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Federalism and the determinants of environmental policy in the American states
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Content
FEDERALISM AND THE DETERMINANTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES
by
Anthony Simon Kandel
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Political Science)
August 1992
Copyright 1992 Anthony Simon Kandel
U M I Number: DP30329
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissaiiaïion Pvblî-sMng
UMI DP30329
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
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a
This d isse rta ü o n ^ r^ te n by
under the direction of h.../.S.... Dissertation
Committee, and approved by all its members,
has been presented to and accepted by The
Graduate School, in partial fulfillm ent of re
quirem ents for the degree of
D O C TO R OF PHILOSOPH Y
Dean of G raduate Studies
U a t e .....
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairperson
This Dissertation is dedicated to my loving wife
FOR POOKY
Ill
The completion of this dissertation would not have been
possible without the generous assistance of two
special people.
Endless thzinks to Sheldon Kamieniecki and
Brother Payez
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables v
1. Introduction 1
2. An Overview of Environmental Policy 29
3. Determinants of Environmental Policy 81
4. Air Pollution Control Policy 143
5. Water Pollution Control Policy 166
6. Hazardous Waste Policy 190
7. Conclusion 205
Tables 223
References 257
LIST OF TABLES
4.1 State Level Variables used in the Air Pollution Analysis 223
4.2 Pearson Correlations between Selected Independent Variables
and Air Pollution Policy 226
4.3 State Air Pollution Spending Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 228
4.4 State Ozone Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 229
4.5 State Global Warming Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 231
4.6 State Local Automobile Test Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 233
4.7 Renew America Score for Air Pollution Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 234
5.1 State Level Variables used in the Water Pollution Analysis 236
5.2 Pearson Correlations between Selected Independent Variables
and Water Pollution Policy 238
5.3 State Water Pollution Spending Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 241
5.4 State Groundwater Protection Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 242
5.5 State Wetlands Protection Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 243
5.6 State Pesticide Permit Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 245
5.7 Renew America Score for Surface Water Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 246
VI
6.1 State Level Variables used in the Hazardous Waste Analysis 247
6.2 Pearson Correlations between Selected Independent Variables
and Hazardous Waste Policy 249
6.3 State Hazardous Waste Spending Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 251
6.4 State Superfund Plan Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 253
6.5 State Right-To-Know Policy Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 255
6.6 Renew America Score for Hazardous Waste Regressed on Selected
Independent Variables 256
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The system of government known as federalism is based on the concept
that power should be shared between a national and various subnational governing
bodies, each possessing legitimate sovereign power. Due to the nature of the
system, some degree of confusion and controversy infiltrating the mechanism of
government is bound to result. The situation in the United States is a perfect
example of such a muddled governing process. The relationship between the
federal and state governments, with local entities seemingly created to add extra
confusion into the design, amounts to a regular patchwork quilt of legislation,
administrative decisions, judicial decrees, and intergovernmental conflict. This
mélange of political organization results in a certain amount of uncertainty as to
the proper roles of each level of government, and nowhere is this uncertainty so
I obvious as in the creation and administration of public policy.
One of the reasons behind the founding fathers' decision to create a federal
system was to avoid the usurpation and abuse of power by one level of
government. Using the federal and state levels to balance one another was a
mechanism inserted into the Constitution to forestall tyrannical practices and
insure that the rights of citizens would enjoy protection from the heavy hand of a
central government. To this end, there is a multitude of historical evidence of the
strong feeling held by many of the founding fathers in support of protecting the
2
strong feeling held by many of the founding fathers in support of protecting the
rights of the states from being trampled by the federal government.
Arguments for the validation of the power of state government through
historical documentation are significant. The Declaration of Independence was
ratified separately by each state, and the creation of the states preceded any
national American government. The Peace Treaty of 1783 between Britain and
the United States recognized the individual United States "to be sovereign and
independent states" (Commager, 1963, p. Ill), and at the Constitutional
Convention, most of the states had instructed delegates to reserve "to themselves
the complete control of their internal affairs" (Berger, 1987, p. 24). The
Federalist Papers also support state power, as Madison (#39) stated that "each
state...is to be considered a sovereign body, independent of all others," and
Hamilton (#32) wrote that states retain powers which are not "exclusively
delegated" to the federal government.
There are also powerful arguments as to historical limitations on state
power. Although the Articles of Confederation maintained that each state "retains
its sovereignty," the Articles were scrapped: the Constitution, upon which the
legal base of American society came to rest, does not use the word sovereignty at
any point. In addition, the Constitution clearly outlines states' limitations through
the use of the Supremacy Clause and the fact that the United States is referred to
in the singular, as opposed to the plural references which had existed under the
Articles (Anderson, 1957). Although the original thirteen states might have
1 ^
preceded the federal government, a compact was formed in 1787 under which
power was voluntarily ceded to a central authority. In addition, three-fourths of
the currently recognized states did not precede the federal government, and the
Constitutional guarantee of equality for all states casts doubt on the concept of
prior sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment had originally granted the states "all
powers not expressly delegated" to the federal government, but in the final draft,
the word "expressly" was omitted, clearly weakening state power relative to the
federal government (Anderson, 1957). Federal intervention in state affairs was
mandated by the clause which guarantees a republican form of government in the
states, and Madison (Federalist #14) refers to the states as subordinate
governments. Finally, the flexibility of the Amendment process and judicial
interpretation and re-interpretation of Constitutional concepts exposes a
fundamental flaw in the argument for adhering to the "original intent" of the
founding fathers.
The question of how power is to be distributed between the federal and
state governments is older than the United States. It should be noted that although
local governments are normally included in the federalism equation, this study
concentrates on the state and federal levels, the only legally empowered,
sovereign governments in the American political system. Local governments exist
entirely at the whim of the states, and are devoid of Constitutional protection.
States are free to alter the powers or structures of local governments as they see
fit. This clear expression of state superiority has been adopted by both federal
4
and state courts, and is known as Dillon's Rule, after Justice John Dillon.
Therefore, questions of federalism involving local governments must be filtered
through the states.
This study investigates the question of the federal division of power within
the framework of an issue consistently growing in importance; environmental
policy. The issue of environmental protection is still fairly new relative to many
other policy areas such as the economy, education, or crime. Thus, many
questions regarding the proper role of the federal and state governments, both
theoretically and practically, are still in the early stages. One major question of
any such discussion of federalism is which factors determine the formulation of
policy. In the area of environmental policy, the 1970s witnessed a vast increase
in federal involvement due to a perceived lack of initiative by the states to handle
growing pollution difficulties. In the 1980s, however, the onus was shifted onto
the states as Ronald Reagan slashed environmental spending and proclaimed the
area the primary responsibility of state governments.
The three major pollution areas addressed in this study are air pollution,
water pollution, and hazardous and toxic waste. These subgroups of
environmental policy account for a vast percentage of legislation in the area of
pollution control. This investigation analyzes which variables among a set of
pollution, political, economic, and social conditions most heavily influence state
policy in the three areas. The findings will have critical implications for how and '
5
to what extent the federal government should play a role in state environmental
programs.
In order to provide a proper context for the analysis of the relations
between federal and state governments in the environmental sphere, the evolution
and types of federalism must be presented in an overview. The remainder of this
chapter is devoted to such a discussion, and introduces a framework for the
analysis of the state of contemporary federalism.
The Historical Context of American Federalism
Throughout the history of the United States, the relationship between the
federal and state governments has gone through several phases, shifting constantly
along the way. From the beginning of the Republic until the Civil War, the
dominant model of federal-state relations was what is referred to as dual
federalism. Under the dual system, the states and the federal government
operated within entirely different spheres, each autonomous within its realm.
Much governmental power was decentralized, giving the states wide latitude, and
allowing for the two levels to exist in a state of tension tempered by an acceptance
of the status quo. This style of federalism has also been dubbed "layer cake
federalism" (Grodzins, 1966), as the layers of government are separate and
distinct, with little if any overlap. Grodzins does note, however, that true
separation of responsibility is a myth; there has always been an overlap between
the various levels of government in the United States. In the post-bellum era, and
6
especially after the New Deal, the country entered an era of cooperative, or
"marble cake" federalism. Under this model, the federal government and the
states work together to govern society, the sharing of power and responsibility
forced upon them by the demands of a complex society. Various national
administrations have tinkered with cooperative federalism as an attempt to place a
stamp on the relationships between levels of government. President Lyndon
Johnson offered up "Creative Federalism," characterized by cooperation between
all levels of government, business, labor, and private institutions. Nixon created
"New Federalism," which stressed general revenue sharing, streamlined
administration, and a return of power to local governments, those closest to the
people.
Reagan adopted the Nixon title, but the 1980s "New Federalism" consisted
of a desire to return power to the states, grant relief from regulation, and cut
federal grant money to state and local governments. Reagan's ideological stance
indicated a desire to return to a system based upon dual federalism, as evidenced
by his offer, withdrawn after intense opposition by the nation's governors, to have
the federal government take over total responsibility for Medicaid if the states
would assume control over both the Food Stamp and Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) programs. Suspicion over continued funding levels
eventually destroyed the deal, as Reagan considered his desire to cut the federal
budget more important than political reform (Conlan and Walker, 1986). The
total Reagan plan for federalism reform has been criticized as an underhanded
7
method of cutting social programs altogether by returning responsibility to the
states without the funding to carry out the tasks required. This could partially he
a function of the tendency of the President to hang onto "political goodies," while
passing the burdens onto the states (Elazar, 1986). These various Presidential
initiatives were politically motivated, searching for a redefinition of the
relationship between governments as a cure to perceived problems in the United
States. In addition to these political versions of federalism, there are also models
based upon functional characteristics.
There are several functional models of federalism. Such conceptions of
federalism convey the nature of intergovernmental relations with a focus on
empirical realities as opposed to normative goals. One such example is picket
fence federalism. This model deemphasizes the horizontal divisions which exist
between the levels of government. Federal, state, and local levels are not
considered to be the most accurate method by which to partition government.
Instead, cleavages are made along vertical, or policy lines, such as health care,
education, social programs, and the environment. According to picket fence
federalism advocates, the various levels of government are less important than the
bureaucracies which span all three government levels (Nice, 1987). The
bureaucrats form bonds, strengthened by grants specific to their issue area and the
fact that the training and expertise of the functionaries at all levels are similar.
The fragmented nature of elected governments are unable to focus and offer a
coherent response to problems, thus leaving a vacuum which the various
8
bureaucracies quickly inhabit. As noted earlier, the President and Congress have
only a passing interest in policy implementation, choosing instead to focus most of
their efforts on policy formulation. To the bureaucrats, however, the power to
implement effectively offers a veto power over policy success. Although the
growing strength of government bureaucracy lends credence to the picket fence
theory, the fact that differences exist between policy specialists at different levels
of government casts doubt on a theory of solid unity within issue areas. For
example, although the EPA and state environmental agencies often cooperate, the
relations are not always completely amiable. In the cases of both clean-air and
clean-water policy, attempts in the 1960s to have the states set pollution standards
resulted in insufficiently stringent measures so disappointing that in many
circumstances the EPA refused to accept the
proposed regulations. This state of affairs was partial cause for the passage of
both the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act (Grunbaum and Wenner, 1986).
Another example of functional federalism is "bamboo fence" federalism, a
model which espouses a more specific view of issue areas. Levels of government
are somewhat influential, and policy areas are divided into subspecialties, such as
air pollution and water pollution, as opposed to a more monolithic view of
environmental protection. The bamboo fence theory recognizes the importance of
specialists in the policymaking process, and the differences which can exist within
a broad issue area, causing rifts which allow for greater influence from the
various levels of government.
Federalism scholar Deil Wright (1982) characterizes American federalism
as an "overlapping-authority" model. Wright describes a system wherein many
areas of government operation involve more than one level of government
simultaneously, thus leaving few areas of policy where a single jurisdiction has
complete control. This situation of limited power at any single level "produces an
authority pattern best described as bargaining" (Wright, 1982, p.38). This model
combines aspects of both competition and cooperation, as the various levels of
government work together harmoniously while concurrently attempting to gain
advantages over rivals for authority. One such example of this situation occurs in
the area of education, as federal education officials, state superintendents, and
local school boards bargain over issues such as operating budgets, capital
improvements, teacher qualifications, and curriculum composition. Critics of this
model could state that such a system reflects the waste and inefficiency of a
federal system gone amok, where everyone is trying to do everything. An
alternative view is that of a system providing various levels of protection for the
individual, so as to insure that all decisions are not made by a single entity. In
either case, as the complexity and breadth of public policy continues to expand,
the tendency of authority to overlap seems certain to increase accordingly as all
levels of government struggle to cope with the challenges of modern society.
Finally, one conceptualization of federalism which is widely discussed and
debated is that of fiscal federalism. Money is the "mothers milk" of all levels of
government, and thus the financial relationship between the federal and state
10
levels takes on a particularly sensitive nature. The manner in which the federal
government collects revenue and then distributes resources among the states is of
vast interest to state leaders and interest groups, as hundreds of billions of dollars
are annually disbursed by Washington to state and local governments.
Fiscal Federalism
The federal government has been allocating resources to the states since
before the adoption of the Constitution; in 1785, federal land was donated for the
purpose of education. Grants were relatively few and far between during the
nineteenth century, and by 1900, grants from the federal government accounted
for less than one percent of all state and local revenue (Nice, 1987). During the
twentieth century, with large booms occurring during the depression and the
1960s, monetary grants from federal to state and local sources grew enormously,
reaching close to 20 percent of all state/local revenues by the mid-1980s. The
ability of the federal government to tax incomes, the growth of national policy
due to wars and the depression, and limits placed on state governments by law
and competition with neighbors have all worked to increase the financial
dependency of the states on the federal government (Nice, 1987). The desirability
of this state of affairs is under fire, as critics level a variety of complaints based
upon issues of ideology, efficiency, accountability, and fairness.
One overriding criticism of federal intervention in state financial affairs is
the belief that grant money leads to federal government interference in the affairs
11
of the states (Wright, 1982; Hale and Palley, 1981). One study undertaken by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in 1980 found that
three-quarters of state administrators felt that federal grants led to federal
interference in affairs that should be left solely to the states (Walker, 1981). This
ties into the idea of regulatory federalism, which concerns both the division of
regulatory power and the tendency of the national government to impose
regulation upon the states. There are several ways in which grants can be tied to '
regulation (e.g., grant money can be offered on a matching basis, thus forcing a
state to allocate its own funds in order to accept the federal largesse). Grants can
also be used for political purposes. In 1979, for instance. Transportation
Secretary Neil Goldschmidt threatened to deny funds to cities which were run by
leaders who did not back Carter’s reelection campaign (Anagnason, 1982).
Although Goldschmidt backed down on his threat after he was called in by the
Senate, the use of grants for political purposes has continued and is one example
of a method by which states zmd localities are denied complete control of federal
money.
Categorical grants are allocated for specific purposes, thus forcing a state
to administer a project with which it might not be in total agreement. Although
both Nixon and Reagan attempted to reduce the number of categorical grants in
favor of more general block grants, thus offering the states more flexibility in
spending. Congress was against the idea. Interest groups pressured Congress to
continue categorical grants because the loss of such allocations in favor of block
12
grants would force the groups to fight for their share of the pie first in Congress
and then in the state legislatures. In addition, Congressmen distrust the
willingness of state officials to carry out national policy and enjoy the ability to
provide for their districts with specific distributions (Henig, 1985). This
preference was noted back in 1972 by Undersecretary of Transportation James
Boggs, who claimed that "categorical programs are nearer and dearer to
Congressmen's hearts than any other. They are the porkiest of the pork"
(Conlan, 1986, p. 103).
Fiscal federalism allows for income redistribution, which critics decry as
unfair to the more successful states. Since 1976, the ratio of money received
from states to money given to states, which had been evening out in the period
from 1967-1976, has become increasingly uneven. States such as Florida and
New Jersey pay out up to 50 percent more than they receive, while for
Mississippi and Montana the reverse is true (Hanson, 1990). States rights
advocates would prefer that the federal government lowers taxes, allowing each
state legislature room to increase its revenues in the manner of its choosing.
Aaron Wildavsky, for example, claims that the redistribution of revenue by the
federal government distorts both the concepts of state citizenship and state
responsibility (Dye, 1990). There is also the argument that infusions of federal
cash reduce the responsiveness of state policies to the desires of the inhabitants of
that state, thus diluting democratic tendencies (Dye, 1990). The competition
between state governments is healthy, as each state attempts to cater to the
13
preferences of its citizenry, taxing and spending at appropriate levels. The state
government, being closer to the people, can better gauge the public mood and
provide accordingly. Previous research has shown that state policy tends to be in
agreement with public opinion, especially when the public mood is strong
(Erikson, 1986). Should policymakers fail the public, people can "vote with their
feet," thus forcing innovation among states through competition for citizens.
Therefore, the democratic tradition of America supports the idea that state
governments are the preferred agent to carry out the will of the people.
States rights advocates also note that the federal government is less
efficient than smaller, subnational units. When policy is created nationally and
executed statewide, often separating the raising of money from the provision of
services, the result can be dysfunctional policy (Walker, 1981). The ACIR noted
in 1980 that the influence of the federal government had become increasingly
ineffective, costly, and unaccountable (Schecter, 1982). Research has shown that
very large organizations (such as the federal government) tend to be more
inefficient due to size. Workers tend to become so alienated as to pursue personal
as opposed to organizational goals, and consumers are forced to accept the
product created for an "average" customer (Williamson, 1970). This has been
found in the case of the EPA, where some solutions have been crafted by using
averages, which fails to account for the diversity of the states and regions
suffering varying degrees and types of environmental problems.
14
The final argument put forth by states rights proponents against fiscal
federalism is the idea that social needs and economic problems are not the
determinants of getting federal money; the telling factor is an efficient state
bureaucracy (Dye, 1990). This refers to the skill known as grantsmanship,
whereby knowing how and what to request is more important than need in the
federal redistribution process. Early federal water pollution grants for wastewater
treatment construction were intended to be based strictly on local needs, but states
overburdened and unfamiliar with the system had a tendency to award money on a
first come, first served basis. This aura of unfairness has continued, as many
rural officials protest that they do not possess sufficient resources to match the
proposals developed by larger and wealthier urban areas (Nice, 1987). The
application process can also be time-consuming and thus expensive; some
localities and states set a bottom limit on the amount for which they will apply so
as to insure a "profit" on receipt of the grant. Generally, critics of federal
financial intervention wish to return both fund-raising and policymaking
responsibilities to the states, while reducing the size and power of the federal
government. This view is not unanimous, however, as many scholars and
nationalists contend that federal control and power has a protective and equalizing
effect on American society.
The federal government has forced change upon the states several times in
the history of the United States. Trading restrictions, tariff collection, the
abolition of slavery, and civil rights enforcement are all examples of states
15
pressured to make changes against their will. One of the central controversies of
federalism has always been how far the federal government can push the states.
Federal involvement in fiscal and regulatory federalism gamers support for
several reasons. First, the redistribution of funds through taxation and the grant
system works as an equalizing agent across the country. The states have widely
uneven fiscal capacities; in 1982, for example, Alaska had a tax capacity
quadruple that of Mississippi. The support for federal funds being used to
provide a minimum level of service for all Americans is based upon a belief in the
responsibility of the federal government to American citizens, who also happen to
be citizens of a state. Previous research has found that levels of state spending
are becoming increasingly determined more by federal aid and less by state
resources (Dye, 1990; Anton, 1986). Such findings are often utilized as support
for demands for federal aid for environmental projects and pollution control.
Those in favor of federal intervention argue that pollution control is too expensive
for many states to afford, and therefore requires federal assistance. In addition,
the negative externalities, or spillover effects, of pollution have interstate
properties, thus creating the possibility of an equivalent problem in states with
unequal capacity to handle it. Larger, wealthier states are better able to pay for
the clean up of a toxic waste spill, while poorer states might lack the resources to
undertake a rapid clean up, thus postponing a resolution and quite possibly
allowing the problem to grow in size and severity. States not only have different
capacities but different needs as well. Many poorer states, such as Louisiana and
16
Arkansas, suffer from some of the worst environmental problems. The
knowledge that federal dollars lead to more state spending and thus stricter
regulation is linked to the belief that without federal help the poorer states would
be likely to do much less than their wealthier counterparts. Thus, it is argued, the
use of federal funds to "level the playing field" is a legitimate tool to achieve a
national goal.
Often, the argument in favor of fiscal federalism boils down to the issue of
fairness. Nationeil income tax is more progressive than state sales tax or local
property tax; thus, it is better because it is more equitable to make wealthier
citizens pay a fair share. Without federal assistance to build wastewater treatment
plants, cities will dump wastes into a river, an act which will have a minor effect
on them but will have a strong negative impact on those living directly down
river. Therefore, the intervention of the federeil government mandates a national,
as opposed to parochial, view with the goal of clean water for everyone taking
precedence over a pattern of passing problems onto the neighbors. Federal
funding also insures a basic level of service for all Americans, thereby forestalling
the prospect that those living under a state legislature which refuses to allocate
any mediccil assistance for the poor will have available some federally funded
facilities to care for those who are both impoverished and ill. Federal
intervention also prevents rampant competition between the states, which can lead
to desperate measures taken to attract industry and jobs. Such measures could
include tax breaks, lax environmental restrictions, and weak support for unions.
17
States can be afraid to act in a manner which can be construed as anti-business,
for fear of losing industry to a competing state. One example of this competition
occurred in 1980. Delaware abolished usury limits and offered tax breaks to the
banking industry, and was rewarded with an influx of banks to the state. Shortly
thereafter, Maryland abolished fees for credit cards, and three major banks moved
to Delaware. More recently. Governor Wilson of California appointed a special
commission to look into making the state competitive. Among the
recommendations were measures clearly advantageous to business, but
objectionable to many other groups. One example was the suggestion that
environmental permitting be streamlined, a euphemism which to environmentalists
implies an easing of restrictions.
Finally, the argument that less federal involvement in financial politics is
more democratic has been hotly contested. Opponents note that voter turnout for
state and local elections is much lower than for national contests, therefore
lending greater legitimacy to the federal government. Lower turnout also makes
state officials less accountable, as their constituency, often defined as the voting
population, is proportionately reduced. In addition, lobbyists for interest groups
are more coercive in states than at the federal level, a further reason to view state
legislatures as the property of an elite class (Ziegler, 1983). There are convincing
arguments on both sides of the fiscal federalism issue, as the history of the United
States has been filled with constant tension between the two levels of government.
Despite all the efforts of states rights advocates, however, the last fifty years has
18
seen a tremendous growth in national power. Morton Grodzins sums up this
situation nicely, as he notes that "no strengthening of the states will materially
reduce the present functions of the federal government, nor will it have any
marked effect on the rate of new acquisition of new federal functions The
American system is best conceived as one government serving one people"
(Walker, 1981, p .66).
The Concentration of Federal Power
Over the last half century, while various federalism plans were being
touted, the nature of federalism underwent a slow but inexorable alteration. The
momentum of change has superseded any Presidential attempts to make
meaningful modifications, as a trend toward greater national power at the expense
of the states has become solidly entrenched in the American political system. A
perfect example of this trend occurred over the last two decades in the Supreme
Court. In 1976, in the case of National League of Cities versus Userv. the court
held that federal restrictions on minimum wage and maximum working hours
were not applicable to state employees, protecting what the court referred to as
"traditional government functions." Ten years later, however, in the case of
Garcia versus San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, the court reversed itself.
The new majority claimed that the courts were not the appropriate domain to
determine the restraint on Congressional power to control state governments, thus
turning the responsibility back to the states and the political process. The Garcia
19
decision, according to legal expert Archibald Cox, was "consistent with the
Constitutional trends and decisions of the last 40 years" (Berger, 1987, p. 8).
The overwhelming presence of the federal government is summed up well by
former Governor Richard Snelling of Vermont (1977-1985), who states, "State
and local governments have lost much of their identity, becoming more like sub
national units than individual members of the federal system" (Hall, 1989, p. 6).
Following Grodzins’ use of different cakes as metaphors for styles of
federalism, perhaps the analogy most fitting for the contemporary system is that
of upside-down wedding cake federalism. The multi-tier style of a wedding cake
turned upside-down characterizes a situation where the top layer of government
(federal) is large and overbearing, while the lower levels (states) is smaller,
merely trying to retain independence and prevent themselves from being absorbed
by the crushing weight of the much larger layer above. Over the last three
decades, the states have become less partners than administrative aides to the
federal government. The ACIR describes a time before the power balance
became so skewed: "The system in 1960 clearly was a good example of
’cooperative federalism' in action...Few, if any, municipal functions and only
about half of the state responsibilities were touched in any way by federal grant or
other programs" (ACIR, 1981, p.7). As grant expenditures rose in the 1960s, the
federal government began to evolve into a monster, culminating in the present
situation of ever-increasing budgetary demands and yearly deficits running above
$300 billion. Despite this massive spending, federal grants to the states in the
20
1980s were cut sharply after decades of increases. In 1980, for example, federal
grant expenditures totalled 15.5% of all federal expenses, but by 1987, this figure
had fallen to 11% (Berger, 1987). The budget cuts enacted by Reagan in 1981
slashed spending on a variety of grant programs to the states by 25 percent. The
U.S. Conference of Mayors estimates that federal aid to state and local
governments fell $34 billion in real terms during the 1980s (O’Cleireacain, 1991).
For the states, this reduction in monies received has by no means meant an easing
I of the heavy hand of federal government regulation.
Washington uses a number of techniques to coerce state acquiescence to
federal goals. Crosscutting requirements can be placed on all grants, mandating
restrictions against discrimination, economic policy, or environmental impact.
Crossover sanctions can also be used, whereby fiscal penalties in one area can be
used to encourage action in another area. Examples of this include the loss of
federal highway funds which states risked losing in two cases: not legislating
mandatory 55 mile per hour speed limits and not instituting a 21 year old
minimum drinking age. The national government can also use partial preemption, |
which allows a state implementation authority in a policy area only if national
standards are followed. This technique has been used extensively in
environmental policy, including regulations governing air, water, and hazardous
waste. Finally, direct orders to comply with federal law can be imposed on a
state. Such action can be extremely frustrating as well as expensive for state
governments. One example of the financial pressure caused by federal mandates
21
is the regulations proposed under a 1977 disabled persons law. Had this
legislation not been altered, simply changing the subway system to meet
requirements would have cost New York City one billion dollars (Berger, 1987).
The reaction of the states to the crushing weight of mandates accompanied by
budget cuts can best be summed up using words from an article on the costs of
I federalism in the 1980s, "If the federal government isn’t paying the piper, why is
it still calling the tune?" (O'Cleireacain, 1991, p. 278).
The movement by the federal government towards greater control over
state policy, begun with the New Deal and expanded during the Great Society, has
led to an increase in its intrusion into areas over which the states might well
prefer to preside alone. The federal government is involved in policy concerning
education, prisons, police, housing, economics, health, and the environment. A
constant tension exists between those who claim that the federal government can
administrate public policy more cheaply and effectively by virtue of its economy
of scale, and states’s power advocates who believe that increased state
independence leads to more responsiveness to local needs and greater democracy.
The federal government also plays a role in guaranteeing fairness and equality,
such as by forced court implementation of legislative reapportionment and national
environmental standards which prevent states from relaxing pollution controls to
attract business. Former HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen argues, "We have to
have federal programs with strings attached because it is the only way that the
disadvantaged...will get their fair share. Unlike the federal government, city
22
councils are controlled by the real estate and industrial development interests and
they will divert the money to their ends" (Liebschutz, 1976, p. 107).
Cohen's condemnation notwithstanding, research on 35,000 municipal
governments over a five year period has shown that state governments are more
efficient than the federal government at redistribution of money to needy cities
and other areas (Stein and Hamm, 1987). The Council of State Governments has
referred to federal legislation as "piecemeal, lacking in continuity, and sometimes
characterized by ambiguity" (Council of State Governments, 1978, p. 7). Finally,
state diversity should be protected as cultures within a culture; part of the
heterogenous nature of the United States lies in the differences between the fifty
states. Aaron Wildavsky states, "Uniformity is antithetical to federalism. States
must differ if they are to do more than obey central directives" (Dye, 1990, p. 7).
The State Role in Environmental Policy
The question of whether state governments are capable of overseeing and
operating complex programs, such as air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous
waste control, is the quandary of the 1990s. In the 1960s, it was widely agreed
that many state governments were unprofessional as well as lacking in both
resources and expertise. Legislatures were poorly staffed, met rarely, and often
malapportioned. In 1969, federalism scholar James Sundquist said, "As the
federal government continues to establish national objectives that can be executed
only through state and local initiative and participation, the stake of the country in
23
the upgrading of state and local government...becomes ever greater" (Porter,
1976, p. 82). Prompted partially by the reapportionment cases of the 1960s,
which led to reductions in traditional rural power structures, it seemed that state
governments in the 1970s heeded the call to reform. Recognition by the federal
government that the states were incapable of handling environmental protection
led to the Clean Air and Clean Water legislation of the early 1970s, no doubt
I playing some role in spurring the states to action. During the 1970s, many states
rewrote Constitutions, expanded both the powers and terms of the governor, zmd
increased the professionalism of state legislatures. Jimmy Carter called for the
"New Partnership" during his term, which translated to increased state input into
the policymaking process. Federal acceptance of state capability culminated in
1980, when Ronald Reagan called for a return of much responsibility to the states.
The 1980s became a decade of development for the states politically, especieilly in
the environmental sphere, as innovation increased zmd many states took over
primacy on a variety of environmental regulations.
What remains to be seen, however, is both how far the federal government
is willing to back off from intervention in state policy and to what degree the
states have matured politically to accept increased obligations. Looking ahead to
the 1990s, quite possibly a decade of federal deficits and further increased state
capability, it seems likely that further responsibility will fall to the states. Daniel
Elazar refers to the process of policy devolvement as states being "forced to be
free." Freedom, of course, is always relative, and the devolution of obligations to
24
state governments will by no means signal a total withdrawal of the heavy federal
hand in public policy.
The Federal Role in Public Policy
The role of the national government in environmental policy has been
substantial, dating back to the first major piece of federal pollution control
legislation, the Clean Air Act of 1970. As federal restrictions and standards have
multiplied, many state governments have rebelled against the expense and loss of
independence connected with the forced implementation of federal law. Public
policy analysts have debated the question of under what conditions the federal
government should become involved in state public policy. Martin Diamond asks,
"by which level of government or combination of levels is it best that this thing or
that thing be done?" (Hawkins, 1982, p. 17). This idea of specific policy
examination should certainly take place when an issue meets two criteria: (1) the
issue must have interstate ramifications, and (2) the issue must require financial
and technical resources beyond the capacity of the state. When these criteria are
applied to environmental policy, it is clear that both tests are met. The spillover
effects of air, water, and toxic pollution bring several states into the equation. It
is clearly a source of frustration when one state toils diligently to clean up and
prevent pollution, only to suffer environmental degradation stemming from the
activities of an adjoining state. Although state competition spurs innovation and
reflects the differences which are a part of Americana, the negative aspects of
25
state autonomy must also be weighed. In addition, the costs and technical
knowledge required for cleanup and control can be astronomical. The complexity
of pollution control in a country rife with chemicals, faced with the constant strain
of balancing economics and environmentalism, and seeming to discover a new
problem daily can overload the capabilities of a state government. Repetition of
policy and research is wasteful; federal coordination can prevent such
occurrences. The inspection of the federal role, however, must include the
consideration of respect for state diversity. A reduced federal role could tend to
force state initiative, thus sparking diversity. In addition, there are always two
sides to an issue. In terms of the environment, a poor state lacking in natural
resources or industry might well be less polluted, thus lacking in wealth but
possessing an abundance of unspoiled physical beauty. Although this description
is an oversimplification, the possibility of allowing differences in state
environmental policy and allowing the population to exert the desired amount of
pressure for change must not be swept away by an overzealous proponent of
federal intervention.
An examination of the condition of state environmental policy is in order
before any conclusions are drawn about the urgency and/or the propriety of the
federal role in that policy. First, one must delve into both the historical roots of
legislation and present state policy involvement across the three pollution areas,
including a discussion of how these two phenomena relate to important concerns
I
I
of federalism. In addition, an analysis is required of the conditions and sources of ,
26
state policy in order to enter into the question of federalism armed with all
possible knowledge which could be relevant to the policy making process. The
possible environmental, political, economic, and social conditions which might
affect state policy in air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste are
crucial variables which must be considered in any discussion of the proper federal
role in these three areas. In expectation of possible findings, a pollution severity
hypothesis is put forth: Assuming actors are rational, it is expected that states
suffering the most from degraded environmental conditions will be more likely to
enact stricter policies than states which are relatively free of pollution. As
pollution worsens, and its negative effects become evident to both the public and
policymakers, support for action will increase. Public opinion will support
pollution control in response to threats to public health and to the beauty of the
land and water, and legislators will respond both to public sentiment and to
warnings from knowledgeable sources about the ever-expanding danger of
allowing pollution growth to continue unabated.
Environmental conditions, of course, must interact with the other variables
which influence state policy. The pollution severity within a state does not exist
within a vacuum. Political and social variables influencing state structure and
attitudes will influence the manner in which the pollution problem is viewed.
States with varying balances of power among the governor, legislature and
bureaucracies as well as differences in percentages of ethnic and ideological
groups, education levels, and urbanization seem likely to reflect those
27
discrepancies in state pollution control policies. In addition, economics affect the
attitudes of both public and elites as to how much pollution control is affordable
and/or desirable at any given time due to prevailing fiscal conditions. Rates of
unemployment, inflation, and economic growth are bound to prejudice attitudes
toward environmental programs. This interaction between variable groups and the
resulting findings will be helpful in drawing conclusions about the appropriate
nature of federal intervention in the creation and implementation of state clean-air,
clean-water, and hazardous waste policy.
The Plan of the Study
This study examines the determinants of state pollution control policy and
! the nature of federal-state relationships in the area of environmental policy. The
dissertation builds upon the historical and contemporary views of both federal and
state policy. In addition, the nature of federalism and its proper role in air
pollution control, water pollution control, and hazardous waste policy are
analyzed in accordance with the findings on state policy determinants.
Chapter Two introduces a preliminary discussion of state environmental
policy as well as a comprehensive review of the literature on the determinants of
American environmental attitudes and policy. The discussion of state policy
includes am introduction to Ronaild Reagan's "New Federalism" policy of the
1980s, and its resulting effects on state environmental policy. The literature
review covers the relationship between environmental attitudes and policy and
28
four sets of conditions: pollution severity, political, economic, and social. In a
rational setting, it is expected that state legislators will react to an increased level
of pollution with a strong policy aimed at abating the problem. The political
conditions include ideology, partisanship, political culture, interest groups, and
several measures of political structure. Economic factors include gross state
product per capita, per capita income, unionization, unemployment level, and
social class. These factors are particularly important in light of the ongoing
debate over how much money the federal government should grant to the states
for environmental protection and projects. Finally, social factors such as age,
race, gender, and urbanization are discussed in relation to the roles these
socializing agents contribute to the formation of attitudes on the environment.
The chapter concludes with an outline of the research design, an
explanation of the statistical techniques utilized, and information about the sources |
for the data used in the analysis.
Chapter Three deals with state air pollution control policy. The types and i
effects of air pollution are introduced. This is followed by a discussion of the
possible explanatory variables. Findings from both bivariate and multivariate
analyses are reported in the next section. A summary of the major findings and
an examination of the implications for air pollution control policy follow. A
conclusion summarizes the main points of the chapter.
The next two chapters, on water pollution control and hazardous waste
policy, respectively, follow the pattern established in the chapter on air pollution
29
control. A general introduction is followed by a preliminary view of possible
explanatory variables, the analysis of the data, a discussion of the findings and the
resulting policy implications, and a concluding section recapitulating the main
points of the chapters. Although each area of pollution is covered in the same
manner, differences between the pollution types become evident in the specific
chapters. Each pollution type is examined in terms of spending and regulatory
policies. This allows for a more accurate view of the pieces of the state
environmental policy puzzle, which are then reconstructed to form a more
comprehensive picture of both the specific policy area and state environmental
policy as a whole.
The final chapter brings together the study's findings in a discussion of the
relationship between federalism and state environmental policy. The study's
findings are reunited with the discussion of the literature on federalism in the first
chapter in order to analyze the general relationships which exist as well as convey
possibilities for future policy relationships. Any suggestions, however, for
specific government action must always take into account the fact that decisions
are ultimately made by human beings largely controlled by personal attitudes and
values. This underscores the importance of examining the sources of previous
state environmental policy.
30
CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
For the first 180 years of the United States, the role of the federal
government in environmental policy was limited primarily to the management of
public lands. Thus, the emphasis was placed on conservation and preservation,
not the abatement of pollution problems. This emphasis was reflected in air
pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste policy. All three areas were
ignored, with the exception of some limited local governmental action in air and
water policy, until after the Second World War. In the 1950s and 1960s some
tentative state and federal steps were taken, but the 1970s was the environmental
decade, as major federal legislation concerning all three pollution areas was
passed. These laws forged a federal-state partnership, as the states were forced to
play a role in pollution control. Although the 1980s was a time of federal
retrenchment from responsibility, state initiative rose in that period. Thus, the
1990s are a decade of hope, as the possibility exists that continued state efforts
combined with a resurgence of federal efforts in response to growing
environmental problems could result in a new level of commitment toward
environmental protection in the United States.
This chapter will concentrate on a discussion of three areas of
environmental policy from both a historical and a contemporary perspective. Air
pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste policy will be examined first
31
within the context of a historical overview. This section will be followed by a
discussion of more recent federal and state involvement. The discussion of the
states concentrates primarily on the 1980s, the decade in which state responsibility
for and participation in environmental matters grew considerably. This
examination of past and present policy is necessary for any discussion of future
policy, especially from a federalist perspective. The record of both the federal
and state governments to date is important to the formulation of possibilities for
forthcoming intergovernmental relations in environmental policy. Environmental
policy is incremental; therefore, a knowledge of what has transpired is crucial to
any analysis of future developments.
History of Air Pollution Legislation
Until the second half of the twentieth century the federal government had
almost no role in air pollution control policy. As early as 1881 cities such as
Chicago and Cincinnati had passed legislation designed to control smoke
problems. St Louis and Pittsburgh had taken similar steps in the early 1940s. At
the state level, California and Oregon, in 1947 and 1951 respectively, had taken
very tentative steps toward beginning to control air pollution. None of these
actions, however, had any serious effect on what had become a growing problem
of a perilous nature (Caldwell, 1976). As of 1955, no state air pollution
programs were in existence.
32
Ingram and Mann (1983) explain why state governments were so reluctant
to undertake pollution control without strong urging by the federal government.
First, the problem was regarded as interstate, and with states generally
competitive instead of cooperative, the concept of allotting resources to clean up
what is potentially the problem of another state was unattractive. Second,
industry tends to be more influential at the state level, and had been successful at
pressuring for the passage of ineffective pollution control laws. Finally, with
many voters against the idea of spending for pollution, political elites were lacking
motivation to act responsibly on environmental issues.
Jones (1975) provides further explanation for the inability of states to act
in his analysis of the 1945 air pollution disaster in Donora, Pennsylvania, which
resulted in almost half the town of 12,000 people falling ill and 20 people dying.
The state of Pennsylvania did nothing, as the Department of Health, the state
agency in charge of pollution matters, had no authority to act unless the air
pollution "nuisance" could be directly tied to health problems. In addition, there
was little organized interest group activity, thus no strong voice made demands on
the state legislature for action.
As the states were displaying reluctance to act, and the problem was being
perceived as quickly becoming dangerous, the federal government eventually took
action. The feeling that state and local governments were incapable of handling
the problem led to the onset of federal air pollution control policy in the 1950s
(Jones, 1975).
33
In 1955, Congress passed the first federal air pollution legislation. The
Federal Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 was of a limited nature, authorizing
federal research on air quality as well as technical assistance to the states.
Congress authorized five million dollars per year for five years, but at the end of
the five year period only $16.5 million had been spent. Congress, in the text of
the law, had made it clear that the states still possessed the primary responsibility
for air pollution policy. In fact, Lynton Caldwell remarks, "Prior to the 1960s,
there appears to have been no clear concept of a public responsibility for the
environment" (Caldwell, 1970, p. 7). Although the 1955 act was extended in
1962 and directed the Surgeon General to study the effects of motor vehicle
exhaust, air pollution was not really recognized as a national problem until one
year later.
The Clean Air Act of 1963 marked a change in attitude among federal
leaders, as the states were urged to utilize federal standards as a guideline for
initiating pollution abatement criteria and instituting plans for the implementation
of those criteria (Kraft and Vig, 1990). The federal government published air
quality information in order to assist the states in setting standards, but no national
standard was imposed. This act also created air quality control regions,
authorized grants to the states for air pollution control, and empowered the federal
government to intervene in interstate air pollution problems. For the case to go to
court, however, the states involved had to give consent. Although the role of the
federal government was clearly growing in 1963, the unwillingness of the federal
34
government to usurp state authority was still evident. As the 1963 act states, "the
prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of
state and local governments" (Jones, 1975, p. 74).
As the 1960s wore on, the trend toward increased federal authority
continued. In 1965, the first national regulatory act was passed, as automobile
emissions were created and enforced by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW). Two years later. Congress passed the Air Quality Act of 1967,
expanding the powers of the Secretary of HEW to combat air pollution. HEW
was directed to provide the data and criteria necessary to set air quality standards,
then allow each state to create its own regulatory mechanism, subject to review by
HEW. Should any state not set a standard, then HEW had the authority to do so.
Federal money was also provided in support for the creation of interstate air
pollution compacts, perhaps to encourage cooperation among traditionally
competing state legislatures. One clause in the 1967 act displayed the weakness
of air pollution legislation before 1970. The law stated that pollution control was
to be undertaken selectively with regard for technological and economic
feasibility. This clause allowed an easy escape for state legislatures pressured by
industry to pass lax controls. The threat of increased costs leading to layoffs
could well fall within the range of economic infeasibility. Thus, although the
power of the federal government, specifically HEW, was increased, so was state
power. The loser in the contest for authority were local governments, which lost
a great deal of independence to the broader state programs. Another weakness
35
lay in the fact that should states not enforce their standards, HEW could request
the Attorney General to take the case to court only when interstate air pollution
occurred. Therefore, unless interstate ramifications could be proven, states were
free to ignore those polluters who refused to obey the regulatory principles laid
out by the state legislature and approved by HEW.
The first truly serious step taken by the federal government to combat air
pollution in the environmental decade resulted in the passage of the Clean Air Act
of 1970. This first major piece of environmental legislation was brought on in
part by a realization that the environmental crisis had grown to national
proportions and that the limited federal role of the past had become insufficient
(Kraft and Vig, 1990). Many states had feared losing business, and thus had
avoided stringent environmental regulation. Although the states and industry had
fought an expanded federal role, the perception that the states were not
performing adequately forced the federal government into action (Lowry, 1992).
The Clean Air Act was the first major piece of federal legislation aimed at
attacking a single pollution issue, preceding both the Clean Water Act and the
hazardous waste legislation of the mid 1970s. Truly the father of federal
legislation directed at pollution reduction, the Clean Air Act signaled the intent of
the federal government to become serious about pollution abatement. Until the
passage of the Clean Air Act, the federal government had chosen to concentrate
on research efforts and stress the responsibility of the states for environmental
issues. Public policy in the environmental area had been characterized by
____________________________j
36
incrementalism; prodded by the flourishing environmental movement of the late
1960s, however, Congress took a revolutionary step and inaugurated the era of
modern environmental legislation in 1970.
Prior to 1970, a majority of the states were lacking in the commitment of
both money and staffing to the fight against air pollution (Lowry, 1992). Thus,
the states were forced into action as the Clean Air Act established national air
quality standards, to be determined by the newly formed United States EPA, in
order to accomplish a series of goals. The National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) would force areas with dirty air to improve their air quality
as well as prevent states from constantly easing pollution restrictions in order to
compete with one another for business. The legislation also placed a cap on
emissions from both stationary sources and motor vehicles. Finally, each state
was required to develop a state implementation plan (SIP) by 1975, outlining how
federal standards would be achieved.
On the one hand. Congress was very specific in some portions of the act;
one example of this was the mandate that automobile emissions of hydrocarbons
and carbon monoxide be reduced by 90 percent within five years. On the other
hand, the EPA was granted great flexibility under the act, which has proved to be
a problem. The clause allowing the EPA Administrator to grant extensions, a
prerogative which has been utilized several times and has thus weakened full
implementation and enforcement of the law. It should be noted, however, that
Congress itself has added to this problem by also postponing deadlines on several
37
occasions. The Clean Air Act established a new method of environmental
regulation, described as either "standards-and-enforcement" or "command-and-
control." This method meant that the government would set standards and then
enforce them using a variety of coercive techniques, such as monetary penalties,
civil litigation, and even criminal charges.
In 1977, the Clean Air Act was amended. These amendments were a
mixture of strengths and weaknesses, as cross-pressures forced Congressional
action in two directions at once. As the environmental movement began to lose
steam, other issues, especially the energy crisis brought on by the 1973 Arab oil
embargo, began to replace the environment at the top of the political agenda.
This window of opportunity was not lost on interested parties, and both polluters
and state governments took advantage of the moment. Deadlines for meeting
requirements on motor vehicle emissions were extended. SIP deadlines were also
postponed. This move was a political necessity since few areas of the country had
achieved the NAAQS. Bringing one or two lawbreakers under control can be
accomplished, but when practically the entire country is in violation. Congress no
doubt found it easier and more accommodating to a majority of constituents to
merely change the law, thus in effect granting widespread amnesty for polluters,
albeit of a temporary nature.
Congress also took a step which cheered environmentalists. In 1972, the
; Supreme Court decided, in the case of Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus. that the
protection under Clean Air Act prohibited areas with pristine air from
38
significantly spoiling it. This was written into the 1977 CAA Amendments, as the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program, PSD allowed only very
small increases in pollution levels for places with practically unpolluted air, such
as national parks and other underpopulated, undeveloped areas. All existing
pollution sources in these areas had to install the Best Available Technology
(BAT) to control air pollutants. This decision greatly angered energy interests
and developers, who were eager to take advantage of the abundant resources and
wide open spaces available in much of the western part of the country. Many
state and local governments were also dissatisfied with the original CAA. First,
they felt excluded from the policy making process. The CAA granted broad
powers to the EPA, including what subnational governments viewed as an
infringement of enforcement sovereignty. There have since been complaints that
the EPA has delayed in relinquishing the power to control air pollution programs
to the states (Tobin, 1984). State and local governments were also concerned that
the nationalization of air pollution control policy would ignore problems and
preferences specific to various regions. An example of this fear being realized
occurred in the early 1970s. The EPA drew up a plan for California air pollution
reduction which would have forced gasoline rationing six months a year (Tobin,
1984). Although the plan was eventually dropped, such impractical ideas flowing
from the EPA chilled state enthusiasm for air pollution regulation based in
Washington.
39
State and local governments were also worried that overly stringent air
pollution restrictions would inhibit desired economic development (Rosenbaum
1985). State and local politicians are highly sensitive to subnational economic
indicators, as measures of growth and unemployment often play heavy roles in
public enthusiasm for or against incumbent legislators. There was a distinct
worry among many state and local leaders that the restrictions imposed by the
CAA would inhibit the development of new industry, therefore lowering the
economic strength of the affected area. Subsequent research, however, has shown
that the EPA ozone standard attainment status for a county is unrelated to that
county's level of success in attracting industry (McConnell and Schwab, 1990).
The PSD program, however, was not a one-sided piece of legislation.
State governments were granted greater flexibility under the plan, as states were
empowered to assign all airsheds within their domain which already met NAAQ
standards into one of three classes. Although many economic interests were still
unhappy at the fact that there was less freedom to pollute than in areas which did
not fall under the PSD program, the states' authority to classify airsheds and
petition the EPA for certain areas to be reclassified into a class with higher
allowable levels of pollution was indeed a step away from heavy-handed federal
rule.
During the 1980s, the emphasis placed by the Reagan Administration on
both fostering economic growth and reducing governmental regulation of business
served as an insurmountable obstacle to the Congressional passage of any new
40
clean-air legislation. After the election of George Bush in 1988, however, several
key changes occurred which gave clean-air proponents reason for optimism.
First, President Bush displayed more support for clean-air legislation than his
predecessor. In addition, Robert Byrd, the Senate Majority leader, had long been
an opponent of strict clean-air laws due to his allegiance to the powerful coal
mining industry in his home state of West Virginia. The replacement of Byrd by
a strong supporter of environmental regulation, George Mitchell of Maine, gave
clean-air advocates a powerful ally leading the Senate. This combination of
changes, after thirteen years of legislative gridlock, worked to create the
atmosphere that eventually led to the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.
The 1990 clean-air legislation was both a continuation of earlier policy and
truly a sign of the times. The amendments direct that areas which are in violation
of EPA mandated ozone and carbon monoxide levels must take action toward
reduction of these infractions. Should these "non-attainment" areas fail in meeting
federal deadlines for compliance, mandatory sanctions will be implemented,
including loss of federal highway funds and restrictions on new pollution sources
so strict as to become a prohibition of new development. The EPA can also apply
further penalties with discretion, including the power to impound state and local
pollution control grants. These steps are severe, but the past tendencies of the
Congress and the EPA to grant extensions leaves latitude for skepticism as to
whether the punishments will be enforced.
41
Stringent standards regulating motor vehicle tailpipe emissions have also
been included, as well as directives to oil refineries to make gasoline 15 percent
cleaner by 1995 and 25 percent cleaner by the year 2000. There is also a
stipulation that promotes the use of clean burning fuel vehicles, such as electric or
hydrogen powered cars, although the states are given the option of whether or not
to participate. This ambitious proposal is being tested in California, where
vehicular air pollution is the most severe in the country. The EPA is required to
set standards which must reduce both toxic air pollutants and the use of CFCs,
which, as noted earlier, do great damage to the ozone layer.
The section of the law requiring EPA-approved permits for major pollution
sources will likely have a strong impact on the states. Although about two-thirds
of the states presently require permits for various sources of air pollution, the new !
system will insure that minimum standards are met. State permits must meet
federal limits on the amount of pollutants allowed into the air. The permit system
also has a clause which deflects growing state criticism over the imposition of
federal mandates without the support of federal funding. The states are required
to charge a sufficient amount for the permits to cover the costs of administrating
the permit plan. The EPA, however, is to insure that funds collected from the
sale of permits are spent only on the permit program. Thus, although the states
have the flexibility to what the cost should be to various polluters, the permit
system establishes a solid source of long-term funding for state air pollution
control programs.
42
The 1990 legislation also addresses a relatively new issue in air pollution,
that of acid precipitation. Utility power plants are required to reduce emissions of
both sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides. Much as the 1970 Clean Air Act spurred
the development of the automobile catalytic converter, there is a 1990 clause
which depends on yet undeveloped technology. Utilities can exempt themselves
from the emissions regulations by installing clean coal technology. This is
defined by the law as "any technology, not currently in widespread use, that
significantly reduces emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides during the use
of coal for the generation of electricity" (New, 1991, p .8). Although the
murkiness behind the term "significant" could prove to be a loophole, the
advantage of pollution reducing technology could prove to be a boon for the
research and development of new equipment; already, several methods of cleaning
sulfur from coal are being developed (Corcoran, 1991).
Finally, the most revolutionary aspect of the new law is a step away from
the traditional "command-and-control" form of pollution regulation. This comes
in the form of marketable air pollution permits. Utilities which are able to reduce
their pollution output below the EPA directed allowable level can defray the cost
of pollution control by selling permits to another polluter who has exceeded the
legal limit and therefore must buy the permits or suffer sanctions. This process
creates increased incentive for the purchase of equipment such as smokestack
scrubbers, which clean flue gases and remove pollutants, as at least a portion of
the cost can be recovered. This could create a more business-oriented mode of
43
thought, where pollution equipment can be viewed as "paying for itself" as
opposed to being merely part of the benefit-free, costly regulatory burden imposed
by the government. This plan is part of a tradition of EPA innovation in air
pollution control, including such past attempts to provide flexibility like the
"bubble" concept, which allows a plant to cut emissions in different areas as
management sees fit, as long as the total output of the plant meets legal
guidelines. Although the business community has long claimed these market
oriented techniques are more efficient and effective, research has found that
incentive-based regulation is only slightly better, and when command and control
is driven by economic as opposed to political concerns, the two techniques are
practically equivalent in terms of success (Oates et al., 1989). Still, more
evidence is needed before any conclusions can be drawn, and the presence of
innovation at the federal level, seeming to be previously a state monopoly, is
heartening.
Air quality, when measured on a comprehensive basis, has improved in the
twenty years of extensive federal involvement. The six major air pollutants
declined by an average of 34 percent from 1970-1986, and the number of
unhealthful air quality days has been markedly reduced in most parts of the
United States (Kraft and Vig, 1990). Serious problems remain, however. Over
100 urban areas, including Los Angeles and New York, continue to fall short of
federal standards for limits on ozone or carbon monoxide, and both toxic air
pollutants and acid rain remain largely unaddressed issues (Kraft and Vig, 1990).
44
Finally, CFC output has risen, and despite the rise in carbon dioxide output, a
major cause of global warming. President Bush has steadfastly refused to set
limits on this pollutant for fear of stunting economic growth. Generally, the
report card on air pollution is mixed; lead and particulate outputs have been
slashed, while other substances have increased. The new challenges facing the
government in the 1990s will certainly require an increased amount of innovation
and attention as the road ahead, paved with unknown aspects of new problems and
budgetary restrictions, seems likely to be more arduous than that which has
already been traveled.
State Involvement in Air Pollution Policy
One reason behind the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act is the difficulties
shown by many of the states in achieving passage of clean-air legislation on their
own. Worries over unemployment, arguments over responsibility, utility threats
of rate hikes, state competition for industry, and the American tradition equating
unrestricted automobile use with freedom have combined to limit the opportunities
for state representatives to gather the support for air pollution abatement
legislation.
There have been exceptions, however, as some states have worked
strenuously to combat smog and/or acid rain. In the Northeast, where acid rain is
particularly damaging, some steps have been taken to combat air pollution
problems. In 1984, New York became the first state to take express action to
45
stop acid rain. The state's Environmental Conservation Commissioner refused to
allow three utilities to bum coal unless they first installed scrubbers. More
recently, a number of eastern states, including New York, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire, have set caps on annual sulfur dioxide emissions, a primary
cause of acid precipitation. California, which also has acid rain problems,
imposes fees on sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions, a program which
raised $800,000 for acid rain research in 1987. Wisconsin, prior to the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, instituted emissions trading on a statewide basis,
allowing utilities to adjust and trade as long as total sulfur dioxide emissions are
within acceptable aggregate guidelines. The state of Minnesota, in order to
protect its many fragile lakes, has mandated the most draconian emissions cuts in
the country. Sensitive areas are identified, and in those sites emissions must be
reduced by 25 percent over 1980 levels. Furthermore, the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, in order to achieve state goals, has placed limits on the two
largest utilities in the state (Schmandt et al., 1988). In a state with bitterly cold
winters, such a challenge to the utilities is not a timid tactic. In addition to
Michigan and Wisconsin, Minnesota has also worked with Provincial governments
in Canada to reduce the amount of acid rain each side causes to fall on the other.
Although such contacts are positive, substantive results are made difficult by the
fact that the above noted states are primarily recipients of pollution. The primary
polluting states, Indiana, Illinois, West Virginia, and especially Ohio, have shown !
little or no interest in reducing emissions (Schmandt et al., 1988). The highly
46
mobile nature of air pollution, often borne by the winds, makes large variations in
state policy all the more discouraging to states attempting to clean the air, only to
be fouled by a neighboring state's smokestack emissions and exhaust fumes.
Several states have also worked to cut other types of air pollutants.
Several New England states as well as New Jersey now require new nozzles on
gasoline pumps which restrict the release of vapors, thus reducing hydrocarbon
pollution. Connecticut has passed a global warming law which mandates that all
state-owned vehicles must average 45 miles per gallon by the year 2000, as well
as authorizing sanctions against the owners of any new building which fails to
meet state energy conservation guidelines.
In general, the states have had great difficulty overcoming the negative
effects of the automobile. Americans presently drive four times as many miles as
they did 40 years ago, and more than the rest of the world combined. The
number of cars on the road has also skyrocketed, as the one car family now seems
to be a relic of ancient history. James Bond, the executive Director of the
California Air Resources Board, underlines the frustration felt by many pollution
control officials. Bond states that "all the progress we are making through fuel
efficient technology is being eaten up by growth" (Hall and Kerr, 1991, p. 15).
Pollution officials are no doubt further disconcerted by the apparent widespread
unwillingness of state legislatures to support more environmentally efficient
transportation. Sadly, 31 states allocate less than three dollars for mass transit for
every hundred dollars spent on highways.
47
There are indications, however, that the future of mass transit might be
brighter. Congress recently passed a $151 billion transportation bill, which for
the first time gives the states great flexibility in deciding whether to spend dollars
on highways or mass transit. Massive public works projects could eventually
erect a truly utilitarian mass transit structure, thus weaning Americans from their
automobiles. This could be especially attractive, as the more confined work space
and easier access to the work site could mean more jobs created for every mass
transit dollar than its highway counterpart. Some states have also undertaken
impressive steps in the fight against motor vehicle pollution which could well be
the precursor of other state or even federal legislation.
Denver, a city situated between mountains cursed by a smog-retaining
inversion layer, and possessing little mass transit, is a recipe for air pollution
disaster. For years, the city was indeed covered by a thick blanket of smog.
Throughout the 1980s, as nearby ski resorts such as Aspen grew in popularity and
thus population, the trendy practice of installing and using wood-buming stoves
began to increase the air pollution in formerly pristine areas. The state of
Colorado, in cooperation with local governments, has taken steps to counteract
these negative effects of growth. Mandated improvements in automobile
inspection, state subsidies for mass transit, limits on wood-buming stoves, and
compulsory reductions in gasoline consumption have resulted in notable
improvement in the status of the air in the state. In the Denver Metropolitan area.
for example, the number of days of noncompliance with federal carbon monoxide
levels fell from 80 in 1984 to four in 1990 (Harris, 1991),
California has been a leader in air pollution control, as the geographic
structure of greater metropolitan Los Angeles combined with explosive population
growth and the "car culture" have created the dirtiest air in the country. Pollution
control in the Los Angeles area began shortly after the Second World War, and in
1961, California became the first state to act on emission control by mandating a
crankcase device on all vehicles within the state. Recently, the California Air
Resources Board (ARB), proprietor of the nation's smoggiest skies due largely to
the Los Angeles area, fought off intense lobbying by oil companies and in
November of 1991 adopted regulations mandating that all gasoline sold in the state
be cleaner by 1996. The board has also bucked pressure from small refineries by
its recent implementation, on January 1, 1992, of a total ban on leaded gasoline in
the state.
The ARB has also passed regulations which use incentives as a tool.
Private firms which employ over 100 people must encourage car-pooling by
giving information on car-pooling, as well as forcing those who drive alone to pay
higher parking fees. This use of incentives seems likely to increase, as the
consensus to date has been that the system has been quite successful in California
(Kamieniecki and Ferrall, 1991).
The state legislature has also made efforts to control air pollution. In
1990, both the State Assembly and the State Senate overwhelmingly passed the
49
"Drive-Plus" plan, which would have offered rebates for vehicles with less
emissions, paid for by taxing more polluting vehicles in the same class. The plem,
however, was vetoed by Governor Deukmejian, in line with his antipathy to what
he considered excessive regulation. Finally, the Public Utilities Commission
(PUC) implemented the "least cost" conservation mandate, which stated that if
energy efficiency improvements cost less than a new plant and supplies an equal
amount of energy, then the cheaper option must be implemented first (Cavanaugh
and Rosenfeld, 1990).
The "least cost" program is representative of the leading environmental
role California plays among the several states. The program was adopted by
seventeen other states shortly after passage in California. In a similar fashion,
soon after the ARB imposed tough air quality standards intending to cut
automobile emissions, both New York and Massachusetts followed suit. This
trend widened in November of 1991, when, utilizing a choice allowed under the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, twelve eastern states from Virginia to Maine
and the District of Columbia opted to implement California's clean-air plan
instead of the plan offered by the federal government. The pioneering spirit of
the state, coupled with the severity of the air pollution problem, has prodded
California into a position of leadership in air pollution innovation among the
states. As only 15 percent of the state's air pollution stems from industry,
innovation is necessary to create practical solutions for the reduction of the
majority of the state's air pollution; that which is emitted from non-point sources.
50
The massive population and industrial growth explosion in California will
guarantee that polluting sources will not decrease in volume. Therefore, it seems
inevitable that the state bureaucracy, in concert with local and regional boards,
should continue to play a leading role in fighting air pollution in the near future.
The prolonged economic recession in the early 1990s has forced cutbacks
in many state budgets and put pressure on state legislators to create jobs for the
swelling ranks of the unemployed. In this atmosphere, the possibility exists that
states will opt to reduce the emphasis on environmental protection in order to free
up business resources to protect the job market, and by association, the state and
local tax bases. Kamieniecki and Ferrall's work on air pollution in California
notes, in reference to the difficult economic climate, "it is uncertain whether state
legislators...will be willing to make the changes in laws and business practices
necessary for effective pollution control. Furthermore, opposition by commercial,
industrial, agricultural, and labor interests...is most likely to be strong during
hard economic times" (1991, p. 20).
An example of this phenomenon is occurring at the federal level. The
business community, backed by Vice President Quayle's Council on
Competitiveness, has lobbied the EPA for favorable implementation rules under
the Clean Air Act. The request has been for a stipulation which allows industry
to make changes in emissions of regulated pollutants after requesting permission
from the state. The catch is that should a state not respond to the petition within
seven days, the change is automatically approved. This blatantly pro-business
51
ruling was justified by William Rosenberg, the EPA Assistant Administrator for
Air and Radiation, who stated, "We are doing everything we can to minimize
inefficiencies" (Tucker, 1991, p. 171). The response to these proposals by the
Sierra Club, however, was condemnatory: "The regulations...will allow industries
to do just about anything they want" (Tucker, 1991, p. 171). In this manner
federal action can place great strain on state bureaucracies, severely hindering
state efforts to resist the pressure of large business interests.
It seems likely that other states, also hit hard by the recession in the early
1990s, will be equally unwilling to take strong steps to regulate the business
community during a period of high unemployment and state budget deficits. Both
Ohio and Illinois, budgets slashed due to federal cutbacks, have had to curtail
state endeavors to reduce air pollution. One study of state air pollution control
managers found that over half believe that state competition for industry will
pressure state governments to lower the emphasis on enforcement of air pollution
regulations (Kraft, Clary and Tobin, 1988). Emphasis on enforcement in the
midwest is made notably more difficult by the political power of industrial
polluters, an overall poor economic climate, and the threat of many industries to
relocate south, where restrictions are more relaxed (Kraft, Clary and Tobin,
1988).
Energy use reduction is closely related to the abatement of air pollution.
The United States uses fossil fuels to produce 93% of its energy, spewing a
variety of pollutants into the atmosphere (Rosenbaum, 1985). There have been a
52
number of steps taken by the states to encourage the public to use less energy. In
Oregon, state law requires all local governments to develop land use plans which
fall under state guidelines, including the setting of boundaries for urban growth
and protecting open spaces in and around the cities. The prevention of urban
sprawl reduces the distances people need to travel for work and pleasure, thus
reducing automobile emissions. The state also recently passed a transportation
planning regulation, which requires cities to consider land use when improving
transit (Lowe, 1992). This ruling is certain to provide support for increased use
of mass transit in Oregon's cities, as space used for parking and traffic will need
to be reduced under the urban growth management plans.
Florida passed a strict energy conservation law which sets tough guidelines
for the efficiency level of all home appliances. The savings were so impressive
that several states copied the plan and a new Florida coal driven power plant was
canceled (Hall and Kerr, 1991). Former Governor Thomas Keane of New Jersey
issued an executive order directing all state agencies to work for the reduction of
global warming by conserving energy, recycling CFCs, and planting trees, which
absorb carbon dioxide. Vermont has also taken a step against ozone destruction
by banning automobile air conditioners which use CFCs. Although some critics
note that the cold northern state of Vermont is not the place where such legislation
is most needed, the importance of an idea being implemented in the hope that it
will spread cannot be overemphasized. Should New Jersey's plan, implemented
by a retiring and thus politically invulnerable governor, prove successful, perhaps
53
other Governors will see political benefit in such policies and implement them in a
timely fashion.
In both Alaska and New York, strong state home weatherization programs
provide jobs and create more energy efficiency, especially among low-income
residents. The simple techniques needed to provide insulation and protection can
result in huge energy savings, as heat and cooling are prevented from escaping the
structure. Hawaii has experimented with state-sponsored wind power programs,
and California grants tax credits and research grants to producers of renewable
energy, including solar and wind power. The California Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) has also taken steps to stimulate energy conservation and thus
reduce pollution. In 1990, the PUC approved regulatory alterations which
allowed utilities to profit by saving energy. This change has resulted in utility
corporations offering rebates for consumers who purchase energy-efficient
appliances or modernize their homes in order to save energy. Such an incentive-
based approach has proved successful, linking consumers and utilities together in
the fight against wasteful energy consumption and its negative side effect, dirty
air.
The states, under the federal mandate of the Clean Air Act, have been
forced into the battle against dirty air. Although difficult economic times and
questionable regulation hamper overall efforts to fight air pollution, the problems
of traffic congestion and energy supplies could propel the states into actions which
will be helpful in achieving cleaner air. It seems certain that a variety of actions
54
will be taken by legislatures across the 50 states. The capabilities, environmental
philosophies and problem levels of the several states vary to such a degree as to
insure that differences in air pollution control policy is a certainty. This certainty
raises the question of the possible need for federal aid to the states for assistance
in the battle against dirty air. This aid could come in the form of grants,
technological assistance, or help in enforcing regulations and bringing polluters
under control. Such examples of federal aid could well result in greater federal-
state cooperation, further blurring the lines of "dual federalism" and enhancing the
overall battle against air pollution by combining the resources and capabilities of
two levels of government. Although differences in state policy will remain, the
aggregate level of the 50 state campaigns for clean-air can only be aided by a
greater degree of cooperation between the federal and state governments.
History of Water Pollution Legislation
Similar to the situation in air pollution control, state laxity eventually led
to federal involvement in the battle against water pollution (Caldwell, 1970). This
intervention began in 1948 with the passage of the Water Pollution Control Act.
This legislation provided federal assistance for local efforts to build sewage
treatment plants and created a Pollution Control Advisory Board. The act allowed
for federal enforcement of polluters in interstate cases, but only at the request of a
governor. This restriction was in line with the care taken by Congress to make it
clear that the states were still fundamentally responsible for controlling the quality
55
of their waters. The legislation stated that it was Congressional policy to
"recognize, preserve, and protect the priniary responsibilities and rights of the
states in controlling water pollution" (Grad et al., 1971, p. 50).
In 1956, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted. Research
grants were made available to both public and private institutions, the federal
government was given increased ability to handle interstate polluters, and a
program of assistance for wastewater plant construction was set up which would
disperse over one billion dollars to state and local governments over the following
twelve years. Although more stringent regulation was proposed in 1965,
President Eisenhower vetoed the legislation claiming that "water pollution is a
uniquely local plight" (Ball, 1976, p. 175). This statement was an ideal example i
of the prevalent federal attitude demanding primarily state and local responsibility
for environmental problems.
In 1965, states were required to establish quality standards for interstate
waterways under the regulations of the Federal Water Quality Act. The standards
had to be set within a two year timetable, or the newly created Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration, within the Department of the Interior, would
create standards for stalling states. This legislation was the first example of true
federal environmental leadership, establishing a national policy for water pollution
(Grad et al., 1971). The act increased funding levels for sewage plant
construction and research. Like the 1948 and 1956 legislation, this act made it
clear that the states had principal responsibility for water pollution control. Thus,
56
the trend of increased federal power combined with continued prodding of state
governments to take direct responsibility for the overall program existed in water
as well as air pollution control policy.
State assistance was mandated under the terms of the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970. This law directed any applicant for a federal permit to
discharge into navigable waters to first obtain a certification from the proper state
agency attesting that the discharge activity would not violate water standards.
Thus, the states were drawn into the regulatory scheme, albeit in partnership with
the federal government. As water pollution problems continued to grow,
however, the federal government seemed to tire of waiting for a concerted burst
of action from the states. As the environmental decade of the 1970s began, it
soon became apparent that decisive policy greatly expanding federal involvement
was on the minds of Congress.
The water pollution problem in the United States was epitomized in 1969
when the Cuyahoga River, which runs through Cleveland, was so polluted that it
burst into flames. The increased concern among both leaders and citizens
coalesced to give birth to the first major piece of federal legislation concerned
with the water pollution problem, passed on the heels of the Clean Air Act of
1970. The second step in the environmental revolution was titled the Federal
W ater Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA), also known as the
Clean Water Act. Although the original act was passed in 1948, the 1972
Amendments were such a drastic change as to constitute a new era in water
57
pollution legislation. The FWPCA was established with the intent of reaching an
ambitious pair of goals. First, by 1985, zero pollution would be discharged into
any navigable waters in the United States. En route to this elimination of the
problem, by 1983, all waters were to be "fishable and swimmable," or clean
enough for recreation and to protect fish and wildlife dependent upon the habitat.
These goals were to be achieved by setting dual limits on pollution. The law
established restrictions on both water quality and effluent discharges. Water
quality was to be determined by the states, which would designate each body of
water to be used for a specific purpose, and then regulate discharges in order to
allow that purpose to be achieved. This aspect of the law gave the states latitude
which the Clean Air Act did not offer until the 1977 Amendments were passed.
Obviously, a lake designated for waste disposal would be the repository of more
pollution than one selected as a site for swimming. The EPA also set a standard,
however, which designated which technologies would have to be used in order to
control pollution. Within seven years, all dischargers were required to have the
"best practicable control technology," and within eleven years, the "best available
technology" (BAT). This technology-based regulatory system could not be
avoided by polluters in favor of state mcuidated water quality rules, as the stricter
of the two standards had to be followed. The law also mandated technology for
wastewater treatment plants, restricted toxic discharges, and allocated $18 billion
over two years for capital construction of wastewater treatment plants, with the
58
mandated that all polluters had to possess a permit under the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which outlines the requirements the
applicant must follow. The permit can be issued by either the EPA or, if a state
has been granted program control, by a state agency. The state may exceed
federal standards, but must meet the minimum established principles. The
NPDES program was established primarily to keep track of industrial polluters
and municipal wastewater treatment plants, the two largest contributors to point-
source water pollution (Wassenberg, 1986).
In 1974, as Congress became increasingly concerned over the fouling of
drinking water sources, it passed the Safe Water Drinking Act. This legislation
authorized the federal government to set National Primary Drinking Water
Standards, which established limits on various types of contaminants. The states
are given the primary responsibility for enforcing the standards, although the
federal government regulates state programs, including those which protect
underground water sources. This legislation was strengthened in 1986, as the
regulation of many chemicals was mandated to be undertaken within a strict
timetable limited to three years.
The Clean Water Act was amended in 1977, in a manner similar to that of
the Clean Air Act. Ambitious deadlines which had been drawn up in 1972 were
not being met, so the 1977 amendments extended treatment standard deadlines for
both industrial polluters and municipalities. More funding was also allocated for
sewage treatment plants, and national standards were to be created by the EPA for
59
the regulation of the pre-treatment of wastes by industrial polluters. The states
were granted flexibility in deciding where grant monies were most needed, thus
somewhat placating state leaders upset by the heavy-handedness of the
environmental mandates of the 1970s.
In 1986, Congress sent President Reagan a reauthorization of the Clean
Water Act, which he vetoed due to his belief that the expense involved, $18
billion, was not warranted. Early the next year. Congress passed the act again,
with the funding increased to $20 billion. This time, however, after another
Reagan denial. Congress overrode the veto by substantial margins, 401-26 in the
House and 86-14 in the Senate. The 1987 Amendments expanded the
enforcement authority of the EPA, increased the funding for wastewater
construction, and allowed state governments further flexibility by authorizing 20
percent of grant money to be used at the discretion of the Governor. Most
innovative, however, was a section dealing with the problem of non-point
pollution, which includes runoff from urban sewers, agriculture, mining, landfills,
and septic tanks. Each state was required to develop a management plan,
approved by the EPA, for the control of non-point pollution. This has become a
crucial issue, as two-thirds of the pollution in streams stems from non-point
sources. Dominated by the runoff from agricultural poisons, state plans for the
management of such pollution is not as politically popular as regulating industry,
but from an environmental point of view, equally important.
60
Whether or not the legislation governing American waters has been a
success is not clear, as indicators on both sides of the answer have substance.
Some highly visible bodies of water have shown dramatic improvement in
cleanliness levels. Fish have reappeared in the Great Lakes of Ontario and Erie,
and the Potomac River, once a veritable sewer, has shown a dramatic rise in
water quality and is now swimmable again. In addition, according to the
Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators, since
1972, over 47,000 miles of rivers and streams and almost 400,000 lakes have
become considerably cleaner (Carpenter, 1990). Although point source discharges
have been reduced, however, toxic water pollution and pesticide problems
continue to plague the nation's water. In addition, there has been almost
practically no progress in stemming the serious problem of groundwater
contamination (Kraft and Vig, 1990). Overall, the consensus seems to be that
water quality in surface areas has remained generally unchanged since 1972.
The surge in population in the last two decades coupled with strong
economic growth and development allows for the interpretation of this statistic as
a victory. A 1986 report by the General Accounting Office, using empirical data,
notes that "some of the nation's water is of fairly good quality while other water
remains polluted...Pollution control efforts have had an effect. What is less
clear...is the degree to which the reduction in pollutants has improved water
quality. Data indicate no change in water quality for most of the rivers that were
examined. In some instances, water quality has improved, but opinions differ on
61
how much. However, it is not insignificant that the water quality in many rivers
and streams has been maintained despite a growing population and economy"
(USGAO, 1986, p. 3).
The tone of this report is clearly noncommittal, and has been echoed by
later studies. The EPA reported in the late 1980s that water pollution efforts had
been notably successful in the drive to "restore or protect" the quality of the
nation's surface waters. This statement loses much of its force, however, due to
its vagueness. There is a large difference between restoration and protection.
Protection can refer to merely keeping up the status quo: preventing further
degradation of the waters, but allowing present pollution levels to remain. In the
same vein, restoration is a relative term. To what desired level should waters be
restored, that of industrial polluters or environmental activists? Obviously, there
is no lack of disagreement about the state of the fight against water pollution.
Pollution from non-point runoff continues to be a major problem and
groundwater contamination appears to be flourishing, as many of the nation's
wells are contaminated by chemicals, toxic substances, and salt. This is especially
distressing because a majority of Americans, and most rural dwellers, depend on
groundwater for their potable water supply. In 1987 there were over 100,000
recorded violations of the SDWA in public drinking water systems which affected
over 40 million people. The poor enforcement record of the law practically
insures that the true number of such trespasses was considerably larger. A 1988
EPA report underlined the problem of nonpoint pollution, noting "nonpoint
62
sources present continuing problems for achieving national water quality goals in
most parts of the country" (Rosenbaum, 1991, p. 40). The most difficult aspect
of regulating nonpoint pollution is that to do so would require a change in lifestyle
from the population. Farmers, generally conservative, would have to be willing
to make radical changes in farming methods, and urban dwellers would need to
refrain from activities such as dumping used automobile oil into sewer systems.
Regulation of this type is politically difficult, but in this case absolutely necessary
in order to achieve the goal of clean waters.
President Bush has sent no proposal to Congress for renewal of the Clean
Water Act, as he has clearly refused to offer clean water the same priority as
clean-air. Wetlands, which serve as a natural water purification system, are
disappearing due to development and environmental conditions at the rate of
290,000 acres every year. Although the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers
have the authority to protect wetlands under the 1972 Clean Water Act,
development forces have exerted tremendous pressure in order to open up such
areas to economic exploitation. Recently, despite President Bush's 1988 campaign
pledge of "no net loss of wetlands," the Administration proposed a new definition
for what constitutes 'wetlands,' which would have the effect of causing huge areas
of wetlands to lose protection from development. Despite widespread criticism
from environmentalists, the scientific community, and government agencies, the
Administration attempted to keep the results of a critical internal investigation
secret.
63
The EPA has been slow in its implementation of clean water legislation.
In late 1991, the agency gave notice to over 20 states that they had 90 days to
comply with the Clean Water Act or the EPA would impose federal standards.
The EPA was spurred to action in part by the threat of a lawsuit from the Natural
Resources Defense Council (Abramson, 1991). In early 1992, action was taken to
regulate several industries only in settlement of a lawsuit brought by the Natural
Resources Defense Council. The new steps are promising, but when action is
taken only in response to lawsuits, the commitment to implementation can be
suspect.
The federal government has held the line in the battle for clean water over
the last 20 years. During the 1980s, however, as the funding cuts of the New
Federalism occurred, the states were not completely inactive in the water pollution
arena. Some states, unsatisfied with merely keeping the status quo on pollution,
have done more than others. In general, however, the innovation at the state level
has been impressive, and it certainly added much to the overall national attempt to
achieve clean water.
State Involvement in Water Pollution Policy
Before 1970, most states utilized state health departments as the agency
controlling water pollution. What state pollution control boards did exist were
often of an advisory nature, and enforcement was often shunted off to municipal
governments. During the 1970s, expansive federal involvement overwhelmed
64
state policy. As the new decade dawned, the election of Ronald Reagan and his
mandate to reduce regulation pushed state governments into the driver's seat on
water pollution control policy.
During the 1980s, 30 states adopted some legislation protecting
groundwater, and 24 states passed laws mandating quality detection of state
drinking water. The methods used by various state governments to confront the
water pollution are as diverse as the problems themselves, and include taxes,
loans, education, various legislative regulation, and experimental environmental
techniques. There has been no shortage of state response to water problems,
serving notice that there is concern over pollution.
Although the states have shown innovation in clean-water policy, not all of
it has been positive. Several states are lacking in the technical resources to
monitor groundwater contamination, and are therefore forced to wait upon
evidence of damage to the environment or public health before acting after the
fact to control pollution (Rosenbaum, 1991). Many states have passed "right to
farm" laws, which exempt farmers from liability for pollution (Segerson, 1990).
An example of this is Connecticut's Potable Water Law, which grants exemptions
to certain farmers from having to provide payment for drinking water when
pesticides have caused contamination. Laws such as these serve as a reminder of
the political power of the farming community, even in a relatively urbanized state
like Connecticut (Segerson, 1990). Nebraska has a pesticide registration program
which is based on protecting farming interests. The state insures that the
65
chemicals live up to performance standards, with no thought given to public
health or environmental concerns. Clearly, the power of the farm and business
lobbies have kept many stringent policies from enactment and/or full
implementation. Despite such opposition, however, the states have taken many
impressive steps to curb water pollution.
One important variable in state water pollution control policy is money. In
the form of income or expenditures, states have used funds as a weapon.
Washington exacted a "sin tax" on cigarettes and loose tobacco, creating revenue
specifically for water quality programs. Iowa enacted a tax of 75 cents per ton on
fertilizer, with the collected monies used to fund a program monitoring water
quality (Libby and Boggess, 1990). California funds research into non-toxic
alternatives for agricultural pesticides, hoping to reduce the runoff problem as
well as groundwater contamination. Maine, which has the best drinking water in
the country, created a small community program which gave grants for water
pollution abatement to small towns with problems not expensive enough to qualify
for federal financial assistance (Council of State Governments, 1989). New
Jersey and Virginia both set up state funds for wastewater treatment, offering
loans to local governments for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities
and other sewer projects. These funds are examples of state augmentation of
federal grants, a trend which should increase in direct correlation to the reduction
of federal wastewater funds. Oregon uses a different approach to the idea of
financial inducement with the use of the Riparian Tax Incentive Program. This
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program provides tax credits equal to the value of land adjacent to protected rivers
which is donated for conservation purposes (Sierra Club, 1985). The willingness
of the state to take a tax loss in order to encourage private conservation efforts
amounts to government support for environmental protection not through direct
regulation, but instead with the use of the less coercive, indirect source of
pecuniary incentive.
The use of wetlands as a natural recharge system for water quality has
become recognized as one possible alternative to expensive technology. South
Dakota offers funds to local wetland projects which are used for wastewater
treatment. Louisiana, which suffers from plentiful rain and thus massive pollution
from storm runoff, has initiated a program which utilizes natural marshes to clean
runoff water which flows from New Orleans into the polluted waters of Lake
Pontchartrain. Hopefully, this increasing use of the cleansing powers of nature
will stir state level support for the protection and even restoration of the nation’s
wetlands from development.
The control of land use has long been a local prerogative, but states have
pre-empted such rights in order to protect water. Maryland set up a commission
to guide development on the Chesapeake Bay for the express purpose of
protecting the water quality in the Bay. Washington has strictly limited the felling
of trees near streams on private lands, as well as prohibiting the spraying of any
chemical within 50 feet of water. These latter steps are noteworthy in light of the
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tremendous power of the timber industry in the state, and thus exemplary
environmental regulation in the face of economic pressure.
Drinking water is perhaps the most sensitive area of water policy. In a
1985 survey of state natural resource officials 65 percent stated that groundwater
was the state's "most threatened resource" (Blomquist, 1991). In response to this
threat the states have taken action to protect this human necessity. Oregon offers
training to small public water systems in order to help achieve compliance with
the federal Safe Drinking Water Act. Minnesota established a safe drinking water
program, which provides a system of state follow-up and fines in order to insure
that localities which neither monitor nor file required reports on their drinking
water are checked, and punished if laxity continues. California passed a pair of
laws which deal with drinking water. The Pesticide Contamination Act of 1985
requires pesticide memufacturers to provide documentation to the state as to the
effects of the chemical on groundwater, cancels the registration of any pesticide
which is discovered to affect human health, and mandates licensing and record
keeping rules for sales of pesticides. The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act of 1986, passed as an initiative, bars any industry from
discharging any carcinogenic substance into drinking water supplies. The state
also requires that all new underground tanks be double-lined and fitted with
systems which automatically detect leaks. Arizona mandates permits for any
activity which pollutes aquifers, along with constant monitoring to insure
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compliance. Nebraska compels any farmer who applies pesticides to be certified,
and to keep the permit current through ongoing training.
Finally, Iowa has taken a comprehensive approach with the passage of the
1987 Groundwater Protection Act. The legislation calls for a number of measures
intended to work in a complimentary fashion. Included in the law are the
registration and control of all agricultural drainage wells, money for research on
techniques to reduce the reliance of farmers on agricultural chemicals, training
and testing programs for individuals who apply pesticides, an effort to monitor
groundwater quality, funds and personnel for the cleanup of underground storage
tanks, and financial support for projects which promote clean groundwater
(Council of State Governments, 1989). The emphasis on reducing non-point
agricultural pollution, widespread in a farm state, is symbolic of a strong effort to
address the root of the problem. Also important is the concern with underground
storage tank pollution, as leakage from millions of tanks is doing serious damage
to groundwater across the nation.
The states have taken action to protect their waters. Groundwater, due to
the great importance of drinking supplies, has been addressed most intensely.
Yet, this is a result of federal inaction on groundwater protection as much as state
concern. Surface waters have been protected for 20 years, and thus are likely to
receive less attention than a less regulated source of water. It must be noted,
however, that all waters are ultimately connected, and thus protection for one
source is protection for all.
69
Again, differences are apparent when observing state policy. The southern
states seem to have been less innovative, and many western states have also
appeared to show a lesser degree of concern for pollution control. The latter
group, however, is considerably more concerned about water supply, and thus
might have a preoccupation which precludes total concentration on pollution
control. Inevitably, of course, the two water policy areas are linked, as are state
policies. Water respects no man made boundaries, and it is truly a national
resource. Differences in state policies, therefore, are crucial to the national water
pollution effort. Intergovernmental relations, both state to state and federal to
state, hinge on knowledge of pollution policy: this in mind, the determinants of
state policy are an important aspect of such a knowledge base.
History of Hazardous Waste Legislation
Although chemical production boomed in the United States after World
War Two, the hazardous and toxic waste problem was ignored until the 1970s.
Although some waste disposal was covered under air and water pollution laws,
neither state nor federal governments addressed the issue of hazardous waste until
a bill dealing with toxic substances was originated in Congress in 1971. It took
five years for the bill to become a law, eventually known as the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), which authorized the EPA to test any suspect chemicals.
This legislation was indicative of a rush to attack a previously underestimated
threat, and other laws soon followed.
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The era of regulation of toxic waste for the federal government began in
the latter part of the 1970s, In addition to the previously mentioned TSCA, most
notable were two pieces of legislation: the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), which was passed in 1976 and reauthorized in 1984 by the
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act (HWSA), and Superfund, which
was created in 1980 by the Comprehensive Environment Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CRCLA), and reauthorized in 1986 by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). The RCRA controlled
waste permits, defined wastes, regulated landfills and injections, and appropriated
money for the states to implement and enforce the statute. The RCRA was
intended to be a cooperative venture between the federal government and the
states, implemented by what is referred to as partial preemption, or primacy
(Crotty, 1987). This aspect of federalism is defined by Crotty (1987, p.53) as a
"delegation of national authority, not an abdication of national control", and
consists of state implementation of federal legislation. Each state must develop a
program which meets or exceeds minimum EPA standards, or the EPA will
preempt state authority and enforce the legislation itself. Although a state has the
option to refuse enforcement of the federal mandate, history has shown that the
states are generally loathe to accept federal intervention in state affairs, and would
thus be unlikely to refuse partial preemption in favor of total preemption. Under
the federal umbrella of primacy, the passage of the RCRA wrenched the states
into the arena of hazardous waste regulation.
I
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Superfund consists of appropriations for emergency and remedial cleanup
of toxic waste sites. This process was also to be a collaboration between the
states and the federal government. The states are required to contribute a portion
of the money for cleaning their sites, as well as having a state environmental
agency work with the EPA in supervising the cleanup. The relationship between
the state and the EPA is negotiable: either may take charge of the clean up
process, but in either case, the EPA has ultimate power over the scheduling,
appropriations, and the general guidelines (Bowman, 1988).
This EPA-dominated program is a shambles. Superfund has been racked
by politics and slow implementation, as many abatement efforts have been
inadequate and inefficient. Implementation has been delayed due to the
complexity and enormous size of the hazardous waste problem (Kraft and Vig,
1990). The requirement that states provide a portion of the abatement cost has
tipped the balance in favor of wealthier states, as contributions of up to 50 percent
could well discourage poorer states from requesting remediation of poisoned sites.
Overall, state superfund cleanup has been moving quite slowly. The National
Priority List for Superfund sites contains over 1200 sites, but clean-up has begun
at less than one-fourth and finished at less than fifty places. The consistent
inadequacy of the federal government in dealing with the hazardous waste
problem has been documented; the performance of the 50 state governments has
not been so congruous, consisting of both inspired innovation and stubborn
resistance to dealing with a major environmental disaster.
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State Involvement in Hazardous Waste Policy
There are several phenomena which must be discussed before one can
theorize about the strength of a given state's hazardous waste regulatory program.
The amount of money spent on the problem, state legislation created, and the role
that the state chooses to adopt in accepting and/or strengthening mandated federal
guidelines are all aspects of the commitment and ability of a state to combat the
problem of toxic and hazardous waste. The states have ranked priorities
I differently and, as a result, have taken varying action, or inaction, in response to
the waste management problem.
Due to the decentralizing and budget slashing characteristics of Reagan's
New Federalism of the 1980s, states have been forced to become innovative in
order to assail growing toxic waste problems on a steady diet of decreasing
financial support. Toxic waste controls are made more difficult by the fact that
states not only have to work to control citizens and business, but must also
contend with waste producers who are often beyond the reach of state power.
Recently, several Indian tribes desperate for income have begun to lease
reservation lands out for toxic waste landfills and incinerators. The fact that tribal
lands are not subject to state regulation makes a comprehensive policy more
difficult to achieve. Groundwater contamination and air toxics can easily migrate
beyond tribal lands, yet state governments are prohibited by federal laws and
treaties from regulating the source of the pollution.
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Along the same lines, states are being forced to contend with massive toxic
pollution caused by the activities of military bases around the country. At over
850 domestic bases more toxic waste is generated than is created by the five
largest chemical companies combined, and the Department of Defense admits that
in excess of 8,000 sites will need remediation. Despite these statistics. President
Bush requested just over $800 million for environmental restoration in the 1991
defense budget, less than one-half of one percent of the total military budget.
State governments have been frustrated by both the attitudes of military leadership
and structural obstructions. The armed forces have been consistently
uncooperative toward efforts at remediation, slowing cleanups with requirements
of bureaucratic procedures and claims of national security. One EPA regional
manager remarked, in reference to an attempted cleanup at a military base, "The
Air Force has fought us every step of the way" (Turque and McCormack, 1990,
p. 20).
In order to cope with budget crunches and the massive volume of the
hazardous waste dilemma, the states have been remarkably innovative and active
' in filling the hazardous waste regulatory gap. One example is the passage of
Proposition 65 in California, which mandated a reduction in the use of toxics and
put the burden of legal proof on the offending industries. Florida has instituted
"Amnesty Days," an annual event in which a mobile hazardous waste collection
unit visits each county in the state. Schools, businesses, local government units
and individual citizens can dispose of up to 55 gallons of waste without any
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monetary charge being assessed. This program has become a model for other
state and local governments, and Alaska has already implemented a similar
program, as the realization has set in that small quantity generators (SQGs)
produce large amounts of waste when taken in sum (Lester, 1990). Other states
have set up programs to help SQGs as well. There are presently technical
assistance programs in 14 states, and 40 states offer free visiting consultation. In
addition, over 20 states have information telephone lines, some of which are quite
busy: North Carolina, Wisconsin and Hawaii each receive over 3,500 calls per
year (Schwartz and Pratt, 1990). Twelve states offer grants for research into
waste reduction, and 35 states have implemented some type of source reduction
program, but the average budget is only $150,000 per year and allows two full
time employees (Dolin, 1988). In addition, a 1989 survey of 21 states found that
only four intended to include toxic waste reduction as a major element in waste
planning (Gold, 1989). Massachusetts passed a strong law, however, when it
offered up the nation's first comprehensive toxic use reduction legislation. The
goal of cutting chemical waste in half by 1997 is to be achieved by annual
compliance reports from large chemical users, a research center for waste
reduction, and citizen right-to-know laws. A truly shining example, however, of
an innovative approach has been taken by North Carolina. The state's "Pollution
Prevention Program" has broken from the traditional approach to regulating
pollution after it has already been created. This program works on reducing the
amount of pollution which society must deal with by working to recycle or reduce
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hazardous waste output. The state offers on-site consultation, technical aide, and
education and research funding. The program has attracted much attention,
including the scrutiny of the Office of Technology Assessment (Lester, 1990).
Minnesota offers another interesting program for waste reduction. The state has
set up a program which requires public-private cooperation, as the government
provides interns for a six month period who assist businesses in devising an
individualized waste reduction plan. The value of business cooperation is quite
high, as Monsanto and 3M have shown that vast waste reductions can be obtained
with minimal changes. California has also taken steps toward cooperation with
business, as the state offers monetary incentives for waste reduction, including
loans, bond issues, and tax breaks for those who meet state goals.
In 1986, New Jersey passed the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act. This
law requires that the owner or operator of any facility that generates, treats, stores
or disposes of hazardous waste must have a state-approved risk management plan.
This legislation has been further indication of a push by the states to cope with
problems through prevention, rather than the far more expensive and dangerous
method of trying to control pollution at the "end of the pipe." Michigan and
Minnesota both regulate vehicle waste oil. New Jersey and Arizona demand
records be kept by those involved with hazardous waste, Vermont and Wisconsin
require licenses for businesses involved in the waste industry, and both
Connecticut and Kansas require waste haulers to carry liability insurance.
Oklahoma issues a 20 percent tax credit to companies which install equipment
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which will reuse or recycle toxic waste, effectively subsidizing the initial
investment necessary to forestall massive cleanup costs.
Several states, including California, New York, New Jersey, and Ohio
have passed mini-superfund laws, in order to strengthen the federal attempts to
clean up abandoned waste sites and deter future polluters from repeating the
carelessness of the past. These laws have been supported by court decisions
which have upheld joint-and-several liability, which allows individual parties to be
assessed for the full amount of a clean up cost even if they were responsible for
only a portion of the pollution, and strict liability, which attaches responsibility
for the pollution regardless of whether negligence is proven (Nakamura, 1991).
Such innovation is necessary for state governments concerned about the
loss of federal funds to combat an ever worsening hazardous waste problem. One
difficulty which plagues state governments nationwide is that of inadequate
facilities to cope with the growing amounts of toxic waste. Waste reduction plans
are helpful, but as of yet no technology exists which can completely eradicate
hazardous wastes from an industrial society. Although landfills are safer than
they have been in the past, the danger of toxic leakage into the groundwater is
still possible and space is quickly running out. Thus, the most practical solution
for the immediate future of hazardous waste is a proliferation of treatment
facilities, which use a chemical process to remove all or most of the toxicity from
the waste. Most of the states have accepted treatment as the best idea for a
solution to a difficult problem, which will continue to worsen unless direct action
------------!
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is taken to confront the constantly increasing build-up of waste (Portney, 1991).
The siting of hazardous waste facilities, however, has become the bugaboo of
many state officials, as community fears, both rational and irrational, have
worked to prod local populations across the country into fighting proposed waste
projects. Despite a generally agreed upon need for such facilities, since 1981, 81
applications across the United States have resulted in the creation of only one
facility, an incinerator in Illinois (Heiman, 1990). Accidents like those which
occurred in Bhopal and Chernobyl heightened public awareness and stimulated
fear of toxic and/or nuclear waste. It seems plausible that many members of the
public would lump the two types of waste together; stories of widespread death,
vastly increased incidence of cancer, birth defects, and ill effects displayed by
flora and fauna are characteristic of both. The fear of an uncertain degree of risk
links the poisonous wastes as a target for citizen protest and outrage (Kraft and
Kraut, 1988).
State governments searching for sites for hazardous waste treatment,
storage or incineration have run into roadblocks set up by a variety of groups for
various reasons. In addition to irate mothers seeking to protect their offspring
from the horrors of another Love Canal, protests have begun to arise from
historically docile sources. Many toxic waste sites have been located in areas
heavily populated by the poor and minorities, groups which tend to have relatively
less political power, less understanding of the governmental process, and less
awareness of the danger posed by toxic waste. Sixty percent of Blacks and
78
Hispanics live in areas with uncontrolled toxic waste sites, such as Louisiana's
infamous "cancer alley," 75 miles of chemical plants and oil refineries that line
the Mississippi river along the way from Baton Rouge to New Orleans. "Cancer
alley" has both a very high proportion of black residents and an abnormally high
cancer rate (McDowell, 1990). The nation's largest hazardous waste dump is
located in Sumter Counter, Alabama, which is populated predominantly by blacks.
In the recent past, however, several grass roots groups in poor neighborhoods
have sprung up to confront proposed hazardous waste projects. Displaying a
tenacity derived from the uncertain dangers posed and the growing realization that
minorities bear the brunt of hazcirdous waste effects, these groups have been quite
successful in delaying a number of waste projects (McDowell, 1990).
State legislatures must contend with local attitudes which are often found to
be in contrast to that which is expected. Several studies have concluded that the
vast majority of people living in a community proposed to be the site of a
hazardous waste facility are unlikely to be swayed in favor of the facility by any
of a number of economic incentives (Portney, 1991; Kunreuther and Easterling,
1990; Freeman et al., 1989). What does seem to be more amenable to local
citizens, however, are risk reduction factors. Americans have consistently
displayed an extremely low level of confidence in the ability and/or commitment
of government to act on their behalf when it comes to issues of hazardous waste.
The faith of the people in scientists as a reliable source of information and an
influence on decision-making is considerably higher than that in public officials in
79
any level of government (Kraft and Clary, 1991; Freeman et al., 1989). In
addition, in regard to environmental issues, the public often tends to hold opinions
which are neither consistent nor realistic (Ingram et al., 1980). This combination
of distrust and irrationality has resulted in the great difficulties states have
encountered in attempting to site facilities to treat or dispose of hazardous waste.
Politicians are also wary of being removed from office if anti-waste fervor
becomes a major issue. In the 1986 Senate race in Washington, Brock Adams'
victory over the incumbent has been attributed largely to Adams' unflagging and
vocal opposition to the choice of Washington as the site for the first American
permanent nuclear waste repository (Dunlap, 1987). Despite these difficulties,
steps have been taken to sidestep the clamor of public dissent, although the results
have been less than wildly successful.
A number of states have attempted to use state pre-emption of local
authority as a tool to ease siting woes. In 1988, 35 states had such laws on the
books (Mazmanian and Morell, 1988). Pre-emption policy grants total siting
power to a state board or agency, effectively sacrificing local autonomy to the
greater good of the state. This pre-emption supersedes such local authority as
zoning or land use laws and health codes which have traditionally been used to
prevent hazardous waste sites from being constructed. One example of such pre
emption legislation was passed by New York in 1987. The state legislature
decreed that no municipality could require any conditions, including conformity
with local land controls, for a hazardous waste facility that had previously been
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permitted by the state hazardous waste siting board (Heiman, 1990). The number
of states adhering to a pre-emptive policy is constantly fluctuating, as states
continuously shift between policies of total state pre-emption of siting power,
allowing local governments veto power over the projects, and a state/local
mediation process on siting. States that have used pre-emption, however, have
often found it to be a politically unrealistic and impractical situation. The political
influence of localities has been strong enough to block state governments from
ignoring local input and protests, thus turning the idea of state pre-emption into a
"myth" (Portney, 1991), which is theoretically attractive but politically
improbable.
In 1980, Massachusetts passed the Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act,
which laid out a process of both negotiation with and economic compensation for
localities as tools to "reduce real and perceived risks, and to ensure that
communities share in the benefits that the facility provides to the state" (Portney,
1991, p. 27). The previously noted lack of importance that residents place on
economic compensation is apparently also present in Massachusetts; not a single
facility has been situated in that state since the legislation was passed. It appears
that negotiation with local interests is often fruitless, as the opposition to waste
facilities among residents is extremely difficult to mitigate.
What is surprising about the inability of the states to provide adequate
facilities for hazardous waste is the fact that financial penalties exist for such
failures. The 1986 Superfund reauthorization (SARA) allows for the EPA to cut
81
off funds to states that do not insure provision of adequate treatment capacity for
future wastes to be generated. This insurance must include, if necessary, a state
override of local veto power. Although this threat is murky, and has not been
wielded by the EPA in a serious manner, the historical tendency of the EPA to
withhold allocated superfund monies should sound warning bells to state
legislatures already reeling from the budget cuts of the 1980s.
In the first half of the decade, most states were either incapable or
unwilling to use state funds to replace federal cutbacks in hazardous waste
programs (Lester, 1990). There were exceptions to the rule, however. In 1983,
New York passed legislation which attached regulatory fees to the amount of
pollution produced. For example, hazardous waste generators were assessed less
money for recycling or using incineration than for landfill use. The success of the
law in reducing pollution spurred a set of amendments in 1985, which doubled the
fees in many hazardous waste categories to help pay for the clean up of
abandoned toxic waste sites (McCaffrey and Miller, 1986). One similarity which
does seem to run throughout the country, however, is the lack of funds for waste
reduction. Common to both federal and state spending on all hazardous waste
programs is the reality that less than one percent of the budgets are aimed at the
reduction of waste generation (Futurist, 1987).
One of the more successful tools which has long been considered a crucial
aspect of any hazardous waste plan is the public dissemination of information.
Unless citizens involved in the generation, transportation, disposal and treatment
82
of toxic and hazardous wastes are aware of the options, regulations, and technical
possibilities concerning the waste, the government has set up a large roadblock to
the success of the program. Minnesota, for example, funds an education task
force which teaches citizens and businesses about hazardous waste.
One pilot project using communication and information as instruments was
initiated in Massachusetts in 1986. It is estimated that five percent of the toxic
waste generated in that state is created by small quantity generators (SQGs),
including small businesses, government operations, and households. This causes
serious contamination of both ground and surface water due to widespread illegal
disposal (Tuthill and Stanek, 1987). The Massachusetts project was aimed at
assisting the numerous automobile body shops in the state to achieve compliance
with state hazardous waste regulations. State services under the program include
information mailings, workshops across the state, periodic visits by state
inspectors, and technology transfer. The result of the state's efforts was the
doubling, in one year, of the number of shops which were complying with state
regulations. The success was attributed largely to the vastly increased level of
awareness among shop owners, who for the first time were made not only
cognizant of the regulations, but were assisted in discovering proper methods by
which to obey them (Brown and Kelley, 1988).
The status of state hazardous waste programs can perhaps best be summed
up as troubled, but struggling to move ahead. The number of states which had
achieved implementation primacy of their hazardous waste program under the
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RCRA was only 25 in 1985, but had climbed to 42 by the middle of 1989.
Despite problems with unregulated entities and budget shortfalls^ some states have
made advances in tackling the problem through commitment and innovation.
Others, however, have made little or no progress, and some critics suggest that
certain states who achieved RCRA primacy did so as to control a state plan which
is then poorly implemented. The differences between the states are not to be
dismissed lightly. In 1990, a federal appeals court overturned an Alabama state
law which prohibited the import of toxic waste from states which do not possess
their own hazardous waste facilities. Thus, the waste policies of one state are
relevant to the other states, as not only migrating pollution but also interstate
commerce protection guarantees the movement of toxic and hazardous wastes
across state borders. Clearly, there is a great variance among the states, and in a
crucial environmental area such as hazardous waste, which has serious interstate
ramifications, the causes and effects of this variance are of great interest.
The environmental movement of the last forty years has undergone a series
of changes. Originally the sole responsibility of state governments, the federal
government slowly gained influence for two decades until it reached a culmination
of power represented by the major legislation of the 1970's. The 1980's,
however, was a decade of federal retrenchment and state growth in pollution
control. The 1990's appears to be a model of cooperation for the future; both
levels of government in the United States are working on pollution problems, as
neither federal nor state leaders are abdicating from responsibility for
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environmental problems. Although the recession of 1991-1992 has forced
cutbacks in some state regulation, environmental policy innovation continues at
the subnational level.
This commitment to pollution control varies widely among the states. An
issue of great interest to policy analysts, therefore, is what differences between the
states account for the wide range of policy outputs. State differences in the
degree of pollution severity as well as political, economic, and social conditions
are all possible explanatory factors of state environmental policy. State
characteristics and their relationship to environmental policy is an area which
provides a strong contribution to this study, as the sources of state pollution
control policies are directly linked to the discussion of federalism. Federal
intervention in environmental matters should be based upon a knowledge of the
factors influencing state policy, so as to shape a program for intergovernmental
relations which addresses state differences in a rational and informed manner.
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CHAPTER THREE
DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Since the introduction of Ronald Reagan's "regulatory relief" policies,
recent years have seen an increase in governmental regulation at the state level.
Unlike President Nixon, who felt that municipalities should be enhanced, Reagan
pushed for increased responsibility to fall upon the states. He claimed that such
action would result in greater efficiency, although critics have claimed that the
true intent of such policy was to spur the elimination of much regulation entirely
(Lester, 1984). Unable to abolish much needed regulation, state governments
have been forced as never before to control the activities of citizens and business.
This regulatory growth is due not only to attempts to pick up the slack left by the
reduction of federal responsibility under the "New Federalism, " but also to the
legal necessity of complying with continuing federal mandates on a variety of
issues.
The future seems likely to hold more of the same, as the increasing
complexity of American society constantly forces new issues onto the regulatory
agenda. This trend, however, could be abated by changes in the political
landscape. Relations between the federal and state governments could change,
should federal deficits fall and future administrations work to recentralize
regulation. Recent calls for a balanced budget amendment are indicative of the
radical changes which could dramatically alter the present state of regulatory
86
federalism. In addition, should the phenomena of agency capture, whereby a
regulatory agency acts in a manner highly sympathetic to the object of its
regulation, expand at the state level, regulatory efforts could slow. Still, the
likelihood of future government activity deems it important that the conditions
shaping regulatory policy be understood, especially when noting the wide
variation in policy outputs among the several states. State differences in
regulation affect national issues: these include migration patterns, regional
economic growth patterns, political strength, federal spending policies, and
intergovernmental relations. Thus, the factors which influence state policy
development are an important consideration in terms of the relationship between
federalism and public policy.
Possibly no other single policy area is both as crucial and controversial as
that of the environment. Although environmental protection is widely accepted as
a desirable goal, disagreements exist on how to achieve it. A major difficulty lies
in the interpretation of the problem and the solution.
There exists a mutual suspicion between environmental activists and groups
inclined to be strongly supportive of economic growth, including business and
industry leaders, agricultural interests, and some government officials. Business
leaders and environmentalists, in particular, are highly distrustful of each other
(Milbrath, 1984). Each group has its own agenda and views the other as hostile
to the attainment of that agenda. In 1983, upon the resignation of EPA
Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford, President Ronald Reagan stated that "there
87
is environmental extremism" in the United States, and "I don't think they'll be
happy until the White House looks like a birds nest" (Kraft, 1991, p. 19).
Environmental leaders, however, often view corporate leaders as greedy capitalists
bent on maximizing profits at all cost, including that of public health. Studies
have consistently shown not only that most Americans agree that the environment
is important and should be protected, but that this general agreement is no passing
fancy but instead an enduring issue on the nation's political agenda (Dunlap,
1987; Ladd, 1982; Ladd et al., 1979). Almost half of adult Americans have
interest in joining an environmental group, and if given a choice between
environmental protection and economic growth, Americans choose the former by
a three to one margin (Milbrath, 1984). Still, how far the protection should
extend, the role of government in regulating environmental protection, and the
form of such protection are all questions which are hotly debated among
supporters of environmental protection in the United States.
The federal government, silent during the Reagan years, has shown some
signs of innovation in environmental policy under the leadership of George Bush.
Bush displayed interest as early as 1989 in reforming environmental protection
regulations to make greater use of market incentives, a goal which came to
fruition in certain provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act. The EPA under Bush
has also made attempts to work on legislation which supports pollution prevention
rather than control (Kraft and Vig, 1990). Generally, however, the actions of the
federal government during the 1980s led to innovation in many states. Due to the
88
negative view taken by Ronald Reagan towards environmental regulation, "a new
grass-roots activism developed, creating further political incentives for
environmental activities at all levels of government" (Kraft and Vig, 1990, p. 16).
This chapter will focus upon the sources of state policy will be analyzed.
The current trends in state environmental policy will be discussed, and an
extensive literature review of the factors which influence environmental policy
will be discussed. These factors will include pollution severity, political,
economic, and social conditions. This chapter contributes to the overall
examination of federzilism and environmental policy, as an awareness of the
sources of state pollution control policy lend a sense of legitimacy to the
discussion of the proper federal role in environmental matters.
Trends in State Policy
The devolution of policy responsibility from the federzil government
to the states during the 1980s triggered a positive response from many state
Capitols. Information collected by the Council of State Governments since 1976
illustrates that state innovation in the area of environmental policy increased
during the 1980s not only in total number but also in the quality of the innovation
(Lester, 1990, p. 62). This innovation has not been across the board, however,
as some states have declined to join the effort (Lester, 1990). This seems likely
to change in the future, as the pressure of the pollution problem forces action.
James Lester (1990, p. 76) contends that "the 50 states are not equally able to
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muster the necessary resources to deal with environmental problems in the 1990s.
Novel approaches will thus be required. " The states have long been regarded as
the laboratories of democracy: smaller (than the federal government), more
flexible units of government where innovation and initiative can be fostered and
implemented more easily than at the cumbersome federal level. According to one
expert, "Many states have taken the lead on environmental topics...because the
federal lead was either slow in coming, inadequate or nonexistent. As the states
continue to administer their environmental programs, their expertise grows and
their ability to point out inadequacies in federal legislation increases" (Brown,
1986, p .403). During the budget cutting era of the 1980s, several state and local
governments have undertaken exactly such moves in the field of environmental
policy.
The states have reacted to the crisis of the 1980s in environmental policy
in different ways. The passage, implementation, and funding of pollution control
programs has varied widely across the country, as has both the techniques used
and the areas attacked by state legislatures, bureaucracies, and governors. Some
states have attempted to stem pollution through the use of tougher penalties. One
example of this has taken place in Pennsylvania, where the punishment for the
illegal dumping of toxic waste has increased from a $300 fine to one year in jail
and/or a $500,000 fine (Block, 1985). Connecticut has also attempted to hit
polluters in the pocketbook, although by different means. The state's enforcement
plan was aimed at companies which delayed implementing compliance with
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environmental regulations. Noncompliant companies were fined the cost of
installing and operating pollution control equipment as well as interest accrued
during the period that they avoided the regulation, therefore creating a strong
monetary incentive for regulation (Cohen and Kamieniecki, 1991). In addition, a
1988 state law compels payment for environmental damage, and is so specific as
to include a cost placed on each fish killed in a water pollution accident
(Carpenter, 1990).
Other states, however, have taken steps backward in regulation of the
environment. New Hampshire has passed legislation which protects the
environment, but in the 1991 budget, slashed $100,000 from the budget of the
environmental enforcement staff. This is not an isolated case, as several states
utilize such tactics to undercut environmental regulation. In Arizona, a law was
passed which requires farmers to minimize water pollution by using fertilizer
management guidelines issued by the state Agriculture Commission. The
Commission, however, has refused to set the standards for implementation, so
consequently nothing has been accomplished.
California has set extremely strict standards for the control of air pollution,
while Utah, which does not possess the pristine air pictured in ski resort
brochures, has almost no state air pollution control program. New York
possesses both strong legislation and funding for clean water, while several states
have the law but not the money and Texas and Alaska have neither. The above
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examples clearly demonstrate that the stringency and effectiveness of
environmental programs vary widely from state to state.
Generally, however, most states have not been inclined to use state funds
to replace federal budget cuts in the area of environmental protection (Lester,
1984, Davis and Lester, 1987). In addition, the little replacement funding which i
has occurred has often been committed for only one year. Reasons for the lack of
state effort have ranged from deficits in state budgets to the contention by some
state legislatures that much spending for environmental projects should be the
responsibility of local governments (Davis and Lester, 1987). The state budget
problems which the recession of 1991-1992 has wrought are bound to continue to
affect environmental policy, but increasing concern for health and natural
resources will also play a strong role in the policy arena. In general, despite
state willingness to innovate, budget difficulties put a damper on environmental
regulation during the 1980s.
Possible Explanatory Variables
A great number of factors may account for the differences in state
environmental policy. Varying conditions concerning specific areas of pollution
across the American states must be considered. Included are variables indicating
the severity of the problem in the areas of air and water pollution, as well as toxic
and hazardous wastes. In addition, the literature on general state policy, and
specifically environmental state policy, strongly suggests that the differences
r
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among the states can be attributed to a combination of political, social, and
economic variables. Political variables allow for insight into the workings of the
governmental system, and how the structure of power and the relationships
between actors contributes to the formulation of public policy. The political
variables include citizen and elite partisanship and ideology, political culture,
party competition, chemical and oil industry presence, the gender and racial
makeup of state legislatures, the strength of the governors office, the overall
liberalism of state policy, unionization levels, and the ruling party in both the state
legislatures and the governor's office. The social and economic variables include
unemployment levels, urbanization, education, state wealth, population density
and composition, age, and occupation.
EXISTING STATE CONDITIONS
One of the most important conditions, one would assume, is that of
severity of pollution within a state. The degree to which a state suffers from one
or another type of pollution seems likely to affect public policy. In a rational
world, legislators will react to a problem in society. The existing environmental
conditions within a state are representative of the magnitude of an extremely
serious problem. Should a deteriorating environment be dismissed by leaders as
not sufficiently critical for inclusion on the government agenda, there is either a
serious dearth of information among policymakers or countervailing forces at
work. As environmental problems continue to grow, policymakers should
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respond to the worsening problem with a more urgent attitude toward pollution
control Thus, the assumption of rationality leads one to surmise that indicators
of pollution severity in a state are extremely important indicators of state policy.
Air pollution in California, water pollution in the Great Lakes, and toxic waste
horrors in New Jersey place great pressure on public officials to act.
Technological pressures, which include both the degree of the pollution problem
which exists and the knowledge of the existence and severity of the problem, have
been found to correlate with increased environmental protection (Regens and
Reams, 1988). In addition, industrialization, which is the cause of much
pollution, is linked with increased state policy innovation (Walker, 1969).
It does seem logical that the worse a problem is, the more likely the
people of a state would feel an urgency to deal with it. Pristine air in Wyoming
with an occasional puff of smoke would raise few eyebrows, but a layer of smog
which obscures entire mountain ranges and shortens breath in Los Angeles could
very well spur human action to alleviate the problem. There is another side to the
issue, however. Several states which suffer from a high degree of environmental
degradation, such as Louisiana and Texas, do so because the state's leaders have
invited business to the state in order to spur economic growth, with little concern
for environmental side effects. In these cases, the despoliation of the environment
has been directly related to state policies which have sought other, economic
benefits. Although the pollution may be a terrible problem, some change would
have to occur in order for a serious abatement program to come into existence.
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Such a change could come in three forms. In the first, new leadership
could be elected to the state which might be substantially more interested in
preserving the environment. Environmental election slogans are not sufficient to
merit change, however, as President Bush, the self-proclaimed "Environmental
I President, " has turned out to be a weak ally of conservationists at best. In
! another example, both Jerry Brown and Michael Dukakis, former Governors,
turned out to be far more friendly to the concerns of business than had been
indicated by pre-election rhetoric (Gray et al., 1990). Second, the degree of
environmental destruction could become so great as to truly upset the government,
which could have a change of heart and move to reverse past policies. Finally, a
change in awareness could occur at the elite and/or mass levels. This awareness,
an increase of knowledge regarding the severity of pollution problems, could
cause a change among elites who were truly unaware of the destruction that
former economic policies had brought upon the state environment. The advice of
experts, media attention, interest group pressure, scientific reports, and the
attention paid to the issue on a national scale could all be catalysts which could
spark awareness and thus the belief in taking action among previously recalcitrant
government officials. An increased level of awareness among the public could
also bring change. An example of such a phenomenon occurred at Love Canal,
where the revelation of a massive toxic waste problem and public outrage stirred
action by state and federal officials, eventually leading to the clean-up of Love
Canal and the passage of Superfund legislation. Increased awareness of the
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dangers of hazardous waste has resulted in minority groups protesting the siting of
hazardous waste facilities in their neighborhoods. As the general public becomes
more educated about the existence of pollution and the problems associated with
it, it is likely that demands for policy change will increase. In a democratic
society, such demands cannot be ignored, and thus the level of public awareness
is of great importance to state legislators.
Due to increasing awareness among both the public and elites, and the
impression among many that environmental quality has seemed to have declined,
it seems likely that the severity of the pollution problem will indeed be related
positively to state environmental regulation and spending. Even traditionally
recalcitrant states like Alabama and Arkansas have shown some signs of moving
toward increased environmental protection, and as conditions worsen, this
tendency among the states is expected to continue.
Indicators of the level of the problem include outputs of pollutants as well
as measures of cancer rates, amount and degree of facilities which deal with
pollution, and human actions which add to pollution. For example, previous
research has shown that as population density rises, so does the severity of
pollution in a given area (Barnett, 1973, 1974; Simon, 1971). States differ widely
as to the severity of the problem within their borders. This will lead to great
variation among the conditions which are specific to air pollution, water pollution,
and hazardous and toxic waste.
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Air Pollution
Air pollution, although probably the most abated of the three areas, is still
a substantial threat to the health and welfare of the broad public. The level of
severity, however, varies widely from state to state, and from pollutant to
pollutant. This wide variance across the states leads to the expectation that a
range of variables will be found to be significant indicators of state air pollution
control policies. For example, the percentage of the population of a state which
falls below federal standards for ozone ranges from zero percent to 100 percent,
and one would expect that regulations and expenditures to control ozone would
vary accordingly. Other indicators such as the density of motor vehicles and
miles driven per square mile measure the amount of damage from exhaust pipes.
Along the same lines, variables dealing with mass transit are expected to be
telling, as Alaska has 191 automobiles per transit bus, while the same ratio for
Arkansas is 19,200/1. Toxic air emissions, which can cause a variety of health
problems ranging from breathing disorders to death, are perhaps the most harmful
to human health, and range in pounds per capita from Nevada (0.7) to Utah
(70.6). Acid rain, as measured by the pH of the air, emissions from utilities, and
all carbon dioxide emissions, is also evaluated. The energy use of a state is not to
be ignored, as the fossil fuel powered plant is a major contributor to air pollution.
Renewable energy sources, or lack thereof, and the growth in energy consumption
are indicators of the strain a state puts on its air quality through power generation.
Use of fuels such as oil and coal, the most common sources of energy, are not
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clean burning, thus contributing heavily to the deterioration of air quality. Of
course, many of these variables are interrelated and any research effort must
attempt to control for their overlapping association.
Air pollution is directly correlated with population size and density of a
given area (Kromm et al., 1973). Population density, in turn, is positively
correlated with higher levels of state spending on air pollution (Game, 1979).
This is not surprising, as the industrial nature of an urban, highly populated
center, coupled with a greater number of automobiles being driven in a more
compact space, is bound to produce more air pollution than a sparsely populated
rural area. Previous research has also found both state spending on air pollution
and the strength of auto inspection programs to be negatively correlated with state
air quality (Lowry, 1992). One study found that public concern with the
problems of air pollution are related to the severity of the pollution level
(Degroot, 1967). Thus, as public opinion is related to state policy (Wright et al.,
1985, 1987), it follows that the severity of the air pollution problem in a state
would positively correlate with the strength of the air pollution control policy.
The severity of the problem can be related to a number of different
antecedent causes. The population of the state, growth rates, and the dependence
on the automobile plays a large role in determining the amount of pollutants
which enters the air. In the same vein, the availability of mass transit compared
to the automobile is a telling sign of how committed each state is to weaning the
public from their cars. Energy use is also important, as a state which takes steps
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to conserve energy is giving itself one more advantage in the fight to reduce the
use of fossil fuels and thus air pollution.
It is logical to expect that the technological pressure created by a greater
level of air pollution will prove to be effective in pushing a state toward a more
environmentally protective policy. There is a theory, however, which is at odds
with this hypothesis. Several states, especially in the south, are poor relative to
other states and thus view themselves as economically underdeveloped. Many
state leaders, in their drive to attract industry, have been willing to provide lax
environmental regulation as an inducement. This in turn has caused great harm to
the air of the state, but the tradition of laxity and the continued interest in
"catching up” economically to the rest of the nation has dampened enthusiasm for
stricter regulation. Thus, in the cases of these poor states, higher levels of air
pollution could be inversely related to efforts to clean up the skies. It is possible,
however, that as the damage reaches a certain level of severity, even these
regressive states will begin to consider the environmental aspects of unrestrained
industrial growth.
One example of this about-face in policy recently occurred in Louisiana.
The state legislature, after years of consistent resistance to meaningful
environmental legislation, passed a law in 1990 requiring 100 air toxic pollutants
to be cut by 50 percent by 1994 (Hall and Kerr, 1991). This legislation could be
representative of a larger pattern, where states who have pursued rapid growth,
and received the accompanying air pollution, have begun or will begin to
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reconsider their policies and take more stringent steps to prevent further air
deterioration. This reconsideration could be hastened by the discovery that the
existence of pollution can impede business development. In one study of the
motor vehicle industry, it was found that firms were deterred from locating plants
in the areas of the country that had the highest level of violation of the EPA
ozone standards (McConnell and Schwab, 1990). This information could prove to
be further incentive for historically lax states to step up the regulation of polluters.
Water Pollution
Indicators of the severity of water pollution also show great disparity in the
American states. Amounts of toxics released to surface water in pounds per
square mile, for example, range from New Mexico (0.0) to Louisiana (3294.9).
The same diversity is evident in many categories of water pollution severity, such
as toxics in public sewers, underground injections, impaired rivers, streams,
lakes, and reservoirs, and the percentage of people served by septic tanks. Other
factors include pesticide contamination and compliance with the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) of 1974. A measure of the percent of water systems which
violate the SDWA, for example, finds a low of 1.0 (Minnesota) and a high of
78.8 (Alaska). As in air pollution, the variance among practically all the
indicators leads to the expectation that at least some of the measures of the
severity of water pollution within a state will be related to public policy.
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Hart (1974) found that the severity of water pollution was unrelated to
state groundwater legislation. Opposite results were found by Blomquist (1991),
however, who concluded that a higher level of groundwater contamination bore a
direct relationship to stricter groundwater protection laws. There is some
difficulty in putting greater emphasis on the more recent study, as the pollution
problem has not notably worsened since 1974. In addition, the early 1970s was a
time of environmental awareness, similar to the late 1980s.
There is one factor, however, which could be telling. Recent
advancements in science have increased the knowledge as to the ill effects of
pollutants and the seriousness of the long term nature of groundwater
contamination. It is possible that this increased information has led to greater
concern among states who perceive a more serious problem.
There is some support for the Blomquist findings in the work done by
Wassenberg (1986). Her study on the NPDES permit system divided states into
two groups, those which applied for program authority and those which did not.
Presumably, states which applied for the authority would tend to be more serious
about the state role in protection of water quality. Wassenberg found that the
seriousness of the problem had a strong, positive correlation with state application
for authority. This finding supports the findings of both Blomquist and much of
the work done on general environmental indicators. One would therefore expect
to find similar results, but there is one mitigating factor. Several states have
chosen to mortgage their environmental future by allowing pollution to flourish so
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as to stimulate the economy. Thus, these states could have pollution problems
caused by laxity and fewer or less strict programs to deal with the problem.
These cases seem exceptions, however, and in some circumstances there is
evidence that policies have begun to change. It seems, therefore, that the
expected result will find a strong correlation between water pollution severity and
state regulation.
Hazardous Waste
Considerable differences across the states concerning the severity of the
hazardous and toxic waste problem also exist. Toxic chemical releases to the land
range from 0.0 pounds per capita (several states) to 40.9 pounds per capita
(Montana). Other indicators such as toxic transfers, various chemicals and toxins
released into the environment, hazardous waste generated, managed, and
transported, and military hazardous chemical sites are all equally divergent, and
thus potentially valuable in a study of state hazardous waste policy. It seems clear
that hazardous and toxic waste, like the other two types of pollution discussed
previously, are quite likely to be important factors influencing state environmental
policy.
Several states with strict hazardous waste regulation outlaw procedures
which cause pollution, such as underground toxic injections. Thus, it is possible
that a pollution severity factor such as underground injections will correlate
negatively with environmental regulation. Although environmental conditions as a
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group is clearly a critical factor, it remains to be seen how each measure of
pollution will correlate with the specific dependent variables.
Logically, as pollution worsens due to population growth, increased
consumption, and greater industrialization, the public eventually will become
distressed about the filth in the environment and become more supportive of
pollution control and cleanup plans. Previous research has found that an increase
in the magnitude of the hazardous waste problem does lead to greater
governmental regulation (Lester et al., 1983). Although this finding does not hold
true in regard to implementation (Lester and Bowman, 1989), it must be noted
that the formulation of policy and the implementation of policy are notably
different phenomena. Implementation is less political and relies more heavily on
the skill and commitment of a small group of officials and the willingness of
target groups to cooperate than on public outcry caused by worsening pollution
circumstances. According to Wright et al. (1987), state policy output is strongly
correlated with public opinion. Public opinion on hazardous waste policy, in
turn, is going to be affected by the severity of the problem. Residents of the
Hawaiian Islands, which has practically no toxic waste problem, are going to
create less political noise than denizens of Louisiana's "cancer alley" or neighbors
of the Stringfellow acid pits near Riverside, California. Therefore, it seems likely
that the intensity of the hazardous waste problem will prove to be a critical factor
in the state policy process.
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POLITICAL VARIABLES
Logically, one would expect severity of pollution among the states to vary
directly with state environmental regulation and expenditures. However, other
forces may be at work which mitigate the relationship between level of pollution
severity and public policy, and they must be considered in any study of state
actions. Political variables, for instance, can have such an effect. Political
measurements of ideology, structure, power, and attitudes seem likely to have an
effect on state environmental policy. The importance of political variables should
not be understated (Ripley, 1991), in any study of a political nature. Therefore,
the role played by such measures is a necessary ingredient in any formula
analyzing the factors influencing state public policy.
Political Ideology
Several researchers suggest that the state policy outputs are influenced by
the ideology of both the general public and political elites. Among the general
public, liberalism has consistently been found to correlate strongly with concern
for the environment (Dunlap, 1975; Buttel and Flinn, 1978b; Calvert, 1979; Ladd
et al., 1979; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Ladd, 1982; Milbrath, 1984).
Moderates tend to be middle of the road, while conservatives appear to have less
concern for environmental issues. Liberals also display a greater willingness to
approve increases in both governmental regulation and spending regarding the
environment (Ladd et al., 1979; Ladd, 1982). In addition, Lester and Bowman
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(1989) found that the increased economic diversity of a state was positively related
to improved hazardous waste policy implementation. Klingman and Lammers
(1984) relate economic diversity to general state policy liberalism. Therefore, as
liberalism is associated with the innovation and willingness to anger business
interests, it can be postulated that states which rank high on the liberalism scale
tend have a stronger stand on hazardous waste regulation.
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) offer several suggestions as to why such
relationships exist among the citizenry. Conservatives tend to support business
and industry, which is normally perceived to be adversely affected by
environmental regulation. Conservative thinking also shirks from innovation,
which is required to institute new environmental legislation. The environmental
crisis is a fairly recent phenomenon which is evolving as society develops, and
thus constantly demands novel approaches in order to help combat the ill effects
of the deterioration of environmental quality. The connection between business
and conservatism is harmful to the degree that an adverse attitude toward change
is being harbored by a section of society responsible for much of the pollution
problems. In addition, conservative economists generally support laissez-faire
capitalism, which embraces the idea of no government regulation of the
marketplace. Such a policy of non-interference would be disastrous for the
environment, as rampant development and manufacturing driven solely by the
profit motive would result in tremendous increases in pollution levels. Thus,
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conservative ideology and business interests reinforce an aversion to innovative
environmental policy making.
Moreover, conservatives possess a general antipathy to regulation by the
government. Conservatives tend to be wary of big government, and often demand
that government "get off the backs of the people. " This disdain for regulation is
usually reserved, however, for business controls. Conservatives are much more
willing to support governmental regulation of behavior when morality is involved
(Hahn and Kamieniecki, 1987). This distinction is less relevant to environmental
policy, however, because Americans view the struggle for a better environment
not as a moral or religious crusade, but as a material good to augment ones
quality of life (Ladd, 1982).
Finally, those embracing environmentalism as an ideology believe that
government is coping inadequately with the nation's environmental problems
(Milbrath, 1984). This view extends environmentalism off of the accepted
American political ideology spectrum, a narrow range under which both
conservatives and liberals generally accept the status quo supporting economic
growth as a primary national goal. What Milbrath refers to as the environmental
"vanguard" is a bloc which believes that a new paradigm must replace the old
economic growth paradigm in American society. Adherents to this view refuse to
accept the convictions of any of those along the traditional left-right spectrum in
American politics. Among the traditional liberals and conservatives, however, it
appears that liberals are more willing to accept some of the vanguard's positions.
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while conservatives make up the majority of the "rearguard," those dedicated to
obstructing change.
The differences in attitude toward the environment among competing
ideological views extends to elites as well. Although the data are not nearly as
complete as that on citizen views, Dunlap and Allen (1976) and Mzizmanian and
Sabatier (1981) found that among elites, liberalism was positively correlated with
environmentalism. Dunlap and Allen discovered in a study of Congressional
roll-call votes that support for environmental bills was considerably stronger
among liberals than among conservatives. In a study of state administrative
officials, Mazmanian and Sabatier found that liberalism was linked with support
for the protection of natural resources. A portion of their study divided liberalism
into three aspects: support for governmental regulation of the market, reservations
against local government autonomy, and positive attitudes toward the welfare
state. Although the first two aspects were relevant, attitudes toward the welfare
state was found to be unrelated to environmental attitudes. This finding is
duplicated in a study by Samdcihl and Robertson (1989), who found that although
liberalism was not related to support for environmental regulation, anti-laissez-
faire liberals were more likely to support such regulation. These findings might
explain different attitudes toward the environment among blocs within the liberal
coalition; one example would be the tendency of unions to be unenthusiastic
toward environmental regulation (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981). The weak
support from unions may be attributed to a proclivity to support increased
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employment through economic growth, which is normally assumed to suffer under
more stringent environmental regulation. Despite such exceptions, it appears that
liberalism among both citizens and elites leads to support for increased
environmental protection and governmental action.
PARTISANSHIP
The literature on the relationship between political party affiliation and
environmental attitudes is murky at best, as no clear consensus exists on the role
party plays as a determinant. Many dedicated environmentalists have expressed a
strong willingness to change parties based upon the environmental stand of each
major party at election time (Milbrath, 1984). Among citizens, research findings
on the relationship between partisanship and environmental attitudes have been
inconsistent. Buttel and Flinn (1978b) uncovered no relationship. Other studies
have found Democrats to be only slightly more concerned about the environment,
possibly attributing variations among party members to differences in socio
economic status (Dunlap, 1975; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). Further research
has concluded that Democrats and Independents are considerably more concerned
about environmental issues (Calvert, 1979). Research on state hazardous waste
policy has also shown mixed results. One study found that partisanship was found
to have no significant impact on hazardous waste policy (Lester et al., 1983),
while other research found that Democrats were clearly more supportive than
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Republicans of a hazardous waste bond issue in New Jersey (Greenberg and
Amer, 1989).
The differences between these findings could be due to the variations in
interests and ideology among members of the same party. Southern Democrats
tend to both represent states which have a historically lower commitment to
environmental protection and be significantly more conservative than their
northern brethren. Lester (1980) found that a weak relationship between the
percentage of Democrats in a state and an increased likelihood of that state
adopting environmental policies strengthened to a moderate relationship when one
observed the non-southern states. In addition, certain members of the Democratic
party might be less concerned about environmental issues than others. Examples
of such groups include blacks and unionists, both of whom could have
environmental sensibilities dulled by an overriding concern for economic growth
(Kamieniecki, 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981). Certain party elites are also
less likely to support environmental measures. One such case is exemplified by
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, who was long an opponent of air pollution
control legislation due to his home state’s heavy reliance on coal mining.
Finally, many Republicans are quite likely sympathetic to efforts to protect
the environment, as environmentalism has been found to be broad-based in
America, cutting across all social classes (Calvert, 1979; Mohai, 1985; Buttel and
Flinn, 1978a). There is a difference, however, between concern for the
environment and support for laws and regulations that are intended to improve
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environmental quality. Ladd (1982) found that Democrats were clearly more
supportive of laws and regulations protecting the environment than Republicans.
Wassenberg (1986) found that Republican party dominance was related to a
reduced likelihood that a state would apply for program authority of the NPDES
system under the Clean Water Act. Public policy outputs are not measures of
feelings, but of action, and in this measure a critical question is how closely
lawmakers heed the concerns of constituencies and translate concern for the
environment into policy.
Findings concerning the effect of partisanship on elite behavior seem to be
more consistent. In Congress, Democrats appear to be more supportive of bills to
protect the environment than are Republicans (Dunlap and Allen, 1976). Among
state legislators, there is also a consistent trend of partisan behavior. Calvert
(1979) concluded that Republican state legislators were substantially less
supportive of efforts to protect the environment than their constituents, and they
acted upon those values. Democrats were closer to the voters, and this smaller
gap between public opinion and legislative attitudes propelled Democrats to
promote environmental policy more strongly. Several states, including Oregon, a
state with low partisanship, exhibited a strong, significant positive relationship
between Democrats and pro-environmental votes in the legislature (Dunlap and
Gale, 1974; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). A study of state administrative
officials, however, found that party identification was of little value in explaining
either policy preferences or professional behavior (Mazmanian and Sabatier,
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1981). Nevertheless, the above evidence seems to indicate that the partisanship of
elected policy makers might be a critical indicator of policy output.
POLITICAL CULTURE
Political culture consists of collections of citizen conceptions, attitudes, and
beliefs, so deeply imbedded as to be subconscious in nature, which together
determine the important issues and tolerable range of behavior inherent in the
political arena (Kincaid, 1982). This measure is not taken at the individual level,
but is explanatory of an entire state. Elazar's mapping of the three major political
cultures in the United States, moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic,
provides a source from which to draw hypotheses about the possible relationship
between culture and state environmental policy.
Political cultures are differentiated by variances in beliefs about the role of
government and the public, as well as the level of political participation in a given
society. Moralistic culture is characterized by a government which is committed
to working toward the public good. Intervention by political authority is justified
when the welfare of the entire community is being furthered. Political
participation is high, as the concept of civic duties are widely held. In a
traditionalistic culture, government is not expected to be active or innovative, but
merely to act to maintain the status quo. Political participation is not encouraged,
as politics is regarded as a realm of the elite few. This culture serves the interests
of elite policymakers, and is generally unresponsive to any appeals for change in
I l l
the society. Individualistic culture stresses a low degree of initiative by the
government, which acts instead in response to demands made by the private
sector. Public pressure triggers action by officials, who are expected to be
professional in their duties, and are thus aware of the need to satisfy the voting
populace. The political system is perceived as a marketplace, in which both
individuals and groups utilize political action to advance self-interest.
States with a moralistic culture would seem to be the most likely to enact
vigorous legislation in favor of environmental protection. The moralistic culture
has been associated with higher state spending on the environment, while the
traditionalistic and individualistic cultures correlate with lower spending patterns
(Miller, 1991). Although support for environmental protection is not considered
to be a moral crusade per se (Ladd, 1982), clean air and water is certainly
considered a public good. Environmental law public trust doctrine, a judicial
doctrine which holds that natural resources are held in trust for the people by the
government, has been accepted most widely by states with a moralistic political
culture (Lawler and Parle, 1989). Existence of this doctrine has in turn been
strongly correlated with a states commitment to environmental protection (Lawler
and Parle, 1989). Moralism is also correlated with liberal ideology (Wright et
al., 1987), and as environmental regulation requires innovation, liberalism could
lead to such regulation. Although individualistic states have not been aggressive
in accepting the environmental law public trust doctrine, it is possible that as
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communal concern over environmental hazards increases, public opinion will urge
lawmakers to act.
There is evidence linking political culture with state water pollution control
policy. Hart (1974) found that political culture was the driving force behind
changes which occur in state groundwater laws. Blomquist (1991) echoed this
finding, expanding his conclusion to note that there was a strong positive
correlation between states that have a moralistic political culture and strong
groundwater quality protection. This is not surprising, as this correlation has also
been found for environmental policy as a whole. The moralistic culture stresses
the community good more emphatically than either the individualistic or
traditionalistic cultures, leading to the obvious relationship to pollution control.
Water pollution regulation provides for the good of all citizens, who share in the
use of the water for drinking, cleaning, and recreation. Agribusiness and industry
might have to suffer to provide for the greater good. Indeed, even legislation
restricting citizens' behavior which causes pollution is a case of the moralistic
state leaders saving the people from themselves.
INTEREST GROUPS
Mancur Olson, in The No-Growth Societv. stated that over time, the
number and influence of groups which are interested in slowing or reversing
economic growth will grow, and subsequently become increasingly successful in
forcing political leaders to adopt anti-growth economic policies. Such policies
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might include limits on new building, environmental restrictions on development
and existing business expansion, and zoning restrictions which discourage the
introduction of certain commercial enterprises. A more recent study found,
however, that the relationship between the chronological development of anti
growth groups and economic growth is not significant (Gray and Lowery, 1988).
Regardless of how many years they have existed to build strength and influence,
such groups are stymied by the significant, positive relationship which exists
between business and/or labor power and economic growth (Gray and Lowery,
1988).
There is little doubt as to the power that interest groups hold in the United
States (Berry, 1984). The growth of Political Action Committees (PACs), rising
cost of campaigns, and the weakening of political parties have combined to allow
interest groups to flourish and dominate electoral politics. Mazmanian and
Sabatier (1983) believe that the influence and power of the target group in an
implementation scheme (such as the polluters in environmental regulation) is an
extremely important variable when attempting to determine the viability of the
implementation plan. Thus, it is expected that assessing the relative strength of
certain groups in the various states would be essential to any study of state public
policy.
In the case of environmental policy, the two opposing sides in the battle
would most commonly be the environmental interest groups and the groups
dominated by heavy industrial polluters, such as the oil, chemical and utility
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industries. The strength and numbers of the environmental groups vary widely
among the states (Hall and Kerr, 1991), and as certain industries are more
prominent in some states than in others, the strength of the interest groups also
has a wide disparity among the states. The wealth and influence of both of these
sets of groups leads one to the expectation that interest group strength is indeed a
key variable in the formulation and implementation of state environmental policy.
The strength and importance of the various industries associated with air
pollution vary greatly across the fifty states. Oil and gas corporations, automobile
companies, and utilities all wield powerful political and economic influence in
states where they have a strong presence. One study found that the mere presence
of a greater number of polluting industries is related to stronger enforcement of
air quality regulations (Lowry, 1992). Other research, however, has found that
strong industry groups can seriously deter environmental legislation (Wassenberg,
1986; Lester and Bowman, 1989). One study concluded that the oil companies in
California, in a strong economic position, will prove to be a major impediment to
the success of the recent plan to clean the air in Southern California (Kamieniecki
and Ferrall, 1991). Corporate steps to deter implementation can easily expand to
efforts against the creation and passage of strict air pollution control policy. State
legislators are likely to be receptive to arguments stemming from a source of
major employment and tax revenues. Thus, the actions of the government could
well be influenced by the types and strengths of economic actors present within a
state. Representative John Dingell fought in Congress for years on behalf of
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Detroit automobile makers to prevent a strengthening of the Clean Air Act. This
type of pressure could also be provided at the state level, and thus must be
considered an important variable.
It should come as no surprise that industrial interests are generally opposed
to water pollution regulation. As most legislation has concentrated on point
source output, industry has borne the brunt of regulatory control efforts. Changes
necessary to reduce pollution are often fought on the grounds of expense and the
natural tendency of conservative business leaders to defy the principle of
innovation and governmental interference in the market. Wassenberg (1986)
found that the strength of the manufacturing sector in a state was correlated with
the reduced likelihood that the state would apply for independence in the water
pollution permit program. Such a conclusion is expected, as the interests which
are responsible for pollution are likely to wield great influence in state
legislatures, working against the passage of strong regulatory controls.
The hazardous waste industry is growing rapidly, and with increased
wealth and size comes a more powerful voice in the political system. William
Ruckleshaus, a former EPA Administrator, has become the head of Browning-
Ferris Industries, one of the three largest hazardous waste firms in the country.
Thus, the strength of the hazardous waste facilities in a given state could be
meaningful when the growing political power of such industries is considered. In
addition, a strong hazardous waste industry could potentially employ thousands of
workers, a benefit certain to be noticed by state legislators. These industries
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would be likely to push for the right to ply their trade without the interference of
governmental regulation. State mandated safety improvements such as landfill
linings, increased protection for employees at treatment facilities, or a reduction in
toxics released into the air during incineration are all expensive and thus directly
reduce the profit margin of waste firms. Such loss of income could in itself
eventually lead to employee layoffs. On the other hand, legislation which forces
industry to dispose of waste through licensed companies could prove to be a boon
for the hazardous waste management industry. Thus, it seems that the sphere of
"regulation" is large enough to encompass both positive and negative aspects for
hazardous waste industry executives, government officials, and workers, and
offers the possibility of mixed or unclear results.
POLITICAL STRUCTURE
Additional political variables that might help explain variations in state
environmental policy concern the nature of the political structure of a state,
including party competition, gubernatorial power, state environmental agency
consolidation, and legislative professionalism. Although research in these areas is
somewhat sketchy, there is reason to believe that such variables might contain
explanatory value. The degree of party competition which exists in the politics of
a certain state could, for example, have an effect on environmental policy. States
which tend to be less competitive have been found to pay less attention to issues
which involve the "have-nots" of society (Jennings, 1979). Therefore, one could
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infer that less competitive states are characterized by a more elitist style of
government which is closely linked with moneyed and business interests.
Although environmental concern is broad-based, regulation is often opposed by
business and industry. Increased party competition could stimulate office holders
to look outside of the elite circle for electoral support. As the environment is
becoming a more salient issue on the American political agenda, it is likely that
environmental regulation is an area which could expand as competition prods
candidates to appeal to wider groups of supporters.
Although Lester (1980) found that gubernatorial strength, as defined by a
combination of veto, appointment, and budget power, was not a predictor of
environmental policy adoption, the dearth of findings on this variable make it
worthwhile to investigate new possibilities. Much important environmental
innovation has come out of the office of the executive, such as the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 and in California, Governor Pete
W ilson's newly formed Cal-EPA. In the 1990s, the trend toward the balance of
power moving toward the executive branches of government shows no signs of
changing. It is possible that the innovation necessary to spark fresh environmental
policy might need to come from the office of the Governor. Should this be the
case, the amount of power the governor holds would be a telling barometer of the
likelihood of such policy being legislated and eventually implemented.
The limited work done in the area has found that both the professionalism
of the legislature and the consolidation of a state's environmental agencies are
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positively correlated with increased environmental regulation (Lester, 1980).
Research has found that legislative professionalism is a significant variable in the
area of state hazardous waste policy, especially in states where the problem is
more severe (Lester et al., 1983). Hazardous waste regulation was found to rise
in states with increased professionalism. As a legislature becomes more
professional, meetings are more common, staffing and other support sources are
more extensive, and the people attracted to such work probably have a more
professional attitude toward the job. Such advantages would allow a legislature to
become involved in highly complex issues, such as the environment. Information
is more easily obtained, as is help in interpreting such information, and the
workings of state government open up, allowing various groups, including
environmental activists, to press their case with legislators.
The consolidation of state environmental agencies is also expected to aid in
the passage and implementation of policies aimed at protecting the environment.
Kaufman's study of the Forest Service (1960) concluded that the success of the
service was due largely to its ability to ward off fragmentation. When the
responsibility for environmental protection is spread thinly over several agencies
and/or bureaus, work becomes easily overlapping and thus inefficient. The
environment is interconnected, and thus bodies claiming custody of one medium
cannot help but clash with another media-specific organization. Centralization is
also helpful in regard to information collection and dispersal, large budget
projects, and clout within the political structure. Studies of hazardous waste
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policy have found that strenuous regulation and effective implementation are more
likely to occur when the state environmental bureaucracy is more fragmented only
in states with low levels of pollution severity (Lester and Bowman, 1989; Lester
et al., 1983). Research on Texas, however, a state with more severe problems,
has found several examples of a fragmented bureaucracy detracting from solid
hazardous waste regulation (Kramer, 1983). As environmental problems worsen,
it seems likely that the states will need all available resources to control and
combat pollution properly. Thus, environmental bureaucratic consolidation,
which removes overlap and infighting among competing agencies, and provides
strength through a more unified regulatory voice, should prove to be of
importance among all states. Where the problem is more severe, both the
legislature and the bureaucracy will be necessary to create and implement an
effective program to control the effects of hazardous waste generation. The
strength of solid bureaucracy cannot be dismissed lightly, and the growing
necessity for an organization with a broad level of expertise to understand and
regulate the various factors which entail environmental protection imply that such
bureaucracy will only strengthen in the coming years.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic factors, like political conditions, can moderate the relationship
between the severity of pollution within a state and public policy. Economic
advantages and constraints can enhance or limit what states can and cannot do
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despite the best intentions policymakers. Economic variables must therefore be
considered in research on state environmental policy.
Several factors which are representative of the economic characteristics of
a state, such as unemployment level, gross state product per capita, per capita
income, unemployment level, and rate of unionization, could prove to be valuable
in analyzing state environmental policy. The wealth of a state is important as an
indicator of the ability of that state to pay for environmental protection regulation
and enforcement. It is true that even wealthy states may have competing fiscal
priorities such as health care, education, and crime. Without the ability to fund
environmental programs, however, even with an abundance of political will a state
would likely fall short of being able to accomplish the desired goals.
State Wealth
Per capita income and per capita gross state product (measured per capita
to account for state size and population differences) are measures of the wealth of
a state. As the amount of money which is earned and generated within a state
rises, so does the amount of funds available for the government to tax and then
spend. The states show notable differences in these two wealth indicators; as a
result, these differences translate into a large diversity in state taxation potential.
One would expect that wealthy states will have more funds available for
environmental regulation and protection than poor states whose coffers can only
cover essential services. Environmental policy requires innovation, and as
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previous research has shown, larger, wealthier states tend to be more innovative
(Walker, 1969). Thus, it is expected that size and wealth will also be positively
correlated with state environmental protection.
Research on hazardous waste policy has found the hypothesis of wealthier
states being more likely to spend more money on waste control holds true only in
non-southern states which produce a relatively high amount of waste (Lester et
al., 1983). The finding that in low waste states economic resources were not
significant is not altogether surprising. When a state requires less resources to
deal with a smaller problem, it seems reasonable that the overall wealth of the
state should be less crucial. As the problem worsens all over the country,
however, this variable may begin to become more important in a higher number
of states. A state hazardous waste program consists not only of policy creation,
however, but of implementation as well. Lester and Bowman (1989) found that
when more funds were allocated to subnational governments for environmental
cleanup, the implementation of hazardous waste programs improved. This finding
is based on a federalist perspective, however, and when each state is measured
strictly on state gathered funds, the previously noted finding on northern, high
waste states is more telling. The measure of one's commitment to action is not
accurate when considering the spending of another's resources; the same holds
true for a state which is squandering federal grant money versus spending "hard-
earned," internally raised dollars.
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The state wealth variable is crucial to the discussion of federalism and
environmental policy. The varying abilities on the part of the states to afford
environmental protection policies has major implications for the relationship
between the two levels of governments. Fiscal intervention is one of the simplest
methods by which the federal government can attempt to equalize regulation
among the states. If it is the case, as expected, that poor states cannot afford
environmental protection, then Congress can merely allocate funds based on need
in order to allow the poor states to fund the same environmental policies already
in place in wealthy states. Although such action amounts to redistribution, and
might be less than popular among the wealthy states, an overriding national goal
could be enough to sway the federal government toward fiscal intervention.
Should state wealth be the dominant influence on state policy, wealthy states could
even support funds for poor states. If an influx of money was a guarantee that
strict action would be forthcoming, wealthy states could look forward to a
lessening of interstate transfers of pollution from neighboring states with less
stringent pollution controls. In addition, the fear of industrial flight would be
reduced if all states, after being made financially capable, enacted equally
stringent environmental regulations. Clearly, wealth is a major issue in the
analysis of federalism policy implications. Unlike other variables, such as deeply
ingrained political culture or the percentage of blacks in a state, inequality in the
capabilities of the states to afford environmental protection policies is within the
power of the federal government to alter. Although the expense would be too
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great and the protest (from the wealthy states) too strong to entirely "level the
playing field," allocations to states for specific policies or projects is one manner
in which the federal government can act to influence state environmental policy.
Employment and Unions
The unemployment level in a state is likely to have a major impact on
shaping the politics of that state. Should the number of unemployed rise
dramatically, pressure mounts on policy makers to attend to the crisis. One
example of such a situation occurred in 1982, when the Democratic gains in the
1982 House of Representatives elections combined with an economic recession
and the resulting public pressure to force many conservative Republican legislators
to reverse their stand and accept a job creation bill. The idea that such a scenario
could be played out at the state level is all the more likely in light of the fact that
the 1980's marked the creation of a substantially larger state role in this area
(Baumer and Van Horn, 1985). Baumer and Van Horn (1985, p. 198) state,
"The unemployment rate has a powerful influence on...policy decisions As
unemployment and concern over it rise, public support for government action
increases." It is quite possible that in hard economic times, the idea of an
expensive jobs program could be replaced with a rash of environmental
deregulation. This idea would especially appeal to conservatives, who trumpet the
efficiency of the private sector in creating jobs, especially when government
regulation is kept to a minimum. States with high unemployment levels would
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tend to be more desperate for jobs, and thus might well be more willing to allow
companies greater leeway in the environmental area in order to attract industry
and employment. States with lower levels of unemployment, and therefore under
a lower level of public pressure, can be expected to demand more from industry
in the way of protection for the environment.
Unionization is also tied into this formula, as unions have historically
tended to view environmental regulation as a threat to economic growth and
subsequent expansions in employment. In addition, power of organized labor in a
state is positively associated with economic growth (Mazmanian and Sabatier,
1981; Gray and Lowery, 1988). One mitigating factor in this equation, however,
might be the tendency of unions to be concerned with job safety. Buttel and Flinn
(1978a) found that working class individuals were more concerned about the
environment, due to a work environment which is relatively more polluted.
Should environmental pollution prove to be a threat to employees, unionization
could turn out to have a positive effect on state environmental regulation.
Organized labor is not a monolith, however, and not all unions will be
equally resistant to environmental regulation. Unions most interested in fighting
regulation should be those whose workers are involved in industrial enterprises.
Thus, the more industrialized a state is, the greater the likelihood of union
pressure against environmental regulation. Industrialization in a state, however,
begets both greater wealth and a higher pollution level, both variables which lead
to more extensive protection of the environment (Regens and Reams, 1988). This
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example is a perfect illustration of how vciriables in this field often work to
mitigate one another. It remains to be seen, therefore, which economic factors
prove to be the most influential in explaining state environmental policy.
Social Class
Social class, when defined as a combination of income and occupation, has
been shown to be an unreliable indicator of environmental concern among the
general public. Environmental concern has been found to be broad-based, with
support which transcends social class barriers (Calvert, 1979; Van Liere and
Dunlap, 1980; Mohai, 1985; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; Lowe et al., 1980).
Various theories have been postulated regarding class differences in environmental
attitudes, some of them at direct odds with one another. Initial research by Buttel
and Flinn (1974) found that white collar occupations tend to be more supportive
of environmental legislation. Further study (1978a), however, concluded that due
to the fact that the working class lives and works in a more polluted atmosphere,
they would tend to be more concerned about environmental issues. Van Liere and
Dunlap (1980), however, state that as the lower classes are less aware of the poor
conditions wrought by pollution and the need to spend their time concerned about
basic needs of life, they tend to be less concerned. Both later studies, however,
found that neither income nor occupation had any significant effect on
environmental attitudes. Finally, Greenberg and Amer (1989) found that
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members of higher social classes tended to be more supportive of a hazardous
waste bond issue.
Findings concerning income are quite confusing. Study results range from
findings that a higher income translates into more environmental concern (Buttel
& Flinn, 1974), a lower income equals greater concern (Cutter, 1981), and
income makes no difference at all (Ladd, 1982). Calvert (1979) found that
medium income correlated with high support for environmental issues, but both
high and low income correlated with low support for the same issues. At any
rate, the issue of wealth is better tested at the state rather than the individual
level, where both the method of measure and the results are lucid.
Clearer differences with respect to social class, however, are found among
environmental activists. Class does have a positive correlation with political
participation in general, and environmental activists are no exception, coming
primarily from upper-middle class backgrounds. Environmental activism is not a
function of concern, but of resources and efficacy, both assets which are more
abundantly held by upper class individuals (Mohai, 1985). Therefore, class is a
poor predictor of environmental concern, as it has little or no significance when
observing the public. It is true that activists are by definition more aware and
vocal on issues, thus having a stronger effect on policy than non-activists.
Previous research has shown, however, that the more intense behavior displayed
by activists is based solely on political attitudes, and is thus unrelated to social
class.
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SOCIAL FACTORS
In addition to political and economic factors, social variables may also
influence the relationship between the severity of the pollution problem and state
environmental policy. Differences in gender, age, race, educational level, and
area of residence are all factors which influence attitudes toward environmental
issues. Sometimes the impact of public opinion on public policy can be strong
(Wright et al., 1985, 1987), and so the size and thus political strength of social
groups could well have an effect on environmental policy. Elite social
characteristics, a source of environmental attitudes among a powerful sector of
society, are thus extremely important. The social classifications into which state
legislators fall, and thus the environmental attitudes associated with those
classifications, may play an influential role in actions of elites and thus the
development of state environmental policy.
Gender
Gender is one social variable which might explain differences in
environmental policy among the states. Although research has been limited in this
area, studies have found that higher levels of environmental concern and attitudes
more in favor of action to protect the environment exist in women, among both
the general public and activists (Fortmann, 1990; Jackson, 1980; Merchant,
1980). Males are also more likely than women to accept the environmental
problems associated with the risks of technology (Milbrath, 1984). Women have
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been found to be slightly less likely to engage in public behavior which express
their concern for the environment, although this difference is explicable when
noting that men are more political in general. It is also important to note that
females are notably more likely to express their environmental concern through
personal or private behavior than men (Mcstay and Dunlap, 1983).
There are a number of possibilities to explain the difference in attitudes
between the genders. Women tend to be less concentrated in employment related
to heavy pollution; clerical jobs, nursing, and other pink collar employment which
is heavily populated by women are not as threatened by pollution regulation as are
energy, chemical and heavy industries. In addition, although the percentage of
women in the labor force is growing (Kandel and Huber, 1989), women are still
somewhat more likely than men to work solely in the home, where daily pressure
to promote economic growth is negligible, and quality of life issues, such as the
environment, dominate. It is therefore expected that gender will help explain
overall state environmental policy.
Hazardous and toxic waste concern is unique among pollution issues in
one regard; it is often focused upon by a single community which has fallen
victim to a toxic attack by polluters or a hazardous waste accident. If pollution
should be seen as a threat to children, it is possible that the strong maternal
instinct could propel women toward support for environmental protection as a
means of defending their young. Research undertaken in these communities has
concluded that women are particularly concerned about toxic waste problems.
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especially those with young children (Greenberg and Amer, 1989; Hamilton,
1985a). One possible hypothesis, therefore, is that states with increased
percentages of women in the state legislature will tend to have stricter hazardous
waste regulation policy. Women legislators, probably more informed and aware
than the average citizen, will be able to focus upon the preventive as well as
remedial aspects of a waste program. It can be expected that the tendency of
women to associate with female concerns would lead to a higher level of support
for stringent hazardous waste policies among women state legislators.
Race
The differences between whites and blacks on the issue of environmental
policy is important, as the racial composition of both state populations and state
legislatures vary greatly across the nation. Several studies have found that white
adults hold more positive values toward environmental protection and demonstrate
higher levels of awareness of and irritation over pollution than do black adults
(Crenson, 1971; Ostheimer and Ritt, 1976; Kamieniecki, 1980). Black
community leaders tended to be either indifferent or even hostile to ideas favoring
environmental protection, as such notions were thought to be considered either
threats to desired economic growth or black population growth (Hershey and Hill,
1977-1978). Explanations for lower levels of environmental concern among
blacks could be traced to the fact that many have less money and education, or
are more accustomed to and thus less aware of pollution. A poll on community
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concern for pollution found, for example, that blacks and whites in poor
communities had equivalent amounts of concern for the environment (Cutter,
1981). One study of children, however, found that blacks were less likely to
define pollution in complex terms, consider the quality of the environment a
concern for the entire community, and identify in a positive manner with
environmental protection goals. The difference between the races grew as the
children aged and received more information, leading the researchers to conclude
that a socialization process within the black subculture is responsible for the gap
in attitudes toward the environment (Hershey and Hill, 1977-1978). Although
national polls in the 1970s and a Roper Poll in 1981 found blacks to be slightly
more in favor of increased spending and regulations on the environment (Ladd,
1982; Ladd et al., 1979), it is possible that blacks were merely supporting
government action in general, which has historically been more helpful to blacks
than inaction. Such values are likely to be lightly held, and would probably not
translate into the concerted type of support necessary to seriously promote
environmental regulatory policy. Indeed, it seems more plausible that a lower
value placed on the environment within the subculture, combined with a strong
emphasis on economic growth as a path to racial empowerment, could prove to be
the elements which merge to make race a likely determinant of state
environmental policy.
In the area of hazardous waste specifically, black concern could increase.
Therefore, the presence of blacks in the state legislature could be telling. Toxic
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waste facilities are often located in areas heavily populated by blacks. Black
communities can also be victimized in other ways. One plant in Tennessee which
illegally dumped mercury into a river for years was defended by the Department
of Energy in an ignorant manner. The DOE stated that little threat existed to an
"affluent city.. .populated by scientists and engineers who have other pursuits than
habitual fishing" (Goldman, 1984, p. 551). What the DOE and the state ignored,
however, was the existence of a black community two miles downstream, many of
whom fished and swam regularly. As the vicious effects of toxic waste mount,
blacks are beginning to fight back. One study of a hazardous waste bond issue
found that minorities were more supportive of the issue than whites. This finding
runs contrary to the norm, and could reflect the recent growth of concern among
minorities that their neighborhoods are all too often the recipients of hazardous
waste. This concern could lead to black legislators taking steps to insure more
serious regulation of the problem. As the percentage of black legislators rises in
response to population growth and court ordered redistricting plans, so will the
power of blacks as a voting bloc. The log-rolling realities of politics should
provide such blocs substantial influence, and if the death and disability of black
communities through toxic poisoning increases, the issue of hazardous waste could
rise to the top of the black legislative agenda.
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Education
A component of social class which tends to be a powerful indicator of
environmental attitudes is education. Many studies have found that education has
a strong, positive correlation with support for increased spending on the
environment, attitudes in favor of environment protection, and support for
environmental legislation (Calvert, 1979; Ladd et al., 1979; Buttel, 1974; Van
Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Morrison, 1986; Mohai and Twight, 1987). In addition,
dedicated environmentalists are better much educated than the average American
(Milbrath, 1984). This finding is not surprising since awareness is likely to rise
with increased education. The broadening of interests beyond basic demands of
life into more complex areas, such as the environment, is a function of increased
education. This understanding of complexity is what links education with an
understanding of the need for environmental protection. The ability to view an
issue in a long-term perspective eillows those with more education to appreciate
the need to act now in order to preserve a sustainable planet for future
generations. Education can assist in developing a grasp of more abstract issues,
such as the connection between the use of an air conditioner in an automobile
contributing to the thinning of the ozone layer, which in turn could lead to an
increase in skin cancer. In addition, one with increased education is more likely
to view the world from a less parochial view, thereby understanding how the loss
of rain forest in another part of the world will affect Americans. There is an
appreciation of the world as a community; this could lead to a comprehension that
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the protection of the environment around the globe is necessary for the survival of
the human race. Therefore, a well-educated state population could wish to obtain
strong environmental protection in order to minimize the deleterious effects of
pollution: increased risk to personal health, damage to natural beauty, and long
term harm to a fragile eco-system.
Age
Differences in political attitudes between age groups, also known as the
"generation gap," is an enduring phenomenon. This chasm is due to a
combination of varying interests and changing values. Age has been consistently
found to be the single most dependable variable in predicting environmental
concern and attitudes (Hamilton, 1985a; Buttel and Flinn, 1978a & 1978b; Buttel,
1979; Milbrath, 1981; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Mohai and Twight, 1987;
Greenberg and Amer, 1989). Older people are more likely to accept the
environmental risks related to advancing technology in society (Milbrath, 1984).
Youth is positively associated with attitudes in support of protecting the
environment. The possible explanations for this finding are Vciried. One theory is
based on the belief that the young are less integrated into the economic system
and the social order, and they are thus less committed to maintaining the status
quo. They are more likely to be willing to press for change and innovation in
policymaking, both of which are required for a successful environmental program
to be instituted.
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Another likely explanation is a twist on Mannheim’s (1952) theory of
generations, which states that each generation has a permanent mark left on its
psyche by certain historical occurrences. This theory has been validated by more
recent research, which has found that conservatism is generational, and so
therefore not related to the actual aging process (Cutler, 1977). Perhaps those
who were young in the 1960s identified the green movement with the struggle
over civil rights and Vietnam (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). The youth of today,
unfamiliar with the material scarcity of wartime, have turned to stressing quality
of life, or "post-materialism," such as environmental issues over economic growth
(Inglehart, 1990; Ladd, 1982). Older people tend to be more set in their ways,
and thus less likely to accept change of any type willingly. The current younger
cohorts have been raised on Love Canal and Times Beach, Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl, acid rain and the Exxon Valdez disaster. The environment is no
passing fad, but a permanent issue which could likely continue to grow in
importance as environmental deterioration persists. Thus, each succeeding
generation would be more aware, therefore probably maintaining the distinction
between generations and environmental attitudes. It seems likely that age
composition of states will be a significant indicator of state policy.
The most active section of the population in terms of environmental
political participation, however, are those in their forties. This is also the group
at the height of the income/occupational prestige index (Mohai and Twight, 1987).
This may be explained as the result of greater resources with which to participate
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than a higher level of desire, in which case both the attitudes strongly supporting
environmental protection and the appetite to participate among the young could
still be stronger than in groups of older Americans.
One mitigating factor must be mentioned, however. The elderly are
extremely politically well-organized on an aggregate basis. The A ARP is the
largest interest group in the country, and has proven effective in securing
legislation beneficial to its members. Although senior citizens are less concerned
generally for the environment on an individual level, should some environmental
issue be perceived as a threat to the elderly, the bloc could swing into action.
Should more evidence be made widely available demonstrating that the elderly are
suffering respiratory problems stemming from high smog levels, or that rampant
development is threatening the serenity of a retirement area, the voice of the
senior citizens as a group could be shouting in accord with those of
environmentalists.
Urbanization
An initial review of the literature on the relationship between residence and
attitudes toward environmental policy provides confusion, as different attitudinal
stimuli based on residency furnish cross-pressures on both rural and urban
residents which seem to push and pull them between both ends of the
environmental spectrum simultaneously. It is reasonable to assume that as
residents of the more densely populated urban areas of the country live in an
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environment marked by greater levels of pollution (Hendee, 1969), they would be
more apt to hold stronger beliefs as to the necessity of decreasing the various
hazards to the health and beauty of the community. Rural residents living in less
developed localities, however, might tend to take a more appreciative view of
nature and its offerings and thus be compelled to support the protection of the
environment. For example, rural residents are more likely to depend on
groundwater than urbanites, and might therefore be apt to favor legislation which
protects their water source. Another factor could be the rural tendency to view
the environment as a source of recreation, thus leading to rural outrage over
rivers so polluted as to be unsafe for swimming, boating, and fishing.
Several studies have shown that urban residents seem to be more
supportive of environmental issues and reforms and have higher levels of concern
for the environment than rural residents (Calvert, 1979; Van Liere and Dunlap,
1980; Christenson, 1978; Lowe and Pinhey, 1982; Rickson and Stables, 1985).
More specific research, however, has discovered interesting exceptions to and
explanations for the relationships. One explanation, noted above, is that urbanites
tend to have higher levels of concern because of increased levels of pollution in
metropolitan areas. Living in a more polluted 2U "ea, with air pollution alerts,
sewage in the water, and especially trash on the streets does tend to provoke a
higher level of awareness of the problem (Kromm et al., 1973; Buttel and Flinn,
1978a). Early studies discovered that level of pollution was also related to
concern for the environment (Degroot, 1967; Kromm et al., 1973). Buttel and
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Flinn (1978a), however, found that support for environniental regulation was only
slightly higher among urban residents. In addition. Cutter (1981) found that in
the case of community concern for pollution, social indicators were more
important than those of environmental quality, and Samdahl and Robertson (1989)
concluded that perception of the pollution problem was unrelated to support for
the environment. Thus, residence was not significantly related to support for
environmental regulation.
A second explanation for the differences between urban and rural residents
is that rural residents tend to have a utilitarian view of the environment, stemming
from a combination of an individualistic, anti-regulatory outlook on life and
traditional rural occupations such as farming, ranching, mining, and logging (Van
Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Hendee, 1969). Support
for a portion of this theory lies in the knowledge that fcirmers and ranchers have
indeed been found to hold attitudes considerably more in opposition to
environmental regulation than other occupations, due to financial self-interest and
a belief in maximum freedom from government interference (Calvert, 1979).
This distinction, however, remains even when only rural residents are studied.
The denizens of rural cireas who are engaged in non-fcirming occupations have
attitudes more supportive of environmental regulation and a higher level of
concern for the environment (Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978; Fortmann, 1990).
This leads one to question whether the difference between urban and rural
occupants is spurious, based instead on contrasts in occupation or the fact that
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urbanites tend to be better educated (Graber, 1974; Sofranko and Williams,
1980).
Studies have shown that the attitudes on the environment of both new
migrants to rural areas and long-standing rural residents are quite similar (Fliegel,
1980; Garkovich, 1982). Such length of time in residence differences was found
to have no difference in attitudes, action, or dissatisfaction on the issue of forest
management, but that ex-urbanites tended to be more willing to speak up, voicing
attitudes that were truly held by a broad section of the community (Fortmann,
1990). Another study of rural residents found that those living in the area for
long periods of time were less concerned about water pollution. One resident
summed up the general feeling by stating, "We been drinking it all our lives"
(Hamilton, 1985b, p .467). Farmers reluctant to curb pesticide use are likely to
oppose strong water pollution laws. Based on these findings, it seems that the
much higher percentage of farmers living in rural areas would lead one to expect
to find a negative relationship between feelings of concern for the environment
and rural residence.
Another possibility is that as much of America is migrating toward urban
areas, the smaller towns and farm communities will need to forgo environmental
regulation in exchange for the economic growth necessary for the community to
survive. Businesses which cater to a limited clientele are likely to have a lower
profit margin. A small town establishment, running at a relatively small profit,
might well not have the resources to comply with environmental regulations.
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Therefore, strict regulation could have the effect of driving businesses out of a
small community, thereby losing precious jobs and often forcing residents to
travel in order to fulfill basic needs. Such a dire scenario is certainly incentive
for rural districts to forgo strict environmental regulation as a threat to the
survival of the community.
Finally, the lack of difference between recent and long-standing residents
of rural areas could be a function of either of two possibilities. The first is that
certain urbanites believe in the rural utilitarian-environment attitude and thus
migrate to an area replete with natural resources. The second is a mixing of
attitudes between newcomers and old-timers which could still find the summary
attitude measures of such a group of rural residents less concerned about the
environment than city-dwellers. These possible explanations raise the possibilities
that urban/rural distinction may be a significant indicator of state environmental
policy output.
The Research Design
The research design was created to offer a comprehensive examination of
the various factors which influence different aspects of state environmental policy.
The design was constructed to examine the combined effects of several types of
variables on state policy, including those which measure political, economic, and
social conditions, as well as indicators of pollution conditions within a state.
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Data were collected from several sources to construct both the independent
and dependent variables used to analyze the various environmental policies across
the fifty states. The independent variables were divided into four types of
conditions: severity of pollution, political, economic, and social. This division
was not simple, as several variables could be interpreted as belonging to either of
two types. In such cases the decision was based on an opinion as to which type
of condition a variable best fits. The initial set of conditions forms the basis for
the pollution severity hypothesis: In a rational world, as environmental conditions
worsen, policymakers will react with stronger policies created to respond to the
intensity of the environmental crisis. The list of pollution conditions is
exhaustive, totalling almost 200 variables. These variables were gathered from
information reported in The Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991), and are
representative of various measures of the severity of environmental degradation in
a state. The indicators range from direct information, such as the total pounds
per capita of toxic chemical releases to surface water, to indirect data, such as the
total number of motor vehicle miles driven annually. There are also indicators of
previous damage, such as the percent of lakes and rivers which are impaired.
Further examples include the growth of energy consumption. Safe Drinking Water
Act violation rates, acid rain levels, military hazardous waste sites, population
density, and cancer rates. The entire list of pollution severity variables, as well
as other variables used, is listed in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
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The large number of variables used to measure pollution conditions covers
a wide range of pollution in each policy area. The discovery of important
variables will also have implications for research on federalism. Certain
indicators of pollution severity are more interstate in nature than others. The
degree to which state policy is related to amorphous types of pollution which
cross state boundaries is helpful in any discussion of the role that the federal
government must play in the regulation of the environment at the state and
regional levels.
There has been criticism that political variables are often ignored or
underutilized in policy research (Ripley, 1991; Lester et al., 1983). This study
does not make this error, and it includes a wide variety of variables which
represent political phenomena. The data for several of these variables were
obtained from previous studies. Information on state ideology and partisanship
was gathered from Wright et al. (1985). As recommended by Wright et al.
(1985), this study utilizes the unweighted estimates of state ideology and
partisanship as reported in their study. The measures employed were constructed
based on information taken from twelve years of poll data from a sample of over
75,000 subjects. A measure of general policy liberalism based on state policy
output was also used, based on the work done by Klingman and Lammers (1984).
The study also uses data on the ideology of both state Democratic and Republican
elites drawn from Kamieniecki and Lammers (1992). This information was
derived from both the attitudes of delegates to the Republican and Democratic
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presidential nominating conventions for 1972, 1976, and 1980 and the self-
identification responses of county party chairpersons regarding ideology gathered
in 1979 and 1980. Data on political culture were obtained from Elazar (1972),
using the three major categories of moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic
cultures. The variable representing the power of the governor is derived from
work done by Gray et al. (1990), and is based on an analysis of the combined
strength of tenure potential, appointment power, budgeting power, veto power,
and the Governor's political strength in the legislature.
Several other political variables were also utilized in the study. Due to the
reported tendency of women to be more concerned about environmental issues,
especially hazardous waste, the percentage of women in the various state
legislatures in 1986 was included as a political indicator. These data were
obtained from Gray et al. (1990). The percentage of blacks in the state legislature
was also included, as one test of the relationship between race, the environment,
and political power. These data were obtained from the 1986-1987 Book of the
States. (Council of State Governments, 1987). The question of elite partisanship
is examined with the inclusion of three variables: the party of the governor, the
dominant party in the state legislature, and a combined party control index derived
from the first two variables. Data for the former two variables were obtained
from Gray et al. (1990). The latter measure was created by the author of this
study from the same information. The party competition variable was obtained
from work done by Bibby et al. (1983). The data on the consolidation level of
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the state environmental bureaucracy was created by the author, using information
from the 1982-1983 Book of the States. (CSG, 1983). The measure was based on
which of four categories a state fell into: these ranged from most fragmented
(health agency domination of environmental implementation), to most consolidated
(a single environmental superagency). The data on legislative professionalism,
based on 1982 state rankings, were obtained from work by Professor William
Lammers at the University of Southern California.
The final political variables are defined by the presence of interest groups.
Two adversarial groups were chosen in the hope of being representative of the
most adamant proponents and opponents of environmental regulation. The first is
a variable indicating environmental interest group strength. Data for this variable
consist of membership levels in the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and the National
Wildlife Federation, and were obtained from Hall and Kerr (1991). The other
interest group variable, dubbed polluter interest group strength, was constructed
by the author based on information taken from a study on the most influential
interests in the fifty states prepared by Hrebenar and Thomas (1990). Points were
added to each state total depending on how many major polluters were listed
among the most influential interests for that state. Representatives of polluting
interests include utilities, transportation interests, oil and chemical companies, and
manufacturing and industrial associations. Agriculture was not included in this
list because it was thought that a large number of agricultural enterprises exist
which emit a relatively low level of pollution, thus providing a counterweight to
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those agricultural groups which depend heavily on pesticides. Agricultural
endeavors which might shun pesticides could include dairy farmers, other
livestock enterprises, and farmers who adhere to organic principles or depend on
natural predators to deter pests. In addition, many farmers who had undergone
troubled financial times might have urged representative groups to push an agenda
concentrating on garnering government aid or holding the banks at bay, rather
than concentrating on state environmental regulation. This list of political
variables is quite exhaustive, and can potentially provide a detailed view of some
important determinants of state policy output.
A final indicator of interest group pressure, especially in the area of
hazardous waste, is the percent of personal income in each state which is derived
from the chemical industry. The data source for this variable is "Growing
Employment, Salaries Push Up Chemical Industry Compensation," Chemical and
Engineering News. October 23, 1989.
The third group of conditions is economic in nature. Environmental
programs do cost money, and thus must also be considered to be related to state
environmental policies. Two measures of state wealth are utilized in this study.
Gross State Product per capita, which measures the total economic output relative
to the population of a state, was included with data derived from statistics
compiled by Gray et al. (1990). Per capita income for 1986 was obtained from
the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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Another important economic variable is the unemployment rate, as it can
logically be postulated that a state with a greater number of jobless people would
be more eager to stimulate the economy, even at the cost of relaxing
environmental regulation. The unemployment rate for each state for 1986 was
obtained from statistics published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Unionization among manufacturing workers is also included as a
possible indicator of the position and political strength of organized labor. This
information was obtained from Hall and Kerr (1991), compiled from information
provided by the "Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climate Study" (1989).
The final two economic variables are concerned mostly with air pollution.
The dependency of a state on motor vehicles and related industries for both jobs
and taxes is an effective measure of the vulnerability of state government to
specific economic pressure from a major source of air pollution. These statistics
come from "MVMA Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures, 1990," (Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the United States, 1990).
The social variables, the smallest group, include the percentages of a state
population which are black, urbanized, graduated from high school, under 25
years of age, and over 65 years of age. The source for the data on each of these
variables is the United States Bureau of the Census (1986). These variables were
chosen because they were thought to be theoretically related to state environmental
policy.
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The design for this study permits the examination of distinct types of
policy outputs within the same issue area. Included among the dependent
variables are two types of indicators of state policy. The first are fiscal,
represented by state spending patterns in a certain issue area. The second type
are regulatory, concerning whether or not certain policies or programs have been
adopted by each state. The study includes evaluative scores, as provided by the
organization Renew America, which combine spending and regulatory effects and
score each state on a ten point scale measuring the overall success of its policy in
each pollution area. The use of distinct types of policy indicators allows for a
more thorough view of overall state policy, and is consistent with research which
has found that variation often exists between policy types within the same issue
area (Kamieniecki and Lammers, 1992; Tatalovich and Dayles, 1988; Klingman
and Lammers, 1984).
The dependent variables, as noted above, were divided into two groups.
The fiscal indicators of state spending policies on air pollution, water pollution,
and hazardous waste were collected from a 1991 report by Bob Hall and Mary
Lee Kerr of the Institute for Southern Studies entitled 1991-92 Green Index. The
data for spending on air quality management for fiscal year 1988 were gathered
from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards. The fiscal year 1988 spending for water quality
and development, which excludes marine protection, was found in the "Resource
Guide to State Environmental Management," (Council of State Governments,
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1991). Hazardous waste spending for 1988, which excludes municipal and county
spending, was also amassed from the "Resource Guide to State Environmental
Management. " Although these fiscal data include all funds that pass through the
state budgetary process, including both federal grants and state allocations, it
should be noted that due to sharp cuts in federal subsidies during the 1980s, it is
likely that overall spending will still offer a true reflection of a state’s
commitment to environmental protection.
The second subset of dependent variables consists of a variety of state
regulatory policies. In the chapter on air pollution, these policies include ozone
protection, global warming, and local automobile testing. The sources for these
data are "Policy Alternatives on Environment," (Center for Policy Alternatives,
Washington, 1991), and "Inspection/Maintenance Program Implementation
Summary," (Environmental Department of the Motor Vehicles Manufacturers
Association of the United States, 1991). The water pollution data include
groundwater and wetlands protection policies and pesticide permit policies.
Information on groundwater was obtained from "Survey of State Groundwater
Quality Protection Legislation Enacted from 1985 through 1987," (United States
EPA Office of Groundwater Protection, 1988). The wetlands data were gathered
from "The State of the States, 1989," (Renew America, Washington, D .C .,
1989), and the source for pesticide permit data was "The State of the States,
1988: Focus Paper on Reducing Pesticide Contamination," (Renew America,
Washington, 1988). The policies used for hazardous waste include a state
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superfund plan and right-to-know laws. Information on the former was obtained
from "An Analysis of State Superfund Programs," (Environmental Law Institute
of Washington, 1989). Data for the latter were derived from "Community
Worker and Right-to-Know News," (Thompson Publishing Group of Washington,
1990). Although the author would have liked to include a policy on reducing
waste, the alternatives in this area were found to either exist in too few states to
be useful or to have no correlation with the independent variables. This area of
policy is important, however, and as more states adopt reduction policy, could
well prove to be fertile ground for future research in this area. The policies
utilized in all three areas were chosen for the relevance they offered to crucial
issues of the late 1980s, the diversity of policy within each environmental issue,
and the predicted relationships to the independent variables.
Composite ratings used for the Renew America scores for air pollution,
surface water, and hazardous waste were compiled from the Renew America
report, "State of the States, 1989." These ratings provide a more comprehensive
view of policy in each state, covering areas which were not included in the more
specific indicators of expenditure and regulatory policy. These sets of dependent
variables offer a variety of angles from which to analyze state environmental
policy. Such an approach will allow for more complete conclusions to be drawn
about the determinants of state policy as well as about the need for future federal
and state intergovernmental relations concerning environmental protection.
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Finally, the statistical analyses employed for this study were utilized in two
stages. The first stage consists of bivariate correlation. This step uses Pearsons
Correlation to determine the relationships between and within the set of dependent
variables and the sets of environmental, political, economic, and social
independent variables. The second step is to use multiple regression to determine
the variables, chosen from the findings in the first stage of analysis, which impact
state environmental policy.
The statistical determinants of state environmental policy, including
pollution severity, political, economic, and social conditions, are all important
factors influencing the policy of pollution control. Although the logical
expectation is that the level of pollution severity in a state will bear a direct
relation to public policy, the strong possibility exists that such a relationship will
be mitigated by the effects of political, economic, and social characteristics unique
to each state. This theory will be tested statistically in each of the three areas of
air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste. The following chapter will
include a discussion of the nature and effects of air pollution as well as the
analysis of the factors influencing clean-air policy at the state level.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY
Air pollution has become perhaps the dominant symbol of the excesses
created by a society driven by industrial production and development. Millions of
Americans are reminded daily of the filthy contents of the air they breathe. The
sky obscured by an ugly brown blanket of smog is a constant reminder of the
most overt of all types of pollution. The dominant political power of the
corporate world combined with the ideological slant in the United States toward
the inherent good of continuous economic development and growth has led to a
general acceptance as to the necessity of allowing a certain amount of pollution to
occur.
In recent years, however, the argument that the economic benefits
outweigh the environmental and health costs has begun to be questioned more
seriously. Citizens have begun to call for changes in the nation's pollution policy.
Support among Americans for the battle against air pollution is widespread. A
1982 Harris Poll found that 72% of those questioned felt that it was "very
important" to improve the nation's air quality. More recently, a 1989 Gcillup Poll
found that 89 % polled felt that spending to control air pollution should not be
lowered, with two-thirds of those in favor of raising spending. In a 1990 Gallup
Poll, 78% supported the new Clean Air Act, even after being informed of the $20
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billion dollar cost of implementation. Clearly, the nation is behind the idea of
fighting air pollution.
Unfortunately, many people are less willing to make changes in personal
behavior in order to reduce air pollution. One study conducted for the Southern
California Air Quality Management District in 1988 found that many people
would oppose air pollution restrictions which significantly affect personal driving
patterns (Kamieniecki and Ferrall, 1991). Such typical American aversions to any
measure which lessens convenience is symptomatic of the difficulty which has
plagued three decades of efforts to achieve a national goal of clean air.
The distortion of a picturesque sunset or the concealment of snow-capped
mountain peaks, although disturbing, is the least malignant aspect of the problems
associated with air pollution. Studies clearly describe the truly insidious effects of
air pollution on public health. One recent report in the American Journal of
Public Health revealed that the air pollution in Southern California is the cause of
severe respiratory damage in children as young as age ten (Fulwood, 1992).
Nitrogen oxide is especially damaging to the lungs of children, particulates often
carry carcinogenic materials, and carbon monoxide has been found to damage the
central nervous system (Mann, 1990). Smog, which is created when chemicals in
the air interact with sunlight, is also damaging. Among its negative effects are
severe headaches and irritation to the eyes, nose, throat, and respiratory system.
Again, children, in addition to older people and the infirm, are particularly
endangered by the effects of smog. Long-term exposure to smog is even more
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harmful, as studies have found links to the development of chronic asthma,
bronchitis, and emphysema. The American Lung Association estimates that the
exhaust from motor vehicles alone is responsible for 120,000 unnecessary or
premature deaths every year (Hall and Kerr, 1991).
In addition to the damage to public health, air pollution can severely
impair earth's environment and atmosphere. The problem of global warming,
which may have recently resulted in some of the warmest years in historical
record in the United States, is partially caused by many types of air pollutants,
especially carbon dioxide. Should the trend of global warming continue, the
future could possibly entail great expanses of desert in the United States and
another dust bowl era within fifty years (Caplan, 1990).
Another problem caused by air pollution is the destruction of the ozone
layer. Although ozone is destructive to the lower atmosphere when emitted
directly into the air from earth, the natural ozone layer in the upper stratosphere
provides protection from the harmful ultraviolet rays of the sun. The hole in the
ozone layer has been rapidly growing, and could eventually lead to a population
held captive indoors for fear of cancerous exposure to the sun. The hole in the
ozone layer is primarily caused by the release of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a
refrigerant and plastics chemical, into the atmosphere, and in addition to human
cancer, could cause great damage to both flora and fauna as well.
Acid precipitation is also a by-product of air pollution which is already
causing both damage on earth and concern for the future. Oil and coal burning
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power plants release sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides into the air, which return in
an acidic form that has caused vast ruin to crops, lakes, rivers, and forests in the
Northeastern United States, Canada, and the metropolitan Los Angeles area. Acid
precipitation damage has been estimated to cost $5 billion a year in the United
States alone, and has caused the death of a majority of various species of trees in
several New England states, Canada, and the San Bemadino Forest in southern
California (Bale, 1991). In addition, in Canada, 48,000 lakes have been
discovered to be "acid sensitive," which causes the death of fish and a reduction
in species diversity (Bale, 1991).
Clearly, the reduction of air pollution would bring several positive
benefits. Included in this list are preservation of the air, land, and water,
improved public health, and even economic benefit. The destruction to crops,
property, and the loss of work time caused by dirty air support the idea that a
concerted effort to clean up the air would be rewarded in financial terms.
In this chapter several variables possibly impacting state clean-air policy
will be discussed and analyzed. Correlation and regression analyses will lead to
conclusions regarding the factors which contribute to state clean-air policy. As
one of the three major pollution areas being analyzed in this study, knowledge
about the sources of state air pollution control policy are key aspects of any
overall environmental plan. The specific phenomena which contribute to the
formulation of state clean-air policy are indicative of which forces, environmental,
political, economic, or social, are the crucial factors in regard to air quality. An
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understanding of the forces which drive clean-air policy is necessary to formulate
a coherent analysis of the proper relationship between federal and state
governments in the sphere of environmental policy. These data therefore fit into
the overall discussion of federalism and environmental policy.
ANALYSIS
The first step in the analysis is to examine bivariate relationships between
the possible explanatory factors and the set of dependent variables, as well as
within both the independent variable set and the dependent variable set. The
analysis begins with an initial consideration of bivariate correlations and then
moves to multivariate analysis. The discussion of the independent factors will be
divided into two parts: the larger set of pollution severity indices which are
specific to the air pollution problem, and the general group of political, economic,
and social variables which apply to all three pollution areas. The dependent
variables include both spending and regulatory variables. Fiscal policy is
represented by the amount of money spent by each state on air pollution control
policy on a per capita basis. The regulatory variables, the analysis based on
whether each state has enacted such a policy, include ozone protection, global
warming, and local automobile testing policies. Finally, the Renew America
Score for air pollution mixes the fiscal and the regulatory, giving an overall score
for the success of a state policy on air pollution.
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The vast number of pollution severity variables evaluated were found to be
not only strongly correlated with the dependent variables, but also often highly
intercorrelated with each other. This relationship with the dependent variables
allows for a tentative acceptance of the pollution severity hypothesis which states
that the worse the pollution problem is in a state, the more likely that the state
will create policies designed to abate the pollution problem. This finding is
expected, as environmental conditions were assumed to be very important
variables in a rational society.
Environmental Conditions
In the air pollution analysis, the high degree of intercorrelation among the
independent variables made it necessary to reduce the set of independent variables
after an initial analysis of the findings. Perhaps the most telling variable is
population density. This measure is intercorrelated with measures of vehicles,
miles driven, toxic air pollutants, acid rain levels, ozone violations, and cancer
case rates and deaths. Clearly, the density of the population within a state
contributes to greater use of vehicles and industry which account for greater
pollution. Interestingly, population density did not correlate with the spending
dependent variables, but it did correlate quite strongly with the non-fiscal policy
measures. The findings provide possible support for the contention that as the
population density of a state rises, so does the likelihood that air pollution control
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policies will be created. Density growth, does not, however, provide any link
with spending on air pollution control.
The percentage of the population of a state which lives in areas that violate
federal carbon monoxide standards was also chosen as representative of several
indicators. This important variable correlated with several motor vehicle-related
variables. There were also strong correlations with both spending and regulatory
members of the dependent variables. These findings continued to support the
pollution severity hypothesis. The findings suggest the possibility that as the
percentage of the population in violation of carbon monoxide standards rises, the
likelihood of both greater spending on air pollution control and the adoption of air
pollution control regulations increases accordingly.
Other valuable independent variables representative of environmental
conditions include the amount of carbon dioxide emissions per capita, the amount
of gasoline used per capita, the amount of sulfur dioxide emissions by utilities per
capita, and the dependency on vehicle and related industries for jobs and tax
revenue. All four measures are negatively associated with air pollution control
policy adoption.
One important note is that several measures of causes of air pollution
severity in per capita numbers were found to correlate negatively with policy
adoption. Outputs per capita of toxic air pollutants, nitrous oxides, carbon
dioxide, energy consumption, and gasoline use were all similar in that as the per
capita outputs rise, the likelihood of state policy adoption plummets. In addition.
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none of these per capita measures have a significant relationship with any of the
fiscal dependent variables.
It is not surprising that greater dependency on vehicle and related
industries for both jobs and taxes would correlate with a reduced likelihood of
adopting air pollution control regulation. Like the per capita measures, however,
these variables have no significant relationship with the spending policy variables.
Spending on air pollution in the states appears to be dictated by total population
and ozone problems. Ozone emissions from all sources as well as the number of
vehicles and miles driven are very strongly correlated with both total spending
and spending per capita. It would appear that many states use ozone levels, the
main ingredient in smog, as the benchmark for decisions regarding spending on
air pollution control. This is borne out by the strong positive relationship
between the per capita spending levels and total state population.
Political Conditions
Several political factors were also found to be not significantly related to
state clean-air policy, including party competition, gubernatorial power, and
partisanship. The latter variable, measured at the gubernatorial, legislative and
public levels, was found to be a surprisingly poor indicator of policy.
Apparently, the American political party system measured at any level has no
bearing on the direction of state environmental policy. This finding is important
in light of the tendency of many Americans to equate the Democrat party with
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liberalism and liberalism with environmentalism. The next logical conclusion
would therefore be to associate the Democratic Party with environmentalism.
This is not the case, however, as partisanship and ideology are entirely separate
phenomena. In this study, the assumption that a connection exists between
Democrats and stringent air pollution control policy clearly has no empirical
support.
Ideology, as expected, was found to a strong factor, as evidenced by
several measures. As Table 4.1 shows, when observing the state as a whole, use
of both Lammers' policy liberalism scale and W right's ideology measure found
that liberalism was correlated quite strongly and positively with most of the
measures of clean-air policy. The analysis implies that states with more liberal
populations are more likely to adopt regulatory clean-air policies, and are likely to
spend more money on air pollution programs.
Party elite ideology also appears to be linked to clean-air policy. Among
Republican elites, increasing liberal ideology is associated with higher total state
spending as well as several non-fiscal policy indicators. Interestingly, the findings
for Democratic party elites were almost identical. These findings, coupled with
the findings regarding partisanship, present a clear picture of where lines are
drawn among legislators in the battle over clean-air policy. Partisanship takes a
back seat to ideology, with liberal elites from both parties working to pass
environmentally sound air pollution control legislation, while more conservative
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members of the parties are also united in the fight against stronger state air
pollution regulation.
The measure of consolidation of a state's environmental bureaucracy
yielded meaningful results. This variable was found to be weakly but significantly
linked to each dependent variable in a positive manner. In other words, as a state
consolidates the responsibilities for environmental protection into fewer and more
concentrated bureaucratic bodies, public policy output promoting clean-air
increases. This finding is complementary with earlier work, and should continue
to increases in importance as increasing numbers of states move toward the
concept of centralized environmental protection.
The analysis of the data on interest groups produced mixed results. The
relationship between the strength of the polluting groups and the dependent
variables was not significant. This finding could be due to a number of factors
other than some type of perceived corporate weakness. For example, it is
possible that many polluting industries choose to concentrate on fighting other
types of pollution controls, such as those regarding water pollution or toxic waste.
In addition, the field of air pollution is diverse; while utilities might be concerned
about sulfur dioxide problems, urban industry might be interested in regulation of
ozone standards. Finally, the vast strength of the business lobby might well be
directed at other targets. Issues such as economic regulation, wage and union
problems, development assistance, and tax breaks could well be higher on the
corporate agenda than issues of environmental regulation. Therefore, it seems
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unwise to discount the power of American industry interest groups to affect
policy, while it must be noted that in the case of state air pollution policy, such
groups tend to be relatively unimportant.
In contrast, the environmental groups’ power was found to bear a strong
relationship to clean-air policy. This variable was closely related to both spending
and regulatory indicators. This suggests that the stronger the presence of
environmental interest groups in the state, the more likely that the state would
adopt strong environmental policies. This finding is both expected and logical.
Unlike industry groups, which must spend time lobbying legislatures on a variety
of issues including taxes, labor relations, and development patterns, environmental
groups are single-issue and thus concentrate their efforts. Such groups are well-
organized and often have solid financial backing. It is therefore no surprise to
find that focused efforts bring results in the policy making process.
Analyses of political culture provided some intriguing information.
Contrary to expectations, moralistic culture was found to be an unimportant
variable, correlating in a positive manner weakly with only one policy indicator
among the five dependent variables. Also, individualistic culture was found to be
not related to policy output. Traditionalistic culture, however, was found to
correlate negatively and significantly with both spending and regulatory dependent
variables. This association suggests that states with a traditionalistic culture tend
to spend less money on air pollution control and have fewer air pollution control
policies than other states.
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Economie Conditions
Not surprisingly, economic issues are clearly related to clean-air policy.
Although gross state product per capita turned out to be a poor explanatory factor,
the per capita income of a state was found to be strongly related to spending and
regulatory measures. These significant relationships are all positive.
Unemployment was found, surprisingly, to be generally unrelated to either
spending or regulatory policy. Unemployment was found to correlate negatively
to the existence of a state ozone program. The expected effect of high
unemployment dissuading policy makers from supporting air pollution control
plans was found to be incorrect: perhaps either the political power of the
unemployed is ineffective, or the issues of jobs and air pollution control are not
widely perceived as connected, despite attempts by industry to trumpet such a
link.
Unionization, perhaps in line with the declining power of labor, was found
not to be a major factor. Only one relationship was found among the dependent
variables and the correlation, although significant, was weak. One can surmise
that union influence is concentrated on strictly economic issues as well as worker
safety, rather than the more abstract good of environmental protection.
Social Conditions
There are questions regarding the relationship of several socio
demographic variables to environmental phenomena; research has found mixed
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results. In this study, the issue of race received a clear answer. The
measurements of blacks as a percentage of a state population and blacks as a
percentage of the state legislature were both found not to be significantly related
to the dependent variables concerning clean-air policy. This finding does not
necessarily imply that white and black populations are equally environmentally
conscious. What is a distinct possibility, however, is the fact that as a political
entity, the black community wields little power, thus bearing no relationship to
state clean-air policy. Another likely scenario is that blacks have a different
political agenda to pursue, thus choosing to neither hinder nor assist in the
passage of environmental legislation.
Age, generally accepted as the most accurate and consistent factor in the
prediction of environmental attitudes, was found to have an expected result
concerning policy determination. The 20 to 24 year old age group had a positive
correlation with several members of the dependent variable set, most notably with
factors related to spending. Conversely, as Table 4.1 displays, the over 65 age
group had a negative correlation with the same factors. This finding suggests
possible support for the claim that as the percentage of the young in a state rises,
so does the likelihood that a state will allocate more money for clean-air
programs.
Gender, another variable which has been the subject of mixed findings,
was found to be a factor in policy formulation. Measured by the percentage of
women in the state legislature, this variable was found to correlate with both
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financial and several of the non-financial policy indicators, although weakly.
There appears to be an association between the percentage of women in the state
legislature and the likelihood of a state adopting more stringent measures in favor
of protecting the environment.
Education was found to be a significant factor, although in a limited
manner. A significant, though weak, relationship exists with per capita spending
on air pollution, but no significant relationship was found with any of the other
indicators. Thus, although education has been found to be a strong indicator of
environmental attitudes, the same cannot be said in regard to a role in policy
formation.
Finally, urbanization was found to correlate with fiscal indicators, but not
with regulatory variables. This could be attributed to the fact that the wealthier
states are also more urbanized. Urbanization continues to be an indicator which
possesses a vague nature, emitting crossed signals about its value as a predictor of
public policy.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
To carry out the multivariate analysis I used the following model:
A IR = a+ bjSP + b2POL + bgECN + b^SOC + e
AIR - State clean-mr policy, the dependent variable
a - The constant
SP - Severity of pollution variables
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POL - Political variables
ECN - Economic variables
s e e - Social variables
bj-b4 - The regression slopes
e - The error term
The next step is to use multiple regression to determine the separate impact
of each independent variable on the dependent variables. This process will allow
for deductions to be made concerning both the explanatory and predictive aspects
of the independent variables.
The unstandardized regression coefficients reported in Tables 4-2, 4-3, 4-
4, 4-5, and 4-6 indicate differences within the field of air pollution control policy.
In the case of expenditures for clean-air policy, the data show that age is the
significant predictor of state per capita spending. In other words, states with a
higher percentage of elderly inhabitants are less likely to cillocate money for air
pollution control. In light of the attitudes of the elderly toward the environment
as a whole, this finding was anticipated. In addition, the ideology of Democratic
party elites is also relevant. The liberal tendencies of these elites is linked to
higher spending patterns for air pollution control. This finding is also consistent
with the previous research done on ideology and environmentalism. Finally, the
amount of explained variance for this variable is 32 percent.
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Political ideology in the form of Democratic party elites influences ozone
protection policy. As expected, an increase in Democratic liberalism appears to
lead a greater likelihood of legislation aimed at protecting the ozone layer. The
existence of a plan to stop global warming is the sole dependent variable to be
impacted by an environmental condition variable. Population density is a positive
influence on global warming regulation. In a similar vein, moralistic political
culture is also positively linked with policy to reduce greenhouse gases and keep
the earth from overheating. These two findings are consistent with theoretical
expectations. Both equations generated respectable amounts of explained
variance; 37 percent for ozone policy and 35 percent for global warming
regulation.
While the independent variables in the equations for the above four
dependent variables explain a reasonable percentage of the variance, the same
cannot be said for the policy of local automobile testing, which has an explained
variance of only 23 percent. This policy indicator is not clearly influenced by any
of the independent variables. Apparently, the determinants of local automobile
testing policy are sufficiently varied and inconsistent across the 50 states to deny
any explanatory or predictive opportunities.
The Renew America Score (RAS) for air pollution, a comprehensive gauge
of a state's overall clean-air policy, was found to be impacted by both per capita
income and traditionalistic political culture. Per capita income shows a
particularly strong link to the RAS, thus promoting the expected theory that state
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wealth plays a strong positive role in forceful air pollution control policy.
Traditionalistic culture, on the other hand, is negatively linked to state policy;
traditionalistic states are weaker on air pollution control. Due to the previous
findings on Moralistic culture, this finding is consistent with theoretical
expectations. Overall, the variables in the equation explain 31 percent of the
variance in state RAS.
Finally, tolerance coefficients were low and vctriance inflation factors high
for Democratic elite ideology in three of the five equations. The tolerance
coefficients were high and the variance inflation factors low for all of the
remaining variables in the five equations, suggesting that multicollinearity was not
a serious problem.
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of this analysis offer interesting insights into the growing field
of research into the development of state clean-air policy. First, it seems quite
clear that the pollution severity hypothesis of worsening environmental conditions
leading to stronger policy measures to combat air pollution is not fully supported
by the data. Although the bivariate correlations suggested considerable support
for such a theory, the regression model demonstrated otherwise. Assuming that
state policymakers and citizens are aware of their state’s pollution problems, it
appears that other factors than the severity of pollution influence public policy.
This could well be a function of a low level of concern about the environment as
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compared to other issues. Perhaps more attention is paid to the economy, crime,
and abortion, for example, and decisions regarding environmental protection are
made as a result of political, economic, and social factors already intrinsic to
overall policy creation.
In addition, the determinants of regulatory and expenditure policies tended
to differ. The age of a state population is a crucial aspect of the spending
process, while at the same time unimportant in the regulatory domain. The
differences between spending and regulation can stem from several sources.
Spending is a form of policy which spreads the onus across the population, while
regulation often focuses on a smaller segment, such as industry or those who
drive a great deal. Thus, spending, as opposed to regulation, seems likely to be
the policy choice preferred by industry affected by regulatory restrictions as well
as those who are heavily dependent upon the automobile for either business or
recreation. On the other hand, spending is a direct allocation of tax dollars, and
could, if the need was estimated to be serious enough, result in higher taxes or
fees. Regulation, however, requires strong implementation to be effective, not
merely passage. Under this scenario, many citizens and businesses could resist
spending increases while accepting regulatory pronouncements which are weakly
enforced. In either case, there does appear to be a distinct difference between
spending on clean-air policy and the passage of regulatory policies.
Another important finding involves the relationship between political
ideology, partisanship, and clean-air policy. According to the correlation
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analysis, partisanship is not an important variable in the state air pollution control
policy process. This finding indicates that studies of congressional roll-call
analysis are insufficient for evaluation of state policy, and studies at the state level
must include state legislators. More importantly, political ideology could well be
the explanatory factor behind results of analyses involving partisanship. Although
the regression analysis did not uphold the strong impact of statewide ideology
found in the correlation analysis, the ideology of Democratic party elites was
found to be of importance in both spending and regulatory measures. A review of
the regression results underscores the finding that increased liberalism is an
indicator of a stronger overall clean-air policy. A possible explanation for the
specific importance of this finding is that ideology within the Democratic party
may have a greater range nationwide than that of the GOP, caused by the rift
between conservative southerners and their more liberal northern counterparts.
Thus, the strength of Democratic leadership on the air pollution agenda, likely
due to the overall greater liberalism of the party as compared to the Republicans,
can vary widely across the fifty states.
Political culture was found, as expected, to play a role in policy formation.
The outcome was not completely consistent, however, as both moralistic and
traditionalistic culture were found to impact air pollution control policy.
Moralistic culture was found to be a positive stimulant to air pollution control
policy, while the opposite was found to be the case with traditionalistic culture.
Although neither variable was found to affect more than one policy measure, the
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findings on air pollution control policy contribute to the status of political culture
as an important predictor of state policy.
Age, which is considered perhaps the strongest predictor of general
environmental attitudes, is also a valuable tool for evaluating state spending on air
pollution. The data show that although age is not a significant factor in regulatory
policy formation, the percentage of a state population which is over 65 is strong
and negatively related to air pollution spending. The realization that attitudinal
differences among generations carries over into state spending patterns is
important. As the population of the entire country ages and demographics within
state borders change due to the migration of younger generations, political elites
will be forced to pay heed to changing constituencies. This could prove to be
important as to the degree of variation in air pollution spending within states, as
well as total state spending patterns. It is possible that the future could bring
reduced overall spending on the state levels, as well as reductions in states with
increasing numbers of elderly denizens. The possibility exists, however, that age
cohort phenomena, which states that political attitudes are based upon generational
experiences and not the aging process itself, might cause the attitudes of those
joining the elderly category within the next generation to be different from the
senior citizens of the present.
While realizing the possibility of age cohort phenomena dictating future
changes in elderly attitudes, the findings on age are important in regard to the
issue of intergovernmental relations. Should state spending levels drop
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precipitously, the federal government might need to reevaluate aid packages for
air pollution reduction. In addition, steep funding cuts in a few select states could
also trigger federal action, either at a regulatory or spending level. In either case,
the graying of America could well have a serious impact on federalism and
monetary appropriations at both the state and federal levels of government for air
pollution control and possibly other general policy areas.
Surprisingly, economic variables are noticeably weak as predictors of
policy. This was especially notable in that economic variables in the regression
analysis appeared to be unimportant in regard to state spending despite strong
relationships found in the correlation analysis. Per capita income was found,
however, to be a very strong explanatory variable of overall clean-air policy, as
measured by the RAS. This is telling, as economic wealth appears to be a solid
tool for the prediction of trends in comprehensive state air pollution control
policy. This finding also bears important considerations for federalism. The
great variation of wealth between the states suggests that states with more money
will develop a stronger overall clean-air policy, while poorer states will lag. The
transitory nature of air pollution could serve to punish states making a strong
effort to combat smog. Alternatively, strong federal controls could place a
moratorium on new industry in a poorer state with dirty air, thus eliminating the
possibility of new revenues and creating a vicious circle whereby the rich states
attract new industry and prosper, while the poor states, without a strong tax base,
are unable to afford air pollution control and are thus stuck in a no-win situation.
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It is also likely that at least a part of the pressure for a federal mandate of higher
standards in poorer states could stem from policymakers in wealthier states
wishing to avoid the possibility of industrial relocation due to environmental
stringency. Although research has shown that industry is highly unlikely to
relocate based on environmental regulations, the perception among state legislators
that this is the case has lingered (Lowry, 1992). Thus, much federal clean-air
legislation, which has been aimed partially at disallowing the practice of states
lowering environmental restrictions in order to attract commercial enterprise,
becomes of questionable value. The pressure from wealthier states to upgrade the
pollution standards of all states runs counter to democratic tendencies, as the
rights of those in poorer states to opt for a less stringent pollution control policy
is violated by non-residents of that state. The right to this preference, however,
becomes diluted as spillover from one state of acid rain, air toxics, or ozone
poisons the relatively cleaner skies of a neighboring state with stricter air pollution
control. Such a situation lends support to the idea that the intervention of the
federal government to "level the playing field" is justified, in light of the problem
of negative externalities.
The data show that within the field of air pollution control lies a wide
variety of programs and policies which are diverse in nature and impacted by
different types of variables. Each of the five dependent variables was found to be
influenced by different factors. In addition, the correlations show that sulfur
dioxide utility emissions were not a significant factor in any of the five cases.
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Sulfur dioxide causes acid rain, an issue which was first attacked nationally by the
1990 Clean Air Act and is thus a recent phenomenon. Clearly, the various types
of air pollutants and the policies which deal with them are associated with
different constituencies. Ozone, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide all have
different causes and effects; the result of this diversity is a dissimilarity within the
confined space of state clean-air policy.
Finally, equally important as to what the analysis found relevant is what
was found irrelevant. Environmental interest group strength was expected to play
a strong role in impacting state clean-air policy. Growing environmental
awareness among Americans, rising membership rates in environmental
organizations, and the focused purpose of a single issue lobbying bloc all point to
the probability that state legislators will respond to the concerns of environmental
interest groups. The regression analysis revealed these interest groups to be poor
evaluative or predictive tools of state clean-air policy. Clearly, despite the
growing strength of special interest groups in American politics, in the case of
state air pollution control policy, factors other than interest groups are driving the
policy process.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the impact of several variables on state air pollution
control policy. After a multiple regression analysis was performed, several
conclusions became apparent. Age was found to be negatively associated with
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spending on air pollution control. Political culture was found to be an important
variable, as moralistic states are more likely to have a strict air pollution control
policy, while those states with a traditionalistic culture tend to have weaker air
pollution control programs. Political ideology is a factor in clean-air policy, but
partisanship is not; apparently, liberals and conservatives coalesce on policy
across party lines. Environmental interest groups were found not to be a factor.
Evidently, the strength of such groups has not yet reached a critical point.
Finally, and unexpectedly, environmental conditions were not a factor in air
pollution control policy. This finding points to the conclusion that at present,
policymakers are still relatively unaffected by the state of the environment.
Should conditions worsen, it will be interesting to note how much air degradation
must occur before the severity of pollution within a state becomes a significant
source of air pollution control policy.
State clean-air policy has been shown to be affected by a combination of
social and political factors while economic and environmental conditions were
found to be relatively less important. These findings, however, may well be
specific to clean-air policy. One common mistake made in studying the
environment is to assume a similarity between all pollution areas. Conditions,
effects, and attitudes differ depending upon the problem area; lumping all types of
environmental problems into one group can result in misleading conclusions.
Although both breathing and drinking are necessary for survival, clean-air and
clean water are very different phenomena. Therefore, the sources of policy could
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quite possibly differ as well across the 50 states. Such differences, as well as
similarities, are discussed in the following chapter on state water pollution control
policy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY
Perhaps the most diverse category among the various types of pollution is
that of the damage done to the waters of the nation. Included among the broader
classification of water pollution are subsections on groundwater, surface water
(including both rivers and lakes), and saltwater sources, including oceans, bays,
and estuaries. In addition, water pollution results not only from direct sources,
but also from toxic runoff, leakage through the earth into the groundwater, and
air pollution which descends from above to contaminate America's waterways.
Inevitably, however, all water sources are connected, thus making the massive
damage done to the nation's waterways all the more disastrous.
Water is life: It provides basic sustenance for man and beast, irrigates the
crops which feed us, keeps us free from disease and filth, and even provides a
host of recreational opportunities. The United States is blessed with a bounty of
water, surrounded on three sides by ocean, crisscrossed by countless rivers and
streams, and home to many lakes, including the Great lakes, which hold one-fifth
of the freshwater on the planet. This resource, however, so valuable in the
development of the country, has been badly abused.
None of the various water sources have escaped degradation. Oceans and
other coastal waters are the recipients of over five trillion gallons of wastewater a
year, much of it raw or undertreated. Chemical plants and other industries
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discharge pollution into lakes, streams, and rivers, turning clear, sparkling waters
into brown, odorous waste holes. Sewer discharge is laden with used motor oil
and other pollutants which stem from improper disposal by individuals and
businesses. Pesticide runoff from agriculture results in vast amounts of chemicals
flowing into rivers and streams. Finally, multitudes of groundwater sources are
being impaired by leakage from pesticides, hazardous waste, and salt. Impure
waters are rampant, and unless changes are made in behavior and investment
undertaken in treatment, the problems are certain to continue unabated.
The pollution of the nation's various water resources has a plethora of
negative effects on human health, other living creatures, and the environment
itself. Human beings are at risk from a number of water pollution sources.
Those who surf and swim in the ocean must be constantly aware of the sewage
and garbage which is disposed of in these vast liquid repositories. In 1988,
beaches in New York and New Jersey were found to be littered with medical
waste, including syringes, which had been improperly disposed of too close to
shore and had thus washed up on the shores of popular seaside areas. In early
1992, a broken main in the San Diego area spilled hundreds of millions of gallons
of partially treated sewage into the ocean seven times closer to the shore than the
norm, and at a depth of only 35 feet instead of the regular 220 feet. The disaster
forced the closure of five miles of coastline to all surfers and swimmers. Health
authorities in the area outlined the danger of such spills into the ocean. Such
sewage contains fecal coliform bacteria, which raised the ocean content level to
Ill
over 400 times the legal limit. The bacteria can cause several water-borne
diseases, including hepatitis, typhoid, dysentery, and gastrointestinal problems.
Humans are also at risk from poisons poured into rivers, estuaries,
streams, and lakes, as well as that which seeps into groundwater aquifers.
Chemical factories and refineries line the 150 mile strip of the Mississippi River
from Baton Rouge to New Orleans. Nicknamed "cancer alley," this home to over
135 major industrial facilities has the most dangerously polluted water in the
country. As a probable result, the residents of the area, who rely on the water
for drinking and household use, suffer cancer and miscarriages at a rate higher
than normal (Hall and Kerr, 1991). The nation's rivers are poisoned by various
types of waste. These include ammonia, which damages the lungs, dioxin, which
causes kidney and nerve damage as well as birth defects, and various carcinogens,
such as heavy metals, formaldehyde, and acrylonitrile. Water pollution can be
harmful to health in a more indirect manner as well. Studies have found that
babies bom of mothers who consume fish caught in Lake Michigan, where the
fish contain dioxide, PCBs, and DDT among other harmful chemicals, are more
likely to be bom prematurely and underweight, as well as to develop leaming
problems as they grow older (Hall and Kerr, 1991). Clearly, the use of the
nation's water resources as sewers puts the population at risk. Fishing,
swimming, drinking, and household use are all ways in which Americans utilize
this valuable resource. As pollution spreads throughout the waters of the land.
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more and more people will be restricted from using water and subject to health
threats when they do.
Water pollution is also harmful to marine life and the environment. Vast
populations of shellfish are restricted from capture due to pollution in the
Chesapeake and Narragansett Bays, as well as the Louisiana coast, where the
shallow water shellfish are a local specialty and many fishermen have suffered as
the available catch is constantly being reduced. California has lost 99 percent of
its original shellfish stock, and has seen total fish catches reduced by two-thirds in
the last 50 years. Many species of fish in the Great Lakes have suffered
enormously, as huge numbers have been decimated, particularly in Lake Ontario
and Lake Erie. Other animals are also affected, as fish laden with mercury
poison birds and other predators who can suffer illness or death. The poison can
thus be passed along the food chain, doing damage to many species of fish, fowl,
and mammals. Lakes which are the recipients of acid precipitation in large doses
can become so acidified as to be dead. A 1989 survey of the lakes in New York
found over 20 percent so acidic that they could not support fish. A 1988 survey
of acid rain by the Environmental Defense Fund found the pollution to play a
major role in degrading the waters of the Chesapeake Bay, Long Island Sound,
and the New York Bight (Rosenbaum, 1991). Not only fish, but various types of
algae, insects, plankton, and snails are all susceptible to extinction in the face of
high acid levels. Amphibians are also in danger, as frogs, toads and salamanders
are extremely sensitive to the acidity. In sum, water pollution stems from a
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variety of sources, and its proliferation threatens all forms of life on earth which
require water to survive.
The sources of state water pollution control policy are intrinsic to an
understanding of why various clean-water policies are passed in the states. The
following analysis of policy determinants focuses upon discerning which factors
most strongly impact state clean-water policy. The determination of which factors
most heavily impact state water pollution control policy contributes to the overall
analysis of the dynamics underlying state environmental policy and how such
findings relate to the discussion of federalism and environmental policy. This
analysis contributes to the larger study, as the data revealing the importance of
pollution, political, economic, and social conditions on clean-water policy is a
crucial aspect in the discussion of federalism and environmental policy.
Support for Clean Water Policv
Similar to results found regarding environmental attitudes, the support for
water pollution control is both strong and widespread. A 1982 Harris Poll found
that three-quarters of those polled felt that it was "very important" to curb water
pollution. Over 90 percent wanted to keep the Clean Water Act at least as strict,
with 60 percent taking the view that it should be made even more stringent.
There was also evidence that, at least theoretically, people were willing to endure
some sacrifice in order to achieve clean water. In response to the question of
whether a factory should be shut down or given a waiver from the mandate of
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achieving best available technology, for example, 86 percent stated that no waiver
should be granted. In addition, 70 percent were willing to pay $100 in taxes and
higher prices for clean-water controls. It seems quite evident that support for
clean water is strong, and like other environmental polls, prominent among all
strata of the population.
ANALYSIS
The analysis of the Pearson correlations between the possible explanatory
factors and the dependent variables uncovered findings somewhat dissimilar to
those of air pollution. It seems that the state policy output for each pollution area
is affected by different independent variable influences. The dependent variables
for water pollution control policy, similar to the section on air pollution, include
factors which represent both fiscal and non-fiscal policy action. State spending on
water quality per capita is the spending indicator. Regulatory policies which are
measured by virtue of whether they have been enacted by each state include a
groundwater protection policy, a wetlands protection policy, and a program
requiring a permit for the application of pesticides. Again, the fiscal and the
regulatory are mixed in the Renew America Score for surface water, which
gauges the overall policy of each state in regard to its lakes, rivers, and streams.
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Environmental Conditions
The findings for the section on environmental conditions was surprising in
that in several cases, the pollution severity hypothesis of worsening conditions
leading to stricter environmental policy seemed to have weak support. Population
density, similar to the air pollution analysis, was found to have no significant
relationship with the spending indicator. Unlike the air pollution findings,
however. Table 5.1 displays that this pattern continued with the regulatory policy
indicators. The only dependent variable with which population density shared a
significant relationship was wetlands protection. It could be that the
disappearance of wetlands is visible and requires active development; it is not a
side effect of industrial or agricultural behavior. As density grows, so does
wetlands protection. The pressure of a growing population will require
development of land, and inevitably some wetlands will have been destroyed in
the past. Thus, as density continues to rise, it is possible that efforts will be made
to rescue what wetlands still remain. In the case of the other dependent variables
already examined, however, population density was found to be an unimportant
factor.
A fiscal independent variable, state sewer investment needs per capita for
the next 20 years, was found to have no relationship to state water pollution
spending. Perhaps only short-term goals are considered, as the long-term is often
deemed politically less pressing. Sewer needs are, however, linked positively to
both wetlands protection and pesticide permits. These findings are interesting
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since sewer problems are usually connected with urban woes, while wetlands and
pesticides are rural issues. Sewer needs and urbanization are significantly related
(r= .3 8 , significant at the .01 level). Logical assumptions continue to fall as the
sewer needs variable is not related to the Renew America score (RAS) for surface
water, the area where sewer runoff is normally dumped. This maze of findings
leaves room for one plausible explanation. States that have greater predicted
sewer needs are undergoing growth and expansion. This growth is reflected not
only in the need for new sewers but in a heightened sensitivity to the need to
protect wetlands. Pesticide permits are also more common because as
urbanization rises, the power of rural political forces falls, and the stronger urban
population is eager to control the pollution problem caused by agricultural runoff.
Although this explanation is complex, it explains an otherwise confusing finding
on water pollution.
Another background condition measured is the percentage of households in
a state which have water needs served by personal wells. Although this measure
is not strictly an environmental condition, as a background condition it is related
to the severity of pollution in a state. This relationship makes the background
variable valuable to the study of water pollution control policy. Those dependent
on water from a well are likely to be more sensitive to issues of water pollution
than residents who receive water from a more distant and unknown source, such
as a department of water. Well users have often put great investment into the
creation and upkeep of a well, and are thus apt to be sensitive to any danger
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presented to the family water supply. There is great variation among the states as
to the percentage of well users, ranging from a low in Hawaii (.02%) to a high in
North Carolina (37%) (Hall and Kerr, 1991). The findings show that the
percentage of well users has no significant relationship with state spending,
wetlands protection, or groundwater protection. The latter finding is quite
surprising, as groundwater pollution is the greatest threat to clean well water.
These data are supported by the finding that well use has a strong, negative
relationship with pesticide permit policy. As well owners are more likely to be
rural dwellers, and groundwater pollution by pesticides is a rural phenomenon, the
expected finding would have been the opposite. Finally, well use did have a
positive relationship with the RAS for surface water. Again, this finding is
confusing, as groundwater, not surface water, should be of primary concern to
well owners. It could be that states populated by a high percentage of well
owners are also more rural. Thus, these states could be more susceptible to
pressure from agricultural interests to stress surface water, not ground water, as
the primary focus of any water pollution control efforts.
The underground injection of toxic chemicals displays great variance
among the states. Measured by pounds per capita, the amounts range from 30
states injecting zero pounds to Louisiana's total of over 95 pounds per resident.
A perusal of the correlations finds that underground injection has a strong positive
relationship to state water pollution spending. Thus, although over half of the
states consider underground injection so damaging as to outlaw the process.
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findings suggest possible support for the theory that states which do inject are
more likely to spend greater sums of money on water pollution control. This is in
line with the pollution severity hypothesis of greater environmental problems
leading to stronger policy. The injection variable is not related to any of the
individual policy indicators, but is negatively related to the RAS for surface
water. Apparently, the pollution severity hypothesis extends only to spending, as
policy and overall indicators are neither significant nor negatively influenced by
underground toxic injections.
The amount of toxic chemicals released to surface water is a similar
measure to the variable discussed above, although surface release is a more
common practice and more likely to occur as a result of accidents than is
underground injections. Forty-five states release over 10,000 pounds annually,
and over half the states release over a million pounds per annum. Despite the
more serious nature of surface release, however, it does not correspond to the
pollution severity hypothesis. Toxic surface release is unrelated to the spending
variable, and when matched with the regulatory indicators, the relationships which
do exist are negative. As states suffer from greater amounts of chemicals poured
in their rivers, streams, and lakes, the likelihood of pollution control decreases.
Especially noteworthy is the fact that surface release is negatively related to the
RAS for surface water. Thus, it appears that in this area of water pollution, state
legislators and bureaucrats are either ignoring the problem and focusing attention
elsewhere, or they are "captured" by industrial interests who are responsible for
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the high pollution levels, and therefore unwilling to take action to strengthen
controls. Finally, one must consider the possibility that cause and effect are
unclear in this case. It is possible that because of lax regulation, pollution levels
have risen in the time period examined. It can be the case that in certain areas of
pollution, time lags of a decade or more are required to determine whether
changes in independent variables truly affect state environmental policy.
The final independent variable measuring environmental conditions which
was found to be closely related to policy is the percentage of drinking water
systems in each state which are in violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA). As Table 5.1 shows, this measure was found to be highly positively
correlated with the spending indicator, but had no significant relationship with the
regulatory policy variables. This may be due to the intervention of the federal
government in the regulation of water sources. Under the SDWA, the EPA can
oversee state behavior, thus bringing the black cloud of federal sanctions into the
equation. In such a case, the policy already exists (SDWA), so the pressure on
state governments to comply results in improved implementation. This process
costs money to insure that drinking water standards are improving. An additional
pressure could be the sensitivity of the drinking water issue among citizens; dirty
lakes and rivers are unpleasant, but polluted drinking water systems can lead to
disease and death. Legislators are responsive to epidemics, as no politician wants
to see an outbreak stemming from unsafe drinking water erupt in his or her
district. This strong desire to avoid such a negative occurrence could well result
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in political unity resulting in a willingness to appropriate funds for the
improvement and protection of drinking water.
Political Conditions
The set of independent variables which are political in nature were found,
as a general rule, to be more valuable as explanatory tools of regulatory policy
rather than fiscal indicators of state action on water pollution. Measures of
political ideology among both statewide populations and political elites of the two
major parties were found to have remarkably similar impacts on water pollution
control policy. All three measures were found to be unrelated to state spending.
Continuity among the three measures was also noted as liberalism was positively
linked with policy in protecting groundwater and wetlands. Finally, ideology was
unrelated to pesticide policy. The only exception to the pattern was that
Democratic elite ideology was linked positively to the RAS for surface water,
while Republican elite and state ideology were unrelated to that specific dependent
variable. Apparently, it seems that ideological slants among legislators prevail
over partisanship when passing policy, but is unimportant when the budget votes
are counted. Conservatives of both parties are united against environmental
regulations directed at water pollution, suggesting support for the contention that
conservatism goes against the ideals of innovation and the regulation of the
business community.
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Interest group analysis supported the importance of the environmental
lobby, while again discounting the importance of polluter representation in state
water pollution control policy making. Strength of the environmental lobby was
not linked to spending, but was both positively and strongly related to
groundwater and wetlands protection. This variable was not found to impact
either pesticide policy or the RAS surface water measure. A possible explanation
for these findings is the stress placed on working to halt the pollution of
groundwater. There is some support for the belief that the Clean Water Act has
worked well at abating the nation's polluted lakes and rivers; the dominant clean
water issue of the last five years has been the threat to groundwater. Thus,
although pesticide permitting should be included in this battle, the thrust of water
protection might well have been aimed at ground rather than surface water.
Wetlands protection is part of a continual environmental agenda, as the issue is
closely linked with development. This reality would therefore lead to an
understanding of the association between strength of the environmental lobby and
wetlands protection. It seems that in the case of water pollution spending, the
patterns among the states are unrelated to environmental groups; perhaps the push
for legislation, as opposed to appropriations battles, has been the focus of
lobbying efforts.
Finally, political culture was examined. Moralistic culture was unrelated
to any dependent variable, and individualistic culture was weakly related to
groundwater protection policy. Traditionalistic culture, however, was found to be
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negatively related to both groundwater and wetlands policy. Similar to the results
found in air pollution, the findings imply possible backing for the idea that the
states sharing the traditionalistic culture down-playing innovation, rejecting the
government as a problem solver, and linking government and elite interest were
solidly lined up against water pollution regulation.
Economic Conditions
Economic issues were found to be strong indicators as a group, although
the effects on spending and regulatory measures differed among the independent
variables. Gross State Product per capita was found to correlate positively with
the spending indicator, but had no relationship with any of the regulatory policy
variables. On the other hand, per capita income and unemployment rate were
both found to have no significant relationship with state spending while being
closely related to other policy indicators. Per capita income was found to be
positively linked with three of four policy variables, while unemployment rate was
related in a negative manner, also to three of four variables. It seems that in the
case of water pollution. There is a good possibility that as unemployment rises,
the likelihood of environmental regulation drops. This is expected, as lawmakers
coping with a disgruntled sector of the populace, worried about putting food on
the table, are apt to take steps to stimulate the economy, even at the expense of
the environment. In addition, states with high unemployment are vulnerable to
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corporate threats of impending layoffs should environmental regulations be
strengthened.
The discovered difference between per capita income and gross state
product per capita creates something of a quandary. Although both indicators of
wealth show that increased state riches leads to stronger water pollution control
measures, the fact that the two variables are not related to any of the same
dependent variables is curious. Clearly, there is a difference between the value of
goods and services versus personal income levels, and this difference is great
enough to separate the two variables as to the utility of evaluating and predicting
water pollution control policy at the state level.
Social Conditions
Further analysis of the Pearson correlations found the social variables to be
of limited value in evaluating state water pollution control policy. Age,
represented by the percent of people over 65, was significantly related to only one
variable, wetlands protection policy; the relationship, surprisingly, was positive.
This finding could be explained by a preference of senior citizens to thwart
development, thus linking environmentalists and older citizens in an alliance
against the destruction of wetlands. Education was found to be positively linked
to state spending, while not significantly related to any of the other dependent
variables. Education has consistently been linked with concern for the
environment, and an educated population might well demand stronger evidence
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than the passage of policy. Should this be the case, serious implementation could
be displayed by elected leaders through increased fiscal outlays, thus possibly
explaining the link between education and state spending. Urbanization was also
linked to only one variable, a positive relationship to pesticide permit policy.
Unlike the above noted finding regarding the negative relationship between
household well use and pesticide permits, the relationship between urbanization
and pesticide permits does not appear to be a repudiation of the hypothesis of
policy driven by environmental conditions. There is no significant relationship
between urbanization and percentages of pesticide contamination of groundwater.
Thus, the explanation to this finding lies in political attitudes and power. The
attitudes of urban residents tend to be more sympathetic toward environmental
protection than their rural counterparts. In a more urban state, the political power
of farmers is decreased, thus allowing for a stronger stand on pesticide pollution.
In a rural setting, however, agricultural interests are more powerful, perhaps
explaining the reduced chance of state pesticide control policy.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
To carry out the multivariate analysis I used the following model:
W AT= a+ biSP + b^POL + b^ECN + b^SOC + e
Where: WAT - State clean-water policy, the dependent variable
a - The constant
SP - Severity of pollution variables
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POL - Political variables
ECN - Economic variables
s e e - Social variables
b^-b^ - The regression slopes
e - The error term
The regression analysis of state clean-water policy and selected
independent variables displayed results markedly different from those found
regarding state clean-air policy. In the air pollution control analysis, the
correlations showed that environmental conditions were an important variable, but
the regression model found otherwise. In the analysis of the water pollution
control data, however, opposite results were found. The correlations showed that
environmental conditions were of limited impact, but the regression analysis
suggested that the pollution severity hypothesis of conditions leading to policy had
support.
As the unstandardized regression coefficients in Table 5.2 suggest, state
water pollution control spending policy is influenced primarily by environmental
conditions. This conclusion is expected, giving support to the theory that
pollution severity is of great importance in forming policy. The amount of
explained variance for spending policy was found to be a respectable 35 percent.
Toxic chemical underground injections per capita and the percentage of drinking
water systems violating the SDWA were both found to influence state spending.
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As the amounts of both underground pollution and water systems in violation
rises, so does state spending on water pollution control. These findings support
the pollution severity hypothesis. The political, social, and economic variables in
the equation, however, do not significantly predict state water pollution control
spending patterns.
The variables in the groundwater protection policy equation displayed in
Table 5.3 predicted little about the differences between the states. The explained
variance was low, only 15 percent, and the total equation as well as each variable
was found not to be significant. It appears that groundwater control policy across
the 50 states has little continuity, and is propelled by a sufficiently inconsistent
series of variables as to disallow any meaningful observations.
State wetlands protection policy, as Table 5.4 suggests, is powered
primarily by a combination of political and social variables. Consistent with
expectations, as the strength of environmental interest groups rises, so does the
likelihood of a state adopting wetlands policy. Ideology is also a strong predictor,
both among state populations and Republican elites. In both of these cases, the
expected conclusion was found: Liberalism is equated with a greater chance of a
state adopting wetlands protection policy.
Socially, the percentage of residents over 65 years of age was found to
have a significant effect on the dependent variable. Specifically, as the population
of a state ages, the possibility of wetlands protection policy increases. This
finding was surprising in light of the strong support from previous research for
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the negative relationship between age and support for environmental protection.
This finding could be indicative of a schism between individual level attitudes and
aggregate level policy impact. There could also be an underlying state
characteristic which is associated with age demographics which was not included
in the multiple regression analysis. As Table 5.4 shows, the independent
variables explain a great deal (62 percent) of the variance in state wetlands
protection policy.
Similar to the results found for state spending, pesticide permit policy is
explained by variables representing environmental conditions. The need for sewer
investment, which indicates the degree to which a state suffers sewer problems, is
linked with pesticide permits. As sewer needs increase, so does the probability
that a state will require permits for pesticide use. On the other hand, as the
percentage of households which use water from their own wells increases, the
probability of pesticide policy adoption decreases. This is a puzzling finding,
perhaps explained by the fact that many well owners, more likely to be rural
dwellers, might well be farmers, and thus be fundamentally opposed to additional
government regulation of agricultural practices. The political, economic, and
social variables were of little value in predicting state pesticide permit policy.
Therefore, the environmental conditions obviously play a major role. Overall, the
equation explained 33 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.
The Renew America Score for surface water was regressed on several
independent variables, with the results shown in Table 5.6. This dependent
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variable, which measures overall state policy, was found to be impacted by both
environmental and economic conditions. The percent of household well users was
positively linked with the RAS for surface water. In other words, a state with a
high number of well users per capita is more likely to score high on surface water
protection than a state with a low number of well users per capita. It seems that
well owners, opposed to pesticide regulations, deem it important for the
government to protect their rivers and lakes. Economically, the unemployment
rate was found to be a strong explanatory variable of surface water policy; The
number of unemployed in a state impacts negatively upon surface water policy.
As industrial operations are a major source of direct surface water pollution, this
comes as no surprise. Otherwise, political and social variables did a poor job
predicting state surface water policy. Overall, the equation explained 28 percent
of the variance in the dependent variable.
The analysis found low tolerance coefficients and high variance inflation
factors for Democratic elite ideology in only one of the five equations. For all of
the remaining variables in the five equations, and for Democratic elite ideology in
four equations, the tolerance coefficients were high and the variance inflation
factors were low. This suggests that multicollinearity was a minimal problem.
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has identified several key findings regarding the determinants
and sources of state water pollution control policy. This information is a valuable
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contribution to the rapidly growing field of research into specific areas of
environmental problems and policies at the state level.
A major finding is that environmental conditions impact state water quality
policy. Although the air pollution correlation analyses suggested environmental
conditions are important, this was not found to be the case in regression analysis.
The water pollution control analysis, however, found the case to be different, as
environmental condition variables did not appear so strong in the bivariate case,
yet proved to be the principal indicator among the dependent variables after
regression was performed. In four of the five policy indicators, the severity of
pollution variables were found to have strong predictive influence, and in the fifth
case no variable at all had a significant impact. It appears that the pollution
severity hypothesis, in regards to state clean-water policy, has strong support from
this analysis. This could be due to the widespread nature of water pollution.
Unlike air pollution, which is basically restricted to urban areas, water pollution
problems have ravaged all areas of the country. In addition, although smog is
certainly dangerous and an eyesore, perhaps the combination of beautiful lakes
and rivers turned brown with sewage and the threat to life-giving drinking water
supplies has worked to stimulate state governments with real problems to take
action based on the need to clean up the degradation of state waters.
Similar to the findings reported in the analysis of state clean-air policy, it
is clear that clean-water policy is driven by various influences. The patterns of
state spending and pesticide policy were the only two policy indicators to show
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similar findings; both were found to be impacted solely by the influence of
pollution severity. The other policy indicators are either driven by additional
types of variables or could not be accounted for with any great success. This
finding in itself reaffirms the theory that the environment is too complex to be
studied in a holistic manner, and must be viewed as a series of separate systems
which are related but not monolithic. This is clearly true even within one policy
type: it does not suffice to refer to clean-water policy as a single unit. One must
separate the larger picture into smaller pieces, analyze separately, and then
attempt to construct an overall view of the broader policy area using the findings.
A third finding is that of the importance of the ideological stances of state
populations and party elites. Although the ideology variables were found to
impact only one dependent variable, the pattern established in the air pollution
analysis of liberal beliefs among both state and elite populations stimulating policy
continues in the area of water pollution. It would seem that the presence of
liberals within both parties is necessary for the passage of stringent pollution
control policy. Democrats hoping to attain passage of water pollution control
regulation, especially when development is an issue, are going to need to count on
the liberal wing of the Republican party, forming a coalition in opposition to the
conservative wings of both parties. This would seem to be especially true in the
south, where conservative Democrats are common among state legislatures. This
finding reaffirms the importance of ideology as compared to partisanship in the
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study of state pollution control policy, a valuable tool for the examination of the
policy making process in a two party system.
The analysis is once again revealing by examining what was not found as
well as what the data did show. Although the strength of environmental interest
groups was found to be important in the wetlands policy analysis, this variable
was not a factor in the analyses of the other four policy variables. It is
unexpected that this single-issue lobbying entity would not play a more important
role in clean-water policymaking. The polluter interest group variable did not
play a role in the analysis, but as mentioned above, the probability that the
industrial lobby is concerned with other issues likely explains this finding.
Apparently, the environmental groups, although growing in strength and certainly
extremely influential in states such as Maine and Vermont (Thomas and Hrebenar,
1990), have not reached a level of power in enough states to make a serious
impact on water pollution control policy.
Political culture and education were found to be poor predictors of water
pollution control policy. Differences between state cultures and along educational
lines, often used in studies of environmental attitudes and policy, are not
important influences in the formation of state water pollution control policy when
other factors are also considered.
Finally, the finding that economic issues were also surprisingly absent
from much of the analysis is a major revelation. Both per capita income and
gross state product per capita were found to be poor predictors of state clean-
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water policy. This finding suggests that arguments claiming that federal funds
provided to poorer states will "level the playing field" have little empirical
support, as state wealth appears to be a poor predictor of state water pollution
control policy. Much of the traditional argument for federal intervention is based
on the principle of redistributive policy. If the states are fiscally incapable of
providing the funds necessary to battle environmental problems, then the federal
government must intervene economically to insure that national goals are met.
The knowledge that state wealth is unrelated to state water pollution control
policy, especially state spending on water pollution control policy, leads to a
diminishment of the importance of federal economic intervention.
Age continued to play an important role in the analysis, as the percentage
of the population over 65 was found to be a positive indicator. The apparent
opposition of the elderly to the destruction of wetlands goes against the grain of
previous research as well as the findings in this study concerning spending on air
pollution control. The expectation that the elderly are less concerned about
environmental issues was unfounded in this case. One possible explanation for
the finding is the idea that older people living in serene areas are against
development. Development is usually sold to the public on the basis of providing
jobs and economic growth to a certain area, but retired individuals are less likely
to be interested in such economic issues. Slow-growth advocates are thus likely
to be supported by senior citizens eager to keep the bulldozers at bay.
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Conclusion
The findings in this chapter contained both similarities and differences to
those reported in the preceding chapter on clean-air policy. This is not
surprising, as the two pollution types share the commonality of all categories of
environmental policy while simultaneously displaying unique characteristics.
Although pollution of the air and water can sometimes be mixed, such as in the
case of acid rain, the two are generally unrelated. This is not so, however, in the
case of water and hazardous waste pollution. The dumping of wastes into rivers
and lakes, as well as land-based hazardous disposal leaking into the groundwater,
links the two policy areas more intimately. Despite this linkage, the variance
which exists between states in hazardous waste policy could stem from a set of
factors unique to this pollution type. The degree to which similarities and
differences exist between hazardous waste and the previous two pollution types
analyzed will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY
For decades, toxic waste has been carelessly spread in ponds, lagoons,
wells and landfills throughout the United States. The problem has mushroomed
from a hidden nemesis into perhaps the most feared environmental problem facing
Americans today. Of all environmental issues, hazardous waste has been the least
abated and therefore remains the most serious environmental predicament (Kraft,
1990). Contamination of land and groundwater is widespread. Much of the
waste is exposed to neither sun nor air, thus preventing evaporation and creating a
long-lasting problem (Block, 1985). The explosive growth of American chemical
production in the last 40 years, combined with geometric increases in pesticide
use and steady population growth, has contributed to the vast increase in highly
toxic chemical waste, estimated annually at between 60 and 100 million metric
tons (Schneider, 1988). Despite this vast amount of waste being created, only ten
percent is being disposed of in a proper manner (Cohen and Kamieniecki, 1991).
Such waste presents grave dangers to human health. Cancer rates are
extremely high in places like Louisiana's "cancer alley" and New York's Love
Canal, site of a toxic waste dump site. Other problems associated with chemical
waste include birth defects, liver problems, reproductive disorders, and learning
disabilities in children. The urgency of dealing with this menace has become
apparent. As the federal government retreated from responsibility for the
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environment in the 1980s, the need for the states to fill the regulatory gap has
become increasingly imperative.
Much like the previous two chapters, the main purpose of this chapter is to
determine which factors most strongly determine the formulation of state
hazardous waste spending and regulatory programs. This analysis will complete
the third and last part of the study. The findings on hazardous waste policy will
be utilized along with those reported on air and water pollution control in a
discussion of the dimensions of federalism and environmental policy at the
conclusion of the research.
The evident fluctuation of hazardous waste policy from state to state could
be caused by a wide variety of variables. In addition to the discussion of findings
regarding important variables and general environmental policy, previous research
has uncovered a number of conclusions about the possible grounds for the
differences between the states specifically in regard to hazardous and toxic waste
policy. The severity of the waste problem must be considered as a critical
variable, and the states vary considerably as to the types and degree of problems
each possesses in the area of toxic and hazardous waste. In addition, one can
theorize that political, economic, and social variables have an effect on state
hazardous waste policy. The marked differences among the 50 states in the
independent and dependent variables offer plentiful data for examination of
hazardous waste state policy.
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ANALYSIS
The Pearson correlation analysis of state hazardous waste policy provides
further support for the contention that pollution areas should be studied
individually. As Table 6.1 shows, the various indicators of pollution severity
have a strong impact on hazardous waste policy, especially in the area of state
spending.
Environmental Conditions
Population density, although it did not affect state spending, was found to
be positively linked with both state superfund plan policy and the Renew America
Score for hazardous waste. Toxic transfers off site, per capita, was linked to all
three regulatory policy measures, and toxic releases to the environment per square
mile was related to the RAS for hazardous waste. In each of these cases, the
relationship which exists is positive. This lends support for the pollution severity
hypothesis, as growth in hazardous waste damage clearly leads to tougher
hazardous waste policy.
Contrary results, however, were found in the analysis of the impact of
independent variables measuring pollution severity on state hazardous waste
spending. Toxic transfers off site, toxic releases to the environment, and
hazardous waste generated were all found to have a significant, negative
relationship with state spending. In other words, as indicators of environmental
damage point to a more serious problem, the funds allocated for hazardous waste
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control in a state become smaller, not greater. The dependent variables, due to a
high degree of intercorrelation, number only four in the hazardous waste analysis.
Spending is denoted by the amount each state spends on hazardous waste per ton.
Regulatory variables include the presence of a superfund plan and the existence of
a right-to-know law. Lastly, the Renew America Score for hazardous waste
combines both spending and regulation into an overall assessment of the total state
hazardous waste policy effort.
Needless to say, the finding of the negative relationship between the
severity of the hazardous waste problem and state spending is startling. One is
forced to consider an alternative theory of cause and effect, wherein lower state
spending leads to even greater damage, and a greater time lag is needed to
measure changes in hazardous waste policy. Otherwise, this trend is clearly
inimical to the pollution severity hypothesis, and forces one to conclude that state
hazardous waste spending is influenced by polluters. Perhaps those who create
the waste apply pressure to keep regulatory spending low, in order to maintain a
profit level. Due to strict mandatory federal regulations, the most likely avenue
for industry pressure at the state level would be an attack on enforcement, which
is strongly linked with funding for inspectors, investigators, and legal personnel.
In this scenario, the worse the problem becomes, the stronger is the interest of a
polluter to avoid regulation, and therefore the more pressure applied to state
government elites for low funding of implementation and enforcement of statutory
or administrative regulations.
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Political Conditions
The political set of variables was found to be a solid group of explanatory
factors. Although many industrial concerns represent polluter interests, one
industry is more likely to be found in a coalition with environmental groups on
the issue of hazardous waste policy. As Table 6.1 indicates, a political variable
unique to hazardous waste holds strong explanatory value as a source of state
spending policy. The number of hazardous waste workers per 10,000 people is a
symbol of the strength of the hazardous waste industry in a state. Unlike air and
water pollution, the movement, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste is
quickly growing into a multi-billion dollar industry. Companies such as
Browning-Ferris Industries are corporate giants, with lobbying budgets befitting
the stature of large business enterprises. Thus, the interest of the hazardous waste
industry in regulatory spending is clear: if enforcement is kept strong and
vigorous, more creators of hazardous waste will be required to hire the services
of the waste management companies. The interest for management firms lies
primarily in the implementation of existing federal and state regulation so as to
insure the highest level of cooperation possible from industries which might
otherwise turn to illegal means for disposal.
Environmental interest group strength was found to be strongly and
positively related to both state spending and the right-to-know law. Perhaps due
to the existence of federal superfund legislation, environmental groups seem to
focus upon enforcement through spending and the right of people to be aware of
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the hazards they face by the proliferation of hazardous waste. Right-to-know
legislation is especially important to environmental interest groups as the
proliferation of knowledge about the dangers of hazardous waste is one technique
helpful in the effort to attract new membership to the environmental cause.
As Table 6.1 suggests, liberal ideology among both state populations and
elites is significantly related to both spending and regulatory policy indicators. In
other words, states with more liberal leanings, both among the masses and within
the leadership of the two major parties, are likely to spend more money on
hazardous waste regulation and enact legislation strengthening the regulatory
stance of the state toward hazardous waste than other states.
Finally, political culture was found to be an important variable as far as
state spending, but not significantly related to regulatory policy. The results of
the analysis wrought no surprises, as moralistic culture in a state is associated
with higher spending, while a state embracing a dominant traditionalistic culture is
likely to spend less money on hazardous waste regulation.
Economic Conditions
Economic factors were also found to play a strong role in impacting
hazardous waste policy. Per capita income was found to be positively linked with
superfund policy but not with state spending. Superfund plans can become
expensive very quickly, thus explaining the relationship between state wealth and
the undertaking of such a policy. It appears, however, that factors other than the
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wealth of a state drive the spending patterns concerning hazardous waste.
Unionization of manufacturing workers was found to be positively linked with
both superfund and the RAS score for hazardous waste. This finding is
enlightening, as one would expect union membership to introduce cross pressures
in the analysis. On the one hand, union members interested in job security could
well fight waste regulation as harmful to industrial growth and thus employee job
security. On the other hand, toxic materials can be extremely dangerous to
workers in industry, thus prompting support for regulation based on the issue of
health. It would appear that the health concern hypothesis has
greater empirical support, as greater percentages of unionization is correlated with
stricter regulation of hazardous waste.
Social Conditions
Social variables were found to be valuable tools for the evaluation of
hazardous waste policy sources. Age continued to be a surprise, as the
percentage of people over 65 was positively correlated with both superfund plan
policy and the RAS for hazardous waste. Concentrations of older people seem to
voice concern for solutions to the horrors of abandoned waste dumps. Support
for a superfund plan and other hazardous waste controls is perhaps a function of
an older generation concerned about the health of both children and
grandchildren. When hazardous waste is viewed as a threat to family, parents
tend to support control measures (Hamilton, 1985a). This could be amplified in
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residents who have concern for two generations, and are willing to be vocal about
their desires. An alternative explanation would be that of pure self-interest.
Retirees who feel they have earned the good life are unimpressed with the reports
of hazardous waste as a necessary by-product of American society. Those who
are no longer invested in the further growth of society might well be willing to
curb the growth in exchange for a reduction in the results or negative externalities
of development and industrial output.
Another social variable which was found to be important is that of
education. This variable, however, was important only as far as fiscal policy was
concerned. There was a strong, positive relationship between education and state
spending, which implies that states with better educated populations are more
willing to allocate funds for the control and regulation of hazardous waste.
It is clear that many variables were found to influence state hazardous
waste policy. The next step is to regress the spending and regulatory policy
measures on the independent variables in order to gain a more lucid understanding
of which state characteristics truly drive hazardous waste policy.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
To carry out the multivariate analysis I used the following model:
H A Z= a+ biS P + bzPOL -h bgECN + b^SOC + e
Where: HAZ - State hazardous waste policy, the dependent variable
a - The constant
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SP - Severity of pollution variables
POL - Political variables
ECN - Economic variables
SOC - Social variables
b^-b^ - The regression slopes
e - The error term
In contrast to the bivariate correlation analysis, the regression analysis
found only two factors that might be considered relevant. The amount of
explained variance for spending is a solid 39 percent, but as Table 6.2 indicates,
only one or two factors appear to predict state spending. Environmental interest
group strength appears to influence spending; as the strength of the environmental
groups within a state increases, apparently so does spending on hazardous waste.
Furthermore, moralistic political culture also may lead to higher state spending
levels.
As suggested in Table 6.3, the presence of a state superfund plan, which
often involves both spending and regulation, is also influenced by a pair of
factors. An increase in the amount of toxic transfers offsite, an indicator of
pollution severity, leads to a greater likelihood of a state adopting a superfund
plan. This finding supports the hypothesis of the importance of pollution severity.
In addition, age is linked to superfund policy. That is, an increasing percentage
of people living within a state who are over 65 years of age seems to lead to a
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greater chance of superfund adoption. This finding was unexpected, but is in line
with the findings on water pollution control policy. Finally, the explained
variance for this equation is 32 percent.
An analysis of the right-to-know policy also supports the pollution severity
hypothesis, as Table 6.4 indicates. As toxic transfers offsite increase, so does the
probability of policy adoption. Moreover, political culture is an important factor,
although the relationship is negative in this case. A state with a traditionalistic
culture seems to be less likely to adopt right-to-know legislation. This finding is
consistent with earlier findings. Similar to the first two equations, the
independent variables explain 35 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.
Finally, as Table 6.5 implies, the Renew America Score for hazardous
waste was found to be impacted by a series of variables. People over 65 and
unionization were both positively linked to the RAS, signifying that the presence
of both elderly people and members of manufacturing unions within a state are
factors which seem to signal a stronger overall hazardous waste policy. In
addition, political culture is a strong indicator of this dependent variable.
Moralistic culture is linked with tougher overall policy, while traditionalistic
culture is associated with weaker overall policy. These findings are consistent
with foreseen results. Lastly, the equation explains 41 percent of the variance in
the RAS.
Multicollinearity diagnostics of the hazardous waste equations differed
from those of air and water pollution. There was evidence of low tolerance
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coefficients and high variance inflation factors for Democratic elite ideology in
one equation, for population density in one equation, and for environmental
interest group strength in two equations. The remaining variables, however,
displayed high tolerance coefficients and low variance inflation factors for all four
equations. Therefore, multicollinearity was not considered a serious problem.
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Several findings arise from the analysis which are of value to the body of
research on hazardous waste policy. First, it seems that the pollution severity
hypothesis stating that worsening environmental conditions lead to more stringent
regulation has support in the case of hazardous waste. Conditions seem to be
partially responsible for the passage of regulatory policy, although state spending
is not affected by the level of pollution severity. This finding would seem to
imply that legislators react to reports of growing waste problems by a willingness
to install new regulatory schemes, but the reaction is not inclusive of an agreeable
attitude toward fiscal reaction to the perceived problems. This could well be
indicative of either the beginnings of a move toward a total policy of strict
regulation, or characteristic of recalcitrant lawmakers willing to pacify indignant
groups with policy creation but unwilling to allocate the funds necessary to
combat the problems caused by waste proliferation. Time will tell, as future
analyses will discover either a continued pattern of intransigence or a steadily
growing attack on the hazardous waste problem.
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The importance of state political culture as a source of hazardous waste
policy seems to be quite obvious. Both moralistic and traditionalistic culture play
dominant roles in impacting both spending and regulatory policy decisions.
Hazardous waste, more than other pollution areas, is perceived as a threat to
human health and safety. Stories of massive health problems at Love Canal and
the desertion of entire towns such as Times Beach, Missouri have been
fundamental in the construction of negative attitudes among Americans regarding
hazardous and toxic wastes. Thus, the perception of government as a protector of
the population is an important issue when linked with hazardous waste policy.
Moralistic culture, based on the belief that government is the benefactor of the
public and an institution representing the public good, is associated with a strong
stand in favor of strict regulation of hazardous wastes. Traditionalistic culture, in
which government is less innovative and regarded more as the property of elites,
would not be expected to act aggressively to protect public welfare. Thus, a
negative relationship with strong waste policy is entirely understandable, as
exemplified in the finding of the strong negative relationship between
traditionalistic culture and right-to-know laws. Elites in traditional states are
expected to feel no need to share business information with the common citizen,
as such important data are the property of the privileged rulers of the state.
Political culture, a variable often used in the study of state policy, has proven to
be a valuable tool for the evaluation of hazardous waste policy.
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The strength of the environmental lobby, though not an important variable
in the analysis of regulatory policy, was found to be significant in the area of state
spending. It appears that interest groups are focusing their efforts on securing
funds for the implementation and enforcement of various programs in place, as
opposed to the creation or passage of new legislation. This might well signal a
belief among environmental leaders that federal legislation is sufficient to protect
the environment against hazardous wastes, and pressure must be concentrated on
urging state lawmakers to allocate funds to insure that federal standards are
followed as strictly as possible. Such a strategy appears to be successful, as state
lawmakers seem to respond to the pressure of the environmental lobby when it
comes to budget allocation for hazardous waste projects, enforcement, and
regulation.
One noted absence from the ranks of key independent variables was that of
political ideology. Both at the state and party elite levels, the liberal/conservative
schism was not significantly related to hazardous waste policy of any type. Other
factors are clearly more important in the debate over hazardous waste policy,
perhaps signaling a greater influence upon legislators from outside sources.
Economic issues were notably absent among the important sources of
hazardous waste policy. Only unionization, which could well be classified as a
social as well as an economic variable, has any impact at all. State wealth does
not seem to have any impact upon a state's waste policy process. This finding is
important within the context of federalism and hazardous waste policy. Similar to
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the findings in the other pollution areas, it appears that the federal government
should not provide poor states with financial incentives in order to even
environmental regulation and spending patterns. Concerns other than fiscal
conditions are driving hazardous waste policy at the state level, therefore taking
much of the steam out of the argument for federal financial intervention. This
crucial finding, so important in relation to fiscal and regulatory federalism, will be
examined in depth in the conclusion to the study.
Those over 65 years of age appear to make a substantial impact on
hazardous waste policy. This finding has implications for future policy, as both
the rising median age of Americans and the changing demographics of states will
force many state governments to evaluate waste policy in light of increasing
percentages of residents who are past retirement age. Groups such as the A ARP,
the largest interest group in the country with over 35 million members, could
become more involved in the matter, lending a strong voice to that of concerned
environmentalists and making the task more difficult for those determined to
undermine any comprehensive, stringent state level hazardous waste regulatory
policy.
Conclusion
Finally, it should be noted that although the analysis of hazardous waste
policy found more continuity among policy types than that of air or water
pollution, it is clear that the differences between the various dependent variables
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are substantial enough to merit a warning against grouping all types of hazardous
waste regulation into one category. The factors impacting the various policy
indicators, although overlapping, are by no means congruent. Each and every
type of policy, spending pattern, or comprehensive policy indicator is impacted by
different independent variables due to differing inherent state characteristics.
Much as it is necessary for researchers to be aware of differences between general
pollution areas, studies of hazardous waste must take into account the nuances
which differ among the various aspects within state hazardous waste policy.
The analyses of state clean-air, clean-water, and hazardous waste policies
reveal important similarities and differences. The findings of all three analyses
bear importance to the relationship of environmental policy to issues of
federalism. The relationship between the federal and state governments in the
spending and regulatory domain and the question of the ability of state
governments to handle their own environmental problems are major issues. The
growing importance of the environment as a policy issue insures that concerns
regarding federalism and environmental policy will continue to merit close
inspection.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the sources of state environmental policy has provided
results relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the role of the federal government
in state policy matters. The increasing importance of environmental issues in
American society combined with the rise in the amount of responsibility allocated
to state governments places state environmental policy high on the research
agenda.
This chapter initially focuses on each of the three pollution areas
separately, discussing the major findings from the analyses of air pollution, water
pollution, and hazardous waste. These findings are then compared and contrasted
in order to note the similzirities and differences between state policies across the
three areas. This is followed by an analysis of the possible future nature of
federalism and environmental policy. Finally, recommendations for future
research are suggested.
The evidence reported in this study lends support to certain aspects of
research on the environment. First, it is clear that a specialized approach to the
study of environmental policy is of the utmost necessity. Differences exist
between not only the sources of broad policy areas such as air and water pollution
control, but also within the components of each policy area. Researchers must be
willing to break down environmental policy areas into more manageable
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component parts for precise study. There are differences between fiscal and
regulatory policy, as well as between certain particular legislative enactments and
overall policy scores which account for a large bloc of legislative behavior. The
inspection of policy in smaller and more defined pieces will allow for greater
insight into the interests of both the public and elites.
The analysis of state clean-air policy yielded several major findings.
There was a distinct difference among the determinants of fiscal as opposed to
regulatory policy, lending support to the idea of specified analysis within the
environmental agenda. The hypothesis linking pollution severity with public
policy was rejected, as the indicators of air pollution levels were not found to be
significant determinants of policy. The contribution of ideology was clear, as
liberalism, especially among Democratic party elites, was found to be a strong
determinant of policy. This finding was especially important given that
partisanship was not a critical factor in the development of state air pollution
control policy. Political culture did have an important effect on policy. Not
surprisingly, moralistic states tend to have stricter controls on air pollution, while
the reverse is true in traditionalistic state cultures. Age, as defined by the
percentage of a state population over 65 years old, was found to have an effect on
state spending but not on regulation. This relationship was negative as expected
due to the tendency of older people to have weak support for environmental
regulation. Environmental interest groups were found not to be a factor in the
analysis, and economic indicators proved to be surprisingly weak determinants of
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state clean-air policy. As noted above, there are notable differences between and
within environmental policy areas. This phenomenon, apparent in mr pollution
control policy, is also evident when observing the field of water pollution control.
Variations in state water pollution control policies are not limited to
fiscal/regulatory lines; the cleavages are evident between all examples of policy.
Pollution severity conditions are an important factor in policy development, as
pollution indicators are significantly linked to several examples of water pollution
control policy. Liberalism was a strong determinant of strict policy, while
partisanship played no role whatsoever. Age, surprisingly, was found to be
positively linked with policy output. This finding could either be related to an
aversion to development and all its related negative aspects among the elderly, or
it could be indicative of a totally different unstudied phenomenon underlying the
relationship. Several indicators, including political culture, environmental interest
group strength, and economic factors were found to be weak determinants of
policy. The findings regarding these variables were surprising since each was
expected to play an important role in state clean-water policy.
The determinants of state hazardous waste policy, although displaying
more consistency across policy categories than in either air or water pollution
control, still demonstrate a notable amount of difference. Strong determinants of
policy include pollution severity, political culture, and environmental interest
groups. A higher percentage of elderly people is also linked to more stringent
policy on hazardous waste. Economic indicators proved to be weak factors in the
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analysis, and both ideology and partisanship were not found to have a significant
impact. Clearly, the three policy areas of clean air, clean water, and hazardous
waste share both similarities and differences, and an examination of these factors
sheds light on both the specific and general nature of comprehensive state
environmental policy.
Similarities and Differences across Pollution Areas
When comparing and contrasting the three areas analyzed, certain factors
stand out as important. One crucial area in which clean-water and hazardous
waste policy differed from clean-air policy was that of pollution severity as a
policy determinant. The federal government has an overall responsibility for the
maintenance of the air, land, and water. Although the states have traditionally
held the police power to protect the health and safety of their residents, the
inability of state governments to cope with complex environmental problems and
the interstate nature of pollution pulls the federal government into the picture.
The finding that states are not always acting responsibly in response to the
seriousness of the environmental problems they face must be of concern to federal
leaders. Although the states do seem to be reacting to indicators of pollution
severity when it comes to water pollution control, and less so when concerning
hazardous waste, air pollution control policy is little affected by the air quality
within a state. Thus, the recent announcement by George Bush that he intends to
side with Vice President Quay le's Council on Competitiveness and weaken
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provisions of the Clean Air Act seems particularly problematic. As noted above,
clean-water policy appears to stem from poor water conditions, but the findings
on hazardous waste are less conclusive. It can therefore be stated that support for
the pollution severity hypothesis is inconsistent. State legislators are not always
acting responsibly, allowing some pollution problems to mount without taking
needed action. This behavior is antithetical to not only state health and
environmental interests but to a sound national environmental policy. Obviously,
other intervening factors are at work here. As has been the case throughout
American history, from South Carolina tariff problems in the 1830s to the Civil
War to the denial of civil rights in 1950s Alabama, the federal government feels
compelled to rein in the errant behavior of recalcitrant states out of line with
national goals.
There is also the possibility that the cause and effect of pollution severity
and regulation are the reverse of that which is assumed in the pollution severity
hypothesis. In other words, a legacy of lax regulation breeds pollution problems,
as opposed to pollution problems powering legislation. This distinction is actually
of little importance when discussed within the framework of federalism. Should
the situation exist wherein lax regulation is causing pollution, and the states have
not corrected the problem, the behavior of the states is still out of sync with
federal guidelines. Federal standards are not being implemented, and enforcement
by certain states is so weak as to be discounted. In all probability, the actual
situation is probably based on a reciprocal relationship. A state which is not
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committed to environmental protection promulgates weak regulations, which leads
to environmental degradation. A continuation of the lax regulation is then seen as
ignoring the pollution problem, confirming that state leadership is only responsive
to narrow or parochial interests. The behavior of state leaders thus stems from
both lax regulation and ignoring serious environmental problems. In such a
scenario, federal intervention is warranted.
The states which are suffering severe pollution difficulties are acting in a
manner inimical to the interests of the people of that state and the nation as a
whole. It is the duty of the federal government to protect the general welfare of
the republic, including preserving clean air, land, and water for future
generations. State policy which ignores a threat so grave as to endanger
permanently the well-being of not only that state but neighboring states as well is
a form of invasion. The Clean Air Act of 1970 mandated that each State
Implementation Plan (SIP) make "adequate provisions for intergovernmental
cooperation" (Paragraph E), and the 1977 CAA amendments disallowed any part
of a SIP which would result in either affecting the ability of a neighboring state to
achieve national air quality standards or hampering the effort to protect significant
deterioration of the air and protect visibility.
In the case of Connecticut v. EPA (1981), the state of Connecticut sued in
protest of the EPA's ratification of a New York plan to increase utility emissions
which would have had an adverse effect on air quality in Connecticut. Although
the outcome was in favor of the EPA and New York, the federal court drew a
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distinction that, in this case, the EPA approval was for a one year plan. The
court continued, implying that the acceptance of a more permanent plan could
trigger an entirely different type of case. In addition, the Constitution specifically
guarantees (Article 4, Section 4) that the federal government will protect each
state against an invasion. Although the immediate danger of toxic air clouds,
polluted rivers, or a hazardous waste spill might not be as dramatic as an attack
by a tank or fighter plane, the long-term effects could be equally damaging.
Ideological measures were found to be valuable tools in evaluating both
state clean-air and water policy, while partisanship was generally unrelated to
policy in all three areas. The strength of ideology as a variable is supported by
the fact that measures of state populations as well as party elites are linked to
policy. Importantly, policy action on environmental issues appears to be based on
ideological beliefs rather than party lines, as partisanship, so evident on many
issues, all but disappears in the battles over state environmental policy.
The strength of interest groups, so prevalent in this age of expensive
political campaigns and PACs, does not seem to be so potent in determining
clean-air or water policy, although environmental groups do have an impact on
state hazardous waste policy. Polluters appear to be more concerned with other
issues, and environmental groups do not seem to have the power or depth to be
able to focus on many areas. This opens the door for wider political participation
on this issue, as the iron triangles so prevalent in controlling public policy are at
least one side short. This could mean that citizen protest and grass roots
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campaigns concerning environmental issues will become increasingly important to
political elites relatively unpressured by special interests. Such a situation will
fuel the fire of the increasing importance of environmental issues on the nation's
political agenda, thus forcing the issue farther into the mainstream and prodding
candidates to take more specific stands on the environmental controversies facing
the United States today.
Other state characteristics found to be relevant to environmental policy
include political culture and age. Political culture, a strong indicator of both
clean-air and hazardous waste policy, is a label placed upon a state population,
based upon tradition and values passed from one generation to the next.
Therefore, a fundamental change in values is necessary in order for the state
political system to react in a non-traditional manner. Such changes do not come
easily, and when they do arrive are slow and torturous.
An example of this is the reaction of many Americans to the civil rights
movement, which has been slowly evolving for almost four decades. A
widespread acceptance of segregation and racial inequality was the norm in the
United States until the 1960s, especially in the south. As many citizens voiced
opposition to bigoted policies, and the federal government pressured many states
to abolish legal restrictions on blacks, a broader acceptance of integration and
increased opportunities for blacks have begun to emerge, in addition, many white
Americans are far more comfortable with racial mixing and the merging black
middle class than their ancestors of a half century ago. These changes, brought
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about by federal pressure and younger generations raised in a different world, are
an example of how outside forces can place stress on the values of an internal
political culture.
Those people raised in a traditionalistic political culture who embrace a
rigorous environmental policy are facing a challenge in attempting to force
enactment of such an agenda. The nature of the system dictates against effective
environmental policy, considered both innovative and hostile to elite interests.
States rights advocates, however, could argue that the existence of cultural
differences among the states should be respected, thus allowing the state policy to
reflect those differences. Thus, the will of the people, dictated at least in part by
their state acculturation, will prevail. However, should enough people demand
change, not only in the area of the environment but in education, economics,
health and other issues, a réévaluation of state political culture could become a
necessity.
As the "graying of America" has become recognized as an important trend
in politics, gerontologists have debated the effect that a maturing population will
have on public policy. The finding that older people are associated with less
spending on air pollution control policy was anticipated. The findings in this
study that greater percentages of people over 65 is related to stricter state water
and hazardous waste policy, however, is the opposite of what had been expected.
Perhaps the difference lies in the types of policies being examined. Although
spending for air pollution control had a negative relationship with older people.
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regulatory policy in the other two areas shared a positive relationship with the
elderly. Thus, it is possible that the distinction between spending and regulatory
policy affects the link between concentration of older people and state policy.
One must be cautious in drawing definitive conclusions regarding the
attitudes of elderly Americans. Due to the predominance of a group-benefits
orientation in American politics, individuals are motivated to lend support to
programs which are identified as yielding benefits for the group of which they are
a member (Cutler, 1977). This has led to the characterization of senior citizens,
represented by the A ARP, as a bloc wielding immense political power. This does
not signify, however, a permanent stance taken by the elderly on environmental
policy. Based on previous research, the common belief that the aging process is
linked to increasingly conservative views is a fallacy. Conservatism is a
generational phenomenon, and therefore unrelated to the aging process (Cutler,
1977). Thus, the steep rise in awareness and concern over pollution in the United
States during the 1970s and 1980s could be considerably tempered by the hard
economic times of the early 1990s. Therefore, the elderly of tomorrow might
well possess different attitudes than contemporary senior citizens. This being the
case, it would be inaccurate to draw conclusions about the opinions of the elderly
on environmental issues in the future, since a combination of past, present, and
future experiences will shape the attitudes of impending American retirees.
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Federalism and Environmental Policy
In the economic sphere Congress has the power to alter existing inequities.
The power of federal grants is vast, as Congress is in effect mandating national
redistributive policy. Should grants be based on economic need in order to
standardize environmental regulation, wealthier states with stronger environmental
records could become frustrated. The frustration would stem from a national
fiscal policy which would have the effect of denying a state the reward of federal
environmental money because that state had been vigilant in attacking
environmental problems.
The increase in the national presence in state affairs is not always
welcome, either. A 1980 study by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations surveyed state administrators over a four year period,
finding that three-quarters of those polled believed that federal monetary aid led to
"national interference in affairs that are the appropriate domain of the states"
(Walker, 1981, p. 206). In addition, federal grants can come with mandates
attached, which can cost the state money to implement, thus diluting the strength
of the grant package.
The findings of this study suggest that the federal government should not
provide states with funding for environmental protection as a tool to correct state
differences. The data analysis showed that only rarely do economic conditions
affect policy creation. Of the fourteen policy issues analyzed, per capita income
was only found to be a significant factor in a single case. Unemployment,
226
expected to be telling due to the assumed relationship between business growth
and environmental regulation, was also found to be relevant in only a single case.
Thus, it seems that factors other than economic considerations are the source of
some state environmental policies. Although additional federal grants for
environmental protection can help to improve environmental conditions, such
grants used in an attempt to close the gaps between state policy efforts rationally
would be misplaced. As far as economic issues are concerned, the federal
government should play a small redistributive role in state environmental policy.
Federal grants should not end since the federal government is primarily
responsible for expensive and vital projects such as wastewater treatment plants.
These projects are awarded across the board, however, with no loss of funds
serving as a penalty for a state with a strong water pollution control record.
Funds distributed to all states is solid environmental policy, but as a tool to even
the playing field, money alone is not the answer to state discrepancies in air,
water, and hazardous waste pollution control policy.
When a policy issue meets the two criteria of resources and interstate
ramifications, discussed in the opening chapter, and is also being ignored by a
state or states so as to constitute a threat to both the offending states as well as
neighboring states, a strong argument can be made for federal intervention in the
policy area. This intervention may be regulatory or punitive, but the resulting
gOcd will be to protect against a further expansion of an offending menace.
Regulatory efforts can include national standards, federal inspection, mandated
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state reports, and intergovernmental ventures. Washington can also wield a
punitive hammer, including such actions as withholding funds in various policy
areas, preemptive legislation reducing state authority, increased federal-local
cooperation, thus bypassing the states, and a widening of federal mandates,
forcing standards on states with little or no regard for regional differences.
This discussion of federal intervention leads to the question: Is the present
effort from the stdtes sufficient? State diversity must enter into the equation, as
the nature of federalism includes a respect for the differences between the states.
Support for the pollution severity hypothesis in the cases of water pollution and
hazardous waste bolster states rights advocates who might question the necessity
of federal intervention when the states are addressing pollution problems in a
responsible manner. In addition, the history of poorly operated federal programs,
such as Superfund, prompts the question of whether the federal government is
more capable than the states in the area of environmental policy, even given the
resource advantages it possesses. The weakness of economic factors in
determining state policy discount the importance of federal funds as a method of
influencing state policy. The findings on political culture suggest that states which
are doing less environmentally are reflecting the values of state citizens. These
issues cannot be ignored in future debates over a proper federal role in
environmental policy. The interstate nature of pollution, however, must mitigate
the values of state citizens. Federal policy must ensure that transitory pollution is
reduced to an acceptable level. This calls for attacking those aspects of pollution
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which are most likely to affect another state. This is no easy task, as everything
from the output of tall smokestacks to pesticides on fruit sold across state borders
constitutes an interstate transfer of pollution. Specific policies must be reached in
accord with the states; in this sense, the federal government can act as a mediator,
establishing guidelines which protect states from one another. This policy does
not address the issue of pollution contained within a state, as the findings which
stress internal political and social characteristics as the primary determinants of
policy illuminate the difficulty the federal government would have in shifting state
structure in these areas. In addition, state autonomy must be respected to a
degree, and if the findings indicate that the inhabitants of a state are strongly
supportive of lax pollution policies which affect the intrastate environment (e.g.
for strictly economic reasons), federal intervention could be perceived to be
violating democratic principles.
It must be noted, however, that as conditions change, so might the
determinants of state policy. Thus, the future nature of federalism and
environmental policy could shift, as the federal government uncovers new
information about the state policymaking process. In the field of air pollution, for
example, the findings from this study suggest that the pollution severity hypothesis
is unfounded (since levels of air pollution are not related to clean-air policy).
This implies that legislators are not acting responsibly, thus provoking the federal
government into setting air quality regulations for a state based solely on existing
pollution levels. Should it become the case that in other areas of pollution
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legislators are acting equally irrationally, national standards and regulations could
be mandated across the nation. In addition, should state wealth become a more
influential factor in state policy, as states became increasingly eager to enact
protective legislation but are unable to afford it. Congress might rethink budgetary
priorities and allocate funds to assist states in attaining national goals.
The relative newness of the environmental agenda, especially in terms of
state politics, suggests that it is too soon to establish a blanket rule on state
behavior. The results of the next generation will be telling, as states struggle to
meet environmental problems within an internal context, while the omnipresent
federal eye keeps tabs on the progress toward the national goals of clean air,
water, and land. Therefore, the future of intergovernmental relations in this field
could shift radically, depending upon the imminent behavior of the states. Should
the states improve in the quest to enhgmce environmental quality, the federal
government could well offer advice, technical information, and limited resources.
If the opposite should occur, however, and certain states lapsed into a lethargic
attitude toward environmental protection which results in pollution being exported,
the federal government could be forced to impose and implement strict pollution
control regulations. Although this idea is often regarded as unworkable and
inefficient, federal pre-emption of state control could eventually become the best
answer to a distressing interstate problem.
The concept of environmental regulation is still in its infancy in the United
States. Slowly, both the federal government and the 50 state governments are
230
learning of the horrific dangers and costs associated with ozone, carbon
monoxide, heavy metals, and toxic wastes. As the nation lurches toward the
development of a comprehensive policy, states are struggling to play the proper
role in defending their populations and resources against the poison of pollution.
Various state characteristics are responsible for state policy output, some of which
are solely internal and others which are of importance from a federalist
perspective. The continuing development of environmental policy offers a
constant challenge to both those who create policy and those who analyze it. The
conditions in America and around the world, pushed to the limit by
overpopulation and rampant development, insure that environmental issues are
going to be a permanent fixture on both the state and national political agendas,
and thus an important inclusion in the American public policy sphere.
The Agenda for Future Research
The results of this study, although enlightening, serve as a reminder of the
vast amount of future research into federalism and environmental policy which
still needs to be undertaken. This research, for example, did not attempt to study
the changes in state policy over a period of time. This static method of analysis,
chosen due to the availability of data covering a limited time frame, has
drawbacks. A more complete study of state policy over a decade or more could
include an analysis of the changes which occur within a single state and all fifty
states as environmental, political, economic, and social conditions evolve over
231
time. In addition, particularly important to research on federalism is the
consideration of intergovernmental transfers in state policy development. The
findings on economic issues in this study, for example, could be supplemented by
work undertaken on federal grants to states and the effects of those grants on
environmental policy.
Another possibility for future research would be to expand the
environmental fields observed in this study. Although air pollution control, water
pollution control, and hazardous waste are often the most visible areas of
environmental policy, there are other domains which are also deserving of
inspection. Solid waste is a growing problem in America, as landfills are filled to
capacity and many areas are fighting the installation of new dumps. Natural
resource depletion is also a major issue, as chronic water shortages in the
southwest, rampant deforestation of old growth forests, and eroding cropland are
part of the environmental dilemma. Another area of contention is wildlife
protection, as environmentalists and Interior Secretary Manuel Lujon have battled
recently over the need to protect biological diversity.
Future researchers will have the advantage of a greatly expanded set of
data and literature. State environmental policy is a relatively new phenomenon,
bursting onto the political scene in the 1980s due to a combination of the Reagan
budget cuts and the realization of rapidly increasing environmental deterioration.
As a growing number of states comes to grips with the need to fund
environmental protection, and the natural political time lag between policy
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formulation and implementation passes, the 1990s should offer an avalanche of
material on new state trends, fiscal and regulatory behavior, and the relationship
between federalism and state environmental policy.
Several specific variables analyzed also offer potential guidance for future
research. The fact that economic issues were found to be weak indicators of
policy suggests that political variables may become more important in studies
analyzing environmental policy. In addition, the findings regarding the
importance of pollution severity variables implies that close attention be paid to
changes in these conditions. In addition, issues of interstate pollution, such as
Midwestern power plants causing acid rain in the Northeast, are likely to become
increasingly important as states base policy on conditions created from outside
state borders.
The rapid turnover presently occurring in both Congress and state
legislatures due to retirement and voter dissatisfaction with incumbents is
important in light of the findings concerning party elite ideology. The battle for
the soul of the Republican party between conservatives and moderates could lead
to major changes in the ideological makeup of the GOP elite, thus sparking
alterations in environmental blocs which reach across party lines. A similar
situation could occur in the Democratic party in the South, where worsening
environmental problems, and the possible ensuing public outrage, could nudge
some candidates and new legislators toward a more moderate stance, including
support for stringent protection of the environment. This could cause an
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ideological shift among Southern Democrats, sparking increased liberalism within
the Democratic party.
The variables utilized in this study, including those found to be of limited
impact on policy, are still important and should continue to be included in future
environmental research. As the conditions in the states change, so might the
determinants of policy, thus mandating that contemporary measures be continually
updated for use in impending research. The findings reported in this study of
environmental policy can be utilized both to help draw conclusions in other fields
such as health care as well as applied to other competing research within the
environmental realm. Future research must strive to be more specific within each
pollution area so as to be as accurate as possible regarding the sources of policy,
while at the same time incorporating all findings into the overall environmental
scheme. The latter is crucial in light of the need for environmental researchers to
account for the interconnected nature of different types of environmental
problems. Each environmental area merits separate examination, followed up by
assimilation of the comprehensive body of research on environmental policy.
234
TABLE 4.1
State level Variables used in the Air Pollution Analysis
Dependent Variables
Air pollution spending, per capita
Highway spending as a percent of vehicle-related revenue
Mass transit spending as a percent of highway spending
Presence of Air Toxics Policy
Presence of Emission Fees Policy
Presence of Acid Rain Policy
Presence of Ozone Protection Policy
Presence of Global warming Policy
Presence of Local Auto Test Policy
Presence of Mass Transit Funding Policy
Presence of Growth Management Plan
Renew America Score for Energy Conservation
Renew America Score for Air Pollution
Renew America Score for Energy Pollution
Renew America Score for Land Use Plans
Renew America Score for Growth Management
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Environmental Conditions
Population Density
Total Population, 1990
Change in Population Density, 1970-1990
Number of cancer cases, 1990
Number of cancer deaths, 1990
Number of cancer cases and deaths, per 100,000 population, 1990
Percent of population exposed to air which violated federal ozone standards
Percent of population exposed to air which violated carbon monoxide standards
Number of motor vehicles
Number of motor vehicles, per square mile
Number of vehicle miles driven
Vehicle miles driven, per square mile
Toxic chemical releases by industry to the air
Toxic chemical releases by industry to the air, per square mile
Toxic chemical releases by industry to the air, per capita
Percent of toxic emissions released without end-of-stack control
Number of facilities which pose a high cancer risk
Ozone depleting emissions output
Number of major ozone depleting facilities
Acid rain pH level
Air emissions from electric utilities, sulfur dioxide pounds per capita
235
TABLE 4.1 (Continued)
State level Variables used in the Air Pollution Analysis
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Environmental Conditions (continued)
Air emissions from electric utilities, nitrous oxide pounds per capita
Air emissions from electric utilities, carbon dioxide pounds per capita
Carbon dioxide emissions from all fuels
Carbon dioxide emissions from all fuels, per capita
Coal Production, in tons
Oil Production, in tons
Growth of carbon emissions, 1966-1986
Per capita energy consumption, in BTUs
Growth in per capita energy consumption, 1960-1975
Growth in per capita energy consumption, 1975-1987
Ratio of energy use growth to population growth, 1975-87
Gasoline use per capita
Miles per gallon gas consumed
Persons per motor vehicle
Number of cars per transit bus
Rate of mass transit use in urban areas
Dependency on vehicle and related industry, for jobs
Dependency on vehicle and related industry, for taxes
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Political Conditions
State ideology
state partisanship
Political culture
Percent of women in the state legislature
Percent of blacks in the state legislature
Environmental interest group strength
Polluter Interest Group Strength
State policy liberalism
Democratic party elite ideology
Republican party elite ideology
Party Competition
Legislative Professionalism
Consolidation of the environmental bureaucracy
Party of the Governor
Dominant party in the Legislature
Governor's power index
236
TABLE 4.1 (Continued)
State level Variables used in the Air Pollution Analysis
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Economic Conditions
Gross state product, per capita
Per capita income
Unemployment level
Unionization level
percent of all personal income coming from the chemical industry
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Social Conditions
Urbanization level
Percent of the population over 65 years of age
Percent of the population between 20-24 years of age
Percent of the population which is black
Percent of the population with a high school degree
237
TABLE 4.2
Pearson Correlations between Selected Independent
Variables and Air Pollution Policy
Independent Air Pollution Renew America
Variables Spending Per Capita Score for Air
Poll.
Population Density -.02 .38**
Population Living under .43** .30*
CO Violations
C 02 Emissions Per Capita .07 -.36**
S02 Emissions by Utilities -.14 -.20
Per Capita Gas Use -.13 -.34*
Per Capita Income .40** .51**
Tax Dependency on Vehicle -.29* -.33*
& Related Industries
Job Dependency on Vehicle -.06 -.30*
& Related Industries
People over 65 -.40** .05
Urbanization .32* .63**
Environmental IG Strength .36** .25
State Ideology -.31* -.33*
Democrat Elite Ideology .34* .23
Republican Elite Ideology -.07 .10
Traditionalistic -.16 -.05
Moralistic .07 -.08
238
TABLE 4.2 fcontinued!
Independent
Auto
Variables
Ozone Protection Stop Global
Policv Warming
Local
Testing
Population Density .33* .42** .29*
Population Living Under
CO Violations
.24 .44** .45**
C 02 Emissions, Per Capita -.37** -.34* -.37***
S02 Emissions by Utilities -.25 -.23 -.23
Per Capita Gas Use -.36* -.18 -.24
Tax Dependency on Vehicle
& Related Industries
-.34* -.06 -.22
Job Dependency on Vehicle
& Related Industries
-.44** -.41** .43**
Per Capita Income .37** .40** .42**
People over 65 .23 .26 -.14
Urbanization .26 .24
54**
Environmental IG Strength .53** .56** .39**
State Ideology -.50**
- 46**
-.26
Democrat Elite Ideology .47** .38** .10
Republican Elite Ideology .41** .34* .15
Moralistic .17 .29* -.05
Traditionalistic -.45** -.39** -.08
* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
239
TABLE 4.3
State Air Pollution Spending Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Vm ables
Independent
Variables
State Air Pollution
Spending. Per Capita
% Population Living under
CO Violations
.00
(.00)
People over 65 -.09
(.03)
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
.00
(.02)
State Ideology -1.66
(1.22)
Democratic Elite Ideology .55
(.29)
Tax Dependency on Vehicle
and Related Industries
-.01
(.02)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Moralistic -.01
(.23)
Traditionalistic .35
(.20)
Constant 1.30
(.90)
Adjusted R Square .32
Significance of F .01
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
240
TABLE 4.4
State Ozone Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent State Ozone
Variables Policy
C 02 Emissions, Per Capita .00
(.00)
Population Density .00
(.00)
Gasoline Use, Per Capita .00
(.00)
Environmental Interest Group -2.16
Strength (3.89)
State Ideology -1.02
(1.03)
Democratic Elite Ideology .54
(.27)
Republican Elite Ideology .06
(.17)
Tax Dependency on Vehicle -.02
and Related Industries (.02)
Job Dependency on vehicle -.05
and Related Industries (.04)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Moralistic -.29
(.23)
241
TABLE 4.4 (continued)
State Ozone Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent State Ozone
Variables Policy
T raditionalistic -.21
(.19)
Constant 2.20
(.96)
Adjusted R Square .37
Significance of F .01
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
242
TABLE 4.5
State Global Warming Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent State Global
Variables Warming Policy
% Population living under .00
CO Violations (.00)
Population Density 7.22
(3.55)
C 02 Emissions, Per Capita .00
(.00)
Environmental Interest .04
Group Strength (.03)
State Ideology -.61
(.95)
Democratic Elite Ideology -.21
(.25)
Republican Elite Ideology -.01
(.16)
Job Dependency on Vehicle -.01
and Related Industries (.04)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Moralistic .45
(.21)
Traditionalistic .07
(.18)
243
TABLE 4.5 (continued)
State Global Warming Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent State Global
Variables Warming Policy
Constant .12
(.77)
Adjusted R Square .35
Significance of F .01
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
244
TABLE 4.6
State Local Automobile Test Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent State Local
Variables Auto Test Policy
% Population Living under .00
CO Violations (.00)
Population Density .00
(.00)
C 02 Emissions, Per Capita .00
(.00)
Environmental Interest .03
Group Strength (.03)
Job Dependency on Vehicle -.02
and Related Industries (.04)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Moralistic -.06
( .18)
Traditionalistic .20
(.19)
Constant .09
(.84)
Adjusted R Square .23
Significance of F .05
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
245
TABLE 4.7
Renew America Score for Air Pollution
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Renew America Score
Variables for Air Pollution
C 02 Emissions, Per Capita -.033
(.018)
Population Density .00
(.00)
% Population Living under -.015
CO Violations (.014)
Gasoline Use, Per Capita .00
(.00)
Environmental Interest Group . 12
Strength (. 15)
State Ideology -3.32
(6.18)
Tax Dependency on Vehicle -.04
and Related Industries (.11)
Per Capita Income 9.82
(2.85)
Moralistic 1.43
(1.05)
Traditionalistic 2.24
(1.09)
246
TABLE 4.7 (continued)
Renew America Score for Air Pollution
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Renew America Score
Variables for Air Pollution
Constant -4.75
(4.87)
Adjusted R Square .31
Significance of F .01
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
247
TABLE 5.1
State level Variables used in the Water Pollution Analysis
Dependent Variables
Water pollution spending, per capita
Presence of NPDES permitting program
Presence of regulation of federal sites policy
Presence of pre-treatment program
Presence of groundwater protection program
Presence of underground storage tank inspection policy
Presence of groundwater toxics program
Presence of wetlands protection policy
Presence of phosphate ban
Presence of pesticide permit program
Presence of growth management plan
Renew America Score for groundwater control
Renew America Score for pesticide control
Renew America Score for surface water
Renew America Score for drinking water policy
Renew America Score for waste recycling
Renew America Score for Land Use Plans
Renew America Score for Growth Management
INDEPENDENT VARTABLES-Environmental Conditions
Population Density
Total Population, 1990
Change in Population Density, 1970-1990
Number of cancer cases, 1990
Number of cancer deaths, 1990
Number of cancer cases and deaths, per 100,000 population, 1990
fresh water withdrawals, per capita
toxic chemical releases to surface water, total
toxic chemical releases to surface water, per capita
toxic chemical releases to surface water, per square mile
Toxic chemical transfers to public sewers, total
Toxic chemical transfers to public sewers, per capita
Toxic chemical transfers to public sewers, per square mile
Toxic chemical underground injections, total
Toxic chemical underground injections, per capita
Toxic chemical underground injections, per square mile
Percent of public sewers in non-compliance with federal standards
Investment for sewer needs to the year 2008, total dollars
Investment for sewer needs to the year 2008, per capita
248
TABLE 5.1 (continued)
State level Variables used in the Water Pollution Analysis
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Environmental Conditions (continued)
Rivers and streams, miles
Rivers and streams, percent impaired
Lakes, percentage impaired
Percentage of population served by groundwater
Percentage of households served by own wells
Percentage of households relying on a septic tank
Percentage of groundwater contaminated by pesticides
Percentage of surface and groundwater possibly contaminated
Percentage of water systems violating SDWA
Percentage of water systems in significant non-compliance with federal standards
Percentage of the population using water in violation of SDWA
Percentage of water used for cooking and drinking
Fertilizer use per capita
Herbicide use per capita
Pesticide use per capita
Percent of wells with unsafe levels of nitrates
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Political Conditions
See variables in Table 4.1
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Economic Conditions
See variables in Table 4.1
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Social Conditions
See variables in Table 4.1
249
TABLE 5.2
Pearson Correlations between Selected Independent
Variables and Water Pollution Policy
Independent State Spending on Protect Wetlands
Variables Water Pollution Groundwater Protection
Population Density .15 .25 .48**
Sewer Investment Needs .05 .03 .45**
% Served by Own Wells -.13 -.12 .22
Toxic Undergmd Injects, per capita .42** -.20 -.22
Toxic Chemical Release to .02 -.33* -.15
Surface Water, Per Capita
% SDWA Violations
40**
.06 .17
People over 65 -.17 .24 .41**
Urbanization -.08 .24 .25
Education .31* .21 .13
Gross State Product, p.c.
43**
-.01 .05
Per Capita Income .19 .32* .36*
Unemployment .05 -.36* -.35*
Environmental IG Strength .15 .34* .54**
State Ideology -.15 -.38**
- 38**
Democrat Elite Ideology .21 .30* .40**
Republican Elite Ideology .01 .31* .63**
Traditionalistic -.25 -.32* -.39**
Individualistic .28 .31* .14
250
TABLE 5.2 fcontinued)
Independent
Variables
Pesticide
Permits
Renew America Score
for Surface Water
Population Density .24 .07
Sewer Investment Needs .44** -.05
% Served by Own Wells -.49**
32**
Toxic Chemical Underground
Injections
-.05 -.27
Toxic Chemical Releases
to Surface Water, Per Cap
-.06 -.31*
SDWA Violations .02 -.05
People over 65 -.04 .16
Urbanization .44** -.08
Education .21 -.01
Gross State Product, p.c. .18 -.10
Per Capita Income
41**
.02
Unemployment -.11 -.48**
Environmental IG Strength .22 .16
State Ideology -.25 -.15
Democrat Elite Ideology .16 .30*
Republican Elite Ideology .07 .10
251
Independent
Variables
TABLE 5.2 (continued)
Pesticide
Permits
Renew America Score
for Surface Water
Individualistic
Traditionalistic
.15
-.07
-.05
-.13
* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
252
TABLE 5.3
State Water Pollution Spending Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent
Variables
State Water Pollution
Spending. Per Capita
% Drinking Water Systems
Violating SDWA
.37
(.15)
Toxic Chemical Underground
Injections, Lbs. Per Capita
.59
(.17)
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
.72
(1.05)
Gross State Product, Per Capita .30
(1.07)
People aged 20-24 .19
(1.73)
High School Education -.19
(.65)
Individualistic 6.63
(7.22)
Traditionalistic -10.43
(10.42)
Constant -1.33
(51.57)
Adjusted R Square .35
Significance of F .001
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
253
TABLE 5.4
State Groundwater Protection Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Groundwater
Variables Protection Policv
Toxic Chemicals Release to -.016
Surface Water, Per capita (.012)
Environmental Interest .00
Group Strength (.02)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Unemployment -.07
(.05)
State Ideology -1.46
(1.15)
Democratic Elite Ideology .33
(.28)
Republican Elite Ideology .02
(.17)
Individualistic .24
(.23)
Traditionalistic .21
(.25)
Constant 1.08
(.80)
Adjusted R Square .15
Significance of F NS
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
254
TABLE 5.5
State Wetlands Protection Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent
Variables
Wetlands
Protection Policv
Population Density
5.60
(3.07)
Sewer Investment Needs,
Per Capita
.00
(.00)
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
.07
(.02)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Unemployment .082
(.046)
State Ideology 2.38
(.98)
Democratic Elite Ideology .10
(.21)
Republican Elite Ideology .45
(.14)
People over 65 .08
(.03)
Individualistic -.07
(.17)
Traditionalistic .02
(.19)
255
TABLE 5.5 (continued)
State Wetlands Protection Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Wetlands
Variables Protection Policy
Constant -2.09
(.88)
Adjusted R Square .61
Significance of F .001
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
256
TABLE 5.6
State Pesticide Permits Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Pesticide
Variables Permits Policv
% Household Well Users -.020
(.006)
Sewer Investment Needs, 5.58
Per Capita (2.68)
Environmental Interest .52
Group Strength
(.61)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Urbanization .00
(.00)
State Policy Liberalism .02
(.08)
Individualistic -.09
(.13)
Traditionalistic .13
(.16)
Constant -.27
(.46)
Adjusted R Square .33
Significance of F .01
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
257
TABLE 5.7
Renew America Score for Surface Water
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent
Variables
% Household Well Users
Toxic Chemicals Release to
Surface Water, Per capita
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
Democratic Elite Ideology
Unemployment
Individualistic
Traditionalistic
Constant
Adjusted R Square
Significance of F
Renew America Score
for Surface Water
.053
(.026)
-.05
(.04)
-.08
(.08)
1.52
( 1.01)
-.58
(.19)
.33
(.69)
1.06
(.88)
6.14
(1.86)
.28
.01
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
258
TABLE 6.1
State level Variables used in the Hazardous Waste Analysis
Dependent Variables
Hazardous Waste spending, per capita
Hazardous Waste spending, per ton
Presence of toxic waste right-to-sue policy
Presence of strict liability policy
Presence of right-to-know policy
Presence of aid for right-to-know access program
Presence of toxic waste worker protection policy
Presence of toxic cuts law
Presence of plan and report toxics policy
Presence of reduce toxics program
Presence of superfund plan
Renew America Score hazardous waste
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Environmental Conditions
Population Density
Total Population, 1990
Change in Population Density, 1970-1990
Number of cancer cases, 1990
Number of cancer deaths, 1990
Number of cancer cases and deaths, per 100,000 population, 1990
Toxic chemical releases to the land, total
Toxic chemical releases to the land, per capita
Toxic chemical releases to the land, per square mile
Toxic chemical transfers offsite, total
Toxic chemical transfers offsite, per capita
Toxic chemical transfers offsite, per square mile
Total toxic releases to the environment
Total toxic releases to the environment, per capita
Total toxic releases to the environment, per square mile
cancer causing chemicals released to the environment, total
cancer causing chemicals released to the environment, per capita
birth defect toxins released to the environment, total
birth defect toxins released to the environment, per capita
nerve damaging toxins released to the environment, total
nerve damaging toxins released to the environment, per capita
Number of hazardous waste management facilities
Number of hazardous waste transport accidents
Amount of hazardous waste transport accident damage, in dollars
259
TABLE 6.1 (continued)
State level Variables used in the Hazardous Waste Analysis
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Environmental Conditions (continued)
Number of military hazardous waste sites
Number of Superfund NPL sites
Number of Superfund NPL sites, clean up completed
Percentage of Superfund NPL sites, clean up completed
Number of Non-Superfund waste sites
net import of hazardous waste
Hazardous waste generated, pounds per capita
Number of hazardous waste RCRA generators
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Political Conditions
Number of hazardous waste workers per 10,000 people
See remaining variables in Table 4.1
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Economic Conditions
See variables in Table 4.1
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-Social Conditions
See variables in Table 4.1
260
TABLE 6.2
Pearson Correlations between Selected Independent
Variables and Hazardous Waste Policy
Independent
Variables
State Spending on
Hazardous waste
Superfund
Plan Policv
Population Density .12 .38**
Haz Waste Workers Per
10,000 Population
.41** .03
Transfers Offsite, p.c. -.29* .35*
Toxic Releases to the
Environment, Per Sq. Mile
-.36* .25
Haz Waste Generated, p.c. -.41** -.22
People over 65 -.02 .37**
Education .43** .05
Per Capita Income .25 .37**
Unionization .05 .32*
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
.64** .25
State Ideology -.31* -.34*
Democrat Elite Ideology .39** .29*
Republican Elite Ideology .31* .30*
Moralistic .32* .07
Traditionalistic
- 39**
-.23
261
TABLE 6.2 fcontinued)
Pearson Correlations between Selected Independent
Variables and Hazardous Waste Policy
Independent
Variables
Right-to-Know
Plan Policv
Renew America Score
for Hazardous Waste
Population Density .21
.36*
Haz Waste Workers Per
10,000 Population
.26 -.05
Transfers Offsite, p.c. .38** .40**
Toxic Releases to the
Environment, Per Sq. Mile
.08 .29*
Haz Waste Generated, p.c. .03 -.19
People over 65 .12
.38*
Education .07 -.18
Per Capita Income .18 .27
Unionization .18 .34*
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
.34* .18
State Ideology .34* -.44*
Democrat Elite Ideology .39** .16
Republican Elite Ideology .33* .28
Moralistic .28 .05
Traditionalistic -.21 .02
* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
262
TABLE 6.3
State Hazardous Waste Spending Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Hazardous Waste
Variables Spending Policv
Hazardous Waste Workers .09
Per 10,000 People (.06)
Toxic Transfers Offsite, -.13
Per Capita (.09)
Hazardous Waste Generated, .00
Per Capita (.00)
Toxic Releases to the .00
Environment, Per Square Mile (.00)
Environmental Interest .316
Group Strength (.168)
State Ideology -5.20
(6.15)
Democratic Elite Ideology -1.92
(1.42)
Republican Elite Ideology 1.04
(.94)
High School Education .03
(.07)
Moralistic 1.90
(1.07)
Traditionalistic 1.34
(1.28)
263
TABLE 6.3 (continued)
State Hazardous Waste Spending Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Hazardous Waste
Variables Spending Policy
Constant -.34
(4.74)
Adjusted R Square .39
Significance of F .001
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
264
TABLE 6.4
State Superfund Plan Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent
Variables
Superfund Plan
Policv
Population Density .00
(.00)
Toxic Transfers Offsite,
Per Capita
.036
(.018)
People over 65 .09
(.03)
Unionization .01
(.01)
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
.02
(.03)
State Ideology 1.75
(1.35)
Democratic Elite Ideology .36
(.31)
Republican Elite Ideology -.10
(.20)
Per Capita Income .00
(.00)
Moralistic -.01
(.25)
Traditionalistic .21
(.21)
265
TABLE 6.4 (continued)
State Superfund Plan Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Superfund Plan
Variables Policy
Constant -3.03
(1.01)
Adjusted R Square .32
Significance of F .01
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
266
TABLE 6.5
State Right-To-Know Policy
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent Right-To-Know
Variables Policv
Toxic Transfers Offsite, .06
Per Capita (.02)
Environmental Interest .039
Group Strength (.028)
State Ideology -.35
(1.13)
Democratic Elite Ideology .46
(.28)
Republican Elite Ideology .22
(.17)
Moralistic .12
(.20)
Traditionalistic .40
(.19)
Constant -.48
(.45)
Adjusted R Square .35
Significance of F .001
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
267
TABLE 6.6
Renew America Score for Hazardous Waste
Regressed on Selected Independent Variables
Independent
Variables
Population Density
Toxic Transfers Offsite,
Per Capita
Toxic Releases to the
Environment, Per Square Mile
People over 65
Unionization
Environmental Interest
Group Strength
State Ideology
Moralistic
Traditionalistic
Constant
Adjusted R Square
Significance of F
Renew America Score
for Hazardous Waste
.00
(.00)
.09
(.08)
.00
(.00)
.267
(.137)
.06
(.03)
.19
(.13)
-4.84
(5.94)
1.87
(.85)
2.60
(.90)
-2.55
(2.91)
.41
.001
The unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors, in
parentheses, are reported in the table.
268
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Kandel, Anthony Simon
(author)
Core Title
Federalism and the determinants of environmental policy in the American states
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
(digital)
Tag
Health and Environmental Sciences,OAI-PMH Harvest,Social Sciences
Format
application/pdf
(imt)
Language
English
Contributor
Digitized by ProQuest
(provenance)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c36-386925
Unique identifier
UC11249905
Identifier
DP30329.pdf (filename),usctheses-c36-386925 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
DP30329.pdf
Dmrecord
386925
Document Type
Dissertation
Format
application/pdf (imt)
Rights
Kandel, Anthony Simon
Type
texts
Source
University of Southern California
(contributing entity),
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
(collection)
Access Conditions
The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...
Repository Name
University of Southern California Digital Library
Repository Location
USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA