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Education finance and the politics of California policymaking: a case study of the Local Control Funding Formula

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i

Education Finance and the Politics of California Policymaking:
A Case Study of the Local Control Funding Formula

by

Michelle Hall

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(URBAN EDUCATION POLICY)
August 2016

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ABSTRACT

One ongoing education policy debate surrounds the issue of who controls the distribution
of scarce resources and in what ways those resources are to be used to improve student
achievement. Contemporary scholars have identified a trend of declining local control over these
decisions and an expanding role for state governments. Between 1970 and 2013, California was
an exemplar of this trend; but in 2013, the state dramatically changed course. This study
examines the roles of policy actors, policymakers, and advocacy coalitions in the development of
the landmark legislation in California known as the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF).
This legislation features three fundamental reforms: (a) decentralizing funding decisions to local
education agencies, (b) the reallocation of state funding based on specific student qualities, and
(c) creating a new output-based accountability system. This study examines how political actors
were able to significantly change the trajectory of California’s education system to develop and
implement LCFF. Only through an in-depth study of the policy-making process can we
understand (a) the motivation for this law; (b) the factors that prompted the changes in the law;
and (c) lessons for other states developing similar education reforms.
Further, this dissertation informs our understanding of state policymaking and extends
extant policy research and theory in five important ways: 1) identifying the powerful role of
policy experts in contributing to policy change; 2) extending our understanding of the role of
activist governors; 3) demonstrating the value of combining Advocacy Coalition Framework
with MSF frameworks to provide a deeper understanding of the politics of state policymaking; 4)
expanding conceptions of policy learning; and 5) broadening the application of MSF theory
beyond agendizing issues. These findings provide policymakers, educators, school boards,

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parents, and stakeholders with the knowledge necessary to facilitate a more effective
implementation of the law This study concludes with implications for policy and future research.

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APPROVAL FOR SCHOLARLY DISSEMINATION

The author grants the University of Southern California the right to reproduce by
appropriate methods, upon request, any or all portions of this Dissertation. It is understood that
“proper request” consists of the agreement, on the part of the requesting party, that said
reproduction is for his personal use and that subsequent reproduction will not occur without
written approval of the author of this Dissertation. Further, any portions of the Dissertation used
in books, papers, and other works must be appropriately referenced to this Dissertation.
Finally, the author of this Dissertation reserves the right to publish freely, in the
literature, at any time, any or all portions of this Thesis.

Author

Date

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of several important
people. First and foremost, I would like to extend my deep appreciation to all of the study
participants who so kindly shared their time and experiences with me. I would also like to thank
Maggie Weston who took her time to talk through the initial ideas of this dissertation and share
her expertise and prior research in California’s education finance system.
I offer my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Julie Marsh, Dr.
Daniel Mazmanian, and Dr. Dominic Brewer, for their expert review, insightful comments and
helpful suggestions. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my advisor, dissertation chair, and
mentor Dr. Julie Marsh, whose intellect both inspires and challenges me and whose
encouragement sustained me as a graduate student.
Finally, I extend my deepest love and appreciation to my family for their endless support,
cheerleading, and patience. Without them none of this would be possible. Special appreciation
goes to my husband, Gabriel Hall, for his unwavering love, commitment, and humor throughout
this entire process. I am grateful to you for choosing me each and every day. To my Mom and
Dad for their support, positive attitudes, and for instilling a deep love of learning for which I can
never thank you enough. Thank you, Mom, for always telling me I could do it even when I felt
like I couldn’t. A special thank you goes to my faithful companion, Finn, who exemplified his
love and support by taking me on daily walks between hours of sleeping at my feet while I
wrote. A final acknowledgment goes to my amazing daughter, Alice, whose life makes my heart
overflow with joy and contributes a deeper meaning to my work in education. Your constant
love, support, and patience while I completed this process have meant the world to me. I love
you all, and I dedicate this dissertation to you.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii
APPROVAL FOR SCHOLARLY DISSEMINATION ................................................................. iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................v
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF TABLES....................................................................................................................... xiii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
Background ................................................................................................................................. 1
Problem Statement ...................................................................................................................... 4
Potential Significance ................................................................................................................. 8
Organization of the Study ......................................................................................................... 10
Definition of Terms................................................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER TWO : A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE...................................... 13
The Focus of the Literature: Findings....................................................................................... 15
Marble Cake Federalism ........................................................................................................... 15
State Policymaking and Official Actors: Governors, Legislatures, and Courts ....................... 17
The expanding role of governors. ......................................................................................... 18
The expanding role of legislatures. ....................................................................................... 19
The expanding role of courts. ............................................................................................... 21
The Role of Unofficial Actors or Interests................................................................................ 22
Interest groups....................................................................................................................... 23
The increasing role of think tanks......................................................................................... 24
Policies Influence Politics ......................................................................................................... 24
The Role of State Culture in Policymaking .............................................................................. 26

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Bounded in Paradigms and Ideas .............................................................................................. 28
Major Debates in Education Policymaking Literature.............................................................. 29
Limitations of Existing Research .............................................................................................. 30
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 31
CHAPTER THREE: GROUNDED IN THEORY ....................................................................... 32
Selection of Frameworks .......................................................................................................... 32
Multiple Streams Framework ................................................................................................... 35
Strengths of the MSF. ........................................................................................................... 38
Limitations of the MSF. ........................................................................................................ 39
Advocacy Coalition Framework ............................................................................................... 40
Strengths of the ACF. ........................................................................................................... 44
Limitations of the ACF. ........................................................................................................ 46
Unifying Factors of the Two Theoretical Frameworks............................................................. 47
CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ................................................ 48
Data Collection ......................................................................................................................... 49
Data Sources ................................................................................................................................. 50
Documents ................................................................................................................................ 51
Interviews.................................................................................................................................. 52
Observations.............................................................................................................................. 54
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 55
Document Analysis ................................................................................................................... 55
Data Analysis and Coding ........................................................................................................ 56
Identifying the coalitions’ beliefs and policy beliefs. ........................................................... 57
Process Tracing ..................................................................................................................... 57
The Challenges of Conducting Retrospective Bias Research ....................................................... 60

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Validity.......................................................................................................................................... 61
Limitations and Strengths ............................................................................................................. 62
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................................... 63
CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY CONTEXT AND COALITION BELIEFS ..................................... 64
California Education Finance Policies: Solidifying Centralized Control ................................. 66
Legal Mandates. .................................................................................................................... 66
Ballot propositions. ............................................................................................................... 75
Accountability measures. ...................................................................................................... 79
California Education Finance: A Layer Cake of Complexity................................................... 80
Education Finance Subsystem Coalitions and Policy Beliefs....................................................... 83
Interest Groups: Two Coalitions ............................................................................................... 85
Issue interest groups.............................................................................................................. 85
Labor interest group(s): California Teachers Association (CTA). ....................................... 92
District Leadership .................................................................................................................... 95
Expert community: Generating evidence that evolves beliefs.............................................. 98
Summing up Coalitions in the Education Finance Subsystem. .......................................... 102
CHAPTER SIX: PROBLEMS, POLITICS, AND ENTREPRENEURS ................................... 105
Changing student demographics. ........................................................................................ 106
Accountability. .................................................................................................................... 109
Problems Contributing to Policy Inertia ................................................................................. 111
Constraints on resources. .................................................................................................... 112
A Culture of Distrust............................................................................................................... 122
Distrust in local administrators. .......................................................................................... 123
Summary of Problem Stream ...................................................................................................... 126
The Policy Stream ................................................................................................................... 127

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The Political Stream: Trends Evolve into Triggers for Change ............................................. 130
Public initiatives and the power of the legislature. ............................................................. 131
The political power of interest groups. ............................................................................... 133
The politics of school funding: Institutional actors. ........................................................... 135
Public opinion and politics.................................................................................................. 136
Section Summary ........................................................................................................................ 137
A Window of Opportunity: Intervening Variables Effect .......................................................... 138
The Great Recession ............................................................................................................... 139
The Election of Policy Entrepreneurs ..................................................................................... 142
The Foundation Community: A Provisor of Resources for Change ....................................... 145
Coalitions respond............................................................................................................... 147
Policy Course Correction: The LCFF and Coalition Unification ........................................... 148
Coalition Unification and Proposition 30. .............................................................................. 152
P30 expanded the coalition of support. ............................................................................... 157
Venue shopping................................................................................................................... 159
Framing the debate.............................................................................................................. 160
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 161
CHAPTER SEVEN : DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS .................................................... 163
Contributions of this study .......................................................................................................... 163
Increasing Role of Policy Experts....................................................................................... 164
Activist governors in policymaking .................................................................................... 166
Combining the two frameworks.......................................................................................... 167
Expanding the who in policymaking................................................................................... 170
Extending MSF beyond agendas ........................................................................................ 171
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 172

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Implications for Policy............................................................................................................ 173
Statewide political composition .......................................................................................... 175
Federal Policy ..................................................................................................................... 177
Implications for Future Research ................................................................................................ 179
Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................................... 181
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 182
Appendix A: ACF/MSF Lcff Policymaking Interview Protocol ................................................ 223
Appendix B: Policymaking And The Local Control Funding Formula Participant Consent Form
..................................................................................................................................................... 226
Appendix C : LCFF Hearing/Meeting Observation Protocol ...................................................... 229
Appendix D: Process Tracing Data Analysis Technique............................................................ 232
Appendix E: Multiple Streams Framework & Advocacy Coalition Framework\Research
Questions, Interview, Document, And Observation Data........................................................... 235
Appendix F: Sample Of California Issue Interest Group, Mission, And Funding Stream ......... 241
Appendix G: Governor’s Addresses 1911-2012 ......................................................................... 295

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Major themes identified in the literature on state education policymaking. .............. 14

Figure 3.1.Adaptation of Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams framework. .................................. 36

Figure 3.2. Flow diagram of the advocacy coalition framework
Adapted from Sabatier and Weible (2014) ........................................................................... 41

Figure 5.1. Conjoined ACF and MSF frameworks in the politics of policymaking..................... 65

Figure 5.2. Per-Pupil spending in 2007 constant 2007-2008 dollars.
Source: National Center for Education Statistics.................................................................. 77

Figure 5.3. Identified California education finance subsystems coalitions and their beliefs about
finance reforms ..................................................................................................................... 85

Figure 6.1. The three streams within education finance subsystem beliefs.Data Source:
Kidsdata.org funded by the Lucile Packard Foundation for Children's Health………….. 106

Figure 6.2. ELL Students Enrolled in California Public Schools, 199-2015. Data Source:
Kidsdata.org funded by the Lucile Packard Foundation for Children's Health .................. 107

Figure 6.3. California Children Living in Poverty, 2009-2013. Data Source: Kidsdata.org funded
by the Lucile Packard Foundation for Children's Health .................................................... 108

Figure 6.4. Per-pupil expenditures, US average versus California average. Data Source: Adapted
from the National Center for Education Statistics. Current expenditure per pupil in average
daily attendance in public elementary and secondary schools, by state or jurisdiction:
Selected years, 1959-60 through 2006-07 .......................................................................... 113

Figure 6.5. Public Opinion 2005-2013 Increase Efficiency, Increase Funding .......................... 117

Figure 6.6. Economic Recession Per Pupil Funding CA, NY, ID, and US 2008-2013.
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments: Finance—
Survey of School System Finances and 2008–2011, 2013 Annual Survey of School
System Finances.......................................................................................................................... 141

Figure 6.7. Public Support for who should control education funding choices. Data Source: PPIC
public opinion polls 2005–2012.......................................................................................... 151

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1. Data .............................................................................................................................. 49
Table 4.2. Theoretical frame, research questions unified with data sources ................................ 51
Table 5.1. Education Finance Cases Affecting California’s School Funding, 1970s–2016 ......... 67
Table 5.2. Example of Issue Interest Coalition Organizations, Missions, and Funders
and Partners........................................................................................................................... 86
Table 6.1. Coalition beliefs, 2012 ............................................................................................... 149

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Constitutionally, American education governance has been the domain of state
governments; traditionally, state governments have delegated this responsibility to school
districts and locally elected school boards (LESBs). Public support for LESBs is rooted in the
American belief in “local democratic control”—the notion that LESBs are the governing body
closest to the people and, therefore, most responsive to the influence of the electorate (Brewer &
Hall, 2014; Elmore, 2000; Hess, 2011; Howell, 2005; Land, 2002). However, contemporary
scholars have identified a trend of declining local control in education governance while the role
of state governments expands (Bulkley & Henig, 2015; Henig, 2009a, 2013; Hinz & Crowson,
2015; Marsh & Wohlstetter, 2013; Menefee-Libey & Kerchner, 2015). California has been an
example of this trend (Timar & Roza, 2010). Over the past 40 years, both resource distribution
and power over education decisions in California have shifted from the local level to the
statehouse (Brewer & Smith, 2006; Clune, 1993; Fuhrman, Clune, & Elmore, 1991; Kirst &
Wirt, 2009). Despite this widely recognized trend of increased centralized control at the state
level, California made an “exceptional” decision and enacted the Local Control Funding Formula
(LCFF) in 2013, marking a shift toward subsidiarity, or shifting the actions of government down
to the most local level (Menefee-Libey & Kerchner, 2015, p. 2).
Background

The LCFF dramatically changed California’s education governance model by returning
power over resource distribution to districts based on student need and setting accountability
standards from the bottom up. This policy represented a radical departure from the historic
governance model employed by both the state and the nation. Such profound policy changes are

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particularly significant in a state that is identified with strong institutional control (Bray, 1999),
powerful education interest groups (Moe, 2005), and low student achievement (National Center
for Education Statistics [NCES], 2014). California has a long history of disproportionate funding
among districts; court rulings mandating equal funding among districts and constraints on the
local tax dollars available for education resulted in a shift in control over school funding––away
from local districts to the state. By 2012, 40% of California’s general fund budget was allocated
to education.
The LCFF overturned almost a half-century of centralized, top-down K–12 education
governance in the state. In the past, the state allocated funds, mandated allocations and
expenditures in up to 60 funding streams, and held local districts fiscally accountable. During
this time, state courts ordered that California’s education resources be distributed equally
(Serrano v. Priest, 1971, 1976, 1977; Butt v. State of California, 1992), and the state reallocated
funds to comply with those rulings. The state also designed and mandated accountability
measures known as the Academic Performance Index (API), and held districts accountable for
student outcomes. Additionally, the federal government injected influence through initiatives
such as providing federal funding for schools that taught low-income students (via the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act [ESEA])
1
and layering additional accountability
measures (i.e., the ESEA reauthorization, No Child Left Behind [NCLB]) into that mandate.
Following these actions, the federal government instituted another accountability-linked, grant-

1
The ESEA, signed into law in 1965, was designed to provide grants to improve the quality of education in
districts serving low-income students. The grants were to provide text and library books, create special education
centers, and make scholarships available for low-income students (U.S. Department of Education, 2015).

3
funded education program known as Race to the Top (RTT).
2
In California, governors and
legislators in both parties contributed to state policies and methods of allocating funds (Brewer &
Smith, 2006). Under the LCFF, these state policies have been replaced with redistributive
funding based on student need, local control over resource allocations, and a more nuanced
accountability system. Therefore, the passage of the LCFF is a significant departure in the
allocation of school funding in California and thus provides an opportunity to study a revelatory
case of state education finance reform (Yin, 2013).
The LCFF reformed California’s education system in three substantial ways. First, it
decentralized resource allocation, shifting it from state control to LESBs and districts. Second,
the reform redistributed funds from categorical funding streams to a more equitable K–12
funding system. The equity component of the LCFF is based on a weighted student funding
formula that allocates additional tax dollars to districts for students who qualify as foster youth,
English language learners, or members of low-income families and provides additional dollars to
districts that serve an unduplicated headcount of qualified pupils above 55%. An additional
intent of this funding method was to bring transparency to the K–12 funding system. Third, the
LCFF established a new accountability system that requires districts to create budgets with input
from education stakeholders
3
and, in accordance with a set of state-prioritized goals, to set their

2
Although California did not receive a traditional RTT grant, the state and a group of districts did
participate in the request-for-proposal process, which promoted both the debate around and changes in district and
state policies based on the prescribed federal requirements to receive the grant.
3
Education stakeholders include “parents and pupils, including parents of unduplicated pupils and
unduplicated pupils identified in Education Code section 42238.01; community members; local bargaining units;
Local Education Agency (LEA) personnel; county child welfare agencies; county office of education foster youth

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own accountability standards for student outcomes in a local control accountability plan (LCAP).
What is not known is how this exceptional shift took place in a state that for so long was an
exemplar of centralized education governance. This study will help address this gap in the
current literature through focusing on the politics of school finance policymaking by backward-
mapping the case of the LCFF in California.
Problem Statement

Public funding for K-12 education represents a significant share of state budgets. On
average, states spend one-fourth of their budgets, or about $280 billion, for K-12 education
(National Association of State Budget Officers, 2013). In 2011 California spent approximately
$57.9 billion on about 6 million K–12 students, which made up roughly 40% of the overall state
budget. These dollars reflected the single largest portion of the state budget and thus influenced
not only education, but also what resources were available for policymakers to fund other state
requirements. What state lawmakers set as priorities for school funding contributes to what and
how students will learn.
State finance policy also has significant implications for equity. Recent national data
revealed 23 states had state school funding policies in which state and local governments
together spent less per pupil in the poorest school districts than in the most affluent districts
(NCES, 2016). Concurrently, the same data revealed that state and local districts combined spent
3.5% more on less wealthy districts than on wealthier ones (NCES, 2016). Inequalities such as
these have created schools that the former Education Secretary Arne Duncan deemed “separate
and unequal” (Sillers, 2015, p. 1). These inequities are the result of revenue generation and

services programs, court-appointed special advocates, and other foster youth stakeholders; community organizations
representing English learners; and others as appropriate” (California LCAP Template, 2013, p. 3).

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allocation decisions made by state and local education policymakers who together create the
parameters of school spending.
In recent years there has been significant debate over how to allocate resources to public
schools. Whereas different states have experienced different economic conditions and
demographic changes since the 1970s, one consistent theme of school funding nationwide has
been court rulings focused on equalizing funding for students. As a result, since the 1970s,
multiple education finance rulings have conferred a legal mandate on states to ensure equality in
school funding for all students. Yet, how individual states should legislate court mandated
equality continues to be an issue of public debate (Augenblick, Myers, & Anderson, 1997;
Darling-Hammond, 2015; Odden and Picus, 2014; Ostrander, 2015). As Odden and Picus (2014)
explain, these debates generally center around differing beliefs about how to achieve equality.
Those beliefs include minimizing variations in spending across school districts (Odden & Clune,
1998); linking finance to an adequate education; and, finally, improving educational productivity
and increasing efficiency to advance student achievement (Hanushek and Associates, 1994).
Despite the importance of public financing of schools and the frequent debates and state
legislative activity surrounding these issues, there has been little theoretically driven, empirical
research on state education finance policy. In fact, there has been limited research on the
enactment of state education policy in general (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999; Dayton & Dupre, 2007).
4

Recent literature on the issue of state-level education policymaking is limited and largely focuses
on legislative reactions to court litigation, federal mandates, and limits on the state’s capacity for
change based on the state’s political culture. By contrast, comparatively little has been written
about the political process involved in devising and enacting sweeping state-level school reforms
outside of mandates such as the LCFF, which are redistributive, decentralizing, and focused on

4
I review this literature in depth in chapter two.

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accountability reforms.
5
While political scientists have paid considerable attention to developing
theories concerning the politics of policymaking—including advocacy coalition theories
(Jenkins-Smith, 1988), the pluralist distribution of power (Dahl, 1961), agenda setting
(Kingdon,1984), clientelism (Lowi, 1964), policy feedback (Pierson, 1993), and punctuated
equilibrium theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991)—few studies have applied such theories to
state education policymaking and finance reform. Extant theory-driven research is limited
regarding the process by which nonmandated broad and sweeping education reforms are
conceived, placed on the legislative agenda, and instituted at the state level.
This study seeks to address this gap in the current literature by focusing on the political
process of policymaking affecting state finance reform, using LCFF as a case study. The LCFF
was an unusual proposal in contemporary education policy in that it not only redistributed funds
to students based on specific needs but also shifted control of how those funds were spent. In
addition, it shifted accountability design from the state to the local level. Such redistributive
policies in education are rarely debated by legislators—and even then, only reluctantly—in the
ongoing struggle for influence over resource allocation and control (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999;
Dayton & Dupre, 2007). Redistributive politics are challenging and often the most difficult to
implement (Piketty, 1995). Thus, understanding how the eighth-largest economy in the world
passed a redistributive education finance policy on the heels of a global economic recession can
contribute to the literature by clarifying how contemporary policy beliefs are contributing to

5
The majority of studies examining state-level policymaking focus on single issues such as school finance
reforms (Fuhrman, 1979; Mazzoni & Malen, 1985), accountability (Fuhrman & Malen, 1991), curriculum
(Cornbleth & Waugh, 1993), local control (Cohen, 1982; Fuhrman et al., 1991; Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990), or the
role of state departments of education (Lusi, 1997). Such studies customarily find that actors, prior policies, and
state culture within a federal and global education environment influence those reforms.

7
policy change. Given the newness of this redistributive policy and the departure in its
philosophy, it is not surprising that little research on the case is available; still, understanding the
political process involved in devising and enacting this type of school reform may fill the gap in
understanding how such reforms are made.
Specifically, this study analyzes how political actors were able to dramatically change the
trajectory of California’s education finance system to develop and implement the LCFF. In so
doing, it seeks to extend our understanding of the policymaking process that concludes with a
substantial education finance reform at the state level. In addressing these gaps, this study both
extends our knowledge about the state policymaking process and promotes the development of
theory.
This study further seeks to provide educators, LESBs, parents, and stakeholders with
knowledge of the “political strategies” of the enactment process “and their effects” to include
additional “explanatory variables” that may assist in a more rational implementation of the LCFF
(McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016, p. 233). By gaining an understanding of how the statute
addressed identified education problems, future researchers may more accurately evaluate the
success or failure of the policy and identify trends that contribute to substantial education finance
reforms. Only through an in-depth study of the policymaking process can we understand (a) the
motivation for this law, (b) the factors prompting the changes in the law, (c) how this case may
be instructive to other states in developing similar education reforms, and (d) the role of political
actors enacting the law. Further, through in-depth analysis, this study reveals how, through
political negotiations, the law may include “unintended consequences” that contribute to the
creation of “vested interests that reconfigure arrangements of power in society” (Mettler &
SoRelle, 2014, p. 152).

8
Additionally, this research provides an important opportunity to test and expand the
utility of conjoining multiple streams and advocacy coalition theories. Although scholars of K–
12 education have advanced various theories of public policymaking to help explain policy
activity within their respective domains (Clune, 1987; Fowler, 1994), there is an overall lack of
scholarship that systematically identifies, organizes, and analyzes the substantial actions and
interactions present in K–12 education policymaking at the state level. Such an effort is
imperative in developing a social scientific literature on education policymaking at the state
level. Utilizing these two theories as a guide, I answer the following research questions:
1. What influenced California’s education policy shift away from categorical funding
and centralized control in the passage of the LCFF?
a. What were the internal and external pressures that drove this choice?
b. What problem(s) were identified that a new policy would solve?
c. Who were the actors and what were the actions, goals, and beliefs?
d. How did all of these variables combine to influence passage of the LCFF?
Potential Significance

This study is designed to better illuminate state education policymaking and beyond. In
2011, California elected a governor who constructed his education platform on changing the way
the state funded schools based on the equality-based formula that had been codified over the
prior 40 years to an equity-based formula that pushed for higher funding for students with
additional needs. Thus, this policy not only changed the direction of California’s education
finance system but may also set a new ideological standard for California’s education finance by
shifting the debate from equality of funding to equity of funding. By understanding the beliefs of
policy actors about how education should be financed in California and the influence those

9
beliefs had on the policy outcomes, this study informs policy actors and the broader community
about the contributors to statewide redistributive education finance reform.
Moreover, this research provides insight into a large, sweeping, and unique proposal and
examines how and why the LCFF redistributed funds based on need and shifted control over
funding to local districts. Given the scope, scale, and intent of this reform, it is essential to
examine the origins, implementation, and initial outcomes of this law. To understand this large
scale redistributive education reform, we must first understand how it was adopted. As
McDonnell and Weatherford (2016) explained, “The politics of both enactment and
implementation are salient influences on whether a policy produces its intended effects” (p. 233).
This study also expands our understanding of the politics of school finance reform. Since
the 1980s, economic, demographic, and policy beliefs about education have changed (Carr &
Fuhrman, 1999; Odden & Picus, 2014). California has been an epicenter for court rulings
mandating and remandating education equality among districts (Serrano v. Priest, 1971, 1976,
1977; Butt v. State of California, 1992). These legal standards and their political interpretations
have influenced both how education is funded and how political actors perceive the role of
education finance. This study investigates how policy beliefs such as these and others contribute
to a substantial statewide education policy reform, To do so, the study draws on a framework that
combines a systems-level theory, multiple streams framework (MSF), and a more organizational-
level theory, advocacy coalition framework (ACF; see Houlihan & Green, 2006, for an
exception). This study will be helpful to future research because it tests the viability of applying
a hybrid of MSF with ACF to analyze state education policy change.

10
Organization of the Study

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. This chapter has provided a brief
introduction of the case study project, including its background, problem statement, and potential
significance. Chapter 2 offers a review of the relevant literature grounding this study. Chapter 3
provides a theoretical foundation for the study. Chapter 4 describes the case study’s methods,
including research design, data sources, and data collection and analysis procedures. Chapter 5
presents a historic review of the policymaking process and issue background, as well as a
descriptive analysis of the politically significant coalitions in the case of the education finance
reform(s) of 2012 and 2013 in California. Chapter 6 provides findings on the evolution and
passage of the LCFF. The final chapter summarizes the key findings of the case and discusses
implications for policy, theory, and research.
Definition of Terms

Categorical Funding: Categorical funding, also known as categoricals in the California
state budget, consists of four funding areas: support for school improvement, special needs-
compensatory aid, variable cost equalization, and auxiliary service revenues (Timar, 1994).
English Learner: According to the California Department of Education, a student is
classified as an English learner for LCFF purposes if he or she is identified in the state student
database, known as CALPADS, as enrolled on Census Day with an English Language
Acquisition Status of English learner (California Department of Education, 2016).
Free and Reduced Priced Lunch (FRPL): According to the California Department of
Education, a student qualifies as FRPL if they meet the federal income eligibility criteria, which
are guidelines used by schools participating in the National School Lunch Program. A student
can also qualify if they are deemed categorically eligible for FRPM under the National School

11
Lunch Program (NSLP), with the exception of students that are directly certified and foster
students identified through a statewide match (California Department of Education, 2016).
Annual adjustments are required by section 9 of the National School Lunch Act.
Foster Youth: According to the California Department of Education, a student is
classified as Foster Youth if he or she is subject of:
a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) Section 300 (meaning
a court has taken jurisdiction over a child and declared the child to be a dependent
of the court due to the presence or risk of abuse or neglect). This includes both
children who are living at home while a dependent of the court as well as children
who the court has ordered to be removed into the care, custody and control of a
social worker for placement outside the home. Additionally, a child or youth who
is the subject of a petition filed under WIC Section 602 (meaning a court has
taken jurisdiction over a child and declared the child to be a ward of the court due
to the child’s violation of certain criminal laws) and has been ordered by a court
to be removed from home pursuant to WIC Section 727 and placed in foster care
as defined by WIC Section 727.4(d). Finally, a youth between ages 18 and 21
who is enrolled in high school, is a non-minor dependent under the placement
responsibility of child welfare, probation, or a tribal organization participating in
an agreement pursuant to WIC Section 10553.1, and is participating in a
transitional living case plan (California Department of Education, 2016, n.p.).
Initiative or Proposition: The initiative or proposition in California is the power of the
citizenry to act as legislators in proposing statutes and amendments to the California
Constitution. The process of qualifying a statewide initiative or proposition begins with the
submission of a request, along with $2,000, to the Attorney General’s (AG’s) Office. After the
submission, the public may provide comment for up to 30 days through the AG’s website. The
proponents (those who support the proposition or initiative) may amend their measure for up to
35 days after submission. Proponents of the initiative or proposition have 180 days to receive and
submit a specified number of qualified signatures depending on the goal of the proposition, to
either amend state law (fewer signatures required) or amend the state Constitution (more
signatures required). Once an initiative or proposition has garnered 25% of the required

12
signatures, the legislature is required to hold a public hearing on the proposal. Once all
signatures have been gathered, submitted, and certified, the measure goes on the next general
election ballot.
Subsidiarity: A principle in social organization in which actions that can be performed
more effectively by subordinate or local organizations belong more properly to them than to a
dominant central organization (Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary, 2016). As defined by
Governor Brown, subsidiarity is a “‘profoundly important principle, namely that in our federal
system there are separate layers of government, each with its own distinct responsibilities.’ The
Oxford English Dictionary defines subsidiarity as the idea that a ‘central authority should have a
subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a
more immediate or local level”’ (Brown, 2013).
Weighted Student Funding in California: Also known as weighted pupil funding formula,
this is when the state provides funding to local districts based on the number of students in the
district. The state provides a base funding amount for all students, additional funding for targeted
disadvantaged students, and additional concentration funding when there are more than 55% of a
district’s students qualify for targeted supplemental funding (Weston, 2011a; 2011b).

13
CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

A review of the empirical literature on the politics of education policymaking at the state
level reveals two essential themes. First, despite the legal authority of the state in education
policy and the magnitude of many contemporary policy shifts, research in this area is sparse.
Second, our understanding of what causes these education policy shifts is limited (McLendon &
Cohen-Vogel, 2008). What researchers have found in the arena of public policymaking can be
characterized as a dynamic, complex, and interactive system (Brown, 2008; Carr & Fuhrman,
1999; Duncombe & Yinger, 2010; Firestone, Fuhrman, & Kirst, 1991; Fowler, 1994; Fuhrman,
1982; Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Louis, Thomas, Gordon, & Febey, 2008; Mazzoni, 1991, 1993,
1994; Mazzoni & Malen, 1985; 2013). Public education challenges can originate in seemingly
endless ways and result in an array of policy responses—such as funding, regulations, and
laws—on the local, state, and national levels. The process of introducing, designing, adopting,
and implementing policy involves many interested parties, making it complex and opaque
(Elmore, 1979). As Timar (1989) argued, vested interests exert political pressure to which states
react “by giving a little something to everybody” (p. 275). In attempting to focus on who or what
has the strongest input into this process, researchers have identified the complex nature of
federalism as an assemblage of ideas and paradigms in which actors, policies, and culture are
situated, their boundaries overlapping one another.
I have identified three main themes found throughout the extant literature regarding
actors, policies, and culture as situated within the broader dynamics of ideas and paradigms
encompassed by federalism (see Figure 2.1). In illustrating the major themes found in the
literature on the politics of policymaking, I acknowledge that the borders between those themes
are permeable (as shown by the lack of solid borders between the circles and frames, as shown in

14
Figure 2.1). That is, scholars often fuse findings regarding actors, culture, and policy with the
broader concepts of ideas and paradigms encapsulated by federalism. The broader concepts
identified in the outer rings are often discussed in the literature as essential elements, and in
some cases the main finding, of influence on the policy actors in the study. Figure 2.1 serves to
frame the following discussion of the literature of policymaking.

Figure 2.1. Major themes identified in the literature on state education policymaking.

To review the empirical foundation on which I will build my study, I will first discuss the
literature on education policymaking at the state level and federalism’s unique role in the
process. Next, I will discuss research findings regarding the influence of both official and
unofficial actors on state education policymaking. I will follow this discussion with a review of
the literature on how policies influence politics and the role of state culture on the policymaking

15
process. Next, I will link these findings with those concerning paradigms
6
and ideas. Finally, I
identify the limitations of these studies that my proposed study seeks to address.
The Focus of the Literature: Findings

The literature on policymaking at the state level is sparse and does not provide a coherent
approach to the subject. The existing studies’ theoretical, methodological, and empirical
conclusions are dynamic, evolving over both time and policy domains. In his review, Cibulka
(1994) aptly critiqued the literature on the politics of education policymaking, finding that state-
level research came from either a wide array of theoretical frameworks or was entirely
theoretical. The vast array of foci presented in the literature creates obstacles to building
cumulative knowledge about the broader political system. Twenty years later, despite the
development of some theoretical frameworks, his criticisms remain valid (Canfield-Davis &
Jain, 2010). The majority of studies proceed as case studies (Canfield-Davis & Jain, 2010),
comparative case studies (Firestone et al., 1991), or historical case studies (Lawton, 2012).
Methodologically, the research proceeds as qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods studies.
This review focuses on building a clearer understanding of the gaps in our knowledge regarding
state education policymaking based on the findings of these studies.
Marble Cake Federalism

As seen in Figure 2.1, policy research has consistently identified federalism as a
powerful, overarching influence on state education policymaking. Education policy has been
described as marble cake federalism, in which local, state, and federal governments share in
addressing education issues (Wong, 2008). Whereas control was traditionally held at the local

6
In this I am applying Kuhn’s (1970) definition of paradigms as dominant views that limit significant
dissent.

16
level over who taught what, when, how, and to what end, these decisions have been shifting
upward as a result of growing state and federal interests in K–12 education (Henig, 2013; Hess,
2011; Kirst & Wirt, 2009). Education policymaking studies are imbued with discussions over the
changing role of local school boards, expanding and contracting roles for the states, and the
increasing influence of the federal government (Henig, 2009b; Kolbe & Rice, 2012; McDonnell,
2005; McDonnell & McLaughlin, 1981; Reckhow, 2012; Swanson & Stevenson, 2002). The
literature is also robust with studies that have found an increased role specifically for the state
governments in the policymaking process (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999; Clune, 1987; Epstein, 2004;
Firestone et al., 1991; Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Gittell & McKenna, 1999; Mazzoni, 1993,
1994; McDonnell, 2005; McDonnell & McLaughlin, 1981; McDonnell & Weatherford, 1999;
Reeves, 1990; Spillane, 1996; Timar & Kirp, 1989). Timar and Roza (2010) argued that the ideal
of local control has been lost to that of centralized state control, offering California as the
exemplar of that shift. The power of federalism in the dynamic of policymaking is one of the
most consistent findings in the research.
Studies further indicate that as statehouse authority over education policy grows, so does
the political debate surrounding it. Olssen, Codd, and O'Neill (2004) found that the increased
role of the state has transformed educational policymaking from what was once a calm and
orderly process into an area of controversy and public interest. It has become “highly politicized”
(p. 3). Education policymaking, which was traditionally a local political affair (Hess, 2011), has
moved squarely into the national and state political fray (Fields, Feinberg, & Roberts, 2001;
Hanushek, 1989; Hess & Kelly, 2012; Manna, 2006; Sunderman & Kim, 2004; Sunderman,
Kim, & Orfield, 2005; Walker David, 2000). McDonnell (1988) attributes this trend to the flow

17
of political influence toward the states that began in the mid-1980s, whereas others date the
transition back to the 1950s and the launch of Sputnik
7
(Kirst & Wirt, 2009).
Significantly, a developing body of literature has found that the expansion of federal
involvement in education policy has not simply centralized power upward from the local and
state levels of government, but redistributed authority and influence down and out to local
districts, schools, education service providers, and other education stakeholders in local
communities (Bulkley & Henig, 2015; Grissom & Herrington, 2012; Marsh & Wohlstetter,
2013; McDonnell & Weatherford, 2013). Marsh and Wohlstetter (2013) found that the increase
in federal education policymaking opened the education infrastructure to new service providers
at the local level such as charter school operators as well as curriculum and instructional material
developers. This expansive service provision empowers not only the federal, but also the local
agencies and organizations. Consequently, findings and trends in the literature on policymaking
at the state level are situated within the broader constraints of federalism’s effects on the politics
of education.
State Policymaking and Official Actors: Governors, Legislatures, and Courts

As Figure 2.1 illustrates, state policymaking studies, situated within the frame of
educational federalism and imbued with ideas and paradigms, often find a wide variety of policy
actors essential to the process (Ball, 2008; Brown, 2008; Cohen, 1982; Denzau & Munger, 1986;
Fowler, 2000; Lusi, 1997; Mazzoni, 1991, 1994; Mazzoni & Malen, 1985; Mintrom & Vergari,
1998; Moe, 2009; Scott, 2009; Timar, 1994; Wong, 1991). Researchers have investigated the

7
The USSR’s launch of Sputnik caused consternation among the American public about the quality of the
American public school science and technology curriculum. Following the launch, a national commission of experts
was created to address the issue, leading to the recommendation and passage of the National Defense of Education
Act, which increased federal funding for education at all levels with a focus on science and technology.

18
actions of official actors within policymaking to identify them as influencers of education
policies. Official actors are those with statutory or constitutional responsibilities. These may
include legislative, executive, and judicial actors. Consistent with historic trends, the literature on
education policymaking at the state level has found that, overall, the power and influence of the
official actors over education policy has grown from fiscal input to more powerful oversight and
regulatory functions (Doyle, Cooper, & Trachtman, 1991; Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Gittell &
McKenna, 1999).
The expanding role of governors. Researchers have found that activist governors who
took advantage of open policy windows led the way to increased state power, creating numerous
commissions to recommend reform and introduce new ideas into states’ legislative agendas (Carr
& Fuhrman, 1999; Fowler, 1994; Gittell & McKenna, 1999; Renshon & Gittell, 1992; Van Horn,
2005; Young, Shepley, & Song, 2010). For example, Gittell and McKenna (1999) found in their
cross-state study that “most governors were influential in steering the direction of education
reform in their states, despite resistance from both the legislature and the unions” (p. 268). In
their cross-state case analysis, Carr and Fuhrman (1999) investigated how state politics affected
policymaking and the subsequent implementation of education reforms. This study found that
expanding policy and political incentives motivated governors and legislators to become
involved in education policymaking, a finding later confirmed by Gittell and McKenna (1999).
In fact, Carr and Fuhrman (1999) argued that making a mark on education can make or break
political careers, which leads to pressure on governors to take an active role in education
policymaking.
Traditionally, one of the best ways for governors and legislators to play a role in
education reform was through education finance (Fuhrman, Clune, & Elmore, 1991). In their

19
cross-case comparison, Carr and Fuhrman (1999) investigated three states—Kentucky, Alabama,
and New Jersey—and found that governors, backed by the courts, were major drivers of policy
change and adoption. When the governor of Kentucky wanted to reform the state’s education
system in 1984, he framed his proposed reforms as a means of improving both the state’s
economy and its ability to compete in the global economy, establishing an argument for
expanding the state’s role with regard to financial questions. Researchers have also found that
longer terms of office, consecutive terms, and veto powers reinforce the power of governors as
actors, increasing their ability to gain more control over state budgets and agencies (Gittell &
McKenna, 1999; Greenblatt, 1996; Renshon & Gittell, 1992; Van Horn, 2005). Official actors
such as governors have been identified as moving beyond budgetary responsibilities to take on
education quality issues (Kirst, 1984). From 1980 to 2007, the role of governors in education
policymaking increased (Henig, 2009a). However, further studies have found that the power of
state legislature committees and their chairs has increased alongside the power of the governor
(Patterson, 1983; Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1982).
The expanding role of legislatures. Research has indicated that during the “excellence
reform” efforts of the 1980s, legislators joined governors in expanding their roles in driving
education policymaking (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999; Evans, Murray, & Schwab, 1997). The sheer
volume of legislative activity around education reform issues in the 1980s was unprecedented.
By 1985, almost every state had enacted some sort of reform package. Examples of those
reforms include over 40 new state accountability programs and over 1,000 pieces of legislation
introduced by state legislatures (Kirst & Wirt, 2009). These reforms, like those the governors
enacted, targeted issues beyond those of traditional education finance, focusing instead on areas
such as teacher pay and certification (Fuhrman & Elmore, 1994).

20
According to Carr and Fuhrman (1999), state legislative activity in K–12 policymaking
increased during the early 1970s. During this time, policymaking focused predominantly on
improving students’ equal opportunity through school finance litigation, often as the direct result
of court orders. Legislative activity grew as 28 state legislatures reformed their finance systems,
increasing their share of spending on education from 38% in 1972 to 45% in 1979 (Evans et al.,
1997) while doubling state aid to elementary and secondary education (Fuhrman, 1982). This
movement expanded further during the 1980s, according to McDonnell (1988), as confirmed by
Marshall, Mitchell, and Wirt (1985) in their comparative four-state, cross-state study of
education policymaking. By the mid-1990s, Griffin (1994) found that legislators considered
education reform policies second in priority behind health care.
Crossing the boundary between actors and ideas, partisan politics weighed in from both
political parties as they addressed their changing goals for and perceptions of education policy
reform. For example, Timar (1994) found that both Democratic and Republican legislators used
their education policymaking influence to enhance funding for their own constituencies.
Meanwhile, other scholars found that unofficial actors
8
such as unions (broadly supported by the
Democratic party) were losing influence as governors gained power (Gittell & McKenna, 1999).
In fact, Gittell and McKenna (1999) argue that increasingly expansive alliances between the
governors and traditional Republican supporters, the business community, and religious groups
diminished the power of unions within the policymaking process. This research also found that
the education bureaucracy in many states, theoretically divorced from partisan politics, lost much

8
Unofficial actors may include interest groups, political activists, think tanks, policy groups, and others
who intend to influence the political system.

21
of its former structural independence from the governor’s office, leading to significant new
power for a broader array of actors and interest groups in education.
The expanding role of courts. The third official actor identified in the research as the
driver of education policymaking at the state level is the judiciary. Many studies of state
education reform connect education reform goals to court mandates (Carr & Fuhrman, 1999;
Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982; Paris, 2010; Picus, 2009). Whereas the research has indicated that
non-judicial actors, interests, state culture, and prior policies play increasing roles as drivers of
policy change, it is often court decisions that set the stage. The foregrounded role of the state-
level judiciary, which once identified itself as a powerful driver of education reforms, has largely
diminished in the contemporary education policymaking era as the number of court cases
decreased in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Scholars specifically studying the role of equity in
education funding have found that by mandating equity-based funding, the courts often created
conditions for increasing state authority and changing the policymaking landscape (Wong,
1991). In contemporary scholarship, the legacy of rulings has been absorbed into the education
backdrop, and empirical research has drifted away from investigating the active role of the courts
in education policymaking since the 1970s.
Policymaking as a result of litigation differs from policymaking as a result of legislation.
Specifically, Elmore and McLaughlin (1982) found that court-ordered reforms are different in
character from legislative initiatives, as legislative reforms are more often the reflection of
popular will and often contain a theory of action. Conversely, court-initiated reforms are
frequently the result of petitions from the politically disenfranchised and are issued to correct a
legal or constitutional violation rather than prescribe a theory of action. Accordingly, Elmore and
McLaughlin (1982) found in their study of the last major California school finance reform in the

22
early 1970s that the reforms did not stem from overwhelming public demand or a theory of
action but were instead the work of a coalition of lawyers, school finance experts, and
foundations, aided by California’s State Department of Education and the National Institute of
Education
9
(Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982). The reformers in this case, as in others, relied on
judicial intervention to disengage school finance from politics, basing their claim on the principle
of equality. As a result, policymaking that follows the courts may not align with the politics of
the state and may therefore face recurring challenges regarding the adoption and implementation
of court-mandated policies (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982; Wong, 1991). The studies that focus
on the courts as the main source of power over state education policymaking provide a different
perspective from those that focus on actors, policies, ideas, or paradigms.
The Role of Unofficial Actors or Interests

Substantial literature devoted to the vast array of unofficial actors in the policymaking
process identify them as interests (Boyd, Plank, & Sykes, 2000; Chubb & Moe, 1988; Denzau &
Munger, 1986; Mazzoni, 1993; Mazzoni & Malen, 1985; Moe, 2009, 2011), networks of actors,
(Kirst, 1984; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Reckhow, 2012), policy specialists (Gittell & McKenna,

9
Although not yet investigated in the literature, today political actors have turned toward the courts to seek
judicial intervention to change state-level education policy and governance. These cases are designed to utilize
judicial action, as part of a political strategy, to disrupt specific education policies in what is known as impact
litigation. Just as civil rights cases in the past depended upon guaranteed rights for individuals in society, this
contemporary genre of litigation is based on equity protections guaranteed by state constitutions. For example ,
current cases such as Vegara v. California 2014 are filed with the expectation that the court will mandate corrections
to the plaintiff’s perception of a structural inequality of education opportunity. Specifically, the plaintiffs in this case
claimed that California’s education system failed to provide the quality education—and the equality in education—
guaranteed to every child under California’s constitution. In this case, as in a similar case filed in New York State,
the plaintiffs argue that teacher tenure laws limit the student’s right to attain equal access to quality public education.

23
1999), and businesses (Odden & Marsh, 1990). All found that unofficial actors influence each
other as well as the broader policymaking process. Empirical studies have tended to focus on a
subgroup of these actors, policy entrepreneurs, who promote perceived issues and solutions to
the active governmental agenda (McDonnell, 2013; Mintrom, 1997, 2000; Mintrom & Norman,
2009). Policy entrepreneurs employ their social and political capital to move policies forward,
supported by or in cooperation with other actors in the policymaking process (Mintrom, 2000).
However, the need to include social and political capital as spheres of influence limits the value
of focusing on policy entrepreneurs as the lone drivers of policy change.
Interest groups. The role of interest groups in education policymaking has been the focus
of many studies, yet most of these have focused on their impact at the federal level (Cibulka,
2001; Mahoney & Lugg, 2001; Mazzoni, 1994). Some studies broadly addressed all potential
interest groups (Denzau & Munger, 1986), while others have focused narrowly on those
organizations traditionally linked to the education system, such as teachers’ unions (Mintrom &
Vergari, 1998). In a study examining the role of interest groups nationally, Thomas and Hrebenar
(1991) identified teachers’ unions as the most influential interest group in 43 of 50 states.
Interestingly, by 2000, in a comparative case study of Michigan and Pennsylvania, Boyd and
colleagues (2000) found that “[p]oliticians in Michigan and Pennsylvania have discovered real
advantages in politics and policies that attack or bypass unions. They do not need to bargain.
They do not need to form public-professional partnerships. They have won the war, and they are
in charge” (p. 36). Although Boyd et al. (2000) indicate a lower profile for teachers’ unions,
Denzau and Munger (1986) have found mixed results demonstrating diverse interest group
influence on education policymaking, leading once again to the conclusion that singling out a
single actor or group of actors in state policymaking has not led to a clear understanding of who

24
is influencing the policies or to what ends.
The increasing role of think tanks. Increasingly, studies have identified think tanks and
foundations as powerful players in the interest group landscape, influencing policy makers and
consequently, policymaking (Reckhow, 2012; Scott, Lubienski, & DeBray-Pelot, 2009; Stone,
1996). According to Mitchell, Crowson, and Shipps (2011), think tanks in the United States
enlarged their areas of interest during the 1980s. Since then, the role and number of partisan
think tanks and the amount of foundation investment in education policymaking have increased
(Scott et al., 2009), yet the effect of think tank reporting on policymaking remains nebulous.
Increasingly, however, policy researchers are focusing on the influence of think tank researchers
and technical specialists and are finding think tank organizations to be features of state and
federal education policymaking (DeBray-Pelot & McGuinn, 2009; Kaestle, 2007; Kirst &
Bulkley, 2000; Manna, 2006).
All of the official and unofficial actors discussed in these studies have been found to
influence the policymaking process by attempting to promote their ideas, beliefs, or values
through education policy change, further blurring empirical distinctions between the influence of
actors and the power of paradigms and ideas.
Policies Influence Politics

Some studies have found that, intertwined with actors as effectors of education policies,
policies themselves can set the stage for the politics of education policymaking (McDonnell,
2013). Theoretical arguments, such as that by Schattschneider (1935, p. 288) observe that
“policies create politics,” have been explored most often at the federal level in the literature of
education policymaking. The vast majority of policy feedback literature has investigated the
influence of federal policies such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of

25
1965 (McDonnell, 2005; Pierson, 1993), which set the precedent for federal involvement in
public schools, and the landmark No Child Left Behind (NCLB) ESEA reauthorization
legislation in 2001 (Hill, Roza, & Harvey, 2008; Wong, 2008), which prescribed a role for the
federal government in setting testing standards, accountability measures for schools and students,
the pace of school improvement, and consequences for schools that do not succeed. These
studies found that, consistent with the concept of federalism and policy feedback, laws passed at
the national level influence policymaking at both the state and local levels. One example of this
is the federal policy passed in 2011, during the global economic recession, known as Race to the
Top (RTT). This legislation was designed to allocate approximately $1.35 billion federal dollars
for states that applied and met preconditions as set out by the law to be awarded additional
federal education dollars. McGuinn (2012) argued that one aim of RTT was to set goals for the
states to promote policy change internally while providing political cover for those changes,
which further impedes the ability to identify sources of influence on state-level policymaking.
An example of NCLB’s wide influence can be found in Hazi and Rucinski's (2009) 50-
state, theory of action study—as defined by Malen (2005)
10
—to ascertain whether state statutes
and Department of Education regulations reflected NCLB guidelines for teacher evaluations.
They found that after the implementation of NCLB, the majority of states asserted oversight and
involvement in local teacher evaluation practices, decreased the frequency of veteran teacher
evaluation, and increased the types of data used in evaluations. In this area of policymaking,
which has traditionally been a local issue, other researchers have found similar outcomes after

10
Malen’s (2005) study uses a form of policy feedback to identify in broad policy initiatives the “theory of
action sets of principles and propositions, orientations, and related assumptions” that underpin the policy (p. 196)
and are either stated explicitly or can be inferred from written descriptions of policies .

26
the implementation of NCLB (Grissom & Herrington, 2012; McGuinn, 2012; Superfine,
Gottlieb, & Smylie, 2012; Viteritti, 2012) and RTT (Baker, Oluwole, & Green, 2013). Other
studies have demonstrated more broadly that state policymakers respond to federal policy
implementation by developing new state policies (Lusi, 1997; Spillane, 1996).
Just as in the case of actors, both non-education (Mettler & Soss, 2004; Skocpol, 1992)
and education studies (McDonnell, 2013) have examined how policy design shapes political
response to and influences subsequent policy, finding similar incorporated ideas, actors, and
paradigms that make it difficult to identify empirically, or investigate theoretically, the separate
influences of these policymaking variables. The policy feedback concept is based on the
assumption that policies establish new institutional rules and structures or augment existing ones
(McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016). These rules specify the conditions under which policies
allocate benefits to some individuals and groups and impose costs on others. For interest groups
and other political actors, these costs and benefits create incentives for mobilizing to protect their
benefits or minimize their costs. Policies generate interpretive effects as individuals come to
understand how costs and benefits affect them personally and then draw conclusions about how
these outcomes influence their status as citizens (Pierson, 1993). These attitudinal effects capture
the impact of policies on individuals’ sense of political value, perceptions of how deserving they
are of public benefits, and trust in government, thus driving a political reaction.
The Role of State Culture in Policymaking

Where and how boundaries are drawn around a public policy issue influences subsequent
political debate (Schattschneider, 1964). Studies of state policymaking have found that culture
functions as an influence on boundary creation (Sacken & Medina, 1990). Elazar (1984)
describes the impact of political culture on public policy as communicated through the attitudes

27
and expectations that grow out of each political environment. The role of culture in state
education policymaking is most often understood in the literature through the interactions of
institutions, actors, and previous policies (Brown, 2008; Louis et al., 2008). For example, Kirst
(1984) examined 24 cases of state education policymaking and found, as did McDonnell and
Elmore (1987), that state institutional political culture affects policymaking. For example,
McDonnell and Elmore (1987) found that the cumulative effect of previous budgetary policies is
an “especially significant” contributor to constraining the options of state policymakers or
administrators to make policy choices (p. 149).
The findings outlined above have been reinforced by more recent studies (Marshall,
1989) that used comparative case study data to find that state-level political cultures shape the
politics of education policymaking and adoption. Brown (2008) studied Wisconsin’s education
policy reform process and found that despite the powerful political prowess of Governor Tommy
Thompson, the state’s institutional and political culture constrained and ultimately defeated his
reform agenda. Louis et al. (2008), with similar findings, concluded:
that enduring political cultures … are hard to measure but easier to see when you are
close to state policymaking activity—and may help to explain why the states still exhibit
great variation in the way in which they are exercising leadership for school
improvement, even after several decades of national reform pressures (p. 588).

Once again, the role of both state and political culture in these studies were identified as a
defined cause of political action, yet it cannot be divorced from the broader educational
ecosphere of which it is a part. For example, these cultures are not free to exist outside of the
American federal system, nor are they exempt from prior policies or court rulings, further
challenging these findings.

28
Bounded in Paradigms and Ideas

As noted at the beginning of this review, the literature has not fully captured the
complexity of interplay between actors, policies, and policymaking culture. Instead, studies have
become entwined with and embedded in the influence of paradigms and ideas and confined
within the American federalist system of government. Mehta (2013) argued that the framing of
actors, policies, and cultures within broader national—and even global—paradigms has
generated more studies on ideas and politics (Beland 2005; Beland & Cox, 2010; Campbell,
2002; Hall, 1993; Mehta, 2013; Steensland, 2006). These studies apply a variety of different
frameworks that invoke diverse paradigms (Hall, 1993; Mehta, 2013), road maps or worldviews
(Goldstein & Keohane, 1993), or simply ideas (Campbell, 2012) as ways to explain actors’
behavior and power to achieve their policy goals.
Specifically, Mehta’s (2013) process-tracing educational policy study found that a
nationwide altered policy paradigm of accountability came out of the publication of A Nation at
Risk (1983). He found that this powerful education paradigm of accountability influenced the
ways in which education reforms restructured the political landscape in each state. Further, he
argues that the paradigm of accountability, “holds that educational success is central to national,
state, and individual economic success; that American schools across the board are substantially
underperforming and in need of reform; that schools rather than social forces should be held
responsible for academic outcomes; and that success should be measured by externally verifiable
tests” (Mehta, 2013, p.286). He finds the saturation of this singular paradigm of accountability
ultimately influences the politics of education policymaking.
Additionally, Mehta’s findings (2013) contributed a deeper understanding of the political
rationale for education reforms passed in many states after 1983. Mehta also promotes the idea

29
that reforms may be more successful if they are framed to complement existing paradigms, such
as framing state level education reforms as essential to achieving state and national economic
success. For example, a state leader may frame a proposal to institute high stakes testing around
a perceived need to ensure public education is improving human capital thus positively
contributing to the state’s economic success. These findings identify the need for researchers to
develop an awareness of the underlying beliefs that shape the politics of education policymaking
at the state level. As a result, incorporating ideas or paradigm-based studies into the body of
literature on state-level education policymaking is open to further exploration.
Major Debates in Education Policymaking Literature

As discussed above, the concept that broader ideas or substantial paradigms propel
policymaking reforms is also a source of debate in the literature. The idea behind a paradigm,
according to Mehta, is to “create a powerful master narrative, that can reverberate outwards,
creating changes in politics, policy, institutional control, and substantive direction of entire
policy arenas” (2013, p. 292). Yet, this raises many questions about the goals of these paradigms.
For example, where do paradigms derive their sense of power over the political landscape in
education reforms? Are these paradigms reflective of existing policy, imposed on the system
from political elites, built up from grassroots ideas, or something else entirely? More studies may
help us develop a clearer notion of where theories clarify, hinder, overlap, or illuminate the
shifting landscape of state education policymaking.
As previously observed, most of the discussion regarding the role of politics in state
education policymaking originates from a quest to identify what causes political shifts. Scholars
have used a range of theoretical lenses to investigate these shifts. Scholars such as Lorraine
McDonnell (McDonnell, 2005, 2009, 2013; McDonnell & McLaughlin, 1981) have found that

30
policy feedback and policy entrepreneur theories play an essential role in the state education
policymaking process. Other scholars such as Mintrom and Vergari (1996) proposed joining
theoretical frameworks such as advocacy coalitions and policy entrepreneurship to deepen our
understanding of the policymaking process and build a richer theoretical base that, consciously
applied, may help our understanding over time.
Limitations of Existing Research

One major limitation of extant research on state policymaking arises from assumptions
about the origins of the politics of change. Often, studies begin by employing theoretical
frameworks, such as policy entrepreneurship, advocacy coalition theory, or policy feedback,
subsequently finding the entrepreneur, coalition, policy, or actor to be the central player in the
political drama of education policymaking. This limits the scope of the potential explanation of
policy change. The second limitation is the lack of research into the role of politics in state
education policymaking in general. The body of literature is thin and lacks a rich foundation on
which to build a debate. The final limitation is time, as Baumgartner and Jones (1991) argue.
Studies often investigate the sources and dynamics of policymaking within a narrow timeframe
(Larson, Vrangbaek, & Traulsen, 2006; Mazzar, 2007). With an abstract notion of time zero
(when a policy conception takes place), it may be more challenging to identify the power and
pressures behind policy shifts. Therefore, allowing the expansion of data by employing a wider
lens of time, together with a broader theoretical lens, may provide a clearer understanding of the
process of education policymaking.
As I argue in the remainder of this dissertation, one promising approach to addressing
these gaps is to draw on 1) Kingdon’s (1984, 2003) multiple streams model to ensure a broader
funnel through which to collect data and increase the applicability of findings and 2) advocacy

31
coalition framework to investigate how the internal and external pressures of coalitions affect the
education policy subsystem and identify the array of influences and their outcomes. The
approach that I have used in this study advances this active and developing theory while also
using it to explain the shifts in California’s education finance system. Applying this lens to the
case of California’s LCFF deepens our understanding of theories of policymaking and creates
opportunities to understand how and why politics have shifted and policies are adopted.
Conclusion

The preceding review highlights useful lessons for a study of policy development and
adoption. Scholarship in this area has revealed a dynamic enterprise in which individual works
build on one another, with some extending lines of analysis and retesting arguments. More often,
however, applying a wide variety of theoretical frameworks such as policy entrepreneurship,
interest groups, and policy feedback limits our ability to discuss the complexities of social
policymaking in the United States. In the literature on state-level policymaking, the dearth of
empirical analysis is even more striking. In applying potentially more substantial or complex
concepts to compelling, problem-driven research, this study creates an opportunity to generate
“the sort of intellectual culmination that allows a community of researchers to make clear
progress over time” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 20). Investigation into state policymaking
should seek to answer substantively and theoretically challenging questions while producing
studies that are responsive to the influence of ideas and paradigms. Study of the origins and
development of the LCFF will help address this void in the literature.
32

CHAPTER THREE
GROUNDED IN THEORY

This study examines state-level policymaking processes through a single piece of
noteworthy education legislation in California that included systematic decentralization, fiscal
realignment, and increased requirements for democratic participation in K–12 education. Passed
in 2013, the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) reflects a dramatic shift in California’s
education policy. One purpose of this study is to analyze the process that led to the adoption of
the LCFF. A complementary purpose of this study is theory development.
To investigate the complexity of this policymaking case, I applied two conceptual
frameworks to explain the phenomena of the passage of the LCFF, John Kingdon’s (1984, 2003)
multiple streams framework (MSF) and Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith’s (1993)
advocacy coalition framework (ACF). To begin, I will explain the rationale behind my
selections, followed by a discussion of the essential elements of each. Then, I will explain how
these frameworks can help us understand the origins, design, and adoption of the LCFF. Last, I
will discuss the use of these theoretical frameworks in tandem to contextualize and analyze the
dramatic education policy and political changes that took place in California in 2013.
Selection of Frameworks

The selection of MSF and ACF developed as a result of the iterative coding and analysis
process. LCFF was a significant policy change, yet not completely unknown to many in the
education research community. It represented a change in policy beliefs about how the state
should finance schools. I identified the MSF and ACF because both frameworks point to three
similar elements that set the stage for significant policy change. Those elements include the
progression of policy change, shifting policy beliefs and actions of subsystem actors toward the
33

current policy, and dynamic external changes including but not limited to societal perceptions,
shocks to the system, and socioeconomic conditions.
First, significant policy changes are often perceived as dramatic regulatory shifts but
often represent a lengthy process in which policymakers and subsystem actors
11
often collect and
analyze data prior to making a policy shift (Ingold & Varone, 2011; Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, &
Woods, 1991). The idea that policy change is a lengthy process is one of the main tenets of the
ACF, which specifically prescribes a timeframe of ten or more years as necessary to understand
policy change (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Consistent with this understanding, I
find that the decentralization portion of LCFF was not as dramatic a policy shift as many
observers claimed. Between 1979 and 2004, California lawmakers attempted to pass five
different pieces of decentralization legislation (Weston, 2011a; 2011c). In 2011, Fuller, Marsh,
Stecher, and Timar investigated how districts implemented these fiscal changes (what was
known at that time as Tier 3 flexibility) and argued that there had been a four-decade-long debate
among state policymakers concerning the idea of decentralizing education funding. According to
the study, one coalition favored continued centralized control over student funding allocations,
while the other favored decentralization of funding, indicating that the idea of decentralized
funding was not new in 2013, but had been a long term policy change discussed by policymakers
prior to the adoption of the LCFF.

11
Both theories include subsystem actors. This specific terminology emanates from the ACF, which
includes detailed definitions yet can be applied to theories and to identifying agents that directly or indirectly
influence policy affairs. These actors are defined by policy topic or territorial scope (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt,
Weible, & Sabatier, 2014). Examples of subsystem actors may include legislators, government agencies, interest
groups, or the media (Ingold & Varone, 2011).
34

Second, subsystem actors are essential to either ensure that their policy solution is placed
on the legislature’s agenda (MSF) or advocate for their beliefs to become part of new laws
(ACF). Recognizing external pressures is essential to understanding the forces that led to the
passage of the LCFF. The goal of both frameworks is to enable researchers to describe, explain,
and sometimes predict phenomena across different contexts. In this case, Fuller et al. (2011)
found that “a variety of analysts and groups have urged moving the pendulum back toward local
fiscal control” (p. 4), indicating that some subsystem actors believed in and were urging the state
to consider a policy shift toward decentralization. In addition, during an LCFF implementation
interview, a district official discussed his role as an advocate for local control with state
policymakers (personal communication, 2014). These two data points indicate the importance of
investigating subsystem actors who believed in and promoted the political debate around at least
one of the fundamental pillars of the LCFF—decentralization. As such, both the MSF and ACF
frameworks provide important leverage for investigating these actors.
Finally, both frameworks argue that external pressure matters—in the MSF, as part of the
politics and policy streams (described below), and in ACF as external subsystem “events” (also
described below). External pressure includes issues outside policymakers’ control, including
public opinion, socioeconomic conditions, and the broader educational landscape, all of which,
based upon my initial participation in the implementation research study, appeared to contribute
to the policymaking process and adoption of the LCFF. For example, a historic global economic
recession occurred prior to passage of the LCFF. During this recession, the state of California
suffered extreme financial hardships including budget reductions of billions of dollars of aid to
local school districts as well as cuts to adult literacy instruction and high-needs student services
(Johnson, Oliff, & Williams, 2010). This indicates a specific socioeconomic condition that may
35

have contributed to the external pressure that produced changes to subsystem beliefs and a policy
change known as LCFF.
Taken together, these three elements highlight the roles of subsystem actors and external
events in the policymaking process and contribute to the choice of the two theoretical frames
proposed in this study.
Multiple Streams Framework

Kingdon’s (1984) starting point is “an idea whose time has come” (p. 1). With this
statement, he argued that policymaking is not a linear path to a collective choice that moves a
societal problem to the political forefront. Instead, Kingdon argued that policymaking is a
labyrinth of “structural forces and cognitive and affective processes that are highly context
dependent” (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 26). The focus of Kingdon’s MSF analysis is the government
agenda and societal problems that draw the government’s attention. The unit of analysis is the
choices made by policy actors that either do or do not attract a government’s attention to a
solution floating around in the policy subsystem. Kingdon argued that there are conditions, such
as an election, external event, or public opinion shift, that must be met during a brief “window of
opportunity” before a policy problem finds a solution. He also argued that the solution to the
problem is already “out there” in the political sphere, and the solution is waiting for a problem to
be attached. Further, Kingdon posited three separate and independent streams of policymaking
that must be coupled to achieve agenda status for potential policy action. He described these
three streams—problem, policy, and political—as being related (Figure 3.1).
36

Figure 3.1.Adaptation of Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams framework.
As Figure 3.1 indicates, the problem stream includes problems that the electorate and
policymakers want addressed (Smith & Larimer, 2009). Problems are matters that are issues
deemed to require attention. Problems may require attention based on their “framing” (the way in
which policy actors define issues) but not necessarily on an objective need to address one
problem over another at any given time. Zahariadis (2007) defined policy actor framing as
“problem surfing,” in which advocates promote a particular policy solution for a sustained period
to try to catch the right problem stream (p. 416). In some cases, issues are brought into focus
because of a crisis or change in the scale of the problem. For example, after a series of shootings
in the United States in 2012, President Obama took the opportunity to propose gun control
legislation. This policy was already part of his party platform, yet the president did not offer the
37

policy (or problem solution) until after the shootings. The president was using the opportunity to
address an issue that had been floating around in the problem stream (gun violence in the United
States) to place his party’s policy solution, gun control, on the national agenda. The MSF argues
that policy actors frame an issue using evidence (in this case, gun violence statistics) to address
doubts (fear of restrictions, governmental overreach, and restrictions on the Second Amendment)
and persuasion (the potential to limit loss of life) to address a systemic inability to deal with a
problem issue. Kingdon asserts because a particular sequence of events and framing needs to
take place, only a small percentage of problems become part of the public agenda. The MSF
emphasizes that getting attention is a primary goal of the political actors, and therefore they must
act quickly before attention shifts elsewhere. This outcome may be achieved by demonstrating
that a solution already exists. Interestingly, the MSF does not contend that getting the problem
on the agenda ensures the policy solution will become law, only that the policy solution will rise
to become part of an active policy agenda.
The second stream is the policy stream in which policymakers consider the list of options
to solve the problem. The policy stream is where ideas or solutions are most likely to influence
the agenda. According to Kingdon (1984), these ideas survive through their technical feasibility,
including judicial, legal, and budgetary constraints. At this point, policy entrepreneurs and actors
such as administrators, legislators, staffers, interest groups, and other technical experts use
rational arguments to elevate the solution within the policy stream.
Finally, Kingdon’s (1984) concept of political stream involves political actions and
strategies that focus policy deliberation on certain issues. Specifically, the political stream
includes national mood, public opinion, electoral politics, regime change, jurisdictional
authority, party ideology, interest groups, and consensus building (Boscarino, 2009). Kingdon
38

viewed the scope of this theoretical frame as part of national politics in the United States, while
other scholars have applied it to supranational (Zahariadis, 2014) and subnational political
landscapes (Zahariadis, 2008). The broader political environment may include a national,
subnational, or supranational “mood” that may promote an opportunity for coupling problem,
policy, and political streams. In addition, the political stream may be influenced by election
outcomes. In other words, policymaking may not be a rational or orderly process. Rather, it can
be viewed as a confluence of separate but not entirely independent streams, with the greatest
agenda change occurring when “these streams are coupled at critical junctures” (Kingdon, 2003,
p. 87).
The MSF rests on the principle that the coupling the three streams creates a “window of
opportunity” to elevate policy solutions to the agenda, promoting the likelihood that a preferred
policy is adopted. In more recent work in the MSF, scholars have revised the framework to
include policy milieu and trends (Ness, 2010; Ness & Tucker, 2008). The policy milieu includes
broader institutional factors and expansion of the policy stream to include a policy field. The
trends contain state government structures, state policy trends, policy entrepreneurs, and policy
windows of opportunity (Ness, 2010; Ness & Mistretta, 2009). The application of this theoretical
frame to the LCFF’s origins, design, and elevation to the state-level agenda will incorporate
policy milieu. Kingdon (1984) defined the process of coupling of the policy streams into the
policy window.
Strengths of the MSF. The advantage of using the MSF framework this study is that the
MSF focuses the researcher’s attention on the streams, which emphasize both the internal and
external dynamics of the political context of the policy change (Ness & Mistretta, 2009). In
contemporary studies, the MSF has been adapted to emphasize policy design and formulation
39

rather than mere agenda-setting (McLendon & Cohen-Vogel, 2008; Zahariadis, 2008). The
framework allows the researcher to investigate how policies are made under ambiguous
conditions and contexts in which many perspectives on the same phenomena exist. In this case,
there were many perspectives in the subsystem about how to improve the California K–12
system. When there are many perspectives, the MSF theorizes that entrepreneurs who are
situated in the policy field seek to merge the streams to ensure the implementation of their
preferred policy design. The MSF also allows flexibility within the framework itself and for
integration with other theories, such as the ACF, which contributes to an in-depth analysis of the
role of subsystem influence in the policymaking and adoption process. Ultimately, the MSF is a
model for systematically studying policymaking and adoption that includes both policy
incrementalism and rapid policy change, both possible options in the adoption of the LCFF.
Limitations of the MSF. In applying the MSF to the study of state policymaking within
K–12 education, two potential limitations arise. One issue is the need to decontextualize the
theoretical frame: “the further one travels from . . . the distinctive characteristics and procedures
of the American legislature, the more Kingdon’s analysis may require adaptation” (Pollitt, 2008,
p. 127). Unlike Pollitt’s (2008) study spanning two European countries and two separate
organizations, this study is situated in the structure of U.S. governance, yet also embedded in
California’s K–12 education landscape. This system differs from the U.S. congressional
policymaking process (studied by Kingdon) because of the unique nature of a state governance
structure in a federalist system. In this case, there is the constitutional supremacy of the state’s
role in education and the local government’s cultural expectation of preeminence to apply within
the MSF. This is confounded by the increasingly influential role of the federal government in
education policy. The state governance structure’s unique nature requires more sophistication in
40

determining who leads and who follows when applying the MSF to California K–12 education
policy.
Second, scholars (Borrás & Radaelli, 2009; Zahariadis, 2003) have argued that some
concepts in the original MSF are underdeveloped theoretically. This study seeks to contribute to
this literature by addressing a series of linked theoretical problems that are evident in applying
the MSF to state-level educational policymaking. Specifically, Kingdon (1984) noted that in the
MSF, entrepreneurs and decision makers are separated operationally and physically. In this
study, I find as, did Smith and Larimer (2009), that this distinction may be too limiting and that
policy entrepreneurs not only advocate for their solutions to policymakers but also become
directly involved in the legislative process. I address the element of the MSF that limits the role
of policy entrepreneur to individuals engaged in the policymaking process. I instead expand the
concept of policy entrepreneurship to include a multiple of actors within the institutional role of
policymaking.
Advocacy Coalition Framework

The ACF was devised by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (Jenkins-Smith, 1990; Sabatier,
1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988) and was expanded and clarified in the late 1990s and
early 2000s (Sabatier, 2007; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999c). The ACF’s analysis focuses on
policy learning and subsequent policy change within a policy subsystem in which beliefs—which
serve as the unit of analysis—are translated into political action. The ACF highlights beliefs or
sets of core ideas about causation and worth in public policy. Advocacy coalitions form when
certain ideas or beliefs are conjoined. According to the ACF, two, three, or four coalitions may
exist within the policy subsystem, each with its own strategies to influence government
decisions. Change, according to the ACF, comes from the adaptability of these ideas to a broader
41

political landscape. In the ACF, the wider political landscape sets the parameters at any given
time for action by the advocacy coalition. Just as the MSF includes “politics” as a stream and a
fundamental factor in the policymaking process, the ACF sets the political landscape as a
contributor to policy change. Unlike the MSF, the ACF does not see the actors as those with
particular solutions in search of a problem but instead posits that beliefs held by coalitions are
fundamental to their attempts to shape policy. The ACF provides a theoretical center for
investigating both stabilities and changes in the policy process (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1999a; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

Figure 3.2. Flow diagram of the advocacy coalition framework. Adapted from Sabatier and
Weible (2014).

42

The ACF model considers policy change results from the coalition learning process. A
policy subsystem consists of actors who are grouped into a number of advocacy coalitions
(Figure 3.2, Policy Subsystem). Policy subsystems are made up of individuals who share
particular belief systems, values, and causal assumptions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999c).
These beliefs are dissected through the ACF into three primary levels: core, policy, and
secondary aspects. Core beliefs (Figure 3.2, Relatively Stable Parameters) are fundamental and
unlikely to change. An example is the belief that children need an education. Policy beliefs are
more particular, such as the belief in free public education, but also remain stable and difficult to
change. The third level of beliefs, as described in the ACF, is secondary aspect beliefs that relate
to policy adoption. An example of a secondary belief may be the belief in supporting publically
operated, rather than privately operated, charter schools. Secondary aspect beliefs are the most
flexible of the three levels of belief and are often those in which the learning process takes place,
affecting the coalition’s promotion of policy change. As Sabatier (1988) stated, “an actor or
coalition will give up secondary aspects of his or her belief system before acknowledging
weaknesses in the policy core” (p. 195). A policy actor may be unwavering in his or her core
belief that children need an education and policy belief that society should provide the
opportunity for children to receive an education.
However, those beliefs may prove more flexible when the actor insists on policies
addressing whether those services are provided through a traditional or charter school operator
(Figure 3.2, Long-Term Coalition Opportunity Structures). Significantly, the ACF allows for
deep beliefs and policy beliefs to potentially change over time, which is one of the reasons why
the framework argues for studies on policy change to be longer in duration than the traditional
year or two, possibly a decade or more (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999c). Mintrom and Vergari
43

(1996) found that within a policy subsystem, when policy beliefs are challenged (in their case,
around the politics of school choice), factions tend toward a 10-year alignment with stable
coalitions, calling into question the proposition of core belief flexibility, even in the long run.
As Figure 3.2 (External Subsystem Dynamics) indicates, the ACF also integrates other
options for policy change. These are external and internal shocks. Comparable to focusing events
in the MSF’s problem stream, these external and internal shocks change conditions for potential
policymaking. External shocks are significant changes that may include socioeconomic
conditions, governmental change, outputs from other subsystems, or losses from disaster
(DeBray-Pelot, Lubienski, & Scott, 2007). As Figure 3.2 outlines, coalitions may use the
opportunity of an external shock to frame the issue, exploit public opinion, and coordinate both
economic and political support. According to the ACF, these shocks and the coalition’s reaction
to them influence agendas, focus attention, and disrupt coalitions in ways that may lead to policy
change. For example, Sabatier (2007) found that coalition stability patterns and interest in
political learning were significant factors in explaining policy change. These findings were
derived through his case analysis of the reaction in Sweden to the external shock of the Three
Mile Island disaster. According to the ACF, an internal shock is subsumed within an external
shock. Internal shocks are the effects of a significant external change on a coalition’s belief
system. An internal shock compels the coalition to revisit its core and policy beliefs, perhaps
following a realization by many of its actors that existing policies have failed.
Traditionally, the ACF has focused on subsystem dynamics, yet contemporary work by
Nohrstedt (2010) put forth the argument that ACF scholars should examine more macro-level,
trans-subsystem components in the policymaking system. At the macro level, these components
would include networks of linked subsystems, public opinion, and the other political and policy
44

venues. Jones and Jenkins-Smith (2009) explicitly argued that the area of public opinion has
been underutilized in applications of the ACF. In their study of climate change policy, they
found that “endogenous subsystem-dimensional shifts, induced by internal subsystem actors,
have migrated outward to help direct public opinion” (p. 52). Hence, they argued that these
macro-level variables make up the landscape in which policy actors engage. As a result, shifts in
public opinion can act either as external shocks that move the policy landscape or as internal
shocks that cause changes in the subsystem.
In applying the ACF to the LCFF policymaking process, many data points appear to
support Jones’ and Jenkins-Smith’s claims that expanding the subsystem over time, to include
scientific evidence as provided by policy experts, influenced the external and internal subsystem
dynamic that led to the LCFF’s passage. For example, over time there was published scientific
evidence to support the notion that disproportionately higher allocations for students with
particular life challenges correlated with improvements in student outcomes (Downes & Pogue,
1994; Levin, 1982, 1989; Reschovsky, 1994). Disproportionate allocations for students with
additional needs are one of the policy solutions included in the LCFF. Additionally, researchers
have found that in California there was public support of disproportionately higher funding for
students with additional needs (Brewer, Plank, & Hall, 2012). Expanding the subsystem to
include public opinion may allow the researcher to either substantiate or negate public opinion as
a contributing factor to policy change. This support, or lack thereof, may also provide an
opportunity to investigate if there were any policy belief shifts or policy learning that took place
beyond advocacy coalitions.
Strengths of the ACF. The application of the ACF to the policymaking process of the
LCFF provides leverage into understanding state education policy change in four ways. First, the
45

ACF allows for the investigation of the policymaking and adoption process based on policy-
oriented learning. According to the ACF, policy-oriented learning is simultaneously inert and
dynamic and opens the door for coalitions of actors to learn and shift while holding onto deep
core beliefs. It also moves beyond the perception that policy actors predictably promote their
predetermined policy outcomes as solutions, as is the case with the MSF. Applying the ACF to
this study expands our understanding of both policy development and the tenets of the ACF in
the state-level education policymaking arena.
Second, the ACF provides a theoretical basis for explaining the role of negotiated
agreements between opposing coalitions that could influence the policy environment (Brewer et
al., 2012). Many perceived the California education system from the 1970s forward as an
exemplar of increased state centralization of K–12 education policy (Duncombe & Yinger, 2010;
Timar & Roza, 2010). Investigating the influence of California’s education subsystem
contributes to a better understanding of the actions of coalitions who made contributions and
how those contributions contributed to this “paradigm shift” in California (Humphery &
Koppich, 2013, p. 1).
This case also contributes to the discussion among ACF theorists regarding the variable
of external sources of influence on policymaking at the state level. The ACF postulates that the
external factors of heightened public and political attention, agenda change, venue shifts, and
most importantly, redistribution of coalition resources, are all essential for contributing to policy
change (Timar & Roza, 2010). It may be that those external subsystem perturbations are
necessary but insufficient steps to policy change, highlighting the potential of the
aforementioned external sources of change to the California education system as a variable in the
case of the LCFF.
46

Third, internal events are essential to examining the LCFF policymaking process within
the ACF framework. Within the ACF, internal shocks conform to the minority’s policy core
beliefs and increase doubt within the dominant coalition. In the case of the LCFF, the role of
external events—national policies, socioeconomic changes, changes in public opinions and
political climate such as the election of a Democratic supermajority, and the shift from
subsystem actors to policymakers—may be examined to interpret various coalitions’ beliefs.
These coalition beliefs can be compared to the three core elements of the LCFF: decentralization,
weighted student funding formulas, and democratic participation in local education
policymaking.
Finally, the ACF has been used to frame studies of policy subsystems across multiple
policy arenas (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Recent work summarizing more than 80 applications of
the ACF has demonstrated its development into a significant research program in which methods
have been devised to assist researchers in investigating “complex, interdependent political
environments where hundreds of participants interact in the context of nested institutional
arrangements, uneven power relations, and uncertain scientific and technical information about
problems and alternatives” (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, p. 121). This description of a
political context correlates with Scott et al.'s (2009) description of California’s education
governance system, promoting the theory that a vast array of shifts potentially influenced by an
ever-broadening cast of actors had to take place to effect such a dramatic policy change.
Limitations of the ACF. One of the ACF’s main limitations is its lack of standard
methodology for operationalizing the underlying conceptual framework. The ACF continues to
be helpful in explaining how policy change is effected, how coalitions are structured, and how
such coalitions learn. Applications of both quantitative and qualitative methods studies, as well
47

as mixed methods studies, are appropriate in the ACF. Through the use of quantitative methods,
a researcher may be able to identify how many in the education finance subsystem support a
change in policy and how strongly they support it.
Unifying Factors of the Two Theoretical Frameworks

Both the MSF and ACF focus on similar types of phenomena that set the stage for
significant policy change. Within these theoretical frames, factors such as dramatic events,
crises, changes in governing coalitions, and administrative and legislative turnover may have
contributed to the significant policy change embodied by LCFF (Smith & Larimer, 2009).
Although it may appear to many in California that this policy change occurred overnight, prior
scholarship suggests that at the very least, the decentralization component, was a decade or more
in the making and reflected the input of subsystem streams and coalitions. This study, with its
backward mapping
12
and focus on the origins and influences of this legislation, benefits from the
MSF’s initial conceptual frame, which asserts that influences from the buildup of scientific data,
public acceptance, electoral politics, and consensus building, as well as information and policy
entrepreneurial support, push a topic to the agenda level. The ACF focuses on contributing
connections of beliefs, pathways to change, and fundamental shifts in policy. For this reason, the
study’s initial stages are framed through the lens of the MSF. As a result, the ACF is embedded
within the MSF because that the role of beliefs among the actors was central to their promotion
of this landmark policy. Thus, a hybrid of these two frameworks are necessary to explain this
case.

12
Backward mapping in this case means to start at the outcome’s end and reason back to the policy’s
initiation (Elmore, 1995).
48

CHAPTER FOUR
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This instrumental case study focuses on the initiation and adoption of the Local Control
Funding Formula (LCFF) in California. When it comes to education reforms such as teacher
compensation, student evaluations, and school accountability measures, California has
historically taken its own path (Halper, 2013), and the passage of the LCFF was no exception.
Understanding the origins and processes by which this landmark legislation was developed and
adopted may not only clarify the implementation and impact of the policy but also help explain
similar policies in other states (Wilson, 2008). Findings from this study can: (a) contribute to the
conversation around state and national policy shifts in urban education governance, and (b) help
refine and advance theory on state education policymaking.
To explore this topic, I employed an instrumental case study method. This approach is
appropriate to the study of the LCFF because instrumental cases are bound by the case, but bring
focus to issues that extend beyond the single case—in this case, the role of subgroup actors and
organizations in policy adoption (Stake, 2005; Yin, 2014). As noted, California provided a
strategic case for understanding a major shift in state level policy. These methods facilitate an
understanding of who was involved and how, and for what purpose the LCFF was adopted—
along with the influence these factors had on California’s shifting education landscape.
In this chapter, I outline research methods for the project. To begin, I outline methods of
data collection, examine sources and coding, and provide an explanation of a methodological
tool—process tracing—included in my analysis. I follow this with a discussion of validity, and
close by addressing the overall weaknesses and strengths of the study design and methodology.

49

Data Collection

Data collection for this study took place in 2015 and focused on understanding activities
that influenced the design and passage of the LCFF. As Table 4.1 indicates, the data collected
included documents, interviews, and observations (described in more detail in the next section).
Table 4.1
Data
Documents
Forms 990 70
Court documents 8
Newspaper articles 112
Legislative committee reports 22
State publications (CDE
1
, CDF
2
, SBE
3
, and LAO
4
) 60
Legislative bill analysis 28
Proposed legislation 16
Websites, blog posts, Twitter feeds 82
Public opinion polls 19
Advocacy documents 24
Policy briefs 13
Coalition talking points 5
Submitted hearing documents 16
Gubernatorial addresses 32
Total 507
Interviews
State-level policy actors 19
Intermediary actors 7
District-level actors 5
Total 31
Observations
Advocacy group meetings 12
State committee hearings 23
State Board of Education meetings 20
Total 55
1
California Department of Education
2
California Department of Finance
3
State Board of Education
4
Legislative Analyst’s Office

I used these multiple sources of data to triangulate findings such as expanded document
collection, follow-up interviews, and a shift toward a different dialectic stance (Greene, 2006).
50

Greene described the dialectic stance as the use of data triangulation to create “generalized,
present tense and specific, past-tense . . . questions, creating a greater depth of understanding
rather than just confirming a conclusion” (quoted in Maxwell, 2013, p. 104). For example, I used
both observation (from public testimony, public interviews, and statements) and documentation
data (policy position statements, 990 forms, and campaign contribution data) from interest
groups to inform interview questions. The results of this design helped to create a greater depth
of understanding of interest group beliefs around state education finance in California. The use
of a diverse array of both data sources and methodological tools also assisted in minimizing the
likelihood of retrospective bias by allowing for the triangulation of interview data with
documentation and observation data. I return to the issue of retrospective bias later in this
chapter.
Data Sources

As Table 4.1 demonstrates, this case study relies on multiple data sources to inform the
research process (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 1994). Both ACF and MSF theory (explained in the
previous chapter) guided this data collection. ACF called attention to collecting, analyzing, and
identifying data regarding shared education finance policy beliefs in the coalitions of the
California education subsystem. MSF highlighted the importance of data related to identifying
policymaking variables. Table 4.2—an excerpt from Appendix A that provides a more
comprehensive mapping of the study design—shows the linkage of the two theoretical frames in
the construct of data collection. The study design and its connection to data is explained in the
subsections below.

51

Table 4.2
Theoretical frame, research questions unified with data sources
Theoretical
frame(s)
Research
questions
Interview
protocol questions
Document data
Observation
data
Section 1: Politics, Policies, and Beliefs
Kingdon’s
political
stream:
political actions
and strategies.

The policy
stream, where
ideas reach the
agenda.

ACF: beliefs
and pressures
on those
beliefs.
What
influenced
California’s
dramatic
education
policy shift
away from
categorical
funding and
centralized
control?

Who was making the
decision regarding
education governance
(specifically allocations
and accountability) in
California prior to the
LCFF? Can you give a
few examples?

What information was
used to make these
decisions?

State reports:
Legislative
Analyst’s Office
(LAO), State
Board of
Education (SBE),
Department of
Education,
Assembly &
Senate committee
hearings

Proposed
legislation from
2013 and prior
years

Academic articles

Policy reports:
PACE, PPIC
SBE and
legislative
hearings

Advocacy
organization
publicized
videos

Published
interviews of
policymakers
and policy
shapers

Documents

Documents provided important information on settings and influences that shaped
policymaking dynamics (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Creswell, 2012; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2014).
These documents included gubernatorial speeches; legislative hearing transcripts; organizational
budgets; 990s; audited financial statements; campaign contributions; federal, state, and local
laws; requests for proposals; research reports; policy briefs; speeches; blog posts; Twitter feeds;
media accounts; government testimony; websites; historic poll data; and grant-funding materials.
Column 4 of Table 4.2 below provides a sample of the document data. A more complete list of
data may be found in Appendix E.
52

These documents were located through three main techniques. The first method for
identification was through the use of Guidestar and Foundation Center to find documents such as
nonprofit 990s and audited financial statements. Next, government databases were searched to
locate documents such as gubernatorial speeches; government testimony; and federal, state, and
local laws. Twitter was used to locate and track organization and individual policy actor Twitter
feeds, and popular and social media accounts. Finally, Google searches were conducted to find
grant-funding materials, budgets, requests for proposals, and websites. Document data were
included based on whether the document (a) discussed California education finance and was
produced by an organization or actor that participated in the California education finance
policymaking or subgroup discussion; (b) was referenced by an interviewee; (c) was listed on an
official statement or letter of support or rejection of the ideas of the LCFF; or (d) was part of
understanding the mission, vision, or funding of a particular subsystem actor or organization.
Interviews

As Table 4.2 demonstrates, the interview questions were based on study research
questions and undergirded them with the two theoretical frames. Additionally, both document
and observation data were used to inform interview questions. Interviews with both official and
unofficial actors in the education policy community were conducted. Given the importance of
interviews as a method for identifying key actors in studies of political actors (Allison &
Zelikow, 1971; Murphy, 1980), a broad net of interviews with both official and unofficial actors
in the policy community was intentionally cast. Interview selection originated with a stratified
purposeful sample of potential interviewees who represent interest groups in the education
community and who may have influenced the legislation (Hatch, 2002). Following the initial
stage of the interview process, a snowball technique was employed (Farquharson, 2005; Fischer,
53

Ingold, Sciarini, & Varone, 2012; Goodman, 1961; Scott, 2013a, 2013b) to select representative
interviewees. Snowball sampling is recommended by Tansy (2007) when studying a past policy
event in which the goal of the study was to interview the most important political players in the
event. The snowball method was directed at linking actors and coalitions to each other through
their beliefs on K–12 education policy challenges and solutions, and was used it in this case to
improve the identification of members within the education community who participated in the
LCFF’s development and passage. The rationale for employing this technique is to identify and
gain a broader understanding of the subsystem actors and the connection between ideas, beliefs,
and actions that influenced this landmark legislation (Thompson, 2002). A total of 31 interviews
were conducted with members of the state board of education, legislators, district leaders,
legislative and administrative staff members, agency bureaucrats, members of the research
community, and advocacy groups.
The semi-structured interviews were approximately 60 minutes in length and included a
pattern of interviewer-prompted multivocality (Kezar, 2003). In this case, multivocality means
that the interviewer attempted to gain insights from the interviewee from the perspective of the
institution, group, or interviewee’s position within those organizations. This technique was
employed to increase the investigator’s understanding of the distinction between the
interviewees’ personal opinions and the organizational, group, or coalition philosophy.
Interviews focused on the ideas, beliefs, and efforts surrounding the derivation, development,
and passage of the LCFF. Interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The ACF- and
MSF-based interview protocol may be found in Appendix A. (See Appendix B for Participant
Consent Form).
54

Observations

The last data source was observations, which were conducted through viewing publically
available archived state Board of Education meetings, legislative hearings, and public addresses
conducted prior to, but with a focus on, California’s redesign of the K–12 education finance
system. Appendices H and I provide the observation protocol designed to standardize procedures
intended. This was, according to Gold (1997),
to maximize observational efficacy, minimize investigator bias, and allow for
replication and/or verification to check out the degree to which these procedures
have enabled the investigator to produce valid, reliable data that, when
incorporated into his or her published report, will be regarded by peers as
objective findings (cited in Angrosino & Mays de Perez, 2000, p. 675).

Each observation was conducted following the protocol and the notes were subsequently coded
using the referent-coding method described below. This coding and convergence of multiple data
sources led to a triangulation of the data and increased the validity of the findings (Yin, 2014).
Observations were used to gain an understanding of who was involved in the education
finance policymaking process and specifically what each actor’s position was on the ideas
included and excluded from the proposal (See Appendix C for observation protocol). For
example, at a 2012 state legislative hearing (Assembly Budget Subcommittee #2 on Education
Finance), the researcher observed the California Teachers Association (CTA) testify that without
increased education funding, passing a decentralized, weighted student funding formula was akin
to “moving the deck chairs on the Titanic,” and the organization did not support the proposal
(Assembly Budget Subcommittee #2 on Education, 2012). Following this example, when
interviewees were asked if the CTA supported the idea of weighted student funding and local
control and a reply was that it was “very supportive from the start,” the researcher could probe
further to try to understand why the organizational leadership testified to the contrary. This
55

helped to inform the understanding of both the CTA position on those specific issues included in
the proposal as well as to focus the understanding of the CTA core and policy beliefs around
education finance in California. Further, observation data were used to inform the interview
protocol, focus the document searches, and triangulate the findings.
Data Analysis

Iterative data analysis started soon after data collection began. This allowed for the
connection of data to emerging insights, leading to a refined focus and understanding of the data
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Glesne & Peshkin, 1992; Hatch, 2002; Srivastava & Hopwood, 2009).
The iterative data analysis process also helped to develop a conjoined theoretical frame based on
results from the data analysis.
Document Analysis

There were two goals in the selection and analysis of study documents. The first goal was
to use these documents to help identify “an informant pool of official and proximate actors and
observers by name and position on the issue” (Geary, 1992, p. 81), identifying potential
interview candidates as well as creating a matrix of positions on the three main goals of the
LCFF and the documented positions taken on those issues by actors or interests. The second goal
of the document collection and analysis process was to capture the roles of actors, organizations,
and coalitions in the development and implementation process of the LCFF, allowing for the
identification, coding, and analysis of document content in the LCFF process and the actions that
led to or resulted in the derailing of the passage of the legislation. These data sources were used
to triangulate evidence and confirm, disconfirm, and probe data acquired from other sources
(Merriam, 1998). Analysis required working with these data to organize them, separate them into
units, synthesize them, search for patterns, and discover what was important and what was to be
56

learned. As described in detail below, each piece of data was applied to a category, subsequently
developing patterns based on the theoretical and empirical literature of the MSF and ACF.
Iterative rounds of document coding and analysis were adapted to the inquiry with the use of
NVivo coding software.
Data Analysis and Coding

At the beginning of the investigation process and prior to the start of fieldwork, a “start
list” of codes were developed (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 58). This list was derived from the
selected conceptual framework(s), the research questions, hypotheses, problem areas, prior
research, and initially identified key variables essential to the study. After the start of data
collection, several rounds of coding were conducted, narrowing concepts to categories,
properties, and themes as indicated by the data (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2006). Through several
rounds of coding, patterns emerged that connected pieces of information that shared a common
attribute, reducing the ideas to categories and themes based directly on the data through the
constant comparative method (Merriam, 1998). For example, after the first few rounds of coding,
subgroup coalition positions on California education finance policy began to emerge. This
process allowed patterns to develop that permitted the identification of connections between
policy actors that shared a common element. One of these patterns that began to emerge was the
identification of the scientific and philanthropic communities’ shared belief in and support for
weighted student funding as a method for improving student outcomes. During this process, each
piece of data deemed important was assigned to a category (Merriam, 1998). The coding and
subsequent analysis produced a rich understanding essential to a credible analysis of the sources
and enactment of the LCFF.
57

Identifying the coalitions’ beliefs and policy beliefs. Once policy actor beliefs were
identified, I coded data to reflect whether the California education finance policy belief was (a) a
core belief and (b) a policy belief. I identified core beliefs as those that were part of the mission
or vision of the organization, publically stated positions over a substantial period of time, or
publically identified by the organization as the most important in education finance. I identified
policy beliefs as those the organizations publically expressed but that were married to or differed
from their core beliefs in relation to the education finance reforms proposed in the LCFF
(weighted student funding, decentralization, and accountability through LCAPs). Whereas some
actors’ core beliefs differed within the education finance subsystem coalitions, they were joined
in a single coalition through shared policy beliefs that pertained to identify problems the LCFF
was designed to solve. For example, Parents in Schools’ (2014) core belief is that the schools
need to increase opportunities for parent engagement. Public Advocates (2014) believes schools
should be held accountable for equitable education opportunities for all California public school
students through state funding formulas based on both adequate and equitable funding. However,
both organizations share the policy belief that increasing funding specifically for students with
additional needs is a good statewide course of action. Therefore, the focus of data collection and
analysis centered on the identification of subsystem actors, their shared beliefs, and how those
beliefs affected the policy streams conjoined to bring the LCFF ideas to the policy fore.
Process Tracing. One additional method of data analysis employed was process tracing.
Process tracing is a qualitative method that is designed as an “analytic tool for drawing both
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often understood as a part
of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier, 2011, p. 824). George and Bennett
(2005) argued that process tracing is about developing and testing a theory in ways that
58

incorporate a focus on the causal processes that exist in political life. This method uses a series
of tests (see the description of the tests in Appendix D) to establish that an initial event took
place, a subsequent outcome occurred, and the initial event caused the latter (Mahoney, 2012).
The research methodology focuses on the links between cause and effect. Process tracing
scholars have argued that instrumental mechanisms are central to the explanation and that case
studies are the best study design for examining these instrumental mechanisms in detail (Bennett,
2010; Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005). Through the application of process tracing,
researchers investigate the chain of events or decision-making processes by which case
conditions become case outcomes. In this case, specific connections were investigated between
the events that developed into the case outcome, namely, the passage of the LCFF.
Central to this method’s use within the case study of the LCFF, the validity of the
theoretical framework was tested in conjunction with what should have been observed if the
theory were false. The application of these tests assisted in both validating empirical findings and
limiting retrospective bias. In employing this method deductively, extant theories were used such
as the MSF with the ACF to generate observable implications within the case, which were
subsequently tested against the evidence (Bennett, 2010). For example, according to the ACF,
policy actors will not change their core beliefs, but they are willing to change their policy beliefs
as a result of, among other methods, learning and internal or external shocks. The researcher
tested the sharing of a policy belief by issue interest groups that weighted student funding could
benefit student populations, while they continued to hold independent core beliefs that remained
unchanged with the agendizing and passage of the LCFF. This flexibility in the policy beliefs
that they retained with their core beliefs allowed the individual actors to come together to form a
coalition in the subgroup of education finance actors, testing the ACF in this case.
59

The study data was additionally analyzed to identify if the MSF is broader and conceives
the political actor’s agency as having more weight, thereby suggesting a greater degree of
incongruity in the policy process. Policy actors in both theories have the ability to promote and
veto policies within the process. The MSF highlights windows of opportunity essential to the
policy process, whereas the ACF stresses coalition advocacy coordination around actor beliefs
that underscore support of stability or promotion of change. For this study, I found a combination
of the actor’s agency as influenced by coalition learning to be a more holistic theory. The
MSF/ACF marriage created the opportunity to examine the effect of slightly different variables
such as the importance of policy actors’ promoting issues (problems) and individuals and interest
groups who both furthered (and attempted to veto) the proposals (politics) as well as exploiting a
policy window to affect the LCFF (policy). Finally, the evidence demonstrates that policy actors
believed the policy window was affected by both institutional arrangements within the
machinery of government and coalition actions that drove the combining of theoretical frames.
By applying process tracing through the theoretical lens of both the MSF and ACF, I then
tested the hypothesis of problems, policies, and politics at a macro level, combined with a
hypothesis of coalition learning at a more micro level within the policy subsystem of California’s
K–12 system. This was accomplished by asking questions in the data such as who should have
known what, when, and how coalition learning was or was not taking place. The time span was
also broken into chunks and focused on multiple snapshots. This chunking of data into smaller
pieces allowed me to focus on gaining in-depth understanding of a series of specific moments
instead of a broader, more superficial account of policymaking. Therefore, process tracing
analysis in this case involved attempting to explain the outcome (the passage of the LCFF) and
the antecedent action(s) and event(s) that served as causes.
60

The Challenges of Conducting Retrospective Bias Research

A study of the LCFF’s origin is unavoidably subject to the potential biases of conducting
a retrospective case study. Scholarly discussion on the pervasive challenges of researching past
events has been well documented (Armstrong, 2001; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Roese & Vohs,
2012; Stanovich & West, 1998). The unpredictable and complex nature of policy research poses
unique challenges to retrospective inquiry. Two specific concerns related to this issue have been
addressed in retrospective policy research: determinism and hindsight bias. Also known as the
misinformation, effect determinism occurs when individuals identify an event as having been
predictable, despite little or no objective basis prior to its occurrence (Hoffrage & Pohl, 2003;
Roese & Vohs, 2012). Hindsight bias, or the misinformation effect, includes elements of
determinism but also includes actors or researchers filling in the gaps or altering a recollection to
connect an outcome to known evidence (Davies, 1987; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Fischhoff &
Beyth-Marom, 1983; Mazzoni & Vannucci, 2007). The combination of both concerns may be
called retrospective bias. Retrospective bias is a multifaceted phenomenon that can affect
different stages of design and processes, contexts, and situations and lead to problems when
attempting to analyze, understand, and interpret results. In prior studies, researchers have either
employed data triangulation (Canfield-Davis & Jain, 2010) either/or process tracing (Mehta,
2013), or they failed to provide a solution to the issue (DeBray-Pelot et al., 2007). In this study
of the development and adoption of the LCFF, I attempted to limit the effect of both forms of
bias via two methods: employing copious and multifaceted data sources and using process
tracing as an analytic tool. In the following discussion, I describe how I employed my
methodological tools to enhance validity.
61

Validity

According to Golafshani (2003), “Reliability and validity are conceptualized as
trustworthiness, rigor, and quality in the qualitative paradigm” (p. 604). By marrying evaluation
criteria with Maxwell’s (2012) checklist
13
for validity, including triangulation, feedback, rich
data, process tracing, and quantitative data, credibility was established for the study. Throughout
the study, sought out disconfirming evidence was consistently sought out. I used multiple
sources of evidence as described by Yin (2014) throughout the data collection process. Multiple
sources—document analysis, observations, and interviews—were employed to triangulate the
data to form themes and ensure the validity of the findings, as well as affirm or disconfirm causal
inference through process tracing (described above). Validity checks occurred through
triangulation, defined as a procedure in which “researchers search for convergence among
multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell
& Miller, 2000, p. 126). Throughout the study, I solicited feedback prior to forming theories or
generalizations from the data. I collected detailed, rich data from the abovementioned sources as
well as from my detailed field notes and memos. Understanding the influence of my position as a
researcher on the behaviors of subjects in the interviews, I noted instances of awareness of these
behaviors in my field notes. These notes included a record of my methodological approach,
applied methods, procedures, and descriptive resources. I used quantitative data such as funding
amounts, budgets, 990 data, and polling data to increase the validity of my qualitative analysis
with a fundamental goal of looking for evidence that could challenge my conclusions.

13
Maxwell’s (2012) checklist includes intensive long-term involvement, rich data, respondent validation,
intervention, searching for discrepant evidence and negative cases, triangulation, numbers, and comparison (p . 126-
129).
62

Limitations and Strengths

Primary limitations of this study are twofold: the study size (being a singular case) and
the potential for retrospective bias. To address the first issue, Ragin and Becker (1992) argued
that the generalizability of case studies can be increased through strategic case selection and that
atypical or extreme cases often involve more actors and “activate more basic mechanisms in the
situation studied” (quoted in Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 13). The passage of the LCFF is a single case
out of many in the contemporary landscape of education reform state politics. The shift of power
away from centralized general-purpose governing institutions has become the norm in education
policy and has been investigated by several scholars (Duncombe & Yinger, 2011; Fuhrman,
1987; Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Grissom, 2007; Henig, 2013; Kirst & Wirt, 2009; Loeb &
Hanushek, 2007; Lusi, 1997; Mazzoni, 1994; Ravitch, 1990; Reckhow, 2012; Timar, 1997;
Weaver & Geske, 1997). This case is atypical because California is the first, and currently only,
state to reverse course and legislate statewide subsidiary and weighted student funding formulas
while simultaneously increasing local responsibility to expand democratic participation.
Although often perceived as limited, a single case study of an atypical nature may offer a depth
of understanding and empirical results that can promote the development of theory and practical
knowledge around education policy reform. This study was a single case, yet it included a vast
array of policy actors, organizations, and government operatives working to influence education
policy outcomes in a state with over 1,000 independent school districts. California’s K–12 public
education is the single largest component of the state budget, and Proposition 98, passed by
voters in 1998, guarantees a minimum funding amount to schools. State policymakers in
California, like other state leaders, have implemented a variety of programs to improve school
quality, including class size reduction, teacher training, standards and testing, and school
63

construction projects. California has the most public education students of any state in the
country. The passage of the LCFF is a tremendous shift away from these state-mandated, locally
operated program models and instead is an attempt to return the power of choice back to local
districts. Although this was a single case, the significance of the state’s role in the education
landscape of the United States, based on the state’s size, diversity, and the progressive nature of
the policy to address traditionally underserved students, substantiates the significance of this case
in the broader debate around education finance and governance policy.
My selection of theoretical frames, case selection, data collection methods and analysis,
and study design was conceptualized and implemented to strengthen this qualitative case study.
This study design and methods worked together to enable me to identify causal processes,
generate hypotheses, and make theoretical contributions.
Chapter Summary

In this chapter, which focused on research design and methods, I first justified the use of
a case study as an appropriate research strategy and established its applicability to the LCFF. I
then explained how research for the case was conducted and how data were gathered, coded, and
analyzed. Next, I discussed the steps that were taken to ensure rigor in the research process
through procedures that foster credibility, transferability, and dependability. I concluded the
chapter with a discussion of awareness of limitations that were part of the study’s research
design.

64

CHAPTER FIVE
POLICY CONTEXT AND COALITION BELIEFS

This chapter has two primary goals. The first is to provide an understanding of policies in
which California’s education finance system reforms were introduced to help explain and
contextualize the pressures for change placed upon the policy subsystem. Thus, the first part of
this chapter traces the origins of policies that created the context and institutional structure for
California’s education finance. The second goal of this chapter is to identify who were the
subsystem coalition actors and what were their beliefs about policy leading up to the placing of
local control and weighted student funding on the legislative agenda. The second half of the
chapter identifies and describes the prominent subsystem coalition actors and their policy beliefs
about education funding. Taken together, these sections offer an understanding of the context in
which advocacy coalitions have built their beliefs about California’s education finance system.

65

Figure 5.1. Conjoined ACF and MSF frameworks in the politics of policymaking.
As explained in Chapter Three, for this study I utilized both an advocacy coalition
framework (ACF) in conjunction with multiple streams framework (MSF), as illustrated in
Figure 5.1. These frameworks allowed me to develop a deep understanding of the passage of
LCFF. To develop this understanding, I outlined the California education finance subsystem
coalition beliefs (the first rectangle in figure 5.1) that contributed to the policies, politics, and
problem streams (the second rectangle in figure 5.1) that conjoined to create the window of
opportunity (the third rectangle in Figure 5.1) to enact the LCFF. To understand why coalitions
developed around beliefs about education finance policy reform, we must first understand the
opportunities for change and the existing constraints that endured in the system before the
passage of the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF). To begin, I answer the question of which
policy structures contributed to the context in which subsystem actors developed their beliefs
about California’s education finance. Historic California spending policies resulted from
progressive layering of policies. As the president of the state school board described, “spending
formulas . . . accumulated for 30 years through ‘historical accretion’” (Festerwald, 2013, p.2).
That “tinkering” toward policy solutions created the institutional structure that set the policy
66

context in which subsystem actors’ beliefs developed regarding education finance (Tyack &
Cuban, 2009, p. 1).
California Education Finance Policies: Solidifying Centralized Control

Over the past 40 years, California’s education finance system has been assembled as a
series of legislative reactions to judicial mandates, statewide propositions, accountability
demands, and interest group pressures. The result is a complex system often seen as incoherent
and awash in both political and institutional barriers to change. As Picus (2001) described, “the
state’s inability to carry out a continuous and coherent educational reform program is at least
partly due to its splintered governance structure” (quoted in Sonstelie & Richardson, 2001, p.
65). By identifying the legal mandates and policies that contributed to California’s calcified and
complex school funding system, we can better understand the policy beliefs of subsystem actors
and the rationale for their support of or opposition to proposed education finance reforms.
Legal Mandates. Historic judicial mandates have contributed to the California education
finance system’s complexity. In the late 1960s, schools received their funding primarily from
local property taxes (Sonstelie, Brunner, & Ardon, 2000).
14
In 1970, California was among the
top 10 states in per-pupil spending, but district-level spending varied significantly on the basis of
local property wealth (Bersin, Kirst, & Liu, 2008). In 1971, the California Supreme Court heard
Serrano v. Priest (1971), in which the plaintiff argued that California’s method for funding
public education failed to meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th

14
Districts were given a revenue limit based on a formula that included the number of students, types of
district (elementary, high, or unified), and historical spending patterns. The formula to calculate a district’s revenue
limit was to add the district’s local property taxes and state education dollars. If the district’s revenues from property
taxes met or exceeded the limit, then the state provided no supplemental funding. If a district’s property tax revenue
was less than its revenue limit, as is the case in 87% of districts, then state funding would make up the difference.
67

Amendment. The court agreed with the plaintiffs and struck down California’s education funding
system, which based district revenue on local property wealth (Serrano v. Priest, 1971, 1976).
As Table 5.1 illustrates, that case started a series of California judiciary mandates to improve
equity among California schools.
Table 5.1
Education Finance Cases Affecting California’s School Funding, 1970s–2016
Case and Year Ruling Result Legal Mandate
Serrano v.
Priest (Serrano
I), 487 p. 2d
1241 1971
The California Court held
that that the state’s plan for
financing public schools was
unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause of the
U.S. Constitution. The court
also concluded that, based on
the way public resources
were allocated for education,
the state’s financial
arrangement violated a
provision in the California
Constitution similar to the
federal equal protection
clause. On the basis of the
Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th amendment, the
court struck down the
education funding system,
which based district revenue
on local property wealth.
The legislature
enacted SB90, which
established a
“squeeze formula” to
begin a leveling of
recurring school-
district income based
on the average daily
attendance revenue.
Need to equalize funding
among school districts.

Why? School districts raise
most education revenue
through local property taxes,
so a district’s capacity to
support education directly
reflects the size of its tax
base. As a result, school
funding is disproportionately
allocated in that the districts
with the most expensive real
estate have the highest levels
of per-pupil funding. The
plaintiffs in this case
believed that students should
all receive equal funding
amounts.

Significance. California
courts mandate equal
allocations between districts
in per-pupil funding
amounts. The court’s ruling
is interpreted to mean that it
is constitutionally
impermissible for the quality
of education to be a function
of local wealth when it may
only be a function of state
wealth.

Nationally, this case is
important because
California’s mechanism for
funding education, with its
resulting complexity and
unequal funding streams,
typifies the funding systems
in effect in most states.

68

Table 5.1. cont’d
1976, in
Serrano v.
Priest (Serrano
II ), 557 p.2d
929

A California state court
affirmed the lower court’s
finding that the wealth-
related disparities in per-pupil
spending generated by the
state’s education finance
system violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the
California Constitution. The
court distinguished the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1973
Rodriguez decision, which
applied only to the U.S.
Constitution, affirming the
Serrano I case based on
California’s Constitution,
held that the legislative
response to Serrano I was
insufficient, and affirmed the
trial court’s order requiring
that wealth-based funding
disparities among districts be
reduced to less than $100 by
1980.
Legislature enacted a
plan to redistribute
property tax revenues
collected in property-
rich districts to
property-poor ones.
Equalize funding among
districts.

Why? Subsystem actors
do not believe the courts
equalization mandate had
been executed in the way
the courts had mandated.

Significance. The court
mandates a specific dollar
amount of allocation
variation in per-pupil
spending. This increases
the role of the state in
making decisions
regarding local school
spending. With more
allocation authority, the
state begins to usurp
some of the authority
over spending from local
district leaders.

Serrano v.
Priest, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 584
(Court of
Appeal, 2d
District 1986
The court held that this level
of disparity satisfied
California’s equal protection
requirements.

At this time 93% of
California students were
in school districts
whose per-student
spending was within
$100 of each other.

Confirmation that public
revenue allocated for per-
pupil funding had been
equalized.

Significance. The state
had complied with the
court’s mandate by
ensuring that state per-
pupil allocations achieved
the goal of the under-
$100 variation between
districts. However, it did
not increase funding for
poorer schools or prevent
wealthier schools from
raising additional dollars
outside of the state’s
control, continuing the
legacy of disproportionate
funding for schools based
on the wealth of district
residents.
69

Table 5.1. cont’d
Williams v.
State, 1999
Several California
organizations filed a case in
state court on behalf of a
class of students attending
substandard schools. The
complaint cited inadequate,
unsafe, and unhealthy
facilities; a shortage of
qualified teachers; missing
libraries; a lack of
instructional materials; and
overcrowded schools that
resulted in a staggered and
shortened school year.

The 2004 court-
approved settlement,
mandating the state to
(a) ensure additional
resources to improve
school maintenance and
student resources and
decrease student-teacher
ratios, (b) create a
School Facilities Needs
Assessment program;
(c) require a complaint
process for inadequate
instructional materials,
teacher vacancies, and
emergency facilities
problems; (d) intervene
in schools ranked in the
bottom 30% under the
2003 Academic
Performance Index if
instructional materials
and facilities standards
are not met; (e)
streamline California
credentialing for out-of-
state credentialed
teachers; (f) allocate
about $140 million for
instructional materials
in 2004–2005; and
several other provisions.

Improve inadequacy and
inequality of resources to
underfunded schools.

Why? Subsystem actors
argued that students were
receiving a substandard
education based on
insufficient resources
some schools received
from the state.

Significance. The case
created the role of a
monitor (filled by the
County Office of
Education) to ensure (a)
sufficiency of
instructional materials;
(b) facilities deficiencies;
(c) accuracy of data
reported on the School
Accountability Record
Card (SARC) related to
sufficiency of materials
and facilities deficiencies;
and (d) teacher
misassignments and
vacancies. The courts
once again ruled that the
districts were in violation
of the state’s equal
protection clause, and
thus they correlated
resources with equality
(COE, 2016).
Renee v.
Duncan, 2012

Case filed in California
arguing that novice teachers
labeled “highly qualified”
were disproportionately
teaching in low-income and
minority schools; asked what
the central teacher
qualification requirement
under NCLB was. In October
2010, the court ruled that
intern teachers could not be
labeled “highly qualified”
under NCLB standards.
This ruling was never
enforced as a result of a
continuing resolution
passed by the U.S.
Congress allowing for
alternatively certified
teachers to remain
highly qualified under
NCLB. Through the
process of litigating this
case, advocates
organized and joined
the Coalition for
Teaching Quality.

To ensure equity of
teacher quality as
mandated by federal law
(NCLB).

Why? Subsystem actors
argued that “intern
teachers” cannot be
highly qualified and that
assigning those teachers
to predominantly low-
income districts violates
the equal protection
clause.

70

Table 5.1. cont’d.
Significance. This case could
have had a national impact on
teacher hiring processes. This
case also uses a measure of
teacher quality as the basis for
ensuring the equality provision
of the constitution is provided
for instead of dollars, based on a
measure of teacher quality as
required by accountability
mandates.
Reed v. State of
California,
2010

In February 2010, a lawsuit
was filed by The ACLU
Foundation of Southern
California (ACLU SoCal),
Public Counsel and
Morrison & Foerster LLP
against the state and the
Los Angeles Unified
School District (LAUSD)
over the state’s decision to
reduce education funding
levels in response to the
fiscal crisis and LAUSD’s
subsequent choice to lay
off thousands of teachers
who primarily taught
students of color, children
from impoverished
backgrounds, and English
learners. The plaintiffs
reached an agreement with
LAUSD and the State of
California to settle the
Reed case, which
prevented budget-based
layoffs from up to 45
schools in LAUSD.
As a result, schools the
district targeted, based
on the likelihood that
teacher turnover would
negatively and
disproportionately
affect them, were
exempt from “last
hired, first fired”
practices, which
continued in effect at
all other schools in the
district.

Increasing teacher
quality will lead to
equal education
opportunities. To
achieve this, the funding
of schools within
districts should be
equalized. At this time
state courts across the
country had made
disparate rulings to
define what was a
constitutionally
adequate education.

The Reed case took the
position that the state
education standards
established the
constitutional bar that
the schools must meet.

Significance. This case
brings to the political
fore the argument that
adequacy and equity of
opportunity are both
mandated by the equal
protection clause of the
state constitution and
that, by placing specific
accountability standards
on schools.

71

Table 5.1. cont’d
Robles-Wong,
et al. v. State of
California, case
no. RG-
10515768 and
Campaign for
Quality
Education v.
California, case
no. A134423
These cases were “brought by
a broad coalition comprising
over 60 individual students
and their families, nine
school districts from
throughout the state, the
California School Boards
Association (CSBA),
California State PTA, and the
Association of California
School Administrators
(ACSA)” (Stanford, 2016).
These cases are
pending.
To ensure adequacy of
education funding based
on the state’s
accountability demands.

Significance. This case
pursues the equity
component first argued
for in the Williams case.

As Table 5.1 indicates, the majority of education finance cases since the original Serrano
case were filed to contest equity of funding among districts, indicating that since the 1970s,
subsystem actors have been interested in using the judiciary to change the distribution of
education funds in the state to derive equal funding between districts. Arguments in these early
cases reflect some of the contemporary court filings nationally about the need to ensure that
students in different districts receive the same financial inputs. Concurrent with these cases in
California, cases were being heard in other state courts. In one of those cases, the Kentucky State
Supreme Court ruled in 1989 in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. that Kentucky’s
legislature had failed to provide students with the required adequate public education, directing
the state to alleviate those inadequacies (Boone, 2014). Significantly, the court’s opinion also
included skills and knowledge that, in its view, constituted an adequate education. Although this
case was based on the Kentucky state constitution, the Rose case had broader implications and
was a legal turning point in the politics of education finance. It is significant because it promoted
the belief that the state’s role in education was not only to provide a standard of equity, as
defined in this case as providing the same resources to all students, but also to provide a standard
of adequacy, meaning that the state must ensure all students have enough resources to achieve
predetermined outcomes (Koski & Hahnel, 2008; Rebell, 2002; Thro, 1989). This interpretation
72

of the state’s mandate for education adequacy serves as a basis for advocates to challenge other
states’ school finance provisions (Boone, 2014). According to Odden and Picus (2014) this
decision “set the agenda for school finance up to the present time” (p. 33).
As Table 5.1 indicates, in more recent California cases such as Robles-Wong, et al. v.
State of California, challenges were made on the basis not only of equity but also of the
adequacy of school funding. This case marries the notion of adequacy, meaning that state
constitutions require an educational system of a certain definable level of quality—or at least the
opportunity to obtain an education of that quality—for every student with the idea that the
natural extension of the adequacy mandate means that students with different needs will require
different resources. According to a leader of an active nonprofit organization in the education
finance subgroup, “adequacy is the notion, [which] goes beyond Serrano v. Priest to say rather
than just giving kids an equal amount, every kid should get what they need to reach the higher
state standards that our states are now expecting.” As one issue interest group leader explained:
that was always part of our campaign as well as in part of that advocacy [through
the courts]: every kid gets what they need, is this notion that some kids who come
from impoverished backgrounds or language barriers need more funding and
more resources to overcome those challenges to have an equal shot to succeed.

Because these adequacy concerns have been married to broader equity concerns, organizations
such as Public Advocates, who filed the Serrano v. Priest and Robles-Wong, et al. v. State of
California lawsuits, have actively pursued broader community support and a larger voice in the
public sphere. This is reflected in the extensive list of organizations
15
supporting Robles-Wong,

15
The Alliance of Coalitions for Community Empowerment, Californians for Justice, Campaign for
Quality Education, PICO California, and San Francisco Organizing Project. Together these groups coordinate
services and activities with thousands of individuals and hundreds of organizations and receive funding from a wide
variety of private and public funding sources.
73

et al. v. State of California, as well as the prepared media kits designed to support the main
argument in the lawsuit that “it’s important that we, the students and parents, fight to have all
schools supported equally and fairly” (Ramirez, 2010, p.2).
One result of these lawsuits is a consistent history of policy mandates from the courts
enforcing the equalization of financial allocations between districts. These mandates have also
reinforced the idea that there should be no wealth-related disparities in per-pupil spending based
on the equal protection clause of the California constitution. These court rulings have both
supported and contributed to a broader belief that equalizing funding between high-revenue and
low-revenue districts was one of the main school finance goals of state lawmakers. As one issue
interest coalition leader argued: “Serrano v. Priest was a national model, one of the earliest cases
in the ‘70s that, struck down the state school funding system as unequal being based on local
property taxes and made it clear that it was a state duty to help equalize.” State lawmakers
reacted to these court rulings and coalition pressures with a series of finance laws designed to
decrease discrepancy in allocations between districts.
Legislative actions. As a result of the Serrano v. Priest ruling, the state legislature
initially passed SB90, which established a revenue limit system for funding school districts. The
first revenue limit was determined by dividing the district’s prior year state and property tax
income by that year’s average daily attendance. That policy resulted in limiting the amount per
pupil that each school district could raise for general spending (Bersin et al., 2008). The revenue
limits were designed to ensure that districts that raised less money in property taxes received
closer to the funding amounts of wealthier districts (Canfield, 2013). Those revenue limits
became a substantial portion of the California school finance system; over the years they were
74

adjusted in complex ways
16
(Bersin et al., 2008; Brewer & Smith, 2006). Reflecting a common
opinion among interviewees for this study, one policy maker characterized the significa nce of the
revenue limit rule this way, “this was the beginning of the shift from local to state control of
school finance.” Returning to the judicial mandate for SB90, the case set a legal precedent by
interpreting dollars as a measure of education equality. By mandating the state as the arbiter of
those dollars, the courts placed the state between local taxpayers and their local schools, resulting
in its political empowerment to decide how public tax dollars would be redistributed to districts.
Therefore, if the community wants to effect change over those allocations, they need not address
their locally elected leaders, but the state legislature.
Even though California’s creation of the “revenue limit” firmly established the state as
the driver of education finance, it did not satisfy the court’s mandate for equity. Following up on
its 1971 ruling, in 1976 the court ruled that district funding disparities must be limited to an
“insignificant amount” (Serrano v. Priest, 1976). As a result, the legislature passed AB65, which
created what is known as a “squeeze formula” designed to equalize spending across districts over
time. The equalization was only partial, however, because it applied only to general-purpose
spending from revenue limits, not to categorical aid or school construction (Bersin et al., 2008).
That important policy decision set into motion two separate interpretations around education

16
Districts were given a revenue limit based on a formula that included number of students, type of district
(elementary, high, or unified), and historical spending patterns. The formula to calculate a district’s revenue limit
was to add together the district’s local property taxes and state education dollars. If the district’s revenues from
property taxes met or exceeded the limit, then the state provided no supplemental funding . If a district’s property tax
revenues were less than its revenue limit, as is the case in 87% of districts, then state funding made up the
difference.

75

finance in California: the need to equalize funding between districts and the need to provide
resources to students through mechanisms not constricted by revenue limits. With those two
differing philosophies on education funding, political actors coalesced around different beliefs
about what was wrong with the way education was funded in California. One policy belief
concerning education funding was that not all students arrive at school with the same needs;
some students need additional programs that cost additional dollars. Over time, the escalation of
allocations through disparate funding streams or categorical funding supported this belief. The
other policy belief that continued was the need to equalize per-pupil funding statewide, ensuring
that all students received the same amount of funding regardless of zip code. Those differing
beliefs manifested themselves in varying policy actions, including public input through ballot
propositions.
Ballot propositions. One of the first and most dramatic reactions to this series of
redistributive policies also influenced the way that some in California viewed their relationships
with school funding and the tax dollars they were paying. Before the establishment of revenue-
limit funding and the attempt to equalize the distribution of tax dollars, the taxpayers’ connection
between property taxes and local schools was direct. In other words, local property owners paid
property taxes that went directly to their local schools and the more money one spent on property
taxes, the more money would go into the local schools. That process, theoretically, improved the
quality of the school, and that, in turn, meant the property was more valuable. The redistribution
of education funds through the state weakened the ties between local taxpayers and local schools.
As a result of political circumstances, as described in the politics section in the following
chapter, and in reaction to state redistributive education funding rulings and mandates, California
76

voters passed a constitutional amendment in 1978 known as Proposition 13 (P13)
17
. Before P13,
local governments had set their own property tax rates and raised revenues for their districts’
schools by taxing the assessed market values of properties within their jurisdictions. P13 passed
with a two-thirds majority vote of the California electorate.
P13 resulted in financial loss for education funding in California. By limiting property tax
revenues, the new policy pushed the state to find novel ways to finance education. Yet P13
included an additional requirement of a two-thirds vote in the legislature to increase state taxes
and prohibited the passage of a statewide property tax. P13, supported by a powerful and well-
organized taxpayer organization (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association),
18
essentially nullified
the district power-equalizing plan the legislature had adopted in compliance with the judicial
mandate in Serrano (Ladd, Chalk, Hansen, NetLibrary, & National Research Council Committee
on Education, 1999). Consequently, the legislature passed a funding formula that relied more on
state revenues to achieve the equalization Serrano required. That had the net effect of limiting
the spending of the wealthier districts to match that of the low-revenue districts. As Figure 5.2
indicates, the method of allocating education dollars coincided over time with the slowing of
overall spending in public schools in California and depressed the per-pupil spending below the
national average.

17
The proposition limited the overall tax rate on any property to 1% of the taxable value of the property.
The initiative also limited the growth in the taxable value of the property to 2% unless that property changed hands ,
at which time the taxable value of the property would be equal to the new sales price (Wong & Guthrie, 2015).
18
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association.
77

Figure 5.2. Per-Pupil Spending in 2007 Constant 2007–08 dollars. Source: National Center for
Education Statistics.

Even though P13 severely constrained local resources for education, it has remained
steadfastly popular in the state. In 2012 and 2013, poll results continued to indicate that over
70% of voters supported P13 (Baldassare, 2014; Brewer, Plank, & Hall, 2012). P13 also resulted
in an organized and sustained coalition of voters who have continued to support the tax
constraints as mandated by P13. This group of voters has been led by an organization known as
the Howard Jarvis Tax Payers Association. The group’s mission was, and continues to be, to
uphold P13 and the “advancement of taxpayers’ rights, including the right to limited taxation, the
right to vote on tax increases, and the right of economical, equitable and efficient use of taxpayer
dollars” (Howard Jarvis Tax Payers Association, 2016, p. 1). With strong support for its
components (decreased funding and organized and popular support for P13), this policy has
contributed to relatively stable parameters that constricted both the funding within public schools
and the opportunity for dramatic policy change.
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
$12,000
1969-70 1979-80 1989-90 1999-2000 2006-07
California United States
78

Although there has been sustained public support for P13, many California voters have
also expressed concern about the lack of stable and growing funding for education (Brewer et al.,
2012). With no mandated floor statewide for funding public schools and no ability to raise funds
locally, district leaders were left to pay for programs based on what was made available to them
each year by the state budget as approved by the legislature. Simultaneously, the state legislature
depended on tax revenues to fund not only education but also all of the services the state
provides. As Henig (2013) argued, shifting education funding from the local to the state level
also places education in an annual battle with other statewide social service programs to secure
resources. Consequently, when tax revenue diminished, the legislature could cut school funds the
same way they might cut road repairs. When tax revenues increased, the legislature funded
programs that were more present on the legislative agenda at the time, such as environmental,
health, or public assistance programs, leading to increased turmoil in the funding stream for
public schools.
Ten years after the passage of P13, voter perception of funding instability for education
manifested in 1988 in Proposition 98 (P98), a voter-approved amendment to the state
constitution. The proposition, still part of the California constitution (later amended by
Proposition 111, which mandated allocating 40% of the state budget to K–14 education),
established an annual minimum funding level for two of California’s school systems: K–12
schools and community colleges. P98 funds have two main sources. The first is the state General
Fund, generated through the collection of taxes, predominantly income, sales, and use taxes with
additions from capital gains and stock options, as well as insurance bank and other corporate and
individual fees. The second source is property tax dollars, which are constrained by P13, as
described above. Consequently, the funding section of P98 constitutes over 70% of the total K–
79

12 funding and about two-thirds of total community college funding (Manwaring, 2005).
Whereas P98’s provision of K–14 school funding was designed to guarantee a revenue source for
education that grew each year with the economy and the number of students, the constitutional
amendment included two practical, fundamental issues that contributed to an unbidden education
finance system. First, the source of funds that made up (as described above) the P98 mandate
included changes in enrollment, per capita personal income, projections on state tax revenues,
and local property taxes, which P13 had previously constrained (Manwaring, 2005). Second, if
the legislature increased funding in the P98 funding pools in one year, the law mandated a
continuation of that level of allocation in the following year.
19
These funding increases often led
to new local investment in programs that were difficult to sustain when statewide revenue
contracted. Because of the limitations on revenue generation that resulted from P13 and the
mandated composition of revenue that comprised P98 funding, education finance became more
vulnerable to the ebb and flow of the California economy.
Accountability measures. Added layers of state and federal accountability measures
increased the complexity of California education, bringing new pressures on the education
system and tensions with the existing funding structure. For example, the federal accountability
measure policy, No Child Left Behind (NCLB, 2002) required school performance outcomes to
be measured based on standardized tests tied to consequences as severe as closure if schools fell
behind in student achievement outcomes. That federal policy was a struggle to implement in
California for many reasons, but primarily because “as a result of past equalization measures and

19
This rule has a few exceptions, including significant declines in state revenue. If state revenue growth is
less than income growth, it is based on income growth but still must meet the 40% minimum of the state’s general
fund budget.
80

the historical accretion of revenue streams, state allocations to school districts often bear little
relation to educational costs or student needs” (Bersin et al., 2008, p. 4). As Michael Kirst—
professor emeritus at Stanford, former policy advisor to Jerry Brown and multiple federal
administrations, current president of the state school board, and advisor to Governor Brown—
explained about the rise of accountability measures and their connection to finance:
The big thing was the agenda turned to the politics of productivity. The Nation at
Risk. That the problem wasn’t financing it was the whole scenario that culminated
in NCLB [No Child Left Behind]. NCLB gave a pittance of federal money, a
billion. I remember listening to Karl Rove cackling about how much change they
got in education for almost no money. It wasn’t money anymore it was a whole
bunch of accountability. It was NCLB, that’s what it was. The ‘83 agenda was the
so-called Excellence Agenda, [it] surpassed the Equity Agenda and finance was
viewed after A Nation At Risk as the old Equity Agenda.

These new policies made educators responsible for student performance, yet gave them no
authority over the allocation of resources to address student needs; this situation created
constraints on local educators to proactively confront accountability measures. Local educators
were constrained by funding limitations, both flexible and gross amounts. To increase local
educators’ ability to control the funding they needed, give them more authority over limited
allocations, and address accountability measures, school districts began to increase demands for
more spending flexibility. As a result, of the “crazy quilt” of policy and constraints on the local
district leaders to allocate dollars based on local needs, the Governor’s Committee on Education
Excellence (GCEE) in 2005 recommended steps to improve public schools by transitioning to a
“student-centered” funding system (Brewer & Smith, 2006 p. 1; California Budget Project,
2009).
California Education Finance: A Layer Cake of Complexity

One important finding from the history of education finance policy is that state policies,
in reacting to both institutional pressures from the courts and subsystem actor demands,
81

contributed to a complex and opaque education finance system. As a response to the additional
costs required to students, the state provided restricted funding to specific services and programs
to improve educational outcomes. Those funds, called categorical funds,
20
mirrored the methods
the federal government was using to provide additional funds for students with special needs.
State categorical programs also addressed the unique costs facing small and geographically
isolated school districts that lacked economies of scale (Rose, Sonstelie, & Weston, 2010).
Researchers identified over 60 state categorical revenue streams in the 2005/2006 school year
(Rose, Sonstelie, & Weston, 2010). Districts received federal dollars that were restricted to
programs such as Title I and the National School Lunch Program (Rose et al., 2010). Those
categorical programs contributed to an even more opaque education finance system composed of
isolated programs designed to serve specific populations of students with specific qualifications.
A labor interest group leader also noted of California’s splintered governance structure:
There were so many categorical programs and so much archeology in the
education budget that some people almost forgot what the purpose was of some of
the programs. There were categorical programs carved out for many, many
interest groups and for many specific programs and there were a lot of complaints
about how that system didn’t seem to be serving students and that it was too
complex and too hard to explain.

As a result, those policies contributed not only to ever-increasing categorical programs, but also
to an expanded and diversified group of constituents who benefited from those programs.
Over time, some argued that this complexity was contributing to spending opacity.
Identifying where the funds were going, who got how much, and how tax dollars were being

20
A few examples of past categorical funding streams include Gifted and Talented Education (GATE),
Instructional Materials Realignment, IMFRP (AB 1781), American Indian Early Childhood Education, High Priority
Schools Grant Program (HPSGP), High Priority Schools: Corrective Action, and California Peer Assistance &
Review Program for Teachers (PAR). For a more comprehensive list, see Appendix C.

82

spent became difficult for parents, administrators, and taxpayers alike. The general consensus
eventually became that only a few experts truly understood the system (Kirst, 2007a) because it
had not been a coherently planned system of education funding. Instead, it had been shaped not
by student needs but by a series of policy decisions, including court cases, voter-approved
initiatives, and historic spending patterns. In this context, the state was compelled to address
accountability mandates from the federal government, and districts were directed to address
accountability dictates from the state.
Alongside the passage of those policies, a body of academic and policy research
developed that focused on this element of school finance, resulting in published evidence to
support proposals and actions to limit categorical funding streams. This research found that a
more efficient, transparent, and equitable funding system could be accomplished by loosening
the “spending strings attached to the funding—and consolidating them into large thematic
revenue streams, or block grants, which would provide a less complex and more flexible
allocation of revenues and greater authority to local school districts” (Weston, 2011b, p. 5). This
research promoted the idea that it was not simply California’s lack of funds to improve its
education outcomes, but the way in which the funds were distributed that contributed to
underachievement based on the federal accountability measures. To improve education, some in
the education finance subsystem began to expand their beliefs beyond more funding and to argue
for the need to redistribute existing dollars by increasing flexibility and decentralizing control
over allocations.
This section provided the historic policy context in which the education finance reforms
of weighted student funding and decentralization were introduced in California. The section also
layered the foundation for understanding what issues in the state promoted the varying beliefs by
83

subsystem actors’ about what, if any, reforms should be made to the system of funding schools.
This section explained how significant court mandates, followed by reactionary legislative
reforms, contributed to a shift in power over education allocation decisions from the local to the
state level. It also outlined how, over time, a subsystem advocate’s arguments both in the courts
and through policy advocacy shifted beyond an argument for equality, meaning the same amount
of resources are provided to all students, to a definition of adequacy or providing enough
resources for students to achieve predetermined outcomes. By redefining the goals for state
education finance, subsystem actors began to argue that equity did not mean the state was
responsible just for equal inputs, but for providing enough resources for all students to achieve a
minimum level of outputs. Finally, this section described how the state funding reactions to
increasing demands for additional resources for specific programs for different students became
disparate programs funded outside of the equity mandate of Serrano. These differing goals for
education led to divided program constituents, a layering of policies and practices, and an
opacity of funding that few understood.
Education Finance Subsystem Coalitions and Policy Beliefs

I define the policy subsystem as geographically bounded by the state of California,
including both governmental and nongovernmental actors and organizations, multiple interest
groups, policy experts, and the media (Weible & Sabatier, 2013). The California education
subsystem consists of over 500 nonprofit organizations
21
with additional for-profit and corporate
actors who both contribute resources to and pursue policies around education (Hansen, Hall,
Brewer, & Hannaway, 2014). As described in Chapter Four, for this study I identified actors and

21
To see the list in its entirety,
http://greatnonprofits.org/state/California/category:Education/search:Education/sort:relevance/direction:desc
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organizations active in the debate about education finance policy in the 2011–2012 and 2012–
2013 budget years through interviews, documents, and observation data. This data was coded
and analyzed based on the referent coding system to identify actors who shared specific
education finance policy beliefs and sorted them into coalitions. I define a coalition as
individuals or organizations that “coordinate their behavior with allies” that (a) “share similar
beliefs and (b) engage in nontrivial degree of coordination” (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1999 quoted in
Weible & Sabatier, 2013, p. 128). Consequently, I identify four unique belief-based coalitions
that contributed to the debate around the governor’s reform proposals. As identified in Figure
5.3, these include issue interest groups, labor interest group(s), district leadership, and the expert
community.

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Figure 5.3. Identified California education finance subsystem coalitions and their beliefs about
finance reforms.

In the following section, each of these subgroup coalitions I describe in more detail,
provide a rationale for selecting each of them as influential in the reform debate, and identify
their policy beliefs as they pertain to education finance reform in California.
Interest Groups: Two Coalitions

Issue interest groups. The first type of group is the issue interest groups active in the
landscape of education finance in California. The number of interest groups participating in the
California education political debate has grown dramatically over the past 40 years. According to
the California Secretary of State’s office, more than 1,890 education advocacy groups have
officially passed through the capital in the past decade as advocates for some type of education
policy in the state (Padilla, 2016). As Table 5.2 illustrates (for larger sample see Appendix F),
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each of those organizations has its own history and mission with its goals set out to effect change
in the provision of education statewide.
Table 5.2
Example of Issue Interest Coalition Organizations, Missions, Partners, and Funders
Organizatio
n
Mission/Goal Partners and Funders
Community
Asset
Development
Redefining
Education
(CADRE)
“We work for systemic
change by supporting
grassroots South LA
parents as the leaders in
stopping the pushout
crisis in schools serving
low-income
neighborhoods of color.
Through parent capacity
building, political
education, advocacy,
and organizing, CADRE
challenges schools’
beliefs and practices that
criminalize children and
parents and violate their
human rights to a
quality education,
dignity, and
participation in our
current public education
system. We build power
to win new policies and
challenge existing ones
as part of a movement
toward educational and
racial justice” (CADRE,
2016, p. 1).
Los Angeles Women’s Foundation (later merged with The
Women’s Foundation of California)
Liberty Hill Foundation, Washington Mutual Foundation
Center for Community Change – Mott Small Grants Program
Los Angeles Conservation Corps – LA Bridges Program at
Gompers Middle School, Edward W. Hazen Foundation
First 5 California, The Women’s Foundation of California
Norman Foundation, Catholic Campaign for Human Development
The California Endowment, Mertz Gilmore Foundation
AT&T Foundation, James Irvine Foundation
California Consumer Protection Foundation
UCLA in LA—Center for Community Partnerships
California Community Foundation, Susan Sandler & Steve Phillips
U.S. Human Rights Fund, United Latino Fund
21st Century Foundation, Ben & Jerry’s Foundation
United Way of Greater Los Angeles
Communities for Public Education Reform (CPER) – California
Just and Fair Schools Fund, Taproot Foundation
Schott Foundation for Public Education, Weingart Foundation
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation – Forward Promise

Contra Costa
Interfaith
Supporting
Community
Organization
“CCISCO is committed
to building civic
engagement and
increasing public
participation by those
most affected by
injustice in Contra Costa
County. We are a
multiracial,
multigenerational,
interfaith federation of
20 member
The California Endowment, The James Irvine Foundation
Y&H Soda Foundation, Robert Woods Johnson Foundation
San Francisco Foundation, W.A. Gerbode Foundation
Mitchell Kapor Foundation, Four Freedoms Fund
Catholic Campaign for Human Development
Lesher Foundation, Crescent Porter Hale Foundation
Kaiser Permanente

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Table 5.2. cont.d’
institutions Firedoll Foundation
representing 38,000 California Consumer Protection Foundation
families across our Walter and Elise Haas Jr. Fund
region” (Contra Costa Evelyn and Walter Haas St. Fund
Interfaith Supporting Part of PICO
Community
Organization, 2015, p.1)
Families in
Schools
“We involve parents
and communities in
their children’s
education to achieve
lifelong student
success” (Families In
Schools, 2015, p.1).
Annenberg Foundation
Annie E. Casey Foundation
Anonymous Donor
ARCO Foundation
AT & T
Boeing Co. Charitable Trust
California Community Foundation
California Credit Union
Chaka Khan Foundation
Citi
Deloitte Services
Disney Worldwide Services
Doll Family Foundation
Edison International
Eisner Foundation
Fred Jones Family Foundation
George Gund Foundation
Go Along Side Foundation
Hudson Group
James Irvine Foundation
J.B.M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation
Joseph Drown Foundation
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Los Angeles Times/ Tribune
NBC Universal Foundation
Ralph M. Parsons Foundation
Read Conmigo – Infinity Insurance
Roth Family Foundation
Southern California Gas Company
S. Mark Taper Foundation
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.
Target
Telemundo
Time Warner
Verizon Foundation
Wachovia Foundation
Walmart Foundation
Washington Mutual
Weingart Foundation
Wells Fargo Foundation
W.K. Kellogg Foundation
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Because of the long-term control over education funding at the state level, many state
organizations worked directly at the state level to promote their programs. As a result, those
interest groups advocated for their policy ideas with the legislature and bureaucracy through a
mixture of educating policymakers and the public and traditional campaign contributions. The
mixture of civil justice, institutional reform, and program-specific groups has contributed to a
wide variety of demands on state lawmakers. K–12 education has become crowded with
advocacy groups in Sacramento that promote a vast array of policy corrections. For example, as
Mike Kirst explained, “If you take our friends in the civil rights movement, they’re largely
lawyers who like to operate in Sacramento, sue the state or negotiate with us.” Often, issue
interest groups work independently and focus on their own specific programmatic goals. One
example of such a group is Families in Schools, a nonprofit organization created in 2000 with the
goal of “[involving] parents and communities in their children’s education to achieve lifelong
success” (Families in Schools, 2016, p. 1). According to its website, Families in Schools uses the
a mixture of public education, advocacy, and training to achieve its goal. According to the
organization’s 990 tax filing, Families in Schools funds its activities predominantly with
foundation dollars, corporate donations, and individual contributions.
Other organizations work collectively with a myriad of independent nonprofits to
coordinate efforts to effect policy change. One of these organizations is Children Now, which
serves as an umbrella organization that advocates for “investments in quality programs for
children” and argues that these increased investments “more than pay for themselves in terms of
increased earnings and revenues and a stronger overall economy, and result in decreases in
healthcare, corrections and other public costs later on” (Children Now, 2016, p. 1). This
organization advocates for this through a method of:
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covering the many individual policy issues impacting kids, and combining its
unmatched policymaking know-how and subject matter expertise with a powerful
organized membership…The organization coordinates The Children’s Movement
of California to educate, organize, and mobilize the extensive number of
organizations in communities throughout the state that support children’s well-
being either directly or indirectly (Children Now, 2016, p. 1).

Issue interest groups that participated in advocacy around the Governor’s 2012 reform proposal
and the LCFF are identified as active in this coalition if they were identified by Children Now,
which served as a coordinator of these organizations as identified by the administration, the
foundation community, the legislature, and the organizations that I interviewed directly, or if
they signed advocacy documents designed to influence the outcome of the Governor’s proposal
or the LCFF. As Appendix F indicates, both independent and collective organizations such as
these, which are active in the finance subsystem of California, have been attempting to affect the
provision of education in the state, often through redirecting resources toward their specific
programmatic goals. The education interest group landscape in Sacramento reflects the
complexity of the state’s funding system.
Analyzing these groups’ goals and mission statements makes clear that while they all
may have had their own differing core beliefs about educational funding needs (e.g., funding for
students with special needs, foster youth, advanced learners, and specialized math instruction),
these issue groups coalesced around the policy belief that there should be different funding for
students with different needs. As demonstrated in Appendix F, many of the organizations’
missions are based on the belief of improving the quality of life for all community members.
Many of these organizations advocate for providing services for a specific subgroup of
community members to achieve this goal. For example, one organization that participated in
advocacy around the Governor’s 2012 proposal and the LCFF was the Alliance for a Better
Community. This organization’s mission is “to promote economic prosperity of the Latino
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community and the Los Angeles region, inclusive of an improved quality of life for Latinos in
education, health and civic participation” (Alliance for a Better Community, 2016, p.1). Another
organization that also participated in advocacy around education finance reforms in 2012 and
2013 was the Clovis Family Literacy organization. The organization’s mission is “to empower
and support parents with the tools, strategies and knowledge needed to support their children in
all areas of their development with emphasis on language, reading and general academic and
social success as become contributing members to the local community and society at large”
(Clovis Family Literacy Organization, 2016, p.1). These organizations, based on my analysis of
the majority of the larger sample included in Appendix F, supported the idea of providing
additional services for students with additional education needs.
Governor Brown’s 2012 education finance reform proposal was based on a weighted
student funding formula (WSF). Under the proposed WSF, school districts were to receive a
specified level of base funding per student along with additional funding for certain subgroups of
students. This additional funding, referred to as a weight, is specified as a percentage of the base
funding. In the original proposal the weights were for specific subgroups of students—those who
qualify for free or reduced priced lunch or English Learners (EL)—and for students in certain
grade levels. The policy proposal, to some extent, reflected the policy beliefs of this subsystem
coalition (providing additional resources for students with additional needs). Conversely, the
proposal also eliminated specific funding streams that many of the issue interest groups had
fought so hard to win in the budget. As one policymaker explained, “with such a vast array of
actors, it [the WSF model] could not reflect all of their individual programmatic demands
without replicating the prior categorical funding structure.” Policymakers needed to address the
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issue interest groups’ beliefs that had coalesced broadly around differentiated funding without
recreating the system that had evolved over the past 40 years.
The governor’s proposal did include increased flexibility at the local level, which could
allow local districts to incorporate the policy beliefs of the issue interest group coalition and
permit increased differentiated funding. As a result, the public statements made by many in the
coalition focused on the argument that this flexibility was a positive opportunity for increased
differentiation, yet there continued to be a fear that the state’s lack of oversight could lead to a
loss of funding for students at the local level and that the legislature would need to address both
differentiation and accountability. As one organizational leader within this coalition argued:
The biggest concerns and flags that were immediately raised to us however was,
the proposal out of the box was, weight the funds and then give it to districts with
complete discretion. Just hold them accountable at the end to see if they are
improving. We said, ‘look no, we are not going to support that.’ The reason the
categoricals exist is because we don’t trust districts and legislatures don’t trust
districts.

Another leader in the issue interest group community Education Trust West clarified this
argument:
His [Governor Brown’s] weighted student formula (WSF) proposal would send
education funding to school districts based on student need and fix longstanding
inequities between rich and poor districts. This could be beneficial for high-need
schools. Yet, the governor and his advisers have failed to include basic principles
of financial transparency, accountability, and school-level authority on how the
dollars are spent (Ramanathan, 2011, p. 1).

On the one hand, this community supported increased funding for traditionally underserved
students. Yet on the other hand, the community was concerned about the loss of other mandated
programs and the lack of district oversight the state had included in the proposal. As a result,
based on this evidence, I have identified their policy beliefs in this case as supportive of
differentiated funding and district accountability. Additionally, I have identified this coalition as
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“issue interest” actors and they represent one of four identified coalitions in the education
finance policy substructure.
Labor interest group(s): California Teachers Association (CTA). The most prominent
interest group involved in education finance has been the CTA. Since its inception in 1863, the
CTA has focused its political energy on coordinating educators and using the resulting power to
influence both local and state policymakers. The CTA is one of the largest and most powerful
political forces in California, collecting $174.4 million in dues in 2013–2014 (Richey, 2016).
From 2003–2012, the CTA made nearly $102 million in political contributions (California
Secretary of State, 2012). When it comes to voter mobilization, the CTA has substantial
membership numbers that include over 1,300 chapters and two statewide affiliates: the California
Faculty Association, which represents the California State University system, and the
Community College Association, which includes members who work in the 72 community
college districts. The CTA membership totals approximately 325,000 members, covering the
districts of every elected official in California (CTA, 2016a). The union is so powerful that
Oakland legislator Democrat Don Perata said, “the union views itself as “the co-equal fourth
branch of government” (Mishak, 2012, p.1). While the political capital of the CTA is one
important variable in identifying it as its own interest group, the second is its steady message of
support for the increased funding needs of schools and its advocacy for this issue within the
education finance subsystem in California.
Consistency of message. Since 1863, the CTA has fought for myriad issues. Some of its
most consistent work over the past 40 years has been advocating for additional funding for
education, either in the form of direct funding or specific programmatic changes such as smaller
class sizes (CTA, 2016b). Its core belief in the need for additional funding has been unwavering
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since 1970. The CTA has promoted the passage of many state laws to increase education funding
through informing the community, mobilizing voters, and advocating state lawmakers. One of its
most successful endeavors was in the 1988 with the passage of P98, which contributed to a long-
term stabilizing trend in education finance in California by guaranteeing about 40% of the state’s
general fund for schools and community colleges. According to the CTA (2016) website, “at the
ballot box, CTA members are a force” (para. 9). In 1998, 2004, and 2006, the CTA mobilized its
members and contributed substantial financial resources to promote the passage of three
statewide school bonds that increased funding for school renovations by $35 million. Those
successful CTA campaigns to increase funding demonstrate the interest group’s belief in the
need to increase public school funding in California.
The CTA also uses its political capital to prevent any cuts to public education funding.
Significantly, during the economic recession, the year following an agreement between the
governor and the CTA to suspend the P98, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed a
budget that did not fully restore the education funding lost the year before. In response to that
proposal, the CTA led a group of organizations in a lawsuit against the governor for not
allocating funds as mandated by P98 and demanded reimbursement for funding (CTA, 2016b).
In a speech given to the CTA State Council of Education, Executive Director Carolyn Doggett
said, “we are here—and CTA exists—to figure out ways to making sure Prop 98 is maintained
and protected” (p. 1). Doggett (2005) also explained, “some of you probably don’t know, but
CTA was created specifically for one purpose . . . POLITICS. It was founded to give educators
an organization that could lobby the legislature and the governor for more money for public
education and higher salaries for teachers” (p. 1). The resulting organization has used its political
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capital to actively engage with policy makers and lead policy shapers in pursuit of their
education finance policy belief: increased funding.
The 2012 proposal and the LCFF did not include any measure to address the need for
additional funding for education. Additional funding by way of temporary tax increases through
a ballot proposition was part of Jerry Brown’s 2011 platform when he ran for Governor. When
Governor Brown proposed weighted student funding reforms in 2012, the labor interest coalition
continued to argue for additional resources prior to engaging around finance reforms.
Additionally, in contrast to the issue interest coalition, the labor interest groups were opposed to
funds being tied directly to students, as one labor leader explained, “for the simple purpose that
attaching funding to an individual kid means that you go down a path of potentially ... It’s similar
to vouchers.” Therefore, there was conflict between the policy beliefs of the issue interest
coalition that believed in tying the dollars directly to the students and the labor interest coalition
that believed in block granting the funds to the districts and allowing them to make the choice.
The result of the policy belief conflict left the administration to bridge the divide between the
coalitions.
The CTA has consistently identified a lack of funding as the most significant problem in
public education in California (CTA, 2016b). Yet in response to the LCFF, the labor issue
coalition’s policy beliefs included the need to provide more funding flexibility at the district
level by not tying dollars directly to students. This combination of powerful political prowess
and consistency of message (adequacy) has made the labor interest coalition a stabilizing factor
in the subsystem of education funding politics in California.
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District Leadership

District leaders also supported increased funding for schools, but when focused on
proposed weighted student funding and decentralization of education finance, the testimonies,
written statements, and interviews demonstrate that many of the politically active district leaders
coalesced around the policy belief that more flexibility in spending, or more local control, was
essential. As one state policymaker explained:
In discussions with a group of superintendents, we heard a clear message from
other large districts in California that although they may not prefer an SBF
[student-based funding] policy, they would all prefer to receive the funding from
the state with fewer strings attached (Chambers, Shambaugh, Levin, Muraki, &
Poland, 2008, p. 91).

Whereas some districts would benefit more than others from the implementation of weighted
student funding, the majority of districts shared in the belief that categorical program funding
was inefficient at best. Support for local control became a policy belief around which district
leadership could unify. In an interview, one district leader described the inefficiency caused by
categorical funding this way:
If you had a budget of $100,000.00, the reality is you probably aren’t gonna spend
$100,000.00. You’ll spend $98,472.63. There’s dust left over. When you have 60
different boxes, you got dust in every box, [which is] essentially was what takes
place, and there’s inefficiencies the closer you get, probably, to your budget limit
of $100,000.00. Flexibility is a big deal because now all the dust gets pushed
together and you can actually do stuff with it (Superintendent, 2014).

Another district leader explained the result of the lack of local control over spending in districts
as “the spending spree.” This is when districts attempt to spend categorically allocated dollars on
mandated purchases for specific purposes outlined by the categorical funding stream by a
specific time and date, but are constrained from spending those dollars in other areas where they
could perhaps best support students (Archer, 2004). This demonstrates some district leaders’
positions that they (local district leaders) were in a better position to determine student need than
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the state. Another district leader testified in a legislative hearing that, “I never thought in my
lifetime I would see this, I have been advocating for flexibility for years. It is the perfect storm in
a positive sense… It is the right thing to do…. Please do not restore any categoricals”
(Seinhauser, 2013). Even those who would lose money as a result of the LCFF proposal argued
for flexibility at the local level. In one legislative hearing Don Stabler, the Deputy
Superintendent of Torrance USD explained, “I support the idea of a similar local control type
formula, we have accountability within the district already” (2013). As a result, politically active
district leaders’ voiced their policy belief that included support for increased flexibility because
it would allow them to make spending choices to improve local districts’ operations and student
achievement in ways that align with local needs.
This would not be the first time it has been argued that districts should retain more
flexibility in spending; the idea had been proposed back in 2005 as part of the Governor’s
Committee on Excellence. The report said, “California should return primary decision-making
authority to local entities (counties, districts, and schools), while strengthening essential state
functions” (Committee on Excellence Report, 2005, p. 12). The districts had an opportunity to
try working with increased flexibility when Sacramento policymakers allowed districts the
freedom to allocate funding without regard to the “special guidelines” that historically mandated
spending on 40 categorical-aid programs in 2011 (Fuller, Marsh, Stecher, & Timar, 2011).
Coinciding with severe cuts in state funding, this flexibility was used to allow district leaders to
reallocate existing resources based on local needs. District leadership argued that it is best suited
to determine the needs of its schools and students, while the expert community in education
finance continued to support this notion. Examples of this policy belief include 20 different
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district leaders
22
who joined Governor Brown when he proposed the LCFF. One district leader,
Mary Jane Burke, superintendent of the Marin County Office of Education (2013), expressed her
support this way, “the new funding formula trusts local decision-makers and school leaders with
greater flexibility and decision-making at the local level where the priorities, needs and goals of
our schools are best understood.” Additionally, district leaders, their professional organizations,
and other coalition groups that represent both district leaders and other members such as the
California Collaborative on District Reform, published joint advocacy documents and testified in
legislative hearings about the need for funding flexibility in regards to both the 2012 proposal as
well as the LCFF. The advocacy platform of one of those professional organizations, the
Association of California School Administrators (ACSA),includes supporting flexibility of
funding and specifically states,
ACSA holds steadfast to the principle that local control is fundamental to
establishing and operating sound programs for students. Locally elected
governing boards know their communities well, and are empowered to set
educational standards and priorities for schools. Because local boards and their
management staff are accountable to their communities, they must be free from
unwarranted intrusion by state and federal authorities (p. 1).

22
Rob Arias, Bakersfield City School District; Tom Armelino, Shasta County Office of Education; Mary
Jane Burke, Marin County Office of Education; John Deasy, Los Angeles Unified School District; Elliott Duchon,
Jurupa Unified School District; Marc Ecker, Fountain Valley School District; Mick Founts, San Joaquin County
Office of Education; José González, Planada Elementary School District; Jon Gundry, Pasadena Unified School
District; Bill Kowba, San Diego Unified School District; Michael Lin, Corona-Norco Unified School District; Dale
Marsden, San Bernardino City Unified School District; Thelma Meléndez de Santa Ana, Santa Ana Unified School
District; Al Mijares, Orange County Department of Education; Rick Miller, Riverside Unified School District;
Jonathan Raymond, Sacramento City Unified School District; Tony Smith, Oakland Unified School District; Sandy
Thorstenson, Whittier Union High School District; Randy Ward, San Diego County Office of Education; and
Kenneth Young, Riverside County Office of Education.
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The local education professionals coordinated their efforts to promote local flexibility
through informal means (all gathering together to support the Governor when he proposed the
LCFF) and formal means, through coordinating efforts through their professional organizations.
Ultimately, the policy beliefs demonstrated through this advocacy were the support of flexible
local control. This concept of local flexibility was part of the Governor’s original 2012 proposal
and the LCFF. Yet, as demonstrated above the issue interest coalition supported more constraints
on that flexibility, creating a conflict between subsystem policy beliefs that the administration
would have to balance if the administration wanted to gain and retain subsystem support for their
proposal.
Expert community: Generating evidence that evolves beliefs. Think tanks and
networks of academic scholars have been active in the education finance subsystem in California
and have contributed to the conversation around weighted student funding and local control.
California-based groups such as the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) and the Policy
Analysis for California Education (PACE), and others have contributed to the discussion and
debate around future potential best practices. Those organizations provide policy research
designed for easy consumption by policy actors and the community. The organizations’ goal is
generally to “inform and improve public policy in California through independent, objective,
nonpartisan research” (PPIC, 2016, p.1). In the era leading up to the passage of the LCFF,
organizations such as these produced policy reports, such as the “Getting Down to Facts” series
that supported the concepts of local control and weighted student funding to improve student
outcome’s, adequacy and equity.
One 2011 RAND report found that “fiscal deregulation in the wake of sharp budget
reductions allowed districts to balance their budgets, protect shrinking reserves, and pursue
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greater efficiencies” (Fuller et al., 2011, p. 62). The study provided evidence to support the
notion that educators and students may benefit from increased funding allocation flexibility. In
finding no evidence of usurpation of funding away from student needs, those who advocated for
decentralized control over education spending used these findings to argue that schools and
students could benefit from a decentralization policy reform. An earlier study the PPIC published
regarding the competition for high quality teachers found that “if those [low-income] schools
have more resources than their counterparts in more affluent neighborhoods, they will be better
able to compete for the most talented teachers” (Sontenlie, 2007, p. 124). These findings indicate
a benefit for low-income schools if they are allocated a disproportionately higher share of funds
and allowed to spend those funds in ways that improve the school’s ability to compete with other
schools in the community for talented teachers. Taken together, these examples establish a
rationale for the expert community to support reforming education finance around both increased
flexibility and weighted student funding in California.
Universities also house institutes with the goal of providing scientific research to inform
the policy community. Examples of such groups in California include the Center for Education
Policy Analysis (CEPA) at Stanford, the Center on Educational Governance (CEG) at the
University of Southern California, and the The Civil Rights Project at the University of
California, Los Angeles. Organizations such as these published academic papers and research-
based reports supporting the idea of weighted student funding for students with additional needs
such as English learners (EL). As one university based policy report suggested, “they [EL
students] require additional resources and support in order to be successful in school, even after
they are classified as fluent in English in many cases” (Gandara & Rumberger, 2006, p.33).
These findings further support the expert coalitions’ belief that reforming education finance
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around additional funding for students with additional needs, specifically ELLs, will improve
student success and therefore should be the policy adopted by the state.
Following the research-based policy analysis coalitions’ changed their beliefs about how
resources should be allocated. The belief in WSF as a method of reform that would improve
student achievement may be found in multiple studies in the mid-2000s. In 2005, the National
Education Association published a report
23
that provided four policy rationales for implementing
a WSF model. In 2010, The Annenberg Institute for School Reform published a report
24
that
contained a series of articles focused on the benefits of policy change from categorical funding to
a decentralized, weighted student funding model. Taken together, these policy briefs, reports,
and academic articles contributed to the policy stream in California and elsewhere as potential
solutions to tightening budgets and less than ideal test results in the era of test-based
accountability measures.
The 2007 Getting Down to Facts (GDTF) series was an independent research project
requested in 2005 by Governor Schwarzenegger’s Committee on Education Excellence and
commissioned by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation, the James Irvine Foundation, and the Stuart Foundation (Loeb & Miller, 2006). The
project was designed to “provide a common ground of understanding about the current state of
California school finance and governance in order to facilitate the serious and substantive
conversations necessary for meaningful reform to ensue” (Loeb, Bryk, & Hanushek, 2007, p.3).
The GDTF series produced many articles focused on various areas of education policy. Among

23
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/formula.pdf

24
http://vue.annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/issues/VUE29.pdf

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their reports was a paper authored by Alan Bersin,
25
Michael Kirst,
26
and Goodwin Liu,
27

published independently in 2008 and titled “Getting Beyond the Facts: Reforming California
School Finance.” In that paper, the authors discussed ideas such as weighted student funding and
decentralization that influenced the way many in the Sacramento policy community envisioned
education reform. As one state policy actor explained, “LCFF doesn’t happen without Getting
Down to Facts.” When interviewed, policy actors commonly explained that, “the policy
environment wasn’t ready for it.” Most interviewees argued that the ideas in that academic paper
in particular instigated a change in beliefs by some actors in California’s education policy
landscape. One issue interest leader explained the shift in beliefs from support for the complex
categorical system toward a predominantly weight-based system this way:
again, I would argue going back to Getting Down to Facts, there was a belief
system that was accepted in the policy arena that “categoricals” was not working.
That was universally believed to be true. This was politically acceptable, and a
policy wise acceptable alternative, to get everyone what they wanted.

The consistency of promoting this alternative method for funding schools over time may have
contributed to the education finance subsystem support for the policy reforms.
Bersin et al. (2008) concluded that student outcomes may improve by allowing districts
more flexibility over funding decisions and reallocating funding toward the students that most
studies indicate have the greatest needs. Those two ideas fundamentally conflicted with the way

25
At that time, Bersin was a former California Secretary of Education and a former district superintendent
of San Diego.
26
At this time, Kirst was emeritus professor of education and business administration at Stanford
University and a former member of the California State Board of Education. He was also working in education
policy for the federal government.
27
Liu was a former assistant professor of law at UC Berkeley.
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California’s education finance system had coalesced over the previous 40 years. The paper
argued that making such changes would bring many benefits for both students and the state.
First, the proposal would create a system that would allow for a more flexible education finance
system by permitting local districts to align their programs with their students’ needs. Second,
the system would shift funding toward the students with the greatest needs. Doing that would
ensure more efficiency by correlating allocated funds to student needs rather than simply leave
them on the table or waste them in unnecessary spending patterns to meet state mandates. Even
though some policy actors and interest groups often embraced those beliefs, there was no
opportunity to push through a piece of legislation because the governor (Arnold
Schwarzenegger) did not pursue these recommendations. As one policy actor explained, “the
governor shelved the recommendations of the Commission [The Committee for Education
Excellence], we had increasing categorical funding, and the recession hit. The Governor had
bigger problems to worry about.” During this era of budget cuts, district leadership was left to
figure out how to continue to fund schools.
Summing up Coalitions in the Education Finance Subsystem. As Weible (2006)
explains, to influence the policy subsystem, actors must coordinate their behavior with allies in
coalitions. Further, Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, and Sabaatier (2014) argue that “by
grouping and analyzing actors by coalitions, the analysts can simplify the hundreds of actors and
their organizational affiliations into groupings that may be stable over time (Sabatier and
Brasher, 1993) and that are instrumental in understanding policy change (Nohrstedt, 2010)” (p.
191). In the context of California’s education finance subsystem prior to the LCFF, I have
analyzed the array of actors and their public policy beliefs about education finance in California
along with their strategies for moving those beliefs forward to identify four coalitions. Some of
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these coalitions worked together in a more direct matter, such as the labor issue interest groups.
Some coalitions were more loosely coupled, yet during the enactment process of the LCFF all
demonstrated some coordination and shared policy beliefs.
Compared to the other coalitions, the strategies employed by the two interest groups
involved more direct advocacy at the state level through direct meetings, community education
programs, and getting their members out to support policies that reflected the coalition’s policy
beliefs. Because the issue interest groups are independent organizations, they each have their
own mission and goals and are therefore not as coordinated as the labor interest groups. They do
not have the financial or political capital to promote their agenda statewide. Yet, there were
coordinated advocacy statements and activities through organization such as Children Now and
others that worked to promote the issue of interest policy beliefs of differentiated funding
alongside holding districts accountable for tying those dollars to students. The local district
leaders were also constricted in their efforts to effect change. These leaders generally attempted
to advocate for their policy beliefs through associations and direct conversations with
policymakers in which they could provide feedback about the impact on existing policy. Those
beliefs included increasing funding (adequacy), increasing local control, and providing additional
programs and resources for students with additional needs (equity). As noted above, the policy
experts published scholarly articles and policy briefs that provided data and policy analysis
supporting the concepts of weighted student funding and local control. The outcome of the
policy expert coalition’s actions was that some policy makers accepted the expert-provided
policy solutions as options and agendized them in the political stream to solve problems in the
state’s education finance system.
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The four subsystem coalitions that I have identified as active in the education finance
policy subsystem before the passage of the LCFF attempted to shape finance policy change
around the state. These coalitions were fundamental in the ongoing layering of policy that
became the state education finance structure. Each of these actors employed both overlapping
and discrete strategies to influence school funding outcomes. Yet over time, external pressures
increasingly shaped the policy context in which they acted, resulting in an education finance
system that was fundamentally controlled by the state. The coalitions were all striving to get their
policy beliefs recognized as ideas “whose time has come” so that they would appear on the
policy agenda.
Summary of Chapter
This chapter sought to explain the policy context for the elevation of the education
reforms’ proposed landmark school funding legislation, the LCFF. In doing so, it highlighted the
complex layer cake of policies instituted to respond to court mandates for equal funding, public
tax initiatives, and stable funding for schools. The chapter also provided information regarding
the structure and composition of the education subsystem coalitions active in the discussion and
debate around education finance reforms. The policy beliefs that united these coalitions were
outlined. In that regard, the chapter identified and described the policy beliefs of each of the
major education finance subsystem coalitions as they related to the finance reform proposals. In
the next chapter, the three streams—problems, policy, and politics—that conjoined and
influenced the elevation of the dramatic LCFF finance reform proposal to the agenda will be
identified, and an analysis of the window of opportunity policy entrepreneurs harnessed to
remake California’s education finance system will be provided.

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CHAPTER SIX
PROBLEMS, POLITICS, AND ENTREPRENEURS

This chapter answers the following research questions: What identified problems would a
new policy solve? What internal and external pressures drove this choice? Building on the
contextual policy factors and coalition beliefs that shaped the policymaking landscape—as
discussed in Chapter Five this chapter begins by identifying the relatively stable external
pressures in which the California education finance system existed before the Local Control
Funding Formula (LCFF). A discussion follows of the problems, policies, and politics that
helped bring the LCFF to the agenda, and its resulting legislative passage. Within each stream,
the analysis highlights each coalition’s policy beliefs, focusing on how those coalitions’ beliefs
and strategies contributed to the incremental policymaking process of the LCFF. The analysis
then examines how the coalition building and policymaking dynamics of identified policy
entrepreneurs used their window of opportunity to propel into law the ideas contained within this
mandate. Finally, this chapter concludes by explaining how these variables combined to
influence the passage of the LCFF.

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Figure 6.1. The three streams and examples of each within education finance subsystem beliefs.
Date Source: Adapted from Kingdon (1984)

Stabilizing Factors in California Education Finance

In this section, I discuss two stable and enduring patterns in California education that
contributed to stability in the three streams (as illustrated in figure 6.1) over time. The first is a
slow shift in student demographics. Whereas the state’s student demographics did change over
time, the shift took place incrementally over a half a century. The second stabilizing factor
included the state and federal government setting standards and using student test scores to hold
schools accountable for meeting those standards. Combined with these two system-wide
parameters were powerful stabilizing factors in which the problems, policies, and politics
existed.
Changing student demographics. As Chapter 5 discussed, over time, layers of policy in
California have addressed both how to improve overall educational outcomes and how to fund
and educate diverse public school student populations. The Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF) set forth relatively stable parameters, or attributes, over which policy shapers have little
control. First, this stability included the diverse demographics of the public school student
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population. According to the California Department of Education (CDE), by 2011 one half of
California students qualified for FRPL, one quarter were EL, and 1 in 10 were FY. Yet, as Figure
6.2 shows, the percentage of English Learners enrolled in California public schools has remained
relatively stable since 1998. Similarly, as Figure 6.3 demonstrates, while a much larger
percentage of California’s public school students live in poverty than the rest of the nation, this
number had been stable before the LCFF’s passage. As a result, these two issues became
ongoing financial challenges for districts attempting to educate their students. This caused some
subsystem coalitions to argue that the persistently diverse demographics contributed to two
financial problems in the schools: inadequacy and inequity.

Figure 6.2. ELL Students Enrolled in California Public Schools, 1998–2015.
Data Source: Kidsdata.org funded by the Lucile Packard Foundation for Children's Health.

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Figure 6.3. California Children Living in Poverty, 2009–2013.
Data Source: Kidsdata.org funded by the 2016 Lucile Packard Foundation for Children's Health.

Coalition beliefs about demographic challenges in California’s education finance system
are complex. As a labor interest group representative explained, “we knew the population in
California has changed dramatically in 40 years. We now have a majority-minority population,
so we have districts that have many hard-to-teach children.” Still other coalition representatives
discussed the need to reform education finance based on more than simply broadening
demographics, but also on institutional disparities and the opaque nature of funding allocations.
As Oakes (2002) reported, there were inadequacies in and disparities among student access to
educational resources necessary for all students to gain an adequate education. Specifically, in
reference to the state’s K-12 education system, Oakes found:
a) a fragmented and incoherent approach to state policymaking; b) a system of
school finance constructed in the absence of an overall plan for providing
equitable and adequate resources and conditions, let alone ensuring education of
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the highest quality to all students; c) a reluctance to invest in ways that ensure an
equitable distribution of adequate resources and conditions; d) the delegation of
responsibility for providing adequate and equitable education to local districts in
the absence of State will or capacity to prevent the occurrence of serious
inadequacies and disparities or to detect and correct them, should they arise.
These flaws grow out of California’s peculiar education policy history since the
1960s, and they have been exacerbated by the State’s recent decision to rely on
test-based accountability to drive educational improvement (p. 2).

As Oakes (2002) argued, the education policies in California were created to address issues such
as accountability mandates, equity of opportunity, voter demands for low taxes and sufficient
school funding, and public perceptions about underachievement in education statewide instead of
a single statewide plan to mandate and fund an adequate and equitable education for all students.
The development and implementation of solutions to those issues were frustrated by the differing
coalition beliefs (as identified in Chapter 5) about how best to fund California schools.
Constrained and disparate funding, a fragmented and incoherent system, and a culture of distrust
all contributed to perceived problems with California’s education finance system. These
embedded problems and issues added to the education policy landscape that became a web of
complex pedagogic mandates and funding allocations that few understood.
Accountability.
28
Concurrent with the stability of diverse student demographics,
accountability policies
29
at both the state, national, and international levels promoted and
provided mechanisms to compare student achievement between states and across countries.
30

28
For more details on how accountability fits within the California context see Chapter 5, page 17. This
might need to be updated.
29
Test-based accountability included the NCLB, California State Test, and California High School Exit
Exam. For all mandated accountability programs in California, see http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/.
30
The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is a nationally representative assessment of
what America’s students know and can do in various subject areas. NAEP scores are made public and may be used
to compare across states and nations.
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The results of these test- based accountability systems revealed that California students were on
the lower end of the spectrum for achievement. One way state political leaders responded to
these results was by creating an in-state accountability system designed to coordinate curriculum
and achievement expectations in the K-12 system. As a result, school districts have been
responding to accountability mandates since 1990, when the state implemented its first
standardized test. Yet even with in state improvements, the exam results consistently revealed
that students’ scores in low-income districts routinely fell substantially below the scores of
students in higher wealth districts. As a result, accountability and how to improve student
outcomes was a consistent issue in California. In 1999, then Governor Gray Davis was quoted as
saying, “we’ve had local control of schools for 50 years and it’s been an abject failure. When
you have an earthquake or natural disaster, people expect the state to intervene. Well, we have a
disaster in our schools” (Broader, 1999, p. 1). The perception of poor academic achievement at
the local level perpetuated the challenges facing districts to improve outcomes based on the
highly isolated funding they received from the state. According to the policy expert coalition,
these accountability measures
31
contributed to the perennial problems of inadequate allocations
and local control over resources to ensure that student performance could meet the externally set
(state or federally mandated) benchmarks for performance. As McCombs and Carrol (2005)
argued, “whether in California or across the country, it is unfair to hold students and schools
accountable for success without giving them the resources they need to succeed” (p. 10).
Consequently, accountability was a stabilizing factor in the education system. It also
contributed to the differing beliefs (inefficiency, inequity, lack of local control) of subsystem

31
Federal and state accountability measures were based on standardized tests (that were eliminated,
redesigned, and reinstated) over the years (1990–2015).
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coalitions about education finance. While the labor issue coalition remained steadfast in its belief
that there needed to be more funding in the system, others debated about mechanisms for
allocating funding. Other coalitions (district, issue interest, and expert) argued that the
accountability outcomes underscored a need at the local level to provide additional services to
students based on need. This created a split in the policy beliefs of the subsystem actors between
those that supported increased funding that was unbounded to students with specific needs (labor
issue interest) and those that supported local control (district leadership, policy experts) and
differentiated funding for students who demonstrated lower achievement rates (issue interests,
district leadership, policy experts). Heightened awareness of those challenges and political
interests in both effecting change and supporting structure had filled the political debate around
education finance in California for decades. Coalitions’ differing perceptions regarding the
problems in the education finance system ultimately contributed to coalition support or rejection
of the governor’s policy reform proposals.
Problems Contributing to Policy Inertia

In this section, I connect the problems as identified by the policy actors within the
education finance system before the implementation of the LCFF with the subsystem coalitions’
proposed solutions to those problems. According to Kingdon (1984), the process of identifying
problems is essential for persuading policy decision makers to pay attention to one problem over
all of the others. Elevating a perceived problem to the policy agenda requires political and
financial capital investments by policy actors and coalitions. Because a policy proposal’s
chances of rising on the agenda are better if the associated problem is connected to a viable
solution (Grossmann, 2014), what policy actors believe is a problem, how they define the
problem, and what solutions they advocate for those problems contributes to the likelihood that
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they would elevate the problem to the policy agenda. How policy actors interpreted what
problems to remedy shaped why coalitions supported or did not support the governor’s education
finance reform proposals.
In the following section, I identify four problems described by subsystem actors in
California before the passage of the LCFF: inadequacy, inefficiency, inequity, and lack of trust.
Different subsystem coalitions interpreted problems differently, promoting disagreement about
proposed solutions that contributed to a trend of broad policy inertia instead of reform. Some
coalitions’ proposed solutions resulted in the mandating of individual programs or categorical
funding streams as reactions to poor student outcomes instead of creating a comprehensive
funding system designed to address the needs of all students. Others proposed dramatic
comprehensive reforms that eliminated the hard-fought policies, such as the Professional
Development Block Grant, Class Size Reduction, and Economic Impact Aid that competing
coalitions had set in place. What follows demonstrates that conflicting coalition beliefs about
policy problems contributed to a trend of inertia in the California finance system.
Constraints on resources. As described by the ACF and Multiple Streams Framework
(MSF), external factors can effect policy change. One of those factors identified by coalition
actors, policy makers, and the public as part of the problem stream was limited resources. This
problem became both a stable and dynamic force for change in the policy subsystem. The
education finance subsystem coalitions identified three elements of resource constraint that
effected policy change: inadequacy, inefficacy, incoherence, and inequity. Each of these will be
addressed in turn below, establishing resource constraint as an instrumental problem that the
LCFF was designed to solve.
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Inadequate funding. The low per-pupil funding amount in California has been well
documented (Kirst, Goertz, & Odden, 2006; Weston, 2010). As Figure 5 illustrates, since the
1970s California’s K–12 education funding has failed to keep pace with national per-pupil
funding allocations (Carroll, Krop, Arkes, Morrison, & Flannagan, 2005). California went from
the highest per-pupil funding in the nation in 1970 to one of the lowest in 2005 (Legislative
Analyst Office, 2005).

Figure 6.4. Per-pupil expenditures, US average versus California average.
Data Source: Adapted from the National Center for Education Statistics. Current expenditure per
pupil in average daily attendance in public elementary and secondary schools, by state or
jurisdiction: Selected years, 1959–60 through 2006–07.

As California student demographics continued to slowly follow the path toward greater
diversity, with increasing numbers of students who qualify for English language programs, Free
and Reduced Price Lunch (FRPL), and special education programs expanding the demand for
resources; funding was constrained by past policy choices. This confluence of events left local
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
$12,000
1959-60
1969-70
1979-80
1989-90
1998-99
1999-2000
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
Constant 2008-09 dollars
United States ............. California .................
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districts constricted in their efforts to improve resource allocations or to redistribute funds to best
serve their local populations. As one issue interest group, Just Schools, asserted in 2011,
California schools need more resources. The limit on property taxes enacted by
Proposition 13 in 1978 severely decreased overall school funding. When we
account for cost of living, California ranks 45th in per-pupil funding. New York
spends 50% more than California for each child in public schools. California
needs to spend as much or more on its children’s education as the other states.

Three of the four education finance coalitions identified in this study made this a clear and
constant demand: (a) the labor issue interest coalition, which believed in increasing funding for
schools across the board; (b) the issue interest coalition, which believed in differentiated funding,
including an element for increasing funding for specific students with identified additional needs;
and (c) the district leader coalition, who also argued for the need to increase funding for schools.
Superintendent of Los Angeles Unified School District John Deasy argued that the cuts to
education funding made during the recession were “devastating” and brought state funding to
“pathetic levels” (Abdollah, 2012, p.2).
Further, issue interest coalitions began to voice their belief in the inadequacy of education
resources by arguing that it constrained the efforts of districts to meet higher accountability
standards set by the state and federal governments. These demands manifested themselves in
2010 when a coalition of students, parents, school districts, and three major education
organizations fi led a lawsuit against the state, claiming that “California’s school finance system
is unconstitutional because it fails to provide all students with an equal opportunity to meet the
state’s academic goals” (Weston, 2010, p 3). As subsystem coalition actors joined in arguing that
funding was inadequate to meet accountability demands, issue interest and district coalitions and
policy experts also retained their policy beliefs that students with different needs required
different resources (Chambers, DeLancey, & Levin, 2007; Gandara & Rumberger, 2007; Harr et
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al., 2007; Imazeki, 2007; Rose & Sengupta, 2007; Sonstelie, 2007). Yet it was also clear, as this
chapter’s section on adequacy describes, that neither the State of California nor local districts
had additional resources to add to the overall funding levels.
Taking these funding constraints into account, the governor’s 2012 education finance
reform proposal contained no solution to the lack of funding. There was no provision to increase
funding in the 2012 proposals and the governor (because of diminished revenue at the state level)
simultaneously proposed a drastic cut to education funding. The budget proposed $5.2 billion in
public school funding cuts—much greater than the K–12 funding reductions during the worst of
the recession. These funding cuts would eliminate many of the differentiated programs and
therefore magnify the belief that the schools were inadequacy funded. Through increasing
inadequacy and decreasing differentiation of programs, the cuts violated three of the four
coalitions’ policy beliefs about education finance, influencing the political dynamic surrounding
the reform proposal. Many subsystem actors did not want to focus on these potential reforms
when there were looming budget cuts that would further eliminate funds for schools. However,
as discussed below, the LCFF policy did attempt to address other identified financial problems in
the system.
Inefficiency. Whereas some policy actors such as the California Teachers Association
(CTA), Labor Interest Coalition (LIC), and school district leaders have remained steadfast in
their shared belief that the State of California was underfunding K–12 education, other policy
actors believed it was not simply a lack of funding hampering the success of California students
but the inefficient and complex ways in which funding was allocated. Discussion about funding
levels and allocation methods has been a stable trend in the state since the 1930s. Governor
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James Rolph, in his 1931 inaugural address, argued for a more efficient education finance
system:
We do not begrudge to our schools any amount of money that they may need for
sustaining and advancing their high standards. But our educational budget now
absorbs more than one-third of the total expenditures of the state. I am convinced
that much expense could be avoided and, at the same time, a notable improvement
in the results obtained if in the education of our children more attention were paid
to fundamentals and less to non-essentials (p. 1).

Education as a state level issue has been a historical constant in California. Whereas 25 of
the last 31 governors specifically addressed education in their inaugural addresses, fewer
governors took up finance as an issue. Since Governor Rolph’s speech, 6 of California’s
31 governors have addressed a need to tackle adequacy or efficiency, or both, in their
inaugural addresses (see Appendix G). Using the governor’s bully pulpit to identify
education finance as an issue contributed to the consistent return of these issues as part of
the statewide policy agenda, although not all governors agreed what the financial
problems were or how to solve them. Over time, coalitions began to inform the debate
about the issue.
Over 40 years after Governor Rolph made his speech, Michael Kirst published “The New
Politics of State Education Finance” (1979), an academic paper in which he discussed school
funding by analyzing two coalitions that, he argued, were central to the debate at the time.
According to Kirst, one coalition argued not only for increases in spending but also for greater
equity between well-resourced and under-resourced districts. The other coalition supported
cutting taxes, limiting government growth, and eliminating education “frills” (Kirst, 1979, p.
428). Appendix G shows that this debate has played out in gubernatorial positions on education
over the past 100 years. Furthermore, many California legislators, advocacy groups, academics,
and the public have taken the position that there was sufficient money in the system, but that the
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system was inefficient (Peng & Guthrie, 2010), perpetuating the stalemate between coalitions
that identified adequacy and those that identified efficiency as a problem.
As Figure 6.3 demonstrates, just in the eight years between 2005–2013, statewide public
opinion regarding education finance ebbed and flowed between the belief that districts need both
additional funds and that they need to be more efficient with the funding already allocated to
them, or that the districts only need to be more efficient with the funding they were allocated and
not given additional funds. Over the same time, coalitions’ beliefs about problems and solutions
remained constant.

Figure 6.5. Public Opinion 2005-2013 Increase Efficiency, Increase Funding, or Increase
Both.
Data Source: PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Education 2005-2013.

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Percent of Respondents Who Support
Public Opinion Effiency, Increase Funding, or Both
Both
More Effiencent
Increase Funding Only
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One trend is clear: simply increasing funds has not been a popularly held belief among
Californians for the eight years before the passage of the LCFF. As Figure 6.5 illustrates, the
peak of support for merely adding in additional dollars was only 13% in 2011, one year after the
recession ended in California.
32
Looking more deeply into public opinion the year before the
LCFF passed and after years of funding cuts, in a 2012 statewide poll the researchers found only
19% of respondents believed that the state funded education well. This poll found that
Californians believed there was not enough money in the education system and that much of
education spending was “wasted” (Brewer, Plank, & Hall, 2012, p. 4). Policy experts reported
specific inefficiencies in the education system were the result of the categorical funding system.
In that system, districts were required to use every last penny for the state mandated purpose and
in most cases could not carry over funds. At the end of the year, educators would be spending
just to use up the funds, when if they had been allowed to carry over or pool with other
categorical funds for other purposes, the funds would have been more targeted to true local needs
(Fuller, et al., 2011; Stecher, et al., 2012).
Since most of the subsystem coalitions supported the notion of increased funding, the
debate’s broader politics were more complex. This debate between adequacy and efficiency is
part of a historical narrative that contributed to the conflicting messages voters sent to
Sacramento policymakers. As one policymaker explained, “we have been underinvested in
public school funding for a long time in this state, certainly since Proposition 13.” As Chapter 5
describes, coalition actors advocated for their varying education finance policy beliefs in

32
“Total income for the median family in California fell more than 5 percent between 2007 and 2009 (the
official recession years) and an additional 6 percent between 2009 and 2010 ” (Bohn & Schiff, 2011, p. 1).

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Sacramento, leaving the legislature and governors over time politically constrained from taking
action on wholesale reform. Taken together, these conflicting positions over the problems of
funding education contributed to the static nature of education funding reforms in the state.
Inequitable and incoherent system. Whereas the debate around the problems of
adequacy and efficiency has been perennial, actors involved in education finance discussions
have identified two additional problems: inequity and incoherence. As Education Trust West, an
issue interest coalition member, argued in 2011,
This cruel divide is the result of an education funding system that is
fundamentally unfair. Not only has California failed to adequately fund its
schools, our state has also failed to equitably allocate existing education funding. .
. . If we truly want to ensure that all California students have access to a high-
quality education, our elected leaders must reform our system of education
finance to make it rational, transparent, and equitable.

As Chapter 5 and previous sections of this chapter have discussed, various issue interest
coalition actors have been engaged over time to effect change and increase funding for public
education. The funding structure that evolved based on subsystem actors’ beliefs helped create
dynamics that contributed to long-term trends that maintained the funding system as it was
before the passage of the LCFF. This funding scheme continued, in part, because of the beliefs of
some subsystem coalitions, such as the issue interest coalition, that funding increases should be
subject to programmatic constraints. Conversely, the labor issue coalition, as opposed to many
legislators and issue interest groups, also believed funding was insufficient, yet they did not
support isolated funding streams as a policy solution. As the State Board of Education President
Mike Kirst explained, “since there was no underlying rationale for what was being done in
school finance, it became an ad-hoc political free-for-all. The legislators like it [isolated funding
streams] because they could pass a categorical program and it became their footnote in history”
(Schurmann, 2013, p.1). The complexity of categorical funding streams limited the community’s
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ability to comprehend and engage in the process (Kirst, 2007a; Kirst et al., 2006; Kirst &
Mazzeo, 1996). One issue interest group described the incoherence of education finance
allocations as a “maze of programs and formulas [that] makes it nearly impossible to understand
whether dollars ever reach the schools and students for whom they are intended” (Barondess,
Schroder, and Hahnel, 2012, p.2). The conflicting beliefs as to what the problems were in
education finance and the political solutions to those beliefs contributed to the incoherence of the
system of funding schools. This incoherence itself became a problem as fewer and fewer people
understood how schools were funded and how to make improvements to the system.
As a result of decades of policy choices, court rulings, voter-approved mandates, and
political influence, the complex funding system of California schools led people to believe that
education resources were distributed inequitably and that the system of funding schools was not
based on a rational plan (Kirst, 2007b). Additionally, constrained resources at the state and local
level as well as the vast system of funding programs through categorical allocations that were
built over time on smaller and smaller needs-based categories of students influenced the belief
that the funding system was inequitable. Perceptions of inequity continued to play out in the
classroom. For example, policy expert studies have found that low-performing and
disadvantaged students often had the least experienced teachers and experienced higher levels of
teacher turnover (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; Loeb et al., 2007). With resources allocated
to specific programs, this left the districts unable to increase teacher salaries to attract the best
teachers to the schools with increased student needs. According to a 2012 policy expert report, in
almost all of California’s 20 largest school districts, significant teacher salary gaps existed
between the higher-resourced and lower-funded schools in each district (Barondess, Hahnel,
Schroder). One study found that more experienced teachers in higher-resourced schools earned
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up to $6,600 more than comparable teachers in lower-funded schools and the poorest districts
received $620 less per pupil than did the wealthiest districts (Barondess, Hahnel, Schroder,
2012). A 2011 study found differences in districts based on the type and size of the district, not
student needs. That finding led to variations in per-pupil funding of more than $1,700 in separate
districts within similar geographic constitutions (PPIC, 2011). Studies such as these that were
published by the expert community in education finance highlighted the inequity in California
school funding.
Despite a history of state and federal programs and funding to support students with
additional challenges, these critics charged that California’s school finance system continued to
struggle to provide all students with enough resources to meet the state’s high academic
accountability standards. Research studies by policy experts, such as these by the PPIC, and
advocacy by subsystem coalitions including issue interest organizations, helped to define
inequity as a problem in California education finance. As a solution, they offered differentiated
funding in the form of weighted student funding. Weighted student funding (WSF) also known
as fair student funding or student-based budgeting, is the idea that additional dollars are provided
to schools or districts to provide additional services for those students with additional needs.
Governor Brown used the term Weighted Student Formula, which I interpret to mean the
formula proposed by Bersin, Kirst, and Liu (2008) that includes concentration money, or
additional dollars, for districts that educate more than 55% of students who qualify for weights
based on the identified categories of FRPL, LI, and FY. By offering a viable solution to the
problem of inequity, as policy experts defined it, this research was placed in a high profile
position to gain policymakers’ attention.

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A Culture of Distrust

An historic lack of trust by both state and local actors in the education system has added
to education finance problems. As Figure 6.8 demonstrates, public opinion polls about who
should control education funding have consistently demonstrated a lack of trust in state
lawmakers’ ability to successfully allocate scarce education resources. This creates a tension
between voters’ trust in local leaders and the state leadership and policy coalition actors’ distrust
of local district leadership.
Since 1960, confidence in local districts to administer education has continued to
dwindle. In 2003, Democratic Governor Gray Davis claimed that local control of education was
a “disaster” (Kirst, 2002, p. 47). Prominent policy expert studies have directed attention to the
state’s financial system’s flaws and suggested guidelines for restructuring it (Bersin, Krist, & Liu
2008; DeLancey & Levin, 2007; Duncombe & Yinger; 2007; Glandara & Rumberger, 2007;
Imazeki, 2007; Loeb, Bryk, and Hanushek 2007; Sonstelie 2007; Weston 2010). All of these
reports also argued against the complex funding formula in California because the system has no
rationale for determining which students need what services and few understood the funding
structure (Kirst, 2007). The continual use of categorical funding, some believed, demonstrated
subsystem actors’ lack of trust in various levels of governance to address the diverse needs of
public school students. As one policymaker who argued consistently against the governor’s
proposed education finance reforms explained, “if you’re taking away categoricals because
you’re saying we trust local districts to make the best decisions for those students, you have to be
willing to trust them and give them some autonomy.”
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Distrust in local administrators. One instance of such lack of trust is evident between
issue interest groups and local districts. As Table 2 in Chapter 5 demonstrates, filing lawsuits has
been one way individuals and advocacy groups demonstrated their lack of trust in local districts’
abilities to respond to state and federal mandates in education opportunities for students. Via the
courts, advocacy groups have attempted to force local districts to provide specific student
services, including more equitable funding, more resources, and more highly qualified teachers.
One advocacy group explained the lack of trust in the local district this way:
[t]here are large gaps between the per-pupil revenues that districts receive from
the state and the dollars per student that they report spending at the school level.
For example, one California district took in $7,445 per student in revenue from
state and local sources in 2009-10, but reported that it spent, on average, $3,053
per student at the school level that same year. A lack of clear accounting for
district- and school-level spending makes it impossible to determine how districts
are investing their funding (Education Trust West, 2010, p. 3).

As previous sections of this chapter have discussed, issue interest coalitions have contested
funding decisions by districts for decades, arguing for more equity in funding allocatio ns. As an
issue interest group leader explains, “we’re highlighting resource and equity issues, focusing on
the need to reform funding.” Groups such as these have historically pursued a two-pronged
effort, one in the courts and one in the legislature, to address the problem of equity in
California’s system of funding education. For example, Public Advocates is an organization that
provided lead counsel in the case of Serrano v. Priest and many other California equity cases
33

and coordinates efforts with a wide range of issue interest groups that include PICO, Alliance of
Californians for Community Empowerment, Californians for Justice, and Youth Together, to

33
For more details on the history of Public Advocates and their work on education please see
http://www.publicadvocates.org/education.
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both support plaintiffs in the courts and effect legislative change in the education finance system
through political advocacy. As one interest issue coalition leader explained,
In any event, our organization is more in litigation. In particular, over the past 15
years in our education work we’ve moved to doing a lot more state-level policy
advocacy and close partnering with grassroots community organizations. For most
of the last 15 years, 2001 to the present, we have been working on school funding
reform with our grassroots partners.

According to another issue organization leader, the reason these groups pursued school
funding reforms through the state and judiciary this way was their “lack of faith in the
districts.” The issue interest organizations attempted to address the policy problems of a
lack of trust in local districts and inequitable funding of education through state
institutional mandates. As a different issue interest leader explained,
Oftentimes we didn’t have the trust that had been built up, and there was a
reason why there wasn’t that trust between the community and the
decision makers at the district. There was a great deal more skepticism
about whether their decisions were left solely up to the Board would
always be made in a way that really did address the needs of the students
with the greatest needs, if they’re not the most politically powerful force
locally.

Those that sought to increase equity for students sought policy change through the state instead
of their local democracy, the school board.
This lack of trust in local education leadership can also be seen in labor issue groups’
decisions to advocate for their policy positions at the state level instead of working with
individual district leaders. As one policy leader explained,
You know it was an odd—and sometimes it would be a little bit of an awkward—dance,
because you would have some [issue interest and labor interest organizations]— for
instance, California Together and, California Association of Educators, they will—they
kind of take that one positions which was—they were kind of anti-local in California.

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This anti-local control belief played out in multiple ways. For example, virtually every school
district
34
uses local collective bargaining. In California, many issues related to working
conditions are subject to bargaining. Local unions rely on state organizations, such as the CTA,
for technical and bargaining support for its local affiliates. This structure reflects the success of
the labor interest groups’ pressure to remove sole control over bargaining issues from the
districts, and a state law that passed in 1975 mandating that school districts “bargain” with the
local union over the impact of new laws such as class size reduction or teacher evaluation. This
mandate for districts to negotiate with labor unions before making a budgetary decision such as
class size reduction is the result of those groups’ state level advocacy. As Chapter 5 describes,
the labor groups have been successful over time in advocating at the state level to enforce policy
positions at the local level, eliminating some of the local district leadership’s power to make
district-level choices. One state policymaker explained her perspective: “there are some people
who trust and have confidence in their local superintendents…, and others who don’t.” This lack
of trust in districts promoted issue interests’ coalitions and labor groups to push for their own
policy changes at the state level that helped shift control over school funding to the state.
Taken together, the conflict over trust has caused local leaders to lose power over
resource decisions to the state as more and more advocates sought to constrain local control
thorough state mandates. At the same time, as accountability demands increased expectations
that local educators improve student outcomes, their ability to control resources to meet those
demands became further and further constrained. As budgets continued to decline and the state
cut funding, class sizes increased, programs were cut, and accountability measures were not met.
As a result, district leaders’ attempted to voice their frustration over resource allocation and
promoted their policy belief that resource allocation decisions should be made at the local level.

34
Clovis Unified is the largest school district in California without a teachers’ union.
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As one local administrator explained: “even if we don’t have enough at least we can serve the
students we have, not the average student statewide.”
Summary of Problem Stream

Within the context of demographic diversity and accountability mandates, subsystem
coalitions identified the education finance problems as inadequacy, inefficiency, inequity,
incoherence, and distrust. Yet, coalitions did not always promote viable solutions to these
problems. Issue interest groups promoted categorical funding that often heightened the state’s
control over funding, increasing the perception of inefficiency and funding complexity. Labor
issue groups supported increased funding, which in an era of severe budget constraints was not
immediately feasible. District leaders also supported increased funding, but with local control to
improve inefficiencies, conflicting with the interest group coalition beliefs that the state should
make funding decisions. All of these clashing beliefs within the problem stream contributed to
the ongoing static nature of education finance in California.
Uniquely, the LCFF accompanied the policy experts’ belief that education was not only
underfunded but that students with different needs demanded different resources, which they
defined as equity. This solution took the form of a new kind of differentiated funding and the
ability of those closest to the students to decide what students needed, termed as local control.
This solution reframed the debate around funding in education away from equality toward a
more outcome-based formula of equity. In this model, funding would be provided through base
grants, weights, and additional concentration funds for districts that serve low-income students
(Berstin, et al., 2007). According to the policy experts, this policy had the unique quality of
being a solution that differentiated funding by creating clear funding allocations through base
grants, weights, and additional concentration funds for districts serving low-income students
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(Bersin, Kirst, & Liu 2008; Chambers, DeLancey, & Levin 2007; Duncombe & Yinger 2007;
Gandara & Rumberger 2007; Imazeki 2007; Kirst, Goertz, & Odden 2007; Loeb, Bryk, &
Hanushek 2007; Reich 2007; Rose et al. 2003; Sonstelie 2007; Weston 2010) . This solution to
some of the perceived problems lacked the ability to unify differing coalitions, in part, because
of the lack of trust in the local districts. In order to promote their policy beliefs, the policy
experts needed a problem solution in the policy stream that could increase trust in local districts
and then gain support from multiple coalitions in the subsystem.
The Policy Stream

According to Kingdon (1984), the policy stream refers to legislative proposals put
forward to solve existing problems. As the prior section discusses, many coalition actors—
particularly policy experts—continued to promote policy changes that supported their policy
beliefs. The unique characteristic of the policy expert coalition was that it offered specific policy
proposals to solve some of the problems. Those solutions included funding a diverse student
population while increasing efficiency by shifting control over funding decisions to the local
level, without adding additional costs. However, this proposed solution did not solve the problem
of the distrust of local districts to ensure that students were properly funded. Additionally,
proposing a solution to a problem would not ensure that the policy would become law; it only
promoted the likelihood that it would be elevated to the policy agenda (Grossmann, 2014;
Kingdon, 1984).
In the years leading up to the passage of the LCFF, the California policy stream lacked
many viable proposals for large-scale reforms. As part of a series of studies published by the
policy expert coalition, one paper stood out above the rest as the foundational doctrine for
policymakers, “Getting Beyond The Facts: Reforming California School Finance” (Bersin, et. al,
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2008). Mentioned by all (100%) of my interviewees as the source for the governor’s LCFF
reforms, this paper’s ideas included a vision that was “a new system that is more rational, more
equitable, and, we believe, politically feasible” (Bersin, et. al. , 2008, p. 1). The key reforms in
this proposal included, “link[ing] district revenue to student needs and regional costs while
ensuring that all districts are held harmless at current funding levels” (Bersin, et al., 2008, p. 1).
The idea of consolidating and allowing some flexibility was not completely absent from the
policy debate in California. Although this proposal set the stage early for dramatic education
reforms in the state, it was not yet to become policy. In 2008, California and the world were
experiencing a global recession that decreased state and federal revenues dramatically. At this
time, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared a fiscal state of emergency (Rau and
McGreevy, 2008). When asked to reflect on the possibility of mandating the proposals in the
Bersin et al., paper back in 2008, one policymaker explained, “it would have been difficult to
hold districts harmless while we were cutting their budgets.”
During the depths of the recession, state lawmakers passed law SBX3-4 that collapsed
some categorical spending and allowed districts more flexibility over their spending decisions.
One outcome of this policy shift was to create a “policy experiment,” because the law allowed
districts to redistribute 6% of their categorical funds, which equated to 40 separate categorical
funding streams, where local needs demanded it and continue to comply with state mandates for
remaining catagoricals (Fuller, Marsh, Stecher, & Timar, 2010). After the implementation of this
funding change, a team of policy experts conducted a study to learn and “build evidence on how
local educators respond to fiscal flexibility, and better understand the forces that shape resource
allocation decisions within district offices and schools” (Fuller et al., 2011). At the time, this
study explained that with “this policy the Governor [Schwarzenegger] and legislature set in
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motion the deregulation of $4.5 billion in previously regulated categorical aid” (p. xi). Given the
severe budget cuts resulting from the recession, the state felt it had no other choice than to
provide some flexibility over previously restricted funds to compensate or help locals deal with
these cuts. An additional study finding was that the deregulation policy “was likely the result of
political expediency rather than a discrete change in philosophy concerning fiscal regulation”
(Fuller et al., 2011, p. xi). At the time state policymakers voted to support local control, they also
continued to believe in state control over education finance. This policy was not the result of a
policy belief change, but one of political convenience.
My research suggests two reported political effects of the SBX3-4. First, lawmakers
interpreted the policy as lowering the barrier of allowing districts to make decisions over funding
allocations. One lawmaker most clearly expressed the position of many study interviewees: “the
report helped lawmakers have more faith in the districts,” and:
It wasn’t as much of as a culture shock particularly for those constituents who
tended to benefit from the categorical programs as it might have been otherwise.
Because they’d . . . had to suck it up for 3 or 4 years during the recession and so
folding all that money in and redistribut[ing] money around the state wasn’t as big
a deal.

The second reported political effect of the policy change did not come from the policy itself, but
instead came from the above mentioned policy study by a group of policy experts—including
RAND and PACE—which found, among other things, that the districts remained committed to
the goals of the programs even though they shifted the dollars elsewhere. The second was the
influence of the Fuller, et al., (2011) study on state policymakers. During my interviews,
policymakers refereed to the study as “essential” and of “great value” in increasing their
confidence in local control. The policy expert community continued to provide support for more
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substantial policy reform with the publication of evidence-based support for decentralization of
education funding.
These policy expert reports worked to provide a solution to some of the identified policy
solutions problems of inequity, incoherence, and inefficiency, while providing evidence to state
lawmakers that local districts could be trusted to manage spending scare tax revenue. First, the
Bersin, Krist, and Liu (2008) proposal offered a new way for the state to address funding,
shifting from traditional equality to an equity-based formula that funded students based on
student need, and increased the funding amounts for students with additional needs. Second, the
proposal addressed efficiency by shifting allocations down to the local level, allowing each
district to spend revenues as necessary on their students and needs they had instead of restricting
spending to in isolated funding streams that often did not take into account individual district
needs. The proposal also addressed the longstanding issue surrounding state-level accountability
mandates’ misalignment, with local demands to meet those mandates, by allowing districts to
spend dollars where they could best improve student achievement rates. Finally, Fuller, et al.
(2001) provided evidence to lawmakers that local districts could manage their funds without
such draconian oversight from the state. How the political stream addressed these policy
proposals and problems shifts the politics in California from inertia toward change.
The Political Stream: Trends Evolve into Triggers for Change

The political stream of California education finance policy before the passage of the LCFF
was rich with actors attempting to effect policy change in Sacramento. The nature of advocacy
around California education mirrored the pattern observed nationwide at the time: a “plethora of
educational advocates—lobbyists, advocacy coalitions, grassroots community organizers,
philanthropists, and religious groups . . . [who] have diversified and intensified around many
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politically contentious education issues” (Scott, Lubienski, & Debray-Pelot, 2010, p. 4).
California has the largest public school population in the nation with the most diverse student
body and before the LCFF, the majority of funds were controlled at the state level. As described
by a policymaker, taken together, the combination of a large and diverse student population and
state-controlled funding decisions about how programs for these students will be funded
controlled by the state, created a political environment around education finance in which “we’d
had a history in California of everybody coming to the state to get a categorical program to
impose something locally.”
As Figure 6.1 illustrates and as Chapter 5 discusses, the topic of education finance has
been part of an ongoing debate in California’s political landscape for over a century. Those
debates include a variety of political actors, including governors, voters, the legislature, and
interest groups. The following subsection discusses the role that the “plethora of educational
advocates” played in the political debates around education finance reform in California leading
up to the enactment of the LCFF.
Public initiatives and the power of the legislature. As Chapter 5 discussed, California’s
initiative process has substantially influenced the way in which the state funds education,
including both limiting local control over tax generation to fund schools (P13) and mandating
allocation of a specific portion (40%) of the state’s budget to public schools (P98). Another
initiative that influenced the politics of education finance was Proposition 140 (P140), which
California voters passed in 1990 to set term limits for the state legislature. One political
ramification of these term limits is a lack of institutional knowledge among the policymakers
themselves, who become dependent on the expertise of unelected bureaucrats and lobbyists
(Cain & Kousser, 2004). According to coalition actors in the education finance subsystem, term
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limits affect both the institutional knowledge in Sacramento as well as the political skill to shift
policy directions when a governor supports a position. By limiting the amount of time a
policymaker can be in office, the law ensures a consistent replacement of those members with
institutional knowledge with inexperienced newcomers. One policy actor explained the influence
on policymakers of term limits:
There has been so much change over and so much musical chairs and… They ran
for the assembly. [Once in office] they only have three terms, six years. They are
looking forward as soon as they get in, where am I going next? I’m going to
congress or I am going to statewide office.

The observation above describes not only a lack of institutional knowledge when new
policymakers arrive in Sacramento, but also a perceived lack of focus on legislative issues once
they arrive. Term limits may have restricted the individual legislators’ time resources for deeply
engaging in the policy debates that arise in the short time that they are in office. Reflecting on
the opinion of many of the interviewees for this study, one policymaker explained the influence
of term limits on the lawmaking process this way:
They completely changed the legislature, it’s a totally different body. Yeah, it
[term limits] absolutely did. Committee chairs were so flipping powerful back
then. I get it if John Baskitone didn’t want it, it wouldn’t happen. I think it would
be much less likely to have happened [LCFF] in a term if there were not term
limits. I think the legislature was just stronger back then and so the governor
didn’t have the influence he has today.

Additionally, as Cain and Krauser (2004) found in their quantitative analysis of the effect
of term limits on California legislation, “term limits greatly reduced the Legislature’s
ability to rewrite executive proposals” (p. 4). Taken together, these data indicate that term
limits likely contributed to shifting the dynamic of politics in Sacramento. Contemporary
legislative dynamics include less institutional knowledge and less time for legislators to
gain that knowledge before they must transition to their next position, leaving the
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legislature as a whole more dependent on outside sources, including interest groups and
the administration for guidance and policy supports.
The political power of interest groups. Issue interest groups, often referred to by state
lawmakers as the “ABC Groups,” served two instrumental political roles in the politics of
California’s education finance system. First, these groups served as a source of information and
offered policy solutions to lawmakers for specific student populations. Second, because their
policy belief was based on the need to differentiate funding for students with specific additional
resource needs, they served as a political foil to the CTA, described in Chapter 5 as a powerful
interest group whose policy belief centered on the perception of inadequate funding of public
schools.
The design of many early categorical programs was based on an attempt to improve the
outcomes of at-risk students—those with special education needs, English Learners, and the
disadvantaged (Weston, 2011c). The 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk shifted the politics of
education by framing California public schools as lacking globally competitive education
outcomes for all students. Subsequently, because of the combination of increasing diversity in
student demographics, a focus on student outcomes, and the benefits of creating categorical
funding streams (as described above), California lawmakers began to set specific criteria for
programmatic outputs and provide additional resources for districts to achieve those goals,
shifting toward incentive-based funding instead of reimbursement for program mandates. Those
criteria included reforms such as higher teacher salaries, longer school days and school years,
and smaller class sizes (LAO, 1984). That shift in funding methodology was based on the belief
that incentives would be more effective and less expensive (increasing efficiency) than prior
program reimbursement policies (LAO, 2002; Picus, 1991).
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Politically, one consequence of state programmatic funding shifts meant that the
introduction of a new funding stream created a new constituency and interest groups. As one
policymaker explained, “a lot of that did come from the civil justice community-based
organization community, which has a good relationship with my members of the Assembly.”
Statewide interest groups developed and focused their attention on the legislature to sustain or
create new categorical programs.
Designed to improve student outcomes, those programs also benefitted state lawmakers
politically by allowing them to make political claims of increasing education funding while
limiting the flexibility of those funds for general-purpose expenditures, such as teacher salary
increases (Kirst, 2007a; Kirst & Wirt, 2009; Timar, 1994). By adding more categorical grants
primarily distributed through specific programs, including special education, pupil
transportation, and professional development for teachers, the legislature gained more control
over allocation of funding while districts lost control. As a result, issue interest groups and the
legislature both demonstrated their belief in differentiated funding and local control (Weston,
2011c). By 2005, over 60 independent categorical state programs constituted 30% of school
district revenues. In addition, districts received federal restricted funds through Title I and the
National School Lunch Program (Rose et al., 2010; Weston, 2011b). Categorical grants created a
myriad of political benefits for the legislature while also creating challenges for the education
system. They helped create a political legacy for state lawmakers, increased those lawmakers’
stature with their constituents, and created new constituent groups, thereby ensuring that grants
would be difficult to eliminate. Finally, by allocating funds for constricted programmatic
purposes, the state ensured the consistency of programmatic implementation, offered a source of
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political action for legislators to pursue, increased the power of interest groups to effect change
at the state level, and limited local control over education.
Politically, the issue interest groups often served as a counter to labor interest groups.
Whereas the CTA was a well-resourced and powerful unified voice that advocated for its
position of broad funding increases, the issue interest groups advocated, often individually or in
smaller consortiums, for limited programmatic improvements. As a result, these two groups
often worked at cross-purposes, both believing in increasing student funding yet supporting it in
different ways. The CTA wanted less restrictive allocations, and, as one policymaker explained,
issue interest groups wanted to ensure that “the district spent the right dollars on the right
students” and that “there was an accountability mechanism for those dollars.” As a result, these
active and influential coalitions were both working hard to influence the legislature to act, yet
with different goals.
The politics of school funding: Institutional actors. The funding of California’s
education system has been a political issue for California’s governors for generations. The desire
of the state to provide either additional funding or redistribute existing education dollars has been
the political agenda for two thirds of a century. As Appendix G indicates, the majority of
California’s governors would be considered education governors, leaders who addressed
education as one of their main concerns (Henig, 2013). As early as 1947, Governor Earl Warren
made the case for state involvement in education finance: “by the equalization of school funds,
the consolidation of districts, and state financial assistance in the construction of schools these
poorer districts can be placed on a firm foundation” (p. 1). Few governors in their inaugural
addresses—4 out of 30—mentioned funding in the context of the state’s role in equalization (see
Appendix G). Slightly fewer inaugural addresses—3 of 33—contained arguments in favor of
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increasing state funding. The concern at the gubernatorial level over increasing state power over
the provision of education came four decades later in 1987 when then Governor George
Deukmejian argued for the need “[t]o simplify the state Tax Code. And we can save the
taxpayers millions by breaking the unwarranted concentration of programs and power that’s here
in Sacramento by returning much of the decision-making to local communities and to school
districts” (p. 1). Although the perception of the need to shift the power over education back to
the local districts was growing, none of these governors were successful in achieving this
purported goal.
Public opinion and politics. The trend of the majority of California voters has been to
disapprove of the job that the state legislature has been doing with regard to education. In
September 2013, the legislature received only a 38% approval rating (Baldassare, Bonner,
Paluch, Petek, & Shresha, 2013). Even so, that rating was up from 29% in the fall of 2012
(Mishak, 2012). That political trend of low public approval correlates with voters bypassing the
legislature and using state ballot initiatives to implement significant political changes (Kirst,
2007). We can see this trend in education funding mandates through voter initiatives such as P13
and P98, as Chapter 5 discussed. The democratically elected legislature became reactive to
policy instead of creating it. Taken together, public opinion has two important consequences for
education financial reforms. First, Californians can bypass the legislature and governor and
mandate policy change through initiatives. Second, policy experts can publish studies and market
findings straight to the public to directly influence policy.
By 2012, public opinion of California’s education system was dismal. As has been
demonstrated throughout this chapter, voters were unhappy with how education finance was
operating in the state, but they also lacked faith in district leadership. Polling data from 2012
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revealed that 42% of voters would give schools statewide a grade of D or F and 57% said schools
were getting worse. They also consistently reported believing that, statewide, schools were not
serving students. At the same time, only 19% of voters believed that the state was funding
schools adequately. Similarly, 52% of voters supported differentiated funding that targeted
resources to schools that educate large percentages of economically disadvantaged children,
while only 31% said that they would support the same reallocation of dollars for EL students
(Brewer, Plank, & Hall, 2012). The public continued to distrust the state’s ability to govern
education (Brewer, et.al., 2012), and the public and the governor continued to rely more heavily
on public initiatives instead of lawmaking by the legislature to make substantial reforms. With
no rational plan for allocating funds, no institutional memory for policies, unsuccessful
proposals, and policymakers continually cycling for their next jobs, no long-term educational
planning contributed to the politics of piecemeal corrections, such as categorical funding, P13,
and P98 to large-scale education finance challenges.
Section Summary

In this section I have analyzed the problem, policy, and political streams in light of
advocacy coalition beliefs and strategies. I identified the trend of consistent inertia within the
education finance subsystem that resulted from the constraints formed by diversity of
demographics statewide in public schools and accountability mandates at both the state and
federal level. I also analyzed how this stasis was perpetuated by the conflicting problems,
identified by subsystem actors as inadequacy, inefficiency, inequity, and a deep distrust among
subsystem policy coalitions and actors. Next, I investigated the role of the policy experts and
identified how they affected subsystem actors’ interest by in education finance reforms by
aligning problems with viable solutions in the policy stream, positioning experts as influential to
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the theory of action behind what would become the LCFF. Finally, I dissected the motives and
opportunities of subsystem coalitions to both promote and veto change. Collectively, the analysis
of these three streams identifies pressures for change and conflict in coalition beliefs that
continued the system’s inertia, and considers the coalitions’ need for change.
A Window of Opportunity: Intervening Variables Effect

Figure 6.5. Window of Opportunity for Change
As Figure 6.5 demonstrates, the conjoined theoretical frames, as described in
Chapter 3, provide an opportunity for intervening variables or external shocks to promote
change. As Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009) explain, “external events or shocks
include broad changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, governing coalitions,
and other subsystems. External shocks can foster change in a subsystem by shifting and
augmenting resources, tipping the power of coalitions, and changing beliefs” (p. 124). In
California, two dramatic external variables of change emerged: the great recession (2007-
2009) and an election. The recession was an external shock that dramatically restricted
resources at the state level, which consequently further restricted funding at the local
level. Yet with accountability mandates and demographic diversity remaining as staples
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of the education landscape statewide, some at the state level were compelled to revisit
education finance reform options. Second, the election of a politically powerful governor,
Jerry Brown, who acted as policy entrepreneur, and who received advice from leading
voice in the policy expert coalition, helped push the LCFF to the front of the political
stage in the state.
The Great Recession

California education funding relies on revenue the state collects from income and sales
taxes, making schools dependent on steady economic growth, which does not occur every year in
California. In 2006, state education aid automatically increased by 11% as a result of growth in
statewide income (Kirst, 2007). Unfortunately, phases of growth are followed by episodes of
decline as a result of the same income tax dependence. In 2007, the global economic recession
contributed to a severe funding constriction in Californa’s revenue stream. On average,
California students were hit harder by the Great Recession than students in the rest of the
country. Since 2007–2008, inflation-adjusted average spending per pupil in the rest of the
country has declined by about 4% compared to 12% in California. As a result, California’s
average class size—already larger than the national average—has increased from 20.9 to 23.2,
while the average class size in the rest of the country has remained at around 15 students
(Weston, 2011a; 2011c).
The funding losses that resulted from the 2007 Great Recession led policymakers to make
significant cuts to K–16 education in California. As a result of those cuts, an expansive coalition
of education advocates, including the California School Boards Association, the Association of
California Administrators, the state Parent Teacher Association, the Campaign for Quality
Education, and lawyers for select low-income students, filed a lawsuit, Robles-Wong v.
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California in 2010. The suit claimed that California’s public school students have a
constitutional right to a quality education and that the state is violating that right by failing to
provide a rational, coherent funding system to support it (Ellson, 2012). That lawsuit was also a
political move designed to pressure the state legislature into moving to reform California’s
education finance system. A lawyer for the students involved in the lawsuit said he hoped the
lawsuit would push the governor and the legislature to action. Bill Koski, a lawyer for the
plaintiffs said, “essentially, there needs to be new politics” (Bush, 2010, p. 1). As the lawsuit
moved through the judicial system, the recession continued to constrict state revenues for
education.
Consequently, as revenues continued to decline in 2009, the legislature reduced
educational funding and temporarily combined 40 categoricals in reaction to the funding
constraints, not as a result of all policy actors believing that the districts would make the right
choices with the money (Fuller et al., 2011). A series of think tank and university policy studies
funded by foundation dollars investigated how districts allocated their Tier 3 funds. One main
finding from those studies was one that was referenced back in my interviews with
policymakers, that “responses from CFOs [chief financial officers] were consistent with the
general notion that districts were displaying ‘rationality on the ground’ in the face of declining
revenues and uncertainty over policy” (Fuller et al., 2011, p. xiv).

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Figure 6.6. Economic Recession Per Pupil Funding CA, NY, ID, and US 2008-2013.
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 Census of Governments: Finance—Survey of School
System Finances and 2008–2011, 2013 Annual Survey of School System Finances.

As Figure 6.6 demonstrates, California has struggled to fund its schools over time and the
recession has had a significant impact on that funding. Whereas the average spending overall
increased over the course of the recession, California lost ground. The per-pupil funding level
remained closer to that of Idaho, a state with very different demographics than California, while
a more demographically diverse state more closely alinged with California’s student
demographics (New York) continiued to almost double California’s per pupil spending. The
recession served as an external shock that pressured policymakers into allowing more flexibility
at the local level. Follow-up studies provided evidence to policymakers and interest groups of
5000
7000
9000
11000
13000
15000
17000
19000
21000
23000
25000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
California US New York Idaho
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rational
35
funding choices made at the local level, supporting the idea that more local control
over education funding was possible.
As part of the new Tier 3 funding flexibility, lawmakers had to extend the funding
flexibility annually or the funding would return to the categorical funding as prior law mandated.
This was one of the first large steps in California to increase local funding flexibility and shift
control from Sacramento to local school districts.
The Election of Policy Entrepreneurs

The election of policy entrepreneurs brought to the state government actors who were
willing to spend substantial policial capital to reframe the debate about education fianance
reforms and connect preexisting problems to policy solutions. When policy entrepreneuers are
elected, they exert qualities that push policy forward. Policy entrepreneurs possess four qualities:
defining problems, building teams, leading by example, and displaying social acuity (Kingdon,
1984, 2003; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Roberts & King, 1991). As Mintrom
(2000) argued, “they must imagine new possiblities and then take actions intended to support the
realization of those possiblities” (p. 106). The policy beliefs of the policy expert community,
whose influence is elevated after the election of a new governor, contributed viable solutions to
the identified problems of school funding contributing to the opening of the window of
opportunity as described by MSF. In the case of the LCFF in California, two policy
entrepreneurs not only returned the issues of weighted student funding and local control to the
policy agenda but also pushed them forward into law.

35
This study found that rational choices were based on the districts’ need to reallocate the funds away from
their initial purposes in order to maintain fiscal solvency and prevent layoffs.
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One policy entrepreneur was Democratic Governor Jerry Brown, elected in 2010 on a
platform that included reforming education. He swept into office along with a Democratic
supermajority
36
in the state legislature. When Governor Brown was sworn into office, he was
committed to decreasing the $13 billion state budget, increasing funding for California schools,
returning authority to local cities, counties, and schools, and opposing tax increases. Governor
Brown also eliminated the position of education secretary and dismissed seven members of the
state education board—some who represented prominent organizations in the education reform
movement—and replaced them with former school superintendents, a teachers’ union activist,
and policy entrepreneurs. One of those entrepreneurs was Michael Kirst, a Stanford University
education professor who had been a former federal advisor on education, a California State
Board of Education member, and author of many academic articles including the GDTF series
advocating for weighted student funding and local control over education finance (Bersin et al.,
2008).
In 1974, when Brown ran for office the first time, he reached out to Kirst to serve as
candidate Brown’s adviser. According to Kirst, “he [Jerry Brown] had face-to-face debates at
that time on Serrano,” and Kirst was hired to advise him, which led to Kirst’s 1975 appointment
to the State Board of Education. After Brown left office he continued to consult with Kirst. As
Kirst explained,
We’ve worked together over all these years, including when he was Mayor of
Oakland. When he got around to running for governor we had a long chat about
what his platform would be, and I brought this up in July 2010, and he agreed and
said, “I really want to pursue this.” He understood the finance program very well

36
A supermajority in this case means that the same political party (in this case, Democrats), holds two -
thirds of both houses of the state legislature. In some cases, a two-thirds majority is required to vote for a proposal in
order for it to be considered as approved. In California, this is necessary for the legislature to pass the state budget.
144

as Mayor of Oakland. Not very well in all the details, but the concepts. That’s
how it happened. It got in his platform and then he turned it over to me and his
finance department to refine it once he was elected.

When Brown decided to run again for governor in 2010, the two discussed Brown’s potential
platform, and they agreed that the ideas documented in the Bersin et al. (2008) paper of weighted
student funding and shifting control over more of the budget to local districts were ideas they
wanted to pursue. Confirming this committment in his 2012 state of the state address, Brown
said,
My budget proposes to replace categorical programs with a new weighted student
formula that provides a basic level of funding with additional money for
disadvantaged students and those struggling to learn English. This will give more
authority to local school districts to fashion the kind of programs they see their
students need. It will also create transparency, reduce bureaucracy, and simplify
complex funding streams (p. 2).

Additionally, Kirst argued that pursuing local control had a political benefit since one of
LCFF’s political goals was to push politics down to the local level. He explained the rationale for
that shift: “the politics in Sacramento favor those who can play the game in Sacramento. We felt
what we want to do over the long run is reverse the politics and build it bottom up, rather than
elite poltics from the top down.” The ideas of weighted student funding and local control married
both practical and political ideals. With Kirst in the role of president of the state school board
and Brown as governor, the two had the opportunity to bring the ideas of weighted student
funding and subsidiarity to the policy agenda. As previously documented, many governors have
discussed education as an issue and proposed reforms to education finance, but on this issue
Governor Brown was unique. To pass the law known as the LCFF required more than just a
popular governor and a well-positioned state board president with a well-conceived platform to
get the policy passed; it took venue shopping, reframing, civic action, support from the
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foundation community, and compromise with differing coalitions to gain enough support to
reshape the proposal into law.
The Foundation Community: A Provisor of Resources for Change

Whereas the recession and the election served as catapults toward disruption of the status
quo in California’s education finance sytem, a third less visible, but still essential, contributor
toward reform emerged: the foundation community. As described below, the foundation
community’s longstanding support for finance reforms as prescribed by the Bersin, Kirst, and
Liu (2008) paper contributed to elevating these ideas to the policy sphere. Yet many foundation
leaders doubted the reforms would become law. Despite their doubts, they continued to fund
policy expert coalition research that interrogated the integrity of the options as proposed in the
Bersin, Krist, and Liu (2008) paper (Rose, Sonstelie, & Weston, 2010; Weston, 2010), as well as
policy expert research that investigated the implementation of the Tier 3 reforms and that
positively influenced state lawmakers around the the issue of lack of trust in local leaders
(Fullert, et al., 2010; Imazeki, 2011, 2012; Stecher, et al., 2012).
As discussed previously, multiple foundatons supported the 2005 GDTF series.
37
At the
same time, foundations also supported independent research that contributed to the governor’s
Committee on Education Excellence, which found, among other things, that finance reforms,
including weighted student funding, greater local control over funding allocation decisions, and
more transparency, would benefit students (Brewer & Smith, 2006; Loeb et al., 2007; Putnam-
Walkerly & Russell, 2014). According to the foundations that supported those projects, “the

37
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the James Irvine
Foundation, and the Stuart Foundation.

146

impact of the economic recession and the absence of political will made it [passage of weighted
student funding and local control] impossible at that time” (Putnam-Walkerly & Russell, 2014).
Although the proposals did not move forward, many foundations remained committed to
the ideas. In an interview, one foundation executive explained that he spoke with many district
leaders and “there was a constant theme of people within districts trying to make a difference,
they would run up against these bizzare rules.” This experience led him to engage with the
research community to “learn more about how education was financed in California.” As a result
he “started talking to people about what can we do to try to have some sort of positive impact on
this?” He initially felt that Foundation leaders believed that, politically, it seemed unlikely that
these reforms could take place: “a lot of other folks had been working on this for decades to try
to fix it, it was like, ‘yeah, go ahead.’” According to foundation reports, that concern over the
way in which schools were funded manifest itself in the funding of studies such as the Tier 3
study (discussed above) by foundations (Putnam-Walker & Russell, 2014). Foundations funded
research on public opinion about the ideas contained in the Bersin et al. (2008) paper, and the
development of education finance models that reflected those reforms (Putnam-Walker &
Russell, 2014). In 2012, when the governor proposed education finance reform based on
weighted student funding and local control, many policy experts and issue interest coalitions,
supported by foundations, had been studying and writing about that idea for decades and were,
therefore, supportive. These ideas provided a base for the issue interest coalition to shift their
support from differentiated funding through categorical allocations as the only mechanism to
fund students with diffent needs, to supporting the idea of weighted student funding given the
opportunity for the right weights to be added for the right subgroup of students. Who those
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students were and what that funding amount should be was still part of the debate, but the
coalition policy expert and issue interest beliefs began to align.
Coalitions respond. Conversely, a loose coalition of groups developed that did not
support the governor’s original 2012 plan. The first group comprised wealthy districts that
perceived the concept as a redistribution of funds in which they would lose (Putnam-Walkerly &
Russell, 2014). The second group was the CTA. As the CTA spokesman explained,
We need adequate funding of our schools, and this legislation does not provide it. It
doesn’t give us the basic resources that we need in our schools to ensure that any
transformation (in school funding) is a positive one, that each student has a qualified
teacher, all schools are safe and clean, and all students have up to date instructional
materials. All those things should be in place before we can support any major reform
(Freedberg, 2011, p. 2).

Remaining dedicated to their core and policy beliefs of adequate funding, the CTA did not
support the governor’s 2012 proposal. The third group comprised the issue interest coalition
members who supported differentiated funding streams. Those organizations argued that without
state mandates to spend tax dollars on categorical programs, the essential categorical programs
would cease to exist. The fourth group that did not support the original 2012 proposal was the
California legislature, many of whom believed first that the Governor’s reform proposal was
based on too much trust in local districts. Many legislative leaders felt that the districts should be
required to spend the additonal funds provided to targeted students directly on programs for
those students. As one legislative leader explained,
basically, the legislative Democrats and the governor about to what extent should
school districts to be compelled to spend some or all of the supplemental
concentration grants on students that generated the money. Largely, legislative
democratic caucuses thought that’s what the money was for and should all be
spent on that. The administration said, “Oh, no, no; principal of subsidiarity and
they should have flexibility and control and all of that sort of jazz.

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Second, many legisative representatives believed the proposal diminished their its role in
education finance. According to one administration official, “I think the goals [of the LCFF] are
very lofty to me. Categoricals and the concept of us [state policymakers] setting a state agenda
for what education is, those two seem like they work for me. I think the state does have a unique
role at a higher level.” With the lack of support from so many interest groups and the limited
time the governor had to create a political coalition to support the 2012 reform proposal, it died
in committee. Yet the coalition of supporters, including the govenor, the members of the State
Board of Education, and the foundations, reassessed after the failed 2012 attempt.
Policy Course Correction: The LCFF and Coalition Unification

After 2012, the governor’s office reframed and redefined the education fiance reform and
negotiated with opponents to build teams of support. As Table 6.1 illustrates, in 2012, two
coalitions supported the governor’s proposal to reform education finance, with differing beliefs
about what the problems were in the exisiting system and what should be the solutions to those
problems.

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Table 6.1.
Coalition beliefs, 2012.
Coalition A
Supporters of weighted student funding and
local control beliefs about California
education finance
Coalition B
Those opposed to weighted student funding
and local control beliefs about California
education finance
 Policy Belief: Inequitable system.

 Causes of Problems: Categoricals create an
inefficient system.


Solution Position in 2012: Let the people
decide: Discussions about how to allocate
funding should take place locally. (They have
a locally elected school board.)

Members: Local District Leaders and Policy
Experts
 Policy Belief: Inequitable system.

 Causes of Problems: Ineffiencies are
protections for districts and students with
additional needs.

 Solution Position in 2012: The state must
mandate: Discussions about how to allocate
funding should take place at the state level.
(They are responsible for education and must
ensure compliance with federal and judicial
mandates.) The state must increase funds
before we can move ahead with other
reforms.

 Members: Labor and Issue Interest Groups

Although the coalitions disagreed about efficiencies and control (shown in Table 6.1),
they agreed that the system was inequitable. Addressing that inequity was at the heart of the
GDTF Bersin et al. (2008) paper and, according to a staffer in the governor’s office, the original
proposal was based “almost entirely” on that paper. Once the proposal was released, the staff
member explained, “of course as soon as we put it out there, we started getting feedback.” Some
of the coalition members who did not support the ideas articulated in the original 2012 proposal
began contacting the administration expressing their dislike of the governor’s plan to restructure
California’s education finance system. At the time, overall education funding remained
significantly diminished as a result of the global economic recession, and those opposed to the
proposal argued that “it was rearranging the seats on the Titanic” (Iverson, 2012). As a result, the
administration and coalition supporters opened discussion and debate about the ideas within the
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policy proposal. There were objections from leading groups such as the CTA who wanted to
exclude certain categoricals from the new funding model, but ultimately the CTA’s concern was
the lack of adequate funding. CTA President Eric Heins argued that “it is unfair to our students
to have this academic discussion when we really don’t have enough money in our schools”
(Iverson, 2012).
Although a coalition opposed the governor’s proposal, public opinion surveys indicated
that a majority of Californians (52%) agreed that the state should provide additional resources to
schools that educate large percentages of economically disadvantaged children, while only 26%
disagreed (Brewer, Plank, & Hall, 2012). Those surveys, along with others conducted by the
PPIC,
38
demonstrated to those in the governor’s administration—and to the governor himself—
that public opinion regarding who should control funding decisions was on his side when it came
to his plan to reform the education finance system.

38
The PPIC has conducted over 20 public opinion polls of voters’ perspectives on education issues.
151

Figure 6.7. Public Support for who should control education funding choices.
Data Source: PPIC public opinion polls 2005–2012.

As an aide to the governor explained, “this was extraordinarily important to the governor. He
knew the people believed in it [disproportionate funding for students with additional needs and
local control]. The recesssion changed everything.” According to the governor’s staff, “some
comfort level with local control” resulted from the prior relaxing of categorical constraints that
was instituted as a result of the recession. The governor’s office moved forward with the
proposal.
In 2007, before the recession, the majority of the California public believed that
inadequate parenting, rather than low levels of school funding, was more likely the cause
education problems (Kirst, 2007). By 2012, California was spending $60 billion for K–12
education and the majority of the public believed that local public schools wasted substantial
amounts of money (Brewer, Plank, & Hall, 2012). Brown, however, identified and advocated
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
District
Schools *
State
152

that a lack of revenue was a serious problem for California education. He included a funding
increase for education in his gubernatorial platform in 2011. This proposal included an increase
in revenue through both sales and income taxes designed to raise approximately $6 billion for
California education (Brown, 2011; 2012).
Although the issue interest groups and the policy experts began to coalesce around shared
beliefs that students with different needs could receive additional funds through other
mechanisms besides categorical funding, the labor interest coalition continued to support their
belief that the system was inadequately funded, and that they would not support reforms that did
not first address this issue.
Coalition Unification and Proposition 30. As the policy entrepreneurs—with the
support of the policy experts, district leadership, and issue interest coalitions—continued to push
for the passage of the LCFF, some lawmakers and the labor interest coalition resisted the reform
based on their belief that the system was inadequate. The governor began to advocate for
improved financial conditions for school budgets (addressing inadequacy) through public
initiative Proposition 30 (P30). The Temporary Taxes to Fund Education initiative, known as
Proposition 30, was an initiative passed in 2012 that increased personal income taxes over seven
years for California residents earning over $250,000 and increased state sales tax by 0.25% over
four years (January 2013- December 2016).
Even though policymakers and many policy shapers in the education community did not
immediately welcome his weighted student funding proposal, they did support P30. The
governor framed the initiative as a safety net, a way to keep education from taking more
financial cuts (Brown, 2013). The campaign for P30 raised $67.1 million, the top contributor
being the CTA at $11.4 million (California Secretary of State, 2013). There were other similar
153

proposals on the ballot, so the governor negotiated with the other proposition coalition leaders to
combine elements of their proposals and bring the coalitions together to support P30. In the end,
the November 6, 2012 California ballot listed two competing tax initiatives to increase funding
for schools. With 55% of voters favoring P30, it became law. According to a local district union
steward, “the governor created a strong coalition of support for Proposition 30, including
bringing in the CTA to help organize local unions to support the initiative and create phone trees
staffed by California teachers to get out the vote in support of P30.” The governor also
personally stumped for P30, which many analysts argued was what made the difference between
passage and failure (Fallows, 2013). The passage of P30 prevented an additional $6 billion in
education cuts to schools and colleges and was expected to generate $47 billion for education
(Jimenez, 2016).
The governor raised substantial political capital from the passage of P30, which he
applied to push his weighted student funding and local control solutions forward. As one
foundation leader explained,
Under the Governor’s leadership, the devastating education budget cuts have
stopped. Looking forward, Governor Brown has a vision for school funding that
corrects inequities, reduces complex regulations, and engages local communities.
We applaud the Governor’s vision and commitment to providing all children a
good education (Wunderman, 2013, p.1).

A state policymaker explained how the passage of P30 affected the governor’s political capital
going forward.
[P30] also gave the governor a lot of political wind at his back. He championed
the thing, he got it done. He got revenue, he got everybody to come on board from
Prop 30, and then everyone was grateful for that. He got that done, so he had a lot
of political capital coming off that victory, and heading straight into the January.
Then you actually had budget projections that would say, when we talk about
being able to hold people harmless, and we talk about implementing this in the
coming eight years, that’s feasible.

154

This analysis of the governor’s favorability rating after the passage of P30 is also reflected in his
public approval ratings, which, according to a Field Poll, was 46% favorable in the end of 2012
and took an 11-point jump to 57% in early 2013 (DiCamillo & Field, 2013). These favorability
ratings contributed to the political capital the governor had to spend to get the LCFF passed into
law. Coalitions agreed that the governor benefited politically as a result of P30 passing. As one
issue interest group leader explained, “he [the governor] was riding a powerful wave and the
membership also understood the politics of that.” One legislative actor put it this way, “without
Prop 30, I don’t know that any of it would have been possible.” A subgroup coalition leader
supported this statement, arguing, “if Prop 30 doesn’t pass, this is all off the table.”
Yet another financial shift was occurring simultaneously: increased tax revenues from an
improving California economy. Therefore, the influence from P30 may be more nuanced. As one
policy actor described,
Well, it’s a combination of whether we need Prop 30 and it was also the recession
ending. Silicon Valley starts making money, we’re getting more money to tax.
Then Prop 98 starts getting flush because there was more tax revenue at large.
Then you add Prop 30 on top of it. Then you really have enough to do it
[redistribution of education finance].

Whereas the governor’s commitment to the passage of weighted student funding was strong in
2012, with the passage of P30 he publicly reintroduced and reframed the policy and dedicated
himself to its passage. As one foundation leader argued,
It [the LCFF] could not have happened without Prop 30, because after that we were able
to say, at least in dollar numbers, no district is going to have a reduction in what they get
below what they’re currently getting. That was a compelling argument.

No longer perceived as simply rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, the reform policy
could move forward. Behind the scenes, the coalition of supporters for weighted student funding
organized during the time of the P30 campaign began negotiating with opponents of the
155

proposal. More importantly, the majority of those opponents were supporters of the governor’s
P30 proposal. With P30 secured, the governor had “stopped the bleeding,” said one advocate,
and he could begin moving forward in discussions about weighted student funding.
In 2012, even though the supporters of weighted student funding did not spend time
building a coalition of support, they did hire a firm to help organize civil justice groups.
However, as one foundation leader explained, “that community, I think it’s not that influential. It
wasn’t influential enough to carry it.” In 2013, the coalition in support of weighted student
funding was committed to the ideals of the law and acted more pragmatically to broaden its base
and build a more a powerful coalition of support for the LCFF. As one representative for the
administration explained,
I think the other thing that was going on at this same time is that we were kind of
building a coaliton around supporting it, which included Children Now and the
ACLU and, certainly, we had brought the CTA into that coalition by making
some adjustments to the principally K–3 add-on. We’re building a coaliton like
that and, in order to build that coalition, we’d need to address concerns in the civil
rights community, around ensuring that the supplemental and concentration grant
dollars generate the benefits for the students that in the districts that they were
getting significant amounts of money. The accounability issue started entering the
discussion at this point and time.

As a result, the administration worked to forge a conjoining of Coalitions A and B, described in
Figure 6.7 above, to form a broad enough coaliton to push the reform through the legisature. As
one policymaker involved in the negotiations explained, “it is one of the governor’s great
strengths that he listened to those concerned about the proposal and made changes.” Some of the
changes included the addition of a more detailed accountability component at the legislature’s
156

request, the addition of a weight
39
for foster youth (FY), and the removal of transportation
dollars from the block grant at the request of those districts that received those dollars.
The accountability component added to the new proposal (known as LCFF) had been left
completely out of the original 2012 proposal. This element of the reform was designed to
promote the local allocation of dollars to the students identified by the proposal as being in need
of additional funds: FRPL, EL and, FY. Coalition B, which included organizations and actors
who support students with additional needs, perceived a loophole in LCFF: that it contained no
mandate that the increased dollars the district would receive be spent on students with those
needs. Also, there was no specific mandate to engage the broader community in devising the
ways in which the provisions of education would be conducted locally. As an issue interest
coalition leader explained,
Again, that critical mass of individuals in either the third house
40
organizations
that are very active in civil rights for students and so on, it was very difficult to
continue the discussion, because without support the members are going,
everybody else wants it. What are we going to do? We had to come back to that
and continue to remind them, “hey, we still need these measure of accountability
to ensure as it moves forward we’re getting the product we want.”

As a result, State Board of Education representatives and legislative leaders worked closely with
the administration to design an accountability component to the LCFF that would bring the issue
interest groups and a wider group of legislators to the coalition of supporters. This was done by
creating the accountability component of the LCFF that includes a Local Control Accountability
Plan (LCAP), which at the time, was designed to address the previously described problem of

39
The proposal of weighted student funding provides additional funds for specific categories of students. In
California’s case, the original proposal included weights for low-income students and English learners. In the second
2013 proposal for the LCFF, foster youth were added to the bill as a group that would receive additional funding.
40
Lobbyists may be referred to as the third house of the Legislature because of their formidable influence.
157

lack of trust in the local districts. The LCAP is a formal document to be completed by each local
education agency in consultation with their community and with the approval of their governing
board. The document describes the annual goals to be achieved for each student group and each
state priority. The LCAP should also explain the annual services, expenditures, and anticipated
progress that the district expects to achieve for each student group (WestED, 2016), creating an
accountability connection between funds and targeted students. As one administration
representative explained, “we ended up in this process, and [a policy leader] came up with this
idea of having this local accountability plan with the state priority areas and all of that. That
seemed to thread that needle. That came out in this spring process, all [the] accountability stuff.”
By adding in the accountability portion, the administration was able to address the problem of a
lack of trust by placing some mandates over how funds are allocated by the district for which the
community, the County Office of Educations, and the state may hold districts accountable.
Politically, this helped the governor solidify his coalition of supporters for the reform and move
on to the second issue that held up the initial proposal: funding.
P30 expanded the coalition of support. While the additional funds provided from an
increasing budget and P30 improved adequacy concerns of coalitions, the funding distribution in
the proposed LCFF did not solve all of the adequacy concerns. Within the district leadership
coalition and the legislators that represent them, there was a disagreement that P30 and the
increasing budget would ensure adequacy for their districts. Without this coalition’s support, the
reform would not pass. Ensuring adequacy statewide was the final key to bringing together the
policy beliefs of all four coalitions in support of this policy reform to ultimately push it from the
agenda to passage.
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As described in the problem section of this chapter, funding levels in California were
dismal before the recession. After the recession began to wane, funding was still far below the
level it had been before the recession, and with the governor’s proposal to shift dollars toward
students with additional needs, districts whose student base was more well heeled would not
benefit from the new funding formula. Assemblywoman Joan Buchanan (D-Alamo), who was
the head of the Education Committee during the LCFF debates, said that, except for the
wealthiest districts, “most suburban schools would end up being losers.” She added, “the people
I represent fully agree that at-risk children need more money. They just want to be assured that
there’s adequate funding for their children” (Skelton, 2013, p. 1). As one state senate staffer that
participated in the negotiations offered, this [the base level of funding for all students] was the
starting point for the negotiations: “what would be an equitable base amount by which all kids to
get funded? It was just these thematically challenging issues on which we needed more
discussion.” Needing wider support from the legislators representing wealthier districts, the
administration began to negotiate the funding amounts with policy and district leaders. What
they wound up with was a compromise between providing additional funds for FRLP, EL, and
FY students with the concentration grant amount for districts with over 55% of students that
qualify for one or more of those additional needs categories, and a high enough base amount for
all students so that no district would lose money after the law was passed.
Simultaneously, the governor received support from the foundation community that
provided resources to hire a marketing group that came up with the title of the policy, the Local
Control Funding Formula, and helped fund nonprofit groups such as Children Now to coordinate
the nonprofit community’s support of the legislation. When the LCFF was reintroduced in 2013,
it had a new name, was a more comprehensive piece of legislation, and had a powerful and
159

broader coalition
41
of support. As one policy actor argued, “I think the opposition didn’t really
know what hit them.” Building a larger coalition of support and continuing to use the strategy of
the budget venue instead of the policy system granted those opposed to the policy little time to
deny passage of the LCFF.
Venue shopping. While the governor’s position is powerful in California, and Governor
Brown had the capital to spend in 2013, he made a strategic move to keep the LCFF as part of
his budget proposal instead of allowing it to go through the policy process. As one legislative
representative explained, “now, remember, the governor did this in the budget in both years.
[The] budget process in and of itself does not lead to robust discussion in a policy venue. It’s
disconnected from the policy venue. That’s what he [the governor] wants.” Many legislators
tried unsuccessfully to convince the governor to change the venue. As the same legislative
representative went on to explain,
What we did was said, ok, were going to put your bill in a policy vehicle. He didn’t want
to put his bill in a policy vehicle. We encouraged him in the beginning of the year to do
that. They [the administration] resisted for whatever reasons and they decided to go
thought the budget process.

41
California NAACP President Alice Huffman, Education Trust-West Executive Director Arun
Ramanathan, California Endowment Senior Vice President Daniel Zingale, Bay Area Council President and CEO
Jim Wunderman, Sacramento Metro Chamber President and CEO Roger Niello, ACLU Southern California
Executive Director Hector Villagra, EdVoice President and CEO Bill Lucia, LA Chamber of Commerce Senior Vice
President of Education and Workforce Development David Rattray, Silicon Valley Leadership Group Senior Vice
President Dennis Cima, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Legislative Staff Attorney
Jeannette Zanipatin, San Francisco Chamber of Commerce Senior Vice President Jim Lazarus, Public Advocates
Inc. Managing Attorney John Affeldt, Latino Community Foundation Executive Director Raquel Donoso, Children
Now President Ted Lempert, and California Asian Pacific Chamber of Commerce Director of Membership and
Business Development Julian Canete.

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The legislature even pushed the issue by passing a bill in 2012 that would have created a
committee to study the governor’s ideas, and Brown promptly vetoed the bill with the message,
“I agree that California’s complex school finance laws need urgent attention. Creating a task
force, however, may actually delay action on reforms. Rather than create a task force, let’s work
together and craft a fair weighted student formula” (Brown, 2012). When he reintroduced the
LCFF in 2013, he left the LCFF proposal that included weighted student funding, local control,
and accountability reforms in the budget (where the governor’s Democratic Party retained a
supermajority), thereby skipping the lengthy policy committee hearing process and expediting
the time for the LCFF to become law.
Framing the debate. Almost no alliances formed against Brown’s LCFF once he
unveiled his plan in 2013—with the exception of wealthier school districts and a few who
believed the formula did not go far enough to provide equity. In 2012, when the governor
initially introduced his education reform, he originally framed it as a governance reform that
could serve as a tool to improve achievement, equity, and efficiency. This more traditional
framing of the issue did not attract substantial support or attention. The governor reintroduced
the policy proposal as a social justice issue. In his 2013 state of the state address, Brown argued
for the LCFF this way: “equal treatment for children in unequal situations is not justice” and “we
have a funding system that is overly complex, bureaucratically driven, and deeply inequitable.
That is the state of affairs today” (Brown, 2013, para. 34). Brown reframed both local control
and weighted student funding as a provision of equity—redefined as differential allocations
based on need instead of the same funding: “he [the governor] set the issue up in a way that if
you didn’t agree with the proposal you were either a racist, a classist, or both,” said one policy
actor. During the time that the LCFF was awaiting passage in the legislature, the Budget
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Committee held hearings on the proposals. Members of issue interest groups, supported in part
by foundation funding, turned out for those hearings by the hundreds, bringing students with
them to demonstrate their support for the proposal. Conversely, those who could potentially lose
funding as a result of the LCFF attacked the proposal both on its merit and the truncated debate
that resulted from the placement of the proposal in the budget process as opposed to the policy
process (as described in the venue shopping section). Representative Joan Buchanan asked, “re-
arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic
42
doesn’t keep the ship from sinking . . . Why do we
need to push through something in a couple of months that is going to affect education for
decades to come?” As one policy actor explained, the administration negotiated up until the last
minute to address adequacy with a formula that would provide a funding base that would ensure
that no district lost money and would provide additional funds for the three weighted
categories—low income, English learners, and foster youth—and concentration funds.
43

Although only the year before Governor Brown had failed to pass weighted student funding, an
overwhelming majority of lawmakers passed his proposal to reform the California funding
system in 2013. The Senate approved the budget bill 28–10, and the Assembly passed the budget
bill 54–25.
Conclusion

This chapter answers the question of what problems were identified that a new education
finance reform policy would solve. Four main problems in the policy stream were identified:
inadequacy, inefficacy, inequity, and the opaque nature of education finance. The Advocacy

42
Many subsystem actors referenced this same metaphor to the Titanic.
43
Concentration funds are grants equal to 50 percent of the adjusted base grant multiplied by Average
Daily Attendance and the percentage of targeted pupils exceeding 55 percent of a local educational agency’s (LEA)
enrollment.
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coalitions identified in Chapter 5 were then linked with their policy beliefs about the problems in
the education finance subsystem prior to the enactment of the LCFF. Next, the policy and
politics stream were identified, including the internal and external pressures that drove these
policy reforms, such as the recession, the election, and a change in belief as a result of an
experiment allowing districts to try out decentralization to see if it could work in the future. In
the policy stream, the policy expert coalition provided a clearly framed argument that identified
beliefs regarding inequity, inefficiency, and the lack of clarity in the funding may be addressed
through weighted student funding, local control, and geographically based funding. The policy
experts also provided evidence for the potential positive outcomes from these reforms based on a
temporary experiment that provided more flexibility and local control to the districts that was
successful. Building on the contextual policy factors and coalition beliefs discussed in Chapter 5
that shaped the policymaking landscape, this chapter next identified the link between coalition
beliefs and identified problems, and the politics that contributed to the pressures that furthered
the decision to bring the LCFF to the agenda and its resulting legislative passage. This chapter
then discussed policymaking dynamics, including policy reframing, spending of political capital,
and the significant support of the policy expert coalition and the foundation community that
allowed the entrepreneurs, in their window of opportunity, to propel the ideas contained within
this mandate into law. Finally, this chapter concluded with identification of factors that
contributed the passage of the LCFF. Taken together, this chapter identified the intricate
relationship between problem identification, policy proposal, and politics, on the one hand, and
the coalitions’ policy beliefs and strategies of coalitions used to promote those beliefs, on the
other. In the following chapter, I will provide conclusions, discussions, implications for policy
and practice, and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study extends knowledge in the area of state education policy making and school
finance reform by examining the policy making process that led to California’s passage of the
Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF). This research, grounded in political theory, had two
major purposes: first, to explain a case of statewide policy making within the realm of school
finance reform and, second, to test the utility of conjoining the multiple streams framework
(MSF) and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) for explaining state-level policy making.
With these goals in mind, this case study explored how key advocacy coalitions utilized differing
strategies to promote their policy beliefs within the education finance subsystem and how policy
entrepreneurs took advantage of a window of opportunity to promote reform. It explains how
both came together to impact the passage of the LCFF. I present the findings of the case study of
the state policy-making process that resulted in the passage of the LCFF and answer the research
question by investigating:
a. How did internal and external pressures influence this choice?
b. What problem(s) were identified that a new policy would solve?
c. Who/what were the actors, actions, goals, and beliefs?
d. How did all of these variables combine to influence passage of the LCCF?
This chapter will provide a discussion of key contributions of this dissertation,
implications for researchers and policymakers interested in education finance policy, and
suggestions for future research.
Contributions of this Study
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My dissertation informs our understanding of state policymaking and extends extant
policy research and theory in five important ways: 1) identifying the powerful role of policy
experts in contributing to policy change; 2) extending our understanding of the role of activist
governors; 3) demonstrating the value of combining ACF with MSF frameworks to provide a
deeper understanding of the politics of state policymaking; 4) expanding conceptions of policy
learning; and 5) broadening the application of MSF theory beyond agendizing issues. Below I
describe each of these contributions in more detail.
Increasing Role of Policy Experts. Similar to prior research, this investigation identifies
researchers and foundations as powerful influences on policymakers and policy making
(Reckhow, 2012; Scott, Lubienski, & Debray-Pelot, 2009; Stone, 1996). As illustrated in Chapter
Six, policy expert research helped to diminish the strength of contextual variables that had long
perpetuated policy inertia in two ways. First, it framed subsystem problems such as inequity,
inefficiency, and incoherence as ones that may be addressed with publicly acceptable policy
solutions. Those solutions included weighted student funding, decentralization, and simplified
funding streams. As demonstrated in the opinion data, the public generally supports the use of
these solutions to fix the problems of education finance as identified by policy experts.
The second way policy experts contributed to moving education finance reform forward
was through the active engagement and distribution of research in the subsystem over time,
which is consistent with prior evidence on the central role scientific actors play in policy change
within an adversarial subsystem (Ingold & Gschwend, 2014). Additionally, multiple key
policymakers referenced the Tier 3 study published by policy experts Fuller et al. (2011) and
Stecher et al. (2012) and indicated that that study helped diminish state policymakers’ fear and
lack of trust in local educators to allocate scarce fiscal resources. These policy expert studies
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along with a series of published works out of the PPIC and other policy expert groups
contributed to promoting change. These findings are broadly aligned with Crow (2010), who
found that policy experts have lower barriers to entry into the policy process due to their
expertise and the trust placed in them by decision makers.
My findings also support those of Hall (1993); Houlihan (2005); Meltsner (1976); Wieble
(2005); and Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier (2010), who found that policy experts played a
significant role in influencing policymakers’ beliefs about what problems were in the education
finance subsystem and promoting their problem solutions through both traditional mechanisms
of academic and policy publications and policy testimony. This study also expands on extant
research by identifying the importance of policy expert research through the identification,
substantiation, and publication of politically and economically viable solutions to existing
problems in the education finance subsystem. As such, this study finds that the policy expert
coalition uniquely contributed to the “primeval soup” of the policy stream by providing scientific
evidence to support a policy solution to education problems (Kingdon, 2003, p. 116). Case study
interviewees, document analysis, and observation data together provided evidence of the
powerful role that published policy expert analysis played in lowering policymaker distrust of
local districts as well as defining policy problems and providing viable solutions through
published findings. These findings are also consistent with previous research (Bourdeaux, 2008;
Levidow & Carr, 2007), which noted that policy experts are perceived as influential in the
subsystem when the issues are complex and technical, as they were in California’s education
finance subsystem.
Consistent with prior research (Ingold & Gschwend, 2014), I also find that policy experts
play the role of external knowledge providers and may also become embedded in the process and
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fully participate in policy making. Mike Kirst, who at first was a member of the policy expert
coalition and then became a policy entrepreneur, illustrates the most obvious case of this.
Because of his firm establishment as an education finance policy expert and his four-decade
relationship advising the governor on education policy, Kirst was trusted by the governor to put
his [Governor Brown’s] substantial political capital behind promoting Kirst’s policy solutions.
This raised the profile of the policy expert coalition and shifted Kirst into the role of policy
entrepreneur in effecting change in the education finance subsystem.
Activist governors in policymaking. My findings extend our understanding of the role
of activist governors by finding that when Governor Brown took advantage of an open policy
window, the resulting policies decreased the power of the state—a finding that broadly
contradicts prior research. According to past studies, when activist governors promote change
when the policy streams converge the resulting policies often increase the power of the state
(Carr & Furman, 1999; Folwer, 1994; Gittel & Mckenna, 1999; Young, Shepley, & Song, 2010).
My research indicates that Governor Brown was an activist policy entrepreneur who pursued his
personal philosophic belief in subsidiarity and his political ideals of equity through policy
reform. He did this by basing his policy proposal on policy expert findings, engaging with
coalitions’ policy beliefs, reframing the problems and solutions in his policy proposal, and
building and expending his own political capital to ensure that the policy became law. This
governor addressed the labor coalitions’ belief in inadequacy by proposing the public initiative,
P30, which would halt funding cuts in education. He also personally supported and promoted the
law’s passage, engaging with the issue interest coalition and the district leader coalition to amend
his policy to include accountability measures over local spending and ensure that all districts
were held harmless. Finally, the governor reframed the debate to address the policy beliefs of
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issue interest groups regarding inequities in education by arguing that his reform was a social
justice proposal, proclaiming that “equal treatment for children in unequal situations is not
justice” (Brown, 2013). In the end, this law did not increase the power of the state government
but rather diminished it. In the governor’s own words, the LCFF was designed to increase the
power of local governments by “cutting categorical programs and putting maximum authority
and discretion back at the local level—with school boards” (2013).
Combining the two frameworks. This case study demonstrates that Kingdon’s multiple
streams framework (1984; 2003) and Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier’s advocacy coalition
framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier, 1998) on their own are each
necessary, but conjoined are sufficient to explain the case of the politics of policymaking in the
LCFF. One important outcome of the dissertation is evidence that the application of a hybrid of
ACF with MSF provides the researcher a systematic way to identify and understand more
essential elements of the complex process of state policymaking. Further, the conjoined theories
provided an opportunity to analyze the state policy-making process by adopting a top-down
(policy entrepreneur) approach with a bottom-up (coalition) approach when investigating the
impact of policy expert knowledge and influence in decision-making.
The MSF rests on three parallel streams within the policy-making environment:
problems, policy, and politics. Kingdon maintained that when the three streams joined at critical
moments, they would constitute a policy window. The coupling of streams is determined by the
presence of policy windows and the actions of policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are
actors who introduce and promote their ideas or beliefs on many occasions, investing time and
energy to increase their chances of getting an idea placed on the decision-making agenda
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(Kingdon, 1984). They are active in both the problem and the policy streams and they must act
quickly when the policy window opens or they will lose the opportunity (Zahariadis, 2007).
The ACF views the policy-making process as a competition between coalitions of actors
who advocate beliefs about policy problems and solutions. This competition takes place within
policy subsystems, wherein a set of actors is actively concerned with an issue and regularly seeks
to influence public policy based on their beliefs. This case study focused on the state education
finance policy beliefs of subsystem coalitions. This is because coalitions, the ACF argues, form
around beliefs, particularly around policy core beliefs. In order to realize the goals generated by
their beliefs, advocacy coalitions attempt to make government institutions behave in accordance
with their policy beliefs. In this, they are assumed to be instrumentally rational (i.e., using venues
provided by the constitutional structure through which they can efficiently exert their influence).
Much like Holihan and Green’s (2007) research, my study highlights the value of
conjoining the two frameworks and the importance of policy-oriented learning—a point
emphasized by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) in their presentation of ACF. As coalitions
shared and differed in their policy beliefs about problems in the education finance landscape, the
policy experts shaped those problems into politically viable policy solutions. These experts
effected change over time with a growing weight of evidence married to solutions to the
education finance problems identified by coalitions, which produced “relatively enduring
alterations of the . . . belief system of individuals or of collectivities (such as advocacy
coalitions)” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 42).
The application of ACF provided a deep understanding of what education finance
subsystem coalitions developed around policy beliefs in California. This understanding led to an
analysis of how subsystem actors strategized to promote their policy beliefs to effect change
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within the three streams as defined by the MSF. Applying the MSF allowed for investigating the
systems through which the coalitions operated to move their beliefs forward through the three
streams. The MSF also identifies the essential role of policy entrepreneurs, in this case the
governor and president of the state school board, who attached to a policy expert, provided
solutions to existing policy problems and took advantage of a window of opportunity to not only
agendize, but also pass a complete overhaul of education finance in the state. Taken together,
these two theoretical frames in this case also provided an opportunity to investigate how
institutional dynamics such as term limits and gubernatorial powers interact with the policy
beliefs of powerful coalitions to promote those beliefs into state law.
Although the evidence from this study provides support for the ACF, it is the MSF that
provides the systematic understanding of policy change. This case identifies an policy
entrepreneur, Mike Kirst’s role in multiple venues (policy expert coalition and policymaker as
the president of the state board of education) as crucial support for policy change. As Zahariadis
(1999) noted, “being a member of multiple arenas or institutional venues . . . helps entrepreneurs
skillfully move issues from one venue to another where success is more likely” (p. 84). Kirst,
having been a preeminent member of the policy expert community, a coauthor of the Bersin,
Kirst, and Liu (2008) paper, and a dedicated believer in local control and weighted student
funding, operated in the policy expert and the policymaker arenas as the president of the state
school board. Governor Brown had served in other positions in the state government including
eight years of prior experience as governor. Through the MSF framework, this study identified
the essential political savvy of the governor to astutely reposition the LCFF away from a more
traditional governance and economic issue to a civil rights issue. This study found that through
this reframing, the governor substantially diminished the power of the majority democratic
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legislature to refuse passage of the LCFF. Hence, employing the two theories together
contributed to understanding the roles of both the policy entrepreneurs and the policy expert
coalition in identifying and analyzing the juncture between the two as essential to the passage of
this education reform.
Expanding the who in policy learning. This study also contributes to a broader
conception of policy learning and who constitutes the “learner.” While the ACF asserts major
policy changes result from policy-oriented learning within a dominant advocacy coalition based
on a core set of values and beliefs, no dominant coalition changed their policy belief in the case
of LCFF. Instead in the final months prior to the passage of LCFF coalition actors’ beliefs were
addressed through negotiations and legislative solutions offered by the administration. It was the
majority of the public and policymakers that changed their policy beliefs over time, aligning with
the policy expert solutions to the education finance challenges. Additionally, by framing the
LCFF as a civil justice issue, the governor also promoted coalition negotiations by ensuring the
status quo was unacceptable. Finally, by placing the reform in the budget, the governor limited
access to the promotion of alternative policies to achieve coalition objectives. This finding is
consistent with Sabatier and Weible’s (2007) findings that when conditions are conducive to
negotiations, agreement between coalitions may occur. Specifically, the governor and his staff
negotiated directly with coalition leaders to address their concerns both within the LCFF and
through alternative policy mandates such as Proposition 30 (P30) as described in previous
chapters. As demonstrated in Chapter six, after the passage of P30, conditions for reform
changed as education funding was no longer in jeopardy of being cut. At that time, coalition
leaders began to negotiate with each other to unify into larger coalitions to support or oppose the
ideas in the LCFF.
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Further, coalitions pursued their objectives by negotiating with the administration and
each other. For example, the labor issue interest coalition whose policy belief was identified in
this study as inadequacy of school funding was partially addressed through the public initiative
system (P30). Rather than changing, the coalitions’ beliefs remained constant and were
addressed through the legislative process with the support of the governor. After the passage of
P30, the labor interest group began to support the passage of the Governor’s LCFF and adopted
the language of the policy experts, arguing that weighted student funding was beneficial for
students with additional needs. Yet, the labor issue coalition continued to ensure through
negotiations with the administration, that the LCFF funds would not be limited to direct spending
for LCFF identified students, but would be more flexible to cover costs at the district level. The
issue interest coalitions’ policy beliefs about inequity were addressed in some ways by the LCFF
mandates for weighted student funding, but their mistrust of local district leaders endured
without specific mandates that tied students to dollars. Consequently, this leaves the conflict over
this issue open to future policy debates. District leadership and policy expert beliefs were
addressed through the policy proposal, and so no learning needed to take place.
In contrast, the public (as demonstrated in Chapter 6) did change their beliefs over time
away from equality of funding toward favoring the concept of equity, as shown through their
support of weighted student funding. This belief change indicates an electorate that modified
their policy beliefs and proves that learning did occur—it was just outside of the coalitions and in
the political stream.
Extending MSF beyond agendas. Finally, this study finds that the MSF can be refined
and applied to other dimensions of policymaking as described by Kingdon’s (1984) policy cycle
model. I find, as have past researchers (Kosicki, 1993; Marsh, forthcoming; McLendon, 2003b),
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that extending and modifying Kingdon’s framework beyond agenda setting into enactment was
important for understanding how agendized policies are affected by both institutional variables
and coalition beliefs. This case demonstrates the power of entrepreneurial behaviors in the post-
agendizing policymaking arena. These post-agenda entrepreneurial behaviors contribute to a
deeper understanding of the three streams as defined by Kingdon (1984). This case demonstrated
a deeper dimension of the political stream by identifying the reframing of the education finance
reform proposal around a popular political belief of civil justice as essential to gaining political
support for LCFF. The case also expanded the knowledge of the policy stream by identifying the
belief that there needed to be a stabilization of funding (P30) to garner coalition and policymaker
support for policy change. Finally, the problem stream continues post agenda as the
entrepreneurs negotiate with subsystem coalitions to address their individually identified
problem beliefs. Additionally, this study found the institutional limits such as venue shopping
and term limits may have increased the power of the governor and decreased the power of the
legislature to make substantial changes to the law. Without moving beyond agendizing this issue,
these policy, problem, and politics streams would not be understood to include these essential
components to state policymaking in the case of LCFF.
Limitations

This study addressed the case of statewide policy making in education finance reform
around the LCFF in California. Although the case study data extended back decades to include
institutional history that included policy beliefs of governors, the judiciary, and public opinion
data, I unfortunately did not have the resources to include the same historical data for the
legislature. These data on the historical context of policy proposals made at the state level along
with a survey of legislators in office during the time of the LCFF debates (2012–2013) might
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have provided deeper insight into the policymakers’ differing beliefs and could have shed light
on the broader contribution of the role of term limits in state policymaking.
Similarly, I did not have the resources to survey the statewide coalition actors to
investigate their core or secondary policy beliefs. I intentionally distilled the positions of a
sample of the 1,000 school districts, 150 issue interest and local and state labor interest groups,
and dozens of policy experts to identify policy beliefs in relation to the education finance system.
These findings are based on interviews, public testimony, advocacy documents, 990 forms, and
websites. These data were used to identify the organizations’ positions as they pertained to
school funding and to identify each organization’s policy beliefs. As a result, there may be some
coalition system members that exist outside of these identified coalitions that attempted to
influence the policymaking process that differ from the four coalitions identified in this study. A
survey might have identified more coalitions and garnered a greater depth of knowledge of core
beliefs.
Finally, while I applied policy tracing techniques and triangulation of data to limit the
imposition of retrospective bias, there was no way to ensure it was completely eliminated from
the study. As Hassen (2006) argues “reported data about past experiences will always be
threatened by the limitations of the individual’s memory” (p. 5). A preferred method may have
been to collect data as the process unfolded either as a participant observer or, at a minimum,
collecting data as the policymaking process was unfolding.
Implications for Policy

This study demonstrated a historic layering of policies by federal and state policymakers
and the public. This layering promoted a complex and incoherent system that both contributed to
and was a reaction to policy coalitions’ distrust of local school districts. Systemic problems of
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inequity, inadequacy, and distrust, in addition to institutional mandates, provided support to the
development of a centralized, top-down education finance system. Even though public opinion, a
coalition of supporters, and over a decade of research based on support for concepts such as
decentralization kept portions of the LCFF on the policy agenda, it appears that a combination of
an historic economic recession, the commitment of a wide array of coalition support, strong
policy entrepreneurs, and a shift in public opinion of what constitutes education equity in
California ultimately pushed the LCFF to the top of the policy agenda and into law. This study
provides three implications for future policy.
Significant policy changes are often perceived as dramatic regulatory shifts. Consistent
with prior empirical research, this study demonstrates that policy change is a lengthy process in
which policymakers and subsystem actors
44
sometimes collect and analyze data prior to making
a policy shift (Ingold & Varone, 2011; Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, & Woods, 1991). Between 1979
and 2004, California lawmakers attempted to pass five pieces of decentralization legislation
(Weston, 2011a). In the Budget Act of 2009, the legislature lifted restrictions on 40 categorical
programs. In 2011, Fuller et al. investigated how the fiscal changes (known then as Tier 3) were
implemented at the district level. In their report, the authors argued that there had been a four-
decade-long debate among state policymakers concerning the idea of decentralizing education
funding. According to the study, one coalition favored continued centralized control over student
funding allocations, whereas the other favored decentralization of funding, indicating that the

44
Both theories include subsystem actors. This specific terminology emanates from the ACF, which
includes detailed definitions but can be applied to theories and identifying agents that directly or indirectly influence
policy affairs. These actors are defined by policy topic or territorial scope (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, &
Sabatier, 2014). Examples of subsystem actors may include legislators, government agencies, interest groups, or the
media (Ingold & Varone, 2011).
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idea of decentralized funding was not new in 2013 but was discussed substantially by
policymakers prior to the adoption of the LCFF. Prior to the governor proposing his education
reform legislation in 2012, he may have benefitted from identifying and engaging with
subsystem actors’ beliefs, building his and his administration’s knowledge of the policy beliefs
and potentially incorporating them into the original proposal. By engaging with subsystem
coalitions prior to agendizing education finance reform, the governor may have eliminated the
need to pull the proposal off the agenda and reassert it the following year.
As many studies in the past have noted (Chayes, 1976; Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982),
“unlike an administrative bureaucracy or legislature, which can delay action indefinitely, the
judiciary must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved” (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982, p. 20).
Given that the particular organizational structure of the judicial system allows for all plaintiffs to
“have their day in court,” groups that lack political clout in traditional policy arenas have found
the courts to be sympathetic to expressions of discontent with regard to the legislative status quo
and useful for compelling action among recalcitrant government representatives (Dayton, 1993;
McUsic, 1999; Vandersall, 1998). This study found that the court, while prominent in setting the
policy context, contributed little to the active policy making process with the LCFF. The election
of a governor that was not only sympathetic to discontent, but willing to contribute substantial
political capital toward a policy change opened up another venue for coalitions with which to
change the status quo to effect that change.
Statewide political composition. It is significant to note that prior to the LCFF’s
passage in California, the only state to have a fully developed decentralized, statewide weighted
student funding system was Hawaii. However, Hawaii is a one-district state; it is not essentially
similar to the application of the policy in California. Since the LCFF was agendized in
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California, multiple states have proposed similar laws including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Georgia, and New Jersey. Additionally, the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), which was a
bipartisan measure that reauthorized the 50-year-old Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA), also promotes the ideal of increased flexibility at the local level. California has a unique
political composition in which the state and its legislature at the time of the education finance
reform debates consisted of a two-thirds supermajority of Democrats who support a more
progressive political agenda. There may be a substantial policy implication for policymakers in
other states in that this study found that after the governor reframed the education finance debate
away from the more politically centered position of efficiency and transparency (in the 2012
proposal) to one that was left of center and that aligned more directly with public opinion in state
equity and social justice (LCFF, 2013). The legislature interpreted this repositioning of the
governor’s mandate as politically limiting their ability to refuse passage. Policymakers and
entrepreneurs in other states may wish to consider framing the problems and solutions in
alignment with the political beliefs of the majority of public opinion rather than limiting their
framing to that of policy experts who are less likely to be concerned with the political ideals of
the state and more concerned with the science behind the solutions.
In consideration of the Democratic party super majority in the state legislature and
administration during the time of this debate, it is important to consider that future policy may
shift away from these reforms as mandated by the LCFF. Prior studies by Baker and Elmer
(2009), Ladd and Fiske (2011), and Miles and Rosa (2006) find that political shifts in
institutional control have contributed to modifications in what is weighted in policies such as the
LCFF. For example, a cohort of new legislators may refute the benefits of providing additional
resources to English learners and instead provide additional resources to high-achieving students.
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There has already been an addition to the students identified by the LCFF as high needs. In 2015
the legislature passed a bill mandating school districts to describe how they are meeting the
needs of homeless students in their LCAPs. These political shifts, according to Ladd and Fiske
(2011), are likely to become increasingly common as policymakers gain experience with
weighted student funding system and have more confidence in making adjustments. As resource
allocation in California transitions from categorical funding to weighted student funding, it may
be expected that if the policy beliefs shift at the state level, so may the categories and levels of
weights. Also, as the discretion of resource allocation is shifted from the state to the local level
without a mandate of linking dollars to students, funding pressures and politics may become
common locally, making the shifting of funds more likely at the local level and creating less
predictable funding for schools.
Federal Policy. Nationwide, these policy beliefs about providing increased funding to
students with additional needs can be seen playing out as a result of the federal ESSA that passed
in 2015. Since the passage of that law, states, lawmakers, and the U.S. Department of Education
have been debating about the absolute priorities for allocating federal Title 1 dollars. The ESSA
says that in order to receive this funding, districts have to prove that that they are spending state
and local dollars fairly and roughly equalizing services to students in both poorer and wealthier
schools. The actors in this debate appear to agree that the money is designed to provide program
services to students with additional needs. The ESSA policy then on its surface aligns with the
policy debate that occurred in California over the LCFF, specifically the provision of allocating
additional dollars to students with additional needs.
Past studies reveal that the equalization mandate in California produced a downward
equalization of funds or decreased funding to all districts in an attempt to level the funding
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between districts (Bersin, Krist, & Liu, 2008; Manwaring & Sheffrin, 1994; Picus, 1991).
Furthermore, because school expenditures are predominately based on human capital positions
(number of employees, not costs), there are increased costs for wealthier schools where the more
experienced and higher-paid teachers reside. Traditionally this discrepancy has underwritten the
need for more state and local money to go to the wealthier schools than the high-poverty schools.
This leads some federal policy actors to believe that the Title 1 dollars could be used to fill in the
gaps left by state and local funds between what is allocated to the wealthier and the low-income
schools. Some policy actors in the ESSA implementation debate are expressing their policy
beliefs that the federal ESSA may develop substantially similar inequities in the system that were
seen in California and in other states.
To address these policy beliefs, John King, the Federal Secretary of Education, has
argued that the interpretation of the law should be based on absolute dollars, not on human
capital positions, and therefore, the poorest districts should receive the most dollars (inclusive of
state and local funding). Conversely, Republican congressional representatives have described
their interpretation of the law in this way: “you have to be spending a comparable amount of
money in schools that get the [Title 1] money and schools that don’t. Except for teacher salaries
may not be included in the computation” (Alexander, 2016). As it happened in California,
coalitions are developing around the interpretation of the law. The exclusion of teachers’ salaries
is important according to the federal labor issue interest coalition (as it was in California)
because they believe this will equalize funding, “we don’t want to hurt one school to help
another school. We to have help all schools” (Weingarten, 2016, public statement). According to
the Federal labor coalition in this subsystem, unless states and districts can address inadequacy
and “find new money for their poorer schools their less poor schools will have to cut”
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(Weingarten, 2016). Hence, as my study identified in California, labor issue coalitions continue
to hold the position that inadequacy is the problem with school finance and inequality may only
be addressed when there are more resources in the system.
There are political implications for the position taken by the labor interest groups because
this policy position places them in alignment with the Republican leadership in Congress and in
opposition to the Democratic administration which conflicts with their historic position. In
California’s case, the labor interest coalitions remained aligned with the Democratic
administration around education finance reforms only after state funding was increased,
indicating space for political gaps between Democratic party positions and labor interest
coalitions. This study of California’s LCFF policymaking process could promote a deeper
understanding of the role of coalitions’ beliefs and how they misalign with traditional political
party politics. Therefore, policymakers may need to reassess the political support they receive
from traditional subsystem and new actors in the political landscape of education as they move
forward to develop support for future education policy reforms.
Implications for Future Research
This study illustrated the importance of policy experts, policy entrepreneurs, and the
benefits of combining ACF and MSF to explain state policymaking in education finance.
Further, these case study findings may contribute to future research that around the issues of (1)
district and state level subsystem coalitions and their policy beliefs after the LCFF, (2) the new
role of local school boards, and (3) investigating local variation in spending LCFF dollars and
the relationship to changes in student outcomes.
This study identified the powerful role of the policy entrepreneurs in both the
administrative position of the governor and the state school board. It sets the foundation to
180

compare local policy subsystems and the role that policy beliefs play in the implementation of
the LCFF at the district level. Preliminary evidence from studies such as those by Marsh and
Hall (submitted manuscript, 2016) provide a foundation for understanding the role of democratic
engagement in the LCFF and who, what, and how policy actors pursued their policy beliefs
locally. Hence, future studies could build better understandings of how local district subsystem
policy beliefs contribute to the implementation and sustainability of the ideals of the LCFF.
Building on this study’s findings that the belief in local control was foundational to the
LCFF, a second area for future research is an examination of the role of local school boards in
the new decentralized systems. As Mike Kirst, Governor Brown, and other interviewees
discussed, the proprietor of the LCFF at the local level is the local school board. Questions that
may be investigated further include: What role are school boards playing in supporting the
implementation of the LCFF? Are communities more likely to turn out to vote in school board
elections in California now that the school boards have authority over a substantially larger
amount of funding? What types of school board activities contribute to more robust democratic
engagement around the LCFF? Are some school boards more successful in improving student
outcomes through differentiation of funding? Additionally, it would help to investigate the
leadership in various districts to compare how they allocated, spent, and accounted for the LCFF
funding and in what ways they believed it would improve student outcomes versus how it
actually improved student outcomes.
Finally, future studies should investigate local variations in the spending of LCFF dollars
181

and its relationship to changes in student outcomes
45
. Specifically, questions that may be
addressed include: Does state money predominately flow to one area (e.g. professional
development, student academic services, school climate) or another in districts? Where and to
what ends? Did the LCFF reform intensify existing instructional approaches, resulting in more of
the same, or provide an opportunity for innovation and creativity at the local level? For example,
do districts engage in a reasonable search for innovative alternatives? How are identified
students’ outcomes affected by the additional dollars?
This future research agenda will help determine whether education finance reform—
designed to enhance transparency, efficiency, and equity—improves the quality of school
services and outcomes.
Chapter Summary

This chapter summarized the key contributions of this case study of state policymaking of
LCFF and implications for policy and future research. In doing so, it validated the joining of the
ACF and MSF for examining state education policy making by extending its application to the
issue of school finance reform and the enactment of policy more generally. It also discussed the
relevant ties to and extensions of existing literature on the politics of school finance reform and
provided suggestions for future research on the topic. Further, this chapter discussed implications
for theory, policy, and further research. Through this process, the study’s findings enhanced the
theoretical understanding of the political process that undergirds one of state government’s most
important responsibilities: the mandate to provide equal education for all school children.

45
This study did not include the addition 2013 of Foster Youth, nor the exclusion of the transportation
funding in the case of the LCFF because they did not substantially change the overall politics of the case. Yet, these
funding streams may be effected by subsystem actor beliefs in the future.
182

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223

Appendix A

ACF/MSF LCFF Policymaking Interview Protocol

 Audio Recording Equipment
 Email or Fax consent form (Appendix J) prior to interview
 Interviewer Clock
 Procedures for obtaining informed consent
For Telephone: Participant will be sent an informed consent form before the interview.
At the start of the interview, interviewer will ask if participant has any questions about
the consent form and if he or she agrees to be interviewed and recorded. A waiver of
signed informed consent will be included in file.

Introduction
 Welcome and explain purpose of the interview. Thank you for agreeing to do this
interview.
 As you know, this interview is part of my study on education policymaking at the state
level. The case I am using to examine this phenomenon is the policymaking process of
LCFF. The purpose of this interview today is to learn more about your experiences and
role related to the evolution and passage of LCFF. It should last between 60-90 min.
 Did you read the consent form that was sent to you? Do you have any questions?
 Everything you say will be confidential. To protect your privacy, I won’t connect your
name with anything you say, unless you don’t mind your name being used. You can let
me know at the end of the interview if you would like to keep your name and/or your
organizations name confidential in this study.
 At any time in our conversation, please feel free to let me now if you have any questions
or if you would rather not answer any specific question. You can also stop the interview
at any time for any reason.
 Is it ok if I turn on the recorder?

Background
1. I’d like to begin by asking you some questions about your current position.
a. What is your position at (XXX)?
b. What are your major responsibilities?
c. How long have you been at your current position?
d. Can you tell me a little bit about your work experience as it relates to your current
job?
e. Are there other organizations that are doing the same type of work you are? How
is it similar?

Area 1: Consensus as to what could improve California’s education system, sharing similar
core beliefs

2. What were the major challenges in California’s education system prior to the passage
of LCFF?
a. Can you prioritize these if there was more than one?
224

3. How did you/your organization recognize this as an issue?
4. Did other organizations that you are aware of recognize this issue?
a. How did you become aware that other organizations were concerned?
5. How were they defined as issues? (Probe for source and type of information in
defining the problem)
6. What elements of LCFF solved these challenges?

Area 2: Policy learning & Stream

7. What was the position of your organization/party/caucus regarding the way education
governance problems prior to LCFF?
8. What other solutions were offered to solve the challenges in education governance
prior to LCFF?
a. Who offered these solutions?
b. What were the constraints to those solutions?
9. Were you/organization/caucus in support of or opposition to LCFF? Why?
10. What were the roles and activities that your organization took to promote their
position? (Probe as to whether they participated in these activities on their own or
with others; if they worked with others, follow up on how they coordinated their
support/opposition)
11. Who/what groups suggested the solutions? (Probe for relative influence of groups
(think tanks, research institutes, academic publications, or individual influence

Area 3: External Shocks/coalition exploitation & Political Stream

12. Who was making the decision around education governance (specifically allocations
and accountability) in California prior to LCFF? Can you give a few examples?
13. What changes occurred in the alignment and relationships since 2008 around
education governance in California? (Probe if alignment/realignment of relationships
went even further back in time.)
14. What changes occurred within California’s political system that may have contributed
to the passage of LCFF?
15. What changes outside of California may have contributed to the passage of LCFF?

Area 4: Policy Entrepreneurs

16. Was there an individual or group responsible for the passage of LCFF?
17. Was there an event, or issue that contributed to the passage of LCFF in 2013
18. Was there a reason that you/your organization supported these changes in the law in
2013? (Probe: why not earlier? Why not later?)

Area 5: Wrap Up
19. Was there anything about your involvement with the creation and passage of LCFF I
haven’t asked about that you think would be important to this study?
20. Is there anyone else I should interview in regard to support or opposition in the
policymaking process of LCFF?
225

21. Is it ok if I follow up with any questions as I review or discussion? May I contact you
via email?

Thank you so much for taking the time to meet with me today.

226

Appendix B

Policymaking and The Local Control Funding Formula

Participant Consent Form

Purpose
This is a study of the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF). The study is being carried out by
the University of Southern California.

The Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) represents California’s first major effort to reform
school finance in 40 years. Previously the state, which provides nearly 60% of revenue to local
school districts, largely specified how dollars were to be allocated to programs and pupils
through a complex web of categorical funding streams. The LCFF removes nearly all categorical
spending requirements and gives districts substantial flexibility to determine how they will spend
their dollars.

The study is designed to answer questions about the role of intermediary organizations regarding
the policymaking and early implementation of LCFF. Interviews are expected to last 60-90
minutes and are intended to provide information about the overall project and not to evaluate
individuals in their capabilities or performance.

Risks and Discomfort
There are no anticipated or known risks in participating in this study. Your participation in the
interview is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may discontinue your participation in the
interview at any time without penalty of any kind.

Benefits
Participation in the evaluation is an opportunity to contribute to an understanding of district
implementation of LCFF and of the budgeting process and priorities. The information you share
will help shape public policy.

Confidentiality
Interviews will be recorded, if you agree. Recordings will be kept on a secure server and will be
deleted upon completion of the study. Only researchers participating in this study will have
access to recordings.

I will treat the information you supply in a confidential manner. Only researchers from the
organizations named above will have access to your interview responses. You will not be
identified by name in any report and data will be reported in a manner that does not reveal your
identity.

As part of the evaluation, the researcher will share aggregated findings (no individuals will be
identified) in research papers and a dissertation. The results of the study will be summarized at
the project level and will not identify particular actors or organizations without advance
permission.
227

More Information
If this explanation leaves you with any unanswered questions, please ask and obtain answers
before signing below. If you have questions later, please contact Michelle Hall at (562) 260-9402
or hallmd@usc.edu.

Informed Consent
By signing this form, you are indicating that you have read and understood the information
provided to you about your participation in this interview.

I am willing to participate in this interview, which may be recorded. I understand that this is
voluntary and that I can stop the recording at any time.

____________________________________________________
Name (please print) Date

____________________________________________________________ __________________
Signature Affiliation
Title

228

229

Appendix C

LCFF Hearing/Meeting Observation Protocol
Name of Observation:
Observation type: Date of Observation
Location: Time of Observation
Observer:

Why are you making this observation?

What is the goal of this observation?

Room Design:

Description of
the Physical
Setting

Portraits of the
subjects

Person A

Person B
Appearance

Dress Mannerisms Style of talking
Roles of
attendees
Role on ____________ board/with
organization

Profession & Position with
organization
Depiction of
Activities
Topics discussed
230

Role of the Staff What role does the staff play in the board meeting? How much of the
decision the board is making appears to be independent? How much appears
to be based on the independent analysis of the board?

How often does a board member refer to a private conversation about the
agenda item/topic? Which items are discussed in this manner?
Role of the
Audience

What was
discussed
Topics Covered

Vote/Conclusion Observer Notes:

231

LCFF Observation Protocol (Public Interviews, Statements, Videos)
Name of Observation:
Observation type: Date of Observation
Location: Time of Observation
Observer:
Why are you making this observation?
What is the goal of this observation?

Name of Organization
Individual(s) Speaking
Position of Speaker
Goal of the Video/Interview
Is there a sponsor of the
publication? Who?
Sponsor
Yes ____ NO____
Who
Who is conducting the
Interview?

Associated Organizations Verbal Mention Logo or other written
associations
Associated Individuals Verbal Mention Written Association
Does the speaker discuss
where the ideas for LCFF
were derived?
Decentralization WSF Accountability
Positions taken surrounding
LCFF

 Decentralization

 Weighted Student
Funding

 Accountability

Did the interviewee, video,
etc. appear supportive of the
new law?
Yes ____ No____ Give evidence to support

232

Appendix D

Process Tracing Data Analysis Technique
In the application of process tracing, researchers investigate antecedent conditions that
leave a trail for the outcome to be traced. For example, if researchers are investigating a case
study around the origins and insertion of the new campaign contribution limits for individuals in
the United States from $32,400 to $324,000 in the 2014 Omnibus Appropriations Bill (OAB),
they could apply the process tracing method. Researchers would begin with an initial round of
data collection, which becomes an iterative process (as described previously). Subsequently,
researchers would formulate hypotheses and an appropriate rigorous test(s) to apply to existing
evidence; hence researchers demonstrate how a hypothesis suggesting the existence of the
outcome can pass one or more of the tests.
Figure 1 illustrates hypothesis testing using process tracing. As shown in Figure 1, a
variety of empirical tests are utilized that draw on diagnostic pieces of evidence as a basis for
causal inference (Mahoney, 2012). The process tracing method consists of four tests: the hoop
test, the smoking gun test, the doubly decisive test, and the straw in the wind test (Van Evera,
1997).
The first test I will discuss is known as a hoop test. As described in Box 3 of Figure 1, the
hoop test involves evidence that is definite but not exclusive. Failing a hoop test eliminates the
hypothesis whereas passing it affirms the relevance of the hypothesis but does not confirm it
(Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Collier, 2011; Van Evera, 1997). Therefore, in
reference to the example of the increasing campaign contribution limit, researchers may
hypothesize that the insertion originated with Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). They test their hypothesis
by employing a hoop test by gathering information from documents supported with interview
233

data. The inserted language, in fact, originated in the Senate (a necessary but not sufficient test of
our hypothesis). Their hypothesis passes the hoop test, so their confidence that the hypothesis is
valid is increased, inspiring them to investigate further.
The second test used by process tracing is the smoking gun test (Figure 1, Box 2).
Passing this test affirms the hypothesis and substantially weakens rival hypotheses, but failing
this test only weakens the hypothesis. For example, returning to the OAB example, researchers
find evidence that Senator Hatch’s staff, as well as the House budget office staff, jointly confirm
and document evidence supporting the fact that the senator had sent over a request to insert the
language in the bill at 2:00 a.m. the night before the bill passed both houses. This evidence
confirms the hypothesis that Senator Hatch did indeed attempt to place the proposal into the
OAB, confirming the hypothesis but not eliminating rival hypotheses (that a different legislature
inserted the language into the bill). The researchers continue their investigation.
The third test is the doubly decisive test (Figure 1), which uses evidence that is jointly
unique and definite (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Passing this test should confirm the hypothesis
and eliminate rival hypotheses. On top of the prior accrued evidence, the researchers may have a
list logged in by the Office of Management and Budget that tracked each amendment to the OAB
from its inception through its passage. This official government document indicates that it was
Senator Hatch’s signature (authenticated by the Senator’s chief of staff) and name next to the
language inserted into the bill that increased individual federal campaign contribution limits to
$324,000, thereby identifying Senator Hatch as the originator and eliminating the potential of
rival hypotheses.
The last test is the straw in the wind test (Box A Figure 1). This test includes data that are
not unique nor certain, necessary nor sufficient, yet may prove beneficial when building up
234

multiple pieces of evidence to support a hypothesis (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Once again,
applying the example data suggests that a bipartisan group of 80 senators signed a pledge to
promote campaign contribution increases. This evidence supports the relevance of the hypothesis
but does not confirm it, nor eliminate the rival hypothesis; in fact, it hardly weakens it. The straw
in the wind test is neither necessary nor sufficient for affirming causal inference (Bennett, 2010;
Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Collier, 2011; Van Evera, 1997). Yet, this test may serve as an entry
level standard for developing a chain of evidence to support research findings.

Figure 1. Process-tracing tests for causal inference. Adapted from Bennett (2010) and Collier
(2011), who build on categories by Van Evera (1997).

235

Appendix E

Multiple Streams Framework & Advocacy Coalition Framework
\Research Questions, Interview, Document, And Observation Data
Theoretical
Frame(s)
Research
Questions
Potential Interview
Protocol Questions
Potential
Document Data
Potential
Observation
Data
Section 1:Politics, Policy, and Beliefs
Kingdon’s
political
stream :
political
actions and
strategies.

The policy
stream,
where ideas
reach the
agenda.

ACF: beliefs
and
pressures on
those
beliefs.
What
influenced
California’s
dramatic
education
policy shift
away from
categorical
funding and
centralized
control?

What were
the internal
and external
pressures
that drove
this choice?
What
benefit is it
to policy
actors to
support such
dramatic
education
changes?

Who were
the players
and what
were the
actions,
goals, etc.,
and how
these
Who was making the decision
around education governance
(specifically allocations and
accountability) in California prior
to LCFF? Can you give a few
examples?

What information was used to
make these decisions? (Probe for
type, source, and trust, as well as
how the different types of
information affect decisions.)

How were decision makers
communicating (both with each
other and stakeholders)?
(PM)

46

Was there any disagreement
conflict over solutions(s)?

What resources were available to
address the problem?

What were the barriers to the
implementation of solutions?

What changes occurred in the
alignment and relationships of
policymakers and advocates since
2008 around education
governance in California? (Probe
if alignment/realignment of
relationships went even further
back in time.)

What changes occurred within
State Reports: LAO,
SBE, DOE, Assembly
& Senate Committee
Hearings

Proposed Legislation
from 2013 and prior
years

Academic Articles

Policy Reports: PACE,
PPIC, RAND, etc.

Advocacy Documents
and Position Briefs

Political Speeches

SBE & Legislative
Hearings

Legislative Committee
Reports

Media Reports

Websites/Social media
Feeds

Public Opinion Polls

Interviews (conducted
and made public) of
both internal and
external stakeholders
SBE &
Legislative
Hearings

Advocacy
organization
publicized
videos

Published
interviews
of
policymaker
s and policy
shapers

46

(PM) indicates
question for policymaker
236

Theoretical
Frame(s)
Research
Questions
Potential Interview
Protocol Questions
Potential
Document Data
Potential
Observation
Data
influence
the ultimate
action?

California’s political system that
may have contributed to the
passage of LCFF?

What changes outside of
California may have contributed
to the passage of LCFF?

What would have been the ideal
solution to California’s education
governance problems?

What were the constraints on
implementing these solutions?
a. Legal
b. Political
c. Budgetary
d. Technical
e. Other

Who/what groups suggested the
solutions? (Probe for relative
influence of groups or
individuals)

Were you/organization/caucus in
support of or opposition to LCFF?
Why?

Who/what groups suggested the
solutions? (Probe for relative
influence of groups (think tanks,
research institutes, academic
publications, or individual
influence)

What were the roles and activities
that our organization took to
promote their position? (Probe as
to whether they participated in
these activities on their own or
with others; if they worked with
others, follow up on how they

Voting Records

Court Records

Political Party
Platforms

Voter Registration

Campaign Contribution
Reports

Google Search Trends

237

Theoretical
Frame(s)
Research
Questions
Potential Interview
Protocol Questions
Potential
Document Data
Potential
Observation
Data
coordinated their
support/opposition)

Section 2: Policy Influence
MSF: Policy
Entrepreneur
s promote
change or
stability.

ACF: policy
brokers seek
compromise
What
influenced
California’s
dramatic
education
policy shift
away from
categorical
funding and
centralized
control?

Who were
the players
and what
were the
actions,
goals, etc.,
and how did
these
influence
the ultimate
action?

Was there an individual or group
responsible for the passage of
LCFF?

Was there an event, or issue that
contributed to the passage of
LCFF in 2013?

Was there a reason that you/your
organization supported these
changes in the law in 2013?
(Probe, why not earlier? Why not
later?)

What were the major challenges
in California’s education system
prior to the passage of LCFF?
1. Can you prioritize these if
there was more than one?

What elements of LCFF solved
these challenges?

Legislative
appointment calendar

Governor’s
appointment calendar

Supporters/Opponent
of LCFF
a. listed on bills
b. hearing
documents
c. filing
documents
d. public
documents
(websites/twitte
r/etc.)
e. organizational
expenditures
around LCFF
(990s)

Think Tank Policy
Reports

Media Reports

Economic Indicators
a. US
47

SBE &
Legislative
Hearings

Advocacy
organization
publicized
videos

Published
interviews
of
policymaker
s and policy
shapers

47
Official US historic economic indicators are published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, and the Census Bureau
238

Theoretical
Frame(s)
Research
Questions
Potential Interview
Protocol Questions
Potential
Document Data
Potential
Observation
Data
b. California
48

Advocacy documents,
reports, and position
statements.

Social media feeds
Section 3: Pressures
49
for Change
MSF:
Pressures a
“window of
opportunity”

ACF:
Pressures
outside the
subsystem
create
opportunitie
s

What
influenced
California’s
dramatic
education
policy shift
away from
categorical
funding and
centralized
control?

How did all
of these
variables
combine to
How did you or your organization
recognize this as a problem?

Did other organizations that you
are aware of recognize this issue?
a. How did you become aware
that other organizations were
concerned?
b. How were they defined as
issues? (Probe for source and
type of information in
defining the problem)

How were they defined as
problems? (Probe for source and
type of information in defining
Legislative votes

Public statements
50

Academic papers
produced by Michael
Kirst

Position statements and
records
51
from political
elite around
California’s education
challenges

Social media feeds

SBE &
Legislative
Hearings

Advocacy
organization
publicized
videos

Published
interviews
of
policymaker
s and policy
shapers

48
California’s official economic Indicators are published by the State Department of Finance at
http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/FS_DATA/INDICATR/Ei_home.htm. Chapman University also produces a
quarterly report that may be useful around California’s consumer sentiment.
49
I am using the term pressure, to encompass the potential ACF external and internal shocks, as well as, the
combination of the factors outlined within the three streams that create the window of opportunity in MSF. (Figures
1 and 2)
50
In searching for a time specific “window of opportunity” (2011-2013) or policy brokering this data
would be specific to policy elites attempting to convince each other to identify the positive aspects of the law or to
negotiate a compromise to get a version of the law passed.
51
This may include interviews, newspaper articles, other voting records or public statements around the
issue.
239

Theoretical
Frame(s)
Research
Questions
Potential Interview
Protocol Questions
Potential
Document Data
Potential
Observation
Data
contribute to
the passage
of LCFF?
the problem; note intermediary
organizations.)

With whom did interviewee
discuss the problem? (Probe
network/associated organizations
for information on the problem.)

What elements of LCFF solved
these problems?

Was there an individual or group
responsible for the passage of
LCFF?

What changes occurred within
California’s political/economic/
educational system(s) that may
have contributed to the passage of
LCFF?

What changes outside of
California contributed to the
passage of LCFF?

Section 4: Technical Feasibility and Learning
The policy
stream, ideas
survive
through their
technical
feasibility.

ACF outside
changes
including
coalition
learning may
influence the
compromise
that policy
brokers
seek.
How did
this change
redistribute
responsibilit
y for
education in
California?
Who (group, organization, level
of government) gained
responsibility as a result of
LCFF? Why? Can you give an
example?

Was there a reason that you/your
organization supported/did not
support these changes to the law
in 2013? (Probe: why not earlier?
Why not later?)

What changes occurred in the
alignment and relationships since
2008 around education
governance in California? (Probe
LCFF legislation,
Chapter 47, Statutes
2013 (AB 97)

LCFF legislation,
Chapter 49, Statutes
2013 (SB 91)

LCFF revisions,
Chapter 357, Statutes
2013 (SB 97)

LCFF revisions,
Chapter 33, Statutes
2014 (SB 859)

LCFF Expenditure of
SBE &
Legislative
Hearings

Advocacy
organization
publicized
videos

Published
interviews
of
policymaker
s and policy
shapers

240

Theoretical
Frame(s)
Research
Questions
Potential Interview
Protocol Questions
Potential
Document Data
Potential
Observation
Data
if alignment/realignment of
relationships went even further
back in time.)

Who/what was responsible for
education allocations?

funds Title 5, Division
1, Chapter 14.5

LCFF Regulations
(DOC; posted 06 Mar-
2015)

LCFF Expenditure of
funds, local control
accountability template
Title 5 Division 1,
Chapter 14.5

LCFF K-3 Grade span
adjustment Title 5,
Division 1, Chapter
14.6

241

Appendix F

Sample of California Issue Interest Group, Mission, And Funding Stream
Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
ACLU
Northern
California
“The ACLU of Northern
California is an enduring
guardian of justice, fairness,
equality, and freedom,
working to protect and
advance civil liberties for all
Californians.” Retrieved
from
https://www.aclunc.org/abou
t
Private contributions,
Bequests, In-kind contributions, Grants
ACLU
Southern
California
“The ACLU of Northern
California is an enduring
guardian of justice, fairness,
equality, and freedom,
working to protect and
advance civil liberties for all
Californians.” Retrieved
from
https://www.aclusocal.org/a
bout/what-we-do-and-how-
we-do-it/
Private contributions,
Bequests, In-kind contributions, Grants
Advancement
Project
“Advancement Project is a
next generation, multi-racial
civil rights organization.
Rooted in the great human
rights struggles for equality
and justice, we exist to fulfill
America's promise of a
caring, inclusive and just
democracy. We use
innovative tools and
strategies to strengthen
social movements and
achieve high impact policy
change.” Retrieved from
http://www.advancementpro
ject.org/#sthash.uu6TjErl.dp
uf
AFL-CIO
AFSCME
Akonadi Foundation Anonymous
Bauman Family Foundation Atlantic Philanthropies
Ford Foundation
Herb Block Foundation
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Mitchell Kapor Foundation Nor et Progress Fund
Open Society Foundations OSI-Baltimore
Public Interest Projects - State Infrastructure Fund
SEIU
1199-SEIU
Stoneman Family Foundation Tides Foundation
UAW
W.K. Kellogg Foundation Wallace Global Fund
Individual Donors
242

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Advocates for
Health
Economics and
Development
“AHEAD California moves
public health, workforce and
economic development
initiatives forward by
advancing local solutions
and statewide policy, linking
people and resources, and
removing barriers to access.”
Retrieved from
http://www.aheadcalifornia.
org
San Diego County, Susan G. Komen Foundation of
San Diego, Mammograms In Action/Barbells for
Boobs, Ralphs/Food for Less, First Five
Commission, National Association of Community
Health Centers (NACHC), Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals, Tides Center, California Health
Information Partnership & Services Organization,
and The Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA)
American
Friends Service
Committee
“The American Friends
Service Committee (AFSC)
is a Quaker organization that
promotes lasting peace with
justice, as a practical
expression of faith in action.
Drawing on continuing
spiritual insights and
working with people of
many backgrounds, we
nurture the seeds of change
and respect for human life
that transform social
relations and systems.”
Retrieved from
http://www.afsc.org/mission
-vision-and-values
Contributions: 33% Bequests: 26% Grants: 10%
Endowments & Planned Gifs: 25% Investment
Income: 4% Other Income: 2% Giving $25,000 or
more. Marguerite Casey Foundation, Chino Cienega
Foundation Conservation, Food & Health
Foundation, Inc., The Ilse, Charles and Peter
Dalebrook Fund, Evangelischerentwicklungsdienst
(eeD), Friends House Corporation, Otto Haas
Charitable Trust, Sarah & William Hambrecht
Foundation, Iolta Fund of the Bar of New Jersey, The
James Irvine Foundation, Johnson Family Fund, W.
K. Kellogg Foundation, Kids in Need of Defense,
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, McCune
Charitable Foundation, Merck Company Foundation,
Nararo Foundation ,Quaker-Hilfe Stiftung, Seattle
Foundation, Sites Foundation, State of Maryland,
State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public
Safety Towards Sustainability Foundation, United
States Department of Agriculture, Five Anonymous
Foundations, Named Endowments, Louisa Alger
Nero Material Assistance and Clothing Center,
Fundernest Arbuckle Endowment, John and
Elizabeth Bakerpeace Fund, Helen Ban Fund for
Peace, Esther Bracken Binns - Josephine Baird Fund,
John Brock Memorial Fund, Laveda Carpenter
Endowment Fund, Richard B. Carter Endowment
Fund, Stephen G. Cary Endowment Fund, Nathan
Chace and Irene Anthony Chace Trust, Clinard
Family Fund for Peace and Justice Frances F. Conrad
Endowment, The Catharine Aldena Cram Fund, Nan
Crocker Fund for Global Peace and Justice Charles,
Ilse, and Peter Dalebrook Endowment Fund, Harrop
A. and Ruth S. Freeman Peace Internship Fund,
Elaine and Werner Gossels Family Fund for Quaker
Service, Nancy and Peter Gossels Family Fund for
243

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Quaker Service, Graetz Fund for Peace and Justice
Anna Grocock Endowment, Katherine B. Hadley
Endowment, Vesta Newlin Hansen Memorial Fund,
Margaret Milliken Hatch Endowment Fund, Virginia
Haviland Endowment Fund, Edward G. Hefter
Endowment, H. Newlin Hill Memorial Fund, Justin
W. Hillyer Memorial Fund, Nina Thompson Hughes
Memorial Fund, Spencer L. Jones Memorial Fund,
Lilliane S. Kaufmann Memorial Fund, Ketas Fund
Leopold Kling and Nannette Kling Endowment Fund
William Bross Lloyd, Jr. Memorial Fund, John
Looney Peace, Justice & Nonviolence Internship
Fund, William Lotspeich Endowment for
International Affairs, Arthur E. and Mabel N. Lybolt
Fund, Viola Marple Fund, William and Frances
McElvaney Trust, Katharine L. Morningstar
Memorial Fund, Walter E. Myer Scholarship Fund.
F. Robert Naka Internship Fund, Marion W.
Neergaard Memorial Fund, Ninde Fund for Peace
and Justice Oldfather Fund for International Peace
and Reconciliation, Laurama Page Pixton and John
Pixton Fund, J. Preston Rice Memorial Fund, Lillian
Rosen and Harry Rosen Fund, Paul G. Schmidt
Endowment Fund, G. Mildred Scott and A. Foster
Scott Endowment Fund, Stern Fund, Emil and Rose
Thielens Memorial Fund, Dorothy M. and Reverend
Dr. Howard B. Warren Endowment Fund, Welch-
Hayes Peace and Justice Fund, Almena Gray Wilde
Fund, Ann Yarrow Memorial Endowment Fund, Two
anonymous endowment funds
Alameda
County
Department of
Public Health
“The mission of the
Alameda County Public
Health Department is to
work in partnership with the
community to ensure the
optimal health and well
being of all people through a
dynamic and responsive
process respecting the
diversity of the community
and challenging us to
provide for present and
future generations.”
Retrieved from
http://www.acphd.org/about-
acphd/our-mission.aspx
W.K. Kellogg Foundation, The California Wellness
Foundation, and The California Endowment
244

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Alliance for
Children’s
Rights
“Our vision is a world in
which all children have safe,
permanent families with the
support they need to thrive.”
Retrieved from http://kids-
alliance.org/what-we-do/
David and Lynn Angell Foundation, Annenberg
Foundation, Anonymous, California Community
Foundation, California Wellness Foundation, John
W. Carson Foundation, Carl and Roberta Deutsch
Foundation, Annie E. Casey Foundation, Eisner
Foundation, Entertainment Industry Foundation,
Everychild Foundation, Max Factor Family
Foundation, Glaser Family Foundation, Green
Foundation, Hedge Funds Care, Higgins Family
Charitable Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation,
George Hoag Family Foundation, Mark Hughes
Foundation, In-N-Out Burger Foundation, Jewish
Community Foundation, JIB Fund Community
Building Initiative, Walter S. Johnson Foundation,
W.M. Keck Foundation, Legal Services Trust Fund,
Morrison & Foerster Foundation, Newman's Own
Foundation, Ralph M. Parsons Foundation,
Pfaffinger Foundation, Roddenberry Foundation, The
Rose Hills Foundation, San Manuel Band of Mission
Indians, Stuart Foundation, S. Mark Taper
Foundation, Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption,
UniHealth Foundation, J.B. and Emily Van Nuys
Charities of the California Community Foundation,
Weingart Foundation, Carl E. Wynn Foundation, and
Zellerbach Family Foundation.
Anti-
Recidivism
Coalition
“The mission of the Anti-
Recidivism Coalition (ARC)
is to change lives and create
safe, healthy communities
by providing a support and
advocacy network for, and
comprised of, formerly
incarcerated men and
women. To accomplish this
mission, ARC provides
services, support and
opportunities to currently
and formerly incarcerated
individuals, and advocates
for fair policies in the
juvenile and criminal justice
systems.” Retrieved from
http://www.antirecidivism.or
g/our_work
The California Community Foundation, The
California Endowment, The California Wellness
Foundation, Ford Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton
Foundation, John M. Lloyd Foundation, Porticus
North America, The Ralph M. Parsons Foundation,
and Rosenberg Foundation.
245

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Arrowhead
United Way
“To improve lives by
engaging the caring power
of communities.” Retrieved
from
http://arrowheadunitedway.o
rg/mission/#sthash.MBMjqf
z3.dpuf
Vons, Pavilions, Albertsons, San Manuel Band of
Mission Indians, Morongo Band of Mission Indians,
Muslims United for San Bernardino, Hangar 24
Charities, Sketchers, Bank of America, Wells Fargo,
Majestic Realty Foundation, Kaiser Permanente,
Reddy Family Foundation, San Bernardino County,
Redlands Community Foundation, California
Foundation for Stronger Communities, Insomniacs,
66ers, Arrowhead Credit Union, Union Pacific
Railroad, California Wellness Foundation, Tesoro
Foundation (Arco), Altura Credit Union, Pizza Hut,
Arrowhead Family Medical Group Inc., Herman
Miller, Chase, BNSF, Fitness International (LA
Fitness), NRG Energy, Children's Home Society of
California, Phillips 66, In-N-Out Burger, Voya
Foundation, Watson Land Company, Beach Point
Capital Management LP, Specialty Restaurants
Corporation (Castaway), Alameda County Auditor,
Vince’s Spaghetti Inc., sic Psycles Promotions,
Schwab Foundation, Hope Reigns Charity
Foundation, Super G Funding LLC, First Solar
Development, Rosso Mag Inc., Tam Cycling, Safelite
Auto Glass, National Alliance of Mental Illness-
Pomona Valley, Ace Beverage LLC, Ross Stores
Foundation, iHerb.com, Markstein Beverage Co.,
Brinker International, Chili's Grill & Bar, First
Presbyterian Church of SB, First Assembly of God of
Victorville Inc., Redlands United Church of Christ,
Green Band Association, Suncrest Solar, EDF
Renewable Development Inc., NAIOP Inland Empire
Chapter, Ontario Mills, Chino Hills Pizza Co.,
Pieology, Staples, Burrtec Waste Industries Inc.,
GoodFellas Screen Printing, Inland Empire United
Way, Lutheran Church of Our Savior, Inland Center
Mall- Macerich, Westbound Communications Inc.,
California Endowment -(Employee Match), Triumph
Management Company, ford Dealers Advertising
Association of Southern CA, Montessori in
Redlands, FLORIN Japanese American Citizen
League, Partners for Better Health, Tilted Kilt,
Griffin Structures Inc., Inland-Metro Services Inc.,
Jewish Foundation of Greensboro, Station3
Entertainment LLC, A Christian Lay Institute, Curt
Hagman for Supervisor 2018, Orange Street Plaza
LLC, A-Ok Collective, Princess House Inc.,
NewCastleGold, Moneytree Inc., Marathon
246

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Communications, HMC Designing Futures
Foundation, Phoenix Barber Schools LLC, Steelers
Fan Club-Celebrities Fan Club, Christina Gagnier
For Assembly 2016, University Crossing SBR LLC,
John and Jan Douglas Family Fund, Fairview Ford
Sales Inc., Bericap LLC, Calvary Assembly of God,
Vietnamese Employees Association of LA County,
Thomas Advocacy Inc., Desert Hills Presbyterian
Church, The Building Association-Baldy View
Chapter, First Congregational United Church of
Christ, Riverside County Democratic Central
Committee State, Denver Real Estate, Assoc.
Government Accountants-Inland Empire Chapter,
Daisy I.T., Griffin Communications, Region One
California Conference of Directors Environmental
Health, California League of Pro Baseball Inc.,
Mizkan Americas Inc., Real Estate Services Dept.,
Zahir Inc., Steckbauer Weinhart LLP, Heubach
Charitable Fund, Leadership Development Network,
Autism Spectrum Intervention Services & Training,
Kravitz Inc., Nortek Distribution Services, American
Endowment Association, Westkoast Inc., Collected
by Inland Empire United Way, Omokase Sushi,
Richard Pope and Associates, International Day Spa
Redlands, MeadowBrook Insurance Group, First
Baptist Church of Perris, BJ’s Restaurant &
Brewhouse, Stahlka Agency Inc., United Way of
Orange County, East Valley Special Education Local
Plan Area, Manjodh Kaur Yoga Center, 29 Palms
Inn, C. Moreno Solutions Inc., 3point, American
Association of University Women- Redland Branch,
County of Los Angeles-Dept. of Mental Health, Paul
Chabot for Congress, Rancho Cucamonga/ West
Valley America’s Job Center of California,
Nutrishop Highland, Jamberry, and Kraken
Productions.
Adorable
Babies Jump
Start
Corporation
“The specific purpose of this
Corporation is to help
develop school readiness in
children from families in
Los Angeles County,
California through early
childhood development
educational programs and/or
other similar activities, in
which every child is treated
Costco, Dianna, Fingerhut, Kentucky Fried Chicken,
Kohl’s, Marion, Sam’s Club, Stater Brothers, Target,
Travis Owner of TEC Services Garage Doors &
Gates, Vons/Pavillions, Walmart Neighborhood
Grocery, and Yvonne.
247

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
as a competent and capable
learner.” Retreived from
http://lancaster.chamberofco
mmerce.me/lancastercc/me
m_adorable
Alliance
College-Ready
Public Schools
“To open and operate a
network of small, high-
performing high schools and
middle schools in low
income communities in
California with historically
under-performing schools,
that will annually
demonstrate student
academic achievement
growth, and graduate
students ready for success in
college.” Retrieved from
http://www.laalliance.org/ap
ps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_I
D=46278&type=d&pREC_I
D=214223
Bloomfield Family Foundation, Lauren B. Leichtman
and Arthur E. Levine Family Foundation, Joni and
Jeff Marine, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
Mariana and David Fisher, Low Income Investment
Fund, Estate of Gayle Miller, Patti and Peter
Neuwirth, Ayako and Dale Okuno, The Riordan
Foundation, The Walton Family Foundation, Carol
and James Collins, The Ralph M. Parsons
Foundation, Kathy and Ambassador Frank Baxter,
Confidence Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton
Foundation, Maggie and Joseph Drake, The Eli and
Edythe Broad Foundation, John W. Carson
Foundation, Renee and Meyer Luskin, Dr. Richard
Merkin, Schwab Charitable Fund, Susan and Eric
Smidt, Eva and Mark Stern, Willow Bay and Robert
Iger, College Kickstart LLC, Draper Family
Foundation, Frank McHugh-O’Donovan Foundation
Inc., George Hoag Family Foundation, Jefferies,
Joseph Drown Foundation, K & F Baxter Family
Foundation, Kissick Family Foundation, The Kotick
Family, The Mayer Morris Kaplan Family
Foundation, Carol and William Ouchi, Alison and
Richard Ressler, Linda Tajima, Wendy Tajima, Pam
Tajima Praeger, Elaine and Stanley Tajima-Johnston,
Ayco Charitable Foundation, California Community
Foundation, Canyon Capital Advisors LLC, Joshua
Friedman, Michelle and Cyrus Hadidi, Rabbi and
Mrs. Uri Hersher, Ignition Creative, Rachel Kaganoff
Stern and Eric Stern, David Kaplan, Martha and
Bruce Karsh, Gayle Miller, Julie and Ken Moelis,
Proskauer Rose, Allison and Bennett Rosenthal,
Sempra Energy, Cynthia L. & William E. Simon Jr.
Foundation, Beverly J. Smith, Jonathon Sokoloff,
Valerie and Ron Sugar, Superior Grocers, AECOM,
Amanda and Paul Attanasio, Mark Attanasio, Robert
Barth, Drs. Rebecka and Arie Belldegrun, William
Burford, Capital Group, Chevron Humankind
Matching Gift Program, CIM Group, The Crail-
248

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Johnson Foundation, Desert Community Foundation,
Deutsche Bank Wealth Management, Laurie and
Scott Dubchansky, Dustin & Lisa Hoffman
Philanthropic Fund, Jane B. and Michael D. Eisner,
The Eisner Foundation, Maryann and Irwin Gold,
Farah and Steve Gozini, Emily and Edward
Greenspan, Heidi and David Haddad, Priscilla and
James Halper, Ellen and Andrew Hauptman, Antonia
Hernandez, The James Irvine Foundation, Jewish
Communal Fund, Shaul Kuba, Heidi and Richard
Landers, Los Angeles Trial Lawyers’ Charities,
Gregory and EJ Milken Foundation, Moelis &
Company, Morgan Stanley Global Impact, Funding
Trust, John Nickoll, Peggy and Charles Norris,
George Novogroder, Resnick Family Foundation
Inc., Ric Suzanne Kayne Foundation, Brenda and
Virgil Roberts, Linda and David Shaheen, Candie
and Richard Weitz, Wells Fargo, Whittier Trust
Compnay, William E. Simon Foundation, Harold
Williams, Alan Arkatov, Patrcia Artigas, Seth
Brufsky, Caldwell Leslie & Proctor, Mark Dalzell,
Del Amo Construction, Leslie and William Elkus,
Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, Fondazione Italia,
Freeman Spogli & Co., Mary Ellen and Christopher
Kanoff, Colleen and Matt Karis, Patricia and Michael
Klowden, Lionsgate Entertainment, Nancy and
Jonathan Lurie, Joanne and Navid
Mahmoodzadegan, Maintex, Marianne and Lance
Miller, Nicole and Allan Mutchnik, Lee Neibart,
Greg Neuwirth, Jean and Anthony Ptitzker, Robin
and Jeff Raich, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
LLP, Georgia and Ron Spogli, Streeterville
Foundation, Toyota Financial Sevices, Stephani and
Andrew Whittaker, A & M Church and School
Furniture, Achieve3000, Page and Lou Adler,
Richard Agabs, Nancy Aossey, Asian Americans
Advancing Juistice - LA, Atlas Embroidery & Print,
Bank of the West, Catherine & Michael Bauer, Leah
and Gregory Bergman, Better 4 You Meals, Carol
and Frank Biondi, Courtney Blanton, Melissa
Bomes, Timothy Brown, Hanna and Aaron Cannom,
Phyllis Cannom, Capital Impact Partners, Ashley
Chay and Tim Fairty, Cox Castle & Nicholson,
William Craig, David S. Cunnigham III, Greg
Custer, Warren Dern, Eric Derrington, Lynne and
James DeWitt, Digital Networks Group, Ranney B.
249

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Draper Charitable Fund, Liberty Hill Foundation,
The Education Trust, Feed You Well, Trish and
William Flumenbaum, David Howard, Kristy
Jorgensen Shaffer & Patrick Schaffer, Kayne
Anderson Rudnick Investment Management LLC,
Christina and Sage Kelly, Monica Sarang and Bryan
Kenny, David Kloos, Konica Minolta, Stewart
Kwoh, Lee Landrum, Larry & Eris Field Family
Foundation, Ellen and Harry Levitt, Jody and David
Lippman, Cara and David Luse, Lisa and Jesse Mark,
Lowell Milken, Neal Millard, Martha Mortenson,
Thomas Newlin, Sara Ouchi, and Vince Tsai, Robert
Pambello, Greg Penske, Brooke Perez,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP., Win Rhodes, Darline
Robles, Laura and Kenneth Rogers, Kristin Salaya,
Carla and Fred Sands, Jennifer Ann Okin and Jon E.
Santemma, Southern California Gas Company,
Marilyn and Eugene Stein, Bethany Stevens,
Catherine Suitor and Joge Ramirez, Allison and John
Tibe, Kathleen and Steven Tricarico, Belen Vargas,
Roger and Angelle Wacker, Walker Stevens
Cannom, Cynthia and James Walsh, William
Wardlaw, Sylvia Weber, Young Minney & Corr
LLP, Kamala and Marvin Avila-Salmon, Kelly
Doran, Leighton French, Marilynn Garcia, Joan and
David Hill, Harley Ellis Deveraux, Jeffrey Heath,
Joan and David Hill, HMC Architects, Erik
Kronstadt, Jessica Kronstadt-Turner, LLBH Private
Wealth Management, Whitney McCormick, Maureen
Mclaren, Theodore R. Mitchell, Marilyn and John
Mohan, Betsy and Charles Oakley, Okwudiri
Onyedum, Rose and Sam Sarafa, SingerLewak LLP,
James Thomas, Variant Partners, Alicia Vaz, Tameka
Watler, Guy Zapoleon, rebecca Agonafir, Arik
Ahtiov, Josephine Aniobi, Laura Beebower, Michelle
and Todd Beiley, Thomas Boobar, Monica Briseno,
Kathleen Bryson, Louise Bryson, Stephen Chang,
Lisa Chevalier, The Clark Family Trust, Susan Colle,
Jon Dearing, Linda Delsack, Rebecca Doessant,
Rebekah and Evan Doran, Kira Epler, Jo Jo and Eric
Fleiss, Gwen Foster, Miguel Gamboa, Goldman
Sachs & Co., Alice Gottlieb, Joanna and Christopher
Hameetman, Harry Hathaway, Allison Hewitt, Jim
Hiltz, Andrea John, Olivia John, Jackson Johnson,
Cameron Johnson, Gregory Kim, John Kronstadt,
Shilpa Kumar, Bali Kumar, Carol Landrith Tyson,
250

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Howard Lappin, Lyn Lewis, Johnathan Lieberman,
Farhan Mahmood, Joradan Mangaliman, Adithya
Mani, Nina Marchiando, Dean Marolla-Turner,
Elizabeth Marshall, Julie and Patrick McCormick,
Rachel McDaniel, Rena and Carl Mckinzie, Cathleen
McMullen, Angus McWilliams, Patrick Murphy,
Sinthuja Nagalingam, Stephanie Novick, Phillip
O’leary, Krystal O’Leary Flores, Cynthia Olmstead,
Leo Otero, Kelly and David Pokress, Christianne
Ray, Yaswanth Reddy, Laura Rogers, Kim Salaya,
Schindler Elevator Corporation, Sam Shefrin, Silicon
Valley Community Foundation, Edward Simpson,
Linda Sirithananan, Almuhtada Smith, Darin Smith-
Gaddis, Jordan Teti, Steven Truong, William Turner,
Ryan Vergara, Chris Weber, Elaine Weberm Kristen
Woo, Kevin Wu, Chrisine Wu, Chris Yontez, and
Kaitlin Yount.
Alliance for
Boys and Men
of Color AKA:
www.cablackhe
althnetwork.org
“Organizing local and
statewide policy campaigns;
Facilitating a robust
community of practice;
Changing the conversation
about boys and young and
men of color; and
Engaging youth leaders in
all facets of the Alliance.”
Retrieved from
http://www.allianceforbmoc.
org/about-us
Cal Endow, The California Wellness Foundation, for
the list in its entirety,
http://www.allianceforbmoc.org/about-us/alliance-
partners.
Asian
Americans
Advancing
Justice
“The mission of Asian
Americans Advancing
Justice | AAJC is to advance
civil and human rights for
Asian Americans and to
build and promote a fair and
equitable society for all.”
Retrieved from
http://www.advancingjustice
-aajc.org/who-we-
are/mission
AT&T, CBS Corporation, Comcast NBC Universal,
Covington, McDonald’s, Nielsen, Northrop
Grumman, The Rockefeller Group, Verizon, NCTA,
Southwest Airlines, Wallace H. Coulter Foundation,
Google, Ropes & Gray, Walmart.
251

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Asian
Resources
“Asian Resources is a non-
profit community based
organization established in
1980 dedicated to providing
multiple social services
needed in our community,
empowering everyone we
serve to become a vital part
of our changing, diverse
society.” Retrieved from
http://asianresources.org/abo
ut-us
Partners: VSP, Sacrament Employment & Training
Agency, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, The
California Endowment, Sierra Health Foundation,
Kaiser Permanente, Covered California, Citi
Community Development, East Bay Asian Youth
Center, Lotus Landing, Providence Place, Citrus
Heights, AT&T, United Way, Opt-In.
Aspire Public
Schools
“The mission they set out to
achieve was simple and
straightforward: grow the
public charter school
movement by opening and
operating small, high-quality
charter schools in low-
income neighborhoods…and
prepare these students for
college.” Retrieved from
http://aspirepublicschools.or
g/about/history/
Achievement School District, Alameda County
Office of Education, Ceres Unified School District,
Lodi Unified School District, Los Angeles County
Office of Education, Los Angeles Unified School
District, Modesto City Schools, Oakland Unified
School District, Ravenswood City School District,
Ravenswood City School District, Sacramento City
Unified School District, San Juan Unified School
District, Stockton Unified School District, Sylvan
Union Elementary School District, Anonymous,
Charter School Growth Fund, The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, Patty Quillin and Reed Hastings,
Helen and Charles Schwab, Tipping Point
Community, U.S. Department of Education, The Eli
and Edythe Broad Foundation, Hastings/Quillin Fund
at the Silicon Valley Community, J.R. Hyde Senior
Family Foundation, NewSchools Venture Fund, The
Ralph M. Parsons Foundation, Silicon Schools Fund,
Stuart Foundation, Tennessee Department of
Education, Beth and Michael Hunkapiller, Steven L.
Merrill, EDUCause, Joseph Drown Foundation,
Koshland Foundation, Leonetti/O'Connell Family
Foundation, Sidney E. Frank Foundation, Wells
Fargo, Theresa and Richard Crocker, Phyllis and
William Draper, Warren Felson and Lucy Sun,
Johnathan and Kimberly Garfinkel, Leslie and
George Hume, Marci Glazer and Jonathan Kaplan,
Lousie Muhlfeld Patterson and Arthur Patterson,
James and Bonnie Quigley, Richard and Helen
Spalding, Joyce and Robert Wisner, Franklin and
Catherine Johnson Foundation, Pyramid Peak
Foundation, The Louis L. Borick Foundation, The
Pacific Companies, Susan and Stephen Chamberlin,
Nicole Mammoser and Courtney Haslett, TPG
252

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Capital, Jill and Brian Olson, Sally and Jeff Snipes,
CharterSafe, Schoolzilla, Sidney Hawkinds and John
Gargiulo, Deidre and Christopher Hockett, Grace
Won and Richard Holden, Lynzi Ziegenhagen and
Lindsey Lack, Jamel and Tom Perkins, Janet and
Robert Schindler, Jason and Courtney Fish, Kathleen
and Richard Hoertkorn, Lene and Steve Joy, Tracy
Leeds and Evan Marwell, Don Shalvey, Anna Utgoff
and Nicolas Spicer, Mary and Jerome Vascellaro,
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., Bingham MucCutchen
LLP, Charter Property Group, Gilbert Associates
LLP, K2 Architects LLP, Larson Communications,
RBC Capital Markets LLC, Reasoning Mind,
Sonitrol, Stifel Nicolas and Compnay, Ultimate
Software Group Inc., Wells Fargo, Diane Nelson and
John Atwater, Mary Anne Nyburg Baker and G.
Leonard Baker Jr., Kathleen Budge, Frank Caufield,
John Chino, Claudio Chiuchiarelli, Robert Coontz,
Nancy and Ed Conner, Charles Couric, Sayed and
Elise Darwish, Pagmar Dolby, Cara and Scott
France, Alex Wolf and Lilah Hume, Chi Kim,
Bonnie and Hank Miller, Tom Periac, Mary and Jeff
Pickard, Karen and George Rathman, Krisin and
David Ritterbush, Matthew Roberts, Jeanne and
Sanford Robertson, Susan and David Tunnell,
Charlotte and David Winton, Low Income
Investment Fund, NCB Capital Impact, Osborn
Architects, Revolution Foods, Cabot Brown,
Matthew Countryman, Melvin Kaplan, Gary Larson,
Susan and Willie Lukach, Christina Villarrea and
Brian Patterson, Jeff Schneble, and Jed Wallace.
Attendance
Works
“Attendance Works is a
national and state initiative
that promotes better policy
and practice around school
attendance. We promote
tracking chronic absence
data for each student
beginning in kindergarten, or
ideally earlier, and
partnering with families and
community agencies to
intervene when poor
attendance is a problem for
students or schools.”
Retrieved from
Annie E. Casey Foundation, W.K. Kellogg
Foundation, The California Endowment, The David
Lucile Packard, The San Francisco Foundation,
William Gaspar Graustein Memorial Fund,
Community Foundation of Greater New Britain, and
Winthrop Rockefeller Foundation.
253

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
http://www.attendanceworks
.org/about/
Bay Area
Council
“The Bay Area Council is a
business-sponsored, public
policy advocacy
organization for the nine-
county Bay Area. The
Council proactively
advocates for a strong
economy, a vital business
environment, and a better
quality of life for everyone
who lives here. Founded in
1945, as a way for the
region’s business
community and like-minded
individuals to concentrate
and coordinate their efforts,
the Bay Area Council is
widely respected by elected
officials, policy makers and
other civic leaders as the
regional voice of business in
the Bay Area.” Retrieved
from
http://www.bayareacouncil.o
rg/about-us/history/
Anonymous, Bank of America Foundation, Bay Area
Family of Funds, Citi Foundation, College Access
Foundation, The Counselors of Real Estate, The Lisa
and Douglas Goldman Fund, The William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation, Home Building Association of
Northern California, Koret Foundation, The Louis R.
Lurie Foundation, Lurie Management, The David
and Lucile Packard Foundation, San Francisco
Foundation, S.D. Bechtel Jr. Foundation, Sierra Club,
US Bank, Wachovia Foundation, Wells Fargo
Foundation, and William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation.
Beauty Within
Teen Esteem
“All of the foundation’s
efforts are geared to
resolving the ongoing
struggles that teens face
every day –peer pressure,
poverty, hunger, illiteracy
and disease – and to replace
these struggles with hope for
the future.” Retrieved from
http://beautywithin-
teenesteem.blogspot.com/p/
mission-statement.html
Honorable Mayor Jim Dear, Damone Roberts, JC
Penney, JJ Star, American Foundation for Suicide
Prevention, Marinelo Schools of Beauty, The
OGMobCo, Javaboi, Lynette Tyner.
254

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Black Youth
Leadership
Project, Inc.
“BYLP establishes, develops
and implements educational
programs for African
American youth in
California in the areas of
leadership development,
public speaking, the
legislative process, public
service, cultural awareness
and identity.” Retrieved
from http://bylp.org
Partners: The California Endowment, Union Pacific,
AFSCME, Walmart, CSUBA, The Home care
Providers Union, Fisk University, CSEA, CCTA,
PhRMA, California Nurses Association, United
Nurses Associations of California, CSBA, PG&E.
Boys & Girls
Club of the
Coastside
“To enable all young people,
especially those who need us
most, to reach their full
potential as productive,
caring, responsible citizens.”
Retrieved from
http://bgccoastside.org/about
-us/
Partners: America Gives Back, Anthem Foundation,
Coca-Cola, Comcast NBC Universal, Conoco
Phillips, Disney, Microsoft, Raytheon, Taco Bell
Foundation, University of Phoenix, America’s Best
Contacts & Eyeglasses, Bridgestone, Buffalo Wild
Wings Team up For Kids, Charles Schwab
Foundation, HSBC, Lowe’s, Major League Baseball
Charities, Nestle, Altria Success 360, Staples,
Toyota, Tupperware Brands, UPS, Aaron’s, ADM,
AT&T, GAP, JCPenney, Kimberly-Clark,
Lunchables, Macy’s, Maytag, New York Life
Foundation, Old Navy, Planet Fitness, Ross, U.S.
Cellular, United Health Foundation, Verizon
Foundation, WWE, Bank of America, BONTON,
Fluor, Kraft Foundation, NBCA, Samsung, Sprint,
Sony, Time Warner Cable, The Zac Foundation, CA
Technologies, Citi Foundation, Cox
Communications, Fiskars, Google, H&M, Jo-Ann
Fabric and Craft Stores, Kids Food Locker
Foundation, LexisNexis, Mattel, MetLife, Michaels
Stores, NFL Charities, Nordstrom, Party City,
Michael Phelps Foundation, QBE Foundation, Regal
Entertainment Group, RetailMeNot, Robert Half,
Smuckers, Symantec Foundation, True Value
Foundation, Unilever, Van Holten’s, Voya
Foundation, Walmart Foundation, Will Rogers
Institute, Comcast Corporation, Cox
Communications, Fox Sports, Nickelodeon, OAAA,
Dreaming Tree Foundation, Kiwanis International,
PGA and USGA, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity.
255

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Boys & Girls
Club of Silicon
Valley
“To inspire and empower all
young people, especially
those who need us most, to
realize their full potential as
productive, responsible, and
caring adults.” Retrieved
from
http://www.bgclub.org/#!abo
ut/c4nz
Partners: America Gives Back, Anthem Foundation,
Coca-Cola, Comcast NBC Universal, Conoco
Phillips, Disney, Microsoft, Raytheon, Taco Bell
Foundation, University of Phoenix, America’s Best
Contacts & Eyeglasses, Bridgestone, Buffalo Wild
Wings Team up For Kids, Charles Schwab
Foundation, HSBC, Lowe’s, Major League Baseball
Charities, Nestle, Altria Success 360, Staples,
Toyota, Tupperware Brands, UPS, Aaron's, ADM,
AT&T, GAP, JC Penney, Kimberly-Clark,
Lunchables, Macy’s, Maytag, New York Life
Foundation, Old Navy, Planet Fitness, Ross, U.S.
Cellular, United Health Foundation, Verizon
Foundation, WWE, Bank of America, BONTON,
Fluor, Kraft Foundation, NBCA, Samsung, Sprint,
Sony, Time Warner Cable, The Zac Foundation, CA
Technologies, Citi Foundation, Cox
Communications, Fiskars, Google, H&M, Jo-Ann
Fabric and Craft Stores, Kids Food Locker
Foundation, LexisNexis, Mattel, MetLife, Michaels
Stores, NFL Charities, Nordstrom, Party City,
Michael Phelps Foundation, QBE Foundation, Regal
Entertainment Group, RetailMeNot, Robert Half,
Smuckers, Symantec Foundation, True Value
Foundation, Unilever, Van Holten’s, Voya
Foundation, Walmart Foundation, Will Rogers
Institute, Comcast Corporation, Cox
Communications, Fox Sports, Nickelodeon, OAAA,
Dreaming Tree Foundation, Kiwanis International,
PGA and USGA, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity.
256

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Brotherhood
Crusade
“The vision of that group of
courageous and dedicated
men and women began to
flourish, as the community
responded by supporting
their efforts through
charitable giving.” Retrieved
from
https://brotherhoodcrusade.o
rg/about-us/
Partners: Chase, Comerica Bank, Wells Fargo, AEG,
AT&T, American Honda, Motor Co. Inc., Bank of
America, Ivie McNeill & Wyatt, A Professional Law
Corporation, Los Angeles Sentinel Newspaper,
MUFG Union Bank, N.A., Nielsen, Northern Trust,
Northrop Grumman, SEIU Local 2015, Southwest
Airlines, The Berry Gordy Family Foundation,
Verizon, AFSCME United, Domestic Workers,
Boeing, CAM Foundation, Comcast, Enterprise,
Kaiser Permanente, Lily & Bruce Karatz, Los
Angeles County Federation of Labor, SEIU Local
1000, Southern California Edison, State Farm
Insurance, Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas, The Gas
Company, Toyota, U.S. Bank, Walmart, Xerox,
Canon, DIRECTV, Global Parking, Green Dot
Public Schools, Herbalife, LeadersUp, Lockheed
Martin, Microsoft, Palazzo Concessions, PCF
Restaurant Management LLC, Printco Graphics Inc.,
SEIU 721, SMS Transportation, The California
Endowment, U.S. Soccer Foundation, AFSCME
3090, Bremond Family, Charles R. Drew University
of Medicine and Science, Dickerson Employee
Benefits, Hill & Morgan Interior Music, Joanne
Kozberg, Justice Unity Generosity and Service,
Paramount Pictures, RFP Insurance, South Centeral
Los Angeles Regional Center, St. John Well Child &
Family Center, Tony Wafford Family, YWCA of
Greater Los Angeles, California Community
Foundation, David & Lucile Packard Foundation,
GALAXY Foundation, James Irvine Foundation, Los
Angeles Times Family Fund, Sorbrato Family
Foundation, The California Endowment, The
California Wellness Foundation, The Edna
McConnel Clark Foundation, Thrive For Youth
Foundation, U.S. Sorccer Foundation, Weingart,
William & Flora Hewlet Foundation, City of Los
Angeles Workforce & Economic Development, City
of Los Angeles- Gang Reduction & Youth
Development, Los Angeles County Department of
Public Health-Nutrition, Education, and Obesity.
257

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Brotherhood of
Elders
“The Brotherhood of Elders
Network is an
intergenerational network of
men of African ancestry
fostering an environment
where Black males are
empowered to flourish. We
advocate for males of
African ancestry from
infancy to adulthood. We
leverage resources and
relationships while re-
connecting to our heritage.
We advance and preserve
the health and wellness of
our families and
communities.” Retrieved
from
http://www.brotherhoodofel
ders.com/about/
Partners: AAMA, ROP, Tech
CADRE “South LA schools that:
Include and respect the
cultures of their families and
communities, Genuinely
engage parents in decision-
making regardless of race,
income, language,
immigration status, or age,
and Actively maintain equal
power with parents who
effectively hold them
accountable. A South LA
community-based,
independent, parent-led
organization that makes
parent power a strong,
organized, and permanent
force to be reckoned with:
Changing the perception and
treatment of South LA
parents, Countering racism
towards South LA parents,
and Protecting the civil and
human rights of South LA
parents and their families,
especially their right to
Los Angeles Women’s Foundation, Liberty Hill
Foundation, Washington Mutual Foundation, Center
for Community Change, Los Angeles Conservation
Corps, Edward W. Hazen Foundation, First 5
California, The Women’s Foundation of California,
Norman Foundation, Catholic Campaign for Human
Development, The California Endowment, Mertz
Gilmore Foundation, AT&T Foundation, James
Irvine Foundation, California Consumer Protection
Foundation, UCLA in LA - Center for Community
Partnerships, California Community Foundation,
Susan Sandler & Steve Phillips, U.S. Human Rights
Fund, United Latino Fund, 21st Century Foundation,
Ben & Jerry’s Foundation, United Way of Greater
Los Angeles, Communities for Public Education
Reform - California, Just and Fair Schools Fund,
Taproot Foundation, Schott Foundation for Public
Education, Weingart Foundation, and Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation - Forward Promise.
258

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
dignity, education, and
participation.” Retrieved
from http://www.cadre-
la.org
California
Alliance of
African
American
Educators
“The mission of
the California Alliance of
African American Educators
(CAAAE) is to provide
programs and services to
students, families, and
teachers in order to create
culturally conscious African
American students who are
life-long learners and critical
thinkers. At California
Alliance of African
American Educators
(CAAAE), we work to
create a forum for the
exchange of ideas and
strategies to improve the
educational opportunities
and achievement for African
American students.”
Partners: Cypress Semiconductor, W.K. Kellogg
Foundation, Mitchell Kapor Foundation, AT&T
Foundation, National Semiconductor, SJSU Mesa
Schools Programs, Comerica Bank, 100 Black Men
of Silicon Valley Inc., Lockheed Martin, XCEL
Educational Services, Del Monte, The National
Coalition of 100 Black Women, Dr. MLK Santa
Clara Foundation, National Society of Black
Engineers, Society of Women Engineers, Alpha Phi
Alpha Eta Sigma Lambda Education Foundation,
Alpha Kappa Alpha Eta Rho Omega Foundation,
Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, and Xi Zeta Zeta
Educational Foundation.
California
Association of
African-
American
Superintendents
&
Administrators
“The California Association
of African-American
Superintendents and
Administrators (CAAASA),
a group of educational
leaders, is committed to
identifying and addressing
the critical issues in
education through public
policy relative to the status
and performance of African-
American students in
California.” Retrieved from
http://www.caaasa.org/#!abo
ut-caaasa/cdcx
Partners: ACT, Advance Path Academics,
Fishtree.com, Bright Bytes, College Board, Lozano
Smith, AALRR, Odyseeyware, Discovery Education,
Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, Illuminate Education,
CTAnea, Comcast, Footsteps 2 Brilliance, UNCF,
Pivot Learning Partners, Compass Learning, K12
Insight, Scholastic, Grand Canyon University,
California School-Based Health Alliance, CCSESA,
Illuminate Education, California State PTA,
California Head Start Association, ACSA, Calsa,
NCEBC, AALRR, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,
CSBA, Pearson, ICAN Learn Education, ACT,
CETPA, Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost.
259

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
California
Center for
Civic
Participation
“To empower youth to be
vital participants in decision
making processes at all
levels.” Retrieved from
http://californiacenter.org/ab
out
California Journal, California Teachers Association,
Chevron CorporationGreat Western Bank, James
Irvine Foundation, Morongo Bank of Mission
Indians, Sempra Energy, State Farm Insurance,
Apple Inc., California American Water, California
Building Industry Association, California Business
Properties Association, California Cable and
Telecommunications Association, California Dental
Association, California Hospital Association,
California State University, Capitol Network, Capitol
Weekly, Enterprise Holdings, Southern California
Edison, Tribal Alliance of Sovereign Indian Nations,
Union Pacific, Wells Fargo, California Teachers
Association, Sempra Energy, Edison International,
State Farm, Apple, California American Water,
California Building Industry Association, California
Business Properties Association, California Cable &
Telecommunications Association, California Dental
Association, California Hospital Association,
California State University, Capitol Network, Capitol
Weekly, The Doctors Company, Enterprise Holdings,
Union Pacific, Tribal Alliance for Sovereign Indian
Nations, and Thermo Fisher Scientific.
California
Coverage &
Health
Initiatives
“CCHI’s mission is to
improve the health and well
being of California children
and families by supporting
its members in meeting the
needs of their
communities.”Retreived
from
http://cchi4families.org/abou
t/mission-vision-history/
Partners: The David and Lucile Packard Foudation,
The California Endowment, Kaiser Permanente,
BlueShield of California Foundation, California Pan-
Ethnic Health Network, California Primary Care
Association, California School Based Health Centers,
Children’s Defense Fund, Children Now,
Community Health Councils, First Five Association
of California, First 5 California, Health Access,
Insure the Uninsured Project, Latino Coalition for a
Healthy California, Moms Rising, PICO California
Project, Teachers for Healthy Kids, The Children’s
Partnership, United Way of California, Vision y
Compromiso, Western Center on Law & Poverty.
260

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
California
Immigrant
Youth Justice
Alliance
“California Immigrant
Youth Justice Alliance
(CIYJA) seeks to establish a
progressive and diverse
immigrant youth led
organizing efforts in the
state of California through
the development of
community-based
undocumented immigrant
youth organizations. CIYJA
is invested in supporting
educational, organizing, and
advocacy efforts by the
member organizations for
the enhancement and
improvement of the lives of
the immigrant youth and
their families in California.”
Retrieved from
http://www.ciyja.org/#!about
/c6mv
Partners: The San Fernando Valley Dream Team,
Dream Team Los Angeles, The Antelope Valley
Dream Team, The Napa Valley Dream Team, The
San Diego Dream Team, The San Gabriel Valley
Immigrant Youth Coalition, The Los Angeles
immigrant Youth Coalition, Fresno Immigrant Youth
in Action, North Bay Immigrant Youth Union, The
Inland Empire Immigrant Youth Coalition, ASPIRE,
Orange County Immigrant Youth United, San
Joaquin Immigrant Youth Collective.
California Pan-
Ethnic Health
Network
“To promote health equity
by advocating for public
policies and sufficient
resources to address the
health needs of communities
of color.” Retrieved from
http://cpehn.org/about#sthas
h.VY5LYa4g.dpuf
Blue Shield of California Foundation, California
Department of Public Health, The California
Endowment, The California Wellness Foundation,
Kaiser Permanente, The San Francisco Foundation.
California
Parent-Teacher
Association
“Our mission is to positively
impact the lives of all
children and families.”
Retrieved from
http://capta.org/about/
CSN, School Services of California Inc.,
ScholarShare, Google Express, Solaro, Lifetouch,
Chevron, Panda Express, Yoobi, CSM, Knight
Insurance Services Inc., Nicky's Folders, GES
Exposition Services, Wells Fargo, Smart-reg,
Kustom Imprints, Production Strategies Inc., Town
and Country Resort & Convention Center, History
Center of San Luis Obispo County, The Hearst
Corporation.
California
Primary Care
Association
“The mission of CPCA is to
lead and position community
clinics, health centers, and
networks through advocacy,
education and services as
key players in the health
care delivery system to
BKD LLP, McKesson, Anthem Blue Cross, Nonstop
Wellness
261

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
improve the health status of
their communities.”
Retrieved from
http://www.cpca.org
California
Program on
Access to Care
“CPACs mission is to
provide timely, actionable
information to the California
State Legislature and
technical assistance to state
and local health agencies to
support the identification,
analysis, and translation of
public policies for
improving access to care for
vulnerable populations.”
Retrieved from
http://cpac.berkeley.edu/hom
e/about-us
Partners: UC Berkeley School of Public Health,
Health Initiative of the Americas, UCSF Philip R.
Lee Institute for health Policy Studies, UCLA Center
for Health Policy Research, UC Office of the
President: State Governmental Relations, Latino
Coalition for a Healthy California, California Pan-
Ethnic Health Network, The Center for Study of
Latino Health and Culture, California Immigrant
Policy Center, UC Berkeley Center for Labor
Research Education, California Latino Legislative
Caucus, California Legislative Black Caucus, Health
Access, UCSF California Medicaid Research
Institute, UC Davis Health System: Center for
Healthcare Policy and Research, Western Center for
Law and Poverty.
California
School-Based
Health Alliance
“The California School-
Based Health Alliance aims
to improve the health and
academic success of children
and youth by advancing
health services in schools.”
Retrieved from
http://www.schoolhealthcent
ers.org/about-us/our-work/
Anthem Blue Cross Foundation, Blue Shield of
California Foundation, The California Endowment,
California HealthCare Foundation, The California
Wellness Foundation, Campaign for Tobacco Free
Kids, Fresno Regional Foundation, Kaiser
Permanente (Northern and Southern California
Regions), The San Francisco Foundation, School-
Based Health Alliance, S.D. Bechtel Jr. Foundation,
The California Endowment, California HealthCare
Foundation, Kaiser Permanente, Blue Shield of
California, California Health & Wellness, California
Primary Care Association, Health Net of California,
Los Angeles Trust for Children's Health.
Californians for
Justice
“Californians for Justice is a
statewide grassroots
organization working for
racial justice by building the
power of youth,
communities of color,
immigrants, low-income
families, and LGBTQ
communities. Led by
students, we organize to
advance educational justice
and improve our social,
economic, and political
conditions.” Retrieved from
California Education Policy Fund, Marguerite Casey
Foundation, Communities for Public Education
Reform, Unitarian Universalist Veatch Program of
Shelter Rock, Hill Snowdon Foundation, Hazen
Foundation, Families Improving Education, Funders
Collaborative on Youth Organizing, Liberty Hill
Foundation, Rappaport Family Foundation, Haas Jr.
Fund, Akonadi Foundation, The California
Endwoment, Weingart Foundation, Alliance for
Educational Justice - Movement Strategy Center,
City of Long Beach, Dwight Stuart Youth Fund, and
City of San Jose.
262

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
http://caljustice.org
Causa Justa:
Just Cause
“Causa Justa: Just Cause
builds grassroots power and
leadership to create strong,
equitable communities. Born
through mergers between
Black organizations and
Latino organizations, we
build bridges of solidarity
between working class
communities. Through
rights-based services, policy
campaigns, civic
engagement, and direct
action, we improve
conditions in our
neighborhoods in the San
Francisco Bay Area, and
contribute to building the
larger multi-racial, multi-
generational movement
needed for fundamental
change.” Retrieved from
http://www.cjjc.org/en/about
-us/mission
Partners: Grassroots Global Justice Alliance, Right to
the City, Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition,
National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights,
Oakland Rising, San Francisco Rising, San Francisco
Immigrant Rights Defense Committee.
263

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Children Now “Children Now’s mission is
to find common ground
among influential opinion
leaders, interest groups and
policymakers, who together
can develop and drive
socially innovative, “win-
win” approaches to helping
all children achieve their full
potential.” Retrieved from
https://www.childrennow.or
g
Alliance for Early Success, The Annie E. Casey
Foundation, The Atlantic Philanthropies, Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, Blue Shield of California
Foundation, California Community Foundation, The
California Endowment, Xcepf, Charles and Helen
Schwab Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation,
The David & Lucile Packard Foundation,
DentaQuest, The Dirk & Charlene Kabcenell
Foundation, East Bay Community Foundation, First
5 LA, Heising Simons Foundation, Hurlbut-Johnson
Fund, The James Irvine Foundation, Kaiser
Permanente, The Louis L. Borick Foundation, Lucile
Packard Foundation for Children’s Health, Morgan
Family Foundation, Pritzker Foster Care Initiative,
The Ralph M. Parsons Foundation, S.D. Bechtel Jr.
Foundation, Sierra Health Foundation, Silver Giving
Foundation, Stuart Foundation, Tikun Olam
Foundation, The Walter S. Johnson Foundation, The
Walton Family Foundation, Westly Foundation,
W.K. Kellogg Foundation, The California Wellness
Foundation, Evelyn & Walker HAAS Jr. Fund, May
and Stanley Smith Charitable Trust, Thomas J. Long
Foundation.
Civicorps “Civicorps’ mission is to re-
engage young adults, so they
can earn a high school
diploma, gain job skills,
pursue college, and embark
on family sustaining
careers.” Retrieved from
http://www.cvcorps.org
Alameda County- Oakland Community Action
Partnership, Altamont Education Advisory Board,
AmeriCorps, Barbara and Donald Jonas Family
Fund, Bay Area Wilderness Training, Beneficial
State Bank, Bernard E. and Alba Witkin Charitable
Foundation, Charles Schwab Foundation, City of
Oakland: Workforce Investment Act, Economy
Lumber, Goodby Silverstein & Partners, Kaiser
Permanente San Francisco's Community Benefit
Grants Program, Lowell Berry Foundation, Oakland
Private Industry Council, Oakland Unite, Orion
Business Insurance and Risk Management Services
Inc., Pacific Gas and Electric Company, REDF,
Solstice Press, The Joseph and Vera Long
Foundation, The San Francisco Foundation: Donor
Advised Fund, The Corps Network, Thomas J. Long
Foundation, U.S. Bank Foundation, Walter S.
Johnson Foundation, and Y & H Soda Foundation.
264

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Clovis Family
Literacy
“To empower and support
parents with the tools,
strategies and knowledge
needed to support their
children in all areas of their
development with emphasis
on language, reading and
general academic and social
success as become
contributing members to the
local community and society
at large.” Retrieved from
http://www.commongrantap
plication.com/grantseekers/1
8910/Clovis-Family-
Literacy.html#gskOrgBackg
round
Arbonne Charitable Foundation AU, Arbonne
Charitable Foundation Canada, Arbonne Charitable
Foundation UK, Arbonne Charitable Foundation US,
Augusta Health, Bacchus Foundation, Bainbridge
Community Foundation, Community Action
Partnership of Staunton, Augusta and Waynesboro
(CAPSAW), Community Foundation for Southern
Arizona, Community Foundation of NCW, County of
Napa, Deacon Corp., ELRHA - HIF, ELRHA -
R2HC, ESTHER Ireland, Foundation for Financial
Planning, Kitsap Community Foundation, Operation
Lifesaver Inc., PADI Foundation, Prime Health
Foundation, ROW Foundation, San Francisco
General Hospital Foundation, San Mateo County
Arts Commission, Silicon Valley Creates, The Elinor
and T.W. Miller Jr. Foundation, The Florence B. and
Cornelia A. Palmer Foundation, The Lawrence
Foundation, United Way of Greater Augusta,
University of Southern California, Women’s
Foundation of Southern Arizona, and Women’s Fund
of Long Island.
Coleman
Advocates for
Children and
Youth
“Coleman builds the
leadership and power of
low-income and working
class youth and parents of
color in San Francisco to
advance racial and economic
justice in our schools and
our city. Through grassroots
organizing, budget and
policy advocacy, and voter
engagement, we are building
a city of hope, justice, and
opportunity – a San
Francisco where all children
and families have access to
high-quality education,
living wage jobs, family-
supporting benefits,
affordable housing, and a
voice in the decisions that
affect us.” Retrieved from
http://colemanadvocates.org/
who-we-are/mission-core-
values/
Alliance for Education Justice Youth Justice Corp,
Edward W. Hazen Foundation, Evelyn and Walter
Haas Jr. Fund, Hill-Snowdon Foundation, Just & Fair
Schools Fund PIP, Marguerite Casey Foundation,
Stone Foundation, Victor and Lorraine Honig Fund,
W. Clement & Jessie V. Stone Foundation, and W.K.
Kellogg Foundation.
265

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Community
Asset
Development
Refining
Education
(CADRE)
“We work for systemic
change by supporting
grassroots South LA parents
as the leaders in stopping the
pushout crisis in schools
serving low-income
neighborhoods of color.
Through parent capacity
building, political education,
advocacy, and organizing,
CADRE challenges schools’
beliefs and practices that
criminalize children and
parents and violate their
human rights to a quality
education, dignity, and
participation in our current
public education system. We
build power to win new
policies and challenge
existing ones as part of a
movement towards
educational and racial
justice.” Retrieved from
http://www.cadre-
la.org/core/about/history-
vision/
Los Angeles Women’s Foundation, Liberty Hill
Foundation, Washington Mutual Foundation, Center
for Community Change, Los Angeles Conservation
Corps, Edward W. Hazen Foundation, First 5
California, The Women’s Foundation of California,
Norman Foundation, Catholic Campaign for Human
Development, The California Endowment, Mertz
Gilmore Foundation, AT&T Foundation, James
Irvine Foundation, California Consumer Protection
Foundation, UCLA in LA - Center for Community
Partnerships, California Community Foundation,
Susan Sandler & Steve Phillips, U.S. Human Rights
Fund, United Latino Fund, 21st Century Foundation,
Ben & Jerry’s Foundation, United Way of Greater
Los Angeles, Communities for Public Education
Reform - California, Just and Fair Schools Fund,
Taproot Foundation, Schott Foundation for Public
Education, Weingart Foundation, and Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation - Forward Promise.
Contra Costa
Interfaith
Supporting
Community
Organization
“CCISCO is committed to
building civic engagement
and increasing public
participation by those most
affected by injustice in
Contra Costa County. We
are a multi-racial, multi-
generational, interfaith
federation of 20 member
institutions representing
38,000 families across our
region.” Retrieved from
http://ccisco.org/about-us/
The California Endowment, The James Irvine
Foundation, Y&H Soda Foundation, Robert Woods
Johnson Foundation, San Francisco Foundation,
W.A. Gerbode Foundation, Mitchell Kapor
Foundation, Four Freedoms Fund, Catholic
Campaign for Human Development, Lesher
Foundation, Kaiser Permanente, Firedoll Foundation,
California Consumer Protection Foundation, Walter
and Elise Haas Jr. Fund, Evelyn and Walter Haas Sr.
Fund.
266

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Education
Trust-West
“Advocates for educational
justice and the high
academic achievement of all
California students,
particularly those of color
and living in poverty. The
Education Trust promotes
high academic achievement
for all students at all levels-
pre-kindergarten through
college Our goal is to close
the gaps in opportunity and
achievement that consign far
too many young people-
especially those from low-
income families or who are
black, Latino, or American
Indian-to lives on the
margins of the American
mainstream.” Retrieved
from
https://west.edtrust.org/issue
/adequate-and-equitable-
funding/
Partners: Alliance for a Better Community, Alliance
San Diego, Californians for Justice, Coleman
Advocates for Children and Youth, Community
Coalition, Congregations Organized for Prophetic
Engagement, Families in Schools, Great Oakland
Public Schools Leadership Center, National Center
for Youth Law, PICO California, Reading and
Beyond, Students for Education Reform, United Way
of Greater Los Angeles.
Families in
Schools
“To involve parents and
communities in their
children’s education to
achieve lifelong student
success.” Retrieved from
https://www.familiesinschoo
ls.org/about/mission-vision/
Annenberg Foundation, Annie E. Casey Foundation,
Anonymous Donor, ARCO Foundation, AT&T,
Boeing Co. Charitable Trust California Community
Foundation, California Credit Union, Chaka Khan
Foundation, Citi,Deloitte Services, Disney
Worldwide Services, Doll Family Foundation,
Edison International, Eisner Foundation, Fred Jones
Family Foundation,George Gund Foundation, Go
Along Side Foundation, Hudson Group, James Irvine
Foundation, J.B.M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation,
Joseph Drown Foundation, JP Morgan Chase & Co.,
Los Angeles Times/ Tribune, NBC Universal
Foundation, Ralph M. Parsons Foundation, Read
Conmigo – Infinity Insurance, Roth Family
Foundation, Southern California Gas Company, S.
Mark Taper Foundation, State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co., Target, Telemundo, Time Warner,
Verizon Foundation, Wachovia Foundation, Walmart
Foundation, Washington Mutual, Weingart
Foundation, Wells Fargo Foundation,W.K. Kellogg
Foundation
267

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
First 5 Fresno “First 5 Fresno County will
be a catalyst for creating an
accessible and effective
network of quality services
for young children (0-5
years old) and their
families.” Retrieved from
http://www.first5fresno.org
Partners: Central Valley Children’s Services
Network, Centro La Familia Advocacy Services Inc.,
County of Fresno Department of Public Health,
Exceptional Parents Unlimited Inc., Firebaugh
Regional Health Council Inc., Foundation for Clovis
Schools, Fresno Interdenominational Refugee
Ministries, Stone Soup Fresno, Frebaugh Las Delta
Unified School District, California health
Collaborative, CASA of Fresno & Madera Counties,
Central Unified School District, Fowler Unified
School District, Fresno Unified School District,
Kings Canyon Unified School District, Focus
Forward, Fresno Barrios Unidos, Fresno Council on
Child Abuse Prevention, Fresno County
Superintendent of Schools, Marjaree Mason Center
Inc., Reading and Beyond, Stone Soup Fresno, and
Superior Court of California County of Fresno.
Full Circle
Education Fund
“Most of our impact happens
through the collaborative
environment of what we
refer to as our Circles, which
bring together Full Circle
Fund Members with a
common interest in our key
issue areas: Economic
Opportunity, Education,
Environment & Energy,
Health. Through our Circles,
we explore key issues,
identify opportunities for
impact, and then select
nonprofit innovators to
support with unrestricted
grants and our Members’
expertise, connections and
resources. Together, we
learn about philanthropy in
general, deepen our
understanding of issues,
partner with amazing
organizations, and have a lot
of fun along the way!
Retrieved from
http://www.fullcirclefund.or
g/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/201
Abbot Downing, BetterWorld Telecom, Boston
Private Bank, Heffernan Insurance, ICONIQ Capital,
Marcato Capita Management, Microsoft, Pacific Gas
and Electric Company, Qualcomm, Tech CU, Wells
Fargo, Dodge & Cox, Google Inc., Housatonic
Partners, Levi Strauss, Macy’s, Makena Capital,
Morgan Stanley, Schwab Charitable, Visa Inc., and
Zynga.
268

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
5-FCF-Grant-Portfolio.pdf
or browse all of Full Circle
Fund's Grant Partners here.”
Gay-Straight
Alliance
Network of
California
“GSA Network is a next-
generation LGBTQ racial
and gender justice
organization that empowers
and trains queer, trans and
allied youth leaders to
advocate, organize, and
mobilize an intersectional
movement for safer schools
and healthier communities.”
Retrieved from
https://gsanetwork.org/about
-us
Anonymous, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, James Irvine Foundation, Open Society
Foundations, Tides Foundation's State Equality Fund,
Arcus Foundation, David Bohnett Foundation, Ford
Foundation, Gill Foundation, Evelyn and Walter
Haas Jr. Fund, Johnson Family Foundation, Juanita
MORE! Pride Party, Liberty Hill Foundation, San
Francisco Foundation, R. Scott Hitt Foundation,
Genentech Inc., Kaiser Permanente, Southwest
Airlines, Bay Area Physicians for Human Rights,
Bishop-McCann, The California Endowment,
Community Thrift, Entertainment Industry
Foundation, Fit for Equality, Fresno Regional
Foundation, Gideon Hausner Jewish Day School,
Paragon Community Enrichment Fund, Peet’s Coffee
& Tea, PwC, Southwest Airlines.
Hispanic
Foundation of
Silicon Valley
“The Hispanic Foundation
of Silicon Valley is the
recognized leader in
Hispanic philanthropy in
Silicon Valley, inspiring
Hispanic families and
children to achieve personal
Broadcom, Cargill, Silicon Valley Community
Foundation, UnionBank, County of San Mateo,
Macy's, Bank of America, Coca Cola, Walmart,
Morgan Family Foundation, Castellano Family
Foundation.
269

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
greatness.” Retrieved from
http://www.hfsv.org
Homeboy
Industries
“Homeboy Industries
provides hope, training, and
support to formerly gang-
involved and previously
incarcerated men and
women allowing them to
redirect their lives and
become contributing
members of our
community. Each year over
10,000 former gang
members from across Los
Angeles come through
Homeboy Industries’ doors
in an effort to make a
positive change. They are
welcomed into a community
of mutual kinship, love, and
a wide variety of services
ranging from tattoo removal
to anger management and
parenting classes. Full-time
employment is offered for
more than 200 men and
women at a time through an
18-month program that helps
them re-identify who they
are in the world, offers job
training so they can move on
from Homeboy Industries
and become contributing
members of the community -
knowing they count!”
Retrieved from
http://www.homeboyindustri
es.org/why-we-do-it/
Partners: Altamed, AREAS LLC, AVP, Bet Tzedek,
Cal State Long Beach School of Public Health,
California Province Society of Jesus, Children's
Institute, Christian Legal Aid, City of Los Angeles,
County Board of Supervisors, Delores Mission, East
Los Angeles Skills Center/LAUSD Adult Education,
GRID Alternatives, Insight Prison Project, Jesuit
Volunteer Corp, Julianne’s, LA Chamber of
Commerce, LA Voice, Learning Works, Los Altos
Retreat Center, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, Los Angeles Parole, Solar City, Phat
Energy, Iron Workers, Project 180, Kaiser
Permanente, Park Pictures, Urban Radish, IBEW
Local, Montebello Plastics, Park Pictures, Ralphs,
Bank of America, California Endowment, California
Community Foundation, Geri and Jon Cusenza, Lilly
and Bruce Karatz, Rose Hills Foundation,
Rodenberry Foundation, Goldhirish Foundation,
Discover a Star Foundation, Hearst Foundation, Stark
Family Foundation, Bill Resnick, Resnick Family
Foundation, Boeing, The Rotary Club of Los
Angeles.
270

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
LA Education
Partnership
“Los Angeles Education
Partnership is an education
nonprofit that works as a
collaborative partner in
high-poverty communities to
foster great schools that
support the personal and
academic success of children
and youth from birth through
high school. We are an
innovative leader in school
transformation, known for
proven, effective programs
and collaboration that is
responsive to student needs.
Our focus, from birth
through high school, is to
produce graduates ready for
college, career, and life.
LAEP works in high-
poverty, multicultural
communities across Los
Angeles County, from the
northeast San Fernando
Valley to East and South
Los Angeles. Each year, we
serve more than 1,000
educators and 39,000
students plus their families
in communities across Los
Angeles County.” Retrieved
from
http://www.laep.org/about-
us/mission/
Stuart Foundation, Cotsen Foundation, Edison
International, Chase Bank, Target, Wells Fargo,
Farmers Insurance, United Way of Greater Los
Angeles, SCALL, Annenberg Foundation, Prudential
Foundation, State Farm, College Futures Foundation,
American Business Bank, Taproof Foundation,
Weingart Foundation, The Ralph M. Parsons
Foundation, WEA, Craul-Johnson Foundation,
Boeing, Comerica Bank, NKSF, Los Angeles
Dodgers Foundation, Patterson Foundation, LaLaw
Library, The Green Foundation, Ford Foundation,
Union Bank, Joseph Drown Foundation, jk livin
Foundation, Dwight Stuart Youth Fund, S. Mark
Taper Foundation, The Ahmanson Foundation, The
Carol and James Collins Foundation, The Kenneth T.
and Eileen L. Norris Foundation, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company, Roth Family Foundation.
Latino
Community
Foundation
“LCF inspires philanthropy,
invests in Latino
communities, and leads
transformative solutions for
change.” Retrieved from
http://www.latinocf.org
ACT for Women and Girls, Chicana/Latina
Foundation, Community Technology Network,
Familias Unidas, Fathers & Families of San Joaquin,
Fresno Barrios Unidos, Homey, La Luz, The Latina
Center, Milpha, mission graduates, women together,
National Compadres Network, North Bay Organizing
Project, Nuestra Casa, Oakland Centro Legal De La
Raza, ODAT, Puertas Abiertas, Somos Familia,
Somos Mayfair, Salud para La Gente, Street Level
Health Project, The Stride Center, TLC, Tiburcio
Vasquez Health Center, Youth Alliance, Barrios
Unidos.
271

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Los Angeles
Chamber of
Commerce
“The Los Angeles Area
Chamber of Commerce
champions economic
prosperity and quality of life
for the Los Angeles region
by being the voice of
business, promoting
collaboration and helping
members grow.” Retrieved
from
http://www.lachamber.com/
webpage-
directory/about/about-
aboutchamber/
Partners: AIA Los Angeles, California Apartment
Association -- Los Angeles, California STEM
Learning Network, Central City Association, City of
Los Angeles, FuturePorts, Greater Los Angeles
African American Chamber of Commerce,
Hollywood Chamber of Commerce, Hospital
Association of Southern California, L.A. INC. The
Los Angeles Convention & Visitors Bureau, Latin
Business Association, LAX Coastal Area Chamber
of Commerce, Los Angeles Business Council, Los
Angeles County Business Federation, Los Angeles
County Economic Development Corporation, Los
Angeles Education Partnership, Los Angeles Unified
School District, Los Angeles Junior Chamber of
Commerce, Los Angeles Sports Council, Metro,
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California,
MoveLA, National Academy Foundation, NAWBO-
LA, Office of Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa,
Partnership for Los Angeles Schools, Pasadena
Chamber of Commerce, Redonodo Beach Chamber
of Commerce, South Bay Association of Chambers
of Commerce, South Gate Chamber of Commerce,
United Way of Greater Los Angeles, The Valley
Economic Alliance, Valley Industry & Commerce
Association.
Los Angeles
Urban League
“Founded in 1921, the Los
Angeles Urban League is
recognizing more than 90
years of service to our Los
Angeles communities. The
League is the city’s premier
organization in advancing
equal opportunities on
behalf of African Americans
and other minority youths
and adults through
innovative job training, job
placement, youth
achievement and business
development programs.
Nolan V. Rollins serves as
the President & CEO of the
Los Angeles Urban League,
one of the largest and most
successful affiliates of the
National Urban League,
Partners: The 21st Century Foundation, Ahmanson
Foundation, AT&T, Bank of America, The Boeing
Company, The California Endowment, The James
Irvine Foundation, National Urban League, State
Farm Insurance, Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc.,
Union Bank, United Way, United Parcel Service,
Walt Disney Company, Weingart Foundation,
ABC/CEE Collaborative, Edison International, Ralph
M. Parsons Foundation, Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,
Anschutz Entertainment Group, Comerica Bank,
American Airlines, Dickerson Employee Benefits,
Enterprise Rent-A-Car, John C. Law. Ralphs Grocery
Company, U.S. Bank, Target, Verizon, Wells Fargo
Bank, Arches Enlace, AXA Equitable Life Insurance,
California Community Foundation, Citibank, Fox
Group, Nestle, and The Wachovia Foundation.
272

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
which has affiliates in 100
cities throughout the United
States. The Los Angeles
Urban League has been at
the forefront of identifying
and addressing issues that
are of concern to African
Americans and other
minorities in Los Angeles
and throughout the state of
California. The mission of
the League is to enable
African Americans and other
minorities to secure
economic self-reliance,
parity, power and civil rights
through advocacy activities
and the provision of
programs and services in our
uniquely diversified city and
region. Beyond its talented
and dedicated staff, one of
the strongest assets of the
League is its Board of
Directors which includes
business leaders,
corporations and individuals
who are committed
stakeholders in the success
of neighborhood change.
The Los Angeles Urban
League has been recognized
for excellence by the
National Urban League,
including the highest
national honor as Affiliate of
the Year. Our auxiliaries –
the Young Professionals and
the Guild – have also
received national recognition
for exemplary service.”
Retrieved from
http://www.laul.org/2012-
01-13-00-20-59/overview
273

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
MarinKids “To build a community —
through advocacy,
education, research,
mobilization and leadership
— that believes caring for
all of Marin’s children is our
collective responsibility, and
that acts to realize this
belief. Our children’s long-
term well-being and Marin’s
civic and economic future
hinge on ensuring every
child has access to high-
quality preschool
opportunities, a rigorous K-
12 education set to high
standards, regular and
responsive healthcare,
physical activity and
nutritional food, and a
community that cares for all
the children. MarinKids will
inform and energize action
of individuals, organizations,
voters and policymakers and
highlight progress. We will
act as a gathering place for
the community stimulating
fresh ideas, new policies and
collective action. We hope
you will join us in working
towards our shared goals and
priorities.” Retrieved from
http://www.marinkids.org/ab
out/
First 5 Marin Children and Families Commission,
The California Endowment, 10,000 Degrees.
274

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Mid-City
Community
Action Network
“Mid City CAN’s mission is
to create a safe, productive,
and healthy community
through collaboration,
advocacy, and organizing.”
Retrieved from
http://www.midcitycan.org/a
bout/mission
Partners: Activist San Diego, California Budget
Project, Center on Policy Initiatives, Environmental
Health Coalition, Official California Legislative
Information Site, Public Policy Institute of
California, San Diego Organizing Project, Supportive
Parents Information Network, The California Council
of Churches, The California Institute for Federal
Policy Research, The California Voter Foundation,
The Electronic Policy Network, UCLA Center for
Health Policy Research, Adams Avenue Business
Association, City Heights Business Association, El
Cajon Blvd. Business Improvement Association,
Supportive Parents Information Network, City
Heights Community Development Corporation, Price
Charities, MAAC Project, Center for Community
Solutions, Church of the Nazarene in Mid-City,
College Avenue Baptist Church, First United
Methodist Church, Harbor Church, City Web Site,
Council District 3, Council District 3 City Heights
Web Site, Council District 3 Normal Heights Web
Page, Council District 7, San Diego City Attorney's
Office, San Diego Police Department, City Heights
Redevelopment Project Area, City of San Diego
Redevelopment Agency, San Diego County Web
Site, First Five Commission of San Diego County,
Fourth District, Health and Human Services Agency,
HHSA Central Region, San Diego County Probation
Department, San Diego County Commission on
Children Youth and Families, State Web Site, 76th,
78th, and 79th Assembly District, Senate Districts 39
and 40, Governor's Office, 49th and 50th district,
Senator Diane Feinstein, Senator Barbara Boxer, The
White House, Adams Avenue Integrative Health, La
Maestra Community Clinic, San Diego Family Care,
Scripps Health, Children's Hospital, Family Health
Centers of San Diego, Alternative Healing Network
Inc., American Lung Association, American Red
Cross, Family Health Centers of San Diego, Project
Concern International, San Diego County
Immunization Initiative, Catholic Charities of San
Diego, Horn of Africa, International Rescue
Committee, Somali Family Services, Survivors of
Torture International, Cambodian Dancers of San
Diego, Activist San Diego, Idealist.org, NP Works,
Azalea Park Neighborhood Association, Redwood
Village Community Council, Fox Canyon
275

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Neighborhood Association, Kensington-Talmadge
Planning Group, Normal Heights, Oak Park
Community Council, Swan Canyon Neighborhood
Association, UCSD CREATE, Alliance Healthcare
Foundation, The California Endowment, Price
Charities, San Diego Foundation, San Diego
Foundation for Change, United Way of San Diego,
Waitt Family Foundation, 211 San Diego, YMCA
Child Care Resource center, San Diego City Schools,
Board of Education, Adams Elementary School,
Carver Elementary School, Central Elementary
School, Cherokee Point Elementary School, Henry
Clay Elementary School, Darnall Charter school,
Edison Elementary School, Euclid Elementary
School, Franklin Elementary School, Hamilton
Elementary School, Hardy Elementary School,
Harriet Tubman Village Charter School, Language
Academy Elementary School, Marshall Elementary,
Oak Park Music Conservatory, Rolando Park
Elementary School, Rosa Parks Elementary School,
Monroe Clark Middle School, Horace Mann Middle
School, Wilson Middle School, Crawfor Educational
Complex, Hoover High School, Catholic Charities of
San Diego, Home Start Inc., MAAC Project, San
Diego Youth and Community Services, SAY San
Diego, Somali Family Services, Union of Pan Asian
Communities, YMCA of San Diego County,
International Rescue Committee, San Diego
Mediation Center, Tariq Khamisa Foundation, Big
Brothers Big Sisters of San Diego County,
Cambodian Dancers of San Diego, San Diego Youth
and Community Services, SAY San Diego, Somali
Family Services, Union of Pan Asian Communities,
YMCA Youth & Family Services.
276

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Parent Services
Project
“Parent Services Project
engages and strengthens
families to take leadership
for the well being of their
children, families, and
communities.” Retrieved
from
http://www.idealist.org/view
/nonprofit/MfbCtDd8FCp/
Partners: Action Alliance for Children, Bahia Vista
Elementary School, Bay Area Male Involvement
Network, Bayside Elementary School, Bring Me a
Book Foundation, California Office of Child Abuse
Prevention, California Strengthening Families
Roundtable, Canal Alliance, Canal Welcome Center,
Catholic Charities Kids Club, Center for the Study of
Social Policy, City of San Rafael: Pickleweed
Community Center, College of Marin, Community
Action Marin, Davidson Middle School, E3:
Education Excellence and Equity, El Dorado County
Office of Education, Estrella Family Services,
Fairfax San Anselmo Children's Center, Federated
Indians of Graton Racheria, First 5 Marin Children
and Families Commission, Family Engagement
Institute at Foothill College, Galarza Elementary
School, Hamilton School, Hammer Montessori
School, Head Start Region II, Lake Family Resource
Center, Legal Aid of Marin, Loma Verde Elementary
School, Los Angeles County Office of
Education/Head Start Division, Luu Sutton
Elementary School, Lynwood Elementary School,
Marin Adopt a Family, Marin Child Care
Council/Parent Voices.
277

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Partnership for
Los Angeles
Schools
“To transform schools and
revolutionize school systems
to empower all students with
a high-quality education.”
Retrieved from
http://partnershipla.org/abou
t
826LA, A World Fit for Kids, ACLU, Academy for
Urban School Leadership, Achieve 3000, AEG,
Alafia Mental Health Alliance for a better
Community, Alliance for Digital Equality, Alma
Family Services. AltaMed, Amanecer, American
Promoting Study Abroad, Americorps Dream
Foundation, American Heart Association,
APSA/100K Strong Initiative, ARToy Trading,
AT&T, Autry, Beyond the Bell, BH Technology
Center, Bienestar, Boston Consulting Group, Boyle
Heights Beat, Boyle Heights Learning Collaborative,
Boys & Girls Club of Carson, Breed Street Shul, The
Broad Stage California, Conference for Equality &
Justice, California Emergin Technology Fund,
California Hispanic Commission on Alcohol and
Drug Abuse, California Hospital Medical Center,
California Pizza Kitchen, California Restaurant
Association, California Science Center Cal-SOAP,
Cause Connect, CDTech Cedars-Sinai COACH for
Kids, Cedars-Sinai Share & Care, Chees Hip Hop
Bootcamp, Children Uniting Nations, Chivas USA,
Circle of Friends, City of Los Angeles, City National
Bank, City Year, Clinica Romero, Collective Voices,
College Bridge, College Match, College Spring,
CollegeSummit, College Track, Communities in
Schools, Computers for Youth, CSULB MSW
Students, CSULA GEAR UP, Culinary Arts Kids
Eat, DIRECTV, Disney, Dolores Mission, East LA
Community Corp, East LA Community College
EduCare, Education Pioneers, El Centro de Ayuda,
Empower Arts LA, ENKI Health and Research
System, EnrichLA, Escalante Math Program, Everest
College, Everybody Wins LA, Experience LA Fund,
Facing History and Ourselves, Families in Schools,
Farmers Insurance, FOCUS FOX Sports, FOX
Sports West, Gay 4 Good, Geffen Playhouse, Getty
Center, Getty House, Girls Inc., Girls Today Women
Tomorrow, Great Minds In STEM, Grupo CRECER,
GRYD, HACLA, Hamilton-Selway Family, Harold
Robinson Foundation, Healthcorps, Hitachi,
hollenbeck Youth Center, Homeboy Industries, I
Have a Dream Foundation, i.am.angel foundation,
i.am.college Track, Illuminate, Education
Imagination Foundation, IMPACTO at Proyecto
Pastoral, Inner-City Arts, InnerCity Struggle, Jose
Huizar, Jose Luis Orozco, JPMorgan Chase, Junior
278

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Achievement, The Kitchen Community , Kaiser
Khalili Center, Kedren Mental Health, KIPP Charter
School, Koreh LA, LA Conservation Corps, LA
Opera, LA Phil, LA Voice, LA Youth at Work, LA's
BEEST, L.A.’s Promise, Legacy LA, Leslie Gilbert-
Lurie, Lexia, Life Moments for Women, LIFT, Los
Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce PILLAR, Los
Angeles Center for Law and Justice, Los Angeles
City College, Los Angeles County Museum of Art,
Los Angeles Education Partnership, Los Angeles
League of Arts, Los Angeles Police Department, Los
Angeles Public Library, Los Angeles Southwest
College, Los Angeles Trade Technical College, Los
Angeles Unified School District, Los Angeles Urban
Teacher Residency, Lourdes Foundation, Lucille
Roybal Family Source Center, MALDEF, Manos
Unidas, Marriott, Math for America, Mattel
Children’s Foundation, McKinsey & Company,
M.E.N.T.E., MESA, Meyer Luskin, MIND Research
Institute, Minds Matter, The Music Center, National
Endowment for the Arts - The Big Read,
Neighborhood Musical School, Network for a
healthy California, network for Teaching
Entrepreneurship, Nextdoor, NIKE, Occidental
College, Office Depot, Office of Councilmember,
Curren Price, Once Voice Scholars, Pacific Clinics,
Paramount Studios, Peace Over Violence, Peer
Health Exchange, People Coordinated Services of
Southern CA, PFLAG, PIQE, Planned Parenthood,
Playworks, Power 106, Promesa Boyle Heights,
Proyecto Pastoral, Public Counsel, Public Matters,
Pueblo del Sol, Puente Learning Center, Ramona
Mental Health Services, Reading Partners, Reading
Writing It's Exciting, Ready Set Gold, Redline Tours,
Revolution Prep Rotary, Ritz Carlton, Salesian Boys
& Girls Club, School 2 Home, Shields for families,
S.H.O.W., Sound Body Sound Mind, South Los
Angeles Math, Southwest College, SLAM Project -
College Bridge, SPARK, Step Up, Stephanie Starks,
HOPE Foundation, Student Stress & Anger
Management Program, StudentsFirst, Suite Kids,
SYTAK Youth Foundation, Teach for America,
Teaching and Learning Solutions, Team Works,
TELACU, The Jewish Federation, Temple Isaiah,
UCLA, UCLA BruinsCorps & AmeriCorps VISTA,
UCLA Cambio, UCLA Center X, UCLA Health,
279

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
UCLA MAPS-UCLA UCLA-EAOP. Union de
Vecinos, United Friends of the Children USC,
Variety Boys & Girls Club, VH1 Save the Music
Foundation, Violence Intevention Program, Vision to
Learn, Volunteers of America Los Angeles,
Wasserman Foundation, Watts Century Latino
Organization, Watts Gang Taskforce, Watts
Healthcare Corp., Watts Willowbrook Boys & Girls
Club, Weather Channel, We Care Outreach
Ministries, Weingart East Los Angeles YMCA,
Wells Fargo, Woodcraft Rangers, Word Theatre,
Worksite Wellness L.A. World Fit for Kids, World
Vision, Youth Policy Institute.
280

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
PICO
California
“Established in 1994, PICO
California brings together
clergy and community
leaders from throughout
California to affect
meaningful budget and
policy change at the state
level. Over the past 20 years,
our organizing and policy
advocacy has resulted in
increased investments in
education and healthcare,
and in programs and services
that are critical to decrease
mass incarceration and gun
violence, create
opportunities for formerly
incarcerated individuals, and
positively impact the lives of
low-income and working
families. Together, we
represent 480 congregations
and 450,0000 families of
diverse economic, racial,
ethnic and religious
backgrounds committed to
advancing racial and
economic justice in
California.” Retrieved from
http://www.picocalifornia.or
g/about

• Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
• Catholic Campaign for Human Development
• Evelyn and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund
• The C. S. Mott Foundation
• The California Wellness Foundation
• The California Endowment
• The David & Lucille Packard Foundation
• The Edward W. Hazen Foundation
• The James Irvine Foundation
• The Nathan Cummings Foundation
• The Needmor Fund
• The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
• Unitarian Universalist Veatch Fund at Shelter Rock
Pivot Learning
Partners
“Pivot Learning is a
nonprofit organization
whose mission is to
revitalize our public school
systems so that all students
have the opportunity to
succeed in college and
career. We partner with
education leaders at all
levels and provide them with
the knowledge, skills and
support proven to strengthen
educational systems and
transform teaching and
learning.” Retrieved from
Boeing, California Community Foundation,
California Education Policy Fund, City National
Bank, S.H. Cowell Foundation, James Irvine
Foundation, Dirk and Charlene Kabcenell
Foundation, Silicon Valley Community Foundation,
Sobrato Family Foundation, State Farm, Stuart
Foundation, Association of California School
Administrators, BCA Architects, Bergman Dacey
Goldsmith, Blach Construction, Blackboard, Dale
Scott & Company, Girard & Edwards, Illuminate
Education, Imperial County Office of Education,
K12 Insight, NextLesson, Ray Morgan Company,
and SchoolsFirst Federal Credit Union.
281

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
http://www.pivotlearning.or
g/about/mission-vision-and-
core-values/
Public
Advocates
“Communities that were
once excluded and
marginalized are energized
by their collective power to
shape public decisions and
achieve justice. As a result
of that engagement, all
Californians have the
building blocks to thrive and
to create vibrant
communities – excellent
public schools, affordable
housing, reliable public
transportation, quality health
care, good job opportunities,
and economic security.”
Retrieved from
http://www.publicadvocates.
org/mission-and-history
Verizon, WSGR, Arnold & Porter, Covington, HP,
Keker & Van Nest, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP
Attorneys, K, Morrison Foerster, Munger Tolles &
Olson, Paul Hastings, Beveridge & Diamond, CTA,
Goodwin Pocter, Outten & Golden, Jeff and Kendra
Simes, SF.
282

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Public Counsel “Public Counsel is the
nation's largest not-for-profit
law firm specializing in
delivering pro bono legal
services. Founded in 1970,
Public Counsel strives to
achieve three main goals:
protecting the legal rights of
disadvantaged children;
representing immigrants
who have been the victims
of torture, persecution,
domestic violence,
trafficking, and other crimes;
and fostering economic
justice by providing
individuals and institutions
in underserved communities
with access to quality legal
representation. Through a
pro bono model that
leverages the talents and
dedication of thousands of
attorney and law student
volunteers, Public Counsel
annually assists more than
30,000 families, children,
immigrants veterans, and
nonprofit organizations and
addresses systemic poverty
and civil rights issues
through impact litigation and
policy advocacy.” Retrieved
from
http://www.publiccounsel.or
g/about_us?id=0001
The Ahmanson Foundation, Akonadi Foundation,
American College of Bankruptcy, Annenburg
Foundation, The Annie E. Casey Foundation,
Anthony and Jeanne Pritzker Family Foundation,
Atlantic Philanthropies, Audrey Irmas Foundation for
Social Justice, Beverly Hills Bar Association, The
Burton G. Bettingen Corporation, California Bar
Foundation, California Community Foundation,
California Consumer Protection Foundation, The
California Endowment, The California Wellness
Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, Carl &
Roberta Deutsch Foundation, The Eisner Foundation,
The Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, The Every
child Foundation, Families in Schools, Ford
Foundation, The Green Foundation, The Hearst
Foundation, Herman Family Foundation, Impact
Fund, In-N-Out Burger Foundation, The Jay and
Rose Phillips Family Foundation of California, John
W. Carson Foundation, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
The Kenneth T. and Eileen L. Norris Foundation,
The Kenny Nickelson Memorial Foundation for
Homeless Veterans, Land of the Free, Los Angeles
County Bar Association, Macy's, The Max and
Victoria Dreyfus Foundation, MAZON: A Jewish
Response to Hunger, Proskauer, The Ralph M.
Parsons Foundation, Reed Elsevier, Rosalinde and
Arthur Gilbert Foundation, Rotary Club, Rx for
Reading, State Bar of California Legal Service Trust
Fund, Stuart Foundation, United Way of Greater Los
Angeles, W.M. Keck Foundation, Walter & Elise
Haas Fund, Walter S. Johnson Foundation, Weingart
Foundation, Yellow Ribbon Fund.
283

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
San Francisco
Chamber of
Commerce
“The San Francisco
Chamber of Commerce
attracts, supports, and grows
business through advocacy,
economic development, and
business development. Learn
more about our pillars.”
Retrieved from
https://sfchamber.com/cham
ber-pillars/
American Express, AT&T, Bank of America,
Dignity Health, Kaiser Permanente, PG&E, VISA,
Wells Fargo, Bechtel, Blackrock, Cisco, Meraki, City
National Bank, Comcast Business, Delta Dental,
Ghiradelli, Google, KPMG, Linkedin, Oracle, PWC,
Ray Morgan Company, Shorenstein, SutterHealth,
Union Bank, United, US Bank, Walgreens, Webcor
Builders.
San Mateo
County Central
Labor Council
“To protect and strengthen
our democratic institutions.
To secure full recognition
and enjoyment of the rights
and liberties to which we are
justly entitled and to
preserve the cherished
traditions of our democracy.
To encourage all workers
regardless of race, creed,
color, age, sex, national
origin, sexual orientation,
disability or ancestry to
share equally in the full
benefits of union
organization and to
promulgate the principles
enunciated by the AFL-CIO
that the concern of one is the
concern of all and to uphold
the Constitution of the AFL-
CIO. To aid and encourage
the sale and use of union
made goods and services
through the use of the Union
Label and other symbols; to
promote the labor press and
other means of furthering the
educations of the labor
movement. To encourage
workers to register and vote,
to exercise their full rights
and responsibilities of
Partners: AFSCME District Council 57, AFSCME
206 UAPD, AFSCME 829, AFSCME 2190, Airline
Pilots Association, Amalgamated Transit Union
1225, 1555, 1574, Bakery Workers 24 and 125,
Bricklayers & Allied Crafts 3, San Mateo County
Building Trades Council, California Conference of
Machinists, California Nurses Association/NNOC,
California School Employees Association 33, 139,
411, and 519, Carpet & Linoleum 12, Cemetery
Workers 265, Communication Workers of America
9410, 9415, and 9423, Communication Workers of
America Council 9, Electrical Workers 3, 617, 1245,
and 1501, Elevator Constructors 8, Engineers &
Scientists of California 20, Fire Fighters CDF, 798,
1507, 1879, 2400, CDF 2881, Flight Attendants-
CWA Council 11, Food & Commercial Workers 5
and 648, Glaziers 718, International Longshore &
Warehouse Union 6 and 10, International Longshore
& Warehouse District Council, Ironworkers #377,
Laborers #261, Latino Caucus of SEIU 521, Letter
Carriers 214, 1280, 1427, Letter Carrier California
State Association, Machinists 1101, 1414, 1781,
1782, Machinists 141 District Council, Machinists
190 District Council, Maritime Council of San
Francisco Bay Area and Vicinity Port, Musicians 6,
Office & Professional Employees International
Union 3 and 277, Operating Engineers 3, Pacific
Media Workers Guild CWA 39521, Painters &
Drywall Finishers Local 913, Painters - IUPAT
District Council 16, Plumbers & Steamfitters 467,
Professional & Technical Engineers 21, Roofers 40,
Service Employees International Union 521, 1000,
1021, 2015, SEIU United Service Workers - West,
284

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
citizenship, and to secure
legislation which will
safeguard and promote the
principle of free collective
bargaining, the rights of
workers, consumers, and the
security and welfare of all
the people and to oppose
legislation inimical to these
objectives. To aid and assist
affiliated unions in
extending the benefits of
mutual assistance, to
promote the organization of
the unorganized into unions
of their choosing for their
mutual aid, and to aid
workers in securing
improved wages, hours,
working conditions and safe
work environments with due
regard to the autonomy,
integrity and jurisdiction of
affiliated unions.” Retrieved
from
http://www.sanmateolaborco
uncil.org
SEIU United Healthcare Workers - West, Sheet
Metal Workers 104, Sign Display 510, Sprinkler
Fitters 483, Stationary Engineers #39, Teachers, AFT
1481, 1493,, 3267, 4681, 6179, 6294, Teachers SF
Archdiocesan 2240, Teachers Redwood City
Teachers Association, Teachers Sequoia District
Association, Teamsters 350, 665, 853, 856, 986,
2785, Teamster Joint Council 7, Theatrical 16
(Stagehands), Theatrical B-18, Transport Workers
505, UNITE HERE #2, United Transportation Union
1741.
285

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
San Mateo
County
Economic
Development
Commission
“SAMCEDA (San Mateo
County Economic
Development Association) is
the oldest business
organization on the
Peninsula, incorporated in
1953 to promote
development, and initially
known as the San Mateo
County Development
Association. Original
members were real estate
and development firms
wanting to create the
infrastructure that could
support business and provide
jobs for the local
communities on the
Peninsula. Today, the core
message that “Business is
Good and Business Brings
Opportunity,” remains
timeless. Beyond that, the
rapid pace of change and
innovation locally,
regionally, nationally, and
globally demands that
SAMCEDA meet this ever-
changing environment with
ideas and tools our members
need to be one step ahead.”
Retrieved from
http://samceda.org/san-
mateo-county-economic-
development/business-
association
Colliers International, Webcor Builders, Kaiser
Permanente, Hanson Bridgett, Brisbane Baylands.
SEIU-LA “SEIU 721 represents the
county and city employees
across Southern California,
including Ventura, Los
Angeles, Orange, and
Riverside counties and
numerous cities in the
region, as well as employees
of special districts and
publicly funded non-profits
Member dues
286

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
such as health clinics.”
Retrieved from
https://www.seiu721.org
Silicon Valley
Debug
“Silicon Valley De-Bug is a
media, community
organizing, and
entrepreneurial collective
based out of San Jose,
California. Started in the
Spring of 2001, De-Bug has
become a nationally
recognized organization
while also establishing itself
as a trusted local platform
for communities in the South
Bay region.” Retrieved from
http://www.siliconvalleydeb
ug.org/about/
Partners: CreateTV, KKUP 91.5 FM, New America
Media, San Jose Beez, Santa Clara University
Journalism Program, After Dark Prints, Bransoiled,
FunkLab, Future Arts Now, Hip Hop Congress,
Isolated Wax Records, Multicultural, Artists
Leadership Initiative, One Love Oceana, Sam
Rodriguez, Asian Law Alliance, Coalition for Justic
and Accountability, San Jose NAACP, San Mateo
Coalition to Stop Deporting Youth, Santa Clara
County Forum for Immigrant Rights and Education
Network, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Youth
United for Community Action.
Silicon Valley
Leadership
Group
“The Silicon Valley
Leadership Group is a public
policy business trade
organization. The
Leadership Group was
founded in 1978 by David
Packard of Hewlett-Packard
and represents more than
400 of Silicon Valley’s most
respected employers on
issues, programs and
campaigns that affect the
economic health and quality
of life in Silicon Valley,
including energy,
transportation, education,
housing, health care, tax
policies, economic vitality
and the environment.
Leadership Group members
collectively provide nearly
one of every three private
sector jobs in Silicon Valley
Partners: 1000 Hearts for 1000 Minds, Applied
Materials “Silicon Valley Turkey Trot,” Bay Area
Climate Collaborative, CEO Show -- 1590 KLIV,
CEQA Working Group, Educare Silicon Valley, Lam
Research “Heart and Soles 5K,” PowerSpeaking Inc.,
Santa Clara County Housing Action Coalition,
SolarTech, TiVo “Santa Run”
287

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
and contribute more than $3
trillion to the worldwide
economy.” Retrieved from
http://svlg.org/about-
us/mission-and-vision
South Bay
Center for
Counseling
“We partner with
individuals, families, and
communities throughout
L.A. County to discover and
develop tools for individual
and collective well being.”
Retrieved from
http://www.sbccthrivela.org/
#!about-us/ctuv
Partners: Weingart Foundation, Tesoro, The
California Wellness Foundation, Chevron, The James
Irvine Foundation, Harbor Community Benefit
Foundation, Goldhirsh Foundation, Wells Fargo, The
Jay & Rose Phillips Family Foundation, Roth Family
Foundation, Baby 2 Baby, United Way, Toberman
Neighborhood Center, JBL, Wencor Group, City of
Los Angeles, United Steelworkers,
DeMenno/Kerdoon, County of Los Angeles, Grifols,
The David & Lucile Packard Foundation,
Providence, Southern California Edison, The Walt
Disney Company, DCFS, Warren Resources, Bring
Me a Book, City of Carson, Goldhirsh Foundation,
Union Bank, California Resources Corporation,
Exxon Mobil, First 5 LA, KPMG, Everychild
foundation, Odyssey Investment Partners LLC,
Phillips 66, Time Warner Cable, Watson Land
Company, The Port of Los Angeles
288

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
The Children’s
Movement of
Fresno
“The Children’s Movement
of Fresno’s mission is to
inform and support
individuals and business,
community and government
leaders in Fresno County to
make the well being and
education of children a
priority in every decision.”
Retrieved from
http://www.tcmfresno.org/ab
out
211 Fresno United Way, 4141 Ministries, AIMS
Center for Math and Science Education, American
Heart Association, Apex Mind Works, Aspiranet,
Big Brothers Big Sisters, Fresno County Board of
Supervisors, Boys & Girls Club of Fresno County,
Building Neighborhood Capacity Program, Building
Youth Tomorrow Today, Boys 2 Men Girls 2
Women, C & I - ASIST -FCOE, CAL VIVA
Health/Health Net, California Health Collaborative,
California Learning Connection, CASA, CBDIO-
Centro Binacional para el Desarrollo Indigena
Oaxaquen, Central Cal. Asthma Collaborative,
Central Unified School District, Central Valley After
School Foundation, Central Valley Children's
Services Network, Central Valley Health Center,
Central Valley Regional Center, Centro La Familia,
Community Hospital Medical Center, City of Fresno,
Clovis Adult/ Pinedale Elementary, Clovis Unified
School District, Comprehensive Youth Services Inc.,
CTFF - California Teaching Fellows Foundation,
Central Valley Educational Institute/California State
University of Fresno, Department of Behavioral
Health Metro School-Based Team, Catholic Diocese
of Fresno, Fresno EOC WIC Program, EMQ
Families First, Encourage Tomorrow, Every
Neighborhood Partnership, Exceptional Parents
Unlimited, FCCAP-Fresno Council on Child Abuse
Prevention, Feed Our Future, Firebaugh Las Deltas
Unified School District, FIRM, First 5 Madera
County, Focus Forward, Fowler Unified School
District, Fresno Police Chaplaincy Program,
Freewheel Project, Fresno Adult School, Fresno
American Indian Health Project, B3 Fresno, Fresno
Barios Unidos, Fresno City College-FCC, Fresno
County Department of Social Services, Fresno
County Department of Public Health, Fresno County
Probation, Fresno County Public Library, Fresno
County Sheriff’s Office, Fresno Compact, Fresno
Council on Child Abuse Prevention, Fresno County
Department of Social Services, Fresno county
Children’s Mental Health, Fresno County
Department of Public Health, Fresno County
Department of Behavioral Health, Fresno County
District Attorney, Fresno County Library, Fresno
County Office of Education, Fresno County EOC -
Headstart, Fresno County Public Library, Fresno
289

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
County Department of Public Health, Fresno EOC-
Early Headstart, Fresno EOC-SACC, Fresno Family
Counseling Center, Fresno Grizzlies, Fresno Housing
Authority, Fresno Housing Education Corps, Fresno
Metro Ministries, Fresno Pacific University, Fresno
Police Department, Fresno Regional Foundation,
Fresno State, Fresno State-Kremen School, Fresno
Superior Court, Fresno Unified school District
School Board, FRWIB- Fresno Regional Workforce
Investment Board, Granville Homes, Greenberg
Elementary, H.O.P.E., Habitat for Humanity Fresno,
HandsOn Central California, HCCD-Highway City
Community Development, JM Consulting, Kaiser
Permanente, Kaplan Early Learning, Kings Canyon
Unified School District, League of Women Voters,
Learn 2 Earn, Marjaree Mason Center, Orange
Center, Pinedale Elementary CFL, PIQE, PlayZeum,
Reading and Beyond, Saint Agnes Medical Center,
Sanger Unified School District, Sanger-CYS Family
Resource Center, SCCCD-State Center Community
College District, SJSU, SoluNet, Stone Soup Fresno,
Summit Public Schools, Teaching Fellows, The
Children’s Corner, The Way Ministries, United Way
of Fresno County, Valley Children's Hospital, Valley
PBS, VIVA Strategies and Communications, Victim
Offender Reconciliation Program, West ED, Youth
Leadership Institute.
The Los
Angeles Trust
for Children’s
Health
“To improve student health
and increase readiness to
learn through access,
advocacy, and programs.”
Retrieved from
http://thelatrust.org
First 5 LA, California Community Foundation,
California Endowment, CVS, CFHC, harbor
Community Benefit Foundation, Dentaquest, Kaiser
Permanente, The Ralph M. Parsons Foundation, Ruth
Allen Ziegler Foundation, W.M. Keck Foundation.
290

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
United Way of
the Bay Area
“With a strong 94-year
history in the Bay Area, we
are leading the community
to overcome barriers to
economic opportunities. We
bring together individuals,
organizations and entire
sectors on research-based
work to create big and
lasting impact on our
community’s most pressing
issues, with a focus on
coming together for good to
end poverty.” Retrieved
from https://uwba.org
Chevron, Salesforce.com, Bank of America, Kresge
Foundation, Wells Fargo Bank, AT&T, IRS
Stakeholder Partnerships Education and
Communications, PG&E Corporation, San Francisco
Dept. of Children Youth & Families, Siemer Institute
for Family Stability, Callan Associates Inc., Costco,
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of San Francisco,
JPMorgan Chase Foundation, Microsoft Foundation,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, S.H. Cowell
Foundation, Tesoro, UPS, Valero Benicia Refinery,
Western Digital, Y & H Soda Foundation, ACCO
Engineered Systems, Annie E. Casey Foundation,
BNY Mellon, BRE Properties Inc., Cargill Salt,
Chinatown Fundraising Banquet, Deloitte, Delta
Dental of California, Dodge & Cox, Gordon & Rees
LLP, Janssen Pharmaceutical - Vacaville, Kaiser
Permanente, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co - SF
Office, Lisa and Douglas Goldman Fund, Macy's
Inc., Nordstrom, ProLogis, Sidley Austin LLP,
Silicon Valley Community Foundation, Stephen D.
Bechtel Jr. Foundation, Sunset Development
Company, Target Corporation, Union Bank
Foundation, Walter & Elise Haas Fund, Abbott
Laboratories, Anheuser-Busch Inc., Bank of the
West, Citi Foundation, Comcast Cable, Community
Housing Development of North, Corporation for
National and Community Service, Dean and
Margaret Lesher Foundation, East West Bank, Eli
Lilly & Company, Emergency Food & Shelter
National Board, Evelyn & Walter Haas Jr. Fund,
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Levi Strauss &
Compnay, Shell Oil Products US., TE Connectivity,
The Charles Schwab Foundation, The Morris Stulsaft
Foundation, The San Francisco Foundation, The
Starbucks Foundation, Walmart.
Waking the
Village
“Waking the Village offers
housing and support so that
Sacramento’s homeless,
parenting youth and their
children can get busy living
rather than surviving.
Through Tubman House,
young parents (18 to 21
years old) experience
healthy living, intensive
mentoring, parent coaching
The California Wellness Foundation, Sacramento
Employment and Training Agency, CGI, Raley’s Bel
Air Nob Hill Foods, Whitewater Connection.
291

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
and college support so that
they leave prepared to be
leaders in their own lives,
and leaders in the lives of
their children and
communities.” Retrieved
from
http://wakingthevillage.org/
mission/
WestCare
California, Inc.
“WestCare empowers
everyone with whom we
come into contact to engage
in a process of healing,
growth and change
benefiting themselves, their
families, coworkers and
communities.” Retrieved
from
https://www.westcare.com/p
age/who-we-are_01
Partners: FitzHouse, WestCare Endowment
Western Center
on Law &
Poverty
“Western Center leads the
fight in the courts, counties,
and capital to secure
housing, health care and a
strong safety net for low-
income Californians.”
Retrieved from
http://wclp.org/about-
us/mission-history/
Does not post donor information
Worksite
Wellness LA
“Founded in 1996, Worksite
Wellness LA’s (WWLA)
mission is “To improve the
health status of low income,
medically underserved
families through workplaces
in Los Angeles County.”
Our goal is to create a bridge
between these underserved
families and the health care
system by providing
information at the worksite
that encourages personal
responsibility, a healthy
lifestyle, and timely and
The Ahmanson Foundation, Bank of America,
Boston Private Bank & Trust Company, The
California Medical Association, The California
Wellness Foundation, Catholic Healthcare West,
Cisco Brothers, First 5 LA, First Credit Bank,
Goodwill Industries, Kaiser Permanente, Susan G.
Komen for the Cure, The Weingart Foundation,
United Way.
292

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
appropriate utilization of
health care services.”
Retrieved from
http://www.worksitewellnes
sla.org/about.php
Youth
Advocate
Network for
Sustainable
Communities
“To empower youth to be
vital participants in decision-
making processes at all
levels.” Retrieved from
http://californiacenter.org/w
ork/SYAN/
California Journal, California Teachers Association,
Chevron Corporation, Great Western Bank, James
Irvine Foundation, Morongo Bank of Mission
Indians, Sempra Energy, State Farm Insurance,
Apple Inc., California American Water, California
Building Industry Association, California Business
Properties Association, California Cable and
Telecommunications Association, California Dental
Association, California Hospital Association,
California State University, Capitol Network, Capitol
Weekly, Enterprise Holdings, Southern California
Edison, Tribal Alliance of Sovereign Indian Nations,
Union Pacific, Wells Fargo, California Teachers
Association, Sempra Energy, Edison International,
State Farm, Apple, California American Water,
California Building Industry Association, California
Business Properties Association, California Cable &
Telecommunications Associations, California Dental
Association, California Hospital Association,
California State University, Capitol Network, Capitol
Weekly, The Doctors Company, Enterprise Holdings,
Union Pacific, Tribal Alliance for Sovereign Indian
Nations, Thermo Fisher Scientific.
293

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Youth ALIVE! “Youth ALIVE! is a non-
profit public health agency
founded in 1991 dedicated to
preventing youth violence
and generating youth
leadership in California
communities experiencing
high rates of violence. Youth
ALIVE! advocates for
strategies to reduce violence,
and runs two programs in
Oakland and Los Angeles”
Retrieved from
http://www.youthalive.org/a
bout/
The Ark Foundation, California Endowment,
California Wellness Foundation, Colombia
Foundation, Crail-Johnson Foundation, David B.
Gold Foundation, David & Lucille Packard
Foundation, East Bay Community Foundation,
Evelyn & Walter Haas, Jr. Foundation, George Gund
Foundation, James Irvine Foundation, Jewish
Community Endowment Fund, Joseph Drown
Foundation, Koret Foundation, Langeloth
Foundation, Laurel Foundation, Merck Family Fund,
Morris K. Stulsaft Foundation, Public Welfare
Foundation, Rembe-Rock Foundation, Richard and
Rhoda Goldman Fund, Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation (Local Initiative Funding Partners), S.H.
Cowell Foundation, San Francisco Foundation, Tides
Foundation, United Way of the Bay Area, W.A.
Gerbode Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation,
Walter & Elise Haas Fund, Weingart Foundation,
Corporations Bank, America Foundation, CIBC
World Markets USA, Charles Schwab Corporation
Foundation, Clorox Company Foundation, Crosby,
Heafey, Roach & May Foundation, Huntsman
Architectural Group, IBM Corporation, McGraw-Hill
Matching Funds, Merck Family Fund, Metropolitan
Life Foundation, Oppenheimer Foundation Fund,
WellPoint Matching Funds, Wells Fargo Foundation,
PLUS HUNDREDS OF INDIVIDUAL DONORS
294

Organization Organization’s published
Mission/Vision
Partners
Youth Alliance “Our mission is to provide
innovative and culturally
relevant services that
strengthen and enrich youth,
families, and the
community.” Retrieved from
http://site.youthall.org
Gilroy Unified School District, Hollister School
District, City of Gilroy South County REACH Grant,
San Benito County Behavioral Health, Prop 63
Mental Health Services Act, Prevention and Early
Intervention, Santa Clara County Behavioral Health
Department of Alcohol and Drug Services, San
Benito County Probation, City of Hollister, Latino
Community Foundation, The California Endowment,
City of Gilroy Gang Resistance Grant and
Intervention Grant, SBC Health & Human Services
Child Protective Services, Gavilan College
CalWorks, Community Foundation for San Benito
County, Community Foundation for San Benito
County, Women’s Fund, Aromas/San Juan
Community Schools Foundation, Aromas/San Juan
Unified School District, City of Hollister Community
Development Block Grant, David and Lucile
Packard Foundation, South County Housing/ Eden
Housing, Castellano Family Foundation, 4H UC
Davis Extension, Monterey Peninsula Foundation,
Host of the AT&T Pebble Beach National Pro-Am,
Gilroy Rotary, Gilroy Community Foundation Latino
Family Fund, de Gilroy, Silicon Valley Hands On
Tech, Sidney E. Frank Foundation, American
Diabetes Association, Safeway, Gilroy Youth Task
Force
Youth Together “Grounded in our
commitment to peace, unity
and justice, the mission of
Youth Together is to address
the root causes of
educational inequities by
developing multiracial youth
leaders and engaging school
community allies to promote
positive school change.”
Retrieved from
http://site.youthall.org
The California Endowment, Clorox Foundation,
Akonadi Foundation, Cricket Island Foundation,
AEJ/Movement Strategy, W. Clement & Jessie V.
Stone Foundation, Irene S. Scully Foundation,
Californians for Justice - Ed Fund, Victor and
Lorraine Honig Fund, Oakland Fund for Children
and Youth, Oakland Unified School District 21st
Century, Public Interests Project.

295

Appendix G

GOVERNOR’S ADDRESSES 1911-2012
Inaugural
Year
Addressed
E ducation
Generally
Identified
Problems in
E ducation
Offered
Solutions
Governor’s Quote

1911

1915 +
Textbooks have been made free of cost to the pupils in our schools; a
fuller measure of social and industrial justice has been accorded

1917

1919

1923 + + +
The education of the youth of the state is one of the most vital matters and
while California ranks high in educational standards be it our endeavor to
have it rank still higher. Education should not be confined to book learning,
but should embrace good morals, citizenship, manual training, thrift and
loyalty to national ideals. The people are willing to contribute liberally to
education because it promotes better citizenship, but they are not willing to
have their money squandered. The educational departments of the State
should be placed on an economical and efficient basis, waste should be
eliminated, and advocates of thrift should be placed in control.

1927 + + +
California has maintained a place of leadership. Our schools are
ranked by those competent to judge as the best in the Union. Our
teachers, particularly those in rural communities, are better paid than
teachers in other states. Our teacher-training institutions are rated
extremely high and are growing better every year. Our university is
excelled by none, and a statewide system of junior colleges is
springing up by which the first two years of university work are
made accessible to almost every community. More than a third of
our entire State expenditures is devoted to education.
There are, however, certain parts of our educational machinery that
need adjustment. There have arisen conflicts, growing out of a
certain duplication of authority between the State Board of
Education, on the one hand, and the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction, on the other. It would seem wise to so modify our laws
affecting the administration of our school system that the functions
of the Board of Education shall be more clearly defined, and that the
State Superintendent shall have entire responsibility for the
educational conduct of the schools, and for the appointment of his
professional assistants.

1931 + + +
"Our public school system is properly one of the main concerns of the state
government"

1934 data not
available

1939 +

1943 +

1947 + + +
Wants more money, equal resources, and specialized resources for special
needs students

1951 + + +
Need to reorganized education finance and add additional funds for
transportation

296

1953

1959 + + +

1963 + + +
Improve the quality of education and the equality of education
1967 + + +
"Again as in the past, I assign first priority to public education, with the
emphasis on primary and secondary schools"

1971 + + +
Return textbook adoption back to local control
1975

1979

1983 + + +

1987 + + +
"Education will continue to be California's highest budget priority" "I want
to simplify the tax code, and we can save the taxpayers millions by breaking
the unwarranted concentration of XX and power that's here in Sacramento
by returning much of the decision making to local communities and school
districts"

1991 +

1995 + +
Poor Outcomes
1999 + + +
"That [improving education outcomes] will be my primary mission as your
governor"

2003 +

2005 + + +

2006 + + +
lack of funding, need more charters and local control
2007 +

2008 + + +
2009 +
2011 + + +
equity and efficiency

Abstract (if available)

Abstract One ongoing education policy debate surrounds the issue of who controls the distribution of scarce resources and in what ways those resources are to be used to improve student achievement. Contemporary scholars have identified a trend of declining local control over these decisions and an expanding role for state governments. Between 1970 and 2013, California was an exemplar of this trend

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Asset Metadata

Creator Hall, Michelle (author)

Core Title Education finance and the politics of California policymaking: a case study of the Local Control Funding Formula

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Urban Education Policy

Publication Date 07/26/2016

Defense Date 06/06/2016

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Education,equity,finance,OAI-PMH Harvest,policy,politics

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Marsh, Julie (committee chair), Brewer, Dominic (committee member), Mazmanian, Daniel A. (committee member)

Creator Email hallmd@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c40-277372

Unique identifier UC11281155

Identifier etd-HallMichel-4612.pdf (filename),usctheses-c40-277372 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-HallMichel-4612.pdf

Dmrecord 277372

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Hall, Michelle

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

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