Civic associations, local governance and conflict prevention in Indonesia

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CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL GOVERNANCE
AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN INDONESIA

by

Hisako Kobayashi

_____________________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT)

December 2011

Copyright 2011 Hisako Kobayashi
ii
DEDICATION
To victims of violence, researchers and practitioners of peace building,
and my parents.

iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
When I started my research, no one imagined how extensive this research
would be. My committee chair, Professor Shui Yan Tang, must have been the most
skeptical about such an ambitious or rather thoughtless project of a Ph.D. student. I
would like to express my deepest appreciation for his steadfast support, from the
beginning through the end of my research. Professor Tang always gave me precise
advice for keeping my research on track and narrowing down the focus of the research.
I especially appreciate his tireless patience in reviewing my lengthy drafts many times
over. I would also like to acknowledge Professor Tridib Banerjee for joining my
dissertation committee. Conversation with him during the research was very pleasant
and helped to soothe anxiety and stress during the process. Additionally, I would like
to thank Professor Jefferey Sellers, who also served on my dissertation committee. I
was lucky to take his class where I was introduced to Ashutosh Varshney‘s research,
which first inspired me to develop a fledgling idea and transform it into a researchable
agenda. Without this class, my research would have been very different. I would also
like to extend my appreciation to Dr. Hugh Evans, a faculty member who is currently
working for UNDP Indonesia. Especially when I came up against challenges while
doing field work in Indonesia, he served as a USC ―outpost‖ in Jakarta and supported
me emotionally and academically.
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Foundation for Advanced
Studies of International Development (FASID) of Japan, which enabled me to conduct
iv
fieldwork in Indonesia; the Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute, the SEASSI
Consortium at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, which provided Indonesian
language training; and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, which allowed me to
attend the Summer Program in Quantitative Methods of Social Research for the
analysis of the survey data. Also I thank the Graduate School of USC for providing the
graduate assistantships that supported my last two years of writing. Special thanks go
to Associate Dean Laura Yoneda of the Graduate School, who encouraged me to
complete my studies while I worked as her research assistant.
The fieldwork in Indonesia was the highlight of my research and Ph.D.
experience. I received incredible support and assistance to conduct the fieldwork from
Los Angeles, Madison, Tokyo, Jakarta, Pontianak, until small villages. Strange
networks of people brought me to West Kalimantan. First, I should acknowledge
support from Dr. Tri Ratnawati of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, who agreed to
be my counterpart for the research. I appreciate Pak Bambang H. Suta Purwana of
Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Traditional Pontianak for taking time to discuss the
research with me. I am also grateful for Ir. Laeli Sugiyono of BPS West Kalimantan
for his technical advice and support in conducting the sampling and household survey.
Thank you, also, to many friends in West Kalimantan, who helped me to conduct
interviews and a household survey, and showed me how to have good time, including
Kris Atok, Subro, Mustain, Bosko, Edi, Margarita (Tata), Mei, sisters of Dian and Ane,
v
Ibu Maya, Tomo, Pak Hotman, and many others whom I cannot mention here. It was
an enriching experience to visit the house of Pak Selamet and Ibu Muhana in
Singkawang while eating ubi goreng. I appreciate the support and encouragement of
Dr. William Chang of the Catholic Church of Pontianak. Ibu Imelda, Dr. Bombunang
Sitrus, and his family kindly offered me lodging. I always felt relaxed and at home
after coming back to Pontianak. I cannot thank enough Mr. Nobuwaka Yamakawa of
Mitrapacific Consulindo International (MCI), Jakarta and the staff in MCI, who
offered me logistical and daily support. The staffs at MCI are like my family in Jakarta.
My connection with Indonesia would never have been so strong without them. My
occasional visits and warm dinners with them refreshed my mind and cooled my ―hot
head.‖
My experience in the Ph.D. program in Los Angeles required me to be
extremely patient. I would not have survived it had I not met a great group of good
friends, who believed in me and encouraged me to complete my Ph.D. I thank Mark
Manabu Kimura and Jun Kameoka from a small town of Ithaca for their steadfast
friendship. I owe Erlyana for so many things and I am not sure if I can ever repay her.
She not only connected me with her friend, Dr. Bombunang, who offered me lodging
in Pontianak, but also offered me her insights in the analysis of data. She almost
became a teaching assistant for the dissertation class! Celeste Schmit has been my
good friend since the first year of my Ph.D. program. We went through many difficult
times together throughout the program. I thank Surajit Chakravarty for his generous
vi
support at the end of the writing process. He read most of my dissertation after my
advisor did and shared not only his academic interests and but also allowed me to take
a good break. I would like to express my gratitude to Peter Girard, the landlord of my
room. Staying in my room was the only luxury I could not resist. The room was so
comfortable that I was able to concentrate on writing. I also would like to thank Aki
Nishiguchi for her friendship and assistance in moving out from LA. I appreciate
friends at the Graduate School and editors who helped me to complete my dissertation.
I cannot forget to mention how fortunate I was to be able to work at the Pacific
Consultant International (PCI) in Tokyo, Japan. The people I met and the experiences
I gained through projects there broadened my horizon and encouraged me to pursue a
Ph.D. Among them, I would like particularly to thank Mr. Sasaki Hideyuki. He played
the role of a guide in a world that was entirely new to me. For his project, I visited
West Kalimantan, which became my fieldwork site almost ten years later. After that,
again his project gave me an opportunity to work in the Middle East, which is my next
destination. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Katsuhide Nagayama and Mr. Tomokazu
Wachi for their support and encouragement. Although PCI was dissolved, I am proud
to be a member of PCI, a group of people who are supportive, open-minded and
passionate about their work.
Finally, I sincerely appreciate the support of my parents, Kikuo and Satoko
Kobayashi, throughout my time in the Ph.D. program. I would like to thank them for
encouraging me to complete my studies, as well as my two sisters, Chiemi Nakamura
vii
and Eiko Saito, and their families, who helped my parents while I was away from
home.

viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ......................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ iii
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... xv
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... xvi
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... xvii
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................... xix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 1
1.1. The Beginning: Violence and Transition ......................................... 1
1.2. Civil Society and Civic Associations: From Democracy to
Conflict Prevention ........................................................................... 5
1.3. Decentralization and Peace Building ................................................ 9
1.4. Research Questions: Conflict Prevention as an Issue of
Governance ..................................................................................... 12
1.5. Research Methodology ................................................................... 14
1.5.1. Research Methodology: Mixed Methods and A Multiple-
Case Study ...................................................................................... 15
1.5.2. Case Selection and Description of Research Sites ......................... 18
1.5.3. Data Collection ............................................................................... 25
1.6. Organization of Chapters ................................................................ 28
CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN WEST
KALIMANTAN ............................................................................ 32
2.1. Overview: Unexplained Variance of Communal Violence in
Indonesia ......................................................................................... 32
2.2. History of Violence in West Kalimantan ....................................... 38
2.2.1. Pre-Independence: Ethnic Relations in Colonial Period ................ 39
2.2.2. Pre-Independence: Japanese Occupation and Mandor Massacre ... 44
2.2.3. Independence and Partai Daya(k) ................................................... 45
ix
2.2.4. Konfrontasi ..................................................................................... 47
2.2.5. New Order: Military Operation and Chinese Expulsion
by Dayaks ....................................................................................... 49
2.3. Ethnic Violence in West Kalimantan ............................................. 53
2.3.1. Ethnic Violence in West Kalimantan: Overview ........................... 53
2.3.2. Pattern of Ethnic Violence in West Kalimantan ............................. 54
2.3.3. Dayak-Madurese Violence in the 1970s ......................................... 62
2.3.4. Dayak-Madurese Violence of 1996/1997: From December
1996 to January 1997 ...................................................................... 63
2.3.5. Dayak-Madurese Violence of 1996/1997: From the late
January to February 1997 ............................................................... 66
2.3.6. Malay-Madurese Clash in 1999: From January to March 1999 ..... 70
2.3.7. Malay-Madurese Clash in 1999: From March 1999: Dayak
Joining Malay ................................................................................. 73
CHAPTER 3 THEORIES OF VIOLENCE AND PEACE .............................. 78
3.1. Theories of Violence in West Kalimantan ..................................... 78
3.1.1. Clash of Culture .............................................................................. 78
3.1.2. Marginalization, State Development Policy, and Economic
Competition .................................................................................... 84
3.1.3. Historic Roots of Violence in West Kalimantan ............................ 87
3.1.4. Ethnic Identity, Indigenous Claim, and Ethnic Politics ................. 88
3.2. A Case of A Peaceful District: Ketapang ....................................... 93
3.3. Conflict and Peace: Research of Variation ..................................... 97
3.3.1. Conflict and Peace —Two Ends of the Continuum? ....................... 98
3.3.2. Study of Variance in Conflict and Peace ...................................... 102
3.4. Democracy, Civil Society, and Peace ........................................... 104
3.4.1. Civil Society Defined ................................................................... 105
3.4.2. Democratic Peace Theory and Civil Society ................................ 107
3.5. Civil Society and Conflict Prevention .......................................... 110
3.5.1. Contribution of Civil Society to Democracy ................................ 110
3.5.2. A Role of Civil Society in Peace Building ................................... 114
3.6. Civic Associations and Conflict Prevention ................................. 117
3.6.1. Inter-Ethnic Associations and Peace ............................................ 117
3.6.2. Intra-Ethnic Associations and Peace ............................................ 118
3.6.3. Can Civic Associations Prevent Conflict? ................................... 120
3.7. Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Cases ....................... 129

x
CHAPTER 4 DIFFERENCES IN CONTEXTS AND ETHNIC
RELATIONSHIPS ..................................................................... 133
4.1. The Contexts of Conflict and Ethnic Relationships in Sambas .... 134
4.1.1. Informal Associations and Ethnic Relations ................................ 134
4.1.2. Ethnic Enclave and Segregation ................................................... 137
4.1.3. Land Problems .............................................................................. 139
4.1.4. Economic Competition ................................................................. 141
4.1.5. Crime ............................................................................................ 142
4.1.6. Madurese Migration History and Malay-Dayak Relationships .... 145
4.2. The Contexts of Peace and Ethnic Relationships in Ketapang ..... 147
4.2.1. Informal Associations and Ethnic Relations ................................ 147
4.2.2. Ethnic Enclave and Segregation ................................................... 149
4.2.3. Land Problem ............................................................................... 150
4.2.4. Economic Competitions ............................................................... 151
4.2.5. Crime ............................................................................................ 152
4.2.6. History of Madurese Migration, Dayak King, and Dayak-
Malay Relationships ..................................................................... 153
4.3. Conclusion of the Contexts and Ethnic Relationships in
Conflict-Prone District and Peaceful District ............................... 158
4.4. Conflict Prevention: Traditional Approach —Informal
Problem Solving Method .............................................................. 159
4.4.1. Deliberation among Leaders ......................................................... 160
4.4.2. Problem Solving Methods of the Dayak: Custom and
Customary Laws ........................................................................... 160
4.5. Informal Conflict Prevention: Success and Failure ...................... 163
4.5.1. Case of Sambas: Why Did Informal Problem Solving Fail? ........ 163
4.5.2. Case of Ketapang: Informal Problem Solving is Working ........... 165
4.5.3. Conflict and Peaceful Districts: What Makes a Difference
in Informal Problem Solving? ...................................................... 167
CHAPTER 5 ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENT AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION ..................................................... 169
5.1. Ethnic Organizations, Government, and Conflict Prevention:
Peaceful Case of Ketapang ........................................................... 169
5.1.1. Ethnic Organizations in Ketapang ................................................ 169
5.1.2. Ethnic Organizations and Conflict Prevention in Ketapang ......... 183
5.1.3. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum, Ethnic Organizations
and Conflict Prevention ................................................................ 185

xi
5.2. Peaceful District Ketapang: Government and Conflict
Prevention ..................................................................................... 187
5.2.1. Law Enforcement and Cooperation .............................................. 188
5.2.2. Ketapang Government and Conflict Prevention ........................... 189
5.3. Ethnic Organizations, Government and Conflict Prevention:
Conflict Case of Sambas .............................................................. 193
5.3.1. Ethnic Organizations in Sambas ................................................... 193
5.3.2. Ethnic Organizations and Conflict Prevention ............................. 198
5.3.3. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forums during the New Order ....... 205
5.3.4. Conclusion: Ethnic Organizations and Conflict Prevention
in Sambas ...................................................................................... 206
5.4. Government and Conflict Prevention ........................................... 207
5.4.1. Weak Law Enforcement and the Strong Madurese ...................... 207
5.4.2. Failure of Reconciliation and Conflict Prevention in Dayak-
Madurese Conflict ........................................................................ 211
5.4.3. Missing Reconciliation Efforts in Malay and Madurese Clash .... 214
5.5. Conclusion: Relationships between Ethnic Organizations,
Government and Conflict Prevention ........................................... 217
CHAPTER 6 REASONS FOR PEACE AND REASONS FOR
CONFLICT ................................................................................. 220
6.1. Peaceful Case of Ketapang ........................................................... 220
6.2. Conflict Case of Sambas .............................................................. 224
6.3. Factors Affecting Ethnic Peace and Ethnic Violence ................... 226
6.4. Conclusion: Civic Associations and Conflict Prevention ............ 229
CHAPTER 7 DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND PEACE
BUILDING .................................................................................. 234
7.1. Approaches for Peace Building .................................................... 235
7.1.1. Definitions and Objectives of Decentralization ........................... 236
7.1.2. Decentralization and Peace Building ............................................ 240
7.1.3. Representative Government and Conflict Management ............... 243
7.2. Decentralization and Local Politics in Indonesia ......................... 246
7.2.1. Decentralization in Indonesia ....................................................... 246
7.2.2. Decentralization, Pemekaran and Local Politics in Indonesia ..... 248
7.3. Theoretical Framework for Analysis of Changing Civil
Societies and Local Politics .......................................................... 264

xii
CHAPTER 8 DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND ETHNIC
RELATIONSHIPS: CASE OF THE NEW SAMBAS ............ 269
8.1. The Objectives of Pemekaran of Sambas .................................... 270
8.1.1. Changes after Pemekaran: Accelerated Development ................. 271
8.1.2. Negative Change or No Change? ................................................. 272
8.1.3. Government Employees and Pemekaran ..................................... 273
8.1.4. Creation of District Police and Security ....................................... 275
8.2. Pemekaran and Civil Society in Sambas ...................................... 276
8.2.1. Ethnic Organizations and Ethnic Cooperation in the New
Sambas .......................................................................................... 277
8.2.2. Ethnic Organizations and Government ........................................ 280
8.2.3. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum in Sambas ........................... 281
8.2.4. Pemekaran of Civic Associations ................................................ 283
8.3. Conclusion: Pemekaran, Ethnic Relationships, and Conflict
Prevention in Sambas ................................................................... 285
8.3.1. Pemekaran and Ethnic Relationships in Sambas ......................... 285
8.3.2. Pemekaran and Conflict Prevention in the Case of Sambas ........ 289
CHAPTER 9 DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND ETHNIC
RELATIONSHIPS: CASE OF SINGKAWANG CITY ......... 292
9.1. Impact of Decentralization and Pemekaran on Government
and Politics in Singkawang .......................................................... 292
9.1.1. Pemekaran of Singkawang ........................................................... 292
9.1.2. Chinese Majority and Singkawang City Government .................. 294
9.1.3. Changes in the Police ................................................................... 296
9.1.4. Development ................................................................................. 297
9.1.5. Problems of Pemekaran ............................................................... 298
9.2. Pemekaran and Civil Society in Singkawang .............................. 299
9.2.1. Madurese Organization: GEMISMA in Singkawang ................... 300
9.2.2. Chinese Organizations: MABT and FOKET ............................... 301
9.2.3. Benefits of Ethnic Organizations .................................................. 306
9.2.4. Relationships between Government, Ethnic Organizations
and Community ............................................................................ 308
9.2.5. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum in Singkawang ................... 310
9.2.6. Multi-Ethnic Civic Organizations in Singkawang ....................... 313
9.3. Conclusion: Pemekaran, Ethnic Relationships, and Conflict
Prevention in Singkawang ............................................................ 315
9.3.1. Pemekaran and Ethnic Relationships in Singkawang .................. 315
9.3.2. Pemekaran and Conflict Prevention in Singkawang .................... 317
xiii
CHAPTER 10 DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND ETHNIC
RELATIONSHIPS: CASE OF BENGKAYANG .................... 320
10.1. Impacts of Decentralization and Pemekaran on Government
and Politics in Bengkayang .......................................................... 320
10.1.1. Background and Objectives of Pemekaran of Bengkayang:
Underdevelopment and Marginalization of the Dayak ................ 320
10.1.2. Pemekaran and Violence .............................................................. 325
10.1.3. Positive Changes after Pemekaran: Development ....................... 328
10.1.4. Safety after Pemekaran ................................................................ 330
10.1.5. Pemekaran Problems: No Change or Worse after Pemekaran .... 330
10.1.6. Opportunities for Dayak: Dayak Majority in Bengkayang
Government .................................................................................. 331
10.2. Pemekaran and Civil Society in Bengkayang .............................. 335
10.2.1. Pemekaran of Dayak Customary Council .................................... 335
10.2.2. Chinese Organizations: MABT .................................................... 336
10.2.3. Javanese Association .................................................................... 337
10.2.4. Ethnic Organizations Cooperation and Communication for
Problem Solving ........................................................................... 338
10.2.5. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum in Bengkayang ................... 339
10.2.6. Civic Associations after Pemekaran ............................................ 342
10.3. Conclusion: Pemekaran, Ethnic Relationships, and Conflict
Prevention in Bengkayang ............................................................ 343
10.3.1. Ethnic Relationships in Bengkayang: Son of Soil —Dayak
Favoritism Matters? ...................................................................... 343
10.3.2. Dayak Internal Politics: Intra-Ethnic Competition after
Pemekaran .................................................................................... 348
10.3.3. Pemekaran and Conflict Prevention in Bengkayang .................... 350
CHAPTER 11 PEMEKARAN AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN
SAMBAS, SINGKAWANG, AND BENGKAYANG .............. 353
11.1. Political Society and Civil Society after Pemekaran ................... 353
11.1.1. Political Society after Pemekaran: Changes in Government ....... 353
11.1.2. Civil Society after Pemekaran: Ethnic Organizations .................. 357
11.2. Obstacles to Conflict Prevention .................................................. 362
11.2.1. Problem Solving through Ethnic Organizations Questioned ........ 362
11.2.2. Ethnic Organizations and Competition ........................................ 364
11.2.3. Political Interests, Ethnic Organizations and Pemekaran ............ 367
11.2.4. A Sense of Ethnicity and Ethnic Organizations ........................... 369
11.2.5. Putera daerah —Son of Soil ......................................................... 371
11.3. Can Pemekaran Prevent Conflict? ............................................... 374
xiv
CHAPTER 12 CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS FOR CONFLICT OR PEACE? .... 383
12.1. Civic Associations for Conflict or Peace? —Reconsidered .......... 383
12.2. Hypotheses about Civic Associations and Peace ......................... 385
12.2.1. Ethnic Peace by Inter-Ethnic or Intra-Ethnic Associations .......... 386
12.2.2. Political Institutions and Ethnic Relationships ............................. 393
12.3. Methods and Data ......................................................................... 399
12.3.1. Household Survey and Sampling ................................................. 400
12.3.2. Data and Variables ....................................................................... 402
12.3.3. Procedures of Analysis ................................................................. 406
12.4. Results .......................................................................................... 407
12.5. Discussion and Theoretical Implications ...................................... 414
12.5.1. Political Representation and Civic Associations .......................... 414
12.5.2. Ethnic Discrimination and Contexts ............................................. 415
12.5.3. Assimilation and Contexts ............................................................ 416
12.5.4. Conclusion .................................................................................... 418
CHAPTER 13 CONCLUSION: CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION .............. 422
13.1. Civic Associations, Conflict Prevention and Local
Governance ................................................................................... 423
13.1.1. Case Study of Relationships between Civic Associations
and Conflict Prevention ................................................................ 423
13.1.2. Mechanism of Conflict Prevention ............................................... 427
13.1.3. Revisiting Theories of Civil Society for Research on Conflict
and Peace ...................................................................................... 430
13.2. Future Research Areas: Civil Society and Path Dependency ....... 438
13.3. Limitations of Research and Knowledge Creation in
Professional Studies ...................................................................... 444
13.4. Epilogue: Policy Recommendation for Conflict Prevention
and Peace Building ....................................................................... 452
GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................... 456
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 458
APPENDIX HOUSEHOLD SURVEY INSTRUMENT ............................... 481

xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 Overview of Ethnic Conflict in West Kalimantan from 1996-2003 .... 22
Table 1.2 Population by Ethnicity in West Kalimantan (Post-Conflict) .............. 22
Table 1.3 Sample Sizes of Household Survey ...................................................... 28
Table 1.4 Sampling Coverage of Villages by District .......................................... 28
Table 2.1 Communal Violence in Indonesia from 1990 to 2001
(Social Violence Dataset) ..................................................................... 36
Table 2.2 Collective Violence in Indonesia from 1990-2003 by District ............ 37
Table 2.3 Ethnic Violence in Kalimantan ............................................................ 57
Table 6.1 Comparison of Contexts, Ethnic Organizations, and A Role of
Government ........................................................................................ 227
Table 11.1 Changes in Political and Civil Societies in Three Districts after
Pemekaran .......................................................................................... 360
Table 12.1 Sample Sizes of Household Survey .................................................... 402
Table 12.2 Regression Results .............................................................................. 413

xvi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Conflict-Prone District Sambas and Peaceful District of Ketapang ..... 23
Figure 1.2 Sambas, Bengkayang, and Singkawang after Pemekaran .................... 24

xvii
ABBREVIATIONS
ABRI Armed Forces of the Republic Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata
Republik Indonesia)
AMA Alliance of Indigenous People (Alliansi Masyrakat Adat)
AMAN Alliance of the Indigenous People of the Archpelago (Alliansi
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara)
BPS Central Statistics Bureau (Badan Pusat Statistik)
Brimob Police Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil)
DAD Dayak Customary Council (Dewan Adat Dayak)
DPRD Provincial/ District/ City People‘s Representative Council or
local council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)
FKPM Communication Forum of Malay Youth (Forum Komunikasi
Pemuda Melayu)
FORMAT Forum of Chinese Community (Forum Masyarakat Tionghoa)
FOKET Communication Forum of Ethnic Chinese (Forum Komunikasi
Etnis Tionghoa)
GEMISMA Competent Youth Generation (Generasi Muda Insan Madani)
Golkar Functional Group (Golongan Karya)
HRW Human Rights Watch
IDRD Institute of Dayakology Research and Development
ICG International Crisis Group
IKBM/IKAMRA Madurese Family Association (Ikatan Keluarga Besar Madura/
Ikatan Keluarga Madura)
IKMK Madurese Family Association Ketapang (Ikatan Keluarga
Madura Ketapang)
Inpres Presidential decree
xviii
MABM Malay Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya
Melayu)
MABT Chinese Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya
Tionghoa)
MASBAYU Malay Cultural Community (Masyarakat Budaya Melayu)
NGO non-governmental organization
NU Council of Islamic Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama)
Paraku North Kalimantan People‘s Force (Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan
Utara)
PD Daya[k] Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daya)
PFKPM Union of Malay Youth Communication Forum (Persatuan
Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu)
PGRS Sarawak People‘s Guerilla Force (Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat
Sarawak)
PKI Indonesian Community Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
PPRM-PHH anti-riot police force
RMAB Family of Grassroots Communities (Rumpun Masyarakat Arus
Bawah)
SARA ethnic, religious, race, and inter-group relations (Suku, Agama,
Ras dan Antar-golongan)
Satgas task force (satuan tugas)
SRS simple random sampling
TNI Indonesian National Army (Tentara National Indonesia)
YHS Upstream Foundation (Yayasan Hulu Sungai)

xix
ABSTRACT
With growing interest in governance, this research explored local governance
structures that contribute to the prevention of social conflict in the case of ethnic
violence in Indonesia. To examine how local governance affects ethnic relations and
peace building, I studied the relationships between civic associations and
conflict/peace and interactions between civic associations and governance at the local
level. The research also investigated the effects of institutional changes, i.e.,
decentralization and pemekaran, on peace building and the roles of the state in conflict
prevention. This was a multiple case study to compare a conflict-prone district and a
peaceful district in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. A mixed methods approach,
consisting of in-depth interviews and a household survey, was used in this research.
Research data of approximately 170 interviews and 675 samples of the household
survey were collected and analyzed.
To explain the regional variance of ethnic violence within a state, scholars
recently centered their attention on the micro level analysis of ethnic conflict with a
focus on which types of civic associations contribute to peace. One theory argued that
civic associations across ethnic boundaries can prevent conflict by building trust and
networks between them while the other theory addressed in-group policing of ethnic
organizations, in which each ethnic group punishes those members who endanger
inter-ethnic peace by committing wrongs against other groups‘ members. Yet, civic
associations are not independent from local contexts and political institutions. For
xx
violence prevention, good governance, involving the government and civil society, is
necessary to settle contrasting interests and to accommodate various needs by
establishing rules and democratic norms.
The analysis of interviews and household survey data showed that certain types
of civic associations work for peace; however, political institutions limit the extent
associations facilitate ethnic peace. In the regression results, the contribution of inter-
ethnic associations for ethnic peace was supported, though equal representation of
ethnic groups in local legislatures made a difference in efficacy of inter-ethnic
associations and local ethnic relationships. While the analysis of the case study
revealed cooperation among ethnic organizations as building blocks to prevent
expansion of violence, the role of local government appeared crucial to facilitate
ethnic cooperation to prevent conflict.
Decentralization provided opportunities for local societies to build local
governance structures appropriate to their specific circumstances for conflict
prevention. In ethnically homogenous districts, the ethnic relationships were stabilized
under the power of the majority groups by eliminating inter-ethnic competition for
power and resources. Moreover, creating homogenous districts and providing
autonomy contributed to mitigation of grievances of the marginalized group. On the
other hand, the pemekaran to establish an ethnically mixed city shifted interests of
ethnic groups and provided incentives for ethnic cooperation and peace in political and
civil societies by implementing direct elections. As a result, a unique ethnic balance
xxi
emerged among the ethnic groups. Based on the existing political and civil societies,
local communities developed unique governance structures, which may contribute to
ethnic violence prevention in the era of decentralization.
Thus, local governance affected the nature of the civil society, more
cooperative or competitive, and hence ethnic peace. In spite of positive notions of
civic associations, this research result called attention to unconditional endorsement
for civic associations and illuminated the need for more research to study local
governance that influences the nature of civil society. These interactions in local
governance explained regional variances of ethnic conflict or peace within a state.

1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Beginning: Violence and Transition
My long journey to West Kalimantan started in May 1997, when I joined the
team of a Japanese technical assistance project. It was to be the last peaceful moment
in the New Order. Yet, the decline of the regime and a change toward the new era had
started and been sensed in a remote island far away from Jakarta. A few months before
my arrival in West Kalimantan, indigenous Dayaks attacked the Madurese in Sambas
and the clash between the two ethnic groups spread through the province from the end
of 1996 to 1997. This ethnic violence caused more than 15,000 Madurese to flee,
mostly from the northern districts of the province (Human Rights Watch 1997). I saw
the remnants of burnt houses standing near the small town of Sanggau Ledo, some of
which were still there even ten years after, when I came back for my field research in
2006.
Two months later, the Asian financial crisis began with the sudden fall of the
Thai baht when it shifted to a floating exchange rate system in July 1997. The crisis
quickly spread to adjacent countries and seriously hit the Indonesian economy (World
Bank 1998). In 1998, the value of the Indonesian currency rupiah sharply declined to
almost one third of the value before the crisis (Asian Development Bank 2010). With
increased instability in the economy, angry students and citizens had started protesting
2
on streets and campuses while I was there. Finally, in May 1998, President Suharto
stepped down and the New Order was ended after a 32-year tenure.
Suharto‘s resignation was just the beginning of the transition for Indonesia; the
country was full of hope but years of bloodshed loomed in the near future. Indonesia
had initiated a fundamental shift in the direction of democratization and
decentralization. Decentralization was expected to respond to the interests and needs
of one of the most diverse populations in the world (World Bank 2003); however,
during this period, communal conflicts arose during this transitional period (UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2004). When I left Indonesia in
March 1998, there was no sign of violence in West Kalimantan after the Madurese-
Dayak clash in 1996 to 1997. As students protested in cities in Java, anxious
customers ran to shops to buy food stocks. Chinese supermarkets had remained
opened in Pontianak, the provincial capital, during the financial crisis. Chinese
merchants became targets of attacks in Jakarta and cities in Java and Sumatra in 1998
(Tadjoeddin 2002a; Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004a). In January 1999,
however, another surprising round of ethnic violence broke out again in Sambas, only
this time between the Malay and the Madurese. Subsequently communal violence
erupted in the eastern parts of Indonesia in Poso, Ambon, North Maluku, and Sampit,
and Jakarta. As a result of the violence, the number of victims reached up to 10,000
across the country (UN OCHA 2004).
3
Indonesia is not the only country that has suffered from communal violence
during a period of transition. A series of incidents of serious communal violence,
occurring in countries in transition, has renewed scholarly interests in ethnic violence
(e.g., Horowitz 2001), and raised questions about the dynamic relationships among
institutions, violence, and peace. A general presumption has been to connect
democracy to peace, more specifically, according to scholars of democratic peace
theory (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999; Doyle 2005). Following
this assumption, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of democratization,
violence and conflicts were expected to decline. However, the evidence refuted this
general belief as internal conflicts broke out in various places in the world, including
former communist or transition countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and East
Timor. Democracy did not appear to be the panacea that promised peace to countries
in transition. For example, in Indonesia, democracy enabled the strengthening of
group identities in a multicultural and multi-ethnic society (Brown 2002).
Democratization and decentralization further empowered the claims of local
communities and indigenous groups (McCarthy 2004; Henley and Davidson 2008).
Indeed, democracy can instigate ethnic conflict by defining citizenship as a narrow
concept of ―ethnos,‖ not ―demos‖ (Mann 2005, 3). Thus, ironically, democracy and
decentralization has not always led to the emergence of peaceful societies in many
transition countries.
4
The incidents of serious violence in countries in democratic transition did not
stop international organizations and donors from implementing projects and programs
that would support democratization (Richmond 2005). A civil society has been
perceived as essential gradient for democracy (Chandler 2004). Extant theories of
social capital in the field literature have provided the rationale for the promotion of
civil society, including civic associations, and non-government organizations (Putnam,
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Putnam 2000). For example, the World Bank established
the Social Capital Thematic Group under its Social Development Department to
operate projects and programs geared towards the empowerment of community. A
concept of governance often discussed in conjunction with decentralization and civil
society (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). Moreover, Ashutosh Varshney‘s (2002)
influential research on ethnic violence in India succeeded in connecting the
possibilities of ethnic violence and civic association.
Varshney‘s (2002) work enabled this research project to question the
interactions among civil society, institutional change, and ethnic relationships—in
other words, how governance affects ethnic relationships. These themes—civic
associations, institutional changes, especially decentralization, and governance, as
they play into the dynamics of the outbreak of violence—are the three central pillars
that form the basis of this research on ethnic violence in Indonesia.

5
1.2. Civil Society and Civic Associations: From Democracy to Conflict
Prevention
The advantages of civil society and civic associations have been discussed in
relation to various fields of inquiry, such as democratization (Diamond 1994; Linz and
Stepan 1996), education (Coleman 1988), development (Hadenius and Uggla 1996),
and ethnic violence (Varshney 2002). The development of theory that has hitherto
related civic associations to peace building is rooted in the various theories on
democracy, civil society and civic associations. Among theories of democracy,
democratic peace theory has specifically argued that democratic norms and decision-
making procedures prevent violent action (Maoz and Russett 1993). Though
democratic peace theory focuses on the inter-state level and is more prevalently
discussed in International Relations, the explosion of intra-state conflict after the Cold
War caused scholars to start applying the argument of the contribution of civil society
to democracy for peace building (Richmond 2005). In theories of civil society, the
positive aspects of civil society and civic associations are believed to promote learning
of democratic skills and to enhance accountability (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti
1993; Diamond 1994; Fung 2003). Thus, these theorists have argued that civic
associations contribute to the deepening and consolidation of democracy (Diamond
1994; Schmitter 1997). In addition, other scholars stated that these benefits of civil
society can contribute to the prevention of conflict (Orjuela 2003; Paffenholz 2010a).
In keeping with the expanding number of proponents of civil society as a contributor
of for democracy, civil society was expected to take on more responsibilities in peace
6
building and conflict prevention. NGOs and civil society have played essential roles in
disseminating the concept of human rights, and are actively involved in humanitarian
aid initiated by the idea of liberal peace (Richmond 2005).
More directly, theories of civic associations for peace building have been
studied. Varshney‘s (2002) research delivered strong empirical evidence for these
theories. Based on his analysis of Hindu-Muslim violence in India, Varshney (2002)
argues that civic associations with mixed memberships can be the foundation for
taking action toward conflict prevention. As discussed by social capital theorists such
as Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), the essence of civic associations—trust and
cooperation also can help defeat the motives of politicians who try to take advantage
of ethnic issues, by cultivating dissention. Through Varshney‘s (2002) research in the
areas, the idea of civil society has been expanded into the field of ethnic violence and
conflict prevention, focusing on the characteristics of civic associations, especially
diversity of membership.
Despite its prevalence in the field literature, this view linking civic associations
with peace building has been controversial. As Varshney (2002) discussed, this
characteristic of civic associations—the heterogeneity and homogeneity of a group—
has been one of interest among scholars of social capital, transaction cost and common
pool resources. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of two types of civic
associations, the discussion of bonding and bridging social capitals favorably argued
for multi-membership associations to integrate different groups (Putnam 2000;
7
Marschall and Stolle 2004). In contrast, transaction cost and common pool resources
theories pointed out the efficiency that could be derived from relatively unified desires
and perspectives of homogenous groups to achieve collective action by lowering
transaction cost (Taylor and Singleton 1993; Baland and Platteau 2000). Hence, these
studies indicate that there are contesting views on the effects of diversity in
memberships of civic associations.
The inconclusive analysis of the characteristics of civic associations and their
outcomes suggests the need for research into the contexts of civic associations, in
particular whether they inhibit or cultivate the capacity of civic association. The
existing theories to connect civic associations and ethnic relationships still lack
clarification on the conditions and contexts that make civic associations conducive to
peace or conflict, including, for example, the level of segregation and assimilation of
groups (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Varshney 2002), urban/rural factors and
formal/informal institutions, types of associations (Varshney 2002), internal group
relationships (Horowitz 1985), and socio-economic levels of the group (Larsen
Harlan, Bolin, Hackett, Hope, Kirby, Nelson, Rex, and Wolf 2004; Marschall and
Stolle 2004). The extant scholarship has also suggested that the question is not a
choice of either inter-ethnic associations or ethnic associations, but rather
supplemental functions of the two types of associations (Fernandez and Nichols 2002;
Larsen et al. 2004).
8
The discussion of the impacts of contextual factors on civic associations
questions the fundamental argument on the contribution of civic associations to peace,
by identifying issues in the definition of peace and civil society. Conflict scholars and
researchers simply reject the peace theories of civic associations. For example, Brass
(2003) disapproved of the arguments, because the presence of peaceful and
cooperative inter-ethnic associations simply serves as an indicator of the existence of
peace. The proponents of civil society and social capital theories, on the other hand,
often neglected the political aspects and the role of the state (Foley and Edward 1996;
Whittington 2001). However, civil society is a place where citizens learn skills for
political actions (Fung 2003) so that it cannot be construed as an apolitical space
(MacLean 2004). Varshney‘s (2002) micro-level analysis dismissed the influence of
state and political factors while overemphasizing the elements of civic associations.
Therefore, the definition of civil society and civic association—independent from the
state and politics and neglected contextual elements—should be scrutinized to prove
their contribution to democracy.
Similarly, there is evidence for a counterargument in regard to civil society for
democracy. The researchers of democratization warned against rushing into
connecting civil society and democracy without carefully pondering the interactions
among civil society, contexts and political factors (e.g., Berman 2001; Mercer 2002;
Encarnación 2003; Armony 2004). More importantly, the normative definition of civil
society, which was developed from liberal democratic theory specifically, is blind to
9
the characteristics or impacts of civil society which do not fit the model of civil
society (Orvis 2001; Encarnación 2002; Mercer 2002). Therefore, these flaws found in
the research on civil society and democracy call for further careful research
investigating the relationships between civil society and conflict prevention and for a
re-examination of the nature of civil society in regard to its function in peace building.

1.3. Decentralization and Peace Building
Decentralization, federalism, regional autonomy, or self-governing are often
put forward as institutional designs that can address the dynamics of ethnic conflict
(Horowitz 1985). In contrast with an approach of ―power sharing,‖ decentralization or
regional autonomy is an arrangement of ―power dividing‖ in which power is
distributed among the different layers of institutions and institutional actors (Rothchild
and Roeder 2005a, 6).
Decentralization broadly aims at two objectives: economic efficiency and
political and democratic decentralization (Silverman 1992; Manor 1999; Cheema and
Rondinelli 2007). Decentralization is a strategy to improve the efficiency of public
services and to build a government that is responsive to local needs and interests
(Silverman 1992; Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Additionally, political and
democratic decentralization enhances transparency and accountability by involving
community and civil society organizations in the decision making processes and by
initiating the direct elections of heads of local governments and legislatures (Manor
10
1999; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). As a result, local governance can be improved in
decentralized institutions (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).
In relation to conflict prevention and peace building, decentralization benefits
minority groups by providing authority to protect their distinct cultures, languages and
customs (Gurr 1993; Ghai 1998) and develop policies and programs appropriate for
regions and populations (Gurr 1993; Lake and Rothchild 2005). Therefore, secession
motives and uprisings rooted in discrimination, oppression or disparities are likely
mitigated while maintaining integration of the state (Gurr 1993; Ghai 1998).
Self-governing institutions can lead to development of distinct ethnic
relationships by applying it to homogenous or heterogeneous regions. As an
institutional design based on differences of ethnicity, culture or language, ethno-
federalism shifts inter-group competition to intra-group problems (Horowitz 1985),
while federalism or decentralization which cuts across different groups of ethnicity or
race can provide opportunities for multiple ethnic and racial groups to cooperate for
common interests or regional issues (Horowitz 1985; Roeder 2005). Thus,
decentralization offers distinctive incentives for competition and cooperation within
and across groups.
Another approach to ethnic conflict—distributive policies such as ethnic quota
or affirmative policy—is often proposed to prevent ethnic confrontation under the
institutional arrangement of decentralization or federalism (Horowitz 1985). In
distributive policies, the allocation of government positions attracts keen interests of
11
groups, because the ethnic composition of the bureaucracy is reflected in the allocation
of policies and programs as a display of their power (Esman 1997, 1999). Thus,
―representative bureaucracy‖ theory (Evans 1974, 628) suggests that fair
representation of groups in government employment leads to better policy
development and implementation and hence contributes to ethnic peace (Esman 1997,
1999).
Through the implementation of decentralization with distributive policies,
different opportunities and incentives are created for restructuring group relationships,
civil society, and government. As a result, the level of diversity is multiplied in local
political and civil societies resulting in what Rodden (2004) described as ―a more
complex, intertwined form of governance‖ (482). After almost a decade of Indonesian
decentralization, however, what has emerged are not necessarily harmonious ethnic
relationships and improved local governance, but fragmented and rather disorderly
politicized local societies. For example, decentralization has intensified local politics,
competition, corruption and rent-seeking by local kings (Hadiz 2004; McCarthy
2004); community violence (Welsh 2008); and extreme indigenism or the adat
movement (Li 2001; Henley and Davidson 2008). It has also promoted the creation of
new districts by administrative fragmentation or pemekaran (Fitrani, Hofman, and
Kaiser 2005), competition over government positions (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006),
and led weak and self-interested civil society organizations to rush into resources and
12
opportunities newly available in local society (Hadiwinata 2003; Antl ӧv, Ibrahim, and
van Tuijl 2006).
As the case of Indonesia illustrates, decentralization increases the number of
variables that may influence ethnic relationships. It is a mistake to simply to ask
whether or not decentralization can contribute to prevention of ethnic violence without
looking at diverse local factors and intricate ethnic relationships. Therefore, in
countries with federalism, decentralization, or regional autonomy, such as Indonesia,
detailed analysis of local governance, i.e., civil society, political society, and the
government, is required, because self-governing institutions expand complexity in
local contexts.

1.4. Research Questions: Conflict Prevention as an Issue of Governance
Conflict prevention requires good governance afforded by democracy. To stop
violence, a process to transform violence into non-violent conflicts is necessary
(Lederach 1997). Democracy is a form of decision-making in ―an interacting system‖
to settle conflicting interests without violence and in accordance with established rules
and accepted procedures in a society (Linz and Stepan 1996, 13). Zartman (1997) has
argued that in order to minimize damage, conflict in society needs to be controlled by
governance structures characterized by ―a national consensus on norms‖ supported by
―a legitimizing regime‖ and a process to build ―a replacement regime‖ (2). Thus,
13
conflict prevention is an issue of governance with the aim of building a democratic
system, including norms and context-specific institutions.
Although the peace theory of civic association has turned our attention to local
factors in order to explain regional variance of violence (Varshney 2002), civic
associations or civil society are not the only factors which can prevent the explosion of
ethnic violence. Similar to its contribution to democracy, the advantages of civil
society are explained in this way: ―structures of civic life constrain political strategies
and their outcomes‖ (Varshney 2002, 13). Yet, civil society is one of many variances
created in decentralized institutions. It is necessary to examine other factors in local
institutions and local governance. Decentralization may affect the complex
interactions among ethnic relationships, politics, and civil society. Taking a
perspective of conflict prevention as an issue of governance can provide a holistic
approach to examine relationships between conflict prevention and civil society.
This research, therefore, aimed to address the question, ―What structures of
local governance contribute to social violence prevention?‖ The research analyzed
how civil society could contribute to conflict prevention and resolution, and also
focused on processes—how ethnic relationships were transformed through
institutional change, especially in ―pemekaran‖ or regional fragmentation. To address
this research question, the following research objectives were proposed:
1) To explore whether or not civic associations contribute to the prevention of
conflict. If yes, identify which type of associations, inter-ethnic or intra-
14
ethnic, contribute to the prevention of ethnic violence and what conditions
enable certain types of associations to work for peace/ conflict, and
2) To examine how decentralization/pemekaran affects ethnic relationships
and whether or not decentralization/pemekaran contributes to conflict
prevention/peace building.
The first question was to analyze the contribution of civil society to conflict
prevention, paying attention to the neglected factors of local contexts, politics and
government. The second question aimed to reconsider the relationships between civil
society and conflict prevention examined in the first question, introducing changes in
the variables of political institutions brought about by decentralization. Pursuing these
two research questions enabled the researcher to conduct a multidimensional analysis
of the relationships between civil society and ethnic relationships.

1.5. Research Methodology
To address the overall research question on how local governing structures
affect social conflicts, this research adopted comparative case studies and a mixed
research methods strategy. These were the same methodologies utilized by Varshney
(2002) for his research on ethnic violence, because one of the objectives of this study
was to reexamine relationships between civic associations and conflict prevention.

15
1.5.1. Research Methodology: Mixed Methods and A Multiple-Case Study
This study utilized a mixed methods research approach with a multiple-case
study. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) defined the mixed research model as, ―products
of the pragmatist paradigm and that combine the qualitative and quantitative
approaches within different phases of the research process‖ (19). Pragmatism focuses
on a problem or question by considering activities in context and the interests of the
researcher (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Creswell 2003). Pragmatism incorporates
both subjective and objective perspectives, or in short intersubjectivity (Tashakkori
and Teddlie 1998; Morgan 2007). The most important criterion of research methods
selection for pragmatists is to find an answer to a problem (Creswell 2003). The truth
is validated by ―actions, situations, and consequences rather than antecedent
conditions‖ (Creswell 2003, 11), ―the consequences of a purposeful action‖ (Schwandt
1998, 234), or ―workability‖ (Morgan 2007, 67).
This research took the ―sequential exploratory‖ procedure, a qualitative study
based on interviews followed by a quantitative research of a household survey
(Creswell, Clark, Gutmann, and Hanson 2003, 227). The results of the qualitative and
quantitative studies were integrated during analysis of data. An analysis of two
different types of data led to the repetition of ―inductive‖ and ―deductive‖ processes to
validate findings (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, 24).
A primary objective of applying mixed research methods for this research was
to achieve a triangulation of the data. A combination of different types of quantitative
16
and qualitative research methods mitigates the weaknesses and constraints of each
approach (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989). By triangulation, the validity of the
argument is improved (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989; Creswell 2003).
Although the triangulation technique analyzes one social event in a study, two
methods do not necessarily examine the same dimensions or aspects of an event. The
types of questions or purpose sought in qualitative and quantitative studies are often
different (Creswell 2003). This was ―methodological triangulation,‖ or more
accurately ―sequential‖ triangulation, focusing on qualitative approach (Morse 1991,
120) to explore a theory to connect governance with conflict prevention, particularly
in relation with civic associations. Application of mixed methods research also worked
to ―elaborate, enhance, or illustrate the results from the other‖ (Greene, Caracelli, and
Graham 1989, 266). The complementary approach deepens analysis and strengthens
validity (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989).
Meanwhile, a multiple-case study was proposed for this research. This research
was an exploratory and explanatory case study to ask the ―what‖ and ―how‖ questions
concerned with relationships between civic associations, institutional changes and
social conflict. A case study can be applied for ―exploratory, descriptive, or
explanatory‖ research (Yin 2003, 3). In particular, the case study is an appropriate
method when contexts matter. The research subject is highly embedded in such
contexts and key factors of interest are correlated each other (Yin 2003). By utilizing
17
the case study method, researchers can achieve comprehensive analysis of a social
phenomenon in given environments through time (Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg 1991).
A multiple-case study has an advantage over a single case study by providing
strong evidence for theory or hypothesis testing through a comparison of similar or
conflicting cases (Yin 2003). The validity of findings is enhanced by testing a theory
across cases in line with the ―replication logic‖, either ―a literal replication‖ to
confirm successfully repeated outcomes or ―a theoretical replication‖ to explain a lack
of expected outcomes (Yin 2003, 47). A study of a ―negative,‖ ―deviant‖ or ―extreme‖
case can not only make an analysis more robust but also provide a challenge to bring a
new perspective beyond the existing analytical framework (Sjoberg, Williams,
Vaughan, and Sjoberg 1991, 62).
A good case study has to achieve three types of validity, including ―construct
validity,‖ ―internal validity‖ and ―external validity,‖ and ―reliability‖ (Yin 2003, 19).
Construct validity is to achieve objectivity in research process, because subjectivity of
the case study method is criticized. Internal validity and external validity are related
with causal analysis and generalization, respectively. Consistency of research process
can improve reliability (Yin 2003). To achieve construct validity, this study took a
mixed research methods approach to analyze different types of data from interviews, a
household survey, observations, and formal documents. As suggested by Yin (2003),
pattern-matching and a logic model in the research aimed to achieve internal validity.
Because this research was a multiple-case study with a mixed research methods
18
strategy, findings are more legitimate for generalization and reliable than a single case
study relying on one type of data analysis.
Thus, the application of a mixed methods and multiple-case study was
appropriate to investigate regional variances in local governance and ethnic
relationships, i.e., peace or conflict. Both mixed methods of qualitative and
quantitative studies and multiple-case study enhanced the validity and reliability of the
research findings by compensating for weaknesses of each method. A theory of
relationships between civic associations and conflict prevention proposed by Varshney
(2002) was scrutinized in the qualitative approach and tested using quantitative
methods. Using mixed methods and multiple-case studies, this research could uncover
the effects and latent factors behind institutional changes, and provide comprehensive
and detailed accounts of conflict and peace.

1.5.2. Case Selection and Description of Research Sites
In this case, the unit of analysis was districts (kota/ kabupaten).
1
Although
Brass (2003) disagreed with treating the district or city as a unit of analysis, I believe
that focusing on the district was appropriate to my research. One of the objectives of
this research was to examine relations between institutional change and ethnic
relationships. In Indonesia, decentralization devolved authority to the district level, not
to the province level. Second, in the peaceful district of Ketapang, peace pledges were

1
In English translation, kota is ‗municipality‘ or ‗city‘ and kabupaten is ‗regency.‘
19
made by the community of Ketapang district with the support of the district
government. In order to analyze this collective action for peace building at the district
level, it was necessary to compare this peaceful case with a conflict-prone district of
Sambas. In brief, for this study, the district was the most appropriate unit of analysis to
explore local governance for peace building in this research.
The study sites were two districts in West Kalimantan province. One district
experienced severe social violence. The other one was a relatively peaceful district. A
case of a conflict-prone district was Sambas (Kabupaten Sambas), in which conflict
broke out in 1999. Shortly after the violence, Sambas was divided through pemekaran
into three districts: two regencies of Sambas and Bengkayang (Kabupaten Sambas and
Kabupaten Bengkayang), and one city, Singkawang (Kota Singkawang). After
pemekaran, the dominant ethnicity in each district became apparent, i.e., Malay in
Sambas, Dayak in Bengkayang, and Chinese in Singkawang. In addition, the
researcher visited Madurese relocation sites in two districts of Pontianak City (Kota
Pontianak) and Pontianak (Kabupaten Pontianak). As of 2007, Sambas residents still
refused the return of the former Madurese in Sambas, in spite of reconciliation efforts
made by various stakeholders.
This study also examined the case of the relatively peaceful district of
Ketapang (Kabupaten Ketapang). In the province of West Kalimantan, there are two
districts that have not been disturbed by serious ethnic violence—Sintang and
Ketapang (Davidson 2008). Ketapang is the only district that had declared its
20
commitment to ―inter-communal peace‖ in the province while other districts in West
and Central Kalimantan were still experiencing violence. In Ketapang, about 20,000
Madurese live peacefully (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2000a).
An overview of ethnic conflict incidents occurring from 1996 until 2003 in
West Kalimantan is presented in Table 1.1. There were two severe ethnic clashes in
the 1990s: one was the Dayak-Madurese conflict that began in Bengkayang in
1996/1997 and resulted in the deaths of 1,006 persons in five districts of Bengkayang,
Landak, Pontianak, Sambas, and Sanggau; the other was the Malay-Madurese violence
with later involvement of the Dayak which killed 481 persons in Bengkayang and
Sambas (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004b). Table 1.1 shows that
approximately one-third of casualties were concentrated in the Sambas district, while
no fatal ethnic incidents were reported in Ketapang. Chapter 2 provides a description
of the ethnic violence in West Kalimantan.
According to the Population Census 2000, the population in the previous
Sambas district before separation, which included the three districts of Sambas,
Bengkayang, and Singkawang, was 781,400, while the population of Ketapang was
424,000 (BPS 2001). The ethnic composition in West Kalimantan after the conflict is
presented in Table 1.2.
2
Although the sizes of these districts are different, they share

2
The data of population by ethnicity in West Kalimantan was revised after the first publication of the
census due to protest by Dayaks claiming that ethnic category produced by BPS Kalimantan Barat
was inappropriate, making the Dayaks population smaller than the actual number. Since then, the
governor of West Kalimantan has banned disclosure of data of population by ethnicity to the public,
considering it ―sensitive data.‖
21
similarities in culture and social condition. Pemekaran, or the separation of districts,
had not occurred in Ketapang until 2007
3
so that institutional effects of pemekaran are
studied only in the three districts that emerged from the conflict-prone district of
Sambas. The location of two districts is shown in Figure 1.1 and that of the three
districts after pemekaran is presented in Figure 1.2.

3
North Kayong district (Kabupaten Kayong Utara) was established by splitting from Ketapang district
in January 2007.
22
Table 1.1 Overview of Ethnic Conflict in West Kalimantan from 1996-2003
Incidents Killed Injured
District (number) (persons) (persons)
Sambas (Old) 32 560 205
Bengkayang** 18 132 157
Sambas (New) 14 428 48
Landak 3 454 261
Pontianak 4 420 46
Sanggau 3 59 22
Pontianak City 5 9 16
West Kalimantan 47 1502 550
Source: Compiled from unpublished raw data of Ashutosh Varshney, Rizal Panggabean,
and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-
2003), (Jakarta: United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR),
2004b).

Table 1.2 Population by Ethnicity in West Kalimantan (Post-Conflict)
(persons)
Dayak Malay Chinese Java Madura Others Total
Sambas Total*
129,096 402,963 128,854 77,225 10,139 32,241 780,518
16.5% 51.6% 16.5% 9.9% 1.3% 4.1% 100.0%
Sambas
20,130 358,305 49,063 13,590 75 12,439 453,602
4.4% 79.0% 10.8% 3.0% 0.0% 2.7% 100.0%
Bengkayang**
108,966 44,658 79,791 63,635 10,064 19,802 326,916
33.3% 13.7% 24.4% 19.5% 3.1% 6.1% 100.0%
Ketapang
123,965 190,672 12,040 41,606 19,582 35,779 423,644
29.3% 45.0% 2.8% 9.8% 4.6% 8.4% 100.0%
West
Kalimantan
1234,162 1208,537 352,939 385,602 203,612 339,455 3,724,307
33.1% 32.4% 9.5% 10.4% 5.5% 9.1% 100.0%
Source: Compiled from unpublished revised Table 06. Penduduk menurut Wilayah
Administrasi (Kabupaten/ Kota) dan Suku Bangsa in BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat,
Population Census 2000 (Pontianak: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat, 2000a).
Note: * At the time of census, Sambas was divided into two districts: Sambas and
Bengkayang. **Singkawang was still part of Bengkayang district. Most of the Madurese
live in Singkawang.
23

Figure 1.1 Conflict-Prone District Sambas and Peaceful District of Ketapang

Source: West Kalimantan Map: Adapted from Basemap in ArcGIS Explorer 1500. ESRI,
Redlands, CA. Adapted April 25, 2011.
Indonesia Map: Adapted from Indonesia Administrative Divisions (Political), (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2002), Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, the University of
Texas at Austin.
[http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/indonesia_adm_2002.jpg].
Accessed November 14, 2008.
The names of locations were added.

West Kalimantan

Ketapang District
Madura Island, East Java

Sambas District

24

Figure 1.2 Sambas, Bengkayang, and Singkawang after Pemekaran

Source: West Kalimantan Map: Adapted from Basemap in ArcGIS Explorer 1500. ESRI,
Redlands, CA. Adapted April 25, 2011. The names of districts were added.

Bengkayang
District

Singkawang

Sambas
District

25
1.5.3. Data Collection
In-depth open-ended interviews and household surveys were used for this
research primarily to improve the validity of the research under a mixed methods
strategy. In-depth open-ended interviews for leaders and key persons were conducted
first and then the household survey followed.

(1) Publication and Other Data
Documents, publications, and information relevant to policy and projects on
institutional changes, activities of civic associations, and conflict were collected.
These included newspapers, documents, reports, articles, and minutes of meetings and
conferences, issued by international organizations, local governments and researchers,
and others. Socio-economic data were also collected.

(2) In-Depth Open-Ended Interviews
The primary objective of the in-depth semi-structured open-ended interviews
was to explore ethnic relations, ethnic problems and conflict, activities of ethnic
organizations and civic associations, government involvement, and local institutional
changes. Prominent civic associations that may have affected conflict and peace
building, significant institutions and institutional changes, and their impacts on ethnic
relationships were identified. Interview data revealed group identities, perceptions,
beliefs, histories of groups and other local contexts as well. The results of the
26
interviews were utilized to refine the theoretical framework and to develop
questionnaires.
Interviewees were primary leaders, influential persons, or persons who have
relevant information on the districts, ethnic groups, and ethnic violence. Respondents
included leaders or key persons in the districts, sub-districts, villages, traditional
customary institutions, business associations, religious groups, women‘s groups, youth
groups, and other NGOs, elected politicians, government officials, scholars and
researchers, teachers, and others. The method of sampling was non-probability
snowball sampling. The interviews were discontinued when new interviews no longer
yielded any additional new information. A total of 178 people were formally
interviewed in Jakarta, Pontianak City, Sambas, Singkawang, Bengkayang, and
Ketapang from January through July 2006 and October 2006 to June 2007. Most of the
interviews in the first phase were audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis.
Bahasa Indonesia (the Indonesian language) was used for interviews. Before
the interview, the researcher asked respondents for informed consent. Interviews were
recorded by taking memos or being taped, if the respondent agreed to do so.

(3) Household Survey
The household questionnaire survey primarily aimed to confirm the validity of
theoretical assumptions constructed from the results of the in-depth open-ended
interviews and literature review. The survey investigated the impacts of civic
27
associations, institutional factors, and contextual factors on ethnic relationships. The
survey respondents were 675 in total, as shown in Table 1.3 and the surveys were
implemented through March to July 2007.
The sampling method was stratified and cluster sampling. The strata were
defined by ethnicity, district, and urban/rural area, and three-stage cluster sampling
was designed based on the Census 2000 data (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2000b),
in cooperation with the West Kalimantan Statistics Office except for the Madurese
population in relocation sites and Pontianak City. First, several villages (desa) and
then neighborhoods in selected villages were randomly chosen. The numbers of total
villages in each district and sampled villages are presented in Table 1.4. Sampling of
Madurese respondents in relocation sites and Pontianak City were implemented
separately. Three groups—the Malays, Dayaks and Madurese—were represented
equally. The sampling weight was calculated based on the strata and clusters. Chapter
12 provides detailed sampling methods and procedures. This was a household survey.
Surveyors visited respondents‘ homes and helped them complete the questionnaire.
Surveyors were recruited from NGOs and their ethnicities were selected to match the
ethnicities of the respondents (e.g., a Dayak surveyor for a Dayak respondent), as
much as possible.

28
Table 1.3 Sample Sizes of Household Survey
Malay Dayak Madurese Total
Sambas (Old)
(Sambas, Bengkayang, Singkawang,
Relocation sites and Pontianak City)
112 115 113* 340
Ketapang 113 112 110 335
Total 225 227 223 675
Note: * Madurese respondents in former Sambas district were selected from Madurese in
Singkawang, Pontianak City, and relocation sites.

Table 1.4 Sampling Coverage of Villages by District

Number of Villages
Number of Sampled
Villages
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
Sambas
(Old)
Sambas (New) 15 162 177 7 13 20
Bengkayang 2 85 87 2 8 10
Singkawang 10 16 26 8 4 12
Ketapang 9 143 152 6 11 17

1.6. Organization of Chapters
This introductory chapter provided an overview of the dissertation, including
the background, research questions, research methodology, and the organization of the
dissertation. The primary objective of the research was to explore the role of local
governance structures in conflict prevention. The research focused on how two factors,
civic associations and decentralization, the division of districts or pemekaran in
particular, affect ethnic relationships. To examine the research questions, multiple case
studies and mixed research methods involving in-depth interviews and a household
survey were employed as the research methodology.
29
Chapter 2 illustrates the history of ethnic violence in West Kalimantan, with an
overview of communal conflicts in Indonesia. The focal topic of this research, two
ethnic violence incidents between the Dayak and Madurese and between the Malay
and Madurese are described as a process in which small incidents triggered
widespread violence. The history of violence in West Kalimantan, especially violence
against Chinese residents and communal ethnic clashes during the transition period,
are traced to understand influences of central politics and the circumstances
surrounding each ethnic group in West Kalimantan, and the different forms of
communal violence in Indonesia.
After the description of the ethnic relationships and violence in the province,
theories to explain ethnic violence there are reviewed in comparison to theories for
peace in Chapter 3. The chapter illuminates the need to distinguish between the two
theories and underscores the importance of developing appropriate peace theories,
separated from conflict theories. Subsequently, the theories to explain relationships
between civic associations and conflict and peace building are explored. First, theories
on civic associations and peace—two theories on relationships between inter- or intra-
communal associations and peace—are analyzed to identify issues and weaknesses in
the arguments. Next, a theoretical framework is proposed for comparing a peaceful
district and a conflict-prone district.
Chapters 4 through 6 provide analyses of the case studies to explore how civic
associations affected the development of violence, conflict prevention and peace
30
building in the conflict-prone district of Sambas and the peaceful district of Ketapang.
The chapters discuss essential contextual factors, namely, ethnic assimilation and
segregation, migration history, and ethnic competition and domination, informal
institutions, traditional conflict prevention approaches, ethnic organizations, inter-
ethnic associations, and local government involvement. After Chapters 4 and 5 discuss
the detailed analysis of the two districts, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and
theoretical implications.
Institutional change, such as decentralization and pemekaran or administrative
fragmentation, and its impact on post-conflict society are discussed in Chapters 7
through 11. A question on the efficacy of decentralization and pemekaran on peace
building is examined by analyzing the cases of the three districts, Bengkayang,
Sambas, and Singkawang. The institutional changes led to the implementation of new
local political institutions, which also affected civil society. Eventually these
modifications in local governance structures led to subtle adjustments of ethnic
relationships and civic associations of ethnic associations, inter-ethnic associations,
and NGOs in each district. Through an analysis of these factors, I examined how
institutional change has influenced ethnic relationships, and the prospect of peace
building, as well as violence in the future. Chapter 7 focuses on the theoretical
argument. The three cases are separately presented in Chapters 8 to 10 and the
discussion concludes in Chapter 11.
31
To reexamine and confirm the findings of case studies in previous chapters, a
regression analysis of the household survey data is presented in Chapter 12. A
relationship between civic associations and ethnic peace and conflict was tested with
key factors such as ethnic discrimination, political representation, assimilation, and
government trust. At the conclusion, the regression results were compared with the
case studies, and the findings in the quantitative and qualitative analysis are
recapitulated as conclusion.
The final chapter concludes by outlining conditions for conflict and peace and
summarizing the findings on the relationships among civic associations, institutional
changes, and conflict/peace building. Local governance and conflict prevention,
interactions between civil society and political society and transformation of the civil
society in particular, are discussed along with those questions that remain unresolved.
Also fruitful topics for future research are presented. The methodology of the research
is reviewed to clarify the limitations of the research and findings. Policies and
programs for conflict prevention and peace building are recommended along with a
discussion on the issue of knowledge creation in professional studies.

32
CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN WEST KALIMANTAN
This chapter reviews the historical background of ethnic relations and violence
in West Kalimantan. The province has a long history of violence, which left lasting
influences on the development of ethnic relationships and violence in the 1990s
(Peluso and Harwell 2001; Davidson 2008). A historic review of past violence is
essential to understanding the current ethnic relationships in the province.
After an overview of communal violence in Indonesia and significant historical
events, this chapter reviews the development of ethnic relations in West Kalimantan
beginning with the Dutch colonial period, Japanese occupation, Sukarno‘s Old Order
regime and onwards through to the beginning of the New Order era. The second part
of the chapter describes the Dayak-Madurese and Malay-Madurese ethnic clashes in
West Kalimantan. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the historical
development of ethnic relationships and their connection to politics in the province.

2.1. Overview: Unexplained Variance of Communal Violence in Indonesia
Before analyzing ethnic violence in West Kalimantan, this section provides an
overview of communal violence in Indonesia. There were two comprehensive
databases and analyses of communal violence in Indonesia. The first one was
Mohammand Zulfan Tadjoeddin‘s ―Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of
Transition: the Case of Indonesia 1990-2001‖ and ―Database on Social Violence in
33
Indonesia 1990-2001‖ (Tadjoeddin 2002a, 2002b), and the second was Varshney,
Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin‘s ―Pattern of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-
2003)‖ (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004a; Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and
Panggabean 2008). The two datasets were developed by reviewing reports of incidents
in the media. Tadjoeddin‘s (2002a, 2002b) data was derived from two national level
media, Antara, a national news agency, and Kompas, a national daily newspaper, from
1990 to 2001 while Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin (2004a) examined
provincial newspapers, including regional editions of a national newspaper, Kompas,
from 1990 to 2003.
In Tadjoeddin‘s (2002a, 2002b) reports, social violence divided into four
groups: ―Communal violence,‖ ―Separatist violence, ―State-community violence,‖ and
―Industrial relations violence‖ (Tadjoeddin 2002a, 24-25). Communal violence
included those related to ―ethnicity, religion, social class, political affiliation or simple
village differences and so on‖ (Tadjoeddin 2002a, 24). This social conflict dataset
contained the number of conflict incidents, number of deaths, and the types of conflict
by municipalities across 27 provinces from 1990 to 2001 (Tadjoeddin 2002a, 2002b).
Excluding the separatist violence in Tadjoeddin‘s data, Varshney, Tadjoeddin,
and Panggabean‘s (2008) collective violence data focused on four types of violence:
―ethnocommunal (interethnic, interreligious, and intrareligious),‖ ―state versus
community,‖ ―economic‖ (land dispute, industry and labor related conflict,
environmental problem), and ―other (lynchings, intervillage brawls, etc.)‖ (368). The
34
collective violence dataset included incidents that occurred in 14 provinces, including
West Kalimantan. The collective violence database reported 10,402 deaths in 5,564
incidents from 1990 to 2001, almost twice as many casualties as found in the social
violence data (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004a).
According to Tadjoeddin‘s (2002a, 2002b) data, two types of social conflict—
communal violence and separatist violence—were the dominant forms of violence
from 1991 to 2001. Communal violence and separatist violence reached 42.5% and
45.9% of total incidents of 1,093, respectively; however, 77% of the total 6,208 deaths
resulting from communal violence and 22% of the lost lives occurred in separatist
violence. The other two types of violence, state-community and industrial relations,
accounted for only 1% of the total deaths (Tadjoeddin 2002a). Among causalities by
communal violence, 52% were rooted in ―ethnicity, religion, and native-migrant‖
related violence conflicts (Tadjoeddin 2002a, 38). Similar to Tadjoeddin‘s (2002a,
2002b), 89.3% of all 10,758 deaths occurred in ethnocommunal violence, in spite of
its share of 16.6% among a total of 3,608 incidents in Varshney, Panggabean, and
Tadjoeddin‘s (2004a) dataset from 1990 to 2003. The ethnocommunal violence
fatality level was higher than other types of violence (Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and
Panggabean 2008).
Both databases showed the geographical concentration of violence. Communal
violence was concentrated in 15 districts in the provinces of Maluku, North Maluku,
Jakarta, Papua, West and Central Kalimantan particularly, and less populated areas,
35
except Jakarta (Tadjoeddin 2002a; Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean 2008). The
share of total deaths in 15 districts reached 85.5% (Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and
Panggabean 2008). Communal violence was more common in rural districts than in
cities, accounting for a concentration of 64% of the incidents or 58% of the casualties
(Tadjoeddin 2002a).
Sambas of West Kalimantan ranked eighth out of fifteen in terms of fatalities.
The ethnic violence between Madurese, and Dayak and Malay in West and Central
Kalimantan provinces, resulting in 2,764 deaths, were the second largest number in the
category of ethnocommunal violence, after religious clashes between Muslim and
Christian with 5,452 victims (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004a). In
Tadjoeddin‘s (2002a) data, Sambas was identified as one of the most seriously
affected areas, ―communal riot prone I,‖ with over 39.7 casualties per 100 thousand
persons with 7 districts such as Poso (Central Sulawesi), East Kotawaringin (Central
Kalimantan), and several districts in Maluku with high concentrations of violence as
well (Tadjoeddin 2002a, 36).
Most violence occurred after the end of New Order or 1998, namely the
transition period. The violence under the New Order was only 2.6% of total incidents
(Tadjoeddin 2002a). The main triggering events of severe violence were fights or
quarrels among youths. The direct causes of explosive violence resulting in 40% of the
deaths were youth fights (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004a).

36
Table 2.1 Communal Violence in Indonesia from 1990 to 2001
(Social Violence Dataset)
(Provinces with more than 100 deaths)
Province
Incidents
(No.)
Death
(persons)
Major Type of Communal Violence
Maluku 164 1,949 Ethnic, religion and migration related
Jakarta 33 1,209 The May 1998
West Kalimantan 13 440 Ethnic, religion and migration related
Central
Kalimantan
16 440 Ethnic, religion and migration related
Central Sulawesi 13 334 Ethnic, religion and migration related
South
Kalimantan
1 124 Political clash
Source: Compiled from Table 3 in Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Anatomy of Social
Violence in the Context of Transition: the Case of Indonesia 1990-2001. Working Paper:
02/01 (Jakarta: UNSFIR, 2002a), page 33; and data in Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin,
Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001 (Jakarta: UNSFIR, 2002b), page 4-
45.

The most important finding in the analysis of the two databases was regional
and local variations of communal violence (Tadjoeddin 2002a; Varshney, Tadjoeddin,
and Panggabean 2008). Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean (2008) contend that
these variations cast doubts on the popular theories of communal violence in
Indonesia: the primordial view of violence seeking a root in history and culture
(Anderson 2001; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002), the collapse of Suharto‘s New Order
regime and transition (Liddle 1999), and Jacques Bertrand‘s (2004, 2008) critical
junctures to connect the outbreak of violence at the time of institutional changes with
the national model. The uneven distribution of violence remains unexplained by
existing conflict theories. Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean (2008) have
appealed to the need for local analysis of violence, because there are
37
Table 2.2 Collective Violence in Indonesia from 1990-2003 by District
Rank District Province
Death Incident
Major
violence
Total % Total %
1 North Maluku
North
Maluku
2,410 21.6 % 60 1.4% Religious
2
Jakarta
(5 districts)
Jakarta 1,322 11.8% 178 4.2%
Anti-
Chinese
3
East
Kotawaringin
Central
Kalimantan
1,229 11.0% 24 0.6% Ethnic
4 Ambon City Maluku 1,097 9.8% 190 4.4% Religious
5 Poso
Central
Sulawesi
655 5.9% 32 0.7% Religious
6 Central Maluku Maluku 632 5.7% 115 2.7% Religious
7 Landak
West
Kalimantan
455 4.1% 4 0.1% Ethnic
8 Sambas
West
Kalimantan
428 3.8% 16 0.4% Ethnic
9 Pontianak
West
Kalimantan
425 3.8% 8 0.2% Ethnic
10
Central
Halmahera
North
Maluku
311 2.8% 6 0.1% Religious
11
Maluku
Tenggara
Maluku 168 1.5% 12 0.3% Religious
12 Buru Maluku 149 1.3% 15 0.4% Religious
13 Bengkayang
West
Kalimantan
132 1.2% 19 0.4% Ethnic
14 Ternate City
North
Maluku
73 0.7% 6 0.1% Religious
15 Sanggau
West
Kalimantan
59 0.5% 5 0.1% Ethnic
15 districts 9,545 85.5% 690 1.2%
Others 1,615 14.5% 3,580 83.8%
Total 14 Provinces 10,758 96.4% 3,608 84.5%
Indonesia Total 11,160 100.0% 4,270 100.0%
Source: Compiled from Table 9 and unpublished raw data in Ashutosh Varshney, Rizal
Panggabean, and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Patterns of Collective Violence in
Indonesia (1990-2003), Working Paper: 04/03 (Jakarta: United Nations Support Facility
for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), 2004a, 2004b), page 34.
38
[T]he local differences existing within such regions or groups that
presumably kept many towns or districts peaceful, even as violence
broke out elsewhere in the region. Institutional factors at the national or
regional level are best viewed as sparks, which were turned into fires in
some places, not others (Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean 2008,
376).
Therefore, regional and local variations in communal violence in Indonesia have
called for more detailed research on local factors that make communal relationships
more peaceful or antagonistic.
As the two databases confirmed, without doubt, West Kalimantan was the
center of ethnic violence. Yet, there were violent districts such as Sambas, Landak,
and Pontianak and peaceful districts such as Ketapang and Sintang. Therefore, this
chapter reviews the history of ethnic violence of West Kalimantan.

2.2. History of Violence in West Kalimantan
The province of West Kalimantan is located in the Indonesian territory of the
island of Borneo, so called Kalimantan, bordering Sarawak State of Malaysia on the
north, East Kalimantan province on the east, and Central Kalimantan province on the
southeast. Until the late 1990s, the province consisted of six districts and a capital city;
there were eleven districts and two cities as of 2010. According to the Population
Census of 2000 (BPS 2001), a population of 3,733,000 resided in 146,800 square
kilometers (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2006). West Kalimantan is one of the least
populated provinces in the country, along with Central and East Kalimantan (BPS
2006). There are three major ethnicities in the province: Dayak, Malay and Chinese.
39
Gradually other ethnic groups, for example, the Javanese or Madurese, migrated from
the other islands of Indonesia.

2.2.1. Pre-Independence: Ethnic Relations in Colonial Period
Before Indonesian independence in 1949, Kalimantan was part of the Dutch
colony, the Netherlands East Indies, from the mid nineteenth century. A number of
sultanates developed in the coastal regions from the pre-colonial period, as trading
points between China and India and eastern Indonesia. However, no single political
entity appeared strong enough to integrate all the small states (King 1993).
The sultanate states in West Kalimantan, such as Tanjungpura in Ketapang,
were under Majapahit control in Java in the fourteenth century (Hall 1981). Islam was
widely introduced to Borneo by missionaries and traders through Malaysia, Sumatra,
and Java around the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. There were Sambas, Sukadana,
and Landak sultanates in the sixteenth century (King 1993). In the interior region,
small Muslim states existed along major rivers in Sintang and Sekadau, for example
(King 1993; Davidson 2008).
Europeans started appearing in Borneo during the sixteenth century. In the
seventeenth century, the Dutch and British increased their presence in the
southwestern and northern parts of the island, currently Indonesian Kalimantan and
Malaysian Borneo, respectively (Irwin 1955). The Dutch had stations in Sukadana,
40
Sambas, Landak, and Pontianak in West Kalimantan and consolidated their rule in
1818 with the surrender of the Pontianak and Sambas sultanates (King 1993).
Dayak is the name of indigenous groups living in the interior regions of
Borneo, especially of non-Muslim groups (Rousseau 1990). According to King
(1993), Europeans distinguished all non-Malay or non-Muslim populations as
―Dayak‖ from the communities in coastal sultanates, despite diversity in tribal
communities. In the mid-eighteen century, the Dutch already used the term Dayak for
a group of tribal communities in the interior. Tribal settlements spread throughout the
Kalimantan hinterland. Inter-tribal wars often happened for capturing slaves, and tribal
communities practiced headhunting (King 1993).
Most Malay people are considered Dayaks who converted to Islam or migrants
who originated from other regions (Rousseau 1990; King 1993). Converting to Islam,
the indigenous groups adapted the Malay lifestyle with changes to their eating habits,
such as avoiding the consumption of pork or alcohol, and with changes in housing
from longhouse to single detached houses, in language, clothing, or occupation, such
as shifting from agricultural cultivation to other activities (King 1993). Experiencing
significant changes in lifestyle and having continuing relationships with Malays,
eventually the Dayaks identified themselves as Malays (King 1993; Davidson 2008)
The tribal communities and coastal sultanates were connected through
exchanges of commodities and trading, or offer of tributes (Rousseau 1990; King
1993). Certain Dayak leaders strengthened alliances with Malay rulers through inter-
41
ethnic marriages (King 1993; Yuan 2000). The rulers in coastal areas hired specific
Dayak groups as soldiers. However, Malay sultans dominated the Dayaks. The Dutch
noted Malay exploitation of Dayaks. The Malays levied poll and trading taxes and
practiced unequal trade and slavery against the local population. Some Dayak groups
chose to enter a Malay state to avoid heavy taxation by the other Malay sultanate
(King 1993). Sometimes Dayaks were forced to retreat further into the interior to
escape taxes and hardships imposed by the Malay states (Rousseau 1990; King 1993).
Unlike the indirect control of Malay sultanate states, the Dutch directly
approached Dayak communities to increase political influence and to gain access to
forest products or resources from the hinterlands for their economic gains. The Dutch
applied separate legal systems for the two populations: Islamic laws for Malays and
customary laws for Dayaks. The Dutch selected leaders from the indigenous
communities to enforce laws and collect taxes. Christian missionaries also entered
Dayak communities to christen, to build churches and schools, to provide medical
services, and to persuade them to stop headhunting and animistic rituals (King 1993).
Besides Malays, Javanese, and Arabs, a large number of Chinese immigrants
settled in Borneo Island. Though Chinese migration to Borneo started much earlier for
trade, many, mostly Hakka, immigrants, according to Yuan (2000), came to West
Borneo as gold miners in the mid eighteenth century (King 1993; Yuan 2000). This
Chinese migration started upon a request of sultans to develop gold mines in their
territories (Yuan 2000) because of the good reputation of Chinese miners in Bangka
42
(Jackson 1970). Major gold mines were located in the areas of Montrado and Mandor.
The sultans of Sambas and Mempawah provided support and protection to the miners
(Yuan 2000).
Along with an increase in the Chinese population, Chinese self-governing
entities called kongsi emerged in the gold-mining regions. Kongsis were organized by
miners to cope with the oppression of the Malay sultanates and later evolved to carry
out various functions from industrial and economic activities, law enforcement and
security, and education to social life support to cultural and religious services. More
powerful alliances or federations of kongsi, such as the Heshun zongting consisting
fourteen kongsis and Lanfang kongsi, were founded in Montrado and Mandor in the
late 1770s (Yuan 2000). In the mid nineteenth century, there were approximately
50,000 Chinese settlers in the kongsi region (King 1993). Those kongsi federations
maintained an independent status from the Dutch and Malay sultanates and fought
against each other over mines and other resources (Yuan 2000). Davidson (2008)
underlined the significant overlap of kongsi areas and incidents of violence from the
colonial period up to the Dayak and Madurese violence in the late 1990s.
The Dutch hostility toward the Chinese settlements rose from the late 1810s to
the mid 1820s. Eventually the kongsi war broke out in 1850. By this time, due to the
gradual decline of gold production, the Chinese were mostly engaged in agricultural
production, trade, and other economic activities. The Dutch decided to use military
force to seize control of the kongsis and the Chinese population in 1851 (Yuan 2000).
43
The great Chinese kongsis ceased to exist after the submission of the Heshun zongting
of Montrado in 1854 (King 1993; Yuan 2000) and the death of the leader of Lanfang
kongsi in Mandor in 1884 (Yuan 2000; Heidhues 2001).
During the kongsi period, the Chinese and Dayaks developed relatively close
relationships. It was common that Chinese settlers, especially the early immigrants,
took Dayak wives because of the shortage of Chinese women and no restrictions to
marry Dayak women. Many Dayak families lived in Chinese communities. Certain
groups of Dayak approached the Chinese to aid in their competition with other
Dayaks. On the other hand, the Chinese and Malay were separated in kongsis and
sultanates and interacted much less with each other. Malays sometimes provoked
clashes between Chinese and Dayaks to increase their influence. The ethnic
relationships at that time were by no means stable. Due to troubles over mines and
lands, Dayaks often attacked the Chinese who settled in inland areas. Approaching the
end of the kongsi era, the Lanfang kongsi fought against the Dayaks of Landak and the
sultan of Pontianak was called as intermediary (Yuan 2000). The Dutch and Malay
sultans also mobilized the Dayaks against the Chinese in the kongsi wars (Yuan 2000;
Heidhues 2001).
The Dutch brought in Madurese as soldiers for the kongsi wars (Heidhues
2001; Davidson 2008). There were 500 to 600 Madurese auxiliary forces in Montrado
in 1854 (Heidhues 2001). The Dutch also hired Madurese laborers for construction
projects (Davidson 2008). According to interviews and Davidson (2008), the
44
Madurese had already migrated to Ketapang and married local Malay women before
the kongsi wars. During the 1920s rubber boom, with Buginese migrants, Madurese
laborers arrived for the development of rubber plantations in West Kalimantan
(Heidhues 2001). Thus, Davidson (2008) argued that the Dutch and the kongsis
brought significant social and political changes to West Kalimantan.

2.2.2. Pre-Independence: Japanese Occupation and Mandor Massacre
Japan occupied colonial Indonesia from 1942 to 1945 until the end of the war.
The Japanese occupation of West Kalimantan started after the bombing of Pontianak
in December 1941 and the landing operation in the beginning of 1942 (Effendy 1982).
The Dutch East Indies Army hardly resisted and withdrew to the interior (Davidson
2002). The population suffered from a lack of food and forced labor under the
Japanese occupation (Effendy 1982). Dayak opposition to the Japanese occurred from
April to August 1945 (Effendy 1982; Davidson 2002).
The Mandor incidents, the massacre of the elites and leaders, occurred
approximately in one year from the middle of 1943 (Maekawa 2002). During this
time, sultans, the ruling class, scholars and educated people, politicians, and
economically powerful figures were arrested and executed for conspiracies of defiance
(Davidson 2008). Based on the records of the Japanese, Dutch, and Indonesians,
researchers such as Maekawa (2002) and Davidson (2008) suspected approximately
2,000 victims, which contrasts with the official figure of 21,037 causalities. In two
45
series of incidents, 1,534 and 350 persons were executed (Maekawa 2002). The
Chinese accounted for almost a half of the 2,000 victims (Davidson 2002; Maekawa
2002). The mass graves of victims were found in Mandor, and a monument was built
after the war. The Mandor incidents threw a shadow over political and economic
circumstances in West Kalimantan, particularly for the Dayak (Davidson 2008).
During the field research, a Chinese businessman in Pontianak cited the Mandor
massacre as one of reasons for the underdevelopment of West Kalimantan. The
political impact of the Mandor incidents in the province is discussed later.

2.2.3. Independence and Partai Daya(k)
Immediately after the surrender of the Japanese, Sukarno declared
independence for the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. The Dutch‘s attempt
to restore control of the country and build a Dutch-led federation met strong resistance
in Java and Sumatra. Lieutenant Governor-General H. J. van Mook and the
Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) initiated a federal state consisting of
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and the islands in eastern Indonesia (Ricklefs 2008; Thomas,
Moore and Butler 2008). In West Kalimantan, by a request of the Sultan Hamid Al
Qadri of Pontianak, who was a supporter of the Dutch federal state and who led the
West Kalimantan Council consisting of Malay aristocracies and Dayak leaders
(Effendy 1982), the Dutch granted autonomous status to West Kalimantan in 1947 and
named it ―the Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat (West Kalimantan Special Region,
46
or DIKB)‖ (Davidson 2008, 39). The Indonesian Revolution‘s struggle to unify
Indonesia continued until the Dutch handed over authority of the Republic in 1950.
However, Sultan Hamid was jailed, charged for his involvement in a coup in Bandung
and the autonomous status, which had been granted by the Dutch, was stripped from
West Kalimantan (Davidson 2008).
The disappearance of the ruling class in the Mandor incidents created a
political vacuum which benefitted the Dayaks who were probably not very visible
among the elite groups at that time (Davidson 2008). In 1946, the Dayaks initiated
political action by organizing the Daya Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daya or PD)
which evolved from a group called the Daya in Action.
4
PD, composed of graduates of
missionary schools, mostly schoolteachers, such as Palaunsoeka and Oevaang Oeray,
aimed to empower the Dayaks, who were the indigenous people of Kalimantan and
who had been continually marginalized and exploited by colonizers and sultans
(Davidson 2008). The Dutch actively recruited emerging Dayak leaders for positions
in the government and the council of West Kalimantan. As a result, the Dayak‘s
political presence strengthened in the province. In the first election after the
integration of Indonesia in 1955, PD received strong support from constituents and
progressed to become the leading party through the elections during the 1950s.
Oevaang Oeray won the position of the first governor of West Kalimantan, and
Dayaks occupied four district head positions (Heidhues 2001; Davidson 2008).

4
Daya is the old spelling of Dayak. The spelling of ―Dayak‖ was officially adopted later (Davidson
2002).
47
However, at the end of 1956, two rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi changed
PD‘s fate. After the suppression of the rebels, the army gained power, the central
control was strengthened, and Indonesia‘s democracy was abandoned. The Maysumi
Islamic party and regional parties, including PD, were forbidden by 1960 (Davidson
2008). PD members were split into two parties following two leaders, Oeray and
Palaunsoeka, to Partai Indonesia (Partindo) and the Catholic Party, respectively.
Partindo selected by Oeray was a left wing party close to President Sukarno (Heidhues
2001; Davidson 2008). According to Davidson (2008), Dayaks lost political
momentum due to the ban of Partai Dayak and the split of the two Dayak leaders. This
decline of Dayak political power continued, and the downward spiral became
definitive by the time of the emergence of the New Order regime.

2.2.4. Konfrontasi
In 1963, konfrontasi (confrontation) with Malaysia had started the opposition
to the independence of the Malaysia Federation, consisting of the British colonies of
Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo. Increasing in popularity, Sheikh A.
M. Azahari of the People‘s Party of Brunei (PRB), who had once joined Indonesia‘s
independence struggle against the Dutch, rebelled with the North Kalimantan National
Army (Tentara National Kalimantan Utara, TNKU) of PRB in December 1962, in
order to found the state of North Kalimantan, including Brunei, Sarawak, and North
Borneo (Tilman 1964; Sutter 1966; Jones 2002). Sukarno and the Indonesian
48
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) advocated for Azahari‘s revolt for
independence of North Kalimantan and criticized the new federation as Western
neocolonialism. Konfrontasi (confrontation), the policy to ―Crush Malaysia,‖ started
in February 1963 (Sutter 1966, 526; Jones 2002).
In Sarawak, Azahari‘s North Kalimantan state also gained support from the
Sarawak United People‘s Party (SUPP), the majority members of which were Chinese,
and the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO) (Sutter 1966; Jones 2002).
5
Facing
the Malaysian attack on the side of revolt, hundreds of pro-North Kalimantan groups
escaped to West Kalimantan. Later the Sarawak People‘s Guerilla Force (Pasukan
Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak, PGRS) and North Kalimantan People‘s Force (Pasukan
Rakyat Kalimantan Utara, Paraku) were organized in West Kalimantan based on the
SCO and TNKU, respectively (Porritt 2004; Davidson 2008). The Indonesian army
supported these rebel forces by providing training, weapons, and thousands of
volunteer fighters who joined from West Kalimantan and Java (Jones 2002; van der
Bijl 2007; Davidson 2008). West Kalimantan was the center of all military forces in
Indonesia (Davidson 2008). A senior Dayak interviewee in Bengkayang recalled that
some Dayaks participated in secret training provided by the military.
However, after the Cobboled Commission and the United Nations Commission
investigations, Sarawak eventually participated in the Federation of Malaysia in 1963

5
The Sarawak Communist Organization was called by the government as at first the Sarawak
Advanced Youths‘ Association (SAYA), Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), and the
Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO), and eventually transformed into the North Kalimantan
Communist Party (NKCP) (Porritt 2004).
49
in the middle of konfrontasi (Jones 2002). Meanwhile, Indonesia soon faced a
formidable internal political change, the beginning of the New Order in 1965, which
affected West Kalimantan significantly (Davidson 2008).

2.2.5. New Order: Military Operation and Chinese Expulsion by Dayaks
On the night of September 30 1965, seven army generals were attacked. Six
were immediately killed or abducted and later murdered at the Halim Air Force Base
in Jakarta. The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Untung and the 30
th
of September
Movement (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, GESTAPU) claimed responsibility for
the coup and declared formation of an Indonesian Revolutionary Council. Led by
Suharto, the army quickly suppressed the rebels. The Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) was purged for having masterminded the failed coup (Sutter 1966; Brackman
1969). From 1965 to 1966, approximately a half million PKI members, activists,
supporters, and suspected communists were slaughtered throughout the country (Cribb
2001). In 1966, Suharto‘s new government took action to restore relations with
Malaysia, and konfrontasi, a war against Malaysia ended with the Jakarta accord peace
agreement in August (Sutter 1966; Jones 2002).
The end of konfrontasi and the collapse of PKI had formidable impacts in West
Kalimantan. In the early 1960s, Said Achmad Sofyan, who led PKI West Kalimantan,
succeeded in gaining support among a large Chinese population in the province.
Immediately after the coup, the PKI was outlawed and the party members ran into the
50
forests to escape arrest. In spite of the change in Indonesia-Malaysia relationship,
PGRS and Paraku rebels seeking the independence of North Kalimantan did not agree
with disarmament and kept the struggle alive near the Malaysia borders. Some PGRS
groups fought on the PKI side (Davidson 2008). The anti-Chinese campaign was
started by introducing restrictions on Chinese language, religion, education, and
organizations (Davidson 2008; Winarta 2008). In West Kalimantan, road construction
and other projects were implemented by Chinese forced labor (Davidson 2008).
Until the middle of 1967, the military produced few apparent results in their
operations against the rebels. Taking seriously the defeat in PKI and the PGRS‘s
attack of an air force base in Singkawang in July 1967, the army launched a new
strategy to separate the Chinese communities from the rebels. Because the Chinese
populations in the rural areas were assumed to be a supply base for the rebels, the
army thought to ―[d]rain the water so the fish can‘t swim‖ (Feith 1968; Davidson
2008, 65). In the operation, Dayaks were selected as the real executor of the Chinese
expulsion. At first, even after the news spread of the murders of Dayak villagers by
Chinese at the army‘s instigation, Dayak and Chinese relations affirmed the unity of
communities through Dayak‘s traditional ceremonies. Yet, in October 1967, the
Dayaks finally started attacking the Chinese in revenge. The Chinese death toll in the
fight ranged from 2,000 to 5,000, according to various records. The Chinese in
Pontianak, Landak, and Bengkayang were the ones most severely attacked (Davidson
2008). More than 53,000 Chinese were displaced (Feith 1968).
51
The massacre of Chinese was conspired by the army and Oevaang Oeray, the
first governor of West Kalimantan (Feith 1968; Jenkins 1978). Due to his close
relations with Sukarno, Governor Oeray was replaced in 1966. Oeray assisted the
army in organizing the Dayaks to attack the Chinese, in order to recover his declining
political fortune (Feith 1968) and supplant Chinese economic dominance through the
Dayaks (Davidson 2008). The militant group Laskar Pangsuma was organized from a
Dayak organization, the Shield and Sword Foundation (Yayasan Mandau Persai)
(Davidson 2008). A red bowl was sent as a call to war against the Chinese by Oeray
and Dayak leaders (Feith 1968; Peluso 2006). The military provided weapons and
commanded the militant group (Davidson 2008).
Even after the violence against the Chinese, PGRS/Paraku and PKI rebels
could not be suppressed, and Oeray‘s ambition for political revival and the consequent
rise of Dayak economic strength were not achieved. Furthermore, in 1967, Dayaks and
Madurese clashed in Pontianak and Landak (Davidson 2008). The Dayak claimed that
the violence was started by the Madurese killing of a Dayak, and consequently Dayaks
took revenge (Bamba 2000; Petebang and Sutrisno 2000). However, before the
murder, there was already intimidation against the Madurese in Anjungan, Mandor
and around Pontianak, the former Chinese settlements, such as setting fire to
Madurese residences or spreading leaflets to abuse and blackmail them, so they could
be coerced to move to other areas (Davidson 2008). Davidson (2008) argued that
52
violence broke out because of competition for abandoned Chinese property and lands
which were supposed to belong to Dayaks in Oeray‘s plan.
From 1967 through 1968, the army moved almost 60,000 Chinese from rural
interior regions to camps in Pontianak, Singkawang, and adjacent areas as the violence
against the Chinese continued (Davidson 2008). The refugees seriously suffered from
starvation and poor camp conditions (Feith 1968), which resulted in thousands of
deaths (Davidson 2008). Later, thousands of Chinese were relocated from the camps
to special settlements in Ketapang (Davidson 2008), according to some interviewees,
in order to educate them to become ―rightful Indonesians,‖ such as learning the
Indonesian language. However, many stayed in the coastal areas from Singkawang
through Pontianak. In spite of all the brutal campaigns, Sofyan of PKI survived until
1974 and the army operation against PGRS/ Paraku continued until 1976 (Davidson
2008).
The result of more than ten year military operation left strong memories of
violence and inculcated ethnic division in West Kalimantan, especially in the northern
districts of Sambas, Singkawang, Bengkayang, Landak, and Pontianak (Davidson
2008). Based on the history of ethnic relationships and the violence described, the
following section discusses the ethnic clashes.

53
2.3. Ethnic Violence in West Kalimantan
2.3.1. Ethnic Violence in West Kalimantan: Overview
This section analyzes the past ethnic violence in West Kalimantan between
Dayaks and Madurese and between Malays and Madurese. The incidents of violence
described came mainly from the Human Rights Watch Report (1997), Jamie
Davidson‘s (2008) research, publications by local researchers and the government,
news media, and interviews.
The record of violence revealed various problems. Davidson (2008) pointed
out three issues about violence records in West Kalimantan: mass media‘s insufficient
coverage of the province and avoidance of violence news by the New Order, historical
accounts by Dayak researchers privileging the Dayak view, and the restructured and
adjusted memories of the violence to fit the perception of specific ethnicities,
especially Madurese and local discourses that have since developed through recent and
significant incidents. Ethnic issues were suppressed as an SARA issue (abbreviation of
ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-groups in Indonesian) under the New Order. In fact,
there were discrepancies in dates and descriptions of incidents, in particular those that
occurred in the early days, among the publications and interviewees. Therefore,
interviews are less reliable than publication records in terms of grasping the larger
picture of incidents, especially from events that happened in the early days. The
incidents of ethnic violence were crosschecked through different data sources and are
reported in Table 2.3. The major incidents are described in more detail.

54
2.3.2. Pattern of Ethnic Violence in West Kalimantan
There was a pattern to the escalating ethnic violence in West Kalimantan. The
pattern followed four steps:
1) Trivial triggering incident—youth fight, dispute over land, etc.
2) Rumor of murder or death of victim
3) Retaliation (with war rituals)
4) Peace building/ reconciliation customary ceremony
Records and interviews indicated that most ethnic violence initially started
with a trivial triggering event, such as a youth fight, a dispute over land or grass, or a
theft, in which a victim was injured or killed. The Dayak and Malay sides as well as
various interviewees and researchers accused the Madurese of initiating the attacks
against Dayak or Malay for insignificant reasons. For example, Bamba (2000, 5)
claimed that ―[a]ll clashes were triggered by the violence response of the Madurese on
the Dayak.‖ However in some cases, there was another quarrel or fight prior to the
incident being described such as the case of 1996 (HRW 1997).
Second, false rumors of a victim‘s (or victims) death were spread after the
triggering event, which expanded a small incident into ethnic violence. During the
large-scale violent clash between the Dayak-Madurese in 1996/1997, for example,
three false rumors were spread: the first rumor was the death of Dayak youths
involved in Sanggau Ledo, the second rumor was a murder of a Madurese religious
person, and the third was the deaths of two Dayak girls at the Pancur Kasih attack.
55
Because of the first and third rumors, many Dayaks came down from the interior
regions and were provoked to attack Madurese residences. On the other hand, it was
suspected that the second rumor was the direct reason for the raid into Pancur Kasih
and a Catholic school in Pontianak (Davidson 2008). The role of rumors in
development of violence was studied by scholars such as Horowitz (2001). A rumor
after a triggering event often became the direct cause to provoke widespread violence
for example in India (Horowitz 2001).
After rumors or news of the deaths of victims had been disseminated to their
respective communities, retaliation against the other group started. In the case of
Dayaks, traditional war rituals were often performed before such an attack, including
sending a red bowl. The settlements of the opponent group were attacked and their
houses set a fire. However, those who chose to flee were allowed to take refugee, and
sexual violence was never reported in the records of past violence in West
Kalimantan. In the Dayak-Madurese clash, religious buildings and structures, such as
churches, mosques, or prayer houses, were not the targets of the attack.
Once the violence calmed down after the destruction of property or
disappearance of the opponent group due to evacuation or attack, reconciliation or
peace building ceremonies were organized by ethnic groups, often with involvement
of the government. The ceremony, imitating the local custom (adat), was attended by
the leaders of ethnic groups, ethnic organizations directly involved in the violence,
other ethnic groups, and government officials. Along with the Pancacila or Youth
56
Pledge, both sides usually issued declarations of peace, which were witnessed by other
ethnic groups and government. Nevertheless, most participants of violence escaped
arrest and justice (HRW 1997). The following section examines three exemplary cases
of ethnic violence in West Kalimantan in the 1970s and late 1990s.

57
Table 2.3 Ethnic Violence in Kalimantan
No. Year Ethnicities Location
(District)
Trigger Impacts Other Factors Source
1 1952 Dayak-
Madurese
Pontianak Theft of a fish trap of a Dayak
by a Madurese thief
? Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
2
6
1967/
1968
Dayak-
Madurese
Toho
(Pontianak)
Murder of the Dayak father of
Toho sub-district head,
Pontianak by Madurese in paddy
field
? HRW (1997)
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
3 1967 Dayak-
Chinese

Pontianak,
Bengkayang,
Landak,
Sambas,
Singkawang
Murder of Dayak villagers by
the Chinese during
PGRS/Paraku, PKI operations
(see above)
2,000 to 5,000 victims
(Demonstrasi)
Oevaang Oeray‘s
political interest
and involvement
of the para-
militant group,
Laskar Pangsuma
Davidson
(2008)
4 1967/
1968
Dayak-
Madurese
Sungai
Pinyuh
(Pontianak)
Murder of Sani, a Dayak public
servant of the Sungai Pinyuh the
sub-district, Pontianak, and
injury of his son by a Madurese
in Anjungan, due to a problem
of land certificate
30 victims of Madurese Competition to
capture the
property and
lands left by
Chinese
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
Davidson
(2008)
5 1969 ? Pontianak Fight occurred but the detail is
unknown.
Davidson
(2008)
6
7
1975 Dayak-
Madurese
Sungai
Pinyuh
(Pontianak)
The detail is unknown. Destruction of houses
and shops; numerous
victims

Davidson
(2008)

6
According to the HRW report, the name of victim of the incident No. 2 was Sani, and it happened in 1968.
7
This incident No. 6 could be the same one as the incident No. 7.

58
Table 2.3 Ethnic Violence in Kalimantan
No. Year Ethnicities Location
(District)
Trigger Impacts Other Factors Source
7 1976 Dayak-
Madurese
Sungai
Pinyuh
(Pontianak)
Murder of a Dayak named
Cangken (Caokeh) by a
Madurese in a dispute over grass
of the Dayak‘s farm
HRW (1997)
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
8 1977 Dayak-
Madurese
Nyarumgkop
(Singkawang)
Murder of Robert Lanceng, a
Dayak policeman, by Maskat, a
Madurese in paddy field due to a
problem between Robert‘s sister
and the Madurese‘s brother (or
their children)
5 deaths, destruction of
72 houses
HRW (1997)
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
Davidson
(2008)
9
8
1979 Dayak-
Madurese
Samalantan
(Sambas)
Assault on Sakep, a Dayak, by
three Madurese, Sisrum,
Maruwi, and Buto, for a dispute
over Sakep‘s dept. Attacked on
two Dayaks, Norani and Toke,
by Hamsin, a Madurese.
Deaths of 15 Madurese
and 5 Dayaks;
destruction of 29 houses
HRW (1997)
10 1979 Dayak-
Madurese
Sendoren
village,
Samalantan
sub-district
(Sambas)
Murder of Sidik, a Dayak retired
policeman, by a Madurese,
Asmadin bin Ariman, on
November 8, when Sidik told
Asmadin/his son not to cut grass
in his farm. After Sidik‘s death,
his friends attacked Asmadin‘s
village and Madurese residents
around there.
Deaths of 15 Madurese
and 5 Dayaks; 40-65
houses burned down
(hundreds of deaths in
the unofficial figure);
arrest of Asmadin with
20 years imprisonment;
a monument was built
in Samalantan.

Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
Davidson
(2008)

8
The HRW (1997) assumed the incident No. 6, the assault of Sakep, as the triggering event of Dayak-Madurese clash in 1979; however, Davidson
(2008), Petebang and Sutrisno (2000), and interviewees identified the Sidik‘s incident as the trigger.

59
Table 2.3 Ethnic Violence in Kalimantan
No. Year Ethnicities Location
(District)
Trigger Impacts Other Factors Source
11 1983 Dayak-
Madurese
Sungai Enau
village,
Sungai
Ambawang
sub-district
(Pontianak)
Murder of Djaelani, a Dayak
named Dul Arif, Madurese, due
to a land dispute
12 deaths (unofficial:
over 50); destruction of
40-65 houses; 3 day-
clash expanded to
Mandor, Toho,
Menjalin, and Karangan
HRW (1997)
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
Davidson
(2008)
12 1992 Dayak-
Madurese
Samalantan
(Singkawang)
Rape of Sidik‘s daughter by a
Madurese
Youth clash between
Dayak and Madurese
HRW (1997)

13 1993 Dayak-
Madurese
Pontianak
City
Youth fight between Dayak and
Madurese
Destruction of church
and school
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)

14 1994 Dayak-
Madurese
Tumbang Titi
(Ketapang)
Stabbing of a Dayak by a
Madurese road construction
worker
No victim Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
Davidson
(2002)
15 Dec.
1996
Dayak-
Madurese
Ledo
(Bengkayang)
Youth fight: Stabbing of a
Dayak youth, Yukundus bin
Pagau and Akim, by Madurese
Bakri and friends
About 20 deaths;
destruction of 1,200
houses
HRW (1997)
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)
Davidson
(2008)
16 Jan.
1997
Dayak-
Madurese
Siantan
(Pontianak
City)
Attack of a Dayak boarding
house at Pancar Kasih and injury
of two Dayak girls by Madurese
for retribution
About 400 deaths;
destruction of over
3,000 houses;
displacement of 15,000
to 20,000 Madurese

17 Jan.
1999
Malay-
Madurese

Parit Setia
village, Jawai
sub-district
(Sambas)
Murder of three Malays by a
Madurese group led by Jabak
bin Punel for retaliation of
punishment on a Madurese
burglar, Hassan bin Niyam
400 deaths; 4,000-6,000
houses destroyed;
displacement of 64,000
Madurese
Malay rivalry
with Dayak for
the claim of ―son
of soil‖ (putera
daerah)
Kabupaten
Sambas (1999)
Petebang and
Sutrisno (2000)

60
Table 2.3 Ethnic Violence in Kalimantan
No. Year Ethnicities Location
(District)
Trigger Impacts Other Factors Source
18 Feb.
1999
Malay-
Madurese

Tebas
(Sambas)
Injury of a Malay named Bujang
Lebik bin Idris by a Madurese,
Rudi bin Muharap, due to a fight
over bus fare
FKPM
Involvement
Purwana (2003)
Davidson
(2008)

19 Mar.
1999
Dayak-
Madurese
Samalantan
Sambas)
Murder of Martinus Amat, a
Dayak by Madurese in
Samalantan

20 2000 Malay-
Madurese

Pontianak
City
Traffic accident between a
Madurese driver‘s bus and a
Malay motorcyclist
40 deaths; destruction
of markets, shops,
vehicles
Competition for
gubernatorial
election
(involvement of
Aspar Asawan,
gangsters and
their groups,
FKPM-
Pontianak)
Purwana (2004)
Davidson
(2008)

19 2001 Malay-
Madurese

GOR/ Stadiun
Sultan Syarif
Abdurrahman
(Pontianak
City)
Accidental death of a boy in
trouble with four Madurese
youths near refugee camps
3 deaths; destruction of
25 houses, kiosks and
tricycles; 3 arrested
Intimidation
against Madurese
refugees
Davidson
(2008)
Varshney,
Panggabean,
and Tadjoeddin
(2004b)
20 2002 Malay-
Madurese

Karimunting
village,
Sungai Raya
sub-district
(Bengkayang)
Clash between Madurese and
Malay villagers (the detail is
unknown)
6 deaths; destruction of
40 houses of Madurese
Varshney,
Panggabean,
and Tadjoeddin
(2004b)

61
Table 2.3, Continued
Source: Compiled from Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: Communal violence in West Kalimantan, 9 (10) (1997), page 8-9; Edi
Petebang and Eri Sutrisno, Konflik Etnik di Sambas (Jakarta: ISAI, 2000), page 201-203; Jamie S. Davidson, From Rebellion to
Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), page 89-90, 157-161, 163-
166; Jamie S. Davidson, Violence and politics in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. Ph.D diss., (Seattle: University of Washington, 2002),
page 225; Kabupaten Sambas, Laporan bupati kepala daerah tingkat II Sambas tentang kerusuhan sosial di kabupaten dati II Sambas
(hasil inventarisasi) (Singkawang: Kabupaten Sambas, 1999); Bambang Hendarta Suta Purwana, Konflik Antarkomunitas Etnis di
Sambas 1999: Suatu Tinjauan Sosial Budaya. (Pontianak: Romeo Grafika Pontianak, 2003); Bambang Hendarta Suta Purwana, West
Kalimantan in Study on conflict analysis and peace building responses: the cases of Papua, Maluku, West Kalimantan, West Timor-East
Nusa Tenggara, Aceh, Poso-Central Sulawesi. Final report, edited by Center for Security and Peace Studies Gadjah Mada University and
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), (Jakarta: Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University and JICA, 2004),
page 5-6; and unpublished raw data in Ashutosh Varshney, Rizal Panggabean, and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Patterns of
Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003), (Jakarta: UNSFIR, 2004b). Page numbers are references for the incidents which are not
discussed in this research.

62
2.3.3. Dayak-Madurese Violence in the 1970s
There were two major outbreaks of violence between the Dayak and Madurese
in 1977 and 1979. The ethnic clashes were started by similar incidents, the murders of
Dayak by Madurese (HRW 1997; Petebang and Sutrisno 2000; Davidson 2008). A
Madurese, whose family was killed by Dayaks, explained the triggering event of the
1979 violence:
A child of Mr. Asmadin‘s took grass in Sidik‘s farm. Sidik was
Dayak . . . so Mr. Sidik said, ―If you take grass, do not cut rice,
cucumber, and beans. If you want to take grass, OK, but the paddy is
still young, [so] do not cut in the young paddy.‖ The rice was indeed
cut to pieces while he was taking grass. Then the boy ran into his home
and complained . . . to his father, Asmadin. Without a question,
Asmadin took a machete, ran into Sidik‘s farm. Sidik was in the middle
of the farm. The next thing I know was he was cut with the machete
without being asked why my child ran at first . . . . After, the body of a
Dayak, Sidik, was buried, people from the mountains came down to
attack Madurese. In 1979, . . . my wife was killed, my real son was
murdered, my brother was killed, [and] my niece and my daughter in
law, five people, in the house. It was the place in Samalantan. I was in
Pontianak.
9

The military and police forces quickly responded to the clash between the
Dayaks and Madurese, cooperating with Dayak leaders (Peluso and Harwell 2001).
Asmadin was found guilty of provoking the violence and received a 20-year prison
sentence (Davidson 2008). According to the interview, the government prepared the
Diram area, now called Marhaban hamlet in Singkawang, for the Madurese refugees
and also built a peace monument in Samalantan. However, the Madurese interviewee

9
In Petebang and Sutrisno (2000) and Davidson (2008), it is Asmadin himself who cut grass in Sidik‘s
farm.

63
also explained that Sidik, a former policeman, was not liked by people because he
asked for money from people who were gambling, i.e., Madurese, before his
retirement.

2.3.4. Dayak-Madurese Violence of 1996/1997: From December 1996 to January
1997
The largest violence between the Dayak and Madurese started at the end of
1996 and continued until March 1997. The triggering incident was that of two young
Dayak brothers, Yukundus and Akhim, who were stabbed by Madurese, Bakrie and
his friends, during a concert in Tanjung village, the Ledo sub-district in the Sambas
district (currently Bengkayang district), at about 1:00 AM on December 30, 1996. This
was actually a retaliation of the Madurese youths for a fight with Yukundus in early
December, also during a concert of the election campaign in Ledo, in which he had
attacked Bakrie‘s group for harassing a Dayak girl.
10
The stabbed Dayaks were
brought to a hospital and released after treatment. While the youths were in the
hospital, the villagers heard rumors of the youths‘ deaths, and hundreds of Dayaks
came to the police station of Ledo to request the arrest of the Madurese youth (HRW
1997).
That morning, a meeting was held by the initiative of the police of Sanggau
Ledo subdistrict, where the Madurese community existed and attended by the leaders
of the Dayak Customary Council Sanggau Ledo and Madurese, military, and the

10
These two youth fights were now told as one incident in interviews.

64
police. The Madurese leaders met with the father of the Dayak brothers for an apology
at the police at Ledo (HRW 1997). To prevent violence, the security force and Dayak
leaders made an effort to persuade the crowd to calm down, and the customary
ceremonies were held several times, according to a senior Dayak interviewee and
HRW (1997). The Madurese residents were advised to take refuge in the Sanggau
Ledo Air Base. The five Madurese were captured by the police, but the news of arrest
was not publicized for their safety at that time (HRW 1997).
Despite the efforts to restore order, the mobs were later further agitated. In the
evening, about 400 Dayaks began to move on Sanggau Ledo and set fire to Madurese
houses. By that time, the riot had spread to the other areas. Rumors of the Madurese
fighting back and of further injuries to the Dayak instigated the crowd‘s emotions.
Many Dayaks gathered at the military station in Bengkayang to raid Madurese
refugees gathered there. Traditional war rituals were organized in Sanggau Ledo. The
next morning, December 31, a crowd of almost 2,000 Dayaks from the surrounding
areas of Seluas, Ledo, and Sanggau Ledo razed most Madurese houses in the area;
however the mobs in Sanggau Ledo were brought under control by the military and
sent back to their villages in the afternoon. Madurese were evacuated to the air base
although, according to other information, about 500 Madurese remained in the forest
to fight (HRW 1997).
The uprising continued in the other areas. In the Sayung village of the
Bengkayang sub-district, the Madurese refugees in the army compound became a

65
target of attack on December 31. The military took action to prevent it, resulting in
injury to several Dayaks. Once again, the rumor of Dayak deaths by the military
provoked the mobs to destroy Madurese houses in other areas such as Monterado,
Nyarumkop, and Pajintan. On January 1, Madurese hamlets in the Samalantan sub-
district in Singkawang were burned and stormed by Dayak groups. A meeting among
Dayak and Madurese community leaders and the disarming of Madurese were
proposed by the subdistrict head of Samalantan, the police, and the military to prevent
the spread of violence. However, a group composed of hundreds of Dayaks kept
destroying Madurese houses and searching for remaining Madurese in Sanggau Ledo
and Tujuh Belas sub-districts on January 2 and 3 (HRW 1997).
The Madurese side retaliated against the Dayak attacks. On December 31
through New Year‘s Day, Madurese attacked Dayaks in Singkawang, destroyed the
residences of popular Dayaks such as government officials and business persons, and
injured some of them. The district military command became a shelter for the Dayaks
in Singkawang (HRW 1997).
From January 2 onwards, the army and government took more serious actions
by blockading roads to Sanggau Ledo to prevent further attacks and in an effort to
suppress rumors, though it was rather late for that. The rioting finally calmed down on
January 4 (HRW 1997). The government supported hosting the peace ceremonies to
end the violence from January 5 to 8. In one ceremony, Dayak and Madurese leaders
declared that they ―condemned the violence, renewed their commitment to the 1979

66
Samalantan peace treaty, said no ―new arrivals‖ would be accommodated who lacked
proper identification, banned weapons, and announced a respect for local tradition‖
(HRW 1997, 18). The ceremonies were held in Bengkayang, Pemangkat, Sungai
Raya, Tujuh Belas, and Samalantan sub-districts (HRW 1997), yet the peace
agreements were broken less than one month later.
A result of the violence from the end of December through mid January was
the destruction of approximately 1,200 houses and 20 casualties, mostly Madurese.
The damage in Sanggau Ledo area reached Rp. 13.56 billion (US $6 million), and
6,075 people took refuge in the military facilities in mutual family residences or other
accommodations in Singkawang and Pontianak (HRW 1997).

2.3.5. Dayak-Madurese Violence of 1996/1997: From the late January to
February 1997
In late January, 1997, violence between Dayak and Madurese returned on a
boarder scale with the attack of Pancur Kasih, a Dayak NGO, in Pontianak. On the
evening of January 28, Dayaks and Madurese clashed in Sakek village, resulting in the
death of one person and the burning of houses by Dayaks (HRW 1997). A small
mosque, a prayer house, was destroyed in Samalantan (Davidson 2008). That night,
the Madurese also heard a false rumor about the murder of Habibi Ali, a religious
figure (HRW 1997).
In the early morning of January 29, 70 to 100 Madurese came to Pancur Kasih
and started burning vehicles there. Two Dayak girls, who were staying in a dormitory

67
in the NGO, were wounded by the Madurese (HRW 1997). A further rumor of the
deaths of those two girls provoked Dayak raids on the Madurese (Davidson 2008).
The next day, both Dayaks and Madurese blocked roads, and each killed several
victims. On January 31, Dayak attacks resulted in about 150 Madurese victims in
Pahauman, Pontianak, and in Salatiga in 131 Madurese casualties on February 1

(HRW 1997). The Dayak crowds reached Malaysian border areas, such as Balai
Karangan and Entikong and Sanggau district, to storm Madurese settlements there
(HRW 1997; Davidson 2008).
On the other side, Madurese also killed Dayaks at various points in the
roadblock, including Martinus Nyangkot, the head of Maribas village in the Tebas
sub-district of Sambas and Djalan from Batang Tarang sub-district, Sanggau district
(HRW 1997). The riots spread to the areas of the two Dayak victims (HRW 1997;
Davidson 2008). In Singkawang where the population of Madurese far exceeded
Dayak residents, again urban Dayaks known as public officials and business people
were targets of Madurese attacks on February 1 (HRW 1997).
According to HRW (1997), because of the incident and the rumor, Madurese
were suspicious of the attack by Dayaks and raided Pancur Kasih. However, Davidson
(2008) suspected a religious retribution for a Muslim prayer house in the village
having been set on fire because Madurese had attacked the NGO, a Catholic junior
high school and a dormitory. The communication between Dayak and Madurese
leaders was terminated by this incident. Later the police caught a man who spread the

68
rumor of a religious figure‘s death and arrested the assailant of the two girls on
February 14 (HRW 1997).
There were reports of the army‘s possible human rights violations against
Dayaks. In Singkawang, some soldiers from Battalion 641, including Madurese, shot
and assaulted a crowd of Dayaks after they surrendered. On February 3, the army shot
at a group of hundreds of Dayaks in Sanggau. Similarly a covey of Dayaks were fired
on by Battalion 643 and helicopters in Anjungan around February 5. In both cases, the
army‘s shooting started without warning. A few dozen people, including Dayaks and
others, died during these shootings (HRW 1997).
The official number of victims of the conflict was reported as 400 (Davidson
2008); 1,200 was the death toll estimated by a student group (HRW 1997). HRW
(1997) suggested around 500 victims as a realistic figure, composed of mostly
Madurese, and assumed that the majority of Dayak deaths occurred during clashes
with the army. The destruction of property included the damage of over 3,000 houses,
and the number of displaced Madurese ranged from 15,000 to 20,000 people (HRW
1997).
From mid February onwards, the peace ceremonies were organized with
government support from the sub-districts to provincial levels. The provincial peace
ceremony was held on March 15 in the presence of the military and police officers, a
rector of a local university, elected officials, party members, the governor and civil
officials of the provincial government, district heads, a public prosecutor, leaders of

69
the two ethnic groups, and the National Human Rights Commission. In the ceremony,
the Dayak and Madurese leaders issued a joint statement which included a pledge to
abide by the laws, engage in conflict settlement through a non-violent approach, end
of vigilantism, to take into consideration local culture and tradition, stop publicly
wearing weapons, and submit to the government. This statement was also adopted by
the two ethnic groups and witnessed by government officials and leaders at the sub-
district level peace ceremonies (HRW 1997). For example, in the district-level peace
ceremony of Sambas on February 27, the statement was signed by representatives of
the Dayak Customary Council (DAD) and the Madurese Family Association
(Keluarga Besar Madura), with witnesses as the district head, the district police and
military, and the chairman of district legislature. Other ethnic groups such as Malay,
Javanese, Banjar, and Buginese attended the peace ceremonies (Kabupaten Sambas
1997). However, HRW (1997, 33) described these ceremonies as ―more about loyalty
to the state ideology, Pancasila, than about a genuine effort at conflict resolution.‖
During and after the riot, the perpetrators of the killings and assaults and those
who instigated violence were rarely arrested. Those formally sentenced included one
Madurese and seven Dayaks responsible for murders, two Madurese involved in the
Pancur Kasih attack, four Madurese and ten Dayaks for setting fires, five Madurese
youths who stabbed Dayaks in Sanggau Ledo, a Madurese disseminating a false
rumor, three Dayaks for taking weapons from the army, and many others carrying

70
weapons. The most serious sentence was a three and a half year prison term for
murder. A total of 184 people were arrested and sentenced (HRW 1997).

2.3.6. Malay-Madurese Clash in 1999: From January to March 1999
Another occasion of violence between Malay and Madurese started from an
incident in Parit Setia village, Jawai sub-district, Sambas. In the early morning of
January 17, 1999, Malay villagers caught and beat a Madurese named Hasan bin
Niyam from the Sari Makmur village of Tebas subdistrict for an attempted burglary
(Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana 2003). Before the police arrived, Hasan was
brought to a clinic by his fellow villagers, including a local gangster, Jabak bin Punel
(Davidson 2008).
11

At 3:30 PM on January 19, the first day of Idul Fitri, the celebration of the end
of Ramadan, about 200 Madurese led by Jabak from the Rambayan village attacked
the Parit Setia village. Three villagers were killed and two were injured in the attack
(Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana 2003; Davidson 2008). The reason stated for this
raid was that the police had rejected Jabak‘s request for an informal settlement of
Hasan‘s case. Two victims were murdered by Hasan‘s parents. Informed about the
plan of attack by Jabak, however, the police sent a few police officers to Parit Setia,
but they could do nothing to stop the attack (Davidson 2008).

11
In the government report (Kabupaten Sambas 1999) and Purwana (2003), a police officer from
subdistrict office took Hasan to a clinic in Jawai and he left alone after he recovered. There is
another story told by Madurese (Purwana 2003).

71
On January 21, a ceremony to ensure friendship (silaturrahmi) between the
two ethnic groups was held in the Jawai subdistrict office and was attended by
representatives of Malay in Parit Setia of Jawai and Madurese from Sari Makmur of
Tebas, Jawai sub-district head, the police and military sub-district heads, and the
commander of Military Resort 121/ABW (Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana 2003).
The security forces stayed in Parit Setia to prevent further violence (Purwana 2003).
A Madurese attack and murders in Parit Setia during the Islamic holy month
shocked the Sambas Malay community, who were also Muslim (Kabupaten Sambas
1999). Malays were frustrated even more by the fact that the police had arrested only
one Madurese during the month after the attack (Purwana 2003). Seven persons
including Jabak and Hasan‘s parents were captured only after an outbreak of massive
violence (Davidson 2008).
12

In the end of January, the Communication Forum of Malay Youth (Forum
Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, FKPM) was founded by Malay seniors, mostly civil
servants and teachers, but also including members who had connections to gangsters
(Davidson 2002, 2008; Achwan, Nugroho, and Prayoga with Hadi 2005).
13
FKPM
secretly developed countermeasures against Madurese and prepared weapons such as
knives, handmade arms, and spears. FKPM established sub-district offices in Sambas
by the end of February (Davidson 2008).

12
The arrested was six persons according Kabupaten Sambas (1999).
13
A meeting to found FKPM was held by ―Team Sebelas‖ consisting of eleven founders on January 26,
1999.

72
On February 21, a trivial incident occurred between Malay and Madurese
youths. Rudi bin Muharap, a Madurese from Pusaka village of Tebas sub-district, was
dropped off from a public bus, because he refused to pay the fare to a Malay fare
collector, Bujang Lebik bin Idris from Semparuk village, Pemangkat sub-district
(Kompas, February 23, 1999). Rudi, who felt insulted by the incident, waited for
Bujang coming back from work and attacked him with a knife, injuring him, in
Mensere, a market close to Tebas sub-district (Purwana 2003; Davidson 2008).
Another fight between Madurese against Malay occurred in Sungai Nyirih village,
Jawai sub-district on the same day and wounded a Malay named Rusdi by Nursian, a
Madurese (Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana 2003).
By 2 P.M. the next day, Malays set fire to houses in Semparuk and Tebas
Kuala (Kompas, February 23, 1999). Three Madurese were killed in Tebas and
Pemangkat sub-districts (Davidson 2008). Hundreds of personnel from the police and
the military were deployed in the two sub-districts (Kompas, February 23, 1999).
However, Malay crowds threatened the security forces with attack and attempted to
raid Madurese refugees in the Tebas sub-district police station (Davidson 2008). The
Malay riot was fueled by the custody of the Sentebang village head as provocateur of
the violence in the Jawai subdistrict on February 25 (Akcaya, February 26, 1999;
Kabupaten Sambas 1999).
After the security force started confiscating weapons in the communities, the
situation stabilized within a few days. On February 23, the government held a meeting

73
with community leaders of the Malays, Madurese and Dayak at the Tebas sub-district
office, with attendance of the sub-district head and the district and sub-district police
forces. The three ethnic group leaders signed a statement to maintain public order. A
similar statement was signed by the leaders of Madurese, Malay, Dayak, and Buginese
in Pemangkat on February 24. Furthermore, realizing the ineffectiveness of the
statements, Tarya Aryanto, the district head of Sambas had to appeal to the Sambas
community to end the violence (Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana 2003). On
February 28, a local newspaper reported seven deaths, three people missing, the
burning down of 64 houses and 1 building, and 169 refugees in the clash in
Pemangkat, Tebas, and Jawai sub-districts of Sambas (Akcaya, February 28, 1999).

2.3.7. Malay-Madurese Clash in 1999: From March 1999: Dayak Joining Malay
Violence reemerged on March 14 and escalated to a district-wide riot within a
few days. At 6:30 PM on March 14, a clash started again in Harapan village,
Pemangkat, with trouble between a youth with a sharp weapon and villagers. It
resulted in about eight deaths and destruction of a few dozen houses in the
surrounding area (Akcaya, March 16, 1999, March 17, 1999; Kabupaten Sambas
1999).
On March 16, the riot gained a new dimension with the killing of a Dayak in
Pemangkat. A few ―Madurese‖ assaulted a truck carrying a group of about 30 persons
(Purwana 2004, 8; Davidson 2008). A Dayak resident of Samalantan, Martinus Amat,

74
failed to escape and was murdered (Purwana 2003; Davidson 2008). Madurese houses
in Samalantan and Montrado were burnt to ashes on March 17, the day of Martinus‘s
funeral (Purwana 2003).
This incident triggered a chain reaction of Dayak attack on Madurese
(Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana 2003; Davidson 2008). Fourteen sub-districts in
Sambas such as Samalantan, Ledo, Sanggau Ledo, Bengkayang, Tujuh Belas, Tebas,
Selakau, and Sambas were affected by the violence (Kabupaten Sambas 1999). The
expansion of the violence up to the north of Sambas, such as Paloh, was led by a group
from FKPM (Davidson 2008). On March 23, about 750 anti-riot police personnel
(PPRM-PHH) arrived from Java for reinforcement of the security (Akcaya, March 24,
1999), including protecting Madurese refugees (Davidson 2008).
By the end of March, violence in the Sambas district had relatively calmed
down. With the end of task in Sambas, riots moved to the Singkawang areas at the
beginning of April (Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Davidson 2008). About a thousand
crowds clashed with PPRM-PHH and the other armed forces at Sungai Garam, a
border with Singkawang (Akcaya, April 8, 1999). According to the report, the Sambas
District Government (Kabupaten Sambas 1999) denied the article of Akcaya and wrote
that the group demonstrated for the discharge of 44 people who had been detained in
the Sambas district police. As a result of these protests, six persons were dead and 74
were injured (Kabupaten Sambas 1999), and the PPRM-PHH‘s role as security guard
for evacuation of refugees was replaced by Malay and Dayak citizens (Akcaya, April

75
13, 1999). On April 8, there was a Madurese attack against the participant of the
Sungai Garam incident in a hospital in Singkawang (Kompas, April 9, 1999). After
several clashes in Singkawang and Sungai Raya in April, violence ended in early May.
No more Madurese were left in the Sambas district (Davidson 2008).
The victims of the violence from January through May 1999 ranged from more
than 400 in the official figure to 800 in unofficial sources (Purwana 2003). Four to six
thousand houses were burned down or destroyed (Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana
2003).
14
According to the interview with the group representing the victims,
approximately 68,200 Madurese or 12,500 households were evacuated. The total
number of refugees in Pontianak City reached 25,000 by the end of March (Davidson
2008). Twelve hundred evacuated to Singkawang (Pembaruan, March 20, 1999).
Some 400 Madurese who sought refuge in Kuching were sent to Pontianak by the
Sarawak government of Malaysia. About 7,000 left Kalimantan for Surabaya, East
Java (Davidson 2008).
During the violence, the government, the police, and the military tried to
suppress the expansion of rioting. As described, after the first clash in Parit Setia, the
government organized a meeting with representatives of the two ethnic groups in
Jawai (Kabupaten Sambas 1999; Purwana 2003). However, there was no material
action to implement the peace agreement made at the meeting. The murderers were
not immediately arrested, and the two sides at the grassroots level had hardly known

14
A total of 167 deaths were reported (Kabupaten Sambas 1999).

76
about the meeting, nor what had been decided. Since the escalation of violence with
the incident in Tebas in late February, 841 soldiers from the army were present in the
region with permission to shoot at mobs. Nevertheless, the killing of a Dayak in mid-
March made suppression of violence impossible and the expansion of rioting
inevitable with the involvement of the Dayaks (Purwana 2003). The district head of
Sambas, H. Tarya Aryanto, again issued an appeal (himbauan) not to participate in the
riots on March 21 (Kabupaten Sambas 1999). However, the evacuation of Madurese
was the only successful measure taken by the government to reduce the number of
victims (Purwana 2003). Yet, according to the Madurese refugees, the police, military,
and others abused Madurese by asking for excessive payment to transport them from
Sambas.
After the end of the violence in 1999, several clashes involving Madurese
refugees and between Malay and Madurese broke out in Pontianak (Davidson 2008),
as described in Table 2.3. Because this research focused on ethnic violence in the
Sambas region and the incidents of violence mentioned above were related to the
election and political issues in Pontianak City, the capital city, the details of those
conflicts are not provided here.

In short, the West Kalimantan province, particularly the Sambas region, has
had a history of ethnic violence that has existed since the Dutch colonial period. This
history of violence includes the kongsi wars, the Mandor incidents, konfrontasi against

77
Malaysia, PGRS/ Paraku military operation and Chinese oppression, and Dayak-
Madurese and Malay-Madurese ethnic violence. Dayak were deeply involved in this
historic violence while the Chinese and later the Madurese often became victims.
These historic events had a formidable impact on the ethnic relationships and the use
of violence in the province as pointed out by Davidson (2008). The next chapter
provides accounts of the occurrence of the ethnic violence including an explanation of
how the legacy of historic violence affected the ethnic violence that came later.

78
CHAPTER 3
THEORIES OF VIOLENCE AND PEACE
The ethnic violence in West Kalimantan has been studied by local and
international researchers, especially after the eruption of two great violence periods in
1997 and 1999 and other types of conflict throughout the country in the post-Suharto
era (e.g., Davidson 2008). The previous chapter provided the historic context of ethnic
relationships and violence with descriptions of the ethnic clashes in the province. This
section analyzes the theories that attempt to account for ethnic violence and peace in
West Kalimantan.

3.1. Theories of Violence in West Kalimantan
3.1.1. Clash of Culture
Among local academics, researchers, and international media, the most popular
discourse seeks to find the roots of conflict in the cultural differences that obtain
between the indigenous groups and migrants, as Davidson (2008) pointed out.
Particularly in reference to violence among the Dayak and Madurese, traditions of
each ethnic group are presented as grounds of the cultural argument, which are: red
bowl (mangkok merah), headhunting and pati nyawa for Dayaks and carok for
Madurese (HRW 1997; Bamba 2000). In general, this view is understood as
primordialism (Davidson 2008).

79
Madurese were often accused of violence and aggressiveness by the local
population. Because of those characteristics, they could not adapt to local customs and
culture. The image of aggressive or brave Madurese people is rooted in the Madurese
tradition of carok and the historical fact that the Dutch hired Madurese for subsidiary
troops. Carok of Madurese is well known throughout Indonesia (Smith 2004). Carok
is a type of violence, ―a premeditated settling of scores that targets a perceived
wrongdoer, or, in the case of a feud, his family‖ and also for ―acts of self-defense‖ or
in the past ―the form of a formal scheduled duel‖ (Smith 2004, 207). Currently,
however, the perception is that the Madurese often raided unprepared people in an
unfair manner. Carok is generally provoked by a trivial problem, such as trouble over
small amounts of money, land disputes, or issues related to women. Violence is
rationalized by protecting one‘s honor and dignity or making accusations of having
been humiliated or shamed, especially in public and accepted as one of the problem
solving methods in Madura (Smith 2004). Abdur Rozaki stated that because ―[a]mong
those issues are Islam, women and self-esteem and the three are closely intertwined,‖
―Madura‘s religious institutions are powerless to end this violent practice‖ (Jakarta
Post, February 7, 2003). Various interviewees agreed with Smith and Rozaki‘s
assessments. An interviewee commented that Dayak and Malays disliked violence of
the Madurese, as ―they easily kill without calculation of price, so easy to kill…for
only a small incident. Meaning it was easy for them to use their knives . . . to kill
people. This attitude was not liked.‖

80
On the other hand, during ethnic violence in West Kalimantan, incidents of
headhunting were sensationally broadcast by the mass media, in particular the foreign
media. Dayaks, an indigenous group of Kalimantan, were portrayed as uncivilized
primitives (Bamba 2000; Peluso and Harwell 2001; Peluso 2006). The revival of war
rituals such as the red bowl (mangkok merah) or tariu—to summon spirits of
ancestors—was also reported (HRW 1997). Dayak researchers and local people
argued that Dayaks highly value life and the blood which represents that life. Once the
blood of a Dayak is lost, that life has to be compensated for, in line with sanctions
based on Dayak customs (adat) (Bamba 1998). If the appropriate fine or compensation
is not paid, the price of blood (the loss of life) has to be paid by blood—which is
called pati nyawa. Thus, Bamba (1998) wrote,
[T]he Madurese are not prepared to accept the Dayak adat, and in fact
belittle it. Failure to fulfill the adat process brings great misfortune
upon the community concerned. One way to free the village from the
consequences of not carrying out the adat is to take the burden of the
adat on to their own shoulders. By killing the Madurese, and through
that war, the Dayak have the reason to perform the adat. In this case,
the killing of Madurese is not for purposes of revenge, but the need to
fulfill the adat demands (Bamba 1998, under ―The Role of Adat in the
Dayak and Madurese War‖).
Then, mangkok merah, a red bowl, is sent from village to village as a call for a
war against an enemy and to appeal to fellow Dayaks for participation in the war. This
argument for cultural differences between the two groups was further strengthened by
the fact that the clashes with the Madurese often started with a Madurese injury to or
killing of a Dayak, for example, the cases of Samalantan in 1979 and Sanggau Ledo

81
1996/1997 (Bamba 2000). A Dayak explained the reason for continuous violence with
the Madurese as follows:
Dayaks already finished the war with a customary ceremony, but
Madurese started again . . . . [T]hey killed Dayak people again . . .
because they did at first. The Dayak . . . have the philosophy that this
blood must be paid with blood. If they make bleed, they make bleed
continuously.
Dayak, Malay, and local researchers and leaders contended that the Malay-
Madurese clash in 1999 provided evidence for the discourse of cultural differences
between Madurese and the indigenous groups, Dayak and Malay, and not over
religious disagreements between the Christian Dayak and the Muslim Madurese.
According to Purwana (2003), Sambas Malays have shared negative perceptions of the
Madurese with the Dayaks. The Parit Setia incident during the Islamic holidays
manifested a difference of Madurese Muslims from Malays. Though the two ethnic
groups were both Muslim, Madurese did not have faith to follow the basic teachings,
such as not to kill, even during religious holidays. Certain Madurese traditions and
tendencies, such as carok, segregation of Madurese neighborhoods, and preferences
for religious education and separated prayer houses, were all facts and perceptions
used to differentiate the Madurese from the others.
Horowitz (2001) acknowledges that emotion accompanied ethnic group
identity as the strength of the primordialist‘s view. Petersen (2002) approached ethnic
violence in Eastern Europe from a neglected dimension of emotion, particularly
resentment. Petersen (2002) argued that violence against a group is triggered by a

82
strong feeling of resentment which emerges from the rank or position of each ethnic
group in the government, politics or economy ―when a majority perceives its position
as ―below‖ a minority‖ or under ―a subordinate status‖ (Petersen 2002, 51). He wrote,
―Resentment combines the feeling that status relations are unjust with the belief that
something can be done about it‖ (Petersen 2002, 256).
The resentment theory seems to fit well with the history of ethnic violence in
West Kalimantan. The Dayaks‘ uncompromising claim for respect of Dayak customs
(adat) came from their indigenous status. Because Madurese were migrants
(pendatang), they had to follow the local customs. The proverb, ―wherever ground is
stood on, the sky holds high (di mana bumi dipijak di situ langit dijunjung),‖ was
frequently referred to support this argument.
There is a proverb ―wherever ground is stood on, the sky holds high (di
mana bumi dipijak di situ langit dijunjung),‖ meaning if people enter a
territory of one region, he has to obey valid customary laws there. If he
does not follow it, sometimes it causes problems, [and] conflicts arise.
People who do not respect the customs could be a potential problem.
That proverb is generally applicable to Indonesia too . . . . If you do not
respect it, people say you are not well-mannered.
Thus, in Kalimantan, the rank of Dayaks, son of the soil, is higher than Madurese
migrants. Such an attitude became a legitimate reason for the Dayak to attack
Madurese migrants who did not follow local rules.
Similarly, at the creation of Malay dominant Sambas district in 1999, Malays
had to prove their supremacy not just in formal institutions such as government, but
also on ―the street‖ where Malays were insignificant and dominated by Madurese

83
gangsters and traders (Davidson 2008, 137). Before the violence, the Madurese were
economically advanced, occupying large plots of land in the district and controlling
the transportation sector in particular. According to the Malay interviewees, this
control was achieved through violence or unfair means. A Malay explained an
example of a non-Madurese who worked as driver of ojek (motorbike taxi) and who
was pressured to leave his job by the Madurese. Malays also felt resentment because
―sometimes people who had this area in the beginning were displaced, dislocated,
removed in long term.‖ Hence, Davidson (2008) argued that the Malay resentment
appeared to come from their fears of being in an inferior position than the Madurese
and the Dayak in the era of the local after decentralization may be identified as the
main reason for the violence in Sambas. In particular, the political competition
between Malay and Dayak was a cause of ethnic violence in Sambas, as discussed
later.
Therefore, seeking the root of conflicts in considering the cultural differences
between the migrants and indigenous groups was strongly supported by the local
community, i.e., Dayak, Malay, and other non-Madurese. However, this cultural
discourse is criticized as primordialism and rejected in favor of the other arguments by
international researchers such as Davidson (2008).

84
3.1.2. Marginalization, State Development Policy, and Economic Competition
The second group of arguments account for ethnic violence by considering the
relationship between marginalization and New Order development policies. Dayaks
were marginalized because their lands were taken to develop oil palm plantations and
transmigration programs, and the forests and surrounding environment of their habitats
were destroyed by logging companies and development projects (Dove 1997; Achwan
et al. 2005). Under the Basic Agrarian Law No. 5 in 1960 and the Basic Forestry Law
No. 5 in 1967, Dayak ancestral lands were acquired by the government without
compensation because of classification of communal land into state land (HRW 1997;
Peluso and Harwell 2001; Achwan et al. 2005). Indigenous groups had no
acknowledged rights under Indonesian law (Bamba 2000). Land was often transferred
to concessionaires through corrupted government officials and village heads or bribed
residents. The suppression and struggle against the government, logging, and oil palm
firms united Dayaks as one ethnic group and urged them to more extreme actions
(HRW 1997) because the government simply ignored the Dayak‘s peaceful protests
and appeals (Bamba 2000). Bamba (2000) warned that the Dayak culture would
decline if the forests and environment where Dayak culture was embedded were lost.
West Kalimantan had been one of the major destinations of transmigration
programs and voluntary or ―spontaneous‖ migration from Java, Madura, and other

85
populated regions in the country (HRW 1997).
15
The government guaranteed a few
years of life support to participants of government transmigration programs and built
infrastructure and public service facilities in transmigration villages while local people
still lived in villages lacking schools, roads, access to health services, and other
essentials. Although the Madurese rarely joined government transmigration programs
(Purwana 2003), increased population by migrations worsened disputes and
competition to obtain already limited lands and employment opportunities (Bamba
2000; Heidhues 2001; see discussion in Chapter 4).
Marginalization of Dayaks occurred in the government and political spheres as
well. In the province, Dayak and Malay are the two majority ethnic groups; however,
the Dayak did not have a fair share of positions in government institutions and
legislatures. In 1997, the Dayak had only one district head position among the six
districts in the province (HRW 1997; Morishita 2006). In 1994, frustrated Dayaks
violently protested when a Dayak candidate of Sintang district head position was
rejected (Davidson 2008). The Dayak also felt that they were discriminated against on
religious grounds and that Muslims were privileged when it came to promotions and
recruitment within the government. An interviewee described how such conditions
could motivate the Dayaks to violence.

15
The number of total migrants by the transmigration programs vary depending on the data from the
largest number of 407,047 from 1986 to 2002 (Achwan et al. 2005), 296,614 from 1969 to 1999/00
in Morishita (2006), to 133,055 calculated from 1969 to 1999 in JICA‘s report (Pacific Consultants
International and International Development Center of Japan 1998). Census 2000 reports 269,743
of in-migration among the population to West Kalimantan province (BPS 2001).

86
Educated [Dayak] people already wished for years . . . to sit in chairs of
government…wanted to catch up…[regarding] economy,
underdevelopment, because Dayaks have land, but immigrants were
more advanced. So it‘s so called real cause of the resurgence . . . . The
content was the wish to rise so that its economy could be better than
before, also they sit in the seats of government.
Thus, frustration and anger at marginalization by the state accumulated in the Dayak
community, as discussed by Peluso and Harwell (2001).
The rise of economic competition was also felt by Malays. Madurese migrants
reached 10 percent of the population in Sambas by 1999 (Davidson 2008). Sambas
Malays, who had not experienced marginalization and had occupied high ranked
positions in the government, unlike the Dayaks, nevertheless, went through an
economic turmoil provoked by destruction of the tangerine industry, because of the
failure of the state sponsored enterprise which had monopolized the industry in 1992
(Davidson 2002, 2008; Purwana 2003). The migrant workers from Sambas to Sarawak
reached about 5,500 persons in 1995-1996 in the official data (and 10,000 to 15,000 in
unofficial sources) (Davidson 2008).
Hence, according to this perspective, ethnic violence was triggered by anger
and frustration that had emerged from economic and political marginalization and the
destruction of living environments by the development projects. This particular
conflict theory attracts wide ranging support from international organizations,
government, NGOs, environmental activists, and scholars (e.g., Achwan et al. 2005).

87
3.1.3. Historic Roots of Violence in West Kalimantan
The third group of theories takes a historical approach to elucidate the roots of
ethnic violence in West Kalimantan, analyzing the distribution and similarities of
violence. The overlap of the locations of Dayak-Madurese clashes and the violent
expulsion of the Chinese in the 1960s was pointed out as significant. Most locations
where violence occurred are the former Chinese settlements around gold mines such
as Montrado, Mandor, and Anjungan (Heidhues 2001; Peluso 2006; Davidson 2008).
Davidson (2008) argued that no Dayak-Madurese clash was reported before the
violence against the Chinese in the 1960s, in spite of the existence of Madurese
community.
From his historic analysis, Davidson (2008) asserts that the decade-long
violence from the 1960s to 1970s, i.e., konfrontasi, the campaign to hunt PKI and
PGRS/ Paraku, and the Chinese massacre in particular, destroyed the existing social
institutions and relationships, and instead seeded ―the use of collective violence as a
means of settling local disputes‖ in West Kalimantan (202). Dayak-Chinese violence
facilitated the politicization of the ethnicities in the region, a differentiation process
which had started since the colonial period, i.e., kongsi wars, the divide and rule
policy, and the development of Partai Daya (Daya Unity Party) (Davidson 2008).
Similarly, Peluso (2006, 106) did not hesitate to argue that the expulsion of
the Chinese was ―the first purposive synthesis of so-called ‗Dayak‘ modes of
violence.‖ In the violence against the Chinese, cultural practices such as headhunting

88
and sending a red bowl were strategically encouraged by the military to signify ethnic
warfare. Such ethnic markers repeatedly appeared in the ethnic violence during the
1990s and evolved into the ethnic identity of the Dayak (Peluso 2006). The Dayak
NGOs further reinforced and modernized the violent ethnic identity under the name of
indigeneity (Davidson 2008), as described later.
Therefore, the Chinese expulsion in 1967 became the model of ethnic violence
in West Kalimantan and the politics at the center, i.e., konfrontasi, the ban of PKI, and
reformasi saliently impacted on the formation of ethnic relations there. A series of
violence altogether had developed the conditions to make it possible to cause ethnic
violence in the 1990s (Davidson 2008). This Dayak model of ethnic violence against
Madurese, such as headhunting, expanded into clashes between the Malay and the
Madurese in 1999.

3.1.4. Ethnic Identity, Indigenous Claim, and Ethnic Politics
Another emerging theory of ethnic violence, which has attracted significant
attentions, is to connect violence with ethnic identity and claims of indigeneity (e.g.,
Peluso and Harwell 2001; Li 2002; Davidson 2008). Along with the influx of migrants
and the unfair exploitation of lands and natural resources for development projects
after the Chinese expulsion, the self-identity of the Dayaks was roused, as described
by Peluso (2006) and Davidson (2008). The ethnic identity of Dayaks was formed by
asking questions such as ―how development takes place, who benefits, and whether

89
preexisting Dayak rights, practices, rules–adat–are respected within the territories long
occupied by Dayaks‖ (Peluso and Harwell 2001, 108). In other words, such questions
are premised on the indigenous rights of the Dayaks. Li (2002, 365) describes ―activist
dilemmas‖ which are ―how a discourse on the deep attachment of indigenous people to
ancestral terrain, and the rights which flow from this attachment, is being echoed,
amplified or twisted to justify violence and exclusion.‖ The ethnic violence in West
Kalimantan is an exemplary case of such an activist dilemma (Li 2002).
According to Davidson (2008), Dayak-led non-governmental organizations
under the Pancur Kasih foundation played a significant role in the rise of indigeneity
claims. Founded in 1981, Pancur Kasih empowered Dayaks and expanded their
activities from the operation of a junior high school and a credit union (one of the the
most successful credit unions in Indonesia) to research and preservation of the Dayak
culture and community. The Institute of Dayakology Research and Development
(IDRD) was established in 1991 with the aims of researching Dayak culture. Two
action-oriented NGOs were formed in 1992 to address communal land rights and
development problems. IDRD and the NGOs physically and intellectually supported
Dayak communities to solve the problems by distributing information, sharing news,
and developing strategies for protests (Davidson 2008).
A movement for indigenous rights started in the 1990s and has been supported
from national and international communities. The United Nations adopted the
resolution (A/RES/45/164) on the first International Year of the Indigenous People in

90
1993 (United Nations General Assembly 1990). In Indonesia, the Alliance of
Indigenous People (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat, AMA) and the Alliance of Indigenous
People of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, AMAN) were
established in West Kalimantan in 1996 and in Jakarta in 1999, respectively (Li 2001;
Davidson 2008). The Dayaks perfectly fit the category of indigenous people, due to
their primitive characteristics (Peluso 2006; Davidson 2008). The founders of IDRD
were inspired by the international indigenous rights movement. With financial support
from the Ford Foundation and other international organizations, IDRD attended
international conferences, published articles in English, and became the standard-
bearer of Dayak indigenous resistance (Davidson 2008).
As a result of the active NGOs movement, the Dayak protested against the
government and concession companies. What were once sporadic and peaceful events
were transformed into struggles for the indigenous group of Kalimantan and these
events were often replete with violence (Davidson 2008). Hence, Davidson (2008,
116) concludes ―Pancur Kasih activists neither engineered nor instigated this
bloodletting [Dayak-Madurese clash in 1997], but in large part its intensity was a
result of this ethnopolitical, indigenous rights movement.‖ The violence between
Dayak and Madurese was escalated by empowerment of the indigenous group
(Davidson 2008).
Meanwhile, violence itself reinforced ethnic identities. Cultural symbols such
as war ceremonies and headhunting practices performed in ethnic clashes between

91
Dayaks and Madurese reinvented Dayak culture transcending hundreds of subgroups
(Peluso and Harwell 2001) and evolved into the political identity of the Dayaks
(Peluso 2006). A government official of Bengkayang commented on the solidarity of
the Dayak as follows:
If Dayak, in terms of politics or what, they can be separated. But if it is
already related to dignity, self-esteem, they are united everywhere. In
this Kalimantan Dayak are a lot. But if an issue is already concerned
with the name of Dayak . . . if there is…such as killing, it is related to
self-esteem of the Dayak, so really one Kalimantan can…Malaysian
Dayak people can help us here.
Moreover, to explain ethnic violence between Malays and Madurese, Davidson
(2008) pointed out the political shift preferring an ―indigenous group‖ in the
beginnings of regional autonomy. As a reaction of the centralized New Order regime,
regional autonomy was interpreted by the heads of districts that the main target and
beneficiary of decentralization should be a son of the soil. Malays have occupied high
positions in government; however, the indigenous group in Kalimantan is the Dayak.
Thus, Davidson (2008) argued that Malay-Madurese violence was motivated by
Malays observing the Dayaks‘ rapid political advance to win the title of indigeneity
and to show their power to the Dayak in violence against Madurese, the Dayak‘s
enemy.
Therefore, as Davidson (2008) and Peluso and Harwell (2001) argue, massive
ethnic violence between Dayaks and Madurese in 1996-1997 was a product of the
emerging ethnic identity of Dayaks born in violence and strengthened by the
indigenous rights movement of the Dayak NGOs. Ethnic politics, rooted in the

92
indigeneity claim and intensified with the beginning of regional autonomy, was a
significant cause leading to the Malay-Madurese clash in 1999. On the other hand, a
lack of Madurese NGOs, which could represent or support Madurese views, put the
Madurese community at a great disadvantage and strengthened the negative
perspective of the Madurese (HRW 1997).

The historical explanation, specific considerations of ethnic identity, and ethnic
politics provided a counterargument against the aforesaid two theories that focused on
cultural clash and marginalization and development. Davidson (2008) denied the latter
two theories, based on the spatial concentration of ethnic violence and the timing of
the first outbreak of ethnic violence. The reasoning was that Dayak-Madurese violence
had not exploded in the districts where the Chinese expulsion had not occurred, such
as Ketapang and Sintang (Davidson 2002, 2008). The first bout of ethnic violence
preceded the start of large-scale development projects in the province. Moreover, West
Kalimantan was not the only province to receive an influx of migrants and state
development projects on the island, yet no serious ethnic clashes occurred in the other
provinces (Davidson 2008). For example, according to one researcher, in the 1990s, in
East Kalimantan, which was also one of the large scale transmigration project sites,
Dayaks were more segregated along sub-ethnic groups and the identity of the Dayak
as whole had not fully developed. If the cultural clash and marginalization theories are
true, violence between Dayaks and Madurese should be relevant regardless of

93
differences in locations and times.
16
However, as indicated by the historical record,
ethnic violence appeared only in certain areas and during a specific time period
(Davidson 2008).
The analysis of the causes of ethnic violence and the spatial variations pointed
out by Davidson (2008) lead us to examine the reasons for the peaceful districts in
West Kalimantan. The following section turns from discussions of conflict to explore
the dynamic differences between conflict and peace.

3.2. A Case of A Peaceful District: Ketapang
The history of violence and the roots of ethnic violence in West Kalimantan
explored in preceding sections is only one side of the story. In the midst of the ethnic
violence in West and Central Kalimantan from 1996 to 2001, there were a few districts
immune from deadly ethnic violence: Ketapang and Sintang in West Kalimantan and
West Kotawaringin in Central Kalimantan (International Crisis Group 2001; Davidson
2002). Supported by the local governments, Ketapang and West Kotawaringin held
peace pledge ceremonies with the attendance of various ethnic groups (ICG 2001;
Bamba 2002).
Ketapang protected ethnic peace by holding ceremonies on the Rejection of
Violence, Tolak Bala,
17
a Dayak ritual. In Ketapang, two ceremonies of Tolak Bala

16
The total area of oil palm plantation in Ketapang was 95,737 ha in 2000 (BAPPEDA Kabupaten
Ketapang and BPS Kabupaten Ketapang 2005); while the oil palm plantation at in Sambas and
Bengkayang were 7,417 ha in 2000 (Pemerintah Kabupaten Sambas and BPS Kabupaten Sambas
2006) and 13,438 ha in 2004 (BPS Kabupaten Bengkayang 2004) respectively.

94
were held in 1998 and 2001. In the first Tolak Bala, on August 13, 1998, a monument
of Tolak Bala was set up in the middle of the market of Ketapang, with more than 300
guests watching, including heads of the district government, military and police,
politicians, ethnic group leaders, and other important figures (Bamba 2002). The Raja
Hulu Aiq or the ―King of the Upriver,‖ a spiritually symbolic figure of the Dayak from
Sengkung, performed a ritual. The ethnic groups in Ketapang, Dayak, Malay, Chinese,
Madurese, Javanese, and others, signed a statement of peace building. This ceremony
was not organized by government initiative. A Dayak Catholic priest, an organizer of
the Tolak Bala, explained the motive for the ceremony:
I saw two things very dangerous. First, I was afraid of conflict between
Dayaks and Madurese because the situation of Indonesia was very
chaotic. Second, I was afraid of plunder, robbery, rape, and murder of
ethnic Chinese. Here I thought Dayak Ketapang had an obligation to
show together a traditional symbol of the existence in this Ketapang
town. They completely agreed about this symbol in accordance with
their desire and this was a stimulus for them. Eventually they planted
the symbol I made with a traditional ceremony of Dayak. So at that
time, more than 350 people gathered, though some said there were up
to 500 Dayaks from interior regions. Most of them had never been to
Ketapang town and actually there were traditional spiritual leaders
too . . . . So here primal implementers were traditional spiritual leaders
of Dayaks; they were principal characters. But we also invited all
ethnicities in Ketapang here in order to unite them and each group
acknowledged the agreement. Because of this, this monument is not
just for the sake of symbol of the existence of Dayak but also the sign
each person can look at; this is the symbol we have to protect Ketapang
and we have to defend ethnic harmony . . . . At that time I was
forbidden by several parties. I am Catholic. I was suppressed by the
Catholic, opposed by government, and formal organizations too. But I
looked at this moment which never happened again, because I was

17
In English tolak means ―rejection‖ or ―prevention‖ and bala is ―catastrophe‖ or ―disaster.‖

95
confident that this moment came only once, only once. There was no
second chance. Dayak had to use this moment.
The second Tolak Bala ceremony was held on March 21, 2001, and this time
led by the vice district head of Ketapang, Lourentius Madjun, a Dayak. Similar to the
first Tolak Bala, representatives of various ethnic groups, including Dayak, Madurese,
Malay, Chinese, Javanese, Buginese, Padang, Batak, and East Nusa Tenggara,
attended the ceremony and signed the declaration of ethnic peace in Ketapang.
18

Because this ceremony was prepared by the government, the declaration was endorsed
by the district head, Morkes Effendi, in addition to Madjun as the chief of the
committee of Tolak Bala 2001 and the Raja Hulu Aiq. Elected officials of the local
council, district and provincial police, and the military also participated in the
ceremony.
In February 2001, one month before the second Tolak Bala, violence between
Dayaks and Madurese broke out for the first time ever in Central Kalimantan.
Ketapang has a provincial border with Central Kalimantan province. Sampit, the
center of violence of Central Kalimantan, was even closer to Ketapang than Sambas.
Thus, impacts of ethnic violence from the neighboring districts were a serious concern
for the Ketapang community. A Dayak government employee explained the rationale
of the second Tolak Bala.
Every year and every time when we have an opportunity to renew, I
mean, to remind… to remind [us] that we have already the declaration
[because] I can say that there are those who forgot. It is one effort, one

18
Declaration is called, ―Ikrar Pemuka Suku-Suku Yang Hidup di Kabupaten Ketapang.‖

96
effort to make Ketapang peaceful in influence of conflict in Sambas
and Sampit, because this region is the middle, Sampit in the south and
Sambas in the north. So at that time, we always watched out
interventions from the north and south.
However, John Bamba, a well-known Dayak researcher of the Institute of
Dayakology, renamed IDRD, criticized the political intentions behind the ceremony
and the disregard of the Raja Hulu Aiq (Bamba 2002), yet most participants of the first
ceremony joined the second, and again the Raja Hulu Aiq signed the declaration
document.
In addition to the two Tolak Bala ceremonies, three appeals and a commitment
to ethnic peace were prepared by government initiatives. Before the first Tolak Bala,
―Appeal and Commitment of Ketapang District Community‖ was declared at the Post
of District Military Command (Markas Komando Distrik Militer or Makodim) on
February 12, 1997.
19
The leaders of four ethnic groups of Dayak, Malay, Madurese,
and Chinese signed the appeal. At the time of ethnic violence in Sambas, again
―Appeal and Commitment of Leaders of Ketapang District Community‖ was issued on
March 24 1999.
20
This time the chief of district police initiated the appeal, and eleven
leaders from six ethnic groups, including Dayak, Malay, Madurese, Chinese,
Buginese, and Batak, signed the document. The Ketapang district government also
organized a similar appeal called ―Declaration of Unity‖ on October 28, 2000.
21
There

19
Himbauan dan Kebulatan Tekad Masyarakat Kabupaten Ketapang
20
Himbauan dan Kebulatan Tekad Para Tokoh Masyarakat Kabupaten Ketapang
21
Surat Pernyataan bersama Tokoh-tokoh masyarakat dan suku-suku yang ada di Kabupaten
Ketapang

97
were approximately one hundred participants, including ethnic leaders from Dayak,
Malay, Madurese, Chinese, Javanese, Buginese, Batak, Banjar, and Sundanese,
government employees such as heads of sub-districts, urban districts and villages, and
youths from various sub-districts.
Ketapang managed to survive the time of major ethnic violence from 1996 to
2001 in West and Central Kalimantan without any serious ethnic clashes. Now the
ethnic peace of the district is known to the country and world. This district has not
experienced serious ethnic violence up to the present. However, in 2005, the Tolak
Bala monument was damaged by someone during the election period for the district
head of Ketapang. On August 24, 2005, a ceremony for restoration of the Tolak Bala
was held with attendance of ethnic leaders, the district head, and government officials.

3.3. Conflict and Peace: Research of Variation
This section examines relations between conflict and peace. In particular, I
discuss what conflict theories say about peace, whether or not conflict theories explain
ethnic peace, and what conflict theories and analysis suggest for peace building. The
analysis of causes of violence indeed does not provide sufficient reasons for the
persistence of peace. Thus, the research methodology to examine variances across
different cases should be scrutinized to measure the variations with each variable,
conflict, or peace.

98
3.3.1. Conflict and Peace—Two Ends of the Continuum?
The lack of ethnic violence in Ketapang and Sintang in West Kalimantan was
explained by Davidson (2002) as the lack of violence against Chinese in the 1960s.
Due to the nonexistence of Chinese settlements engaged in gold mining, Dayaks in the
two districts did not participate in the violence to expel Chinese. In Ketapang
particularly, the army did not embark on the sweeping operation of the rebellions.
Thus, no root of violence existed in the two districts. Besides, there were no visible
numbers of Madurese in Sintang (Davidson 2002).
This Davidson‘s argument provides a certain account for the lack of violence
in the two districts, yet can this argument explain the reasons for peace in the two
districts or how to build peace or prevent conflict? Davidson (2008) recommended
improvement of the police and legal system for conflict resolution. It should hold true
that if a criminal were to be immediately captured by the police following a crime,
then large-scale ethnic violence may be contained. No one can deny the need for
capable police and strict law enforcement. However, what matters here is how the
study of conflict relates to the study of peace: Do solutions for peace derived from
conflict analysis truly work for peace building?
A critical problem in peace and peace building is that the concept of peace is
rarely questioned in spite of a number of research studies and projects dedicated to
peace (Richmond 2005). Among peace scholars, Galtung (1996, 223) defined peace as
a ―reduction of direct, structural and cultural violence.‖ Peace is categorized into

99
negative and positive peace: negative peace means the non-presence of violence while
positive peace is achieved by overcoming ―structural violence‖ of ―political,
repressive and economic, exploitative‖ dimensions characterized by ―penetration,
segmentation, fragmentation and marginalization‖ (Galtung 1996, 31) and moves
toward ―freedom‖ and ―equity‖ through ―dialogue,‖ ―integration,‖ ―solidarity,‖ and
―participation‖(32).
Such a definition of peace is criticized by conflict scholars because it seems
that violence is indeed required to explain peace (Horowitz 2001). Horowitz clearly
expressed his suspicions about attempts to explain peace. Peace is simply a lack of
violence because serious ethnic violence would not happen without at least one of four
conditions: ―appropriate precipitants, appropriate targets, police indifference or
condonation, or social support for violence‖ (Horowitz 2001, 479). Even Galtung‘s
positive peace definition needs negation of structural violence (Davies-Vengoechea
2004). In short, among many scholars of conflict and peace, conflict and peace are to
be understood as two ends of the same continuum as Davies-Vengoechea (2004)
pointed out. Because peace is achieved by reducing of conflict or violence, a study of
conflict can contribute to the study of peace as well.
Nevertheless, there would have to be different models, levels and qualities of
peace, beyond the simple status of absence of violence. Davidson (2008) criticized
Varshney‘s work on ethnic violence in India for ―he tends to understate the analytical
importance of variations in size or intensity of Hindu-Muslim bloodshed and how or

100
when other such communal groups such as Sikhs or Christians become embroiled in
riots‖ (19). This criticism should be applied for research on peace as well. The
intensity or quality of peace should be different between Sintang, and Ketapang and
West Kotawaringin, two districts that could declare ethnic peace. Such capacities to
maintain or enhance ethnic peace embedded in the societies of those districts should
be distinguished from a situation that simply implies the absence of violence, which is
explained by a lack of one or more of the four conditions suggested by Horowitz
(2001). In other words, there should be certain types of strong forces, circumstances,
or mechanisms to prevent the four conditions from being complete.
Moreover, each peace model could have different reasons and causes for it.
Horowitz (2001) degraded Fearon and Laitin‘s (1996) peace maintenance based on
intra-ethnic group control mechanism as just a short-term solution only ―on such
occasions and for such purposes‖ with narrow reliance on ethnic leaders (Horowitz
2001, 475). But why is it wrong? Davidson (2008, 19) described riots: ―As dynamic
configurations, they have their own traceable histories and discrete lineages,‖ yet if the
violence in Sambas emerged within a specific arrangement of factors rooted in the
militant Dayaks and violent identity born from the Chinese expulsion, as Davidson
(2008) argued, a combination of different factors should have emerged in the peaceful
districts to supplement the police‘s inefficiency and weak legal system. There should
be a variance in peace as well. Thus, why do researchers of conflict ignore diversity in

101
peace, while they study different types of violence and try to find causes and solutions
to them, such as war, ethnic violence, separatism, lynching, or terrorism?
This fixed view of peace is an important impediment to peace theories.
Researchers in both conflict and peace studies tend to accept only one type of peace,
the liberal peace, as the universal model (Richmond 2005). From the field of
international relations, Richmond (2005) pointed out a critical problem in conflict and
peace research, as follows:
[C]onflict theory has tended to assume that the liberal peace
unquestionably forms the basis for theorising the ending of conflict,
and more recent debates on peacebuilding and UN peace operations
have moved into the terrain of the reforms or construction of liberal
modes of governance of economies, polities, and development (120).
Liberal peace is characterized by ―sovereignty, self-determination, democracy,
development, and human rights‖ (Richmond 2005, 19). It also entails a free market
economy and, more recently, civil society. In short, it is a western model of liberal
society—assumed to be universal. Conflict, violence, and war are perceived as failures
or problems and need to be fixed by correct interventions in line with the idea of
liberal peace. The grassroots efforts of including civil society organizations and
bottom-up problem solving and mediation are often suggested in conflict resolution by
the external participants or from above, but within the expected model of peace
(Richmond 2005). Hence, determining the concept of liberal peace is the ultimate
objective: ―The study of peace is usually overlooked in the face of the need to

102
understand violence‖ (Richmond 2005, 122). What is needed is the study of peace and
research on models of peace beyond the concept of liberal peace alone.

3.3.2. Study of Variance in Conflict and Peace
The view of the conflict-peace continuum and of the fixed model of peace can
cause a methodological problem in research on the variances in conflict and peace.
After his seminal research, Varshney has promoted comparison of peace and conflict
cases because he believes the comparison necessary to confirm a theory or reasons of
conflict (Barron, Jaffrey, Palmer, and Varshney 2010). Thus Varshney‘s claim is
derived on the assumption of the conflict-peace continuum. If the assumption is
correct, comparison of variations between peace and conflict is a legitimate research
methodology because the two are measured on the same scale. However, if conflict
and peace are different phenomena deviated from a continuum, this research strategy
is akin to comparing ―apples and oranges,‖ as discussed by (Gerring 2007, 50).
Indeed, Varshney‘s (2002) research on Hindu-Muslim violence never
explained a conflict mechanism nor proved a conflict theory; however, it provided one
theory of the peace mechanisms with inter-ethnic associations. Therefore, it is
essential to examine what variations are comparatively analyzed in the research.
Moreover, conflict is also not a single phenomenon and could foreseeably exist in a
relatively peaceful situation. For example, Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Panggabean
(2008) and Tadjoeddin (2002a) measured the significance of a violent event by the

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number of resultant deaths in group-based incidents. However, Barron and Sharpe
(2008) contend that small individual level incidents which are usually not counted as
communal violence indeed involved group factors because they are ―a precursor to or
symptom of large intergroup conflicts‖ (396). Even though there are sufficient
numbers of victims in a district, the district with more deaths from petty crimes is
perceived as a ―peaceful‖ district. Thus, the dataset of Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and
Panggabean (2008) did not correctly capture the significance and spatial variation of
communal violence, and many more districts in Indonesia in fact experienced
collective violence (Barron and Sharpe 2008).
Though a comparison of success and failure cases seems a good starting point,
a lack of certain variables in one case, let us say, failure (conflict) or success (peace),
does not necessarily explain the main reason for the case of failure or mechanism of
conflict, because success and failure might be caused by totally different mechanisms.
In research in social science, particularly in case study as Yin (2003) discussed, many
variables are not controlled in comparative analysis. Hence, a lack of certain factors
might explain a lack of success (peace), but it is still uncertain if missing the factors is
a reason of failure (conflict). Thus, the idea of the conflict-peace continuum should be
analyzed more carefully.
Subsequent sections and chapters explore reasons and prospects for peace in
the Ketapang district, compared with the conflict district of Sambas, from the
perspective of theories of civic associations and decentralizations. In this research, a

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comparison is facilitated between the existence of peace or a lack of peace, with the
aim of explaining a mechanism of peace, not a cause or mechanism of conflict.

3.4. Democracy, Civil Society, and Peace
To understand the reasons for peace, it is necessary to analyze cases of peace,
in addition to cases of conflict, as discussed in the previous section. The concept of
peace is derived from democratic theory. The widespread idea of liberal peace
(Richmond 2005) and the structural positive peace proposed by Galtung (1996)
strongly reflects the idea of democracy, such as participation, human rights and civil
society. After the end of the Cold War, civil society became a focus of research on
democracy or democratic transition, due to its contribution to democratization
(Diamond 1994; Encarnación 2002). On the other hand, in the study of ethnic
violence, Ashutosh Varshney‘s (2002) seminal research on Hindu and Muslim
violence in India first proposed a theory to connect civil society with conflict
prevention and ethnic peace. Therefore, the remaining sections of the chapter explore
theories on relations between civil society, civic associations in particular, and conflict
prevention. The theories that connect civil society with conflict and peace, including
democratic theory, social capital, civic associations, and peace building, are reviewed
to identify the salient issues with such a dynamic and propose a framework for the
analysis of the two cases of both the conflict prone and the peaceful districts.

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3.4.1. Civil Society Defined
In general, civic society is understood in terms of two characteristics or
sectors, which correspond to the public and business sectors and the public sphere or
space where those actors interact (Warren 2001; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). Civil
society refers to the public space between the state and personal domain where
autonomous citizens interact and voluntarily organize activities for shared interests
without intervention from the state (Diamond 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; Cohen
1999; Varshney 2002). In particular, Cohen (1999) emphasized the view of civil
society as public sphere.
Moreover, civil society consists of a collection of groups or organizations
which are ―voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the
state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules‖ (Diamond 1994, 5). They
entail four characteristics: 1) autonomy from state, economic entities, and families, 2)
ability to organize collective actions for the group‘s concerns and objectives, 3) no
substitutions to replace a dominant political or economic role such as government, and
4) established behavioral civic norms (Schmitter 1997). These characteristics are
summarized as ―dual autonomy,‖ ―collective action,‖ ―nonusurpation,‖ and ―civility‖
(Schmitter 1997, 240). In spite of its autonomous nature, civil society is regulated by
institutions (Diamond 1994).
A wide range of formal and informal organizations and associations is
classified as members of civil society, including community associations, economic

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and professional associations, religious and cultural organizations, women and youth
organizations, non-governmental organizations, social movement, etc. (Diamond
1994; Linz and Stephan 1996; White 2004). Some theorists emphasize informal
associations such as community groups in their definitions (Putnam, Leonardi and
Nanetti 1993). Others have added traditional associations like ethnic or clan-based
associations to the list (Orvis 2001; Varshney 2002).
To be counted as civil society, it is argued that civic associations have modern
characteristics that distinguish them from ―ascriptive‖ groups such as ones based on
ethnicity or religion (Varshney 2002, 40; White 2004). However, a boundary between
modern and ascriptive associations is not always clear because people join ethnic
associations of their free will, and the activities of ascriptive associations are broad,
ranging from political to economic (Varshney 2002). Thus, in his research on ethnic
violence, Varshney (2002) defined civic association by activities and aims of
associations toward the public or civic and included certain ethnic associations in civil
society depending on their roles or objectives.
Civil society is discussed in relations with democratization (Diamond 1994;
Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1997), development (Hadenius and Uggla 1996),
decentralization (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007), and ethnic conflict (Varshney 2002).
Based on the understanding of the definition of civil society as described above, how
civil society contributes to peace building and conflict prevention is discussed in the
following sections.

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3.4.2. Democratic Peace Theory and Civil Society
The contribution of civil society for peace has attracted attentions in the fields
of international relations and comparative politics. In the field of international
relations, a role of civil society in conflict prevention and peace building emerged
from democratic peace theory and liberal peace (Rasmussen 2003). On the other hand,
the role of civil society was recognized as important in democratization (e.g.,
Diamond 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996). This section first reviews discussions of civil
society in democratic peace theory.
Democratic peace theory or liberal peace is a group of theories that connect
democracy with peace (Rosato 2003; Richmond 2005). Democratic peace theory,
which holds that democratic countries do not go to war against each other, is a notion
strongly supported in the extant scholarship (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and
Russett 1999; Doyle 2005) and has become a conceptual base to promote democracy
in the world (Rosato 2003). Democracy‘s contribution to peace is explained by
normative and structural factors. According to the normative view, democratic states
apply ―norms of compromise and cooperation‖ for resolution of conflict rather than
violent means (Maoz and Russett 1993, 624). Democratic institutions impose more
constraints on decision makers to take military action through legitimated processes to
reach consensus in government and legislatures and obtain support from
constituencies (Maoz and Russett 1993). The accountability required by, and inherent
to, democratic systems plays an important role to make this process work (Rosato

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2003). The idea of connecting democracy and peace is widely accepted by
international organizations as well. For example, UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros Ghali wrote in An Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A/47/277) in 1992:
―Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and
justice‖ (Boutros Ghali 1992, under paragraph No. 82, X. An Agenda for Peace).
Thus, it is believed by scholars and practitioners that creating a solid democratic
society leads to peace.
Meanwhile, democratization theories perceive civil society as an indispensable
element in democratization (Huntington 1991; Diamond 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996).
To consolidate democracy, ―a free and lively civil society‖ is necessary in addition to
―a relatively autonomous and valued political society‖, ―a rule of law,‖ ―a state
bureaucracy,‖ and ―an institutionalized economic society‖ (Linz and Stepan 1996, 7).
As these conditions are attained, democracy or democratic norms take root in society
(Linz and Stepan 1996). In particular, liberal peace theory rooted in Kantian thought
contributed to the development of the concepts of civil peace and governance
(Richmond 2005). Liberal peace theory emphasizes democracy, economic
interdependence, international laws, and human rights in peace building (Oneal and
Russett 1999; Doyle 2003) as a rather universalistic view of peace or an ideology of
peace (Richmond 2005). Liberal peace needs to be supported by civil peace at the
grassroots level. Involvement of civil society, in addition to various actors, strengthens
the legitimacy of liberal peace building. Non-government organizations appeared as

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main actors of human rights, humanitarian and human security intervention
(Richmond 2005). Consideration of local culture, traditional conflict mediation, and
participation of local community were incorporated in conflict resolution and
transformation processes (Lederach 1997). Civil society is specifically important for
emancipation of the local community (Richmond 2005; Paffenholz 2010a). The
approaches to address conflict changed from a top-down approach assuming the state
as the main actor to bottom-up and involvement of citizens, NGOs, and non-state
stakeholders, and eventually to integrated and comprehensive approaches aiming at
long-term transformation to a peaceful and sustainable society, with an increase in
civil wars and intra-state conflict (Richmond 2002). International organizations such
as the United Nations and international donors welcomed participation of civil society
in peace building activities (Richmond 2005). Eventually, civil society has become the
central topic in peace building activities. For example, in the case of Yugoslavia, the
international community believed that the underdevelopment of the civil society there
caused the ethnic war and the consequent stagnation of democratization (Chandler
2004).
Therefore, civil society has appeared as an essential ingredient for the
prevention of conflict from the aspects of peace building (Richmond 2005) and
democratization (Huntington 1991; Diamond 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996), with the
changes of type of conflict from inter-state to intra-state and approach to peace along
with that (Richmond 2005). Indeed, increasing attention of civil society in conflict

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prevention was parallel to, or led by, the rise of the importance of civil society in
democratization theories. Peace building projects started taking a governance
approach to transform social, economic, and political institutions into liberal
democracies by involving different actors from local civil society, to NGOs, to
government, to international organizations (Richmond 2005). The contribution of civil
society to peace building is discussed in the next section.

3.5. Civil Society and Conflict Prevention
From the perspective of theories on democracy and conflict prevention, the
above sections explored the relations between civil society and conflict prevention.
This section discusses a specific role of civil society, namely, civic associations as
they prevent communal violence. Firstly, civil society‘s contribution to democracy and
peace building is examined. Then, two mechanisms of conflict prevention, involving
two types of civic associations, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic associations, derived from
social capital and rational choice approaches, are examined in detail.

3.5.1. Contribution of Civil Society to Democracy
Civil society can contribute directly and indirectly to conflict prevention and
peace building. The functions of civil society in peace building correspond to the roles
played by civil society and associations for democracy. Diamond (1994) identified ten
contributing democratic functions of civil society: 1) overseeing and guiding the
practices of state authority for democracy, 2) developing the abilities and

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responsibilities of citizens to participate in democratic polity, 3) learning civic virtues
and democratic values for pluralism, 4) functioning as an alternative arena to identify
and express citizens‘ preferences and concerns, 5) developing inclusive views and
attitudes to accommodate various interests, 6) incubating for the next generation of
politicians, 7) deepening democracy through various activities of associations, 8)
promoting information sharing and improving transparency, 9) supporting market
liberalization, and 10) contribution to state building by improving the performance and
legitimacy of the state.
More specifically, the benefits that democracy gains from associations were
identified by Fung (2003) in relations to types of associations: 1) exercising of a right
to organize associations, 2) developing of civic virtue and democratic capacity for
political participation, 3) monitoring and fighting against undemocratic force and
authority, 4) allowing for opportunities for broad and fair reflection of public interests,
5) promoting discussion of problems and policies, and 6) being involved in political
activities and policy making. Civil virtue and civil skills develop through socialization
in civil society by nurturing reciprocity and cooperation. Civil society provides
supplemental public services insufficiently covered by government (Edward and Foley
2001; Fung 2003). These functions are more or less similar to Diamond‘s (1994)
argument on civil society‘s contribution to democracy. In short, the advantages of
civic associations for democracy are summarized in Warren‘s (2001) three effects,
namely, ―developmental effects‖ of citizens‘ skills, ―public sphere effects‖ for

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articulation of political interests and examination of policies through communication,
and improvement of ―institutional conditions‖ to mobilize various political actions for
democracy (Warren 2001, 61).
The benefits of civil society and civic associations such as trust, network, and
facilitation of cooperation, are the primary arguments in social capital theory (Putnam,
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Social capital theory has strengthened a link between
civil associations and democracy by illuminating certain aspects of civil society
(Armony 2004). According to Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993), social capital
stands for ―features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions‖ and is expressed
in ―norms of reciprocity‖ and ―networks of civic engagement‖ (167). On the other
hand, Coleman‘s (1988) definition of social capital focuses on functions and structure
of social relations that make resources available to people in order for them to take
action for certain purposes. A person in such a relational dynamic has obligations to
fulfill the other‘s exceptions so that trustworthiness and social norms are key factors to
maintaining social capital. The necessary information to execute such actions is
accessible through social capital. While Putnam‘s (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti
1993) neo-Tocquevillean view emphasizes that social capital highlights civic virtue
and civic engagement that prevent free-rider problems and enable cooperation,
generalized reciprocity and trust that emerge through specifically horizontal, or face-
to-face interactions, lead to the growth of a healthy democracy.

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The advantages of associations for the purposes of a productive democracy are
highlighted differently, depending on the focus of the types of associations (Warren
2001) and the models of democracy including liberal, representative, or participatory
(Fung 2003). In particular, associations divide into two general types: apolitical civic
associations and political associations. Apolitical types of civic associations were
mostly discussed by Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) as more appropriate for the
development of civic skill because of socialization in direct interactions (Fung 2003),
yet Putnam (2000) distinguished formal and informal associations, favoring formal
associations as having the efficacy to develop civic skills. Fung (2003) underscored
the importance of democratic values of associations such as pluralism, rather than any
particular form of association for this particular purpose. The other types of
associations that fight against the undemocratic forces—such as advocating for policy
to reflect certain interests, stimulating public discussion through professional
associations, political organizations, interest groups, or social movement—may be
distinct from those associations that directly contribute to civic skills and democratic
values. These associations do not necessarily support other purposes and may even
undermine developing democratic values (Fung 2003).
Warren (2001) developed a sophisticated typology of associations with three
criteria: the level of autonomous membership, a factor to connect members and
relations to it, and outcomes or objectives of association, or simply ―ease of exit,
constitutive media, and constitutive goods‖ of association (Warren 2001, 133). For

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example, according to Warren‘s (2001) classification, ethnic association is
characterized as having a low level ease of exit, connected by a vested social
relationship, and one that produces ethnic identity (see Table 6.1 in Warren 2001,
136). The contributions of various types of associations for democracy are evaluated
based on the typology (Warren 2001).
In short, civil society and civic associations strengthen democracy by
educating and promoting political actions and democratic values. The different types
of civic associations play specific functions in democratic society.

3.5.2. A Role of Civil Society in Peace Building
For peace building, Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) identified seven roles civil
society plays, including ―Protection,‖ ―Monitoring,‖ ―Advocacy and public
communication,‖ ―In-group socialization,‖ ―Social cohesion,‖ ―Intermediation and
facilitation,‖ and ―Service delivery‖ (67). In the analysis of the Sri Lankan case,
Orjuela (2003) found two beneficial activities of civil society for peace: education and
communication at community levels for ethnic integration and perception changes,
and peace movements and advocacy to prepare the political environment for peace and
initiate political changes, in addition to the contributions to economic development.
Thus, the contribution of civil society for peace building can be divided into two
categories: direct political actions for peace building and enhancement of cooperation,
and integration of the community.

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As discussed by Fung (2003), monitoring and advocacy, and communication
are one important advantage of civil society within a democratic society (Paffenholz
and Spurk 2010). Civil society can monitor violence and identify the risk of breaking
down ethnic relations. These activities become the foundation for the development of
an early warning system and can then function as an advocate for peace (Paffenholz
and Spurk 2010).
In addition to formal public campaigns for peace, informal dialogue and
communication are soft approaches to prepare the environment, set agendas for
negotiation, and connect the grassroots organizations (or organizational structures)
with the state. Socialization within groups brings with it the culture of peace and
empowers suppressed and victimized groups through identity formation. Building
social cohesion is necessary to integrate divided groups and build trust (Paffenholz
and Spurk 2010). Orjuela (2003) argued that civil society‘s important contribution to
peace is to build trust among different levels of key actors by disseminating
information and promoting dialogue. In the middle of violence, well-integrated
neighborhoods, not only civic associations or NGOs, often work together to prevent
violence (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). Such was the case as reported in West
Kalimantan. Correspondingly, social capital contributes to public safety and the
prevention of crimes, for example, due to dense social networks and trust that may
exist in the community, teenagers come to be well supervised, disadvantaged families

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can often find support systems, and the community overall takes proactive measures
for public safety such as community policing (Putnam 2000).
To compare the contributions of civil society to democracy and peace building,
those functions which were identified as promoting democracy encompass the roles
which civil society supports in peace building efforts. Civil society‘s involvement in
monitoring, advocacy, communications, socializations, and education for peace
building (Orjuela 2003; Paffenholz and Spurk 2010) are the key functions of civil
society for democracy as Diamond (1994), Warren (2001), and Fung (2003) discussed.
Social cohesiveness and trust building (Orjuela 2003; Paffenholz and Spurk 2010) are
interpreted as part of the continuing development of pluralism and civic virtues
(Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Diamond 1994; Warren 2001; Fung 2003).
However, types of associations are not identified as a necessary or prerequisite link
between civil society and peace building.
This section explored the important functions and aspects of civil society as an
advocate for peace, based on those factors in civil society critical for the development
of democracy. The following section examines the mechanisms by which these
functions of civil society and civic associations work to prevent conflict, depending on
the types of civic associations being invoked.

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3.6. Civic Associations and Conflict Prevention
The preceding discussion indentified potentials of civil society for conflict
prevention and peace building. In this section, two mechanisms of conflict
prevention—utilizing two types of civic associations—inter- and intra-communal
associations are discussed.

3.6.1. Inter-Ethnic Associations and Peace
Derived from a social capital approach, Ashutosh Varshney (2002) found a
role for civic associations in conflict prevention. This is called ―an institutionalized
peace system‖ (Varshney 2002, 11) in which the ―structures of civic life constrain
political strategies and their outcomes‖ (13). From examining a case study of ethnic
conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India, Varshney (2002) has argued that civic
associations enmeshed across religious and ethnic groups can prevent ethnic conflict
by building trust and networks at local levels.
According to Varshney (2002), existence of strong associations transcending
narrow group interests provide the foundations of effective local governance where
government and civil society work together to prevent violence. Risk and potential
damage of inter-communal violence are anticipated by participants in inter-communal
associations. Interactions and communications are smoothly facilitated between ethnic
groups at the critical moment, and communities can endure provocations or faked
information that seek to disturb the peace. Neighborhood watch groups can emerge,
and a grassroots peace-building process can move quickly. Hence, there is less

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opportunity for political leaders to mobilize their self interests along ethnic lines
(Varshney 2002).
Nevertheless, not all types of civic associations work in all circumstances.
Varshney (2002) argued that informal civic networks such as face-to-face interactions
can stop ethnic violence in rural areas while formal associations are more persistent in
urban areas. Because people are more detached in urban than in rural areas, informal
associations are not strong enough to prevent urban conflict. Instead, labor
organizations or business associations can effectively mobilize people through branch
offices or liaisons to maintain peace in a city towards common objectives. Size,
resources, and capacity of organizations determine the ability to influence
communities and control conflict (Varshney 2002).
The preventive power of civic associations does not last if there is political
change. Although civic associations can explain regional variances of communal
violence, Varshney (2002) warned that conflict prevention by civic associations is
rather a short- or medium-term solution and that political circumstances or
institutional changes, such as political transformation brought by Gandhi in India,
affect the efficacy of civil society.

3.6.2. Intra-Ethnic Associations and Peace
In contrast to Varshney‘s argument for inter-ethnic associations, Fearon and
Laitin (1996, 719) proposed a theory of peace, ―in-group policing,‖ based on a

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rationalist approach. This approach explains how to maintain social order by
controlling self-interested individuals in groups. Two mechanisms that describe
conflict spiral and peace equilibrium relying on intra-ethnic associations are suggested
(Fearon and Laitin 1996).
Fearon and Laitin (1996) argued that in ethnic relations, people usually know
more about their own group through close interactions and networks than about the
other groups. Because of a problem of asymmetry in the information access between
ethnic groups, it is more efficient for each ethnic group to punish its own members
who endanger the inter-ethnic peace by committing wrongs against the other groups‘
members, than for the other ethnic groups‘ members to look for and punish those
people. Members of ethnic groups trust that each ethnic group is responsible for its
own members‘ wrongdoing, and thus the mechanism of in-group policing is self-
sustaining. Reputation within the group prevents self-interested individuals from
breaking ethnic peace. However, if punishment is not implemented by the group of a
wrongdoer and trust between groups is lost, a group of victims retaliates
indiscriminately and the other group fights back. Hence spiral of conflict easily
develops as, for example, the relations between Israel and Palestine demonstrate
(Fearon and Laitin 1996).
For in-group policing to work, Fearon and Laitin (1996) identified that the
persistent and unique characteristics of groups, clear lines and the frequency of
interactions between groups, and the size of the group matters because these group

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aspects affect the ability to enforce sanctions within the group and build cooperation
between the groups. A decentralized structure or the autonomous status of a group is
necessary to micro-manage ethnic relations, though the state may need to step in once
ethnic relations deteriorate. Fearon and Laitin (1996) admitted that this in-group
policing mechanism is relatively fragile compared to the conflict spiral model, yet this
is one approach to make up for a deficiency in theories to prevent the explosion of
ethnic violence and maintenance of inter-ethnic cooperation for peace (Fearon and
Laitin 1996).

3.6.3. Can Civic Associations Prevent Conflict?
Civic association-based conflict prevention models, inter-ethnic association-
based peace system, and in-group policing by intra-ethnic associations were
introduced in the previous section. Here I discuss issues and problems within the two
theories that describe the efficacies of civic associations for conflict prevention.

(1) Characteristics of Inter-Ethnic Associations
The theory of inter-ethnic associations and peace does not specify what types
of inter-ethnic associations support ethnic peace. Not all types of civic associations
work in all circumstances. Characteristics of associations, their purposes, objectives
and structure can influence ethnic relationships. For example, labor organizations or
business associations can mobilize people to maintain peace in a city for common
objectives that transcend ethnic or religious divisions (Varshney 2002). In a study

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conducted in post-conflict cities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pickering (2006) found that
workplace interactions were more effective in rebuilding inter-ethnic relationships,
rather than neighborhood organizations or advocacy groups, because neighborhoods
were more likely to be ethnically segregated and at the workplace people looked at co-
workers objectively, such as one‘s competence or position. A community in Lindu,
Central Sulawesi, Indonesia successfully signed peace agreements between an
indigenous group and migrants, guided by secular objectives, incorporating
nationalistic aspects of unity and harmony and citizens‘ obligations which were indeed
the national slogan or rather propaganda promoted by the past authoritative regimes
(Acciaioli 2001). Moreover, Varshney (2002) argued that the size, resources and
capacity of organizations influence their ability to control conflict.
The structure of inter-communal organizations is likely to reflect inter-group or
intra-group relationships within a city. As Horowitz (1985) stated, whether or not
inter-ethnic peace can be built depends on intra-group relations. In Varshney‘s (2002)
cases, it is not known whether or not inter-communal associations can strive for peace
without economic interdependence between groups or intra-group competitors in the
cities or, in other words, whether or not group relations at the district level are more
important in conflict prevention than inter-communal associations.
Hence, there are still various unanswered questions on relationships between
types or characteristics of inter-ethnic associations and ethnic peace building. It is also

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uncertain how the external factors of inter-ethnic associations affect the peace building
function of the associations.

(2) Formal and Informal Associations in an Urban-Rural Setting
Varshney (2002) differentiated formal inter-communal associations from
informal ones. Because formal associations organize people more efficiently, people
can interact with others through organizations in urban areas where people and
families are more separated. In rural areas, face-to-face interactions are sufficient to
prevent violence (Varshney 2002).
In contrast to the Indian case, communal violence in Indonesia was not
necessarily an urban phenomenon. In West Kalimantan, of the 1,515 deaths from
violence between 1991 and 2003, 95% occurred in rural areas (Varshney, Panggabean,
and Tadjoeddin 2004a). This contradicts the notion of the efficacy of informal
associations in rural areas pointed out by Varshney (2002). If rural violence implies
the failure of informal associations to maintain peace in villages, conflict resolution
could become more difficult because fewer formal associations exist there.
The case of Indonesia casts doubt on the simplistic views on the efficacy of
formal and informal associations which rely on urban and rural differences. The level
of informal associations may depend on the nature of villages and neighborhoods and
whether they are ethnically segregated or mixed.

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(3) In-Group Policing for Peace or Conflict?
In-group policing can escalate ethnic conflict instead of build inter-ethnic
peace as the spiral model suggested (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Bhavnani and Backer
2000). Social pressure and sanctions from a group can force the group‘s members to
attack opposition groups. In Rwanda, Hutu people who did not want to be involved in
genocide or who helped to evacuate the Tutsi were intimidated and even killed by
other Hutus (Bhavnani and Backer 2000). Fearon and Laitin (1996) pointed out the
weaknesses and fragility of ethnic peace based on in-group policing because it could
be an impediment to the assimilation of groups and because ethnic leaders might abuse
the system for their own political interests, for example when they can expect benefits
from the antagonism of a specific ethnic group, such as during election time. Thus, in-
group policing should not be the first choice for peace building (Fearon and Laitin
1996). Second, within this theoretical construct, the role of the state is still unspecified
(Fearon and Laitin 1996). The state can be involved in such a way that ethnic groups
are autonomous or can legitimately impose sanctions on their own members. Finally,
the theory of in-group policing has not been tested empirically, though Fearon and
Laitin (1996) have provided several examples.

(4) Association for Peace: Inter-Ethnic Associations or Intra-Ethnic
Associations?
It is still inconclusive which type of association, inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic,
works for peace and conflict prevention, and under what conditions. Putnam (2000)

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introduced ―bonding‖ and ―bridging‖ social capital (22). Bonding social capital
enhances solidarity and cohesiveness within the group while bridging capital exists
between groups and produces overarching identities under larger goals or concepts.
Bridging social capital connects a wide variety of people and enables them to bring
cooperation and other opportunities. On the other hand, bonding social capital is
developed within a small circle, with rather limited memberships, such as ethnic
groups, and cements relations among them (Putnam 2000). The contribution of
bridging social capital to the public is expected to be larger than bonding while a
bonding type may accelerate competition against other groups, though not always
(Putnam 2000; Putnam and Gross 2002; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Coffé and Geys
2007). Intra-ethnic associations, a quintessential type of bonding social capital, are
often perceived to bring a negative impact or rather constraints on inter-ethnic
relationships as compared to inter-ethnic associations (Putnam 2000; Marschall and
Stolle 2004). The discussion of bonding and bridging social capital implies advantages
of inter-ethnic associations over intra-ethnic associations for ethnic harmony.
However, Putnam (2000, 23) articulated a relationship between bonding and
bridging social capital by explaining that ―bonding and bridging are not ―either-or‖
categories into which social networks can be neatly divided, but ―more or less‖
dimensions along which we can compare different forms of social capital.‖ Scholars
have provided evidence that bonding and bridging social capital are not mutually
exclusive (Fernandez and Nichols 2002), but also that bonding social capital is a

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premise for creating conditions wherein bridging social capital can function (Larsen et
al. 2004). In a multi-ethnic society, participation in multi-ethnic organizations
increases together with a rise in involvement in ethnic organizations (Fernandez and
Nichols 2002). Larsen et al. (2004, 74) revealed that ―the presence of bonding social
capital was a significant predictor of taking civic action,‖ though social status, such as
education level, can affect this link.
Therefore, advantages of inter- or intra-ethnic associations are still in question.
Context of local society, such as segregation as Varshney (2002) has mentioned, could
influence efficacy of the two types of civic associations in conflict prevention.

(5) Politics and the Role of the State
Civic associations, or civil society in general, are not independent of the
contexts where they are located. Macro-level institutions have long-lasting impacts on
conflict and ethnic relationships (Davidson 2008). According to Varshney (2002), a
rudimentary constellation of civic engagement was installed during Gandhi‘s political
movement aimed at building cooperative relationships between Hindus and Muslims.
Politics affecting intra- and inter-ethnic relations prior to violence at the local level
such as a movement to mitigate lower caste discrimination in Calicut and Sunni-Shia
competition in Lucknow also provided a framework for developing inter-ethnic civic
associations in civil society (Varshney 2002). The theory of in-group policing

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mechanism regarding how the state and politics affect ethnic cooperation is not
sufficiently discussed (Fearon and Laitin 1996).
Political factors are often overlooked in the analysis of civil society and social
capital (Foley and Edward 1996; Whittington 2001). From the analysis of social
cohesion and violence, Colletta and Cullen (2000, 13) found that in addition to
horizontal social capital, vertical social capital connecting community with
government and the economy is an influential factor for ethnic relations by creating
―social cohesion‖ of equality, fairness, inclusion, and democracy. Depending on the
level of social cohesion, social capital, bridging or bonding, can work either to
contribute to or undermine peace building. Political interventions are necessary to
develop social cohesion. Moreover, Davidson (2008) showed that from a historical
institutional perspective, politics at the center framed ethnic relationships and ethnic
violence in Kalimantan.
MacLean (2004) argued that because ―[s]ocial capital is not solely developed
through participation in civil society organisations, however, but also in the spaces for
interaction between individuals and the state‖ (593), ―experiences within civil society
organisations often parallel and thus reinforce the initial variation in the ways that
individuals interact with the state‖ (592). Whittington (2001, 31) warned against
rushing to the conclusion of connecting social capital and positive outcomes:
―[C]oncentrating on the formation of social capital begs the question of the ends for
which that capital is to be used‖ while it ignores political contexts.

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Hence, political institutions and the state are neglected in research on civil
society and social capital. Studies on relations between civic associations and conflict
prevention need to pay attention to political institutions which have significant effects
on how civil society develops and how people experience it.

(6) Conflict Prevention by Civic Associations: No Such Thing?
Conflict scholars raise questions, not just on the characteristics of civic
associations and contextual conditions, but also about the contribution of civic
associations to conflict prevention. Brass (2003), who researched ethnic violence in
Aligah for twenty years, the same as Varshney (2002), criticized Varshney‘s (2002)
argument as ―tautological‖ by stating ―Where there is extensive civic engagement
between Hindus and Muslims, there is peace, which amounts to saying that where
there is peace, there is peace‖ (Brass 2003, 418n44). Brass (2003) also pointed out the
methodological problems of Varshney‘s (2002) research, such as coding incidents,
units of analysis, and comparing peace and conflict cases (Brass 2003). In fact, a peace
building approach that primarily relies on inter-communal social cohesion does not
show notable contribution in real cases due to the neglect of various differences and
partition lines in the community, strong antagonism, lack of integrated actions toward
peace, and overlooking resolution of true causes of conflict (Paffenholz 2010b).
Corresponding with Brass‘s (2003) criticism, Horowitz (2001) stressed the
deficiency of an individualistic approach to in-group policing. Though ethnic violence

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is a group problem often motivated by political interests, Fearon and Laitin‘s (1996)
in-group policing theory is to ―reduce collective behavior to individual grievance or
individual antisocial behavior‖ (Horowitz 2001, 477). Moreover, threats or attacks
without distinction could escalate violence, rather than provide a brake, as Fearon and
Laitin (1996) explained in their articulation of the conflict spiral model. Peace-
oriented ethnic leaders may not be able to suppress triggering events provoked by
politically motivated ethnic elites or groups whose interests are completely outside the
conflict spiral model (Horowitz 2001). Therefore, further research is necessary to
convince academics and practitioners of the advantages of civic associations for
conflict prevention.

Though theories to explain the ways in which civic associations contribute to
conflict prevention have been developed, there are still unsolved issues and puzzles
within those theories that need to be clarified. They are linked to characteristics or
types of associations, conditions to make the mechanisms work, and political
influences or relations with the state, or provide insufficient empirical evidence to
connect the civic associations and peace. Based on understanding of these remaining
concerns, the next section proposes a framework of how civic associations can
contribute to conflict prevention and peace building as a conclusion to the chapter.

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3.7. Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Cases
Both scholarly and practitioner spheres increased interests in civil society after
democratization and the advantages of civil society and civic associations in society,
particularly as they obtain with regards to democracy (e.g., Putnam, Leonardi, and
Nanetti 1993; Diamond 1994; Warren 2001; Fung 2003) and to peace building (e.g.,
Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). The study of ethnic violence identified two mechanisms
to connect civic associations to conflict prevention, inter-ethnic associations
(Varshney 2002) and intra-ethnic associations (Fearon and Laitin 1996).
However, contribution of civil society and particularly civic associations to
conflict prevention has not been acknowledged in any great measure. The
characteristics of associations, such as purposes and values of organizations (Acciaioli
2001; Varshney 2002), may affect the effectiveness of the inter-ethnic associations
based on conflict prevention. Informal and formal associations can work differently
for ethnic peace depending on rural and urban areas (Varshney 2002). Because there
are risks of intra-ethnic associations and in-group policing to bring conflict or peace
rather than cooperation (Fearon and Laitin 1996), it is necessary to identify conditions
to make inter- or intra-associations work. As pointed out by Foley and Edward (1996)
and MacLean (2004), the political impacts around civic associations and the role of
the state should not be dismissed from considerations when developing civic
associations and ethnic relationships. Thus, the fundamental question of whether or
not civic associations benefit conflict prevention needs to be carefully examined.

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These issues suggest that the efficacy of civic associations for conflict
prevention cannot be determined solely by their characteristics or capacity. In the
study of democratization and democracy, the theory of civil society‘s contributions to
democracy was extensively examined. However, indeed, a number of researchers
across the globe rejected a simple, positive relationship between civil society and
democracy and pointed out the importance of contextual factors, specifically utilizing
political institutions to evaluate the benefits of civil society for democracy instead
(Berman 2001; Mercer 2002; Encarnación 2003; Armony 2004). For example, in El
Salvador, civil society was more active in the civil war zone than the in the other areas
both before and after the war (McIlwaine 1998).
Moreover, various researchers repeatedly noted the weakness and confusion
regarding the concept of civil society itself (e.g., Encarnación 2002, 2003; Armony
2004). The concept of civil society was derived from liberal democracy and takes a
normative view to accept only those associations, which fit certain specific models of
associations, in particular, those in Western society, as being a rightful part of civil
society (Encarnación 2002; Mercer 2002). Therefore, different types of civil society,
civic associations, or NGOs are simply ignored, with the concluding judgment that
civil society is lacking or only weak civic associations exist in any given case (Orvis
2001; Mercer 2002). Mercer (2002) criticized the simplistic view of modernity in civil
society arguing that ―membership of NGOs and other civil groups that cut across
ethnic and regional cleavages are considered a key mechanism for breaking down

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‗traditional‘, ‗deeply rooted‘ and potentially divisive socio-cultural identities that are
anathema to the liberal democratic vision‖ (11). In fact, Uhlin (2009) found no
significant association between ethnic heterogeneity of civic organizations and
democracy.
Similarly, in social capital theory, Coleman (1988) warned about the negative
aspect of social capital. Coleman (1988) perceived social relations more objectively
and confined the concept of social capital to certain relations and contexts (Edward
and Foley 2001). Creation of social capital is often unintentional, the consequences of
actions that had been taken for other purposes (Coleman 1988). Based on this value-
free aspect of social capital, Coleman (1988) argued that ―[a] given form of social
capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful
for others‖ (S98). The flaws in the concept of civil society and social capital could
bias the analysis of the impact of civic associations on democracy as well as their
effects on ethnic relationships.
Therefore, considering that the advantages of civil society in conflict
prevention are derived from its roles in strengthening democracy, its impact on peace
building is also indecisive. Rather, it could be that contextual factors–political
institutions, the state, social conditions, and the existing ethnic relationships–
circumscribe how different types of civic associations affect ethnic relationships,
peaceful or competitive, and whether or not civic associations can contribute to
conflict prevention. Meanwhile, it is also crucial to scrutinize the definition and roles

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of civil society in relation to peace building through analysis of relationships between
contextual factors and civic associations.
Thus, the succeeding chapters present the analysis of two cases, peaceful and
conflict-prone districts, to examine the relations among civic associations, ethnic
relations, and contextual factors, in search of an answer to the question of how civil
society and civic associations can contribute to conflict prevention. The analysis of
these cases provides a detailed description and discussion of the two cases in terms of
ethnic relations before the outbreak of violence, informal and formal associations and
their contributions to conflict prevention and peace, the foundation of civic
associations, and the state response to conflict and problem solving.

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CHAPTER 4
DIFFERENCES IN CONTEXTS AND
ETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS
This chapter provides a comparison of contexts and ethnic relationships in the
conflict-prone district of Sambas and the peaceful district of Ketapang. I analyze the
contextual factors before the major ethnic clashes, including informal associations and
ethnic relationships, economic issues, crimes, residential patterns, and history of
ethnic groups. Then, the traditional approaches for problem solving are discussed to
compare the situations in the two districts.
In Sambas, Malays lived in the coastal area while Dayak settlements resided in
the mountainous areas that eventually became the district of Bengkayang after
pemekaran. The Chinese population was concentrated in the urban areas of
Singkawang. Due to the particular concentrations and distribution of ethnic groups in
certain areas, the description of ethnic relationships between Dayak and Madurese
focuses on the situation in Bengkayang, while a case of the relationship between the
Malays and Madurese illustrates the ethnic relationships in the area of the new
Sambas.

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4.1. The Contexts of Conflict and Ethnic Relationships in Sambas
4.1.1. Informal Associations and Ethnic Relations
The residents of Sanggau Ledo, Samalantan, and other sub-districts currently
under the Bengkayang district regularly described the ethnic relations between Dayaks
and Madurese as good or harmonious. The two groups were usually mixed and had
good communication and interactions between them. A Dayak village head in
Monterado described relations with Madurese villagers as follows: ―They were
already neighbors. Every day we met, often told a joke, and ate together . . . . Here we
couldn‘t say this is Dayak, this is Madurese, and this is Malay, [everyone is] the
same.‖
Before the outbreaks of violence, Madurese and Dayaks were often able to
solve problems without difficulties before the initial problem became serious. Most
residents were farmers. Dayaks, Madurese, and others worked together at paddy or
rubber plantations and helped each other with the farming and the development of the
villages. There were community groups in villages such as groups for mutual help,
farmers, and specializing in livestock. Such farmer‘s groups often consisted of
members from the Dayak, Madurese, and Malay. Madurese were known for their
cattle farming skills. The former village head in Sanggau Ledo said that he learned
how to raise livestock and better cultivation methods from the Madurese, and indeed
the Dayaks in the village gained farming skills from the Madurese.
In villages, the Dayaks and Madurese gathered for special events and festivals.
They visited each other‘s houses during religious cerebrations and ceremonies,

135
mutually helped each other for upcoming events, and cooperated in the matters of
daily life. For example, a Dayak in Sanggau Ledo invited his fellow Madurese to the
wedding ceremony of his child, and they in turn helped out with the ceremony without
asking for rewards or compensation. One Dayak said, ―We visited each other. If we
celebrated Christmas, they came to us. For example, for them, at Idul Fitri, we went to
their places to share feelings of happiness and togetherness.‖ In Sanggau Ledo,
Madurese leaders provided financial support for the Dayak festivals such as Gawai
Dayak (harvest festival) in the village. The Dayak did not forget such generous
contributions from the Madurese. The Dayak interviewee contended that ethnic groups
were already assimilated enough in the village to have close interactions, which were
indeed expressed friendship between the Dayak and Madurese.
In the beginning, the ethnic relationships between the Malays and Madurese
were also described as good by the interviewees. The Madurese arrived in the Sambas
region at the beginning of the 1960s. The Malay helped the Madurese to settle in
Sambas by leasing land for farming or building of houses. A village head in the Jawai
sub-district, the location of the triggering incident for the ethnic violence in 1999,
commented that, in the early days there, Madurese migrants were occasionally treated
as family members of the Malay and were supported by them to become self-reliant.
By the 1990s, there were already a number of inter-ethnic marriages between
the Malays and the Madurese. According to the Madurese, almost 50% of Madurese
were married with other ethnic groups, and among them, Malay-Madurese marriages

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were the most common type of couple. In fact, many Madurese interviewees said that
their parents, or they themselves, had Malay spouses, and Malay interviewees also
often claimed that they had the Madurese as in-laws in their families.
Similar to the relationships between Dayaks and Madurese, the Malays and
Madurese also invited each other during ceremonial times or religious celebrations.
Particularly because the two groups were both Muslims, they also met at mosques or
prayer houses. There were sometimes problems or small fights between the Malay and
the Madurese, as is the case in any other place and between other groups. However,
these problems were perceived as individual scuffles and settled without any further
expansion of the specific conflict. Thus, the interactions between the two groups were
described as ―very good.‖
Hence, before the ethnic violence and in ordinary situations, both Dayak-
Madurese and Malays-Madurese relations were described as good. They worked and
ate together, helped each other with projects in the villages, and shared celebration of
religious festivals and holidays and family ceremonies. As part of daily village life,
there were dense interactions and face-to-face informal associations between the
Dayaks, Malays, and Madurese. In fact, these relationships, especially between the
Dayak and the Madurese, were more intense than those in Ketapang.

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4.1.2. Ethnic Enclave and Segregation
In spite of the positive comments on the ethnic relationships, informal
interactions between the Dayak and the Madurese declined and became less frequent
than those between the Dayak and Malay or the Javanese. The non-Madurese
interviewees pointed out that this was because the Madurese tended to create
segregated enclaves as expressed by the Indonesian word ―mengelompok.‖ As the
Madurese population increased, it became less likely that the Madurese and Dayaks
would interact and cooperate in the activities of their daily lives. Rather formal,
mutual visits during festivals and religious celebrations became the only interactions
between the Dayaks and Madurese. As a Dayak in Monterado explained, ―At the
beginning, we were together. They were still together with Dayaks and with Malays,
but if they . . . had been here for a while and they made an enclave like this. They were
not with us.‖
This type of segregation and eventual decline of face-to-face interactions
happened to the relations between the Malay and Madurese as well. With the increase
of the Madurese population, the two ethnic groups became segregated and fewer
Madurese, i.e., only close friends, family, or leaders of the communities attended
Malay religious celebrations, weddings, or community programs.
The Malays and Madurese, who were both Muslim, did not continue to meet at
mosques or places of worship on a daily basis because the Madurese built their
mosques or prayer houses in their own enclaves. There was an association for hajis,

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those who made pilgrimages; however not many Madurese hajis joined the
association, though the relationships between the hajis were described as good. Even a
Christian Dayak noticed the separation of the groups in terms of worship rituals: ―If
[they were] Madurese, they had their own mosque and couldn‘t be mixed with the
others . . . . They are the same, Muslim, but the place of their prayer was different . . . .
Although I am Christian, I could see it.‖
The Madurese were known as devoted and conservative Muslims in Indonesia,
sometimes called ―fanatic‖ or ―extreme.‖ Madurese parents often sent their children to
Islamic schools, such as the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), rather than public
schools. Similar to the sentiments expressed about the mosques built in their own
enclaves, Malay interviewees said that they founded a boarding school in their
community. As a result the Madurese children did not have many opportunities to
interact with other kids.
In general, the Malay, Dayak, Chinese, and Javanese interviewees reported that
the Madurese community was ―closed‖ or ―exclusive‖ and they were criticized for not
being able to adapt to the local community and culture, though some interviewees
contended that the assimilation levels of the Madurese with the Malay were no
different from those of the Javanese. Many Sambas-born Madurese had already lost
the Madurese language and used the Malay Sambas dialect in daily life. Yet, a Malay
interviewee reflected, ―The feeling of friendship was gone after their population
already had grown large.‖

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Therefore, the Madurese developed their ethnic enclaves along with the
increase of the population in Sambas. As a result, interactions with other ethnic
groups, the Dayak and Malay in particular, declined.

4.1.3. Land Problems
Before the ethnic violence, the Madurese owned large plots of land in Sambas
and Bengkayang. In the Bengkayang district, the Madurese occupied the land that had
belonged to the Chinese, such as in Monterado, which was once known for Chinese
gold mining or kongsi. After the Chinese were chased out, the Madurese moved into
the area. The interviewees in Sanggau Ledo and Samalantan explained that while the
Dayaks were still busy with helping the army, the Madurese took all the land left by
the Chinese. Moreover, Sanggau Ledo was the location of the transmigration program,
which was, as described before, a government-sponsored program to accept migrants
from highly populated regions such as Java, though most Madurese migrants arrived
as voluntary migrants.
A typical land problem pointed out by local residents was that the Madurese
obtained the land by unfair means. At first, the Dayak or the Malay leased land to the
Madurese when they arrived in the village. Eventually the Madurese obtained more
land than did the Dayak and the Malay. A Malay interviewee explained the problem of
land acquisition regarding the Madurese as follows:
Before the conflict, there was also the issue of land . . . . Oh yes, you
can ask it everywhere in Sambas. Here was our land and this was his

140
land divided by a border. Later Madurese planted a banana tree on the
border. The banana tree grew, its roots entered into Malay‘s land, and
new trees came up there. Then the Madurese claimed that the land was
his land. He deliberately planted the tree on the border. Later, his land
increased because he cultivated the land and planted there again,
farmed again. Malay‘s land was getting smaller. This was the problem
in villages, land problem there. Madurese claimed someone‘s land as
theirs.
According to a Dayak interviewee, if people wanted to take back the lands that
had been leased to the Madurese, the Madurese often refused and sometimes attacked
the lessors. In some cases, Malay farmers gave away land to the Madurese to borrow
money for family matters, such as education or the weddings of their children. Land
problems sometimes caused fatal incidents. Consequently violence and other types of
trouble also began to appear among the groups. A Malay said that to avoid problems
with Madurese, Malays gave up land to the Madurese for an ―unsatisfactory price . . .
because we couldn‘t stand, we had to sell it [the land] to them, left them.‖ Eventually,
the Madurese attained economic dominance by acquiring land in rural villages.
There was another issue related to land ownership. In the villages, not many
people were aware of formal land ownership, and a number of villagers did not have
land certificates indicating ownership. Particularly given the shifting cultivation
practices carried out by the Dayaks, some land remains unused for a few years until its
fertility recovers, or it is simply kept unused. When the Madurese saw land unused,
they thought that land was abandoned without a specific owner and started farming
there. Villagers could not ask the Madurese not to use these empty plots of land
because they did not have the land certificate that would indicate ownership for them.

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The Dayak and Malay interviewees commented that during these instances, sometimes
the Madurese contended ―this is the land of god, god owns [this] land‖ as a way of
suggesting that they were free to use it.
As a result of these existing conditions, competition over land ownerships
existed in Sambas before the violence. Increases in the population only aggravated the
existing conditions over land ownership and caused friction between the various ethnic
groups. Nevertheless, the Dayak side commented that the land issue could be solved
by village administration, and they did not feel that the issue was significant, in terms
of the relationships between the Dayak and Madurese.

4.1.4. Economic Competition
As migrants, the Madurese were more motivated to succeed, so generally they
worked hard. Madurese dominated farmlands in villages and later prevailed in the
sectors of transportation and construction, and in urban areas as unskilled workers. A
number of Madurese who economically succeeded in villages and towns made
pilgrimages to Mecca. Due to their hard working ethics and economic success, the
Madurese have the nickname of ―Chinese with black skin.‖
Needless to say, the rise of the Madurese economically fueled competition
with the local community. A Dayak criticized the Madurese economic dominance as
follows: ―They controlled everything. For example, if there were stones and there was
construction work using those stones, they took everything. Other people were not

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allowed to work . . . . They didn‘t want to divide.‖ According to interviewees, there
was no economic cooperation between them such as sharing knowledge or skills with
the other ethnic groups.
As Davidson (2008) described, the economic competitions between the local
populations and the Madurese appeared in urban and rural areas, corresponding with
the increase of the Madurese population during the last decades, up until the outbreak
of conflict in 1999. In rural areas, people left their land and villages, as previously
described, because of competition over land and security problems. In urban areas, the
Madurese dominance appeared in markets or in terminals of public transportation as
Madurese retailers and workers were actively engaged in the transportation sector.

4.1.5. Crime
According to interviews, a major problem with Madurese was the level of
crime they engaged in. Interviewees from various ethnicities in Sambas, Bengkayang,
and Singkawang reported frequent involvement of the Madurese in murder, theft, land
grabbing, and other violence. These Madurese crimes were believed to be a result of
―their habit‖ by the local community. The perceived power imbalance between the
Madurese and Malays found expression in an infamous statement: ―When chicken is
small we (Malay) have, after chicken has grown, they (Madurese) have.‖ A Malay
villager in Jawai expressed his fear of the Madurese: ―We couldn‘t oppose them again.
No one could.‖ There were frequent crimes by groups of Madurese gangsters in

143
Sambas, and the locals had come to call this area ―Texas,‖ as also pointed out by
Davidson (2008).
22

Murder was the one problem that the residents were most concerned about in
the area. Often small troubles, even over one or two thousand rupiah (less than a
quarter or twenty-five cents), resulted in murder. The Dayak and Malay insisted that
sometimes people who complained or reported thefts to the police, were also later
killed. The district head of Sambas described the community situation before the
Malay-Madurese riot in this way:
[B]efore the riot, there were so many social disturbances, security
problems yes, stealing, thief, killing happened so easily before.
Murder . . . it is easy for them to kill people, just because of a woman
or like that . . . . Before, we couldn‘t leave paddy in field. Before,
people were afraid to leave a bicycle [because of a fear of theft]. This is
what the community said about the situation of security.
A village head in Monterado, referring to the murder of a Dayak named Sidik in
Samalantan, the incident which triggered the Dayak-Madurese violence 1969,
provided the somewhat exaggerated figure of hundreds of killings of the Malay by the
Madurese.
A Madurese custom of carrying a sharp weapon or a knife of some sort was
often pointed to as a cause for the violence, and claims were made that the Madurese
sometimes used those very weapons in incidents of murder or injury. It was reported
that the Madurese brought sickles everywhere, even to mosques. However, those who

22
According to Malay interviewees, there was a Madurese map portrayed to make Sambas the second
Madura Island.

144
carried the sharp weapons were often newcomers from Madura Island, and not
Kalimantan-born Madurese. Although other ethnic groups also carried sharp tools with
them that were used for their farming or other purposes, interviewees contended that
the Madurese misused the sharp weapons they carried to commit acts of violence.
Given these incidents and the general perception, it was not surprising that a
Dayak concluded that the murders by the Madurese provoked the anger of the Dayak
and Malay to fight against the Madurese. Another person, speaking of the Madurese,
expressed his sentiments: ―They thought that life did not have any value. That was
their ugliness.‖ A Malay villager also expressed his anger against Madurese without
hesitation: ―So many Madurese were ruthless. That exceeded the limits. They fulfilled
their desire in various types of ways. Before the conflict, already for 32 years,
Madurese suppressed, made disturbance, and did things to harm Malays.‖
Frequent violence and murder, land problems, economic competition, and the
creation of a distinctive ethnic enclave were all interpreted by the local community as
inherent Madurese characteristics or culture. Although those Madurese causing the
troubles were believed not to be the ordinary local citizens, or simply gangsters, the
community believed that in general the Madurese were ―aggressive, violent, short-
tempered, [and] cannot adapt to local culture.‖ Similar to the comment above, another
person believed that killing was endemic to the Madurese ―because characteristics of
the Madurese were very temperamental.‖ Views such as these reiterated the
persistence of the primordial theory of conflict in the local community.

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4.1.6. Madurese Migration History and Malay-Dayak Relationships
The historic origins of the Madurese might have influenced the ethnic
relationships in Sambas. The major migration of the Madurese to the Sambas region,
such as Sanggau Ledo or Samalantan, started in the late 1960s or early 1970s, after the
displacement of the Chinese to the urban areas although the Madurese had lived in
Samalantan since the 1940s and the Dutch had brought the Madurese to region as
soldiers (Heidhues 2001; Davidson 2008) as discussed in Chapter 2. These sub-
districts became the epicenters of Dayak and Madurese violence in the 1970s and
during 1996/1997. The Madurese migration to Sambas was a relatively recent event,
and on a larger scale, as compared with Ketapang. Patterns such as these could have
affected the development of inter-ethnic relationships.
According to interviews, the origin of the Madurese Sambas was mostly from
Bangkalan. Bangkalan Madurese were known for their bravery, and they engaged in
activities such as bull racing. The stereotype of inherent Madurese rudeness originated
from Bangkalan; on the other hand, the alternate stereotype of Madurese softness
referring to the attitudes of Madurese in Sumenep originated in Ketapang. Similarly
hundreds of Dayak sub-groups were often defined by language or their habitats
divided by the rivers (Lontaan 1975). Interviewee described that Dayaks in Sambas,
Landak, or Pontianak such as Kayaan, Kenyah, or Iban, who were also known as
brave, actively engaged in headhunting traditions (Bamba 2000). Both the Madurese
and the Dayak in the Sambas region were called ―keras,‖ meaning strong or hard. It

146
was believed that their ―violent culture‖ affected the frequent ethnic clashes in
Sambas.
In Sambas, the dynamic of the Dayak and Malay relationships rarely attracted
attention as an issue of any sort. There was a Malay sultanate until the Japanese
Occupation. Sambas was known as the center of the Malay culture, and the sultan of
Sambas was a prominent figure there. There was no Dayak king in the Sambas region.
Given the strong Malay presence in Sambas, the Dayak-Malay brotherhood was
repeatedly emphasized in Sambas and Dayak-Malay competition never appeared in
Sambas. Dayak and Malay informants believed in a tie between the two groups and
denied there existed a risk of ethnic competition between them. They referred to a
legend that having thrown a stone in the Sambas River, the Dayak and Malay
promised to maintain friendship for as long as the stone remained there. However,
after a Dayak interviewee left, a Malay informant teasingly said, ―We knew the stone
never comes up.‖ Although a few Dayaks spoke of the exploitation of Dayaks by the
Malay sultans and aristocrats, which may be thought of as the ―hidden history,‖ the
Malay were never described as an enemies.
The ethnic relationships in Sambas, therefore, fell under the shadow of the
anti-Madurese sentiment. The negative experiences with the Madurese over economic
competition, and fewer interactions with them, further strengthened the discourse of
cultural differences.

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4.2. The Contexts of Peace and Ethnic Relationships in Ketapang
4.2.1. Informal Associations and Ethnic Relations
In Ketapang, ethnic relationships were ―far different‖ from the other districts in
the province. The relationships have been described as ―good‖ or ―harmonious‖ by
interviewees of almost all ethnic groups in Ketapang, e.g., the Dayak, Madurese,
Malay, Chinese, and Javanese. There had been good interactions and communications
among ethnic groups in the district since before the ethnic violence in West
Kalimantan. A Chinese interviewee described the dynamic between the groups as
follows:
Ketapang is conducive to ethnic relations…for long time, as far as I
know . . . . Indeed at the sub-district level or Ketapang district, ethnic
groups here are very mixed, very compound, respect each other
between one and another . . . . We attend all activities. Everyone is the
same, not like this person is this ethnic group, that person is not from
this group, same. We work together.
The foundation of the peaceful ethnic relationships in Ketapang was informal
interactions. The same held true in Sambas between the various ethnic groups, i.e., the
Malays, Madurese, Dayaks, and the Chinese shared religious celebrations and family
events while putting their differences aside. Though these types of interaction were
common in most parts of Kalimantan even in Sambas, it was important to maintain
ethnic peace in Ketapang and to develop the feeling of tolerance towards other
ethnicities. A Madurese leader described such informal associations as ―solidarity‖ or
―harmony‖ among ethnicities in Ketapang.

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The different ethnic groups cooperated for the community, known as ―gotong
royong‖ in Indonesia. The residents worked together to farm and to construct roads,
churches, and mosques in villages or neighborhoods, despite differences in religion or
ethnicity. These community self-help activities were more common and inevitable in
remote or isolated villages in the mountains because they could not rely on the
government, due to a lack of accessible transportation and government offices.
However, rural villages were relatively more homogenous than urban neighborhoods.
Many inter-ethnic marriages have occurred among the Dayaks, Malays,
Madurese, Chinese, Javanese, and other ethnic groups for generations in Ketapang.
For example, leaders of the Dayak and Madurese ethnic organizations were relatives
by marriage between their children. These inter-ethnic marriages contributed to the
assimilation of ethnic groups. Most Dayak, Chinese, and Batak, and some Javanese
were Christian; Malay, Madurese and Javanese were Muslims. Because Malays and
Madurese had no religious obstacles between them, inter-marriages between Malays
and Madurese were so frequent that the two groups were well assimilated in terms of
custom and culture.
Therefore, ethnic groups in Ketapang have enjoyed good ethnic relationships.
However, compared with Malay-Madurese interactions, Dayak-Madurese interactions
were limited in the urban areas of Ketapang because of the regional concentrations,
namely the Dayak population in the interior and Madurese settlements in the coastal
areas. The villages in rural areas were primarily dominated by either Dayak or Malay.

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4.2.2. Ethnic Enclave and Segregation
In Ketapang, the Madurese developed ethnic enclaves just as they did in
Sambas. The Madurese built these ethnic enclaves to satisfy cultural needs and to offer
mutual help and cooperation among migrants. Madurese enclaves existed in the
coastal areas and adjacent areas of the Ketapang town, such as Pematang Naning,
Sungai Kinjil, and Mulia Karta.
Once the Madurese settled in Ketapang, later their family or friends moved
from Madura Island and built or rented homes close to the first comers. With the
increase of their population, the Madurese purchased land and built houses around
their settlement. Eventually their community expanded, and the consequent ethnic
enclave developed.
However, the Madurese in Ketapang still interacted and mingled with the local
community. Though some interviewees described the Madurese community as
―exclusive‖ and ―less assimilated‖ to local society, more people rejected the negative
view of these Madurese enclaves. Not only Madurese but also Dayaks, Malay, and
Buginese interviewees contended that the Madurese in Ketapang were already
assimilated to the local community, especially through inter-ethnic marriage.
Moreover, it was sometimes said that Madurese prefer to construct their own
mosques or prayer houses in their ethnic enclaves, yet both the Madurese and Malay
denied this and explained that the location of worship depended more on just where
they happened to live, not on ethnicity.

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Hence, the Madurese and other ethnic groups agreed that these Madurese
ethnic enclaves were not a problem in Ketapang. Madurese in Ketapang were well-
assimilated into the local community. As a result of assimilation, some former
Madurese enclaves in the north started disappearing.

4.2.3. Land Problem
However, land problems appeared between the Madurese and the local
community in Ketapang. As in Sambas and Bengkayang, local people offered land to
new migrants through leases, or occasionally, for free. As time went by, the migrants
claimed ownership of the land based on a long time occupation of it. The original
owners were sometimes threatened and consequently gave up the land. However, such
cases were uncommon in Ketapang.
If a land problem appeared in Ketapang, it was likely settled in keeping with
land ownership laws. Madurese interviewees explained that currently the Madurese
organization in Ketapang promoted administrative orders and respect for existing
laws. Most residents had certificates of land ownership. People understood ownership
rights. Hence, according to a Malay interviewee in Sukadana, land problems between
the Malay and the Madurese were solved before such disputes triggered any serious
fights.
From the interviews on this matter, it appeared that the number of cases
involving land disputes was believed to be not many and solved in accordance with

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the land ownership and laws and regulations. This was probably because most of the
Madurese community was located adjacent to urban areas where property rights were
relatively established and acknowledged by the people.

4.2.4. Economic Competitions
As discussed, the local people often described the Madurese as hard working,
tough, and diligent. Because of their hard working nature, the Madurese were often
financially successful, compared with other groups. The Madurese were involved in
farming, raising livestock, butchery, fishery, small scale retail, street vending, the
transportation sector, and construction work, etc. They were found in almost all
sectors of civic life, including government. The interviewees commented that the
Madurese occupied 80% of the vegetable markets in Ketapang and once dominated
ojek (motorcycle taxi) jobs.
According to interviewees, local people were economically less successful
than the Madurese. Quarrels and disputes happened between the Madurese and the
other ethnic groups in the markets and on the streets, for example, in bargaining with
customers, problems of parking and traffic rules, location of kiosks, or interrupting
other ethnic groups to start business in certain sectors in Ketapang as well.
Yet, these problems had not expanded to become a substantive ethnic issue or
manifested as acts of obvious aggression. Indeed there was an effort from the
Madurese leaders to control and minimize problems in the markets and in other sectors

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of economic competition. Thus, the economic dominance of the Madurese in the
certain sectors had not produced serious competition between ethnic groups.

4.2.5. Crime
Crimes committed by the Madurese were also reported in Ketapang. A
Madurese senior said disgustedly, ―Madurese were told evil . . . . I am ready to accept
it. Well in this prison there are no other people [than the Madurese].‖ As I stated
earlier, the infamous proverb used to describe the Madurese, ―when a chicken is small,
it‘s yours. When it has grown, its‘ mine,‖ was also well-known in Ketapang. In fact
there was news of carok in Madura Island during my fieldwork there.
However, Madurese interviewees contended that petty crimes such as stealing
chickens were not very common in Ketapang and those crimes were mostly committed
by new migrants. Because there were also Dayak and Malay thieves, an interviewee
said, ―If the problem of thievery, we don‘t relate it to the ethnic problem of who steals,
meaning it is a matter of the laws. So we do not mix [the crime] with ethnicity.‖
In Sambas, the Madurese habit of carrying a sharp weapon was cited as one of
primary causes of violent incidents. The Madurese in Ketapang also brought a knife or
sickle when they went out, as was their tradition. In social gatherings such as
ronggeng (social dance) or cockfights, fatal fights could happen because of the sharp
weapons they traditionally carried. Nevertheless, most Madurese in Ketapang have
already foregone this tradition. The Madurese community made efforts to stop

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carrying sharp weapons, and a Madurese interviewee explained the reason as follows:
―So now such tradition was removed already after consideration. We studied, we
examined it has no advantage at all, what there is is just devastating damage.‖ In fact,
a law prohibited the carrying of sharp weapons in public spaces. The Madurese were
aware that if they brought a knife or sickle to the market, the police could apprehend
them.
In short, there was still prejudice against the Madurese that believed them to be
short-tempered or violent. In particular, before the ethnic riot in Sambas, intimidation
and blackmail by the Madurese bandits were often reported. However, with the
conscious efforts of the Madurese community to eliminate the habit of carrying sharp
weapons, crimes committed and the ethnicities of those who committed them were
perceived as separate issues.

4.2.6. History of Madurese Migration, Dayak King, and Dayak-Malay
Relationships
The three ethnic groups, consisting of the Dayak, Malay and Madurese, had
different histories and inter- and intra-ethnic relations in Sambas and Ketapang.
According to interviews and Davidson (2008), the history of Madurese migration to
Ketapang was older than their migration to Sambas. Ketapang was the place where
Tanjungpura, the oldest kingdom in West Kalimantan, was located. In the fourteenth
century, Tanjungpura was under the Majapahit Empire in Java. There had been
exchanges of people, commodities, and culture between Kalimantan and Java or

154
Sumatra for a long time (King 1993). Due to its proximity, Ketapang had close
connections with Java and Sumatra, and the legacy of Javanese influence, such as
language, was still observed in the Dayak community there.
Although the earliest story about Madurese migrants in Ketapang goes back to
the eighteenth century, most interviewees pointed out that many Madurese arrived
there in the 1920s or 1930s and that the current Madurese in the region were the third
generation.
23
Interviewees mentioned that there was one report of an uprising, of a
small group of Madurese, to express their frustration against their employers in 1933
(Davidson 2008). A Madurese senior proudly said that their Madurese ancestors were
invited by the Sultan of Ketapang, Panembahan Saunan, in the middle of 1920s
because of their higher farm skills. In fact, several Madurese communities are located
adjacent to the Matan palace. There is also a story that a sultan in Sukadana provided
land to the Madurese, Buginese and other migrants. This story of Madurese migration
to Ketapang contrasts with the Chinese migration to Sambas, where the Chinese were
invited by sultans for their skill in gold mining (Yuan 2000).
The Madurese in Ketapang stressed their difference of origin (tracing it back to
the Madura Island) from those in Sambas. According to the interviews, the Madurese
in Ketapang came from Sampang or Sumenep. The Madurese in Ketapang emphasized
that their place of origin had a sophisticated and polite culture with less common
tradition of the carok, because that was where the early kingdoms in Madura were

23
Davidson (2008) mentioned the mid or late nineteenth century as the start of Madurese migration to
Ketapang.

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located.
24
Similar to the argument of the Madurese sub-groups, the Dayaks argued that
the Dayak in Ketapang, such as the Laur, Pesaguan, Sandai, Tumbang Titi,
Kendawangan, etc., abandoned the tradition of headhunting, or ―mengayau,‖ a long
time ago. Based on this difference in tradition, the Dayak interviewees argued that the
Dayak in Ketapang were less violent than those Dayak who continued with the
headhunting tradition.
Therefore, earlier migration helped the Madurese migrants to assimilate to the
local community in Ketapang. Moreover, the Sultan‘s invitation to the Madurese to
come had, might have prepared the local community to be more ready to accept the
Madurese, and to know that they would be enabling the development of Ketapang. In
addition, due to the proximity to Java and existence of the oldest kingdom, Arab and
Chinese merchants had visited Ketapang in the thirteenth century (Haliem 2002).
According to interviews, the migration of the Chinese, Javanese, Arab, the Madurese
and all others from all over Indonesia to Ketapang, which started earlier than other
districts in the province, helped to develop a society open and tolerant of outsiders.
The Dayaks did not develop a kingdom comparable to the Malay sultanate in
Kalimantan. In Ketapang, however, there has been a Dayak king called the Raja Hulu
Aiq. Interviewees, Djuweng (1999) and Bamba (2002) explained that this Dayak king
was not a figure with concrete authority and power; rather the position was perceived
as symbolic, without an actual kingdom. He was a spiritual leader who organized and

24
There were 35 kings in Sumenep, from Arya Wiraja, the first king in 1269 (Kabupaten Sumenep,
Selayang Pandang Sejarah Sumenep, accessed September 14, 2011, [http://www.sumenep.go.id/].)

156
participated ceremoniously in rituals, and many believed this figure to be invested
with magical powers (Djuweng 1999; Bamba 2002). However the Raja‘s authority
reached as far as the Sandai, Sungai Laur, and Simpang Hulu sub-districts, and had
been respected by the Dayaks and even by the Malay sultans (Djuweng 1999).
According to interviews, a Malay sultan had invited the Dayak King at the end of each
year and a senior Malay interviewee witnessed the king at the ceremony, before the
outbreak of World War II. Additionally, as stated before, the Raja Hulu Aiq, the
Dayak King, was invited to the Tolak Bala peace ceremonies in 1998 and 2001 and
signed the official document with the district head and the department head of the
National Unity and Community Protection (Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan
Masyarakat, Kesbanglinmas). Surprisingly, no descendants of the Malay sultans were
included in the list of signatures of ethnic leaders. The district head provided financial
support to restore the palace of the Raja Hulu Aiq in Sandai (Bamba 2002).
In Ketapang, some informants commented on the competition between Islamic
and Christian groups, namely the Malay and the Dayak. Multiple Dayak interviewees
said, in some form or another, ―[o]ur real enemy is Malay, not Madurese.‖ A Dayak
activist in Pontianak, originally from Ketapang, said how his grandfather hated to be
in service of the Malay sultan in Ketapang. This long-standing hidden Dayak-Malay
tension surfaced at the time of the district head election in 2005, as the competition for
the post was between a Malay, the current district head, and a Dayak candidate (P3M
Stain Pontianak and Puslitbang Departmen Agama 2005).

157
Finally, there was intra-group competition among the Malays in Ketapang, in
addition to inter-ethnic competition. A group of a few Malay leaders opposed the
district head‘s position as chairman of a Malay organization. This group formed an
organization that transformed into a multiethnic organization, which is discussed in
succeeding chapters.
As discussed in Chapter 2, ethnic relationships in Ketapang had been
maintained without disturbance due to the absence of a history of violence and
difficulty in access to the area in the late 1960s (Davidson 2002). Because of that,
Chinese leaders in Ketapang were relatively actively involved in the local community.
A Chinese informal leader commented that he gave a Dayak youth a telling-off when
the youth caused a problem in a local market.
Therefore, ethnic relationships in Ketapang differed from those in Sambas.
Ketapang‘s ethnic relations were denser and multi-dimensional than those in Sambas,
such as the Dayak-Malay tensions and even internal competition between the Malays.
The level of the complexity to which ethnic relationships had become intertwined
could have influenced the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in Ketapang and Sambas.
Compared with Sambas, the relatively small populations of the Madurese and the
Chinese had minimized the impacts of the Chinese massacre and the violence between
the two indigenous groups, and the Madurese on the local community.

158
4.3. Conclusion of the Contexts and Ethnic Relationships in Conflict-Prone
District and Peaceful District
The comparison of those districts that experienced conflict and that was
peaceful showed that there were not that many differences demonstrated in the ethnic
relations and informal associations between the Sambas district before the violence
and the district of Ketapang. Similar to Ketapang, the Dayak, Malay, and Madurese in
Sambas enjoyed various events and ceremonies together and developed close
relationships through marriage, work, and daily activities. In fact, various interviewees
in Sambas said that Malays and Madurese worked together to protect the security of
their villages at the beginning of rioting in 1999. There was enough evidence to
suggest that the Dayaks and the Malays protected the Madurese from violence and
helped to evacuate them to safe zones such as those in Singkawang or Pontianak.
However, despite what initially began as well maintained interactions, there
was a deterioration of ethnic relationships in Sambas. The increase in the Madurese
population led to the development of Madurese enclaves which hindered interaction
with other ethnic groups and tightened economic competition, particularly over land-
ownership issues and job opportunities. The deterioration of the public order and
safety and the repeated clashes between Dayak and Madurese strengthened the
prejudice against the Madurese and the cultural discourse highlighting ethnic
differences in the local community.
On the other hand, the previous discussion showed that the Dayak, Malay and
Madurese in Ketapang maintained good relationships among them. The Dayaks,

159
Malays, and Madurese had interacted in daily life, shared religious celebration or
family events, and worked together for projects in village. There were also many cases
of inter-ethnic marriage. The Malays and the Madurese had an additional strong bond
between them through Islam. Although the Madurese occasionally developed ethnic
enclaves, the community still had interactions with other groups. Land problems and
crimes were solved in accordance with the laws. Thus, ethnic groups in Ketapang were
connected through dense informal institutions, and the rule of law was considered to
be working there. The history of the ethnic groups and intra-ethnic group
characteristics also influenced the development of intricate ethnic relationships and the
peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups in Ketapang.

4.4. Conflict Prevention: Traditional Approach—Informal Problem Solving
Method
Based on an understanding of the development of ethnic relations and historic
factors in Sambas and Ketapang, this section discusses conflict prevention methods to
analyze their effectiveness, obstacles and problems that often arise with regard to
conflict prevention. In West Kalimantan, there were two approaches to conflict
prevention or problem solving: informal and formal processes. The informal problem
solving approach entails resolution by deliberation among leaders and by Dayak
customs. The formal approach is to involve the police who took legal action. These
two approaches were common in the two districts of Sambas and Ketapang.

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4.4.1. Deliberation among Leaders
In Indonesia, problems in the community are generally settled through
deliberation (musyawarah). These deliberations take the form of consultation with
leaders or respected figures called tokoh masyarakat (community leaders/ figures),
such as the village head, neighborhood/ hamlet head, a religious figure, or an ethnic
leader. When problems appear in the community, leaders or tokohs are asked to help
address troubles between families of victims and the ones who committed the crimes.
Those leaders hold meetings to discuss how to solve the problem. For serious crimes
that cannot be settled through discussion, the police are ultimately involved.
These leaders coordinate for prevention of trouble at the time of sport events or
elections for example. Deliberation among leaders was a common problem solving
method between the Malays and the Madurese, yet the Dayaks applied a Dayak
customary method to resolve problems.

4.4.2. Problem Solving Methods of the Dayak: Custom and Customary Laws
The Dayaks have indigenous customs (adat) and customary laws (hukum adat)
to solve troubles and crimes in the community. A respected chief of the Dayak
Customary Council (DAD) in Singkawang explained the importance of Dayak
customs for the resolution of conflicts: ―For the Dayak people, when this customary
ritual is performed for resolution of the conflict or a problem, it ends everything, from
the heart.‖

161
The Dayak custom and customary laws have been applied to various types of
trouble and problems in the Dayak villages, ranging from petty crimes of robbery or
fights to serious cases of murder or rape, traffic accidents, or land disputes. A person
called the kepala adat, temenggung or demong, a respected senior Dayak member,
often a village or hamlet head, plays the role of judge in enforcement of the customs
and customary laws, in addition to holding cultural events and ceremonies. The Dayak
customs were more respected than the formal legal system in the Dayak community,
and these conflicts and disputes were settled by imposing sanctions and holding a
customary ceremony according to the rules of the adat and hukum adat. A Dayak
interviewee said, ―The Dayak community is the most docile and obedient to the
customs for any problems.‖
For settlement of a case, there was a choice between the Dayak customs and
the formal processes, i.e., the customary ceremony with fines or going to the police.
The Dayak custom was to supplement the national laws and the Dayak‘s problem
solving method was acknowledged by the government and police. Correspondingly,
the police usually did not interfere with community life and sometimes had difficulty
in gaining access to the location of a particular case in time, in order to intervene
effectively. Only with serious crimes like murder or when the groups involved could
not come to a consensus using customary settlement methods, did the police get
involved. A choice of the method used to settle the dispute sometimes depended on the
wrongdoer and victim or the location of the crime. In general, the method was decided

162
by the side of victims. If a Dayak caused a problem to someone from other ethnic
groups, the national laws, not the customary law, were applied to the case.
The advantages of the Dayak customary laws over the police or court were
emphasized by the Dayaks. Because of the time and uncertainty involved in going
through the bureaucratic process, and the potential risks of going to jail or to losing a
job, adjudication using the Dayak customs was the preferred method of settlement.
Moreover people tended to think that involvement of the police and the formal legal
process were troublesome due to weak law enforcement and corruption. Because of a
lack of trust in the police, people avoided the formal process. Dayaks expected that the
Dayak customs and traditions should be respected and given a priority as the problem
solving method utilized in their territory.
However, the application of the Dayak customary laws occasionally caused
problems for other ethnic groups, especially Muslims and new migrants to
Kalimantan. This was because the Dayak customs sometimes required the offering of
pigs or dogs for their ceremony. New migrants to Kalimantan were not aware of the
Dayak traditions and customs. The Dayak customary laws were occasionally misused
to acquire money. Sometimes the Dayaks forced the police to accept the customary
laws. After the reformasi started, the community‘s request to enforce the local
customs intensified, causing a serious problem (Li 2001; Henley and Davidson 2008).
This issue is discussed in conjunction with the rise of indigenous awareness in later
chapters.

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The following section discusses why informal problem solving methods failed
or succeeded in attempting to prevent ethnic violence. A case of Sambas is analyzed to
identify problems and obstacles that hindered informal problem solving processes
from working. Secondly, a case of Ketapang is examined to illuminate how informal
problem solving processes work and yield success.

4.5. Informal Conflict Prevention: Success and Failure
4.5.1. Case of Sambas: Why Did Informal Problem Solving Fail?
Given the dynamics of Indonesian culture, an informal problem solving
approach has often proven to be effective in the community. However, such informal
approaches failed when utilized between ethnic groups in Sambas. The two issues that
may have led to the failure could be identified as the distance between the grassroots
community and leaders and the failure of leadership skills.
Problems arose when people at the grassroots level did not always agree with
the decisions of the leaders or they were resistant to change their own views of an
incident. A role and responsibility of community leaders were important to make
informal problem solving methods work by explaining and providing a better
understanding of the nature of incidents in the community. However, the trust in
leaders declined over time, and leaders lost the capacity to guide the community.
Often, in spite of the leader‘s advice, people acted based on their own decisions and
inclinations. A Malay district council member explained it as a ―crisis of informal
leadership.‖

164
In particular, Malay informants often blamed the incompetence of Madurese
leaders in the settlement of the problem, which led to its recurrence, in spite of the
agreement among leaders or reconciliations reached or even the termination of
violence. An interviewee explained, ―Madurese said OK in a meeting, but they could
not act . . . . Their words and deeds were not same. What they said was nice, but their
action was not good.‖
In the Madurese community, religious leaders, especially Islamic scholars
called kiai, are highly respected and have significant influence. A Madurese
interviewee said, ―Madurese are obedient to leaders such as kiai or ulama. If they are
told ―not to do,‖ indeed they don‘t do anything.‖ However, these scholars usually did
not live in West Kalimantan, but were invited from Java or Madura after a violent
incident occurred. An informant explained that the Madurese lacked a commitment to
peace because ―after kiai left, their attitudes changed and the previous behaviors were
returned.‖ Besides kiai, senior or wealthy Madurese were considered leaders in the
Madurese community, regardless of their education. A Dayak interviewee recalled a
Madurese leader in Sanggau Ledo who had not even finished primary school, but was
nevertheless respected in the community because of his wealth.
Moreover, the Madurese community was relatively fragmented because of
their original clan or affiliations from Madura Island. Because of these divisions, no
leaders had significant influence over the entire Madurese community, unlike the
Dayak. A Malay interviewee explained that ―leaders in this village were not

165
recognized in that village‖ and ―group A was obedient only to kiai A, group B to kiai
B. So if something happens in group A, group B does not know this.‖ Thus, a problem
was likely to remain unsolved through deliberation of leaders.
From the discussion above, therefore, it can be surmised that the ethnic
leaders‘ capacity to influence their own community was critical to making the
informal problem solving process work. Additionally, because of the divisions
between ethnic leaders and communities and the limited capacity of ethnic leaders, the
people at the grassroots level sometimes ignored or did not fully comprehend the
reconciliation efforts at the leadership level. At other times, incidents would happen or
escalate too fast to ask the leaders for help, and by the time the leaders or security
forces came, people had already taken justice into their own hands.

4.5.2. Case of Ketapang: Informal Problem Solving is Working
Ketapang came to be known as a peaceful district, but that did not mean there
were no ethnic problems. There were incidents of injury, fighting, or rape involving
different ethnic groups that could trigger an incident of large-scale ethnic violence just
like those that occurred in Sambas. However, small incidents which could trigger
ethnic conflict were solved through informal problem solving processes in place in
Ketapang.
When I visited the chairman of DAD Ketapang in March 2006, a Dayak leader
was about to be sent off to the police with a senior Madurese to settle an issue that had

166
arisen between the Dayak and Madurese in Tumbang Titi. In this case, both sides had
already agreed to solve the problem in accordance with the Dayak customs. Shortly
thereafter, a senior Madurese appeared, and they were preparing to leave for the office
of the district police to ask them not to apply the national laws, as the conflict had
already been resolved. The head of DAD explained that ―he [a person who caused the
trouble] is taken care of by the Dayak and Madurese leaders. We will ask the police
that the problem is settled by the customary laws of Dayak and Madurese.‖
A youth fight was a typical incident that often expanded to violence between
groups. There was a case of youth quarrels between the Madurese and Malay at a
soccer game in the Sukadana sub-district in 2003. A Malay youth working as security
at the game was hit by a Madurese. The chairman of the Madurese organization,
IKMK, was summoned and had a meeting with the other groups in Ketapang town.
Later the representatives from IKMK were sent to Sukadana to settle the problem. The
district police and the government also called other ethnic leaders from the Chinese,
Dayaks, Buginese, and Batak as witnesses. This incident between the Malay and
Madurese was settled with involvement of the police due to the moderate expansion of
the incident. A Malay in Sukadana stressed the importance of the two processes, the
respect of the law as well as the informal process, at the same time. Therefore, in
general, problems between ethnic groups were solved through informal processes
mediated by ethnic leaders and, as needed, through the formal processes of the police
system.

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4.5.3. Conflict and Peaceful Districts: What Makes a Difference in Informal
Problem Solving?
Informal problem solving processes effectively resolved problems and issues
among ethnic groups in Ketapang. However such processes did not always produce
satisfactory results in Sambas. The analysis above showed that in Sambas, though
ethnic leaders made some concerted efforts to address problems and agreed on
settlements, what hindered their effectiveness was their lack of leadership skills, and
that the people involved questioned the legitimacy of ethnic leaders. On the other
hand, the legitimacy of ethnic leaders and their capacity to resolve problems was not
an issue in Ketapang. What caused this perceptual difference in the two districts?
For one, in Ketapang, ethnic leaders were not informal leaders. Ethnic groups
in Ketapang formed ethnic organizations, and leaders from these groups were
recognized as legitimate representatives of these ethnic organizations. A Dayak senior
of DAD explained.
In Ketapang, this is because there is a unity between ethnic chairmen.
So there is among Malays, the Malay Custom and Cultural Council.
Among Madurese there is a group named IKMK, the Association of
Madurese Family in Ketapang, yes. In Dayaks, there is [one] called the
Dayak Customary Council. Then in Buginese, there is an association of
Buginese. For Javanese, there is a Javanese association. Then there is
for Manado, there is also an association of Manado. For Batak, it‘s . . . .
Ah, so that‘s what helps ethnic groups in dispute so they are helping if
there is… for example, like Sambas, something happened . . . . So we
are here chaired by the Dayak Customary Council. The Dayak
Customary Council calls chairmen of ethnicities existing in Ketapang.
If any problem appeared between two groups, leaders of the two ethnic
organizations discussed the issue together. Because of the existence of the ethnic

168
organizations, not only was the leadership of those organizations indisputable, but also
the capacity to reach out to the community was strengthened by those organizational
structures. Additionally, there existed an inter-ethnic communication forum
connecting ethnic organizations that was facilitated by the government. A
representative of the Chinese organization contended.
Because there is a forum between ethnicities, ranging from Chinese,
Madurese, Dayak, Malay, and to Sudanese, Javanese . . . . So, if there
something happens, small frictions among these ethnicities, this forum
is called for a meeting, which is facilitated by local government. Later
they discuss together. So with this forum, it is functioning very well
which can reduce the problems, upheavals that would arise in the
community.
Therefore, the operation of informal problem solving process in Ketapang was
based on the strong foundations of ethnic organizations, the inter-ethnic
communication forum, and support from the government. On the other hand, in
Sambas, ethnic organizations were rather dysfunctional, or instigating violence against
the other group. The next chapter discusses how ethnic organizations, the inter-ethnic
communication forum, and the government either facilitated or agitated conflict
prevention among ethnic groups in Sambas and Ketapang.

169
CHAPTER 5
ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENT AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION
The contexts of the two districts discussed in the previous chapter illuminated
the differences in ethnic relationships and the efficacy of traditional approaches to
problem solving and conflict prevention in Ketapang and Sambas. The case of the
peaceful conditions that prevailed in Ketapang indicated that there the problem solving
mechanisms of traditional approaches had been reinforced by the existence of ethnic
organizations. However, ethnic organizations existed in Sambas before the ethnic
clashes as well.
This chapter discusses how the specific characteristics of the ethnic
organizations in each district have influenced ethnic relationships, to enable peace or
to engender conflict. In addition, this chapter also explores the role of the local
government in peace building and conflict prevention.

5.1. Ethnic Organizations, Government, and Conflict Prevention: Peaceful
Case of Ketapang
5.1.1. Ethnic Organizations in Ketapang
Most ethnic groups in Ketapang founded ethnic organizations. There were
eleven registered ethnic organizations in the district: Dayak, Malays, Madurese,
Chinese, Javanese, South Sulawesi, Minang in West Sumatra, Sundanese from West
Java, Flores from East Nusa Tenggara, Banjar from South Kalimantan, and Batak

170
from North Sumatra. This section discusses the background and characteristics of the
major ethnic organizations in Ketapang, namely, ethnic organizations belonging to the
Dayak, Malay, Chinese, and Javanese.

(1) History of Dayak Customary Council (Dewan Adat Dayak, DAD)
Development of DAD in West Kalimantan
Dayaks founded the original ethnic organization in West Kalimantan. The first Dayak
Customary Council (Dewan Adat or DAD) was formally established in 1985
(Davidson 2008). DAD was a hierarchical organization from the provincial level to
district, sub-district, small areas called, benua, down to the village level. The
provincial level organization was called the Dayak Customary Association‖ (Majelis
Adat Dayak, MAD). After the reformasi, the national level of the customary council
was also established. In spite of a large number of sub-ethnic groups within the Dayak
community, DAD entailed all sub-ethnicities of Dayaks. Leaders of DAD were chosen
through discussion or election. The Dayaks explained the preservation of customs and
traditions as the primary objective of DAD. However, according to Dayak
interviewees, DAD was also created because of the government‘s own political
interests, i.e., as a way of supporting the government party, Golkar, (Davidson 2008).
Even before the foundation of DAD, the Dayak community had a customary
council for a few hundred years. This institution called ketemenggungan was led by a
leader called temanggung. Instead of kings or rulers, the Dayak society was governed

171
by a leader to enforce customs, (ketua adat), high-ranking officers (temenggung), and
a commander of war (panglima).
DAD significantly contributed to Dayak society in two important ways:
enhancing solidarity and developing the Dayak community. A Dayak interviewee
explained that with the establishment of DAD, Dayaks succeeded in developing
Dayak solidarity across various sub-ethnic groups. At the same time, DAD supported
marginalized Dayak communities in the interior regions by connecting those
communities with the government and requesting development projects or funds.
Thus, DAD played a critical role in empowering the Dayak community, though the
resulting politicization of the DAD was pointed out as a negative consequence.

DAD Ketapang
Another branch of DAD was established in Ketapang, following the foundation of the
first DAD in Pontianak in 1985 (Davidson 2008). The Dayak interviewees cited
different years, from 1986 to 1994, as the year they believed was the establishment of
DAD Ketapang. DAD Ketapang had a distinct history of development from the DADs
in the other districts.
DAD Ketapang had its political roots in the regional political party, Partai
Persatuan Daya (Dayak Unity Party, PD). Although the PD was banned in 1959 along
with other regional parties, political aspiration among the Dayaks remained active
(Davidson 2008). The DAD aimed to contribute to the solidarity of the Dayaks and to

172
coordinate with the government and other ethnic groups. However, according to a
Dayak, former Golkar members and other interviewees, including John Bamba of
IDRD, DAD was actually formed by the government as a tool to control the Dayak
population, a majority of whom lived in the hinterlands where the government
apparatus could not effectively reach them. Therefore, it was contended that DAD did
not really represent the Dayak community.
Before the foundation of DAD Ketapang, there were local Dayak associations
in Ketapang. The Good Work Foundation (Yayasan Usaha Baik, USABA) was
formed by a Catholic missionary group in 1958 to build schools in the interior region
of Ketapang. USABA contributed to the education and modernization of the Dayaks.
Nevertheless, the local Dayak elites, P.E. Denggol, a former district head of Ketapang,
Somprong and other politicians felt that the sole efforts of USABA were insufficient
to develop the Dayak community and established a new organization, the Upstream
Foundation (Yayasan Hulu Sungai, YHS) in 1982 to improve the social and economic
situation of the Dayaks. To support education of Dayak youth, YHS built a
guesthouse, Wisma Hulu Sungai, in Ketapang town with donations from Dayaks and
accepted students from remote villages. The founders of YHS were former members
of PD
25
, and YHS and Wisma were built on the land owned by PD Ketapang.
26
Later

25
PD Ketapang: P. E. Denggol, Amat Segura, Somprong, Denatus Parong, Y. Alim Mantara
26
Each Dayak household donated 2.5 rupiah to PD which bought two hectares of land in Ketapang
town in the 1950s.

173
DAD Ketapang
27
was evolved from YHS. This guesthouse still exists to this day,
presently used for customary meetings. The building was reconstructed with donations
from the Dayak community and 150 million rupiah of government support.
DAD Ketapang involved itself with issues and problems concerning the
Dayaks. The DAD coordinated with leaders of other ethnic groups and acted as a
bridge between the government and the Dayak community. DAD Ketapang consisted
of the departments of public affairs, custom and culture, and economy. The
department of public affairs was in charge of coordination and communication with
the government, because the government was less likely to be involved with the
customs of the local community. There were DAD branches in sub-districts and the
traditional customary institutions in villages.
When a problem arose, DAD Ketapang played the role of facilitator to seek a
solution. As such a facilitator, the DAD promoted coordination with other ethnic
groups and the government, and disseminated information or their perspectives at the
grassroots level to prevent conflict. A Dayak senior evaluated DAD‘s contribution to
the Dayak community, by describing the situation before the foundation of DAD as
follows: ―Dayaks were there, but not there.‖ Without DAD, it was difficult to deliver
the voice of the Dayak people to the government. Besides DAD Ketapang, there were
three Dayak organizations including two youth organizations and one cultural
organization in Ketapang.

27
DAD Ketapang: Pst. Z. Lintas, David Sabantalandingun, SB, Anastasius Bantang, Jr. Saykun Riadi,
Saleh Albinus and Philipus Kaleh

174
Therefore, the Dayak organization, DAD Ketapang, which had a distinct
history, empowered the Dayak community. The DAD facilitated and coordinated
problem solving in the Dayak community and between the Dayak and other ethnic
groups, same as the DADs in other districts.
28

(2) Malay Ethnic Organizations: MABM and RMAB
In Ketapang, there were three Malay organizations: Malay Cultural and
Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu, MABM), Communication Forum
of Malay Youth (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, FKPM), and Family of
Grassroots Communities (Rumpun Masyarakat Arus Bawah, RMAB). MABM and
FKPM were district branches of province-wide organizations while RMAB was a
local organization in Ketapang. In addition, there was IKRAMAT, an organization of
decedents of the former kingdom. Here two major Malay organizations, MABM and
RMAB, are discussed.

Malay Cultural and Customary Council (MABM)
MABM Ketapang was a district-level organization of MABM. According to
interviews, MABM Ketapang was established in 1996; however, there was a Malay

28
However, DAD was often criticized within the Dayak community. Edi Petebang wrote in
Kalimantan Revie, a magazine published by IDRD that Raja Huku Aiq rejected DAD Ketapang,
since it did not represent the Dayak community (Kalimantan Review No. 40, December 1998).
Also John Bamba criticized DAD for the elites‘ political intensions and the government influence
(Bamba 2002).

175
organization called MASBAYU or Malay Cultural Community (Masyarakat Budaya
Melayu). MABM aimed to protect and promote Malay customs and culture. The
chairman of MABM Ketapang was the district head of Ketapang, Morkes Effendi.
Under his leadership, Ketapang held an annual event, ―Malay Cultural Festival‖
(Festibal Budaya Melayu) in February 2006, and the MABM expanded to have
branches in sub-districts and certain villages. Compared with other organization,
MABM Ketapang was active and financially well off, due to the district head‘s
leadership and the Malay‘s majority status in the district.
If there was a problem in the community, the MABM discussed the issue with
the board members of MABM and other ethnic leaders, and worked with the police if
necessary. The district head immediately took action for serious cases. According to
the district head, MABM Ketapang was an umbrella organization not only for Malays
but also everyone in Ketapang.
The fact that the district head of Ketapang concurrently held the chairmanship
of MABM Ketapang raised questions among certain ethnic groups. The Malay side
countered such suspicious by emphasizing his fair and equal attitudes towards all
ethnic groups, particularly citing the district head‘s fairness, yet others expressed their
concerns and discomfort with the district head‘s position as the chairman of the
MABM because ―the district head is a public figure.‖ The expansion of MABM
branches to the interior region, primarily to the Dayak‘s settlement, was similarly
questioned.

176
The interviewees anticipated the political implications of the presence of
MABM Ketapang because ethnicity was already a controversial issue during the last
district head election. During the last election campaign, a letter asking voters not to
choose a non-Malay candidate, undersigned with the signature of the district head, had
been disseminated by the MABM, yet the Ketapang community was well aware of this
ethnic risk and watched out for the activities of the MABM. A Madurese senior said,
―If he has a position and used it for favor of his own ethnic group while [he] sets aside
the other ethnic groups, certainly we deliver our aspiration in a democratic way. We
definitely monitor a problem like this.‖

Family of Grassroots Communities (Rumpun Masyarakat Arus Bawah, RMAB)
The Family of Grassroots Communities or RMAB was not truly a Malay ethnic
organization, but more likely a non-government organization. The organization used
to have the name of Family of Grassroots Malays (Rumpun Melayu Arus Bawah) but
changed it to the current name, Rumpun Masyarakat Arus Bawah, by replacing
―Melayu‖ or ―Malay‖ with ―masyarakat‖ or ―community.‖ This revision of the name
came as a result of the request from the other ethnic groups, which wanted RMAB to
transform themselves into a forum for all ethnic groups, not just the Malay. The
chairman of RMAB explained the risk of further ethnic compartmentation that may be
the indirect result of ethnic organizations as ―All ethnicities here were already
categorized. Before, we were aware if the situation like this will divide ethic groups.

177
This is not allowed.‖ He underlined the importance of Indonesian solidarity expressed
in the national slogan of Unity of Diversity and the Youth Pledge.
29

The chairman of RMAB, Saharan Nur, was a respected Malay figure in
Ketapang and used to be a leader of the Malay organization MASUBAYU. Although
he had been a department head of the district government, he was demoted due to a
political conflict with the district head and the chairman of MABM Ketapang, Morkes
Effendi. A Chinese interviewee noticed the division in the Malay community between
the MABM and RMAB, and he expressed the difference metaphorically as that
between the ―upstream and grassroots.‖
In short, there were two major Malay organizations: one was an ethnic
organization and the other was transformed into a multi-ethnic organization. Though
there existed a conflict between the two organizations and there was criticism against
the district head leading MABM Ketapang, the two organizations aimed to address
problems and issues in community.

(3) Madurese Family Association Ketapang (Ikatan Madura Keluarga
Ketapang, IKMK)
Madurese Family Association Ketapang (Ikatan Madura Keluarga Ketapang,
IKMK) was established in 1997 at the time of the clashes between the Dayak and
Madurese. However, IKMK was not active before the ethnic violence Sambas in 1999.

29
The Youths Pledge in 1928 read as follows: One Homeland of Indonesia, One Nation of the
Indonesian Nation, and One Language of Bahasa Indonesia.

178
It currently had sub-district branches and organized cultural and social events in the
district.
The objectives of IKMK were to raise awareness and to develop a Madurese
community in Ketapang. The chairman of IKMK explained that IKMK helped to solve
problems and to prevent fights or conflicts in the community by providing instruction
or advice for business, such as on traffic rules, for example. This is partly because the
education level of the Madurese was relatively low and a majority of the first
generation Madurese in Ketapang never went to school.
30
IKMK made an effort to
address issues with other groups before those issues expand, in cooperation with other
ethnic leaders and the government. For example, a Chinese senior called the chairman
of IKMK to prevent possible trouble when he met an angry Madurese retailer in a
market. Thus, a Madurese interviewee said that ―[w]e‘re here. Other ethnic groups tell
our organization [about what is going on]. So here is something unpleasant. So let's
get together to have a meeting with the government.‖
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the behaviors of new migrants from
Madura were often criticized by the local residents. The most critical issue was their
habit of carrying sharp weapons on their person. To prevent potential trouble between
the new migrants and local community, IKMK provided guidance to the newcomers

30
According to my household survey data, 48% of Madurese respondents did not complete primary
school and Madurese with education of primary school or less accounted for 70%. On the other
hand, only 19% of Dayak and 23% of Malay respondents did not complete the primary education.
Those with education of the primariy school degree or less account for 33% of Dayak and 46% of
Malay respondents.

179
and rejected their migrant status if the migrants were not willing to accept their advice.
The ex-chairman of IKMK contended:
[I]f he does not want to accept my advice, I send him back to Madura.
So rather than we all suffer because of him, yes he better leave . . . . Do
not make [Ketapang] like the other people‘s areas, I do not want.
He insisted that he had the right do to so as a recognized leader. The other ethnic
groups also cooperated with IKMK for assimilation of the newcomers by watching out
for their behaviors.
Madurese leaders were committed to promoting ―socialization‖ or adjustment
to the culture and traditions in Ketapang. During the time of the ethnic violence in
Sambas and in Sampit of Central Kalimantan, the Madurese in Ketapang rejected the
relocation plan of moving Madurese refugees to Ketapang, in anticipation of
disturbing the ethnic peace in Ketapang. Ethnic leaders together guarded the border
with Central Kalimantan to prevent the expansion of violence to Ketapang.
Similar to DAD and MABM, the Madurese association was hierarchically
arranged from the provincial level to district and sub-district levels. However, most
Madurese interviewees denied a connection between IKMK and the Madurese
association in Pontianak, Ikatan Keluarga Madura or IKBM represented by Sulaiman.
A Madurese senior criticized him for embezzling funds intended for the government
assistance programs for displaced Madurese. IKMK declined the invitation to be a
district branch of IKBM. A young Madurese emphasized the independence of the
Madurese Ketapang community and IKMK because ―[w]e are afraid if later some

180
issues from the outside are brought to us.‖ Only when there was need for coordination,
for example, an ethnic riot, did IKMK coordinate with Madurese organizations outside
of Ketapang. Thus, the Madurese in Ketapang were aware of the risks of ethnic
violence between the Madurese and other groups. IKMK exerted their efforts on
various fronts to suppress problems with other ethnic groups, in particular problems
that arose as a result of the behaviors of new Madurese migrants.

(4) Chinese Associations: MABT, FORMAT and Yayasan
Because the Chinese are one of the oldest migrants in Indonesia and already
indigenized, the Chinese are considered one ethnic group called Tionghua. There were
several Chinese social foundations called yayasan since the 1960s, such as Yayasan
Dharma Bahkti or Yayasan Tri Dharma. These organizations were formed by religious
groups comprised of Catholics, Buddhists, Confucians, and sub-ethnic groups of
Teochew, Hakka or Hokklo, or clans, and they provided social services such as
helping patients, the poor, or people needing funeral services. Due to the political
oppression of the Chinese during the New Order, these organizations focused on social
services only. The Chinese had never established a consolidated Chinese ethnic
organization before reformasi. After reformasi and the development of ethnic
organizations, the Ketapang Chinese organized the Forum of Chinese Community
(Forum Masyarakat Tionghoa, FORMAT) in 2001 and a district branch of the Chinese
Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya Tionghoa, MABT) in 2006.

181
The Chinese in Ketapang were relatively divided by religion, sub-ethnicity, or
the level of assimilation and history. There was social distance between the Chinese
and other ethnic groups, due to their limited interactions and the disparity in economic
status. The connections with the government or other ethnic groups were more likely
based on the personal relationships of the leaders. Thus, the two Chinese organizations
intended to build solidarity within the Chinese and improve relationships with the
government and other ethnic groups.
The objectives of FORMAT included promoting communication, resolving
problems in the Chinese community, and delivering Chinese interests. The
organization was asked by the district head for help at the time of the incident between
the Malay and Madurese in Sukadana. On the other hand, MABT focused on matters
of culture and custom. MABT Ketapang aimed to integrate the Chinese social
organizations of yayasan by involving representatives of each organization. In
addition, there was a plan to absorb FORMAT into MABT, though the plan was not
confirmed by FORMAT.

(5) Javanese Ethnic Organizations
The Javanese were the third largest ethnic group in Ketapang after the Malay
and the Dayak. The Javanese organization was called paguyuban, which meant
“association‖ in Javanese. The Javanese migrated across the county often as
government employees and teachers or through government sponsored transmigration

182
programs as well.
31
The Javanese organization, paguyuban, was organized to integrate
small Javanese groups divided by the origin of region, after the experiences of ethnic
violence there.
32

The paguyuban bridged not only across small Javanese groups but also
between the Javanese community, the government, and other ethnic organizations. The
paguyuban was officially registered as a Javanese organization at the government
level, so that the government contacted it for various purposes. The paguyuban invited
the other ethnic groups and government officials to cultural events such as the
Javanese New Year celebration called syuro, as a way of maintaining communication,
as well as information sharing about the government‘s policies and community issues.
These interactions were important for cooperation and friendship building among
ethnicities.
The sub-district level local Javanese paguyubans were organized in the region
of transmigration. In addition to organizing social activities, including rotating credit
(arisan) and cultural celebrations, the paguyuban also helped to solve problems
between the migrants and the local residents. The new migrants occasionally had
trouble with the local community due to the unfamiliarity of the local customs and
culture. However, Christian Javanese were well assimilated within the Dayak
community due to their religious connection. A leader of the paguyuban in Tumbang

31
In the inland sub-districts of Ketapang, large-scale transmigration sites were developed for oil palm
plantations in the 1990s.
32
According to the former chairman of Javanese pagyubang, pagyubang was organized in 1997 while
the current chairman said the establishment after ethnic violence in Sambas 1999.

183
Titi was once involved in the settlement of a clash between the Dayak and Madurese
there.
The other migrant groups, such as the Banjar and the Batak, had already
organized their associations in the 1980s. Similar to the Javanese, these organizations
also held cultural and social activities and invited the government and other ethnic
groups to participate.

5.1.2. Ethnic Organizations and Conflict Prevention in Ketapang
In Ketapang, major ethnic organizations of the Dayak, Malay, Madurese, and
Javanese had been actively involved in ethnic issues since the late 1990s. Other ethnic
groups, such as the Chinese, Banjar, and Batak, newly established or restructured their
organizations after the reformasi. Most of these major organizations had structures
with established hierarchies from the district, up to the sub-district and village levels.
These ethnic organizations were officially registered at the government level and
received financial support from the district governments.
Ethnic organizations cooperated to address problems among ethnic groups. In
particular, three ethnic organizations in the district, DAD, IKMK, and MABM played
important roles in problem solving. DAD Ketapang, the oldest and one of the most
structured ethnic organizations, made efforts to solve ethnic problems with the
Madurese ethnic leaders in accordance with Dayak customs. Madurese leaders from
the Madurese organization, IKMK, not only promptly acted along with the Dayak

184
leaders towards finding a solution for the problem, but also took necessary measures,
such as disseminating information or organizing meetings in their community, to
prevent further trouble with the Dayak and other ethnic groups. IKMK‘s proactive
attitudes and preventive activities appeared to have paid off in terms of maintaining
ethnic peace in Ketapang. MABM Ketapang acted as an agent of the district head to
address inter-ethnic problems. The position of the Malay as the majority group in the
district strengthened the presence of the organization. The personal connections
between the IKMK leaders and the district head cemented relationships between the
IKMK, and MABM and the Malay community.
Besides the three major ethnic organizations, other ethnic organizations
participated in the problem solving processes. When conflicts emerged between ethnic
groups, the organizations of the ethnic groups not related to the conflict audited
problem solving processes from a neutral position in order to enable a solution.
Hence, ethnic peace was maintained by coordinated preventive activities of the
key ethnic organizations and the cooperation of other smaller ethnic organizations.
This cooperation of ethnic organizations was built on informal interactions and
communication among ethnic leaders and between these leaders and the government
through mutual attendance of cultural events or ceremonies.

185
5.1.3. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum, Ethnic Organizations and Conflict
Prevention
In Ketapang, ethnic cooperation was consolidated by an inter-ethnic
communication forum and government facilitation. An inter-ethnic communication
forum in Ketapang also contributed to settling incidents between ethnic groups and
maintaining ethnic peace. The inter-ethnic communication forum was a place where
leaders of ethnic organizations gathered, discussed community problems, and
attempted to build a consensus. The forum was organized in 1999 after the ethnic
violence in Sambas, involving the three major ethnic groups, the Dayak, Malay, and
Chinese, and currently consisted of eleven ethnicities. The district government of
Ketapang facilitated meetings with necessary parties, with the involvement of the
police or the military when necessary.
This inter-ethnic communication forum was ―a coordinating institution
(wadah)‖ among ethnic leaders. The forum aimed at cooperation among ethnic groups
and with the government to address inter-ethnic issues, in anticipation of ethnic riots.
If problems appeared between ethnic groups or when a clash or riot was anticipated,
for example at the time of an election, a meeting was organized to discuss the relevant
issues. Later ethnic leaders delivered information and messages to their community to
calm them down, in an effort to prevent conflict. A Dayak leader pointed out the
efficiency of this mechanism, i.e., that each ethnic leader took care of his own group.
The local government facilitated the forum, and the security forces of the
police and the military were occasionally invited to meetings. The government closely

186
worked with the ethnic leaders and maintained communication with each ethnic group
through the forum. The chairman of IKMK emphasized the role of the government in
relationship building among ethnic groups:
We try to instill a sense of pluralism, with the meetings of the inter-
ethnic forum. We have meetings in the forum with all ethnic groups.
Usually the government facilitated it…[s]o relationships among
community leaders from ethnic groups are good. For example, in the
case there is a kind of problem, a gap between Madurese and Dayak, all
ethnic groups in Ketapang are involved with facilitation of the local
government . . . . It is impossible at all, if leaders only [are involved],
but no support from the government.
In fact the antecedent of the inter-ethnic communication forum was developed
in the late 1990s before the ethnic riot by an initiative of Sunardi Basnu, the district
head of Ketapang from 1993 to 1998. Around 1995, a forum, Badan Seni dan Budaya
Antar Ethnis (Inter-ethnic Group of Art and Culture),
33
was organized involving three
ethnic groups consisting of the Malay, Dayak, and Chinese, and expanded to include
other groups such as the Madurese, Javanese, Batak, Buginese, Minang, Padang, and
others. The forum held monthly meetings to discuss problems in the community and
sometimes the military and the police also attended these forums. Nevertheless, the
forum gradually became less active and ineffective to coordinate ethnic groups due to
political issues. Saharan Nur‘s organization, RMAB, was occasionally perceived as a
successor organization to the original forum.

33
A Buginese interviewee called it in different name, Forum Adat Istiadat Masyarakat Ketapang
(Forum of Custom and Tradition of Ketapang Communities).

187
Hence, the mechanism of conflict prevention in Ketapang consisted of ethnic
organizations and the inter-ethnic communication forum. There had been an inter-
ethnic forum, which served as a place of discussion and coordination among ethnic
leaders to resolve ethnic issues, before the ethnic violence in 1997 and 1999. Through
the forum, pluralism and tolerance to different cultures and ethnic traditions grew in
Ketapang. The local government‘s involvement was essential to develop this
mechanism and to make it work, though there had been criticism against the forum as
well due to its orientation to elites and a lack of involvement at the grassroots level.
The following section analyzes how the local government has contributed to conflict
prevention in Ketapang.

5.2. Peaceful District Ketapang: Government and Conflict Prevention
The peace building mechanism in Ketapang was composed of ethnic
organizations, inter-ethnic communication forum, and the government. The local
government, the police and the military paid close attention to the ongoing dynamic of
ethnic relationships by holding regular meetings with the ethnic organizations. The
government promoted not only the cooperation of ethnic organizations for problem
solving through the inter-ethnic communication forum but also for the cultural
activities of ethnic organizations. Therefore, this section analyzes the involvement and
contributions of government in conflict prevention.

188
5.2.1. Law Enforcement and Cooperation
The state of the police force in Ketapang was not far different from the
situation in Sambas. There had been a shortage of security personnel in Ketapang. The
total police personnel of the district were approximately 800 and the police-population
ratio was one per 600. The sub-district police stations only had 15 to 20 personnel, in
spite of the appropriate, established standard of 25 to 35 personnel. In the remote
mountainous regions such as in the Sandai sub-district, police stations did not even
exist in most villages, though a Dayak villager commented that there was a police
station, with personnel, in Sandai, during the New Order. In Ketapang, law
enforcement was an issue as well. The vice chief of the district police admitted
corruption among police officers, due to a lack of education among them and their low
salaries. In particular, enforcement of laws and justice at the grassroots levels was
always questioned by the residents.
Nevertheless, the security forces, especially in Ketapang, had been relatively
effective in taking prompt action when needed, compared to the police in Sambas. The
security of public spaces, such as a traffic terminal where small clashes or fights
would often happen, were well maintained. In spite of the limited personnel, police
officers were present at major traffic sections. When a traffic accident happened or
someone violated the law, the police quickly handled the case. As mentioned before,
the police also carried out their work of inspecting for sharp weapons such as knives
or sickles in markets or other public spaces to prevent fights or riots. Community

189
leaders regularly informed the police if they suspected any problem in their
community and police conducted inspections or raids based on that information. Thus,
the police in Ketapang could take preventive action in anticipation of potential
problems, and they were perceived as effective and disciplined.
During the New Order, the police were an entity to fear for ordinary citizens;
however after the reformasi, communication and cooperation started between the
police and the community. In order to make up for the deficiency of personnel, the
police coordinate with the community and civil society to maintain public order and
safety. The police, military and the local government coordinated within government
agencies when a problem appeared and the government facilitated cooperation with
the community. A Madurese interviewee stated that the respect for the rule of law and
cooperation between the government and community were the beauty of Ketapang.
Another interviewee commented, ―In the meantime, the police still act professionally.
Hopefully [this] will continue in Ketapang. They always support what we aim at in our
aspirations to achieve peace.‖

5.2.2. Ketapang Government and Conflict Prevention
The government in Ketapang, i.e., the district government, police, and military,
contributed to maintain the peace in Ketapang. In particular, the district government
took proactive measures to prevent ethnic problems. The district government

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participated in Tolak Bala ceremonies and financially supported events and activities
of the various ethnic organizations.
The district head was actively involved in the community. Problems in the
district were directly reported to him in order to take action to address them,
sometimes through MABM Ketapang as previously discussed. For instance, when
problems appeared between the Dayak and the Madurese in Tayap, very quickly the
district head visited the trouble spot and settled the problem without delay. Thus, an
interviewee commented, ―In Ketapang, government is good enough to directly handle
a problem.‖
The government facilitated communication among and within ethnic
organizations through various meetings. The government and ethnic leaders hold
monthly breakfast meetings, called the ―morning coffee meeting.‖ The district
government, the chief district police, and the district military commander organized
the meetings by rotation to share information regardless of the existence of a problem,
which constituted the regular meeting of the local consultative council (Musyawarah
Pimpinan Daerah, Muspida). As discussed, the inter-ethnic communication forum was
originally initiated and facilitated by the government. As the morning coffee meetings,
major government institutions in Ketapang, including the police, the military,
executives, local council members, and judiciaries, attended the forum. The
Kesbanglinmas of Ketapang was in charge of communication with the ethnic
organizations, the community as well as the inter-ethnic communication forum.

191
Through these meetings and the forum, information regarding ethnic problems was
shared with the government. Then the government and the police, when necessary,
worked to solve issues with ethnic leaders in a coordinated manner.
The importance of coordination within ethnic organizations and between ethnic
organizations and the government was well recognized as a crucial factor in
maintaining ethnic peace by the community and the government. A department head
emphasized the need for preventive efforts because building peace and trust between
ethnic groups take time, yet such trust can be destroyed in a moment. The head of the
Kesbanglinmas also stressed the importance of tolerance in pluralistic society like
Indonesia.
The Indonesian nation consists of various ethnicities, various religions,
various races so yes, in other words, pluralistic society, complex. If
plurality is not well managed, that will be the potential for conflict, just
misunderstanding between culprits, or between individuals, but it can
bring into a group . . . . That is a very dangerous. So we are here always
to develop attitudes of tolerance in a pluralistic society. Attitudes of
tolerance must be built.
In fact, the Ketapang government itself had more ethnically diverse public officials
than did the Sambas government. There were Dayak government officials at the levels
of director and assistant secretary in Ketapang. P.E. Denggol, a Dayak government
official was promoted to be the district head of Ketapang after the sudden death of the
district head, M. Tohir in 1970.
A Dayak village head in Sandai explained that no one except the government
could prevent the Dayaks from sending a red bowl or mangkok merah to call for war.

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Moreover, the government understood that peace and security were required to invite
investors to the district and to promote economic development.
The government and community complemented each other by sharing
information and jointly solving problems. Together the government and the
community leaders issued statements and memoranda of understanding after meetings.
The community needed the government support and the government needed the
community‘s help as well. Either side could initiate action if they anticipated any
issues. The ethnic organizations were indeed there to compliment the limited capacity
of the government. A Javanese interviewee said,
The government supports ethnic organizations very much, because
indeed an objective of establishing ethnic organizations is to help
government . . . . Now imagine . . . [the police] they are not
adequate . . . . if everything has to be handled by the police only, they
are not competent. So social institutions, including ethnic organizations,
NGOs, and others, take responsibility in accordance with their own
tasks.
The business sector in Ketapang also cooperated with the government. When
there was a shortage of rice in Ketapang, the business community donated money to
buy it because as Chinese interviewee pointed out, the business community ―should be
concerned with the difficulty of the government‖ because ―Ketapang is owned by all
people, not a government alone.‖ However, the government was expected to protect
economic activities in return for help they may receive from the business sector.
Therefore, in Ketapang, there had been cooperation and close communication
between the government and the community, including ethnic organizations, since the

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New Order era up until now. This spirit of cooperation was described as ―the tradition
of Ketapang,‖ and had become the foundation of peace building in Ketapang.

5.3. Ethnic Organizations, Government and Conflict Prevention: Conflict
Case of Sambas
5.3.1. Ethnic Organizations in Sambas
In Ketapang, ethnic organizations cooperated to solve the conflicts that came
up between ethnic groups and prevented the expansion of an initial incident into
something larger. The inter-ethnic communication forum also functioned as a venue
for coordination and cooperation among ethnic organizations and with the
government, as discussed in the previous section. Ethnic organizations formed a
crucial part of the conflict prevention mechanism in the district.
In Sambas, two major ethnic organizations already existed, the Dayak
Customary Council and Communication Forum of Malay Youth at the time of the
Malay-Madurese ethnic violence in 1999. The other ethnic organizations were mostly
established sometime after the violence. The following section discusses how the
ethnic organizations affected ethnic relationships in Sambas.

(1) Dayak Customary Council (Dewan Adat Dayak, DAD): DAD and
Problem Solving
DAD Sambas was founded in the Sambas district in June 1986. Before the
division of the Sambas district, the chairperson of the DAD was located in the district
capital, Singkawang. At the sub-district level, for example, in the Sanggau Ledo sub-

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district, a DAD sub-district branch was organized in 1996 before the ethnic clash
between the Dayaks and the Madurese.
Same as in the other district, DAD Sambas played an important role towards
problem solving, conflict prevention, and peace building. In Bengkayang, if a problem
emerged, first the problem was reported to village level customary council. If not
solved there, it was transferred to the higher level of DAD, to the council at benua,
then to the sub-district level, and eventually to the DAD district level. Various cases
were reported to the DAD, including murders, fights, thefts, cases of adultery, etc.
If any person had a problem with the Dayak community, s/he could ask DAD
for help. A problem beyond its capacity was reported to the police. DAD mediates
between the community and the government. This function of DAD provided peace
and order in the Dayak villages, especially in remote areas where often no police force
existed, nor were any government institutions accessible.

(2) Malay Organizations: Communication Forum of Malay Youth (FKPM)
and Malay Cultural and Customary Council (MABM)
There were two Malay organizations in Sambas: Communication Forum of
Malay Youth (FKPM), later known as Union of Communication Forum of Malay
Youth (Persatuan Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, PFKPM) and the Malay
Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu, MABM). FKPM was
an independent organization in the district while, MABM was a province-wide

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organization and had been unknown to the Sambas community until the foundation of
a provincial organization after the reformasi.

Communication Forum of Malay Youth (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu,
FKPM or PFKPM)
Communication Forum of Malay Youth (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, FKPM)
was established in January 1999. The original name was changed into Union of
Communication Forum of Malay Youth (PFKPM) by adding ―Union (Persatuan)‖ to
it.
34
FKPM had branches in sub-districts and several villages in Sambas. It had
departments focusing on security, education, culture, economy, legal issues, and
others. Later independent FKPMs were founded in other districts, and a network
among the various organizations was created.
The objectives for the establishment of FKPM were to promote unity or create
―a sense of community‖ in the Malay community and to take actions to represent the
interests of the Malay. Before the foundation of FKPM, Malays had neither an
organization nor formal leaders in Sambas. Interviewees argued that because of this
undefined nature of leadership, the Malays could not take action when a problem
occurred, in particular when trouble arose with the Madurese, because the Malay
community was afraid of the Madurese.

34
In this research, ―PFKPM‖ is used for PFKPM Sambas after pemekaran. ―FKPM‖ incidates the
organization in Kabupaten Sambas before pemekaran, including Sambas, Singkawang, and
Bengkayang.

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Malay interviewees emphasized that the creation of FKPM was in reaction to
the violence they had experienced with the Madurese. The Malays were naturally
united in their efforts to found FKPM due to the murders of Malays, and they became
stronger as a group after the establishment of FKPM. Interviewees were proud of their
solidarity, as one stated: ―Malays already cannot be made a fool again. Ah so if there
is anything we are already united.‖ Thus, FKPM created ―Malay power‖ in the
community. FKPM supported the current district head at the first term election, in the
local council, after the Malay-Madurese violence, and by bribing local council
members.
After the division of the Sambas district, PFKPM supported the government‘s
community activities by distributing information and assisting in the implementation
of development projects. In 2001, PFKPM founded a special security force called the
Satuan Tugas (Satgas, Task Force) to maintain security, such as the prevention of
riots. The activities of PFKPM during the post-violence period and the division of the
district are analyzed in a subsequent chapter.

Malay Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu, MABM)
As its name indicates, an objective of the Malay Cultural and Customary Council
(Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu, MABM) was the preservation and development of the
Malay culture. MABM Sambas was founded in 1996, yet a precedent organization of

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the MABM, called the Malay Cultural Society (Masyarakat Budaya Melayu,
MASBAYU), was established in 1993 in the district.
MABM was the counterpart of DAD. However, unlike DAD and MABM
Ketapang, MABM Sambas did not have sub-district branches. Compared to the
FKPM, the presence of MABM in Sambas was minimal, and it was more active in
Pontianak City, the provincial capital.

(3) Madurese Organization: Madurese Family Association (Ikatan Keluarga
Besar Madura, IKBM or IKAMRA)
A Madurese organization, Madurese Family Association (Ikatan Keluarga
Besar Madura, IKBM), was a nation-wide organization founded before the Dayak-
Madurese clash in 1996/1997, to create unity among Madurese migrants. In West
Kalimantan, the organization was established in 1995 in Pontianak, the provincial
capital. The Madurese organization held religious activities in cooperation with other
Muslims during Islamic holidays. There was no visible Madurese organization in the
Sambas region before the ethnic violence, yet there were Madurese social groups
before the ethnic violence in the late 1990s. These included groups for recitation of the
Koran, rotating credit associations, and art and dance, which were similar to what
other ethnic groups had.
Although IKBM and its chairman were recognized by the Madurese in even
rural town, only small numbers of the Madurese local leaders attended the activities of
the organization. Not all Kalimantan-born Madurese, nor those who were mixed with

198
other ethnicities, were welcomed in the organization. Strangely, most Madurese
interviewees in Singkawang denied their connection with IKBM, though some of the
Madurese figures were known to have been involved in the organization. Issues of
leadership, fragmentation, and competition among the Madurese leaders were reported
as problems to make the organization work. There were also political divides among
the Madurese (HRW 1997). An interviewee evaluated IKBM as being ―less effective‖
or ―not united,‖ because ―every leader wanted to be leader there‖ and ―[n]o one
wanted to be led.‖
Thus, the organization was not truly acknowledged as a representative
organization of the Madurese in Sambas before the violence. During the Malay-
Madurese clash, IKBM helped with the evacuation of the Madurese from Sambas and
provided aid to those who had been displaced.

5.3.2. Ethnic Organizations and Conflict Prevention
This section explores relationships between these ethnic organizations and
conflict prevention. In the case of Sambas, the discussion focuses on how each
organization affected the ethnic violence and why ethnic organizations could not
contribute to conflict prevention. In particular, three ethnic organizations, the Dayak
Customary Council (DAD), Communication Forum of Malay Youth (FKPM), and
Madurese organization, IKBM, are the focus of the discussion.

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(1) DAD and Ethnic Violence and Conflict Prevention
During the violence between the Dayaks and the Madurese in 1996/1997,
DAD in Sambas made an effort to appease the Dayak community, especially those
who came from villages in the mountains. The DAD at the various levels, held
customary ceremonies and tried to prevent expansion of violence in cooperation with
the government and the Madurese leaders. DAD had an ability to prevent the
expansion of violence by blocking or prohibiting people from sending a red bowl, or
mangkok merah, a tool to ask reinforcement for war.
Nevertheless, DAD could not stop the expanding violence. Due to repeated
ethnic clashes, people became emotional and masses quickly gathered. The Dayak‘s
customary ceremonies, held with the cooperation of the Madurese leaders after the
triggering incident in 1996, could not ease people‘s anger. A handful of ethnic leaders
were too few to impede the actions of thousands. What DAD could do was only to ask
people not to be involved in mobs and to go home by organizing meetings and
appealing to the mass with customary ceremonies. Sometimes, a subsequent incident
or a rumor of attack occurred to worsen the situation. Because of the repeated clash
between the Dayak and Madurese, such requests were likely ignored. As a result, the
masses did not listen to the pleas made by DAD to stop the violence, and given the
situation, there was little DAD could do. A senior Dayak pointed out that this was the
primary weakness of DAD.

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Moreover, deterioration of trust in the Dayak leaders and the waning influence
of DAD were noted as factors behind the limited capacity of DAD to prevent conflict.
Along with improved education and the development of the Dayaks, Dayak society
became fragmented. The distance between the community and the DAD organization
eventually went far enough to become an obstacle to socialization. Improved
communication tools and transportation access should make information more readily
available to the community; however, it was still proven to be difficult to deliver the
correct message at the grassroots level where the population did not always take
advice from DAD without having some doubts. A Dayak interviewee pointed out that
the leaders‘ perceptions and requests were also ―intentionally challenged by the people
below.‖ It was also often said that the Dayak could be united across various sub-ethnic
groups to fight against a common enemy of the Dayak but not for any other purpose.
Moreover, DAD had been inclined to politics, and the DAD leaders were criticized for
being more concerned with the interests of the government and business, rather than
the interests of the community. Thus, a researcher at the Institute of Dayakology
pointed out that the current DAD had no relation to traditional customary councils at
all, and therefore could not represent the Dayak community.
Meanwhile, it should be noted that at the time of violence with the Madurese
from 1996 to 1997, DAD was only one ethnic organization in the region so that their
influence was limited within the Dayak community. Since the Madurese did not have

201
a functional ethnic organization in the region, coordination for conflict prevention
among ethnic groups was not productive.

(2) FKPM and Ethnic Violence in Sambas 1999
According to Malay interviewees, FKPM was not founded to fight the
Madurese. During the Malay-Madurese clash in 1999, FKPM helped evacuate the
Madurese from Sambas. Malays contended that FKPM was developed ―to save them
[the Madurese] who were still alive,‖ not ―to kill or ―to slaughter them.‖
However, FKPM was indeed organized to attack the Madurese and played a
significant role in expelling them from Sambas. One of the founders noted, ―FKPM is
indeed, if in rough words, it is a battle division. It‘s a combat division.‖ Without
hesitation, he explained the objective behind the foundation of FKPM, and their
consequent involvement in the violence:
Before they established FKPM . . . Madurese attacked in Parit Setia.
There were three victims. So we Malays looked at the development of
the incident and formed an organization named FKPM . . . . After
FKPM was founded, we did socialization of FKPM throughout sub-
districts, let the community know that we could not tolerate this
Madurese act anymore. We needed us to prepare so that the Malay
community was united. Quietly we ordered to prepare equipment, tools,
spears, bows and arrows, etc. Later in a certain period of time, there
were their efforts to engage in peace, reconciliation . . . , [b]ut they
were just pretending . . . [to ask for] reconciliation. Just then our people
were wounded in Tebas. So we looked at that and we were not happy.
So that we did not want to reconcile. So quietly, FKPM moved the
mass to expel all the Madurese in Sambas, in Sekura, in Paloh . . . .

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A FKPM member also explained without hesitation that a strong group of Malays in
Pemangkat created FKPM ―to eliminate the Madurese, eradicate the tyranny.‖
35

The security force before the conflict was perceived as powerless by the
Sambas Malays to address the problems they had experienced with the Madurese.
Multiple interviewees explained that in the beginning of 1999 before the ethnic
violence, the Madurese attacked the residence of the police and Brimob (Mobile
Brigade Unit) and destroyed the street lights in Pontianak. However, the police did not
arrest those mobs. A founder of FKPM, seeing the incident, concluded that ―the police
was meaningless for them.‖ Later, the Malays founded FKPM to take the law into
their own hands, coordinated attacks against Madurese, and expelled them from
Sambas. A FKPM leader said, ―So the police feel helped by FKPM. They can have
dignity as police.‖
FKPM was strongly accused, even in the Malay community, for the escalation
of the violence, ―the most responsible for fall of victims in the violence,‖ by
strengthening ethnicism. In spite of the name of FKPM, ―Communication Forum‖ of
Malay Youth, a Malay NGO member in Singkawang said, ―What appeared in the
community was not communication—it was precisely immediately to reject
communication for reconciliation [by FKPM].‖ Most NGO activists involved in
peace-building projects, including the Malays, the Dayaks, and the Madurese,
condemned FKPM or later PFKPM‘s opposition to the reconciliation between the

35
As mentioned, Tim Sebelas called a meeting to organize FKPM on January 26, 1999 after the Parit
Seia incident.

203
Madurese and the Malays. NGOs and participants in the reconciliation projects were
occasionally threatened by PFKPM not to bring the Madurese back to Sambas. FKPM,
speaking for the interests of the Malays, had not been accepted by the entire Malay
community, in particular, those outside the new Sambas district, such as Singkawang.

(3) The Madurese Organization: IKBM
Madurese leaders were criticized for their incompetence to prevent ethnic
clashes with the Dayak and the Malay and reconcile relationships between the
Madurese and the Malays. In the late 1990s, there were Madurese elected officials for
the local council of Sambas. The ethnic elites maintained a good relationship with the
Dayak and Malay leaders. At the time of the clash with the Dayak, these so called
Madurese ―elites‖ could have worked to prevent the violence from expanding in
cooperation with the Dayak leaders. Nevertheless, there was no visible effort from the
local Madurese leaders to suppress the violence, though IKBM chairman Sulaiman
rushed to Singkawang and called kiai from East Java. A Madurese, leading a NGO for
peace building, blamed the Madurese leaders for provoking the violence with a strong
tone, by calling them ―commanders of cockfights, not . . . commanders to resolve
problems with the Dayak and Malay.‖
Because the triggering event was initially a trivial youth fight, it could have
been resolved if the Dayak and Madurese leaders had made serious and concerted
efforts to stop violence, through cooperation. In spite of coordinating the preventive

204
efforts with the Dayak leaders, the Madurese leaders incited the people‘s emotion by
saying ―carok concong,”
36
which in the Madurese language means ―a war, just a war‖
though the Madurese leaders in the villages cooperated with the Dayaks to stop the
expansion of riots. Insufficient efforts for prevention of the violence expansion and
rather instigative attitude of the leaders resulted in the escalation of the violence and
later these leaders ran away from the region for their own safety. It was also reported
that the accusation of the Dayak for a burned mosque by kiai who had come in from
the outside of Kalimantan provoked the assault against the Dayak, though the mosque
was accidentally burned due to a fire in an adjacent house. Thus, the Madurese
interviewee pointed out, that the Madurese leaders were ―the main provocateur.‖
After the Malay-Madurese clash, reconciliations were several times agreed to
between the Malay and Madurese leaders. However, the Sambas community‘s
rejection of the proposition to return the Madurese to Sambas was perceived as
evidence of a lack of the capacity of the Madurese leaders and organization in conflict
prevention and enable reconciliation. A Madurese criticized his leaders for their
incapacity to provide resolutions and support for the grassroots community.
Moreover, the leaders from the Madurese organization, IKBM, were
condemned because they exploited Madurese refugees. The Madurese leaders in
IKBM actively cooperated with the government for evacuation and distribution of
relief supplies to the displaced; however, at the same time, they made fortunes from

36
Carok concong literally means ―duel to defend our honor, go forward without turning around.‖

205
those projects and not all those supplies were distributed to the evacuees. This was
described by a fellow Madurese as follows: ―Madurese ate carrions of Madurese.‖

5.3.3. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forums during the New Order
In Sambas, there used to be inter-ethnic communication forums during the
New Order period in the mid 1990s, similar to Ketapang‘s case. This initiative was led
by the central government at the national level. The forums were founded at the sub-
district level with the involvement of the Dayak, Madurese, Malay, Chinese, and the
Javanese around 1996 before the Dayak-Madurese clash. A Chinese described it as
moral movement rather than forums.
An objective of the forums was to unite all ethnicities for development, and
conflict prevention was one of the focuses of the forum, along with other objectives.
After a meeting in the forums, each ethnic group was expected to communicate with
their fellow members. However, an ethnic riot broke out between the Dayak and the
Madurese in the end of 1996, and it eventually faded away. A Dayak senior
questioned the effectiveness and objectives of the forums while pointing out its
political intentions.
It was not certain that the inter-ethnic communication forum in Ketapang was a
part of this national initiative. However it would be one possibility because during the
New Order, the central government did not permit the local government to run its own
programs.

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5.3.4. Conclusion: Ethnic Organizations and Conflict Prevention in Sambas
In terms of the general beliefs held, any ethnic organization in the Sambas
district could not prevent ethnic violence in the late 1990s. At the time of the ethnic
clash between the Dayak and the Madurese in 1996/1997, the DAD‘s conflict
prevention efforts did not produce satisfactory results. Repeated violence with the
Madurese triggered emotional responses within the Dayaks, while a decline of
confidence in the DAD leaders, and the decreasing influence of DAD hindered its
capacity to prevent violence. Moreover, the lack of a counterpart organizational power
on the Madurese side also made preventive efforts less effective.
On other hand, FKPM, the Malay organization, was indeed established to
expel the Madurese from the Sambas district. The ethnic organization raised the Malay
ethnic solidarity to attack the Madurese. FKPM had never contributed to reconciliation
or peace building, except for the evacuation of the Madurese from Sambas; in fact,
they had been a powerful opponent of reconciliation. Weak law enforcement pushed
Malay leaders to organize FKPM as to punish the Madurese.
Finally, the Madurese leaders and organization, IKBM in Pontianak, could not
solve the ethnic problems. Rather than stopping the attack, the Madurese leaders in
Singkawang believed to instigate violence against the Dayaks. The leaders of IKBM
were beneficiaries of the government aid supplies for the displaced Madurese.
Therefore, although there were narrow efforts to stop the riots, ethnic
organizations were powerless to contain them or were in fact involved in the violence.

207
There existed inter-ethnic communication forums in Sambas developed by the central
government. However, the forums simply disappeared without producing any
expected outcomes towards community peace. In conclusion, unlike the Ketapang, the
case of Sambas revealed ethnic organizations incapable of or an impediment towards
preventing ethnic violence.

5.4. Government and Conflict Prevention
As discussed, the government in Ketapang, including the local government, the
police, and the military, had taken initiatives to prevent ethnic violence. In particular,
the district government of Ketapang promoted the establishment of the the inter-ethnic
communication forum and facilitated other activities within ethnic organizations.
Government involvement and efforts for conflict prevention in Sambas are
evaluated and compared to Ketapang here. After I discuss the security force in the
district, I analyze the government initiatives for prevention of the conflict or
reconciliation.

5.4.1. Weak Law Enforcement and the Strong Madurese
In general, police offices and stations are located in the district capital, sub-
district centers, and certain villages. The district police of Sambas was located in
Singkawang until 1999. Small incidents were resolved at the village or sub-district
level by the police. Serious crimes such as murder were certainly reported to the
police, and criminals were arrested and prosecuted.

208
Before the division of the Sambas district, the sub-district police had
approximately twenty to forty police officers with a total of 800 police personnel in
the district. A single policeman statistically served about 600 to 700 people, so that the
numbers of police personnel were not sufficient to effectively serve the population.
37

Additionally, there were physical constraints in transportation and communication
between the police and community. There was no police station in most villages. If a
crime happened in a village, there were no material means to address it. Due to a lack
of any kind of security force, thefts were frequent in the villages. In Monterado, the
community had to build police stations and Bapinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa, non-
commissioned military officer) in villages by themselves.
Even with police present, law enforcement was one serious problem, due to
corruption in the force. Often the legal process was stopped and criminals were
released before justice had been done. According to interviewees, the Madurese often
bribed police officers with livestock and such; even a condemned criminal could be
released. Because of government corruption and the financial strength of the
Madurese, Madurese culprits were not always brought to justice. That gradually
frustrated and angered the other ethnic groups.
Additionally, Madurese criminals were occasionally harbored by the Madurese
community if the problem involved another ethnic group. A policeman in Sambas

37
This data came from an interview of police officers. If the police-resident ratio was estimated with
the total number of 800 police personnel and the population of Sambas district in Census 2000 data
of 780,500, the service population was 975 per police personnel (BPS 2001).

209
commented that the Madurese leaders often protected their followers, a pattern
described as a constraint to law enforcement. Moreover, the police were reluctant to
take action against the Madurese because of reported cases that Madurese had attacked
police stations and residences; consequently, the police feared the Madurese. The
previous situation in Sambas was described as very difficult. People and the police had
to pay close attention not to make any mistake when they dealt with the Madurese
gangs because ―they must make a fuss.‖
Furthermore, even if people reported a crime to the police and a criminal was
arrested, the criminal sometimes took revenge after his release from prison. Because
of this fear of retaliation, people often chose not to report crimes and ―most people just
kept their silence.‖ A Malay interviewee spoke of the risks of reporting crimes to the
police and invoked a famous Madurese story of ―rage up to seven generations,‖ which
means the Madurese chase their enemies up to the seventh generation to take revenge.
Thus, the interviewees contended that the police and the judicial system could not
contribute to security because ―[o]ne Madurese enters prison, two make problems
again. One enters prison, four make problems again.‖
In the late 1990s, therefore, the problem of weak law enforcement, including
the police, prosecutors, and courts, was widely recognized by the community. An
interviewee described the situation of Sambas as one in which ―the atmosphere was
not conducive, our law was not effective.‖ In the eyes of the community, the Madurese
in Sambas seemed to enjoy their power and strength. Hence, the community felt they

210
were just in taking the law into their own hands, and that such action was legitimized
by the weak existing law enforcement structures. A Malay said with anger, ―The
Indonesian government is corrupted; all local governments are thieves. Give money
and they release criminals. This is what we did not like. So we kicked all [the
Madurese] out. No prosecutor or the police helped them. We killed them.‖
During the ethnic clash, delayed operations and weak law enforcement at the
time of the triggering event were reasons for the violence expansion. A Madurese
refugee sadly said, ―At that time, if the law enforcement was strict, I think this would
not have happened‖ and ―it is good if one person is butchered rather than spreading to
the others.‖ Once a small triggering event in a village had developed into an ethnic
clash, thousands of people became mobilized. Multiple fights took place in villages
across the region. The masses participating in the violence outnumbered police
personnel. There was little the police could do to suppress the conflict, because of its
limited resources and the quick spread of the violence and the mobs. During the
Malay-Madurese riot, some security forces exploited the Madurese by asking for
money to transport them to safe zones. It should also be noted that ethnic violence in
Sambas broke out in 1999 during the transition to democracy. After the reformasi
started, the security forces could no longer take overtly strong actions against citizens,
as had been common during the New Order period, because human rights protections
were then in place.

211
Yet the security force in Singkawang was able to protect the Madurese there,
during the violence at least. Because all government apparatuses were located in
Singkawang, the district capital of Sambas, the Madurese in Singkawang had more
protection more than the Madurese in other Sambas areas.
Therefore, weak law enforcement was a serious problem in Sambas before and
through the time of ethnic violence. The community assumed that the violence was
justified due to the ineffective or delayed actions of the security forces and their
inability to repress crime and the violence.

5.4.2. Failure of Reconciliation and Conflict Prevention in Dayak-Madurese
Conflict
During the Dayak-Madurese violence in 1996/97, the Sambas district
government, the police, the military and ethnic leaders cooperated to suppress the
violence and to reconcile the ethnic groups. At first, a problem was reported to the
police and then to the district head. These government institutions contacted ethnic
organizations and leaders and held meetings to address the issues together. Later
ethnic leaders and the district head went to the field to soothe the masses.
However, their efforts were not very successful. The government actions
during the occurrence of violence were criticized. Most instigators were not arrested
during and after the riot (HRW 1997). The attitudes of the government were passive,
and they did not take any proactive measures for conflict prevention. A Dayak leader
in Singkawang was critical saying that ―they [government] were always late to take a

212
step.‖ However, it may be argued that they were unable to do anything, due to the
complexity of the existing ethnic problems.
After the violence, as facilitator and mediator, the government held a
reconciliation ceremony, invited Dayak leaders and Madurese leaders, and issued a
peace statement signed by the ethnic groups. The government provided financial
support for the peace ceremony and aid to the victims to rebuild their residences. The
reconciliation ceremony was also repeated at the sub-district or village level. Other
ethnic groups also attended the ceremony as witnesses, such as the Javanese,
Sundanese, Malay, and Batak. The ceremony adopted Dayak customs; however, the
customary fine was paid by the government, as in the past ceremonies. After
witnessing the reconciliation ceremony organized between ethnic groups, the
government officially announced the end of conflict. The peace ceremony had been
effective, at least to end the violence and normalize the ethnic relations, between the
Dayaks and the Madurese.
However, the ethnic violence between the Dayak and the Madurese had been
repeated for the past decades, almost once a decade. For example, the clash in
Samalantan in 1979 ended with the peace ceremony and the construction of a peace
monument. But once a triggering event happened, due to repeated ethnic clashes, what
had started out as a small incident, easily spread to adjacent regions. The government
and the community could not suppress violence until it resulted in a number of
victims.

213
A problem with the reconciliation ceremony was that it was primarily symbolic
and not a genuine peace ceremony (HRW 1997). The ethnic leaders who participated
in the peace ceremony and signed a reconciliation statement always maintained good
relationships even during the violence. On the other hand, there was no real
reconciliation performed between those who actually fought each other. A Dayak
government official explained,
The trigger before was a small incident. For example, in an event with a
band, there was a small fight about a band, maybe because of
drinking . . . . And that was not leaders. At the time of reconciliation,
they didn‘t join reconciliation. Later we mistakenly think peace comes
back, although it is leaders who were reconciled. Leaders do not need
to be reconciled; they are already reconciled.
The ceremony was more or less coerced by the government to declare the end
of violence and the return of peace. As HRW (1997) also discussed in their report, at
the government sponsored ceremony, the attendants of the ceremony were often ethnic
leaders who had strong connection with the government, rather than those who were
close to the community. The peace declaration was made by the government, not by
the ethnic groups, often referring to the national slogan of ―Unity in Diversity.‖ A
Dayak politician said that the ceremonies seemed to be performed in the way of the
Dayak traditions; however, most ceremonies were far different from the Dayak
customs and customary laws. The Dayak criticized that the Madurese side did not
have a genuine commitment to reconciliation. To them, the reconciliation simply
meant that the ―Dayaks were just reconciled with the government. So it did not go to

214
Madurese.‖ Thus, the frustration among the two groups had never been completely
resolved.
Hence, the HRW (1997) described the attempts by the government at
reconciliation as ―useless ceremonies‖ (33) and ―[t]hey [peace ceremonies] were first
and foremost government shows and had very little to do with traditional end-of war
ceremonies‖ (HRW 1997, 35). Therefore, peace had never been achieved in the past,
due to the lack of the commitment from the government, and the inability of ethnic
leaders to truly create peace among ethnic groups.
38

5.4.3. Missing Reconciliation Efforts in Malay and Madurese Clash
The reconciliation meetings between the Malays and the Madurese were
organized by the government after the ethnic violence at the district office in
Singkawang. In addition to community leaders from the Malays and the Madurese, the
provincial and local government officials, the police and military officers, local
council members, and members of the judiciary attended the meeting. During the riot,
the government assisted with the evacuation of the Madurese and provided emergency
aid such as food and assistance for settling those displaced in the relocation sites in
Pontianak.

38
When I visited West Kalimantan for a Japanese technical assistant project of regional development
planning from 1997 to 1998, ethnic violence between Dayak and Madurese had never become an
agenda of meetings with the government, even though the clash happened only a few months
before. Certainly the government had no interest to bring the topic of ethnic violence in front of the
foreigners.

215
Nevertheless, even after the reconciliation ceremony, there was an unwritten
local rule that the Madurese should not enter the territory of the new Sambas district.
A Malay contended that during a peace meeting in East Java in 2002 this was agreed
to as a provisional decision among leaders from the Malays, the Madurese and the
Dayaks, the government, police and military.
At the time of my field research in 2007, the Madurese were still unable to
openly enter the Sambas district. It was said that a Madurese would be killed if he
entered the Sambas district. In fact, there was a murder case involving a Madurese
who visited their former residences or farms in Sambas, even though a police or
military officer accompanied with him. The Malay side rejected the idea of
reconciliation, because in Sambas ―we have peace already‖ without the Madurese. A
leader of Malay organization, now PFKPM, said,
We do not have a term of ―peace,‖ because we did not have a war . . . .
We expelled bad people, chased away the evil . . . [b]ut good ones were
also evicted...all. A point is all Madurese should be out, bad and good.
PFKPM Sambas was still a strong opponent of the return of the Madurese. Besides,
the Sultan of Sambas, Raden Wimpi, also sided with PFKPM. Viewed from the
Madurese side, the refusal of significant Malay figures, to let the Madurese return, was
one of the obstacles to real peace building.
The grassroots efforts to seek true reconciliation continued to normalize ethnic
relationships between the Malays and the Madurese in Sambas. International and local
NGOs and religious organizations were also involved in the reconciliation projects

216
between these two groups. However, the reconciliation meetings at the grassroots
levels had not yet been successful to break through the strong opponent of Malays.
The missing role of the government in such conflict resolution efforts was pointed out.
To overcome the reluctance of the Malay community, the government needs to take a
strong initiative to promote ethnic peace. As an interviewee said, ―The key was the
local government.‖ A Madurese activist criticized the government view that the
Malay-Madurese problem was over, because separating the two groups is not the same
as reconciliation and ―it [we have] yet to reach the creation of peace in community.‖
Though the governor of West Kalimantan had the vision of ―harmony in ethnicities,‖
there was no concrete program or project to materialize the vision. However, NGOs
and activists believed that if the government supported the reconciliation process, the
Madurese would be able to enter Sambas.
The Sambas district government emphasized the effectiveness of the ―natural
process‖ of reconciliation. The government perception was that the issue was not the
government, but within the community, i.e., the fact that the Malay residents were not
yet ready to accept the Madurese and still suffered from the trauma and painful
experiences they had had with the Madurese. This situation was succinctly described
by the proverb ―the fire hidden inside a mound of rice chaff (api dalam sekam)‖: it
implies that due to the lack of resolution with previous issues, given a small incident,
old flames easily flare into a fire. The district head of Sambas said that the Malay and
the Madurese had never been able to reach a reconciliation agreement in meetings so

217
that the only option left was to ―let time decide.‖
39
However, it should be noted that
the majority of the Sambas district government officials were Malays, though the
district heads were often outsiders from the army or Java before the reformasi.
Meanwhile, Singkawang City, the former district capital of Sambas, has a large
population of Madurese. The Madurese in Singkawang emphasized that the
reconciliation between the Malay and the Madurese was an issue of Sambas, not
Singkawang, because the expansion of ethnic violence was limited in certain part of
Singkawang City. Therefore, reconciliation between the Malay and the Madurese
would not be initiated by the Singkawang Madurese, except those who were involved
in NGOs, though refugees were relocated to Singkawang.

5.5. Conclusion: Relationships between Ethnic Organizations, Government
and Conflict Prevention
The relational dynamics between the various ethnic organizations, the
government, and efforts at conflict prevention were explored in this chapter. The two
cases of Ketapang and Sambas illuminated the striking differences in the roles played
by the ethnic organizations and the local government in conflict prevention and peace
building.

39
The Malay ethnic leaders often tried to persuade me of the legitimacy of rejection of Madurese by
referring the relations between Indonesia and Japan after the World War II, because I am Japanese.
The district head said to me that because Japanese massacred many people in Mandor, if I had
visited Sambas in 1946, people in Sambas would not have accepted me. But after 60 years from the
war, people welcome Japanese. This is the same for Madurese. Thus, he said, ―We do not reject the
Madurese coming back, but not now, like us Indonesians and Japanese.‖

218
In Ketapang, ethnic organizations were the main actors for conflict prevention.
The ethnic leaders from ethnic organizations, in particular DAD, MABM and IKMK
there worked together to address problems as they emerged between the ethnic groups.
The Madurese organization, IKMK, made concerted efforts to correct the negative
reputation of the Madurese, and to live peacefully in Ketapang. These ethnic
organizations exchanged information and communicated through the inter-ethnic
communication forum, which was initiated by the district government of Ketapang.
The local government was actively involved in coordination and facilitation of the
ethnic organizations and the inter-ethnic communication forum. Also the district
government promoted communication and information sharing between the
government side including the district government, the police and the military, and the
community by inviting the ethnic organizations to their meetings. Therefore, in
Ketapang, both the ethnic organizations and the government were well aware of the
risk of ethnic clash and the government demonstrated their initiative to guide the
ethnic organizations to enable genuine, ethnic peace building.
Contrarily, in Sambas, the ethnic organizations, i.e., DAD, FKPM, and IKBM,
were ineffective in preventing ethnic conflicts, and it would appear that they had even
instigated the violence during the ethnic clashes in the late 1990s. There were no
significant coordinated efforts among the ethnic organizations to stop the expansion of
the violence, unlike Ketapang. Moreover, the government‘s attitude toward ethnic
violence was always rather reluctant or blatant avoidance of involvement in ethnic

219
issues. Despite the history of the ethnic clashes, there were no preventive actions or
material encouragement towards reconciliation from the government. This government
indifference often provoked the community into taking the law into their own hands.

220
CHAPTER 6
REASONS FOR PEACE AND REASONS FOR CONFLICT
Why is there ethnic peace in Ketapang but not in Sambas? The factors
influencing ethnic relations include informal associations, contextual factors, informal
problem solving, ethnic organizations, the inter-ethnic communication forum, and
government. After a brief summary of each case, the findings on the relationships
between these factors and conflict prevention are discussed. The concluding section
provides theoretical implications from an analysis of the two cases.

6.1. Peaceful Case of Ketapang
Analysis of the peaceful case of Ketapang showed that civic associations,
especially ethnic organizations, contributed to the prevention of ethnic violence in
Ketapang. In the mid to late 1990s, most ethnic groups in Ketapang established ethnic
organizations, which, with government support, promoted communication among
ethnic groups. In particular, ethnic organizations of the key ethnic groups, Dayak,
Malay, and Madurese, played important roles in resolving minor triggering events in
Ketapang.
Fearon and Laitin (1996) argued that inter-ethnic peace can be achieved
through intra-group control mechanisms such as in-group policing. Competing groups
maintain peace by punishing and creating sanctions against group members who
disturb inter-ethnic peace. The case of Ketapang showed the importance of problem

221
solving mechanisms within a group. Informal problem solving by respected leaders or
figures is a common practice in rural Indonesia, given the inefficiency of the police,
the cost of formal processes, and strong local customs.
In Ketapang, when a problem emerged between ethnic groups, leaders of the
formal ethnic organizations met. With structured ethnic organizations, it was easier to
identify whom one should ask for help and how opposing groups communicate with
each other. Close informal relations among ethnic leaders and key ethnic organizations
also reinforced the problem solving capacity of ethnic groups. Most conflicts in West
Kalimantan began in rural areas while urban areas remained relatively peaceful.
Ethnic organizations were usually established in urban areas where the population‘s
ethnic composition was relatively multi-ethnic and the level of education was higher
than in rural areas.
40
Urban area ethnic leaders asked village leaders, teachers, and
priests to protect villages and prevent violence at the time of crisis. If village-level
leaders could not solve a problem, leaders of ethnic organizations visited or sent
representatives to the villages to assist. Ethnic leaders not only met to settle ethnic
problems but also to participate in wedding parties, government ceremonies, and other

40
According to Census 2000 data (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2000a, 2000b), the ethnic
composition of urban/rural areas of Sambas (including Sambas, Bengkayang, and Singkawang) is
as follows: rural areas: Malay (62%), Dayak (21%), Madurese (0%), and Others (17%) and urban
areas: Malay (37%), Dayak (3%), Madurese (5%), and Others (55%). The ethnic composition of
Ketapang is as follows: rural areas: Malay (42%), Dayak (35%), Madurese (3%), and Others (20%)
and urban areas: Malay (57%), Dayak (8%), Madurese (11%) and others (21%).
In the urban areas, the population of 5-year-olds and over with a primary school degree or less is 67%
and 61% in Sambas and Ketapang, and the population with junior high and high school diplomas is
31% and 36% in Sambas and Ketapang. In rural areas, the population of 5-year-olds and over with
a primary school degree or less is 85% and 87% in Sambas and Ketapang and the population with
junior high and high school diplomas is 15% and 13% in Sambas and Ketapang (BPS 2001).

222
events and occasions. These informal meetings and communications strengthened
inter-ethnic relationships that became a foundation for peace.
Also important for effective problem solving was that all major ethnic groups
had ethnic organizations rooted in local ethnic communities. Furthermore, the inter-
ethnic communication forum consolidated each group‘s commitment to common
objectives and integrated the activities of ethnic organizations for that purpose by
facilitating communication with the government and among ethnic groups. Hence, an
interviewee explained:
Why Ketapang became conducive to peace is because all elements,
ethnic organizations, already had interaction with each other, mutual
dependence, interconnectedness with each other in order to quickly
cope with an incident so that it did not expand, so they could be united,
could find a middle ground to be taken by us.
Moreover, the government was actively involved in conflict prevention
processes by maintaining close communications with ethnic leaders through ethnic
organizations and the inter-ethnic communication forum. The government regularly
held morning coffee meetings with the police and military in attendance. The
government supported cultural events and activities of ethnic organizations, called
meetings, and facilitated the forum. The district head directly intervened in ethnic
problems when they arose. The peace building ceremonies of Tolak Bala were also
assisted by government. The district government encouraged ethnic diversity and
tolerance from before the reformasi by promoting ethnic organizations and ethnic
cultural events. The Ketapang government itself had more ethnically diverse public

223
officials than did the Sambas government. Dayak government officials were found at
the levels of director and assistant secretary in Ketapang. These proactive attitudes of
the local governments of Ketapang contributed to lasting ethnic peace.
Meanwhile, in the theorized literature, in-group policing mechanisms are not
discussed beyond group sanctions. In Ketapang, ethnic leaders emphasized
compliance to formal laws, especially among the Madurese. This confirmed the
importance of rule of law and public order, rather than sanctions within a group such
as customary laws of the Dayak.
Therefore, Ketapang achieved ethnic peace through cooperation and
coordination among ethnic leaders, ethnic organizations, and government. The
informal institutions—built among ethnic groups and leaders through daily
interactions, family events, religious celebrations, and inter-ethnic marriages—
contributed to the development of trust and cooperation. In particular, the Ketapang
district government facilitated dialogue and a culture of peace with commitment.
Relatively effective law enforcement and respect for rule of law in settling of ethnic
problems also strengthened the community‘s efforts for peace building and conflict
prevention. Thus, an interviewee explained with confidence:
There is a coordination of relationships among ethnic groups by ethnic
organizations . . . . The government very much supports bridging and
coordination among ethnicities in Ketapang . . . . People already think
about it more in advance. To me, it is also about government, the
district head, and security forces like the police or military. They are
fast. Before we come here, a problem is already settled through
socialization in communities . . . . Therefore, it is not easy to instigate
[trouble] in Ketapang by a third party.

224
6.2. Conflict Case of Sambas
In many villages in Sambas and Bengkayang, good relationships and
friendships between the local population, i.e., Dayaks and Malay, and Madurese were
observed before violence erupted. Nevertheless, Sambas experienced deterioration of
informal associations with the increase in migrant population. Informal associations
alone proved insufficient to prevent the spread of violence. The traditional problem
solving methods used by ethnic leaders, including the Dayak‘s customary approach,
failed to work because leaders were not true representatives of the people, and the
community did not follow their decisions. The fact that most ethnic groups, except the
Dayak and Madurese in particular, did not have ethnic organizations before the
triggering events made the ethnic leaders‘ efforts at problem solving less effective. In
the case of the Dayak and Madurese, minor incidents easily ignited large scale
emotional responses due to the history of violence. In particular, the angry masses
gathering from surrounding areas reduced the chances of preventing the expansion of
violence by deliberation among leaders.
In contrast to Ketapang, ethnic organizations in Sambas stimulated violence by
strengthening the solidarity of their ethnic group and emphasizing ethnic differences.
Only the dominant ethnic groups, i.e., the Dayaks and Malays, had founded ethnic
organizations before the 1999 conflict in Sambas region, though there was a Madurese
organization in Pontianak City. As Davidson (2008) argued, a discourse of ethnic
identity and struggle tacitly approved use of violence among Dayaks. Consequently, in

225
Sambas, Malays deliberately attacked the Madurese under FKPM leadership. The
ethnic organizations indeed strengthened their ethnic identity and solidarity, which
fostered ethnic violence.
The Sambas government did not take sufficient preventive actions. For one, a
problem of weak law enforcement prevailed. The fairness and capability of the
government to maintain peace and order were questioned. Due to corruption and a
lack of capacity, the police did not capture criminals, and culprits were not
appropriately prosecuted. As interviewees and HRW (1997) contended, the
reconciliation measures organized by the government after the ethnic clashes were
largely ceremonial, simply indicating the end of violence, rather than seeking a true
and lasting resolution of the ethnic problems. The Dayak‘s customary laws were also
perceived by other groups as mere fine collecting machines. Therefore, after a certain
period of time, small incidents triggered the same patterns of violence between the
Dayak and Madurese. The accumulation of these factors resulted in a situation in
which people took the law into their own hands.
A lack of government interest in ethnic issues might have reflected the
composition of public officials. The Malays dominated the Sambas government led by
outsiders from Java or the army. Dayak government employees were rare in Sambas.
However, after the division of districts, the discourse of ―putera daerah‖ prevailed
from the district head to village leader. Local governments, like Bengkayang, hired

226
more local Dayaks than from other ethnic groups. Subsequent chapters explore the
issue of government ethnic composition in detail.
In short, informal problem solving by leaders and cooperation among ethnic
organizations, the two approaches for conflict prevention found in Ketapang, were not
available options in Sambas. Moreover, the Sambas government did not pay enough
attention to ethnic relations even though Sambas was a hot spot of conflict. As a result,
expansion of ethnic violence could not be prevented.

6.3. Factors Affecting Ethnic Peace and Ethnic Violence
The previous Chapters 4 and 5 analyzed the relationships between conflict
prevention and various factors, including ethnic organizations and inter-ethnic
association, informal associations, contextual factors, informal problem solving, and
government. A comparison of those factors in the conflict-prone district of Sambas
and the peaceful district of Ketapang is summarized in Table 6.1. The next part, the
conclusion, discusses theoretical implications based on the findings.

227
Table 6.1 Comparison of Contexts, Ethnic Organizations, and A Role of
Government
Key Factors Sambas (Sambas, Bengkayang
and Singkawang)
Ketapang
Informal
Associations
Informal associations, e.g., face-
to-face relations and joint
celebration of events or holidays
existed both in rural and urban
areas.
However, intense informal
associations deteriorated due to
the growth of the migrant
population and segregation of the
communities.
Informal associations of face-to-face
relations and mutual visits during
holidays, events, and ceremonies existed
in urban and rural areas, though inter-
ethnic interactions in rural areas were
relatively limited and inter-ethnic relations
were stronger in urban areas.
Ethnic
Enclaves, Land
Problems,
Economic
Competition,
and Crime
With an increase in the population
of Madurese, ethnic enclaves and
segregation developed;
competition over land rose and
economic opportunities tightened.
Public security declined from
increasing crimes and gang
activities. Sambas was called
―Texas‖ in Kalimantan.
Ethnic enclaves of Madurese existed;
however, relatively small migrant
population still made assimilation possible
and they maintained interactions with the
local community.
Land problems and crimes were likely
resolved in accordance with the formal
legal system.
Madurese organization made efforts to
prevent trouble in the business sector and
between new migrants and the local
population.
History and
Ethnic
Relations
Relatively recent and large
number of Madurese migration.
Existence of the Malay Sultan.
Lack of competition among ethnic
groups except the Madurese.
Sub-groups of the Madurese and
Dayaks described with strong or
tough culture, characterized as
head-hunting of the Dayaks and
bull fights and carok of the
Madurese.
Long history of migration of the Madurese
and other ethnic groups.
Existence of the Dayak King.
Rival relation between the Dayak and
Malay.
Competition within the Malays.
Lack of violence against the Chinese
during PGRS/ Paraku.
Sub-groups of Madurese and Dayaks with
soft culture—e.g., no tradition of head
hunting in Dayaks and aristocratic culture
in the Madurese

228
Table 6.1 Comparison of Contexts, Ethnic Organizations, and A Role of
Government (Continued)
Key Factors Sambas (Sambas, Bengkayang
and Singkawang)
Ketapang
Problem
Solving
Dayaks use customs and
customary laws.
Malays relied on informal
approach as well as police
maintenance of security, but it
was often ineffective.
Failures of informal and formal
approach s.
Weak leaderships and
fragmentation of groups.
A problem was settled through
communication among ethnic leaders and
Dayak customs and customary laws.
Relatively better law enforcement.

Ethnic
Organizations
Only two major ethnic groups, the
Dayaks and Malays, organized
ethnic groups before conflict.
The Madurese did not have a
solitary ethnic organization in
Sambas.
Leaderships and representation
issues.
Many ethnic groups have started
organizing ethnic organizations in the mid
1990s.
Most ethnic groups had ethnic
organizations.
Especially the Dayaks, Malays, and
Madurese had well-structured
organizations until sub-district level.
Inter-Ethnic
Communication
Forum
Inter-ethnic communication
forums existed at the sub-district
level before the violence.
However, it did not bring any
positive impact for conflict
prevention and faded away.
The inter-ethnic communication forum
was organized and occasionally facilitated
by the government.
A precedent of the forum was established
by the government initiatives in the mid
1990s.
Inter-ethnic NGOs were founded.
Local
Government
Lack of proactive measures from
the government to prevent ethnic
violence and no interest in
reconciliation.
Composition of public officials
was homogeneous (Malay
dominant).
The district heads were outsiders
from Java or the army.

The local government organized morning
coffee meetings by inviting the police,
military, and ethnic organizations.
The district head was actively involved in
the peace building.
A mayor initiated a multi-ethnic cultural
festival in 1996, which became the
stimulus for inter-ethnic communication.
The government financially supported the
peace pledge ceremonies of Tolak Bala.
Composition of public officials was
relatively diverse and there was a mayor
from Ketapang even before reformasi.

229
6.4. Conclusion: Civic Associations and Conflict Prevention
This chapter explores how civic associations affected conflict prevention or the
relationships between conflict prevention, civic associations and other factors, based
on the findings in the preceding chapters. The analysis of peaceful and conflict-prone
districts showed not only the contradicting impacts of civic associations on ethnic
relationships but also illuminated certain characteristics of civic associations and civil
society.
Two theories connecting civic associations with ethnic relationships,
Varshney‘s (2002) inter-ethnic civic associations and peace and relationships, and
Fearon and Laitin‘s (1996) in-group policing, based on ethnic organizations, provided
the theoretical framework for investigating the relationships between civic
associations and conflict prevention. Contrary to Varshney‘s (2002) argument for
inter-ethnic organizations, Ketapang‘s case posited that ethnic organizations can
initiate ethnic peace if major ethnic groups have established ethnic organizations and
cooperate for maintenance of peace. The case of Ketapang is a similar mechanism to
in-group policing proposed by Fearon and Laitin (1996). However, to make problem
solving by intra-ethnic organizations work, major ethnic groups need to have ethnic
organizations that are recognized by their communities. In Ketapang, other ethnic
organizations at neutral positions were also involved in problem solving processes as
witnesses to ensure fair resolution. Informal interactions among ethnic leaders
strengthened their problem solving capacity. Moreover, sanctions within groups such

230
as Dayak customary laws should have enhanced law enforcement and have been
accommodated in the legal framework, rather than replace it, in order to be accepted
by other groups. In Sambas, the failure of the Dayak ethnic organization, DAD, to
prevent conflict was partly caused by the absence of an effective Madurese
counterpart organization, which could have coordinated efforts for a commitment to
peace. The Dayak customary approach did not work and tended to be ignored where
weak law enforcement existed. Therefore, contrary to Varshney‘s argument for inter-
ethnic organizations, ethnic organizations can contribute to ethnic peace building.
Moreover, the analysis of the two cases showed that the establishment of
ethnic organizations strengthens the efficiency of the existing informal problem
solving mechanisms by reinforcing leadership and compliance among members.
Varshney (2002) argued for the potential of informal associations in preventing ethnic
conflicts in rural areas. However, in the Kalimantan case, triggering incidents usually
happened in rural villages and then expanded to urban areas. Before the triggering
incident happened, deterioration of informal associations in Sambas occurred.
Informal associations could not provide protection for the large population if angry
masses rushed from the outside community and unless the community was relatively
small or segregated. However, if ethnic organizations exist, ethnic leaders from the
organizations could help to solve the problem by sending additional people or asking
for government support, the case of Ketapang showed. Thus, ethnic organizations can
prevent the expansion of violence more efficiently even in rural areas. The efficacy of

231
informal and formal associations in urban and rural areas should be carefully
examined with the ethnic relationships in each location.
In contrast, in Sambas, the Malay ethnic organization developed to fight
against the Madurese, and Dayak and Madurese organizations failed to prevent the
expansion of the riots. As Fearon and Laitin (1996) speculated, ethnic organizations
can advance both ethnic peace and ethnic antagonism. On the other hand, the inter-
ethnic communication forum in Ketapang, a type of inter-ethnic association bridging
ethnic organizations, acted as a catalyst for the exchange of information, cooperation
and coordination among ethnic groups, per Varshney‘s (2002) argument. In short, both
types of civic associations, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic associations, can contribute to
conflict prevention. Nevertheless, there is no short answer to the question of what type
of associations most effectively prevent conflict.
This finding suggests that whether or not civic associations contribute to
conflict prevention depends on the contexts in which the civic associations are
embedded, rather than the types of civic associations, inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic. In
particular, the role of the government is crucial for making civic associations work for
ethnic peace. Before the violence erupted in Sambas, there were positive interactions
between the Madurese and the Dayaks, between the Madurese and the Malays, and
with informal problem solving mechanisms used by ethnic leaders, just like the
situations in Ketapang. However, in Sambas, despite the decline of public security and
repeated ethnic violence, the government neglected ethnic issues. When FKPM

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organized the attack against the Madurese, the government, including the current
district head of Sambas, did not stop FKPM but simply assisted the evacuation of
Madurese and the rescue operations, which resulted in ethnic cleansing of the district.
In Ketapang, the government, the police and the military cooperated to enhance
interactions among ethnic leaders and encouraged ethnic organizations to take actions
for conflict prevention. The inter-ethnic communication forum, monthly morning
coffee meetings, and various ethnic cultural events were organized by the initiatives of
the government for information sharing, communication, and improvement of
understanding and tolerance of different groups. These activities led to cooperation
between the government and ethnic organizations, and among ethnic groups. The
actions of the government sent clear messages to the community of the government‘s
commitment to protecting ethnic peace and rejecting violence in Ketapang. The
relatively functional law enforcement reinforced problem solving by ethnic
organizations because if a problem was not addressed at the level of ethnic
organizations, the case was certainly reported to the police for prosecution.
Therefore, this unique cooperation among the government and ethnic groups,
or simply the local governance structure, worked to prevent ethnic violence in
Ketapang unlike in Sambas. Specifically, the government was an essential factor in
determining the capacity and intention of civic associations to contribute to ethnic
peace and conflict prevention. Civic associations acted one of those players in the
local governance structure. Inter-ethnic associations, which could contribute to ethnic

233
peace, appeared only in the environment to foster ethnic cooperation. Thus, the causal
relationship between inter-ethnic civic associations and ethnic peace proposed by
Varshney (2002) was rejected. Ethnic peace does not exist because of inter-ethnic
civic associations, but inter-ethnic civic associations can be born because of good
ethnic relationships. It is meaningless to discuss the efficacy or characteristics of civic
associations without the contexts.
Subsequent chapters discuss how the local governance structure and contextual
factors that influenced ethnic relations and development of violence were transformed
by institutional changes. After the reformasi, decentralization and pemekaran, the
division of a district brought significant changes in the local governance structure.
These changes in local governance could have promoted the development of new
ethnic relationships. Chapters 7 to 11 discuss how these institutional changes affected
civil society, the government, and ethnic relationships by analyzing three districts,
Sambas, Singkawang, and Bengkayang that emerged after the division of the conflict-
prone district of Sambas.

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CHAPTER 7
DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND PEACE BUILDING
The analysis of the relationships between civic associations and conflict
prevention in the previous chapters revealed that the local contexts circumscribe the
impacts of civic associations on ethnic peace building. The specific local governance
structure developed in a peaceful district prevented the expansion of ethnic violence.
The government has played a significant role to develop ethnic peace and the conflict
prevention mechanism in Ketapang.
Local governance changed drastically with the introduction of decentralization.
In Indonesia, decentralization started in 2001 and most functions and substantial fiscal
resources were transferred to approximately 400 districts. Regional assemblies were
formed by directly elected legislators and the first round of the heads of local
government were chosen by the legislators (World Bank 2003).
Decentralization is often suggested for post-conflict areas to mitigate violence
and promote peace as discussed by Gurr (1993) or Horowitz (1985) for example. For
Indonesia, decentralization was considered a practical solution for maintaining the
multicultural state and coping efficiently with diverse local interests and needs (World
Bank 2003). During the various conflicts in the transition period, as discussed,
approximately 10,000 lives were lost and 1.4 million people were driven from their
homes by communal violence (UN OCHA 2004). Ethnic violence in Sambas broke
out in 1999 immediately after the opening of the reformasi, Indonesian institutional

235
change. As discussed in Chapter 2, Davidson (2008) pointed to the reformasi as one of
the stimuli for ethnic clashes in West Kalimantan.
This chapter, therefore, examines how institutional changes, especially
decentralization, affect ethnic relationships and whether the local governance changes
resulting from decentralization bring positive or negative effects on ethnic relations.
This chapter begins by reviewing theories of decentralization, including federalism
and self-governing mechanism for peace, and identifying key issues that impact ethnic
relations. The second part of the chapter discusses the decentralization process in
Indonesia and its effect on ethnic relations. Based on the analysis of the theories and
Indonesian decentralization, the final section explores how decentralization has
changed ethnic relations in newly created districts in the conflict area of Sambas as
well as the prospect of conflict prevention in the region.

7.1. Approaches for Peace Building
There are two approaches suggested to contain ethnic clashes: distributive and
structural measures. The distributive approach seeks to improve the economic
situations of disadvantaged or marginalized groups through affirmative policies, or
special programs or projects, to promote development in the region of those groups
(Horowitz 1985). Affirmative actions that are taken to make bureaucracy reflect the
ethnic or racial composition of a population is called representative bureaucracy
(Evans 1974; Esman 1997, 1999). On the other hand, the structural approach involves

236
political institutional change, including self-governing or federalism, or amendment of
the electoral system (Horowitz 1985).
This section discusses the advantages and challenges of decentralization and
the theory of representative bureaucracy in the distributive and structural approaches
for mitigating ethnic violence. After a discussion of the theoretical framework of
decentralization and representative bureaucracy, an application of the two measures,
specifically to Indonesia, is analyzed to reveal constraints and opportunities.

7.1.1. Definitions and Objectives of Decentralization
Throughout the past decades, developing countries have promoted
decentralization. The concept of decentralization has evolved from the simple shift of
authority from center to the local level to ―the sharing of authority and resources for
shaping public policy within society‖ (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 6). Cheema and
Rondinelli (2007) pointed out that the idea of governance expanded the view of
decentralization.
Categorization of decentralization varies depending on the focus and degree of
shift in authority or functions. Decentralization can divide into three types, from the
most minimal model to the most autonomous: ―deconcentration,‖ ―delegation,‖ and
―devolution‖ (Rondinelli 1981, 137; Rondinelli and Cheema 1983; Silverman, 1992;
Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Focusing on the functions that are to be devolved,
scholars often classify decentralization into fiscal decentralization, administrative or

237
policy decentralization, and political decentralization (Rodden 2004; Falleti 2005;
Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). Fiscal decentralization is related to allocation of
autonomy over revenues and expenditure among governments. Administrative
decentralization means the transfer of responsibilities, tasks and functions of public
services to lower levels of government (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). Political
decentralization improves the political power of regional and/or local governments by
direct elections of a mayor, governor or legislatures and political autonomy (Falleti
2005). Economic policies or ―divestment‖ such as privatization or deregulation is
added as a fourth type of decentralization (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983; Work 2001,
29; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).
The assumption behind decentralization is that local government has an
advantage over the central government due to its proximity to people, issues and areas
(Rondinelli and Cheema 1983). The objectives of decentralization include: 1)
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector, 2) responding to
diverse local needs and interests to achieve more equal economic and social
development, 3) strengthening participation and democracy and improving
governance, 4) maintaining political stability through self-governing, and 5)
improving the public finance and economy (Silverman 1992; see summary in Litvack,
Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Besides, it is believed that the capacity of local government
as well as civil society can be improved through decentralization for development and

238
poverty reduction (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). These objectives of decentralization
are broadly categorized into economic and political purposes (Silverman 1992).
In theory, decentralization differs from democratization; a certain level of
democratization is necessary to make decentralization work properly (Manor 1999).
Decentralization, however, is considered to be essential for democratization (Work
2001). The principles of democracy, such as human rights, equality, citizenship, and
self-governing, are compatible with decentralization. Democratic decentralization in
developing countries aims to empower the community by contributing to democracy
and development, building locally tailored decision-making processes, increasing
information available, improving accountability and transparency, and promoting
cooperation and partnership between state, civil society and non-governmental
organizations, etc. (Manor 1999; Work 2001). With the concept of governance,
Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) expanded the interpretation of political decentralization
to include participation of citizens and civil society in the political process, policy
making and public service provision, and the self-governing mechanisms of federalism
or autonomous regions. In fact, the three types of decentralization—political,
administrative and fiscal—cannot be separated in implementation (Manor 1999;
Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).
Outcomes of decentralization, whether or not it has produced the expected or
desired results, become more vexed when they are applied in developing countries.
Decentralization can result in economic inefficiency and spread of corruption

239
(Martinez-Vazquez and Mcnab 2003). Decentralization does not guarantee improved
accountability or civic participation depending on the country in question (Inter-
American Development Bank 2001; Rodden 2004; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).
Rodden (2004) warned against rushing to conclusions about the efficacies of
decentralization without understanding the complexities and differences inherent to
decentralization. In addition, Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) argued for examining
issues of implementation, rather than the theoretical flaw of decentralization, to
explain the lack of any satisfactory results. More importantly, decentralization must be
understood as a political process (Manor 1999; Work 2001). According to Falleti
(2005), the model of decentralization that is first implemented is associated with
power relations between the center and sub-national levels. The decentralization
framework is developed within the specific contexts of each country, with multiple,
often conflicting objectives, as a result of the political interests and calculations that
are inherent to any specific context (Silverman 1992; Manor 1999).
In short, decentralization initiates ―a more complex, intertwined form of
governance‖ (Rodden 2004, 482) involving the government, civil society, and the
private sector at the local level. Decentralization, the design and objectives of which
varies depending on the country‘s contexts, brings about extensive political changes.

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7.1.2. Decentralization and Peace Building
Providing territorial autonomy is one approach that has been used to address
communal violence (Gurr 1993). Self-governing arrangements include federalism,
autonomy, reserves and decentralization (Ghai 1998). Regional autonomy is a power-
dividing approach for conflict prevention, which is often discussed with the power-
sharing approach of Lijphart‘s (1969, 207) ―consociational democracy.‖ The power-
dividing mechanism of federalism or regional autonomy leads more likely to ethnic
peace than does a power-sharing mechanism such as consociationalism (Roeder 2005).
The advantages of self-governing institutions in conflict resolution include
improved political position of minorities and protection of their rights and culture;
mitigation of secession movements; cooperation among sub-groups or competition
within a group by separating regional and national issues; and respect for the
constitution and legal framework (Ghai 1998). Minorities and indigenous groups seek
autonomy to protect their own rights or determine their own future when they are
economically, politically and culturally marginalized in a state (Hannum 1996).
Minority rights are acknowledged as the foundation of a legal framework for self-
governing institutions, while self-determination has been accepted under an
appropriate institution of state (Ghai 1998). Cultural autonomy works to preserve the
distinct culture, language, religious tradition and values of minority groups. Financial
resources are allocated to develop public policies and promote economic development
by means self-chosen by the region. It increases local authority to manage natural

241
resources within a given territory (Gurr 1993). Under autonomous arrangement, civil
society based on civil rights creates alternative flows of power, crosscutting ethnic
differences of the state and the various ethnocentric groups (Roeder 2005). Therefore,
state integration is not threatened by secession movements or interests of regional
groups (Gurr 1993; Ghai 1998) and at the same time authority to control cultural,
economic and social issues is devolved to the local level (Lake and Rothchild 2005).
Hannum (1996) summarized that under the self-governing arrangement, a group
attempts to achieve certain objectives affecting the group‘s future, including
―language; education; access to governmental civil service, including police and
security forces, and social services; land and natural resources; and representative
local government structures‖ (458).
Autonomy is primarily suggested for regionally concentrated groups (Ghai
1998); however, federalism can be applied for intermixed regions with power-sharing
mechanisms utilized as an integrative approach (Lijphart 1979; Sisk 1996). Horowitz
(1985) analyzed the advantages of autonomy in ethnically homogenous and
heterogeneous regions. In homogenous regions, regional autonomy can mitigate ethnic
conflict by shifting focus to intra-ethnic problems at the local level such as Nigeria
and India (Horowitz 1985). Federalism based on ethnicity is called ―Ethnofederalism‖
(Rothchild and Roeder 2005b, 33). With the protection of minority rights under
ethnofederalism, trust in institutions of the state grows among minorities (Bunce and
Watts 2005). In the extreme case of ethnic civil war, ethnofederalism or the division of

242
conflicting groups into their own regions is the only available option in maintaining
the integration of a state (Kaufmann 1996).
On the other hand, ethnic elites in a heterogeneous region may build inter-
ethnic cooperative relations for certain objectives under self-governing institutions. An
example of such federalism is the multi-ethnic states in Malaysia. At the state level,
the Chinese developed partnerships with Malay elites for their businesses, and ethnic
clashes are often treated as regional problem (Horowitz 1985). According to Roeder
(2005, 64), ―power dividing creates conditions in which many members of the ethnic
majority and minorities are likely to recognize shared interests in defending the
institutional order.‖ Hence, Horowitz (1985) argued that not just self-governing
ability, but local political factors of inter- and intra-ethnic relationships are the main
reason for making regional autonomy work for the prevention of ethnic conflicts.
In short, self-governing institutions provide a good opportunity for cessation of
conflicts and can become a basis for negotiation (Ghai 1998), because regional
autonomy serves the interests of both the majority and the minority (Lake and
Rothchild 2005) through ―inclusion,‖ ―division of power,‖ opportunities to ―improve
performance‖ of government (Bland 2007, 208), and promotion of ―discussion and
compromise‖ (209). However, as Horowitz (1985) stated, there are different
arguments to explain the mechanisms of ethnic peace at the local level, depending on
the level of heterogeneity or homogeneity of the population.

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Similar to the impacts of decentralization discussed above, Ghai (1998) argued
that whether or not decentralization contributes to ethnic peace cannot be guaranteed,
because of the dynamic of political and social changes in ethnic environments that are
at play along with institutional changes. Rather, self-governing institutions should be
understood as a process for modifying the existing local contexts, which could either
stimulate peace or give rise to conflict between ethnic groups (Ghai 1998). Therefore,
as Horowitz (1985) proposed, it is imperative to examine how ethnic relations are
changed to create peaceful and cooperative relations or to intensify antagonistic
relations, depending on the level of heterogeneity in the population.

7.1.3. Representative Government and Conflict Management
Policies aimed at proportional representation in the public and private sectors
and higher education have been adopted to mitigate economic disparities among ethnic
groups in various countries (Horowitz 1985). Horowitz (1985, 653) called these
―preferential policies.‖ For example, Malaysia is well known for implementing
affirmative programs for indigenous Malays in the area of government employment
and university admission. Because these policies require no special financial
investment to implement, they are legitimated as provisional policies that enable
disadvantaged groups to catch up with the majority (Horowitz 1985). Policies for fair
ethnic representation or quota are developed as part of the pluralism and power-
sharing approaches to accommodate grievance of marginalized groups (Gurr 1993). In

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fact, such preferential policies are often adopted under self-governing mechanisms
such as regional autonomy or federalism (Horowitz 1985).
In particular, focusing on a fair share of government positions, the theory of
representative bureaucracy argues that if the composition of a bureaucracy resembles
its society, (i.e., in gender, ethnicity or race), such a government serves its people
better (Evans 1974; Esman 1997, 1999; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998).
According to Horowitz (1985), one of the objectives of regional autonomy is to
achieve equal representation of ethnic groups in government employees. Hannum
(1996) also pointed out that groups often sought the provision of employment
opportunities in government and representation in bureaucracy of the local
government in autonomous arrangement.
The role of the government in ethnic conflict is arguably mediated by the
ethnic composition of public officials and the implementation of policies and
programs (Esman 1997, 1999). The ethnic composition of public officials becomes a
political issue in an ethnically politicized society in terms of whether or not a group
occupies an appropriate proportion of bureaucracy, especially at the higher levels
(Esman 1997, 1999), a dynamic that Brown (1999, 373) called the ―theatre of inter-
ethnic drama.‖ Because of the relative importance of the government in providing job
opportunities in developing countries, discrimination in recruitment of civil services
significantly affects minorities not only in terms of economic, but also political,
resources (Hannum 1996). Policy implementation is not always fair for all groups.

245
Important positions in government are distributed to members of a dominant group,
and entry to the public sector is sometimes limited to certain groups through
discrimination and disparity in socio-economic status (Esman 1997, 1999). Thus,
inclusion of all groups in society into government is perceived as a symbol of fairness
and lack of discrimination, which can result in trust of the populace in their
government (Hannum 1996) and can improve legitimacy of the government as well
(Esman 1999). Designing the bureaucracy to represent the ethnic composition of a
society can mitigate ethnic conflict by promoting fair policies and access to
government resources (Esman 1997, 1999; Brown 1999).
Nevertheless, there are negative effects in installing representative bureaucracy
in terms of efficiency, politicization and equality. A group expects special services or
provision of resources from bureaucrats belonging to its own group, which places a
hidden burden on the public officials (Esman 1999). Horowitz (1985) explained that
preferential policies aimed at long-term social changes, not immediate changes,
generally target the middle class. These policies do not address the frustrations of
those who are usually involved in ethnic violence, because they are often not from the
middle class. With limited opportunities for the non-targeted groups, due to
preferences given to the target group (such as the middle class), the preferential
policies can exacerbate antagonism between groups and discrimination. At the same
time, the group benefiting from affirmative policies does not always improve their
abilities or economic position, because under such policies, even those who are less

246
qualified than others, are accepted into positions. Such inflexible quotas may cause a
problem when the numbers do not reflect the ethnic balance (Horowitz 1985).
Therefore, both positive and negative impacts of preferential policies, representative
bureaucracy in particular, on ethnic relationship should be carefully examined.

7.2. Decentralization and Local Politics in Indonesia
7.2.1. Decentralization in Indonesia
Indonesia had been known as an authoritarian and unitary state that was
centralized for over thirty years before Suharto stepped down. Indonesian
authoritarianism was legitimated under the state ideology with an emphasis on
harmony, consensus, cooperation and paternalism. Corporatism was integrated in the
Constitution to maintain national solidarity in the multi-ethnic country (Bourchier
1997). Regional aspirations were suppressed to maintain the unitary state, which was
one of the most diverse, in terms of both inhabitants and environments (Carnegie
2008).
Decentralization in Indonesia was described as the ―Big Bang,‖ ―moving the
country from one of the most centralized systems in the world to one of the most
decentralized‖ (World Bank 2003, 1). The Laws No. 22 on Regional Government and
No. 25 on the Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Governments were
enacted in 1999 (Law No. 22/ 1999; Law No. 25/ 1999). After a two-year preparation
period, the two laws became effective in January 2001 (World Bank 2003).

247
To prevent separatism of provinces and to improve local governance, these two
laws transferred most functions to approximately 400 districts, except those of
national concern such as national security and foreign affairs (Duncan 2007). Along
with the shift in functions, regions received substantial fiscal resources consisting of
equalization funds including block grants, revenue sharing of property taxes and
income from natural resources, and special allocation funds (Suharyo 2002). Under
these laws, regional assemblies were formed by directly elected legislators and the
head of the local government was chosen by the legislators. The head of the local
government is required to prepare development policies with stakeholders (World
Bank 2003). Civil servants formally under the central government were transferred to
local governments, mostly at the district government level (World Bank 2003;
Kristiansen, Dwiyanto, Pramusinto and Putranto 2009).
The two laws of No. 22/ 1999 and 25/ 1999 were amended in 2004 as Law No.
32/ 2004 and Law 33/ 2004 (Law No. 32/ 2004; Law 33/ 2004). In particular, Law No.
32/ 2004 brought two important changes to inter-governmental relations at the central,
provincial and local levels, and the direct election of the heads of the regions. During
the first round, the heads of the region were elected by the Regional People‘s
Representative Assembles (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). After 2004,
governors, district heads, and the president have been selected through direct election.
In addition, Law No. 32/ 2004 articulated the management of civil servants, such as
appointment and promotion, to be supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs and

248
provinces, and new requirements for creating new districts and provinces (Law No.
32/ 2004).
Nevertheless, the revised Law 32/ 2004 and Law 33/ 2004 were perceived as
setbacks from the objectives of decentralization by strengthening the authority of
provinces as well as the central government, i.e., recentralization (Okamoto 2005;
Bünte 2009). Well-known opponents of decentralization included President Megawati
and her military networks (Hadiz 2004) and the Ministry of Home Affairs
(Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005; Bünte 2009).

7.2.2. Decentralization, Pemekaran and Local Politics in Indonesia
Based on experiences from around the world, decentralization has produced
mixed results in building ethnic peace. Institutional arrangements do not necessarily
prevent social conflict and guarantee ethnic peace. For example, India, Spain,
Switzerland, Belgium and Malaysia are often cited as successful cases of regional
autonomy or federalism (Horowitz 1985, Roeder 2005; Brancati 2006), while Nigeria,
Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia are cited as failed or less successful cases (Lake and
Rothchild 2005; Brancati 2006). Although there are contesting views on the
contribution of decentralization, federalism and regional autonomy to conflict
prevention (Bunce and Watts 2005; Brancati 2006), the record of the effects and
process would thus far indicate that decentralization is a far more complex process
than the mere imposition of an institutional design (Horowitz 1985; Rodden 2004;

249
Falleti 2005; Lake and Rothchild 2005; Brancati 2006). Therefore, scholars have
argued that the success of decentralization in conflict prevention depends on various
factors: the commitment of politicians at regions and the center, and available
resources (Gurr 1993), the constellation of intra- and inter-ethnic relationships
(Horowitz 1985), a strong region of majority or ―core ethnic region‖ (Hale 2004, 166),
regional ethnic parties (Brancati 2006), dependency of institutions (Lake and
Rothchild 2005), and the democratization process (Bunce and Watts 2005).
Moreover, institutional arrangements do not answer the question of why there
is unequal distribution of ethnic violence within a country (Varshney 2002; Varshney,
Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004a). The consequences of self-governing institutions
are not fully known before implementation (Ghai 1998), because the macro
institutional design ignores local contexts such as differences in interests and
competition for power (Hadiz 2004). Horowitz (1985) therefore concluded, ―In short,
federalism is not for everybody‖ (619).
Hence, there is a strong need to scrutinize each case, to examine the processes
and impacts of decentralization on ethnic relationships and local institutions. In
particular, the discussions of institutional arrangements for peace building lack
consideration of its impact on ethnic relationships in civil society, despite the
emphasis on political cooperation and competition. An analysis of the changes in
ethnic relationships in civil society, corresponding with the political changes initiated
by decentralization, is necessary to attain a holistic understanding of the effects of

250
decentralization on ethnic peace building. The following sections provide the case of
Indonesian decentralization and its effects on local governance, including changes in
politics, the government, and civil society.

(1) Changing Local Politics
In the case of Indonesian decentralization, various issues and problems have
emerged due to the short preparation period and the wide scope of the changes. The
World Bank (2003) identified the issues in Indonesian decentralization as follows: 1)
ambiguity in functions transferred to local governments, 2) the responsibilities of
provinces, 3) a weak and conflicting legal framework, 4) capacity of local
governments and human resources management, 5) creation of new districts, 6) weak
financial base of and disparity of fiscal power among local governments, 7) a need to
improve accountability, and 8) political representation. As discussed before, the
amendment in 2004 specifically aimed at addressing issues concerning roles of the
provinces (Okamoto 2005; Bünte 2009).
Hadiz (2004) assessed Indonesian democratic decentralization as a failure. In
Indonesia, with increasing uncertainty and confusion about the decentralization
process, strong political connections that had survived the transition were transformed
to capture the benefits of newly enacted local situations that played a part in
decentralization and democratization. The powerful, rather violent groups
overwhelmed civil society in competitions for power. Thus, democratization and

251
decentralization merely transferred the New Order‘s violent tactics and KKN—
abbreviation for corruption, collusion, and nepotism in Indonesian–to the local level
(Hadiz 2004).
Regional autonomy has activated the interests of local actors, including
governments, politicians and communities. Along with the devolution of various
functions and responsibilities, local governments gained legal power to enact
regulations for controlling those issues that were not covered by the central
government‘s regulations or laws (Law No. 22/ 1999). However, the regulations
passed by districts and municipalities often conflicted with the regulations prepared by
other agencies. In the forestry sector, in particular, such conflicts created competitions
and various relational dynamics of power, over the control of natural resources.
District governments provided logging concessions without coordinating with other
agencies, while villages and local communities requested compensation or economic
opportunities in exchange for access to forests or lands, based on customary right,
(McCarthy 2004), which is called ―the revival of adat‖ movement (Henley and
Davidson 2008, 815). If denied, villagers did not hesitate to engage in violence to
protest against outsiders deciding what they should have. Brokers and gangsters
appeared to coordinate logging companies with government and local communities
(McCarthy 2004).
Decentralization was expected to make governments and policies more
responsive to local interests and promote participation of the local community,

252
especially indigenous groups who were marginalized under Suharto‘s New Order
regime (Duncan 2007). In spite of the confusion and competition among multiple
actors at the central and local levels, McCarthy (2004) argued that local communities
can benefit from opportunities provided by decentralization in deciding the policies
and management of natural resources. Nevertheless, local governments, bureaucrats
and local politicians were trying to increase their own benefits with the given
autonomy, rather than support those groups. Local communities were not necessarily
better off in the highly politicized local environments that have resulted under
decentralization (Duncan 2007).
Thus, development of local politics should be carefully monitored along with
the implementation of decentralization. As scholars and practitioners such as Manor
(1999) and McCarthy (2004) discussed, decentralization is a process of political
change. The degree to which the local community can cultivate opportunities for self-
governing in decentralization depends on the capacity and the political skills of the
groups involved (Duncan 2007). Yet, McCarthy (2004) posed a question of ―whether
the incipient decentralized system—with all its faults—is worse than the highly
centralized bureaucratic system that existed in the past‖ (1216). The political process
at the local level after decentralization is not necessarily a straight path to effective
democracy and has often resulted in unexpected outcomes. Among those, violence is
one of the most undesirable consequences.

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(2) Violence and Decentralization
Moreover, according to Welsh (2008), violence such as mob activities,
lynching and vigilantism has increased after decentralization. Community policing,
which was organized to fill the gaps of weak law enforcement and social control that
resulted with the end of the New Order, often legitimated the use of violence in
solving problems in the community. Rearrangement and emergence of local power
relationships after decentralization have become stimuli for violence while
deteriorating the foundation of the existing conflict resolution methods.
Violence after decentralization was often related to the emergence of strong
local identifications, such as ethnicity. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Malay and
Madurese clash in 1999 was instigated by Malay elites‘ rivalry against the Dayaks due
to competition over the district head posts. The need to establish the position of
―putera daerah‖ (native son) was fueled by decentralization and the creation of new
districts (Davidson 2005, 2008). Thus, Davidson (2005) concluded that
decentralization has ―unleashed spiralling ethnocentrism and heightened the
dehumanization of irksome ‗outsiders‘‖ (184), though violence was concentrated in
certain areas in the country (Varshney, Tadjoeddin and Panggabean 2008).

254
(3) Adat Movement and Rise of Putera Daerah (Native Son) Discourse
The rise of a sense of local community is supported by the adat movement and
putera daerah discourse. In the reformasi era, adat (custom or tradition) movement,
41

which had already been awakened by international recognition of indigenous rights,
had spread in Indonesia, particularly outside of Java (Li 2001; Henley and Davidson
2007, 2008). During the New Order period, adat and indigenous rights were ignored
for the sake of a national development policy and projects such as transmigration,
logging or large scale plantation projects (Bamba 2000; Achwan et al. 2005).
However, the decentralization laws officially acknowledged the roles of adat in local
governance, which was also used as a strategy to deal with uncertainty and insecurity
in the situation of weak law enforcement during and after the transition (McCarthy
2004; Henley and Davidson 2007, 2008).
In the current movement, adat is frequently applied to land ownerships, natural
resource management, social norms and a model of community (McCarthy 2004;
Henley and Davidson 2008; Acciaioli 2010). In the reality, the return of adat, in spite
of its positive notions of self-governing or community based-management, did not
necessarily benefit the indigenous community, but the existing power structure,
including politicians, local elites, and specific traditional leaders (Li 2001; McCarthy
2004; Henley and Davidson 2008). More importantly, the claim of adat denied rights
of outsiders or migrants, while making claims for the demands of indigenous groups

41
For detail, see Chapter 3.

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(Li 2001; Henley and Davidson 2008). In other words, adat legitimated hierarchy of
citizenships in rural Indonesia, based on ―a politics of difference‖ or ―the racialization
of territory‖ (Li 2001, 647, 2002).
Thus, ―adat has served as a rationale for ethnic exclusion and a justification for
ethnic violence‖ (Henley and Davidson 2008, 818). However, there are several cases
in which the concept of the adat was used as a means for problem solving. For
example, in Central Sulawesi, migrants accepted customary management of fishery
resource imposed by the adat council as an effective means of solving the problem,
which had developed as a result of overfishing, while, on the other hand, they rejected
the restriction of land ownership proposed for conservation purposes (Acciaioli 2010).
The dual nature of the adat movement, ―violence and empowerment,‖ reflects the
bright side and dark side of democratization and decentralization (Henley and
Davidson 2008, 840). This symptom of adat demonstrates the failure of not only state
institutions but also the romanticized idea of autonomous community management (Li
2002; Henley and Davidson 2008).

(4) Administrative Fragmentation “Pemekaran”
Since decentralization, ―pemekaran‖
42
or ―administrative fragmentation,‖
which is the separation of the existing administrative units to establish new districts or
provinces, became frequent (ICG 2005, 1). The district governments jumped from 292

42
Pemekaran means ―process of making something blossom out‖ in Indonesian.

256
in 1998 to 434 in 2004 after decentralization mostly in the regions outside of Java
(Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser 2005). With the birth of seven new provinces, 33
provinces exist as of 2010.
In Government Regulation No. 129/ 2000, objectives of the establishment of
new regions were identified as improving the welfare of the community by upgrading
public services, accelerating democracy and regional economic development,
cultivating regional potentials, improving security and order, and reinforcing central
and regional relationships. To create a new jurisdiction, a prospective area needs to
submit a request to found a new region with the required approvals from the head and
legislature of the original region. A technical team is then sent from the Regional
Autonomy Advisory Council for assessment. Once the president approves the
proposal, the parliament adopts a law to establish the new region or directly decides on
the formation of a new region (Government Regulation No. 129/ 2000; Fitrani,
Hofman, and Kaiser 2005). Establishment of a new region is determined according to
the requirements of economic capacity, regional potential, socio-culture, socio-
politics, population, area, and other aspects related to regional autonomy (Government
Regulation No. 129/ 2000).
The research of Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005) found that from 1998 to
2004, new districts were more likely to be established by dividing large districts with
lower population density, districts with higher ethnic diversity and party
fragmentation, and districts with smaller amounts of developmental budget allocations

257
in local government expenditures. The earlier cases of pemekaran before 2000
occurred in the districts with rich natural resources. The later cases, those after 2001,
resulted in increases in the wages of public officials (Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser
2005). Thus, Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005) have argued that the motives of
pemekaran entail improvement of public services in a large and less populated district,
creation of homogenous areas, and an increase of the government budget, as well as
bureaucratic and political positions.
The first decentralization law No. 22/ 1999 did not require strict criteria for
creating a province or a district. A new district including regency and municipality
(kabupaten/kota) could be established with three sub-districts (kecamatan), with
approvals from legislatures of the original district and province (Law No. 22/ 1999;
Okamoto 2005). The moderate requirements for creating a new district encouraged
local elites to establish new administrations for the enlargement of their own power
and resources (World Bank 2003; Okamoto 2005; Bünte 2009). Thus, the requirement
for creating new administrations was revised in Law No. 32/ 2004 due to the criticism
(Okamoto 2005). In the amendment of 2004, a new regency (kabupaten) should
consist of minimum five sub-districts (four sub-districts for creation of a municipality
or kota) and the legislatures of the originating district and province, district head, and
governor must approve the creation of a new district with the recommendation of the
Minister of Home Affairs. It also stipulated a seven-year restriction on the creation of
a new district after the first pemekaran (Law No. 32/ 2004).

258
Creating a new district, or pemekaran, can become a new cause for conflict in
Indonesia. Granting autonomy based on ethnicity can also hinder the development of
inter-communal civic associations and reinforce the polarization of groups (Ghai
1998). It emphasizes differences in ethnicity or group, which results in competition
between groups (Bünte 2009). In analysis of religious conflict in North Maluku,
Wilson (2005) found that a root of conflict in the region was the establishment of a
new subdistrict, which was related to the location of a gold mine as well as the
solidarity of the indigenous group, attachment to ancestral lands, and migrants‘ access
to resources and land. The unfair treatment of contesting ethnic groups due to
connections of government and other institutions intensified the tensions between the
groups. Similarly, violence in West Sulawesi, which was initially perceived as a
religious clash, actually started with a dispute over the creation of the Mamasa district
between the pro-pemekaran and opponent groups (ICG 2005). Therefore, the creation
of new districts could trigger communal conflicts by dividing the community, though
there are cases that the previously marginalized groups under the New Order benefited
from increased opportunities for participation in policy making by creating a new
district (Bünte 2009).

(5) Bureaucracy after Decentralization and “Pemekaran”
After the decentralization, civil servants were transferred to regional
governments, with the devolution of functions and responsibilities. As a result, more

259
than 75% of civil servants belonged to regional governments in 2002 (Rohdewohld
2003). By Law No. 22/ 1999, local governments were granted autonomy to develop
their own organizational structure and administer recruitment of new employees (Law
No. 22/ 1999; Rohdewohld 2003; World Bank 2003). However, a number of issues
were pointed out in management of the bureaucracy after the decentralization,
including corruption (Kristiansen et al. 2009), hiring of civil servants and putera
daerah (Rohdewohld 2003), and the capacity of and the conflicting legal framework
for the management of public servants (World Bank 2003).
Due to a lack of transparency and accountability, corruption has remained at
the highest levels or has worsened, and local government officials abused granted
authority and funds for their own interests (Kristiansen et al. 2009). According to
Kristiansen and Ramli (2006), new applicants for public service positions often had to
pay bribes during the recruitment process, and promotions in government also involve
additional payments. After decentralization, the amount of payment required for the
first employment doubled from 17.5 million rupiah in 1998 to 30.8 million rupiah in
2004 due to the tight competition. For example, the Public Works Department and the
Ministry of Religion, which controls development projects or religious permits and
activities, required higher payment than other sectors such as the Health Department.
The price also varied depending on the connections of the applicants to government
officials and transactions of bribes were coordinated through brokers (Kristiansen and
Ramli 2006).

260
As discussed previously, the ethnic composition of a bureaucracy and policy
implementation influence ethnic relationships and conflict (Esman 1997, 1999).
Communal conflict is sometimes related to competition for important government
positions (Horowitz 1985; Bertrand 2004). Bertrand (2004, 6) pointed out ―the intense
competition at the local level for state resources, access to positions in the civil
service, or control of the top leadership positions in the province or district‖ as causes
of violence. Local residents, or putera daerah, have been given priority in recruiting
many local government employees (Rohdewohld 2003; World Bank 2003). In order to
prevent corruption and nepotism, Law No. 32/ 2004 reassigned supervision over
recruitment and management of the civil service to the Ministry of Home Affairs and
governor, and at the district level the secretary of region, not the district head, for
guidance and administration of the personnel (Law No. 32/ 2004; Okamoto 2005).
Yet, whether or not these changes in government, in addition to pemekaran,
influenced the existing ethnic relationships and how they contribute to conflict
prevention have not been examined. Because pemekaran makes the population more
homogenous or heterogeneous by the division of a district, the ethnic composition of a
district after pemekaran affects both the ethnic composition of government and
politicians and their calculation, as Horowitz (1985) suggested. For example,
according to the theories of representative bureaucracy (Esman 1997, 1999), if a new
administrative unit is created along ethnic lines, connections to power and resources of
government could be secured and as a result, inter-communal conflict may decline,

261
because it shifts competition from inter-group to intra-group relations. Therefore, it is
essential to analyze how institutional change, pemekaran, affects ethnic relationships
to prevent ethnic violence.

(6) Civil Society after Decentralization and “Pemekaran”
The design of the decentralization process expects to increase citizen
participation and provide an opportunity for civil society to take an active role as an
alternative power source for improving accountability and public service delivery
(Crook and Manor 1998; Manor 1999; Work 2001; Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, and
McNulty 2007). With the implementation of democratization, freedom of associations
in particular, non-governmental organizations (NGO) mushroomed after the reform
and their increase rates varied from about 270% in women‘s organizations to 3,900%
in unions (Feulner 2001). The total number of NGO was estimated at 70,000 in 2000
(Hadiwinata 2003).
Nevertheless, the civil society has yet to prove itself to have worked as
expected (Feulner 2001). The constraints of NGOs in Indonesia are summarized to
include dependence on top-down leadership, lack of horizontal relationships and
networks among NGOs, limited capacity, ambiguous targets and goals, weak
management, and accountability issues (Hadiwinata 2003; Antl ӧv, Ibrahim, and van
Tuijl 2006; Antl ӧv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010). NGOs founded by strong leaders
were less likely to be able to develop effective connections with the community, due

262
to the bourgeois characteristics of NGOs. These organizations have been concentrated
in urban areas of Java (Antl ӧv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006; Antl ӧv, Brinkerhoff, and
Rapp 2010). Due to the problems described, NGOs in Indonesia have not gained the
trust of the government and the community (Antl ӧv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006).
Many new NGOs were not functional because of structural problems and undefined
missions (Feulner 2001). Corruption and embezzlement of project funds were not just
issues of the government but also NGOs (Hadiwinata 2003). Financial dependence on
international donors was a critical problem for the sustainability of programs and the
survival of many organizations (Antl ӧv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006).
These issues showed that Indonesian NGOs were still under the shadow of the
New Order oppression. Many NGOs had little connection with the mass population.
They had developed as yayasan or a foundation, not a membership association
(Hadiwinata 2003; Antl ӧv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006; Antl ӧv, Brinkerhoff, and
Rapp 2010), as a strategic way of avoiding attracting attention from the regime,
because of its depoliticization policies and requirement for adopting the state ideology
of Pancasila during the New Order (Hadiwinata 2003). According to Hadiwinata
(2003), the survival of NGOs depended on the ability of management to build
relationships with the government. Network or coalition building in outside the
government control was not only difficult, but dangerous to organization‘s survival.
The legacy of violence of the New Order was inherited by civil society. To
survive the brutal New Order regime, violence and riots were often the only means for

263
people to express their civic opinions during the New Order (Aspinall 2004). After the
reformasi, it was not rare for gangsters to be involved in demonstrations, resulting in
more violent protests (Hadiwinata 2003). Also farmers ran into land that previously
belonged to them but had since been appropriated by the state for projects or for
development plans of private firms (Hadiwinata 2003; Aspinall 2004). Thus,
Hadiwinata (2009, 278) wrote ―the ‗heroes‘ of earlier mass movements against
authoritarian regimes have tended to turn into ‗troublemakers‘ during the transition
period.‖
As discussed, the promoter of the adat movement is AMAN (Aliansi
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, or Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago),
which expressed its strong position by stating, ―We will not recognize the Nation, if
the Nation does not recognize us‖ (Li 2001, 645). As champions of the adat
movement and supporters of putera daerah, Dayak NGOs and ethnic organizations
became vehicles of ethnic violence in West Kalimantan (Davidson 2008) and Central
Kalimantan (ICG 2001; van Klinken 2002). Vigilante groups or community security
watch groups took the law into their hands by punishing violators of adat and local
customs as described by Welsh (2008). Hence, civil society, including NGOs and
other associations in Indonesia, were not only too weak to be the leading force of
democracy, but also sometimes violent and destructive to society by bringing up
narrow interests and political ambitions of specific groups.

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In short, after the decentralization, various changes were observed in politics,
government and civil society across the country. Among them, the adat movement and
pemekaran were rather excessive reactions to localization from the past centralization,
as discussed by Henley and Davidson (2008) and Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser (2005)
respectively. The corruption, abuse of power and capture of local resources by politics
and in bureaucracy were transferred and expanded at the local level after
decentralization and democratization (Hadiz 2004; McCarthy 2004). In spite of the
growth of civic associations, civil society has not become a leading actor in the newly
opened democratic space, but rather has become a corrupt one that rushes into self-
serving opportunities as they arise, similar to the functioning of political society
(Hadiwinata 2003; Antl ӧv, Ibrahim, and van Tuijl 2006). Described by many scholars
(e.g. McCarthy 2004; Henley and Davidson 2008; Welsh 2008; Hadiwinata 2009), the
tactics of violence have appeared more openly in the local, political and civil society.

7.3. Theoretical Framework for Analysis of Changing Civil Societies and
Local Politics
To analyze the impacts of institutional changes in decentralization and
pemekaran (i.e., the division of the district) on ethnic relationships in the case of
pemekaran in West Kalimantan, I focus on the symbiotic relations between civil
society and political society at the local level. The development of civil society is
strongly influenced by interactions and experiences of civil society and politics. In

265
West Kalimantan, civil society has been ethnicized inevitably, due to the existence of
strong ethnic organizations, ethnic NGOs and ensuing ethnic politics.
Civil society has not developed independently from political society. Although
vibrant civil society is often discussed as an indispensable ingredient of democracy,
there exists a ―complementarity‖ between civil society and political society (Linz and
Stepan 1996, 8). Political society learns democratic norms from trials and errors, on
how to deal with demands and criticism from civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996). On
the other hand, a state is necessary for civil society to articulate rules and rights
available there. To build a better society, civil society has to mobilize state power or
bureaucracy by changing rules or law or policies (Chandhoke 2004). In short, ―the
state frames the limits of civil society, as well as frames social initiatives in civil
society‖ (Chandhoke 2004, 153). Therefore, state-civil society cannot be simply
dichotomized, but are mutually influential.
This mutually dependent relationship between civil society and political
society has been prevalent in Indonesia. The stronger impacts of politics were
observed in civil society. In an analysis of Indonesian NGOs, Hadiwinata (2003, 253)
wrote, ―[T]he associational cultures are often fragile, crudely reflective of the
structures of power within society.‖ Additionally, ―[s]pace for civil society
engagement in democratic governance in Indonesia is highly dependent on political
will, which is unevenly distributed‖ (Antl ӧv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010, 436). The
transition did not affect the players in bureaucracy and politics in the old regime as

266
well as their business corruption, rent-seeking, use of violence since the New Order
(Aspinall 2004; Hadiz 2004; Antl ӧv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp 2010). By restructuring
and renewing the existing patronage networks to adjust the new institutional
framework (Hadiz 2004), ―clientelism became even more decisive, both at the
explicitly political level and in civil society‖ (T ӧrnquist 2000, 401), but ―turning from
one-man bossism to petty bossism‖ at the local level (T ӧrnquist 2000, 417). Even
though Indonesia successfully managed to implement democratization and
decentralization, Aspinall (2004, 84) has argued that the fall of Suharto has ―little
relationship to the models of political change nurtured in much of organized civil
society.‖ Because development and capacity of civil society were significantly
constrained by the past experience of civil society and a centralized and oppressive
government, it was not an easy task for NGOs to develop democratic norms in civil
society (Hadiwinata 2003).
However, the creation of a new district or pemekaran can open new spaces for
civil society and political society to emerge by freeing a new district from issues of the
originating district and organizing a new government, i.e., the district head and
bureaucracy. As discussed, the theories of decentralization for conflict prevention
focus on not civil society but politics, distribution of economic resources, or
preservation of culture (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1993; Hannum 1996). Yet, general
decentralization arguments rooted in democratization and governance pay attention to
civil society and participation (e.g. Manor 1999; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). The

267
local political opportunities could cause problems of local boss enclaves and patron-
client relationships (T ӧrnquist 2000; Hadiz 2004); however they also can work to
bring about positive impacts. For example, the division of the Luwu district into four
districts in South Sulawesi moderated communal antagonism. The new district head of
North Luwu took initiatives to improve public order by cooperating with newly
founded district police and mobile brigade (Brimob) post within the district and to
support re-establishing village governance and resolving land disputes (ICG 2003).
According to the ICG (2003), in this case, the absence of a single majority ethnic
group and antagonism against the province worked positively for peace building.
Creation of a new district or pemekaran, therefore, opens new spaces for civil
society and political society. While decentralization has the effect of separating
regional issues from the central problem vertically by providing autonomy (Ghai
1998), creation of a local unit horizontally divides regional issues between ethnically
contested areas and areas accommodating ethnic differences. As the example of North
Luwu, the newly democratically elected district head is able to develop policies to
address problems among different groups. Meanwhile, as discussed, by organizing
bureaucracy to reflect the ethnic composition of district, government can reduce
tensions among ethnic groups (Esman 1997, 1999). Thus, civil society at the local
level can emerge and evolve through the reorganized political structure in the region
while enjoying democratic values and openness.

268
Nevertheless this separation does not necessarily guarantee ethnic peace. Yet,
with decentralization, pemekaran, and democratization, ethnic relationships may turn
into the new phase of cooperation, dominance and competition, which was hidden
beneath during the New Order. The following chapters show the changes and
opportunities in political and civil society brought about by pemekaran through three
cases of Sambas, Bengkayang and Singkawang.

269
CHAPTER 8
DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND ETHNIC
RELATIONSHIPS: CASE OF THE NEW SAMBAS
The succeeding four chapters illustrate the impacts of decentralization and
pemekaran on ethnic relationships in the three districts after the pemekaran of
Sambas. The Sambas district experienced serious violence, including ethnic clashes
between the Dayak and Madurese and the Malay and Madurese, the massacre of the
Chinese, the suppression of the rebels of PGRS/ Paraku and konfrontasi
(confrontation) against Malaysia, as described in Chapter 2.
The process for the pemekaran of the Sambas district started before the ethnic
clashes between the Dayak and Madurese in the end of 1996. The initiatives for
pemekaran started on October 14, 1994 by establishing a task team (Kabupaten
Sambas 1998). A letter from the governor of West Kalimantan regarding the
pemekaran of Sambas was issued on February 15, 1996. The district head of Sambas
also prepared a letter concerning the pemekaran on January 29, 1997 and the Sambas
District People‘s Representative Council (DPRD) made a decision to separate Sambas
into three districts, namely, Sambas, Bengkayang and Singkawang on March 29, 1997.
In 1999, the Bengkayang district was founded, separating from the Sambas
district. The district capital of Sambas moved from Singkawang town to Sambas town.
Furthermore, Singkawang City was separated from Bengkayang in 2001. As a result

270
of the pemekaran, Malay and Dayak became majority groups of Sambas and
Bengkayang respectively. The Chinese were the largest ethnic group in Singkawang.
The three cases in the following chapters describe changes in government and
local politics, impacts on civil society and ethnic relationships after decentralization
and the establishment of the new districts. This chapter provides the case of Sambas,
how the pemekaran affected the ethnic relationships and local governance after
pemekaran.

8.1. The Objectives of Pemekaran of Sambas
For the community of Sambas, the pemekaran was ―moving Sambas from
Singkawang to Sambas.‖ Before Indonesia‘s independence, there was a sultanate in
Sambas with the capital in Sambas town; however, the Dutch moved the capital of
Sambas to Singkawang in consideration of transport networks and other reasons, such
as the kongsi war against Chinese. The Sambas community had wished to take the
capital back to where it had been, ever since the Dutch moved. Since decentralization,
or regional autonomy, was recognized as self-governing, as well as providing a
financial arrangement that enables the improvement of the regional economy and
development, most of the community welcomed both the regional autonomy and
pemekaran.

271
8.1.1. Changes after Pemekaran: Accelerated Development
Creation of the Sambas district brought about various positive changes. Before
pemekaran, Sambas town was described as a ―dead . . . ghost town.‖ However, after
division of the district, Sambas developed into a real town as the district capital. The
palace of the Sambas sultan was repaired with government assistance. The pemekaran
brought significant benefits, improved public services, and an increased per capita
budget.
After the transfer of the district capital to Sambas, access to government
services dramatically improved. Before pemekaran, all facilities and government
offices were located in Singkawang. Because of the distance to it and an inadequate
transportation network, it was difficult for residents of certain sub-districts to access
public services there.
Due to the district‘s smaller size and improved transportation, the distance
between community and government shortened and communication between them
improved. An interviewee commented that ―the communication is now easy‖ with
information reaching village levels. A close relationship between community and
government helped government manage the community.
The local government budget also increased after the district‘s creation. As a
result, infrastructure, including roads and transportation network, bridges, electricity
and telephone, and health and education facilities, improved and the construction of
new buildings, offices, and houses accelerated. These improvements contributed to

272
improvement of the Sambas economy as well. The chairman of the Chamber of
Commerce mentioned the growth of the Sambas economy and its exports. A Dayak
interviewee also noted the growth of the economy, especially in the agricultural sector.
Thus, through pemekaran, ―Sambas became visible‖ because of development and
progress.

8.1.2. Negative Change or No Change?
In spite of the positive assessment of changes, accelerated development of the
region was enabled by high spending from the local government which relied on
subsidies from the central government; local income accounted for only 10% of the
total revenue in 2005 (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2006). The existing economy of
the region was insufficient to generate the needed tax revenues for the district; while
many areas still needed to be developed and improved. The local government was
required to make greater effort to develop the local economy by inviting investors.
Moreover, the cost of pemekaran ran high. Indeed, with pemekaran, new and
more complex problems emerged, and people‘s expectations for the positive effects of
change were raised. To address the issues that arose, interviewees pointed out the
importance of communication among the various levels involved in the change.
Another issue of pemekaran was that with observed positive impacts of the
pemekaran, more desires to create a new district appeared. Plans to create new
districts in the Sambas district included Sambas Pesisir (around Pemangkat) and North
Sambas (Jawai, Tangngarang, Teluk Keramat, Paloh, and South Jawai sub-districts).

273
These pemekarans intended to seek improved welfare, services, development, central
facilities and infrastructure. A local council member described those phenomena as
―excessive‖ because a new idea of pemekaran started even before the newly created
district began fully functioning. Sometimes a plan for a new pemekaran was initiated
by candidates who lost elections. Moreover, there was a desire to found a new
province, North Kalimantan, in northern West Kalimantan, including Singkawang,
Sambas, and Bengkayang.

8.1.3. Government Employees and Pemekaran
Malay has been the dominant ethnic group in the Sambas district government
since before pemekaran. However, after the Sambas district became more ethnically
homogenous, the ethnic composition of government employees, specifically executive
officials, more closely resembled the general population. Before the reformasi,
Sambas had only a few local district heads. In the last administration of the old
Sambas district, the highest rank of Malay government official was secretary of the
region. The district heads were mostly Javanese or military officers, though
interviewees commented it was not a problem for the local community. In the new
Sambas district, Malay became the district head and most high rank officials. A Malay
government official, but not from Sambas, expressed his concern with a strong
sentiment of son of soil or ―putera daerah‖ in the government.

274
Sambas Malay government officials, however, denied bias in the ethnic
composition of government employees. As long as requirements for a rank of
government officials were satisfied, anyone could fill a position and there was no
preference of local Malays in recruitment. There were Malay, Javanese, Dayak,
Sundanese, Batak, Buginese, Padang, West Nusa Tenggara, and others in the
government. In fact, the vice district heads and the secretary of region were not
Sambas Malay. A visible deficiency of another indigenous group, Dayak, in the
Sambas government was explained by issues of human resources, not discrimination.
The government emphasized equality in policy; for example, Dayak dominant sub-
districts also enjoyed development and improved public services. Thus, while there
was a majority of Malay government officials, they rejected the notion of any
favoritism towards Malays. Rather, they presented a nationalist view: ―This Sambas
has a nationalist aspect in [its] governance structure . . . . There is no ego of
ethnocentrism . . . . Certainly we differentiate government from ethnicity.‖
Nevertheless, it was a common practice in Indonesia for leaders to provide favorable
treatment to their own group.
Meanwhile, there was friction even within Malays who were unhappy about
the current administration. Although the current district head, Burhanuddin A. Rasyid,
was selected in the district council with the backing of FKPM in the first term in the
direct district election of 2006, FKPM divided its support among the candidates. For

275
example, certain southern sub-districts supported the pair of the vice district head and
the sultan over the district head.
Therefore, the minority groups were concerned about the majority-minority
issue. Because the majorities of government employees and population were Malays,
in general, Christians rarely received high ranking positions, such as department head.
However, because of the unchanged status of Malay dominance in the government and
a strengthened majority in the population, these voices were rarely heard compared to
those in Bengkayang.

8.1.4. Creation of District Police and Security
The creation of a new district means establishing not only the district
government but also all other government institutions. After the creation of the
district, the security apparatus for the area, i.e., the district offices of police and
military, were also created in the district capital, Sambas town. The installation of the
district security forces in Sambas was welcomed by the Sambas community.
In the past, only sub-district police stations were located outside the former
district capital, Singkawang. If an incident could not be addressed by the sub-district
police, people had to ask for help from the district police in Singkawang located about
a 90-minute drive from Sambas. As the triggering incidents of most ethnic violence in
the past often happened in villages, this lack of access to the security forces, due to
distance, was one of critical factors in the government‘s ability to quickly address
problems. An interviewee pointed out, ―[T]he police were not ineffective, but slow,

276
delayed.‖ However, after pemekaran, the PFKPM chairman explained, ―[N]ow in
Bengkayang there are District Military Commander and District Police office. They
are in Singkawang and in Sambas. So it‘s very easy.‖
Thus, because of the reduction in the jurisdiction of each security force from
pemekaran, the police were able to detect problems easily and take necessary action to
address them quickly. This made the prevention of problems and conflict more
effective and efficient. However, other factors, such as restructuring the police by
reformasi, could have been one of factors affecting the improvement in responsiveness
of the security force.

8.2. Pemekaran and Civil Society in Sambas
The discussion above showed how local contexts changed after pemekaran.
The division of the district accelerated development and improved the district
economy, public services, and security. On the other hand, the creation of a Malay
majority district reflected the composition of government employees, which caused
some concerns among the minority. Nevertheless, the political changes in Sambas
were not as significant as in Bengkayang or Singkawang. Because Malay received
relatively better education and access to public services, compared with Dayak and
Chinese, their majority position in the district government and population had not
changed.

277
This section discusses how these political and contextual changes made by the
pemekaran affected civil society, in particular, ethnic organizations. With the new
districts, the existing ethnic organizations, i.e., DAD, PFKPM, and MABM, founded
new district-level organizations through the pemekaran. The ethnic groups that did not
have ethnic organizations, such as the Chinese, formed their district organizations after
the reformasi and pemekaran.
The strengths of ethnic organizations depended on the status of ethnicity in
district. PFKPM was dominant in Sambas; DAD was prominent in Bengkayang; and
there were two Chinese organizations, MABT and FOKET, in Singkawang. These
major ethnic organizations often had branch offices in sub-districts. Because of a
diverse population, more ethnic organizations were established in Singkawang than
the other two districts.

8.2.1. Ethnic Organizations and Ethnic Cooperation in the New Sambas
In the new Sambas district, there existed ethnic organizations of Union of
Malay Youth Communication (PFKPM), Malay Cultural and Customary Council
(MABM), Dayak Customary Council (DAD), Chinese Cultural and Customary
Council (MABT), Javanese, Sundanese, and other ethnic organizations. In the past,
these organizations were neither very structured nor active, and most were created
after the ethnic riot Sambas in 1999. Along pemekaran of the district, the existing
ethnic organizations, PFKPM, MABM, and DAD, were separated to adjust to the new

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jurisdiction. A Malay organization, PFKPM (previously FKPM), was the most
powerful in the district due to the Malay majority in population, though by the
division of PFKPM Sambas and Singkawang, the power of PFKPM was divided.
A Chinese organization, Chinese Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis
Adat Budaya Tionghoa or MABT) was newly founded in 2006, as a district branch of
MABT. Since the 1970s, Chinese social organizations existed for funerals, other
traditional ceremonies, and social matters. These organizations were planned to be
integrated under MABT. If there was a problem, the Chinese communicated with
other groups through MABT, which contributed to improve communication with
government.
In general, the foundation of ethnic organizations was considered good for the
community. These organizations were able to contribute to settlement of problems
between ethnicities by promoting communications and exchanges of information
among them. If trouble appeared between ethnic groups, ethnic leaders from ethnic
organizations, e.g., PFKPM, often became the first contact to seek advice and help in
mediation. With the creation of ethnic organizations, coordination with other
ethnicities was improved. In the past, it was difficult to identify the appropriate ethnic
leaders who could resolve a problem. But because Malay leaders were easily identified
in PFKPM, formal communications among ethnic leaders were established through
ethnic organizations in addition to informal communications among leaders. The
foundation of ethnic organizations simplified the process of problem solving by

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clarifying the ethnic leaders. Ethnic organizations also invited people from other
ethnicities, i.e., leaders or key figures, to cultural events and occasionally played the
role of advisor to other ethnic organizations.
As previously discussed, ethnic organizations emerged as a by-product of
ethnic violence. A need for ethnic cooperation was identified in the dynamics of that
ethnic violence. A Malay interviewee said, ―The conflict was as a starting point to
understand that we have to mutually introspect ourselves, and mutually provide
information between ethnicities.‖ Ethnic organizations can facilitate cooperation and
strengthen friendships among ethnic groups. Thus, ethnic organizations were
described as ―coordinating institutions . . . precisely to make it easier to overcome the
problems faced by various ethnicities, not for competition or conflict.‖
Nevertheless, there was concern over ethnic organizations. As discussed,
FKPM was the driving force to expel Madurese from Sambas. Satgas, the security
division of PFKPM currently, could become simply a group of gangsters, if not
managed well. An interviewee from PFKPM said that if Satgas is not well-managed,
―they become thugs who use the power of the organization to seek personal or group
interests.‖
Moreover, the majority group of the district could not be ignored in civil
society. PFKPM, the most powerful organization, led ethnic organizations in Sambas.
Although the ethnic organizations were positively accepted by the community in

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general due to their contribution towards problem solving and conflict prevention,
some anxiety remained about the misuse of ethnic organizations.

8.2.2. Ethnic Organizations and Government
Ethnic organizations benefitted the government in several ways. One was that
the ethnic leaders were easily identified through their respective organizations. In the
past, because there were so many types of informal leaders, who the actual ethnic
leaders were, was not necessarily clear to the government. With foundation of ethnic
organizations, the government could easily identity those ethnic leaders who could
influence the community.
After the ethnic organizations were formed, if a problem occurred between
ethnic groups, the government called on the clearly identified ethnic leaders and asked
them to settle the problem. As a government official commented, ―It‘s easy to handle
conflict by calling heads of the organizations. It‘s heads of the organizations who
pacify.‖ The government also provided support to ethnic organizations in their efforts
to address an issue, if the ethnic organizations alone could not solve the problem.
Ethnic organizations also improved overall communication with government.
Meetings were held among ethnic organizations, as well as between ethnic
organizations and the local government, when an important issue or event arose.
Because ethnic organizations functioned as liaisons of ethnic groups, the local
government could have frequent and productive communication with the community.

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A Malay organization, PFKPM, cooperated with the government and the
police during local events. For example, Satgas of PFKPM cooperated with the police
at the time of the district head election of Sambas in 2006 to maintain peace and
security upon their request under the police command. Thus, if there was a problem,
the government asked PFKPM for help to resolve it in the community.
Thus, a distance between the local government and community shortened and
cooperation between them increased. However, there was a criticism against the ethnic
organizations that they simply followed government instructions.

8.2.3. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum in Sambas
After the reformasi and the division of Sambas district into three districts, an
inter-ethnic communication forum was founded in the Sambas district in 2001, in
addition to the ethnic organizations. The forum consisted of the ethnic organizations in
Sambas: PFKPM, MABM, MABT, DAD, and other ethnic groups such as Javanese,
Sundanese, Batak, or Buginese. Each ethnic organization sent representatives to the
forum. This inter-ethnic communication forum was not a formal organization but a
loose network of ethnic organizations.
The forum did not hold regular meetings but called them as necessary—for
example when a problem arose, or an event was planned. The forum was recognized
by the district government, the police, and other government institutions. The local

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government provided non-financial forms of support to the forum because the forum
was founded by initiatives from the community, not the government.
One objective for the foundation of the inter-ethnic communication forum was
developing communication between ethnicities to prevent future ethnic conflict.
Problems and concerns between ethnic groups were reported to the forum for the
resolution of those issues. This forum contributed to building a ―sense of brotherhood,
a sense of togetherness‖ between ethnic groups.
In addition to the district-level forum, sub-district level inter-ethnic
communication forums were founded in several sub-districts. For example, headed by
Malay and involving ethnic groups there such as Malays, Chinese, Javanese,
Buginese, and Aceh, the forum in Jawai was established in 2000 after the ethnic clash.
A meeting was called if there was a topic to be discussed. The forum worked
effectively to resolve ethnic issues before they became significant as explained:
The purpose of the forum is to reduce the atmosphere of conflict
between ethnic groups here, even it is a small conflict, and especially a
big conflict. We always contact leaders . . . . [I]t is very good . . . [as]
this forum functions very well. It means that a problem can end through
settlement at the family level.
Besides ethnic leaders, key government officers at sub-district level, such as the heads
of the sub-district police (polsek) and military (koramil), attended the forum as

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advisors. The idea to organize various types of inter-ethnic communication forums
appeared in different places in the district.
43

In the new Sambas, a Malay organization, PFKPM, dominated the forum and a
Malay majority was prominent in almost every aspect including politics and
governments. The inter-ethnic communication forum was rather a venue of
coordination between PFKPM and other ethnic groups in the district. However, those
inter-ethnic communication forums had not contributed to reconciliation between
Madurese and Malays, due to the PFKPM opposition. A Madurese criticized the
communication forum involving only the top level and a lack of efforts from the
forum to resolve the Malay-Madurese relationships. Most Sambas Malays considered
that the problem with Madurese was already over because the displaced Madurese
were no longer residents of Sambas. Hence, reconciliation with Madurese was out of
the scope of the forums.

8.2.4. Pemekaran of Civic Associations
The pemekaran promoted the development of not only ethnic organizations but
also other types of civic associations. After the foundation of the new district of
Sambas, district-level civic organizations were also formed by separating them from
the previous organizations based in Singkawang. This ―pemekaran‖ of civic

43
For example, there was a plan to establish a forum for ethnic communication such as the Association
of Community Caring Sambas (Himpunan Masyarakat Peduli Sambas) involving Malays, Chinese,
and Javanese.

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organizations happened to mostly nation-wide organizations. For example, once
Muhammadiyah, an Islamic organization, in Sambas town, was a sub-district level
branch, but a ―regional board,‖ or district branch, was founded in 2000 by separating
from Singkawang.
The other religious organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), established a district
organization corresponding to the creation of the districts of Sambas, Bengkayang and
Singkawang.
44
Each district branch managed its organization independently. Before
pemekaran, most civic organizations and NGOs were located and organized activities
in Singkawang, the capital of the old Sambas district. Because of that, the members in
Sambas and Bengkayang had difficulty to participate in the activities. However, after
pemekaran, civic organizations became active and cooperation emerged with the
government and other civic organizations, e.g., for religious celebration during
Ramadan. NU received financial support from the government and directly
coordinated with them.
Civic organizations acted as coordinating institutions and made efforts to
anticipate problems, including ethnic issues. The success of the district head election
was argued as evidence of cooperation among civic organizations and between civic
organizations and government. The government asked cooperation of civic
organizations for the prevention of riots during the election campaign. The chairman
of NU explained the cooperation of the civic organizations:

44
Unlike Muhammadiyah, the district headquarter of NU Sambas was located in Pemangkat, a center
in southern Sambas.

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[T]hese civic organizations form coordinating institutions, umbrella
institutions to assemble a variety of professions who are here, and
ethnic groups . . . . Yes, that is, they can anticipate when undesirable
things may happen. With the holding hands of all the existing civic
organizations here, we create an atmosphere of peace. I think if civic
organizations were not active, the district head election . . . would not
be successful.
Besides religious organizations, business organizations, such as the Chamber
of Commerce, also established new district-level branches in Sambas. New NGOs
were founded after pemekaran and were actively involved in policy making process as
partners of the government.
In short, the civil society in Sambas had been activated after pemekaran.
Ethnic organizations, inter-ethnic communication forums, and civic associations,
including religious organizations and NGOs, were newly established or upgraded to be
district-level organizations. These civic associations and the government built
cooperative relationships to take action to prevent violence and to address troubles in
the community.

8.3. Conclusion: Pemekaran, Ethnic Relationships, and Conflict Prevention in
Sambas
8.3.1. Pemekaran and Ethnic Relationships in Sambas
The previous sections explored the changes in political society and civil
society after the foundation of the new Sambas and examined pemekaran‘s impacts on
ethnic relationships and conflict prevention. However, prominent changes were not
found in the political structures and, less so, for civil society in Sambas. Because

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pemekaran produced minimal changes in the politics of Sambas district, consequently
the lack of changes was also reflected in civil society.
The newly created district was more ethnically homogeneous. The ethnic
compositions were illustrated by the Malays in the coastal areas of Sambas, the Dayak
dominance in Bengkayang, and the Chinese in Singkawang. The majority-minority
issues were realized as a symptom of pemekaran. A government official said that ―the
direction is toward the symptom of ethnic dominancy.‖
However, the ethnic concentration of each district was explained primarily
from the geographical concentration of ethnicity, historic reasons, or simply
coincidence. The pemekaran of the Sambas district was initiated for historic reasons
and the purpose to improve development. The relations between pemekaran, ethnic
relationships, and ethnic violence were rejected. The pemekaran of Sambas was
supported not only by Malays but also by all ethnic groups in the district, including
former Madurese residents. The pemekaran of Sambas was indeed planned before the
occurrence of the ethnic violence.
In the new Sambas district, the majority group was Malay. After the
pemekaran, Sambas Malay became more dominant in the bureaucracy, especially at
high ranking positions, e.g., the district head and department heads. However, because
the Malay was the majority group in the government even before pemekaran, the
recruitment of putera daerah had not raised fear or concern of inequality among the
minority groups there.

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Moreover there were several sub-districts dominated by minority ethnic
groups. For example, though the majority group in the district was Malay, Sajingan
and Subah were Dayak dominant sub-districts. The government contended that
policies had been fair for all citizens in the district and the bureaucracy was ethnically
mixed as discussed. All ethnic groups were involved in the governance, especially at
the sub-district level. If there were differences in the levels of development and
implementation of policy, they were because of constraints, such as insufficient
infrastructure or distance to the capital or urban areas. The negative impacts of the
majority or ethnic dominance were rejected.
In civil society of Sambas, ethnic groups founded ethnic organizations while
the existing ethnic organizations, such as Malay‘s PFKPM, renewed the organizational
structure by establishing a new district branch corresponding to the government
jurisdiction, and new leadership was established. Similarly, the existing civic
associations, such as religious organizations and NGOs, established district offices
while new organizations were established to fulfill new opportunities in the district.
Yet, relationships among ethnic organizations were more likely determined by the
Malay ethnic organization, i.e., PFKPM. Though inter-ethnic communication forums
were established, no inter-ethnic organizations for peace and/or efforts at
reconciliation with the Madurese appeared in the district.
Thus, not many changes were observed in ethnic relationships in Sambas.
Because the ethnic political status in the district, i.e., the Malay majority, had not

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changed either before or after pemekaran, consequently the ethnic relationships in
civil society and relationships between ethnic organizations remained unchanged as
well.
However, the creation of a Malay-dominant district slightly increased
competition in the Malay community. The district election in 2006 divided Malay into
the incumbent district head, and the vice district head paired with the sultan of
Sambas. Though the current district head of the first term was elected by the local
council with the support of PFKPM, PFKPM did not support any candidate and their
members voted for a candidate based on their own preference. There was a report of
minor fights between the communities, such as a fight between fishermen in Jawai and
Pemangkat. Nevertheless, it was less likely that these fractions among Malays would
affect inter-ethnic relationships in Sambas or Malay-Madurese relationships.
Therefore, ethnic relationships in Sambas depended on Malay and the Malay
organization, PFKPM, due to the Malay dominance in the district. After the expulsion
of the Madurese from the district in 1999, ethnic relationships in the district had not
changed and had become more stable. Although establishment of the district police
station and inter-ethnic communication forums may be able to prevent ethnic violence
within the district, the foundation of a Sambas district as a pure Malay district made it
more difficult to reconcile with the Madurese, under the flag of Malay in Sambas from
the government to civil society. Hence, civil society was not independent from the
political society. A lack of changes in the political position of Malays and the

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government‘s view on the ethnic relationships did not alter attitudes of ethnic
organizations and the community in civil society.

8.3.2. Pemekaran and Conflict Prevention in the Case of Sambas
The creation of an ethnically homogeneous district may have reduced ethnic
conflict because it was easier to have greater control over a homogenous community.
The community, specifically the majority group, felt safer in the new district; on the
other hand, such arrangements raise concerns among the minority groups.
Pemekaran simulated communication and cooperation between civil society,
the community, and government due to the smaller administrative areas that had been
created and the corresponding closeness to community that occurred. Ethnic
organizations and inter-ethnic communication forums cooperated with the government
to address issues and various problems that arose in the community. An interviewee
commented, ―There is always communication among individuals, and among ethnic
groups through associations or forums.‖ Thus, the community felt safer after
pemekaran.
The maintenance of ethnic peace also depends on the new government and
leadership. The newly established district police contributed to improved security in
the district. The reelection of the district head in 2006 by a direct election was cited as
evidence that he treated all ethnic groups equally and ethnic peace existed in Sambas.
A Malay, a leader of PFKPM, said with the confidence that the minorities, including

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Dayak, Javanese, and Chinese, felt safe in the Malay district: ―[I]f this district head
had a chance to win, it is one of the indicators that he has capacity to give a sense of
security to all ethnicities there.‖ The residents chose a district head based on his
capacity, not ethnicity. A Chinese interviewee supported the comments of Malay
interviewees by indicating that ―we don‘t choose ethnicity,‖ but ―intelligence,‖
―education,‖ and ―professional experience‖ as selection criteria of a district head. He
also said that Chinese were not afraid of being a minority because of fair treatment.
The successful district head election without violence strengthened people‘s
confidence in progress of democracy and peace in the district.
Such basic securities were also critical to the economy, as there were economic
incentives to maintaining ethnic peace and creating a safe environment in order to
promote investment there. There were two important tasks for the Sambas government
and community to promote investment in Sambas: to prove the safety of Sambas to the
entrepreneurs and to always evolve better ways of preventing violence.
These discussions showed the increased importance of local factors as they
related to ethnic relationships, and the emergence of various interests in the district
which had come about as a result of decentralization and the pemekaran. Strong ties
had built between ethnic organizations and the local government. The latter also
strengthened control over the community. Due to the direct elections and the majority
of Malay status, the district head, elected officials, and the government started caring
about the name of ―Sambas‖—how people perceived the district and the regional

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autonomy raised concern over impacts of ethnic issues on the economy as well.
Therefore, with the increased influence of various local factors and interests, and the
strong Malay dominance, there was less possibility of inter-ethnic violence at the
district level.

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CHAPTER 9
DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND ETHNIC
RELATIONSHIPS: CASE OF SINGKAWANG CITY
Founded by separating from the district of Bengkayang in 2001, two years
after the pemekaran of Sambas and Bengkayang, Singkawang City was an urban
district and the second most populous city in the province, after the provincial capital
of Pontianak. The majority of the population was Chinese, yet it had a more
heterogeneous population than Sambas and Bengkayang and a relatively large
Madurese population. This section explores changes in political and civil societies
after pemekaran and its impact on ethnic relationships.

9.1. Impact of Decentralization and Pemekaran on Government and Politics in
Singkawang
9.1.1. Pemekaran of Singkawang
Singkawang City was established along the division of the Sambas and
Bengkayang districts. The pemekaran of Sambas aimed to improve access to public
services and accelerate the development of remote areas in the district. Because
Singkawang was the capital town of the Sambas district and the commercial center in
the northern part of the province, most infrastructure and government facilities were
already installed, unlike Sambas and Bengkayang. A resident of Singkawang said,
―Singkawang already had facilities and infrastructure to welcome the arrival of
regional autonomy.‖ However, by separating Bengkayang from Sambas in 1999, the

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capital moved from Singkawang to Sambas town, and Bengkayang town was
designated the capital of the Bengkayang district. Consequently, Singkawang lost its
function and the status of being the district capital and became an area of ordinary sub-
districts.
Responding to this change of the status, the Singkawang community launched
a campaign to establish Singkawang City. They concluded that pemekaran was
necessary to explore the economic potentials of Singkawang. The group ―Community
Caring for Singkawang (Masyarakat Peduli Singkawang),‖ consisting of various
ethnic members including the Dayak, Malay, and Chinese was organized to establish
Singkawang City. Most ethnic groups n Singkawang—Chinese, Malay, Dayak,
Madurese, Javanese, and Buginese—participated in the campaign and the public
expressed widespread support for the fight to create the city. This community
involvement was a political movement to found its own district, including new
political institutions and positions, such as a local council and a district head. Just like
the residents in the Sambas district, people expressed ethnic sentiment behind the
creation of new districts and the Singkawang community rejected ethnic issues. It is
coincident that the majority of the groups became more prominent in each district after
pemekaran.
After the creation of Singkawang City, sub-districts were also divided to found
new sub-districts, or in other words, pemekaran of sub-districts for improvement of
access to and quality of public services, and community development, similar to the

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objectives of establishing a district. Creating a new sub-district, people built an office
of sub-district head and other public facilities. Along with those, small restaurants and
shops opened in the area for the sub-district offices. The following section illustrates
changes in the political society and government after pemekaran.

9.1.2. Chinese Majority and Singkawang City Government
The ethnic composition of the Singkawang government employees did not
reflect the population‘s ethnic composition. The majority of city government
employees were Malay, though the Chinese comprised the majority group in the
general population. The mayor and vice mayor were Malay and Dayak, respectively,
in 2007. The Chinese were only found among the elected officials of the local council,
not in government.
The Chinese and other ethnic groups believed that most Chinese were
disinterested in being civil servants. The government did not reject Chinese applicants,
as long as the requirement of Indonesian citizenship was fulfilled because some
Chinese did not have Indonesian citizenship or maintain dual citizenship of China. The
Chinese tradition or culture of going into business and avoiding problems with other
ethnic groups were noted as reasons of the small number for Chinese public servants.
Thus, unlike Sambas and Bengkayang, giving priority for the indigenous population in
recruitment of government employees, i.e., the issue of putera daerah, were not
apparent in Singkawang.

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Nevertheless, despite the past trends of the Chinese being primarily engaged in
business, there was a desire within the Chinese community to make the ethnic
composition of the Singkawang government resemble the population‘s—
consequently, to increase the number of Chinese in the government and to elect a
Chinese mayor. Certain Chinese individuals showed interest in running for the
mayoral position during the 2007 election because Chinese had already been elected
as district heads across the country. A Chinese interviewee commented on increasing
interest in ethnic composition of the government but also contested views on political
participation among the Chinese community. There was a belief among the Chinese
community that increasing the number of Chinese in the government, elected officials,
and heads of government would correspondingly reduce discrimination against them.
A Chinese local council member explained this as follows:
Why are Chinese people discriminated against? Because there is no
Chinese among high ranking government officials. Say in police there
is examination of motorcycle driver‘s license, Chinese are warned, get
caught, others escape. Why? Because there is no Chinese police. This is
why young people should join, become the army, become a cop, a
prosecutor, a judge, to be fair.
As Esman (1997, 1999) discussed, ethnic groups seek access to government
resources through their members who occupy high ranking positions. For example,
though the private sector there was dominated by Chinese, Malays were more likely to
join the Chamber of Commerce and its chairman was not Chinese. The Chamber of
Commerce was described as an organization to access government resources, but a
Chinese business person said that the Chinese were not interested in joining it. On the

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other hand, Malays were often criticized for receiving more projects through
connections with Malay government officials. Chinese endured discrimination in the
past with economic strength and apolitical attitudes; however, the government
reflecting the ethnic composition of the population has been waited for fairness and
equality of all the community there.
Therefore, pemekaran initiated changes in ethnic positions underneath the
surface, in terms of access to the government. The Chinese community began
expecting fair treatment and political representation in the city. Their majority status
contributed to overcoming the fear derived in the past suppression. However, a lack of
government experience, political education, and human resources were suggested as
obstacles to increasing Chinese representation in government.

9.1.3. Changes in the Police
Singkawang maintained relatively better conditions of public peace and order
since before its creation. There were fewer problems in the city. If something
happened, the police usually arrived shortly and addressed it without delay, due to the
small jurisdiction, infrastructure, and proximity to government offices. The
Singkawang residents said that ―there was no difficulty,‖ or ―a large-scale conflict has
never happened in Singkawang,‖ though the Dayak-Madurese clash and Malay-
Madurese riot spilled over the Singkawang community.

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After reformasi, attitudes of government, the police in particular, drastically
changed. The police were more concerned about eyes of the community, NGOs, and
human rights violations. It was not easy to bribe the police as in the past. People
criticized and fought against the police if the latter did something wrong, for example,
filing a false charge. The behaviors and attitudes of police officers were well
supervised while community and civil society carefully watched them. Thus,
performance of the police and law enforcement were believed to improve in
Singkawang. A citizen commented, ―The government is already tight. If there is a
little problem, it is arrested at first . . . . There is indeed the action of security forces.‖
This was partly because Singkawang was an urban district with active NGOs and
educated citizens.
As discussed in Chapter 2, triggering events of the past violence happened in
rural areas. However, it is uncertain whether or not the observed changes of the
security force affects their capacity to prevent the expansion of riots to the city.

9.1.4. Development
Development in Singkawang accelerated after pemekaran. The community felt
positive changes had happened in terms of development, improvement in the
infrastructure, and public facilities. For example, an interviewee commented on
improved drainage and flood control in his testimony. In the past, development
programs were not provided equally and fairly to all sub-districts creating disparities

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in development among sub-districts. The fair allocation of budgets was an issue
because the distribution of resources in the past was suspected of being tainted by
corruption. However, development became relatively balanced throughout the city
after pemekaran. As a result of physical development, the city economy also was
enhanced, and the gross regional domestic product grew by 4% per year from 2001 to
2004 (BPS Kota Singkawang 2005). Changes in public services and development
were more apparent to the community. Nevertheless, the development of Singkawang
after pemekaran was less visible compared to that in Sambas and Bengkayang,
because most of government and public facilities were already developed there before
pemekaran.

9.1.5. Problems of Pemekaran
One issue of regional autonomy in Indonesia was heavy local government
budget reliance on subsidies from the central government. One government employee
explained that 90% of regional budgets was subsidized. In fact, 80% of the total
revenue came from Jakarta in 2005 (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2006). The
government cannot pay the personal expenses of the government employees from their
own local revenues (BPS Kota Singkawang 2005). At the time of the pemekaran of
the Sambas district, the financial requirements for initiating pemekaran were not
clearly defined. A Malay government official pointed out that Indonesian
decentralization efforts in the past had always focused primarily on autonomy rather

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than the financial aspects inherent to such a move. As discussed in Chapter 7, now,
requirements for the pemekaran became quite strict, and it is not easy to create a new
district.

9.2. Pemekaran and Civil Society in Singkawang
The ethnic groups in Singkawang newly founded ethnic organizations after the
pemekaran, similar to what happened in Sambas. The district branches of Dayak
Customary Council (DAD), Union of Malay Youth Communication Forum (PFKPM),
and Malay Cultural and Customary Council (MABM) were formed. In Singkawang,
there were two Chinese organizations of Chinese Cultural and Customary Council
(Majelis Adat Budaya Tionghoa, MABT) and Communication Forum of Ethnic
Chinese (Forum Komunikasi Etnis Tionghoa, FOKET), a Madurese group of
GEMISMA (Generasi Muda Insan Madani), Harmony of South Sulawesi Families
(Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan, KKSS) for Buginese, and associations of
Padang, Manado, and others.
The unique situation in Singkawang was the wide variety of ethnic
organizations. Due to the relatively mixed population of the city, the minority groups
in the other districts, such as the Madurese, also established ethnic associations.
Moreover, multi-ethnic civic associations were founded for ethnic peace and conflict
prevention. The next sections discuss those ethnic organizations, civic associations,
and their roles in conflict prevention. Because DAD, PFKPM and MABM are

300
previously discussed in the cases of Sambas and Bengkayang, ethnic organizations of
Madurese and Chinese are described in the case of Singkawang.

9.2.1. Madurese Organization: GEMISMA in Singkawang
The Madurese organization Generasi Muda Insan Madani or GEMISMA,
meaning Competent Youth Generation, was founded in 2004 in Singkawang.
According to the chairman, GEMISMA was not an exclusive Madurese organization
but made of mixed memberships. A Malay woman whose husband was Madurese
attended the activities of GEMISMA. The chairman said that the organization
belonged ―to all citizens,‖ though 60% to 70% of members were Madurese.
GEMISMA aimed to build unity, brotherhood, peace, and safety in the community.
GEMISMA held weekly activities of rotating funds, reading of Koran, and saying
prayers. Social activists or women‘s NGO asked GEMISMA to hold several meetings
for peace building.
GEMISMA was registered by the Singkawang government and welcomed by
the local community. The members enjoyed activities and positively evaluated the
organization‘s development. GEMISMA supported cultural events of other ethnic
groups, such as Dayak‘s harvest festival. If there was an event, the government sent an
invitation to GEMISMA as the Madurese community representative.
In the Sambas region, the primary concentration of Madurese was only found
in Singkawang. Approximately 10,000 Madurese live in the City, according to the

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2000 Census data (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2000a, 2000b).
45
Despite this
population concentration, GEMISMA was a new organization with only a small
segment of the Madurese in Singkawang having joined. Indeed there was some
Madurese opposition to the organization, as the Madurese community often divided by
sub-ethnicities or groups depending on the place of origin, or political parties, for
example. The chairman of the organization commented on the difficulties of
integrating the Madurese community.
However, a Buginese interviewee claimed that GEMISMA likely encompassed
sub-groups in Madurese Singkawang. Though there was criticism against the
organization for its powerlessness to help the displaced Madurese from Sambas and its
alert to a risk of ethnic organization, GEMISMA helped to integrate the Madurese
community with the government and other ethnic groups. GEMISMA made an effort
to create the community of Madurese in Singkawang separated from the negative
image of Madurese in Sambas in the past.

9.2.2. Chinese Organizations: MABT and FOKET
Two Chinese organizations, Chinese Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis
Adat Budaya Tionghoa, MABT) and Communication Forum of Ethnic Chinese
(Forum Komunikasi Etnis Tionghoa, FOKET), were founded in Singkawang after
reformasi. Similar to DAD and MABM, MABT Singkawang was a district branch. On

45
According to Census 2000, Pontianak had the largest Madurese population in 118,600, followed by
Pontianak City with 47,500 and Ketapang with 19,600 (BPS 2001).

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the other hand, FOKET was independently established in Singkawang. Before the
creation of these Chinese organizations, the Chinese community only had local social
organizations to help with funerals and traditional ceremonies, and other social matters
since the 1970s.

(1) Chinese Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat Budaya Tionghoa,
MABT)
Singkawang City was known as Chinese town or ―Kota Amoi‖ because
Chinese or Tionghoa, which is the name of the Chinese ethnic population, accounted
for 40% of the population of the City (BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat 2000a, 2000b).
MABT Singkawang, organized in September 2005, was the second largest district
branch of MABM after Pontianak. However the organization had more projects than
Pontianak, and members of the younger Chinese generations were actively involved in
MABT.
The primary objective of MABT was to restore aspects of the Chinese culture
that had been lost during the New Order period, primarily through the teaching of the
Chinese language and through cultural events sponsored by the group. MABT also
implemented social projects to help the Chinese and local communities, e.g.,
distribution of rice to the poor and other charity events. Their activities were supported
by the local government because the Chinese culture was one of central attractions for
the tourism industry in Singkawang.

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Although MABT contended that politics was beyond the scope of their
intentions, several interviewees pointed out that, nevertheless, MABT was one of the
political tools utilized by the Chinese community, particularly to obtain government
positions. It was also explained that one objective in founding MABM was to face
other ethnic organizations such as DAD and MABM.

(2) Communication Forum of Ethnic Chinese (Forum Komunikasi Ethnic
Tionghoa or FOKET)
Communication Forum of Ethnic Chinese (FOKET) was established as a local
organization in Singkawang in 1999 after the ethnic violence in Sambas. FOKET
aimed to protect the Chinese community, to support social development, and to be a
coordinating institution that represents Chinese interests. A FOKET representative
explained its scope was wider than MABT‘s, including not only culture, but also
economic, social, and legal issues in the community. FOKET held meetings
irregularly when an event, a problem, or a case with other ethnic groups warranted it.
However, MABT stated that the objectives and activities of FOKET were ―not so
clear.‖
FOKET also kept a close relationship with the Singkawang government.
Registered, the organization received financial support from the government. As
MABT, FOKET stressed the importance of the Chinese culture for tourism in
Singkawang. For example, Cap Go Meh, a festival on the fifteenth day from Chinese
New Year, attracted tourists across the country and from overseas.

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(3) Competition and Representation of Chinese Associations
There were two central issues regarding these two Chinese organizations:
competition between FOKET and MABT, and the representation of the Chinese
community, the ostensible aim of the organizations. A clear difference between the
two organizations was MABT‘s provincial organization with an established hierarchy
from province to sub-districts and with attempts to create a national branch in Jakarta.
A representative of MABT emphasized that particular advantages of the provincial
nature of MABT were quick responses to problems through representatives in each
region and the cooperation that existed among them. While FOKET was an
independent organization in Singkawang, there were similar local Chinese
organizations in other districts. Cooperation between FOKET and MABT was
mentioned by an interviewee from FOKET; however, another Chinese interviewee
stressed the competition between the two organizations:
They fought each other. There is an event like distribution of 500 tons
of rice. FOKET did not let us be involved. FOKET should have invited
all, like ‗let‘s work together for the community.‘ They split a group,
which was not good.
A Chinese interviewee even raised the question as to the needs for an
organization. The other also explained that the Chinese community once rejected
FOKET to found MABT. The Chinese community was rather fragmented by religion,
sub-ethnicity, clan, and economic disparity between the rich and the poor. The
community was not united nor solidarity maintained as a group. For example, the
religions among the Chinese population include Buddhism (of which there are further

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sub-groups), Catholicism, Protestantism, and Confucianism. They aligned with sub-
ethnicities in Chinese such as Teochew, Hokken or Hakka. There were divisions in
generations between the young and elders as well. Before the foundation of the two
Chinese ethnic organizations in Singkawang, there were fifteen Chinese foundations
for social services called ―yayasan‖ during the New Order era; however, not many
Chinese supported those organizations.
The reformasi or democratization offered political freedom, specifically for
Chinese. During the New Order period, Chinese were easy scapegoats, and various
―Chinese‖ activities were suppressed (Winarta 2008). Chinese still feared founding an
ethnic organization. A Chinese commented, ―They [Chinese] still have trauma from
the New Order, do not dare to have an organization. Later if there is Chinese who has
a rather vocal organization, it will be labeled as communist.‖ In spite of Chinese
avoidance of politics, it was anticipated that ethnic organizations could be used for a
political purposes such as elections, because ethnic organizations can nurture ethnic
solidarity, which leads to ethnic political power. A locally elected Chinese official
warned of negative influences caused by the organizations and fragmentation of
Chinese, economic calculation, and political benefits behind involvement in ethnic
organization: ―It eventually causes harm, loss, due to cultural habits of Tionghoa. If
they do something, certainly, there should be consideration of fortune first, benefits,
profits, benefits in the back, fortune at first . . . .‖

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The foundation of ethnic organizations indicated the beginning of political
participation for the Chinese. However, the Chinese ethnic organizations were not as
active as those of the two Malay and Dayak indigenous groups. The majority status of
the Chinese in Singkawang encouraged their political involvement, while it mitigated
fear and concerns they may have had about their perception in the eyes of other ethnic
groups.

9.2.3. Benefits of Ethnic Organizations
The identified advantages of ethnic organizations included development of a
sense of unity, prevention of ethnic clashes and nurture of ethnic harmony in
communities by joint problem solving and ethnic cooperation. The interviewees in
Singkawang argued that ethnic organizations could contribute to maintenance of
ethnic peace by hindering riots from entering to the city and deepening understanding
of other ethnic groups.
Most expected for ethnic organizations was resolving problems between ethnic
groups. According to interviewees, including Malay, Dayak, Madurese and Chinese, if
there was a problem, leaders from ethnic organizations met together to discuss how to
address it. Each ethnic group settled down its ethnic members. An interviewee said,
―We sit at a negotiation table, in order to avoid things like the Sambas.‖ Ethnic
organizations worked as contact points for other ethnic groups if a problem appeared

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and facilitated communication. These ethnic organizations compensated for weakness
of informal leaders, such as limited influence in the community.
Malay and Chinese leaders from MABM, PFKPM, and MABT explained that
ethnic organizations aimed to unite their communities and nurture a sense of
togetherness. Because of that, they said, ―relationships between ethnic organizations
are very good; interactions are very good.‖ All ethnic organizations attended ethnic
cultural festivals, and the government supported activities of ethnic organizations. A
representative of MABT said,
We visit each other at holidays . . . Idul Fitri, if for Muslims, we visit
there. If we have Imlek, Chinese New Year, there are people coming to
our place too. So there are mutual visits there. We have good
interactions. It‘s already very nice. Naik Dango, Dayak‘s holiday, so
we are also invited, yes. [In] the events like that, we support each other.
The chairman of the Madurese association GEMISMA expressed that they
performed Madurese dances at the Dayak harvest festival called Naik Dango or Gawai
Dayak. The head of Buginese association contended that the cultural festival was a
good opportunity to exhibit their unity of ethnic groups in Singkawang. Ethnic
organizations also mobilized for events such as elections, riot prevention, and public
order maintenance. A government official of Singkawang believed that these ethnic
organizations could contribute to education of democracy during elections.
The chairman of DAD Singkawang explained a plan of a new form of inter-
ethnic cooperation in the business and economic sectors. For example, other ethnic
groups can learn from the economic strength of the Chinese or the cattle farming

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expertise of the Madurese. Such economic cooperation among groups might lead to
improved economic situations for the entire community, and thus may eventually
reduce the risk of riots and ethnic violence in the region. A Chinese from the MABT
organization hoped that the expansion of ethnic cooperation and a deepening
understanding of the needs for ethnic cooperation in the Chinese community would
change the relative isolation the Chinese experienced due for historical reasons
previously explained.
Therefore, ethnic organizations promoted communication and interactions
between ethnic groups. The communication and problem solving through ethnic
organizations were efficient. A Chinese interviewee contended that ―ethnic
organizations are more efficient to solve a problem because the target is clear. If there
is an issue, we know who we should go to.‖ Thus, ethnic organizations can prevent
inter-ethnic conflict. Despite these positive evaluations of the citizens in Singkawang,
it cannot be overlooked the fact that a Malay ethnic organization, FKPM, instigated
the violence in Sambas as discussed in Chapter 5.

9.2.4. Relationships between Government, Ethnic Organizations and
Community
Initiatives of ethnic organizations for problem solving and ethnic cooperation
were supported by government because they reduced the tasks of government, the
police, and the military. If a problem appeared between ethnic groups, the government
could ask the ethnic organizations of those groups to settle it. Leaders of ethnic

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organizations and the government believed that this type of problem solving through
ethnic organizations proved more effective and efficient.
The activities of ethnic organizations supplemented tasks of the police, and the
government recognized these benefits. According to one government official, with the
foundation of ethnic organizations, government can easily contact community through
ethnic organizations, because contact persons were clearly identified. When necessary,
the government asked ethnic organizations for help and ethic organizations took
actions for their communities, such as disseminating information. Thus,
communication with the community was simplified and improved. A Dayak
interviewee said that ―a clear division of tasks‖ between them helped the police‘s duty
to maintain public order and enforce the rule of laws.
When there was a festival or cultural event of an ethnic group such as the
Chinese Cap Go Meh or Dayak Naik Dango, the government encouraged other ethnic
groups to participate in the event. A retired Malay government officer said that the
government supported activities of ethnic groups, promoted communication among
them, and made an effort to build cooperative relationships among ethnic groups. In
fact, Singkawang had a policy for ethnic peace building which included acceleration
of ethnic cooperation.
Not only between the government and ethnic organizations but also
communication between the community and government improved in general. Due to
the pemekaran, the district areas became smaller and distance between government

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and community shortened. The government and policy-making became more open to
the public with more information made available to the community. Chinese and
Madurese interviewees explained the relationships between the government and
community: ―In Singkawang, the relationships between the government and the people
are clearly better, far different, more focused now.‖ As a result, communication
between them improved.
Therefore, unlike the Sambas government, the Singkawang government
became actively involved in its concerns for ethnic organizations and for ethnic peace
building. After pemekaran, communication and interactions among government,
ethnic organizations, and community improved.

9.2.5. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum in Singkawang
(1) Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum
In 2006, an inter-ethnic communication forum was founded in Singkawang.
The forum aimed to develop unity and friendship among ethnic groups through
communication and joint-problem solving. The chairman of the forum was a retired
Malay government official, and the vice chairpersons were Chinese, Dayak, and
Madurese. The forum consisted of various ethnic leaders.
The primary objective of the forum was to address ethnic issues and problems
that would trigger a large scale ethnic riot. If a dispute or fight appeared between
ethnic groups, ethnic leaders discussed in the forum and took actions to address the
trouble to prevent it from spreading. A Dayak interviewee explained the function of

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the forum as follows: ―If there is a problem, yes, we solve it, we sit at one table, we
discuss there. Later we socialize a result of discussion to the community.‖ The forum
had sub-district branches. A given problem was handled at the sub-district level first
and, if it not resolved there, then it was brought to the district level and eventually
reported to the police. Because the forum included all ethnic groups in the city, it
functioned as a coordinating institution for ethnic groups through mediation by leaders
of those organizations. A government official of Singkawang evaluated that the forum
as effective because ethnic leaders could quickly respond through the forum and
facilitate possible settlements.
The chairman of Madurese association, GEMISMA, described the inter-ethnic
communication forum as ―the most beautiful,‖ because within the forum, the Dayak,
Malays, and Madurese were able to work together. The inter-ethnic communication
forum participated in cultural festivals and events organized by ethnic organizations or
the government, though the focus of the forum centered on social affairs.
The inter-ethnic communication forum was initiated by the Singkawang
community. Meanwhile, the forum was facilitated by the city government of
Singkawang. The Singkawang government recognized risks of ethnic organizations
that could lead to a strong sense of ethnicity. If there was no communication among
them, a trouble could easily appear among them. A government official said, ―The
government has policy in this issue so that ethnic groups shouldn‘t have too strong an
ego.‖ The Singkawang government supported cultural activities of ethnic

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organizations and ethnic pluralism. The support for the inter-ethnic communication
forum was one government effort to mitigate negative impacts of ethnic organizations
and nurture ethnic harmony through cooperation and communication. By involving
multiple ethnic organizations, fair resolution of problem was achieved. Singkawang
government officials stressed a risk of ethnic organizations and needs for the inter-
ethnic communication forum, in order to ―not let them [ethnic organizations] feel, well
I am right, this is true . . . .‖ Thus, ―[t]here must be other ethnicities to help
resolution.‖ Indeed, in 2006, the Singkawang government declared a policy to develop
Singkawang as a peace zone in West Kalimantan. The inter-ethnic forum was
identified as a factor useful to promote peace at the grassroots level.
Moreover, the government was helped by the forum. The forum cooperated
with the local government by providing advice and suggestions as a partner. Ethnic
organizations and the government mutually assisted each other under the forum, when
either of them needed help. Besides the Singkawang city government, the police were
also involved in the forum. The chairman of MABM Singkawang said, ―We are
always facilitated by the government whenever we want and we need . . . . So when
the government needs us, we get together and talk about things or issues related to
each ethnicity and each religion.‖ Thus, the forum contributed to the government and
the police by reducing troubles and problems in community.
Therefore, the inter-ethnic communication forum contributed to building of
cooperative relationships not only among ethnic organizations but also with the

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government. It reinforced the problem solving function of the ethnic organizations and
advocated ethnic cooperation.

(2) Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Faith Communication Forum
In addition to the inter-ethnic communication forum, there existed an inter-
faith communication forum in Singkawang. In the inter-religious communication
forum, Islamic groups such as Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), Catholic and
Protestant churches, and Buddhists, Hindu, and other religious groups assembled and
discussed religious issues or problems. According to interviews, the inter-religious
forum was established after the ethnic violence in the late 1990s. Their activities were
incidental, and meetings were counseled by the government. Nevertheless, a Catholic
priest questioned the efficacy of the inter-faith forum. The religious groups and leaders
occasionally took part in the inter-ethnic communication forum.

9.2.6. Multi-Ethnic Civic Organizations in Singkawang
Corresponding to the emergence of ethnic organizations in the region, people
who anticipated problems that might arise from the ethnic divisions, the community of
Singkawang founded multi-ethnic civic organizations. There were two NGOs aiming
at ethnic peace: FMMD (Forum Menuju Masyarakat Damai, Forum for Community
Peace) and DERMAIS (Dewan Rakyat Madani Singkawang, Council of Singkawang
Civic People).

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FMMD was established in 2000 after the ethnic violence in Sambas. The
chairman of FMMD was Madurese and the Dayak, Malay, and Chinese participated in
FMMD. An objective of FMMD was the reconciliation of ethnic groups in trouble. In
the past, FMMD supported reconciliation between the Dayak and Madurese in
Samalantan, in cooperation with Dayak leaders there. Before their attempt, Madurese
were allowed to enter Dayak villages for work but not stay overnight. With the efforts
from FMMD, Madurese were now able to stay the in village if a villager endorsed it
by providing written permission. However, Malays in Sambas still rejected Madurese
so that FMMD focused on reconciliation of Sambas Malay with the Madurese.
The other organization, DERMAIS, was founded in 2006 with members from
the Malay, Dayak, Javanese, Sundanese, and Chinese populations. A founder of
DERMAIS described the mission of the NGO: ―We have a mission to develop this
Singkawang as a civil society, intellectuals, people who love peace, community that
has a moral.‖ DERMAIS focused on social and economic sectors, such as programs
for the poor, development of small business and industries, micro finance and
cooperatives. A Malay member expressed concerns over development and ―a negative
social impact‖ of ethnic organizations and compartment of community, and needs of
multi-ethnic civic organization. Thus, ethnic peace and the national unity expressed in
the Youth Pledge were adopted as one of the missions of DERMAIS.
However, how much these multi-ethnic civic associations could contribute to
ethnic peace was still unknown. A Madurese NGO activist criticized FMMD because

315
the organization had not started substantial activities at the grassroots level. The
members of FMMD themselves commented on a lack of funding for activities as
critical problem of the organization.
The creation of multi-ethnic NGOs aiming for ethnic peace was specific to a
district with a heterogeneous population. For example, in Ketapang, multi-ethnic
NGOs were also founded to connect ethnic groups such as the Dayak, Malay, and
Chinese. It was considered that this reflected not only peaceful ethnic relationships but
also the policy for building ethnic harmony in Singkawang.

9.3. Conclusion: Pemekaran, Ethnic Relationships, and Conflict Prevention in
Singkawang
9.3.1. Pemekaran and Ethnic Relationships in Singkawang
The pemekaran brought subtle changes in ethnic relations in Singkawang. By
separating the Malay dominant Sambas and Dayak region‘s Bengkayang, Singkawang
became a Chinese city both in name and reality, though ethnic motives for the
pemekaran were rejected. After pemekaran, the Chinese started showing their interest
in politics, such as in the position of the mayor. In civil society, Chinese ethnic
organizations, MABT and FOKET, began their activities to represent the Chinese
community and competition appeared between the two organizations.
Because the Chinese had been politically disempowered in the past, Malays
still maintain their dominance in the Singkawang government. It was reported that
after the conflict and pemekaran, Malay contractors received more government

316
projects and replaced the Madurese contractors. A Madurese whose family had a
construction business explained, ―Once the contractors used to be Madurese, but now
Malay. Rarely Madurese can get [contracts].‖ Madurese received contracts of only
small sized projects. The other Madurese interviewee, indeed a victim of violence,
pointed out Malay preference as the consequence of the ethnic violence:
[I]f in Bengkayang, it is the Dayak people who are dominant in the
project area now, because they will make noise, if not given projects.
Also the same in Singkawang so, because in this Singkawang, Malays
are already, let‘s say, it is they who hold the power.
The Madurese interpreted that this Malay favoritism was to avoid a trouble with
Malays, or ―not to let Malay make a fuss,‖ whose ethnic indentify and solidarity were
strengthened after the ethnic violence.
However, it is uncertain whether or not Malay‘s political advantage would last
in Singkawang in the future. Due to the long history of coexistence of Malay and
Chinese, it may not be expected that Chinese would take the Madurese side; however,
this political shift could influence the ethnic relationships and Malay attitudes to
Madurese there in the future. In the direct election of the mayor, gaining support from
Chinese community is inevitable to win for candidates from non-Chinese ethnic
groups. In fact, one Madurese interviewee did not criticize the Malay mayor for the
Malay favor among the government officials. Though the Malay ethnic leaders
including the founders of PFKPM lived in Singkawang, it was clear that in the center
of Sambas Malay already moved from Singkawang to Sambas by pemekaran.

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Along with the rise of ethnic awareness, the national motto of ―Unity in
Diversity‖ (Bhineka tunggal Ika) and the Youth Pledge were emphasized to assure
ethnic harmony after the pemekaran. The citizens expected healthy competition to
promote development and consequent progress of the city. Generally, people are more
concerned with the ethnic relationships in Sambas and Bengkayang, rather than in
Singkawang. In Singkawang, there existed a unique balance among ethnic groups, in
particular among the Chinese as the majority in population and their economic
strength, the Malays for their presence in the government, and in others including
Dayak. The pemekaran of Singkawang promoted the shift of ethnic relationships
within the political and civil arenas.

9.3.2. Pemekaran and Conflict Prevention in Singkawang
The foundation of Singkawang City brought distinct changes in the political
and civil societies. Ethnic organizations and the inter-ethnic communication forum
were founded, the same as in Sambas and Bengkayang. Ethnic peace was clearly
identified as one of the primary policies and purpose of the City. Multi-ethnic civic
associations were created for ethnic peace and conflict prevention. Thus, Singkawang
developed as a city of ethnic peace in the middle of a conflict region.
This unique development of ethnic relationships and ethnic policies in
Singkawang were partly attributed to the weak Chinese majority. Although the
Chinese were the largest ethnic group in Singkawang, they maintained a low political

318
profile because of the history of the massacre in the province and the discrimination
they faced throughout the country. The Chinese community was rather fragmented,
and the Chinese ethnic organizations were still nervous to take action as
representatives of the community. Thus, there was no apparent issue of son of soil in
Singkawang. The Singkawang government was aware of the risk of ethnic
organizations and carefully watched their activities, while supporting the inter-ethnic
communication forum. Therefore, most Singkawang residents believed that ethnic
violence would not happen in Singkawang.
Pemekaran contributed to peace building and prevention of ethnic conflict,
though an explicit connection between the resolution of ethnic issues (conflicts) and
pemekaran had been rejected by interviewees. It was pointed out that improved
communication and distance between the community and government had also
contributed to conflict prevention. After pemekaran, the government quickly
responded to ethnic issues before they spread to the other areas due to the smaller
territory of the new district. Thus, the community and the government believed that
pemekaran reduced crimes and contributed to prevention of ethnic violence. In fact,
the government employee said that ―disturbance in terms of ethnicity already does not
exist‖ as a benefit of pemekaran.
In conclusion, the probability of a large scale ethnic clash in Singkawang after
the pemekaran seemed remote. Various factors contributed to peaceful ethnic
relationships including the multiethnic population, the existence of various ethnic

319
organizations and their connection with the government, active multi-ethnic NGOs,
productive government policies, and a unique ethnic balance between the government
and the population. These changes in civil relationships were brought about by
political changes in the City. Indeed, the dynamic of the political and civic societies in
Singkawang became similar to that in Ketapang. This is discussed in the following
chapter.

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CHAPTER 10
DECENTRALIZATION, PEMEKARAN AND ETHNIC
RELATIONSHIPS: CASE OF BENGKAYANG
As previously described, the Bengkayang district separated from the Sambas
district in 1999, immediately after the Malay-Madurese ethnic violence, and
Bengkayang town became the district capital. Before its establishment in 2001,
Singkawang City was part of the Bengkayang district. The majority population of
Bengkayang was Dayak and the district head and vice district head were also Dayak.
The district head, Yakobus Luna, was elected by the local council as provisional
district head after the creation of the district, and reelected during the direct election in
2005. The following sections discuss changes in the political and civil arenas and the
dynamics of ethnic relations in Bengkayang after pemekaran and decentralization.

10.1. Impacts of Decentralization and Pemekaran on Government and Politics
in Bengkayang
10.1.1. Background and Objectives of Pemekaran of Bengkayang:
Underdevelopment and Marginalization of the Dayak
The objectives for the creation of the Bengkayang district were the acceleration
of development and improvement of access to public services. During the New Order,
the government paid less attention to Bengkayang, in particular the remote areas. As a
result, aspects of the public services provision were limited. Bengkayang was
underdeveloped. The infrastructure of transportation, health services and education
was not sufficiently provided. According to interviewees, there were difficulty and

321
delay in communication with the government, because government offices, including
the police, did not exist, roads were in poor condition, and there were no telephone
facilities in the villages. Traditional leaders usually managed village affairs. Therefore,
DAD members explained the development of the region as the primary objective of
the pemekaran. Various reasons were cited as the causes for underdevelopment of the
region, including its inland location, distance from Singkawang, the size of the area,
and a lack of fair ethnic representation in government.
The pemekaran of Bengkayang was related not only to underdevelopment of
the region but also to the marginalization of the Dayak and eventually ethnic violence.
Dayak villages in mountainous areas had not benefitted from development in the same
way as the coastal areas, where the Malays resided during the New Order period. A
Dayak senior recalled the old days of no schools in interior villages and of only one
school in Bengkayang town before the Presidential Decree (Inpres) in 1973.
46
He said,
―Once indeed Dayak people were so poor, poor and stupid.‖
There had not been many Dayak government officials in government
institutions. One reason for the small number of Dayak civil servants was limited
opportunities for education in remote villages where the majority of Dayaks lived.
47

Many Dayaks used to be illiterate due to a lack of schools in rural areas. However,

46
Presidential Decree. No. 10/1973. Assistance Program for Primary School Construction.
47
A retired Dayak government official compared the human resources of Dayak with those of Malays‘:
―We now apply for public servants. For example, they [Malay] enter up to 1000 people, and Dayak
people enter five people who are competitive there.‖

322
modern generations of Dayak now attend colleges and universities to receive higher
education.
The Dayaks in Bengkayang believed that Dayak marginalization was caused
by discriminations. Referring an example of unfair recruitment of the government
employees, an interviewee explained that during the New Order period, the
government did not give a chance to Dayak. The government treated Dayaks as less
capable people. A Dayak interviewee contended that ―opportunities to work in
government were also not given. We wanted to enter the army, but it‘s hard, difficult
to join the police, too hard to be civil servants.‖
Religious discrimination against Christian occurred as well. Various Dayak
interviewees claimed that Dayaks were not given opportunities as civil servants or
promotion in the government, unless they converted to Islam. Construction of a new
church was sometimes opposed even with permission from the government. Dayak
leaders pointed out that Dayak marginalization was a political issue and strongly
criticized the government, saying that ―it [Indonesia] is called the country of unity and
integrity, but it is only a theory.‖
During the New Order, Javanese received favorable treatment over the local
population in recruitment of civil servants, which was called ―Javanese colonization.‖
The central government perceived the local populations, Dayaks and Malays, less
capable than Javanese. The military occupied most of high ranking government

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positions and did not allow criticism of the government. There were only a few Dayak
district head in the province until the end of the New Order.
In the ex-Sambas district, Malay was the dominant group in the government.
Before pemekaran, not many Dayaks held civil servant positions, and they rarely held
important ones except several sub-district head positions in Dayak-dominant areas.
The Dayak interviewees commented that the Sambas government rarely hired Dayaks,
and the Malay dominant government also failed to help the Dayaks develop their
regions and community. Furthermore, a Dayak interviewee argued that in the past
Malay also colonized Dayak, though it is ―That history . . . prohibited to be written.‖
Given this history, a strong feeling of having been treated unfairly had grown
in the Dayak community. The natural resources in Kalimantan, specifically the forests,
were regularly cut down for export by logging firms with concessions obtained from
the central government. However, the local community hardly benefitted from the
extraction of natural resources taken from their community. A Dayak government
official of Bengkayang expressed anger against the destruction of forests in his
hometown in Central Kalimantan:
My place was indeed a logging site. Trees take several hundred years to
grow so large, but it is only ten minutes to cut it down with a
chainsaw . . . . There is a community who still lives in houses with
walls of skins of trees, with a roof of leaves. All trees were cut down,
taken. There is no contribution for them, none. It made people
angry . . . . Everywhere water resources, forests are dying, damaged,
hampered . . . . They wanted to take all opportunities to be rich. But the
rich are central people, the people at the center. The wealth were
brought from there . . . . Their children can‘t get anything. We all have
difficult lives still . . . . People really want to progress . . . [s]o if I look

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at that, and in rough words, it is colonization too, of their own people.
So do not say offended. People colonized their own people.
Villages in mountains were still not connected by roads even 60 years after
independence. A priest warned of unbalanced development and the general feeling of
unfairness and frustration in the community.
Dayak leaders, therefore, fought for development and improvement of the
status of Dayak. A Dayak department head and DAD members explained, ―We asked
to have our own district to bring equal development.‖ For the Dayak, the creation of
Bengkayang meant that we became ―a master of our own country‖ to overcome the
past hardships and discrimination and to catch up to other regions. Eventually
marginalization of Dayaks and the underdeveloped region attracted government and
community attention to create a new district, Bengkayang.
48

Thus, it was not surprising, that Bengkayang residents had longed for creation
of a new district for decades. By dividing a district, the community expected that the
government would begin to pay attention to all groups in the area; that there would be
a building up of the infrastructure and public services including security, education,
and health services; and also that the natural resources of the region could be properly
managed by the local community. Additionally they hoped for appropriate Dayak
representation in the government, ending the historic marginalization of the Dayak.

48
Several Dayak leaders already expressed a need for more attention for development of the region at
the time of the Dayak-Madurese clash in 1979. A Dayak senior recalled that they asked for
improvement of infrastructure in villages including transportation, schools, and heath centers in a
meeting to mitigate a risk of ethnic violence.

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Therefore, the Dayak community and Dayak Customary Council strongly supported
the creation of the Bengkayang district.
The pemekaran of the sub-districts followed the pemekaran of the district. Ten
sub-districts in the former Sambas district joined the Bengkayang district. Among
them, three sub-districts separated from Bengkayang to found Singkawang City.
Eventually the number of sub-districts increased to fourteen in Bengkayang. There
were also plans to divide Sungai Raya, Samalantan, and Sanggau Ledo to found three
new districts as of 2006.

10.1.2. Pemekaran and Violence
(1) Ethnic Violence against Chinese and PGRS
Although some interviewees believed that there was no causal relationship
between pemekaran and the ethnic conflict in Bengkayang, others argued that the
creation of the Bengkayang district was not independent from the ethnic violence in
the region. A Javanese in Ledo attributed underdevelopment of Bengkayang to the
past violence, particularly the violence against the Chinese during PGRS/ Paraku
rebellions. The fact that Bengkayang was ―the nest of PGRS‖ and the ―conflict area‖
delayed the development of the region because of the security concerns.
The Javanese interviewee explained Dayaks‘ desire for pemekaran and their
own district from their contribution to the army operation against the Chinese. In spite
of Dayaks‘ significant role to expel the Chinese, they did not receive rewards for their
contribution.

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In the past, at the time of the expulsion of ethnic Chinese, PGRS,
actually the most meritorious in this Sanggau area, was ethnic
Dayak . . . . So at that time, TNI and ABRI trained the Dayaks. Those
who knew hiding places were them. Regular soldiers were actually
behind, in the back of villagers . . . . But ordinary people finally became
the majority population. It is natural for Dayak to collect a promise.
‗Once I had been instrumental to expel PGRS; now what is a reward for
me?
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Dayak‘s involvement in the military operation and the
Chinese massacre were planned by Oevaang Oeray, the first governor of West
Kalimantan and Dayak leaders. Their desire to establish a Dayak economic zone after
the disappearance of Chinese had never been achieved. Some Chinese properties and
economic bases were taken by the Madurese (Davidson 2008).
During the operation against the Chinese and PGRS, Dayaks were treated as
supporters of the Indonesian Army. With the outbreak of Dayak-Madurese clash in
Samalantan in 1979, however, Dayaks were perceived in a totally different way. In a
meeting at the district head office to deal with the violence in Samalantan, an officer
from the district military command accused the Dayak for their violence in front of
Dayak leaders. Consequently, the Dayak were frustrated by the changes in the
government attitude which called them ―criminals (titik hitam),‖ though once they
called Dayaks the ―good thumb.‖

(2) Conflict between Dayak and Madurese 1997 and Pemekaran
Ethnic violence in the late 1990s further evoked the idea of creation of a
district in the Dayak region to improve the welfare of the community and promote

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development. The ethnic clash between Dayak and Madurese in 1996/1997 sounded
the alarm for the government and community leaders about the tenuous dynamic of the
situation within the marginalized community. A Dayak interviewee described the
ethnic clash as the climax of the suppression of the Dayak community and the
solidarity of Dayaks, ―a turning point for the ethnic Dayak to demonstrate their
existence,‖ which indicated that ―they must be paid attention.‖
Moreover, as discussed, Dayak felt strong discontent with the fact that there
were fewer Dayak leaders and government officials at the time, which noted one of
reasons for the riot and a cause of discrimination. The ethnic riot was an expression of
injustice and frustration against the government ruled by outsiders. Understanding the
imminent need to improve the community, community leaders quickly prepared a
proposal to create Bengkayang and pushed the government to take urgent actions for
that.
The establishment of the Bengkayang district was therefore a reasonable
request from Dayaks who had not remuneration for their work. The underdevelopment
of their region and discrimination against the Dayak deepened such feelings and
strengthened a wish to create a Dayak district. For other ethnic groups there, the
creation of the Bengkayang district and Dayak dominance in the government were
legitimate from a Dayak historical perspective.
Meanwhile, Dayaks pointed out that in the transition period not only the Dayak
but also Malay wished to show their presence through the riots with Madurese. An

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interviewee said that ―the reform was used . . . to create the existence of each, that
gave the name to themselves as ethnicity or tribe‖ and concluded that the pemekaran
occurred as the consequence of ethnic violence to resolve ethnic issues by providing
their own territory.
However, relationships between conflict and decentralization were rejected by
most interviewees. In fact, the pemekaran plan of Sambas district was started before
the Dayak-Madurese violence in 1996 and 1997.
49
Decentralization was a political
change initiated in Jakarta. On the other hand, according to interviewees, the causes of
conflict were often considered social and economic problems and delay of government
intervention at the local level, though these institutional changes certainly affected the
ethnic relationships and political calculation in the region.

10.1.3. Positive Changes after Pemekaran: Development
Positive changes identified in Bengkayang after the pemekaran included
improved access to public services, progress in development, expansion of the
regional economy, growth of the government budget, increase in employment
opportunities, close communication between government and community, and
improvement of infrastructure and transportation. Along with the creation of the
district, the district government and the regional people‘s representative assembly, or
simply the local council of Bengkayang were established. The local government

49
A letter from the governor of West Kalimantan regarding pemekaran, the creation of new district
level region in Sambas district, was issued on February 15, 1996.

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obtained power to develop their policies and plans and enact district ordinances. New
sub-districts or villages were also founded.
As a result, significant development and changes were observed after
pemekaran, such as increases in the population, the number of vehicles, development
of offices, buildings, houses, and facilities, and improvement in education. Some
people spoke of the advantages of a strong central government in the past and said that
development by Suharto‘s regime was more efficient and organized. However, after
pemekaran, the rate of development was faster and decision making was close to the
community. With the increase of the local budget, development was more widespread
in the district and the district economy improved.
With the institutional changes of reformasi and pemekaran, relationships
between the government and community changed. A government official of
Bengkayang stated that people‘s perceptions of the government changed from a ruler
to a facilitator. An interviewee concluded that the current government was responding
to the community with good leadership practices, and he felt that the community could
now easily approach the government and discuss community issues with them.
Proximity between the community and the government, and decision making powers
within the community itself, led to quick implementation of projects and the
accelerated development. After pemekaran, the government and leaders from the local
area were able to know more easily the community‘s desire, needs, interests, and
problems, and to provide the necessary, prompt support for them. A resident positively

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evaluated pemekaran because ―the government became closer to the community‖ and
―knows more about deficiencies or shortages faced by the community.‖ A NGO
member said, ―The policy is more appropriate for the people‘s desire, because the
selected leader is truly in line with inner mind of people.‖

10.1.4. Safety after Pemekaran
According to interviewees, safety and security issues in Bengkayang improved
after pemekaran of the district. With the establishment of district police in
Bengkayang, it was no longer necessary to bring in police officers from the outside.
One reason for improved security was the quality of the leadership from the
government. However, some people also suggested that another reason for improved
security was the disappearance of Madurese from the area.

10.1.5. Pemekaran Problems: No Change or Worse after Pemekaran
The primary objective of pemekaran in Bengkayang was to accelerate
development and in fact many citizens felt that such progress had been achieved.
However, some residents expressed discontent with the development that took place,
or even that the situation in the village was worse than during the New Order period.
A village head in Monterado criticized the local government for not having enough
capacity and fiscal means to properly manage the region and pointed to the
deterioration of the village after reformasi. The specific problems pointed out included
the neglected repair of a bridge in the village for years after a flood, a lack of

331
maintenance of roads, and unpaid honorariums for village heads for months. In spite
of the smaller area of the district, which was one of the objectives of pemekaran, the
government failed to respond to the community‘s issues in a timely manner.
Others also pointed to a lack of human resources, both in quality and quantity.
In fact, not all government positions in the district were filled, yet there was corruption
among those in the positions that had been filled. A Dayak local council member said
that the local government and local council members including the prosecutor, ―from
the top to the bottom,‖ were corrupt. After reformasi, the technique of corruption
became even more sophisticated.
It was also pointed out that the process of pemekaran had been too fast. After
the creation of district, several new sub-districts were created; however, infrastructure
and facilities in the newly created sub-districts have yet to be built. There was
criticism that it is irrelevant to found a new sub-district which is inaccessible by roads.

10.1.6. Opportunities for Dayak: Dayak Majority in Bengkayang Government
The reformasi, i.e., democratization and decentralization, and pemekaran
drastically expanded opportunities of political participation. Specifically for Dayaks,
the changes were significant compared with the New Order era. Dayak government
officials commented that after years of dominance by the Malay and Javanese, finally
the Dayaks enjoyed expanded opportunities for progress in the reformasi era.

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Dayaks celebrated the era of reformasi and pemekaran because the local
community and the government gave them a free hand to develop their own region
and community. These institutional changes brought specific advantages to the Dayak
because they provided them an opportunity to have representation through a district
head and an increased opportunity to be civil servants. The local government also
encouraged education of government employees for human resource development, for
example, offering fellowships to graduate-level programs. Thus, a Dayak interviewee
believed that the reformasi promoted expansion of Dayak potentials to catch up with
other ethnic groups.
However, after decentralization and creation of the new district, the issue of
putera daerah, or son of soil, so called ―symptom of regional autonomy,‖ emerged.
The issue of putera daerah is a phenomenon of indigenous groups first, i.e., political
and government positions should be given to local groups. A Dayak interviewee
recalled that Dayak employees were less than 10% of the previous Sambas district
government. However, Dayak was the majority in Bengkayang government, from the
district head, vice-district head, government officials, and local council members. The
chairman of DAD Bengkayang said, ―If it had not been separated from Singkawang,
there would not have a Dayak district head.‖ In the local council of the former Sambas
district, Dayak elected officials were only five among forty-five members while in
Bengkayang, Dayaks accounted for more than 60% of the members. Thus, it was a

333
benefit of pemekaran for Dayaks to hold district head, council members, and public
servant positions.
A Dayak politician, a strong supporter of the creation of Bengkayang district,
clearly explained that increase of Dayak government employees was one objective of
pemekaran. A Dayak department head admitted that pemekaran increased job
opportunities for Dayaks in government by commenting that he himself would not
have been promoted to the position of department head without creation of
Bengkayang: ―Before pemekaran, I did not have an opportunity, because an official
head of department is just one.‖ Another government official also agreed with the
increased opportunities. In fact, local people expected the local government to support
them to get a job there. A Dayak government official explained local people‘s
expectation as ―Oh, this is my region. A son of soil, myself, is not given an
opportunity?‖
After the creation of the Bengkayang district, the ethnic representations of
Dayak and Malay in the public sector were more balanced. Dayak became the
majority of the local government employees of Bengkayang. Approximately 40% to
60% of the Bengkayang government employees were Dayak. There was an intention
to create a local regulation for government employee recruitment policy which gave
priority to local residents, though the attempt was abandoned. In fact, the first public
official exam after pemekaran accepted only applicants of local residents. However,

334
the requirement of local residency was removed in the second exam in 2004. The civil
servant exam was still regulated by the central government.
Thus, compared with in the New Order era, the political status of the Dayaks
significantly improved with reformasi and pemekaran. A Dayak local council member
said that Dayaks were proud to have a Dayak district head and proud of his leadership
in the government. In spite of the pervasive negative views of the Dayaks, that they
were primitive or less educated, having Dayak leaders was evidence of the Dayak‘s
capacity to manage the area. An interviewee said, ―They [Dayaks] feel acknowledged
that they have the ability. They feel appreciated. They have leaders or figures
considered to fulfill the requirements in the regulations. This is one thing that Dayaks
are proud of.‖
Moreover, it was pointed out that with a Dayak district head, the Dayak
community felt protected and believed that the public policy was more appropriate for
them. A government led by their own people can pay more attention to the Dayak and
the region and can take prompt actions directly. Thus, the Dayak community
delightedly expressed their feeling toward self-governing: ―If in the past, we were
always led by someone else, well now we are led by our own friends, who led now
proved his ability, quality.‖ Therefore, after pemekaran and reformasi, the residents
commented, ―Almost everything is better [for Dayaks in Bengkayang].‖

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10.2. Pemekaran and Civil Society in Bengkayang
In Bengkayang as of 2006, there were ethnic organizations of Dayak
Customary Council (DAD), Malay Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat
Budaya Melayu, Melayu), Javanese association or paguyuban, Sundanese association,
and Batak association. The Chinese Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis Adat
Budaya Tionghoa, MABT) was established in 2006 in Bengkayang. In addition,
groups of Nias from Sumatra, Minahasa from North Sulawesi, and Flores and East
Nusa Tenggara existed in the district. There had been no Madurese organization
before the Dayak-Madurese clash in 1996/97 and until now.
These organizations were neither very structured nor active in the past, though
several ethnic organizations or groups such as DAD existed. The changes in civil
society, specifically the foundation of ethnic organizations in Bengkayang, are
explored in the following sections.

10.2.1. Pemekaran of Dayak Customary Council
The Dayak Customary Council was the largest ethnic organization in
Bengkayang, reflecting the ethnic composition of the district. After pemekaran of the
Bengkayang district, DAD Bengkayang was founded in 2000. Similarly, with the
creation or pemekaran of sub-districts, DAD sub-district branches were also formed in
new sub-districts in accordance with the government administrative structure. The
chairman of DAD Bengkayang explained the foundation of new branches along
pemekaran, as ―DAD was adapted to the government [structure]. If the government

336
developed a district, it also creates DAD. Also a sub-district is created; DAD is also
created too.‖ In the Dayak district of Bengkayang, with its history of ethnic
organization, DAD was the most active and structured ethnic organization.

10.2.2. Chinese Organizations: MABT
A Chinese organization, the Chinese Cultural and Customary Council (Majelis
Adat Budaya Tionghoa, MABT), was founded in Bengkayang in January 2006.
MABT was not well known to people of Bengkayang, and its organizational structure
was still in the process of development in June 2006. MABT cooperated with and
facilitated communication with other ethnic groups. A Chinese interviewee explained
that MABT could improve ethnic relations with other groups, and that ethnic
organizations indeed contributed to the integration of the Bengkayang community. For
example, MABT invites Dayak and other ethnic groups to their celebration of the
Chinese New Year, while MABT is invited to the Dayak‘s festival such as Naik
Dango. MABT also cooperates with government for the celebration of Chinese New
Year.
Nevertheless, MABT did not necessarily represent the entire Chinese
community there. The Chinese community of Bengkayang district was primarily
divided into two areas, the coastal area and the surroundings of Bengkayang town. The
chairman of MABT was from the coastal area where the largest concentration of
Chinese population in the district lived. The Chinese in coastal area such as Sungai

337
Raya ignored an invitation from the Chinese in Bengkayang area to celebrate Chinese
New Year. Yet, according to an interviewee, Bengkayang Chinese still maintained
good solidarity, compared to Singkawang Chinese, because they had only one
organization. Besides MABT, since before the creation of MABT, there were two
Chinese social foundations in Bengkayang.

10.2.3. Javanese Association
Javanese often migrated throughout the country and they tended to organize a
Javanese association called ―paguyuban‖ in the new places they entered. The
objectives of the Javanese organization included preservation of the Javanese
language, tradition and customs: development of morals; and cultivation of strong
family bonds. The association also provided newcomers advice to adjust to the
migrated location and prevent the occurrence of problems with the local community.
A Javanese explained that adapting to the local culture was important for migrants in
order to maintain the security. Thus, the association helped integrate Javanese
migrants to the local community.
In the Sambas region, the Bengkayang district had the largest Javanese
population because of migration through the government‘s transmigration program. A
group of Javanese for rotating funds (arisan) was already organized in the 1990s in the
transmigration villages, Sanggau Ledo. When the Javanese hold a cultural event such
as Syuro, the celebration of the Javanese New Year, the association invites other

338
ethnic groups such as the Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese to join them. A Javanese
contended that mutual invitations enhanced understanding of each culture.
However, the Javanese organization was not truly ―ethnic,‖ because non-
Javanese were also involved in the organization. Not all Javanese joined the
paguyuban. An interviewee expressed disagreement and anxiety as a migrant with the
idea of ethnic organization because it might develop intolerance to other groups and
increase a risk of conflict between ethnic groups.

10.2.4. Ethnic Organizations Cooperation and Communication for Problem
Solving
According to interviewees, an objective of establishing ethnic organizations
was to address problems or disputes between ethnic groups and to prevent ethnic
violence. For example, the Javanese organization negotiated with the Dayak
community when a Javanese received excessive sanctions from the customary laws in
2005. A Javanese explained, ―If there is one problem between Javanese and the
Dayak, the Javanese association first tries to reconcile it.‖
As previously discussed, one benefit of ethnic organizations was to make it
easy to identify leaders when people needed to contact an ethnic group. A member of
DAD explained that it was difficult to find Madurese leaders in the past because they
did not have an organization and most of their leaders were religious figures. But after
the creation of organizations, it was easy to contact leaders to discuss solutions to
problems.

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With clarified ethnic leaders in each organization, ethnic groups improved
communication among them. Ethnic leaders invited other ethnic leaders to meetings
when they had issues to discuss, or to religious celebrations or cultural events. As a
result, bonds between leaders were strengthened through improved communications
and interactions. Formal communications among leaders were established through
ethnic organizations, in addition to informal connections. Thus, ethnic leaders
explained that the objectives of establishment of ethnic organizations were ―to develop
and facilitate communication between ethnicities and to enable to coordinate‖ among
them.
The activities of ethnic organizations were perceived as good by the
government as well. The Bengkayang government supported and facilitated ethnic
cooperation for problem solving and cultural events. These organizations started to
play a more significant role in the society because they reduce the duties of the
government, police and military.

10.2.5. Inter-Ethnic Communication Forum in Bengkayang
An inter-ethnic communication forum was organized in Bengkayang. An
objective of the forum was to improve communication and exchange information to
solve social problems. In the forum, leaders of ethnic organizations, such as
chairpersons of DAD and MABT, meet and discuss any relevant problems or issues.
The forum was initiated by the community and held meetings as need arose. It also

340
cooperated and shared information with the government, and the government
occasionally coordinated a meeting. The district head supported the forum as
coordinator. An interviewee stressed an advantage of the inter-ethnic communication
forum to reduce concerns about ethnic organizations among other ethnic and minority
groups:
At least it is possible to mutually reduce a sense of suspicion between
ethnic groups or between ethnic organizations. For example, there is
the Dayak Customary Council. And Malays may be suspicious about
the visibility of DAD because they do not enter the organization. But if
we cooperate, we can decrease a sense of suspicion.
However, this inter-ethnic communication forum had not quite started activities yet.
As of 2006, it was not well known to the Bengkayang community, including
government officials and even the new chairman of DAD Bengkayang.
Nevertheless whether or not the inter-ethnic communication forum had been
organized would not be a critical issue in Bengkayang. It was commented that the
stable ethnic relationships in the district after the last ethnic riot made it difficult to
provoke an ethnic problem. A government official raised a question about a need for
an inter-ethnic communication forum: ―[W]e think it is not necessary, because the sign
of conflict like the last one does not exist.‖ A local council member also described
ethnic tolerance in Bengkayang: ―So our life is pretty good, tolerant in terms of
religious life as well as social life.‖ However, there was a comment that coordination
among ethnic organizations was not very effective. Bengkayang was a ―Dayak
district,‖ in contrast to the Malay Sambas. Most ethnic organizations there were not

341
active and had not fully developed. In reality, DAD was the only ethnic organization
with capacity and functional structure in Bengkayang.
The Bengkayang government launched a new initiative in 2006, the
―Bengkayang Intellectual Alliance,‖ to build a network among the educated, the
community, religious figures, and the government for the development of
Bengkayang. The chairman of the local council explained that a further purpose of the
alliance was to assist the government in community development as a partner of the
government, because the government needed help from the intelligent and
knowledgeable people in the district. The alliance consisted of multi-ethnic members,
including Dayak, Malay, Chinese, Javanese, Batak, and others.
Besides the inter-ethnic communication forum, the government promoted
inter-faith coordination. At the time of religious festivals, such as Idul Fitri or
Christmas, Muslims and Christians visited each other and shared in mutual
celebrations. The local government and the Department of Religion held meetings of
the inter-faith communication forum. This forum functioned as coordinating
institution for any problem or issue that appeared in the religious community.
According to interviewees, there were no obvious religious problems in Bengkayang.
In short, the inter-ethnic communication forum was rather a titular organization
in Bengkayang, similar to the situation in Sambas. Due to the predominance of Dayak
in politics and population, the forum would not have a chance to play a leading role in
organizing ethnic organizations beyond DAD.

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10.2.6. Civic Associations after Pemekaran
Before the pemekaran, the civic associations and civil society in Bengkayang
were not active; most organizations were small scale, at the sub-district level. Because
of distance and limited infrastructure, the members of organizations in the
Bengkayang region could not actively participate in activities sponsored by such
organizations, and the organizations had difficulties accessing to the district
government located in Singkawang before.
A leader of the Catholic Women‘s Association of Bengkayang stated that the
women‘s associations (PKK) were not very active nor had they been particularly
cultivated before the creation of district. However, after pemekaran, the government
provided financial support for women‘s organizations. As a result, a new umbrella
organization for various women‘s organizations had founded. The civic associations in
Bengkayang were much more active after pemekaran.

There were no drastic changes observed in civil society in Bengkayang,
compared to the political changes. Although several ethnic organizations and civic
associations were established and activated after the creation of the district, the Dayak
Customary Council (DAD) further strengthened their organizational structure by
establishing sub-district branches in new sub-districts. The inter-ethnic communication
forum was believed to exist; however, it was still unknown if it could take any positive
role for ethnic relationships in the district. The Dayak‘s leading position in the civil

343
society was confirmed by the newly created political society of Bengkayang.
Therefore, a noteworthy change in Bengkayang civil society was rather the
strengthened Dayak‘s status by connecting civil society with political society.

10.3. Conclusion: Pemekaran, Ethnic Relationships, and Conflict Prevention in
Bengkayang
10.3.1. Ethnic Relationships in Bengkayang: Son of Soil—Dayak Favoritism
Matters?
Pemekaran brought about significant changes to the Bengkayang political
society. The Bengkayang district was called ―a Dayak district‖ because of the Dayak
majority in the population and government. In the New Order period, there was only
few Dayak district head, and not many Dayaks became the public servants due to a
lack of educational opportunities and the general discrimination they faced. The
reformasi and pemekaran completely transformed the Dayak‘s formerly weak political
position, and now they were the majority group in the district. This section analyzes
how these political changes of Dayak affected ethnic relationships in Bengkayang.
After pemekaran, due to dominance of Dayak in the district, Dayak favoritism
was anticipated in policy implementation and civil servant recruitment. Malay and
other minority interviewees pointed out the majority rule or strong position of Dayak
as ―the government policy goes to Dayak more than others.‖ An interviewee criticized
the first recruitment after pemekaran by saying ―we felt like a migrant.‖ Several non-
local government employees voluntarily moved to Singkawang or other district
because ―most of non-Dayak people [in government] were not happy, not comfortable

344
there.‖ Then these positions were replaced by Dayak; however, occasionally people
who did not have the required ability or qualifications for positions were promoted
because of ethnicity. Thus, the current Bengkayang district had a strong tendency to
favor the majority group with ―too much ethnocentricity.‖ Dayaks benefitted more
from policies and projects including favorable treatment in recruitment of government
employees. Moreover, there were problems of nepotism and corruption in recruiting of
government employees.
The Bengkayang government was criticized for neglecting the objective of
development, while taking advantage of autonomy. The minority groups argued that
Kalimantan-born migrants should be treated as local population or son of soil because
hiring unqualified local population and the favorable treatment of the majority could
undermine development of the district and progress of the region. There was also an
opinion that the government employees of the former Sambas district were ethnically
mixed, though Malay was the majority group, and the Malay leaders fairly treated all
ethnicities and gave opportunities to every ethnic group.
Nevertheless, Dayak rejected the idea of majority and minority differences and
favorable treatment of putera daerah in the district, while acknowledging that
pemekaran increased job opportunities for the local population as discussed. A Dayak
department head insisted that there was no difference in attitudes of government
toward the majority and minority and the government provided fair and equal services
for all ethnic groups, including Dayak, Chinese, Madurese, Malay, or Batak.

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According to Dayaks, this Dayak-dominance in government employees and the ethnic
composition of the district were not intended but coincident because the district was
divided based on geographical consideration. A recruitment priority for putera daerah
was also rejected because the district needed people capable of and experienced for
development. If only the majority group is employed, development of the district
would be hampered. A Dayak interviewee commented that the ethnic composition of
the government was ―balanced‖ or ―50-50.‖ The ethnic diversity in Bengkayang
government was stressed, referring to existence of Malay, Batak, Javanese, Sundanese,
and other ethnic groups in addition to Dayak, including department heads positions. A
Dayak government official said that ―there is no desire that Dayak should lead
Bengkayang, no . . . democracy is still there.‖
Moreover, according to a department head, although many Dayak were
employed for lower rank positions, Dayak were less than 50% of management and
higher rank positions such as department heads. In fact, the department heads of
Bengkayang government were more diverse than the Sambas where most high-ranking
officials were Malays. For example, the vice secretaries of the region were Javanese
and Malay. Rejecting favoritism to Dayak in recruitment of government officials, a
Dayak government official argued that it was not ethnicity but commitment of
applicant that mattered in recruitment.
We accept Javanese if his knowledge is good and then he wants to live
here . . . . But usually the experience is if he received education, he
goes home. That‘s what we don‘t want. Hence there is a tendency that

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each region educates local people there . . . . It is for the sake of
development. Yes, there is a difference.
Because government officials from outside often asked to leave Bengkayang after
certain years of experience and receiving education, he contended that it was better to
hire and educate local people. What mattered was ―commitment‖ or ―a desire to
develop Bengkayang,‖ not an issue of ethnicity. Non-local people were welcomed if
they could commit to work in Bengkayang until their retirement.
Meanwhile, despite the majority of the Dayaks in the government, the minority
groups commented that the ethnicity of leaders was not an issue as long as they were
treated fairly and security was guaranteed. Javanese interviewees explained that the
son of soil was not a problem or concern for them, because ―our goal is how people
can increase their income, security‖ and what they wish is ―a sense of fairness‖ and
―how to progress together.‖ Thus, it was explained that the minority groups in the
district had no fear or concern with the ethnic composition of government as long as
these officials performed their tasks and fairness was secured. The Dayaks pointed out
that the district head was a ―nationalist‖ so that all ethnicities were treated equally by
the government without nepotism or corruption. What the community expected was a
district head who committed to the development of Bengkayang, not a Dayak district
head. Unfair promotion of a certain group or nepotism could become a source of
conflict among citizens. Thus, a Dayak interviewee emphasized the importance of
balance and the nationalist view to reduce concerns about majority and minority. It

347
was contended that because Bengkayang was safe and accommodating everyone,
transmigrants from outside were coming to the district.
Similarly, there were a fewer risks to connect ethnic favoritism with religious
issues. According to Muslim interviewees, the government provided significant
support for construction of a mosque in Bengkayang town. A representative of an
Islamic organization, NU commented that Muslims had no fear or uneasiness to live in
a Christian majority district. Again, it was said that that ethnicity was not an issue as
long as the government performed their tasks.
It was natural for the government to have more Dayak public servants and
local council members, and Dayak district head, because Dayak accounted for more
than 50% of the population. It was reasonable and understandable that local people
chose the district head from them. A Javanese interviewee said that the district head
was a choice of community and a Javanese candidate was not elected. A Chinese
interviewee also agreed with the Javanese interviewee and said that the Chinese also
voted for the current Dayak district head. The reelection of the district head in 2005
was evidence of the community‘s trust in him because the district head had
significantly contributed to the district, such as human resource development,
education, health, and economy.
There was no intention among the minority groups to oppose what the majority
wished. A Malay interviewee said, ―A key is what Dayak want.‖ However, there was
still a concern on the majority and minority issues in the community. A Dayak

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interviewee admitted that the minority groups felt anxiety about the majority, in spite
of his belief in a lack of discrimination and fairness in the district. Yet, the
community, including Dayaks and other ethnic groups can express their evaluation of
the performance of the leader and government through election. Yakobus Luna, the
district head of Bengkayang lost the district head election in 2010.

10.3.2. Dayak Internal Politics: Intra-Ethnic Competition after Pemekaran
The creation of a Dayak majority district initiated internal competition in
Dayaks in Bengkayang. Dayak interviewees and Lontaan (1975) explained that the
Dayak ethnic group consisted of hundreds of sub-ethnic groups in accordance with
languages or location of residence. There were several Dayak sub groups in
Bengkayang such as Bahkati, Ahe, and others. After the reformasi and creation of
Bengkayang district, political competition emerged and intensified among Dayaks in
the district, or ―putera daerah‖ issues among Dayaks.
During the last district election campaign in 2005, a leaflet was spread to
appeal to Bahkati, the largest Dayak group in Bengkayang, for choosing a Bahkati
candidate. A former candidate of local council and other interviewee explained that
after the election, the winner and his supporters enjoyed benefits from positions and
projects while losers sought revenge in the next election. The important government
positions were replaced by the supporters and families of the winners. A Dayak
interviewee in Samalantan from Ahe Dayak criticized the district head for favoring his

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sub-ethnic group, Bahkati, as ―development goes to the region there, his area.‖ This
was to ask a true son among ―sons of soil,‖ i.e., who the indigenous Dayak in
Bengkayang were among sub-ethnic Dayak groups. According to a Dayak government
official from Central Kalimantan, the local Dayak employees said, ―You are a new
comer here. Why are you here?‖ A Dayak internal competition and politics were
created with the Dayak district.
However, a difference of sub-groups in Dayak was an issue in local politics,
only among Dayaks, not an issue with other ethnic group. Although there were
differences in political positions and opinions, solidarity across various Dayak sub-
groups was strong. A Dayak government official stated, ―Although they can differ
politically, but when it comes to dignity of the Dayak, it‘s only one.‖ Thus, solidarity
of sub-groups in Dayaks did not affect their solidarity.
As Horowitz (1985) argued, intra-ethnic political competition appeared among
Dayaks in Bengkayang. However, the Dayak internal competition was less likely to
work for prevention of inter-ethnic clashes because, as Davidson (2008) and Peluso
and Harwell (2001) discussed, solidarity and identity of Dayak as ethnic group had
grown much stronger through repeated ethnic violence and Dayak NGO‘s struggle
against the New Order regime.

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10.3.3. Pemekaran and Conflict Prevention in Bengkayang
In Bengkayang, the most notable changes appeared in the political society after
pemekaran. In contrast with the political and economic marginalization of Dayaks by
the New Order regime, Dayaks made great strides in politics and power in government
as the majority group in the district under the name of ―son of soil‖ or putera daerah.
The newly established district government staffed by the local residents started
making efforts to catch up with the development of other districts and other
ethnicities. Several new ethnic organizations and other types of civic organizations
were founded in the district. However, Dayak‘s DAD was the most powerful
organization in civil society in ―a Dayak district.‖
There were positive comments on the contribution of pemekaran as it related
to the prevention or reduction of ethnic violence. Interviewees in Bengkayang stated
that conflict was indeed less after the creation of district so that conflict would be less
likely to happen in the future. First, the division of the district shortened the distances
between government and community and contributed to building close relationships
among them. Improved communication and dialogue between the government and the
community after pemekaran can contribute to reduction of conflict. In the past, the
previous leaders who came from the outside sometimes did not know the local issues
of the region; sometimes, even the community was unaware of them. As a Dayak
interviewee in Bengkayang bluntly stated, ―We used to be isolated.‖

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A Chinese representative of the local council explained the importance of
closeness between the government and the community for preventing conflict
expansion. At the time of the violence in 1996 and 1997, villagers came from the
mountains to join the riots, and the government could not take any effective action to
prevent them from coming. The interviewee continued to explain that the government
is obligated to prevent ethnic conflict:
We now together protect ethnic harmony. We guard not to let conflict
happen. It already forms an obligation of the government to maintain
security and stability in the region . . . . Now the district head with the
local council directly goes to community, socializes government
programs, especially in the development sector. Ah, so people do not
worry anymore. We can keep going just as good. So now for
disturbance of security, disorder, or any terrorist efforts—we have fully
entrusted law enforcement authorities, the police, who are together with
the existing communities in the area.
Moreover, a sense of unfairness caused by economic disparity could be
reduced by upgrading the life of the community as a whole, which was exactly the
objectives of pemekaran such as economic development, and improvement of
infrastructure and public services. The progress and improved economic situations in
rural areas after pemekaran could mitigate disparity in development as well as a sense
of inequality.
The pemekaran of a district can be one of the political arrangements to prevent
ethnic violence at the district level. It is likely to address discrimination and political
marginalization by expanding opportunities to participate in the policy making
process. In the case of Bengkayang, the pemekaran resulted in Dayak political

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advancement by the creation of a Dayak-led district government and significant
progress in development of the region, though obstacles existed in building ethnic
cooperation, especially, son of soil issues. A Dayak interviewee argued that
pemekaran is ―one solution for the problem because the division of district is the same
as share of power. So by ethnicity or religion, power was already divided.‖ The
creation of a new district equals to power sharing among different ethnic groups.
However, it is uncertain whether or not ethnic clash or competition at the larger scale
such as the provincial level could be prevented.

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CHAPTER 11
PEMEKARAN AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN SAMBAS,
SINGKAWANG, AND BENGKAYANG
The preceding three chapters presented the changes in the political and civil
arenas after pemekaran in the three districts of Sambas, Singkawang and Bengkayang,
specifically regarding their impact on ethnic relationships. This chapter summarizes
these changes and articulates the effects of pemekaran and conflict prevention.
First, the impacts of pemekaran on political society and civil society are
examined. After a discussion of the overarching themes across the three districts and
an examination of the important factors influencing ethnic relations, this chapter
explores the prospect of conflict prevention by comparing the three cases.

11.1. Political Society and Civil Society after Pemekaran
11.1.1. Political Society after Pemekaran: Changes in Government
The political societies in the three districts after pemekaran developed
distinctive characteristics. The political societies of the Sambas and Bengkayang
districts were led by the majority groups, i.e., the Malay and Dayak respectively;
however, the two districts responded very differently to the political turn of events. In
Sambas, no prominent changes emerged in terms of the regional politics, while in
Bengkayang, the Dayak enjoyed considerable political advancement. On the other
hand, the multi-ethnic city of Singkawang succeeded in developing an ethnic balance.

354
These changes reflected the ethnic compositions of each district and the political status
of the majority group before pemekaran.
Before pemekaran in 1998, the Malay occupied better positions in the Sambas
district government and in the social hierarchy than did the Dayak and other groups.
Although the district head was from West Java and from the Indonesian Army, the
Malay accounted for more than 60% of the department head and sub-district head
positions. The Malay district head and vice district head were chosen after pemekaran;
however, the separation of Sambas did not impact the ethnic composition of the
government and the Malay have remained as the majority group.
On the other hand, only a small number of Dayak government officials were
working in Sambas. Again among the high ranking government officials, the Dayak
accounted for 16%. Most of them were sub-district heads of the Dayak majority sub-
districts, which became part of Bengkayang after pemekaran. In the Bengkayang
district government, the Dayak turned out to be the majority, offsetting past
disparities, occupying positions which included the district head and vice district head,
and other elected official positions.
In Singkawang, the majority of the city official positions were still held by the
Malay; however after pemekaran, a Malay mayor and a Dayak vice mayor were
elected by the local council. Moreover, there were a few Dayak department heads in
the city. Although the Chinese rarely held government employee positions, there were
a few Chinese elected officials in the local legislature.

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After pemekaran, the ethnic compositions of the government employees
shifted to more closely resemble those of the populations of each district, except in
Singkawang. In Sambas, because the Malay generally had occupied prominent
positions in the government since before the pemekaran, the government‘s policies
and relationships with the community did not change, though the development of the
area and communication with the community were strengthened.
In contrast, the Dayak in Bengkayang started receiving benefits from the
Dayak majority government through improved public services and accelerated
development in underdeveloped villages. It was an indication of the end of ethnic
discrimination for the Dayak by having a Dayak district head and having high-ranking
Dayak government officials. Self-governing and economic development initiated by
decentralization and pemekaran drastically transformed the relationships between the
government and the community by mitigating frustration and grievances among the
population.
The case of Singkawang displayed a unique ethnic balance and relationships
between the government and the community. Because of the historic political
suppression against the Chinese, there were only a few Chinese in the Singkawang
city government; however, a Malay and Dayak pair of the mayor and vice mayor,
respectively, were elected on consideration of the multi-ethnic nature of the City and
the relatively diverse employees were now working for the city.

356
After the reformasi, the first round of district heads and mayor were selected in
the district level people‘s representative council. In 2004, Law No. 22 was amended to
stipulate direct election choosing the heads of districts and cities (Law No. 32/ 2004).
This amendment enabling direct elections which strengthened the power of the district
heads and mayor as well as the majority group in each district. In particular, the
Chinese population in Singkawang, who were excluded from politics during the New
Order period, could no longer be ignored by anyone who ran for mayor. These direct
elections in the City, given the ethnic imbalance in the population and the government,
could be one factor that has pushed the Singkawang government to promote a policy
of ethnic peace in Singkawang. In Sambas and Bengkayang, the incumbent district
heads were elected by direct elections in 2006 and 2005 respectively. However, the
installation of the direct elections weakened the connection between the Malay ethnic
organization, PFKPM, and the government in Sambas. Although the district head was
elected in the local council with the support of FKPM, the direct election divided
PFKPM members among the Malay candidates, and the district head was recognized
as the people‘s choice through direct election.
Therefore, the pemekaran of Sambas, Bengkayang, and Singkawang brought
distinctive changes in their respective political societies and, in particular, the
governments of the three districts and the city. The political changes significantly
affected the Dayak community in Bengkayang due to the past discrimination and
underdevelopment they had experienced. In addition to the ethnic composition of the

357
government, the installation of the direct elections of district head and mayor
introduced further changes in the relationships with the community. In multi-ethnic
Singkawang, the silent Chinese, who were disconnected from politics and the
government, became key constituents in the mayoral election.

11.1.2. Civil Society after Pemekaran: Ethnic Organizations
Along with the transformation of political society after pemekaran, the civil
societies in the districts under discussion showed two types of changes depending on
the level of homogeneity of the population. In the homogenous districts of Sambas and
Bengkayang, the ethnic organizations of the majority groups started to play a leading
role in civil society. In heterogeneous Singkawang, there was a balance among the
various ethnic organizations, and the inter-ethnic communication forum also appeared
to play a coordinating role among the various ethnic organizations. The restructuring
of the ethnic composition of the populace by pemekaran also has influenced the civic
associations in civil society.
In Sambas and Bengkayang, minority groups such as the Chinese established
ethnic organizations of their own; however, in reality, a Malay organization, PFKPM
and the Dayak‘s DAD were the only truly functional ethnic organizations in each
district. Inter-ethnic communication forums were proposed and established; however,
these forums were primarily titular in the two districts, and were somewhat hidden in
the shadow of the ethnic organizations of the majority groups. Moreover, because of

358
the homogeneity of population, other types of associations, such as NGOs, were also
led by the majority ethnic groups there, though religious organizations were more
likely to consist of members of different ethnicities.
Yet, it was uncertain that strong ethnic organizations would remain influential
in the district. PFKPM still maintained relatively strong solidarity after the pemekaran
in Sambas. The founders of FKPM held strong sway over the organization and
opposed reconciliation with Madurese. However, some of the founders lived in
Singkawang and the relationships between PFKPM and the Sambas government
started to change as discussed. Unlike PFKPM, the foundation of DAD in Bengkayang
did not affect DAD or the solidarity among the Dayak. This was probably explained
by the fact that DAD has had a long history and strong connections to traditional
village councils, while FKPM was first organized by Malay leaders. In both districts,
the divides in the majority groups were reported, especially at the time of elections.
On the other hand, in Singkawang, most ethnic groups founded their ethnic
organizations; however, there was no single organization that dominated civil society
there and the majority Chinese had two organizations—MABT and FOKET. Because
the Chinese were still reluctant to be involved in politics, MABT and FOKET were
wary of taking actions in front of the community. Similarly, the Madurese
organization, GEMISMA, also hesitated to express its ethnic dispositions, due to the
ethnic violence with the Malay and Dayak. Meanwhile, the Malay‘s PFKPM and
Dayak‘s DAD‘s activities were concentrated in the adjacent districts of Sambas and

359
Bengkayang. Reflecting the foundations of diverse ethnic organizations, an inter-
ethnic communication forum was organized and multi-ethnic NGOs for peace building
were established by the citizens. In addition, the Singkawang government maintained
contact with the ethnic organizations regarding their concerns over ethnic issues and
created a policy to promote ethnic peace in the City. The civil society of Singkawang
resembled the situation in Ketapang.
In spite of the differences in the developmental paths of the ethnic
organizations and civil society among the three districts, the ethnic organizations were
expected to contribute to the prevention of ethnic violence by promoting cooperation
among ethnic groups and sharing information. Before discussing how these changes in
political society and civil society affected conflict prevention, the next section
analyzes common issues in political and civil society. The changes in political and
civil societies are summarized in Table 11.1.

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Table 11.1 Changes in Political and Civil Societies in Three Districts after
Pemekaran
Sambas Bengkayang Singkawang
Ethnic
Composition
of
Population*

Before** Malay (52%), Dayak (17%), Chinese (17%), Javanese (10%), and
others (4%)
After
(Census
2000)
Malay (79%),
Chinese (11%),
Dayak (4%),
Javanese (3%),
Others (3%).
Dayak (53%), Malay
(17%), Javanese
(14%), Chinese
(9%), Madurese
(1%), Others (6%)
Chinese (40%),
Javanese (27%),
Malay (10%), Dayak
(8%), Madurese
(5%), Other (10%)
Political
Society &
Government
Before District Head: Tarya Aryanto (West Java, Indonesian Army)
Majority of District Government: Malay
After (as
of 2006)
District Head:
Burhanuddin A.
Rasyid (Malay)
Majority in District
Government and
local council: Malay
District Head:
Yakobus Luna
(Dayak)
Majority of District
Government and
local council: Dayak
District Head:
Awang Ishak
(Malay)
Majority of District
Government : Malay
Efforts/
Initiatives
for Ethnic
Issues
No government
initiatives for
reconciliation with
Madurese, wait a
natural process
None A policy to make
Singkawang ethnic
peace zone was
proposed.

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Table 11.1 Changes in Political and Civil Societies in Three Districts after
Pemekaran (Continued)
Sambas Bengkayang Singkawang
Civil Society

Before Ethnic organizations: Dayak Customary Council (DAD),
Communication Forum of Malay Youth (FKPM), Malay Cultural
and Customary Council (MABM), Paguyuban (Javanese),
Chinese social foundations (yayasan)
After PFKPM as Malay
organization is
the most powerful
organization
MABM, DAD,
MABT, Javanese
Paguyuban,
Others
Inter-ethnic
communication
forum but not
active

DAD as Dayak is
the most powerful
organization.
MABT, PFKPM,
Javanese
Paguyuban, and
others
Inter-ethnic
communication
forum but not
active
Chinese Cultural and
Customary Council
(MABT),Communication
Forum of Ethnic Chinese
(FOKET), a Madurese
organization (GEMISMA),
DAD, PFKPM, MABM,
Harmony of South
Sulawesi Families (KKSS)
Buginese, Javanese
paguyuban, associations of
Padang, and Manado
Inter-ethnic
communication forum
Pemekaran of
civic associations
and establishment
of new NGOs
Pemekaran of
civic associations
and establishment
of new NGOs
Multi-ethnic NGOs for
peace building
Efforts/
Initiatives
for Ethnic
Issues
Strong opposition
of PFKPM
against
reconciliation
None Inter-ethnic
communication forum and
NGOs seek reconciliations
and problem solving
*Javanese include Sundanese and other ethnic groups from Java Island.
** This figure does not include the Madurese population evacuated from Sambas due to
the ethnic violence in 1999. According to Davidson (2008), the Madurese population
accounted for approximately 5% of the district population.
Source: Population: Compiled from unpublished revised Table 06. Penduduk menurut
Wilayah Administrasi (Kabupaten/ Kota) dan Suku Bangsa in BPS Propinsi Kalimantan
Barat, Population Census 2000 (Pontianak: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat, 2000a);
unpublished raw data in BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat, Population Census 2000.
Population by Ethnicity (Pontianak: BPS Propinsi Kalimantan Barat, 2000b). District head
data: Compiled from Table 2-4 in Akiko Morishita, Suharto Taisei Houkaigono Indonesia
Chitouseiji: Nishi, Chubu, Higashi Kalimantanno Rikenwo Nigirunoha Douitta
Hitotachika? PhD diss., (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 2006), page 77.

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11.2. Obstacles to Conflict Prevention
This section discusses the obstacles in political society and civil society to
conflict prevention. In the first section, four issues in civil society, mostly related to
ethnic organizations, are discussed. The following section analyzes constraints in
political society and political institutional changes.

11.2.1. Problem Solving through Ethnic Organizations Questioned
After the pemekaran, ethnic organizations were founded in the three districts.
Particularly, in the multi-ethnic city of Singkawang, ethnic organizations contributed
to ethnic peace building. The capacity and efficacy of ethnic organizations in solving
ethnic issues, as well as how much influence ethnic organizations have on the
community, are here questioned. It is uncertain if people follow the decisions of ethnic
organizations. It depends on whether ethnic organizations effectively contribute to
problem solving among ethnic groups or whether they tend to accelerate competition
among ethnic groups. Leaders of ethnic organizations need to be fair to all ethnic
groups and understand problems or issues without ethnic bias.
However, in peace building in the past, even though ethnic leaders of the
Dayak and the Madurese agreed on peace after ethnic violence, people ignored those
agreements. Ethnic organizations may not be able to reach the community because the
active participants of the ethnic organizations were basically leaders and there is a
distance between the organizations and the community itself. As an interviewee aptly

363
put it ―those who talk are high-ranking persons so that it is not sure if they can reach
the grassroots, the below.‖
A difference in the social structures between the Dayak and other ethnic
groups was pointed out as a critical factor for the capacity of ethnic organizations to
manage ethnic problems. Though the establishment of the Dayak‘s organization,
DAD, was initiated by the government, the Dayak historically have had a customary
council and ethnic leaders, while the Malay, Madurese and Javanese did not have
ethnic leaders. Thus, a Javanese interviewee said it was relatively easier for the Dayak
leaders to control the behaviors of the community at large, than for those who were
not Dayak. However, the reasoning behind this comment was rejected by Dayak
interviewees.
There was an issue of representing the interests of the ethnic community by the
ethnic organizations. Ethnic organizations were not able to represent every single
interest within their respective ethnic communities. A Malay government officer
pointed out that ―in certain cases they can be united, but in other matters, they are not
united.‖ It was strongly suggested that because not everyone joins ethnic
organizations, the organizations could not fully represent and unite their ethnic
constituents. Due to inherent political differences, there were disagreements and splits
within the organization, depending on the interests at play and the issues under
discussion. Even FKPM, a strong Malay organization which played an instrumental
role in the Malay-Madurese ethnic violence, became fragmented after pemekaran and

364
similar divisions were present in the PFKPM branches in Sambas and Singkawang.
Thus, some criticized ethnic organizations for not serving the interests of all members
of the ethnic group.
Although there was enthusiasm for problem solving through ethnic
organizations, the efficacy of these organizations was questioned from the
perspectives of leadership quality, the presumed distance between the elite and the
grassroots, and the feasible representation of diverse interests in ethnic organizations.
These concerns over ethnic organizations apply to all three districts.

11.2.2. Ethnic Organizations and Competition
Ethnic organizations and a correspondingly strong sense of one‘s ethnic
identity can lead to competitions among ethnic groups. There was disagreement over
the degree of risk that ethnic organizations posed in terms of heightening ethnic
competition. However, it would appear that the birth of ethnic organizations has not
provoked undue ethnic competitions in the community. Several ethnic leaders argued
that the primary functions of ethnic organizations were the development of their own
culture and the preservation of traditions, as well as ethnic cooperation and friendship.
Frequent communication, meetings, and cooperation can prevent the emergence of
ethnic competition. In fact, ethnic organizations can even help to mitigate the
disparities between ethnic groups. Thus, ethnic identity might remain a concern among
only small numbers of people, as interviewees commented. The residents in the three
districts contended that if there was competition, it should be fair and positive. An

365
advisor of DAD Sambas underlined the positive aspect of ethnic organizations while
emphasizing that the objective of an ethnic organization was not to insist on a type of
solidarity that would promote rivalry between ethnic groups. Indeed, conflict
prevention was one important objective of these organizations. Ethnic organizations
together took preventative actions against ethnic violence and supported ethnic
cooperation, such that ―violence would not happen in the future.‖ As of 2007, no sign
of competition or negative consequences of ethnic organizations were identified in the
three districts. A Chinese interviewee said that even though they were not the majority
in the Sambas district, all ethnicities were treated equally so that they were not anxious
about any impending violence.
However, the founding of ethnic organizations was not supported by all of the
ethnic groups in Bengkayang. In fact an interviewee commented that ethnic
competitions did appear after the establishment of ethnic organizations. Because the
majority in Bengkayang district was Dayak, the other minority groups expressed some
anxieties about forming ethnic organizations. A Malay interviewee opposed a plan to
organize a branch of a Malay organization in his sub-district, ―because what we fear is
it looks as if there is resistance.‖ In particular, their minority status in the district made
it difficult for them to feel comfortable forming their own ethnic organization. He said,
―Ah just be obedient . . . . We‘re just a few.‖ Thus, there was fear among minorities in
the area that ethnic solidarity could be enhanced through ethnic organizations and thus
eventually would lead to competition between ethnic groups.

366
The creation of ethnic organizations of Malays and Chinese in the beginning of
the reformasi era was stimulated by the Dayak organizations, including the Dayak
Customary Council, as well as Dayak NGOs as Davidson (2008) contended, that
contributed to the political development of the Dayak and solidarity among the
Dayaks. As a result, ethnic competition increased. An interviewee explained, ―When
they looked at development of Dayak in politics, there are already others who
confront, who feel competed and scared.‖ Especially for the Malays, Dayak solidarity
became a driving force to organize their own organizations to compete against the
Dayak (Davidson 2008). Eventually, the two indigenous groups, the Dayak and
Malay, had equally strong organizations in the province.
Competition between the two largest ethnic groups, the Dayaks and Malays,
was anticipated and fueled by the ethnic organizations through rivalry between ethnic
organizations, such as PFKPM, MABM or DAD. In fact, one founder of FKPM did
not hesitate to show his willingness to confront the Dayak if necessary.
Our Malays in the area of Bengkayang, Malays seem to be pressured,
they [Dayaks] do not like Malays. In the past, they were not like that.
Now in Singkawang they do not walk around this Singkawang, do not
take a stroll, because here there are many Malays, many Malays in the
government offices. If they are in Bengkayang, they are strong. In
Landak, Sanggau, Sanggau Kapuas, they are great yes. For us, Malays
do not want to be the enemy with them. But if they already want to be a
competitor with us, we face them, we are against them now.
Competitions among ethnic organizations can be divided into two levels:
namely, the district level or beyond the district level. The district level competition
between ethnic organizations was less likely to happen in Sambas, Bengkayang, and

367
Singkawang. In Sambas and Bengkayang, because of clearly identified majority
groups, the Malay and Dayak, the other ethnic groups would not be against the
majority, even if they feel certain dissatisfactions with their present situation.
However, there may be a higher risk of ethnic clashes in Singkawang due to the multi-
ethnic population or frictions that may be caused by broader issues or triggers, such as
the election of a governor. In fact, an interviewee mentioned there would be ethnic
competition at the provincial level regarding the election of the governor.

11.2.3. Political Interests, Ethnic Organizations and Pemekaran
In spite of the positive perspectives on ethnic organizations, there is a concern
that ethnic organizations could be used for political objectives. This was especially
believed to be so because political institutional reform, or reformasi, coincided with
the emergence of ethnic organizations, by lifting restrictions on the freedom to express
local culture including ethnicity, race, and religion—in general known as SARA
during the New Order period. In essence, the reformasi became a viable force that
promoted the development of ethnic organizations. After the reformasi, people are ―no
longer afraid of the central policy‖ and the community ―has shown the courage to
suggest opinions, the courage to show a different color from the others.‖
One of the motives behind the foundation of ethnic organizations was political
interest, rather than cultural or social ones. As discussed by Davidson (2008), an
interviewee also said that the growth of political power of the Dayaks along with the
development of the Dayak Customary Council, motivated other ethnic groups to

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organize ethnic organizations. The connections between ethnic organizations and
politics were pointed out specifically at the time of the local elections. An interviewee
from the election committee regarded ethnic organizations as ―one of the pillars of
political power.‖ The political intentions of ethnic organizations were already
suspected by people and cited in the newspaper. Several interviewees criticized the
political mobilization of ethnic organizations for the election of specific groups.
Moreover, there is a political intention behind the implementation of
pemekaran as well, because giving name to a district representing ethnicity has
political implications. With democratization, the district heads were selected through
free elections. Ethnicity became one important factor that determines the selection of a
candidate. The ethnicity of pairs of candidates usually reflected the ethnic composition
of the population. A Malay interviewee explained this ethnic consideration in local
elections: ―If in general, the Malay community certainly chooses Malay leaders. If
Dayak people, generally they choose Dayak. Now, when fifty-fifty, 50 Dayak 50
Malays, sometimes they are coupled, sometimes both Malays and Dayak become
district heads.‖ A Dayak district of Bengkayang and a Malay majority district of
Sambas both had a pair of Dayak or Malay district head and vice district head that
represented their respective ethnic majorities, while the mayor and vice mayor of
multi-ethnic Singkawang were Malay and Dayak respectively. Therefore, ethnic
composition of district population definitely plays into the political interests of the
government and politicians, particularly in estimating the odds of winning elections. A

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Chinese interviewee pointed out that the changes in ethnic or religious composition
that were brought about by transmigration programs have affected the political
position of each group and the odds of winning an election. He said, ―There are people
who see this long-term strategy and there are people who do not see.‖
Nevertheless, because of democratization, people can choose any candidate of
their preference through the free election process. As a result of that, the ultimate
political influence of ethnic organizations might be mitigated and not as significant as
first suspected. This is discussed in relation with the political changes in the
conclusion.

11.2.4. A Sense of Ethnicity and Ethnic Organizations
Ethnic organizations were a product of the openness brought about during the
era of the reformasi. The ethnic violence at the beginning of reformasi stimulated
development of ethnic organizations. This was described as such: ―Once what was
closed became opened. Once what was considered taboo became ordinary.‖ Ethnic
organizations strengthened a sense of belonging to a particular ethnicity and created a
sense of solidarity. Thus, the foundation of ethnic organizations stimulated ethnic
identity by providing concrete meaning for a particular ethnicity, but such an
identification could also create negative consequences. A Malay interviewee analyzed
the issue as follows: ―Because one person speaks on the name of Malay, it moves all
Malays for sure‖ and by giving a name to ethnicity, for example, Malay, ―Malayness
appears and attacks the others.‖ It creates an ―an emotional bond‖ or a sense of unity

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based on ethnicity that then emerges as a group, or in short identity. Thus, there was
anticipation that once the solidarity of ethnic groups was reinforced, then ethno-centric
perspectives might also appear. Ethnic organizations have a risk to stimulate strong
feelings about specific ethnicities within the community.
Eventually, such feelings could result in an increase in conflict among ethnic
groups and damage the unity of the nation. A Malay interviewee warned that the
existence of ethnic organizations opposed the Indonesian motto, ―Unity in Diversity‖
(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). Ethnic organizations could accelerate disagreement,
fragmentation, and disputes in the community, by emphasizing difference, and in
advocating for the benefits and interests of a small group or particular ethnicity in the
region—which is a ―narrow understanding of ethnicity, too narrow understanding of
region, regionalism.‖ He also called for going back to the ideology of the Indonesian
state, Pancasila, the Youth Pledge and the ―Unity in Diversity.‖ Moreover, ethnic
organizations do not represent their ethnic groups in the same way parliament or a
local council could.
However, a Madurese commented that ethnic solidarity among the Malays had
not changed even after the creation of the Sambas district. Proponents of ethnic
organizations did not necessarily neglect the national unity. A Dayak public official
emphasized the advantages of ethnic differences by referring to the national slogan,
―We have diversity which makes us different but still one in the country of Unity in
Diversity.‖

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Yet, ethnic politics has already become a reality in West Kalimantan, in spite
of the ostensible rejection of political involvement declared by ethnic organizations. In
the election of district head and governor, ethnic composition of the population
became an important factor for calculating the odds of winning, particularly in multi-
ethnic districts and at the provincial level.

11.2.5. Putera daerah—Son of Soil
During the New Order, expression of ethnic differences was suppressed.
Moreover, so-called Javanization or colonization by the Javanese, in which the
Javanese occupied high-ranking government positions outside of Java to implement
Jakarta‘s policy, occurred in West Kalimantan. A Malay official in Singkawang
explained the suppression of ethnic culture and Javanization: ―If you were not
Javanese, did not expect to have any position in the army, police, or district head.‖
After reformasi, what appeared was the issue of ―putera daerah‖ or ―son of
soil,‖ the reverse of Javanization. With democratization and decentralization,
indigenous ethnic groups claimed that the ―son of soil‖ should be given priority in the
recruitment of public servants. The chief of local government and high-ranking
government officials should be from local ethnic groups. Moreover, pemekaran
escalated the issue of son of soil, because the separation of the Sambas district into
three districts made the majority ethnic groups more prominent in each district, i.e.,
the Malays in Sambas, the Chinese in Singkawang, and the Dayaks in Bengkayang. A
Chinese interviewee described the political change in these terms: ―Javanese

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dominated political positions. Once it was the Javanese, and then the Malay, then now
the Dayak appeared.‖ A Madurese interviewee accused this ―son of soil‖ tendency as a
misinterpretation of regional autonomy. A problem with the ―son of soil‖ approach is
that it strengthens ethnic differences, especially between the majority and minority,
and might provoke competition between the two majority groups, as Davidson (2008)
pointed out. An increase of Dayak government employees after pemekaran could lead
to competition between two indigenous groups, the Malay and the Dayak. Obviously,
there is political motive behind the son of soil movement.
An emphasis on putera daerah raised issues about whether a nationalistic
perspective was being forgotten. A Dayak retired government official critically
commented on the rise of localism, saying that ―it should be a national perspective, not
focusing on only regions. The national perspective should be more invested.‖ A
Buginese described regional autonomy as creating small kingdoms of ethnicity or
―small countries in one country.‖ The Buginese said: ―We are sad. We fought together
to achieve the same purpose [of the independence]. Now we fight together to make a
difference.‖ He concluded that this ethnic issue was what devastates the Indonesian
people most. Moreover, the heads of government and local governments from
indigenous groups did not necessarily have the capacity to lead development in the
districts, and corruption among them was often reported. Thus, most people
acknowledged that the capability and commitment of district heads to development
were more important than ethnicity.

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Hiring putera daerah or local residents for governments, however, can benefit
the government and region as well. Because local people know the area better than
outsiders, it is reasonable to give local groups priorities for job opportunities. There
was an advantage in reflecting the ethnic composition of the population in the district
government in terms of improvement of the security of the region, and communication
with the population. A government official of Singkawang pointed out, ―It‘s better,
because the head of the region, leaders can more easily get into the community, so
much easier to interact with them.‖ The creation of new districts provided job
opportunities for qualified and educated local residents including son of soil, because
of needs to hire new staff for the new district governments.
It should be also noted that the minority groups did not necessarily worry about
the government hiring more employees from the majority group. For example, the
Chinese had little concern with being the minority or with favorable treatment given to
the majority groups, because there were Chinese representatives in the local council. It
was a natural phenomenon that a district head was elected from the majority group. In
the recent direct elections, people tended to choose candidates from their own
ethnicity. This ethnic sentiment was described as, ―not wrong‖ or ―a natural law.‖
In particular, the Dayak side argued that it does not mean that the Dayak only
want a Dayak district head, and they insisted that the promotion of public officials
should be based on the qualifications inherent to the positions, as defined by the
regulations, not the ethnicity of a particular candidate. The increase of employment

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opportunities in the government for the local population was not a primary reason of
the creation of a new district, though it was expected by the community. The growth
of the indigenous groups in bureaucracy simply reflected the composition of the local
population.
In short, son of soil or the putera daerah phenomenon was a reaction to the
strong control exercised by the New Order regime and the past marginalization of
indigenous groups, specifically the Dayak. Moreover, the decentralization and the
creation of homogenous districts by pemekaran accelerated the localism of the son of
soil movement. Although the excessive application of the son of soil concept and
pressing enforcement of customary laws could cause a problem, as described by
Henley and Davidson (2008), a policy to give priority to local residents in the
recruitment of government employees can bring certain benefits to the community by
promoting fairness and stabilizing ethnic relationships as Esman (1997, 1999) argued
in the theory of representative bureaucracy. The district heads chosen by direct
election can mitigate such frustration against favoritism for specific groups among the
residents.

11.3. Can Pemekaran Prevent Conflict?
Pemekaran, or creation of new districts through decentralization and
democratization, brought about a variety of changes in Bengkayang, Sambas, and
Singkawang. Both civil society and political society emerged in the three districts by

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restructuring relationships among ethnic groups, depending on the characteristics of
the population and the history of each district. The ethnic relationships in the districts
adjusted along with the majority or minority status of the groups and the changes in
strength and solidarity of the ethnic groups.
Among the three districts, remarkable changes were observed in Singkawang
and Bengkayang. In Singkawang, the multi-ethnic population of relatively educated
urban residents led to the development of a balance among ethnic groups and ethnic
organizations, and the emergence of multi-ethnic civic associations aiming at conflict
prevention and ethnic peace. The Singkawang government has started a polity
promoting ethnic peace. Although the mayor of Singkawang was Malay, Singkawang
is no longer the capital of the Sambas district. The name of Sambas is rooted in the
Sultan of Sambas, while Singkawang is a Chinese town, known as ―Kota Amoi‖ or
―City of Chinese Girl.‖ Freed from the name of Sambas, the Singkawang government,
as the city of the Chinese, together with the Madurese including the displaced from
Sambas, was able to take a free hand to promote ethnic peace, though there were not
many Chinese government employees.
In the newly founded Bengkayang district, the Dayak started enjoying political
freedom and access to government resources and power. The Dayak were
marginalized by the New Order regime‘s discrimination and development policy, and
suffered from the underdevelopment of the region. Through the pemekaran, in
addition to incorporating regional autonomy and democratization, the Bengkayang

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district, ―a Dayak district,‖ was founded with a Dayak dominant government. As son
of soil of the province and district, the Dayak started enjoying priority in the
recruitment of the civil servants or promotion in the government, to fill in the gaps of
opportunity created by past discrimination. In civil society, the Dayak organization,
DAD, emerged as the primary political organization, though other ethnic and civil
society organizations were founded as well after pemekaran. However, internal
competitions emerged among the Dayaks at the time of election.
Unlike Singkawang and Bengkayang, Sambas experienced the least changes,
because the Malays have been the majority in the government, as well as the majority
population of the former Sambas. As explained, Sambas was developed as the
kingdom of Malay sultan and Malays have enjoyed the advanced development in the
coastal areas and opportunities to join the government. Moreover, the foundation of a
Malay organization, FKPM, showed the strength of the Malays through the ethnic
clashes with Madurese. Even after pemekaran, the position of the Malays remained
unchanged in the political and civil societies of Sambas. Thus, there was little change
in Sambas.
One question is whether or not these changes, or the continuation of previous
conditions in political and civil societies, can contribute to conflict prevention and
ethnic peace. The ethnic organizations and inter-ethnic communication forums in the
three districts were expected to address ethnic problems through cooperation and
communication. However, the preceding sections identified the factors that could

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threaten ethnic relationships, i.e., the problem solving capacity of ethnic organizations,
competitions among them, political interests, ethnic solidarity, and the issue of son of
soil. Within such a situational dynamic, can ethnic peace still be achieved?
As many interviewees discussed, I would argue that it is possible to prevent
ethnic clashes at the district level. Davidson (2008) has criticized the ethnic
organizations and NGOs, in particular a Malay organization in Sambas, FKPM, and
the Dayak NGOs which endorsed violence against the Madurese. However, there was
a critical difference, which was that before the ethnic violence and reformasi, those
ethnic organizations were not connected to the government, while now most ethnic
organizations after the pemekaran have built close relationships with the local
governments and the government often organized ethnic cultural events with them. As
with the case of Ketapang, a peaceful district discussed in the previous chapters, close
relationships between the local government and ethnic organizations are indispensable
for achieving peace in the district.
However, civil society and the relationships between ethnic organizations and
the government have developed in a distinct way, depending on the specific
characteristics of the three districts. In Sambas and Bengkayang, because Malays and
Dayaks became the majorities of the two districts respectively, these two groups and
their ethnic organizations were the main players in various activities in civil society
and built a strong tie with the government. Meanwhile, in Singkawang, similar to
Ketapang, inter-ethnic relations were further strengthened by the emergence of multi-

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ethnic civic organizations for peace building with government support. The issues
identified in ethnic organizations, i.e., problem solving abilities, competitions, political
interests, and ethnic identities could be addressed with the support and guidance of the
government. Therefore, ethnic relationships in the two types of districts, homogenous
and heterogeneous or multi-ethnic, were stabilized by totally contrasting
characteristics of civil society and relationships with the government.
The government‘s attitude toward ethnic relationships has changed after
pemekaran, decentralization and democratization. Heads of district and elected
officials selected through popular election were more concerned with how people,
including residents and outsiders, perceive their district. In Sambas, government
officials and local council members often expressed anxieties about the image of
Sambas: how people think about Sambas, whether or not people still think that
Sambas is dangerous or that the Sambas people are violent, which could affect
development of the district. On the other hand, for the residents of Singkawang, the
ethnic violence between the Malay and Madurese was a problem of Sambas, because
Singkawang was no longer part of the Sambas district after pemekaran. As discussed,
the mayor of Singkawang proposed a policy for ethnic peace, in spite of his ethnicity,
Malay. Therefore, the responsibility of the local government became clearer after
pemekaran and decentralization. The government was expected to show their ability to
manage their own jurisdiction without violence and to fulfill their responsibility.
Moreover, with pemekaran, the distance between the community and the government

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reduced, and the community, especially the Dayaks, enjoyed improved access to the
government. In the past, violence was the only means by which to express a
community‘s discontent with the government, as cases in West Kalimantan described
by Davidson (2008), and the situations through Indonesia stated by Aspinall (2004);
however after democratization and pemekaran, non-violent approaches became more
available for people to appeal to the public and government. In fact, the community‘s
grievances about the political and economical marginalization started to decline.
Majority-minority issues, or a fear against tyranny of the majority, are
expected to be addressed through elections. In particular, the Indonesian election
mechanism requires candidates to run in pairs of district and vice district candidates.
This arrangement provides incentives for candidates to select the most optimal partner
to attract votes from various groups in terms of ethnicity, religion and other
characteristics.
Because of these factors, ethnic violence at the district level is more likely
addressed through efforts of the community and government. The three cases
illuminated the importance of connections between political society and civil society
to build peaceful relationships in a district. The political society and government
should fairly represent the community and send an appropriate signal to the
community to guide civil society. Unlike Varshney‘s (2002) argument, ethnic peace
cannot be achieved only by civil society. As discussion of the theory of
decentralization for conflict prevention in Chapter 7, the benefits of decentralization

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such as self-determination, improvement of the public service and economic
development, have certain advantageous impacts on the mitigation of grievances of
marginalized groups such as the Dayak. However, a critical factor for these groups
was, rather than those improvements, political changes and power brought by self-
governing and autonomy.
However, again, what kind of mechanism do these changes suggest for
prevention of ethnic conflict? The three cases illuminated two mechanisms for conflict
prevention based on homogenous and heterogeneous populations of districts, which
was similar to what Horowitz (1985) argued for. Horowitz (1985) discussed two
different types of federalism to decide the boundaries according to the territory of
ethnic groups or area cross-cutting various ethnic groups for conflict prevention. The
federalism that creates ethnically homogenous regions can help mitigate ethnic
conflict because ethnicity ceases to matter as a category of analysis among the
population; however, ethnically mixed-regions can change the interests of ethnic elites
and increase benefits through ethnic cooperation (Horowitz 1985). In the two
homogenous districts of Sambas and Bengkayang, ethnicity was not an issue anymore.
During the election of the district head, Sambas Malay were divided into two groups
supporting either the incumbent district head or the former vice district head and
Sambas Sultan. The members of Malay organization PFKPM sided with one or the
other depending on their own preference. In Bengkayang, because of the existence of
sub-ethnicities among the Dayak, intra-ethnic competition was intensified over who

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could lay claim to being the indigenous Dayak in Bengkayang during the election.
Thus, ethnic competition at the district level was not the concern of the Malay in
Sambas and the Dayak in Bengkayang. On the other hand, the creation of the multi-
ethnic city of Singkawang changed the political calculations and interests among
ethnic leaders there. It is essential for minority groups to cooperate with the majority
Chinese there. For the government, the absence of severe ethnic violence is a selling
point to invite investment and accelerate development of Singkawang by
differentiating it from Sambas and Bengkayang. Though the focus of Horowitz‘s
(1985) two design of federalism was to mitigate ethnic conflict at the center, the
creation of homogeneous and heterogeneous districts can contribute to prevention of
regional ethnic violence by diverting interests from ethnicity or rearranging benefits of
ethnic cooperation at the local level.
Yet, there was still a risk of ethnic clashes, especially between the two majority
groups, the Dayak and the Malay. For example, during the riot between the Malay and
Madurese in Pontianak in 2000, the Madurese were victimized during the political
competition for the governor‘s election (Davidson 2008). Moreover, it seemed less
likely that intra-ethnic competition, such as sub-group competition among the Dayaks,
would lead to prevention of ethnic conflict, because a feeling of hatred against other
ethnic groups is different from and stronger than that between sub-groups within the
same ethnicity. However, the gubernatorial election took place in 2007 without serious
riots or violence. Cornelis M. H., a former district head of Landak, was elected as the

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first Dayak governor since Oevaang Oeray, the first governor of West Kalimantan,
with a Chinese vice governor. Intra-ethnic divides and inter-ethnic relationships
beyond the district might have been subtly altered by varying degrees of new
competitive relations in ethnicity or needs for ethnic cooperation in each district, as
Horowitz (1985) discussed. However, the question about the relationships between
peace, and decentralization and pemekaran, in the long run, still remains to be
answered.

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CHAPTER 12
CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS FOR CONFLICT OR PEACE?
12.1. Civic Associations for Conflict or Peace?—Reconsidered
This chapter reconsiders relationships between civic associations and conflict
prevention by a regression analysis on data obtained from a household survey.
Whether or not civic associations contribute to peace building was analyzed in
Chapters 4 to 6. In particular, two types of civic associations, inter-ethnic associations
and intra-ethnic associations, were the focus of analysis, based on Varshney‘s (2002)
seminal work on ethnic violence in India and Fearon and Laitin‘s (1996) theory of in-
group policing of intra-ethnic control mechanism. Varshney (2002) argued that civic
associations across ethnic boundaries can prevent conflict by building trust and
networks between them; while, Fearon and Laitin (1996) suggested that ethnic peace
is achieved by in-group policing in which each ethnic group punishes those members
who endanger inter-ethnic peace by committing wrongs against other groups‘
members.
In the previous chapters, a comparison of conflict-prone and peaceful districts
through the analysis of interview data revealed that civic associations, ethnic
organizations in particular, contributed to the maintenance of peace in the Ketapang
district. Ethnic organizations maintained close communication among them and
worked together to prevent conflict, while the inter-ethnic communication forum,
members of which are leaders of ethnic organizations, strengthened cooperation and

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information sharing between ethnic groups. Moreover, local government was
identified as having an important role in peace building. The local government,
including the district government, the police and military stations in the district, not
only took proactive actions towards conflict prevention and but also promoted
pluralism and tolerance within the ethnic diversity that already existed by improving
communication and facilitating an inter-ethnic communication forum.
The framework for ethnic peace similar to the case of Ketapang also appeared
in the three districts of Sambas, Bengkayang, and Singkawang in the conflict region
after pemekaran, particularly in Singkawang. As illustrated in Chapters 8 to 11, ethnic
groups in the three districts organized district-level ethnic organizations, which started
cooperating to address ethnic problems and issues together. The new governments, led
by the district head, directly elected by the local population, built close relationships
with the community and the ethnic organizations. Similar to the case of Ketapang,
inter-ethnic communication forums were initiated by community with support from
the government. Nevertheless, the strength of ethnic groups was determined by the
ethnic composition of the population itself. In Sambas and Bengkayang, it was the
majority groups, the Malay and Dayak, who actually had the decision-making power
in the civil and political society of their respective districts. On the other hand, the
relatively mixed and multi-ethnic city of Singkawang has developed balanced ethnic
relationships, because of the political insignificance of the Chinese majority due to
historic reasons previously described.

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Hence, the case studies showed mixed results as to the question of the efficacy
of civic associations in preventing conflict, in particular, the question of what type of
civic associations enhance ethnic peace. This chapter aims to reexamine the relations
between civic associations and ethnic peace, specifically which type of association,
i.e., inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic, can prevent violence, through quantitative analysis of
the household survey data, which was conducted as a part of this study.
To build hypotheses, relationships between civic associations and
conflict/peace, as well as government and socio-economic factors which are
considered to be influential on the dynamics of ethnic conflict, are reviewed to
identify independent variables for a regression model. After the research method and
data are presented, the results are discussed and the theoretical implications are
presented as part of the conclusion.

12.2. Hypotheses about Civic Associations and Peace
To examine how civic associations affect ethnic peace or conflict, this section
develops hypotheses to be tested. Conditions or issues for the relationships between
two types of civic associations and peace are analyzed in detail, in addition to other
significant factors that likely influence ethnic relationships.

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12.2.1. Ethnic Peace by Inter-Ethnic or Intra-Ethnic Associations
(1) Which Type of Association Works for Peace: Inter-Ethnic Associations or
Intra-Ethnic Associations?
Relationships between civic associations and ethnic relationships have been
examined from the perspective of the types of associations as presented in Chapter 3.
Two types of civic associations, inter-ethnic associations and intra-ethnic associations,
are the foci of research on how civic associations affect ethnic relationships, whether
for peace or conflict. In the area of theories about inter-ethnic associations, Varshney‘s
(2002) argument, most notably, is summarized as stating that in the case of ethnic
clashes between Hindus and Muslims in India, trust and bonds built through inter-
ethnic associations became the foundation for taking actions to prevent ethnic violence
by promoting communication and cooperation, especially in urban areas.
On the other hand, adopting a rational choice approach, Fearon and Laitin
(1996) developed a model of ethnic cooperation, in-group policing. This control
mechanism draws on the group‘s internal advantages in information sharing and
enforcement of sanctions, so that each group is responsible for the behaviors of group
members. This helps to ensure that they do not jeopardize ethnic peace. Thus, in-group
policing is peace building through intra-ethnic organizations. As pre-conditions for in-
group policing, a group needs to have a distinct identity, be relatively segregated, and
maintain enough autonomy to be able to enforce group sanctions (see Chapter 3 for a
detailed discussion of the two theories).

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Bridging social capital theory provides a similar argument for the role of inter-
communal associations (Putnam 2000). Associations that have bridging social capital
are often identified by heterogeneous memberships that provide opportunities to meet
people from different backgrounds or social status (Coffé and Geys 2007), and to
develop new perceptions about members of other groups (Marschall and Stolle 2004).
Marschall and Stolle (2004) found, from an analysis of neighborhood-level black-
white racial differences, that cooperation and generalized trust towards different race
groups tend to appear through heterogeneous interactions especially for blacks.
Similarly from a psychological aspect, Oliver and Wong (2003) showed that a
multiracial setting helps residents to overcome racial stereotypes and to develop
cooperative relationships with other groups. Thus, ―the degree of associational
diversity is associated with levels of generalized trust and community reciprocity
among members‖ (Stolle and Rochon 1998, 61). From these findings, it can be
suggested that inter-ethnic associations contribute to peaceful ethnic relationships by
mitigating negative views towards other groups and developing cooperation, trust and
reciprocity among ethnic groups.
However, homogenous groups have advantages over heterogeneous groups in
building trust, collective action or social output. Often, the same ethnicity and
common language help to develop trust at the personal level. In particular, linguistic
differences impose considerable constraints on trust building in developing countries
(Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006). According to a study of ethnic diversity in

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Indonesia, community organizations in ethnically diverse community are less likely to
receive support or cooperation from the community and a minority group is not likely
to be involved in community organizations to the same degree as the majority group.
Thus, ethnic diversity hinders the activities of community organizations (Okten and
Osili 2004).
The common pool resources and collective action literature argues that the
homogeneity of a group tends to reduce transaction costs and lead to successful
collective action because the members have similar views and desires (Taylor and
Singleton 1993). A similar group background helps people to understand issues,
customs or circumstances. In particular, sharing interests among groups is one of the
essential factors for management of common pool resources (Baland and Platteau
2000). Thus, in general heterogeneity of a group negatively affects organizing
collective action (Taylor and Singleton 1993; Libecap 1994; Baland and Platteau
2000), though certain types of heterogeneity may promote or improve it (Baland and
Platteau 2000). Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) found that heterogeneity in ethnicity
and language lowers economic growth, especially in low-income and non-democratic
countries.
Hence, current theories in the field have found both advantages and
disadvantages within heterogeneous and homogenous groups in trust building,
cooperation and shared objectives or goals. This indicates that both types of
associations, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic associations, can contribute to building

389
peaceful ethnic relationships. The analyses of conflict and peaceful districts in
Chapters 4 through 6 and Chapters 8 to 11 also supported both arguments that
associate inter-ethnic associations and ethnic organizations with peace. In the peaceful
district of Ketapang and the multi-ethnic city of Singkawang, an inter-ethnic
communication forum was formed to address ethnic problems based on ethnic
organizations, with the support of the local government. Thus, these cases suggested
that both types of associations, inter- and intra-ethnic associations can contribute to
peace building.

(2) Contextual Conditions: Segregation and Urbanity
According to Varshney (2002), ethnic segregation is a key variable in
determining the efficiency of inter-communal associations in building peace. In India,
both society and civic associations are ethnically mixed. He speculated that a divided
society, for example the white-black relationship in the United States, may provide
appropriate conditions for peace building through in-group policing by ethnic groups,
rather than through inter-ethnic associations. In fact, an assumption of in-group
policing is the existence of clear boundaries between groups (Fearon and Laitin 1996).
The level of segregation varies from place to place and from community to community
within a country and even depends on the types of associations. In general, an urban
community, such as Singkawang City or the provincial capital of Pontianak City, is

390
more ethnically mixed than rural society.
50
Though these theories analyzed only two
groups involved in conflict, there would be other group(s) influencing the
development of antagonistic or peaceful group relationships. Moreover, once ethnic
conflict breaks out, divides and segregation of the contesting groups is accelerated
(Pickering 2006) so that interactions across groups declined (Varshney 2002;
Pickering 2006). This means that physically dividing antagonistic groups into separate
areas could mitigate troubles or lessen tensions between the groups. In short, the
pattern of residence and development of civic associations has not been explored
enough in these theories.
As discussed in Chapters 4 to Chapter 6, the residents of Sambas complained
of the Madurese ethnic enclaves which they believed hindered interactions between
groups and efforts to assimilate. In 1999, a Malay ethnic organization, FKPM led the
attack on the Madurese. In peaceful Ketapang, ethnic leaders and their organizations
helped to resolve impending conflicts by visiting or sending assistants to the location
of the problem, which was often in rural areas. This type of ethnic cooperation was
developed in Ketapang town, the district capital, where the community was relatively
diverse and the ethnic organizations, the inter-ethnic communication forum, and the
government were all located. The ethnic clashes in West Kalimantan usually started in
rural areas, while inter-ethnic interactions or cooperation were more likely to emerge
in urban areas. The population bases of the ethnic organizations were found in

50
See comparison of ethnic composition in Sambas and Ketapang in footnote in Chapter 6

391
ethnically heterogeneous urban areas, not in homogenous rural areas, regardless of
their location in either peaceful or conflict-prone districts.
Therefore, the contexts of a location can affect the potential efficacies of the
two types of associations on ethnic peace, for example, levels of assimilation or
segregation of ethnic groups in urban or rural areas. This analysis would suggest the
hypothesis that segregation could influence ethnic relationships either negatively or
positively. There may be less serious problems between ethnic groups in urban areas
due to assimilation, diversity and other factors.

(3) Contextual Conditions: Education and Economic Status
To make ethnic organizations work for peace, individual or community
characteristics matter. Marschall and Stolle (2004, 129) pointed out ―interactions‖ and
―knowledge-based trust‖ as important factors in building a good relationship across
different groups from a psychological perspective. Inter-ethnic associations increase
opportunities to communicate with different people so that new ideas and perceptions
about different groups can be developed and then generalized trust can be created
(Marschall and Stolle 2004). When the security maintenance within groups is
effective, members of one group may not necessarily directly interact with other
groups, but they would trust and know that members of the other group are
cooperating to maintain ethnic peace by punishing those in their group who have
caused trouble to the other ethnic groups. Hence, information or knowledge about the

392
other group is essential to developing trust or motivation for in-group policing (Fearon
and Laitin 1996). In Larsen et al.‘s (2004) research, the levels of education and
awareness about problems in a community are related to civic actions and the
development of bonding social capital. More educated people not only develop close
connections within the community, but are also able to build bridging social capital for
problem solving in the community. In addition to the education level of an individual,
communities or individuals who have a higher economic status are more likely to
develop capacities to act for the collective good (Larsen et al. 2004). From the
findings of Larsen et al. (2004), it is assumed that in the case of an ethnic problem,
people with a higher level of education have the cognitive ability to correct ethnic
stereotypes from knowledge about other groups‘ attitudes acquired through direct
interactions or relationships between ethnic organizations. Educated and wealthy
communities are able to take such actions to solve troubles between groups.
From this discussion, a hypothesis on education and economic status can be
developed—that a higher level of education and economic status (of an individual or
community), are likely to lead to ethnic cooperation and better relationships.

Therefore, the following hypotheses on civic associations and ethnic
relationships are identified from the above discussion:
Hypothesis 1: Inter-ethnic associations contribute to prevention of ethnic
violence and to ethnic peace.

393
Hypothesis 2: Ethnic associations contribute to prevention of ethnic violence and
to ethnic peace.
Hypothesis 3: Contextual conditions (level of segregation, urban/rural, socio-
economic status) affect the efficacy of civic associations and hence
ethnic relationships. These are positive impacts of urban and socio-
economic status on ethnic relationships and negative effects of
segregation.

12.2.2. Political Institutions and Ethnic Relationships
Civic associations or civil society in general are not independent of the
contexts in which they are located. According to Varshney (2002), a rudimentary
constellation of civic engagement was installed during Gandhi‘s political movement
with the objective of building cooperative relationships between the Hindus and the
Muslims. MacLean (2004) argued that civil society is more likely to be developed
based on the existing framework of relationships between the citizens and the state.
Moreover, as Davidson (2008) has shown from a historical and institutional
perspective, how policy determined at the center, such as konfrontasi and the ban of
the Indonesian Communist Party, influenced ethnic relationships and ethnic violence,
and left long-lasting impacts on ethnic relationships in West Kalimantan.
Hence, political institutions have significant effects on how civil society
develops and how people experience it. In the following sections, I discuss aspects of

394
political institutions that influence ethnic relationships—political representation,
government and policies—and propose hypotheses on political institutions and ethnic
relationships.

(1) Representation and Ethnic Relationship
The issue of political representation and ethnic relationship is widely studied in
the design of political institutions. Gurr (1993, 6) argued ―any communal group or
minority that has been subject to political or material discrimination is at risk of
collective adversity.‖ When there are no means to express a minority group‘s
grievances within the existing system, they are likely to be forced to choose a violent
option to change the situation in spite of the high costs involved (Gurr 1993, 2000).
There are two political institutional designs that have been suggested as ways to
integrate diverse groups, while responding to the frustration of groups. In
consociational democracy, different groups in society are proportionally represented
and share political positions and resources at the national level (Lijphart 1969, 1971,
1979). With autonomous status, distinct groups are able to express their own rights or
develop appropriate policies for their own group under the arrangements of federalism
(Hannum 1996; Ghai 1998). Therefore, to achieve peace, political institutions from
consociational democracy to federalism or decentralization are designed to represent
the interests or needs of different segments or groups in society.

395
As discussed in Chapters 7 to 11, ethnic representation in government matters
for ethnic relationships (Esman 1997, 1999), in addition to political representation.
According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, interests and needs of a
population are better understood and more likely addressed by policies and programs
when the ethnic composition of the government reflects the population (Evans 1974;
Esman 1997, 1999; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998).
In fact, the Dayak, with their long history of marginalization, enthusiastically
welcomed the foundation of the district of Bengkayang. Because the new district
government led by the Dayak district head hired more Dayaks, the Dayak residents
expressed their opinion that this government knew the community‘s desires better and
paid closer attention to the Dayak community, compared with the previous Sambas
government, where the majority of the public servants were Malay. Similarly, a
Chinese interviewee contended that a lack of Chinese representation in government
was one of the causes for the unfair treatment of Chinese. On the other hand, the
ethnic composition of the local government of Ketapang, a peaceful district which has
been relatively more diverse than the old Sambas district even before the reformasi,
enjoys ethnic peace to the present day. Thus, a government that reflects the ethnic
composition of the population is more approachable by the community, in particular
those groups that have been marginalized or are weak.
However, as Esman (1997, 1999) predicted, corruption and nepotism within
the majority group, or any group close to high-ranking officers, were found in the

396
governments in West Kalimantan. There was also concern about the inherent
favoritism in the ‗son of soil‘ concept, and other issues which disadvantage the
minority groups in the district. Yet, theory and case analysis indicate that making the
ethnic composition of the bureaucracy resemble that of the resident population is one
way of improving ethnic relationships, thus allowing disadvantaged groups access to
the government.

(2) Inequality and Policies for Ethnic Integration
Policies for peace or conflict have been argued in relation to inequalities
among groups (Stewart 2002). Stewart (2002, 2) points out the importance of
―horizontal inequalities‖ in ―culturally defined groups‖ such as the role of imbalances
in political power or socio-economic status to explain social upheavals. In the
Minorities at Risk project, Gurr (1993, 38) has pointed out, ―the more sharply distinct
they are culturally from dominant groups, the more they tend to suffer from political
and economic inequalities.‖ In particular, a minority or group with a significantly
different culture from the majority group is more likely to experience economic
hardships, because there is often discrimination against those groups behind political
and economic inequalities (Gurr 1993). From a district-level analysis of Indonesia,
Mancini (2005) showed a positive association between group inequalities measured by
child mortality rates and incidents of serious ethnic violence, rather than vertical

397
inequalities. Eventually the groups express their difficulties in addressing political and
economic inequalities (Gurr 1993).
In the case of West Kalimantan, the Dayak were discriminated against and
marginalized by Suharto‘s New Order regime, as described above. Their protests
against the government projects in Dayak villages often became violent, involving
such actions as setting fire to the office of an oil palm plantation firm (Davidson
2008). In Davidson‘s (2008) analysis of the attack against the Chinese by the Dayak,
one of the motives of Oevaang Oeray was to create a strong economic base for the
Dayak by expelling the Chinese from the strategic areas. Therefore, policies that
address inequalities between groups, such as more inclusive policies or affirmative
action to rectify past injustices, are suggested as ways to reduce the risk of ethnic
violence (Stewart 2002).
Inclusive policies at the local level can promote ethnic integration. Bollens
(2007, 237) argues that inclusive urban policies at the local level can build strong local
identities, called ―place-based nationalism,‖ overcoming differences in ethnicities or
immigrant groups. The case studies of Barcelona and Basque County revealed that
micro urban development or design projects focusing on immediate living
environments and public spaces succeeded in integrating communities for the public
good. These urban development projects resulted in gaining trust in government and
shifting the community‘s sentiments from sympathy for insurgents seeking
independence to anti-violence and anti-extreme separatists without any actions for

398
reconciliation. Provisions for strong regional autonomy in Spain offered opportunities
for local governments to act upon their own initiatives and financial resources. As
Varshney (2002) has stated, there is regional variance of ethnic violence in a country.
Distinct local policies, as illustrated by the two Spanish cities in Bollens‘s (2007)
research, may explain such spatial variations of violence.
Hence, discrimination and political and economic inequalities increase the
likelihood of ethnic conflict or violence. A fair attitude of government toward all
groups and specific policies that address inequalities among the groups and integrate
various groups into the community are all measures that reduce the risk of frictions
between groups and help to mitigate the frustration of disadvantaged groups.

(3) Trust in Government and Ethnic Relationships
Finally, there is an association between trust in government and ethnic
relationships. Bahry, Kosolapov, Kozyreva, and Wilson (2005) found that inter-ethnic
trust increases with trust in government, and those who do not trust the government
are less likely to trust either their own group or other groups. In comparing civic
associations and political institutions in Ghana and the Cote d‘Ivoire, MacLean (2004)
observed that Ivorians felt distant from their government and thus trusted the
government institutions less. This political circumstance was not only mirrored in less
democratic civic associations but also impeded ethnic integration. Moreover, as
discussed above, a group involved in violence or collective action often has

399
experiences of discrimination (Gurr 1993). It is not difficult to imagine that horizontal
inequalities that reveal the comparative disadvantages or the weak position of a group
(Stewart 2002; Mancini 2005) provoke dissatisfaction with the government. Therefore,
a higher level of trust in government likely leads to more peaceful ethnic relationships.

Based on the discussion above, hypotheses concerned with the relationships
between political institutions and ethnic relationships are proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 4: If people perceive fair representations of ethnic groups in political
and government institutions, it contributes to ethnic peace
Hypothesis 5: If people recognize that the government’s attitude and policies are
equal and less discriminatory, it contributes to ethnic peace.
Hypothesis 6: If groups have higher trust in government, they are more likely to
develop peaceful relationships.

12.3. Methods and Data
The objective of this regression analysis is to examine relationships between
civic associations and ethnic peace or conflict, with specific consideration given to
related contextual factors. Similar to the qualitative analysis of the case studies
presented in the previous chapters, the analysis here aims to identify the differences
between the conflict-prone and peaceful districts. However, in this research, there is

400
only one pair of conflict-prone and peaceful districts. Because of this small N
problem, the analysis alternatively examined household data, instead of district data.
To test the hypotheses identified, this section describes variables, data, and the
analytic procedures. After a brief explanation of household survey and sampling, and a
description of the dependent and independent variables, the following section explains
the method of analysis.

12.3.1. Household Survey and Sampling
Household survey data was collected from March to July 2007. The
respondents were sampled from stratified and cluster sampling. The population was
divided into 17 strata in combinations of district, ethnicity, and urban/ rural areas at
first. The sampling in Ketapang, Sambas, Bengkayang, and Singkawang was done
through three-stage cluster sampling with villages (desa/kelurahan) and
neighborhoods/ hamlets (rukun tetangga, RT/ dusun) as the first and second stages
respectively. Subsamples were selected at each stage of village and neighborhood
according to the cumulative-size method. The samples were chosen in selected
neighborhoods by simple random sampling without replacement (SRS). In the old
Sambas district (Sambas district before pemekaran), because the Malays and the
Dayaks were concentrated in Sambas and Bengkayang respectively, the sample sizes
of the two ethnicities in each district were determined in line with the ethnic
composition and populations of the districts. For Ketapang, based on the difficult

401
experience of sampling in Sambas, the sampling method was improved. Strata were
developed by the ethnic composition of villages and then three-cluster sampling was
applied.
The separate sampling design was applied for sampling of the Madurese
respondents because the former Madurese residents of the old Sambas were divided
into three areas—those who live in Singkawang, those displaced to relocation sites,
and those displaced to Pontianak City. Two different sampling methods were designed
for them. Two-stage cluster sampling was used for the Madurese in the relocation
sites. In this sampling, after the selection of a determined number of neighborhoods/
hamlets, respondents were sampled by SRS. The Madurese in Pontianak City were
directly sampled with SRS from a list of displaced families in Pontianak City. The
Madurese in relocation sites and in Pontianak City were categorized into rural and
urban samples, with the assumption that the Madurese who used to live in rural areas
of Sambas moved to relocation sites that were primarily prepared for farmers, and
those who lived in urban areas of Sambas chose to live in Pontianak City. The
Madurese in Singkawang were sampled according to the methods utilized for the
Malays and the Dayaks. The sampling weights were estimated in accordance with
strata and different cluster sampling methods. Table 12. 1 provides the sampling sizes
by district, urban/ rural areas and ethnicities.

402
After the samples were selected, the surveyors, mostly recruited from local
NGOs, conducted the household survey. Due to sensitivity of ethnic problems,
ethnicities of surveyor and respondents were designed to be as similar as possible.

Table 12.1 Sample Sizes of Household Survey
District Urban/Rural Malay Dayak Madurese Total
Greater
Sambas
(Old Sambas
district
before 1999)

Sambas Urban 26 16 - 42
Rural 48 8 - 56
Bengkayang Urban 6 16 - 22
Rural 7 40 - 47
Singkawang Urban 21 29 33 83
Rural 4 6 - 10
Pontianak
City
Urban - - 31 31
Relocation
sites
Rural - - 49 49
Urban 53 61 64 147
Rural 59 54 49 113
Ketapang Urban 56 56 55 167
Rural 57 56 55 168
Total Urban 109 117 119 345
Rural 116 110 104 330
Grand Total 225 227 223 675

12.3.2. Data and Variables
(1) Dependent Variable
Experience of Conflict with Other Ethnic Groups: Experience of conflict with
other ethnic groups was measured by a binary response variable. The conflicts under
discussion included theft, robbery, maltreatment, fights between youth groups,

403
murder, and problems related to land, transportation, money or work. However, these
conflicts and problems were not necessarily related to ―ethnic‖ issues such as
discrimination or violence targeted at certain ethnic groups. Because many
interviewees in Sambas pointed out that an accumulation of many small problems and
crimes eventually caused a larger conflict, this variable was used as a proxy to
measure problems between ethnic groups. If any one of the family members had
experienced one of those conflict or problems, this variable was coded as 1.

(2) Independent Variables
Numbers of Inter-ethnic Associations that a Household Belonged to: This
variable is the total number of multi-ethnic associations that the family of the
respondent belonged to. Associations and organizations included those related to
production, occupation, social services, religious gatherings, finance, credit or savings,
environmental services, natural resource management, recreation and culture,
government affairs, political activities, ethnic groups, youth groups, NGOs, or others.
If an association or organization consisted of members of more than one ethnic group,
it was counted as a multi-ethnic or inter-ethnic association. This category of
associations was developed from the Local Level Institutions Study by the World
Bank, in particular, ―Local Institutions and Service Delivery in Indonesia‖ by
Christiaan Grootaert (1999).

404
Ethnic Organization Membership: These are the binary variables of membership in
ethnic organizations. There were two variables that could be used to account for ethnic
organization membership: one was a binary variable of the current membership of an
ethnic organization; and the other was a binary variable of ethnic organization
membership including those who once joined but later withdrew participation from the
organization. The latter variable was chosen for the regression analysis, because of the
better fit.
Trust in Ethnic Groups: Two variables were used to measure the level of trust in
one‘s own ethnic group and in other ethnic groups. These are ordinal variables on a
Likert scale from ―trust very much,‖ to ―do not trust at all.‖
Equality Variables: Four binary variables were used to examine representation,
inequalities or discrimination. These were not objective but subjective assessments of
respondents.
 Whether or not government treats all ethnic group equally (ethnic
equality/ fair treatment by government)
 Whether or not respondents have experienced ethnic prejudice/
discrimination by government (ethnic discrimination)
 Whether or not respondent‘s ethnic group has fair representation at
local legislatures (political representation of ethnicity at local
legislatures)

405
 Whether or not the respondent‘s ethnic group is fairly represented
among public officials/ bureaucracy (ethnic composition of
bureaucracy)
Government Trust: An index of trust in government institutions was developed from
five variables to measure trust in various government institutions, i.e., trust in the legal
system, police, local government, provincial government and central government. At
first, the five variables were examined through correspondence analysis and then the
first score was estimated by the polychoric principal component analysis, which was
then used to develop an index of government trust.
District: A district variable was coded as 0 for the peaceful district of Ketapang and 1
for the conflict-prone district of Sambas.
Ethnicity: This variable is a categorical variable of the three ethnic groups of Dayak,
Malay and Madurese. Dayak was the base category.
Urban: This is a binary variable indicating whether the location of residence was
urban or rural. An urban or rural status was determined at the village level by the
definition of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia (BPS 2001).
Level of Assimilation: Segregation and Inter-Ethnic Marriage: The two variables
of ethnic segregation and inter-ethnic marriage aimed to measure the level of
assimilation among ethnic groups. A categorical variable of ethnic segregation asked
whether or not a neighborhood consisted of one ethnic group and if there were
residents from several ethnic groups, whether or not the neighborhood was ethnically

406
divided into clusters by ethnic group. The inter-ethnic marriage variable is a binary
variable indicating whether or not there was an inter-ethnic household in the
neighborhood.
Household Income: The household income variable is the monthly household income
estimated in Indonesian Rupiah amounts. Household income was estimated from
household expenditures. In addition, an ordinal variable and a natural log transformed
variable of household income were alternatively used to examine models.
Education: The variable of the education level indicates the education level of the
head of the household. The lowest level is no education, and the highest level is at
least an undergraduate degree and over. This is an ordinal variable but treated as a
continuous variable.
Some of the original data collected in the household survey were ordinal
variables expressed through a Likert scale. Those variables were converted to binary
variables. Missing values were imputed through multiple implantation methods. The
questionnaire was developed based on the existing survey instruments, in particular of
Varshney (2002), Davidson (2002), and World Values Survey 2000 in Indonesia
(World Value Survey 2001). The household survey instrument is attached as the
Appendix.

12.3.3. Procedures of Analysis
To explore associations between variables of civic associations, political
institutions, ethnicity, district and the other indicators of socio-economic status and

407
conflict/peace, I ran logistic regressions. Because stratification and clustering were
adapted as sampling methods, I used the survey setting of Stata Version 10.1
(StataCorp LP 2007) to run logistic regressions, i.e., the survey logit model. The
analytic procedure followed the methods suggested by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000).
The first step was a univariable analysis to select independent variables for
multivariable logistic regressions. As per Hosmer and Lemeshow‘s (2000) suggestion,
basically independent variables with p-values larger than 0.25 were submitted to
multivariable logistic regressions, and then analyzed through backward methods. After
the final model was determined, interaction terms were added to the model for
analysis. A goodness of fit test, multi-collinearity test, and other tests were performed
to evaluate the model. Nevertheless, only limited tests for model specification were
applicable for the evaluation of the final model, because of the complex survey design.

12.4. Results
Table 12.2 shows two logit regression results with and without interaction
terms. Model 1 includes ten independent variables including: District, Urban,
Education, Ethnicity, Inter-Ethnic Marriage, Government Trust Index, Number of
Memberships in Inter-Ethnic Associations, Membership in Ethnic Organization,
Political Representation, and Experience of Ethnic Discrimination by Government.
The variables of Income, Trust in One‘s Own Ethnic Group, Trust in Other Ethnic

408
Groups, Equal Treatment by Government and Ethnic Representation in Bureaucracy
were not significant and were dropped from the model.
In model 1, District, Inter-Ethnic Marriage, and Number of Inter-Ethnic
Associations are significant at 0.01 and have expected signs of coefficients. Urban,
Malay, and Unequal Political Representation are significant at 0.05. Education is
significant at 0.10. There is less conflict in urban areas and places where ethnic groups
are more segregated or less assimilated as measured by inter-ethnic marriages. The
contribution of a lack of inter-ethnic marriage to the decline of conflict was rather
surprising however. As expected, there are negative associations between conflict and
involvement in inter-ethnic associations. The variable of Unequal Political
Representation is associated with more conflict. Malays are more likely to be involved
in conflict than the Dayak and Madurese. Understandably, the likelihood of conflict is
high in the conflict-prone district of Sambas. However, the education variable has an
unexpected positive sign, which indicates a positive association between education
level and conflict. Madurese, Government Trust Index, Membership in Ethnic
Organizations, and Experience of Ethnic Discrimination by Government are not
significant even at 0.10.
In comparing the odds ratios of these variables with significant effects, the
Conflict-Prone District variable has the largest positive impact, followed by the
variables of Malay and Unequal Political Representation. Holding all other variables
constant, being a resident in a conflict-prone district increases the odds of having

409
experienced ethnic conflict 10 times; while the odds are 3 times greater if one was
Malay. The odds of involvement in ethnic conflict increase 2.6 times when unequal
political presentation is present, holding the same conditions for other variables.
On the other hand, No-Inter-Ethnic Marriage has the greatest effect of
decreasing the odds to be involved in ethnic conflict. The odds are decreased by 98%,
holding all other variables constant. Secondly, being in an urban area reduces the odds
of experiencing ethnic conflict by 65%. The effect of the variable of Number of Inter-
Ethnic Associations is rather small. The odds of having experienced ethnic conflict are
decreased by 10% only, with involvement in one inter-ethnic association.
Hence this model supports Hypothesis 1 of the association of inter-ethnic
associations and peace, as well as Hypothesis 4 of political representation, and
partially Hypothesis 3 of contextual conditions of urban area and inter-ethnic
marriage, though assimilation through inter-ethnic marriage is associated with more
conflict. However, there is no significant evidence for Hypothesis 2 of ethnic
association and peace, Hypothesis 5 of inequality and discrimination, and Hypothesis
6 of government trust. From the comparison of the odds ratios, the impact of inter-
ethnic associations on ethnic conflict is smaller than the contextual variables of urban
area and inter-ethnic marriage, and political representation.
The interaction terms, Urban * Lack of Experience of Ethnic Discrimination,
Political Representation * Number of Inter-ethnic Associations, and Lack of
Experience of Ethnic Discrimination * Number of Inter-ethnic Associations, were

410
added in model 2. Three interaction terms of Urban * No Discrimination, Unequal
Political Representation * Number of Inter-ethnic Associations, and No
Discrimination * Number of Inter-ethnic Associations are significant. In this model,
most variables significant in model 1 remained significant and the sign of those
coefficients were unchanged. However, the Urban and Political Representation
variables are no longer significant and the sign of the coefficients of the two variables
changed due to the interaction term. Education and Malay became significant at 0.05
and at 0.10 respectively. The odds ratios of experiencing ethnic conflict changed only
slightly for the variables of Conflict-Prone District, Malay, and Lack of Inter-Ethnic
Marriage; while, for the variables of Urban, Number of Inter-Ethnic Associations, and
Unequal Political Representation, the changes in the odds were larger due to the
addition of interaction terms, holding all other variables constant.
The interaction term of Urban and Lack of Experience of Ethnic
Discrimination is significant at 0.01 with the expected sign of negative. This means
that the urban residents who have not experienced ethnic discrimination by
government are less likely involved in ethnic violence. The odds of being involved in
ethnic conflict are reduced by 97%, holding all other variables constant. However, due
to this interaction term, the sign of the coefficient of the urban variable is changed to
positive and it is no longer significant.
The interaction effect between Unequal Political Representation and Number
of Inter-ethnic Associations is significant at 0.05 and positively associated with

411
conflict. This result shows that compared with people who feel they have equitable
political representation, people who perceive unequal political representation are more
likely to experience ethnic conflict, with increased involvement in inter-ethnic
associations. In this model, increase of additional involvement in inter-ethnic
associations reduces the odds of ethnic conflict by 33%, holding all other variables
constant. However, the odds of experiencing ethnic conflict increase by 38% for each
additional involvement in inter-ethnic associations when the respondent perceives
unequal political representation, holding all other variables constant. Thus, this
interaction effect of perceived unequal political representation and involvement in
inter-ethnic associations cancels out the mitigating effect of the variable of
involvement in inter-ethnic associations.
The interaction term between No Experience of Ethnic Discrimination and
Number of Inter-ethnic Associations, which has an unexpected positive coefficient, is
not significant at 0.05 but at 0.10. This result, which indicates that people who have
not experienced ethnic discrimination are more likely to face ethnic conflict, along
with increased participation in inter-ethnic associations, is hard to explain. It may
indicate that even without any discrimination, increased interactions in inter-ethnic
associations can increase frictions between ethnic groups. However, considering the
strong impact of the interaction variable between Urban and No Experience of Ethnic
Discrimination, this is probably related to the differences between urban and rural
areas, because rural residents have less opportunity to meet government officials or

412
apparatus and ethnic violence is often started in rural villages in the province. Due to
this interaction term and Urban and No Ethnic Discrimination, the variable of No
Experience of Ethnic Discrimination by government proved not to be significant and
had the unexpected sign of positive.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 of inter-ethnic associations for ethnic peace and
Hypothesis 4 of political representation are conditionally supported in model 2.
Hypothesis 5 on relationships of the government‘s equality and a lack of
discrimination and ethnic peace is confirmed only in urban areas. In Hypothesis 3, the
assimilation process measured by inter-ethnic marriage actually is positively related to
conflict; while urban residents with less experience of ethnic discrimination are
associated with decreases in conflict. The most intriguing result in model 2 is the
interaction between civic associations and political factors, which is that the
contribution of inter-ethnic associations to ethnic peace is influenced by political
factors. If political representation of ethnicity is perceived to be unequal, involvement
in inter-ethnic associations are indeed related with increases in conflicts. In other
words, Hypothesis 1 and 4 are not independent. In model 1, involvement in inter-
ethnic associations has a rather small effect on the decrease of the experience of ethnic
conflict compared with other contextual variables, though it is still significant. Model
2 shows that this effect is wiped out by the factor of political representation. The
following section discusses these interactions and concludes with the implications of
the results.

413
Table 12.2 Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variable

Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Odds

Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Odds

Conflict District 2.312 10.09 *** 2.327 10.25 ***
(0.520) (0.538)
Urban -1.062 0.346 ** 1.858 6.412
(0.416) (1.127)
Education 0.281 1.324 * 0.376 1.457 **
(0.144) (0.163)
Malay 1.122 3.071 ** 1.075 2.931 *
(0.541) (0.556)
Madurese -0.210 0.811 0.065 1.067
(0.571) (0.613)
No Inter-ethnic marriage -3.966 0.019 *** -4.081 0.017 ***
(1.171) (1.153)
Government Trust Index 1.633 5.118 0.899 2.456
(1.032) (1.070)
No. of Inter-ethnic Associations -0.109 0.897 *** -0.394 0.674 ***
(0.035) (0.138)
Memberships of Ethnic Organization 0.652 1.919 0.481 1.618
(0.586) (0.612)
Political Representation Not equal 0.944 2.569 ** -0.150 0.861
(0.416) (0.528)
Don‘t know -0.880 0.415 * -1.153 0.316 *
(0.476) (0.643)
No Experience of Ethnic
Discrimination by Government
-0.373 0.688 0.743 2.103
(0.511) (0.764)
Constant -6.702 0.001 *** -7.481 0.001 ***
(1.822) (2.033)
Urban * No Experience of Ethnic
Discrimination
-3.496 0.030 ***
(1.174)
Political Representation (unequal) *
No. of Inter-ethnic Associations
0.325 1.383 **
(0.126)
Political Representation (don‘t know) *
No. of Inter-ethnic Associations
0.129 1.137
(0.103)
No Experience of Ethnic Discrimination *
No. of Inter-ethnic Associations
0.225 1.253 *
(0.127)
F 3.86 *** 4.25 ***
n= 675 675
* significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01

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12.5. Discussion and Theoretical Implications
This regression analysis aims to reexamine the contributions of civic
associations to ethnic peace. The two regression results illustrated the importance of
political factors, i.e., fair representation and a lack of discrimination or mitigation of
conflict, and strong impacts of contextual factors on ethnic relationships such as
urban-rural differences and assimilation through inter-ethnic marriage. These factors
mediate relationships between civic associations and ethnic conflict.

12.5.1. Political Representation and Civic Associations
The regression results indicate that inter-ethnic associations are important for
ethnic peace, while relations between ethnic organizations and conflict are not
confirmed. However, the relationship between inter-ethnic associations and ethnic
peace is not straightforward. Interestingly, interaction effects are found between civic
associations and political factors. Political factors, especially fair political
representation, matter for ethnic relationships. Inter-ethnic associations have positive
effects on peace but only when ethnic groups are equally represented in legislatures.
The political representation effect almost cancels out the contribution of inter-ethnic
association in terms of contributing to ethnic peace. Thus, Varshney‘s (2002)
argument on inter-communal civic associations is only half of the story. This result
that the efficacy of inter-ethnic associations toward ethnic peace is conditional on
political factors more readily concurs with MacLean‘s (2004) findings on the
relationships between civic associations and political culture. Her research showed

415
that homogenous organizations developed in more democratic institutions are more
effective for peace building than heterogeneous organizations in less democratic
institutions. The regression results also demonstrated that political institutions likely
determine the nature of civic associations. Moreover, the impact of civic associations
on ethnic conflict is relatively small, in comparison to the contextual factors of district,
urban versus rural areas and inter-ethnic marriage.

12.5.2. Ethnic Discrimination and Contexts
Ethnic discrimination by government becomes an influential factor only in
urban areas. The statistically significant interaction term of lack of ethnic
discrimination in urban areas suggests the unique function of urban areas for ethnic
peace. In West Kalimantan, the triggering incidents of large-scale ethnic clashes rarely
happened in urban areas. The interviewees in Singkawang City explained that the
residents of Singkawang were more educated than the other districts such as Sambas
or Bengkayang and that the government has been proactive. The government and
educational institutions concentrated in urban areas may have contributed to the
maintenance of ethnic peace.
The urban areas are not only the places where various ethnic groups tend to
interact with each other, but also the location where relationships between the
government and ethnic groups are clearly expressed. The residents in rural villages
have fewer contacts with government officials than urban residents and the ethnic

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composition of villages are relatively homogenous. It is clearly evident in an urban
area which group has power and benefits from the government. Thus, the government
has to prove a lack of ethnic discrimination in urban areas. Bollens (2007) has
described the dynamics of the opportunity for peace building in urban areas by stating
that ―urban areas can constitute unique and essential peace-building resources‖ (229).
The regression result implies that displaying a lack of ethnic discrimination by the
government in urban areas might have symbolic meaning for ethnic peace and can be
a foundation of ethnic cooperation. Thus, inclusive policies in urban areas, such as in
the cases of the Spanish cities (Bollens 2007) would be an effective measure in efforts
to mitigate ethnic contestation.

12.5.3. Assimilation and Contexts
The relationships between contexts and ethnic relationships are more intricate
than at first glance. The residential characteristics, i.e., levels of assimilation among
ethnicities, urban residents and districts, also influence the likelihood of conflict. The
relationships between urban areas and conflict can be mediated by one other factor,
such as ethnic discrimination by the government as discussed. The impacts of context
variables, especially levels of assimilation, are even stronger than the effects of civic
associations and political representation.
Inter-ethnic marriage is positively associated with conflict. Similarly, there is a
significant association indicated by an interaction term in which increased

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involvement in inter-ethnic associations can lead to more conflict, even in situations
where there is no ethnic discrimination by the government, compared to cases where
there is ethnic discrimination. These results indicate that more interactions or
assimilation lead to ethnic problems. Though it is not surprising that there is more
ethnic conflict when different groups live together and encounter each other more
frequently, interactions through family ties or inter-ethnic marriage and through inter-
ethnic associations would have different impacts on ethnic relationships. Moreover,
those who join inter-ethnic associations in situations where ethnic discrimination by
the government exists might be more conscious about ethnic issues and may in fact
trying to prevent trouble from emerging among different ethnic groups. When ethnic
differences or inequality surface through interactions or assimilation, political
representation of ethnicities might be an issue for concerned groups.
The unexpected positive relationship found between education and ethnic
conflict is probably because of the interaction effects between variables. For example,
when an interaction term between district and education variables is added to the
model, the education variable is not statistically significant, though the sign remains
positive and the interaction term is not significant.
Therefore, further analysis is necessary to examine interactions among
contextual factors such as assimilation and education, civic associations, and political
factors. The contextual factors are intertwined, and only limited variables among
various potential factors were included in the model. It also cannot be denied that the

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measurement problems in the selection of dependent and independent variables
affected the unexpected results.

12.5.4. Conclusion
The case study of Ketapang and the regression analysis agreed on the
importance of political institutions and the government. As illustrated in Chapters 4 to
6, the local government of Ketapang supported development of cooperative ethnic
relationships by facilitating the activities of ethnic organizations, and at the same time
strengthened ethnic peace by stimulating communications through the inter-ethnic
communication forum. The regression analysis does not provide evidence for a
relationship between ethnic organizations and ethnic peace or violence, and there is no
evidence to support a relationship between government trust and ethnic relationships.
However, with facilitation and assistance from the government, ethnic organizations
played an important role in the prevention of ethnic violence in the peaceful district of
Ketapang.
Analyzed along with the findings of the relationships among political factors,
civic associations, and contextual factors in the regression, the role of the government
in Ketapang is understood to have developed equality and fairness in ethnic
relationships. As an example, the district head of Ketapang held a cultural festival in
the mid-1990s. This government action celebrated the unique ethnic diversity of the
district, and promoted tolerance in Ketapang. Encouragement for the establishment of

419
organizations of most ethnic groups in the 1990s and support for activities of ethnic
organizations advanced a balance among ethnic groups, which resulted in cooperation
of the ethnic organizations to protect ethnic peace. Though the political involvement
of the Malay organization of MABM, led by the district head, raised concerns in the
community, other ethnic groups and community leaders carefully observed their
activities to minimize negative consequences. Moreover, the Ketapang government
had more ethnically diverse public officials than did the Sambas government. After
democratization, the district head and vice district head of Ketapang were from the
local Malay and Dayak respectively. However, even before that, there were a local
Malay district head, and once a Dayak district head before reformasi. There have been
department directors and a secretary of the region from among the Dayak and
Javanese. Madurese public officials have also occupied high-ranking positions such as
director and sub district head. On the other hand, the Malays have been dominant in
the Sambas government before and after reformasi. Dayak government officials were
found only in several sub-district head positions. Therefore, as MacLean (2004)
argued, ethnically homogenous organizations can contribute to peace if political
institutions treat all ethnic groups equally. From these findings in the regression results
and the case studies, government initiatives or policies to promote equal political
representation and a lack of ethnic discrimination by the government can lead both
types of civic associations, inter-ethnic associations and ethnic organizations, to

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cooperate for ethnic peace building. Particularly, the regression results demonstrated
that inter-ethnic civic associations are susceptible to political factors.
This finding, regarding the critical role of political institutions, attests to the
optimistic prospects of the impacts of decentralization and pemekaran on ethnic peace
building. This is because in the three districts after pemekaran, the ethnic
compositions of government and legislatures have come closer to representing the
actual population. A district government under the leadership of a district head who
was born in the district and elected by direct election had no hesitation in
communicating and being involved in the community affairs. This improved ethnic
representation and proximity between the government and the community can
stimulate fairness and equality among ethnic groups, which can result in more
cooperative and peaceful ethnic relationships.
In conclusion, this chapter explored the contradicting theories on the
relationship between civic associations and ethnic peace, and on which kinds of civic
associations—inter-ethnic associations (Varshney 2002) or intra-ethnic organizations
(Fearon and Laitin 1996)—contribute to ethnic peace. Though the analysis supported
the role of inter-ethnic civic associations in promoting peace, it also indicated that
political institutions can limit the extent to which inter-ethnic associations facilitate
ethnic peace. The results showed that the existence of inter-ethnic civic associations
that could contribute to ethnic peace is simply evidence of the existence of relatively
equal or fair political institutions. Hence, in spite of positive notions of and enthusiasm

421
for civic associations, the research results of this study calls attention to the
unconditional endorsement of civic associations and illuminates the need for more
research to study the conditions and contexts influencing the overall impacts of civic
associations.

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CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSION:
CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION
This research analyzed the relationships between civic associations,
institutional changes associated with decentralization and administrative fragmentation
(pemekaran), and ethnic relationships. The first part of this study explored how civic
associations affected ethnic peace building and violence. The second part of the study
focused on the impacts of decentralization and pemekaran on ethnic relationships and
peace building. In contrast to the qualitative analysis used to address the first two parts
of the study, the third section examined the relationships between civic associations
and ethnic peace, using data generated by a household survey.
This concluding chapter summarizes the findings from the analyses to examine
the research question that guided the study: ―What structures of local governance
contributes to the prevention of social violence?‖ In particular, the characteristics of
civil society in relation to local governance are examined. Meanwhile, relationships
between theory building and research methodologies utilized in the field are reviewed,
along with a discussion of the limitations of this research and recommendations for
future research. The chapter concludes with policy recommendation for conflict
prevention and peace building.

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13.1. Civic Associations, Conflict Prevention and Local Governance
13.1.1. Case Study of Relationships between Civic Associations and Conflict
Prevention
The primary interest of this research was in the relationships between civil
society and conflict prevention. Civil society is an essential sector that constitutes a
governance structure, together with the public and private sectors (United Nations
Development Programme 1997; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). Civil society is
perceived not only as an indispensable element for democratization (Diamond 1994;
Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1997; White 2004), but also as a factor in advancing
peace in society (Varshney 2002; Paffenholz 2010a). The functions of civic
associations and social capital, e.g., monitoring and advocacy, facilitation of
discussion and information sharing, democratic norms, civic skills, trust building and
cooperation (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993; Fung 2003) benefit peace building
and reconciliation (Orjuela 2003; Paffenholz and Spurk 2010). The study of civic
associations for peace building culminated with Varshney‘s (2002) research on the
roles of inter-communal associations in ethnic peace. This research explored how civil
society, specifically civic associations, contribute to ethnic peace building, based on
the framework of Varshney‘s (2002) inter-ethnic civic associations for peace and
mechanisms relying on ethnic organizations derived from intra-group mechanisms and
the concept of in-group policing, as suggested by Fearon and Laitin (1996).
The findings in my research are not entirely discordant with theories that have
drawn connections between civil society and peace building, but this study poses

424
further questions on the approaches to studying civil society and the definition of civil
society. In Ketapang, a peaceful district of West Kalimantan, it was the ethnic
organizations that were the primary mediators of inter-ethnic problems and disputes,
in ways that were similar to Fearon and Laitin‘s (1996) in-group policing mechanism.
When potential problems appeared between ethnic groups, ethnic leaders from the
groups involved rushed to settle the problem cooperatively. However, just as in
Varshney‘s (2002) case, one type of inter-ethnic association, called an inter-ethnic
communication forum, played a particularly positive role in the prevention of ethnic
violence in regions that were the subject of this study. The forum, consisting of the
representatives of various ethnic organizations, facilitated ethnic cooperation by
promoting communication and information sharing. On the other hand, an ethnic
organization of the Malay, FKPM, was a vehicle of ethnic violence in the conflict-
prone district of Sambas. Hence, the relation between civic association and ethnic
peace is not a simple either-or question, as to which type of civic association—inter-
ethnic or intra-ethnic associations—contributes to ethnic peace building. Rather, there
are other factors that led to contrasting impacts of civic associations on ethnic peace in
the two districts.
My research indicated the importance of political institutions, in particular
government, for the prevention of ethnic clash. Underlying the cooperation of ethnic
organizations, the district government of Ketapang along with the district police and
military, supported the activities of ethnic organizations and facilitated the inter-ethnic

425
communication forum for ethnic peace. The government of Ketapang, which consisted
of ethnically heterogeneous government employees and was led by a district head
from the area, initiated ethnic cooperation and tolerance in the district. Moreover,
contextual elements such as migration history, residential pattern, economic relations,
and inter- and intra-ethnic competitions, influenced the development of distinct ethnic
relationships in each district. These findings, including the connection between
political institutions, contextual factors and civic associations, in the qualitative
analysis of the case studies presented, were also confirmed by the quantitative
analysis. The regression results demonstrated the extent to which inter-ethnic civic
associations can contribute to ethnic peace, as well as the extent to which they are
constrained by the performance of political institutions, such as equitable ethnic
representation in local legislatures. In fact, a positive relationship was found between
involvement in inter-ethnic associations and conflict, where equitable ethnic political
representation was lacking.
Moreover, the analysis of ethnic relationships in three cases after
decentralization and pemekaran provided evidence to further endorse the importance
of political institutions for ethnic peace building. The implementation of
decentralization and pemekaran, or the division of a district, had significant impacts
on the political and civil society of the three districts: Sambas, Bengkayang, and
Singkawang. The two districts of Sambas and Bengkayang are identified by the Malay
and Dayak districts respectively. The dominance of the two majority indigenous

426
groups of Malay and Dayak was explicit in the government, local legislature, and civil
society. The district head and vice district head were from the majority group, Malay,
in Sambas, and the Dayak in Bengkayang. In the civil society of each district, the
ethnic organization of the majority group led various events and generally coordinated
among ethnic groups, though inter-ethnic communication forums were founded in the
two districts. As a result, for better or worse, the ethnic relationships in the districts
became stabilized with the creation of a strong majority group.
On the other hand, in Singkawang City, a unique ethnic political balance has
emerged between the government and population. Due to the historical political
repression of the majority Chinese, the Malay and Dayak were elected as mayor and
vice mayor, and the Malay has been the largest group in city government. However,
the political ambition to attain the position of the mayor was awakened within the
Chinese community after democratization. In response, the Malay mayor and the
government proposed a policy to promote ethnic peace. Because of the beginning of
direct elections and the diverse population of the City, it became important to win
support from the majority group of the Chinese and the residents of other ethnic
groups, such as the Dayaks and Madurese. Responding to the changes in political
environment, various ethnic groups, including the Chinese and the Madurese, founded
ethnic organizations and established close connections and cooperation with the
government to prevent ethnic problems. Similar to the case of Ketapang, an inter-

427
ethnic communication forum and multi-ethnic civic associations, i.e., NGOs, were
created in Singkawang as well.
Therefore, the analysis of the three cases of Sambas, Bengkayang and
Singkawang, supplements the findings in the case of Ketapang and the regression
analysis that political institutions have critical impacts on the development of civil
society and ethnic relationships—civil society does not act alone in influencing ethnic
relationships. These findings would suggest a necessary reconsideration of the theories
on civil society, including the research strategies one might utilize to study civil
society.

13.1.2. Mechanism of Conflict Prevention
From the analysis of the case studies presented, certain factors were identified
as important for conflict prevention. First, the case of Ketapang suggested that the
local governance structure consisting of ethnic organizations, the inter-ethnic
communication forum, and the government, worked in tandem towards ethnic peace.
The district government took the initiative to develop the governance structure by
initiating ethnic cultural cooperation and promoting ethnic organizations. Moreover, as
the regression analysis showed, equal political representation of ethnic groups was
recognized as having a critical impact on making multi-ethnic civic associations work
for ethnic cooperation. In Ketapang, a more equitable ethnic representation was
observed in the district government as a result of a less discriminative attitude of the

428
government toward ethnic groups. The government‘s initiative to organize a multi-
ethnic cultural group raised awareness about ethnic tolerance and contributed to
inclusive relationship building. The responsiveness of the government and police, and
relatively effective law enforcement enhanced justice and rule of laws. Therefore,
these factors, i.e., equality, fairness, justice, and rules of law are necessary foundations
in order for civic associations to work toward peace building, and furthermore, to
build effective local governance for conflict prevention. It is a critical role of the
government to eradicate ethnic discrimination, to promote equality and inclusive
policies, and to enhance law enforcement for peaceful ethnic relationships. Without
these critical elements that are conducive to ethnic cooperation, functional multi-
ethnic civic association would not emerge.
Secondly, the examination of the creation of new districts and decentralization
presented earlier suggested that there are other local governance mechanisms for
conflict prevention. In the ethnically homogenous districts of Sambas and
Bengkayang, the majority groups of Malay and Dayak, respectively, dominated
positions in government and the local council, and the ethnic organizations of these
majority groups became prominent actors in civil society. Ethnic relationships in the
two districts were stabilized under the power of the majority groups because group
competition shifted, along with the creation of homogenous districts, from inter-group
to within the majority group. Both the Malay and Dayak were divided within their
groups and competed with each other for power and resources. In particular, a sub-

429
ethnic divide among the Dayak became salient during district head elections. The
minority groups also took sides among the sub-ethnic groups within the majority
group, in accordance with their interests and preferences. Thus, in homogenous
districts, ethnicity is no longer an issue dividing the population, which can help the
reduction of ethnic competition in the district.
Meanwhile, creating a homogenous district and devolving authority can also
help mitigate the grievances of a marginalized group, as the field theory has discussed.
For the Dayaks, the creation of a Dayak district was the way to overcome the
discrimination and underdevelopment produced during the New Order period, by
enhancing access to political power and government resources. Thus, decentralization
and the creation of a homogenous district reduced frustration of a marginalized group,
which in turn can lead to a decline in ethnic violence.
On the other hand, a unique ethnic balance emerged in Singkawang City which
corresponded with the heterogeneous population there. The majority group in
Singkawang was the Chinese, who have long held a strong presence in the economic
sector; a large number of government officials, as well as the mayor, were Malays.
There were also concentrations of the Madurese population and other ethnic groups.
As a reflection of this diversity in the population as well as the strength and power of
the ethnicities, not only were ethnic organizations established but also multi-ethnic
civic associations including the inter-ethnic communication forum and NGOs.
Furthermore, the government proposed a policy for ethnic peace while supporting

430
cultural events of the various ethnic groups. The pemekaran, which resulted in an
ethnically-mixed city and unbalanced ethnic compositions between the population and
the government, shifted the interests of the various ethnic groups and provided
incentives for ethnic cooperation and peace. Compared with Sambas and Bengkayang,
a lack of serious ethnic violence, aside from suppression and massacre of the Chinese
by the New Order, and the concentration of the Madurese population in the middle of
the conflict-prone region of Sambas, encouraged ethnic peace building and
strengthened the distinguished characteristics of Singkawang City.
Therefore, the analysis of the above four cases illuminated the different
patterns and mechanisms of local governance that can be utilized for conflict
prevention and ethnic peace building. Incentives for ethnic cooperation and the factors
involved in promoting ethnic peace were identified in the cases of Singkawang and
Ketapang. On the other hand, eliminating inter-ethnic competition in district-level
politics was highlighted in the cases of Sambas and Bengkayang.

13.1.3. Revisiting Theories of Civil Society for Research on Conflict and Peace
The findings above pointed out three critical points to reconsider in studying
civil society, namely the definition of civil society, the role of political institutions and
government, and research strategies utilized for the study of civil society. Armony
(2004) summarized approaches to comprehending civil society into three: third sector,
public sphere, added and social capital. Civil society is a sector of voluntary

431
organizations such as civic associations or NGOs (Diamond 1994; Schmitter 1997). It
is also the public space for interactions and communication among citizens and in civil
society, and for those groups to develop their purpose, view points and actions (Linz
and Stepan 1996; Cohen 1999; Warren 2001). While social capital theory emphasizes
social trust, networks or cooperation emerged through face-to-face interactions in civil
society (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993; Putnam 2000).
In spite of positive and normative views, civil society does not necessarily
contribute to democracy and accommodate the interests of all segments of society;
there are always competitions for power within civil society. Schmitter (1997)
identifies the negative consequences of civil society for democratization, as follows:
1) difficulty integrating groups into a stable majority for shared interests or consensus
which could become a foundation of democracy, 2) unequal representation of interests
in policy, 3) unexpected and unsatisfactory policy as a result of compromise, 4)
increase of pork-barrel or rent-seeking activities causing economic loss, and 5)
polarization and fragmentation of groups, for example, along ethnic lines. In fact, civil
society is ―a site for struggle‖ (Chandhoke 2004, 161). In the sphere of civil society,
not all actors are equal nor do they necessarily build peaceful relationships. Power
relations in civil society reflect the socioeconomic status of actors and influence the
capacity of a democratic system (White 2004). Competition can produce negative
consequences in civil society (Chandhoke 2004). Lack of equal access to power or
opportunities to express one‘s voice can contribute to the birth of extreme groups.

432
Certain ethnic and religious organizations, which are often considered uncivil or
extreme, are indeed a part of civil society (Kasfir 2004). Berman (2001) summarized
the weakness of social capital theory by stating ―collective endeavors and activist
skills are good things in and of themselves, without regard to the purposes to which
they will be directed‖ (35).
Armony (2004) has criticized that many of the existing approaches to civil
society ignore the fact that ―the sociohistorical context influences the nature,
dispositions and orientations, and impact of civic engagement‖ (3). The characteristics
of civil society, specifically its democratic contributions, are determined by historical
and social factors. In particular, political institutions and the rule of law, i.e., formal
institutions as well as implementation and performance of these institutions in
guaranteeing equality and fairness, and in establishing standards of society, are crucial
for the development of civil society. When these structures are dysfunctional or
deteriorating, devastating consequences may occur, such as the rise of the Nazi party
in Germany, racial segregation in the United States, and the setback of democracy in
Argentina (Armony 2004). Hence, Encarnación (2003) asserts that ―a flourishing civil
society can actually be a hindrance to democratization, particularly if surrounded by
weak and inefficient political institutions‖ (5) and ―a deficit in civil society
development is not a handicap to the successful consolidation of democracy‖ (163).
Correspondingly, Berman (2001) has argued that the answer to the question of

433
whether civil society is truly civil or democratic is ―not to be found in an analysis of
societal and cultural factors, but rather in an examination of political institutions‖ (37).
My research results confirmed political aspects of civil society, which is that
civil society develops in correspondence with the political institutions and social and
historical contexts in which the civil society is situated. It was the local government
initiatives that stimulated ethnic peace building in Ketapang by facilitating
communications and connecting ethnic organizations, while the government of
Sambas simply took reactive actions, rather than preventive measures after the ethnic
clash occurred. The conflict-prone district of Sambas and the peaceful district of
Ketapang both experienced contextual differences including the history of the
Madurese migration, assimilation of the local communities, ethnic segregation,
informal associations, crimes and problem solving, and ethnic competitions. As
Davidson (2008) has starkly stated, the national politics left an indelible mark in
ethnic relationships, particularly in the Sambas region, and catalyzed the development
of ethnic politics and violence in West Kalimantan. These variations were further
widened by the attitudes of the local government, i.e., negligence over ethnic violence
or as a supportive of ethnic peace.
In particular, a significant role of government in the development of civil
society and its contribution to ethnic peace or violence was suggested by this research.
In democratization theory, the relationship between civil society and government is
often described as antagonistic, e.g., resisting undemocratic regimes and demanding

434
correction of injustice or corruption by government (Diamond 1994; Fung 2003).
However, civil society is not only specific to the local contexts, but is also a mirror of
the rules and values of the existing society. Mosher (2002, 208) has argued that civic
associations are ―always congruent with the prevailing norms.‖ As discussed, the
concept of civil society entails the normative perspective of liberal democracy
(Encarnación 2002). There is indeed an argument that ―civil society should be forced
to reflect liberal democratic values and practices‖—which is described as ―logic of
congruence,‖—due to a fear of fragmentation of society (Rosenblum 2002, 172). Yet,
government is the amalgamation of institutions that endorses and disseminates certain
values and norms as the model of society and political identity through policies,
programs and ceremonies (Post and Rosenblum 2002). Often newly contested issues
such as civil rights for minorities, women or gays, and whether those values should be
accepted as the common values in a society are ultimately judged by the courts (Arneil
2006).
This role of government in assisting in the cultivation of certain values, morals,
or ideals, such as equality or peace, is important for the development of civil society as
well as the local governance structure, because such official endorsements from the
government is ultimately reflected in civil society. In the case of Ketapang, the
government sent a message that violence would not be tolerated, and conversely, that
ethnic peace was desired and appreciated. Thus, the government established the norms
of the Ketapang government, which entailed its own active involvement in settling

435
disputes of the communities and supporting the activities of ethnic organizations and
the inter-ethnic communication forum, as well as the peace ceremonies of the Tolak
Bala, and these norms were shared by the society. In Sambas, on the contrary, a lack
of preventative actions by the government sent a message of tacit approval of the use
of violence as a means of addressing troubles between ethnic groups. Therefore,
Varshney‘s (2002) argument for inter-ethnic associations as a vehicle for peace should
be understood that inter-ethnic associations can contribute to conflict prevention when
the shared norms for ethnic cooperation and harmony are present in civil society,
though there would need to be feedback from the inter-ethnic associations as to the
development of such peaceful means. The critical role of government cannot be
neglected in countries that are in transition, or in rural areas where a vibrant civil
society does not exist. In particular, without the government‘s active role, it is difficult
to develop a local government structure that would contribute to ethnic peace in a
region where ethnic politics have already been prevalent.
To understand the influence of contextual factors and politics on civil society,
Armony (2004) recommends expanding the concept of civil society beyond social
capital and the third sector, and taking account of public sphere theory, in order to
include anti-democratic forces and un-civic associations in civil society. His research
adapted Skocpol and Fiorina‘s (1999, 2) definition of civil society as ―the network of
ties and groups through which people connect to one another and get drawn into
community and political affairs‖. Their definition includes the important dimensions

436
of civil society, such as the relations between the various formal and informal
institutions framing civil society, the meaning and manipulation of civil society space,
and the interactions and competition of actors beyond individual trust and voluntary
civic associations (Armony 2004). This broad definition of civil society may be more
appropriate for researching civil society, particularly in relation to conflict and peace.
For example, Davidson‘s (2008) findings of the unexpected consequences of the
Dayak NGOs on the escalation of ethnic violence between the Dayak and the
Madurese are a good example of the ways in which we can come to understand the
subtle relationships among civil society, politics and conflict.
The last issue is the macro-micro level analysis of civil society as it relates to
conflict and peace, in particular. Though relationships between civil society and ethnic
conflict have attracted attention since Varshney‘s (2002) research, the unit of analysis
of most research on ethnic conflict is at the country level. The scholars and
practitioners of conflict studies and reconstruction of post-conflict societies tend to
focus on national political institutions, such as consociationalism, federalism, and
electoral design. For example, similar to my cases of the ethnic relationships between
majority and minority groups, Posner (2004) explained that political elites‘ strategy
calculated based on the size of population of two ethnic groups has affected
development of the different levels of antagonism and the integration between the two
ethnic groups in Malawi and Zambia. Hale (2005) also examined the role of a majority
ethnic group in the maintenance of a federation by comparing the demise of the Soviet

437
Union and the emergence of the Russian federation. There are a number of case
studies of conflict at the sub-state and local level; however civil society is still a
missing gradient in conflict studies conducted at the local level.
As Varshney (2002) has pointed out, spatial variation of ethnic violence,
political institutions and ethnic relationships vary from region to region. The
performance of the legal system and institutions, including such variables as
predictability, fairness, equality, transparency, or accountability, should be evaluated
through everyday practices and experiences at the micro level, because citizenship is
not always guaranteed to the minority, the poor, women, immigrants, indigenous
groups, or any other groups facing discrimination (Armony 2004). Thus, local
governance structures, consisting of the different characteristics of political and civic
institutions, set rules and establish the social norms of the local society, which affects
the performance and efficacy of government and/or ethnic relationships. Armony
(2004) wrote that ―where patronage, clientelism, racial and ethnic hierarchies, and
violence among citizens become organizing principles in society, they tend to shape
the rules of social interaction, which influence a society‘s forms of association‖ (53).
Because ethnic issues surge in people‘s mind, particularly during specific periods such
as an election (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), daily interactions and the framework
of local institutions are essential for the prevention of conflict.
As my research showed, implementation of decentralization dramatically
increases factors affecting the development of civil society by strengthening both

438
regional- and local-level political institutions, while democratization expands the
space of civil society. Political, economic and cultural autonomies granted by
decentralization become resources to restructure the existing hierarchies and then
transform the norms of social interactions in civil society at the regional or local
levels. A local governance structure conducive to ethnic peace, which is similar
structure to the case of Ketapang, also appeared in Singkawang. The separation of
Singkawang City from the Sambas and Bengkayang districts enabled the ethnic
groups, including the Chinese and the Madurese, to establish a relatively balanced
political hierarchy, because the bases of the Malay and the Dayak in the region were
identified as Sambas and Bengkayang respectively and the new majority of
Singkawang were the politically innocent Chinese. Different types of incentives for
ethnic cooperation and competitions among ethnic groups were induced in
heterogeneous and homogenous districts and also reflected in civil society. Thus, it is
essential to the design of peace and ethnic cooperation to study how macro-level
political institutions such as democracy or authoritarianism are mediated and put into
practices in civil society and ethnic relationships by the meso and micro-level
institutions.

13.2. Future Research Areas: Civil Society and Path Dependency
The transformation of ethnic relationships and development of civil society
along the institutional changes illuminated in my research, suggest a venue for future

439
research on the study of civil society, namely, the path dependency of civil society. As
discussed, civil society is neither necessarily pro-democracy nor independent from
contexts such as history, politics, and social and economic conditions. In particular, its
characteristics and contribution to democracy is strongly constrained by political
institutions (Berman 2001; Encarnación 2003; Armony 2004). As this research
described, political institutional changes, such as decentralization, significantly impact
the development of civil society. Research on the path dependency of civil society
may deepen our understanding of the nature and development of civil society, and its
relationships to political institutions and ethnic relationships.
New institutionalism argues that the evolution of political and economic
institutions is path dependent. A set of institutions selected in the path provides
learning to develop or modify ―belief systems‖ or a way of thinking to guide actions,
with the culture shared by groups, which is accumulated learning in the past (North
1994a, 363, 1994b). Because of the mechanism of increasing returns, the costs of
choosing different paths rise and opportunities and choices available for society are
constrained in the existing institutional structures (North 1990). The distinct
characteristics embedded in political behaviors and institutions, i.e., possibilities of ―a
number of outcomes,‖ ―large and enduring consequences‖ of trivial incidents,
importance of ―timing and sequencing,‖ and ―resistant to change,‖ enhance increasing
returns and thus make ―critical junctures‖ essential for a choice of development path
of political institutions (Pierson 2000, 263).

440
If political institutions are path dependent, these paths could influence the
course of the development of civil society. Although current social capital theory is
criticized as being ahistorical, and criticized for relying too heavily on quantitative
measurements of civic associations such as memberships or density (Armony 2004),
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti‘s (1993) research of social capital was derived from
the historical analysis of civic associations in Italy, from a path dependency
perspective. With an increased understanding of the interactions between contextual
factors and civil society, therefore, it is necessary to reexamine these prominent
studies on civil society and analyze the developmental paths of civil society, focusing
on interactions between institutional changes and contextual factors. Moreover,
research on the path dependence of civil society and ethnic relationships can
contribute to the development of more appropriate and effective policy and projects
for reconstruction and reconciliation in post-conflict society, because international
organizations and donors often propose projects for institutional changes, such as
democratization or decentralization as aid for those countries suffering from
communal violence.
For example, decentralization does not simply devolve authority and power to
local-level political institutions, but involves intricate and dynamic transformations of
power structures (Manor 1999; Rodden 2004; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). Civil
society is expanded with legitimacy and opportunity to participate in the decision-
making processes and policy formulation (Manor 1999; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).

441
Meanwhile, decentralization offers distinctive incentives for competition and
cooperation within and among communal groups (Horowitz 1985; Roeder 2005).
Indeed civil society is expected to take an active role in policy making (Litvack,
Ahmad, and Bird 1998; Manor 1999). As a result, decentralization alters power
relationships within civil society at the local level.
In West Kalimantan, democratization, decentralization and the creation of new
districts brought about substantial changes in civil society. As described, the status of
a majority group and hierarchy of ethnicities in each district were reinforced not only
by the ethnic composition of the population but also by directly elected district heads,
the members of local councils, and senior ranked government officials. The
modification in political interests provided incentives for ethnic cooperation and intra-
group competition. Civil society at the district level has mirrored the strength of the
various ethnicities. As a result, ethnic relationships at the district level are stabilized
for better or worse. For worse, in the Malay dominant Sambas district, the citizenship
of the Madurese was significantly threatened by the virtual denial of residency rights
by the Malay community and the negligence of the government in assuring their
physical security. The separation of Sambas from the multi-ethnic Singkawang City
and the Dayak-dominant Bengkayang has consolidated ethnic expulsion.
At the provincial level, the political power of the two indigenous ethnic
groups, the Dayak and the Malay, were balanced at last after the reformasi. The two
groups competed in the direct election of the governor and in local elections in multi-

442
ethnic districts such as Ketapang. In 2007, as the Dayaks had longed for for decades, a
Dayak governor was finally elected with a Chinese vice-governor for the first time
since the first governor of West Kalimantan, Oevaang Oeray. The provincial capital of
Pontianak City, the center of politics and civic associations, had not experienced
serious ethnic clashes in the 1990s; however ethnic violence between the Malay and
Madurese broke out during the pre-governor election period (Davidson 2008). The
history of deadly ethnic conflicts in the past had cast a shadow on the civil society in
Pontianak City. There were a number of civil society organizations and NGOs that
aided reconciliation efforts, and developed a network towards cooperation and the
promotion of ethnic peace. However, most of these organizations are divided along
ethnic lines.
Thus, the development of civil society would be inseparable from the history,
institutional changes and politics of the region; in short, it has been path dependent.
Yet, civil society can take on its own developmental path. The international
community, including international organizations and transnational NGOs, has been
directly involved in civil society even in areas, such as the rural regions of Indonesia
including West Kalimantan. Their projects in civil society, e.g., community
participation or support for democracy or funding for NGOs, have impacted the
development of civil society there. The Dayak, an indigenous ethnic group involved in
ethnic violence, has a long history of active Dayak NGOs. International indigenous
movements and international organizations, such as the Ford Foundation, have

443
strongly supported the establishment of indigenous Dayak NGOs and their protests
against the central government‘s development policy, as Davidson (2008) described.
However, at the same time, these organizations played a significant role in the political
uprisings of the Dayak, and hence in ethnic violence indirectly, and this triggered
other ethnic groups to organize their own ethnic associations (Davidson 2008).
The institutional changes of decentralization and democratization encouraged
the establishment of NGOs and expansion of civil society, but they also intensified
ethnic politics at the local level in West Kalimantan. The democratic norms of civil
society in Pontianak City were still weak and rudimentary. Therefore, it is essential to
explore how civil society there has developed unique democratic and civil forces
which stimulate cooperation or competition among ethnic groups, and how civil
society and ethnic relationships are changed through the experience of elections under
strong influence of ethnic politics.
One of the criticisms of Varshney‘s (2002) research is a causal direction
between violence and civic associations, which is ―turning the causal chain around so
that violence itself, the dependent variable, suddenly at one point becomes the
independent variable‖ (Brass 2003, 419n44), or in short, the endogeneity of violence
in social relationships. Though endogeneity of conflict was not identified in my
statistical analysis, it is plausible to presume that previous violence and other
significant events have affected development of ethnic relationships and civil society.

444
Taking this into consideration, a study of the developmental path of civil
society needs to analyze dynamic interactions between civil society and substantial
social events. Hence, the research of the path dependency of civil society would
contribute to a greater understanding and refinement of the theory of civil society as it
engages with ethnic relationships, towards the improvement of peace building and
conflict prevention projects and policies.

13.3. Limitations of Research and Knowledge Creation in Professional Studies
In conclusion, I discuss the limitations and weaknesses of my research, as well
as the quest for appropriate methodologies in professional studies. My research aimed
to explain how local governance influences ethnic relationships, i.e., conflict or peace,
with a focus on civic associations and institutional changes. This study applied mixed
methods of qualitative and quantitative approaches for a multiple case study that
compared peaceful and conflict-prone districts, following the framework of
Varshney‘s (2002) research on ethnic violence and civic associations. However,
Varshney‘s (2002) methodology was attacked by Brass (2003) due to ―an
extraordinary faith in causal explanation and the ability of this kind of social science
research to generate full-fledged causal statements‖ and because Varshney‘s
methodology was ―sanctified by the (mis)use of currently fashionable methodologies
in the social sciences‖ (Brass 2003, 419n44).

445
I accept Brass‘s first criticism regarding the attempt to prove causal
relationships in case studies. The findings in this research do not provide an account of
generalizable causal relationships towards conflict prevention. Comparisons of cases
and combinations of interviews and regression analysis improved the validity of this
research by controlling some variables such as ethnic compositions or social and
cultural contexts to a certain extent. However, unlike research in the natural sciences,
research in the social sciences cannot guarantee causality of social events or factors
due to impossibility of replication, uncontrollable factors in social settings and
selection bias, and the influence of subjectivity and values in interpretation (Maxwell
1996; Gerring 2007). Because the cases examined in this research involved ethnic
violence and peace in rural and remote districts of a Third World country, Indonesia,
the findings would not be plausibly applied to the cases of urban districts in developed
nations. Moreover, this research compared only two cases so that there is a small N
problem. Case studies can only attain ―internal generalizability‖ of ―a conclusion
within the setting or group studied‖ not ―external generalizability‖ which is what
scientists usually aim for (Maxwell 1996, 97). Multiple case studies are not effective
when their differences are too significant, so that the attempted comparison increases
the variables to be controlled, and needs a distinct causal reasoning for each case.
Thus, there is a risk that a multiple case study comparing cases of success and failure
could ultimately be akin to the proverbial comparison of ―apples and oranges‖
(Gerring 2007, 50). Gerring (2007) underlines advantages of comparison of similar

446
cases or an in-depth case study in that situation. As discussed in Chapter 3, success
and failure or violence and peace could be caused by completely different factors and
mechanisms. In addition to these limitations in qualitative research, the weakness of
the quantitative analysis aspect of the research is that not many evaluation methods of
regression analysis were available for a complex sampling survey.
One serious problem inherent in a mixed methods research study is how to
prove validity of the research. Validity for mixed methods is expressed as ―inference
quality‖ (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003, 36) or ―legitimation‖ (Onwuegbuzie and
Johnson 2006, 54). According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003), ―design quality‖ and
―interpretive rigor‖ should be realized to improve the inference quality in mixed
methods research, while pursuing ―inference transferability” for generalization (37).
The legitimation issue pointed out in mixed research is concerned with proving the
findings to be genuine. Mixed methods research, consisting of data and analysis
derived from different types of research methods, amplifies advantages as well as
weakness of the methods used, such as the issue of ―representation‖, and the
researcher might face problems in attempting an ―integration‖ of the findings
(Onwuegbuzie and Johnson 2006, 52). Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006) stressed that
legitimation should be achieved both in the findings and inferences and the process of
the research. However, because of the complexity and the interactions in the data
collection and analysis, a definitive approach to achieve legitimation or validity in
mixed methods research studies has not been established, in spite of the development

447
of the concept of validity (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson 2006). Therefore, the evaluative
aspect of this research is not easily defined or attained, so that it is a difficult task to
confirm that the research process was appropriate and that the consequent findings are
reliable.
Some of the issues involved in case study and mixed methods research
described above, such as generalization and causal analysis, are derived from the
inherent characteristics of what the social sciences are. Social science has toiled to
obtain the status of the natural sciences by taking positivist and behaviorist
approaches, seeking to produce ―[u]niversal, transcontextual, scientifically proven,
objective knowledge‖ (Caterino and Schram 2006, 3). However, such daring attempts
within the social sciences are often doomed to fail (Flyvbjerg 2001). The definition of
natural science as ―context-independent‖ and universal in terms of predictive and
causal explanations, contradicts the very nature of the social sciences (Flyvbjerg 2001,
39). Therefore, as Flyvbjerg (2001) has written:
[A] social science theory of the kind which imitates the natural sciences,
that is, a theory which makes possible explanation and prediction,
requires that the concrete context of everyday human activity be
excluded, but this very exclusion of context makes explanation and
prediction impossible (40).
Quantitative research aiming for the precision of the natural sciences, such as
regression analysis, is criticized in the social sciences. For example, examining social
capital from the numbers of a given membership or the sizes of connections can
overlook the group dynamics of how a civic association works and interacts with other

448
associations and in society (Arneil 2006). Similarly, in an analysis of violence,
Horowitz (2001) criticized Fearon and Laitin‘s (1996) concept of in-group policing
because the methodology applied was reliant on individualism, and rational choice is
not necessarily appropriate to capture the true motives behind group uprisings or
political violence. In attempting to analyze the causal relations within social science,
Gerring (2007) underlined the needs for research on ―a causal mechanism‖ rather than
―causal effects‖ (44). Complex social phenomena cannot be comprehended by simple
causal effects, if a theory lacks the explanation for why and how factor A leads to
outcome B, with other variables influencing a causal relationship. Thus, ―[t]racing
causal mechanisms is about cultivating sensitivity to a local context‖ (Gerring 2007,
48). The contextual factors are not negligible in social science research.
To address this dilemma, Flyvbjerg (2001) proposed the concept of
―phronetic‖ social science based on Aristotle‘s concept of phronesis, which is
―analyses and interpretations of the status of values and interests in society aimed at
social commentary and social action, i.e. praxis‖ (60), paying close attention to the
dynamics of power. This is because phronesis or practical knowledge is ―the medium
of both ordinary understanding and social scientific understanding‖ (Caterino and
Schram 2006, 5) integrating ―analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical
knowledge or know-how (techne)‖ (Flyvbjerg 2001, 2). The center of Flyvbjerg‘s
phronetic social science is inquiries about the vision of society, guided by four critical

449
questions: ―Where are we going?‖ ―Is this desirable?‖ ―What should be done?‖ and
―Who gains and who loses; by which mechanisms of power?‖ (Flyvbjerg 2001, 60).
Nevertheless, ―context matters‖ is not enough to make progress in the social
sciences. I would like to suggest two strategies for social science research to
understand the importance of contexts: decontextualization or theorization of contexts
and contextualization of theory. Decontextualization or theorization of contexts is to
conduct an analysis of why and how certain contexts or social environments,
consisting of a set of factors in specific constellations, are developed in a society, and
aims to build theory of contexts. On the other hand, contextualization of theory
suggests not only paying attention to the contexts of research from which a specific
theory is developed, but also examining the theories and/or premises and assumptions
that became the building blocks that generated a new thesis in the field.
For example, most peace theories have been invented in the West, with the
assumption that liberal democratic peace is the ideal model as discussed (Richmond
2005). Moreover, peace theories simply infer that peace is the absence of violence as
criticized by scholars of conflict theory such as Horowitz (2001). Peace-building
projects are launched based on the causes of conflict that are derived from conflict
theories (Richmond 2005). However, we need to ask what specific kind of peace or
society we want before developing either public policies or social programs, which are
unique to each society. Because the negation of one thing does not lead to the opposite
thing, researchers have to critically assess research questions and methods, whether or

450
not a researcher is asking the right questions and choosing appropriate research
methods to examine the social phenomena relevant to answering the question.
In attempting to study social capital from multicultural perspectives, Arneil
(2006) criticized Putnam‘s (2000) call to revive American civic life and increase
social capital, because his social capital theory assumed specific values and an
imagined community behind those values. These are consonant with the dominant
values and do not accept anomalies, such as views of women or handicapped people.
Thus, she contends that the task of scholars is to explore ―not simply how we ‗fix‘ the
problem, but what is the problem we are attempting to fix‖—in this case ―what kind of
community it is that Americans are hoping, in their own eyes, to (re)build‖ (Arneil
2006, 239).
In particular, development of practical knowledge is crucial in professional
studies, such as public administration, public policy or planning. Due to their
interdisciplinary nature, theories and knowledge are applied and integrated across
boundaries of various disciplines. Therefore, it is essential to scrutinize the premises
of theories and then translate theories from these fields into practical concepts, in
order to apply them to the real world through public policy, programs, and projects.
Hence we need to take values of inquiry more seriously in professional studies, as
proposed by Flyvbjerg (2001).
The importance of inquiry leads to methodological discussions in social
science research. Mixed methods research can contribute to creating a problem-

451
centered social science. The research paradigm of choice depends on the selection of
or emphasis on the method of research to be employed; however, pragmatism is often
suggested for mixed methods, as reviewed by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003).
Pragmatism assumes that the choice of research method and research paradigm should
be determined according to the research question being studied (Teddlie and
Tashakkori 2003). Hence, this paradigm benefits the social sciences by allowing
researchers to do an integration of epistemology and an adjustment of research
methods based on the research questions that guide a specific study (Morgan 2007).
Pragmatism is suggested as the most appropriate paradigm for a mixed methods
approach which offers ―the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of divergent
views‖ (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003, 15). Because ―[n]ew paradigms offer new ways
to think about the world—new questions to ask and new ways to pursue them‖
(Morgan 2007, 73), pragmatism benefits social science by exploring different
phenomena, events, societies, and histories across the globe.
Considering the nature of social sciences, therefore, a research question should
be a determinant of the research methods utilized and should guide the research.
Methodological bias or preference in a discipline, program or school should be seen as
academic sabotage and a social loss of intellectual opportunities to create new
knowledge. Here, I believe that research in comparative studies can contribute to
exploring a new aspect of our world view by illuminating relationships between
contexts and theory.

452
13.4. Epilogue: Policy Recommendation for Conflict Prevention and Peace
Building
The findings of this study suggest an approach for conflict prevention and
peace building that incorporate an appropriate level of political institutions. Political
intervention is necessary for conflict prevention and peace building as illustrated in the
cases. Yet, peace building projects tend to be at the macro level or micro level. In
Indonesia, the World Bank (2011) has suggested sub-district-level peace building
approaches based on the Bank‘s long term experience in the Kecamatan (sub-district)
Development Program and the results of conflict research.
Though conflict prevention efforts at the village level and district level, such as
Ketapang, were reported throughout West Kalimantan, sub-district level conflict
prevention was rarely heard of. Moreover, the key actors of sub-districts are
government officials such as heads of the sub-district government (camat) or sub-
district police, unlike the district head and village head who are elected by the people.
Thus, these leaders at the sub-district level cannot take preventive actions without the
approval of higher authorities. When a problem reaches a level which needs
intervention at the sub-district level, the district level back-up is necessary to prevent
expansion of the problem to the entire district. Therefore, in order to prevent
expansion of violence or riots, the level of intervention is a critical factor in proposing
more practical and effective peace building projects.
On the other hand, there were grassroots efforts to build multi-ethnic
associations, especially in the financial sector in West Kalimantan. For example, a

453
credit union led by the Dayak‘s Pancar Kasih launched an initiative to build multi-
ethnic credit unions in cooperation with Madurese NGOs activists. Yet, these efforts
in the community need to be connected with a broader policy on peace building
activities. A holistic approach at the appropriate level including both civic associations
and the government is necessary to make peace building projects work.
During my fieldwork, seven years after the end of the Malay-Madurese ethnic
violence, various efforts for peace building and reconciliation were still being
continued at the grassroots. NGOs representing ethnic groups occasionally held
meetings for a project of early warning of conflict. Economic cooperation between
ethnic groups including credit unions was initiated. In the fall of 2006, during the holy
month of Ramadan, a women‘s group including the Malay and the Madurese had a
meeting in Pemangkat, Sambas district, a stronghold of the Malay organization,
PFKPM. The meeting was organized as an activity of the women‘s peace building
project of the European NGO and facilitated by a Dayak female consultant. Because
of concerns about security for the group, PFKPM was notified about the meeting in
advance and approved by the Satgas, the security task force of PFKPM. In spite of its
opposition to reconciliation with the Madurese, the Satgas promised to protect the
women‘s group and endorsed the meeting. However, one day before the meeting, the
head of the Satgas disappeared and never replied to the calls of the Dayak consultant.
She later expressed fear of attack and tensions among the gathered group. Yet, the
Madurese women, the displaced residents from Sambas, visited and met with the

454
Malay women in Pemangkat. The meeting took place successfully and without
disturbance, as planned. After the meeting was over, the head of the Satgas returned to
his house.
The following year, 2007, was a historic moment for West Kalimantan.
Cornelis M. H., a Dayak candidate, along with a running mate of Chinese descent won
the elections for governor. Before the election, violence was anticipated and was a
serious concern in the local community. Candidates from the Dayak, Malay, and other
ethnic groups, selected their running partners based on their own calculations. The
people were afraid of the worst sort of clash—that between the two majority groups,
the Dayak and the Malay. Cornelis, the district head of Landak at the time, promised
support to the Madurese community toward reconciliation between the Madurese and
the Malays in Sambas. Fortunately the gubernatorial election ended without ethnic
violence and the Dayak finally heard news of the comeback of a Dayak governor, the
victory of Cornelis. However, there was no news of the reconciliation between the
Madurese and Sambas Malays until now.
Ethnic violence in West Kalimantan was once anticipated to occur at least
once a decade. As of the summer of 2011, that prediction is about to cross its
threshold. The unprecedented institutional changes of reformasi, democratization and
decentralization, and pemekaran of district, radically transformed the mindsets of
politicians and the community and hence the ethnic landscape in the province. As a
result, large-scale ethnic violence is less easily provoked at least at the district level, as

455
discussed, though more time is required to judge the broader prospect of ethnic
relationships. It is my hope that ethnic peace lasts in West Kalimantan, that ethnic
violence becomes history, and that my research provides some insight for peace
building there.

456
GLOSSARY
adat custom
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Unity in Diversity
bupati district head of regency (kabupaten)
camat sub-district head
Cap Go Meh festival during Chinese New Year
carok stabbing adversary from behind
desa village
dusun hamlet
hukum adat customary law
Idul Fitri Islamic holiday after Ramadan
Imlek Chinese New Year
kabupaten district (regency)
kecamatan sub-district
kelurahan urban village
kepala adat/ ketua adat enforcer of customs and customary ceremony
kiai Islamic scholar
konfrontasi confrontation
kongsi Chinese self-governing entity for gold mining
kota city
mangkok merah red bowl
mengayau headhunting
musyawarah deliberation

457
Naik Dango Dayak harvest festival (or Gawai Dayak)
ojek motorbike taxi
paguyuban association (Javanese)
Pancasila The five principles of Indonesian state
pemekaran administrative fragmentation (creation of a new
province/ district by dividing or merging of
administrative units)
pendatang migrant
putera daerah son of soil or native son
reformasi reform (democratization and decentralization)
Raja Hulu Aiq Dayak king
rukun tetangga (RT) neighborhood association
tariu shrill war cry
temanggung Dayak traditional leader
Tionghoa ethnic Chinese
Tolak Bala ceremony to ward off evil (to reject disaster/violence)
tokoh leaders/ figures
yayasan foundation

458
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