had by ordinance established a procedure for
including affected third parties, such as neighborhood associations, good government groups, chambers of
commerce, fair housing councils, or environmental groups, in the formal bargaining process for negotiating
development agreements” (Cowart, 1989, p. 35). This circumstance solidified development agreements as
bilateral, privately-negotiated contracts between the developer and local government, in which public
interests remain “overlooked” unless they are adequately represented by negotiators or legislators (Cowart,
1989, p. 35). They generally face public scrutiny only after the agreement terms are decided upon, and after
stakeholders are “usually heavily invested in the contract as drafted” (Cowart, 1989, p. 35). Rather, they are
usually “presented to the public as “done deals” just before a public legislative hearing on the contract” with
little opportunity for altering the agreement terms during a public hearing after public input (Cowart, 1989,
p. 35). In sum, initial research raised questions about development agreement processes and
implementation, and questioned how non-signatory parties were affected by this new, and increasingly
widespread, development practice.
17
While development agreements present many potential legal challenges, courts have upheld them as
legal. Early debates concerned whether local governments effectively “contract away” their police power
when they sign onto a development agreement, as subsequent to the agreement they can no longer “exercise
these regulatory powers” (Callies et al., 2003, p. 92). Development agreements remain limited by federal and
state law, which governs the extent to and manner in which government can exercise its police power. In
many jurisdictions, development agreements face further restrictions, including that they must adhere to
general and comprehensive plans established by localities in states such as California and Hawaii. Moreover,
development agreements are legislative acts in California, such that voters can undertake referenda to alter
development agreements or prevent them from being enacted entirely (Callies et al., 2003). The legislative
act classification influences “due process requirements of notice, hearing, and findings for quasi-judicial
actions, and ultimately the applicable scope of judicial review” (Holliman, 1981, p. 60).
Once approved, development agreements are enforceable by the signatory parties, subject to the
Contracts Clause in the United States Constitution, which largely prevents local government from acting to
undermine the agreement (Schwartz, 2001). Courts have generally ruled that subsequent zoning changes do
not apply to a development agreement. When parties do not meet the terms of the agreement, courts have,
in general, strictly upheld the agreement terms, even in extremely difficult cases (Callies et al., 2003).
2.3. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: A NEW FORM OF LAND USE REGULATION
As Selmi (2010) clarifies, development agreements can be understood as part of a
“transformational” shift from the “traditional, hierarchical permit process” to a somewhat less hierarchical
“contract model” characterized by “negotiations leading to binding contracts between local governments
and development interests” (p. 597; p. 593). Seen this way, the development agreement model
fundamentally differs from previous forms of land use regulation, and introduces a new paradigm in which
land use regulation occurs through ad hoc contract negotiation (Canon, 2014; Selmi, 2010; Ryan, 2002;
Coomes, 1989; Cowart, 1989; Porter, 1989). While negotiations had occurred informally prior to
development agreements, as “bargaining” within the land use regulatory process, these previous efforts did
18
not create a binding contract with lasting built environment consequences (Selmi, 2010; Cowart, 1989). This
approach can frustrate comprehensive planning, as it introduces an array of consequential agreements
whose impacts are not considered together (Porter, 1989; Cowart, 1989).
Development agreements have therefore introduced “a form of actual governance through private
negotiation…based on consensus” around the initial development terms, which are codified in the
agreement (Canon, 2014, p. 787; Marsh, 1989). Under the negotiated paradigm, zoning still matters, but
provides a “baseline rights allocation from which a locality and a developer bargain” rather than a rigid
formula that restricts bargaining (Camacho, 2005, p. 16). This departure toward contract law has significant
but overlooked implications for land use regulation and outcomes. Contracts transform the guiding
principles of the regulatory system from those of public law to private law. That is to say that while the land
use approval process is intended to serve public interest, with a clear role for the public, the contracts model
enables the negotiating parties to prioritize their ends over those of the public. The negotiation-based
approach alters the relationship between local government and developer from a hierarchical relationship, in
which local government held significant power and prioritized objectivity and systematic decisionmaking, to
a negotiation format characterized by mutual reliance, necessity and interest, if not to a particular end, then
at least to reaching consensus.
Therefore, development agreements have fundamentally changed what was an adversarial
relationship guided by public interests toward one that emphasizes reaching agreement between public and
private interests.
17
Simply entering into negotiations implies that local governments believe that agreement
can be reached, indicates “a willingness to compromise” to reach agreement, and demonstrates local
government’s dependence on private infrastructural provision (Selmi, 2010, p. 614; Canon, 2014; Camacho,
2005). This negotiating environment affords developers a significant advantage during negotiations, as they
possess the means to effectively promote their interests and can circumvent local participation that may

17
As Funk (1997) describes that while the principles underlying the “public interest” are “not always clear” (p. 1383), negotiated
rulemaking, as opposed to “the exercise of discretion and judgment” can “reflect the capture of government processes by special
interests” (p. 1383). With this approach, “agencies are influenced to see their role not as serving the public interest, but as
generating a consensus among the parties to the negotiation” (p. 1386).
19
otherwise have occurred (Cowart, 1989; Porter, 1989). This helps developers not only gain specific
provisions that benefit their interests, but also to retain important matters unsettled within the agreement, to
their later benefit (Camacho, 2005; Selmi, 2010).
18
Furthermore, Porter (1989) finds that since development
agreements are ad hoc and negotiation-based, this process enables some projects to be approved that might
have otherwise been rejected or altered.
The shift towards negotiated contracts also enables planners to act according to their own discretion
rather than through standardized, consistent and predictable procedures. This discretion can undermine
equal protection and can create unequal outcomes, even among similar projects (Selmi, 2010). Just the
decision to engage in negotiations alters outcomes because local government can treat projects differently,
and create varying outcomes, based only on the decision to negotiate in some instances and not in others.
Ryan (2002) argues that such different treatment, if undertaken with sufficient stakeholder engagement and
representation, can improve outcomes, as “it takes into account specific characteristics and problems that
justify variations from a potentially overbroad norm” since each land parcel is unique (p. 337).
Much of the negotiations, however, occur prior to resident engagement, such that residents become
involved in the process after the developer and local government have a stake in a specific proposal moving
forward. Community engagement becomes “little more than a pro forma exercise” (Camacho, 2005, p. 44;
Canon, 2014). This problem can generate mistrust and suspicion among residents, and the developer and
local government have an incentive to compromise to reach a mutually agreed-upon product, to avoid
public “scrutiny” before arriving at a final agreement, and to gain approval for the agreement that they
reached during negotiations (Canon, 2014, p. 809; Camacho, 2005). Thus, the shift toward negotiated
decision-making, rather than public decision-making, raises concerns related to public access to information,
democratic participation, accountability, and the extent to which the agreement formulation is transparent to
those not involved in negotiation. The negotiations process is not open in terms of information or
participation, which is especially important as development agreements constrain local government’s future

18
As Camacho (2005) observes, “development agreements may fail to accurately define which entitlements the local government
is granting to the developer and which it is withholding, leaving critical long-term issues open to interpretation. The risk that these
ambiguities will inure to the benefit of the developer is high” (p. 57-58).
20
abilities to address resident needs and changing conditions. States like California have open meeting laws
that prevent development agreements from being negotiated behind closed doors, except for certain issues
such as property-related costs (Larsen, 2002, p. 26). However, issues with negotiations have generated calls
for more inclusion and democratic participation in development agreements (Canon, 2014; Selmi, 2010;
Larsen, 2002).
Public participation requirements for development and annexation agreements remain minimal;
often participation does not occur until a public hearing, at which time the agreement specifics have often
already been determined, and input has little influence on the outcome. These processes are characterized by
insufficient transparency and meaningful input into the process. Municipalities lack even a method for
incorporating community input into the agreement formulation process, let alone ensuring that this
participation occurs. This situation illustrates the “asymmetrical access to planning decisions” experienced
by “financially powerful interests in municipal decisionmaking” as compared to community interests
(Camacho, 2005, p. 43; Canon, 2014; Selmi, 2010).
Development agreements thus arose to enable both developers and public agencies to overcome
weaknesses within the land use approval process. Since their inception, these agreements have spread
throughout the country, such that their use remains common on large-scale urban development projects.
However, cities deplore development agreements for insufficient public participation, and projects with
development agreements can be vulnerable to opposition from community advocates. In this next section, I
describe the emergence of a new agreement type, which I call community development agreements, which
address these lingering concerns with development agreements. I argue that community development
agreements have emerged and become popular due to their ability to involve community stakeholders in the
land development process, and thus enable developers to incorporate and gain the support of these
individuals and groups.

21
2.4. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: A LAND USE INNOVATION
Community development agreements, defined by their aim to generate community benefits through
development projects, have emerged as an alternative approach to the development agreement model,
allowing greater resident participation. While community benefits agreements and project labor agreements
with community workforce provisions undertake different strategies to enhance community participation in
development, both agreement types similarly emerged in response to inadequate community involvement in
nearby urban development projects. As a result, they both aim to ensure that historically marginalized
groups are included in, and benefit from, adjacent urban development projects.
Parkin (2003) details the emergence of community workforce provisions within project labor
agreements, or components within these labor agreements that ensure local benefits provisions, such as
targeted hire. He notes that the construction industry has historically excluded minorities and women from
jobs in the industry, and that adjacent communities have historically not benefitted from the economic
development opportunities afforded by large-scale, adjacent projects. Parkin argues that the Port of Oakland
Project Labor Agreement, the first project labor agreement to include community workforce provisions,
emerged because the organized, experienced Oakland organizing community sought to overcome this
systematic exclusion. In this way, previous agreements could not adequately address exclusion and failed to
include communities and their concerns in the agreements, which prompted community advocates to push
for greater inclusion in agreement formulation and provisions. Thus, community workforce provisions
within project labor agreements emerged to address exclusion within previous projects and to ensure
equitable development.
Community benefits agreements similarly arose to ensure that these marginalized residents
participated and had their needs met in the development process. Haas (2012) discusses her involvement as
a community activist driving for the first community benefits agreement in the nation in 2001, concerning
the L.A. Live development project in downtown Los Angeles. She emphasizes that from her perspective, as
executive director of the community organization Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), “the goal of
22
the CBA was community control over development, a goal that resides in a larger human rights development
framework we call urban land reform—a people-centered development framework that establishes a right to
the city for all” (p. 273, emphasis mine). The community sought a CBA in order to alter the way in which
land development traditionally took place, in which the local community was frequently overlooked and
harmed by local development projects.
From the developer side, scholars generally conclude that CBAs have emerged due to the lack of
community influence in the development process, which has driven developers to negotiate to gain
community support (Saito & Truong, 2014; Wolf-Powers, 2010; Liegeois and Carson, 2003). Liegeois and
Carson (2003) argue that activists possess various “leverage points” that they can use to “win benefits for
their communities,” including zoning and environmental approval processes, redevelopment plans and
public subsidies (p. 180). Saito and Truong (2014) note that, “In contrast to the historical conflict between
use and exchange values, CBAs can change the relationship between developers and communities by
fostering collaboration and turning adversaries into partners, which can help developers in the city approval
process and avoid costly delays and lawsuits” (p. 21). Given that large-scale development projects frequently
include significant public subsidies and public approval requirements, the public support generated by
community benefits agreements can be a significant incentive to pursue these agreements (Saito & Truong,
2014; Baxamusa, 2008).
Canon (2014) describes how community opposition can create additional development uncertainty
and drive developers to negotiate CBAs,
“Regulatory and political risk to a proposed development can also be understood as the risk that
needed entitlements—like re-zonings—will not be issued as a result of a change in or lack of
political will. Public and popular opposition to a project often directs that political will. Public
opposition to land use changes, including development agreements, can cause delays and introduce
uncertainty into the process in its late phases, and often set the stage for subsequent litigation. Local
opposition to new developments, often characterized as “NIMBYism” is so widespread as to be a
built-in expectation for developers of controversial or high-intensity projects (such as dense housing
or high-traffic commercial developments). As many as one in five Americans has opposed a new
development by attending hearings, writing or calling elected officials, or gathering petition
signatures. This level of participation is unmatched in other political areas” (p. 801).

23
Thus, through CBAs, developers can reduce this uncertainty and curb opposition “by addressing, early in
the process and in a meaningful way, those externalities and the impulse created by the endowment effect”
(Canon, 2014, p. 803). While the development agreement model does reduce uncertainty in the development
process, it does not actively neutralize community opposition by involving community stakeholders in the
development process; community benefits agreements explicitly do so. Further, in some instances where
developers resist community-led CBA efforts, these efforts have driven developers to engage in DAs, or
“hybrid CBA-DAs” (p. 26). Such seemingly-failed efforts are often perceived as successful, since they
broaden recognition and support for the social justice coalitions and objectives. Coalition participants can
also leverage their position and visibly publicize outcomes (Canon, 2014).
In this way, a new form of agreement has emerged within this negotiated land use paradigm, in
partial response to inadequate community participation within both the land use approval process and
negotiated development agreements. Community development agreements, such as project labor
agreements and community benefits agreements, build upon the development-through-negotiation
foundation established by development agreements; they differ, however, from development agreements in
consequential ways (Camacho, 2013; Seigel, 2014; Selmi, 2010; Baxamusa, 2008; Ryan, 2002).
I discuss this further in the next section, where I introduce the literature for community benefits
agreements and project labor agreements. I conclude this chapter by explaining how these agreements can
similarly be considered as community development agreements, and how this agreement type differs from
previous forms of negotiated land use agreements.
2.5. COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
Generally, CBAs refer to legally binding contracts that address multiple issues and involve significant
community participation (Gross, 2007; Salkin & Lavine, 2008). Research contends that through
participation, CBAs enable community residents and groups to voice their interests by creating an
opportunity for deliberation (Lucas-Darby, 2012; Saito, 2012; Gross, 2007). In contrast to other
24
development approaches, CBA proponents generally aim for “inclusiveness and accountability,” and these
documents frequently contain legal protections for the community (Gross, 2007, p. 36).
19

Local stakeholders generally seek CBAs to ensure that developers confer positive benefits to
communities, beyond simply reducing harmful project impacts (Saito & Truong, 2014; Camacho, 2013;
Salkin & Lavine, 2008; Salkin & Lavine, 2007). The benefits afforded by CBAs vary significantly between
contexts. Thus far, they have included affordable housing, housing loans, and community services such as
childcare, youth centers, health clinics, parks and neighborhood improvement funds. CBAs also often
include targeted hire or “PLA-like provisions to help prevent work stoppages and establish dispute
resolution mechanisms” (Herrera et al., 2014, p. 3).
Parks and Warren (2009) contend that CBAs enable communities to benefit from development
without relying upon the legislative process, which increasingly favors big business and developers over
worker protections and low-income communities. CBAs offer a new approach to bring communities into
the development process, and developers have conceded more benefits to communities in CBAs than occur
within the land use approval process (Been, 2010). This has encouraged changes in the legislative
environment; cities such as Pittsburg and Detroit have considered laws to facilitate and systematize CBAs
(Felton, 2015; Salkin & Lavine, 2007). In addition, Denver passed a living wage requirement for a large
project in response to a CBA process; this eliminated the need for a CBA while setting a larger, more
influential precedent (Parks & Warren, 2009). In this way, the state and local context fundamentally impacts
CBA development. For example, California provides a unique legal and political context that encourages
developers to pursue CBAs; local governments can legally enter into development agreements, and the
environmental review process affords communities significant leverage over developers by enabling lawsuits
that delay projects and drive up costs (Parks & Warren, 2009; Salkin and Lavine, 2007).
Seigel (2014) illustrates the potential benefits afforded by CBAs in contrast to public regulatory
processes; these include greater flexibility to incorporate a “wider range of interests to influence the

19
Gross (2007) defines inclusiveness as “the process through which a CBA is negotiated,” generally referring to which
stakeholders participate. Accountability refers to “the outcome—in particular whether CBA commitments are specific and legally
enforceable” (p. 36).
25
allocation of burdens and benefits of land use decisions, and a wider range of solutions that can be crafted
specifically to meet the needs of the interested participants. The decisional outcomes may thus yield a more
efficient allocation of resources” (p. 55-56). CBAs can also improve democratic participation in the
development process and include residents that would otherwise be excluded from participation, or not
motivated to participate (Seigel, 2014; Saito, 2012; Baxamusa, 2008).
However, not all CBAs exhibit these important characteristics. Gross (2007) distinguishes between
public and private CBAs, which differ based on their legal enforceability. Private CBAs exist between a
developer and community groups, and these parties individually can enforce the agreement terms. In
contrast, public CBAs occur within the land use approval process and lack community enforceability. With
public CBAs, redevelopment agencies or other public agencies sign onto the agreements and retain
enforcement control. The redevelopment agency and the developer can change the agreement at a later date
without community input. Public CBAs remain vulnerable to changes within the agency, including reduced
capacity for monitoring and personnel turnover. Further, enforcement potential varies significantly between
states and local jurisdictions. If undertaken, community-based monitoring generally occurs through informal
means and is not institutionalized; this may place a greater burden on communities and undermine
monitoring over time (Lucas-Darby, 2012; Saito, 2012; Wolf-Powers, 2010; Salkin & Lavine, 2008; Gross,
2007). While private CBAs do not have this same role for government, they generally include government
participation at some point, though the nature of this involvement varies between cases. Private CBAs can
offer significant advantages, since the community role is strengthened, particularly for formal oversight
capabilities (Camacho, 2013).
Accordingly, implementation, including monitoring and enforcement capacity, varies widely between
CBAs (Saito & Truong, 2014; Wolf-Powers, 2010; Baxamusa, 2008; Salkin & Lavine, 2008). Since CBAs are
relatively new, research has just begun to examine whether these agreements achieve their objectives, as
outlined within the agreement. Early evidence indicates that CBAs are often only partially implemented, that
their outcomes frequently fail to materialize, and that they may achieve little community benefits beyond
26
those assured by the land use approval process (Marantz, 2015; Saito & Truong, 2014; Hutson, 2013).
Implementation varies widely between agreements and regions, and outcomes are difficult to track (Salkin &
Lavine, 2008; Salkin & Lavine, 2007).
Some CBAs, such as the L.A. Live CBA, do not allow communities or the local government to fine
the developer for failing to achieve certain goals (Saito, 2012). Others prevent penalties above a certain
dollar amount. With the Gateway Center/ Bronx Terminal Market CBA, for example, the penalty can be no
more than $600,000 (Salkin & Lavine, 2007). Only parties to the contract can legally enforce it; this limits
enforcement capacity, as fragmented and unstable coalitions often serve as signatories (Salkin & Lavine,
2008). Further, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement efforts are expensive for community coalitions.
Therefore, ensuring funding for monitoring and enforcement efforts, as well as creating institutional
memory in the face of personnel turnover, remains a problem (Salkin & Lavine, 2008).
Community Benefits Agreements and Consensus Building
CBAs occur through negotiated processes that involve deliberation between stakeholders.
Community residents and organizations use their leverage to enhance uncertainty and draw developers into
negotiations. Therefore, through meaningful participation in negotiations, CBAs present an opportunity to
alter the way in which urban development traditionally occurs (Saito, 2012; Baxamusa, 2008; Lowe &
Morton, 2008). Baxamusa (2008) contends that CBAs provide a mechanism for community
“empowerment” through organizing and negotiations, though outcomes hinge upon who participates in this
process (p. 261). Camacho (2013) emphasizes that, “[t]o the extent that these agreements integrate the full
range of interests of affected parties, CBAs have the potential to promote and perhaps best approximate the
broader public interest” (p. 364).
Beyond community participation, developers remain a significant influence in CBA processes,
including whether and how to engage in CBA negotiations, the agreement terms, and how these processes
relate to the land use approval process. Camacho (2013) holds that,
“As a result, such agreements typically develop in parallel to the public process but independently of
it... the negotiation process results in less-than-optimal agreements that disproportionately reflect the
27
interests of the developer, since it is entirely up to the developer how much to involve other
stakeholders” (Camacho, 2013, p. 356-357).

Further, communities require significant resources to adequately negotiate CBAs, including legal assistance,
so that funding can be a barrier to negotiation, which can limit or undermine community participation
(Herrera et al., 2014).
Many factors can discourage participation, including inauthenticity and inadequate representation.
20

Primarily, advocates express concern that participating stakeholders come from the affected community,
share the various community concerns and effectively articulate these issues. Lucas-Darby (2012) notes that
sometimes developers engage in community participation solely in order to secure additional government
subsidies that require such input. This context does not encourage developers to seek genuine participation.
Consequently, resident perspectives may fail to inform decision-making. Community stakeholders also vary
in their ability to advocate for their interests, such that some stakeholders claiming to represent community
interests may not actually do so in a representative manner. For example, the Atlantic Yards project used
eminent domain to amass land for a new stadium for the Brooklyn Nets professional basketball team (Salkin
& Lavine, 2007). However, some community organizations were formed just to negotiate for a CBA, and
others were “hand-picked” by the developer to represent the community in negotiations (Saito, 2012, p.
144). Critics contend that most groups actually opposed the project, and that the process lacked
transparency (Saito, 2012; Been, 2010; Salkin & Lavine, 2007).
Frequently, residents use coalitions to generate influence during negotiations. While coalitions do
not necessarily represent the affected community, they tend toward inclusiveness in order to maximize the
coalition’s influence (Gross, 2007). Despite their weaknesses, coalitions remain the standard practice among
those seeking CBAs because coalitions afford communities additional power. For example, during the L.A.
Live CBA negotiation, coalition building enabled residents to share information and resources, and provide
a united community front during negotiations (Saito, 2012). Unions have played an important role as

20
Scholars that have addressed these issues appear most concerned with the extent to which negotiating stakeholders espouse, act
or are recognized to advance the interests of those individuals or groups they claim to represent (e.g. Gross, 2007; Salkin &
Lavine, 2007).
28
coalition members promoting CBAs in Los Angeles. In such coalitions, labor groups partner with other
community interests to create a support base, and seek “locally-driven” benefits that extend beyond labor
interests (Lowe & Morton, 2008, p. 26; Saito & Truong, 2014). For this reason, Lowe & Morton (2008)
argue that, “CBA campaigns create an alternative channel for community organizing in regions, especially
the U.S. South, that have limited union representation and power” (p. 26).
Coalitions remain vulnerable, however, to fragmentation due to conflicting interests, and some
developers may exploit this weakness. In this way, developer expertise in negotiations can divide fragmented
resident interests, which frequently lack adequate representation and experience in formal negotiations
(Wolf-Powers, 2010; Salkin & Lavine, 2008). Further, without a unified coalition, developers or elected
officials may be able to cherry-pick the groups with which they want to negotiate, such as in the New York
City Bronx Terminal Market agreement case (Gross, 2007).
Without a means to ensure that coalitions reflect the community, marginalized interests may remain
marginalized. Coalition members may prefer to advocate for their particular constituencies and interests,
rather than for shared concerns (Wolf-Powers, 2010). Community negotiators may also misrepresent,
misunderstand and/or overlook community interests during negotiations (Been, 2010). For example, by
emphasizing affordable housing, frequently built far from an adjacent community, CBA benefits may not
always target the locals most affected by the project (Saito, 2012; Baxamusa, 2008; Salkin & Lavine, 2008).
Community Benefits Agreements: An Altered Role for Local Government
The proper role for local government in CBAs remains highly contested. However, as with
development agreements, developers willingly enter into CBAs and the negotiation process, such that the
constraints presented by the land use approval process and Nollan and Dolan rulings likely fail to apply to
CBAs. However, CBAs have yet to stand the test of judicial review (Been, 2010; Baxamusa, 2008). Further,
CBAs generally exist between a community coalition and the developer, such that the benefits restrictions
applied by development agreements do not similarly limit CBAs. Therefore, CBAs may impose conditions
on developers beyond what is allowed in the land use approval process and development agreements.
29
In practice, local government’s engagement in community benefits agreement deliberation and
enforcement varies between cases. Local government may not even participate in developing some CBAs,
which reduces local government’s influence in land use decision-making and creates a “parallel process”
(Baxamusa, 2008, p. 266). For this reason, local governments often seek to enhance their influence by
participating in CBAs. In contrast, some CBAs are included in a development agreement, at least in part.
Development agreements codify and establish the local government role within the CBA, and expedite the
development process (Been, 2010). When included in the development agreement, CBAs experience greater
public accountability. However, this model is not always possible, as some states do not permit development
agreements (Salkin & Lavine, 2007).
Local governments can enhance CBA negotiations by assembling groups and mediating, though not
always in a formal capacity. Rather than simply promoting CBAs, local governments can play a key role in
negotiations, and they can directly benefit from CBAs that improve outcomes and produce consensus.
Government participation can also give these CBAs the perception that they are institutionally sanctioned,
and promote developer adherence to the agreement. Local government actors can use their expertise about
the development process to improve information and facilitate CBA development. Many large
developments currently occur in low-income communities with histories of urban renewal and barriers to
participation. With large public subsidies at stake, local governments can use CBAs to ensure that
historically marginalized communities benefit from adjacent projects (Wolf-Powers, 2010; Gross, 2007).
Elected officials often participate in CBA development, though this does not necessarily improve
outcomes or increase community participation. CBAs with significant leadership from elected officials tend
to tackle fewer issues, lack substantial monitoring and enforcement, and involve less transparent and open
processes (Parks & Warren, 2009). Politicians may take positions that conflict with community interests, and
may sway the final agreement in their direction (Been, 2010; Gross, 2007). Elected officials can use CBA
processes to promote their own ends, such as to reduce the stigma related to unpopular projects (Been,
2010). Further, some argue that if CBAs involve local governments, they do not undertake real negotiations
30
apart from the land use approval process; these discussions simply achieve different exactions and may
involve issues and populations not directly related to the project (Been, 2010; Wolf-Powers, 2010; Salkin &
Lavine, 2008; Gross, 2007). For this reason, some scholars are careful to specify a more circumspect role for
elected officials, to oversee negotiations but not direct decision-making (Salkin & Lavine, 2008; Gross,
2007).
Without a legislative check on process, CBAs can provide an additional venue for developers to
exert their power. CBAs enable policy formulation to occur in new ways, with a vague and context-driven
role for local government, and frequently through opaque processes. Rather than retaining control over
decision-making, CBAs can occur without local government influence. Moreover, due to public support, the
CBA process can encourage local government to approve projects that would otherwise have been rejected
or altered. In this context, process matters deeply, since it influences outcomes and occurs without
government protections. CBAs can conflate public and private interests such that the CBA negotiations
process “may be seen as muddying and privatizing public land use regulation” (Camacho, 2013, p. 368).
Therefore, CBAs can potentially harm local communities, if they lack the expertise or information to
adequately weigh the agreement’s benefits and costs (Saito & Truong, 2014; Camacho, 2013; Been, 2010;
Wolf-Powers, 2010).
2.6. PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENTS
Overview of PLAs
In contrast to CBAs, project labor agreements are construction agreements in which contractors or
owners and unions mutually agree upon the labor specifics, often including hiring policies, labor conditions,
and dispute resolution. PLAs arose as a means to address work disruption, which was often caused by
varying working conditions, wages and/or rules on a worksite (Herrera et al., 2014; Philips, 2010; Belman &
Bodah, 2010; Perritt, 1996). PLAs exist on both private and public projects, though they are more common
on private projects. Public PLA requirements have a significant impact, however, since government
disproportionately builds large-scale infrastructure projects (Johnston-Dodds, 2001; Northrup & Alario,
31
1998). PLAs ideally benefit developers and contractors because they streamline disjointed work sites that
involve many companies and work rules, such that they ensure minimal work stoppage and avoid related
project delays (Kotler, 2009; Johnston-Dodds, 2001).
21

PLAs began in the 1930s, though their origins can be traced to a World War I agreement between
the Secretary of War and the American Federation of Labor President, in which the Secretary of War agreed
to union pay for military-related construction if the unions agreed to open hiring on these projects beyond
unions. Similar agreements became more common during World War II, to avoid work stoppage and ensure
overtime pay related to atomic energy and space and missile sites (Belman & Bodah, 2010, p. 3; Johnston-
Dodds, 2001; Perritt, 1996). Project labor agreements have governed historic, large-scale projects such as the
Hoover Dam and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and were commonly used on atomic energy projects in the
1940s (Belman & Bodah, 2010; Perritt, 1996). The first California PLA was the Shasta Dam, under
construction from 1938 to 1945 (Philips, 2010). While their use declined in the 1950s, project labor
agreements became more popular after a few notable events, including significant wage inflation in the
1970s, and after many state courts deemed affirmative action unconstitutional (Mayer, 2010, Perritt, 1996).
22

PLAs are particularly effective at ensuring that projects are not delayed due to labor issues, including
worker and union disputes, a lack of streamlined work and labor agreements between trades, including work
hours and tasks, and inadequate supplies of skilled labor (Belman & Bodah, 2010; Siegel, 2000). Critically,
unions give up their right to strike under PLAs; these agreements generally include provisions for dispute
resolution, including that involved parties seek to avoid, and when necessary, remedy disputes quickly, or
face significant penalties (Belman & Bodah, 2010). Thus, even when a work stoppage occurs on projects
governed by PLAs, it ends quickly. In exchange for this additional certainty and efficiency, the project
owners and/or contractors commit to hiring a minimum percentage from the union dispatch list, so that

21
According to Kotler (2009), “On a typical construction project operation without the benefit of a PLA, there can be fifteen or
more different collective bargaining agreements covering work being performed by various crafts…[which] are not generally
coordinated in any meaningful way” (p. 2-3).
22
Perritt (1996) notes that, “When construction industry wage inflation led a general price inflation that accelerated through the
early 1970s, a variety of efforts to reform the employee relations structure in the construction industry further increased interest in
project labor agreements” (p. 70).
32
union workers are hired. Further, all the jobs produced meet union labor standards, including nonunion
workers, such that these individuals are paid higher wages and represented by the union grievance process.
Thus, PLAs are intended to benefit both signatory parties. Often, hiring is restricted geographically
(Langworthy, 1995). PLAs usually occur prior to the hiring process. They remain possible in the
construction industry due to an exception in the National Labor Relations Act, though this policy prohibits
prehire agreements in other industries (GAO, 1998).
23

PLAs remain extremely controversial and their outcomes are contested. Many question whether
PLAs are efficient, fair and legal, since they alter the bargaining process and can increase project costs.
According to the General Accounting Office (1998),
“Proponents say that PLAs provide economic benefits such as (1) avoidance of work stoppages on
long-term projects during which collective bargaining agreements of different craft unions expire, (2)
uniform work rules for different crafts working on the same project, and (3) access to a skilled labor
force through the union referral systems. Opponents say that, among other things, PLAs,
particularly in the public sector (1) discourage competition by favoring union companies and (2)
result in higher costs due to the restricted number of bidders, higher union wages, and the
imposition of union work rules” (p. 1-2).
24

Opponents further claim that the benefits that PLAs do provide are concentrated on the referent workers
and contractors, rather than all workers, contractors and the public (Belman & Bodah, 2010). However, it
remains difficult to address these assertions and undertake direct project comparisons, due to
methodological challenges such as the high variation between construction projects (GAO, 1998). In this
way, PLA outcomes continue to be debated.
Project labor agreements can generate significant benefits for unions and union workers, particularly
considering that unionization rates have declined drastically in the construction industry. Unionization rates
have shrunk from approximately 50 percent union density in the 1950s to its current levels, where only 14

23
As Langworthy (1995) explains, “Under the original version of the NLRA, all pre-hire agreements were illegal because the
agreements appointed a sole union representative before an election of union members had been held. However, when Congress
recognized the impact this constraint had on the construction industry, Congress amended the NLRA to allow contractors to
enter into pre-hire agreements” (p. 1107). Approved by Congress in 1959, this is known as the “construction industry proviso”
(29 U.S.C. Section 158(f)) (Johnston-Dodds, 2001).
24
Belman and Bodah (2010) clarify the union competition claim. “Because PLAs require that all contractors working on a project
adhere to a collective bargaining agreement, even non-union contractors must operate under negotiated rules. These contractors
complain that PLAs remove their competitive advantage, require them to use union workers from hiring halls rather than their
own employees, and require them to contribute to union-sector health care and pension funds from which their own employees
are unlikely to benefit” (p. 3).
33
percent of construction workers are union members and 15 percent of workers are represented by unions
(BLS, 2015; Kosla, 2014). Lower unionization rates have contributed to inadequate supplies of skilled
workers in construction, and unions have historically provided job training and ensured that a skilled
construction workforce existed (Belman & Bodah, 2010). Unions improve access to job training, through
the necessary classes, apprenticeship programs, and on-the-job training to gain skills. Adequate skill
development takes many years, and unions historically enabled this process, such that lower unionization
rates have contributed to fewer apprentices and trained workers (Belman & Bodah, 2010; Northrup &
Alario, 1998).
25

At the same time, nonunion construction firms have become more common, and many now have
the capacity to bid on large-scale projects with PLAs, though many still contend that PLAs effectively
prevent nonunion contractors from bidding on projects (Northrup & Alario, 1998; Langworthy, 1995).
They assert that PLAs favor union contractors because PLAs require nonunion contractors to significantly
alter their normal business practices, including paying higher wages and providing benefits, which requires
higher productivity than lower-skilled, nonunion workers usually achieve (Northrup & Alario, 1998;
Langworthy, 1995). Belman and Bodah (2010) articulate the differences between union and nonunion firms,
“Higher wages and benefits can be a particular problem for nonunion contractors who use relatively
large numbers of semi-skilled workers rather than follow the union model of smaller numbers of
highly skilled workers. The lower productivity of semi-skilled workers is economical if they can be
paid relatively low wages, but the arrangement may not be workable at union rates. Depending on
the terms of the PLA, nonunion contractors may be required to hire some or all of their employees
from a union hall. Differences in work rules regarding time keeping, persons allowed to do various
types of work, and time off may also make working under union rules challenging. Nonunion
contractors may also be required to pay into funds to support apprenticeship training, safety
programs, and other institutions common to organized employers. A common complaint is that
nonunion contractors may have to pay into both their firms’ pension and health funds and into
union programs, but evidence of double payments is scarce” (Belman & Bodah, 2010, p. 30-31).

25
As Belman and Bodah (2010) note, “In the past, much of the training of construction workers took place in apprenticeship
programs overseen by join labor/management committees. These programs were financed by contractually mandated employer
contributions determined by the number of hours worked by a trade. The joint governance structure proved to be effective in
providing broad skills training economically. With the large-scale shift to nonunion employment, the apprenticeship system has
declined. The lack of large-scale training systems in the nonunion sector was not an issue for many years because many of its
workers had been trained in joint apprenticeship programs. Over the past 20 years, however, the lack of effective training systems
in the nonunion sector has increasingly affected the ability to deliver high-quality projects Thus, training has become an issue for
construction stakeholders” (p. 5).
34
PLAs have become highly politicized, with their use subject to the prevailing political climate. The
Association of Building Contractors, which is a trade association representing nonunion contractors, has
actively lobbied against project labor agreements with significant success (The Truth About PLAs, 2015).
President George H.W. Bush signed Executive Order 12818 in 1992, which effectively prevented project
labor agreements, as labor and construction groups could not enter into agreements, and federal funds could
not discriminate against nonunion firms. However, President Clinton revoked this action only 11 days into
his first term as president (Kussy & Cooke, 2010; Northrup & Alario, 1998; Langworthy, 1995). In 2001,
President George W. Bush used Executive Order 13202 to prevent project labor agreements from occurring
on federal projects (Kussy & Cooke, 2010). Most recently, PLAs received support at the national level after
President Obama signed Executive Order 13502 in 2009 to advocate for PLAs on federally funded, large-
scale projects, arguing that PLAs improve construction efficiency and timeliness (Mayer, 2010; The White
House, 2009). PLAs have been contested in the court system numerous times, but they have been
consistently upheld, including at the U.S. Supreme Court in the Boston Harbor case (Johnston-Dodds,
2001).
26

Project Labor Agreements and Community Development
Since approximately the early 2000s, PLAs have expanded from their historically circumspect scope
to commonly include community development provisions. Rooted in regional efforts to enhance local hire
in construction in the 1970s, the Port of Oakland PLA is generally considered a path-breaking PLA due to
its explicit inclusion of social justice concerns (Belman & Bodah, 2010; Parkin, 2003; Johnston-Dodds,
2001). This effort arose due to recognition that construction work is inherently place-based, and the jobs
created by large-scale infrastructure projects present important employment opportunities that can
contribute to local economic development. Further, the Port of Oakland PLA sought to address the

26
507 U.S. 218 1993; Langworthy (1995) clarifies that this decision did not necessarily uphold the validity of project labor
agreements, but rather found that “the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preempt a pre-hire agreement between a
state and a union consortium” (p. 1104-1105). Accordingly, he argues that, “Subsequently, several courts and public agencies have
misinterpreted the Boston Harbor decision to stand for the proposition that project-labor agreement use is unrestricted” (p. 1105).
Regardless, the prevailing legal interpretation upholds project labor agreements as legal, and cites the Boston Harbor case as legal
precedent for this judgment.
35
historical, pervasive discrimination and exclusion of women and people of color from union construction
jobs. Notably, stakeholders engaged in the Port of Oakland redevelopment recognized the potential for
community development. They sought to expand the agreement scope to achieve social justice ends through
local economic development, to ensure that the local community captured the economic spillovers
produced by the project. Accordingly, the PLA is cited as the first to explicitly seek to foster community
development, and include provisions for local hire of disadvantaged workers, workforce training and local
contractors and small businesses utilization. The PLA created a Social Justice Committee to monitor and
enforce the agreement (Parkin, 2003; Johnston-Dodds, 2001). The PLA is generally considered successful,
especially as compared to previous projects that lacked an agreement, and as a result, it became the model
for subsequent PLAs (Belman & Bodah, 2010; Parkin, 2003).
PLAs now frequently include provisions to alter jobs distributions, provide job training, and target
resources to local programs and businesses, particularly disadvantaged, minority-owned and women-owned
businesses. The courts have upheld the legality of project labor agreements as a means to attempt to
increase diversity in construction employment, by using local hire and similar classifications as a proxy for
race or gender-based hiring (Parkin, 2003). PLAs also commonly address considerations such as health and
safety on project sites, and larger community benefits issues, including jobs distributions, targeted worker
and firm hiring to increase local economic spillovers, and worker training (Figueroa, Grabelsky & Lamare,
2011; Belman & Bodah, 2010; Garland & Suafai, 2002).
27
Health provisions are critically important given the
perils of construction sites, which are notoriously dangerous; in 2013, construction had the highest fatality
rate of any industry sector. Thus, many PLAs include specifications intended to enhance worksite safety,
which also make projects more cost-efficient (BLS, 2013a; Belman & Bodah, 2010).
Given the range of issues that PLAs now address, the terminology concerning PLAs can be
somewhat unclear. PLAs that specifically seek to promote community development are sometimes called
Community Workforce Agreements. Other PLAs remain classified as PLAs with Community Workforce

27
“”Targeted hire” is a policy initiative aimed at increasing employment opportunities for disadvantaged workers, who often
experience difficulty accessing the construction workforce pipeline. The value of targeted hire is that it creates institutional
mechanisms to increase the availability and accessibility of opportunities for these workers (Herrera et al., 2014, p. 12).
36
Provisions, and similarly aim to foster community development (Figueroa, Grabelsky & Lamare, 2011;
Herrera et al., 2014; Villao & Le, 2012; Belman & Bodah, 2010). PLAs can effectively target work because
they are a legal means of altering normal union dispatching procedures. In contrast to the traditional hiring
process, in which unions refer workers sequentially based off an out-of-work list, PLAs enable preferential
hiring of targeted individuals such that unions do not have to dispatch in order (Herrera et al., 2014).
28
In
the western United States, these agreements arose to meet community pressure for more inclusive
employment in construction (Figueroa, Grabelsky & Lamare, 2011). Such PLAs foster community
development by training construction workers, to ensure that the created construction jobs provide
workforce training, good wages, benefits and retirement, and accordingly generate construction career
opportunities (Philips, 2010).
PLAs can connect job training to employment opportunities, and such training is crucial to
improving access to construction careers. Ensuring that PLAs create construction careers is fundamental to
using these agreements to foster community development, to make certain that these agreements produce
good, local jobs with long-term career prospects, which go to local disadvantaged residents who would
otherwise lack the skills or opportunity to access these jobs. Apprenticeship requirements are the central
mechanism to achieve this objective, to encourage construction companies to employ construction
apprentices, who need to complete on-the-job training hours to advance within the industry to journeyman
(skilled worker) status. Eligible community residents enter the industry and advance through these pre-
apprenticeship and apprenticeship programs, which help workers gain the soft and technical skills required

28
The dispatch process is the way in which unions refer workers onto jobsites. Union members cannot take a job on a union site
without being dispatched by a union hall. When an eligible union member is out of work, either because a job ended, they were
terminated or they finish the apprenticeship training, he or she is placed at the bottom of the out-of-work list. Workers only
advance up the list as the preceding individuals are hired, so a slow construction market means there is little movement up the
dispatch list. Construction contractors contact the union hall when they need a worker, and the union hall is required to send the
worker(s) at the top of the dispatch list. Once the worker’s employment with that contractor ends, the worker returns to the
union hall and is placed at the bottom of out-of-work list. Some unions make exceptions for individuals that were only hired for a
brief period such as one day, and place them at the top of the list again. Each union has its own procedure, but generally seeks to
ensure fairness and predictability in hiring, to the benefit of all members. Project labor agreements are unique and effective at
targeting labor because these agreements allow unions to prioritize hiring based on socioeconomic or geographic characteristics, a
practice that is otherwise not permitted. Under a project labor agreement that seeks to hire local workers, for example, a union
dispatcher sends the local worker that is highest on the dispatch list, rather than the individual (regardless of where they live) at
the top of the list (Interview with Respondents 16 and 24).
37
in construction (Figueroa, Grabelsky and Lamare, 2011, p. 6; Villao & Le, 2012).
29
Thus, creating a
construction pipeline that successfully directs unskilled residents into sustaining employment in construction
requires substantial resources to support workers, but is crucial to ensure that disadvantaged residents gain
access to union jobs in construction.
Beyond the individual jobs produced, some CBAs and PLAs include provisions for women and
minority business enterprises (WMBE) or disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) utilization, to
additionally benefit marginalized communities through broader wealth creation. WMBEs and DBEs are
important because they tend to employ underrepresented workers at higher rates and involve opportunities
for wealth creation through business ownership (Herrera et al., 2014; Interview with Respondent 8). Yet,
barriers to utilization remain for many of these businesses, including timely payment for services rendered,
as these businesses are frequently too small to withstand significant periods of nonpayment. Thus,
successful WMBE and DBE utilization often requires altering standard practice and business support
(Herrera et al., 2014; Interview with Respondents 12, 14 and 15).
Community workforce provisions are becoming standard practice within PLAs. Figueroa, Grabelsky
and Lamare (2011) undertook a content analysis of over 185 project labor agreements over 15 years, to
assess the commonality of community workforce provisions. They found that many agreements include
community workforce provisions, to target jobs to local residents who are economically disadvantaged (45
PLAs), veterans (139 PLAs) and/or women or members of an underrepresented group (103 PLAs); and
requirements for hiring apprentices (100 PLAs), including local residents (25 PLAs). Further, 36 PLAs of
the 185 PLAs specified targets for women or minority owned businesses, small businesses, and 65

29
Figueroa, Grabelsky and Lamare (2011) note that, “Giving targeted populations privileged access to union-based apprenticeship
programs is meaningful only if there are sufficient employment opportunities for apprentices. Pre-apprenticeship programs can
recruit individuals and prepare them for successful entry into and completion of skilled crafts apprenticeships, but progress
through the apprenticeship requires a stipulated number of hours worked each year. So there must be sufficient demand for
apprentices in order for the system to deliver on its promise of lifetime construction careers. Moreover, the union-based
apprenticeship system is supported and sustained by the collective bargaining process, of which PLAs and CWAs are now an
increasingly important part. That apprenticeship system represents the most effective training mechanism in the United States,
with 15,000 certified instructors, 1,500 state-of-the-art training facilities, and hundreds of millions of dollars of private capital.
Construction contractors generally lack the resources or will to invest in training on their own. Given the transient nature of
employment in the industry, individual employers fear that investments in training their current employees might benefit their
competitors when their current employees go to work for other employers. But through the collective bargaining process,
employers agree to invest in jointly administered apprenticeship programs that offer industry-wide skills training” (p. 6).
38
agreements addressed implementation and monitoring, sometimes including community-based
organizations.
30
Only three percent of PLAs had no community workforce provisions, and almost half had
between 4 and 9 such provisions. Further, the authors found that the most recent PLAs all included at least
one community workforce provision, and argue that these provisions are becoming more common within
PLAs such that PLAs appear to be increasingly used to achieve larger community development objectives.
CWA provision types evidenced regional variation; Mid-Atlantic PLAs were more likely to include
community workforce stipulations, while PLAs in the West and Northeast were more likely to include
language related to local hire, implementation and economic disadvantage (Figueroa, Grabelsky and Lamare,
2011).
However, construction work presents many challenges as a means to foster community
development. Accordingly, construction projects include many different employers; general contractors
employ subcontractors that specialize in a certain trade to complete different parts of the project. As
Belman and Bodah (2010) describe,
“Construction workers are defined by their occupation more so than by their employers. Skill
development is specific to a trade—electricians do not have the skills to do the work of carpenters
or pipefitters—and once workers have acquired substantial skills within a trade they usually remain
in that trade. Moreover, most firms are occupationally structured. They provide a specific type of
service, such as electrical contracting, plumbing, pipefitting, painting, or roofing. Even general
contractors seldom employ more than the basic trades—for example, carpenters, ironworkers,
laborers, operating engineers, and bricklayers—and may obtain even these workers by
subcontracting with specialty employers. The occupational structure of construction makes skill
development central to the success and efficiency of the industry and supports the easy movement
of employers between employers” (Belman & Bodah, 2010, p. 4).

Generally, many subcontractors are working on a site at the same time. Thus, coordination becomes a
central prerequisite to effective construction management, and ensuring timely project completion. Work
disruptions against one employer disrupt the entire project, because construction work is deeply intertwined.

30
“Pre-apprenticeships are workforce development programs that prepare people, particularly, low-income individuals and non-
traditional construction workers such as women and people of color, to enter the construction trades. These programs bring
significant value to the construction industry; they conduct the initial outreach, recruitment, and screening of potential employees,
and provide contractors with a workforce that is prepared with the necessary skills and knowledge for entry-level work. Since pre-
apprenticeship programs provide training and services for targeted individuals and are portals to diversity hires that help
contractors meet hiring goals, any targeted initiative should invest in these programs and facilitate resources for their success”
(Herrera et al., 2014, p. 76).
39
Unemployment presents a serious concern, as manifested during the recent recession, since construction is
vulnerable to larger economic conditions (Belman & Bodah, 2010; Kotler, 2009). Job training programs
frequently churn out individuals looking for jobs that may not exist during construction lulls, and yet such
programs may not be able to produce sufficient numbers for peak construction periods. This employment
context is further complicated by construction labor market, which expands beyond the local region;
workers travel far for temporary work, such that the construction labor market is competitive and expansive
(Giuliano, Blanco & Bahl, 2013, p. 25; Belman & Bodah, 2010).
31

PLA Negotiation
PLAs are negotiated on a project or set of projects, so that they are generally ad hoc interventions in
which agreements can vary widely and are not systematized. For this reason, the negotiation process deeply
influences the agreement produced and the outcomes promised to stakeholders (Belman & Bodah, 2010).
Garland & Suafai (2002) argue that certain project characteristics promote PLA development, including: a
larger scale; projects occurring within an organized community with previous PLAs and existing training
programs; regions with insufficient labor supply; and backing from elected officials. In contrast, PLAs are
less likely to occur in areas that lack community-labor coalitions, and in states with a system that is “hostile
to PLAs” (p. 9). Given the frequency with which PLAs are negotiated, stakeholders including the building
trades have developed expertise in negotiations and agreement terms, as well as methods for standardizing

31
Perritt (1996) further illustrates employment market instability in construction. He states, “most construction enterprises do not
maintain a significant workforce unless they are working on a particular job. Therefore, the level of employment at any particular
construction enterprise fluctuates widely. Employment levels also fluctuate because of cyclical forces in the economy. Thus, when
investment expenditure increases, construction activity increases and employment levels rise. During recessionary periods,
construction activity and employment decline sharply. An industry in which such fluctuations in employment predominate must
have institutional arrangements to deal with those fluctuations. Generally there is no fixed group of employees in a defined area
employed by a construction firm in a continuing work relationship. By contrast, in an industry such as the steel industry, there
exists a continuous working relationship between employer and employee, Workers at a steel plant do not, on the whole, move on
to other projects once a certain amount of steel has been produced. The steel industry, unlike the construction industry, is not
occasional or seasonal in nature. Finally, because construction work is conducted by specialized firms, each performing a
particular type of task, employees from different firms regularly work side by side and must integrate their activities. For example,
the employees of a plumbing subcontractor may be installing water pipe in the same space that the employees of an electrical
subcontractor are installing electrical conduit. The industrial relations literature long has recognized that dramatically different
employment terms of employees working side by side lead to dissatisfaction and disrupt work. Collective bargaining in the
construction industry adapted to these unique market characteristics before detailed regulation of collective bargaining existed.
The construction labor market developed collective bargaining as a self-regulating mechanism to channel the competing interests
of employees and entrepreneurs at different levels of the product chain” (p. 71-72).

40
these agreements across different contexts. Regardless, this ad hoc process still produces significant local
variation, as is characteristic of all development agreements, including the extent to which communities are
involved and outreach occurs. Such variation occurs partly from necessity, so that each PLA can be
successful in varied conditions, and partly due to the terms that individual project owners and/or
contractors, and the building trades agree upon. Regardless, stakeholders still expend considerable resources
negotiating individual agreements locally, and local engagement and relationships are a key component of
negotiations and implementation (Herrera et al., 2014; Belman & Bodah, 2010; Interview with Respondent
9).
While some scholars identify community participation as an important factor in producing and
shaping PLAs, little research has directly concerned the role of community stakeholders. Existing research
notes that community groups have sought additional community workforce provisions within PLAs,
advocating for greater workforce diversity in construction. Such advocacy often takes the form of labor-
community coalitions that include unions, community groups, disadvantaged residents and disadvantaged
contracting firms (Herrera et al., 2014; Garland & Suafai, 2002). Community participation can occur through
direct or indirect involvement in negotiations; while community stakeholders are not signatories, their
participation in negotiations can meaningfully influence the agreement. Thus, community groups and
representatives play an important, albeit distinctly overlooked, role in project labor agreements, particularly
during implementation (Garland & Suafai, 2002).
PLA Implementation
As Figueroa, Grabelsky and Lamare (2011) note, PLA outcomes hinge on implementation, and
many factors can influence implementation. Pre-apprenticeship programs are crucial to ensuring that eligible
workers gain necessary skills and are directed into construction careers. Flexibility and coordination between
unions, contractors and workers is essential, since it enables stakeholders to adapt to changing conditions
and unexpected barriers (Figueroa, Grabelsky & Lamare, 2011). Stakeholder commitment to the PLA
objectives and process can improve coordination and expedite conflict resolution because it drives
41
stakeholders to work toward a successful and timely overall project and to preserve relationships for future
PLAs (Belman & Bodah, 2010). Further, achieving local hire can take time, as contractors gain the necessary
experience (Philips, 2010). Local factors can also deeply influence outcomes; previous PLA implementation
indicates that connecting training programs to jobs for program graduates, as well as providing
disadvantaged workers with necessary support services, influences outcomes (Philips, 2010; Garland &
Suafai, 2002).
Implementation is also supported by various characteristics throughout policymaking and
implementation, including “clear policy language,” such as specified goals and consequences for
noncompliance (Herrera et al., 2014, p. 70). Chimenti (2010) found that PLAs sometimes experience partial
compliance, and thus partial implementation, due to inadequate “political will to enforce the agreement” (p.
11). She concludes that of all implementation factors, including barriers to employment within the
construction industry for underrepresented workers, incentives or penalties to promote compliance most
directly relate to whether a PLA achieved its outcomes.
How outcomes get measured is particularly important and can determine whether an agreement
meets its goals. It is most difficult for small subcontractors to meet local hiring requirements. As a result,
smaller subcontractors may produce fewer outcomes, despite that many PLAs prioritize small business
utilization. However, measuring outcomes at the general contractor level enables a project to be considered
a success even if some sub-contractors miss the targets, as long as others exceed them (Philips, 2010).
PLA Monitoring
Stipulations for monitoring vary significantly, but remain fundamental to ensuring that outcomes
materialize. Monitoring can occur by internal or external groups, and can include the community in a
formalized capacity such as by designating on-site representatives (such as with the Sound Transit PLA in
Seattle) or a formal committee to oversee and influence implementation (such as with the Port of Oakland
PLA). Key considerations include the reporting structure, access to data, including on-site observations, and
the extent to which a PLA includes the ability to sanction non-compliance (Garland & Suafai).
42
Such agreements frequently need, but rarely include, outside compliance mechanisms to enable third
parties to observe implementation and outcomes. Such provisions, including sanctions, are important to
ensuring that the community workforce outcomes materialize (Garland & Suafai). Herrera et al. (2014) argue
that,
“A targeted hire initiative needs a robust compliance system with “teeth”; meaning that it has a
system of clear workforce goals, strategies and expected outcomes that is connected to active
monitoring, transparency, and consequences when there is a breach. It should include a multi-
stakeholder advisory body, penalties and incentives, and dedicated funding, staffing and active
compliance systems” (Herrera et al., 2014, p. 6).

Without mechanisms for ensuring compliance, including participation by an array of stakeholders, they note
that targeted hire initiatives may not produce outcomes. Garland and Suafai (2002) summarize this dilemma,
and state that, “The community can either depend on the goodwill of management and labor, or community
representatives can advocate their interests directly” (p. 16).
However, community input into compliance is frequently difficult. It varies between agreements,
since community groups are not agreement signatories. Community groups frequently enforce agreements
as third parties, without institutional resources or support, and without a formal role (Herrera et al., 2014).
Regardless, community organizations have come to play an important role in implementation, including
monitoring and enforcement. Community participation in enforcement has arisen out of necessity, since
these agreements lack support from federal and state policies and thus depend upon enterprising
community-based organizations to ensure that implementation occurs (Swanstrom & Banks, 2008, p. 364).
Thus, community-based organizations (CBOs) “have stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the
withdrawal of the federal government from affirmative action in construction” though such community-
driven efforts tend to seek geographically targeted hire rather than racially targeted hire, including to groups
such as African American workers (Swanstrom & Banks, 2008).
While project labor agreements were once more restricted to collective bargaining, these agreements
now frequently attempt to use urban development to generate community development through community
workforce provisions. Project labor agreements with community workforce provisions offer an important
43
opportunity to target the economic development spillovers generated by large-scale project construction to
local communities. However, while the scale of many of these projects means that project labor agreements
can have an enormous impact, implementation continues to occur on an ad hoc basis. For this reason, it
remains crucial to assess the outcomes that PLAs systematically produce, to understand the extent to which
these agreements produce community development.
2.7. CONCEPTUALIZING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
With the literature related to project labor agreements and community benefits agreements thus
reviewed, in this section, I argue that these agreements can similarly be viewed as community development
agreements, a new and unique agreement type. I present this typology in Table 1. There is a basis in the
literature for viewing these agreements as similar types, though this perspective is not widespread. Liegeois
& Carson (2003) and Siegel (2000) classify development agreements, project labor agreements and
community benefits agreements together, as agreements that similarly aim to ensure that communities
benefit from projects that include public contracts and/or subsidies. Liegeois and Carson also include
neutrality agreements, in which employers remain neutral to organizing activities, and different types of
legislation, including living wages.
32
Cummings (2009) also positions CBAs and PLAs within a broader
strategy to enact local protections for low-wage workers, which have largely emerged from inadequate
federal legislation. These local protections have taken many forms, including efforts to influence local
contracting and land use regulation.
33
Cummings views CBAs and PLAs as part of this land use expression
of this broader strategy, which leverages local government authority of land development to enact
protections for low-wage workers.
Seigel’s (2014) work is also relevant here; he notes that CBAs can circumvent the land use approval
process. He hints at negative consequences for communities, as unions can exert an enormous influence
over the CBA process at the expense of community stakeholders. He says,

32
For example, the Living Wage Ordinance in Los Angeles, and the neutrality provision within the Los Angeles Staples Center
CBA (Cummings, 2009).
33
For example, the Los Angeles Sweat-Free Procurement Ordinance (Cummings, 2009).
44
“because CBAs are negotiated in the shadow of government, free from the strictures of mandatory
public oversight, important questions of transparency and representation must be addressed.
Unions’ intentional strategy of using CBAs to evade the strictures of a highly reclusive federal labor
law regime, for instance, raises the specter that unions’ advantages in community organizing may
overwhelm a process aimed at resolving local issues—not because labor has any vested interest in
the land-related impacts of the development itself, but because the process serves the instrumental
end of circumventing federal law. The prevalence of labor interests that infused the Newhallvile
CBA negotiation reflects the muscular political power of new union-affiliated politicians in New
Haven, and perhaps suggests a need for enhanced scrutiny when the boundaries between private
negotiations and public approval processes begin to dissolve” (p. 7).
34

However, existing research largely fails to articulate PLAs and CBAs agreements together as a new form of
agreement related to, but distinct from, land use regulatory mechanisms and development agreements. This
work does not consider the implications of this new model for its end goal of promoting community
benefits. In my dissertation, I establish community development agreements as a new land use agreement
type, and I explore how implementation occurs and the outcomes produced, in an effort to bridge this
literature gap.
Community development agreements differ from development agreements because they lack a
systematic, formal role for government. Development agreements face significant limitations due to
constitutional restrictions, because they include local government participating in a formal role and
exercising its powers. While community development agreements such as CBAs and PLAs vary significantly
in form, they often include no such formal role for government, and thus they are less regulated than
development agreements and the land use approval process. As Nadler (2010) notes, some CBAs can be
“considered to be a private action rather than a governmental action” such that the takings restrictions do
not apply (p. 605). Similarly, the role for government varies fundamentally with project labor agreements,
depending on their status as project owner, project administrator or simply the body with the authority to
grant project approval.

34
According to Seigel (2014), “where the negotiations involve labor-related commitments like neutrality and card check
agreements, the “private” nature of the contract is essential to avoid the preemptive force of federal labor law. Under federal
labor law, district courts are able to enforce contracts in which unions and employers agree to specific provisions that would
otherwise be governed by federal statutes—including agreements by the developer to remain neutral during union organizing
campaigns, and provisions through which the employer will automatically recognize the union (without a secret ballot vote) if the
union shows that a majority of employees have signed cards agreeing to be represented by the union. However, these agreements
must be private; local government involvement in shaping the rules governing union organizing is precluded by federal labor law”
(p. 20-21).
45
Table 1: Typology of Land Use Agreements

Land Use
Approval Process
Development
Agreements
Community
Development
Agreements: CBA
Community Development
Agreements: PLA
Local
government role
Regulatory body Formal signatory For CBAs, there is
frequently no formal role
for local government
For public PLAs, a
government/quasi-government
body is signatory, though no
formal role exists for local
government; for private PLAs,
no formal role for local
government
Community role No formal role, but
can advocate for
certain outcomes;
not recognized as a
formal stakeholder
No formal role, but
can advocate for
certain outcomes;
not recognized as a
formal stakeholder
Often a formal
participant or advocate in
negotiations; recognized
as a formal stakeholder
Often a formal participant or
advocate in negotiations;
recognized as a formal
stakeholder
Negotiation No formal
negotiation
Occurs between
developer and
government
Occurs between the
developer and community
representatives, though
local government
sometimes mediates or
participates informally
Occurs between project owner
and building trades/unions;
government may be project
owner; community
representatives often act lobby
for agreement and/or project
to local government officials,
and sometimes confer with
unions and/or developers
Community
Role During
Implementation
Government retains
enforcement
capacity
Government retains
enforcement
capacity
Does not directly
implement the agreement;
dependent on agreement
terms; generally limited to
signatory groups; often
community enforcement
occurs as a third-party
watchdog/advocate
Does not directly implement
the agreement; dependent on
agreement terms; generally
limited to signatory groups;
often community enforcement
occurs from a third-party
watchdog/advocate
Legal status Enabled by the
police powers of the
state
Enabled by
legislation and the
fact that they are
entered into
voluntarily
Enabled by the fact that
they are voluntary
agreements opted into by
stakeholders
Enabled by the fact that they
are voluntary agreements opted
into by stakeholders
Public funding/
resources
Public oversight Public oversight;
Frequently include
dedications to
government
Depending on whether
they are private or public;
CBAs largely govern
projects with significant
public subsidies, funding
and/or discretion
Depending on whether they are
private or public; PLAs often
govern projects with significant
public subsidies, funding
and/or discretion
Constitutional
limitations
Government
takings restrictions,
cannot contract out
police powers
DAs are considered
voluntary
agreements, such
that takings
restrictions do not
apply
[If government is a
signatory] CBAs are
considered voluntary
agreements, such that
takings restrictions do not
apply
[If government is a signatory]
PLAs are considered voluntary
agreements, such that takings
restrictions do not apply

In contrast to development agreements, community development agreements and project labor
agreements with community workforce provisions explicitly seek to bring about community development.
While under development agreements, developers direct provisions to the public in exchange for greater
46
development certainty, participation generally remains exclusively between local government (acting on
behalf of the larger public) and the developer. In contrast, community development agreements specifically
target the community adjacent to the project for benefits, through provisions such as job targeting,
workforce development, affordable housing, public parks, and so forth.
Further, community development agreements include the local community in the deliberation
process, in order to secure benefits for this group. CDAs are not just development agreements with
community benefits provisions; most aim to include community perspectives, or rely on community
stakeholder in meaningful ways, and often with some role in enforcement (Liegeois & Carson, 2003). This
process moves negotiations from a “bilateral” to “multilateral” process (Camacho, 2013; Camacho, 2005).
Even when the community is not involved in a formal capacity, they remain the intended beneficiary, such
that the role of community remains fundamentally different than under the development agreement model.
Due to this flexible role for stakeholders, including local government and residents, some CDAs can
exist in a fundamentally different regulatory context than development agreements. Nadler (2010) addresses
this point related to CBAs, and holds that this additional flexibility can encourage some stakeholders to
engage in CBAs, as compared to development agreements, as the latter are more restrictive. For example, he
asserts that, “[p]oliticians might believe that through CBA negotiations, they are able to make an end-run
around the limited conditions they can impose on developers through the normal land use processes, or
they might derive second-hand benefits if constituents are able to address their own needs through CBAs,
rather than relying on elected officials to meet them” (Nadler, 2010, p. 591).
While this argument is only just emerging within CBA and legal research, I use this dissertation to
clarify how community development agreements frequently bypass the land use approval process, with
varying outcomes for the communities they intend to benefit. Moreover, these agreements often produce ad
hoc, contested implementation processes, since, as I later argue, community influence systematically declines
as the agreement moves from the formulation to the implementation process. This ad hoc implementation
can either reduce or enhance equality, depending on how these efforts are undertaken. For this reason,
47
engaging in community development agreements creates meaningful tensions, which planning practitioners
and scholars must understand and confront.
Scholars have noted the challenges inherent to CBA processes, due to their varying position vis-à-vis
the land use approval process and the role of government. As Camacho articulates, by employing private
negotiations rather than public processes, CBAs
“undoubtedly have an uneasy and unclear relationship with public land use decision making as they
are currently used... CBAs are not wholly private, as they obligate stakeholders to support or
acquiesce in development applications that are before public decision makers. Yet they are not
public agreements either, as they are typically negotiated without the involvement of public
authorities and entered into only by private parties. Treating CBAs as both supplemental and distinct
from the public land use process creates a new category of agreement that introduces various legal
uncertainties, including their questionable validity, enforceability, and relationship to regulatory
exactions” (p. 374-375).

Therefore, unlike in the land use approval process or development agreements, in which the government
and developer interact in a more formalized, restricted capacity, community benefits agreements and project
labor agreements create policy through more informal channels. As such, these community development
agreements enable stakeholders to circumvent the public protections embedded within the land use
approval process and formalized participation by government. Consequently, the agreement terms can vary
dramatically between projects and regions. Early evidence supports this claim, and indicates that many
CBAs and PLAs experience partial implementation and fail to achieve their articulated goals, or do not
produce additional benefits beyond what would occur through the land use approval process (Saito &
Truong, 2014; Hutson, 2013; Saito, 2012; Salkin & Lavine, 2008; Gross, 2007).
Mechanisms for standardizing CDAs or their implementation remain in their infancy. Municipalities
and government agencies are seeking to both address this circumstance and ensure widespread use of CDAs
by creating policies to require and regulate these agreements on a broader scope. Examples include a
proposed community benefits agreement ordinance in Detroit, a priority hire ordinance recently approved
by the City of Seattle, and master project labor agreements such as the Metro PLA, which govern “all
projects within an agency” (Herrera et al., 2014, p. 45; Felton, 2015; Seigel, 2014; Interview with Respondent
27). In a similar vein, Camacho (2013) has called for including the participatory elements of CBAs within the
48
land use approval process, to systematize these agreements and their implementation. Camacho holds that
mandating greater participation within the land use approval process, to replicate the participatory elements
of CBAs but without the bilateral negotiations that favor developers, would enable local government to
achieving an outcome more favorable to all stakeholder interests.
A final, significant distinction between development agreements and community development
agreements concerns how the community participates, or does not participate, in implementation. The
potential for community enforcement is so powerful that the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy
(LAANE), one of the main innovators and advocates of CBAs, “proposed shifting to a wholly private CBA
model after noting dissatisfaction with the development agreement model. Because these “public” benefits
were negotiated directly between the developer and the city, beneficiary groups were unable to resort to
court enforcement when the city proved either unable or unwilling to satisfactorily enforce the contract”
(Seigel, 2014). Community involvement differs fundamentally between agreements and development
contexts, but importantly, the community does not retain control over the actual agreement implementation,
such as building affordable housing, parks and other promised amenities, or hiring disadvantaged
construction workers. Further, community stakeholders generally lack the ability to directly assess punitive
damages. Even if they are formally involved in agreement oversight, community stakeholders lack the ability
to ensure that implementation occurs in the way they originally envisioned and expect. Thus, community
stakeholders generally exist in a third-party oversight role during implementation, regardless of their often
transformative role during agreement formulation. In so doing, they are regulated to a role in which, at best,
they “provide input, advocate, and apply political pressure” or use other forms of indirect influence (Herrera
et al., 2014, p. 50). While this can prove influential, it shifts community influence from direct participation in
implementation to the role of an indirect participant, and often an outside agitator (Herrera et al., 2014).
In subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I develop this argument and assess its implications for
stakeholder behavior, implementation, and community development. I hypothesize that community
stakeholders, the intended beneficiaries of project labor agreements with community workforce provisions,
49
and important stakeholders in this process, systematically lose influence over outcomes as the agreement
moves from the formulation to the implementation stage. I position this inquiry within existing theories of
consensus building and implementation, to understand how these processes relate. I use a case study design
to examine community influence in community development agreement implementation, how stakeholders
behave in this process, and the outcomes produced. I present four case studies two assess implementation:
two project labor agreements and two community benefits agreements. I conclude by synthesizing these
case studies together, which represents a first step toward generating new theory about how community
development agreement implementation occurs, and how these agreements relate to community
development.
2.8. CASE SELECTION AND METHODS
My community benefits case studies are: the Park East Redevelopment Compact, in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, and the Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan in Atlanta, Georgia. Table 2 reviews the
relevant variations and controls between these case studies. These cases similarly are in the implementation
stage, involve project administration by public agencies, include the local government as a signatory party
with some discretion during implementation, with oversight from a local government legislative body, and
include some direct community oversight through an established committee. However, these agreements
also have important variations, including that the Milwaukee agreement was approved far before the Atlanta
agreement, that it is a county resolution broader than only one development project with penalties for
noncompliance established in the development agreements, and that the Atlanta project does not specify
precise benefits but only ensures a monetary investment, leaving further decisions to the administering
agencies.

50
Table 2: Community Benefits Agreement Case Study Characteristics

Park East Redevelopment Compact Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
Timeline Agreement approved in 2004 Agreement approved in 2013
Agreement stage Implementation Implementation
Project Land sale and redevelopment of the Park East
Redevelopment Corridor: 16 acres of county-
owned land near downtown Milwaukee
New $1.2 billion stadium project for the
Atlanta Falcons National Football League
(NFL) Team
Public agency County of Milwaukee, which is selling land,
divided in parcels, for private development
City of Atlanta, which retains development
approval over project approval and public
financing
Private interest Differs between different parcels and projects;
two projects in the implementation stage
concern the Milwaukee Bucks National
Basketball Association (NBA) Team and
Wanguard Partners, a private developer
The Atlanta Falcons and owner Arthur M.
Blank
Public investment 16 acres of county land, sold at far below
market price, within a Tax Incremental District
established by the City of Milwaukee
$300 million from the City of Atlanta’s hotel-
motel tax
Agreement scope County resolution that specifies benefits
(prevailing wage, affordable housing by the
county, local hire, disadvantaged business
utilization, green design and a community
fund) which are written into development
agreements
Designates $15 million investment each from
Invest Atlanta (formerly the City of Atlanta’s
redevelopment authority) and the Arthur M.
Blank Foundation. The Benefits Plan made
recommendations about projects and
identified desired benefits, but could not
select specific proposals for funding
Signatory parties County of Milwaukee passed resolution;
developers become signatory parties when they
enter into development agreements
City of Atlanta and the Arthur M. Blank
Foundation entered into agreement to deliver
benefits; benefits plan approved by Atlanta
City Council after deliberation under
Community Benefits Plan Committee,
including community representatives
Agreement administrator(s) The County of Milwaukee Economic
Development Division
Invest Atlanta and the Arthur M. Blank
Foundation administer their different
investments, with some coordination
Oversight Reporting to the County of Milwaukee Board
of Supervisors; establishes a community-driven
Park East Advisory Committee to review
development proposals
Reporting to the Atlanta City Council and
continued participation by and reporting to
the Community Benefit Plan Committee
Stakeholder discretion in
implementation?
Yes, as county employees responsible for
administration negotiate agreement terms into
development agreements
Yes, as Invest Atlanta and the Arthur M.
Blank Foundation retain discretion over
which projects get funded
Penalties for noncompliance? Yes, written into development agreements No
Is the agreement ad hoc, or
part of a broader strategy?
Yes, county resolution that governs many
different developments within the Park East
Redevelopment Corridor; in 2015, PERC
terms extended to all county land through a
separate county ordinance
No
Was agreement formulation
community led (at least in
part)?
Yes Yes

To construct these case studies, I conducted stakeholder interviews with 13 individuals (6 in
Milwaukee and 7 in Atlanta) representing community advocates, local government and private interests.
Information about the interview subjects is available in Table 3.
51
Table 3: Interviews for Community Benefits Agreement Cases

Milwaukee case Atlanta case Total
Local government 3 2 5
Community representatives 1 5 6
Developers/ Private interests 2 0 2
Total 6 7 13

I triangulated this data from archival data (see Table 4). For the Atlanta case, this included minutes
from the Community Benefits Plan Committee, relevant local government plans, and newsletters, press
releases and grant reporting from the Blank Foundation, and some radio and television transcripts. For the
Milwaukee case, my archival research involved minutes from the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors,
as well as relevant plans and proposals related to the Park East Area. For both cases, I conducted content
analyses of media mentions related to the agreements, which produced important news articles, blog posts
and website mentions. I used the search terms “Atlanta Falcons” “Community Benefits Plan” for the
Atlanta case, and two searches for the Milwaukee case: Milwaukee “Park East Redevelopment Compact”
and Milwaukee “Park East Redevelopment.” After my initial search, I set Google alerts to inform me of new
articles emerged after this effort.
Table 4: Archival documents for Community Benefits Agreement Cases
Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan Park East Redevelopment Compact
Minutes and Agendas from City Council and
Community Benefits Plan Committee Meetings
(when available)
Minutes and Agendas from Milwaukee County
Board of Supervisors
Online media archives: Google Scholar and Proquest Online media archives: Google Scholar and Proquest
Systematic online searches, including project and
construction firm websites
Systematic online searches, including project and
construction firm websites
Newsletters, press releases and annual reports from
the Arthur Blank Foundation
Existing literature (see footnote 35 on p. 52)
Relevant city plans Relevant city and county plans
Reports from Invest Atlanta

Further, the Milwaukee case provides a significant body of existing research from which to draw. As
the first successful attempt to create a community benefits ordinance, thus codifying community benefits in
legislation that extends more broadly than a single development project, the Park East Redevelopment
Compact (PERC) in Milwaukee has received significant attention in the community benefits agreement
52
literature.
35
However, since implementation of the PERC was delayed due to the economic recession and
other factors, these studies occurred almost exclusively before implementation fully proceeded, such that
none examine the outcomes produced by this innovative and important agreement. As a result, to construct
this case study, I build upon an existing body of research to provide background context, much of which
occurred over a decade ago, but none of which examine agreement implementation.
My project labor agreement case studies: are the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(Metro) Project Labor Agreement (PLA) and the Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement (CWA)
in Seattle, Washington. Table 5 shows the different characteristics of these case studies.
Table 5: Project Labor Agreement Case Study Characteristics

Metro PLA Yesler Terrace CWA
State California; affirmative action prohibited
by Proposition 209 (1996)
Washington; affirmative action
prohibited by Initiative 200 (1998)
Regional Context Strong unions; regional history of large-
scale, innovative PLAs; strong real estate
market
Strong unions; regional history of large-
scale, innovative PLAs; strong real estate
market
Project Controversy? Yes Yes
High-profile project? Yes Yes
Project Type Transportation Residential
Project Owner Regional public agency: Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority
Public agency: Seattle Housing Authority
Project Cost The entire PLA covers a $40 billion sales
tax measure; I examine the Crenshaw-
LAX Transit Corridor Project, which
costs $2.058 billion and involves a
federal grant
The CWA covers the $300 million public
housing construction, funded by the
Seattle Housing Authority (including
land sale) and a HUD choice
neighborhoods grant
Project stage Implementation Implementation
Agreement Goals Target work to “disadvantaged workers,”
women and apprentices
Target work to Yesler Terrace residents,
public housing residents and Section 3
workers and businesses (economically
eligible for public housing)
Implementation Structure Internal with third party administrative
support (the jobs coordinator)
Internal; first CWA within the agency
Oversight Metro Board of Supervisors (comprised
of public officials)
Section 3 Advisory Committee (includes
community stakeholders and union
members)
Penalties for noncompliance? Yes, and Metro has previously assessed
penalties
Yes
Are agreements ad hoc or part of a
broader strategy?
Yes, PLA covers all Measure R projects No, CWA only concerns Yesler Terrace
Was agreement formulation community
led (at least in part)?
Yes No
(California Voter Foundation, 1996; Herrera et al., 2014; Interview with Respondents 3, 14 and 27; League of Women Voters,
1998; Metro, 2012c; SHA, 2013)

35
Other work that discusses the PERC includes McKean (2015); Severin (2013); Wolf-Powers (2012); Larsen (2009); Pastor,
Benner, & Matsuoka (2009); De Sousa (2008); Gross (2007); McGahey & Vey (2008); Salkin & Lavine (2008); and Sheikh (2008).
53

Los Angeles and Seattle share important characteristics that likely influence PLA and CWA
implementation, including a history of formulating, approving and implementing innovative, large-scale, and
nationally prominent PLAs. Los Angeles has important PLAs around the Port of Los Angeles and Los
Angeles Unified School District (Herrera et al., 2014). Seattle and Los Angeles are both similarly constrained
by state laws banning public institutions from engaging in affirmative action, including preference based on
race, ethnicity and gender (League of Women Voters, 1998; California Voter Foundation, 1996).
36
Both
Seattle and Los Angeles currently enjoy strong real estate markets, including large-scale projects, and
therefore have active construction industries. Each case involves a public agreement, with a public agency
serving as the project owner and master developer, and internally administering the agreement (as in, the
agency is directly responsible for implementation and has not outsourced this responsibility). Further, these
cases are both in the implementation stage, with construction ongoing, such that I can observe
implementation as it unfolds. Both projects are high-profile and controversial, which contributed to
agreement formulation (Interview with Respondents 1, 4, 12 and 14)
However, these agreements also differ along many characteristics, including the project scale, the
construction type and the various constraints attached to the different funding sources. The Los Angeles
case concerns a $2.058 billion transportation project, and includes a federal grant. The Seattle agreement
covers a $300 million public housing redevelopment project, funded by a federal grant and money from the
Seattle Housing Authority. Further, implementation is structured slightly differently; an oversight committee
oversees implementation for both projects, but these committees differ in influence, including their ability
to assess penalties for noncompliance. While the Yesler Terrace CWA is ad hoc, the Metro PLA is linked to
other projects since they are part of a broader strategy. Finally, community involvement differs between the
projects, including whether the community drove agreement formulation.

36
In 1996, California voters enacted this though Proposition 209, a constitutional amendment (California Voter Foundation,
1996). In 1998, Washington voters approved this law through Initiative 200, which also prohibits preference based on national
origin (League of Women Voters, 1998).
54
To construct these case studies, I conducted field interviews with 29 individuals (11 in Los Angeles
case and 18 in Seattle) representing community advocates; project owners, administrators, and implementing
groups; building trades representatives and construction companies. Information about the interview
subjects is available in Table 6. Interviews followed a semi-structured format, and were approximately one
hour. I transcribed all interviews, though there were three interviews in which I was not given permission to
record, and thus have a less detailed transcript of the interview. Next, I coded these interviews using a
grounded coding approach and NVivo qualitative coding software.
Table 6: Interviews for Project Labor Agreement Cases

Metro PLA Yesler Terrace CWA Total
Project owner/ administrator 3 7 10
Third party administrator (if applicable) 1 0 1
Community representatives 4 3 7
Building Trades/ Union Representatives 1 5 6
Contractors 2 1 3
Other
37
0 2 2
Total 11 18 29

I triangulated data from interviews with available archival data from in-person library visits,
documents provided by stakeholders and media articles available online from web searches. For the Los
Angeles case, I visited the Metro library and searched for all documents related to the PLA formulation and
implementation process. For the Seattle case, I visited the Seattle Public Library and Seattle Municipal
Archives and searched for relevant documents related to the Yesler Terrace redevelopment project and the
community workforce agreement. These documents included environmental impact reports with extensive
public comments. Also included are any available meeting agendas and minutes, including from the Citizen
Review Committee.
I conducted web searches on both the Google and Bing search engines. For the Los Angeles case, I
used conducted two searches, using the terms: ““Los Angeles” Metro “Project Labor Agreement”” and
“”project labor agreement” Crenshaw.” For the Yesler Terrace case, I also conducted two searches each. I
used the search terms: 1. “”Yesler Terrace” “community workforce agreement;” and 2. “Yesler Terrace

37
This includes individuals engaged in agreement negotiation and administrators of other agreements in the region who had
important information about the Yesler Terrace Agreement and/or the regional context.
55
Redevelopment.” I examined each web hit, and downloaded and identified relevant documents and news
articles. I then coded these documents and articles using a grounded coding approach and the NVivo
software. I also set up a Google Alert for each search terms, so that I was aware of news articles that met
the search terms subsequent to the web searches that I performed. This enabled me to be kept up to date on
the news articles.
I also extensively searched organization websites, including the administering agency, developers and
community organizations. This endeavor yielded important public documents such as meeting minutes,
guiding plans, agreement reporting and construction updates (see Table 7). The Seattle Housing Authority
and Metro also both maintain blogs that provide revealing updates about these projects. In contrast to the
Metro agreement, Yesler Terrace project outcomes are not publicly reported. I specifically requested these
reporting documents, to analyze the community outcomes that Yesler Terrace construction contracts
produce.
Table 7: Archival documents for Project Labor Agreement Cases

Metro PLA Documents Yesler Terrace CWA Documents
Minutes and Agendas from Metro Board Meetings
(when available)
Minutes and Agendas from Citizen Review
Committee (when available)
Online media archives: Google Scholar and Proquest Online media archives: Google Scholar and Proquest
Systematic online searches, including project and
firm websites
Systematic online searches, including project and
firm websites
PLA Symposium Video Environmental Impact Reporting
Metro Source Blog Seattle Housing Authority Blog
Hiring reports (available online) Hiring reports (requested from SHA)
Reports produced by community stakeholders
(available online)

For the Los Angeles case, I also rely upon over four years of participatory research with a Los
Angeles-based community organization. This organization was deeply involved in the PLA formulation
process, and continues to work to ensure PLA monitoring and enforcement, such that observing their work
enables me to examine Metro PLA implementation as it occurs. This effort included participant observation
in organizational meetings and monitoring efforts. I also attended public meetings, including a day-long
PLA symposium held by Metro.
56
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have reviewed the literatures related to development agreements, community
benefits agreements and project labor agreements, to trace their emergence and establish community
development agreements as a land use innovation. I drew out the key differences between community
development agreements and previous mechanisms for regulating land use and real estate development, to
begin to identify how these may involve different implementation processes. Through this effort, I
construct the foundation into which implementation, and my analysis, enters.

57
Chapter 3

A Theoretical Foundation for Community Development Agreements

Community development agreements are insufficiently theorized in planning. Existing literature
(presented in Chapter 2) largely focuses on agreement specifics, and fails to position these agreements, their
formulation and implementation within larger theoretical perspectives. Prior research, which almost
exclusively studies community benefits agreements, generally limits inquiries into explaining why developers
and community stakeholders pursue CBAs and who participates.
38
In so doing, research has overlooked how
participation and implementation occurs, to what end, and the implications of this new strategy. In other words,
this literature does not sufficiently theorize what happens after the agreement gets signed, how
implementation relates to consensus around an agreement, and the extent to which these agreements do or
do not generate lasting change for the targeted communities (Abram, 2000; Alexander, 1998). Rather, prior
research largely assumes agreement effectiveness after consensus, and does not theorize agreement
implementation, including recognition that this process can take place within a fundamentally different
context than agreement formulation.
While not explicitly used, communicative planning theory, and specifically the consensus building
subset therein, offers the theoretical frame that most logically applies to community development
agreements, since it is the dominant planning framework for understanding governance through negotiation
and collaboration between stakeholders. Therefore, in this chapter, I review different strands of
communicative planning theory, to understand this theoretical framework in relation to community
development agreement formulation and implementation. However, communicative planning theory
focuses on episodic stakeholder participation and consensus within agreement formulation, and ignores

38
For example, Parks and Warren (2009) consider CBAs as part of the “new accountable development movement,” and uses
community organizing, the political process and the geographic constraints of certain industries to force developers to make some
concessions to communities. Lucas-Darby (2012) explains CBAs as a resident-driven response to environmental justice concerns,
rooted in the persistent, impactful legacy of urban renewal. Saito (2012) and Saito and Truong (2014) use urban regime theory to
explain why developers, who have traditionally held significantly more power than local communities in the development process,
are seeking to negotiate with, and afford benefits to, residents.
58
what happens after policies and plans achieved through negotiation and collaboration, such as community
development agreements, are approved. In other words, communicative planning theory does not examine
implementation as a separate and influential governance stage, on a continuum of policymaking stages, one
that affects the outcomes produced by governance through negotiation and collaboration. Rather,
communicative planning theory assumes that implementation naturally derives from sufficient policy
formulation processes, that stakeholders retain similar motivations and behaviors throughout, and does not
provide a means to understand contested or partial implementation of community development agreements.
Yet, existing literature implies that despite consensus on the agreement terms, community
development agreements frequently fail to produce negotiated outcomes. This suggests that issues may arise
during agreement implementation that must be examined in order to understand the outcomes that these
agreements produce. Regardless, community development agreements are becoming more common as a
means intended to enhance economic justice, and these projects frequently include large public subsidies or
funding. For this reason, the agreement promises and potential impacts are significant. To this end, it is
crucial to understand what outcomes are produced by these agreements, how this process occurs, and what
factors might contribute to improved implementation and outcome for community beneficiaries.
Since communicative planning theory does not cover implementation, I draw from implementation
and enforcement literature in public management and labor. This research, while not connected to the
consensus-building literature, provides a basis for beginning to theorize community development agreement
implementation and community participation in this process. My goal is to develop a framework for
understanding how consensus building extends and relates to implementation, positioned within post-
democracy theories, which lends insight into the different ways in which implementation can become
contested or dominated by some stakeholders at the expense of others. In subsequent chapters, I use
grounded theory, informed by my four case studies, to develop new theory where existing theory falls short.

59
3.1. COMMUNICATIVE PLANNING THEORY AND CONSENSUS BUILDING
Influenced by Habermas (1984), Forester (1989) and others, communicative planning theory
contends that planners should seek to enhance the conditions under which planning decisions are made, by
improving how participation occurs. This perspective envisions planners as mediators between stakeholders,
responsible for assisting conflict resolution between different parties. In this capacity, how planners
communicate, including how they frame and convey information to the public, affects decisions and
outcomes. Theories related to deliberative governance in planning, including consensus building and
collaborative rationality, derive from this communicative perspective. Throughout, such theories hold that
for policies created through deliberative governance, the conditions under which deliberation takes place
influences the policies and outcomes produced (Innes & Booher, 2015, 2010; Innes, 2004; Healey, 1999).
Susskind, McKearnan and Thomas-Larmer (1999) explain deliberative policy formulation as
consensus building. They clarify that,
“Consensus building is a process of seeking unanimous agreement. It involves a good-faith effort to
meet the interests of all stakeholders. Consensus has been reached when everyone agrees they can
live with whatever is proposed after every effort has been made to meet the interests of all
stakeholding parties. Thus, consensus building requires that someone frame a proposal after
listening carefully to everyone’s concerns. Participants in a consensus building process have both the
right to expect that no one will undermine their interests and the responsibility to propose solutions
that will meet everyone’s interests as well as their own” (p. 6).

They go on to identify five stages of consensus building: “convening, clarifying responsibilities, deliberating,
deciding and implementing agreements” (p. 20). The constraints that exist during the process prior to
consensus influence implementation. Throughout, consensus building provides a means to understand how
stakeholders deliberate to generate policies, plans and contracts through agreement.
The consensus-building perspective maintains that stakeholders work together to achieve a mutually
beneficial outcome.
39
The assumption underlying this perspective is that stakeholders seek Pareto optimal
terms for the involved parties, in which participants can arrive at an agreement from which no action can be
taken to improve the position of one party without harming at least one other. Consensus building generally

39
When I discuss mutually beneficial outcomes, I refer to what Forester (1989) calls “both-gain” or ideally “win-win” ends (p.
100). In both scenarios, all parties experience some benefit as a result of participation in the collaboration, beyond participation
costs.
60
further assumes that implementation derives from consensus, and that the process of arriving at consensus
encourages stakeholders to work to generate the promised, mutually beneficial outcomes.
Consensus building can vary in form significantly, including negotiation and collaboration. These
different forms reflect different engagement between stakeholders, and the extent to which their relative
positions are adversarial or cooperative. Even though these consensus-building types exhibit different
interactions between stakeholders, the goal throughout remains to engage in joint action to produce an
agreement. I expand upon these two main types below.
Negotiation
Fisher and Ury (1991) contend that, “[n]egotiation is a process of communicating back and forth for
the purpose of reaching a joint decision” (p. 32). Under negotiation, participants are motivated to reach a
joint decision to achieve their individual goals, but hold different positions on what the decision terms
should be (Fatima et al., 2004; Faratin et al., 1997). While negotiation seeks to produce a Pareto-optimal
agreement, ineffective negotiation procedures or information deficits can produce suboptimal agreements or
frustrate agreement altogether. Negotiation analysis emphasizes the factors that contribute to joint action,
recognizing that subjective, context-dependent factors can influence the negotiation outcome; thus
outcomes are not necessarily expected to achieve Pareto efficiency, and multiple mutually beneficial
outcomes are acknowledged to exist (Sebenius, 1992; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
The negotiation literature thus distinguishes between stakeholder positions (the solution they
advocate as a means to achieve their goal) and goals (the broader objective they seek to achieve). When
stakeholders often remain entrenched in their particular positions, less room exists to reach agreement. This
tendency to emphasize positions can undermine negotiations, since it obscures the important objectives that
encourage parties to negotiate in the first place. Throughout, stakeholders generally do not settle for less
than their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), which stakeholders could achieve without
negotiation (Mnookin & Susskind, 1999; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Sebenius, 1992; Fisher & Ury, 1991).
61
As Sebenius (1992) clarifies, the negotiation analysis literature “typically seeks to generate prescriptive
advice to one party given a (probabilistic) description of how others will behave…assum[ing] intelligent, goal-
seeking action by other parties, but not full game-theoretic (interactive) rationality” (p. 20; emphasis theirs).
Many scholars have sought to employ economic and game theoretic models to simulate negotiations and to
predict behavior during negotiations. Negotiation analysis involves significant uncertainty, including no clear
beginning point for negotiations, an adversary who does not necessarily act rationally, and frequently,
unknown rules and incomplete information about the other party’s preferences, positions, alternatives, and
other key factors (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).
To this end, extensive research in negotiation has focused on the means by which participants in
negotiation can reach agreements that advance or capture participants’ goals. A significant portion of the
literature has assessed how, and the extent to which, demands are met, tactic efficacy, and factors that
contribute to timely consensus. Research has also addressed how negotiators cope with barriers to conflict
resolution, including psychological, structural and strategic limitations, such as incomplete information or
information processing issues, perceptions of other parties, time constraints, and tactical decisions. This
literature has also examined differences between bi-lateral negotiations (between two parties) and multi-issue
negotiations (with more than one issue under negotiation) (Fatima et al., 2004; Mnookin & Susskind, 1999;
Faratin et al., 1997; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Sebenius, 1992; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
In their highly-cited work, Fisher and Ury (1991) advocate for “principled negotiation” to improve
negotiation conditions and outcomes (p. 12). In this model, “you look for mutual gains whenever possible,
and… where your interests conflict you should insist that the result be based on some fair standards
independent of the will of either side” (p. xviii). They clarify that,
“Any method of negotiation may be fairly judged by three criteria: It should produce a wise
agreement if agreement is possible. It should be efficient. And it should improve or at least not
damage the relationship between the parties. (A wise agreement can be defined as one that meets the
legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable,
and takes community interests into account.)” (p. 4).

62
In this way, Fisher and Ury emphasize that the agreement produced is only one negotiation outcome.
Beyond reaching agreement and the agreement terms, ongoing relationships between parties are also
important, and those relationship hinge on the negotiations process and agreement. While “hard
negotiators” prioritize winning at any cost, the authors emphasize that relationship preservation is an
important objective for most negotiators (p. xviii).
Throughout, the negotiation literature emphasizes the process and agreement reached. This research
seeks to explain how adversarial stakeholders work together to produce decisions, including the extent to
which these parties achieve their original objectives. Prior research lends significant insight into community
development agreement formulation, including the factors that drive stakeholders to negotiate, and the
means by which negotiation yields consensus. However, this inquiry ends prior to implementation.
Therefore, this literature generally does not inform how conflicts that may arise during implementation get
reconciled, except to assume that all stakeholders will return to the negotiating table.
Collaboration
Collaboration similarly involves stakeholders working together to problem-solve through consensus.
Margerum (2011) defines collaboration as “an approach to solving complex problems in which a diverse
group of autonomous stakeholders deliberates to build consensus and develop networks for translating
consensus into results” (p. 6). A trained facilitator may oversee this process.
40
Collaboration includes three
distinct stages: convening, deliberation, and implementation (Margerum, 2011). Collaboratives differ by
stakeholder types and implementation structure. These collaborative types require different approaches to
implementation, since they vary in important ways (Margerum, 2008).
Selin and Chavez (1995) note that “[c]ollaboration implies a joint decision-making approach to
problem resolution where power is shared, and stakeholders take collective responsibility for their actions

40
Margerum (2011) notes that, “A facilitated process is important for reaching an agreement that ensures buy in, whether there is
a formal facilitator or not. A facilitated process means that some combination of a chair, staff person, and facilitator ensures that
the process is facilitated” (p. 89).
63
and subsequent outcomes from those actions” (p. 190).
41
Collaborative approaches involve five stages:
antecedents, problem-setting, direction-setting, structuring, and outcomes (p. 191). Collaboration may take
different forms, including partnerships, dialogues, and negotiated settlements.
42
These forms produce
varying collaborative environments, address different problems, and produce outcomes that range from
shared information to formal agreements. However, these approaches similarly “emphasize sustained
dialogue between stakeholders to resolve differences and advance a shared vision of the future” (p. 190).
When issues arise during implementation, stakeholders are expected to return to the negotiating table to
reconcile their differences, to the mutual benefit of all parties involved. However, stakeholder accountability,
to work to achieve this shared future imaginary of a common vision, depends on the individual context, and
is by no means assured by stakeholder participation in the initial collaboration.
Margerum (2011, 1999) has identified many factors that may undermine implementation subsequent
to consensus. Collaborations often fail to prioritize implementation or consider implementation prior to
consensus for different reasons, including inadequate expertise in collaboration or implementation.
Participants may also not recognize, or deliberately not address, factors crucial to implementation that could
undermine consensus, an action that can lay the foundation for conflict to arise during implementation
(Margerum, 1999). Stakeholders may not adequately represent resident opinions and beliefs, and the
collaboration may lack key information as a result. Further, even if stakeholders are initially representative of
community interests, the collaborative process encourages them to shift their views and priorities. Certain
stakeholders are more open to learning, adapting and altering the status quo than others; implementation
frequently requires such flexibility. State and local government actors may prove particularly adverse to

41
Selin and Chavez (1995) define stakeholders as “individuals, groups and formal organizations who have a perceived interest or
impact on a particular resource” (p. 190).
42
Selin and Chavez (1995) specify these different forms. They claim that “[a]ppreciative planning occurs when participants are
motivated to advance a shared vision of resource use and the expected outcome is limited to exchanging information” (p. 193).
Partnerships “create specific agreements that formalize the shared responsibilities of each stakeholder to address the resource
problem or carry out the vision” (p. 194). In contrast, “dialogues are commonly used by managers when the goal is to resolve
conflict by exploring differences and searching for common ground without the pressure that a binding agreement will result
from the discussions” (p. 194). Finally, the authors content that, “[n]egotiated settlements are designed to resolve conflicts by
producing a binding agreement ratified by all participating stakeholders. Negotiated settlements are particularly effective in
resolving sit-specific disputes and situations where stakeholders challenge a specific rule about to be enacted by a government
agency” (p. 194).
64
change, since they are often unaccustomed to engaging in this decentralized, unpredictable policymaking
format.
43
Moreover, these stakeholders are often reluctant to undertake the institutional changes required to
successfully implement a policy (Margerum, 1999).
With this, Margerum specifies certain conditions within consensus building that can improve
implementation. His work acknowledges that even with successful collaborative processes, conflict can
emerge during implementation. As with the negotiation literature, research on collaboration focuses on the
events prior to consensus, with some discussion of how collaboration influences implementation.
Throughout, the underlying assumption persists that stakeholders remain committed to working to achieve
consensus both prior and subsequent to consensus. However, some stakeholders may choose to deliberately
avoid conflict on important terms to promote consensus. The desire to avoid conflict and leave important
terms unsettled implies that some stakeholders are more committed to reaching consensus than to ensuring
that all parties achieve their objectives during implementation. However, the collaboration approach tends
to assume that stakeholders will remain engaged in collaboration, driven by the incentives that originally
motivated them to collaborate, until all parties achieve their goals.
Collaborative Rationality
Within planning, Innes and Booher (2010; also, Innes, 2004; and Booher & Innes, 2002) propose
collaborative rationality, a specific collaborative form designed to better address particularly complex
planning problems. Collaborative rationality specifies that stakeholders address the entire, complex system
in which problems occur. This approach holds that collaboration can confront more effectively the
challenges inherent to contemporary planning settings, including diverse interests, political influence,
dynamic environments, and complex problems that transcend bureaucratic silos (also: Margerum, 1999).
While consensus building is resource-intensive and not always preferable to more traditional forms of
decision-making, it offers a way forward for stakeholders to confront particularly intractable problems laden
with conflict and uncertainty (Innes, 2004).

43
Margerum (1999) asserts that government stakeholders envision their role within the collaborative as, “one-way (providing
information and expertise to the committee) rather than interactive (exchanging information between the committee and their
organization)” (p. 187).
65
Collaborative rationality envisions an ideal consensus-building environment that achieves specific
communicative conditions, to ensure that the collaboration produces an agreement that reflects the interests
of all stakeholders based on the best information available. In particular, Innes and Booher (2010) specify
that consensus building must realize DIAD conditions: Diverse Participants, Interdependence, and
Authentic Dialogue. Participants must be diverse in that they should include not just those with the power
to either approve or reject outcomes, but those with a stake in the outcome. Stakeholders must be
interdependent to the extent that they mutually rely on each other for some condition or resource, to
enhance the likelihood that collaboration persists through conflicts that arise. Finally, participants must
attain authentic dialogue, in which they “engage with each other on a shared task in a deliberation that
closely adheres to Habermas’ ideal speech conditions. That is, the deliberations must be characterized by
engagement among agents so that they can mutually assure that their claims are legitimate, accurate,
comprehensible, and sincere” (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 36; for further explanation, see Habermas, 1984).
44

Achieving these ideal conditions remains impossible in practice, but the extent to which these conditions are
approximated depends upon stakeholder behavior and the larger context. It also practically requires some
influential individual in this context, often a trained facilitator, to have process expertise, or expertise with
the negotiation and collaboration process, to create these necessary conditions (Innes, 2004).
45

Innes and Booher (2015) and Innes (2004) strongly contend that under these conditions, consensus
building can produce benefits beyond the policy or plan produced, including improved understanding
between participants. Innes and Booher (2015) draw from Castells’ conception of communication power to
emphasize that deliberative process and outcome overlap significantly, as changes from process are “part of
the outcome” of communication (p. 207). To this end, deliberation may continue after agreement, such that

44
In articulating his theory of communicative action, Habermas (1984) identifies ideal speech conditions that can equalize power
between participants and produce transformative outcomes for cultures, structures and institutions. Among other conditions,
these include free expression and the absence of coercion between participants (also: Innes, 2015; Booher & Innes, 2002; Healey,
1999).
45
Goldstein and Butler (2010) claim that facilitators can provide “process expertise” to “help define the dispute, identify and
recruit stakeholders, manage agendas, moderate discussion, and document agreement” (p. 239).
66
agreements are less the final outcome, and more an intermediary step in a larger, transformative process, in
which stakeholders continue to work together to resolve enduring conflicts.
However, Innes and Booher (2015, 2010) and Innes (2004) largely do not examine how consensus
building deliberations may change after stakeholders reach agreement; while deliberation may persist, it is
unlikely to remain unchanged, particularly after some participants achieve their goals and are no longer
motivated toward reciprocity. Innes (2004) acknowledges that some stakeholders may “defect” if conditions
change so as to make independent action preferable for a stakeholder to consensus building. However, she
treats this possibility as a one-off event, which savvy stakeholders know to expect, rather than a real threat
to the ability of all stakeholders to continue to achieve their interests through consensus building. This
perspective overlooks that some stakeholders may systematically achieve their goals earlier in the consensus
building process, including solely by reaching agreement, and not need all the goals within the agreement to
be met. In such cases, absent any external threat such as a lawsuit or damaging relationships that may
impede future collaboration, a stakeholder may have little incentive to continue to engage in a power-
decentralizing consensus-building forum after all their individual goals are met.
Rather, stakeholders can act in their own best interests, possibly damaging relationships but not
incurring penalties, if other interests are viewed as unimportant to future goals or viewed as ephemeral.
Conflicts at the neighborhood level often include groups that may appear temporarily, including firms that
are not spatially targeted, such as multinational corporations, or for community development agreements,
developers, construction contractors and other non-local entities. Even inherently local groups, such as
neighborhood associations and interests groups targeted at a particular issue, such as opposition to one
development, may be viewed as relatively temporary. When relationships between stakeholders are not
viewed or valued as long-term, the incentive for a relatively powerful stakeholder to maintain a beneficial
relationship provides little motivation to remain engaged in collaboration once that stakeholder’s goals have
been met. In this way, there are many instances in which relationship preservation does not provide
significant incentive to persist in consensus building after individual goals are met.
67
Consistent with other consensus-building frameworks, collaborative rationality assumes that if
conflict arises during implementation, key stakeholders remain interdependent, retaining a vested interest in
continued joint action to deliver all outcomes delineated in the agreement. In other words, the needs of all
stakeholders remain unmet until all goals are realized. Reciprocity, or the extent to which stakeholders are
accountable to mutual dependence, is a key precondition to ensure that stakeholders remain engaged. Thus,
the assumption remains that sufficient deliberation, undertaken vis-à-vis the conditions espoused by
collaborative rationality, yields stakeholder outcomes. Existing collaborative rationality research seeks to
determine the optimal conditions for reaching agreement, to the mutual benefit of all stakeholders. In so
doing, this approach does not recognize that within implementation, different stakeholders vary in the
extent to which they control the implementation process.
However, collaborative rationality fails to acknowledge that, in contexts with significant power
differentials and interest and stakeholder diversity, such as community development agreement
deliberations, all stakeholders do not necessarily achieve their desired ends at the same time. Rather,
collaborative rationality assumes that all stakeholders similarly rely on the same point of interdependence, or
if they do not, that these differences do not materially affect stakeholder conduct during implementation, or
the ability of all parties to secure their ends. As a result, collaborative rationality does not reconcile a central
tension that can emerge with community development agreements: some stakeholders achieve their goals
when the agreement is signed, as they may seek only to produce an agreement to reduce community
resistance to development, represent community interests, placate politicians, undertake legally-required
community participation, or generate goodwill by promising (but not delivering) benefits. After the
agreement gets signed, these parties may no longer be motivated toward reciprocity because their own
objectives have been met. After this point, some stakeholders can walk away from the agreement and its
implementation before others, including community stakeholders, get what originally sought.

68
3.2. CRITIQUES OF COMMUNICATIVE PLANNING THEORY
Communicative planning theory has generated multiple critiques. Scholars such as Abram (2000)
and Huxley (2000) question the extent to which the conditions and outcomes espoused by many
communicative planning theories can be achieved through communication alone (Huxley, 2000). Abram
holds that this assertion implies,
“that either power relations are negligible or interests superficial. In cases where they appear to have
been achieved, I would suggest that conflict was certainly not informed by any profound structural
difference, such as ethnic, cultural or political difference. These sorts of difference are so intrinsic to
the identity of the negotiators that I do not believe they can effectively be set aside” (Abram, 2000,
p. 355).

Many have recognized the inherent flaws with a perspective that asserts that ideal communicative processes
can transcend existing hierarchies and power asymmetries, particularly without regard to the consequential
power differences that frequently exist among participants. In this way, many hold that communicative
planning theory does not sufficiently acknowledge and alter consequential power differentials between
participants that exist both external to and within deliberations (McGuirk, 2001; Fischler, 2000; Huxley,
2000; Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000).
Some critiques of communicative planning theory can be extended to deliberative governance
theories generally. Many scholars hold that deliberation offers a limited democratic form, and therefore
consensus building does not achieve democratic governance. Fung (2006) notes that deliberative governance
is exclusive and resource-intensive, though those stakeholders that are included have significant control over
the final agreement. Whereas Fung holds that participation can enhance justice, legitimacy and effectiveness
in governing, the representative, selective engagement that communicative planning theory approaches
frequently employ prevents open participation, and thus falls short of democratic ideals. As a consensus-
building approach, communicative planning theory stands in stark contrast to utilitarianism, under which
parties would seek to produce an optimal outcome for the entire population, rather than for interest groups
that do not necessarily include all citizens. Under collaborative rationality, the “public interest,” as defined
by participants, reflects the interests of engaged stakeholders and their constituencies within the existing
69
planning regime, and not the entire public. Stakeholders are chosen, or opt in, so as to represent interests
directly affected by the issue at hand, and thus do not necessarily represent citizens not immediately
recognized as direct stakeholders. Despite their indirect interest, the broader citizenry still retains an interest
in the distribution of public goods generally, and thus has a stake in any agreement produced, but are not
guaranteed representation under collaborative rationality unless you assume that their interests are
effectively represented by public agencies (Brand & Gaffikin, 2007; Bengs, 2005a; Bengs, 2005b).
Beyond failures of communication as a means to transform and deliberation as a limited democratic
form, Purcell (2009) argues that through deliberation, communicative planning theory simply reinforces
neoliberalism.
46
Full inclusion in deliberation is not possible, and this serves to advance neoliberalism,
through the systematic exclusion of marginalized interests, and the systematic inclusion of landowners and
elites, further concentrating elite power in urban development. This structure enables the neoliberal status
quo to persist and become more entrenched, as it ensures that even within representative deliberations,
neoliberal ideals remain privileged. Beyond issues of representation, those participants included in
deliberation also frequently lack autonomy, including the ability for stakeholders to jointly select “both the
issues to be discussed without prejudice, and the procedures regulating the discussion” (Urbanti, 2010, p.
74). This inability to “influence the political agenda” can produce injustice through undemocratic
deliberations (Fung, 2006, p. 70). In this way, deliberations are characterized by systematic exclusion of
marginalized interests. Those that do participate are limited in their ability to direct the deliberation. In sum,
these characteristics indicate that communicative planning theory contributes to “the establishment of
institutions for the few rather than the many” toward neoliberal ends (Sager, 2005, p. 7).
Communicative planning theory can thus legitimize and facilitate neoliberalism, rather than its
espoused ends of enhancing democratic governance and enabling transformations to occur through
deliberation (Purcell, 2009; Sager, 2005). Deliberations remain situated within the neoliberal context but do
not seek to transform it, and non-elite interests can become co-opted. As neoliberalism reduces barriers to

46
In accordance with Purcell (2009), neoliberalism refers to the urban political economic shift toward economic liberalization
policies associated with laissez-faire economics.
70
capital accumulation, including land development, communicative planning theory enables capital
dominance over decision-making through decentralized, collaborative dialogues between stakeholders,
rather than top-down, centralized government regulation (Sager, 2005).
Therefore, communicative planning theory can enable development and legitimize neoliberalism
through the appearance of participation, which demonstrates widespread support for the agreements
produced through consensus. Simply through their participation, stakeholders are motivated to reach
agreement and not undertake other, more conflict-driven strategies to advocate their interests and call for
larger transformations than deliberations generally allow. However, by engaging in a governance strategy
that avoids politicization and obscures conflict, such local deliberations cannot counter global forces
including neoliberal hegemony, and marginalized groups are prevented from engaging in other (potentially
consequential) actions. Taken together, this system reinforces the neoliberal status quo (Purcell, 2009; Sager,
2009; Brand & Gaffikin, 2007). Under communicative planning theory, planners have similarly been co-
opted from a potentially more transformative role, and rather than counter capital dominance, their work
often addresses marginal concerns such as project design elements, rather than calling into question the
projects themselves. From this perspective, planners’ work shifts from seeking to promote the long-term
public interest to facilitators between stakeholders, with an emphasis on communication (Bengs, 2005a;
Bengs, 2005b). In practice, this work serves to mitigate concerns about capital dominance, rather than
address it outright.
Accordingly, deliberation can act as a tool to promote order, rather than democracy, by reducing or
co-opting conflict. Urbanti (2010) asserts that deliberation can produce a “regime of consensus that expels
antagonism and disagreement with the consequence of rendering the citizens politically apathetic” (p. 68).
Deliberative groups tend toward “elitism” and enable elites to use deliberation to “legitimate their policies
while bypassing electoral responsibility” while also rendering the public even more passive (p. 74).
Deliberations can also obscure public will, as those individuals most vested in participation can easily
dominate deliberations. Therefore, deliberation risks falling short of democratic ideals by preventing conflict
71
or influence by relatively disempowered individuals or groups, but rather concentrating and legitimating the
power of elite influences.
To this end, Bond (2011) and Brand and Gaffikin (2007) draw from Chantel Mouffe to question
whether “free and unconstrained public deliberation” is even possible, primarily because consensus-building
deliberations are necessarily situated within the existing power structure in which they take place. For this
reason, consensus building at least partially occurs within, and replicates, existing power relations. Seeking
consensus, the authors argue, can obscure relevant conflicts, gloss over material forms of difference, and
perpetuate the status quo. Deliberation offers a limited strategy for relatively disempowered stakeholders to
enact transformations to the system. In this way, collaboration “denies disempowered groups their most
promising political tool” by prioritizing agreement over achieving individual interests and preventing
conflicts that could possibly enact larger transformations (Purcell, 2009)
Regardless, Innes and Booher (2015; 2010; also, Innes, 2004) hold that relatively disempowered
stakeholders retain power over other stakeholders through their mutual dependence on joint decision-
making. This appears to partially explain why power-holders enter into deliberations, to work toward a
mutual outcome. However, the extent to which this equilibrium of mutual dependence persists beyond
agreement and outside of the deliberation remains in doubt. The authors’ claim about diffuse power is
subject to further critique when it is considered that consensus can be used to gloss over conflict and
perpetuate or co-opt the status quo (Brand & Gaffikin, 2007). Bond (2011) similarly posits that reciprocity
provides a way for stakeholders to use deliberations to call existing power relations into question, though
without fully eliminating them. In this way, communicative planning theory can be an effective mechanism
for promoting order through managed participation in deliberation, but this does not produce any real
alteration in power distributions.
Innes (2004) distinguishes between “power around the table and power outside the dialogue,” and
clarifies that consensus building is a not a transformative dialogue in the sense that it does not alter power
relations external to the dialogue (p. 12). Reciprocity during consensus building—the dependence of all
72
stakeholders on the others, to achieve their individual interests—can “equalize” power asymmetries between
stakeholders during deliberation, who are interdependent (p. 12). However, these interactions do not
equalize power between stakeholders external to the dialogue, where the same reciprocity does not exist.
It is at this point that consensus-building theories present significant limitations to explaining
behavior during implementation, including the extent to which stakeholders will work to produce outcomes
for all stakeholders. After an agreement gets signed, deliberation can change fundamentally: there is no
longer a sharp divide between events within and outside of the dialogue, and stakeholders do not enjoy
equal ability to produce outcomes during implementation. And since the reciprocity of some stakeholders is
only contingent on agreement, consensus building does not necessarily persist past this point unchanged,
with all stakeholders mutually interdependent and willing to make concessions when they have nothing left
to gain from such behavior.
Regardless, communicative planning theory has become the dominant theoretical planning
framework concerning governance through negotiation and collaboration, as it provides a means for
explaining how and why stakeholders achieve consensus. Therefore, this theoretical perspective should
logically apply to community development agreements. However, in this dissertation, I argue that
communicative planning theory cannot explain the tensions that emerge during community development
agreement implementation. Through my case studies, I use a grounded theory approach to explain the
conflicts that arise during implementation and how they get reconciled.
3.3. COMMUNICATIVE PLANNING THEORY AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS
Community development agreements can be understood within the consensus-building framework,
as stakeholders come together to delineate, advocate for and approve these agreements. Rooted in what
Selmi (2010) calls the “contract model” of land use regulation, these agreements involve governance
through negotiation and/or collaboration. Each agreement and its larger context produce different
consensus building formats and stakeholder interactions; some more closely resemble negotiation, while
73
others exhibit characteristics of collaboration. Regardless, community development agreements are
generated through consensus building processes, and therefore communicative planning theory can inform
these agreements. While communicative planning theory implies that these consensus-based agreements
may generate limited transformations for communities, whether these incremental outcomes materialize
hinges on implementation.
However, communicative planning theory makes significant assumptions about the events
subsequent to consensus, including that stakeholders remain committed to working to achieve all the agreed
outcomes delineated in the agreement, rather than only their individual goals. When outcomes fail to
materialize, Abram (2000) notes that proponents of communicative planning theory often blame inadequate
communicative conditions prior to consensus, and overlook failures inherent to this theoretical frame. He
states that,
“The problems that make theoretical models unworkable are adapted in practice by making
allowances for approximations, non-ideal conditions, and so on. In this way, inconsistencies are
accounted for by the impossibility of perfect implementation rather than by fundamental faults with
the theoretical models. Planning’s faults, or the evidence of its incapacity, are often explained as
faults of implementation, rather than as faults in the model” (p. 354).

Communicative planning theory offers little to explain how community development agreement
implementation systematically occurs, and how these agreements can fail to produce the outcomes promised
to stakeholders, beyond issues in the consensus building process.
To begin to understand implementation and the outcomes produced, I draw from literature related
to public management and labor relations. This research theorizes implementation as a separate process
from policy formulation that, while related, presents its own specific challenges as it attempts to make the
policies generated by consensus building and other policymaking formats real. This literature demonstrates
that regardless of the policy formulation process, implementation can reveal meaningful differences between
stakeholders that influence how different stakeholders can produce their desired outcomes.

74
3.4. IMPLEMENTATION
Public management evaluates implementation in far greater depth than planning, and this research
mostly concerns federal or state-level policy implementation. Interest in policy implementation arose from
efforts to understand how the “Great Society” programs failed in the late 1960s, and some scholars
attributed poor outcomes to failed implementation efforts (Sabatier, 1986; McLanahan, 1980). As
McLanahan (1980) explains, scholars became aware that implementation involved some discretion by
individuals to act upon policy ambiguities, and consequently “bargaining” occurred between different
stakeholders to determine how implementation would proceed (p. 356).
47
Scholars also began to understand
that policy implementation frequently included participation by stakeholders external to public agencies,
including private firms seeking to promote their interests during implementation (McLanahan, 1980).
Implementation research takes two conflicting perspectives: a top-down versus a bottom-up
process. Scholars such as Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) first
envisioned implementation as centrally-driven, carried out by actors seeking to realize a policy. From this
perspective, implementation concerns “the carrying out of a basic policy decision” by agency staff, directed
by the policy language and policy drafters (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989, p. 20). Implementation analysis
seeks to identify the mechanisms that determine how this process proceeds (Matland, 1995; Hjern, 1982).
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) similarly contend that implementation concerns, “the ability to achieve the
predicted consequences after the initial conditions have been met. Implementation does not refer to creating
the initial conditions…Lack of implementation should not refer to failure to get going but to inability to follow
through” (p. xxii, emphasis added). According to this top-down perspective, implementation requires clarity;
fewer actors and little contextual change to reduce complexity; and an agency that prioritizes the stated
policy objectives (Matland, 1995).
In one such approach, policymaking occurs through three stages, including policy formulation,
implementation and reformulation. Each stage contributes to the degree to which a policy produces a

47
By policy ambiguities, McLanahan (1980) refers to instances in which unclear policy language could produce multiple potential
interventions and outcomes.
75
desired change (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Pressman and Wildavsky
(1984) caution that to enhance outcomes, policy formulation should anticipate and direct the decisions to be
made during implementation, and structure actors engaged in implementation. Interests and other
differences among stakeholders can complicate even the most straightforward implementation process, due
to “differing perspectives and senses of urgency” despite “broad substantive agreement” (Pressman &
Wildavsky, p. 113).
Implementation thus constitutes an iterative, dynamic process that requires both anticipation and
reaction by government staff. By understanding policy formulation and barriers to implementation,
stakeholders can address what implementation requires within the policy itself, and work to enhance
outcomes from the outset. Contextual factors influence outcomes related to implementation, including
leadership and commitment among agents, and socioeconomic change (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1989).
Further, stakeholders often hold different, potentially competing views on what constitutes implementation,
which can undermine joint efforts. Success can mean adherence to the policy language, attaining local policy
goals or meeting the goals that the policy specifies. Implementation efforts can proceed and be perceived
very differently based on which definition of success prevails, if stakeholders differ on what constitutes
success (Ingram & Schneider, 1990).
In contrast, bottom-up implementation theories recognize local actors and their interactions as
crucial to implementation. This perspective identifies two different levels at which policy implementation
occurs: “At the macroimplementation level, centrally located actors devise a government program; at the
microimplementation level, local organizations react to the macrolevel plans, develop their own programs,
and implement them” (Matland, 1995, p. 148; Hjern, 1982). Bottom-up theories emphasize that political and
contextual factors and external stakeholders also contribute to implementation, as opposed to solely the
policy, policy framers, and the bureaucratic process (Matland, 1995).
Bottom-up perspectives identify the limitations faced by higher-level actors, who remain detached
from the day-to-day implementation process. Rather, they contend that “street-level bureaucrats” can
76
deviate from directives from those crafting policy; they deeply influence implementation through their
“goals, strategies, activities, and contacts” (Matland, 1995, p. 149). As Lipsky (1980) clarifies, street-level
bureaucrats are “[p]ublic service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and
who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work” (p. xii). Street-level bureaucrats, including
planners in public agencies, possess significant discretion and autonomy, as well as constraints that limit job
performance, such as insufficient time, resources or information. Further, these individuals’ choices and
practices combine to deeply impact policymaking through individual behavior, thus deeply influencing how
public agencies operate and the outcomes they produce (Lipsky, 1980).
Policies vary based on clarity and conflict, which can alter how implementation occurs and which
perspective appears to best characterize implementation. Greater ambiguity in policy language, concerning
both the policy objectives and mechanisms for achieving objectives, can contribute to additional conflict
during implementation, though these variables are not necessarily related. The larger implementation
context also meaningfully shapes implementation and presents important constraints. However, some
caution that the bottom-up perspective “overemphasizes the level of local autonomy” (Matland, 1995, p.
150). Planning scholars note that even successful planning processes can produce incomplete
implementation, due to factors such as fragmentation between different interest groups and agencies, and
insufficient control by planners over key aspects of implementation (Fainstein, 2010; Forester, 1989).
Attempts to reconcile the bottom-up and top-down perspectives emphasize that various
bureaucratic levels interact to shape implementation, which Stoker (1989) characterizes as an
implementation regime (Matland, 1995). Stoker defines an implementation regime as, “an arrangement
among implementation participants that identifies the values to be served during the implementation
process and provides an organizational framework to promote those values” (p. 30).
48
Conflict is inherent
within regimes, and the way in which such differing priorities are sorted out partially depends on participant
interactions, with the goal of enhancing cooperation between different parties. Stoker clarifies that,

48
Stoker (1989) clarifies that, “At the organizational level, a regime is a system of rules, norms, and procedures that governs the
interaction of participants to some collective decision. The regime may alter the costs of transactions, availability of information,
or level of uncertainty in the decision-making process” (p. 30).
77
“From a regime perspective, the essential task of implementation is to create a context in which
participants are likely to cooperate to achieve policy goals despite the absence of a dominating
authority. Cooperation is not assumed to follow automatically from the mutual interest of
implementation participants, so the implementation process is examined to determine whether
context or mechanisms exist that enhance the incentives for cooperation. The emphasis upon
cooperation distinguishes the regime framework from established views of the implementation
problem. Top-down approaches value compliance over cooperation. Bottom-up approaches focus
upon conflict resolution, but fail to ask how implementation participants might realize their mutual
interest through cooperation” (p. 31).

Thus, in deep contrast with communicative planning theory, implementation analysis is undertaken with the
acknowledgement that conflicts will arise, change and must be addressed, even after original consensus.
Rather than perceiving implementation as an extension of collaboration, implementation specifically
envisions the process of making policy outcomes real to be somewhat adversarial, with different interests
seeking to continue to pursue their own interests. To this end, stakeholders leverage their positions,
resources and influence to affect the delivered outcomes, even though policy terms have already been
decided. A central question that implementation research concerns, then, is how such conflicts get resolved,
its timing, which stakeholders influence this process, and how this influence occurs.
Community and Co-Enforcement
More recently, scholars have recognized the transformative role that communities can play in policy
implementation, particularly through outside monitoring and enforcement. An emerging literature, much of
which addresses labor relations, considers community enforcement and co-enforcement implementation
models, in which community groups do not directly undertake implementation, but seek to promote
implementation through advocacy. Luce (2012, 2005) finds that worker participation in living wage
implementation strategies and related enforcement efforts can improve implementation and contribute to
better policy outcomes, in this case adherence to living wage laws beyond what federal inspectors and firms
can achieve alone. Community participation in implementation can occur through representation on a task
force or committee, or through outside monitoring and enforcement efforts that “pressure” implementing
groups. She finds that,
“there is almost no case where the city does a good job of enforcement on its own. Many city
administrators are themselves opposed to living wage ordinances as they see their main task as
78
creating a “friendly business climate”. Other city administrators might support the living wage, but
feel powerless to enforce it in the face of employer threats. Outside forces can increase the capacity
of the city to enforce the laws” (Luce, 2012, p. 23).

Thus, when local government officials and employees do not advance implementation for various reasons,
including institutional constraints, community stakeholders can assist implementation by contributing vital
resources, acting as a watchdog, and highlighting instances of noncompliance or insufficient information.
Luce (2005) concludes that this effort can “enhance state capacity,” though she is careful to stress that
community participation cannot “solve all implementation problems or replace the state as the chief
implementation agent” (p. 53, p. 54).
O’Rourke (2002) finds that government frequently lacks incentive to enforce regulation, as
regulation may be perceived to undermine economic growth. Yet, community stakeholders can generate
political pressure, through monitoring and advocacy efforts, to induce governments to implement and
enforce policies. In some cases, he finds that enforcement only occurs due to complaint-based “community-
driven regulation” (p. 231). However, like Luce (2005), O’Rourke cautions that this approach complements,
rather than replaces, governmental regulation efforts. Community-driven regulation offers a path forward
for community stakeholders to act to improve outcomes when the state does not prioritize implementation;
this strategy is particularly effective with those vulnerable to political pressure, such as elected officials.
However, community stakeholders lack the resources and direct control over outcomes to replace
institutions as the primary implementing agent.
Similarly recognizing the potential for community enforcement, Fine and Gordon (2010) advocate
for a “tripartism” model for labor standards enforcement, where worker centers gain “equal standing” to
enforce policies as government and employers (p. 553).
49
The authors emphasize that the relationship
between these groups must be “formalized,” “sustained” and “vigorous,” and that these community-based
worker centers must have sufficient resources to undertake its role (p. 561). In a later article, Fine (2014)
holds that,

49
Fine (2006) defines worker centers as “community-based mediating organizations that provide support to low-wage workers”
(p. 2).
79
“Worker organizations can also enhance the power of regulators in responding to and preventing
violations. Street-level bureaucrats of regulatory agencies face a wide range of political pressures.
Worker organizations can play an important role acting as countervailing powers to employers
during enforcement operations. For example, union leaders can push regulators to negotiate terms
of compliance that are more favorable to employees. Moreover, after the act of enforcement, the
power of regulators is dimmed by the low probability of a repeat enforcement action. Worker
organizations can continue to press employers to respect regulations. Finally, they can also advocate
on behalf of agency budgets. In sum, no matter how many resources are allocated to regulators, the
full potential for enforcement cannot be achieved without including worker organizations” (p. 2).

While Fine and Gordon (2010) address labor standards enforcement, their argument can inform
policy implementation generally because it highlights that third parties bring critical, unique information to
improve implementation, even though they do not control implementation. Further, this perspective
emphasizes that complaint-driven regulatory enforcement strategies (which the authors consider a “reactive”
approach) and self-regulation by firms constitute inadequate means to guarantee compliance. Rather, the
authors hold that compliance requires more proactive strategies and external accountability. The limited
resources possessed by government agencies render comprehensive enforcement efforts infeasible.
However, third party enforcement can allow stakeholders external to firms and government to share their
expertise and resources, including relationships with workers, to inform and improve enforcement. Seen in
this light, worker centers are positioned in a unique role to assist with implementation, given their
connections to both workers and institutions, expertise in worker rights and interest in accountability
measures to ensure that firms produce outcomes. To this end, the authors underscore the importance of
“meaningful penalties, collected with enough frequency to generate real deterrence” as a means to increase
accountability and ensure compliance (Fine and Gordon, 2010, p. 559, emphasis removed).
Thus, the community and co-enforcement literature adds many important contributions to
implementation research. It identifies the influential role that community enforcement can play in driving
and informing implementation, to ensure that the promised outcomes materialize. This literature also
illustrates how community stakeholders remain particularly vulnerable to their outcomes not materializing,
since they lack direct control over implementation. However, they can work to generate influence over other
parties with control over policy implementation, including government agencies. Throughout, this literature
80
shows that conflicts can systematically arise during implementation, with some stakeholders demonstrating
reluctance to work to produce the outcomes that they committed to during the policy formulation process.
However, prior research is careful to note that communities alone cannot ensure enforcement
because community stakeholders are inherently weak, due to their resource constraints and limited influence
over larger institutions. Regardless, the co-enforcement literature identifies how important third-party actors
in implementation have begun, particularly given declining government resources, as neoliberalism has
contributed to an increasingly hollowed-out state. In this way, the co-enforcement literature is consistent
with neoliberal critiques of communicative planning theory such as Purcell (2009), as marginalized
stakeholders are left with the greatest burden, and more powerful stakeholders have little incentive to alter
the status quo to benefit marginalized groups, regardless of their policy promises. In this way, the co-
enforcement literature illustrates how a hollow state, produced by neoliberalism, can burden marginalized,
community stakeholders by leaving them to hold more powerful stakeholders accountable to their original
commitments under consensus building agreements and other policies.
While communicative planning theory depicts processes and frequently assumes that outcomes
hinge on policy formulation, the implementation literature more deeply examines events after stakeholders
reach consensus. The implementation literature exposes critical assumptions that consensus-building
approaches make, including that implementation is assumed to extend from consensus building, and that all
key stakeholders will remain committed to producing the outcomes delineated in the agreement. This
literature reveals many instances where, absent pressure from other stakeholders, actors empowered during
implementation may lack an incentive to implement the agreement. However, research on community
enforcement also demonstrates that, when so driven, community stakeholders can influence implementation
through meaningful participation so as to hold other stakeholder accountable (Fine & Gordon, 2010; Luce,
2005; O’Rourke, 2002).
In so doing, the implementation and enforcement literatures show that beyond concerns about the
inherent limitations of deliberation as a transformative tool for community stakeholders and the larger
81
public, major concerns exist regarding what the incremental policies generated by consensus building
actually deliver under implementation. This literature underscores that simply approving a consensus does
guarantee its implementation or the outcomes it promises to produce. Rather, simply because they approve
an agreement, stakeholders are not necessarily motivated to achieve the agreement terms beyond their
individual goals. Rather, the different positions, strategies and resources of stakeholders influence how
implementation proceeds and the outcomes produced. From this perspective, there is reason to believe that,
consensus-building agreements such as community development agreements, with significant power
asymmetries and interest differences between stakeholders, may systematically face conflict and partial
outcomes during implementation.
Conclusions
Communicative planning theory explains how stakeholders undertake deliberative governance, and
has extensively described the ideal conditions for negotiating policies and plans to reach consensus,
including stakeholder communication and participation. However, communicative planning theory ignores
what happens subsequent to consensus, including the ultimate outcomes produced by these policies and
plans, and persistent differences in interests between stakeholders regardless of initial consensus about plans
and policies. Given that community development agreements appear to frequently produce contested
implementation processes and partial outcomes, what happens subsequent to their signing can provide
numerous insights into who gets what out of these agreements as they transition into implementation.
Critiques of communicative planning theory specifically, and deliberative governance generally,
illustrate how deliberation can de-politicize, marginalize and isolate opposition to the state and capital
interests. This work strongly suggests that policies and plans generated through deliberation and consensus
may be fundamentally limited in their ability to alter the status quo, including empowering marginalized
stakeholders at the expense of entrenched power-holders. This implies that relatively powerful stakeholders
may engage in consensus building, including community development agreements, solely in order to
advance their own interests, including to marginalize, co-opt or reduce opposition to development.
82
However, even under optimistic assumptions about agreements reached through consensus building, actors’
power, mutual ties and incentives to produce outcomes can change about agreement, prior to all the
promised outcomes materializing. Power differences both before, during and specifically, after the
agreement, may turn incentives and interests against what non-state, non capital interests—including
community stakeholders—want. For this reason, it becomes important to understand the interests and
incentives of all stakeholders throughout this process, as well as to observe how these interests and
incentives may change between deliberation and throughout implementation. These factors likely influence
whether, and how, stakeholders will work to produce all outcomes they agreed to during consensus.
In sum, this literature provides many reasons to believe that benefits may systematically not get
delivered to the community, even when stakeholders have deliberated and reached consensus in good faith.
In the chapters that follow, I use four case studies to examine whether and how communities see the
benefits promised to them through community development agreements. In so doing, I trace the agreement
implementation process to specifically look at the different actors, incentives and outcomes. I particularly
focus on how the incentives of actors involved can change after consensus and during implementation, to
understand how this may affect what communities receive from this new community development strategy.

83
Chapter 4

MANAGED PHILANTHROPY:
The Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan

In the Atlanta Falcons stadium project case, private and local government stakeholders have worked
to build a new stadium for the region’s professional football team. Prior stadium projects in Atlanta have
caused significant harm to local, disadvantaged communities, and occurred with minimal community input.
The new, elaborate Mercedes-Benz stadium is similarly being built in a low-income community. For these
reasons, the community advocated for local benefits distribution from the project through a community
benefits agreement. However, this benefits delivery process has occurred from the top down, despite
significant efforts from the local community, and local government and private officials retain direct control
over how investment occurs in this community. While the community has influenced the implementation
process, they have had to expend significant effort, and to do so, have moved to less direct community
organizing strategies to ensure accountability and compliance.
4.1. PROJECT BACKGROUND
Beginning in 2006, Atlanta Falcons owner Arthur Blank, the co-founder of the Home Depot,
expressed his desire to build a new stadium for the National Football League (NFL) professional team with
amenities that many newer stadiums feature, including a retractable roof (Saporta, 2013b; Tucker, 2012;
Interview with Respondent 30). Currently, the Falcons play at the Georgia Dome, located in the Castleberry
Hill neighborhood of Atlanta, next to the Georgia World Congress Center and downtown, and within the
historically disinvested Atlanta Westside (Keating, 2001; Rutheiser, 1996). The Georgia Dome is a major
entertainment attraction; the Falcons share the stadium with Georgia State University, and it also hosts
other events ranging from college and high school championship games, to the Super Bowl and the NCAA
Final Four basketball championships (Georgia Dome, n.d.).
While the new stadium was not a “necessity,” as the Georgia Dome remains fully functional, the
84
Mayor and other local elected officials were quick to support the new stadium proposal and to help the
Falcons leverage public funds to finance the project. The Falcons’ Georgia Dome lease ends between 2017
and 2020, depending upon bond repayment, so concern existed that the Falcons would move away from
downtown Atlanta. The Atlanta Braves, the local professional baseball team, had recently initiated a move to
the suburbs, and public officials were particularly concerned with keeping the Falcons near downtown (City
of Atlanta, n.d.; Interview with Respondent 30). Beyond Falcons games, many public officials saw a new
stadium as an opportunity to generate economic revenue by retaining existing, and capturing new, sporting
events in the city, including a new professional soccer team (City of Atlanta, n.d.; City of Atlanta, 2013;
WGCL-TV Atlanta, 2013).
However, the stadium proposal enters into an ongoing history in which the Atlanta governing
regime has long favored business and growth interests and done little to support poor, African American
residents. As Rutheiser (1996) notes, Atlanta elites have sought to make the city a cosmopolitan center and
supported projects that have promoted that image. As a result, Atlanta has a long history of development
projects that have occurred without adequate community involvement and have severely harmed vulnerable,
largely African American communities (Wheatley, 2012; Keating, 2001).
The Atlanta-Fulton County stadium was the first of numerous large-scale stadium projects to disrupt
the African American community in which it was built. During urban renewal, Atlanta local government
officials worked to clear housing in poor African American communities near downtown, but did not want
to build replacement public housing for African American residents near downtown. In 1963, when Mayor
Allen sought to bring a professional baseball team to Atlanta, the owner of the then-Milwaukee Braves
selected one of these urban-renewal cleared parcels near downtown for its future stadium. To pay for the
costs of the new stadium, money was diverted from existing parks and sports infrastructure in the city. At
the time, the money would have gone to remedy a significant racial gap in sporting facilities among
neighborhoods (Wheatley, 2012; Keating, 2001).
The Atlanta-Fulton County stadium left a significant mark on the Atlanta landscape. The stadium
85
was built within the once-thriving Summerhill and Peoplestown neighborhoods, and displaced 75 businesses
and 948 families. Since the stadium coincided with a zoning change that enabled people to use their land as
baseball game parking, many residents tore down or burned down their houses, turning neighborhoods into
parking lots. Peoplestown, to the South of the stadium, lost about one-quarter of its population from 1960
to 1970, and the percentage of African American residents increased from 49.8 percent to 89 percent
(Wheatley, 2012; Keating, 2001). As a result of the way in which the development occurred, Wheatley (2012)
argues that the Atlanta-Fulton County stadium “set an unfortunate precedent” that normalized displacement
of African American families related to development projects.
The 1996 Atlanta Olympics continued this pattern of impactful development in African American
communities, which occurred without significant participation. Atlanta won the Olympic bid in 1990, and
planning began soon thereafter. Among the projects was a new baseball stadium, to which the Atlanta
Braves would move after the Olympics. Those individuals who put together the Olympics proposal
specified that the new stadium be built next to the existing one. Despite significant local impacts and
widespread criticism, the Braves and the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) did not allow
residents to participate in the planning process, and the proposal made no significant attempt to avoid
further harming a neighborhood that had already borne the impacts of the first baseball stadium project.
While Peoplestown residents formed the community organization Atlanta Neighborhoods United for
Fairness (A’NUFF), their advocacy efforts were largely ineffective in altering the plan, and they were
excluded from formal participation in the stadium planning process (Keating, 2001). Further, the city and
county governments approved the stadium location chosen by ACOG and the Braves. They also gave
management to the Braves, as opposed to the publicly managed Atlanta-Fulton County stadium. This
decision also enabled the Braves and ACOG to avoid environmental and traffic assessments, despite
neighborhood residents pressing for reduced traffic and environmental harm (Keating, 2001).
Local government officials promoted the Olympics and related development, often at the expense
of marginalized, predominately African American neighborhoods. Development for the Olympics included
86
substantial housing, which, in the years after the Olympics, became prohibitively expensive for low-income
residents. This contributed to significant gentrification and displacement in neighborhoods like Summerhill
(Keating, 2001; Interview with Respondent 33). The Olympics development attempted to direct some of the
jobs created by the massive event to low-income residents, but questions remain about whether these
benefits actually materialized. One local government official attributed failed community benefits
distributions to “no capacity” in the targeted area and disqualifying characteristics such as felony convictions
or substance abuse problems. This effort revealed the need to “transform people,” but provided little
tangible benefit from the massive investment (Interview with Respondent 33). In this way, the Olympics, an
event that was intended to showcase Atlanta as a world-class thriving city, failed to provide lasting benefit
for impacted, impoverished residents affected by development. Many engaged in victim-blaming, holding
local residents accountable for not being prepared to receive the directed benefits. And as the Olympics
failed to deliver benefits to the promised recipients, it became yet another in a series of local, major
developments that produced little for the communities in which the development took place (Keating, 2011;
Interview with Respondent 33).
This development pattern continued when the Atlanta Falcons, who shared the Atlanta-Fulton
County Stadium with the Braves, sought a new stadium of their own. This process began in 1986, and much
of it took place around the same time as the Olympics development. By 1989, the Falcons and the city
chose a site next to downtown to build what became the Georgia Dome (Keating, 2001). The Georgia
Dome construction occurred in the early 1990s, and politicians promised community residents that this
development project would be different. Burns (2013) describes the events surrounding the Georgia Dome
development in an article for Atlanta Magazine,
“Back in 1991, when the Georgia Dome was under construction, then-mayor Maynard Jackson and
members of City Council (among them future mayor Bill Campbell), set up shop at the corner of
Magnolia and Vine to hear from residents concerned about the Dome’s impact on the
neighborhood. Back then, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported on plans to build homes on vacant
lots and offer job training to those living in the Dome’s shadow. ‘This is not a sideshow,’ Jackson
told the newspaper. ‘When that Dome opens up it’s not going to be business as usual in Vine
City . . . We want the sidewalks fixed and the streets properly paved to make Vine City as good as
any other neighborhood.’”
87

Through this effort, city representatives made a significant, public commitment to community benefits
change. The project was supposed to transform the physical area and its residents.
The Georgia Trust Fund was created to direct the community benefits promised by the Dome
project (Invest Atlanta, n.d.a.). Established in 1989, The Fund would “[a]cquire land and build single family
homes, provide mortgage financing encouraging homeownership opportunities, facilitate the conversion of
rental properties to homeownership, develop vacant tracks of land for new mixed income rental housing,
improve the existing rental housing stock” (Invest Atlanta, n.d.a.). The $8 million Trust Fund Agreement
was divided into $1.5 million for construction loan revenue notes, $3.5 million in single family mortgage,
and $3.0 million in multifamily rental housing (Invest Atlanta, n.d.a.). The Georgia Trust Fund did produce
some tangible community benefits, including property refinancing and renovation, air conditioning for an
elementary school, student art displays, food for the Atlanta Community Food Bank and training programs.
In sum, the Georgia Dome Trust Fund created 815 units, and directed loans to 119 homeowners and 20
developers, at a cost of $15.8 million (Invest Atlanta, n.d.a.).
50

However, individuals from local government and the community similarly recognize that the
community benefits that the Fund did deliver failed to create the promised, lasting community
transformation, and that this event deeply impacted the relationship between local residents and their
representatives. This circumstance occurred from both political overpromise about how the Trust Fund
would impact the community, as well as implementation failure due to the way in which the benefits were
undertaken. As one local government stakeholder said, “Now if we look into the community, you've no idea
where [the money] went, right? Because it wasn’t part of a comprehensive program. It went to this project,
it went to that project -- some of them never got done so the buildings that were started and they never got
finished…it didn’t get to the people who needed it most” (Interview with Respondent 30). As a result, the
Dome project remains widely criticized, though for different reasons (Interview with Respondents 30, 31, 33

50
Specifically, the Georgia Trust Fund created 21 homes, 47 single family mortgage loans, and “financed construction of 2
apartment complexes” for a total of 309 units (Invest Atlanta, n.d.a.). In addition, the Fund included $7.8 million in
“downpayment assistance loans, first mortgage financing for homeownership, multifamily rental loans, interim construction loans,
rehabilitation loans for seniors, flood victims assistance” (Invest Atlanta, n.d.a.).
88
and 41). Some argue that the program was flawed from the outset, due to ill-conceived provisions such as
one that only provided developers reimbursement for completed work, thus requiring nonprofit developers
to get finance loans. One community respondent argued that the investment was doomed to fail because
not enough resources were allocated to generate the promised improvement, such that the investment
constituted political overpromise. As this person noted, “You give people just enough money so that they
can't do what they need to do, and say: got you! You didn't get it” (Interview with Respondent 34).
Others argue that the benefits failed to materialize due to misguided implementation. Some maintain
that the benefits mistakenly targeted physical construction, and particularly new home construction, rather
than funding existing property renovation, education or economic development (Mariano, 2015a; Interview
with Respondent 31). Others note that local ministers were mostly tasked with implementation. One
government stakeholder held that implementation failed because these ministers were poorly prepared to
direct implementation. This individual stated that, “They were religious leaders in the community. And even
though they were very effective in their leadership, they just weren’t effective home builders and
construction builders. They were not developers. They were pastors. They were used to running churches
[not] housing development” (Interview with Respondent 33). The respondent further held that in this way,
the community lacked the capacity to implement the community benefits. For this reason, the
transformative benefits never materialized despite the financial investment.
Despite the economic investment and community benefits allocation associated with the Georgia
Dome project, the surrounding communities are “worse off than before,” in part due to impacts related to
the Georgia Dome and its events (11Alive Staff, 2013). The Georgia Dome effectively further separated the
adjacent neighborhoods from downtown. Later additions to the Georgia World Conference Center
worsened this divide, and rendered Downtown Atlanta even less accessible (11Alive Staff, 2013; Wheatley,
2012). As one longtime Atlanta resident stated, “We have 150 years of the business community running this
city. They displaced people to build Turner Field. They displaced people to build the Atlanta Civic Center.
And they displaced people to build the Dome, which is already serviceable. This city has a long history of
89
being unfair” (WSB Web Staff, 2013). This treatment has only exacerbated the issues facing these
communities.
As a result, the neighborhoods adjacent to the Dome, including Castleberry Hill, Vine City, and
English Avenue, remain deeply impoverished. Atlanta’s economic and geographic polarization is well
documented, and the area around the stadium exemplifies this divide (Keating, 2001). As one community
leader described it, “in the shadow of the stadium, [there is] all of this human need” (Interview with
Respondent 41). As Table 8 shows, residents in the area surrounding the Georgia Dome and new stadiums
are predominately African American, low income, and relatively young. Approximately 40 percent earn less
than $20,000 each year and nearly two-thirds earn less than $40,000 annually. Unemployment is far higher in
those places than at the county and state levels, particularly among African Americans.

90
Table 8: Atlanta Neighborhood Demographics
51

United
States
Georgia Fulton
County
Westside Tax Allocation District
(TAD) Neighborhoods/
Community Improvement Fund
Eligible Area
Population 314,107,84 9,907,756 967,100 9,274
Average Household Size 2.6 2.7 2.5 1.96
% White Alone 63.8% 55.0% 40.6% 15.9%
% African American 12.2% 30.4% 43.5% 72.8%
% Hispanic or Latino 16.9% 9.1% 7.7% 5.8%
% with High School Diploma or
Equivalency or less, but no college
(25 years or older)
41.7% 43.6% 27.5% 42.5%
% Households with income less
than $20,000
52

17.9% 20.0% 19.4% 40.4%
% Households with income less
than $40,000
38.1% 41.5% 37.3% 66.5%
% Age 0-17 Years 23.5% 25.2% 23.5% 14.6%
% Age 18-24 Years 10.0% 10.2% 10.7% 23.2%
% Age 25-34 Years 13.5% 13.7% 16.5% 24.4%
% Age 35-44 Years 13.0% 14.0% 15.1% 12.9%
% Age 45-54 Years 14.1% 14.1% 13.9% 11.8%
% Age 55-64 Years 12.3% 11.5% 10.6% 7.1%
% Age 65-74 Years 7.6% 6.9% 5.7% 3.6%
% Age 75 and older 6.2% 4.5% 4.0% 2.6%
% Unemployment (Total) 9.2% 10.8% 11.1% 19.0%
% Unemployment (White) 7.9% 8.3% 5.7% 16.3%
% Unemployed (Black or African
American)
16.1% 16.2% 18.2% 21.4%
% Unemployed (Hispanic or
Latino)
11.0% 9.6% 8.3% 13.2%
% Over 16 but not in labor force 36.1% 36.7% 32.7% 35.6%
Source: (American Community Survey, 2010-2014 (5-Year Estimates) SE:T1; T7; T14; T21; T25; T33; T37; T40; T41; T47; T56A)

Socioeconomic variation exists between the different neighborhoods near the stadium, and
community residents maintain that the differences between the neighborhoods are significant. Castleberry
Hill remains the least impoverished of the areas adjacent to the Dome and enjoys relatively higher property
values. As a result, it faces different issues than English Avenue and Vine City (Interview with Respondents
32 and 34). Further, since 1990, Vine City and English Avenue have experienced significant population
decline. Invest Atlanta, the economic development arm of the City of Atlanta, attributes this decline in
population, number of households and household size to fewer housing and employment opportunities in

51
I estimated boundaries using Social Explorer and Westside TAD maps from a Request for Qualifications issued by Invest
Atlanta (Invest Atlanta, 2014b). The Census tracts do not correspond exactly to the TAD neighborhoods boundaries, so I
included census tracts comprised largely of the neighborhoods listed (Tracts 25, 26, 35, 36, and 118). As such, the neighborhood
classifications defined in this table are larger than the neighborhoods themselves. Except for the total populations, the numbers
for the neighborhoods show the average amounts between the tracts.
52
Household income refers to 2014 Inflation Adjusted Dollars
91
the area. As Councilman Michael Julian Bond described, “7,000 people have left the area and voted with
their feet" (11Alive Staff, 2013; Interview with Respondent 33).
The neighborhoods near the stadium experience high reported crime rates relative to the rest of
Atlanta. The majority of the Westside neighborhoods lie in Zone 1 of the Atlanta Police Department,
though Castleberry Hill is located in Zone 5, with Downtown Atlanta and the Georgia Dome (Atlanta
Police Department, 2015).
53
Table 9 shows the reported crimes in 2015, with the percent change from 2014
reports in parenthesis. Crime in Zone 1 has generally decreased since 2014, but violent crimes remain
relatively high as compared to other zones. In particular, Zone 1 had 31 homicides; the next highest number
of reported homicides was Zone 4, with 19.
Table 9: Atlanta Reported Crimes in 2015 (in parenthesis: % change from 2014)
54

Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6
Aggravated
Assault
500 (-5.7%) 131 (-0.8%) 556 (-5.8%) 438 (+0.2%) 222 (+8.8%) 175 (-7.4%)
Auto Theft 678 (+1.4%) 454 (+14.4%) 933 (+15.3%) 910 (+0.7%) 466 (+2.2%) 639 (-6.2%)
Homicide 31 (-10.7%) 2 (-33.3%) 20 (-33.3%) 19 (+18.8%) 7 (-12.5%) 10 (+100.0%)
Larceny 850 (-9.2% 1,733 (+3.5%) 712 (-7.9%) 904 (-11.6%) 1,213 (-4.3%) 891 (-4.6%)
Non-residential
burglary
108 (-10.0%) 200 (+0.5%) 145 (-26.4%) 110 (-19.7%) 88 (-19.3%) 121 (-7.6%)
Residential
Burglary
785 (-10.3%) 484 (+1.5%) 793(-23.9%) 886 (-19.2%) 164 (+19.7%) 545 (-11.5%)
Robbery 360 (-23.7%) 242 (-2.4%) 435 (-3.1%) 409 (-6.4%) 318 (-10.7%) 287
Vehicle Larceny 965 (+36.1%) 1,887 (+6.2%) 945 (-13.2%) 1,267 (+31.6) 2,304 (-9.8%) 1,719
Source: Atlanta Police Department, 2016

In addition to poverty and crime, intense speculation abounds in these neighborhoods, which
contributes to the uncertainty and risk facing these communities. Local businessman Rick Warren has
purchased approximately 10 percent of properties in English Avenue, some for only hundreds of dollars.
Warren is speculating on the future value of these properties, given the proximity to downtown Atlanta, and
is waiting for the neighborhood to change to make his fortune. Meanwhile, Warren has let the properties
decay to the point where they are the sites of drug deals, prostitution and dead bodies have been found, yet
he remains unwilling to invest the funds necessary to maintain the properties until their values increase. As a

53
The Atlanta Police Department provides no information on the relative geographic and population size of these zones, but
does note that Zones 2 and 5 are major business districts, and thus their population varies by time of day. Zones are divided by
neighborhood, and each zone includes a Neighborhood Planning Unit (personal communication, December 29, 2015).
54
The plus sign indicates an increase in reported crimes over 2014 values.
92
result, Warren perpetuates and exacerbates neighborhood blight, to the extent that he was recently
sentenced to jail time for property code violations (Leslie, 2015; Mariano, 2014; Interview with Respondent
34). As an article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution describes,
“The sheer number [of properties] means Warren holds much of the fate of this fragile
neighborhood in his hands. Some say he’s holding it hostage… What’s clear from Warren’s track
record is that he’s a cunning investor who is setting the stage for a big payoff. As a result, he is
changing the face of English Avenue more than any of its most influential politicians or churches,
let alone the core group of residents fighting to revive the neighborhood. As blight closes in,
properties are even cheaper to buy” (Mariano, 2014).

Warren, who has a history of failed real estate and other financial deals, preys on desperate residents
by renting decaying properties to them, then refusing to make improvements. Some have sued, with one
tenant winning a $22,000 judgment against him for hazardous conditions. Warren acknowledged in 2014
that he expected soon to be the biggest violator of housing codes in Atlanta, with at least 80 complaints of
“highly dangerous” conditions at that time (Mariano, 2014). Residents surmise that Warren wants the
neighborhood to decay so the city would have to intervene to improve the community. In such
circumstances, Warren would be a primary, albeit unintended, beneficiary of this public funding. Warren has
already tried to cash in on the land by selling it to the Arthur M. Blank Foundation through the Fulton
County/City of Atlanta Land Bank for $667,500, but the mayor stopped the deal to ensure that Warren’s
speculation did not pay off. The Blank Foundation, funded by Atlanta Falcons owner Arthur Blank, sought
to purchase the land to alleviate property blight in the area surrounding the Georgia Dome. According to
Leslie (2015), the Mayor’s spokeswoman said that allowing speculation to generate such profit in English
Avenue and Vine City would be a “slap in the face” to residents (Leslie, 2015; Lee, 2015; Mariano, 2014;
Interview with Respondent 34).

93
Figures 2 and 3: Abandoned Properties

Photo by author

Photo by author

On the ground, there is some sense that these neighborhoods are improving. One community
representative noted that before, English Avenue was dark at night, and many drug deals occurred in the
94
area. But now, “the streets are lit up and they've tried to deal with the drug, open drug market there. I think
that's been a significant change. It's not perfect, but it's better than it was. And there is somewhat of a
sense of order that people can't just do anything, like it was before” (Interview with Respondent 34).
However, for some residents, physical improvements only heighten worries that gentrification will
eventually displace the residents that have held these communities together for so long. Efforts such as
those by Warren demonstrate the desperate situation faced by community residents, as these neighborhoods
face persistent poverty, crime, and health, safety and environmental issues, yet remain the site of intense
speculation, such that gentrification poses a real threat. This speculation contributes to neighborhood decay,
and makes addressing the problems faced by these communities even more difficult (Interview with
Respondent 31).
Beyond real estate uncertainty, poor physical conditions and extreme poverty, residents of the
neighborhoods adjacent to the Dome experience further harm due to their proximity to the stadium. The
neighborhoods have large parking lots for game days, but when not in use, these empty lots are “dead zones”
and contribute to physical fragmentation. The Dome and related parking lots have also exacerbated flooding
in the area, as extensive impermeable surfaces drain into the neighboring communities. Further, game days
bring traffic, tailgating, drunk fans and litter, and generally make normal life difficult on these days. As Greg
Hawthorne, executive director of the Vince City Health and Housing Ministry, stated, “It’s such a heavy
onset and a lot at one time. You’ll get 80,000 people from the metro area in the community” (Wheatley,
2012). Local churches also report that many attendees skip Sunday services during football season just to
avoid traffic, and their contributions decline significantly on those days (Wheatley, 2012).
At the same time as these developments have proceeded, the communities retains a strong and
proud activist tradition, rooted in the Civil Rights Movement. The Atlanta Westside was home to Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. (Saporta, 2014b; Burns, 2013). The communities are only about two miles from Dr. King’s
birth site and the Ebenezer Baptist Church, where much of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s
community organizing took place. Despite its deep activist traditions, the community remains imperiled, and
95
faces a continual assault from development, speculation, and poverty. One community respondent identified
this paradox, stating that this “is a community that gave birth to the civil rights movement…it was born and
nurtured right there in that community. So I think that the challenge for anybody is: will the center of the
civil rights movement for social justice become a victim of discrimination and displacement without justice”
(Interview with Respondent 31).
Moreover, even though the population of these neighborhoods has declined, many chose to stay,
including working professionals with the resources to leave. Those who stayed became even more
committed to community advocacy and improvement, wary of gentrification, and resentful of the
“unwholesome perception” of their community (Kahn, 2015a; Interview with Respondents 31 and 34). As
one individual stated,
“It wasn’t like a natural disaster that happened or a big gas leak or a Chernobyl that kind of drove
people away. People got up and decided they don't want to live there anymore despite all of these
different pockets of effort. People decided, hey, this is not the neighborhood or the place I want to
raise my kids, not where I want to come home after a hard day’s work. I don't want to live here.
And so the spirit of the people who remained, they all share a vision that hey, this is a beautiful area,
this is a beautiful community. They want to see their neighborhood preserved and uplifted. And a
lot of people are dedicated to their vision” (Interview with Respondent 33).

Thus, despite the turmoil and population decline, many community residents anticipate and actively fight to
avoid future impacts from development projects. Active, under-resourced community development
corporations remain committed to community development efforts (Mariano, 2015a). The neighborhood
planning unit structure in Atlanta, installed in 1974 by Maynard Jackson, Atlanta’s first African American
mayor, further incorporates community participation into the political process to give the communities “a
voice” (Wheatley & Isaf, 2015). As a result of this model, Atlanta has “a very strong citizen engagement
component by design” (Interview with Respondent 34).
This local history and advocacy tradition influenced the new Falcons stadium proposal, as this
project enters into a tense history. With the new stadium, Larry Keating, Professor Emeritus in City and
Regional Planning at Georgia Tech, stated, "This is the fourth time we've built a stadium in a poor black
neighborhood. That's wrong. And that tells people in those neighborhoods you don't count, just get out of
96
my way. That's real ugly. That's a real punch in the nose." (Wheatley, 2012). More optimistically, Burns
(2013) holds that through the new stadium, “Almost a quarter-century later, Atlanta gets a second chance to
make good on those promises [from the Georgia Dome project].” For this reason, the question of
community impacts and benefits has become particularly important and contested, and negotiations have
become an important arena in which the community has aired past grievances and seeks to ensure better
outcomes from current and future planning efforts. However, the distrust that this failed investment
generated still lingers in the community, and became central to the new stadium proposal and related
community benefits negotiations (Interview with Respondent 30).
4.2. THE STADIUM PROJECT
The new stadium project enters into this ongoing history, and the prosperity that the stadium
represents juxtaposes against the impoverished surrounding neighborhoods. Public officials maintain that
this stadium deal is economically justified, with a significant regional and statewide economic impact, and
differs from past development projects. While the Georgia Dome was entirely publicly funded, the Falcons
proposed to pay at least two-thirds of the stadium costs, and potentially much more. The state would also
receive $2.5 million annually in rent (Bluestein & Stafford, 2013). Further, public officials cited significant
revenue associated with professional sports teams and “marquee events” (City of Atlanta, n.d.).
The stadium construction is expected to increase the regional GDP by $155 million, by creating
1,468 full-time equivalent jobs and $71 million in personal income. High-profile events held at the stadium,
for which “the new stadium allows the City and State to remain nationally competitive,” including the SEC
Championship Game, will generate between $111 and $149 million in annual revenue for the State of
Georgia. Further, advocates hope that the new stadium will attract other high-profile events such as the
Super Bowl ($187-276 million to the State of Georgia), the FIFA World Cup ($150-250 million), the BCS
Championship Game ($125-201 million) and a professional soccer team ($15-$24 million) (City of Atlanta,
n.d.). Without the Falcons in the Georgia Dome, the Georgia Dome would lose between $1.5 - 2.5 million
each year, and the Georgia World Convention Center would “have no funds to support a capital
97
improvement program” (City of Atlanta, n.d.).
City officials and the Falcons initially sought funding from the state government, but the state
refused to contribute to a new stadium. As a result, the City of Atlanta leveraged its Hotel Motel Tax to
contribute about $200 million to the new stadium, since the stadium would ideally contribute to the fund by
attracting out-of-town tourists, though much of the project revenue will occur at the regional lvel. The
remaining project funding would come from Falcons owner Arthur Blank.
55

Public funding became a major point of contestation for many community advocates, who opposed
using tax dollars for an elective, amenity-driven, costly project. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution conducted a
statewide poll in 2013, and found that “72 percent of respondents either opposed or strongly opposed using
hotel/motel tax collections in Atlanta and unincorporated Fulton County to help finance construction”
(Bluestein & Stafford, 2013). However, city officials countered that the city was only funding about one-fifth
of the stadium, and would receive significant public benefit (City of Atlanta, n.d.; Tucker, 2013a). Further,
these public funds do not involve additional taxes, but rather a redirection of taxes “largely paid by visitors
from outside the state of Georgia” (City of Atlanta, n.d.).
56
Some councilmembers objected to the stadium
vote, arguing that the process occurred too quickly and without adequate consideration. As Councilman
Kwanza Hall (2013) noted, previous Council decisions “could have benefited from more time for Council
deliberation,” and concern for duplicating this inadequate process drove him to vote against the stadium
project.
As stadium negotiations proceeded, the stadium location became a central point of contention. The
Falcons and Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed identified two sites, to the north and the south of the existing

55
As Tucker (2013b) clarifies, “How much public money eventually goes into the stadium depends on how much revenue Atlanta
hotel rooms generate through 2050. That’s because 39.3 percent of the city’s 7 cents-per-dollar hotel-motel tax is committed by
law to the stadium — the same percentage that has gone into the Georgia Dome for the past 21 years. The tax money would be
used first to make the annual principal and interest payments on the bonds that would fund $200 million of the construction cost.
And whatever is left after that — potentially hundreds of millions of dollars over 30 years, according to some projections —
would go to offset the Falcons’ expenses of operating and maintaining the stadium. In another use of public money, the GWCCA
is responsible for acquiring the land on which the stadium would be built.”
56
According to City of Atlanta (n.d.), “The hotel-motel tax is legislated through two different paragraphs of the state code. One
allows for 7% and the other allows for an additional 1%.” 39.30% of the first 7% of this tax goes to the Georgia Dome and new
stadium, while 28.56% goes to the Atlanta General Fund, 22.5% to the Atlanta Convention and Visitors Bureau, and 9.64% to the
Georgia World Congress Center. The entire additional 1% tax goes to the Atlanta Convention and Visitors Bureau Marketing
Fund.”
98
Dome. The Falcons and the Mayor preferred the south site, which is closer to public transit and to the
convention center. However, this site required acquisition of the two historic churches on the land. The
Blank family negotiated with the congregations to purchase the land, with encouragement from the mayor.
Talks did not proceed easily; negotiations with Mount Vernon Church stalled for some time, as the two
parties sought prices that differed by over $14 million. When sales did not meet an established August 1,
2013 deadline, the Falcons viewed the south site as no longer possible. However, Mayor Reed encouraged
both parties to come back to the negotiating table, and the church eventually agreed to a sale (Mercedes
Benz Stadium, 2015; Saporta, 2013a; Tucker, 2013c). The use of eminent domain and the mayor’s strong
commitment to the project demonstrated to the community that the project was going to move forward
regardless of community resistance, and the only questioned that remained was the form that the project
would take. In this way, the community never held control over whether the development would occur, but
only had some leverage over how it would take place (Interview with Respondents 31 and 34).
One community respondent noted that because of strong community organizing and advocacy, the
churches “probably got better prices than they otherwise would have as if nobody was paying attention”
(Interview with Respondent 34). The congregations received more than market value for the land; the
Falcons paid $19.5 million for the Friendship Baptist Church property, and the Falcons and Georgia World
Congress Center Authority paid $14.5 million for the Mount Vernon Church property (Mercedes Benz
Stadium, 2015; Tucker, 2013c). The project required acquisition of five other properties; four were sold near
the appraised value, and one holdout owner sought $12.5 million for a property that the GWCCA offered
$1.26 million. As a result, the state used eminent domain to acquire the property (Saporta, 2013a; Tucker,
2013c).
However, the sale of the churches represented an important moment for some community
representatives, who wanted to get the communities to maintain a unified front to the city and developers.
As a result, from their perspective, “the City did divide and conquer” and appeal to the varying concerns
that exist between the different neighborhoods (Interview with Respondent 34). As one community
99
representative explained,
“And so I was very disappointed [that the communities became divided] because the communities
are very different. Castleberry Hill property values are high, that's a transition neighborhood…They
are going to be okay. They had very different issues. They're just concerned about traffic and noise
and whatever. And so we do -- we had very different issues and Castleberry would always complain,
you're not seeing us because that firstly was all about Vine City and English Avenue” (Interview with
Respondent 34).

Divisions between the different neighborhoods fractured their united front, and enabled the development to
proceed.
The community recognized that the project would move forward due to its strong political support,
and therefore mobilized to gain local benefit from this publicly funded project. The community, including
residents and organizations such as Georgia Stand-Up, a member of The Partnership for Working Families,
a nationwide umbrella advocacy coalition, studied the experiences of other communities, and sought a
community benefits agreement.
57
Their goal was to ensure that the new stadium would not follow the
disruptive, harmful path of previous development projects in the city. Groups such as Georgia Stand-Up
lobbied the mayor and city councilmembers, and held leverage over their elected officials voting on the
stadium project (Interview with Respondents 31, 33 and 34).
The different community stakeholders put together what one individual called “draft mitigation
documents” or “what we thought that they could do to mitigate this huge development” (Interview with
Respondent 34). From their perspective, the stadium illustrates,
“the moral obscenity of [the stadium project] taking place without resources being designated to
redevelop on a major scale—not just cosmetic development, but substantial development on a
major scale; resources being made available as concerns scholarship, health care, job training—we
weren’t against the stadium so much as we were against the building of the stadium as we were
against doing nothing for the communities in the shadow of the stadium. We didn’t see a need for a
new stadium, because a beautiful dome already exists, but we knew it would be built. And we knew it
would enrich those who are already rich” (Interview with Respondent 41, emphasis mine).

These community stakeholders sought to ensure dedicated human capital and physical infrastructure
development in the area, to overcome the stark inequality that this project represented.

57
The Partnership for Working Families is a nationwide umbrella advocacy coalition whose member community organizations
frequently employ community benefits strategies, including in the other case study sites of Los Angeles (Los Angeles Alliance for
a New Economy or LAANE), Seattle (Puget Sound Sage) and Milwaukee (Citizen Action of Wisconsin Education Fund).
100
Due to significant public opposition to the inclusion of public financing, the history of land
development in Atlanta, and community pressure, city officials worked to ensure community benefits
attached to the stadium development. In a decisive move, Councilmember Michael Julian Bond, whose
district lies within the area in question, moved to require that the $200 million in bonds could not be issued
until a community benefits package was “adopted by the City Council and approved by the Mayor”
(Interview with Respondent 30; City of Atlanta, 2013; Atlanta City Council President Ceasar Mitchell, 2013).
Community representatives hold that the Blank Foundation and local government stakeholders were not
just driven to work for community improvement out of concerns of justice, but out of “shame” that “the
community next door” to the massive development remained so under-resourced (Interview with
Respondent 34).
A Community Benefits Plan Committee was formed in July 2013 to shape the community benefits
package related to the stadium. In separate negotiations with the Mayor’s office, the Arthur Blank
Foundation and Invest Atlanta signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which the Foundation agreed to
allocate $15 million in community benefits. Invest Atlanta similarly invested $15 million, for a promised $30
million investment total. The Community Benefits Plan Committee was formed to establish guidelines for
how this community investment would proceed, prior to implementation.
58
Invest Atlanta facilitated the
Plan Committee, which involved elected officials, representatives from the Mayor’s office and community
representatives, including individuals from metropolitan planning units and different community
organizations that nominated individuals to represent the community (Shapiro, 2013a; Interview with
Respondents 30 and 33). The Plan Committee engaged in a five-month process to prioritize different goals
and potential projects for the Blank Foundation and Invest Atlanta (through the Westside Tax Allocation
District) funds. The former redevelopment branch of the city, Invest Atlanta, is required to fund capital

58
“The stated purpose of Invest Atlanta is to strengthen Atlanta’s economy and global competitiveness in order to create
increased opportunity and prosperity for the people of Atlanta. Chaired by Mayor Reed, and governed by a nine-member board of
directors, Invest Atlanta’s programs and initiatives focus on developing and fostering public/private partnerships to create jobs,
grow the economy, revitalize neighborhoods, attract investment, spur innovation, and encourage entrepreneurship. To achieve
these goals, Invest Atlanta leverages the benefits of bond financing, revolving loan funds, housing financing, tax increment
financing (TIF), and tax credits” (Archbold, 2014).
101
projects, but the Blank Foundation’s money can go to either capital projects or programming. Both entities
committed to call for proposals, but retained the discretion to decide which projects receive funding,
broadly directed by the community benefits plan goals. The meetings were open to the public, with public
agendas, but there are no public minutes available (Interview with Respondents 30 and 33). However, there
are some transcripts of the particularly contentious moments available online (Blau, 2013a).
In their committee participation, community stakeholders expressed considerable distrust, rooted in
past experiences. Community representatives looked to other examples of community benefits agreements,
though their own priorities and perspective were largely driven by experiences with the Georgia Dome
project. As one community respondent stated, “this time we wanted to be better stewards” to avoid
“unmanaged gentrification” and displacement (Interview with Respondent 31). Their concerns soon
focused on ensuring that benefits would take the form of a legally binding community benefits agreement.
The community felt that an agreement would afford them legal recourse in case the agreement terms were
not delivered (Interview with Respondents 31 and 34). Further demonstrating community distrust, the
community sought clawbacks, to ensure that if the money for a particular project was not being spent in a
way so as to help the community, further public money would not be issued (Interview with Respondent
31).
In contrast, city officials sought a non-binding community benefits plan, which they felt would
provide additional flexibility during implementation, and would be approved and enacted more quickly
because it would not have to meet legal requirements (Leslie & Tucker, 2014; Interview with Respondent
30). They emphasized that the community did not need an agreement in order to gain their benefits, since
Invest Atlanta could deliver the outcomes, and that research shows that even a legally-binding agreement
can fail to deliver the promised benefits (Interview with Respondents 30 and 31).
Negotiations over the proposal were often very tense, and largely centered on this legal requirement.
As one local government representative stated,
“Our first meeting was tough because what you saw was the community purging all the attention
and all the disappointment that they had been holding there for years. And the distrust to say: what
102
about this is going to be different? You guys just wanted to bring the stadium in here. And you
don’t care -- you don’t care about anything else that’s going on. And so in fact our first of meetings
pretty much went nowhere. I mean there were a couple of them where we just had to say, you know
what, let's come back next week” (Interview with Respondent 30).

A different local government representative echoed this sentiment, and said that, “I came to the meeting a
few minutes after it had begun, it had just degenerated into chaos. A lot of shouting, a lot of arguing. And
it was really bad. And it was bad because the history over there is so bad” (Interview with Respondent 33).
Local government representatives maintained their position in directing the benefits deliberations
from the top-down. Even though the community played an active role in the process, local government
stakeholders were reluctant to allow the community to control the benefits process entirely, since many
blamed the community for being unable to direct the Georgia Dome investment so as to effectively foster
lasting community improvement. As one local government official stated,
“you've got a community that is used to getting money, used to giving a lot of pressure and then
having city hall kind of follow and say, what would it take… just leave us alone. But this time,
because of the dynamics of the people involved on the dome side, primarily on the Falcons and the
Blank Foundation and Arthur Blank himself, and just a general sense that things just can't be keep
going the way that it has been going on from the city's perspective… And so the community, they
wanted more money, they wanted money to do the things that they’ve said they’ve always wanted to
do, what we were attempting to do. And they wanted it now, they didn't trust city hall, they didn’t
trust -- certainly they didn’t trust the development authority. And they didn’t trust each other. So it
was an extremely violent sort of situation… So the second meeting kind of went like the first one,
just a lot of volatile talking. The community got to speak a lot, but it wasn’t really a lot
accomplished” (Interview with Respondent 33).

In this way, public officials downplayed the community’s historical accounts and related pain as
unproductive, which hindered timely progress on the project they so desperately sought to secure. Since the
committee needed to pass a final plan for the bond issuance, and thus for stadium construction to begin,
many non-community stakeholders sought to expedite committee deliberations. As community stakeholders
remained adamant about producing an agreement, many non-community members began to express
concern at the length of deliberation time for the committee (Shapiro, 2013c; Shapiro, 2013d).
In November 2013, months after the committee began meeting, Councilmember Michael Julian
Bond sparked outrage when he announced during the meeting that the then-unapproved community
benefits plan was already being considered before the Atlanta City Council. In response to a direct question,
103
Bond surprised other committee members and community residents when he stated, “It is not before us
properly any longer. We can no longer amend this document because it is before City Council now.”
(Shapiro, 2013b). A representative from the Mayor’s office argued that the move was intended to ensure
that the Council could approve the plan before break, and was merely a “placeholder” for the terms that the
committee would later specify. However, the move clarified that the committee had no real power to
determine the agreement terms, and raised concerns of tokenism.
59
In so doing, the City Council had
effectively nullified the influence of the committee formed expressly to ensure community participation and
accountability (Shapiro, 2013b).
Community stakeholders expressed shock, frustration and outrage at local government’s efforts to
circumvent public deliberation. As one committee member responded during the exchange that followed
the revelation, “You wonder why we want an agreement? Because we don’t trust you! And you proved
yourself untrustworthy tonight!” (Shapiro, 2013b). In light of this action, City Council President Ceasar
Mitchell stated, “I am afraid that a process already filled with distrust, from the outset, will now lose any
remaining credibility needed to achieve a positive outcome so desperately needed. We have to put our heads
together and find a way out of this mess” (Pendered, 2013). As Yvonne Jones, the head of the Vine City and
English Avenue neighborhood planning unit and a member of the Community Benefits Plan Committee
stated, “All this has been a sham. Whoever comes in, whatever they say. All we can do is hope now. It’s just
a hope and a prayer,” (Shapiro, 2013e). In response to the actions of local government stakeholders, one
group of community activists sued the city to halt the stadium project on the grounds that the city funding
constituted a payout to private entities. However, their real grievance was that they wanted the benefits
package to be a “bona fide agreement” but “their strategy was to sue the city over whether the city had the
right to use the $200 million in that land” (Interview with Respondent 41; Pendered, 2014; Blau, 2013b).
They eventually lost the lawsuit, and the development proceeded, albeit delayed (Interview with Respondent
41).

59
Arnstein (1969) clarifies that without “genuine participation” (p. 217), planning processes risk tokenism, as they fail to confer
“the real power to affect the outcome of that process” (p. 216).
104
As the plan proceeded to the City Council’s Community Development Committee, many residents
encouraged committee members to vote against the proposal, which they contended was still too vague, and
did not clarify which projects would receive funding or how the money would be dispersed (Rabouin, 2013;
Shapiro, 2013d). That the benefits package proceeded as a plan, and not an agreement, remains a point of
contention for the community, whose distrust became more entrenched due to the way that the benefits
proceedings occurred. As one community resident stated, the altered wording of the benefits package
“triggered our concern, and ultimately our outrage” that “you can put a plan on the shelf and never take it
off” (Interview with Respondent 41). A different community representative argued that the “deadline-
driven” process was set up to avoid real discussion from the outset. From this perspective, the committee
chair, Michael Julian Bond, “was the mayor's point guy to kind of shut things down, and kind of keep things
in limited conversations and limited responses and who could talk and this kind of thing” (Interview with
Respondent 34). Before a scandal led to ethics charges, Councilman Bond “wanted to run for mayor” and
therefore let the process become politicized. This individual held that the city was “going to do what they
wanted to do regardless, that was clear… in particular, [in] the meeting where an official vote was taken, the
Mayor showed up with the Atlanta Police Security and so no one was going to act too crazy in the meeting”
(Interview with Respondent 34).
Further, this respondent argued that in retrospect, negotiations should have proceeded between the
developer and the community, and allowed local government to only act as a “mediator” (Interview with
Respondent 34). The Blank Foundation only began to actively engage with the community after the
community began to demand such action through the Community Benefits Plan Committee. Rather, the
community,
“should have been bargaining directly with [the developer], we should have marching it there, in
front of their homes…... it took us saying, hey, we want a representative from [the developer]. I
don’t recall the time Mr. Blank himself came to that community benefits meeting. He's a billionaire
but it would have been a wonderful gesture, even if it was just a gesture, for him to come and say I
want $200 million or whatever it was to finance the stadium. And they say I can't go and say I want
those two churches, I will knock him down to pay this money and, you know, if he paid $19 million
for one and $15 million for the other, he is probably going to triple his money because all of the
proceeds from the stadium and concessions and everything associated with it, that goes to him, he
105
pays a fee, a certain fee which is minor compared to what he is going to make” (Interview with
Respondent 34).

The Community Benefits Plan Committee meeting minutes support the claim that that Arthur Blank never
attended a meeting. While the Community Benefits Plan Committee began meeting in July 2013, these
records indicate that representatives for the Blank Foundation began attending on February 27, 2014, over
six months since the first committee meeting, and on the seventh of ten meetings total (Invest Atlanta,
2014a). Further, the meeting minutes show no significant discussion of the Blank Foundation funding until
the fourth meeting, on August 21, 2013, when an Invest Atlanta representative “provided an overview of
the Arthur M. Blank Family Foundation Neighborhood Prosperity Fund” (Invest Atlanta, 2013b).
In contrast to the community perspective, many local government stakeholders express satisfaction
at the benefits deliberation process and the final plan. According to one local government stakeholder, the
process “was not necessarily civil when we started [but the community] got to a point where we were being
constructive and moving forward and really putting our best ideas out there. We got over the fact that it
wasn’t to be an agreement and we moved on with the plan” (Interview with Respondent 30). Local
government stakeholders express optimism that outcomes are being delivered and will contribute to lasting
community improvement (Blau, 2013b). One local government representative held that community
respondents were still making demands and remained frustrated regardless of the fact that, “the process is
working. These people are getting grants, they're getting funded. [The community] didn’t shift. And so
they're in the mode of we're here to fight and divvy up these resources. They're still kind of in that mindset.
But that fight is over” (Interview with Respondent 33). In this way, local government respondents feel that
the community was being unreasonable by making additional demands, and causing what they perceived to
be unnecessary conflict. Local government representatives held that they were deeply invested in outcomes
delivery because of their personal and professional commitment to community improvement, including
family ties. Regardless, these respondents maintain that the best way to engage in benefits distribution is not
community-drive, but rather led by local government (Interview with Respondents 30 and 33).
The Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan deliberation process included significant direction by
106
local government representatives. Community stakeholders played an important role in driving the original
benefits by putting pressure on local government officials. The community also had a role in determining
the agreement terms through the Community Benefits Plan Committee, though the plan only provides
guidelines for how the money will be spent. Throughout, local government representatives largely directed
the committee, and had their own agenda in the deliberations process. The Blank Foundation negotiated
their spending allocation with the Mayor’s office, and only began to engage with the community through the
Community Benefits Plan Committee after the community put pressure on the elected officials on the
committee.
4.3. ATLANTA FALCONS COMMUNITY BENEFITS PLAN AND IMPLEMENTATION
With the Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan in place, the “new operable roof, state-of-the-art
multi-purpose stadium” is currently under construction, and expected to be completed by 2017 (Invest
Atlanta, 2013a). Figure 4 shows the new stadium, under construction. The stadium is elaborate and touted
as a “game changer” for fans; it is expected to receive the highest LEED certification level, with 650
concession stands, a bar the size of the entire field, and fans will find “edible gardens” outside the field
(Green, 2016). Originally anticipated to cost $1 billion, the Falcons believe that the project will now cost at
least $1.2 billion (Leslie, 2013). Mercedes-Benz purchased the naming rights, so the new stadium will be
called the Mercedes-Benz Stadium, after the luxury European car manufacturer. The new stadium has
already been selected to host the NCAA Final Four in 2020 (NCAA, 2014). After the Mercedes-Benz
stadium is complete, the existing Georgia Dome will be torn down, and replaced with a large parking garage
and hotel. The goal is to actually take up less space with parking, since the current Georgia Dome has many
different lots throughout the adjacent area, which remain vacant during nonevent times (Interview with
Respondent 30; Tucker, 2013b; Tucker, 2013c; Saporta, 2013c). The new stadium will be owned by the
Georgia World Congress Center Authority and “will license rights of use” to the Falcons, who will benefit
from stadium revenue, including “tickets, premium seating, food and beverage, sponsorships, naming rights
and parking” (City of Atlanta, n.d.).
107
Figure 4: Mercedes-Benz Stadium Construction

Photo by author

As stadium construction proceeds, so does implementation of the approved community benefits
plan. The Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan dedicates $30 million to community benefits; $15
million will come from The Arthur Blank Family Foundation and the other $15 million will come from
Invest Atlanta. The beneficiary area includes Vine City, English Avenue, Castleberry Hill, Marietta Street
Artery, Downtown Neighborhood Area and the “surrounding areas” (Invest Atlanta, 2013a). The Invest
Atlanta funding creates the Westside Tax Allocation District Community Improvement Fund, while the
Blank Foundation money forms the basis for the Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund.
The Blank Foundation and Invest Atlanta retain sole discretion over how this money will be spent,
much to the chagrin of the residents for whom these funds are intended to benefit.
60
The plan specifies that
it “provide community job training, affordable housing, environmental mitigations, special event
enforcement programs, historic preservation, health and wellness programs and economic development”

60
According to the plan, “These charitable contributions will be made solely at the discretion of the trustees of The Arthur M.
Blank Family Foundation and will be guided by the Community Benefits Plan Framework approved by the City of Atlanta
Council” (Invest Atlanta, 2013a, p. 2).
108
(Invest Atlanta, 2013a, p. 1). Funds from the Blank Foundation are to be spent by 2020, and are directed to
“ignite positive change and improvement in the quality of life in Vine City, English Avenue, Castleberry Hill
and adjacent neighborhoods” (Invest Atlanta, 2013a, p. 2). The Plan includes recommendations by the
Community Benefits Plan Committee, including a community center with job training, education, youth
programs, health and wellness programs, and business initiatives, as well as desired “catalytic projects,”
affordable housing, land banking, environmental mitigation, transportation improvements, zoning, historic
preservation, green space, and provisions for community safety (Invest Atlanta, 2013a; WGCL-TV Atlanta,
2013). The Plan also requires that Invest Atlanta report quarterly to the City of Atlanta Community
Development/Human Resources Committee and the Community Benefits Plan Committee. It further
specifies that Invest Atlanta hold application cycles beginning in January 2014 to allocate at least some of
the funds to community initiatives. There are no penalties for noncompliance (Invest Atlanta, 2013a).
Importantly, local government stakeholders hold that the $30 million investment is only part of a
larger strategy to revitalize the neighborhoods surrounding the proposed stadium. As one local government
official stated, there is “a recognition that the $15 million from Blank or from the city, it's just not enough
money. So where do you get the money from?” (Interview with Respondent 33). The city has looked to
government and philanthropic funding, further underscoring its top-down approach to community
investment, largely rooted in experiences around the Georgia Dome. During the Community Benefits Plan
Committee meetings, Mayor Reed indicated that the city was looking to leverage this $30 million for
additional funds, including from the city, as well by applying to the Choice Neighborhoods Program at
HUD. In September 2015, HUD announced that Atlanta received $30 million in a Choice Neighborhoods
Implementation Grant, including the Community Benefits Plan-targeted neighborhood of Vine City
(Durham, 2015).
Further, the city is actively encouraging philanthropic investment in the community, and established
the Westside Future Fund to work with business leaders to achieve this goal. The Westside Future Fund
“will serve as a catalyst for philanthropic and corporate support to accelerate improvements in the health,
109
education and welfare of current residents, address equity and social justice issues associated with new
residential and commercial development, and attract new investment, new jobs and new residents” (Durham,
2015). Many philanthropic investors have a stake in this community, including the CEO of Chick-Fil-A,
which sponsors the Peach Bowl, a college football event held at the stadium. The fund is intended to
coordinate efforts to improve the neighborhood, and ensure that the needed investment materializes,
beyond the $30 million promised in the benefits plan (Interview with Respondents 30 and 41). The Mayor
appointed the board membership, including the Presidents of Spelman College, Atlanta Life Financial and
the Blank Foundation; the CEOs of Jackmont Hospitality and United Distributors; the Chairman and CEO
of the PulteGroup; a partner from Bain & Company, a global consulting firm; and Atlanta City
Councilmembers Michael Julian Bond and Ivory Lee Young. There is no mention of community
participants or involvement by the community (Williams, 2014; Interview with Respondents 30 and 41)).
Other major investments are being considered in the area; nearby Georgia Tech University is
pushing for a $500 million, 60-acre, mixed-use development in the northern site where the Falcons chose
not to locate the new stadium (Kahn, 2015b). In 2015, philanthropists dedicated $1.6 million to the
proposed Mims Park, which the City Council has already approved, but has yet to receive sufficient funding.
The Park would memorialize the community’s civil rights history, with statues and sculptures to memorialize
peace advocates such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and local leader Rodney Mims Cook Sr. (Green, 2015).
One community representative highlighted the fundamentally different way in which philanthropic
and other top-down investment, such as that of the Blank Foundation, instigates community change. This
person noted that this approach does not cultivate deep relationships with community residents that could
inform funding strategies, develop capacity and generate grassroots change. This person noted that, “you're
going to get out what you put in. So why not make the serious investment?” (Interview with Respondent
34). Following this same approach, the $30 million allocated by the Community Benefits Plan is also not
directed by the community, but rather will be spent by Invest Atlanta and the Blank Foundation, with
ongoing input from city officials and guidance from the community into the original plan.
110
Thus, the new stadium development promises a significant investment in the communities adjacent
to the stadium, but the community retains little control over how this money is spent. As a result, the
community has little direct influence over the outcomes produced. Due to the distrust generated by the long
history of development in Atlanta, as well as a process in which the community was denied a legally-binding
plan, many community residents vowed to actively participate during implementation. In particular, as the
final plan was approved, the community motioned to keep the Community Benefits Plan Committee active
through implementation. While the Committee was only intended to last through the plan approval,
community members successfully kept the Committee intact, and intended to use it to ensure public
reporting, monitor outcomes and ensure that this benefits package will finally produce long awaited, lasting
community change (Shapiro, 2013f; Interview with Respondents 30 and 31).
The plan itself does not include an implementation strategy, and only includes a “list of ideals”
rather than specific promises (Interview with Respondent 31). Implementation is ongoing, and as one
community representative noted, “the jury is still out” on the outcomes that community will receive. As one
community respondent noted, “Anybody can put something on paper. The integrity is getting off the paper
into a reality. The integrity is for the people that the benefit was designed to benefit. If we actually received
some form of benefit from that” (Interview with Respondent 31). As implementation proceeds, important
patterns have emerged that illustrate how stakeholders engage in implementation. In particular, Invest
Atlanta and the Blank Foundation are largely driving plan implementation and retain control of the process,
as they work to spend the money in the way they see fit. While some community activists have attempted to
insert themselves into implementation and influence how the money gets spent, this effort remains limited
and difficult.
Invest Atlanta began planning related to the benefits plan by hiring an outside consultant to create
the Westside Tax Allocation District (TAD) Neighborhood Strategic Implementation Plan, in advance of
the $30 million spending by the Blank Foundation and Invest Atlanta. The Strategic Implementation Plan
“aggregate[s] all the plans that have been developed for the area” to “create a cohesive vision for Vine City
111
and English Avenue” with involvement by the city. The plan sought to “create a cohesive, sustainable vision
for the Westside TAD Neighborhoods that will guide future redevelopment” and “build human capital and
increase job creation as an economic development strategy” (Invest Atlanta, 2013c, p. 6).
61
As one local
government stakeholder stated, “Everything that we're doing today is based on that strategic plan”
(Interview with Respondent 30). The plan involved community engagement, including resident and business
outreach, neighborhood tours, interviews and three community meetings from March to June, 2013. The
plan makes recommendations for design, safety, transportation, stormwater management, job creation and
human capital. It also includes an implementation strategy, with a focus on neighborhood stabilization and
job creation (Invest Atlanta, 2013c; Saporta, 2013b).
Guided by the plans in place, Invest Atlanta sought projects to fund. In January 2014, Invest Atlanta
issued a call for project proposals, for which they would spend part of their $15 million allocation. Invest
Atlanta accepted applications for grants through the Westside Tax Allocation District from January to April
2014 (Archbold, 2014; Invest Atlanta, 2014a; Neighborhood Newspapers, 2014). Applications were
“evaluated on their fit into the priority categories established in the community benefits plan and their ability
to accelerate quality-of-life improvements, leverage other public and private funding sources and attract new
investment, jobs and residents” (Neighborhood Newspapers, 2014).
62
Invest Atlanta only funds up to ten
percent of total project costs, and projects are expected to find other funding sources for the remaining
costs. This is a very steep funding match, particularly for residents of under-resourced communities, many
of whom lack experience securing grants (Invest Atlanta, 2014c; Green, 2014; Interview with Respondent
30). Further, as stated in the request-for-proposals (RFP), “applicants must demonstrate experience with real

61
According to the plan, “These goals will be accomplished by: Identifying specific recommendations for connections to
downtown and surrounding areas; Improving and increasing walkability within the project area; Addressing watershed
management issues while maximizing park and greenspace opportunities; Reducing crime within the project area; Improving the
quality and mix of housing stock; Identifying three to five key short term development opportunities as priority projects;
Integrating job creation opportunities into redevelopment scenarios; Promoting public/private partnership opportunities among
developers and interest groups; Identifying opportunities for development of a resource center in a central location that could
provide access to the human services needed by residents”(Invest Atlanta, 2013c, p. 6)
62
Invest Atlanta’s states that “[p]rojects will be evaluated on the following criteria: Possession of site control; Utilization of vacant
land; Attraction of private investment; Adequate zoning and entitlements; Proximity to existing homeowners; Condition of
existing infrastructure; Proximity to services, food, education, education, transit, open space and previous investments; Job
creation (construction and permanent); Attraction of innovation and growth services; Utilization of intergovernmental
partnerships; Support of sustainability efforts (water management, urban gardening, parks and open space) (Invest Atlanta, n.d.b.).
112
estate projects that have resulted in positive economic impact, and evidence property control, financial
feasibility (with TAD funding), and market acceptance” (Invest Atlanta, 2014c).
Invest Atlanta offered 40 hours of “technical assistance” to “level the playing fields” and ensure that
resourced individuals external to these communities did not enjoy a competitive advantage over community
residents. The origins of the idea arose from the Community Benefits Plan Committee, where community
residents expressed that their ideas would not be taken seriously because of the proposal process. From this
process, Invest Atlanta recognized that “there were some very good ideas inside the community” and
wanted to ensure that community members were not at a disadvantage due to the expertise and resources
required to put together a competitive application. As one individual stated, “I think the end product you
see is people that may not have had an opportunity to present themselves well, that they actually were able
to better articulate their ideas” (Interview with Respondent 30). This local government representative
contends that through this process, the agency showed “good faith” by prioritizing accessibility and
transparency. As a result, many of the projects come from within the community. Further, this individual
holds that, “If you look at the projects we chose, you look at the community benefits plan, there is a direct
connection” (Interview with Respondent 30). In this way, Invest Atlanta is implementing the agreement in a
top-down manner, but with some evidence of community inclusion. However, participation from the
community through the Community Benefits Plan Committee and outside relationships has influenced
implementation as well, in an effort to enhance community inclusion.
Invest Atlanta received roughly 20 applications, and a committee of representatives from Invest
Atlanta and the City of Atlanta selected eight projects to fund, totaling about $6.2 million of the $15 million
that Invest Atlanta original allocated to funding in the area. Invest Atlanta only funds gap funding, usually
up to 20 percent of a project, necessitating outside financing or equity for the rest of the project costs
(Interview with Respondent 30). Table 10 displays the projects funded by Invest Atlanta. The largest
allocation funded the QUEST Healthy Workforce Center, at over one-fifth of Invest Atlanta’s $15 million
promised investment. The community center provides a physical space for job training for community
113
residents, both for the jobs that the stadium projects would produce, including construction, as well as other
local jobs. Other funded projects included community enterprises such as a media company, which aligns
with the local government’s desire to augment its growing film industry, with English Avenue and Vine City
included in that growth. In the proposal process, Invest Atlanta also secured internships for local youth
from that enterprise, to enhance the investment’s impact and contribute to human capital development. A
different grant funded the Lindsay Street Park, which is the first park in English Avenue (see Figure 5)
(Interview with Respondent 30). The park project redeveloped six blighted parcels to form what one local
reporter called “an oasis within the community” and includes environmental remediation (Kahn, 2015c).
Another held that the park project is “a model of what needs to happen” for the polluted creek and flood
zone (Saporta, 2014a).
Figure 5: Lindsay Street Park

Photo by author

114
Table 10: Projects Funded through Invest Atlanta’s Community Improvement Fund

Project Amount Funded Total Project Cost Project Description
Quest Healthy
Workforce
63

$3,468,162 $5,018,162 Community Center for “workforce training, healthcare,
education, and community space” including Westside
Works programs
English Avenue
School Project
$1,000,000 $3,422,670 Community Center converted from former public school
West Block Retail $600,000 $5,255,633 Community Enterprise for “retail, financial services,
personal care, and dining options”
Awesome, Inc. $81,126 $256,126 Community Enterprise
770 English Avenue
Expansion
$250,000 $400,000 Community Enterprise
Hagar Civilization
Training Missionary
$500,000 $2,977,303 Housing
AUERC @ Proctor
Street
$100,000 $10,000,000 “Parks, green space, urban agriculture”
Lindsay Street Park $222,000 $432,000 First park in English Avenue: 1-acre, converted from
blighted land, including playground, storm water
mitigation and area for environmental education
Total $6,221,288 $27,761,894
Sources: Kelley, 2014; Invest Atlanta, n.d.b.

The remainder of the money not allocated to these projects—approximately $7.8 million—will be
spent at the discretion of the Board of Invest Atlanta, including other capital improvement projects, such as
security cameras and street improvements, and possibly a second round of proposals. The exact manner in
which the money will be spent has not yet been determined (Interview with Respondent 30). For those
community members whose projects did not receive funding, lingering resentment and distrust of the
process persists (Interview with Respondents 30 and 31).
The QUEST Healthy Workforce Development Complex is already completed. Invest Atlanta helped
fund the QUEST complex construction, and the Blank Foundation funds a job training program, Westside
Works, in partnership with the City of Atlanta and various training programs and community organizations.
Invest Atlanta coordinated with the Blank Foundation, since their funding is more flexible and can be spent
on programming (Interview with Respondent 30). Westside Works aims to “prepar[e] residents of Atlanta’s
Westside neighborhood for employment opportunities (Westside Works, 2016). Westside Works includes
job placement and support services. Many community and non-community stakeholders cite the program
community investment from the Blank Foundation that produced “some successes” (Interview with

63
While Invest Atlanta only intended to fund about 10 percent of total project costs, local government representatives report that
this project was particularly important to the community, so they chose to fund it at a far higher percentage (Interview with
Respondent 30).
115
Respondents 31; 30 and 34). According to the Blank Foundation, since its inception in June 2014, Westside
Works “has provided job skills training and placement for more than 100 residents of Atlanta's Westside in
the areas of construction, nursing, and culinary.” The program also includes auto technician classes (Blank
Foundation, 2015d).
As one community respondent described, Westside Works was intended to not just concern the
immediate construction jobs created by the new stadium project,
“But we were also thinking about long-term. So what happens when construction stops, would
those skills be applied to other project. You know, giving people some real skills, that's one thing for
someone to get a $20 an hour job or even a $10 hour job and wave a flag and watch traffic and this
kind of thing. But it's another thing to actually get some real construction skills that they could use
on another project. For example, Atlanta, they were back to building, there is a crane behind you, so
there is another project. So if you talk people are skilled, like welding, maybe that's more long-term
versus some real minor things that they could do. So [we were looking for] something that was more
skilled versus unskilled labor“(Interview with Respondent 34).

Invest Atlanta is overseeing implementation of these projects, with later disbursements contingent
on adequate progress. They hired a project manager and outside staff to oversee the more technical parts,
since Invest Atlanta does not have the internal capacity to oversee all the technical parts of implementation.
If the project is not progressing according to plan, as has happened in one case, the disbursements from
Invest Atlanta to the project are delayed until the project manager and funding recipients get the project on
track (Interview with Respondent 30). In this way, Invest Atlanta is monitoring implementation and
observing outcomes, though this process lacks transparency and accountability to the larger public and the
community.
Implementation: The Blank Foundation
Similarly to Invest Atlanta, the Blank Foundation has sought projects to fund through its $15 million
Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund, with participation by Invest Atlanta and the community. In 2014,
the Blank Foundation issued a call for grant applications for its Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund.
The Blank Foundation prioritizes proposals that will “be catalysts for the community” and attract additional
community investment, though the funded proposals are not necessarily within the Westside communities
116
or place-based.
64
Nonprofits able to work in the targeted areas met the eligibility criteria and were able to
submit an initial proposal. If selected by the foundation, these nonprofits could submit a final grant
application. This approach leaves significant discretion to the Blank Foundation, who has stated that they
“will favor groups that have the capacity to work with those who are already in the area” and want to
incorporate both expertise external to the community and local knowledge (Saporta, 2014b). The
Foundation intends to commit all $15 million by the end of 2017, and spend the entire amount by 2020
(Blank Foundation, 2015c). Table 11 shows the organizations funded through the Westside Neighborhoods
Prosperity Fund, according to the Blank Foundation Annual Reports.
Table 11: Westside Neighborhoods Prosperity Fund Grants

YEAR ORG AMOUNT Location Description
2015 21
st
Century Science
Technology Engineering
and Math Foundation
$150,000 over
three years
Atlanta, GA To support participation in the Westside Momentum
Capacity Building Program, operated by the Georgia
Center for Nonprofits
2015 Atlanta Habitat for
Humanity
$25,000 Atlanta, GA For Community Day 2015, in which 100 volunteers
from the Blank Family of Businesses will complete
five Atlanta Habitat Brush with Kindness projects in
English Avenue.
2015 Center for Civic
Innovation
$150,000 Atlanta, GA To launch and operate a social enterprise civic
innovation program focused on addressing the key
neighborhood opportunities and challenges
identified by the Westside community
2015 The Conservation Fund $50,000 Atlanta, GA To complete Lindsay Street Park, the first fully
equipped playground and green space in the English
Avenue neighborhood
2015 Construction Education
Foundation of Georgia
(CEFGA)
$406,272 Lawrenceville,
GA
For operating support to manage the Westside
Works facility
2015 Construction Education
Foundation of Georgia
(CEFGA)
$140,000 Lawrenceville,
GA
To provide construction and commercial truck
driving training and job placement services for
Westside residents
2015 Georgia Appleseed $140,000 Atlanta, GA To provide Westside residents (primarily senior
citizens and other long-time homeowners) with pro-
bono legal services to maintain housing stability and
access financial assistance
2015 Georgia Center for
Nonprofits
$60,000 Atlanta, GA To provide intensive coaching and technical
assistance for a select group of grassroots Westside
nonprofits; and to establish a Westside Momentum
Community Group small grants program, which will
be administered by the Georgia Center for

64
According to the Blank Foundation, grants will emphasize,
“Helping community members receive the training and opportunities they need to secure stable, good-paying jobs or
start small businesses; Creating a safer environment that will lead to lower crime and a greater sense of community;
Increasing and improving the educational opportunities available to kids in these neighborhoods; Providing safe, quality,
affordable housing for long-time residents who need assistance; Improving the ability of local residents to live healthier
lives in healthier environments; and More broadly, connecting neighborhood residents to the socio-economic
opportunities they need to succeed” (Saporta, 2014b).
117
Nonprofits
2015 Health Education
Assessment and
Leadership, Inc.
$27,500 Atlanta, GA To provide community outreach and education
about the new primary care and dental services
available to Westside residents at the historic
Neighborhood Union Health Center
2015 Integrity Transformations
Community Development
Corporation, Inc.
$150,000 over
three years
Atlanta, GA To support participation in the Westside Momentum
Capacity Building Program, operated by the Georgia
Center for Nonprofits
2015 Integrity Transformations
Community Development
Corporation, Inc.
$210,000 Atlanta, GA To provide neighborhood recruitment, intake and
assessment, and employment case management
services at Westside Works
2015 Literacy Action $51,982 Atlanta, GA To provide customized adult education to Westside
residents to ensure that they have the requisite
literacy and numeracy skills needed to access job
opportunities, as part of Westside Works
programming
2015 People Partnering for
Progress
$25,000 Atlanta, GA To provide the Fulton County District Attorney's
Office with Atlanta Police Department's gang
intelligence IT platform to combat the growth of
gang-related violence and share critical data
2015 Per Scholas $150,000 Bronx, NY To provide IT hardware and software training and
job placement services for Westside residents
2015 Phoenix Boys Association,
Inc.
$150,000 over
three years
Atlanta, GA To support participation in the Westside Momentum
Capacity Building Program, operated by the Georgia
Center for Nonprofits
2015 Project for Public Spaces,
Inc.
$28,000 New York, NY To conduct a two and one-half day Westside site
assessment and identify up to three areas ripe for
community engagement and informed placemaking
2015 Quest Community
Development
Organization, Inc.
$1,250,000 Atlanta, GA To facilitate the acquisition and redevelopment of
strategic blighted properties in the English Avenue
and Vine City neighborhoods, as part of the Problem
Property Initiative
2015 Raising Expectations, Inc. $150,000 over
three years
Atlanta, GA To support participation in the Westside Momentum
Capacity Building Program, operated by the Georgia
Center for Nonprofits
2015 Vince City Civic
Association
$75,000 over
three years
Atlanta, GA To support participation in the Westside Momentum
Capacity Building Program, operated by the Georgia
Center for Nonprofits
2014 City of Refuge $115,000 Atlanta, GA To provide auto tech training and job placement
services for Westside neighborhood residents
2014 Construction Education
Foundation of Georgia
(CEFGA)
$356,400 Lawrenceville,
GA
To provide operating support for the Westside
Works facility
2014 Construction Education
Foundation of Georgia
(CEFGA)
$141,372 Lawrenceville,
GA
To provide programmatic support, construction
training and job placement services for Westside
neighborhood residents
2014 Fulton County Sheriff
Reserve
$25,000 Atlanta, GA To provide the Fulton County Jail, located on the
northern border of the English Avenue
neighborhood, with APD's highly successful gang
intelligence IT platform to combat the growth of
gang-related violence and share critical data
2014 Georgia Center for
Nonprofits
$405,000 over
three years
Atlanta, GA To provide a three-year program to help build
capacity of nonprofits on the Westside
118
2014 Higher Ground
Empowerment Center
$1,000 Atlanta, GA To sponsor “A Turkey for Thanksgiving.”
2014 Integrity Transformations
Community Development
Corporation, Inc.
$190,220 Atlanta, GA To provide programmatic support to help operate
Westside Works' programs, specifically for
neighborhood recruitment, intake and assessment,
and employment case management
2014 KIPP Metro Atlanta
Collaborative
$225,000 over
two years
Atlanta, GA To provide high quality educational opportunities to
Westside elementary and middle school students by
supporting the growth of KIPP Ways Primary and
supplemental services at KIPP WAYS Academy
2014 Literacy Action $23,018 Atlanta, GA To provide customized adult education to Westside
residents to ensure that they have the requisite
literacy and numeracy skills needed to access job
opportunities, as part of Westside Works
programming
2014 Phoenix Boys Association,
Inc.
$55,000 Atlanta, GA To provide mentoring, health services and scouting
programs to 175 young men through three Westside
chapters, based at Antioch Baptist Church,
Adamsville Center and Hollywood Road
2014 Raising Expectations $20,000 Atlanta, GA For general operating support to provide targeted
after-school programming and mentoring to
Westside school age children
2014 Street Smart Youth
Project, Inc.
$500 Atlanta, GA For sponsorship of the third annual Rally for
Prevention and Recovery in English Avenue on
9/27/2014
2014 Walking Through the Vine,
Inc.
$1,000 Atlanta, GA To sponsor the Tree Lighting Celebration on
11/22/2014
Source: Blank Foundation, 2015a; Blank Foundation, 2014

The Foundation has therefore worked to implement the agreement and make good on its financial
commitment, but it has done so at its sole discretion. The Foundation has emphasized capacity building, to
help organizations already doing good work in the community to “increase their impact” so that they can
“play a larger role in creating the transformative change we all want to see” (Saporta, 2014b). To this end,
the Foundation worked with the Georgia Center for Nonprofits to enact Westside Momentum in January
2015, which extended a call for grants through mid-February 2015. Created by the Georgia Center for
Nonprofits, and first piloted in 2011, Westside Momentum is a “three-year capacity building initiative
designed to strengthen and empower up to 50 nonprofits” within the targeted communities (Blank
Foundation, 2015c). The grants are ”open to all Westside-based nonprofit organizations and community
initiatives looking to strengthen leadership, build infrastructure, and deepen collaborative efforts that can
help restore the English Avenue, Vine City, Castleberry Hill neighborhoods as vibrant and thriving
communities” (Blank Foundation, 2015c). Westside Momentum offered two programs: up to six nonprofits
119
in the Core Group, and up to fifty nonprofits in the Community Group. The Core Groups receives a
greater investment, including “an array of training seminars, personalized business coaching and consulting,
and deep leadership training. In addition, annual financial support will be provided to aid in the execution of
necessary practices and investments needed for becoming higher impact nonprofits” (The Blank
Foundation, 2015b; Georgia Center for Nonprofits, 2015).
65
In contrast, 39 nonprofits were selected for the
Community Group, which receives only networking and some training.
66
Some recipient organizations have
chosen not to pursue due to limited time and resources, and a need to prioritize financial support and grants
(Georgia Center for Nonprofits, 2015; Interview with Respondent 32).
In this way, the Blank Foundation has made efforts to begin to spend the allocated money. However,
the way in which they are choosing to invest in the communities generally lacks community participation,
transparency and accountability. Foundation staff members regularly meet with Invest Atlanta staff, yet the
Blank Foundation is only obligated to spend the money, and can do so as it sees fit. The Blank Foundation
funds projects separately than Invest Atlanta, though Invest Atlanta tries to coordinate with the Blank
Foundation on occasion. This is particularly true where there are programming needs that Invest Atlanta
cannot fund, such as the Westside Works training programs, since Invest Atlanta can only fund capital
improvements (Interview with Respondent 30).
Throughout, the Blank Foundation takes a private philanthropic approach to spending, in which the
money is dedicated to community improvement but not accountable to the community. The Blank

65
The Blank Foundation funded the following organizations in the Core Group: 21st Century S.T.E.M. Foundation, Integrity
Transformations Community Development Corporation, Phoenix Boys Association, Raising Expectations, West Atlanta
Watershed Alliance, and a collaborative team from the English Avenue Neighborhood Association and Vine City Civic
Association (The Blank Foundation, 2015b).
66
The Blank Foundation funded the following organizations in the Community Group: The 3x3 Project, A Hand Up Ministries,
Abel 2, Actor’s Express, Antioch Urban Ministries, Assembly of Truth Ministries, Atlanta Center for Self Sufficiency, Central
Community Services, Community Empowerment Development Corporation, The Community Foundation for Financial Literacy,
Create Your Dreams, Field of Dreams Academy, First Step Staffing, Flight Buddies Foundation, Foreverfamily, Friends of Lillian
Cooper Shephard Park, Fulton County Court Appointed Special Advocates, Georgia Micro Enterprise Network, GivingPoint,
Grow Montessori School, Hagar Civilization Missionary Training, Historic Westside Cultural Arts Council, Historic Westside
Gardens ATL, HOPE Through Divine Intervention, The Joseph and Evelyn Lowery Institute for Justice and Human Rights at
Clark Atlanta University, Lifecycle Building Center, Meals on Wheels Atlanta, Midtown Assistance Center, Morehouse Alumni
Mentoring Program, The Music Education Group, New Hope Enterprises, Resources for Residents and Communities of
Georgia, The Roosevelt House, SafeHouse Outreach, The Salvation Army Boys & Girls Club of Greater Atlanta, Southeastern
Horticultural Society, Truly Living Well Center for Natural Urban Agriculture, Urban Perform, and Walking Through the Vine
(The Blank Foundation, 2015b).
120
Foundation retains control over their spending, and remains only accountable to its board. While
Foundation staff report to the City Council, as one local government representative stated, “The city council
can't force them to say, you've to spend it this way… they’re a private entity. All we can do is make sure they
can commit to it” (Interview with Respondent 30).
Although the community retains no direct influence over the Blank Foundation and its spending,
the community has sought to influence how the Blank Foundation invests in the community, with some
success. When the Blank Foundation issued the Westside Momentum call for proposals to help build the
capacity of local nonprofits, many community-based nonprofits that “have been working and struggling in
the community for a while” applied for the funds, as well as organizations outside of the community with
proposals to begin working in the community (Interview with Respondent 31). The Blank Foundation chose
to fund some organizations outside the community, with whom community representatives argue the
Foundation had established relationships (Interview with Respondents 31 and 34).
Community stakeholders “took [the Foundation] to task about” funding outside organizations at the
expense of “growing people internally” to the community (Interview with Respondent 34). Many held that
this action generated distrust, and undermined the intent of the community benefits plan, to generate
“spending for the community, not on the community” (Interview with Respondents 32, 31 and 34).
Residents expressed their displeasure to the Blank Foundation and encouraged the Foundation to reconsider
its strategy. One community representative describes the community response, when they found out that the
call for grants was open beyond the community,
“I’m going to tell you straight up that what you just did that is not what we asked for, and what you
just did, in putting a call at outreach to every damn non-profit in the City of Atlanta, was to dilute
and disempower the people who have the relational capacity to actually get out there and get the
work done in favor of your friends… [this] was the total opposite of what the community asked for.
That’s exploitation on wholesale. So we had to stop that, at least tell them that. They are working
about changing it now. I don’t know how they are going to save it, but the first thing was, oh, no,
that’s not what we asked for. And that became a little bit of a battle” (Interview with Respondent
31).

However, this community representative said that once the Blank Foundation was confronted by the
community, the Blank Foundation has “been responsive, but you know, it hasn’t been willing
121
responsiveness” (Interview with Respondent 31). In other words, the Blank Foundation has only responded
to community pressure reluctantly, when the community demanded responsiveness, and not out of any
structured accountability.
Thus, this respondent held that this incident demonstrated that the community has some leverage in
implementation, rooted in the Blank Foundation’s, Arthur Blank’s and the city’s concern for their
reputation, which reinforces their desire to produce lasting community improvement and not incite the
community. In this way, the community benefits plan gave community residents,
“a guideline, and if something is wrong people make a stink, they'd go down to city hall, complain
and then the media get it …[this is] the way people are held accountable, particularly in this
town…the City is not going to come out with a press release and say, we're not meeting our targets
and doing -- we say it we were going to do. So it's going to take community grassroots, people to
bring that to there” (Interview with Respondent 34).

In this way, the community benefits plan gave the community a template from which to gauge Invest
Atlanta and the Blank Foundation’s efforts. With vigilance and community organizing, the community can
generate leverage to improve compliance. The community can work to ensure some degree of accountability
through community pressure. A different community representative summed it up by saying that, “The only
thing that keeps them at the table is the same thing they keeps anybody, that’s in the public eye at the table”
(Interview with Respondent 31). However, this responsiveness to the community remains very fragile, and it
is unclear how long it will persist during the implementation process.
As a result, the community is working to ensure accountability and enforcement leverage generated
by the Blank Foundation and City’s reputation. One community representative argued that individual
residents have an important role to play to ensure implementation, and must work to “remain focused, to
stay at the table and to call people into accountability because if there is nobody at the table holding people
accountable then community benefit will never materialize. What they'll do is they wait out another
generation” (Interview with Respondent 31). Thus, the community is organizing to generate leverage,
remain vigilant and expose what they perceive as noncompliance with the spirit of the agreement. While this
strategy is reactive and inefficient, as one respondent stated, “What can I do, what else can we do?”
122
(Interview with Respondent 31).
Further, the community is working to maintain formal oversight through the Community Benefits
Plan Committee, though this effort has proven less successful than one-off efforts to pressure the Blank
Foundation and Invest Atlanta. One local government official noted that the committee has no real leverage
during implementation, and was created for the “specific purpose” of formulating the plan. As a result, the
committee has no real oversight capacity, and has “to go to the appropriate agencies to do or to get
whatever result they would want to get” (Interview with Respondent 33). This government official held that
this realization,
“was an education for some people. So I think that when they thought of the committee that they
had a tool that they could go out and conquer the world with, and I was like, no. If you read the
resolution you're empowered to do a specific thing. You know what I mean? And so beyond that
specific thing, of course you can request, you can ask, cajole, whatever and advocate for something
else. But your requirements are -- it's plain in the resolution” (Interview with Respondent 33).

This perspective demonstrates the extent to which local government remains entrenched in its position that
the benefits delivery and community investment should occur in a top-down form, with limited community
power over implementation. To this end, some hold that the committee was just “a formality in the
process” but it was not intended to give the community the ability to genuinely influence the process
(Interview with Respondent 34). The community sought to increase the scope and power of the committee,
but faced significant resistance (Interview with Respondents 33 and 34). As a result, the committee can
“make suggestions” to Invest Atlanta and the Blank Foundation, “but there’s no requirement that residents
be told about plans in advance” (Mariano, 2015b).
Over time, committee particiaption has declined; the committee right now “is kind of dormant, it’s
not really active” and only three people showed up to the last meeting (Interview with Respondents 34 and
32). Most local government committee members have stopped showing up altogether, including City
Councilman and Committee Chair Michael Julian Bond (Mariano, 2015b; Interview with Respondents 32
and 34). An investigative report published by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution argued that the committee “may
be one of the loneliest bodies in city government” (Mariano, 2015b). The article ran with a picture of the
123
empty meeting, displayed as Figure 6, with the caption, “lots of room, if anyone would bother to show up”
(Mariano, 2015). Most who attended were “unpaid community volunteers” (Mariano, 2015b). At this
particular meeting, residents found out that Invest Atlanta had allocated $1.2 million to police cameras in
the neighborhoods without community consultation. When community members had questions about what
they expressed was a largely reactive strategy to crime, “No officials who could answer committee questions
were in attendance” (Mariano, 2015b). Further, no Blank Foundation representative attended, though the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution article was later updated to note that City Councilman Bond and the Blank
Foundation representative reached out to the newspaper to say that they were ill, and the city representative
was traveling for work (Mariano, 2015b).
Figure 6: Empty Community Benefits Plan Committee Meeting (after plan approval)

Source: Mariano, 2015b

Every community and local government respondent cited extreme fatigue as an issue that has arisen
after the contentious plan deliberation process, and which had driven down participation on the committee.
One local government representative that normally attended before the plan was approved stated, “I think
[the participation decline] just demonstrates that probably a lot of people probably mild PTSD from dealing
124
with some of these issues” (Interview with Respondent 33). Both local government and community
stakeholders are “really worn out” (Interview with Respondent 34). However, one community
representative insightfully pushed back against the local government official’s reasoning. This community
stakeholder said, “I buy that [explanation] from a community member who is working two jobs and all of
this. I don't buy that from an elected official. This is your job. If you're fatigued, you should resign”
(Interview with Respondent 34).
Regardless, the dominant perspective within the community remains that community stakeholders
have to re-energize so as to remain vigilant, or risk implementation happening without their input, and
potentially harming their interests. As one community representative stated, “I think [community residents]
are pretty much, quite down. As they're going to -- have to be a resurgence of putting common people to
the task. But some of it is still being done. So there's not really -- there's not been a whole lot of movement”
(Interview with Respondents 34, 31, 33, 34 and 35). As a result, some community residents have remained
active in implementation despite their fatigue because they believe that without their efforts, Invest Atlanta
and the Blank Foundation will not be held accountable to the community at all. This concern is well-
founded, since city officials have demonstrated little interest in overseeing implementation.
For this reason, community stakeholders believe that they need to participate in enforcement, but
that this effort requires significant time and resources. This individual stated that, community vigilance,
“is a tremendous burden, and I feel that every day. And we have to fight to be in a position to drive
[implementation]. And that may not be -- and so everybody might not be up for that fight. But I
think that there is -- and we also have to be aware of the strategies and what people do to just
encourage success in that because it's a vicious game and I was telling somebody other day. I said
this is like playing chess. Every time you think over something, something else pops up… They
probably have very honorable intentions. But the problem is do you have the capacity to deliver on
those contingents. And so if you don’t, then it becomes another victimized community” (Interview
with Respondent 31).

Thus, the burden of plan monitoring and enforcement has fallen to residents that have limited resources,
face extreme exhaustion, yet feel that they have no choice but to undertake this effort.
Despite their work, community residents remain doubtful about the extent to which they can
fundamentally alter the way in which the investment gets made in their community. The community has
125
leverage to go to the media and expose noncompliance, but this reactive tactic will not necessarily change
the philanthropic Blank Foundation’s overall strategy.
“I feel that [Arthur Blank] is genuine and that he wants to do the right thing and definitely has a
commitment…I think the Blank Foundation and Arthur Blank and the City will make some
significant investments but they are going to do it in a way that they control investments that Blank
made. People have tended to give money to people who they know and like. So they're going to pick
the people they know and like… at certain point you realize that you don't have any real control
now. Do I think that there are some things that we can do? Yes. So I try to do those things and
continue to talk and keep the pressure on, keep communicating with the Blank Foundation”
(Interview with Respondent 34).

Thus, while community residents do not worry that the promised investment will be made in some form,
many fear that this process will remain controlled by the outside interests of Invest Atlanta and the Blank
Foundation. Despite their vested interest in the outcomes produced, they lack direct influence over how the
money gets spent. Further, community stakeholders have little faith that local government representatives,
including those who have stopped showing up to committee meetings, will represent their interests.
Through their nonparticipation, local government representatives have placed a tremendous burden
of oversight and enforcement onto the same community that they argued lacked the capacity to
appropriately decide how the money would be directed. Regardless, one local government representative
maintained that the community has influence in the plan implementation process, but remains too focused
on “agitating” what they see as “external power that has influence over [the] community” rather than being
“at the table trying to build a foundation,” even though the community has no leverage, and the Community
Benefits Plan Committee has no recognized influence during implementation. As a result, the community is
“agitating the foundation that [it’s] trying to build” (Interview with Respondent 33). However, this
individual maintained that the community acting as a watchdog and taking the primary role in monitoring
and enforcement is “the way it ought to be,” since they need to generate capacity and should have an active
role in securing benefits (Interview with Respondent 33). This comment underscores how power-holders,
including government officials, are working to reinforce existing power distributions, by passing
responsibility off onto overburdened residents, knowing that community residents lack the capacity to
implement alone. Furthermore, the previous stadium benefits effort failed for this very reason.
126
Yet, the contradiction remains that at some points, the community is perceived to lack the capacity
to direct spending, yet is supposed to have the capacity to monitor and enforce the agreement terms.
However, local government representatives argued that directing investment and engaging in monitoring
and enforcement are different tasks. As one individual stated, “Well, watching them and watching the
process and building a building or writing a program. They're all different skill sets. We all have eyes. So it's
easier, I would think, to watch a process as opposed to running a human services program. You know what
I mean?” (Interview with Respondent 33). Further, the perception that the community cannot effectively
direct resources, rooted in the failed Georgia Dome investment, remains a dominant perspective. As a
result, it makes sense for local government and private investors to serve as “stewards of their funds” and
direct their money to see it “well spent.” Through this process, “You don't have the waste of the money,
you don't have the waste of the effort, the waste of the time, because there is enough of that already”
(Interview with Respondent 33). Thus, the legacy of the failed Georgia Dome planning process has proven
important, since it reinforces beliefs about insufficient community capacity, and thus impacts not only
perceptions about the community but the way in which investment is continuing to occur.
However, monitoring and enforcement requires vigilance, resources and significant effort by
community residents. Accountability to the community is only assured as long as the community is actively
monitoring implementation, and raising issues as they arise. This reactive strategy has some pitfalls. People
are not as involved as they once were, leaving a significant burden to fewer individuals (Interview with
Respondent 31). Further, the entire process, and particularly the Blank Foundation efforts, lack
transparency, such that it remains difficult for community members to engage in monitoring and
enforcement. In addition, some actors engaged in advocating for the original benefits package have moved
on, placing an even larger burden on those who stayed. For example, although the local community
organization Georgia Stand-Up was deeply involved in pushing for the agreement, Georgia Stand-Up has
been absent during implementation and the initial coalition has fallen apart, demonstrating the difficulty
with engaging in sustained community pressure (Interview with Respondent 33).
127
However, as individuals become fatigued and stop participating in plan implementation, the burden
of monitoring and enforcement becomes more acute on those who remain, and more influence accrues to
the Blank Foundation and Invest Atlanta, who administer the agreement terms by spending the allocated
money. Further, with insufficient community monitoring and enforcement, the community is the party that
risks losing the most, since other stakeholders saw their objectives met when the plan was approved and the
stadium bonds were issued. As a result, they can implement as they see fit, and leave the community
working to bring them back to the table. Therefore, the Blank Foundation and Invest Atlanta largely
dominate implementation, and the community is left to use outside efforts to draw local government and
the Foundation back to the table to ensure that their needs are met. I display this agreement structure in
Figure 7, below.
Figure 7: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan Structure

Agreement Implementation Agreement Negotiation
Negotiation
Stakeholders

Negotiation
Outcomes

Implementation
Stakeholders
Tools
Community (through
CBP Committee)
Community Benefits
Plan (nonbinding
recommendations
approved by City
Council)
Motivations Implementation
Outcomes
Seeks to
represent
constituency
and gain
support
Perception about benefits
commitment helps
elected officials and
Blank Foundation
Local
government
(City Council,
Mayor’s staff,
Invest Atlanta
staff)
Community
benefits
Arthur M. Blank
Foundation
Memorandum of
Understanding about
funding allocation
Stadium approval
(required community
benefits approval)
Community
(through CBP
Committee; elected
officials no longer
participating and no
working in
oversight capacity)
Invest Atlanta benefits
Funded projects may
benefit community,
depending on how
investment occurs
Invest Atlanta
Low attendance;
not taken
seriously during
implementation;
no oversight
capacity
Arthur M. Blank
Foundation
Blank Foundation
benefits
Grantmaking
Some coordination
between Invest
Atlanta and Blank
Foundation
Persistent community
residents
Relationship-
building,
media
Weak influence
Strong influence
128
As this diagram illustrates, while community and government stakeholders retain some ability to
influence outcomes, their influence is indirect and minimal for a few different reasons. For local
government officials, they are not participating strongly in oversight, which many community members view
as evidence of failed leadership and inadequate representation (Interview with Respondents 31, 32 and 34).
The Community Benefits Plan Committee has little direct influence over Invest Atlanta and the Blank
Foundation; while they report to the committee, the Blank Foundation is no longer attending meetings, and
the committee has no real influence over their actions. However, some community residents are working
outside the committee to develop relationships with the Blank Foundation and Invest Atlanta staff and
influence implementation by leveraging their ability to expose noncompliance and harm the reputations of
these organizations through media reporting. As a result, this case evidences some community influence
over the outcomes produced, but this influence is only indirect and largely reactive. Rather, the Blank
Foundation and Invest Atlanta retain the ability to directly control, with minimal community input, to
produced the promised community benefits.
In sum, community stakeholders are not powerless during implementation, despite that they lack
direct control over agreement outcomes. Community representatives have worked to remain vigilant and
organize to ensure that the community remains represented, though the extent to which this will determine
outcomes remains questionable. Throughout, the feeling remains among many community stakeholders that
the community cannot walk away from implementation without risking losing the benefits they fought so
hard to target to these communities. However, non-community stakeholders do not face the same risk, and
can walk away from the benefits they promise to communities unless there is someone—in this case,
community stakeholders with leverage—forcing them to deliver the promised outcomes. Despite that many
community stakeholders are likely the most burnt out, they are the ones who cannot walk away. Therefore,
this case demonstrates the risk associated with sustaining community monitoring and enforcement, which
requires significant resources over time in communities that, by definition, lack these very resources.

129
Chapter 5

MANAGERIAL DISCONNECT:
The Park East Redevelopment Compact

The Park East Redevelopment Compact is a county resolution that mandates benefits on
development projects that occur within 16 acres of county-owned land in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. These
benefits are codified into development agreements between individual developers and the County of
Milwaukee. Approved in 2004, implementation was delayed due to many factors that deterred development,
including the economic recession. As a result, the PERC remains in the implementation stage even though
many community and local government stakeholders have since retired or moved on in the decade
subsequent to PERC approval. For this reason, implementation is largely left to the county employees who
administer the policy, who have only acted in this capacity since 2013 or later. While these individuals
remain deeply committed to agreement administration, they lack essential resources, which prevents timely
reporting of outcomes. Due to their focus on political concerns, the County Board of Supervisors are more
focused on extending the PERC terms rather than overseeing agreement administration. Therefore,
agreement administrators and their oversight body face a crucial disconnect that limits oversight. Evidence
exists that developers have exploited this disconnect, as well as weak agreements written by prior agreement
administrators who lacked legal expertise, to use legal loopholes to reduce their obligations under the PERC.
5.1. THE PARK EAST REDEVELOPMENT COMPACT
In Milwaukee, a controversial freeway spur was demolished in 2003, which opened up 64 acres of
land for redevelopment near downtown. The freeway spur comprised the last remnants of the Park East
freeway project, which was cancelled abruptly in the 1970s before completion, over concerns that the
expressway would obstruct the Milwaukee waterfront. The project severely impacted the “thriving working-
class” African American community within which the highway project took place (Wolf-Powers, 2012, p.
224). By the time the freeway project was terminated, however, the one-mile stretch through the Park East
130
Corridor was already completed, and the affected community was cut off from downtown jobs. Beginning
in the late 1980s, Mayor John Norquist led the effort to remove the freeway spur, perceived as blight and a
barrier to development, though demolition would not occur for nearly 15 years (Wolf-Powers, 2012;
Chiuchiarelli, 2011; Wolf-Powers, 2010; Henry, 2009; Larsen, 2009; Redevelopment Authority of the City of
Milwaukee, 2004; Interview with Respondent 36).
With the freeway spur gone, redevelopment of the now-abandoned Park East land was seen as a
potential “catalyst” for up to $250 million in development projects in the area, and a key component of
downtown revitalization (Parker, 2005, p. 1; Henry, 2009). The Park East land included 16 acres of county-
owned, prime real estate for development, divided into different parcels intended for separate
developments. The entire 64 acres was located within a newly-established Tax Incremental District (TID) in
the City of Milwaukee, and adjacent to a low-income community (Wolf-Powers, 2010; Partnership for
Working Families, 2007). The Downtown Milwaukee Plan sought to encourage mixed-use development on
the Park East land, with open space and a connection to the Milwaukee River and RiverWalk, which cuts
through the land (Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee, 2004).
Local government, with significant participation from developers and pro-development interests,
put forward the Park East Redevelopment Plan to guide development on the land. In 2002, as the City of
Milwaukee Common Council reviewed the plan, local unions noted that the redevelopment plan was
proceeding without significant participation, and paid little attention to job creation and job quality.
67
To
address what they saw as an opportunity for job creation within a struggling community, unions and
community organizations representing affordable housing and economic development interests began
working together to call for community benefits related to the redevelopment effort. They created the Good
Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods Coalition, and advocated for a community benefits agreement with the
City of Milwaukee related to all the parcels within the 64-acre site (McKean, 2015; Wolf-Powers, 2010;
Larsen, 2009; Partnership for Working Families, 2007). The coalition first met in January 2003, with

67
In other cities, this body is generally called the city council (City of Milwaukee, n.d.).
131
representatives from 25 organizations, including labor, religious institutions, and affected residents (Parker,
2005). The Coalition for Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods did not have any paid staff, but instead
“were people who had a little more time or opportunity from different organizations” (Interview with
Respondent 37).
The Coalition used the Los Angeles Staples Center Community Benefits Agreement as a model for
their proposal, which they submitted to the Mayor and Common Council of the City of Milwaukee. This
original proposal suggested benefits ranging across environmental justice, economic development,
affordable housing, and community services concerns. Among other specifications, the coalition sought to
ensure that three of every four jobs created in the 64-acre Park East redevelopment area paid a living wage
and offered health benefits. The coalition proposed to include the community benefits agreement in the
redevelopment plan for the entire 64 acres by writing the benefits into each development agreement.
Developers strongly opposed the proposal on the basis that the additional regulations and associated costs
would deter much-needed, broadly beneficial development, in a downtown area that was struggling to
compete with suburban development (Ryan, 2015a; Larsen, 2009; Parker, 2005; Millard, 2003; Interview
with Respondent 37).
Despite significant opposition by developers, the Common Council Steering Committee approved
the agreement for developments that involved public funding. However, some officials later dissented, so
the agreement was sent back to the committee, where it was delayed until after the election. While many
aldermen expressed public support for the agreement prior to a local re-election, the final vote took place
after the re-election effort. However, some alderman who had previously expressed public support for the
agreement changed their stance, so the Common Council voted to approve the redevelopment plan without
the CBA. The coalition attributed the rejected CBA to insufficient pressure from community residents, as
they lost their leverage after the vote (Larsen, 2009; Parker, 2005).
According to one community respondent, after the loss in the City of Milwaukee, members of the
County Board of Supervisors “reached out to the coalition” about whether they could attach benefits to the
132
land owned by the county (Interview with Respondent 37). Developers appeared to exert less influence over
the County of Milwaukee Board of Supervisors, as compared with the City of Milwaukee Common Council.
As a result, the coalition turned their attention to the County of Milwaukee, which owned 16 acres of land in
the redevelopment area. While this constituted only a fraction of the original land under consideration, there
was momentum for a benefits agreement at the county level. The coalition received support from numerous
members of the County of Milwaukee Board of Supervisors, and created a new version of their original
community benefits agreement that became known as the Park East Redevelopment Compact (PERC).
Rather than negotiate for benefits with each developer separately, the coalition opted to advocate for an
agreement that would cover all projects that would occur on the entire county-owned portion of the Park
East land (McKean, 2015; Ho, 2007; Parker, 2005; Interview with Respondent 38).
The County Board of Supervisors approved the PERC, but it was vetoed by then-Milwaukee County
Executive (and current Wisconsin Governor) Scott Walker. Walker strongly opposed the legislation on the
grounds that the agreement would reduce land value and impede development, and attempted to personally
lobby supervisors to oppose the PERC. According to a community representative, Walker was also
investigated for potentially using campaign funds to make robocalls to his supporters, to encourage them to
urge their supervisors to oppose the PERC (Interview with Respondent 37). Despite Walker’s efforts, the
legislation held a strong majority, and the coalition continued to press for support among the County
Supervisors. The County Supervisors were able to overturn the veto in a 15-4 vote and “didn’t lose a single
vote” despite the “conservative push” that Walker mounted (Interview with Respondents 37 and 36; Wolf-
Powers, 2010; Larsen, 2009; Parker, 2005; Walker, 2005; Park East Milwaukee, 2004).
68
After approving the
PERC, Supervisor Broderick stated about Walker’s opposition and concerns about alienating the
development community, “Where we part ways, I guess, is what you see are hurdles and barriers, while we
see them as opportunities. Profits are still there to be made. It may be that (developers) will achieve a little
less and the community a little more” (Ryan, 2004). This comment illustrates the opposing views that pro-

68
File no. 04-492 (Park East Milwakee, 2004).
133
development and pro-community interests held about government regulation and community benefits
which, to this day, continue to manifest in PERC implementation and the relationship between the County
Board of Supervisors and the County Executive.
The approved community benefits package related to the Park East redevelopment took the form of
a county resolution, the first community benefits agreement in Milwaukee, and the first successful attempt
in the nation to pass a community benefits-related policy broader than an individual development (Wolf-
Powers, 2010; Partnership for Working Families, 2007; Parker, 2005). The PERC extends through the
existence of the Tax Incremental District in the PERC area, and only applies to the 16 county-owned acres
within the Park East Redevelopment. The PERC is not an agreement between developers and communities
in the way that most community benefits agreements function. Rather, it specifies that when the county
goes to sell each parcel that it owns within the Park East Redevelopment, it attach community benefits to
the development agreement between the county and the developer (County of Milwaukee, 2004).
The PERC enables the County to prioritize benefits distributions over the land sale price. The
PERC states that the county “should not just sell the land for the highest price offered but rather should
seek development proposals which will provide the greatest future benefit in jobs, tax base and image for
the communities, as well as, a fair price” (County of Milwaukee, 2004, p. 2). In so doing, County Supervisors
sought to promote broader community development goals by allowing land sale for less than the appraised
price if it provides community benefits, to amortize the development risk (Interview with Respondent 37).
When the parcels go through the request-for-proposals (RFP) process, developers put together proposals
for the land. This includes land sale cost and their proposed construction on the site. The County then
considers the different projects, including the community benefits associated with the projects. The county
selects a winning proposal, and works to enter into a development agreement with that developer. In so
doing, the County essentially negotiates the PERC terms into the individual development contracts for each
parcel sale, allowing some flexibility for different projects (Interview with Respondents 36 and 38).
134
Concerns about potential changes in state laws necessitated that the PERC terms be codified into
individual development agreements, to ensure that the benefits would withstand political acts. As one
community stakeholder explained,
“Shortly thereafter [the PERC was passed], [Walker] got elected governor, one of the first things he
does is pass a law saying that no municipality can institute any kind of ordinance that applies
prevailing wage to private practice. And so now, [the PERC] is not considered a law. It's considered
policy guidance. So [the county] just writes it into the development agreements” (Interview with
Respondent 37).

As such, the adversarial and highly politicized development process in Wisconsin has influenced this policy,
how it takes effect, and perceptions about the future development climate. This includes now-Governor
Scott Walker, whose failed 2016 presidential bid was based largely on his reputation as a staunch anti-union,
pro-business politician, and has engaged in local land development to assist pro-growth allies. However,
despite this politicization, including many local and state attempts to undermine the PERC terms
subsequent to its approval, the agreement continues to be followed because county staff continue to write
the terms into Park East development agreements.
5.2. THE PARK EAST REDEVELOPMENT COMPACT TERMS
The Park East Redevelopment Compact specifies that construction workers on the project are to be
paid a prevailing wage through the existence of the Tax Increment District, and that developers, contractors
and tenants report this data annually. The PERC ensures that County standards for hiring Disadvantaged
Business Enterprises (DBEs) are included in each land sale contract, and that additional training and
apprenticeship opportunities are also included (County of Milwaukee, 2004). The PERC attempts to ensure
local hiring, defined broadly to individuals living within Milwaukee County, and that hiring reflect the racial
diversity of the county (County of Milwaukee, 2004). Importantly, this definition therefore includes both the
disadvantaged and affluent areas that exist within the county. However, since the labor market for
construction remains quite large, and workers frequently come from Madison and other areas of the state,
prioritizing workers who reside in the county does require deviation from existing practices in the
construction industry (Interview with Respondent 36).
135
The PERC also requires that Milwaukee County “sponsor the construction of new affordable
housing of not less than 20% of the total housing units built on the County’s Park East lands, but they may
be built on other infill sites in the city of Milwaukee” (County of Milwaukee, 2004, p. 3). However, the
PERC is careful to specify that the county “may require a different percentage of affordable housing or have
no requirement at all” (County of Milwaukee, 2004, p. 3-4). The policy also establishes that green space and
green design be incorporated into proposals for the parcels, so the County can factor this into the RFP
decision process.
Finally, the PERC specifies that the County establish a Community and Economic Development
(CED) Fund with the revenues from the Park East land sales (Park East Milwaukee, 2004). According to the
PERC, the CED fund aims to serve as “a catalyst [for] sustainable development” and “would be comprised
of a series of programs designed to address ‘gap’ needs in the marketplace” rather than existing public
services, including workforce training, economic development and environmental mitigation (Park East
Milwaukee, 2004, p. 1).
69
According to one community respondent, the fund was another example of how
the County sought to direct and protect community benefits. The fund, “wasn't as much of what the
community wanted as something the supervisor thought would be kind of cool to have. And again, Scott
Walker was County Executive then. Probably had a pretty tight control on the budget. This was going to be
like something they couldn’t get their hands on” (Interview with Respondent 37). In contrast, the
community’s main focus was access to quality jobs, which was to be provided by the local hire and
prevailing wage provisions. Throughout, the Board of Supervisors remained acutely aware of the
conservative political environment that threatened to undo the PERC, in the present and future (Interview
with Respondent 37).
As such, the PERC contains far-ranging provisions that county employees work to include into
development agreements. These employees, within the County of Milwaukee Economic Development
Division, are directly accountable to the pro-growth, largely anti-community benefits County Executive, but

69
The PERC specifies “some possible uses of the CED Fund: Minority Business Working Capital; Small & Minority Business
Contract Financing; Housing Development; Neighborhood Business Development; Economic Development; Environmental
Mitigation/Brownfields” (County of Milwaukee, 2004, p. 2).
136
also report to the County Board of Supervisors, who have promoted the benefits agreement. In practice,
developers have viewed the PERC benefits provisions with varying degrees of reticence. According to many
stakeholders, the prevailing wage is the most consequential community provision within the PERC; this is
also the most controversial provision within the PERC, and is generally “the one [PERC requirement] that
developers argue about the most” (Interview with Respondents 36 and 39). Community representatives
uphold this provision as the most potentially impactful for community beneficiaries. However, some have
noted that without improving access to union construction jobs for individuals who have been historically
excluded from these jobs, the PERC will not help local, disadvantaged workers (Wolf-Powers, 2012;
Interview with Respondents 36 and 37).
Many developers also hesitate to include the affordable housing requirement, though community
stakeholders and county agreement administrators similarly hold that developers largely misunderstand this
requirement. The affordable housing requirement specifies that if the development includes housing, the
county has to ensure additional affordable housing, and not the developer. As one county representative
noted, Milwaukee County is, “thousands of units above what we need. So that's really not an issue. But a lot
of developers see that like I don't want affordable housing in my project. We don't even need to have
housing project; it's Milwaukee County's mandate based on this…a developer doesn’t need to give us
anything. They don't have to stay responsible for housing here” (Interview with Respondent 36). As a result,
the real estate community also fought hard against the affordable housing requirement, even though it only
mandates action from local government. One community respondent discussed the confusion generated by
this provision. “Some years later… I said something about affordable meaning open to moderate -- low to
moderate income. And all of a sudden, the realtors were like oh, that's what -- we thought you meant like
lodging for homeless people or single-room occupancy. So it's like well, them maybe we wouldn't have had
to fight about that” (Interview with Respondent 37). In contrast, developers express the least resistance to
provisions for green design, since it contributes to the value of their developments as well (Interview with
Respondent 36).
137
The PERC establishes a Park East Advisory Committee to oversee implementation, and participate
in the RFP process. After PERC approval, the Park East Advisory Committee was the primary means by
which community participation in PERC implementation occurred. As outlined by the PERC, the Park East
Advisory Committee can exert influence over the chosen bid during the RFP process, to ensure compliance
to the PERC terms. The advisory committee, including community stakeholders, would review development
proposal and “as a separate body, would give a recommendation” to the County Board of Supervisors
Economic and Community Development Committee about the project (Interview with Respondent 38).
This committee was originally comprised of representatives from the Good Jobs and Livable
Neighborhoods Coalition, other community groups, and the Milwaukee Realtors Association (Larsen, 2009;
Holloway, 2005; County of Milwaukee, 2004). The PERC specifies that the committee produce an annual
report to the County Board of Supervisors, in coordination with the Director of Economic and Community
Development. Similar to the PERC, the Park East Advisory Committee extends through the life of the Tax
Incremental District within the PERC area (County of Milwaukee, 2004).
5.3. REDEVELOPMENT OF THE PARK EAST LAND
In the decade subsequent to PERC approval, many projects have been proposed but little
development has actually occurred on the Park East land. Proposals have reached various stages in the
development process. Initially, the Board of Supervisors approved four projects: the Park East Square, a $65
million project that included hotels, apartments and retail; the $145 million Palomar Hotel and Residences,
also with retail; and the Marcus Theatres Project, with office, a movie theatre and retail space (Larsen, 2009).
The Palomar Hotel and Residences project died in 2009 due to low demand for housing downtown and
“suffocating credit markets” (Daykin, 2009). The Marcus Theatres project halted when the corporation’s
option ran out in September 2014; Marcus was never able to attract tenants to fill the office building
(Daykin, 2014). As of 2009, the County had only actually sold one parcel, though the project had “been
delayed indefinitely” (Daykin, 2009). The Park East Square project, renamed Avenir Apartments, is only
now finally moving forward and currently under construction after a new developer, Wangard Partners,
138
joined the project in 2012 and was able to secure financing. It was only the second project to begin
construction on the land, after the Milwaukee School of Engineering, located adjacent to the Park East land,
built a parking lot with a soccer field on top on one of the parcels, which was completed in 2013 (City of
Milwaukee, 2014; Daykin, 2012). Figure 8 shows a map of the land, Figure 9 shows the Milwaukee School of
Engineering construction, and Figure 10 shows the Avenir apartments construction.
Figure 8: Park East Map

Map adapted from maps.google.com

Existing Bucks
Arena
Completed
Milwaukee School
of Engineering
parking structure
and soccer field
Avenir
Apartments
Phases 1 and 2
Last full block in
Park East
purchased by
Wanguard in
December 2015 for
$52 million
development
Bucks mixed-use
development site
New Bucks
Arena site
Aloft
Hotel
139
Figure 9: Milwaukee School of Engineering Parking Structure and Soccer Field

Photo by author

Figure 10: Avenir Apartments Construction

Photo by author

In 2012, the Kohl’s Corporation attempted to bring its headquarters to the Park East
140
Redevelopment area. The proposal would have sold the land at a low cost and included “a structured
financial assistance package” (Interview with Respondent 37). Community advocates were hesitant to
support the project, despite the pressing need to attract development to the vacant land, since the corporate
relocation was not perceived to bring new, long-term, quality jobs to the area. In the end, however, Kohl’s
decided against the relocation and the development project never materialized (Daykin, 2013; Interview with
Respondent 37). As the Park East land faced low demand for development, the area next to the eastside of
Park East land (and therefore not subject to the PERC) successfully completed multiple redevelopment
projects during this same time, including construction of the Moderne apartments, a high-rise building, the
North End apartments, and the Aloft Hotel. Figure 11 shows the Aloft Hotel, with the vacant Park East
parcels in the background. This larger area is also within the Park East Tax Increment District (Daykin,
2013). However, despite many proposals, most of the Park East land has laid vacant for over a decade. Yet,
while other community benefits agreements would fall through when the projects do, the PERC has
persisted because the policy broadly applies to the Park East land.
Figure 11: Aloft Hotel with vacant Park East parcels in the background

Photo by author

141
County and community respondents, who maintain that the PERC is an important policy for
community development, largely attribute delayed development to the economic downturn of the mid-
2000s, which halted demand for real estate development and made financing large development projects
more difficult around the time the agreement was approved. As one county respondent noted,
“Because of the Great Recession, many developers tried to present proposals, and there were times
when the developers…would give us deposits so they could work on doing what needed to be done.
But in most cases, the projects fell though -- projects weren't completed. Projects weren't even
initiated, let me put it that way. Because it was so hard to get the packaging of finances in order to
go forward with the project” (Interview with Respondent 38).

Similarly, Laura Wolf-Powers (2010) holds that PERC implementation stalled as projects fizzled after the
recession began. She uses the Park East Redevelopment Compact as evidence that that community benefits
agreements require a strong real estate market, such that demand exceeds the (real or perceived) additional
costs of providing community benefits.
The Park East redevelopment faced other barriers beyond poor economic conditions, including
brownfields issues that have introduced additional uncertainty and costs into proposed projects. The original
freeway removal only addressed above-ground construction, and did not remove the underground pillars
built to stabilize the freeway. As a result, the Park East land contains significant brownfields and related
environmental remediation works that deters development, by increasing land development costs. As one
county representative said, “[the land] is such a mess. There's really no way around it, it is such a mess”
(Interview with Respondent 36).
However, different parcels face different environmental, brownfields and grading issues, which
partially explains why some have been so slow to generate development, particularly as compared to the
land adjacent to the Park East area. The eastside of the freeway “never really got completely built. There
aren't as many piers there. That's in an area where there's a lot more built-up around it. So those were the
more attractive pieces" (Interview with Respondent 36). As a result, the eastside portion of the PERC land
has developed more quickly, since it has lower costs for environmental remediation and less perceived risk.
In contrast, the westside is “kind of this barren wasteland” with storm sewers, fuel piers and brownfield
142
issues that can be traced to industrial manufacturing uses in the 1800s and early 1900s (Interview with
Respondent 36). As a result, in addition to the known costs associated with remediation, developers
perceive this land as a riskier investment, since there are likely issues with the land that will only become
apparent as construction proceeds (Interview with Respondent 36). Figure 12 shows the parcels that have
laid vacant for over a decade, with development alongside it. The high-rise building is the Moderne luxury
apartment building, built on land that the PERC does not cover, as the Park East land remained dormant.
Figure 12: Western Park East Parcels with Brownfield Issues

Photo by author

Local government and community stakeholders further note that political and bureaucratic issues
frustrated development as the PERC first transitioned into implementation. Conflicts arose from then-
County Executive Walker’s staunch positions and infrastructural provision allocations, which prevented vital
coordination between the City and County of Milwaukee, as well as between County Supervisors, the
County Executive and the County of Milwaukee Economic Development Division responsible for PERC
implementation (Interview with Respondents 36 and 37). Walker let the position of economic development
director sit vacant for years, which made development even more difficult in the county (Jannene, 2014).
143
Further, bureaucratic issues undermined implementation initially. For example, developers often
included provisions from the city in their proposal, such as parking structures and environmental
remediation. However, the original RFP review process did not include a city representative, so the county
would approve a project dedicating city resources, only to have the city refuse to provide the benefits that
the developer proposed. After many failed attempts, the county worked to bring the city into the RFP
process, to streamline development approval and enable all parties to know, from the outset, whether the
project would be feasible. As such, the review panel now includes city, county and community
representatives chosen by county staff. This RFP panel determines which development projects proceed, or
if they wait for better proposals to come along. Due to the panel’s influence on the development process,
county administrators work to ensure diversity on the panel (Jannene, 2014; Interview with Respondent 36).
As a result, county and community stakeholders largely attribute stalled development on the Park
East land to economic conditions, issues with the land and a steep learning curve to effective
implementation, rather than the agreement itself (Interview with Respondents 36, 37 and 38). One county
representative held that,
“the PERC gets a really bad rap. And it's not because it was bad legislation. It just didn’t come at a
very good time; the market wasn't super strong then, or even if the market was strong initially, the
communication between the city and the county wasn't there. So projects were failing, not because
of the PERC, but because the county wasn't cooperating with the city, and you need the
intergovernmental cooperation in order to have a successful development” (Interview with
Respondent 36).

Community and local government stakeholders maintain that the PERC is good policy, despite that
development has failed to materialize on much of the Park East land in the nearly 12 years since the
agreement was approved and the land became available for development.
In contrast, real estate proponents cite the PERC as an important contributor to stalled
development. To them, the PERC is additional, costly regulation, which deters developers from even
proposing projects. For developers, the PERC requirements, and primarily prevailing wage, necessitates
additional funds in their “capital stack” of resources to fund projects; without other funding to offset the
additional costs related to the PERC, some projects become “no longer viable” (Ryan, 2015; Larsen, 2009;
144
Parker, 2005; Millard, 2003; Interview with Respondents 39 and 42). One developer estimated that the
prevailing wage requirement can add 8 to 10 percent to the final project cost, and thus require additional
resources, often from local government, to make a project feasible. Local government contends that it is
amortizing development costs by heavily discounting the land, but developers contend that this is not
sufficient incentive to develop the land (Interview with Respondents 36 and 39). Further, to developers,
different provisions within the PERC pose varying costs. For example, developers view the prevailing wage
as strictly monetary, which unavoidably raises wages, and therefore directly increases project costs. In
contrast, the requirements for disadvantaged business utilization can be achieved without necessarily
increasing costs, but simply by hiring different subcontractors. However, such requirements present other
challenges, such as providing the necessary support to disadvantaged businesses largely unaccustomed to
operating on larger development projects (Interview with Respondent 39).
Even though development has proceeded slowly, local government has worked to attract proposals.
The County and City teamed with the Commercial Association of Realtors to attract development through a
marketing campaign that began in 2014 to “create badly-needed buzz” (Daykin, 2013; Interview with
Respondent 42). Further, to generate development, community benefits and associated spillover benefits,
and as permitted by the PERC, the county generally seeks to sell the land at far below market value; in some
cases, the county has sold parcels for only one dollar (Daykin, 2015; Interview with Respondent 36). One
Milwaukee County representative explained why the county would choose to forego potential profits in
favor of development.
“We don't have any real economic development powers…What can we do to incentivize
development? We'll reduce the purchase price. Selling lands at a discount is really the only thing we
have, the real motivator. But we’re not just going to give you a discount because we don't know if
that really would be in the best interests of the taxpayers of Milwaukee County. What do taxpayers
want? They want jobs, they want to make sure that they are the ones that can have those jobs. They
want to make sure the workforce is trained. They want to make sure that we're growing small
businesses, things like that. So that's why we want to attach all the benefits to make sure that we get
the quality development but actually benefit citizens. And if that means you accept the purchase
price in order to get those things, then we will be willing to do that. But we’re not going to just sell
your land for a dollar, and say, do whatever you want; we don't care, pay everyone minimum wage.
We’re not going to do anything like that” (Interview with Respondent 36).

145
As a result, the county has reduced the land purchase prices significantly, in recognition that the PERC add
costs to development and that benefits will not materialize unless development occurs.
However, selling the land for far below market value proved difficult initially, and further slowed the
original land development. Jurisdiction of the original freeway spur belonged to the Wisconsin Department
of Transportation (WisDOT), but they did not want to develop the land. As a result, WisDOT turned the
land over to the County of Milwaukee, but chose to retain oversight. Since the County of Milwaukee had
accepted funds from the Federal Highway Administration, this body also has oversight, and needs to be
repaid if the land gets sold. Therefore, both the Federal Highway Administration and WisDOT partially
determine what the land sells for, and the County of Milwaukee needs a federal exemption and
memorandum of understanding to sell the land for less than fair market value (Interview with Respondent
36). However, the County of Milwaukee remains most interested in producing benefits for the public, by
applying the PERC to the land sale and ensuring that development occurs, to provide amenities and
generate tax revenue. For this reason, the County fought hard to sell the land for less than market value, and
brought these different stakeholders into the RFP process to further streamline this complicated
development process (Interview with Respondents 36 and 37).
Throughout, Park East Redevelopment has proceeded slowly, with many failed proposals, such that
PERC implementation and benefits delivery has largely been delayed. Within the latter half of 2015,
however, redevelopment of the more difficult westside parcels has finally proceeded, with new proposals
and the RFPs extended for the final parcels (see Figure 13). The largest redevelopment project yet began
when the Milwaukee Bucks basketball team, whose current arena is located near the Park East land, sought a
new complex for the team. Owners chose to build the new arena on a site directly next to (but not on) the
Park East land (shown in Figure 8 on page 138). The owners, who are experienced hedge fund managers,
also wanted to also build an entertainment complex near the new arena, to capture the economic spillovers
that the team generated, particularly as development picked up due to a strengthened economy. The
undeveloped Park East land provided sufficient acreage for the entertainment complex, and so the Bucks
146
owners sought to purchase the westside parcels. As one community stakeholder stated, “these guys that
back the Bucks, they don't really know anything about sports per se, but what they do know is how to build
retail and develop” (Interview with Respondents 37 and 36). Given renewed interest in redevelopment in
downtown Milwaukee and the new arena proposal, team owners saw an opportunity to generate additional
profit, and the vacant land next to the new arena was suddenly ripe for development.
In September 2015, the County sold 10 acres west of the Milwaukee River to the Milwaukee Bucks
majority owners through Head of the Herd LLC. The land is estimated at $8.8 million but was sold for $1,
and will be the site of this $400 million development. Known environmental remediation that the land
requires, including removing the freeway footings and altering the existing sewer, is estimated at
approximately $8.3 million. Developers further anticipate soil contamination issues, though they are
expected to seek state and federal grants for brownfields remediation (Bayatpour, 2015; County of
Milwaukee, 2015; Daykin, 2015; Ryan, 2015). With the arena, the Park East Development combines to
create a $1 billion development, including a new practice facility for the Milwaukee Bucks, as well as
housing, restaurants and office buildings. This is in addition to the arena development, which is also
estimated at $500 million. The Bucks proposal will create an estimated $5 million in property taxes each
year, and more than 3,700 jobs, including 700 office jobs and 100 grocery store job. In sum, the expected
local economic impact is significant (Ryan, 2015). One county representative explained that due to the
known and potentially additional brownfields issues on the land, as well as the public benefit that this large-
scale development could generate, the county valued the development project more than receiving the
appraised land value. This individual explained that, “rather than get the $10 million that would be a face
value estimate that did not include any sort of remediation estimate… they offered a dollar for the land.
And we said, okay, a dollar now for a $400 million development here or just nothing. Let's take the $400
million” (Interview with Respondent 36).
An article in The New York Times highlighted the contradiction that the project represent, given the
significant public spending among the very political leadership that promote austerity in the state, notably
147
Governor Walker. The state legislature, supported by Governor Walker, recently cut the University of
Wisconsin system budget by $250 million, yet Walker highly promoted public subsidies for the Bucks
project, which represents a significant payoff to “two of the richest people in the U.S.A.” (Powell, 2015).
The Bucks ownership and the National Basketball Association threatened to move the team without a new
arena. Yet, the Bucks ownership has only dedicated $100 million to the project, and the public is expected to
pay for over half the costs of the new arena. Further, the new ownership will keep much of the revenue,
including all of the naming rights money (up to $120 million) and part of the parking fees (Powell, 2015).
Figure 13: RFP for final Park East parcels

Photo by author

The timing of the new stadium was “completely coincidental” since it coincided with the RFP for
the land. This temporarily slowed other proposals, as developers waited to see if this impactful development
occurred. As the Bucks proposal has proceeded in a unified development, many believe that this large-scale
project, which includes a practice facility, parking, commercial, retail and residential uses, will truly
transform the Park East area and encourage other development near and within downtown Milwaukee
(Interview with Respondent 36). Since project approval, other developers have turned their attention to the
148
Park East land, and the Park East Redevelopment Corridor and adjacent land faces renewed speculation
(Interview with Respondent 36; Daykin, 2013). About the recent redevelopment projects, developer Stewart
Wangard publicly said, “(These projects) are reinforcing the desirability of the neighborhood… Milwaukee
is on a roll. A lot of office users are considering downtown. There is momentum building” (BizTimes Staff,
2015). City Development Commissioner Rocky Marcoux echoed this statement by saying, “I think we can
honestly say it’s a new day for the Park East” (Daykin, 2013).
5.4. THE PARK EAST REDEVELOPMENT COMPACT IMPLEMENTATION
Due to the delayed redevelopment process, PERC implementation continues to unfold, with
multiple projects at various stages in the development process. Beyond the Bucks development, which
remains in the early stages of development and for which construction has not yet begun, the Avenir
Apartments, developed by Wangard Partners, is currently under construction. The mixed-use Avenir
development will include 86 apartments and 14,600 square feet for commercial purposes (Daykin, 2012).
Further, PERC implementation related to the Bucks stadium and the final parcels has yet to begin.
Even though implementation remains ongoing, many stakeholders have moved on from the
agreement and its implementation since the agreement was approved over a decade ago. In the initial years
subsequent to PERC approval, the Park East Community Advisory Committee existed, met regularly when
there was a proposal to review, and was taken seriously by local government. A community respondent
noted that in one instance where the committee did not review a proposal before it advanced to the
Economic and Community Development Committee, a county supervisor held the proposal up in
committee to make sure it was properly reviewed before it proceeded further (Interview with Respondent
37). Early in the process, some community members expressed concern that the County Executive would
try to strip PERC provisions through a developer-driven Park East committee, and so community activists
remained vigilant in the implementation process (Interview with Respondent 37). As a result, the
community was initially active in the project proposal process through the Park East committee.
However, as development proposal slowed, there was little need for the committee to meet. The
149
committee met “five or six times to review parcels…maybe it was 10 times” but since as the land generated
little interest and proposals did not proceed, there was not a lot for the committee to review (Interview with
Respondent 37). Further, community stakeholders were only really interested in projects that would create
jobs potentially accessed by community residents, and there were rarely competing projects from which to
choose. As a result, the committee’s role in ranking different proposals rarely materialized. Further, there is
no evidence that the community was ever active in overseeing the implementation process, beyond its
participation in RFPs; with few developments getting built, there was little opportunity for community
involvement during agreement administration since initial projects never progressed that far (Interview with
Respondent 37).
Now that development has picked up again, there are proposals to review, but the committee is no
longer active. A decade is a long time, and both community and local government stakeholders have moved
on. For those that remain, the initial momentum has dissipated. One key staffer to the County Board
retired, and local government and community stakeholders cited this individual’s departure as an important
moment. This individual was responsible for convening committee meetings and played a significant role in
PERC development and approval (Interview with Respondents 37 and 38). The committee cannot convene
on its own, and members of the County Board of Supervisors, who hold that they still strongly support the
PERC, have not taken an active role in PERC oversight. As a result, after this individual’s departure,
community engagement in PERC implementation has waned. The committee has not been convened for an
estimated six years, since before the current County Executive’s tenure (Interview with Respondent 37).
The committee did not meet to review the new Milwaukee development proposal, so there was no
formal community oversight for this project. According to a community stakeholder with knowledge of the
committee, one supervisor “was going to convene [the committee], and then we just weren't convened. I
had let [this supervisor] know which of the members didn't live in Milwaukee anymore. And so we had had
a dialog about it, and then it didn’t happen” (Interview with Respondent 37). Key local government
representatives express that they believe that the committee met to discuss the Bucks development, though
150
members of the committee maintain that the committee never met. One respondent held that this
misunderstanding could have occurred because the former committee chair testified to the county board
about the project, and thus participated in some form, such that the supervisor could have remembered.
Regardless, the formerly-influential committee is no longer active, and the County Board remains detached
from PERC implementation despite that recent, significant developments projects have proceeded on the
Park East land (Interview with Respondents 37 and 38).
However, the community did persist in advocacy efforts around the Bucks proposal even though it
did not pass through the established community advisory committee. As one individual noted,
“people were working on it in different segments, like whether it was talking to country supervisors
or talking to the people who handled the approvals or talking up at the state legislature. But it wasn't
all under one because it was -- rather than just one approval process for this, there were three
because of the complexity of the financing package… We just weren't convened under the Park East
Committee banner to do it… when I go through and I think about everybody who was around the
table, the stakeholders guard it. They were all present in some way, just not underneath that
umbrella. Not convened under that name. But they were all speaking out” (Interview with
Respondent 37).

In this way, community representatives have demonstrated significant continued interest in the agreement
and ensuring broader community benefits. However, this advocacy has not translated into agreement
administration. Rather, community stakeholders have only been active concerning the development
proposals and the benefits distributions, rather than in seeing if the community realizes these benefits.
Further, the intended beneficiaries of this agreement remain largely absent and invisible during advocacy,
and instead are represented by local unions and community organizations.
As a result, agreement administration has left been largely to the county staff tasked with this job, in
the County of Milwaukee Economic Development Division. However, significant personnel turnovers have
occurred within this department such that key individuals deeply involved in the PERC approval and
implementation have moved on or retired. No member of the Economic Development Division has
worked there since before 2013. These newer staff members express a deep commitment to PERC
implementation, and have legal backgrounds and experience with community benefits agreements.
According to one community respondent, the individual running the implementation arm of the PERC,
151
within the county, “is a big community benefits proponent,” and local government and community
stakeholders both express trust that the new economic development staff is working to implement the
PERC (Interview with Respondents 37 and 38). However, these same staff members lack important
information related to the agreement; for example, they remain unaware of the advisory committee
membership since they have never seen it active, and they are completely unfamiliar with PERC provisions
such as the Community and Economic Development Fund (Interview with Respondents 36 and 37). In fact,
no one seems to remember what happened to the community fund. According to some, the land sales may
have contributed to a workforce development program, but they do not know if the CED fund “was ever
actually formally established, other than in the in the resolution itself” despite that, according to the
agreement terms, it should be ongoing (Interview with Respondents 36, 37 and 38). This circumstance
demonstrates the challenges inherent to such a long implementation effort.
PERC implementation changed significantly with the personnel turnover, as new staff had to gain
expertise about agreement administration. However, members county staff report that they take the PERC
seriously, work to negotiate PERC requirements on a case-by-case basis, and have sought to improve
agreement administration. The county scores development proposals based on adherence to the PERC, and
factors this score into their decision-making about how proposals proceed. In this way, county
administrators retain significant discretion about PERC implementation, but report that they actively
promote the agreement whenever possible. Further, the county has learned other crucial aspects of
agreement administration, including tracking workers by hours and not number of workers, to avoid hiring
and firing to inflate numbers. This division has also doubled its staffing to four full-time employees, to cope
with its new, significant workloard (Interview with Respondent 36).
PERC outcomes are difficult to track publicly, as the County of Milwaukee acknowledges that it is
too short-staffed to publically report data, or to track outcomes as they materialize. County employees assert
that most projects report good outcomes, and that they are working to digitize payroll reporting, which
facilitates data entry and report generation. As it stands, one county administrator held that, “I don't [input
152
numbers in] real time. I don't have time to do it real time… data entry is always last on the list because it has
to be” (Interview with Respondent 36). The County uses certified payroll data, which is legally required to
be accurate, but currently inputs data manually using Excel spreadsheets, which is cumbersome and delays
data analysis. However, the county is transitioning to LCP tracker, which is a certified payroll reporting
software in which contractors input their payroll data, enabling report production in almost real time. The
Los Angeles Metro administrators use this same system, and report that when they transferred to digitized
reporting, it transformed their ability to collect, analyze and compare data (Interview with Respondent 1).
This software will enable developers, contractors and the County to know much sooner if a project is failing
to meet hiring targets, so that they can alter their behavior before it is too late to change outcomes. County
administrators are also working to improve reporting by requiring payroll data, which was not previously
required, and using it to establish baseline data from which to gauge compliance. Administrators hold that
prior County contracts were “moderately compliant,” but the county lacks the baseline data to compare to
non-DBE and prevailing wage projects, so they are having to generate all this data from scratch (Interview
with Respondent 36).
However, even though outcomes are not publicly reported because of the data lag, no one is really
checking on the County staff to make sure that the agreement is being implemented, or asking what the
numbers are. One County administrator stated, “Oh yeah, no one asks me. Now here, [county supervisors]
put into the monitoring enforcement section with like, oh, we will need a report once a year. Okay, well, he
did really specify what type of report? Do you want me to give you a number? What type of data are you
looking for? If you don't communicate that to me, I can’t get you what you want” (Interview with
Respondent 36). If the county staff did not take implementation seriously, there is no outside check to make
sure that developers are implementing the agreement terms.
County administrators report to the Board of Supervisors annually, and Supervisors remain generally
aware of Park East land development due to their participation in the development approval process.
However, since the agreement “doesn’t tell you how to implement it and nobody is checking to make sure
153
you're doing it right,” administration is left to county staff (Interview with Respondent 36). Pro-
development interests continue to hold that the PERC is unnecessary, harmful regulation, and so they have
little incentive to comply unless given external motivation to do so. Further, county administrators report
that they retain a distant relationship with the County Board of Supervisors; since the County Executive
oversees their department, they are isolated from active coordination with the Board due to the continued,
adversarial relationship between the County Executive and the Board. As such, oversight by the Board is
restricted to periodic reporting in which Board members ask questions; this implementation structure is
distinctly reactive, rather than proactive. If reports do reveal noncompliance, the County Board can only
expose this issue after it occurs, rather than work to improve outcomes as they continue to materialize
(Interview with Respondents 36 and 38).
In sum, county staff members are directly responsible for agreement administration and largely
direct implementation. These individuals hold that several strategies ensure developer compliance. First,
before construction begins, the county assesses a $50,000 performance deposit on developers, which they
receive back if they comply with the agreement terms; whether they are judged to comply remains at the
discretion of county staff. The deposit is,
“not much, but a $50,000 performance deposit is saying, if you don't live up to your expectations
here, if you don't exercise good faith efforts in trying to meet your goals, we can keep maybe the
entire thing, maybe a portion. It depends on what you've done... I mean, that might be a drop in the
bucket, but that's just the number we've always sort of used and it's usually been effective. They're
always looking for their $50,000 back at the end” (Interview with Respondent 36).

In this way, the county can assess a penalty for noncompliance with the agreement terms, by refusing to
return this original performance deposit. Beyond the financial penalty, in phased developments, the county
notes that it can prevent or delay noncompliant developers from exercising future options to develop. This
action would render significant damage to their development plans. However, after a phase begins, the
incentive for developers to comply declines, since few developers come in to finish what is essentially
another developer’s planned development (Interview with Respondent 36).
Beyond penalties, agreement administrators hold that that developers seek to comply with the
154
agreement terms to avoid the “public relations nightmare” that could result if the public finds out that they
are failing to deliver promised community benefits, though this leverage requires the public to care about
the PERC and its outcomes. In turn, compliance with the agreement terms can improve their public image.
As one county respondent described, “it looks good if you [meet the goals]; you can say and everything like
oh, look what I've given back to the city, look at what I've done” (Interview with Respondent 36). However,
the threat of a public relations scandal is still contingent on someone watching outcomes and exposing this
process. This is easier for Milwaukee County employees to expose; they are already monitoring
implementation. Since outcomes are not up-to-date or publicly reported, it would be difficult for the
community to expose noncompliance, even if someone was trying to watch this process (Interview with
Respondents 36 and 37).
However, since the PERC is a broader county policy, and codified into individual development
agreements, its implementation partially hinges on the terms negotiated into the different development
agreements. There is some flexibility in the negotiated targets, and administrators have had to allow for
relatively low local hire numbers, as greater demand for construction workers has meant that there are fewer
workers in the out-of-work pool from whom to choose. This makes achieving targets harder, though
apprenticeship targets try to get workers trained for these jobs. Evidence exists that some of the earlier
agreements were “not great” and “said nothing” about crucial provisions such as residential hiring and
apprenticeship (Interview with Respondent 36).
The extent to which parties comply with the contract terms differs from whether they adhere to the
spirit of the PERC, as evidenced with the Wangard Park East Square project. While the PERC specifies
prevailing wage, the terms of this contract specify prevailing wage for on-site work only. Milwaukee County
entered into this agreement prior to these new agreement administrators who, as lawyers, can help ensure
strong contracts. When directly asked, Wangard acknowledged that it is not paying prevailing wage to off-
site work, and that some work is being undertaken in a modular fashion, and only being assembled on-site.
This strategy enables Wangard to drive down wages and project costs while still remaining in compliance
155
with the contract. The developer maintains that this is only a small portion of the total work, while the
County holds that the offsite work constitutes a significant amount. Without payroll data, it remains difficult
to independently assess these claims. However, this information is not publicly known, which demonstrates
the challenge with the monitoring and enforcing these technical agreements, in which terms can be met
while the outcomes for communities remain somewhat obscured. Further, members of the County Board of
Supervisors remain unaware of this circumstance, and since the agreement terms are technically being met,
this information will only be revealed to them if they ask the right questions during one of the annual
reports (Interview with Respondents 36, 38 and 39).
County administrators readily acknowledge the weaknesses in this contract, and express that they are
working to close this loophole in future contracts. They hold that the loophole occurred because prior
implementation staff members lacked legal expertise. The lawyers tasked with reviewing the contracts,
external to the Economic Development Division, are not “subject matter experts on it; they’re not dealing
with it every day” (Interview with Respondent 36). In this way, these individuals lacked the expertise with
community benefits and development to foresee this problem. As a result, a knowledge gap emerged that
developers could exploit to their benefit, by writing loopholes into contracts to minimize their obligations to
provide community benefits and adhere to the spirit of the PERC. Now that implementation staff members
happen to possess both legal and community benefits expertise, and are motivated to close these loopholes
and improve future contracts due to their demonstrated personal and professional commitment to this work
(Interview with Respondent 36).
This circumstance illustrates that developers on the Park East land have little incentive to work to
adhere to the spirit of the agreement, but are only compelled to achieve the legal minimum necessary to
avoid losing their performance deposit and being exposed in the media. In development agreement
negotiations, developers are also fighting to reduce their obligations for hiring disadvantaged businesses and
other requirements; this further demonstrates that they are not committed to the larger goal of community
benefits provision. While developers may enter into agreements that explicitly aim to direct community
156
benefits, they do not necessarily seek to promote this objective. These contracts only bind developers to
achieve the minimum compliance necessary to avoid penalties; throughout, their main interests relate to
profit, design and project timeliness.
County employees reported that Wangard has worked to promote the contract terms by putting
pressure on their subcontractors to meet the performance goals. In one instance, the county found out that
a drywalling subcontractor was not paying his employees prevailing wage. County administrators noted that,
“Wangard was very good about not paying them when we discovered it” (Interview with Respondent 36).
While the District Attorney did not press charges, the contractor did not get paid and the County put the
contractor “on a list. So for at least three years, they can’t work on any Milwaukee County project”
(Interview with Respondent 36). The County did not hold Wangard responsible because they “worked with
us when we discovered the prevailing wage issue” (Interview with Respondent 36). In late December 2015,
Wangard purchased the last complete block within the Park East, for a $52 million residential and retail
space, so the County has an interest in retaining a good relationship with the developer (Delong, 2015). This
ongoing relationship likely further motivates Wangard to adhere to the contract terms, so that the developer
will be eligible for future projects.
Figure 14 shows the PERC agreement structure. Throughout, county staff members drive and
control implementation. Local government and community stakeholders similarly agree that these
individuals are particularly driven to implement community benefits provisions for both personal and
professional reasons, and have unique skills to improve implementation. However, these staff members
have only worked in this capacity since 2013, and thus face a significant learning curve to PERC
administration. Further, their implementation work includes contracts written prior to their tenure, which
have proven to contain crucial flaws. While they could play a driving role to additionally motivate
compliance, community stakeholders have not formally overseen PERC implementation, as individuals have
moved on in the decade since PERC approval. While some are still working to ensure that PERC terms are
written into contracts, they have not paid attention to the community outcomes actually produced by these
157
contracts. The County Supervisors could also play a driving role, as they have formal oversight capacity, but
they have not actively overseen PERC implementation and have only required periodic reporting. In this
way, they have entrusted implementation to County staff.
Figure 14: Park East Redevelopment Compact Agreement Structure

The PERC case study reveals that many barriers can frustrate community enforcement. The
community could, in theory, remain vigilant during implementation and agreement administration to expose
noncompliance with the agreement terms and the spirit of the agreement. However, nearly a decade passed
before a development agreement had been signed and agreement administration proceeded. As a result,
many community stakeholders had moved, changed jobs or simply moved on from this process. Further,
there is no evidence that the intended community beneficiaries ever participated in the PERC, during its
formulation or implementation. It is impossible to know whether community stakeholders would have
Pro-development
stakeholders, including
pro-development
County Executive
Negotiation
Stakeholders
Agreement Implementation

Agreement Negotiation
Negotiation
Outcomes

Implementation
Stakeholders
Tools
Milwaukee County
Board of
Supervisors
Community
Park East
Redevelopment
Compact approved
by County
Supervisors
Developers
Motivations
Implementation
Outcomes
Community
benefits
Represent
constituency;
pro-benefits
Agreement
outcomes
Potentially benefits
community and local
government, depending on
how outcomes are met
PERC approval benefits local government
through public perception; developers perceived
as harmed though outcomes unclear
Economic
Development Staff
Pressure through
lobbying, media,
monitoring (with
sufficient
resources)
Milwaukee County
Board of Supervisors
Community (including
beneficiaries)
Periodic reporting;
focused on politics
and extending PERC
terms, not oversight
Benefits provision
No community
benefits, which
are perceived
as harmful to
development
Written into
development
agreements
negotiated between
developer and county
Economic
Development staff
Writes and enforces;
threat of future
contract rejection;
deposit not returned
158
sought to participate and direct agreement administration, by monitoring the actual outcomes produced by
PERC-related projects, if this process had begun in 2004. However, in 2016, the community is not
overseeing the process of PERC outcomes delivery. While many remain committed to community
development in Milwaukee, as evidenced by their advocacy efforts around the new Bucks arena, they are no
longer participating directly in PERC implementation, through the established community mechanisms.
The County Board has also not maintained a vigilant role in agreement implementation. Rather,
driven by the highly politicized Wisconsin development process, members of the County Board of
Supervisors remain more focused on protecting community benefits through legislation than tracking the
outcomes produced by their policies, as political efforts continually seek to erode their policy efforts.
County and community stakeholders are concerned that the State of Wisconsin legislature will eliminate the
prevailing wage in public works, so they seek to protect the prevailing wage by writing it into PERC
contracts and development agreements, which would continue to apply even if prevailing wage were
eliminated in the state (Interview with Respondents 36 and 38). In addition, Wisconsin Governor Scott
Walker, the state legislature, and county executives recently worked together to pass Act 14 to reduce costs
at the county; the legislation cuts the salaries and terms of the full-time County Supervisors in half. While
the County Board of Supervisors is now technically a part-time job, but as one Supervisor noted, “my work
wasn’t cut in half” (Schultze, 2013; Schultze & Stein, 2013; Interview with Respondent 38). In this way, the
Governor has engaged in local land development, which demonstrates the highly politicized context in
Milwaukee, which remains the focus of the County Supervisors. As a result, the County Board of
Supervisors faces a continued onslaught of political events, and remain more focused on policy generation
than oversight.
For this reason, even as PERC outcomes remain largely undetermined, the County Board of
Supervisors has extended the PERC requirements beyond the Park East Land, motivated by the political
climate. Act 55 reduced the influence of the County Board of Supervisors by enabling the Milwaukee
County Executive, in concurrence with the County Comptroller, to sell land without oversight or approval
159
from the Milwaukee Board of Supervisors. This action has enabled the County Executive to “bypass” the
County Board of Supervisors and act unilaterally, and in so doing, greatly reduced the influence of the
County Board over land development in the County (Wisconsin State Legislature, 2015; Interview with
Respondent 38).
70

In direct reaction to Act 55, the County Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance to “essentially
codify the PERC” and extend its terms throughout the County (Interview with Respondent 36).
71
In 2015,
County Supervisor John Weishan introduced this bill, to require local hire, prevailing wages and
environmentally sustainable design as the PERC on projects with over $1 million in county financial support
(Ryan, 2015; Supervisor John Weishan, 2015). In this way, the County Board of Supervisors are more
focused on establishing and protecting community development through broader policy objectives, in light
of the tense political context in Milwaukee County and the state.
In so doing, the County Supervisors are leaving the process of benefits delivery up to the agreement
administrators and not actively overseeing the PERC. County administrators note that Act 55 eliminates
their obligations to follow the ordinance, but “for the most, we're going to. But there are certain things in
here that are just not necessarily feasible or well done. They're not flexible enough” (Interview with
Respondent 36). In one example, the new legislation introduced by County Supervisor Weishan raises the
green design requirements in the PERC to mandating that developments be LEED certified, which is “just
bonkers” for development (Interview with Respondent 36). Other provisions, such as a community safety
plan requirement, remain vague. However, County staff members maintain that they will seek to follow the
ordinance as best they can, due to their commitment to community benefits delivery. While this response
could be attributed to social desirability bias, they have demonstrated a commitment to PERC
implementation, so there is reason to believe that they will work to ensure that this new policy produces
outcomes, wherever possible. And as with the PERC, County employees anticipate that implementation and
outcomes delivery will fall to them (Interview with Respondent 36).

70
Act 55, Section 1907M. 59.17
71
Milwaukee County Ordinance 15-13, File No. 15-352.
160
Chapter 6

IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS:
Community Benefits Agreements

The Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan and Park East Redevelopment Compact illustrate
different ways in which implementation can become contested after consensus, as stakeholder incentives
shift after consensus. Prior to consensus, stakeholders show evidence of mutual dependence and reciprocity,
as identified within theories of consensus building. However, after stakeholders reach consensus, these cases
demonstrate how the interests of non-community stakeholders can shift, as they achieve their original goal
and are no longer motivated toward reciprocity. At this point, community stakeholders are left with their
original goals unmet, and can either resign themselves to not achieving their goals, trust other stakeholders
to fulfill their commitments, or work to gain leverage over other stakeholders, to force them to deliver
benefits.
In both cases, the community played an instrumental role in advancing the original agreement, as the
community benefits agreement literature suggests communities should. For the Milwaukee case, however,
community organizations largely drove the agreement, rather than the intended beneficiaries. These
agreements are both instances in which local government negotiated for benefits directly with the developer,
such that the community is not a signatory to the agreement. As such, they represent a distinct type of
community benefits agreement, in which the local government mediates between the developer and the
community.
Regardless, the community remains a key stakeholder as the agreements transition to
implementation. During agreement formulation, community leverage derives from influence over elected
officials and, to varying extents, the desire to avoid community resistance to development. During
implementation, the community retains influence through oversight, though the extent to which this
oversight influences outcomes depends on whether the agreement structure involves accountability to
161
community outcomes production, including the extent to which developers and the local government are
vulnerable to pressure from the community. Unless given the explicit authority, community stakeholders can
only indirectly produce the outcomes promised to them. Further, indirect pressure from the community
hinges upon the ability of the community to expose noncompliance, including access to information, as well
as the ability of community stakeholders to mount a continued, persistent enforcement effort. In this way,
the cases illustrate two different models: in Atlanta, a philanthropic model of outside, directed investment,
and in Milwaukee, a public administration model, with investment directed by government employees.
The Atlanta and Milwaukee cases implies that when the community really drives agreement
approval, community stakeholders are motivated to remain active in implementation in some form, despite
how burdensome this is for the community to do. In Atlanta, community stakeholders fought for the
committee to remain active during implementation, to require reporting and to give community stakeholders
access to actors involved in implementing the agreement. Community stakeholders were denied a legally-
binding agreement, and many vowed to remain active during implementation, including by extending the
duration of the Community Benefits Plan Committee. Even though some community stakeholders and
most non-community stakeholders are no longer appearing at the committee meetings, a few, highly-
motivated community residents are working to build relationships with the Blank Foundation and Invest
Atlanta, to informally pressure them to produce outcomes that align with the community’s vision. In
Milwaukee, community representatives, and not the beneficiaries themselves, drove the agreement
formulation. While community representatives initially participated actively in implementation, over a
decade has passed since implementation began. Community representatives are still actively seeking
community benefits through indirect strategies, and using the public funds involved in the Bucks stadium
deal as leverage to generate community benefits. However, the intended beneficiaries are largely invisible
during in this process. PERC outcomes remain obscured, and the community has not worked to remain
active during agreement administration; rather, community stakeholders have relationships with local
government staff and officials, and report that they trust these individuals to oversee implementation.
162
Throughout, these cases illustrate how difficult it can be for the community to act as a watchdog.
Without institutional support and formalized participation, the community can face significant barriers to
accessing information, particularly for behaviors that are not readily observable. Community stakeholders
face significant turnover; the Milwaukee case shows the difficulties involved in sustaining community
vigilance for over a decade. Many of the key players involved in the agreement formulation, from local
government and the community alike, have retired, moved, or simply moved on. Though far less time has
passed in the Atlanta case, many community stakeholders report that they are exhausted and cannot
maintain the pressure and vigilance that they believe that implementation requires. Thus, many community
stakeholders cannot mount the resource-intensive effort required to engage in community monitoring and
enforcement, and thus the burden has fallen to a smaller number of stakeholders, further concentrating this
burden.
The Atlanta case further demonstrates the risk involved with lingering negative perceptions of the
community. The failed Georgia Dome implementation process is still very current for both the Atlanta
philanthropic community and Atlanta local elected officials, who seek to direct community investment—not
just with this benefits distributions, but the future philanthropic investments that they are actively pursuing
As such, failed community benefits distributions do not simply represent a missed opportunity and a failed
planning effort, but can contribute to harmful, persistent perception about communities that can influence
how future planning occurs. Due to this legacy, non-community stakeholders see little reason to depart from
their current, philanthropic model of generating community development through top-down decision-
making. Importantly, in contrast to the ideals behind the community development agreement model, this
philanthropic community benefits agreement approach favors the status quo. To this end, it promises
marginal benefits rather than attempting to enact any substantive changes to existing power differences
between non-community and community stakeholders.
The role that community stakeholders are playing in these agreements evidences many important
similarities to the project labor agreement case studies in the following chapters. When the community has
163
sought the agreement, stakeholders have recognized that it must continue its advocacy efforts during the
implementation process, to ensure that the promised benefits promised on paper actually materialize. In
instances where the community has participated during implementation, there is evidence that the
community has altered implementation to their benefit. Throughout each case, however, the community
retains only indirect, limited control over the production of the benefits promised to them by these
agreements. While their advocacy efforts can inform and influence the implementation process, this is
contingent upon other actors being vulnerable to pressure from community stakeholders. One significant
point of community leverage is the ability to publicly expose noncompliance, and to endanger the
reputations of other stakeholders. To achieve this, however, requires access to information and persistent
vigilance. Further, while the Blank Foundation in Atlanta and Wanguard Partners in Milwaukee have
demonstrated sensitivity to public relations, it remains undetermined whether public exposure constitutes
sufficient incentive to induce these stakeholders to produce outcomes for the community.
The role of local government is also crucial to both cases. In both cases, local government directing
benefits to constituents, and theoretically providing oversight, though oversight from elected officials is
minimal. In both cases, local government officials and staff members mediate between the community and
developers. However, in the Milwaukee case, the County Board of Supervisors has actively fought for
greater community benefits, and county staff members are working to overcome implementation barriers
and produce outcomes. While this implementation structure does not guarantee outcomes, implementation
is proceeding because new staff members have entered into implementation with personal and professional
commitments to ensuring compliance and key expertise. In contrast, Atlanta local officials have
demonstrated that they are not actively seeking to represent the community or its interests, but rather have
dominated, from the top down, agreement formulation. They leave administration to Invest Atlanta staff
because they have negative perceptions about community intentions and capacity.
The Atlanta community stakeholders argue that their locally elected officials are not adequately
representing their interests, and are no longer attending meetings related to the agreement. Local
164
government has prevented the community from directing the community benefits process and terms.
Rather, local government has mediated in such a way as to prioritize stadium progress, at the expense of
community benefits deliberation. During implementation, local government elected officials reported that
the very community members that they believe lacked the capacity to lead the community benefits process
should be tasked with monitoring the agreement and enforcing its outcomes. In this way, the local elected
officials argue that they are building capacity, but are handing off their very real responsibility in overseeing
the implementation process.
For both cases, local government staff members are tasked with agreement administration, and
working to ensure implementation as best they can, with limited resources. In the Atlanta case, Invest
Atlanta staff members include the community minimally, but seek to represent its perceived interests. In the
Milwaukee case, local government staff are seeking to carry out the agreement terms, but with little
involvement with the community as well, who are not seeking to work with agreement administrators and
have become invisible to administrators during implementation. The extent to which agreement
administrators are bound to produce outcomes appears to hinge on their personal and institutional
commitments to this work, as well as the extent to which they face oversight and scrutiny from outside
parties, including potential community watchdogs. In the absence of oversight and scrutiny, implementation
can occur if individuals are personally motivated; however, individual characteristics idiosyncratic and do not
systematically guarantee outcomes delivery.
Throughout both cases, developers use community benefits to reduce community resistance to
projects, as a means to an end, rather than with the primary motivation of fostering positive transformations
for community residents. In the Milwaukee case, developers work to reduce their obligations to benefits
delivery during the development process, and then deliver the bare minimum during implementation. In the
Atlanta case, many argue that Arthur Blank and his Foundation actually care about community benefits
delivery and positive community change. However, there is little evidence that the Blank Foundation’s
efforts represent more than a philanthropic, top-down investment to facilitate project approval, and which
165
produces significant financial returns and a public relations boost for the Foundation. Further, any
investment occurs at the complete discretion of the Foundation. Thus, while the Foundation may seek to
help the community, this approach has explicitly avoided any direction, oversight or serious input from
community stakeholders.
In sum, in both cases, private interests are not acting benevolently. Rather, private interests are
delivering benefits as they see fit, primarily in advancement of their own interests, and without the
underlying objective of producing any real change in the existing distribution of power between
stakeholders. Throughout, private interests persist to protect their public reputation and stake in future
projects, and are therefore vulnerable to an organized community that acts as a watchdog and can expose
noncompliance. However, this undertaking requires a significant, highly organized effort, enabled by
adequate transparency, undertaken by under-resourced community representatives and residents.
Therefore, private interests remain primarily interested in meeting their own objectives, which do
not necessarily require community outcomes to materialize, and may meet their own objectives before
community benefits get delivered. Agreement administrators may also not necessarily retain an incentive to
produce community outcomes throughout implementation. For this reason, the agreement structure
becomes a paramount consideration, because it can put mechanisms in place to give community
stakeholders leverage, and to ensure that all stakeholders have a similar incentive to produce community
outcomes. To this end, I depict an ideal community benefits agreement structure in Figure 15, which
includes structured accountability so as to ensure that all stakeholders are motivated to produce community
outcomes subsequent to original consensus as the agreement is approved. This could include potential
participation by local government officials and staff, and with a legally binding agreement negotiated
between the community and developer. Beyond stakeholder behavior during implementation, formal
agreements may be more effective at ensuring that stakeholder interests align than voluntary agreements,
particularly if they include clawbacks that afford community stakeholders an avenue for redress if their
outcomes are not met, and resources to enable community monitoring and enforcement.
166
Figure 15: Ideal Community Benefits Agreement Structure

These cases strongly indicate that communities cannot rely on agreements alone to produce the
promised benefits, particularly if these agreements are voluntary. Rather, in the absence of structured
accountability, in which reciprocity endures during implementation and all stakeholders remain motivated to
produce community outcomes, community stakeholders have to work to organize to ensure outcomes, or
depend on actors with personal or professional commitments to represent their interests, to varying ends.
Throughout, benefits delivery is not easy, as developers have little incentive to deliver more than the bare
minimum unless they face external motivations to do so. The burden on communities to retain vigilance is
significant; the process often lacks transparency, and community stakeholders require significant resources
and energy to continue this effort. And yet, community residents are the ones with the most at stake in the
actual delivery of community benefits. In the face of undelivered outcomes, and if properly motivated and
resourced, the only choice for community stakeholders is to undertake a reactionary, adversarial approach in
which the community can organize to expose noncompliance after it occurs.
Negotiation
Stakeholders
Agreement Implementation

Agreement Negotiation
Negotiation
Outcomes

Implementation
Stakeholders
Tools
Developer
Community
Agreement
(binding,
between
community and
developer)
Community
(including
beneficiaries)
Motivations Implementation
Outcomes
Community
benefits
Represent
constituency and
gain support;
project approval
Agreement
outcomes
Potentially benefits
community and local
government, depending
on how outcomes are
met
Benefits developer and
local government
through public
perception and project
approval
Project
approval;
public
reputation
Developers
Pressure through
lobbying, media,
monitoring (with
sufficient
resources)
Oversight body
(including responsive
elected officials)
Community (including
beneficiaries)
Oversight body
(including elected
officials) could motivate
developer to be
community responsive
Enforcement
capacity from
binding contract
Pressure through
project approval,
media
Local government
staff could work to
ensure community
expertise
Equitable/
community
development,
community
representation
Benefits provision
167
Chapter 7

COMMUNITY BYPASS:
The Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement

In effect since 2013, the Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement seeks to direct work on
this public housing project to public housing residents and those individuals economically eligible for public
housing in the Seattle area. However, the Seattle Housing Authority primarily pushed agreement
formulation. They wanted to demonstrate community inclusion; the community, rather, expressed far more
interest in influencing the redevelopment project than capturing the jobs produced. So far, outcomes are
highly mixed, difficult to track, and while community residents remain the intended agreement beneficiaries,
they have not participated in this agreement. Stakeholders further report that this agreement is particularly
hard to implement. As a result, tensions have arisen in the implementation process, in which involved
parties are passing responsibility for agreement implementation, and there is little incentive for most
stakeholders to meet the targeted community workforce goals.
7.1. BACKGROUND: YESLER TERRACE REDEVELOPMENT
The Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement concerns the redevelopment of Yesler
Terrace, a low-income public housing community run by the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA). Completed
in 1941, Yesler Terrace was “the first racially-integrated housing project in the United States” and the first
public housing development in Washington; it remains “Seattle Housing Authority’s most urban family
community” (SHA, 2015c; Curbed Staff, 2014; SHA, 2008). It began as a 43-acre site with 863 units,
intended to last 60 years. In 1962, 11 acres and 266 housing units were eliminated to make way for I-5,
which now acts as Yesler Terrace’s western boundary (SHA, 2008).
Yesler Terrace enjoys a central location, perched on a prime hill above I-5, within easy walking of
downtown Seattle, and with stunning views of downtown, Puget Sound and Mt. Ranier. It is also close to
important local institutions, including Seattle University and the Harborview Medical Center. The
168
community is proximate to public transportation, jobs and entertainment venues such as the Seattle
Seahawks and Mariners stadiums (Young, 2011; Interview with Respondents 12 and 13). The community is
low-density given its proximity to downtown; Yesler Terrace is mostly two-story buildings, and most
residents have their own yards (Interview with Respondent 13).
Figure 16: Old Yesler Terrace Residences

Photo by Author

Yesler Terrace also has a diverse resident population. At the beginning of redevelopment in 2008,
1,190 people lived in the 515 housing units, which ranged in size from studios to four-bedroom apartments;
approximately thirty-five percent of residents were children, and fifteen percent were elderly (SHA, 2015c;
SHA, 2008). Approximately thirty percent of residents are immigrants, including significant Somali and
Vietnamese immigrant groups. Yesler Terrace also has a large portion of nonnative English speakers and
non-English speakers, and community residents speak more than 20 languages (Black, 2013b; SHA, 2008;
Interview with Respondent 13). Only about one-third of residents rely on employment as their primary
source of income; others primarily depend upon public assistance (SHA, 2008).
In the 1960s and 1970s, the SHA attempted to redevelop Yesler Terrace; both plans sought to
169
increase density through mixed-use development, but neither plan moved forward. In the 2000s, SHA again
sought to redevelop the site, and held that the aging Yesler Terrace community desperately needed
significant repairs, including housing repair and sewer system replacement (SHA, 2015c; Interview with
Respondent 13). SHA saw the necessary, extensive repairs as an opportunity to redevelop the whole site
“for the benefit of the entire city” (Curbed Staff, 2014). Further, given that the City of Seattle faces
significant development pressure, with a growing population and a hot real estate market, a low-density site
near downtown like Yesler Terrace is viewed as a prime location for creating additional density close to jobs
and transit (Interview with Respondent 13).
The Yesler Terrace redevelopment intends to remove the existing, low-density, older housing and
create a much higher density, mixed-income community (SHA, 2013a; Interview with Respondent 13).
Figure 17 shows the new, higher density buildings. The project will create 561 “replacement units targeted
to people with incomes under thirty percent (30%) of the Area Median Income (AMI), two hundred and
ninety (290) additional low-income units serving people with incomes from thirty to sixty percent (30 –
60%) AMI and up to eight hundred and fifty (850) workforce housing serving people with incomes below
eighty percent (80%) AMI” (SHA, 2013a). The redevelopment is expected to take between 10 to 15 years
(Curbed Staff, 2014; Interview with Respondent 13).

170
Figure 17: Yesler Terrace New Construction

Photo by Author

Prior to undertaking redevelopment, the Seattle Housing Authority applied for and was granted
funding from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Choice
Neighborhood Programs. It was initially awarded $10.2 million in funding but was granted additional funds
from HUD, totaling $30 million, after the City of Seattle committed $7.62 million for housing and $3
million for parks to fund the redevelopment (HUD, 2013; SHA, 2012). HUD funding provisions required
that redevelopment be mixed use and aim to deconcentrate poverty. SHA also had to consider larger
community characteristics beyond housing, including “neighborhood” and “people” aspects such as
community gardens and economic opportunity (Interview with Respondent 13; HUD, 2015). In accordance
with the guiding principles and HUD’s Choice Neighborhood conditions, the SHA is also focusing on
connecting residents to major employers and job training programs (Interview with Respondent 13).
171
Seattle Housing Authority staff held that the agency sought to include residents in the
redevelopment process through the Citizen Review Committee (CRC), though a prior court settlement
necessitated this action (SHA, 2007; Interview with Respondent 13). In July 2002, just prior to demolition
for the $125 million Rainier Vista redevelopment, low-income housing advocates and community
representatives sued the Seattle Housing Authority, the City of Seattle and the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). The coalition won an injunction to halt the project over concern that the
“housing authority and city conducted substandard environmental reviews, failed to provide proper
assistance to displaced residents and didn't make sure that lost low-income housing would be replaced”
(Eskenazi, 2002; SHA, 2002). In December of that year, the coalition and SHA settled on terms to govern
the Yesler Terrace redevelopment. The settlement stipulated that residents have a right to return to Yesler
Terrace, with priorities for low income residents to attempt to avoid displacement, as well as design and
traffic stipulations, including limiting the maximum number of housing units. The settlement also
formalized citizen participation for the Yesler Terrace redevelopment by establishing a Citizen Review
Committee prior to the redevelopment planning process.
72
In this way, community inclusion on the Yesler
Terrace redevelopment was mandated by a legal settlement from a prior, contested redevelopment project
(SHA, 2002).
Currently, the CRC comprises 30 members, including residents and other stakeholders. SHA staff
noted that the CRC was involved in the planning process and established key guiding principles, including
social equity, environmental sustainability, economic opportunity and one-for-one replacement housing.
The SHA has used these principles to direct the redevelopment plan and process. In particular, residents
expressed considerable concern over ensuring that SHA maintained one-for-one replacement housing, or

72
The case was FN 161 Harris v. HUD (Dec. 2002). According to the legal settlement, “the CRC as outlined specifically in that
agreement is entitled to: Participate in and comment on development of any redevelopment and renovation plans for Yesler
Terrace by the City and SHA; Make recommendations to SHA and the City on all land use proposals and housing
redevelopment/reconfiguration proposals for Yesler Terrace; Make recommendations/comments to SHA and the City that assist
in the protection of resident rights; Make recommendations to SHA and the City on any variances, rezones, or proposals
regarding preservation of low income housing; Full involvement with the city and SHA in any and all planning efforts involving
Yesler Terrace; The CRC also must include at least one representative of the community council and the Displacement Coalition”
(SHA, 2007; FN 161 Harris v. HUD, 2002).

172
the same number of affordable units on-site. Further, the economic opportunity principle sought to
“[s]upport training, apprenticeship and living wage job opportunities for residents and those in adjacent
communities wherever possible in all phases of Yesler Terrace redevelopment from planning through
construction” (SHA, 2007, p. 9, bold formatting removed). In this way, SHA staff hold that the CRC “has
been a really important group to hold us accountable to the promises we made” as the SHA reports to them
quarterly, and recognizes that community input is critical to achieving their goal of developing and
maintaining a successful community (Interview with Respondent 13).
Project Controversy
Redevelopment has proven controversial for many reasons, including concerns of gentrification and
displacement. This project enters into a tense history, in which previous redevelopments in Seattle
eliminated 2000 public housing units since the mid-1990s (Fox, 2011; SHA, 2007). Relocation is a major
concern for residents; while each resident was guaranteed a right to return, provided they continue to meet
the program requirements, they have had to find a place to live in-between. One SHA employee noted that
the agency sought to ensure minimal displacement through a phased development, so as to maximize the
number of residents that can relocate directly into new housing. The agency is also working with households
individually to ensure optimal placement, and provides 18 months notice for relocation, including two
summers, so that residents can move at the most convenient time for them. Regardless, however, the
process has created tension and controversy (Mudede, 2013; Interview with Respondent 13 and 14).
Many community advocates have argued that this redevelopment is simply a “façade for
gentrification” and that Yesler Terrace is actually a functioning, successful public housing community
(Curbed Staff, 2014; Mudede, 2013). As one activist noted, “Yesler Terrace is no Cabrini-Green” (Mudede,
2013). One resident held that, “There wasn't a serious crime problem. Their children were safe and in a
great location. To justify the redevelopment, SHA had to create and amplify a discourse about the condition
of the buildings" (Mudede, 2013). In this vein, Kristin O’Donnell, a Yesler Terrace resident since 1973, and
member of the Yesler Terrace Community Council and Citizen Review Committee was quoted as saying,
173
Yesler Terrace is a “community that works” but with redevelopment, “You're replacing a community that
was designed to be a really good place for people to live, and a real neighborhood, with something that very
probably will not be” (Young 2011; Black, 2013a). Signs like the one visible in Figure 18 appear on various
construction fences across the community, and hint at a real affinity for Yesler Terrace as it existed before
redevelopment.
Figure 18: Community Signs on Construction Sites

Photo by Author

Yesler Terrace crime statistics support the contention that Yesler Terrace and its surrounding area
are not significantly more dangerous than the rest of Seattle. In 2014, relative to other sectors of the Seattle
Police Department, the Sector E jurisdiction within which Yesler Terrace falls had below average rates of
criminal homicide, burglary and forcible rape, but above average rates of robbery with weapons other than
firearms. In particular, Sector E had about fifty percent higher incidences of non-aggravated assault, with
the highest relative number being strong-armed assault; this was about double the average of other sectors
(Seattle Police Department, 2014).
73

73
As of 2015, Yesler Terrace made up the majority of the E2 and E3 beats, within Sector E of the Seattle Police Department East
Precinct.
174
In a decision that remains contentious, the SHA chose to sell three blocks of Yesler Terrace,
comprising 3.7 acres, for $22 million to a private developer, to fund redevelopment of the remaining land
(SHA, 2014). Many stakeholders, including individuals on the Citizen Review Committee, did not want to
see the SHA sell land to a private developer (Interview with Respondent 12). This land will be built into
high-rise residential units with ground-floor retail; due to a clause in the sale agreement, at least twenty
percent of the private units will be made available to people that make eighty percent of the area median
income (Interview with Respondent 13). With the sale, the remaining SHA units will be significantly higher
density, in order to maintain the same number of units on approximately one-fourth of the land (Interview
with Respondents 13 and 14).
The sale of valuable public housing land emerged as a central issue for community activists, who
express larger concerns about neighborhood change. At the same time, SHA staff have noted that while the
agency can seek to avoid displacement, since one-for-one replacement of affordable housing enables
residents to remain on-site, the agency cannot control the effects of the project on the larger community,
including the neighboring international district, known as Little Saigon. The City Council recently upzoned
this district due to its proximity to downtown, since it is currently low density, with mostly two story
buildings. The upzoning presents an opportunity for the region to concentrate more of its growth
downtown but has raised concerns that, combined with a denser, redeveloped Yesler Terrace, developers
will speculate in the area, displace existing small businesses and gentrify community (Curbed Staff, 2014;
Mudede, 2013; Interview with Respondents 12 and 13).
7.2. YESLER TERRACE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE AGREEMENT
Yesler Terrace redevelopment and construction enters into this contentious, politicized process.
While the SHA is a municipal corporation independent from the City of Seattle, the City retains influence
over the SHA as the agency seeks to redevelop Yesler Terrace. The project required the City Council to
approve components of the redevelopment, which they did in 2012. This decision rezoned the land and
required cooperative agreements with the SHA and ordinances related to the proposed redevelopment
175
(Seattle City Council, n.d.; SHA, 2012). Thus, the project was political, and the Seattle Housing Authority
did not retain sole authority to execute the redevelopment.
Within this context, the Housing Authority of The City of Seattle (SHA), the Seattle/King County
Building and Construction Trades Council, and the Pacific Northwest Chapter of the national Construction
Alliance II (referred to as Construction Unions) established a community workforce agreement to govern
the Yesler Terrace Redevelopment. It took effect January 3, 2013 and runs through December 31, 2017
(SHA, 2013a). The CWA attempts to target jobs to low-income residents and businesses. The CWA directs
hiring to Section 3 workers, which are individuals that either reside in public housing or “live in the area
where a HUD-assisted project is located and who have a household income that falls below HUD’s income
limits” (HUD, n.d.).
74
A Section 3 business, “Is 51 percent or more owned by Section 3 residents; [e]mploys
Section 3 residents for at least 30 percent of its full-time, permanent staff; or [p]rovides evidence of a
commitment to subcontract to Section 3 business concerns, 25 percent or more of the dollar amount of the
awarded contract” (HUD, n.d.). The CWA also sets voluntary goals of 14% WMBE and 10% Section 3
business participation; a 15% apprenticeship requirement; and voluntary goals of 21% minority workers;
20% female workers; 4.5% minority female workers (SHA, 2013a).
75
The race-based goals are also only
aspirational because Washington State Initiative 200 makes affirmative action illegal on state-funded
projects, such that projects with state funding cannot mandate race-based targeting (SHA, 2013a; League of
Women Voters, 1998; Interview with Respondent 12).

74
According to HUD (2013) “Section 3 is a provision of the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Act of 1968 that helps
foster local economic development, neighborhood economic improvement, and individual self-sufficiency. The Section 3
program requires that recipients of certain HUD financial assistance, to the greatest extent feasible, provide job training,
employment, and contracting opportunities for low- or very-low income residents in connection with projects and activities in
their neighborhoods.”
75
Specifically, the CWA establishes that signatories to the agreement “agree that: 1) Section 3-eligible persons seeking pre-
apprenticeship training will be given preference for entry into these programs. 2) Qualified Section 3-eligible persons who
successfully complete approved pre-apprenticeship programs, mutually agreed upon by SHA and the Unions, will be given
preference for entry into the Union-sponsored apprenticeship programs. 3) Qualified Section 3-eligible persons enrolled in
Union-sponsored apprenticeship programs will be given preference in dispatch to Contractors working on the Project. 4) Section
3-eligible persons who qualify and possess the requisite skills as a journeyman as evaluated by the Local Unions will be given
preference in employment by Contractors working on the Project. These evaluations by the Unions will be offered frequently and
in close proximity to the Project. Any person denied journeyman status by any of the Local Unions may appeal this decision to
the Administrator. The Administrator has sole discretion to accept or deny the decision of the Local Union” (SHA, 2013a, p. 9).
176
The CWA governs redevelopment of the Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project, but is limited to
land that the Seattle Housing Authority is redeveloping itself, and this restricted scope has become a point
of contention for building trades representatives.
76
Multiple individuals at the building trades held that they
undertook CWA negotiation with the understanding that an agreement would concern the entire $1 billion
redevelopment project. However, during this process, SHA revealed that it was selling off parts of the parcel
to fund redevelopment and other Housing Authority expenses, and that unions would have to negotiate,
separately, a private PLA with the buyer. As one building trades respondent stated, while SHA “did commit
to whatever they would personally redevelop they would do an agreement on… that turns out to only be
about 30 percent of the property” (Interview with Respondents 12, 16, 18 and 24). The development on the
private side is not covered by the CWA, as SHA expressed concern that the CWA would reduce profit from
the land sale, demonstrating that producing larger community benefits was not a driving priority for the
agency (Interview with Respondent 12). Now it is uncertain whether a PLA or CWA will be created on the
remainder of the project. According to the SHA, the other parts that were sold off to fund the project are
“highly recommended to comply with [the Yesler Terrace CWA], but they don’t have the same requirements
that [the SHA construction contractors] do” (Interview with Respondent 14).
Union and community representatives agreed that the SHA was politically motivated to undertake a
community workforce agreement, to undermine opposition to the controversial project, demonstrate
community inclusion and show that the SHA was interested in the larger project effects (Interview with
Respondents 20 and 24). In contrast, SHA staff hold that the agency sought a CWA to both achieve greater
project stability and to generate local benefits to Yesler Terrace residents (Interview with Respondents 12
and 14).
How community stakeholders participated in agreement formulation has been somewhat disputed as
well, though all stakeholders agreed that the community can be a consequential actor in agreement

76
As the CWA clarifies, “The Seattle Housing Authority uses the term “’Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project’…to refer
collectively to a number of individual projects… that they will build, or fund. These projects are an integral and important part of
the overall Yester Terrace Master Planned Community, but distinctly separate from other Master Plan projects that will be built by
non-profits, or market-rate developers, as the work on the Project will be covered by the Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project
Community Workforce Agreement” (SHA, 2013a, p. 8).
177
formulation and implementation. Some respondents held that the community “drove” the CWA
formulation process by formally advocating for the agreement with legislators and with their allies, though
others believed that the process lacked sufficient community input (Interview with Respondents 12 and 23).
Community stakeholders reported that they participated, but compared with other CWAs in the region,
their input was limited, and the project was not a focus for regional organizing.
77
One individual also
reported that union stakeholders were only interested in directing the community’s political power to
achieve agreement approval, and not to spread benefits to the community (Interview with Respondents 20
and 23). Across these different perspectives, however, stakeholders widely expressed that Yesler Terrace
residents, the intended agreement beneficiary, did not actively participate in agreement formulation
(Interview with Respondents 12, 20, 23 and 24).
The construction unions report that they advocated for a CWA to increase demand for union
workers, and sought collaboration from community groups because they recognize that elected officials
respond more to such agreements when they have community support. When agreements include
community workforce provisions, community stakeholders have an interest in the agreement passing, such
that union-community collaboration emerged around CWA approval. Political support is crucial to getting
these agreements passed, and since contractors generally want to avoid community workforce provisions,
both community and union stakeholders benefit from allegiance on the agreement terms, despite their
different interests (Interview with Respondents 12, 18 and 21).
Beyond ensuring union work hours, union stakeholders espoused a commitment to community
inclusion and the community workforce provisions, borne largely out a desire to overcome the long,
entrenched and widely-known history of racism and exclusion within the building trades (Interview with
Respondents 12 and 24). As one individual stated,
“over the years, the building trades kind of lost our way with community groups, there’s a lot of
distrust, and developing agreements like this, we’re bringing that trust back. That actually gives

77
Many other CWAs exist in the region, including significant agreements around Sound Transit projects, the Port of Seattle, and
the Elliot Bay Seawall project, which is the largest project in the history of the City of Seattle (Interview with Respondents 26 and
29).
178
unions a positive role, and some positive feedback in the community; we’re not just getting
hammered in the community all the time” (Interview with Respondent 12).

Multiple union stakeholders expressed that union leadership is changing and turning its back on this legacy
of racism; particularly given declining union representation, unions cannot afford to exclude potential
members. One respondent asserted that unions in the region are already diverse enough to meet most
community workforce provisions targets, and these provisions enable unions to demonstrate the
inclusiveness that they have already achieved (Interview with Respondents 12, 16, 18 and 24).
CWA deliberation involved advocacy from the community, directed towards towards unions and the
city council, since the community holds some leverage over both interest groups. However, this community
advocacy occurred largely from community organizations and did not include Yesler Terrace residents. The
unions rely upon the community to advocate for agreements, and the community can use its political
relationships with decision-makers to encourage the union to negotiate for more ambitious community
workforce provisions. The community also holds leverage over elected officials, which seek to gain and
maintain support from their constituency. Thus, while community representatives did not engage in Yesler
Terrace CWA negotiation as an agreement signatory, the community held influence over signatories and
other stakeholders during the negotiation process. Importantly, however, community participation largely
did not include the intended beneficiaries: Yesler Terrace residents.
7.3. COMMUNITY WORKFORCE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION
Currently, the CWA is in the implementation phase, and is proceeding with oversight by the Section
3 Advisory Committee. Reports produced by the Seattle Housing Authority and disseminated to the Section
3 Advisory Committee detail the outcomes produced by the Yesler Terrace CWA. These reports are not
publically available and had to be specifically requested, and no one had previously requested this
information. While the Seattle Housing Authority responds to requests for information, the lack of public
reporting or interest demonstrates that CWA outcomes are not transparent beyond the Section 3 Advisory
Committee. It further illustrates that no one beyond the stakeholders directly engaged in implementation are
monitoring the outcomes produced by this agreement.
179
These reports are broken down by the individual contracts, a practice that makes understanding the
entire project’s progress towards CWA compliance difficult. Data from the reports, in Appendix 1, show
varying outcomes between contracts. Moreover, the reporting format is hard to interpret, and it remains
difficult to assess whether the redevelopment comprehensively meets the CWA goals or whether actual
residents are hired on the project, which remains the primary agreement objective. While SHA staff note
that the CWA has changed their hiring outcomes significantly, this claim is hard to verify, as hiring reports
from previous projects are not available (Interview with Respondents 12, 14 and 19).
Initially stakeholders discussed hiring a third party administrator, such as a consultant with expertise
in CWA implementation, but the Seattle Housing Authority chose to administer the agreement internally
with oversight from the Section 3 Advisory Committee.
78
This committee is comprised of stakeholders
including representatives from the building trades and community organizations (Interview with
Respondents 14 and 22). Seattle Housing Authority staff note that community participation in CWA
implementation has almost exclusively occurred through the Section 3 oversight committee, and that this
body was established far prior to the CWA. One staff member noted that the Citizen Review Committee
has not shown interest in the CWA. This claim is supported by the committee minutes, as the agreement
was only discussed once, during a 10-minute presentation by the agreement administrator (SHA, n.d.; SHA,
2013b; Interview with Respondents 13 and 14).
The Seattle Housing Authority representatives argue that residents are more concerned with
immediate and pressing concerns facing residents, including potential displacement and the upheaval
experienced by residents as a result of the redevelopment process. As one respondent stated, “They don’t
ask a lot of questions about the CWA. We’ve presented, you know, that we’re moving forward with it, but it
hasn’t come up as one of their top concerns…[they’re] undergoing relocation and in survival mode”

78
Some individuals, including interview respondents, are essentially consultants that specialize in PLA negotiation and
administration. These individuals are third parties, with significant expertise in agreement administration. For this reason, some
stakeholders reported that they prefer administration by these consultants because they are independent, and hired specifically to
ensure implementation. Further, these maintain relationships with stakeholders such as union leadership and understand the
challenges to PLA administration, such that they do not have to face the learning curve associated with PLA implementation
(Interview with Respondents 12, 21 and 29).
180
(Interview with Respondent 13). As such, while some community participation in implementation is
occurring, it is only really through a formal, ongoing, SHA-created advisory committee, and Yesler Terrace
residents show little interest in the CWA or its implementation.
According to the CWA terms, the Section 3 Advisory committee is intended to,
1) “Monitor contractors’ compliance efforts with the social equity requirements and goals for all
Covered Work on the Yesler Terrace Project.
2) Advise SHA and its contractors on how best to meet those goals as appropriate as well as
address areas of deficiency and corrective measures.
3) By its representative composition, the Committee will help interested community members
understand the requirements and goals, and SHA’s and the Parties’ commitment to them.
4) Through the Committee’s involvement, increase the community’s confidence in the effort being
made and make success more likely” (SHA, 2013a, p. 16).

Multiple stakeholders noted that the Section 3 Advisory Committee has driven enforcement through
its oversight role, as the SHA and contractors report to this body. Comprised largely of community and
union stakeholders, respondents held that this committee encourages implementation by reviewing reports,
asking questions, and generally seeking to problem-solve challenges that arise. When outcomes lag, the
committee can confront contractors about their underperformance, though the committee has no official
power to assess penalties or enforce the agreement (Interview with Respondents 12, 14, 17 and 22).
Regardless, one SHA representative noted that oversight of the Section 3 Advisory Committee remains
central to implementation.
“That advisory committee is [and] can be a real, a good, positive thing because it keeps the
companies on point with fulfilling their obligations once they’ve signed those contracts. Because
sometimes, if no one is tracking them, they’ll complete the project and hardly anyone will get hired,
and they’re like oh, or they don’t do the outreach they should do in order to get people in. So really
the key to this is seeing that a project is coming, identifying whatever numbers you want to do, and
then getting people into the system” (Interview with Respondent 17).

However, without the ability to assess penalties, the committee can only exert minimal pressure on
contractors and the SHA, and lacks any real levers for accountability besides shaming contractors into
compliance (Interview with Respondents 14, 17 and 22). Further, since the Seattle Housing Authority only
infrequently undertakes redevelopment projects, and does not have enough bidders on projects as it is, the
181
threat of developing a bad relationship with the agency provides only slight incentive for contractors to
comply with the agreement terms (Interview with Respondents 14 and 15).
This CWA has proven particularly difficult to implement due to the Section 3 requirements. As the
CWA administrator stated, “there is quite a learning curve on this,” since this is the first CWA in the agency,
and the first administered by a public housing agency in the nation. Further, the Yesler Terrace CWA is also
the only CWA in the country to target economically, rather than geographically, through Section 3 worker
hiring (Interview with Respondents 14, 17 and 21). Unique to this CWA, the Section 3 worker requirement
has posed a significant challenge for CWA implementation in practice. The Section 3 classification does not
only refer to individuals living in public and assisted housing and who receive financial assistance from
HUD, but also nearby individuals who meet the income requirements established by HUD. Therefore, to
meet the Section 3 requirements, contractors do not have to hire individuals living at Yesler Terrace or other
public housing communities, but rather can target low-income individuals generally (HUD, n.d.; Interview
with Respondents 12, 14 and 17).
79

Regardless, many individuals involved in the agreement formulation noted that the spirit of the
CWA sought to hire local residents, meaning residents within Yesler Terrace and other local public housing
communities (Interview with Respondents 12, 14 and 21). In practice, it has been difficult to hire Yesler
Terrace residents on the project. As one building trades stakeholder said, while the Section 3 requirement
makes sense in theory, “in the reality of things, it’s kind of hard to [make it] work” (Interview with
Respondent 18). Stakeholders widely held that Yesler Terrace residents are generally not interested in
construction work and lack any experience in construction, which is the reason that it has been hard to
target work to residents. One individual simply stated, “construction is hard work. [Yesler Terrace residents]
don’t want to do it” and that while the Seattle Housing Authority “ has been doing heavy outreach about
these opportunities, supporting apprenticeship programs, things like that… there’s been a really low interest

79
Although the Section 3 requirement exists regardless of the CWA, since the SHA generally uses HUD funds, SHA staff noted
that the CWA systematizes the process of hiring Section 3 workers and “takes it a step farther” through additional compliance.
Union stakeholders expressed that they have an unfair burden placed on them, since normally the Section 3 requirement is not
policed with so much attention from the agency, but it is scrutinized on this union agreement (Interview with Respondent 14;
Interview with Respondent 12).
182
in sign-up” (Interview with Respondent 15). Most respondents speculated that Yesler Terrace individuals,
many of whom are East African, preferred other types of work to construction for cultural reasons,
including hospital work, janitorial work, landscaping and food service (Interview with Respondents 13 and
17).
More likely, residents face significant barriers to entry that also explain low enrollment, including
skills gaps and information asymmetries such as residents lacking information about these jobs as they
become available. SHA staff members acknowledge that outreach has been a significant problem, but pass
responsibility for outreach onto the construction unions. Stakeholders from the building trades maintain
that the Seattle Housing Authority should be doing the outreach to residents, to identify and screen
potential applicants. Further, many of the eligible and interested Section 3 workers lack basic construction
skills and knowledge, such that the unions were reluctant to enroll them in an apprenticeship program, and
expend their resources, without additional screening to reduce their liability (Interview with Respondents 16,
17 and 18).
The Section 3 requirement also complicates implementation because it deviates from standard union
practices. In general, PLAs and CWAs in Seattle and most cities target hiring based on zip code, which is
more straightforward; workers can easily be identified by zip code, and unions have adopted this practice.
But, various stakeholders, and particularly union representatives, emphasized that the Section 3 targeting is
too restrictive and difficult to track. Unions are required to collect and maintain additional data on their
members and incorporate it into the dispatch process, which is how unions refer workers onto job sites.
However, unions have historically not tracked their workers by Section 3 status, though some in the Seattle
area have since altered their practice to do so (Interview with Respondents 12, 14, 17 and 24). Contractors
and the SHA have also had to alter their hiring practices to identify and target Section 3 workers, and this
process involves a cumbersome identification and hiring process (Interview with Respondents 13 and 14).
To cope with these added challenges, SHA staff and unions have had to seek Section 3 workers
from beyond Yesler Terrace, and in many cases, outside of public housing. Some trades have found that
183
reclassifying workers is a far easier strategy to employ to meet the requirement. Due to the deep impact of
the recession on the construction industry, many union members fell into the income requirements, since
they were out of work for so long (Interview with Respondents 12, 14, 17, 18 and 24). For unions, drawing
from existing lists makes sense, since enrolling individuals simply because they live in public housing carries
significant risk, and they already have members on the dispatch list that meet the Section 3 requirement. As
one union representative commented, “I think HUD needs to look at the fact that, I know they’re trying to
benefit the community as a whole, and we all want to do that, but that doesn’t mean you have to [target]
everyone for a construction career” (Interview with Respondent 18). Since unions already have enrolled
workers that, due to the recession, meet the Section 3 income requirement and need work, they have little
incentive to seek out new workers. However, this practice undermines the original spirit of the PLA, which
is to enable public housing and disadvantaged residents to access construction careers, not to hire existing,
reclassified workers.
However, union stakeholders also held that since the CWA applies to only 30 percent of the Yesler
Terrace redevelopment, expending significant resources to achieve CWA implementation is not worth their
effort, particularly since the unions are “the only ones policed” on the requirement (Interview with
Respondent 24). From the building trades perspective, there is still a lot of tension around the fact that the
PLA only applies to about 30 percent of the total redevelopment, rather than the entire $1 billion project
(Interview with Respondents 12, 16, 18 and 24). Representatives from some trades noted that since they are
already “community inclusive,” meaning they have high diversity numbers, this CWA really just requires
them to reclassify workers and change their reporting, and therefore they do not have to change their
practices significantly. When this occurs, the union meets the Section 3 requirements, but does not
necessarily attract Yesler Terrace residents into the trades, as initially envisioned. However, for trades that
are not already diverse, the CWA constitutes a significant change from existing practices. For these trades,
they have more been “forced to do it,” which is problematic; the Yesler Terrace redevelopment
administered by SHA is only about $300 million, which is not enough work to really incentivize them to
184
change their practices (Interview with Respondent 24). If they do not meet these requirements, all trades can
appear as though they are failing to be inclusive (Interview with Respondents 12, 16 and 24).
Section 3 worker outreach and recruitment has proven to be a central challenge in implementing this
CWA. SHA staff members hold that the unions have not done enough work recruiting eligible potential
workers, but unions note that there are fundamental barriers to recruiting Section 3 workers (Interview with
Respondents 14 and 17). As with other PLAs, good working relationships between unions and community
stakeholders are key to ensuring a functional pipeline to funnel potential workers through training and onto
jobsites. This process requires commitment and good communication, in order to ensure that all
stakeholders support each other in implementation activities. For example, contractors and unions must
quickly and effectively communicate their dispatching needs, to make sure that Section 3 workers are sent to
jobsites whenever possible. If there are no targeted workers available, then they need to figure out how to
direct individuals into the trades and onto jobsites. SHA has struggled to ensure that a pool of eligible
workers exists in advance of contractor needs, since some unions are reluctant to bring people in before
there are jobs; these workers would have to wait on the out-of-work list for potentially a long period, and
maybe not pursue construction since many could not wait without work for a job opening to arise
(Interview with Respondent 18). Further, different trades have varying commitment to inclusion of
historically marginalized workers, such that some unions are more willing to confront the challenges that
arise with community inclusion. Throughout, coordination and communication are critical; as one
respondent stated, “When there’s breakdown either way [in communication], the whole thing falls apart”
(Interview with Respondent 12).
That the SHA is administering the CWA internally has frustrated union stakeholders; one union
staekholder noted that union representatives undertook negotiations under the belief that an impartial,
expert third party would administer the CWA. It can be difficult to get internal administrators to enforce the
agreement, since they have no external pressure or expertise for enforcement, and may be wary of
penalizing their own contractors or prioritizing implementation over project costs. Internal administrators
185
may also lack the expertise related to targeted hire to overcome the technical issues can frustrate a functional
worker pipeline. For this reason, many building trades representatives expressed a preference for third party
administrators, or for “somebody who is truly neutral and outside,” through stakeholders acknowledged that
this implementation involves “good players” who are truly invested in the agreement, its implementation
and outcomes (Interview with Respondents 12, 16, 18 and 21). Union stakeholders noted that SHA
agreement administrators, particularly one staff member who began this work after the agreement was
already signed, are good people and working hard, but lacked both expertise and institutional support. In
this way, the SHA faces lingering concerns about whether the agency lacks the capacity, connections,
expertise and incentive to effectively undertake implementation (Interview with Respondents 16 and 24).
As both project owner and CWA administrator, the Seattle Housing Authority oversees
implementation, in conjunction with the contractors and subcontractors. Various stakeholders noted that
the SHA has to hold the contractors accountable, or else there is no incentive for the unions or the
contractors to alter their practices. As one respondent noted, if the SHA “isn’t willing to hold their feet to
the fire, the contractor runs and says, I’m out of here. I’m going to do whatever I want” (Interview with
Respondents 12 and 14). However, this same individual noted that the CWA has achieved outcomes
because the SHA is willing to hold parties accountable, as Yesler Terrace is “a very high-profile project”
and, therefore, faces additional scrutiny (Interview with Respondent 12). This individual further speculated
that personal and institutional commitment further drives implementation, and that SHA “want[s] to do
right by the project and by the folks” living in Yesler Terrace (Interview with Respondent 12). Regardless,
however, outcomes undisclosed to the public, and neither SHA nor contractors express that they are
compelled to meet all of the established targets. Rather, they appear to be satisfied to give what they
perceive to be their best effort, and absent significant oversight, are not motivated to find a way to deliver
all of the promised outcomes (Interview with Respondents 14 and 15).
In contrast, contractors remain primarily concerned with producing profitable, timely, quality
construction. However, some express a commitment to CWA compliance and a desire to preserve
186
relationships so that the company would be considered for future bids (Interview with Respondents 14 and
15). However, the Seattle Housing Authority does not have enough bidders for these projects, so eligibility
for future contracts appears to not be a significant threat. As a result, the contractor has an incentive to
maintain business as usual, which is easier and more cost-effective, instead of targeting historically excluded
workers and supporting these workers on construction sites (Interview with Respondents 14, 15 and 17). I
depict this agreement structure, and the motivations of stakeholders, in Figure 19.
Figure 19: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement Structure

Figure 19 illustrates that community stakeholders exerted only weak pressure over hiring outcomes,
with some community engagement but no participation by the agreement beneficiaries. During
implementation, community involvement has only occurred through the Section 3 Advisory Committee,
Negotiation
Stakeholders
Agreement Implementation

Agreement Negotiation
Negotiation
Outcomes

Implementation
Stakeholders
Tools
Community orgs
(not YT residents)
Building and
Construction Trades
Seattle Housing
Authority
Seattle City
Council
Yesler Terrace
CWA (signed by
SHA and
Building Trades)
Building and
Construction Trades
Motivations Implementation
Outcomes
Community
benefits
Seeks to represent
constituency and
gain support
Contractors
Worker hiring
Benefits SHA
and Building
Trades through
public
perception
Jobs for
union
members;
demonstrate
diversity in
trades
Facilitate redevelopment
projects; assist residents
Seattle Housing
Authority
Potentially benefits
community and unions
(depending on if hiring
outcomes are met)
Section 3 Advisory
Committee
Weak influence
Strong influence
Reviews reports
and questions
contractors; no
penalties for
noncompliance
No penalties for
noncompliance; no
real threat from
future bids
187
which holds no real levers to motivate the contractors and unions to produce community outcomes and
ensure accountability. In this Yesler Terrace case, the community has not driven the process through a
watchdog role, which many speculate happen because residents themselves are not that interested in these
jobs. In this way, the community has no control over the agreement outcomes, and has not asserted itself
during implementation.
Unions have largely pursued CWA implementation, due to what they consider to be a dual
dependence on outcomes materializing: to both guarantee union jobs and to overcome the perception of
persistent discrimination within construction unions. The volume of work available is a central concern for
unions, since directing work to members is their main reason to engage in a CWA. Further, their desire to
overcome perceptions of racial and gender exclusion, rooted in their history of discrimination, made union
stakeholders additionally vulnerable to outcomes not materializing. Union stakeholders cited other
agreements in the region with high diversity numbers, such as the Elliot Bay Seawall Project, as evidence
that insufficient diversity within the union trades is not the primary issue with implementing the Yesler
Terrace agreement (Interview with Respondents 12, 16 and 24). Regardless, union stakeholders expressed
concern that (a) they would be blamed for inadequate worker inclusion and (b) would not meet their
secondary goal of demonstrating to the broader public that unions are more diverse and no longer
discriminate. Union stakeholders reported that for these reasons, they needed to the agreement goals to
materialize, which drove them to produce outcomes (Interview with Respondents 12, 16 and 24).
However, unions alone cannot ensure that Yesler Terrace residents are directed into these jobs,
since they need outreach and hiring assistance from SHA and the contractors. However, unions can control
some outcomes if they reclassify and refer their own workers that fall under Section 3 status. This is exactly
what the unions have done, to enable them to meet the outcomes without having to rely on other,
potentially less committed stakeholders. Fundamentally, however, hiring Section 3 workers in construction
unions does not advance the original spirit of the CWA, since it does not create new construction careers
for the vulnerable residents affected by Yesler Terrace Redevelopment.
188
7.4. THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
As the Yesler Terrace CWA implementation process evolves, community organizations within
Seattle have worked with labor unions to advocate for addition community workforce provisions on large-
scale, publicly funded city projects. These efforts have produced two policies: the Seawall Project
Community Workforce Agreement and the Seattle Priority Hire Ordinance. The Seawall CWA concerns the
$290 million first phase of the Elliot Bay Seawall project, the “largest public works project in the City of
Seattle’s history” (City of Seattle Purchasing and Contracting, n.d.; Interview with Respondent 27). The
agreement is a pilot project for the ordinance, which was approved in 2015 by the Seattle City Council. In
contrast to the Yesler Terrace agreement, the Seawall agreement and priority hire ordinances both target
work based on individuals living with economically distressed zip codes, and include aspirational goals for
hiring women and workers of color (City of Seattle City Purchasing & Contracting, 2015a; City of Seattle
Legislative Information Service, 2015). This larger context remains important because it demonstrates how
the City of Seattle and regional actors are moving forward with efforts to scale and systematize what had
been ad hoc agreements. In many ways, this effort seeks to address some of the challenges presented by ad
hoc, smaller-scale agreements such as the Yesler Terrace CWA, in which stakeholders struggle with
coordination, lack incentive to meet outcomes and have limited resources dedicated to implementation.
However, this different scale also introduces concerns related heightened politicization, which could
potentially water-down the agreement terms, as indicated by the Seattle ordinance.
Community stakeholders, including representatives from local community organizations, cited low
diversity numbers on prior regional projects, as well as the opportunity to increase access to good jobs for
disadvantaged residents, as their main reason for seeking community inclusion on publicly funded projects
(Interview with Respondents 20 and 23). Labor unions partnered with the community in this effort; they
wanted to similarly advocate for agreements to ensure that future projects produce union construction jobs,
but recognized that the community held more political sway with locally elected officials than union
representatives (Interview with Respondents 20 and 24). Unions sought to use community advocacy and
189
influence, and channel it into a mutually beneficial agreement at the regional level. One union representative
explained that “[the Council] was listening to [the community] more than they were listening to us” and that
the “message is better received from community than from [the unions] (Interview with Respondent 24). In
this way, the community played a major role in the Seawall agreement, and the unions and the community
united to form a powerful, if tenuous, alliance.
The Seawall CWA terms are favorable to union interests, and the community workforce provisions
are ambitious relative to other regional and national agreements, so union representatives expressed pride at
the agreement terms.
80
As one representative held, the Seawall CWA is “labor history being written, that’s
how important it is in my belief” (Interview with Respondent 24). From the community perspective,
however, the “genesis [of the Seawall CWA] was community organizing” and they fought to ensure that
other stakeholders incorporated their demands into the agreement (Interview with Respondent 23). City of
Seattle staff members and the community also proudly discuss the agreement (Interview with Respondents
20, 27, 28, 29).
Throughout, the community advocated for a citywide ordinance, to extend the agreement terms to a
broader scale than one project (Interview with Respondents 20 and 23). The community fought hard for the
ordinance, and the union and community effectively collaborated during negotiations to advance their
mutual interests by establishing, prior to negotiations, mutually agreed-upon terms from which to negotiate
and leverage their influence (Interview with Respondents 12, 20, 23 and 24). From the community
perspective, the incentive to advocate for an ordinance originated in the ad hoc-nature of PLA work. PLAs
are project-specific, and therefore lack the far-reaching impacts that institutions can have. One stakeholder
held that Yesler Terrace was influential in the priority hire ordinance, as Yesler Terrace redevelopment
began around the same time as the ordinance formulation. The Yesler Terrace project underscored that the
city needed to systematize an increasing number of ad hoc agreements that specified vastly different terms

80
The Seawall CWA specifies aspirational goals of: 15% workforce hours by individuals from “economically distressed zip codes
which shall be defined and prioritized by the City,” 12 percent of total work hours by women, and 21% of total work hours by
people of color. In addition, the CWA established an aspirational goal of 15% of all workforce hours by Apprentices, with 21%
Apprentices being people of color and 12% female Apprentices (City of Seattle, 2015a).
190
and had different implementation processes (Interview with Respondent 12 and 24). As one respondent
explained, “I think the momentum [with Yesler Terrace] carried it into the Mayor’s Office, saying, you
know, we need something that’s citywide. Not just this department, that department, that department.
Something that the City of Seattle has covered” (Interview with Respondent 12). Greater scale also
benefitted the unions, which sought to guarantee as much work as possible for members.
However, the ordinance negotiations quickly became more politicized than ad hoc agreements
concerning individual projects.
81
The agreement attracted the attention of nonunion contractors, who
lobbied city leaders against strong provisions for labor. In particular, the ordinance allows contractors to
“select and hire up to five Core employees before filling further hiring needs through Dispatch” (City of
Seattle Legislative Information Service, 2015). Core employees are employees of nonunion contractors that
the contractor seeks to bring onto projects. This requirement enables contractors to bring their long-term
employees onto the project. However, union stakeholders noted that this requirement is high, and many
crews are five workers or fewer, meaning they would not have to hire from the union dispatch lists at all.
Thus, this provision is a significant loss for unions, who expect that far fewer union workers will be hired on
projects subject to the ordinance. Thus, the increased politicization around this public ordinance, in which
city officials wrote the agreement, influenced the agreement terms so as to benefit the nonunion contractor
lobby (Interview with Respondents 16, 18 and 24).
Beyond heightened politicization altering the agreement terms, evidence suggests that by increasing
the scale, implementation changes as well. Rather than one-off implementation efforts, often undertaken by
individuals without experience implementing agreements, this longer-term, scrutinized effort has driven the
city to invest in implementation. The Seawall CWA is considered a “pilot” for the broader ordinance, and
demonstrates the careful consideration paid to ordinance implementation by the City of Seattle Department
of Finance and Administrative Services, in which the City Purchasing and Contracting Services resides,
which oversees the Seawall CWA and ordinance implementation. While there had been many recent

81
Politicized is defined as: of or relating to the politics or government.
191
influential CWAs in the region, the city had not had a PLA on its projects in ten years, and had never had
one with community workforce provisions. As a result, city stakeholders recognized that they needed to gain
experience with implementation (Interview with Respondent 27).
Prior to ordinance approval, the city partnered with the UCLA Labor Center and produced a report
to assess how the City could improve diversity on projects that it funds (see Herrera et al., 2014). Similar to
the Metro PLA, the ordinance is essentially a “master CWA” since it functions like one, and thus broadens
the scope of projects covered by the agreement from only one project to all projects within an agency
(Interview with Respondent 28). Thus, the Seawall CWA and its implementation remains crucial, because it
serves as an important foundation upon which future priority hire in the City of Seattle will occur.
Even so, there are marked similarities between implementation of the Seawall and Metro project
labor agreements, including administration by the project owner, with an entire staff dedicated to the effort.
Information is readily and publicly available, including construction maps, contact information and diversity
reports, and monthly project tours are offered. As such, tracking outcomes is far easier for an outsider, and
this effort is made possible due to sufficient staffing by the City of Seattle Department of Finance and
Administrative Services, which includes both field enforcement and payroll data analysis, and technological
capacity (City of Seattle City Purchasing & Contracting, n.d.a.; City of Seattle City Purchasing &
Contracting, 2015b; Interview with Respondent 28). Finally, contractors face penalties for noncompliance,
and contractors are given incentives to meet the goals not only to avoid penalties but also to be eligible for
future contracts (Interview with Respondent 27). With this system in place, the Seawall CWA is currently
exceeding all of its outcomes (City of Seattle City Purchasing & Contracting, 2015b). Stakeholders including
city employees, building trades representatives and community advocates consider the agreement and its
implementation to be a resounding success, and all respondents expressed a commitment to community
workforce goals (Interview with Respondents 12, 16, 23, 24, 27, 28 and 29).
City staff acknowledged initial issues related to learning how to implement the CWA, and argue that
since these staff members will also be implementing the priority hire ordinance, they have gained valuable
192
expertise. As one City employee stated, “we played a lot of catch-up” in the beginning, and then had to
rethink how implementation would occur for the ordinance (Interview with Respondent 28). The City is
really focused on confronting the challenges inherent to the larger-scale ordinance and how to structure
implementation moving forward, since the ordinance will require additional resources for implementation.
To learn about implementation, City staff conducted field visits and troubleshot issues with the Port of
Seattle and Sound Transit, local agencies with active PLA and CWA administration (Interview with
Respondent 27). City staff touted the benefits of internal administration by staff members whose sole
responsibility is agreement administration. Such benefits include “access and the ability to do things more
efficiently, being internal… I mean, we're living in this. We live it every day. And I think if you're doing this
on a voluntary basis or maybe just doing it for part-time, it'd be a lot more challenging.” (Interview with
Respondent 28).
In this way, Seattle Seawall CWA implementation has informed how implementation will occur for
the ordinance. Stakeholders have already sought to put measures in place to ensure implementation,
including an advisory committee “for accountability” (Interview with Respondent 27). This Implementation
and Advisory Committee will oversee implementation of the Priority Hire Ordinance. The vision of the
committee is to ensure that “City projects go beyond the minimum requirements of Priority Hire (laying the
groundwork for sustaining and institutionalizing the practice)” and that “City projects hit their Priority Hire
targets so people in distressed ZIP codes, people of color, and women are getting into and/or staying in
City public works jobs” (City of Seattle Department of Finance and Administration, n.d.). Other goals
include shared expertise, transparency, identifying how the city could undermine barriers through
investment, and “looking out for unintended consequences” (City of Seattle Department of Finance and
Administration, n.d.). Committee representation will include at least three members each from labor unions,
worker-related community organizations, contractors (with at least one WMBE firm) and apprentice/pre-
apprenticeship programs. As such, implementation of the Seawall CWA has informed the Priority Hire
193
Ordinance implementation from the outset, including explicitly ensuring that the community participates in
an oversight committee that is deeply involved in the implementation process.
Even though community development outcomes remain unclear, and evidence exists that issues
frequently arise that frustrate implementation, planning practice is moving forward with the model,
including the recently approved Priority Hire Ordinance in Seattle. However, as stakeholders scale up
community development agreements from ad hoc agreements on individual projects to larger city-wide
policies, there is evidence that this model changes fundamentally. This process underscores that community
development practitioners and local government representatives are moving forward with the process of
attaching community benefits to large-scale public projects, and are seeking to address the problems
associated with smaller-scale agreements such as Yesler Terrace. In so doing, they work through a political
process that may introduce other issues with agreement formulation and implementation.

194
Chapter 8

FRAGILE ACCOUNTABILITY:
The Metro Project Labor Agreement in South Los Angeles

Approved in January 2012, the Metro Project Labor Agreement implementation process is
producing most of the outcomes promised by the agreement so far. While apprenticeship numbers are
lagging, stakeholders are working together to improve these numbers. However, these outcomes have not
proceeded due to the contract alone. Rather, community stakeholders are driving the implementation
process through their continued monitoring and enforcement efforts. Due to this cumbersome undertaking
by the community, all stakeholders retain a vested interest in achieving the community outcomes promised
by the original agreement and are accountable to these goals.
8.1. BACKGROUND
In 2008, Los Angeles County voters approved Measure R, a sales tax increase that constitutes a
significant investment in regional transportation infrastructure over the coming decades. Measure R directs
“$40 billion to traffic relief and transportation upgrades throughout the county over the next 30 years” (Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority [Metro], 2012b). Measure R funds a wide range of
projects, including building entirely new light-rail lines. According to original estimates, Measure R is
expected to produce 210,000 new construction jobs and contribute $32 million in economic spillovers into
the regional economy (Metro, 2012b). Future regional construction projects present an important
opportunity for local residents because they will create jobs that pay well, include valuable training
opportunities, and are attainable regardless of educational achievement (Metro, 2012c). The construction
industry has experienced high unemployment rates after the recent recession (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), 2013b). Hiring deficits for some groups persist due to entrenched discrimination, especially
for skilled jobs that pay higher wages (BLS, 2013b).
In an attempt to direct the distribution of jobs produced by this substantial local investment, many
195
stakeholders, including the public officials on the Metro Board of Supervisors and community
organizations, came together to formulate and advocate for a PLA related to Measure R projects (Interview
with Respondents 1, 2 and 8). This culminated in a project labor agreement (PLA) between the Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) and the Los Angeles/Orange County Building and
Construction Trades Council, which Metro approved in January 2012. This PLA is the first master project
labor agreement approved by a regional transportation agency in the nation, and it is being touted as a
national model by the U.S. Departments of Labor and Transportation as a means to increase access to
construction jobs for local, disadvantaged residents (Foxx, 2015; Ubaldo, 2014; Miller, 2013; Griffin, 2012;
Weikel, 2012). Accordingly, the Metro PLA seeks to ensure that the jobs and career opportunities created by
public spending from Measure R will extend to historically marginalized workers. This policy is also
intended to produce spillover benefits for entire communities through local spending. In sum, the PLA
attempts to create a pathway to community development, by enhancing human capital, undermining
structural discrimination and fostering local economic development (Nelson, 2014).
While approved in January 2012, the agreement formulation process began three years prior, when
the Metro Board of Directors and local community advocates sought to target hiring on the publicly-funded
Measure R projects to local residents (Interview with Respondents 1 and 2). Agreement formulation
involved both grassroots mobilization by community organizations seeking to enhance access to
construction careers for groups historically excluded from these jobs, lobbying from union representatives,
as well as leadership from the Metro Board of Supervisors, and particularly then-new Board member and
County Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas.
Supervisor Ridley-Thomas assumed office in 2008, and represents the Second District, which
includes much of South LA and the Crenshaw area. One of the new light-rail lines, the Crenshaw Line,
which is the focus of this case study, cuts through this predominantly African American, low-income
Crenshaw neighborhood (Ridley-Thomas, n.d.; Streeter, 2013; Soja, 2010; Interview with Respondents 7 and
9). As a new supervisor, Ridley-Thomas sought to respond to resident calls for greater diversity on Metro
196
construction projects (Streeter, 2013; Soja, 2010; Interview with Respondent 7). At this time, community
stakeholders were “making their voices heard” to the Metro Board of Directors, and Ridley-Thomas sought
to engage with activists and to change the culture at Metro. Further, the Metro Board also wanted a project
labor agreement to ensure timely progress on agency megaprojects, as Metro had received criticism in the
past about project delays (Interview with Respondents 1, 4 and 8). Simultaneously, unions sought a project
labor agreement to ensure high-quality job creation on these large-scale, regional construction projects
(Interview with Respondent 9). As such, both the Metro Board, union and community stakeholders played a
key role in advocating for a project labor agreement and in specifying its terms. Metro staff emphasized that
community pressure gave Metro crucial political support and shared its expertise, which enabled the agency
to effectively pursue this new, riskier policy that deviated from agency practices (Interview with
Respondents 1, 2 and 3). Community stakeholders reported their political influence occurred indirectly, but
in an impactful way; to influence the agreement terms, the community worked with the unions and the
Metro Board (Interview with Respondents 4 and 8).
Community influence proved particularly impactful because public support is especially important
for Metro, which shares a tense history with low-income residents and community groups in the region, yet
depends upon voter support to fund future expansion (Interview with Respondent 3). Many residents cite
agency prioritization of light-rail funding over bus transit as proof that Metro has neglected the urban poor
(Soja, 2010; Griffin, 2012). Low-income residents disproportionately rely upon public transit, and in
particular, bus service. In 1996, in response to Metro’s actions, a community coalition, including the Bus
Riders Union, sued Metro for discrimination against low-income riders in its transit provision and won. The
legacy of this confrontation persists in the public memory (Bakewell, 2012; meeting notes from October 25,
2012; Newton, 2011; Soja, 2010).
82
Regardless, disparate treatment continues; many residents note that
Metro builds light rail “at-grade,” or at street level, in low-income communities, rather than above or below
ground, as it does in wealthier communities. Building transit at-grade presents safety concerns to pedestrians

82
Soja (2010) describes the fractured relationship between Metro and low-income residents, which culminated in the 1996 court
case Labor/Community Strategy Center et al. v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority.
197
and drivers and contributes additional tension to the relationship between Metro and low-income residents
(Newton, 2011).
Against this backdrop, and four years after Measure R approval, Metro sought voter approval for
Measure J in November 2012, to extend the sales tax increase that Measure R initiated for an additional 30
years. However, Measure J received 66.11 percent of the vote, and thus barely failed to achieve the necessary
two-thirds majority required for new tax measures in California. Importantly, community groups, including
the Bus Riders Union, strongly opposed Measure J, which prioritized light-rail transit (Bloomekatz, 2012;
League of Women Voters of California, 2012). During interviews, Metro staff noted that Measure J failure
imperiled future regional transit construction and the agency’s goals, so ensuring new funding remained a
key agency priority. Therefore, Metro still depends upon future ballot box measures for its future projects,
and is preparing another, similar ballot measure for 2016 (Rudick, 2015; Interview with Respondent 3).
Metro staff expressed the agency’s reliance on strong community relationships to gain voter approval.
Metro, like so many public agencies, faces declining federal investment, an uncertain fiscal outlook, and has
turned to ballot measure to secure funding for future projects (Boarnet & Crane, 1998). As a result, the
agency now finds itself in an era in which future project funding hinges on community support, such that
Metro has an interest in at least appearing to deliver community benefits from agency projects (Interview
with Respondent 3).
Within this larger context, the agency approved its PLA on January 26, 2012, and is currently
implementing its PLA. While early agreement versions included local hire provisions, Metro could not enact
local hire, as jobs needed to be available at a national scale in accordance with Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) policy (Foxx, 2015; Sulaiman, 2013; Interview with Respondents 1 and 2).
83
Further,
since Measure R projects involve state funds, California’s Proposition 209 affirmative action prohibition
extends to the PLA, so the agreement could not mandate race-based or gender-based preferences (California

83
U.S. Secretary of Transportation Anthony Foxx created a one-year pilot program in March 2015 to test local hire on federal
projects, in a move to reduce federal limitations on local hire. Foxx cited the Metro PLA, and a worker on the Crenshaw/LAX
Corridor Project, to bolster his argument that the federal government should promote local hire (Foxx, 2015). Metro amended the
project labor agreement to enable a local hire pilot, to run during the larger FTA pilot project, during February to September 2015
(Metro, 2015b; Vock, 2015).
198
Voter Foundation, 1996; Metro, 2012c; Interview with Respondent 1). Therefore, the Metro PLA targets
hiring to “disadvantaged workers,” a classification that broadens the beneficiary pool from exclusively local
workers (Interview with Respondent 2).
84
That these projects are largely funded by local, public funds was
an important reason why Metro could push the FTA to allow this ambitious PLA (Interview with
Respondents 1 and 2).
Thus, the Metro PLA aims to mitigate historical and contemporary injustices by targeting hiring to
local, disadvantaged workers, including historically excluded groups such as African American workers
(Griffin, 2012; Metro, 2012a; Metro, 2012c Weikel, 2012;).
85
To accomplish this, the agreement specifies
that “Local Targeted Workers, with priority given to Community Area Residents” complete forty percent of
total work hours for applicable projects. Metro employees note that this target is high relative to other
project labor agreements (Metro, 2012c, p. 14; Interview with Respondent 2). Ten percent of total work
hours must be completed by “Disadvantaged Workers whose primary place of residence is within Los
Angeles County” (Metro, 2012c, 14). Further, the PLA requires that, at minimum, apprentices must
complete 20 percent of all project hours (Metro, 2012c).
86
Through the apprenticeship provision, the PLA
attempts to achieve two ends: first, to ensure that the target workforce has the necessary skills to gain access
to jobs, and second, to create career opportunities. This process enables potential workers to gain access to

84
The term “Disadvantaged Worker” is defined as “an individual who, prior to commencing work on the project, resides in an
Economically Disadvantaged Area or Extremely Economically Disadvantaged Area as defined in 1.9 and 1.10 below, and faces at
least two of the following barriers to employment: (1) being homeless; (2) being a custodial single parent; (3) receiving public
assistance; (4) lacking a GED or high school diploma; (5) having a criminal record or other involvement with the criminal justice
system (as more specifically described in Section 3.8 of the Construction Careers Policy); (6) suffering from chronic
unemployment (as more specifically described in Section 3.28 of the Construction Careers Policy); (7) emancipated from the
foster care system; (8) being a veteran of the Iraq/Afghanistan war; or (9) being an apprentice with less than 15% of the
apprenticeship hours required to graduate to journey level in a program” (Metro, 2012c, p. 3). “Local Targeted Worker” refers to
“Local Resident, Community Area Resident or a Disadvantaged Worker whose primary place of residence is within Los Angeles
County” (Metro, 2012c, 4). A Community Area Resident is considered to be “a Local Resident whose primary place of residence
is within an Economically Disadvantaged Area or an Extremely Economically Disadvantaged Area and is within a 5-mile radius of
the covered project in question” (Metro, 2012c, p. 2).
85
Targeted hire in construction constitutes “a policy initiative aimed at increasing employment opportunities for disadvantaged
workers, who often experience difficulty accessing the construction pipeline…Targeted hire refers to hiring requirements for
target groups, such as minorities, women, or low-income workers. In other words, local hire is tied solely to a specific geographic
region, while targeted hire is broader, encompassing different segments of the population across geographic regions” (Herrera et
al., 2014, p. 12-13).
86
“Apprentice” concerns “those apprentices registered and participating in Joint Labor/Management Apprenticeship Programs
approved by the State of California, Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Apprenticeship Standards (“DAS”), or in the
case of Projects with federal funding, approved by the US Department of Labor (“DOL”) and DAS” (Metro, 2012c, p. 2).
199
construction careers and the building trades, and receive vital on-the-job experience that enables them to
advance from entry-level apprentice positions to the more skilled (and more lucrative) journeyman status
(Metro, 2012c; Interview with Respondent 1). To oversee progress toward these hiring targets, the general
contractor must hire a Metro-approved “jobs coordinator” who has the responsibility “to identify and refer
targeted workers” (Miller, 2013; Metro, 2012a).
The disadvantaged worker classification introduces a zip code proxy for local and race-based hire,
which potentially changes who gets hired on related projects. In an analysis of a previous PLA, the UCLA
Labor Center found that only about one-sixth of the locally hired workers “came from the narrow definition
of “local”—that is, the zip code area in which the project was being constructed” (Philips et al., 2010).
Further, the disadvantaged worker classification introduces vagueness within the agreement that permits the
PLA to be implemented in ways that may not augment racial or ethnic diversity, while still meeting its
established targets. Specifically, African American workers do not have to be hired to meet the
disadvantaged worker agreement goal, despite that some community stakeholders specifically entered into
negotiations to ensure that local, African American workers would be hired. This ambiguity, combined with
obscured data and lack of direct community control over implementation, enables stakeholders to continue
to contest jobs distribution during implementation.
To illustrate the tensions that have arisen during implementation and its impacts, I describe the
Crenshaw/LAX Corridor Project, which is the first megaproject covered under Measure R. Project
construction and PLA implementation remain ongoing (Interview with Respondent 1). While outcomes are
continuing to materialize, the tensions that have arisen during implementation have already been established.
The project broke ground on January 21, 2014, and is expected to open in 2019 (Metro, 2014a; Metro,
2014b). As Figures 20 and 21 show, this project will create the Crenshaw Line, which is a new, 8.5-mile
light-rail line through Crenshaw, Inglewood and Westchester. This project will connect the Expo Line and
the Green Line (Metro, n.d.a.; Metro, 2014a; Metro, 2014b). The Crenshaw Line will cost an estimated
$2.058 billion (Metro, 2014a).
200
Figure 20. Map of Los Angeles Light-Rail System, including Crenshaw Line Under Construction

Adapted from Metro, n.d.b.

PACIFIC OCEAN
LONG BEACH
SOUTH BAY HARBOR
GATEWAY
EL MONTE
NORWALK
KOREATOWN WESTWOOD
PASADENA
EAST LOS ANGELES
HOLLYWOOD
SAN FERNANDO VALLEY
DOWNTOWN
LA
Ventura County Line
San Bernardino Line
Riverside Line
Orange County & 91 Lines
Antelope Valley Line
LAX
LATTC/
Ortho Institute
Expo/La Brea
P La Cienega/Jefferson
Crenshaw/Slauson
Expo/
Western
CULVER CITY
LATTC/
Ortho Institute
Jefferson/
USC
Expo/La Brea
P Culver City
P La Cienega/Jefferson
Farmdale Martin Luther
King Jr
Hyde Park
Fairview Heights
Downtown Inglewood
Westchester/ Veterans
Aviation/
Century
Expo/
Crenshaw P
Expo Park/USC
Expo/
Vermont
¢ P South Pasadena
Vermont/Santa Monica
Vermont/Sunset
Westlake/
MacArthur Park
Wilshire/Vermont
¢ P
Wilshire/Normandie
Wilshire/Western
7th St/
Metro Ctr
2nd Pl/
Hope
2nd St/
Broadway
1st St/Central
Hollywood/Highland ¢ P
North Hollywood ¢ P
Vermont/Beverly
¢ P Atlantic
Little T okyo/
Arts Dist
¢ P Indiana
East LA Civic Ctr
Maravilla
Soto
Mariachi Plaza
Pico/Aliso
Slauson ¢ P
Manchester ¢ P
Rosecrans ¢ P
37th St/
USC
Harbor Gateway
Transit Center ¢ P
LAC+USC Medical Ctr
Washington
San Pedro St
Vernon
Slauson
Florence ¢ P
Firestone
103rd St/Watts Towers ¢ P
Willowbrook/Rosa Parks ¢ P
Compton
Artesia ¢ P
Del Amo ¢ P
Wardlow ¢ P
Willow St ¢ P
Pacific Coast Hwy
Anaheim St
5th St
1st St ¢ P
Downtown
¢ P Long Beach
¢ P Pacific Av
Grand/
LATTC
Cal State LA
Union Station ¢ P
¢ P Lincoln/Cypress
¢ P Heritage Sq
Southwest Museum
Highland Park
Chinatown
Pico
El Monte ¢ P
Pershing
Sq ¢ P
Pershing
Sq ¢ P
Woodley
Tampa
De Soto
Laurel Canyon
Valley College
Woodman
Hollywood/Western
Hollywood/Vine ¢ P
Van Nuys ¢ P
Pierce College ¢ P
Aviation/
LAX ¢ P
Hawthorne/
¢ P Lennox
¢ P Crenshaw
¢ P Vermont/Athens

Harbor Fwy ¢ P
Avalon ¢ P
Long Beach Bl ¢ P
Lakewood Bl ¢ P
Norwalk ¢ P
Reseda ¢ P
Balboa ¢ P
Sepulveda ¢ P
Mariposa
¢ P El Segundo
¢ P Douglas
¢ P Redondo Beach
Warner Ctr
Nordhoff
Roscoe
Sherman
Way ¢ P
¢ P Canoga
¢ P Chatsworth
Memorial Park
Allen
Fillmore ¢ P
Del Mar ¢ P
Lake ¢ P
Sierra Madre Villa ¢ P
DOWNTOWN
LA
Civic Center/
Grand Park ¢ P
Universal City/
Studio City ¢ P
Arcadia
Monrovia
Duarte/City of Hope
Irwindale
Azusa Downtown
APU/Citrus
College
Westwood/Rancho Park
Palms
P Expo/Sepulveda
P Expo/Bundy
26th St/Bergamot
P 17th St/SMC
Downtown
Santa Monica
Leimert Park
SANTA
MONICA
Wilshire/La Brea
Wilshire/Fairfax
Wilshire/La Cienega
Wilshire/Rodeo
Century City/Constellation
Westwood/UCLA
Westwood/VA Hospital S
F
F
Go Metro
metro.net
Gold Line Foothill Extension
Under Construction Lines and Stations
Gold Line Foothill Extension
Expo Line Phase 2
Purple Line Extension
Regional Connector
Crenshaw/LAX Line
12-0524 ©2012 LACMTA
Metro Rail lines and stations
Metro Busway lines and stations
Red Line
Purple Line
Blue Line Expo Line
Green Line
Gold Line
Street stop
Orange Line Silver Line
Metrolink & Amtrak
LAX FlyAway
Subject to Change AUG 2015
Free parking
Paid parking
Regional Rail
Airport Shuttle
LAX Shuttle (free)
Transfers
15-0614 ©2014 LACMTA
Metro Rail lines and stations
Metro Busway lines and stations
Red Line
Purple Line
Blue Line Expo Line
Green Line
Gold Line
Street stop
Orange Line Silver Line
Metrolink & Amtrak
LAX Shuttle (free)
Subject to Change SEP 2014
Regional Rail
Airport Shuttle
Parking
LAX FlyAway
BUR SuperShuttle (free)
Transfers
Free
Paid
Bike
S
F
LAX Shuttle (free)
Airport Shuttle
Parking
LAX FlyAway
BUR SuperShuttle (free)
Free
Paid
Bike
S
F
16- 0350 © 2015 LACMT A
201
Figure 21. Map of Crenshaw Line

Adapted from Metro, n.d.a.

As Table 12 shows, the Crenshaw Line transverses a relatively disadvantaged, predominantly African
American community. In the Crenshaw area, 62.5 percent of residents are African American, compared with
8.2 percent in Los Angeles County. Crenshaw residents are relatively less educated when compared to the
county and state levels. The Crenshaw area has about twice the share of households with an income less
than $20,000 annually than at the county, state and federal levels; nearly half of all households in this area
have a total income less than $40,000. The age distribution of Crenshaw residents is quite similar to the
national level, though a slightly greater proportion of residents are above retirement age than in Los Angeles
County. Further, total unemployment and percent not in the labor force occurs at a far greater rate than at
any other scale. However, employment among African American residents is somewhat higher in the
Crenshaw area than among African Americans at the county, state and federal scales. Finally, only about 3.5
COLDWATER CANYON
ROSCOMARE
BEVERLY GLEN
CANYON
BENEDICT
SAN DIEGO FWY
BEACHWOOD
GOWER
HIGHLAND
GOLDEN STATE FWY
MT
HOLLYWOOD
VISTA DEL
VALLE
CYN
COMMONWEALTH
CANYON
WILLOW
GLEN
WESTERN
COMMONWEALTH
HILLHURST
MULHOLLAND
MULHOLLAND
3RD
TEMPLE
HYPERION
ST. GEORGE
RAMPART
FRANKLIN
SUNSET
TRACY
SAN VICENTE
BURTON
ROSSMORE
WILSHIRE
MELROSE
FAIRFAX
HILGARD
WESTERN
NORMANDIE
GARFIELD
VERMONT
LA BREA
ROWENA
LA BREA
VINE
SUNSET
GRIFFITH
ALVARADO
SUNSET
TALMADGE
SUNSET
STEWART
OLYMPIC
18TH
17TH
BUNDY
PICO
AIRPORT
VETERAN
NATIONAL
CENTINELA
SAWTELLE
BARRINGTON
SANTA MONICA FWY
CHURCH
MONTANA
WESTWOOD
BARRINGTON
EXPOSITION
PICO
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR BL
CADILLAC
WEST
REDONDO
HAUSER
SANTA MONICA FWY
OLYMPIC
OLYMPIC
WASHINGTON
ADAMS
8TH
8TH
JEFFERSON
HOOVER
WILTON
ROBERTSON
FAIRFAX
PICO
WILSHIRE
LA CIENEGA
WASHINGTON
VENICE
3RD
6TH
6TH
FL OWER 11TH
FIGUEROA
12TH
BL VD
23RD
12TH
BL VD
BRO AD W
HILL
23RD
BROADWAY
MAIN
JEFFERSON
SAN PEDRO ST
BRO AD W
HILL
WASHING
54TH
SLAUSON
GAGE
STOCKER
48TH
FAIRVIEW
STOCKER
54TH
60TH
60TH
60TH
GAGE
HYDE PARK
SLAUSON
SOUTHWEST
LEIMERT
FAIRVIEW
OVERHILL
BUCKLER
ANGELES VISTA
BEACH
ARLINGTON
LA BREA
LA BREA
MARKET
ROSE
OVERLAND
CALIFORNIA
BEETHOVEN
WALGROVE
SAWTELLE
LINCOLN
ABBOT
KINNEY
CENTINELA
JEFFERSON
ADMIRALTY
LA TIJERA
LA CIENEGA
VIA MARINA
PACIFIC
FIJI
SLAUSON
MARINA FWY
ARBOR VITAE
90TH
8TH
HILLCREST
INGLEWOOD
AIRPORT
WESTERN
135TH
MARIPOSA
135TH
WESTCHESTER PKWY
MANCHESTER
120TH
NASH
VISTA DEL MAR
MAIN
WESTERN
VAN NESS
VERMONT
NORMANDIE
MANCHESTER
ARBOR VITAE
IMPERIAL HWY
PRAIRIE
108TH
CENTURY
LA BREA
LA CIENEGA
AVIATION
VAN NESS
NORMANDIE
IMPERIAL
GRAND
HOOVER
COLDEN
108TH
124TH
FIGUEROA
135TH
MAIN
BROADWAY
BROADWAY
103RD
MAIN
FIGUEROA
CENTURY
WESTERN
MARINE
161ST
VERMONT
REDONDO BEACH
ALONDRA
S MAIN
STANFORD
RAMONA
HAWTHORNE
PRAIRIE
ROSECRANS
YUKON
ROSECRANS
MARINE
FIGUEROA
ROSECRANS
VAN NESS
MARINE
ARDMORE
GOULD
HIGHLAND
AVIATION
SILVER LAKE BL
SILVER LAKE BL
SAN PEDRO ST
SAN PEDRO ST
PEDRO ST
SAN PEDRO ST
AVALON BL AVALON BL
LOS FELIZ BL
LOS FELI Z BL
LOS FELIZ BL
OCEAN PARK
SEPULVEDA
SEPULVEDA BL SEPULVEDA BL
SEPULVEDA BL
CULVER
SEPULVEDA
SEPULVEDA
BEVERLY DR
BEVERLY
6TH
W SILVER
LAKE BL
HOLLYWOOD BL
HOLLYWOOD BL
VENICE
PALMS BL
EL SEGUNDO
MANHATTAN BEACH BL
MANHATTAN BEACH
HERMOSA
CRENSHAW
RIMPAU
CRENSHAW BL
GRIFFITH PARK DR
REDONDO BEACH
VERNON
VERNON AV
MANCHESTER
SANTA MONICA BL
SANTA MONICA BL
REDONDO BEACH BL
SAN
GLENDALE BL
ARTESIA BL
GLENDALE
GLENDALE BL
ARTESIA BL
FLORENCE
FLORENCE
INGLEWOOD
GARDENA BL
GARDENIA
HARBOR FWY
BROADWAY
BEVERLY BL
WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON BL MARTIN LUTHER KING JR BL
PARK BL
INGLEWOOD
INGLEWOOD
MAIN
MARINE
FIRMONA
OSAGE
FREEMAN
FAIRFAX
WEST
MCKINLEY
NICHOLS
CANYON
SANTA MONICA BL
SANTA MONICA BL
EL SEGUNDO
LA BREA
10
110
110
405
91
107
1
1
1
90
2
2
91
101
101
101
HIGHLAND HIGHLAND
3RD
TEMPLE
RAMPART RAMPART
SAN VICENTE SAN VICENTE
BURTON BURTON
ROSSMORE ROSSMORE
WILSHIRE WILSHIRE
MELROSE
WESTERN
NORMANDIE NORMANDIE
VERMONT
LA BREA
SUNSET
BARRINGTON BARRINGTON
PICO
CADILLAC
REDONDO
HAUSER HAUSER
OLYMPIC OLYMPIC
8TH
8TH
JEFFERSON
HOOVER
ROBERTSON
FAIRFAX
LA CIENEGA
WASHINGTON WASHINGTON
VENICE VENICE
3RD
6TH
23RD
MAIN MAIN
STOCKER
60TH
60TH
GAGE
LA BREA
OVERLAND
SAWTELLE SAWTELLE
CENTINELA
JEFFERSON
LA CIENEGA
SLAUSON
MARINA FWY
ARBOR VITAE
WESTERN
135TH
MARIPOSA
135TH
WESTCHESTER PKWY
MAIN
WESTERN
VERMONT
NORMANDIE
MANCHESTER
VAN NESS
NORMANDIE NORMANDIE
IMPERIAL
GRAND
HOOVER
FIGUEROA
MAIN
BROADWAY
BROADWAY
MAIN
FIGUEROA
PRAIRIE
YUKON
SILVER LAKE BL SILVER LAKE BL SILVER LAKE BL
SEPULVEDA
CULVER
SEPULVEDA
SEPULVEDA
BEVERLY DR
BEVERLY
6TH
PALMS BL
EL SEGUNDO
BEVERLY BL BEVERLY BL
WASHINGTON BL WASHINGTON BL MARTIN LUTHER KING JR BL MARTIN LUTHER KING JR BL MARTIN LUTHER KING JR BL
INGLEWOOD
FAIRFAX
SANTA MONICA BL SANTA MONICA BL
EL SEGUNDO EL SEGUNDO EL SEGUNDO EL SEGUNDO
10
110
110
405
1
1
90
101
GLENDALE
Crenshaw/
MLK
Leimert
Park
Crenshaw/
Slauson
Florence/
West
Florence/
La Brea
Hindry
Aviation/
Century
Expo/
La Brea
Farmdale
Expo/
Crenshaw
Expo/Western
Culver
City
Expo
Park/
USC
Jefferson/
USC
23rd St
Expo/
Vermont
La Cienega/
Jefferson
GLENDALE
Harbor Fwy
Vermont/Athens
Redondo Beach
Douglas
El Segundo
Mariposa
Aviation/LAX
Hawthorne/Lennox
Crenshaw
Avalon
Wilshire/
Western
Wilshire/
Normandie
Westlake/
MacArthur
Park
Vermont/
Beverly
Wilshire/
Vermont
Hollywood/
Highland
Slauson
37th St/
USC
Manchester
105
405
405
105
VENICE
LOS
FELIZ
PARK
LA BREA
MID-CITY
MARINA
DEL
REY
LADERA
HEIGHTS
BALDWIN
HILLS
BEL AIR
UCLA
OCEAN
PARK
WEST
LOS ANGELES
ATWATER
VILLAGE
HOLLYWOOD
HILLS
WEST HOLLYWOOD
SILVER
LAKE
HANCOCK
PARK
HOLLYWOOD
BEVERLY
HILLS
CHEVIOT
HILLS
CENTURY
CITY
PALMS
LAWNDALE
MANHATTAN BEACH
ATHENS
LAX
MORNINGSIDE
PARK
FLORENCE
HYDE
PARK
LEIMERT
PARK
WESTCHESTER
WEST
ADAMS
KOREATOWN
WILSHIRE
CENTER
WESTWOOD
LENNOX
INGLEWOOD
EL SEGUNDO
HAWTHORNE
LOS ANGELES
GARDENA
CULVER CITY
Existing Metro Rail & Station
Metro Silver Line & Station
Exposition Transit Corridor
Phase 2 (approved alignment)
Westside Subway Extension
(under study)
Harbor Subdivision
Light Rail (LRT)
Alignment & Station
Optional Station
At-Grade LRT
Below Grade LRT
Aerial LRT
Maintenance Yard Site
Parking
Subject to Change 12-2284 ©2012 LACMTA
Crenshaw/LAX Transit Corridor
Línea y estación de
Metro existente
Metro Silver Line y estación
Corredor de Transporte
Exposition fase 2
(alineamiento aprobado)
Extensión del Subterráneo
hacia el Oeste (bajo estudio)
Harbor Subdivision
Estación y alineamiento
de tren ligero (LRT)
Estación opcional
LRT a nivel de la calle
LRT debajo de nivel
LRT a nivel elevado
Sitio de mantenimiento
Estacionamiento
Sujeto a cambios 12-2284 ©2012 LACMTA
Corredor de Transporte Crenshaw/LAX
Crenshaw/LAX Transit Corridor
LA TIJERA
Optional Station
STOCKER
CRENSHAW BL
STOCKER
LA BREA
HILLS
Optional Station
202
percent of Crenshaw residents are employed in construction, as compared to roughly six percent of the total
population in the county and state (American Community Survey, 2008-2012, 5-Year Estimates).
Table 12: Crenshaw Area Demographic Characteristics

United States California L.A. County Crenshaw Area
87

Population 309,138,711 37,325,068 9,840,024 44,811
Average Household Size 2.6 2.9 3.0 2.6
% White Alone 63.7% 40.1% 27.8% 2.2%
% African American 12.2% 5.8% 8.2% 62.5%
% Hispanic or Latino 16.4% 37.6% 47.7% 30.0%
% with High School Diploma or Equivalency, but
no college
28.2% 20.7% 20.5% 25.4%
% civilian over age 16 employed in construction
industry
6.5% 6.2% 5.8% 3.5%
% Households with income less than $20,000
88
17.6% 15.1% 17.2% 29.7%
% Households with income less than $40,000 37.8% 32.9% 36.2% 51.5%
% Age 0-17 Years 24.0% 24.8% 24.4% 24.4%
% Age 18-24 Years 10.0% 10.5% 10.7% 10.3%
% Age 25-34 Years 13.3% 14.3% 15.1% 12.5%
% Age 35-44 Years 13.3% 13.9% 14.6% 12.2%
% Age 45-54 Years 14.4% 14.0% 13.9% 15.3%
% Age 55-64 Years 11.8% 10.9% 10.3% 12.1%
% Age 65-74 Years 7.1% 6.2% 5.9% 7.3%
% Age 75 and older 6.1% 5.3% 5.1% 6.1%
% Unemployment (Total) 9.3% 11.0% 10.8% 15.7%
% Unemployment (White) 8.1% 10.5% 10.3% 12.8%
% Unemployed (Black or African American) 15.9% 17.0% 16.0% 15.9%
% Unemployed (Hispanic or Latino) 11.3% 13.0% 11.8% 15.6%
% Over 16 but not in labor force 35.3% 35.5% 34.8% 39.9%
Source: (American Community Survey, 2008-2012 (5-Year Estimates) SE:T1; T7; T14; T21; T25; T33; T37; T40; T41; T47; T49;
T56A)

Since large-scale development often contributes to neighborhood change, gentrification and
displacement, a recent trend toward “accountable development” attempts to promote social justice through
enhanced equity within urban projects. This effort seeks to avoid the history of urban renewal in which
planning efforts severely disrupted communities with little to no meaningful community participation (Parks
& Warren, 2009). This accountable development theme appears in the rhetoric surrounding the Metro PLA
and the Crenshaw Line, as construction affects the surrounding business environment.
89
Leimert Park, a
neighborhood adjacent to the Crenshaw line, includes the largest presence of African American-owned
businesses in Los Angeles. Residents advocated for and received a station in the area, which Metro originally

87
Census tracts 2340, 2342, 2343, 2345.01, 2345.02, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349.01, 2349.02, 2352.01, 2352.02; ACS 2008-2012 (5-
Year Estimates) were used to represent the Crenshaw area.
88
Household income uses 2013 Inflation Adjusted Dollars
89
Goodin (1980) defines rhetoric as “stylized speech” intended to persuade (p. 96).
203
opposed due to cost (Kudler, 2013; Miller, 2013). However, business owners have already begun to witness
changes, such as landowners declining to renew leases (Kudler, 2013). These business owners have
expressed concern about their ability to benefit from nearby development. As one business owner stated,
"We fought so hard to get the station. Then I wondered if we would still be here to enjoy it" (Kudler, 2013).
In this way, questions remain about the benefits and impacts produced by this public investment, beyond
jobs.
Accordingly, many local African American residents, business owners and organizations have argued
that African American residents should benefit from the jobs created by this much-needed, local
investment, since the Crenshaw line construction occurs within and will disrupt their community. In their
eyes, the Metro PLA should include targeted hire to ensure that local residents, and specifically African
Americans, benefit from development projects in their communities (Meeting notes from April 11, 2014;
Griffin, 2012; Interview with Respondent 8). Metro responded to local business concerns by creating an
“Eat, Shop, Play Crenshaw” initiative, intended to encourage people to support local businesses during the
construction disruption. This undertaking recognizes the negative impact that Metro construction is having
on local businesses, by covering storefronts, removing parking, and restricting pedestrian access (see Figures
22, 23 and 24). Metro also designated $10 million to a “business interruption fund” to “provide[s] eligible
businesses up to $50,000 annually, not to exceed 60 percent of business revenue loss to address construction
impacts along on the project alignment” (Metro, 2014e). Figure 25 displays the Eat, Shop, Play section of
Metro’s website, dedicated to advertising and offering discounts for local patronage among Metro users.

204
Figure 22: Metro’s Eat, Shop, Play Crenshaw Initiative Signage

Photo by the author

Figure 23: Disrupted Pedestrian Access along Crenshaw Blvd

Photo by the author

205
Figure 24: Disrupted Businesses along Crenshaw Blvd

Photo by the author

Figure 25: Eat, Shop, Play on Metro website

Source: Metro, 2015a

206
8.2. METRO PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION
Subsequent to PLA approval, Metro hired additional staff members tasked with implementing the
agreement internally to Metro. These staff members work to ensure that the agreement meets its goals, and
are invested in changing the culture within Metro to the extent that it promotes agreement implementation.
As a result, these individuals seek to cultivate strong relationships with the community, to both improve
PLA implementation and to generate support for future funding measures (Interview with Respondents 1,
2, 3 and 8).
The PLA’s cumulative impact so far remains undetermined, as implementation remains ongoing.
However, currently the PLA is meeting most of its targets (Metro, 2015c). Significant work for the
Crenshaw Line began in Summer 2014, and as of January 16, 2016, 46.82 percent of work hours for the
project had been completed.
90
As Table 13 shows, early reports produced by the jobs coordinator, based on
certified payroll data and made public on the Metro website, indicate that the project is exceeding the goals
for “Economically Disadvantaged Area Hours” and “Disadvantaged Workers” Hours, but not meeting the
apprenticeship hours goal established in the PLA, though these numbers have improved over time (Metro,
2016; personal communication, February 12, 2015; Metro, 2015c; Metro, 2014d). The outcomes for
disadvantaged workers and apprentices have declined since October 2015 (Metro, 2016; Metro, 2015c).
However, when examining the breakdown by race/ethnicity, it becomes apparent that worker composition
differs significantly from the Crenshaw area.

90
As of March 30, 2016, the January 16, 2016 Targeted Worker Summary Report is the most recent, publicly available report,
which demonstrates that there is sometimes a significant lag in reporting. In mid-January 2015, the August 2014 report was the
most recent report available on the Metro website, meaning that the most current public data was nearly six months old.
207
Table 13. Current Outcomes According to Jobs Coordinator Reporting
91

Percentage Cumulative
Reported Craft Hours
(January 2016 Report)
Percentage Cumulative
Reported Craft Hours
(October 2015 Report)
PLA Goals for
Percentage Total
Craft Hours
Total completed work hours 46.82% 36.75% N/A
Economically Disadvantaged Area
Hours
59.11% 59.33% 40%
Disadvantaged Workers Hours 11.48% 10.31% 10%
Apprenticeship Hours 18.20% 17.76% 20%
Caucasian workers 23.21% 22.81%
Hispanic workers 55.36% 55.11%
African-American workers 15.61% 16.24%
Asian workers 1.15% 1.23%
Native American 1.15% 1.17%
Other 3.14% 3.01%
Not specified .34% .42%
Female workers 2.90% 2.60%
Source: Metro, 2016; Metro 2015c

Yet, the means by which these data are reported obscures many important factors, including that
different quality jobs are stratified across race and gender; data such as the percentage of total payroll, rather
than project hours completed, would reveal this information. As such, observing the outcomes for labor
that this policy is producing remains difficult. Jobs are reported by “craft hours,” which makes tracking
individual workers across a task and observing job creation extremely challenging with the available data
92

(Hymon, 2014; Metro, 2014c).
Metro staff members express reluctance to report by total workers (Interview with Respondents 1, 2
and 3). Since construction work is often temporary, reporting data by total workers would not distinguish
between workers that have only worked a few days versus those employed for months. However,
community groups continue to press for these data to enable community monitors to track the number and
types of jobs created, which they emphasize is the ultimate goal of the community workforce provisions
within the project labor agreement. The types of jobs produced by this project and who gets these jobs
matters for the community development outcomes produced, since construction jobs vary in pay. Light-rail

91
Percentages refer to Percentage of Cumulative Craft Hours completed on the project by the end of the reporting period. As the
PLA does not target hiring by ethnicity or gender, goals are listed as not applicable here.
92
By reporting the data by total work hours than by individual worker, Metro seeks to standardize across the different lengths that
an individual worker remains employed on a project. Otherwise, contractors could hire workers for short durations, such as one
day, and potentially mislead about the extent to which job creation occurs. As such, either form of data aggregation—by total
work hours or individual worker—has limitations that obscure hiring outcomes observations (Interview with Respondent 1).
208
line construction requires a varied workforce, such as electricians, sheet metal workers, laborers and
painters. These jobs differ in pay, education, skill level, risk, and potential for career growth. Metro has
indicated that it may give this information, but only after educating the public about the ways in which
tracking individual workers can mislead about worker duration (Interview with Respondents 1, 3 and 8;
BLS, 2014). Metro has also altered reporting to require more data. This effort derived both from agency
needs as well as the Metro Board requesting additional data, largely due to community advocacy (Metro,
2016; Metro, 2015c; Interview with Respondent 1). Thus, communities have continued to use their political
relationships to indirectly demand transparency and implementation by lobbing their elected officials on the
Metro Board of Directors. They have also developed relationships with Metro staff that administer the PLA,
to increase their influence over the implementation process (Interview with Respondents 1 and 4).
Metro staff reports progress monthly to the Metro Board of Directors for the Crenshaw project;
since it is one of the megaprojects funded by Measure R, the Metro Board has required additional reporting.
Representatives from Walsh-Shea, the prime contractor for the Crenshaw project, are required to attend
those meetings, in case a board member has a question for a contractor. In these meetings, Metro staff
members note that that the Board of Directors shows its commitment to the project labor agreement, which
gives staff the institutional support to enforce the agreement with the contractors (Interview with
Respondents 1, 2 and 10). One Metro employee emphasized that this demonstrates “the level of attention
that [the project labor agreement is] getting” by the Metro Board and “how important [the PLA] is not just
to staff, but [to] the governing Board. This is to be taken seriously” (Interview with Respondent 1). Metro
implementation staff also expressed serious personal commitments to producing outcomes, derived from
personal beliefs in promoting economic justice (Interview with Respondents 1, 2 and 3).
Thus, Metro, union and the contractors, including the general contractor, Walsh-Shea, directly
implement the agreement because they refer and hire workers. Since Metro is administering the agreement
internally, it has oversight responsibility. As one Metro respondent stated, “if Metro was lax, if Metro was
not enforcing, if Metro was not reporting, on a monthly basis, if it’s not being transparent, no one is going
209
to take this program seriously,” particularly contractors (Interview with Respondent 1). However, as with
similar agreements, contractors and subcontractors have significant influence during implementation
because they are responsible for directly producing outcomes based on which workers are hired. Despite
this direct influence, the contractors are not a signatory to the agreement, which means that their critical role
emerges after PLA formulation and approval (Interview with Respondents 1 and 2). Thus, the general
contractor is “like a third party” to the agreement, such that “that the contractor taking ownership over the
PLA, just like they do any other provision of the contract, is key” (Interview with Respondents 1 and 2).
Walsh-Shea has significant incentive to implement the project labor agreement and meet its goals.
Beyond having to report monthly to the Metro Board of Directors, the prime contractor faces penalties if
the goals are not met. This is a legitimate threat, as Metro has assessed penalties on a previous contract
under this project labor agreement (Interview with Respondent 1). As one Metro staff noted, penalties give
the prime contractor “skin in the game” so that they have an incentive to implement the agreement, and
drive the subcontractors to similarly work to achieve outcomes (Interview with Respondent 3). Further,
Metro is the major transportation provider in the greater Southern California region, such that contractors
interested in working on transportation construction in Southern California cannot afford to gain a bad
reputation with the agency or its Board (Interview with Respondent 3).
However, Walsh-Shea has demonstrated commitment to meeting the PLA terms, as evidenced by
the outcomes and reports from other stakeholders. One individual discussed the different motivations
underlying the prime contractor’s actions by stating,
“I just believe that [the Walsh-Shea employee carrying out the community workforce outcomes]
believes in the program, I think he does. I think he recognizes, the prime contractor recognizes that
they're on a high profile project, the very first one, running through a community that is a diverse
community or that is a -- you know, it's Crenshaw. So he recognizes all of that and from my
conversations with him he does want to help the community, he does want to read the numbers, he
does want to prove that him and -- not him, but Walsh/Shea and him can do what's required,
because it only makes them stronger. If they meet all the numbers and nobody else does, then they
get on another project” (Interview with Respondent 6).

This statement underscored the multiple factors that can drive implementation, including concerns about
future competitiveness on Metro contracts, the firm’s reputation, recognition of the project scale and
210
novelty, and individuals with influence during administration that have a personal commitment to ensuring
local benefits from the project. Even if the contractor lacks the commitment to community outcomes or is
not motivated preserving the firm’s public reputation Metro is still driving the contractor to implement the
agreement under threat of penalty and risk of not receiving future contracts.
Unions also have direct influence over outcomes, since they refer workers. One union representative
reported that their main concern was to ensure that “good folks” entered the construction trades, to
safeguard their investment and ensure that unions produce quality work. As this individual stated,
“We don't want to take in somebody in [and] a year later, after we spend an initial amount of money,
find out that they really didn’t know they had to have a shovel, use the shovel or climb on ladders.
It's a waste of money because there is somebody behind them that is really wanting that job”
(Interview with Respondent 9).

Since the unions invest so heavily in training during the apprenticeship process, they want to ensure that
those individuals pursue construction as a long-term career. One way in which unions additionally screen
workers is through pre-apprenticeship programs, often administered by community groups, which put
candidates through classes to teach them soft skills, and assess a worker’s commitment, before they enter an
apprenticeship program (Interview with Respondent 9).
Finally, the jobs coordinator, an outside community organization contracted to enable
implementation, exerts significant influence over implementation of this PLA. The jobs coordinator is
responsible for coordinating between the contractors, the union, the community, apprenticeship programs
and Metro, to direct workers from the community and onto these projects. Further, as the prime contractor
stated, “the jobs coordinator vets the disadvantaged workers” (Interview with Respondents 6 and 10). This
is an extremely difficult task, complicated by many nuanced, overlapping factors. To give an example,
directing apprentices onto a jobsite requires coordination between pre-apprenticeship programs, unions,
contractors and the jobs coordinator. Pre-apprenticeship programs identify eligible, interested residents, and
help them gain the necessary soft skills (such as timeliness) and technical skills (such as math requirements
and interview skills) to gain access to a union apprenticeship program. These programs also screen residents,
and those residents who pass are then referred to the construction unions. Union leadership report that pre-
211
apprenticeship programs have become increasingly important for them to identify committed workers
before they invest significant resources, up to $50,000 for an apprentice operating engineer, in their training
(Interview with Respondents 4, 9, 12 and 16).
Further, pre-apprenticeships and apprenticeship programs have become increasingly important after
high schools and community colleges have cut technical classes that used to teach students basic
construction skills and enable them to learn about the different trades. Without these programs, many
potential candidates know little about construction work or their preferred trade. As one union
representative asserted, some candidates come into apprenticeship programs “cut the grass green”
(Interview with Respondent 12). Once signed up for an apprenticeship program, most trades require a basic
training that lasts for a few weeks, and after that, workers are placed on the out-of-work list from which
unions refer workers onto jobsites. Throughout, timing is crucial to ensure that there is a disadvantaged
ironworker apprentice, for example, on the out-of-work list and ready to go at the exact moment that a
contractor is seeking an ironworker who meets the disadvantaged worker classification to show up for work
the next day (Interview with Respondents 16 and 24).
California law further complicates the effort to ensure sufficient apprenticeship hours. Labor laws
prohibit apprentices from working underground, and also establish minimum and maximum ratios between
apprenticeship and journeyman work hours.
93
Apprentices can only account for a maximum share of each
crew, due to safety concerns. These specifications make it additionally difficult to get apprentices onto the
project at specific stages, such as during phases with significant underground work, and it becomes difficult
to make up the apprenticeship hours at later stages. For this reason, producing apprenticeship outcomes
remains complex, and requires significant coordination between, and commitment from, the different
stakeholders involved (California Labor Commission, 2014; Interview with Respondent 6).
Unlike these other stakeholders that possess direct influence over outcomes, the community retains
only indirect leverage during implementation, similar to the agreement formulation stage. While stakeholders

93
As outlined in California Labor Code 1777.5. The maximum ratio varies between trades, but the minimum ratio is generally one
hour of work by an apprentice for every five hours of work by a journeyman.
212
cite two community organizations as instrumental in advancing the agreement, only one of those has
remained engaged during the implementation process. The organization that has moved on focused on
regional policy issues, and reports that it remains difficult for community organizations to find grants to
conduct implementation work (Interview with Respondent 8). The organization that has remained active in
implementation, however, is focused specifically on the local Crenshaw area, and therefore has a deeper
vested interest in the local outcomes materializing. Further, it benefits from a more secure funding structure
and is less dependent on outside grants, such that it is able to remain focused on the agreement as it
proceeds through the implementation stage (Interview with Respondents 4 and 8).
The organization that has remained vigilant during implementation has focused on influencing
outcomes by acting as a watchdog. Through this organization, the community has come to play an
important, albeit indirect role, in Metro PLA implementation. This organization was initially motivated out
of concern that other stakeholders related to the PLA have moved on and will neglect their commitment to
local, disadvantaged workers, specifically Black workers and women. Initially, this organization attempted to
gain a formal role in implementation, such as part of an oversight committee (personal communication, July
23, 2015). However, Metro did not extend direct oversight capacity to the community, and thus official
oversight remains limited to the Metro Board of Directors.
Subsequently, the organization sought to influence the contractor hiring process by grading
prospective contractors on their past behavior, including transparency, discrimination and community
relations. Their report card findings were presented to the Metro Board of Directors and the contractors
that bid on the project. The organization reported that members of the Metro Board of Directors, including
Mark Ridley-Thomas, considered the findings in their final decision, and sought to gain access to the data
and findings to use for future bidding processes. Further, many contractors expressed significant interest in
the report card methods and findings, and some sought to work with the organization to ensure that they
scored higher on future projects (Interview with Respondents 4 and 5).
213
The organization was also instrumental in influencing the jobs coordinator on the Crenshaw line.
Originally, Metro selected a jobs coordinator from outside the Crenshaw area. However, after community
stakeholders expressed concern to Metro and the Metro Board of Directors that this jobs coordinator would
not have the local knowledge to immediately work effectively with community groups to direct workers,
Metro selected a jobs coordinator, PV Jobs, located in South Los Angeles (Interview with Respondent 8).
Due to their success in these endeavors, this organization has shifted their activities to assessing hiring and
worker treatment on projects related to the PLA (personal communication, March 6, 2014).
This organization continues to monitor hiring outcomes without access to construction sites, which
makes conducting accurate observations exceedingly challenging, particularly as construction work moves
into underground drilling phases. This effort involves going to construction sites early in the morning to
watch workers enter, either by driving or walking along the site, and trying to observe how many Black
workers and women are working on the site and their working conditions (personal communication, April
11, 2014). As Figure 26 shows, community monitors face data collection issues such as poor visibility onto
the jobsite. The organization uses the information it gathers to create and circulate public reports, including
to the Metro Board of Directors, to monitor Metro’s data and outcomes related to this PLA.
Multiple Metro employees report that this organization’s role is fundamental to PLA
implementation, by sharing on-the-ground reports, improving the agency’s information and pushing Metro
to produce additional outcomes, increase transparency, and be more accountable to the local community.
Further, by putting pressure on the Metro Board, Metro staff members note that the community has given
the agency the support necessary to pressure the contractors for results (Interview with Respondent 1). The
community organization maintains this watchdog role and somewhat adversarial relationship, yet recognizes
the gains made by the community workforce provisions, and Metro, jobs coordinator and the contractors’
work. However, it continues to push Metro for full compliance, and in particular, hiring Black workers,
women and apprentices (Interview with Respondents 1 and 4; personal communication, July 23, 2015).

214
Figure 26: Jobsite Visibility Issues Facing Community Monitors

Photo by Author

While community stakeholders retain the political influence with Metro Board members that they
had during agreement formulation, this is only because the community has specifically sought such influence
during implementation. Despite that this organization has leveraged its knowledge and resources to gain
influence during implementation, the community remains fundamentally limited in its capacity to directly
affect worker hiring. Rather, the contractors directly hire workers, and Metro has enforcement capacity
(Metro, 2012a; Interview with Respondent 4). Many community activists have publicly critiqued PLA
implementation, and question the extent to which this policy will benefit local residents at the same time
that it threatens residential and commercial displacement (Kudler, 2013). In this way, different stakeholders
have come to contest the implementation process to promote their respective constituencies or interests,
215
but retain differential ability to influence which workers get hired onto these job sites. Without direct
participation in implementation and outcomes delivery, but with high-level political support and cultivated
relationships with PLA administrators, community stakeholders possess indirect, though not
inconsequential, influence in this process, largely derived from their influence on the Metro Board.
Community interests can increase political pressure on elected officials, which gives Metro staff the
necessary support to enforce the agreement with the contractors (Interview with Respondents 1, 2 and 3).
Metro staff report that they encourage communities to “help us get better” with implementation, by
providing information, directing potential workers and participating in this process (Interview with
Respondent 3). To this end, Metro emphasizes that it “takes our community groups seriously” as they have
important information that can enable Metro to do a better job implementing the PLA (Interview with
Respondent 1). As one Metro employee stated, “the community partners have insights that we can’t have,
just because we work here and we work in this building, we’re out there, we try to go out there, but they’re
out there every day…you won’t be successful, you won’t be, if you don’t engage your stakeholders”
(Interview with Respondent 1). In this way, Metro administrators emphasize that the community plays an
instrumental role in implementation, with essential resources that are necessary to improve information and
outcomes.
Community organizations have also come to impact the pre-apprenticeship process. Many
community organizations have pre-apprenticeship programs, and work with unions to ensure that they
identify and adequately prepare targeted candidates. As a result, community groups are critical to ensuring
that the target workforce possesses the necessary information and skills. Pre-apprenticeship programs
“identify and funnel workers” into the construction trades, and the trades are more willing to take on these
candidates, as they are perceived to be more likely to pursue a construction career over the long-term
(Interview with Respondents 1, 2 and 3). From this process, project labor agreements enable unions to
dispatch based on the targeted characteristics. Rather than proceeding in order down the out-of-work list,
from which unions refer workers onto jobsites, project labor agreements enable unions to prioritize targeted
216
individuals and refer disproportionate numbers of these workers onto the jobsites, to ensure that the policy
targets get met.
Throughout, community stakeholders have inserted themselves into implementation and have come
to drive this process. I illustrate this agreement structure in Figure 27.
Figure 27: Metro Project Labor Agreement Structure

As this diagram illustrates, Metro PLA implementation does not proceed simply from agreement,
but rather involves a partly collaborative, partly antagonistic process in which stakeholders interact to
implement outcomes. While each uses its direct and indirect influence during implementation to work
toward its goals, stakeholders remain mutually dependent, driven from leverage that originates from the
community, but largely rests with the oversight agency: the powerful Metro Board. The contractor retains an
incentive to meet the agreement goals to avoid penalties and be eligible for future contracts, primarily due to
the Metro Board’s willingness to assess penalties and reject future bids. The Metro Board’s interest, and
information, is a result of pressure from the community to produce community outcomes (Interview with
Negotiation
Stakeholders
Agreement Implementation

Agreement Negotiation
Negotiation
Outcomes

Implementation
Stakeholders
Tools
Community
Building and
Construction Trades
Metro Agency
Metro Board of
Directors
Metro PLA
(signed by Metro
and Building
Trades)
Community
Building and
Construction Trades
Motivations Implementation
Outcomes
Community
benefits
Seeks to represent
constituency and
gain support
Pressure on Metro
Board through
lobbying, media,
monitoring
Contractors
Worker hiring
Outcomes
Benefits Metro
through public
perception
Secure jobs
for union
members
Community
and project
support
Metro Board of
Directors
Metro Agency
Potentially benefits
community and unions
(depending on if hiring
outcomes are met)
Penalties for
noncompliance;
reporting
Formal oversight
with penalties,
required reporting,
future contracts
217
Respondents 3, 4, 10 and 11). This structure does not mean that implementation proceeds smoothly and
without effort, or that all individuals involved are satisfied with this process. Rather, it suggests that all
stakeholders have their incentives aligned so as to work to produce the promised community outcomes, and
are held accountable to this objective. For this reason, all stakeholders remain committed to producing
community outcomes: actual jobs for targeted community members.
Since the contractor and subcontractors are motivated to hire disadvantaged workers, they can work
with the unions and the jobs coordinator, whose sole role is to help refer and retain targeted workers, to
ensure that these workers are referred. In this way, when each stakeholder has “skin in the game,” either
from an interest in local hiring or from vulnerability to backlash if outcomes do not materialize, stakeholders
can work together to promote implementation by identifying, referring and supporting targeted workers.
This process can ensure that eligible workers gain access to long-term careers, rather remaining overlooked,
or only having temporary opportunities (Interview with Respondents 1, 6, 9, 10 and 11).
Importantly, some stakeholders do not depend on local workers getting hired to achieve the goals
that drove them to create the agreement initially. Metro, as an agency, largely achieved its original objective
of improving its community image from PLA approval, before it produced any outcomes. Public reporting
has characterized this PLA as an overwhelming success, such that the casual observer would likely perceive
that Metro has achieved the agreement outcomes simply by approving the agreement. Just after the PLA
was approved, then-Los Angeles Mayor and Metro board Chairman Antonio Villaraigosa stated, "This
landmark program is part of a strategy to deliver public transit projects while creating jobs that will lift
people out of poverty and into the middle class" (Weikel, 2012). The high-profile Los Angeles Times and local
news outlets ran 33 articles in total, 13 of which primarily focus on the Metro PLA as a major victory for the
community, through local job creation and infrastructure investment (Nelson, 2014; Miller, 2013; Streeter,
2013; Griffin, 2012; Weikel, 2012). Further, the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Transportation have
both visibly promoted the Metro PLA as a national model that achieves local hire, which should be
replicated nationally (Foxx, 2015; Ubaldo, 2014).
218
Regardless, the community continues to pressure Metro to produce outcomes by threatening this
public image. Metro’s responsiveness to community perception was demonstrated in an early incident that
arose around jobs forecasts for the project. Initial reports indicated that the Crenshaw Line would produce
18,000 jobs, when in reality the number is closer to only a few hundred new jobs, since most work will
benefit individuals already employed in construction (Hymon, 2014; Sulaiman, 2013; Interview with
Respondent 3). This difference occurs partially because project labor agreements allow some jobs to be
directly routed to “core workers” who traditionally shift between sites but permanently work with a given
contractor or subcontractor, to enable contractors to rely on trusted employees (Hymon, 2014; Metro,
2014c; Interview with Respondent 24). It also included spillover jobs not directly in construction, as well as
work performed by people already in the industry. However, elected officials highly publicized that the
investment would produce 18,000 jobs despite that this is a very misleading figure, and it gained traction
with the media (Hymon, 2014; Sulaiman, 2013; Interview with Respondent 3). Due to this political
overpromise, many community residents believed that this work would produce jobs for everyone in the
community. Metro respondents expressed frustration at how elected officials characterized job creation, and
noted that agency staff continues to work to overcome the suspicion that this action generated in the
community about these jobs. For the Crenshaw community, the disputed number contributes to ongoing
institutional mistrust, and this incident remains a source of contention between the community and Metro
(Hymon, 2014; Sulaiman, 2013; Interview with Respondents 2, 3, 4 and 8).
In a related concern, Metro has sought to reduce community concern that local residents may not be
working on the project, or that those who are working are invisible. As community respondents noted,
worker visibility is an end in itself, as it matters that this historically marginalized African American
community, with deep institutional mistrust, “sees itself” in this large-scale, public, local project (Interview
with Respondent 8; personal communication, July 23, 2015). While Metro contends that many local workers
are on the project but working underground, the watchdog organization’s efforts to monitor African
American worker hiring on the Crenshaw Line project remain valued within this community. As this
219
community respondent clarified, this is an issue of community residents being empowered to identify
problems, express them to their representatives, be heard, and witness change because of their actions. As
one individual said,
“We’re taxpayers just like everybody else, but our voice gets drowned out by the Westside and the
Valley and folks who have had institutional access to power at City Hall for a lot longer than we
have… It comes down to: this is our community, you’re literally tearing up our streets where we drive
everyday, where we walk everyday. We need to see our workers, who have been historically pushed
out of the trades for many, many reasons, some of them have to do with Metro, a lot of them don’t,
but we need to see our workers on these jobs. And we need to see community benefit because we,
just us, we are going to struggle through this five-year project. You know? We need to be able to
have enough power at these places to say this is what we need, and to see response. We all have
enough power to walk into a public meeting and say what we want to say, but are people paying
attention? Are people actually taking our voices to be important enough to actually evaluate how
they’re doing and to say: we can make a change here” (Interview with Respondent 8).

This comment illustrates the underlying inequality, largely exacerbated by local institutions, that this
agreement seeks to ameliorate. However, achieving this objective requires genuine community influence
over the Metro and the contractor’s behavior, to ensure real accountability in the development process.
To promote disadvantaged worker visibility, Metro posted large posters at light-rail construction
sites along major roads in late 2014. Those posters promote Metro’s successes at hiring and training
underrepresented local workers (see Figures 27 and 28). Metro staff members contend that the agency
installed the posters at one of its largest construction sites on the project to meet this community concern
and increase worker visibility on Metro projects. Metro staff clarify that this action was intended to
“multiply the effect” of worker hiring, and increase visibility, particularly for African American workers. The
female worker in the photo, LeDaya Epps, has become a public examplar of hiring success on the project.
Epps was invited to the State of the Union, and the Secretary of Transportation has highlighted her story
publicly (Foxx, 2015; Kirkham, 2015).
The impact of these posters and visibility efforts remains undetermined. There is an obvious
performative aspect to these posters, which signal that the project, and Metro’s work generally, only
provides benefits, and not costs, to both the built environment and Crenshaw residents. These posters
therefore obscure the real conflicts that have characterized this agreement, its implementation and the
220
outcomes that continue to materialize, and the community lacks a similar public platform upon which to
dispute this narrative. At the same time, these posters demonstrate the power that the community has
generated over Metro which, in response, took substantial, public action to attempt to alleviate community
concern. Metro’s response underscores how the community has influenced Metro’s behavior and the
implementation process (Interview with Respondent 3).
Figures 28 and 29: Metro Construction Site Billboards

Photo by the author

Photo by the author
221

Further, Walsh-Shea invited the referent community organization to enter jobsites on the Crenshaw
Line, observe working conditions and more easily observe hiring outcomes (Interview with Respondent 10).
This action is quite significant and rare on construction sites, and demonstrates the extent to which
community pressure has increased transparency and altered behavior by both Metro and the business
community (Interview with Respondents 3 and 10). As the contractor clarified, this action was really about
“controlling the message” and letting the community get a better sense of construction work and these jobs
sites (Interview with Respondent 10).
Regardless of Metro’s primary motivation, other stakeholders have shifted their focus so that Metro
retains a vested interest in implementation, through pressure on the Metro Board and the agency, to
encourage the agency to similarly pressure contractors and the unions to produce outcomes. Primarily, the
community continues to monitor and enforce the PLA, so as to continually question the agency and drive it
to protect its reputation within the community. This effort has translated to Metro’s changing practices.
Representatives from Metro and Walsh-Shea both noted that they invited the community organization to
enter jobsites on the Crenshaw Line, observe working conditions and more easily observe hiring outcomes.
Metro has also altered reporting in response to community concern, though conflict persists about this issue
(Interview with Respondents 1, 3 and 10). Further, informed by the community, the Metro Board has taken
a lead on encouraging enforcement, and regularly questions the prime contractor during its monthly
meetings (Interview with Respondents 3 and 10). In this way, Metro staff members have pressure from both
top-down and bottom-up actors, driving them to produce PLA outcomes.
This case study offers evidence that when all stakeholders have their incentives aligned so as to
produce community outcomes, both prior to and subsequent to consensus, these agreements can produce the
community outcomes they promise. However, it is difficult to ensure that everyone retains a vested interest
on community outcomes over the implementation period unless these agreements are structured carefully;
and even in the most ideal scenarios, such as the Metro PLA, implementation remains a fragile and difficult
process. Throughout, consensus on the original agreement in no way ensures that stakeholders will work to
222
promote all the promised outcomes, and particularly community outcomes. In the Metro PLA case, the
community has emerged in a watchdog role, to put indirect pressure on agreement administrators and the
oversight agency, to ensure that all parties stay focused on the promised community outcomes via their
influence on the elected officials on the Metro Board of Directors.
Thus, while community stakeholders lack the ability to directly produce outcomes, they retain
considerable, albeit indirect, influence during implementation. This case demonstrates that actions by
community representatives can be very effective when carefully undertaken, as community groups have
effectively leveraged their political influence and developed relationships with Metro administrators and the
County Supervisors on the Metro Board of Directors, and channeled it toward increasing their influence
over PLA implementation. They have gained access to work sites for observations, influenced PLA
reporting, and motivated stakeholders with direct power to produce their desired outcomes. As a result, the
Metro PLA has hired far more Black workers than other projects, though apprenticeship and female hiring
goals still lag. Through their efforts, community stakeholders have created a somewhat adversarial, but
productive, relationship with other stakeholders, including Metro staff and board members, such that all
stakeholders recognize the community as an influential and beneficial participant in implementation, one
that enhances outcomes. As a result of this combined effort, the project has achieved unprecedented
outcomes for Black workers in Los Angeles. As one respondent noted, “There is nowhere in L.A., on no
project in Los Angeles, where there is that percentage of African Americans working on a project”
(Interview with Respondent 6).

223
Chapter 9

IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS:
Project Labor Agreements

The Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority Project Labor Agreement evidence starkly different implementation processes, but
both similarly illustrate how stakeholder incentives can shift after consensus and generate conflict during
implementation. The Los Angeles case, however, shows how savvy, vested community stakeholders, with
the resources to generate leverage over other stakeholders, can keep all parties focused on producing
community outcomes. In deep contrast to the Seattle case, the Los Angeles case provides the most ideal
accountability structure during implementation of those explored in this dissertation, as the community has
effectively exerted pressure to ensure that all stakeholders retain the incentive to produce community
outcomes, even after some have achieved the goals that drove them to original consensus. In other words,
the community has driven implementation so as to ensure that stakeholders maintain reciprocity—despite
their individual shifting interests—throughout implementation, such that this agreement is producing most
of the promised outcomes. However, even under the ideal Los Angeles case, accountability is incredibly
fragile and the burden on community stakeholders is significant, to maintain the necessary pressure to
ensure that all parties remain motivated to produce community outcomes.
In both cases, stakeholder interactions are characterized by reciprocity during agreement
deliberation, and community stakeholders participate in an influential role. Even in the Yesler Terrace case,
in which residents, the intended beneficiary of the Yesler Terrace agreement, did not participate in
agreement deliberation, community organizations played an important, driving role. These cases illustrate
how, during agreement formulation, community stakeholders possess significant leverage through their
relationships with and lobbying of elected officials, who seek to appear responsive to their constituents.
Respondents noted repeatedly that community stakeholders effectively advanced their interests through
224
union-community partnerships and by lobbying elected officials, particularly if they held strong relationships
with these decision-makers. The community and labor unions both recognize this influence, and use it to
advance these agreements. The agencies also depend on other stakeholders in order gain agreement
approval. Therefore, even though the community is not a signatory to project labor agreements, community
representatives are important stakeholders to these agreements.
However, after consensus, these cases show how the interests and incentives of some stakeholders
can change, as their interactions are no longer characterized by reciprocity and they no longer exhibit mutual
dependence. After consensus, stakeholders who are not motivated to work to fully produce community
outcomes can move on, including disinterested elected officials, unions that do not care about improving
diversity, and agreement administrators constrained by resources or institutional commitment. In other
words, non-community stakeholders may achieve their original goals without community workforce
outcomes actually materializing. Contractors retain the most direct control over hiring outcomes, since they
directly hire workers. However, contractors are not involved in deliberation and therefore never exhibit
reciprocity, so it is unsurprising that, in both cases, they are motivated primarily from their own interests
rather than to produce community outcomes. In this way, stakeholder interests can shift away from
reciprocity after consensus, as stakeholders remain primarily motivated to achieve their own interests, rather
than producing all outcomes delineated in the agreement.
This shifting incentive of other stakeholders can particularly impact community outcomes, as
community stakeholders must rely on other stakeholders (including contractors and unions) to directly
produce the outcomes they seek. In other words, other stakeholders mediate between the community and
the outcomes produced, such that community control over outcomes remains indirect. While indirect
community influence can effectively alter implementation, this is contingent on other stakeholders being
vulnerable to their pressure, and community stakeholders remaining vigilant throughout implementation.
Rather, community influence over other stakeholders appears to decline as the agreement transitions
to implementation, and as the interests of other stakeholders shift away from consensus. Community
225
stakeholders lose influence over unions, since unions no longer need the community to advocate for the
agreement and project to elected officials. During implementation, union interests shift toward union
worker hiring rather the community hiring, such that union stakeholders are not necessarily motivated to
produce community outcomes. The agreement administrator and elected officials also do not necessarily
remain vested in producing community outcomes or maintaining vigilance, either, unless elected officials
have taken a strong leadership role to push for community benefits, such as Los Angeles County Supervisor
Mark Ridley-Thomas. In the Los Angeles case, elected officials such as Ridley-Thomas have taken a strong
lead in pushing for enforcement via the Metro Board. This strong oversight role appears to derive partially
from their responsiveness to community pressure and partly from their intentional leadership, as Ridley-
Thomas explicitly sought to ensure that Metro becomes more responsive to the community. Throughout,
this accountability structure is incredibly fragile, contingent on dedicated public officials, agency staff with
institutional support and community stakeholders that have developed key relationships.
Regardless, as the co-enforcement literature suggests, evidence indicates that the community can
meaningfully impact implementation through an indirect role, and alter the behavior of other stakeholders
to their benefit. In the Metro case, Metro staff repeatedly stressed that community relationships with the
Metro Board give staff members the support to push for outcomes from the unions and contractors.
Further, the Metro PLA case demonstrates that community stakeholders can gain additional leverage by not
leaving enforcement to the oversight committee, and by taking on a watchdog role. Individuals from Metro,
contractors and the community reported that community enforcement improved implementation, by
providing on-the-ground reports and unique information, giving actors the political backing to push for
outcomes to materialize, and fostering connections between other stakeholders and the community,
including the targeted population. The community drove the formulation process, and remains mobilized
and committed to implementation. As a result, community groups won major concessions, including access
to worksites for monitoring, additional and altered reporting, and outcomes have improved over time. In
the Yesler Terrace case, the community is not acting as a watchdog, and is therefore not driving
226
implementation in the same way. The intended beneficiaries, Yesler Terrace residents, were not active in
agreement formulation, and are similarly absent during implementation. Thus, community stakeholders are
not driving implementation in the transformative, grassroots way that has become apparent in the Los
Angeles case. However, this community vigilance comes at a cost, including significant time, money,
technical expertise and effort. For this reason, it remains problematic to leave enforcement to the
community, since they act from an inherent resource disadvantage.
Further, indirect influence as an implementation watchdog is fundamentally different from
possessing direct control over implementation. In Los Angeles, community stakeholders sought, and were
able to gain leverage and use it to influence implementation without an official role in oversight. In this
capacity, community stakeholders rely on other stakeholders to act in their interests to achieve their desired
objectives, and thus have little direct control over ensuring that outcomes materialize. Rather, they are left to
indirect strategies, mediated by other stakeholders, to achieve their goals, including lobbying elected officials.
Further, in the absence of an organized, motivated, sufficiently resourced community, there is no real
guarantee that community outcomes will materialize, such as in the case of Yesler Terrace. In the Yesler
Terrace case, community residents were more focused on avoiding displacement than capturing jobs from
the redevelopment, and therefore have not participated in this agreement. This implies that for agreements
to achieve community development, the community may need to see these opportunities as a means by
which they want to develop.
Beyond shifting incentives, whether the agreement is formal and includes penalties also influences
stakeholder accountability during implementation. In the Metro PLA case, the agreement administrator can
sanction the general contractor, which many report is a significant incentive to get the general contractor to
promote compliance internally and among the subcontractors. However, for Yesler Terrace, the Section 3
Advisory Committee can only really shame the contractor, or threaten to reject future contracts. Thus, even
if Yesler Terrace community stakeholders, such as residents or community organizations, actively pushed
for implementation, the contractor would still not incur penalties, or have incentives withheld. In this way,
227
the contractor can present a significant barrier to implementation, and the community cannot directly force
them to alter their behavior, since they are not responsible for assessing penalties (if the agreement includes
penalties) and do not select contractors for projects. However, contractors do remain vulnerable to indirect
community pressure if it can jeopardize future contracts and create bad publicity (Interview with
Respondents 10 and 11).
The threat of eligibility for future contracts is much greater in the Metro agreement case, since this
agreement concerns a larger scale than just one project, and thus future, lucrative contracts are at stake
during agreement implementation. The implications of developing a poor relationship with Metro are quite
significant, as the contractor would likely not be competitive for future Metro contracts, which are large and
numerous. The threat of eligibility for future contracts offers a significant incentive to produce community
outcomes, since it would be a poor business strategy to alienate future revenue sources, and Metro has
demonstrated an interest in whether community outcomes materialize. In contrast, the Yesler Terrace CWA
is episodic and only applies to the Yesler Terrace redevelopment, and unions appear unlikely to pursue
another CWA with the Seattle Housing Authority. Moreover, the Seattle Housing Authority engages in
redevelopment only infrequently, such that the threat of developing a bad relationship with the agency, and
thus imperiling competitiveness for future bids, appears to be far less of a deterrent. This concern is further
diminished by the fact that SHA does not have enough bidders on these projects.
Based on lessons from these case studies, I illustrate an ideal project labor agreement structure in
Figure 30, which shows many important similarities to the Los Angeles case. The community drives both
deliberation and implementation, with a responsive oversight body that has formal oversight over the
agency and the ability to penalize noncompliance. Agency staff, therefore, is directed from its oversight
body to pursue implementation, can threaten contractors with penalties to ensure accountability, and has
sufficient expertise in administration to problem-solve as implementation proceeds. With this structure in
place, it is not necessarily problematic that the agency and public officials can realize their goals at
228
consensus, far before community outcomes materialize, since all stakeholders maintain a strong incentive to
continue to work to produce community outcomes throughout implementation.
Figure 30: Ideal Project Labor Agreement Structure

Without structural factors in place to ensure implementation, including third party administration
and the ability to fine noncompliance, implementation often comes down to a personal commitment by
individuals engaged in implementation. While these efforts can still prove successful—the cases are
dominated by stakeholders dedicated to this work and committed producing outcomes—this structure does
not systematically guarantee that implementation will occur. Outcomes can still be good when people who
buy into the process. However, as a means to use these agreements to ensure lasting community
development, institutional change and economic justice, these efforts appear significantly limited and
vulnerable to changing institutional priorities and personnel shifts.
Negotiation
Stakeholders
Agreement Implementation

Agreement Negotiation
Negotiation
Outcomes

Implementation
Stakeholders
Tools
Community (including
beneficiaries)
Construction unions
Agency
Agreement
(signed by
agency and
unions)
Building and
Construction Trades
Motivations Implementation
Outcomes
Community
benefits
Seeks to represent
constituency and
gain their support
Contractors
Worker Hiring
Outcomes
Potentially benefits
community and unions
(depending on how hiring
outcomes are met)
Benefits agency and
public officials (and
potentially unions)
through public
perception
Jobs for
union
members;
community
relationships
Facilitate redevelopment
projects; maintain good
relationships with
populations it represents
and public
Agency and/or third-
party administrator
Pressure through
lobbying, media,
monitoring (with
sufficient
resources)
Oversight body
(including responsive
elected officials
Community (including
beneficiaries)
Oversight body
(including responsive
elected officials)
Penalties for
noncompliance, with
sufficient expertise in
administration
Formal oversight
with penalties
229
The Yesler Terrace CWA also demonstrates that an agreement has to be viable to begin with,
particularly since project labor agreements require significant expertise and resources for effective
implementation. In this case, the beneficiary group may not provide a large enough labor pool from which
to draw sufficient numbers of workers, to meet the agreement goals. Project labor agreement
implementation requires that agreement administrators possess the necessary incentive, expertise and
capacity to implement the agreement; this can occur through community enforcement, idiosyncratic factors
such as a personal commitment by implementation agents to outcomes, or a well-structured agreement that
ensures accountability, such that all stakeholders have a genuine dependence on outcomes materializing
throughout implementation.
That project labor agreements and implementation constitute essentially ad hoc efforts is a
significant problem for the intended beneficiaries of such agreements. In sum, these agreements lack
systematic structures for implementation, including levers that ensure broad stakeholder participation in
implementation. For this reason, many labor and community stakeholders in both Seattle and Los Angeles
cited the importance of third party administration and/or oversight, to ensure that external parties that
retain only a vested interest in outcomes materializing retain significant control over the implementation
process (Interview with Respondents 8, 16, 20 and 21; personal communication, July 23, 2015). Third
parties can be more likely to assess penalties, since they do not face institutional harm from this action.
However, they may face potential capture by the stakeholder funding their efforts; penalties can often hurt
the project administrator, either by driving up costs, delaying the project or harming relationships (Interview
with Respondent 18). Such an implementation structure could occur through third party administration or
internal administration with an oversight committee that has real power to keep implementation actors
engaged, such as the ability to assess penalties. Both structures serve the same purpose, which is to ensure
agency accountability, in which an actor empowered during implementation has tools and the motivation to
protect the agreement beneficiaries, with or without their direct participation.
230
Ad hoc administration procedures can make implementation difficult, since stakeholders have to
learn how to implement each agreement. In this way, third party administration may be more efficient, since
it allows stakeholders to rely on experts in project labor agreement implementation, just as professional
consultants are frequently brought in to negotiate PLAs in the first place (Interview with Respondents 21
and 24). Community stakeholders across cases advocated for third-party administration since, in theory, a
third-party administrator has an interest in seeing all outcomes materialize, including community workforce
provisions. Thus, third-party administration ensures that community interests are represented during
implementation. Further, PLA implementation requires a substantial effort and process expertise, including
worker referral, troubleshooting, coordinating with government agencies, unions, community groups and
construction firms, as well as monitoring and enforcement. While the costs obviously vary between
agreements and settings, many respondents reported that third-party administrators can operate at a higher
efficiency sufficient to equalize their additional cost (Interview with Respondents 18 and 21). In contrast,
small agencies with limited staff can struggle with agreement implementation, unless they happen to possess
significant expertise or are given sufficient resources. As many stakeholders cautioned, there is a significant
“learning curve” to PLA implementation (Interview with Respondents 14 and 1).
As large-scale urban development projects abound across the country, with significant impacts for
community residents and organizations, project labor agreements are becoming increasingly common as a
means to ensure that local residents and businesses benefit from the economic development opportunities
created. However, implementation varies dramatically between projects, with significant implications for
agreement outcomes. In these project labor agreement chapters, I presented two case studies to examine
implementation and the outcomes produced by these agreements. These cases demonstrate that the
community tends to lack direct control over outcomes, and is relegated to an indirect, though potentially
important role in implementation. However, this structure implies that these agreements require
accountability measures in place to ensure that stakeholders remain vested in producing community
outcomes subsequent to consensus, despite their frequently shifting individual incentives. Such
231
accountability can include a watchdog effort by community stakeholders, as in the Los Angeles case, though
this comes at significant cost for under-resourced community residents and organizations.

232
Chapter 10

CONCLUSIONS

In an era of increasing economic inequality, investment is flooding into cities, including large-scale
urban development projects in historically disinvested areas. These projects, such as the Mercedes-Benz
stadium in Atlanta, the Park East redevelopment in Milwaukee, the Yesler Terace Redevelopment project in
Seattle, and the LAX-Crenshaw Line in Los Angeles, as well as many other multi-million and billion-dollar
projects throughout the nation, are changing the face of American cities. These projects are intended to
transform the communities that have held these cities together during long periods of public and private
disinvestment, but also risk community harm through gentrification and displacement. In this context,
community residents and advocates remain concerned that these projects will worsen urban inequality by
benefitting the wealthy, rather than the impoverished residents who have long struggled to attract jobs,
businesses and amenities to their communities. At the same time, however, these projects represent a
significant potential opportunity, by bringing long-sought investment into communities that desperately
need resources.
In recognition of this opportunity and community vulnerability to adjacent development,
community residents, and organizations on behalf of residents, have begun to leverage their influence within
the development process to demand benefits from adjacent development projects. These community
development agreements have recently proliferated to facilitate development and distribute some project
benefits to local, historically marginalized residents. Community development agreements exist within a
larger land use history in which local government has required developers to offset related expenses. Over
time, local government and developers created development agreements, to use local development projects
to secure public benefits in exchange for reduced risk in the development process. Community development
agreements represent the latest version of land use agreements, but depart from previous examples due to
the consequential introduction of the local community as a recognized and important stakeholder.
233
Increasingly, community activists are using benefits redistribution agreements as a central mechanism in
their efforts to ensure equitable development. Organizations such as those within the Partnership for
Working Families, for example, employ benefits distributions as a central part of their strategy to promote
equity and foster community development.
And yet, agreement approval is only one step toward ensuring that the promised community
benefits materialize. While existing research on consensus building has largely ignored the implementation
process, in which these agreements confer real benefits for community residents, the case studies presented
here reveal that how implementation occurs can determine whether, and how, communities receive the
benefits they have asked for from new development projects. This dissertation research illustrates that
implementation occurs in an ad hoc fashion, yet reveals patterns that lend insight into how implementation
occurs, who controls this process, and identifies factors that contribute to whether and how benefits get
delivered, or fail to get delivered, to community stakeholders.
In contrast to how planning traditionally views policies generated through stakeholder deliberation
and consensus, these cases indicate that, despite consensus, stakeholders have differing resolve and
capability to generate the promised community benefits, and as a result, the implementation process can
become contested and produce partial outcomes. Some stakeholders achieve their desired goals simply
through the perception that community benefits will be delivered, by signing the agreement, or being
allowed to proceed with development. Still others may want the intended community benefits to be
produced, but have little incentive to work with other stakeholders to overcome the (often significant)
barriers that emerge during implementation. In such cases, stakeholder incentives can shift before and after
consensus, such that some stakeholders may not be driven to work to deliver the promised community
benefits, jeopardizing any gain by the community. Even for committed parties, the process of distributing
benefits and monitoring outcomes, such targeted worker hiring, remains difficult to achieve. As such, non-
community stakeholders, who do not directly benefit from the community outcomes, need to have a
234
consistent incentive to deliver community benefits throughout implementation, and the resources to be able
to do so, in order to maintain reciprocity and to produce community outcomes.
Therefore, community outcomes are among the last outcomes that the agreement delivers, and
community stakeholders are the most vulnerable to their outcomes not materializing. As the case studies
demonstrate, community stakeholders may have little direct control over the outcomes that they were
promised and so desperately need. In such cases, community stakeholders depend upon others to provide
information and to act to promote community interests.
And yet, organized communities are not without power during implementation. Rather, the case
studies indicate that savvy, invested and persistent community stakeholders have leverage to bring other
stakeholders back to the table, to deliver on their promises and ensure that community outcomes
materialize. This leverage largely occurs through the community’s ability to use the media to expose and
shame noncompliant stakeholders, particularly developers and local government, who have a vested interest
in preserving their public reputation or gaining access to future contracts. The Los Angeles case study
provides the most ideal example of agreement implementation, as the community has worked to ensure that
other stakeholders’ incentives hinge on the delivery of community outcomes, and are penalized if the
agreement does not produce the promised community outcomes.
However, community watchdog efforts place a significant burden on community stakeholders, since
community monitoring and enforcement requires the resources and energy to be vigilant and effective, to
gain the necessary information to track implementation, and make their voices heard. By leaving the
community to monitor and enforce agreements, the burden of compliance is placed onto communities that,
by definition, lack resources. Stakeholders with a less vested interest in benefits delivery or those without the
ability to maintain their efforts throughout implementation may leave the process, including some
community stakeholders. For example, while organizations within the Partnership for Working Families
have a hand in each of these agreements, there was no evidence to indicate that any of these organizations
was present during implementation. One community stakeholder in Los Angeles speculated that this can be
235
attributed to little funding for implementation work, which is less appealing to private foundations and
grantors (Interview with Respondent 8). This demonstrates that even for highly motivated community
interests, the burden of watchdog, unfunded monitoring efforts remain potentially insurmountable. At the
same time, this research demonstrates a pressing need for systematic implementation, including third-party
monitoring, to ensure that all parties remain accountable to community outcomes delivery.
To this end, leadership from elected officials, such as Los Angeles County Supervisor Mark Ridley-
Thomas, can prove transformative when community stakeholders lack the ability to directly produce their
intended outcomes or assess financial penalties for noncompliance. In the Los Angeles case, community
leverage has motivated other stakeholders to remain focused on community outcomes, but this leverage
hinges on the responsiveness of the elected officials on the Metro Board of Directors, including Supervisor
Ridley-Thomas, to community pressure. Elected officials that are not similarly vested in community
outcomes or responsive to community pressure, such as then-Milwaukee County Executive and current
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, with national ambitions that hinge on support from business and pro-
growth interests, may not act to promote community interests, which can reduce community leverage over
implementation. While the Milwaukee community continues to benefit from support from the County
Board of Supervisors, the antagonistic political context in Wisconsin has made it very difficult for
community stakeholders to secure benefits, both on paper and materially, through agreement
implementation. Elected officials in Atlanta have similarly prioritized growth interests over community
representation. This has produced weaker community influence during agreement implementation and
undermined community outcomes, as elected officials have not proven responsive to community pressure,
and acted directly counter to the interests expressed by community residents. In this way, leadership from
elected officials, and their responsiveness to constituents can constitute a key lever to ensure that
communities have leverage during implementation and that their outcomes materialize.
These cases also show that throughout the nation, there are dedicated people in local government
and private companies that are working to ensure that benefits are delivered. Many individuals are
236
committed to implementation because they believe that inclusive, equitable development is the right thing to
do, though they have little professional incentive to promote implementation. However, in such instances,
these actors are not bound to delivering outcomes, so while they may do their best, there is no guarantee
that the outcomes will meet expectations, or that they enjoy the institutional support often necessary for
outcomes delivery. Further, such idiosyncratic personal characteristics do not systematically ensure that
communities will receive the promised benefits. Rather, this structure illustrates just how fragile community
development implementation can be in practice.
For this reason, this research demonstrates that actors engaged in community development
agreement formulation need to think systematically about implementation so as to ensure that all
stakeholders retain the incentive, throughout agreement formulation and implementation, to act as stewards
for community outcomes. It is not sufficient to rely on good actors to deliver outcomes when it is not in
their professional interest to do so, or when they have to fight their institutional missions, because this
agreement structure does not systematically ensure that implementation will occur across agreement
contexts. This is particularly true since delivering community benefits remains quite difficult; for example, it
is difficult to target potential workers for future jobs and direct them through training programs to gain the
necessary skills. Such efforts require immense coordination between all the actors involved, and a dedicated
commitment to work together to overcome the challenges that necessarily arise during implementation.
However, a legally-binding, formal agreement can make systematic implementation more likely, particularly
if these agreements include incentives and/or penalties, to ensure that all stakeholders maintain reciprocity
and the incentive to produce community outcomes both prior to and subsequent to consensus. In contrast,
voluntary agreements are unlikely to systematically ensure that stakeholders remain committed to producing
community outcomes after consensus, when reciprocity erodes and stakeholder incentives shift.
The cases presented here indicate that better outcomes may result when implementation includes
individuals solely dedicated to this end, who possess sufficient resources, including expertise, institutional
support, dedicated time and real-time tracking technology, to track outcomes as they materialize. In so
237
doing, a party emerges with a vested interest in implementation, but also with the ability to observe
outcomes as they occur and alter conditions to improve implementation while there is still time to improve
outcomes. Further, this agreement administrator can develop relationships with community stakeholders,
who have unique resources to assist and inform implementation. This requirement suggests that either third
party implementation, or staff dedicated explicitly to implementation with strong oversight, expertise and
institutional support, the latter of which is generally more feasible on larger projects that warrant such an
investment. Throughout, however, this circumstance indicates that parties involved in formulation must
consider the agreement implementation structure, process and expectations before the agreement gets signed.
This process must ensure that all actors must have a direct or indirect interest in community benefits
actually materializing both prior to and subsequent to consensus.
The delivery of the material community benefits promised by community development agreements
is incredibly important. Failed benefits delivery to community stakeholders does not just constitute a missed
opportunity for community development, or wasted time and resources. Rather, by not delivering the
promised benefits to communities, planning risks contributing to ongoing harm that residents face, and may
further marginalize vulnerable communities. The Los Angeles case sheds insight into the tokenism that
planning can produce if these agreements do not achieve outcomes, as some stakeholders began to promote
the narrative that the agreement was a success long before any worker was hired onto the project. In the
Atlanta case, the failed planning process around the Georgia Dome project remains acutely present, as local
government and outsiders retain harmful perceptions about community members that drives their top-down
approach to community investment.
As community organizations and residents focus attention on equitable development, scholars need
to consider the implications of this model, under which the realization of community benefits hinges not on
need but on opportunity, which depends upon real estate demand. The Milwaukee case, in particular,
demonstrates the risk for communities that is associated with leaving community development outcomes
dependent upon a strong real estate market: with fluctuations, the benefits get delayed or may never
238
materialize. For vulnerable communities that work to achieve and need community benefits, economic
downturns then pose an additional threat, beyond those posed by economic hardship generally. Rather,
when you tie community development to economic growth, community development agreements cannot
move past cyclical investment and disinvestment in disadvantaged communities. For this reason, it remains
crucial to continually recognize that community development agreements should not come at the expense of
other forms of investment in communities. Community development agreements are only one, potentially
impactful but inherently limited community development tool, which seeks to ensure that wealth-generating
development projects share some prosperity with local community members.
As Haas (2012) describes, community development agreements were initially designed to produce
“community control over development, a goal that resides in a larger human rights development framework we call
urban land reform—a people-centered development framework that establishes a right to the city for all” (p.
273, emphasis mine). Activists envisioned a tool that activated community power to generate sufficient
leverage over developers that the community would have control over local development—not just token
participation or minor input, but the ability to fundamentally direct local development. These cases
demonstrate that community development agreements fall far short of that ideal for significant power
redistributions in urban development. As critiques of deliberative governance suggest, local development is
still dominated by growth and capital interests, and communities lack the ability to reject an unwanted
development or to fundamentally alter developments to their advantage, unless growth interests so consent.
Community development agreements fit within, and do not fundamentally threaten, the existing neoliberal
paradigm. Community development agreements are an important land use innovation, and can confer
important benefits, but they have not fundamentally altered who controls development, and to what end.
Regardless, the Los Angeles case in particular demonstrates how community development
agreements can generate important opportunities for historically disinvested, local communities and
residents to share in the benefits produced by large-scale urban development projects. The marginal benefits
promised by community development agreements may be the best that community activists can do under
239
the neoliberal status quo, an urban political context in which community participation is used to give the
appearance of democratic decision-making, and thus co-opted to promote capital interests. In this way,
community development agreements promise only incremental changes for communities, but these benefits
can prove consequential for disadvantaged residents and communities that desperately need resources.
Throughout, it remains essential to view these agreements against the counterfactual of the existing urban
political context, in which low-income residents risk experiencing only harm from adjacent development, in
the form of gentrification and displacement. In this light, community development agreements present an
important opportunity for disadvantaged residents to secure access to critical resources; however
incremental these benefits may appear, they may an important improvement over the counterfactual.
This perspective only underscores that stakeholder behavior subsequent to consensus, during
implementation, remains a crucial stage for the delivery of community benefits. Therefore, an important role
for planners exists during implementation. Planners in community development organizations and public
agencies can steward implementation, to ensure that these agreements do more than produce tokenistic
deliberations and partial outcomes, but rather seek to stabilize communities facing significant threats and
future change. In this way, benefits that act as stabilizing forces (such as affordable housing, community
land trusts, job training and jobs for residents) may generate longer-lasting benefits for vulnerable residents
than benefits that could catalyze gentrification and act as amenities for future, wealthier residents (such as
parks and physical design improvements). As planning practice moves forward with benefits distribution
agreements, and scales this strategy to multiple projects, planners can use their unique position and expertise
to improve agreements and outcomes by ensuring that agreements are carefully structured so as to deliver
optimal benefits for vulnerable residents.
While it may seem too early to worry about gentrification in areas such as the impoverished Atlanta
Westside, these projects illustrate that growth interests have already identified the potential profit in these
communities, and large-scale community change appears inevitable. Even on the Atlanta Westside, where
community concerns currently focus on issues created by decades of disinvestment, gentrification lies just
240
on the horizon. Planners can foresee this future change, and use community development agreements to
enact local changes that protect community residents, to balance community investment and economic
growth with community development for existing residents. Such efforts will not produce the
transformational shifts originally envisioned by community development agreement innovators. However,
carefully crafted, formal agreements, with community benefits provisions that actually are delivered through
an implementation process in which all stakeholders retain accountability and an incentive to produce
community outcomes, can realize meaningful change for the intended community beneficiaries.

241
REFERENCES

11Alive Staff. (2013, September 25). No more broken promises for new Falcons stadium neighbors? WXIA
Atlanta. Retrieved from http://www.11alive.com/story/money/economy/2014/03/06/1948638/
Abram, S. A. (2000). Planning the public: Some comments on empirical problems for planning theory.
Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19, 351-357.
Alexander, E. R. (1998). Planning and implementation: Coordinative planning in practice. International
Planning Studies, 3(3), 303-320.
Archbold, H. (2014, January 15). Next steps: Transforming Atlanta's Westside Neighborhoods. Patch.
Retrieved from http://patch.com/georgia/cascade/next-steps-transforming-atlantas-westside-
neighborhoods
Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Planning Association, 35(4), 216-
224.
The Arthur M. Blank Foundation. (2014). 2014 Grants. Retrieved from http://blankfoundation.org/2014-
Grants
The Arthur M. Blank Foundation. (2015a). 2015 Grants. Retrieved from http://blankfoundation.org/2015-
Grants
The Arthur M. Blank Foundation. (2015b). Capacity building grants awarded to 45 Westside Atlanta
nonprofits through Westside Momentum initiative. Retrieved from
http://blankfoundation.org/sites/default/files/press-
releases/Westside%20Momentum_March192015.pdf
The Arthur M. Blank Foundation. (2015c). Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund - Capacity Building
Program. Retrieved from http://blankfoundation.org/westside-capacity-building-
program#sthash.tJ5j24lX.dpuf
The Arthur M. Blank Foundation. (2015d, March). Westside Works and the new Atlanta stadium are
changing lives. Newsletter Issue No. 41. Retrieved from
242
http://blankfoundation.org/sites/default/files/newsletters/AMBFF_Issue_No41_Mar2015.pdf
Atlanta City Council President Ceasar Mitchell. (2013, March 19). Atlanta City Council approves resolution
authorizing the use of the city’s hotel/motel tax revenues to partially fund a new professional sports
stadium. Retrieved from http://www.ceasarmitchell.com/73-atlanta-city-council-approves-
resolution-authorizing-the-use-of-the-city-s-hotel-motel-tax-revenues-to-partially-fund-a-new-
professional-sports-stadium
Atlanta Police Department. (2016). Find my zone. Retrieved from
http://www.atlantapd.org/findmyzone.aspx
Bakewell, D. J. (2012, July 12). Will Black political leaders deliver on the Crenshaw Line? Los Angeles Sentinel.
Retrieved from Proquest.
Barnebey, M. P., MacRostie, T., Schoennauer, G. J., Simpson, G. T., & Winters, J. (1988, Winter). Paying for
growth: Community approaches to development impact fees. Journal of the American Planning
Association, 18–28.
Baxamusa, M. H. (2008). Empowering communities through deliberation the model of community benefits
agreements. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 27(3), 261–276.
Bayatpour, A. J. (2015, September 24). Land sold to Bucks for $1 for arena project; but first, it must be
prepared for construction. Fox 6 News. Retrieved from http://fox6now.com/2015/09/24/land-in-
park-east-corridor-sold-to-bucks-for-1-for-arena-project-but-first-it-must-be-prepared-for-
construction/
Been, V. (1991). “Exit” as a constraint on land use exactions: Rethinking the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Columbia Law Review, 91(3), 473–545.
Been, V. (2010). Community benefits agreements: A new local government tool or another variation on the
exactions theme? University of Chicago Law Review, 77(1), 5-35.
Belman, D., & Bodah, M. M. (2010). “A Look at Best Practices for the Design of Project Labor
Agreements.” Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper, 274. Washington, D.C.
243
Bengs, C. (2005a). Planning theory for the naïve? European Journal of Spatial Development. Retrieved from
http://www.nordregio.se/global/ejsd/debate/debate050718.pdf
Bengs, C. (2005b, June). Time for a critique of planning theory? Nordic Centre for Spatial Development.
BizTimes Staff. (2015, July 8). Wangard plans redevelopment of former downtown Laacke & Joys site.
Milwaukee Business News. Retrieved from http://www.biztimes.com/2015/07/08/wangard-plans-
redevelopment-of-former-downtown-laacke-joys-site/
Black, D. (2013a, March 25). After 40 years, one resident looks to the future. KUOW. Retrieved from
http://kuow.org/post/after-40-years-yesler-terrace-one-resident-looks-future
Black, D. (2013b, January 13). From Profanity Hill to Yesler Terrace. KUOW. Retrieved from
http://kuow.org/post/profanity-hill-yesler-terrace
Blau, M. (2013a, August 26). Reed, English Avenue pastor spar over community benefits package for
neighborhoods near new Falcons stadium. Creative Loafing Atlanta. Retrieved from
http://clatl.com/freshloaf/archives/2013/08/26/reed-english-avenue-pastor-spar-over-
community-benefits-package-for-neighborhoods-near-the-new-falcons-stadium
Blau, M. (2013b, December 3). Council OKs community benefits plan for Falcons stadium neighborhoods.
Creative Loafing Atlanta. Retrieved from http://clatl.com/freshloaf/archives/2013/12/03/council-
oks-community-benefits-plan-for-falcons-stadium-neighborhoods
Bloomekatz, A. (2012, November 7). This just in. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/measure-j-la-county-transit-tax-extension-
fails.html
Bluestein, G., & Stafford, L. (2013, January 12). Falcons stadium will be a hard sell, legislators say. The
Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved from http://www.ajc.com/news/news/falcons-stadium-will-
be-a-hard-sell-legislators-sa/nTtWy/
Boarnet, M., & Crane, R. (1998). Public financing and transit-oriented planning: New evidence from
Southern California. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 17, 206-219.
244
Bond, S. (2011). Negotiating a ‘democratic ethos’: moving beyond the agnoistic-communicative divide.
Planning Theory, 10(2), 161-186.
Booher, D. E., & Innes, J. E. (2002). Network power in collaborative planning. Journal of Planning Education
and Research, 21, 221-236.
Bosselman, F. P., & Stroud, N. E. (1985). Mandatory tithes: The legality of land development linkage. Nova
Law Journal, 9, 381–412.
Brand, R., & Gaffikin, F. (2007). Collaborative planning in an uncollaborative world. Planning Theory, 6(3),
282-313.
Brown, C., & Gross, J. (2015). Facilitating local hire on transportation projects: A recommendation for the Surface
Transportation Authorization. Policylink.
Burns, R. (2013, March 13). It’s going to take more than $45 million* to help Vine City. Atlanta Magazine.
Retrieved from http://www.atlantamagazine.com/civilrights/its-going-to-take-more-than-45-
million-to-help-vine-city/
California Labor Commission. (2014). Public works manual. Retrieved from
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/PWManualCombined.pdf
California Voter Foundation. (1996). Proposition 209. Retrieved from
http://www.calvoter.org/voter/elections/archive/96gen/props/209.html
Callies, D. L., Curtin, D. J., & Tappendorf, J. A. (2003). Bargaining for development: A handbook on development
agreements, annexation agreements, land development conditions, vested rights, and the provision of public facilities.
Washington, D.C.: Environmental Law Institute.
Camacho, A. E. (2005). Mustering the missing voices: A collaborative model for fostering equality,
community involvement and adaptive planning in land use decisions. Stanford Environmental Law, 24,
3–69.
Camacho, A. E. (2013). Community benefits agreements: A symptom, not the antidote, of bilateral land use
regulation. Brooklyn Law Review, 78(2), 355–383.
245
Canon, R. G. (2014). Participatory democracy and the entrepreneurial government: Addressing process
efficiencies in the creation of land use development agreements. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 89(2), 781–
821.
Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation and mediation. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 43, 531-582.
Chimienti, E. A. (2010). Breaking down barriers, building up communities: Implementing project labor agreements with
targeted hiring goals. (Master’s thesis). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Chiuchiarelli, K. (2011, March 1). Past and future of Park East development. Marquette Wire. Retrieved from
http://marquettewire.org/3785513/tribune/tribune-featured/development-kw1-rp2-dac3/
City of Atlanta. (n.d.). A new stadium: An economic driver. Retrieved from
http://www.atlantaga.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=6824
City of Atlanta. (2013). Resolution 13-R-3783. Retrieved from
http://atlantacityga.iqm2.com/Citizens/Detail_LegiFile.aspx?MeetingID=1237&ID=3346
City of Milwaukee. (n.d.). Common Council. Retrieved from
http://city.milwaukee.gov/CommonCouncil#.VpXfGzbEiQc
City of Milwaukee. (2014, March 7). Downtown proposed, under construction and completed public and
private projects. Retrieved from
http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/cityDCD/DowntownMilwaukee/Development/
pdfs/3.7.14Projects.pdf
City of Seattle City Purchasing & Contracting. (n.d.). Labor equity in construction contracts. Retrieved from
http://www.seattle.gov/city-purchasing-and-contracting/social-equity/labor-equity
City of Seattle City Purchasing & Contracting. (2015a). Community workforce agreement. Retrieved from
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FAS/PurchasingAndContracting/Labor/Seattle
_CWA_final.pdf
City of Seattle City Purchasing & Contracting. (2015b). Labor Equity on the Elliot Bay Seawall Replacement
Project. Retrieved from
246
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FAS/PurchasingAndContracting/Labor/Seawal
lWorkforceDiversity201501.pdf
City of Seattle Department of Finance and Administration. (n.d.). Priority hire Implementation and
Advisory Committee Charter. Retrieved from
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FAS/PurchasingAndContracting/Labor/PHAC
-Charter-6.5.pdf
City of Seattle Legislative Information Service. (2015). Council Bill Number: 118282. Retrieved from
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~scripts/nph-
brs.exe?s1=&s3=118282&s4=&s2=&s5=&Sect4=AND&l=20&Sect2=THESON&Sect3=PLURO
N&Sect5=CBORY&Sect6=HITOFF&d=ORDF&p=1&u=%2F~public%2Fcbory.htm&r=1&f=G
Coomes, J. E. (1989). Practical concerns in drafting and negotiating development agreements. In D. R.
Porter & L. L. Marsh (Eds.), Development Agreements: Practice, Policy and Prospects (pp. 133–147).
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Land Institute.
Councilman Kwanza Hall. (2013). Why I voted no on the stadium. Retrieved from
http://www.kwanzahall.com/why_i_voted_no_on_the_stadium
County of Milwaukee. (2004). Park East Redevelopment Compact. Retrieved from
http://county.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/cntySupervisors/dimitrijevic/PERC.PDF
County of Milwaukee. (2015, June 1). Interoffice Communication. Retrieved from
https://localtvwiti.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/bucks-arena.pdf
Cowart, R. (1989). Experience, motivations and issues. In D. R. Porter & L. L. Marsh (Eds.), Development
Agreements: Practice, Policy and Prospects (pp. 9–39). Washington, D.C.: The Urban Land Institute.
Crane, R., & Manville, M. (2008). People or place? Revisiting the who versus the where of urban
development. Land Lines, July: 1-7.
Cullingworth, J. (1993). The political culture of planning. New York: Routledge.
247
Cummings, S. L., & Boutcher, S. A. (2009). Mobilizing local government law for low-wage workers.
University of Chicago Legal Forum, 187, 1-60.
Curbed Staff. (2014, July 7). A Fresh Look at Yesler Terrace’s Redevelopment. Curbed Seattle. Retrieved from
http://seattle.curbed.com/archives/2014/07/an-indepth-look-at-yesler-terraces-redevelopment.php
Curtin, D. J., & Edelstein, S. A. (1992). Development agreement practice in California and other states.
Stetson Law Review, 22, 761–783.
Daykin, T. (2009, January 13). Park East project dropped. Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from
http://www.jsonline.com/business/37502349.html
Daykin, T. (2012, September 20). Cleanup loan for Park East apartment project approved. Retrieved from
http://www.jsonline.com/business/cleanup-loan-for-park-east-apartment-project-approved-
hj6ufr6-170562906.html
Daykin, T. (2013, May 18). Park East development kicks into high gear with a new marketing campaign.
Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.jsonline.com/business/park-east-
development-kicks-into-high-gear-with-a-new-marketing-campaign-709v4j3-208008131.html
Daykin, T. (2014, October 4). But Marcus still hopes to make cinema happen. Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal
Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.jsonline.com/business/successful-movie-theater-plan-eludes-
downtown-milwaukee-b99362293z1-278124101.html
Daykin, T. (2015, June 3). Bucks development plan would tie up Park East parcels for 9 years. Milwaukee-
Wisconsin Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/business/305932371.html
Delaney, J. J. (1993). Development Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to Let’s Make a Deal. Urban
Lawyer, 25(1), 49–67.
Delong, K. (2015, December 30). Milwaukee County officials plan to sell last full block of Park East land to
Wangard Partners Inc. Fox 6 News. Retrieved from http://fox6now.com/2015/12/30/milwaukee-
county-officials-plan-to-sell-last-full-block-of-park-east-land-to-wangard-partners-inc/
De Sousa, C. A. (2008). Brownfields redevelopment and the quest for sustainability. Oxford: Elsevier.
248
Durham, E. (2015, September 28). City of Atlanta wins $30 million HUD Choice Neighborhood Grant.
Morehouse College. Retrieved from http://www.morehouse.edu/newscenter/city-of-atlanta-wins-30-
million-hud-choice-neighborhood-grant/
Erie, S. P., Kogan, V., & MacKenzie, S. A. (2010). Redevelopment, San Diego style: The limits of public-
private partnerships. Urban Affairs Review, 45(5), 644-678.
Eskenazi, S. (2002, December 25). Rainier Vista lawsuit settled; demolition can begin. The Seattle Times.
Retrieved from
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20021225&slug=vista25m
Fainstein, S. S. (2010). The just city. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Faratin, P., Sierra, C., & Jennings, N. R. (1997). Negotiation decision functions for autonomous agents.
Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 24(3), 159-182.
Fatima, S. S., Woolridge, M., & Jennings, N. R. (2004). An agenda-based framework for multi-issue
negotiation. Artificial Intelligence, 154, 1-45.
Felton, R. (2015, February 10). Deadspin highlights proposed community benefits agreement ordinance in
Detroit. Detroit Metro Times. Retrieved from
http://www.metrotimes.com/Blogs/archives/2015/02/10/deadspin-highlights-proposed-
community-benefits-agreement-ordinance-in-detroit
Figueroa, M., Grabelsky, J., & Lamere, R. (2011). Community workforce provisions in project labor agreements: A tool
for building middle-class careers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Fine, J. (2006). Worker centers: Organizing workers at the edge of the dream. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Fine, J. (2014). Strengthening labor standards compliance through co-production of enforcement. New Labor
Forum, 1-7.
Fine, J., & Gordon, J. (2010). Strengthening labor standards enforcement through partnerships with
workers’ organizations. Politics & Society, 38(4), 552-585.
249
Fischler, R. (2000). Communicative planning theory: A Foucauldian assessment. Journal of Planning Education
and Research, 19, 358-368.
Fisher, R., & Ury, W. L. (1991). Getting to yes (2
nd
ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Forester, J. (1989). Planning in the face of power. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fox, J. (2011, March 16). Yesler Terrace and SHA are on the Wrong Track. International Examiner. Retrieved
from http://www.iexaminer.org/2011/03/yesler-terrace-sha-wrong-track/
Foxx, A. (2015, March 3). Local hiring just makes sense. U.S. Department of Transportation Fastlane. Retrieved
from https://www.dot.gov/fastlane/local-hiring-just-makes-sense
Fung, A. (2006, December). Varieties of participation in complex governance. Public Administration Review,
66-75.
Funk, W. (1997). Bargaining toward the new millennium: Regulatory negotiation and the subversion of the
public interest. Duke Law Journal, 46(6), 1351-1388.
Garland, L., & Suafai, S. (2002). Getting to the table: A project labor agreement primer. National Economic
Development and Law Center.
Georgia Center for Nonprofits. (2015, January 8). Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund accepting
applications for capacity building grants through February 13, 2015. Retrieved from
http://www.gcn.org/Westside-Neighborhood-Prosperity-Fund-Accepting-Applications-for-
Capacity-Building-Grants-Through
Georgia Dome. (n.d.). About the Georgia Dome. Retrieved from
http://www.gadome.com/about/Default.aspx
Giuliano, G., Blanco, H., & Bahl, D. (2013). Promoting employment in transit construction projects by members of
minority and low-income communities. Los Angeles: University of Southern California.
Goldstein, B. E., & Butler, W. H. (2010). Expanding the scope and impact of collaborative planning:
Combining multi-stakeholder communities of practice in a learning network. Journal of the American
Planning Association, 76(2), 238-249.
250
Goodin, R. E. (1980). Manipulatory politics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Green, J. (2014, June 13). On downtown fringe, $15M offered for strong developments. Curbed Atlanta.
Retrieved from http://atlanta.curbed.com/archives/2014/06/13/on-downtown-fringe-15m-
offered-for-strong-developments.php
Green, J. (2015, October 21). By golly, the 'Mims Park' Vision just got a $1.6M boost. Curbed Atlanta.
Retrieved from http://atlanta.curbed.com/archives/2015/10/21/mims-park-vision-got-16m-
boost.php
Green, J. (2016, January 5). Atlanta Falcons stadium touted as absolute game-changer. Curbed Atlanta.
Retrieved from http://atlanta.curbed.com/archives/2016/01/05/atlanta-falcons-stadium-game-
changer.php
Griffin, C. E. (2012, February 2). Disadvantaged workers win in new MTA agreement. Our Weekly.
Retrieved from http://ourweekly.com/news/2012/feb/01/disadvantaged-workers-win-in-new-mta-
agreement/
Gross, J. (2007). Community benefits agreements: Definitions, values and legal enforceability. Journal of
Affordable Housing & Community Development Law 17(1/2), 35-58.
Haas, G. 2012. Community benefits, negotiations, and (in)justice. In D. S. Sloane (Ed.), Planning Los Angeles
(pp. 272-278). Chicago: American Planning Association.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action. Boston: Beacon Press.
Healey, P. (1999). Institutional analysis, communicative planning, and shaping places. Journal of Planning
Education and Research, 19, 111-121.
Henry, K. T. (2009). Deconstructing elevated expressways: An evaluation of the proposal to remove the
Interstate 10 Claiborne Avenue Expressway in New Orleans, Louisiana. University of New Orleans
Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1016.
Herrera, L. E., Waheed, S., Koonse, T., & Ovando-Lacroux, C. (2014). Exploring targeted hire: An assessment of
best practices in the construction industry. UCLA Labor Center. Retrieved from http://ccaucla-
251
laborcenter.electricembers.net/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2014/04/Exploring-Targeted-
Hire.pdf
Hjern, B. (1982). Implementation research: The link gone missing. Journal of Public Policy, 2(3), 301–308.
Ho, W. (2007). Community benefits agreements: An evolution in public benefits negotiation processes.
Journal of Affordable Housing & Community Development Law, 17(1/2), 7-34.
Holliman, W. G. (1981). Development Agreements and Vested Rights in California. The Urban Lawyer, 13(1),
44–64.
Holloway, L. (2005). Milwaukee County Board Chairman Lee Holloway announces the Park East
Redevelopment Compact’s (PERC) Community Advisory Committee’s first organizational meeting.
County Board of Supervisor Lee Holloway. Retrieved from
http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/Holloway_announces_Park_East_Community_Advisory_Com
mittee_Organizational_Meeting.pdf
Hutson, M. A. (2013, July). The role of community benefits agreements in addressing gentrification and
displacement. Paper presented at the Joint Congress Association of European Schools of Planning
and the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Dublin, Ireland.
Hutson, M. A. (2015). Deepening their roots: The urban struggle for economic, environmental and social justice. New
York: Routledge.
Huxley, M. (2000). The limits to communicative planning. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19, 369-
377.
Huxley, M. & Yiftachel, O. (2000). New paradigm or old myopia? Unsettling the communicative turn in
planning theory. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 19, 333-342.
Hymon, S. (2014, January 21). And so it begins: Ground is broken for 8.5-Mile Crenshaw-LAX Line. The
Source. Retrieved from http://thesource.metro.net/2014/01/21/and-so-it-begins-ground-is-broken-
for-8-5-mile-crenshawlax-line/
Ingram, H., & Scheider, A. (1990). Improving implementation through framing smarter statutes. Journal of
252
Public Policy, 10(1), 67–88.
Innes, J. E. (2004). Consensus building: Clarifications for the critics. Planning Theory, 3(1), 5-20.
Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2010). Planning with complexity: An introduction to collaborative rationality for public
policy. New York: Routledge.
Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2015). A turning point for planning theory? Overcoming dividing discourses.
Planning Theory, 14(2), 195-213.
Invest Atlanta. (n.d.a.). Georgia Dome Community/Housing Development Trust Fund. Retrieved from
http://investatlanta.com/wp-content/uploads/Vine-City-Trust-Fund-Overview.pdf
Invest Atlanta (n.d.b.). Westside TAD Community Improvement Fund (round I) fact sheet). Retrieved from
http://www.boarddocs.com/ga/investatlanta/Board.nsf/files/9QNNE371C47A/$file/CIF%20Fac
t%20Sheet_20141106.pdf
Invest Atlanta. (2013a). Community Benefits Plan. Retrieved from http://investatlanta.com/wp-
content/uploads/Community-Benefits-Plan.pdf
Invest Atlanta. (2013b, August 21). Community Benefits Plan Committee meeting. Retrieved from
http://investatlanta.com/wp-content/uploads/CBP-Committee-Minutes-8-21-13.pdf
Invest Atlanta. (2013c, September 10). Westside TAD Neighborhoods Strategic Implementation Plan.
Retrieved from
http://westsidetad.com/appendices/Westside%20TAD%20Final%20Report%20091013%20(1).pdf

Invest Atlanta. (2014a, February 27). Community Benefits Plan Committee meeting. Retrieved from
http://www.investatlanta.com/wp-content/uploads/CBP-Minutes-022714.pdf
Invest Atlanta (2014b, March 10). Request for qualifications. Retrieved from
http://www.investatlanta.com/wp-content/uploads/RFQ-for-Program-Management-Services-
03112014.pdf
Invest Atlanta. (2014c, August 14). Westside catalytic projects RFP. Retrieved from
http://www.investatlanta.com/opportunities/rfp/westside-catalytic-projects-rfp/
253
Jannene, J. (2014, June 10). Finally, a new Park East plan. Urban Milwaukee. Retrieved from
http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2014/06/10/eyes-on-milwaukee-finally-a-new-park-east-plan/
Johnston-Dodds, K. (2001, October). Constructing California: A review of project labor agreements. California
Research Bureau. Retrieved from http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/01/10/01-010.pdf
Kahn, M. (2015a, March 19). In shadow of stadiums, neighborhood pines for investment. Retrieved from
http://atlanta.curbed.com/archives/2015/03/19/in-the-shadow-of-the-stadium-a-neighborhood-
ready-for-investment.php
Kahn, M. (2015b, September 16). Tech seeks city funds to spark $500M mixed-use center. Retrieved from
http://atlanta.curbed.com/archives/2015/09/16/georgia-tech-enterprise-park.php
Kahn, M. (2015c, October 20). In shadow of Falcons stadium, new park is a key addition. Retrieved from
http://atlanta.curbed.com/archives/2015/10/20/lindsay-street-park-english-avenue-first-park.php
Keating, L. (2001). Race, Class and Urban Expansion. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Kelley, C. (2014, November 20). Invest Atlanta announces funding for Westside projects. Atlanta INtown.
Retrieved from http://www.atlantaintownpaper.com/2014/11/invest-atlanta-announces-funding-
westside-projects/
Kessler, R. M. (1985). The development agreement and its use in resolving large scale, multi-party
development problems: A look at the tool and suggestions for its applications. Journal of Land Use &
Environmental Law, 1, 451–481.
Kirkham, C. (2015, January 20). A new effort to help black workers find higher-paying jobs. Retrieved from
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0121-african-american-employment-20150121-story.html
Kosla, M. T. (2014). More than members: Market revitalization in the building trades. Critical Sociology, 1–22.
Kotler, F. B. (2009). Project labor agreements in New York state: In the public interest. Ithaca, NY.
Kudler, A. G. (2013, July 10). Black-Owned businesses already being pushed out of Leimert Park ahead of
the Crenshaw Line. Curbed Los Angeles. Retrieved from
http://la.curbed.com/archives/2013/07/blackowned_businesses_already_being_pushed_out_of_lei
254
mert_park_ahead_of_the_crenshaw_line.php
Kussy, E. V., & Cooke, R. J. (2010). Executive Order encourages project labor agreements on federal
projects. Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction, 2(2), 97–99.
Landis, J., Larice, M., Dawson, D., & Deng, L. (2001). Pay to play: Residential development fees in California cities
and counties, 1999. State of California Department of Housing and Community Development.
Sacramento, CA.
Langworthy, D. J. (1995). Project-labor agreements after Boston Harbor: Do they violate competitive
bidding laws? William Mitchell Law Review, 21, 1103–1138.
Larsen, D. J. (2002). Development agreement manual: Collaboration in pursuit of community interests. Sacramento, CA:
Institute for Local Self Government.
Larsen, L. (2009). The pursuit of responsible development: Addressing anticipated benefits and unwanted burdens through
community benefit agreements. Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy Working Paper Series Number
9. University of Michigan Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy.
League of Women Voters. (1998). Initiative 200. Retrieved from
http://www.smartvoter.org/1998nov/wa/state/meas/i200/
League of Women Voters of California. (2012, November 6). Measure J. Retrieved from
http://www.smartvoter.org/2012/11/06/ca/la/meas/J/
Lee, M. (2015, October 23). Mayor offers land speculators journey through judicial system, restful vacation
in city jail. Creative Loafing Atlanta. Retrieved from
http://clatl.com/freshloaf/archives/2015/10/23/mayor-offers-land-speculators-journey-through-
judicial-system-restful-vacation-in-city-jail
Leslie, K. (2013, December 3). Atlanta council passes community benefits plan, clears path for construction.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved from http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govt-
politics/atlanta-council-passes-community-benefits-plan-cle/nb89x/
Leslie, K. (2015, June 18). Reed halts plan to buy troubled investors’ properties. The Atlanta Journal-
255
Constitution. Retrieved from http://www.myajc.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/reed-knocks-
deal-with-land-bank-blank-foundation-a/nmfmW/
Leslie, K. & Tucker, T. (2014, March 16). Inside the evolving Atlanta Falcons stadium drama. Athletic
Business. Retrieved from http://www.athleticbusiness.com/more-news/inside-the-evolving-atlanta-
falcons-stadium-drama.html
Liegeois, N., & Carson, M. (2003). Accountable development: Maximizing community benefits from
publicly supported development. Clearinghouse Review, 37, 174–188.
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (n.d.a.). Project map English. Retrieved from
http://media.metro.net/projects_studies/crenshaw/images/140207_map_project_crenshawlax_eng
.pdf
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (n.d.b.). System map. Retrieved from
http://media.metro.net/riding_metro/maps/images/rail_map.pdf
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2012a). FAQs. Retrieved from
http://www.metro.net/about/pla/faqs/
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2012b, December 14). Milestone: L.A. Metro
officially begins utility relocation work for major light rail project in downtown L.A. Retrieved from
http://www.metro.net/news/simple_pr/Metro-begins-utility-relocation-regional-connector/
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2012c). Project Labor Agreement. Retrieved
from http://media.metro.net/about_us/pla/images/agreement_projectlabor_2015.pdf
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014a). Crenshaw/LAX Transit Project.
Retrieved from http://www.metro.net/projects/crenshaw_corridor/
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014b, March). Crenshaw/LAX Transit
Project Overview Fact Sheet. Retrieved from
256
http://media.metro.net/projects_studies/crenshaw/images/factsheet_crenshawlax.pdf
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014c). Referral (hiring) process. Retrieved
from http://media.metro.net/about_us/pla/images/pla_hiring_flow_chart.pdf
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014d, June). Targeted worker summary
report. Retrieved from
http://media.metro.net/about_us/pla/images/C0988_Targeted_Worker_Report_June.pdf
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2014e, October 17). Metro to launch Eat
Shop Play Crenshaw campaign at Taste of Soul. Retrieved from
http://thesource.metro.net/2014/10/17/metro-to-launch-eat-shop-play-crenshaw-campaign-at-
taste-of-soul/
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2015a). Eat Shop Play Crenshaw/LAX.
Retrieved from http://www.metro.net/interactives/html/eatshopplay/#map
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2015b). Project labor agreement &
construction careers policy. Retrieved from https://www.metro.net/about/pla/
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2015c, October). Targeted worker summary
report. Retrieved from https://www.metro.net/about/pla/co988-crenshaw-lax-transit-corridor-
designbuild/
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (2016, January). Targeted worker summary
report. Retrieved from
https://d1akjheu06qp1r.cloudfront.net/about_us/pla/images/summary_C0988_placlax_2016-
01.pdf
Lowe, N., & Morton, B. J. (2008). Developing standards: The role of community benefits agreements in
enhancing job quality. Community Development, 39(2), 23–35.
Lucas-Darby, E. T. (2012). Community benefits agreements: A case study in addressing environmental and
economic injustices. The Journal of African American History, 97(1-2), 92-109.
257
Luce, S. (2005). The role of community involvement in implementing living wage ordinances. Industrial
Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 44(1), 32–58.
Luce, S. (2012). Living wage policies and campaigns: Lessons from the United States. International Journal of
Labour Research, 4(1), 11–26.
Marantz, N. J. (2015). What do community benefits agreements deliver? Evidence from Los Angeles. Journal
of the American Planning Association, 81(4), 251-267.
Margerum, R. D. (2011). Beyond consensus. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Margerum, R. D. (2008). A typology of collaboration efforts in environmental management. Environmental
management, 41(4), 487-500.
Margerum, R. D. (1999). Getting past yes: From capital creation to action. Journal of the American Planning
Association, 65(2), 181-192.
Mariano, W. (2014, November 1). Betting on ‘The Bluff.’ The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved from
http://www.myajc.com/news/news/fate-of-blighted-atlanta-neighborhood-in-hands-of-/nht29/
Mariano, W. (2015a, March 14). Divine mission gives way to blighted streets. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution.
Retrieved from http://www.myajc.com/news/news/public-affairs/divine-mission-gives-way-to-
blighted-streets/nkTqp/#b75767b1.3566485.735675
Mariano, W. (2015b, March 27). Residents: Atlanta Falcons stadium money oversight body gets no respect.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved from
http://investigations.blog.ajc.com/2015/03/27/debate-on-atlanta-falcons-stadium-money-
fractious-but-few-show-up-to-hear-it/
Marsh, L. L. (1989). Introduction. In Development Agreements: Practice, Policy and Prospects (pp. 2–6).
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Land Institute.
Matland, R. E. (1995). Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy
implementation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 5(2), 145-174.
Mayer, G. (2010). Project labor agreements. Congressional Research Service, No. 854. Retrieved from
258
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/854
Mazmanian, D. A., & Sabatier, P. A. (1989). Implementation and public policy. Lanham, MD: University Press of
America.
McGahey, R. M. & Vey, J. S. (Eds.). (2008). Retooling for Growth: Building a 21
st
Century Economy in
America’s Older Industrial Areas. Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press.
McGuirk, P. M. (2001). Situating communicative planning theory: Context, power and knowledge.
Environment and Planning A, 33, 195-217.
McKean, A. (2015). Local Government Legislation: Community Benefits, Land Banks, and Politically
Engaged Community Economic Development. Journal of Affordable Housing, 24(1), 133-163.
McLanahan, S. (1980). Organizational issues in U.S. health policy implementation: Participation, discretion,
and accountability. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 16(3), 354–369.
Mercedes-Benz Stadium. (2015). Stadium Info. Retrieved from http://mercedesbenzstadium.com/location/
Millard, P. (2003, December 7). ‘Community’ Park East plan irks developers. Milwaukee Business Journal.
Retrieved from http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2003/12/08/newscolumn1.html
Miller, K. (2013, February 1). CEO Art Leahy guides MTA’s transition to a community-friendly rail system.
The Los Angeles Sentinel. Retrieved from
http://www.lasentinel.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10397:ceo-art-leahy-
guides-mta-s-transition-to-a-community-friendly-rail-system&catid=80:local&Itemid=170
Mudede, C. (2013, February 6). The twilight of Yesler Terrace. The Stranger.
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/the-twilight-of-yesler-terrace/Content?oid=15933703
Mnookin, R. H., & Susskind, L. E. (1999). Negotiating on behalf of others: Advice to lawyers, business executives, sports
agents, diplomats, and everybody else. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Nadler, M. L. (2010). The constitutionality of community benefits agreements: Addressing the exactions
problem. The Urban Lawyer, 43(2), 587-625.
NCAA. (2014, November 14). Five future Final Four sites announced. Retrieved from
259
http://www.ncaa.com/FutureFinalFour
Neighborhood Newspapers. (2014, January 14). Invest Atlanta taking Westside TAD applications. Retrieved
from http://neighbornewspapers.com/view/full_story/24388307/article-Invest-Atlanta-taking-
Westside-TAD-applications?instance=all
Nelson, L. J. (2014, January 21). Metro breaks ground on $2-billion Crenshaw light-rail line. The Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-crenshaw-line-
groundbreaking-20140121,0,1889081.story#axzz2zk7wz6iD
Newton, D. (2011, April 28). Highlights from the Metro Board: Crenshaw Grade Separation, Bikes on
Trains, Bus Cuts. Streetsblog LA. Retrieved from http://la.streetsblog.org/2011/04/28/highlights-
from-the-metro-board-crenshaw-grade-separation-bikes-on-trains-bus-cuts/
Northrup, H. R., & Alario, L. E. (1998). “Boston Harbor”-type project labor agreements in construction:
Nature, rationales, and legal challenges. Journal of Labor Research, 19(1), 1-63.
O’Rourke, D. (2002). Motivating a conflicted environmental state: Community-driven regulation in
Vietnam. The Environmental State Under Pressure, 10, 221-244.
Park East Milwaukee. 2004. Park East Redevelopment Compact. Retrieved from
http://parkeastmke.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Attachment-Q-Park-East-Redevelopment-
Compact.pdf
Parker, B. (2005, May 9). This land is our land: The battle for a community benefits agreement in Milwaukee. Good
Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods Coalition. Retrieved from
http://regionalpowerbuilding.webs.com/power/downloads/Parkeast.pdf
Parkin, J. (2003). Constructing meaningful access to work: Lessons from the Port of Oakland Project Labor
Agreement. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 35, 375-414.
Parks, V. & Warren, D. (2009). The politics and practice of economic justice: Community benefits
agreements as a tactic of the new accountable development movement. Journal of Community Practice,
17, 88-106.
260
Partnership for Working Families. (2007, July). Partnership in Action: Recent Victories, Future Directions.
Retrieved from
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/pwf/files/publications/2007.07_Partnership_in_Action.p
df
Pastor Jr., M., Benner, C., & Matsuoka, M. (2009). This could be the start of something big: How social movements for
regional equity are reshaping metropolitan America. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Pendered, D. (2013, November 21). Community cut out of community benefits deal at Falcons stadium;
Mayor Reed ready to engage. Saporta Report. Retrieved from http://saportareport.com/community-
cut-out-of-community-benefits-deal-mayor-reed-says-hes-ready-to-engage/
Pendered, D. (2014, February 12). Lawsuit contends stadium bonds unconstitutional, violate Georgia’s
environmental policies. Saporta Report. Retrieved from http://saportareport.com/lawsuit-contends-
stadium-bonds-unconstitutional-violate-environmental-policies/
Perritt, H. H. (1996). Keeping the government out of the way: Project labor agreements under the Supreme
Court’s Boston Harbor decision. The Labor Lawyer, 12(1), 69–92.
Philips, P. (2010). Construction Careers for Our Communities. UCLA Labor Center. Retrieved from
http://www.pacific-gateway.org/constructioncareersforourcommunities.pdf
Porter, D. R. (1989). The relation of development agreements to plans and planning. In Development
Agreements: Practice, Policy and Prospects (pp. 148–152). Washington, D.C.: The Urban Land Institute.
Powell, M. (2015, August 14). Bucks’ owners win, at Wisconsin’s expense. The New York Times. Retrieved
from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/sports/bucks-new-owners-get-house-warming-gift-of-
public-money.html?_r=0
Pressman, J. L. & Wildavsky, A. B. (1984). Implementation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Purcell, M. (2009) Resisting neoliberalization: Communicative planning or counter-hegemonic movements?
Planning Theory, 8(2), 140-165.
Rabouin, D. (2013, December 3). City Council unanimously approves benefits plan for communities around
261
new Falcons stadium. Retrieved from http://atlantadailyworld.com/2013/12/03/city-council-
unanimously-approves-benefits-plan-for-communities-around-new-falcons-stadium/
Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee. (2004, June 15). Park East Redevelopment Master Plan.
Retrieved from http://city.milwaukee.gov/Zoning-Topics/Redevelopment-Zoning-RED/Park-
East-Redevelopment-Plan.htm#.VmcY9ITEj7U
Rosenberg, R. H. (2006). The changing culture of American land use regulation: Paying for growth with
impact fees. SMU Law Review, 59, 177–264.
Rudick, R. (2015, April 22). The 710 and Measure R2: Can Los Angeles build transit and beat its addiction
to asphalt? Streetsblog LA. Retrieved from http://la.streetsblog.org/2015/04/22/the-710-and-
measure-r2-can-los-angeles-build-transit-and-beat-its-addiction-to-asphalt/
Rutheiser, C. (1996). Imagineering Atlanta: The politics of place in the city of dreams. London: Verso.
Ryan, E. (2002). Zoning, taking, & dealing: The problems and promise of bargaining in land use planning.
Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 7, 337–388.
Ryan, S. (2004, November 15). Panel OKs Park East Mandates. Daily Reporter. Retrieved from
http://dailyreporter.com/2004/11/15/panel-oks-park-east-mandates/
Ryan, S. (2015, May 8). Park East hiring, wage rules could extend to other properties. Milwaukee Business
Journal. Retrieved from http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/print-edition/2015/05/08/park-
east-hiring-wage-rules-could-extend-to-other.html
Sabatier, P. A. (1986). Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: A critical analysis
and suggested synthesis. Journal of Public Policy, 6(1), 21–48.
Sager, T. (2005, December). Communicative Planners as Naïve Mandarins of the Neo-liberal State? European
Journal of Spatial Development, 1-9.
Sager, T. (2009). Responsibilities of theorists: The case of communicative planning theory. Progress in
Planning, 72, 1-51.
Saito, L. T. (2012). How low-income residents can benefit from urban development: The LA Live
262
Community Benefits Agreement. City & Community, 11(2), 129-150.
Saito, L. & Truong, J. (2014). The L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement: Evaluating the agreement
results and shifting political power in the city. Urban Affairs Review, 1-27.
Salkin, P. E. & Lavine, A. (2008). Understanding community benefits agreements: Equitable development,
social justice and other considerations for developers, municipalities and community organizations.
University of California Los Angeles Law Review, 26, 291-331.
Salkin, P. E. & Lavine, A. (2007). Negotiating for social justice and the promise of community benefits
agreements: Case studies of current and developing agreements. Journal of Affordable Housing, 17(1-2),
113-144.
Saillant, C. (2012, December 11). USC’s $1.2-billion expansion wins City Council approval. Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved from http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/12/city-council-approves-usc-
expansion-project.html
Saporta, M. (2013a, August 6). Mayor Kasim Reed: Deal reached with Friendship Baptist Church for $19.5
million; makes plea for south site. Saporta Report. Retrieved from http://saportareport.com/mayor-
kasim-reed-deal-reached-with-friendship-for-19-5-million-makes-plea-for-south-site/
Saporta, M. (2013b, March 6). New deal for Atlanta Falcons stadium will address community concerns.
Atlanta Business Chronicle. Retrieved from
http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2013/03/06/new-deal-for-atlanta-falcons-
stadium.html?ana=e_du_wknd&s=article_du&ed=2013-03-
09&u=uXeEudjyKIiT%2FPFbz0OVLvOSU36&page=all
Saporta, M. (2013c, November 4). http://saportareport.com/choices-around-new-atlanta-falcons-stadium-
parking-lots-or-people-places/
Saporta, M. (2014a, April 7). Lindsay Street Park a model of what needs to happen along Proctor Creek.
Saporta Report. Retrieved from http://saportareport.com/lindsay-street-park-a-model-of-what-needs-
to-happen-along-proctor-creek/
263
Saporta, M. (2014b, April 22). Blank Foundation now taking grant requests for $15 million Westside fund.
Saporta Report. Retrieved from http://saportareport.com/blank-foundation-now-taking-grant-
requests-for-15-million-westside-fund/
Schultze, S. (2013, May 31). Wisconsin governor says government will be more efficient. Milwaukee Journal-
Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/scott-walker-signs-bill-to-limit-
county-board-authority-b9923377z1-209735131.html
Schultze, S. & Stein, J. (2013, May 14). Legislature passes bill to cut budget of Milwaukee County Board.
Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/state-senate-
passes-bill-to-cut-funds-for-milwaukee-county-board-u19up00-207470061.html
Schwartz, B. K. (2001). Development agreements: Contracting for vested rights. Boston College Environmental
Affairs Law Review, 28, 719–755.
Seattle City Council. (n.d.). Yesler Terrace redevelopment. Retrieved from
http://www.seattle.gov/council/issues/yesler_terrace.htm
Seattle Housing Authority. (n.d.). Citizen Review Committee (CRC) Meeting Minutes. Retrieved from
http://seattlehousing.net/redevelopment/yesler-terrace/people/community-outreach/citizen-
review-committee-crc-meeting-minutes/
Seattle Housing Authority. (2002, December 24). Rainier Vista lawsuit settled. Retrieved from
http://seattlehousing.org/news/releases/2002/rainier-vista-lawsuit-settled/
Seattle Housing Authority. (2007). Yesler Terrace Definitions & Guiding Principles. Retrieved from
https://www.seattlehousing.org/redevelopment/pdf/YT_Guiding_Principles_English.pdf
Seattle Housing Authority. (2008, September 30). Yesler Terrace background report. Retrieved from
http://www.seattle.gov/parks/projects/yesler_terrace_park/files/background_report.pdf
Seattle Housing Authority. (2012, December 13). $19.73 million HUD grant awarded to Seattle Housing for
Yesler Terrace redevelopment. Retrieved from
http://www.seattlehousing.org/news/releases/2012/choice-neighborhoods-grant/
264
Seattle Housing Authority. (2013a, January 3). Community workforce agreement. Retrieved from
http://seattlehousing.org/redevelopment/pdf/YT_CWA.pdf
Seattle Housing Authority. (2013b, January 30). Citizen Review Committee (CRC) Meeting Minutes.
Retrieved from http://seattlehousing.net/redevelopment/yesler-terrace/people/community-
outreach/citizen-review-committee-crc-meeting-minutes/
Seattle Housing Authority. (2014, October 13). “Housing Authority land sale helps revitalize Yesler Terrace.”
Retrieved from http://seattlehousing.net/2014/10/housing-authority-land-sale-helps-revitalize-
yesler-terrace/
Seattle Housing Authority. (2015c). “Yesler Terrace.” Retrieved from
https://www.seattlehousing.org/housing/public/locations/yesler-terrace/
Seattle Police Department. (2014). Precinct Crime Statistics. Retrieved from
http://www.seattle.gov/police/crime/14_Stats/Precincts/2014_Precinct_Crime_Statistics.pdf
Sebenius, J.K. (1992). Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review. Management Science, 38(1), 18-38.
Selin, S. & Chavez, D. (1995). Developing a collaborative model for environmental planning and
management. Environmental Management, 19(2), 189-195.
Selmi, D. P. (2010). The contract transformation in land use regulation. Stanford Law Review, 63, 591–646.
Severin, C. (2013). We built this city: The legality of community benefits agreements for big box
construction under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Columbia Journal of Race and Law, 3(2),
215-252.
Shapiro, J. (2013a, September 23). Long-running tensions on display during stadium impact meeting. NPR
Atlanta. Retrieved from http://news.wabe.org/post/long-running-tensions-display-during-stadium-
impact-meeting
Shapiro, J. (2013b, November 20). Tensions Erupt At Falcons Stadium Impact Meeting. NPR Atlanta.
Retrieved from http://news.wabe.org/post/tensions-erupt-falcons-stadium-impact-meeting
Shapiro, J. (2013c, November 25). Committee Approves Community Benefits Plan Related to New Falcons
265
Stadium. NPR Atlanta. Retrieved from http://news.wabe.org/post/committee-approves-
community-benefits-plan-related-new-falcons-stadium
Shapiro, J. (2013d, November 26). Falcons Stadium Community Benefits Plan Clears Another Hurdle. NPR
Atlanta. Retrieved from http://news.wabe.org/post/falcons-stadium-community-benefits-plan-
clears-another-hurdle
Shapiro, J. (2013e, November 27). Full Council To Vote on Falcons Stadium Community Benefits Plan.
NPR Atlanta. Retrieved from http://news.wabe.org/post/full-council-vote-falcons-stadium-
community-benefits-plan
Shapiro, J. (2013f, December 3). Falcons Community Benefits Plan Clears Final Legislative Hurdle.
Retrieved from http://news.wabe.org/post/falcons-community-benefits-plan-clears-final-legislative-
hurdle
Sheikh, N. (2008). Community benefits agreements: Can private contracts replace public responsibility?
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 18(1), 223-246.
Seigel, S. M. (2014). Community benefits agreements in a union city: How the structure of CBAs may result
in inefficient, unfair land use decisions. Urban Lawyer, 46(3), 419–505.
Siegel, J. M. (2000). Project labor agreements and competitive bidding statutes. University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Labor and Employment Law, 3(2), 295–331.
Smith, R. M. (1987). From subdivision improvement requirements to community benefit assessments and
linkage payments: A brief history of land development exactions. Law and Contemporary Problems,
50(1), 5–30.
Soja, E. J. (2010). Seeking spatial justice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Stoker, R. P. (1989). A regime framework for implementation analysis: Cooperation and reconciliation of
federalist imperatives. Policy Studies Review, 9(1), 29–49.
Streeter, K. (2013, September 7). Workers hoping to build Crenshaw Line rally in Leimert Park. The Los
Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/07/local/la-me-0908-
266
blackworkers-rally-20130908
Sulaiman, S. (2013, September 9). Hope on the horizon? The Crenshaw Line and the question of jobs.
Streetsblog LA. Retrieved from http://la.streetsblog.org/2013/09/09/hope-on-the-horizon-the-
crenshaw-line-and-the-question-of-jobs/
Supervisor John Weishan, Jr. (2015, September 16). County Board committee passes employment,
environmental standards in development agreements involving county land, subsidies. Retrieved
from http://www.thewheelerreport.com/wheeler_docs/files/0916weishan.pdf
Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas. (n.d.). Second Supervisorial District. Retrieved from http://ridley-
thomas.lacounty.gov/index.php/2nd-supervisorial-district/
Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. & Thomas-Larmer, J. (Eds.) (1999). The consensus building handbook. Thousand
Oaks: Sage.
Swanstrom, T., & Banks, B. (2008). Going regional: Community-based regionalism, transportation and local
hiring agreements. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 28, 355–367.
Taub, T. C. & Rhodes, R. M. (1989). The Florida Local Government Development Agreement Act. In
Development Agreements: Practice, Policy and Prospects (pp. 59–70). Washington, D.C.: The Urban Land
Institute.
Thompson, L., & Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 47, 98-123.
The Truth About Project Labor Agreements. (2015). About TheTruthAboutPLAs.com. Retrieved from
http://thetruthaboutplas.com/about-us/
Tucker, T. (2012, May 27). Fans pay the price for new stadiums. Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved from
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/fans-pay-the-price-for-new-stadiums/nQT7T/
Tucker, T. (2013a, February 6). New stadium plan shifts, doesn’t cut, public money. Atlanta Journal-
Constitution. Retrieved from http://www.ajc.com/news/news/new-stadium-plan-shifts-doesnt-cut-
public-money/nWG5r/
267
Tucker, T. (2013b, March 23). An up-close look at the Falcons stadium deal. Atlanta Journal-Constitution.
Retrieved from http://www.myajc.com/news/news/an-up-close-look-at-the-falcons-stadium-
deal/nW22W/
Tucker, T. (2013c, December 3). GWCCA approves more land purchases for Falcons stadium. Atlanta
Journal-Constitution. Retrieved from http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/gwcca-approves-more-
land-purchases-for-falcons-sta/nb938/
Urbanti, N. (2010). Unpolitical democracy. Political Theory, 38(1), p. 65-92.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2013a). Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Summary. Retrieved from
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2013b). Current Population Survey, Tables 26, 40, 42, 43 [Data file].
Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2011.pdf
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2014). Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2014-15 Edition, Construction
Laborers and Helpers. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/ooh/construction-and-
extraction/construction-laborers-and-helpers.htm#tab-7
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2015). Union affiliation of employed wage and salary workers by
occupation and industry. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm
U.S. Census Bureau. (2010). American Community Survey 2008-2012 (5-Year Estimates), Tables SE:T1; T7;
T14; T21; T25; T33; T37; T40; T41; T47; T49; T56A [Data file]. Retrieved from
http://www.socialexplorer.com/
U.S. Census Bureau. (2012). American Community Survey 2008-2012 (5-Year Estimates), Tables SE:T1; T7;
T14; T21; T25; T33; T37; T40; T41; T47; T56A [Data file]. Retrieved from
http://www.socialexplorer.com/
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (n.d.). Section 3. Retrieved from
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/section3/Section3.pdf
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2013). 2010-2013 Choice Neighborhoods
268
implementation grant awards. Retrieved from
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=implementgrantlist.pdf
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2015). Choice neighborhoods. Retrieved from
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/
ph/cn
U.S. General Accounting Office. (1998). Project Labor Agreements: The Extent of Their Use and Related Information.
(GAO Publication No. GAO/GGD-98-82). Retrieved from
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98082.pdf
Ubaldo, J. (2014, August 19). U.S. Labor Secretary Thomas Perez tours Crenshaw/LAX Transit Project. The
Source. Retrieved from http://thesource.metro.net/2014/08/19/u-s-labor-secretary-thomas-perez-
tours-crenshawlax-transit-project/
Valentini, L. (2012). Ideal vs. nonideal theory: A conceptual map. Philosophy Compass, 7/9, 654-664.
Villao, D., & Le, U. (2012). On track for quality careers, Project labor agreements and the Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Los Angeles: UCLA Labor Center.
Vock, D. C. (2015, March 4). Some Cities May Soon Make Contractors Hire Local for Transportation
Projects Join the Discussion. Governing. Retrieved from
http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-usdot-cities-require-local-
hiring.html
Walker, S. (2005, January). Veto of File No. 04-492.7. Milwaukee County Executive.
Wegner, J. W. (1987). Moving toward the bargaining table: Contract zoning, development agreements, and
the theoretical foundations of government land use deals. North Carolina Law Review, 65, 957–1038.
Weikel, D. (2012, January 26). Big Metro projects will offer jobs to disadvantaged workers. The Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved from http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/01/big-metro-projects-will-
offer-jobs-to-disadvantaged-workers.html
Westside Works. (2016). About us. Retrieved from http://www.westsideworks.org/about-us/
269
WGCL-TV Atlanta. (2013, March 18). Atlanta City Council approves deal for new Falcons stadium.
Retrieved from http://www.cbs46.com/story/21674440/atlanta-city-council-members-vote-in-
favor-a-new-stadium-for-the-falcons
Wheatley, T. (2012, September 6). The stadium effect. Creative Loafing Atlanta. Retrieved from
http://clatl.com/atlanta/the-stadium-effect/Content?oid=6296522
Wheatley, T. & Isaf, R. (2015). Wither the NPU? Creative Loafing Atlanta. Retrieved from
http://clatl.com/atlanta/wither-the-npu/Content?oid=13834029
The White House. (2009). Use of Project Labor Agreements on Federal Construction Projects. Retrieved
from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrderUseofProjectLaborAgreementsforFe
deralConstructionProjects
Williams, D. (2014, December 19). Mayor Reed appoints board to lead West Atlanta redevelopment. Atlanta
Business Chronicle. Retrieved from
http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/blog/capitol_vision/2014/12/mayor-reed-appoints-board-to-
lead-west-atlanta.html
Wisconsin State Legislature. (2015, July 13). 2015 Wisconsin Act 55. Retrieved from
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/related/acts/55
Wolf-Powers, L. (2010). Community benefits agreements and local government: A review of recent
evidence. Journal of the American Planning Association, 76(2), 141-159.
Wolf-Powers, L. (2012). Community benefits agreements in a value capture context. In G. K. Ingram & Y.-
H. Hong (Eds.), Value capture and land policies (pp. 217-228). Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy.
WSB Web Staff. (2013, March 19). Atlanta City Council votes yes for new Falcons stadium. WSB Radio.
Retrieved from http://www.wsbradio.com/news/news/atlanta-city-council-votes-yes-new-falcons-
stadium/nWwtq/
270
Young, B. (2011, March 19). Seattle’s Yesler Terrace faces the future. The Seattle Times. Retrieved from
http://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw-magazine/seattles-yesler-terrace-faces-the-future/
Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

271

Project Tree
Protection,
Abatement
& Building
Demolition

Yesler Terrace
Steam Plant
Adaptive
Reuse Project
1005 E. Fir Project Baldwin Renovation
Project
820 Yesler Way
Building
Construction Project
Leschi House
Renovation and
Addition
Yesler Terrace Early
Infrastructure, Hill
Climb, Site Demolition
& Rough Grading
Company Rhine
Demolition
LLC
CE & C, Inc. Andersen
Construction
CE & C, Inc. Walsh Construction W.G. Clark
Construction, Inc.
Flatiron West, Inc.
Award Amount $923,000 $4,386,921 $23,151,471 $2,947,332 $21,171,892 $9,489,667 (Phase 2) $12,029,000
Construction start date: 5/12/14 9/30/13 Phase 2: 4/30/14
(NTP)*
Phase 3: 5/30/14
(NTP)*
Phase 2: 8/2/13

6/12/14 (Limited
NTP)*
8/28/24 (Full NTP)*
Completion Date 8/11/14 10/21/15 Phase 2: 8/13/13
Phase 3: 11/11/13
(not specified) 10/21/15 (not specified) (not specified)
Reporting Date July 2014 March 2014 April 2015 August 2014 February 2015 January 2015 April 2015
Construction Status at
Reporting
99% 100% 98% 99% Phase 2: 88%
Phase 3: 34%
Phase 2: 99% 39%
Number of Section 3 new
hires for month
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Section 3 total new hire
positions employed to-date
on project
8 25 34 (Project
commitment: 60)
17 44 29 (Project
commitment: 22)
(not specified)
Number of non-Section 3
new hires employed during
month
1 0 0 0 3 0 3
Non-Section 3 total new
hire positions employed to-
date on project
2 66 17 12 18 26 10
Percentage of Section 3
hires expressed as % of
total hires to-date
80% 28% 67% 59% 59% 53% 23%
Apprenticeship
Participation Percentage
achieved to-date
4.1%
Goal: 15%
16.5%
Goal: 15%
15.54%
Goal: 17%
19.39%
Goal: 15%
10.4%
Goal: 15%
31.2%
Goal: 15%
7.99%
Goal: 15%
WMBE Participation %
(signed contracts)
12.5%
($115,000)
Goal: 14%
13.2%
($580,246)
Goal: 17%
17.01%
($3,937,462)
Goal: 16.98%
18.51%
($545,614)
Goal: 20%
14.8%
($3,194,620)
Goal: 25%
13.5%
($1,280,823)
Goal: 14%
7.56%
($909,768)
Goal: 19.3%
WMBE Participation %
(paid to date)
0%
($0)
5%
($227,453)
12.99%
($3,007,862)
10.63%
($313,404)
1.5%
($333,854)
12.6%
$1,191,090
0%
($0)
APPENDIX 1: Yesler Terrace Outcomes
272
Goal: 14% Goal: 17% Goal: 16.98% Goal: 20% Goal: 25% Goal: 14% Goal: 19.3%
Section 3 Business
Participation %
(signed contracts)
1.08%
$10,000
Goal: 3%
9.3%
($408,809)
Goal: 10%
22.03%
($5,100,000)
Goal: 12%
8.5%
($250,650)
Goal: 2%
13.6%
(2,942,896)
Goal: 20%
16.82%
($1,598,141)
Goal: 16.76%
5.4%
$650,000
Goal: 10%
Section 3 Business
Participation %
(paid to date)
(1.08%)
$10,000
Goal: 3%
5%
($227,453)
Goal: 10%
20.67%
($4,785,463)
Goal: 12%
7.56%
($222,899)
Goal: 2%
0.2%
($40,000)
Goal: 20%
16%
(1,518,729)
Goal: 16.76%
0%
($0)
Goal: 10%
Minority Workforce goal
44.9%
Goal: 21%
24.3%
Goal: 21%
38.24%
Goal: 25.5%
32.66%
Goal: 21%
44%
Goal: 25%
45%
Goal: 21%
51.49%
Goal: 21%
Women Workforce goal
9.22%
20%
.2%
Goal: 20%
2.83%
Goal: 20%
3.36%
Goal: 20%
3.2%
Goal: 20%
4.8%
Goal: 20%
3.05%
Goal: 20%
Minority Women WF Goal
2.1%
Goal: 4.5%
0.2%
Goal: 4.5%
0.44%
Goal: 4.5%
1.33%
Goal: 4.5%
0.2%
Goal: 5%
3.5%
Goal: 4.5%
1.61%
Goal: 4.5%
Notes
Report
specifies the
WMBE and
Section 3
firms
Report
specifies the
WMBE and
Section 3
firms
Section 3 new
hires include:
carpenters, HVAC,
electricians,
laborers
Section 3 hires
include demo,
drywall, insulation
applicators. New
hires include 4
Section 3 drywall
apprentices. Non-
Section 3 hires
include pipefitter,
plumber, drywall
None Report specifies the
WMBE and Section 3
firms. New hires
include: carpenters,
laborer, electricians and
electrician apprentices,
plumber and plumbing
apprentice, equipment
operator, painters,
drywallers
Report specifies the
WMBE and Section 3
firms. New hires
include laborers, pipe
layers, top man,
operator

*NTP indicates “notice to proceed”
APPENDIX 1: Yesler Terrace Outcomes
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 1

Community Benefits Plan

Article I. PURPOSE
Section 1.01 The purpose of this Community Benefits Plan is to present
recommendations to the City of Atlanta, Invest Atlanta and The Arthur Blank Family
Foundation that will maximize the benefits of the New Stadium Project (NSP) to the
Westside TAD Neighborhoods of the City of Atlanta, Georgia. Pursuant to the New
Stadium Project resolution passed by the Atlanta City Council, the Community Benefits
Plan will provide community job training, affordable housing, environmental
mitigations, special event enforcement programs, historic preservation, health and
wellness programs and economic development.

Article II. DEFINITIONS

Section 2.01 Area Residents: Residents of Vine City, English Avenue, Castleberry
Hill, Marietta Street Artery, Downtown Neighborhood Area and surrounding areas.

Section 2.02 Community Benefits Plan (CBP): The instrument, mandated by the
Atlanta City Council in the New Stadium Project Resolution (13-R-0615), through which
the Community Benefits Plan Committee will make recommendations for the
administration of the Westside TAD Community Improvement Fund and the NSP
Neighborhood Prosperity Fund. The intent of the CBP as authorized by the Resolution
is to develop a strategy to enable the development and operation of the NSP to have a
positive impact on the economy, safety and environment of the surrounding
neighborhoods.

Section 2.03 Community Benefits Plan Committee (CBP Committee): A group
of affected stakeholders tasked with developing the CBP. Pursuant to the New Stadium
Project legislation (13-R-0615), the CBP includes the following: City of Atlanta Council
members from Districts 2, 3, 4, and Post 1; the Mayor or his designee; the City Council
President or his designee; a representative from Neighborhood Planning Units M and L;
a representative from the Atlanta Downtown Neighborhood Association, Marietta Street
Artery Neighborhood Association, Vine City, English Avenue and Castleberry Hill
neighborhoods; a representative from the Westside TAD Neighborhood Advisory
Committee; a representative of Invest Atlanta; and a representative of the City of
Atlanta’s Department of Planning & Community Development. A member of the English
Avenue-Vine City Ministerial Alliance was also added.

APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
273
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 2

Section 2.04 Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund: The Arthur M. Blank
Family Foundation will voluntarily make charitable contributions of $15 million to
catalytic projects that will ignite positive change and improvement in the quality of life
in Vine City, English Avenue, Castleberry Hill and adjacent neighborhoods. These
charitable contributions will be made solely at the discretion of the trustees of The
Arthur M. Blank Family Foundation and will be guided by the Community Benefits Plan
Framework approved by the City of Atlanta Council.

Section 2.05 New Stadium Project (NSP): A new operable roof, state-of-the-art
multi-purpose stadium for the Atlanta Falcons to be located in downtown Atlanta and
constructed on land owned or controlled by the Georgia World Congress Center, a
portion of the funding for which will come from certain hotel/motel taxes collected in
the City of Atlanta as authorized by City Resolution 13-R-0615.

Section 2.06 Westside Tax Allocation District: To encourage the redevelopment
of the western downtown area of the City, the City Council, by City Resolution 98-R-0777
(amending Resolution 92-R-1575), created The Westside Redevelopment Area and Tax
Allocation Bond District (Tax Allocation District Number 1 – Atlanta/Westside), adopted
the Westside TAD Redevelopment Plan, and designated Invest Atlanta as the City’s
Redevelopment Agency, all as provided for under Redevelopment Powers Law, O.C.G.A.
§36-44-1, et seq., as amended. The WTAD is one of Atlanta’s ten tax allocation districts.

Section 2.07 Westside TAD Community Improvement Fund: A $15 million fund
to be provided by Invest Atlanta to invest in capital projects of varying sizes that remove
blighted conditions, expand redevelopment efforts, leverage other public and private
funding sources and result in job creation and quality of life enhancement for residents
of Vine City, English Avenue and Castleberry Hill.

Article III. COMMUNITY BENEFITS PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS

The following categories are examples of recommendations that have been made by the
CBP Committee after completing an information-driven (see Exhibits) and deliberative
process as required by the NSP legislation. The CBP Committee members received input
from their respective neighborhoods and worked collaboratively to create a unified vision.
APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
274
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 3

Section 3.01 Community Center
1
- Job Training and Workforce Development
Programs
The development of the NSP is intended to bring jobs and other opportunities for career
growth to the impacted neighborhoods. In order to prepare Area Residents for new
opportunities, it is important that they be afforded the training and professional
development programs necessary to qualify them for the jobs and careers arising from
the NSP. The stakeholders have recommended the following general project concepts to
further this CBP objective:
(a) Place-Based Training
(b) Soft Skills Development
(c) Youth Jobs Program
Section 3.02 Community Center
1
- Business Initiatives
In the interest of empowering Area Residents to create and pursue their own business
initiatives and entrepreneurship, a serious effort should be made to provide them with
the resources and assistance necessary to support their business or creative ventures.
The stakeholders have recommended the following general project concepts to further
this CBP objective:
(a) Technical Assistance/Capacity Building
(b) Business Center (with computer lab, internet, faxing, etc.)
(c) Small Business Development
(d) Micro Loan Program
(e) Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZone)
(f) Arts Incubator
(g) Business Incubator
Section 3.03 Community Center
1
- Education
Investments in the education of Area Residents are a priority of the NSP development.
A comprehensive and sustainable community enrichment initiative should include a
robust educational component that educates Area Residents at a variety of levels and
ages. The stakeholders have recommended the following general project concepts to
further this CBP objective:
(a) Comprehensive Education Programs
(b) GED Program
(c) Education Fund
(d) Technical School
(e) Internship/Apprenticeship and Jobs Training Programs

1
A Community Needs Assessment will be conducted prior to the establishment of a Community Resource Center.
Demographic data and economic analysis will be utilized in order to define the specific needs within the
community. Existing service providers within the community and outside agencies would then be identified to
provide said services within a central Community Resource Center.
APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
275
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 4

(f) Ex-Offender Re-entry Program

Section 3.04 Community Center
1
- Youth Programs
Providing young Area Residents with opportunities to be productive and supporting
their parents in creating a healthy and stable environment is essential to fostering a
thriving community. Area Residents’ quality of life, education and safety are directly
tied to the amount of resources invested in their youth. The stakeholders have
recommended the following general project concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Early Childcare
(b) After School Programs
(c) Recreation Center/Youth Center
(d) Youth Nutrition Program
Section 3.05 Community Center
1
- Health and Wellness Programs
The physical, mental and behavioral health of Area Residents is central to the Area
Residents’ quality of life. Resources should be available for treatment and preventative
measures in regard to health and wellness issues. The stakeholders have recommended
the following general project concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Mental/Behavioral Health Program
(b) Health Clinic
(c) Comprehensive Drug/Alcohol Treatment Program
(d) Food Pantry
(e) Birthing Center

Section 3.06 Catalytic Projects
It is important that the NSP leverage available resources to incentivize private
investment in these underdeveloped areas. The development of the NSP should attract
new industries and commercial activity. Economic development is key to maintaining
the impact of all the CBP categories. The stakeholders have recommended the following
general project concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Development of Commercial Districts
(b) Development that Activates Area Adjacent to NSP
(c) Improved Transportation Connectivity
(d) High Density Mixed-Use Along Northside Drive
(e) Promotion of Hospitality Industry
(f) Interior Commercial Node Development
(g) Retail Development
(h) Transit Oriented Developments at Ashby and Vine City MARTA Stations
(i) Community/Cultural Festivals
(j) Grocery Store
APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
276
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 5

Section 3.07 Assemblage and Land Banking
The property in the area is one of its greatest assets. Comprehensive revitalization
demands that the land be acquired, held, managed and developed in a coordinated
manner. There should be a concerted effort by public and private entities to account for
and develop the area’s land strategically. The stakeholders have recommended the
following general project concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Repurpose Land
(b) Public/Private Partnerships
(c) Land Banking
(d) Creation of a Community Land Trust

Section 3.08 Affordable Housing Creation and Preservation
The development of the NSP should address the potential impacts of gentrification.
Rehabilitation of existing stock and the creation of more affordable housing will ensure
that current Area Residents are given an opportunity to remain in the community. The
stakeholders have recommended the following general project concepts to further this
CBP objective:
(a) Renovations for Seniors and Low Income Homeowners
(b) Vacant Housing Strategy
(c) Workforce and Senior Housing
(d) Single-Family Mixed-Income Homeownership Opportunities
(e) Housing Enterprise Zone
(f) Green Renovations
(g) Non-Displacement Strategy
(h) Cooperative Housing
(i) Current Homeowner Tax Abatement Strategy

Section 3.09 Environmental Mitigation
The area has long suffered from environmental challenges. The development of the NSP
should improve the environmental stability of the area to provide Area Residents with a
higher environmental quality of life. Current areas of concerns, such as stormwater
runoff, should be addressed and measures should be taken to prevent future
environmental issues. The stakeholders have recommended the following general
project concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Stormwater and Water Resource Management
(b) Construction Mitigation Strategy
(c) Brownfield Assessment and Remediation
(d) Water Reuse
APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
277
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 6

(e) Environmental Protection Division Study
(f) Environmental Education - Urban Ecology
(g) Eco-District

Section 3.10 Transportation Infrastructure and Improvements
The area’s transportation and infrastructure challenges should not be compounded by
the advent of the NSP. Through strategic planning, development of the NSP should
improve the condition, efficiency and connectivity of the area’s transportation and
infrastructure. The stakeholders have recommended the following general project
concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Sidewalks
(b) Streetscape Improvements
(c) Lighting
(d) Safe Routes
(e) Traffic Management
(f) Crosswalks
(g) Re-establish Street Grid Vehicular and Pedestrian Connectivity
(h) Gateway Monument Entrances
(i) Bike Connectivity
(j) ADA Compliant Accessibility
(k) 2-Way Street Conversion
(l) Bike Share Program
(m) Promenades
(n) Traffic Calming Measures
(o) Angled Parking

Section 3.11 Zoning
An evaluation of the current zoning and permitted uses in the area should be conducted
to ensure that each is in line with the neighborhoods’ needs and is supportive of the
revitalization initiative. The stakeholders have recommended the following general
project concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Evaluate Current Zoning and Permitted Uses
(b) Assess Impact of Rezoning
(c) Respect Landmark Zoning

Section 3.12 Safety and Code Enforcement
Area Residents are familiar with the safety and code enforcement issues related to living
in close proximity to a large event center. The development of the NSP should address
these issues in a manner that encourages City of Atlanta Departments and the
APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
278
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 7

communities to work together collaboratively. The stakeholders have recommended
the following safety and code enforcement measures to further this CBP objective:
(a) Increased Police Presence
(b) Special Event Parking
(c) Resident Permit Parking
(d) Code Enforcement 7 Days a Week
(e) Sanitation
(f) Neighborhood Ambassador Program
(g) Tailgating Controls
(h) Hours of Operation
(i) Security Cameras
(j) Neighborhood Watch
(k) Signage
(l) Officer Courtesy
(m) Noise Ordinance Enforcement

Section 3.13 Historic Preservation
The area’s rich cultural history provides it with a unique identity and attractiveness. A
collateral benefit of the development of the NSP should be to promote and preserve that
history. The stakeholders have recommended the following general project concepts to
further this CBP objective:
(a) Identify Landmarks and Explore National Registry Listing
(b) Promote Heritage Tourism
(c) Preserve Landmarks and Historic Sites

Section 3.14 Green Space and Urban Agriculture
The area neighborhoods suffer from a lack of parks, green space and urban agriculture,
which negatively affects Area Residents’ quality of life. A collateral benefit of NSP should
be to assist in developing outdoor options that will encourage Area Residents to enjoy
and interact with nature. The stakeholders have recommended the following general
project concepts to further this CBP objective:
(a) Walking Trails
(b) Linear Parks
(c) Dilapidated Property Conversion
(d) Farmer’s Market
(e) Urban Farming/Community Gardens Including Youth Development Program
(f) Pocket Parks
(g) Green Streets
(h) Food Truck Market

APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
279
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 8

Article IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Section 4.01 For those who are interested in receiving assistance with completing
the application for funding from the Westside TAD Community Improvement Fund and
presenting their proposal to Invest Atlanta, Invest Atlanta will offer the services of an
experienced business consultant. This consultant will be available to provide
prospective applicants the consulting and technical assistance associated with scoping a
project and completing the application as needed. Applicants will be required to
contribute an engagement fee of $100. Invest Atlanta will cover the cost of these services
at up to $50 an hour for a maximum of 40 hours per client.

Article V. REPORTING

Section 5.01 Invest Atlanta or its designee will monitor and report quarterly on the
status of funding and CBP project initiatives to the City of Atlanta Community
Development/Human Resources Committee.

Section 5.02 Invest Atlanta or its designee will meet with the CBP Committee
quarterly for programmatic updates on the implementation of the CBP and post regular
updates of all CBP project activities to the Invest Atlanta website.

Section 5.03 The City of Atlanta will identify a program manager to perform the
following duties:
(a) Act as a liaison between the City of Atlanta, CBP Committee, Invest Atlanta
and the NSP construction team
(b) Convene meetings with the CBP Committee, during preconstruction and
construction of the NSP, regarding construction plans, progress and quality
of life issues at least every forty-five (45) days
(c) Oversee continued monitoring of activities, planning of events and ongoing
quality of life issues with CBP Committee post-construction of the NSP
(d) Report quarterly to the CBP Committee on the following measures of success:
(i) Public Improvements Projects Initiated
(ii) Funds Expended
(iii) Quality of Life enhancements

Section 5.04 Invest Atlanta will hold multiple application cycles for funding
through the Westside TAD Community Improvement Fund beginning in January 2014. It
APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
280
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 9

is anticipated that all funds will be allocated within thirty-six (36) months. Success will
be measured by:
(a) Funds Allocated
(b) Funds Expended
(c) Level of Project Completeness
(d) Jobs Created
(e) Benefits to the Community
(f) Quality of Life Improvements

APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
281
Final with Amendments 11/26/2013 10

Exhibits

Exhibit A: New Stadium Project Legislation (13-R-0615)

Exhibit B: Memorandum of Understanding between Invest Atlanta and the Arthur M.
Blank Family Foundation

Exhibit C: Community Benefits Plan Committee List

Exhibit D: Community Benefits Meeting Presentation (August 21, 2013)

Exhibit E: Westside TAD Community Improvement Fund Fact Sheet

Exhibit F: Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund Fact Sheet

Exhibit G: Westside TAD Neighborhoods Strategic Implementation Plan Summary for
Vine City and English Avenue

Exhibit H: Collective Communities Presentation: Vine City, English Avenue and
Castleberry Hill

Exhibit I: Castleberry Hill Neighborhood Presentation

Exhibit J: Community Benefits Plan Project Concepts and Examples

Exhibit K: Scope of Work Prioritization Survey (Survey Monkey)

APPENDIX 2: Atlanta Falcons Community Benefits Plan
282
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
283
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
284
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
285
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
286
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
287
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
288
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
289
APPENDIX 3: Atlanta Falcons Memorandum of Understanding
290
Exhibit E
COUNTY CLERK
Milwaukee eouutv
MARK RYAN • County Clerk
STATE OF WISCONSIN )
)SS
COUNTYOFMILWAUKEE )
I, Mark Ryan, County Clerk in and for the County of Milwaukee, State of Wisconsin, do
hereby certify that the attached copy of File No. 04-492 is a true and correct copy of the
original resolution duly adopted by the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors at a meeting
held on December 16 2004 .
Given under my hand and official seal, at the Milwaukee County Courthouse, in the City
of Milwaukee, this 14th day of February , 2005.
MARK RYAN
County Clerk
COURTHOUSE, ROOM 105 " 901 NORTH 9TH STREET ~ MILWAUKEE, WI 53233 " TELEPHONE: (414) 278-4067
APPENDIX 4: Park East Redevelopment Compact
291
DEC 1 6 2004
~~
.~··.
···· NOV 2004 ..
itrijef:':ief~~fg(:j West,i[Vhite,
I 5-Lf-
- ~ /
3
4
5
By Supervisors johnson, Coggs-jones, Broderick,
Holloway,.Weishan, Quindel, DeBruin
DEC l 6 2004
A RESOLUTION
County 88ard
Chairman
FILE NO. _.c_O_fc._- '1"-iL."' d.-__'-"'--
!J-3-0'7
fj~
f}ft. ~
9
To create the Community and Economic Development (CEO) Fund and adopt the Park East
Redevelopment Compact (PERC) in order to provide additional sustainable community
benefits for the development of the County Park East land.
~
(S-4 13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2!
22
WHEREAS, Milwaukee County will seek the sale of significant r·eal estate assets,
including approximately 16 acres of land in the Park East freeway corridor and these
lands represent tremendous assets held in trust by Milwaukee County for the benefit of
the citizens of this County. This revenue has been used in various ways, but often it has
been used to offset basic operating expense or tax levy; and
WHEREAS, while offsetting tax levy to fund operating expense is a tool that is
sometimes necessary, such major sales should provide a longer-term and sustainable
benefit to the community. True stewardship of these major public resources requires that
their sale provide a benefit for the citizens; and
WHEREAS, the redevelopment of the Park East land, by itself, using private
development, will not take advantage of unique opportunities to provide sustainable
community benefits especially to those in most need of jobs; and
24 WHEREAS, adoption of the Park East Redevelopment Compact (PERC), as
25 provided in this resolution, will provide the best opportunity to provide incr:eased jobs
26 and tax base not only on this land, but also for the entire community; and
27 WHEREAS, this resolution also provides for the creation of a Community and
28 Economic Development (CEO) Fund. The CEO (pronounced 'seed') Fund would be
29 comprised of a series of programs designed to address 'gap' needs in the marketplace and
JO it is not intended to reproduce resources that are available either in the commercial
Jl marketplace or through other public r·esources; and
32 WHEREAS, the CEO Funclt·ecognizes that there are ar·eas where the mar'ket does
33 not make available the resources r·equired for sustainable development and by providing
H those resources, the Fund seeks to be a catalyst that will enable businesses to develop
35 and grovv
1
communities to prosperr and the lives of all of our citizeilS to be enriched; and
36 WHEREAS, this Fund would be endowed with all net revenue gener·atcd by the
n of land i1-1 the Park l.=:ast Co1-ridor a11d ]y:: used to c;_nry out this n~solutinn for U .. 1e Park
38 East Rcdeve!oprnent CmT!])act (PLRC);
APPROVED AS 10 FOR hi
CORPORMION COUNSEL
APPENDIX 4: Park East Redevelopment Compact
292
39 WHEREAS, in the future, with the exception of revenue allocated to other
40 purposes by statute, ordinance, resolution, or budget action, revenue produced by the
41 sale of real estate assets (except park land sales) may be allocated to the CEO Fund by the
42 County Board at the ii me of each sale; and
43 The following are some possible uses of the CEO Fund:
44
45 • Minority Business Working Capital
46 • Small & Minority Business Contract Financing
47 • Housing Development
48 • Neighborhood Business Development
49 • Economic Development
50 • Environmental Mitigation/Brownfields
51 • Carry out Park East Redevelopment Compact (PERC); now therefore,
52
53 BE IT RESOLVED that this resolution adopts the principle and creation of the
54 Community Economic Development (CEO) Fund and adopts the Park East
55 Redevelopment Compact (PERC) with the specifics of the policies and procedures to
56 implement this resolution to be adopted separately by the County Board; and
57 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the following Park East Redevelopment Compact
58 (PERC) establishes the policies for the sale of the County's Park East land to achieve the
59 goal of providing additional sustainable community benefits for the development of this
60 land:
61 1. Competitive Development Agreements
62 Each parcel of Park East land will be sold through a competitive Request for Proposals
63 (RFP) which shall be reviewed and approved by the County Board. Milwaukee
64 County should not just sell the land for the highest price offered but rather should
65 seek development proposals which will provide the greatest future benefit in jobs, tax
66 base and image for the community, as well as, a fair price. The policies to carry out
67 the PERC will be contained in the RFP and the final legal requirements will be
68 included in each development contract. These contracts will be for 27 years or until
69 the Tax Incremental District (TID) is terminated. (A parcel may be all or part of one or
70 more blocks as contained in the each RFP.)
71
n 2. Cooperation with Existino 01·ganization~
73 Milwaukee County will coope1·ate with and use existing governmental and private
7iJ organizutior:s
1
pmgrarns <'llld funding sour·ces vvhenever possible to car·ry out these
75 PERC pol :cies.
76
7"
''
7S
79
80
~_g_rn ~J. LL!~ i tv _.§.~sl_
The CECI
funding is not
ic: Deve!uurr1cn1- Fund (CED)
------·-----------"-----·--· --------------
may b0 :o carry out these:: PERC policies vvhencver other
lhc CU) fund is described in other parts of this resolution.
2
APPENDIX 4: Park East Redevelopment Compact
293
81
82 4. Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE)
83 Milwaukee County will include their current DBE policies, as they apply to county
84 construction contracts, in all RFP's and development contracts. The Office of
85 Community Business Development Partners shall assist in administering this
86 provision.
87
88 5. Enhanced Apprenticeship and Training
89 All RFP's and development contracts shall contain additional apprenticeship and
90 training requirements, using existing agencies whenever possible. Participation in
91 County sponsmed training shall meet county established income and residency
92 requirements.
93
94 6. Local Employment and Coordination
95 Milwaukee County will hire one or more non-profit community economic
96 development agencies to assist in coordinating the DBE, training and local
97 employment requirements. All employment vacancies for developers, contractors,
98 trainees, owners and tenants, who will work on the County Park East land, will be
99 required to be provided to the County and the County's designated coordinating
100 agencies, so that they may assist local applicants to apply for these vacancies. This
101 requirement will end with the TID.
102
103 Milwaukee County and many in the community have as a goal that the workforce on
!04 the Park East property reflect the racial diversity of Milwaukee County. The
105 Milwaukee County Board and the community asks and expects businesses and
106 contractors to make a good faith effort to employ racial minorities consistent with
107 their numbers in the County's workforce. (The 2000 county census population (over
108 age 18) was 68.7% White, 20.4% Black, 7.2% Hispanic and 3.7% other). Reports
109 will be required to determine whether this goal is being achieved.
110
·111 7. Prevailing Wages and~Employment Data
112 All RFP's and development agreements will require the payment of prevailing wages
113 for constr·uction employees as is now required for most public works projects.
114 Developer·s, owners and tenants will be required to provide an annual repor1 to
115 Milwaukee County with the number of non-construction full and part time employees
116 working on the Pad< East project. Milwaukee County will develop the required report
117 which will include the wage ranges and whether employees have health or r·ctirement
118 benefits. This report will be designed to help measure the job impact of the PERC:.
119 Ti·:is n~:quircment 'Nil! end 'Nith the TlD.
i20
121
J22
0
u. /'_fforcicJb I e Hems i n g
h~vuukl::e County Vv'il! ~ponso1· construction
th,ln 2U'-;!) of the~ totai ng w·iit::; built 01-i the
124 be built on other ir1fill sites in the city ~~,/\il\vaukee. The Cou11ty .. in eJch RJP for any
3
APPENDIX 4: Park East Redevelopment Compact
294
125 given parcel, may require a different percentage of affordable housing or have no
126 requirement at aiL The County may use funds from existing housing programs along
127 with County funds to meet this requirement.
128
129 9. Green Space and Green Design
130 Milwaukee County will require that green space and green design be specifically
131 included in all proposals submitted in response to an RFP. The County will consider
132 this information wher1 evaluating and selecting a final developer for each parcel_
133
134 10. Community Advisory Committee and Administration
135 A Community Advisory Committee will be appointed by the Chairman of the County
136 Board, after the adoption of the PERC, which shall advise the County Board on
137 implementing the PERC policies. This committee shall continue until the Tax
138 Incremental District is completed for the PERC area. The Director of Economic and
139 Community Development shall assist this committee in preparing an annual report to
140 the County Board on the effects of the PERC policies. The Director of Economic and
141 Community Development shall administer the PERC agreements with the primary
142 goal to achieve the desired community benefits.
143
144 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that Milwaukee County should seek the input of
145 business and community leaders to assist in carrying out the PERC and CEO Fund policies.
146
147
148 10/28/04
149 1:\My Documents\PARK EAST REDEVELOPMEN1\Resolution.doc
150 GB/Id
151
4
APPENDIX 4: Park East Redevelopment Compact
295
SEATTLE HOUSING AUTHORITY
YESLER TERRACE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT
COMMUNITY WORKFORCE AGREEMENT
January 3, 2013
As amended with minor edits to Attachments; A, D, E, F & J and approved by
The NCA and Seattle Building Trades February 13, 2013
Page 1 of 62
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
296
1 " ~ 1 _ ~:
INTRODUCTION
DEFINITIONS
ARTICLEI PURPOSE ............................................................................................5
ARTICLE II SCOPE OF AGREEMENT ......................................................................9
ARTICLE III LABOR/MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE ..................................................13
ARTICLE !V UNION RECOGNITION AND EMPLOYMENT ..........................................15
ARTICLE V UNION REPRESENTATION AND STEWARDS .........................................19
ARTICLE V1 MANAGEMENT'S RIGHTS ..................................................................20
ARTICLE VII WORK STOPPAGES AND LOCKOUTS .................................................21
ARTICLE VIII DISPUTES AND GRIEVANCES ..........................................................24
ARTICLE IX JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES ........................ ......................................26
ARTICLE X WAGES AND BENEFITS ......................................................................28
ARTICLE XI HOURS OF WORK, OVERTIME, SHIFTS AND HOLIDAYS ........................31
ARTICLE XII SAFETY/ PROTECTION OF PERSON AND PROPERTYIJDINT
LABOR/MANGEMENT SAFETY COMMITTEE ...........................................................34
ARTICLE Xlll NON-DISCRIMINATION .....................................................................35
ARTICLE XIV TRAVEL AND SUBISTENCE ..............................................................36
ARTICLE XV WORKING CONDITIONS ...................................................................36
ARTICLE XVI WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT/SOCIAL EQUITY/ TRAINING ..................37
ARTICLE XVII HELMETS TO HARDHATS .........................................................43
ARTICLE XVIII SAVINGS AND SEPARABILITY .........................................................44
ARTICLE XIV DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT ....................................................45
Page 2 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
297
ATTACHMENT A Letter of Assent
ATTACHMENT B Substance Abuse Prevention Program
ATTACHMENT C Drug Testing Threshold Levels
ATTACHMENT D Employee Acknowledgement/Authorization Consent Form
ATTACHMENT E Proposed Trade Assignments Document
ATTACHMENT F Final Trade Assignment Document
ATTACHMENT G New Employee Report
ATTACHMENT H Craft Abbreviation/Information Report
ATTACHMENT I CWA Grievance Form
ATTACHMENT J CWA Procedures
EXHIBIT 1: SECTION 3 Business and WMBE Contracting Goals
Page 3 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
298
SEF~TTLE HOUSING AUTHORi~'
YESLER TERRACE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT
COMMUNITY WORKFORCE AGREEMENT
This Community Workforce Agreement (hereinafter, the "Agreement" or "CWA") is entered
into on January 3, 2013 by and between the Seattle Housing Authority, its successors or
assigns (hereinafter, "SHA" or "Owner") and the Seattle/King County Building and
Construction Trades Council and the Pacific Northwest Chapter of the National
Construction Alliance II (hereinafter, collectively called the "Construction Unions") and the
Local Unions who become signatory hereto (hereinafter, collectively called the "Union(s)"
or "Local Unions) ") with respect to the new construction work contracted or funded by the
Owner within the scope of this Agreement. This Agreement establishes the labor relations
policies and procedures for the Sea#tle Housing Authority, Contractors and subcontractors
and for the craft employees represented by the Unions engaged in the construction,
reconstruction or rehabilitation work with regard to the Yesler Terrace Redevelopment
Project, as further defined in Article II, Section 7, that is bid out and awarded by the Seattle
Housing Authority, or for work that is funded by the Seattle Housing Authority and
contracted to another government agency, on or before December 31, 2017 (hereinafter,
"Covered Work")
It is understood by the parties to this Agreement that if this Agreement is acceptable to the
Seattle Housing Authority and approved (as reflected by the authorized endorsement by
the Seattle Housing Authority in the space provided on the signature page of this
Agreement), it will become the policy of SHA that the construction work covered by this
Agreement will be contracted exclusively to Contractors and subcontractors, who through
their execution of a Letter of Assent (Attachment A) binding them to this Agreement, shall
have become bound hereto.
It is further understood that the Parties to this Agreement support the active and effective
administration and enforcement of the terms of this Agreement by all signatory parties to
ensure that the benefits envisioned from it flow to all intended parties: the Owner,
taxpayers, residents living in and near SHA housing, Contractors and community groups.
SHA will, therefore, designate a Community Workforce Agreement Administrator
(hereinafter, "Administrator"), either from its own staff or an independent, third-party
contractvt', i0 fTiGi iiivi Zvi i i~IIAI IIiC vviii i tl IIJ
/~-~l~"".
I Gel i ICI It; ~5Si51, c!S if IC dUlf IVI IL~U
representative of SHA, in developing and implementing the programs referenced herein,
all of which are critical to fulfilling the intent and purposes of the Parties and this
Agreement; and to otherwise interpret, implement and administer this Agreement. For such
purposes, the Owner recognizes and appoints the Adminisfirator, its successors or assigns,
as its agent; and together with Contractors and the Unions, the Administrator shall be
considered a party in interest in all matters related to his Agreement.
Page 4 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
299
The Owner will implement this Agreement by including appropriate provisions in its
solicitation documents, contract specifications and other contract documents for Covered
Work, as hereinafter defined. Therefore, the Parties agree that this Agreement will cover
a!I Contractors, subcontractors of whatever tier, individuals, firms, partnerships,
corporations (or any combination thereofl, including any joint ventures (hereinafter,
"Contractors" or "Employers") that will perform Covered Work and that each will become
party to this Agreement and that the Agreement specifies the rights and obligations of each
such Contractor as if already party to this Agreement.
The Unions and all signatory Contractors agree to abide by the terms and conditions
contained in this Agreement. This Agreement represents the complete understanding of
the parties, and no Contractor is or will be required to sign any other agreement with a
signatory union as a condition of performing work within the scope of this Agreement. No
practice, understanding or agreement befinreen a Contractor and a Union party which is not
specifically set forth in this Agreement will be binding on any other party unless endorsed
in writing by the Administrator.
The Unions agree that this Agreement will be made available to, and will fully apply to, any
successful contractor for Covered Work who becomes a signatory hereto, without regard
to whether that successful contractor performs work at other sites on either a union or a
non-union basis, and without regard to whether employees of such contractor are or are
not members of any union. This Agreement shall not apply to any work of any contractor
performed on any other project or at any location other than as defined in this Agreement.
The Unions hereby pledge to work cooperatively with all businesses awarded work
governed by this Agreement, despite any other dispute they may have with a business
over, for example, trust or benefit payments that arose on non-Covered Work.
The use of masculine or feminine gender or titles in this Agreement shall be construed as
including both genders and not as gender limitations, unless the Agreement clearly
requires a different construction.
DEFINITIONS
1) Agreement: The Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project Community Workforce
Agreement between the Seattle Housing Authority, signatory Contractors and signatory
Unions that have negotiated the terms and conditions of employment and have established
the labor relations policies and procedures to be applied for the work on the Yesler Terrace
Redevelopment Project.
2) Community Workforce Agreement Administrator: Contractor or SHA staff who will
act as a representative of SHA to interpret, monitor and enforce the terms and conditions
of the Agreement.
3) Construction Unions: Seattle/King County Building and Construction Trades Council
and the Pacific Northwest Chapter of the National Construction Alliance.
Page 5 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
300
4) "Core" Employee: An employee of a Contractor not signatory to a collective bargaining
agreement with any of the Local Unions who meets the criteria established it the CWA.
5) Covered Work: All on-site construction, reconstruction or rehabilitation work with
regard to the Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project, as further defined in Article II,
Section 1, that is bid out and awarded by the Seattle Housing Authority, or for work that is
funded by the Seattle Housing Authority and contracted to another government agency,
on or before December 31, 2017.
6) Greatest Extent Feasible: Every effort must be made to comply with the regulatory
requirements of Section 3. Recipients of Section 3 covered financial assistance will make
every enor~ within ineir aisposai to meet the regulatory requirements, including developing
strategies that will specifically target Section 3 residents and businesses for these types of
economic opportunities.
7) HUD Youthbuild Programs: Programs that receive assistance under subtitle D of Title
IV of the National Affordable Housing Act, as amended by the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 12899), and provide disadvantaged youth with
opportunities for employment, education, leadership development, and training in the
construction or rehabilitation of housing for homeless individuals and members of low- and
very low-income families.
8) Joint Advisory Committee: A Committee comprised of the Community Workforce
Agreement Administrator, representatives of the signatory Construction Unions, as well as
Contractors whose purpose is to promote harmonious and stable laborlmanagement
relations on the project for issues that have project-wide implications. The Committee
Beets mont .{y.
9) "Key" Employee: An employee of a Union Contractor who meets the criteria
established in the CWA.
10) Low-Income and Very Low-Income: Low- and very low-income limits are
determined annually by HUD. These limits are typically established at eighty (80) percent
and fifty (50) percent, respectfully, of the median income for each locality by household
size or the number of people residing in one (1) house. HUD income limits may be
obtained from: http://www.huduser.org /portal/datasets/il.html
11) Metropolitan Area: A metropolitan statistical area (MSA), as established by the Office
of Management and Budget. SHA's metropolitan areas are King County, Snohomish
County, and Pierce County.
12) Owner: The Seattle Housing Authority.
13) Parties: Seattle Housing Authority, Contractors signatory to this Agreement and
Unions signatory to this Agreement.
Page 6 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
301
14) Pr, oiect: The term "Project" refers collectively to the individual projects (affordable
housing units, community facilities, steam plant renovation and infrastructure) that make
up the Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project.
15) Section 3 Advisory Subcommittee: The committee authorized under Article III of
this Agreement to provide the Owner with assistance and advisory services concerning the
administration of the social equity requirements established far its contracts pursuant to
Article XVI.
16) Section 3 Business Concern: A business concern,
a. That is fifty-one percent (51 %) or more owned by Section 3 resident: or
b. Whose permanent, full-time employees include persons, at least thirty (30) percent
of whom are Section 3 residents, or were Section 3 residents within three (3) years
of the date of first hire; or
c. That provides evidence of a commitment to subcontract in excess of twenty-five
percent (25%) of the dollar award of all subcontractors to be awarded to business
concerns that meet the qualifications set forth in paragraphs a or b above.
17) Section 3 Resident: A public housing resident or an individual who resides in the
metropolitan area or non-metropolitan county in which the Section 3 covered assistance is
expended and who is considered to be a low- to very low-income person.
18) Women-owned or Minority-owned Business Enterprises "WMBEs": Businesses
that are self-identified or certified by the State of Washington Office of Minority and
Women's Business Enterprises (OMWBE) to be at least fifty-one percent (51 %) owned by
women and/or minority group members, including but not limited to African Americans,
Native Americans, Asians, Hispanics, and Hasidic Jews.
ARTICLE I:
INTENT AND PURPOSE
Seattle Housing Authority is engaged in a long-term, comprehensive effort to
replace Yesler Terrace's aging public housing buildings with a new mixed-income
community, known as the Yesler Terrace Master Planned Community (hereinafter, "Master
Plan", where people from across society can come together to enjoy cultural diversity,
neighborhood amenities and high-quality housing, thereby furthering many regional policy
goals, including: smart growth, neighborhood scale sustainability, maximizing public transit
infrastructure investments, creating "complete streets" and walkable neighborhoods,
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and adding to the stock of affordable housing. The
Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Guiding Principles, developed by the Citizen Review
Committee, establish core values of social equity, economic opportunity, environmental
stewardship and sustainability, and one-for-one replacement housing for the
Page 7 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
302
redevelopment. Affordable housing will ~nc!;a~e fiv? h~andrsd end sixty-~np X561;
replacement units targeted to people with incomes under thirty percent (30%) of Area
Median Income (AMI), two hundred and ninety (290) additional low-income units serving
people with incomes from thirty to sixty percent (30 — 60 %) AMI and up to eighfi hundred
and fifty (850) workforce housing serving people with incomes below_ eighty percent (80%)
~CNII~ The-l~/laster Plan will be carried out over ten to fifteen (10 — 15) years in multiple
phases.
The Seattle Housing Authority intends to use the term "Yesler Terrace Redevelopment
Project" (hereinafter, the "Project") to refer collectively to a number of individual projects,
listed in Article II, Section 1) that they will build, or fund. These projects are an integral and
important part of the overall Yesler Terrace Master Planned Community, but distinctly
se~a~ ate fr~~ ~ ~ ~t .e. ti1d~ic~ I~'Idfl FJf VJ~~S L~ldi WIII [Je DUlli [Jy n0(1-FJfOTIiS, or market-rate
developers, as the work on the Project will be covered by the Yesler Terrace
Redevelopment Project Community Workforce Agreement. As such, work on these
projects will be referred to as "Covered Work". SHA seeks to establish the Yesler Terrace
Redevelopment Project Community Workforce Agreement as a model for social equity,
workforce development and economic development programs. SHA, therefore, wishes to
promote these programs through the employment of low-income residents, utilization of
Section 3 businesses, women and minority businesses, employment of women and
minority workers, as well as to utilize the most modern, efficient and effective procedures
for construction, including assurances of a sufficient supply of skilled craft workers, the
elimination of disruptions or interference with Covered Work and a Project that is
completed on time and within budget.
The Unions agree and accept that critical funding for this Project under the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968 requires, under Section 3 of the Act (hereinafter, "Section
3"), that econcmic cpp~~tunit~es be given to qual~~ied residents and Businesses in the
project area and that SHA and Contractors must exert efforts to achieve the statutes'
training, hiring and contracting goals "to the greatest extent feasible." Accordingly, the
Parties have established and put into operation under this Agreement unique procedures
and practices to achieve these goals.
i.Although the program is quite comprehensive, the intention of this CWA is that only the
work bid out and awarded by the Seattle Housing Authority, or work funded by the
Seattle Housing Authority and contracted to another government entity, on or before
December 31, 2017, will be considered Covered Work. However, it is also the
intention of the Parties to offer the CWA to contractors working on groiects for non-
profits or market-rate developers within the Master Plan on a voluntary basis. The
Parties further agree that work not bid gut and awarded, or funded by SHA, within the
Master Plan may be performed by Contractors that have not entered into or assented
to this Agreement or any collective bargaining or labor agreement or otherwise with
any Union or any party hereto. Nonetheless and notwithstanding anything contained in
this Agreement or any other agreement to the contrary, the Unions and Contractors
agree that they will not encourage or engage in any lockouts, strikes or any other
demonstrations or disturbances on any projects covered by the CWA.
Yage 8 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
303
ii. Will at all times maintain harmony and cooperation with any and all contractors and
others perForming work on the Project or Master Plan, and;
iii. Waive any and all claims, damages, complaints and rights to engage in or encourage
any lockout, strike or any other demonstration or disturbance with regard to Covered
Work at the Project. The parties agree that the timely and successful completion of the
SHA-proposed Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project is critical to the ability of SHA
to meet the area's need to provide affordable housing.
It is the explicit understanding and intention of the parties to this Agreement to use the
opportunities provided by the work covered by this Agreement to identify and promote,
(through cooperative efforts, programs and procedures) the interest and involvement of
low-income residents in the construction industry; to assist them in entering the
construction trades, and through utilization of Washington State-approved apprenticeship
programs, to provide training opportunities for those residents and other individuals
wishing to pursue a career in construction.
To this end, the Parties agree that:
1) Section 3-eligible persons seeking pre-apprenticeship training will be given
preference for entry into these programs.
2) Qualified Section 3-eligible persons who successfully complete approved pre-
apprenticeship programs, mutually agreed upon by SHA and the Unions, will be given
preference for entry into the Union-sponsored apprenticeship programs
3) Qualified Section 3-elegible persons enrolled in Union-sponsored apprenticeship
programs will be given preference in dispatch to Contractors working on the Project.
4) Section 3-eligible persons who qualify and possess the requisite skills as a
journeyman as evaluated by the Local Unions will be given preference in employment
by Contractors working on the Project. These evaluations by the Unions will be offered
frequently and in close proximity to the Project. Any person denied journeyman status
by any of the Local Unions may appeal this decision to the Administrator. The
Administrator has sole discretion to accept or deny the decision of the Local Union.
The Project will also provide many opportunities for Section 3 businesses and women- and
minority-owned business enterprises to participate as Contractors or suppliers, and the
parties therefore agree that they will cooperate with all efforts of SHA for the purpose of
encouraging and assisting the participation of these businesses on the Project.
Specifically, all parties understand that SHA has established and quantified goals which
place a strong emphasis on the utilization of Section 3 businesses and women- and
minority-owned businesses on the Project. Each party agrees that it shall employ
demonstrable efforts to encourage utilization in an effort to achieve such goals. Further,
the parties shall ensure that the provisions of this Agreement do not inadvertently establish
impediments to participation of such small local businesses and residents of SHA.
Page 9 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
304
Thy parties recognize that the ~orstr:~ction to take place under this Agreement involves
unique and special circumstances, which dictate the need for the parties to develop
specific procedures to promote high-quality, rapid and uninterrupted construction methods
and practices. The smooth operation and successful and timely completion of the work is
vitally important to the residents of Seattle Housing Authority facilities. The parties
therefore agree that maximum cooperation among all parties involved is required and that
it is essential that all parties work in a spirit of harmony and cooperation, and with an
overriding commitment to maintain the continuity of Covered Work.
In the interest of the future of the construction industry in the King County area, of which
labor is a vital part, and to maintain the most efficient and competitive posture possible, the
Unions pledge to work with management on this Project to produce the most efficient
uiiiiz~iion or lagor and equipment in accordance with this Agreement.
The purpose of this Community Workforce Agreement is to ensure that all construction
work at the Project will proceed continuously and without interruption, efficiently,
economically, and with due consideration for the protection of labor standards, wages and
working conditions. In recognition of the special needs of this Project and to maintain a
spirit of harmony, Labor/Management peace and stability during the term of this
Community Workforce Agreement, the parties agree to establish and put into practice
effective and binding methods for the settlement of all misunderstandings, disputes or
grievances that may arise between the Contractors) or subcontractor(s), at any tier level,
and the Unions, or their members, to the end that the Owner, the Contractors and the
Unions are assured of complete continuity of operation without slowdown or interruption of
any kind.
As previously stated, the parties are committed to providing open access to bidding
opportunities for ail ~ontracfors and to assuring an adequate supply of craft workers
possessing the requisite skills and training in order to provide SHA, their residents and
ratepayers a project of the highest quality. Further, the parties agree to cooperate
throughout the term of this agreement to develop methods to reduce SHA construction and
project administrative costs.
ARTICLE II:
SCOPE OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall apply end is limit?~I to a!! C~vere~ 1/~!ork ir. C?~?f~ tG~ ?!I ~n-s:te
construction, reconstruction or rehabilitation work on the Yesler Terrace Redevelopment
Project, on the individual projects specifically listed in Section 1 of this Article, that is bid
out and awarded by the Seattle Housing Authority, or for work that is funded by the Seattle
Housing Authority and contracted to another government agency, on or before, December
31, 2017.
As such, Covered Work is only to be applied to the individual projects that collectively
make up the Yeller Terrace Redevelopment Project. These projects are listed below:
Page 10 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
305
Section 1: Pro jects to be covered:
(a) Affordable housing units
(b) Community facilities
(c) Steam plant
(d) Infrastructure
It is understood by the Parties that the Owner may at any time, and at its sole discretion,
determine to build segments of the Project under this Agreement not currently proposed,
or to modify or not to build any one or more of the particular segments proposed to be
covered. If segments are added to the Project scope, they will be covered by this
Agreement at the discretion of the Owner.
Section 2: Off-Site Fabrication:
Pre-cast, pre-fabricated, pre-assembled, or pre-finished items shall be performed in shops
or at off-site assembly yards employing workers whose terms and conditions meet or
exceed those conditions established by Articles X, and XI of this Community Workforce
Agreement for the craft having jurisdiction over the pre-cast, pre-fabrication, pre-assembly,
or pre-finishing being performed. The Union recognizes that the timely completion of this
project is vital to the Owner. Therefore, if the nature of the work, under project schedule, or
contracting circumstances make it necessary to obtain pre-cast, pre-fabrication, pre-
assembly, orpre-finishing under conditions different than those above, the Union agrees to
cooperate in accommodating the reasonable needs of the Project. If, as a result of such
circumstances, the pre-cast, pre-fabrication, pre-assembly, or pre-finishing is performed
outside the region, the pre-cast, pre-fabrication, pre-assembly, orpre-finishing will be
performed in shops or assembly yards whose terms and conditions of employment equal
or exceed those established in this area under the prevailing wage laws applicable for the
appropriate work classification. The Project Contractor and the Union agree to discuss any
other circumstances affecting off- site fabrication contracting or purchases where an
accommodation is sought for any reasons making it necessary to depart from the
conditions set forth above. The Union will not unreasonably withhold its consent to such
accommodations and the Union agrees to install on-site any components fabricated
pursuant to the terms of this Article and Section without limitation. The parties will make
every effort to keep an open channel of communication to insure that both parties are fully
informed of the facts affecting the substance of this Section.
Section 3: Items specifically excluded from the scope of this Agreement
include the following:
(a) Work of non-manual employees, including but not limited to, superintendents,
supervisors, assistant supervisors, staff engineers, inspectors, quality control and
quality assurance personnel, timekeepers, mail carriers, clerks, office workers,
including messengers, guards, safety personnel, emergency medical and first aid
Page i l of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
306
technicians, and other professional, engineeri~y, administrative, corr~~runity r~~dt~or~
or public affairs, environmental compliance, supervisory and management
employees.
(b) Equipment and machinery owned or controlled and operated by the SHA or by
any of the SHA concessionaires or tenants.
(c) All off-site manufacture, pre-fabrication or assembly of materials, equipment or
machinery, not in contradiction with Section 2 above.
(d) All employees of the design teams or any other consultants of the SHA for
specialty testing, architectural/engineering design and other professional services.
(e) Any work performed on or near or leading to or onto the site of work covered by
this Agreement and undertaken by state, county, city or other governmental bodies,
other than SHA, or their contractors; or by public utilities or their contractors.
(fl Work by employees of a manufacturer or vendor necessary to maintain such
manufacturer's or vendor's written warranty or guarantee, or the on-site supervision
of such work.
(g) Laboratory for specialty testing or inspections not ordinarily done by the signatory
Local Unions.
(h) Non-construction support services contracted by the Owner in connection with
this Project.
(~) A!! work by employees of the ANA ~r by e~rtractors ~f reta~~ c:.mpanies c.
concessionaires doing business within the Project site after certificate of occupancy
has been issued. The Unions recognize that during the term of this Agreement,
significant improvements will be contracted directly by tenants or concessionaires
and performed by contractors outside the scope of this Agreement.
(j) Construction work ancillary to the Project, but contracted by others. When the
Administrator is informed of such construction work, it will notify the Construction
Unions as soon as possible thereafter, but not later than twenty-four (24) hours prior
to the commencement of such work.
(k) Construction work contracted out and/or performed by contractors of non-profiits
or market rate developers on the Yesler Terrace Master Planned Communi#y, not
covered by this Agreement.
(I) Construction prime contracts whose bids or proposals come in below five
hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
(m) Construction contracts granted a waiver pursuant to Article IV, Section 8.
Page 12 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
307
(n) Survey work by companies contracted by the Owner to perform QA/QC work for
the purpose of verifying the Contractor's work and updating the final survey.
Section 4: (a) The Owner and/or Contractors, as appropriate, have the
absolute right to select any qualified contractor and award contracts or subcontracts on
this Project without reference to the existence or non-existence of any collective bargaining
agreements between the prospective Contractor and any Union party, provided only that
such Contractor is willing, ready and able to comply with this Community Workforce
Agreement and to execute a Letter of Assent (in the form attached as Attachment A),
should such Contractor be awarded work covered by this Agreement.
(b) It is agreed that all subcontractors of a Contractor, of whatever tier, who have been
awarded contracts of work covered by this Agreement that are solicited and awarded after
the effective date of this Agreement shall be required to accept and to be bound by the
terms and conditions of this Community Workforce Agreement, and shall evidence their
acceptance by the execution of a Letter of Assent with a copy transmitted to the
Construction Unions and the Administrator a minimum of one (1) week prior to the
jurisdictional pre-job conference established for that contract.
Section 5: (a) The provisions of this Community Workforce Agreement,
including the local Collective Bargaining Agreements (hereinafter, "CBA"), as modified by
this Agreement, between bona fide contractor groups or representatives and the signatory
Unions having covered work that corresponds to Covered Work on the Project shall apply
to the work covered by this Agreement, notwithstanding the provisions of any other local,
area and/or national agreements which may conflict with or differ from the terms of this
Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Elevator Constructors' National Agreement
shall be applied to work falling within the jurisdiction of the Elevator Constructors, except
that Articles VII, VIII, and IX of this Agreement shall prevail and be applied to such work.
The Administrator and each Local Union shall agree upon the local collective bargaining
agreement to be designated for work covered by this Agreement. Where a subject covered
by the provisions of this Agreement is also covered within the applicable CBA, the
provisions of this Agreement shall prevail. Where a subject is covered by the provisions of
the applicable CBA and is not covered by this Agreement, the provisions of the applicable
CBA shall prevail.
(b) Disputes pertaining to the applicable source between this Agreement and any CBA
provision shall be resolved under the procedures established in Article VI11. It is
understood that this Agreement, together with the referenced CBA's, constitutes a self-
contained, stand-alone agreement and that, by virtue of having become bound to this
Community Workforce Agreement, the Contractor will not be obligated to sign any other
local, area or national agreement as a condition of performing work within the scope of this
Agreement.
Page 13 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
308
Section 6: This Agreement sha!! oily be girding upon the signatory ~iart~2~
hereto and shall not apply to the parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, or other ventures of any
such party.
Section 7: This Agreement shall be limited to the on-site construction work
within the scope of this Agreement, as set forth in Section 1 of this Article, for which prime
contractor bids or proposals have been advertised after the effective date of this
Agreement, including, specifically, site preparation and related demolition and
deconstruction work. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit, restrict, or
interfere with the performance of any other operation, work or function awarded to any
contractor before the effective date of this Agreement or which may be performed or
contracted by the Owner for its own account on the property, in and around the Project
~~nsiruction sites, yr iviasier Tian.
Section 8: It is understood that the liability of the Contractor and the liability of
the separate Unions under this Agreement shall be several and not joint. The Unions
agree that this Agreement does not have the effect of creating any joint employment status
between or among the Owner and/or any Contractor.
Section 9: None of the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to SHA and
nothing contained herein shall be construed #o prohibit or restrict SHA or its employees
from performing work not covered by this Agreement on the Project sites or Master Plan.
As areas and systems of the Project are inspected and construction tested and accepted
by the SHA, the Agreement shall have no further force or effect on such items or areas,
except when the Contracfiors are directed to engage in repairs, modifications, check-out
and/or warranty functions required by their contract(s).
section 10: it is understood that the Owner, at its sole option, may "terminate,
delay and/or suspend any and all portions of the covered work at any time.
Section 11: The Parties agree and understand that this Agreement shall not apply to
any work that would otherwise be Covered Work except when a government agency or
granting authority partially or fully funding such Covered Work determines that it will not
fund it if such Covered Work is covered by this Agreement; or a law, regulation, proposition
or measure prohibits such coverage or the use by SHA, or for its benefits, or particular
funds if such coverage exists. SHA agrees that it will make every effort to secure approval
for the application of this Agreement from any government agency or granting authority
having authority or control over cpnditiens ~nnlie:ahlP to
the ~?rf~rmanCe
~f tie ~~,r,rk,
ARTICLE III:
MONTHLY LABOR/MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE &SECTION 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Section 1: The parties to this Agreement recognize the necessity for
cooperation and communication between Labor and Management, the elimination of
Page 14 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
309
disputes and misunderstandings and the resolution of unfair practices on the part of any
party. To this end, the Community Workforce Agreement Administrator will meet monthly
with the representatives of the signatory Construction Unions to promote harmonious and
stable labor/management relations on this project for issues that have project-wide
implications arising under the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and to insure
effective and constructive communications between the labor and management parties.
The date and time of this meeting will be determined by the parties and will be open to all
representatives of Contractors signatory to this Agreement.
At this meeting, the Administrator will give a report on the safety and progress of on-going
contracts and any outstanding issues pertaining to this project, and will entertain questions
and discuss labor relations matters of mutual interest affecting the work and administration
of the Agreement.
Section 2: A Community Workforce Agreement Joint Administrative
Committee (JAC) will be formed consisting of equal numbers of Union representatives,
selected by the Unions and Contractor representatives, selected by the Administrator. The
Committee shall be jointly chaired by a representative of the Administrator and a
representative of the Unions, appointed by the Construction Unions. The purpose of the
committee will be to resolve disputes and misunderstandings related to the interpretation
and effective implementation of this Agreement.
The Committee shall meet at the call of the Joint Chairs of the monthly Labor/Management
Meeting to discuss any labor/management problems that may arise or any other matters
consistent with this Agreement. The Administrator shall be responsible for the scheduling
of the meetings, the preparation of the agenda topics for the meeting with input from the
Unions and Contractors. Notice of the date and time of the meeting shall be given to the
Committee members at least three (3) business days prior to the meeting. In an
emergency, a meeting of the Committee may be held within two (2) business days at the
request of any member Union or Contractor. The Meetings will be held at the Seattle
Housing Authority offices.
At such meetings any member may present facts concerning any alleged violations of any
part of the Agreement by a Contractor or its subcontractors or by any Union. The Unions
and the Contractors each agree to notify the other party upon discovery of any potential
violation of this Agreement or any practices that might lead to a misunderstanding or
dispute between the parties. Any agreement or resolution reached pursuant to this
paragraph shall not supersede, alter, modify, amend, add to or subtract from this
Agreement.
All parties signatory to this Agreement acknowledge the importance of attendance and
active support of the Joint Administrative Committee and agree to participate in the
meetings as their responsibility requires.
Section 3: (a) Section 3 Advisory Subcommittee: The parties signatory to this
Agreement and the Owner agree that the Owner's existing Section 3 Advisory Committee
Page 15 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
310
shall funct;on under this Agreement as a sabc;ommittee of the JAC. Far purposes of th~~
CWA, the Subcommittee shall be comprised of representatives of the Construction Unions,
Contractors and affected Community-based organizations with the additi~r. of ±he
Administrator as a participating member. The Administrator will serve as a liaison
between this Subcommittee and the JAC and in this capacity, shall brief the JAC on any
subcommittee discussions concerning this Project as requested.
The Section 3 Advisory Committee will serve as the central forum for representatives of all
interested parties to report, exchange information and ideas, and to advise the Owner's
Representatives (Administrator and SHA staff, as appropriate) concerning the operation
and results of the Seattle Housing Authority Social Equity Program and the on-going role
of this Community Workforce Agreement as an integral component of SHA's Yesler
Terrace Keaeveiopmen~ project.
It is the goal of the Committee to achieve the inclusion of disadvantaged businesses and
individuals in the contracting and employment opportunities created by the Covered Work.
The Committee will serve these purposes:
1) Monitor contractors' compliance efforts with the social equity requirements and
goals for all Covered Work on the Yesler Terrace Project.
2) Advise SHA and its contractors on how best to meet those goals as appropriate as
well as address areas of deficiency and corrective measures.
3) By its representative composition, the Committee will help interested community
members understand the requirements and goals, and SHA's and the Parties'
cemmitmert to them.
4) Through the Committee's involvement, increase the community's confidence in the
effort being made and make success more likely.
The Subcommittee will meet monthly after business hours to discuss work progress and
projections and other issues of mutual concern. SHA's contract specifications will include
the requirements for its contractors to attend these meetings for work covered under this
Agreement.
ARTICLE IV:
UNION RECOGNITION AND EMPLOYMENT
Section 1: The Contractor recognizes the Unions as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representatives of all craft employees within their respective jurisdictions
working on the Project within the scope of this Agreement. The collective bargaining
relationship so established is recognized to be a "pre-hire" relationship authorized under
Section 8(fl of the National Labor Relations Act.
Page 16 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
311
Section 2: The Contractor shall have the right to determine the competency of
all employees and the number of employees required, and shall have the sole
responsibility for selecting employees to be laid off, consistent with Article V, Section 3.
Section 3: (a) For Local Unions now having a job referral system in their CBA,
the Contractor agrees to comply with such system and it shall be used exclusively by such
Contractor, except as modified by this Article. Such job referral system will be operated in
anon-discriminatory manner and in full compliance with federal, state, and local laws and
regulation, and referrals shall not be affected by obligations of union membership or the
lack thereof. All of the foregoing hiring procedures, including related practices affecting
apprenticeship, shall be operated so as to accommodate the goals of the SHA to
encourage employment of local and disadvantaged Section 3 residents and utilization of
small local businesses on the Project, and to facilitate the ability of all Contractors to meet
their employment needs.
(b) The Contractor may reject any referral for any lawful nondiscriminatory reason,
provided the Contractor complies with Article XI, Section 6. If the Contractor does reject
any referral before the dispatched individual performs any work ( "turned around"), the
Contractor will write a letter to the Administrator and the affected Union explaining the
reasons) for the rejection.
Section 4: In the event that Local Unions are unable to fill any request for
employees within forty-eight (48) hours after such request is made by the Contractor
(Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excepted), the Contractor may employ applicants from
any other available source. The Contractor shall inform the Union and the Administrator of
the name of any applicants hired from other sources and shall refer the applicant to the
Local Union for dispatch to the Project prior to the commencement of employment.
Section 5: Except as required by law, the Local Unions shall not knowingly
refer an employee currently employed by any Contractor working under this Agreement to
any other Contractor.
Section 6: It is agreed that affirmative action shall be taken to afford equal
employment opportunity to all qualified persons without regard to race, creed, color, sex,
disability, national origin or any other protected classification. This shall be applicable to
all matters relating to hiring, training, promotion, transfer or termination of employees. The
parties agree to cooperate to the fullest extent to achieve the intent and purpose of Title VII
of the Civi] Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order No. 17246, or such laws or Executive
Orders as may supersede them.
Section 7: No employee covered by this Agreement shall be required to join any
Union as a condition of being employed on the Project; provided, however, that an
employee who is a member of the referring union at the time of the referral shall maintain
that membership while employed under the Agreement. All employees shall, however, be
required to comply with the union security provision of the applicable CBA, for the period
Page 17 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
312
during which they are performing ~n-site work,, except a~ modified by ±his Agreement. The
Contractor agrees to deduct union dues or representation fees, whichever is applicable,
from the pay of any employee who executes a voluntary authorization for such deductions
and to remit the dues to the appropriate Union.
Section 8: The Parties recognize SHA's commitment to provide opportunities
to the greatest extent feasible contracting opportunities to minority-owned and women-
owned businesses and HUD Section 3 businesses (hereinafter "WMBE" or "Section 3 ").
Contracting participation goals of fourteen percent (14%) for WMBEs and ten percent
(10%) for Section 3 businesses have been established for construction projects covered
under this Agreement. Additional information concerning these contracting goals is
outlined in Exhibit 1. The Parties understand that SHA recognizes small or disadvantaged
uus~~~e5s e~ii~~°~~ises ~s i~eing covered under its ~eciion ;s business or vvomen- or
Minority-Owned Business programs. The Unions agree that if SHA is unable to meet its
WMBE or Section 3 business goals because qualified union WMBE or Section 3
businesses will not bid or propose or are unable to provide a competitive responsive bid or
proposal, Article II, Section 3 of this Agreement may be waived by mutual agreement
between SHA and the Unions. Such waiver will not be unreasonably denied. The Owner,
Contractors, and the Unions shall commit to joint outreach efforts throughout the Seattle
area to promote the WMBE, and Section 3 business work opportunities available on the
Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Project.
It is the intention of SHA to partner with other Puget Sound area organizations to create a
regional approach to encourage, support and "grow" WMBE and Section 3 contractors.
Upon establishment of this multi-agency program and approval by SHA, a WMBE or
Section 3 contractor may apply to the JAC for cone-time only waiver to be exempt from
the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The WMBE or Section 3 contractor receiving
tti~ ore-ili7ic Gillj/'v~iaiVE'i wii~ be r~quir~d to attend and successfuiiy complete any program
that is developed in order to be eligible for any additional SHA contracts. No parent
company, joint ventures, subsidiary and/or other WMBE or Section 3 contractors who
share any corporate shareholders with the WMBE or Section 3 contractor to whom this
waiver is extended, or WMBE or Section 3 contractors who bid or propose on other work at
fihe Yesler Terrace Master Planned Community for contracts bid out by contractors not
signatory to this Agreement shall receive a subsequent second waiver. Any additional
contracts awarded to the WMBE or Section 3 contractor will be worked under all of the
terms and conditions contained in the Agreement, if applicable.
Section 9: "Core" Employees: The parkie~ rec~g~li~e the QvtrnPr'~
commitment to provide opportunities to participate on the Project to emerging business
enterprises as well as other enterprises which may not have previously had a relationship
with the Unions signatory to this Agreement. To ensure that such Contractors will have an
opportunity to employ workers with whom they have had a previous relationship and who
they believe are essential for the efficient, reliable, and consistent operation of their
company (hereinafter, "core" employees), the Parties agree that in those situations where
a Contractor not a party to a current collective bargaining agreement with the signatory
Union having jurisdiction over the affected work is a successful bidder or proposer, the
Page 18 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
313
Contractor may request by name, and the Local will honor, referral of up to a maximum of
three (3) persons in each craft, provided that the Contractor first demonstrates that those
persons possess the following qualifications:
Any license required by state or federal law for the Covered Work to be
performed;
Have worked a total of at least one thousand (1,000) hours in the construction
craft during the prior three (3) years;
iii. Were on the Contractor's active payroll for at least sixty (60) out of the one
hundred-eighty (180) calendar days prior to the contract award;
iv. Have the ability to perform safely the basic functions of the applicable trade.
It is understood by the Parties to this Agreement that the Unions will work with SHA
regarding their employee referrals to ensure maximum opportunity for Section 3
placement, apprenticeship utilization, and women and minority utilization consistent with
the requirements of Article XVI. Therefore, the method for referral listed below may be
modified only to the extent as necessary to achieve a contractor's goals in these areas.
Except that a Contractor may elect to hire one of its core employees to be a foreman, the
Union will first refer to such contractor one (1) journeyman employee from the hiring hall
out-of—work list for the affected trade or craft, and will then refer one (1) of such
Contractor's core employees as a journeyman and shall repeat the process, one (1) and
one (1), until such Contractor's crew requirements are met or until such Contractor has
hired three (3) core employees, whichever occurs first. Thereafter, all additional
employees in the affected trade or craft shall be hired exclusively from the hiring hall out-
of-work list{s). For the duration of the Contractor's work, the ratio of core employees to
hiring hall referrals shall be maintained and when the Contractor's workforce is reduced,
employees shall be reduced in the same ratio as was applied in the initial hiring.
(a) All Contractors shall require their core workforce and any other persons employed
other than through the referral process, to register with the appropriate hiring hall, if any,
prior to their first day of employment at the Project site.
(b) If there are any questions regarding a core employee's eligibility under this provision,
the Administrator, at the request from the affected Union, shall obtain appropriate proof of
such from the Contractor. For proof of employment eligibility, payroll records normally
maintained by the Contractor (or officially recognized substitutes) shall be utilized.
(c) Exceptions to core employee referral provisions are allowed for contractors
who meet one (1) or more of the following classifications:
• Minority Owned business (MBE)
• Women Owned business (WBE)
• Minority Women Owned Business (MWBE)
Pale 19 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
314
Section 3 Business Gon~ern
For Contractors in these classifications, the limits on care employees shall be as follows:
the first two (2) workers may be core employees and the next two (2) shall be Union
referrals, understanding that such referrals shall be consistent with SHA's Section 3
employment, apprenticeship, and women and minority employment goals and
requirements. Thereafter, dispatch may alternate one-for-one (1/1) between core
employees and Union-dispatched employees until there are five (5) core employees, per
craft, dispatched to the Contracfior. Thereafter, all additional employees in the affected
trade or craft shall be hired exclusively from the hiring hall out-of-work list(s).
Section 10: "Kev" Employees: To ensure Contractors party to a current collective
pargaining agreement wiin a signatory union with jurisdiction over the affected work have
an opportunity to be successful, the Parties agree that they will have an opportunity to
employ workers with whom they have had a previous relationship and who they believe
are essential for the efficient, reliable, and consistent operation of their company
(hereinafter, "key" employees) and that Section 3-eligible workers will have priority access
to Project openings. To this end, the Parties agree to the following procedures.
1) The Contractor may transfer and continue to employ currently-employed journeymen
who qualify as key employees under the criteria set forth below without going to the
hiring hall for referral,
2) The Contractor may request by name, and the Local will honor referral of up to a
maximum of three (3) journeymen in each craft, who qualify as key employees, provided
that the Contractor first demonstrates that those persons possess the following
qualifications set forth below. Except that a Contractor may elect to hire one of its key
employees to be a foreman, the Union wiii first refier to such contractor one (1) Section
3-eligible employee, if qualified and available, from the hiring hall out-of—work list for the
afFected trade or craft, and will then refer one of such Contractor's key employees and
shall repeat the process, one (1) and one (1), as long as Section 3-eligible employee
are available, until such Contractor's crew requirements are met or until such Contractor
has hired three (3) key employees, whichever occurs first. Thereafter, all additional
employees in the affected trade or craft shall be hired exclusively from the hiring hall
out-of-work lists) giving any qualified Section 3-eligible persons on the out-of-work list
priority referral. For the duration of the Contractor's work, the ratio of key employees to
Section 3 referrals shall be maintained and when the Contractor's workforce is reduced,
employees shall be reduced in the same ratio ~s was ~~rll2d
!n the initial hiring,
3) Key employees, to be eligible for direct transfer or referral under Sections 1 and 2
above, must:
Possess any license required by state or federal law for the Covered Work to be
performed;
Page 20 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
315
Have worked a total of at least one thousand (7 ,000) hours in the construction
craft during the prior three (3) years;
iii. Have been on the Contractor's active payroll for at least sixty (60) out of the one
hundred eighty (180) calendar days prior to the contract award;
iv. Have the ability to perform safely the basic functions of the applicable trade.
Section 11: Except as provided in Article V, Section 3, individual seniority will not be
recognised or applied to employees working on the Project.
Section 12: The selection of craft foremen and/or general foremen and the number of
such foremen and/or general foremen required shall be entirely the responsibility of the
Contractor. Craft foremen shall be designated working foremen at the request of the
Contractor. Craft workers covered by this Agreement will, in the normal day-to-day
operations, take their direction and supervision from their foreman.
ARTICLE V:
UNION REPRESENTATION AND STEWARDS
Section 1: Authorized representatives of the Union shall have reasonable
access to the Project, provided that such representatives do not interfere with the work of
the employees, and further provided that such representatives fully comply with posted
visitor, security and safety rules and the environmental compliance requirements of the
Project. It is understood that because of the scope of the Project and the type of work
being undertaken on the Project site, visitors may be limited to certain times, or areas, or
to being accompanied at all times while on the Project site; in such circumstances,
however, project workers shall be allowed to confer privately with their authorized Union
representatives. The Contractor recognizes the right of access set forth in this Section and
such access will not be unreasonably withheld from an authorized representative of the
Union.
Section 2: (a) Each signatory Local Union shall have the right to designate a
working journeyman as a steward for each General Contractor and for each shift being
worked, and shall notify the Contractor in writing of the identity of the designated steward
or stewards prior to the assumption of such person's duties as steward. Such designated
steward or stewards shall not exercise any supervisory functions, such as hiring or
termination of fellow employees or the direction of the work. There will be no non-working
stewards. Stewards will receive the regular rate of pay for their respective crafts.
(b) A steward for each craft of the signatory Unions employed on the Project shall be
permitted on the Project site at all times when work is being performed. Stewards shall not
be subject to discrimination or discharge on account of proper union activities. The Unions
agree that such activities shall not unreasonably interFere with the steward's work for the
Contractor.
Page 21 of S3
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
316
(c) In addition to his work as an employee, the steward shall have the right to receive, but
not solicit, complaints or grievances and to discuss and assist in the adjustment of the
same with the employee's appropriate supervisor. Each steward shall be concerned with
the employees of the steward's Contractor and if applicable, subcontractors, and not with
the employees of any other Contractor. The Contractor will not discriminate against the
steward in the proper performance of his union duties.
(d) When a Contractor has multiple, non-contiguous work locations on the site, the
Contractor may request, and the Union shall appoint, additional working stewards to
provide independent coverage of one (1) or more such locations. In such cases a steward
may not service more than one (1) work location without the approval of the Contractor
and me union.
(e) The stewards shall not have the right to determine when overtime shall be worked or
who shall work overtime. Provisions of any CBA giving the steward the option of working
all reasonable overtime within his craft and shift shall be recognized, provided that he is
qualified to perform the tasks assigned.
Section 3: The Contractor agrees to notify the appropriate Union and the
Administrator a minimum of twenty-four (24) hours prior to the layoff of a steward, except
in the case of disciplinary discharge for just cause. If a steward is protected against such
layoff by the provisions of any CBA, such provisions shall be recognized to the extent that
the steward possesses the necessary qualifications to perform the work remaining. In any
case in which a steward is discharged or disciplined for just cause, the appropriate Union
and the Administrator shall be notified immediately by the Contractor.
Section 4: Personnel of the SHA may be working in close proximity to the
construction activities. The Union agrees that the Union representatives, stewards and
individual workers will not interfere with the SHA personnel, or with personnel employed by
any other employer not a party to this Agreement on either the Project or Master Plan.
ARTICLE VI:
MANAGEMENT'S RIGHTS
Section 1: (a) The Contractor retains the full and exclusive authority for the
management of its ppeCations. ThP ~~ntr~r_.tnr Thal! direst the
~~~nrkfn~~g ~± !t~
sole
prerogative, including but not limited to the hiring, promotion, transfer, layoff, discipline or
discharge for just cause of its employees; the selection of foremen and general foremen;
the assignment and schedule of work; the promulgation of reasonable work rules; and, the
requirement of overtime work, the determination of when it will be worked and the number
and identity of employees engaged in such work. No rules, customs, or practices which
limit or restrict productivity, efficiency or the individual and/or joint working efforts of
employees shall be permitted or observed. The Contractor may utilize any methods or
techniques of construction.
Page 22 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
317
(b) The foregoing enumeration of management rights shall not be deemed to exclude other
functions not specifically set forth. The Contractor, therefore, retains all legal rights not
specifically covered by this Agreement.
Section 2: There shall be no limitation or restriction by a signatory Union upon
a Contractor's choice of materials or design, nor, upon the full use and utilization of
equipment, machinery, packaging, pre-cast, pre-fabricated, pre-finished, or pre-assembled
materials, tools, or other labor-saving devices. The on-site installation or application of all
items shall be performed by the craft having jurisdiction over such work; provided,
however, it is recognized that installation of specialty items which may be furnished by the
Owner may be performed by employees employed under this Agreement who may be
directed by other personnel in a supervisory role, or, in limited circumstances requiring
special knowledge of the particular item(s), may be performed by employees of the vendor
or other companies where necessary to protect a manufacturer's written warranty or where
the employees working under this Agreement lack the required skills to perform the work.
Section 3: The use of new technology, equipment, machinery, tools and/or
labor saving devices and methods of performing work may be initiated by the Contractor
from time-to-time during the Project. The Union agrees that it will not in any way restrict the
implementation of such new devices or work methods. If there is any disagreement
between the Contractor and the Union concerning the manner or implementation of such
device or method of work, the implementation shall proceed as directed by the Contractor,
and the Union shall have the right to grieve and/or arbitrate the dispute as set forth in
Article VIII of this Agreement.
Section 4: The inspection of incoming shipments of equipment, machinery and
construction materials of every kind shall be performed at the discretion ofi the Contractor
by individuals of its choice.
ARTICLE VII:
WORK STOPPAGES AND LOCKOUTS
Section 1: There shall be no strikes, sympathy strikes, picketing, work
stoppages, slowdowns or other disruptive activity for any reason during the term of this
Agreement (including disputes relating to the negotiation or renegotiation of the Iocal
collective bargaining agreements or disputes by the Unions) or employees at or affecting
the Project site or against any Contractor covered under this Agreement and there shall be
no lockout by the Contractor.
Failure of any Union or employee to cross any picket line established by any Union,
signatory or non-signatory to the Agreement, or by any other organization or individual at
or in proximity to the Project construction site is a violation of this Article. Any Union which
initiates or participates in a work stoppage in violation of this Article, or which recognizes or
supports the work stoppage of another Union which is in violation of this Article, agrees as
Page 23 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
318
a remedy for said viola±ior, to pay liquidated damages to the Jwner in accordance with
Section 4(h).
Section 2: No Union shall sanction, aid or abet, encourage or continue any
activity in violation of Section 1 of this Article, Article IX, Section 4, or Article XVIII, Section
3 of this Agreement and shall undertake all reasonable means to prevent or to terminate
any such activity. No employee shall engage in activities which violate this Article. Any
employee who participates in or encourages any activities which violate this Article will be
subject to disciplinary action, including discharge. The Union shall take all steps
necessary to obtain immediate compliance with this Article by employees it represents but
shall not be held liable for conduct by employees for which it is not responsible.
~eciion s: (a} it the Contractor contengs that any Union has violated this
Article, Article IX, Section 4 or Article XVII I, Section 3, it will serve written notification upon
the Unions) involved, advising him of the fact, with copies of such notice to the
Administrator. The Unions) will immediately instruct, order and use the best efforts of his
office to cause their members to cease any violation of this Article. A Union complying
with this obligation shall not be liable for unauthorized acts of its members.
(b) If the Union contends that any Contractor has violated this Article, it will notify the
Contractor and the Administrator setting forth the facts which the Union contends violate
the Agreement, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to invoking the procedures of Section
4. It is agreed by the parties that the term "lockout" for purposes of this Agreement does
not include discharge, termination or layoff of employees by the Contractor, nor does it
include the Contractor's decision to terminate or suspend work on the Project or any
portion thereof for operational or special circumstances.
Section 4: Any party, including the owner, whom the parties agree is a party in
interest for purposes of this Article, or the Administrator, may institute the following
procedure, in lieu of or in addition to any other contractual procedure or any action at law
or equity, when a breach of Section 1, above, Section 4 of Article IX, or Section 3 of Article
XVIII is alleged:
(a) A party invoking this procedure shall notify Michael Beck, whom the parties agree shall
be the permanent arbitrator, or his designee, under this procedure. In the event that the
permanent arbitrator is unavailable at any time, the designated alternate, ,
shall preside. Invocation of this procedure and notification to the arbitrator on behalf of
Contractor parties shall be made by the Administrator. R►oti~? t~ the arbi±rator ~ha!! be nS~
the most expeditious means available, with notices to the party alleged to be in violation
and to the Construction Unions if it is a Union alleged to be in violation. For purposes of
this Article, written notice may be given by facsimile, hand delivery or overnight mail but
will be deemed effective upon receipt.
(b) Upon receipt of said notice, the arbitrator named above or his alternate shall set and
hold a hearing within twenty-four (24) hours if it is contended that the violation still exists.
Page 24 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
319
(c) The arbitrator shall notify the parties of the place and time chosen for the hearing. Said
hearing shall be completed in one session, which, with appropriate recesses at the
arbitrator's discretion, shall not exceed twenty-four (24) hours unless otherwise agreed
upon by all parties. A failure of any party or parties to attend said hearings shall not delay
the hearing of evidence or the issuance of any award by the arbitrator.
(d) The sole issue at the hearing shall be whether or not a violation of Section 1, above,
Section 4 of Article IX, or Section 3 of Article XVIII, has in fact occurred. The arbitrator
shall have no authority to consider any matter in justification, explanation or mitigation of
such violation or, except as expressly provided by Section 4(h) of this Article, to award
damages, which issue is reserved for court proceedings, if any. The award shalt be issued
in writing within three (3) hours after the close of the hearing, and may be issued without
an opinion. If any party desires an opinion, one shall be issued within fifteen (15) days, but
its issuance shalt not delay compliance with, or enforcement of, the award. The arbitrator
may order cessation of the violation of the Article and other appropriate relief, and such
award shall be served on all parties by hand or registered mail upon issuance.
(e) Such. award shall be final and binding on all parties and may be enforced by any court
of competent jurisdiction upon the filing of this Agreement and all other relevant documents
referred to hereinabove in the following manner. Written notice of the filing of such
enforcement proceedings shall be given to the other party. In the proceeding to obtain a
temporary order enforcing the arbitrator's award as issued under Section 4(d) of this
Article, all parties waive the right to a hearing and agree that such proceedings may be ex
parte. Such agreement does not waive any party's right to participate in a hearing for a
final order of enforcement. The court's order or orders enforcing the arbitrator's award shall
be served on all parties by hand or by delivery to their last known address by registered
mail.
(fl Any rights created by statute or law governing arbitration proceedings inconsistent with
the above procedure or which interfere with compliance hereto are hereby waived by the
parties to whom they accrue.
(g) The fees and expenses of the arbitrator shall be equally divided between the moving
party or parties and the party or parties respondent.
(h) If the arbitrator determines that a violation of Section 1, above, Section 4 of Article IX,
or Section 3 of Article XVIII, has occurred in accordance with Section 4(d) above, the
Unions) shall, within eight (8) hours of receipt of the award, direct all of the employees
they represent on the Project to immediately return to work. If the trade involved does not
return to work by the beginning of the next regularly scheduled shift following receipt of the
arbitrator's award, and the Unions) has not complied with Section 2 of this Article, then the
Unions) shall pay the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) as liquidated
damages to the Owner, and shall pay an additional sum of twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000.00) per shift for each shift thereafter on which the trade has not returned to work.
If the arbitrator determines that a lockout has occurred in violation of Section 1, he shall be
Page 25 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
320
empowered to award back pay to the employees who were lock~~ out. ThP arbitrator sha!!
retain jurisdiction to determine compliance with this section and Section 2 of this Article.
Section 5: Procedures contained in Article Viii shall not be applicable to any
alleged violation of this Article, with the single exception that any employee discharged for
violation of Section 1, above, may resort to the procedures of Article VI II to determine only
whether or not he was, in fact, engaged in that violation.
Section 6: The Administrator is a party in interest in all proceedings arising
under this Article and Articles VIII and IX and shall be sent contemporaneous copies of all
notifications required under these articles, and, at his option, may initiate or participate as
a full party in any proceeding initiated under this Article.
ARTICLE VIII:
DISPUTES AND GRIEVANCES
Section 1: (a) This Agreement is intended to provide close cooperation
between Management and Labor. The Construction Unions, together with the Contractor,
commit to completing the construction of the Project economically, efficiently, continuously,
and without interruption, delays or work stoppages.
(b) The Construction Unions and Contractors and their employees collectively and
individually, realize the importance to all parties of assuring continuous and uninterrupted
performance of the work on the Project, and agree to resolve disputes in accordance with
the arbitration provisions set forth in this Article.
(c; T"~ Admin;strator shall administer the pr~ces~ing o~ tine grievance, in~iu~ing the
scheduling and arrangement of facilities for meetings at Step 2 and beyond, the selection
of the arbitrator to hear the case and any other administrative matters necessary to
facilitate the timely disposition of the case.
Section 2: Any question arising out of and during the term of this Agreement
involving its interpretation and application (other than trade jurisdictional disputes or
alleged violations of Article VII, Section 1, Article IX, Section 4, or Article XVII I, Section 3)
shall be considered a grievance and subject to resolution under the following procedures.
Step 1. (a). When any employee subject to the provisions of this Agreement feels he is
aggrieved by a violation of this Agreement, he shall, if he intends to grieve his complaint,
give notice of his grievance through his Local Union Business Representative or job
steward to the work site representative of the involved Contractor. Such notice, to be
timely, shall be given within five (5) working days after the disputing party knew or should
have known of the facts or occurrence giving rise to the dispute and will state the
provisions) of the Agreement alleged to have been violated. The Business
Representative of the Local Union or the job steward and the work site representative of
the involved Contractor shall meet and endeavor to adjust the matter within three (3)
Page 26 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
321
working days after timely notice has been given. If they fail to resolve the matter within the
prescribed period, the grieving party may, within two (2) working days thereafter, pursue
Step 2 of the grievance procedure provided the grievance is reduced to writing, setting
forth the relevant information concerning the alleged grievance, including a short
description thereof, the date on which the grievance occurred, and the provisions) of the
Agreement alleged to have been violated. Grievances and disputes settled at Step 1 shall
be non-precedential, except as to the parties directly involved, unless endorsed in writing
by the Administrator within five (5) working days after resolution has been reached.
(b) Should the Local Unions) or the Administrator or any Contractor have a dispute with
the other party and, if after conferring within ten (10) working days after the disputing party
knew or should have known of the facts or occurrence giving rise to the dispute, a
settlement is not reached within three (3) working days, the dispute shall be reduced to
writing and proceed to Step 2 as outlined herein for the adjustment of an employee
complaint.
Step 2. The International Representative of the involved Local Union or his designee,
together with the site representative of the involved Contractor, and the Administrator shall
meet within seven (7) working days of the referral of the dispute to this second step to
arrive at a satisfactory settlement thereof. !f the parties fail to reach an agreement, the
dispute may be appealed in writing in accordance with the provisions of Step 3 within
seven (7) working days after the initial meeting at Step 2.
Step 3. (a) If the grievance shall have been submitted but not resolved under Step 2,
either party may request in writing within seven (7) working days after the initial Step 2
meeting, that the grievance be submitted to an arbitrator designated from a permanent
panel of five (5) arbitrators to this Agreement. Designation of the arbitrator from the panel
to hear any grievance shall be by rotation among the panel members and shall be made
jointly by the Administrator and the Construction Unions on behalf of the parties. If the
panel has not been agreed upon by the parties, arbitrator selection shall be made pursuant
to the rules of the American Arbitration Association, which rules shall also govern the
conduct of the arbitration hearing. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding
on all parties and the fee and expenses of such arbitration shall be borne equally by the
involved Contractor and the involved Union(s).
Failure of the grieving party to adhere to the time limits for filing a grievance established
herein shall render the grievance null and void. Failure by either party to adhere to the time
limits herein beyond the initial filing shall constitute a negative response and shall advance
the grievance to the next step in the grievance procedure. Any party, duly notified, who
fails to appear or attend a scheduled hearing shall not delay the hearing of evidence or the
issuance of any decision by the Committee. The time limits established herein may be
extended by written consent of the parties involved at the particular step where the
extension is agreed upon. The arbitrator shall have the authority to make decisions only
on issues presented and shall have no authority to change, amend, add to or detract from
any of the provisions of this Agreement.
Page 27 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
322
Section 3: No adjustment or ds~;si~n mad provide retroactivity exceeding sixty
(60) calendar days prior to the date of the filing of a written grievance.
Section 4: The Administrator shall be notified by both the involved Union and
Contractor of all actions at Steps 2 and 3 and shall, upon his request, be permitted to
participate fully in all proceedings at these steps.
ARTICLE IX:
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
It is the desire of the parties hereto #o provide, establish and put into practice effective
~~~ei►~~US it~~ Fie seiiiement of jurisdiciionai misunderstandings or jurisaictional disputes
which may arise under this Agreement on the site without strike, lockout, work stoppage or
slowdown, to the end that all parties shall be assured of continuity of operation and
continuity of employment in order that harmonious relations will be maintained. The
Contractors, at whatever tier, which are performing construction work at the Project site
shall comply fully with this Article.
Section 1. The assignment of work will be solely the responsibility of the
Contractor performing the work involved; and such work assignments will be in
accordance with the Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the
Construction Industry (the "Plan") or any successor Plan.
Section 2. All jurisdictional disputes on this Project, between or among the
Construction Unions and Contractors of any tier; parties t~ this Agreement, shad b~
settled and adjusted according to the present Plan established by the Building and
Construction Trades Department or any other plan or method of procedure that may
be adopted in the future by the Building and Construction Trades Department.
Decisions rendered shall be final, binding and conclusive on the Contractors and
Unions parties to this Agreement.
Section 3. All jurisdictional disputes shall be resolved without the occurrence of
any strike, work stoppage, or slow-down of any nature, and the Contractor's
assignment shall be adhered to until the dispute is resolved. Individuals violating
iriiS S2iiivfi shall be SubjeCi iG imirie~i~te UiSC~i~r~~.
Section 4. The Contractor and each of its subcontractors will follow the jurisdictional
guidelines in the "CWA Procedures" that are set forth in Attachment J. The Contractor and
each of its subcontractors will complete a "Proposed Trade Assignments" document
(Attachment E) and announce proposed work assignments at a pre-job jurisdictional
assignment conference with the Construction Unions held in accordance with industry
practice not later than fourteen (14) calendar days before commencing any work under this
contract. The pre-job conference will be chaired by the Administrator. Competing Unions
Page 28 of 53
APPENDIX 5: Yesler Terrace Community Workforce Agreement
323
may present evidence in support of their jurisdictional claims to the Contractor. Any Union
in disagreement with the proposed assignment shall notify the Contractor of its position in
writing, with a copy to the Administrator, within seven (7) calendar days thereafter. Within
seven (7) calendar days after the period allowed for the Union notices of disagreement
with the Contractor's proposed assignments, but prior to the commencement of any work,
the Contractor shall make final written work assignments to the Construction Unions with a
copy to the Administrator through the issuance of a "Final Trade Assignments"
(Attachment F) Any subcontractor brought on after the initial pre-job conference must
adhere to the aforementioned procedure prior to commencing any work.
In those cases where an assignment was not covered in the pre-job mark-up and where
the involved Unions notify the Contractor of a jurisdictional dispute over unassigned work,
then and in that event, the competing Unions will be given no less than two (2) work days
time to prepare and present jurisdictional claims for the work in question. When the
Contractor becomes aware of any item that is not specifically covered by agreement
between the affected trades, then the Contractor will immediately notify the Construction
Unions and the Administrator of this specific item of work and allow competing Unions at
least two (2) work days to resolve the dispute. These time limits may be extended by
mutual agreement, but in no event will work be held up due to ongoing jurisdictional
claims.
(d) The Contractor has the obligation to present to the Unions all of the pertinent data,
drawings, specifications or descriptions that are available at the time of the jurisdictional
mark-up. If the signatory Unions are unable to reach agreement as a result of the pre-job
mark-up, then after the time limits have expired, the Contractor shall make a clear
assignment of the disputed work with a "Final Trade Assignments" (Attachment F)
ARTICLE X:
WAGES AND BENEFITS
In consideration of the mutual desires of the Contractors, the Owner and Unions that all
construction work to proce