Governance and urban design: Omaha by design

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GOVERNANCE AND URBAN DESIGN:
OMAHA BY DESIGN

by

Sunita Kalsariya

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT)

December 2011

Copyright 2011 Sunita Kalsariya
ii

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to two women whose commitment to my studies has led me to
complete this work

My mother Ansuyaben Kalsaria

And

My mother-in-law Madhurikaben Shah

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and the foremost, I am thankful to my advisor, Prof. Tridib Banerjee, for his
able guidance, which played an instrumental role in my intellectual journey during my
doctoral studies. I am greatly indebted not only for his valuable input during my research,
but also for his kindness to accommodate my changing circumstances over the period of
this dissertation. I am also indebted to other members of my dissertation committee, Prof.
Shui Yan Tang, who introduced me to the pertinent concepts in public administration and
public policy, and Prof. Philip Ethington, who provided critical input from the
perspective of urban politics at various stages of this research. I am thankful to my fourth
committee member Prof. Robert Blair at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) for
introducing me to the background of Omaha and granting me access to the faculty study
area in the library along with parking privileges at UNO.
In Omaha, I would like to extend my gratitude toward Connie Spellman and her
staff for all their assistance. This analysis was possible because Connie graciously
allowed me to spend long hours in her office and on her computer browsing through all
the archival documents on Omaha By Design. I would like to thank Prof. B.J. Reed, Jed
Moulton, John Gottschalk, Marty Shukert, Steve Jensen, Robert Peters, and Patrick
McNamara for not only kindly agreeing to meet on more than one occasion for the
personal interviews, but also for sharing valuable and at times rare information related to
the case study. A special thanks to every one of the interviewees who generously shared
their precious time and knowledge about the initiative in their interviews. Their
iv

wholehearted participation in this study reflects their commitment to the city‘s built
environment coupled with their midwestern kindness and humility.
At SPPD, I greatly appreciate the teachings and advice of current and former
faculty members, Prof. Greg Hise, Prof. Peter Robertson, and Prof. Clara Irazabal. At the
Student Affairs Department of SPPD, I cannot thank June Muranaka and Christine
Wilson enough for their ever present help and Julieth Kim for patiently resolving all my
long-distance queries.
Finally, I thank my father, who has been a constant source of inspiration
throughout my life. My mother and mother-in-law essentially took care of everything at
my home and provided all the love and care to my little one during the last year. Without
them, the task of completing this dissertation would have been unattainable. My sisters,
Nishtha and Dhruti, cheered me from continents away. My son Vihan‘s love and
affection have contributed to this work in ways words cannot describe and he makes
everything worthwhile. Last but not least, I would never have come to the United States
to pursue my dream of achieving a doctorate if my husband, Bhavin, had not encouraged
me. I am forever grateful for his love and support in this journey.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication ii
Acknowledgments iii
List of Tables xi
List of Figures xii
Abbreviations xix
Abstract xxii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
Motivation behind the Study 1
Argument 2
Theoretical Context 4
Urban Regimes 5
Emerging Paradigms 6
Production of Urban Form 8
Research Question 10
Methodology 10
Generalizing from the Case 11
Structure of the Study 12
Key Findings 18
Governance Aspects Affecting Urban Design Process 19
Revisiting Urban Regimes 20
Public Participation and Urban Form 23
Collaboration for Urban Form 23
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 25
Urban Regimes 26
Cooperation among Regime Players 29
Community Power of Regimes 31
Motivations of Regime Players 33
The Civic Role of Business Leadership 33
Change in Regimes 36
Key Critiques of Regimes 39
Regimes, Pro-growth Coalitions and Growth Machines 43
Emerging Paradigms 47
Collaboration in Governance 47
Participation in Governance 50
Participation and Collaboration in Planning 55
Production of Urban Form 58
Aesthetics of Urban Form 60
Humanities and Social Science-based Understanding of Urban Form 62
Governance Dimension of Urban Form 70
Summary: Synthesis of Urban Design and Theories of Governance 73
vi

Regimes 75
Collaboration 75
Participation 76
Urban Form Production 77
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 78
Research Design 79
Analytical Framework 82
Case Selection 82
Data Collection 83
Context Data 84
Selection of Informants 84
Interviews 87
Interview Questionnaire 89
Other Data 90
Data Analysis 91
Limitations 92
Summary 93
CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF CASE STUDIES IN OTHER US CITIES 95
Collaboration for the City‘s Overall Development 96
Cleveland Tomorrow and Others 96
Partnership for the Built Environment 101
Baltimore Harbor Redevelopment 101
Urban Design Plan for the City 106
San Francisco Urban Design Plan 106
Summary 112
CHAPTER 5: BACKGROUND OF OMAHA 115
Current Demographics 115
History of Omaha 116
Railroad 117
Developments in the Late Nineteenth to Mid Twentieth Centuries 119
Key Political Developments in the Twentieth Century 122
Banks 124
Newspapers 125
Economic Activities and Emergence of PPPs 126
Business Leadership 129
Planning History of Omaha 134
1880-1920: Omaha and the “City Beautiful” 134
1920-1966: Omaha and the “City Efficient” 135
1966-1989: Omaha and the “Livable City” 137
Parks and Boulevards 144
Summary 144
vii

CHAPTER 6: LIVELY OMAHA TO OMAHA BY DESIGN 147
Omaha By Design Timeline 148
Search for the City‘s Image 151
Niemen Marcus Catalogue of Philanthropy 154
A Private Agenda of the City Planners 162
Trading of the Green Space 167
Convergence of the Three 176
Lively Omaha 180
Setting Up 180
Project for Public Spaces 182
Emerging Partnership with the City 185
Activities 186
Strengths and Challenges 190
Summary of Lively Omaha 192
Local Dreams, Global Talent 194
Destination Midtown 195
Appointment of the Designer and the Legal Consultant 199
Perceptions of the Stakeholders 201
Summary of Local Dreams, Global Talent 208
Omaha By Design: An Urban Design Plan for the City of Omaha 210
Urban Design Element 210
Lively Omaha to Omaha By Design 213
Summary 215
CHAPTER 7: COLLABORATION FOR AN URBAN DESIGN PLAN 218
How to Partner with the City 219
Mayor Embraces the Plan 221
Developers Join In 224
New Partnership Model 225
Resource Contribution 227
Practicing Collaboration 229
Public vs. Private 231
Roles and Responsibilities 233
Committees 235
Cost 238
Institutional and Collaborative Framework 239
Summary 240
CHAPTER 8: DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE OBD PLAN 242
Timeline for the Urban Design Plan 243
Design Context 244
Design Concept 255
Design Framework 258
Design Components 261
viii

Green Omaha 261
The Cole Creek Project 270
Civic Omaha 271
Neighborhood Omaha 280
Benson-Ames Alliance 285
Visuals and Representation 286
Visuals in Design Phase 289
Visuals in Implementation Phase 300
Summary of Visuals and Representation 303
Summary of Design Aspects 305
CHAPTER 9: ENGAGING THE PEOPLE 308
Key Issues of Engaging the People 309
Main Approaches 312
Role of the Media 315
Participants‘ Characteristics 319
Effectiveness of Participation 323
Summary: Participation in Urban Design 327
CHAPTER 10: IMPLEMENTING AN URBAN DESIGN VISION 330
Implementation Timeline and Background 331
Workable Plan 333
Change in Collaboration 337
Opposition 339
Negotiated Codes 338
Collaborative Code-making 349
Urban Design Review Board 351
City Council‘s Approval 353
Institutionalizing the Vision 354
Summary: Acceptable Accomplishment 356
CHAPTER 11: AESTHETICS OF RETAIL 360
Shift in Walmart‘s Design Ideology 363
Walmart Supercenter in Steelyard Commons, Cleveland, OH 367
Walmart Supercenter in White Plains, NY 369
Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets 372
Role of OBD 377
City Council‘s Vote 385
Final Product 388
Summary 394
CHAPTER 12: BILLBOARD INDUSTRY: A TOUGH PARTNER 398
Timeline 399
Tale of Two Billboard Companies 401
ix

History of Billboard Controls 403
Administrative Loophole 406
Collaborating in the OBD Process 409
Nebraska LB 302 411
Electronic Billboards 413
Splitting the Baby 419
Tough Partner 421
Summary 428

CHAPTER 13: REVISITING THE BATTLE OVER AESTHETICS OF
RETAIL: CVS PHARMACY 433
CVS on 49
th
and Dodge Streets 434
CVS Store Design 437
Public Protest 442
City Council‘s Vote 444
Revote 449
Influence of OBD 454
Summary 460
Comparison among Three Cases in Chapters 11, 12 and 13 464

CHAPTER 14: EMERGING FINDINGS: REGIMES, COLLABORATION
AND PARTICIPATION IN URBAN DESIGN 465
Role of Governance Processes in Urban Design 466
Political Economy of Urban Design Plans 482
OBD and FBCs 483
Emerging Nature of Urban Regime in OBD 488
Effectiveness of Participation and Collaboration 497
Is OBD a Success? 503
Further Research 505
References 506
Appendices
Appendix A: Omaha By Design: Steering Committee
(Working Review Committee) 528
Appendix B: The city of Omaha Master Plan: Summary of the existing
urban design components (from 1997 revision) 530
Appendix C: Survey questionnaire in the last page of newspaper
supplement insert in Sunday World-Herald 532
Appendix D: Draft of frequently asked questions during
the OBD public meetings as prepared by Redstone
Communications for OBD 533
Appendix E: OBD online and newspaper insert‘s survey results 535
Appendix F: List of Technical Advisory Group committee members 537
Appendix G: Applicability chart for urban design codes 538
x

Appendix H: Final text adopted for signs in implementing the urban design
plan 539
Appendix I: Omaha‘s demographics 541
Appendix J: Findings of the Gallup Organization Survey 544
Appendix K: Letter of exemption from IRB 545
Appendix L: Informed consent for non-medical research 546
Appendix M: List of informants 549
Appendix N: Interview questionnaire 551
xi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Analysis of collaborative and participatory initiative with a local
corporate regime in an urban design plan process. 82

Table 4.2: Categorization of the informants 87

Table 4.3: Categorization of the interviews according to duration 88

Table 6.1: Omaha By Design timeline 149

Table 8.1: One-year urban design plan schedule 243

Table 9.1: Implementation timeline 331

Table 11.1: Timeline for the Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory streets 372

Table 12.1: Timeline of the billboard companies‘ institutional interactions in
Omaha 399

Table 13.1: Urban design and governance implications of three small cases in
the OBD Process 464

xii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Urban design codes in the context of dominant urban design
discourses 59

Figure 5.1: 1854 Plan of Omaha showing the first platted settlement by the
Missouri River 117

Figure 5.2: Omaha‘s Union Station in 1947 118

Figure 5.3: City engineer‘s map of Omaha in 1920 121

Figure 5.4: Livestock Exchange Building in South Omaha built in 1927 127

Figure 5.5: View of the Trans Mississippi International Exposition 128

Figure 5.6: Ak-Sar-Ben racing track in 1940s 131

Figure 5.7: Aerial view of the downtown during 1940s 136

Figure 5.8: Gene Leahy Mall 139

Figure 5.9: Bob Kerrey Pedestrian Bridge 141

Figure 5.10: Jobbers Canyon district 142

Figure 5.11: An aerial view of ConAgra Foods downtown campus by the river 143

Figure 6.1: The OBD process chart: from the concept level to adoption of urban
design codes for Omaha 150

Figure 6.2: Photos showing Omaha‘s undeveloped riverfront in 1998, in 2003
and 2006 during its redevelopment and in 2010 approaching the
completion of redevelopment 152

Figure 6.3: Western Electric Plant‘s image from 1962 168

Figure 6.4: Images showing proposed Sams Club and Home Depot stores on
Avaya plant site 169

Figure 6.5: Photos of Walmart in Ft. Collins 170

Figure 6.6: The Public Pulse section in the OWH Editorial of
March 7, 2003 171
xiii

Figure 6.7: A greatly criticized retaining wall of Walmart and Sams Club stores
after construction on Avaya site which was a large open green space
before 175

Figure 6.8: PPS framework 183

Figure 6.9: Gene Leahy Mall in 2002 and proposed redevelopment through Gene
Leahy and 11
th
Street Master Plan 189

Figure 6.10: Photos of place game workshops in Omaha 190

Figure 6.11: DM study area highlighted in pink with key public and private
institutions inside and outside its boundaries 197

Figure 6.12: An artist‘s rendering based on the plan of Midtown Crossing- A
Mixed-use development at the heart of DM area 198

Figure 6.13: Site plan of Midtown Crossing showing proposed mixed use
buildings in Pink 198

Figure 6.14: A move from Lively Omaha to Omaha By Design as seen in logo
designs and tag Lines 214

Figure 6.15: The new Omaha By Design website announces the name change
from Lively Omaha to Omaha By Design in 2004 215

Figure 8.1: Hilly terrain and Papio creek system of Omaha metro area 245

Figure 8.2: 1975 Map of Omaha 246

Figure 8.3: 2005 Map of Omaha 246

Figure 8.4: Joslyn Art Museum in downtown 247

Figure 8.5: Woodmen Tower 248

Figure 8.6: Douglass County Court House 248

Figure 8.7: Gene Leahy Mall 249

Figure 8.8: Heartland of America Park 250

xiv

Figure 8.9: Federal Courthouse building 251

Figure 8.10: The John Gottschalk Freedom Center 251

Figure 8.11: First National Bank 252

Figure 8.12: Qwest Center 252

Figure 8.13: Holland Performing Arts Center 253

Figure 8.14: Midtown Crossing 253

Figure 8.15: ―Fish-bone‖ Diagram of Omaha 255

Figure 8.16: Map of waterways showing corridor 500‘ and 1000‘ from center line
Of each waterway 264

Figure 8.17: Brush Creek in Kansas City 264

Figure 8.18: Conversion of creeks into waterways with break-away dams in the
Brush Creek 265

Figure 8.19: Photos of the existing trail along the creeks in Papio watershed and a
sketch showing a widened creek with additional landscaping 265

Figure 8.20: Map showing proposed parks in Omaha Suburban Parks Master Plan 266

Figure 8.21: Photo showing Interstate I-80 and a sketch with proposed landscaping
along its edges 266

Figure 8.22: Green streets plan where proposed green streets are to receive special
landscape treatments 267

Figure 8.23: Cross sections showing proposed street rights-of-ways with
landscaping and future transit lines 268

Figure 8.24: Sketch showing how parking lot can help solve on-site drainage
needs and visual improvements through landscaping 269

Figure 8.25: A bird‘s eye view of Omaha‘s terrain with all the Green Omaha
policies are combined in one 269

Figure 8.26: Stabilized waterways as a part of the Cole Creek Project 270

xv

Figure 8.27: Diagram highlighting the areas where most people work and shop,
in downtown and along Dodge Street. They were delineated as ACIs 273

Figure 8.28: A proposal for an ACI 274

Figure 8.29: A proposal for Gene Leahy Mall 275

Figure 8.30: A view of typical Omaha street with new streetscape elements 275

Figure 8.31: Proposed elevation control techniques for large retail buildings to
give coherent image in MCCs 276

Figure 8.32: WRT‘s design proposal for 72
nd
and Dodge streets intersection 277

Figure 8.33: Photo of a historic building in Omaha revived for a new use 278

Figure 8.34: Views looking north along the I-480 freeway before and after
illuminating the bridges 278

Figure 8.35: Examples of public art in Omaha, similar concept of public art was
proposed in ACIs and other appropriate locations 279

Figure 8.36: An example of quality design structure in Omaha that was proposed
for other public buildings 279

Figure 8.37: A sketch showing a combination of several OBD policies in a new
urban neighborhood 280

Figure 8.38: Map showing how Neighborhood Alliances made up of a cluster of
existing neighborhoods could be mapped in Omaha 282

Figure 8.39: Picture showing an older neighborhood in Omaha 282

Figure 8.40: Proposed streetscape improvements on 24
th
Street in North Omaha 283

Figure 8.41: A neighborhood street after proposed streetscape policies are
implemented 283

Figure 8.42: A walkable neighborhood commercial center proposal with
"Four Corners" development pattern 284

Figure 8.43: A sketch by consultant team showing downtown redevelopment
proposal for Benson under Benson-Ames Alliance 286

xvi

Figure 8.44: ―Fish-Bone‖ diagram of OBD‘s design concept 287

Figure 8.45: Four pictures highlighted by the design consultants in first
presentation 291

Figure 8.46: 50
th
Dodge now and after proposed guidelines implemented 292

Figure 8.47: North 90
th
Street now and after proposed guidelines are implemented 292

Figure 8.48: Gene Leahy Mall now and after being redeveloped 293

Figure 8.49: Capitol Avenue looking west towards Central High School before
and after 293

Figure 8.50: Proposal for 72
nd
and Dodge Streets intersection before and after 294

Figure 8.51: 120
th
and Dodge streets Miracle Hills area proposal before and after 295

Figure 8.52: Proposal for 78
th
and Cass Street area before and after 295

Figure 8.53: Creeks now and an example of how they can become after their
water is raised like in Brush Creek, Kansas City 297

Figure 8.54: Omaha‘s creeks as they existed before and as they exist now after
being Neglected 298

Figure 8.55: Bob Kerrey Pedestrian Bridge and the riverfront 299

Figure 8.56: The Hilton hotel, downtown Omaha 299

Figure 8.57: The Gallup premise on the riverfront where once there used to be the
one of the largest car junk yards of Omaha 300

Figure 8.58: Public spaces of Omaha, two examples of unusable and usable public
spaces 300

Figure 8.59: Before and after plans of block layouts 302

Figure 8.60: Example of how urban design zoning codes can alter how an area
develops 303

Figure 10.1: Proposed location of the streets with respect to garages 346

Figure 11.1: A visual of Walmart on Mars 361
xvii

Figure 11.2: Photos of Walmart at Steelyard Commons in Cleveland 367

Figure 11.3: Walmart in downtown White Plains, NY 369

Figure 11.4: Change introduced in Walmart‘s logo design in 2008 371

Figure 11.5: Proposed Walmart site on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets intersection 374

Figure 11.6: A revised plan of Walmart with added trees on the perimeter 380

Figure 11.7: Approved site plan of Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets 389

Figure 11.8: Elevations of Walmart 390

Figure 11.9: North side front elevation facing the parking lot 390

Figure 11.10: Landscaping in the parking lot 391

Figure 11.11: Covered plaza for the bus stop along 72
nd
Street 391

Figure 11.12: Terraced retaining wall with monument sign 392

Figure 11.13: Mezzanine floor to give a two storey look 392

Figure 13.1: Site highlighted with dotted perimeter shows properties to be
demolished for building the proposed CVS Pharmacy 436

Figure 13.2: Design of proposed CVS Pharmacy store as approved by the
Planning Board in June 2010 439

Figure 13.3: Revised elevation of the building after the approval of the Planning
Board 443

Figure 13.4: Existing Reiner‘s Piano building 447

Figure 13.5: A rendering of the proposed Reiner‘s Piano building plans 448

Figure 13.6: Final CVS design aerial views before the revote 452

Figure 13.7: Final CVS design drawings before the revote 453

xviii

Figure 14.1: Institutional interplay-1 signifying the design stage of the
plan 494

Figure 14.2: Institutional interplay-2 signifying the implementation stage of the
plan 495

xix

ABBREVIATIONS

ACCD The Allegheny Conference on Community Development
ACI Area of Civic Importance (district)
AG Advocacy Group
BAA Benson-Ames Alliance
CCIH Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management
CCMO Charles Center Management Office
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CIP Capital Improvement Plan
CIS Community Input Sessions
CP Civic Place (district)
CRP Citizen Review Panel
DM Destination Midtown
EIR Environmental Impact Review
GBC Greater Baltimore Committee
GOCC Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce
GPF Greater Philadelphia First
HBA Highway Beautification Act
IG Industrial Gateways
LB Legislative Bill
MBP The Minnesota Business Partnership
MCC Major Commercial Corridor (district)
xx

MU Mixed-Use (district)
NAM Nonprofit Association of Midlands
NCAA National Collegiate Athletic Association
NCE Neighborhood Conservation & Enhancement
NCED Neighborhood Conservation & Enhancement District
NCGO Neighborhood Center for Greater Omaha
NIGP Neighborhood Improvement Grant Program
OBD Omaha By Design
OCF Omaha Community Foundation
OPPD Omaha Public Power District
OTC Omaha Traction Company
OTOC Omaha Together One Community
OWH Omaha World-Herald
PD Planning Department
PMRNRD Papio-Missouri River Natural Resources District
PPP Public-Private Partnerships
PPS Project for Public Spaces
PR Public Relations
PRD Parks and Recreation Department
PSA Public Service Announcements
RBC Ronnie Brooks Consulting
RC Redstone Communications
xxi

RFP Request For Proposal
WRND Walkable Residential Neighborhood District
SCV Special Community Value
TAG Technical Advisory Group
UDRB Urban Design Review Board
UNO University of Nebraska at Omaha
URP Urban Renewal Program
USDOT United States Department of Transportation
VPGF Volunteer Place Game Facilitators

xxii

ABSTRACT

Omaha By Design (OBD) began as an idea for improving the built environment
of Omaha, and evolved into a local corporate-sector-led initiative. OBD collaborated with
the city governance, the real estate sector, and neighborhoods for creating a citywide
urban design plan and corresponding codes. This dissertation studies the process of the
OBD plan from urban governance and political economic perspectives and employs
theoretical concepts of urban regimes, collaborative governance, and citizen participation
to inform urban design literature. During this study, it became apparent that these
theoretical concepts were not entirely effective in explaining several dimensions of the
OBD process, leading to secondary insights for these concepts.
The scholarship on urban design plans typically overlooks the process dimension.
Rather, the literature comprises of comparative studies of plans, content analysis of form
controls and urban design guidance systems, and case studies of completed projects. By
focusing on the process, this study examines how urban design visions are transformed,
contents of the codes are altered, and initial intents of the plans are modified by the
nature of collaboration and participation among various regimes, interest groups, and
institutional and political actors.
The primary research question of this study is: How does governance dimension
explain the process of an urban design plan and its implementation? The secondary but
related questions are: (1) How do recent developments of collaborative governance and
participatory planning revise the notion of urban regimes? (2) How does this revised
notion of urban regimes contribute to understanding the production of urban form? This
xxiii

study employs a single case study based qualitative framework of data collection and
analysis. Three types of secondary cases about collaboration, private sector participation,
and urban design plan process, supplement the primary case to augment the validity and
reliability of the findings.
Overall, the OBD initiative is found successful, because its collaborative model
for an urban design plan united stakeholders from the public, private, and nonprofit
sectors for the first time, generated awareness, and led citizens of Omaha to realize their
role in shaping urban design and form issues for the community. The drawbacks in the
OBD process include: weaknesses in the vision and design of the plan, greater focus on
the planning but not enough on implementation, a lack of specificity and rigor in the
formulation of the codes, and the promoters of the plan relenting to the demands of the
interest groups.
The findings reveal that ―internal‖ and ―external‖ aspects of governance influence
the realization of an ideal urban design vision into corresponding codes. These ―internal‖
dimensions are: (1) multi-faceted stakeholders; (2) nature of the urban design vision; (3)
absence of meaningful participation of the community; (3) problems in implementation
arising from consultants conveying a limited knowledge about institutional complexities,
their short-term focus, and a lack of concern on relating final codes with the overall
vision. The ―external‖ dimensions are: (1) tensions among local expectations and global
trends of retail urban forms; (2) demands of local communities for context-specific urban
forms; (3) lack of variety and flexibility in retail prototypes; and (4) unfamiliarity of the
plan‘s promoters in collaborating with diverse stakeholders.
xxiv

The findings enhance the scholarship on urban regimes by demonstrating that
regime theory neglects the roles of multiple levels of governing institutions, stakeholder
collaboration and citizen participation. Furthermore, collaboration for an urban design
initiative differs significantly from other cross-sector collaborations, and the ideals of
citizen participation still remain at a nascent stage in developing urban design plans.

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Motivation behind the Study
My interest in exploring the relationship between planning and institutional
processes had emerged when I worked as a planner in different organizations in India.
These organizations varied from a local NGO to an infrastructure advisory firm to a
global development organization, where I saw the interdependence of the production of
the built environment and the governing institutions. At that time I asked these questions:
How is built form linked with the institutional processes? Do institutions impact the
creation and evolution of built form? If they do, then what is the extent of their impact?
What role does a designer play amongst the political, administrative and other
stakeholders? I followed this line of inquiry during my doctoral studies and explored
scholarly discourses in the fields of urban design, planning, public administration, and
urban politics.
Fortunately, I came to know about Omaha By Design (OBD) in 2008, when I
moved to Omaha, Nebraska. The case of OBD allowed me to continue my initial line of
inquiry and apply my interest of exploring the links between the built environment and
institutional processes. The initiative was essentially about creating urban design
standards from scratch in a city of over 450,000 persons. After preliminary research of
the OBD initiative, my questions became more specific. I came to understand that urban
design standards and building design codes are integral components of a city‘s Master
Plan and crucial elements in determining the nature of a city‘s future urban form. By
analyzing the process of creating these codes, it may be possible to understand how
2

specific political and institutional aspects affect the urban design processes and how,
ultimately, those aspects influence what urban form a city obtains.
During the course of my research on the OBD case, I became interested in
identifying how urban design ideas are incorporated in the city planning process and what
political and institutional challenges are encountered in creating and implementing urban
design visions. I was also interested to learn about the role of existing governance
processes, how various individual interests were incorporated in making an urban design
plan, and their role in subsequent development of the regulatory codes for the city. I
recognized that my initial interest in the built form and governing institutions was
essentially in finding a connection between the practice of urban design and how it was
impacted by urban governance of a place. Therefore, I began reviewing the urban design
plan-making process from a governance perspective.
1

Argument
This research involves a critical analysis of the process of creating urban design
codes for a midsize US city, Omaha—a process that included collaborative and
participatory governance models. To understand the process of OBD—a citywide urban
design plan that originated from the private sector and incorporated collaborative and
participatory elements in its theme—a current understanding of the late twentieth century
model of regime theory (Stone 1989; Elkin 1987) is in order. Regime theory and pro-
growth coalition (Hartman 1984; Mollenkopf 1983; Molotch 1976) models successfully

1
In this study, I interpret political processes of the City Hall, administrative actions of the City Planning
Department and culture of urban development decision-making as institutional dimensions under the broad
term of urban governance of a place. I interpret urban design as a discipline primarily relating to the aspects
of the built form.
3

explained urban growth and redevelopment issues of their time from an urban political
perspective. Subsequently, several scholars (Lauria 1997; Davies 2002; Irazábal 2009;
Cox 1997; DeLeon n.d.) have found drawbacks in these models and highlighted
limitations in the way they conceptualize formation and behavior of urban regimes.
The major premise of this study is that production of urban form needs to be
understood within a framework of urban governance. Urban design codes developed from
urban design plans are the major determinants of the production of future urban form.
Since urban design plans of cities are embedded in the Master Planning processes
undertaken by their respective City Planning Departments, creation of urban design plans
and codes are invariably impacted by the culture of governance in place.
My first argument is that urban form resulting from urban design plan and
corresponding codes, is greatly shaped by the city‘s governance processes and culture,
and these governance processes are influenced by existing urban regimes and various
local interest groups. This argument is currently missing from recent urban design
theories on production of urban form that focus upon political-economic, socio-cultural,
and environmental dimensions while overlooking the abilities of corporate stakeholders,
political processes, and local governance systems to bargain and intervene into the urban
design visions of communities and designers.
My second argument is that the traditional regime literature, going back to
Stone‘s (1989) book on Atlanta and its recent critiques and interpretations, is potentially
relevant to the understanding of the governance context of an urban design initiative.
However, a new literature on institutional dimensions of collaborative governance and
4

participatory planning may advance this existing understanding of the governance
context. With the emergence of more collaborative forms of governance and introduction
of the larger public‘s participation in governance processes, it may be possible to view
the notion of urban regimes in a new light. The perspective of urban regime theory in
regard to collaboration and participation in governance processes provides the context
against which this study examines the urban design plan and code-making processes.
Theoretical Context
It is well-documented that Omaha has a strong urban regime of local
corporations
2
for more than half a century (McNamara 2004; Larsen and Cottrell 1997).
When the same local corporate regime found the city‘s built form unappealing, it woke
up to realize it needed urban design standards to improve the appearance and design of
the city. It was the beginning of the OBD initiative. In Omaha, the urban design plan and
code-making processes took place in a governance culture dominated by the local
corporate regime. However, the goals of OBD were not limited to fulfilling the self-
interests of its corporate promoters, which contradicts the premise of urban regime
theory. The plan and code-making process in OBD also involved dimensions of civic and
business leadership in public design. It highlighted how aesthetic values play a role
within a larger discourse on political economy of urban design. In essence, theoretically,
this study redefines underlying assumptions of the urban regimes and applies that

2
In this dissertation all the references to an urban regime in Omaha involve local corporations and
companies that are headquartered in Omaha and whose historic presence in the city ranges from fifty to one
hundred and fifty years. In the subsequent chapters another set of corporations will be mentioned which
include national and global corporations such as Walmart, CVS Pharmacy etc. These corporations are not
to be confused with the ones that constitute the local urban regime in Omaha. On the contrary it will
become evident that there is a great degree of divergence about urban form issues between the two sets of
private corporations.
5

understanding to the local governance context for developing interdisciplinary knowledge
on production of urban form.
The theoretical argument of this study is threefold. In the first part, I consider the
concept of urban regimes in terms of cooperation among players, issues of community
power, motivations of regime players, process of regime change, major critiques of
regime theory with respect to pro-growth coalitions, and growth machine theories. In this
part, I also discuss a less-developed area of regime theory—the role of business
leadership and how it influences the civic outcomes within urban regimes. In the second
part, I explore emerging paradigms of citizen participation and collaborative governance
and their theoretical underpinnings in public administration and planning theory
literatures. The third part revolves around aesthetic values of urban design discipline vis-
à-vis interdisciplinary understanding of urban form. I use the notion of urban
governance—consisting of augmented understanding of urban regimes, notions of cross-
sector collaboration and citizen participation—for developing a new understanding of
production of urban form and, thus, inform the field of urban design.
Urban Regimes
Regime theory aims to understand cooperative relationships between public and
private sectors, as they exist by a way of creating governing partnerships or coalitions
(Stone 1989, 1993; DeLeon 1992; Orr and Stoker 1994; DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993;
Elkin 1987). According to Stone (1989), ―[A regime is] the informal arrangements by
which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make
and carry out governing decisions‖ (6).
6

Here, private interests include business interests and nonprofit interests, but for
Stone, business interests are the key, since they not only encourage economic
development in cities, but also control politically important resources. Thus, business
interests are directly or indirectly involved in urban political decisions. Based on the
existing literature on regime theory, four major aspects of urban regimes are identified as
key to the regime theory: cooperation among regime players, community power of
regimes, motivations of regime players, and the transitioning process of different types of
regimes. The interplay of these aspects determines the way urban regimes form and the
way they function and change. The most unnoticed area of urban regimes is the role of
the business leadership in bringing the civic outcomes and philanthropic benefits that
promote societal good, while achieving self-interests to some extent. Also, regime theory
does not clearly explain how regimes form and transform into smaller coalitions. Certain
aspects of Omaha‘s urban regime, and the way OBD evolved from it, may explain these
behavioral, formational, and functional dimensions of urban regimes.
Emerging Paradigms
Around the dawn of the twenty-first century the concept and practice of
collaborative governance became increasingly important in public administration and
urban governance. While collaborations have a tone of long-term and large-scale
associations as opposed to Public Private Partnerships (PPP), they also involve much
larger variations in terms of sectors represented in a collaborative initiative. Several
attempts have been made to analyze cross-sector collaborations, and one of the major
frameworks for analyzing cross-sector collaboration is proposed by Bryson et al. (2006).
7

Unlike regimes, the concept of collaboration assumes equal powers to its participants and
does not show a group of individuals as dominating factors in a collaborative decision-
making process. An empirical evaluation of a collaborative decision-making would
conclude whether OBD performed as a collaborative model within the existing local
corporate regime context of Omaha, or its goals were not realized collaboratively.
Two perspectives exist to look at citizens‘ participation in governance, first, the
democratic perspective in public administration literature and second, the participation in
planning perspective in political science and planning theory. The nature of participation
in an initiative determines citizens‘ ability to affect final policy decisions and actual
outcomes. I argue that introduction of public participation also influences formation,
change, and functioning of the existing urban regimes. In presence of a strong regime,
public participation may only be symbolic; whereas, in presence of a strong participatory
initiative, underlying behavior of regimes may shift and give rise to more civic functions.
The theoretical discourse on citizen participation and collaboration in planning
borrows less from public administration and management perspectives and more from
political science and philosophy, where scholars like Habermas (1996) in his
communicative action theory calls for citizen participation, as a way of public
deliberation over planning decisions.
In the fields of planning and public administration, researchers conceptualize and
operationalize definitions of public participation and collaboration in the decision-making
process fundamentally differently. Neither field considers effects of the existing local
regimes on the nature of participation and cross-sector collaboration and vice-versa. By
8

doing so, it may be possible to see characteristics of governing regimes from a different
perspective.
Production of Urban Form
Having revisited the existing understanding of urban regimes, I consider the
following questions: How does it help understand the context of urban form production
within political economic discourse in urban design? In light of existing urban form
production discourses, how do coalitions, similar to the one in OBD, shape the
production of urban form? Do collaborative and participatory processes lead to more
equitable urban form? If certain players of the coalition exercise more power, then what
role does the urban designer play in shaping the urban form? Above all, how do such
place-based initiatives strengthen the link between urban design and urban governance
and create a stronger position for urban design practice within city planning processes?
To answer these questions, a regime-based, collaborative, and participatory model of the
case study is positioned in a larger context of political economy of urban form.
The political economy of the production of urban form is one of the least-
researched aspects of urban design. Literature on the political economy influencing the
built form can be divided into three categories. The first category suggests design
initiatives have shifted from public to private sector, and this has resulted in private
control of the urban public realm (Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998; Crawford 1995).
The second category of political economic focus revolves around the role of the state and
political players in shaping the urban design processes (Sagalyn 2001; Hartman 2002;
Ethington 1994; Fainsten et al. 1983; Allensworth 1980; Mollenkopf 1983). These
9

scholarly accounts of the urbanization process in American cities highlight physical
evolution of cities, as a result of political influences. In the third category, the focus is on
the dominance of capital over urban design processes. For example, Harvey (1985)
applies Marxian thinking to examine the role of capital on urban development. In a
different perspective, the political economic thought in urban design looks at urban form
from aspects such as market, politics of a place, and social and global influences; it does
not see urban form as a result of specific governing regimes nor does it see it resulting
from collaborations. This study raises issues of governance from within a political
economy perspective. In Cuthbert‘s (2006, 4) classification there are four levels of urban
design knowledge.
1. The theoretical, philosophical and contextual foundation of the discipline and the
meta-programmes that both inform and legitimise practice.
2. The legal, financial and administrative context within which the discipline
operates
3. Technologies of space and form
4. Case studies of urban design practice.
This research falls partly under the second level of administrative context, in
which the discipline of urban design operates.
In summary, two arguments aimed at synthesizing the social sciences-based
understanding of urban form production and the theories of governance emerge. First, a
renewed understanding of urban regimes needs to be developed in urban design plan-
making context in light of emerging paradigms of citizen participation and cross-sector
10

collaboration of urban governance, and, second, development of such a perspective needs
to expand the political economic discourse in urban design by adding governance
dimensions of urban design plan and code-making to the existing interdisciplinary
understanding of the production of urban form. Accordingly, the central research
question can be stated as bellow:
Research Question
How does the governance aspect
3
explain the process of an urban design plan and
its implementation in codes?
Methodology
This research adopts a single case study approach and employs qualitative
methods of data collection and analysis. The case selected is a citywide urban design plan
initiative—Omaha By Design. This case is pertinent to the theoretical premise of the
study, because the method involves the process of creating and incorporating urban
design codes in a city‘s Master Plan. Collaboration and participation in OBD is the
context in which the case of OBD is analyzed; whereas, individual stakeholders, design
components of Omaha‘s urban design plan and zoning codes are the three embedded
units of analysis.
Selection of a single case study approach was based on the distinctive nature of
this case. The research design of the case calls for concentrating upon unexplored areas
of governing regimes and urban design plan-making process in detail. The primary case
is also supported by three secondary cases based on the criteria of collaboration, private

3
The governance aspect in this question refers to the way recent developments in collaborative governance
and public participation impacts the understanding of the local governing regimes.
11

sector participation, and urban design plan process to increase the validity and reliability
of research findings. These secondary case studies were instrumental in informing the
choice of research questions, nature of research design, and methods of analysis. Main
methods for analyzing the primary case included personal interviews, archival research,
and direct observation. The major data sources for this study were the fifty-three primary
interviews of OBD stakeholders, archival records of OBD organization, and the Omaha
World-Herald (OWH) newspaper archives. Data analysis consisted of pattern-matching
and explanation building techniques.
Generalizing from the Case
It is critical to clarify how the findings of OBD case study can be generalized for
other large cities because OBD took place in a midsized US city located away from the
coastal region. Omaha is not only smaller in population, but also has much less
complicated governance and institutional set-up than major metropolitan cities in the US.
Therefore, findings from OBD case may not be directly relevant to metropolitan cities,
but they can be very significant for other midsize US cities, like Kansas City,
Minneapolis, Colorado Springs, Cleveland, Raleigh, and Fort Worth. Other midsize cities
in the Midwest, like Cedar Rapids, have already taken notice of this initiative and have
acknowledged a need for developing design principles for their urban areas as well.
Structure of the Study
This study is divided into fourteen chapters. In Chapter two, which is about the
theoretical background of the dissertation, the focus is on two themes—urban governance
and urban design—and the aim is to establish a link between the two. Keeping urban
12

form as the main focus, urban governance is narrowed down to the works of scholars,
who analyze urban form, and development and redevelopment processes with a
governance and political economy lens. Urban regime is identified as the most relevant
model to be revisited in light of participation and collaboration components of OBD.
Whether Omaha‘s community culture follows traditional urban regime model as
conceived by Stone (1989) and Elkin (1987) or not is based on the review of secondary
literature about Omaha. The theoretical premise leads to three arguments. First,
motivational, behavioral, and formational aspects of urban regimes are questioned, and,
second, the notion of urban regime needs to be augmented, based on recent onset of
collaborative governance and citizen-participation theories. The emerging understanding
of regimes, collaboration, and participation becomes the governance context, in which the
process of creating urban design plan and codes needs be understood. Third,
interdisciplinary understanding of urban design plan and code-making process needs to
be developed within the political economic discourse in urban design.
Chapter 3 is a premise for developing detailed research framework for the primary
case, where the three types of secondary cases are analyzed. Review of the secondary
cases gives insight on factors, such as what triggers collaboration and cooperative
mechanisms, what motivates collaborating partners, and the roles played by business
leaders, as well as the long-term goals and immediate objectives of such collaborations.
The three types of secondary cases include: first, collaboration for city-level initiatives in
economic and urban development; second, partnership formed specifically for the built
environment reforms; and third, a citywide urban design plan. The citywide plan was not
13

a collaborative effort conceptually, but the plan is reviewed as a model to understand a
city-level urban design plan process.
Chapter 4 discusses the qualitative methodology adopted for this study. Selection
of a single-case study and reasons for its usefulness, limitations, and attempts to
overcome those limitations are elaborated. Furthermore, major criteria of analysis, how
they are incorporated in a personal interview questionnaire, and the document-review
process are explained in the chapter. This is followed by information about the data
sources and analysis techniques.
In Chapter 5, a brief perspective on the evolution of Omaha is presented to
understand how its historic developments have contributed to its present status,
specifically as they relate to two major aspects of this study, which explains the current
governance, as it evolved from a chain of historic political events, and the current
physical footprint of the city as it was invariably linked to the political, economic, and
social developmental history of Omaha. Through this overview of Omaha‘s history, an
attempt is made to find a link between the existing business regime and its intervention in
the way the physical form of the city has evolved over time.
Chapter 6 introduces the case study with an overall timeline and goes on to
analyze how the idea for OBD emerged, as two different factions came together to
address a common problem. The idea of OBD came about, as the city leaders from the
local corporate sector searched for ways to improve the image of their city and that gave
rise to an initiative called ―Lively Omaha.‖ Lively Omaha adopted the framework of
―place games‖ derived from Project for Public Places, and at that time the promoters of
14

Lively Omaha realized they needed a citywide regulatory framework to achieve better
urban form and an improved civic image. The first step in doing so was to create an urban
design plan for the city and then implement the plan in form of urban design codes.
Eventually, Lively Omaha was transformed into the OBD collaboration, as various city
departments and other stakeholders agreed to collaborate for an urban design plan and
codes for the city.
The OBD collaboration did not arrive without difficulties, as the real estate sector
saw the plan‘s proposal as a cost-increasing element for their businesses, and the city
governance perceived the situation as a threat from the local corporate sector to take over
the tasks carried out by the public sector. Chapter 7 deals with the complexities of
creating a collaborative framework of OBD. The roles and responsibilities of each partner
after the decision to collaborate had been reached are also highlighted in the chapter.
In Chapter 8, design aspects of the urban design plan of OBD are discussed and
illustrated. The design concept of the OBD plan was based on three major institutional
constituencies—the environmentalists, the civic leaders and the Chamber of Commerce
personnel, and the neighborhoods—that were reflected in the green, civic, and
neighborhood categories of the plan. All design proposals of OBD were grouped in these
categories. One of the prominent aspects of communicating the design proposals to all the
stakeholders and the community were the ―before‖ and ―after‖ graphics. Drastic visual
contrast achieved through many of the after images resulted in lasting impressions in the
minds of Omaha residents and brought in frantic reactions from the property owners in
15

those areas. The chapter summarizes the critical aspects of the design elements in OBD
plan.
Chapter 9 specifically highlights citizen participation element in the process of
OBD plan. The chapter presents an analysis of citizen participation in terms of the
effectiveness of participation, characteristics of the participants, major approaches to
engage the public, and the role of popular media in circulating the OBD information to
the people. In summary, the focus is upon the role of citizen participation in the urban
design plan processes.
Implementation aspects of OBD plan, after it was adopted by the City Council as
Urban Design Element of Omaha‘s Master Plan, are analyzed in Chapter 10. During
implementation phase of OBD, the collaboration and regime issues come face-to-face
with the urban design proposals. This chapter analyzes the unfolding of the powers of the
stakeholders to leverage varied pressures and how they compromise the original intents
of the plan, which result in a negotiated set of codes. The resulting codes not only reflect
a weakened disposition, but also characterize a collaborative outcome in an urban design
process. This stage is the most significant point in the case study, because, at this stage,
multiple stakeholders actually begin influencing the proposed OBD codes.
Chapters 11, 12 and 13 demonstrate small case studies within the larger case
study of OBD. In Chapter 11, the case of a Walmart store on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets is
discussed. The proposed Walmart debate took place in the middle of the implementation
phase of OBD, which led the organization to play a key role in demanding that Walmart
follow the recommendations of the plan, even if the plan was not legally binding at that
16

time. A detailed account of Walmart‘s overall built form practice and its reflection in the
proposed design negotiations of Walmart is followed by the recognition of key criteria
driving the retail urban form in Omaha and elsewhere. A battle for better aesthetics
between local forces—political, community, and OBD—and global retail giant Walmart
characterizes three aspects: first, the limitations of local governing regime to explain
urban form implications of global forces; second, the ability of the local interest groups to
affect the global giant‘s design policies; and third, importance of aesthetics over
economic values in urban design.
Chapter 11 focuses on one of the key stakeholders of OBD process, the billboard
industry, which not only secretly opposed OBD, but also managed to get a better bargain
from the city by collaborating in the OBD process. The national billboard companies and
their tie-up with the state and the city‘s political wing form a strong interest group against
the local regime. In this chapter, the history of billboard companies in Omaha, along with
the history of a series of bargains and deals they negotiated with the city that aided the
leaders of this industry to become negotiation-savvy are elaborated. The expertise of
these stakeholders in mitigating the institutional complexities and overcoming the
toughest possible constraints render them the most successful opponents in the OBD
process. The resistance of the billboard companies for the OBD codes demonstrated this
interest group‘s ability of questioning the local corporate regime and preventing the
dominant regime from realizing its goals in the context of urban form controls. It showed
how the original vision of an urban design plan was negotiated in the final codes by the
local interest groups.
17

The third small case study in Chapter 13 is of the proposed CVS Pharmacy
building on the edge of one of the most historic residential districts in Omaha. The CVS
project came after the OBD codes were implemented for three years, and the battle over
retail aesthetics discussed in Chapter 11 is visited again. The CVS project in Dundee was
the first controversial retail development, after the codes were put in place, because,
despite following all the requirements of the new codes, the local community did not
accept the urban form of the proposed project, and the City Council also voted against the
proposal. Nevertheless, the larger political will was in favor of the economic gains from
the project, which led to second vote on the project, and that step eventually allowed the
building to be erected.
The CVS Pharmacy case revalidates four variables determining the aesthetics of a
retail store as discussed in the previous case of Walmart—economic value of a location
for the retailer, strategic importance of the location with regards to capturing the
consumer base in regional context, design awareness of the community, and the political
context. For the first time after the new urban design codes came into effect, unusual
local opposition to the urban form and aesthetics of CVS points at two major aspects;
one, new codes were not successful in achieving their true intent nor helping the
neighborhoods achieve their vision; and two, contrary to the corporate regime‘s
anticipation, the OBD process was successful in generating awareness about urban design
issues, because of its community visioning process. The community visioning process,
however, did not transform into corresponding urban form controls in the city.
18

Chapter 14 is the concluding chapter, which identifies major governance aspects
that alter the original urban design vision, as it is implemented in the city‘s urban design
codes. It explains how the study adds to the political economic discourse in urban design
and the OBD codes relate with the Form-Based Codes (FBC). A list of successes and
failures of the process is summarized to determine if OBD was a successful initiative as a
result. The chapter includes a discussion on the emerging nature of urban regime in the
OBD process and effectiveness of citizen participation and cross-sector collaboration.
Finally, it explores the arenas for further research to advance the direction of this study.
Key Findings
Findings from this dissertation contribute to several theoretical discourses—
primarily to urban design plan and control processes in urban design and secondarily to
the understanding of urban regimes, cross-sector collaborations, and citizen participation.
The findings highlight three areas: first, an interdisciplinary understanding of political
economy of urban regimes and urban form controls emerge, where interactions among
―internal‖ and ―external‖ forces mitigate the nature of the urban design control outcomes.
Second, the limitations of urban regime theory capture the dynamics of scale and
institutional complexity. The dominant regimes are rendered less powerful in light of
participatory and collaborative approaches that empower the local interest groups. Third,
urban design codes become a negotiated product, which is determined by neither the
ideals of FBCs nor the community visioning process. The following paragraphs expand
upon these findings.

19

Governance Aspects Affecting Urban Design Plan Process
This study adds to the political economy of urban design controls by highlighting
the need to understand the internal—vision, design and contents of the plan and codes—
and external challenges—local, national and global institutional processes—in the
contexts of OBD plan and code-making. It emerges that the findings from the OBD case
also relate with the ongoing scholarship on FBCs. Elaborations over these areas are
summarized below.
1. It is evident from the OBD process that internal dimensions alter the vision and
impact the implementation process of an urban design plan, which involve
actions of various stakeholders, as they fight for protecting individual stakes.
Problem areas in the urban design vision include: big ideas to change the social
context; a lack of community‘s real involvement; grouping together and
adopting a number of urban design solutions belonging to diverse institutional
contexts; an absence of transit and economic models; and extra emphasis on
visual dimensions of the plan. Additionally, the problem areas in implementing
urban design plans involve the consultants‘ approach to convey a limited
knowledge about the complexities of implementing urban design vision, their
focus on short-term actions, and a lack of stress on relating each code detail
with the overall vision of the plan.
The external dimensions of the institutional context, in which an urban
design plan is conceived and implemented, are equally responsible in
transforming the nature of the final urban design codes. These dimensions
20

involve a tension among global, national, and local forces, that are linked to the
intents and actions of all the stakeholders, trends of global retail urban forms,
demands of local communities for context-specific urban forms, an absence of
varied retail prototypes, and the tendency of the collaboration for urban design
plan to take the path of least obstacles, while dealing with unfamiliarity of
cooperation among a different stakeholders. In essence, formulation of urban
design vision and urban design plan do not result in corresponding codes, as
their adoption is invariably linked to the governance context.
2. OBD codes are similar to FBCs, but do not have the rigor and specificity of
other FBCs, such as Smart Codes. This lack of thoroughness eliminates a
―wiggle room‖ that is ―open for interpretation‖ the future planners and
developers, thereby compromising the original vision and intents of the plan.
Overall, this study contributes to the political economy of production of urban
form by understanding governance dimension that mitigates the processes of urban
design plan and code-making.
Revisiting Urban Regimes
Even though OBD originated in an urban regime largely dominated by business
leaders in Omaha, its collaborative and public participation elements do not support all
the assumptions underlying the production and functioning of urban regimes in the city.
OBD was initiated by the dominant local corporate regime to create an urban design plan
and corresponding codes for the city. This coalition brought together actors, which were
not necessarily a part of the dominant urban regime in the city.
21

Based on findings from this research, OBD initiative is identified as an attempt of
the local corporate regime to protect and increase the values of the existing assets in the
city. In their collaborative and participatory process of an urban design plan, two major
parallel small-scale coalitions emerged that included the development community and the
billboard companies, who opposed the dominant regime in the arena of urban design
controls. This outcome suggests more than one regime exists in the form of local interest
groups, depending upon the nature of the sector, i.e., urban development, urban planning
and urban design. These sectors can have different local interest groups, and even though
many of the players are common in these coalitions, all of them may not have pro-growth
intents. Since the participating individuals differ, and their self interests vary widely
within an urban agenda, underlying assumptions for the dominant regime in a city are not
consistent for urban form processes, as implied in the urban regime literature.
Urban regime theory does not capture the complexities involved in multiplicity of
local, national, and global interests as well as the challenges determining the nature urban
design control and resulting urban form. Some of the political economic theorists
(Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock 1997; Savitch and Kantor 2002) capture these dynamics,
but their findings are not in the area of urban design plan and code-making processes.
The OBD case highlights the need to understand regimes as a more dynamic
phenomenon that influences the nature of urban design codes and policies.
The OBD initiative was collaborative and involved preliminary level of public
participation in its process. However, these two aspects brought forth unintended and
unforeseen outcomes for the dominant regime, which had encouraged OBD initially.
22

These unexpected outcomes were empowerment of the neighborhoods, and significance
of private sector groups who were opposed to many proposals of OBD.
The study finds that the larger forces like state, federal or global ties of the local
stakeholders exercise greater power on urban design code decisions, than urban regimes,
even though the built form decisions are local. In line with Sites' (2003) observation that
the global and state dimensions are equally important in redevelopment of New York, the
case of Omaha‘s urban design plan and code-making process displays a similar role
played by such external influences.
Within local influences, the dominant regime and its members did not determine
the final outcome for urban design codes. On the contrary, it was the group of local
developers, land-use attorneys, and billboard companies—who were linked to their
national counterparts—that steered the details of the codes to suit their comfort levels.
They also ensured that the cost of construction, anticipated profit, and project duration
remained nearly constant, after new codes were created. The reason this group of players
were more dominant than the local corporate regime was due to their professional
expertise and extensive understanding of rules, regulations, design, and approval aspects
of built form in the city planning processes. Their knowledge and expertise of built form
aspects and of legal meandering render them powerful in winning large-scale urban
design and planning battles, such as OBD. A newer understanding of power emerges, as
these issue and sector-specific players exercise more power, than the traditionally
understood distribution of power within a regime.

23

Public Participation and Urban Form
The nature of public participation was limited to public-hearing model in planning
practice. As a result, the community visioning process did not actually take into account
true vision of the community. Nevertheless, the community‘s participation in the process
provided an awareness of urban design issues, and some of the initial design continued to
produce changes, even if they were initially rejected by the community. A significant
outcome of the designer‘s vision to have a larger public‘s participation was that the
population of the city became versed with the language of urban design, and the people
began to raise their voices in the battles over aesthetics of urban form. The citizens of
Omaha came to realize their ability to affect urban form to create an alternate built
environment in their neighborhoods. This outcome was evident from the public
contentions over Wal-Mart and CVS Pharmacy.
Collaboration for Urban Form
The collaboration in the OBD process reveals a level of discomfort for the
business leaders in the partnership. Business leaders are comfortable with partnering and
investing in projects that follow a three-tier model—investment, creation of the product,
and releasing the project to run independently. This model works well in public-private
partnerships for sports arenas, stadiums, concert halls, river-front developments, and
other similar projects tied to specific sites, which have stipulated time periods for their
completion and follow predetermined budgets. None of these criteria fits well with
citywide urban design plan, because plan creation does not guarantee its implementation,
and, therefore, the plan does not guarantee a physical expression of what the designer had
24

originally envisaged. Its success is contingent upon innumerable and unforeseen sets of
factors that unfold in the future.
The type of collaboration OBD adopted differs significantly from Business
Improvement Districts and Special Improvement Districts, because OBD sought neither
the statutory powers nor the rights to be exercised over land to control future urban form.
It only managed and coordinated the plan-making and code-making process for a specific
period of time.

25

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In theory, this study informs the field of urban design with emerging urban
governance paradigms, and, in the process, it redevelops the late twentieth century urban
political construct of urban regimes in light of collaborative and participatory governance
phenomena. A midwestern US city, like Omaha, with a strong presence of local corporate
regime, lends itself to such revisiting of regime theory. The existing regime of local
business elites and the city governance collaborated for an urban design agenda in this
case study. The evolution of collaborative and participatory methods for an urban design
initiative in a regime-dominated governance context leads to examining several aspects.
These aspects are stakeholders‘ actions, business leadership, political and institutional
complexities, the role of aesthetic values, and political economy of urban design plans.
Above all, the theoretical premise of this study calls for developing political economic
understanding of production of urban form controls, while redefining underlying
assumptions of behavior of urban regimes.
This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part, the concept of urban
regimes is explored from several perspectives: cooperation among regime players; issues
of community power; motivations of regime players; regime change; its major critiques;
and its position with respect to pro-growth coalitions and growth machine theories. The
first section concludes with defining the role of civic leadership within governing
regimes. The second section focuses on emerging paradigms of citizen participation and
collaborative governance and how their conceptions vary in the public administration and
planning theory literatures. In the third section, trends of humanities and social science-
26

based approaches to understand urban form production vis-à-vis the importance of
aesthetic values in urban design are discussed. The absence of governance dimension in
the theoretical discourse over production of urban form in political economy of urban
design is highlighted, and the governance dimension of this research is positioned to be
examined through empirical case of urban design plan and implementation process. The
fourth and last section summarizes the theoretical premise of this dissertation.
Urban Regimes
Regime theory explains the cooperative mechanisms between public and private
sectors, as they create governing partnerships or coalitions (Stone 1989, 1993; DeLeon
1992; Orr and Stoker 1994; DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993; Elkin 1987). Stone (1989)
defines a regime as, ―the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private
interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions‖
(6).
In his definition, by private interests, Stone (1989) implies business interests, nonprofit
organizations or foundations, labor-union officials, party functionaries, church leaders,
and similar entities. Within a set of private interests, he pays specific attention to the
business interests, because they play a key role in encouraging economic development
within communities. Moreover, businesses control resources politically important, and,
thus, they are always a part of urban political arena either directly or indirectly. Through
his analysis of regimes, Stone (1989) explores political economy of business interests
from cooperation perspective and divides the definition of regimes into three parts: one, a
―capacity‖ to carry out specific actions or governing decisions, two; a ―group of actors,‖
27

who have capacity to govern and form governing coalitions to do so; and three, an
underlying ―relationship‖ among all the actors to function together. Since no rules are
formally laid down by the city government on how these relationships should function,
cooperation and coordination happen informally in governing regimes. However, as
informal as they may be, business leaders are able to carry on a regime for decades, based
on informal rules they devise, adopt, and follow.
In Stone‘s explanation, business leaders play one of the most important roles in
creation, function, and maintenance of regimes. Their active involvement in local politics
and stronghold on the civic arena help them reinforce the existing local regime. By a
virtue of their economic value, businesses have an active role in the local politics. They
participate in the politics in various collective or independent ways. Businesses either get
together collectively via formal or informal mechanisms to propagate their agendas or act
individually through direct involvement as developers or single businesses that contribute
to political campaigns. Business leaders‘ investments in the civic organizations help them
gain private influence over the civic and community initiatives. Through these processes,
business leaders invest in creating and strengthening the local regime.
To maintain regimes, business elites also have the ability to control the nature and
the extent of privileges offered. They use ―selective incentives‖ and opportunities to
discipline others, depending on whether they ―go along‖ or not. The strength of business
sector lies in its ability to promote its ―class unity‖ and use ―reciprocity‖ in form of
―selective‖ economic ―incentives‖ to gain cooperation from its allies and in getting tasks
done with a backing of strong network of civic cooperation. According to Stone (1989),
28

one of the most negative outcomes of disciplining with ―selective incentives‖ is it reduces
a need to identify with the community at large and acts on the community‘s behalf, thus,
reducing social learning in the process. To Stone (1989), the political challenge that
remained in the Atlanta case was how to channel and configure a reformist or progressive
regime that will allow the civic cooperation and social learning to take place. In a way,
how to make it more inclusive, than what its existing form was. In the subsequent
sections of this chapter, an argument is made that citizen participation and collaborative
governance models help achieve the civic cooperation and social learning to occur, but
they do not necessarily do so from the perspective of making regimes more progressive.
For a progressive regime to happen, Stone (1989) makes a suggestion to let
effective cooperation and association from community levels take place. To him,
associational life among business elites and community exists, but is so heavily
dependent upon business sponsorship, which does not allow nonprofit and other groups
to function together, in such a way, where they could raise community concerns
meaningfully. He also calls for federal policy changes in urban redevelopment programs
to mandate an association of nonprofit and private corporations for community
development. Thus, he is hopeful for alteration in self-interest behavior of a regime, but,
in his view, solutions for channeling regimes towards community betterment can only be
found through external stimulus, rather than community motivation or internal dynamics
within a regime. This study will question that premise and hint at the possibility, that
regimes may be capable of community betterment behavior without requiring external
stimulus.
29

The subsequent scholars of urban regimes show an effort to break down the level
of abstraction postulated in the original regime theory. In one such effort, Stoker and
Mossberger (1994) classify regimes in terms of organic, instrumental, and symbolic
regimes, based on criteria like overall goals of the regime, motivating factors of its
participants, the path followed for developing common purpose among them, the nature
of associations and similarity of interests in a regime, and the links between regimes and
external political economic environment. According to them, organic regimes can be
further divided into caretaker, exclusive, and traditional regimes, and symbolic regimes
can be divided into progressive and urban revitalization regimes. Within these two
categories, organic regimes display a social fabric that is tightly woven, while
instrumental regimes relate to property related coalitions, and symbolic regimes occur as
a response to economic changes. The symbolic regimes are more interested in forming
local support for symbolic or image-building ventures and, thereby, attracting
government funding. Such classifications have helped reflect upon multidimensionality
of regimes and reduce ambiguities in its original model.
Cooperation in Regime Players
Returning to the original concept of regimes for the cooperation aspect, Stone
(1989, 1993) explains regimes from two perspectives; one, players who make the
governing coalitions; and two, how these coalitions achieve cooperation. Unequal
distribution of resources affects the way regimes are formed and maintained. Stone‘s
account of Atlanta‘s regime shows the aim of its governance coalitions, including varied
development and policy agendas that favored the interests of its business elite.
30

Stone argues business cooperation in the political decision-making is neither given, nor
does it occur, solely because it is beneficial. According to him, cooperation comes at a
cost, sometimes visible or invisible. The invisible costs include commitment in a set of
relationships that limit the independence of actions and special efforts required to form
community-wide connections. Since the power is diffused, cooperation cannot be induced
by a single person, but it is achieved through varying degrees of ―reciprocity‖, which
becomes a recurring interaction amongst a set of actors of regimes. Stone believes multi-
faceted forms of ―reciprocity‖ are the prime motivators for the cooperation. Devising a
new set of relationships, each time a new initiative is proposed, involves enormous
transaction costs (Williamson 1985), but an established form of cooperation avoids such
costs and serves as an incentive to further strengthen the ―reciprocity‖ and ―loyalty‖.
Cooperation requires effort in creating, and, once established it needs similar
efforts to sustain. Stone (1989) explains this process of sustaining cooperation in detail
through his empirical study on Atlanta. According to him, a complex set of conditions
surround the notion of ―reciprocity‖ in the case of Atlanta. Businesses have slack
resources, which give them an advantage to encourage civic cooperation, solve their own
collection action problems, and create a network of mutual cooperation across
institutional boundaries. This quality of businesses attracts public officials and other
groups looking for results. Overall, business elite use their resources to influence policies
and maintain a privileged position in the community. By being useful to others, they are
able to draw different individuals and groups into a ―reciprocity‖ network, accrue more
31

resources, and, thereby, gain ―preemptive power‖ (Stone 1988), which in turn enables
them to protect their advantaged position.
Community Power of Regimes
Issues of community power are central to urban regime theory, and they help shift
the traditional pluralist and elitist debates of ―who governs‖ and ―who controls‖ (Young
1975) in urban politics towards addressing power issues of which entity has the capacity
to act. ―Governance occurs, not as an act of will or domination, but as a coordination of
efforts by those who have complementary aims. Community power accrues to those with
a capacity to act in what is otherwise diffuse system of authority‖ (Stone 1989, 230).
For Stone, power is not socially controlled, but socially produced. Individuals and
groups with essential resources, that partner with governments, hold systematic power
and form regimes. As a result of merging their resources, their goals, and skill-sets, these
individuals and groups acquire a capacity to act in long-term associations termed
―regimes‖. The political power sought by these regimes is termed as ―power to‖, which is
the capacity to act, and it differs from ―power over‖, which is about social control (Stone
1989). Subsequent scholars further characterize the nature of power in Stone‘s concept of
regimes. According to Molotch (1999), Stone‘s regime theory is concerned with
institutional form of power, instead of identifying who are the individual power-holders
and how they utilize that power.
For Stoker (1995), the regime theory‘s concept of power is based on the notion
that urban political power is fragmented in many forms, and, as a result, four major types
of powers exist. They are: one, ―systemic power‖, which is possessed by certain groups
32

and individuals seen as part of regimes; two, ―command or social control power‖ that
involves mobilization of resources, like information, finance, reputation, and knowledge
to control over interests of others; three, ―coalition power‖, which shows the ability to
bargain on the basis of its autonomous strength; and the fourth, ―preemptive power‖ or
the power of social production that is at the heart of regime theory.
Fragmentation of power exists in regimes, because of division of labor between
businesses and governments (Elkin 1987), where governments have the authority and
legitimacy and businesses have the capital essential for generating jobs and revenues. A
subsequent understanding of multiple layers of community power suggests an idea of
―advantage‖ (Dowding et al. 1995). According to that study, the groups may get
―advantages‖ they want without trying, because of actions of others. Thus, the concept of
systemic power that questions who benefits becomes narrow in its scope in later analyses
of regime (Stoker 1998).
Little discussion over power is held by players outside dominant regimes in
Stone‘s regime theory. Stone (1989) suggests other people ―go along‖ with regimes to
realize their aims, because if they do not ―go along‖, regime behavior will not let them
accomplish their goals. So these people modify their aims, instead of restructuring the
regimes, which could require enormous effort and ability to garner higher community
power than existing regimes. As in Stone‘s perception, other people outside of regimes
modify their goals in sync with regimes; there is no question of more than one regime or
another coalition to coexist, when the existing power of regimes gets divided. This stance
will be analyzed further through the case study.
33

Motivations of Regime Players
Clearly, in the original conception of regimes, the reasons behind formation and
growth of urban regimes involve self-interests of the stakeholders or members of a
regime. Stone (2006; 1993, 1989) discards the possibility of altruistic or social welfare
behavior from a regime by suggesting, even if some regime players have altruistic
motives, they do not foresee fulfillment of their goals in the near future and, therefore,
grab whatever they see possible in the immediate future. He perceives surrendering of
altruistic and community serving aims, in lieu of chances readily available, result-
oriented, and inevitably beneficial to the individuals first, then the community later, if at
all. The concept of regimes excludes a possibility of philanthropic actions from business
elites beyond their self-interest gains and rejects the prospect of business elites serving as
the civic leaders, who may act with a primary goal of betterment of the community. This
assumption is questioned by the subsequent scholars in the area of business and civic
leadership.
The Civil Role of Business Leadership
Contrary to a series of theoretical and empirical research postulating self-interest
behavior of business elites in urban policy making processes, their civic leadership role
remains ill explored in urban political theory. As a result, distinction between public good
served versus special self-interests served by various forms of public and private
coalitions remains unclear. There is already a recognition that regime scholars do not take
into consideration the more heterogeneous nature of business sector partnering activities
in the civic arena, as Austin and McCaffrey (2001) state:
34

The regime research literature may sometimes give the impression that
governance coalitions between the private and public sectors revolve around one
agenda, one policy, one collaboration style, and that this alleged uniformity can
be captured by the use of all-purpose labels like pro-growth or progressive (46).
Austin and McCaffrey (2001) call for a further categorization of regimes that
takes into account community needs addressed by business elites, while achieving their
own goals. They agree to the need for developing typologies and vocabularies, like
regimes and growth coalitions, for understanding urban politics of such alliances, but at
the same time, they demand a clear distinction between more just and efficient
governance models based on their ability of creating and enhancing social value (Zukin
1991; Pierre 1999).
Scholars like Austin (2000) distinguish business elites and their participation
based on their ability to produce civic benefits through governing coalitions, as he argues,
There is a new social contract emerging between business and the rest of society
and it is rooted in collaboration for the common good, which also produces
specific benefits for the collaborators. There are new realities and expectations
fueling this new set of relationships. These dynamics raise basic questions for
BLC (Business Leadership Coalition) about who should participate in the process
and how (50).
This type of distinction can help show the role of particular ―constellations‖ of
regime formation and their influence on generation of social benefits through governing
regimes in urban governance processes (Pierre 1999).
A hint of more inclusive categorization of regimes based on variety of governing
structures and a set of policy agendas can be seen in the works of DiGaetano (1997;
1989), DiGaetano & Klemanski (1993) and DiGaetano & Lawless (1999). Their
categorization shows inherent multidimensionality of public private partnerships in urban
35

politics and recognizes, ―business elites might participate in mixed governance coalitions
with multifaceted agendas, where pro-growth agendas could co-exist with social reform
or growth management policies‖ (Austin and McCaffrey 2001, 47).
In recognition of the role of business elites as civic leaders, Molotch (1988)
accepts that some social classes, such as business elites, are likely to be more ―public
regarding‖ than others, and the challenge is to have those people be in charge of policy
agendas and decision-making. If that challenge cannot be overcome, then ―a shortage of
persons with this civic duty altruism, their passivity, or a leadership structure that inhibits
their cohesion, leads to frustration of their efforts on behalf of city betterment‖ (Molotch
1988, 31).
He hints at the civic potential of power concentrated in a few economic hands and
such groups have the ability to pursue public goals more cohesively, due to a lack of
opposition to their decisions. Molotch (1988) also criticizes the absence of dialogue on
urban leadership aspects specifically how the conflicts within elites impact nature of
growth, and this is precisely what is missing from the original, as well as subsequent
literature on urban regimes. According to him, achievement of social goals and how
personal, group, or class interests of leaders make a difference in the achieving them
needs to be analyzed. Since business elites differ in their ability and effectiveness to
perform as the civic leaders, it is even more critical to take into account their internal
dynamics, namely their system of ―intra-elite communication‖ and ―past historic
conditions.‖ A sustained history of economic well-being in a city is indicative of a well-
36

placed network of communication and connections among business elites, political, and
administrative players (Molotch 1988).
Thus, individual capacities, organizational structures, and inter-organizational
communication among business elites become important in determining the civic
leadership roles and their ability to achieve the civic objectives within governing regimes.
It is imperative not to dismiss the ability of business elite to act as social leaders nor give
priority to civic gains in the process of achieving their own individual gains as is the case
with current urban regime scholarship.
Change in Regimes
Stone (1989) identifies a single regime in Atlanta from 1946 to 1988 and not a
succession of regimes, because the central membership of its governing coalition was
constant and its primary mode of encouraging cooperation continued to be the same over
time. According to him, within one regime, significant changes occurred in the
configuration of the city hall and influence of specific groups or actors. Nevertheless, the
regime remained essentially a single entity – capable of adapting to the cycle of
continuity and change. Thus, he dismisses the potential of non-members of the regime or
other interest groups to affect governing decisions and exist alongside a dominant regime.
Recent critiques of regime theory (Dowding 2001; Lauria 1997) do not clearly
define the existence of parallel interest groups outside of governing regime nor a
possibility of division of power within an existing regime. Even though Stone (1993)
hinted at the dynamic nature of urban regimes by emphasizing collective action problems
of oppositions, he did not address oppositions leading to the change of behavior of
37

regimes. Moreover, based on Stone‘s initial idea of viewing community power in a
dynamic setting where regimes constantly have to work towards maintaining themselves,
few recent scholars explore the ability of regimes to change or transition from one type of
regime to another.
Orr and Stoker (1994) emphasize regime transition through external, non-local
influences and internal regime dynamics. They categorize regime transition into three
stages. The first stage is about doubting and questioning the existing regime, as well as
expressing these doubts to a larger group of civic and political leaders. In second stage,
differences over scope and purpose of the existing regime and configuration of new
regime emerge. During the last stage, institutionalization of new regime takes place by
developing a new solution-set, respective institutional arrangements, and selective
incentives.
A different approach to understand regime change refers to regimes, as a set of
solutions derived from policy ideas of particular eras (Jones and Bachelor 1993).
Regimes tend to, ―codify solutions and problem definitions into a solution-set that tends
to dominate policy-making for a period of time‖ (Jones and Bachelor 1993, 18). As new
ideas in tune with present times arise in opposition to regime-favored policy solutions,
which are influenced by specific solution-sets, the ability and outreach of regimes also
change. Regimes ―have the capacity to attract new participants to politics, altering the
existing governing arrangements‖ (Jones and Bachelor 1993, p 250).
From the two views on regime transition, it is evident existing regimes change
over time, but more than one regime does not exist. Moreover, a regime does not exist in
38

association with other powerful interest groups that may reduce its ability to influence
policy decisions. So far, regimes are envisaged as a monolithic group and neither in
association with nor parallel to other interest groups. This research will explore that
parallel interest groups may exist, and they may form anti-regimes specific to a sector or
an area of decision-making.
There is evidence of formation of more than one regime and regimes related to
specific issues. DeLeon (n.d.) suggests regimes can form on non-coalitional basis based
on Krasner‘s (1982) definition. He argues, ―[Regimes provide] principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
issue-area‖ (DeLeon n.d., 185). A framework of informal rules of interactions may
remain in place, but configuration of the group may differ with respect to issues being
addressed. It is proposed in this study that emergent anti-regimes are the local interest
groups that coexist with dominant regimes. Episodic emergence of anti-regimes does not
mean an end of existing dominant regime.
If we look at anti-regimes in comparison with the local interest groups, the
coexistence and prevalence of regimes cannot be dismissed. The coexistence of more
than one regime is evident in the San Francisco case, where Deleon (1992) finds
mobilization of anti-regime agendas was capable of leading to a downfall of the
development regime and resulting in a hyperpluralist anti-regime in San Francisco.
However, the soundness of Deleon‘s (1992) theory of emerging anti-regime is
questionable in the wake of other studies that show how San Francisco‘s pro-growth
regime has flourished since then (Domhoff 2005; Beitel 2004). It implies that the
39

dominant regime never really declined, because of the parallel existence of interest-
groups previously identified as anti-regimes by Deleon (1992).
In reviewing regime transformation and transition, recent scholars find regime
change happens, as a result of coming to power of individuals or groups in opposition
with existing regimes. However, these scholars do not explore the scope of dominant
regimes to have reduced power in one field and increased power in another. Certain
policy arenas or sectors could exist, where dominant regime exercises greater power;
whereas, in other policy arenas, it could have reduced power, and other interest groups
may dominate decision-making in these other arenas.
Key Critiques of Regimes
A major critique of the way regimes are originally characterized by Stone
suggests, the focus should not just be on internal dynamics of regimes, because they are
influenced by their external socioeconomic contexts as well (Horan 1991). Moreover, the
process used by early regime theoriests to conceptualize behavior of regimes is not
enough to explain the extent of political actions in urban politics. Because policy changes
not only result from regime behavior, but also from consequence of changes in economic
and political environment constraining regimes (Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock 1997;
Savitch and Kantor 2002). This critique argues regimes are not immune to external
influences, but the method of how they impact policy outcomes, also impacts them within
existing political economic environment.
Addressing the concept of regime as a two-way phenomenon, Kantor, Savitch,
and Haddock (1997) propose an alternate framework of analysis with a clear distinction
40

between agency and structure, where local regimes are conceptualized as bargaining
agents in a variety of liberal democratic political economies. In this concept, regimes are
bargaining agents in constant interplay with local, democratic, economic and
governmental institutions. Each of these forces impacts setting of bargaining rules for the
regimes and determine what their opportunities and limitations are in the process.
Regimes differ in their role of social production, their focus on development agendas, and
their association with governing institutions.
According to Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock (1997), regimes also differ across
geographic boundaries and depend on external and internal dynamics. However, regimes
have some flexibility to change, depending on how their external context constrains them
and if their internal character of cooperation and policy agenda for collective benefits are
favorable to change. In their framework, they present eight types of emerging regimes,
4

which depend highly upon vigor of the civic participation and democratic institutions.
The possibility of change in a city‘s regime over time is very limited in this schema.
In a comparative framework similar to that of Savitch and Kantor (2002), in the
context of 14 American cities, Kilburn (2004) analyzes variation in regime typology. He
discovers discrepancy among factors, like market conditions and democratic conditions.

4
Kantor, Savitch and Haddock (1997) propose a framework to take into account variations in regime
formation and functioning in eight cities. They first define four different types of constrains dependent
upon interplay between intergovernmental system whether it is integrated or dispersed and market positions
varying from favorably to unfavorable. Favorable market position and integrated intergovernmental system
generates dirigiste context, unfavorable market position with dispersed intergovernmental system generates
dependent private context, favorable market position with dispersed intergovernmental system generates
mercantile context and unfavorably market position with integrated intergovernmental system generates
dependent public context. When particular structural-institutional conditions like market position, popular
control and intergovernmental support interact with particular bargaining context they specify the
formation and behavior of emerging regime. Dirigiste context produces either planner or distributor
regimes, depending public context produces grantsman or clientelist regimes, dependent private context
produces radical or vendor regimes and mercantile context produces commercial or free enterprise regimes.
41

No single factor explains the presence of a progressive regime—a type of regime that is
rendered ideal by the regime theorists. In contradiction to Stone (1993) and Kantor,
Savitch, and Haddock (1997), Kilburn (2004) finds stronger civic participation is not the
key for the presence of a progressive regime.
A community-power based critique presented by Domhoff (2005) suggests
Stone‘s characterization of community power in form of ―power to‖ and ―power over‖ is
not persuasive enough. He argues Mann‘s (1986, 1993) categorization in terms of
―collective‖ and ―distributive‖ powers is more helpful. According to Domhoff (2005),
formation of Stone‘s reformist coalitions is a farfetched concept, because of fixed
preferences of main actors, as envisaged in Molotch‘s (1976) pro-growth coalitions.
Reformist regimes can only happen, when public opposition to the existing regime is very
strong as in the San Francisco case (DeLeon 1992) or in the case of a series of electoral
defeats, as in Santa Cruz (Gendron 2006).
Although regime theory (1989) and pro-growth coalitions (Mollenkopf 1983)
successfully explain actions of local political and economic groups of agents at the city
level, they are criticized for their inability to explain the influence of larger connections
of the agents and institutional setups within which these agents operate (Lauria 1997).
Cox (1997) critiques that regime theory tends to equate the scale of city politics and
political players with that of urban governance. However, according to Lauria (1997),
such a comparison is not the case, because regime analysis also involves State-level
representatives with political players and their influence on local governance. He agrees
regime analysts tend to ignore the non-central city political players.
42

Theoretical discourse on regimes and its critiques leads us to rethink the
assumptions of underlying scale, motivations, behavior, and formation of urban regimes.
The dimension of scale implies that regimes may or may not explain the larger state,
national, and global influences on local governance. The motivational dimension suggests
regime players may think beyond their self-interests. The behavioral dimension means
the power exercised by the members of a regime has shifted to non-regime members, and
the formative dimension suggests parallel interest groups may exist with the dominant
regime.
Before applying the concept of an urban regime to a midsize US city like Omaha,
it is important to clarify appropriateness of such a possibility. Starting from Stone‘s
(1989) study of Atlanta and Orr and Stoker‘s (1994) study of Detroit, the concept of
regimes has mostly been understood through the examples of large cities. It begs a
question that to the extent, where one can rethink the model of regime theory in a midsize
US city like Omaha. To support such application, several scholarly works have used the
regime concept in cities like Columbus, OH (Cox 1997);Santa Ana, CA (Judd 2006); and
Santa Clara, CA (Gendron 2006). Thus, application of regime theory model is not
limited to large-size cities or metro cities exclusively. Additionally, different authors use
diverse terms to identify governing coalitions in various contexts. Therefore, it is
necessary to understand differences among these if any do exist. The following section
clarifies these specific characteristics.

43

Regimes, Pro-growth Coalitions and Growth Machines
Urban regimes (Stone 1989; Elkin 1987; DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993; Orr and
Stoker 1994), pro-growth coalitions (Hartman 1984; Fainsten et al. 1983; Mollenkopf
1983), and growth machines (Jonas and Wilson 1999; Molotch 1976) emphasize similar
notions of coming together of business elites and political powers to impact policy
decisions that favor individual or group interests. Still, these three concepts differ in their
conceptual orientation, attitude towards viewing partnerships among diversified
stakeholders, and their approaches to the external and the internal contexts.
Stone (1989) uses the term ―coalition‖ to define bringing together of different
civic and institutional capacities for governing and, hence, ―governing coalition‖. He
does not specify if these governing coalitions have dissimilar views at times in the
history, or whether they are synonymous to regimes. In his analysis, ―coalition‖ remains a
term often interchangeable with the notion of regimes. In contrast, authors like
Mollenkopf (1983), Hartman (2002), and Sites (2003), who refer to coalitions among
public and private sectors in the urban redevelopment context, perceive the term
―coalition‖ as a term-specific, agenda-oriented, and city and case related phenomenon.
Mollenkopf (1983) shows a pro-growth coalition of political entrepreneurs,
congressional, presidential, bureaucratic, and other special interest groups governed the
public intervention in the urban redevelopment process of Boston and San Francisco. He
rejects economic determinism as a motive behind urban redevelopment of San Francisco
and suggests pro-growth coalition and political entrepreneurship are the only independent
variables influencing the dependent variable of urban redevelopment. He focuses on
44

structural principles that directed political entrepreneurs to support government
intervention, which were ultimately responsible for the resulting urban development and
for influencing the national and urban politics. He rejects the regime-politics argument
and the presence of power-structure or capitalist-class model acting behind the
development process. Instead, he argues actors did neither act nor form pro-growth
coalition with some kind of class-conscious scheme. They had no control over the overall
outcome, and they were only reacting to the most critical problems. His analysis
highlights a short-term and issue-based nature of coalitions, and that is significantly
different from ongoing, decades-long governing regimes.
According to Hartman (2002), the whole redevelopment process of Yerba Buena
project in San Francisco unfolds as a conspiracy of elite and business interests in
conjunction with the Redevelopment Agency, the City Hall and HUD, who were against
the low-income South of Market residents. Despite the overall conspiracy tone of his
analysis, Hartman denies calling it a conspiracy, rather he calls this coalition as, ―a
confluence of powerful public-and private-sector actors operating in their class and
personal interests‖ (393).
His characterization of the state apparatus suggests it is only to support private
interests, manage negative aspects of the community‘s resistance, and act in their
immediate personal and political interests at the cost of displaced, low-income
communities. Besides an intensive and episodic account of San Francisco‘s business and
political allies trying to develop South of Market redevelopment in their favor, Hartman
45

also acknowledges the role of citizen protests and how they forced the modifications in
the planned redevelopment of Yerba Buena Center.
Hartman‘s characterization of coalition is close to Stone‘s regime concept, but an
important distinction is his coalition was formed clearly to act against a set of citizens.
The concept of regimes neither emphasizes involvement of the general public in its
concept nor highlights formation of regimes to act against a group of affected citizens.
Rather, it is concerned more with the process of governance in relation with interest
group mediation and cooperation to gain the capacity to govern.
The growth machine theory (Molotch 1976) relates more to the concept of urban
regimes for its long-term and sustained formation of coalitions for development. Its
framework to understand cooperation and collaboration of stakeholders in urban politics
differs from that of urban regimes. The intentions of stakeholders, the agenda for
cooperation, and the nature of preferences of stakeholders are more specific in growth
machine theory; whereas, regime theory leads itself to other interpretations in these areas.
According to Molotch (1988, 29), actions of the participants of pro-growth coalitions and
growth machines carry an element of discretion, and they function among a set of
constraints. Their fundamental goal is to maximize their rents and the worth of their
assets by intensifying the land-use. Additionally, growth machines do not characterize the
nature and the extent of local government‘s involvement, even though local governments
are concerned with increasing growth. In the regimes perspective (Stone 1993), city
governments are equally interested in coalitions with feasible goals and matching
resources, which can help achieve them.
46

Similar to regimes, the idea of systematic power exists in the growth machine
theory (Logan and Molotch 1987), but the concept of the latter is directed mainly towards
physical growth aspects of cities and explores property-based coalitions. Logan and
Molotch (1987) find ―rentiers‖— local landowners, developers, media, politicians, utility
companies, and all others, who acquire advantages from growth—are a part of growth
coalition, and they are vital to urban development related policy decisions. They stress on
the power of business community, but they are not looking at power as to who holds it to
govern, but to learn who exercises influence over built environment, land, and place
decisions, and what are the resulting parameters. Another important comparison between
regimes and growth machines is regimes are portrayed as inescapable, where players do
not have a choice to become a part of it. Instead, the position and resources render players
to become a part of regimes. On the contrary, stakeholders in the growth machine theory
have volition to exercise power and affect policy outcomes.
Regime theory‘s lack of clarity in differentiating motivations of participating
players is one of the major divergent factors between regimes and growth machines. As
opposed to regimes, growth machine theory (Logan and Molotch 1987; Jonas and Wilson
1999) proclaims self-gain motivations of business elite and other players involved in
policy decisions rather clearly. For example, ―rentiers‖, a group of property owners who
are looking to make profit from their assets, are united with other place-bound and non-
place-bound allies to pursue economic growth, which will ultimately bring tangible
benefits to the members of a growth coalition. Their direct allies are developers,
financiers, construction companies, and professional practices, and the indirect associates
47

are the local media, utility companies, universities, cultural and civic institutions, sports
clubs, local retailers, etc. This list essentially refers to business elites, who have control
over property and financial resources and exploit them to their advantage. Thus, profit
maximization is the only goal of ―rentiers‖, as they participate in the growth machine, but
regime players can have different goals and may or may not act to produce civic gains.
The above discussion shows how the concept of urban regimes is not analogous
to pro-growth coalitions and urban growth machines. The next section discusses the
emergence of concepts of public participation in governance and collaborative forms of
governance that gained popularity since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Recall
that none of the recent scholars of regimes, pro-growth coalitions or growth machines
have explored their concepts in relation to the presence of collaborative governance and
public participation in urban governance.
Emerging Paradigms: Collaboration in Governance
Near the dawn of the twenty-first century, the concept and practice of
collaborative governance became increasingly important in the public administration and
urban governance fields (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Rethemeyer 2005; Goldsmith and
Eggers 2004; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Mandell 2001). The scholars in these
fields associate collaborations for public service delivery with a variety of terms, like
―hollow state‖ (Milward and Provan 2000; Milward and Provan 1993), ―third-party
government‖ (Salamon 1981), ―government by proxy‖ (Kettl 1988), and ―collaborative
governance‖ (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006). Despite
various terms used for the collaboration among varying sectors, the words are
48

conceptually similar and point to the diminishing boundaries between different sectors, as
well as decreasing power of the government in collaborative processes.
While collaborations have a tone of long-term and large-scale association, as
opposed to public-private partnerships that may or may not be long-term, they involve
much larger variations in terms of sectors represented in the collaborative endeavor. On
the contrary, public-private partnerships may only be between a governing body and a
private company or a business. The cross-sector collaboration, as a process, is defined by
Bryson et al. (2006) as, ―the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and
capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that
could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately‖ (44).
By cross-sector collaboration, they refer to partnerships among government,
business, nonprofits, philanthropies, communities, and populations at large. Effort
required in maintaining a successful collaboration among a varied group of stakeholders
is similar to the idea of maintenance of urban regimes. Cross-sector collaborations are
prone to competitive and institutional pressures that can change its formation and
existence (Oliver 1990). The nature of the external context, whether it is regime-
dominated or is governed by active participation of citizens and other sectors, shapes the
performance of any collaboration (McNamara 2007).
There have been several attempts to analyze cross-sector collaborations. One of
the major frameworks for analyzing cross-sector collaboration is proposed by Bryson et
al. (2006), which includes five major stages:
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1. Initial conditions trigger a possibility for cross sector collaboration like
environmental factors, sector failure, and direct antecedents of collaboration
formation.
2. Process components relate to forging the initial agreement, building leadership
and legitimacy, managing conflicts, and planning issues.
3. Structure and governance go parallel with the process components, and they
include governance of collaboration, configuration of its structure and importance
of the context in which collaboration takes place.
4. Contingencies and constraints affecting process, structure, and governance,
include type of collaboration, power imbalances, and competing institutional
logics issues.
5. Outcomes and accountabilities relate to aspects of public value, different orders of
effects, resilience and reassessment of collaborating partners, as well as an
efficient system to take care of accountability aspects.
A distinctive framework for analysis of collaborations focuses upon evaluating
collaborations in terms of their democratic potential. Leach (2006) have developed seven
normative ideals to evaluate democratic merits of collaboration in a watershed
management initiative. These seven ideals are: ―inclusiveness,‖ ―representativeness,‖
―impartiality,‖ ―transparency,‖ ―deliberativeness,‖ lawfulness,‖ and empowerment.
Collaborations significantly differ from networks. According to Bryson et al. (2006), a
cross-sector collaboration appreciates uniqueness and differences of all sectors involved,
and it defines ongoing processes and leadership broadly, which involves a dynamic
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nature of collaborative development. Unlike regimes, the concept of collaboration
assumes equal powers to its participants and does not show a group of individuals as
dominating partners in a collaborative decision-making process. However, such an ideal
conception of equal powers may not be true empirically. According to McNamara
(2007), few individuals can dominate decision-making of a collaborative in their favor.
Such a behavior of a collaborative model resembles decision-making in
regime-dominated context; thus, making collaborative approach a figurative one.
In summary, empirical evaluation of collaborative decision-making can suggest
three factors, first, whether it characterizes a collaborative model, a regime model, or a
combination of the two; second, if a collaborative approach in regime-dominated context
influences the behavior of regimes or vice-versa; and third, whether the coexistence of a
collaborative approach and urban regime changes the overall outcomes.
Participation in Governance
Public participation, citizen involvement and civic engagement are some
expressions used by scholars to illustrate some form of direct involvement of citizens in
decision-making processes of the government. There are two different approaches to
review citizens‘ participation in governance: one, democratic angle in the public
administration literature; and two, the role of participation in urban planning and urban
political theories.
In the democratic perspective, citizen participation ranges from the acts of voting
and lobbying to active participation in decision-making, as seen in form of town meetings
(Timney 1998). A further categorization of this perspective divides democracies into
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―representative democracy‖ and ―direct democracy,‖ based on involvement of citizens
(Box 2004). The former involves decision-making for the people by the elected officials;
whereas, the latter revolves around decision-making through citizens‘ participation.
―Representative democracy,‖ a process that is adopted in the United States, not only
carries a potential of disempowering its citizens from having a direct voice in the
government‘s decisions (Fox and Miller 1996), but also becomes unrepresentative and
underperforming without direct involvement of its citizens (King, Feltey, and Susel
1998).
A call for direct participation in representative democracy is ever-increasing for
several reasons. The people‘s view of authority has changed over time (Kweit and Kweit
1981), an increase in level of education in the society has demanded greater access to
information and involvement, as well as the fast-paced technological advances have
allowed a higher level of information sharing. Such developments have led to a slow
dismantling of hierarchical forms of government (Moynihan 2003) and a rise in
participatory and collaborative governance.
Advocates of citizen participation demand a ―strong democracy,‖ which is
exemplified by increased citizen participation, instead of a ―representative democracy‖
(Barber 1984). Increased participation would not only be efficient and effective, but also
provide, ―healthier democracies, stronger public sector accountability and a restricted and
strengthened relationship between government and its citizens‖ (Moynihan 2003, 169).
A normative view of citizen participation looks for benefits of the citizens in a
way, where they can accomplish a democratic ideal of affecting the governing processes
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(Morone 1998). Such an idea of fulfilling the democratic ideal through citizen
participation also relates participation in democratic theories with planning theories.
Before expanding upon public participation in planning, the following paragraphs review
few different classifications of public participation in the governance context.
One of the most prominent citizen participation frameworks calls for participatory
democracy at the local levels. Arnstein‘s (1969) ladder of public participation consists of
eight rungs, where lowest rung represents no participation at all and the highest rung
depicts citizens‘ control over decision-making. She answers the question of what is
citizen participation by suggesting that it is a categorized classification of citizen power.
―It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded
from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future‖
(Arnstein 1969, 216) and ―it is the means by which they can induce significant social
reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society‖ (Arnstein
1969, 216). Her classification of participation is as follows:
1. Manipulation: This bottom-most rung signifies non-participation in a form, where
―it signifies the distortion of participation into a public relations vehicle by power-
holders‖ (Arnstein 1969, 218). In this typical way of citizen participation, people
are supposed to participate on advisory committees and boards that exist only on
paper.
2. Therapy: Much like manipulation, this rung lacks honesty and involves arrogance
on the part of its administrators. Instead of focusing on citizens‘ concerns for an
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issue, this approach assumes citizens as a part of the problem that needs to be
treated by interacting with them under the pretense of citizen participation.
3. Informing: Although just a token form of participation this rung is slightly better
than the previous two, because it involves, ―Informing citizens of their rights,
responsibilities, and option‖ (Arnstein 1969, 219) and ―[Such informing] can be
the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation‖ (219).
4. Consultation: This rung is carried out in the form of surveys, neighborhood
meetings, and public hearings to take into consideration citizens‘ views. If it is not
accompanied by other higher forms of participation, it serves no purpose because
citizens‘ views will not be included in decisions or implementation.
5. Placation: is a rung amidst tokenism and influence that involves some degree of
influence over decision-making, but participation in this rung can easily become
meaningless, ―if they are not accountable to a constituency in the community and
if the traditional power elite hold the majority of seats‖ (Arnstein 1969, 220).
6. Partnership: In the partnership rung, ―the power is in fact redistributed through
negotiation between citizens and power-holders‖ (Arnstein 1969, 221). Here
power-holders and citizens join their hands in sharing planning and decision-
making tasks in the form of boards, committees, or other such platforms.
7. Delegated Power: This is the rung, where interactions between power-holders and
citizens lead to outcomes manifesting higher power of citizens. The citizens then
can be assured about accountability from public officials and exercise authority
over a plan, policy, or a program.
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8. Citizen Control: Although very rarely manifested, this ideal level of citizen
participation means,
People are simply demanding that degree of power (or control) which
guarantees that participants or residents can govern a program or an
institution, be in full charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be able
to negotiate the conditions under which ‗outsiders‘ may change them
(Arnstein 1969, 223)
Based on Wang‘s (2001) work, a slightly simplified categorization of public
participation involves two levels, one, ―pseudo participation‖ and two, genuine
participation. Here the former is a mix of ―informing‖ and ―placating‖ in Arnstein‘s
ladder, where citizens are informed about decisions, and their concerns are conciliated;
whereas, the latter involves real participation, in which citizens‘ participation in decision-
making has power over government processes.
A recent framework of analyzing citizen participation involves three fundamental
criteria of evaluation. Fung (2006) evaluates participation from the perspective of
legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of public action. His analytical framework involves:
 Who participates: he classifies five ways of participant selection, which
include self-selected, selectively recruit, randomly selected, lay stakeholders,
and professional stakeholders.
 How they communicate and make decision: he categorizes communication
into six different modes from least to most intensive, in terms of investment,
knowledge and commitment by the participants.
 Connection between their conclusions and final policy outcomes: To what
extent the final policy outcomes involve input of its participants.
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It is apparent from the classifications evaluating public participation in
governance, that the presence of citizen-participation in any initiative guarantees neither a
bottom-up approach nor empowerment of citizens in any way. Rather, the primary aims,
and the manner in which citizen participation is implemented, determine the degree of
success and the citizens‘ ability to affect governance decisions in a participatory
approach. One may wonder about the nature of participation possible in regime-
dominated governance contexts. It is a common assumption that the presence of strong
urban regimes may just allow symbolic forms of participatory expressions. However,
presence of any forms of citizen participation may carry some implications on the nature
of decision-making, and, also, it may carry a potential of impacting the behavior of the
existing urban regimes.
So far this chapter has focused upon participation and collaboration from
governance literature. If collaboration and participation are made parts of the planning
and urban design arena, the nature of governance could also influence the built form
processes. Planning scholars look at citizens‘ participation and cross-sector collaboration
in another manner compared to public administration scholars. The following section
highlights participation and collaboration in planning theory.
Participation and Collaboration in Planning
Theoretical discourse on citizen participation and collaboration in planning
borrows less from public administration and management perspectives and more from a
political science perspective. For example, Habermas (1996) in his communicative action
theory calls for citizen participation as a way of public deliberation over planning
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decisions. The Habermasian public sphere is envisaged to benefit citizens as well as
society for allowing deliberative political processes with an aim of achieving higher
democratic legitimacy (Habermas 1989). Communicative action approach involves many
aspects of communication, knowledge production, and deliberation over planning issues.
Based on this discourse, several planning theorists have developed different lines of
inquiries, including the collaborative planning approach (Healey 1999; Innes and Booher
2003) highlighting consensus building aspects and critical pragmatic approach (1993,
1989; Sager 1994) focusing on rational thinking and questioning processes (Forester
1979). In these lines of inquiries, communicative action primarily deals with ways to
arrive at a collaborative consensus and does not specifically about citizens‘ participation
in planning processes.
Despite their conceptual similarities, scholars of public participation and
collaboration in governance and of communicative action in planning theory have
differing world views. Participatory governance (Fung and Wright 2003; Fung 2006;
Barber 1984; Moynihan 2003) theorists use assumptions about dominance of state, which
are priority over citizens‘ participation as a way to reduce the gap and achieve a
democratic ideal, while communicative planning theorists (1993, 1989, 1979, 1999; Innes
1992, 2004; 1995; Godschalk 1992) look at it as social constructionists, and they believe
in the importance of individual agency and the potential for planning to be a
transformative activity. Communicative planning does not revolve around citizen
participation, as it is exercised in current city planning practice; instead the focus is upon
planners‘ role as an effective communicator in facilitating communicative practices in
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planning. Yet another difference is the aim of each approach. Citizen participation in
governance stresses more on the process aspects of citizen participation; whereas,
communicative action focuses more on the collaborative consensus from planning
processes. Nevertheless, Innes, and Booher (2004) link deliberative democracy and
policy-making based on networks to find a new paradigm of public participation within
the scope of communicative planning (Irazabal 2009).
The major critiques of communicative planning involve its greater focus on
processes of collaborative consensus and a lack of regard towards outcomes (Fainstein
1999). It has also been criticized for its ignorance for inherent power issues (Irazábal
2009). Flyvbjerg (1998) criticizes the lack of deliberation on power in communicative
planning theory which, according to him, overlooks the dark side of planning. As a
critique based on democratic perspective, Huxley and Yiftachel (2000) raise the issue of
fairness in dialogic processes of communicative planning. Empirically based findings
(Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998; Flyvbjerg 1998) from planning practice reveal
that it is difficult to attain consensus formation through rational communicative processes
as envisaged by Habermasian concept of communicative action.
To summarize, the focus of this section has been on participatory and
collaborative approaches in public administration and planning theory. In both the fields
researchers conceptualize and operationalize definitions of public participation and
collaboration in decision-making fundamentally differently. In none of the fields, they
attempt to unfold effects of the existing regimes on nature of participation and cross-
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sector collaboration and vice-versa. By doing so, it may be possible to see consequences
of governing regimes from alternative perspectives.
After elaborating on regimes, collaboration, and participation, the following
section discusses the production of urban form in terms of recent humanities and social
science-based approaches to understand how urban form is produced and how political,
economic, and governance aspects implicates its production. The aim is to highlight the
connection between physical form and the non-physical aspects, namely institutional
processes within a larger political economic discourse over urban form.
Production of Urban Form
When urban design plan and code-making processes take place in a
regime-dominated context, how does it impact the urban form? Does emerging
understanding of production of urban form contribute to the social science-based
discourse on urban form and space? Specifically, does it add to the political economic
argument of production of urban form through collaboration and participation methods of
governing coalitions? Additionally, how do aesthetic values originating from
environmental determinism in urban design play a role in contemporary urban design
practice? These are some of the questions explored in theory in this section.
To situate the governance perspective in an urban design context, it can be argued
that when an aesthetic view of urban form and an abstract humanities and social science-
related approach to understand urban form are placed on two ends of a continuum; the
governance aspect can be located in the center. On this continuum, the aesthetic view is
based on environmental determinism perspective, as aesthetic values help display the
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ability of the practice of urban design to bring in physical transformation. On the other
hand, humanities and social science related approaches to understand urban form do not
give importance to merely the aesthetics of urban form. Rather, they see urban form as a
product of social, cultural, and environmental processes. By introducing the dynamics of
urban regimes, collaboration and participation for achieving aesthetic values, a purely
aesthetic view of urban design is modified. This modified view not only involves
aesthetic dimensions, but also carries conceptual links with social science-based
approaches to define urban form. This view claims that achievement of aesthetic values
depends upon the governance dimension. Thus, the governance of urban form angle
relates to the aesthetic view of urban design on one end of the continuum, as well as
social, political, economic, and cultural theories of urban form and space on the other end
of the continuum.
Figure 2.1 Urban design codes in the context of dominant urban design discourses

Source: Author
The governance perspective advances political economic discourse, which is
among several social science-based perspectives, over urban form-making, and it
questions solely aesthetic approaches. In this research, the governance perspective refers
to a reformed understanding of governing regimes of a place with an expanded
consideration of collaborative and participatory aspects. In the following paragraphs, an
Aesthetic /
Environmental
Determinism
Social science
related
approaches to
urban form
Urban design plan &
code-making
Governance of urban
form
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aesthetic argument in urban design and more recent social-science based, non-aesthetic
approaches are elaborated. They are followed by the details of governance dimension in
relation to the political economic perspective in urban design.
Aesthetics of Urban Form
During the 1950s and 1960s, urban design theory had been influenced by
environmental determinism. Environmental determinists believed specific built
environment can shape specific ways of living (Fava 1956). However, this tradition had
been challenged by several scholars soon after (Gans 1967; Dobriner 1963). The city and
urban design proposals of Le Corbusier (1971) can also be put under this tradition. In
some ways, the majority of modernist architecture and urban design follows
environmental determinism. Scott (1998) shows how modernist urban spaces of Brasilia
display its designer‘s determinism to reflect the power of the state and ignore any
contextual, social, and cultural implications in their creation. A relatively smaller
segment of urban design literature delved with deterministic tradition, as compared to
other perceptual, experiential, social, visual, functional, and temporal approaches.
The aesthetic tradition in urban design literature focused mainly upon visual
qualities and aesthetic nature of urban spaces. The roots of this tradition go back to
Camillo Sitte‘s City Planning According to Artistic Principles (Sitte 1965). Similarly,
Zucker‘s (1959) work on artistically relevant urban squares emphasizes the nature and
effects of different geometric compositions of public squares and strengthens aesthetic
and visual tradition. The emphasis on visual and artistic composition can also be seen in
Gordon Cullen‘s work during 1950s and 1960s. Some critiques of his work suggest he
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failed to take into consideration people‘s perspective on townscape and the places they
inhabit (Punter and Carmona 1997). It is even more evident, when his work is compared
with Lynch‘s (1960) work—―The Image of the City‖—that focuses on experiential and
perceptual dimensions more than just personal or visual interpretation of urban spaces.
The aesthetic tradition in urban design also includes the work of Raymond Unwin
(1971), who emphasized visual part of built environment as a stage for human actions.
Some of the modern urban design endeavors show such traces of aesthetic and
deterministic approaches. New urbanism movement based on Ebenezer‘s (1902), ―garden
cities‖ concept is one of them, which has been criticized for its deterministic and
aesthetic nature (New Urbanism Comprehensive Report & Best Practices Guide 2001),
because it also attempts to plan the social aspect of built form from a preconceived
vision. Similarly, ―City Beautiful‖ theories represent aesthetic and deterministic
approaches to a great extent.
Despite all criticism against it, the visual and aesthetic tradition in urban design
cannot be completely ignored in appreciation of social, political, cultural, and economic
approaches developed much later. Some of the great European urban spaces, analyzed by
Zucker (1959), are not only socially and culturally thriving, but also its architecture is
aesthetically pleasing. As discussed by Carmona et al. (2003), the aesthetic dimension
should be considered with caution, where architectural style should not become the prime
focus for successful urban space. Montgomery (1998) suggests architectural style is also
important, because it is the source of meaning, identity, and image of the built
environment.
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Several efforts attempt to find meaning among aesthetic approaches in
contemporary urban design literature. Lang (2003) gives description of various types of
aesthetics like environmental, speculative, sensory, formal, and symbolic in his theory of
aesthetics. These types of aesthetics emphasize psychological perception and experiential
dimensions. Research in this direction shows aesthetics and experience of appearance of
built environment still draw interest of researchers. Scholars like Rubin (2003) claim
aesthetic dimension in architecture and urban design is losing its validity amongst social,
cultural, and political economic discourses on urban space. She argues:
Few students of culture would claim that the architectural forms and the syntax of
commercial competition conform to discernible patterns deriving from a coherent
system of belief and behavior, parallel to the free enterprise logic which provides
a rational basis for the analysis of economic behavior (Rubin 2003, 311).
Rubin (2003) strengthens the need for further research in aesthetic direction in
urban design, as opposed to well-acknowledged, socio-cultural, and political economic
analyses of urban form.
On the whole, deterministic and aesthetic approaches serve as the basis of early
urban design theory. Literature on these approaches was considered keystone works in
urban design, until the late 1960s (Vernez-Moudon 1992), which suggests their
foundational role in the field.
Humanities and Social Science-based Understanding of Urban Form
Recent explorations by the scholars belonging to urban geography, anthropology,
urban planning, social science, and political science entail social, capitalistic, cultural,
political-economic, and gender dimensions of the urban form and space production.
These scholars portray how the production process of urban space is vital in
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understanding inherent complexities of the present cities. In their multidisciplinary
perspectives on urban form and space, the space is no longer a physical, but an abstract
phenomenon. Capital space, social space, and contested space are identified in addition to
physical space. Authors like Lefebvre (1991), Harvey (1989), Castells (1977), Zukin
(1995), King (1996), and Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee (1998) advance
multidisciplinary ideas and develop theories on how urban space and form are conceived
socially, culturally, politically, and temporally. In the following paragraphs, some of
these authors‘ arguments are further elaborated.
Lefebvre (1991), in ―The Production of Space‖, develops concepts like ―the
production of space,‖ ―the political economy of space,‖ and ―the science of space‖ and
identifies different levels of space, ranging from the absolute space, which is very
abstract, crude, and natural to social space that is more complex. Lefebvre‘s (1991)
notion of space gives importance to the social and temporal dimension in creating
specific spaces. He talks about an abstract dimension, like social life in time, contrary to
the ways, in which mathematicians talk about space and time. According to him, space
production is a triad of spatial practice of society, a representation of space by the
planners and designers, and a lived-in space by its inhabitants. He utilizes this triad to
show how powerful, domineering, and abstract social and spatial practices interact in
everyday life of living spaces. Lefebvre also argues that every society with its dominant
mode of production in time produces space specific and suitable to its modes of
operations. When a society fails to produce its own space, it creates a spatial mismatch at
the social and intellectual levels, e.g. Soviet planners‘ failure to produce socialist space.
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At the conceptual level, Lefebvre (1991) seems to resonate with feminist
critiques, when he talks about the relationship between space and human body‘s
masculinity and femininity. He identifies social practices of space and form-making as
extensions of human bodies. Lefebvre‘s notion of space is not a static one, like scholars
of environmental determinism perceived it; rather it is dialectical, which is a product of
set of social relations that mediates its production process. This type of association
between physical and social aspects is ideologically similar to the premise of this study,
where an association is sought between institutional dimensions of urban governance and
production of urban form.
Scholars like Castells (1983, 1977) relate urban space and spatial forms with
social structure of a society in time differently compared to the one by Lefebvre (1991).
Castells (1977) specifies the relationship between the state and the urban and then
initiates a debate on theory of form and space. Castells (Castells 1977) argues for the
scientific mode of analysis to identify ideological discourses. According to Castells
(1983), spatial forms are a result of human actions. As a result, they reflect interests of
the dominant classes, power relationships, domination of the ruling classes, and
resistance from the exploited classes. It becomes a process, in which the meaning of
earlier forms and spaces are challenged by new movements that take place. These
conflicts result in creation of new urban forms and spatiality. Hence, urban social
movements are the generators of urban social transformation and of urban space and
form. Active participation of citizens is a critical dimension of urban social movements.
He holds modern capitalist modes of production, specialization, commercialization, and
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profit maximization, as well as information technological development, responsible for
defining the relationship between space, urban forms, and society.
Castells (1983) differs from Lefebvre, because his work is more ideological and
only expands the ideological forms of capitalist society, rather than breaking them to
understand its dynamics. Saunders (1981), in defense of Castells, says although space is
an important feature of social relationships, it cannot become an object of analysis on its
own in theory like in case of Lefebvre‘s analysis. As a result, Lefebvre fails to establish a
scientific basis of his analysis (Saunders 1981). Above all, according to Gottdiener
(1985), Lefebvre and Castells analyze space as a material product of a given social
formation (Gottdiener 1985, 115).
Gottdiener (1985) develops a parallel argument based on social aspects of
production of urban form and space. He deviates from Lefebvre and Castells in some
ways, because he forms a debate on theory of space by addressing questions, like what is
the relationship between space and class struggle; between economy and space; and
between the state and space. He proposes a socio-spatial perspective (Gottdiener and
Hutchison 2006), which, according to him, is not explored earlier by other urban
sociologists, like Harvey, Lefebvre, and Castells as well as by any urban ecologists. This
approach differs from traditional urban ecologist or urban sociologist perspectives,
because it incorporates urban growth networks, cultural factors, real estate interventions,
and global perspectives in the process. Gottdiener‘s (1985) understanding of urban space
and form refers to what he terms as urban science. According to him, ―[Urban science] in
general rests on a basic premise that the spatial patterns of settlement space correspond to
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the action of deep-level forces of social organization‖ (8). In addition, ―spatial
arrangement of people and activities is said to lie at the core of a wide variety of
contemporary problems associated with metropolitan life‖ (13). In his understanding,
spatial forms are dialectically related to social processes, which are the root causes for
urban problems of the present times.
Besides the social argument over the production of urban form and space, strong
claims arise from Marxian philosophy on the capitol, as the only dimension determining
urban form and geography of uneven development in the cities (1989, 1985). Marxist
geographical perspective grouped under postmodern thoughts (Soja 1980; Harvey 1989;
Massey 1984) postulates space as a feature that helps in creating opportunities for
accumulating capital in the future (Saunders 1981). According to Harvey:
The geographical landscape that results is the crowning glory of past capitalist
development. But, at the same time, it expresses the power of dead labour over
living labour, and as such it imprisons and inhibits the accumulation process
within a specific set of physical constraints (Harvey 1985, 25).
He argues the built environment is the material reflection of capital accumulation.
It also reflects implicit power conflicts of specific capital regimes. Built forms fixed by
these regimes act as barriers for additional accumulation.
Scholars propagating political economic aspects of urban form add social and
political dimension into capital-oriented arguments. They argue actions motivated by the
capital are neither free of human values nor devoid of powerful political ideologies, and
these values influence creation of space (Cuthbert 2006). This line of thinking suggests
design initiatives have shifted from the public to the private sector, and they have resulted
in the private sector-oriented urban public realm (Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998;
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Crawford 1995). It also shows a shift from a comprehensive and inclusionary built
environment to a market-driven approach of packaging private urban spaces.
Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee (1998) hold the financial dependence of public
institutions on private sector responsible for the changing nature of urban form. They also
claim that urban design professionals are equally accountable for contributing to isolated
nature of urban public realm. Through a similar argument, Molotch (1976), Logan and
Molotch (1987), and Sagalyn (2001) narrate how deal-making politics and its impacts on
urban form are important factors in understanding urban form production aspects.
Parallel to the public dimensions of urban space, another strand of urban form
literature highlights conception of urban form and space from individual rights‘
perspective (Kohn 2004; Irazábal 2005). A narrative of loss of individual rights is evident
in Kohn‘s (2004) political take on privatization and its impacts on urban public spaces.
Such a loss of individual freedom in public urban spaces also alters the democratic nature
of urban form. Her argument can be understood in two ways, one, present spatiality
resulting in present political reality; and second, present economic and political reality
contributing to the present spatiality. These two ways form an additional cycle. Public
realm fosters political identities and salient capacities. This public realm, as a result of
distinct political economic forces, shapes the spatial order of spatial realm. Such two-way
relationship resonate with the theoretical premise in this study that in some ways existing
regimes, citizen participation, and collaborative governance impact the urban form
production and vice-versa.
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The political economic argument on planning in redevelopment context involves
segmentation politics as it is reflected in production of urban form (Molotch 1976;
Fainsten et al. 1983). It shows how city is a site for class and racial conflict and the ways
these conflicts produce and shape the built form. Scholars like Sagalyn (2001), Hartman
(2002), Allensworth(1980), Ethington (1994), Mollenkopf (1983), and Fainstein et al.
(1983) talk about the political history of planning processes and characterize urban
redevelopment processes in four major cities of the United States. In case of San
Francisco, Hartman (2002) contends confluence of people with power and private actors
dominated the development of San Francisco‘s urban history, despite the existence of
significant community-based movements. These accounts of urbanization process in
American cities highlight the urban form evolution as a result of political conflicts.
Political economic discourse on the production of space and form also deals with
the issues of global political economic processes. Sassen (1991, 1994) draws attention to
the global aspect of economic development of cities. She develops an urban social angle
to emphasize the importance of local spaces and geographies, despite the globalization of
economies. Similarly, Cuthbert (2006) links the capitalistic and global dimensions of
urban space by saying:
In this global economy, vast changes in the restructuring of both capital and labor
have created corresponding tectonic shifts in a restructured space economy, where
the geographically uneven development inherent to advanced capitalist societies
is reforming in new and frequently unpredictable ways (2).
One could argue that advent of globalization has added to economic disparities,
furthered the understanding of the political and social differences, and changed the way
we perceive processes of production of urban form.
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The culture of society is another social and humanities related theme that also
contributes to urban form discourse. King (1996) gives a cultural perspective on urban
form and representation of cities. Images, metaphors, and discourses contribute to
contemporary city‘s socio-cultural side of urban forms. Zukin (1995) analyzes how cities‘
culture is produced by complex interactions amongst ethnic groups, urban elites, and
modern citizens. Her argument is similar to the one by King, where economically elite
groups are the ones who determine how cities get represented culturally, as well as
through urban forms.
Gender dimension is not as recognized as other social and cultural dimensions
contributing to the urban form discourse, but it could become an important lens, from
which to view the production of urban form A human-made and human-dominated
environment is less sensitive towards gender-equal forms and spaces (Weisman 1992).
Spain (1992) gives a cross-cultural and historical perspective on how urban form and
space organization is affected by gender relations. According to her, gender-differentiated
spaces strengthen the status differences in men and women. Hayden (1980) shows gender
issues manifest not only at the urban space levels, but also at the city levels.
Social, political, economic, cultural, and gender discourses stemming from
humanities and social sciences facilitate fundamentally different understanding of
production of urban form, as compared to environmental determinism of purely aesthetic
approaches. In order to position the emerging perspective on regime theory, collaborative
governance, and participatory planning in a larger context of political economy of urban
form, the question is how do interaction of regimes with collaborative and participatory
70

processes impact urban form? If certain internal or external players in a regime or outside
of a regime exercise more influence than the others, then what role does the urban
designer have in shaping an urban form vision? Above all, how does the process of
creating urban design plans and codes strengthen a link between urban design and urban
governance? The following paragraphs explore the governance dimension of urban form
in theory with respect to urban design initiatives originating from the private sector.
Governance Dimension of Urban Form
All our investment in the complexity of individual buildings, on the one hand, and
in elaborate engineering infrastructure on the other, we have failed to achieve a
physically humane setting for a social existence at a time when the abstract setting
of life is increasingly bureaucratized and constrained (Gosling and Gosling 2003,
7).
Contemporary midsize American cities stand at a threshold of holding onto their
functional efficiencies, which they have managed to achieve so far, and, at the same time,
are attempting to fulfill aesthetic and visual ambitions resulting from economic
competition with their national and global counterparts. A large number of these cities
have exercised planning controls through two-dimensional policies, until now. Those
policies include following of subdivision and zoning codes laid out in the Master Plans
rigidly while neglecting three-dimensional controls (Gosling and Gosling 2003; Ben-
Joseph and Szold 2005) that are essential in shaping overall physical form of an urban
realm.
Having urban design codes in place is a way to achieve three-dimensional
controls. However, the process of creating such codes for cities with more than a century-
old physical footprint and virtually no history of such constrains is not as easy as it
71

maybe for a city or a township to be built from scratch. It is as much a challenge for
urban designers to incorporate multiplicity of social, economic, cultural, and
environmental aspects of an existing city into new codes, as it is for a city‘s political and
planning wings to meander through cooperative and collaborative mechanisms involving
collaboration among numerous stakeholders. It further complicates an established
understanding of processes of urban form, when entire process of urban design plan and
code-making is initiated and managed by the local corporate sector. A task, that used to
be governed and funded by the state, now comes under the domain of market forces and
holds a potential to redefine our long-held conception of how market, state, and the civil
society behave in the evolution of urban form. The market, state, and civil society triad
developed by the urban design (Sanyal 2005; Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998) and
planning theory scholars (Campbell and Fainstein 1996) shows how each end of this triad
exercises its authority and resources in creating, managing, and redeveloping urban form,
as well as interrelationships among the three.
While political economic perspective in urban design conceptualizes urban form
from the perspectives of market, politics of a place, social, and global aspects, it does not
see urban form as a result of specific governance dimensions, such as governing regime,
civic participation, or a collaboration. The market, state, and civil society triad assumes
an inherent distinction in interests and activities of the three and holds one or more sides
responsible for causing distress to another. Additionally, it explores neither a possibility
of constraints nor of limitations beyond the three sides of this triad and urban form
decisions, as ways for one or more sides to find optimum solutions. Through the market,
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state, and civil society triad, urban form creation is not seen as a middle ground, amidst
available choices as regime theory ―explores the middle ground between‖ (Stone 1989, 2)
the pluralists‘ assumptions, that government has adequate authority to create and manage
policies and structuralist assumptions, that economic influences control policies. So they
do not look at it from, ―who controls it,‖ or ―who governs it,‖ as it has been done so far in
production of urban form debates, but to find a middle approach by asking who has the
capacity to act in influencing urban design decisions and eventually the city‘s urban form.
In this research of production of urban design plan and codes for a city, the above
theoretical lens is employed to contribute a governance angle within the political
economic perspective in urban design. Additionally, to situate this study in a broader
urban design dialogue Cuthbert‘s (2006, 4) four levels of urban design knowledge are
referred. His classification of urban design knowledge for urban designers is:
1. The theoretical, philosophical and contextual foundation of the discipline and the
meta-programmes that both inform and legitimize practice.
2. The legal, financial and administrative context within which the discipline
operates
3. Technologies of space and form
4. Case studies of urban design practice.
This research falls partly under the second level of administrative context, in
which the discipline of urban design functions. However, his categorization also does not
fully capture the extent of influence exercised by the governance context. He reduces this
segment to mere administrative aspect of urban design decisions and fails to acknowledge
73

its potential to contribute to the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the
practice of urban design. The need to focus on the urban governance context in urban
design literature is also apparent in the lack of studies on urban design plans and code-
making processes. The research on urban design plans, guidelines, and codes is either
focused on analyzing the contents of various plans (Southworth 1989; Punter 1999) or
delves upon effects of specific plans and urban design controls (Ben-Joseph and Szold
2005). The process aspect of the production of urban design plans and codes is neither
highlighted, nor recognized, as an important contributor to the way urban form of the city
is produced. This study aims to fill that obvious gap.
Summary: Synthesis of Urban Design and Theories of Governance
The above theoretical exploration in this chapter attempted to understand three
angles: First, it elaborated on urban regimes, its critiques and how introduction of citizen
participation and cross-sector collaboration may affect existing understanding of regimes.
Second, it discussed the concepts of citizen participation and collaborative decision-
making and the lack of theoretical examination of the same in urban design and planning
scholarship. Third, it highlighted recent humanities and social science-based approaches
to understand production of urban form and the absence of a governance perspective
from the angles of urban regimes, citizen participation, and cross-sector collaboration.
The fact that the practice of urban design most often occurs in a governance
setting, the discipline is invariably linked to the specifics of institutional processes of the
city‘s governance. No matter how much importance is given to a designer‘s ideas and
plans in design fields, it is well-known that political and institutional dimensions
74

transform the original aims, ideas, and schemes of a designer, when it is time for
implementation. It is also known that the creation and transformation of urban design
rules and regulations are influenced by the governance processes, but what remains to be
explored is how and to what extent governance factor impacts this transformation. This
study will attempt to analyze ―how‖ aspects of production of urban form through an
empirical analysis.
The scholarships in urban governance, urban politics, and urban design remain
clearly divided, despite obvious links found in practice among these disciplines. Recent
multidisciplinary foray into understanding urban from processes through social, political,
cultural, economic, and other varied perspectives are creditable, and an addition of
governance perspective would add to this line of reasoning. This study‘s governance
perspective in urban design is situated in the larger discourse of political economy of
urban form, where the idea that political and market-driven economic influences greatly
shape the urban form remains constant.
The field of urban governance spans across multiple disciplines, and the scholars
from various fields such as political science and public administration elaborate on
different aspects of it. To narrow down the theoretical enormity of the term ―governance‖
to the level of carrying out an empirical evaluation, three major themes of urban
governance were elaborated in this study. These themes were derived from three primary
areas most relevant to urban design plan initiatives
5
in a regime context. These themes

5
The information for deriving these three themes was collected from initial interviews of the informants
related to the case study, literature review of secondary sources on the case study and on secondary cases
discussed in Chapter 3.
75

are urban regimes, citizen participation, and cross-sector collaboration. Theoretical
exploration of these three areas in the above sections of this chapter has led to the
following key positions.
Regimes
A review of early and recent regime scholarship in terms of its concept,
functioning, and critiques brings forward key formational, motivational, and behavioral
aspects that need empirical evaluation. In formational aspects, the unanswered question is
whether regimes are single dominant phenomena at the city level, that are not affected by
the other levels of governance or multiplicity of other stakeholders or interest groups.
Motivational aspects question the self-interest behavior of regime players and raise a
question about whether civic-mindedness of business leaders in a regime could be a
motivating factor as well. Lastly, behavioral aspects hint at the absence of scholarship on
behavior or functioning of urban regimes at the advent of citizen-participation and cross-
sector collaboration during the last decade.
Collaboration

Cross-sector collaboration is widely researched subject in public administration
and governance disciplines, but its presence and the nature of its implications are not
examined from the perspectives of urban design plan processes. By examining the extent
of collaborative decision-making and its ability to bring consensus over urban form
decisions through negotiations, it will be possible to shed insight on the ―how‖ aspect of
the process of urban design plan in this study. From the regime theory perspective, few or
no groups of recent or early scholars of regimes, pro-growth coalitions, or growth
76

machines have explored how their theoretical propositions would change in light of
collaborative governance, where the power dynamics are assumed to be opposite of
regimes or pro-growth coalitions. Above all, empirical evaluation of a collaborative
process would show the extent and nature of collaboration in urban design decision-
making, the influence of existing regimes on the nature of collaboration, and the ability of
collaborative approach in a regime context to facilitate or transform the original goals of
an urban design plan and the nature of resulting urban form controls.
Participation

The notion of citizen-participation is developed fundamentally differently in the
fields of urban planning and governance; the former looks at it from consensus building
perspectives; whereas, the latter conceives it as keeping the democratic ideal alive and
political legitimacy perspectives. Consequently, each discipline adopts different modes
of operationalizing citizen participation in practice. For the purpose of this study, the
most important theoretical and empirical question is how citizen-participation for
achieving urban design goals takes place in a regime-dominated context. Whether the
presence of citizen-participation alters the urban design goals of an existing regime or
facilitates the same and vice-versa also needs to be investigated. Above all, an empirical
evaluation of the nature of citizen participation in a regime context for an urban design
plan and its implementation could contribute to social science-based understanding of
urban form production and inform the notion of regimes, in light of new paradigm of
citizen participation.

77

Urban Form Production
The idea of urban form and space production has already been perceived from
multiple angles—social, economic, political, geographic, cultural, and gender related
perceptions. However, the idea of urban design plans and form controls as one of the
important creators of urban form is only introduced recently (Ben-Joseph 2005). Yet, the
process of creating urban design plans and its implementation in urban design codes and
the governance context, in which this process takes place, are neither recognized nor
researched as important aspect of production of urban form. With a focus on analyzing
the process of creating an urban design plan and its implementation, this study will fill
that gap and extend the scholarship of political economy of urban design plans.
In conclusion, two major positions surface: first, the interplay among paradigms
of urban regimes, citizen participation, and cross-sector collaboration form the
governance premise of this study to understand the production of urban design plans and
codes. It also sheds light on the impacts this governance context can have on emerging
nature of urban form controls. Such a perspective on governance context would add to
the political economic dialogue in urban design within the larger social science-based
discourses on the production of urban form. Second, regime theory is questioned for its
formative, motivational, and behavioral premises in light of citizen participation and
cross-sector collaboration in urban design decision-making processes.

78

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This chapter illustrates research design and data-collection methods to evaluate
the propositions made in the second chapter. The primary research question of this study
is; how does governance dimension explain the process of urban design plans and their
implementation? The secondary research questions are: How do recent developments like
collaborative governance and participatory planning aid in understanding the notion of
urban regimes? How does this revisited notion of urban regimes contribute to
understanding the production of urban form? This research employs a single-case study
approach to address these questions.
The case being studied is a citywide urban design plan initiative, OBD, and the
process of its incorporation as urban design codes in the city‘s Master Plan. The nature of
collaboration and citizen participation in OBD is the context, in which the case of OBD is
analyzed, while individual stakeholders and urban design components of Omaha‘s urban
design plan and the codes are the embedded units of analysis. The type of the research
questions asked in this study calls for a qualitative approach towards data collection and
analysis. The main methods of data collection involved open-ended, semi-structured
interviews, archival records, documents, and direct observations. This primarily
qualitative data was analyzed by using pattern-matching and explanation-building
techniques.

79

Research Design
The research question in this study informs the research design, because it carries
several characteristics innate to qualitative research problems as described by Morse
(1991).
6
One of such characteristics of this study‘s research question is that the concept
of relating governance and urban design is at an immature stage, due to a lack of previous
research in this area, and the second is quantitative measures are not appropriate for the
nature of research phenomenon in this study. Similarly, eight basic research
characteristics central to a qualitative inquiry mentioned by Creswell (1998) also suggest
adopting qualitative methods based on the type of research question and the nature of
information sought in this study.
7

Within the qualitative research theme, a case-study approach is selected, because
case study research is ideal for finding explanations of ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions,
where a researcher does not have control over actors and the world as necessitated in an
experimental research (Creswell 1998; Yin 2003). Case study approach also allows a
researcher to use multiple sources of information for an in-depth empirical exploration of
a complex, real-world phenomenon (Yin 2003). Several reasons for adopting a single-
case study approach are detailed. First, the OBD case represented a phenomenon of

6
Morse (1991) describes four major characteristics of qualitative research, they are,
a. The concept is ‗immature‘ due to a conspicuous lack of theory and previous research
b. A notion that the available theory may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect or biased
c. A need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to develop theory
d. The nature of the phenomenon may not be suited to quantitative measures (120)
7
Creswell (1998) identifies eight basic characteristics of qualitative research which include: 1) Natural
setting as source of data, 2) Researcher as key instrument of data collection, 3) Data collected as words or
pictures, 4) Outcome as process rather than product, 5) Analysis of data inductively, attention to particulars,
6) Focus on participants‘ perspectives, their meaning, 7) Use of expressive language, 8) Persuasion by
reason (16).
80

private sector initiated citywide urban design plan and code-making process not widely
employed in other cities, and, therefore, a comparative approach could not have been
carried out meaningfully. Second, focusing on a single-case study helped to go in-depth
of one case and understand the process involving the multiple dimensions of governing
regimes, stakeholder collaboration, citizen participation, and the implications of their
interrelationships on urban form. However, to substantiate the research validity and to
understand the phenomenon of private sector involvement in the city governance,
planning and urban design, a secondary review of cases employing these characteristics
in other US cities was carried out.
The primary aim of this research through a single-case study approach is not to
achieve a set of generalized findings, but to highlight specific, unexplored dimensions of
governance in relation to the production of urban form in greater detail, because ―case
studies are of value in refining theory, suggesting complexities for further investigation
as well as helping to establish the limits of generalizability‖ (Stake 2005, 460).
Nevertheless, certain findings may be applicable to other cities, if their background,
evolution, and governance conditions are similar to that of the OBD case.
The research strategy for this study advances the argument made by Mukhija
(2010) that research framework of a single case informed by multiple secondary cases
may be a better approach in certain cases than having an in-depth analysis of a single
case. According to him, multiple secondary cases serve as a platform to clarify key
issues, refine research questions, and assist in the data collection process for the primary
case.
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Four major research goals directed the research design of this study. First, to find
out whether a private sector-initiated, collaborative, and participatory urban design
initiative redefines underlying motivational, behavioral, and formative assumptions of
urban regime theory as seen in cities like Atlanta (Stone 1989). Second, to what extent
cross-sector collaboration and citizen participation were effective to affect the outcomes
of urban design plan, to alter the behavior of existing regime, and to fall under the
scholarly meaning of collaborative governance and citizen participation. Third, how was
the improvement of urban form—the reason for the origination of the initiative—
influenced by the dynamics of collaboration, participation, and governing regime? Lastly,
the research intended to find a connection between urban design plan and code-making,
including the processes that govern them.
Based on the above goals, evaluating the nature of collaboration and participation
of OBD became the context for a single-case study design. In the case study, the
individual stakeholders and design elements of urban design plan process were the
embedded units of analysis. The analysis of collaborative or participatory behavior of
individual stakeholders within the context of the existing regime, as an embedded unit,
contributed to the governance aspect of the research question. The urban form production
aspect of the research question is another unit of analysis, which is manifested in the
analysis of the proposed urban design plan and urban design codes for Omaha‘s Master
Plan. The following analytical framework illustrates these distinct units of analysis within
a single-case study approach.
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Analytical Framework

Table 4.1: Analysis of a collaborative and participatory initiative with a local corporate
regime in an urban design plan process.
8

Governance
Aspects

Major
Characteristics
Revisited
dimensions of the
existing regime
Participation in urban
design plan process
Collaboration in urban design
plan and code-making process
Behavioral
Nature of
cooperation and
business leadership
Outcomes of citizen
participation in shaping
urban design plan and
codes
Outcomes of stakeholder
collaboration in urban design
plan and codes
Motivational
Power structure
and
motivations of
players
Effects of participation as
influenced by the existing
power structure on plan
outcomes and final codes

If the existing power structure
remains the same in plan and
code-making or if collaborative
aspect changes the power
structure and influences the
nature of final codes adopted
Formative
Transition, change
in existing regimes
If the regime-shift due to
citizen participation
results in specific plan
features and code details
Whether regime-shift due to
stakeholder collaboration results
in plan and code dimensions that
would not have happened in
absence of a collaborative
approach

Case Selection
The process of selecting the case study did not follow a conventional sequence of
identifying a question, based on theoretical framework and then selecting a case to
uncover the answers of the research question. Rather, it was a simultaneous process, in
which I became interested in the case, based on her primary interest in governance,
planning, and urban form processes, then developed a research question, while gathering
preliminary information about the case.
The selection of the case OBD is attributed to several factors. As seen in many
other cases, involvement of multiple players and sectors was the institutional stage, on

8
All the tables in this dissertation that are not attributed to any other source are by the author.
83

which OBD progressed but what differentiated OBD from other initiatives was its focus
on improving the urban design conditions in the city. Very few citywide public-private
partnerships and collaborative efforts have arisen from private sector in the areas of
planning and redevelopment in recent history, and practically none exists in the field of
urban design practice. Therefore, selection of OBD was based on not only an
amalgamation of my interest in public administration, planning, and urban design, but
also a distinctive nature of the case, where the private sector initiated an urban design
agenda, and brought in the city governance and other stakeholders in the process of
making it legally binding.
During the course of preliminary research on the case of OBD and the
background of the City of Omaha, several questions emerged. The process of
unstructured preliminary interviews for information gathering and reviews of other
secondary cases related to OBD was important in arriving at the most relevant research
question among several initial inquiries. The research questions were fine-tuned, based
on theoretical background of the study; a personal interview questionnaire was
developed, and data collection was thereafter commenced.
Data Collection
Within a single-case study, I used multiple sources of data with a special focus on
personal interviews of key individuals from all sectors involved in OBD. Initially, a set
of questions was prepared for each of the aims, and appropriate data sources were sought.
Major data sources included semi-structured plans, open-ended personal interviews,
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archival and secondary data, administrative records of the plan-making and code-making
process, and direct observations.
Context Data
Three kinds of contextual data were sought for this research: first, the governance
context of Omaha; second, the history of urban development related decision-making and
the existing regime in Omaha; and third, the background of the OBD initiative. The
information on governance context of Omaha, specifically the nature of the existing
regime and urban development decision-making, was collected from primary and
secondary sources. The primary sources included preliminary interviews of key
individuals from planning and political wings of Omaha, as well as my experience of
living in Omaha for two and a half years. Secondary sources included dissertations
covering the governance and cultural context of Omaha, scholarly articles, and the books
published on the political-administrative history of Omaha. Newspaper archives of the
Omaha World Herald (OWH)—the employee-owned and single-most, widely read
newspaper in the region—was a key secondary resource for the contextual data. The
information on the background aspects of OBD was collected from personal interviews,
OWH archives, administrative records, and process documents from the archives of OBD.
Selection of Informants
Individual informants within the OBD case were selected via a mixed method
involving sequential referral (snowball), intentional, non-probability strategy, and
stratified purposive sampling approaches (Bogason 2000; Miles and Huberman 1994;
Wengraf 2001). This mixed-method approach facilitated the selection of respondents
85

with the most knowledge and experience of the case study among different sectors that
participated in OBD. An intentional sampling strategy was followed for reaching key
informants. Besides the referrals made by the informants, information sources for basing
the selection of informants consisted of newspaper archives; lists of OBD Technical
Advisory Committee members and its board members and officials, and unofficial
documents on OBD.
During the preliminary stage of information gathering, several informants from
the City Planning Department, OBD staff, and academic scholars at University of
Nebraska at Omaha, were contacted for non-structured talks about OBD and Omaha‘s
political, economic, and administrative settings. I described the research project to them
and requested them to suggest other potentially useful informants. Their references,
combined with the contacts derived from documentary resources, constituted the sample
frame, from which I selected the first set of informants. These persons then were sent an
email containing a brief explanation of the research project, a reference letter from my
dissertation chair, and an informed consent form (Appendix L). Additionally, during the
interviews, informants were asked about other referrals, which greatly enhanced the
selection process.
One important measure of informant selection was to identify individuals, who
either actively participated in one or more stages of urban design plan and code-making
processes under the OBD initiative or were aware of the process, but chose not to
participate for specific, individualized reasons. By using referral sampling, it was
possible to arrive at a list of such individuals, who were highly active in OBD or were
86

drawn to participate, due to their profession or were opposed to the process followed. An
additional criterion was used to categorize participants within different aspects
9
of the
OBD process, as displayed in Table 4.1. Of eighty-four potential informants, fifty-nine
informants were selected and contacted as the final sample frame. From the fifty-nine
contacted, fifty-three (Appendix M) participated in one or more sessions of face-to-face
or telephone interviews. A total of three telephone interviews and fifty face-to-face
interviews were completed, and six individuals directly or indirectly declined to
participate.
Among the total of fifty-three informants, eleven were females, and forty-two
were males.
10
These fifty-three informants represented eleven categories, depending upon
their professional roles, individual interests, and ways of associating or disassociating
with the OBD process. The following table presents the number of informants in each of
these categories and the given IDs.

9
Such as the key individuals active in citizen participation, cross-sector collaboration and governing
regimes.
10
The selection criteria did not include any gender dimension and there was no attempt made to have a
gender equal sample. Here, the number of males and females are mentioned only to give readers an idea of
gender division in the interviewee sample.
87

Table 4.2: Categorization of the informants

Name of the informants’ category
Number of
informants
Assigned
IDs
1 Donors 3 DO1-DO3
2 OBD concept and design plan team 5 OB1-OB5
3 Steering Committee members 6 SC1-SC6
4 Local support and neighborhood outreach 4 LN1-LN4
5 Advocacy group 11 AG1-AG11
6 City planning and public works
departments
5 CP1-CP5
7 City Planning Board members 3 PB1-PB3
8 City Hall (Mayor, Council members) 6 CH1-CH6
9 Academic scholars 4 AC1-AC4
10 Urban Design Review Board 2 UD1-UD2
11 Others (residents and persons not involved
directly in the OBD process)
4 O1-O4
Total number of respondents 53

Interviews
Interviews are integral to a qualitative inquiry specifically for a case-study
research based on the process that occurred in the past and involved subjective
interpretations of issues, like cooperation, leadership, power structure, and motivational
factors in urban design. ―By using interviews researchers can reach areas of reality that
would otherwise remain inaccessible such as people‘s subjective experiences and
attitudes. The interviews are also a very convenient way of overcoming distances both in
space and in time‖ (Perakyla 2005, 869).
A range of different interview formats exist, such as open-ended interviews,
focused interviews, and formal surveys. In this study, fifty-three informants participated
in sixty semi-structured, open-ended personal interviews. Most of the fifty face-to-face
88

interviews took place in informants‘ places of work, but some informants opted for other
locations, such as restaurants, their residences, or public parks. Five informants agreed to
meet for more than one session. None of the sessions included more than one informant
per meeting. The following table portrays the categorization of interviews, which is based
on duration of the sessions.
Table 4.3: Categorization of the interviews according to duration
Duration Number of interviews
20 minutes to 1 hour 29
1 to 2 hours 21
2 to 3 hours 2
3 to 4 hours 1

Prior to meeting for an interview, respondents were emailed a research disclosure
and a consent form, and they were informed about the voluntary nature of their
participation. They were also assured about the confidentiality of their names to be
followed in the research protocol entrusted in the IRB Application Form submitted to the
University of Southern California. Almost all the interviews were voice-recorded with
consent from the respondents, except for one respondent, who declined to be voice-
recorded. These voice-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, and, for one
unrecorded interview, detailed notes were taken during and after the interview. The
interview sessions ranged from twenty minutes to over three hours, with an average
session time of approximately sixty-five minutes.

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Interview Questionnaire
Interview questions followed a semi-structured, open-ended format. Though
question categories were structured, answer categories were not predetermined, thus,
making it a non-directed personal interview process. A basic set of questions (Appendix
N) and several units of focused questions were developed in such a way, that basic
questions applied to all the respondents, but focused questions were varied by the
respondents. The basic questions were divided into seven categories, which were:
Introduction, Collaboration, Participation, Design, Resistance, Introduction to the Master
Plan, and Overall Outcomes. Of these seven categories, Collaboration, Participation,
Design, Resistance, and Introduction to the Master Plan were expanded into a set of
focused questions. The decision to ask which set of focused questions to each participant
varied. This task primarily depended upon the role and familiarity of a respondent with
one or more question categories. For example, respondents from the Local Outreach and
Public Participation group were the most familiar with Participation set of questions. So
these respondents were asked basic questions, as well as an elaborated set of questions
from the Participation category. The interviewer constantly evaluated respondents‘
familiarity with each of the categories, based on their answers to basic questions during
interview sessions and determined whether or not to pursue other focused questions from
that category. The open-ended and semi-structured questionnaire was helpful in drawing
direct and indirect inferences from the information gathered from personal interviews
(Wengraf 2006). Thus, it was possible to gauge, not only what was said by the
respondents, but also what was not said, but implied.
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Since the interview questions followed a non-directive format, the answer data
was required to be classified through content analyses. Except for three respondents, the
rest of the fifty interviews were face-to-face, which maximized the interviewer‘s control
over interview process. However, a downside to that situation was interviewer bias may
exist, and it could challenge the superiority of face-to-face interview data. I did a careful
examination of verbatim interview transcripts to capture such biases and avoid those
responses from influencing the research findings.
Other Data
In addition to information gathered from the interviews, additional data sources
on the case consisted of administrative records and plan documents from the archives of
OBD, archival records of OWH newspaper, and direct observations. The data collection
methods ranged from note taking, photocopying, printing, and photographing. The
administrative and plan documents from the OBD archives included the documents
related to the initial concept, configuration of different committees, annual reports, design
plan, minutes of meetings among various stakeholders of the initiative, photographs of
Omaha and other cities, and information from individual projects. Archival records of
OWH included more than one hundred articles related to OBD during various stages of
the initiative. Some of these articles covered the case in detail, while others mentioned
the implications of the urban design plan and the codes. The direct observations included
attending public meetings of OBD; documenting buildings before and after the codes
were in place; and visiting individual projects implemented under the direction of OBD.

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Data Analysis
Two ways to analyze interview texts include formal and informal. Formal ways to
analyze interview texts include semiotic narrative, critical discourse, historical discourse,
and membership categorization analysis (Perakyla 2005). Informal approach to analyze
involves reading and rereading of the empirical materials and identifying the key themes
emerging from them. These themes then help draw a picture of meanings and
assumptions that make a larger phenomenon of the case, from which a sample of
interviews is taken. According to Perakyla (2005), an informal approach is the best
method in research designs, where focus of research is not qualitative text analysis. More
formal ways of analysis are needed, when a research project essentially uses talks and
texts as empirical materials. In this research, the informal way of analyzing interviews is
used, because interviews are not the only source of information. They are also
supplemented by multiple sources of information and analyses. Informal ways of analysis
are similar to explanation building described by Yin (2003), where the analysis explains a
phenomenon in a narrative style and reflects upon theoretically significant propositions
(120). A less complex way of explanation building is pattern matching, which ―compares
an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions).
If the patterns coincide, the results can help a case study to strengthen its internal
validity‖ (Yin 2003, 116). In summary, this study adopts two informal ways to analyze
the interview data—pattern matching and explanation building.
Alongside the analysis of interview transcripts, contents of documents from the
secondary sources, like newspaper articles and process documents on OBD were
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analyzed to find recurring themes, and they were compared with research propositions of
this study. Separate files were made for each recurring theme, and, eventually, each of
these themes was correlated to find interrelations across different themes and compare
different emerging points within each theme to arrive at specific explanations.
The data substantiation involved triangulation among different data sources, along
with constant comparison of the information and interpretations. The explanations
derived from interview analysis were compared with archival data and other documentary
evidence to achieve factual correctness and plausibility and to avoid bias that may have
been imposed by the interviewer. The verbatim transcriptions helped distinguish
soundness of the respondents‘ answers and identify any verbal interventions made by the
interviewer, which could have impacted the respondents‘ answers.
Limitations
With a single-case study framework, this research aims to satisfy construct
validity, internal validity and reliability aspects of trustworthiness, more than the external
validity aspects discussed by Yin (2003) and Creswell (1998). External validity is
expected to increase by researching more than one case, where research findings exhibit a
greater possibility of being applicable to other cases. Even though some scholars hint at
the possibility of increasing external validity through multiple cases, to what extent case
study findings are generalizable is not certain and remains a topic of debate (Lincoln and
Guba 1985; Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster 2000). In this study, in lieu of multiple
primary cases and a comparative analysis, the primary case is supported by three types of
secondary case studies (Chapter 4). Specific research questions and framework of
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analysis took into account the inferences from these three types of secondary cases in
order to contribute towards external validity. Additionally, a member checking process
(Schwandt 2001, 155; Creswell 2003, 196) was employed to increase the validity and
reliability of the research findings. Preliminary findings were discussed with some of the
informants, and their feedback confirmed the research findings were indeed accurate.
Ideally, I would have liked to have examples of similar urban design plan-making arising
from the private sector in other cities for a comparative study, but the distinctive nature of
the OBD initiative for a midsize city like Omaha limited the possibility of finding another
such example and thus, of implementing a comparative study.
Summary
This research chose a single-case study approach and employed qualitative
methods of data collection and analysis. Selection of single-case study approach resulted
from the distinctive nature of the case and the need for concentrating on unexplored areas
of governance and urban design plan-making process. Moreover, the primary case was
supported by three secondary cases based on the criteria of collaboration, private sector
participation, and urban design plan process to increase the validity and reliability of the
research findings. These secondary case studies were instrumental in informing the
choice of research questions, nature of research design, and methods of analysis. The
main methods for analyzing the primary case included personal interviews, archival
research, and direct observation. The primary data sources for this study were personal
interviews of the OBD stakeholders, secondary data on OBD, and the archival records of
OBD and the OWH. The data analysis consisted of pattern-matching and explanation
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building techniques, which analyzed the contents of interview transcripts, secondary data,
and archival records.
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CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF CASE STUDIES IN OTHER US CITIES

Private sector initiated cross-sector collaboration has been a widely occurring
phenomenon across cities in the United States from the late twentieth century to the
present times. Researchers in public administration field have focused on this
phenomenon specifically from the perspective of how performance and functioning of
various rungs of government are affected by increased involvement of private sector in
the governance affairs (Milward and Provan 2000; Salamon 1981; Kettl 1988). This
chapter is a review of urban design and development partnerships and focuses on the
nature of partnerships and how they evolve. The analysis of the partnerships in this
chapter differs from that of the public administration scholars, who focus on finding the
impacts of such partnerships on the governing bodies. Instead, the objective of this
review is to understand the key aspects of partnerships for the urban development
projects.
As a premise for supporting the single-case study approach, this chapter is a
review of types of collaborative and participatory urban development initiatives. It
explores important dimensions, i.e. trigger factors for these collaborations, cooperative
mechanisms within them, motivations of collaborating partners, and the role of business
leaders, as well as overall goals and objectives of the collaborative initiatives. Three
types of cases from the secondary sources are reviewed. The first type involves
collaborations for the city-level initiatives in economic and urban development. The
second type focuses on a partnership formed specifically for the built environment
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reforms. While the third type is not a collaborative effort in its concept, it serves as the
only model of a citywide urban design plan.
Collaboration for the City’s Overall Development
Cleveland Tomorrow and Others
In the1970s, Cleveland was facing deteriorating housing stocks, declining
industrial base, rising unemployment, declining incomes, increasing crime, eroding tax
base, weakening school system, and mounting budget deficits. As a result, in 1978,
Cleveland became the first city to go bankrupt, since the Great Depression. Cleveland‘s
default and economic nightmare made it, ―a microcosm—almost a caricature—of all the
recent ills of urban industrial America‖ (Magnet in Waddock and Post 1991, 395). This
downfall gave Cleveland an ill-famous title of ―mistake by the lake.‖ The business
leaders of Cleveland were not happy with the city‘s administration and its deteriorating
image, because it affected their business and recruitment negatively.
In the beginning of 1980s, as a response to rise above Cleveland‘s downward
spiral, the Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of fifty largest corporations in the area
incorporated a nonprofit organization—Cleveland Tomorrow.
11
These CEOs were
instrumental in evaluating the status of Cleveland‘s economy and developing a strategy to
manage future growth and urban development in the city-region with their annual
earnings stretching over $300 million by the turn of the century (Wallis 1996). The same
business sector in Cleveland also supported George V. Voinovich to run for mayor. Upon

11
Background information on Cleveland Tomorrow is based on Waddock and Post (1991), Wallis (1996)
and Kanter (1999).

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winning, his administration enthusiastically participated in the public-private partnership,
which later expanded to cross-sector collaboration.
For realizing the goals of economic development and the revitalization of
Cleveland‘s downtown, Cleveland Tomorrow was instrumental in launching or
supporting several initiatives. These changes consisted of the Jacobs‘ Field, Gateway
Stadium, and the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, which transformed dilapidated industrial
area into a vibrant entertainment district, resulted in the redevelopment of housing in
neighborhoods and generated investment entities for funding of new ventures. Cleveland
Tomorrow‘s target region was the main city area, but the progressive group also
collaborated with other organizations in the region for an overall development of the
specified areas. Some of these organizations included The Greater Cleveland Growth
Association, which dealt with a wide array of small companies and projects for the civic
improvements; Leadership Cleveland, which was made up of a group of civic leaders
from diversified institutions to serve community service goals; and The Business
Volunteerism Council, that focused on linking the local corporate resources with the
community‘s requirements. Additionally, in 1998, one of Cleveland Tomorrow‘s
collaborative initiatives included a collaboration in the form of Corporate Partnership
Program with one-hundred-seventeen public schools in the area that improved schools‘
management; trained teachers and school administrators in leadership; and provided
excellent future employment opportunities for its graduates (Kanter 1999).
Cleveland Tomorrow displayed an extraordinarily vigorous public-private
partnership and cross-sector collaboration, when it opened itself to the civic arena
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through opportunities for citizen participation in creating a new Cleveland (Purdy 1993).
Since its turnaround resulting from a series of cross-sector collaborations and public-
private partnerships, Cleveland became entitled to win All-America City award five
times.
12
Such an honor put Cleveland back on the list of one of the most vibrant and
progressive cities in the country.
According to Waddock and Post (1991), in order to make Cleveland Tomorrow a
successful, cross-sectoral collaboration and to ensure its operations were effective, its
creators depended on five intangibles—respect creation, trust development,
communication complexities, decision-making dynamics, and relationship-building.
Above all, the initiative benefited from a decision-making structure, which was less
bureaucratic and more suitable to businesslike approach. As Ohio Governor Richard
Celeste states, ―Cleveland Tomorrow derives its strength from the fact that the CEO is
the only participant. There is no delegating it to anyone else. He can commit real
resources in a way that only a CEO can‖ (Waddock and Post 1991, 395).
Cleveland Tomorrow‘s supporters undermined the democratic processes by
depicting it as slow and hierarchical with inability to commit resources required for
uplifting a city like Cleveland. The quick success through local corporate model of
governance in Cleveland‘s case strengthens the notion, that greater level of business
involvement is necessary in the city governance for economic, as well as overall
development of the city.

12
This is an award given by the National Civic League and it is, ―the oldest community recognition
program in the nation, the award recognizes communities whose citizens work together to identify and
tackle community-wide challenges and achieve uncommon results.‖ (All-America City Award n.d.)
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Multiple collaborative models can be found across the US, which resonate with
the ideology of Cleveland Tomorrow. Some of the significant ones are: Greater
Philadelphia First (GPF), Detroit Renaissance, The Boston Compact, the Greater
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce in Minneapolis, and The Allegheny Conference on
Community Development (ACCD) in Pittsburgh, which later developed into a
multifaceted collaborative organization.
GPF was an initiative of corporate CEOs, who had employed a series of
competitive strategies and collaborated with multiple organizations and governing
entities for economic development of its region. Detroit Renaissance, a business
leadership collaborative during 1980 to 1993, had promoted its strategic plan for Detroit
(DiGaetano and Lawless 1999), which incorporated the economic development agenda,
as well as measures for crime prevention, public education, and an overall improvement
in the image of the city. The business elites in Detroit actively worked in collaboration
with the mayor and his administration on various economic development efforts
including the city‘s redevelopment and other social issues hampering the city‘s growth
(Austin and McCaffrey 2001).
In Pittsburgh, the ACCD was originally initiated in 1943, as an organization to
focus on the region and make a community improvement plan. Over time, this
organization was transformed into a versatile collaborative organization. ACCD worked
in collaboration with governing bodies in the 1980s and 1990s to make a rather
complicated county governance process more-streamlined and efficient (Austin and
McCaffrey 2001).
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Minneapolis has had a few different collaborative enterprises key in bringing
together business leaders, the city government, and the community. These enterprises
were The Minnesota Business Partnership (MBP), The Phillips Neighborhood
Revitalization Project in 1998, and The Minnesota Community Development Agency.
The MBP was responsible for creating several PPPs, which not only benefited the larger
community, but also created valuable socio-economic infrastructure for the city. The
Phillips Neighborhood Revitalization Project was initially led only by the business sector,
but over time it became large-scale, cross-sector collaboration with partners like the
federal government, The Minnesota Community Development Agency, and coalitions of
nonprofit and other government departments. This collaboration was successful in
housing renewal, creation of new jobs, overall social development, and the community‘s
betterment (Austin 2000).
An example worth noting in the education sector, where Boston businesses and
the schools came together to form one-of-a-kind collaboration is called The Boston
Compact. Initiated by the city‘s Private Industry Council (PIC), The Boston Compact—
comprised of a network of twenty-five corporate CEOs called the ―Vault— had specific
goals for the participating companies and the public schools. In The Boston Compact, the
private companies would ensure access to jobs for graduates in the public schools of
Boston, and in turn the schools would try to achieve designated goals, like improved
attendance, test scores, and graduation rates (Waddock n.d.). Some of the key
achievements of The Boston Compact involved $5 million raised by the Vault companies
for a scholarship program in the 1980s and $26 million in cash donated by these
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companies for equipment and services to wire the city‘s public schools (Abraham 1999).
One of the key persons in this collaboration was the first chair of Boston PIC, William
Edgerly, who brought together key business leaders to collaborate with PIC and
channeled the focus of PIC on issues of the public schools (Waddock n.d.).
The above examples characterize different forms of collaborations witnessed in
some of the major American cities in the sectors, such as economic development,
educational reforms, and urban development. The factors that triggered the emergence of
such collaborations vary from declining economy to poorly performing school districts to
deteriorating images of the respective cities. In all the collaborations, a great deal of
resource investment—mainly monetary—from the business sector was the key for their
existence and success. However, it may not be the only reason for success, because
business leadership and commitment to a cause seemed to have played equally important
roles in achieving their stated goals.
Partnership for the Built Environment
Baltimore Harbor Redevelopment
The Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) is a good example of an urban
redevelopment initiative emerging from the private sector and later being implemented in
form of collaboration with the city and other stakeholders. The GBC comprised of one-
hundred CEOs of Baltimore to focus upon individual urban development projects and to
stir the growth in the city during the1950s. The collaboration‘s approach was to narrow a
broader focus of the Chamber of Commerce (Wallace 2004). Its project-based approach
aimed at revitalizing the downtown in a short period of time. The GBC‘s manifesto read,
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―The GBC was organized on January 5, 1955 as an action committee designed to
mobilize the commercial, industrial and professional leadership of Baltimore to bring
about tangible and rapid improvements in the community.‖
13
As GBC‘s history suggests
it was greatly influenced by Pittsburgh‘s The Allegheny Conference on Community
Development and its success in turning around Pittsburgh‘s fate.
14

Prior to the GBC, already the Committee for Downtown was formed by the
business leaders to prevent downtown Baltimore from further deterioration. Because of
their similar goals, the GBC and the Committee for Downtown met, communicated, and
organized to make a joint plan of action and hired a planner to procure professional
assistance. The GBC and the Committee for Downtown did not want to rely on the city
for their goals, because they, ―wanted the planning one step removed from the political
process‖ (Wallace 2004, 10). Such a belief of the business leaders came from their desire
to be actively involved in the plan-making, because they had much more at stake than the
rest of the citizens or the citizens‘ groups (Wallace, 2004).
The collaboration for the Baltimore‘s urban redevelopment was aimed at
achieving representation from all the sectors in the city. ―The process of implementing
the strategy for Baltimore‘s physical renaissance involved much of the community, the
power structure, many citizens groups, and politicians in learning how to solve problems,
make decisions together, and get a consensus‖ (Wallace 2004, 242). Despite its
collaborative aims, the members of this group clearly did not represent all the sectors,

13
(The Greater Baltimore Committee: A Brief History n.d.)
14
Ibid.
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specifically, African American representatives, who remained absent from the group.
Unlike the civic leadership in Atlanta (Stone 1989) that was successful in achieving the
joint civic leadership of white and African American leaders since the 1950s, and the
same remained a major challenge in Baltimore even during the 1970s.
The key projects accomplished by the GBC included Charles Center and
Waterfront development in Baltimore. The Charles Center project‘s objective was to
improve the deteriorating retail district by redeveloping thirty-three acres of midtown
situated between Baltimore‘s financial and retail districts. The project was officially
adopted as an urban renewal plan by the City Council in 1959. The Charles Center
Management Office (CCMO) was a nonprofit organization that managed and supported
the Charles Center project. Concurrent to the Charles Center redevelopment project, the
city decided to redevelop another 240 acres of waterfront site in 1964. Once again, the
GBC took upon this task through their planning committee for developing a 30-year
water front plan with a total budget of $260 million.
15

The Master Plan for the Baltimore‘s inner harbor was jointly sponsored by the
GBC and the city. It had appointed the architect, planner, and urban designer David
Wallace and the architect and urban designer Tomas A. Todd, as their full-time design
staff as an external professional resource for the City Planning Office.
16
As a first step
towards redeveloping the inner harbor, GBC acquired voter approval for its bonds. The
CCMO received the Inner Harbor Development assignment in collaboration with the

15
Source: http://www.gbc.org/upload/GBC_History2008.pdf
16
They went on to establish the planning firm Wallace McHarg Roberts & Todd in 1965, which later
became Wallace Roberts & Todd in 1980.
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GBC, and they became the Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc. (CCIH) in
1965. CCIH‘s involvement was critical for the development of the Baltimore‘s
Renaissance and the waterfront development projects with help of the private and public
sectors‘ investments.
Wallace (2004) mentions institutional details of the CCIH as an entity, which was
a private, nonprofit corporation to serve the City of Baltimore. It operated under a
contract with the mayor and the City Council, which allowed it to plan and implement
Charles Center and Inner Harbor projects in collaboration with a Baltimore organization
called Urban Renewal and Housing Agency of Baltimore. The corporation took upon the
tasks of the urban renewal. All the administrators, private developers, contractors, and
citizens were required to deal with CCIH regarding all the urban renewal projects in the
city. The Inner Harbor Development Project brought desired success for its initiators, and
the CCIH managed to acquire annual operational funding for more than twenty-three
years from the mayor and the City Council. CCIH‘s major strengths were its unique
vision and business leadership. Baltimore‘s redevelopment initiative became
internationally known for its revitalization model as London Sunday Times mentioned in
November, 1987,
Baltimore, despite soaring unemployment, boldly turned its derelict harbor into a
playground. Tourists meant shopping, catering, and transport; this in turn meant
construction, distribution, manufacturing-leading to more jobs, more residents,
more activity. The decay of old Baltimore slowed, halted, then turned back. The
harbor area is now among America‘s top tourist draws and urban unemployment
is falling fast (Harvey 1991, 237).

While the success of Baltimore rested upon redeveloped built form of the
downtown and inner harbor, its criticism rested on unequal and undemocratic approach in
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administering the collaboration, which may have led to imbalanced development. A
critical view of the CCIH by David Harvey (1991) suggests it acted as an agency without
democratic control in shaping the urban renewal in Baltimore. He condemned the
process, through which the redevelopment occurred and criticized its outcome by alleging
that the process had followed a white, race-centered development.
Predominantly, white, upper-class business elites were a key in transforming the
Baltimore‘s downtown and the Inner Harbor, and this aspect was reflected in the
emerging segregated revitalization of its urban form. Its major critique is the redeveloped
areas failed to connect with other parts of the city. Instead, they acted as cosmetic
makeover to hide the reality of the city, which included racial conflicts, disadvantaged
African American neighborhoods, and obvious economic inequalities. Harvey (1991)
summarizes this redevelopment, ―like the city fair, the Inner Harbor functions as a
sophisticated mask…If the mask cracks or is violently torn off, the terrible face of
Baltimore‘s impoverishment may appear‖ (226).
He views Baltimore‘s renaissance as an urban renewal scheme implemented by
the business interests and supported by the public money and tax cuts. He also points at
the unequal distribution of civic amenities in the city and the incomplete nature of
Baltimore‘s redevelopment efforts that prevented it from becoming a headquarters city
(Zukin 2008).
To summarize, Baltimore‘s case represents two sides of thought; one side is
highly praised for its one of a kind public, private, and nonprofit collaboration and
business leadership that led Baltimore to become a first-class city for business and
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tourism. The other side questions the undemocratic roots of its administrative process, its
inability to have representation of all the sectors, and the disconnectedness reflected in its
urban form.
Urban Design Plan for the City
San Francisco‟s Urban Design Plan
Today, urban design issues are at the forefront in the city of San Francisco, but
such a status was not the case in the 1960s. Though San Francisco‘s urban design vision
had been crafted quite early by David Burnham after the earthquake and fire of 1906, the
city found his ideas too ambitious to put into its rebuilding efforts at that time. As a
result, his urban design principles never became a part of the planning practice of the
city, until the early 1970s.
Several triggering factors for the city of San Francisco created a citywide urban
design plan. In the late 1960s, the design of quite a few individual projects, such as Bank
of America Building, Embarcadero Center office towers, and Trans America building,
initiated a wave of dislike among the people of San Francisco for their shapes, sizes, and
volume disrupting the city‘s existing building landscape. Despite having one of the most
innovative land-use controls for an American downtown of that time, San Francisco‘s
city planners did not have a say in the appearances of the new buildings. They could only
regulate the shape of the buildings‘ overall bulk (Barnett 1982). In the 1950s and 1960s,
as Jacobs (1978) identifies, the citizens of San Francisco were becoming increasingly
concerned about various issues, such as buildings blocking familiar views, loss of
Victorian houses, widened streets dividing the neighborhoods, increased traffic,
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aesthetically displeasing remodeling, increase in billboards, and development over open
spaces that people were used to seeing. Above all, the major issue was, ―how to maintain
the physical attractiveness, charm, and pleasantness of San Francisco in the face of
mounting pressures for drastic change. Put another way, the problem was to moderate
and direct growth and change in a desirable and pleasing way‖ (Jacobs 1978, 191).
To address the mounting urban design concerns, it was necessary to create
regulations that could aid in achieving three dimensional controls over built environment
in the city, because ―San Francisco, considered by its own residents to be a very special
place, was without a public statement of what the city should look like‖ (Jacobs 1978,
190). In 1967, as a result, the City Planning Office decided to take upon the task of
preparing an urban design plan for the entire city, which was to become a part of the
city‘s comprehensive plan. It was a task no other city had attempted, since the City
Beautiful movement (Barnett 1982).
Allan Jacobs (1978), who was the planning director at the time, recounts the
urban design plan-making for San Francisco, as an initiative largely managed and run by
a team of young architects and urban designers from the city planning staff. Other
departments and government agencies were invited to participate in the process, but their
participation was not significant. At the conceptual stage, the City Planning Department
had realized the need for representation from all the sectors of the society in making an
urban design plan. So the city planning team made an effort to establish a committee with
various representatives. However, in the end, the committee neither had an overall
representation as an elitist group, nor played an instrumental role in giving its input
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during the initial stages, due to various reasons not envisaged earlier by the Planning
Department.
The original plan-making process was to take about two years and required an
estimated amount of $270,000. This funding for the plan came from various sources.
HUD provided $180,000, the mayor‘s Board of Supervisors approved $20,000, and for
the remaining $70,000, monies would be raised from local funds. The team of architects
and urban designers in the City Planning Department took almost a year to identify and
implement a methodology and the overall framework of aim and objectives for this urban
design plan. At the end of the first year, they were able to devise three initial reports titled
Background; Existing Plans; Policies and Goals; and Objectives and Policies. At this
stage, no major publicity of the plan took place; although the committee meetings were
open to the public, rarely did the city experience participation from the public in the
process.
To invigorate a rather slow process of the plan, external consultants, other than
the Planning Department, were hired in 1970, and they produced the fourth preliminary
report—Existing Form and Image—which included components like Quality of the
Environment, Internal Pattern and Image, Road Environment, and External Form and
Image. These parts went down to the details of evaluating every block in the city in terms
of environmental, physical form, visual character, and transportation related aspects.
The major turning point in the plan-making process came, when the consultant
presented fifth preliminary report titled ―Urban Design Principles‖ to the Plan Committee
and the Planning Commission, and later on to the San Francisco Planning and Renewal
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Association (Barnett 1982). This report‘s salient features included three major points;
one, streets and the qualities of street furniture and sidewalks; two, relationship between
the streets and building facades; and three, relationships among street layout, natural
landscape, and building mass. At this stage, the planning director and rest of the Plan
Committee recognized the enormity and the real potential of the initiative they had
undertaken.
The sixth report Social Reconnaissance Survey was important from public
participation perspective, because, at that stage, the Planning Department and the
consultants made an effort to reach out to the neighborhoods and take their values into
account. The process involved interviewing residents of thirteen diverse neighborhoods
about their views on the level of satisfaction with their neighborhood, access to the civic
amenities, desired environmental features, and suggestions on future public
improvements. Following the survey in 1970, San Francisco‘s Planning Department
completed the last two reports—Implementation Approaches and Citywide Urban Design
Plans. The final plan based on seven preliminary reports came out in 1971. ―[The plan]
provided a definition of design quality of San Francisco. In it was a set of objectives,
principles, and policies that dealt with the physical and sensory relationships between San
Franciscans and their environment‖ (Jacobs 1978, 209). It had sections, which included
City Pattern, Conservation, Major New Development, and Neighborhood Improvement.
The plan proposed four objectives, eighty-six principles and forty-five policies.
Surprisingly, San Francisco‘s urban design plan did not have any sketches
depicting the future urban form of the city based on the proposed plan. Reasons for
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omitting those types of futuristic images were described by Jacobs (1978) as, sketches
such as these may restrict many other possibilities; represent vested interests of certain
groups; make people hostile, due to massive condemnation of private properties for
public projects; and, above all, divert the attention away from the fundamental principles
and policies of the plan. The plan consisted of a series of constraints on height and mass
that would not only allow restricting of how tall and bulky the buildings could be, but
also control their shape in the San Francisco‘s skyline. The City Council adopted the plan
in 1971, and, soon after, the Planning Commission passed a resolution to develop new
zoning controls to help implement the plan.
The implementation results of the plan were not an outright success, as the plan
proposal was. It was a slow process that required acclimatizing the administration and
lawmakers to adopt design standards step-by-step. As a first step towards implementation
of the plan, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors approved the new zoning regulations
in 1972. California‘s environmental quality legislation of 1970 mandated Environmental
Impact Review (EIR) of all the major public and private developments, which meant they
had to go through the Planning Department. Such routing of all the projects for EIR also
allowed the City Planning Department to review the projects for new urban design
regulations, before granting its approval. Thus, urban design plan achieved the backing of
the environmental legislation for the state of California.
For the scale and its future impacts on San Francisco‘s urban form, the plan-
making process was not as controversial. However, it did see a fairly small-scale
opposition at different stages. Since the time of the plan‘s initial report-making, certain
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groups were opposing the growth. One of these groups even brought stricter height limit
measures on the ballot during the approval process of the plan in 1971 and 1979, but they
were not successful. Another group of people showed discontent for some of the new
buildings in the downtown business district, after the plan measures were in place. To
overcome those flaws, the San Francisco City Planning Commission made several new
architectural principles (Hedman 1981), which were included in the project review
process. These principles required new buildings to be built up to the property line on
lower floors, which would create visual interest at lower levels and relate with nearby
buildings. Barnett (1982) points to an overall critique of San Francisco‘s plan‘s
implementation, where the buildings built according to the urban design plan displayed a
poor contextual fit.
In terms of public participation and governmental collaboration outcomes, Jacobs
(1978) notes although the heads of the major operating departments were invited in the
plan-making process, their participation was not significant, and, therefore, the outcomes
did not reflect their commitment. On the contrary, different neighborhood groups drew
greatly from the urban design plan in making their own neighborhood plans. The Urban
Design Plan was instrumental in guiding other Master Plan components like
transportation, recreation, open-space planning, and conservation aspects. This plan also
proved to be a great educational resource with its extensive distribution and sustained
reference in public meetings for planning decisions. As Jacobs surmised, ―it proved to be
a worthwhile aid to citizens in helping to determine the kind of community they wanted‖
(Jacobs 1978, 218).
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Summary
It emerges from the first two types of cases, that different ways were prevalent, in
which the local corporate sector or business elites collaborated for various types of urban
initiatives. At times, few CEOs from the local corporations may have come together for a
common concern and employed their financial and other resources towards addressing
the issues. At other times, they may have collaborated with the city‘s political and
administrative wings, especially when it was necessitated by the project, or a better
outcome was anticipated in collaborating with the city.
Successful collaborative efforts in the civic arena give the corporate sector leaders
a coveted position in the society, as they contribute to their ongoing leadership role,
because ―these private groups sometimes have greater organizational continuity than
political regimes: their leaders can occupy their positions longer than elected officials;
they can mobilize substantial resources and talent faster than the public sector; their
meetings can occur behind closed doors‖ (Kanter 1999, 7).
An important aspect of private companies, which contribute to such partnerships,
is whether or not they are headquartered in that city. Kanter (1999) found locally
headquartered companies did the highest
17
for the community on all aspects. Research on
the motivations of the locally headquartered companies to participate in urban
development initiatives confirms these companies have greater stakes in the urban image
of their headquarter cities for several reasons. It is not just the number of people who

17
Kanter along with Allison Hughes did analysis of community involvement of 180 companies in Boston,
Cleveland, and Miami. Their conclusion showed that locally headquartered companies did the most for the
community on all the measures and their leaders had the most active involvement in major local civic and
cultural organizations. For further information on analysis criteria see Kanter (1999).
113

matter in the interests of the companies to improve their surroundings, but the flow of
executives and customers also matters, because:
In larger companies international recruitment of talent in a global labor market
means that the headquarters city must meet international standards, with
maximum amenities and minimum problems. Companies often place showcase
operations or pilot ventures in the headquarters region for convenient visits by top
management, customers, or suppliers (Kanter 1999, 12).

Thus, the nature of multi-sector partnerships or collaborations, as seen in
Cleveland Tomorrow and Baltimore‘s redevelopment, depends upon several factors.
These identified factors are: the business sector‘s motivations in leading the formation of
partnerships; the primary goals of the groups, who initiate them; and a greater reliance on
the business sector for monitory resources and civic leadership for framing future visions
of cities.
In case of urban design plan process as observed in San Francisco; the private
sector played almost no role, except for participating as advisory committee members,
whose interests and influences were minimal at best. On the contrary, neighborhoods
were more active, when it came to area plans and incorporating their vision of the future
built form improvements in their neighborhoods. The plan became an acclaimed
document in urban design and planning practice, not necessarily for its design controls,
but for being the first-of-its-kind in charting a path for a citywide urban design plan, that
other American cities could look up to.
Several points emerge, when the categories of collaboration and urban design
plan-making are merged, specifically, as private sector takes the initiative, and multi-
sector collaboration is incorporated in an urban design plan process. First, in a private-
114

sector-initiated urban design plan, the acceptance and participation by the Planning
Department, developers and citizens at large may not be as easy to implement, as it
maybe in cases where it is initiated by the city‘s Planning Department. Second, the
private sector is likely to be inexperienced in the arena of built form processes, which has
been a domain of the City Planning Department, and, as a result, the local corporate
sector‘s approach of quick turnaround may become an unrealistic goal for an urban
design plan and its implementation. Lastly, even with a promise for greater collaboration
among numerous stakeholders, the private sector leadership in urban design plan and
code-making processes lends itself to question its democratic premise and accountability
to the citizens.

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CHAPTER 5: BACKGROUND OF OMAHA

A brief perspective on evolution of Omaha is presented in this chapter for
understanding how its historic developments have contributed to its present status
specifically as it relates to two major aspects of this study: One, current governance scene
as it evolved from historic chain of political economic events; and two, evolution of
current physical footprint of the city, as it was invariably linked to political, economic,
and social developmental history of Omaha. Through this historic overview an attempt is
also made to identify, whether there is a definite existence of a business regime, and if
there is, then what is the nature of this regime and the kinds of interventions it has made
in the history of the city‘s growth.
This chapter is divided into four sections: the first one describes Omaha‘s present
demographics for a current perspective on its size and its population dynamics. The
second section focuses on an overall history of Omaha in terms of major political and
economic developments in the city, since its inception in the 1850s. However, it is a brief
history that does not cover all the historic aspects comprehensively, but highlights only
the key historic changes relevant to this study. In the third section, the planning history of
the city is discussed and three key phases (Daly and Reeves 1989) of planning in Omaha
are explained followed by the last section, which summarizes this chapter.
Current Demographics
Omaha is significantly smaller than the most of other major metropolitan cities in
the US, but it is one of the major cities among a large number of second-tier cities, like
Kansas City, Minneapolis, Denver, St. Louis, Colorado Springs, Cleveland, Raleigh,
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Fort Worth, and other similar cities. The city of Omaha has a population of 408,958,
18

and Omaha metropolitan area has a population of 838,855
19
. The city‘s land area is 115
square miles with a density of 3,370.8 persons per square mile. In Omaha racial and
ethnic classification from 2000 census data includes 78.4 percent white, 13.3 percent
African American, 1.7 percent Asian, 7.5 percent Hispanic or Latino, and 1.9 percent
reporting to be of two or more races
20
. The median household income is $40,006
21
and
11.3 percent of the population lives below poverty line in the city.
History of Omaha
The first settlement of Omaha was surveyed and platted in 1854, after the
conclusion of a treaty with the Omaha native American tribe in June 1854 that required
the native Americans to cede the majority of their lands in Nebraska to the US
Government (Larsen and Cottrell 1997). The first town site of Omaha consisting of 320
blocks of 264 square-feet each was platted by Alfred D. Jones, a postmaster and
surveyor, in 1854. Three blocks were dedicated for park-like squares. Jones did not
layout the city in a manner that most other river cities of that time did—parallel to the
adjacent river. Instead, his simple grid followed the points of a compass and disregarded
the winding channel of the river (Peterson 1983). It was the beginning of ignoring natural
terrain, while platting the city‘s footprint. This settlement was to see innumerable

18
Source: U.S Census Bureau, 2010.
19
Source: US Census Bureau 2009, Decision Data
20
See Appendix I for detailed statistics on Omaha and Omaha metropolitan area.
21
Source: US Census Bureau 1999.
117

episodes of grading, which resulted from this initial grid along with attempts to flatten the
hilly ground on the path of Omaha‘s physical growth for the next century.
Figure 5.1: 1854 Plan of Omaha showing the first platted settlement by the Missouri
River

Source: Lowe Jackson Bayliss and Co. Courtesy: From the collections of the Omaha Public Library

Railroad

Without Union Pacific, Omaha might never have become more than a village and
could have disappeared, after the state capital was moved to Lincoln in 1869
(Peterson 1983, 6).

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Omaha‘s future and its existence became tied to Union Pacific Railroad after
President Abraham Lincoln approved the Pacific Railroad Act on July 1, 1862, that
assured federal assistance for the construction of a transcontinental railroad. The
groundbreaking of Union Pacific Railroad took place in 1863, and since then it attracted
workers for the railroad and for other businesses supporting the migrant population of
railroad workers. Omaha also became a major transferring point for the pioneers
exploring the West, because Union Pacific Railroad was one of the first railroads into the
West.
Figure 5.2: Omaha‘s Union Station in 1947
22

Source: Photograph by John S. Savage, Omaha From the Air © 1947 Omaha World-Herald, Omaha.
Reprinted, by permission, from Omaha World-Herald.

22
On the left foreground is the Union Station; opposite to it is the Burlington Railroad Station. On the right
foreground is the Burlington Railway Mail Terminal. The Union Station was completed January 15, 1931.
It was owned by the Union Station Company and operated by the Union Pacific Railroad.
119

Union Pacific Railroad was instrumental in consequent growth of Omaha
23
.
Omaha‘s wholesale industry was a result of a demand for the goods to small-town
shopkeepers along the Union Pacific and other railroads in Nebraska, and as far west as
to the Pacific Coast. As early as in the 1860s, Omaha developed as a meat-packing hub
and agricultural processing center by processing the supply provided by Nebraska
farmers. The Union Stock Yards Company founded in 1880s was not only an alternative
to the Chicago market, but also one of the largest industries dependent on Omaha‘s
hinterland (Hewitt 1954), and its growth relied on Union Pacific Railroad.
Developments in the Late Nineteenth to Mid Twentieth Centuries
Omaha‘s rapid economic growth during 1860s to 1880s led to a real-estate boom,
which resulted in a number of suburban residential subdivisions in Omaha
24
. The village
of Dundee as a suburban residential village was also a product of this real-estate boom.
The public transportation in the form of horse cars and streetcars had made commuting
among these suburban villages and the downtown business district increasingly feasible.
The urban growth during 1880s was more speculative and led to many paper towns and
subdivisions surrounding Omaha, but populating these towns remained gradual. Many of
these subdivisions were not built, due to drought-led slowing down in the following
decades from the 1890s to the 1900s.

23
For further information refer to Athearn R. G. 1971. Union Pacific Country. Chicago: Rand McNally &
Co.

24
Factual information about historic developments in Omaha is referred from Athearn (1971), Bristow
(2000), Daly and Reeves (1989), Hewitt (1954), Larsen and Cottrell (1997), Dustin (1980), Peterson
(2003), and Sorenson (1889).

120

At that time, the adverse crop conditions and nontransparent practices of railroad
leaders raged Nebraska farmers, who were drawn into the city politics as a way to revolt
against their exploitation. The Nebraska Grange in 1870s and the Farmers Alliance in
1880s were initial platforms of the political revolt of farmers against the established order
of Nebraska in general and of Omaha in particular. A final manifestation of this agrarian
uprising was the emergence of the Populist Movement in the early 1890s, which spread
widely and received national recognition. It called for nationalizing of railroads,
government ownership of communication systems, reforming the monetary system and
election practices, creating postal savings banks, and stopping the subsidies to the private
corporations. In Nebraska, the populists managed to elect a governor in 1892, but, over
the years, their original aims got diffused in the political rancor, and the major populist
groups were merged with the Democratic Party. This occurrence was the only single,
historic example of a large-scale peoples‘ movement against the status-quo involved
masses of people in Omaha.
From 1900 to the 1920s is known as a Golden Era for Omaha, when new
developments and growth in agriculture brought prosperity to the city and other Nebraska
towns. Many of the paper towns were now built and attracted new residents to inhabit
them. Omaha grew faster and bigger, when it annexed Dundee and South Omaha in 1915,
then Florence and Benson in 1917. These annexations led Omaha‘s population to reach
191,601 persons in 1920.

121

Figure 5.3: The City Engineer‘s map of Omaha in 1920

Courtesy: From the collections of the Omaha Public Library

122

Following the 1920s, the growth of Omaha slowed down, and the city remained
primarily a north-south city with a slight bulge on the west towards Dodge Streets.
Omaha grew rapidly towards the direction of this bulge, as the World War II ended in
1945. In the 1950s, the advent of greatly improved automobiles with improved
technology led to interstate highways and rapid expansion westward. It marked the
beginning of a quick emptying of Omaha‘s downtown. In the1960s, 55 years, after it
annexed other towns, Omaha annexed Millard, which added to the city‘s westward
growth significantly.
Key Political Developments in the Twentieth Century
Omaha‘s location as a transfer terminal for Union Pacific Railroad boosted the
city‘s economy, which also allowed undesirable elements within the city boundaries.
Gambling, drinking, and violence percolated in Omaha‘s development in various forms
from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. The first ward of the town,
which was later labeled as the Third Ward became a center for most of the vice dealings.
Tom Dennison, who at the age of 34 had mastered gambling before he moved to Omaha
in 1892, became a key figure in Omaha‘s political history. He first established himself as
a leader of the Third Ward, where nearly all of the vice activities had their base and later
expanded his influence as the real ―boss‖ of the rest of the town. Dennison developed
good ties with the police, newspaper owners, business owners, and the mayor. He also
formed a charity with his gambling money and helped the poor, who in turn supported his
political candidates.
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Though Tom Dennison never held a political office, he remained in the limelight
and at the helm for over three decades and became known for controlling the political
―machine‖ during his time in Omaha. During the Dennison era, gambling, drinking, and
drug traffic flourished inside as well as outside the Third Ward. Eventually, after his
death in the 1930s, his control over the political machine ended, and a new surge of
business and political leadership took over to assist the political processes and city‘s
development.
Around the decade of Dennison‘s death, worth noting is a major and unexpected
employee outrage materialized concerning the local corporate practices in Omaha.
Backed up by Section 7A of the National Industrial Recovery Act that allowed the
workers to unionize, the workers of Omaha Traction Company (OTC) formed the
Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees in1934. They
demanded recognition in form of seniority and pay increase.
A series of strikes, appointment of an arbitrator from Kansas City, rejection of
arbitrator-proposed settlement by the workers, and firing of all the workers by the
company subsequently occurred. The new strike-breakers were hired in place of fired
workers, and the streetcars were put back on the streets. This action of the OTC further
angered the Union workers, who resorted to violence to the extent that the governor had
to declare martial law in Omaha with 1,800 National Guard members on duty. The
governor also ordered an immediate arbitration, and the company was forced to comply
with what governor‘s representative dictated in order to have its streetcars running. The
124

final settlement allowed strikers to return, their wages to increase in the future, and a two-
person panel to be put in place for deciding the seniority demands of the workers.
Just when everything seemed to be in place, the strikebreakers brought a Court
injunction saying governor had exceeded its authority in the settlement and were rehired
to replace the Union workers. No counter-violence from the Union workers was recorded
this time. Additionally, the seniority rights approved by the two-person arbitration
committee were rejected by the company. Although the win for Omaha Traction
Company in the streetcar strike marked a great victory for Omaha Business Men‘s
Association, this uproar also encouraged subsequent unionization of Omaha‘s
unorganized labor force.
Banks
Banks played a major role in Omaha‘s history and continue to do so in the present
day. One of the first banks to open in Omaha was the Bank of Nebraska in 1956. This
financial institution was one of the several ―wild-cat‖ institutions that circulated its own
paper money. Growth of different industries in historic Omaha meant increase in
monetary transactions and expansion in size and number of banks. Many of the early
banks collapsed in the initial few years, but only a small number of banks survived, such
as the earlier form of today‘s American Bank, which made its way through in the early
twentieth century. Another institution that survived was today‘s First National Bank
(FNB), which was originally established as a banking firm by the Kountze Brothers in
1857. The Kountze brothers were also the civic leaders of Omaha, and, as a result, FNB
played an important role in the civic affairs of the community. Some other noteworthy
125

banks in the history of Omaha include Omaha National Bank, whose chair was an
eminent civic leader W. Dale Clark, Livestock National Bank, Package National Bank,
and Federal Land Bank.
Newspapers
Printed newspapers today may be on the path to extinction among growing
electronic media, but, about 150 years ago, press-printed newspapers were the only
means of gaining information about the neighborhoods, community, city, state and the
external world. The first Omaha newspaper called The Arrow was published by J.W.
Pattison, who was a lawyer, business agent, and co-editor. He traveled westward from
New York, as a correspondent for The New York Herald. Pattison originally published
The Arrow in July, 1854 (Larsen 1984) with an established Council Bluffs location and,
six days later, published it from several Omaha locations. In The Arrow‘s first editorial,
he described his vision of Omaha becoming a commercial metropolis. Only twelve issues
later, The Arrow was suspended, as Pattison left for Missouri. The first newspaper printed
in Omaha was The Nebraskian that began in the fall of 1854, flourished for 11 years, and
then was out-of-business in 1865. A competition for The Nebraskian was The Weekly
Times, a Democrat newspaper, which was also ended within two years. The Omaha
Republican was the residual, which was a quick reaction to the demise of The Weekly
Times, then went through several owners and reconfigurations, before emerging as The
Tribune in 1870.
In 1865, Dr. George Miller founded The Herald, which was consolidated with
The Evening World in 1889 and evolved into the Omaha World-Herald (OWH). The
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Omaha Bee was another famous newspaper, which was founded by Edward Rosewater in
1871 and rose to publish morning and evening editions during the tenure of the
publication. In those times, newspapers took strong positions on every issue amidst
ongoing rivalry between leading newspapers. In 1920, The Omaha Bee merged with The
News and became The Bee-News, which was a fierce competition for the OWH.
Eventually, The Bee-News was purchased by the OWH in 1937. Later in history, The Sun
newspaper also gave the Omaha World-Herald some competition. The Omaha World-
Herald, for the most part, has been the dominant newspaper in Omaha.
Economic Activities and Emergence of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)
Omaha originally was a town that survived, because of major corporations like
Union Pacific Railroad and First National Bank, which were founded within decades of
Omaha‘s origination. Omaha could have remained a small village or a point of transfer
towards the West, if the Union Pacific Railroad had not selected Omaha as its
midwestern hub. The presence of big corporations, since the inception of Omaha, made
their involvement in the governance of the town a natural occurrence. The city also relied
on the successful existence of corporations as business partners and political leaders,
because it ensured the sustenance of the city government, after Omaha was granted a city
charter in 1957 by the third Nebraska territorial legislature (Larsen and Cottrell 1997).
The prominent business owners of the first few decades of Omaha‘s establishment
included the Kountze and Creighton families. Four Kountze brothers founded the first
bank in Omaha in the mid 1950s, and Edward Creighton, who had other numerous
business investments, also joined Kountze brothers by investing in their First National
127

Bank. The Bank along with Union Pacific Railroad remained founding corporations
amidst many other small business pioneers, who came and went. Other businesses like
cattle farming and meat-packing industries in South Omaha, manufacturing, smelting,
and refining, retail establishments, and jobbing firms that rose to their Golden Era by the
turn of the twentieth century, but eventually declined during the Post-War Era.
Figure 5.4: Livestock Exchange Building in South Omaha built in 1927
25
surrounded by
stockyards and meat-packing plants.

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from Omaha-World Herald, Omaha From the Air © 1947 by Omaha
World-Herald, Omaha.

The earliest form of public-private partnership for improving Omaha‘s image as
an urban center took place, when local businesses and the state government contributed
towards bringing Trans-Mississippi International Exposition in 1898. The Nebraska

25
A maze of a thousand cattle pens and a handful of meat packing plants surrounded the building in which
35,000 head of cattle were processed daily. The Union Stock Yards Company, one of Omaha's biggest
industries begun in 1884.
128

legislature contributed $100,000; other states and territories put in $138,000 for buildings
and exhibits. Omaha businesses made matching contributions reaching a total of
$600,000 (Larsen and Cottrell 1997). The fair was a big success with as many as 2.6
million attendees. This point onward, Omaha was no longer a frontier town or a city in
wilderness, but it achieved an image of a stabilized and matured town on its way to
become a metropolis.
Figures 5.5: Views of the Trans Mississippi International Exposition, 1898

Courtesy: From the collections of the Omaha Public Library

129

This trend of forging partnerships between the city and corporations continued
with occasional downward turns, like the first three decades of the twentieth century,
when Omaha‘s political leaders were anti-business, and the political ―machine‖ was ran
by a single man—Tom Dennison. However, that trend once again initiated the
momentum during the 1960s, when A.V. Sorenson became the mayor of Omaha. He
championed the art of public-private partnership and led a successful completion of
Omaha-Douglas Civic Center, conversion of the Courthouse into a Hall of Justice, and
completion of the Woodmen Tower. He planted the seeds of urban renaissance in
Omaha‘s downtown with public-private partnerships, which only grew and advanced
further during the last quarter of the twentieth century in the form of river-front
development and downtown redevelopment.
Business Leadership
Business leadership was a key to Omaha‘s success, as business heads of local
corporations also took a great deal of interest in non-business affairs of the city. In the
second half of the nineteenth century, William A. Paxton and John A. Creighton were the
key business leaders. Creighton was a great philanthropist and the most respected man in
the town, who had donated large sums of money to charities, hospitals, and Creighton
University. Paxton‘s leadership style and generosity was not the same as Creighton‘s,
because Paxton did not share his wealth with others, but he was a city leader for his
contributions towards uplifting the city with his business acumen. Following the demise
of these two leaders, Gurdon W. Wattles, a former Iowa Banker, took the baton and
became famous for making Trans Mississippi Exposition in Omaha a reality by bringing
130

together public and private funds for the event. He was a member of many social and
commercial groups and was crowned king of the Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben
26
in 1905. His
civic contributions were vital in improving the overall image of Omaha.
Among multiple voluntary associations, commercial groups, and professional
societies, the most prominent society was Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben founded in 1895. Its
goals were economic and social, which were to promote patriotism, publicize the town,
and bring together neighborhoods within the boundaries of Omaha. It carried a tradition
at the annual social event of the group, where one of the Board of Governors and a
young, society woman were crowned ―King and Queen‖ of the Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben,
and thousands of members, their families, guests, and acquaintances from Omaha and
many surrounding locations gathered to take part in the group‘s festivities. This group
became a major platform for creating an elite business regime, and its Board of
Governors included a handful of community-minded decision-makers in the city for
many decades. Larsen and Cottrell (1997) describe the existence of the racing concourse
of Ak-Sar-Ben as an important social, entrepreneurial, and profitable facet of Omaha,
which would sustain its existence and increase growth substantially through the
involvement of other towns, farming communities, and cities in a successful manner. The
legacy of Ak-Sar-Ben celebrations and activities eventually faded in the late twentieth
century with diminishing popularity of the horseracing track, but the tradition of confined
decision-making power in the hands of a few, prominent, and influential, civic leaders
continued to encourage growth and development in Omaha.

26
The name Ak-Sar-Ben title comes from Nebraska spelled backwards.
131

Figure 5.6: Ak-Sar-Ben racing track in the 1940s

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from Omaha-World Herald, Omaha From the Air © 1947 by Omaha
World-Herald, Omaha.

After the Dennison Era and during the decades of 1940s to 1960s, the power of
Omaha‘s business interests seemed to have weakened with a ―sort of power vacuum,‖ as
noted by Paul Williams (1966) in his study on the civic leadership in Omaha. He
identified ―Twenty Influentials,‖ who were business leaders, excluding doctors, lawyers,
labor leaders, and women. The doctors and lawyers were regarded as paid consultants,
who led healthcare, and legal, endeavors, as per the requirements of their clients. He
argued that the existing twenty influential leaders had been on power for too long, and, as
132

a result, they had lost the effectiveness of their power. To add to the growing crises,
emerging leadership was estimated to take at least ten years to become insiders of the
existing power structure. He defined an ―insider,‖ as the person, who was acknowledged
by the majority of the ―power elite‖ and sat on numerous boards and committees.
However, the screening process of becoming an insider was not an easy task, especially
when the power group remained a closely-knit, closed-will entity.
A few of the these ―Twenty Influentials‖ included the owner of OWH; the
presidents of Peter Kiewit & Sons Company and First National Bank; the head of Leo A.
Daly Co.; the director of Byron Reed Company; the heads of Mutual of Omaha and
Central States Insurance groups; the leads of the food-processing, gas, and utility
companies; sole proprietors of a plow company, a major retailer, and an advertising
company. In relation to the powers held by these businesses, political powers of the City
Council had a small base restricted within specific interest groups or neighborhoods.
Very few, if any, mayors of early Omaha had the kind of economic power required for
controlling and influencing the entire city, that some of the business leaders did. Even
popular mayors such as A.V. Sorenson remained on the periphery of the real power
structure of Omaha. When the mayor, Dworak, in the 1960s cut his connections from the
real power-holders of the business sector, his political future in the city suffered. On the
contrary, mayors like Eugene Leahy, who worked to garner the support of power groups,
could achieve many tangible results, and winning future political battles became easy for
him. Leahy went on to become the CEO of the Riverfront Development Foundation
formed by the business interests in 1971.
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In the latter part of the twentieth century, Omaha‘s business leadership was
successful in redeveloping the downtown, pushing the river front development, and
carrying out a great deal of construction to revitalize the urban core, which again
remained in their economic interests. At the end of 1970s, the leadership and decision-
making power had shrunk further from ―Twenty Influentials‖ to ―Big Five‖ (Larsen and
Cottrell 1997, 270). This group of five included three members from the original twenty
and two new members
27
. These five members were in charge of the business affairs of
Omaha. They were regarded as knowledgeable and rational decision-makers, who looked
after Omaha‘s best interests.
The political economic history of Omaha suggests Omaha‘s business leadership
was inseparably linked with the major political and governance decisions of the city,
since the beginning of Omaha. Some of the key local corporations like Union Pacific
Railroad, First National Bank, and the Omaha World-Herald were not only the economic
drivers of the city ,but their professional heads were also the civic leaders of the city, and
this traditional model of leadership and decision-making has survived, even in the present
times (McNamara 2007). Decision-making limited to a few, key, and influential leaders
suggest a predominant presence of a corporate urban regime, especially after the
Dennison Era from 1940s to the present times. Based on the history of the city, this
regime is primarily made up of business interests, and the political and administrative
factions of Omaha have displayed little influence in the developmental history of the city

27
The five members were architectural firm owner Daly, insurance executive V. J. Skutt, Northern Natural
Gas board chairman Willis Strauss, and president of the Union Pacific Railroad John C. Kenefick, and the
president of Northwestern Bell Telephone Jack McAllister.
134

in the last half century. This regime influenced the historic urban form evolution of the
city. The following portion portrays the influence of the regime on the history of planning
and physical developments within the Omaha boundaries.
Planning History of Omaha
Omaha‘s planning history is invariably tied to the aspirations of its civic and
business leaders and to what these leaders had envisioned Omaha should become in the
subsequent phases of its growth in last 160 years. Daly and Reeves (1989) provide a rich
and valuable account of Omaha‘s planning history, which she divides into three phases.
Below is the review of these three phases, as identified by Daly-Bednarek (1992).
1880-1920: Omaha and the „City Beautiful‟
Long before the establishment of Omaha City Planning Commission in 1915,
early fabric of the city had followed the footsteps of Frederick Law Olmstead‘s planning
and greening ideas. As soon as Omaha displayed the signs of becoming urban, the city
leaders of frontier Omaha saw the importance and necessity of open spaces to alleviate
congestion and improve the urban conditions. Omaha had prepared park plans by 1900
that included a boulevard system to give an image of Omaha as a stable and well-
established city. The city‘s park system was further developed by the Park Board, based
on the state legislation of 1889 directing the metropolitan-class cities in Nebraska to
create, institute, and set up a system of parks. The establishment of the City Planning
Commission in the early twentieth century was another step closer to achieving the City
Beautiful ideal, then the park and boulevard system was unified further, as the city
planning activities commenced.
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The first plan produced by the Commission in 1919 for Omaha introduced the
earliest zoning ordinance in the city. The plan somewhat shifted from the popular ―City
Beautiful‖ ideals of its time for two reasons: one, during that time, Omaha had become a
busy commercial and industrial town; and second, planning practice had just moved away
from the ―City Beautiful‖ towards the ―City as a Machine‖ model.
1920-1966: Omaha and the “City Efficient”
To fulfill the requirements of a striving commercial and industrial town that
Omaha‘s civic leadership had aspired for, the decades of early 1930s to 1960s involved
significant planning actions in the city. In a growing city, there was a need for a strong
downtown served by paved streets and highways, then along with parks and playgrounds,
water and sewer mechanisms. This was the agenda of three plans prepared during the
period from 1945 to 1966. During 1945 to 1958, two plans were prepared—The Blue
Book and The Omaha Plan. These plans focused mainly on basic infrastructure
improvements. They also included recreational projects like parks and playgrounds, as a
part of the city‘s infrastructure to help boost morals of the adult community.
The plans were also the outcomes of initiatives sponsored by the private sector,
and the local civic and business leaders formed various committees to promote those
outcomes. In the Omaha plan of 1958, parking and traffic accesses were given an added
importance within the overall City Efficient framework. This plan also called for urban
renewal in the downtown for strengthening the city‘s core. However, Omaha voters
declined the large-scale urban renewal multiple times (Stevens 1981), which saved a
large-scale demolition of Omaha‘s urban core.
136

Figure 5.7: Aerial view of the downtown during 1940s

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from Omaha World-Herald, Omaha From the Air © 1947 by Omaha
World-Herald, Omaha.

Along with the former ideas of improving the city‘s image of being efficient and
support its economic goals, the third plan named ―Central Omaha Plan‖ prepared in 1966
introduced concepts of city beautification, historic preservation of buildings and
structures, and enhancement of cultural activities and recreational institutions in Omaha.
For the first time in the planning process, beautification of the city became a focus. This
plan also came at a time, when the downtown was witnessing its ill-fate in terms of
declining sales and emptying of its core. Through this plan, the civic leaders were
interested in building the interstate link to the downtown and renewing the urban core
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ideas; whereas, others in the city raised aesthetic issues like planting of trees and flowers
and improving architecture of many of the local downtown buildings. Also on their
agenda were the anti-litter campaigns and preservation of the city‘s historic urban form.
Even though such new ideas emerged in 1966 plan, they were acknowledged only after
the 1960s, when the city‘s leadership looked elsewhere for improving the city‘s image.
During the 1960s, the business leadership took a number of study trips to other cities to
learn about their ways of portraying their cities and attracting further development
28
. This
was a process, through which Omaha‘s business leaders realized where the urban
aesthetics of Omaha stood in relation with other similar-sized cities and the vital role of
urban aesthetics in the city‘s economic growth.
1966-1989: Omaha and the “Livable City”
Omaha entered an era of change, when earlier notions of the City Functional gave
a way towards creating a more Livable City. A couple of economic factors contributed to
this shift. The first was the collapse of the meat-packing industry during late 1960s, and
second was the change in local leadership, where leaders, who were older in age, retired
or passed away, which as a natural occurrence, allowed for new leaders to take their
positions. The new leadership structure made up of younger group was open to creative
ideas at this time. To add to this dynamic, an innovative mayor Eugene Leahy came into
power in 1968, who gave novel ideas for improving the city‘s image and directing its
future growth.

28
Omaha Chamber of Commerce. July 22, 1963. Profile Vol. XXIII, No. 14, 1-2; and

_____ . Sept 27, 1965. Profile Vol. XXV, No. 18, 1-5.
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The new agenda for this era involved expansion of cultural and recreational
amenities, which was manifested in the public relations campaign called ―Awareness
Omaha.‖ It was launched by the Economic Development Council of the Chamber of
Commerce in 1968. This campaign moved away from glorifying the benefits of working
in Omaha to celebrating the joy of living in Omaha. It exhibited how Omaha was better
than New York, Chicago, or San Francisco, because it had less traffic and congestion and
presented a better living environment as a result.
The Chamber of Commerce made quality of life agenda its top-focus in 1970.
Small-scale projects like sidewalk vendors, concert bands, art fairs, small shoppers‘
plazas, and additional greenery were implemented to attract shoppers into the downtown.
Redevelopment of an old, wholesale district called Old Market was the most successful
project in this recently created direction. The Livable City idea reached a plateau, when a
series of planning proposals grouped under Riverfront Development came forth in the
1970s. Mayor Leahy called for building a whole new lifestyle along the river by
developing the city‘s riverfront. The projects included renewing the Orpheum Theater
into a symphony hall, creating a downtown UNO campus, building a new headquarters
for Northwestern Bell in downtown Omaha, generating more housing in the downtown
areas, and doing additional rebuilding and renovating work in the Old Market area.
One of the key elements of the projects involving renewing the downtown, and
the riverfront was the creation of a Central Park Mall to give downtown an urban image.
This mall was to be a block-wide open space that connected the downtown with the
Missouri river and allowed people to use the sought-after area for concerts, fairs, or
139

leisure space. The Central Park Mall ideas, along with other proposed projects in this
category, were welcomed by the City Council.
Figure 5.8: Gene Leahy Mall

Source: Author
In the direction of Livable City ideas, a 1975 study called Planning for Aesthetic
Quality was funded by the National Endowment for the Arts and the Cities of the Omaha-
Council Bluffs region. Although the study was primarily intended for the aesthetic
improvement of the riverfront area, it also included the elements pertinent to other areas
of the city. Objectives of this study were,
1. To define operating definition of regional aesthetic quality.
2. To propose a plan that improves physical environment of the region in terms of its
aesthetic qualities.
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3. To propose a program that involves arts as a method to enrich the culture and
improve aesthetic qualities.
4. To propose implementation mechanisms for the study.
At the time of this study‘s publication, urban design standards had not dominated
small, midwestern cities as much, but the study mentioned the role of architectural and
urban design guidelines for improving the aesthetics. It also made suggestions for
improving the streetscape and open spaces by proposing street prototypes in categories
like main streets, schoolyards, and neighborhood centers. Interestingly, improvement in
the aesthetics of schoolyards was intended for creating a pleasing and stimulating
environment for children in the school system. This study was one of the first steps that
recognized the value of urban form guidelines for Omaha, as early as in 1975, but these
ideas, unfortunately, were to remain on paper for the next twenty-five years.
During the last three decades of the twentieth century and beginning of the
twenty-first century, unprecedented developments for a midwestern city occurred in
Omaha‘s downtown and riverfront areas (Shukert 2010). These downtown developments
included construction of Qwest Center sports arena and convention center, a series of
new hotels including Omaha Hilton, a 42-story, one million sq ft First National Tower,
new publishing facilities of the Omaha World-Herald, corporate headquarters for the
Union Pacific Railroad, and the approval of a 25,000-seat ball park as a permanent home
to the National Collegiate Athletic Association‘s (NCAA) College World Series from
2011 onwards. On the riverfront, development of corporate facilities like ConAgra Foods
Headquarters, a major facility of the Gallup Organization, numerous residential
141

developments, and additional enhancements in the form of entertainment ventures took
place. Construction of Bob Kerrey Pedestrian Bridge across the Missouri River was an
embodiment of creating, improving, and enhancing Omaha‘s image, as a culturally and
aesthetically superior city. Citizens of the Omaha area, as well as the leaders and people
nationwide began to learn about the state-of-the-art and progressive enticement toward
the Omaha location.
Figure 5.9: Bob Kerrey Pedestrian Bridge

Source: Author
An important turn came for the historic district in downtown Omaha in the 1980s,
when ConAgra Foods voiced their desire to locate its Headquarters on a large plat of land
along the Missouri River. This proposition required demolishing several historic
142

warehouse buildings in the downtown, known as Jobbers Canyon, and that announcement
created uproar and upheaval from the historic preservation groups in the city. Also, the
owners of the Old Market area considered this demolition, as a threat to a thriving Old
Market District in the downtown area. Despite the city planners and the City Council‘s
efforts to suggest alternate sites and plans, ConAgra did not change its position, and the
city was faced with the option of either losing a large, economically beneficial, and well-
known corporation like ConAgra or giving away its prime land with historic buildings to
a private company. A major compromise was made by the city to keep ConAgra in
Omaha. As a part of this compromise, the city not only took upon the responsibility of
acquiring all the historic buildings, demolishing them, and preparing the site for
ConAgra, but also provided other negotiated tax breaks to the company.
Figure 5.10: Jobbers Canyon district

Courtesy: From the collections of the Omaha Public Library

143

Figure 5.11: An aerial view of ConAgra Foods downtown campus by the river. It deviates
significantly in its suburban urban form than rest of the downtown.

Source: Reprinted, by the permission, from Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Omaha.

ConAgra used a suburban style urban form for its new campus, in place of a
dense, historic warehouse district and disregarded the surrounding physical fabric of the
downtown, and the city had neither the means nor the intention to prevent ConAgra from
doing so. Initially, ConAgra remained a closed campus, but, in the later years, it opened
its public park area for the citizens of Omaha. The compromise by the city for ConAgra
reflected two major points: One, the private corporate sector regime in the city was much
more powerful in large-scale urban form decisions; and, two, cities like Omaha weighed,
and rated economic growth and retention of jobs more important than historic
preservation or sustaining the existing urban form of their downtown areas.
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Parks and Boulevards
A number of parks were interwoven in the fabric of Omaha, ever since the first
community on the banks of Missouri was platted in 1954. At that time, Omaha had four
public spaces, three public squares, and one large park. The four public squares were
Jefferson Square, Capitol Square, and an unnamed square overlooking the river and
Washington Park. Of these four, only Jefferson Square survived, until 1969, and then the
square was paved over by the construction of I-480 in the downtown. A series of parks,
many of them connected by a system of boulevards, followed, as Omaha expanded
during subsequent decades, and the lands for these were either donated or purchased by
the city. Horace Cleveland designed Omaha's boulevard system to be a part of the city‘s
parks system in 1889. However, the system of boulevards did not continue, as the city
expanded westward. Additionally, no large-scale public squares or plazas were planned
or constructed, since the demolition of Jefferson Square.
Summary
Larsen and Cottrell (1997) depict Omaha as, ―[Omaha] is not a ‗great city‘—a
Paris, Rome, or London, which radiates the humanity that holds the flame of high
civilization—but Omaha has long been a significant part of the American urban mosaic‖
(xiii).
Their finding positions of Omaha‘s current status and its historic evolution was
not the greatest, but of some importance, in relation with other American metropolitan
cities, as well as major world cities. However, narratives of historians like Daly-Bednarek
145

(1992), Hewitt (1954), Larsen and Cottrell (1997), and Menard (1989) render Omaha‘s
evolution, as one of the most prominent among other midsize American cities.
In the overview of the city‘s history depicted in this chapter, the inseparable
natures of the city‘s urban form and its economic, political, social, and geographic
developments are evident. While presence of such interconnectedness is not new,
recognition of it in analyzing present-day phenomenon of urban design plan-making can
assist in finding important insights for the production of urban form. The aim of this
chapter was to review historic interconnections between specific changes in the urban
form of the city and the actions of the city‘s local corporate regime and the business
leadership. Subsequently, to link the understanding based on those interconnections, as
they relate with the present day urban design plan and regulation related decisions, and to
find clues on specific regime behavior or change.
The history of Omaha suggests its governance had a dominance of a local
corporate regime from the beginning, when Union Pacific Railroad made its headquarters
in the city. The existence of the city depended upon the success of its corporations; and,
therefore, the city‘s political and administrative wings were greatly influenced by its
business and the civic leadership. There existed a parallel civic leadership structure that
exercised a greater power and control on virtually all the areas of the city, compared to
the political leadership throughout Omaha‘s history, except for a few decades in the early
twentieth century, infamously known as the ―Dennison Era.‖ The latter half of the
twentieth century saw emerging young leadership conscientiousness about the city‘s
image, aesthetic values, and urban form improvements. Their vision led to a more than a
146

quarter of a century of public-private partnerships for urban development and planning
interventions in Omaha. Decisions, such as giving away the historic warehouse district
for retaining a private corporation like ConAgra, suggest the power of corporate regime
in large-scale urban form decisions in the city and hint at the city‘s preference for
economic development, over preservation of historic urban form and downtown
aesthetics. Subsequent to the building of the ConAgra campus, a series of developments
and redevelopments took place in and around the downtown area, and those modernistic
improvements, innovative enhancements, and welcomed changes were the key impetus
for the concept of OBD initiative to emerge from the private sector at the dawn of the
twenty-first century.

147

CHAPTER 6: LIVELY OMAHA TO OMAHA BY DESIGN

Conventionally, City Planning Departments prepare urban design plans, as a
segment of city‘s Master Plans. Such urban design plan processes largely involve
stakeholder consultation, public participation in form of public hearing sessions and
neighborhood involvement in terms of preparation of neighborhood plans. In Omaha, the
urban design plan process was not initiated by the Planning Department, but it arose from
the city‘s local corporate sector. Omaha‘s local corporate sector leaders created and
funded a nonprofit organization called OBD to manage envisioning, designing, and
implementing an urban design plan in collaboration with the Mayor‘s Office and the City
Planning Department. This plan was first incorporated as Urban Design Element in
Omaha‘s Master Plan and then implemented in form of amended zoning and subdivision
ordinances, as well as new urban design codes for the city.
Two important characteristics of OBD make it a distinctive case for this study.
One, it deviates from a conventional pattern of creating and managing urban design plans
through the City Planning Department; and second, it adopts collaborative and
participatory aims in its design and implementation process. To what extent this initiative
achieved collaborative and participatory aims remains to be evaluated, especially in a
city, whose political economic history suggests a strong presence of a local corporate
regime in the city‘s governance. This chapter lays a background of how the idea of the
OBD initiative came into being and what factors contributed to its evolution.
After deliberating over whether to present analysis of the case study OBD in
chronological order or to present it according to the research themes, regardless of
148

chronological order of the events constituting them, I decided to group different themes
in a chronological order. The last concluding chapter of the dissertation will address
further elaboration over the findings of the research themes. The reason behind keeping
broad chronological order present in the analysis is the complexity of events, interactions,
and proceedings in this case. Reconnecting different events according to research themes
like regimes, collaboration, participation, and design without an explicit chronological
sequence may have led to a rather complicated narrative, without a clear timeline of how
different events were connected. Therefore, the narrative in this and subsequent analysis
chapters broadly follow a chronological order of the entire OBD process. The first step
towards understanding the chronology of events is to put forward a timeline of the OBD
initiative.
Omaha By Design Timeline
Below is the overall timeline of the OBD initiative. The following chapters of
analysis have detailed timelines of their own to further expand upon different stages of
research themes or a project also a part of the overall timeline.

149

Table 6.1: Omaha By Design timeline
1997 Omaha City Council adopts Omaha Master Plan developed by the Planning Department,
which did not have a detailed urban design component, only zoning regulations were present.
1999

Parallel conversations begin to improve built environment of the city:
1. Amongst the civic leaders at Omaha Community Foundation who wanted to channel
philanthropic money for improving the built environment of the city
2. Amongst the city planners, Planning Board members and other prominent citizens, who
were unsatisfied with the lack of urban form regulations for a long time
3. Big box retail proposal on former Avaya lawns stir a debate over urban design and
aesthetics of retail in the city.
Omaha Riverfront Improvement Plan is being implemented.
Lively Omaha is created by private donors and Omaha Community Foundation (OCF). OCF
commissions Omaha Philanthropy study.
2001

Based on Omaha Philanthropic Study results, the city‘s philanthropic leaders and Omaha
Community Foundation pushes Lively Omaha to think beyond small interventions.
New mayor, who won his seat as the ―neighborhood mayor,‖ takes the office
2002 Weber and Spellman (2003) and Rainbow Rowell (Rowell 2003) write about aesthetics of
Walmarts in Ft. Collins and Omaha
2003 Proposal to form a steering committee and naming the initiative OBD
Hiring of Jonathan Barnett at WRT and Brian Blaesser at Robinson and Cole
2004 Urban Design element became an official part of Omaha‘s Master Plan after the City Council
adopted it as guidelines for the master plan
2005 Gene Leahy Mall project proposal under the leadership of OBD, which raised about $11
million in private funding for this project, along with $200,000 from the city funding
2005-2007 Implementation of design guidelines into design codes began with an estimated completion
time of 9 months (the city contributed $40 K and staff support for completing zoning
regulations)
2007 Council adopts zoning and design codes proposed by the OBD collaboration.
2008 OBD takes on Environment Omaha initiative, based on the framework of Urban Design
component. This time, the initiative is done in-house based on their previous experience

150

Figure 6.1: The OBD process chart: from the concept level to adoption of urban design
codes for Omaha

Source: Author

The idea of OBD was triggered by:
 Corporate leaders at OCF
 City planners and Planning Board members
 Big box aesthetics of Walmart on Avaya site.
Creation of Lively Omaha from the
donations of local corporate leaders through
OCF.
Development
community

City Planning
Department

New mayor and his
administration

Hiring of
renowned Urban
Design and Legal
Consultants

OBD
A collaboration for a citywide urban design plan. Creation of
OBD plan community input and stakeholder consultation

The City Council adopts OBD plan as Urban
Design Element for Omaha‘s existing Master Plan.
Implementation
of the adopted OBD plan as an amendment to the city‘s land-use and zoning
ordinances (A new collaboration only with key stakeholders, no general public involved)
Adoption of urban design codes
Code changes and introduction of additional urban design codes to the existing
municipal ordinances accepted by all the stakeholders and the City Council
Important stage
where regime
and collaboration
issues for urban
design come
together

151

Search for the City’s Image

There is not a specific time, to which the roots of the idea of OBD can be placed.
Rather, OBD was a result of a series of institutional and built form changes in Omaha
that were highly interconnected. If Daly-Bednarek‘s (1989) categorization that divides
the development and planning history of Omaha from 1880 to 1990 into three specific
periods
29
—the City Beautiful, the City Efficient, and the Livable City—was extended
from the developments after 1990s to the beginning of the twenty first century, they
would go beyond the Livable City idea. The new developments were about giving Omaha
an image, which could lead Omaha into becoming a‖first-choice city‖. Del Weber as the
co-chairman of OBD, defined a ―first-choice city‖ in the OWH as, ―It's when the
corporate CEO says, ‗I'd rather be in Omaha than Denver‘‖ (Kotok 2004).
Attracting more workers to work for Omaha‘s local corporate sector was one of
the important criteria for the city‘s business leaders. In a newspaper report, Jeff Beals of
the World Group said what the city‘s business leaders had imagined for the city, ―They
understand that Omaha has to be an attractive city to land the companies and workers,
who may have to choose between Omaha, Minneapolis, and Denver. We don't want to
lose out because of the way we look‖ (Kotok 2004, 1A).
The development trend that began to make Omaha a Livable City by
implementing $2 billion
30
renovation of downtown and the riverfront in the 1990s
eventually led to the creation of OBD and implementation of urban design codes.

29
For details see the section Planning History of Omaha in Chapter 5.

30
From a short note ‖Omaha Believes‖ by Kathleen Jefferies in Omaha By Design archival documents.
152

Figure 6.2: Photos showing Omaha‘s undeveloped riverfront in 1998, in 2003 and 2006
during its redevelopment and in 2010 approaching the completion of redevelopment.
Until 1998, the river front was surrounded by a lead refinery plant and a large car
junkyard. A 2003 picture (on the following page) displays the riverfront halfway through
the redevelopment process with the construction of recreational facilities on the former
lead refinery site. A photo from 2006 (on the following page) shows the construction of
new condominiums and the Gallup premises by the river. An addition of a new
suspended pedestrian bridge on the river, and additional multifamily residential
developments by the river are seen in a 2010 photo (on page 154).

1998

153

Figure 6.2: Continued

2003

2006

154

Figure 6.2: Continued

2010

Source: All the four photos in this figure are reprinted, by the permission, from Greater Omaha Chamber of
Commerce.

If distant origins of OBD initiative can be traced to ―livability‖ trend of urban
form changes in the downtown and riverfront areas during the 70s and 80s (Daly and
Reeves 1989), more recent origins involve a few distinct set of conversations. These
parallel conversations occurred among different sets of professionals and the civic leaders
of Omaha and revolved around their apparent distastes about the city‘s built environment.
Below are three events that happened in Omaha in the late 1990s.
Niemen Marcus Catalogue of Philanthropy
A prominent donor in the city had a friend with a sum of several million dollars,
and he wanted to make the best use of that money for Omaha, but he had no idea how to
155

put the thought of philanthropy in action. because he had never been engaged in any way
in the community before, ―he was not a member of a Rotary Club, he was never in the
United Way Board, and he had never done anything, so he called this friend and said I
don‘t know how do you get started and what to do‖ (DO1).
31

The donor contacted another friend of his, who was the chair of Omaha
Community Foundation (OCF) and a civic leader, to get his views on how to advice this
person to use several million dollars for the community. The question left the chair of
OCF thinking, and he thought if he were the czar of philanthropy in Omaha, what he
would do with this kind of money. His answer was, first, he would take care of the city‘s
existing treasures that are its institutions related to education, healthcare, etc. followed by
recreational aspects and so on to make the fabric of life much richer and better. In this
thinking process, the chair tried to find a more-organized structure for setting priorities
for philanthropy in the city.
Eventually, the donor‘s friend was indoctrinated into the philanthropic arena of
the city, but the chair of OCF was left with a lot of ideas, without any particular order or
reason to them. An idea for introducing trolleys was floated by Mayor Haul Daub in the
90s, so if one had to invest the money in that idea from philanthropy standpoint, besides
evaluating its economic, social, and transportation values, shouldn‘t there be definite

31
Each of the quoted and block quoted sentence in this chapter, if not referenced otherwise, are the exact
sentences used by one of the fifty-three interview respondents. In some instances broad profiles may be
mentioned before a quote, but on many occasions, they are mentioned without any profile information.
Each respondent was assigned an alpha-numeric identifier to keep their identity anonymous. At no time,
names of respondents are used with quotes in order to protect their privacy. If names appear with quotes,
then those quotes are from secondary sources, like newspapers, news reports etc., and appropriate citations
appear next to those quotes. Each alpha-numeric identifier is assigned according to the broad categories of
respondents shown in Chapter 3. These alpha-numeric identifiers appear at the end of each quote from the
primary interviews.
156

points and places around, which a trolley route had to be planned? However, places like
Qwest Center, Holland Performing Center, Henry Doorly Zoo, and other main event and
major activities facilities did not exist in Omaha at that time. Certain attractions needed to
precede over others; i.e., before building a trolley, it would be wise to think about why
and where it would go. This systemic line of thinking contributed to the beginning of an
entertainment district in Omaha‘s downtown in 1990s. In essence, the chair of OCF felt a
need to have a Master Plan of Philanthropy just as there are other master plans in the city
planning. A nationwide search began for such a plan.
To their surprise, OCF could not find any city in the US that had created such a
Master Plan for Philanthropy. Some cities had high-powered groups, like the St. Louis
100, but nobody had actually laid out such a plan. So the leaders at OCF began
developing their own idea of a Neiman Marcus catalog of philanthropy. It were to include
all the things the community needed and wanted, then sort those, which would be the
starting point for developing a list of prerequisites, so when the next person walks down
the street with $100 million looking for something to do, they had a list of things that
needed to be done. There was a logical sequence or prerequisites they needed to follow,
and the role of OCF then would be to facilitate what donors chose from that catalogue.
A great idea existed, but no other organization in the country had ever tried this
before. Whoever was to carry it out had to know this process was a very difficult task and
one not to be taken lightly. So the OCF put out a Request for Proposal (RFP) around the
country for such a project and selected a group from Minnesota called Ronnie Brooks
Consulting (RBC) from Minnesota to create such a plan. Their team included a whole
157

range of experts, geologists, economists, architects, sociologists, and so on to work on
developing a Master Plan for Philanthropy. The consultant team worked for about three
months on this project and interviewed the civic leaders, communities, and other experts.
Finally, when the time to deliver came, the consultants sat down with the leaders at OCF
with their report titled, ―Omaha: Above all other on a Stream‖ and conveyed to them, ―if
you want project-based report, we can do that, but what Omaha needs is a direction first‖
(OB3).
Their conclusion was that Omaha was a very rooted city with a great civic
leadership, who were able to select really good projects and execute them, but it was still
a project-driven city. Although this model of strong leadership combined with strong
private resources had been a great thing for Omaha for several decades, in the future
current leaders were going to have to find a new way to set priorities, when current
leadership will give a way to the next generation.
So instead of a project-based catalog that OCF had asked for, the consultants were
suggesting that essential aspect was what people of Omaha wanted for the future of the
city. From the consultant‘s survey of what Omahans wanted was a city, which was,
smart, fun, sparkling, significant, and connected (Consulting 2000). In that synopsis of
thought, the city must be connected to build a community, based on shared values. It
must be smart to increase its capacity of solving complex future economic and leadership
aspects. It had to be a community significant in considering regional and global
implications of its leadership, philanthropy, and growth. Based on consultants‘ survey,
Omaha had no identification at all, nothing about this midwestern city stood out, as bad
158

or good. By being significant, it could begin to raise the awareness about the city. It
needed to be sparkling by protecting its natural and built environments. Business owners
in the community and Nebraskans were hard-working, but they had forgotten how to play
and have fun. So it needed to be a fun city by nurturing the spirits of its people.
The recommendations of RBC study were so abstract in nature, that if one were to
replace their use of the word ―Omaha‖ with any other city, which had an active business
community, the findings in the report will still hold true. Using universal quotes from
intellectuals, heroes, and prominent leaders, like Einstein, Benjamin Franklin, Winston
Churchill, and Ben Nelson. The report spent a great deal on artistic representation of its
contents and abstract colorful graphics. Although the report did not deliver to the intent
of its sponsors, the document generated multiple interpretations and marked a beginning
of exploring the unknown—how to change the image of the city by improving overall
aesthetics of built environment in Omaha.
RBC‘s report was more like an education, rather than a plan to OCF, and,
therefore, OCF had to still find ways to convert those ideas into a plan. So a group of
potential donors, civic leaders, and others involved in the civic service were convened by
OCF to present findings of the consultant‘s report and to see if anything from this report
resonated with them. This group of donors did not seem to get excited by the findings of
RBC study. To them, the report provided some learning, but failed to build any bridge.
One of the OCF heads described,
I can‘t tell you the angst that was involved, once we read this report, because it
put great pressure on us, on me particular, because we had spent $300,000 on
this…I think there were two concerns one is, what is the role of, we sponsored
those projects what do they mean, I mean what was, what piece of this did we
159

grab, how should we strategically intervene, you know should we begin to put
together a smart taskforce to fund that, and it just seemed so overwhelming
(DO1).

The OCF had already invested a big sum in commissioning this report, and now
they were left to interpret it on their own.
At this point, the director of the Parks and Recreation Department (PRD) in
Omaha, who was aware about the proceedings of the RBC‘s report, shared his thoughts
with the heads at OCF. He expressed the city‘s Planning Department (PD) and the PRD
were looking for ways to improve open spaces and parks, because they were facing a
problem of postage stamp like green areas springing up as the city expanded. The zoning
standards at that time only required developers to set aside green space, without any
control over where those green spaces were going to be, leading to an unplanned mosaic
of small open spaces in newly developed communities. Those open spaces were of no
real recreational use for the community. So the city wanted to find ways on how to
combine the requirements of multiple green spaces into few meaningful open spaces.
They thought of looking at developing ordinances or locating such open spaces by land
acquisitions, and so on, but they did not have funds to carry out such a task. For this
reason, the director of the PRD thought OCF could provide some help.
The OCF and the PRD of Omaha continued the dialogue; both looking to
accomplish their goals and to find common links that could tie those goals together on the
ground in a form of actual activities and projects. For OCF, the goal was to find ways to
set priorities for more inclusive philanthropic activities in the city, not the way they had
done so far, but the way they would have to do it in the future, as RBC had suggested,
160

and, for the PRD, the goal was to get some quality open spaces in the city. To determine
an agenda for action on their combined goals, heads of OCF contacted a retired head of
Omaha Chamber of Commerce (OCC), who was well acquainted with Omaha‘s business
community and institutional dynamics in the city. With the help of this person, a working
team of the city‘s civic experts and philanthropists was organized and gathered, and, for
months, the group brainstormed details of RBC‘s report to make a formal report and
some project-oriented logic from the initial five words: smart, fun, sparkling, significant
and connected, as they related to the citizens of Omaha.
Besides interpreting those five words, the mandate for this specific group of about
8-10 individuals, included the PRD‘s idea of creating quality green open spaces. This
group came to be known as the Advocacy Group (AG)
32
. One of the AG members
recounts,
I think the idea was to get this group of people together, which all tended to be
people who were—I would say, the elite of Omaha. You know, there were people,
who were well-connected donors, and kept them together to start brainstorming.
How can we start to implement some of the ideas in that report? (AG1)

The AG consisted of many members of the class of Leadership Omaha 2000.
Leadership Omaha was an initiative of Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce (GOCC)
to prepare young and emerging potential leaders of Omaha to take upon greater
leadership responsibilities in the future. The AG invited expert planners and other
professionals to give talks, reviewed measures taken by other cities to improve their
public environment, and also prepared a working documentary on their work.

32
Configuration of AG changed over the course Lively Omaha and OBD. It grew during this time, and
many of its members were also a part of the Steering Committee and the Technical Advisory Group.
161

If where you live reflects, who you are, then changing the image of where you
live should help change how you see yourself. This notion implicit in the working paper
produced by the AG group at the end of year-long discussions,
We know something is not quite right with the weeds along Dodge Street, barren
boulevards across the city, and a shortage of fun places to hang out. This feeling,
in turn, affects how we think about where we live and the image we have of it. If
we do not like the feel of a place, we usually do not have a good image of that
place; the reverse is also true. So how can we create a good feel for our city and
subsequently improve its image? (Eikenberry 2001, 1).

Some of the AG‘s inferences were to create citywide fountains like in Kansas
City or to transform Dodge Street by greening the medians with flowers. However, the
reality of implementing those tasks seemed overwhelming to the group, as one of the AG
members mentioned, ―we were saying, ‗why don‘t we start on a two-decade project to
build public fountains, that will be a destination not only for Omahans, but for people all
around the country‘?‖(OB2) That idea resonated with everybody. An article on OBD that
discussed this aspect, highlighted the response of the director of OBD, ―Well, but it‘s
more than fountains; ‗how do you build great public spaces‘?‖(Zacks 2006) The
discussion shifted to improving public spaces.
In search of ways to create better public spaces, one of the AG members came
across the work done by Project for Public Spaces (PPS). The head of PPS, Fred Kent,
was invited to give a talk to the group. His ideas of place games to reinvent public spaces
resonated with the group.
We said, gee, that is a good idea, not just a place to watch a water fountain, but
make it more interesting, you know. So we began to study that and out of that
then grew something called Lively Omaha, which was the predecessor than to
OBD (OB3).

162

Establishing Lively Omaha required an individual, under whose direction the
initiative could not only function as envisaged by OCF leaders and its donors, but also
continue the journey to explore the notions advanced in the RBC study. They wanted
someone, who had some grassroots skills for creating a new way of setting priorities for
the philanthropy, as well as for the public projects through civic engagement. They chose
Connie Spellman to do this job. Her experience and involvement with K12 educational
reforms during her tenure at the Chamber of Commerce in the early 1990s was an
important factor, for her suitability for leading this initiative, and, thus, the Lively Omaha
initiative began.
33

Private Agenda of the City Planners
A different group of individuals in another setting were dealing with similar kind
of built environment related frustrations in Omaha in the late 1990s. During one of their
lunchtime conversations, the city‘s planning director, chair of the City Planning Board
and their common friend, who was the head of a major local corporate foundation in
Omaha were discussing how to push their rather-private agenda to a public stage. In this
group, the city‘s planning director and the Planning Board chair were disturbed by the
lack of attention given to the design of the projects and urban design related physical
development of the projects in Omaha. Their friend from the major local corporate
foundation was involved in this conversation, because their foundation had the financial
resources with a keen interest to improve the city‘s overall urban environment. Their

33
Details of Lively Omaha Initiative are discussed in the following section.
163

foundation had supported the riverfront and downtown redevelopments, along with many
other community-driven projects and activities.
Building upon their informal conversations, over a period of months, this group
was able to develop an idea about what needed to be done, and that visualized concept
soon to be formally documented was to have an Urban Design Element of the city‘s
Master Plan in place, but they were not certain about where they could intervene. ―We
had determined the direction we wanted to go, yet we had to find the way to find the
hook somewhere in the city legislation or requirements that would allow us to pursue
that‖ (CP1).
Based on urban design topics listed in the Master Plan, the group put together an
outline of how the components would appear in the form of an Urban Design Element,
which included components, such as: preservation of character and identity of key
districts, improved linkages and connections between districts, the city‘s transportation
pattern, signage, landscaping, pedestrian system, historic preservation, public art,
streetscape, quality of design, and implementation mechanisms. They also framed the
opportunity for a large group, consisting of thirty to forty people, who would be a part of
an advisory committee in envisioning such Urban Design Element. This committee was
to include: the real estate sector, the public sector, the charitable sector and the
neighborhoods. Thus, this group of city administrators and planners had made the initial
step for the collaborative component of city‘s future urban design efforts.
This initial idea of conceptualizing the Urban Design Element was shared with
two other persons—one was the member of Omaha Planning Board, and other was a
164

leading planner from the Planning Department. They both were also interested in raising
the level of the city‘s built form design and adding legal requirements for the developers
in Omaha. Subsequently, the group authored and outlined a draft of preliminary
components for an urban design element to be presented to the mayor of that time—Haul
Daub. Their meeting with the mayor in 1999 was not as welcoming, as they might have
expected. As a person from this group reflected,
As a mayor, you are probably always faced with the likelihood of rubbing
somebody the wrong way. Politics in Omaha are vehicle of development
community. It is not like many cities, Lincoln is so different, but the Omaha
Planning Board and the City Council are largely framed by their development
interests. About 80 to 85 percent of the dollars raised on those campaigns are
from development community. So they definitely listen, and they respond
accordingly (CP2).

To the mayor, the idea of urban design component was appealing, but, at the same
time, it carried a potential of bringing discontent among the development community.
The mayor took a while to consider the idea, and his interest was evident in his notes to
his assistant on the copy of the initial proposal, ―this is a Planning Board request,
excellent, name citizen‘s committee of distinguished citizens 30 to 40—Haul.‖
34

Based on his initial response in 2000, the group of planners, Planning Board
member, and their other two friends began mobilizing the financial resources starting
with the commitment from one of their group members—the head of the leading local
corporate foundation. This group greatly needed the financial resources to be able to
promote and organize a larger group of stakeholders and carry out necessary tasks to
ensure public participation. While searching for the financial support, they deliberated

34
Source: Copy of the document with mayor‘s notes from personal records of a head from the Planning
Department.
165

further collaboration strategies with the director of the leading local corporate foundation
from their group. At this point, the group was certain they had to seek private funds and
appoint a consultant to do the plan, because of the limited financial and human resources
of the City Planning Department.
Through the Urban Design Element, planners of the City Planning Department
were also interested in pushing forward a set of guidelines created under Special
Community Value (SCV) tool by them, ―which was a way to try to get new commercial
centers to be more attractive places‖ (CP5).
The City Planning Department had been using SCV on project-by-project basis.
The concept and guidelines of SCV were also presented to Lively Omaha group by one
of the city planners, when they were seeking possible arenas for improving the city‘s
built environment. Because SCV was a discretionary tool and its application was limited
to certain commercial projects, it could not serve a larger and definite purpose. For the
city planners, having an Urban Design Element would eliminate the need to make
decisions on case-by-case basis and introduce a level of certainty and consistency in the
built form decisions. By promoting the idea of better design through SPV and
transforming it into an Urban Design Element, these planners in some ways wanted to
recreate the urban design section of the Planning Department that once existed during the
time of Alden Aust‘s leadership in the department in the 1960s and 1970s
35
. Such urban
design section had actually been an entry way for the majority of the planners in the City

35
Alden F. Aust served as the first Planning Director of Omaha from 1957 to 1981. His directorial vision
and leadership in the planning activities in Omaha were highly recognized.
166

Planning Department, who later went on to become planning directors. This section was
eliminated, as a cost-cutting measure during 1990s.
As the group of planners and members of the Planning Board were devising
implementation aspects of their proposal, a new development materialized unexpectedly
and happened. In May of 2001, just before the general election, Mayor Haul Daub was
opposed by Mike Fahey. At that juncture, this group of planning professionals
transmitted their implementation ideas to Haul Daub, and he forwarded it to his assistant,
who then wrote to the group, ―per Haul, it seems this proposal will have to wait for the
next administration.‖
36
The mayor had lost the election; and, therefore, a warm embrace
for the idea of Urban Design Element was not warm anymore, but cooled dramatically,
and that cooling period confirmed the fears of the group, whose unnamed member stated,
―we would always have conversations about how although everybody thought this was
the right thing to do, yet you had to be very sensitive to how quickly or forcefully you
could push the agenda‖ (CP1).
Then Mike Fahey became the mayor, and that change started a whole different
culture with a completely refocused embrace for this idea. Mike Fahey had won the
election on the platform of ―Neighborhood Mayor,‖ and the idea of an urban design
element fit right in with the notion of improving the built form to help uplift the image of
neighborhoods. Before the group
37
of planning professionals from the city administration
could build a new case for their agenda, Lively Omaha had proposed a similar vision to

36
Source: copy of the document with Mayor‘s notes from personal records of a head from the Planning
Department.

37
The initial group of planners and the City Planning Board members.
167

the recently elected mayor. His new administration welcomed their idea so well, that its
pace worried the group of planners and Planning Board members, who had wanted to
execute this same, formerly presented idea, since the tenure of former Mayor Daub.
Moving too fast could jeopardize the successful implementation of their idea, as it had
happened in the past. For the mayor, the unprecedented nature of a citywide urban design
plan in midwestern city, could not only give opportunity to put Omaha ahead in a
competitive race with other cities, but also strengthen his image of a ―Neighborhood
Mayor‖ further. Moreover, OBD was to be funded by the private sector, so no tax-dollars
were needed to be spent in serving this dual purpose.
Trading of the Green Space
In the early 2003, when Lively Omaha initiative was well underway with place
games and public space revitalization efforts as suggested by PPS, a new development
was taking place in the Southwestern part of the city. On the intersection of 132
nd
and L
streets in Millard,
38
Home Depot had purchased a large green space that formed the front
lawns of former Western Electric plant, which was owned by Avaya, Inc. at that time.
The retailer had planned to build a big-box strip mall development that was to house,
Walmart, Home Depot, and Sam‘s Club stores. They had proposed three big stores on a
120 some acres site, which had been a vast, green, and tree-lined open space for at least
four decades.

38
A Southwestern suburban town that was a part of city of Omaha after being annexed in 1971.
168

Besides an employment destination for many thousands
39
of Omahans in
manufacturing communications equipment for the telecom industry, this proposed strip
development site was also the most visible, park-like, and open space in Millard that
people had gotten accustomed to seeing as a large green open space. Its elevated location
and nicely landscaped, green lawns made the contrast seem even larger in relation to
what these retailers were proposing. The proposal came at a time, when the city‘s first,
suburban, and pedestrian-friendly open mall called ―Village Pointe‖ was being
constructed in the far Western part of the city, and Omahans were drawn by and
enthralled with its concept, aesthetics, and urban design.
Figure 6.3: Western Electric Plant‘s image from 1962. Bottom right corner shows a
portion of its front lawns sold to Home Depot.

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from Omaha-World Herald © The World-Herald

39
At its peak in the 1970s, the plant employed 7,700 people, and offered many of Omaha's highest-paying
jobs (Robb, J. 2010. Plant Fueled Omaha suburbs, Omaha World-Herald. Omaha, NE: Online edition)

169

Figure 6.4: Images showing proposed Sam‘s Club and Home Depot stores on Avaya
plant site

Source: OBD

It was upsetting for Omaha Planning Board, as these retailers proposed to raze
over Avaya‘s much-cherished green lawns to build their basic models of retail stores with
limited landscaping and huge parking lots that looked like ―seas of asphalt.‖
40
Kathleen
Jeffries, a long-time member of the Planning Board said of the Avaya development, ―I
have never looked at a project that is as insensitive as this one to its surroundings‖ (Robb
2004).
At the same time, one of the Council members, in whose district proposed project
site was located, researched other models of Walmart‘s store designs, which were much
more sensitive to its context. Specifically, the one in Ft. Collins featured recessed façade,
canopies, and overhangs for pedestrians and aesthetic purposes, appealing landscaping,
and a more appropriate parking layout.

40
This term was used in Omaha By Design draft Progress Report of December 17 & February 18, 2004,
Source Omaha By Design archival documents.
170

Figure 6.5: Photos of Walmart in Ft. Collins

Source for above six images: OBD
171

Jeffries' comments about Walmart, Sam's Club, and Home Depot developments
on the former the Avaya plant site were crucial in spurring a debate that touched a chord
with Lively Omaha, the city‘s local corporate sector, and the community at large. After
the Planning Board raised a concern over the retailer‘s proposed design, the retailers were
sent back to the design board to propose new storefronts and color schemes, as an
alternative. These changes seemed trivial to the Board, as evident in a caricature
published in the OWH at that time.
Figure 6.6: The Public Pulse section in the OWH Editorial of March 7, 2003, showed this
caricature of Avaya site design proposals. It depicted proposed project prior to the City
Planning Board‘s demand for a better-looking design, and after the companies‘
developers had revised them and suggested the built form still remained box-like, and
there were no significant changes proposed to improve the aesthetic dimension of the
project.

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from the Omaha World-Herald.

172

This proposal on former green space seemed to be proving the city planners‘ fears
were right. As a former planning director mentioned,
We had told the Planning Board for years that a place like that somebody could
come in and just put stuff up, because we didn‘t have the controls, and the
Planning Board was kind of reticent to try and take the extra step to get into the
controls (CP5).

As the Avaya site proposal came along, the Planning Board turned to the Planning
Department for solutions. However, the City Planning Department could do much
without any controls in place. Since the site was zoned for industrial use, the City
Planning Department could not demand that the developers change anything in their
design or adopt SPV guidelines, because they were required from areas zoned
commercial. Moreover, the Master Plan allowed commercial properties to be converted
into mixed-use zoning, but such a conversion did not apply to industrial zones.
The City Council came to know about this issue first, when the Council
representative from Millard, who had looked up and presented the Walmart designs
from Ft. Collins to the Council. The following event added verbal fuel to the situation,
when the Planning Board asked Walmart‘s representative Randy Anderson from BRR
Architects, why couldn‘t Walmart build a more attractive building in Omaha, like they do
in other communities like Ft. Collins. The answer they received was, ―that‘s because Fort
Collins has strict design standards in city ordinances, and Omaha does not. We build to
the ordinance and the politics.‖
41

At first these remarks intensified the debate among the city planners, the Planning
Board members, and the City Council members. The rage at big box retailer‘s remarks

41
Presentation titled ―Structural Engineers May 2004‖ from OBD‘s digital archives.
173

then spread widely in the community, when two major newspaper articles highlighted the
matter. The first one rebuttal and response article was written by Connie Spellman and
Del Weber, leaders of Lively Omaha. Their article published on January 19, 2003, in the
OWH, entitled ―Omaha should Raise Aesthetic Standards for New Development‖ (Weber
and Spellman 2003) was the first newspaper account to raise a concern about aesthetic
issues of retail design in Omaha.
The aim of this article was two-fold, one, to introduce Omahans to the work,
background, and future scope of Lively Omaha; and, two, to create awareness about the
need to have higher urban design standards in the city. The article began with the
description of the process of Ronnie Brooks Study and how that study led to the
formation of Lively Omaha. The authors of this article also congratulated Omaha
Planning Board for criticizing the proposed development on the Avaya site. It was a call
and plea to seek additional, more-comprehensive, and larger support, but it also had a
tone of forging associations with the Planning Board, the Council and the citizens at
large,
The time has come for the City of Omaha to insist on higher design standards.
The time has come for the City of Omaha to stand firm against the trend of
unimaginative, "plain label" design that was presented at the recent Planning
Board meeting. This is an opportunity for both our elected and appointed officials
to take a stand against "off-the shelf" buildings swimming in a sea of asphalt with
no windows, rooflines, nor architectural characteristics that are aesthetically
pleasing (Weber and Spellman 2003).

Walmart‘s case on Avaya site served as a perfect example to stir the debate and
garner a larger support for the mission that Lively Omaha had already embarked upon, as
their closing paragraph asserted, ―let's create an Omaha, where citizens feel joy, where
174

people want to visit. Let's move forward to transform Omaha into a more energetic and
beautiful city by fostering lively, secure, and distinctive places throughout Omaha‖
(Weber and Spellman 2003). In this article, along with Ft. Collins, the authors also
mentioned other communities like Long Beach, CA; Albuquerque, NM; Cape Cod, MA;
and other progressive cities, as the ones with outstanding and more-progressive design
standards that avoided the possibility of unpleasant aesthetics of big-box stores from
arising.
On the same topic, the second article, ―Omaha should set aesthetic standards‖ by
Rainbow Rowell (2003), published on March 7, 2003, was much-more assertive in its
tone and somewhat rebellious in stating the same argument, as compared to the one by
Weber and Spellman (2003). Rowell challenged the aesthetics and design of not only the
proposed development, but also the entire city by quoting what a planner from Kansas
City had said,
―The development was designed to fit into its surroundings. What blends into the area is
frankly, big box‖ (Rowell 2003).
The article pressed the need for the City Council to take a bold step and vote
against this development. Even though the Planning Board wanted to avoid such building
developments, in absence of any urban design controls, it had no control over stopping
them from occurring or demanding improvements in the proposed designs.
The Planning Board doesn‘t have the authority to demand better-looking
developments. Just getting the stores to plant a few more trees and change some
stripes was a victory. The City Council, on the other hand, can tell Walmart,
―Thanks for shopping‖ and ―Have a nice day.‖ This isn‘t Benson Park
development at 72
nd
and Ames. Millard isn‘t desperate for another shopping
center—and will actually lose a nice green space in the deal (Rowell 2003).
175

Rowell (2003) further strengthened Weber and Spellman‘s (2003) call for better
aesthetics and set the stage for a larger debate over the role of political will and
administrative limitations in urban form and design decisions in Omaha.
These two articles were instrumental in informing the public about what a loss of
open green space in the city and building of big retail stores meant. They set the stage to
the general public to become involved and what to look for in the future retail
developments, but the one on Avaya site did not get outvoted, despite its unattractive
form and design, because ―in Omaha regulation is still somewhat a dirty word, and
elected leaders had always resisted placing limits on private property for the sake of the
public good‖ (Zacks 2006).
Figure 6.7: A greatly criticized retaining wall of Walmart and Sam‘s Club stores after
construction on Avaya site, which was a large open green space before. The wall
essentially cut off any visual connection between the site and the streets and created a fort
like barrier along the street.

Source: OBD

176

Convergence of the Three
These three streams of conversations took place somewhat in parallel during the
late 1990s and what tied them together was a common conceptual thread of creating a
better image for the built environment in the city by improving its aesthetics. These
streams remained parallel for a while and at the dawn of the twenty first century they
became close before eventually merging to collaborate. This collaboration included
planners and Planning Board members, philanthropists, corporate leaders, and the real
estate sector. Evidently, it was the collaboration with a caution and distances were
guarded.
In the backdrop of the above three conversations, another influencing factor
emerged to make Omaha‘s citizens interested in the debate over the city‘s urban design
and built form. The Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce (GOCC) had commissioned a
series of studies through a consultant in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to determine
how to create a strong economy in Omaha. Those studies directed GOCC to create a
diverse economy for a balanced growth. Having worked in diversifying the economy
before this time, GOCC once again commissioned the same consultants to work further
finding ways to develop Omaha‘s businesses and leadership. At this second time, their
mandate was how to build a capable future leadership in the city by involving younger
people. Thus, GOCC initiated a Leadership Omaha effort to indoctrinate the young and
emerging leaders into higher leadership roles.
One of the suggestions given to GOCC by these consultants involved making
Omaha a more attractive place, because having great businesses was not enough for
177

attracting a divergent group of younger, modern-thinking, innovative professionals to
Omaha. According to a city planning director,
If you are trying to attract somebody from the coast or a bigger city, and you say
―why don‘t you come work at ConAgra or Mutual of Omaha or whatever,
Kiewit,‖ and they visit Omaha. It‘s a great place to raise a family, but if they
don‘t have a family, it gets boring and not interesting (CP4).

That moment in history was also the time of OCF taking the lead from the
perspective of creating a Niemen Marcus Catalog of Philanthropy and furthering the
efforts of improving the city‘s image. GOCC, in a way, distanced itself from the built
environment aspects of Lively Omaha‘s activities, because it did not feel that those
aspects fell into their arena of economic development. Some respondents of this study
believed that GOCC‘s Leadership Omaha initiative was an important step, because the
group of people who were involved in the initial AG for brainstorming on RBC‘s study
was primarily from the Leadership Omaha initiative. The director of Lively Omaha was
also a member of the Leadership Omaha initiative. Thus, the GOCC studies and
Leadership Omaha provided an impetus for the city‘s young leaders to participate in
Lively Omaha and eventually in OBD.
The way Walmart proposal on Avaya site helped stir the debate over the lack of
building design standards in the city, and the way Lively Omaha and the Planning
Department came together for addressing this issue demonstrates the agenda of urban
design took precedence over all the rest of the policy issues of that time in Omaha. This
circumstance was not a coincidence, as evident from a predominant policy theory. The
process, by which the above three events converged to give rise to eventual formation of
OBD, resonates with John Kingdon‘s (1984, 1994) Multiple Stream‘s (MS) theory of
178

policy formation. In Kingdon‘s research of federal policy-making in the areas of
transportation and health, he finds three sets of activities are known as streams, which are
separate, but simultaneous, in their occurrence. These streams are problem, policy, and
politics, and they flow independently of one another, following their interior dynamics of
change within each. The problem stream is the condition that policymakers identify as a
problem, the policy stream involves a set of different solutions developed by the
interested groups and specialists, and the politics stream is the set of larger political
aspects of public‘s mindset, interest groups‘ dynamics, and variation in administrative
and legislative resources.
A policy agenda gets prioritized, when three activity streams converge, and a
window of opportunity opens, which channels proponents of problems and solutions to
push their agendas. It is a reverse process, in which solutions follows problems, and
politicians seek policies to move forward their political future. As Kingdon (1995)
describes, ―[Policy entrepreneurs] lie in wait in and around government with their
solutions in hand, waiting for problems to float by, to which they can attach their
solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream, which they can use to their
advantage‖ (165).
In the case of Omaha, even though a series of urban redevelopment projects were
taking place for improving the built environment of the downtown and the riverfront in
the city, an urban design agenda did not become a priority in the recent two decades,
before OBD was formed. The city planners had always wanted to have urban design
element of the city‘s Master Plan and looked for opportunities to push their agenda,
179

which had been put off for unknown reasons by different mayors and their
administrations. An availability of funding was prevalent through local corporations in
the city. Omaha‘s problem stream was its unattractive and uninviting built environment,
for which there were a series of solutions devised by the corporate philanthropic
community namely OCF, Omaha‘s Planning Department, and the Planning Board. The
city‘s politics involving complex Council-developers ties had turned down any strict
regulations on developers or plan-making for a long time, until the proposal for building
three box-like retail stores on the Avaya site stirred the debate. A large-scale acrimony
over the loss of a beautiful green open space and the gain of gigantic, drab retail
buildings and their parking lots proved to be an ideal and welcomed window of
opportunity for the city planners, Planning Board members, OCF through Lively Omaha,
and the neighborhood mayor for pushing their preferred solutions of beautifying the city.
As these three streams converged for creating OBD, the collaboration took place
primarily between three entities—Lively Omaha, Omaha‘s Planning Department and the
mayor. The city‘s developers or neighborhoods were not involved at this conceptual
stage, but some form of collaboration with distinct citizens and representatives of the
development community was preconceived by the city planners. If collaboration among
these three entities meant distinctive policies for solving Omaha‘s urban design problem
within ongoing politics of complex developer-Council relationships, it also meant each
partner brought their own set of goals, agendas, expectations, and perhaps issues and
problems. The following chapter focuses upon how OCF‘s intents of beautifying the city
180

had progressed through Lively Omaha, prior to its collaboration with the city to form
OBD.
Lively Omaha

Lively Omaha‘s initiative was a precursor to OBD initiative. This particular
initiative was planned, as a three-year long proposal and began its operations in the early
2002. However, before the end of Lively Omaha‘s second year its partnership with
Omaha Planning Department and the newly elected mayor was official, and the
collaboration decided to carry out a citywide urban design plan, it was converted to OBD.
This section in the chapter looks at Lively Omaha‘s beginning, evolution, emerging
partnership with the city, place game activities, and anticipated challenges.
Setting Up
The founding of Lively Omaha, a nonprofit organization, was the first step
towards implementing what RBC study had highlighted— to create Omaha how its
people wanted: sparkling, smart, connected, significant, and fun. In the early 2002, OCF
had hired Connie Spellman to spearhead Lively Omaha. After finding a direction with
PPS, the task of the heads of OCF was to mobilize funds for this initiative. The initial
ideas of revitalizing and greening of public areas for improving the city‘s image had
resonated with the three major local corporate heads and civic leaders. Two of them were
the CEOs of Omaha‘s oldest corporations, and the third person was the CEO of Omaha‘s
oldest newspaper-publishing company. This group of three civic leaders and local
corporate CEOs agreed to fund the activities of Lively Omaha with $200,000 each
through OCF. The funds would also support two paid positions for the initiative, and the
181

rest of the human resources were to come from the volunteers. Lively Omaha was
planned to be a three-year long initiative with a mandate to transform Omaha into an
energetic and beautiful city by promoting lively, secure, and distinctive places in Omaha.
OCF had also committed to house the initiative‘s staff on their premises and handle their
accounts and the 501(c)3 status. An Advisory Committee comprising of representatives
of twenty-two organizations was constituted to advise Lively Omaha. It included the
city‘s Planning, Public Works, Economic Development, and Parks and Recreation
Departments, GOCC, OCF, several nonprofits, and leading corporations in the city. A
majority of Lively Omaha‘s place game related work was to be carried out by the
volunteers.
Shortly after Lively Omaha was founded in June 2002, the Gallup Organization in
Omaha did a Global Cities Project. They compared a set of 50 largest cities in the US
based on people‘s perspectives of their cities. The idea behind this survey was if Omaha‘s
leaders were to make Omaha a world-class city, an assessment of its strengths had to be
appraised by its residents. They had to know what Omahans value now, and what they
want to see more of in the future. The study interviewed 1,017 residents of Omaha and
placed Omaha in a context of other eighteen like-sized cities, as well as thirty-one cities
much larger than Omaha. Based on its findings,
42
Omaha‘s strengths were its Henry
Doorly Zoo and the Public Schools. However, people of Omaha did not think they lived
in a best place or beautiful physical setting, as compared to other citizens from similar-
sized cities. The findings of this survey were important for Lively Omaha in stressing

42
For details of the findings from this report see Appendix J.
182

their mission of improving the city‘s urban character and overall image and sending a
strong message to Omaha‘s citizens and specifically to the neighborhoods, where place
games were taking place.
Project for Public Spaces (PPS)
PPS was a vital influence that converted the vision of Lively Omaha into specific
activities and gave it a definite path towards improving city‘s public spaces. The initial
committee formed by OCF to interpret RBC study had started a dialogue with PPS, even
before Lively Omaha was put in place. This dialogue expanded further as Lively Omaha
began carrying out place games in Omaha‘s neighborhoods.
Based on the framework suggested by PPS, Lively Omaha‘s mission was to make
Omaha a lively and a beautiful city by creating fun, interesting, and well-used public
spaces. Lively Omaha‘s place games targeted all types of public spaces in the city,
including parks, plazas, transportation, public buildings and architecture, public markets,
and public art. The director of Lively Omaha explained in her interview with Metropolis
Observed magazine that,
[PPS] talked about the components of a great space: an image people identify
with, access, connection, activity, and sociability…We wanted neighborhoods to
think about their spaces differently; it wasn‘t just how it looked, but how it was
used. We were getting them to look at their own individual spaces to find out
what they would like rather than having the city say, ―This is what you should
have‖ (Zacks 2006).

Involvement of PPS during initial stages of Lively Omaha introduced them to the
idea of usability and user interaction in public spaces, which was beyond just the
aesthetics and physical design. The idea of positive user interaction also seemed to echo
with words fun and sparkling, that the RBC study had suggested.
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Figure 6.8: PPS framework
Source: Reprinted, by the permission, from PPS ©2003

PPS was instituted in 1975, and it had worked with thousands of communities
across the United States for improving their public spaces.
43
PPS introduced a
methodology that was time-tested and well-accepted for revitalizing Omaha‘s public
spaces through Lively Omaha. Inspired by the key factors William H. Whyte had
identified more than thirty years ago in his book The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces
(Whyte 1980). PPS had categorized four components for making quality public spaces.

43
For detailed information on the framework of Place Game workshops and activities of PPS refer to
www.pps.org.
184

These components were Uses and Activities, Comfort and Image, Access and Linkage,
and Sociability, which were emphasized throughout the process of place game workshops
in Omaha to determine how to enhance existing public spaces in the city. Communities of
Omaha were excited to participate and welcomed place games in their neighborhoods, as
one of the volunteer and Advocacy Group members said,
In most cases, these were very, very small areas for which these people had
emotional attachment. This wasn‘t like presenting the entire city. This was my
backyard, my little community, my little business district, so there was no lack of
people, who were interested in seeing something positive happening (AG4).

Known as Volunteer Place Game Facilitators (VPGFs), volunteers were the major
reason a citywide implementation of place game workshops became possible for Lively
Omaha. Initially, PPS had trained these volunteers from Omaha to carry out place games,
and the organization had about 20 trained VPGFs at that time. Over a period of time, this
number increased to a total of 37 volunteers as Lively Omaha was able to train more of
them later. The people associated with Lively Omaha gave the credit to their director for
mobilizing a large number of volunteers in this initiative, ―she has a unique ability to get
volunteers to get done a lot of work in time and more than I have ever seen anybody be
able to do it‖ (OB4).
Most of the volunteers were highly educated professionals, some of whom were
retired design professionals, and others were planners, architects, executives from
different businesses, as well as people who were driven to improve spaces in Omaha‘s
neighborhoods. An unforeseen positive consequence of mobilizing so many volunteers
for the place games was these volunteers, and the connections they had developed
185

through place games, were going to help them in winning political support for OBD in
future.
Emerging Partnership with the City
A change in the city administration in 2000 was beneficial to Lively Omaha,
because the winning candidate had won the election on the platform of ―neighborhood
mayor,‖ and he had demonstrated he was going to create a neighborhood Grant Program
for the neighborhoods. As a part of this program, he was going to restore 70
neighborhood parks in five years alongside the Parks Restoration Project that had already
planned to improve six city parks in North and South Omaha. At that time, the director of
Lively Omaha was working with OCF for allocating their funds to help the
neighborhoods, who were participating in the place game workshops to provide them an
incentive to participate. The director of the Grant Program for neighborhoods at OCF was
a little concerned after learning about the mayor‘s own Grant Program and thought the
two should be compatible or have a common form. OCF decided to discuss this
circumstance with the mayor‘s administration. That timely neutral incident was the
beginning of an association between Lively Omaha, OCF, and the mayor, which was to
become a partnership for urban design and grow in the coming decade.
The outcome of their first meeting was positive. The mayor‘s office had agreed to
give more amount than OCF grants to the neighborhoods through their Neighborhood
Improvement Grant Program (NIGP), and they also created a common application with
clear distinctions between OCF and the mayor‘s grant. Neighborhoods could get up to
$5000 extra to improve public spaces in their area in NIGP, if they had participated in the
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place game workshops by Lively Omaha. In addition, the mayor also committed to give
high priority for allocating his NIGP grants to those, who participated in the place games.
During this time, the William and Ruth Scott Foundation associated with OCF was also
interested in the idea of restoring neighborhood parks, and they agreed to give up to
$25,000 additional funds to whoever had gone through the place games and had received
the mayor‘s grant. Omaha Venture Group, an arts and culture interest group, also
provided a number of project- based funds to these neighborhoods. Funding possibilities
for the participants of the place game workshops served as a major impetus towards
generating active interest in the activities of Lively Omaha.
Activities
Lively Omaha was designed to serve four major roles: educator, facilitator,
initiator, and advocate, as the mission statement of Lively Omaha stated,
Lively Omaha was established to foster lively, secure, and distinctive places
throughout Omaha, to create strong partnerships involving citizens, officials, and
organizations and to encourage increased local philanthropy to improve our public
spaces.
44
And, our vision is for Omaha to be recognized nationally and by its
citizens as one of the Top 10 Cities for Livability.
45

o Educator
Lively Omaha played the role of an educator by spreading awareness about
improving public spaces of the neighborhoods through its website.
46
It began offering
Laurels Awards to honor significant contributions in creating great public spaces in the

44
Source: Lively Omaha, Statement of Work for Gene Leahy Mall/11
th
Street Project, March 2004, OBD
archival documents.

45
Ibid.

46
www.livelyomaha.org which is now superseded by www.omahabydesign.org.
187

city. Its first award was given to the City Planning Department of Omaha for their
creation of new Special Community Values designation. The website of Lively Omaha
presented the outcomes of all the Place Game Workshops, new community projects
education resources, and useful links. During its first year, it had nearly 17,000 visitors.
o Advocate
In addition to working with the City of Omaha and its neighborhoods, Lively
Omaha began the process of advocating for better public spaces in Omaha. Their article
in the ―Midlands Voices‖ Column of the Sunday World-Herald (Weber and Spellman
2003) was the first one to argue Omaha should raise aesthetic standards for new
developments and praised the Planning Board for its stand on the aesthetics of the
proposed development of the Avaya property at 132nd and L Streets. Subsequently,
Lively Omaha created partnership agreements between the Mayor‘s Office, the City
Planning Department, and Lively Omaha to carry out a comprehensive Urban Design
Plan for the City of Omaha. It also conducted research regionally and nationally on cities
that had implemented urban design guidelines. Thus, its major contributions as an
advocate were, creation of OBD—an advocacy group for the built environment at the
time
47
—and mobilization of public voice for the design improvements of Walmart
48
on
72
nd
and Hickory Streets.

47
Omaha By Design became collaboration in 2003 and Lively Omaha formally adopted the name Omaha
By Design for the organization thereafter.

48
For further discussion on this topic see Chapter 6.7 Aesthetics of retail.
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o Facilitator
Lively Omaha facilitated place games, Park Restoration Program of PRD,
eligibility of neighborhoods for the mayor‘s grant, as well as William and Ruth Scott
Family Foundation Grants. By 2005, the organization had accomplished 29 place games
and enabled a number of neighborhoods to be eligible for receiving $160,000 in grants
for improving their public spaces.
o Initiator
As an initiator Lively Omaha was instrumental in the 11
th
Street Improvement
Project carried out in partnership with Old Market Business Association. It was also
active in promoting a community-wide focus for the new MAT Retro Bus system and the
Public Art Project. Additionally, it initiated Gene Leahy Mall and Civic Center Plaza
improvements and mobilized funds for implementing those projects.

189

Figure 6.9: Gene Leahy Mall in 2002 (first below) and proposed redevelopment through
Gene Leahy and 11
th
Street Master Plan (second below)

Source for both the images: OBD by Michael Van Valkenburgh Associates, Inc.

190

The second stage following a Place Game workshop by Lively Omaha was the
Place Definition process, as a volunteer explained,
So the next step, we take all these ideas and congeal them down basically to a
program statement or a clear statement of need that can almost be used to write a
grant with the money to implement it, so we called that the place definition
process (LN4).

In October 2003, Lively Omaha Advisory Committee selected 11
th
Street from
Leavenworth to Farnam Street, as its first project to carry out Place Definition process
and display quality improvements in the public space. The idea behind selecting 11
th

Street was it was ideal for becoming a main pedestrian-connector corridor between the
new Performing Arts Center, Qwest Center Omaha, and the Old Market district. Lively
Omaha partnered with a number of downtown organizations for redeveloping the area
and during a daylong charratte, Gene Leahy Mall became an integral part of their
discussion as a pedestrian connection. Thus, a major renovation project for Gene Leahy
Mall was coordinated by Lively Omaha, and a committee named Gene Leahy Mall/11
th

Street Committee was formed to implement the project.
Figure 6.10: Photos of place game workshops in Omaha

191

Figure 6.10: Continued

Source for all the four images in this figure: OBD
Strengths and Challenges

The success and challenges for Lively Omaha are correctly identified by
McNamara (2004) in his evaluative pilot study on community collaborative.
49
His
research found four factors contributed to the success of Lively Omaha, which were:
origin, leadership, technical assistance, and timing. Because the initiative originated from
the private sector, which was particularly very strong in Omaha, chances of it succeeding
were much higher. The leadership of a trusted project director and generous local
corporate sponsorships were also important dimensions. Lively Omaha acquired able
technical assistance from PPS, who provided a strong foundation for its future presence
in Omaha‘s communities. Last was its appropriate timing, as its director said in an
interview to the Generations magazine, ―well, I think timing is everything, and I think if
you were to have this even five years ago, I don‘t think you would have had the same
amount of interest or attention given to it‖ (Buttner 2004, 4).

49
His study involved document review, surveys of neighborhood residents where Lively Omaha initiative
was implemented and interviews of key actors.
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McNamara‘s (2004) research also found key challenges for Lively Omaha were
the lack of shared vision in the beginning of the initiative and short-term thinking of its
partners, which led to a lack of long-term prioritization of different perspectives. An
absence of shared vision was evident in this initiative, as two of the interviewees
validated in McNamara‘s (2004) report, ―each foundation had its own vision. The
corporations had their interests. And the City government was dragged kicking and
screaming into these efforts‖ (19). Another interviewee said, ―the original goals were not
clear, except for the five general words in the Ronnie Brooks study: Connected, Smart,
Significant, Sparkling, and Fun‖ (19). Short-term thinking of the initiative‘s partners,
specifically of the political actors, who were inclined to focus on the next election cycle
first and then upon the long-term implications of initiatives like Lively Omaha, emerged
to pose the greatest challenges for its successful operations.
Summary of Lively Omaha
Framework and guidance given by PPS contributed to two important directions
for Lively Omaha. One, it provided a base for Lively Omaha to engage with the
neighborhoods and the community meaningfully under a time-tested framework of PPS;
and, two, it initiated a partnership between the city‘s Planning, Public Works, and Parks
and Recreation Departments. Because it was a requirement of the organizational model of
PPS that heads of all three departments should be present in Lively Omaha‘s Advisory
Committee. Then a working relationship between the public and the private sector was
formed at this stage. PPS introduced Lively Omaha to begin a dialogue with the city
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governance, which Lively Omaha explored further, and it led to a greater collaboration
for OBD subsequently.
If place games had many positive outcomes, it also had some downsides. Over a
period of time, a number of neighborhoods receiving the mayor‘s grant declined, due to
reduced availability of funds, which generated an altered outlook towards the place
games and related activities. According to a planning professional,
The downside is after the place game is gone, there is no money to do anything so
it almost shoots itself on the foot, because then people are like – why are we get
all excited? Nothing is going to happen, so why do we go through that process?
So I go back and forth on that. I wish there was a whole big pot of money on the
back side, then we can start making all those improvements. But there isn‘t
(AG6).

A similar sentiment was voiced by a place game volunteer,
To be honest with you, this is one of the things about OBD that has never really
worked out to my satisfaction is we don‘t follow onto place games all that well. I
think we need more somehow, we need to be able to help those neighborhoods to
execute, because there are a lot of those neighborhood associations that don‘t. To
me, this goes back to community organizations. We haven‘t been real involved in
that (AC1).

These views suggest the first experiment of community interaction by Lively
Omaha through place games gave mixed opinions for its success.
Even though place games were executed citywide, leaders of Lively Omaha came
to realize place games had limited influence on overall fabric of the city. According to
them, place games helped create small useful public spaces, but they did not contribute to
transforming the look and image of the city. As Lively Omaha assisted in implementing
Gene Leahy Mall renovation project and enabled many neighborhoods to improve their
public spaces, the change seemed miniscule, when seen from a citywide perspective.
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According to a volunteer, ―I don‘t recall a place game exercise, that really transcended
the really big picture‖ (AG4). Most of these spaces were far too interior in the
neighborhoods to have any significant visual impact for an outsider. Therefore,
improving small space improvements were not going to aid in realizing the larger vision
of Omaha‘s corporate community and civic leaders, who wanted to transform the city‘s
urban form.
As the promoters of Lively Omaha began evaluating greening of Omaha and
improving public spaces through PPS,
It became clear that planting flowers and locating parks was probably, it would
have been a part of it, but it did not come into and certainly that was not the goal.
The goal was to put in place the structure and the system, which may ultimately
green our boulevards and locate our parks and all the rest of it (OB3).

Doing an urban design plan for the city could provide the structure they were
seeking. Three major donors once again convened for discussing potential funding
needed for putting a framework of urban design related decision-making in place, but
their inexperience with planning processes and creation of regulatory frameworks for
built environment was evident,
So we said, gosh, you know, it sure would be great, if we had some design
standards. We didn‘t know the city code, and we didn‘t know anything
about…none of us were developers. We didn‘t know any of the politics, well—we
did know where the money came for from elections, and a whole bunch of it
comes from the development community (DO1).

Despite a degree of uncertainty about the future results, the three initial donors
decided to extend their support, based on Lively Omaha team‘s initial talks with Jonathan
195

Barnett
50
and with the city. They also agreed to pledge more funds through their contacts
in the local corporate sector. Thus, Lively Omaha began morphing into a larger initiative
named OBD.
Local Dreams, Global Talent

An exploration of how and why renowned urban designer Jonathan Barnett and
his firm were selected as design consultants for Omaha‘s comprehensive urban design
plan gives in insight on different aspects of global aspirations of the promoters of OBD
and of the city‘s civic leaders. A search for the best urban designer in the country took
place simultaneously with the beginning of a partnership between Lively Omaha, Omaha
Planning Department, and the mayor. While Omaha‘s civic leaders were looking for a
national talent to execute their global vision of making Omaha a ―First Choice City,‖
members of its Advisory Committee and other professionals in the city had different
views on how an out-of-town designer‘s plan may not result in desired local actions.
Moreover, Omaha boasts of some of the finest architectural and planning firms in the
country, whose principals are equally, if not more, entwined with Omaha‘s historic
context and its planning and governance culture, as compared to their national or global
counterparts. The unlikely situation leads to this question—why was a local designer not
assigned to carry out this task? The local visions of the rest of the OBD stakeholders
resonate with the global aspirations of city‘s leaders and are analyzed by taking into
account stakeholders‘ perceptions of appointing a designer of national and global
recognition for this plan.

50
For details on selection of Jonathan Barnett as a designer see the following chapter.
196

This section discusses some of the issues surrounding the process of designer‘s
selection and how other stakeholders of the OBD collaboration perceived it. The major
finding of the analysis indicates disconnect between global aspirations of city‘s leaders
and the local acceptance of global ideas by other stakeholders, as it relates to
implementation of those ideas. Even the selection of a nationally renowned designer is
seen as an academic exercise by many stakeholders, and, in that, the designer remains an
outsider, who presented great possibilities, but a large number of them were disregarded
as solutions, because those presumptions do not advance Omaha‘s local context and its
culture.
Destination Midtown
Destination Midtown (DM) initiative was the reason how Jonathan Barnett was
introduced to Omaha. DM‘s collaborative and participatory model displayed similarities
with that of OBD. This section briefly outlines DM, its concept, framework of
collaboration, and participation.
DM was a collaborative initiative aimed at improving the built environment in
Omaha‘s midtown area. The concept of creating DM took place in late the 2001, which
was also the time, when Lively Omaha had just begun functioning. Both the initiatives
had some conceptual links, such as their focus on the built form and the attempts to bring
multiple stakeholders together to accomplish their goals. However, the scale of
operations and type of collaboration were entirely different in the two initiatives.
DM was a planning study informed by a collaboration of neighborhoods, large
and small-scale businesses, the civic institutions, and the city. Its goal was, ―to establish a
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framework to assist Midtown return to prominence and make it a ‗destination of choice‘
within the metropolitan area‖ (HDR 2004, 2).
The reason for taking up this particular area was Midtown had shown its age and
needed a framework to lay down a proactive path for its future. Additionally, several
major corporations in the Midtown community had begun making investments in their
properties, such as Mutual of Omaha, University of Nebraska Medical Center, Peter
Kiewit and Sons, Inc., and Creighton University. They believed Midtown had a potential
for physical and economic redevelopment. As a result, these corporations collaborated
with the Midtown Business Association, several midtown neighborhood associations, and
some midtown nonprofits to work with GOCC for developing a Master Plan to realize
their vision of the future of Midtown Omaha. While DM‘s groundwork was laid during
2001 to 2003, its planning process was announced to the citizens of Omaha in April
2003.
Figure 6.11: The DM study area highlighted in pink with key public and private areas
highlighted in yellow inside and outside its boundaries

Source: Reprinted by the permission from DM, HDR and Mutual of Omaha.
198

Figure 6.12: An artist‘s rendering based on the plan of Midtown Crossing- A mixed use
development at the heart of DM area.

Source: Reprinted by the permission from DM, HDR and Mutual of Omaha.

Figure 6.13: Site plan of Midtown Crossing showing proposed mixed use buildings in
pink.

Source: Reprinted by the permission from DM, HDR and Mutual of Omaha.
199

The DM study area was 3.6 square miles in size with 28,000 residents and 43,000
employees, leading to a density of 7,700 residents per square mile, and it constituted 7
percent of the population of Omaha. Its master-planning process involved a series of
public meetings, workshops and design charrettes for about a year to develop a vision,
based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the study area. From a large
number of ideas and recommendations, the Steering Committee finalized 101 programs
for action and further divided them according to neighborhood issues, transportation
enhancements, central corridor design program and parks, and open-space opportunities.
This master-planning process mainly focused upon physical space and, to some extent,
upon economic conditions in Midtown, but not as much on social and human issues
involved in redeveloping the area.
After creating a Master Plan for the area, DM collaboration instituted a DM
organization with a director and an Advisory Board to implement its proposed plans in
2004. Since then, as a part of economic development of the area, Destination Midtown
has facilitated one of the most vibrant mixed-use urban development districts in the city
called Midtown Crossing. It has also worked on neighborhood revitalization by
encouraging enhanced code enforcement and strengthened Midtown Neighborhood
Alliance, as well as made transportation and corridor improvements in the Midtown area.
Appointment of the Designer and the Legal Consultant
While DM and OBD had many aspects in common, the most obvious connection
was the urban designer Jonathan Barnett, who came to Omaha as a sub-consultant for
DM study through HDR, Inc., which was the primary consultant for DM. At that time,
200

Lively Omaha was also searching the best talent to create an urban design plan for the
city. They had short-listed four consultants nationally, who were experienced in urban
design plans, and Jonathan Barnett was one of them. As he was visiting Omaha for his
work on DM study, the manager of HDR introduced him to the director of Lively Omaha
and the heads of OCF. Their meeting was an instant success, and even though Lively
Omaha had researched other potential consultants,
When it came down to it, it just seemed like for our purposes, and what we
wanted in the background. You know, his initial book – it just gave me a lot of
confidence, that this was somebody who knew what he was doing, had done it and
was eager to do it. So we just made the decision (OB1).

Thus, he was hired as an urban design consultant from Wallace Robert and Todd
LLC (WRT)—a planning and design consultancy firm with several offices across the
country. Jonathan Barnett‘s initial ideas helped materialize and accelerate the process of
Omaha‘s urban design plan-making. It was during their initial meetings, that Jonathan
Barnett developed the idea of a three-prong framework of green, civic, and neighborhood
Omaha. The participation of the City Planning Department or the mayor was minimal in
this selection process, but Lively Omaha had conversed with the director of Omaha‘s
City Planning Department about selecting Jonathan Barnett, and he had agreed with
Lively Omaha‘s decision. However, the city and mayor were not equal partners in the
process of short listing, researching, and finalizing the consultant.
After being selected as a consultant and laying out the timeframe for making the
plan, Jonathan Barnett expressed the need to have equally competent zoning lawyer for
two reasons – first, to transform the plan ideas in enforceable codes for urban design plan
to be implementable; and, second, to give legal creditability to an urban design plan
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among the city‘s developers. Even though Jonathan Barnett was well-acquainted and
capable of delivering legal codes, according to him, people would not have received legal
codes as well, if they had come from an architect and urban designer. Lively Omaha and
OCF accepted Barnett‘s suggestion of appointing Brian Blaesser from Robinson & Cole
LLP in Boston as the legal consultant for the plan, based on his reputation and experience
with such projects. Having a legal consultant from the beginning of the plan process not
only gave some buffer time for the developers and local land-use attorneys to get
acclimatized with what was to come after the plan, but also provided more creditability
and believability in the plan-process.
He knew exactly what would be running through the minds of the people, who
were very invested in Omaha and had concerns about what this would be and
having him there it was useful, because he could pick up immediately, when
people were asking those kinds of questions and giving them reassurance, that we
weren‘t crazy. We weren‘t out to ruin the city on the name of design (OB5).

Brian Blaesser had a broad client base, including cities, counties, and real estate
developers, which made him more aware about the perspectives and concerns of
stakeholders in the process.
Perceptions of the Stakeholders
Selection of the designer happened simultaneously with the formation of Steering
Committee, which included the city‘s developers, land use attorneys, neighborhoods, and
other nonprofit organizations, as a part of OBD urban design plan-making. Some of them
had an opinion against the decision in retrospect, but many of them perceived it as a
positive step throughout the process. From the perspective of Lively Omaha and OCF,
[The decision of selecting the designer] was never a matter of contention. From
the first meeting that we had, and we announced that he was going to be the
202

person. No one had any, because his credentials were startling, and they had no
reason to object. As time went along, there were people, well, we have got this
guy from New York, and he doesn‘t understand us (laughs), you know (OB3).

The mayor‘s administration also did not contend the selection because,
I think there was a general consensus, this man was well-respected and knew what
he was doing. The private sectors again particularly funders here have a
reputation that they are not going to do it on the cheap. They are going to pay for
the quality, and he came and did presentation, and he kind of wowed everyone
with the presentation so… (OB4)

Also, according to one interviewee, ―He was extremely well-known, extremely
well-respected. He had written, obviously, books on this matter, and he embraced the
project from the get going and, of course, the private sector was paying for it‖ (OB1)!
However, as the process of plan-making progressed, stakeholders developed mixed
opinions and perceptions for an out-of-town urban design consultant. The primary
concern some of the stakeholders had was the selection process, ―I mean, I don‘t have
any idea, no, that was not a public process. He wasn‘t selected by the community or even
by competitive process‖ (SC4).
The selection of the designer and legal consultant were perceived as a decision
made behind the closed doors for a project that was going to affect the entire city. There
was a perception among some professionals in the city, that it was good, not to have local
planning firms do the plan, because,
[An out-of-town designer] brought a broader experience. We probably did have
some locals, who were qualified to do the work, but it allowed all the local design
community to participate and provide that input into the plan rather than trying to
lead the effort (SC1).

Instead of becoming a lead designer of the plan, some city planners saw
participation of local firms and the City Planning Department, as a constructive process,
203

where the city planners did not have to defend their proposals, but sit on the other side of
the table and challenge the designer to come up with his best design.
If local experts were to give constructive input, there seemed to be a doubt about
how much of their involvement was possible or incorporated in the creation of the plan.
In that case, the entire burden of critically viewing designer‘s ideas rested on Lively
Omaha and OCF leaders. However, their professional expertise in the subject of urban
design plans was less than what some respondents think they should have had in order,
To steer the man from Pennsylvania, maybe, and give him a knowledge-based
reaction, and I think the local steering committee was made to be somewhat
politically correct, which is okay in the US. I question as a result, also, maybe
how truly involved and engaged they were, or if they were a piece of a process
that had to be there, so it looked like it was well structured…but I question the
leadership here locally. The OBD to me is very serious business; I think I would
have wished that they had a highly qualified leadership group (O2).

Thus, having local corporate leaders leading an urban design plan versus a
professionally qualified group of planners and urban designers from the city leading the
group seemed to have made a big difference in how Lively Omaha‘s efforts were
perceived.
Other planning and design firms in the city might have taken up the task, but two
aspects prevented the local corporate leaders from hiring them: one, they were not as big
a name as Jonathan Barnett and WRT, which would help local leaders to gain regional
and national recognition for their initiative; and, two, the local professionals were
perceived to carry baggage, based on their work and institutional interactions in the city.
According to one of the planning directors, a national figure for this plan helped,
Because we did so much internal planning, Omaha doesn‘t have much of a
national image, and so I think that is another side benefit of having somebody like
204

Jonathan, who publishes a lot, writes a lot of articles and books and that kind of
stuff (CP1).

Furthermore, in case Lively Omaha was to hire a local planning professional,
If Marty proposed doing something with the trail, well that‘s just Marty, you
know, if somebody comes in from the outside and says, you should have trails
here. Oh, well, you know, this isn‘t some bicycle nut. This is somebody who
thinks this is a good idea. So, there is a kind of the benefit in having somebody
come in from outside (CP5).

Similarly, the city‘s civic leaders perceived the appointment of a national talent as
the one that carried a greater standing,
I think Omaha, number one, has a history of paying more attention to outside
experts than their own, which is interesting, but if somebody from outside tells
you should do this for some reason it has more creditability than if somebody
from the inside (OB4).

An initial working group member of Lively Omaha also hinted at the possibility
of internal politics behind not having one of the local planning firms do the project,
because its head was a former planning director, who was the boss of current planning
director, and that would have created a complicated set of relationships in the plan
process. A member of the City Planning Board even questioned the capability and
credibility of the local planning and design firms, because their presence and work did
not reflect in the urban form of the city. ―I have this question on why we have Leo a Daly
and HDR and a lot of other architects, and why we haven‘t had better design in the city?
It‘s really perplexing‖ (PB2).

On the other side, many believed an outside urban designer provided a neutral
perspective. According to a local architect and urban designer,
205

I think having experiences with other environments is really helpful to bring kind
of an unbiased view, an objective view of what a city is really healthy I think by
human nature we are prone to kind of see our own circumstances as immovable
somehow and permanent, particularly if you have been here for 30 years, and you
have seen the rate of change (UD2).

The real test of designer‘s ideas was at the time of implementation phase of the
urban design plan. A fair amount of skepticism among the people about how many of the
original ideas were actually was accepted by the local stakeholders during
implementation,
It can be an interesting dichotomy in this city sometimes and in maybe a lot of
places like this. There is this tendency to like to have consultants in from outside,
but at the end of the day, we want to do it our way (laughs), so it‘s a little bit
weird. You know, we are happy to take ideas from other people, but we really
want to do it our own way. This is what Omahans want, and this city, I think part
of the reason, that we have been a little bit late to the game in terms of public art
and public spaces (AC1).

Many stakeholders seemed to have dismissed a number of good ideas proposed by
Jonathan Barnett, because they were coming from an outsider who belonged to a city
geographically and culturally very different from Omaha. As a local land-use attorney
puts it,
When somebody comes from Philadelphia, well Philadelphia is not Omaha, NE.
We have space here, you know. We are used to space here, and the changes are
made in steps, not miles. So you could be critical of somebody, who came in with
their definite idea about what your town ought to do (SC5).

Similarly, a local architect and planner said,
I think there were times, when you push something, that this isn‘t culturally part
of that community, and there might have been a few times he was encouraging us
to think us in that way but everybody seemed to accept his ideas. To think about
it, did we end up using those? May be not all of it, but may be certain aspects of it
(SC1).

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Thus, locals tended to discount some of the design and implementation ideas as
something that came from an outsider, who may not know the context of Omaha as well,
and, therefore, what he has done in other places may not be possible to do in Omaha. The
local planning professionals believed being an outside expert, the designer tended to
simplify the complex realities of Omaha‘s context,
I would have made that document more specific than it turned out as well, but you
know the fact that it sort of, that an outsider of note came in and sort of looked at
the city in a way you know may have confirmed some of our perspectives and
may have helped us look at things maybe a little bit differently as well, is
probably not a bad thing. And it did in this case had the benefit of—I think—the
benefit of simplification, you know, by sort of compartmentalizing things into
green, civic, neighborhood, that was an interesting construct (SC4).

But, ―I actually think usually a best combination is the combination of a local
perspective and an outside perspective‖ (CP5).
On the other hand, the local Planning Department was of the opinion, that
although the ideas in the plan came from Barnett, they acted as equal partners, when it
came to producing the plan,
What is seen on stage should be somebody that is perceived as an expert and
probably from out of town, because while we were all really good at what we did,
experts are perceived to be at least 50 miles away take no responsibility for the
work product, come in and show some slides at the time now PowerPoint and
disappear right? (CP1)

Overall the appointment of an outside expert was inevitable,
Because it was cutting new ground for Omaha, I think it was almost imperative
that you bring someone in from the outside. Because if it would have been
someone from the city itself, I don‘t know what kind of traction it would have
received and its often times easier to bring an outside expert, because they have
that experience, but they can also become the fault person, too, in case it doesn‘t
work out. So a local person doesn‘t take the fault for it (AG6).

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Among positives and negatives of having a designer from outside, supporters of
the decision to hire him saw it as the trend Omaha‘s civic and philanthropic leadership
had followed since long.
He was probably the best in what he did. And they were saying Omaha wants the
best, if they are going to have a museum it‘s going to be the best regional museum
in the country, it‘s going to be the best zoo, you know, so they wanted somebody
who had credentials, who can speak with authority and had experience in doing
this (OB4).

Lively Omaha and the corporate civic leaders‘ choice to hire a legal consultant
from outside was also based on similar reasoning, that they wanted the best talent in the
field to work on their initiative.
They also knew the Law Department in the city couldn‘t handle all of the extra
work, so they had to bring in a legal team to do that, and there was nobody in the
city of Omaha that had the experience of doing the city codes and things. So that
was the reason he was chosen I think is they looked around and said this guy is
the best (OB4).

And an out-of-town legal consultant avoided any possibility of biasing the urban
design codes, which may have been the case with local land-use attorneys, due to their
existing associations in the city.
Brian Blaesser gave the kind of the legal background I think also had to bring that
in, because you needed a more neutral look at it, as opposed to bring some of our
existing land use attorneys, and because they would have been very biased based
on their work within the city (AG6).

The donors‘ perspective on hiring Jonathan Barnett implied it was a two-way
process, where the city was going to gain as much from a renowned urban designer, as
the urban designer for having an opportunity to work on a project of this scale and
impact.
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Frankly, the power behind the throne has been people who are experts from
somewhere else, but it‘s satisfying to the experts, too. How would you like to
have Barnett‘s portfolio and be able to have the impact on places all over the
globe that he does? (DO1)

The donors, planning professionals, city planners, developers, and local land-use
attorneys expressed a mixed set of opinions on selecting a nationally renowned team of
urban designer and legal consultant to work on OBD plan and code-making tasks. The
negative views about the selection were not just the opinions of different stakeholders.
Rather, they carried a great potential to impact the implementation phase of the plan,
where details of each sentence of the code was to be debated by the same stakeholders,
many of whom were already distanced by their views of the selection of the designer and
the legal consultant.
Summary of Local Dreams, Global Talent
The entire selection process of the designer and legal consultant revolved around
three points, politics, talent of the person, and neutrality of having an outsider. These
three reasons determined it was particularly important for Omaha‘s urban design plan to
have Jonathan Barnett or anyone else from the outside. The issue of choosing someone
from Omaha, versus someone from the outside for OBD, was a point of debate even
among the initial Working Group members of Lively Omaha. ―We had some long, pretty
hard conversations in behind the scenes way about what the best was‖ (AG7). A national
level talent like Jonathan Barnett was equally important, because, ―I think that no one in
the country can argue the best or at least among a handful of the very best, when it comes
to urban design and to get a guy of his caliber was extraordinary‖ (AG6). Being an
outsider, he was to provide a much-needed neutral perspective on the project.
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If we would have hired someone from Omaha, there would have been a certain
baggage, yes familiarity, but also a bias that that person would have brought, so
the neutrality of having an outsider was really important to taking a fresh look at
the city (AG7).

Selecting a designer for Omaha‘s urban design plan was not a public process,
because the initiative itself did not emanate from the public sector. It was done by the
local private sector leaders and through their private funds. The plan‘s funders and
Omaha‘s civic leaders wanted to have a designer, who was the best in the nation, but
from other stakeholders‘ perspectives, there were positives and negatives about the
process of selecting an outside designer. Having an outside designer led local
stakeholders to be selective during implementation stage in accepting many of the ideas
proposed by him, as well as believing in the designer‘s overall vision. A tension between
Omaha‘s civic leaders‘ global vision to hire the best talent for Omaha, versus local
stakeholders‘ tendency to view this talent‘s ideas with a bias and accept only the ones
they think are appropriate for Omaha is clearly evident in the analysis. While selection
process was not a matter of debate for its proponents, this section sheds insight on the
background of interrelationships of trust and confidence, in what the designer was going
to propose. It also provides a glimpse into the collaborative relationships among
stakeholders of the OBD process being not as collaborative during the selection process
and in accepting the designer‘s ideas and vision.
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Omaha By Design: An Urban Design Plan for the City of Omaha
A group of Omaha‘s civic leaders came to understand that individual acts of
making public spaces beautiful would not serve the purpose of giving Omaha an image of
becoming a ―First Choice City.‖ It needed to have a firm foundation in the form of
legally binding urban design rules and regulations. The first step, toward forming such
rules, was to create a vision of an Urban Design Plan. Many facets of making this plan
were undertaken, because its process differed significantly from any other citywide urban
design plans, such as San Francisco‘s Urban Design Plan in 1971 (Jacobs 1978).
Having selected a nationally renowned urban designer and the legal consultant to
perform the task of creating and implementing the plan the next steps were to officially
announce the plan‘s arrival and its position within existing Master Plan of the city to the
rest of the Omahans. At this stage, leaders at Lively Omaha searched for an apt title for
this grand initiative and came up with OBD. The title for the plan was found very
appealing and catchy by all the proponents of the plan that soon after the adoption of the
plan Lively Omaha decided to adopt the same title for the organization. The following
two sections will explain the background of urban design plan, to be included as an
Urban Design Element in the existing Master Plan of Omaha and a shift from the Lively
Omaha to OBD initiative.
Urban Design Element
The comprehensive urban design plan was to be incorporated as Urban Design
Element in Omaha‘s then-current Master Plan, which was last revised in 1997. In 1997
revision, the Urban Design Element was not pursued intentionally, due to potential uproar
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from the development community and the lack of resources to carry out a collaborative
effort. As a result, the Master Plan did not have guidelines or enforceable codes for urban
design in the city. The need for having urban design codes was recognized from time to
time, ever since the city charter had mentioned it for the first time in 1956 (Utley 1956).
At that time, the Proposed Home Rule Charter of the City of Omaha described a number
of Master Plan elements, that were to be a part of the overall comprehensive Master Plan
of the city, and one of them was called Urban Design Committee.
For being authored in 1956, the City Charter was very innovative and had a
foresight to incorporate the possibility of an Urban Design Element. It was innovative in
envisioning urban design components at the time, when the knowledge and practice of
urban design were not firmly established. The following decades after 1960s saw a
declining interest in ―urban design‖ phrase of the charter, because several other priorities
took over. In that, the first priority was the city‘s growing mission of annexing
surrounding communities. The Planning Department spent the majority of its resources in
preparing documents to substantiate a need for annexing each of the surrounding
community (Daly-Bednarek 1992). The second priority was the focus of the City
Planning Department on building the Interstate. The city planners believed giving
downtown an easy access with interstate highway system was the only way to ensure its
central role in the metropolitan area. However, many neighborhood groups, parks
supporters, and others opposed building of the highways.
The clash of values between groups supporting the neighborhoods versus
businesses and the civic leaders supporting the metropolitan area meant the City Planning
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Department had to spend more resources in preparing a stronger case for every area a
highway was proposed to pass through the process in a positive manner. A third task the
Planning Department was occupied with was the battle over urban renewal movement in
Omaha in the early 1960s. Despite being advocated by the most businesses and the city
leaders, the federal Urban Renewal Program (URP) could not gain foothold in Omaha
and was voted down twice, because ―the combination of opposition, unfavorable state
legislation, and the late date at which renewal supporters began their campaign assured
repeated defeats for the program‖ (Daly-Bednarek 1992, 155).
As a result, Omaha did not participate in URP. However, proponents of URP in
Omaha found other ways to fill the void left by the absence of URP. The city‘s political
and the civic leadership attained similar downtown development goals on the name of
urban redevelopment of the City Center, which included projects like carving Gene
Leahy Mall from the city‘s fabric and allowing the construction of ConAgra
Headquarters by demolishing one of the largest historic districts in the country.
Although the above three aspects contributed to a lack of attention over Urban
Design component of Omaha‘s city charter in the past, the City Planning Department
kept that door open, as it constituted an Urban Design Master Plan Committee with the
help of Omaha Planning Board over time. A former planning director says of the
committee, ―It became the public vehicle to express some of the concepts and
opportunities that by creating that Master Plan, that we would be able to achieve, so it all
came down as part of improving the image and retaining young and bright people in the
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city (CP1).‖ Many of the planners who went on to become the city‘s planning directors
joined the Planning Department initially as a part of this group.
Omaha‘s current Master Plan was developed in 1987, as a part of the City of
Omaha‘s Municipal Charter that required
51
maintaining a Comprehensive Plan for the
Physical Development of the City. It was later revised in 1997, and the vision for this
Master Plan as mentioned in its Concept Element was ―Omaha must be a community
committed to promoting and maintaining a high quality of life for all its people.‖
52

The Plan contained a Concept Element and various other elements addressing
areas, such as land use, parks and recreation, transportation, and so on. Thus, OBD‘s
association with the city and other stakeholders for an urban design plan would also
fulfill one of the requirements of the City Charter, in the form of an urban design element
of the city‘s Master Plan.
Lively Omaha to Omaha By Design
Initially, OBD was the name given to the emerging collaboration among Lively
Omaha, Omaha Planning Department, and the mayor; whereas, Lively Omaha remained a
nonprofit that was participating in OBD collaboration, until urban design plan was
adopted in the Master Plan. By the end of 2004, as the City Council adopted Urban

51
Description of Section 7.04 of the Charter of the City of Omaha: The Master Plan
It shall be the duty of the Planning Director to prepare and maintain a comprehensive plan for the physical
development of the City, to be known as the master plan. The Master Plan shall establish the City‘s long-
range policies, goals and standards as a general rule for its physical development. These policies goals and
standards shall at a minimum address the areas of land use; the provision of urban services, including
transportation, parks and recreation, utilities, public facilities, and disposal of solid and liquid wastes;
housing and community development; economic development, environmental protection, development
management; urban design; historic preservation; and any other areas, necessary to guide the physical
development of the City.

52
Source: The Master Plan for the City of Omaha, 1997 Revision.
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Design Element of the city‘s Master Plan, Lively Omaha organization formally adopted
the title ―Omaha By Design.‖ The title of Lively Omaha was discontinued thereon. This
set of decisions helped avoid any misunderstanding that could arise among the general
public between the two terms related to one organization. From public relations
perspective, also a single title sent a clear message that the organization and its
collaborative plan-making process would be recognized as one. This procedure was also
an effort to project a clear brand image to the outsiders, because the title ‖Omaha By
Design‖ was more appealing than Lively Omaha according to its promoters.
The adoption of the Element prompted our name change to Omaha By Design.
Our original purpose continues, however, albeit with expanded goals: to
implement the Element‘s 21 goals and 73 recommendations, build on existing city
planning, and advance a community philosophy based on people‘s needs and
values.
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Figure 6.14: A move from Lively Omaha to Omaha By Design as seen in logo designs and tag
lines

Source: OBD

53
‗Omaha Only Better‘ unpublished document from OBD archives
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Figure 6.15: The new Omaha By Design website announces the name change (at the bottom)
from Lively Omaha to Omaha By Design in 2004

Source: OBD

The urban design plan was now advocated as an Urban Design Element carried
out by OBD initiative. Thus, the process of urban design plan-making, which was
previously advocated as OBD, was further clarified as Urban Design Element after the
organization Lively Omaha became OBD.
Summary
This chapter analyzed the conceptual and formative stage of OBD in terms of,
how the idea of improving urban design in the city originated, how it was carried forward
in form of Lively Omaha initiative, how the designer was selected to realize an urban
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design vision of city‘s leaders, and how the original goals meandered from Lively
Omaha‘s place games to an urban design plan for the city called OBD, which was also
going to fill a gap in the city‘s Master Plan.
The idea of OBD began in form of two parallel conversations among different
group of leaders and professionals, whose aim was common—finding long-term solution
to improve Omaha‘s built environment. The community and media outrage over drabness
of the proposed retail strip development became the window of opportunity (Kingdon
1994) that brought together the streams of urban design policy solution for the problem of
unappealing urban form of the city. It stirred the urban design cause to make it a priority
among other ongoing political agendas. Thus, the beginning of the idea of OBD is
analogous to the Multiple Streams theory of policy change (Kingdon 1984, 1994; 1995).
Lively Omaha took inspiration from PPS and became the first step by the
corporate sector in the direction of improving the city‘s built environment, but its
piecemeal nature did not seem to get to the heart of the problem. An alliance that began
with the city during place games activities of PPS, took a significant leap towards
achieving Lively Omaha‘s goal, after the new ―Neighborhood Mayor‖ took the office.
Soon after the city, Lively Omaha and the city‘s civic leaders were working out the
details of how an urban design plan could transform the nature of the built form in the
city. The selection of Jonathan Barnett was a critical step at this juncture. He presented
endless possibilities and a grand vision to the leaders of the city. He would also become
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an important person to further the collaborative and participatory elements of the
proposed urban design plan.
54

During the process of formalizing OBD and finalizing the designer, the
collaboration between OBD and the city had already taken place.
55
However,
consultation with other stakeholders was not a part of the process as yet. Involvement of
citizens and other stakeholders evolved as the OBD initiative began formally in the years
2003-04. The following chapter analyzes the complexities involved in forging
collaboration among multiple stakeholders.

54
Refer to Chapter 7 for collaborative aspects and Chapter 9 for citizen participation.

55
Details of this collaboration are elaborated in the following Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7: COLLABORATION FOR AN URBAN DESIGN PLAN

In order to have a collaboration among the stakeholders in the OBD plan, Lively
Omaha partnered first with the mayor, Planning Department, Parks and Recreation
Department, and then with the developers, Neighborhoods Center, and other nonprofits.
Each partnership came as a successive step, initiated, suggested, and at times insisted
either by one of the partners of Lively Omaha or by the designer. This section explores
various stages and dimensions involved in the process of this collaboration. Here I argue
that collaboration in the OBD process was an evolutionary process, where the cross-
sector collaboration was not implemented in a formal sense from the beginning. Rather,
the existing corporate regime, who initiated Lively Omaha and OBD, found it necessary
to have the support of many stakeholders, as the process evolved to realize their aim of
improving the city‘s urban form.
This chapter is divided into eleven sections. The first three sections focus on the
process of initial muddling through of the promoters of Lively Omaha to form
partnerships and associations with stakeholders. The following four sections analyze the
nature of collaboration among stakeholders, the promoters of Lively Omaha and,
subsequently, OBD. The eighth section describes the division of roles and responsibilities
among three major partners in OBD, and the ninth section focuses on the Steering
Committee as a platform that brought the rest of the stakeholders together in the OBD
decision-making process. The tenth section briefly mentions estimated costs for the
initiative, followed by the summary to highlight the institutional and collaborative
framework, at which OBD finally arrived.
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How to Partner with the City
Starting from the time Lively Omaha had not partnered with any organization or
with the city, ideas of the group revolved around the need for improving the urban form
in Omaha. They realized urban form controls were not in place. A first step towards
having any enforceable controls was to have an urban design vision in the form of an
urban design plan. As the heads of Lively Omaha and its donors were preparing to take
on the task of an urban design plan, they knew they needed to have the city involved, but
were uncertain about how the Planning Department and the mayor may respond.
Especially when such a proposal came from the private sector, a possibility existed, as the
process might be viewed as interference with what the city‘s Planning Department was
already doing. Their doubts were not unfounded, as shown,
There is always a fear that an outside agency that is somehow been given or de
facto given some planning responsibility, there is always a fear that they will
become bigger and more powerful than the agency that created them. I don‘t think
that‘s happened I think that the fear in some minds was there, we heard it
expressed two or three times in the hallways so to speak but I don‘t think that it‘s
gone to the tip of the balance of that (CH4).

Although private funding for a public cause was a beneficial offer, the city
administration and the Planning Department feared about letting an agency supported by
private funds take control over public process of the urban design plan and code-making,
which might jeopardize the accountability aspect in the process.
So the good news is we have got some outside funding the bad news is there are
strings attached to that outside funding. So yes of course it‘s a constant worry for
government because of accountability issues. Where is the accountability when
private donations come in and private donors take control, how are they
accountable to the public? And this is a key question that is always of concern and
was of concern to us (AC2).

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When Lively Omaha first contacted the City Planning Department in January,
2003, with their proposal of an urban design plan and development of possible urban
design controls, the response from the department professionals was they would not
partner in this kind of a top-down approach, because it could result in a failure. Soon
after, a face-to-face meeting was arranged with the Planning Department staff and the
assistant to the mayor, so they would understand the concerns Planning Department and
the city had with Lively Omaha‘s idea of urban design plan and controls. The Planning
Department did not find the proposal feasible was that without specific involvement of
the development community they did not want to participate with Lively Omaha at any
level. Furthermore, the department heads also believed the mayor would not be willing to
partner with the local corporate leaders without any support of the developers. If the
developers were convinced to partner, then the City Planning Department would be
happy to partner in their effort. In case developers did not agree, the city planners also
suggested a bottom-up, long-term approach involving ―conservation designation‖ to
create success stories in the neighborhoods, also business and environmental areas. Once
the developers would see these successful examples, they would see the value in them
and become willing partners in the initiative. The outcome of this meeting was
unsatisfactory for the Lively Omaha group, because the solutions suggested by the
Planning Department would slow down their mission considerably, if not stall their
progress completely. At this stage, the heads of Lively Omaha perceived the position of
the city as the domineering force, whose members wanted to be in control.
Their whole notion was as I recall it, we have to be in control because it is a city
project and so I remember as we left that day saying this is not going to work, we
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can‘t do this. But the next time we met with them, either we misunderstood or
they changed their minds because it then became a bonafide partnership and it has
worked beautifully (OB3).

To some participants, the Planning Department was apprehensive initially, not
because they were against a non-public organization taking control of the process, but it
was the way in which the Planning Department had historically functioned. Despite
having had some of the most intelligent professionals on their staff, the Department had
not been able to accomplish many essential tasks, including an Urban Design Element
because,
The planning department was always relatively constrained by the political
environment in which they operated. It is not that they didn‘t understand the good
design or they didn‘t understand the issues. But there was very little political
support and very little corporate support, so you didn‘t have the mayor in any of
those, going back to my time in Omaha, who sort of decided to lead the charge
because there would be significant resistance both from those very heavily
affected developers and also from corporate side in my view (AC3).

With the proposal from Lively Omaha, the local corporate leaders were now
backing the agenda the Planning Department had held somewhat secretly for a very long.
Therefore, it was a positive development, and yet it carried a high potential to get crushed
by the real estate sector.
Mayor Embraces the Plan
Soon after Lively Omaha group‘s first unsuccessful meeting with the city, they
spoke to other planning professionals in the city, who advised them about the extent to
which developers dominated such decisions and also gave them some suggestions on how
to involve developers in the process. According to these professionals, the city‘s Master
Plan had all the vision, concepts, and objectives for producing quality design standards,
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along with suggestions for potential incentives. However, the local developers were a
problem in creating the urban design element, which the City Planning Department had
always desired. It was not a surprise that the developers held so much power, because
most people knew they elected the mayor. The development community worked through
their land-use attorneys, and a few of these lawyers represented all the development in
the city. The city planners believed certain events could inflict change in the city
planning, and the developers only heeded the threats like opposition from the
neighborhood associations or negative publicity acquired through cases like Avaya site
development.
56
Another suggestion given to the group was if the local corporate leaders
invited and explained their proposal to the developers, they might agree to collaborate.
To develop strategies for encouraging developers to collaborate and find feasible
approach to achieve enforceable design standards in Omaha, Lively Omaha hired a
scholar of public administration to work on the task in February 2003. Meanwhile, the
League of Women Voters, Omaha Together One Community (OTOC), and the Sierra
Club also joined in to look at the city‘s Master Plan, its Smart Growth policies, and the
City Transportation Study to find a niche for Lively Omaha‘s proposal. OTOC already
had a basic summary of the Master Plan, information on the transportation study, and
details on major developers‘ contributions during the last election for the mayor and the
City Council members. Certain neighborhoods, like The Pacific Springs Neighborhood
Association, were also interested in Lively Omaha‘s efforts, as the former was dealing
with downscaling of a Metro Center Designation in their neighborhood and opposing the

56
Refer to the section Search for the City‘s Image in Chapter 6 for the details on Avaya site case.
223

existing proposals from four developers. They expressed their frustration about the
absence of real community input in Omaha‘s planning process, as it existed in other
cities, and one of their group‘s leaders made a proposal to be involved in the Steering
Committee for urban design standards, which Lively Omaha was going to formulate.
Lively Omaha developed a broad information base from its background research
and the knowledge of opinions within the community. . This step was the first instance,
when the community‘s involvement in the OBD plan gradually began to take place. It
occurred due to the need to give legitimacy to Lively Omaha‘s proposal for an urban
design plan and controls. At this stage, Lively Omaha‘s background research consisted of
facts of their vision, concept, and objectives of the city‘s Master Plan, review of case
studies, best practices and lessons learned from the cities close to Omaha, as well as from
cities, with which Omaha‘s leaders liked to compare their city with. It also focused on
specific relationships among the City Planning Department, developers, and the private
sector in cities with mandatory design standards, as well as economic impact of
mandatory design standards on developers and communities to identify what was in it for
the developers. Above all, they worked on developing a strategy about how to approach
developers for their participation in the urban design plan process. Lively Omaha‘s
options included approaching developers, either through their attorneys or directly, and,
in both situations, they had to establish a strategic order, through which they could
proceed. Lively Omaha decided to approach the city directly.
The second time Lively Omaha met with the city was after it had completed the
background research on how to present their case to the mayor and how to convince him
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that the proposal also would be beneficial for him politically. However, during their
meeting with the mayor, the latter welcomed the proposal without any question. The
mayor‘s quick approval came as a surprise for Lively Omaha, particularly after they had
done an extensive research and explored creative and convincing ways to persuade him.
Developers Join In
Once the Mayor had agreed to support OBD wholeheartedly, the Planning
Department was certain developers would follow, maybe not by their volition, but for the
concern that the local corporate-mayoral alliance could enforce standards, and they may
have a difficult time adhering to the new urban design mandates. So the developers were
forced to join in for ensuring that they were not subjected to a level of urban design
standards, of which they were not comfortable.
So when the corporate, at least key actors in the corporate sector decided that this
is something they wanted to embrace and invest resources in and commit to then
things will move forward it would not have moved forward if the city had to come
in and say that this is the thing that we need to do at least that in the tradition that
I am aware of it would have been highly unusual (AC3).

Because the call to improve the city‘s urban form through urban design was
backed by the local corporate sector, the message carried an additional authority that the
city‘s political and administrative wings were unable to exercise independently.
I think they saw the city fathers, the corporate sponsorship early on and that gave
it a real endorsement you know, and I think they felt well I am invited to the table
I better speak up and try to make it work the best I can or we will get run over
here you know. And I think it‘s very Nebraska thing…, I think our forefathers got
stuck here, or came here to settle land and out here, you kind of got to figure out
how to get along and work together (PB2).

Historically, the city, the development community, and the local corporate sector
in Omaha formed a triad, where each strand had its own powers with clearly defined
225

functional territories, and they worked in harmony for a long time. The triad functioned
perfectly, until one of the strands decided to collaborate with the second to bring in
additional controls over the work of the third. Lively Omaha‘s apprehension over
approaching each strand of this triad for collaborating on additional urban design
constraints was well-founded. But the Mayor‘s backing to Lively Omaha changed the
dynamics completely, and the city‘s support for Lively Omaha came in rather
effortlessly. Once the city and the corporate sector partnered for the initiative, bringing
developers to the table was an automatic outcome. Thus, getting developers to participate
in the OBD process was not as difficult as Lively Omaha had envisioned in the
beginning.
New Partnership Model
Several decades of former experiments of Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
among the local corporate donor and the city‘s governance in Omaha‘s history came to
guide Lively Omaha in determining how to proceed with its collaborative approach. Such
partnerships had been instrumental in creating nationally recognized ventures like Henry
Doorly Zoo, Qwest Convention Center, River Front Development, Holland Performing
Arts Center, and other major developments in Omaha. They had followed a PPP model in
funding and implementing these ventures. ―So it was a private-public partnership, but, as
most public private partnerships in Omaha, it was a vision on the private side more than
the public side‖ (AC4).
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If these ventures had given an identity to Omaha, they also carried a downside
that came with consolidated power in few hands of the local corporate leaders to get
duties, and tasks done according to their plans.
So once you have got the power brokers in Omaha on board and Omaha has a
history of influential people saying, we are going to do it, we are going to get it
done and let‘s do it, whether that‘s the Quest center whether its riverfront
development whether it‘s the zoo, whether it‘s the new baseball stadium,
whatever, once you get those folks on board, it goes and so that kind of
collaboration between the powerful business interest and city politicians have
been there for a long time and it‘s not a corruption type of thing…there is
obviously a lot of pluses and minuses. The minuses are they can rough shot over
people, the pluses are once they decide something is going to get done, it gets
done (AG1).

This outlook also seemed to carry forward, when Lively Omaha came to be
recognized as an initiative supported by some of the powerful local corporate leaders,
and, therefore, many individuals, businesses, and organizations questioned the nature of
collaboration Lively Omaha was proposing. Some claimed the proposed partnership
followed a traditional model in the beginning, where local corporate leaders held the most
power and as the initiative developed, nature of the process became more like a multi-
sector partnership or a collaboration, which may not have been practiced or preconceived
by its promoters.
Yeah but public-private partnership in a traditional Omaha way, which is that
private side drives the decision-making and public side follows behind… I don‘t
know, if you go back and got real honest feedback from the folks who funded
this, would they say today that they understood at the time they invested in it the
implications of it? And my gut feeling is that I am not sure they did. But once
they opened the doors and they started moving down and it began to have broader
based set of actors involved in it I think it took on a life of its own (AC3).

In a way, Lively Omaha and its promoters were welcoming uncertain chains of
development, as they were collaborating with different set of actors for fulfilling their
227

aim of creating urban design plan and codes. A constant adjustment and accommodation
of different aspects of the initiative was mandatory, as the city‘s corporate leaders delved
more into the overall goals of the initiative and became welcoming to broad-based
support over time.
But we also had people on the committee from the very beginning who were very
skeptical. But I think the process and the openness and the ability for them to
voice their concerns and to hear that they were listened to and adjusted helped the
original planning committee realize and come to consensus that this was going to
be okay (OB1).

As a result, collaboration of different stakeholders in OBD started as a traditional
PPP model, but was transformed into a more collaborative form during the course of
time. The collaboration was not instituted since the conceptual stage, but it became a
necessity during the design and implementation stage, before any urban design plan or
controls would come into fruition.
Resource Contribution
One of the criteria of determining the nature of collaboration is the resource
contribution from each of the collaborators. The financial resources for the entire
initiative were invested by the local corporate donors through Lively Omaha in OBD;
whereas, the Mayor‘s Office and the Planning Department contributed mostly in-kind.
The development community and other stakeholders did not contribute any financial
resources, but volunteered their time to sit on various OBD committees and meetings.
Additionally, from the City Council, a council member selected by the Council sat on the
OBD Steering Committee during urban design plan phase, as well as on the Technical
Advisory Group during implementation stage. Among all the stakeholders other than the
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OBD promoters, the Planning Department contributed equal or more human resources
than any other group involved in the OBD collaboration.
The City Planning Department acted as a local counterpart to the consultant,
while simultaneously being an evaluator of the consultant‘s proposals. Their role was
even more critical, because neither Lively Omaha, nor its promoters, were well-versed
with the language of planning and design. A considerable amount of human resources
were contributed by the Public Works Department and Parks and Recreation Department
in the OBD process. ―So you know the public is putting dollars in there. There is a lot of
dollars in. I look around the room sometimes, and there is, we are about $5,000 an hour
sitting here, you know‖ (AG10).
Although no formal estimate was made about the amount of resources contributed
in-kind by the city and the city planners, based on their rough estimate, the City Planning
Department claimed to have been an equal contributor.
We estimated that OBD‘s donors put in I think it was somewhere in the
neighborhood of 800,000 for the first part and another 400,000, so it was like
maybe $1.2 M altogether but when we calculated the city‘s investment in time
and resources it was about 750,000 dollars but I don‘t think most people know
that. So I mean it was probably altogether about 2M dollars project and about 1.2
M out of donors and 750 out of the city (CP5).

To summarize the resource contribution among major participants of OBD
collaboration, it was not equal in terms of financial contributions made by each
collaborator, but the city‘s contributions in-kind matched with the monetary resources
invested by the private sector. The developers joined in as affected parties, and not as
collaborators, who had contributed the financial or human resources to develop the plan.
They did contribute their time in participating in the process, but their involvement was
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largely from the perspective of protecting their interests. The nonprofits and other civic
organizations were part of this collaboration to give public voice to the process, and they
did not make any financial contributions.
Practicing Collaboration
Having brought a varied group of stakeholder on the table with different levels of
resource contributions, the path of practicing collaboration was even more treacherous for
Lively Omaha. The nature of interaction among different collaborators remained middle-
of-the-road, where certain aspects of the proposed plan design were welcomed by some
people, while other ideas were rejected by some of the stakeholders in the group.
I think it was kind of 50/50, I think it was even split in my perception, there were
moments when I think city had more pull, there were moments when private had
more pull, when we had our review committee meetings everybody had
opportunities to voice their opinions, I think everybody, there were certain factors
within the committees that would push agenda items that were more to their
benefit, that occurred numerous times, but overall I think it was pretty even
(SC1).

The developers, who participated in the collaboration, had a slightly different
perception about the openness and inclusiveness of the process to incorporate everyone‘s
opinions, as these developers claimed whoever had negative opinions got alienated from
the process gradually.
I think there was a kind of a movement and what started to happen as I saw it is
that more negative ones kind of moved out and the ones that stayed in were the
ones who kind of went along the process so I think there was a little bit of a
movement. I understand having been on the process, it‘s always easier to get the
negative comments out and the best way to get them out and easiest way is to
drop those folks from the process but that led to I think maybe you know that‘s
where the unintended consequences ended up because you didn‘t get a balanced
…so they ended up with maybe some things in there that shouldn‘t have been
there or things that maybe we need to change down the road to encourage the
development (AG3).
230

Even within the groups participating in the collaboration, there tended to be lines
that separated them during their committee meetings.
Where I was in the corner where all business guys hung out, then there was a
whole bunch of other people in the room and then there were some professionals
from the city staff and then there were some of the people I would say public
advocates I guess, so we are all sitting around, Omaha is a town where there is a
lot of goodwill, so nobody gets really screaming at each other but it was clear that
everybody had a different interest in what was going on and so we kind of talked
through the stuff (AG5).

To some, ―It ended up being an effort to mollify the real estate developers, who
saw this as a direct attack on what they were doing. So we spent a lot of time talking
about various construction materials that go on the outside of buildings‖ (AG4). Also the
length of interaction that ranged over three years from the design to implementation
phase required a persistent commitment of time and interest from all the groups and
individuals in the OBD collaboration. It was difficult to have their sustained interest in
the process for such a long time.
You really had to have nose in the grindstone I really care about these things for a
long period of time, by stretching it out over a number of months, you kind of
wore people down, so they couldn‘t remember what the subjects were from the
last meeting, what I care about what I don‘t care about, so when you finally got to
crunch decision-making time you have worn out 80% of the people in the room,
from a political stand point that‘s a very good way to the plan, you know get
down to the hard core who care about what is going on, and everybody felt like I
was on the committee so I had something to say about that so I am okay about it
(AG5).

Thus, the actual collaboration among Lively Omaha, the mayor, the City Planning
Department, and the developers appeared more like a consensus-building process among
different stakeholders as opposed to a multi-sector collaboration envisaged in theory
(Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006).
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Public vs. Private
The collaboration in OBD involved issues of control since the beginning, and they
shaped the nature of emerging alliance among other stakeholders of OBD. Ever since the
private sector decided to create an urban design plan, they were clear about keeping the
control over the process of creating this plan. Therefore, they did not give the donation to
the Planning Department or the mayor to hire the consultant and manage the plan-
making. They instituted, instead, a nonprofit entity, which would report to them directly
about the details of their functioning and progress. On the other side, the city planners
were unconvinced and uncomfortable about the private sector taking over the public tasks
of planning and design controls. There was an implicit divergence over who will have
how much control over the process, and clearly whoever invested the money seemed to
be having more control. But there was another explanation given by the local corporate
sector about keeping the control over the process,
If it was supported by tax dollars rather than just having the public entities
involved in that the City Council and those people would have tried to control it
and if they try to control then they were going to have all the public pressure of
what should be in it and what shouldn‘t (OB4).

The major reason why it was essential to make the entire plan and implement it as
a package that was controlled and delivered by the private sector, included,
They (developers) didn‘t pick out and say we didn‘t want this piece in here, and
they had to write the regulations you know. That‘s when the developers come in
and can stick it to you, so if you don‘t have somebody that‘s paying attention and
watching all the time things even though you have passed, the concept will get
changed in the doing. Some of them have. Some of them have (OB4).

While acquiring and managing the funds for the initiative from its donors, Lively
Omaha also assumed the responsibility of being a watchdog for the process of urban
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design plan and subsequent code-making. In some ways, it alleviated the liability and
accountability aspects from the responsibilities of the city‘s governance. The city could
put forward OBD as the initiative proposed and executed with private funds and managed
by the private sector, and, therefore, the city would not be held accountable for any
negative outcomes of the initiative. Allowing the private sector to manage urban design
plan was also advantageous for the city, because it did not have to bear any financial
burden nor take overall responsibility, in case the initiative was unsuccessful.
Publicly elected officials have a hard time you know they have people that
support them financially, they have people that work with all the time and its hard
and this kind of took them out of the process, they could sit on those committees
and say oh this would never pass and you can say back to them and in that
environment well why not and what can we do to make it you know (OB1).

Once the design of the plan was prepared by the consultants, after stakeholder
consultation and community participation,
57
OBD had to win the City Council‘s approval
and make sure no conflicts existed within the OBD collaboration. This premise was made
clear to the OBD promoters in their initial interactions with the Council members, when
the latter had told that the former would need to find a common ground between
themselves and the developers and not bring a polarized proposal before the Council.
At the end one of the Council meetings, people said to us don‘t come back here.
Don‘t come to us, unless you have got a consensus. I mean they just told us that if
you come in here, and if you raise a lot of conflict, we are not voting for this
(OB3).

The OBD promoters also knew they needed the City Hall and the Planning
Department‘s support to a great extent throughout the plan-making and code-making

57
For details of community participation see Chapter 9.
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process. For OBD, the city was the real beneficiary, and it had to be at the front row in
advancing OBD as a collaborative venture.
Ultimately we needed the city. This had to be codified, and it had to be passed by
the City Council and the mayor. And you might as well make them beneficiary.
That‘s the way politics work. If I say you take all the credit for this, you know,
and that‘s the way it works. You might as well get politicians on board sooner,
rather than later (DO2).

From the perspective of the designer, the real managerial connection was not
with the mayor or the city administration, but with the Planning Department, and a great
deal of what was to be put into the regulations during second phase of the plan included
efforts and proposals the Planning Department either had been doing or had been trying
to do, but could not do for years. In the end, the OBD plan was about giving the Planning
Department a leverage they did not have, in terms of urban design controls, and to do so
by monitoring the process from outside of the City administration with the support of the
private sector.
Roles and Responsibilities
Once a collaborative relationship between Lively Omaha, the mayor, and the
Planning Department was established, detailed roles and responsibilities among the three
were charted out
58
as listed below:
 City of Omaha roles and responsibilities
o Supports Co-chairman of Steering Committee (Bob Peters)
o Ongoing financial support for post 2004 outcomes of the plan – i.e., support of
Design Review Committee

58
Source: Omaha By Design archival documents.
234

o In-kind support for the process from the Planning Department, Law
Department, and other departments as necessary.
o Co-selection of committees
o Co-selection of consultants
o Public relations support
 Planning Department roles and responsibilities
o Director acts as a Co-chairman of Steering Committee
o He also acts as an arm for consultant‘s need—research, GIS system access.
o Specific Planning Department staff dedicated to this project
o Supervise and manage staff of project and produce written reports from
committees
o Support community engagement process
o Assumes responsibility of taking finished product through the Planning Board
and the City Council for approval of the plan
o Assumes responsibility of integrating plan into the Planning Department‘s
goals, plans, and policies
o Creates Design Review Committee with input from the Working Review
Committee
 Lively Omaha roles and responsibilities
o Head becomes the Co-chair of Steering Committee
o Responsible for community education and support for outcomes
o Responsible for private fund-raising effort
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o Co-selection of Steering Committee
o Co-selection of consultant
o Fiscal agent for the project
o Arrange meeting locations, provide committee communications, take minutes
of the meetings, and provide refreshments
o The community engagement was completely a responsibility of Lively Omaha
The above three entities were the main partners of the collaborative effort.
Although the local developers and their attorneys joined the collaboration, there was a
difference in terms of their involvement, versus the involvement of the city. The former
was not going to be the author of the plan or the codes, but the latter were assuming some
amount of authorship in the outcomes. The developers and their attorneys‘ positions were
perceived in opposition to the OBD proposals. The former knew their clientele‘s
development agendas may contradict with what the plan was to propose and the codes
were to enforce. The roles and responsibilities categorization suggests except these three
stakeholders no other stakeholder had assumed any responsibilities. It meant other groups
were to be a part of this collaboration by being on the Steering Committee to provide
their opinion and consensus for the consultants‘ proposals without having to take any
responsibility of the outcomes.
Committees
In 2003, once Lively Omaha and its donors decided to undertake making of the
urban design plan, a Steering Committee (Working Review Committee) was formed.
59

59
For the list of Steering Committee members see Appendix A.
236

This committee represented the stakeholders, including the citizens at large, who were
represented by the nonprofits, like Neighborhood Center for Greater Omaha, the League
of Women Voters, Chicano Awareness Center, which were leading the community
volunteers. The committee was co-chaired by the Planning Director and the former
Chancellor of University of Nebraska at Omaha. Other stakeholders in the committee
were real estate developers, land-use attorneys, architects, planning and engineering
professionals, business executives, union leaders, and government officials. This
stakeholders‘ group covered a cross-section of the society, whose members were to
consent on urban design proposals of the plan.
It‘s the committee of people who had an interest in the product, who could
represent a constituency and between meetings might, we hoped, go back to the
people, whom they represented and say this is okay, or this is what I have told
them and so forth. So there would be a network of people, who were involved
beyond the committee (OB5).

The OBD Steering Committee was to serve as the Board of Directors for the
Urban Design Plan, and its focus was to establish an overall direction of the plan. In
addition, members of this committee were responsible for building partnerships amongst
their own professional and the community associations through information sharing and
community support perspectives. The committee was also to make decisions on: design
process, recommendations from the consultant, and approval of the completed design
plan. The Steering Committee members were to be vocal advocates of why there was a
need to have the OBD process and help finalize the proposals of the plan. They were also
to participate and assist in the community engagement sessions.
237

Besides this committee, a work group of volunteers was formed. This Volunteer
Work Group included 5 or 6 members of the Steering Committee—architect, developer,
landscape architect, and community member. The group was chaired by the planning
director and the leader of Lively Omaha. Its purpose was to review recommendations of
the consultant on specific design issues, before they were put forward to all the members
of the Steering Committee, and to help the consultant in identifying viable resources on
Omaha. This group also served as a focus group of experts, who evaluated the designer‘s
recommendations with respect to two major criteria—Omaha‘s character and opinions of
rest of the members of the OBD collaboration. In essence, this group provided OBD with
the technical expertise for the local context, which the leaders or the founders of the
initiative needed.
In addition to the Steering Committee and Volunteer Work Group, a Marketing
and Public Relations Committee was established for the OBD Advisory Board, which
was composed of approximately 10 members and worked in partnership with the staff of
Lively Omaha to develop media relation services to meet the needs and interests of OBD.
The members of this committee were to serve two-year terms, which could be extended
up to four years. The goals
60
of this committee were to:
 Determine the communication needs of OBD
 Oversee design of Marketing Plan for OBD
 Develop a Public Relations Plan for the organization and its various initiatives

60
Source: Omaha By Design archival documents.
238

 Develop the tools to assist the OBD staff in implementing the Public Relations
Plan, such as the website, communications strategies, media presentation
materials, annual report, promotion materials for the organization and its
initiatives, and tips on working with the media
 Assist and monitor advocacy issues of OBD: define the communications message
in relation to policy matters, and understand the perspectives of influential policy
makers
 Monitor the annual priorities identified in the Scope of Work and determine how
marketing can assist in the achievement of OBD‘s goals
Cost
The estimated cost of the OBD initiative for the design phase was $800,000,
which included: $450,000 for the urban design and legal consultants and community
engagement and $250,000 for the community education and marketing campaign. During
the implementation phase, an additional sum of $400,000 was sought by OBD, which
was used to fund more staff required for the plan development, as well as ongoing
expenses for the collaboration and equipment. As the budget requirements of OBD
increased, the funds were needed to be raised through other donors besides three primary
donors. The mayor took the responsibility of raising $100,000 from his supporters in the
private sector and provided substantial in-kind resources from sundry city departments.
The mayors‘ fundraising efforts were coordinated with those of Lively Omaha. In order
to raise $550,000, the three initial donors hosted the fundraiser soliciting required funds
239

from other local corporate heads and civic leaders within the city. Institutionally, OCF
served as a fiscal agent for OBD, and WRT became the client of Lively Omaha.
Institutional and Collaborative Framework
The institutional framework of OBD had five stages in its one-year design
process. For the successful completion of all the stages, the OBD collaboration—
including the stakeholders and all its committees—had to function smoothly. These
stages were: first, establish a Steering Committee; second, hire a consultant; third, have
the Steering Committee review the existing urban design goals, concepts, and directions
to establish an overall direction; fourth, requisite consultants to develop the plan with
input and review by the committee; and lastly, submit the plan to the Planning Board and
the City Council for adoption.
Finally, as all the committees were in place, partnerships had been confirmed, and
collaboration was assured. On October 21, 2003, the lead donors, the mayor, the planning
director, and the designers held a kickoff event letting the rest of the city and the media
officially know about the project. The donors explained the need for such a plan and
codes to be put in place as,
There has been over $1.8 billion in public and private investment in downtown
Omaha alone in the last few years. It is high quality as witnessed by this
magnificent building and park, and we can all be proud of the first-choice city we
are creating, not only for our citizens, but for those considering relocation….It is a
commitment to our future, a legacy we can leave to future generations just as the
leaders of previous generations made commitments that have lead us to the
position, where we can consider such a bold step.
61

61
Documentation on The kick-off event of OBD held on October 21, 2003, OBD archival documents.
240

The OWH reported,
A Lively Omaha supporter and chair and chief executive of Peter Kiewit Sons'
Inc. said visitors to Omaha are wowed by recent improvements to the city. The
Omaha By Design initiative will protect that investment, he said, "We want to
make sure that future development does not diminish that 'wow'‖ (Kotok and
Robb 2004).

There was a need to protect and increase the value of the investment made in the
built environment of the city in the last decade, and the city‘s local corporate leaders had
recognized the role of urban design codes as an inevitable piece in doing so. Thus, urban
design became not only a medium to give a distinct identity to the city, but also a
foundation that could sustain and grow built and un-built investments in the city made by
the city‘s local corporate sector.
Summary
Lively Omaha‘s first steps towards collaboration began with their initial
interactions with the City Planning Department and with the mayor. Once the mayor had
embraced the plan, the City Planning Department‘s apprehensions and hesitation
concerning a private-sector-initiated proposal, which might take control over its domain,
were overcome. The mayor‘s support to this initiative also forced the developers to heed
the corporate sector‘s call for collaboration over urban design plan and codes. However,
the developers and land-use attorneys contribute neither monetary nor other significant
resources, except for their time in participating in monthly Steering Committee meetings.
The city‘s Planning Department, Public Works Department, Parks and Recreation
Department, and the mayor‘s administration contributed human resources in different
degrees to assist with the process. The only monetary contribution from the city was the
241

pledges made by the mayor for a sum of $100,000 from his supporters. Above all, it was
a complicated and time-consuming process of building a consensus among the groups
and individuals, who had a larger say and determination in the city‘s built form decisions.
The primary aim for collaboration in OBD was to build a political constituency
for urban design and, thereby, in the years to follow, improve the urban form. These
improvements were as a result going to protect the assets and investments made by the
local corporate sector in the city‘s recent past. Thus, the OBD collaboration did not exist
with democratic ideals. This observation was the major difference between the public-
sector-initiated cross-sector collaborations and the OBD collaboration for urban design
plan and codes.

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CHAPTER 8: DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE OBD PLAN

For the designer, Jonathan Barnett, the idea of designing a citywide urban design
plan was ―a case study of an unusually ambitious yet feasible plan‖ (Barnett 2006, 44).
Creating urban design guidelines for preserving a historic district or for a central business
district in downtown New York or Boston was one scene, but to do the same for an entire
footage area of Omaha, which involved downtown, urban, and suburban areas and other
areas of the city, was a completely different experiment and, frankly, a risk-taking
process and a monumental task. This project was not just about preparing the façade and
massing related guidelines for vast sets of buildings within the city, but its implications
were much larger and far more complex in nature. It involved placements of the buildings
in terms of how these buildings related to each other and how the topography appeared or
was naturally designed in various areas, most of which required and demanded with
wide-spread uses and diversified street patterns in Omaha.
This chapter focuses on the design solutions proposed by the urban design
consultants in response to the challenges specific to Omaha. The chapter is divided into
six sections. The first section describes the details of the one-year timeline for preparing
the urban design plan in consultation with the stakeholders and Omaha‘s citizens.
Subsequent four sections highlight the physical and architectural context for the urban
design plan, the conceptual premise for the major ideas of the plan, the grouping of these
ideas under specific design framework, and the major components of the design
proposals, as they relate to the design framework. The last section deals with the role of
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specific types of visuals and their representation during a series of urban design plan
proposals prepared by the consultants.
Timeline for the Urban Design Plan
The urban design team from WRT, led by Jonathan Barnett, had divided the tasks
of making the plan in four consecutive stages with a timeframe projection from October
2003 to October 2004. These stages were Inventory and Analysis, Urban Design
Framework, Detailed Recommendations, and Final Report. The table below displays a
detailed timeline
62
of their one-year urban design plan schedule.
Table 8.1: One-year urban design plan schedule
Plan Phases Components Duration
Inventory and Analysis

Green Omaha
Oct‘03 to Dec‘03
Civic Omaha
Neighborhood Omaha
Staff Workshop [No.1]
Synthesis of Findings, Review meeting
Urban Design Framework
Green Omaha
Jan‘04 to Apr‘04
a. Open Space Framework Plan
b. Workshop [No.2]
c. Review Meeting
Civic Omaha
a. Civic Design Framework Plan
b. Workshop [No.3]
c. Review Meeting
Neighborhood Omaha
a. Neighborhood Omaha. Design Framework
Plan
b. Workshop [No.4]
c. Review Meeting
Revised Framework Plans
Recommendations
Design Guidelines
May‘04 to Jul‘04
Regulatory Changes
Workshop [No.5]
Revised Draft Recommendations

62
Source: A document titled, Revised Schedule 9-23-03 from Omaha By Design archival documents.
244

Table 8.1: Continued

Plan Phases Components Duration
Deliverables
Final Report
Jul‘04 to Oct‘04
Streetscape Handbook
Landmark Lighting Concept Plan
Public Art Concept Plan
PowerPoint Presentation

At the end of one year, the design consultants were to deliver a final report that
included a Citywide Urban Design Vision, Illustrated Urban Design Principles and
Prototypes, Technical Appendices, and an all-encompassing detailed poster. In addition,
they were to produce a Streetscape Handbook; Lighting and Art Plan within civic
locations; and a PowerPoint presentation. As per the roles and responsibilities decided for
the plan, Lively Omaha was to carry the responsibility to deliver Omaha Philanthropy
Catalogue for Urban Design and work diligently on media engagement during the plan
process.
Design Context
Contrary to general perception about a midwestern city on the Great Plains, the
geographic layout of Omaha is considerably hilly with a series of creeks winding along
the valleys. However, the natural landscapes of hills, valleys, and creeks are no longer
significant features of the city, after being leveled by a Jeffersonian grid, which involved
consistent efforts, since the onset of when the city was first platted. The grid led to
grounds being cut and filled, and creeks being converted in narrow culverts that look like
drainage-ways, which dramatically demonstrated a complete disregard for the natural
topography. As a result, it seemed like a startling discovery and appalling monetary
245

travesty to the natives and leaders of Omaha, when the designer Jonathan Barnett detailed
how hilly the city was, and how the creeks could be revived to make them an asset for
Omaha.
Figure 8.1: Hilly terrain and Papio Creek system of Omaha metropolitan area

Source: OBD

246

Figure 8.2: 1975 Map of Omaha

Source: OBD

Figure 8.3: 2005 Map of Omaha

Source: OBD

247

Omaha‘s grid-based urban fabric expanded westward, as the city grew since its
inception in the 1850s. While a series of suburban developments were taking place on the
west side of the city, Omaha‘s core, the downtown remained typical, as any other
midsized American city. Omaha had a few significant buildings architectural buildings,
like Joslyn Art Museum built in 1930s, Woodmen Tower built in 1960s, a distinct Old
Market District that persevered Omaha‘s historic character, and a redeveloped urban core
in form of few blocks with its long, sunken, open space named ―Gene Leahy Mall.‖ The
water feature of Gene Leahy Mall is connected to the lake in Heartland of America Park,
which was developed as a part of ConAgra campus in the 1980s. The campus by the river
sits on what was once known as Jobbers Canyon, and its demolition was the largest
destruction ever carried out for a historic district in the country
63
.
Figure 8.4: Joslyn Art Museum in downtown. Its main building on the left was designed
by John McDonald, Alan McDonald, and Herschel Elarth in 1931, and the expansion on
the right was by designed by Sir Norman Foster in 1994.

Source: Author

63
For further details on this acquisition and ConAgra Campus construction refer to Chapter 5: Background
of Omaha.
248

Figure 8.5: Woodmen Tower. A 30-storey building, designed by Leo A. Daly and
completed in 1969, was the tallest building, until First National Bank Tower was built in
2001.

Source: Author

Figure 8.6: The Douglas County Court House built in 1912 was designed by John
Latenser.

Source: Author
249

Figure 8.7: Gene Leahy Mall. A 9.6-acre, open, sunken public space created in 1970s and
redeveloped in 2005 based on Lively Omaha‘s place game responses.

Source: Reprinted, by the permission, from Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce.

250

Figure 8.8: Heartland of America Park. A 31-acre area, including the central lake by the
river (top right side of the photo), surrounded by ConAgra Headquarters, as it connects
with the water feature of Gene Leahy Mall (left from the center of the photo).

Source: Reprinted, by the permission, from Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce.

By the turn of the twentieth century, Omaha saw a revival and building boom in
the downtown area, which included more than $1.5 billion in new architectural
statements built and recorded for recreational, travel, retail, corporate office, and
manufacturing uses. These multi-million establishments included: the Federal Courthouse
building by Pei Cobb Freed and Partners in 2000; the John Gottschalk Freedom Center in
2001; Nebraska‘s tallest 45-storey First National Bank Tower in 2002; Qwest Center, a
sports and convention arena in 2003; Holland Performing Arts Center in 2005; and
Midtown Crossing—a mixed-use development in 2010. Many of these buildings involved
a varying degree of PPP (Public-Private Partnerships). Although some of these buildings
were not completed, when the OBD initiative began, these corporate facilities were either
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about to be built or were being constructed. Thus, before the idea of OBD materialized,
the framework of downtown‘s resurgence was in place, and the downtown redevelopment
envisioned by Omaha‘s civic and local corporate leaders was being realized in the form
of multibillion-dollar facilities across the downtown area.
Figure 8.9: Federal Courthouse, completed in 2000 was designed by Pei Cobb Freed and
Partners.

Source: Author

Figure 8.10: John Gottschalk Freedom Center, a production facility of the Omaha
World-Herald, designed by HDR, Inc., completed in 2001.

Source: Author
252

Figure 8.11: First National Bank 45-storey Tower designed by Leo A. Daly architects
was completed in 2002, which is the tallest building in Nebraska.

Source: Author

Figure 8.12: Qwest Center, 1.1 million ft² arena and convention center facility in the
North Downtown area, designed by DLR Group, was completed in 2003.

Source: Author

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Figure 8.13: Holland Performing Arts Center, a state-of-the-art performing arts facility in
downtown was completed in 2005 and designed by the architectural firm HDR, Inc.
located in Omaha in collaboration with Polshek Partnership Architects.

Source: Author

Figure 8.14: Midtown Crossing, a mixed-use development in of Destination Midtown
Alliance area, completed in 2010.

Source: Reprinted by the permission from Destination Midtown and Mutual of Omaha.

Prior to any proposal by the consultants, the lead designer Jonathan Barnett made
some key observations about the context of Omaha‘s existing built form. He observed
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although very few of the inner city areas in Omaha were distressed in a literal sense;
some residential neighborhoods were in poor condition in the older parts of the city.
Contrastingly, a significant amount of well-preserved, traditional, and older
neighborhoods, like Dundee and Benson, with local amenities like schools, churches, and
shopping within walking distances along with tree-lined streets and residences were well-
established, thriving, and vital. The newer residential developments in the Western
geographic areas of Omaha were developed in tracts of agricultural land and converted
for mass real-estate developments with very little concern for trees or location of the civic
amenities within walking distance.
Based on Barnett‘s initial observations, the downtown was just one business
center in a long chain of small centers stretching westward along Dodge Street. These
other small business centers were located on Dodge Street where 72
nd
, 132
nd
and 168
th

streets intersected. He characterized these intersections as the ones that fostered business
growth, boosted the economy, improved social and cultural interaction, and brought
monies to the main downtown Omaha area. These main intersections had recorded proof
that more than 50,000 cars traveled through these intersections daily. Improving design
guidelines for this vibrant, economically stable, and sought-after stretch of business
centers was of prime importance for the designer and his team.

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Design Concept
Figure 8.15: Fishbone Diagram of Omaha (An aerial view juxtaposed with topography
highlights major commercial corridors, river, also creeks and freeway systems).

Source: OBD

The main conceptual framework of OBD did not borrow from its physical or
architectural context, but from its institutional and the civic context. Three areas
suggested by the designer were the ones he had found to be the three constituencies of
256

making an urban design plan in the city. The first constituency focused on the people,
who wanted to save the environment and were very concerned about the ―loss of natural
habitat.‖ The issues prioritized by them were to be addressed in the Green Omaha
category. The second constituency included the persons, who were interested in the
―good image‖ of the city; for example, they wanted to have aesthetically pleasing ride
from the airport to the downtown area to impress the visitors, to make a positive
difference during their visits, and to encourage multiple future returns to Omaha. This
group of people included the Chamber of Commerce professionals and leaders, who
wanted to make the city an important visual and civic statement. Their priorities would be
addressed in the Civic Omaha category of the plan. The third constituency was
documented as the people in the communities and the neighborhood activists, who
wanted to ―safeguard the neighborhoods.‖ Their issues were to be addressed in the
Neighborhood Omaha category. The designer felt if he had to approach remake efforts of
the whole city, he needed those three groups of people on board and they had to become
three major areas, where constructive change could potentially happen. In addition:
Relating development to the city‘s characteristic geomorphology, designing
desirable and recognizable places, and creating an appropriate setting for
community life are also basic issues within the Green, Civic, and Neighborhood
categories (Barnett 2006, 45).

The rule urban design consultants for OBD at WRT followed was not to propose
any concept, that had not been successfully implemented nationally. Because application
of urban design principles for the entire city was a unique phenomenon, adding
innovative practices without any precedent would only narrow their chances of successful
implementation. Even though the process was an overwhelming task to gather all the
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individual design solutions into one plan, the design team was hopeful, because they
witnessed the continual support of the city‘s civic leadership and the Planning
Department. As the lead designer of the team, Jonathan Barnett said, ―What‘s interesting
about Omaha By Design is that the leadership wants to put it all together here. My
greatest hope is that Omaha can benefit by putting it all together‖ (McNamara 2003, 27).
Jonathan Barnett had also clarified, that he and the OBD team were not just
creating, standards for Omaha, because a selective and stringent set of guidelines was
only one tool for reaching the overall goal in any comprehensive design plan. They
wanted to address the larger urban design concerns in the city by communicating with the
three major constituencies of urban design.
The three-pronged conceptual framework was positioned in Omaha‘s 1997
Master Plan, which had already highlighted components of a future Urban Design
Element.
64
These components were divided into citywide and area-specific applications
of design controls with their implementation mechanisms. The citywide aspects of design
controls in the Master Plan included: streetscape, signage, landscaping, provisions for
pedestrians, historic preservation, protection of natural features, public art, vistas, and
design quality aspects. Specific areas, where sets of design controls were to be developed,
included: districts, neighborhoods, Streetcar Era business districts, linkages, and major
corridors. Both the categories of implementing an urban design element involved a set of
implementation techniques, such as incentives in terms of additional development rights;
categorization, like overlay districts; neighborhood conservation districts; and historic

64
For details of urban design components of the 1997 Master Plan, see Appendix B.
258

districts. The following the ideas presented in these components allowed the design team
to, ―Concentrate on design and not unlock all the interrelated variables about such issues,
as infrastructure, health services, and education. All the Master Plan components have
design implications, but revisiting every recently made decision would have stopped us,
before we got started‖ (Barnett 2006, 45).
In a way, following the existing Master Plan components increased the future,
successful implementation possibilities of the Urban Design Element and ultimately
influenced the Planning Department to play a role of co-author from the initiation of the
urban design plan.
Design Framework
Hiring of Brian Blaesser, a zoning attorney, provided higher credibility to the
process from the beginning. Based on the experience or the design team, they had
proposed two other aspects. These were: one, to carry out a series of public meetings, so
the public would know about the plan; and two, to form a working committee,
65
because,
the design team believed that a public meeting was not the place to make constructive
decisions. As a member of OBD stated, ―[The] Public is very good about saying no, this
is bad, but you can‘t get 200 people in a public meeting to come up with an alternative‖
(OB5).
The design team suggested a schedule, where they met with the Steering
Committee and all the stakeholders first to present the ideas to be discussed later in the
public meetings. Thus, the design consultants proposed an orderly series of meetings to

65
Lively Omaha was already in the process of forming this committee which at the time was known as the
Steering Committee.
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deal with issues within three major categories of the plan in a sequence, beginning with
the environment (green), the civic, and then the community (neighborhoods).
The initial idea of the design team involved a two-step process for each of the
categories—Green, Civic, and Neighborhood. In that concept, both the steps for each
category would have a significant time-gap between them. In the first step, the design
team members would convey their ideas to the stakeholders, who were also the
representatives of their respective constituencies, would then interact with rest of the
members of the constituencies and report the feedback to the design team. In the second
step, the design team would work on the feedback received and modify their initial
proposal for that category, before presenting the concise, yet detailed package to the
public at large in one of the community meetings. This two-step process would ensure
maximum participation and a greater level of acceptance of the designer team‘s ideas
among citizens at large. However, in actuality, both the steps were completed on the
same or consecutive days. This unanticipated timeframe was partially to save money on
airplane fares for the consultants that were included in the quoted fees of the consultant.
Such a schedule of activities also meant consultants would have a discussion and make
decisions during or soon after the working committee meeting, and then they would take
this proposal and these statistics to the public to categorically and systematically gauge
their responses during the same trip. Few persons from the Steering Committee remained
present at the public meetings, which assisted in determining perceptions of the populace
concerning multi-faceted urban design and form ideas. The clubbing of the two steps into
one was efficient and entrepreneurial for the consultants, as it avoided additional trips and
260

added expense; for the members of the Steering Committee, they did not have to spend
their time conveying to others in their constituencies about the myriad of urban design
proposals by the design team. In that process, the important steps, which included
acquiring the appropriate feedback of the citizens, reworking on the timely and difficult
process, and presenting the multiple outcomes again to them, were basically lost.
To facilitate the Steering Committee and the public meetings,
66
one of the Lively
Omaha‘s research scholars had suggested using three-colored cards, where participants
received red, yellow, and green cards during the meeting to be raised for indicating
negative, not sure, and positive responses. This technique allowed the consultants,
newspaper reporters, and members of the Steering Committee to get a good cross section
of how people were thinking, then initially reacting. The innovative process also allowed
the former to know the segment of people, who were in attendance, to take an opposite
position on a majority of their ideas, but were not amenable to a discussion. The card
system let members of the group, who may not be very articulate in conveying their
views verbally, participate effectively. As a result, it was possible to have a responsive
set of public meetings, and the consultants were able to gather, categorize, and record a
set of decisions, after each of the Steering Committee and public meetings, which were to
be incorporated into the plan. At the end of four sets of these meetings, consultants could
arrive at twenty-one Green, Civic and Neighborhood goals, objectives, and policies,
requiring seventy-three recommendations involving administrative changes, legislative

66
There were a total of four sets of Steering Committee and public meetings:
February 18, 2004 – Green Omaha Proposals
March 31, 2004 – Civic Omaha Proposals
April 28, 2004 – Neighborhood Omaha Proposals
May 19, 2004 – Omaha By Design Recommendations
261

changes, capital project, and opportunities for initiatives to be funded privately. During
the last set of public gatherings and the Steering Committee meetings, proposals from the
three categories were endorsed to be included in the final plan document.
Design Components
The major goal of the urban design plan, which WRT proposed was, ―To build a
city of a million people in a way that makes it the ―City of Choice‖ for the region and
nation.
67
To achieve this goal, their design plan divided the major components of 1997
Master Plan into three categories: Green, Civic, and Neighborhood.
68

Green Omaha

Inspired by Omaha‘s hills and creeks, Green Omaha component identified and
mapped the most critical natural systems that formed a setting for the future development
in Omaha, created a new public open-space framework of parks and boulevards, and
established green guidelines for the new development. Within Green Omaha, aspects
such as: safe floodways and floodplains;, a complete trail system; preservation of
landscape at the city‘s edges; freeway landscaping; green streets; and understanding the
public open space as a citywide framework were highlighted.
Environmental conservation was an important aspect of Green Omaha. The idea
was to set a limit on uncontrolled and unnecessary urbanization of the agricultural land.

67
Lively Omaha Comprehensive Urban Design Plan, Summary Ideas from 9/15/03 Advocacy Meeting.

68
Information on design Components is derived from three documents mentioned below,
1. WRT. 2004. Omaha By Design: Urban Design Element. Omaha, NE: Omaha By Design.
2. Omaha By Design. 2003. Omaha By Design: Growing with a plan planning with a vision. Advertising
Supplement. Sunday Omaha World-Herald: 16.
3. Barnett, Jonathan. 2006. Omaha by Design-All of It: New Prospects in Urban Planning and Design. In
Urban planning today: a Harvard design magazine reader edited by W. S. Saunders. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
262

Thus, the proposal of placing growth boundaries and green zones was introduced.
However, the larger, prevalent, and time-constrained issue at that time was the
annexation of smaller nearby communities in the Western part of Douglas County. These
communities were thinking of annexing lands, which would otherwise come into Omaha,
and Omaha had delayed annexing them for some time. One of the documentaries or
possible directives the design team had proposed to the Steering Committee and the
mayor was they needed to annex those communities to have control of those areas and to
implement many of the ideas from the OBD plan. The suggestion had seemed plausible
to the group, and within a few years Elkhorn was annexed by the city of Omaha.
69

While the plan formulation process of OBD was taking place and the design team
was discussing preservation of public open spaces along the creeks to make them an
asset, as opposed to a problem, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) announced
remaking of the power lines along the creeks. The promoters of OBD and the design team
realized that OPPD‘s actions would hamper the creditability of the OBD process. At that
time, OBD approached OPPD and convinced its Board to halt the project. Such
mobilization of opinion in favor of OBD was largely credited to the leadership of heads
of OBD and their societal and political abilities.
In the Green Omaha category, the attempt was also made to coordinate the plan
with Papio Missouri River Natural Resources District (PMRNRD), which was outside the
jurisdiction of Omaha, but, from the creeks and river system‘s perspective, their policies
greatly and strikingly impacted Omaha. So OBD team decided to coordinate with the

69
Elkhorn did resist and went to the Court, but eventually the City of Omaha won the litigation.
263

policies of PMRNRD to confirm no conflict. PMRNRD also consulted lawyers, who
represented property owners, to agree to the flood control suggestions OBD was making
in the plan.
One of the most important ideas of the Green Omaha, included preservation of the
creeks to treat them as park systems, because, up until that time, people had looked at
those creeks as nuisances; they were used as storm drains, which hid behind the
buildings, where people put their dumpsters, service entrances, and parking lots back-to-
back against the water. The design team proposed Omaha did not have to follow that
process, because they were living on a water-front property. In order to display how those
creeks can be turned around, OBD launched The Cole Creek Project, after the plan was
completed.
The major reason behind Omahans not wanting these creeks to be developed for
recreational use was the traditional environmental perception that water should be
brought out of the city as quickly as possible, when a big storm occurs. Nevertheless, the
designer demonstrated how cities across the country had taken a different approach over
time, where they thought the water should be retained with a series of check dams, and
this water should be treated as an asset. Examples of places that had done this procedure
included Tulsa Water Management System and Brush Creek redevelopment in Kansas
City. The following illustrations explain the major goals in the Green Omaha category:

264

1. Safe Floodways and Floodplains Forming a Citywide Park System

Figure 8.16: Map of waterways showing corridor 500‘ and 1000‘ from centerline of each
waterway.

Source: OBD

Figure 8.17: Brush Creek in Kansas City

Source: OBD
265

Figure 8.18: Conversion of creeks into waterways with breakaway dams in the Brush
Creek.

Source: OBD

2. A Complete Trail System

Figure 8.19: Photos of existing trail along the creeks in Papio watershed and a sketch
showing a widened creek with additional landscaping.

Source: OBD

266

3. Preservation of Landscape at the City‘s Edges

Figure 8.20: Map showing proposed parks in Omaha Suburban Parks Master Plan

Source: OBD

4. Landscaped highway Edges

Figure 8.21: Photo showing Interstate I-80 and a sketch with proposed landscaping along
its edges

Source: OBD

267

5. Green Streets

Figure 8.22: Green Streets Plan, where proposed green streets are to receive special
landscape treatments

Source: OBD

268

Figure 8.23: Cross sections showing proposed street rights-of-ways with landscaping and
future transit lines.

Source: OBD
269

6. Green Parking Lots

Figure 8.24: Sketch showing how parking lot can help solve on-site drainage needs and
visual improvements through landscaping

Source: OBD

7. A Green Image for Omaha

Figure 8.25: A bird‘s eye view of Omaha‘s terrain with all the Green Omaha policies are
combined in one.

Source: OBD
270

The Cole Creek Project

Figure 8.26: Stabilized waterways as a part of the Cole Creek Project

Source: OBD

The Cole Creek Project began as a first pilot project in 2007, based on the OBD
plan‘s recommendations to transform the Papio Creek waterways into a public park and
recreation system. It sought to stabilize the creek, improve its water quality, enhance the
recreational use of Orchard Park, and educate the citizens of Omaha about their role in
the local water cycle. Located within Benson-Ames Alliance
70
area, the Cole Creek
Project focused upon upper portion of Cole Creek from its headwaters south of Sorensen
Parkway to Hartman Avenue. The project followed a collaborative model and included a
public outreach component by engaging the homeowners, neighborhood associations,
business association, and the students from the vast Benson-Ames Alliance area. The

70
Details of Benson-Ames Alliance are explored in the upcoming section on ‗Neighborhood Omaha‘ in
this chapter.
271

collaboration
71
was made up of City of Omaha‘s Public Works Department, Parks and
Recreation Department, local nonprofits, schools, engineering firms, Benson-Ames
Alliance, and OBD. The project was divided into three phases—construction of a series
of bio-retention gardens to detain and cleanse storm water runoff, before it enters the
creek; restoration of the creek to reflect its original meandering state; and creation of a
walking trail and interpretive signage. This pilot project is currently an ongoing
progression.
Civic Omaha

Design ideas in the Civic Omaha category revolved around the commercial
corridors, where there was maximum public use, which in the case of Omaha, were along
Dodge Street and in the downtown areas. Based on recent rezoning plan of Miami, the
main idea was to rezone the major Areas of Civic Importance (ACI) to higher density
along Dodge Street corridor. This change would allow planning of a transit line in those
commercial corridors in the future. The reason WRT team did not include transit or any
features pertaining to transportation in the OBD plan was
There wasn‘t an immediate prospect of any meaningful transit being built in
Omaha. It‘s not big a city, and it‘s tough enough getting people in Fort Worth to
build transit, or Kansas City to build transit, it was going to be even tougher in
Omaha, but the civic spine, the areas of civic importance where you would build
transit (OB5).

71
This collaboration was among the City of Omaha Departments of Public Works; Parks and Recreation;
and Public Property; Roncalli Catholic High School; Douglas County; Omaha By Design; the Benson-
Ames Alliance; Big Muddy Workshop; Hayes Environmental LLC; Lamp, Rynearson & Associates; and
Olsson Associates. It is funded by the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality and the Papio-
Missouri River Natural Resources District.

272

Hence, they recognized a possible organization system for future transit plan,
which can be incorporated in the same urban design plan, but no illustrations nor written
proposals detailed transit development for the future.
Within the ACIs, two levels of zoning improvements were proposed: first for the
Major Commercial Corridors (MCC); and the second for the Major Districts (MD), like
the downtown and the midtown areas. The reason behind proposing these special zoning
districts was that other than ACIs, the city also needed to allow special zoning districts
with design guidelines specific to specific areas. One of the most ambitious special
district proposals was for the intersection of 72
nd
and Dodge streets (Fig. 8.32). Above
all, the Civic Omaha category helped set priorities for the public improvements and
philanthropic civic projects, identified locations of critical public concern that needed
special regulation, and developed regulations that reinforced the civic design. Major
components of Civic Omaha were to create a sense of place, civic vistas, streetscapes,
major commercial corridors and intersections, conservation of buildings, lighting
landmarks, and general quality of public design. The following are illustrations
corresponding to each of the goals of Civic Omaha.
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1. Delineating the Areas of Civic Importance (ACI)

Figure 8.27: Diagram highlighting the areas, where most people work and shop, in
downtown and along Dodge Street. They were delineated as ACIs.

Source: OBD

274

2. Preserving and Creating Distinctive Civic Places

Figure 8.28: A proposal for an ACI, view looking west towards Capitol Avenue looking
at Central High School with proposed residential towers on both sides and
shifting of the existing freeway ramp.

Source: OBD

275

Figure 8.29: A proposal for Gene Leahy Mall with an addition of a restaurant and a
second pedestrian bridge

Source: OBD

3. Streetscapes

Figure 8.30: A view of typical Omaha street with new streetscape elements. All the
ACIs were proposed to have same street level details

Source: OBD
276

4. Statement : Coherent image for Major Commercial Corridors (MCC)

Figure 8.31: Proposed elevation control techniques for large retail buildings to give
coherent image of MCCs

Source: OBD

277

5. Pedestrian-Oriented Mixed Use Centers

Figure 8.32: WRT‘s design proposal for 72
nd
and Dodge streets intersection that aimed at
transforming Crossroads area into a ‗Civic Place District‘ of mixed-use
development. The image above displays the existing area and below is the
view after proposed developments take place.

Before

After

Source: OBD
278

6. Conservation of Buildings

Figure 8.33: Photo of a historic building in Omaha revived for a new use, the same was
proposed for other historic buildings.

Source: Author

7. Lighting Significant Structures

Figure 8.34: Views looking north along the I-480 freeway before and after illuminating
the bridges.

Source: OBD
279

8. Public Art

Figure 8.35: Examples of public art in Omaha, a similar concept of public art was
proposed in ACIs and other appropriate locations.

Source: OBD

9. General Quality of Public Design

Figure 8.36: An example of quality design structure in Omaha that was proposed for
other public buildings.

Source: Ken Mayer

280

Figure 8.37: A sketch showing a combination of the several OBD policies in a new urban
neighborhood on 78
th
Street between Dodge and Cass Streets along Papio
Creek.

Source: OBD

Neighborhood Omaha

The framework for Neighborhood Omaha category differed from the previous two
categories—Green and Civic Omaha—as it involved proposals for institutional changes
in terms of neighborhood alliances alongside the urban form improvements. This
categories design process included a review of community centers, business districts
housing, and mixed-use developments, and it created goals for neighborhood planning
and design. In Neighborhood Omaha components like understanding neighborhood
clusters, preservation, and enhancement of older neighborhoods, neighborhood retail,
281

creation of neighborhoods in newly developing areas, and framework for planning
neighborhood clusters were included.
Design ideas of Neighborhood Omaha revolved around decentralizing the city by
making the neighborhoods more walkable and coherent. The major aim was to bring the
new neighborhoods in line with the older neighborhoods, which existed before World
War II, even though the newer ones were much bigger and a longest distance away from
the center. Forming coalitions of several neighborhoods was new in Omaha, but its
national counterparts had already witnessed the trend, and the design team was proposing
those ideas and suggestions to better manage planning and design within neighborhoods.
Below are the sketches and images corresponding to the goals of Neighborhood Omaha
category of the OBD plan.

282

1. Creating Neighborhood Alliances

Figure 8.38: Map showing how Neighborhood Alliances made up of a cluster of existing
neighborhoods could be mapped in Omaha.

Source: OBD

2. Preservation and Enhancement of Older Neighborhoods

Figure 8.39: Picture showing an older neighborhood in Omaha.

Source: Author
283

3. Preserving and Enhancing Retail in Older Neighborhoods

Figure 8.40: Proposed streetscape improvements on 24
th
Street in North Omaha

Source: OBD

4. Neighborhood Retail and Other Amenities in Post-1950 Neighborhoods

Figure 8.41: A neighborhood street after proposed streetscape policies are implemented

Source: OBD
284

5. Walkable Neighborhoods in Newly Developing Areas

Figure 8.42: A walkable neighborhood commercial center proposal with "Four Corners"
development pattern

Source: OBD
285

Benson-Ames Alliance

Within Neighborhood Omaha a pilot neighborhood alliance project called
Benson-Ames Alliance (BAA) was initiated by OBD in 2005. BAA was the first project
to be taken up by OBD to show how several proposals within Neighborhood Omaha
category of OBD could be implemented. To plan and revitalize Benson and Ames within
the city, the alliance was located in two of Omaha‘s distinct historic districts, which were
desperately in need of revitalization. BAA was to be the first of the fifteen neighborhood
alliances recommended in the Neighborhood Omaha section of the plan. BAA was also
adopted as a collaborative model to promote economic and social vitality in the BAA
areas. The members of the BAA collaboration included: neighborhood and business
associations; educational institutions; social service and civic organizations; community
and religious leaders; developers; and the design professionals. The Alliance consisted of
over 800 businesses, including schools, religious organizations, and 15,543 households.
In 2006, the BAA created a Master Plan for the area, and, since then, the group has
worked on several projects outlined in that elaborate plan. Some of these projects are the
Cole Creek Urban Green Stream Project and the Maple Street Corridor Project aimed at
making the area a sustainable community with a balance between its built and natural
environments. OBD acts as the project manager for the alliance and its initiatives.

286

Figure 8.43: A sketch by consultant team
72
showing the downtown redevelopment
proposal for Benson under Benson-Ames Alliance.

Source: OBD

Visuals and Representation

Visual representation of the existing and future built form in specific ways was a
distinct characteristic of the OBD process beginning from the first presentation made by
the consultants to the heads of Lively Omaha and Steering Committee members to all the
other interactions that took place with different stakeholders during the design and

72
Gould Evans LLC, Robert Peters Company and Ehrhart Griffin and Associates
287

implementation process. Use of visual material to represent design team‘s ideas is an
established tradition of communication for urban designers and planners. In case of OBD,
It was a concerted effort to make sure that graphics did play a role, especially
when you are dealing with urban design, because urban design can be so
subjective so if you can identify it and associate with it, then you understand it
(AG6).

Within a larger tradition of using visuals to communicate urban design goals,
specific ways of representing design ideas may dominate, for reasons such as the
designer‘s attempt to seek approval of his clients and to increase the clients‘ ability to
imagine the possibilities.
Figure 8.44: ―Fish-bone‖ diagram of OBD‘s design concept

Source: OBD

The first visual (above) of the OBD plan was responsible for changing the way
citizens of Omaha perceived topography and natural environment of their city. It was a
birds-eye view of Omaha‘s terrain superimposed with the plan of ACIs and MCCs in the
city and was referred as ―fish-bone‖ diagram.
288

Everybody knew that the place was hilly and would laugh at people who thought
of it as flat, but didn‘t really understand how the topography worked. So that sort
of brought that idea home, the concept of the ―fish-bone,‖ of a central corridor
with these north-south things that radiated from it has been a fairly strong image. I
mean it‘s not; again it‘s not an implemented image, but it sort of out there and
affects the people to think about development in those areas (SC4).

The ―fish-bone‖ diagram left a long-lasting image on the minds of Omaha‘s
citizens, because, for the first time, they viewed their city from such a lens.
The most eye- catching aspects of presentations for the OBD plan were before
and after images. They were about what Omaha‘s built form was at the time and what it
could become, after the implementation of the OBD plan. As an OBD team member
states,
The before and after [images] are so dramatic, and it really captures people‘s
attention. They can see it. They can understand quickly what you mean by, ohhh
there is a blank wall—there is no windows on it, that‘s what you mean, and how
that stops pedestrian activity. There is no interest, and it‘s not safe, and all of
those things were just very easy (OB1).

Modern computing technologies also allowed greater possibilities of generating
transformative after visuals. ―It was the only way people could get it. You show what it is
and what it could be or examples from other cities‖ (CP1).
Remarkable focus on before and after visuals during the plan-making stage of
OBD suggests: one, aesthetic dimension of urban design outcomes is still equally, if not
more important, than its non-aesthetic counterparts, such as political, economic and
experiential processes determining the urban design outcomes; and two, it is one of the
most salient aspects of building a constituency for urban design proposals.

289

Visuals in Design phase
Since the promoters of OBD had aimed to ―dream no small dreams,‖
73
and not
limited the possibilities by worrying about practicalities of its design proposals in the
beginning of the urban design plan phase, it was imperative for the design team to
illustrate what those dreams would look like visually. The way in which visuals were to
be presented directly related to how people understood urban design concepts and
proposals and how their understanding reflected through their consent for those
proposals.
I think it was very important, because this is such a visual field. You know it‘s
very easy to see a picture of a big box with a blue band around it and a companion
picture that had building articulation and the materials and all of the design
components illustrated in the buildings. It‘s very easy. They could just see it. You
don‘t have to have words to explain it (OB1).

Based on all the visuals presented during the plan‘s design, community engagement,
and implementation in codes phases, there emerges two primary ways,
74
in which visuals
were used:
1. Visual preference idea:
According to one of the members of the initial group for Lively Omaha,
His [Jonathan Barnett] presentations early on used what‘s called a visual
preference survey, which essentially is putting up two pictures of a what
particular area could look like, one, this beautifully designed, high urban

73
Co-Chairman of OBD Del Weber‘s address in the first public meeting where he quoted Victor Hugo
―Dream no small dreams. They have no power to stir the hearts of men‖ and asked Omaha‘s citizens to
dream big without delving over financial and practical possibilities from the beginning. Community Input
Meeting, Omaha By Design, Scott Conference Center, December 17, 2003.

74
This analysis of visuals is based only on the images used in PowerPoint presentations of urban design
plan and Omaha By Design plan report and may not cover all the graphics used during Community Input
Sessions, because exact illustration charts are no longer available.

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design standards, nice-looking and other schlock, that no one is going to
buy into. Well, it was a set up, you ask, citizens of Omaha, do you want A
or B? Of course we are going to chose A, but he used a lot of these visual
survey techniques early on in both the TAG and in the public meetings
(AG7).

It was evident Visual Preference idea in form of before and after visuals played
a major role in conveying the design team‘s proposals. Below are the three major ways,
in which the Visual preference in the OBD process was used:
a. Inferior existing vs. superior proposed form
This category of before and after pictures included inferior built environment of
present Omaha, versus sketches and enhanced images of what those areas could
look like after applying proposed urban design proposals.
We do in our practices a lot of before and after graphics. too. There is
nothing special about that, but it helps. People see something different and
think about well that‘s interesting; by the ways I think that those things
have to be grounded in some reality (SC4).

The following are some of the examples of visuals from this category. The
initial presentation made by WRT highlighted four pictures
75
that are shown in
figure 8.45.

75
Source: all the images in this section are from OBD archival data.
291

Figure 8.45: Four pictures highlighted by the design consultants in first presentation

Existing
After
Existing
After
Source for the above four images: OBD
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Interestingly, there were no people in the before pictures, although automobiles
were present in both photographs. Better design is associated with vital
environment that has more people outdoors. This dynamic marketing tool would
also suggest more density and more users of the same space. Below are the
images in the same category shown during different public meetings of OBD
between December 2003 and December 2004 period.
Figure 8.46: 50
th
and Dodge streets now and after proposed guidelines implemented

Source: OBD

Figure 8.47: North 90
th
Street now and after proposed guidelines are implemented

Source: OBD

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Figure 8.48: Gene Leahy Mall now and after being redeveloped with a restaurant on the
right side and an additional pedestrian bridge over the water body.

Source: OBD

Figure 8.49: Capitol Avenue looking west towards Central High School before and after
proposed urban design changes.

Source: OBD

The major strength of some of the most radical proposals in the OBD plan was
its visuals with three-dimensional sketches relating to those proposals. The
redevelopment proposal on 72
nd
and Dodge Streets was met with a huge
contention by the locals, as well as other planning and design professionals in
the city, because of what its visuals illustrated.
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You print in the paper what they want 72
nd
and Dodge looks like, and I
mean people think that‘s going to be built (laughs), and they think that the
city has mandated that and somebody is going to go out and build it, you
know. Visuals are very strong in people‘s minds on what is going to be
built (PB2).

Figure 8.50: Proposal for 72
nd
and Dodge Street intersection before and after

Existing

Proposed
Source: OBD
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Figure 8.51: 120
th
and Dodge Streets Miracle Hills area proposal before and after

Existing

Proposed

Source: OBD

Figure 8.52: Proposal for 78
th
and Cass Streets area before and after

Source: OBD

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What seemed like an outrageous proposal in the plan for 72
nd
and Dodge
Street intersection, the visual of it was to leave a long-lasting impression on the
minds of most people for many future decades.
There was an image of 72
nd
and Dodge that showed towers development
concept in that. People got upset about, startled by. The same with the
Papio Creek, there was an image of the Papio Creek, kind of right over
here. Again some people thought, ―Oh that will never happen.‖ People
didn‘t particularly like the idea of the 72
nd
and Dodge image. That design
didn‘t exemplify Omaha (LN4).

The OBD plan‘s design team and local professionals faced a tough task of
convincing the people, that it was just a proposal, an idea to start people thinking.
The Omaha World-Herald reported on the responses of the local businesses
surrounding this intersection,
The owners of O'Daniel Honda, Fuddruckers Restaurant, and Schmitt
Music said they fear that their businesses don't fit in the new vision of
Dodge Street, framed by high-rise offices, apartment developments, and
green space. O'Daniel is an established business that doesn't want to move
or be blocked from making improvements to serve its customers, said
Howard Kaplan, the dealer's attorney. Rick Windrum, owner of
Fuddruckers at 72
nd
and Dodge Streets, said, "I see eminent domain
coming down." (Kotok 2004, 1A)

Several years after this proposal in the OBD plan, as the economic
viability of Crossroads Mall declined and the image of the same seven-year-old
proposal was refreshed once again in the minds of Omaha‘s citizens.
When it [72
nd
and Dodge Streets proposal] came out, people were like,
that‘s just crazy. That‘s the most ridiculous thing. I have ever seen in my
life. Here we are a number of years later, and people are saying, how do
we make it? How do we do that now? You know. That‘s the power of an
image. It gets people on the same page. It gives something to think about
that they otherwise wouldn‘t (CP5).

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b. Inferior existing vs. superior form from other cities

In this category of before and after images, an inferior built form of
present Omaha is contrasted with the superior built form of places in other
cities. The images below are examples of this type of contrast.
Figure 8.53: Creeks now and an example of how they can become after their water is
raised, like in Brush Creek, Kansas City.

Source: OBD

c. Inferior existing form vs. Superior form of the past

In this third category of before and after pictures, good, natural
environments like creeks from the past within Omaha are compared to the
deteriorated, natural environment of the present. Below are the images
representing this concept:

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Figure 8.54: Omaha‘s creeks, as they existed before, and as they exist now, after being
neglected

Source for both images: City of Omaha

2. Reinforcing the existing trend of developments: Besides visual preference technique,
another way to promote the plan was presenting pictures of superior building
developments within Omaha and push for continuing that trend of positive aesthetics
within Omaha. In this group of visuals, Omaha‘s recent downtown developments
were highlighted.

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Figure 8.55: Bob Kerrey Pedestrian Bridge and the riverfront

Source: Author

Figure 8.56: The Hilton hotel, downtown Omaha

Source: Author

300

Figure 8.57: The Gallup premise on the riverfront (below right), where once there used to
be one of the largest car junk yards of Omaha (below left)

Source for the image on left: City of Omaha. Source for the image on right: author.

Figure 8.58: Public spaces of Omaha: two examples of unusable and usable public spaces

Source for both the images: Ken Mayer

Visuals in Implementation Phase
Despite an abundance of visuals during design stage of the plan, little of the same
trend was carried over into the implementation stage.
76
This stage would determine what

76
Detailed analysis of the implementation stage is presented in Chapter 10.
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urban form implications would be of the proposed zoning ordinances. A 143-page Urban
Design Element Implementation Measures document included only 20 illustrations at the
end of the document to explain different zoning code regulations. As a former city
planner pointed out,
Graphics in the regulations is not nearly as good, and they are, sort of, they are
more diagrammatic. I am much more of a believer in sort of performance-based
standards that are rather unspecific, that don‘t get into percentages and numbers
and so forth – that are copiously illustrated, so that you can point to something
that‘s built in the environment and say this is what we mean by this. So build that,
build something else, develop your own interpretation, but do it somehow (SC4).

Local planning professionals questioned the effectiveness of the diagrams in
implementation codes from the perspective of how it would encourage developers to
imagine and adopt possibilities.
There could have been more visuals. I think you need that [visualization] to really
push along that idea, because you have people in the room, who are not visual
people. He could have probably sat more in the room with the bunch of architects
and planners, and everybody would have been understanding it (SC1).

However, there were more visuals in the PowerPoint presentations made to the
TAG committee, as compared to the ones in the actual code document. Visuals for the
TAG committee meetings were directed to explain meanings of proposed codes. Above
all, there were far less diagrams than required by some of the stakeholders. The following
are the visuals and diagrams presented to the TAG Committee at various stages of the
implementation of the OBD plan.

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Figure 8.59: Before and after plans of block layouts. After image shows a layout that is
orderly and aesthetically pleasing, even though it is only two-dimensional
view

Source: OBD

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Figure 8.60: Example of how urban design zoning codes can alter how an area develops,
Hercules, California. These two were the only comparative image in
implementation phase of urban design plan.

Source: OBD

Summary of Visuals and Representation
Representation of visuals from categories of comparatives and images, that built
upon exiting positive built form aspects, played a key role in communicating urban
design ideas to the community, Steering Committee, TAG Committee, and the leaders
and the donors of OBD. These types of visuals helped, not only in gaining a design
constituency of citizens and stakeholders, but also left indelible impressions on people‘s
minds for a long time. ―I thought the graphics in the urban design element were quite
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good in terms of showing evolution of areas and creating some fairly lasting images‖
(SC4).
Even though people disagreed with some of the proposals, they remembered
visuals of those specific proposals even more vividly. The consultants‘ images played a
very important role in how the citizens of Omaha came to understand the proposed plan,
and how the proponents of OBD were convinced of the potential of the proposed plan
and corresponding codes. The sketches for Omaha‘s future urban form, as a result of
implementing each section of the plan, were a fascinating contrast to the city‘s current
urban form.
While these images were a positive aspect of earning corporate support, they were
also a negative aspect for promoting many good ideas inherent in the plan. As Jacobs
pointed out in case of San Francisco‘s (see Chapter 4, section on San Francisco‘s Urban
Design Plan) urban design plan of 1971 (Jacobs 1978), images illustrating what various
parts of the city may look like, after adopting the proposed plan were specifically
avoided, because they were considered detrimental to the fundamental principles of the
plan and urban design policies for the future. According to Allan Jacobs, the planning
director of San Francisco at the time, such images would have reflected vested interests,
restricted other possibilities, and, above all, made communities hostile, due to large-scale
redevelopment over many private properties. A major institutional difference between the
plan of San Francisco and Omaha was San Francisco plan was prepared by the city‘s
Planning Department; whereas, Omaha‘s plan was managed and funded by people in the
private sector, who had hired a private consultant to make the plan. As a result, it was
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important for the consultants to convince the corporate donors by using fascinating
images of the proposed plan. Long-term institutional sustenance of the plan and
corresponding codes or convincing each private property owner to agree to the proposed
vision was not a part of the contract between the corporate sector donors and the
consultants. For out-of-town design and legal consultants, this assignment was a limited-
time urban design plan and code-making contract, in which they had to put forward the
best transforming vision possible for the city within twelve months.
The Visual Preference approach was successful in accomplishing what it was
aiming to achieve—consent of the collaborating stakeholders, Omaha‘s citizens, Planning
Board, and the City Council during the design stage. Nevertheless, the implementation
stage lacked equal level of stakeholder consent, which was based on inadequate visual
parameters.
Summary of Design Aspects
The OBD plan‘s design solutions were categorized in terms of three major
institutional constituencies—the environmentalists, the civic heads, and the
communities—because the design team‘s aim was not to just make a plan on which to
base the urban design standards, but to address greater urban design issues pertaining to
these three constituencies. In a way, the OBD plan‘s urban design solutions aimed to
satisfy the three categories of the people within the city.
The plan was effective in looking at Omaha‘s urban form and respective players
comprehensively. The design team‘s keen observations of Omaha‘s geographic and
physical context were commended by the populace, even complimented by the local
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planning professionals. The design proposal categories, like Green, Civic, and
Neighborhood Omaha, provided easy-to-understand grouping of different urban design
ideas in one plan for the entire city.
With a goal of providing solutions to the urban design problems of the city, the
design team adopted proposals already adopted in other cities. Each of the proposed
solutions was implementable individually. However, the design team overlooked the
institutional capacity of the city‘s governance or ability of communities to implement all
those ideas in one city. This was a major drawback, which not only clubbed the best
solutions and proposed them in one city, but also neglected the availability of institutional
and other resources needed to implement them. Omaha‘s governance and community
capacity for the built form initiatives was not the same, as Tulsa Arizona or Kansas City,
Kansas, where some of the proposed solutions had been implemented individually. In
fact, OBD was just beginning to teach the communities about the importance of better
urban form. Therefore, the implementation of the identified solutions in the plan was
questionable institutionally from the onset of the plan. This finding is proven valid, after
seven years of adoption of the plan, as the pilot projects that began with the plan have
still not been replicated by other neighborhoods within the city.
Another drawback of the plan was its inability to include transit component. The
reason for not including transit proposals was to make the plan more implementable; but,
in doing so, the plan avoided any perspective on the most important aspect of the city‘s
future development. It also left the city‘s transportation planners to discover on their own,
how their future proposals may or may not fit with the vision of OBD.
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Overall, it was an ambitious plan, whose implementation in codes would greatly
determine its future success.

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CHAPTER 9: ENGAGING THE PEOPLE

Place games based on the PPS model conducted by Lively Omaha were the first
step in the direction of involving Omaha‘s citizens in the urban design plan process. It
was instrumental in reviving people‘s interest in the built form aspects of Omaha‘s public
spaces, in taking a first step towards making a broader constituency for urban design in
the city, and in helping OBD later during its public outreach, education, and awareness
building efforts. Once the decision to make urban design plan and codes for the city was
taken in early 2003, citizen participation, awareness, and education were identified as the
major goals for the Public Relations (PR) campaign of Lively Omaha. They were
considered important and in fact crucial by the design team to ensure ultimate success of
the plan. In dividing the roles and tasks among the consultants, the City Planning
Department, and Lively Omaha, all the aspects related to public relations and citizen
participation were identified as the sole responsibility of Lively Omaha. The design team
was neither involved in public relations efforts, nor in citizen participation, although they
were a part of the Community Input Sessions (CIS).
This chapter analyzes the nature of citizen participation in the OBD process,
which is divided into six sections, where the first section introduces key issues involved
in engaging the citizens in an urban design process. The second section is the description
of major approaches identified by Lively Omaha in the beginning of the OBD initiative.
The third section focuses on the role played by various forms of media, its implications
on citizen participation, and the overall initiative. In the fourth section, specific
characteristics of the participants in the citizen participation process are analyzed, and the
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fifth section questions the effectiveness of the citizen‘s participation to impact the
decision-making in the OBD process. The last section summarizes the idea of citizens‘
participation in urban design. The process of making the OBD plan involved interactions
with citizens of Omaha in various ways. In this chapter, an attempt is made to analyze the
nature of citizen participation, extent of its reach, and characteristics of citizen
participation in urban design initiatives within ongoing planning processes.
Key Issues of Engaging the People
The most important aspect for understanding the nature of public engagement is
the goals and objectives behind involving citizens in an urban design plan. Is it done to
keep the democratic ideals alive or to garner larger support for the political success of
any new initiative? The academic scholars of Omaha described it as a requirement for
establishing legitimacy of the initiative.
Legitimacy I think. You could not have implemented. This is not one of the
things that corporate community could have done on its own. This is
fundamentally a city function ...this cannot work without the city investing
significantly its time and effort into that regulatory function, and, by the nature of
it, then it has to have a broader constituent base to it (AC3).

Besides legitimacy, there were other objectives citizen participation was to
accomplish in OBD.
I think there was a sense that OBD should needed to be an educational process, as
well as a regulatory or to- down process, and so what was really needed for long-
term success was to build an increasing level of public participation, public
awareness about the importance of design and I think that sort of happened, and it
resonated in other somewhat a wide areas like Live Well Omaha, which is related
to healthy living and so forth (SC4).

The OBD initiative needed public participation also for assuring its long-term
success. From the perspective of a city council member,
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These meetings I believe were pretty similar to that, or when you are going to
change a road or put in a swimming pool or tennis court, you call meetings with
neighbors, so you show them what you are going to do. Then they tell you, if they
like it or not, and based on their opinions, you can change it (CH2).

The idea was to seek consent of the citizens on the plan‘s design proposals,
because OBD did not seek any public input prior to forming the plan. Citizens‘ input was
necessary for OBD to avoid future public uproar for its design proposals. If the idea had
been to receive real input at the grassroots‘ level, the process would have meant more
complications than solutions.
Input then becomes a matter of staging a meeting, like a Town Hall meeting or
putting up a website or doing a survey or whatever and not being overly
concerned, about whether the people who participate are truly representative of
the community (AC1).

Various dimensions of representativeness are keys to meaningful participation,
but achieving the same in an urban design process for the first time in a city is not the
same, as it may happen in cities, where participation for design aspects is a common
practice. When a new initiative is being proposed, about which the community has no
prior idea, it becomes difficult to find people who will support it wholeheartedly,
especially in areas like public spaces, urban design, and streetscapes where it is not easy
to prove their contribution to the vitality of the city, until they are built. ―So, you know,
that‘s the other side of this [public participation] is that sometimes people with vision do
have to kind of move forward, even though somebody hasn‘t said we want that
[outcome]‖ (AC4).
One of the key parameters for engaging the people is to have participation that is
representative. Even if one were to assume that citizens who participated were largely
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representing the city, without having any records of background characteristics of the
participants in OBD, it becomes impossible to gauge the extent of reach and validity of a
citywide outreach effort. ―I would very much like to see who is responding, because I
think there have been decisions made in some of these situations sort of a priori and the
sessions have been used to validate that sort of a decision‖ (AC1).
But in case of OBD, it was observed, that citizen participation was not as
representative of race, gender, and income groups within the city, as it should have been.
We had intentional outreach to especially neighborhood groups. However, we did
not have great representation from North Omaha, majority African American
groups in that process. So the people who showed up to the meetings were mostly
white, middle-class, college-educated, homeowners who were comfortable with
the process, with talking and talking and talking (AG7).

It made many stakeholders think,
These events where we have this public input session, or whatever, are in many
ways apparently staged to say, ―well, you had your chance.‖ It‘s a kind of a way
to cover yourself after the fact, and when people object to maybe what‘s been
done, there is this ability to go back and say, ―well, we had this opportunity for
you to give us input‖ (AC1).

Public participation then might become a way to avoid any future objections to
the project. However, the main concern about the effectiveness of engaging the citizens
remains.
So the truth be told, you know you start out with casting a really wide net. The
most influential people are probably a handful of people, who care the most, who
are on the executive committee, but there is always— it‘s always presented as a
public engagement process (CP3).

Thus, the primary goals behind introducing citizen participation such as
representativeness of the people, and effectiveness of their participation by involving
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their views in the plan are the key parameters of citizen-participation in the OBD plan.
These aspects will be explored further in subsequent sections of this chapter.
Main Approaches
OBD planned to involve the citizens‘ input in its design process in six ways. The
first was the idea of Citizen Review Panel (CRP), which was the panel that eventually
came into existence in the form of Urban Design Review Board (UDRB) for public
projects. The initial idea was to have a CRP for all projects in the city, not just for the
public projects. OBD idealized this panel to have an authority to recommend to the
Planning Board and the City Council on urban design aspects. Their recommendations
were to be incorporated from the beginning of the project approval process, and caution
was to be exercised for CRP to not become yet another layer of bureaucracy with little or
no power to implement.
The second approach included creation of the Steering Committee. Through this
committee, a small group of citizens represented the larger population in the form of
different constituencies of their respective interest groups. These key leaders of a variety
of constituency groups were intended to not only guide the design team, but also
advocate what was being proposed in the plan to their constituents. The Committee
included 26 community representatives from various sectors.
77
This Committee oversaw
the proposals by the urban design team at WRT, and Brian Blaesser—a legal consultant
from the law firm Robinson & Cole. Through this committee, representatives of citizens

77
For a full list of its members see Appendix A.
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were to interact with the team of urban designers, personnel from various administrative
departments of the city, and OBD.
A third approach for involving citizen participation included five Community
Input Sessions (CIS),
78
which were held during the OBD plan-making process. The
process worked such that during one visit by the consultants, a set of two public
engagement meetings could be completed: the first, with the Steering Committee; and the
second, with the citizens of Omaha in the form of CISs. The reason behind not involving
the citizens of Omaha in the Steering Committee meetings was ―we realized that if we
opened the review committee meetings to the press and the public, the committee
members would be less likely to speak frankly‖ (Barnett 2006, 46).
So the Steering Committee met with the design team in the morning, gave their
input, then the design team improved and incorporated those comments and presented a
revised version to the general public in the evening. Some committee members also at
times were present at these CISs. The primary format of a CIS was a public hearing and
not a community meeting, as it involved comment cards for people to write opinions or
questions, which were circulated and then read by one of the Steering Committee chairs.
At times, the citizens broke into smaller focus group discussions to ―avoid people making
prefabricated statements‖ (McNamara 2003, 2) and to encourage public input. Thus,
community input sessions ranged from a public hearing model to occasionally breaking

78
Dates of these five sessions were:
 December 17, 2003: Critical Issues
 February 18, 2004: Green Omaha
 March 31, 2004: Civic Omaha
 April 28, 2004: Neighborhood Omaha
 May 19, 2004: Recommendations
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into small group discussions facilitated by the members of the Steering Committee and
other Lively Omaha volunteers.
The fourth approach of involving the citizens was through the Public Education
Campaign, which was not a two-way participatory model, but a one-way process of
information-dissemination. The aim was to keep the public informed through mass
media, like radio, television, and newspaper articles, as well as presentations to the civic
groups, like Rotary, Kiwanis, and other nongovernment organizations. Through a
Request for Proposals (RFP) from local communications firms, Lively Omaha selected
Redstone Communications as the consultant group to manage its Public Education
Campaign.
The fifth approach combined the third and fourth approaches by bringing together
CISs and the Public Education Campaign in the form of Call to Action—a public
lobbying effort. It was aimed at mobilizing a group of citizens, who were more engaged
in issues relating to improving built environment of Omaha, so they could represent
OBD, when the proposed urban design plan required votes with a positive outcome at the
Omaha City Council meeting.
The sixth approach was a variation of the fifth one, in which a series of meetings
in seven City Council districts of the city were to be conducted. These meetings
happened between the first announcement about the outlines of the urban design plan in
May 2004 and the final announcement of the actual plan in September 2004. These
gatherings were not the same as CISs, but were an opportunity to let the City Council
members know what recommendations were made in the plan and why they were
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important for the city to adopt. By holding such educational sessions in each district,
OBD could lobby for the support of the Omaha City Council members in favor of an
urban design plan and perhaps expect the latter to act as advocates for the proposed plan.
There were challenges in effectively communicating urban design aspects to the
general populace of Omaha by using the above six approaches. These challenges were a
lack of interest or concern of the citizens, the absence of understanding of urban design
aspects, and other similar barriers. The design team‘s solution to the challenges was,
To overcoming some of the barriers, was to find reasons why doing something in
urban design is beneficial to the people involved. In order for this plan to be
successful, we must build a constituency, not for the process, but for each
proposal…urban design is really meant to show people realistically what can be
done. The way to do this is to explain that it‘s been done in other places
(McNamara 2003, 2).

The main goal of bringing together the citizens, the elected officials, the major
business leaders, and many of the city departments on a common citizen participation
platform was to be able to pass the plan and its proposals in the City Council. The
departments of the city, whose representatives participated in the process, included the
City of Omaha‘s Planning, Parks and Recreation, Public Works, and Legal Departments.
In addition, the Douglas County commissioners and the PMRNRD were also involved.
Role of the Media
The public relations efforts were vital for gaining broad-base support for OBD in
two ways: first, to generate awareness about urban design aspects; and second, to build a
larger constituency for passing the urban design plan and its recommendations at the City
Council meeting. Although there was no concerted effort in this direction, when Lively
Omaha was formed, the need for involving the media was felt, once the newspaper
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articles on Avaya property‘s development had stirred the urban form debate among the
general public. The hiring of Redstone Communications (RC) in January, 2002, was the
first step to public relations work for Lively Omaha and subsequently for OBD. After the
decision of creating an urban design plan was taken, public relations efforts became one
of the very important aspects of the OBD process. The change in the name of the
organization from Lively Omaha to OBD was helpful from a branding perspective,
because ―I mean OBD is lot more catchy, so I think that [name] is partially branding. It‘s
saying, ‗hey we are positive and we can do some neat things‘‖ (AG6). An effort was also
made to make more appealing logos for Lively Omaha and for OBD to give the
organization a distinct identity.
Looking at the long-term role of the OBD process, Redstone Communications
proposed a strategy involving a website, public service announcements (PSAs), a public
relations strategy, and the creation of a recognized brand for the project. The public
relations strategy included media training and a Speakers‘ Bureau to raise community
awareness to the extent, that Omaha‘s citizens were willing to take political action by
voicing their support to the decision-makers. RC created and ran radio PSAs asking the
people of Omaha to look for the upcoming OBD newspaper insert and to log-into its
website. The newspaper insert went out in the Sunday World-Herald on November 14,
2003 and about 300 readers responded directly to the insert by mailing in the survey,
79

included in the insert. About 1,000 newspaper readers logged in the OBD website to
complete the survey. Intensive public involvement component of the initiative was

79
For details of the mail-in survey on the back of the newspaper insert see Appendix C.
317

completed after the Planning Board, and members of the City Council unanimously
approved the plan.
The difference between how the design team of the plan would have responded to
the frequently asked questions, versus a communications consultant, who is not the
author of the plan, is evident in the responses to frequently asked questions prepared by
Redstone Communications (Appendix D). The latter‘s inability to cite other examples of
recommendations made in the plan and to justify economic viability of the plan‘s
proposals were evident in these answers. The answers prepared by RC suggest a lack of
detailed communication between the design and public relations‘ consultants, which
resulted in wide gaps and obvious discrepancies between design team‘s explanation of his
ideas and the people‘s understanding of the same.
The role of the single-most, widely read newspaper in Omaha, The Omaha World-
Herald (OWH), through its newspaper articles and Sunday insert, was vital in spreading
the details of the proposed urban design plan and collecting the citizens‘ responses to
determine, which goals were the priorities
80
for the citizens. The newspaper coverage of
OBD was their most effective medium of outreach. ―There was a fair amount of
endorsement by the Bully Puppet, as we call it in the newspaper, so I think that [backing]
pretty much bought us all the creditability we needed‖ (AG8).
The OWH‘s coverage
81
helped promote OBD to a great extent. because during the
process of urban design plan, the newspaper ran stories every week about the initiative, at

80
For the analysis of survey findings see Appendix E.

81
Search for the word Omaha By Design on the OWH archives had identified more than 500 articles related
to the initiative, urban design plan, and proposed guidelines.
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times putting it on their front page with a large sketch prepared by the design team. ―It
came really out of the World-Herald, and it just bombarded people with OBD what they
were doing‖ (OB3).
Also, before and after all the public meetings, there were printed articles covering
various aspects associated with those meetings, which kept citizens of Omaha abreast of
all the developments taking place in OBD. ―A reporter would come out, and we would
talk about that meeting and what happened, and there will be something in that meeting,
or they might have articles about it, ‗here is what other cities have done‘‖ (OB1).
The aim of a citywide outreach and making people interested in the initiative
required a great deal of effort on how the information was disseminated by the media.
The media had to put forth relevant information pertaining to different categories of the
plan, in such a way that it would garner the general public‘s attention and prompt them to
attend the public meetings of OBD. ―If you are going to try and do this citywide, you
really do have to have the ability to reach out and the ability to package it in a way that
gets people interested and involved, because, otherwise, it‘s just too big [and
insurmountable]‖ (CP5).
Impacts of television and radio coverage were far less, as compared to the OWH,
but they reported most of the meetings. Many of the respondents of this study believed
the local media professionals were more receptive to covering OBD, because,
One of the big sponsors of OBD was the OWH and John Gottschalk. So I am sure
you know, OWH gave a great coverage, and you know anything the OWH covers.
you can probably assume that televisions and radio stations are going to cover. So
I think it was pretty good and very supportive of the initiative and lot of editorials
in the newspaper about, you know, x, y, z so. I think it was very good (LN3).

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The reason for greater coverage was not just that one of the major donors of OBD
was also the chairman of the OWH. For most people, it was obvious the local newspaper
would support this initiative because, ―are you going to be negative about setting good
standards‖ (AG11)? Omaha also benefited from its traditional social and economic
leadership structure, where the heads of the leading local bank and the newspaper played
a key role.
One of the great things about Omaha from this point of view is that it‘s an old-
fashioned city, in the sense that the bank and the newspaper are still locally
owned, and these people are behind the process. So they didn‘t influence the
coverage, but they made sure that the coverage took place (OB5).

In summary, the public relations efforts of Redstone Communications were
targeted to build a constituency for the proposed urban design plan, and the newspaper
coverage highlighted the positive impacts of the plan even further by incorporating public
awareness and participation components.
Participants’ Characteristics
Representativeness of the citizens, who participated in the four public meetings of
OBD, remains statistically unverified, because no data on gender, race, education or
occupational characteristics was collected during the CISs. However, based on the
accounts of interviewees, it was possible to get a broad idea about the categories of the
citizens, who may have participated.
The most dominant groups present among all the participants, included
architecture and planning professionals; people from the real estate sector; environmental
groups like Keep Omaha Beautiful; activist groups like the League of Women Voters;
artists, and neighborhood groups. There was a higher concentration of neighborhood
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participants, who came to see what tools they could have to help their neighborhood
associations. ―I mean the topics were so broad, that there was something for kind of
everybody there. And yet they were specific enough, that you could see where you would
fit in‖ (OB1).
Age and gender variations were more evident than the ethnic diversity among
these groups present at the CISs. ―It was the kind of people, who, I guess, what you
would expect, you know, middle class, well-educated. I think more people in the older
parts of the city than the newer‖ (LN4).
The composition of the participants from the neighborhoods included more senior
citizens and people with free time. ―The people, who have time and interest to engage in
this kind of discussion, are mostly people who have some spare time. If you are working
two jobs to support your family, you can‘t go to a meeting‖ (OB5).
Within all the different professions and ethnicities, the majority of the attendees
were white from middle and upper classes. ―And there are a lot of reasons why you don‘t
get other backgrounds there‖ (LN3). Because,
[Omaha] is fairly divided along racial lines, segregated, so to speak, you know,
white, middle-class Omahan can afford to worry about urban design; whereas,
other races have bigger concerns, I think, and if they have got to choose between
something or another, I mean, urban design is going to be a very low one on their
list of priorities (AG6).

Thus, participation in urban design issues was of interest to a very select group of
white, middle-class citizens of Omaha despite having a higher-than-expected turn-out at
the public meetings. It suggests aesthetic values for the city‘s urban form only concern
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the groups who can afford to spend time and resources, and these tend to be affluent
sections of the society.
The promoters of OBD and the city were surprised at the amount of participants,
because most of their public sessions were attended by more people, than they had
anticipated. Each CIS saw a turn-out ranging from 100 to 300 people,
I think that‘s because it was a focused timeframe, a new idea, something where
everybody could kind of relate, to in one little form or another, and it wasn‘t so
many that it was overwhelming. So I think for a lot of different reasons, it worked
pretty well (OB1).

However, the critiques of this turn-out suggest, ―when you have 100 or 200
people participating, is that participation out of the city of 700,000? you know‖ (PB2).
The reason why a greater number of citizens of Omaha did not want to participate is ―I
don‘t think they understand the impact of not participating and that‘s probably…it‘s
typical Omaha personality not to participate, unless there is a real problem, like the tax
problem right now is perceived as a real problem‖ (PB2).
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For the people who did
participate, they were the ―people who realized the value. Omaha doesn‘t have
mountains. It doesn‘t have oceans, but we can create a greater urbanity here, so I think
there were folks, who value that‖ (AG6).
There are various dimensions as to what may have interested the individuals or
the groups of participants to engage in an urban design initiative, especially in a city
whose population had been neither exposed to urban design or planning debates in a
public arena, nor sensitive to their role in the built form improvements.

82
At the time of conducting personal interviews for the study Omaha‘s current Mayor Jim Suttle had
imposed a 2% dining tax on Oct 1, 2010, applicable to all the restaurants and food venues in Omaha. It was
opposed vehemently by Omaha‘s citizens and led to a recall election of the mayor. However, the mayor
won with a narrow margin, and the restaurant tax also continued.
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I think if you went to the average person and said, ―What is OBD?‖ And they
won‘t know about it, so it‘s still run by the decision-makers—those people who
have the vested interest in it. So why would people have vested interest in it?
People who actually share the vision for what a well-designed city looks like, the
Chamber has interest, they begin to see maybe this has economic development
implications. If the city is attractive, it looks good, it actually has policies that are
evidence-based and progressive around how urban design impacts livability, and
culture, and economic activity. They begin to understand that connection, and
then they have a vested interest in making that successful (AC3).

In addition to aesthetic improvement of Omaha, one of the reasons for a higher
turn-out of the people for the OBD meetings was their property rights and land-value
aspects were critical to them.
They realize that you know there are issues of property values that could come up.
There is the aesthetic appearance of neighborhoods; there is [sic] gentrification
issues that could possibly come up, so they certainly had a stake in it, if nothing
else for the minimum fact that they live here (LN3).

A lack of interest still prevailed among the citizens, who had little aesthetic
related interest or property rights related stakes in the process. ―I think they are
supportive. I don‘t know how I would rate it. I think they are supportive, but I am not
exactly sure that a lot of folks know exactly what OBD does‖ (LN3).
Overall, the composition of participants may not have been representative of the
population of Omaha in number and background characteristics, such as race, gender,
occupation, and other demographic information. Nonetheless, OBD did attract
representatives from the majority of stakeholders and the civic-minded citizens, who
were vital in building political and design constituencies for the plan. In that sense,
citizen participation had served its purpose for the promoters of OBD.

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Effectiveness of Participation
The extent, to which it was feasible to incorporate the citizens‘ input and the
extent to which they were actually incorporated, remains unverified because the OBD
plan process, did not involve an evaluation of those aspects. However, the perceptions of
the respondents, types of participation mechanisms used, and the information collected
from some of the participants, allowed me to draw inferences about the effectiveness of
the citizens‘ input.
Incorporating the views of the citizens was necessary for building political and
design constituencies in the city, as well as in generating awareness about urban design
issues by educating Omahans. With these two goals, it was not imperative for the OBD
team to take into account the suggestions and change the plan accordingly. Although the
citizens were to give their endorsement for the plan, the final decision-makers would not
be the general public.
We were more concerned not with the lack of the citizen input, as we were with
the decision-making process. Who is making the decisions? Are private, unelected
funders making the decisions, or are elected office holders making the decisions?
And that goes to the accountability issues (AC2).

From the perspective of a person from the Mayor‘s Office, public participation at
large did not contribute to as much change in the plan, because people were not the real
decision-makers in the process. However, the city planners had a different view about it.
I think to some extent the views were incorporated. I think to a large extent they
[OBD] made the decisions. But that‘s okay. There is not necessarily anything
wrong with that. But, yeah, I mean I don‘t think generally those meetings are
designed to allow the public to come in and make sweeping changes (CH3).

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For some observers of the participation process, the model of public participation
was atypical to Omaha, because the city had a strong corporate regime that made most of
the urban development and other city-level decisions on behalf of rest of the citizens.
People, who were largely behind OBD, fit the traditional corporate philanthropy
model in Omaha, which is that there are few people around the table; they decided
that this is an important issue; they are the ones who decided to invest resources
behind this, hired the consulting operation, and, kind of, make that push (AC4).

There were two other initiatives that came out of Omaha Community Foundation
(OCF) around the same time as Lively Omaha and OBD. These were the Nonprofit
Association of Midlands (NAM) and Neighborhood Center for Greater Omaha (NCGO).
In both these initiatives, there was a great extent of public participation.
83
In comparison
of these two initiatives,
OBD was more of a traditional corporate way, in which things happen in Omaha.
It was still tightly structured in the sense that the resources, that supported it and
built it, were still fairly limited. They didn‘t have a broad-base kind of support,
that either NAM or the Neighborhood Center had. So the funding model remained
a traditional kind of model, but I do think as its advisory grew, and as it developed
its agenda, it became much broader based, than it was initially (AC3).

Hence, what started as the traditional philanthropy model in the form of Lively
Omaha morphed into a somewhat collaborative and participatory model, and that was
contrary to the initial perception of the OBD promoters.
From the perspective of the OBD design team, the public‘s role in the OBD
process was effective in providing a counteracting force to the development community‘s
demands. According to the design team of OBD,

83
NAM and NCGO developed fundamentally differently than did OBD. In case of NAM, it developed
primarily of the human service, where there was a precursor to NAM called Servnet. That organization was
a coalition of human service agencies, but it did not come in the traditional corporate philanthropy model.
The NCGO developed out of a coalition and University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) was largely involved
with that. The coalition for NCGO was between Omaha Community Partnerships, United Way, and UNO.
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The strategic concept was, we got to build the constituency for urban design,
because then that constituency will hold developers, and retailers, and other
project sponsors more accountable; whereas, nobody cares, and the only political
force is a land use lawyer lobbying the City Council incessantly, then bad things
tend to happen. So there needed to be a countervailing force, namely the public,
and I think that OBD has been fairly successfully in general at doing that (OB5).

The design team‘s idea of introducing long-term participation was the major goal
of the Neighborhood Omaha category. In that process, he wanted to introduce community
planning as a part of a long-term process, because ―the way you get more participation is
to go out into the neighborhoods. And you also get more interest when you are dealing
with neighborhood issues‖ (OB5).
The citywide ideas proposed in the plan were to be taken up by each
neighborhood alliance at a smaller scale in such a way, that each of the subdivisions
would incorporate urban design issues like creeks, streetscape, and ACIs in their area
plans. In many cities, neighborhoods have become increasingly powerful, and they
contend any big proposal in their neighborhoods. Many of them also have decentralized
responsibilities, where they are in charge of many planning and design decisions, such as
determining the location of new public buildings. However, Omaha was behind on that
curve, and, therefore, the design team‘s suggestion was OBD and the city should identify
some big, future issues in their neighborhoods and get them involved in those
conversations. In addition, there needed to be a process in place for the people from
various parts of the city to be heard, as and when an issue would arise. These measures
were to allow Omaha to manage the process of decentralizing the decision-making
related to planning and design, as well as enabling neighborhoods to take charge of what
would be built within their constituencies.
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The design team of OBD aimed to generate higher-level and long-term citizen
participation in urban form and design issues and not just limit it to the OBD process. On
the contrary, there was a larger concern for the lack of public debate in Omaha over built
form issues, because the citizens focus more on the political candidates. Issues, such as
growth boundaries versus no-growth boundaries, did not affect the general population of
Omaha, unlike in the state of Portland, Oregon or Ft. Collins, Colorado. Even if some
group raised such a concern in Omaha, ―they usually get worked out or resolved in some
sort of a compromise. It may not always be a totally satisfactory compromise, but it keeps
the peace, and, to most people, that‘s really more important‖ (SC4). Some find it is a
good situation, because ―it‘s certainly good to come to some accommodation rather than
to risk: number one, losing it all; and number two, having an unstable situation, which is
under attack all the time‖ (CP5), and ―every community has its own profile and its own
personality, and the profile of this one, like it or not, is that more gets done with honey,
than with vinegar‖ (SC4).
The culture of non-confronting, and finding a middle way through all the issues in
the city, greatly shapes the way major urban form and development decisions have been
taken at higher levels, without going down to involving the general public and to letting
the public debate over them. Citizen participation was effective from the perspective of
the design team and the promoters of OBD, who wanted it to be a constituency-building
process for their plan. It was not effective from the perspective of incorporating the input
of citizens within the plan.

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Summary: Participation in Urban Design
How do you write design guidelines for a whole city? One part of such a system
of guidelines would have to engage the community‘s beliefs—the design values
on which everyone could agree (Barnett 2006, 44).

This quote was the premise of the design team for incorporating citizen
participation in Omaha‘s urban design plan process. Producing a design, based on the
values of its residents, is not a new concept in urban design, but its implementation, in
practice, has not seen a systematic approach specific to urban design. Instead, urban
design plans typically follow a traditional public-hearing style format of informing the
citizens. In this traditional format of citizen participation the major concerns are the
citizens are responding to a concept and design proposal already formulated and the
design team is actually defending and modifying, but rarely rejecting the proposal. Thus,
values of the citizens are incorporated indirectly, only in the form of considering their
objections. The idea in OBD process was not to empower the citizens or let them be the
author of the proposals, but to seek their approval administratively and politically. The
citizens were not forming the vision; they were not determining the goals. They were not
deciding, which project they wanted to pursue, but they were only responding to what
already had been decided. Their comments were left to the decision-makers to decide,
whether they wanted or did not want to incorporate them.
Public participation issues also impacted one of the major Neighborhood Omaha
proposals—Benson-Ames Alliance—where consolidation of several neighborhoods into
a few bigger alliances was proposed. What seemed like an easy merger on the plan was
not as easy on the ground, given the history, politics, and racial characteristics of
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diversified neighborhoods. This premise could be the reason why no further alliances
have taken place, after the implementation of the Benson-Ames Alliance model. In the
Benson-Ames Alliance, the attempt was made to be inclusive, but, at times, the history
and the politics of the place prevented the neighborhoods from uniting as one. One of the
reasons was the ―African American community was not particularly welcomed in
Benson, and so it still lingers‖ (LN3), and,
Ames area is more North Omaha. They would consider them North Omaha, and
not Benson. The boundaries, I think, were kind of set up, you know, somewhat
randomly. I think there was some idea behind what the Benson-Ames Alliance
was, and the Destination Midtown and South Omaha, and you know, those are
kind of Chamber and city driven, and you get the cards that are dealt. But I don‘t
think anybody really thought about—It isn‘t just political; it‘s cultural, too (LN3).

The citizen participation in OBD was an extension of a public hearing model for
urban planning initiatives that go back to the early 1970s, when the federal Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program came into effect in Omaha. In the CDBG
program, neighborhoods were encouraged to be organized and participate in a process,
which was mandatory. Thus, citizen participation in urban design issues was not
significantly different from other political and administrative public participation
processes in the history of such processes in Omaha. The real decisions in urban planning
in the city were not based on the input received from citizen participation. This begs a
question; if urban design practice invariably involves a public visioning and consultation
component, to what extent do we allow citizens at large to determine urban design plan
outcomes, while keeping the transformative traits and implementation possibilities of
these plans realistic? It remains a challenge for the scholarship of urban design, whose
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answers may become evident through more empirical studies on public participation in
urban design initiatives such as OBD.

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CHAPTER 10: IMPLEMENTING AN URBAN DESIGN VISION
Making of the urban design plan was just the first small step towards realizing the
vision for improving Omaha‘s built environment. The donors and the leaders of OBD had
known that they had to implement the plan‘s proposals in terms of zoning amendments in
order for the proposals in the plan to become enforceable. What they had established by
the end of 2004 in the OBD plan, and what the City Council had adopted were simply the
goals in form of Urban Design Element of the city‘s Master Plan. They were a guide, but
not yet mandatory by law. OBD had already planned to undertake the implementation in
codes, and, therefore, they had hired the zoning attorney Brian Blaesser from Robinson &
Cole LLP in Boston as the legal consultant since the beginning of the plan. Once the plan
was adopted by the Council, the urban design team switched its leading position, and it
was time for the legal consultant to lead the implementation process. In the beginning of
2005, the OBD collaboration worked upon introducing changes to Omaha‘s zoning and
subdivisions ordinances, which would dictate the final performance of the plan‘s
proposals.
This chapter analyzes the complexities involved in implementing urban design
plan into urban design codes for Omaha. The chapter is divided into ten sections. The
first section is an introduction to the overall implementation timeline, followed by initial
background of the implementation phase. In the second section practical nature of the
plan for the ease of implementation is highlighted. The third section discusses the change
in the form of collaboration during implementation phase, which was different from the
urban design plan-making stage. In the fourth and fifth sections, oppositions to some of
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the aspects of the proposed plan are detailed along with how these oppositions managed
to negotiate the proposed codes. The sixth section deals with collaborative code-making
aspects and challenges faced in getting the consensus among all the collaborators. The
creation of Urban Design Review Board (UDRB) during implementation phase is
described in the seventh section. In the eighth section the approval by the City Council
for the final version of the codes is covered, which is followed by the types of measures
taken by the city governance to institutionalize the vision of OBD in the ninth section.
The last section summarizes overall nature of accomplishments through the
implementation phase of OBD.
Implementation Timeline and Background
Table 9.1: Implementation timeline
Dec 2003-
May 2004
Community Visioning process, which was the component that included stakeholder
collaboration and public participation in the urban design plan process.
June 2004-
Sept 2004
Beginning of the Implementation process – converting goals into recommendations
Sept 2004 Steering Committee gave consent on recommendations
Oct 2004-
Dec 2004
Presentations to Planning Board and citizens, press conference, two hearings before the
City Council
Dec 2004 Final presentation to the council for their vote
Dec 2004 The City Council voted unanimously for Urban Design Element and its recommendations
Jan 2005-
Aug 2005
Writing of the draft codes by the city attorney and legal consultant. Formulation of the
Technical Advisory Group (TAG) Committee
Sept 2005 First TAG Committee Meeting
Jan 2005-
July 2007
Consensus building among TAG committee members to arrive at final code changes. The
process was initially expected to take one year, but extended to two years
Aug 2007 The City Council voted unanimously to adopt the code changes, which would take effect
in two weeks
Mar 2008 The City Council approved ten members to the city's first Urban Design Review Board
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The OBD group had sought mayor‘s support to create and implement the urban
design plan by elaborating and focusing on three areas: first, asking the mayor to become
public spokesperson for OBD and to champion OBD, by making the initiative a vision
for the city and part of the legacy he would leave during his administration; second,
soliciting his support for introducing urban design aspects in different departments, such
as strengthening the City Planning Department by increased funding, tying the mayoral
initiatives to economic and community development aspects of OBD; and third,
requesting the mayor to support implementation of the OBD plan‘s proposals. The third
area included capital improvement projects of OBD, as well as regulatory changes and
support for public private partnerships in implementing urban design guidelines. Once
important areas of implementation were identified, OBD met with the city, where both
parties discussed what steps and avenues the city departments were willing to develop for
the implementation. Soon after the decision of implementation, the process of converting
plan recommendations into zoning codes began.
Implementation of Urban Design Element in Municipal codes of the city was
going to include the major revision of the zoning and subdivision codes since 1987. The
1991 Master Plan had highlighted potential mechanisms like Overlay Districts, Zoning,
CIP, Incentives, Awards Programs, City Demonstration Projects, and Design Review
Board towards implementation of Urban Design Element in the future. However, these
tools were merely the guides in the process that involved a long stretch of collaboration,
negotiations, and compromises, which lay ahead an in-depth and time-consuming
process.
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Omaha Planning Board and the City Council unanimously approved OBD‘s
Urban Design Element for the City of Omaha Master Plan in 2004 (O'Connor 2005). This
Urban Design Element laid down a framework for changing the quality of future urban
form developments within the boundaries of Omaha. Before proceeding to the
codification process, OBD needed to develop recommendations for the codes, standards,
and guidelines to implement the vision and present it to the Planning Board and the City
Council for their approvals. In addition, the project had to set priorities for the public,
private, and philanthropic investments, and demonstrate how planned developments
would benefit Omaha‘s natural environment, civic spaces, and the neighborhoods. During
2005, OBD, the City Planning Department, and the consultants set the goals and priorities
in each sector to implement and develop pilot projects, such as the Papio Creek Project,
Gene Leahy Mall redevelopment, and Benson-Ames Alliance. The group outlined
seventy-three recommendations based on seven Green Omaha, nine Civic Omaha, and
five Neighborhood Omaha goals to improve urban design in the city. An important
component of achieving these goals was going to be the regulatory recommendations to
be codified in form of Omaha‘s municipal zoning ordinances.
Workable Plan
The Urban Design Plan of OBD was intended to be an implementable plan,
although no other city had applied a mix of different urban design principles citywide.
We felt it was a pretty ambitious agenda, but it wasn‘t beyond the realm of
possibility, it wasn‘t something they could never do. It was all the ―stuff" that
other cities had already done, and that‘s one of the things that‘s a favorite of mine
is that you always suggest things that somebody has already done, because you
can go and look at it (OB5).

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Even though the plan was idealized to be a practical one, based on its applicability
elsewhere, certain key drawbacks in the process posed challenges in its implementation.
Some of those drawbacks followed by the key implementation mechanisms suggested by
the design team to implement all the three segments of the plan are Green, Neighborhood,
and Civic Omaha.
For making a workable plan, the design team overlooked two aspects. The first
facet was the aggregation of different urban design solutions, which had been
implemented independently in other cities nationwide in a single plan, which was to be
implemented in Omaha. This designated process required as much an institutional
capacity, as those initiatives being implemented together as a cohesive group
84
. Such
adoption of solutions from other places meant as much motivation and contribution of
multiple sectors, as all the other cities, wherever such comparable initiatives had been
implemented, combined. Cities involved in similar or closely related processes, which
had implemented individual projects proposed in Omaha‘s plan, had dissimilar
institutional capacities; some of those locations had proactive city governments, active
citizens‘ groups, a motivated private sector, or a varied combination of these three. On
the contrary, what did Omaha have? It had a motivated private sector for the plan and
code-making, which was relying on the Planning Department to carry forward the
implementation, once the plan and code-making were completed. In fact, the design or
the legal consultants never made clear to the private sector, that the implementation was
much bigger a task, than the plan and code-making. When ACIs, MCCs, and other such

84
As highlighted in the conclusion of Chapter 8.
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designations were proposed in the plan, the promoters of OBD did not know how many
layers of institutional setup each of these ACI designations had to pass through, in order
for them to become legally enforceable.
The second aspect was the design of the plan,
85
which was independent of the
transit design. The reason given by the design team, for not including a transit component
in the plan and in implementation, was not to make the plan implementation contingent
on transit implementation.
We are not talking about transit, because we didn‘t want to lead into something,
which would only work, if they did transit. Then everybody would say well we
will do it, when we get the transit, and we said there is [sic] a lot of things you can
do with these corridors, without waiting for transit (OB5).

This segregation was a cause of concern for local planning professionals, because
transit was the prime and focal requirement for Omaha.
The Civic Omaha was the most critical part of implementation according to the
design team, because it was targeted at highly visible areas of the city. In addition, it had
to deal with the interests of the public sector, private developers and individual property
owners. Interface between the two factions of neighborhood and civic Omaha were to
reflect significantly in the urban design codes. Green Omaha was not as critical an
interface, because it was going to depend on the capital improvement side of
implementation. In the Green Omaha, the regional flood district—PMNRD—and the
Parks and Recreation Department in Omaha were to bring together their funds to carry
out, evaluate, and monitor a planning process with community participation to implement
the major Green Omaha goals.

85
More details on this aspect are presented in Chapter 8 Summary Section.
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The key for any urban design plan implementation mechanism was to lead, guide,
and steer the issues and not wait, until someone or a group proposed a development, with
which all the parties involved would not be comfortable. Hence, the design team
proposed a systematic way of being in the front of the built form issues, which was to
create area plans for each of these neighborhoods. However, some of the most traditional
and historic neighborhoods also happened to be more effluent ones, so the city would
certainly not fund their plan-making, and that rebuttal and standstill meant the
neighborhoods were not going to be ahead of upcoming design issues within their
boundaries.
The design and the legal team had envisaged the implementation measures to be
organized in four separate categories:
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1. Administrative changes in the city government involving the Planning
Department with support from Mayor Fahey, Parks and Recreation Department,
Public Works Department, and the City Law Department.
2. Legislative changes, such as new zoning districts or improved zoning for
pedestrian-oriented mixed-use centers.
3. Fostering Neighborhood Development plans and other detailed control
mechanisms for areas, such as the Papio Creek Park system, highway
landscaping, public art, and lighting.

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Source: Omaha By Design archival documents.
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4. Philanthropic initiatives packaged together for ways that private donors can
bridge gaps in public funding or pay for start-up or pilot programs, such as
lighting, public art, new parks, tree planting, or highway landscaping.
In overall summary, three implementation mechanisms were idealized by the
design team, which included capital improvements for the Green Omaha; codes and
capital improvement for the Civic Omaha; and neighborhoods plans through citizens‘
consensus for the Green Omaha component. The Streetscape Manual was also a public
contribution to the civic realm, and OBD prepared that publication through a consultant,
in conjunction with the Parks and Recreation Department. This Manual included tree
planting and street lights guidelines, which could and most likely would help make a
civic statement.
Change in Collaboration
As a first step towards codifying urban design recommendations, OBD sought
architects, planners, landscape architects, developers, lawyers, contractors, concrete
suppliers and other such built environment related individuals to get involved in the code-
making process. The idea was that this group was going to negotiate and agree upon
development regulations, before they went to the Planning Board and City Council for
their approval. Hence, the Planning Board and City Council would not have to handle any
conflicts arising from unplanned and untimely disagreements over proposed codes. This
group was called Technical Advisory Group (TAG) Committee. The members of the
TAG
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Committee were initially asked to participate in approximately four committee

87
For the list of TAG Committee members see Appendix F.
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meetings and review the drafts of the regulatory package prepared by the consultants in
cooperation with the city attorney. The TAG Committee members were also asked to
attend two CISs during that time. This committee did have some members from the
Steering Committee of the design stage, but it did not involve any representatives from
the nonprofits or community, because the task of code-writing was considered too
technical for the community to understand and make meaningful contributions.
We used many of the people that were on the same original planning team in the
smaller technical group. But we used many people with technical expertise as
opposed to general community participation, because it was very tedious, and you
needed to understand the current codes and what would be new and they really
need people, who had that skill (OB1).

Besides the technical aspect of code-writing process and involving or making the
process open to the general public carried several potential threats, which could
jeopardize the consensus developed during the plan-making process. The process of TAG
Committee collaboration was quite different from that of the Steering Committee and
CISs. During CISs,
[Community] People came and contributed their ideas and wrote things down on
flip charts, but when it came down to real regulations, it was really more of a
smoky room kind of a thing. And this is interesting, because the urban design plan
itself…the urban design element is pretty abstract…in the sense, that people
would read and say, oh that‘s nice. They don‘t necessarily [say], if it produces a
project, or a different way of doing things, or planting trees in parking lots and so
forth. That‘s all nice, but that was a pretty easy process. I mean…there wasn‘t… I
hesitate to say motherhood and apple pie, but that sort of more the vision thing
(SC4).

Collaboration and participation during first stage of urban design plan-making
was relatively easy process, as compared to the code-writing stage, because in the plan-
making stage the community only had to approve what were obviously better-looking
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visuals, than the present urban form of the city. Even the developers and the land-use
attorneys had no objections for this stage, because at that level, the plan was intended to
act merely as a guide. It was during the code-writing stage that these stakeholders became
concerned, had to read each line of the proposed draft codes, and negotiate the specifics
to make sure those did not eventually result in higher cost of construction, loss of
profitable land, or delay in the duration of their projects.
The possibility for greater acrimony was in the implementing regulation side and
the things that involved how you actually did business on day-to-day basis…I am
not completely satisfied with everything that came out of there. Probably others
aren‘t on the other side…if you went too far. I know that development interests
will be able to defeat it, so we needed to sort of push, and then you say, well, you
can see why this makes sense. Can‘t you? (CP5)

The TAG Committee‘s interactions and functioning were planned as a nonpublic
collaboration, so it was not open for media or the community. However, the final
outcomes were conveyed to the general public, City Council, and Planning Board from
time-to-time, which was delivered by the OBD staff.
Opposition
It was not surprising for the promoters of OBD that no systematic opposition
developed toward the implementation of urban design plan in zoning codes, because they
had taken precautions and involved important stakeholders in the process, since the
beginning of the urban design plan-making process. In addition, the TAG Committee
formation allowed for any potential opposition to be handled behind the closed doors. As
a donor states,
You know all of these things, once you get into a public discussion of changes in
an existing city, then you are going to have controversy. You are going to need to
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compromise what you can accomplish, and so it all gets down to a little give and
take (DO3).

A small group of important stakeholders participated in the TAG Committee, and
the absence of public discussion helped reach consensus satisfactory to the members of
this group. This small group setting for negotiating the content and the language of
proposed codes also allowed developers, planners, and the OBD promoters to deal with
any opposition in private.
Now, was the public involved in that [process]? No, absolutely not. Because had
there been significant organized developer opposition to those regulations as they
came out of that committee, they probably would not have gotten it up [and
accepted]. And the ―larger public‖ would not have been either aware enough or
motivated enough to say by God, this is what we want. So it‘s not Berkeley, it‘s
not Portland, it‘s not Seattle, it‘s not a place, where you have a sort of highly
design literate, motivated, shall I say, progressive populace, that‘s going to
demand these kinds of things (SC4).

The fear, that dealing with contentions in public would make the situation worse,
make the process extremely difficult, and encourage developers to unite systematically in
opposition, seemed evident and so avoiding involvement of the general public was the
channel selected. Besides, Omaha did not have a community as literate, aware, and
motivated about urban design issues to fight against any organized opposition by the
developers, as in other cities. The lack of organized opposition was also a result, because
OBD had been backed by the local corporate sector, which was powerful to fight against
such oppositions.
The development community knew that there was this strong backing that we are
going to do something different, and so the discussions, the battles, that were on
the details but I think all along, it was felt this is going to be approved in some
fashion or another (CP5).

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Although no systematic opposition to OBD surfaced, an attempt was made to
build one. At that time, a real estate development group called The Nebraska Association
of Commercial Property Owners Inc., which was originally formed in 2002 to lobby the
Nebraska Legislature on an issue, grew concerned about ongoing development issues,
OBD being the major one. So they decided to become the permanent voice on a variety
of issues concerning commercial property owners and developers, and they elected a
five-member Board, that held its first regular meeting in October 2006. During this
meeting, a real estate attorney Jerry Slusky of Omaha commented on the OBD plan:
The proposed regulations could substantially slow or discourage development
without a corresponding increase in staffing and funding for the Planning
Department. In addition, urban design review criteria would impose additional
requirements and restrict uses of certain materials (Shanahan 2006, 02D).

So the concern of this group of developers was not only the potential additional
code requirements, but also a lack of staffing in the Planning Department, which could
lead to unwarranted outcomes and undesirable situations for the developers.
A few developers also hired an attorney to look into the proposed codes and how
their implementation might affect the profitability of their projects. At the same time,
OBD had also decided to identify and test how new standards might impact the
developers to understand their version of the story. To do such a test, OBD had asked one
group of volunteers from the design community to take existing zoning regulations for a
development project and another group to take the same location with OBD‘s proposed
design requirements, and then a plan would be drawn to compare the two. They wanted
to see specifically how the proposed codes would impact the ability of the developers to
complete their projects. They chose three sites to compare—one urban and two suburban
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sites. Their findings revealed that the average increase in the cost of building with the
new codes was about one percent.
So if you are dealing with a $100,000 project, another $1,000 could be all it
would take to make it aesthetically much more pleasing. So if we relate that to a
$1 million building, it‘s only $10,000 more, so it‘s not this huge pie thing like a
lot of people go, oh man, they really tripled my cost. It‘s not like that (AG4).

OBD and the planners also learned from this exercise that they needed to make
some changes in the proposed codes with regard to sidewalk and build-to-set-back
regulations in areas with gradient, versus flat areas. So the exercise was a learning for
both groups—the developers and the OBD team.
To oppose the one percent cost increase, the developers had another argument to
put forward. They argued that in case of low-income housing, for every $1,000 that a
house went up in its building costs, they would lose 1 percent of the segment of the
market who could afford to buy that house. According to a member of the development
community, ―when Planning Department wants a 100 percent of its wish list, the Public
Works Department wants a 100 percent of its wish list, and the seller wants a 100 percent
of its wish list. All of a sudden, the buyer can‘t afford to do any of it‖ (O3). Putting in the
required public infrastructure, adding greenery, and following new rules seemed like a
daunting task for the developers, who were working on affordable housing projects, but
had limited profit margins. ―It‘s a huge impact on those people, because you know they
want to maximize their dollars, and we just want the city to be better – you know‖ (UD1).
The developers claimed new codes were going to have a major impact on them,
even if they might not be very stringent; whereas, the OBD promoters argued that the
increase in the cost would be much smaller, as compared to aesthetic and urban form
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improvements from these same authorized codes. Arguments over these claims during the
TAG Committee interactions were the difficult bottlenecks and elevated challenges to
overcome.
OBD followed a more specific approach, whenever their negotiations with the
TAG Committee members faced an impasse. When it was difficult to reach consensus, a
number of smaller break-out meetings were held with the representatives of the real
estate sector. In these smaller groups, once again the members would work word-by-word
on the details of the code changes. In turn, this arrangement helped expedite the process
significantly, because in the end, very little aggregate dissent could be found.
Thus, as a result, the codes were a negotiated product that satisfied both sides to
some extent and succeeded tremendously in avoiding any major conflicts, which could
have threatened the execution of the initiative.
Negotiated Codes
OBD had planned to make the final code recommendations to the Planning
Commission and the City Council in a nine-to-twelve months period, but the negotiation
process with all the stakeholders took almost double the time, than what was anticipated
(O'Connor 2005). There were different views about the final outcome in the codes as an
article in the OWH mentioned, ―the finished product reflects a series of compromises
between city planning officials and developers‖ (Robb 2007, 08B). In the same article,
the director of OBD said, ―The original proposal offered one way to fulfill various parts
of the plan. The latest proposal builds in flexibility; [furthermore], it is truly an Omaha
product that has been tried and tested and debated and finally agreed upon‖ (Robb 2007,
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08B). An Omaha lawyer, who represented some of the developers, said in a newspaper
interview,
The proposed changes provide a good middle ground between the interest of
developers and city government. Although the rules might require developers to
spend a little more on their projects, I don't think it's going to hamper
development (Robb 2007, 08B).

One example of this flexibility given by the planning director was that the
negotiated final codes allowed three options for landscaping the same parking lots;
whereas, the original concept had one row of landscaping required between each parking
rows (Robb 2007).
The city planners and promoters of OBD perceived negotiations over codes as a
collaborative process. On the other hand, the attorneys of the developers had opposite
views of the same collaborative process,
Oh! there were big differences, I think. I mean the walkable neighborhoods. We
got that essentially thrown out, so it was a voluntary deal that was a big one. That
would have been devastating for their businesses, because, first of all, they don‘t
have—these are tract builders. They don‘t have plans for a half-a-million dollar
houses or $800,000 houses. Try to have walkable neighborhood that has the alleys
all over the place and the walk ways, and then we start to look into infrastructure
cost and what that was going to do. It just wasn‘t going to work (O3).

One of the major points of contention was the number and location of street trees
required to be planted by the developers. Prior to the OBD codes, no requirements for the
developers to plant trees existed in newly developed residential neighborhoods. In the
past, the developers and planners assumed people would plant trees for themselves, but
that ideal and likely situation was not the case.
We actually went out and photographed parts of the city that, even after ten years,
people had not installed trees. There was no green canopy being grown
whatsoever, and it was really ugly. It looked terrible, because they [developers]
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loved to go in and do clean-cut developments. They go in and take out all the
trees, put in their roads and everything, and build the houses. They weren‘t
planting anymore trees (UD1).

OBD proposed to have trees planted by the developers, but the point of contention
was whether developers should be required to install trees, and, if so, then how big should
the trees be and how many of them should be required to be planted. Developers, who
were developing low-income housing, were completely against it, but the higher income
housing groups were not concerned as much because,
A few more thousand dollars worth of trees is nothing to them. They just decked
it onto the price, and people with that kind of money really don‘t care (AG4).

Eventually, the group agreed for two trees with two-inch diameter trunks in the
front and in the back of the houses. However, the developers criticized it would cost them
another $1,000, and the prices of homes would go up about $1,000 more, but OBD‘s
answer to them was:
You have to think overall what is best for the whole entire city. If you can‘t
replace your green canopy, then you are not contributing to the lower energy cost
and heating, cooling cost and environment. Everybody is more concerned about
those things now (UD1).

The developers also opposed the proposed codes for subdivision layouts. A
provision in street and lot plan standards for subdivisions had shown how parking
garages should not be located in the front, but this idea was opposed on the basis of its
street layout diagram.

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Figure 10.1: Proposed location of the streets with respect to garages

Source: OBD

According to a member of the development community,
I think the location of the streets…they had the streets coming down like in the
middle of lots. Some of this is foggy, but almost like the headlights of a car would
go right into the windows of the house [is] the way they wanted to design. Why
would you do that? (O3)

Limiting more than three-car garages was also proposed in order for
neighborhoods to be more walkable, but the local land-use attorneys argued ―well, this
isn‘t Boston. Sorry, we have got to drive from 180th to downtown. So that didn‘t go over
very well‖ (SC5). Within the walkable neighborhoods concept, a proposal for decreasing
the length of the block perimeter became an issue of debate among the TAG Committee
members. OBD had supported walkable residential neighborhoods in the Urban Design
Element, but when it came down to deciding what a block perimeter should be, the
developers did not allow reduction in the perimeter length. Decreased size of the block
perimeter would make the block more walkable, but eventually raise a project‘s
infrastructure costs.
The urban design plan recommendations did not involve details of making
visually appealing retaining walls, because the first stage of the plan was largely dealing
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with the citywide proposals, and retaining walls were assumed to be a part of ACI
concept to be developed later in the implementation stage. The proposed code document
had to incorporate specific requirements for the retaining walls, because that factor was
the prime reason for the emergence of OBD. The retaining wall of big-box Walmart on
Avaya site was one of the major aspects of the public outcry over retail aesthetics in
Omaha. Therefore, during implementation stage, retaining walls were brought back into
the discussion. The developers and their attorneys were clearly not welcoming of
multiple-stepped retaining walls standard, because, one, it would use more land, as
compared to a single wall; and two, it would increase their construction and landscaping
costs.
We were saying how can you do this? Omaha rolls and you are talking about
eating up acres and acres and acres of ground. That is expensive, you know, then
you throw all the storm water stuff into it…the Clean Water Act – you know.
How they are applying that? You are eating up ground left and right (O3).

The local land-use attorneys critiqued implementing any standards for retaining
walls.
Because somebody goes in and puts in an ugly wall someplace. Well, you‘ve got
to write a regulation that no more ugly walls [can be erected], but what you do is
you hurt everybody else, who might be building a decent wall. Trying to legislate
design is difficult you know. It‘s like telling somebody what color shirt they
should wear (SC5).

While the land-use attorneys argued for the increased cost of land and
construction resulting from the proposed codes, the OBD team did not have specific
answers to their arguments in economic terms. Instead, they emphasized the future
aesthetic benefits.
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Stemming from a two-year long negotiation process, the final code document
introduced six categories of overlay zoning districts to be developed in the areas, such as
downtown, Dodge Street corridor, North and South 24
th
Street, and other major
intersections, as highlighted in the ―fish-bone‖ diagram for the city. According to these
new codes, large retail buildings were now required to have limited material options for
facades, including stone or brick, and there were minimum requirements for the window
surfaces. The codes limited the height of on-site store signs and required commercial
center buildings to be grouped in ways that created plazas or public spaces to encourage
people to walk. Corners of the major street intersections were required to have green
space, in place of commercial buildings. Large parking lots in retail and commercial
developments were to fulfill landscaping requirements, then terrace and landscape their
retaining walls as well. The codes gave an option of making neighborhood plans creating
special zoning districts for the neighborhoods, but specifically to older neighborhoods. It
introduced zoning classification for walkable neighborhoods with a combination of a set
of urban design principles that can help achieve that objective. It introduced an Urban
Design Review Board to advise the city planning director on urban design of the public
projects.
The overlay districts proposed in the codes were to be adopted for different areas
of the city over time. These districts were called: Areas of Civic Importance (ACI), Major
Commercial Corridors (MCC), Civic Place Districts (CPD), Mixed-Use Districts (MUD),
Neighborhood Conservation & Enhancement Districts (NCED), and Walkable
Residential Neighborhoods (WRN). Wherever these overlay districts would be adopted,
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their new zoning designation would supersede the existing zoning for the individual lots.
A total of twenty-four design standards were prepared for the proposed codes (Appendix
G). Of these twenty-four standards, a combination of several standards was applied to
each of the overlay districts. Within those twenty-four design standards, six standards
were going to be used most frequently. They included: Large Retail Building Design
Guidelines, Build-to/Set-back Lines, Ground-level Transparency, On-Premise Signage,
Retaining Walls, and Green Parking Lots.
Overall, final codes were negotiated to a great extent, which seemed to dilute the
intent of the original goals, as envisioned in recommendations of OBD‘s urban design
plan. The group of Omaha‘s developers and land-use attorneys represented a strong lobby
and contended details of proposed codes to an extent, that the initial codes were to be
modified to accommodate what the group thought was an acceptable level of regulatory
framework for building and public design in Omaha.
Collaborative Code-Making
The City Planning Department found the TAG Committee process for code-
making,
Pretty collaborative, you know. They brought to the table things they were
familiar with and examples that they were familiar with. We brought to the table
knowledge of the code and how it functioned, and things that we had seen
elsewhere as well (CP5).

The group had brainstormed proposals of the Urban Design Plan and had worked
on each of them systematically. Based on the group‘s agreement, the language of each
code was drafted in form of regulations with the assistance of the city attorney and the
legal consultant of OBD. To maintain collaboration within the group, the city planners
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and OBD worked their way down strategically. Their strategy was to begin by asking the
development community and citizens of Omaha, if they wanted a more attractive city.
Once they agreed upon that goal, they would move on to next stage, and then continue
with their strategies. An example of this process was to start by asking, if they would
want landscaped parking lots to make the city look attractive, to which the citizens were
welcoming, but developers were uncertain. At that point, the process of negotiating
would begin by pointing at the larger goal of an attractive city and how that goal would
require landscaped parking lots.
Because we had agreed on the goals, we could work through the details, and I
think that‘s important in the process. If you hadn‘t agreed on the goals, and we
just jump right into the details, we would just never have a way to resolve the
argument (CP5).

A step-by-step process helped convince the developers to adopt some of the
means required to enforce previously agreed upon goals of the urban design plan. During
the period of negotiations with the TAG Committee, two segments of the development
community emerged, one who was ―uncomfortable with having to operate under the new
standards. Some would like to turn back the clock to the anything-goes days of the
1970s,‖ and another segment of the developers was ―confused by the new procedures and
fearful of the impact‖ (Kotok 2007, B1).
While OBD and the city planners could not get many of the plan measures
enforced in the new codes and had to agree to introduce them, as provisions in future
overlay districts. The developers agreed upon some changes that could raise their cost of
construction. These cost rise included: greater use of masonry and glass on storefronts,
particularly at building entrances; increased landscaping around businesses, including
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green strips in parking lots; monument signs that were to be limited to a height of twelve
feet; terraced retaining walls with landscaping; breaking up the wall's surface and
improving its appearance; and walking paths between shopping areas and neighborhoods.
―Developers apparently have accepted, that they will have to pay more on future Omaha
construction to satisfy the city's desire for more stylish shopping areas, neighborhoods,
and high-traffic streets‖ (Sloan 2007, A1). As the Council member Chuck Siegerson said,
―I don't see any organized resistance‖ (Kotok 2007, B1).
Thus, a collaborative process of creating urban design codes resulted in
compromises for both sides. The fact that the task was accomplished without breaking the
collaboration or giving rise to an organized opposition were greater achievements for the
promoters of OBD.
Urban Design Review Board
The design team had suggested creating an Urban Design Review Board (UDRB),
and it was also one of the suggestions of Omaha‘s Master Plan for the Urban Design
Element. However, especially in the beginning, the idea of a Design Review Board was
not welcomed by the developers. They perceived it as an additional level of review that
would slow down the project approval process. ―They already have to go through the
Planning Board and Council, and if they get pushed over, and they didn‘t want it to wait
another month‖ (PB1).
But as the TAG Committee‘s negotiations had gotten closer to an end, the need to
have a review process—over who had a final say and who were to act as negotiator
between developers and the City Planning Department—for future development projects
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became evident. ―I think that the people then realized the value it could have and the
alternative review that a developer could choose or not, it became appealing. In actuality,
it has been helpful‖ (OB1).
The design team had perceived UDRB as a cooling chamber that could give
developers or a group of people some stature and put multiple interests in a larger
perspective. Before OBD, when UDRB was not put in place, the planning director had
served in that role, but the planning director did not have as much leverage, as he would
have needed, and UDRB was perceived as an entity that could give that leverage to the
planning director. Although a progressive step, UDRB would not have literal power to
stop a development from happening, but it would have an influence and could advise the
Planning Board as to why they should not vote for certain developments. In terms of the
formation of UDRB,
The Board [UDRB] was made up of members from that TAG Committee,
because they: one, represented the diverse perspectives; and, two, understood the
intent of the regulations and the background of why it was needed. So that string
has kept through in the committee process and probably will [continue] (OB1).

Before agreeing to have an UDRB, the developers from the TAG Committee
demanded that only public projects would be required to go to the Design Review, and
the private projects would have an option of going to the Design Review, only if the
Planning Department and the developer could not come to an agreement.
So I think the developers saw it, as this could be to our advantage. If we are
disagreeing with the city, and we take it before this group of professionals, who
work in the field, they will know that if you know if we are saying we can‘t afford
to build the wall this way, they will know, if we are telling them the truth or not or
whatever it is (LN4).

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Because UDRB was mandated to handle public projects, its influence over
reviewing urban design aspects in the city became very limited. However, it was a good
beginning, since the city had no such institutional mechanism before, and
institutionalizing its basic form could later give rise to expanding its purview and powers
in the future.
City Council’s Approval
When the new codes were presented to the City Planning Board, no one appeared
in opposition, and they were approved unanimously in June 2007. The City Council also
approved, unanimously, the new design codes and zoning regulations on August 15,
2007, which took effect within two weeks (Sloan 2007, B1). Seven months after adopting
new zoning codes crafted by OBD, Omaha City Council approved ten members of the
city's first UDRB in March of 2008.
The united voice of the Omaha City Council has joined urban designers,
developers, business people, city planners, and civic-minded Omahans to
overwhelmingly approve new urban design and zoning codes. Members of the
City Council saw the possibilities in the new regulations and acted decisively.
Omaha will be better for it.
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It was perceived as an aid for the developers, in case of disagreements with the
Planning Department over proposed project designs.
The [Urban Design] Review Board's job will be to help developers apply those
zoning codes to their projects, said Connie Spellman, director of Omaha By
Design. A developer might ask to meet with the Board, she said. Or a project
might be referred to the Board, if a developer and the city can't agree on a design
issue (Nygren 2008, B2).

88
Anonymous. 2007 Improving Omaha City Council puts imprimatur on regulations to hold growth to
higher standard. Omaha World-Herald. Omaha, NE, August 18, B.6.
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Members of the UDRB had previously been on the TAG Committee, and some of
them had also been on the Steering Committee, which enabled the group to interpret the
codes as intended by the plan.
Institutionalizing the Vision
Incorporating seventy-two recommendations in the zoning codes was not the final
step, because each type of overlay district formation was required to follow the same
process as that of the overall plan implementation.
[The] Implementation I am referring to is institutionalization, and that‘s the piece
people don‘t seem to realize, that for the key objectives to happen, it has to move
through all the layers of city government and community. To me, the majority of
the work is institutionalizing the vision (CP3).

So even after zoning and subdivision, codes were amended a major task of
creating Areas of Civic Importance (ACI), Major Commercial Corridors (MCC), Civic
Place Districts (CPD), Mixed-Use Districts (MUD), Neighborhood Conservation &
Enhancement Districts (NCED), and Walkable Residential Neighborhoods (WRN)
needed to go through a separate set of approval process for each one of them. These
procedures would include building consensus among the stakeholders, who would get
affected for creating each area or districts. This complexity was either not very clearly
explained to all the funders and initiators of OBD by the consultant and the Planning
Department or the professional group of the consultants and city planners was not certain
how implementation process will unfold, after the plan‘s recommendations were
accepted.
We learned pretty much that also at the end of the process, that in order for the
ACI designation to really be a requirement, it would have to go through yet
another level of planning review and zoning, because this was explained very
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clearly then after, (laughs) maybe, and I don‘t think many of us really realized it
(OB1).

The process involved adopting the recommendations in a Master Plan first and
then creating and adopting ACI designation, as a viable concept in the plan and in zoning
ordinance. As the implementation document explained,
The precise application of the guidelines will vary according to the selected area‘s
land-use patterns and geographic characteristics, as identified by the City of
Omaha Planning Department. They will be developed in consultation with the
owners of businesses and homes in that area (OBD 2007, 5).

Soon after the formation of UDRB, the next important step for the designation of
areas was to hire some staff dedicated to this task in the Planning Department.
It was the second year after that, they hired a staff person in the Planning
Department, who was totally responsible for, you know, really incorporating
those into the working operation of the city planning and whatever department
was affected, and that [process] has been really helpful (OB1).

The City Planning Department hired an urban designer to handle the
implementation in terms of area designations and their incorporation in the city‘s
subdivision and zoning ordinances. However, this task was not a job of one person, and
that encumbrance slowed down the process of area designations as per the codes.
Moreover, it became the sole responsibility of the Planning Department
89
to carry out the
most significant part of the codes without the local corporate and philanthropic support
they had received during the first two stages of the urban design plan and code-making.
Now, once again, the development community was in a powerful role, because the

89
Omaha By Design does consult on implementation process periodically, but they are not accountable for
implementation. They have now taken upon the task of making an Environmental Element for city‘s Master
Plan.

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corporate sector had given the responsibilities and control over the area designations and
additional work on codes to the city. At this stage, the development community would be
able to exercise their influence over political decisions of area designations.
After conceptualizing ACIs, they were to be mapped and communicated with
each of the property owners about the impact of this new zoning on their areas. OBD
collaboration had already spent a great deal of effort on identifying and defining the
characteristics of each one of the ACIs, because each ACI was not the same in its
character, process, and schematics. They were urban, moderately urban, a mix of the two
or suburban. So the consultants came up with three categories and defined them
specifically around topography, density, and the characteristics of the areas, rather than
just A, B, and C. Having made this categorization, the urban designer from the Planning
Department had to explain to the property owners about what this newly categorized
designation meant. The property owners wanted to know how it was going to impact
them and how it was going to enhance these areas. This process was and is still handled
in an ongoing basis by the urban designer in the Planning Department.
Summary: Acceptable Accomplishment
In summary, implementation of urban design goals into urban design codes was
perceived as an acceptable solution to the city‘s urban design problems by all the factions
involved in the TAG Committee process. The resulting codes were certainly not ideal nor
exactly what the urban design plan had envisaged. Because they existed in a city, that did
not have any enforceable urban design codes before, reassured its promoters to expect
positive changes in the city‘s built form. Some of the most important outcomes of the
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implementation process were, ―I would say ACIs, the UDRB, the large format retails,
also the neighborhood conservation and enhancements are the big key ones‖ (LN4). For
the local planning professionals,
I would still like to see more stringent [codes], I would like to see form-based
codes downtown. I mean it would basically, it wouldn‘t leave anything to chance,
and, right, now we are still leaving a whole heck of a lot open to chance (SC4).

On the other side, Omaha‘s developers found the new code document had given
them enough ―wiggle room‖ for it to be accepted by them, and it was opened for different
interpretations. ―The document is pretty detailed, but there is still enough wording in
there that there is a plenty of ‗wiggle room‘. It depends on who is interpreting it‖ (SC3).
Codes were still unclear in many ways and allowed for multiple interpretations of the
same text.
If somebody interprets it like the current administration, or the past
administration, or the past planning director, I am okay with that, because they
understand, well yeah, we can kind of do that. We can make it work, but if you
eventually get someone who has a tunnel vision, well then, that could be a
problem, because he can say, no, this is what it says. It‘s like the [US]
Constitution. We have been trying to interpret that for 100 years, but I think as
long as they are open minded, it shouldn‘t hurt us (O3).

A lack of diagrammatic explanations, overall clarity in words, and specific images
were other reasons for the open-to-interpretation nature of the code document. As one of
the city planners stated, ―I find it difficult to work with, not incredibly clear. They don‘t
have the clarity of say a Smart Code—I don‘t think. They are written; well, the primary
consultant was a lawyer, so they look much more like legal stuff‖ (SC4). While focusing
on the details of each regulation, the codes seemed to have lost the larger picture.
We were getting into the arguments about how much Eifs to use on the side of the
building or what percentage of transparency do you have. We were losing the
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performance of what this stuff should do. We were getting into the statistical
weeds (SC4).

The fact that overlay zones were not adopted with the rest of the regulations made
it difficult to implement all the adopted regulations together.
ACIs and MCCs and so forth should have been applied along with the adoption of
the code, so that everything that got built in those specific delineated areas had to
follow the standards. Instead, the individual application only happens, when a
project happens...it‘s sort of a bunch of words that sit there, and they get applied,
when they need to, but don‘t really govern in the way that I think they should
(SC1).

The codes became enabling legislation, rather than real controls, because they
resulted in text that was going to be interpreted for its words by the future city planners
and developers. ―They are really right now implemented only from perspective of being
on the books‖ (SC4). Above all, ―The fact that they are out there does tend to make
people comply with them‖ (CP1).
The existence of some urban design codes was an accomplishment for the
supporters of OBD, but a larger question over the effectiveness of transforming Omaha‘s
built environment loomed once the incorporation of these codes in the city‘s built form
ensued in the following years. It became apparent in the negotiation process over every
code, where the development community had exercised greater control over the
implementation process, than the corporate sector—the dominant regime—that had
promoted and sponsored OBD. The former were able to discard many proposals
perceived to be important to ultimately realize the vision of the plan. The latter tried to
implement maximum number of recommendations of the OBD plan, but they knew, from
the beginning, that they would have to compromise and alter many of them. The OBD
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team finalized the end product, with an understanding that neither side got all they had
wanted, but in the end everyone was content and judiciously satisfied about the final
outcome in the codes.

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CHAPTER 11: AESTHETICS OF RETAIL

Within the OBD case, three minor case studies illuminate global, national, and
local dynamics of urban regimes and their relationship with the process of urban design
plans and subsequent codes. This chapter analyzes the first of the three minor cases,
while the other two cases are studied in the following chapters.
The argument in this chapter is threefold: one, local regimes are not as pervasive
and powerful in explaining the global dimensions of urban built environment, even
though they are capable of explaining the local dynamics of major policy decisions
effectively in the regime literature (Elkin 1987; Stoker 1995; Stone 1989). Two, local
interest groups, such as the development community—developers and land-use
attorneys—play a greater role than the dominant regime in informing the nature of urban
form outcome of a global retailer, like Walmart. Three, aesthetic concerns are
predominant in generating the community‘s and the local planning professionals‘ interest
in the urban design practice. The following excerpt recognizes the interrelationship
between the global dimensions of local design and the production of urban retail forms.
Building materials can be imported from anywhere. Hills can be flattened and
streams put in culverts. We can transform the landscape with great speed and
build anything that fits our budget or strikes our fancy. Technological innovation
and a global economy make it easy for building plans drawn up at a corporate
headquarters in New Jersey to be applied over and over again in Phoenix,
Philadelphia, Portland, or a thousand other communities (McMahon 2010, 7).

A rise in communities‘ awareness about the importance of place-making and
appreciation for the aesthetic dimension of commercial establishments has changed the
way Americans perceive presence of large-scale retail stores in the twenty-first century.
Not more than a decade and a half ago, retail chain stores were welcomed with open arms
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and hefty tax breaks by the city governments, and the former were the sole decision-
makers of what to build and how to build it. They could raze-over a hilly piece of
property, build their most basic prototype design for a store, use the most inexpensive
materials, and still be looked upon as if they were doing a great favor to the community
by deciding to locate there. Many of these retailers‘ standard, off-the-shelf store designs
sprinkled like rubber stamps across the country give an impression that someday these
retail stores would appear on Mars without any change in their design or an effort to
associate with the existing built environment or natural topography of the surroundings.
Figure 11.1: A visual of Walmart on Mars

Source: Chris C.
90

One such chain store example highlighted in this study is Walmart. Though
Walmart is not alone in characterizing the way the retail landscape of suburban America

90
This image was posted on January 14, 2004 by Chric C. for his blog at http://www.chris-
place.com/archives/2004/01/walmart_on_mars.html (accessed March 2011). The image was created by
him to show pervasiveness of Walmart as apparent in the title of the image, ―Wal-Mart on Mars?? Never
know...it might happen one day‖ The image was neither supported by any write-up except for its title nor
targeted at urban form and aesthetic issues surrounding Walmart. However, a visual of Walmart on Mars
seemed apt for discussing the aesthetics and urban form of Walmart highlighted in this section.
362

has evolved over time, being the world‘s largest retail corporation, it has played a
dominant role. For many years, Walmart had been successful in promoting its store
openings as beneficial for the communities in terms of low prices, more jobs, and
increased sales revenues. However, that trend started changing in the late twentieth
century, as community opposition against the presence of retail giants, like Walmart,
sporadically started occurring. However, the opposition of communities was mainly
economic and labor-related, because they began to realize that not all the jobs created by
these retailers were equal, and the loss of small businesses was more detrimental in a long
run. ―Walmart is a clear symbol of jobs that don‘t help people sustain their families‖
(Clark 2004).
Parallel, to this overall opposition, was the rise of a different sentiment in
communities, where the presence of Walmart was not as much a subject of contention,
because they did not mind Walmart‘s economic model. This new sentiment was related to
the appalling aesthetics of Walmart stores with their big-box designs that destroyed many
good qualities defining the character of the surrounding communities and the natural
landscape. This chapter is an attempt to analyze issues over aesthetics of Walmart in
Omaha, in relation to the overall approach of the retailer towards urban design and form
issues.
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section focuses upon a recent
policy-shift of the global retailer—Walmart—from a more dominant and autocratic
decision-maker of its location, building design, and overall form to a more community-
centric approach to its overall marketing, that is also reflected in the way its buildings are
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designed. In the second section, this approach of the retailer is viewed in light of a
proposed Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets in Omaha during the OBD code-making
process. In the third section, issues surrounding OBD‘s position to oppose Walmart‘s
proposed designs, based on its recently completed urban design plan, are highlighted. The
final design of the proposed Walmart based on negotiation among Walmart, the City
Planning Department, the City Planning Board, the City Council, the neighboring
community, and OBD constitute the fourth and fifth sections of this chapter. In the last
section, theoretical inferences of the case are summarized.
Shift in Walmart’s Design Ideology
Besides opposition to its overall presence, Walmart is one of several retailers,
who also face the wrath of American communities for its store designs. It is also among
one of the few retailers, who resist changing its suburban prototype as much as possible.
However, Walmart‘s resistance to change from its suburban prototype to other built
forms is all but uniform across the United States. In a few cities and towns, Walmart has
built some highly urban store designs to fit the dense downtown fabric of the surrounding
context or has modified its suburban designs to a great extent to please the communities
in the suburbs. Ironically, such an uneven approach in Walmart‘s store-designs is not
governed by the aesthetics of the physical context of a site. If local constraints or
community uproar did not exist, Walmart would not hesitate to build a suburban store in
the middle of an urban district. The reasons, that govern Walmart‘s decision to change its
aesthetics and urban form, seem to be based on the economics, politics, and community‘s
awareness for the biased design approach of the retailer.
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It is argued that in the cities, where Walmart was obliged or complied to spend
more money on its store designs and aesthetic appearance, eventual economic advantages
of the location were the prime reasons for the retailer to do so. Whether it were for
suburban sites in California or urban sites in New York or Massachusetts, architecturally
attractive proposals were purely based on how eagerly Walmart wanted to penetrate
untapped areas in these states. On the contrary, design concerns were not the ones that
determined whether or not Walmart would be able to have a presence in a community. So
in some ways, design aspects have been secondary for the communities that have been
opposing the presences of the retailer. On the other hand, wherever communities are
somewhat opposed, and the political will is in favor of Walmart, the retailer has been
using store‘s design as one of the major tools to gain a greater presence and appease the
communities. The trend of resorting to improved aesthetics is very recent; it began about
a decade ago, but this trend‘s serious implementation was considered only six years ago.
One of the urban design strategies used to penetrate urban markets was Walmart‘s
experiment in 2005 with ―Urban 99‖ stores—a 99,000 square-foot superstore designed
for smaller urban sites. It aimed at circumventing local ordinances in many communities
that prevented or required detailed scrutiny of retail stores of more than 100,000 square-
feet in size. Walmart was ready to become a small-box retailer through ―Urban 99‖ to tap
into its most coveted markets in California and New York. The retailer had planned to
build up to 1,000 such small-box stores by 2013, and, by doing so, the plan was to slowly
withdraw from any new big-box Walmart stores.
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There were economic and political reasons for resorting to the ―Urban 99‖ design
concept (Fulton 2005). The economic reason was to squeeze Walmart into highly
expensive and valuable plots of lands throughout densely urbanized states like California,
New York, and Massachusetts. Politically, this tactic was an easier way for Walmart, not
only to avoid public outcry over big box stores, but also to get around any anti-Walmart
municipal ordinances that are based on size restrictions of 100,000 sq ft. The need for
expanding in California was so high, that Walmart was spending $275 per incremental
square-foot for its California stores, as compared to the $250. that Target was spending in
the same area (Fulton 2005).
The ―Urban 99‖ strategy could not become a reality, due to the economic
downturn that subsided Walmart‘s plans of expanding ―Urban 99‖ stores across the
country, but the retailer continued with its different variations of supercenter urban stores
that held an economic advantage. Meanwhile, to sustain Walmart‘s ongoing large-scale
building strategy, the focus was now put on giving the retailer a green image. Walmart
committed to make its stores twenty percent more energy efficient by 2013 by cutting
down up to 3.5 million megawatt-hours of electricity usage and doubling the fuel
economy of its trucks (Mitchell 2007). The critics of Walmart‘s green move argue for the
insignificance of such moves, because retailers like Walmart and others displace
thousands of neighborhood businesses, increase inconceivable driving miles towards
fringes of urban areas for its millions of shoppers, and leave behind empty boxes as soon
as an opportunity to expand or move to a more profitable location arises (Mitchell 2006).
A minimum investment in its stores‘ designs and materials allowed Walmart an easy way
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out, whenever more economic potentials arose in locating its stores elsewhere. Walmart‘s
green initiative did not bring promising results, and, in 2010, the retailer once again
decided to go back to the concept of building small stores in urban areas. Walmart
planned on testing the effectiveness of proposed small stores by opening thirty to forty
such stores initially (O'Dowd 2010). Even during this second experiment with their urban
prototype, untapped markets in California and New York City remained the primary
causes.
To have a broad picture of stores where Walmart adopted superior aesthetics and
improved urban design in response to the retailer‘s need for expanding in untapped
markets, two of its recent store designs are discussed in the following text.

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Walmart Supercenter in Steelyard Commons, Cleveland, OH
Figure 11.2: Photos of Walmart at Steelyard Commons in Cleveland

Source: All the four images are reprinted, by permission, from Cleveland Construction Inc.
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The first Super Walmart in Cleveland opened in October 2007 in Steelyard
Commons, as a part of the city‘s $120 million commercial redevelopment project
spanning over 125 acres of land. Walmart was keen on opening a store at this location,
because 320,000 Clevelanders lived within five miles of the project area. However, the
initial proposal of opening a small discount store in this redeveloped Steelyard Commons
area by the Steelyard Commons developers did not seem economically profitable to
Walmart, because it aimed to enter this market with a superstore. So the retailer declined
the offer to open a small store in that location. The property‘s developer First Interstate
Properties were not keen on having a Super Walmart and proceeded with other stores,
including Target and Home Depot. As the developers finalized their plans with different
retailers, they realized there would not be any free-standing grocery store on the property,
and this situation led the developers to allow Walmart to build a superstore on a parcel of
220,000 sq ft of land.
91
This development made the Walmart superstore economically
viable and gave the retailer an opportunity to enter Cleveland‘s market with a
supercenter. The elaborate, context-specific, industrial-themed urban design details
followed without any resistance from the retailer.

91
Source: ‗Steelyard Commons Developer irons out deal with Walmart‘ A Press Release, Cleveland‘s
Steelyard Commons, First Interstate Properties, Lyndhurst, OH 44124.
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Walmart Supercenter in White Plains, NY
Figure 11.3: Walmart in downtown White Plains, NY

Courtesy: Stephen Sisler

Opening a 179,731 sq ft store in White Plains, NY, in July 2006, was a strategic
move by Walmart to infiltrate the New York City area marketplace by drawing customers
from the Bronx, which was only 10 miles away. The same strategy to encircle New York
City with Walmart stores had prompted another Walmart store opening in Kearny, NJ, a
month ago. This encircling strategy was put in practice, after several failed attempts to
site Walmarts in Manhattan and Queens, and logistically, 40 Walmart supercenters were
in New York State, but none of them were in New York City.

370

Despite Walmart‘s official announcement, ―the architecture and product mix in
the development of this highly anticipated store were conceived to serve the needs of the
community and Main Street residents,‖
92
its great urban architectural design and layout in
White Plains were not prompted by the retailer‘s sensitivity to its context and the
community. On the contrary, these changes were to: one, experiment retailer‘s future
ability to operate in Manhattan and to demonstrate how effectively Walmart‘s new model
can be fitted into an urban environment like New York City in the future; and two,
extract the customers from New York City and its surroundings, until it is allowed to
open a store in New York City. Some of features of the store in White Plains for
operating in urban setting, included shopping-cart escalators between the two store levels,
an automated shopping cart elevator to deliver carts from the parking lot back to the store
and a six-level parking above the store in the building‘s roof-top garage. Steve Michael,
director of design for Walmart‘s North-Central Division and person-in-charge of White
Plains‘ Walmart, stated the ultimate goal of the retailer at the time of store‘s opening,
―this store represents an excellent example of how well the Walmart concept can fit into
an urban setting.‖
93

While Walmart was accommodating new design ideology to expand into urban
contexts, it was also pronouncing its community-friendly image through a new logo
design adopted in 2008. A drastically different new logo changed the way Walmart was

92
―Wal-Mart Opens Multi-Level Store on Main Street in Downtown White Plains
Former Department Store Hi-Rise Remodeled As New Wal-Mart to Serve Downtown Residents‖ Press
Release, White Plains, N.Y., July 18, 2006, http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/5835.aspx.

93
Ibid.
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spelt along with its fonts, colors, and overall design. The new logo was much softer with
a yellow flower design implying spark of energy and motion.
Figure 11.4: Change introduced in Walmart‘s logo design in 2008

Source: Graphics: author, logos: Walmart.com

According to the chair and creative director of Collins—a brand innovation and
design company—Walmart‘s new logo design conveyed an image of a friendlier, more
accessible, and broader company, and it was a real jump into the future company with its
polite design, instead of all the capital letters, that are considered rude in written
correspondence (Lippert 2008). As one of the Omaha planners puts it,
Walmart was Wall military star Mart, and now its starburst thing in the same sort
of soft alphabet. Their marketing people are telling them something, and what
they are telling them is people—consumers want to feel like you are their friend,
and they are your friend and want to feel that there is sort of the warm, fuzzy
experience, and I think that sort of has gone down to the level of the design of
buildings, too. So if you are building a Walmart, increasingly you see these, they
look more like sort of weird, little, villagish things that have different articulations
on facades, awnings, and little…they are trying to look like they are more than
one building, and that‘s, you know, I mean, you got to take it for what it is. They
will still be boxes, but they are sort of a friendlier big box, and they are expressing
sort of different corporate culture to the design of the box (SC4).

Such cosmetic changes on Walmart stores‘ facades are fundamentally a different
approach, than the one adopted in case of Walmart‘s urban stores. Façade changes in
suburban stores in the form of small residential elements, such as projected awnings, fake
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windows, and pitched roofs directly adopt residential architecture on a giant building box.
They do all these marketing enhancements, but still not relate to the character of its
surrounding residential community or the natural environment.
With this background of Walmart‘s economic strategies for determining the
design aspects of its stores, the following paragraphs discuss the battle over its proposed
store in Omaha during 2005 to 2006.
Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets

Table 11.1: Timeline for the Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory streets

Nov 2005
Walmart applies for rezoning and re-platting for their proposed store on 72
nd
and
Hickory Streets. The Omaha City Planning Department gives a recommendation
report highlighting the need for better elevation and landscaping to Walmart Real
Estate Business in response.
Jan-Apr 2006
OBD opposes proposed Walmart design, landscaping, and site layout and demands
improvements. Surrounding neighborhood residents oppose Walmart as a whole.
Mar 2006
The City Planning Department delays their consent and asks Walmart to do a series
of improvements in proposed design before agreeing to recommend it to the
Planning Board
May 2006
The Planning Board approves rezoning and re-platting with a series of aesthetic and
landscaping conditions.
OBD still wants additional improvements in aesthetic and design layout aspects.
June 2006
After going through six revisions, Walmart agrees to meet all the conditions related
to aesthetic appearance put forward by OBD. However, it does not agree to any
substantial layout or massing changes that OBD had asked for.
July 11 2006
The plan goes to the City Council for an approval, the City Council asks Walmart to
reduce its 24-hours operations based on neighborhood‘s demands and delays their
decision for a week, during which Walmart is to respond, if it will reduce its hours.
July 18 2006
Walmart declines to reduce hours after a week. The City Council approves the
project with one minus vote from the Council member representing the proposed
project‘s district.

Just when the TAG Committee, the Planning Department, and OBD were busy
crafting urban design codes for Omaha, a new Walmart proposal for building a 221,000
sq ft store on the former Ranch Bowl Entertainment Center site on 72
nd
and Hickory
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Streets came to Omaha‘s Planning Department. The local land-use attorney representing
Walmart and the community affairs manager, in charge of the project, were well-aware
about the recent struggle over the Walmart project on 132nd and L Street. They were also
aware that they will have to meet higher building and site design expectations for this
Walmart, because the city had just adopted a new Urban Design Element. In order to
open the building in the fall of 2006, as Walmart‘s management had planned, the building
design, rezoning, and re-platting approval had to move quickly through the Planning
Board and the City Council. Therefore, even before submitting the project to the Planning
Department, Walmart officials had publicized, ―this is a project that we've put a lot of
effort into…We've made sure this store is planned well, and we will continue to work
with the city to address any concerns‖ (Cole 2005 ). According to Walmart, the design
prepared for this store was unique among all the other stores in Nebraska, the Dakotas,
Iowa, or Kansas.

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Figure 11.5: Proposed Walmart site on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets intersection with the
existing Ranch Bowl building

Source: Google satellite image
Walmart‘s design layout proposed a store facing the north and not the major street
of the store‘s entry and exit. The floor plans were to have an upper mezzanine level,
loading deck and lower-level sales floor with utility lifts, because of a big height
difference between the two ends of the site. For aesthetic considerations, the store design
had included rooftop screening elements, Garden Center with masonry pilasters,
ornamental metal fencing, and retaining walls to hide the parking view and the rear of the
store. Soon after the first proposal, opposition from the surrounding neighborhoods
ensued. ―It was a nice neighborhood, up until now. We were hoping they wouldn't build
here‖ (Cole 2005 ). Adjacent neighborhood residents feared the amount of traffic this
proposed 24-hour store would generate. In response, Walmart‘s Community Affairs
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Manager ensured them by locating its entrance and exit on 72
nd
Street, so that the
neighbors to the west would not be disturbed.
Walmart‘s supposed unique design did not seem appealing to the Planning
Department, and they told the retailer to revise its plans. Their concerns were related to
the appearance of the building‘s exterior, such as large number of flat, painted surfaces,
and unattractive retaining wall along 72
nd
street (O'Connor 2006). To the city planners, an
increase in traffic was not significant enough to cause any negative impact on the
adjacent neighborhood. In light of recent adoption of Urban Design Element, the
Planning Department recommended the Planning Board should postpone their approval
for one more month, so revised changes could be tested against the city‘s Urban Design
Element.
It seemed Walmart‘s project came at a perfect time to find itself into a series of
demands, for which Walmart officials had not prepared themselves adequately.
Walmart organizations had identified itself as opposed to these sorts of things and
was very, in our eyes, sort of cynical. Well, we have got three drawers of plans,
and it‘s just a question of which one can we get in with the existing (regulations),
you know, if you have got the ‗c‘ site regulators, then you get to see a plan, which
is tilt up and the sign and a bare parking lot and hit the road, but if you have got
higher regulators, better regulators than that, you get Ft. Collins plan, and, you
know, they were very…they were sort of appallingly forthright about that in their
original conversations (AG9).

The retailer‘s history of unattractive stores in Omaha, its forthrightness in
suggesting Omaha was a C grade town for its urban design requirements, and its
uncooperative attitude towards spending more money, than what was required for
building a box-store had made Walmart preselected target for everything that was wrong
with the appearance of retail stores in the city.
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Walmart was, you know, the giant discount retailer from out of town and made
the mistake that at the public hearing, you know, we design to the level of
requirements in the city‘s code. Well, we showed them. They got…they were
thrown our whole toolbox of hooks, and whether it was zoning or access or
landscape requirements, and they got…the project fell into a time period, where
the regulatory requirements were evolving, and so it also became a great poster
child, you know, for the efforts, because it was so easy for people to see what
could be accomplished, if you just did some things a little bit smarter, a little bit
more appropriate (CP1).

The City Planning Department and the Planning Board united to show the citizens
of Omaha, that recommendations of the new Urban Design Element can help produce
better aesthetics for retail stores, even though they were not yet made mandatory in the
form of urban design codes. At this point in February 2006, OBD decided to get
involved in the process, based on its interaction with the Planning Department about
Walmart‘s proposed project design. By now, the Walmart project had been reported, as a
point of contention in the newspapers, suggesting it may not be an easy path for the
retailer in the wake of new urban design plan adoption and design related opposition from
OBD.
Walmart originally planned to open this fall [2006], but the project has stalled in
the City Planning Department, since October. One reason, city officials say, is
because Wal-Mart is not presenting the quality of design that the city wants
(Asanaenyi 2006, 1A).

OBD saw the need to get involved, because one more aesthetically displeasing
Walmart in Omaha could potentially destroy the creditability the OBD initiative had
received so far in preparing the urban design plan. Also a pervasive impression of
Walmart as an unsupportive retailer for the local needs added to the contempt of OBD
and the city.
377

Number one, it wasn‘t local, so it‘s this corporate giant that typically has been
nonresponsive to local design interest. Although you can see, throughout the
country, it depends upon how rich the market place is, and our marketplace, you
know, we have limited number of people (CP1).

In summary, from the first project proposal, Walmart had set itself for a larger
battle over its aesthetics and design, for which its proposed design was a factor. From
another point-of-view, its historic image in the city, the statements made by Walmart
officials in the past and overall impression of being an out-of-town, unresponsive retailer
were equally important.
Role of OBD
OBD decided to take a position on Walmart issue, based on their interactions with
the City Planning Department during February 2006. This period was the time, when
TAG Committee negotiations regarding the future urban design codes were also in-
progress. While taking a stand against Walmart‘s proposed design, OBD had to be
careful, that it was sending an accurate and well-focused message. Neither OBD, nor its
local corporate donors, wanted to be portrayed as being against the economic aspect of
Walmart arriving in the city, but they wanted to convey their opposition with Walmart‘s
design plans for both the Supercenter building and its parking lot. OBD believed that
proposed plan would lead to a suburban-style building with a gigantic and aesthetically
displeasing parking lot on a cramped urban location. According to OBD, the 16-acre
space was significantly smaller than other suburban locations, where Walmart had built
such stores. Furthermore, Walmart‘s proposal seemed to be inconsistent with many of the
city‘s Master Plan requirements, and with a number of the recommendations of the new
Urban Design Element, which was in the process of becoming legally binding. So OBD
378

decided to oppose the proposed design, on the basis of: its landscaping, frontage on 72
nd

Street, construction materials, appearance, vistas and views from the surrounding areas,
existing properties, parking lot plans, pedestrian orientation, ease and access, signage,
retaining walls and terracing, and loading areas and docks. For OBD, Walmart was to act
as a test of all the recommendations of the new Urban Design Element, and the Planning
Department was interested in and willing to cooperate with OBD to a great extent.
OBD argued that Walmart had adhered to local building codes and design
elements at numerous places throughout the nation, but it was refusing to do so in Omaha
and, thereby, disrespecting the city.
If you can build one thing in Ft. Collins, you can build same thing in Omaha,
because it‘s the same money, and it‘s the same yield per square foot. So, you
know, why build something cheap and crummy in one place, because they are
easier to deal with, than something much more palatial in other place, because
they are tougher on you. I mean that changed clearly, as it happened. Also there
are competitive companies like Costco, which build very nice buildings and, for a
long time, had a real commitment to decent not necessarily great, but decent
corporate architecture (SC4).

Furthermore, OBD valued the economic development and argued that improved
aesthetics were needed to attract and sustain businesses. Therefore, by demanding better
aesthetics, OBD was actually helping to increase the economic development of the city.
Omaha is hardly alone. The trend toward high-quality urban design is nationwide.
And many of the very metropolitan centers that Omaha competes against have
joined the common-sense movement toward sensible design standards (Editorial
2006).

Walmart was even compared with upcoming Target, just a few blocks away for
their use of high-quality design and materials and willingness to meet all the expectations
of the city‘s Planning Department and Planning Board (Editorial 2006).
379

Walmart revised its appearance, according to suggestions of the Planning
Department, and resubmitted a revised design. This time, the changes aimed at giving a
green image to the project. The perimeter of the site now had a line of trees, the parking
lot had a couple of landscaped islands, and the tiered retaining wall along 72
nd
Street was
to have shrubs. In terms of building elevation, it was pointed out earlier, that the building
would give an appearance of two stories, because it had a raised mezzanine in the original
proposal. Its signage and façade were to be made from brick and stone. Walmart officials
let the Planning Department know that by making these changes,
Walmart has surpassed other national retail stores in Omaha with its latest plans.
They are reading Omaha By Design's opposition to the Wal-Mart design and its
push for tougher zoning as dangerous moves that could stall the city's commercial
growth (Asanaenyi 2006).

380

Figure 11.6: A revised plan of Walmart with added trees on the perimeter.

Source: City of Omaha Planning Department

The changes in revised plan seemed miniscule to OBD and did not fit the image
of any other upscale Walmart designs in the country, such as the one in Ft. Collins. OBD
consulted with the Planning Department, and they managed to extend the review period
for an additional month. At this time, OBD sought input from the designer of the OBD
plan, Jonathan Barnett, who researched the project proposal in relation to the goals of the
existing Master Plan of the city and recommendations of OBD‘s Urban Design Element.
He found major discrepancies between proposed design of the project and the intent of
381

the city‘s Master Plan. Also the project did not satisfy many of the recommendations
outlined in Urban Design Element, as its location was a part of one of the ACIs. Based on
designer‘s suggestions, OBD prepared their case against the design of Walmart and
presented it at the upcoming meeting of the City Planning Board. The project had
threatened the very requirements of the OBD plan, for which they had worked so hard to
coordinate, validate and implement.
A fight is brewing over the design of the proposed Supercenter near 72
nd
Street
and West Center Road. It's a fight that could fracture the three-year-old coalition
of interests that, until now, have stood united in a broader effort to raise local
building design standards (Kotok 2006, 1A).

OBD was confident about its stand and was not concerned with the consequences
of Walmart walking away, as to what the retailers‘ attorney and Community Affairs
Manager had conveyed to the public. ―Walmart can spend only so much, before the
location no longer makes economic sense…We've gone as far as we can go‖ (Editorial
2006).
The director of OBD responded to their threat of walking away, rather than
making the improvements by saying ―then they may have to walk‖ (Editorial 2006).
However, the mayor was walking an uncomfortable path at this stage; he could not
publicly disagree with OBD, because his wholehearted support had made the OBD
initiative possible. At the same time, he did not want Walmart to pull out of Omaha, due
to design demands from OBD, because that would result in a loss of all the sales tax
revenue and the jobs. A new Walmart could generate money, jobs, inexpensive products
for all levels of consumers, and evidence of business growth during his tenure. According
to a member of the Planning Board,
382

Planning shouldn‘t be a part of economic development, but if you don‘t try to get
sites, like that in there, I mean. those sales tax revenues end up going outside the
city. Because people do go to the Walmart and shop, and it‘s just down in
Papillion, and Papillion gets the sales tax, so I think they pay something like $1.5,
$2 million a year in sales tax, maybe even more (PB2).

Thus, the political will to make Walmart follow urban design guidelines without
any mandatory code requirements in place seemed like a far-fetched idea and
unattainable goal in Omaha,
I don‘t think the political will was ever going to exist. You know to say we are
only going to have corner stores. I mean, we are not Vermont. We weren‘t going
to force sort of Vermont ethics into what we were doing at that time (AG9).

The struggle had now turned to the question of how far could the city‘s political
and administrative wings push Walmart to improve its appearance, before the threats
from Walmart on leaving Omaha would become a reality. ―A Wal-Mart planned in
South-Central Omaha is emerging, as the first, real test of how far the city is willing to
push developers to beautify new commercial buildings‖ (Kotok 2006). Both the sides
knew the city needed Walmart, as much as Walmart needed this location from an
economic perspective.
They [Walmart] thought that if we just hang in there long enough, they will give
up, and we will put up a bottom-drawer plan, that we have, that we put up in any
city, and they will accept this, because Omaha wants us so bad that‘s what they
will do (OB3).

It was a matter of testing each other‘s limits. For the city planners, members of
the Planning Board and the mayor, it was advantageous, that Walmart was going to
utilize a topographically and functionally challenging piece of land and put it into a
revenue-generating use for the city. According to a local attorney,
383

I mean, that site had been the site of a bowling alley and entertainment center,
kind of a mid-market entertainment venue, and a kind a peculiar one at that, and it
stood vacant for number of years, and of course down the street you have got Dr.
John‘s, and you have got sort of weird, I mean, from, you know, Fortune 500 First
Data on the corner, you know, sort of fortress, like installation, and up the hill you
have got a weird sort of paraphernalia of uses, and Walmart came along and said
we are willing to do something with this (AG9).

The mayor‘s views at the time indicated he was ready to give into what Walmart
had proposed in their first project proposal. So the message of the m mayor was ―the city
pushed Wal-Mart, as far as it could, to match the brick and stone Supercenter built in Fort
Collins, Colorado. If the city had the proposed new zoning codes in place, we could
demand more bells and whistles‖ (Kotok 2006, 1A). The Planning Board and the city
planners were also about to send the same message and accept the revised design of
Walmart with minor changes, if OBD had not raised its voice against the retailer‘s poor
urban design aspects and had it not been consistent in its opposition to the proposed store
design.
[It] wouldn‘t have been as stringent, as it was, if we had not been involved in it,
because we were at every Council meeting, and as if we hadn‘t been there saying
no, this is not acceptable to us. I think may be it might have been turned out to be
a somewhat different building (OB1).

Finally, at the Planning Board meeting on May 1
st
, OBD presented its case, that
despite being located in an ACI, Walmart had not met all the requirements of the Master
Plan and the Urban Design Element. OBD asked the retailer to redesign the layout,
instead of making cosmetic changes to their suburban store layout
94
. In this meeting, a
former Planning Board member, Kathleen Jefferies, highlighted the issues of store‘s size,
24-hours of operation affecting surrounding land use, poor quality material to be used in

94
From the minutes of Planning Board meeting held on 5/3/06, C8-05-331 C10-05-332 C12-05-333.
384

the building, and a meager level of landscaping proposed in a seven-acre parking lot. She
critiqued, ―this Wal-Mart adds nothing of significance to the city; it‘s still a Wal-Mart.
It's still a big box‖ (Kotok 2006). Martin Janoushek, an architect representing local area
institutions, also criticized the proposal in front of the Planning Board, because,
Good urban design is good business. Instead, this design has taken a beautiful hill
and leveled it down by more than 30‘ and surrounded it with retaining walls on
75% of the site. It is has fortified itself by topping the retaining walls with
fencing and made sure that nothing stops a shopper from car to front door…the
pedestrian experience is non-existent.
95

Lastly, a group of local residents opposed the project for the potential traffic it
would generate by being open for twenty-four hours. However, this degree of opposition
was not substantial enough to influence voters of the project.
At the end of the meeting, the City Planning Board approved the Walmart project
unanimously with a clause that the retailer had to meet additional conditions, which were:
improved landscaping with more mature plants along 72
nd
Street; broader terraces and
ornamental stone on the retaining wall at the corner of 72
nd
and Hickory Streets;
elimination of a thirty-five feet high sign on a pole; agreement that all signs will be
monument style or affixed to the buildings; improved material use on its building with
less stucco-like material on the outer walls; creation of a plaza entrance near the bus stop
on 72
nd
Street with a tower or gazebo on the east corner of the building; and recessed
lighting around the building to reduce the glare to the adjoining neighbors (Kotok 2006).
A special cause for maintaining the landscaping was introduced in this list because,
On other Walmart there was actually an email that got forwarded to the city
accidently about the Walmart way out West was, ‗ahh put the trees in and don‘t

95
Ibid.
385

water them, we don‘t care if they die or not‘ you know, that was written by a WM
guy, and they came to the table with that deal and said what do you want us to do,
and we spent a lot of time on Planning Board on that issue (PB2).

The Planning Board did not think any change in twenty-four hours operation time
or redesign of overall layout, needed to be completed, because, ―city planners aren't
looking at the store's economic impact, but rather the city 's design standards and codes‖
(Kotok 2006). However, the list of design changes demanded by the Board were not good
enough for many of the area residents, who cared less about the store's appearance than
about its size and the changes it would bring in their neighborhoods.
The conditions for design changes demanded by the Planning Board for the
Walmart project seemed satisfactory to the City Planning Department, but not to OBD
who was still questioning the project on five aspects; its consistency with Omaha‘s
Master Plan and with the Urban Design Element, its appearance; its non-substantive
changes during revisions; and its overall approach to building a distasteful-looking
building in Omaha. By now, the Planning Board and the Planning Department had
accepted major site layout, massing, and size aspect of the proposed store, and that
preface had left OBD no scope to insist upon changing those aspects. At this stage, OBD
could only ask Walmart to do further changes related to its appearance, retaining wall
design, and landscaping in the parking lot.
City Council’s Vote

For Walmart, getting an approval of the Planning Board‘s was just a small step, it
still had to get an approval from the City Council, then the neighbors surrounding the
project area had decided to put up a fight (Kotok 2006). The Walmart faction saw the
386

potential of their project getting rejected by the Council, if the discontentment of OBD
would get coupled with already unhappy residents of the adjacent neighborhoods. If
Walmart would somehow calm OBD by accepting most of their demands, then the
former could weaken the overall neighborhood opposition substantially. In absence of
OBD‘s opposition, it will become easier for Walmart to convince the City Council to
keep the store functioning for twenty-four hours. After all, a few more cosmetic changes
amounted to only a fraction of overall cost, when compared with the financial profits,
which a 24-hour store would generate. So the Walmart officials decided to please OBD
and ascertain their willingness to accept the majority of OBD‘s demands.
They had gone five times, and they came back the sixth time, and we said there
are fourteen changes you need to make. Their attorney said this is a deal breaker.
We can‘t do this; it will not be profitable. We can‘t do it. And they were told,
well, you go back and take a look at it. So now they came back to the next
meeting, and we were sitting there ready to take them, and the guy, the attorney,
for them stood up and said we will accept all fourteen! That was it, and I will bet
they were making money! (OB3)

However, OBD did not have chance to demand any substantial layout or massing
changes, because the City had already given those approvals, before OBD had raised its
strong opposition. Thus, Walmart officials agreed to all the aesthetic and appearance
related demands of OBD, before the project had to go to the City Council.
OBD had to now contemplate over their stand in front of the City Council,
whether to go against Walmart for their overall unaccommodating attitude over the
demands of OBD or not to oppose them, because of their latest consent to all the
cosmetic changes. OBD decided not to oppose the project in the City Council. However,
the vote from the City Council proved to be a tougher challenge for Walmart to
387

overcome, because the Council decided to delay their vote, after hearing all the
arguments by the neighborhood residents in opposition. The City Council did not vote,
but demanded Walmart should not have a twenty-four-hour store on that location.
Walmart had to respond to the Council‘s demand in a week‘s time.
So there is that tension between wanting business, but also saying you can do
better than this, and I think one of the things that the Council may have
discovered is that these big stores, they will do what you tell them they have to do
(OB2).

The mayor and others saw an opportunity of having Walmart on that site slipping
by as an article in the OWH argued;
The brightly lighted QuikTrip on the south side of the proposed Wal-Mart site
operates 24 hours. Just to the north, Dr. John's Lingerie serves its adult customers
any hour of the day and night. Yet neighbors of a proposed Wal-Mart at 72
nd
and
Hickory Streets don't want a Supercenter open all night (Kotok and Kuiper 2006).

If Walmart were to reduce its hours of operation, it would be the first time the city
would have limited the hours of any retailer in Omaha. Walmart proclaimed, ―‗It is a
deal-breaker‘ Carolyn Bock, Walmart's regional sales manager, told the Council Tuesday.
She warned that Walmart might walk away from the $40 million to $50 million project‖
(Kotok and Kuiper 2006).
A week later, at the time of the City Council‘s vote, Walmart officials rejected the
Council 's request to reduce store‘s hours and said, ―to impose such a restriction on this
store alone would be unfair and place us at a competitive disadvantage‖ (Kotok 2006).
This time, Council member Garry Gernandt changed his vote from the last week‘s
negative to positive, and the project was approved 5-1 in favor. After all, delaying the
vote was the last attempt by the City Council to get one more demand fulfilled and not
388

the matter over which they will let a Walmart walk away. ―Opponents and concerned
Council members had delayed the showdown vote from last week in an effort to pry one
more concession from the world's largest retailer to reduce operating hours‖ (Kotok
2006). The Council member representing the neighborhood, where Walmart was to be
located, gave a ―no‖ vote. Overall, a one-week delay helped Walmart to keep its planned
size and a store with a twenty-four hour business operation.
Final Product
According to the final agreement, the design of Walmart on Hickory and 72
nd

Streets was going to have: parking to be broken up along every other row by up to 10-
foot strips of grass and trees; retaining walls to be terraced and made shorter with no
fencing at the top; more masonry and less stucco-like material to be used on its façade;
the facade to have a two-story appearance with faux windows at the upper levels and
many of the windows to have awnings; the storefront to have more indentations and
angles creating less of a look of one long wall; a covered plaza with benches to be built
near the bus stop on 72
nd
Street; and the Garden Center to be fully enclosed under a roof,
instead of fenced-off in an open area.

389

Figure 11.7: Approved site plans of Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets

Source: City of Omaha Planning Department

390

Figure 11.8: Final elevations of Walmart

Source: City of Omaha Planning Department

Figure 11.9: North side front elevation facing the parking lot

Source: City of Omaha Planning Department

391

Figure 11.10: Landscaping in the parking lot

Source: OBD

Figure 11.11: Covered plaza for the bus stop along 72
nd
street

Source: OBD

392

Figure 11.12: Terraced retaining wall with monument sign

Source: OBD

Figure 11.13: Mezzanine floor to give a two storey look

Source: OBD

Planning and architectural professionals in the city were not satisfied with the end
product, because this project had not addressed most fundamental problems of its layout,
size, and grading. Its aesthetics were superficial without correcting underlying functional
problems.
The building design, it could have been much, much better. What was the
importance of having a public transportation, a bus stop, you know, shelter,
393

whatever, in the location that it is when people really can‘t get there anyway. You
know, so there is a certain point in the negotiations, where you stand down on
some things to get much, much more on the other (CP1).

Overall, the building continued to have a middle-of-the-road design, but it was
touted, as the best-designed Walmart in the Midwest by Walmart officials.
When the design team of OBD had reviewed Walmart‘s proposal in detail, prior
to it being submitted to the Planning Board, they had alerted,
It is unlikely that minor cosmetic changes can bring the current proposal into
compliance with Omaha‘s Master Plan and the zoning review criteria. The
probability is that a complete redesign will be needed, on different site planning
principles, before the zoning on these sites can be changed and a specific
development concept approved
96

However, in the end, minor cosmetic changes were all that was agreed upon,
after nine- month long negotiations with Walmart. There was no change in its site layout,
building design or grading. Based on Walmart‘s acceptance for landscaping, elevation
changes, and retaining wall details, the city planners announced that all of their demands
had been met. According to OBD,
We didn‘t get everything we wanted. We thought the size was way too big, the
footprint was way too big for that location...they thought that they had done a lot
beyond what was currently in the plan to begin with, so you know it‘s always a
compromise, and we wanted more, and they wanted less, and it worked out.(OB1)

According to the leaders of OBD, this plateau was the farthest they could get
Walmart to accept urban design recommendations, which had not yet been implemented
in the city‘s zoning codes.

96
Source: Written communication from WRT to OBD from OBD archival documents.
394

Summary
This chapter has argued that urban regimes do not fully explain the relationship
between urban form and design decisions of global retail forces and local forces—the
local corporate regime, the community, the city planning officials, and the political wing.
Based on the analysis a two-way process emerges between the global retailer and the
local forces for the built form and design decisions of the retailer. On the one hand, the
retailer is imposing its standardized box-like designs across the country‘s urban and
suburban landscapes. By following standardized, ―tried and true‖ (Baer 2010) urban
forms, the retail urban forms reflect the minimum requirements of the city‘s built form
regulations. On the other side, the retail giants are also bending its standard design
policies to correspond to other non-regulatory local variables that significantly influence
its location and growth strategy.
Variables governing Walmart‘s built form decisions: Influence of local Walmart‘s
vigorous struggle to capture urban markets, especially on the Northeast and West-coast
gave rise to retail giant‘s willingness to go to any extent in improving its aesthetics;
whereas, rural and
small-town markets, where penetration was not an issue, could only receive its basic
prototypes. Aesthetics and site-design decisions of Walmart seem to depend upon four
major variables, which are,
1) How economically valuable a location is for a new Walmart, in relation to the
national and global expansion policies of the retailer.
395

2) The level of strategic importance of that location with regards to capturing the
consumer base in surrounding regional context.
3) Design awareness and demands of the local community.
4) The political context of a proposed location.
An ongoing process of negotiations appears to be happening among these four
variables, as new stores keep surfacing, because any one of the variables can vary for a
given location with a designated timeframe. The first two variables clearly indicate
regional, national, and global forces, which are not confined to the dynamics of local
regimes or local politics. Only one last variable is dependent upon the nature of the local
governing regime. This finding confirms to the limitation of urban regimes highlighted
by Cox (1997) and Horan (1991). In addition, Savitch and Kantor‘s (2002) argument, that
local decisions are shaped as much by economic and political contexts outside of local
regimes, holds true in variables governing Walmart‘s decision-making for its building
form and designs. According to their framework, the first two variables can be
categorized as ―driving‖ variables, such as market conditions and a larger political
context, and the remaining two as ―steering‖ variables that depend upon local culture and
popular control.
In the case of Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory streets, the local variables included
emergence of OBD that had brought a shift in community‘s awareness about urban
design. Walmart was certain of the economic viability of the store, and penetration in
Omaha‘s market was not difficult, because the city‘s political leadership wanted more tax
revenue. However, the existence of this store was not as critical for Walmart, as it would
396

have been, if no Walmarts had existed in Omaha, until then, but that was not the case.
Omaha already had four Walmart Supercenters prior to the one on 72
nd
and Hickory
Streets. So Walmart officials were not as eager to gain a foothold in the region, as they
were in Inglewood, CA.
Local opposition as a determining factor: At the time of Walmart‘s proposal on 72
nd
and
Hickory Streets, two kinds of community awareness had come to the forefront: first, from
the professionals and supporters of OBD that stressed upon design, aesthetics, and
environmental aspects of the project; and second, from the surrounding community and
neighborhood residents, who had resisted Walmart‘s existence. If this community
opposition for Walmart‘s existence and design opposition from OBD were not the
factors, Walmart would have been even less willing to make all the design changes they
were asked to make by the Planning Department and OBD. This situation was the case,
because Walmart already had the political will and the lack of regional need for that
location acting in its favor. However, the economic advantage in a highly central location
of the city surpassed all the losses the retailer may have had to make in implementing a
better design. Still Walmart used tactics, such as conveying that they may have to leave,
because the site will not be economically viable, after investing in better design and
improvements demanded by OBD are not yet in the city‘s design codes, so they should
not be enforced. But Walmart officials knew that by following the design changes, as
asked by OBD, they were able to avoid the question of their existence on that particular
site. After all, the surrounding community had opposed Walmart‘s existence, as well as
its twenty-four hours of operation. Abiding to many of OBD‘s demands was a very small
397

sacrifice and not-too-large of an expense, and, therefore, in the end, they accepted all the
fourteen demands and tried to go beyond what they had agreed to accept initially.
Dominance of aesthetic values: The Walmart case represents a shift in the community‘s
awareness about aesthetics of retail stores. Rubin‘s (2003) claim that aesthetic dimension
is losing its validity among other social, cultural, and political economic discourse over
urban form is challenged by the aesthetic focus in OBD, that went beyond just the
architectural styles (Carmona et al. 2003). The previous Walmart stores in Omaha had
defined what an unpleasing, big-box store could look like, and the confrontation over the
aesthetics of the store on 72
nd
and Hickory streets had manifested how improvements can
be demanded. However, this community awareness remained only at the level of
aesthetics of elevational changes and parking lot landscaping and did not go to the levels
of improving the building layout, massing, and overall urban form. The struggle over
Walmart‘s aesthetics also highlights the power of visuals and the greater presence of
aesthetic dimension in urban design. External aesthetics and visual perception of the built
form are found to be foundational to the community and the local governing regime in
the city.

398

CHAPTER 12: BILLBOARD INDUSTRY: A TOUGH PARTNER

This chapter takes the argument over limitations of urban regimes further, by
analyzing the relationship between national billboard companies, the federal, the state,
and the city‘s regulatory mechanisms for the billboard industry, and the attempt of local
governing regime to control Omaha‘s billboard companies through the OBD codes. As
opposed to global dimension highlighted in Chapter 11, the battle over regulating
billboards is a national one. It is argued that billboard companies have succeeded in
overcoming attempts of the local corporate regime to control them through OBD, due to
support of federal and state legislations, institutional expertise in negotiating the legal
framework across all three levels of the government and an absence of local political will.
A lack of community interest in the arena of regulating billboards further accentuates the
absence of political will at all levels. To overturn the local corporate regime‘s intents, it is
argued; billboard companies formed an interest group limited to the billboard industry.
Their group was similar to the one made up of the development community for the built
form aspects, but the former had more power politically and institutionally than the latter.
The existing urban regime theory does not capture this interplay of national and state-
level ties of the local interest groups against the governing regime, as they are reflected in
the success of billboard industry and the defeat of the local corporate regime, especially
for billboards related urban design controls.
The history of regulating billboard in Omaha has been an extremely tangled web
of political and administrative negotiations dating back to more than three decades. OBD
had entered the field of beautifying the city in 2002, first as Lively Omaha, and had
399

invited the billboard companies to join their collaborative process, since the beginning.
OBD only discovered the extent of complexities involved in regulating the proliferation
of billboard industry in Omaha after they learned that many phases had already been set
by the billboard companies discreetly, while participating in the OBD process. The
billboard companies wanted to be two steps ahead in making sure they did not have to
give into any regulations throughout the urban design plan and code-making process. A
process, which was supposed to control billboard companies in the city‘s new zoning and
subdivision ordinances, was, in turn, being controlled by these companies. The
negotiation process with the billboard companies was similar to the one with Walmart on
72
nd
and Hickory Streets, but this time OBD was dealing with a much stronger and
institutionally capable partner, who had deep historic roots of successful dealings with
the city.
This chapter is divided into ten sections that include historic and present account
of two major billboard companies in Omaha; their collaboration with OBD; their secret
efforts to overcome proposed restrictions on billboards; the emergence of electronic
billboards; and, finally, negotiated outcome in the final OBD codes, which favored the
billboard companies to a great extent.
Timeline
Table 12.1: Timeline of the billboard companies‘ institutional interactions in Omaha

1986
The entire zoning ordinance of Omaha‘s Municipal code is revised and passed, but the
billboard regulations are separated to be written later due to their contentious nature.
1987
Stricter billboard regulations are adopted due to the courage and willingness of the City
Council, which made many of the existing off-premise signs nonconforming and
billboard companies are granted fifteen years to earn returns on them and then bring
them down.
400

Table 12.1: Continued

2002
At the end of fifteen years period new set of negotiations begin as billboard companies
demand compensation for bringing down nonconforming signs which would be an
enormous amount for the city to pay. The city gives another fifteen years to bring down
those signs.
2003-04
Billboard companies agree to participate in the OBD process as a part of the Steering
Committee.
2005

Billboard Companies participate in implementation of Urban Design Plan into
municipal codes as a part of TAG committee.
In January 2005, billboard companies find a loophole between the city and the state
administrations and erect a total of eighteen new billboards almost overnight along I-80,
a major freeway for interstate and intra-city commuters of Omaha.
2006

Billboard companies continue to be a part of TAG committee of OBD. In the
background they support Nebraska LB 302 which would allow removing the 2017
amortization deadline for nonconforming signs in Omaha.
The City of Omaha‘s Planning Department, the City Attorney‘s Office, and OBD
develop a Position Paper on Billboard Usage in the Omaha Metropolitan Area to devise
areas to regulate them.
2007

Sign companies do not agree to proposed regulations by OBD, Planning Dept and the
City. Instead Lamar demands from the city to remove 2017 amortization deadline for
nonconforming billboards.
Negotiations break down for a large set of proposed regulations including the ones for
2017 deadline. The only ones accepted by the companies are, no new billboards in ACIs
will be erected, and as and when the need arises, due to redevelopment or any other
reason billboard companies may consider removing them from ACIs.
2008

Lamar Outdoor Advertising adds five digital faces on the existing regular billboards in
absence of any city regulations controlling digital billboards.
The city puts a temporary ban on digital billboards, until new regulations are put in
place.
Lamar files a law suit in the Douglas County District Court against the City of Omaha,
arguing that Omaha's codes don‘t specifically prohibit digital billboards. The city of
Omaha counter-sues saying digital billboards are not allowed even though they may not
be mentioned in the codes. Later both the parties withdraw litigations and agree to seek
consensus through negotiations, the existing ban continues until December 2008.
In July OBD hosts a Public forum on electronic billboards; OBD does not take a stand
but calls Kevin Fry, president of Scenic America to give a guest talk.
Negotiations on digital billboards result in a compromise, digital billboards, maximum
up to 18 are allowed. Five regular billboards have to come down for each electronic
billboard installed in older parts of Omaha and along major thoroughfares, the ratio is
be 4-to-1 in other areas and 3-to-1 in industrial areas.
The 2017 amortization deadline was removed in December 2008, when the City
Council approved the new electronic billboard ordinance that OBD supported.
401

Tale of Two Billboard Companies
One of the first major billboard companies, Imperial Outdoor Advertising, in
Omaha originated in 1966, after Stuart Enterprises had purchased Stoner Systems in
Lincoln, Nebraska, and in Sioux City, Iowa. Over time, Stuart Enterprises took over two
outdoor advertising firms in Illinois in 1973, which were later sold in 1997. The president
of Imperial Outdoor, Scott Stuart, whose sons had settled in other out-of-state businesses,
had planned to retire and decided to sell the company. His company was sold to Lamar
Advertising Co. of Baton Rouge, the nation's third-largest outdoor billboard company at
the time for $42.5 million in January 1999 (Russo 1999). Lamar Advertising Company,
founded in 1902, soon became the largest outdoor advertising company in the nation. In
1996, Lamar had become a publicly-traded company, and, in 1999, it acquired Chancellor
Media to achieve the status of the nation‘s largest for its number of displays. Its annual
revenue for 2005 was $1 billion. Many of the local staff of Imperial Outdoor Advertising
in Omaha continued to operate under the ownership of Lamar Advertising, after the
takeover in 1999, and Lamar continued to have the highest number of billboards in
Omaha.
Waitt Media, now Waitt Corporation, was generated from a radio company in
1998, which was initiated by Norm Waitt, who was one of the founders of Gateway
Computers. For Waitt, the company Waitt Media was an opportunistic way of investing
in an industry other than technology. He had first bought one radio station in Plattsmouth,
Nebraska, before moving the company to Omaha. He was interested in media and music.
Therefore, his company had a record company, movie company, and related holdings.
402

The company eventually owned ninety-two radio stations, five television stations, and
700 billboards across the Midwest. Before plunging into billboard industry, Waitt was
only in media related businesses, but its CFO had realized billboards were good business
ventures. At that time, the vice president of the Sales Division at Lamar Advertising
wanted to split ways with Lamar Advertising, and he turned to Waitt Media. They formed
a new billboard company, which was named Waitt Outdoor. Waitt Outdoor started with
200 billboards in Iowa and slowly spread their market into seven midwestern states.
Waitt Outdoor has the second-highest number of billboards in Omaha.
In the twenty first century, Lamar and Waitt became the two major outdoor
advertising companies in Omaha. However, the nonconforming billboards belonged to
Lamar, because it was the oldest company. The 1987 revision of the sign ordinance made
some of Lamar‘s billboards nonconforming; whereas, Waitt had no nonconforming
billboards in Omaha, because the corporation began operating much after the 1987
regulations were in place. The constraints that applied to Lamar‘s old signs did not apply
to Waitt‘s new signs. Given this dynamics between two companies, any time the city
brought up the issue of enforcing its existing amortization rules on Lamar‘s old signs,
Lamar counter-questioned, as to why Waitt should benefit from not having those
restraints on their billboards, and why was the city singling them as the culprit of
noncompliance. Even the clause in sign regulations that required Lamar to remove one
old face in order to put new face was eliminated after Waitt entered the market, because
Waitt had no old signage faces. That reciprocity agreement again benefited Lamar,
because it could keep its old signs, along with the new, signs.
403

One employee of Lamar, who had later worked for Waitt, eventually went on to
form his own company. He was responsible for the idea that a loophole was prevalent in
the law, which would allow billboards to be put up on the interstate I-80 running through
Omaha. Waitt and Lamar had responded to his idea, by saying Omaha and Nebraska
State will fight with all their power, before these companies could put up billboards on
the interstate, but to their advantage, the state did not do a very good job of fighting the
materialization of this idea. As a result, billboard companies could get all the permits they
needed to put up those billboards on the I-80 interstate.
97
Lamar and Waitt split the
number of billboards to be erected on the interstate, and then put up the billboards as
soon as they managed to get the required permits in January 2005. These billboards on
the I-80, which is used heavily by the city commuters, became some of the most valuable
ones in the city and most lucrative for the company. This episode will be highlighted
further.
History of Billboard Controls
Since the time of the initial appearance of billboards on Omaha‘s streets—mostly
after the advent of automobiles—billboards were regulated by the zoning ordinance of
1945. The first major revision of the city‘s 1945 zoning ordinance began in 1985, when
entire zoning section was rewritten. However, the sign ordinance was a difficult one,
given the political and legal complexities involved. So the Planning Board, of that time,
delayed any provisions related to billboards in the zoning ordinance for some period of

97
See further details on the this topic in the section ―An administrative loophole‖ of this chapter.
404

time.
98
―The sign provisions have been the most controversial in the proposed ordinance,
which would replace the city zoning ordinance adopted in 1945‖ (Collison 1986).
Regulating billboards was as contentious in 1986, when for the first time tougher
regulations on the billboard industry were being considered, as a part of revised zoning
ordinance.
The sign issue could be one of the most controversial aspect of the proposed
zoning ordinance, a set of laws that would affect every parcel of property in the
city‖ and ―Council members said there may be extensive discussion and
compromises, before the sign issue is settled (Goodsell 1986).

Eventually, after a year in 1986, the billboard issues were settled as stricter zoning
changes for billboards were passed. These controls over billboards became possible,
because of the City Council of that time, which was interested in reducing the ―billboards
pollution‖ in the city (Collison 1986). The new zoning changes made many existing
billboards in the city nonconforming, and the City Council gave billboard companies a
relief period of fifteen years, by which all the nonconforming billboards were to be
removed by the billboard companies. This period ended in 2002, and once again billboard
companies started negotiating their way through the upcoming threat of the compliance
deadline.
During their 2002 negotiations, the City of Omaha and the billboard companies
were having a standoff, because Lamar had always taken a stance, that when their

98
―The City Planning Board endorsed the city's first major overhaul of its zoning ordinance in 40 years
Wednesday, without provisions proposed for billboards. Board members postponed, until December, a
recommendation on provisions that would reduce the number of outdoor signs in older areas of Omaha by
the year 2000. That reduction would be in return for allowing signs in areas, where they are now
prohibited.‖ Collison, K. 1985. Board Endorses Zoning Update; Signs Left Out. Omaha World-Herald,
Omaha, NE, November 21.
405

nonconforming billboards are fully depreciated and ordered down, the city will have to
compensate them for the lost revenue. Because Waitt Media, the other major billboard
company that did not have any nonconforming signs, believed that the city administration
was being too lenient on Lamar, who had at least forty nonconforming signs in the city at
that time. According to one of the city administration personnel, ―they [Lamar] had sort
of different acts to grind with us. Well, so, it‘s very controversial, very contentious, but
also sort of a silent battle, because it was all for the future, but we knew at some point we
are going to have to argue that out‖ (CH3).
The arguments were put to rest by the city to be dealt with in the future, when the
city gave another fifteen years to the billboard companies, mainly Lamar, to take down
their nonconforming billboards This extension was granted on the premise, that it will
give enough time to the billboard companies to earn additional revenue on their
nonconforming billboards, and, that way, the city will not have to pay for the lost
revenue, which billboard companies were claiming from the city, if those billboards were
to be brought down in 2002. However, the billboard companies were working on ways to
avoid this 2017 deadline, and OBD became an opportunity for them to negotiate for
removing that time constraint. Their interest in interacting with OBD was twofold: one,
to keep abreast about what OBD was planning, as far as regulating the billboards was
concerned; and, two, to find a way to negotiate with the city through OBD to get rid of
the 2017 deadline for their nonconforming signs. Eliminating the 2017 amortization
deadline was a point that neither the city nor OBD wanted to negotiate. That stance was
406

the reason billboard companies turned to the state and supported Legislative Bill 302 (LB
302) without any interaction with the city, OBD or the public at large.
Administrative Loophole
The employee, who had worked initially with Lamar and later on with Waitt, had
found a loophole in the system, which could result in a tremendous profit for both the
companies. The plan of putting billboards along I-80 in Omaha started with the idea, that
Lamar should somehow manage the permits for erecting new billboards along I-80 from
60
th
Street west to the I-680 interchange from the City of Omaha and then convince the
State of Nebraska to relax their regulations that did not allow any billboards on that
stretch of I-80 in Omaha. So in February 2003, Lamar Outdoor Advertising applied for
permits to erect eighteen new signs along I-80 in Omaha from the City of Omaha. The
city officials assumed the state administration would never allow Lamar to erect any
signs along the freeway, so there is no harm in making some money from Lamar by
granting them the permits. Thus, they granted the permits and collected the fees for those
permits totaling at $6,180 (Abbott 1983). The city was not concerned to recollect the
history of their unsuccessful negotiations with the billboard companies in the past or take
clues from the overall attitude of billboard companies in following the city‘s regulations
before granting them these permits. The city planners thought the State of Nebraska had
never permitted billboards along Omaha city‘s limits. Therefore, they would prevent
these billboards as well. With this belief, the city once again renewed Lamar‘s permits
after six months and received another $6,180, when Lamar applied for the renewal in
April 2004. Even while giving the permits for the second time, neither the city
407

administration nor the city planners know why Lamar was renewing the permits, if the
State administration would never allow them to erect billboards in the proposed locations.
The city had sufficient time to look into the matter, before renewing Lamar‘s
permits again for that stretch of the interstate I-80. They could have given a thought into
whether it was necessary to strengthen the regulations along the freeway in Omaha, but
they did not follow that reasonable and prudent process. Soon after that, the city learned
that the State of Nebraska was actually looking into relaxing billboards regulations along
I-80 in Omaha. The state administration did that in July 2004, after being pursued by
Lamar, who was insisting the state should give the city an ultimate authority to permit
new signs and relax its control along I-80 in Omaha. This incident is where the blame-
game started. The city planners blamed the state for not apprising them about this change
in their policy, and the state officials at the Nebraska Roads Department said the city had
more-than-sufficient time to notice the change, when the city had renewed Lamar‘s
permits twice (Abbott 1983).
The question arises as to why did the State give the city an ultimate authority and
relaxed its regulations for that stretch of land only along I-80, and why did they not think
of communicating their future move with the city officials, before relaxing their policies.
That moment was when the employees of the billboard company found a loophole. As
compared to the other states, the State of Nebraska had an additional control over
billboards along its highways, because it had bought advertising rights for 660 feet on
either side of highways, when the interstate system was developed in 1950s and 1960s.
However, the only areas near the interstate, where the state was not able to buy
408

advertising rights, were the lands owned by the railroad companies, which were opposed
to the development of new interstate highways. The stretch Lamar had pinpointed and
had already received the city permits for was owned by Union Pacific Railroad. Lamar
had planned to lease those lands from Union Pacific, before maneuvering the city and the
state administrations. Because the state did not have advertising rights for the stretch of
land owned by Union Pacific, the state agreed to give the city an authority to control
those areas. The state had assumed the city will stop Lamar from putting billboards on
Union Pacific lands, but that problem was already taken care of by Lamar, because
Lamar had already managed to get required permits from the city to erect billboards on
those lands twice.
In the end, Lamar erected eighteen new billboards by the end of 2004 on the
busiest vehicular route in the city, where no billboards had existed before, which made
these eighteen billboards the most valuable ones for the billboard companies. Lamar had
to give four signs to Waitt, because the person who had found this loophole had moved to
work for Waitt in the meantime. This small catastrophic change was also the time, when
comprehensive urban design plan was adopted for the city by the City Council on
December 7, 2004 as a part of the city‘s Master Plan, and one of the collaborators in the
process were the billboard companies. The official goal for improving I-80 and other
highways was to convert them into ―landscaped designs that create a positive image of
the city,
‖99
but these new billboards had made achieving that goal even more difficult, if
not impossible.

99
Source: Omaha By Design plan document.
409

Collaborating in the OBD Process
As a part of beautifying the city, OBD was interested in regulating the billboards
in the city, since the beginning. Even before the billboards issue became a part of the
OBD plan, the city‘s Master Plan had also enlisted ―signs‖ as a major area within a set of
urban design issues to be handled in future. So billboard companies were invited by OBD
to become one of the collaborators in the Steering Committee prior to creating an urban
design plan for the city, and later in the TAG committee, for devising the implementation
mechanisms, based on OBD‘s Urban Design Element. A leader of one of the major
billboard companies sat on the Steering Committee and on the TAG committee, along
with an attorney of the firm representing other billboard company. During the initial
Steering Committee meetings, OBD was asked by the billboard industry leaders, if they
were planning to put them out-of-business, and OBD had responded they did not want to
do that accusation, but they only wanted to implement what the city‘s Master Plan had
recommended.
During public participation and stakeholder collaboration process for the Urban
Design Plan, OBD had learned that majority of the stakeholders and Omaha‘s citizens
had agreed not to have new billboards in the ACIs. In addition, the group had also agreed
that all the nonconforming billboards should be removed or relocated to become
conforming by 2017, as it was outlined in the city statutes at the time. In the beginning of
2006, as a part of implementation mechanisms, OBD‘s two major goals for regulating
billboards in Omaha included: no new billboards should be allowed in ACIs, and the
existing amortization schedule for removing all the nonconforming billboards by 2017
410

should be enforced. In addition, OBD was also interested in devising some ways to
reduce and control the existing conforming signs. ―The Urban Design Element calls for
the elimination of new off-premise advertising signs in all Areas of Civic Importance. In
addition, the city should follow policies that reduce the number and improve the
placement of existing off-premise signs‖ (WRT 2004). While the Omaha Municipal Code
called for the removal of nonconforming billboards by 2017, the Urban Design Element
recommended a faster and greater removal in specific target areas.
100
However, billboard
companies were working on their own plans to counteract any prospective regulations on
them from OBD.
Shortly after the completion of the urban design plan for the city of Omaha, OBD
came to learn billboard companies had negotiated with the state for eighteen new
billboards to be erected along I-80 (Kotok 2005). A large number of phone calls and
emails to OBD from the citizens of Omaha commenced, when seeing these gigantic,
intrusive, and undesirable series of billboards on the highway. The OBD leaders were
appalled by the act of billboard companies, who had installed eighteen billboards along I-
80, where OBD was prohibited by Nebraska state statutes to do any landscaping, that
could be used to obstruct the view of the billboards.
After a series of meetings, the billboard companies officially agreed upon one
demand of OBD, to not have any new billboards in ACIs, but the existing ones would
stay. They also agreed to continue discussing ways to reduce and improve billboards
throughout the city. Through their good-faith negotiations, Lamar had considered not to

100
OBD Position paper on billboards usage in the Omaha Metropolitan area, OBD archival documents.
411

remove the 2017 deadline for its nonconforming billboards. It was also a solution, which
leaders of the billboard companies, Lamar Advertising and Waitt Media had agreed to
during their negotiations with the city in 2002. Soon after making these commitments,
billboard companies proceeded to find another way to remove 2017 deadline. This time,
it was by supporting Nebraska LB 302.
Nebraska LB 302
OBD had spent about four years, since its inception as Lively Omaha, in
preparing an urban design plan for the city; it was working on implementing new urban
design ordinances, when LB 302 was proposed in 2006. Introduction of the bill LB 302
came as a surprise for OBD in the middle of their dialogue with the billboard leaders and
their legal representatives to address the no new billboards in the ACIs, as one of the
goals listed in recently adopted urban design plan.
If passed, LB 302
101
was to remove the long-standing practice of using a
published amortization schedule to determine the value of billboards that a city was
requiring to be removed.
102
In its place, it would require municipalities to pay the value

101
LB 302 would allow cities of the primary class to create assessment districts for street trees, but the
amendment included the right of the property owners in the district to protest and stop the creation of the
district and some of these property owners were billboards companies. (Source: League of Nebraska
Municipalities April 15 2005, Legislative Bulletin 15, 99
th
Legislature- First Session). Even though the bill
was not directly worded to benefit the billboards companies, the companies had found out it was going to
favor them tremendously, because it will allow them to protest and stop the creation of assessment districts
in the areas, where nonconforming billboards were. The local governments would essentially be unable to
remove all the nonconforming billboards, as a result of passing of LB 302.

102
Summary of LB 302, Introduced by Mike Friend, Urban Affairs Committee, Omaha By Design archival
documents.

412

of the whole economic unit, which may include the value of any leases going forward and
the value of the billboard itself, regardless of how much value the owner of the billboard
has obtained during its life. OBD tried hard, along with the city of Omaha, to convey its
position; the history of interactions with billboard companies; and why this bill would
destroy more than two decades long efforts to remove nonconforming billboards in the
city.
OBD‘s position was that the cities in Nebraska needed the existing language of
the State‘s statutes as a tool to revitalize their cities. In Omaha, the citizens had seen a
transformation in its downtown and the riverfront, and this transformation was to be
reflected in all the segments of the city, specifically in its built environment. By removing
the tool of amortization schedule, the bill would impede economic growth and vitality of
Nebraska cities. More specifically, the bill was targeted to be advantageous to one
industry by giving them a relief from nonconforming issues, which meant other industries
could request the same in the future.
Along with OBD, the city of Omaha opposed LB 302 on several premises.
103

First, billboard companies had testified in 2002 to Omaha City Council supporting a
change in the zoning code, which allowed all the nonconforming signs to be removed in
order to comply with the codes by January 2017. Two, the City of Omaha needed to
maintain its ability to cause the removal of seventy out of 450 nonconforming billboards
in the city‘s jurisdiction. Three, existing law already had the provision, that the city
should compensate for the removal of the nonconforming billboards, which was more

103
City of Omaha and Omaha By Design, Feb 8, 2007, Memorandum to Urban Affairs Committee of the
Nebraska Legislature, Omaha By Design archival documents.
413

than any other nonconforming uses received from the city. Four, LB302 required the city
to compensate without taking into consideration the condition of the sign; length of time
it had been maintained by the company; the amount of profit and return on investment
generated; and the amount of time remaining of the lease of a sign. It would mean that
taxpayers‘ money would go to pay the billboard companies for their anticipated,
unrealized, and speculative profits in the future.
To summarize, introduction of LB 302 would have completely undermined the
city‘s ability to regulate nonconforming billboards and require their eventual removal or
relocation. Even though LB 302 was publicized as merely cleaning up language and
making procedures consistent, it was going to take away the ability of the cities of
Nebraska to regulate nonconforming billboards and become a windfall to the billboard
industry.
The most disappointing part for OBD was despite their hard work and good-faith
collaboration with the billboard companies, the latter had taken this step to counter-attack
the efforts of the former. Nevertheless, OBD displayed willingness to negotiate to reach a
reasonable compromise on this local issue with intricate historic roots. Eventually, based
on the arguments presented by the city and OBD, LB 302 was indefinitely postponed by
the committee.
Electronic Billboards
OBD might have thought their ordeal of negotiating with billboard companies had
finally come to an end, after they had successfully opposed passing of LB 302, and, at
one time, the companies had agreed to have no new billboards in the ACIs. Even though
414

billboard companies were not as committal about not removing the 2017 deadline, the
city had also not agreed to the companies‘ demand of removing the deadline. Meanwhile,
OBD had to keep a progressive pace to implement rest of the plan with the satisfaction,
that no new billboards will be erected in the ACIs—a commitment the billboard
companies had already made. In reality, there were very few locations left for billboard
companies to erect new billboards in the ACIs, and there were already many
nonconforming billboards in the ACIs. To the city planners and OBD, it seemed that
pressuring billboard companies further by proposing regulations in non-ACI areas would
hamper OBD‘s success with other stakeholders in implementing the urban design plan.
The OBD team‘s apprehension was if other developers saw the billboard companies
getting their way in that period of time, they may also unite further and find ways to resist
new controls on their work. Pushing billboard companies too far was not in the best
interests of OBD, who was working diligently on the implementation phase of the OBD
plan. At the same time the billboard companies were still searching for ways to bring
more pressure on the city to remove the 2017 deadline, while participating in OBD‘s
implementation process.
Digital billboards are a recent technology, to which many small and midsize cities
are not yet exposed. Therefore, many of these cities have ordinances regulating regular
billboards without any mention of digital billboards. This fact is exploited to a great
extent by the billboard industry to bring in electronic billboards across a large number of
cities.
It‘s one of many strategies being used to bring digital technology to as many cities
and towns as possible, before localities have a chance to explore the implications
415

of the new technology, update their sign ordinances, or ban digital signs outright
(Fry 2007).

In April 2008, Lamar followed the same strategy of putting digital faces on its
existing billboards without seeking prior permission from the City of Omaha. It put up
five digital billboards in places of regular ones in the city, which were a violation of the
city‘s zoning ordinance according to the city. Soon after, in May 2008, the issue of
electronic billboards received a lot of attention from the local media including KETV-
Channel 7 and the Omaha World-Herald. OBD once again was startled at this new move
of the billboard company and released a statement outlining their position on the issue,
―Omaha By Design believes these illegal electronic billboards should be turned off, until
the city develops an appropriate policy that regulates their use.‖
104

Following the citizens‘ uproar and OBD‘s opposition, the City of Omaha put a
limited-time ban on electronic billboards, until it devised regulations to control them.
However, billboard companies were prepared with their next move; they filed a lawsuit in
Douglas County District Court against the City of Omaha arguing, because Omaha‘s sign
ordinance did not specify prohibition of digital billboards, they were allowed, and the city
could not ban them. The city of Omaha counter-sued the company to have all the digital
billboards taken down. According to the deputy city attorney at the time, ―the city has
taken the position that the existing code doesn't allow for the electronic signs, even
though there is no specific language about LED signs‖ (Sloan 2008).

104
OBD archival documents.
416

Although codes did not mention digital billboards, they clearly did not allow
them. However, neither the city nor the billboard companies were certain about the
outcome of their litigations.
Our Law Department, I think, put up a good line of defense, but they weren‘t
confident enough to say we will win this no matter what. They said, we think we
have got a good case, and I think the same thing was probably being said to the
billboard company by their attorney. Well, I think you have got a shot at this,
can‘t guarantee you are going to win. So we had this situation, where neither side
was quite sure they could pull that off. So there was some willingness to negotiate
(CP5).

Based on uncertainties involved in a legal battle, such as this, both the parties
withdrew their cases to find a solution outside the court.
In June 2008, city of Omaha unanimously passed an amendment to the city‘s
zoning ordinance that clarified the prohibition of electronic billboards, which was
effective through December 31, 2008. This time period was given, so the Planning
Department can negotiate with the two billboard companies regarding the potential use of
electronic billboards in the city. Waitt Outdoor, the other billboard company, had not
erected any electronic billboards in the city at the time. In the interim, the Omaha‘s
Planning Department began its negotiations with the two billboard companies. Also
during this time period, OBD hosted a public forum on digital billboards‘ issue in July
2008. Unlike the case of Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets, OBD did not take a stand
in favor or in opposition of the digital billboards.
Omaha By Design is not opposed to the use of billboards in Omaha, electronic or
otherwise. However, electronic billboards represent a significant new land use;
therefore, warrant careful study and appropriate regulation. We believe the public
417

has a right to learn more about the issue, before any change in policy is
approved.
105

However, they chose to invite Kevin Fry, the president of Scenic America, to give
a guest talk in the public forum to let the community know about the threats of digital
billboards. The act of inviting Fry for a talk was interpreted by the billboard companies,
as OBD taking a position of no digital billboards in the city.
Despite an objective stand portrayed by OBD, its actions on the issue were
interpreted as subjective, when three members of OBD's Advisory Committee authored
an essay in the ―Midlands Voices‖ section of OWH on July 25
th
that clearly opposed
electronic billboards.
Electronic billboards are like huge televisions sets. They are capable of being
dangerous, ugly distractions. Omaha currently does not allow them. If it is to do
so, regulations must be developed to govern their use (Weber, Levy, and Thomas
2008).

Weber, Levy, and Thomas (2008) proposed suggestions for regulating digital
billboards, which included allowing digital billboards only in the industrial zones;
spacing them at least 1,000 yards apart; and requiring billboard companies to remove the
existing static billboards, before they could install electronic ones. This article was also
supported by the editorial of the Omaha World-Herald on the same day,
The proliferation of billboards is a huge blot on the visual appeal of Omaha's
interstate corridor. A glut of electronic billboards throughout the city would only
add to the problem. The city of Omaha should be careful not to open the door to
an escalation of these eyesores. These billboards should be implemented only
with sensible regulations, and ―City leaders can promote a business-friendly

105
Source: From the public announcement on OBD website on July 9, 2008, ―OBD to host public forum
on electronic billboards on July 29‖ http://www.omahabydesign.org/2008/07/obd-to-host-public-forum-on-
electronic-billboards-july-29/.
418

atmosphere in Omaha without allowing a glut of billboards to detract from the
city's appearance and its design standards.‖ (Editorial 2008)

To counter attack OBD‘s article and the editorial in the OWH, the vice president
and the general manager of Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Dick Deitering, wrote his piece
in the ―Midlands Voices‖ section of the OWH on the day of the public forum to be held
by OBD. Deitering (2008) claimed digital billboards were safe, beneficial to the society,
and are a requirement for the economic survival of the industry. He alleged that, ―Omaha
By Design is providing mixed messages to the community. It asserts that it is not anti-
billboard, but it partners with Scenic America, which is blatantly anti-billboard and refers
to billboards as ‗litter on a stick‘‖ (Deitering 2008). About 50 people attended the public
forum on digital billboards held by OBD. ―Aesthetics and safety were the primary issues
that came out. Some people felt they are an improvement over the older, vinyl billboards‖
(Sloan 2008).
Digital billboards are considered a much bigger threat for cities than their regular
counterparts by Scenic America—a nonprofit dedicated to ―preserving and enhancing the
scenic character of Americas communities and countryside‖ (Fry 2007). The reasons
behind considering them a threat are based on the grounds that they are much brighter,
like large plasma-screen televisions; more distracting due to their brightness and
changing messages; and much more expensive to be removed for cities without
amortization laws in place or along federal-aid highways that do not allow amortization
as per the Highway Beautification Act (HBA).
106

106
―The Highway Beautification Act: A Broken Law‖ A report (n.d.) by Scenic America describes that The
Highway Beautification Act (HBA) passed in 1965 is the only such act that requires taxpayers‘ money to
419

It‘s not unusual for billboard operators to erect digital signs, even when state-
federal agreements or local ordinances prohibit them, knowing that local
enforcement can be difficult, due to lax or inefficient enforcement or the prospect
of the lengthy and costly litigation that inevitably follows (Fry 2007).

According to Federal studies
107
of drivers, who take their eyes off the road for
more than two seconds, are far more likely to suffer a crash or near crash, and the most
digital billboard images change every six seconds, because that time is needed to
comprehend a message. This time period of six seconds is three times longer, than what it
requires to cause an accident, and that statistic suggests digital billboards are a threat to
the drivers.
On the other side, despite their high-installation costs, digital billboards are
extremely profitable, as compared to non-digital ones, because they allow billboard
companies to sell advertising space up to ten times more than their traditional
counterparts. They also make content-change much easier, and, as often as desired, which
is not the case with their traditional counterparts. Despite being a great cause of concerns
for the communities, astounding economic returns on the digital billboards make them
the most lucrative undertakings for the billboard industry.

be used to pay the polluter to stop polluting. It has so many loopholes and a major one, that benefits the
billboards industry to an extent that it has become a Billboard Protection and Proliferation Act. The report
highlights two major ways the act does so,
1) The HBA allows billboards to be erected virtually everywhere-in commercial/industrial area adjacent to
interstate and federal-aid primary highways.
2) The HBA makes it virtually impossible to remove nonconforming billboards by prohibiting amortization
along interstate and federal-aid primary highways. The state and local governments could require
nonconforming billboards to be removed, but they will have to bear the cost of doing so. This prohibition
of amortization has allowed over 38,000 billboards to be standing even though local ordinances seeking to
remove them.

107
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, USDOT (April 2006) ―The Impact of Driver
Inattention on Near-Crash/Crash Risk: An Analysis Using the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study Data‖
420

Splitting the Baby
At the end of 2008, negotiations among billboard companies, the city planners
and OBD ended in a compromise, where the city agreed to allow digital billboards, but
limited them to a total of eighteen digital billboards, based on the number of traditional
conforming billboards owned by Lamar and Waitt. If Lamar would upgrade its older
billboards, then more digital billboards would be allowed. OBD wanted to have a cap of
fifteen, but the city planners and the billboard companies agreed to have a cap of
eighteen. According to this negotiated agreement, five regular billboards would have to
be taken down for each digital billboard installation along major thoroughfares and in
older areas of Omaha; whereas, in the rest of the city, the ratio would be 4 to 1, and, in
industrial areas, the ratio would be 3 to 1. OBD had asked for 7-1, 5-1, and 3-1 ratios for
the three areas respectively, and their reason for suggesting stricter ratios was the city
should start with tougher regulations, since the technology was new for Omaha. On the
other hand, the billboard companies denied agreeing for stricter ratios. They agreed for
the message switching time of ten seconds on these digital billboards. The Planning
Board and OBD had asked for the switching time to be a minimum of sixty seconds.
Above all, the most significant regulatory change during these negotiations was the
removal of the 2017 amortization deadline that billboard industry had been unsuccessful
in achieving, since last twenty years. The reason why billboard companies agreed to have
any controls on electronic billboards was the city agreed to remove their 2017
amortization deadline. A lack of the political will was considered as the major reason for
giving into the billboard companies‘ demands of removing this deadline.
421

The City Council favored less-restrictive controls, suggesting they did not mind
electronic billboards. In fact, the Council was not pleased with OBD‘s interference in the
billboards‘ issue, and that premise was manifested, when the Council member Garry
Gernandt referred OBD as ―Omaha By Demand‖ intentionally. before correcting himself
during the Council hearing and vote on electronic billboards (Shaw 2008). Eventual
outcome on this issue was just like all the other political battles resulting in a middle-of-
the-road solution.
Like a lot of political disputes they get solved to the lowest common denominator,
that‘s usually split the baby. Too much public policy comes into being that way,
because there have to be decisions made along the way, that will not please
everybody, and natural instinct in the political environment is to split the baby, go
with the middle, which is one of the reasons that OBD, I mean, another reason
OBD needed to be there, because it‘s not the way to do it, set the standard, which
you want (DO1).

OBD and the city of Omaha took solace in the fact that Omaha‘s regulations for
digital billboards were slightly stricter, than the cities surrounding it, such as Lincoln and
Council Bluffs. These cities required a less number of traditional billboards to be taken
down for putting up digital billboards. The director of OBD conveyed to the media, after
the vote on electronic billboards, that approved regulations were stricter than what would
have passed, if OBD had not been involved in the process (Shaw 2008).
Tough Partner
In the OBD collaboration, OBD promoters had began with a view, that billboards
were ugly and should be controlled strictly, if not eliminated. That view had triggered a
further acrimony from the companies leading them to fight more vigorously against any
future controls that might result from the OBD process. In the end, billboard companies
422

got much more than OBD had wished to allow in the beginning of their collaborative
process. In many ways, billboard companies proved to be a tough partner in OBD‘s
collaborative urban design plan and code-making process.
From the beginning of the process, billboard companies were considered
politically very powerful by the stakeholders of the OBD collaboration.
They are again very powerful, because they are contributing big time to the
Council and mayors, and again no one wants to drive them out of business. We
were really against electronic signs to start with. But we lost. We went to the City
Council, and we lost. That‘s the way it is, you know. You win some; you lose
some…that was a case, where we sat down with the sign companies and tried to
work through these things. We couldn‘t do it, and we still believe that they are a
hazard to driving and but couldn‘t prevail (OB3).

The political constituency of billboards in the local government was also strong,
because of their contributions to various political parties and candidates, and that
prevented political candidates from taking a strong stand against the industry.
Politicians need advertising, and politicians need contributions to their campaigns.
Politicians buy spaces on billboards, you know, or have them donated as
campaign donations. I am sure politicians would say that has nothing to do with
that [situation], but when you don‘t have your constituents calling up, pounding
the table saying no no no to billboards, it‘s pretty hard for politicians to say ―no.‖
(CP5)

Even the city officials were of the opinion OBD had insisted on regulating
billboards, since the beginning, but the latter were eventually on a losing side.
There was sensitivity to sign issues all throughout this process and recognition.
We probably shouldn‘t put in the urban design code conflicting terms with the
proposed issue, that we had at hand with Lamar...OBD argued for more restriction
than the city eventually adopted on the electronic signs, and they were on. I call it
a losing side of that argument, because the restrictions were not as strong, as they
had hoped for (CH3).

423

According to Omaha‘s planning professionals, it was the organized opposition
from the billboard industry that allowed them to have their way.
The billboard industry, which is highly organized, and it has almost always gotten
its way, even to a greater degree than the developers have. You can always have
neighborhood protests that can really stir things up. I don‘t think that they felt
much about inclination to compromise (SC4).

On the contrary, the faction of the society opposing the billboards was not as
organized and, thus, had a limited reach politically.
Billboards are a special interest, and they organized. People, who don‘t like
billboards, are a diffused group of people, and they are not so well-organized.
This is a national issue, and the billboard companies are very often national
companies. I think the most promising approach on billboards is to say that they
are hazard for drivers (OB5).

Based on all the accounts, the final compromise had benefited the billboard
companies the most at the end of the OBD process.
The planning professionals and the city planners believed one of the reasons for
the billboard companies‘ success was the fact that Omaha‘s local corporate sector did not
take as much interest in the billboards issue, as they did in other developments relating to
the built environment of the city. According to a planning professional,
Had the major corporations had the same level of commitment as on billboards‘
issue, as they did on architectural or site planning issue, that might have been
different, but they really didn‘t. There is sort of a fundamental feeling that, well, if
you want to advertise, you all have the right to do it, which you should. The
billboard issue felt more like conventional government regulation. So here OBD
was in a weaker position politically, than this one industry that‘s very focused on
getting its way in this one thing. So a compromise was cut, it was not a good
compromise (SC4).

Citywide regulations on billboards were not addressed in the final codes, although
they had been considered in the beginning of the OBD process, because OBD‘s
424

continuous battle to control billboards effectively could have jeopardized their success in
the other areas of the plan-making.
Billboards were dealt with a little bit in the urban design element, but the city and
the billboard people decided we weren‘t going to do. We didn‘t want that to
sidetrack the whole thing. So it kind of got separated out (CP5).

Thus, most important reasons for the billboard companies‘ triumph were: one,
OBD could not manage it effectively; two, community did not pay attention to the
billboards issue as much; and three, the issue never received the kind of corporate leaders
and the public‘s support, that it did for the rest of the aspects of the OBD plan. ―I think
billboards are a hard thing to get people‘s heads around. I think it‘s kind of a background
to people they don‘t see it‖ (OB5).
The local corporate sector‘s stand on billboards was different from what the city
planners had assumed. These corporate heads felt a grave concern over the hegemony of
the billboard companies.
I think those things diminish the beauty of streetscape, that we are spending
millions of dollars to try to develop and urging our retailers and businesses, when
they build new places to make their stores more attractive to the neighborhoods
and more functional in certain ways, and then we allow them to junk it up with a
bunch of obnoxious signs flashing at you (DO3).

But the existing political complexity and the lack of administrative capacity had
resulted in compromises, where they should not have been allowed, and the local
corporate leaders felt the issues had gone beyond reach as a result.
This signage thing, which had been on the radar screen for a long time, and
always with utter failure, and always with political issues involved from candidate
support to president to kind of ignoring it, and then coming up with these 11
th

hour compromises, which is I said, all it does is move something insane to
something very stupid. That shouldn‘t be the polar ends of these things. You
425

[have] got to be good—right or wrong. But what we wind up constantly doing is
to make it least worst that we can (DO1).

Lamar benefited the most in the end, because the amortization deadline was
removed. Lamar could keep some of the most profitable nonconforming billboards and
remove the least profitable ones to be replaced by their electronic ones.
If they could get the government to give them something for taking down old,
crappy billboards, that they don‘t like anyway, and that [sic] are very hard to sell.
They are playing the government for, you know, we are working for the franchise.
We are working in the situation. Is that right or wrong? (AG5)

In this game, the city was always trying to catch up to the moves of billboard
industry.
In fact they built them (digital billboards), and that forced us to shut them down.
So we were playing catch up. It wasn‘t like we had time to build a constituency
opposed to it, and then they put one up or came in with an application. They put
them up and dared us to make them take them down (CP5).

For some of the supporters of OBD, approach of OBD on electronic billboards
was partial. They felt even though OBD had not explicitly taken a stand on the issue,
their actions to strictly regulate billboards suggested their stand was not neutral.
We put together a public forum on electric billboards that was one-sided. It was
unfair. We had kind of an extremist speaking for the anti-billboard deal, and they
came in and were very rational and spoke to a very business-oriented City
Council and just said this is about Omaha businesses. You know, they had a right
to advertise, and we really don‘t want to blight. They have been incredibly
successful…Where they haven‘t succeeded politically, they have resorted to
litigation (AG9).

This kind of approach by OBD may have helped billboard companies in gaining a
larger support politically and implying how OBD was intending to put them out-of-
business.
426

We were out of position on that, and I think failed to articulate the case with the
reason and the balance and sort of the care for the community that we have had. I
think case is makeable from what we had. We just weren‘t very fair, and I think it
showed in the result and gave them a much bigger space to say we are really
about throwing them all out-of- business, and we were tactically maneuvered
(AG7).

There were several arguments billboard companies had put forward from time to
time. They dismissed the editorials critiquing the lack of the political will to have any
effective enforcement over billboard regulations, on the basis that billboard companies
were the biggest rivals of the local newspaper advertising. For the billboard companies‘
involvement of OBD into the billboards issue was motivated by its donors, who had
stakes in the newspaper industry. ―Think about who is sponsoring OBD, biggest
newspaper in town, think about what they do. Think about what their biggest competition
is for ad space. There was without question and effort to try to restrict that business in
Omaha‖ (SC5).
However, sustained tactics of delaying the amortization deadline and eventually
having it removed; putting digital signs without prior permissions to trigger a
compromise; and expanding the billboards‘ presence in uncharted city areas by finding
loopholes in the system indicated the newspaper articles and editorials critiquing
Omaha‘s billboard industry were not unfounded. The billboard companies‘ game of delay
tactics finally had worked in favor of Lamar and allowed it to keep its ninety-two
nonconforming signs up out of the total of 349 at the time, when the 2017 deadline was
removed (Editorial 2009).
Another argument made by Lamar, prior to the removal of amortization deadline,
was other structures are allowed to stay, even if they are nonconforming after the new
427

codes come into effect, and the billboards are no different. However, off-premise signs
most everywhere in the US are taxed as personal property and not a real property. Many
outdoor advertising agencies have fought being taxed as real property legally. In one such
battle, the New Jersey Outdoor Advertising Association contended its signs were a
private property, based on several premises.
108
The billboard industry had claimed in
most occasions, the sign‘s face was not damaged at all while moving, and 80 percent of
the structure of these signs was salvaged to be used at other locations (Floyd 2000, 3).
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the claims of the industry.
109
Off-premise signs, as
they are taxed and defined by the billboard industry and by the courts, clearly suggest they
are not treated the same as the rest of the buildings or structures, even if they are
nonconforming. Thus, Lamar‘s argument that nonconforming billboards should stay
indefinitely, like other structures, does not hold ground or is not valid. The billboard industry
also argued that the city had only been targeting them without paying as much attention
to on-premise signs, that maybe equally or more distracting.
You have got dancing signs over. You can have dancing girls on it to any number
of things on the commercial property, and you can‘t have a low-lit digital
billboard that advertises Blue Cross, your local Ford dealer, whatever, every 10
seconds or something? (SC5)

108
These premises were (1) were personal property, not real property, (2) were not "improvements" to the
real estate, but "personal property affixed to the real property," (3) could be removed "without material
injury to the real property," (4) could be removed "without material injury to the personal property itself,"
and (5) were "not intended to be affixed permanently to the real property." Floyd, C. F. 2000. The Takings
Issue in Billboard Control. 2000 APA National Planning Conference.

109
R.C. Maxwell Company v. Galloway Township, 679 A.2d 141 (N.J. Supreme Ct. 1996)
428

This argument is important, because the new urban design codes control on-
premise signs to a great extent (Appendix H). The design team of OBD summarized the
issue of billboards as,
Billboards are an interesting problem in a lot of cities. They have regulations,
permit them, allow them to have very longstanding times, where they keep their
billboards. So even after everybody has decided they don‘t want them anymore,
it‘s quite tough to get them out of there. It‘s perfectly possible, a legal issue. And
the City Council has to be willing to do it.

A greater problem in changing regulations is ―before you get them changed,
everybody runs around and makes sure that they haven‘t made to do stuff‖ (OB5). For the
urban designers,
Another thing with billboards from aesthetic point of view is you don‘t have
consensus. There are a lot of people out there, who think that billboards are
terrific. And in fact if a billboard is well-designed and is in an appropriate
location, it‘s not necessarily bad. You go to China, and, you know, all those signs
and the streets and so forth are quite exciting. The design, in fact there in New
York City, they actually went out and tried to save the billboards. They wrote an
ordinance that you had to have billboards. At the right place, they are appropriate
(OB5).

A combination of political, administrative, and community interest aspects
created a web of institutional dynamics, that allowed the billboard industry to overcome
stricter regulations, and, in the end, they proved to be tougher partners for OBD.
Summary
This chapter highlighted the limitations of the local governing regime to deal with
local billboard companies that had more institutional connections. Having two major
billboard companies with entirely different histories of billboards presence in the city had
made the city of Omaha deal with each billboard company‘s constraints and pressures
separately. While meeting demands of the two major companies to keep both of them
429

happy, the city had compromised much more than it would have, if there was only one
major company with which to deal. Since 1987, at no point, the city‘s political wing or
the Planning Department had shown inclination to strictly enforce what had been agreed
upon years ago. Every new set of city administrators, planning staff, and the planning
director interpreted previously set deadlines differently; succumbed to pressures of the
billboard companies differently; and, in the end, the city remained with the same number
of, if not more, nonconforming billboards.
The billboard companies in Omaha had proven to be the toughest collaborator for
OBD in their seven-year-long journey of creating urban design plan and codes for the city
of Omaha. The billboard companies‘ intent for participating in OBD was completely
different from the rest of the stakeholders. All the stakeholders, who participated in OBD
process, did so to protect their self-interests, but the billboard companies were working
on gaining more than just protecting their businesses. They took existence of OBD as an
attack on their business, which they had to fight hard to win, but their fight had to be
discreet, so OBD did not learn about their next moves or outmaneuvered them by
bringing in additional regulations on the billboards. The billboard companies had
inherited several decades-long history of dealing with the city, which came to their
advantage in maneuvering through tough negotiations with the city and with OBD. In the
last two decades, the leading company Lamar was particularly successful in delaying the
amortization deadline for their nonconforming signs. Their experience of successful
negotiations with the city had allowed billboard companies to make sure no stricter
430

regulations were brought upon them by OBD, as compared to the rest of the stakeholders,
such as developers who had no such negotiation experience.
The billboard companies had mastered the process of institutional negotiations
over the decades, and they were aware about the techniques of bringing different types of
pressures on the city governance. They had also discovered and utilized many loopholes
that existed in the city and the state‘s administrative and legal apparatus. Above all, they
had managed to garner a much-needed political support of various city administrations
since 1987. The political will in 1987 was strong enough to withstand many pressures
brought in by the billboard companies, but that kind of political will, for the enforcement
of billboard regulations, was not seen thereafter in Omaha.
Just like tobacco companies, political associations of billboard companies from
the federal to the state levels have shielded these companies away from many regulations
nationally. The toughest shield they have managed to acquire is through Federal HBA.
110

Since the passing of HBA, billboard companies have benefited from lobbying efforts at
the federal, state and city levels. A deep-rooted history of the political and administrative
linkages and the dealings of billboard companies depict the extent, to which they can
undermine the success of one of the major goals of an urban design initiative at the city
level. The OBD faction and the city‘s local corporate regime may have been aware about
the possible challenges for dealing with billboard companies, but they may have not
realized the extent, to which billboard companies could maneuver the institutional set up
for their own benefit.

110
See footnote 9 in this section.
431

Through this tale of a battle among the billboard companies, the city and OBD,
two findings related to the current study emerge. First, traditional conception of the local
corporate regime‘s dominance over major policy decisions does not hold true in the case
of urban design controls. The billboard companies act as local interest groups with
national ties and impact aesthetics of built form constantly through their actions. Because
the citizens at large are not concerned with the existence of the billboards, political
pressure from them is less likely to appear, especially in cities like Omaha, where
community awareness about aesthetics of public realm is only at a nascent stage. The
local corporate leaders in Omaha have not been able to find comparable ability to
conquer such local interest groups administratively and politically. These local interest
groups do not ―go along‖ (Stone 1989) or adjust their goals to match with that of the local
dominant regimes, because these interest groups with their national ties form a bigger
regime, that has a national political and economic presence. Thus, a national level force
that lobbied its way across the state and the federal governments is able to successfully
withstand the demands from a local urban regime. However, the actions by national-level
interest groups or regimes, such as billboard companies, are limited to the decision
related to the billboard industry, and, therefore, the larger policy decisions about urban
development of the city are still dominated by the governing regime. Such local interest
groups with national ties may never oppose the governing regime in any other areas,
other than their businesses. Therefore, they may never be able to lead to the downfall of
the governing regime, because they are not anti-regimes (DeLeon 1992) in a pervasive
sense.
432

Second, the final urban form controls are a result of a series of negotiations
among the dominant regime, local interest groups, and the city governance. These entities
form a local context for mitigating the urban design controls in their favor. The
community‘s visioning process, design team‘s ideal intents, and the dominant regimes‘
quest for making the city aesthetically pleasing do not transform in corresponding urban
design codes, also, because of the larger political economic dynamics, which tie local
forces to the state and national level debates.

433

CHAPTER 13: REVISITING THE BATTLE OVER AESTHETICS OF RETAIL:
CVS PHARMACY

In this section, one more battle over site layout and aesthetics of retail chain store
CVS Pharmacy in Omaha is analyzed from three angles. First, discussion will include,
whether four variables: economic importance, regional strategic importance, community
awareness, and political will, as identified in case of Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory
Streets, also apply to the CVS Pharmacy case, which occurred after the new urban design
codes were put in place in Omaha. Second, how does the CVS case help understand
present implications of the community vision of the urban design plan? And third, to
what extent new urban design codes are successful in transforming the retail urban form.
The underlying assumption is if the final urban design codes were a result of the
community‘s visioning, goals of the dominant regime and needs of the city planners to
have certainty in the urban design decision-making process, a new battle over proposed
CVS store‘s design should not have ensued. However, such a battle did occur, despite the
store following the new codes, and that happening questions the efficacy of the process of
involving people in the production of urban design codes and the watered-down nature of
the codes themselves, that did not confirm to the contextual and community needs.
This chapter is divided into seven sections; the first two sections focus on the
proposed store design of CVS in the Dundee area of Omaha. The third section highlights
the public protest over the proposed design. The fourth and fifth sections involve political
decision-making over urban form and design of CVS, while the sixth section exudes the
inability of the OBD organization to take a stand on this issue. The last section
summarizes the theoretical implications of the CVS case.
434

Unlike Walmart and other large-scale retailers, who mainly look for suburban
open lands, growth of drugstore companies, such as CVS Pharmacy, depends upon
locating themselves in inner-city areas that have higher population densities. Some of
these locations are the ones that may not have been explored by its competitors, and,
therefore, such unexplored residential areas carry a greater economic advantage based on
their location. At the same time, these areas also involve a difficult acquisition process
with greater prospects of neighborhoods‘ opposition, especially when they are in historic
neighborhoods. Despite its foray into unexplored and, at times, historic areas of Omaha,
the prototype design of CVS stores has not always changed in response to the built form
of the rest of the neighborhood. Aside from the built form character of the neighborhood,
other factors also determine the aesthetics adopted by retail and drug stores like CVS
Pharmacy.
CVS on 49
th
and Dodge Streets
Within the timeframe of five years after the Walmart project on 72
nd
and Hickory
streets was proposed, another national retail and drugstore company CVS Pharmacy
decided to enter Omaha‘s market for the first time. The Omaha area had about thirty
Walgreens, but no CVS Pharmacy locations, until then.
111
CVS/Caremark had developed
a citywide strategy for entering Omaha area on multiple locations over a period of several
years. One of their initial strategic locations was targeted for the 49
th
Street and Dodge
Street intersection, which was a very important location for the drugstore company, as it

111
World-Herald News Service ‗CVS eyes Walgreens intersection‘ August 21, 2009.

435

would set on the busiest corridor of the city, and there were no other drugstores like CVS
or other small-scale grocery stores in the immediate surroundings on Dodge Street. At the
same time, this site was located on an outer edge of Omaha‘s exclusive Neighborhood
Conservation & Enhancement District (NCED), known as Dundee. In order for CVS to
have its store and necessary parking space area in that location, it had to rezone, re-plat,
and demolish five houses and four commercial buildings, including a local entertainment
venue-cum-bar called the 49‘er. Some of these houses, which needed to be rezones, re-
platted, and demolished, were more than 100-years old.
Seeds of neighborhood opposition against the proposed CVS Pharmacy were
planted much before the drugstore company had announced its plans for locating at the
proposed Dundee location. In January 2010, Dundee-area residents heard the news of
possibility of a CVS Pharmacy store in their neighborhood, based on the talks and
murmurings of ongoing sales deals with the owners of that location. The residents
became concerned about the potential destruction of a part of the neighborhood‘s
character and local businesses in the area. ―Dundee residents and patrons of the 49'er, a
longtime neighborhood bar, are organizing to protest possible plans to demolish several
buildings on the northeast corner of 49
th
and Dodge Streets and build a CVS Pharmacy‖
(Laue 2010). At the prospects of 49‘er getting sold to CVS, patrons and fans of the bar
started mobilizing through a Facebook page called ―Save the 49‘er,‖ as thousands joined
the page in the following months.

436

Figure 13.1: Site highlighted with dotted perimeter shows properties to be demolished for
building the proposed CVS Pharmacy.

Source: Google Satellite image

The existing building block, where CVS was planning to arrive, consisted of two
zoning types—commercial and multifamily residential. The site would have to be
rezoned and re-platted as a single- use zone and required an approval from the Planning
Board and the City Council, before rezoning and re-platting. In addition, the front end of
the site was located on Dodge Street, which was an ACI District, according to new urban
design codes of the Master Plan of Omaha. So the building design would have to follow
the strict code requirements for an ACI overlay district. In any case, some of the Dundee
residents did not believe or desire, the drugstore proposal fit the built form of that area. ―I
just don't want these buildings, that are valuable to people in the neighborhood, to be
replaced with this big eyesore big-box building‖ (Laue 2010). By the end of the first
quarter of 2010, it was finalized, that CVS Pharmacy was going to be proposed on the
intersection of 49
th
and Dodge Streets.
437

CVS Store Design
Developers for the CVS/Caremark began consulting the neighborhood residents,
soon after their first design plan for a 13,225 sq ft pharmacy in Dundee-Dodge area was
developed. Several spirited and well-attended neighborhood meetings were held, and a
concerted attempt was made to incorporate various suggestions made by the residents of
the area. The initial group of about forty residents, who had participated in the public
meetings held by the developer of CVS/Caremark for the proposed project, liked the
changes made by the store, which included variety in elevation, change in the type of the
brick, and less-jarring signage. One of the residents from the meeting even said, ―I feel
pretty positive about our discussions, I think Orange [the developer] is genuinely trying
to make this a good project, because they know it‘s in a key part of the city‖ (Keenan
2010). Another interviewee said, ―A lot of the questions were geared toward aesthetics
[in the public meeting of proposed CVS store]‖ (Keenan 2010). As the developer of
CVS/Caremark replied to the citizens of Dundee, ―That‘s why we‘re here, we want your
input‖ (Keenan 2010). Everyone present at these public meetings seemed to be satisfied
with the type of development that was going to take place on the proposed CVS
Pharmacy site, as the spokesman for CVS Mike DeAngelis concluded to a newspaper
reporter,
We have committed to making some modifications to our prototype that fall
within our budget for this store. The best way to describe it is trying to provide
more richness to the facade to make it more complementary to the look of the
surrounding community (Keenan 2010).

The urban designer from the City Planning Department also assured how the CVS
proposal would fit with the new Urban Design codes. ―To some extent, they‘ve done that.
438

I don‘t know whether they went far enough for some people, but they‘ve gone beyond
what the minimum requirements are in terms of zoning requirements‖ (Keenan 2010).
At this stage, concerns of some residents were lingering, which included that the
proposed drugstore still did not mesh with the aesthetics of the neighborhood, but their
opposition was an isolated one, which did not materialize into a louder, more-organized
voice during that period of time.
If we had been organized on it, that we would have fought this at the very
beginning at the Planning Board level. We never thought that this would happen
and people weren‘t really paying attention and the city has very poor noticing
requirement. It was only within 300 feet of the proposed project (O4).

At a later stage, a number of Dundee residents felt the noticing requirement of
Omaha for a new project was very lax; the nature of public meetings held by the
developers for CVS/Caremark were domineering and deceptive; as well as the
presentation of the visuals on the project did not draw a realistic picture of the scale and
impacts of the proposed built form. ―It probably wasn‘t clear in the drawings, exactly
what was being proposed, because that‘s another major issue that always comes up is that
people cannot understand drawings. They can‘t read drawings‖ (O4). In addition,
[The] 3D drawings too weren‘t in context. They didn‘t show the neighborhood in
the background. It was like it could have been CVS that was anywhere. It could
have picked from off the shelf of the one that we did in Minnesota. When you
give these really poor, low-resolution line drawings to the public, and they are
like what is this, I don‘t understand. Are you planting some trees on Dodge? Oh
that‘s great. I love it (O4).

Poor understanding of the visual context as presented in the drawing proposals of
the project limited the capacity of the public to understand all the impacts this design
439

would have on their historic neighborhood. Moreover, the public meetings may not have
provided an equal opportunity to speak up, because,
What happens in those [meetings], frequently, is people won‘t talk. They are
scared to talk, or they don‘t understand the drawings. They don‘t understand what
is going on. Even the tone of the person, who is presenting, can have a really big
impact and scare other people from participating (O1).

In the absence of a better public engagement process, a large section of the
neighborhood remained distant from the project, until the project was ready to be sent to
the Planning Board for its approval.
Figure 13.2: Design of proposed CVS Pharmacy store as approved by the Planning Board
in June 2010. Notice the title of the illustration on the bottom right corner—‗Birds eye
view from the southeast corner of the site.‘ Such titling with lack of any other visual or
textual reference, such as street names or a mention of north side on an architectural
drawing, avoids additional efforts on the part of its designers to get involved with the
context, as well as succeeds in keeping the general public in the dark about the proposed
urban form, in relation to the actual site and its surroundings. This store could have been
rotated in any direction to fit any site in any community of the country, which resonates
with the analogy of Walmart on Mars in Chapter 11.

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from CVS/Caremark

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Having met all the minimum requirements of the new urban design codes of the
city, the Planning Department recommended proposed CVS Pharmacy project to proceed
to the Planning Board, and the Board also approved it with proposed rezoning and re-
platting with a 5-2 vote in June 2010. At the Planning Board hearing, the local land-use
attorney of the project mentioned to the media, that CVS had come a long way from its
prototypes in redesigning the proposed store, based on their discussions with the
community, and they would not be able to make any more changes. ―I think we're at what
we need, and that's all we can give‖ (Robb 2010).
The building plans approved by the Planning Board included the changes in terms
of positioning of the building on the corner and not behind the parking lot; a
multidimensional brick façade instead of a straight slab; clear glass windows along the
sidewalk; and fifteen-feet-wide sidewalk along Dodge Street. The project‘s design was a
perfect example of what a building would look like by meeting the minimum
requirements stated in the new urban design codes of Omaha. Therefore, neither the
Planning Department nor the Planning Board saw any reason not to approve the project.
Even after the plans had been approved by the Planning Board, the proposed
design of CVS was not well received by some of the neighborhood residents and two of
their elected representatives. According to the two Council members from the Dundee
District, ―The spruced-up design that CVS Pharmacy is proposing for its 49
th
and Dodge
Streets store is not good enough‖ (Robb 2010). Because Dundee residents felt,
It‘s totally generic. They took it off the shelf. I understand you know the
formulas, what the developers are dealing and what CVS does. They have to have
this formula, and that‘s how they make their money. It‘s like okay, that‘s fine. But
you can still [make improvements] (O4).
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These two Council members preferred a design similar to the one in Charleston,
South Carolina, that used its architectural design to, ―Cleverly disguise what the store
actually is‖ (Robb 2010). The two Council members had also interacted with CVS
personnel regarding how the latter should improve the aesthetics and layout of the
building.
In essence, only after the approval of the Planning Board had the Dundee
residents and their Council representatives realized how much of a misfit the design and
aesthetics of proposed CVS project were and how essential it was for them to fight
against the project, before the vote of the City Council. At this stage, political pressure
was the only weapon left with the Dundee residents, as they had not mobilized as
strongly as they wished they would have, before the Planning Board‘s approval. Two
Council representatives Chris Jerram and Pete Festersen from the Dundee area, who were
against the project design, and a third neighboring District Council member Ben Gray
resonated with the opinion, that the store needed better design for the area. Along with
the large size of the parking lot, Ben Gray even questioned the location of CVS, ―I am
not sure that's even an appropriate place for it‖ (Robb 2010). Few of the changes that
these residents wanted after the Planning Board‘s approval, were a more distinctive
façade; alteration of building‘s roof line; reduced size of the parking lot; and a building
entrance directly off of 49
th
and Dodge streets along with an entrance proposed on the
east end of the building. Before the Council‘s upcoming vote on the project, the residents
began mobilizing their opposition more strongly than ever.

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Public Protest
In June 2010, the residents launched an online petition titled, ―No CVS box in
Dundee.‖ Its preamble read,
CVS Pharmacy wants to level two thirds of the block between Dodge & Capitol
Avenue and 48
th
& 49
th
Streets in historic Dundee to build a suburban style box
store with an oversized parking lot. Their design does not fit the style and
architecture of the area. It will also create traffic problems in the area and will
increase noise pollution to the remaining neighbors.
112

They managed to collect over 1,800 signatures for their petition. Through their
opposition, the residents were now demanding to limit the redevelopment area required
for building a CVS Pharmacy to the existing commercial land only, have the new
building resemble the architecture of surrounding area, such as the former Reiner‘s Piano
Store and the apartments to the east; not cut down all the existing trees; reduce the size of
the parking lot; use full-size trees and varied vegetation native to the area; increase
pedestrian friendliness of the plan; and address traffic issues on 49
th
& Dodge streets
corner. Their overall message was ―The current design [of proposed CVS Pharmacy]
does not meet the form, scale, and character of our neighborhood.‖
113

Despite the growing opposition, overarching message of the opposition group
remained a mixed one. One set of residents wanted significant revisions in the CVS‘s
design; whereas, the other set did not want a CVS Pharmacy in the neighborhood. ―Some
who live in the area want the new store to fit into the look of the neighborhood, while
others don't want it at 49
th
and Dodge at all‖ (Chapman 2010).

112
Taken from the online petition on http://www.gopetition.com/petitions/no-cvs-box-in-dundee.html.

113
Ibid.
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Figure 13.3: Revised elevation of the building after the approval of the Planning Board.
Note the similar abstract titling of the illustration on the bottom right corner.

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from CVS/Caremark

Nevertheless, the opposition gained a larger support over two months, and more
than 1,000 people joined its Facebook page in protest of the store. At this stage, CVS
developer did not think they could possibly make any more layout and form related
changes, but tried to incorporate more changes in its elevation.
What happened is that they had gone so far down this one particular path, they
were, like, we are not going to change, and it was this mentality that we are not
going to be flexible. We have done this. We have gone as far as we want, and we
are not interested in having to change or spending the more money, and that‘s the
bottom line (O1).

New changes in the elevation of the building now included varying roofline,
where the front half of the building had a flat roofline, and the other half on the back of
the building had a pitched roofline. Architecturally, it seemed like a literal interpretation
of how to respond to the surrounding context, which for the designers of the proposed
CVS store, was to make the front elevation of the building commercial to relate to Dodge
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Street and the back elevation residential to relate with the houses on the backside. They
thought splitting the building in half with two different elevations on both sides would
satisfy the neighborhood residents, which obviously did not happen. The City Council‘s
vote on August 31 was going to prove critical for both—CVS/Caremark and the residents
of Dundee.
City Council’s Vote
It came as a surprise to the rest of Omaha, when the City Council voted down the
proposed CVS project in a 4-3 vote, because no project of such economic impact had
ever been voted down, which was simply based on the aesthetic, urban design, and
historic preservation aspects in Omaha, until that time. In the past, Omaha had been
grateful to have commercial and retail developments come into the city, and for the city
to tell these new developments to have better aesthetics was an enormous step, let alone
deny the project on the urban design and form criteria. In the public hearing prior to the
vote on CVS, ―Dundee residents had complained that the store, which would abut a
residential neighborhood, would look like a box with a parking lot that was too large.
They also said the store would cause major traffic problems for Dodge Street
commuters,‖ and ―CVS representatives countered that opening the [CVS] pharmacy at
49
th
and Dodge streets would create 25 jobs and raise millions of dollars in city sales tax
and property tax revenue‖ (O'Brien 2010).
The decision of the Council came as a disappointment for the CVS/Caremark
group, and their local attorney stated to the media, ―The company has spent $264,000 on
architectural and legal fees. Now that, that location isn't there, they'll probably just avoid
445

that entire area of Omaha‖ (KETV 2010). The Council member Ben Gray supported the
residents, because ―I think they lost me at the parking lot. The sheer size of that parking
lot disturbs me, especially as it relates to that neighborhood‖ (Morman 2010). The City
Council‘s decision was,
An absolute manifestation of a priority setting in that neighborhood about where
they wanted to live, they wanted to be able to walk down the street, get an ice
cream cone, you know, sit on a park bench and, you know, not have to deal
Dodge traffic, because your curb is one foot from where you are trying to walk on
the sidewalk (DO1).

This decision had emerged to pick up, from where Urban Design standards had
fallen short,
People think design issues and neighborhood issues are standardized. They‘re not.
You go back, and Florence, South Omaha, Benson, Dundee—these were all
independent cities annexed by Omaha, but they still have strong individual
identities and viewpoints about the alignment and the fit of particular businesses
in their neighborhoods (Vogel 2010).

The decision to favor the neighborhood‘s demands seemed to uphold what
Jonathan Barnett had envisioned in conceptualizing the Neighborhood Omaha component
of the Urban Design Plan—to encourage and enable neighborhoods to take charge of
their physical surroundings.
But according to CVS officials, being voted down for their Dundee location was
going to have much larger repercussions, not only for CVS/Caremark, but also for other
out-of-town companies wanting to set up their businesses in Omaha. They believed that
they had met all the retaining wall and set-back lines requirements, pulled the building to
the corner, followed the seven percent interior landscaping requirement, and adopted a
four-sided brick building. Still, they were rejected by the City Council. The vote of the
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City Council had gone against the approval of the Planning Board and the
recommendations of the Planning Department. Those two approvals meant that CVS had
met all the requirements of the existing urban design codes. According to CVS officials,
the City Council was trying to interpret the urban design codes on their own without
acknowledging the advice of the city‘s planning and design experts. However, in reality,
the City Council was not applying the OBD codes on their own, but listening to their
constituents, who were not happy with the proposed design of a CVS Pharmacy in
Dundee.
A major reason for the popular opposition against the project was the proposed
site was located at the juncture of one of the busiest commercial corridors—Dodge
Street— and a most-cherished historic neighborhood—Dundee—in the city. Supporters
of CVS Pharmacy argued that residents were treating the project on Dodge Street, as if it
were in the heart of Dundee. According to CVS Pharmacy group, the location was not
Dundee-Underwood ,but it was Dundee-Dodge, and the Dodge Street corridor was
important, in fact, vital, for the city of Omaha. They argued that by not allowing this
type of development, where substandard buildings were standing at that time, and the
existing property owners were voluntary sellers without any use of eminent domain, the
City Council was sending a wrong message to the future retail developers, which, in turn,
would harm economic development for Omaha
To some people, the voting down of CVS Pharmacy, despite the proposed design
meeting all the urban design codes was unfair. This stance came about, because after the
OBD codes, there was no development for three years, due to economic downturn. They
447

also noted during this period, the entire composition of the City Council and the City
Planning Department had changed. The new composition was neither experienced in
applying the new codes nor understood the true intent of these codes. This denial,
according to the CVS supporters, meant no purpose of the whole OBD process existed,
because the projects following minimum requirements put in place by the OBD process
were also rejected by the Council. Two days after CVS was voted down, an article in the
Omaha World-Herald showed the proposed redevelopment of the existing Reiner‘s Piano
retail business, in front of the proposed CVS Pharmacy on 49
th
and Dodge Streets
intersection.
Figure 13.4: Existing Reiner‘s Piano building

Source: Author

448

Figure 13.5: A rendering of the proposed Reiner‘s Piano plans by Alley Poyner
Macchietto Architecture, which called for taking down the painted plywood that covers
the outside and returning to a brick, Tudor-style exterior.

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from Alley Poyner Macchietto Architecture P.C.

In this article, Dundee residents claimed, if CVS had proposed what Reiner‘s
Piano Building redevelopment plans were proposing, they would have welcomed the
design. However, CVS Pharmacy could not have altered their design to such an extent,
because it would mean a significant increase in their cost per square foot. CVS officials
claimed their latest plan was already costing the project more per square foot, including
the land costs than what it would cost per square foot to build One Pacific Place—the
only lifestyle center in Omaha. Thus, the cost calculations of the proposed CVS store in
Omaha were in consideration with the existing building costs in the city. Fulfilling
residents‘ demands for a building a CVS store in Omaha with a design like Reiner‘s
Piano building, or like any other CVS with superior aesthetics in other US cities, would
449

not have been economically justifiable for the CVS/Caremark group. Besides, the
redevelopment plan of the building housing Reiner‘s Piano had only changed its façade
treatment without any major changes to the overall structure of the building. The reason
why renovated building seemed to fit the character of the neighborhood was that building
was constructed at the time, when the rest of the neighborhood was constructed, and not
because its developer had designed the structure from scratch to match the styles and
uniqueness of the neighborhood. The proposed redevelopment project, where Reiner‘s
Pianos was originally established, was to house several local businesses and preserve its
traditional character. Such growth of local economy and small businesses was another
reason, which led Dundee residents to applaud the proposed Piano Building
redevelopment.
Revote
A week later, hopes of the CVS officials were raised once again, as the residents
felt betrayed by the news of the decision of the Council member, Ben Gray, to change his
mind and then move to make the motion to reconsider the proposal during the Council
meeting. Gray, as the prevailing side member during the last vote, was eligible to ask for
a revote, and his motion was supported by the Council president, Gerry Gernandt. To
Gray, reasons for reconsidering his vote were,
In difficult economic conditions, I do not believe Omaha can afford to restrict
economic development. CVS is highly interested in moving into the Omaha
market, and I believe they should have the opportunity to pursue a store at this
key location (KETV 2010).

450

In his meeting with the mayor after the first vote, Gray was asked to revisit his
decision, because he had not known certain facts before (KETV 2010). However, some of
the respondents had known a different side of his story,
I understand that Mayor Suttle had a conversation with Ben, in which he put some
pressure on Ben Grey to come back to the vote, that he had taken before, with
which the mayor did not agree with. Mayor Suttle made a promise in his
campaign of a 1,000 jobs. He is nowhere near that number. He saw even a 100
low-paid, not-so-great jobs from the various CVSs that were going to be
developed as a progress towards his goal of a 1,000, and when that began to slip
away, it was he. Mayor Suttle felt like he needed to put more pressure on the City
Council, and Ben Grey in particular, for this project (AG7).

There was another set of respondents, who believed Gray‘s decision was
influenced by a difficult and stressful proposition he faced from CVS corporate office,
after voting ―no‖ to the CVS in Dundee. In that, he was told he would lose a future CVS
and jobs that came with it from his District—which was one of the most underdeveloped
parts of the city—if he did not change his vote to ―yes‖ for the project in Dundee.
However, Gray publicly denied such allegations that he was bought over, or CVS
officials had talked with him about their future store in his District (O'Brien 2010).
Gray acknowledged that during this time, CVS representatives met with him and
had assured him they will reduce the amount of parking stalls by thirteen in their plan. In
addition, he had discovered affected homeowners were willing sellers, and those details
had influenced him to change his decision. Despite a number of justifications given by
the Council member Gray, he may have lost the faith of the citizens‘ in changing his vote.
Oh, the neighborhood hates it, and the neighborhood is really bitter. People are
very bitter. People are very disappointed in the whole process. People are very
disappointed in Ben Gray that he would just go and change his vote like that
without really any substantive reason for why he is changing his vote (O4).

451

This revote was to leave a lasting impression on the minds of Omaha‘s citizens.
Seeing the prospects of a revote, CVS did three things: one, it announced it will pull out
of the Omaha market, if their Dundee location was not approved (KETV 2010). Their
attorney also claimed to the media, that ―the Dundee store is at the core of the company‘s
plans to enter the Walgreens-dominated Omaha market… It‘s extremely critical to their
competitive strategy‖ (O‘Brien 2010). Two, it worked on improving the aesthetics of the
building one last time. Based on Piano Building, the company developers tried to change
the roofline of the proposed store and made some changes in the elevation, along with
reduced the size of its parking lot. Three, the company developers also tried to put
pressure on the leader of the neighborhood opposition. She was called by the president of
the development company and according to her, his talks were intimidating (KETV
2010). Nevertheless, the residents continued with their protest and were now literally
walking in protest on the streets.

452

Figure 13.6: Final CVS design aerial views before the revote

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from CVS/Caremark.
453

Figure 13.7: Final CVS design elevations before the revote

Source: Reprinted, by permission, from CVS/Caremark

A week before the revote, about 50 Dundee residents lined up along Dodge Street
near the proposed CVS location with banners like, ―No Means No, No CVS.org‖ to
oppose, not only the CVS Pharmacy there, but also the move by Omaha City Council that
had let the revote happen. However, the City Council voted 4-3 in favor of CVS on
September 22, as Ben Gray now voted in favor of the store. He argued,
I didn't want to have to do this…didn't want to look at angry faces. But if you're
going to be in office, you have to vote for what is the right thing to do. And, what
we're talking about here is economic development, and the message we are
sending to other developers around the country (Nowatzke 2010).

The final decision angered the community to a great extent. Another dimension to
the revote was, according to Omaha city clerk, in the history of the City Council, a revote
454

was usually done in cases of errors, not because a Council representative had a change of
mind. Additionally, in the past, a revote would be done for issues which were not in the
public eye, as opposed to CVS project, which had become a very public issue (Vogel
2010). Hence, this revote was a very unusual and unprecedented occurrence, which was
surprising to the general public and shocking to the people in the Dundee neighborhood.
The result emerged from the entire battle leading to the revote on CVS, that this
confrontation was not about making new developments adhere to minimum standards
anymore, but the citizens expected the developers should have exceeded the minimum
standards. On the other hand the chain store companies like CVS/Caremark were
producing only slight variations in their standard prototypes to match the new standards.
The citizens were disappointed, that OBD could not make retailers build attractive
buildings in their neighborhoods, and OBD or the Planning Department could not require
retailers to follow anything more than what was demanded in the minimum standards.
Since the Planning Board did not find any reason to deny the zone-change request by
CVS and the Planning Department could not oppose to the zone-change based on store‘s
design, because it was complying with the minimum urban design standards. The only
weapon Dundee residents were left with was to convince the City Council, that their
original arguments were right. Their secondary attempt to change the revote, too,
eventually did not work in the favor of Dundee residents.
Influence of OBD
The local land-use attorneys were perplexed about the fact that, if a project was
following required urban design codes, then why was it meeting so much resistance from
455

the residents and the City Council. This group believed that their assurances to their
clients, about getting the approval by following the standards, were not giving any
certainty about the projects‘ approval. Moreover, the group felt their expenses on
architectural and legal fees would be met with a disappointment, if the new codes were
not being interpreted correctly and resulting in incorrect denials. They also feared such
practice would send a message to the out-of-town major retail chains, that Omaha was
not providing a business-friendly environment for their investments and economic
development. The new urban design code changes were intended to give the land-use
attorneys a certainty for their clients, that their project would get approved, if they would
meet the code requirements.
On the other side, the residents were disappointed, because they had expected a
CVS that would blend with their historic neighborhood, and the new codes would help
them achieve that kind of urban form. Even when the existing codes did not help achieve
the desired urban form, the residents thought at least OBD would support them in
fighting to get what they wanted, as it did in case of Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory
Streets.
The OBD organization, which was working on Environment Omaha component
of the Master Plan at this time, was still functioning in the same capacity, as it did during
the making of the Urban Design Element. The OBD group may not have been happy with
the way CVS designs looked, but they had not intended to become an advocacy
organization, since the beginning. They had only played that role for the Walmart on 72
nd

and Hickory Streets, because their goal of implementing urban design standards was at
456

risk, if the Walmart was allowed to build the same box-like design. It seemed the battle
over Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory Streets was being relived again, but now with CVS on
Dodge and 49
th
streets, but without the involvement of OBD. However, the major
difference this time, in the case of CVS conflict, was zoning ordinances mandating new
urban design codes had already been in place for more than three years.
Many of the city professionals had predicted a compromised urban design
solution for the CVS case, just as it had happened for the Walmart on 72
nd
and Hickory
Streets.
We are going to see the same thing in CVS on Dodge street. CVS and their
developers are not happy that they are being made to go through these sixteen
loops. I can tell you neighborhood associations are not happy. They don‘t like it.
Well, there will be a compromise, and you will end up with something that neither
one really likes, but which is better than nothing (AC3).

Opposition put forward by the residents of Dundee could be characterized as the
first-of-its-kind in Omaha concerning urban design issues. Even though the residents did
not succeed in their demands completely in the end result, their protest suggested: one, a
belief that they could demand better urban form in their neighborhoods; and two, OBD
had succeeded in raising community awareness about urban design aspects; and it had
provided a beginning for learning the language of urban design issues to Omaha‘s
neighborhoods.
It became evident that a generic suburban form of a retail chain-store in a historic
neighborhood and out-of-the state retail business giant, instead of local, small businesses,
were the major reasons behind neighborhood‘s opposition.
The actual use I don‘t think was such a big issue. I think what people were really
upset about was that they were going to come in there and demolish five houses
457

and a couple of commercial buildings and replace it with a building that is very
generic. You know, it could be anywhere in the United States. It could be in
Minnesota. It could be in California. It could be in Boston, and so, you know, that
was a major issue with changing the physical characteristics of the neighborhood
(O3).

The residents‘ urban design related opposition was fueled by the overall image of
an out-of-town chain store company that was perceived to have no real interest in
contributing to the development of the neighborhood. ―They wanted more local,
indigenous type of commercial [development]. My personal feeling was that‘s kind of
hard to achieve‖ (AC3). So if the residents could not avoid a national chain store, they at
least wanted to acquire the desired urban form from the drugstore company, but ―they
[CVS developers] said, oh, this is the best we can do, and we are responding to all the
guidelines, and that was, sure, you are responding to the guidelines, but how about trying
a little bit harder‖ (O3).
However, CVS/Caremark group was not required to go beyond what the
guidelines said, which would only increase their cost of construction. According to the
design team of OBD, ―Suburbanization of cities has been going on by having these
suburban building types put up on corners inside the city‖ (OB5). If corresponding
zoning changes are strictly adhered to, then:
What the city has is the bargaining in position. You go to people and say we think
you should be near the street, and they say well we think we should be farther
than the street. You don‘t win an argument like that. And if you say that built-to-
line requirement in this district, that‘s a little different (OB5).

In this case, CVS did adhere to the existing zoning overlay district (ACI), but the
conversion of adjacent residential into commercial zoning allowed the project to have
458

suburban layout in its building design. The CVS battle seemed to repeat what had
happened in case of Walmart five years ago, despite having all the regulations in place.
It is the microcosm of what OBD is about, and the battle that‘s not yet over on
that one is very similar to the battle of the Walmart on 72
nd
and Mercy Road. You
are reliving that battle now with the CVS Pharmacy on Dodge Street, and you
have neighborhood associations (AC3).

The standards created through the OBD process seemed to have fallen short over
the details, and those could only come out as such conflicts took place over time.
I think we are realizing you can‘t necessarily dictate every community, every
corner to be the same. In some ways, that‘s the challenge of anything like this.
You can‘t tell people you got to have 10 percent glass, red brick and pitched roof,
because that‘s what we think. It doesn‘t fit in everywhere in the city, and
everybody‘s perception of their neighborhood is different, and so right now CVS
Pharmacy wants to build something at 49
th
and Dodge, and that neighborhood
wants different things for their neighborhood to make it fit in. There are people
who don‘t live in the neighborhood, but they love that part of town. They
understand design, and they also want something different (SC1).

What OBD standards did was to provide a legal framework of the minimum
requirements, but the communities and the Planning Department were to take up from
that point on and further modify their visions to suit the needs of each community and
each neighborhood in the city.
After seeing OBD support the battle of aesthetics over Walmart, the city‘s
neighborhoods came to recognize OBD as a voice for the urban design issues in the city.
They are thinking that OBD will solve everything, and you can‘t. I mean there are
certain things that you can‘t solve, or it was never addressed, or we did address it
in the OBD code, but the design element code. It just can‘t be a one-size-fits-all. I
think we are realizing that we should ask for more glass, or maybe there should
something in the code that says, when you are on the corner, and be more specific
on them when your building is on the corner of an intersection (SC2).

459

But for the residents of Dundee, ―OBD, they basically had no involvement in this.
They did nothing. They were completely silent on the whole issue and just like,
well, what was the point of the organization‖ (O4).

Many professionals believed as the built form of CVS would have been even
worse, if no standards, such as the ones created by OBD, were in place to restrict CVS,
If we look at what that building would have been without the guidelines, it
probably would have been worse, in the fact that it would have pushed the
building back up against the residential neighborhood and put the parking in the
foreground against the street and specifically in this location where there is an
urban edge along the street. I think it‘s important the building did get push
forward. And there is an entrance off, a pedestrian entrance associated with the
street. It‘s still unfortunate there is still a large parking lot. We still are a
commuter city, and part of that has to do with our weather (UD2).

For the local land-use attorneys, the concept of exceeding the minimum
requirements does not hold ground, because that process would mean minimum is not the
minimum but should be a step-up. If the residents were demanding better aesthetics, than
what was required by the minimum standards, the minimum standards needed to be
raised to match that level.
An absence of OBD in the CVS conflict was evident, and their support was called
for by both sides, who believed OBD was in position to help their case, as they did for the
Walmart case in the past. According to OBD, it had supported the opposition against
Walmart, only because it was the question of saving the image of upcoming urban design
codes, which they had worked so hard to create. Nonetheless, their opposition to
Walmart‘s design had given the rest of the community an impression, that OBD would be
able to support their future urban design causes, as long as it was functioning. However,
460

OBD did not intend to play an advocacy role or to take a position over CVS‘s design
without any professional expertise on board, once the codes were put in place four years
ago.
Summary
This chapter analyzed a case that took place three years, after the new urban
design codes were implemented. Therefore, it provided a context for evaluating the
efficacy of the process of urban design code-making and the content of the codes. An
analysis of the CVS case in Omaha leads to three major conclusions: First, four variables
governing Walmart‘s design policies hold true in case of national retailer CVS; and
second, new urban design codes for Omaha did not confirm to the community‘s vision or
the development community and the Planning Department‘s need to bring certainty in
urban design decision-making process. Third, while the new codes were able to lay down
minimum standards for urban form in the city, they were negotiated by the mitigating
context—local regime, local interest groups and the city‘s political wing—to an extent
that the original vision behind creating the standards did not result in corresponding
urban design codes. These three conclusions are elaborated next.
1. Four variables governing Walmart store‘s aesthetics (Chapter 11) seem to hold
true in CVS case as well. These variables, the economic value of a location for the
retailer; the strategic importance of the location with regards to capturing the
consumer base in regional context; design awareness of the community; and the
political context have also been the
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decision-making factors in the case of the CVS store in Dundee. A difference
between the two cases from institutional process perspective is that Walmart‘s
design was challenged by the Planning Board, the Planning Department, and
OBD, while its functional aspects were challenged only by the surrounding
community and the City Council. However, in case of CVS, the store‘s design
was challenged only by the community and not by the Planning Board or the
Planning Department. A factor such as community acrimony seemed to have had
a short-lived influence on the City Council‘s vote for CVS. The community‘s
opposition was responsible for changing the political will for a short duration,
and, eventually, the political will took over the community interests. Also the
goals of public opposition were multifaceted and shifting, which may not have
sent a clear and strong message, in terms of whether they were opposing the
existence of CVS or the proposed design of CVS. If they were opposing rezoning
and re-platting, they would not have gone on to demand a better-looking building,
because without the possibility of taking over those houses, CVS would not have
chosen that location.
2. The CVS project set itself up for a greater challenge by pursuing 49
th
and Dodge
Street location. Although it met minimum standards set by the OBD process, the
building still did not match the character of the neighborhood, according to the
residents of Dundee. The urban design codes seemed to have been of little value,
either to the residents or to CVS and local land-use attorneys, who were seeking a
degree of certainty from these standards. While new urban design codes are not a
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failure in terms of possibilities, they have opened and do seem to remain open for
interpretation in the absence of some of the vital implementation measures in
place.
[Dundee was] Fighting very hard to push the developers to change the
design of that and how that plays out between what the City Council does,
what the Planning Board does, and what the neighborhood does is the
reflection of what OBD is about, and what OBD did is, it gave tools to the
neighborhoods to be able to advocate for a different design structure
(AC3).

OBD did not solve future conflicts over built form, but created a
framework for them to occur and, thereby, encouraged a process, where the
community can take control over their built environment.
3. In the debate over minimum urban design standards versus performance-based
design guidance (Baer 2010), OBD codes followed the minimum standards
approach, that would avoid the worst-case urban form scenarios. However, the
final codes do not seem to have succeeded in achieving the vision of improving
overall aesthetics of the city by bringing Omaha‘s built form controls to a level,
where minimum requirements would be sufficient to change the image of the city.
The original vision of the urban design team of OBD had included
grouping each of the neighborhoods into several alliance districts, such as
Destination Midtown, and preparing separate area plans for each. These plans had
to be either prepared by the city staff or through the consultants hired by each of
the neighborhoods. Although Dundee neighborhood did adopt an overlay zoning
district, identified as NCED in urban design codes, it did not have a neighborhood
specific Area Plan. Such an Area Plan would have created a community vision for
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the neighborhood. Such a plan would have been able to not only guide the
community in terms of what kind of new development would fit in their collective
vision, but also become a tool to support their opposition against any rezoning and
re-platting, that was not envisioned in their area plan. In the absence of such a
plan, opposition from the community could be easily dispensed as an opinion of
few residents against the legal rules and regulations that were being followed by
the proposed project. CVS project serves as an example of how a lack of
resources for implementation of the urban design plan, and subsequent codes
could lead to frustrate all the stakeholders and limit the realization of urban design
plan‘s original intent.

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Comparison among Three Cases in Chapters 11, 12, and 13:
Table 13.1: Urban Design and governance implications of three small cases in the OBD
process

Three cases

Implications
Walmart on 72
nd

and Hickory Streets
Billboard Companies CVS Pharmacy
Time
2005
After the OBD plan
before codes were
adopted
2004-2006
During the OBD plan-
making and code-making
2010
After the OBD codes
were adopted
Scale
Global retail store National and regional
billboard companies
National drugstore
chain
Citizen
Participation
Size, location and hours
of operation opposed by
the community. Urban
form and design
opposed by OBD
Citizens at large did not
formally oppose billboards.
Local community
opposed rezoning,
urban form, location
and size of the proposed
store.
Stakeholders/
Interest Groups
Local attorneys of WM
succeeded in keeping
the overall urban form
and functioning hours
as initially planned.
Billboard companies
successfully out-maneuvered
most of the stricter
regulations sought by OBD.
CVS along with its
developers and legal
representatives won the
battle as the community
did not get their major
demands fulfilled.
Urban Design
Review Board
(UDRB)
UDRB not yet
instituted.
UDRB was not yet instituted.

No role of UDRB
because its approval is
only mandatory for
public projects
Resulting
Urban form
No change in site layout
or massing and urban
form. Only elevational
and landscape related
changes were made.
No new billboards allowed in
ACIs but existing non-
conforming ones to stay.
Digital billboards introduced
with certain restrictions on
its no.
Elevational and parking
lot changes, no change
in scale or location of
the building.
New codes
New codes were not
adopted yet.
New codes could not bring
new controls over off-
premise signs except in ACIs
and in no. of digital faces.
Build to set-back lines,
landscaping, and more
windows towards the
mains street.
The role of
OBD
Actively opposed
Walmart‘s overall form,
design & scale.
Actively lobbied for stricter
controls on billboards.
No role as OBD moved
on to Environment
Omaha initiative.
The City
Planning Dept
and The City
Planning Board
Their negotiations for
rezoning essentially
required WM to follow
some of the OBD
guidelines.
The issues primarily dealt by
the City Administration and
the City Council and not by
the Planning Dept or the
Planning Board.
Both allowed rezoning
of 5 historic residences
that paved a way for a
large scale building.
Local
Corporate
regime and
civic leaders
Supported the
opposition of OBD
against WM‘s urban
design
Except for a few, rest of the
members of the regime did
not oppose billboards.
No role played by the
regime, in favor or
against the proposed
CVS.
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CHAPTER 14: EMERGING FINDINGS: GOVERNANCE OF URBAN DESIGN
PLAN AND CODE-MAKING

This study aimed at examining the role of governance institutions and other
stakeholders in an urban design plan process. In the case study of OBD, I have identified
urban regime theory, cross-sector collaboration, and citizen participation as the most
relevant and significant concepts that were first explored theoretically for their
contributions to explaining the production of urban form in urban design. I have defined
these concepts as various dimensions of governance. Initial theoretical explorations of
these governance dimensions have led to the framing of the major research questions,
shaped the qualitative research framework, and influenced the selection of methods of
analysis. Within the governance context of OBD, an analysis of actions of the dominant
local corporate regime and other powerful interest groups, as well as collaborative and
participatory aims of the OBD initiative, brings forth critical issues of the production of
urban design plan and codes.
The findings from this study contribute to two major areas. First, the study sheds
light on the political economic discourse in urban design by expanding our understanding
of the governing regime, the community, the local interest groups, and collaborative and
participatory goals in an urban design plan process. Second, it highlights the limitations
of traditional regime theory literature to explain complex institutional processes in the
area of built environment. My study shows that the regime theory literature may not fully
explain how local interest groups with national and global ties compromise the urban
design goals of local regimes within the participatory and collaborative framework used
in urban design plan and implementation process.
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Role of Governance Processes in Urban Design
The OBD experience suggests that governance processes affect the urban design
plan and code-making right from visioning to design and implementation of the codes
and policies. The findings from this study reveal four key aspects of governance
processes that prevent the ideal vision of an urban design plan to be realized through its
implementation into the urban design codes. These four aspects are:
1. Stakeholders compromise the intents of an urban design vision
The interests of various stakeholder groups—ranging from the dominant
corporate regime involved in the commissioning of the plan to the political wing as a
part of propagating and approving the plan to the real estate sector—were quite
important in influencing the outcomes of the OBD process. The interest groups that
participated in envisioning the plan, negotiated the implementation processes, and
leveraged their influences to varying degrees, significantly altered the nature of the
urban design team‘s original vision.
None of the stakeholders had known what the final outcome of the plan or the
subsequent urban design codes would be, but they participated in the OBD process to
protect their interests. Thus, developers wanted the least amount of change in their
existing building practices, the land-use attorneys wanted to save the interests of their
clients and the billboard companies wanted to avoid any control on expanding their
business in the city. Each stakeholder participated in the collaboration with differing
intents and discovered how much they were willing to negotiate to reach a
collaborative outcome. The process of negotiating and discovering individual
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preferences was similar to Cohen and March‘s (1986) argument that rejects the notion
people have preferences first and then act to satisfy those preferences. ―Human choice
behavior is at least as much a process for discovering goals as for acting on them‖
(Cohen and March 1986, 220).
The stakeholders were not the only agents in altering the original vision and
thereby making the plan‘s goals difficult to achieve. The inherent flaws in the urban
design plan discussed added to the complexity as the proposed design failed to sustain
the interest of the larger population for a long period of time. Therefore, the plan fell
short of garnering the support needed for implementing many of the key proposals in
its design.
2. Problem areas in urban design plan make the vision difficult to achieve
Two design imperatives of the OBD plan emerged in the analysis: first, to live
up to the visions of Omaha‘s corporate leaders, who had hired the design consultant;
and second, to implement those visions in the future. The plan seems to have satisfied
the former more than the latter. The analysis in this study brings forth several critical
issues in the design elements of the OBD plan.
Plan to alter behavior of institutions and actors: The plan‘s design solutions tried
to address the interests of three major institutional constituencies—the
environmentalists, the civic heads, and the communities. The primary design focus
was to address broader citywide urban design issues pertaining to the three
constituencies and only secondarily to make a plan that would offer the basis for
future urban design standards. In a way, urban design solutions in the OBD plan
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aimed to associate these three interests and institutions in the city. However, this kind
of collaboration had never taken place in the past and proposing so would mean
altering the existing ways of how different institutions and stakeholders had
functioned.
The goals of the OBD plan to create an unpracticed collaboration among
numerous social constituencies in the city were difficult to achieve, as compared to
implementing merely a physical change in the city‘s form. Institutional change
through an urban design plan was a lofty goal to be achieved, and its inability to
succeed reflected in those three constituencies not compromising to the extent needed
for the collaborative and associational design goals of the plan.
Community visioning as a symbolic exercise: Parolek et al. (2008) recognized the
need for public participation and stakeholder collaboration in the community
visioning process to create form-based codes that can be successful as adopted in the
future. However, the OBD process involved a community visioning component,
whose potential was not completely explored. Citizen participation in OBD validates
how the requirement of involving the community is fulfilled in reality and how it can
become no more than another public hearing process of the City Planning
Departments.
An important and unplanned outcome of the public participation in the OBD
process was the awareness generated among the citizens about urban design issues. It
is still not clear to what extent public awareness may help improve the existing codes
to accommodate the communities‘ vision, and, therefore, it is too early to learn
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whether the community is actually empowered to affect urban design codes.
Identifying several benefits of design codes, Carmona and Tiesdell (2007) argue that
better-designed development leads to less local opposition, because it results in a
more level playing field for the stakeholders. The CVS case displays that public
opposition increased despite following the new codes, because the design of CVS did
not fit in the historic character of the Dundee area and failed to meet the vision of the
local community. To advance the argument by Carmona and Tiesdell (2007), it can
be observed, when codes are not specific to the local conditions, they may result in
increased opposition to future developments.
National solutions for the local context: In OBD, the design team had only adopted
discrete solutions implemented elsewhere in the country. However, they either did not
investigate, whether any city had bundled and implemented these solutions in one
plan, or were totally unaware of these aspects. Would realization and revelation of
this vital fact ha