The effect of Kohlberg's theory of moral development in the parochial secondary classroom on levels of moral judgment and dogmatism

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Content THE EFFECT OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE PAROCHIAL SECONDARY CLASSROOM ON LEVELS
OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND DOGMATISM
by
Charles Edgar Schlimpert
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Education)
June 1980
UMI Number: DP24732
All rights reserved
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been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
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//
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES...................................... iv
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION.................................. 1
Statement of the Problem
Purpose of the Study
Importance of the Study
Questions to be Answered
Central Research Problem
Conceptual Assumptions
Delimitations
Limitations
Definition of Terms
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE.......................... 13
Introduction
Conceptual Background
Experimental Precedents
III. METHODOLOGY.................................. 61
Research Design and Statistical Analysis
Selection and Classification of Subjects
Instrumentation
Treatments
Data Collection/ Processing# and Analysis
Precautions
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS......... 77
Analysis of Results
Interpretation of Findings
Summary
ii
Chapter Page
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . 102
Summary
Conclusions and Implications
Recommendations
REFERENCES............................................. 112
APPENDICES
A. A Lesson Plan for Leading Discussions of
Moral Dilemmas ......................... 128
B. Original Dilemmas Created by the Students . . 131
C. Lecture Outline--Control Treatment ........... 133
iii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Means and Adjusted Means for Immediate
Posttests Using the Defining Issues
Test (N = 395)................. 78
2. Means and Adjusted Means for Immediate
Posttests Using Rokeach's Dogmatism
Scale— Form E (N = 3 9 5 ) ................... 79
3. Results of Analysis of Covariance on
Immediate Posttests Using the Defining
Issues Test (N = 3 9 5 ) .......... 81
4. Results of Analysis of Covariance on
Immediate Posttests Using Rokeach's
Dogmatism Scale— Form E (N = 3 9 5 ) ......... 82
5. Control Group Correlation Matrix for Scores
on the Defining Issues Test and the
Dogmatism Scale— Form E ................... 84
6. Experimental Group Correlation Matrix for
Scores on the Defining Issues Test and
the Dogmatism Scale— Form E ................ 84
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Teachers and learners have been engaged in the endeavor
to discover and establish principles of right and wrong
since the beginning of recorded history. A recent Gallup
Poll (1978) indicated parents of students are still looking
for professional educators to lead in this discovery.
Seventy-nine percent of those polled affirmed the idea that
schools should teach morals and moral education.
Within the past few years numerous books and hundreds
of articles have been written on the topic of moral develop
ment and moral education. As one observes the rise in
delinquency and crime/ the breakdown of marriage and the
home, Watergate, My Lai, and other distressing signs of the
times the demand for moral education as part of the school
curriculum grows.
From this perspective the cognitive-developmental
approach to moral education in the tradition of Piaget
(1932) and now Kohlberg (1958, 1963a, 1963b) has emerged
1
2
to explain what it is we mean by the terms moral and moral
education. The work of Kohlberg has received increasing
emphasis in educational circles and more recently has re
ceived the attention of church school educators.
Statement of the Problem
One goal mentioned often in the Christian Church and
also a topic of recent interest in educational research
literature is moral development/ and more often than not,
is subjected to the same indoctrination approach used to
educate church members in matters of faith. The stated
goals of such movements are oftentimes contradictory, con
fusing, or even absent and the results of these movements
have not at all been subjected to or supported by scien
tific research. In addition, the very word "indoctrinate1 1
has taken on extremely negative connotations. The Christian
Church, by virtue of its existence and purpose, has also
received increased criticism. If the Christian Church is
to be effective in the training of its young, it must dif
ferentiate matters of faith from moral reasoning and admit
that it does not have a preeminent position on moral educa
tion.
3
The challenge of educating persons to be morally
mature individuals has occupied the minds of the great
philosophers of the world since the time of Plato and
before. Morality which is specifically Christian has not
been found; yet, the Christian Church continues to play an
important role in the socialization of its members. Both
with respect to the Church and to the world, religious
educators want to investigate the impact of recent theoreti
cal positions in the area of moral development on its mem
bers .
While there has been a heavy amount of research in
both moral development and moral education in the past two
decades, a thorough reading indicates the subject is still
in its infancy. Wilson (1974) suggests that research in
moral development and education is not conclusive but that
it does seem to support the need for further investigation
as well as provide some direction for that research.
In recent years Kohlberg (1958, 1963a, 1963b, 1969,
1975) has done some significant research in moral education
based on the earlier work of Piaget. He argues that the
development of moral judgment and character can be described
as a cognitive developmental process producing movement
4
through a series of moral stages. Among the generaliza
tions derived from related research is the belief that
development occurs in a series of invariant sequenced
stages; that development occurs because of an attraction
to the next higher stage of reasoning. Most importantly
for this study/ the stages defined do not constitute cul
tural beliefs taught to children directly.
The problem takes on expanded relevance for the Chris
tian educator since recent explications of the "moral"
individual are most often negatively correlated with a
prominent characteristic of religiously oriented persons/
that of dogmatism. The theory of open-mindedness and
closed-mindedness (dogmatism) has been well formulated by
social psychologist Milton Rokeach (1960, 1970). He refers
to dogmatism in these terms: "The more closed a system,
the more is the acceptance of a particular belief assumed
to depend on irrelevant internal drives and or arbitrary
reinforcements from external authority." Kemp (1961)
describes the dogmatic person as one who finds new situ
ations, ideas, and even opportunities as threatening.
Since much of the work by Piaget and Kohlberg is based on
the introduction of dissonance into the individual's world
5
of moral reasoning, it seems appropriate that the resulting
levels of dogmatism should also be investigated.
The proposed study is directed to defining ways of
helping adolescent students develop their moral reasoning,
particularly within the Christian context, and to the
description of the results of such research on a prominent
characteristic of religiously oriented persons, i.e.,
dogmatism. Kohlberg's theory suggests that moral education
is not socializing or indoctrinating, but that it seeks
to stimulate the reasoning of the child in a manner natural
to his stage of development. The attempt in this study,
therefore, will be to work with the dimension of moral
reasoning through the stimulation rather than the direct
teaching of moral values. Moral stage theory supports this
type of application by positing that the central dynamic of
moral development is moral conflict. Scharf (1978) opines
that introducing students to new moral perspectives, and
placing old ideas in doubt, stimulates movement to the next
stage. Repeating moral truisms or punishing bad behavior,
in contrast, may have little impact on the child's moral
ideas.
Blatt and Kohlberg (197 3) first outlined the practical
6
applications of the cognitive developmental approach to
moral education. They discovered that the "moral dis
cussion" approach was a method capable of stimulating the
development of moral reasoning. The results show that
teachers must provide students with experiences which
"stretch" their existing thinking which, in turn, initiates
the process of building a more complex structure for inte
grating more complex experiences. One teaching strategy
which has been developed to stimulate both cognitive con
flict and students' perspective taking ability is the
presentation of moral dilemmas. This format, called the
"moral discussion" format, calls for the discussion and
resolution of open-ended moral problems— those which in
volve the conflicting rights, claims, or responsibilities
of various people in hypothetical or real situations with
no clear solution. Employing a discussion of moral dilemmas
approach with adolescents in the secondary classroom as a
part of the regular instruction process will provide new
perspectives while working within the bounds of the stu
dents 1 maturity and experience. The research indicates
that when teachers present moral dilemmas, encourage
interaction among students at different levels of moral
7
reasoning, ask open-ended "probing" questions, and pose
arguments above a student's current level of reasoning that
moral development can be stimulated.
The basic purpose of the proposed study was to test
planned variations of an application of Kohlberg's theory
of moral development in secondary parochial classrooms.
While several recent attempts have focused on Kohlberg's
blueprint for the moral aspect of adolescent development,
Mosher and Sullivan (1978, p. 85) indicate "the major
educational and curricular applications of Kohlberg's
theory remain to be tested." The results of this study
should have direct implications for future secondary school
curriculum designs, in both religious and public education.
Purpose of the Study
The study was designed to:
1. Determine the effects of an experimental curricu
lum intervention designed to raise levels of moral
judgment on the levels of moral judgment as
postulated by Kohlberg and on the levels of dog
matism among parochial secondary students.
2. Analyze the relationship between the levels of
moral judgment and dogmatism as a result of the
experimental curriculum intervention designed to
raise moral judgment levels among parochial
secondary students.
8
Importance of the Study
Since religious literature abounds with opinions of
various procedures used within the church setting designed
to foster moral development/ the results of this study
should provide empirical evidence related to the effects
of one of these procedures. The results of this study may
also indicate the advisability of promoting this type of
training within the Church if one of the Church's major
goals is that of imparting certain beliefs to its members
which are to be held as certain without doubt. If the
Church wishes its members to have such positiveness about
its teachings, the results of this experiment may show that
an intervention which lowers levels of dogmatism is a
hindrance rather than a help to achieving the Church's
goals. If, on the other hand, the Church is more concerned
about the personal effectiveness of its members in this
world, then the study might possibly be used to assist in
future curriculum designs in moral education for the paro
chial secondary classroom.
9
Questions to be Answered
The research will seek to answer the following ques
tions :
1. Does participation in moral dilemma discussions
designed to raise moral judgment levels among
parochial secondary students significantly affect
adolescents' levels of moral judgment?
2. Does participation in moral dilemma discussions
designed to raise moral judgment levels among
parochial secondary students significantly affect
adolescents' levels of dogmatism?
3. How are the change scores in levels of moral
reasoning related to the change scores in levels
of dogmatism?
Central Research Problem
The central research problem will be concerned with
determining the effects of a moral dilemma discussion train
ing program designed to raise moral judgment levels using
two populations of adolescents: (1) one experimental group
of adolescents who participate in a conventional secondary
class in religion (lecture and discussion) at a parochial
high school with additional time spent in discussing moral
dilemmas; and (2) a control group of adolescents who par
ticipate in a conventional secondary class in religion
with the addition of one or two lecture periods covering
10
the proposed outcomes of engaging in discussions of moral
dilemmas (will serve to rule out the effects of sets due to
directions, etc., in number one).
It is proposed, therefore, that participation in moral
dilemma discussions designed to raise moral judgment
levels among parochial secondary students will have a sig
nificant effect on levels of both moral judgment and
dogmatism.
Conceptual Assumptions
The following assumptions were implicit in the in
vestigation :
1. The stages of moral reasoning proposed by
Kohlberg (1958) constitute a valid framework
within which the moral reasoning levels of
adolescents may be conceptualized.
2. Exposure to training which encourages the develop
ment of the use of moral judgment in working with
moral dilemmas will intrigue the student and
promote student participation.
3. The subjects employed in this investigation have
not been exposed to discussions of Kohlbergian
type moral dilemmas in their formal schooling.
4. Basic moral norms and principles are structures
arising through experiences of social interaction,
rather than through internalization of rules that
exist as external structures (Kohlberg, 1976).
11
5. Environmental influences in moral development are
defined by the general quality and extent of
cognitive and social stimulation throughout the
child's development (Kohlberg, 1976).
Delimi ta tion s
The investigation was subject to the following delimi
tations:
1. This study was limited to students enrolled in
regular courses of study at Christian secondary
schools in grades 9-12, thus also limiting the
generalizability of the findings to such popula
tions.
2. The moral dilemmas used in class discussions were
constructed by the investigator. Materials
adapted from other sources were acknowledged.
3. The study did not concern itself with the rela
tionship between moral reasoning and direct
measures of moral behavior.
Limitations
The investigation was subject to the following limita
tions that served to narrow its focus and generalizability:
1. The reliability and validity of the test instru
ments selected for use in this study affected
the outcomes of the study.
2. The outcome of the study was affected by the
degree of cooperation by teaching and testing
personnel connected with this study.
12
3. There was no completely adequate control over the
possibility that the students carried discussion
of the moral dilemmas presented in class outside
the class, thus receiving some additional practice
in the solving of moral dilemmas.
4. The application of treatments was restricted to
the use of intact classrooms where the experi
mental and control groups did not have pre-
experimental sampling equivalence made possible
by the random assignment of subjects to treatments.
Definition of Terms
1. Moral Education— a deliberate process of assisting
members of society to develop from a naive self
orientation concerning their rights and obligations
to a broader view of self-in-society.
2. Religious Education— Christian religious education,
and religious instruction based on the Bible.
3. Dogmatism— the extent to which a person is authori
tarian and generally intolerable toward other
points of view. The more authoritarian in demeanor
and intolerable toward another's point of view a
person is the more dogmatic he is and vice versa.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter presents the theoretical and experimental
framework for the investigation of moral development re
ported in this research. The conceptual background,
presented first, serves as a point of reference for the
study and 'provides a look at the Kohlberg model of moral
development (Kohlberg, 1958, 1963a, 1963b), the construct
of dogmatism as posited by Rokeach (1960), and the relation
ship between moral development and religion (Gustafson,
1970; Kohlberg, 1967; Wright, 1971). Selected supportive
theoretical and empirical works are cited as a part of this
discussion. A second section of this chapter critiques the
several experimental precedents involving attempts at
raising levels of moral reasoning and their applicability
to the research problem of the present investigation.
13
14
Conceptual Background
Moral Education
Moral education and values have been the focal point
of a struggle in American schools for at least a century.
Prescribed morality is positioned at one end of the con
tinuum while an attempt to remove all discussion of morality
from the classroom is found at the other end. There are
many positions along this continuum of indoctrination—
relativism and the resulting confusion pose special problems
for educators who wish to help students in this sensitive
area.
There is little doubt that the recent surge of interest
during the past decade in moral education has in its origin
dissatisfaction with the product of contemporary educational
programs, particularly with regard to the development of
personal maturity and responsibility. Tyler (1974) indi
cated that the opportunities provided children in schools
to learn responsibility seem to work in reverse of what is
really desired. While the goal is for students to learn
to act responsibly and from a position of concern for
others, the schools tend to remove any such opportunity
by serving the students and planning for them. Other
15
indications of dissatisfaction are reported in major works
by Lickona (1976), Scharf (1978a), and Hersch et al. (1979).
All point to recent reactions of parents to the inability
of public education to prevent such incidents as Watergate,
My Lai, and illegal corporate payoffs. Whether or not
parents are justified in their criticisms, such reactions
kindle renewed interest in programs of moral education.
One difficulty associated with work in the area of
moral education is the number of different approaches to
moral development and education available for use by the
professional educator. Recent overviews of moral develop
ment theories and research (Beck et al., 1971; Chazan and
Soltis, 1973; Graham, 1972; Kay, 1975; Maccoby, 1968;
Scharf, 1978b, 1978c) indicate the lack of consensus on the
proper goals of moral education. Educational philosophers
continue to speculate about moral education and its objec
tives which suggest how a child may be taught to distinguish
between right and wrong. Scharf (1978c) described three
contrasting philosophies and approaches to moral education
prevalent in American education today.
The first is a system by which social virtues (or what
is "right11) are taught through Systematic application
16
of scientific learning theory after the particular com
munity has determined what is good for the community.
Children and adults can be taught to conform to particular
behavioral norms through the systematic application of
rewards and punishments. Moral education within this
system emphasizes the training of children to conform to
social rules. One of the major proponents of this approach
is Skinner (1948) whose application of modern behavioral
psychology has created an educational science called be
havior modification. Many educators trained in the
behavioral sciences would argue that moral behavior can be
taught directly through the application of behavior modi
fication techniques.
The second approach to moral education as depicted by
Scharf views moral development as the antithesis of the
social pressures and restrictions found in the educational
philosophy of the behaviorist. The "romantic" teacher
"seeks to maintain the child's sense of natural autonomy
and inner direction and to protect him from becoming dog
matic/ other-directed/ or neurotic as a result of his
contact with an authoritarian society" (p. 24). This
perspective of moral education/ then, reacts strongly
17
in opposition to the inculcating of social norms and stan
dards and, instead, seeks to encourage the child to express
himself freely, protected from social pressures and restric
tions. One type of "romantic” curriculum intervention is
the values clarification approach in which the student's
personal values are brought into clearer focus— personal
change results from greater self-understanding (Simon
et al. , 1973). A person becomes moral only by understand
ing his own values and priorities.
In yet another view, moral education is synonymous
with philosophical inquiry and morality exists as a philo
sophic concept rather than as a particular set of social or
personal values. Moral truth is discoverable through
logical philosophical inquiry and not by indoctrination or
personal insight. Scharf (1978c, p. 25) indicated two
central postulates for this position:
1. Education is defined by progressive movement
toward ultimate moral truth.
2. Movement toward truth is achieved by dialectical
inquiry.
This approach to moral education/ first encountered in such
educators as Socrates and Plato, was an integral part of
Dewey's (1959) position on moral principles and the moral
18
education of children, and has recently surfaced again in
the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education
proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg (1958). The present study
focused on a systematic attempt to change the moral reason
ing of children within the cognitive-developmental frame
work. Both Piaget and Kohlberg have suggested ways in
which modern developmental psychology might focus on the
issue of moral development and, particularly, ways to
include practices from the Socratic educational tradition
in modern moral education.
In 1958 Kohlberg began a series of papers (1958,
1963a, 1963b, 1966, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1975,
1976, 1978) arguing that the development of moral judg
ment and character can be described as a movement through
moral stages. Kohlberg indicated his approach began to
take form in 1955 after initiating a redefinition of
Dewey's (1964) and Piaget's (1932) thinking on the stages
of moral development. During infancy and early childhood
the individual manifests behaviors which clearly identify
his dependence on others and his desire for rapid gratifica
tion of his wants. His preprogrammed egocentricity and
lack of physical and cognitive development deny him the
19
ability to return what is done for him/ and he appears/
therefore/ to be a self-serving individual, oblivious to
the needs of others. He may vigorously avoid what he dis
likes and pursue with equal vigor any felt need.
This stage is often referred to as the heteronomous
or other-directed stage and through a prolonged process of
social/ physical, and cognitive development the individual
is expected to advance from this stage to the autonomous
stage. At this latter stage the individual is deemed
capable of behaving independently but with certain quali
fications governing his conduct. For example, through his
long period of socialization he should have developed an
ability to respect the rights of others. He should have
also developed a sense of responsibility for his own be
havior and for the well being of others.
Obviously, these two positions represent polar points
on the developmental continuum. They are referred to by
Kohlberg (1975) as the preconventional and postconventional
stages (p. 671). At the lower extremity of the preconven
tional stage an individual cannot comprehend, or he ignores,
what is thought to be morally right or wrong, good or bad;
and he may conform with the expectations of others only
20
under the threat of punishment or promise of reward. Before
the postconventional stage, however, he will have gone
through a socializing experience in which he has learned
and accepted the "right1 ' and "wrong, " the "good" and the
"bad" things of his society. Through this socializing
experience the individual is expected not only to learn the
conventions of his society but, in general, to accept them
and conform to them. Kohlberg appropriately named this
process the conventional stage.
From childhood through early adolescence the individual
adopts the behavioral expectations of those with whom he
interacts— parents, teachers, peers, and others— and through
them, the rules of society. He comes to respect the rights
of others and to regard the rules of his society as a means
of guaranteeing that justice will be served to all. Like
Piaget, Kohlberg describes this preconventional, conven
tional, postconventional sequence as developmental and by
definition, therefore, it implies the following character
istics :
1. Stages are "structured wholes," or organized
systems of thought. Individuals are consistent
in level of moral judgment.
21
2. Stages form an invariant sequence. Under all
conditions except extreme trauma, movement is
always forward, never backward. Individuals never
skip stages; movement is always to the next stage
up.
3. Stages are "hierarchical integrations." Thinking
at a higher stage includes or comprehends within
it lower-stage thinking. There is a tendency to
function at or prefer the highest stage available.
(Kohlberg, 1975, p. 671)
Evidence for the validity of Kohlberg's stage sequence
comes from several sources. Kohlberg's empirical studies
began with a longitudinal study (Kohlberg, 1958) of boys
between the ages of ten to sixteen and an additional study
of boys between the ages of ten and sixteen in cities of
Taiwan, Mexico, and in isolated villages in Turkey and
Yucatan (Kohlberg, 1969). The six stages of moral reason
ing were constructed based on responses obtained from the
subjects of the initial study and longitudinal data were
compiled by following fifty of the original subjects from
the same study over a period of twelve years. Further
support for the stage sequence of moral reasoning has been
collected in a number of studies conducted by researchers
other than Kohlberg, and although the results are by no
means conclusive at this point they do give some indication
as to what claims are being made in this area.
22
The question of whether movement through the stage
sequence is both invariant and hierarchical has received
empirical support from a number of studies. The generality
underlying the concept of "invariance1 1 has been studied by
Turiel (1966, 1969). In this study Turiel exposed seventh-
grade American children to statements both above and below
their own moral orientations. A third of the group was
exposed to reasoning on how to solve a moral dilemma that
was one stage below their own level of reasoning, a second
third was exposed to similar reasoning that was one stage
above their own level of reasoning, and the final third was
exposed to reasoning two stages above their own level.
Turiel learned by means of a posttest that preadolescents
will learn or assimilate moral argumentation one level
above their own more readily than they will learn or assimi
late moral argumentation one level below their own or even
two stages above their own. In fact, the level having the
least effect was that two stages above the subject's own
stage. Turiel indicated that these findings support the
contention that the moral stages form a developmental
continuum in which a fixed sequence is followed by each
individual and that stages are not skipped. In addition,
23
the fact that exposure to stages one stage below the sub
ject's own stage was not as influential as stages one above
the subject's own supports the idea that the attainment of
a stage of thought involves restructuring and displacement
of the previous stages (Langer, 1969; Turiel/ 1974, 1977).
In a similar experiment (Rest et al./ 1969) forty-five
preadolescent and adolescent subjects from a Catholic
parochial school in New York were presented with a list of
responses to a moral dilemma including one response at each
of the six stages. In an attempt to replicate and examine
implications of the Turiel (1966) study, Rest chose to
investigate the hierarchical and invariant nature of the
Kohlberg moral stages. This position assumes that each
stage passed through is retained and accessible, although
lower stages are subordinated to the higher stages. The
results of the study indicate support for this position
when it was shown that reasoning one stage above the sub
ject's own level had the most appeal for him. More
explicitly, children preferred concepts that are above
their dominant stage, they found thinking above the domi
nant stage increasingly more difficult to comprehend than
stages below their own, and they assimilated thinking that
24
is one stage above their own stage more readily than think
ing that is either one stage below or two stages above
their own. This last finding provided direct support for
the contention of an invariant sequence of stages as posed
by Kohlberg.
Also relevant to the issue of moral development as a
series of stages is a study by Rest (197 3) supporting the
claim that each succeeding stage is more cognitively dif
ferentiated and integrated than the preceding one, and that
each succeeding stage is more conceptually adequate.
Nearly 50% of his subjects were able to understand moral
statements from a level one above their own. Since most of
these subjects also showed "substantial" (at least 20%)
usage of the next higher level of moral reasoning on their
pretest it was determined that subjects generally" did not
understand the orientation above their own unless they were
already using that orientation in some instances. The data
supported the hypothesis that comprehension scores should
be high up to the subject's predominant pretest stage and
then progressively decrease, thus providing pertinent
evidence for the claim of the consecutive sequence of stage
development.
25
Critical to the validation of Kohlberg1s stage theory
of moral development are longitudinal data supporting the
claim of the hierarchical nature of the stages and their
invariant sequence. The completion and publication of
Kohlberg's longitudinal study will greatly help in this
regard, but as yet the results have not been published.
Recently/ however, two longitudinal studies appeared sup
porting the validity of the stages of moral, development.
Holstein (1976) conducted a three year longitudinal study
of fifty-two American adolescents and their parents in an
attempt to validate the stepwise sequence and irreversi
bility of levels (as opposed to individual stages) in the
Kohlberg model. The data reported indicate that movement
is stepwise and sequential from level to level (not stage
to stage) for young adolescents. As for the issue of
irreversibility, however, the subjects at higher stages
showed a significant tendency to regress, while the lower
stage subjects almost always were more likely to advance.
In a similar vein Kuhn (1976) investigated the sequentiality
of stages over a period of one year by examining the pro
gression of fifty elementary students through stages of
moral reasoning. The assessment of changes in moral
26
judgment scores over six months offered little support for
the sequentiality hypothesis, but over the longer period of
one year significant progressive change was reported. It
was argued that considerable short-term fluctuation cited
as evidence to support the null hypothesis may have been
due to measurement error or to genuine fluctuation in the
individual's judgment.
To the above support for the hierarchical and sequen
tial structure of stages described by Kohlberg another type
of evidence is provided in a recent study by Davison et al.
(1978). By applying multidimensional scaling and factor
analysis to the responses of nearly two hundred high school,
college, and graduate students, the authors were able to
demonstrate that the patterning of stage scores within and
across subjects is consistent with the hypothesis that
moral judgment development proceeds by the gradual replace
ment of lower stage reasoning by higher modes of thought.
Specifically, the data support Kohlberg's contentions that
1. the reasoning of adjacent stages is more similar
than the reasoning of non-adjacent stages
2. there is an ordering of the stages
3. the ordering corresponds to the theoretically
predicted sequence
(Davison et al., 1978, p. 140)
27
A final type of empirical evidence comes from the
intervention studies in which the major effect is to move
subjects up in the postulated order. Blatt and Kohlberg
(1973) explored the effects of guided peer discussion of
moral conflicts upon junior and senior high school students'
reasoning. Replicating Blatt's earlier study (1969) the
investigation took place in both Chicago and Boston schools
and found that the experimental students (those exposed to
the classes) increased an average of nearly one-third of a
moral stage. In addition, the observed changes were in
variably one stage higher. That is, students who started
at stage three moved toward stage four but never as high as
stages five or six. These findings have been replicated in
a variety of settings (Bennet, 1976; Boyd, 1977; Hickey,
1972; Keefe, 1975; McCann, 1975) and have created a great
deal of enthusiasm because they provide indications that
the stages of moral judgment hypothesis posited by Kohlberg
probably offer a key to help understand moral development
(Rest, 1976).
While researchers warn readers regarding the tentative
nature of the findings in the development of moral reason
ing, generalizations available (Fenton, 1976) encourage
28
educational leaders to consider the implications of this
research for pedagogical practices. During the past ten
years "moral education" has received renewed impetus based
on the findings of the available studies. At the same time,
however, Kohlberg's work on the development of moral judg
ment has not been without its critics; increased popularity
of developmental theory has brought with it increased
criticism of its central tenets and axioms. Scharf (1978c)
indicated:
The issues raised by Kohlberg's critics are funda
mental to both developmental theory as well as to the
educational approaches which follow from it. Many of
their objections seem resolvable within the develop
mental framework, but they are worth considering if
the reader is to make a reasoned assessment of the
educational implications of developmental theory.
(pp. 71-72)
One of the most controversial aspects of Kohlberg's
theory is found in his direct challenge to the issue of
"cultural relativity." When the norms and values of a par
ticular society are viewed as unique to that society to the
point where they may be judged only within the perspective
of that society and by its standards, those norms and
values are identified as "relative to that culture." In
opposition to the developmental position this perspective
allows no universally valid moral principles which can be
29
applied to all societies. Kohlberg's early and ongoing
research (1958/ 1969) indicated that development follows
the same progress in different societies.
Fraenkel (1978) expressed concern over this postula
tion of the "universality" for the stage development of
moral reasoning, even though Kohlberg's work to date has
supported the idea. In stating his reservations Fraenkel
suggested that the sample utilized by Kohlberg was much too
small to make such a sweeping generalization and also cited
contradictory evidence (Turnbull, 1972) which would appear
to demonstrate cultural relativity of some human values
such as justice. Also critical of Kohlberg's contention
regarding the universality of the stages of moral reasoning
is E. L. Simpson (1974) who pointed out that Kohlberg's
cross-cultural evidence is more ideological than scientific.
Referring to the small samples used in support of this con
tention she criticized Kohlberg for a lack of sensitivity
toward the cultural variables in different settings. In
addition, Bandura and McDonald (1963) have argued that
moral judgments can be directly affected by social in
fluence. They found, for example, that "children's judg
mental responses are readily modifiable, particularly
through the utilization of adult modeling cues" (p. 280).
This position was underlined and further supported more
recently by Flowers (1978).
Kohlberg's framework does not require the stage struc
ture of moral development to be demonstrated by any other
means than "verbal responses" to hypothetical dilemmas
which are then used to predict the moral process which will
be used to solve ethical conflicts in a variety of social
contexts. Joining Simpson and Fraenkel/ related criticisms
of this assumption are found in Kurtines and Grief (1974).
In their view the research of Kohlberg and his associates
is beset with a multitude.of problems which detract from
the model's usefulness. In regard to the issue of using
verbal responses they consider the use of verbal responses
to be anything but reliable indicators of the relationship
between moral reasoning and moral action, and argue that
"individuals at different stages can exhibit the same be
haviors using different types of reasoning, whereas indi
viduals at the same stage can exhibit different behaviors
using the same type of reasoning" (p. 459). In addition,
Simpson (1974) claimed that such an assumption leads the
interested reader to equate higher stages of moral reasoning
31
with verbal sophistication. Sullivan (1978) continued in
this vein by pointing to what he considers shortcomings in
the way that Kohlberg treats the relationship between judg
ment and action.
With a few exceptions, however, these critics of
Kohlberg's position agree that the impact of his theory has
been significant, particularly in the areas of philosophy,
psychology, and education. More friendly critics (Gibbs,
1977; Scharf, 1978b) suggest that the contentions of
Kohlberg and his associates should be regarded as hypo
theses rather than scientific fact, and that the majority
of the research "frontier" still lies ahead. Even though
the apparent ambiguity in the research findings poses some
serious questions, it is argued that educators and psy
chologists should "become acquainted with developmental
moral education as an alternative set of propositions and
assumptions" (Scharf, 1978b). He then goes on to outline
the history of developmental research in the field of moral
education and indicates six areas of research, the first
three of which are well defined and the second set of three
which are still in the beginning stages of conceptualiza
tion. As research is continued by developmental psycholo
gists and educators it is argued that more conclusive
32
evidence for/against the Kohlberg model will be forth
coming.
At the same time, the response to the critics should
not include postponement of any type of application until
the research is more conclusive. Scharf argues that the
timetable for educators is much different than that for
research psychologists. In the position of educator one is
forced to choose immediately among conflicting theories of
education— criticisms of the type discussed previously are
also found in other areas related to teaching practice and
have not necessarily deterred progress. Developmental
moral education is offered as an alternative to existing
approaches to the moral education of the child and, as such,
deserves empirical investigation and verification.
Dogmatism Model
The theory of openmindedness and closedmindedness
(dogmatism) as formulated by social psychologist Milton
Rokeach (1954, 1960, 1970) provides the theoretical frame
work for this section of the review. For more than two
decades Rokeach has been investigating the internal struc
ture of belief systems and has tried to discover conditions
for their modification. He began his research with the
33
observation that dogmatism is basically an organization of
belief-disbelief systems, that individuals were either open
or closed (dogmatic) about various things, and that dog
matism can be placed on a continuum ranging from open to
closed with the term "closedminded" being used inter
changeably with "dogmatic."
Rokeach1s analysis of this array of systems began with
this definition of dogmatism: "(a) a relatively closed
organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality,
(b) organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute
authority which, in turn, (c) provides a framework for pat
terns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others"
(Rokeach, 1954, p. 194). This organized structure serves
two purposes. An individual has a need to know and to
understand while at the same time experiencing a need to
ward off threatening aspects of reality (Rokeach, 1960).
Vacchiano (1977) claimed that both needs will often
operate independently to varying degrees. An open system
is characterized by a predominant need to know which reality
is nonthreatening. In this instance the individual is per
mitted to evaluate and react to objective reality. On the
other hand, the system becomes closed when reality becomes
34
threatening. In this case the need to know lessens and the
individual finds he cannot separate information from source/
and identifies with an absolute authority or cause. For
instance, Rokeach postulated that the dogmatic person
identifies with authorities who support his belief system.
This identification permits the individual to defend him
self against anxiety caused by feelings of isolation and
self-depreciation.
Further examination of this component of Rokeach's
definition emphasized intolerance toward opposition (Gold
stein and Blackman, 1978). Since the individual's cognitive
system is organized into belief and disbelief systems
Rokeach postulated that the dogmatic individual polarizes
his beliefs and rejects individuals whose beliefs fall at
the opposite pole. Basically, the belief system is made up
of ideas an individual accepts as true and the disbelief
system is comprised of a number of ideas an individual
rejects as false. Rokeach (1956) illustrated this point
in suggesting that an individual holding the belief system
of "Catholicism" can be best understood if his attitudes
toward Catholicism are studied along with his disbelief
systems of Lutheranism, Calvinism, Judaism, and so on.
35
The study of dogmatism by Rokeach began as a reaction
to criticism leveled at the California F Scale (Adorno
et al./ 1950) which was felt to be high directional, i.e.,
it measured a political "right" authoritarianism as opposed
to a more general authoritarianism which included both
extremes on a political continuum. His concept of dogma
tism was put forth as a generalized theory of authoritarian
ism (Rokeach, 1960) and many of its major hypotheses have
been substantiated.
In an early review (Vacchiano et al., 1969) research
was presented which supported Rokeach's claims concerning
his measure of dogmatism, the Dogmatism Scale. It was felt
on the basis of research conducted in the 1960's that
Rokeach had indeed created a measure which was a more
generalized measure of authoritarianism than the F Scale.
In one of the earliest studies Plant (1960) supported
Rokeach's contention that the Dogmatism Scale was a better
measure of general authoritarianism than the F Scale because
of his findings using a relatively large sample (N = 2350)
of American students. A factor analysis of items on both
the F Scale and the Dogmatism Scale also supported this
contention. Kerlinger and Rokeach (1966) noted a "common
36
core" of authoritarianism underlying both scales, but a
second order factor analysis demonstrated that the two
scales were factorially discriminable, with the Dogmatism
Scale representing a generalized authoritarianism inde
pendent of a particular ideological content. Barker (1963)
also demonstrated the independence of the Dogmatism Scale
from political ideology but did find it was related to a
sense of commitment to a particular position on the politi
cal spectrum.
An attempt to demonstrate that the Dogmatism Scale was
not entirely independent of ideological orientation reported
significant correlations between the Dogmatism Scale and
pro-Vietnam (or pro war) attitudes (Bailes and Guller,
1970). However, Granberg and Corrigan (1972), after study
ing the same issue, found that although the Dogmatism Scale
was ideologically correlated to a slight extent with pro-
Vietnam attitudes it was significantly less so than a modi
fied version of the F Scale. They concluded that although
Rokeach did not succeed completely in developing an ideo
logically free measure of authoritarianism, his scale was
significantly less ideologically correlated than the
modified F Scale used in their study.
37
Rokeach's theory of dogmatism also indicated the more
closed a person's belief system, the more difficulty he
would have in discriminating between the information re
ceived and its source (authority). In the same vein,
Vacchiano (1977) expected highly dogmatic persons to show
a greater dependency on absolute authority, to be more
easily influenced by authority, and to confuse the veracity
of the authority with the status of the authority. Kemp
(1963) demonstrated the dependence of the highly dogmatic
person on authority figures in his work in the area of
counselor training. Since the dogmatic (closed) person was
believed to distort meanings and review his responses in
light of the demands of the situation, it was also felt
the more dogmatic a person was the more he would adjust his
thinking and responses to the degree he felt was acceptable
and in accordance with the perceived demands of the in
structor. Kemp's findings supported this position and
argued that emphasis in counselor training programs should
be placed on assisting the counselor to understand his own
personality dynamics since his counseling, if genuine,
would be in agreement with his inner attitudes.
Later, Kemp (1963) discovered that low-dogmatic
38
subjects perceive authority more realistically than high-
dogmatic subjects, recognizing both their positive as well
as negative characteristics. Feather (1967), studying the
relationship between dogmatism and membership in religious
groups, found that high-dogmatics among religious groups
that are dependent on authority tolerate little argument in
adherence to religious beliefs.
Problem-solving situations provided Rokeach (1960)
with additional evidence of the relation between dogmatism
and reactions to authority. One of his hypotheses regard
ing dogmatism was that the more closed the individual's
belief system, the more difficult it would be for him to
find new solutions to problems. Two processes, analysis
and synthesis, are required in problem solving. In analysis
the individual must overcome established beliefs while
synthesis requires that new beliefs be organized and inte
grated into a substitute system. Rokeach suggested that in
the problem-solving process high-dogmatics can be signifi
cantly influenced by the presence of an experimenter because
he is perceived to be an authority figure who holds the
solution to the problem. This position was supported by
Schultz and DiVesta (1972) who discovered that high-
dogmatics achieved a large number of new beliefs in a
39
problem-solving task when they received endorsement from an
authority figure. In addition, the high-dogmatics' uncriti
cal acceptance of authority endorsement facilitated their
problem solving when new solutions received authority
endorsement and hindered problem solving when old beliefs
were endorsed. Since this was not found to be true in low-
dogmatics the conclusion was reached that the more closed
a person's system of beliefs the more limited he is in
evaluating information independent of its source because of
the absolute and uncritical acceptance of authority.
Thus, the concept of dogmatism, as measured by the
Dogmatism Scale, as a more generalized form of authori
tarianism was supported by the verification of a major
hypothesis of the dogmatism theory, namely the high dog
matics' dependence on authority. These studies supported
the theory that high-dogmatics are dependent on and in
fluenced by authority and demonstrated the difficulty of
separating the merit of the communication from its source.
It has been said the major reason for the construction
of the Dogmatism Scale was to provide an instrument that
would be sensitive to authoritarianism of the left as well
as authoritarianism of the right. Studies relating
40
performance on the Dogmatism Scale to performance on the
California F Scale have yielded consistent positive rela
tionships (Goldstein and Blackman/ 1978)/ a finding which
suggests that Dogmatism Scale scores are not entirely free
of content bias. The studies reviewed indicated that indi
viduals who score high on the Dogmatism Scale are often
likely to be rightist in political orientation.
Since/ on the basis of Rokeach1s theory/ it might be
expected that supporters of political candidates from dif
ferent parties would be equally dogmatic, a number of
investigators chose to study the relationship between presi
dential candidate preference and dogmatism. During the
1968 election campaign DiRenzo (1971) found a greater
preference for the conservative candidate/ Wallace, by
undergraduate and graduate students who were high in dogma
tism. Later, Steininger, Durso, and Pasquariello (1972)
found more favorable ratings of Nixon and Agnew from higher
dogmatic undergraduates than from lower dogmatic under
graduates. An additional study from the 1972 presidential
election found that students with dogmatism scores above
the mean were more likely to choose Nixon, whereas those
scoring below the mean were more likely to favor McGovern
(Jones, 1973).
41
It would seem, therefore, that Rokeach's original
hypothesis that dogmatism would be independent of political
or ideological content and that high dogmatism scores would
characterize individuals at either extreme of the political
continuum has not been borne out. Research has indicated
that the high dogmatic is more likely to adhere to a con
servative position or one supported by authority. Further
research may determine extraneous confounding factors not
yet discovered, but until such a time it must be concluded
that high dogmatics are more conservative and more accepting
of beliefs supported by authority.
Finally, the research reviewed would suggest that
dogmatism, and thus authoritarianism, are fruitful avenues
for research in the area of moral reasoning and development.
Children with a high degree of rigidity in their personality
have been described as basically authoritarian or dogmatic.
Leach (1967) contended children were happiest when it was
possible for them to continue with a familiar mode of con
duct and that they felt most secure when this was clearly
described and stipulated. Hence they were considered
conformists. These findings suggested that children who
are presented with consideration of moral principles would
42
inevitably resist the introduction of dissonance into their
rigid world. The children preferred to keep to the safety
of accepted stereotypes and social norms. Sears et al.
(1957) found that the experiences most likely to develop an
internal control system, or the autonomous child, were
those which were most likely to develop moral flexibility
in a child. It was suggested (Vacchiano, 1977) that future
research might well be extended to other applied areas such
as educational systems where the effectiveness of educa
tional programs may be increased through a better under
standing of the impact of dogmatism on such programs.
Religion and Moral Education
With the aforementioned goal of utilizing the cognitive
developmental approach in moral education as identified by
Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1958 ff.) within the church
school setting there was obviously an area of research
literature which needed to be examined carefully— that of
outcomes of various methodologies within the framework of
moral education as they related to religious education.
Unfortunately, there has been no specific research litera
ture directed toward this goal, mainly because the Christian
church has not felt a need to support its teachings and
43
practices with scientific research and literature. Never
theless/ theoretical literature pertaining to the relation
ship between moral education and religion or religious
education had a significant impact on this study in its
conceptual stages and is introduced here to assist in
focusing on the issues of the study conducted.
Both secular and religious literature often paint grim
pictures of twentieth century Christian church membership
as something a person would not ordinarily want to include
on a list of achievements worth mentioning. From a lengthy
list the following examples are provided:
In their organization, their theology/ and their ways
of relating to the world, our churches of today are
for the most part merely richer and shinier versions
of their nineteenth century parents. Their organiza
tion (residential parishes) is based on the socio
logical patterns of 1885 . . . their Sunday at eleven
culture is timed to fall between the two milking hours
in the agricultural society. Sermons remain one of
the last forms of public discourse where it is cul
turally forbidden to talk back . . . the church
remains a patriarchal, agricultural, prescientific
relic. (Cox, 1965, p. 1)
Basically, we don't want anything to happen on Sunday
morning that will upset our daily routine. We want
to be inspired, to come away with a warm feeling, but
we do not want to be disturbed, so subconsciously
we structure the service in order to assure safe,
predictable, comfortable results. (Reid, 1966, p. 2)
44
The educator who is part of a religious setting thus
finds modern society has to a large extent withdrawn from
religion as that which gives life focus and meaning (Molt-
mann, 1970). It is no wonder society views moral education
with some skepticism as it has in the recent history of
formal education. Christian schools have significantly
contributed to this neglect of the academic study of moral
education by the tendency of its participants and supporters
to conflate moral with religious education.
One of the most indicting criticisms leveled at reli
gious education and one which has had direct impact on the
education and development of individuals involved is the
difference between professed values and what Richards (1970)
called "operationalized values." Nearly all Christians
profess certain biblical values which define the church's
goals. Initial stress is placed on the conversion experi
ence in which the individual as a sinner comes to terms
with God, and receives the forgiveness freely offered in
Jesus Christ. From this point a new life begins from which
comes the phrase "growing in Christ." This view of Chris
tian growth is basically a process of socialization, which
may include moral development.
45
Strangely, when the world looks at the church it often
sees the development of values other than those just cited.
Other values dominate much church life. Richards identi
fied at least three lines of evidence which clearly indi
cate this fact: (1) the major deliberations of church
leaders focus on organizational problems; (2) Christians
are oftentimes seen in terms of their role in the organiza
tion— not primarily as Christians; and (3) status in the
church is ascribed on the basis of organizational perform
ance .
Several studies done in the past few years aimed at
discovering the differences between parochial education and
public education have discovered results which correspond
to Richards' position. The first was conducted through the
National Opinion Research Center by Andrew Greeley and
Peter Rossi (1966) and a second by Milo Brekke (1974) who
asked whether students who attend Lutheran schools are
different from those who do not. The Greeley and Rossi
study concentrated on four general issues that discussed
the relative merits of public and Catholic schools. The
Brekke study asked questions relating to such issues as the
effect of a Lutheran education on involvement in church
46
and community life. It would seem, then, the evidence
supported Richards' contentions. A third study (Boehm,
1971) illustrated similar effects of religious education
within Catholic parochial schools.
Another accusation that has often been hurled at the
institutional church is that it tends to provide answers to
religious and moral problems instead of fostering a free
spirit of inquiry leading to personal decision making
(Knox, 1975). Should answers be provided by religious edu
cators? If so, to what extent? These and other questions
like them were identified as items of debate among religious
educators. One side hurls the epithet "indoctrination"
while the other side replies with "liberalism" or "know-
nothingness" (Beck, 1976; Scharf, 1978a).
Not all writers, however, paint such grave pictures of
religion and religious education. Some have agreed with
many of the above criticisms but at the same time have
given suggestions for more effective socialization of
church members both with respect to the church and to the
world.
One of the basic human experiences is that of the ten
sion that exists between a desire for personal development
47
and fulfillment, and the demands of society. This tension
has a religious dimension to which the adolescent is par
ticularly susceptible. If one accepts Erikson1s (1968)
theory, the adolescent is in a period of working toward
a personal identity and ego consciousness, of working
toward some form of primary status. Such identity and
status, however, can only be achieved within the context of
some societal relationship. From the religious point of
view the adolescent is working toward a mature personal
faith and a fruitful association with others as an expres
sion of that faith. Many religious educators have pointed
out the development of a balanced personality can only take
place in the context of a proper group setting (Kelsey,
1972; Miller, 1956; Sherrill, 1955). The group provides
the community setting in which the development of the indi
vidual members is nurtured. Miller (1956) posited the idea
that one of the major tasks of the religious educator,
therefore, is to make use of the adolescent peer group for
the religious development of the adolescent.
Other authors have been more direct in their treatment
of morality as a part of this socialization process, albeit
on a theoretical level, and have put direct emphasis on
48
moral education as part of or even different from religious
education. Kohlberg (1967) clearly identified the position
which holds moral development is entirely different from
religious education. On the basis of his research, Kohl
berg pointed out that little difference was to be found in
moral development due to religious belief. His studies did
not find the use of religion by children in their responses
to moral dilemmas, and based on his cross-cultural studies
indicated that religion is not a necessary or important
condition for the development of moral judgments. When
Kohlberg analyzed attempts by members of religious groups
to support their moral beliefs, he found that they fall
back on those forms of moral judgment or principles which
he has described, regardless of religious affiliation.
Consequently, Kohlberg was led to believe that the primary
purpose of religious education in our society is not to
develop moral character, but rather to develop religious
beliefs and sentiments.
While agreeing that the work of Kohlberg and others
has established that critical inquiry into moral beliefs
and judgments is necessary and valuable for any community,
other research began with the contention that religion
49
itself or religious education can (not necessarily does)
make some difference in a person's morality. Beginning
with almost the same premise that religious and moral edu
cation are different, Gustafson (1970) argued that regard
less of religious conviction man instinctively seeks a
justification for morality and that religion provides for
some a way of justifying morality. He very carefully
identified his beliefs that moral training does not neces
sarily require religious training since there are other
justifications for morality than religion and that religious
training has an intention distinct from moral education,
namely faith in, or orientation of life toward God. How
ever, Gustafson went on to identify the implications of
religious training for moral reasoning and behavior. Since
the institutionalized church has been looked on as con
fining its moral training to authoritative rules of conduct
and sanctions of punishment and reward in eternity, Gustaf
son outlined an alternate view— one in which the church can
and ought to aid in developing autonomous, morally respon
sible persons. He claimed members of the Roman Catholic
Church are calling for a revision of the legalistic model
of church authority, to a new ideal of the church as the
50
giver of freedom rather than the prescriber of conduct and
judge of moral mistakes. No longer is the moral person one
who is free from the strains of sin through scrupulous
obedience to the eternal moral truths of the church's teach
ing/ but rather it is one who is motivated to be freely
self-giving in service to God and others in the world. One
judges what he should do in light of responsibilities to
himself/ to others# and in religious morality to God.
Wright (1971) also identified characteristics of the
institutionalized church which provide a basis for morality
but also serve to provide barriers against growing into
moral autonomy. At the same time# however# Wright sug
gested that certain elements of the Christian faith are
almost certain to foster such development# e.g.# the
independence in the character of Jesus Christ# the belief
that each person can establish a personal relationship with
God, etc. Therefore# in spite of the impediments placed
in the way by church officials and leaders# Wright argued
that the real point of Christianity is to produce just such
a moral autonomy. One should seek to separate those
features of Christianity and related religious education
which retard moral development from those which foster it.
51
A final study in this domain dealt specifically with
the relationship and implications of Kohlberg's research
to church school education. Bergman (1974) asked whether
pedagogical recommendations made by Kohlberg could be
adopted by church educators and on what basis. In formu
lating a response to the question it was observed that most
theologians would press for religious beliefs and theologi
cal perspectives serving as grounds for one's moral values
and judgments rather than, as Kohlberg suggests, religious
education serving to integrate religious beliefs and moral
values formed elsewhere. Resulting implications from such
a position include the use of Kohlberg's articulation of
the stages of moral judgment in sensitizing teachers to the
developmental levels of children, as well as the realization
that the Kohlberg approach has not been thoroughly re
searched within the context of religious education and that
the approach deserves attentions by teachers in church*
communities. Joy (1976) suggested new areas of research
which include comparative studies of parochial and public
school students to investigate possible differences in moral
reasoning as a result of religious schooling and longitudi
nal studies of moral development as outlined by Kohlberg.
52
Experimental Precedents
Research on Moral Development
In a recent review of research on moral development
curricula (Lockwood, 1978) it was pointed out that most
debate and discussion about the cognitive developmental
approach to moral education have been at a theoretical or
conceptual level rather than with the demonstrated effects
of this approach on students. It was also pointed out that
research on the effects of the cognitive developmental
approach to moral education has not been frequently or
systematically reported, making conclusions about such
effects difficult to achieve.
The evaluation of research by Lockwood focused on
three general features of the research: (1) the extent to
which variables other than the treatment provided plausible
alternative explanations for obtained results; (2) the ex
tent to which the experiment was adequate to answer the
questions posed by the researcher; and (3) the extent to
which the claimed results were warranted, given the data
presented. A total of eleven studies was finally selected
for review in the area of moral development, all of which
were doctoral dissertations because of the rigorous criteria
53
established by Lockwood in the selection of the studies.
Of particular relevance to the current study were the facts
that subjects in the selected studies were to be only
students in regular school settings and that the interven
tions were designed to produce educational benefits to the
students.
Two specific types of treatments were identified by
Lockwood in the attempts made to find treatments that are
effective in stimulating moral development. One type was
identified as "psychological education" utilizing activities
with students often found in counseling psychology and
practice. These activities included exercises in empathy
training, peer counseling, role-playing, and the evaluation
of practice of counseling skills emphasizing listening and
communication. Another type of intervention was identified
as the "direct discussion" of moral dilemmas and issues.
Students were asked to consider moral dilemmas and ethical
issues and attempt to clarify and justify their reasoning
regarding a chosen position. The studies based upon "direct
discussion" included important background information for
the current study and provided useful observations regard
ing the design of any future research conducted on the
54
results of the discussion of moral dilemmas.
As was observed by Lockwood/ the direct discussion of
moral dilemmas as an intervention has mixed results. The
review of these articles indicated several studies produced
no significant effects after treatment while others claimed
that the direct discussion of moral dilemmas and issues
effectively promoted positive changes in moral reasoning.
Using direct discussions of moral dilemmas and philosophical
topics in ethics Beck et al. (197 2) conducted thirty-two
sessions designed to promote increases in principled
(Stages Five and Six) moral reasoning. Testing immediately
following the treatment did not produce significant results
but delayed posttests showed a significant increase after
one year in the Stage Five reasoning of the experimental
group. Weaknesses identified as a part of this study
included the lack of proper control groups and the use of
the written form of Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Scale (not
recommended by Kohlberg). The small sample size of the
experimental group, seventeen junior students, also probably
added to the difficulty of obtaining significant results on
immediate posttests.
Blatt and Kohlberg (197 3) explored the effects of
guided peer discussions of moral conflicts upon junior and
55
senior high school students' moral reasoning. Students
were exposed to cognitive conflict about moral reasoning/
to the awareness of different moral points of view, and to
moral reasoning at different levels than their own in an
attempt to change students' levels of moral reasoning.
Following a pilot study by Blatt in a Reform Jewish Sunday
School class the authors explored the effects of their
intervention at the adolescent and late high school level
with more representative classrooms. Both studies involved
one year follow-ups to provide a preliminary assessment of
the long range effectiveness of the intervention. One
treatment involved direct discussion of moral dilemmas in
which the instructor (Blatt) attempted to produce cognitive
conflict and thus change in levels of moral reasoning by
providing reasons for moral choices at least one level
higher than the students' own reasons. The other treatment
group also discussed moral dilemmas but did not use system
atic teacher leadership. Control groups received no treat
ment. A significant effect was observed in the upward
development of those in the teacher led groups as compared
to the control groups. Lockwood (1978) claimed the
strengths of this particular study, i.e., randomization.
56
substantial sample size (N=132) and systematic treatment/
led him to feel confident that the treatment effects were
demonstrated.
Lieberman (1975) also explored the effects of direct
discussion of moral dilemmas by students and reported that
students who discussed moral dilemmas significantly in
creased their level of moral reasoning over those who did
not. In addition# he discovered that the number of dilemmas
discussed was not of significance when comparing groups
which used twelve dilemmas to groups which used twenty-four
dilemmas. Lockwood (1978) claimed# however, that the
report was not sufficient to demonstrate the claims made
by Lieberman since the results were not supported by grade
level or class data and since the possible impact of
multiple treatments was not controlled. The discussion of
dilemmas proceeded in classrooms where students were al
ready participating in an inquiry approach to social studies
and no controls were reported.
Using twenty to thirty eleventh and twelfth grade
students Schaffer (1974) studied the effects of discussions
of moral dilemmas on student levels of moral reasoning
as measured by the Kohlberg scale. This treatment was
57
consistent with the direct discussion of moral dilemmas
approach but included an added dimension in which the
students interviewed younger children to assess the moral
development of the younger student. Schaffer obtained
a small positive gain on the Kohlberg scale, with the
lower students gaining the most, but the results were non
significant. Other difficulties led to the conclusion that
the effects were not clearly demonstrated by the experiment.
The design did not incorporate control groups, selection
was not random, and the written interview form was an inade
quate test of the direct discussion approach (Lockwood,
1978).
Dozier (1974) compared the effects of two types of
treatment on levels of moral reasoning among sixth grade
students. The treatments were designed to vary the method
of approach to dealing with similar moral dilemmas and were
identified as a "vicarious" technique in which direct dis
cussion of moral dilemmas was employed as the major approach
while the other was identified as an "experiential" tech
nique in which the students were asked to focus on expres
sion of feelings and increased awareness of self and others.
Using control groups it was determined that both techniques
58
were significantly more advanced than the control groups
but that because distinctions between the treatments were
not always clear, it was difficult to distinguish between
the two experimental treatments. A similar study by Harris
(1976) also led to the conclusion that treatment groups
which included direct discussion of moral dilemmas and a
"psychological awareness" approach were both significantly
advanced in comparison to the controls.
Relation to the Present Study
Following his thorough and critical review of recent
research in the development of moral reasoning Lockwood
(1978) presented what he believed to be defensible claims
about treatments designed to stimulate moral reasoning as
well as what he believed to be the necessary direction of
future research. When comparing treatments it was found
that the direct discussion approach generally produced
significant development in moral reasoning. Those studies
which were analyzed as adequate tests of the treatment
(Blatt and Kohlberg, 1973; Dozier, 1974; Harris, 1974)
obtained mean significant increases in stages of reasoning.
Another observation indicated that while group mean scores
in these studies produced consistent results in reasoning
59
levels, not all individuals advanced consistently. Often,
some subjects advanced significantly while others remained
at their pretest position. Another important discovery was
the fact that treatment effects in the measurement of moral
reasoning stages were found more often among subjects who
reason at lower stages, e.g., stages two and three.
In the design of the current study these factors aided
in the decisions regarding type of treatment, experimental
design, and the selection of moral reasoning levels of
students included. The direct discussion of moral dilemmas
was chosen as the treatment since recent studies indicated
significant development in moral reasoning when using this
approach. In addition, the criticisms regarding experi
mental design aided in the appropriate determination of
control and experimental groups and the type of treatment
offered to each. Finally, the finding that most significant
results thus far have been found with lower stages of
reasoning it was decided to search for a school with sub
jects at all ranges, including at least stage four subjects.
In searching for schools with students using different
levels of moral reasoning it was discovered that high
schools which explicitly attempt to influence character
60
development, i.e., parochial or denominational schools,
often demonstrate higher average levels of moral reasoning
among students as opposed to public schools which do not
explicitly attempt to influence character development
(Baker, 1976? Robinson, 1975? Selig and Teller, 1975).
A recent study (Stoop, 1979) discovered significantly
higher levels of moral reasoning used among students at
particular secondary schools in the local area and was
influential in the determination of the site for the cur
rent study.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Research Desicrn and Statistical Analysis
This investigation involved the use of a non-equivalent
control quasi-experimental design (Campbell and Stanley,
1963, p. 47) since the experimental and control subjects
were selected from already assembled classrooms. Scores of
control and experimental group subjects on the dogmatism
and moral reasoning pre- and posttests were compared to
determine the effect of a moral dilemma discussion training
program. Essentially, the research questions to be
addressed were:
1. Does participation in moral dilemma discussions
designed to raise moral judgment levels among
parochial secondary students have a significant
effect on adolescents' levels of moral judgment
as measured by the Defining Issues Test?
2. Does participation in moral dilemma discussions
r designed to raise moral judgment levels among
parochial secondary students have a significant
effect on adolescents' levels of dogmatism as
measured by the Dogmatism Scale--Form E?
61
62
3. Are scores on levels of moral reasoning signifi
cantly correlated with scores on levels of
dogmatism?
The independent variable examined was defined as a
moral dilemma discussion training program. This variable
consisted of participation in regular classes of religious
instruction with prescribed activities in the discussion of
moral dilemmas (Appendix A). The control program consisted
of classes in regular religious instruction which included
one prescribed lecture (Appendix C) on the stages of moral
reasoning as outlined by Kohlberg (1958/ 1963a, 1963b) and
the proposed outcome of participating in discussions of
moral dilemmas.
The dependent variables/ immediate posttests on levels
of dogmatism and moral reasoning, were separately analyzed
using an analysis of covariance, controlling on pretest
scores. Although use of intact classes was a constraint in
the study, randomization was used in assignment of classes
and teachers to experimental conditions. Self-selection
was eliminated by using a course in the curriculum required
of all students, and the analysis of covariance enabled the
experimenter to analyze the difference between experimental
groups on the dependent variables after taking into account
63
initial differences on the same variables (Kerlinger, 1973).
Selection and Classification of Subjects
The 395 subjects included in the investigation were
pupils enrolled in grades nine through twelve at Lutheran
High School of Orange County, Orange, California during the
1979-1980 school year. The pool of classes selected was
comprised of all the regular classes in religious instruc
tion (grades 9-12) which is required of all students during
each year of attendance at the school. All teachers volun
tarily participated in the experiment and individual
classes were randomly assigned to either the control or
experimental program using a chart of random numbers. How
ever, to control for possible "halo" effects, both values
of the independent variable were termed "experimental"
throughout the study.
The research sample consisted of adolescents between
the ages of thirteen and eighteen years. They were of
middle to upper class socioeconomic status, and were pre
dominantly (74%) from families belonging to the Lutheran
Church— Missouri Synod. The racial membership included
95% white, with the remaining 5% made up of black, oriental,
64
Spanish-surname/ and other students.
Selection of the subjects from a relatively homogeneous
population, i.e., one secondary school in a particular loca
tion, was justified on the basis that the differential
effects of the treatment would be more clearly demonstrated
using students from similar backgrounds, levels of educa
tion, and socioeconomic status. Research literature in the
area of dogmatism has previously concentrated on measuring
different levels of dogmatism within religious denomina
tions. Such research has yielded inconsistent results with
some finding significant differences between religious
groups (DiRenzo, 1967; Glass, 1971; and Keopp, 1963) while
others found no significant differences (LoScinto and
Hartley, 1963). Webster (1967) offered some explanation
of the inconsistencies by demonstrating that many of the
contradictory results concerning dogmatism and religious
beliefs could be attributed to differences in geographic
norms and subcultural patterns based on geographic location.
Therefore, to demonstrate clearly the effect of the inde
pendent variable, subjects were chosen from one school at
one location.
65
Instrumentation
After assignment of the fourteen class units to treat
ments# the subjects were pretested# exposed to the treat
ments for fourteen weeks, and then posttested. The
psychometric instruments employed by the investigator were
Rest's Defining Issues Test and Rokeach1s Dogmatism Scale--
Form E.
The Defining Issues Test (Rest# 1974)
As outlined in chapter two of this paper Kohlberg has
identified a six-stage theory of moral development in which
each successive stage in the theory is characterized by
moral reasoning which is more complex# more comprehensive#
more integrated# and more differentiated than the reasoning
of earlier stages. According to Kohlberg's theory the
child develops by movement through a sequence of steps and
these stages can be identified in a subject by means of an
interview procedure developed by Kohlberg.
Rest (1974) proposed several alternatives for classi
fying a subject's stage of moral development# among them
the Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT consists of six
stories describing moral dilemmas. After reading each
66
story, the subject is first asked to answer a yes-no ques
tion indicating how the central character of the story
ought to respond to the dilemma in the opinion of the sub
ject. Second, each subject is asked to rate each of several
issues on a five-point scale of importance in deciding what
ought to be done. And finally, the respondent is asked to
rank order the four issues thought to be most important.
Because the DIT presents data as a continuous variable
it provides several different ways for indexing development
(Davis, M. L., and Robbins, S., 1977). The test readily
yields subscale or stage scores based on Kohlberg's theory,
and two indices of the individual's overall developmental
level, the "P" and "D" scores. The "P" score is an overall
index of moral development but uses information keyed only
to the higher stages (Stages 3+) of moral reasoning.
Davison and Robbins claim the "D" score, which uses in
formation from items keyed at each stage level, is more
intuitively appealing to researchers and more sensitive to
changes in scores at all levels.
In a recent review of relevant literature Davison and
Robbins (1978) cited research which supports the DIT as
being valid and reliable for measuring levels of moral
67
reasoning. While primarily studying directional changes
in moral judgment over time, a number of other types of
data were offered in support of the DIT as a valid and
reliable measure of moral judgment. After review of
several studies Davison and Robbins concluded that the
test-retest reliabilities for the major indices of the DIT
(P and D scores) are generally in the high . 70's or .801s
and Cronbach's alpha index of internal consistency is
generally in the high .70*s. On a sample of 160 subjects
consisting of junior high students, senior high students,
college students, seminarians, and graduate students
Cronbach1s alpha was .79 for the D index. In addition,
the DIT has been shown to be very stable over time (Pano-
witsch, 1976) as well as reliable for use with high school
age students (Cooper, 1973).
Face validity, criterion-group validity, longitudinal
change, convergent-divergent correlation validity, and
other methods were described by Davison and Robbins in an
attempt to validate the DIT as a test of moral judgment.
Using a sample in excess of 1000 it was determined the DIT
does, in fact, represent the construct, moral judgment.
68
The Dogmatism Scale— Form E (Rokeach/ 1960)
The Dogmatism Scale— Form E was developed and stan
dardized by Milton Rokeach (1960) as a measure of his
generalized theory of authoritarianism. Dogmatism is con
ceived of as an organization of belief-disbelief systems
and is measured by a Likert-type scale involving forty
statements with which the subject is asked to agree or
disagree. Each statement is marked with a number ranging
from + 3 (I agree very much) to - 3 (I disagree very much).
A person's score on the Dogmatism Scale is the sum of the
scores on all forty items, after adjusting each answer by
a constant of +4. A highly dogmatic person is defined as
one who obtained a relatively high score on the scale
(usually higher than 195), while a low dogmatic person is
one who obtained a relatively low score (usually lower
than 140).
In general, research concerned with the validity and
reliability of the Dogmatism Scale tends to support
Rokeach's concept of dogmatism and its measurement. Recent
reviews (Vacchiano, 1977, and Goldstein and Blackman, 1978)
reported that reliability coefficients for Form E of the
Dogmatism Scale based on test-retest data and measurement
69
of internal consistency varied from .68 to .93. Since the
major reason for the construction of the Dogmatism Scale
was to provide an instrument that would be sensitive to
authoritarianism of the left as well as authoritarianism
of the right, validation studies have been aimed in this
direction. These studies concerned with the validity of
the Dogmatism Scale have yielded mixed results suggesting
that the Dogmatism Scale is not entirely free of content
bias. Studies by Steininger et al. (1972), Stimpson and
D'Alo (1974), and Klyman and Kruckenberg (1974) all sup
ported the concept that Rokeach's concept of dogmatism was
independent of a rightist political orientation. However,
such researchers as Harrison (1973), Kirtley and Harkless
(1969), and Thompson and Michel (197 2) all found a positive
relationship between dogmatism and measures of conserva-
tivism. The implication of these later studies is that
individuals who score high on the Dogmatism Scale are
likely to be rightist in political orientation. This bias,
however, was not considered detrimental to the present
study. Rokeach provided evidence bearing on the validity
of the scale in the area of capacity to integrate new
belief systems, a concept of particular interest to this
70
study in the description of subjects' ability and desire
to solve Doodlebug problems (1960).
Further evidence for the suitability of the Dogmatism
Scale for use in the present study was provided by Kemp and
Kohler (1965) who demonstrated the validity of its use
among 350 high school students. Chabassol and Thomas (1975)
also demonstrated the Dogmatism Scale may be used with
adolescents and/ in addition, found a negative correlation
of Form E with scores of ambiguity tolerance among 400
subjects in grades eight through eleven.
Treatments
Following an initial data-gathering period, the treat
ment conditions were identified for each instructor involved
and training was provided on how to lead moral discussion
with students. During week three the experimental classes
began a series of moral dilemma discussions following the
format in Appendix A, the first one being led by the in
vestigator and subsequent discussions led by the regular
classroom instructor. Regular visits to the classrooms by
the investigator provided a check on whether the discus
sions of moral dilemmas were proceeding according to the
71
format outlined. Also during week three the control group
classes received a lecture (Appendix C) which explained
Kohlberg's stages of moral development as well as proposed
outcomes of participating in the discussion of moral
dilemmas. On subsequent weeks the control group classes
proceeded with regular religious instruction.
A closer look at the experimental treatment is pro
vided :
1. A standard format for leading discussions of moral
dilemmas was developed by the investigator and the
teachers. A lesson "plan" was drawn up (Appen
dix A) based on recent curriculum publications in
the area of moral development (Beyer, 1976; Duska
and Whelan, 1975; Galbraith and Jones, 1976;
Hersch, Paolitto, and Reimer, 1979; Kavanaugh,
1976; Ladenburg, Ladenburg, and Scharf, 1978;
Mattox, 1975; Scharf, 1978b).
2. Sample dilemmas taken from published resources
(see references above) were provided in the initial
lessons and later sessions utilized dilemmas cre
ated by the students themselves (Appendix B) based
on suggestions by Hersch et al. (1979) that real
72
dilemmas often provide higher interest levels
among the participants than do hypothetical
dilemmas.
3. After practicing the lesson format with fellow
faculty members, the teachers of religion observed
a discussion with each of the experimental groups
led by the investigator following the lesson plan
in Appendix A.
4. The remaining discussions of moral dilemmas were
conducted by the individual classroom teachers and
were observed on a regular basis by the investi
gator .
5. Following each discussion a written report was
prepared by the instructor including a copy of the
dilemma(s) used and both teacher and student
reactions to the discussion.
Data Collection, Processing, and Analysis
Before exposure to the treatments, each subject was
asked to complete the Dogmatism Scale— Form E and the
Defining Issues Test. Each subject completed the Defining
Issues Test during a designated period in the first week
73
and the Dogmatism Scale— Form E during a designated period
of week two. During weeks seventeen and eighteen the
Defining Issues Test and the Dogmatism Scale— Form E were
once again administered to all students in the study. In
both the pretest and the posttest conditions the scales
were administered by the regular instructor with the attempt
to approximate regular testing procedures in these classes.
Data processing was done at the University Computing
Center of the University of Southern California. Analysis
of covariance was used to analyze the treatment effects on
the dependent variables, controlling for initial differ
ences on the pretests. In addition, the correlation between
the scores of moral reasoning and dogmatism was generated.
The following programs available for computers were utilized
in the processing of data:
1. BMDP9D— Multiway Description of Groups. A program
component of the BMDP Biomedical Computer Programs
(Dixon and Brown, 1979) which generated the fol
lowing descriptive data for the groups used in the
study:
(a) Defining Issues Test: Mean, standard devi
ation, standard error, and range for individual
74
classes and for experimental and control
groups.
(b) Dogmatism Scale— Form E: Mean, standard devi
ation, standard error, and range for individual
classes and for the experimental and control
groups.
2. BMDP1V— One Way Analysis of Variance and
Covariance. A program component of the BMDP Bio
medical Computer Programs (Dixon and Brown, 1979)
which generated separate analyses of covariance
for the moral reasoning and dogmatism data using
the pretest scores as the covariate and the post
test scores as the designated dependent variables.
In addition, the program was asked to generate
correlation matrices depicting the relationship
between levels of dogmatism and moral reasoning
on both pretests and posttests.
Precautions
This investigation was subject to a variety of assump
tions and limitations which need to be taken into consider
ation when analyzing the results. The following decisions
75
were made relative to the methodology of the investigation
which have some bearing on internal validity and reli
ability. The assumption was made, previous to the study,
that the subjects of this experiment had not previously
been exposed to discussion of Kohlbergian-type moral
dilemmas in their formal schooling. The extent to which
this is not true indicates previous exposure to the inde
pendent variable of this study. In addition, it was assumed
that all data were accurately gathered, recorded, stored,
and analyzed. Part of this assumption was based on the
premise that teaching and testing personnel had volunteered
for this experiment and would be highly cooperative in all
phases of the study.
It was also recognized that there was no completely
adequate control over the possibility that the students
carried discussion of the moral dilemmas presented in the
class outside the class, thus receiving some additional
practice in the solving of moral dilemmas. When interpret
ing the results it was remembered that true randomness was
available only in the assignment of treatments to groups.
While a number of other precautions were taken in recogni
tion of this fact, the lack of true randomness may have
76
been significant in the outcome.
Finally, the subjects used in the study were repre
sentative only of the delimited population from which they
were sampled. This delimitation was imposed to establish
more clearly the results of the treatment, but generaliza
tion to students of other backgrounds should be avoided
pending replication and expansion of this investigation.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Analysis of Results
In terms of the questions posed in Chapter I the fol
lowing results were obtained. The posttest means and
adjusted means for each set of seven treatment groups using
the pretest as the covariate are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
It should be noted that the protocols of eight students
were withdrawn from an original sample of 403 students
because of detected unreliability of the subjects' responses
in the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979a). This check on
reliability was produced by inserting a number of items
into the test which were lofty and pretentious sounding but
which did not mean anything. If subjects consistently
rated and ranked these items high, then the subjects
probably did not have the proper test-taking set, and the
protocol was discarded.
77
78
TABLE 1
MEANS AND ADJUSTED MEANS FOR IMMEDIATE POSTTESTS
USING THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST
(N = 395)
Group N Mean
Adjusted
Mean
1.
Control 33 18. 19 18. 21
2. Control 31 19. 90 19.65
3. Control 13 20.14 17. 37
4. Control 29 17. 17 17.68
5. Control 35 18. 28 18. 50
6. Control 29 15.65 17. 28
7. Control 21 21. 32 19.60
8. Experimenta1 31 19.81 18.91
9. Exper imenta1 37 21.16 19. 21
10. Experimenta1 18 21. 30 18. 33
11. Exper imenta1 27 17. 11 17. 36
12. Experimental 29 14.55 16.14
13. Experimental 35 16. 25 17.84
14. Experimental 27 13. 28 15.19
Control Group 191 18.42 18. 38
Experimental Group 204 17.60 17.64
TABLE 2
MEANS AND ADJUSTED MEANS FOR IMMEDIATE
USING ROKEACH'S DOGMATISM SCALE—
(N = 395)
79
POSTTESTS
FORM E
Group N Mean
Adjusted
Mean
1. Control 33 170.67 170.52
2. Control 31 177.42 175.48
3. Control 13 172.85 174.30
4. Control 29 178.90 174.75
5. Control 35 189.89 189.41
6. Control 29 167.90 171.48
7. Control 21 159.10 161.49
8. Experimental 31 179.58 177.06
9. Exp e r imen t a 1 37 179.38 175.63
10. Experimental 18 166.72 171.54
11. Experimental 27 153.41 150.39
12. Experimental 29 171.72 173.57
13. Experimental 35 160.26 161.71
14. Experimental 27 164.52 169.58
Control Group 191 174.99 174.83
Experimental Group 204 168.52 168.47
80
The Effects of Participation in Moral-Dilemmas
Discussions on Levels of Moral Reasoning-
The I T Ratio obtained for the effects of the experimen
tal moral discussions program on levels of moral reasoning
as measured by scores on the Defining Issues Test was
2.06 (Table 3). Since an Ratio of 3.89 was required for
statistical significance at the .05 level/ a decision was
made to reject the hypothesis concerning the effects of the
experimental program on levels of moral reasoning. Thus,
within the limitations, delimitations, and assumptions
specified in this investigation, participation in a program
of moral dilemma discussions had no demonstrable effect on
parochial secondary pupils' levels of moral reasoning.
The Effects of Participation in Moral-Pilemmas
Discussions on Levels of Dogmatism
Analysis of the effects of participating in moral
dilemma discussions on the dogmatism variable also achieved
nonsignificant results. Whereas an F_ Ratio of 3.89 was
required for the .05 level of significance, an F^ Ratio of
1.80 was obtained on data derived from scores on the
Dogmatism Scale— Form E (Table 4). This I P Ratio resulted
in the untenability of the hypothesis that participation
in discussions of moral dilemmas would have significant
81
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE ON IMMEDIATE POSTTESTS
USING THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST (N = 395)
Source
Sum of
Squares df M. S. F
Between Groups 54.55 1 54.55 2.06 N.S.
Within Groups 10404.62 392 26.54
82
TABLE 4
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE ON
USING ROKEACH'S DOGMATISM SCALE--
IMMEDIATE
■FORM E (N
POSTTESTS
= 395)
Source
Sum of
Squares df M.S. F
Between Groups 3748.00 1 3748.00 1.80 N.S.
Within Groups 818307.56 392 2087.52
effects on levels of dogmatism.
The Correlation Between Levels of Moral Reasoning
and Dogmatism as a Result of Participating- in
Discussions of Moral Dilemmas
Tables 5 and 6 present additional information on the
results of the experimental treatment in the form of cor
relation matrices. The correlations of particular interest/
DIT Posttest Scores correlated with Dogmatism Scale Post
test scores, indicated very little (if any) correlation
between scores on the two instruments. The fact that three
of the four indices given on both pretests and posttests
approximated 0.00 indicated the same results could have
been obtained using random numbers and, consequently, the
differences between groups were attributed to chance
fluctuations.
Only a moderate relationship (0.32) existed between
Control Group scores on the DIT Posttest vs. the Dogmatism
Scale Posttest and, along with the results of the separate
analyses of covariance, this appeared to be nonsignificant
as well.
Interpretation of Findings
The lack of statistically significant differences
84
TABLE 5
CONTROL GROUP CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SCORES
ON THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST AND THE
DOGMATISM SCALE— FORM E
Dogmatism
Pretest
Dogmatism
Posttest
DIT
Pretest
DIT
Posttest
Dogmatism Pretest 1.00
Dogmatism Posttest 0.17 1.00
DIT Pretest -0. 12 0. 31 1. 00
DIT Posttest -0. 14 0.32 0.61 1.00
TABLE 6
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SCORES
ON THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST AND THE
DOGMATISM SCALE— FORM E
Dogmatism Dogmatism DIT DIT
Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest
Dogmatism Pretest 1.00
Dogmatism Posttest 0.40 1.00
DIT Pretest 0.00 0.01 1.00
DIT Posttest 0.09 0.01 0.65 1.00
85
between the experimental moral discussions program and the
control program could be viewed in several ways. The
results indicated that the experimental and control pro
grams were probably of comparable effectiveness in the
development of moral reasoning levels and levels of dogma
tism. The results did suggest the possibility that this
program was ineffective in developing moral reasoning and
in changing levels of dogmatism. These results and impli
cations were interpreted in light of the research on moral
development over the past two decades.
Soon after Kohlberg (1958, 1963a/ 1963b) demonstrated
the sequentiality of levels of moral reasoning, researchers
began seeking ways to demonstrate empirically the movement
of individuals from one level to the next and methods which
might be utilized to foster upward movement. Turiel (1966)
and Rest (1968) suggested that exposure to higher levels of
moral reasoning was a way to foster higher levels of moral
reasoning. Turiel found that children who were presented
with advice one stage above their own level moved closer
to the stage of the advice than did the children presented
with other kinds of advice. Rest found subjects tended to
prefer responses given to moral dilemmas by the experimenter
86
which were one stage above the subject's own level, demon
strating that reasoning one stage above the subject's own
level had the most appeal for him. Shortly thereafter
researchers became more and more interested in the effects
of classroom moral education.
In one of the first successful experiments of class
room moral education Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) introduced
the idea that a pupil who encounters moral reasoning at a
level one above his own level of moral reasoning the pupil
is motivated by the resulting cognitive dissonance to pro
duce a permanent change to the next highest level. This
report was the first of its kind to document a substantial
and relatively enduring effect of a formal program of moral
education on students. It examined the effects of applying
developmental principles to a program of moral education
for junior and senior high school students in which cogni
tive conflict and exposure to higher stages of reasoning
occurred in the context of moral discussions between peers
in a classroom setting under the direction of the teacher.
It included a similar rationale to the present study in
which students were exposed to cognitive conflict about
moral reasoning and to the awareness of different moral
87
points of view by encouraging students at differing levels
of moral reasoning to argue and discuss moral issues.
Blatt and Kohlberg reported the classroom experience led to
a significant increase in moral judgment maturity in both
posttest and follow-up measures. The classroom experience
seemed to lead to the formation of a higher level of
thought. In contrast, Blatt and Kohlberg also examined
the results of a control group which included the discus
sion of moral dilemmas used in the experimental groups
under the supervision of their regular teacher, with little
systematic teacher intervention, and with no effort by the
teacher to use developmental principles. The finding that
no significant change in moral reasoning occurred in the
moral reasoning of the control group subjects suggested the
significance of the systematic teacher leadership present
in the experimental groups.
In two major reviews of research Rest (1976) and Lock
wood (1978) described programs designed to foster higher
levels of moral reasoning among students. Some of these
programs met with success by stimulating development, while
others were not so successful. From these reports the
researchers concluded that educational interventions have
88
produced mixed results. Rest indicated that some of the
educational interventions seemed to promote significant
moral judgment development and others did not. Lockwood
indicated those studies which showed no significant differ
ences or increases as a result of the direct discussion of
moral dilemmas were not considered adequate tests of the
treatment. He also qualified his position, however, by
adding that while the direct discussion approach appeared
to produce consistent results in developing group mean
scores, not all subjects advanced consistently. It would
seem, therefore, the results of the present study have
indicated the necessity to discover the crucial ingredients
in the success of such programs.
It is possible to explain some of the difficulty in
achieving lack of statistical significance in studies such
as this one given the history of developmental research in
the field of moral education. Scharf (197 8b) delineated
six discrete but overlapping areas of research in moral
education. Those studies which described clinical and ex
perimental findings regarding moral change (Turiel, 1966;
Blatt and Kohlberg, 1973) following Kohlberg's introduction
of his six stages of moral reasoning were identified as
89
seeking to establish that moral change could be induced
experimentally and that movement to higher stages of moral
reasoning was developmental (represented structural changes
in thinking rather than language) in character. The second
and third areas of research outlined by Scharf were identi
fied as research in progress which describes the relation
ship between social role-taking, ego development, inter
personal relationships, and moral development as well as
the preconditions necessary for developmental change in
moral reasoning.
These three areas were viewed as established research
domains by Scharf who also outlined three areas not yet
established, and which must be entered in order to close
the gap between developmental theory and broadbased educa
tional practice. There has been practically no research on
what specific strategies, tactics, or dilemmas are likely
to affect moral thinking. Information does not exist which
would allow researchers to offer teachers more than super
ficial advice. In addition, little specific knowledge is
available on how to train teachers in moral education
techniques.
The outcome of this study that indicated no significant
90
differences between the moral discussion approach and the
control approach was interpreted as providing further
evidence for the need to clarify some of these issues and
did present preliminary information regarding several facets
of the above issues.
The Training and Skills of Teachers Using
the Mora1-Dilemmas Discussion Approach
One interpretation of the results obtained in this
study centered on the area of teacher effectiveness based
on previous training and individual teaching skills.
Recent studies (Grimes, 1974? Kohlberg et al. , 1975;
Kavanaugh, 1976) which dealt with the training of teachers
and leaders of moral discussions raised the question as to
whether the discussion of moral dilemmas approach can only
work with certain individuals with certain training or
whether anyone, given a set of instructions for use, can
accomplish the basic aims and objectives of the moral
dilemma discussion approach.
Kohlberg et al. studied this question by exposing a
total of twenty-two Social Studies teachers to a week-long
training experience in developmental teaching strategies.
Then the teachers returned to their classrooms to implement
91
an ongoing Social Studies program which included a moral
education component. The procedure, similar to the one
presented in Appendix A and used in the current study,
trained the teachers to present the facts and circumstances
of a moral dilemma, elicit from students an initial posi
tion regarding the dilemma, and initiate a process of
questioning and testing of the positions adopted by members
of the class. While the results indicated a significant
difference between teachers in the experimental group and
those in the control group with respect to ability to pro
duce moral change in students, there were also evidences of
great differences in effectiveness. Approximately one-
third of the teachers produced substantial gains in reason
ing among their students while two-thirds did not. It was
observed that teachers could be trained to use the develop
mental teaching strategies but that not all used them.
Teachers who either failed to employ any active questioning
strategies or simply told students the "right" answer to
a dilemma did not produce substantial moral change in their
students.
Grimes (1974) developed a course in moral reasoning to
include the training of mothers of 11 year old children
92
in order to prepare the mothers as agents for change in
moral development. Mothers and their children participated
in weekly sessions containing discussions of moral dilemmas
(both pre-existing and original) and the enactment of moral
dilemma material. Again, the results indicated a signifi
cant difference between experimental and control groups
with respect to changes in level of moral reasoning among
the children but the results were not consistent among
pairs. Some of the mothers were able to stimulate moral
change while others were not.
Kavanaugh (1976) investigated the relative effective
ness of three different approaches in raising levels of
moral reasoning among high school students. These ap
proaches were based on the cognitive-developmental approach
and included a peer-led group, a counselor-led group, a
writers' group, and a control group. Of particular inter
est is the finding that the counselor-led group, which
placed emphasis on the role of adult interaction while at
the same time acknowledging the power of students' contacts
with one another, was less effective in raising levels of
moral judgment than was the peer-led group approach empha
sizing the role of peer interaction. In fact, both peer-led
93
discussions and the writing experiences groups were more
effective than counselor-led discussions or the control
group discussions. Further research was suggested which
might identify teacher variables conducive to the promotion
of moral reasoning levels.
The results of the current study also indicated more
extensive training and/or monitoring of the instruction
process used in the study may have been desirable. The
instructors of this study were given training in the lead
ing of moral discussions but on a limited basis. This
training consisted of three planning meetings where a stan
dard lesson plan was drawn up. These sessions were fol
lowed by practice in the use of the lesson format with
fellow faculty members, and observation of a discussion
with each of the experimental groups led by the author.
After each classroom discussion of moral dilemmas conducted
by the instructors and their students, written reports were
prepared by the instructor of the proceedings including a
copy of the dilemmas used.
Hersch et al. (1979) identified three themes which
might be used to analyze these instructors' assumptions
about their teaching roles in the classroom, and which
94
might shed further light on the way in which these assump
tions may have affected the outcome of the study. It was
determined that many teachers were not able to begin work
ing effectively with moral development curricula until they
reexamined their assumptions about their teaching in the
classroom and that such a reexamination was difficult to
accomplish. Teachers who were asked to continue their
teaching under the usual pressures found the additional
request to increase their own awareness of moral issues, to
recognize that many teacher-student interactions have a
moral dimension/ and to realize that certain kinds of social
interaction may be more conducive than others to moral
change, very difficult to do.
The account was given of one instructor's struggle
with these issues and the kind of rethinking which was
necessary to produce changes in levels of moral reasoning
among students. Six specific problems were identified
which may also have posed difficulties for the instructors
in the present study in their attempts to affect the moral
reasoning of their students: (1) an unwillingness to con
front one's own moral beliefs and values system adequately,
(2) an unwillingness to confront the moral dimension of
95
the institution of which they are a part, (3) a struggle
with the concept of the authority of the teacher in the
classroom as it enters into the discussion of moral
dilemmas, (4) the teacher's limited ability to understand
the many different perspectives of the students in the
classroom on any one moral problem, (5) the teapher's
limited ability to ask good questions that stimulate inter
esting and challenging discussion, and (6) difficulties
with group management skills.
In addition, Hersch et al. recognized and described
for the educator seeking to foster moral growth potential
difficulties in the practice of moral education which, if
not anticipated, would make practice difficult. Five
assumptions were considered by the authors to be inherent
in the process of moral education and it was suggested that
any analysis of actual classroom experience ask whether
these occurred: (1) peer pressure often discourages open
and honest communication, (2) moral issues often involve
the examination of authority roles, (3) cognitive conflict
can be painful for students, (4) moral development does not
necessarily result from verbal activity (referring to the
possibility of change resulting from internal dialogue
96
with oneself), and (5) some moral dilemmas fail to generate
discussion.
Forward and Backward Movement on the
Scale of Moral Reasoning
Further examination of individual change scores in the
present study indicated, as previous research has demon
strated, that some of the students advanced significantly
in levels of moral reasoning while others remained at the
same level. In addition, a number of students actually
scored at significantly lower levels of moral reasoning
than on the pretest. With the lack of specific knowledge
on how to train teachers in moral education techniques and
the current mixed results from other studies, the results
of this study indicated that some teachers can actually
cause a significant decrease in the level of moral reason
ing of their students.
As early as 1971 researchers were beginning to suspect
that other components of the teacher-student relationship
were equally important to the fostering of moral develop
ment as was the discussion of moral dilemmas. The finding
of the present study that some students actually achieved
significantly lower levels of moral reasoning gave support
97
to this position, particularly with regard to research in
moral development related to the field of counseling. In
1971 Mosher and Sprinthall trained high school students to
engage in systematic peer counseling. After receiving
initial exposure to counseling theory, students were intro
duced to a short practicum in technique and then engaged
in both simulated and real counseling with other students
in their class. Initially Mosher and Sprinthall were
interested in the development of counseling skills such as
empathy but were surprised to find the experience affected
levels of moral judgment in the trainee as well. The dis
covered change in level of moral reasoning was roughly
equivalent to that achieved by Blatt (Blatt and Kohlberg,
1973) in his courses designed specifically and directly to
analyze and discuss moral dilemmas and, thereby, to affect
moral development.
It was decided by the authors that what they had dis
covered was another way in which advances in moral reason
ing might be fostered. In the process of learning to
counsel the students were trained to understand a person's
ideas, feelings, and dilemmas in more complex, comprehen
sive, and subtle ways and to respond to them on their
98
own terms and with more options. The concept of empathy,
a desired entity in the counseling process, was also sug
gested by Kohlberg (1963a, 1963b) as a part of the process
in the development of moral reasoning. Mosher and Sprint
hall suggested the teaching of the counseling process
included accurate identification and sensitive response to
the feelings and ideas of the other person and would seem
to be necessary in the development of moral reasoning,
particularly as it includes the ability to assume the role
of another person.
In relation to the present study and to the findings
it was determined that one possible explanation for the
lack of statistical significance in the difference between
experimental and control treatments was the fact that some
of the students actually went "down" in levels of moral
reasoning. Mosher and Sprinthall reached the conclusion
that involvement in the program of counselor training
resulted in greater moral change than did a similar program
using moral discussion formats, but with the observation
that some students actually declined in levels of moral
reasoning.
Carkhuff and Truax (1966) presented a model of core
99
conditions which have implications for all interpersonal
processes including teacher-student and parent-child rela
tionships. Carkhuff (1967) explained that parents and
teachers of children and students demonstrate different
levels of facilitative conditions and that the presence or
absence of these conditions may operate to facilitate or
retard the outcomes of the primary process variables.
Mosher and Sprinthall (1971) suggested that students who
increased their level of functioning on these conditions
also improved their level of moral reasoning. In addition,
Carkhuff and Berenson (1967) claimed that parent-child,
teacher-student, counselor-client relationships may be for
"better or for worse." In the case of teacher-student
relationships it was assumed that higher levels of facili
tative dimensions on the part of the teacher would effect
higher levels in the students and vice versa.
Examination of the Carkhuff scale (Carkhuff and Beren
son, 1967) and its rationale concerning the role of certain
dimensions of the interpersonal process led to the inter
pretation that these same issues might have been present in
the classrooms of this investigation. The instructors of
this investigation may not have been functioning either
100
at a higher level of moral reasoning/ or at higher levels
of core interpersonal conditions than their students.
Upward movement/ therefore/ along a continuum of moral
reasoning as outlined by Kohlberg (1958/ 1963a, 1963b) may
have been thwarted to some extent.
In opposition to the Kohlberg position that the stages
are hierarchical, the Carkhuff and Berenson model suggested
that not only can persons at higher levels of functioning
help persons at lower levels achieve higher levels of
functioning but the reverse might be true as well. Teachers
who were perceived as the significant power source in the
classroom relationship may have been responsible for the
deteriorative effects found in this study. An analysis of
the perceived power structure of the classroom and related
levels of interpersonal functioning might well have pro
duced an explanation for the fact that while some of the
students increased in levels of moral reasoning and some
remained the same, a number of students actually decreased
significantly in level of moral reasoning.
Summary
Results of data analysis led to a decision to reject
the tenability of the hypotheses set forth in the study,
101
although individual data revealed some interesting possi
bilities for future deliberations on the effects of class
room discussions on levels of moral reasoning and dogmatism.
The lack of significant results indicated only that the
experimental and control program were of comparable effec
tiveness in the development of moral reasoning and dogma
tism. Further analysis, however, yielded the fact that as
some students increased in levels of moral reasoning the
experimental treatment actually had the effect of signifi
cantly lowering the levels of moral reasoning for some
students.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY/ CONCLUSIONS/ AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
Interest and concern about the moral development of
children during the past two decades have produced an
impetus for research and subsequent development of curricu
lum and educational materials concentrating on attempts to
raise levels of moral reasoning in the individual. One
area of special interest has been the educational approach
to moral development which has at its center the planned
discussion of moral dilemmas. Investigators have shown a
relationship between the discussion of moral dilemmas in
the classroom setting and movement to higher levels of
moral reasoning among participants. The underlying objec
tive of this study was to determine whether the discussion
of moral dilemmas in a parochial school setting would pro
duce upward movement in levels of moral reasoning among
students already participating in regular religious instruc
tion.
102
103
Problem
The focal point of this investigation was the design
of a moral dilemma discussion program implemented in regu
lar high school classes of religious instruction and an
examination of its effects on the level of moral reasoning
among the participants as well as the level of dogmatism
among the participants. The following questions were
asked:
1. Does participation in moral dilemma discussions
designed to raise moral judgment levels among
parochial secondary students have a significant
effect on adolescents' levels of moral judgment
as measured by the Defining Issues Test?
2. Does participation in moral dilemma discussions
designed to raise moral judgment levels among
parochial secondary students have a significant
effect on adolescents1 levels of dogmatism as
measured by the Dogmatism Scale— Form E?
3. Are scores on levels of moral reasoning signifi
cantly correlated with scores on levels of
dogmatism?
104
Central Research Problem and Hypothesis
The central research problem was concerned with deter
mining the effects of a moral dilemma discussion approach
to moral education. It was proposed/ therefore, that
participation in moral dilemma discussions designed to
raise moral judgment levels among parochial secondary stu
dents would have a significant effect on levels of both
moral judgment and dogmatism.
Conceptual and Experimental Background
After a review of pertinent literature, Kohlberg's
stages of moral reasoning were chosen as the framework
within which the moral reasoning levels of adolescents were
conceptualized, and Rokeach's conceptualization of dogma
tism was chosen as an appropriate arena in which to discuss
changes in scores of dogmatism. Since Kohlberg and subse
quent investigators claimed changes to higher levels of
moral reasoning could be experimentally induced/ data were
introduced in Chapter II which supported the claims that
there is an ordering of moral reasoning stages, that the
stage sequencing is invariant and hierarchical in nature,
and that educational interventions have been used to raise
levels of moral reasoning.
105
A final section of the review of literature discussed
existing experimental studies examining the effects of
participation in moral discussions on levels of moral
reasoning. This review analyzed existing research data in
terms of its ability to answer adequately whether the dis
cussion of moral dilemmas approach has proven effective in
the raising of moral reasoning levels.
Methodology
The sample used in this study was composed of 395
junior and senior high school students enrolled in a paro
chial high school (grades nine through twelve) in Orange
County, California. The subjects whose ages ranged from
thirteen to eighteen years came from homes covering the
middle to upper class socioeconomic status ranges. Ninety-
five percent of the students were white and the remaining
5% consisted of black, oriental, and Spanish-surname stu
dents.
Following classification of subjects, classes, and
instructors as to experimental and control conditions the
independent variable, participation in a moral dilemma
discussion program, was assigned to the experimental group.
Subjects in both conditions were pretested for levels of
106
moral reasoning and dogmatism using the Defining Issues
Test and the Dogmatism Scale— Form E. Scores on these two
measures following the treatment were the specified depen
dent variables as scores on the pretest were used as co-
variates in separate analyses of covariance. Data were
also analyzed through the examination of descriptive
statistics as well.
Findings
Within the framework of the central research problem
and hypothesis the findings may be summarized as follows:
1. A nonsignificant F^ Ratio of 2.06 was obtained for
the effects of participation in a program of
planned moral dilemma discussions at the junior
and senior high school level on levels of moral
reasoning as reflected by the lack of difference
in mean Defining Issues Test scores for the ex
perimental and control groups.
2. A nonsignificant F_ Ratio of 1.80 was obtained for
the effects of participation in a program of
planned moral dilemma discussions at the junior
and senior high school level on levels of dogma
tism as reflected by the lack of difference in
107
mean Dogmatism Scale scores for the experimental
and control groups.
3. The correlations between posttest scores on the
Defining Issues Test and the Dogmatism Scale
approximated 0.00.
Conclusions and Implications
An evaluation of the findings in light of the assump
tions, limitations, and delimitations of the study led to
the following conclusions and certain implications associ
ated with them:
1. The experimental moral-discussions program and the
control condition of participation in regular
classes of religious instruction only were not
shown to be different in their average effective
ness in altering levels of moral reasoning and
dogmatism as measured by the Defining Issues Test
and the Dogmatism Scale. An implication of this
conclusion would be that either direct discussion
of moral dilemmas in addition to regular classes
of religious instruction or religious instruction
alone are probably of comparable effectiveness
108
in the development of moral reasoning levels and
levels of dogmatism. The results did suggest that
both programs were ineffective in developing moral
reasoning within the framework suggested by
Kohlberg and changing levels of dogmatism.
2. Whereas classroom experiences in the discussions
of moral dilemmas have yielded mixed results in
other studies, the conclusion was made that changes
in levels of moral reasoning might well be linked
to other classroom variables in addition to par
ticipation in such discussions. This conclusion
and its implications were supported by theoretical
and historical findings regarding the "state of
the art" in moral education research. Quite
possibly, the crucial ingredients in the success
of moral discussions programs have yet to be dis
covered. Implications for the training of teachers
who conduct discussions of moral dilemmas included
encouragement for longer and more extensive train
ing periods.
3. Results of pre- and posttest scores on the Defining
Issues Test afforded a basis for questioning the
way in which the change scores affected the test
109
of significance for levels of moral reasoning.
It was concluded that the actual decrease in some
students' scores may have had profound impact on
the outcome of the study and on implications for
future research as well. Again, the implication
reached was that developmental moral education
must include other variables beside classroom dis
cussion of moral dilemmas in the fostering of
moral growth.
Recommendations
Based on these results and conclusions, the following
recommendations are made:
1. Considering the fact that studies examining the
relationship between the discussion of moral
dilemmas and levels of moral reasoning have
yielded mixed results, further research employing
sound experimental designs should be continued.
This would include the random assignment of sub
jects to treatments.
2. Further research must be conducted with regard to
the length and type of training programs provided
110
for instructors who plan to use the moral dilemma
discussion approach. Apparently, great skill
needs to be employed in handling the structure of
the class so that the thrust of the discussion is
understood and that the student is provided ample
opportunity to experience and struggle with the
cognitive dissonance inherent in moral dilemmas.
3. Teacher training programs, both preservice and
inservice, should seek to raise the levels of
moral reasoning among all teachers.
4. The actual program of providing a forum for the
discussion of moral dilemmas should be continued.
With a number of studies reporting significant
results and the high interest level exhibited by
the experimental subjects of the present study,
deletion of the program would not be warranted and,
if continued, will provide for future study of
other pertinent variables in the classroom appli
cation of this theory.
5. A replication of this type of study should be con
ducted to study explicitly the possibility that
change scores in levels of moral reasoning may
Ill
actually decrease/ a finding not reported in
previous studies.
6. Considering the fact that some students actually
decreased significantly in their levels of moral
reasoning application of conditions reported in
psychological education/ such as provided by
Mosher and Sprinthall, should be examined more
closely in the classroom setting. Of particular
interest is the position by Carkhuff that certain
conditions may increase or decrease a person's
level of interpersonal functioning.
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112
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APPENDICES
127
APPENDIX A
A LESSON PLAN FOR LEADING DISCUSSIONS OF
MORAL DILEMMAS
128
II.
III.
129
THE TEACHING PLAN
Confronting a moral dilemma
A. Present dilemma
B. Students must state circumstances in the story
in their own words
C. Define terms
D. Do students understand the problem which faces
the central character?
State a tentative position
A. Students reflect on where they stand on the moral
issues in the story
B. Can students identify and support their choice?
C. Determine how the total group stands on the
moral dilemma
D. Give students opportunity to express reasons for
assuming certain positions
Examine the reasoning
A. Dialogue with other students
B. Dialogue with teacher
1. asking "should" questions
2. asking "why" questions
3. in depth questioning
a. clarifying probe— asks students to
explain terms they use
130
b. issue-specific probe— question or state
ment that asks students to explore one
moral issue related to the problem in
question
c. inter-issue probe— one that seeks to
stimulate the resolution of conflict
between two issues
d. role-switch probe— asks the student to
assume the perspective of a different
person in the conflict from the one the
student has been taking
e. universal-consequences probe— asks the
students to consider what would happen
if they applied their reasoning so that
everyone would follow it
IV. Reflect on an individual position
A. Summarize reasoning
B. Assist students in reflecting on their positions
C. Open-ended— do not seek consensus
APPENDIX B
ORIGINAL DILEMMAS CREATED BY THE STUDENTS
131
132
EXAMPLES OF STUDENT DILEMMAS
A. Your best friend has a drug problem. She comes to
school totally loaded and nobody but the students are
aware. She is losing all of her friends because of
the mean things she says to them.
She doesn't mean the things she says and later she
doesn't remember them either. She comes to school and
people hate her for what she thinks is no reason at
all. She says, "Good, I don't need friends like that
anyway."
If you say anything to her about her drug problem she
either denies it or gets very angry. You have thought
about informing her mom about the problem. But since
her mom is totally unaware of the problem she would
either be very hurt or be very angry that you would
suspect such a thing. Should you leave it be?
B. You have a group of friends who have been your friends
for many years. You all do everything together and go
everywhere together. One day one of these friends
decides to have a party and invites everyone in your
group but one person. When asked why she says it's
because she doesn't like the other person because of
an old grudge.
The person she doesn't like happens to be a very nice
person and the one person you associate with the most.
The party's going to be a lot of fun and you really
want to go. If you decide not to go everyone has
threatened not to be friends with you anymore. How
ever, you don't think it's fair to leave out one
person. What should you do?
APPENDIX C
LECTURE OUTLINE— CONTROL TREATMENT
133
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL REASONING
134
I. Matters of faith and moral education
A. Faith— believing, trusting, relying
B. Morality— concerned with what persons are to do
or not to do
II. Key features of Kohlberg's Model for moral develop
ment
A. Stage One: Fear of Punishment
B. Stage Two: Self Benefit— Hope of Reward
C. Stage Three: Roles— Good Boy, Nice Girl
D. Stage Four: Law and Order
E. Stage Five: Contract Fulfillment
F. Stage Six: Conscience or Principle
III. Key Kohlbergian Principles
A. Development is step by step.
B. Development is not governed by age.
C. Development can terminate at any stage.
D. At any given time, an individual's reasoning
is predominantly at one stage.
E. Reasoning one stage above the present predominant
stage is attractive.
F. Cognitive development is necessary.
G. Empathy is also necessary from stage 3 on.
135
H. If an individual remains in a stage over too long
a period of time, and if he is not forced out of
that stage, the person may become incapable of
moving to a higher level.
IV. The discussion of moral dilemmas
A. Introduction to moral dilemmas
B. Examples of moral dilemmas
C. Conflict which causes change

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Creator Schlimpert, Charles Edgar (author)

Core Title The effect of Kohlberg's theory of moral development in the parochial secondary classroom on levels of moral judgment and dogmatism

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