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Governing regional collaboratives: institutional design, management and leadership

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Governing regional collaboratives: institutional design, management and leadership

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GOVERNING REGIONAL COLLABORATIVES:
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP

by

Yoomi Jeon

________________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT)

December 2011

Copyright 2011 Yoomi Jeon

ii
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation
to my loving, understanding, and ever-encouraging parents,
Yang Hei Jeon and Joo Hyun Jeon.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My education at the University of Southern California has been a blessed
experience, as I have had the privileged and enlightening opportunity to work closely
with excellent scholars as my professors and advisors.
First, I would like to express my sincerest appreciation to the two co-chairs of the
dissertation committee: Professor Daniel Mazmanian, who provided the main inspiration
for my dissertation topic, and Professor Shui Yan Tang, who provided me with a
framework to apply to my dissertation. Were it not for their constant support and
encouragement, I would never have completed this dissertation.
The professors who served on my guidance and dissertation committees—Terry
Cooper, Richard Sundeen, Peter Robertson, Chris Weare, and Priscilla Wohlstetter—also
offered me invaluable guidance throughout the process. I also owe my gratitude to
Professor Elinor Ostrom, who kindly agreed to review my hypotheses and answer my
questions. Thank you, also, to June Muranaka for her generous support over the years.
Furthermore, I would like to thank Kyu-Nahm Jun for her continuous friendship
and support and to Ellen Shiau and Emily Hsu for their assistance. Gerhard Hellman’s
meticulous review of my statistical analysis was also greatly appreciated.
Lastly, I want to thank my parents, sister, Elaine, brothers, David and Jason, and
my sister-in-law Sunny for their continued blessing and support. My husband, Hak-
Cheon’s steadfast encouragement, in every sense, is what has enabled me to earn this

iv
Ph.D., and for that, I am eternally grateful. My sincere appreciation and love also go to
my sisters-in-law, Maria Chong Seo, and the late Yeon Hee Kim, for their beautiful heart,
love, and care for me. Thank you also to my oldest brother-in-law, Hak Ryun, and my
youngest brother-in-law, Hak-Chin, and their families as well.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS------------------------------------------------------------------------iii
LIST OF TABLES---------------------------------------------------------------------------------vii
ABSTRACT----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------viii

CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION----------------------------------------1
1.1 Research Questions----------------------------------------------------------------------------2
1.1.1 Regional Collaboratives in California-------------------------------------------------4
1.2 Overview on Regionalism and Regional Collaboratives---------------------------------8
1.2.1 Regionalism-------------------------------------------------------------------------------9
1.2.2 Regionalism in California-------------------------------------------------------------11
1.2.3 Civic Regionalism: Regional Collaboratives---------------------------------------13
1.3 Theoretical Overview------------------------------------------------------------------------15
1.3.1 New Institutional Economics----------------------------------------------------------17
1.3.2 Governance------------------------------------------------------------------------------21
1.3.3 Common-pool Resource and 8 Design Principles by E. Ostrom-----------------27
1.4 Network Management and Leadership---------------------------------------------------28
1.5 Research Design and Methods-------------------------------------------------------------29
1.5.1 Sources of Data and Survey Instruments--------------------------------------------29
1.5.2 Analytic Overview---------------------------------------------------------------------34
1.5.3 Methodological Strengths and Weakness-------------------------------------------34
1.5.4 Relevance and Contribution of the Study-------------------------------------------35
1.5.5 Dissertation Outline--------------------------------------------------------------------36

CHAPTER 2 DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF REGIONAL COLLABORATIVES----------37
2.1 Theories on IAD Framework and Collective Action-----------------------------------38
2.1.1 E. Ostrom’s Common-pool Resource and Design Principles--------------------44
2.2 Comparison between Common-pool Resource and Regional Collaboratives-------47
2.3 Adaptation of Ostrom’s 8 Design Principles to Regional Collaboratives------------50
2.4 Research Design and Methods-------------------------------------------------------------52
2.4.1 Development of Design Principle Scale---------------------------------------------53
2.4.2 Hypotheses------------------------------------------------------------------------------58
2.4.3 Statistical Approach--------------------------------------------------------------------62
2.5 Empirical Findings---------------------------------------------------------------------------63
2.5.1 Statistical Findings of Pearson Correlation------------------------------------------63
2.5.2 Limitations-------------------------------------------------------------------------------70
2.6 Discussion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------70

CHAPTER 3 NETWORK MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP------------------------74
3.1 Theoretical Overview-----------------------------------------------------------------------75
3.1.1 Management and Leadership of Alliances and Networks-------------------------75

vi
3.2 Research Design and Methods-------------------------------------------------------------82
3.2.1 Scale Analysis---------------------------------------------------------------------------83
3.2.2 Hypotheses-------------------------------------------------------------------------------83
3.3 Empirical Findings---------------------------------------------------------------------------89
3.3.1 Statistical Findings of Pearson Correlation------------------------------------------90
3.3.2 Additional Findings--------------------------------------------------------------------97
3.3.3 Limitations-------------------------------------------------------------------------------97
3.4 Discussion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------98

CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDIES------------------------------------------------------------------100
4.1 Methods and Data-------------------------------------------------------------------------100
4.1.1 Descriptive Data-----------------------------------------------------------------------100
4.2 Analysis of Eight Cases--------------------------------------------------------------------101
4.2.1 Conditions for Successful Projects------------------------------------------------- 101
4.2.2 Leadership------------------------------------------------------------------------------105
4.2.3 Governance-----------------------------------------------------------------------------106
4.2.4 Sustainability---------------------------------------------------------------------------107
4.2.5 Challenges------------------------------------------------------------------------------113
4.3 Limitations----------------------------------------------------------------------------------113
4.4 Discussion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------114

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION------------------------------------------------------------------116
5.1 Summary of the Development Process of the Design Principle, Management,
and Leadership Principle Scale---------------------------------------------------------- 116
5.2 Major Empirical Findings----------------------------------------------------------------117
5.3 Summary of Case Comparison Study---------------------------------------------------120
5.4 Convergent Evidence from Both Studies for Key Factors---------------------------122
5.5 Concluding Discussion--------------------------------------------------------------------123
5.6 Understanding the differences between Regional Collaboratives and Common-
Pool Resource Settings--------------------------------------------------------------------129
5.7 Implications---------------------------------------------------------------------------------130
5.8 Limitations and Future Research--------------------------------------------------------131

BIBLIOGRAPHY--------------------------------------------------------------------------------133

APPENDICES------------------------------------------------------------------------------------140
Appendix I: Questionnaire---------------------------------------------------------------------140
Appendix II: Case Study Interview Questions----------------------------------------------151
Appendix III: Scale Analysis of Design Principles-----------------------------------------153
Appendix IV: Scale Analysis of Management and Leadership---------------------------157

vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 Differences and Similarities between Regional Collaboratives and
Traditional Alliances-----------------------------------------------------------------32

Table 2.1 Comparing Goods and Services: CPR vs. RCs-----------------------------------49
Table 2.2 Modified 8 Design Principles-------------------------------------------------------52
Table 2.3 Results of Pearson Correlation on Design Principles----------------------------69
Table 2.4 Summary of Findings on Design Principles-------------------------------------- 72
Table 3.1 Results of Pearson Correlation on Network Management and Leadership-----93
Table 3.2 Summary of Findings on Network Management and Leadership--------------95
Table 4.1 Case Study Findings------------------------------------------------------------------102
Table 5.1 Findings on RCs Based on Case and Survey Studies----------------------------125
Table 5.2 Summary of Findings on Traditional Alliances Based on the Survey---------126
Table 5.3 Comparison between RCs and Traditional Alliances----------------------------127

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ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, the formation of regional collaboratives (RCs) to
resolve regional issues has become a nationwide phenomenon. These collaborative
organizations are composed of entities from two or more sectors and typically include
civic leaders and public, private, and nonprofit groups. As one of many emerging hybrid
governance structures, this collaborative governance system is characterized by multiple
sector participation (Tang and Mazmanian, 2008).
This dissertation seeks to identify the factors contributing to the sustainability and
accomplishments, management and leadership of successful regional collaborative
governance structures, as these organizations take on critical roles in shaping regional
development. The research involves adapting Elinor Ostrom’s (2005) original design
principles of common-pool resource settings.
By conducting a survey and case study analyses on 64 organizations across the
nation (39 regional collaboratives and 25 traditional alliances), this dissertation identifies
design principles and management and leadership principles that relate to the outcome
measures of sustainability and accomplishments.
The findings of this study reveal that the principles contributing to sustainable and
successful regional collaboratives are: shared values, consistent mission and values,
legitimacy and political support, membership behavior and homophily, and
organizational capacity. Additionally, external economic climate, organizational

ix
financial stability, and executive leadership are identified as key factors for success in
regional collaboratives.
Compared with Ostrom’s design principles of common-pool resource regimes, the
number of elements that contribute to successful collaborative governance, especially in
the case of regional collaboratives, is fewer. It is consistent with the fact that many
regional collaboratives are often disbanded or become inactive as they are difficult to
sustain themselves.

1
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
The concept of “hybrid governance” (Klitgaard and Treverton, 2003, p. 4) has
existed long enough for many researchers to investigate these various new models of
authority. From the traditional governance system, which maintains sectoral differences,
to a system in which sectoral differences (Tang, 2002) have become blurred,
partnerships, alliances, networks, collaboratives, and other permutations of governance
are being practiced now more than ever. Although many scholars initially praised the
advantages of partnerships and alliances, some have begun to study the risks and
disadvantages of these new governance systems. Currently public, private, and civic
partnerships are ubiquitous phenomena. Indeed, corporations, governments, and civic
sectors all seem to have recognized that no single institution alone can manage the
societal issues that present themselves today (Klitgaard and Treverton, 2003).
The catalysts behind hybrid governance include the “market state,” the
development of technology that enables or facilitates the formulation of partnerships
(Klitgaard and Treverton, 2003, p. 7), as well as the lack of government funding for
public service delivery amid the public’s growing skepticism that governments can meet
its demands (Tang and Mazmanian, 2008). Powell’s (1990) differentiation among
market, hierarchy, and networks, and his alternative governance model of networked
forms of organization offer yet another example of hybrid governance. Collaborative
governance is one variation of hybrid governance systems and is distinct from
governments that outsource their service deliveries to vendors (Tang and Mazmanian,
2008). According to Tang and Mazmanian (2008), collaborative governance is:

2
a concept that describes the process of establishing, steering, facilitating,
operating, and monitoring cross-sectoral organizational arrangements to address
public policy problems that cannot be easily addressed by a single organization or
the public sector alone. These arrangements are characterized by joint efforts,
reciprocal expectations, and voluntary participation among formally autonomous
entities, from two or more sectors – public, for profit, and nonprofits – in order to
leverage (build on) the unique attributes and resources of each. (p. 5)

Moreover, Tang and Mazmanian (2008) distinguish collaborative governance from
market or “intergovernmental cooperation” (p. 5), as collaborative governance has added
value from each sector. Collaborative governance is becoming a more common
configuration in the field of public administration. Currently, numerous groups
nationwide have joined together from diverse sectors, forming different styles of
governance to work on issues vital to their regions and filling in the governance gap left
by different levels of government jurisdictions. The overarching structure these
organizations form is one of collaborative governance. Collaborative governance is a
noticeable feature in regional organizations, in which local entities, civic leaders, the
nonprofit sector, and public sector groups concerned with regional issues form
organizations in the regions they represent. Model cases of this governance system,
particularly the “Regional Collaboratives” in California, represent a new form of
collaboration that stresses three-sector, or at least two-sector, participation in a loosely
organized group that aims to solve the regional issues of its respective geographical areas.
1.1 Research Questions
In the 1990s, new leadership groups emerged and organized themselves in
California—and nationwide—with a primary focus on the interests of regions. These
leaders created new collaborative alliances, known as Regional Collaboratives (RCs).

3
RCs, or regional organizations, concentrate on strategic planning and on implementing
initiatives that address regional and statewide sustainability issues related to the
economy, the environment, social equity, and education, among other issues. RCs serve
as gathering places for private, public, and nonprofit civic leaders who partner with one
another to resolve issues at the regional level. This type of regional cooperation typically
depends on networks of disparate entities (McCarthy, 2003) from across the community
and local government.
According to an evaluation by Innes and Rongerude (2005), RCs frequently have
yielded positive results, even without formal structures and powers. As these RCs
become increasingly active, researchers have sought to better understand the critical
factors that help improve the stability, success, sustainability, and accomplishments of
RCs. At the same time, some scholars have observed that many newly created RCs are
short-lived and unable to sustain themselves.
Acknowledging that the longevity and vitality of these groups are oftentimes at
stake, this dissertation is particularly interested in investigating the sustainability and
accomplishments of RCs across the nation, along with the management and leadership
issues that affect their sustainability and accomplishments. In exploring these issues, this
dissertation will shed light on the elements that are essential to forming successful
regional collaborative governance structures.
Specifically, by adapting E. Ostrom’s original Eight Design Principles (2005) of
common-pool resource regimes, this study aims to examine the governance mechanisms
of RCs and to determine the underlying factors that contribute to their sustainability and

4
accomplishments. This dissertation will identify the rules of institutional arrangements
and network management and leadership principles applicable to RCs and will also
determine whether differences exist between RCs and traditional alliance groups. The
primary target group is the regional collaborative, which is defined as an organization
composed of entities from multiple sectors that gather to provide solutions to regional
issues. The traditional alliance group—defined as an organization composed of fewer
than two sector representatives or a network of traditional nonprofit service providers—
serves as the comparison group.
As a cautionary note, I emphasize the fact that this dissertation takes on an
exploratory nature of study, as there are no existing theories on RCs available or
applicable to my research questions. No identifiable scholars have researched RCs: thus,
this dissertation serves as a conduit to future research on the subject matter and uncovers
initial substantive issues of interest related to RCs.
1.1.1 Regional Collaboratives
With the assumption that collaboration among multiple players with diverse
backgrounds and from different sectors would solve regional issues, the James Irvine
Foundation initiated the “Sustainable Communities” program in California between 1997
and 2004. During that period, the foundation invested more than $20 million in creating
and supporting regional groups, known as “Collaborative Regional Initiatives” (CRIs),
which the foundation defines as “partnerships that engage diverse stakeholders seeking to
enhance economic vitality, increase social equity, and protect the natural environment in

5
California regions.” These grants either established or supported 17 CRIs (Innes and
Rongerude, 2005, p. iii).
These CRIs, or regional collaboratives (RCs), comprise concerned civic leaders
from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors and promote regional economic vitality
and sustainability. The report of the California Center for Regional Leadership (2003)
describes RCs as “region-based civic organizations” acting as “conveners and
coordinators of community initiatives and civic governance within their regions” (CCRL,
2003, p. 2). RCs are regarded as civic regional governance organizations that fill gaps
left by municipal, county, and state governments. RCs that coordinate among more than
one unit of government jurisdiction have become necessary for two main reasons:
because the government has limited financial resources and because current political and
geographical jurisdictions are unable to adequately resolve regional issues (CCRL, 2003;
Innes and Rongerude, 2005).
These RCs engage in developing “community indicators – creating common
benchmarks among collaboratives, economic strategy and workforce investment,
visioning and strategies for regional planning, [and] civic engagement,” forming policy
that focuses on “local, regional and state fiscal structures, infrastructure planning and
investment, responsible policies for sustaining the state’s quality of life, while
accommodating projected population growth, etc.” (CCRL, 2003, p. 2). By 2003, the 17
RCs initiated and supported by The James Irvine Foundation grew to 24. Today, many
are still active as regional civic leaders, but some have become inactive and have
disbanded (CCRL, 2003).

6
The reason why the state of California has become the testing ground for civic
engagement and civic entrepreneurship with the active development of regional
collaboratives can be traced to many sources. As the birthplace of the Progressive Era
and a trendsetter of socioeconomic, political, and cultural movements, California
represents the world’s sixth largest economy and accounts for 13% of the national gross
domestic product. However, in a 1999 United Way report, California ranked below
average in many significant quality of life indicators: “40
th
in the percentage of
population living in poverty, 42
nd
in employment, 45
th
in housing affordability, 49
th
in
pupil-to-teacher ratios in public schools, 45
th
in children medically uninsured, etc.”
(CCRL, 2003, p. 4). In addition, California has accrued a major budget deficit, water and
power shortages, traffic congestion, and lack of housing, in addition to education and
healthcare problems and aging infrastructure issues. With its population projected to be
48 million in 2020 and a continuously growing body of immigrants, California will face
an even greater challenge in providing livable communities. To remain a viable
competitor in the global economy, California must invest in education and attract
industries by cutting red tape and business costs. In other words, “competitive industries,
skilled workforce, quality of life and effective state and local government” (CCRL, 2003,
p. 4) are integral components in making California an attractive place to live (CCRL,
2003).
However, derailed coordination among all levels of government and the private
and nonprofit sectors hamper any meaningful progress, particularly where multiple
geographic jurisdictions overlap. Acknowledging the need for new leadership in the mid-

7
1990s, civic leadership began bringing in stakeholders from all sides to serve as
intermediaries for policy makers and communities seeking solutions for California.
These leaders began anchoring community issues within broader settings, namely regions.
Statewide civic leaders with regional perspectives began developing strategies for
regional and statewide solutions by pushing the limits of political and bureaucratic
structures (CCRL, 2003).
Regional perspectives are particularly important because many people today live
and work in regions such as industrial clusters that are located throughout multiple cities
and counties. Silicon Valley offers a good example. Some areas in California are
characterized by natural geographical distinctions, some by economic activity, and others
by “settlement patterns” (CCRL, p. 6). Whereas in the early part of the 20th century,
dwelling areas were confined to cities and counties, suburban expansion has blurred these
distinctions and produced areas that exist between regions. As such, people live and
work in jurisdictions where traditional municipal and county governments do not
coincide. Traffic, housing, education, and environmental issues do not fall under a single
governmental jurisdiction and efforts to generate solutions must be coordinated across
multiple jurisdictions—efforts that are often stymied by “boundary-bound policies,
governance structures, tax structures and service delivery systems” that are inadequate to
handle problems of such magnitude. Hence, regional perspectives have proven important
when it comes to visioning, planning, and actually implementing policies for such hybrid
areas (CCRL, 2003).

8
According to CCRL (2003, p. 7), “a region may be a combination of multiple
counties or [may comprise] pieces or subdivisions of counties and cities. A region is an
all-inclusive place, sharing common and collective interests.” Regional collaboratives in
California act on common interests found in their regions and practice collaborative
processes to effect positive outcomes for all stakeholders involved. In other parts of the
country, regional organizations, as a more generic term, have been active for the past
three decades or so. Many of these organizations have belonged to the Alliance for
Regional Stewardship (ARS), a national organization for regional groups. In 2006, more
than 100 groups were active members of the ARS. Like California’s regional
collaboratives, these groups are concerned with regional sustainability.
As these collaboratives become an increasingly popular mode of regional
governance nationwide, organizational sustainability has become a fundamental issue.
Some of these cross-sectoral organizations have remained active through ups and downs,
but others have quickly disappeared. Whereas the effectiveness and success of these
organizations could be a decisive factor in regional vitality, the reasons behind those
failures were not examined in detail. Thus, I am attempting to study institutional
arrangements and management and leadership elements to identify factors that contribute
to the sustainability and accomplishment of regional collaboratives.
1.2 Overview on Regionalism and Regional Collaboratives

Perspectives on regionalism in California and across the world explain how
regions have become active jurisdictions in building better communities and states. This
overview provides a foundation for understanding the roles and expectations assigned to

9
the regional collaboratives as a regional governance institution involved in the processes
of policy making.
1.2.1 Regionalism in the United States

Issues relating to metropolitan areas are often high-stake issues, and solutions
may not be readily available due to the complex configurations of different values and
ideological contrariety. The administration of urban growth has always been pitted
against issues of economic development and societal obligations.
Historians generally discuss regionalism in the United States in terms of three
waves: its start in the 1920s, its revival in the 1960s, and its evolution from the 1990s to
the present (Jonas and Pincetl, 2006; Saxenian and Dabby, 2005; Waste, 2001). The
concept has been put into practice in the United States for decades and has gone through
many life cycles. Repeated attempts to set up working regional governance systems have
been a response to previous failures of regional governance. Hence, rather than seeing
the continuous development of regionalism, we see regionalism en vogue.
The first regionalism movement occurred in the 1920s to combat the Great
Depression. The Regional Plan Association of America (RPAA) was conceived to
address issues of “metropolitan livability and form, and regional economic development”
(Jonas and Pincetl, 2006, p. 488). As suburbanization occurred, old urban industrial sites
and their infrastructures became a major concern for Progressive reformers. Their idea of
efficiency meant creating unified fronts with “business, land use, [and] fiscal planning”
(Jonas and Pincetl, 2006, p. 488); hence, metropolitan governments were established.

10
The second wave of regionalism arrived as the federal government began to stress
regional planning in the 1960s, after post-war, Fordism-based, urban-industrial growth
had occurred. Fordism generally refers to the mass production of commodities on
assembly lines for consumption by nuclear families (Jessop, 1996). In the era of
industrial growth, “economic and technological transformation” (Scott, 2007, p. 17)
supported the institutionalization of new governing bodies. Councils of governments
(COGs) were created by the U.S. Congress to resolve issues such as the inadequacies of
the urban infrastructure and housing, among other things (Jonas and Pincetl, 2006; Scott,
2007).
The third wave of regionalism, known as “New Regionalism,” began in the early
1980s and is characterized “not by the type of policy but rather by the type of
organization” (Olberding, 2002, as cited in Saxenian and Dabby, 2005, p. 58). Scott
(2007) has added that the new regionalism’s focus was to create “institutional conditions
within which partnerships, cooperation and volunteerism” (p. 16) can mend the alienated
and fragmented metropolitan areas. Saxenian and Dabby (2005) reiterated that such
collaboration occurs through public, private, and nonprofit cooperation.
If old regionalism pertains to national economies (Jonas and Ward, 2002, as cited
in Jonas and Pincetl, 2006) and is concerned with local and regional service delivery and
with sharing social costs, then new regionalism is not so different. In the United States,
new regionalism directly relates to “the future of metropolitan areas” and to issues of
“continuing sprawl, [the] hollowing out” of the urban core, “traffic congestion, pollution”
(Jonas and Pincetl, 2006, p. 486), transportation, land use, the loss of agricultural land,

11
job creation, and economic development (Waste, 2001). Economic development is
associated with the increasing “attractiveness and livability of urban regions” (Jonas and
Pincetl, 2006, p. 486). Thus, U.S. new regionalism aims to enhance economic viability
by addressing key concerns with disintegrated governance systems in metropolitan
regions.
According to Pastor and others (2000, as cited in Scott, 2007), new regionalism
maintains the hope of bringing solutions to metropolitan problems and of promoting
much more efficient and flexible governance. Many scholars believe that new
regionalism can provide some answers to the problems of constant growth and disjointed
local governance (Waste, 2001). According to Jonas and Pincetl (2006), critics regard
U.S. new regionalism as a better measurement for the middle class than for the
disadvantaged classes, even though new regionalism is hailed as a solution to burgeoning
growth problems. To these critics, new regionalism caters to the “creative class—people
working in new economy sectors” (Florida, 2002, as cited in Jonas and Pincetl, 2006, p.
486), to the neglect of other social classes.
1.2.2 Regionalism in California
According to Waste (2001), regionalism first emerged in California in the 1960s
and 1970s as a means for addressing concerns about the environment. The first wave
resulted in the establishment of Councils of Government (COGs), three [other]
commissions to regulate growth management, water management, and environmental
concerns, and the creation of the Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO).
COGs consist of local government agencies that address issues concerning regional

12
planning, including transit and transportation, economic development, water use, and
environmental issues, etc.
However, until the establishment of the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, regional policy was not properly administered. Indeed,
evaluations of the first wave of California regionalism are somewhat negative because the
movement was able to “establish spheres of influence” over local areas but was unable to
regulate broader regional issues. This failure of the first wave of regionalism and
unresolved regional issues brought “New Regionalism” to California (Waste, 2001).
New regionalism intends to enhance the capacity of existing institutions, such as
COGs and LAFCOs, and to embrace new institutions such as “regional alliances” or
“regional initiatives” that have been burgeoning since the 1990s and have been actively
initiating efforts to resolve regional issues on their own (Waste, 2001). According to
Jonas and Pincetl (2006), this new regionalism is revived by a “new civic regionalism,”
in which civic entrepreneurs, business leaders, the public sector, and nonprofit groups
come together to focus on region-specific issues with the fluidity of a new organizational
structure equipped with more mobility and flexibility for swift decision-making. These
institutions are based upon participatory regional governance models, “area-wide
collaborative partnerships, compacts or councils” (Waste, 2001), including “voluntary
agreements, multi-jurisdictional compacts, [and] the infusion of private investments”
(Jonas and Pincetl, 2006). Enthusiasts of this new breed of regionalism see a good
example of devolution to regional governance, not through administrative changes but
rather through stimulating civic and business communities.

13
The voluntary regional unit approach to regional issues began with the Pete
Wilson Administration in California. Many of his growth management plans based on
environmentalism demanded a “bioregional council,” and each bioregion, “watershed or
landscape associations” (Jonas and Pincetl, 2006, p. 495), was encouraged to coordinate
its work to find regional solutions. Interested parties in each bioregion would eventually
implement land management strategies related to “urban growth and habitat protection”
(Jonas and Pincetl, 2006, p. 494). These activities were not funded by the state at all
(Duane, 1999, as cited in Jonas and Pincetl, 2006), and were undertaken by regional
volunteer organizations.
1.2.3 Civic Regionalism: Regional Collaboratives
Jonas and Pincetl (2006) have stated that California’s recession in the early 1990s
and continuing regional concerns prompted the Irvine Foundation to take bold initiatives
regarding the state’s economic future. This project was spearheaded by Nick Bollman,
who had recently joined the foundation. Bollman was trying to nurture “public private
partnerships” (p. 496) under new regionalism and thus coined the term “civic
regionalism” (p. 496). In his view, the region is a basic unit of policy decision-making
processes, where issues of “livability and economic development” (p. 496) should be
treated first—but with the fusion of civic leadership.
The results were new sets of regional governance institutions known as
Collaborative Regional Initiatives (CRIs). From 1997 to 2004, 17 regional collaboratives
(RCs) were established, and more groups were subsequently formed.

14
RCs may consist of old groups with long histories assembled and incorporated
into a new entity or they may be an entirely new group created in a region. RCs are
taking the lead in local and regional issues as clusters or as a statewide network. Indeed,
their major accomplishments are seen as taking place in “regional engagement, regional
education, and regional action” (Henton et al., 1999, as cited in Waste, 2001, p. 27).
With regard to its regional engagement function, an RC, as neutral ground, allows
regional stakeholders to work on consensus-building processes. The regional education
function allows the general public and stakeholders to be informed about their own
region by having clear visions and “regional performance indicators and regional quality
of life indexes.” Regional action involves undertaking new projects and programs within
regions (Waste, 2001).
Regional organizations have been active agents in creating solutions, not just in
California, but in other parts of the country. In 2000, just like CCRL of California, 50
regional leaders across the nation began to investigate ways to bolster regional initiatives
and planning. They recognized the limitations of federal and local governments and saw
the great need to collaborate on the economy, environment, social issues, and other
complex challenges. Inspired by John W. Gardner, founder of Common Cause, regional
leaders formed the Alliance for Regional Stewardship (ARS) to support regional
organizations in providing better futures for regions. Issue areas being addressed at ARS
include bringing regional equities, helping regional organizations to formulate clear
directions and goals, and providing web-based networking capacity for memberships, etc.

15
For the first five years, ARS provided a forum for 1,500 regional leaders to share
knowledge and implement strategies tackling regional tasks (http://www.acce.org, 2011).
Clearly, the presence of regional organizations has become a widespread
phenomena throughout the nation in responding to increased demands for collaborative
regional problem solving.
1.3 Theoretical Overview
Theories regarding New Institutional Economics (NIE), governance, and
common-pool resources provide the most pertinent perspectives for studying issues
relevant to the governing mechanism of RCs. In particular, these theories identify the
institutional arrangements and management and leadership elements that relate to
network management and to understanding the sustainability and accomplishments of
RCs.
Together, the three theoretical lenses—NIE, governance, and E. Ostrom’s
common-pool resource framework—create the necessary foundations for understanding
collaborative governance in which RCs represent a typical form.
The key concept of the NIE is based on the research on interactions between
institutions—firms and organizations, bureaus (Williamson, 2000, 2008), “rules or
humanly devised constraints” (Ferris and Tang, 1993, p. 5)—and human actors. From
the process of interactions, transactions occur, and to make transactions effective, the
coordination is needed.
Within the given institutional constraints, individuals select their best
coordinating options either by exercising property rights or employing contracts

16
(Williamson, 2008). To prevent potential hazards and conflicting interests in the
opportunistic behaviors of human actors, a mechanism of coordination—governance—
becomes necessary. Thus, governance is needed to devise rules pertaining to all
collective decisions that extend beyond conventional government authorities.
When governance is understood as a mechanism for delineating the roles of
institutions, human actors, and governments and for untangling various issues affecting
societies without governmental fiat (Stoker, 1998), the concept of governance begins to
replace an old notion of governments.
As the increased demand for more quality public services has started to stifle
governmental functions and capacity, governments began to render services through non-
profit and for-profit entities. Soon many public services were delivered by networks of
nongovernmental services providers. Thus, instead of governments, governance as a
mechanism of processes and as the implementation of rules dictating collective action
choices arises more evidently (Ewalt, 2004; Kettl, 2002; Tang and Mazmanian, 2008).
Among many different hybrid governance frameworks, collaborative governance
(Tang and Mazmanian, 2008) most effectively depicts the characteristics of RCs. It
refers to collaborative efforts among different sectors adding unique values from each
sector in delivering public services.
Within the framework of institutions and coordinating mechanism of governance,
a new type of governance—collaborative governance—is created. As NIE measures the
effectiveness of governance structures and institutional mechanisms (Williamson, 1996),
this dissertation borrows Ostrom’s framework of eight design principles and the

17
management and leadership elements of network management to understand the
governance structures and mechanisms of RCs.
1.3.1 New Institutional Economics
As various scholars have attested (Brousseau and Glachant, 2008; Joskow, 2008;
Williamson, 2008), New Institutional Economics is an accumulation of findings by
analytical practices—not an overarching or grand theory. NIE, according to Langlois
(1986, as cited in Maki, 1993), includes institutions in forecasting economic activity in
addition to market transactions. Taking into consideration the nature of human beings,
most NIE scholars believe that the cognition of human actors is limited by a lack of
“information and calculation” (Cyert and March, 1992, p. 214), namely by bounded
rationality (Cyert and March, 1992; Williamson, 2000). Simon (1947, as cited in Maki,
1993) has stated that bounded rationality is “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (p.
15) unlike neoclassical theory’s rational human being, who strives to maximize his or her
utility (Elster, 1986).
In his transaction cost analysis, Williamson (2000) has asserted three
assumptions: bounded rationality, “opportunism” (p. 601), and “conscious foresight” (p.
601). Although human actors lack competence in cognitive ability and are thus inhibited
from doing complete transactions in processing and calculating information, they attempt
to be rational in their behavior. Whereas a neoclassical “economic man” (Williamson,
1981, p. 553) would select the best option by ranking the utility of fulfilling self-
interested goals simplemindedly, an “organizational man” (Williamson, 1981, p. 553) is
guided by a more complex set of motivations concealed by other motivations. The

18
opportunistic behaviors of the organizational man, as a form of “adverse selection, moral
hazard, shirking, subgoal pursuit, and other forms of strategic behavior” (Williamson,
2000, p. 601) will ultimately surface. Likewise, human actors tend to conceal their
preferences and intentions to attain a better outcome to serve their self-interest, in
addition to their problem of bounded rationality (Petersen, 1995; Williamson, 1981,
2000). Conscious foresight, or the “capacity to simulate the future in imagination … that
saves us from the worst consequences of the blind replicators” (Dawkins, 1976, as cited
in Williamson, 2000, p. 601) is another human attribute that makes human actors take ex
ante precaution. Understanding human rationality in these terms demonstrates the need
for institutions; institutions provide support for human actors’ goals, given these exposed
human attributes (Maki, 1993).
In more specific terms, Williamson (2000) has pointed out some key concepts of
NIE: “human actors, feasibility, firms and bureaus” (pp. 600-602), and so forth. Besides
those points concerning human actors, Williamson (2000) has claimed that NIE is
looking at all “feasible organizational alternatives, all of which are flawed” (p. 601). He
also has argued for accepting firms as governance units rather than as units of production,
as they have “organizational construction” (p. 602). Williamson (2000) has further stated
that NIE mainly focuses on the basic institutional framework and governance mechanism
in which actual transactions occur. His analysis shows how informal and formal
institutions are intertwined in constructing a society’s top-level values and environment
constraints a level down, and with all levels together producing certain societal, political,
and economic conditions that structure the mechanisms of transaction.

19
According to the above analysis, an institution can be defined as informal and
formal rules present in society that may visibly or invisibly bind human actors’ behaviors.
Institutions have been defined in various forms: “an institution is of the nature of a usage
which has become axiomatic and indispensable by habituation and general acceptance”
(Veblen, 1924, as cited in Maki, 1993, p. 13); and “as collective action in control of
individual action, collective action ranges all the way from unorganized custom to the
many organized going concerns” (Commons, 1934, as cited in Maki, 1993, p. 13).
Encompassing various definitions, institutions are customs, conventions, traditions,
culture, habits, routines, regularity of behavior, and rules, either created or evolving
through the time.
Other NIE scholars define the institution as “humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction…[which] structure incentives in human exchange, whether
political, social, or economic” (North, 1990, p. 3), or “shared concepts used by humans in
repetitive situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies” (Ostrom, 1999, p. 37).
Ferris and Tang (1993) interpret institutions as “rules or humanly devised constraints that
structure actions and interactions among individuals” (p. 5).
As seen by its definition of institution, the NIE is most interested in analyzing
how institutional frameworks interact with individuals and groups (Brousseau and
Glachant, 2008; Ferris and Tang, 1993) and how the evolution of these changes takes
place by “operationalizing” (Williamson, 2008, p. xxiv) the research through the
“microanalysistics of transactions, governance structures, and the rule of the game”

20
(Williamson, 2008, p. xxiv) for eventual usage in public policy recommendations in
various settings (Ferris and Tang, 1993; Williamson, 2008).
According to Williamson (2008), firms embody a mode of “coordination” (p.
xliii), which helps “transactions” (p. xliii) among individual actors. In firms and
organizations, “hierarchical coordination” (p. xliii) is indispensable to preventing
“independent decisions” (p. xliii) compelled by selfish motivation. This departure from
the market principles induces principal agent problems; to avert these problems, incentive
structures are introduced and the very action brings the market mechanism back to firms.
Williamson has asserted that new institutional analysis needs to delve into the analysis of
“interdependencies between these alternative modes of coordination” (p. xliii). Due to
the fact that the decentralized economy was a focus of the economics of contracting, it
engendered research on incentives and led to a focus on coordination mechanisms.
Bringing institutions into the picture, NIE has conjectured that within the given
institutional environment, individuals with bounded rationality execute their property
rights and contracting capacity depending on the device of coordination options. This
framework leads to a concept that governance systems may secure coordinating
mechanisms, though perhaps not completely.
The tools and devices individuals use to secure contracts, formal rules, incentives,
and other devised methods are called “mechanisms of governance – in the sense that
they are devices to reach efficiency in a set of transactions” in the transaction cost
economics (Williamson, 1996, as cited in Gonzalez-Diaz and Luis Vazquez, 2008, p.
259). Williamson (2000, 1996) has asserted that governance is a mechanism that

21
alleviates the “conflict” (Williamson, 1996, p. 12) and “hazards” (Williamson, 1996, p.
12) inherent in human behavioral assumptions—namely the bounded rationality and
opportunism—and creates an attainable state of “order” (Williamson, 1996, p. 12).
Although Williamson concentrates his analytical efforts on market mechanisms,
he interprets governance as an institutional foundation upon which all transactions or
business decisions occur (Williamson, 1996). As such, governance is inclusive of all the
measures devising collective decisions, in addition to a usual reference to government or
governmental authorities (Tang, 2002).
1.3.2 Governance
Traditionally, governance has meant government (Kettl, 2002; Stoker, 1998).
Government, in political theory, is defined as:
the formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate coercive
power. Government is characterized by its ability to make decisions and its
capacity to enforce them. In particular government is understood to refer to the
formal and institutional processes which operate at the level of the nation state to
maintain public order and facilitate collective action. (Stoker, 1998, p. 17)

At one point, public administration meant politics but now refers to governance as well
(Kettl, 2002; Stoker, 1993). Frederickson and Smith (2003, as cited in Heinrich, Hill, and
Lynn, 2004) have asserted that governance is now considered “a virtual synonym for
public management and public administration” (p. 3). Distinct from “government,”
which has the coercive power to “tax, punish, and require participation” for delivering
services and protecting individual rights (Tang, 2002, class notes), “governance”
portends the beginning of changes in the work, processes, members, and methods of
government (Rhodes, 1996, as cited in Stoker, 1998).

22
Though definitions of governance are ranging, they invariably underscore the
changing role of government in attempting to meet the demands of an ever-evolving
society (Pierre and Peters, 2000, as cited in Kettl, 2002; Rhodes, 1996, as cited in Stoker,
1998). Governance has been variously defined as: (1) “the processes and institutions,
both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”
(Keohane and Nye, 2000, as cited in Kettl, 2002, p. 119); (2) a term similar to public
sector governance: “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decision, and administrative practices
that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and
service through formal and informal relationships with agents in the public and private
sectors” (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2001, as cited in Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn, 2004, p. 6);
and (3) a “predominance of network relationships, deregulations, hybridization of public
and private resources, and use of multiple instruments in policy implementation” (Peters
and Pierre, 1998, as cited in Heinrich, Hill, and Lynn, 2004, p.3).
Stoker (1998) has prescribed five propositions that not only define governance but
also acknowledge its changing role in society. In summary, by clarifying each player’s
(institutions, actors, government) role and power relationship, governance can deliver and
resolve societal issues using new methods without resorting to governmental authorities.
In the latter part of the 20th century, governments in the United States and other
nations around the globe began to experience increasing demands to provide more public
services with shrinking resources. The public in general has become increasingly
disengaged from politics, and civic participation in governments has become less
attractive. The public began losing confidence in governments, realizing the

23
government’s limitations in solving the social and economic challenges it confronts.
Some researchers believe that changes in the value of individualism and growth in the
federal budget, reaching 20% of GNP, has caused people to turn away from government
(Nye, 2002).
At the same time, governments were faced with escalating demands to provide
better educational opportunities, to build up infrastructure, to increase economic growth,
and to protect the environment for future generations; unable to meet these demands,
governments began looking for solutions. Due to funding shortfalls, governments tried to
cut services, defer payment of debts, and even tried renewing themselves to better serve
the public with market economic principles (Ewalt, 2004; Kettl, 2002; Tang and
Mazmanian, 2008).
In the midst of devising responses to these diversified demands and strains on
their function, governments began turning to nonprofit and business organizations to
render public services that would produce cost savings and better quality services.
Federal, state, and municipal levels of governments were soon to engage with networks
of service providers by contracts and grants. Thus, the clearly commanded,
hierarchically controlled, democratically accountable notion of government became
antiquated (Ewalt, 2004; Kettl, 2002; Tang and Mazmanian, 2008).
Public services as traditionally delivered by the public sector are no longer the
norm; instead, services are provided by various multisector organizations. Hence,
governance has replaced old notions of government and has begun to represent a

24
mechanism of processes and the implementation of formal and informal rules guiding
collective action choices (Ewalt, 2004; Kettl, 2002; Tang and Mazmanian, 2008).
The impetus behind this transformation from government to governance is
“devolution and globalization” (Kettl, 2002, p. 118), “technology” (Klitgaard and
Treverton, 2003, p. 7) and “market state” (p. 7), “globalization, marketization, and the
information revolution” (Nye, 2002, p. vii), and so forth. For the United States,
transformation was an answer to the decades-long deliberation about “privatizing and
shrinking government” (Kettl, 2002, p. 120), accelerating the devolved system and
bringing in reinforcement by multinational corporations and organizations that have
global influences. It was also the response to debates about modifying the nature of
government and interconnecting it with the general society and the world (Kettl, 2002).
In replacing an authority-based, command-and-control hierarchical framework, various
hybrid governance frameworks became noticeable. Partnerships, alliances, networks, and
other forms all focus on collaboration and coordination among multiple sectors in sharing
the responsibility of public policy implementation at some juncture (Heinrich, Hill, and
Lynn, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Tang and Mazmanian, 2008). Hybrid governance
often suggests the blurry distinction among three sectors—the public, private, and the
nonprofit (Klitgaard and Treverton, 2003). As these phenomena become ubiquitous not
only in the United States but also worldwide, scholars have been trying to conceptualize
them through various theoretical lenses.
Some scholars have applied existing theories such as federalism and global
regimes of international relations, whereas others have come up with new concepts like

25
“multi-level governance, polycentric governance, multiperspectival governance”
(Hooghe and Marks, 2003, p. 234). Between hierarchies and markets (Williamson, 1996),
scholars have observed a vast array of hybrid governances (Haynes, Kirby, and Sloan,
2000, as cited in Tang and Mazmanian, 2008).
Tang and Mazmanian (2008) have situated authority-based outsourcing and
collaborative governance between the two polar modes of government hierarchies and
markets. The outsourcing mechanism by the public sector has been in use for decades to
deliver public services. Initially, outsourcing was given predominantly to nonprofits but
corporations were soon included as well. Modes of outsourcing have changed as well,
evolving from a simple contract to complex transactions with multiple vendors.
According to Tang and Mazmanian (2008), collaborative governance characterized by
collaborative efforts among three sectors (public, private, and nonprofits) in delivering
public services is happening today throughout the “public policy processes—from
formulation, enactment, implementation to evaluation and feedback” (p. 5). They have
argued that collaborative governance is different from “collaborative public management
– the process of multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be
solved or easily solved by a single organization” (O’Leary, Gerard, and Bingham, 2006,
as cited in Tang and Mazmanian, 2008, p. 5). They have also differentiated collaborative
governance from outsourcing, which has a problem with principal-agent issues or
“intergovernmental cooperation” among different levels of governments in the United
States (Conlan, 2006, as cited in Tang and Mazmanian, 2008, p. 5).

26
Tang and Mazmanian (2008), borrowing from Smith and Gronbjerg (2006), have
explained the strength of collaborative governance:
Collaborative governance draws on the unique attributes and resources of
participating sectors, with each expected to add significant value to the joint
enterprise. In broad terms, governments bring to the enterprise public legitimacy
as representatives of the public’s needs and desires, the authority and coercive
posers of the state, taxation powers, the necessity of public transparency and
accountability, and a public service mission. Private sector actors bring funding
secured through private capital market, real property, financial management skills,
an entrepreneurial spirit, agility and timeliness, business-like management
practices, and organizational and individual incentives. The most valuable assets
of non-profits and civic organizations are their commitment to serve those in need,
willingness to perform as intermediaries in the provision of public goods and
services, the use of moral suasion and social capital, on the one hand, and
business-like management skills on the other, and agility in responding to needs.
(p. 6)

Tang and Mazmanian (2008) have also emphasized the “reciprocal relationship” (p. 7)
in collaborative governance, especially the relationship between organizations in
different sectors, as compared with “public-sector networks” (p. 7) or “public-sector
governance” (p. 7).
According to some scholars (Kettl, 2002; Tang and Mazmanian, 2008), despite
the many advantages of partnerships or collaborations among entities of multiple sectors,
these arrangements are not an antidote to all problems. The delegation of authority for
carrying out public services to public, private, and nonprofit sectors presents a classic
problem of a representative democracy. In the system of public administration, public
policy makers have delegated their authority to administrators to perform the job, and
thus hold them accountable. However, it is not known who should be held accountable
in a new governance structure where public policy delivery is shared. Potential conflict

27
resolution and “collective-action problem” (Tang and Mazmanian, 2008, p. 9), “agency
capture, public transparency” (Tang and Mazmanian, 2008, p. 10) issues are also
pertinent. Fundamentally, government is faced with the task of restructuring the
bureaucratic system from a hierarchy to a system capable of managing “horizontal
partnerships” (Kettle, 2002, p. 130).
1.3.3 Common-Pool Resource and 8 Design Principles by E. Ostrom
The third theoretical foundation of this dissertation is based on the institutional
analysis and development (IAD) framework, developed through the work of Elinor
Ostrom and her colleagues and by the subsequent application of the framework to
common-pool resource settings. The dissertation is founded on the eight design principles
of robust, self-sustaining common-pool resource models. The challenge of a common-
pool resource regime is the dilemma of collective action. The consequences of free-
riding by resource users are detrimental for the future of resource users. However,
Ostrom found that this dilemma does not necessarily appear in every common-pool
resource case. When resource users and incentives are an appropriate match (an
extension of that would be if resource users were to craft their own rules in governing
themselves), the collective action dilemma in the self-organizing organizations becomes
less of problem.
In the context of finding the rightful institutional match for the IAD argument,
RCs could be an ideal model for an entity filling in regional governance and physical,
community environment in which RCs are situated. Also, applying the eight design
principles of a common-pool resource regime to the RC setting provides an opportunity

28
to explain the institutional arrangements in resolving collective-action problems and
becoming robust organizations dealing with regional issues.
In Chapter 2, a more detailed theoretical analysis on IAD and common-pool
resource framework will follow along with an analysis for how these frameworks are
adapted to RCs.
1.4 Network Management and Leadership
Alliances and networks are being established to meet the growing needs of
cooperation and collaboration within all sectors, nationally and globally. Viewing these
entities as institutions, scholars have been researching to find mechanisms, particularly
management and leadership elements, which promote successful and sustainable alliances
and networks.
Management and leadership strategies identified for alliances and networks are
not any different from operating single organizations (Page, 2003). However, major
differences in strategies would occur for leaders who build and manage inter- and intra-
network relationships for the benefit of network (Cullen, Johnson, and Sakano, 2000).
From managing the processes of relationship building and the network of relationships,
trust and commitments are generated, which are significant factors that ensure the success
of collaboration in alliances and networks.
In Chapter 3, network management, communication, cohesion, and collaborative
organizational leadership are examined to identify the elements affecting network
management and leadership of RCs.

29
1.5 Research Design and Methods
This research uses both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Empirical
testing was used for Chapters 2 and 3, and a case study was conducted in Chapter 4.
1.5.1 Sources of Data and Survey Instruments
Many California regional collaboratives (RCs) worked together under the
auspices of the California Center for Regional Leadership (CCRL). CCRL acted as a
convener and a bridge among the regional collaboratives to plan and advocate statewide
policies concerning regional issues. In 2003, CCRL had 19 active RC memberships.
Although CCRL has been dormant since 2008, the membership list was acquired from
their documents and web site.
Initial contact with California regional collaboratives was made at a conference
hosted by CCRL in 2006. Almost all regional leaders were present with key policy
makers and corporate leaders of California. There, firsthand information on the activities
and agendas of RCs was attained.
With the key contacts made at the conference, initial interviews with experts were
prepared. In February of 2007, nine of the participants who had attended the conference
were contacted because they were known to be regional leaders who run an RC or who
have expertise in regional organizations. The purpose of these expert interviews was to
prepare for the survey instruments. Following the expert interviews, draft hypotheses
were developed from the interviews. The preliminary hypotheses pertain to what factors
contribute to the organizational commitment, program implementation, and viability of
organizations. At the same time, Ostrom’s eight design principles were modified for the

30
RC setting. Together, an entire set of new hypotheses was developed covering
institutional design, a new set of eight design principles, and the network management
and leadership elements of collaborative governance systems. Survey instruments were
developed under each section of hypotheses derived from literature reviews, phone
interviews, and discussions.
The survey questionnaires were revised many times. In March 2008, the survey
was pilot-tested with people who were familiar with RCs; all test subjects were from
California RCs. The survey was revised after the pilot and completed at the end of
March 2008. The final survey is an 11-page document with 140 indicators in 16 different
categories.
(See Appendix I for Questionnaire)
In the meantime, the author contacted the Alliance for Regional Stewardship
(ARS), a national organization of regional leaders, for its national membership. ARS was
a place for regional leaders to learn from one another and to share their knowledge about
resolving regional issues. The membership was composed of regional collaboratives or
alliances that can be categorized as service providers or a council of governments that
deal with regional issues or provide services to a specific region, but may not necessarily
be made up of multiple sectors. The ARS membership included about 100 organizations
nationwide.
The list from ARS was reviewed with California RCs; their web sites were
examined to check current operating status, and the CEOs or executive directors of each
organization were identified. Private companies such as consulting firms and educational

31
institutions like university research centers were deleted from the list. The organizations
on the final contact list consisted of all formally organized nonprofit groups, which were
then divided into two groups: RCs, the primary target group, and traditional alliances, a
comparison group.
The definition of the target group, regional collaboratives (RCs), is a group made
up of entities of two or more civic, public, private, and non-profit sectors that are
organized to resolve regional issues. The traditional alliances are mainly groups of
traditional non-profit service providers with or without some regional interests,
government-mandated planning agencies, or council of governments that are made up of
representatives from the public sector.
Following the suggestion of Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), an alliance is defined as
“a novel form of voluntary interorganizational cooperation that involves significant
exchange, sharing, or codevelopment and thus results in some form of enduring
commitment between the partners” (p. 1440). I adapt his definition for this study:
traditional alliances—voluntary arrangements of organizations to exchange information
and to nurture and educate each other to achieve common goals with various forms of
governance structures in multi-interest areas. Traditional alliance groups in this study are
governmental alliances, or service-providing alliances, that may or may not deal with
regional issues or are only made up of one sector of organizations, rather than what is
defined by the target group.

32
Although the two groups may resemble one another in their activities and in the
issues they address, the main distinction is that RCs’ membership and governance
systems are composed of two or more sectors—usually three—where traditional alliances
Table 1.1 Differences and Similarities between Regional Collaboratives and
Traditional Alliances

Activities Issues Products
RCs
(comprising
2 sectors or
more)
Taking a leadership role as
convener and facilitator of the
region

Conduct research, provide
reports and region – specific
demographics

Identifying regional issue
champions and initiative
leaders

Program development in
economic development, land
use, strategic planning, etc.
Economic growth

Education and workforce
enhancement

Planning and infrastructure
investment

Providing economic opportunity
for the poor

Conservation of natural resource

Share and measure progress

Community vision and plan

Community indicators report

Formation of task-specific
alliances to solve regional
problems

Initiatives that have appeals to
be adopted by organizations
within the region
TAs
(comprising
1 sector)
Develop regional plans

Coordinate intergovernmental
cooperation

Provide technical support for
local organizations

Allocate resources for regional
systems

Transportation

Air quality / water quality

Economic Development

Community Development

Governmental Services

Emergency Preparedness

GIS data development &
analysis

Traffic counts and surveys

Environmental management
Plans

are composed of one sector—typically the public sector. RCs suit the nature of
collaborative governance with multiple sectors engaged in the process of regional
problem solving. However, the traditional alliances tend to be characterized by
“intergovernmental cooperation” (p. 5) rather than collaborative governance systems, as
Tang and Mazmanian (2008) differentiate.

33
A total of 82 organizations were identified and the surveys were sent to 96
individuals between March 30 and December 28, 2008. As the unit of analysis is at the
organizational level, the surveys were sent to the head of each organization with some
exceptions, where the organization leaders requested they be sent to designated
individuals. The surveys were sent by Qualtrics, a Web-based survey tool, and via
regular mail. Total respondents were 73 out of 96 (72.9%). The total data set was 64
(78%) organizations across the nation: 39 regional collaborative organizations and 25
traditional alliance organizations.
For case studies, all RCs that participated in the survey were contacted and eight
RCs eventually participated in the case study. These eight informants represent a cross-
section of samples as they are from across the nation.
(See Appendix II for Case Study Interview Questions)
This dissertation reveals how the main dependent variables—the sustainability
and accomplishments of regional collaboratives—correlate with the eight design
principle variables adapted from E. Ostrom’s original work (membership and boundary
criteria, cost-benefit practices, rules and regulations, monitoring, conflict-resolution
mechanisms, perceived legitimacy, stakeholder recruitment, and relationship structure)
and also with the management and leadership elements of networks. The dependent
variables, sustainability and accomplishments, are the primary outcomes of this study and
are explained in Chapter 2.

34
1.5.2 Analytic Overview
Scale analyses were conducted to refine the measurement instrument. Mokken
scale analyses were used on the scales with dichotomous items and factor analyses on the
scales with Likert items. Doing so revealed that most of the original scales are
multidimensional and tap into constructs other than that for which they were designed.
The dependent variable, sustainability scale splits into two independent factors that were
almost orthogonal (correlations between the factors <.3). Based on this empirical result,
the scale was split into two subscales: maintaining influence and stability. According to
the new scales for each variable, target group (regional collaboratives = RCs group) was
compared with the other group (traditional alliance). Pearson Correlations were used to
determine which of the design principles and management and leadership facets actually
affects the two primary outcomes of interest: sustainability and accomplishments.
1.5.3 Methodological Strengths and Weaknesses
This study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods to address the
research questions. Design principles and management and leadership section were
researched with empirical testing, while a comparison of cases was performed with a case
study method.
The strength of this research lies in the originality of data. The development of
survey instruments and its scale development is a valuable contribution that other
researchers may be able to adopt for their research. It is believed that the survey
instrument can be modified for application either to nonprofit or for-profit sector studies.
The survey indicators are comprehensive lists of institutional arrangements, management,

35
and leadership behaviors. The generalization of this study is also believed to be possible
as the sampling of regional collaboratives is nationwide.
An inherent methodological limitation of this dissertation is that only RCs that
have survived and are currently active were examined, due to constraints in contacting or
identifying disbanded groups. Thus, it inhibits the study from unearthing possible direct
causes of dissolution, which cannot be shown in the analysis of existing RCs. This may
also result in a gap in identifying substantive factors in design principles of sustainability
and accomplishments of RCs.
The issues and weaknesses of this study in general are attributed to surveying
only one participant from each organization, which may have led to biased results.
Moreover, due to resource constraints, active outreach in contacting additional
organizations did not occur in the case studies. A detailed description of limitations is
addressed in the individual chapters.
1.5.4 Relevance and Contribution of the Study
In an era in which alliances and networks are institutions that engage in the
delivery of public services, identifying appropriate institutional arrangements for these
relative new governance systems is a worthwhile academic endeavor. Findings from this
dissertation will contribute to identifying principal elements of institutional arrangements
and management and leadership in collaborative governance. Findings from case
comparisons also add contextual, but general understanding needed for sustainable
collaboratives.

36
1.5.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation consists of five chapters. Following the dissertation overview,
Chapter 2 will identify the design principles of RCs by utilizing E. Ostrom’s common-
pool resource framework. Chapter 3 will reveal the findings of management and
leadership elements necessary for sustainable RCs. Chapter 4 is a case study chapter
analyzing the interviews of eight RCs across the nation to determine whether the findings
from the previous chapters corroborate the results of the case study and to identify any
unknown supporting factors contributing to the sustainability of RCs. Lastly, Chapter 5
is a conclusion.

37
CHAPTER 2: DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF REGIONAL
COLLABORATIVES
Based on the new institutional economics (NIE), Ostrom and her colleagues
constructed the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. One of the core
aims of IAD is “matching institutions to the physical environment and to the
characteristics of the community” (McGinnis, 1999, p. 8). This concept originated with
Vincent Ostrom’s writing in 1953, which posited that the dictates of the physical
environment ultimately lead to the alteration of “institutional arrangements and social
policy, especially in regard to the control and development of natural resources”
(McGinnis, 1999, p. 8). V. Ostrom has asserted that the institutional arrangements must
fit the physical reality of the respective region or area since governmental jurisdictions
rarely coincide with the natural resource (McGinnis, 1999).
In applying the IAD framework for common-pool resources, V. Ostrom questions
the issue of congruency between the “legal rules” and “rules-in-use” (McGinnis, 1999, p.
8). For example, state governments are often viewed as lacking the management capacity
to handle natural resources beyond their legal jurisdiction (McGinnis, 1999). Here, legal
rules refer to the fact that the state has the rights and authority to regulate and administer
its natural resources. However, in reality, the state is not an adequate entity to regulate
and administer its natural resources because the resources are not confined to state
boundaries. In this case, legal rules regarding the natural resource should be modified to
rules-in-use to be effective. Due to frequently found incongruence among the rules,

38
governmental jurisdictions and multiple overlapping jurisdictions often inhibit the
production and application of proper policies, rules, and regulations.
The concept that institutional arrangements can be modified to accord with a
unique physical environment has great applicability to the setting of regional
collaboratives (RCs). RCs are organized to address regional concerns, such as housing,
transportation, education, job development, and economic growth, with an emphasis on
environmental issues. RCs deal with issues that are more diverse than a single physical
resource, and most of the time, regions refer to areas under the jurisdictional authority of
more than one government. Thus, due to its characteristics, the IAD framework can be
easily adapted to RCs.
This chapter examines the institutional arrangements of RCs to identify design
principles that predict sustainability and accomplishments. RCs and traditional alliances
will also be compared to identify any differing predictors.
2.1. Theories on IAD Framework and Collective Action
The institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework developed by Elinor
Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at
Indiana University was borne out of new institutional economics. They hoped to create a
general framework that could explain “how institutions affect the incentives confronting
individuals and their resultant behaviors” (Ostrom, 1999, p. 36). To E. Ostrom, an
institution is defined as “shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations
organized by rules, norms, and strategies” (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, as cited in
Ostrom, 1999, p. 37). She also defines the rules as “rules-in-use” rather than “rules-in-

39
form” (Ostrom 1999, p. 37). Rules-in-use are similar to an informal organizational
culture in which each organization or group may guide members with “do’s and don’ts”
(Ostrom, 1999, p. 38) as opposed to asserting formal rules.
Thus, the IAD framework is a “general language about how rules, physical and
material conditions, and attributes of community affect the structure of action arenas, the
incentives that individuals face, and the resulting outcomes” (Ostrom, 1999, p. 59). As
IAD scholars have considered the significance of the “physical nature of good, the
attributes of the community, and the institutional rules-in-use within that community” in
coping with physical problems (McGinnis, 1999, p. 5), the IAD framework has come to
reflect those factors with structures of “operational, collective choice, and constitutional
levels (arenas) of interaction” (McGinnis, 1999, p. 5).
As a framework for studying various theories, IAD was first applied to public
administration and metropolitan organizations and police service delivery systems; from
the late 1980s, IAD was used to build up a theory of common-pool resources and
appropriation models with extensive empirical research in an experimental lab and in the
field (Ostrom, 1999).
According to McGinnis (1999), common-pool resource (CPR) refers to
“commonly held resources” (p. 1) like “fisheries, irrigation systems, and groundwater
basins” (p. 1). In a CPR situation, one individual’s consumption of a resource means that
another individual is deprived of the same resource. Controlling appropriation is a major
task, as it requires rules, monitoring, and sanctioning, among other responsibilities.
Hence, CPR users are presented with “a dilemma of collective action” (McGinnis, 1999,

40
p. 1), namely how to secure the resource from free-riders and individuals who overuse it.
Creating effective collective action does not occur easily, as human history proves.
The dilemma in collective action, also known as social dilemmas and other names, arises
when an individual in a group tries to maximize his or her utility (self-interest), forcing
others to be worse off. The dilemma in collective action is much like the dilemma
around a public good, such as when some individuals try to contribute less to pollution
control. If all individuals behave the same way, everyone is harmed; but with everyone
contributing, all will be better off. These kinds of dilemmas exist in everyday life, from
major decisions affecting policy directions to ordinary decisions (Ostrom, 1998). As
Lichbach (1996) has said,
collective action theories are designed to explain the causes, and consequences of
individual participation in groups. Using arguments from micro-economic theory
about public goods and game theory about the Prisoner’s Dilemma, they show that,
under certain conditions, the equilibrium outcome of voluntary contributions to
the general welfare will be Pareto deficient (p. viii).

When rational actors do not find incentives to voluntarily contribute to the public good,
they face what is referred to as the cooperator’s dilemma (Lichbach, 1996), the free-rider
problem (Edney, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1980, as cited in Ostrom 1998), the moral
hazard (Holmstrom, 1982, as cited in Ostrom, 1998), the credible commitment dilemma
(Williams, Collins, and Lichbach, 1997, as cited in Ostrom, 1998), the tragedy of the
commons (Hardin, 1968), the prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), the
public-good dilemma, or the collective good problem, and so forth. “Politicians,”
“legislators,” and “workers” must face these dilemmas and learn to “trust others to
cooperate […] on long-term joint endeavors” (Ostrom, 1998, p. 2).

41
According to Hardin (1968), who has presented a classic case of the collective
action problem, the tragedy of the commons occurs when “a tragedy of freedom in a
commons” (p. 1244) is allowed. In the past, when population control occurred by various
natural and man-made disasters, herdsmen were allowed to raise cattle according to
individual desires and the capacity to handle. By the time “social stability” (p. 1244) was
achieved, each herdsman, in trying to maximize goods for himself, wanted to add to the
number of his herd. Because every herdsman would follow the same logic, the number
of stock in a commons would be increased without a control mechanism and the tragedy
of “ruin” (p. 1244) would take place; indeed, “the freedom of commons brings ruin” (p.
1244) as a natural consequence and it could happen in the “freedom of the seas” (p. 1245),
“freedom of the parks” (p. 1245), and so on. Hardin (1968) has suggested resorting to
laws and taxing, especially administrative laws, to correct—or attempt to correct—
collective action problems; he also cautions to “watch the watchers” (p. 1246). For its
part, according to Sen (1986), the prisoner’s dilemma reveals the inability to make
“individualistic decisions” (p. 70) and is used as the “justification of a collective
contract” (p. 70). A group of individuals would be better off under the collective contract
than following individualistic decisions.
One problem in Olson’s theory of collective action is that it neglects that there are,
indeed, individuals who sacrifice for others’ benefit and are willing to share public goods
by actively participating in producing them. Not everyone is self-interested (Lichbach,
1996). Various lived examples like IRA hunger strike participants, Gandhi and his
supporters in India, and the citizens of Poland’s solidarity movement illustrate altruistic

42
human behavior (Coleman, 1990, as cited in Lichbach, 1996). Tullock (1995, as cited in
Lichbach, 1996) applies the 5% rule, by which a minority of people is willing to make
sacrifices for others. Thus collective action scholars must acknowledge the existence of
altruists and volunteers willing to risk their lives. Cosmides and Tooby (1992, as cited in
Ostrom, 1998) have stated that humans have learned “reciprocity norms and general
social rules that enhance returns from collective action” (p. 2) over time. Through “trial-
and-error” (p. 2), necessary skills and rules were attained and trained. Scholars realize
that human nature is a composite of maximizing self-interest and at the same time
learning norms and abiding by rules that are keys to successful collective action (Ostrom,
1998). Human rationality is not purely self-serving but capable of making independent
objective choices. As seen in the concept of bounded rationality, humans may choose to
act contrary to collective action (Lichbach, 1996).
Assuming that collective action has characteristics of both public goods and the
prisoner’s dilemma, researchers have been trying to solve collective action problems to
retain gains. Lichbach (1996) posits that “any institution or social situation with a
Pareto-suboptimality supply of public good” (p. 14) cannot be sustained and will have to
give in to creating potential benefits by cooperation that make someone better off,
because accepting suboptimal condition is difficult for any rational being to do. Plott
(1976, as cited in Lichbach, 1996) has claimed that “institutions which induce prisoner’s
dilemma and the resulting inefficiencies for societies as a whole are not viable and will
soon be transformed” (p. 14).
As uncovered by some researchers (Arnold and Campbell, 1986; Baland and

43
Platteau, 1996; Morrow and Hull, 1996, as cited in Ostrom, 1998), policies based on
Hardin’s (1968) dilemma of the tragedy of commons have proven to be inadequate and
even to aggravate the situation. Policies based on assumptions that people can gain skills
by devising rules and following them—that they are able to coordinate and cooperate
when they have opportunities to create institutional arrangements—have been proven
more effective (Berkes, 1989; Bromley et al., 1992; Ellickson, 1991; Feeny et al., 1990;
McCay and Acheson, 1987; McKean and Ostrom 1995; Pinkerton, 1989; Yoder 1994, as
cited in Ostrom, 1998).
In their study on common-pool resources and the inherent dilemma of collective
action, Ostrom and her colleagues discovered that user groups with autonomy in devising
their own rules have more sustaining power than the groups ruled by government
authorities because the latter cannot restrain the behavior of free-riders (McGinnis, 1999).
McGinnis (1999) also states that this finding highlights important aspects of
governance, signifying the role of “community efforts” (p. 2) in the “context of
polycentric governance” (p. 2). Polycentric governance refers to the existence of “many
overlapping centers of authority and responsibility” (p. 2) in all levels of governance
structures from local to higher levels. Rather than an orthodox view of a sole sovereign
power exercising its authority in devising public policies, “development must occur at all
scales simultaneously with input from individuals and local communities welcomed at all
levels of political interaction” (p. 2). The “nesting of local arrangements” (p. 2) within a
larger societal context is characteristic of polycentricity. The workshop scholars believe
that polycentric governance is the only answer to educating and breeding self-organizing

44
local community groups. In the process of analyzing common-pool resource
management, noticing that some fail and others succeed in the long-term preservation of
the resource, Ostrom and her colleagues identified the institutional arrangements of
successful common-pool resource management using institutional analysis, dubbing it the
eight design principles of the common-pool resource regime.
2.1.1 E. Ostrom’s Common-pool Resource and Design Principles
Ostrom and Blomquist (1999) have argued that “not every common-pool resource
will necessarily produce a commons dilemma” (p. 61). They say that a commons
dilemma occurs when a particular situation of resource users and their “incentives” (p.
61) do not fit. Like Ostrom and Blomquist (1999), scholars like Lewis and Cowens
(1983, as cited in Ostrom and Blomquist, 1999) have built models indicating “stable,
long-term cooperative solutions” (p. 61), with others predicting the “possibility of long-
term cooperative equilibria” (p. 61). Some scholars have resorted to the “coercive
intervention of an external regulator” (p. 61) and some have tried to “privatize the
commons” (p. 61).
In the case of West Basin, an underground water basin in Los Angeles County,
California, efforts to preserve the resource were made through joint actions taken by
public and private entities. The institutional design reflecting both public and private
arrangements provided solutions for this particular resource management. Ostrom and
Blomquist (1999) have asserted two possible ways of dealing with a commons dilemma:
institutional arrangements by resource users themselves or institutional arrangements
assisted and “facilitated” (p. 62) by public institutions. The first approach, “resolution

45
without institutions” (p. 62) was introduced by Lewis and Cowens (1983, as cited in
Ostrom and Blomquist, 1999), and aims to explicate “cooperative behavior in a commons
dilemma” (p. 62) without the presence of outside influence. Their conclusion is that for
an indefinite time, “cooperative equilibrium” (p. 62) can be achieved in the case of open-
access fishery as long as resource users monitor each other’s deviant behavior for excess
harvesting and every user equally harvests.
Lewis and Cowen’s (1983, as cited in Ostrom and Blomquist, 1999) model for
solving commons dilemma, posits five necessary conditions: “information,
communication, symmetry, enforcement, and monitoring” (p. 62), which refers to
complete information, costless and honest communication; symmetrical resource use and
resultant benefits; self-enforcement until detecting other’s excessive harvest; and “perfect
and costless monitoring” (p. 64). In predicting enduring cooperative equilibrium, these
five conditions seem to be improbable—hence, many scholars cannot accept them as a
given. Therefore, Ostrom and Blomquist (1999) took these five conditions as “variables”
(p. 62) and tried to find out what “institutional arrangements” (p. 62) would bring these
variables close to the level of assumptions made by Lewis and Cowens. By doing so,
Ostrom and Blomquist found real-life resource users constructing and developing various
“institutional arrangement[s]” (p. 62) over time. Ostrom and Blomquist (1999) have
posited that the “resolution of a commons dilemma” (p. 69) relies on the “capacity to
make such (institutional) changes” (p. 69). Those institutional arrangements are:
information about the commons and use-patterns; a forum for communication
among those affected; cost-sharing formulae accepted by most participants as
being equitable; enforceable, contingent contracts; and effective monitoring of
use-patterns (Ostrom and Blomquist, 1999, p. 69).

46

Ostrom and Blomquist have also observed that groups that develop and nurture
institutional capacities through learning and adaptation can wisely deal with a commons
dilemma.
Along with uncovering these five basic institutional arrangements for resolving a
commons dilemma, Ostrom expands the research examining institutional arrangements in
diverse common-pool resource settings, including mountain meadows, forests, irrigation
systems, fisheries, and groundwater management. Through the comparisons of varying
common-pool resources worldwide, she identifies eight design principles supporting
stable and enduring common-pool resource management (McGinnis, 1999; Ostrom,
2005).
Again, contrary to the general assumptions that the central management of
resources is a must, that resource users are incapable of governing the resources, and that
outside analysts are best suited for devising the institutional rules necessary for
sustainable resources, Ostrom’s field research exhibits that self-organized local groups
are capable of managing the CPR, sometimes with or without third-party involvement.
The design principles that proved to be essential in long-lasting and “robust” (Ostrom,
2005, p. 258) CPR regimes are clearly defined boundaries, proportional equivalence
between benefits and costs, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated
sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights to organize, and
nestled enterprises (Ostrom, 2005). Recently Ostrom (2010) has updated her design
principles reflecting many scholars’ efforts in assessing the common-pool resource
condition around the world. In the revision, she differentiates “ecological” (p. 653)

47
factors from “sociological” (p. 653) factors to avoid confusion in three principles:
boundaries, costs and benefits, and monitoring. Thus, in the above three principles, two
factors are included in each of them.
2.2 Comparison between Common-Pool Resource & Regional
Collaboratives
Regional issues could, to some degree, be grouped as collective-action problems;
thus comparing them with the common-pool resource system would not be a tremendous
task. The common-pool resource issue presents one of the most challenging collective-
action cases. In search of rules for making this system “robust,” or having “adaptability
to disturbances” (Anderies, Jansses, and Ostrom, 2004, as cited in Ostrom, 2005, p. 258),
Ostrom has identified eight design principles that are distinctive to robust common-pool
resource institutions.
Ostrom (2005) has argued that CPR can be managed better locally, namely by
self-governing associations made up of appropriators rather than by central authorities.
Local residences or appropriators have the most knowledge about the resources they
depend on and have a common understanding of resource conditions. Like entities of the
CPR system, regional collaborative (RCs) are self-organizing entities that sustain,
develop, and cultivate local resources. (Resources do not necessarily refer to physical
resources, as in CPR). The meaning of resources expands to include human, financial,
environmental, and educational resources for the sustainable and viable future of regions.
RCs, though in some cases initially funded and promoted by foundations, are often self-

48
organized groups made up of concerned civic leaders and organizations seeking to better
the regions in which they reside.
Interestingly enough, Ostrom (2005) has written that “community organizations -
in federations” (p. 280) can do much more good than a single organization. The idea of
“community organizations in federations” is very similar to the concept of networks of
organizations such as RCs, whose membership is composed of representatives of
organizations. A federated group or collaborative is a more capable and versatile entity
for amassing knowledge, experience, funding, and ways of doing things than a single
organization. RCs have a greater advantage in that their membership is diversified
enough to bring different expertise to the entity to produce common goods.
It seems that the fundamental differences between common-pool resources and
RCs involve the presence of resources to allocate and the need for rule dependence in
maintaining resources. RCs have fewer resources, and thus may have less need for rules.
Because there are no existing resources to distribute among RC participants, the
provisional, appropriational, and distributional problems of CPR may not be applicable to
the RC setting. Rather, RCs could be thought of as a group of people gathered to create
resources rather than to allocate pre-existing resources.
Ostrom (2005) and others have categorized CPR by types of resources. After
recognizing that CPR faces common challenges within the CPR framework, they were
able to identify rules common to the CPR settings. In reviewing more than 80 entities
(member organizations of the Alliance for Regional Stewardship) working on regional
issues nationwide, I have observed, as well, that most groups seem to identify a handful

49
of issues as priority areas. Issues include economic development, policy advocacy,
community development (community improvement), leadership, education, information
access (telecommunication), work force development, public health, family, child care,
aging, emergency services, arts, and planning (housing, transportation, land use, etc.).
Thus, the author believes that RCs can also be generalized.
Table 2.1: Comparing Goods and Services: CPR vs. RCs

Classification of Resources and Goods

Subtractive consumption Non-subtractive consumption

Table 1

As with public goods, one person’s utilization of the outcomes and products
produced by RCs—such as indicator reports, economic forecasts, strategic plans, and so
forth—once produced, would not be subtracted from the availability for other people,
although regional limitations exist where benefits are limited to people living in a specific
region. It is almost impossible to exclude the beneficiaries once the products are
available.
According to Tang (1992), an issue related to public goods derives from the
difficulty of exclusion. Unlike the ease of excluding beneficiaries of private goods,
removing users of public goods is costly, meaning that there are fewer incentives for
individuals to participate in creating public goods. The RC setting has a provision issue
Common-pool resources
(e.g., irrigation systems)
Public goods
(e.g., outcomes produced by regional
collaboratives’ activities, police service)
Private goods
(e.g., food)
Toll goods
(e.g., toll bridge)

Costly to
Exclude:

Not costly
To exclude

50
as well, especially because membership is made up of volunteers who do not gain any
tangible benefits from participation, unlike those in the common-pool resource setting
where users have incentives to participate. Good causes, civic issues, civic mindedness,
and foresight drive concerned parties to join, which is why it is difficult to retain
membership and to recruit new members. Thus, the provision of outcomes is an issue.
The enhancement of regional interests and the betterment of the community can hardly be
seen as a direct benefit; in many cases, possible benefits are also intangible.
2.3 Adaptation of Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles to Regional
Collaboratives
Due to commonalities in dealing with collective-action issues and in being self-
organizing institutions, I found some compatibilities between common-pool resource
systems and regional collaboratives. In search of institutional design principles for
sustainable regional collaboratives, I adapted Ostrom’s (2005) eight design principles to
the regional collaborative setting. By modifying the design principles, I hoped to create
design principles applicable to the sustainability and accomplishments of regional
collaboratives.
Attuning E. Ostrom’s 8 Design Principles to the Regional Collaborative Setting:

1. “Clearly defined boundaries” (Refers to territories and rights to harvest and also
defines membership issue by certain attributes). ⇒ In the RC setting, boundaries
could be interpreted as the criteria of participation for board, general members,
and stakeholders’ membership, and also physical natural (regional) boundaries.

2. “Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs” (Refers to rules regarding
benefits consistent with costs for sustainable resources: fair rules build trust and
social mechanisms such as mutual consent). ⇒ In the RC setting, there may not
be a direct sharing of resources, but sharing financial burdens among members

51
and sharing credit and products are important practices to keep members from
developing grievances.

3. “Collective-choice arrangement” (Refers to the ability of resource users to draft
and modify rules according to changing environments if those rules are to be
abided by. One can compare rules crafted by local elites or by government
officials with ones crafted by users themselves in relation to how to increase the
participation of appropriators). ⇒ Instead of rules as in the case of common-pool
resource settings where rules are critical in the allocation of resources and also in
the minimization of conflict, collective-choice arrangements in RCs could refer to
having written visions, values, and rules (bylaws, rules and regulations, common
understandings). As they are a gathering place of issue-specific and issue-
concerned organizations, RCs are more bound by a tacit agreement to improve
and resolve regional issues. Thus the common understanding and commitment to
the agreement act as collective-choice arrangements along with rules.

4. “Monitoring” (In addition to relying on norms of trust and reciprocity, rules must
be enforced for sustainability. Users become monitors or choose their own
monitors to check biophysical conditions of resources and harvesting activities).
⇒ In the RC setting, checks and balance systems overseeing the financial
handling of RCs, board supervision of staff, evaluation of projects and annual
performance (performance-based management) are important. Monitoring also
oversees whether any big players capture all the benefits of the RCs or whether
product sharing occurs equitably.

5. “Graduated Sanctions” (Violation of rules will result in graduated sanctions, for
repeat violators, higher levels of sanctions will apply). ⇒ In the RC setting, no
comparable measures seem to exist.

6. “Conflict-resolution mechanisms” (Refers to having “access to rapid, low-cost,
local mechanisms” to resolve conflicts, which leads to long-term rule
conformance and prevents the erosion of trust as well as elite capture). ⇒ In the
RC setting, conflicts could arise from competing claims and opinions regarding
regional issues among members and stakeholders (e.g., conservation groups vs.
business groups). The resolution mechanisms could involve an open dialogue
through forums and other processes to reach an agreement.
7. “Minimal recognition of rights to organize” (Refers to government authorities’
recognition of user groups). ⇒ In the RC setting, government participation gives
legitimacy to the group in a region, which means that an RC is recognized by
government authorities, and that recognition by stakeholders is a key factor for an
organization to succeed. Minimal recognition by all stakeholders provides
perceived legitimacy to an RC. According to Human and Provan (2000),

52
legitimacy is defined as a “generalized perception that the actions, activities, and
structure” (p. 328) of an organization are “desirable and appropriate” (p. 328).
The “credibility” must be given to an organization by both membership within
RCs and outside stakeholders. It will ensure the acquisition of resources and
strengthen the commitment and obligation to the causes of organization.

8. “Nested enterprises” (Refers to where “citizens organize multiple governing
authorities at differing scales” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 283), which means keeping a
“polycentric governance” (p. 283) system. In other words, resource users would
like to keep both high-level government and local systems to garner a larger
resource system). ⇒ In the RC setting, regional collaboratives are self-organized
groups “nested in layers of governance system.” In this case, it does not
necessarily mean layers of governance of authorities but a system made up of
relationships that provides “local knowledge, inclusion of trustworthy
participants, [and] reliance on disaggregated knowledge” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 281)
to better prepare for the future of regions.*

Based on the above explanations, I propose eight Design Principles of Regional
Collaboratives adapted from Ostrom (2005).
Table 2.2: Modified 8 Design Principles
E. Ostrom’s 8 Design Principles (2005) Modified 8 Design Principles

1. Clearly defined boundaries 1A. Written boundary criteria
1B. Written membership criteria
2. Proportional equivalence bet. benefits & costs 2. Practices of benefits and costs
3. Collective-choice arrangement 3. Collective-choice arrangement

4. Monitoring 4. Monitoring
5. Graduated sanctions 5. Stakeholder recruitment
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 7. Legitimacy
8. Nested enterprises 8. Relationship structure

2.4 Research Design
This research was done by using a quantitative method to analyze the survey data.

53
The total data set was 64 organizations across the nation: 39 regional collaborative
organizations and 25 traditional alliance organizations. Hypotheses were set and tested
using Pearson Correlation. Design principles of each group were identified and two
group comparisons were done. The sources of data and survey instruments applicable for
two chapters (this chapter and Chapter 3) are stated in the overview of this dissertation.
2.4.1 Development of Design Principle Scale
Design principle scales were developed with the participation of expert groups
and through discussions with colleagues. The phone interviews with expert groups
included the following questions: What are the criteria of inclusion to induce diverse
participation at your network? What kind of mechanisms would foster commitment
among participants? What kind of mechanism is required to have effective
implementation of goals and other objectives? And what are the formal and informal
rules to make your network work better? These questions were meant to probe the basic
tenets of each collaborative and to learn the common practices among collaboratives to
devise survey indicators.
After each interview, transcriptions were created. As the questions were intended
to derive answers on membership and inclusion criteria, commitment-boosting
mechanisms, tools for effective goals and program implementation, and general
institutional arrangements, all responses from the interviews were transcribed to create a
complete list of conditions and practices of RCs. After combining common practices and
unique points, initial draft hypotheses were created and those were a total of 29 items
with 13 potential variables. From this list, each item was reviewed and categorized

54
according to its characteristics (design principles, management, or leadership) and
analyzed against the Ostrom’s design principles.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 1, “clearly defined boundaries” (p. 259), refers
to territorial and membership boundaries. As learned from the interviews, the
membership criteria of RCs pertained to qualities and conditions of membership rather
than to physical boundaries, as suspected. Thus, seven items were created to measure
membership criteria. The scale analysis showed that five out of these seven items
represented a homogeneous underlying construct: skill sets; representation of certain
groups; diverse sectoral participation; diverse issue group participation; and regional
industry representation.
(See Appendix III for Scale Analysis of Design Principles)
Although the interviews with experts did not indicate that physical boundary was
an issue in the case of RCs, to test against Ostrom’s design principles, I created the
“boundary criteria,” meaning geographical boundaries, as a part of Design Principle 1.
There were two dichotomous items and two Likert items. The scale analysis showed that
two Likert items form a homogeneous construct: the geographical region of the network
and the size of the population served by the regional network.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 2, “proportional equivalence between benefits
and costs” (p. 259), refers to rules regulating benefits and costs shared by resource users.
Experts of RCs talked about co-branding with partners, sharing financial burdens, and
product sharing. Whereas Ostrom’s rule is concerned with allocation of resources,
regional leaders were more preoccupied with sharing the advantages and disadvantages

55
of being in RCs; hence, to measure costs-benefit practices, three items were created. The
result of scale analysis showed that all three items were homogeneous: cost-sharing
practices; credit-sharing practices; and product-sharing practices.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 3, “collective choice arrangements” (p. 259),
refers to crafting operational rules by the resource users themselves and modifying them
as they see fit (Ostrom, 1993, as cited in McGinnis 1999; Ostrom, 2005). Expert
interviews showed that invisible, but binding, rules were as important as written rules
structuring governance systems. As RCs are more concerned with resolving imminent
and long-term issues facing their respective regions, and these RCs are equipped with the
power to craft their own governing rules, they believe it is critical to maintain common
values or to create visions that could hold them together—that means sustaining a level of
commitment to the vision and keeping an agreement, using any necessary devices to do
so. A total of 12 items were developed to measure rules and regulations. The scale
analysis showed two distinct constructs: structure and shared values. The structure scale
includes two items: well-established decision making procedures and a well-established
governance system. The scale of shared values includes three items: a well-established
vision; shared convictions and values in place; and action plans in place.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 4, “monitoring” (p. 259), refers to resource
users becoming monitors or choosing their own monitors for sustainable resources.
Experts of RCs share the belief in achieving accountability and having feedback loops
account for monitoring, as RCs are more about generating collective wisdom and plans to
solve regional problems than about allocating and monitoring resources. Three items

56
were developed to measure monitoring. The scale analysis showed that all three items
form a homogeneous construct. Those three items are: evaluation of projects; annual
performance reviews of staff; and observable and measurable benchmarks for each
project.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 5, “graduated sanctions” (p. 259), does not
seem to have corresponding interview results. Thus, a new principle was proposed as
written in the previous section. Under the new principle, stakeholder recruitment, four
items were developed to measure the variable. The scale analysis showed that three out
of four items represented a homogeneous construct. Those three items are: identifies
stakeholders who are necessary in creating solutions to complex regional problems; has
been successful in recruiting sought-after stakeholders or members; has been successful
in including members of the most disadvantaged groups in your region.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 6, “conflict-resolution mechanism” (p. 259),
refers to readily available local mechanisms to solve conflicts among resource users. RC
experts shared that conflicts among their membership often arise due to differing stands
on issues and values. Many RCs have open forums and dialogues to prevent unnecessary
conflicts. Three items were developed to measure the conflict-resolution mechanism.
The scale analysis showed that those three items form a homogeneous construct. Those
are: a special committee dealing with conflict resolution; written rules to resolve
conflicts; sufficient authority to craft action plans.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 7, “minimal recognition of rights to organize”
(p. 259), refers to the government recognition of the user groups. RC experts shared their

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experiences in building organizational credibility and in achieving stakeholders’
recognition through the inclusion of public agencies in the regional collaboratives. Thus,
a newly named principle, legitimacy, is proposed, and seven items were developed to
measure it. The scale analysis showed that four out of seven items form a homogeneous
construct. Those items are: well-established reputation within the region; well-
established credibility within your region; effective community champions; a critical role
in the region.
Ostrom’s (2005) Design Principle 8, “nested enterprises” (p. 259), refers to
“polycentric governance.” There were no directly comparable features from the
interview remarks. As written in the previous section, a new principle was proposed,
relationship structure. A total of six items were developed to measure the relationship
structure. The scale analysis showed that all six items were homogeneous. Those items
are: friendship and information exchanges within the regional network that induce
positive relationships; individual members who have strong and extensive personal
relationships within your regional network; individual members who are well connected
to relevant policy leaders; strong affiliations with other networks or organizations; been
maintaining strong ties with the community and region; been serving as a focal point for
and is crucial to the life of the community and region.
The dependent variables are sustainability and accomplishments. To measure
sustainability, a total of 19 items were developed. The 19 items included seven
descriptive questions as well. The results of scale analysis showed two distinct
constructs: maintaining influence and stability. The scale of maintaining influence

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include: an impact on the region; the capability of maintaining its current level of
performance in the future; success in influencing policy making processes at any level of
government decision-making. The scale of stability includes: vulnerability to
unpredictable outside disturbances and success in retaining members.
Four scales were developed under the other dependent variable, accomplishments,
and the scale analysis showed that all four scales were homogeneous. Those scales are:
has accomplished what it set out to do; has been satisfactory in its accomplishments thus
far; is considered a solution provider on regional issues; has identified regional issues and
provided solutions.
2.4.2 Hypotheses

The rationales and theoretical backgrounds of Design Principles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6
are not repeated in this section as those principles are based on E. Ostrom’s original
design principles, which were explained in previous sections.

Design Principle 1 (membership & boundary criteria)
Hypothesis 1A: The better the written membership criteria of regional collaboratives, the
greater the sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 1B: The better the written membership criteria of regional collaboratives, the
greater the accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Hypothesis 1C: The better the written boundary criteria of regional collaboratives, the
greater the sustainability of regional collaboratives.

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Hypothesis 1D: The better the written boundary criteria of regional collaboratives, the
greater the accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Design Principle 2 (cost-benefit practices)
Hypothesis 2A: The better the practices of benefits and costs sharing among members of
regional collaboratives, the greater the sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 2B: The better the practices of benefits and costs sharing among members of
regional collaboratives, the greater the accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Design Principle 3 (rules and regulations – two constructs: structure, shared values)
Hypothesis 3A: The better the structure of regional collaboratives, the greater the
sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 3B: The better the structure of regional collaboratives, the greater the
accomplishments of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 3C: The greater the degree of shared values of regional collaboratives, the
greater the sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 3D: The greater the degree of shared values of regional collaboratives, the
greater the accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Design Principle 4 (monitoring)
Hypothesis 4A: The greater the degree of monitoring activities on programs and
resources, the greater the sustainability of regional collaboratives.

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Hypothesis 4B: The greater the degree of monitoring activities on programs and
resources, the greater the accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Design Principle 5 (stakeholder recruitment)
A case study by Innes and Rongerude (2005) has illustrated that the recruitment
of politically well-connected and knowledgeable stakeholders is critical to moving a
regional collaborative forward to solve issues. In the system of interorganizational
collaboration, or where diverse interest groups are gathered, Gray (1985) has emphasized
the major role that stakeholders play. Stakeholders bring the issues forward or identify
them and also find solutions to them. So that the body can effectively respond to
problems, the assembly of stakeholders must have expertise in certain fields and mirrors
the needs of current agendas. The depository of a “sufficient requisite variety” (Ashby,
1960, as cited in Gray, 1985, p. 919) of stakeholders is a precursor to the success of any
collaboration. Therefore, continuous stakeholder outreach and recruitment is crucial to
the sustainability and accomplishments of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 5A: The more continuous that stakeholder outreach and recruitment efforts
are, the greater the sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 5B: The more continuous that stakeholder outreach and recruitment efforts
are, the greater the accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Design Principle 6 (conflict-resolution mechanism)
Hypothesis 6A: The better the conflict-resolution mechanisms, the greater the

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sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 6B: The better the conflict-resolution mechanisms, the greater the
accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Design Principle 7 (legitimacy)
For organizations to be durable, the entity must be viewed as legitimate and
credible (Human and Provan, 2000). Legitimacy is recognition and acceptance by all
stakeholders (Human and Provan, 2000). Internal and external stakeholders must
approve not only the organization, but also the issues and agendas (Raaij, 2006). In the
case of RCs, legitimacy-building processes and earning legitimacy are even more critical
due to the regional collaborative’s operation as a place of multiple intertwining interests,
and the reality that the impact of decisions could be tremendous, considering the size of
populations and geographical scale that RCs cover. Gaining the support and approval of
regional stakeholders (including government authorities, funders, members, and civic
groups) is directly connected to the survival of RCs.
Hypothesis 7A: The greater the legitimacy of regional collaboratives, the greater the
sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 7B: The greater the legitimacy of regional collaboratives, the greater the
accomplishments of regional collaboratives.
.

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Design Principle 8 (relationship structure)
Labianca and Brass (2006) have defined social capital as an individual’s position
within a social network and his or her potential ability to improve the group because of
his or her social contacts (Burt, 1992, 1997; Coleman, 1988, 1990, as cited in Labianca
and Brass, 2006). Because individuals’ social contacts create benefits for them and for
the organizations to which they belong, regional collaboratives depend on the derivative
effect of each relationship that members have. Also as an organizational unit, regional
collaboratives have an evolving relationship structure, in which internal and external
individual relationship exchanges are necessary for information exchanges and for the
system to sustain itself.
Hypothesis 8A: The stronger the relationships built by individual members of regional
collaboratives, the greater the sustainability of regional collaboratives.
Hypothesis 8B: The stronger the relationships built by individual members of regional
collaboratives, the greater the accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

2.4.3 Statistical Approach
Hypotheses were set and tested by Pearson Correlation. The correlation
coefficient was a standardized effect size, so I could compare the magnitude of effects
and test the differences of correlation coefficients and their significance. The
multivariate approaches were not conducted because of the relatively small sample size;
nonparametric approaches have the drawback in that they have less power and do not
allow for statistical tests to compare different correlation coefficients.

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In each hypothesis, independent variables were design principles (membership
and boundary criteria, costs-benefits sharing practices, collective choice arrangements—
rules and regulations, monitoring activities, stakeholder recruitment, conflict-resolution
mechanisms, legitimacy, relationship structure), and dependent variables were
sustainability and accomplishments.
2.5 Empirical Findings
Results of the Pearson Correlation are provided to show the predictors of the
design principles for each respective two groups: regional collaboratives and the
traditional alliance groups. Also a comparison of the two groups is undertaken to
examine if any glaring differences exist.
(See Table 2.3 for Pearson Correlations on Design Principles)
2.5.1 Statistical Findings of Pearson Correlation
As previously discussed, the primary outcome of sustainability is
multidimensional and composed of two facets: maintaining influence and stability. The
other primary outcome, accomplishments, is unidimensional; thus, there are no subscales.
Design Principle 1: Membership and Boundary Criteria
In the regional collaborative (RCs) group (target group), membership and
boundary criteria showed no statistically significant relationship to sustainability or
accomplishments of the regional collaboratives.
In the traditional alliance group, membership and boundary criteria also did not
have any relationship with either sustainability or accomplishments.

64
The reason why membership and boundary criteria were not statistically
significant for RCs was perhaps because these groups’ activities and programs depended
on participation from various professional, industrial, and sectoral representatives, as well
as from multigeographical areas. The result of the traditional alliance was perhaps due to
the same reason as the results for RCs.
Design Principle 2: Cost-Benefit Practices
In the RCs group, cost-benefit practices showed no statistically significant
relationship to either sustainability or accomplishments.
In the traditional alliance group, the costs-benefits practices did not show any
relationship to either dependent variable.
One explanation for the results in the RCs group could be that membership dues
and other associated costs were not related directly to the benefits they received from the
RCs. Regardless of whether a member pays the dues or not, the benefits can still be
enjoyed. Because not all RCs are membership organizations and the cost of producing
benefits are often time borne by contributions and grants, a strict sense of costs and
benefits sharing practices might not be paramount to the survival of RCs.
The traditional alliance groups’ sustainability and accomplishments may not
necessarily be related with the costs and benefits sharing practices because many of them
are service providers or government alliances, where costs associated with producing
benefits are mostly borne by grants, fees, and government funding.

65
Design Principle 3: Rules and Regulations (two constructs: structure, shared values)

In the RCs group, both structure (r =.447, p =.008) and shared values (r =.375,
p=.029) were strongly associated with accomplishments. Structure and shared values in
enforcing the governance system of collaboratives among its membership seemed to play
a critical role in accomplishing goals and objectives.
In the traditional alliance group, structure (r =.477, p =.025) was positively
associated with maintaining influence, a subscale of sustainability. It is also positively
associated with accomplishments (r =.465, p =.025). Shared values (r =.724, p =.000)
also were strongly associated with maintaining influence. It is also positively associated
with accomplishments (r =.665, p =.001).
Notably, both structure and shared values were related to the accomplishments of
the RCs and the traditional alliance group. It seems that governing mechanisms and
shared values both support the groups better in providing products to respective regions
and communities, thus achieving the established goals.
Design Principle 4: Monitoring
In the RCs group, monitoring was associated with maintaining influence (r =.358,
p =.037). It is also associated with accomplishments (r =.591, p =.000). It could be said
that monitoring activities, such as staff review and project evaluations, are directly related
to the accomplishments of specific goals and, as a result, the accomplishment of goals
and providing regional solutions are associated with maintaining influence within the
region, thus increasing sustainability.

66
In the traditional alliance group, monitoring (r =.668, p =.000) was only
associated with accomplishments. Monitoring or managing performance in the
collaboration of alliances is not only to evaluate but also to “control/steer/coordinate,
motivate, promote, celebrate, learn, and to improve” (Imperial, 2004, p. 401). As such,
the concept of monitoring encompasses an entire aspect of performance management; in
that regard, it is easy to understand why monitoring could be associated with
accomplishments.
Design Principle 5: Stakeholder Recruitment
In the RCs group, stakeholder recruitment showed no statistically significant
relationship to either predicted outcomes.
In the traditional alliance group, stakeholder recruitment (r =.491, p =.017) was
associated with the accomplishments.
Gray (1985) has emphasized that for a successful “inter-organizational
collaboration,” the pool of stakeholders must reflect the diverse and complicated nature
of issues to be addressed. Thus the more stakeholders involve in decision-making
processes, the greater the outcome will be. It is difficult to grasp why stakeholder
recruitment is not related to either dependent variables in the RCs group; however, in the
traditional alliance group, the role of stakeholders and their continuous participation are
essential, which is an idea supported by other studies.
Design Principle 6: Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms
In the RCs group, conflict-resolution mechanisms showed no statistically
significant relationship to either predicted outcomes.

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In the traditional alliance group, the presence of a conflict-resolution mechanism
(r =.636, p =.001) was strongly associated with maintaining influence. The resolution of
discord among members with readily available in-house conflict-resolution mechanisms
helps preserve the RCs. As diverse interests and sectors are represented in RCs, the
management of member organizations’ conflicting interests and claims is a challenge. It
seems that long-lasting RCs must be equipped with conflict-resolution mechanisms. The
nature of conflict could be different in the traditional alliance group as compared with the
RCs, but having some sort of conflict-resolution mechanism can certainly increase an
organization’s ability to maintain influence.
Design Principle 7: Perceived Legitimacy
In the RCs group, legitimacy (r =.372, p =.030) was associated with maintaining
influence. Also, legitimacy was highly associated with accomplishments (r =.589, p
=.000) of the RCs. A positive reputation and the credibility of an RC would bring proper
recognition to the group, and therefore legitimize the activities of the entity, thus
enhancing both the sustainability and accomplishments of RCs.
In the traditional alliance group, legitimacy was strongly associated with
maintaining influence (r =.631, p=.002). It is also strongly associated with
accomplishments (r =.727, p=.000).
The establishment of legitimacy is critical for any organization to be sustainable.
Human and Provan (2000) have stated that the “survival” (p. 328) of an organization
“depends” (p. 328) on its acceptance by the same communities and environment of which
the organization is a member. Thus, the finding is consistent with the theory.

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Design Principle 8: Relationship Structure
In the RCs group, the relationship structure was strongly associated with the
accomplishments (r =.476, p =.004). The results show that friendship and information
exchange within and outside the network, including communities and policy leaders, are
important features in enhancing the accomplishments.

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Table 2.3 Pearson Correlations on Design Principles

RC Group Trad. Group
Sustainability Accom-
plishmen
t
Sustainability Accom-
plishment
Variables M I Stb Acc M I Stb Acc
Design
Principle 1

•Membership
Criteria
r=-.162
p=.369
N=33
r=.135
p=.455
N=33
r=.058
p=.750
N=33
r=-.324
p=.141
N=22
r=.009
p=.967
N=22
r=-.208
p=.352
N=22

•Boundary
Criteria
r=.193
p=.274
N=34
r=-.048
p=.786
N=34
r=.171
p=.333
N=34
r=.054
p=.812
N=22
r=.186
p=.406
N=22
r=.278
p=.198
N=23
Design
Principle 2
Cost-Benefit
Practices
r=.316
p=.073
N=33
r=-.021
p=.907
N=33
r=.175
p=.330
N=33
r=.353
p=.107
N=22
r=.321
p=.145
N=22
r=-.241
p=.268
N=23
Design
Principle 3
Rules &
Regulations.
•Structure
r=.310
p=.075
N=34
r=.012
p=.945
N=34
r=.447**
p=.008
N=34
r=.477*
p=.025
N=22
r=.362
p=.097
N=22
r=.465*
p=.025
N=23
•Shared
Values

r=.306
p=.078
N=34
r=.247
p=.159
N=34
r=.375*
p=.029
N=34
r=.724**
p=.000
N=22
r=.162
p=.471
N=22
r=.665**
p=.001
N=23
Design
Principle 4
Monitoring r=.358*
p=.037
N=34
r=.053
p=.764
N=34
r=.591**
p=.000
N=34
r=.353
p=.107
N=22
r=.280
p=.206
N=22
r=.668**
p=.000
N=23
Design
Principle 5
Stakeholder
Recruitment
r=.225
p=.202
N=34
r=.013
p=.942
N=34
r=.215
p=.222
N=34
r=.378
p=.083
N=22
r=.433
p=.044
N=22
r=.491*
p=.017
N=23
Design
Principle 6
Conflict-
Resolution
Mechanism

r=.200
p=.264
N=33
r=-.154
p=.392
N=33
r=.051
p=.779
N=33
r=.636**
p=.001
N=22
r=.044
p=.846
N=22
r=.328
p=.127
N=23
Design
Principle 7
Perceived
Legitimacy
r=.372*
p=.030
N=34
r=-.067
p=.707
N=34
r=.589**
p=.000
N=34
r=.631**
p=.002
N=22
r=.239
p=.285
N=22
r=.727**
p=.000
N=23
Design
Principle 8
Relationship
Structure

r=.324
p==.061
N=34
r=.018
p=.920
N=34
r=.476**
p=.004
N=34
r=.573**
p=.005
N=22
r=.356
p=.104
N=22
r=.496*
p=.016
N=23
Correlations Table
r= Pearson Correlation
p=Significance
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
N=sample number
M I= Maintaining Influence
Stb= Stability
Acc= Accomplishments

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In the traditional alliance group, the relationship structure (r =.496, p =.016) was
associated with the accomplishments. It was also associated with maintaining influence
(r =.573, p =.005). The same reason stated in the above case of RCs could be applied to
traditional alliances.
2.5.2 Limitations
Despite efforts to conduct rigorous scientific research, this study has some
limitations. If more potential respondents to the survey had been available, the number of
respondents to the survey would have increased, providing a greater respondent pool to
analyze. But, the total available number of organizations to contact was limited due to
the nature of study, which sought a specific type of regional organization not easily
found. However, the survey had a high response rate, which supports the validity of the
study outcomes. In addition, the survey instruments could have been improved to
increase the accuracy of the findings.

2.6 Discussion

Searching for elements creating sustainable and successful collaborative
governance systems among the adapted eight design principles from E. Ostrom (2005),
monitoring (Design Principle 4), and legitimacy (Design Principle 7) predicted
maintaining influence (one of the facets in sustainability) in the case of RCs.
Rules and regulations (structure, shared values: Design Principle 3), monitoring
(Design Principle 4), legitimacy (Design Principle 7), and relationship structure (Design
Principle 8) predicted the accomplishments of RCs.

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Generally speaking, in the RCs group, the design principles are related more
strongly to accomplishments than to any subscales of sustainability.
In RCs, monitoring (Design Principle 4) and legitimacy (Design Principle 7) were
predictors for both maintaining influence (one of the facets in sustainability) and
accomplishments. The possible reasons that monitoring is an essential design principle in
RCs are that monitoring and evaluating programs and staff help ensure accomplishments
by holding RCs accountable for their promises. In addition, constructing legitimacy
within the region by forging a positive image and reputation as a regional leader that
resolves issues is another key component to creating a sustainable organization.
However, it was rather surprising to find that the other six design principles
(membership and boundary criteria, cost-benefit practices, rules and regulations, conflict-
resolution mechanism, stakeholder recruitment, relationship structure) did not predict any
facets in the outcome of sustainability.
In the case of membership and boundary criteria, unlike the users of resource
systems studied by E. Ostrom (2005) and her colleagues, membership and physical
boundaries did not account for any facets in sustainability and accomplishments of RCs.
Representation of various sectors, skills in the membership, and the size of populations
and their geographical regions did not secure either of the predicted outcomes of the
collaboratives. The reasons for these findings could be attributed to the fact that the
regional collaboratives’ issue areas are more diverse than the resource system users;
therefore, a strict membership control may have a negative effect on inducing synergistic
energy in creating regional solutions. Conceivably, the same reason could be applied to

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Table 2.4: Summary of Findings on Design Principles
Outcomes
Sustainability Accomplishments
Regional
Collaboratives
Maintaining Influence Stability
1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared Values
2. Monitoring
3. Legitimacy
4. Relationship Structure

1. Monitoring

2. Legitimacy

Traditional
Alliances
1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared
Values

2. Conflict Resolution
Mechanism

3. Legitimacy

4. Relationship Structure

1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared Values
2. Monitoring
3. Stakeholder Recruitment
4. Legitimacy
5. Relationship Structure

Underlined are common predictors for both sustainability and accomplishments in RCs and traditional alliances.
the traditional alliance groups.
In traditional alliances, rules and regulations (Design Principle 3), conflict-
resolution mechanism (Design Principle 6), legitimacy (Design Principle 7), and
relationship structure (Design Principle 8) predicted the ability to maintaining influence
(one of the facets in sustainability).
Rules and regulations (Design Principle 3), monitoring (Design Principle 4),
stakeholder recruitment (Design Principle 5), legitimacy (Design Principle 7), and
relationship structure (Design Principle 8) predicted the accomplishments. Among all the
variables, shared values (one of the facets in the rules and regulations) and legitimacy
have the largest associations, affecting both predicted outcomes.
E. Ostrom (2005) has enumerated eight design principles found in robust self-
organizing common-pool resource systems. In this study of robust, self-governing RCs,
only two design principles—monitoring (Design Principle 4) and legitimacy (Design

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Principle 7)—were identified empirically to predict at least one facet in the outcome of
sustainability. Monitoring and legitimacy both predict maintaining influence. The
findings are believed to be congruent with the fact that RCs are difficult to sustain, as has
been demonstrated when groups have lapsed or become inactive. In other words, it is
challenging to detect the elements composing the institutional arrangements of RCs as
they face many predicaments in operation.
Awarding grants to RCs or to collaborative governance systems that require the
institutions to have positive relationship structures within the membership body and with
other entities may be something to consider, as this practice has been a mandatory
condition by governments over the years and may serve to induce sustainable RCs as
well.

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CHAPTER 3: NETWORK MANAGEMENT AND
LEADERSHIP
A regional collaborative (RC) is an alliance or network of organizations
composed of autonomous entities mostly representing organizations on their own. Its
governance structure is suggestive of an alternative as Powell (1990) mentioned.
Though most of their networks are organized into nonprofit groups, RCs have paid staff,
boards of directors, and other supportive members, and are not hierarchical organizations
with top-down agenda-setting or control mechanisms. Together, the paid staff, board
members, and general members set goals, share information and knowledge, and
implement plans through deliberative team-building processes. According to Innes and
Rongerude (2005), through collaborative processes, members of each RC bring interested
individuals and organizations into the group and create a structure of networking that
serves as a key aspect in creating social and political capital for solving regional issues.
Mostly organized into formal nonprofit organizations, RCs face management and
leadership issues just as any other organization does. In many ways, the challenges are
even greater given that RCs are made up of representatives from multiple sectors.
Oftentimes, these sectoral and organizational representatives have different interests and
goals, which can result in conflict among member organizations. Managing and leading
these alliances or networks of RCs can be very challenging and is a critical issue in the
sustainability of RCs. This chapter identifies the management and leadership principles
of RCs and traditional alliances.

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3.1 Theoretical Overview
Notably, managing alliances and networks is not entirely different from managing
single organizations (Page, 2003). Because alliances and networks are viewed as an
administrative unit with functions and capacities (Kogut, 1988; Mowery, 1988; both cited
in Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997) or an institutional unit that delivers “goods, services,
[and] knowledge” (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997, p. 272), their actions are no different
from ordinary organizations. However, in alliances and networks, additional
expectations exist. Managing relationships (Spekman, Isabella, McAvoy, and Forbes III,
1996) is key to managing collaborative activities, an ability that relates directly to the
particular leadership skill set needed for networking management, which is necessary on
top of the leadership qualities needed in networks and alliances.
3.1.1 Management and Leadership of Alliances and Networks
As public agencies increasingly engage in interorganizational collaborations for
the delivery of public services, scholars have been studying management strategies and
principles appropriate to interorganizational management. Along with management
issues, interorganizational leadership has been an important research topic as well.
Delineating the two issues presents challenges because leadership skills and qualities
manifest themselves in management, performance of organization, and outcome of
performance as well.
In their study of U.S. public education systems, Meier and O’Toole (2001) argue
that “networking management matters” (p. 279). Management is about what kind of
choices and decisions need to be made in a given situation, which is associated not only

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with general organizational performance but also with all the “constraints and resources”
(p. 286) an organization faces, which ultimately reside under the manager’s purview.
In an effort to apply the management strategies of a single agency to an
interorganizational setting, Page (2003) has identified commonalities about single agency
management in the literature on entrepreneurial public management. Among them are:
having “missions and goals” (p. 312) to garner support from “external stakeholders” (p.
312); being held accountable to citizens and legislators and increasing the legitimacy of
their “efforts” (p. 313) by increasing stakeholder participation (Feldman and Khademian,
2000; Moore, 1995, as cited in Page, 2003); making programs and processes responsive
to clients (Moore, 1995; Rosenthal, 1982, as cited in Page, 2003); and improving staff
member performance measurement systems (Kettle, 2000; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997, as
cited in Page, 2003). As Page (2003) and others have shown, many management and
leadership fundamentals do not change in alliance or network settings but additional
skills and expectations arise.
Network management is expected to engage in collaboration with participating
organizations and stakeholders. The role of network managers is presumed to be that of
“facilitator, broker, and mediator” (Bueren, Klijin, and Koppenjan, 2003, p. 197). In the
preparation stage for this dissertation, expert interviews were conducted, during which
many people characterized leaders of RCs as brokers and facilitators who bring all
stakeholders together and coordinate and collaborate among divergent entities. Leaders
and managers of such alliances need to take on disparate roles for different life cycle

77
stages as “visionary, strategic sponsor, advocate, [and] networker” (Spekman et al., 1996,
p. 761).
Mitchell and Shortell (2000) have described network management in the
following terms:
engaging and maintaining organizational members’ interest in a shared vision and
mission; implementing the chosen strategies by providing appropriate structures
and coordination mechanisms; developing ways to promote constructive conflict
and manage destructive conflict; implementing information systems to monitor
progress over time; adjusting to changes that occur in leadership, in the overall
membership, and in the community at large; dealing with related factors (p. 243).

The above-mentioned tasks should be administered by those who are equipped with
“managerial acumen, the ability to relate to others, [and] leadership abilities”—all
common attributes among accomplished joint venture managers (Parker, Zeira, and
Hatem, 1993, as cited in Spekman et al., 1996, p.764). Nevertheless, institutional
challenges present themselves to network managers: “poor governance, short-term
interest, weak enforcement, inappropriate incentives and penalties, inequity, vested
interests and corruption, inter-sectoral conflicts, poor training, [and] weak motivation”
(Karsenty, 2000; Puts, Dykstra, and Heinrich, 2000a, as cited in Sheil, Nasi, and Johnson,
2004, p. 6). These institutional and managerial undertakings are the very reasons that
many RCs struggle and often dissolve. Conflicts coming from sectoral differences,
governance issues emanating from weak engagement with the board of directors, and
poor organizational capacity are typical issues with which RCs contend.
Another critical component in managing alliances involves managing
relationships. According to Spekman et al. (1996), the creation of alliances engenders

78
formal and informal relationships. Formal relationship boundaries often manifest
themselves in the control of structure, contracts and agreements, and other operational
issues. Personal qualities also assist managers and leaders of alliances to perform their
duties better. Turning adversarial conditions, such as what Sheil et al. (2004) mentioned
above, to a manager’s advantage is part of these relationships.
Cullen et al. (2000) have also emphasized that giving attention to the “soft side”
(p. 223) of management is just as important as addressing hard core management issues
in an alliance. They refer to the soft side as the “development and management of
relationship capital” (p. 223), specifically trust and commitment. Trust can be explained
rationally and emotionally. The rational side of trust, “credibility trust” (p. 225), occurs
when a partner in an alliance begins to believe that the counterpart has the “intent and
ability” (p. 225) to deliver what has been promised for the alliance (Johnson, Cullen, and
Sakano, 1996, as cited in Cullen et al., 2000). It encompasses reliability upon a partner’s
capacity to bring said resources and techniques—such as including tacit knowledge—and
to actually apply them to the alliance. The emotional side of trust, “benevolent trust” (p.
225), occurs when a partner in an alliance begins to show “goodwill” (p. 225) toward the
alliance—much like having faith that a partner will endure hardships in the relationship.
Without being able to manage relationships, which is the most coveted and an imperative
skill in managing an RC, alliances cannot be sustained. Building trust and inducing
commitment in the nonprofit settings of the RC is a crucial asset.
Commitment can also be explained in rational and emotional terms, or what they
call instrumental and attitudinal terms (Becker, 1960; Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1982,

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as cited in Cullen et al., 2000). “Calculative commitment” (p. 226), on the instrumental
side, is based on expectations of economic gain and reward from being in the alliance.
On the emotional side, “attitudinal commitment” (p. 226) occurs when partners become
such strong advocates of the alliance that they would go the extra mile to make sure the
alliance maintains a working relationship. Thus, commitment means that partners are
willing to continue the relationship. Trust and commitment are important in alliance
setting because no complete formal contracts can foretell all possible events and cases,
and conflicts and differences of opinions and cultures can inhibit the healthy operation of
alliances. According to Robertson and Tang (1995), credible commitment is difficult to
induce in the interorganizational relationship when no strict constraints for deviant
behavior exist. Trust and commitment can fill gaps in formal contracts and potential
conflicts. Moreover, mutual commitment induces “fair exchange” and reciprocity; in
turn, those factors reinforce the relationship within the alliance.
Vangen and Huxham (2003a) have argued that although practitioners may
emphasize the trust factor for successful collaboration, lack of trust does not necessarily
lead to the failure of the collaboration. Trust among partners in collaboration cannot be
easily cultivated; thus, they claim that “predict[ing] others’ behaviors” (p. 26) is an
essential element for success. Namely, managing trust is a more realistic objective for
achieving collaboration. As they have explained, “Trust management is about managing
the risk and vulnerability inherent in the collaborative situation” (p. 26).
Huxham and Vangen (2000) stated that in the presence of “collaborative inertia”
(p. 1160), what “makes things happen” (p. 1160) is “leadership” (p.1160). This

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leadership is not only recognized by members in the collaboratives but also arises
throughout the “collaborative structures and processes” (p. 1160). In RCs, leadership is
generated by governing the RC itself and in the structures where multiple players gather
and making all the transaction decisions.
Also, as Osborn et al. (2002) have argued, leadership is embedded in the context
and is socially constructed. His definition of leadership is:
the incremental influence of position holders exercised via direct and indirect
means to maintain and or alter the existing dynamics in and of a system.
Incremental influence is that having an impact beyond other formally designated
aspects of the system (p. 804).

Organizational networks of RCs depend on the social relations of actors and their
embedded structure. The embeddedness of each RC can shape and determine success
and failure. Population, nature and purpose, contingency and opportunity, actors, and
other exogenous and endogenous factors that RCs face are all different. Thus, their
embedded social structure will be different accordingly and will induce unique
leadership.
Recognizing that numerous theories and perspectives relate to leadership,
Huxham and Vangen (2000) attempted to explain various facets about it. The leadership
traits approach tries to classify the “personal characteristics of successful leaders, the
style approach focuses on leadership behaviors” (Argyris, 1953; Stogdill, 1948, all as
cited in Huxham and Vangen, 2000, p. 1160), and contingency or situational approaches
emphasize a particular organizational situation (Avolio, Howell, and Sosik, 1999; Fiedler,
1967; Graeff, 1983; Hersey and Blanchard, 1977; Howell, Dorfman, and Kerr, 1986, all
as cited in Huxham and Vangen, 2000). The leader-member exchange theory suggests

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that leaders develop different types of relationships with different members (Phillips and
Bedeian, 1994; Schriesheim, Neider, and Scandura, 1998; Sparrow and Liden, 1997;
Wayne, Shore, and Liden, 1997, all as cited in Huxham and Vangen, 2000). In the
transformational, visionary, or charismatic approach, leaders are seen as “managers of
meaning” (Bryman, 1996, p. 280, as cited in Huxham and Vangen, 2000, p. 1160), who
raise the aspirations of followers in such a way that fuses the leaders’ and followers’
aspirations (Bass, 1985, Burns, 1978; Pawar and Eastman, 1987; Shamir, House, and
Arthur, 1993, all as cited in Huxham and Vangen, 2000, p. 1160).
In addition to all of those varied perspectives of leaders, the performance of
network leaders is viewed as critical to ascertaining the success of networks and alliances
as a person brings alliance partners together (Spekman et al., 1996). A leader in an
enduring and successful network or alliance has “interpersonal skills, alliance mindset,
plurality of intellect” (Gardner, 1993, as cited in Spekman et al., 1996, p. 765), “manages
uncertainty” (McCaskey, 1982, as cited in Spekman et al., 1996, p. 765), [and is a] “risk
taker, reflective, careful listener, open to new ideas” (Knotter, 1996, cited in Spekman et
al., 1996, p. 766), [and has a] “commitment to learning, seek[s] challenges” (Spekman et
al., 1998). Also Huxham and Vangen (2000) have also suggested a different type of
leadership that adapts to changing organizational forms, which they describe as
“collaborative leadership that is inspiring, nurturing, supporting, communicating with
individuals, teams, networks, communities” (p. 1161).
More than anything else, for leadership of networks, Crosby and Bryson (2004)
have posited for the “leadership for the common good framework” (p. 177), in which

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policy makers and bureaucrats, in collaboration with stakeholders, work on projects that
respond to the needs of community. In that framework, power is dispersed among
divergent stakeholders where “information” (p. 205) and “resources” (p. 205) are used for
common goals. To facilitate common beliefs and an understanding of issues, “forums,
arenas, [and] courts” (p. 206) are used. Also Crosby and Bryson (2004) postulate eight
“leadership capabilities: leadership in context (understanding the social, political,
economic, and technological givens), personal leadership, team leadership, organizational
leadership, visionary leadership, political leadership, ethical leadership, and policy
entrepreneurship” (p. 188).
According to Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch (2002), another significant characteristics
of network leadership concerns that the “depth and breadth” (p. 818) of the leader’s
network and its effect and prominence over information; anyone associated with the
networks is a medium for communication and for distributing ideas and intelligence to
the network. The “quality, quantity, flow, and processing” (p. 818) of information in
each leader’s individual network varies in that the leadership ability in a network setting
should be measured against those conditions mentioned above.
3.2 Research Design and Methods
This chapter is a continuation of Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The
questionnaires used for this chapter are part of entire questionnaires circulated and
completed by survey participants. (See Chapter 2 for the research design and Chapter 1
for the sources of data and survey instruments).

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3.2.1 Scale Analyses
As this chapter is a continuation of Chapter 2, the scale analyses were conducted
in the same manner as those of the preceding chapter.
(For details, see Chapter 2 of the Development of Design Principle Scale, and also
see Appendix IV for Scale Analysis of Management and Leadership Elements.)
The following is a brief summary of the scale analyses of network management
and leadership elements. In total, network management and leadership include four
variables: network management; communication; cohesion; and collaborative leadership.
All the variables are multidimensional in their constructs. There are three distinct
constructs in the variable network management: member capacity; organizational
capacity; and programmatic capacity. The communication variable has three constructs:
frequent information sharing; web and phone contact; and media coverage. In the
variable cohesion, two constructs exist: membership behavior and homophily; and
continuous membership. In the variable collaborative leadership, there are four
constructs: personal qualities and skills; organizational leadership; network leadership;
and political skills.
3.2.2 Hypotheses

Network Management
(three constructs: member capacity; organizational capacity; and programmatic
capacity)

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a) member capacity
Network management is crucial to sustaining networks. Collaboratives with
built-in network management capacity - member capacity - enhance the sustainability of
an organization (Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, and Allen, 2001).
Foster-Fishman et al. (2001), who have sought to identify core faculties of
“collaborative capacity,” meaning “conditions needed for coalitions to promote effective
collaboration and build sustainable community change” (Goodman, Speers, McLeroy,
Fawcett, Kegler, Parker, Smith, Sterling, and Wallerstein, 1998, as cited in Foster-
Fishman, 2001, p. 242), illustrate a framework for facilitating collaboration. They
explicate four levels of collaborative capacity: “member capacity, relational capacity,
organizational capacity, and programmatic capacity” (p. 41).
Because volunteer members and board members, or other stakeholders, gather to
resolve regional issues, collaboratives depend on the skills and knowledge these members
bring to perform the projects and initiatives of each group. In other words, the capacity
of members is one of many resources that collaboratives seek and they must nurture these
resources in order to enhance the sustainability of organizations. Foster-Fishman et al.
(2001) also suggest that the “ability to work collaboratively, ability to create and build an
effective program, ability to build an effective coalition infrastructure, holds positive
attitudes about collaboration, etc.” (p. 244).
Hypothesis 1A: Regional collaboratives with more developed member capacities will be
more sustainable.

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Hypothesis 1B: Regional collaboratives with more developed member capacities will
achieve more accomplishments.
b) organizational capacity
Collaboratives with built-in network management capacity - organizational
capacity - enhance the sustainability of the organization (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001).
To assist members to be an active part of collaboratives, organizations must offer
leadership that integrates individual skills and knowledge as organizational assets to
further goals. Structuring collaboratives so that staff roles and responsibilities are clearly
delineated improves performance. For effective information sharing, external and
internal communication has to be in place. Collaboratives must be able to procure
financial resources to deliver the objectives. Also the collaborative must be willing to be
a learning organization that is able to adapt to changing environments (Foster-Fishman et
al., 2001).
Hypothesis 1C: Regional collaboratives with more developed organizational capacities
will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 1D: Regional collaboratives with more developed organizational capacities
will achieve more accomplishments.
c) programmatic capacity
Collaboratives with built-in network management capacity - programmatic
capacity - would enhance the sustainability of the organization (Foster-Fishman et al.,
2001). Whether collaboratives are directly engaged in projects and initiatives or are just
convening new project ideas, the capacity to implement projects is crucial to becoming a

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meaningful collaborative in any region. This capacity includes having clear program
goals and objectives, developing programs fitting regional needs, and implementing
culturally competent programs (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001).
Hypothesis 1E: Regional collaboratives with more developed programmatic capacities
will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 1F: Regional collaboratives with more developed programmatic capacities
will achieve more accomplishments.
Communication
(three constructs: frequent information sharing; web and phone contact; and media
coverage)

Constant communication to keep members and stakeholders informed fosters
commitment and trust among members of regional collaboratives. Frequent
communication among members, stakeholders and the administrative body also generates
legitimacy, commitment, and trust, which enhances an organization’s chance for
sustainability.
Hypothesis 2A: Regional collaboratives with more frequent information sharing
practices among members and stakeholders will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 2B: Regional collaboratives with more frequent information sharing
practices among members and stakeholders will achieve more accomplishments.
Hypothesis 2C: Regional collaboratives with more web and phone contacts among
members and stakeholders will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 2D: Regional collaboratives with more web and phone contacts among
members and stakeholders will achieve more accomplishments.

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Hypothesis 2E: Regional collaboratives with more media coverage among members and
stakeholders will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 2F: Regional collaboratives with more media coverage among members and
stakeholders will achieve more accomplishments.

Cohesion
(two constructs: membership behavior and homophily; continuous membership)
“Greater perceived cohesion produces greater commitment to the exchange
relation” (Kanter, 1968, as cited in Lawler and Yoon, 1998, p. 872). Greater perceived
cohesion within regional collaboratives would foster commitment among members of
regional collaboratives.
According to Lawler and Yoon’s “theory of relational cohesion” (Lawler and
Yoon 1993, 1995, 1996, as cited in Lawler and Yoon, 1998. p. 872), human relationships
within given social structures render “cohesion and commitment” indirectly:
first, social structure makes some pairs of actors more likely to exchange than
others; second, frequent exchanges between the same actors produces mild,
positive emotions; third, these positive emotions, felt repeatedly, foster
perceptions of a cohesive relation; fourth, greater perceived cohesion produces
greater commitment to the exchange relation, defined generally as actors’
attachment to a social unit (Kanter, 1968, as cited in Lawler and Yoon, 1998, p.
872).

Also Rogers (1995, as cited in Kraatz, 1998) argues that the concept of
“homophily,” namely “social similarity” (p. 624), induces “frequent communication,
liking, intimacy” (p. 624) within network settings. Kraatz (1998) posits that groups with
similar social standings are more capable in adapting to changing environments. Thus,
following arguments by Lawler and Yoon (1998) and Kraatz (1998), memberships with

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social similarities and continuous frequent interactions more easily make necessary
adaptations to ensure the sustainability and accomplishments of regional collaboratives.

Hypothesis 3A: Regional collaboratives with better membership behavior and greater
homophily among their memberships will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 3B: Regional collaboratives with better membership behavior and greater
homophily among their memberships will achieve more accomplishments.
Hypothesis 3A: Regional collaboratives with a higher rate of continuous membership
will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 3B: Regional collaboratives with a higher rate of continuous membership
will achieve more accomplishments.
Collaborative Leadership
(four constructs: personal qualities and skills; organizational leadership; network
leadership; political skills)

Leadership is critical for dealing with complex problems in a network setting. A
regional collaborative displaying a leader as an “entrepreneur, coordinator, facilitator,
fixer or broker, devil’s advocate, unsnarler, champion” (Imperial, 2004, p. 413), or a
“mediator” (Bueren et al., 2003, p. 197) enhances the sustainability of the collaborative.
Leadership activities that promote collaborative efforts include “embracing members,
empowering members to enable participation, involving and supporting all members,
mobilizing members to make things happen, and playing the politics” (Vangen and
Huxham, 2003b, p. 65-69). Spekman et al. (1996) has defined the expected skills and
“competencies” of leaders of collaboratives as “social skills, process skills,

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tact/sensitivity, cross-cultural awareness, credibility and respect, and extensive networks,
etc.” (p. 354).
Hypothesis 4A: Regional collaboratives with leaders who have greater personal qualities
and skills will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 4B: Regional collaboratives with leaders who have greater personal qualities
and skills will achieve more accomplishments.
Hypothesis 4C: Regional collaboratives with greater organizational leadership will be
more sustainable.
Hypothesis 4D: Regional collaboratives with greater organizational leadership will
achieve more accomplishments.
Hypothesis 4E: Regional collaboratives with leaders who have greater network
leadership will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 4F: Regional collaboratives with leaders who have greater network
leadership will achieve more accomplishments.
Hypothesis 4E: Regional collaboratives with leaders who have greater political skills
will be more sustainable.
Hypothesis 4F: Regional collaboratives with leaders who have greater political skills
will achieve more accomplishments.
3.3 Empirical Findings

Hypotheses testing was done using Pearson Correlation, which showed a small
difference between regional collaboratives and traditional alliance groups.

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3.3.1 Statistical Findings of Pearson Correlation
As previously discussed, the primary outcome of sustainability is
multidimensional and composed of two facets: maintaining influence and stability. The
other primary outcome, accomplishments, is unidimensional; thus, there are no subscales.
Network Management
(three constructs: member capacity; organizational capacity; and programmatic
capacity)

In RCs group, the member capacity (r = .552, p = .001) showed a statistically
significant relationship to accomplishments.
In the traditional alliance group, member capacity showed a statistically
significant relationship to maintaining influence (r = .632, p = .002) and accomplishments
(r = .804, p = .000).
In the RCs group, the organizational capacity (r = .686, p = .000) showed a
statistically significant relationship to accomplishments but did not show any association
with any of the facets in sustainability.
In the traditional alliance group, the organizational capacity showed a statistically
significant relationship to maintaining influence (r = .428, p = .047) and to the stability (r
= .452, p = .035). Also it is strongly associated with accomplishments (r = .664, p =
.001).
In the RCs group, the programmatic capacity showed no statistically significant
relationship to any facets of sustainability or accomplishments.
In the traditional alliance group, programmatic capacity showed a statistically
significant relationship to maintaining influence (r = .448, p = .036).

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Network management may have predicted the outcome of accomplishments and
sustainability more strongly in the traditional alliances than in RCs because they are more
stable in resources, collaboration structure, and implementation of programs. Traditional
alliances are often bound by contracts to deliver services and carry out the programs.
RCs are weak in resource capacity and have fragile systems of collaboration because they
have many stakeholders and partners to please and must rely on the continuous
commitment of volunteer members despite the challenges their efforts present.
Communication
(three constructs: frequent information sharing; web and phone contact; and media
coverage)

In the RCs group, frequent information sharing showed no statistically significant
relationship to any facets of sustainability or accomplishments. The same results applied
to the traditional alliance group.
In the RCs group, web and phone contact (a facet of communication) showed an
inverse relationship to maintaining influence (r = -.491, p = .003). In the traditional
alliance group, web and phone contact showed no statistically significant relationship to
either dependent variable.
This finding suggests that even today, personal interactions and face-to-face
meetings are essential to maintain an organization, as Robertson and Tang’s (1995) study
suggests.
In the RCs group, media coverage (r = -.410, p = .016) also showed an inverse
relationship to maintaining influence.

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In the traditional alliance group, media coverage showed an inverse relationship
to both maintaining influence (r = -.506, p = .016) and accomplishments (r = -.491, p =
.017).
Again, this finding paints a very unexpected picture of the influence of regional
collaboratives. It seems that the most successful collaborative work occurs behind the

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Table 3.1 Results of Pearson Correlation on Network Management and Leadership
RCs TAs
Sustainability Accomplishments Sustainability Accomplishments
Impact &
Influence
Stability Impact &
Influence
Stability

Member Capacity
Network Management r=.197
p=.265
r=.099
p=.579
r=.552 **
p=.001
r=.632 **
p=.002
r=.302
p=.173
r=.804 **
p=.000
Organizational Capacity r=.338
p=.051
r=-.044
p=.805
r=.686 **
p=.000
r=.428 *
p=.047
r=.452 *
p=.035
r r=.664 **
p=.001
Programmatic Capacity r=-.095
p=.593
r=-.095
p=.593
r=.089
p=.610
r=.448 *
p=.036
r=.225
p=.314
r=.356
p=.095

Frequent Information Sharing

Communication r=.094
p=.597
r=.085
p=.634
r=-.055
p=.758
r=.110
p=.627
r=.070
p=.756
r=.173
p=.429
Web & Phone Contact r=-.491 **
p=.003
r=.229
p=.192
r=.070
p=.696
r=-.332
p=.131
r=-.346
p=.115
r=.035
p=.875
Media Coverage r=-.410 *
p=.016
r=.285
p=.102
r=-.137
p=.441
r=-.506 *
p=.016

r=-.066
p=.770
r=-.491 *
p=.017

Membership Behavior & Homophily
Cohesion r=.457 **
p=.007
r=.289
p=.097
r= .358 *
P=.038

r=.498 *
p=.018
r=.301
p=.174
r=.487 *
p=.018
Continuous Membership r=.169
p=.341
r=.392 *
p=.022
r=.480 **
p=.004
r=.308
p=.163
r=.437 *
p=.042
r=.604 **
p=.002

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Table 3.1: Continued

Personal Qualities & Skills
Collaborative Leadership r=.457
p=.007
r=.289
p=.097
r=.358
p=.038
r=-.061
p=.788
r=.106
p=.637
r=.390
p=.066
Organizational Leadership r=.417 *
p=.014
r=-.027
p=.879
r=.614 **
p=.000
r=.664 **
p=.001
r=.248
p=.267
r=.545 **
p=.007
Network Leadership r=.202
p=.252
r=-.117
p=.511
r=-.008
p=.963
r=.227
p=.310
r=.184
p=.411
r=-.073
p=.741
Political Skills r=-.185
p=.295
r=.094
p=.598
r=-.059
p=.740
r=-.084
p=.719
r=.169
p=.464
r=.026
p=.908
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

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Table 3.2 Summary of Findings on Network Management and Leadership
Outcome
Sustainability Accomplishments
RCs Maintaining Influence Stability
1. Network Management
• Member Capacity
• Organizational Capacity

2. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior &
Homophily
• Continuous Membership

3. Collaborative Leadership
• Organizational Leadership
1. Communication
• Web & Phone contact
(Inverse Relationship)
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

2. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily

3. Collaborative Leadership
• Organizational Leadership

1. Cohesion
• Continuous Membership

Trad.
Alliance
1. Network Management
• Member Capacity
• Organizational Capacity
• Programmatic Capacity

2. Communication
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

3. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily

4. Collaborative Leadership
• Organizational Leadership

1. Cohesion
• Continuous Membership

1. Network Management
• Member Capacity
• Organizational Capacity

2. Communication
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

3. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior &
Homophily
• Continuous Membership

4. Collaborative Membership
• Organizational Leadership

scenes in connecting members and maintaining networks while not being in the spotlight
itself.
Cohesion
(two constructs: membership behavior and homophily; continuous membership)
In the RCs group, membership behavior and homophily were associated with
maintaining influence (r = .457, p = .007). It is also associated with accomplishments (r
= .358, p = .038).

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In the traditional alliance group, membership behavior and homophily were
associated with maintaining influence (r=.498, p=.018). It is also associated with
accomplishments (r = .487, p = .018).
In RCs, continuous membership was associated with stability (r = .392, p = .022)
and accomplishments (r = .480, p = .004).
In the traditional alliance group, continuous membership was associated with
stability (r = .437, p = .042) and accomplishments (r = .604, p = .002).
As expected, organizations that survive challenging times have an impact on their
region and are stable to attract members willing to engage over the long term. Or the
direction of causality might be the reverse—because members are willing and able to
engage over the long term, the organizations become successful.
Collaborative Leadership
(four constructs: personal qualities and skills; organizational leadership; network
leadership; political skills)

In the RCs group, personal qualities and skills of leadership are associated with
neither sustainability nor accomplishments. The traditional alliance group produced the
same results.
In the RCs group, organizational leadership was associated with maintaining
influence (r = .417, p = .014) and accomplishments (r = .614, p = .000).
In the traditional alliance group, organizational leadership was associated with
maintaining influence (r = .664, p = .001) and accomplishments (r = .545, p = .007).

97
In the RCs group, network leadership and political skills were associated with
neither sustainability nor accomplishments. The traditional alliance group produced the
same results.
The fact that RCs and traditional alliances experienced the same results suggests
that the capability of the organization as a whole is more important than personal
qualities and skills. In other words, it is not one skill or one personal quality of a leader
but the impact of a leader on the organization as a totality that is crucial. Regardless of
how great a leader’s personal skills and qualities, if those are not translated into a
performing organization, they will be futile.
3.3.2 Additional Findings
I tested to see if the correlations were different between the two groups using
Fishers r-to-z transformation and the independent sample z-test. There was no significant
difference, but due to the severely limited power, the result is inconclusive.
3.3.3 Limitations
Among several shortcomings, the survey may have induced biased results because
it only included responses from CEOs or chairmen. One rationale for sending the survey
to the heads of organizations or board officers was because those individuals have the
most knowledge of the organization, including its history, vision, programs, board,
capacity, communities, and so forth. However, having only one person respond from
each organization may also have produced biased results. Additionally, errors may have
occurred in answering the survey. The questions that used the Likert agree-disagree scale
could also have resulted in measurement problems, as people have a tendency not to

98
think carefully before selecting an answer, leading potentially to inaccurate interpretation
of the results.
3.4 Discussion
The findings in this chapter affirm the hypotheses presented regarding
management and leadership principles in at least one of the facets in the predicted
outcomes of sustainability or accomplishments, except in the case of frequent information
sharing, which is a facet in the communication variable.
At least one facet of each variable—network management, cohesion, and
collaborative leadership—had a positive relationship with the predicted outcome.
However, communication had an inverse relationship with the outcome. This finding is
rather surprising considering the trends of our society, in which most transactions occur
electronically and publicity seems to be a near universal goal. As Speckman et al. (1996)
and Cullen et al. (2000) have concluded about relationship-building in networks and
alliances, relationships cannot be nurtured easily. Basic contacts via electronic methods
to transact businesses do not build relationships and obviously do not promote trust and
commitment, which scholars regard as crucial for successful collaboration. Thus a face-
to-face relationship is more valuable in both RCs and traditional alliances.
The fact that the two groups (RCs and traditional alliances) did not have many
differences may have been because they share characteristics of nonprofit organizations.
In the nonprofit service settings where the board of directors has to provide leadership,
member cohesion is imperative. Also active and continuous membership has to be
fostered in order for organizations to be sustainable and successful organizations. In

99
short, RCs and traditional alliances are alike in their substance as organizations, though
they differ in institutional functionality and purpose.

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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDIES
In an attempt to discover various factors affecting the sustainability of regional
collaboratives—other than the design principles already found in Chapter 2 and the
leadership and management principles discussed in Chapter 3—this chapter parses out
the case study results. The findings, based on interviews with eight regional
collaboratives across the nation, reveal significant factors contributing to sustainability
and accomplishments that were not notably pronounced in the previous chapters.
4.1 Methods and Data
This case study was conducted through interviews with the CEOs of eight RCs.
All RCs that had responded to previous surveys were contacted via e-mail. Of those
RCs, eight were willing to partake in the interviews and came from across the nation: the
greater Los Angeles area of Southern California (4), Northern California (1),
Pennsylvania (1), Kentucky (1), and Texas (1). None of the traditional alliances
responded to the request for interviews; thus, the case study was conducted only with
RCs.
Interviews were conducted either in person or via telephone and were recorded
with the consent of participants; one in-person interview could not be recorded. During
the interview, 27 questions (see Appendix II for case study interview questions) were
asked and all contents were transcribed and documented.
4.1.1 Descriptive Data
Among the eight regional collaboratives (RCs) that participated in the case
studies, three had 10 or more staff members and a budget exceeding $1.5 million. The

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remaining RCs ranged from one half-time to seven staff members. The number of years
in business ranged from about 10 to 100 years. Clearly, these study results represent a
wide spectrum of organizational sizes, histories, and locations, ranging from the most
well-established RCs to the least established. All of these RCs concentrated their efforts
on economic development, regional strategic planning, and environmental issues; some
also focused on public policy advocacy efforts.
4.2 Analysis of Eight Cases
Of the 27 questions asked during the interview, the 10 most relevant to the
research questions and the hypotheses of Chapters 2 and 3 will be analyzed together.
Those questions address: 1) conditions for successful projects; 2) skills required to
manage diverse organizational members; 3) ways to resolve conflicts within member
organizations; 4) factors influencing organizational sustainability; 5) factors that help to
sustain organizations; 6) & 7) outside and inside disturbances; 8) hardships experienced
by organizations; 9) consideration of disbanding the organization; and 10) main
challenges. Analyses of these questions will reveal whether the findings from the case
interviews corroborate the survey results in the previous chapters or whether they
uncover something that wasn’t learned from the survey analysis.
4.2.1 Conditions for Successful Projects
Among the questions, the one concerning “conditions for successful projects”
seemed most appropriate for assessing one of the outcome measures—accomplishments.
Three conspicuous issues were raised by informants: 1) the need for the political support

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of elected officials; 2) adequate funding to implement and sustain the plan; 3)
implementing relevant and valuable programs for residents and constituents. The first
Table 4.1 Case Study Findings
Case Study Questions Case Study Results
Conditions for successful products Political support (2)*
Adequate Funding (2)
Implement Relevant & valuable
program to constituents (4)
Need of central organization (1)
Leadership Skills
Qualities
Governance Resolution of conflicts
- use consensus base
Sustainability (a) Factors influencing sustainability
- Funding (3)
- Board commitment (2)
- Addressing the need of community(2)
- Consistency in mission & vision (2)
- Strong executive leadership (2)
(b) Outside disturbance
- Economic condition (6)
- Changing political leanings
- Redundancy & competition
(c) Inside disturbance
- Staff turnover (5)
- Board management (2)
- Lack of board commitment (1)
- Relationship problem among partners (1)
(d) hardship Experiences
- Organizational deterioration due to mismanagement
- Financial hardship

Challenges

Financial concern
Board management
Quality services
Relationship building within the region
Providing regional framework

* indicates a number of informants
two issues were each shared by two participants and the third issue was shared by four
participants. Another salient point, though made by one participant only, was: 4) the
necessity of having central organization as a condition for successful projects.

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1) Having political support gives a sense of legitimacy to projects and initiatives
led by RCs. Human and Provan (2000), in their case study analyzing successful
networks, have found legitimacy to be vital to ascertaining thriving networks. According
to Human and Provan, legitimacy directly relates to a network’s capacity to entice new
resources. Many programs run by such RCs are orchestrated with the help of elected
officials, who often sit in as board members. Many CEOs meet regularly with elected
officials to market their agendas and report back to their stakeholders on the status of
their primary interests. Legitimacy is also one of the design principles tested in Chapter
2. There, legitimacy is associated with accomplishments (r = .589, p = .000) and
maintaining influence (r = .372, p = .030). Political support and the endorsement of an
RC—or its program—is a strong indicator of approval by stakeholders, and therefore
help to sustain RCs.
2) Being equipped with adequate funding is also crucial to achieving any goals an
RC may have. As indicated by participants, oftentimes a lack of sufficient funding
shortchanges the quality of programs or the completion of projects. Funding issues also
have a direct relationship to the sustainability of RCs, as will be shown in responses in
later sections.
3) Relevancy issues, as expressed by the largest number of participants, raise a
unique point of discussion. Sharing candid revelations about the causes of hardship
experienced by RCs, one informant mentioned that having elaborate and costly programs
while being unable to attract members and participants is detrimental to the survival of
the organization. Recognizing a rapidly changing global economy, participants

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unanimously commented on devising programs catered to the needs of people in the RC’s
region. If RCs design their programs in ways that are insensitive and unresponsive, they
can neither support the regions nor RCs financially. Any organization that is entrenched
in old ways of doing business must try to adapt to the rapidly changing economic climate
and the needs of people. As organizational theories such as that of Lawrence and Lorsch
(Scott, 2003, pp. 104-105) and the contingency model and ecological model by Hannan
and Freeman (Scott, 2003, pp. 220-222) indicate, the influence of environments—with
their “uncertainty and complexity” (Scott, 2003, pp. 220-222)—on organizations is
profound and can provide both “constraints and opportunities” (Scott, 2003, pp. 220-
222). Lawrence and Lorsch have argued for structural differentiation among units within
an organization respective to the environment with which each unit works and posit that
the larger organization as an entity must correspond with its overall environmental
context. RCs, in general, are small organizations that may not need differentiation in
their subunit structure; however, an organization as a unit must be able to adapt as the
regional environmental context changes. Thus, an RC as an organization must be able to
adapt to changes made in each respective region. To do so, RCs must be armed with the
analytic capacity to detect the evolving needs of the region, including industrial changes,
demographic changes, leadership changes, and a changing global economy. Thus,
relevancy of the projects and initiatives to respective regions seems to be a pertinent
response.
4) Although expressed by only one RC, the need to centrally organize successful
projects or accomplishments is worthy of attention. According to an informant, “it can

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take a central organization committed to a collaborative regional work, which may not
have a specific interest except for the interest of region.” This remark suggests the need
for an honest broker organization that devotes itself both to collaborative processes
among various entities and to administrative work for all transactions among the parties.
Provan and Milward (1995, p. 30) have postulated that a single coordinating agency is
imperative to ensuring effectiveness in the network of service providers and in delivering
regionally planned products by partnering with various entities, including the public
sector to academia. They add that a well-respected and credible organization with strong
administrative capacity increases effectiveness and, hence, can enhance accomplishments
substantially.
4.2.2 Leadership
In leadership categories, interview responses to “skills required to manage diverse
organizational members” are worthy of review as one of the major topics of Chapter 3.
Among the necessary skills mentioned, flexibility appeared to be the most highly
regarded. Being open to new ideas and not being rigid were among the indicators of
flexibility. Other answers included not only skills but also the desirable qualities for
leaders managing diverse organizational members, such as having a service mentality,
patience, empathy, impartiality, consensus-building skills, perseverance, the ability to
inspire enthusiasm, adaptability, commitment, listening well, being able to think
critically, and so forth. These skills and qualities may not be differentiated from those
required for leaders managing a single organization. Page (2003) has stated that
“managing complex single agencies is similar to managing inter-organizational

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initiatives” (p. 314). In a complex institutional setting, whether it is a single organization
or network, coordination issues become one of the most crucial matters to address. In a
network structure or in RCs, where building and retaining good relationships with
multiple partners is a key to success, skills and qualities that ensure coordination and
collaboration among partners are vital. Harmaakorpi and Niukkanen (2002) have also
claimed that the kind of leadership required in “regional development” (p. 7) includes
“information management, choice, flexibility, responsibility, etc.” (p. 7) whereas
“traditional management” (p. 7) is focused on “control, standard, stability, [and] task” (p.
7).
In the management and leadership chapter, it was found that personal qualities
and skills of collaborative leadership are not associated with any facets of either
sustainability or accomplishments. Because it is indicated that, in the previous chapter,
organizational leadership is associated with maintaining influence (r = .417, p = .014) and
accomplishments (r = .614, p = .000) rather than the personal qualities and skills are
associated with the predicted outcome.
This finding contradicts the claims of other scholars and the remarks of
informants in this case study, due to the fact that the qualities and skills of individual
leaders are stressed throughout the interviews.
4.2.3 Governance
In governance categories, with regard to the “question of resolution of conflicts
within the member organizations,” four out of seven participants cited that they employed
a consensus base as a principle for resolving conflicting views or conflicts within

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member groups. One informant stated that if an issue is seriously affecting the region
and a consensus cannot be reached, in some cases the RC may take a position with a
majority vote. Simultaneously, because they are considered a neutral convener to which
every stakeholder comes and discusses conflicting issues, RCs consider merely providing
a neutral forum to regional players without taking a side as one of their tasks and
contributions to their respective regions.
4.2.4 Sustainability
A. With regard to sustainability questions about “the most significant factors
influencing an organization’s sustainability,” five issues were notable. 1) The funding
issue was shared by three participants; 2) board commitment was shared by two
participants; 3) addressing the needs of community was shared by two participants; 4)
consistency in mission and vision was shared by two participants; and 5) strong executive
leadership and passion was shared by two participants.
1) Stability of funding is one critical resource in organizational sustainability.
Provan and Milward (1995) have emphasized “munificence” (p. 27) of funding as one of
the conditions of network effectiveness. Economic context affects fundraising abilities.
In times of economic recession, as we are currently experiencing, resource stability is the
most pivotal issue directly related to the survival of an organization.
2) Board commitment represents a crucial facet of organizational leadership.
Committed board members invest their time, working side by side with staff to bring
regional initiatives and programs together. Even in the case of having no staff support at
all, as in the case of one RC, the board had managed to work on projects and initiatives

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for the previous three years or so. Having an inactive and disengaged board can present a
governance issue; however, cultivating the commitment of board members can be an
asset that can affect sustainability in a positive way. Cornforth and Edwards (1999) have
stated that the behavioral patterns and actions taken by a board of directors depend upon
the “situational” and “contextual” circumstances of the organization, along with its
“economic, technical, social, cultural demands” (p. 347). Creating committed board
members might be hindered by many factors; indeed, for any nonprofit organization to
sustain itself, having engaged board members is a key to success.
Findings from Chapter 3 show that membership behavior and homophily is
associated with the accomplishments (r = .358, p = .038) and maintaining influence (r
=.457, p = .007). Though the indicators of the cohesion are not limited to board members
(due to the fact that the survey states “members” rather than “board members”), all board
members are members of the organization; thus, the results can be extended to argue that
the two findings (case study and Chapter 3) corroborate one another.
3) Consistency in mission and vision is viewed as another factor influencing
sustainability. People in the region evaluate an RC against the values it presents. When
an RC carries out the mission and vision it markets, it cultivates credibility and
legitimacy on a continuing basis. As shared by one participant, when his or her RC’s
planning was adopted by a local metropolitan planning organization, he or she interpreted
the adoption as an official endorsement. In testing the design principles in Chapter 2,
shared values were found to be associated with the predicted outcome of

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accomplishments as well. Personal conviction and passion, fortified with strong vision of
the RCs, are significant factors contributing the success of RCs.
4) That “strong personal leadership or strong executive leadership” is an
important element for a sustainable RC shared by two informants is an interesting
finding, considering it does not corroborate the survey findings discussed in Chapter 3.
Only organizational leadership is related to the predicted outcome of both
accomplishments and sustainability when other factors, such as personal qualities and
skills, network leadership, and political skills, are not related to the outcome. Participants
in the interviews repeatedly emphasized the significance of who and what kind of person
is at the helm of executive leadership. Many organizations have experienced hardship
due to weak executive leadership; to turn the situation around, the board had to search for
capable executives. The right person with the right skills, qualities, and experiences was
able to get the organization back on the right track and stabilized. In a way, these
phenomena expose the inherent limitations of nonprofit organizations with volunteer
boards of directors. With the exception of a couple of RCs that were interviewed, in most
circumstances, the case study bore out that board members of nonprofits are busy
volunteers who can lend their time at the meeting only. In most RCs, board members
represent the leadership of the region, meaning these members are extremely busy and
cannot commit much of their time to the RCs. Imagine a Google or Intel top executive
coming to an RC board meeting in the Silicon Valley. How much time could he or she
conceivably allot in a hectic schedule to an RC. Thus, with extremely well-connected
and resourceful board members, an RC or any nonprofit organizations could easily be

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placed in the hands of strong executive leadership with commitment and passion and the
ability to enhance the sustainability of organization. Ideally, an organization with a
committed and engaged board and a strong CEO would ensure sustainability. However,
in reality board members are often otherwise engaged, which makes strong executive
leadership imperative for RCs.
With regard to governance frameworks on the role of the board, agency theory
focuses on monitoring management by the board and concludes that managers protect
their own interests—a concept incorporated into the board as guardians of nonprofit
resources. A democratic perspective sees these stakeholder groups as a policy board,
whereas an elite perspective sees the board as a resourceful body and a fundraising entity.
Another view is that the board is a strategic partner of the management, bringing value to
the organization in the form of “expertise, skills, contacts,” and so forth (Cornforth and
Edwards, 1999, pp. 348-350). My argument is that ideally, all of these above
perspectives would not be separated. It is most desirable if all board members can fulfill
all of the above-mentioned functions. But in reality, the board takes on only a couple of
the roles mentioned above and, oftentimes, cannot even perform a single role well. The
situation for RCs is not an exception. When the board is not functioning reliably in
governing a nonprofit, the need for strong executives becomes even more pressing. Thus,
participant remarks about the need for strong executives seem to be a reasonable
assessment for sustainable organizations.
B. Under the sustainability questions, “outside disturbance” raises three points of
discussion. 1) Economic conditions were cited by six participants; 2) changing political

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whims was shared by two participants; and 3) redundancy and competition among
organizations were shared by two participants.
1) Economic conditions undoubtedly affect RCs in dramatic ways, forcing lay
offs of staff, reducing the size of the office, and cutting down the program. To handle the
financial crisis, RCs try to find alternative ways to raise funds, such as making trade trips
to foreign countries and converting themselves into membership organizations if they
were not already so.
2) Changing political parties in respective regions can also be a disturbance,
especially when RCs are targeted by ideologically distinct political parties and as a
consequence, program continuity is put into question. Changing regional leadership’s
party affiliations can cause a disruption in funding the programs.
3) Redundancy in the form of existing or newly established regional organizations
that engage in similar missions and compete for the same pool of resources is one of the
factors undermining the chances of sustainability.
C. For “inside disturbances,” 1) staff turnover or loss of staff was cited by five
participants; 2) board management issues was shared by two participants; 3) lack of
commitment by board officers; and 4) relationship problems among partnership
organizations were shared by one participant each.
1) Staff turnover issues are aligned with the findings from Chapter 3 that discuss
how the organizational capacity of the variable network management relates to
accomplishments. Losing key staff members or laying off staff is related to
accomplishments but may not be directly related to the sustainability of an RC.

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2) Board management is not directly measured in the previous survey studies
because the survey indicators refer to members instead of board of directors. However, it
can be inferred that the meaning of members includes boards of directors in a broader
sense (see Appendix I for questionnaires). Disagreements among board members can be
a nuisance and, if prolonged, can be challenging for any executive to manage.
3) Lack of commitment by board officers and relationship problems among
partnership organizations are discussed in the previous section. Partner organizations can
be interpreted as membership organizations.
D. Responses to “organizational experiences of any hardship” include two major
issues: 1) organizational deterioration due to mismanagement was shared by four
participants; and 2) financial hardship was shared by three participants.
1) Notably, informants construe mismanagement as a failure of executive
leadership, though it could be attributed to a lack of leadership by the board—or some
entirely different factors. One person’s misjudgment and mishandling of a situation can
put an entire organization in jeopardy, as affirmed by the experiences of four
organizational leaders. Mismanagement, due either to miscalculation by executives or to
lack of passion and devotion, can prompt losses of membership and support bases.
2) Causes of financial hardship in RCs can be rooted in macroeconomic
conditions from outside of organizations as well as in mismanagement. The two issues
can be separated and may just be a matter of sequential development: mismanagement
induces financial hardship that ultimately leads to questions of sustainability. A

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condition of munificent resources is already noted previously in accordance with Human
and Provan’s (2000) perspectives.
4.2.5 Challenges
The main challenges facing CEOs are financial concerns and related issues, as
indicated by seven participants. Managing a large board, maintaining quality of services,
building relationships within the region, and reshaping the organization are other issues
that were mentioned. One CEO expressed that the task of providing a regional
framework to the community-at-large is a huge challenge when there is no entity
providing such work. Marketing and selling the vision of an RC was also cited as a
major challenge.
4.3 Limitations
Despite efforts to conduct scientific research, I found several shortfalls in this
study. First, due to time and resource constraints, the number of cases was limited and
traditional alliances were not included in the case study. Moreover, except for two cases,
six interviews were conducted by phone, which may have affected the quality of
interviews and prevented me from gaining an in-depth knowledge about the institutions.
Also, in a few of the cases, some questions were unanswered due to the participants’ time
constraints, which also could have affected the findings. Another shortfall is that it is
impossible to reflect on every aspect of the interviewees’ unique history, institutional
background, and current situation of participating organizations. Also, the sole focus on
CEOs in the interviews (rather than including board members as well) could have
resulted in biased outcomes.

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Though there may be many other limitations, this case study served as an attempt
to discover new information, in addition to determining whether the findings in the
survey studies corroborate the results of the case studies. Thus interview questions
included diverse questions asking perhaps the same question from many different angles.
Surprisingly, many answers overlapped and consequently, those points were emphasized.
This structure allowed me to augment the survey findings and to provide contextual
understanding of RCs confronting issues of sustainability.
4.4 Discussion
The results of this case study corroborate findings from the previous chapters with
the exception of one and disclose complementary but significant factors contributing to
the sustainability of RCs.
Design principle 3 (shared values – one of the facets of rules and regulations)
confirmed that consistency in mission and vision predicts the outcome of sustainability.
Design principle 7 (legitimacy) confirmed that for successful projects, political support is
crucial. From the network management and leadership chapter, variable cohesion was
affirmed by the result of this case study in predicting the outcome of sustainability and
accomplishments of RCs. The more cohesive the members or the board members are, the
greater the sustainability and the accomplishments of RCs.
The one exception in which the survey study findings were not corroborated by
the case study results was a facet in the collaborative leadership variable—personal
qualities and skills. While personal qualities and skills did not predict any outcomes in
the survey studies, they were crucial factors in the case study.

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As mentioned earlier, some points that were not addressed in the survey study
findings are nonetheless very significant in revealing the characteristics of both nonprofit
organizations. Throughout the interviews, strong emphasis was made regarding
executive leaders’ skills and experiences. Though all participants acknowledged the
indispensable function that the board of directors performs in RCs, day-to-day operations
are conducted by executive leaders, who are ultimately held accountable for
implementing programs and projects. The board cannot be held responsible for the daily
operation of RCs. As such, RCs cannot escape the predicament that every nonprofit
organization experiences.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In 1999, McGinnis wrote that common-pool resource management and “global
environmental issues” (p. 11) were emerging as some of the most pressing issues. Now,
more than 10 years later, natural resources and environmental issues are even more
critical as global concerns. In addition to these matters, a worldwide recession is
magnifying the challenges that each nation—and the different levels of governments
within each nation—is facing. Our rapidly changing socioeconomic and political
environment demands a new kind of governance to sustain quality of life for the average
citizen.
A form of new governance—not one based on the market or hierarchy (Powell,
1990) but a collaborative governance (Mazmanian and Tang, 2008)—has been in practice
for a few decades. Together public agencies, private corporations, and nonprofits have
been organizing various collaborative mechanisms to serve the public more effectively.
This dissertation examines regional collaboratives (RCs) as a representative model of
collaborative governance to identify design principles and management and leadership
principles through empirical studies and case study comparisons.
5.1 Summary of the Development Process of the Design Principles,
Management, and Leadership Principle Scale
The results showed that the scale was valid and, for the first time, allowed
theories to be empirically tested and refined. This enabled useful comparisons between
different organizations; potentially offered a diagnostic instrument that will provide

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information about the strengths and weaknesses of organizations; and allowed, in
combination with the other results of this dissertation, an organization to be evaluated
based on the relevant measures and their projected long-term health. Additionally the
results provided empirical norms that suggested improvements for long-term outcomes.
5.2 Major Empirical Findings
In the case RCs, of the eight design principles that E. Ostrom asserts are necessary
for robust common-pool resource systems, only two in this sample related to maintaining
influence (a facet in sustainability): monitoring and legitimacy. For accomplishments,
four design principles predicted the outcome: structure and shared values (both facets in
rules and regulations), monitoring, legitimacy, and relationship structure. The principles
that are relevant for both of these outcomes are monitoring and legitimacy.
The possible reasons why both legitimacy and monitoring are essential design
principles in RCs are that RCs are measured by their deliverable products to respective
regions, such as initiatives or projects. To deliver the products, monitoring of projects
and staff performance is critical to ensuring the quality of final products and to sustaining
themselves. In addition, constructing legitimacy within a region through recognition as a
leading group that resolves regional issues is another key component to creating
sustainability and serving as an effective regional leader.
Of particular interest is that four of the proposed design principles—membership
and boundary criteria, cost-benefit practice, stakeholder recruitment, and conflict-
resolution mechanism—do not seem to predict the outcomes. Though they are
theoretically attractive, the proposed design principles do not seem to matter in the RCs

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measured here. Both theoretically and as one would expect, RCs would be better off with
more qualified members who have certain skills representing various sectors; however,
contrary results indicated that the work of RCs takes place more through relationships
built in the region than by what kind of persons join the RCs. The costs-benefits
practices, like sharing credits and costs, are perhaps not big enough antecedents to
causing conflicts or any issues affecting the sustainability. Although these points were
raised by experts on RCs during the preparation stage of this dissertation, structural
differences between common-pool resource settings and RCs may explain the different
result: most RCs are organized into nonprofit groups with staff capacity, which absorb
the work of cost and credit sharing, meaning the staff brings resources and is responsible
for operating daily programs. In common-pool resource settings, by contrast, resource
users perform all the major aspects of resource-related work. Stakeholder recruitment
issues are a particular challenge in efforts to understand why it does not predict the
outcomes.
In the traditional alliance, four design principles predict the outcome of
maintaining influence (a facet of sustainability): the structure and shared values (both
facets of rules and regulations), conflict-resolution mechanism, legitimacy, and
relationship structure. For accomplishments, five design principles predict the outcome:
structure and shared values (both facets of rules and regulations), monitoring, stakeholder
outreach and recruitment, legitimacy, and relationship structure. The common predictors
for both outcomes are the structure and shared values (both facets of rules and
regulations), legitimacy, and relationship structure. A possible reason for the above

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common predictors is that for traditional alliances, structure and shared values may both
be equally important in providing services or implementing contractual agreements. A
strong relationship structure may be possible for traditional alliances because the number
of members could be more definitive due to contractual agreements or address the needs
of constituent demands unlike RCs, where membership may be fluid as new
organizations join or leave. Also legitimacy justifies the existence of the group and helps
bring in resources from the outside. Again, notably, these results suggest that parts of the
theory and hypotheses do not match the empirical realities of the RCs and traditional
alliances surveyed.
(See Table 2.4 Summary of the Findings on Design Principles)
Of the management and leadership elements affecting the outcome of RCs,
membership behavior and homophily (a facet of cohesion), and organizational leadership
(a facet of collaborative leadership) predicted the outcome of maintaining influence (a
facet of sustainability). Web and phone contact and media coverage (facets of
communication) were inversely related to the outcome of maintaining influence,
suggesting that even today—in the age of the Internet—face-to-face contact remains
essential. Similarly, organizations seem to work better if they are not in the media
spotlight. A continuous membership (a facet of cohesion) predicts stability (a facet of
sustainability). Also member and organizational capacities (facets of network
management); membership behavior and homophily; continuous membership (facets of
cohesion); and organizational leadership (a facet of collaborative leadership) predict the
outcome of accomplishments.

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For traditional alliances, all three facets of network management (member,
organizational, and programmatic capacity), membership behavior and homophily (a
facet of cohesion), and organizational leadership (a facet of collaborative leadership)
predicted maintaining influence (a facet of sustainability). Media coverage (a facet of
communication) was inversely related to maintaining influence (a facet of sustainability).
Also organizational capacity (a facet of network management) and continuous
membership (a facet of cohesion) predicted stability (a fact of sustainability).
(See Table 3.2 Summary of Findings on Network Management and Leadership
Principles)
Overall the most surprising feature was that media coverage was detrimental to an
organization’s health, both in traditional alliances and RCs. The networking and
collaboration that makes these organizations perform relies on personal contact and trust,
which in turn is connected to creating individual commitment to respective organizations.
This finding was also mirrored by the fact that organizations that rely too heavily on web
and phone contact do not do well.
5.3 Summary of Case Comparison Study
Interviews with participants included 27 questions divided into five blocks of
questions: conditions for successful projects, leadership, governance, sustainability, and
challenges.
Regarding the necessary conditions for successful projects, political support (2
persons), adequate funding (2 persons), implementation of community relevant programs
(4 persons), need of a central organization (1 person) were mentioned.

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On leadership skills and qualities, various facets were brought up, including the
need for flexibility, a service mentality, patience, empathy, commitment, and critical
thinking abilities, impartiality; and listening well.
On governance, potential conflicts were resolved by taking the precautionary
measure of a consensus-based approach (as 4 persons mentioned).
Sustainability had four major questions: (a) factors influencing the organization’s
sustainability, (b) outside disturbance, (c) inside disturbance, and (d) hardship
experiences.
a. Factors influencing an organization’s sustainability included: funding (2
persons), commitment of the board (2 persons), meeting community needs (2
persons), retaining the mission and vision (2 persons), and having strong
executive leadership (2 persons).
b. Outside disturbance included: economy (6 persons), political shift in party
politics (2 persons), and competition with similar organizations (2 persons).
c. Inside disturbance included: loss of staff (5 persons), board management
(2 persons), lack of commitment of board officers (1 person), and relationship
issues among partner organizations (1 person).
d. Hardship experiences included: hardship due to mismanagement (4
persons) and financial hardship (3 persons).
On challenges, informants shared concerns about financial constraints (7 persons),
board engagement, service quality, relationship building in the region, providing regional
framework, and difficulty in marketing the vision.

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5.4 Convergent Evidence from Both Survey and Case Studies for Key
Factors
In both the case study and the survey studies, shared values (Design Principle 3)
and a consistent vision for the mission of the organization (interview results on
sustainability) were identified as crucial for the long-term sustainability and health of an
organization.
Both the case and the survey studies corroborated that RCs needed legitimacy
(Design Principle 7) from the outside to initiate and implement programs (interview
results on conditions for successful projects). Legitimacy predicted maintaining
influence (a facet of sustainability) and accomplishments, and the case study results
seemed more related to accomplishments.
Both the case study and the management and leadership principles confirmed the
importance of membership behavior and homophily (a facet of cohesion) and board or
member commitments (interview results on factors influencing organization’s
sustainability). Board or member commitments were critical to ensuring the success of
RCs, as the more cohesive members are, the better the chance of success for an RC.
Comments made by participants regarding engaged board members were not limited to
the sustainability question of the case study. Throughout the interviews, informants
shared board engagement as one of the factors of “inside disturbance,” “challenges,” and
so forth.
Also in both the case study and the management and leadership principles,
organizational capacity (a facet of network management) and staff turnover (interview

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results on inside disturbance of sustainability) corroborate one another. Having a stable
workforce is a key to organizational capacity to maintain the same level of quality and
quantity of the programs and projects.
5.5 Concluding Discussion
This dissertation showed that the principle elements leading to sustainable and
successful RCs are: shared values (a facet of Design Principle 3: rules and regulations):
consistent mission and values; legitimacy (Design Principle 7): political support;
membership behavior and homophily (a facet of cohesion); and organizational capacity (a
facet of network management).
This dissertation showed that the key principle to which all successful RCs adhere
is having a consistent mission that is continuously communicated within the RCs and is
based on a set of values that all members share. To maintain that cohesion of shared
values and mission among members, the RCs must be equipped to deal constructively
with disagreement among members. Codified and consensus-based conflict-resolution
mechanisms provide the means of doing so.
In addition to the above findings, economic conditions or the financial concerns
of RCs, which was mentioned by interview participants 21 times, and the presence of a
strong executive leadership seemed to be an additional key issue for sustainable RCs. As
Vangen and Huxham have asserted, “continuous nurturing and the presence of at least
one competent individual who champions and nurtures the partnership is essential”
(Huxham and Vangen, 2000, as cited in Vangen and Huxham, 2003b, p. 74). That person
could be a strong executive leader who can multitask, is capable of many skills, and is

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endowed with leadership qualities. A decisive factor in having sustainable RCs, as
illustrated in the case interviews, is the presence of strong executive leader. Sheil, Nasi,
and Johnson (2004) have echoed the significance of financial security as a “factor
determining institutional and administrative capacity” (p. 7).
Aggregating the findings from management and leadership principles, it is
determined that sustainable and successful traditional alliances are in need of: structures
and shared values (both facets of Design Principle 3: rules and regulations), monitoring
(Design Principle 4), stakeholder recruitment (Design Principle 5), conflict-resolution
mechanism (Design Principle 6), legitimacy (Design Principle 7), and relationship
structure (Design Principle 8), with network management capacity, membership behavior
and homophily (a facet of cohesion), and organizational leadership (a facet of
collaborative leadership).
In other words, traditional alliances in which shared values are strong and
governance structures are in place so that members can not only transact their contracts
and deliver their services better but also prevent potential conflicts; have cohesion in
which stakeholders participate and relationships are well built; have a monitoring system
in place for network management capacity and organizational leadership; and receive
recognition from outsiders are more likely to sustain themselves.
One noticeable finding was that web and phone contacts and media coverage were
inversely related to maintaining influence (a facet of sustainability) in the case of RCs,
and media coverage was also inversely related to maintaining influence (a facet of
sustainability) and accomplishments in the case of traditional alliances. This finding was

125
Table 5.1 Corroborative Findings on RCs
Case Study Questions Case Study Results Design Principles Management & Leadership
Conditions for successful products Political support (2)*
Adequate Funding (2)
Implement Relevant & valuable
program to constituents (4)
Need of central organization (1)
Legitimacy → Maintaining influence
(a facet in sustainability)
→ Accomplishments

Leadership Skills --- flexibility
Qualities

Governance Resolution of conflicts
- use consensus base

Sustainability (a) Factors influencing sustainability
- Funding (3)
- Board commitment (2)
-Addressing the need of community(2)
-Consistency in mission & vision (2)
-Strong executive leadership (2)
(b) Outside disturbance
- Economic condition (6)
- Changing political leanings
-Redundancy & competition
(c) Inside disturbance
-Staff turnover (5)
- Board management (2)
- Lack of board commitment (1)
- Relationship problem among partners (1)
(d) hardship Experiences
-Organizational deterioration due to mismanagement
-Financial hardship

Shared Values (a facet in Rules &
Regulation ) → Accomplishment

Membership Behavior &
Homophily (a facet in cohesion)
→ Maintaining influence
(a facet in sustainability)
→ Accomplishments

Organizational Capacity (a facet in
network management)
→ Accomplishment
Challenges

Financial concern
Board management
Quality services
Relationship building within the region
Providing regional framework

* - number of informants

126
Table 5.2 Summary of Findings on Traditional Alliances Based on the Survey
Traditional Alliance

Sustainability

Accomplishment
Design
Principles

Maintaining Influence

Stability
1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared Values
2. Monitoring
3. Stakeholder Recruitment
3. Legitimacy
4. Relationship Structure

1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared Values

2. Conflict Resolution
Mechanism

3. Legitimacy

4. Relationship Structure

Management
&
Leadership
1. Network Management
• Membership Capacity
• Organizational Capacity
• Programmatic Capacity

2. Communication
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

3. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily

4. Collaborative Leadership
• Organizational Leadership

1. Cohesion
• Continuous Membership

1. Network Management
• Membership Capacity
• Organizational Capacity

2. Communication
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

3. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily
• Continuous Membership

4. Collaborative Leadership
• Organizational Leadership

rather surprising, as even in our rapidly changing technology-bound society, face-to-face
contact is still a way to build trust and relationships in ways that telecommunication or
electronic communications are not. This finding resonates with Robertson and Tang’s
(1995) argument that face-to-face interactions develop trust among entities. This
situation may change in the future when the internet and other communication tools are
even more pervasive than they are today.
The other research question, which was posted in the overview of this dissertation
sought to determine differences between RCs and traditional alliances in their predicted

127
outcome of sustainability and accomplishments. Examining the design principles
predicting sustainability and accomplishments separately between the two groups
revealed small differences. For the outcome of maintaining influence (a facet of
sustainability), legitimacy was the common predictor in both groups but monitoring was
shown only in RCs, and rules and regulations, conflict-resolution mechanism, and
relationship structure were shown in the traditional alliances only. For outcome
accomplishments, four predictors were common between the two groups: rules and
regulations (shared values and structure), monitoring, legitimacy, and relationship
structure. Only stakeholder recruitment was shown in the traditional alliances.
Table 5.3 Comparison between RCs and Traditional Alliances

Outcome

Sustainability

Accomplishment
Maintaining
Influence

Stability
Regional
Collaboratives
Design
Principle
1. Monitoring

2. Legitimacy

1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared Values
2. Monitoring
3. Legitimacy
4. Relationship Structure
Management
&
Leadership
1. Communication
• Web & Phone contact
(Inverse Relationship)
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

2. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily

3. Collaborative
Leadership
• Organizational
Leadership

1. Cohesion
• Continuous
Membership

1. Network Management
• Membership Capacity
• Organizational Capacity

2. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily
• Continous Membership

3. Collaborative Leadership
• Organizational
Leadership

128
Table 5.3: Continued
Traditional
Alliances
Design
Principle
1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared
Values
2. Conflict Resolution
Mechanism

3. Legitimacy

4. Relationship Structure

1. Rules & Regulations
• Structure, Shared Values
2. Monitoring
3. Stakeholder Recruitment
4. Legitimacy
5. Relationship Structure

Management
&
Leadership
1. Network Management
• Membership Capacity
• Organizational
Capacity
• Programmatic Capacity

2. Communication
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

3. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily

4. Collaborative
Leadership
• Organizational
Leadership

1. Cohesion
• Continuous
Membership

1. Network Management
• Membership Capacity
• Organizational Capacity

2. Communication
• Media Coverage
(Inverse Relationship)

3. Cohesion
• Membership Behavior
& Homophily
• Continuous Membership

4. Collaborative Leadership
• Organizational
Leadership

Items in bold are the common predictors for both RCs and traditional alliances.

Management and leadership principles showed almost same results except
network management (member, organizational, resources, and programmatic) capacity
predicted maintaining influence (a facet of sustainability) in the traditional alliances,
whereas it does not reveal any relationships in RCs. Altogether, one could argue that
there were few noticeable differences between the two groups. Being nonprofits and
constrained by human and financial resources, both types of entities will always face
sustainability as one of its most challenging issues.

129
Traditional alliances have more stable funding sources, with grants for service
deliveries and tighter relationships among stakeholders because of relatively smaller
networks of service providers or contract partners than networks representing an entire
region. RCs, however, often have shorter histories and less stability in locating funding
because very few receive government grants and their business membership fluctuates
depending on economic conditions. These realities may explain why perhaps RCs are
found with fewer design principles than the traditional alliances. RCs are difficult to
sustain; as has often been demonstrated, groups have lapsed or become inactive.
5.6 Understanding the Differences between RCs and Common-Pool
Resource Settings
As the management of resources is the most critical issue for the resource users in
CPR systems, devising a workable governance system that discourages human actors
from engaging in utility maximizing and self-preserving activities of depleting the
resource is key to robust self-sustaining organizations. Hence, the governance system
containing Ostrom’s (2005) 8 design principles are found to exist in more successful CPR
systems.
In RCs, however, where there are no existing “commonly held resources”
(McGinnis, 1999, p. 1) to share, the characteristics of public goods are more pronounced
in the case of products delivered by them. Regional plans, community plans,
environmental management guidelines, and other reports and indicators are to benefit
broadly defined general populations, rather than specific members. Thus, design
principles that keep these RCs intact and make them sustainable are unique to the

130
particular settings of RCs. Rather than the boundaries, benefits and costs sharing,
graduated sanctions, and nested enterprises in the case of CPR, the invisible bindings,
relationship, shared values, and understandings among the members within the
governance system and their commitment toward achieving sustainable regions
contribute more significantly to the long-lasting RCs. Therefore, it can be stated that in
the case of RCs, value-ridden principles are strongholds of institutional arrangements
rather than the structure-centered arrangements.
5.7 Implications
Practical implications can be found in a couple of places. First, researchers can
use the survey developed for this dissertation to assess networks or alliances in order to
discover whether these groups are sustainable or accomplishing what they set out to do.
Practitioners can utilize the findings as guidance to fortify their organizations. Those
predictors can be guiding principles for practitioners to make improvements in their
organizations. Organizations that are going through difficulties should first assess
whether they can strengthen the key properties identified here:
(a) Cohesion through shared values and an agreed-upon shared mission
(b) Resolution of conflicts that threaten this cohesion through codified, agreed-
upon conflict-resolution properties
(c) Avoidance of too much media exposure in favor of networking via face-to-
face contact within the organization (members, partners, board members) and
between the organization and political and other outside agencies.

131
5.8 Limitations and Future Research
In spite of efforts to produce quality research, the case study seems to have some
limitations. Due to constraints in time and resources, the number of interviewed
organizations was limited and participating organizations only included RCs. Also due to
resource constraints, I could not extend the invitation to traditional alliances to participate
in the interview. However, because the focus of this study was more on identifying the
governing principles of RCs, I opted to focus on RCs. Not including board members or
other stakeholders in the case study interview may have produced slightly partial
answers.
The primary limitation of this kind of study is that one is only able to contact
organizations that are currently active, and not those that no longer exist. Thus it is not
possible to discover the factors that caused RCs or traditional alliances to dissolve.
Perhaps the only way to expose more cogent facts about design principles of
collaborative governance is to conduct a longitudinal study in the future.
Notably, not all of the design principles suggested by the theory worked in real
life. A second edition of this measurement instrument should take this finding into
account by concentrating on improving the measurement of the relevant design
principles.
Perhaps refining the theory on which the eight design principles are based needs
to be revisited and further refined. Of particular interest would be determining whether
the principles that are not relevant to the sustainability and success of an organization
from this dissertation (membership and boundary criteria, cost and benefit practices) are

132
important, or to investigate whether they could still be related to other outcomes that
were not part of this dissertation.

133
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APPENDIX I: Questionnaire

The following questions should be answered by the head of the regional network. In this
survey, a regional network refers to a network of organizations composed of representatives
of other various organizations—business groups, government agencies, community groups,
etc.—and other individuals working together to bring about solutions to regional issues. To
help with the ease of taking this survey, a regional network of organizations is referred to as
“regional network” throughout the survey.

I. Personal Demographic Questions

These are the first few
questions of the survey.
They ask you a number
of demographic
questions for statistical
purposes.

Male Female
1. Please indicate
your gender 1

2

Asian/
Pacific
Islander

Black or
African
Americ.

Hispanic
or Latino
Caucasian
or White
and not
Hispanic
Multi-
Racial
Other
2. Please indicate
your race or
ethnicity
1

2

3

4

6

5

Please write in the space
provided:

3. Your age
_________________________
4. Your final
degree and
major
_________________________

5. Your job title
_________________________

6. How long you
have worked at
this current
regional
network
_________________________

7. How long you
have held the
same position at
this current
regional
network
_________________________

141
8. Before joining
this current
regional
network, how
long you have
worked at other
similar kinds of
regional
networks
_________________________

9. How long you
have worked in
a similar line of
work
_________________________

II. Organizational Demographic Questions:

Please write in the space
provided:

1. When your
regional network
was established

_________________________
2. How many
general
members your
regional network
has

_________________________
3. How many
board members
your regional
network has
_________________________
4. Your regional
network’s staff
size (Please
indicate in FTE)
_________________________
5. Your regional
network’s
annual budget
_________________________

III. Membership Criteria
Please indicate Yes or No regarding the
following statements.
Yes No
1. Your regional network has written
membership criteria for board
members
1

2

2. Your regional network has written
membership criteria for general
members
1

2

142
When bringing in a new member, your
regional network has as a criterion:

3. Skill sets
1

2

4. Representation of certain groups (e.g.
women, ethnic minorities and
economically disadvantaged groups)
1

2

5. Diverse sectoral participation (e.g.
non-profits, business sector,
government entities etc.)
1

2

6. Diverse issue group participation (e.g.
economic development, environment,
housing etc.)
1

2

7. Regional industry representation
1

2

IV. Boundaries

Please indicate Yes or No regarding the
following statements.
Yes No
1. Your regional network has written
physical boundary criteria 1

2

2. All of the members in your regional
network are from within your region
1

2

Portion
of a city
Entire
city
Multiple
cities
A
county
Multiple
counties
3. Please indicate the geographical
region of your regional network

1

2

3

4

5

Below
100,000

Below
500,000

Below 1
million
1 to 3
million

Above 3
million

4. Please indicate the size of the
population your regional network
serves
1

2

3

4

5

V. Cost-Benefit Practices

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree
Your regional network has fair:

1. Cost-sharing practices (bringing and
sharing resources)
1

2

3

4

5

2. Credit-sharing practices
1

2

3

4

5

143
3. Product-sharing practices (sharing
materials or social relationships
produced)

1

2

3

4

5

VI. Rules and Practices
Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree
Your regional network has:

1. A well established vision
1

2

3

4

5

2. Shared convictions and values in
place
1

2

3

4

5

3. Action plans in place
1

2

3

4

5

4. A common understanding of regional
issues
1

2

3

4

5

5. Well-established consensus-building
processes
1

2

3

4

5

6. Well-established decision making
procedures
1

2

3

4

5

7. A well-established governance
system (bylaws, rules and
regulations)
1

2

3

4

5

8. Rules pertaining to interactions and
relationships with other organizations
and/or networks (alliances)
1

2

3

4

5

9. Rules regarding accountability
1

2

3

4

5

10. A special committee dealing with
conflict resolution
1

2

3

4

5

11. An open-dialogue policy as a way to
reduce conflict
1

2

3

4

5

12. Written rules to resolve conflicts
1

2

3

4

5

13. Experience in resolving conflicts
within the regional network
1

2

3

4

5

14. Been able to enforce its authority
1

2

3

4

5

15. Sufficient authority to craft action
plans
1

2

3

4

5

VII. Monitoring

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree

144
Your regional network has well-established:

1. Evaluations of projects
1

2

3

4

5

2. Annual performance reviews of staff
1

2

3

4

5

3. Observable and measurable
benchmarks for each project
1

2

3

4

5

VIII. Perceived Legitimacy

Please indicate how much you
agree or disagree with each of
these statements.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree

Your regional network has:

1. A well established
reputation within your
region
1

2

3

4

5

2. Well established credibility
within your region
1

2

3

4

5

3. Effective community
champions
1

2

3

4

5

4. A critical role in the region
1

2

3

4

5

Please check as many groups that
apply. Govt.
Agencies

Non-
Profits

Business
Groups

Resi-
dents

Lobby-
ists

Electe
d
Officia
ls

5. Your regional network is
highly regarded by:

1

2

3

4

5

6

6. Your regional network’s
current initiative was
brought (influenced) by:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7. Your regional network has
involvement of stakeholders
from:
1

2

3

4

5

6

IX. Stakeholder Recruitment

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree

145
Your regional network:

1. Has continuous outreach activities to
recruit members
1

2

3

4

5

2. Identifies stakeholders who are
necessary in creating solutions to
complex regional problems
1

2

3

4

5

3. Has been successful in recruiting
sought-after stakeholders or members
1

2

3

4

5

4. Has been successful in including
members of the most disadvantaged
groups in your region
1

2

3

4

5

X. Relationship Structure

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree
Your regional network has:

1. Friendship and information
exchanges within the regional
network that induce positive
relationships
1

2

3

4

5

2. Individual members who have strong
and extensive personal relationships
within your regional network
1

2

3

4

5

3. Individual members who are well
connected to relevant policy leaders
1

2

3

4

5

4. Strong affiliations with other
networks or organizations
1

2

3

4

5

5. Been maintaining strong ties with the
community and region
1

2

3

4

5

6. Been serving as a focal point for and
is crucial to the life of the community
and region
1

2

3

4

5

XI. Network Management

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree
A. Member Capacity

Members in your regional network have:

1. The ability to work collaboratively
with others
1

2

3

4

5

146
2. The ability to create and build
effective programs
1

2

3

4

5

3. The ability to build an effective
coalition infrastructure
1

2

3

4

5

4. Positive attitudes about collaboration
1

2

3

4

5

5. A commitment to target issues or
target programs
1

2

3

4

5

6. The ability to implement
actions/initiatives
1

2

3

4

5

B. Organizational Capacity

Your regional network has:

1. Effective leadership in network
management
1

2

3

4

5

2. Effective internal communication
1

2

3

4

5

3. Effective external communication
1

2

3

4

5

4. Sufficient resources to manage the
regional network
1

2

3

4

5

5. An orientation of continuous
improvement
1

2

3

4

5

6. Staff training on how to manage
networks
1

2

3

4

5

7. Paid staff
1

2

3

4

5

8. Committees and task forces
1

2

3

4

5

C. Programmatic Capacity

Your regional network has:

1. Realistic goals
1

2

3

4

5

2. Projects that are unique and
innovative
1

2

3

4

5

3. Projects that are driven by community
needs
1

2

3

4

5

4. Projects that are culturally competent
in design
1

2

3

4

5

XII. Communication

Please indicate Yes or No regarding the
following statements.
Yes No

Your regional network:

1. Publishes newsletters regularly
1

2

2. Has a Web site
1

2

3. Uses its Web site as a mode of
communication
1

2

4. Uses e-mail as information
dissemination and communication
methods
1

2

5. Has frequent contact by phone among
members
1

2

147
6. Has frequent forums, meetings or
workshops
1

2

7. Utilizes local newspapers to publicize
your members’ work
1

2

8. Has a media strategy
1

2

XIII. Cohesion

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree
In your regional network:

1. Members make efforts to bring in
funding
1

2

3

4

5

2. All members have similar professional
standing

1

2

3

4

5

3. Members trust each other
1

2

3

4

5

4. Members have a common purpose
1

2

3

4

5

5. Members are mutually supportive of
each other
1

2

3

4

5

6. Members creatively bring about
solutions to regional issues
1

2

3

4

5

7. Members remain in the regional
network because of the potential for
returns
1

2

3

4

5

8. Members stay in the regional network
because of pride in the association and
to nurture regional strength
1

2

3

4

5

9. Members have left the regional network
because of their dissatisfaction
1

2

3

4

5

XIV. Collaborative Leadership

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree
A. Your regional network as a whole:

1. Engages and maintains organizational
member interest in a shared vision
and mission
1

2

3

4

5

148
2. Is in charge of the processes of
planning and organizing, identifying
problems and causes, and formulating
solutions
1

2

3

4

5

3. Implements chosen strategies by
providing appropriate structures and
coordination mechanisms
1

2

3

4

5

4. Develops ways to promote
constructive conflict and manage
destructive conflict
1

2

3

4

5

5. Develops strategies and mobilizes the
resources necessary to take action
1

2

3

4

5

6. Implements information systems to
monitor progress over time
1

2

3

4

5

7. Adjusts to changes that occur in
leadership in the overall membership
and in the community at large
1

2

3

4

5

8. Is able to manage cultural diversity
1

2

3

4

5

B. Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree about the importance of having the
following leadership skills and qualities as a
regional network head.
Not
Important
At All
Somewhat
Un-
Important
Somewhat
Important
Very
Important

9. Interacts with people outside the
regional network
1

2

3

4

5

10. Is considered a person of integrity
1

2

3

4

5

11. Is open to experiences (imaginative,
original and broad minded)
1

2

3

4

5

12. Is committed to learning
1

2

3

4

5

13. Seeks challenges
1

2

3

4

5

14. Listens carefully
1

2

3

4

5

15. Is open to new ideas
1

2

3

4

5

16. Has political skills
1

2

3

4

5

17. Has technical skills
1

2

3

4

5

18. Has interpersonal skills
1

2

3

4

5

19. Is not involved in conflicts of interest
or appearances of impropriety
1

2

3

4

5

XV. Regional Organizational Sustainability

Please write in the space provided:
1. How long your regional network has
existed
_________________________

2. The number of projects (initiatives
and programs) your regional network
has completed in the last five years
_________________________

149
3. Your regional network’s major
outputs (e.g. reports, indicators,
policy inputs, new policies
implemented, advocacy opportunities
etc.)
_________________________
4. How long your regional network has
produced any publications
_________________________
5. The longest period in which your
regional network has gone without a
board meeting
_________________________
6. The longest period in which your
regional network has gone without a
general meeting
_________________________
7. How long your regional network has
had relationships with policy leaders
(e.g. elected officials, government
agency officials, lobbyists, etc.)
_________________________

Please indicate Yes or No regarding the
following statements.
Yes No
8. Your regional network has
continuing outside support from
organizations or individuals
1

2

9. Your regional network has
projects that have continued on
since the establishment of your
regional network
1

2

10. Your regional network has
standing (on-going) projects
1

2

11. Within the last five years, your
regional network members have
considered disbanding
1

2

12. Your regional network has
experienced a loss in significant
numbers of key board members
1

2

13. Your regional network has come
close to dissolving since its
inception
1

2

a. If yes, please indicate
when this occurred
________________

Please indicate the degree to which your
regional network has the following
characteristics.
Not At
All

Some-
what
Moderat
e-ly So
Very
Much
So

14. Stability in its resource base
1

2

3

4

5

15. An impact on the region
1

2

3

4

5

16. Vulnerability to unpredictable outside
disturbances
1

2

3

4

5

17. The capability of maintaining its
current level of performance in the
future
1

2

3

4

5

18. Success in retaining members
1

2

3

4

5

150
19. Success in influencing policy-making
processes at any level of government
decision-making
1

2

3

4

5

XVI. Accomplishments

Please indicate how much you agree or
disagree with each of these statements. Strongly
Disagree

Disagree
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagree

Agree
Strongly
Agree
Your regional network:
1. Has accomplished what it set out
to do
1

2

3

4

5

2. Has been satisfactory in its
accomplishments thus far
1

2

3

4

5

3. Is considered a solution provider
on regional issues
1

2

3

4

5

4. Has identified regional issues and
provided solutions
1

2

3

4

5

151
APPENDIX II: Case Study Interview Questions

Open-ended Interview Questions

Projects
1. What have been your organization’s main projects?

2. What were the successes of each of these projects?

3. What were the limitations and/or failures of each of these projects?

4. What should have been done differently with these projects?

5. What are the conditions for successful projects?

Leadership
6. Overall, what is the nature of your organization’s leadership?

7. Is your organization’s leadership effective?

8. What are the strengths and weaknesses of your organization’s leadership?

9. What kinds of skills are required to manage diverse organizational members?

Governance
10. How effective is your organization’s governance structure?

11. What is the nature of your organization’s governance structure (hierarchical, non-
hierarchical, network, grassroots)?

12. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this structure?

13. How does the political context influence your organization?

14. How does your organization resolve issues when there are conflicting views and
interests within the member organizations?

15. How does the economic context influence your organization?

16. On a community/social level, is there a sense of commitment in participating in
your organization for the betterment of your region?

152

Sustainability
17. What are the most significant factor(s) influencing your organization’s
sustainability?

18. What factors help sustain your organization?

19. To which outside disturbance is your organization most vulnerable?

20. To which inside disturbance is your organization most vulnerable?

21. Has your organization ever experienced any hardship?

What was it? What caused it? How was it resolved?

22. Has your organization ever considered disbanding? Why? How was it resolved?

23. Is your organization thriving?

Other important questions
24. What are the main challenges in running your organization?

25. What are the major contributions your organization is making to your region?

26. What types of issues is your organization best at handling?

27. What advice does your organization want to share with other regional
organizations?

153
APPENDIX III: Scale Analysis of Design Principles

Scale analyses were performed to determine if all scales were unidimensional. I used
Mokken scale analyses on the scales with dichotomous items, and factor analyses on the
scales with Likert items. Findings revealed that most of the scales were
multidimensional.

Design Principle 1 (membership & boundary critera)
Membership Criteria – 1 factor- Mokken analysis H>.71
Out of total seven indicators, five of them were one factor.

1. Skill sets
2. Representation of certain groups
3. Diverse sectoral participation
4. Diverse issue group participation
5. Regional industry representation

Boundary Criteria -1 factor – correlated at .41-sufficient to consider them one scale.
Out of total four indicators, two of them were one factor.

1. Please indicate the geographical region of your regional network
2. Please indicate the size of the population your regional network serves

Design Principle 2 (cost-benefit practices)
Cost-Benefit practices (total 3 indicators): used factor analysis, and all loadings are >.78,
thus it was one factor. All three indicators were one factor.

1. Cost-sharing practices
2. Credit-sharing practices
3. Product-sharing practices

Design Principle 3 (rules and regulations)
Collective-choice arrangements (Rules and Practices) (total 15 indicators): used factor
analysis. Out of total 15 indicators, 3 factors were found.

The first factor was composed of four indicators. These four indicators are more related
to rules and certain governance structures, thus these subscales were named “structure.”

Structure

154
1. Well-established decision-making procedures
2. A well-established governance system
(bylaws, rules and regulations)
3. Rules pertaining to interactions and relationships with other organizations
and/or networks (alliances)
4. An open-dialogue policy as a way to reduce conflict

The second factor was composed of three indicators. These three indicators were named
“shared values.”

Shared Values
1. A well-established vision
2. Shared convictions and values in place
3. Action plans in place

Design Principle 4 (monitoring)
Monitoring (total 3 indicators): used factor analysis, communalities>.5
All three indicators were one factor.

1. Evaluation of projects
2. Annual performance reviews of staff
3. Observable and measurable benchmarks for each project

Design Principle 5 (stakeholder recruitment)
Stakeholder Recruitment (total 4 indicators): used factor analysis.
An indicator, continuous outreach activities, is separate but the other three indicators
were one factor.

1. Identifies stakeholders who are necessary in creating solutions to complex
regional problems
2. Has been successful in recruiting sought-after stakeholders or members
3. Has been successful in including members of the most disadvantaged groups in
your region

Design Principle 6 (conflict-resolution mechanisms)
The third factor of Design Principle 3 is Design Principle 6, the conflict-resolution
mechanisms. It was composed of three indicators.

155
1. Special committee dealing with conflict resolution,
2. Written rules to resolve conflicts
3. Sufficient authority to craft action plans

Design Principle 7 (legitimacy)
Legitimacy (total 7 indicators): used factor analysis, four indicators were one factor with
communalities >.47.

1. A well-established reputation within your region
2. Well-established credibility within your region
3. Effective community champions
4. A critical role in the region

Design Principle 8 (relationship structure)
Relationship Structure (total 6 indicators): used factor analysis. All six indicators were
one factor.

1. Friendship and information exchanges within the regional network that induce
positive relationships
2. Individual members who have strong and extensive personal relationships
within your regional network
3. Individual members who are well-connected to relevant policy leaders
4. Strong affiliations with other networks or organizations
5. Been maintaining strong ties with the community and region
6. Been serving as a focal point for and is crucial to the life of the community and
region

Dependent Variables
a. Sustainability (total 19 indicators): used factor analysis
Excluding the first seven indicators questioning descriptive data, the rest of the 12
indicators were split into two factors.

Factor 1 (maintaining influence)
1. An impact on the region
2. The capability of maintaining its current level of performance in the future
3. Success in influencing policy-making processes at any level of government
decision-making

156

Factor 2 (stability)
1. Vulnerability to unpredictable outside disturbances
2. Success in retaining members

b. Accomplishments (total 4 indicators): used factor analysis. Four indicators was one
factor.

1. Has accomplished what it set out to do
2. Has been satisfactory in its accomplishments thus far
3. Is considered a solution provider on regional issues
4. Has identified regional issues and provided solutions

157
APPENDIX IV: Scale Analysis of Management and
Leadership

The author used both Mokken scale analyses and factor analyses to verify dimensions
within scales.

Network Management
Total of 18 indicators in the network management: used factor analysis and the results are
3 factors.

First factor (7 indicators):
1. The ability to work collaboratively with others
2. The ability to create and build effective programs
3. The ability to build an effective collation infrastructure
4. Positive attitudes about collaboration
5. A commitment to target issues or target program
6. The ability to implement actions/initiatives
7. Committees and task forces

These are named “member capacity.”

Second factor (5 indicators):
1. Effective external communication
2. An orientation of continuous improvement
3. Paid staff
4. Realistic goals
5. Projects that are unique and innovative

These are named “organizational capacity.”

Third factor (3 indicators):
1. Sufficient resources to manage the regional network;
2. Staff training on how to manage networks;
3. Projects that are culturally competent in design

These are named “programmatic capacity.”

158
Communication
Total of 8 indicators in communication: used Mokken scale analysis and the results are 3
factors.

First factor (2 indicators):
1. Has frequent forums, meetings or workshops
2. Publishes newsletters regularly

These are named “frequent information sharing.”

Second factor (2 indicators):
1. Uses its web site as a communication mode
2. Has frequent contact by phone among members.

These are named “web and phone contact.”

Third factor (1 indicator):
1. Utilizes local newspapers to publicize members’ work.

This is named “media coverage.”

Cohesion
Total of 9 indicators in cohesion: used factor analysis and the results are 2 factors.

First factor (6 indicators):
1. Members make efforts to bring in funding
2. All members have similar professional standing
3. Members trust each other
4. Members have a common purpose
5. Members creatively bring about solutions to regional issues
6. Members have left the regional network because of their dissatisfaction

These are named “membership behavior and homophily.”

Second factor (2 indicators):
1. Members remain in the regional network because of the potential for returns
2. Members stay in the regional network because of pride in the association and to
nurture regional strength.

These are named “continuous membership.”

159
Collaborative Leadership
Total of 19 indicators in regional collaborative leadership: used factor analysis and the
results are 4 factors.

First factor (6 indicators):
1. A person of integrity
2. Seeks challenges
3. Listens carefully
4. Is open to new ideas
5. Has technical skills
6. Has interpersonal skills

These are named “personal qualities and skills.”

Second factor (8 indicators):
1. Engages and maintains organizational member interest in a shared vision and
mission
2. Is in charge of the processes of planning and organizing, identifying problems
and causes, and formulating solutions
3. Implements chosen strategies by providing appropriate structures and
coordination mechanisms
4. Develops ways to promote constructive conflict and manage destructive conflict
5. Develops strategies and mobilizes the resources necessary to take action
6. Implements information systems to monitor progress over time
7. Adjusts to changes that occur in leadership in the overall membership and in the
community at large
8. Is able to manage cultural diversity

These are named “organizational leadership.”

Third Factor (2 indicators):
1. Interacts with people outside the regional network
2. Is open to experiences (imaginative, original and broad-minded)

These are named “network leadership.”

Fourth Factor (1 indicator):
1. Has political skills

It is named “political skills.”

Abstract (if available)

Abstract Over the past few decades, the formation of regional collaboratives (RCs) to resolve regional issues has become a nationwide phenomenon. These collaborative organizations are composed of entities from two or more sectors and typically include civic leaders and public, private, and nonprofit groups. As one of many emerging hybrid governance structures, this collaborative governance system is characterized by multiple sector participation (Tang and Mazmanian, 2008). ❧ This dissertation seeks to identify the factors contributing to the sustainability and accomplishments, management and leadership of successful regional collaborative governance structures, as these organizations take on critical roles in shaping regional development. The research involves adapting Elinor Ostrom’s (2005) original design principles of common-pool resource settings. ❧ By conducting a survey and case study analyses on 64 organizations across the nation (39 regional collaboratives and 25 traditional alliances), this dissertation identifies design principles and management and leadership principles that relate to the outcome measures of sustainability and accomplishments. ❧ The findings of this study reveal that the principles contributing to sustainable and successful regional collaboratives are: shared values, consistent mission and values, legitimacy and political support, membership behavior and homophily, and organizational capacity. Additionally, external economic climate, organizational financial stability, and executive leadership are identified as key factors for success in regional collaboratives. ❧ Compared with Ostrom’s design principles of common-pool resource regimes, the number of elements that contribute to successful collaborative governance, especially in the case of regional collaboratives, is fewer. It is consistent with the fact that many regional collaboratives are often disbanded or become inactive as they are difficult to sustain themselves.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Jeon, Yoomi (author)

Core Title Governing regional collaboratives: institutional design, management and leadership

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 12/12/2011

Defense Date 05/11/2011

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag collaborative governance,governance,non-profit leadership,non-profit management,OAI-PMH Harvest,regional collaboratives,regional organization

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Mazmanian, Daniel A. (committee chair), Tang, Shui Yan (committee member), Weare, Chris (committee member), Wohlstetter, Priscilla (committee member)

Creator Email lyjeon@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-214041

Unique identifier UC11292240

Identifier usctheses-c3-214041 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-JeonYoomi-448-1.pdf

Dmrecord 214041

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Jeon, Yoomi

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA