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Educational planning, supply of and demand for engineers: A mismatch in Iran

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Educational planning, supply of and demand for engineers: A mismatch in Iran

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Content EDUCATIONAL PLANNING, SUPPLY OF AND
DEMAND FOR ENGINEERS: A MISMATCH
IN IRAN
by
Keykhosrow Sobhe
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Education)
January 1982
UMI Number: DP24844
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Disssrtaion P _ .b i.s h *n g
UMI DP24844
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
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P.O. Box 1346
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
TH E G RA DU A TE SCHO O L
U N IV E R S IT Y PARK
LOS A N G ELES. C A L IF O R N IA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
Keykhosrow Sobhe
under the direction of h.?-.?.... Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
QEVtCATJ0W
To the. memory o£ my fa th e r u)ko m )a.6 my
bz6t tzcic.k2.Ji and to my mother ion hzr
constant morat support throughout my
zdu catton .
i i i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In completing this dissertation the author
received generous help from a few individuals. Dr.
William Rideout, who chaired the doctoral committee,
deserves a special word of appreciation for enhancing the
quality of this research through his constructive remarks
and criticism during a particularly busy period.
Special gratitude is also extended to Dr. Robert
Brackenbury for his invaluable assistance and constant
help. An additional grateful word of thanks is also
extended to Dr. William C. Himstreet of the School of
Business, University of Southern California, for his
guidance and advice.
I would also like to acknowledge the great help
I received from my friends in Los Angeles and Tehran,
who provided me with data and thoughtful ideas.
Finally, a word of deep appreciation to my
brother Daryush, whose sacrifice during the difficult
time that my family needed me most, made it possible for
me to continue my studies.
i v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DEDICATION . ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES.................................. vi
Chapter
I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM........... 1
The Case of Iran
Statement of the Problem
Research Questions
Purpose of the Study
Importance of the Study
Definitions of Terms
The Procedure
Limitations
Delimitations
Organization of the Study
II. PLANNING IN IRAN: A BRIEF REVIEW , „ 35
The First Development
Plan 1949-1955
The Second Development
Plan 1955-1962
The Third Development
Plan 1962-1967
The Fourth Development
Plan 1968-1972
The Fifth Development
Plan 1973-1978
The Sixth Development
Plan 1978-1988
The Dichotomy of Oil and
Development: A Lesson from Iran
Revolution, Change, and Planning
The Iranian System of Education
Education: Planning, Inequality
of Opportunities and Access
Fields of Study and Distribution
of Students
High Level Manpower and
Higher Education
V
Chapter Page
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY............... 106
Research Questions
Sources and Methods of
Data Collection
Presentation of the Data
IV. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA AND
FINDINGS OF THE S T U D Y............ . Ill
High Level Manpower and
Engineers
Higher Education and Supply
of Engineers
Answers to Research Questions
Engineering Schools in Post-
Revolution Period
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 154
Summary
Some Selected Findings
Conclusions
Recommendations
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................... 167
APPENDIXES.................................... 175
A. Admitted, Enrolled and Graduated
Students from Iranian Schools by
Specialization ..................... 176
B. Enrollment and Graduates of
Iranian Engineering Schools .... 179
v i
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Sectoral Contribution to GNP (%).... 17
2. Exports in Selected Years ($ million). . 20
3. Annual Import and Export Rates of
Growth (%).......... 21
4. Industry and Services Annual
Growth Rates (%)....................... 22
5. Illiteracy Rates in 1972 ............... 61
6. Type and Number of Institutions of
Higher Education in Iran in
Selected Years . ..................... 66
7. Students Admitted to all Iranian
Institutions of Higher Education,
1969-1970 to 1976-1977 ............ 77
8. Distribution of Students by Fields
of Study in 1976 in Iran . . . . . . . . 80
9. Iranian Returnees in the Fourth
Plan, 1968-1972 84
10. Iranian Graduates of Foreign Colleges
and Universities in the Fifth Plan,
1973-1978 . . ...................... 85
11. Iranians Graduated from Foreign
Colleges and Universities by the
Level of Education During the
Fourth and Fifth Development Plans . . . 86
12. High Level Manpower Stock in 1966
and 19 75 by Fields of Study ...... 93
13. Total Graduates of Higher Education
from Iranian Schools by Sex,
1964-1965 to 1975-1976 ................. 94
vii
Table Page
14. Graduates of Higher Education by
Different Levels in Iran, 1969-1970
to 1975-1976 ......................... 95
15. Comparison of the Required Manpower
With the Supply in 1963 ............. 97
16. Surplus and Shortage of Higher
Education Graduates in the Fourth
Plan, 1968-1972 ..................... 99
17. Supply of and Demand for Manpower in
Different Years of the Fifth Plan,
1973-1978 ........................... . 100
18. Supply of and Demand for Manpower
Based on the Level of Education in
the Fifth Plan,,1973-1978 (Domestic
and Foreign)......................... . 102
19. Distribution of the Graduates of
the Iranian System of Higher
Education, Fourth Plan, 1968-1972 . . . 117
20. Graduates of Foreign Schools in the
Field of Engineering in the Fourth
Plan, 1968-1972 .... ............. . 123
21. Graduates of Engineering from both
Iranian and Foreign Schools,
Fourth Plan, 1968-1972 ............. . . 125
22. Distribution of the Graduates at
the Master*s Level in Technical and
Engineering Fields in the Fourth
Plan, 1968-1972 (Iranian Schools) . . . 126
23. The Comparison of Estimated and
Actual Supply of Engineers in the
Fifth Plan, 1973-1978 (Iran Only) . . . 128
24. Iranian Graduates of Foreign Schools
in the Fifth Development Plan,
1973-1978 .......................... . . 130
v i i i
Table Page
25. Graduates of Engineering from both
Iranian and Foreign Schools, Fifth
Plan, 1973-1978 . ....................... 131
26. The Comparison of Iranians Graduated
from Iranian Schools with Those from
Foreign Schools in the Fifth Plan,
1973-1978 ........ ............. 133
27. Supply of and Demand for Engineers
in the Fifth Development Plan,
1973-1978 ....................... 135
28. The Ratio of Graduates to Faculty
Members in the Field of Engineering,
1969-1974 ......................... 143
29. Engineers Involved in Research Based
on Their Highest Degrees and
Countries of Study Between 1971-1973 . 147
1
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Some terms such as "developing countries," "less
developed countries," and "Third World countries" have
been interchangeably used in the post-World War II
literature. An identifying characteristic of these
countries is that a majority of the population lives in
rural areas? also, much of the labor force is involved
in agriculture. These countries do not enjoy a high
level of technical sophistication compared to that of
the developed nations.
Although some developing countries such as China
and Korea have improved over the years, this is not true
for- all. According to the World Bank (1978), "About 40
percent of the population of the developing countries,
nearly 800 million people are still living in absolute
poverty" (p. 7). By absolute poverty it is meant that
income is so low that adequate nutrition cannot be
assured. "In addition to absolute poverty, many more
people have inadequate access to essential public services
such as health care, safe drinking water, and sanitation"
(World Bank, 1978, p. 7).
2
It has been two decades or more since a large
number of the Third World countries announced their
independence. Although they may no longer be under
colonial rule and military occupation, through economic
means they are still controlled by the industrial nations.
After independence, leaders of the developing countries
looked at the West as an ideal model on which they could
base their development efforts. Industrialization was
thought to be a short cut and the fastest way to develop
ment. However, as will be discussed in the following
pages, not only did the developing countries not
industrialize, they became more dependent on the West.
There may have been some absolute gains on the part of
the developing countries; however, statistics proved that
the gap between developed and developing countries
widened. It was reported in 1976 that the average per
capita income of the developed countries was about $2,400
compared to $180 in the developing countries. The per
capita gap was, therefore, $2,220 which, according to
U1 Haq (1976), was expected to widen by another $1,000 by
1980.
Writing about the 800 million people of the Third
World countries who live in absolute poverty, the World
Bank (1978) reported
3
Many of these people have experienced no
improvement in their living standards;
and in countries where economic growth has
been slow, the living standards of the poor
may even have deteriorated. (p. 3)
The World Bank reported that from 1970 to 1976,
industry with an average annual growth rate of 4.5 percent
in the low income countries (countries with income per
capita of $250 and below) was the fastest growing sector
while agriculture with a 1.6 percent growth rate in the
same period was the slowest growing sector. Considering
the fact that developing countries comprise 70 percent of
the world population, it is revealing to see that these
countries supply only a tenth of the world1s manufactured
exports and earn 11 percent of the world's gross national
product (GNP). (OPEC countries are excluded.)
Developing countries showed (and still show) a
genuine interest in industrializing themselves. Kerr
(1960) stated "the people of the world are everywhere on
the march toward industrialism" (p. 15). The race for
industrialization required developing countries to import
machinery and equipment from the industrial nations
(imports were not limited to industrial products. Food
stuffs, fabrics, petrochemicals and other items were also
imported). This increased the dependency of the Third
World countries on the industrial states. This same
subject was also discussed by the World Bank (1978). It
was reported that "as their economies have grown, the
4
developing countries have become a large market for the
exports of the industrialized countries" (p. 2).
It was mentioned earlier that in 1976, the average
per capita income in the developing countries was as low
as $180 per year. Here, the assumption is that the
existence of cheap labor (due to the low income) and
availability of raw materials were the factors which
invited multinational corporations to invest in the Third
World countries. With help from their indigenous
counterparts and the local capitalists, multinationals
established their subsidiaries in the developing nations.
A small percentage of the inputs required by these
subsidiaries were produced by the local firms and the rest
had to be imported from outside the country; this made the
developing countries more dependent on the advanced
states.
In the move toward industrialization which called
for the use of technology and the replacement of man by
machine, a need for technically trained personnel was felt
in the developing nations. In some nations, of which Iran
was one, the supply of such manpower (skilled) did not
match the demand and a shortage emerged.
5
The Case of Iran
Iran is a classic example of a developing country
which, in its attempt to industrialize with the help from
oil revenues, removed all financial barriers that other
less developed countries faced. To launch the industrial
ization, oil was an independent variable on which all
development projects were heavily dependent. In other
words, oil revenues were to be the engine of industrial
ization. The money from oil enabled Iran to buy more of
everything; however, as this study suggests, Iran failed
to buy development. Development was a two-sided coin.
On one side, there were physical resources such as money,
infrastructure, raw materials and machinery, all of which
could be bought with the oil money although some (for
example, infrastructure) needed more time to be made
available for development projects to take place. On the
other side of the development coin, what Iran failed to
forecast and provide correctly was the required number of
skilled workers, those who could help the country move in
the right direction toward industrialization. But human
resource development was neglected.
Among those needed most to work with the
sophisticated imported machinery were engineers. The
dream of industrialization was not to come true if its
major ingredients, the technical know-how and engineers,
were missing. This research, after dealing briefly with
6
how Iran tried to industrialize, will emphasize one aspect
of the human resources side of industrialization, the
engineers. The dominant theme of the study, therefore,
is the neglect of high level manpower supply and more
specifically the bottleneck created by the shortage of
engineers.
Some Notes on Industrializa
tion in Iran
After World War II, the oil and wealth of Iran
made the country a tempting market for investment by
foreign governments and multinational corporations. Iran,
as other developing countries, planned to industrialize
and oil was to secure the funds for industrialization.
In this regard, a capitalistic model of production was
pursued by both the public and private sectors. The
dominant theme of industrialization was unfair profit
taking and an accumulation of substantial wealth by only
a few Iranian and international capitalists.
On the march toward industrialization, Iran was
no exception; however, as suggested by statistics
throughout this study, Iran was going to be a dependent
industrial country if the process of industrialization
had not been interrupted by the Revolution of 1979.
Dependent industrialization means that industries rely so
much on foreign physical or human resources that it is
impossible for them to function independently on their
7
own. In addition to this, dependent industries are not
complementary to one another, meaning that they do not go
through all phases of manufacturing; instead, they import
the parts and put the pieces together. In short,
dependent industry is only an assembly line that is not
able to process raw materials in order to produce finished
goods.
Prior to the recent developments and attempts to
industrialize in the last two decades, Iran was an
agrarian society which wanted to become a capitalist
industrial state. In this transition, both private and
public capitalism developed in Iran. On one hand, there
was government capitalism that consisted of companies and
industries owned by the public sector. On the other hand,
there existed a private sector which became stronger
through the years.
It was previously mentioned that the increasing
revenues from oil were the only source to finance the
industrialization. As time went on, oil revenues played
a larger part in supporting the cost of five-year
development plans. Graham (1980), writing about oil
money and its contribution to the last three development
plans, reported
The Third Plan (1962-67) was 62 per cent dependent
upon oil revenues, the Fourth Plan (1968-72) 63
per cent . . . (and in) the Fifth Plan (1973-78),
following the 1973 oil price rises, the dependence
has risen to over 80 per cent. (p. 38)______________
8
The oil price boom of 1973 pushed the oil revenues
from $5 billion to more than $21 billion, annually. The
price rise, therefore, enabled Iran to earn some $90 to
$100 billion in revenue over the Fifth Development Plan
(1973-78). Through investing in heavy industries which
was made possible by the oil money, the government of Iran
expanded its state capitalism. Askari and Majin (1976)
reported that "the ratio of Iran's government consumption
to GNP has been increasing over the period 1965/66-1972/
73" (p. 117).
During the initial period of industrialization in
the early 1960s, the private sector was not strong enough
to be able to invest in heavy industries. The government,
by investment in heavy industries, especially in steel,
mining, and petrochemicals, as discussed by Jazani (1973),
relieved the private industrial sector of a heavy burden.
However, it cannot be argued that this was socialism since
even though the government was investing in industries,
the private sector was also expanding at the same time.
The government investment in heavy industries was finally
going to be in the interest of the private sector because
the policy was to turn industry over to private enter
prises. Tyagunenko (1973) believed
9
In countries where the state industrialization
is simultaneously developing with private
capitalist enterprise, this rechannels
substantial state resources into the private
sector for its expansion and consolidation.
(p. 110)
This was what happened in Iran as the government
intended to transfer the ownership and operation of the
state-owned factories to the private sector. It was
reported by Jazani (1973) that "the government openly
announces that subsequent stages of production (steel
mills and copper mining) will be undertaken by privately
owned steel and copper industries" (p. 37). "The gradual
sale to the private sector of public sector industrial
units" was a goal of the Fifth Plan, 1973-77, (Tehran:
Plan and Budget Organization, 19 74), which proved that
the trend was moving away from the system of a mixed
economy where both public and private sectors operated,
to the ownership of industries by private entities.
Through deliberate actions by the government,
foreign enterprises were strongly encouraged to invest in
Iran. In Keddie's words (1977) "Tax holidays have also
been given to encourage foreign investors" (p. 249).
Subsequently, Iran turned into a heaven for the inter
national firms. On the issue of unfair profit making by
multinationals, Keddie stated:
10
Brochures of foreign investors proclaim that
profits on capital investment of 30 per cent
. . . are normal in Iran . . . economists who
know Iran often spoke of 50 per cent profits
as quite standard, and profits in trade and
industry of 100 to 200 per cent are not
unknown. (p. 250)
This kind of profit making benefited multinational
organizations which had invested in Iran and who were in
many instances the shareholders. Parvin and Zamani (1979)
reported that "in 1972, firms with foreign partners
accounted for 40 per cent of the firms employing 100
persons or more" (p. 76).
The industrialization which had begun to take
place was a production of close cooperation between
Iranians and their international counterparts. In this
regard, Saghafi-Nejad (1976), wrote "four of the world’s
top 10 automotive manufacturers had assembly or production
operations in Iran in early 1974" (p. 154). He further
stated that in 197 4 "some 18 firms had involved themselves
in either assembly or production of automotives, all with
technological assistance from foreign firms" (p. 155).
The Iranian local industries supplied a minor part of what
was needed by the subsidiaries of multinationals.
According to Parvin and Zamini (1979), less then 30
percent of the inputs required by the subsidiaries was
produced by Iranian firms and the rest was imported. This
perpetuated the dependence of the Iranian industries on
the West.
11
Katouzian (1981) discussed the growth of the
private sector which played an important role in pushing
the country toward industrialization. He stated:
The relatively high private investment,
especially from 1973 onward, is the result
of the state’s policy of passing on large
portions of the oil revenues to its clientle
(read to its business and political buddies)
through grants and low interest credit. The
recipients invested the funds and enjoyed a
high income from them. (p. 266)
In the outline of the Fifth Plan (1973-78), it
was mentioned that a major objective of the plan would be
"to increase the level of transfers of financial resources
from the public sector to the private sector in the form
of loans" (Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, 1974a).
Therefore, credit policies were designed in a way that
large industrial firms received loans with interest
rates between 4 to 9 percent, considerably lower than the
market price of money which was never lower than 12
percent, officially.
Efficiency and Capacity
of Industries
On the subject of industrial efficiency, Iran
Trade and Industry in its October 1977 issue reported
that "on the whole, it is undisputed fact that industry
in Iran does not enjoy a good reputation for its
efficiency, the high quality of its products, or
competitiveness of the prices" (p. 10). This incompetency
. 12
of Iranian industries kept the quality so low that
Iranian products could not compete with those of the
industrial countries in international markets.
The existing industrial facilities were also not
operating at full capacity. In 1977, according to the
Ministry of Industry and Mines and the Chamber of Commerce,
most Iranian factories and plants were producing only at
60 to 70 percent of their full capacity. The inefficiency
of the industrial sector made a high proportion of
government firms lose rather than make a profit. Parvin
and Zamani (1979) indicated that "the 1978 budget of the
government of Iran listed 157 state-owned companies, among
which 47 ran at a loss." They further stated "the
highest losses were reported by the National Steel
Corporation, Tabriz Machine Tool Plant, and Arak Machine
Tool Plant" (p. 76).
As a result of the oil price increase in late
1973, Iran was able to move toward capital-intensive
industry which reduced the reliance of the factories on
the labor available. This approach was not employment-
generating at all. Carey and Carey (1975) reported
By the end of the Fourth Plan (1972), the
large new state owned heavy industries had
not added as much to employment as had been
the goal of both the Third (1962-67) and the
Fourth Plan (1968-72). (p. 14)
Planning and implementation of the plans are
discussed in the second chapter. However, as far as this
13
section is concerned, one goal of the Fifth Plan, 1973-
1978, in regard to employment was never achieved* In the
Fifth Plan, the government was expected "to emphasize the
establishment of medium and small-scale industries
because of their propensity to generate employment" (p. 51)
What was achieved was rather different from what was
sought as the government invested huge amounts in heavy
industries and employed a capital-intensive strategy in
industrialization. Johnson (1980) touched on the issue
of the capital-intensive approach in Iran. She pointed
out that "the bias of growth has been clearly capital-
intensive rather than employment-generating" (p. 15).
Using capital-intensive technology and heavy
investment in machines increased the investment/labor
ratio (the money value of investment in machines which
had to be made in order to employ one more worker). As
was discussed by Katouzian (1981), between 1963-1972,
about a $4,000 investment in machines was needed to
generate employment for one person. Between 1973-1978,
due to the massive purchases of machinery by Iran, the
investment/labor ratio jumped to $21,633.
Due to the heavy investment in machines and
equipment, by 1977 Iran had invested $68 million in
industry (excluding oil, ^.as, power generation and
buildings). It was mentioned before that as late as 1977,
the factories operated at 60 to 70 percent of their
14
capacity, meaning that 30 to 40 percent of their capacity
was not used. It is, therefore, concluded that 30 to 40
percent of the $68 billion, or some $20.4 to $27.2
billion was idle and being wasted.
The attempted industrialization worsened the
inequality of income and employment opportunities between
rural and urban areas. Looney (1977a), discussed the
"slow growth in rural consumption of 3.7 percent per
annum between 1959 and 1971 as compared with 8.7 percent
. . . in the urban areas" (p. 6). He also mentioned that
prior to 1977, urban people earned six to seven times as
much as the rural people. It was also reported by the
International Labor Office (ILO) (1973) that "the ratio
of urban to rural income per head is estimated by the
Plan Organization to have increased from 4.6 to 1 in 1959
to 5.7 to 1 in 1969" (p. 25).
Concentration of industries in big cities was
part of the reason for the inequality which existed
between the rural and urban areas. Johnson (1980)
indicated that "Tehran which encompasses 14 percent of
Iran's population . . . accounts for 51 percent of the
industrial enterprises and . . . 35 percent of the
country's national product" (p. 25). Due to this
concentration of opportunities, Looney (1977a) reported
that per capita income in Tehran was 45 percent higher
than in other large cities in Iran and 70 percent higher
15
than in small towns. The attraction of the cities
brought rural people to the urban areas in search of jobs
and this brought about some demographic change. "In 1966,
up to 60 per cent of the population was rural. This
decreased to 40 per cent in 1978" (Embassy of Iran, The
Press and Information Office, 1978).
Inequality of income and opportunity existed not
only between urban and rural areas, it existed within
these as well. Looney (1977) indicated that the top 10
percent of the population in the early 1970s accounted
for 40 percent of the total private consumption. On the
other extreme, the bottom 30 percent of the population
accounted for only 8 percent of private consumption.
The Relationship Between
Industry and Other
Sectors
The attempted industrialization was determined
to take place at any cost and in this race agriculture
was the obvious loser. Graham (1980) stated that "Iran
was largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs up to the early
1960,s" (p. 40). However, the situation deteriorated and
in 1973 Iran had to import approximately $2 billion
worth of foodstuffs, as Johnson (1980) reported. It was
previously discussed that in search of a better life and
higher standards of living, rural people migrated to the
cities. This demographic change was part of the reason
16
for the agricultural decline. Nobari (1978) indicated
that in 1978, Iran had to import 93 percent of its food
requirements. Of this, according to Time (1979), about
25 percent was imported from the United States alone. It
is, therefore, concluded that the move toward industrial
ization took place at a great cost for the agricultural
sector as the country lost its self-sufficiency, while
at the same time it could not achieve industrialization.
As shown in Table 1, the neglect of agriculture dropped
its contribution to GNP from 25.4 percent in 1968 to 18.1
percent in 1973. This further declined to 8 percent of
the GNP in 1978.
According to Table 1 in the 1970s, nothing could
keep pace with the increasing share which oil had in GNP
which turned Iran into a single-commodity country which
was heavily dependent on oil and the revenues from it.
The decline in the contribution of agriculture to
GNP was not perceived as a surprise by the government of
Iran since it was envisaged by the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978,
that "The agricultural sector will not play a major role
in the creation of new employment in the Fifth Plan"
(Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, 1973). The plan
also sought "to ensure that more agricultural manpower is
absorbed by the industrial and services sector" (p. 3).
It was, therefore, expected that people would move from
agriculture to other sectors. The plan had also
Table 1
Sectoral Contribution to GNP (%)
Activity 1967-1968 1972-1973 . 1977-1978
Agriculture 25.4 18.1 8.0
Oil 13.8 19.5 48.7
Industries and mines 21,3 22.3 17.1
Services 40. 5 40.1 27.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Embassy of Iran, The
Development of Iran,
Press and
1945-1978,
Information Office
Washington, D.C.:
, Economic
Embassy of
Iran, 1978, p. 8.
18
forecasted that the share of agriculture in GNP would
drop from 18.1 percent in 1972 to 9.5 percent in 1977-
1978. The actual proportion as shown in Table 1 was 8
percent.
It is not intended to compare agriculture with
oil, but to have an idea where the two were going.y ;.It is
worth mentioning that the National Iranian Oil Company,
which, according to Forbis (1981), was the second largest
industrial company in the world outside the United States,
employed only 66,000 people. This was, as Parvin and
Zamani (1979) mentioned, 0.5 percent of the total labor
force that produced about half of the GNP. On the other
hand, agriculture which employed 33 percent of a total
labor force of over nine million in 1978, produced only
8 percent of the Iranian GNP.
The surplus created by the oil income could
offset the reduction in agricultural production. However,
as is discussed in Chapter II, because of the short-fall
in the world demand for oil, in 1975-1976, the Iranian
oil income was off $4 billion from what had been expected.
This led to a deficit of more than $2.4 billion in 1976-
1977 fiscal year. Due to the deficit, foodstuffs had to
be imported at the expense of some development projects
as there was no oil income surplus to offset the decrease
in farm production.
19
The Balance of Trade
The neglect of agriculture and the desire for
industrialization increased the imports which resulted in
more dependency on foreign countries. Rouleau (1978)
indicated that Iran imported a total of $3 billion worth
of goods and services in 1972. According to the October
1977 issue of Iran Trade and Industry (1977g), in.1975,
imports amounted to $16 billion, while non-oil exports
hardly reached $0.5 billion. The ratio of imports to non-
oil export was thus 32:1, meaning that for each dollar
exported there was $32 of import.
As far as the industrialization with which this
research deals is concerned, out of the total exports of
Iran in 1963, about 23 percent was non-oil exports, which
dropped to 15 percent in 1972. The sudden increase in oil
revenues in late 1973 led to a fall in the ratio of non
oil exports to total exports, which was reduced to no more
than 2 percent in 1978.
According to Table 2, in 1978, oil and gas
accounted for 98 percent of total Iranian exports. Of the
2 percent share of non-oil exports, agriculture (cotton,
dried fruits) contributed 51 percent and traditional
products (handicrafts and carpets) 28 percent. Industrial
goods made up the remaining 21 percent of the non-oil
exports. Table 2 suggests that the ratio of industrial
products to oil and non-oil export was negligible.
Table 2
Exports in Selected Years ($ million)
1963
o ;
ro . 1972 % 1978
o
*5
Oil and Gas 471 77 2,600 85 23,500 98
All other goods 137 23
440
15 520 2
Total Exports 608 100 3,040 100 24,020 100
Source: Cited in H., Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran,
1926-1979. New York: New York University Press, 1981, p. 325.
i s J
O
21
It was reported by the World Bank. (1978) that
between 1960 and 1970, Iranian exports (excluding oil)
enjoyed about a 10 percent rate of increase, which from
1970 to 1976 dropped to 5 percent. On the other hand, as
Table 3 presents, imports that in the period of 1960-1970
grew at 11.3 percent, reached a growth rate of 28.3
percent in the 1970-1976 period.
Table 3
Annual Import and Export Rates of Growth (%)
Activity 1960-1970 1970-1976
Exports 9.8 5.0
Imports 11.3 28. 3
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report, 1978
Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 87.
22
The declining rate of exports and the sharp
increase of imports indicated a worsening balance of
trade from 1970 to 1976.
In spite of the propaganda by the government that
Iran was going to be one of the leading industrial nations
by the year 2000, industrial growth declined sharply from
1970 to 1976, while growth in the service sector picked
up the decline in industry. Table 4 compares the growth
rates of industry with services.
Table 4
Industry and Service Annual
Growth Rates (%)
Sector 1960-1970 1970-1976
Industry 21. 4 5.6
Services 910 20. 5
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report, 1978
Washington, D.C., 1978.
23
The increase in the service sector created a huge
private and state bureaucracy (and red tape) which was
corrupt in nature and decreased productivity.
As a result of imported machinery and equipment,
which was very expensive to run, and due to government
support of indigenous monopolies, prices rose sharply.
The inflation rate of 1.1 percent in the 1960s increased
to 25.2 percent in 1970-1976, the World Bank reported in
1978. Increased government expenditures also helped
inflation grow as the oil income shot up. Huge spending
on military hardware contributed to high inflation.
Rouleau (1978) reported that "over half of the nation1s
1976-1977 budget is devoted to the armed forces, eleven
times the defense budget for 1970" (p. 84). Iran Voice
(Embassy of Iran, 1980b) indicated that there was $11
billion for the year 1978 in the defense budget. Due to
the high rate of inflation, prices of goods and services
went up so sharply that in the international markets, Iran
was never able to compete with the exports of the
industrial nations. Domestically, high prices meant
lower purchasing power for the needy and poor, the most
vulnerable of all in the society.
Besides the neglect of agriculture, the promotion
of existing inequality between and within urban and rural
areas and high under-unemployment caused by the attempted
industrialization, another problem, which was the shortage
24
of highly skilled personnel, emerged. This problem was
created as the country began gradually to adopt a capital-
intensive industry which needed a huge amount of money
invested in sophisticated machines.
Due to the use of a capital-intensive approach,
the demand for high level manpower, those who had some
years of university training, especially in technical and
industrial fields, was so great that the supply could not
keep pace; therefore, severe shortages resulted. To meet
the demand, a huge number of foreign experts had to be
invited to the country. Iran Trade and Industry (1977d)
reported that the number of non-Iranian workers had more
than tripled during the 1973-1977 period. The same issue
°f Iran Trade and Industry (1977d) stated that "The
Minister of Labor openly and publically urged employers
to seek foreign labor to overcome the present labor
shortage" (p. 46).
Johnson (1980) stated that in June 3.975,
a survey of the press showed that an average
of 1,000 "situation vacant" advertisements
appear daily in the (Iranian) press. Of these,
about 40 per cent are for engineers and
technicians. (p. 17)
To meet the demand for skilled labor, technical schools
were established to deal specifically with the shortage
of engineers. In addition to the expansion of existing
colleges which had engineering departments, new engineer-
ing schools came into existence. In 1960, a total number
25
of 614 students graduated from engineering schools. The
number of the graduates increased to 9,415 in 1975
(UNESCO, 1977). This rapid increase in the number of
graduates in the field of engineering was not sufficient
to catch up with the rising demand caused by the attempt
to industrialize.
Another source to supply technically trained
people was the foreign human resources market. According
to Johnson (1980), "the number of foreigners employed in
1965 did not exceed 4,000. This figure was estimated
to reach the 60,000 mark in 1977" (p. 16). She also
mentioned that "50.6 per cent of the non-Iranians per
formed professional and technical jobs" (p. 16).
Although hiring foreign nationals might help run
the factories in the short-term, it could not be a long
term remedy to the bottleneck of a shortage of the
indigenous manpower supply. It was very expensive to
employ non-Iranian professionals to work in Iran. This
was due to the shortage of technically trained personnel
in the world market. Graham (1980) stated that "By mid-
1975, there were some 35,000 foreigners living in Tehran
alone— mostly Europeans acting as technicians, managers,
advisers" (p. 90). This had an important inflationary
effect (because of high salaries which gave high purchas
ing power to foreign employees) which pushed up the prices
of Iranian commodities. It is further assumed that the
26
cost of those foreign workers (of whom more than half
performed technical jobs) who worked in the private
sector was directly charged against the cost of goods
produced and this raised the prices.
Among those technically trained personnel in
short supply in Iran in recent years, engineers were
needed most. Meeting the demand for engineers was a
problem to be tackled by the Iranian system of education
through the engineering schools. However, the statistics
presented later in this research suggest that the system
failed to respond adequately to the needs of the market.
This study assumes that engineers had an important
role to play in the industrialization of Iran as they
possessed the skill to work with the imported machinery.
It would take a long time to increase the supply of
engineers since training high level manpower was a time-
consuming process. Its planning and execution required
the kind of administration that did not exist in Iran.
Supplying a sufficient number of engineers needed
appropriate information (which in Iran, as other develop
ing countries, was hard to gather) on present and future
requirements of the economy and job market. It should be
noted, however, that a quantitative increase of engineers
would not necessarily guarantee their quality nor achieve
national industrialization, as many other interconnected
factors (for example, the kind of technology which suited
27
the human and physical resources of the country) were
involved. The above-mentioned points are brought up
throughout the study wherever appropriate.
One big issue which has little to do with the
system of education itself is utilization? how engineers
or other kinds of graduates are used by the system after
having completed their education. Regardless of the
number of engineers, it is important to explore how and
where their expertise is employed. Frustration arose
when it was reported that "Iran contracted more than
15,000 engineers while its own were imprisoned for their
political views" (Embassy of Iran, Iran Voice, 1980c', p. 4)
In a case like this, the system of education has nothing
to do with misutilization of its output. Apparently, the
controversy of orthodoxy and ideology versus expertise
is likely to be a major issue in Iran under the Islamic
regime also, as more emphasis is being placed on ideology
than on expertise.
Statement of the Problem
The existing literature on the job market
substantiates the growing demand for engineers in Iran in
recent years. However, the demand was never equalled by
the supply, and this discrepancy caused a shortage of
engineers in the country.
28
The primary concern of this study was to examine
and analyze the relationship between the supply of and
demand for engineers for the period of 1962-1981. The
study also sought to examine whether there existed an
educational plan at the national level to supply engineers
for the period under study. Implementation of the plan
was also investigated by the study.
Research Questions
The study intended to provide answers to the
following questions:
1. What was the relationship between supply of
and demand for all kinds of engineers in Iran?
2. To what extent was the supply of engineers in
Iran based upon a well-designed manpower plan at the
national level and how was the plan implemented?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to analyze the
relationship between supply of and demand for engineers
in Iran. On the supply side, three sources provided the
engineers:
1. Indigenous schools;
2. Iranian returnees from abroad; and
3. Foreign nationals.
On the demand side, each Iranian five-year
development plan estimated the skilled labor and the
29
number of engineers needed for the years ahead. The last
three development plans were analyzed to determine the
demand for engineers. It was also the purpose of the
study to find out why equilibrium, the point where the
supply of engineers should equal the demand, was never
achieved. The possibility of partial substitution of
engineers by technicians was also examined.
Importance of the Study
The study dealt with development planning in
general and educational planning in particular for the
field of engineering. The study was thought to be
important because by identifying the strengths and
weaknesses of the past, it could be helpful in
1. Preparing an educational plan to meet the
future demand for engineers. Generally speaking, through
surveying the public and private sectors it is possible
to estimate the demand for engineers and their needed
branches of study. The existing supply of engineers
could be easily calculated by gathering data on engineer
ing colleges and universities. To take care of the
shortage which has long been an issue, establishment of
new schools or expansion of the existing ones should: be
carefully considered. In this regard, the present study
can be used as a guide.
30
2. Designing a new development plan. Regardless
of the kind of government, each country needs development
planning; this need is more serious in developing
countries like Iran. Since this study analyzed the
process of development planning during the last two
decades, in preparing a new development plan the study
could be of help to planners in formulating new goals and
designating new means to achieve the plan*s objectives.
3. Coordinating non-education sectors with
education sector. Although different segments of a system
or plan may work individually, it is equally important
that their functions are coordinated. Each society is
comprised of several sectors such as agriculture, industry,
and education. Engineering as a cross-sectoral factor is
an important element in all these sectors which helps them
function properly. The present study is important because
it can be used in coordinating the supply of engineers
for different sectors.
Everything else being equal, oil is most likely
to be a major source of energy for the years to come.
Although because of the political situation, Iranian oil
revenues have sharply declined, the wealth is still there,
and if properly planned and efficiently executed, the
money from oil can bring about a real and independent
industrialization. The findings of this study suggest how
31
planners can avoid the past mistakes so that the Iranian
human and physical resources can be reallocated. This
will help the country meet the challenges caused by its
lagging economy.
Definitions of Terms
The following terms were frequently used
throughout the study in the way described.
Deve1opment. Gradual advance or growth through
progressive change. Development is much broader than
mere economic growth which is measured in monetary terms
such as GNP or income per capita. Other factors such as
illiteracy rate, average life expectancy at birth, and
infant mortality (number of children who die prior to the
age one) as have been incorporated in the Physical
Quality of Life Index (PQLI) should be combined with GNP
in measuring and determining development.
Engineer. A person who holds an engineering
degree at the bachelor's level or higher, awarded by an
institution of higher education.
Industrialization. The process of transition
from a traditional society toward one which uses advanced
technology and replaces human labor with machines. Mass
production (large-scale production) is a characteristic
of industrialization.
32
Technician. A person who holds an associate of
science in a technical or industrial field after attending
a two-year program in an institution of higher education.
The Procedure
The study was a descriptive survey which utilized:
1. Official Iranian publications in both English and
Farsi, the official language of Iran.
2. Publications of international and non-Iranian
organizations.
3. Publications by private individuals in books,
articles, papers, dissertations.
To have a wider access to related information, a
computer search was done. Dissertation Abstracts
International and ERIC were the most helpful.
Limitations
The study was limited by the following:
1. The study was conducted in the United States,
therefore, the access to the data available was limited.
2. A large proportion of data on the Iranian
system of education and planning was in Farsi, therefore,
the closest possible equivalents were used if the exact
translation did not make sense.
3. Since the Revolution of 1979, few official
statistics have been put out by the new regime. In
33
addition to this, part of what had been published by the
former government was destroyed during or after the
Revolution.
In regard to the first limitation, it is assumed
that more data would have been available to the researcher
if the study had been done in Iran.
Delimitations
The following delimitations were imposed:
1. The time span for the study was from 1962 to
1981. The year 1962 was the beginning of the Third five-
year Development Plan of Iran.
2. The focus of the study was on engineers and
technicians who had graduated from Iranian and non-
Iranian schools. Since this research was done at the
macro-level, engineers were not differentiated based on
their specializations and branches of study. Therefore,
all types of engineers were classified as engineers.
Organization of the Study
The study is divided into five chapters. The
first chaper has deductively dealt with the problem under
study. In the beginning, the income and the general
situation in developing countries were compared to those
of the developed nations. The shortage of technically
trained labor in Third World countries was also discussed.
The chapter then took up the case of Iran which, prior to
34
the attempted industrialization, was an agrarian society.
As the chapter moved on, the focus of study narrowed and
the specific problem under study, which was the emergence
of the shortage’ of engineers was discussed.
The second chapter reviews the related literature
on Iranian development planning in general and the
educational system of the country in particular. Chapter
III, briefly describes the methodology and sources
employed by the study to find the answers to the research
questions. Findings and the way in which educational
planning for engineering schools were handled ard
presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V summarizes the study
and makes specific conclusions. The recommendations
bring the study to an end.
References and Appendixes are the last sections
of this study.
35
CHAPTER II
PLANNING IN IRAN: A BRIEF REVIEW
Planning deals with the future and in Steiner*s
(1969) words:
As a process, planning may be defined as
deciding in advance what is to be done,
when it is to be done, how it is to be
done, and who is to do it. Planning is
also a continuous process. . . . (p. 7)
Planning by itself does not automatically achieve the
goals if it is not properly implemented. There are
different points of view on whether planning and execution
should be done by the same body and organization.
However, the assumption undertaken by this study is that
regardless of who plans and who implements, achieving
goals needs coordination, feedback and a constant inter
action between planning and execution.
Economic planning is a required tool to reach
development, while other social, cultural, and political
factors are to be taken into account when planning is
done. Development planning in Iran started in 1937, the
year in which the High Economic Council, a body
responsible for economic development of the country, came
into existence. The Council did not get much done, since
36
the outbreak of the Second World War interrupted economic
planning activities in Iran. In 1946, within the
Ministry of Finance a commission called "Commission for
Drafting the Plan for Development of the Country" was set
up. In the same year, the Commission prepared a draft
which three years later became the Seven Year Plan Law.
The Cabinet at the time, following the suggestions of the
Commission for. Drafting Plans, appointed a "Supreme Plan
ning Council" to prepare a development plan. Since the
country was short of money to finance its development
projects, the newly established International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was asked to
partially finance the plan. In order to receive the
loan, the contents of the projects had to be specified.
Subsequently, to qualify Iran to receive a loan from IBRD,
an American engineering firm, Morrison Knudson Inter
national was asked to prepare a specific survey of the
projects outlined by the plan. The report was completed
by 1947. Based on this report, the plan had to be
revised and the government proposed a bill for
parliamentary approval of the revised plan. The Outline
Of the Third Plan 1341-1346 (Iranian years corresponded to
1962-1967) published in 1965 stated:
Before the enactment of the bill, the Inter
national Bank (IBRD) suggested that Iran's
draft plan be reviewed by the Overseas
Consultants Incorporated. In a report
submitted in Dey 1327 (1948), OCI accepted
37
the broad allocation of the bill. . . . In
Bahman 132 7 (1949), the OCI was asked to
assist the Plan Organization, new body set
up to administer the plan to formulate the
details of the programmes within the framework
of the bill. Two weeks later, the First Seven
Year Plan became law. (Tehran, Plan Organization,
1965, p. 3)
According to Baldwin (1967), the "Plan Organiza
tion came into being with the enactment of the First
Seven Year Law in May 1949. This was the outcome of four
years of discussion, negotiation, and preparations started
at the close of World War II" (p. 24). A report called
the Naficy Report, as Baldin (1967) stated, "provided the
basis for the Seven Year Plan Law as finally enacted.
The following five points summarize the conception of the
development agency at the time the law was passed.
1. The development agency should be
independent, insulated from the government's
chronic instability and its politics.
2. To assure its independence the agency
would be given legal status and financial
autonomy. The latter was to be secured by
giving the agency its own bank account in Bank
Melli (National Bank of Iran).
3. The agency should not be given executive
powers. It should not become a government within
a government. It should study, advise, plan,
guide, coordinate, and supervise.
4. Execution of the plan should be a
responsibility of the ministries or other
regular government bodies, separate from the
development agency.
5. The agency*s internal organization was
sketched in very broad terms. In addition to
a chief executive and supervisory boards, it
would have a technical bureau (composed mainly
of engineers) and subject divisions (e.g.,
industry, agriculture, transport). The agency
38
was to be exempt from the government's normal
rules and regulations on tendering, salaries,
etc., instead, it was to be given special
regulations of its own. (Tehran, Plan
Organization, 1965, p. 28)
As described above, there was a chief executive in
the Plan Organization called the Managing Director who was
responsible to a High Council (equivalent to a Board of
Directors) which included seven full-time members. The
High Council approved all programs, budgets, and contracts.
The power of execution and working independently
were the center of controversy between the Plan Organiza
tion and ministries. The literature shows that during the
First (1949-1955) and Second Plan (1955-1962), the Plan
Organization had some executive power; however, this was
taken away from it gradually. Politicians and government
officials usually did not like the independence of the
Plan Organization and "whenever they (politicians) had any
hope of a reform movement improving government performance(
they tended to reopen the question of the Plan Organiza
tion*, s basic structure and purpose" (Baldwin, 1967, p. 35).
Planning was always influenced by politicians in
Iran. Whenever there was an issue to be decided upon by
the planners or politicians, the latter had the upper
hand. Baldwin (1967) stated that "In Iran, law is weaker
than personalities. Much weaker. One cannot expect the
ship of state, once set on course, will hold to it" (p. 40).
This was why he believed____________
39
Iran is a country where economic development
is succeeding but where economic planning,
as the process is usually understood, has
largely failed. . . . The attempt to plan
in Iran turned out to be a high-risk invest
ment that did not pay off. (p. viii)
The subject of execution power was also discussed by
Tyagunenko (1973) who stated "In many countries, planning
organizations have neither an appropriate status nor
powers. Economic departments are often not subject to
control of the planning committee" (p. 120). From the
discussion on the Plan Organization, it is concluded that
the organization was a planning body with no executive
power because each of the ministries was in charge of
plan implementation. In Baldwin*s (1967) words, the Plan
Organization "never developed effective powers of
supervision over ministry execution of plan projects"
(p. 39).
In 1973, the Plan Organization changed its name
to the Plan and Budget Organization. The responsibilities
and functions were more or less the same. Hereafter, the
names Plan Organization and Plan and Budget Organization
will be used interchangeably. Forbis (1981) stated that
the Plan and Budget Organization
fills a palatial building on a hard-to find
small street near the Parliament (in downtown
Tehran), and utilizes the largest computer bank
in the Middle East . . . the Plan Organization
is a big factor in the life of anyone connected
with business, industry, or government. (p. 236)
40
Forbis (1981) discussed the pre-Revolution
function of the Plan and Budget Organization by stating:
the Plan Organization weighs and balances its
goals and then prepares the government's budget.
In the $42 billion budget for the Iranian year
(corresponded to) 1978-79, for example, the
various goals received allocations as follows:
economic development $17.2 billion, the
military $10 billion, health, education and
welfare $8.5 billion. (p. 237)
As a planning body, prior to the Revolution of
1979, the Plan and Budget Organization had formulated
five development plans. The following is a summary of
the plans.
The First Development
Plan 1949-1955
This seven-year plan was the first of its kind in
the history of development planning in Iran. The nature
of the plan and the way in which the plan was designed
created the basis for the dependence of the country on
foreign help as the plan itself was prepared with outside
help. It is assumed that a team of foreign advisors who
were not totally familiar with the unique fabric and
milieu of Iranian society might not be able to draw a
plan that could serve the interest of the Iranian people.
Looney (1977) believed that "the First Plan was imposed
by the international lending agencies" (p. 44) as they
financed part of the plan. Financing the First Plan was
also discussed by Mani and Pouyan (1972) who wrote:
41
The first economic plan . . . did not exceed
$300 million which was to be financed from
internal and external sources: internally by
the oil revenues and a loan from the National
Bank; externally by a loan from IBRD. (p. 34)
Mani and Pouyan further stated that 60 percent of the
plan’s funds had come from foreign sources. The plan was
a mere list of some fragmented projects which had not
taken into consideration the needs and resources of the
country.
The Second Development
Plan 1955-1962
The second plan, like the first one, was also a
seven-year program with about $1 billion to invest in
development projects (Forbis, 1981). The plan emphasized
infrastructure and subsequently some roads and dams were
built. However, as Mani (1972) believed, landowners and
agricultural capitalists received most of the benefit,
although this was not what the plan had intended to do.
The Second Plan was not a comprehensive plan; it
did nothing more than some tinkering and isolated
improvements occurred in some sectors in a very
fragmented way. Baldwin (1967) reported that "Neither
the'First nor the Second seven-year plan was concerned
with development objectives covering the entire economy"
(p. 38). Looney (1977) also believed that the Second
Plan did not consider economic analysis, rates of return,
or cost benefit analysis.
42
The Third Development
Plan 1962-1967
It was claimed by the government of Iran that the
Third Plan was a comprehensive plan covering all aspects
of the Iranian society. The concept of comprehensive
planning became popular in the West in the post-World War
II era. By the time that the Third Development Plan of
Iran was being formulated/ Iranian planners thought that
they could probably use the technique. The comprehensive
ness of the plan was questioned by Katouzian (1981), who
discussed the involvement of a team of foreign advisors
in drafting a comprehensive plan for the period 1962-1967.
He stated that by the time of the Third Plan
Comprehensive planning had become both
respectable among Western technicians and
fashionable among Iranian (and similar)
technocrats. The plan frame was based on
assumptions a lot of which bore little
resemblance to reality: there was for
example, no reference to an imminent land
reform! And the plan was never adhered to
either in the letter or in spirit. (p. 230)
According to Forbis (1981), the budget of the
Third Plan was $2.7 billion. As time went on, the
dependency of the country and development projects on the
oil revenues increased. Graham (1980) in his book, Iran:
The Illusion of Power, reported that the Third Plan was
62 percent dependent on oil revenues. This dependency
made Iran a single commodity country with all its eggs in
one basket. Although the investment in the Third Plan
43
was nine times greater than that of the First Plan ($2.7
billion compared to $300 million; of course, the purchas
ing power of the dollar would not be the same if inflation
was accounted for). Mani and Pouyan (1972) argued that
. The main features of the (Third) plan on the
whole remained the same as the two earlier
ones: to build infrastructure, help expand
mining and consumer industries not so much
in competition.with imperialist exports to
Iran, and to expand lagging health and
education facilities needed for the current
rate of expansion of capitalism in Iran.
(p. 36)
In spite of the claim by the government officials
who regarded, the Third Plan as a comprehensive guideline
for development,
many have doubted that the first two or
three Iranian plans were real plans, since
they mostly grouped together disparate
government projects with no means to
enforce an effective government strategy
toward the economy as a whole. (Keddie,
1977, p. 245)
It was said that the Third Plan with an 8.5 per
cent annual rate of growth in GNP had passed the set
target.. However, the increase in GNP was mostly achieved
by an increase in the oil revenues rather than by
producing more goods and services. On the other hand, as
discussed in Chapter I, the growth was not shared by all
the people; therefore, the gap between rich and poor
widened. The growth in itself did not spell prosperity.
44
The Fourth Development
Plan 1968-19,72
The Fourth Plan had a budget of $10 billion
(Forbis, 1981). Of this, according to Graham (1980) 63
percent was financed by oil. The Fourth Plan was said to
be the most comprehensive compared to the previous ones.
It was expected in the outline of the Fourth Plan that
industry would take an increasing part in the development
of the country. The Fourth National Development Plan,
1968-1972 (Tehran, Plan Organization) was published by
the Plan Organization in 1968 and listed as one of the
objectives of the plan
An increase in the rate of economic growth
and in national income by gradually increasing
the relative importance of industry . . . using
advanced techniques in all fields of activity,
and expanding scientific and applied research,
especially for the solution of problems of
economic growth. (p. 39)
In spite of the importance of industry mentioned
in the plan, in reality only 20 percent of the total
public investment was spent on the industrial sector in
the Fourth Plan. This may be attributed to mismanagement
of industrial planning and inconsistency in implementation
of the plan. It was reported by Mani and Pouyan (1972):
Although it was claimed that the Fourth Plan
was to be the foundations of Iran's rapid
march toward industrialization, still the
industrial sector did not receive more than
20 per cent of the total public investment
appropriations. (p. 36)
45
Government policy to protect domestic industries
through restriction of imports, helped the indigenous
monopolies grow. On the other hand, machinery and
equipment needed by the large manufacturers were exempted
from custom duties. Selective import restrictions and
exemptions facilitated the expansion of the industrial
firms.
The Fifth Development
Plan 1973-1978
The money to be invested during the Fifth Plan was
$36 billion. Due to the sharp increase in the oil income,
the plan was revised in 1974. The Middle East Annual
Review (World of Information, 1980), reported that the
"1973 oil price rises brought almost as much income in one
year as had been available in the previous five" (p. 215).
Looney (1977) also discussed the sudden oil price boom of
the late 1973 and its impact on the Fifth Plan. Revision
of the plan increased the allocated money for investment
to nearly $70 billion; "it thus doubled the scope of the
original 1973 version and increased seven-fold the Fourth
Plan" (p. 24). According to Forbis (1981), "in 1973, GNP
reached $68 billion" (p. 235). Subsequently, it was
reported that GNP per capita in 1976-1977 reached the
$2,000 mark (Iran Trade and Industry, 1977c).
In the revised version Of the Fifth Plan, 1973-
1978, which was prepared in 1974, almost all sectors
46
received budget increases. Electricity expanded 352
percent, state building 251 percent, and oil 156 percent—
achieving the first, second, and third largest increases,
respectively. Education received 2.4 percent increase
which was the lowest increase of all. Mining, which
received the second lowest increase, enjoyed a 34 percent
increase in its budget. It is revealing to note that
education, which was to train the manpower required for
industrialization and development of the country, received
the lowest increase. In absolute value, education was
supposed to receive $1.88 billion out of a total budget of
$19.24 billion in the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. In the
revised plan, education received $1.92 billion out of a
total budget of $42.19 billion. There was no justificatior
or explanation whatsoever for this low increase for
education while "the first aim of the plan included
raising the level of knowledge to the maximum extent"
(Tehran, plan and Budget Organization, 1974a, p. 4) .
Writing about the role that oil played in
financing the plan, Graham (1980) stated "by the time of
the revision of the Fifth Plan (1973-1978) following the
1973 oil price rises, the dependence (on the oil money)
had risen over 80 per cent" (p. 38). This same subject
was also the focus of attention in the Middle East Annual
Review (World of Information, 1980), which mentioned
"oil revnues in 1973 . . . (and 1978) accounted for some
47
80 percent of foreign exchange income" (p. 215). In the
Fifth Plan, dependence on oil increased drastically
compared to that of the previous plan which was 63 percent.
According to the Middle East Annual Review (World
of Information, 1980), the oil price boom of 1973 caused
a surplus of $5 billion in the Iranian Fifth Plan (p. 215).
However, because of the shortfall in the world demand for
oil, Rouleau (1978) reported that the Iranian oil exports
"for 1975-76 dropped 11 per cent and its revenues were
off $4 billion from what had been expected" (p. 82). This
fluctuation of demand and income created a deficit in the
budget. It was reported by Iran Trade and Industry
(1977b) that "the Iranian national budget for 1976-77
showed a deficit of more than $2.4 billion" (p. 3). This
sent the government of Iran to the international money
markets begging for loans. As a result of this deficit,
many of the projects designated by the plan had to be
stopped.
In spite of the false propaganda by the government
in regard to industrialization and "Iran's future as the
world's fifth industrial power by the turn of the century"
(Graham, 1980, p. 79), Forbis (1981) argued "but the
industrialization of Iran has been planned and carried
out so inefficiently, wastefully and rapidly that by and
large it is not productive enough to provide competitive
exports" (p. 232) .
48
Parvin and Zamani (1979) reported that in 1962,
when the Third Plan (1962-67) began, non-oil exports
accounted for 20 percent of imports. The proportion
dropped to 9 percent in 1974. In 19 76, close to the end
of the Fifth Development Plan (1973-78), non-oil exports
fell to 4 percent of imports. This proved that following
the developmental pattern outlined above export of
industrial goods in particular and non-oil exports in
general could never bear a fair part of the cost of
imports as they always lagged behind. Contrary to the
claimed industrialization, there was only "piecemeal
industrial planning based on immediate demand, rather
than building a strong industrial base for a self-
sustaining economy not dependent on oil" (Graham, 1980,
p. 46).
The promise was made by the government that Iran
would achieve a "Great Civilization" which was possible
through becoming the "Japan of Middle East" by the year
2000. However, the dream of becoming the "world's fifth
industrial power by the turn of the century" (Graham,
19 80, p. 46), never came true. As argued by Katouzian
(1981):
When the country was at "the gates of Great
Civilization" the share of oil (including
rural and traditional) manufacturing in non
oil GDP (gross domestic product) was 20 per
cent, while the share of "services" was 56
per cent. (p. 275)
49
This was how the Japan of Middle East industrialized!
The Sixth Development
Plan 1978-1988
This 10-year period plan, according to Iran Trade
and Industry (1977e) was "due to be launched on March 21,
1978" (p. 7). It was said that the plan would be quite
flexible,7which meant "total development implies the
existence of a logical and natural link between all
related projects whether in one sector or in several
sectors" (p. 7). In dealing with flexibility of the plan
it was stated by the same issue of Iran Trade and
Industry;
In this fashion sectoral links will provide
a comprehensive posture for the planning
effort while freedom from the bondage of
achieving specific targets within a time
limit will accord the required flexibility
in resource allocation according to the
dictates of any given time during the
lifespan of the Sixth Plan. (p. 7)
It was also added that the plan would have to be
revised based upon constant surveys of development in
each year of the plan period. Because of the political
upheaval in 1978 and the Revolution of 1979, the Sixth
Development Plan never went into effect. Subsequently,
little official data were available on the content of
the plan.
50
The Dichotomy of Oil and
Development: A Lesson
From Iran
This study assumes that it is a fallacy that money
can buy development. Since money and foreign exchange are
usually in short supply in developing countries (except
OPEC countries), it may be thought that financial
resources are the only requirements for reaching develop
ment. The study of Iran proved that after money becomes
available and financial barriers fade away, the problem
then is what to do with the money and how it should be
allocated between the physical and human resources of
the country.
Iran, with an abundance of financial capital and
foreign exchange, failed to buy development because the
money from oil did not guarantee the right kind of
planning and planning by itself did not guarantee that
sound implementation would follow. Too much was invested
too rapidly in the hardware (machinery and equipment) of
development while the software (human resources) was
neglected and did not receive the appropriate attention
it should have. As a result, provision was not made to
provide sufficient numbers of high level manpower, among
whom the shortage of engineers was the major concern of
this research.
51
It is further assumed that depending on how the
income from oil is spent, oil can both facilitate or
hinder development. Significant development requires a
comprehensive and balanced plan which is correctly
executed. By comprehensive, it is meant that the plan
considers all sectors and subsectors.. The links and
interactions between different sectors are also to be
taken into consideration. A plan is balanced when all
sectors receive an appropriate share of funds and
development efforts; for example, industry should not be
favored at the expense of agriculture as it was in Iran..
Oil exporting countries which enjoy a relative
excess of capital will end up with the same results as
Iran (which failed to develop) if they make the same
mistake and neglect human resources development and
follow a Western approach which disregards their
indigenous culture and resources and calls for heavy
employment of sophisticated machinery.
If development is too much dependent on oil
revenues, each fluctuation in the demand for oil in the
world market will shake the development of the country as
the income may change from one day to another. This was
what happened to Iran as the country lost $4 billion of
its expected income due to the fall in the world demand
for oil. Because of the lost income, some developmental
projects had to be stopped.
52
Revolution, Change,
and Planning
Prior to the Revolution of 1979, planning was done
by a number of Western educated technocrats who worked in
the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO). Forbis (1981)
commented on the planning staff in PBO
its largely foreign-educated staff where
what one Iranian sociologist called in
Persian, masachuseti-technocrats who might
have graduated from Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. Masachuseti . . . were
homogenizing Iranians, neglecting religion,
relying too heavily on bureaucracy . . . and
preference for cities over villages. (p. 238)
Planners who were influenced by politicians and
the regime were fascinated by numbers and quantities.
Their major concern was economic marvels and not the
sociopolitical disasters which might appear through
ignoring the unique milieu of Iran. Thornburg (cited by
Baldwin, 1967), an American involved in the formation of
the Plan Organization of Iran in 1950, wrote:
Today (Plan Organization) is so nearly
completely dominated or victimized by
either political or private interests
. . . there probably is little to choose
between Plan Organization and (other)
government organizations. ; (p. 33)
The politicians wanted to maintain excessive
control over the planning and its process; maybe this was
due to the fact that if something went wrong, politicians
were the ones which had to bear the responsibility and
consequences.
53
The conflict between planning and politics was
also touched by Baldwin (1967) who stated "Iranian
politics is anti-planning,, anti-programming" (p. 197) .
This meant that in the conflicts between planners and
politicians, the case would be always solve to the
politicians' satisfaction.
Political repression and socioeconomic inequality
reached its peak by the mid-1970s. People began to
mobilize against the regime. Because of its opposition
to religion which is mixed with the lives of the people,
communism had no chance to gain mass support. Moreover,
religion could sensitize and mobilize the people. People
of all groups and factions united and overthrew the
government? the new regime was a religious one. The
promise was to topple the dictatorship. Whether this
has happened .or not is open to question. Imperial
monarchy was tried for centuries and it did not work.
Now the time has come for the religious obligarchy to be f
tested.
Because of the Revolution, the political structure
of Iranian society change; for example, the monarchy was
replaced by a Presidency and the Senate was dissolved.
It was thought that the Senate would only lengthen the
process of decision-making. A President, Cabinet (with
22 ministers) headed by the Prime Minister, and the
Majlis (parliament) are now in charge of affairs in Iran.
54
Planning and its processes also underwent dramatic
changes. However, in regard to planning, one thing
remained unchanged and that was its domination by politics.
This is assumed not to be unusual after a revolution
takes place. Iran Voice (Embassy of Iran, 1980c), a
weekly paper published in English in the United States by
the Embassy of the new regime analyzed the post-
Revolution planning for different sectors, of which
industry was the major concern of the present study. It
was reported:
While the new Ministry of Science has been
working on a new science policy, a sub
committee of the Revolutionary Council has
been working on a new Development Plan. The
Plan concentrates on four areas; first, the
fundamental sector of industry, where the
emphasis is put on private cottage industry.
Medium-scale industry will be operated on a
cooperative basis with the government, and
essential heavy industry will be run entirely
by the government. . . . (p. 24)
*
Pre-Revolution plans were moving toward the
ultimate ownership and operation of heavy industry by the f
private sector. The excessive use of machinery was the
instrument to force cottage industries and small
businesses out of the market. In the post-Revolution
tentative development plan, the reversed emphasis was to
be on cottage and small-scale industries with the owner
ship of heavy industries by the government. To implement
the policy of ownership and operation Of big industrial
and non-industrial corporations by the public sector, all
55
the private banks, insurance companies and heavy
industries (those which were not already owned by the
government) were nationalized after the Revolution of
1979. In addition, foreign trade was also nationalized,
which meant that no private individual or private firm
could any longer sign contracts with foreign companies
for exports or imports, except in some limited cases
specified by law. The Middle East Annual Review (World of
Information, 1980) discussed the introduction of the first
post-Revolution Iranian budget in 1979. It was reported
that the director of the Plan and Budget Organization
"presented a $34 billion budget in July, but the grounds
(bases) for reaching that figure were never clear. The
budget’s oil revenue of $21 billion seemed somewhat
conservative" (p. 220)
In dealing with the Iranian Revolution and its
impact on the economy, Business Week’s (1980) article
entitled "Iran’s New Economics: Islam plus Marxism,"
forecasted a drop of 6 percent in domestic products for
1980 after already having dropped by 12 percent in 1979
(p. 64).
The war with neighboring Iraq, which broke out in
September 22, 1980, sharply reduced the export of the
Iranian oil, which prior to the Revolution of 1979
accounted for 10 percent of total world oil production.
The war reduced Iran’s annual income from oil exports to
56
approximately $11.5 billion and pushed inflation for
consumer goods up to 60 percent (Time, 1981).
This study earlier warned that if development of
a country was heavily dependent on oil and the revenues
from it, changes in the world demand for oil could have
a decisive impact on development plans and projects. One
other dimension could be added to the uncertainty of the
world demand for oil and that is some unexpected event ,
such as an outbreak of war. This could hinder development
in both the short- and the long-run. It*s immediate
effect could be to cut oil exports as a result of attacks
on vulnerable oil installations (such as has been the
case for Iran). Over the long-term, it takes some .time
before refineries can be fixed to resume functioning.
Frequent changes in the post-Revolution government
such as changing the presidents and other political
leaders, plus the decrease in oil income, have contributed
to the extinction of organized planning. After the
Revolution, the dominant theme has become the survival
and strengthening of the new republic, not long-range
comprehensive planning.
57
The Iranian System
of Education
To deal with the supply of and demand for
engineers which is the specific problem undertaken by
this study, the system of education as a major source of
supply will be briefly discussed in this part.
Prior to the Revolution of 1979, the system of
education at all levels was centralized and this has not
changed. In 1975, the government made education free for
those who agreed to work for the government upon their
graduation. Two years of service in the public sector
was expected for each year of free higher education
received (one year of public service for each year of
free pre-higher education, excluding the first 8 years of
compulsory education). Two different ministries were
responsible for education. The Ministry of Science and
Higher Education was in charge of postsecondary education
and the Ministry of Education was responsible for primary
and secondary education.
Primary and Secondary
Education
In the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972, a new
system of schooling was introduced in Iran. The old
system (6-3-3) was comprised of six years of primary
school, three years of lower and three years of upper
secondary school, after which taking a nationwide exam
58
would lead to a high school diploma. The new system
brought a major structural change in the system of
education. The new system (5-3-4) claimed to further
improve the quality of education. The new system also
planned to create moire balance between the output of
education and the manpower requirements of the nation.
Under the new system, there was a 5-year period of
primary schooling followed by a 3-year "Guidance Cycle."
There was also a 4-year secondary period. The guidance
cycle was an intermediate period between the 5-year
primary and 4-year secondary periods. The curriculum of
the guidance cycle was designed to help identify the
talents of students and their academic or vocational
abilities. Figure 1 presents a chart of the new
educational system.
At the end of the guidance cycle, students were
required to take a final examination which would
determine their future education. Depending on their
exams, students could continue their education in
academic or practical fields. Secondary education
consisted of two branches, a 4-year academic program and
a practical branch which took from two to four years to
complete. Figure 1 shows the alternatives available to
the students at different stage of education.
P re- Prim ary P rim ary
-000-00HI
Elementary
Voc. Trrtg.
0 0
0
Counselling &
Voc. Guidance Cyclei
0 0 0
Technical A Vocal. Ed.
(Tmg. of Foremen)0)
0 0 0 0
Vocational Ed.
( Appren ti ce - Technicians) (2)
0 0
(3)
Secondary
Academic Ed.
3 - A
© 0
0 0 0 0
3.- 4
Age
Years
ttttt ttt
I Z H Z
8 10 11 12 13
t t t t
U 15 16 17
( i >
( 2)
0 >
(4)
(7)
This is equivalent to znd Degree Technicians (Assistant - Technicians).
This course may be abolished in Ike near-future.
A t present, 10 fie ld s of specialisation are offered. These are : Mathematics; Natural Sciences-
Literature & Humanities; Foreign Languages; Education; Economics; Sociology & Social Studies-
Statistics; Nutrition & Home Economics; and A rt. These fie lds are subject to changes as decisions
are not fim liz e d .
These are average durations required f o r the completion o f each level of study. These durations
sometimes vary betiveen higher education establishments.
Doctorate re m ires minimum period o f J year and maximum period o f 2 years
Possible to obtain degree equivalent to B.Sc. after 4 years and M.Sc. after 5 years at some Higher
Education Institutions. *
G°yearslP h a r m a c y ; Dentistry and Veterinary Medicine usually requires a minimum period c f
Adv. Technical A Vocal. Higher Ed.
Institutes
Junior College Cert.
1 - 2
0 0
Universities & Higher Ed. In s titu te s ^
Bachelor's M aster's Ph. D.
G H 0 0 0 000
Degrees in Engineering & Architecture^
Doctor cf Medical Sciences^
1
I s - 5-6
0 1
Post. Graduate Specialisations
(Medicine only).
[ 0 - 0 0
0 0 - 0 0
Source: Institute for Research and Plan
ning in Science and Education,
Analytical Study on Financing of
Higher Education in Iran, 1973.
Figure 1. Chart of the System of Formal Education in Iran. (The New System.)
Ln
60
According to the law, the first eight years of
schooling was compulsory and free for everybody. However,
lack of facilities plus some other socioeconomic factors
made it impossible for all school-aged children to receive
educations. In the rural areas, for example, parents
needed their children to work on the farms. Therefore,
there was a conflict between education of the children
and their families' financial requirements. Another
problem was that parents, especially in the rural areas,
either did not like their daughters to be taught by male
teachers or claimed they were needed at home to work.
Subsequently, these factors prevented most rural girls
from attending schools.
In regard to inequality of access to primary
education, Graham (1980) reported an enrollment of 39
percent of the school-aged children in rural areas against
90 percent for the urban areas. He further stated that
"throughout Iran in the early seventies only 40 per cent
(of the age group) completed primary education" (p. 29).
Illiteracy has been a severe problem and bottleneck to
development. According to Forbis (1981) the rate of
literacy among rural women has never been higher than 10
percent. Table 5 is a comparison of illiteracy rates by
sex and areas of residency.
Although the rate of illiteracy might have
declined recently, the absolute number of illiterates has
61
Table 5
Illiteracy Rates in 1972
Area
Sex Rural Urban Total
Male 67. 2 31.4 51.6
Female 91. 3 52.5 73. 9
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of
Population and Manpower, Regional Inequalities
in the Context of Education and Health. Tehran:
Author, 1976.
increased. In a recent report published in 1980 by the
Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and
Manpower, it was stated that "between 1966-75, approxi
mately 259,000 people have been annually added to the
illiterate population of the country" (p. 9). Forbis
(1981) also reported that in 1980, there were 18 million
illiterates in Iran, while only a decade ago the number
was 15 million.
After the Revolution of 1979, the claim was that
the curricula and books did not prepare students to live
in an Islamic society since the books were not in
accordance with the needs and culture of Iran. In spite
of the attempt and intention to change the curricula, the
Iran Times (1981a), which quoted a speech by the Minister
62
of Education in mid-November 1981, reported that the
Islamic Republic in its attempt to change the textbooks
"has been only able to revise and rewrite 40 texts out of
a total of 610: which are being used in primary and
secondary schools. Besides technical problems, such as
the shortage of paper, and availability of printing
machines, it is assumed that political changes and lack
of a comprehensive plan, which is accordingly executed,
are the reasons why a complete change of the curricula
has not taken place yet. One point deserves attention
and that is that each minister who takes office brings----
with him his own colleagues and staff members who may be
in complete disagreement with the previous administration.
Therefore, these changes make it difficult for a con
sistent educational plan to develop.
The System of Higher
Education
Iran has a long history of higher education which
dates back to the third century. The system of higher
education in its present form is only half a century old.
Tehran University, which was established in 1934 by
combining few existing colleges, is the oldest and largest
center of higher learning in Iran with an enrollment of
18,000 prior to its closure by the new regime in 1980.
Some other state universities also came into existence,
including: _____________
63
1. University of Tabriz (founded in 1947).
2. University of Shiraz (founded in 1948). This
was renamed Pahlavi University in 1962. After
the Revolution of 1979, it reverted to its
previous name and became University of Shiraz.
3. University of Meshad (founded in 1949).
4. University of Esfahan (founded in 1950).
5. University of Gondishaour (founded in 1955).
6. Iran National University (founded in 1961);
first a private university, it later became
semi-public.
7. Aryamehr University of Technology (founded in
1966)? this was renamed University of Technology
after the Revolution.
Types of Institutions of
Higher Education
The system of higher education was comprised of:
1. Public Higher Education Establishments.
2. Private Higher Education Establishments
Public higher education establishments were
founded by government legislation and were mainly
financed by public funds. There were two types of public
higher education establishments: (a) autonomous higher
education establishments, and (b) affiliated higher
education establishments.
64
Autonomous higher education establishments had
independent status. However, they had to comply with the
regulations and guidelines set by the Ministry of Science
and Higher Education. There were two kinds of autonomous
higher educational establishments:
1. Universities, which had university status,
such as Tehran University, Tabriz University, and the
University of Shiraz.
2. Public Higher Education institutions which
were independent but did not have university status
because of their limited number of departments. They
were, however, authorized to award academic degrees
equivalent to the universities. Some of these institu
tions were: Tehran Polytechnic, College of Science and
Technology, and Tehran Teacher Training College.
Affiliated establishments were directly attached
to, and supervised by, a government body. The main
purpose of such establishments was to train the
necessary skilled manpower for government organizations.
Some of these establishments were Tehran Technical
Institute, School of Hotel Management, and Abadan Institute!
of Technology.
Private higher education institutions were
established with permission from the government. They
did not receive public funds and their main sources of
income were tuition and private donations. Although they
65
operated within the regulations set by the Ministry of
Science and Higher Education, they were completely
independent in their internal affairs. Due to the
initiation of free higher education by the government in
1975, private institutions of higher education lost their
independence as they became financed partially by the
government. Tuition received from students who did not
use free higher education was also a partial source of
money supply to the private colleges.
In the 1962-1963 academic year, there were seven
universities and four public higher education institutions.
Private and affiliated higher education establishments
did not exit then (with the exception of the National
University). Out of a total number of 24,456 students
of higher education, 88 percent were studying in the
seven universities.
According to Table 6, in the early 1960s, higher
education was almost totally provided by public establish
ments (with the exception of the newly established
National University). Between 1962-1977, the number of
students increased sixfold from 34,456 to 154,215
studying in 188 institutions of higher education.
Table 6
Type and Number of Institutions of Higher Education
in Iran in Selected Years
Type
Year Universities
Public
Higher
Education
Affi1i ated
Institutions
Private
Institutions
Total
Institutions
Total
Students
1962-63 7 4 None None 11 24,456
1966-67 8 5 24a 5 42 36,826
1971-72 8 6 58 25 97 97,338
1976-77 17 10 140 21 188 154,215
a
The total number of both public and affiliated institutions in 1966-1967 was 29, therefore,
the numbers were estimated at 5 and 24 to complete the comparison.
Source: Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education* Institute for Research and Planning
in Science and Education, Analytical Study on Financing of Higher Education in Iran.
Tehran: Author, 1973; P. Shahlapour, "Development of Higher Education and High Level
Manpower Needs in Iran." Unpublished dissertation ^University of Missouri-Columbia)
Dissertation Abstracts International, 1978.
c r>
cty
67
Educationa1 Obj e c t i ve s
of the Development
Plans
The objective of the Third Development Plan, 1962-
1967, was to improve the quality of education rather than
the quantity. Therefore, there was no intention to
establish new colleges or universities. That was what the
plan recommended; however, what was achieved was rather
different, as several institutions came into existence
For example, the University of Technology (also called
the Industrial University) was founded by the government
in 1966. In regard to the quality of education, the
Fourth National Development Plan,. 1968-1972 (Tehran,
Plan Organization, 1968b), mentioned that:
In spite of the efforts made during the Third
Plan period, the educational system in Iran
is not suited to the needs of the country.
Among other things, higher education is not
sufficiently developed in comparison with
similar countries. (p.>262)
The evaluation of education in the Third Plan,
therefore, suggested that the goals of the plan were not
achieved as expected. This, as mentioned earlier, was
pointed out in the next plan, the Fourth Development Plan.
The Fourth Plan, 1968-1972, claimed to establish
a greater compatibility and consistency between manpower
needs and the country*s educational system. The new
Ministry of Science and Higher Education, established in
1967, was to bring the institutions of higher education
68
into line with the requirements of an industrializing
country. Tabib's (1974) study reported that the number
of institutions of higher learning increased threefold
between 1967-1973. During this seven-year period 102
institutions were established. However, no university
was among these institutions. In 1973, the total number
of higher education establishments reached 156 (pp. 65-66).
Among these, the Industrial University (formerly Aryamehr
University of Technology), Tehran Polytechnic College,
and the College of Science and Technology were the three
major institutions of higher education specializing in
the field of engineering. All three were located in
Tehran. Some other: provincial universities such as the
University of Shiraz (formerly Pahlavi University),
Tabriz University, Tehran University, and Meshad
University also had colleges of engineering with a variety
of branches. The breakdown of the branches in the field
of engineering is presented in Appendix A.
During the Third Development Plan, 1962-1967,
student enrollment in higher education was planned to
increase by 90 percent. This rate was expected to drop
to a 60 percent rate of increase for the Fourth Develop
ment Plan, 1968-1972. However, no explanation for the
decline from 90 to 60 percent was given. According to
the goal of higher education, the number of students was
expected to reach 60,000 by the end of the Fourth Plan,
69
1972-1973. The actual enrollment of 115,311 passed the
set goal. Reaching a student enrollment twice the goal
implies poor planning. Distribution of students by
fields of study also was not in accordance with the
proportions set in the plan. About 55 percent of the
students were expected to enroll in science, vocational,
and technical fields while the actual enrollment was 48
percent. The Fourth Plan was not able to forecast
expansion accurately and there was a rate of increase for
which there was no provision. It should be noted that
the sharp increase in the number of students was not
necessarily a remedy for the manpower bottleneck since
some areas of shortage, like technical or medical
education, for which there was a huge demand and high
need did not enjoy an appropriate increase.
The overall educational objectives of the Fifth
Development Plan, 1973-1978, were to expand vocational
and technical education so that the required number of
technologists and scientists could be provided by the
indigenous system of education. The number of students
was planned to increase to 190,000 by the end of the plan.
Due to the political events in the mid- and late
seventies, it is difficult to evaluate the success and
the output of the Fifth Plan in the later part of the
period. Because of demonstrations and riots by the
students, universities and colleges were closed partially
70
during the years prior to the Revolution. Classes did not
meet because students, and on many occasions faculty
members, went on strike. This off and on closure of the
universities had an impact on the number of graduates,
as very few finished their education and received their
degrees. After the Revolution of 1979, colleges and
universities resumed their functions briefly. However,
due to the existence of several interest groups
(religious, Marxist, or secular) in and out of the
education sector, the government closed the universities
and colleges in 1980. It was claimed that the education
system with all its components (faculty members, students,
and the curricula) must undergo purification. Purifica
tion has meant that those (people or ideologies) who4 were
in conflict with Islamic ideologies must be put aside
regardless of their expertise or importance. Universities,
therefore, have been officially closed since Fall 1980-
1981. At the beginning, it was announced that medical
and engineering schools would be soon reopened. It was
believed that medical and enginerring fields were least
influenced by Western ideologies. It was later announced
that medical and engineering schools would only be open
for those who required less than a year to graduate. Up
to the beginning of 1982, no institution of higher
education has reopened. In getting admitted to the
universities after their reopening, ideology has been most
likely to be important since the government has called for
de-Westernization and Islamization of the system of
education (by Islamization it is meant that education
must fit into Islamic ideology and serve the interests of
Muslim people). It is still unknown when universities
will open again, but it is certain that if they are
closed for a long time, the consequences will have a
serious impact on long-term development because of an
interruption in the supply of highly skilled manpower.
Education: Planning, Inequality
of Opportunities and Access
In the Ministry of Science and Higher Education,
the highest authority for expansion and promotion of
postsecondary education was the "Council for Expansion
of Higher Education." The Council was responsible for
establishing new colleges and universities whenever and
wherever the need was felt. Another body of the Ministry
was the Institute for Research and Planning in Science
and Education which was responsible for the planning of
higher education.
In 1974, Tabib published a report called The
Evaluation of Expansion of Higher Education in Iran.
The report argued that the Council for Expansion of
Higher Education failed to anticipate the exact need
for the future expansion of institutions of higher
learning. The demand for higher education in
72
different regions and major fields was also not correctly
predicted by the Council. According to the report, the
Council did not propose creating new schools; on the
contrary, it waited only until it received proposals for
establishing new institutions or adding new majors. Its
function was then to say yes or not. It cannot be argued
that since the Council waited for some proposals,
establishing new colleges or universities was based on
social demand which might emerge because of the demand
for some kind of education.
Prior to the Revolution of 1979, in spite of the
high social demand for fields such as medicine or
engineering, there was no private school to train
physicians and there was only one private four-year
college to award bachelor*s degrees in technical fields
and that was Naficy Technicum. Naficy Technicum was a
two-year college which later was permitted by the Ministry
of Science and Higher Education to become a four-year
college. In academic year 1975-1976, Naficy Technicum
had an enrollment of 1,333, of which 625 were studying
for their bachelor*s degrees. The rest attended two-year
technical programs and became technicians.
Lack of comprehensive and long-range educational
planning at the national level, which was caused by non
existent coordination between responsible^organizations,
plus private sector*s failure to alleviate the problems,
73
was the focus of attention and criticism in the report
(Tabib, 1974). As discussed earlier, in terms of quantity,
higher education experienced an extraordinary expansion.
However, the areas in which the expansion took place were
not in accordance with the manpower needs of the country
forecasted by the development plans. This mismatch of
supply on the part of the education system and demand for
manpower by the market created the bottleneck of skilled
personnel.
Tabib reported that the proportion of the age
group (20-24) in higher education was 1.5 percent in 1965
and 3 percent in 1970. According to the World Bank (1978)
the rate increased to 5 percent in 1978.
Between 1963 and 1978, the total population (with
an average growth rate of 2.9 percent) grew from 23 to
35 million, of which 46 percent were below age 15. This
showed how young the population was. It was reported
by the World Bank that in 1975, about 90 percent of this
segment of the population were enrolled in primary
schools. The data were somewhat misleading as they did
not reflect the proportion who completed primary schools.
The same report mentioned that in 1975, about 37 percent
of the age cohort group enrolled in secondary schools,
again it was not stated what percentage completed the
program. UNESCO (1977) also reported on school enroll-
ment ratios in Iran. In 1976, about 73 percent of the
74
age group were enrolled in the first and second levels of
education (primary and secondary). However, like the
World Bank, UNESCO did not mention the ratio of those
who completed schooling as the dropout or repetition rates
were not taken into consideration.
According to UNESCO (1977), a total of 4,768,588
attended primary schools in Iran in 1976. In the same
year, 2,356,878 enrolled in secondary schools. Students
in higher education numbered 154,215. Therefore, the
total student body reached 7,279,681. Of this number,
65.5 percent were at the primary level; 32.4 percent were
at the secondary level? and 2.1 percent of the total
student body were enrolled in higher education.
In academic year 1976-1977, of the total of
154,215 students of higher education, 30 percent were
female. In that year, according to the Ministry of
Science and Higher Education (Tehran, Ministry of Science
and Higher Education, Institute for Research and Planning
in Science and Education, 1976), of the total of 40,166
who were admitted to colleges and universities, 34 percent
were female. Distribution according to sex varied based
upon the major fields of study. In 1975, according to
UNESCO, 51 percent of the graduates majoring in humanities
were female while only 12 percent of the engineering
graduates were female.
75
According to Tabib (1974), in 1973, about 80
percent of the higher education applicants were from
urban areas compared to 20 percent from rural areas. In
that year, about half of the total population lived in
rural areas. It was also reported by the Tehran, Ministry
of Science and Higher Education, Institute for Research
and Planning in Science and Education (1970) that in
academic year 1969-1970, only 8 percent of the students in
higher education were from working and farming families.
In Tehran, which in 1971 consisted of 12.8 percent
of the country’s population, had 54.2 percent of the
total student population. In academic year 1973-1974,
out of each 260 Iranians, one was a student of higher
education. In Tehran, this ratio was one person out of
each 36, while the proportion for Kurdistan, a western
province of Iran, was one out of each 9,472 residents.
Applicants for Higher
Education
Both public and private sectors through their
policies of employment and promotion increased the demand
for higher education. In the huge government bureaucra
cies, using college degrees as a criterion for promotion
was a common phenomenon. The private sector by means of
high salaries offered to the graduates of some wanted
fields such as engineering and the like also inflated
the demand for university degrees.
76
To enter a college or university, each applicant
was required to take an exam called "concour." The exam
was administered at the national level during the summer
of each year. Forbis (1981) stated "now almost every
high school graduate wants to matriculate (enter college).
In 1976, 300,000 of them vied for 34,000 freshmen
openings" (p. 196). Therefore, only 11 percent of the
applicants had the chance of being admitted to a college
or university. Due to the increasing demand and hunger
for higher degrees, the number of applicants in the
academic year 1979-1980, the last year before the
universities and colleges were closed by the post-
Revolution government, reached the 550,000 mark (Tehran,
Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and
Manpower, 1980). The limited capacity of institutions
of higher education, as will be discussed later, was
considered to be a major cause for the shortage of highly
skilled labor.
Table 7 shows the number of students admitted to
the college and universities from academic years 1969-
1970 to 1976-1977. As shown, the female proportion
increased from 29 percent in 1971-1972 to 34 percent in
1976-1977 compared to 66 percent for males.
As was discussed earlier, in Iran in 1976,
according to UNESCO (1980), out of a total of 154,215
students in higher education, 46,019, or 30 percent, were
Table 7
Students Admitted to all Ircinian Institutions of
Higher Education, 1969-1970 to 1976-1977
Year Total Male Female Female %
1969-1970 20,617 - - -
1970-1971 21,181
- - -
1971-1972 33,034 23,443 9,591 29.0
1972-1973 32,836 23,360 9,476 28.8
1973-1974 36,809 24,718 12,091 32.8
1974-1975 42,411 29,781 12,630 29.7
1975-1976 45,916 31,896 14,020 30.5
1976-1977 40,166 26,476 13,690 34.0
Source: Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Institute for
Research and Planning in Science and Education, Statistics of
Higher Education,, Tehran: Author, 1977, p. 56.
' - j
' ■ j
78
female. To have an idea of how Iran compared to its
neighbors in 1976, in Afganistan the female proportion in
higher education was about 14 percent (1,951 females out
of a total of 14,214). This ratio was 26 percent in
Pakistan (34,210 females out of a total student population
of 133,465). In Turkey, the female proportion in higher
education was 24 percent as 76,251 female students were
presented in a total student body of 312,871. Iraq was
the only neighboring country which had a higher rate of
I
female participation in higher education with a rate of
32 percent (29,207 female students in a total student
population of 91,358).
Not all applicants or even entrants yearned to
learn something. Forbis (1981) believed
what most Iranian students want from higher
education is a piece of paper. They want a
degree which is essential for a career in
government, valuable for a career in business
and industry, prestigeous in society. (p. 195)
Bazargan (1975) reported "the majority of high school
graduates wish to enter medical schools, engineering, or
law schools" (p. 3). Seeking a degree in these fields
was because of the social and financial advantages
attached to these specializations.
79
Fields of Study and
Distribution of
Students
The Iranian literature on higher education uses
UNESCO's international standardized fields of study.
Table 8 shows the numbers of students in these nine fields
in 1976. As evidenced by Table 8, in 1976 more than half
the students’studied in non-professional liberal arts and
social sciences while there was an acute need and high
demand for more technically oriented education.
Iranian Students Abroad
Foreign education, if not accompanied with the
desire and ability to serve the home country, is worth
little to the sponsoring nation. Whatever the case might
be, whether for the country, the individuals, or both,
foreign colleges and universities have long been a major
source to supply educated Iranians. In the beginning,
it was the government which sent some students abroad to
receive higher education. However, as time went on,
private individuals and families found it much easier to
acquire degrees from a foreign institution of higher
education than it was from colleges at home. This was
due to the highly competitive entrance examinations in
Iran and, in addition, to the existence of more
institutions of higher education abroad.
Table 8
Distribution of Students by Fields
in 1976 in Iran
of Study
Field of Study Number . Percentage
Education. Science 5,342 3.5
Humanities,. Religion, and Theology 26,348 17.1
Fine and Applied Arts 4,659 3.0
Law 2,973 1.9
Social Sciences 27,093 17.6
Natural Sciences 27,317 17.7
Medical and Health Related Sciences 19,235 12.5
Engineering 34,411 22.3
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 6,837 4.4
Total 154,215 100.0
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook Paris: Author, 1980.
00
o
81
According to Iran Review (Embassy of Iran, 1958)., Iranian
students in the United States in 1958 totaled 2,400.
Because of the rising competition among the applicants
of the indigenous colleges and universities, the number
of students leaving the country for education increased
drastically. As Askari, Cummings, and Izbudak (1977)
reported "In the early 1970's . . . of every four Iranian
students pursuing post-secondary education, one is doing
so outside Iran" (p. 5). They also mentioned that "In
1973, more than half of the Iranians engaged in advanced
studies abroad were in the U.S." (p. 10). The United
States was not chosen because its education was believed
to be better compared to that of other countries, but
because of the availability of more colleges and
universities.
In the early 1960s, according to Baldwin (1967),
"the annual cost of foreign study was running about $30
million, about a third of total export earnings excluding
oil" (p. 144). Johnson (1980) indicated that in the mid-
1970s, about 44,000 Iranian students were enrolled abroad.
Because of a sharp increase in the number of students who
left Iran for higher education, Amuzegar (1977) estimated
that Iranian students abroad totaled 100,000 in 1977.
(According to the Iran Times, December 1981b, Iranian
students in America totaled 51,300 in 1980. The number
declined to 47,000 in 1981.) Economically speaking the
82
direct cost in foreign exchange that the country has had
to bear for foreign educations is very high (if each
student spends an average of $10,000 a year, including
tuition, board, books and so on, the estimated total cost
of Iranian students abroad would be $1 billion per year).
On the other hand, there is a hidden cost
involved in having a large number of students abroad;
that is, earnings foregone or lost opportunities, the
money that would have been made in the country (by the
individual students) as a result of the output of students
if they had stayed home and produced something. At the
present, while universities have been closed intentionally
by the government, factories are closed or work at below
their capacity, and under-unemployment is high (some
reports indicated a 30 to 40 percent rate of unemployment),
thus the earnings foregone on the part of the students is
rather low because they would probably have been
unemployed and earned nothing if they were home.
The preceding discussion considered only the
economics of Iranian students abroad through examining
the direct and non-direct cost of foreign education. One
other cost, however, can be added and that is a non
monetary cost. Culturally and psychologically speaking,
when Iranian students are first abroad, they experience a
"cultural shock" because of the differences between the
home and foreign cultures. After getting to know the
83
foreign environment, students become accustomed to it.
Long years of staying abroad makes it difficult for
student returnees to readjust to their own culture.
Upon their return, therefore, students receive a reverse
cultural shock. In this process, an Iranian returnee has
become alienated from his or her own environment.
In the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972, a total
of 8,899 Irian students returned home. Table 9 presents
the number and percentage by sex of the returnees.
According to Table 9, 13.2 percent of the student body in
1968 was female and slightly increased by 1972 to 15
percent.
Table 10 is an indication of the returnees during
the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978. Based upon
Table 10, Iranian returnees in the Fifth Plan, totaled
19,803. Females averaged 14.4 percent of the total which,
compared to 14.8 percent for the previous plan, declined
slightly.
The number of returnees increased from 2,213 in
1973 to 5,794 in 1977.
Table 11 compares the number of graduated
Iranians who returned home by their levels of education
in the Fourth and Fifth Plans. As time went on, the
importance of higher degrees (the higher the better)
became more apparent in Iranian society. It is, there
fore, assumed that Iranian students abroad who had the
Iranian Returnees
Table 9
in the Fourth Plan, 1968-1972
Year Total Male Female . Female %
1968 1,385 1,202 183 13.2
1969 1,591 1,334 357 16.1
1970 1,968 1,663 305 15.5
1971 1,946 1,671 275 14.1
1972 2,009 1,707 302 15. 0
Total 8,899 7,577 1,322 14.8
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and
Manpower, Supply of Skilled Manpower and the Output of the Country's
Educational System in the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972,
Tehran, Author, 1974.
00
Table 10
Iranian Graduates of Foreign Colleges and
Universities in the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978
Year Total Male Female Female %
1973 2,213 1,891 322 14.5
1974 3,536 3,015 521 14.7
1975 3,955 3,428 527 13.3
1976 4,305 3,755 550 12.7
1977
5,794 4,855 939 16.2
Total 19,803 16,944 2,859
14.4
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and
Manpower, The Output of the Country1s Educational System in the
Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978. Behran: Author, 1980, p. 22.
00
u i
Table 11
Iranians Graduated from Foreign Colleges and Universities
by the Level of Education During the Fourth
and Fifth Development Plans
Level
Fourth Plan
1968-1972
Fifth
1973-
Plan
1978
Total % . Total %
Art Associate 602 6.8 729 3.7
Bachelors 3,712 41.7 7,888 39.8
Masters 1,833 20.6 6,747 34.1
Doctors 1,806 £0.3 4,439 22.4
c l
Specialization 712 8.0 - -
Unspecified 234 2.6 - -
Total’ 8,899 100.0 19,803 100.0
c l
702 of these people were M.D.s on their residency programs to receive
specialization and 10 were postdoctorate graduates in the fields of
natural sciences, mathematics, and engineering.
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and Man
power, Supply of Skilled Manpower and the Output of the Country's
Educational System in the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972. Tehran:
Author, 1974, and Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of
Population and Manpower, The Output of the Country's Educational
System in the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978. Tehran: Author,
1980.
87
opportunity of moving up the ladder of education, studied
on and received higher level degrees. This was why the
number of associate of arts degrees earned by Iranians
declined from 6.8 percent of total degrees in the Fourth
Plan (1968-72) to 3.7 percent in the Fifth Plan (1973-78).
The same argument is assumed to be true for graduates at
the master's level, whose proportion increased sharply
from 20.6 percent in the Fourth Plan to 34.1 percent in
the Fifth Plan.
The government of Iran did not have any means to
control or shape the study of Iranians abroad, at least
directly. For those who were on government scholarships,
the selection of major fields of study had to be approved
by the government. Those who were on their own and were
not government-sponsored were free to choose whatever
field of study they liked. The only thing required to
leave Iran for study abroad, if the student had not
performed two years of military service, was an
"educational exemption." To qualify for an educational
exemption (which would postpone service in the army to
the time of return), each student had to take a foreign
language test in the language of the country in which he
or she wanted to pursue a course of study. The test
scored from zero to 100; the passing score was 50 or
higher. Ejflucated girls who held a high school diploma or
88
higher were also required to serve in the army. However,
not all girls were drafted; some were randomly exempted.
Expenditure on Education
In 1970, according to UNESCO (1980), 2.9 percent
of the GNP was spent on education in Iran. The percentage
increased to 3.0 percent in 1974 and 4.6 percent in 1975.
In 1976, the percentage of GNP spent on education reached
the 5.6 percent mark. In that year, 14.1 percent of all
public expenditures was on education. The proportion of
GNP spent on education dropped to 5.1 percent in 1977.
According to Aghazadeh (1977), the expenditure on
public higher education was 0.4 percent of GNP in 1965.
The percentage increased to 0.6 in 1975.
As Forbis (1981), stated, in Iran's 1978 budget,
the last presented under the former regime, expenditures
for the military ran to more than twice that for
education. Therefore, the defense against illusory
enemies had a two-to-one priority over education.
High Level Manpower and
Higher Education
Until 1958, there was no study done on manpower
requirements in Iran. In 1958, the Plan Organization and
the Ministry of Labor published a joint report ; called
"Investigation of Human Resources and Needs in Iran."
The report seemed to be comprehensive for the time;
89
however, since it was based on occupations and not on
levels and kinds of education, the report could not be,
and was not, utilized by the system of higher education
to predict and remove the manpower bottleneck. Another
report to warn authorities and planners of the potential
need for high level manpower, according to Tabib (1974)
was published by the Plan Organization. Like the previous
one, this report was also not used by responsible
departments to plan future manpower requirements. There
fore, through the years, the gap between supply of and
demand for highly trained personnel widened.
Manpower shortages became acute in technical
fields as the country moved toward the use of capital-
intensive industry. Johnson (1980) wrote "the choice of
a capital-intensive approach, for instance, has increased
the demand for high level manpower, thereby, creating a
shortage of such manpower" (p. 20).
The Outline of the Third Plan 1341-1346 published
by the Tehran, Plan Organization in 1965, discussed the
shortage of manpower and its impact on development
projects by stating that "a severe limiting factor in
Iran is the lack of manpower qualified for the jobs of a
modern society" (p. 135). Looney (1977) also took up
the issue and stated that "by mid-1975 . . . shortages of
skilled manpower in most industries and occupations were
beginning to pose a serious constraint on growth."
90
Looney further stated "the country's manpower shortages
seem to affect every sector and profession" (pp. 42-43).
Lack of proper planning and non-availability of
technical opportunities were major contributing factors
to the inability of existing personnel to cope with
technical matters on the job. Kayhan (1976), a major
daily newspaper in Tehran, reported "according to the
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, 70 per cent of the
workers in the industrial sector lack enough skills and
required education" (p.9)
One may ask that if there was knowledge of what
was needed, why was this not reflected in education and
its planning? The oil price rise of late 1973, as
discussed earlier, suddenly increased finances available
for the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. But the capacity of the
educational system did not, and indeed could not,
increase correspondingly. This was the physical part of
the case. Theoretically, there was not a comprehensive
national plan for education to create a balance between
the demand for and supply of required manpower. As
Askari and Majin (1976) reported "the shortage of
technical and professional manpower is partially the :
result of inconsistent plans" (p. 123).
Iran Trade and Industry (1977c) reported that
the economically active population of Iran in March 1976
was 9,067,000. This increased to 9,096,000 in March 1977.
91
"Due to this insignificant increase in the number of
available workers in the population, the country had to
import more foreign workers" (p. 44). As reported
earlier, more than half the imported labor performed
professional and technical jobs.
Baldwin (1967) reported on the stock of high
level manpower in 1958 in Iran which included 75,000
people or 1.25 percent of the total labor force. Those
who had a high school diploma and held a job serving
economic growth were considered high level manpower.
According to Baldwin, musicians, members of the clergy,
and the like, whose jobs did not directly contribute to
growth, were not manpower.
The population census of 1966, unlike Baldwin's
categories, considered those who had received some higher
education as manpower. The census reported the stock of
high level manpower at 73,904 in 1966. Of this, 86.5
percent were males. Shahlapour (1978) stated that of the
total supply of manpower in 1966, about 63 percent were
graduates, 19 percent post-graduates, and the rest, some
19 percent, were doctoral degree holders. Humanities with
2 0.4 percent, medical science with 18.6 percent, and
social sciences with 17.8 percent claimed the largest
proportion of the high level manpower stock in 1966. By
1975, the proportion had undergone some changes.
Humanities with 19.0 percent and engineering with 18.6
- -
92
.percent were second and third largest, respectively.
Table 12 is a comparison of high level manpower stock in
1966 and 1975 by the fields of study. As shown in Table
12, the manpower stock increased from 73,904 in 1966 to
260,121 in 1975. Table 13 is a supply version of the
manpower for academic years 1964-1965 through 1975-1976.
Table 13 gives the reader an idea of how many students
graduated each year.
Table 14 presents numbers of graduates based on
their levels of education. As seen in Table 14, over a
7-year period,- although the total number of graduates
tripled, most of the increase happened at the under
graduate level. Masters and doctors enjoyed the least
expansion. It is interesting to see how low the supply
of Ph.D.s was. These were the people who should shoulder
the responsibility for teaching at the university level
or be doing research to solve the problems faced by the
country, yet, in spite of a high demand, very few were
produced (although, a master's degree was the minimum
academic requirement to teach at the university level, a
Ph.D. was preferable). In the academic year 1975-1976,
only 117 Ph.D.s graduated from Iranian universities. The
fields of study were Persian literature, theology, law,
and a few in economics.
Manpower planning requires an attempt to remove
existing or future disequilibria in the supply of, and
Table 12
High Level Manpower Stock in 1966 and
1975 by Fields of Study
Field of Study Stock/1966 %/Total Stock/1975a %/Total
Humanities 15,076 20.40 53,141 20.43
Fine Arts 907 1.23 6,451 2.48
Law 7,438 10.06 10,204 3.92
Social Science 13,189 17.84 49,522 19.04
Physical Science*3 419 .56 11,785 4.53
National Science and
Mathematics 7,784 10.53 31,593 12.15
Engineering 9,887 13.38 48,492 18.64
Medical Science 13,741 18.60 34,730 13.35
Agriculture 2,957 4.00 11,697 4.50
Unspecified 2,506 3.40 2,506 . ‘96
Total
73,904 100,00 260,121 100.00
Includes Iranian graduates from foreign higher education institutions who returned to Iran
■ during this period.
This includes those who specialized in the field of education in 1975.
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, High Level Manpower in 1974. Tehran: Author,
1976. Also, A. Aghazadeh, "Higher Education and Investment in Human Capital: The
Case of Iran." Unpublished doctoral dissertation (Florida State University)
Dissertation Abstracts International, 1977.
, w
Table 13
Total Graduates of Higher Education from Iranian Schools
by Sex, 1964-1965 to 1975-1976
Year Total Male Female Female %
1964-1965 5,033 3,982 1,051 20.8
1965-1966 5,272 4,142 1,130 21.4
1966-1967 5,086 3,813 1,273 25.0
1967-1968 5,813 4,014 1,799 30.9
1968-1969 8,114 - - -
1969-1970 11,769 8,718 3,051 26.0
1970-1971 17,150 12,452 4,698 27.4
1971-1972 17,949 12,036 5,913 34.0
1972-1973 26,328 16,481 9,847 37.4
1973-1974 30,630 19,967 10,663 34.8
1974-1975 31,576 21,180 10,396 32.9
1975-1976 37,546 26,058 11,488 30.6
Source: Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Institute for Research and
Planning in Science and Education. Statistics of Higher Education. Several
yearly reports.
VO
Table 14
Graduates of Higher Education by Different Levels
in Iran, 1969-1970 to 1975-1976
Year Total A.A. BA/BS MA/MS
Doctors (Ph.D.
Plus M.D.)
1969-1970 11,769 1,776 8,231 859 905 (83 + 822)
1970-1971 17,150 5,185 10,129 977 859 (52 + 807)
1971-1972 17,949 5,595 10,034 1,096 1,224 (20 + 1,204)
1972-1973 26,328 12,653 11,520 1,089 1,066 (70 +996)
1973-1974 30,630 13,926 14,031 1,383 1,290 (74 + 1,216)
1974-1975 31,576 13,856 15,157 1,226 1,337 (108 + 1,229)
1975-1976 37,546 17,431 17,644 1,293 1,178 (117 + 1,061)
Source: Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Institute for Research and
Planning in Science and Education, Statistics of Higher Education. Several
yearly reports.
VO
U1
96
demand for, specific fields. However, the statistics
suggest that lack of, and inconsistency in, manpower
plans have been a major source of imbalances between what
is needed and what is provided. The manpower bottleneck
dates back to the time when development planning began in
Iran some decades ago after the end of World War II. As
time went on the shortage and imbalance between supply
and demand became more acute. Table 15 compares manpower
supply and demand in the early 1960s and points out the
areas which suffered from an inadequate supply of trained
personnel.
According to Table 15, in 1963, demand for
graduates in the field of medicine was 8,722 while the
supply was as low as 998. Agricultural specialists were
also in short supply. Engineering, similar to agriculture
and medicine, suffered from a severe shortage. The
graduates of natural sciences and mathematics surpassed
the required number by a ratio of 2:1. On the whole,
the total supply met only one-third of the demand. It
should be noted that there was also a backlog of unmet
demands from the years prior to 1963 which should be
added to the 1963 demand.
During the years of the Fourth Development Plan,
1968-1972, the aggregate demand for high level manpower
reached 56,420 while the supply went up to 81,952. The
result was a net surplus of 25,532. However, the
Table 15
Comparison of the Required Manpower With
the Supply in 1963
Major Fields
Required Manpower
1960 1963 Graduates of 1963
Medicine 6,597 8,722 998
Law N.A.d N.A»a
Social Sciences 1,858 2,049 (
Humanities 43 59
( 2,359
(
Education
. . . . a
N. A. N.A.a
Natural Science and
Mathematics 339 417 858
Agriculture 628 873 196
Engineering 2,363 3,273 546
Arts 46 67 64
Total 11,874 15,460 5,021
aN.A. = Not Available
Source: M. T. Tabib, Evaluation of Expansion of Higher Education in Iran.
Tehran: Imperial Bureau of Inspection of Higher Education and-
Scientific Research, 1974, p. 111.
VO
98
imblances by fields of specialization between supply and
demand continued. Table 16 tabulates the situation in
1968-1972.
Due to the lack of a well-designed manpower plan
at the national level, skewedness of supply and demand
created a surplus in some fields and a shortage in others.
Based on Table 16, during the Fourth Plan, 1968-1972,
engineering suffered most with a shortage of 7,707.
Agriculture was the second largest area of shortage with
a minus 4,633. Medicine also needed 1,114 more graduates
to catch up with the demand. Humanities during the Fourth
Plan had the largest number of graduates for whom there
were no jobs. Natural sciences and mathematic also had a
surplus of 7,745. In the field of social sciences, there
was an excess of 7,486.
In the first two years of the Fifth Plan, 1973-
1978, the aggregate supply of graduates exceeded the
demand. However, in the last three years of the plan,
supply lagged behind the demand. This is presented in
Table 17.
As shown by Table 17, in the Fifth Plan, 1973-
1978, at the aggregate level, against a shortage of
24,9 36 there was a surplus of 12,524. The net shortage,
therefore, was 12,412. As was the case in the Fourth Plan,
1968-1972, the surplus occurred in non-technical fields
while the shortage for engineers, medical personnel, and
Table 16
Surplus and Shortage of Higher Education
Graduates in the Fourth Plans 1968-1972
Field Surplus Shortages
Medicine
1.114
Law 879
Social Science 7,486
Humanities 19,205
Education 1,959
Natural Science and Mathematics 7,745
Agriculture
4,633
Engineering
7,707
Fine Arts 1,712
Total 38,986 13,454
Source: M.T. Tabib, Evaluation of Expansion of Higher Education in Iran. Tehran:
Imperial Bureau of Inspection of Higher Education and Scientific Research,
1974, p. 140.
VO
VO
Table 17
Supply of and Demand for Manpower in Different
Years of the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978
Year Supply Demand Shortage Surplus
1973 28,541 17,136
- 11,405
1974 34,166 33,047
- 1,119
1975 35,531 39,303 3,772
-
1976 41,852 53,041 11,189
-
1977 50,840 60,815 9,975
-
Total 190,930 203,342 24,936 12,524
Source: P. Shahlapour. Development of Higher Education and High Level Manpower in Iran.
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Missour-Columbia, 1978). Dissertation
Abstracts International, 1978. (This table has been derived from several tables.)
100
101
agriculturalists was severe.
Table 18 compares the supply of and demand for
college graduates based upon their levels of education
for the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. A shortage of 20,907 was
felt at the associate of arts level. At the master's
level, there was also a shortage of 9,927. Table 18 shows
a surplus of 18,198 at the bachelor's level and a surplus
of 22 4 at the doctoral level. The surplus of doctors
was only in the fields of Persian literature, theology
and law while doctors of medicine or Ph.D.s in engineering
and related fields were in short supply. On the whole,
against an aggregate demand for 203,342 graduates of
higher education, there was a supply of 190,930. The net
shortage, therefore, was 12,412.
Aghazadeh (1977) compared the manpower stock of
1966 with 1975 and showed that the total stock increased
from 73,904 to 260,121 during that time span. In spite
of this huge increase of the manpower stock, the demand
for technical personnel was never matched to the supply.
The last few tables and their analyses have all
shown that there has always been a disequilibrium between
supply of and demand for manpower. The surplus was
noticeable in the liberal arts and non-technical fields
while engineering, medicine, and agriculture were the
areas which suffered most from the shortages.
Table 18
Supply of and Demand for Manpower Based on the Level of Education
in the Fifth Plan9 1973-1978 (Domestic and Foreign)
Levels Supply Demand Shortage Surplus
Art Associate
80,495 101,402 20,907
-
Bachelor's 86,462 68,264 - 18,198
Master's 13,057 22,984 9,927
-
Doctors 10,916 10,692
_
224
Total 190,930 203,342 30,834 18,422
Sources: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Manpower Demands in the Fifth Development
Plan of Iran. Tehran, Author, 1974b, and Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization,
Office of Population and Manpower, The Output of the Country's Educational
System in the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978. Tehran: Author, 1980.
H
o
NJ
103
As discussed earlier, prior to the Revolution of
1979, there was only one private technical college,
Naficy Techhicum (established in 1971) which awarded
bachelor's degrees. Therefore, the role that private
higher education played in supplying engineers was
negligible. On the other hand, most four-year private
colleges offered programs in liberal arts and the like
(for instance, business schools mushroomed in recent
years). It is assumed that the costs (both physical,
such as equipment and laboratories, and human, such as
faculty members) were contributing factors to the almost
total exclusion of private engineer schools. The
permission granted by the government to individuals who
wished to establish private colleges could be attributed
to the implicit intention of the government to provide
higher education of one kind or another, even non-technical.
and non-professional education for which there was a low
demand. This had political implications through the
partial fulfillment of the high social demand for higher
education. Sobhe and Yavari (1981) stated:
It is much cheaper and easier to invest in
the arts than it is in technical or vocational
fields. Governments of the developing countries
in order to satisfy political needs, provide
higher education in liberal arts and the
social sciences.
The imbalances between supply and demand for
manpower implied that manpower planning was never a
104
continuous and consistent practice at the national level.
Manpower planning was usually done without undertaking a
careful economic analysis including job market require
ments into account. Each five-year development plan, for
example, included a manpower chapter section which was
always prepared and included after all other goals had
been defined and agreed upon. To support the argument
that manpower planning did not correspond to the market
and needs of the country, suffice it to say that The Fifth
National Deveioment Plan, 1973-1978, published by the Plan
and Budget Organization in 1973, projected that the number
of students in Iranian institutions of higher education
would jump from 115,000 at the end of the Fourth Plan in
1973 to 190,000 at the end of the Fifth Plan in March
1978. This was the prediction of the Fifth Plan, which
had an original investment of $36 billion. It was
mentioned before that because of the oil price rise of
late 19 73, the Fifth Plan was revised in 1974. The
investment budget of the revised plan enjoyed a 100 per
cent increase and reached $70 billion. In the revised
plan, almost all sectors received some budget increases;
for example, electricity and state building received 352
and 251 percent increases, respectively. The original
plan stated that "top priority in social affairs goes to
education" (p. 4). Yet, education in the revised plan
received a 2.4 percent increase, the lowest increase of
105
all. It is revealing to see that in the revised plan,
which enjoyed an enormous increase (in terms of the number
of projects and size of the budget), the expected and
predicted number of students in higher education did not
change and remained the same at 190,000.
Once again, the point that was made earlier by
the study in regard to the domination of the Iranian
economy by oil revenues and the neglect of human resources
development should be re-emphasized. The tables and
discussions support the argument that physical expansion
of the economy took place at the expense of the develop
ment of software, know-how, and high-level manpower.
106
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
For the purpose of this study and for finding
answers to the research questions, a descriptive survey
was employed by the researcher. Since the events and
trends analyzed in the study have already taken place,
a descriptive approach was most appropriate.
To investigate the problems comprehensively, the
issues were not only dealt with individually? but major
social, political and economic factors which might have
shaped and influenced the variables of the study were
also taken into account while the research was being done.
All research seeks solutions to one or more
problems, so each study starts out with some questions.
The present research was no exception to this.
;
Research Questions
Throughout the study, the attempt was made to
provide answers to the following questions:
1. What was the relationship between supply of and
demand for all kinds of engineers in Iran?
2. To what extent was the supply of engineers in Iran
based upon a well-designed manpower plan at the
107
national level and how was the plan
implemented?
Sources and Methods of
Data Collection
To do a descriptive study, two sources of data
could be used, primary and secondary. This research
utilized both primary and secondary sources in order to
arrive at conclusions and answers to the questions. The
following is a summary of these sources.
Primary Sources
A major concern of the research was the develop
ment of engineering education and the determination of the
number of engineers who graduated since 1962. The time
span 1962-1981, covered three development plan periods
plus j the first three years of the post-Revolution period.
The year 1962 was the beginning of the Third Development
Plan. The Third Plan, compared to the two previous ones,
was claimed to be the most comprehensive.
To deal with the engineering colleges and
universities which were almost exclusively run by the
government, primary data published by the Ministry of
Science and Higher Education was most valuable. A body
of the Ministry, the Institute for Research and Planning
in Science and Education, published some yearly reports
on the higher education of the country. The reports were
108
called Statistics of Higher Education in Iran, which
dealt with the number of colleges and universities, and
students in higher education by sex, major fields and
levels of study.
Publications of the Plan and Budget Organization
also provided the researcher with a variety of information.
As already mentioned, the Plan and Budget Organization
(PBO) was in charge of development planning in Iran. PBO
outlined and published the development plans in which an
attempt was made to forecast the needed numbers for
skilled labor and manpower required for each plan period.
A section of the Plan and Budget Organization,
called the Office of Population and Manpower, published
some reports on manpower in different sectors in each
development plan. Although very few official publications
have been available since the Revolution of 1979, a recent
report, The Output of the Country1s Educational System
in the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978, was published
in Farsi in 1980 (Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization,
Office of Population and Manpower, 1980). Most of the
primary sources were also in Farsi. A major advantage of
the primary data used in this study was that they were
unanalyzed and uninterpreted by anyone else. Therefore,
there was less likelihood that the data would be
influenced by the value judgment or biases of others.
109
Secondary Sources
The Revolution of 1979 made Iran the focus of
world attention. Due to the American involvement and
interests in the region generally, and in the country
specifically, a large body of literature has appeared in
American journals and magazines. The events also
motivated scientists, politicians, and journalists to
write and publish a variety of books which were used as
secondary sources of data by this researcher. Although
this kind of literature did not directly deal with the
specific problem of the study, which was the supply of and
demand for engineers and the reasons why a shortage
emerged and persisted, it provided background material
for an analysis of the manpower bottleneck and for a
clearer understanding of why everything did not go the
way it should have.
International organizations such as UNESCO,
International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank,
and the like were also used as secondary sources of data.
»
Presentation of the Data
The data used by the study were extensive; there
fore to facilitate comparability and comprehension,
tables have been prepared wherever they were deemed
appropriate.
The research investigated the shortage of
L engineers in Iran which has severely handicapped___________
110
development. The shortage was a result of a mismatch
between supply and demand. Therefore, the study focused
on both the system of higher education (supply) and the
job market (demand).
As often as possible, the researcher tried to
present the data based on the development plan years so
they would be easier to compare with the outcomes of the
different plans.
Although the Fifth Development Plan ended in
March 1978, the period of 1978-1981 was also investigated
for the impact the Revolution might have had on engineer
ing manpower developments in Iran. The research did not
call for complicated statistical operations.
Ill
CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION OF THE DATA AND
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this chapter is to present the
appropriate data and to analyze the findings so that
answers can be provided to the following research
questions:
1. What was the relationship between supply of
and demand for all kinds of engineers in Iran?
2. To what extent was the supply of engineers in
Iran based upon a well-designed manpower plan
at the national level and how was the plan
implemented?
High Level Manpower and
Engineers
As discussed in Chapter II, the first survey of
Iranian manpower was done by the Plan Organization in
1958. In that year, a stock of 75,000 high level man
power existed in Iran. Holding, as a minimum, a high
school diploma and performing a job helpful to economic
growth were the criteria to consider someone as high level
manpower. According to Baldwin (1967), a total of 7,510
112
people were involved in the field of engineering. The
breakdown was as follows:
Engineers, civil 2,536
Engineers, mechanical 1,914
Engineers, electrical 1,414
Engineers, chemical 547
Engineers, mining 133
Engineers, metallurgical 2
Engineers, miscellaneous 96 4
Total 7,510
Three main branches of civil, mechanical, and
electrical engineering accounted for about 78 percent of
all engineering stock. Baldwin (1967) did not specify
the levels of education of those involved in engineering.
However, it was mentioned that about 30 percent of the
total stock of high level manpower in 1958 had received
university training.
Some years later, the population census of 1966
reported on the stock of high level manpower. Unlike the
previous report of 1958, this time a minimum of associate
of arts or science degree, equivalent to a high school
diploma plus two years of higher education, was required
to be considered high level manpower. This upgrading of
the definition of high level manpower (holding a high
school diploma in 1958 and an associate of arts in 1966)
could be attributed to the expansion of higher education
113
and availability of more college graduates at the later
date, 1966. On the other hand, the import of more
advanced technology necessitated that high level manpower
had to have some years of university training. According
to the report of 1966, there was a stock of 73,904 in high
level manpower of which 9,887 or 13.4 percent were
engineers. The comparable stock of manpower in 1975
reached the 260,121 mark. Of this, 48,492 or 18.6 percent
were engineers.
The trend and proportion of the supply of :
engineers shows that in 1958, engineers accounted for
10 percent of high level manpower. The proportion
increased to 13.4 percent in 1966 and 18.6 percent in
1975. On the whole, although engineers enjoyed a high
rate of growth in terms of absolute number and proportion
of the stock of high level manpower, as will be discussed
in the next part, they could not keep pace with the demand
for highly skilled engineering personnel.
Higher Education and Supply
of Engineers
Within the time frame of the study, supply of and
demand for engineers from 1962 is discussed in this part.
In 1968, the Plan Organization published a report called
Education in the Third Development Plan, 1962-1967
(Tehran, Plan Organization, Bureau of Information and
Report, 1968a). To compare technical with non-technical
114
education, it was stated in the report
In Iran, young people show a greater propensity
toward non-technical than technical studies and
for this reason in spite of the nation's need
for specialized and technical personnel, the
number of students of non-technical subjects
has always exceeded that of technical subjects.
(p. 40)
The report further noted that in the academic year
1962-1963, about 37 percent of all students studied
letters and 14 percent studied law, economics, and social
sciences. It was also reported that in 1962-1963, at the
beginning of the Third Development Plan, 1962-1967, out of
21,858 students in higher education, 2,360 or 11 percent
studied engineering and technology. Engineering and
technology were different from one another, as engineering
education led to a degree in engineering, for example, a
bachelor's degree in electronic engineering. Techno
logical fields did not necessarily lead to an engineering
degree. For example, a bachelor of science in electronics
dealt with more theoretical aspects of electronics than
with the hardware and practical parts.
The low proportion of students in technical fields
was referred to in different private and government
publications. In a report put out by the Plan Organiza
tion in 1968 (Tehran, Plan Organization, Bureau of
Information and Report, 1968a), it was stated that "less
than 3 per cent of secondary school pupils are undergoing
technical and vocational training" (p. 263).
115
According to Habib (1974), the required manpower
in the field of engineering in 1963 was 3,273, while the
supply reached only 546. For the whole period of the
Third Plan, 1962-1967, there was a demand for 5,600
engineers. However, the supply did not exceed 3,065.
Therefore, a shortage of '2/535 engineers resulted.
The low supply of engineers in the Third Plan was
the result of a government policy deliberately initiated
as one of the goals of higher education before the plan
started in 1962. The Outline of the Third Plan 1341-1346
(Iranian year corresponding to 1962-67) published by the
Plan Organization in 1965, stated that "no expansion will
take place in engineering facilities; instead they will
be strengthened, diversified and better equipped" (p. 142).
The report then dealt with the goal of engineering
colleges by stating "The main objective of engineering
schools will be to produce engineers of a better calibre
than those generally produced in the past" (p. 142). To
this end, the Plan Organization (Tehran, Plan Organization
1970) reported "projects for completing and equipping
engineering facilities and Tehran Polytechnic were
implemented" (p. 146). Completion of the mentioned
projects were considered a sort of expansion which was
contrary to the intention of the Third Plan. In addition,
the Industrial University (Aryamehr University of
Technology prior to the Revolution of 1979), the only
116
university which specialized in engineering and technical
fields, was established in 1966, two years before the
Third Plan ended in March 1968. This was also against
the policy and goals of the Third Plan which had no
intention to establish new colleges or universities.
Therefore, it is concluded that planning for engineering
and implementation of the plans was not consistent. This
was why what happened in reality was different from what
the plan had sought. It may be argued that since a need
for an engineering university emerged, the Industrial.
University was established. If this were so-, it is
assumed that the Third Plan was so poorly formulated that
it had not been able to foresee the huge demand which
resulted in the establishment of the Industrial University.
The governments non-expansion policy in higher
education during the Third Plan, 1962-1967, severely
exacerbated the shortage of engineers in the Fourth
Development Plan, 1968-1972. The gap between the supply
of and demand for engineers, which was 2,535 in the Third
Plan, grew bigger and reached 7,707 (supply was 14,828
while demand was 22,535). Compared to other areas of
shortage, such as agriculture (which was short by 4,632)
and medicine (a shortage of 1,114), the field of engineer
ing (both numerically and proportionately) suffered most
from an insufficient supply of graduates. Table 19
compares the graduates of engineer schools with total______
Table 19
Distribution of the Graduates of the Iranian System
of Higher Education, Fourth Plan, 1968-1972
Year
Level
1968 1969 1970
Total Engr. % Total Engr. % Total Engr. %
Associate 4,123 448 11 2,976 722 24 2,352 534 23
Bachelor's 2,905 260 9 5,915 263 4 8,210 536 6
Master's ■ 785 292 37 748 102 14 986 312 32
Total 7,813 1,000 13 9,639 1,087 11 11,548 1,382 12
Year 1971 1972 Plan Total
Level Total Engr. % Total Engr. %. Total Engr. %
Associate 5,299 1,856 35 5,714 2,538 44 20,464 6,098 30
Bachelor's 10,036 1,075 11 10,059 881 9 37,125 3,015 8
Master's 977 198 20 1,096 315 28 4,592 1,219 26
Total 16,312 3,129 19 16,869 3,734 22 62,181 10,332 17
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and Manpower, Supply of
Skilled Manpower and Output of the Countryfs Educational System in the Fourth
Development Plan, 1968-1972. Tehran: Author, 1974.
117
118
graduates of Iranian colleges in the Fourth Plan, 1968-
1972.
Table 19 indicates that of the total of 62,181
graduates of Iranian higher education in the Fourth Plan,
10,332 or 17 percent graduated in the field of engineering.
The breakdown by academic levels of study showed that of
the total degrees in engineering, 59 percent were awarded
at the associate level to 6,098 graduates who became
technicians (technicians and the trend of their supply
will be discussed later in this chapter)? 29 percent of
engineering degrees were granted at the bachelor's level;
12 percent of all engineers received their degrees at the
master's level.
According to Table 19, in the Fourth Plan, 20,464
students graduated at the associate level in all major
fields of study. Of these, 6,098, or 30 percent,
received their associate degrees in engineering. During
the Fourth Plan period, 1968-1972, out of 37,125 degrees
awarded at the bachelor's level, only 3,015, or 8 percent,
were in engineering. About 26 percent of all master's
degrees were granted to the graduates in engineering. As
was true -in the previous plan, no doctoral program was
offered in engineering in the Fourth Plan.
As shown in Table 19, supply of technicians
(holders of associate degrees in technical fields)
enjoyed an increasing share of the total degrees granted
119
at the associate level from 11 percent in 1968 to 44
percent in 1972 (with the exception of a drop from 24
percent in 1969 to 23 percent in 1970). The proportion of
bachelor’s degrees in engineering to total degrees granted
in the Fourth Plan fluctuated from time to time as it
decreased from 9 percent in 1968 to 4 percent in 1969.
In the last year of the Fourth Plan, 1972, the proportion
of bachelor's degrees in engineering to total degrees
dropped from 11 percent to 9 percent which equalled the
proportion at the beginning of the Plan in 1968. The
proportion of master's degrees in engineering to total
master's degrees fluctuated most in the Fourth Plan.
Not only did the proportion of the degrees in
engineering to total degrees change, but there were
frequent declines in absolute numbers as well. For
example, in 1971, a total of 1,075 bachelor's were
granted in engineering; this declined to 881 in 1972. The
number of master's degrees in engineering dropped from
292 in 1968 to 102 in 1969. It also dropped from 312 in
1970 to 198 in 1971. The study assumes that the
fluctuation and frequent changes in the proportion of
engineering degrees awarded by Iranian schools were due
to imbalanced planning which did not maintain a steady
proportion between engineering and other fields of study.
In some instances inconsistency between the plan and its
implementation caused the percentage of engineering
120
degrees to change. (It was previously mentioned that the
Fourth Plan had expected that 55 percent of students
would study in scientific, technical and industrial
fields. In reality, only 48 percent did so.) One other
factor which might have contributed to the change in the
number and proportion of engineering graduates was the
opposition of the students of engineering colleges to the
government, which was expressed through demonstrations,
boycotts of the classes, and riots. For example, the
celebration of 2,500 years of monarchy that was held in
Iran in 1971, resulted in a series of disturbances on the
campuses. As Sobhe (1979) stated "Technical and
industrial universities were the core of the demonstra
tions, and they were pioneers in political movements"
(p. 12). Due to the riots and boycotts, classes were
cancelled and courses were not completed. Therefore,
students did not graduate on time, as it took some extra
years to complete a program to receive the degree.
A report called The State of Higher Education in
the Fields of Science and Technology (Tehran, Ministry of
Science and Higher Education, 1969) , argued that most of
technical colleges and universities had been established
prior to the entry of the newly imported sophisticated
technology. Since revision and updating of the necessary
curricula was accomplished only slowly, engineering
schools always lagged behind the new technology. For
121
example, Tehran Polytechnic College and The College of
Science and Industry were established in 1957 and 1963,
respectively. The Industrial University, the only
university which specialized in engineering and science
(awarding, for instance, degrees in chemical engineering
and bachelor*s of science in chemistry), was founded in
1966. Due to the slow process of updating the curriculum
and bringing about necessary changes in spite of the
existing high demand, for years no one was trained in the
field of high voltage electricity. On the other hand,
the content of the courses taught in engineering was
designed based on what the instructors had studied in
their schools abroad. The above-mentioned report
indicated that there was no reflection whatsoever with
curricula of the needs of Iranian industries.
During the Fourth Plan, 1968-1972, engineers and
technically trained personnel were badly needed. However,
as low as 8 percent of the bachelor*s degrees awarded by
Iranian schools were in engineering. The limited number
and capacity of the engineering colleges was a major source
of the shortage. Moreover, the low capacity of engineer
ing schools, a cause itself of the shortage, was due to
the lack of overall planning for such college and
universities at the national level. As a report by Tabib
(1974) put it, there was no habit of planning for higher
education; after 40 years of non-existent educational
122
planning, the need for it was felt but it was not going to
be easy to encourage systematic planning. Yet, having a
plan did not necessarily guarantee its execution. An
example was given before that the Third Plan, 1962-1967,
did not expect an expansion in the number of engineering
colleges, while to the contrary, the College of Science
and Industry and the Industrial University were established
in 1963 and 1966, respectively. Iranian colleges and
universities were not the only sources to train engineers.
In this regard, foreign schools played a role also.
Table 20 presents the number and levels of those studying
engineering, who graduated from foreign institutions of
higher education during the Fourth Plan period, 1968-1972.
During the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972, a
grand total of 8,899 graduated from foreign colleges and
universities. Of that, 2,914 or 33 percent were in the
field of engineering. The breakdown of the engineering
graduates was 7 percent at the associate level, 56 percent
at the bachelor1s level, and 29 percent at the master's
level. Those at the doctoral level made up 8 percent of
the total graduates from foreign schools of engineering.
Of the total graduates abroad only 34 or 1.2 percent
were females.
Some interesting comparisons can be made between
the graduates of Iranian and foreign engineering schools
in the Fourth Plan. In Iran, 16.6 percent of the total
Table 20
Graduates of Foreign Schools in the Field of Engineering
in the Fourth Plan, 1968-1972
Level 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Plan
Total Female Male
Associate 49 51 35 * 33 38 206 4 202
Bachelor's 223 252 323 426 424 1,648 15 1,633
Master's 103 111 162 211 254, 841 11 830
Doctors 26 30 50 51 62 219 4 215
Total 401 444 570 721 778 2,914 34 2,880
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and Manpower. Supply of
Skilled Manpower and Output of the Country's Educational System in the Fourth
Development Plan, 1968-1972. Tehran: Author, 1974.
w
to
u >
124
graduates were in engineering while the proportion for
foreign educated engineers was 33 percent. In Iran, 59
percent of all engineering graduates earned associate
degrees, while only 7 percent of all Iranian engineering
students abroad received such a degree. In Iran, 29
percent of the graduates in engineering got a bachelor*s
degree. This proportion for Iranians graduated abroad
was 59 percent. Of the total degrees granted in engineer
ing by Iranian schools, 12 percent were at the master's
level. In foreign schools, this proportion was 29 percent.
No doctorate in engineering was given by Iranian schools.
Among Iranian graduates of foreign engineering schools,
8 percent received a Ph.D. Table 21 is a summary of the
comparison between the graduates of Iranian and foreign
engineering schools.
Table 22 presents the distribution of the
graduates of Iranian colleges and universities who
received their engineering degrees at the master's level
in the Fourth Plan, 1968-1972. Of the total of 1,219,
civil engineers totaled 610, or 50 percent, of the
graduates. Electrical and mechanical engineering claimed
second and third for the largest share of the total
master's degrees awarded in engineering. The low rate of
females who graduated in engineering was noticeable. Of
the total of 1,219 only 40 graduates, or 3 percent, were
females. The proportion was much lower than the average
Table 21
Graduates of Engineering from both Iranian and
Foreign Schools, Fourth Plan, 1968-1972
Level
Iran
Number %
Abroad
Number . %
Associate 6,098 59 206 1
Bachelor's .3,015 29 1,648 56
Master's 1,219 12 841 29
Doctors 0 0 219 8
Total 10,332 100 2,914 100
Source: Tables 19 and 20.
125
Table 22
Distribution of the Graduates at the Master's Level in
Technical and Engineering Fields in the Fourth Plan,
1968-1972 (Iranian Schools)
Major Fields Total Female Male
Electrical Engineering 204 6 198
Civil Engineering 610 10 600
Chemical and Petrochemical
Engineering 79 12 67
Mineralogy and Metallurgy 18
-
18
Mechanical Engineering 152 7 145
Surveying Engineering 98 1 97
Miscellaneous Engineering 58 4 54
Total 1,219 40 1,179
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and
Manpower, Supply of Skilled Manpower and Output of the Country's
Educational System in the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972.
Tehran: Author, 1974.
126
127
for all fields of study at the master's level, which was
15 percent.
In 1974 a report, The Estimate of Skilled Man
power Supply at Different Educational Levels During the
Years of the Fifth Development Plan, was published
(Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education,
Institute for Research and Planning in Science and
Education, 1974). The report forecasted that in the Fifth
Plan, 19 73-1978, a total of 158,947 would graduate from
Iranian colleges and universities. Of this, 34,832, or
21.9 percent, was estimated to be in engineering. Although
in reality, graduates in engineering made up 21.9 percent
of the total graduates, in absolute numbers out of the
total of 171,127, those who majored in engineering were
37,46 3, or 2,631 higher than the estimated graduates in
engineering. The real total of graduates was also 12,180
higher than the estimated figure.
According to Table 23, at the associate level in
engineering, the estimate of graduates was 24,506, while
the actual figure reached 28,103. It was estimated that
in the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978, about 10.7 percent of those
with bachelor's degrees, or 7,927, would be in the field
of engineering. In reality, the graduates numbered 7,717,
or 9.8 percent, of the total bachelor's degrees awarded
in all fields. At the master's level, the forecast was
that 2,399, or 30.5 percent, were going to graduate in
Table 23
The Comparison of Estimated and Actual Supply of Engineers
in the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978 (Iran Only)
Estimate Total % Associate % Bachelor's % Master's % Doctors %
Total 158,947 100 72,621 100 74,255 100 7,861 100 4,210 100
Engr. 34,832 21.9 24,506 33.7 7,927 10.7 2,399 30.5 - -
Actual
Total 171,127 100 79,766 100 78,574 100 6,310 100 6,477 100
Engr, 37,463 21.9 28,103 35.2 7,717 9.8 1,643 26.0 - -
Source: Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Institute for Research and Planning
in Science and Education, Estimate of the Supply of Skilled Manpower at Different
Levels of Higher Education During the Years of the Fifth Development Plan (Revised).
Tehran: Author, 1974. Also, Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of
Population and Manpower, Output of the Educational System of the Country During
the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. Tehran: Author, 1980.
H
N)
00
129
engineering. The real proportion was 26 percent, or 1,643
graduates. As in the previous plans, there were no
graduates at the doctoral level in engineering in the
Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. Of 37,463 graduates from Iranian
engineering schools in the Fifth Plan, 4,377, or 11.7
percent, were female. During the Plan period, Iranians
graduate abroad reached 19,803, of which 6,320 or 31.9
percent, were in engineering.
In Iran, 9.8 percent of all bachelor's degrees
were in engineering while in schools abroad, of all
bachelor's earned by Iranians, 47.3 percent were in
engineering. Of all doctorates earned by Iranians abroad
10.5 percent were in engineering, while the proportion in
Iran was zero. Out of 6,320 graduates of foreign schools
in engineering, 151, or 2.4 percent, were female. This
was much lower than the domestic rate of 11.7 percent
(Table 24).
According to Table 25, an overwhelming majority
of those who graduated from Iranian engineering schools
in the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978, received associate of
science degrees. Therefore, 75 percent of the total, or
28,103, became technicians. On the other hand, the
proportion of Iranians who earned an associate of science
in engineering to total engineers graduated from foreign
schools was 2.7 percent. Compared to 20.6 percent of the
Iranian degrees in engineering awarded at the bachelor's
Table 24
Iranian Graduates of Foreign Schools in the
Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978
Total Male Female Associate % Bachelor's % Master's % Doctors %
Total
Engr.
19,803
6,320
16,944
6,169
2,859
151
729 100
168 23.0
7,888
3,731
100
47.3
6,747
1,953
100
28.9
4,439
468
100
10.5
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and Manpower, Output of
the Educational System of the Country During the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. Tehran:
Author, 1980.
H
u>
o
Table 25
Graduates of Engineering from both Iranian and
Foreign Schools, Fifth Plan, 1973-1978
Level
Iran Abroad
Number % Number %
Associate 28,103 75.0 168 2.7
Bachelor's 7,717 20.6 3,731 59.0
Master's 1,643 4.4 1,953 30.9
Doctors 0 0.0 468 7.4
Total 37,463 100.0 6,320 100.0
Source: Tables 23 and 24.
131
132
level, there was a proportion of 59 percent for graduates
outside Iran. Four percent of Iranian engineering degrees
were master1s while 30.9 percent was the proportion for
master's degrees received from abroad. Of 6,320 engineer
ing degrees earned abroad, 468, or 7.4 percent, were at
the doctoral level. No one received a Ph.D. from Iranian
engineering colleges.
Table 2 5 suggests that due to the non-availability
of opportunities in Iran, the higher the level of
education in engineering, the smaller the proportion of
the graduates. It can also be concluded that since there
were more possibilities for Iranian engineering students
to continue their education through higher levels, only a
small minority of 2.7 percent dropped out of school after
they received their associate of science degrees. As
shown in Table 25, due to the existence of more opportun^
ities in foreign schools, 59 percent of Iranian engineer
ing students got their degrees at the bachelor's level
from abroad.
In the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978, a grand total of
190,930 Iranian students graduated from both Iranian and
foreign schools. Of this total, 43,783 (23 percent) were
in the field of engineering.
Table 26 compares the graduates of Iranian higher
education with those of the foreign schools. Graduates
Table 26
The Comparison of Iranians Graduated from Iranian
Schools with Those from Foreign Schools in the
Fifth Plan, 1973-1978
Total Male . Female 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Total Domestic 171,127 115,849 55,278 26,328 30,630 31,576 37,546 45,047
Engrs. Domestic 37,463 33,086 4,377 5,414 5,934 5,963 9,415 10,737
Total Foreign 19,803 16,944 2,859 2,213 3,536 3,955 4,305 5,794
Engrs. Foreign 6,320 6,169 151 744 1,045 1,317 1,591 1,623
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, Office of Population and Manpower, Output of the
Educational System of the Country During the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. Tehran; Author, 1980.
133
are presented on a yearly basis so that the trend toward
increasing numbers can be followed.
Graduates of engineering in Iran in 1973, the
first year of the 1973-1978 Plan, totaled 5,414 which
doubled by the end of the Plan in 1977 and reached 10,737.
Iranians who graduated in engineering from foreign schools
also more than doubled; they increased from 744 in 1973 to
1,623 in 1978.
According to the report The Estimate of Skilled
Manpower Supply at Different Educational Levels During
the Years of the Fifth Development Plan (Tehran, Ministry
of Science and Higher Education, Institute for Research
and Planning in Science and Education, 1974), there was
going to be a need for 25,000 engineers. The supply was
predicted to be 18,000. Therefore, a shortage of 7,000
engineers was expected.
The oil price boom of late 1973, as discussed in
Chapters I and II, increased the income of the country so
drastically that a need to revise the projects of the
Fifth plan was felt; therefore, the revised summary made
another forecast which identified a demand for 36,400
engineers. The supply of engineers was estimated to be
20,300. As a result, a shortage of 16,100 engineers was
expected. Table 2 7 presents a comparison of supply and
demand for engineers based on their specialization.
Table 27
Supply of and Demand for Engineers in the
Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978
Jobs Demand Supply Shortage
Civil and Architectural
Engineers 7,800 4,000 3,800
Electronic and Electrical
Engineers 5,500 2,800 2,700
Mechanical Engineers ' 6,900 4,200 2,700
Chemical, Metallurgy, and
Minerology Engineers 2,000 1,000 1,000
Other Engineers 14,200 8,300 5,900
Total 36,400 20,300 16,100
Source: Tehran, Plan and Budget Organization, The Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978
(Revised Summary). Tehran: Author, 1974.
135
136
Table 27 shows that a little more than half the
demand for engineers was expected to be met by the supply.
One interesting point which implies that planning for
engineering colleges and universities was not consistent
and did not take long-term market requirements into
consideration is that in the original Fifth Plan, a demand
for 25,000 engineers was expected. In the revised plan
the demand was expected to jump to 36,400 engineers;
therefore, the demand was expected to increase by 46
percent. On the other hand, in the revised plan, supply
was expected to increase from 18,000 to 20,300 engineers.
Thus, the supply was going to enjoy a 13 percent increase.
A 46 percent increase in demand compared to a 13 percent
increase in supply of engineers widened the gap between
supply and demand which was already serious.
A Note on Iranian
Engineering Students
Abroad
A high proportion of Iranian students outside Iran
studied engineering. As Askari et al. (1977), saidiin the
academic year 1959-1960, out of a total of 2,509 Iranian
students in the United States, 44 percent studied
engineering. In 1963-1964, the proportion changed
slightly? out of 3,162 Iranian students in America, 43
percent were in the field of engineering. Compared to
this, only 11 percent of the students who attended
137
Iranian institutions of higher education studied engineer
ing in the academic year 1962-1963 (the absolute number
was 2,360 engineering students). The proportion of
Iranian students in American engineering schools remained
43 percent of the total of Iranian students in the United
States in 1968-1969. In 1973-1974, the proportion
increased to 46 percent. It is, therefore, concluded that
about half the Iranian students in the United States
studied engineering. In the academic year 1973-1974, out
of 6,016 Iranian students in America at the undergraduate
level, 3,492 were in engineering. At the graduate level,
717. out of 1,965 studied engineering.
The Relationship Between
Technicians and Engineers
Technicians as defined previously were graduates
of two-year institutions of higher education in technical
and industrial fields. Since they had two years of higher
education, they were intermediaries between engineers (who
were supposedly highly trained) and skilled labor. Having
enough technicians (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 1974, indicated that the desired rate was
three technicians for each engineer) would enable
engineers to do more complicated tasks which required
higher levels of expertise only possessed by them.
In this part, the chapter examines the number of
technicians compared to engineers and how the relationship
138
changed in the period under study. One problem area in
the Third Plan, 1962-1967, was that very few technicians
were supplied. Therefore, the very low number of
engineers was further hampered by the shortage of support
personnel. It was forecasted by the outline of the Third
Plan in 1962 that "very few technologists will be available
to provide practical support for engineering staff" (p.
142). Since the exact statistics were not available for
the Third Plan, it was not possible to determine the
relationship between the number of technicians and
engineers.
In the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972,
compared to 4,234 engineers (see Table 19) supplied by
colleges and universities in Iran, 6,098 technicians
graduated. (1.4 technicians for each engineer which was
lower than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's figure, assuming that their figure would
suit the Iranian situation).
In the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978, the situation
improved as 28,103 technicians were produced compared to
9,360 engineers (holding bachelor's or master's degrees)
graduated from Iranian colleges and universities. The
proportion of technicians/engineers was thus 3:1 which
equalled the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's figure. It is, therefore, concluded that
training paraprofessionals, those who were used as the
139
support personnel for engineers, improved over the years
and reached an ideal relationship, assuming that the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
figures of 1964 held true for Iran in the 1973-1978
period.
Pour-Moghaddas (1975) stated that in 1968, two-^
year colleges provided 50 percent of all technical higher
education in Iran. The number of technical institutes
almost doubled in the space of three years from 75 in
1970-1971 to 148 in 1972-1973. On the other hand,
according to Tabib (1974), out of a total of 191 programs
in engineering, 105 were at the associate level. There
fore, it is concluded that existence of a large number of
two-year technical programs (compared to four-year
engineering programs) was the reason why in the Fifth
Plan, 1973-1978, about 75 percent of engineering degrees
were granted at the associate level (see Table 25).
After all, having two years of higher education was better
than no higher education at all.
Areas of Specializa
tion in Engineering
Some branches of engineering received more
favorable attention than did the others. In 1968, the
Fourth National Development Plan, 1968-1972 was published
(Tehran, Plan Organization, 1968), which was comprised of
four parts. It was reported by Part 1 that
140
* >
Another important problem as regards the
training of engineers is the limited number
of subjects taught by engineering faculties.
Several basic fields of study such as
industrial design, metallurgy and electronics
are still overlooked. (p. 73)
During the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972,
there was no attempt by the government to create a balance
between different branches of engineering. According to a
report, The System of Education in Islamic Republic,
People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist System,
published by Peykar Organization in 1980; in the field of
engineering in 1972-1973, the majority of students were
admitted in mechanical engineering (1,563 entrants),
electrical engineering (1,320 entrants), and civil engine
ering (1,179 entrants). Compared to these figures, only
40 were admitted to petrochemical engineering and 76 to
industrial engineering.
The report also pointed out that most of the
Iranian engineering students abroad were also studying
civil, electrical, and mechanical engineering. In a
country which claimed that it was going to be "the fifth
industrial nation in the world by the year 20 00," more
industrial engineers were needed than 76 per year. Also,
with the heavy reliance on oil (80 percent of foreign
exchange and 50 percent of the GNP came from oil) the
proportion admitted to petrochemical engineering was
rather low.
141
Underutilization of
Engineers
It was discussed earlier (see Table 4) that the
service sector enjoyed a sharp increase in its rate of
growth from 9 percent in 196 0-1970 to more than 25
percent in the 1970-1976 period. The expansion of
services created a huge bureaucracy whose employees were
drawn from all branches of education including engineering.
Due to the smaller size of private firms and the goal of
profit making, the study assumes that private organiza
tions better utilized their human and non-human resources.
Underutilization of engineers who were employed
by the public sector meant that money and energy spent
on engineering schools, which were expensive to establish
and run, was in fact being wasted. In government
departments, engineers were underemployed in their
specializations as they were given administrative jobs.
Since the education sector did not have any means to
control placement of or utilization of its output (the
graduate), it should not be blamed for misutilization of
engineers. According to the Ministry of Science and
Higher Education "most of the engineers are in charge of
jobs which have nothing to do with their educational
background" (p. 96). A high majority of engineers were
hired by the government for non-industrial jobs. A study
on the engineers graduated in the second half of the
142
1960s from Tehran Polytechnic revealed that 89 percent
of them were employed by the public sector against 11
percent who had been absorbed by the private industries.
Not all government jobs were necessarily production
oriented; out of those considered by the study, only 33
percent were industrial production based (Tehran,
Ministry of Science and Higher Education, 1969b). Among
the reasons mentioned by public sector employees for
seeking government employment were job security, retire-
r
ment benefits, and prestige.
The Ratio of Graduates to
Faculty Members in
Selected Engineer
ing Schools
A report "Quantitative Investigation of Engineer
ing Education and Research in Iran" (Tehran, Ministry of
Science and Higher Education, 19 75) named the college of
Science and Industry located in Tehran, an engineering
college, as having had the highest ratio of graduates to
faculty members between 1969-19 74. During this 5-year
period, for each faculty member there was an average of
5.2 graduates per year. As Table 28 indicates, Tabriz
University, with the ratio of 1.3 and Tehran College of
Polytechnic with the ratio of 1:2 enjoyed the lowest
ratios of graduates to faculty members. On the whole,
for each faculty member in the seven mentioned, engineering
Table 28
The Ratio of Graduates to Faculty Members in the
Field of Engineering, 1969-1974
Average for 5 Years
Institution
Faculty
Members Graduates
.Ratio
College of Science
and Industry 84.8 443.6 5.2 si
Industrial University
Engineering Fields 114.8 245.4 2.1 :1
Tehran University
Technical College 89.4 170.6 1.9 :1
Shiraz University
Engineering College 45.6 87.2 1:9 il
Abadan College of Petroleum 25.2 37.2 1.5 11
Tabriz University
Technical College 42.4 56.8
1.3 si
Tehran College of
Polytechnic 124.4 153.6 1.2:1
Total 526.6 1,194.4 2.3 s 1
Source: Tehran, Ministray of Science and Higher Education, Institute
for Research and Planning in Science and Education, Quantitative
Investigation of Engineering Education and Research in Iran.
Tehran: Author, 1975.
143
144
*
schools, there was an average of 2;3 graduates over the
5-year period of 1969-1974.
The ratio of graduates/faculty members was varied
for each branch of engineering. In production and
industrial engineering the ratio was 3.1, which was the
highest, while in textile engineering the ratio was 0;3,
the lowest; electrical, civil, and mechanical engineering
each enjoyed a ratio of 2.7.
It should be noticed that having a high ratio of
graduates/faculty members was not in itself a good
criterion to evaluate the efficiency of an engineering
college as the ratio was only a quantitative tool. For
example, a ratio of 5.2 graduates for each faculty member
at the College of Science and Industry did not necessarily
mean that its graduates were more competent than the
College of Polytechnic where the ratio was 1.2.
Research and Advanced
Studies in
Engineering
As discussed earlier, prior to the closure of the
universities in 1980 by the Islamic Republic, no Ph.D
was given in engineering. Therefore, for the purpose of
research and teaching, the country was heavily dependent
on the graduates of foreign engineering schools. Accord
ing to Thbib (1974), out of 35 different doctoral programs
offered in academic year 1973-19 74, 16 were in medicine
145
and the rest, 19 were in humanities, social sciences,
agriculture and law. A report by Tabib (19 74) stated
that:
Doctoral programs in education, natural
sciences, mathematics and engineering have
not been established yet. Lack of Ph.D.’s
in these fields affects the system of higher
education more than any other sector in the
country as the system desperately needs
these Ph.D.’s to fill the faculty member
positions. (p. 88)
Again, the point which was made throughout the
study can be made once more. Iran, which after the oil
price boom of late 1973, overcame its financial
difficulties and even enjoyed a capital surplus,
neglected the supply and training of a highly skilled
manpower who could teach at the university level or do
research to solve the problems that a developing nation
faces in its attempts toward industrialization. Although
Iran imported up to 15,000 engineers prior to the
Revolution of 1979, this was no long-term solution to the
bottleneck of shortage of indigenous engineers supply.
The assumption which is made in this part of the
study is that Ph.D.s in engineering were capable of
teaching and doing research. This was evident as between
1971 and 1973, out of 59 research projects done by
engineers, 52 were done by Ph.D.s, according to Tabib
(1974).- it is further assumed that these research projects
146
were done well and could solve problems in the field of
engineering. In short, the assumption is that these
research projects were worth doing. As Table 29 suggests,
out of these 59 studies, 52 were done by Ph.D.s graduated
abroad. Only seven master's degree holders were among
the researchers of whom three were graduates of Iranian
engineering institutions. As Table 29 presents, among
59 researchers, a high majority of .41 were graduates of
American engineering schools. Thirty-eight out of 41 held
doctoral degrees. England, by having nine graduates who
were all Ph.D.s was the second highest represented by the
researchers. Table 29 also shows how dependent the
country was on Ph.D.s from the United States and England
to do the research.
Brain Drain in
Engineering
The data presented in Chapter IV was an indicator
of the worsening shortage of engineers in Iran. Yet, the
problem was more complicated by the outflow of highly
skilled manpower from the country. As in almost all
other developing countries, Iran suffered from a brain
drain. According to Askari et al. (1977) "close to half
of the Iranians who obtained permanent resident status in
the U.S. during the 1970*s, some 1,600 to 2,300 a year,
possessed notable occupational skills" (p. 15).
Table 29
Engineers Involved in Research Based on Their
Highest Degrees and Countries of Study
Between 1971-1973
Country. Number Ph. D Master's %
America 41 38 3 ^ 70
England 9 9
-
15
Germany 5 4 1 8
Iran 3
-
3 5
France 1 1 2
Source: Tehran, Ministry of Science and Higher Education,
Institute for Research and Planning in Science and
Education, Quantitative Investigation of Engineering
Education and Research m Iran. Tehran: Author,
1975.
147
148
It was also reported that in the early 1970s "a
rough estimate, then, would be that three to five
thousand Iranians with professional qualifications
settled in western countries annually" (Askari et al. , 13.7/7
p. 18). Between 1967-1969, a total number of 637
Iranian engineers became permanent residents in the
United States. Also, 4,065 Iranian professionals
immigrated to America from 1970 to 19 75. Of these, 795
were engineers in such fields as civil, mechanical,
eletrical, electronic, industrial and mechanical
engineering, all of which were in short supply and
severely needed by Iran. During that time, according to
Askari et al. (1977) about 2.1 percent of the total
engineers who immigrated to America were Iranians. To
have an idea of how many engineers .immigrated to America,
Niland (1970) reported that in 1967, about 9,000
engineers immigrated to the United States, of which about
50 percent represented brain drain from developing
countries.
Answers to Research Questions
The last part of the chapter is an attempt to
answer the following research questions:
1. What was the relationship between supply of and
demand for all kinds of engineers in Iran?
14 9
2. To what extent was the supply of engineers in
Iran based upon a well-designed manpower plan
at the national level and how was the plan
implemented?
As chronologically discussed in Chapter IV, a
shortage of engineers existed in the Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Development Plans which started in 1962 and ended
in March 1978. in the Third Plan, 1962-1967, a shortage
of 2,535 engineers emerged. The situation did not get any
better as the Fourth Plan, 1968-1972, was short of 7,707
engineers. Shortage of engineers in the Fifth Plan, 1973-
1978, was even more acute. In the last plan the
shortage of engineers reached the 16,100 mark. Therefore,
the answer to the first question of the study was that
pursuant to Iran's development trends supply was not
catching up to the demand for engineers.
Throughout the study, it was mentioned several
times that educational planning was never systematically
done in Iran. Tabib (1974) reported that no habit of
educational planning was developed in Iran. Educational
planning for engineers was no exception to this. Since
there was no direct or close relationship between the job
market, especially industries, with the education sector,
there never developed any comprehensive planning on
engineering education at the national level.
; _______________________________________________
150
The non-existent cooperation between universities
and industries was referred to by several authorities in
the field of education* In March 1977, UNESCO sponsored
a seminar on education-industry cooperation in Engineering
Research and Training. In the seminar, the Chancellor of
the University of Shiraz, then called Pahlavi University,
one of the leading institutions of higher education in
Iran, said that the alienation of industry from uni
versities must be overcome if developing countries are to
achieve independence and become free from foreign techno
logical domination. The Chancellor stated "medical
schools and hospitals are closely linked to one another"
and suggested that "engineering schools and industries
should have similar links" (Iran Trade and Industry,
1977c, p. 33).
To answer the second research question, which
dealt with the existence of educational planning to
supply engineers at the national level, it can be said
that there never was any master plan to provide the needed
number of engineers as the planning body of the Ministry
of Science and Higher Education, the Institute for
Research and Planning in Science and Education, had no
executive power over implementation of the plans and
suggestions prepared by its staff. Some plans were
drawn up, however, they were never at the national level,
neither had they considered the needs of the market. As
151
Baldwin (1967) once put it, the expansion of higher
education was never based on a master plan.
One other point which deserved attention was the
possibility of substituting technicians for engineers.
'According to Shahlapour (1978), a total of 31,582
technicians, graduates of two-year programs in industrial
or technical fields at postsecondary levels, were needed
in the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978. However, the actual number
of such graduates from both Iranian and foreign schools
was 28,271. Therefore, the supply did not match the
demand. If there was an ample supply of technicians,
there could have been some arrangements to substitute them
for engineers by designing some short-term programs to
upgrade their knowledge. Due to the short supply of
technicians, it was not, therefore, possible for them to
fill the vacant positions for engineers.
Engineering Schools in Post-
Revolution Period
Prior to the fall of 1980-1981, the new regime
decided to shut down the colleges and universities for
an indefinite period to revise the curricula and change
the admissions requirements. It was said that the new
government had nothing against using technology and
industrialization. Therefore, it was announced that
engineering schools were going to reopen for those
students who needed less than a year to graduate. In
152
regard to Iranian students abroad, the government
determined that those who were studying in any of the
four needed areas, agriculture, engineering, medicine,
and pure/applied sciences (such as mathematics, computer
sciences, and physics) could receive money from home at
an official exchange rate which was 80 Rials (Iranian
money) for one dollar. Those who were studying in fields
other than the four needed areas, were obliged to buy
foreign exchange at an unofficial rate (90 Rials = $1)
which was about 13 percent higher than the official rate
(>but considerably lower than the market price of 300
Rials for $1).
After the announcement was made by the government
concerning the fields of study which were considered
important to the development of the country, those who
were going to start their studies as new students in
areas other than which had been specified, were entitled
to receive no money from home. Studying social sciences,
humanities, and so on was thought to be useless to the
country if the study was done outside Iran. This was due
to the assumption that these fields were influenced by
Western values and culture which did not fit the unique
culture and environment of Iran.
Up until 1982, no institution of higher education
had been reopened in Iran; even engineering colleges,
which were considered helpful to economic growth of the
153
coufitry have remained closed. It is unknown when colleges
and universities will resume functioning. Due to the
recent political events, some existing factories are
closed or work at below their real capacity and this has
contributed to a low demand for engineers. As a matter
of fact, there is a surplus of engineers as they are
underemployed. The future demand for engineers and the
fate of engineering colleges lies with the government and
its policy toward industrialization. For example, if
industrialization is thought to be a Western phenomenon
which does not fit the traditions and the culture of Iran,
there will be no need for technically-trained personnel
who are able to work with sophisticated technology.
Therefore, there will be a change in technical and
engineering education as the engineering colleges will
have to fade away and give way to some other kind of
educational institutions which train people to be used in
a non-industrializing society.
154
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to present a
summary of the selected findings and conclusions reached
by analyzing the data. The last part of the chapter
formulates and puts together some recommendations on how
to deal with the disequilibria between supply of and
demand for engineers.
Summary
This research was an attempt to investigate the
state of educational planning for engineers, a critical
ingredient for the industrialization of Iran from 1962 to
1981. It was believed that developing countries showed
an interest in industrialization and to make the dream of
industrialization come true, they followed a Western model
which called for the use of advanced technology. This
subsequently created a need for trained manpower which
simply did not exist in Third World countries; a shortage,
especially of engineers, emerged.
In its desire for industrialization, Iran was no
exception. However, it also followed a capital-intensive
155
approach. The money from oil, which enjoyed a fourfold
increase in late 19 73, enabled the country to import more
and more sophisticated technology. This created a huge
demand for technical experts, especially engineers, to
work with the imported machinery. Contrary to the sudden
increase of income and subsequent demand for engineers,
technical colleges and universities were not expanded
accordingly. In short, the supply of engineers did not
keep pace with increasing demand. To deal with this very
acute problem more specifically the study sought answers
to the following questions:
1. What was the relationship between supply of and
demand for all kinds of engineers in Iran?
2. To what extent was the supply of engineers in
Iran based upon a well-designed manpower plan at
the national level and how was the plan
implemented?
To provide appropriate answers to the research
questions, a wide range of the related literature on the
subject was reviewed. Publications of the Plan and Budget
Organization of Iran, and the Institute for Planning and
Research in Science and Education, a body within the
Ministry of Science and Higher Education, were most helpful
in conducting the research.
156
Some Selected Findings
The analysis of the data suggested that during the
last three development plan, which started in 196 2 and
ended in March 19 78, there was always a shortage of
engineers. Some important findings were the following:
1. In the Third Development Plan, 1962-1967, there
was a demand for 5,600 engineers while the supply
reached 3,065. Therefore, the plan was short by
2,535 engineers.
2. In the Fourth Developing Plan, 196 8-1972, the gap
between the supply of and demand for engineers
grew bigger as the plan was short 7,707 engineers.
3. In the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978, there
was a demand for 36,400 engineers while the supply
reached 20,300. As a result, the plan was short
by 16,100 engineers.
4. In the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972, among
those who studied technical and engineering
education in Iranian schools, 59 percent received
an associate of science; compared to this, only'
7 percent of the Iranians graduated from foreign
engineering schools received associate of science
degrees.
5. In the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972, about
29 percent of the degrees awarded in engineering
by Iranian schools were bachelor's; whereas 56
percent of all engineering degrees earned by
Iranians abroad were bachelor's.
6* In the Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972,
Iranian schools had no graduates of engineering
at the doctoral level. Contrary to this, 8 per
cent of the Iranians graduated in engineering froir
foreign schools received a doctorate.
7. In the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978, among
those who studied technical and engineering
education in Iranian schools, 75 percent received
an associate of science, compared to this only 2.7
percent of Iranians graduated from foreign
engineering colleges and universities received
associate of science degrees.
8. In the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978, about
2 0 percent of the degrees awarded in engineering
schools were bachelor's, whereas 59 percent of all
engineering degrees earned by Iranians abroad
were bachelor's.
9. In the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978, only 4
percent of all engineering degrees awarded in Irar.
were master's. Thirty percent of all engineering
degrees earned by Iranians abroad were master's.
10. In the Fifth Development Plan, 1973-1978, Iranian
schools had no graduates at the doctoral level in
f
158
engineering; 7.4 percent of the Iranians graduated
in engineering from foreign schools received a
Ph.D.
11. In all three development plans, the field of
engineering was heavily dominated by civil,
electrical, and mechanical engineering. This was
true for Iranian schools and returnees from abroad.
Branches so vital to industrialization and
petrochemical industries on which the country was
so heavily dependent (industrial and petro
chemical engineering) enjoyed little importance.
12. In the period of 1970-1975, about 800 Iranian
engineers immigrated to America. For that period,
Iran accounted for 2.1 percent of the total
engineers immigrating to America. By the close
of 1981, due to the Revolution and political,
religious, or social reasons, the number of
Iranian engineers working abroad is estimated to
be extremely high. Although at this time, there
is no specific data available on engineers, Time,
July 6, 1981, reported that since the Revolution
of 1979, about one million educated Iranians had
left the country.
159 .
Conclusions
From the literature on the Iranian economy, job
market, industrialization, politics, and education, it is
concluded that Iran wanted to become an industrial nation.
However, the data presented in this research suggested
that it failed to do so. As the study pointed out, the
need for engineers grew through the years; and since the
system of education did not catch up with the rising
demand, a shortage of engineers emerged. An insufficient
number of engineers was one among many factors responsible
for the failure to industrialize.
The shortage of engineers, a contributing factor
to hindering industrialization, was caused by a chain of
complicated variables. They were complicated because
at the same time they were both cause and effect. For
example, lack of enough engineers was caused by a lack
of enough engineering schools. However, an insufficient
number of schools was caused by non-existent educational
planning at the national level in general and engineering
education in particular.
The study, although implicitly, came up with the
conclusion that education, as other sectors, was dominated
by politics and this even became more evident after the
Revolution of 1979. Of course, domination of education
by political considerations is not unusual as making
changes in the system of education is critically important
and has political consequences. After all, if anything
goes wrong, politicians have to be blamed.
It was concluded that a manpower survey of markets
and industries was never done properly for educational
purposes. Therefore, in establishing new engineering
colleges or expanding the existing ones, the needs of the
market were never taken into consideration. The study
also suggested that in cases where a plan existed,
implementation did not correctly follow. Therefore, what
was achieved was rather different from what had been
planned. The goal of the Third Plan, 1962-1967, which did
not provide for establishing any engineering colleges and
the subsequent establishment of the College of Science
and Industry in 1963 and the Industrial University in
1966, was among the examples of inconsistency between
planning and implementation.
The study also concluded that there was little
cooperation between engineering colleges and industries.
There were some fragmented workshops for practical
training in factories. However, they were conducted
inefficiently and non-systematically.
The study revealed that with the help from oil
money, which enjoyed a sharp increase in late 1973, Iran
thought that it could and indeed should buy more of
everything. Sophisticated machinery was subsequently
imported. In regard to the supply of a cadre of skilled
161
manpower, the policy was to fulfill the immediate demand,
rather than to prepare long-term comprehensive planning to
train the required number of engineers. To meet the
demand as Graham (19 80) reported "By March, 19 77, some
60,000 foreigners possessed work permits. In addition,
some 10,000 or more were thought to be in Iran without
work permits" (p. 119). As mentioned earlier, half of
the foreign personnel in Iran performed technical and
professional jobs.
What an abundance of foreign exchange and the
surplus of capital failed to buy was the supply of
sufficient numbers of indigenous high level manpower
through an indigenous system of higher^ eduoat;io£u Among
different groups which were in short supply, engineers
were needed most and as time went on their shortage
became more acute.
The usefulness and implications of this study can
go beyond Iranian boundaries as oil surplus countries with
their excess of financial capital may end up with a
similar result; that is, not being able to reach develop
ment if their attempts are mono-directed, meaning that
attention is only paid to industrialization and physical
resources while human resource development, and some
sectors like agriculture, are neglected.
162
Re c oimtte n da t i on s
Under the present circumstances, while universities
— a major source of manpower supply— are closed and
industries— a major source of demand for manpower— are not
in full operation, it is most difficult to comment on how
to reach an equilibrium between supply of and demand for
engineers in Iran. In spite of a need for engineers, due
to the closure or partial operation of Iranian factories,
demand is not high for such highly skilled personnel.
Although there is no exact figure available, the guess is
that a large number of engineers are underemployed or
unemployed, working in jobs which have nothing to do with
their education. As discussed previously, the future of
engineers and engineering schools is dependent on the
political events ahead and the policy of the Iranian
regime toward using technology. That is, for example, if
the government chooses not to emphasize the industrial
sector nor to invest in the fields which require engineers
who are not highly trained, the engineering schools will
shrink in terms of both number and quality.
It is only possible to carry out the following
recommendations if the country enjoys a relative political
stability.
1. In development planning a comprehensive
systems approach should be employed. That is, Iranian
society as a system is comprised of several subsectors.
163
Not only should each subsystem be separately studied, the
interaction and interdependence of the subsectors with one
another must also be taken into consideration in
comprehensive development planning. This helps to produce
a balanced growth of all. sectors. It would also assure
that one sector would not expand at the expense of
other sectors.
2. In planning for education in general, and for
training engineers in particular, the needs and demands
of the job market should play a decisive role. This is
only possible through setting up a planning body (probably
a department) that also regulates the expansion of
existing engineering schools or establishing new ones.
This department should be in constant contact with
educational and industrial institutions in order to be
able to forecast the number and types of needed engineers
in the future. This estimate can be provided by
constantly surveying the public and private sectors which
would identify the future demand for engineers.
The engineering planning section should not train
engineers as that is the responsibility of the Ministry
of Higher Education (newly Ministry of Culture and Higher
Education), which should be implemented through engineer
ing schools.
To reduce the duplication of work and to eliminate
overlooking or overexpanding engineering education, all the
164
decisions about engineering education should be made
through an engineering planning section mentioned above.
To avoid excessive centralization, establishing regional
offices may be considered.
3. Planning (even sound planning) for engineers
does not automatically guarantee achievement of the goals
if the plans are not correctly implemented.
No plan should be drawn unless there is a need for
it and when planning is done, its implementation must be
assured by supervision of the planners in cooperation with
the executors. To assure good results, there must be a
constant evaluation of the process to make necessary
adjustments.
4. It is impossible to train the required number
of engineers if enough faculty members are not available.
Therefore, a step must be taken (probably with the help
from the proposed department) to forecast and then to
supply the teaching personnel. In regard to the research
in the field of technology and engineering, it should be
noted that having a Ph.D. by itself does not necessarily
qualify someone to do research. The possibility of using
more non-Ph.D.s (for example, master1s degree holders)
for research and teaching should be investigated. After
considerable and careful examination of the educational
system and the job market, if there is a need, possible
fifit-ahlishmp.ni: of Ph.D. programs in Iran may be considered.
16S
5. In a case where a shortage of engineers
emerges, one way to eliminate, or at least to ease the
problem, is to hire Iranian engineers who reside, study,
and work abroad. The assumption is that there are enough
Iranian engineers abroad. It was reported by Iran Times
(1981c) that in 1981 a total of 47,000 Iranian students
were studying in America. Given the fact that more than
half of these students were in engineering, it is
concluded that about 23,500 Iranian engineers were being
trained in America. In addition, there were also those
who had already finished their education which could be
added to this figure. If incentives and motivations were
provided by the government of Iran, the return and hiring
of Iranian engineers might be a better solution than
employing expatriates, as it fills the Iranian jobs with
Iranians.
6. The Iranian system of education should not be
the sole trainer of engineers. Engineering colleges and
universities need to be helped by industries in providing
practical training for engineering students. Therefore,
it is recommended that practical training be an important
part of the training that engineers receive. On the other
hand, engineers working in factories should be required to
upgrade their knowledge of the field. This is possible
through arranging short-term specialized upgrading work
shops or courses at engineering colleges. __
166
7. To make engineers (who are extremely expensive
to train) free from doing less important jobs and to use
them more efficiently, it is recommended that para-
professionals or technicians be trained in sufficient
numbers. Availability of more technicians and support
staff makes it possible for engineers to take care of
more complicated tasks. This would permit a partial
substitution of engineers by a less scarce type of
manpower, the technicians.
8. To use the existing number of engineers more
efficiently, before more are trained, engineers should be
given jobs which correspond to their education and
experience. By elimination or at least reduction of the
underemployment and underutilization of engineers, more
use can be made of this scarce type of high level
manpower.
One last point is that the system of education is
not only to train engineers and to turn pupils into
robots; instead, education must go beyond this and train
human beings. The ultimate goal of education, therefore,
should be to supply a group of educated people, who do not
only have the brains to work efficiently with machines,
but who have hearts and are ready to sacrifice and work
on the problems faced by mankind.
167
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168
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APPENDIXES
176
APPENDIX A
ADMITTED, ENROLLED, AND GRADUATED
STUDENTS FROM IRANIAN SCHOOLS
BY SPECIALIZATION
Admitted, Enrolled, and Graduated Students from
Iranian Engineering Schools by Specialization
Engineering
Specialty
Adnltted October 1978 Enrollment April 1979 Graduated September 1978
AA BS MS PhD Total AA BS MS PhD Total AA BS MS PhD Total
Technical 9.327 4.526 366 14.219 20.760 18.827 1,427 41,014 7,136 1,863 99 9,098
General 25 25 43 43
Communication 143 143 447 447
Electrotechnical 22 22 22 22
Electronical 37 37 84 84
Electrical 554 66 620 2.479 271 2,750 235 12 247
Petrochemical 107 107 370 26 396 27 5 32
Energy Conversion 45 45 84 84
Traffic 21 21 21 21
Production 44 44 96 96
C1v1l 390 108 498 1.964 390 2,354 125 38 163
Rural 40 40 79 79
Construction 73 73 153 153
Structural 72 6 78 342 14 356 38 1 39
Systems 69 69 154 154
Chemical 289 31 320 837 118 955 91 6 97
Industrial 247 247 1.160 1,160 110 110
Computer 64 64 190 190
Control 37 37 66 66
Gas 21 21 29 29
H
'-J
'vj
Engineering
Specialty
Admitted October 1978
AA BS MS PhD Total
Enrollment April 1979
AA BS MS PhD Total
Graduated September 1978
AA BS MS PhD Total
Design 60 60 121 121
Machine 23 23 23 23
Metallurgical 271 30 301 891 82 973 85 4 89
Minerological 103 27 130 271 113 384 9 2 11
Mechanical 775 55 830 3,348 296 3,644 280 9 289
Mech. (install
ation) 42 42 80 80
Thermomechanical 37 37 81 81
Material 33 1 34 170 1 171 5 5
Mineral material 31 31 55 55
Textile & dyeing 44 44 243 5 248 8 8
Petroleum 24 24 9 9
Nuclear 29 4 33 67 19 86 5 5
Architectural 79 79 548 548 47 47
Total Engineering 3,802 328 4,130 14,524 1,335 15,859 1,117 77 1,194
Source: Statistics of Higher Education in Iran. Tehran Ministry of Science and Higher
Education, Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education, 1980
<1
o o
179
APPENDIX B
ENROLLMENT AND GRADUATES OF IRANIAN
ENGINEERING SCHOOLS
Enrollment and Graduates of Iranian Engineering Schools
Enrollment (1975-1976) Graduates (1974-1975)
All Jr. Under Post- Jr. Under Post-
Institutions Total College Grad. Grad. Total Colleqe Grad. Grad.
151,905 44,555 90,883 16,467 31,576 13,856 15,157 2,563
Universities 65,372 4,166 45,952 15,254 10,442 909 7,162 2,371
Pahlavi Univ. 4,719 411 2,112 2,196 785 112 356 317
College of Engr. ,886 :r ' ' : i ,886 174
■ j -
!
' ' j . 174
Tabriz Univ. 7,102 5,891 1,212 1,349 1,032 317
College of Engr. 682 674 8 92 8 84
Tehran Univ. 18,866 521 10,971 7,374 3,211 117 1,981 1,113
College of Engr. 1,279 1,279 148 49 99
Aryameh Univ.
of Tech. 3,086 3,007 79 282 264 18
Coll. Elec. Engr. 572 572 79 78 1
Coll. Struc. Engr. 329 324 5 12 12
Coll. Chem. Engr. 312 312 79 78 1
Coll. Ind. Engr. 334 334 12 12
Coll. Metalurg. E. 318 318 16 16
Coll. Mech. Engr. 614 614 57 57
Meshad Univ. 5,085 49 3,937 1,094 542 26 381 135
Coll. Engr. 29 29
O O
O
Enrollment (1975-1976)____________ Graduates_ (1974-1975)_______
Jr. Under Post- Jr. Under Post-
Total College Grad. Grad. Total College Grad. Grad.
Autonomous
Public Inst. 8,904 1,132 7,727 45 1,273 1,721 2
Tehran Polytech. 1,252 1,207 45 206 204 2
Coll. Science
& Tech. 4,497 4,497 683 683
Affiliated Inst. 29,716 23,383 5,623 810 12,726 11,969 689 68
Abadan Coll.
Petro Engr. 389 389 47 47
Private Inst. 37,813 5,874 31,581 358 7,135 978 6,035 122
Naficy Techni com 1,333 708 625 140 140
Source statistics of Higher Education in Iran, Ministry of Science and Higher
Education, Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education, 1976
181

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Creator Sobhe, Keykhosrow (author)

Core Title Educational planning, supply of and demand for engineers: A mismatch in Iran

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Education

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