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Neo-liberal hegemony and re-construction of Islamic community discourses in Turkey: the cases of the Gülen and Erenköy communities

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Neo-liberal hegemony and re-construction of Islamic community discourses in Turkey: the cases of the Gülen and Erenköy communities

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NEO-LIBERAL HEGEMONY
AND
RE-CONSTRUCTION OF ISLAMIC COMMUNITY DISCOURSES IN TURKEY:
THE CASES OF THE GÜLEN AND ERENKÖY COMMUNITIES

by
Deniz Çakırer

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

May 2012

Copyright 2012 Deniz Çakırer

ii

DEDICATION

To my grandparents Vesile and Remzi Kalaycıoğlu
and
To my parents Ayşe and Haluk Çakırer

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to express my deep gratitude to my advisor Professor
Laurie A. Brand for her encouragement, support and patience throughout my doctoral
study. She gave me courage and confidence whenever it felt very difficult to continue. I
am truly indebted and thankful to Professor Brand for providing very detailed feedbacks
for my chapters in an incredibly fast way in order to help me with the time constraints.
Her comments on my chapters challenged me and pushed me to discover new ways of
thinking, which became the sources of excitement for my research. I have been very
fortunate to work with an advisor like Professor Brand, who not only provides invaluable
intellectual guidance but also truly cares for her students and does whatever she can to
help them succeed. It is an honor to be her student.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor J. Ann Tickner, whose lectures and
scholarly work introduced me to new paradigms that changed the way I look at the world.
I have always thought that having Gender, Culture and Global Society as one of my fields
of study has been one of the most valuable contributions of the Ph.D. process to my life
and that feminist paradigm has been the one of the most exciting aspects of my research.
I am also grateful to Professor Tickner for all the care, support and encouragement she
gave me throughout my doctoral study.

iv

I would like to thank Professor G. Thomas Goodnight’s for his valuable feedback and
insights especially on the epistemological and theoretical foundations and the
methodological approach of this study. Professor Goodnight’s feedback allowed me to go
outside the boundaries of Political Science and International Relations, and look at my
research from different, broader points of view.

I am sincerely grateful to Dr. Cathie Gum, who gave me help, support and the tools to
overcome the challenges I faced during dissertation writing and the challenges to come in
the rest of my life. I also thank her for being the most wonderful coach anyone can have
in a race, for picking me up with her joyous attitude whenever I stumbled, for her
understanding, for sharing the ups and downs with me and for making this difficult
process so much easier. I will always remember our talks as the happiest parts of my
dissertation writing years.

I would also like to thank all my friends for their emotional support and making this
process fun. Above all, I would like to thank Seda Ünsar and Sinan Birdal for their
unyielding encouragement, support and intellectual inspiration, to May Chen Kuo for
providing much needed care during long work hours and for our talks that always gave
me peace and happiness, and to Özlem Kalınlı Akbacak and Murat Akbacak for their
constant moral support in the dissertation writing phase and for being available whenever
I needed them.
v

I owe the deepest gratitude to my parents Ayşe and Haluk Çakırer, and my grandparents
Vesile and Remzi Kalaycıoğlu for their unconditional love, support and sacrifice, for
teaching me the joy of exploring and learning and for helping me to keep my inner
strength and perseverance. Writing this dissertation would not have been possible without
my husband Mustafa Oğuz, who shared every bit of this process with me, stayed up in the
sleepless work nights with me just to keep me company and took care of all the
household chores so that I could concentrate only on my dissertation. He has been a
constant source of motivation, always encouraging me in every step and keeping me
going on. I am forever thankful for his love and support.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ x
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... xi
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... xii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................1

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL APPROACH
2.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................10
2.2. Literature Review................................................................................................ 12
2.2.1. The Political Economy Framework ................................................................12
2.2.2. Center-Periphery Approach ............................................................................15
2.2.3. Social Movement Framework .........................................................................24
2.2.4. Theory of Hegemonic Politics ........................................................................27
2.3. Gramsci .................................................................................................................31
2.3.1. Hegemony .......................................................................................................32
2.3.2. Capillary Intellectual Meatuses: The Construction of
Hegemonic Discourses....................................................................................34
a. Civil Society ...................................................................................................35
b. Intellectuals ....................................................................................................36
c. Language ........................................................................................................38
2.3.3. “Applying” Gramscian Perspective to Different Contexts ............................39
2.4. Neo-Gramscianism and Post-Structuralism in IR .................................................41
2.4.1. Evolution of Neo-Gramscianism within the Field of IR .................................42
2.4.2. Post-Structuralism ...........................................................................................45
2.4.3. Criticism of Post-Structuralism.......................................................................49
2.5. Gramsci and Post-Structuralism: Towards A Broader Framework ......................51
2.5.1. Re-appropriation of Gramsci ..........................................................................52
2.5.2. Transformation of Discourses .........................................................................58
a. Post-Structuralist Understanding of Discourse and Gramsci .........................58
b. Discourse Theory ...........................................................................................61
2.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................67

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................70
3.2. Epistemological Perspective .................................................................................70
3.2.1. Ontological and Epistemological Foundations of Discourse Theory .............71
3.2.2. Ontological and Epistemological Foundations of Neo-Gramscianism ...........73
3.2.3. Weak Social Constructivist Epistemology......................................................74
vii

3.3. Research Question and Method ............................................................................78
3.4. Case Selection .......................................................................................................83
3.5. Data Selection .......................................................................................................85
3.6. Data Analysis (Operationalization) .......................................................................89
3.6.1. Contextualization ............................................................................................90
a. Context at the macro level ..............................................................................90
b. Context at the micro level ..............................................................................92
3.6.2. Topics .............................................................................................................93
3.6.3. Discursive Strategies ......................................................................................94
a. Nomination strategies.....................................................................................95
b. Predication strategies .....................................................................................96
3.6.4. Organization of data .......................................................................................98
3.7. Evaluation of the Method .....................................................................................98

CHAPTER IV: A GRAMSCIAN ACCOUNT OF NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY
CONSTRUCTION IN TURKEY
4.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................100
4.2. Neo-Liberal Restructuring of the World Order ....................................................101
4.3. Neo-Liberal Restructuring in Turkey and the Rise of Islamic Businesses ...........106
4.3.1. 1980-1989: The Introduction of Neo-Liberal Principles ...............................106
a. The 1980 Military Coup .................................................................................108
b. The Özal Period (1983-1989) ........................................................................114
c. Rise of the Islamic Capital under Özal Government .....................................115
4.3.2. 1989 - 1999: “The Lost Decade” for Neo-Liberalization ...............................120
a. The February 28 Process ................................................................................123
4.3.3. 1999-2011: Institutionalization of Neoliberalism: From Dominance
to Hegemony ..................................................................................................126
a. The Historic Bloc ...........................................................................................126
b. Empowerment of Islamic Businesses ............................................................132
c. The AKP’s Welfare Policy and the Role of Islamic Communities ................133

4.4. Hegemonic Discourse during the AKP Years ......................................................136
4.4.1. The AKP’s Hegemonic Discourse .................................................................137
4.4.2. The AKP’s Articulation of Neoliberal Discourses
with a Morality Discourse ..............................................................................138
4.5. Summary and Conclusion .....................................................................................143

CHAPTER V: SHIFTS IN THE GÜLEN COMMUNITY DISCOURSE
5.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................146
5.2. The Gülen Community .........................................................................................147
5.3. Organization of the Gülen Community.................................................................151
5.4. Sources, Production and Dissemination of Discourse
in the Gülen Community ......................................................................................153
5.4.1. Said-i Nursi’s Discourse ................................................................................153
viii

5.4.2. Production of Discourse .................................................................................155
5.4.3. Dissemination of Discourse ...........................................................................156
5.5. Changes in the Gülen Community Discourse ......................................................157
5.6. Gülen Community Discourse between 1996 and 1999 ........................................162
5.6.1. Topics ............................................................................................................162
5.6.2. Nomination ...................................................................................................163
5.6.3. Predication ....................................................................................................166
a. Self and Other ..............................................................................................166
b. Old Social Order versus New Social Order .................................................170
c. Social Transformation ..................................................................................171
d. Economy ......................................................................................................174
e. Women .........................................................................................................176
f. Democracy, Freedom, Human Rights ..........................................................177
5.6.4. Reference points and Associated Concepts ..................................................178
5.7. Discursive Shift: March-December 1999 ...........................................................180
5.8. Discursive Articulation: 2006-2011 ....................................................................184
5.8.1. Topics ............................................................................................................184
5.8.2. Nomination ...................................................................................................185
5.8.3. Predication ....................................................................................................186
a. Self and Other ..............................................................................................186
b. Working Women ..........................................................................................188
c. Economy ......................................................................................................191
d. Social Justice ................................................................................................194
e. Social Transformation: The Relationship between the
Individual and Society .................................................................................195
f. Liberty, Justice, Democracy and Human Rights ..........................................198
5.8.4. Reference Points and Related Concepts .......................................................200
5.9. Discursive Shifts and Hegemonic Discourses ....................................................201
5.9.1. Shift from individual Centered Social Change towards
Community Centered Social Change ...........................................................201
5.9.2. Shift from “Culture” towards “Collective Cognition” As
the Basis for Social Peace ............................................................................203
5.9.3. Shifts in the Boundaries of Public and Private .............................................205
5.9.4. Articulations of Democracy, Freedom and Justice .......................................207
5.10. Discursive Dilemmas and Strategies Used To Address Them ...........................209
5.11. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................210

CHAPTER VI: SHIFTS IN THE ERENKÖY COMMUNITY DISCOURSE
6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................214
6.2. The Erenköy Community .......................................................................................215
6.3. The Altınoluk Journal ............................................................................................222
6.4. The Erenköy Community Discourses Between 1995 and 1997 ............................224
6.4.1. Topics ...............................................................................................................224
6.4.2. Nomination ......................................................................................................225
ix

6.4.3. Predication .......................................................................................................227
a. Economy .........................................................................................................227
b. Individual and Society ....................................................................................231
c. Secularism and Democracy .............................................................................232
6.4.4. Reference Points ..............................................................................................235
6.5. The Erenköy Community Discourses, 1997-2000 .................................................236
6.5.1. Topics ...............................................................................................................236
6.5.2. Nomination ......................................................................................................237
6.5.3. Predication .......................................................................................................238
a. Economy .........................................................................................................239
b. Individual and Society ....................................................................................240
c. Secularism and Democracy .............................................................................242
d. The European Union .......................................................................................245
6.5.4. Reference Points ..............................................................................................246
6.6. The Erenköy Community Discourses between 2001- 2011 ...................................247
6.6.1. Topics ...............................................................................................................247
6.6.2. Nomination ......................................................................................................249
6.6.3. Predication .......................................................................................................252
a. Economy .........................................................................................................252
b. The European Union .......................................................................................255
c. Secularism, Democracy and Human Rights....................................................256
d. Individual and Society ....................................................................................260
e. Freedom...........................................................................................................264
g. Gender Roles ...................................................................................................266
6.6.4. Reference Points ...........................................................................................269
6.7. Discursive Dilemmas and Strategies Used To Address Them ..............................270
6.8. Conclusion .............................................................................................................271

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION
7.1. Main Argument ......................................................................................................276
7.2. Neoliberal Re-Structuration and Shifts in the Islamic Community Discourses ....278
7.3. Comparison of the Shifts in the Gülen and Erenköy Community Discourses .......285
7.4. Implications of the Findings for the Engagement
between Hall’s Neo-Gramscianism and Post-Structural Discourse Theory ..........289
7.5. Implications for Feminist Research .......................................................................290
7.6. Implications for Future Research on Turkey .........................................................293
7.7. Implications for Future IR Research ......................................................................297

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................301

x

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1.Nomination of Self and Other in the GC Discourse
between 1996 and 1999 ..................................................................................166

Table 5.2 Nomination of Self and Other in the GC Discourse
between 2006 and 2011 ..................................................................................186

Table 6.1. Nomination of Self and Other in the EC Discourse
between 1997 and 2000 .................................................................................238

Table 6.2. Nomination of Self and Other in the EC Discourse
between 2001 and 2011 ..................................................................................249

xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Stuart Hall’s Re-appropriation of Gramsci ....................................................57

Figure 5.1. Reference Points and Associated Concepts Used
in the GC Discourse between 1996 and 1999 ...............................................179

Figure 5.2. Reference Points and Associated Concepts
in the GC Discourse between 2006 and 2011 ...............................................201

xii

ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the relationship between changes in the international
economic structures and transformation of Islamic identities by focusing on the neoliberal
restructuring in Turkey that started in the early 1980s and its impact on the discourses of
two Islamic communities in Turkey, the Gülen and Erenköy Communities. The
dissertation argues that a structural form of power and a diffused form of power in the
form of discourses that become common sense over time operate simultaneously. In order
to understand the connections between the structural and diffuse forms of power, the
dissertation proposes a theoretical framework that draws from Stuart Hall’s interpretation
of Neo-Gramscianism and Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structural Discourse Theory. The
study adopts the weak social constructivist epistemology in order to bring together certain
aspects of epistemological foundations of Discourse Theory and Neo-Gramscianism. By
using the tools provided by the Discourse Historical Approach to discourse analysis, the
dissertation analyzes the transformation of the two Islamic communities’ discourses from
mid 1990s until the end of the 2000s. The study concludes that through the articulation of
Third Way neoliberal discourses within Islamic community discourses, the Islamic
communities serve to legitimize the AKP government’s hegemonic neoliberal discourse
in Turkey. Through the discourses of Islamic communities, the structural power the AKP
and the Islamic actors acquired in the process of neoliberal restructuring in Turkey are
translated into everyday life as a diffused form of power operating primarily through
gender discourses.
1

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

This dissertation grew out of an interest in the interactions between patterns of global
economic systems and mechanisms of religious identity construction. Since the 1980s,
neoliberal economic reforms, which favor unrestricted financial flows, privatization, a
small state, low inflation, and restrictive fiscal policies, were applied in developing
countries, mostly as a result of the conditions the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank (WB) imposed on providing loans.
1
Towards the end of the 1990s, the
“Third Way” discourse emerged as a variant of neoliberal discourses and stressed the
need for community networks, social cohesion and responsibility in a neoliberal
economic system.
2
The third way discourses, with their emphasis on concepts such as
community, family, benevolent state and active citizen, provided new possibilities for
contextualizing neoliberal discourses within the dominant discourses in different
countries.

In the 1970s and early 1980s in Turkey, groups espousing political Islam represented the
urban poor. Starting in the early 1980s a new class of small and medium business owners
committed to Islamic beliefs emerged. These businesses, which also try to adhere to the
rules of Islam regarding trade and business, are referred to as Islamic businesses, and
many were founded by the adherents of various Islamic communities. An Islamic

1
Rodrik, 2001; Williamson, 2004.

2
Plehwe et al., 2006: 214-216.
2

community is defined as an organization of piety, composed of individuals bound
together by strict obedience to its founder or his recognized successor and who follow
their mystic doctrine and religious, social, and political rules. In the context of the neo-
liberal restructuring of the economy that began in the early 1980s in Turkey, Islamic
businesses, political parties, and communities underwent major transformations. Islamic
businesses benefited significantly from the neoliberal reforms, thus allowing associated
Islamic communities and foundations to flourish.

In addition to the variation among Islamic actors that results from different interpretations
of the Qur’an and adhering to different branches of tarikats (Islamic orders)
3
, Islamic
actors’ functions in the socio-economic system have also increasingly diversified since
the 1980s. Class relationships have come to crosscut Islamic identities as Islamic labor
unions emerged alongside Islamic business associations. Some Islamic communities have
given priority to establishing education institutions, some to mass media companies, and
some to commerce. During the 1990s, while some supported the Islamic political party
RP (Welfare Party) and its continuation FP (Virtue Party), others supported center-right
non-Islamist political parties, such as the ANAP (Motherland Party) and the DYP (True
Path Party).
4

3
Islamic orders are Islamic communities organized around a sheikh, who teaches his disciples the rules of Islamic
mysticism that he learnt from his sheikh. A fuller description of Islamic orders will follow in Chapter 6, “Shifts in the
Erenköy Community Discourse.”

4
For differences in the political orientations of various Islamic actors see Turam, 2007; Buğra, 2002; Çalışlar and
Çelik, 2000.

3

When the AKP (Justice and Development Party), a conservative party established by the
cadres of the Islamic FP (Felicity Party), came to power in Turkey in November 2002, it
began to institutionalize neo-liberal reforms. Most Islamic actors, even some who were
critical of capitalism in general and economic liberalization in particular, supported the
AKP government and its neo-liberal policies.
5
Some had staunchly opposed the secular
regime in the 1990s, yet they gave their support to the AKP, which declared its non-
opposition to secularism.
6

Investigating how Islamic actors in Turkey adapted to the economic structure they had
been criticizing while preserving the fundamental elements of their ideologies will help
us identify the connections between neoliberal discourses and the discourses of political
Islam. An analysis of these connections will help us elucidate the processes by which
discourses of domestic social groups reconstructed and were woven into the neoliberal
discourses and by which the latter discourse is legitimized within these social groups. In
other words, it will give us an understanding of the dynamics of re-contextualization of
neoliberalism in Turkey, as well as how Islamic actors’ self-identities and discourses on
socio-economic and political issues are transformed in this process.

The research question in this dissertation is “How have Islamic community discourses
been transformed in the context of the institutionalization of neoliberal restructuring in

5
Uzgel et.al., 2009.

6
Akdoğan, 2003.
4

Turkey since 2001?” How do they affect and/or are affected by the hegemonic discourse
in Turkey that emerged in 2001, as neoliberal restructuring of the economic system
accelerated. The first goal of this research is to develop a theoretical framework for
understanding how Islamic communities are positioned in social structures and how
community members interpret social processes. The dissertation aims to provide an
understanding of knowledge production dynamics by exploring the simultaneous
operation of structural power and diffuse power in the form of discourse. The search for
an appropriate explanatory framework led to a second goal: providing an engagement
between neo-Gramscianism in International Relations (IR) and in cultural studies, and in
this way, between IR neo-Gramscianism and post-structural discourse theory. Finally,
this research aims to identify sources of power, how power is distributed in everyday life
through discourses.

The dissertation focuses on Islamic communities because their increased financial
capabilities, especially in the first half of the 2000s, have allowed them to use mass
media, education networks, and interactions in small social gatherings, to develop
discursive spaces for the construction of new Islamic identities, thus making them
significant sources of Islamic identity formation in Turkey. The journals published by
some of the Islamic communities, directed at the community followers, serve to
reconstruct meanings that affect followers’ perceptions regarding the general messages of
the hegemonic discourse they are exposed to through mass media. Thus, these
5

publications have the power to contest or increase the appeal of and generate consent for
the dominant ideologies in the eyes of community adherents.

In order to assess the different ways in which dominant ideologies are interpreted in
different Islamic community settings, two Islamic communities – Gülen and Erenköy –
were selected for this study. Both communities have extensive ties with national and
international trade and financial networks; hence, the process of global neo-liberal
restructuring has had important implications for both. However, they differ in terms of
the number of their adherents, their views regarding the state and secularism and the
Islamic teachings they follow. The Gülen Community follows the teachings of Said-i
Nursi (1878–1960), who prioritized disseminating religious beliefs over teaching
principles of a particular Islamic order to a limited number of people over a very long
period of time. The latter way of teaching is characteristic of the branches of the
Nakshbandi tarikat (Islamic order), such as the Erenköy community. While the Gülen
community is the largest Islamic community in Turkey with a transnational network, the
Erenköy Community is much smaller with significantly fewer transnational connections.
The two also differ in that the Gülen Community adopted a statist language and
expressed support for the secular regime in Turkey, while the adherents of the Erenköy
Community have openly expressed their opposition to the secular establishment. As a
result, the two communities supported different political parties-- until the establishment
of the AKP. Businesses associated with the two communities also formed and joined
different associations. The variations between the two communities allow us to compare
6

different mechanisms that underpin the processes through which dominant ideologies are
synthesized with community discourses.

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework of this study. It reviews the literature on the
rise of political Islam in Turkey and the role of Islamic communities in the socio-
economic and political spheres. It also provides an account of Gramsci’s philosophy,
discusses the usefulness of Neo-Gramscian approaches in the field of IR and their post-
structural critiques in addressing the dissertation’s research question. The chapter
proposes a theoretical framework that draws from Stuart Hall’s appropriation of
Gramscianism
7
and Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structuralist Discourse Theory (DT)
8
.
While, Hall’s appropriation of Gramsci provides an understanding of the structure of
discourse production at the macro level of analysis, DT provides tools to analyze the
ways in which hegemonic discourses unfold, are transformed and construct inter-
subjective meanings at the micro level.

Chapter 3 focuses on the epistemological and methodological approaches and presents
the operationalization of the method. It argues that a weak social constructivist
epistemology can complement the theoretical approach of the dissertation that draws
from Neo-Gramscianism and DT. The chapter explains the steps for the data analysis in

7
Hall, 1987.

8
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985.

7

accordance with the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA).
9
First is the identification of
the topics covered in the journals under each time period for each community. The next
step is to analyze the way in which “self” and “others” are referred in the two journals.
The third is to identify the characteristics and qualities attributed to the actors, concepts,
and processes discussed under the topic the dissertation focuses on. The final step of
discourse analysis draws from the DT, which proposes that new meanings materialize as
a result of the emergence of certain concepts as reference points in defining other
concepts. In line with the DT, the connections between the concepts that are central in
providing new subject positions and meanings will be determined.

Chapter 4 focuses on the historical context. The chapter begins with an account of the
neoliberal structuring of the world order since the late 1970s, the Washington Consensus,
and the Third Way adopted by the former US President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and
former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-2007) that emerged as a variant of the
neoliberal discourses.
10
The chapter weaves together the phases of neoliberal
restructuration in Turkey and the accompanying changes in the socio-political structures
with the discourses that became dominant in each phase. The chapter continues with an
analysis of the hegemonic discourses during the AKP period and argues that the AKP’s
appropriation of neoliberal discourse drives not only from the Islamic identity of the

9
Reisigl and Wodak, 2001.

10
Giddens, 1998; Giddens, 2000.
8

Party’s core cadres but also from the elements of the dominant discourses in the 1980s
and 1990s, each of which provided the discursive ground for the next.

Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the diachronic changes in the discourses in the Gülen and the
Erenköy Community discourses respectively in the main journals of the two
communities, Sızıntı and Altınoluk. The analysis of these discourses is divided into three
time periods between 1995 and 2011, determined according to significant shifts in the
discourses. The analyses of Sızıntı and Altınoluk show that the main themes in the period
under study were similar. Among the primary topics were: characteristics of the self and
others; social transformation; the relationship between individual and society, and
between men and women; public and private boundaries; the economic system;
secularism; democracy; human rights; and social justice. Each chapter applies the data
analysis method described above for each time period under investigation. The chapters
conclude with a comparison of the characteristics of discourses in different time periods.

The final chapter begins with a discussion of the main argument and overview of the
relationship the connections between neoliberal restructuring and the discursive shifts in
the two communities and changing power relations among the AKP, the Gülen and
Erenköy communities, and the state. The chapter continues with a comparison of the
shifts in the discourses in the Gülen and Erenköy Communities and the mechanisms that
underlie these discursive shifts. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
implications of the findings for the engagements between Hall’s neo-Gramscianism and
9

post-structural discourse theory, for the feminist research, for the future studies on
Turkish politics, and for the new research avenues in the field of International Relations.

10

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL APPROACH

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the
transformation of the discourses of two religious communities, the Gülen community and
the Erenköy Community in accordance with the changes in the political and socio-
economic structure in Turkey after 2001. I adopt Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of
discourse as the means used to organize a society into a structured reality, in order to give
it stability and meaning.
11
Discourses are indicators of power relations.
12
They also
constitute power itself, shaping cultures, identities and ideologies.

In analyzing the interaction between the power structures and discourses, we need a
theoretical framework that accounts for both a diffused form of power contained in
discourses and in our everyday lives and a more concentrated and institutionalized form
of power that actively shapes discourses. Despite their ontological differences,
engagement between Neo-Gramscianism and post-structuralism can lead us to fruitful
discussions of the dynamics between structure and agency and between socio-economic
changes and changes in culture and identity. Political actors who govern by the consent
of the ruled, or in Gramscian terminology establish ‘hegemony,’ do so by formulating

11
Sutherland, 2005: 191

12
Sutherland, 2005: 186
11

“hegemonic discourses.” Through a process called articulation, whereby elements of the
hegemonic discourse and already existing discourses of social groups are connected in a
way that changes certain meanings in both discourses, social groups internalize some of
the cultural and political values promoted in hegemonic discourses. Both direct,
institutional power and diffused form of power operate during the process of articulation.
Social groups internalize some of the elements of the hegemonic discourse through the
process of articulation. Shifts in the hegemonic discourse and/or the social group’s role
within the structures of the society open up possibilities for new articulations, which may
legitimate, challenge and shift the hegemonic discourse.

This chapter begins with a review of the literature on the rise of political Islam in Turkey
in general and on religious communities in particular. Then, it discusses Gramscianism
and argues that this approach provides a promising avenue for studying religious
communities in Turkey. Next, the chapter will focus on the evolution of Neo-Gramscian
approaches in the field of International Relations (IR) and their post-structural critiques.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of a new theoretical framework, which uses
Stuart Hall’s re-appropriation of Gramscian concepts together with Laclau and Mouffe’s
post-structuralist account of discourse transformation.

12

2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies that analyze the rise of political Islam in general and religious communities in
particular can be divided into four groups. First are those studies that use a political
economy framework to explain the rise of political Islam as the result of the increase in
income gap between high and middle/lower income classes and resulting migration to
cities. Second, the center-periphery framework analyzes the rise of political Islam as a
cultural reaction of the masses to the secular culture of the elites. Studies using a social
movement framework, the third group, focus on the characteristics of political structures,
organizational dynamics of the Islamic movements and the framing techniques they use.
Finally, the theory of hegemonic politics adopts a Gramscian perspective. It focuses on
how structural changes in the economy empower certain actors, changing the socio-
political landscape.

2.2.1. The Political Economy Framework

The political economy framework focuses on the interaction of state and economy in
explaining the rise of political Islam in Turkey. These studies use the increasing income
gap between upper and middle/lower classes as an independent variable to explain the
increase in the vote for Islamist parties. According to the “protest-vote framework,”
membership in a group that is economically and socially underprivileged, excluded or
discriminated against, greatly enhances the probability that it will vote for political
13

parties on the far left or far right.
13
A political economy framework is also used to explain
the appeal of religious communities among the lower social classes. Saktanber focuses on
the methods religious communities use to attract followers especially among the poorer
segments of the society.
14
Ayata shows that Sufi communities are active in helping needy
students and financing Quran courses.
15
Other studies focus on the impact of neoliberal
restructuring on the strengthening of Islamic identities, either by state policies that
support Islamization to suppress leftist groups, or as a result of a reaction by various
social groups to the culturally homogenizing effects of globalization.
16

There are numerous studies that examine the rise of Islamic businessmen and in
particular the role of religious communities in Islamic capital accumulation process in
Turkey especially during 1980s and 1990s. Yeşilada investigates the origins of Islamic
capital and provides evidence for the linkages between religious orders (mainly the
Nakshibendi sect) and Saudi capital.
17
Kuran argues that networks based on mutual trust
and interdependence that religious communities provided led to the emergence of an
Islamic sub-economy, which enabled Islamic firms to conduct business with other
Islamic firms and banks and recruit their employees as well as customers from Islamist

13
Esmer, 2002: 4

14
Saktanber, 1994: 94-134

15
Ayata, 1996: 50

16
Keyman, 1995; Öniş, 1997; Birtek and Toprak, 1993.

17
Yesilada, 1988.

14

circles. The sub-economy gave them additional advantages in terms of capital
accumulation vis-à-vis other small capital owners who were deprived of the resources
provided by an Islamic sub-economy.
18
Yavuz argues that Islamic communities
functioned as informal networks for raising capital and promoting business interests of
fellow members.
19
Buğra analyzes the role of Islam in the formation of networks that are
mobilized in different areas of economic life and argues that different branches of the
Nakshibendi sect were successful in mobilizing social capital and institutionalizing
wealth in financial institutions and holding companies.
20
Bulut provides an extensive
account of the evolution of Islamic capital, the methods of capital accumulation used by
the religious communities and the links established between state institutions and Islamic
capital under various governments, and concludes that the competition between various
capital factions among Islamists leads to competition among various religious
communities.
21
He also argues that as capital accumulation becomes an integral function
of religious communities, contention emerges between the conservative groups in the
communities who oppose integration into international markets, especially Western
markets, and groups that espouse economic liberalism.
22

18
Kuran, 2007: 51-52, Kuran, 1995:167-169.

19
Yavuz, 1992.

20
Buğra, 1994: 17.

21
Bulut, 1995: 187.

22
Bulut, 1995: 54.
15

Although economic power is an important factor, it is not sufficient to explain the rise of
Islamic identity in Turkey. The political economy framework may explain how Islamic
businesses acquire their economic power, but it fails to account for the impact of Islamic
capital accumulation on the changing relationship between secular and Islamist capital
and between the latter and the state. Further, this framework does not explain how
economic power is translated into political power. In order to accomplish this, one needs
to investigate how changes in the economic structure of the state and in the state-society
relationship affect the perceptions, goals and identities upheld by various Islamist groups.
More specifically, we need to explore how religious communities reproduce Islamic
identity and how Islamic identity is internalized by groups from different socio-economic
classes. In contrast to the political economy framework, the center-periphery approach
focuses on the role of culture and identity in explaining the rise of political Islam.

2.2.2. Center-Periphery Approach

The center-periphery approach, first used by Mardin,
23
frames the rise of Islam as a
source of socio-political identity in terms of a tension between the secular and centrist
state structures, on the one hand, and the sections of society that challenge those
structures on the other. He argues that due to the late modernization of the Ottoman
Empire, the military establishment and political elites are associated with a modernizing

23
Mardin, 1975.

16

state, which does not have organic links to society.
24
The framework portrays state and
society as discrete from and opposed to one another. After the Republic was proclaimed
in 1923, the reaction by the periphery against the homogenizing and centralizing
pressures of the pro-Western, secular and modernist state elites, or “center,” and the
center’s response, have determined the characteristics of the political structure. In the
absence of a civil society tradition and bureaucratic elites independent from the political
party, Heper argues that political parties established by elites to implement the
modernization project were perceived as synonymous with the state --state and political
party were conflated-- and this conflation prevented the emergence of a dynamic
relationship between state and society.
25

The center-periphery framework has had a substantial effect on the way in which
religious communities are studied. Islamic actors, including the Islamic political parties
and religious communities, are considered to be social actors and as such they are part of
the “periphery”, contesting the secular state structures
26
at the “center.” Islamic actors’
interests and behavior are then explained by the character of state-society interaction. By
framing the rise of Islamic actors in terms of the opposition of Islam to the state, the
focus of studies on the rise of Islam has been largely on whether Islamic actors can be

24
Esmer, 2002: 3., Güneş- Ayata and Ayata, 2002: 138.

25
Heper, 1985: 15.

26
By “state structures” or “center” these scholars stand for high judiciary, army, bureaucracy and CHP (Republican’s
People’s Party) which is viewed as the representative of these institutions.

17

conceptualized as civil society actors and on whether they contribute to or undermine
democratization.

Scholars who have argued that religious communities are civil society actors and
contribute to the democratization process frame political Islam as primarily an identity
issue. They argue that Islamist movements created a space for political participation by
new social groups who remained marginal and silenced until the 1980s.
27
This approach
fits well with the symbolic authority approach developed by Eickelman and Piscatori,
who view Islam not as a monolithic faith system, but as a web of symbols. Muslims
employ the symbolic authority of Islamic codes, meanings and practices to devise
strategies for identity recognition and for resisting secular projects.
28

Another scholar who views Islamic actors as part of the periphery, reacting to
authoritarian pressures of the center in Turkey, is Hakan Yavuz. Yavuz argues that
“society-based” Islamic movements seek to reconstitute identities, institutional structures,
ways of life and the moral code of society through participating, influencing and
controlling cultural, educational and economic spheres. Yavuz also differentiates political
and cultural Islam. He argues that “cultural Islam” seeks to influence culture, whereas

27
Sayarı and Esmer, 2002: 19

28
Henrick explains that this literature focuses not on "political Islam" per se, but on "Muslim politics." The distinction
allocates agency not to Islam, but to Muslims who employ the symbolic authority of Islamic categories to define
strategies for subjective recognition in the modern world. See Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996.

18

political Islam seeks to attain political power.
29
In this way, he de-politicizes identity
construction and discourse generation in religious community. Once again, religious
communities are regarded as actors in social sphere, as opposed to political sphere.

Another scholar who criticizes framing the rise of Islamism as a political issue (especially
by scholars principally concerned with international affairs) at the expense of its cultural
significance is Göle.
30
Göle provides an account of the rise of Islamism from multiple
modernities approach, which is based on the notion that modernization acquires unique
characteristics distinctive from Western modernization, depending on the cultures and
institutional settings it is articulated in.
31
Muslim modernity is not opposed to modernity
itself. Rather, it acts “as a means of management with modern society.”
32
This approach
provides a compelling criticism of the theories of modernization, which represent Islam
as traditional and reactionary as opposed to modern and progressivist.
33
In contrast to
these binary categories, multiple modernities theorists argue that Islamism has a hybrid
nature as Islamic identities are reconstructed by selecting various aspects of Western
modernity and of local identities.

29
Yavuz, 2003: 92.

30
Graubard, 2000: 8. Also see Göle, 2000.

31
Multiple modernities literature 2000 Winter issue of Daedalus.

32
Göle, 1996: 138

33
Göle, 1996: 137

19

Focusing on the Islamic movements’ constructions of self and modernity in their
everyday experiences, Göle suggests that the latters’ relation to Western modernity “takes
shape and acquires sense through women’s bodies.”
34
By participating in Islamic
movement, women encounter with modernity. “Individuation” of women (meaning
women view their individual life strategy as a top priority) comes along as an unintended
consequence.
35
Veiling of women is a political statement against Western modernism. At
the same time, it perpetuates segregation between sexes by limiting encounters between
the sexes and confinement of women to private sphere.
36

Despite her criticism of traditional-modern dichotomy Göle maintains the center-
periphery dichotomy. She perceives the rise of Islamic movements as “the return of
Muslim social actors to the history from which they were expelled,” (italics mine) whose
expectations are not fulfilled by the values put forward by Westernist elites. She assumes
that these groups have pre-existing expectations. She draws attention to the similarity of
feminism and Islamism in terms of their upholding difference, particularism and
localism, but she ignores universalist claims of various Islamic groups, and their
advocacy of ‘unity’ of Muslim practices.
37
Second, Göle portrays Westernist elites in
Ottoman Empire as identical to elites in the West, in the sense that they are completely

34
Göle, 1996: 4

35
Göle, 1996: 21- 22

36
Göle, 1996: 137-139

37
Göle views Kemalist elites’ advocacy of protecting “Anatolian country side culture”, which manifests significant
differences depending on the region, city and village and which is also different from the urban Islamist culture, as
elitist. This view stands in contradiction to her advocacy of difference and particularism.

20

cut off from their heritage. Center-periphery framework depicts elites as detached from
the periphery, ignoring they too are products of a hybrid identity. Göle argues that
Kemalist women disowned the Islamic heritage of their mothers. She does not take into
consideration the continuous re-construction of the meaning of ‘Islamic heritage,’ or in
Eickelman and Piscatori’s terms, ‘invention of tradition.
38
” She also argues that Kemalist
women’s identities are designed and delivered by the state.
39
Göle underestimates the
agency of these women in reconstructing state-promoted identities and in transforming
them into more “hybrid identities.” In this way, she contributes to the reproduction of the
binary oppositions between the secular center and Islamist periphery, ignoring the hybrid
forms in between these two extremes.

Turam provides a more sophisticated and dynamic analysis of the mutual transformation
of state and society. She has argued that studies of Islam as a discourse, as identity and as
a civic culture disregarded the importance of the state and macro-political processes.
40

She mentions that these studies either conceptualize the quest for identities without the
state or, more often, despite the state.
41
In addition, the debates on whether political
actions of Islamic business associations, labor unions and religious communities, will
contribute to or undermine civil society have largely neglected the importance of shifts in

38
Eickelman and Piscatory argue that all traditions are created through shared practice, and they can be profoundly and
consciously modified and manipulated under the guise of a return to a more legitimate earlier practice. They refer to
this process as “invention of tradition” Eickelman and Piscatory, 1996: 28.

39
For Göle’s discussion of “Kemalist feminism” see Göle, 1996: 71-81.
40
Turam, 2001: 5.

41
Turam, 2001: 79.

21

state-society interaction in shaping the consequence of the political actions of these
actors.
42

Since the rise of the AKP to the power, which resulted in a new stance by the state
towards Islamic actors, there has been an increase in the number of studies that
emphasize the importance of state structures in affecting social movements, especially in
the literature on social movements. Turam focuses on the “engagements” between
Islamic actors and state. Specifically, she focuses on “Islamic action that is separate from
the state, but that interacts, shapes and also becomes transformed by it.”
43
In this way, she
shows how state institutions and Islamic actors engage in mutually beneficial activities
such as promoting Turkish language in foreign countries by establishing educational
institutions. She argues that these engagements often facilitate democratization not
deliberately, but accidentally.

Studies in this broad center-periphery framework fail to capture most of the complexities
of the state-society relationship in the Republican era. First, by categorizing the all the
non-elite segments of the population as a monolithic entity called “periphery,” this
framework ignores the significant variation in the population. Center-right conservative
parties that claimed to represent the voices of the periphery led or participated in the
governments in Turkey after 1945 more than the center-left Republican People’s Party

42
Turam, 2007: 24.

43
Turam, 2007: 32.

22

(RPP), which claims to represent the voices of those who support the established
principles of the regime. Second, the framework ignores the extensive ties between the
state and groups such as religious communities, which are defined as peripheral. Contrary
to the depiction of religious communities as representatives of social groups that are
excluded by the “center,” many scholars point out that Islamic communities have
established and benefited from their ties with center-right governments since the 1980
military coup
44
and supported by the military regime from 1980 to 1983 against leftist
groups.

Finally, especially since the 1980s, the swift accumulation of capital by religiously
conservative small and medium business owners, has led to the emergence of an “Islamic
elite,” composed of businessmen who are well-integrated into the capitalist economy and
are committed to Islamic principles in their daily life and in business conduct. During this
time, Islamic identity continued to appeal to both small businessmen and immigrants in
the urban areas. Thus, socio-economic cleavages among those who have embraced this
Islamic identity have been deepening. Islamic small business owners, once regarded as
part of the “periphery” have become economically stronger. Their growing economic
strength has led to the political empowerment of Islamic elites through the establishment
of business associations and increasing ties with various right-wing political parties.
Their ties with the state were built slowly during the government of center-right parties

44
For an explanation of state-sponsored religious activities and the symbiotic relations, temporary alliances and long
term affiliations of the central state with religious groups, including religious communities. Ayata: 1996. Also see
Sakallıoğlu, 1996; Vertigans, 2003; Doğan, 2009.
23

before the 1980 coup, but intensified after the 1980 coup. Intricate ties between Islamic
elites and the government suggest that the broad distinction between center and periphery
is inadequate in explaining the rise of political Islam.

Indeed, the center-periphery approach has restricted the debates on the rise of political
Islam to a limited set of questions. Despite their attention to state structures, which is
lacking in the political economy framework, analysts using this framework apply
concepts such as democracy, pluralism and civil society, which originated in Western
settings, without considering what they mean and how they work differently in the
context of Turkish politics. For this reason, their analyses remain Western-centric.
Contextualizing these abstract concepts requires a focus on the way in which these
concepts are interpreted and re-conceptualized in everyday life, through different
channels such as education, mass media and various forms of discussion forums provided
by political parties, civil society institutions, and social movements. Moreover, the view
of state and society as opposed to one another obstructs an analysis of the underlying
power relations among various state and society actors and the shifts in these power
relations, which affect these re-interpretations. An analysis of shifts in the way in which
state and society actors are interconnected, will reveal the purposes the discourses on
identity and culture serve.

24

2.2.3. Social Movement Framework

Social Movement Theory (SMT) provides various theoretical models that are used to
explain the rise of Islamism in a variety of political contexts. The political opportunity
structure (POS) model aims to explain the emergence and success of social movements
using the characteristics of political structures.
45
It is difficult to apply this model in non-
Western settings due to POS theorists’ tendency to examine movements in Western
liberal democracies and the resulting assumption that all social movements share goals
compatible with Western liberal ideas.
46
Nevertheless, a group of non-Western scholars
have examined the rise of Islamism drawing from SMT. Their studies account for the rise
of Islamic social movements, including Islamic political parties, by referring to factors
such as the divides among secular elites, the fragmentation of the political system and the
collapse of center parties.
47
Mecham attributes electoral success of the AKP to the
iterated periods of political learning on the part of leaders of to a political system that
rewards political entrepreneurship and the presence of robust institutional constraints on

45
POS theorists focus on factors such as relative openness of the political system, presence or absence of elite allies,
the stability of elite alignments, state propensity for repression. Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam, Mc Carthy and
Zald, 1996; Tarrow and Meyer, 1998.

46
Eligür, 2010: 10. Mees also mentions the tendency of social movement theorists to avoid studying volatile and
bounded movements based on ethnicity and religion. See Mees, 2004: 312, quoting from D. MacAdam, S. Tarrow and
Charles Tilly, 1996, 17-34.

47
According to Bayat, studies in SMT underestimate the dynamic and changing nature of Islamic movements by
making overarching generalizations about their dynamics. Bayat, 2005: 891. See Tuğal for a discussion of works that
use an SMT framework to explain the rise of Islamism. Tuğal, 2009: 22. Also see Hendrick 2009.

25

the other. According to Mecham, in Turkey, “political learning”
48
resulted in the gradual
moderation of the Islamic political parties, leading to the establishment of the AKP.
49

The POS model has been criticized for a variety of reasons,
50
including the model’s focus
on few factors that might have an effect on social movements and ignoring the possible
interactions among these factors.
51
In an effort to address some of the criticisms against
the POS model, SMT scholars developed political process model (PPM).
52
In PPM,
political opportunity structures remains as the key variable that explains the rise of social
movements.
53
Alongside characteristics of the POS, this model includes organizational
dynamics within the movement and meanings shared by movement actors.
54
As a
response to the criticisms that in PPM is overly structuralist, SMT scholars developed
Dynamics of Contention program (henceforth “Doc”).
55
Despite Doc’s the recognition of

48
Cavdar Yaşar explains that ‘political learning’ is defined as a process whereby a political actor to develops new
beliefs, skills and procedures as a result of experience and evaluation of the political structure. Yaşar, 2008: 478-480.

49
Mecham, 2004: 340.

50
Goldstone, 2004: 334 According to Goldstone, social movements have most often been characterized as movements
of those “outside the polity” or as “challengers”, seeking goals that they are unable to pursue through institutionalized
political processes. Goldstone mentions that social movements have mostly been depicted as acting on behalf of the
economically disadvantaged

51
Eligür, 2010: 9-12.

52
See D. McAdam, et.al., 1996.

53
Eligür, 2010: 13.

54
In this literature shared meanings within the organization is referred to as “framing processes.” Diani and Bison,
2004: 282-289. For an overview of PPM literature and how the model applies to the mobilization of political Islam in
Turkey see Eligür 2010 pp.12-36. PPM analysts brought together in Doug McAdam et.al 1996. For a list of political
opportunity structures see Goldstone, 2004: 347, paraphrasing from Tarrow, 1994: 78-85.

55
See McAdam, Tarow and Tilly Doc propose a more detailed analysis of the specific context. The network
perspective in Doc defines social movements as “dense networks of informal interactions, sharing a collective identity.
(Diani and Bison, 2004: 282-289.) Similar to PPM, in Doc literature, POS remain as the key variable.

26

the importance of identity, cultural production and agency, these elements remain as add-
ons rather than being integrated with organizational dynamics or political opportunity
structures.
56

Using PPM, Eligür explains the rise to power of the Islamic movement in Turkey using
the political opportunities that the 1980 military coup opened up, the organizational
resources of movement entrepreneurs, and successful framing, defined as assigning
meaning to events and conditions.
57
She argues that the movements’ strategies and tactics
are framed according to the POS. Eligür explains the division of the Islamic elites into
two camps (pro-globalization and nationalist) as the result of a narrowing of the POS,
completely ignoring the changes in the economic structure that gave rise to Islamic elites.
Arat argues that Welfare Party provided a political opportunity structure for women by
encouraging political activism in the party’s women branches. The WP provided
opportunities for women to work outside home and exercise a voice in public affairs.
58

Yet WP’s discourse on women continued to be highly conservative and men continued to
occupy high ranking positions within the party. Both Eligür’s and Arat’s works, that give
primacy to POS, exemplify the “top-down” approach of the social movement theory that

56
Beinin and Vairel argues that Doc remains predominantly structural, with agency factors coming in when structural
factors cannot explain the case at hand p.5-6. For a criticism of Doc see Koopman p? , Eligür p.13-14, Goldstone,
Beinin and Vairel argues that Doc remains predominantly structural, with agency factors coming in when structural
factors cannot explain the case at hand p.5-6.

57
Snow and Benford, 1988: 338-339.

58
“Sex and Power in Turkey: Feminism, Islam and the Maturing of Turkish Democracy” European Stability Initiative,
Berlin-Istanbul 2 June 2007, paraphrasing Yesim Arat, 1999: 55.

27

focuses on the impact of high politics on social movements. This approach does not
particularly fit well with some of the religious communities in Turkey that have a
“bottom of approach,” as they aim to bring about political change through cultural
change.

2.2.4. Theory of Hegemonic Politics

Gramscian theory helps to explain the ways in which changes in economic structure
affect the structure of state-society relations. It focuses on how political actors that
operate at the state level, such as political parties, try to acquire the support of economic
and social actors such as businesses and non-governmental organizations in constructing
hegemonic discourses.
59
In this framework “hegemony” is defined as the expression of,
meaning the securing of, broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas
and supported by material resources and institutions. It is an “opinion molding activity”
rather than brute force or repression.
60

The hegemonic politics approach enables one to analyze political opportunity structures,
the context of interactions between particular configurations of socio-economic forces
and the changing interests of actors in civil societies and politics. Such a framework
makes it possible to analyze both the process of change in social movements and how this

59
Discourse can be defined as “an ensemble whose terms are related in a meaningful way.” Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:
139

60
Tuğal defines hegemony as the organization of consent for domination and inequality which forges unity of various
sections of society. Tuğal, 2009: 4.
28

change affects and is affected by the configuration of social, economic and political
structures. In this sense it brings together agency and structure.

Most of the studies that apply Gramsci’s framework to political Islam in Turkey focus on
macro relations, on the structural changes in the economy which led to the rise of an
Islamic bourgeoisie as an important force. The second common theme in these studies is
how the rise of Islamic businesses enabled the AKP to bring together the interests of big
and small capital and the masses by using a populist discourse. They emphasize the
political context after the 2001 economic crisis, when the credibility of the existing
center-right parties had vanished. Most of these studies limit their attention to the rise of
the AKP, rather than other Islamic actors such as religious communities. They attribute
the party’s rise to its successful formulation of a hegemonic project. Broadly, their
argument is that the AKP initiated an Islamic-conservative reconstruction of the
authoritarian state structure which was installed by the 1980 military coup and which
imposed severe restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of association. It has been
successful in establishing a hegemonic bloc consisting of TÜSĐ AD (Turkish Industrialists
and Businessmen Association), which represents the big, internationalized capital, and
MÜSĐ AD (Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen), ĐŞ HAD and
HÜRSĐ AD
61
which represent conservative owners of small, local capital. The hegemonic

61
ĐŞ HAD (Business Life Cooperation Association) and HÜRSĐ AD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's
Association) are businessmen associations that represent “pious capital owners.” See Doğan, 2009: 291.
.
29

bloc also includes some liberal intellectuals and most Islamist intellectuals.
62
Mass media
companies owned by Islamic capital owners as well as secular capital owners who want
to be on good terms with the government served to solidify consent for AKP’s rule.
63

While the AKP employed populist redistribution policies based on philanthropy, it also
restricted some socioeconomic rights, such as labor rights by, responding to the threat of
strikes with threats of lay-offs.
64
The AKP also lowered wages, opened up the
possibilities of employment without social security, and put the tax burden on the
working class.
65
As Bedirhanoğlu argues, at the same time, the AKP strengthened the
state apparatus through depoliticizing economic policy-making by establishing the
Investment Advisory Council
66
(Yatırım Danişma Konseyleri) which is composed of
business associations, government and World Bank officials and whose decisions are
implemented by CCIIE,
67
which comprises government officials and businessmen
associations. In this way, parliament’s role in economic policy making has been
circumscribed. The AKP, Bedirhanoglu argues, also strengthened the state apparatus by

62
Uzgel: 2009 : 11-39.

63
Adaklı, 2009: 560.

64
Yıldırım in 2009: 104.

65
Ibid: 67, 88-89.

66
Investment Advisory Council of Turkey”, The Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment
Environment (YÖĐ KK), accessed February 25, 2012

67
The Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment (YOĐ KK) http://www.yoikk.gov.tr/eng/
accessed January 25, 2012.

30

making changes in the parliamentary system such as transferring some of the decision
making authority from the legislative body to the executive body.
68

There is one study that focuses on the local dynamics from a Gramscian framework.
Tuğal asks why the activist and popular sectors, which, until the establishment of AKP,
supported the religious and anti-free market platform of the Islamist Welfare Party,
wholeheartedly embraced the AKP government. His main argument is that the pious
business community had succeeded in making its vision the vision of religiously
conservative popular sectors and activists through the AKP.
69
Tuğal studies this transition
from Islamism to economically liberal and culturally conservative Islam in a squatter-
majority district, Sultanbeyli, in Istanbul. He argues that consenft for the domination and
inequality that the hegemony of the AKP secures is generated when individuals or groups
in a neighborhood start to identify with local and national leaders.
70

Aside from Tuğal’s study on Sultanbeyli there are no systematic studies of the way in
which consent for hegemony is generated at the local level. Analyzing the discursive
changes of religious communities may help us understand how changes in the meanings
established in the local community and changes in the ways a religious community
defines itself, help to generate consent for the hegemonic discourse. In the next section I

68
Bedirhanoğlu, 2009: 53-64.

69
Tuğal, 2009: 7-8.

70
Ibid: 14-15.
31

will outline an alternative framework that draws on the Gramscian understanding of
hegemony and Foucauldian understanding of power as discourse.

2.3. GRAMSCI

Gramsci was a Marxist and a founding member of the Communist Party of Italy. He is
considered a revolutionary Marxist by some sociologists
71
because he puts an emphasis
on culture, formation of identities, myth and folklore.
72
He assigns a key role to ideology.
He differs from traditional Marxists in his view of social action as having a
transformative effect on structures.
73
Despite his reformulations, class identity was still
the main concern in Gramsci’s work. Because of this focus, his analyses inevitably
privilege economic structure. Still, the ideas and concepts that Gramsci introduced and/or
reformulated are applied to different contexts in contemporary politics mainly by scholars
of International Relations and Sociology. In this section, I will summarize Gramsci’s
concepts that are most commonly used in contemporary research.

71
Morrow quotes Hall, 1986: 22 in Morrow, 1991: 39.

72
Gramsci wrote about identity movements and voluntary association in Gramsci, 1971: 277-318.

73
Gill, 1993: 23 in Germain and Kelly, 1998: 10
32

2.3.1. Hegemony

Gramsci’s idea of hegemony is based on Machiavelli’s distinction between consent and
force.
74
Hegemony means political leadership based on the consent of the led. Winning of
popular consent for the worldview of the ruling class and taking into account subordinate
interests are necessary to establish hegemony.
75
This hegemonic relationship between
dominant classes and class fractions occurs when a leading class develops a “hegemonic
project:” a discourse that transcends particular economic-corporate interests of the ruling
group and becomes capable of bringing together the diverse aspirations and general
interests of various social classes and class fractions.
76
For this reason, in a period of
hegemony, what leads is called a “historic bloc” rather than a ruling class. The
hegemonic bloc also includes fractions of subordinate classes.
77
Hegemony is defined “as
a process of unification which is never totally achieved and which is founded on strategic
alliances of different sectors.
78
Therefore, the discourse of the hegemonic bloc (i.e.
“hegemonic discourse”) brings together various interests of different groups within the
hegemonic bloc.

74
Germain and Kelly, 1998: 10.

75
Hall, 1986/1996: 426-429.

76
In Bieler et. al.: 14. Also see Overbeek, 1990; Overbeek, 1993; Van der Pijl, 1984; Van der Pijl, 1998.

77
Hall, 1986/1996:426. Mercer, 2002.

78
Hall, 1986/1996: 426- 431.

33

According to Gill, a partial and fragile form of class hegemony constitutes “supremacy”.
He argues that an historic bloc
79
can be established without enjoying hegemonic rule.
80
It
is more than simply a political alliance. It indicates the variety of class interests that are
propagated throughout the society.
81
“Supremacy” can be secured by hegemony as well
as through domination.
82
Morton explains that through the expansion of state
intervention, a partial or fragile form of class hegemony may prevail, limited to a certain
social group or groups rather than the society as a whole. Other scholars refer the type of
hegemony that only applies to a portion of society, most commonly elites, as “minimal
hegemony.”
83
“Supremacy” or “minimal hegemony” are useful concepts in explaining
the constitution of hegemony in Turkey, because they capture both the authoritarian
tendencies of the government and the relative looseness of the components of the
historical bloc compared to a wider hegemony or “integral hegemony.”

In a Gramscian framework hegemony is constituted in mainly two spheres of activity: the
social relations of production, and forms of state. Based on the philosophy of internal
relations in historical materialism, “social relations of production” refers to the idea that
production is a social relation, comprising the ties between the means of production and

79
A historical bloc refers to the way in which leading social forces within a specific national context establish a
relationship over contending social forces. It is more than simply a political alliance. It indicates the variety of class
interests that are propagated throughout the society. Bieler et. al., 2006 : 14

80
Bieler et. al., 2006 : 11-15.

81
Bieler et. al. 2006 : 14.

82
Ibid.

83
Ives, paraphrasing from Femia 1981, 47-48, in Ives, 2004: 70.
34

those who own them and work for them. Social relations of production also include
institutions and discursive forms that contribute to the means of production. Because
material production is understood as a social relation, and since any social relation
involves politics, material production is viewed as inherently political.

2.3.2. Capillary Intellectual Meatuses: The Construction of Hegemonic Discourses

In this section I will discuss from a Gramscian perspective where and how hegemonic
power is constituted. Hegemony is generated in civil society and the government
apparatus in the public sphere, which are organically linked.
84
Intellectuals and their use
of language have a significant role in the construction of hegemony. Hegemony is
mediated through what Gramsci calls “capillary intellectual meatuses,” which is defined
as various social settings such as schools, street layout and names, architecture, the
family or church through which political consciousness is constructed by diffused forms
of indirect pressure.
85
Hegemony is filtered through structures of society, economy,
culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology.
86
In order to explain how hegemony is
mediated through various social organizations, first, I will discuss Gramsci’s
understanding of civil society as one of the major spaces where hegemony is constructed.

84
Bieler et. al., 2006: 12-17, 119.

85
Morton, 2007: 93.

86
Bieler and Morton, 2008: 87.

35

Next, I will examine his views on intellectuals and language, which illustrate his views
on process through which hegemonic discourses are constructed.

a. Civil Society

Hegemony is constituted in what IR Neo-Gramscians refer to as historically contingent
“state-civil society” complexes. Gramsci conceived of civil society as organically tied to
the state and as reinforcing state power.
87
Civil society is not reduced to the economy. It
includes schools, churches, media, trade unions, clubs and journals. Political society or
the state includes public institutions such as the government, courts, army and police.
Hegemony is consolidated in both civil society and state in different ways.

Civil society
institutions, as the advocates of various world views, act as capillaries through which the
world view of the rulers is extended to the ruled.
88

The concept of “integral state” in Gramscian framework provides a more sophisticated
analysis of the multiple venues through which the state and civil society are integrated
than does the center-periphery framework’s conception of the two as autonomous from
and opposed to one another. Depiction of civil society as an area of freedom from state in

87
Ives explains that Anderson points out three separate and incompatible ways in which Gramsci ties state and civil
society. First, civil society and state are opposed and associated respectively with consent and coercion. Second, as two
distinct concepts that balance each other (consent and coercion) Third, hegemony fuses the two concepts. Ives, 2004:
124. Anderson, 1976.

88
Bieler et.al., 2006: 15-16; Bates 1975, 353-356. Rupert mentions that there are certain institutions traditionally
associated with the state such as the public education system, justice system and even the police which can be viewed
as belonging both to the civil society.

36

the center-periphery approach may conceal the power relationships among state and civil
society actors. The concept of “integral state” directs our attention towards the
construction of hegemony through the relations of coercion and consent at play between
the class fractions in the institutions of state and of civil society.
89
For this reason, a
Gramscian analysis is better equipped to explain the ties between religious communities
and government actors and institutions.

b. Intellectuals

For Gramsci, intellectuals play a key role in organizing and reinforcing hegemony.
90
He
differentiates between traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals. Traditional
intellectuals establish themselves as detached from the ruling group but actually function
as intellectuals of that group.
91
Organic intellectuals on the other hand, are bound to a
specific social group and they try to rationalize and justify the interests of their group.
92

As a social group is empowered in economic and political terms, its organic intellectuals
penetrate the stratum of traditional intellectuals.

89
Rupert, 1998: 431.

90
King, 2005.

91
Traditional intellectuals include philosophers, artists, writers. They share a common language of high culture. King,
2005 :146-147.

92
Organic intellectuals include engineers, managers, bureaucrats or trade union leaders. King, 2005: 146-147.

37

Common sense refers to the non-critical and incoherent everyday understandings of the
world.
93
What distinguishes intellectual activity of “intellectuals” is their ability to
effectively organize elements of common sense, communicate ideologies to the masses
and generate a seemingly spontaneous consent for the hegemony.
94
King explains that in
civil society they do this by contributing to literature, art and philosophy. In the state,
they create the mechanisms that will coerce the public.
95
Thus, hegemonic discourses are
not restricted to issues of high politics. They are much broader visions of social life that
resonate with people’s common sense in their everyday life. Gramsci’s understanding of
hegemony is broadened from relating to the operations of the state to how people
understand the world. In other words, hegemony involves the structuring of everyday
life.
96
In this framework, culture, identity and everyday philosophy become essential to
political analysis.
97

Intellectuals develop ideologies by harmonizing common sense thought and critical
philosophy. Organic intellectuals develop ideologies. Traditional intellectuals who
cooperate with organic intellectuals express that ideology in the language of “high

93
Salamini explains that in Gramscian perspective “common sense” denotes spontaneous, fragmentary, irrational,
folkloric views that lack critical thinking. As such it is associated with passive behavior. Salamini, 1974: 68.

94
Ives, 2004: 75-77. For “common sense” see Gramsci, 1971:333 and Landy, 1986: 56.

95
King, 2005: 149.

96
Ives, 2004: 71.

97
Danieli mentions that feminist writers such as Cockburn, 1990 and Pollert, 1981 used some of Gramsci’s concepts
for gender analysis.

38

culture.
98
” Intellectuals aim to create a new culture since in a Gramscian perspective mass
culture is instrumental in generating consent or promoting counter-hegemonic practices,
and economic change is translated into political change through the medium of culture.
99

Organic and traditional intellectuals who are followers of Islamic communities generate,
diffuse or challenge hegemonic power by articulating the hegemonic discourses. They do
this mostly through a cultural discourse. In this sense religious communities fit Gramsci’s
definition of “capillary intellectual meatuses.”

c. Language

For Gramsci, languages are fundamental instruments for generating hegemony. Gramsci
does not view language merely as a grammatical structure. Oppression and emancipation
are both inscribed in language, and therefore in everyday life, common sense thought and
culture. That is why, for Gramsci, the study of language must be contextualized across
cultures, class and gender lines. Languages structure perceptions, behaviors and attitudes
of social groups. For this reason, he views construction of language as a continuous
political act and the study of language as the study of everyday life.
100

98
See King, 2005; Hall 1986/1996: 433, Hall, 1980: 29-35.

99
Landy, 1986: 176.
100
For Gramsci’s views on Language see Landy 168-174, Ives 2004.

39

According to Gramsci, languages are in a constant state of codification, a process
whereby natural and fragmented languages are transformed into coherent, consistent and
more homogenous languages. States are actively involved in this process.
101
If we think
of “discourses” instead of languages, we can see that the codification process takes place
at the state level as well as in social organizations like religious communities. In this
sense, what I call “codification of a discourse” is a political process where certain words,
sayings, and idioms are chosen over others.

2.3.3. “Applying” Gramscian Perspective to Different Contexts

Gramsci was writing in the context of the rise of fascism in Italy in the early 1920s. Hall
mentions that “Gramsci’s work often appears as almost too concrete: too historically
specific, too delimited in its references, too “descriptively” analytic, too time and context
bound.”
102
Although there have been disagreements among scholars as to whether or not
it is useful to apply his concepts to today’s sociopolitical context, I agree with those who
argue that it is possible to interpret Gramsci’s concepts in new and innovative ways to
understand problems in various contemporary contexts. This might constitute a form of
“de-contextualization.” However, as long as one does not empty the concepts and give

101
Gramsci was writing in the context of Italy’s unification, and referring to the differences between the language in
South and North Italy. Because of the circumstances in which he was writing, Gramsci has a state-centric outlook on
the codification process.

102
Hall, 1986/1996: 413.

40

them new and unrelated meanings, this type of de-contextualization and re-
contextualization could be useful.

Applying Gramsci’s perspective to today’s context is particularly difficult because his
prison notebooks include many open-ended, fragmented reflections and sketches.
103

Many scholars from diverse areas of disciplines have presented different and sometimes
contradictory interpretations of his ideas. One of the difficulties of using a Gramscian
framework for analyzing today’s socio-political context is the centrality of class identity
in Gramsci’s work. Although he has an expansive definition of civil society, it still
excludes certain relations of social power. For example, feminists criticize his
understanding of civil society for excluding gender relations and the institution of the
family.

Another difficulty is Gramsci’s focus on domestic politics. Today’s issues and puzzles
require an appropriation of Gramsci’s thoughts that helps us analyze dynamics of gender,
religious, racial identities in the context of globalization. In the next part, I will present
main tenets of IR neo-Gramscianism and post-structural challenges to it. I will also
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of adopting this approach in undertaking an
analysis of discursive changes of religious communities in Turkey.

103
Morton, 2007: ix.
41

2.4. NEO-GRAMSCIANISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM IN IR

Neo-Gramscian approaches in the field of International Relations (IR) provide a useful
framework for analyzing the mechanisms of consent generation for the global neo-liberal
restructuring process by focusing on the dynamics of the shifts in state-society
relationships. However, as Gramsci did, these approaches tend to put class relations at the
center of their explanations, leading to a neglect of other sources of identity. This neglect
results in analyses that focus narrowly on shifting state policies that favor the interests of
capital over the labor and on government discourses that aim to de-politicize economic
decision-making. I argue that a dialogue between Neo-Gramscianism and post-
structuralism opens up the possibility of re-conceptualizing Neo-Gramscianism. This re-
conceptualization allows for the analysis of different types of interactions between
hegemonic discourses and actor’s ideas and identities. Focusing on religious communities
offers an opportunity to explore these interactions. In Turkey religious communities such
as Gülen and Erenköy exercise control of religious knowledge. Analyzing religious
communities also sheds light on the re-production and negotiation of and interplay
between nationalist, religious and gender identities in transnational context thanks to
religious communities’ transnational activities.

42

2.4.1. Evolution of Neo-Gramscianism within the Field of IR

In 1996, Linklater argued that Marxian-inspired critical theory
104
had emerged as a
serious alternative to the orthodox IR approaches. He argued that one of the achievements
of critical theory was the rejection of positivism and its replacement by a conception of
knowledge as a reflection of pre-existing social purposes,
105
as indicated in Cox’s famous
phrase “Theory is always for someone and some purpose.” In the field of International
Relations, this challenge of interpretive sciences is referred to as “critical theory.” In IR,
this label comprises the Frankfurt School, neo-Gramscians, feminists, as well as an array
of post-structuralists.
106

In the field of IR, Robert Cox has been the most influential scholar promoting neo-
Gramscian theory. By applying the concepts developed by Gramsci such as civil society,
hegemony and historical bloc, to international relations,
107
neo-Gramscians have

104
Frankfurt School refers to “the Institute of Social Research, established in Germany in 1923, staffed by Theodor W.
Adorno, Marx Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Friedrich Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, and Walter Benjamin….The most
important recent representative of critical theory is Jurgen Habermas, a student of Adorno and Horkheimer, who
departed significantly from the certain positions of the founders.” Agger,1992 :107. Frankfurt School’s critical theory
started to challenge mainstream International Relations Theory in the early 1980s. See Cox, 1981; Ashley,1981.

105
Linklater, 1996.

106
Rengger and Thinkerbell-White, 2007: 5. In the field of sociology, “critical theory” refers to the Frankfurt school
only.

107
Neo-Gramscians have been criticized for de-contextualizing Gramsci’s work by purely “applying” his concepts to
the international setting. See Germain and Kenny, 1998. As a response to this criticism, Murphy explained that IR
Neo-Gramscians used Gramsci’s concepts that fit some of the characteristics of the current international relations. They
used a very small part of Gramsci’s conceptual framework. Murphy, 1998. Neo-Gramscians also cited Cox’s idea that
that Gramsci’s concepts can be flexibly considered in relation to alternative situations. For other Neo-Gramscian
responses to Germain and Kelly’s criticism see Rupert, 1998, Morton, 2003. Morton cites other scholars who have

43

primarily tried to uncover the ways in which economic activities have shaped the
international political system that the mainstream IR approaches tended to take as a
given.
108
Following Cox, one research cluster focuses on the global system of
governance, multilateral agencies and European integration. Since the end of the Cold
War, another research cluster in the field of IPE has paid attention to the economic
dominance of ‘neoliberalism’ and the political dominance of ‘globalization’ and
emphasized the role of ideology in providing widespread legitimation for the domination
of certain classes.
109
Another cluster, following Gill, has focused on transnational class
struggle.
110
A fourth group of scholars has concentrated on US foreign policy
interventions in the countries of peripheral capitalism.
111

Based on a Gramscian framework IR Neo-Gramscians argue that changes in the social
relations of production
112
empower certain actors in society. Hegemony may be projected
to the global level by the central governmental agencies of the most important
industrialized economies, together with key multilateral agencies.
113
Similar to domestic

argued that it is possible to learn from Gramsci's ideas in alternative contexts even if his ideas can only partially fulfill
our own analytical requirements. Hall 1997:27, Showstack Sassoon 2000: 66-76.

108
Rengger and Thinkerbell-White, 2007: 8.

109
Worth, 2011: 377.

110
Morton, 2002.

111
See Augelli and Murphy, 1988.

112
Social relations of production refer to the patterns of social relations, moral and institutions that are prerequisites for
the production of physical goods. Neo-Gramscians use the phrase “social relations of production” instead of “mode of
production” to emphasize that their analyses avoid economic reductionism and that they view economic production as a
part of wider social relations and institutions.

113
Germain and Kelly citing Cox 1993: 5-8 in Germain and Kelly, 1998: 13.

44

civil societies, global civil society actors such as transnational companies, owners of
other types of internationally mobile capital, transnational networks and internationally
mobile class fractions provide widespread legitimacy for hegemony at a global level.
114

Hegemony is formed through the relationship between transnational classes and the
respective national subordinate classes,
115
leading to a re-production of social relations of
production that had given rise to these actors in the first place.

IR Neo-Gramscians adopt Gramsci’s revision of structural Marxism, particularly in their
attention to the agency of social movements, their attention to “social relations of
production” as opposed to “modes of production,” their emphasis on the significance of
identity and the role of ideology in legitimating the “historical bloc.” However, due to
the centrality of relations of material production among other “social relations,” IR Neo-
Gramscians remain preoccupied with class, Neo-Gramscians view “organic
intellectuals
116
” as representatives of class fractions. They leave out issues related to
cultural, ethnic and gender identities.
117
Hence, Neo-Gramscian approaches in IR are
inadequate in explaining the dynamics of religious identity construction.

114
Germain and Kelly, 1998:17 cite Cox 1997, Gill 1993b, Van der Pijl, 1984.

115
Worth, 2011: 378.

116
Organic intellectuals are defined as those intellectuals who stood as the mediators of hegemony articulated by social
classes. Bieler and Morton, 2008: 121.

117
According to Worth, many neo-Gramscians are reluctant to engage with some of the more complex
areas of the super-structure, preferring to leave such complexities in the hands of the various post-modern and social
constructivist accounts that have tended to dominate contemporary accounts of identity and ethnicity in IR. Worth,
2011: 390.

45

In parallel to the neglect of culture and identity, Neo-Gramscianism in IR remains very
much state-centric. It can be argued that it has developed as an approach towards the state
due to its effort to situate itself within an already state-centric discipline.
118
There is
virtually no engagement with critical IR theorists from the Frankfurt school, which puts
far more emphasis on dialogic and discursive elements.
119
IR Neo-Gramscians could
profitably draw from the Gramscian approaches in cultural studies, which are more
engaged with Critical Theory, as well as from post-structuralism and feminism in order to
account for the intersection of culture and identity with socio-economic and political
changes in the process of neo-liberal capitalist development.

2.4.2. Post-Structuralism

In the 1980s, the term “new social movements” was used to refer to non-parliamentary
and progressive movements such as the civil rights, feminist, and ecological movements.
These movements challenged the “normality” of identities and practices. Existing
paradigms did not easily lend themselves to an analysis of the dynamics of identity
construction at diverse sites. The pluralist paradigm views identities and interests as
given, while Marxist accounts are centered on economic relations and class identity.
120

The rejection of overarching explanatory frameworks, “grand narratives”, in post-

118
Murphy mentions that Gramsci’s concepts are used by IR Neo-Gramscians to amend theories that are already
prevalent within Anglophone IR. Murphy, 1998: 420.

119
Rengger and Thinkerbell-White 2007: 8. For an assessment of contributions of Frankfurt School to IR see
Linklater,1996.
120
Ives, 2004: 144-145.

46

structuralism in general and post-modernism in particular became a viable alternative
way to study contingent and fragmented identities and discourses.

Post-structuralists have problematized the identity of human subjects, posed questions
regarding vision and language, demonstrated the importance of subaltern voices in
modern political life and introduced new ways of thinking regarding agency, power and
resistance.
121
They view the subject as always in the process of being constituted and do
not accept any structure as foundational. In other words, the material and ideational basis
of any social or political world order is contingent. They claim to reject the distinction
between the material and the ideational. This does not mean they reject reality outside the
ideas which are conceptionalized as discourses, but that how reality is interpreted by
actors depends on the discourse. In this sense, discourses cannot be considered separate
from or secondary to the material.
122
Discourses always involve the exercise of power,
since they necessarily exclude certain possibilities of relations between social agents.
123

Post-structuralism sheds light on how particular discourses become predominant by
analyzing the “founding moments” when the myth of a new social or world order is
established.

121
Ashley, 1981: 245.

122
Bieler and Morton 2008: 111.

123
Howarth and Stravrarakis, 2000: 4.

47

Post-structuralists, including post-structural feminists as well as feminist IPE scholars
124
,
criticize Neo-Gramscians for their pre-occupation with the activities of elites, which
tends to marginalize the potential for counter-hegemonic forces at the grassroots, such as
feminist movements.
125
Post-structural feminists argue against the traditional notions of
community that often privilege unity over diversity, which leads to the suppression of
race, class and gender differences and the exclusion of subaltern voices and marginalized
groups.
126
Post-structural feminist Hutchings argues that Neo-Gramscianism provides
master narratives which provide coherent and predictable explanations of processes.
127

Instead, she argues that there must be a mixture of contingency and predictability in order
to avoid subsuming different histories under one privileged master narrative and to
account for multiple, parallel and intersecting presents. “Post-structuralism frames power
not simply as one aspect of society but as the basis of society. Thus, patriarchy is not
simply one isolated force among many with which women must contend; patriarchy
involves all aspects of the social and effectively shapes women’s lives.”
128

124
Feminists have argued that despite Neo-Gramscian attempts to recognize the role of ideas in the formulation of
hegemony, they still privilege its materialist foundations by asserting the centrality of production.

125
Marchand and Runyan, 2000.

126
Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005: 314.

127
Hutchings, 2007: 88.

128
Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005: 313

48

Post-structuralists in general and post-structural feminists in particular present a viable
challenge to Neo-Gramscianism.
129
When studying identity-based communities like
religious communities in Turkey, a post-structuralist lens has certain advantages over
Marxist-based accounts. The identities and social meaning that evolve in the context of
religious communities cannot be reduced to a function of preserving the inequalities in
the political and economic structures as Marx argued.
130
Post-structural analysis does not
see religious communities as monolithic entities that can be explained by overarching
generalizations.

Religious discourse, as any other discourse, constructs inside/outside distinctions and
privileges certain types of social orders over others. In doing so it also constructs gender
and class discourses. A post-structural perspective makes it possible to focus on agency
and resistance within these discourses and on the process by which groups or individuals
within religious communities come to see certain discourses as “normal.”
131
It also helps
us understand the articulation of religious identity with other kinds of identity within
Islamic community discourses. However, post-structuralist and post-modernist views
have their drawbacks for the analysis of religious communities in Turkey.

129
Kincheloe and McLaren mention that “After the feminist critique, critical theory can never return to a paradigm of
inquiry in which the concept of social class is anti-sceptically privileged and exalted as the master of concept in the
holy Trinity of race, class and gender.” Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005: 314.

130
Marx, 1844.

131
Laclau and Mouffe are “post-Marxists” who developed a framework to understand the process of transformation of
discourses.

49

2.4.3. Criticism of Post-Structuralism

IR Neo-Gramscians argue that while post-structuralists can conceptualize the structural
relevance of ideas, they concentrate solely on discourses without examining the historical
and social constitution of discourses within particular social relations of production. Due
to a conception of power as diffuse, post-structuralists ignore the institutionalization of
unequal relations of power.
132
Post-structuralists abstract discourses from the inequalities
that lie behind their production, and therefore fail to explain why certain ideas are
predominant at a particular moment in time.
133
As Hall argues, although post-
structuralists have a notion of power, they do not have a notion of hegemony that
explains how that power is generated and diffused.
134

Post-structuralists are also criticized for the implications of their conception of power for
emancipatory research
135
and political activism.
136
Boundaries of universalism and

132
For a discussion on Foucault’s conception of power see Hartsock, 1996.

133
Bieler and Morton also argue that post-structuralists give centrality to ideas, which clearly separates the material and
ideational dimensions but grants causal priority to the latter. Post-structuralists view language as a “non-material”
entity, which has a different logic than material entities such as commodities. However, they view material entities as
discourses. This means that they separate “non-material” discursive constructs, from “material discursive constructs.”
Bieler and Morton, 2008: 115.

134
Fiske 1996: 216-217. Also see Stoddart, 2007: 209-213.

135
Emancipatory research is the research that aims to facilitate the process through which people empower themselves.
Oliver 1992. Letherby argues that many feminist writers argue for a position which retains a commitment to the
emancipatory project yet dispenses with ‘absolute’ epistemological foundations Letherby, 2003: 57-59, 114-116.
Turner argues that emancipatory research requires an understanding of not only different forms oppression takes in
various contexts but also common experiences and collective histories. Turner, 1997: 275.
136
Idealized form of cultural relativism is incompatible with universal human rights. As such, it constitutes a problem
for theoretical approaches that have a commitment to emancipatory knowledge such as feminism. For the debates in the
field of anthropology on the compatibility of universal human rights with cultural relativism see Journal of

50

cultural relativism are among the central topics of discussion both within the religious
communities, and in public discussions and academic literature on religious communities.
The post-structural conception of power is based on difference (i.e. the idea that social
actors are products of difference). This conception of power underlies the idealized form
of cultural relativism.
137
In the idealized form of cultural relativism, it is assumed that
uniqueness of cultures requires the rejection of unifying principles among cultures, or
similarities in the ways culture is produced.
138
According to West, these “thick
descriptions of relativity of cultural products,”
139
may conceal collective histories and
common experiences, which in turn impede the possibility to see how groups are
positioned in social structural terms.”
140

In studying religious communities it is essential to understand different interpretative
schemes to avoid analyzing various cultural groups through the lens of a particular
group’s culture presented as universal. However, cultures are not “only the fleeting
moments of an illusion.” They have identifiable borders. Cultural norms within these

Anthropological Research Vol. 53, No.3 “Universal Human Rights vs. Cultural Relativity” Autumn 1997. Conception
of power in post-structuralism as diffused as opposed to from one source, such as the state, also obscures the
possibilities of political activism. Ives, 2004: 142-143.

137
Idealist forms of cultural difference is based on the idea that values of cultural forms are the only legitimate standard
by which the social conduct of the members of those cultural forms can be judged. Turner, 1997: 277. Idealized form of
cultural relativism is opposed to pragmatic view of cultural relativism is a method rather than theory. It stipulates that
the context in research need to be understood, and moral judgments need to be suspended. See Turner, 1997: 275.

138
Li, 2007: 154-155.

139
West, 1999.

140
Letherby, 2003: 57 paraphrasing from Brah, 1991.

51

borders involve unequal power relationships.
141
If, as envisioned in the idealized form of
cultural relativism, every religious community and even each small group within a
community is judged by its own cultural norms, an important problem arises: what to do
when one’s exercise of cultural rights infringes upon another another’s. In order to
understand these discussions, we need to understand social reality in its context and as
seen by the human subject, without eliminating the possibility of analyzing how groups
are positioned in the social structure. An engagement between neo-Gramscianism and
post-structuralism can avoid the idealized form of cultural relativism and economic
reductionism. In the next section, I will provide a framework that synthesizes these two
broad approaches.

2.5. GRAMSCI AND POST-STRUCTURALISM: TOWARDS A BROADER
FRAMEWORK

In analyzing the dynamics of the interaction between hegemonic discourses and religious
community discourses, while economic factors are one of the important constituents in
the construction of both discourses, they are not the main factors. In order to understand
the dynamics of “layers of histories and discourses” of social groups, we need to
understand how and why a particular discourse or history prevails over others at a given
time in a particular community setting. Based on Hall’s discussion of an engagement
between Gramsci and post-structuralism, I develop a framework that draws primarily

141
Li, 2007: 155.
52

from cultural studies’ re-appropriation of Gramsci in order to explain how transnational
and national changes in the economic, social and political structures and processes affect
the dominant discourses in domestic politics. I will also draw from post-structuralists
Laclau and Mouffe to account for how these dominant discourses diffuse and transform
religious community discourses.

2.5.1 Re-appropriation of Gramsci

In explaining the construction of hegemony in Turkey after 2001, I will draw mainly
from Hall’s reformulation of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Hall is opposed to the
reductionist understanding of the importance of economic relations, not to the economic
factors themselves.
142
He argues that we cannot dismiss material factors altogether but we
cannot limit the logic of ideological formation to material factors either. In this way, we
can understand the concrete ways in which people are empowered to resist power
discourse.

According to Hall, hegemonic relationships and classes are molded only in the first
instance by economic materialism. This is also referred to as “determinism in the first
instance.”
143
Social relations of production are viewed as starting points in the ideological
formation, but they are not sufficient for full development. Forces and relations in the

142
Many other scholars have argued against the economic reductionism of Marxist accounts, but have also asserted that
economic factors do play an important role in explaining social phenomena. See Ives, 2004; Morrow, 2007.
143
Worth, 2011: 385.

53

economy, in society and in culture create various possibilities for political action,
allowing social actors to produce particular forms of domination. There is no direct
correspondence between economic change and political change.
144
Economic changes
may lead to certain tendencies in sociopolitical sphere. (Italics mine). According to
Rupert who draws from Hall, class-based relations of production create the possibility of
particular kinds of agency. These possibilities can be realized only through the political
practices of concretely situated social actors, which involve negotiation of social
identities and other intersubjective meanings.
145
The Gramscian notion of hegemony as a
continuous process of ideological struggle allowed Hall to maintain the important
emphasis on agency.
146
Rupert delineates Hall’s understanding of hegemony as such:

…hegemony is constructed in a more loosely bounded manner where a multiple
set of cultural, social and economic agents serve both to consolidate and contest
what constitutes “common sense” upon an open terrain but are nevertheless are
shaped by a ‘hegemonic center.’
147

Hall’s understanding of hegemony highlights the various forms of struggle for
ideological formation and transformation. Hall views ideologies as a composition of
various discourses, contradictions and similarities. He clarifies that a Gramscian
understanding of hegemony does not suggest a single, unified, dominant ideology. For

144
Mercer, 2002: 314.

145
Rupert, 1998: 428.

146
Procter, 2004: 49.

147
Worth, 2011: 385.

54

this reason, he explains that ideological change in Gramscian thought is not understood in
terms of imposition of a new ideology. It is understood as the articulation or
disarticulation of ideas.

Hall argues that ideological transformation is accomplished through the practices of
“articulation.” Based on Hall, Laclau and Mouffe define articulation as any practice
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of
this practice.
148
Articulation involves establishing discursive connections between earlier
discourse patterns and new ideologies, in a way that shifts the meaning of earlier
symbols. It is a process of differentiation and change in the relative weight that the
elements of the old ideology used to possess.
149

The discursive connections are contingent on the social sphere they are used in and the
identity of the social actors who use them. For this reason, hegemonic discourses are
articulated in different ways by different social groups. Because of the contingency of
discursive linkages, the function of individuals in the production process does not
necessarily determine their ideological positions and give them a class identity.
150
This
understanding of hegemonic discourse mitigates the economic determinism present in

148
Yannis and Stravrarakis, 2000: 11. Also see Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 26.

149
Mercer, 2002: 313.

150
Yannis and Stravrarakis, 2000: 19-21.

55

Marxist approaches by restoring the significance of contingency, agency and fluidity in
the analysis of hegemonic structures.

In Hall’s interpretation of Gramsci, hegemony is understood to be more fluid and less
unified than it is in the IR neo-Gramscian re-appropriation. Nevertheless, Hall’s
understanding involves a hegemonic center which is constituted of a more or less a
coherent discourse and the ruling group that controls material resources and institutions.
Intellectual unity, which requires an extensive cultural and ideological struggle on the
part of intellectuals and politicians, and leadership are prerequisites for constructing such
a hegemonic center.
151

Hall’s understanding of culture comprises practices, representations, languages and
customs of any specific historical society as well as “common sense” of various groups
within it.
152
It is not possible to make hegemonic discourses sound normal, natural or
inevitable without including cultural elements. For this reason mass culture is one of the
most important agents of consent to hegemony. Hall mentions that for Gramsci “the
question of hegemony is always a question of a new cultural order.

151
Hall,1986/1996: 425-432.

152
Hall,1986/1996: 42-43, 432-433.

56

Hall explains that for Gramsci, hegemony must be established in many different social
contexts.
153
Different layers of hegemonic discourse appeal to different social groups and
individuals. As Gramsci saw subjects as heterogeneous, he also saw cultural practices as
heterogeneous.
154
Hall’s analysis implies that hegemonic discourse is articulated
differently in each social group.

Hall uses the concept of articulation to explain the formation of hegemony. However,
neither Gramsci nor Hall explains how this power is diffused in capillaries. If we apply
Hall’s concept of articulation to the process of diffusion in capillaries, we can understand
how various social groups internalize certain elements and generate a version of
hegemonic discourses. Similar to articulation of hegemonic discourses, new dominant
discourses are constituted by bringing together elements of hegemonic discourse and
already existing group discourses and by transforming the meanings of old discourses.
These new versions of dominant discourses in social groups in turn constitute new layers
of ideological complexes. Figure 2.1. depicts Stuart Hall’s understanding of hegemony
and dispersion of hegemonic discourses.

153
Hall, 1987: 233.

154
Gramsci, 1971: 336- 369.
57

Figure 2.1. Stuart Hall’s Re-appropriation of Gramsci

Although Hall mentions that he agrees with post-structuralists in the need to focus on
various discourses that constitute social groups, he does not explain mechanisms through
which these groups internalize hegemonic discourses. He explains that articulation is a
process where different and sometimes contradictory elements of various discourses are
combined in a way that gives them a new meaning. However, he does not explain how
exactly the old meanings are transformed, producing new meanings. Discourse theory
Group
Discourse

HEGEMONIC CENTER
(Hegemonic discourse)
Dominant
Discourse
Dominant
Discourse
Dominant
Discourse
Group
discourse

Articulation Articulation
Group
Discourse
Articulation Articulation

58

developed by Laclau and Mouffe provide analytical tools that help us understand how
articulation happens both in the capillaries and the state-civil society complex.

2.5.2. Transformation of Discourses

a. Post-Structuralist Understanding of Discourse and Gramsci

Hall’s Gramscian framework explains how hegemonic power is generated and diffused
through discourse. His approach emphasizes heterogeneous subject, diffusion of power,
identities other than class identity. In this sense, Hall brings Gramscian perspective closer
post-structuralism. However Hall’s Gramscian framework falls short of explaining how
the hegemonic power unfolds, is transformed and reproduced at the micro level. A post-
structural understanding of discourse and power helps us analyze how hegemonic
discourses are diffused at the micro level through the subjectivities that are formed, the
meanings that are reconstructed and the concepts that are framed in the local setting. It
explains the mechanisms of discourse transformation or “discursive structuration.”

In a Gramscian framework, it is theoretically possible to argue that systemic domination
is exercised through concrete institutions and mechanisms in civil society and the state
and at the same time diffused through all human relationships through discourses. In this
literature, discursive power is understood as the ability to shape the legitimating
59

principles on which hegemony of an actor rests.
155
Understanding this form of power is
crucial in explaining how subjectivities are formed, meanings are re-constructed, and
consent and challenges to hegemonic discourses are re-produced at the micro level. By
analyzing the structural sources of discursive power at the macro level from a Gramscian
perspective and the forms of power diffused through discourses at the social
group/interpersonal network level, we can analyze the interaction of macro and micro
level relations, and provide a more holistic understanding of socio-political dynamics.

Based on the concept of capillary intellectual meatuses, MacNeill argues that discursive
power is the degree of the discursive form’s ability to strengthen connections and
congruencies between various discursive spheres. Increased connections with the
dominant discourses in a society raise the appeal of the discourse for those who do not
originally engage with it, increasing its effectiveness.
156
One can argue that interpersonal
networks such as religious communities provide increased connections with the
hegemonic discourse by shaping inter-subjective meanings and constituting subjects. By
redefining the characteristics of Muslim identity, reconstructing the meanings of
secularism and democracy and shaping the views regarding the economic system and
relations with the West, the publications of religious communities have the power to
increase the appeal of the hegemonic discourses in the eyes of community members.

155
For a discussion of the concept of discursive power see Fiske, 2011: 121.

156
MacNeill, 2008: 10.
60

Olssen argues that each social group interprets the hegemonic discourse differently and
produces a variant of this discourse.
157
Islamist groups in Turkey are organized under
various institutional settings such as political parties, religious communities or
journals/newspapers independent from the first two.
158
Thus, despite overlaps, there are
significant divergences in their discourses. Religious communities also have different
traditions and structures, and hence different discourses. Foucault’s understanding of
discourse enables one to understand how hegemonic discourses unfold in these different
settings and how divergent subjectivities are reconstructed as a result. These various
discourses in turn continuously reshape the hegemonic discourses at the macro level.

Laclau and Mouffe developed post-structuralist “discourse theory,” which drew from a
Foucauldian understanding of power. Since they re-appropriated Gramsci’s concept of
hegemony in this post-structural analysis, their theory is referred as a “Neo-Gramscian”
discourse theory. I will draw from their explanation of transformation of discourses and
will apply this framework to analyze the transformation of discourses within the religious
community setting.

157
Olssen, 1999: 107-108.

158
For an account of different Islamist groups, see Çakır, 2002, Tuğal, 2002, Kuru, 2005.

61

b. Discourse Theory

Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is based on Foucauldian understanding of power.
In a Foucauldian analysis, discursive power can be defined as control over discourses and
knowledge and hence control over subjectivization. Foucault argues that power is
inscribed within discourses, not outside them. He mentions that “discourse is the power
to be seized.”
159
Power operates through discourse and produces knowledge. For this
reason, hegemonic power is one and the same with hegemonic discourse. Different from
Foucault’s understanding of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe incorporate the concept of
ideology in their definition of discourse.

Discourse theory emphasizes power and conflict in the transformation of social meanings
and identity. It analyzes the representations through which the objective world is made
meaningful.
160
For discourse theorists, discourse is not limited to ideas and concepts.
Discourse is defined as “social and political construction that establishes a system of
relations between different objects and practices while providing subject positions with
which social agents can identify.”
161
“Discursive” is defined as a theoretical horizon
within which the being of objects is constituted. As such, society itself is a discursive

159
Flyvbjerg, 1998: 229

160
Martin, 2002: 22.

161
Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 3-4.

62

construction. In other words, the social world is constituted through discursive practices
which give meaning to material objects and social identities.
162
This is not to say that
there is no material reality outside of text. The meaning we give to objects always
depends on a socially constructed system of rules. Thus discourse is an ontological
element of social life, rather than an element within it.

As Laclau and Mouffe put it:

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to
do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism
opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists,
in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether
their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘‘natural phenomena’’ or
‘‘expressions of the wrath of God’’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive
field.
163

Laclau and Mouffe define themselves as “post-Marxists” because they see hegemony not
as a relationship that is formed through a re-positioning of class relations, but as an
organic whole that articulates itself through complex interactions within the social
sphere.
164
Moreover, hegemony is not an external relation between pre-constituted social
agents, but the very process of discursive construction of those agents.
165
Drawing from
Gramsci, they define hegemony as the practice of incorporating a specific group’s

162
Bowman, 2007: 17.

163
Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 108.

164
Worth, 2011: 384. Laclau and Mouffe adopt from Foucault the notion that discourses are fragmentary as opposed to
being unified by a logical coherence of their constituent parts. Ives, 2004: 155.

165
Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 142-153.

63

political demands into a wider identity by making groups see themselves as parts of an
integral larger world view.

Laclau and Mouffe adopt Hall’s understanding of articulation as a process of bringing
together unrelated and at times contradictory elements so that they look naturally related
and coherent. They define articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.” They
view hegemony as a way of discourse articulation. This means that hegemonic practices
are forms of political activity that involve the articulation of different identities and
subjectivities into a common project.
166
The outcome of this articulation project is
referred to as “hegemonic formations.” For discourse theorists, what makes a discourse
dominant is its ability to present social hierarchies and exclusions as “common sense”
and to disguise its contingent nature.

In describing the relationship between objects and discursively constructed forms,
discourse theory differentiates between words and their meanings.
167
Post-structuralists
argue that the connection between the word and its meaning can never ultimately be
fixed. The meanings of words are always changing. For this reason, social identities are

166
Martin explains that according to Laclau and Mouffe specificity of a discourse lies in its novel re-articulation of
signifying elements from pre-existing discourses. This view is similar to Gramsci’s view of normative grammar as a re-
articulation of spontaneous grammars. Martin, 2002: 26.

167
Torfing, 1999: 48

64

not static.
168
In discourse theory, entities do not have intrinsic meanings of their own.
They attain meaning when placed in relation to other elements. Their meaning is a
function of difference. This makes meanings constantly vulnerable to contestation and
modification. During periods of social crisis, the contents of certain words are shaped by
the political choices of social agents. For this reason, in these periods the meanings of the
words acquire a “floating” character. They can take different forms. In the process of the
transformation of discourses, what discourse theorists refer as “the logic of discursive
structuration,” some words emerge as reference points that bind together a particular
system of meaning. These reference points acts as prisms and lenses. When we “look
through” them the ‘floating’ words acquire new meanings. As a result, the meanings of
‘floating’ words become partially fixed. The meaning of a term becomes partially fixed
only if it is regularly used in everyday language.
169
The aim of hegemonic projects is to
construct and stabilize reference points and by this way articulate as many floating words
as possible.

Laclau and Mouffe exemplify this process by taking “communism” as a reference point.
They mention that “floating words” such as ‘democracy’, ‘state’ and ‘freedom’ acquire
new meanings around ‘communism.’ Laclau and Mouffe explain:

168
Howarth and Stavrakakis: 2000: 20.

169
Bowman, 2007: 19.

65

Democracy acquires the meaning of ‘real’ democracy as opposed to ‘bourgeois’
democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation and the role and function
of the state is transformed. In other words, their meaning is partially fixed by
reference to …..‘communism.’
170

Discourse theorists argue that societies are organized around the basis of impossible
social ideals. Some words signify absence of these social ideals. For instance, in the state
of nature “order” represents the ideal that is absent. In discourse theory articulation of a
political discourse can only take place if the word that represents this social ideal
becomes a reference point, a prism that binds together a system of meaning. Democracy,
liberalism, communism, Shari’a can all be reference points that represent social ideals
that are absent. Various political forces compete to carry out the filling of the void
represented by this social ideal. For Laclau and Mouffe, carrying out this “filling
function,” or “articulation” means establishing hegemony. From a Gramscian
perspective, simply giving meaning to reference points is not sufficient to establish
hegemony. Hegemony is established when powerful actors generate consent for their
discourses by actors in civil society, intellectuals, and “capillary intellectual meatuses”
such as schools and churches. Laclau and Mouffe view construction of a discourse as the
act of hegemonizing because they conceptualize all practices as discourses.
171
Since
Laclau and Mouffe view ideology and culture as elements of the political sphere and as

170
Howarth and Stravrakakis cite Žižek (1989), in Howarth and Stravrakakis, 2000: 22.
171
“Conceptualizing all practices as discourses” is Hall’s criticism towards Laclau and Mouffe. See Bowman, 2007:
p.56 Although Laclau and Mouffe mention that they do not deny the importance of broader socio-economic changes, in
practice discourse theorists mostly stay away from discussing the structural factors alongside the discursive changes.
66

“non-economic”, they neglect the role of economic factors in shaping discourses.
172

From a more structural point of view, I argue that constructing an effective political
discourse is not enough to establish hegemony. Most of the time, only those who are
economically, socially and politically empowered are positioned to make their discourses
heard. Only if we consider the role of political and socio-economic structures we can
understand why a certain one becomes hegemonic and how an articulated discourse
works for the purposes of a certain political project.
173
This study adopts Hall’s
understanding of hegemony and in accordance with this understanding, does not equate
Laclau and Mouffe’s account of the process of articulation with the act of hegemony.

I will use this framework in order to understand not only the discourses themselves but
also the relationship of discourses with changing socio-economic and political structures.
In this dissertation I argue that structural power that originates from a specific source and
diffused operate simultaneously. This does not mean only that structural power operates
at the macro and diffused power operates at the micro level. It also means that these two
types of power co-exist at both levels. Contingent configurations of economic, political
and social structures empower certain social actors. Conjectural factors such as events
that result from the actions of political, economic and social actors also affect which
actors establish hegemony. Hegemony is established when the intellectuals associated
with the dominant power formulates a discourse by articulating elements of pre-existing

172
Although Laclau and Mouffe mention that they do not deny the importance of broader socio-economic changes, in
practice discourse theorists mostly stay away from discussing the structural factors alongside the discursive changes.

173
Bowman, 2007: 14
67

ideologies with elements of the new discourse, in a way that can get support from
different functions of society. Hegemonic power is diffused throughout society via
schools, civil society institutions, public gatherings and media channels. Each social
group articulates hegemonic discourse differently, in line with their pre-existing
discourses, cultures, identities and their interests. This articulation is accomplished
through establishing reference points, similar to prisms that shift the meanings of
concepts that comprise the hegemonic discourse. We can say that hegemonic discourse
that includes new cultural order, is internalized in multiple ways, when the new meanings
of concepts are used in everyday life and by this way become partially fixed.

2.6. CONCLUSION

Analyzing the interaction of hegemonic discourses with the discursive changes in the
religious communities requires a framework that can both explain how hegemonic
powers emerge and how the mechanisms through which hegemonic power in the form of
discourses are articulated at the community level. For this reason I adopt a non-
deterministic re-appropriation of Hall’s neo-Gramscianism. I also use concepts of post-
structuralist discourse theory in order to explain the mechanism of discourse articulation
within the community setting. This approach aims to avoid economic determinism, even
in the first instance, without eliminating an analysis of macro processes all together. It
also aims to analyze a diversity of social meanings and multi-faceted identities that are
68

articulated in social groups without falling into post-modernist insignificance and
relativism.

I argue that the opposite of determinism is not anti-foundationalism, relativism or post-
modernist insignificance. Although the interaction between structures and actors does not
determine the empowerment of actors, they constitute foundations that shape possibilities
and limits of their empowerment. Re-appropriating Hall’s definition of hegemony, I
argue that hegemonic power is shaped by the interaction between contingent
configurations of economic, political and social structures on the one hand and efforts of
multiple political actors to consolidate or contest “common sense” on the other hand.
Once this interaction gives rise to various actors, those actors that can develop discourses
that strengthen the connections, reduce disagreements among various discourses in
society and can articulate meanings for the ideals that the society can successfully attain
hegemonic power. Hegemony is constructed in contingent state-civil society complexes
and it is mediated through various social organizations such as religious communities and
transformed into a diffused form of indirect power. From a Foucauldian understanding of
power, I view “the diffused form of indirect power” as inscribed in discourses of
religious communities, which have a form of control over discourses and knowledge,
hence control over subjectivization. Intellectuals within and outside religious
communities play a key role in the construction of hegemonic discourses and in
articulation of these discourses in community settings. Articulated discourses in these
settings structures everyday life through culture, identity and everyday philosophy, or
69

“common sense.” Discourses are articulated and transformed through giving new
meanings to or shifting the existing meanings of the reference points and concepts that
signify the lack of an ideal.

This approach presents an alternative to IR Neo-Gramscian literature, which is
predominantly heading towards greater economic determinism. In a world where
domestic groups are intricately tied to patterns of international trade and finance, the
social meanings constructed within these groups can no longer remain in the domain of
sociology. Religious communities not only hold the power of religious knowledge, they
also hold the power to represent these meanings at global level, through their
transnational ties. A dialogue between IR Neo-Gramscians and post-structuralists opens
up the venues for exploring the articulation of international processes via discourses, with
the identities, culture and everyday experiences of religious groups. Through this
dialogue, IR critical theory can provide new avenues for research on the intersection of
religion and international political economy. Although this study is limited to discursive
articulations in religious community settings, increasing transnational ties established
through these communities also provide a valuable avenue for IR research.

70

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to explain the epistemological perspective of this study and to
outline its research questions and methods. It begins with a discussion of epistemological
perspective, focusing on the epistemological and ontological foundations of discourse
theory and Neo-Gramscianism. Then, the chapter will focus on how the social
constructivist epistemology is capable of bringing together certain aspects of discourse
theory and Neo-Gramscianism in a way that complements the theoretical approach in this
study. Next, the research questions will be elucidated. The section will show that Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA), specifically, the Discourse-Historical approach (DHA)
provides tools for answering the research questions. After explaining the case and data
selection process in line with DHA, specific steps used in data analysis will be presented.
The chapter will conclude with a section on the evaluation of the methodological
approach in terms of its usefulness in revealing discourse and knowledge production
dynamics in the Gülen and Erenköy communities.

3.2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Drawing from a Gramscian perspective and post-structural discourse theory, this
dissertation argues that structural power and a diffused power in the form of discourse
71

operate simultaneously at any given historical conjuncture. Gramscianism, post-
structuralism, and their understanding of power are based on different, and sometimes
opposing, ontological and epistemological assumptions. As mentioned in Chapter Two,
despite these differences, the convergence of critical theory and neo-Gramscianism in
cultural studies enabled cultural theorists to draw from post-structuralism. Engagement
with post-structuralism in turn prepared the ground for an involvement between the
ontological and epistemological approaches upon which neo-Gramscianism and discourse
theory are based.

Epistemological and ontological disagreements between neo-Gramscians and discourse
theorists derive largely from two interlinked issues. The first is whether the researcher
can understand social meanings in an objective manner or not. The second is whether
standards for evaluating social claims completely depend on the rules and norms of a
specific community (i.e. relativism), or if there is a way to distinguish better or social
claims. Each of these issues with regard to Gramscianism and discourse theory will be
discussed below.

3.2.1. Ontological and Epistemological Foundations of Discourse Theory

Discourse theory is based on the ontology of multiple realities. As discussed in Chapter
Two, Laclau and Mouffe argue that there is a reality outside the discourse, independent of
the subjective will of individuals. However, the only way to make sense of this reality is
72

through discourse. They define discourse as social and political construction that
establishes a system of relations among objects, processes and social agents. As such, the
being of objects is constituted within discourse. In other words, discourse is the
ontological element of social life.
174
Since the researcher cannot be independent from the
foundation of social life, the subject and object cannot be separated in knowledge
building. For this reason, the idea that subjective meanings of action can be understood in
an objective manner is rejected in discourse theory.
175

Rejecting the objectivity of the researcher does not necessarily mean that there is no way
to distinguish between better and worse interpretations. Scholars disagree about whether
discourse theory is based on epistemological relativism or not. Epistemological relativism
assumes that since all knowledge claims have local and historical components, there are
no criteria rational to evaluate them.
176
On the other hand, Barrett argues that privileging
the discursive does not necessarily lead to a relativist epistemology. He also argues that
Laclau and Mouffe’s epistemological approach is far from relativism.
177
Yet, some
scholars argue that Laclau and Mouffe have an inconsistent stance on this issue and still

174
Martin, 2002: 23. Also see Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 108.

175
In object-oriented research, the interpreter objectifies (i.e. stands over and against) that which is to be interpreted.
The interpretation is viewed as reflecting the original meaning of an action. p.193

176
Harding, 1998.

177
Barrett argues that Laclau and Mouffe’s discussion of whether people can be said to be oppressed if they themselves
do not think they are shows that they are not relativists. He argues that in this discussion Laclau and Mouffe “speak
from the position of the judging external agent.” They separate between subordination and oppression. Subordination
simply marks a set of differential positions within the social agents. For oppression to exist, there must be an exterior
point from which the discourse of subordination can be interrupted. Interruption of this discourse means that social
agents may not think that they are in a subordinate position. Barrett, 1991: 77. Boucher also mentions that Laclau is
against complete rejection of the universal because rejection might undercut the appeal of the oppressed to human
rights and democratic entitlements. Boucher, 2008: 114.
73

fall prey to relativism. For instance, although they are against the rejection of the
universal, they also argue that the definition of universalism is contextual, and there exist
only local definitions of universality.
178
This ambivalent stance on relativism opens up
the way for engagements with different ontological and epistemological perspectives.

3.2.2. Ontological and Epistemological Foundations of Neo-Gramscianism

The Gramscian view in cultural studies is based on the ontology of historical realism,
which assumes that reality is shaped by social, political, cultural, economic and gender
values, and that reality becomes crystallized in time. Knowledge is created by exploring
the dynamic interaction of the subject and his/her environment. Knowledge about these
meanings is acquired through dialectical and dialogical methodologies. The nature of
knowledge acquired this way is historically situated and structural. Knowledge is
accumulated by making generalizations based on similarities between structures and
historical conjunctures.
179
Standards for evaluating claims are determined by the socio-
economic and political conditions in a society.

Similar to the post-structuralist position on universalist theories, Hall rejects abstract and
universal theories. For him, universalist theories detach the concrete socio-historical

178
Boucher, 2008: 114. For an account of scholars who consider Laclau and Mouffe within the post-modernist
paradigm see Boucher: 33-34. For Boucher’s discussion of post-Marxism’s stance on relativism see Boucher 112-116.

179
See Guba and Lincoln, 2005: 195-196.

74

context from theories. A socio-historical context provides both subject matter and the
conditions in which the subject matter is constituted. For this reason, similar to the case
of post-Marxist epistemology, in Hall’s epistemology, all knowledge is political and
permeated with values.
180
Based on Marx, Hall argues that in acquiring knowledge there
is a constant movement between theory and empirical reality. Different from an ontology
of multiple realities, what “truth” is changes according to socio-economic and political
context rather than the viewpoint of a subject. Hall’s approach is not a relativist one. The
adequacy of theories and research is judged by their ability to help us understand the
complexities of social phenomena.
181

3.2.3. Weak Social Constructivist Epistemology

Understanding how subjects interpret social processes in a particular context and how
they are positioned in social structures requires a dialectical engagement between local
and systemic contexts.
182
This dissertation adopts a subject-oriented view toward
acquiring knowledge. That is, it is assumed that researcher cannot understand social
meaning in an objective manner, because her interpretations are also socially conditioned,
based on her position in the social structure as well as the historical context of the study.

180
Schwandt, 2000: 198.

181
Grossberg, 1996: 153-154.

182
“Hermeneutic circle” is the notion that in order to understand the part, one must grasp the whole. The
epistemological basis of [notion of] the hermeneutic circle is “object oriented” interpretivism. Schwandt, 2000: 193.

75

The ontological view in this study is that knowledge and “truth” are social constructions
embedded in history. There are multiple realities for the researcher as well as for social
groups. For this reason, as Gadamer argues, “the claims of ‘objective knowledge’ are
fundamentally mistaken.
183
However, this study does not adopt epistemological
relativism. The latter goes one step further than the assumption that “truth” is a social
construction by accepting all interpretations as equal. Indeed, relativists argue that the
rules that govern a social group do not apply to others, and they view social groups as
isolated from one another, which prevents the analysis of both the interaction between
different knowledge frameworks and the implications of this difference for the members
of these groups. Moreover, viewing all statements as true eliminates the need to compare
different knowledge frameworks, have conversations between them and in this way
criticize them. Thus, epistemological relativism adopts a non-critical pluralism of views.

The ontology of historically and socially situated multiple realities does not necessitate
adopting epistemological relativism. This study adopts a weak social constructivist
epistemology which is based on contextual empiricism. According to contextual
empiricists, social phenomena have objective qualities. As Jessop explains, “They have
properties and tendencies which give them distinct capacities and liabilities whose
existence may not be acknowledged, but which still have a powerful influence on social
life.”
184

183
Gadamer, 1975.

184
Jessop 1990: 295.

76

Weak social constructivists argue that the objective world exists, yet the researcher
cannot understand social meanings in an objective manner. The first assumption underlies
Hall’s and other Gramscians’ theories. The second assumption underlies discourse
theory. Weak social constructivism brings these assumptions together by adopting a
social epistemology. Social epistemology holds that knowledge production is social. Data
is generated and analyzed according to intersubjectively determined assumptions.
However, the social negotiations that set the rules of research are not the only factors that
lie behind the subjective nature of knowledge production.
185
The real world also
constrains our knowledge construction by specifying claiming which data to dismiss
and/or by making certain data unavailable. Through these constraints on and socially
negotiated assumptions regarding the rules of research, “social values and ideologies
become subtly inscribed in theories, hypotheses and models defining research
programs.”
186

Based on social epistemology, weak social constructivism redefines the positivist view of
objectivity with regard to the public standards or criteria to which members of the
scientific community feel themselves bound. Longino explains that these standards “can

185
Schwandt, 2000: 199.

186
Ibid.

77

include both substantive principles and epistemic, as well as social values.”
187
These
standards are intersubjective; however, as the number of points of view with regard to
public standards increases, social practices will likely be more objective. Alternative and
especially critical points of view help us see social values and interests that are embedded
in research programs. As we expose the biases, we detect limiting interpretative
frameworks and come closer to finding more appropriate ones.
188
In this way we come
closer to objectivity. Similarly, according to Harding, changes in the social relations and
in discourses open up the possibility to ask new kinds of questions that were deemed
unimportant before. Asking questions about the lives are who are socially oppressed
enables us to expose biased elements in conceptual frameworks and in this way provides
“a more rigorous, more competent standard for maximizing objectivity.” She refers to
this understanding of objectivity as “strong objectivity.”
189
Through a reconstruction of
objectivity, weak social constructivists aim to distinguish better or worse
interpretations.
190

Similar to the knowledge frameworks of the Islamic communities it studies, this
dissertation’s own knowledge framework is also shaped by historical and social

187
Longino also mentions that the public standards or criteria can include empirical adequacy, truth, generation of
specifiable interactions with the natural world, the expansion of existing knowledge , consistency with accepted
theories in other domains, comprehensiveness, reliability as a guide to action, relevance to or satisfaction of particular
social needs. Longino, 1990: 77.

188
Longino, 1990: 77.

189
Harding, 1998: 18.

190
See Taylor, 1989.

78

conditions and the author’s place in these conditions. What Harding explains with regard
to her study is also true for this study: it develops from a determined location in
contemporary social relations and available discursive sources.
191
As Smith argues, this
location, standpoint, or situatedness both enables and constrains individuals.
192
The
position of the author of this study as an outsider to Islamic communities, as a Turk, and
as a woman may enable and constrain her in different ways. The dissertation does not
claim to provide the best possible interpretation of the Islamic community discourses. It
claims to provide conceptual and evidential criticism of existing frameworks that analyze
the rise of political Islam in general and Islamic communities in particular, with the aim
of transforming existing knowledge frameworks so that they provide more appropriate
interpretations. The appropriateness of the framework this study provides, and hence the
extent to which the interpretations come closer to strong objectivity, can be assessed after
engagements among various different knowledge frameworks are established.

3.3. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHOD

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the research question in this dissertation is “How have
Islamic community discourses been transformed in the context of the institutionalization
of neoliberal structuring in Turkey since 2000?” The first goal of this research is to
develop a theoretical framework for understanding how Islamic communities are

191
Harding: 1998, 21.

192
Smith, 1987. Also see Harding and Hintikka, 2003: xv.
79

positioned in social structures and how community members interpret social processes.
The second goal is to provide an engagement between neo-Gramscianism in IR and in
cultural studies, and in this way, between IR neo-Gramscianism and post-structural
discourse theory. Finally, the dissertation aims to identify sources of power, and how
power is dispersed in everyday life through discourses.

In this dissertation, a combination of methods of critical discourse analysis (CDA) is
adopted.
193
CDA comprises many approaches that are not mutually exclusive, with
differences in terms of scope of analysis and level of attention to language-use
properties.
194
Some approaches focus on local construction of discourses while others
focus on a historically situated assembly of discourses which are ordered and presented
as an integrated frame.
195
In terms of attention to language use, some approaches focus on
specific details of language use (time, tense, verbal mode etc.) while others are interested
in broad patterns and general tendencies.

193
van Dijk mentions that “Discourse is a multidimensional social phenomenon. It is an object (verbal/grammatical
meaningful words or sentences), an action (an assertion or threat), a form of social interaction (conversation), a social
practice (lecture), a mental representation (a meaning, mental model an opinion, knowledge), an interactional or
communicative event or activity, a cultural product and even an economic commodity that is bought and sold (like a
novel)”. van Dijk, 2009: 66-67 He also mentions that CDA is mainly interested in the discursive re-production of the
social structure of inequality. van Dijk, 2009: 80.

194
Some CDA methods are developed to analyze in detail specific elements of texts such as their semantic elements at
macro or micro level. Others focus on broad discourses and general tendencies at local or global level. See the chart on
page 20 that shows the CDS approaches (deductive general perspective vs. inductive, detailed case studies. Wodak and
Meyer, 2009: 20- 22. Other categorizations include agency vs. structure; broad linguistic operationalization vs. detailed
linguistic operationalization, close range (discourse of one person) or long range (standardized and trans-local
discourses). Alvesson and Karreman, 2000: 1135.

195
Avesson and Karreman, 2000: 1133.

80

The scope of analysis and level of attention to linguistic use depends on our research
questions and goals. Research focusing on the transformation of Islamic community
discourses within the context of neoliberal restructuring requires an analysis of the
interaction between discourses at the local and global level. The theoretical, ontological
and epistemological approach in this study that reconciles aspects of structuralism and
post-structuralism necessitates a methodological approach that helps us analyze the
interaction between locally constructed discourses and hegemonic discourses. In line with
the theoretical approach in this dissertation, certain CDA scholars mention that macro
level discourses contribute to the local production of social inequalities
196
by
politicization/de-politicization or legitimation/de-legitimation.
197
In turn, in line with
Hall’s understanding of hegemony, micro-level discourses play a role in the constitution
of hegemonic discourses. This study assumes neither that discourse is a locally
constructed phenomenon nor that dominant discourses are the primary factors shaping
local discourses. Although Avesson and Karreman argue that there is some tension
between these two levels and that it is not easy to account for both in the same study,
198

Van Dijk mentions that since CDA is mainly interested in the reproduction of power, an
interaction between local and global is particularly important for CDA scholars.
199

196
Van Dijk, 2009: 80.

197
Fairclough, 2009: 174.

198
Alvesson and Karreman, 2000: 1134. Alvesson and Karreman mention that analyses of discourses in specific micro-
contexts treat discourse as a locally constructed phenomenon, while analyses of trans-local discourses starts from a-
priori understandings of phenomenon in question. Ibid.

199
Van Dijk, 2009: 82.
81

This study adopts a meso-discourse approach which is interested in going beyond the
details of the text. Instead, it calls for an analysis of broad patterns of discourses in
specific local contexts. These broad patterns are used to draw connections to a more
general pattern. In this dissertation CDA will not be employed to delineate the details of
grammatical or semiotic structures of specific texts. Although each community discourse
is unique, a focus on only the unique aspects will prevent us from seeing general
tendencies. Instead, CDA will be used to analyze the broad patterns and general
tendencies in the Islamic community discourses and the direction of the change in these
patterns.

Among CDA approaches, the discourse historical approach (DHA) enables us to analyze
the interaction between the global and the local. It focuses on the ways in which specific
discourses mediate and reproduce ideologies.
200
Wodak and Reisigl mention that one of
the aims of DHA is to ‘demystify’ the hegemony of specific discourses by revealing the
ideologies.
201
In other words, DHA is focused on ideologies that are legitimated or de-
legitimated in discourses. Contrary to the Foucauldian understanding of discourse as
power, which Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory adopts, DHA does not see language
as powerful on its own. It views language as a means to gain power. This leads to a

200
Thompson’s definition of ideology will be adopted. Thompson views ideology as social forms and processes within
which, and by means of which, hegemonic symbolic forms circulate in the social world. Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 97,
cite Thompson, 1990: vii.

201
Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 96.

82

critical analysis of the discourse(s) of those who are in power.
202
In line with the
theoretical argument in this dissertation that the discourses of those who are in power are
absorbed by micro-level social groups with differing power levels through the medium of
articulation, I argue that applying DHA to local level community discourses will be
beneficial in revealing the different forms hegemonic discourses may take, shaping
community discourses in the process. This means that power continues to operate in the
discourses themselves at the local level.

In DHA, discourse is not understood as a closed unit. Discourses have fluid boundaries.
They are context-dependent practices and they are open to re-interpretation.
203
The
meaning of discourse always depends on the historical and socio-political context as well
as the perspective of the discourse analyst. DHA pays attention to interdiscursivity, which
is defined as the various ways in which discourses are linked to one another.
204
DHA also
pays attention to de-contextualization, which entails taking elements of a discourse out of
their context, and re-contextualization, which is defined as the process of transferring
elements of a discourse to new contexts. In their new contexts, elements may acquire new
or changed meanings.
205

202
Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 96.

203
Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 97.

204
Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 98.

205
Ibid.

83

3.4. CASE SELECTION

Political scientists base their case selections on theoretical and methodological criteria.
206

One of the goals of this research is to build a theoretical framework. Each empirical
chapter is a theory-building case study or, according to Lijphart’s typology of case
studies, an interpretative comparative case study.
207
Interpretive case studies contain thick
descriptions which illustrate, support or challenge theoretical assumptions.
208
For this
reason, cases are selected for their usefulness in theory building. Another goal of this
study is to provide an understanding of knowledge or discourse-production dynamics.
Identifying broad patterns in the way hegemonic discourses are articulated in the two
community settings will provide insight into these dynamics. Therefore, comparability is
another criterion in case selection. The focus of this study is discursive changes. For this
reason, the possible cases of Islamic communities are narrowed down to the ones that
provide such comparability. Among these communities Gülen and Erenköy communities
are selected for their usefulness for the purpose of developing the theoretical framework
that was discussed above.

Both the Gülen and Erenköy Communities have monthly journals that have been
published without interruption since the mid-80s. They both have businesses that are

206
Levy: 2001, 80.

207
Bennett and George, 2001: 145. Lijphart, 1971.

208
Merriam, 1988.

84

well integrated into the capitalist economy.
209
Hence, both communities have stakes in
the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, society and politics. This similarity is
important in terms of theory building. It allows us to more clearly see the relationship
between neo-liberalization, hegemonic discourses and transformation of Islamic
community discourses. It also allows us to see more clearly the significance of the
differences between the two communities in the way their discourses are articulated with
hegemonic discourses.

The two communities come from different discursive traditions. The Erenköy community
follows the Naqshbandi tradition. The latter is a mystical tradition in the form of tarikat,
which is defined as a Islamic order where the sheikh, meaning the recognized successor
of the founder and designated as such by the previous leader, teaches its adherents the
tenets of the tradition.
210
Tarikats are more spiritual and follow the practices set by a long
line of succession. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the Erenköy community is a
tarikat but it is referred to as a community to indicate that it is one of the branches of the
broad Naqshibandi tarikat in Turkey. Gülen community is a part of the Nur tradition,

209
Gülen community followers have established their own business associations.(ĐŞ HAD and TUSKON) Most of the
businesses owned by Erenköy community followers are members of MÜSĐ AD, a business association composed of
small and middle- sized firms and religiously conservative members. See Chapter 4.
210
The tenets of the Naqshibendi tradition were specified by Bahaddin Naqshibendi, who was born in 1317.
Naqshibendi means “the one who engraves God’s name in one’s heart.” Different from other mystic traditions, in
Naqshi tradition disciples are allowed to establish new mystic lodges without the permission of their sheikh, who is the
recognized successor of the founder. This rule gave Naqshibandi orders organizational flexibility and ability to adapt to
new cultures and socio-political changes. According to Yaşar this flexibility enabled the tradition to last for centuries.
Yaşar, 2004: 324.

85

which follows the teachings of Said Nursi. Nursi’s writings on Islamic principles
211

aimed to construct an Islamic identity by shaping the daily life of individuals in line with
these principles. Eventually the number of individuals will increase and these principles
will be disseminated to whole society. Various groups that follow his teachings are not
considered as tarikats, because the teachings do not adopt the principles of any one
particular Islamic order and can be learned by reading the text rather than from the
sheikh.
212
Although Naqshibandi tradition had an effect on Nursi’s thought, Nursi
developed his own ideas and interpretations drawing from a variety of traditions. Thus,
there are differences between the two communities in terms of their discursive sources
and organizational structure. The two communities also differ in terms of the number and
reach of their followers. The global network established by the Gülen community has
affected its institutional structure and the experiences of its adherents. On the other hand,
Erenköy is a smaller community in terms of the number of its adherents. These
differences between the two communities will provide an opportunity to compare the way
in which the community discourses are articulated with the hegemonic discourses.

3.5. DATA SELECTION

In critical discourse analysis, text and talk are the main objects of research. In this study,
a discourse analysis of the texts will be conducted. According to Wodak, “texts are part

211
His collected works, titled Risale-i Nur (Letters of Light) were replicated and disseminated to different parts of the
country by his followers. Yavuz, 2003: 267.

212
Nursi is not sheikh designated as such by the previous leader either.
86

of discourses and they make the speech acts durable.” She mentions that texts are often
sites of social struggle. Texts allow us to systematically follow the changes in the
discourses in a longitudinal study such as this dissertation. Islamic community discourses
are based on both oral and textual traditions. They gather together in small groupings to
discuss the meaning of texts. Hence, it is possible that texts are interpreted differently in
each of these groups. In Islamic communities there is a hierarchical structure through
which discourses generated at high levels reach lower levels. They also have horizontal
networks through which discourses are disseminated orally and via texts. In the process
of dissemination, discourses may acquire slightly different meanings, especially in the
larger communities. Thus, although texts do not reflect the variance of the interpretations,
based on my interviews with community members I have learned that texts are
representative of dominant community discourses.

Many different types of texts circulate in Islamic communities. Gülen community
followers have their own mass media network. These networks publish newspapers,
books, journals, as well as transcripts of speeches and interviews. Followers of the
Erenköy community also own a publishing house that publishes books and journals.
While mass media channels directly contribute to the formation, transformation or
reproduction of the hegemonic discourses, the more specific media reconstruct meanings
that affect followers’ perceptions regarding the general messages of the hegemonic
discourse they are exposed to through mass media. The many journals published by
community followers play an especially important role in generating consent or
87

opposition to hegemonic discourses. For this reason, the texts analyzed in this study are
primarily selected from journals. In selecting the journals to be analyzed, one of the
selection criteria was whether the journal specifically target the community’s followers,
and a second was whether it had been published without interruption from the mid-1990s
until 2011. The journal also needed to be comprehensive enough to include topics that
relevant to this research. The two journals that meet these criteria are Sızıntı, (Leak)
which is published by Gülen community followers, and Altınoluk (Golden Groove),
which is published by Erenköy community adherents.

During my interviews, I also found out that the speeches of the community leaders and
the interviews they give are significant sources of discourse production in Islamic
communities. Therefore speeches of the community leaders that complement the topics
analyzed in the journals have also been selected for analysis here. For example, Gülen
community leader Fethullah Gülen gave interviews to various journalists, and these
interviews were later published as books. Visual and audio recordings of his answers to
questions posed by community followers are published in Gülen affiliated websites under
the title “Bamteli,” which means somebody’s most sensitive point. His other answers in
the community gatherings are also published as texts on Gülen-affiliated websites and are
referred to as “Kırık Testi” (Broken Flagon.) Successive leaders of the Erenköy
community have published under various nicknames in Altınoluk. These texts are also
analyzed in the empirical chapters.

88

The time frame for analyzing the journals will be between 1995 and 2011. As will be
argued in Chapter three, in 1980 a military coup triggered a re-structuring of the Turkish
political system and its actors and constitutes a watershed in the hegemonic discourses as
well as the discourses of social actors at the micro-level. In the decade that followed, the
discourses of all actors, including those of Islamic communities, were restricted. For that
reason, the discourse analysis of this study will begin from the mid-1990s, when the
limits on freedom of expression were relatively more flexible compared to the 1980s, and
will cover discursive changes until 2011. The period between 1995 and 2011 will be
divided into three periods divided by political events that led to significant shifts in the
hegemonic discourses.

First period will be between 1995 and 2001. The most significant turning point in Turkish
politics after the 1980 military coup came in early 1997. On February 28 of that year, the
National Security Council, which included high-ranking armed forces members and
which advised the government, issued a declaration regarding protecting the secular
nature of the state. The declaration signaled that another military coup was imminent. As
a result, the prime minister at the time resigned from his post. His party, the Islamist
Welfare Party, was then banned closed by the Constitutional Court. In order to
understand the impact of this dramatic event on the Islamic communities’ discourses, the
discourses before and after February 1997 must be analyzed. The first time period will
end in 2001, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded. As will be
discussed in chapter four, AKP’s discourse quickly found support among different
89

segments of society, becoming hegemonic. Second time period will be between 2001 and
2007. The period includes establishment of the AKP, its victory in 2002 elections and its
first term as the government. In this period, neo-liberal policies were institutionalized and
political system was re-structured. Third time period will begin in June 2007 and
continue until 2011. After becoming the government for the second time 2007, AKP
shifted its discourse. Meanwhile, structural changes in the economy and politics started to
show its results on other social actors, including Islamic communities.

3.6. DATA ANALYSIS (OPERATIONALIZATION)

Reisgl and Wodak emphasize that the categories and tools of DHA are not fixed: “they
must be elaborated for each analysis according to the specific problem under
investigation.”
213
This study adopts a meso-discourse approach. It aims to analyze the
broad patterns of the discursive changes. Therefore details of linguistic means are not the
focus of this research. Drawing from DHA, first, the historical and socio-political
context will be provided. Second, the topics to be analyzed will be identified. Third,
discursive strategies that are used in the texts will be analyzed.

213
Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 103.

90

3.6.1. Contextualization

One of the most important principles of DHA is to take historical context into account in
interpreting discourses.
214
The historical dimension of discourses is addressed in two
ways in this study. At the macro level, the historical and socio-political contexts in which
the hegemonic discourses are embedded will be explored.
215
At the micro level,
background information on each Islamic community and an exploration of diachronic
changes in each of their discourses will be provided in the two empirical chapters.

a. Context at the macro level

The historical and socio-political variables and the institutional context will be explored
in the chapter that analyzes global neo-liberal restructuring, the processes of neo-
liberalization in Turkey, as well as the transformation of Islamic actors and their role in
the consolidation of a neo-liberal order starting from the 1980s. The chapter will address
specific periods related to important events that significantly affect the formation or
evolution of hegemonic discourses and the discourses of various Islamic actors.
Neoliberal restructuring in Turkey will be analyzed during three periods, divided
according to the level of embeddedness of neoliberal principles. The research question in
this study necessitates an analysis of the hegemonic discourse in Turkey especially after

214
Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 95.

215
Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 101.

91

2001. Based on Hall’s definition of hegemony, I identified various layers of hegemonic
discourse, including global neo-liberal discourses, a discourse of morality, of nationalism,
and of religion, and I analyze how the articulations among these layers produced a
hegemonic center that is referred to as the hegemonic discourse. The analyses will also
focus on specific social and political actors such as the Turkish Armed Forces,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, the EU, business associations,
trade unions, Islamic political parties, Islamic businesses, Islamic communities and the
AKP, to investigate if they have been effective in the discursive changes in the two
communities.

To provide an analysis of the historical and socio-political context, this study makes use
of secondary sources on the evolution of neo-liberal re-structuring. Various primary
sources are used as well to understand the views of various social and political actors
regarding the changes in their positions within the changing socio-economic and political
structures. Yearly reports of two business associations, TÜSĐ AD and MÜSĐ AD, which
represent big capital and small capital respectively, are also used. In addition, the
websites of various trade unions and state employees’ unions, which include manifestos,
publications and from time to time first-hand accounts of workers or civil employees
have also been consulted.

The Central Bank of Turkey provides current information on the state of neo-
liberalization and monetary policies, as well as periodic data on monetary and financial
92

markets. For an account of hegemonic discourse in Turkey after 2001, the AKP party
program for 2011 and AKP’s primary ideologue Yalcin Akdogan’s book on the party’s
identity as “conservative democrats” have been useful. News published in the major
newspapers such as Milliyet, Hurriyet, Zaman, Taraf and Vatan, provide various
accounts of prime ministers’ and other party officials’ speeches, as well as on civil
society actors supportive of the government. Specifically I searched news in. Finally, my
visits to the AKP headquarters and informal discussions I had with party officials offered
important insights.

b. Context at the micro level

In order to contextualize Islamic community discourses in the beginning of the empirical
chapters, background information on each of the Islamic communities will be provided.
In addition, the sources, production, organization and general features of discourses will
be discussed. Changes in the institutional structures, profiles of affiliates, leaders of the
communities, and position in the socio-economic structure are important for
understanding the shifts in the production and organization of discourses.

To gain insight into the two communities, I conducted interviews with five individuals
with differing levels of attachment to the Gülen community and with one individual
affiliated with the Erenköy community. I attended a conference organized by the Gülen
93

community in Los Angeles in 2009.
216
I also attended various social events like the
Anatolian Cultures and Food Festival in Los Angeles, which was organized by Gülen
community followers and participants such as Pacifica Institute. Archives of the major
newspapers mentioned above which can be accessed from their websites published
articles and news on the communities, interviews with Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the
Gülen community and with Ahmet Taşgetiren, who is the editor of Altınoluk journal.
These sources were very useful in putting the community discourses in context.

3.6.2. Topics

In a discourse historical analysis, after examining the historical background, the analyst
identifies the contents or topics of a specific discourse. Van Dijk advocates beginning
critical discourse analysis with a study of topics or themes. He mentions that these
elements are the most intentional and most consciously controlled by the speaker or
writer. He explains that topics are significant elements of a discourse to study because
they express the general ideological principles. They are significant also because “they
have the most obvious effects on the memory and consequent actions of recipients”, and
therefore on the reproduction of discourses.
217

216
Conference on “East and West Encounters: the Gülen Movement” December 5-6, 2009 University of Southern
California, Los Angeles, CA
217
van Dijk, 2009.

94

The research question plays an important role in the selection of topics. If certain topics
and themes are not prevalent in the community discourses, attention is paid to whether
they are related to hegemonic discourses in Turkey and in the international arena after
2001 through topics such as globalization, democratization, human rights, secularism and
so on. In addition, since the focus of this study is the transformation of discourses in line
with political and socio-economic changes, topics related to social change such as
contrasts between the old and new social orders, gender relations, Islamic life-style, self-
identities, etc. are included. The most common topics during a specific time period are
also selected for analysis, since the research focuses on discursive changes in both the
content and the prevalence of topics.

3.6.3. Discursive Strategies

Wodak and Reisgl focus on five discursive strategies in DHA.
218
These are nomination,
predication, argumentation, perspectivization and intensification/mitigation strategies.
The objective of argumentation strategy is to provide the justifications, question the
claims of truth and normative rightness. The texts in the journal primarily involve
descriptions of the self and other, qualification of events and processes. Arguments are
made within this discursive framework. The aim of this dissertation is not to investigate
the shifts in the arguments or in the way in which arguments are made, but to understand

218
Reisgl and Wodak, 2009: 101-102.

95

the broader discursive framework in which the actors, processes and events that are used
in arguments are constructed and re-constructed. Intensification or mitigation strategy is
about the articulation of utterances. Some of the devices used to intensify or mitigate the
meaning of utterances are hesitations, vague expressions and indirect speech acts. These
tools are not easily applicable to written texts, especially in the major community journals
that are characterized by clear expressions. In order to understand the construction of the
conceptual frameworks, I will use nomination and predication strategies.

a. Nomination strategies

Nomination strategies are about the discursive construction of social actors. The objective
of nomination strategy is to investigate how social actors, phenomena and processes are
named and referred to linguistically. These include membership categorization devices,
verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions etc., and tropes such as metaphors
and metonymies.
219
For each period under investigation, I identify the general patterns in
the nomination strategies.

219
Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 102.

96

b. Predication strategies

Predication strategies are about discursive qualification of social actors, phenomena and
events. For each of the topics within each period under investigation I investigate what
characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, phenomena and
processes. These include evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the form
of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses,
infinitive clauses, and participial clauses or groups, explicit predicates or predicative
nouns/adjectives, pronouns, allusions, explicit comments, similes, metaphors etc.

Analysis of nomination strategies tells us about which subject positions the communities
indicate as relevant. In this way, they help us to find the reference points or floating
words, which in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, bind together meanings related to
self-identity.
220
“Woman” is a reference point for identity construction in that it binds
together various concepts such as caring, emotion or gentleness. These concepts and their
meanings change depending on the discourse. Together, they give meaning to the floating
word of “woman.” Nomination strategies allow us to identify reference points related to
identity and the concepts that “fill these reference points with meaning.”
221
We can
identify the subject positions involved in the articulation process by identifying one or
more of the following:

220
Laclau and Mouffe call these reference points as “nodal points” or “master signifiers.”
221
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985.
97

- changes in the reference points (use of different reference points)
- changes in the combination of concepts that give meanings to reference points
- changes in the concepts that give meanings to reference points (use of different
concepts)

Analysis of predication strategies allow us to identify the reference points/floating words
that bind together meanings related to dominant discourses. It also allows us to identify
the relevant concepts that give meaning to the reference points. “Liberal democracy,”
which does not have a meaning on its own, is a reference point that binds together
concepts such as election, separation of powers and political party. Once we identify the
reference points in an Islamic community at a certain time period, we can analyze the
articulation process by identifying whether different reference points are used and/or
identifying the shifts in meaning attributed to:

- reference points related to identity and concepts that fill reference points with
meaning.
- reference points related to the dominant discourses and concepts that fill reference
points with meaning.

98

3.6.4. Organization of Data

In the beginning of each empirical chapter I provide some background on the Islamic
community, its sources and organization of discourse. For each Islamic community under
investigation, I then analyze the evolution of discourses over three time periods. The
beginnings and ends of these periods are determined by the historical and social context
and the extent to which they have affected community discourses. Under each time
period, an overview of prevalent topics and themes will be first provided. Then, changes
in the broad patterns of nomination and predication strategies will be analyzed. Particular
attention will be given to how texts draw from other discourses’ texts (intertextuality) and
re-contextualize the discourses.

3.7. EVALUATION OF THE METHOD

Islamic community journals express the discourses that are commonly accepted and
adopted by the individuals at the higher levels in the community hierarchy. They guide
and shape the transformation of the dominant community discourses. A discourse
analysis of journals does not reflect the variance in the way in which followers of the
community interpret the discourse in the journals. Islamic communities do not have
homogenous discourses. In order to see the different discourses within each community,
we need to conduct an ethnographic research. The aim of this study is to analyze
99

tendencies in the broad discourses and how the latter is linked to the shifts in political and
socio-economic structures and the discourses. One of the limitations in conducting
discourse analysis in a language other than English is that the translations may not
completely reflect the meanings of the terms and miss the nuances. In this study, to
maintain reliability, concepts are explained in the context in which they are used. The
concepts are translated and interpreted based on their use multiple times, in different
contexts and by different authors.

100

CHAPTER IV: A GRAMSCIAN ACCOUNT OF NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY
CONSTRUCTION IN TURKEY

4.1. INTRODUCTION

As discussed in chapter three, both the Gramscian and Discourse-Historical approaches
analyze the historical and social constitution of discourses. In order to analyze the
discursive changes in the Gülen and Erenköy communities, we need to understand how
they are positioned in Turkey’s socio-economic structure. The aim of this chapter is to
analyze, from a Gramscian perspective, the process through which the Turkish economy
was restructured in line with neoliberal principles and through which the AKP’s
discourse became hegemonic in the 2000s. The chapter argues that Islamic actors,
including Islamic businesses, NGOs, and Islamic communities, played a significant role
both in the neoliberalization process and in the construction of the AKP’s hegemonic
discourse.

The chapter starts with an account of the neoliberal structuring of the world order since
the late 1970s. It continues with a three-part analysis of neoliberal restructuring in
Turkey: the introduction of neoliberal reforms in Turkey beginning in the 1980s; the
1990s, which is referred to as “the lost decade” in terms of neoliberalization; and finally
the establishment of an historic bloc and hegemonic rule in the 2000s. Each part will
focus on changes in the socio-economic and political structure and in the dominant
101

discourses that accompany them. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the
hegemonic discourses during the AKP period.

4.2. NEO-LIBERAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE WORLD ORDER

Neoliberalism is a set of economic, political and cultural beliefs and practices based on
two principles. The first is that the most important purpose of an economic system is the
efficient allocation of resources and that the market is the most efficient mechanism for
doing so.
222
The second is that the state should interfere with the market mechanism only
to safeguard individual and commercial liberty and property rights,
223
not to provide a
social safety net for all its citizens. Since the 1970s, especially after the 1973 and 1978 oil
shocks, neoliberal thinking started to replace Keynesianism, which advocated the
expansion of demand, and hence the market size, through state spending on social
welfare services. The basic neo-liberal policy recommendations, formulated in the late
1970s and prescribed by Washington-based international financial institutions, are
referred to as the “Washington Consensus.”
224
For economic growth, neoliberal policies
prescribe a fiscal discipline that should be achieved primarily by the reduction of state-

222
This definition is based on Munck’s and Harvey’s definition of neoliberalism. Munck, 2005; Harvey: 2005
According to Harvey, neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices rather than a complete political
ideology. Harvey, 2005: 2.

223
Thorsen and Lie: 2002. Thorsen and Lie’s definition that draws from Mises, 1962; Nozick, 1974; Hayek, 1979.

224
Williamson summarizes the recommendations of the Washington Consensus included in the standard reform
package as: fiscal discipline, a redirection of public spending from subsidies to fields offering both high economic
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base),
interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, privatization, trade liberalization, liberalization of foreign
direct investment, deregulation and secure private property rights. Williamson 2000: 251-264; Williamson 1990: 5-38.
102

funded social services and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. The focus of
economic policymaking should be (in the interest of) exchange rate liberalization and the
fight against inflation. These goals are to be achieved through flexible labor markets, the
depoliticization of key economic policymaking institutions such as central banks,
competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization and reducing barriers to the inflow of
long-term and short-term foreign investments.
225

In the developed world, neoliberal restructuration was put into effect by United States
President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher (1979-1990) in the early 1980s. In the IR Neo-Gramscian literature, this period
is referred to as that of the ‘establishment of market hegemony.’ Gill argues that the
historic bloc that fostered the dominance of neoliberalism is a transnational one
composed of G-7 state apparatuses, transnational capital and associated privileged
workers, as well as small- and medium-sized businesses.
226
The implementation of
neoliberal economic policies requires and generates a shift in the dominant political
discourses as well as dominant cultural practices. “New constitutionalism,” the re-
structuring of state and international political institutions, is a result of this

225
Rodrik specifies the policy prescriptions added to the original Washington Consensus by 2001 as corporate
governance, anti-corruption, flexible labor markets, WTO agreements, financial codes and standards, prudent capital
account opening, non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, social safety nets, and targeted poverty reduction. Rodrik,
2001: 51.

226
Gill mentions that smaller firms include contractors, suppliers, import/export businesses and service companies such
as stock brokers, accountants and consultancies, lobbyist, and educational entrepreneurs. Gill, 2003: 119.

103

requirement.
227
As part of this new constitutionalism, discourses of “global governance”
serve to legitimize the emergence of a new institutional structure in which transnational
actors have more influence in the national decision-making processes than in the past.
228

Discourses of global governance are diffused to developing countries through the
conditionality of the IMF, World Bank and other supranational actors, such as the EU.
These discourses emphasize economic policy credibility, confidence, consistency,
economic discipline, and freedom of the market from state interference. Free competition
is associated with democracy and social progress, while the transnationalization of capital
is constructed as inevitable through the process of globalization.
229

Depoliticization is one of the central tenets of neoliberal restructuration. Neoliberalism
makes the assumption that policy-making institutions that are insulated from politics
make neutral and rational decisions, unlike politicians who can be irrational and
subjective. These presumably independent institutions make decisions to promote market
efficiency, which is constructed as being in the interest of everyone in society. By using
vaguely defined terms such as “market efficiency,” “state interference,” and “independent
decision making,” neoliberal discourse hides what is in fact the highly political nature of
promoting market efficiency as the most important purpose of the economy. It also serves
to conceal the existence of other approaches to economic growth that do not prioritize the

227
Gill defines the new constitutionalism as the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if
possible, liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development. Gill, 2003: 132, Gill, 2005: 412.

228
Şenalp, 2007: 2.

229
Gill, 2003: 125.

104

efficient allocation of resources.
230
In other words, as Rodrik puts it, the choice of
development strategy is removed from public debate.
231

According to Hall Thatcherism represented an articulation between the ideologies of
neoliberalism and neo-conservatism.
232
In the 1990s, neoliberal discourses of
Thatcherism and Reaganism were appropriated by center left governments in various
countries, mainly the US and the UK. The term “Third Way” refers to this new
articulation. Giddens provided the theoretical framework that explained the Third Way
discourses adopted by the US President Clinton and UK Prime Minister Blair.
233

Entrenched in the neo-conservatism of Thatcher and Reagan is “moral authoritarianism
with an idealized family at its centre.”
234
Third Way neoliberalism brings together moral
authoritarianism with an emphasis on citizen’s involvement in their communities. New
modes of neighborhood participation are based on the active citizen who views
himself/herself as responsible from the well-being of his community.
235
Giddens
mentions that while the old style social democracy treated rights as unconditional claims,
in the new style individual obligations should be expanded as well.
236
MacGregor

230
Chang, 2001: 5-8.

231
Rodrik, 2001: 2

232
Larner, 2005: 10

233
Giddens 1998.

234
Moody, 1997: 120.

235
Marinetto, 2003: 109.

236
Giddens, 1998: 65

105

explains that in Third Wayism citizens only have rights to the extent that they fulfill their
obligations.
237
Social inclusion also brings social intrusion with it. Third Way discourses
are also characterized by social inclusion as well as social intrusion, social intrusion
stratified systems of welfare provision, public-private partnerships. Moreover, in Third
Way discourses “electoral accountability is supplanted by negotiations among ‘partners’
on ‘community boards.’”
238

As IR Neo-Gramscians point out, central governmental agencies of the most important
industrialized economies together with key multilateral agencies insisted upon the
implementation of neoliberal reforms in developing economies. Chang argues that what
constitutes intervention into the market mechanism depends on which rights and
obligations are legitimate in a particular context. However, standards of neoliberal
governments in developed countries regarding market intervention were directly applied
in developing countries, without regard for contextual differences. The resulting
exclusion of large number of social groups from economic decision-making triggered
resistance and counter movements.
239
Indeed, in many of these countries, including
Turkey, neoliberalism could be implemented only in the context of authoritarian
governments.
240

237
MacGregor, 1999: 108.

238
MacGregor, 1999: 108.

239
For a discussion on the relativity of some of the key concepts in neoliberalism see Chang, 2001.

240
Gill, 1995: 412.
106

A neoliberal economic order was established in Turkey in three phases. Starting with the
military coup in 1980 and continuing until the end of the 1980s, the Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) model that had been in place in Turkey since 1950s was replaced
with an export-oriented economy. Basic neoliberal reforms were implemented under
military rule, and political opposition to neoliberalization was severely repressed. During
the 1990s, the neoliberal reform process was interrupted owing to economic crises, the
return of politicians banned after the 1980 military coup, and challenges from civil
society actors who had gained some power since the 1980s. However, beginning in 1999
and particularly after the 2001 economic crisis, neoliberal policies have been
institutionalized and neoliberal discourse has become hegemonic.

4.3. NEO-LIBERAL RESTRUCTURING IN TURKEY AND THE RISE OF
ISLAMIC BUSINESSES

4.3.1. 1980-1989: The Introduction of Neo-Liberal Principles

During 1980s, neoliberal restructuration in Turkey was shaped by three main factors. The
first was the military regime between 1980 and 1983 which promoted a “Turkish-Islam
synthesis” as the state identity. The second was Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s (1983-
1989) economic policies that promoted liberalization of the economy. The third was
Islamic capital owners who benefited from Özal’s export-oriented growth strategy.
107

In 1977 and 1979, a severe foreign currency shortage in Turkey led to the signing of two
stand-by agreements with the IMF, although the government was reluctant to implement
IMF’s conditions. The ongoing financial difficulties ultimately led to the downfall of the
government. In November 1979, the center-right Justice Party (AP), which formed a
minority government, came to power and in 1980 announced the “January 24th
Decisions,” an economic restructuring program that steered Turkey from ISI to an export-
oriented economy. In line with the January 24
th
decisions, Turkey signed a three-year
stand-by agreement with the IMF that aimed at implementing neo-liberal reforms.
241

Although big businesses had been benefiting from ISI and from patron-client
relationships with the state,
242
the foreign exchange crisis of 1977-1979
243
led to a
reorientation of its interests towards a restructuration of the economy.
244
However, the
government had lacked the capability to implement these reforms owing to acts of
terrorism between radical leftists and ultra-nationalists in the mid-1970s
245
in which

241
The three year stand-by agreement with the IMF aimed at “reducing trade restrictions, giving priority to the export
sector, devaluing the Turkish lira, controlling Central Bank credits, increasing interest rates, reducing government
deficits, curbing monetary expansion, showing greater hospitality to foreign investment, and dismantling of price
controls.” Şen, 1998: 82.

242
In Turkey, during the 1960s and 1970s, the ISI model had provided the conditions necessary for the accumulation of
capital in the hands of a small number of merchants in small towns. With generous incentives from the state, by the
1970s, small number of family owned big businesses emerged. These were generally operating in the industrial sector
and oriented towards domestic markets. Jang, 2006: 105.

243
Önder explains that this crisis manifested itself as balance of payment difficulties, high inflation and unemployment
rates, and a decline in capacity utilization. Önder, 1998: 45.

244
Manisalı, 2003 cited in Şenalp, 2007: 20.

245
Terrorism-related incidents included “bank robberies, assassinations, street skirmishes between rival groups, and
declaring liberated areas that defied government’s authority” and “bombings and armed assault.” There were even
“liberated zones” that defied governments’ authority. The police force itself was divided into the same two factions.
See Keleş et.al. 1982.

108

some 4,500 people were killed. It was in response to this political violence that the armed
forces carried out the coup in September 1980.

a. The 1980 Military Coup

The “National Security Council” (NSC), headed by General Chief of Staff Kenan Evren
and composed of members of the armed forces, declared its commitment to the “January
24
th
decisions,” and during its rule political activities were harshly suppressed. Many
books, newspapers, journals, artistic works, were banned.
246
Almost all professional
associations and foundations were suspended. Academics suspected of having left-wing
sympathies were fired or imprisoned.
247
Trade unions and all political parties were also
banned. Assets of the biggest labor unions were confiscated.
248
Members of political
parties were prohibited from engaging in politics. Thousands of people were arrested,
many died under torture.
249

The 1980 coup makers and their allies then proceeded to transform the political structure
and hegemonic discourses in Turkey. The NSC adopted a “Turkish-Islam Synthesis”

246
Jenkins, 2008: 141.

247
Jenkins, 2008: 144.

248
Adaman, Buğra and Đ nsel, 2008.

249
According to Yavuz, 667 associations and foundations were banned. Fifty thousand people were arrested. 517
people were sentenced to death and 49 of the death sentences were carried out. He also mentions that some 30,000
people were fired for their political views. Yavuz, 2003: 69.

109

(TIS) as the new state ideology, which was based on an interweaving of right-wing
nationalism and religious conservatism.
250
The aim was to produce a new national
identity that would promote unity and social cohesion as well as legitimacy for the
regime. Alongside the NSC, an organization called the “Intellectuals’ Hearth” (Aydınlar
Ocağı)
251
composed of right-wing nationalist intellectuals was very effective in
formulating the TIS discourse and played an important role in preparing a new
constitution.
252
Eligür mentions that “in the post 1980 coup era, the primary institutions
of Turkish political and cultural life were restructured along the lines advocated by the
Hearth.”
253

Since the 1950s, anti-communism had been a common cause for nationalists and
Islamists, whose identities were threatened by class identities promoted by
communism.
254
The Hearth had close ties with “Islamist Society to Disseminate (Islamic)
Knowledge” (Đ lim Yayma Cemiyeti), which was an umbrella organization comprising
various Islamic actors, including prominent members of the Erenköy community. The
Hearth’s discourse was adopted by the military regime so that nationalist discourse in the

250
Jenkins, 2008: 144-145.

251
For a discussion of the evolution and characteristics of the “Intellectuals’ Hearth”, see Eligür, 2010: 96-102. Yavuz
explains that the Hearth was founded in 1970 “to protect the Turkish soul from foreign cultures.” Yavuz,, 2003: 71.
Eligur, citing Güvenç, mentions that “the military cadres who initiated the 1980 coup adopted, implemented and
defended the Hearth’s policy in its entirety.” Eligür, 2010: 101, Güvenç, 1993: 47.

252
Eligür, 2010: 101. Yavuz mentions that two Hearth members participated in the committee that drafted the new
constitution. Yavuz, 2003: 71.

253
Eligür, 2010: 102.

254
The discursive roots of the far right nationalist discourse in Turkey go back to 19th century pan-Turkic movement,
which envisioned a unity of ethnic Turks in Anatolia (i.e. the mainland Turkey) and Central Asia. Bora, 2003: 445.

110

1980s came to portray Islam as the primary element in Turkish national identity.
255
That
said, it is important to stress that the military did not seek to overthrow the secular
system. On the contrary, it aimed to co-opt the Islamic discourses in a controlled way in
order to use them against leftist discourses.

In 1983 the State Planning Organization published a “National Culture Report” prepared
in collaboration with the Intellectuals’ Hearth.
256
The report explained the Turkish-Islam
synthesis, which was based on three institutions; the military, the mosque and the family.
National culture had been reconstructed by Kemalists in reference to Turkish culture
before Islam.
257
National culture was now reconstructed so that Sunni Islam became an
element of state ideology for the first time in the Republican era. The aim of the Turkish-
Islam synthesis was to prevent the recurrence of the social polarization and violence of
the late 1970s. Unity, danger of anarchy and “division” of the country and of the state
were frequently stressed. The two main elements of the discourse of national unity were
national culture and a strong and stable state. Class identities would be replaced through
the promotion of “national culture.” The state was constructed as a strong and stable actor
which guaranteed the endurance of the national culture and, therefore, social unity.

In June 1981 the military administration enacted a law requiring the formation of an
assembly for drafting a new constitution. The new constitution, which was approved by

255
Bora, 2003: 449.
256
Jenkins, 2008: 142-143.

257
Ibid.
111

referendum with 91.37% of the votes and which took effect in November 1982, prepared
the institutional structure for the dissemination of the new discourse of Turkish-Islam
synthesis. In comparison to the 1961 Constitution, the new constitution increased both the
power of state in the state-citizen relationship and the power of the executive in relation
to legislative and judicial institutions. In terms of political participation and pluralism, the
1982 Constitution is more restrictive than the 1961 Constitution.
258
In the new
constitution, notions of public order, public security and national security are
emphasized. These notions are cited as reasons for restrictions on freedom of press and
freedom of expression.
259
In addition, the Law on Labor Unions
260
and on Collective
Bargaining, Strikes and Lockout
261
severely restricted the ability to strike and the
collective bargaining rights of labor unions.
262
The Constitution also opened the way for
establishment of two new institutions, the Council of Higher Education
263
(YÖK) and the

258
As of March 15, 2010 Turkish Constitutions are listed on “Constitutions”
http://www.anayasalar.com/site/1982anayasasi.asp.

259
1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 26 (Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought),
Article 28 (Freedom of the Press) and Article 31 (Right to Use Media Other Than the Press Owned by Public
Corporations). As of March 15 2012, the 1982 Constitution can be accessed at
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKE
Y.pdf

260
Law on Labor Unions [Sendikalar Yasası] of 1983, Law n. 2821 (May 5, 1983), 17
th
Turkish Grand National
Assembly, Official Gazette 18040 (May 7, 1983).

261
Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout [Toplu Đş Sözleşmesi, Grev ve Lokavt Yasası] of 1983, Law n.
2822 (May 5, 1983), 17
th
Turkish Grand National Assembly, Official Gazette 18040 (May 7, 1983).

262
Law on Labor Unions, Law n. 2821 (05.05.1983) and Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lock-out, Law n.
2822 (05.05.1983). Adaman, Buğra and Đ nsel mention that strikes over issues other than wages were forbidden and
permitted strikes could be postponed for reasons of “national security,” very loosely defined to include national
economic interest in, for example, the maintenance of export revenues. For other changes in the 1982 Constitution that
restricted labor union activities see Adaman, Buğra and Đ nsel, 2008.

263
Law on Higher Education [Yüksek Öğretim Yasası] of 1981, Law n. 2547 (November 4, 1981), National Security
Council, Consultative Assembly, Official Gazette 17506 (November 6, 1981).

112

Radio and Television Supreme Council
264
(RTÜK). The former abolished the
autonomous status of universities,
265
while the latter supervised, administered and
evaluated all radio and television broadcasts. Jenkins notes that the higher echelons of
both institutions included many members of the Intellectuals Hearth,
266
enabling them to
influence the appointment of university rectors and the discourse employed in the mass
media.

In order to disseminate the TIS discourse the military administration adopted various
strategies. The coup leaders changed street, park and public square names that were
incompatible with “our national unity.”
267
The leader of the coup, Kenan Evren made
reference to Islam and even quoted from the Qur’an in his speeches.
268
After the coup,
Islamic education, which meant the teaching of Sunni Islam, which was followed by the
majority of population,
269
became compulsory in elementary schools.
270
The military

264
Law on Turkish Radio and Television [Türkiye Radyo Ve Televizyon Kanunu], Law n. 2954 (November 11, 1983),
17
th
Turkish Grand National Assembly, Official Gazette 18221 (November 14, 1983). Radio Television High Council
was renamed as Radio Television Supreme Council in 1994.

265
Yavuz, 2002: 69.

266
Jenkins, 2008: 144.

267
Nazlı Ilıcak and Ahmet Kekeç, “Bir Dönemin Hikayesi Generallerin Gecesi,” Yeni Şafak, September 11, 2000.

268
Jenkins, 2008: 144.

269
There is a minority population in Turkey who follow a version of Shi’ism called “Alevilik.” Alevis continue to
protest against the forced education of their children in Sunni doctrine, demanding their right to teach their own beliefs
to their children. Vercihan Ziflioğlu “Cemevi Could Get Official Recognition after Landmark Istanbul Visit,” Hürriyet
Daily News, May 28, 2012.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=tc-tarihinde-ilk-kez-diyanet-isleri-baskani-cemevini-ziyaret-etti-2011-05-
27

270
Islamic education was already compulsory in high schools.

113

administration also opened new Qur’an courses that taught how to read the Qur’an.
Islamic communities were and still are very active in funding and providing
instructors.
271
In the text books used in elementary schools and high schools, the word
“milli” is used instead of the word “ulus.” Both words mean nation; however, the former
has Islamic connotations while the latter is not associated with a moral value system.
272

Discourse theory suggests that in the process of discourse articulation, meanings are
detached from their symbols and the latter acquire new meanings. After the coup one of
the most significant shifts in terms of shaping the dominant discourses in Turkey was the
re-articulation or reformulation of Ataturk’s ideas, referred to as “Atatürkism” or
“Kemalism.” Bora explains that the left-wing Kemalist discourse of the 1960s and 1970s
represents the humanistic-universalist branch of Turkish nationalism, which is based on
citizenship and territoriality.
273
Elements of the old ideologies such as Kemalism or
Atatürk nationalism were re-produced after 1980 through the “lenses” of the
authoritarian, statist and conservative discourse of the coup leaders. In this process, leftist
interpretations of Atatürkism were replaced with more nationalistic ones.

271
For changes in the state policies towards Qur’an courses, see Jenkins, 2008: 145, See Yavuz, 2006: 151-152 for
changes in the state policies towards Qur’an courses.

272
The word “milli” is a legacy of the Ottoman millet system, which divided the population according to religion into
groups called millet. Çağaptay 2006: 161-164. In time, the latter acquired the meaning of nation in time, but a
connection between nation and religion is retained in this word.

273
Bora, 2003.

114

b. The Özal Period (1983-1989)

In November 1983, general elections were held and the military transferred rule to the
Motherland Party (henceforth ANAP), which took 45% of the votes. ANAP was led by
Turgut Özal, the vice-prime minister in charge of economic affairs under the technocratic
government during the NSC’s rule.
274
A center-right party that brought together
economic liberalism, nationalism and Islamism, it ruled for two terms, from 1983 to
1989. During that time, Özal upheld TIS discourse as the official state ideology and
continued to promote political Islam through the mosque building program and
established more Đ mam-hatip schools.
275
Under ANAP the economic system was slowly
restructured in accordance with neoliberal principles. Legal and economic reforms were
implemented to establish an export-oriented economy. Funds previously spent for the
public sector in general and social services were channeled to exporters in the form of
incentives such as tax breaks, tax rebates and low interest credits.
276
The regulations on
imports such as tariffs, controls, substitutions were dismantled,
277
the financial sector was
liberalized, and the suspension of the rights of collective labor negotiations led to real
wage losses.

274
Özal was also the undersecretary to the prime minister under the AP government. In June 1982 he resigned from this
post and in May 1983 founded the Motherland Party (ANAP).

275
Đ mam-Hatip schools train mosque preachers. Their curriculum puts emphasis on Islamic studies.

276
Emrence, 2008: 57, Önder, 1998: 53

277
In the first half of the 1980s, there were five export promoting policies of the Turkish government. First, the Turkish
currency was devaluated. Second, tax rebate rates, which determined the refund of indirect taxes paid during
production, were increased. Third, cash premiums were paid to select industries. Fourth, export credits, in existence
since 1968, were subsidized. Fifth, tax exemptions were provided to promote exports. Ersel, 1991: 4-5

115

c. Rise of the Islamic Capital under Özal Government

Özal’s government was also instrumental in empowering Islamic capital in Turkey.
Islamic capital can be broadly defined as the capital owned by businessmen committed to
Islamic beliefs.
278
It prepared the legal basis for the entry of “no-interest finance
279
” and
“no-interest Banking” into the Turkish economic system under the category of “Special
Financial Institutions” (SFI) by a government decree in 1983.
280
The aim was to motivate
devout Muslims who kept their money out of banks because of the no-interest principle in
Islam, to invest in the shares of SFIs. The government provided incentives to attract
Islamic capital such as exemption from the Turkish Bankruptcy Law.
281
By the mid-
1990s SFIs established partnerships with Islamist businessmen in Turkey who were able
to accumulate capital generally through their ties to Islamic communities
282
or with the
help of savings collected from the conservative Turkish guest workers in Europe.
283

Özal’s reforms opened the way for the inflow of Arab financial capital into Turkish
markets as well. His brother, Korkut Özal, and a prominent adherent of Erenköy

278
Jang, 2006: 98.

279
Islamic capital does not charge interest, because doing so is prohibited in Islam.

280
Decree Law on Special Financial Institutions [Özel Finans Kurumları] of 1983, Decree Law n. 83/7506 (December
16, 1983), 45
th
Government, Official Gazette 18256 (December 19, 1983). Doğan, 2006: 71.

281
For other incentives see Bulut, 1997.

282
Jang, 2006: 101. Starting from 1982 Korkut Özal and Eymen Topbaş, the son of the Erenköy community’s leader
founded a SFI, Al Baraka-Turk. Bulut, 1997: 289.

283
Jang, 2006: 101.

116

community Eymen Topbaş established a joint-stock company named Al-Baraka Turk in
1983.
284
Bulut argues that as a result of these partnerships with Arab capital, some of the
Islamic businesses grew into large companies which came to constitute an important part
of Islamic capital in Turkey.

Another segment of Islamic capital in Turkey is the capital owned by provincial
merchants committed to Islamic beliefs.
285
State protection of big businesses during the
ISI policy years had led provincial merchants to establish export-oriented businesses. For
this reason, the primary beneficiaries of the export-oriented economy were the small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) engaged in importing and exporting. Islamic small
businesses were among the latter group. These businesses operated in labor-intensive
manufacturing and service sectors. They benefited from the export subsidies Özal
government provided as well as from the export boom in Turkey between 1984 and
1988.
286

In the Özal era, Islamic communities also benefited from changes in the law on
foundations. Islamic communities in Turkey do not have a legal status, but adherents of

284
Korkut Özal was a member of the Đ skenderpaşa Islamic community. Bulut, 1997: 271-284.

285
Religiously conservative merchants, artisans and craftsmen in small towns who were committed to Islamic beliefs
often felt threatened by the huge industrialization policy, and accumulated small amounts of capital engaged in foreign
trade. These provincial ‘Anatolian’ businesses clustered in the labor-intensive sector with low skill and low technical
sophistication were frustrated by the state’s exclusive investment in the bigger enterprises of larger cities during the ISI
years. Jang, 2006: 98-101.

286
Aside from government incentives for exports, the accumulation of petro-dollars in the Gulf area and resulting labor
immigration from Turkey to Gulf countries played a role in the export boom.

117

the communities establish foundations and associations that do have legal status.
287

Foundations enable sharing assets and earnings, and the use of these earnings for a
specific purpose that serves public benefit. They are self-governed and supervised
directly by the Prime Ministry.
288
For this reason, foundations provide a feasible
institutional framework for the activities of Islamic communities. Among the latter, those
that have foundations financially benefited from a series of changes in laws on
foundations implemented by the Özal government. One of the changes in the laws on
foundations, accepted in March 1982, provided tax exemptions.
289
Another government
decree enabled foundations to invest their assets for profit.
290
A law passed in 1986
allowed the establishment of “Foundations for Social Assistance and Solidarity,” in every
province and district. These institutions aimed to provide social assistance for the citizens
who could not benefit from the social security institutions of the state. These foundations
had certain tax exemptions and benefited from public funds. They distributed the goods
they bought at market prices to low-income citizens.
291

287
See Doğan, 2009; Bulut 1997.

288
Administration of foundations is more autonomous relative to associations. Directorate General of Foundations is
directly under Prime Ministry, while associations are supervised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. “Turkish Republic
Prime Ministry Directorate General of Foundations” http://www.vgm.gov.tr/index.aspx?Dil=EN, accessed February 12,
2012.

289
Regulation on Foundations established in accordance with Turkish Civil Code [Türk edeni Kanunu Hükümlerine
Göre Kurulan Vakıflar Hakkinda Tüzük], Article 37 changed on 03.19.1982.

290
Decree Law on the Organization and Tasks of Directorate General of Foundations” (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğünün
Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname) of 1984, Decree n. 227 (June 8, 1984), 45
th

Government, Official Gazette 18435 (April 18, 1984).

291
These foundations were established under the General Directorate of Foundations in accordance with the Law on
Encouragement of Social Assistance and Solidarity” [Sosyal Dayanışma ve Yardımlaşmayı Teşvik Kanunu], Law n.
3294 (May 29, 1986), 17
th
Turkish Grand National Assembly, Official Gazette 19134 (June 14, 1986). The same law
also established a fund for promoting social assistance and social solidarity.

118

Doğan, Yavuz and Bulut agree that Islamic communities have had a central position in
the development of Islamic capital.
292
Kuran argues that a network of economic
relationships link Islamic enterprises, which form a subeconomy within the broader
economy of the country in which they are located.
293
Islamic enterprises, foundations,
associations, businesses, banks, media companies and consumers form such a
subeconomy in Turkey. Özal’s economic and social policies discussed above provided
the ground for a flourishing Islamic sub-economy. Islamic communities supplied cheap
capital and land for Islamic businesses through the foundations they established and
through their wealthy adherents. The could provide cheap capital partly because of the
low cost of labor, as community followers, mostly women, volunteer to work for less or
do not ask for social security since it is already provided by the community. Islamic
businesses take their money to Islamic banks. Some Islamic businesses produce goods
specifically targeted for those who have an Islamic life-style such as women’s Islamic
clothing and the touristic facilities that obey the Islamic rules.
294
Islamic communities
and media channels owned by Islamic businesses play a central role in the re-production
and dissemination of this life-style, which also encourages participating in voluntary
work. As a result, those who lead an Islamic life-style guarantee a certain market share
for some Islamic businesses. According to Kuran, Islamic sub-economy provides

292
Doğan, 2009: 284-285.
293
Kuran, 1995: 167-169

294
Ibid.
119

reliability and predictability, and it reduces transaction costs.
295
Although various Islamic
actors associated with different Islamic communities and tarikats were at times in
competition with each other,
296
the sub-economy in the 1980s led them in the 1990s and
2000s to defend their common interests by establishing Islamic business associations,
pro-Islamic political parties and Islamic labor unions. Next section will discuss the role of
some of these Islamic actors in the establishment of a neoliberal hegemonic discourse in
the early 2000s.

Emergence of an Islamic sub-economy is a result of Özal’s economic policies that
benefited Islamic capital and an efficient system to face the challenges of a volatile
economic system. Importance of establishing the principles of leading an Islamic life-
style in sustaining an Islamic sub-economy shows that, as Hall argued, the shift in the
economic structure is not independent from the reproduction of culture. Similarly,
reproduction of identities is necessary for generating legitimacy for the new ideology.
During the Özal period, Islamic discourses that emphasized social equality were
replacing the leftist equality discourses which were effectively silenced during the 1980s.
Large immigrant communities in the big cities identified themselves not as part of a
social class but as the representatives of a religiously conservative life-style. The
structural changes were accompanied by Özal’s discourse that emphasized the need for

295
Kuran, 2004: 51-52 Kuran mentions that subeconomy enables Islamic enterprises to “reduce their costs of
negotiating, drafting, monitoring and enforcing agreements.” Kuran 1995: 167.

296
For the strifes among Islamic communities and businesses associated with them, as well as between the Islamic RP
(Welfare Party) and the rest of the Islamic actors see Bulut 1997, Çalışlar, O. and Çelik, T., 2000.
120

political stability for economic success. His discourse was based on emphasizing his
expertise in economics to garner support for his party’s rule. He underlined that there was
no alternative political party to the ANAP because only the latter’s members were
economic experts and “knew how to get things done.”
297
In this way, he shifted the
debate away from questioning the prevalent economic ideology itself.

4.3.2. 1989 - 1999: “The Lost Decade” for Neo-Liberalization

Frequent economic crises and political turmoil in the 1990s prevented implementation of
reforms for further neo-liberalization. For this reason this period is referred to as “the lost
decade” by Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSĐ AD).
298
Although the
financial liberalization of capital markets was completed in 1989, the economic system
had not been completely re-structured along neo-liberal lines. Inflation rates were still
very high and privatizations had been largely unsuccessful. Opening domestic markets to
international competition and promoting Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI) was
partly sustained through an expanding informal economy that kept labor costs low.
299

297
Tafolar, 2008: 141-171.

298
Gürkan and Beriş, 2004: 2.

299
The informal economy is characterized by non-organized, low wage and uninsured labor with no contract, increasing
part-time and home-based labor. The size of the informal economy, with current Turkish Lira values, grew from
TL154,420,000,000 in 1979 to TL12,025,227,220,000 in 1989 Karagöz and Erkuş, 2009: 137.

121

The economic growth of the early 1980s could not be sustained, partly because WTO and
EU Customs Union agreements
300
made it difficult for the government to further increase
export subsidies. As a result, low wages became even more important for international
competitiveness and businesses began to turn to the informal workforce. The resulting
increase in socio-economic inequalities provoked mass discontent. Adaman et. al. argue
that there was a revival of union activity, and the early 1990s witnessed an important
increase in strike activity.
301
Civil servants re-established trade unions by using a
loophole in the Constitution that did not specifically ban public sector employees from
forming unions.
302
Big business owners were also unhappy with economic policy.
Kalaycıoğlu explains that until the 1990s, TÜSĐ AD and The Union of Chambers and
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), which represented big businesses and
commercial capital, influenced the decision-making process by establishing close ties
with the state based on personal favors.
303
In 1989 ANAP lost the general elections.
Subsequent coalition governments promised to make reforms and improve social welfare,

300
Turkey became an original Member of WTO on 26 March 1995 and the European Union - Turkey Customs Union
agreement took effect on December 31, 1995. “Trade Policy Reviews: First Press Release, Secretariat and Government
Summaries, Turkey: October 1998 ” World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp83_e.htm
(accessed February 10, 2012)

301
Adaman et.a. 2008: 7. Toprak argues that the “Turkish Criminal Code, under which the trade unions were closed
down and banned, was changed and DĐ SK, the second largest trade union confederation, was reinstated after a decade.”
Toprak, 1996: 97.

302
Toprak 1996: 97. Alemdar mentions that, “In 1992, some unions of public sector employees came together and
founded the Turkish Public Employees’ Unions Confederation (KAMU-SEN) and in 1995, the second confederation of
public sector employees unions, Public Laborers’ Unions Confederation (KESK), was founded.” Alemdar, 2009.

303
Buğra, 2002: 188.

122

but due to fiscal constraints and a currency crisis in 1994
304
were unable to keep these
promises. The loss of credibility of the center-right parties let to an increase of votes for
the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (henceforth RP) which, with its ‘Just Order’ discourse,
305

promised to continue the EOS but with more protection from international markets. The
RP’s popularity did not increase only because of its economic policy proposals. Its
Islamic discourse and networks also appealed to the masses immigrating to the cities in
the absence of an institution that could mobilize them along social class lines.
306

The rise of the pro-Islamic RP coincided with growth of Islamic businesses and
formation of associations among them. In 1990, Islamic businesses formed an
association, Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSĐ AD). It is
not associated with any particular Islamic community, but some of its members have
connections to Islamic communities, including the Erenköy community. In 1993, Islamic
businesses associated with the Gülen community formed their own association, Business
Life Solidarity Foundation (ĐŞ HAD). In 1996, adherents of the Gülen community
established Asya Finance, a participation bank with “no interest” policy in accordance
with Islamic principles.
307
Despite the financial crisis of 1994,
308
Islamic businesses were

304
In 1994 currency crisis the Turkish economy shrank by 6%. The Central Bank lost half of its reserves. Interest rates
rose and inflation reached triple digit levels. Celasun, 1998: 2.

305
For a discussion of the “Just order” discourse see Öniş, 1997; Yıldız, 2003.

306
Önder, 1998: 70.

307
Bulut, 1997. Asya Finance Incorporated Company (Asya Finans Kurumu Anonim Şirketi ) was established on
October 24
th
, 1996. On December 20
th
, 2005 its name changed to Asya Participation Bank Incorporated (Asya Katılım

123

able to grow, partly with the help of business contracts they secured from municipalities
under the pro-Islamic RP’s control, and partly with the help of the connections they had
established with Islamic capital in the Middle East. During the 1990s, MÜSĐ AD
remained content with EOS but demanded higher levels of export subsidies from the state
and some level of protection from open financial markets.
309
The empowerment of
Islamic businesses and the electoral success of pro-Islamic RP in the 1994 municipal and
1995 general elections alarmed the secular establishment.
310
The military’s 1997
intervention against the RP was one of the important reasons behind the emergence of a
new discourse among some of the Islamic actors.

a. The February 28 Process

The National Security Council (NSC) secretariat general was tasked and controlled by the
Turkish General Staff, and hence was an institution whose recommendations had to be
given listened to by the government. In practice this meant that its recommendations were
not challenged. By 1997, the military saw that its “controlled” promotion of Islam
through the TIS discourse had gotten out of control, and that political Islam had become a

Bankası Anonim Şirketi). The bank has a “multi-partnered structure based on domestic capital.” Its main objective “is
to spread interest-free finance system to larger masses.” Bank Asya, accessed February 10, 2012.

308
Celasun, 1998: 2.

309
Büyükdeniz, 1995: 68. Doğan, 2006: 61-67.

310
In December 24, 1995 general elections, the Welfare Party received the highest percentage of votes with 21,38%
Welfare Party up from 16.88% (fourth highest percentage) in the 1991 general elections. In the 1994 municipal
elections it received 19.14 % of the vote. The party won municipalities in Istanbul and Ankara, the two biggest cities in
Turkey.
124

serious threat to secularism. During the NSC meeting on February 28, 1997, the Turkish
General Staff presented an eighteen-point program to the coalition government, run by
the Islamic RP’s leader and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The program listed
measures to be taken against Islamic fundamentalism, such as shutting down Quran
courses, extending compulsory education from five to eight years, and closing middle-
school sections of Đ mam-Hatip Schools. Islamic businesses were identified as an
important threat to the secular regime. Yankaya mentions that “The NSC published a list
of MÜSĐ AD member companies who were accused of financing Islamist reactionary
movement. The larger public was recommended to avoid all trading with them.”
311
Faced
with the military's pressure, Erbakan resigned on June 18, 1997. The coalition
government fell twelve days later. The RP was then shut down by the Constitutional
Court in 1998 and Erbakan was banned from participating in politics for five years.
312

The “February 28th process,” refers to the implementation of NSC recommendations by
the subsequent governments. The process led to a political restructuring by making it
clear that the secular establishment would continue to obstruct political activities of The
RP. The RP was eliminated from the political scene. Its successor, the Virtue Party, (FP)
was also banned by the Constitutional Court in 2001. FP’s statist, anti-Western discourse
and its problems with the key institutions of the regime such as military and the
Constitutional Court led MÜSĐ AD and Islamic labor union HAK-ĐŞ , to see the risks of

311
Yankaya, 2009. Also see Uzgel, 2009: 18.

312
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997.
125

their links with the party. As a result, they adopted a discourse more harmonious with the
secular establishment.
313
Through the mass media channels owned by the Islamic
businesses, Islamic intellectuals provided the discursive framework and started to “call
for an accommodationist rather than a confrontational approach.”
314
Within the FP, a
group referred as “reformists” wanted to reformulate the party’s discourse to make it
more acceptable to and harmonious with the secular establishment.
315
In this way, they
fueled the ongoing discussions of reform within the FP. Tensions between traditionalist
and reformists supported by MÜSĐ AD within the FP increased and in August 2001
reformists in the FP established the center-right Justice and Development Party (AKP).

In the 1990s tensions between small and big business owners, secularists and political
Islamists, governments and labor unions
316
were reproduced by the organic and
traditional intellectuals in academia as well as in mass media channels. Identity discourse
with its focus on suppressed identities and their rights to be politically represented
dominated the works of these intellectuals. In the context of the infiltration of neoliberal

313
Uzgel, 2009: 18; Şenalp, 2007: 102. “Although MÜSIAD members experienced substantial hardship, the
association deepened its market oriented ideology. For an analysis of the discourse of Islamic businesses since the late
1990s see Jang, 2006; Yankaya, 2009; Alemdar, 2009.

314
Yaşar, 2008: 482. Yaşar mentions that “just before the November 2002 elections, a group of intellectuals led by Ali
Bulac began publishing a new magazine “Knowledge and Thought” (Bilgi ve Düşünce) that lent intellectual support to
the AKP program.”

315
Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 323. Yaşar argues that this is the result of a process called ‘political learning’, whereby
interpretation of experience and evaluation of structure lead the political actor to develop new beliefs, skills and
procedures. She also notes that in the Middle East, it is not unusual for political Islamists to display pragmatic
orientations and to moderate their positions according to conjectural and structural changes. Yaşar, 2008: 478-480.

316
Small business owners supported some level of protection while big businesses were opposed to it. Labor unions
and feminist organizations that were slowly recovering from the oppression they had endured during 1980s also started
to contest economic policies.
126

discourse into the political discourse and the suppression of class identities after the
1980s, the political discussions among intellectuals shifted away from labor and workers’
democratic rights to freedom of religion and ethnic identities. Liberal intellectuals
reproduced the tensions in society with analyses based on dichotomies of seculars
(laique) versus democrats, elites versus people (folk/society); Kemalist versus liberal. As
a result of neglecting overlapping identities that cross cut these identities,
democratization started to be defined as empowerment of the weaker identity (i.e.
society) vis-à-vis the powerful one (elites). The AKP was established in an environment
where this definition of democratization prevailed.

4.3.3. 1999 - 2011: Institutionalization of Neoliberalism: From Dominance to
Hegemony

a. The Historic Bloc

In 1999 European Union declared Turkey as a member candidate. In the same year,
Turkey and IMF signed a standby agreement and World Bank started to finance the
structural adjustment program in Turkey formulated by the IMF. These two
developments are considered as the beginning of institutionalization of neo-liberalism.
317

Privatization and international arbitration also entered into the constitution in 1999,

317
Turkey and the IMF had signed a Staff Monitoring Program in 1998 to enable closer supervision and control of the
Turkish economy by the IMF staff. An IMF structural adjustment program (SAP) was adopted in 1999.

127

putting an end to Constitutional Court decisions that obstructed privatization.
318
The year
2001 was another crucial turning point in the neoliberalization process. In February 2001,
Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis.
319
Due to the need to obtain IMF funds, the
stand-by agreement between Turkey and the IMF was extended until 2005.

In line with
this agreement, the government started to implement a series of neoliberal economic
reforms.
320
After the AKP came to power in 2002, it continued the commitment to
implement the program that was agreed upon in the 1999 stand-by agreement with the
IMF. In 2005 this agreement was renewed for another three years and expired in 2008.
321

The most recent IMF-Turkey Stand-by agreement expired in 2008.
322

After 2001, owners of SMEs, represented by MÜSĐ AD, and Gülen Community-affiliated
businessmen associations ĐŞ HAD and TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and
Industrialists of Turkey), wanted to establish relations with the big internationalized
capital owners in Turkey represented by the TÜSĐ AD as well as with the international
capital. Despite state’s discrimination against Islamic businesses during the February 28
th

318
Uzgel. et. al., 2009.

319
Yeldan mentions that “During the year 2001, GNP fell by 5.7% in real terms, consumer price inflation soared to
54.9%, and the currency lost 51% of its value against the major foreign monies.” He explains that when the crisis
happened Turkey was following exchange rate based deflation program led by the IMF. Yeldan, 2008.

320
Boratav, 2009: 490

321
During the crisis, Kemal Derviş who worked at the WB, became Minister for Economic Affairs and pioneered the
implementation of neoliberal reforms”, The World Bank, accessed January 23, 2012

322
"Turkey: Financial Position in the Fund as of September 30, 2011", IMF, accessed January 25, 2012

128

process
323
, by 2000 the association had expanded both the market and membership base
and had attained international competitiveness.
324
In a context in which interests of big,
internationalized businesses as well as SMEs started to converge and support for existing
center-right parties had vanished, the AKP formulated a discourse that included elements
of discourses of big and small business owners, Islamists, liberal intellectuals and center-
right parties. These social and economic actors constituted the historic bloc in the
Gramscian sense. In this period, consent for neoliberal reforms was generated for the first
time, without much opposition. In the nine years of the AKP government, with the
advantage of a single party government, the AKP has been able to institutionalize
neoliberalism.

The AKP government provided the institutional means through which big capital
interests have been able to participate in the government’s decision making. One of these
means is The Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment
(YÖĐ KK).
325
YÖĐ KK is composed of economy bureaucrats and businessmen
associations, under the Ministry of Economy and it prepares economic policy advice for
the government, thus circumscribing parliament’s role in economic policy making. In

323
Yankaya ,2009; Uzgel, 2009: 18.

324
Şenalp, 2007: 102. Şenalp also mentions that MÜSĐ AD’s membership number had decreased around 1998.

325
The cabinet decision to found YÖĐ KK was taken on December 11. YÖĐ KK is a secretariat under the General
Directorate of Incentive Implementation and Foreign Investment, a department in the Ministry of Economy. “History of
YOIKK”, The Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment (YÖĐ KK), accessed February 25,
2012.

129

2004 International Investors Association of Turkey (YASED),
326
TÜSĐ AD, Turkey
Exporters’ Assembly (TĐ M) and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of
Turkey (TOBB) established the Investment Advisory Council (IAC). The council also
involves government and World Bank officials. The recommendations of the council
have a priority among the factors that provide input for the advice YOĐ KK provides to
the government and contribute to agenda setting.
327
YASED’s Annual Report on 2003
states that YOĐ KK’s efforts for the improvement of the investment environment started to
produce desired results thanks to the AKP’s determination to adopt a problem solving
approach.
328

A hegemonic bloc does not mean a complete similarity of interests. Although there has
been a high level of cooperation among major business associations
329
and the
government there have also been significant disagreements among these actors.
330

TÜSĐ AD in particular had a fluctuating relationship with the AKP government. Prime

326
In 2006, YASED's title was changed as the International Investors Association of Turkey. “Investment Advisory
Council of Turkey”, The Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment (YÖĐ KK), accessed
February 25, 2012.

327
“Press Announcement by the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Undersecreteriat of Treasury, June 4, 2008”
accessed December 20, 2011.

328
YASED Annual Report 2003: 6-7.

329
In 2001 ISO (Istanbul Chamber of Industry) TÜSĐ AD and YASED formed an “economic reforms working group. In
2004 IKV joined this group (TÜSĐ AD report) In 2003, TÜSĐ AD and YASED published a consensus report on draft
law. “ISO-TÜSĐ AD-YASED Common Opinion on the Law on Public Bids for Contract,” TÜSĐ AD, July 30, 2003,
accessed February 20, 2012. Also see YASED Annual Reports, YASED, accessed on February 10, 2012.

330
For the disagreements regarding negotiations between Turkey and IMF for a stand-by agreement in 2010 see
“Babacan, TÜSĐ AD ve YASED'i almadı” [Babacan did not accept TÜSĐ AD and YASED], Star, February 3, 2010;
“IMF, Bu Ülkenin Kaderi Değil” [IMF is not the Destiny of This Country], Zaman, October 2, 2009. On the
competition between TUSKON and DEIK see “TUSKON Rekabeti DEĐ K'e Yaramış” [Competition with TUSKON
Good for DEIK], Yeni Şafak, December 30, 2010.

130

Minister Erdoğan indicated although TUSIAD and his government are in agreement
regarding economic policies, they have disagreements on other political issues.
331
Thus,
similarity in economic interest was not enough for a solid relationship between TUSIAD,
which identifies itself as secular and the religiously conservative AKP. There have also
been disagreements among Islamic civil society actors, especially between Islamic labor
unions and Islamic business associations.
332
Finally, non-Islamic labor unions and other
civil society institutions opposed the AKP’s ideology. According to Gramsci, the
hegemonic state’s relationship with civil society institutions involves both coercion and
consent. As Hall argues, hegemony does not mean complete unity. Hegemony is a
process of unification, never completely achieved.

The AKP employed a neoliberal growth strategy based on cheap foreign currency and
foreign debt. This strategy led to an increased current account deficit financed by short
term capital flows.
333
In this economic structure, economic growth does not result from
production. Instead, it results from financial markets, which completely govern Turkey’s
monetary policy.
334
The AKP government rearranged the labor market by enacting legal

331
“Change in the Capital Ownership is a Source of Assurance for us” [Sermayenin El Değiştirmesi Bizim Đ çin Önemli
Bir Güven Kaynağı], Radikal, September 10, 2012, accessed February 10, 2012.

332
Islamic labor union Hak-Đş , expressed its disappointment with MÜSĐ AD’s anti-labor stance. Özdemir, 2010: 43-46.

333
Monetary policies that target a pre-set inflation rate (i.e. Inflation Targeting Regime) set specific short-term interest
rates to reach the inflation targets. High short term interest rates induce high levels of short term capital flows. After
AKP came to power, in the relative abundance of foreign exchange due to high interest rates, the Turkish lira was
overvalued. Overvaluation in turn led to an import boom. Resulting current account deficit is financed with short term
capital flows. Yeldan: 2008.

334
See Yeldan, 2008; Keyder and Buğra, 2006;

131

regulations, which led to pressure on wages and deterioration in working conditions.
335

Agricultural subsidies have been significantly reduced. The resulting rise in immigration
into the cities pushed wages down even further.
336
The AKP also undertook massive
privatizations with the aim of creating revenue for the government and providing
education and health services, whose quality vary depending on the household income.
337

The AKP was able to legitimize the policy preferences of the historic bloc through its
control over media channels.
338
During the AKP’s rule, the leverage of the government
over businesses that own media companies has increased significantly. A great deal of
pressure has been brought to bear on media complexes that have been against the
government.
339
Organic and traditional intellectuals who support AKP discourses made
their voices heard through the “capillary intellectual meatuses” of media companies such
as television, newspapers and journals. Through these channels, they produced discourses
that enable people positively to associate the AKP’s neoliberal policies with economic
problems in their everyday life.
340

335
For the AKP labor policies see Pennings and Süral, 2005; Çelik, 2012.

336
For a discussion of AKP’s agriculture policies in the process of neo-liberalization see Turkish Engineers and
Architects Union of Chambers (TMOBB), Tarım Raporu (Agriculture Report), 2005: 23-26.

337
Đ nal, 2009.

338
Adaklı: 2009.

339
Ibid.

340
Ibid.

132

b. Empowerment of Islamic Businesses

The institutionalization of neoliberal reforms opened up new possibilities for Islamic
businesses to increase their profits and enter international markets. Doğan explains that
Islamic SMEs’ pace of development increased due to the subsidies and privileges
provided in the Organized Industrial Zones (OIZ) in the beginning of 2000s.
341
In
addition, municipalities in the big cities that were controlled by the AKP provided
opportunities for contracts to Islamic business owners. Increased authority given to the
local administrations after 2001
342
enabled Islamic capital to benefit from relations with
municipalities led by AKP mayors. Islamic businesses also benefited from the
privatization of the health and education sectors.

Towards the end of 2000s both MÜSĐ AD and TUSKON increased their power
significantly relative to TÜSĐ AD and other non-Islamic business associations.
343

TÜSĐ AD’s annual report states that “After the 2007 general elections when the AKP
acquired 47% of the votes, the AKP increased its pressure and control over big
businesses, especially big media owners, by using carrots such as privatizations and

341
Doğan 2009. According to the Law on OIZ enacted in April 12, 2000 OIZ's are "places for the manufacture of goods
and provision of services, established, and operated with the aim of enabling manufacturing industries to locate and
develop according to a pre-defined plan.” In 2004 AKP government passed a law to provide incentives for investors
operating in OIZs that are located in provinces with a GDP of less than $1,500. These incentives include 100%
exemption from income tax calculated on the wages of employed workers, 100% Treasury subsidy for the employer's
share of the workers' insurance premiums and electricity price reductions. TÜSĐ AD Report, 2004: 23-26.

342
See Kaya and Şentürk, 2007.

343
The presence of MÜSĐ AD members in the parliament as well as in the AKP’s local organizations and local
chambers of commerce and industries increased after 2002. Yankaya, 2009.

133

economic incentives and sticks such as taxes.”
344
In 2009, Prime Minister and AKP
leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that “TÜSĐ AD excluded the Anatolian capital.
However, whether they like it or not, capital in Turkey has started to shift hands in a
serious way. This is a very important source of support for us.”
345

c. The AKP’s Welfare Policy and the Role of Islamic Communities

The AKP’s network of social support is financed by funds from privatization, foreign
debt, and funds transferred from Islamic businesses to Islamic communities and to the
charitable foundations with which they are connected. The AKP reinstated the authority
of Council of Ministers to grant tax exemptions to foundations.
346
Muradiye Foundation,
which is associated with the Erenköy community, is among the foundations that received
tax exemption.
347
In 2008, with the Law of Foundations
348
allows the Prime Minister to
nominate five members and directly appoint five members of the Foundations Assembly
(Vakıflar Meclisi) of the Social Assistance and Solidarity General Directorate, the
increasing the power of government in this institution. The law also allows foundations to

344

345
“Change in the Capital Ownership is a Sources of Assurence for Us” [Sermayenin El Değiştirmesi Bizim Đ çin
Önemli Bir Güven Kaynağı], Radikal, September 11, 2010.

346
Law on Making Changes in Certain Laws and According Tax Exemption to the Foundations [Bazı Kanunlarda
Değişiklik Yapılması Ve Vakıflara Vergi Muafiyeti Tanınması Hakkında Kanun], Law n. 4962 (July, 30 2003), 22
th
Turkish Grand National Assembly, Official Gazette 25192 (August 7, 2003).

347
For a list of foundations that received tax exemptions under the AKP governments see
http://www.gib.gov.tr/index.php?id=406.

348
Law on Foundations, Law n. 5737 (February 2, 2008), 23
th
Turkish Grand National Assembly, Official Gazette
26800 (February 27, 2008).

134

receive contributions from international actors, without the supervision of the state. In
this way, foundations associated with Islamic communities are able to access the
financial resources of the community’s international branches.

Social Assistance and Solidarity General Directorate has transferred funds to social
assistance foundations and other institutions through tax reductions, administrative
support and other incentives.
349
The AKP governments’ policies of social support are
consistent with the characteristics of a neoliberal state, which provides donations to make
up for the lack of a social welfare structure. As opposed to the welfare state that regards
the provision of social support as a duty, the neoliberal state primarily relies on the
transfer of public funds to private funds as donations and aids in a more arbitrary and ad
hoc manner.
350
Indeed, under the AKP government, social support projects functioned as
rent-creating mechanisms. For instance, the AKP replaced the Rural Services Directorate-
General with the Village Support Project (KÖYDES) and put administrators close to the
government in the project administration. Through this project, village headmen secured
economic rents from this association by either becoming subcontractors, or they were
given share in subcontracting firms.

349
Ekzen, 2009: 501

350
“The main form of aid to poor families took the form of free food packages and deliveries of coal, given three times
per month by the municipalities, plus free hospital treatment. However, there were complaints that the rules for
eligibility were poorly established, with some families receiving assistance they did not really need while other needy
families were neglected.” Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 107.

135

Labor unions, whose goal is to espouse worker’s rights in the welfare state, lose their
power in a neoliberal state. During the AKP’s rule, labor unions lost their effectiveness
on economic decision-making in two ways. First, the AKP limited the power of labor
unions. In 2004, the government postponed strikes on the grounds that they were inimical
to national interest.
351
Islamic labor unions such as, Hak-Đş and Memur-Sen, which use
Islam as a reference point for justification for unionist organization,
352
have been
criticized for their support for the AKP’s economic policies.

Leaders of the non-Islamic
unions have argued that under the AKP’s rule, workers who are contracted by
municipalities and state employers are coerced into joining Islamic labor unions.
353

Second, neoliberal restructuration led to increasing mobility of capital and a transition
from organized or regulated to “disorganized” capitalism, which in turn led to the
emergence of a more heterogeneous working force.
354
As a result, the ability of a union
to reach and organize different segments of a heterogeneous working class has become a
crucial factor in labor union effectiveness. Islamic communities, which are more flexible

351
Adaman et.al. 2008: 169. Small enterprises employing fewer than thirty members in industry and fewer than fifty
workers in agriculture are still not covered by the new law.

352
As opposed to the other Islamic actors, Hak-Đş does not have open references to Islamism in their publications and
discourses. Özdemir, 2010.

353
“Memur-Sen ve Hak-Đş 'ten AK Parti'ye tam destek geldi” [Full Support from Memur-Sen and Hak-Đş to AKP],
Bugün, April 18, 2007, accessed January 20, 2012. According to the statistics of Labor Ministry, between 2002 and
2008, both Hak-Đş and Memur-Sen increased their membership by 40% and 650% respectively, while membership for
other (non-Islamic) labor unions increased between 9% and 16%, and one of the union’s membership decreased 15%.
Şenol and Metin “AKP Iktidarı Hak-Đş ve Memur-Sen’e yaradı” [The AKP Government Good for Hak-Đş and Memur-
Sen], Milliyet, October 12, 2010, accessed January 20, 2012.

354
This heterogeneity resulted from an increase in the numbers of non-traditional workers such as part-time workers,
at-home workers, temporary workers, informal workers, all of whom are difficult to organize. Most of this informal and
flexible work force is feminized, as women more easily accept working informally and to forgo social security and are
willing to work either temporarily or more flexible hours due their responsibilities at home. The blurring of the
boundaries between the formal and informal work force also increased the significance of subcontracting and
outsourcing practices in the context of neoliberalism. See Beneria 2001.
136

than unions in terms of reaching and organizing different segments of the now more
heterogeneous working class, have become more effective in dealing with the problems
of workers. Islamic communities serve a key function of providing social security,
education, and health services for their members. They also promote familial and
community ties as a cultural asset for the poor to deal with the challenges of economic
instability at a time when the hegemonic neoliberal discourse de-emphasizes and
suppresses the role of labor unions. In this sense, Islamic communities act as “capillary
intellectual meatuses” in the Gramscian sense and construct a new political consciousness
that legitimizes neoliberal policies in the eyes of their followers. Chapters 5 and 6 will
analyze this legitimation process.

4.4. HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE DURING THE AKP YEARS

As Hall argues, hegemonic discourse is not a single and unified ideology. It is composed
of various discourses. Therefore it involves contradictions. Its different layers involve
appeals to different social groups. The AKP’s hegemonic discourse can be divided into
three layers. The first comprises the AKP’s adoption of the global neoliberal discourse.
The second involves the discourses that result from the articulation of neoliberal
discourse with the AKP’s morality discourse. Third, the AKP continues to use elements
of Islamic discourses that appeal to its Islamic support base. The use of Islamic
discourses has not become hegemonic. For this reason this section will focus only on the
first two layers of AKP’s discourse.
137

4.4.1. The AKP’s Use of the Global Neoliberal Discourse

The AKP program emphasizes neoliberal policies such as “fight against inflation,”
“investor confidence,” “creditworthiness” and “transition to a strong economy.”
355

Elements of neoliberal discourse such as “good governance”, “rule transfer” and
“decentralization” are also frequently used in its program. Its discourse on the role of the
state in the economy echoes the neoliberal discourse of the transnational bloc. The party
program mentions that state should intervene to regulate and supervise the economy;
otherwise it should stay out of the economic sphere.
356
A strong government can provide
political stability so that the market operates efficiently.
357
A strong government is also
responsible for providing “public benefit.” The Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik,
stated that “the increase in the number of private schools relative to the state-sponsored
schools is protecting the public benefit.”
358
Here, the Public benefit is viewed as a
reduction in the social services the state provides and relying instead on the private sector
for their provision. An example is a statement by party program also emphasizes the
AKP’s commitment to “equal opportunity.” The notion of “equal opportunity” is another
important element of neoliberal discourse. Instead of providing welfare services to
underprivileged groups, the state pledges to provide a pool of opportunities to

355
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Parti Programı [The AKP Party Programme], 2011, accessed February 1, 2012.

356
“The AKP embraces the principle of keeping the state out of the economic sphere.” Ibid.

357
In the AKP’s party program a ‘strong state’ is presented in reference to “the rich and long established state tradition
of our nation.” Ibid.

358
Đ nal, 2009: 693.

138

individuals, in line with the neoliberal view of ‘success’ as an individual accomplishment
instead of a collective practice.
359

4.4.2. The AKP’s Articulation of Neoliberal Discourses with a Morality Discourse

Articulation involves establishing discursive connections between earlier discourse
patterns and new ideologies in a way that shifts the meaning of earlier symbols. The AKP
has articulated the neo-liberal discourse with the concept of morality by referring to
moral values as guiding principles of political, social, and economic life. As will be
discussed below, these discourses provided legitimation for neoliberal policies. In this
way, the AKP has reproduced global neoliberal discourse within the local context,
making it possible for the masses to internalize it.

The central tenet of the AKP’s discourse is its formulation of its identity as “conservative
democrat.”
360
According to Akdoğan, one of the important ideologues of the AKP,
conservative democracy is a political ideology that aims to articulate Turkey’s well-
established system of values with the universal standards of conservatism. It aims to
protect society from revolutionary transformation projects
361
and emphasizes the fallacy
of destroying traditional social institutions. According to conservative democrats,

359
See Blackmore, 2006.

360
Akdoğan, 2003.

361
Akdoğan, 2003a: 14-15.

139

“nation” is a pluralistic whole that can be kept together through common national
values
362
and the consciousness of citizenship.
363
As a continuation of the TIS discourse
of the 1980s, common national values were designated as the way to sustain unity. When
culture is presented as the unifying factor and religion and family as the primary elements
of culture, a discussion of multiculturalism becomes irrelevant. However, the AKP also
constituted new categories to differentiate people according to their religiosity, as it
makes frequent references to “pious people” and talk about paying attention to their
sensitivities.
364

The AKP defines itself as the force opposing “the ideological state” that “defines, shapes
and imposes choices on its citizens.”
365
Although Akdoğan mentions that conservative
democracy is an ideology, in the same document, he criticizes the “State’s ‘ideological
choice’ to restrict itself to a dogmatic domain.”
366
By “dogmatic domain” he means the
ideology of the secular establishment. Similarly, in its 2011 party program, the AKP
characterizes itself as “democratic, not ideological.” Thus, democracy is depicted as in
opposition to the ideological. Similar to both center-right and pro-Islamic parties in
Turkey, the division between “elites” and “society,” formulated in the 1990s is upheldand

362
“Conservatism today....argues for the necessity to show be on guard against the practices that will shake the family
institution.” Akdoğan, 2003a: 11, 58.

363
Akdoğan, 2003b: 34.

364
The AKP Party Program, 2011. The AKP Election Manifesto, 2011.

365
In contrast, “democracy” is associated with a state that is defined, checked and shaped by its citizens. Yalcin, 2003
b: 34.

366
Ibid.

140

is now constructed as the opposition between “ideological” and “democratic”,
respectively. This opposition helps the AKP to portray itself as neutral, above ideologies,
on the side of the society, providing and securing the rights of everyone. Notions of
impartiality and neutrality are often used in its discourse.

In the AKP’s party program, in line with the new understanding of public service
discussed above, the state is characterized as “benevolent” (“hayirsever” in Turkish,
meaning a pious and benevolent person). Similarly, Türközü argues that in the “Human
Rights Chairmanship” reports there is an understanding that civil society institutions are a
part of the state (reminiscent of the Gramscian state-society complex or “integral state”)
and that the state is an “older brother” to these institutions.
367
The state as the benevolent
older brother also protects labor. Instead of a discourse based on labor rights, the AKP
grounds the source of labor protection in Islamic ethics and paternalistic relationships
between the employer and the employee.

The AKP’s paternalistic approach is reflected in its definition of women in terms of their
role in their families. Instead of “women’s rights,” the AKP has emphasized the concept
of the “family unit.” In 2023 “The AKP Family Vision” report, which the party prepared
before the 2011 general elections, preventing couples from living together before getting

367
Türközü, 2009.

141

married and preventing moral degeneration is emphasized as one of its goals.
368
The
“Minister Responsible for Women and Family” is renamed as the “Minister of Family
and Social Policies.
369
” In the reports and other publications of the party, “women” is
replaced with the word “lady,” which denotes a behavior model for women as opposed to
“woman” which also brings to mind women’s sexual identity. “Turkish family structure,”
a patriarchal and nationalist concept, is frequently used by the RTÜK as a justification for
censuring television programs.
370
Özkazanç argues that “Turkish family structure” is a
social construction that does not really exist. However the myth that it exists helps the
AKP to reproduce its patriarchal discourses.
371
One can argue that similar to ‘imagined
communities” now there is an “imagined conservative community.”

Turkish family structure, a benevolent state which is an older brother to civil society
institutions and a moral code for society are indispensable discursive elements in
justifying neo-liberal policies by sidelining the “rights” discourse (i.e. citizens have the
right to receive certain services from the state). Social actors that adopt a rights

368
The report includes the following statement: “We will support the institution of marriage which is the basis of
family structure.” AKP Election Manifesto, 2011: 90-92. Also see “Marriages will Start Without Problems” [Evlilikler
Sorunsuz Başlayacak], The AKP Target 2023, accessed February 10, 2012. Prime Minister Erdoğan repeatedly advised
each family to have three children. See “NGOs Issue Pessimistic Report on Women's Rights in Turkey,” Hürriyet Daily
News, July 2, 2010 accessed February 12, 2010.

369
“Kadından Sorumlu Olmayan Kadın Bakan: Fatma Şahin” (A Women Minister Not Responsible From Women:
Fatma Şahin), BĐ A Haber Merkezi, July 7, 2012 accessed February 12, 2010.
370
The phrase “Turkish family structure” is used in the law regarding RTÜK that was passed in 1994. Law on
Establishment and Publications of Radio and Televisions [Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkında
Kanun], Law n. 3984 (March 13, 1994), Official Gazette 21911 (March 20, 1994). The law indicates that broadcast
principles include “respect for society’s national and moral values” and “morality of the society (genel ahlak), peace in
society and Turkish family structure” In 2002 the principle that broadcasts should not be obsene/suggestive was added.

371
“Assoc. Prof. Alev Özkazanç: Turkey Needs to Accept the Reality of Zina,” [Assoc. Prof. Alev Özkazanç: Turkey
Needs to Accept the Reality of Zina] T24, August 29, 2011, accessed February 10, 2012.
142

discourse, such as labor unions and feminist groups, ask the State to make systemic
changes in their policies, whereas a benevolent state selectively determines whom to
help. As the rights discourse is sidelined, moral values become the guiding principles of
economic life. Instead of collective bargaining, adopting ethical values in the work place
ensures the protection of workers’ rights and unproblematic employer-employee
relations.
372
In both the AKP’s and MÜSĐ AD’s moral values discourse is constituted by a
combination of “our cultural values” and the “realities of the world,” referring to global
economic conditions.

As discourse theory indicates, in the process of articulation, concepts that are related to
one another such as rights, equality, freedom and democracy, as well as state and society,
acquire new meanings depending on the reference point that binds together a particular
system of meaning. In Turkey starting from the early 2000s, “national morality as a
guiding principle for socio-economic life” became a reference point acting as a prism
through which other concepts were articulated. As mentioned above from the perspective
of national morality, the state is constructed as a benevolent older brother. Equality is
articulated as “equal opportunity,” replacing the definition of equality in terms of
economic and gender relations. As a continuation of the post-February 28
th
process
discourses, freedom is constructed as freedom from the secular establishment and thus

372
MÜSĐ AD views labor unions as having a “conflictual nature” which might endanger peace in the workplace
environment. There is no suggestion that labor unions can be considered legitimate in the publications of MÜSĐ AD. In
line with this stance, labor union membership is a rare practice in most of the businesses associated with MÜSĐ AD. The
association blames the 2008 economic crisis on a lack of moral values and thus inability control greed. MUSIAD
Report, 2010.
143

the freedom of religious belief. Other meanings of freedom such as freedom of speech,
freedom from fear, from hunger, from poverty disappear.

4.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

During the 2000s, the hegemonic discourse or in Hall’s terminology, hegemonic center
and its layers, comprised elements from previous dominant discourses. In Hall’s terms,
“national morality as a guiding principle for socio-economic life” and “fusion of our
culture with global necessities” are the elements of the hegemonic discourse center. Other
layers involve elements from the TIS discourse, Özal’s market mentality discourse, and
post February 28
th
process discourses of “center vs. periphery” or “elite-society” duality.
Each of these discourse elements opened the way for production of new reference points
and new articulations, depending on the structural and conjectural changes in the political
and socio-economic system. The AKP’s discourse emerged from these elements and
established its own reference points by articulating elements from global neoliberal
discourse and domestic nationalist and Islamic discourses.

In Turkey one of the most drastic discursive shifts occurred as a result of the 1980
military coup, which prepared the political conditions for neoliberalization. The TIS
discourse promoted by the military administration in the early 1980s and the structural
changes - i.e. the suppression of political expression and implementation of neoliberal
reforms - that accompanied it allowed the discourse of the far left to be framed as
144

anarchic. The TIS also served to eliminate leftist interpretations of Kemalism and in this
way prevented the possibility of discussing its more democratic interpretations. Özal’s
discourse and his redefinition of politics on the basis of expertise in economic matters
shifted the axis of debate away from whether the prevalent economic ideology itself is
useful or not for the society as a whole. In these ways, dominant discourses of the 1980s
limited the breadth of the dominant discourses of the 1990s.

In the 1990s, the axis of debate shifted towards support for or criticism of the TIS
version of nationalism; and whether or not the bureaucrats can “get things done”, a
phrase frequently used by Özal. Özal’s neoliberal reforms, which reduced the state’s
control over the economy, were constructed in the 1990s as “freedom”, especially by the
social actors who benefited from them. Structural and political changes in the economy in
the 1980s and early 1990s led to the empowerment of the Islamic businesses,
communities and Islamic political party, RP. Empowerment of Islamic identity led to a
polarization between Islamic actors and the secular establishment. The February 28
th
process, which was a military intervention into politics, prepared the grounds for
associating Islamic identity with democratization. In the post February 28
th
process,
liberal and Islamic intellectuals defined democratization as the disempowerment of the
institutions that saw themselves as the guardians of secularism, such as the Military and
the high judiciary.

145

Further economic empowerment of Islamic businesses and the February 28
th
process,
which led the “reformist” wing of the Islamic Virtue Party to adopt a more moderate
discourse, culminated in the foundation of the the AKP. Post 28
th
February process
discussions enabled the AKP’s neoliberal authoritarian discourse to be framed as the
voice of society and therefore as “democratic.” Construction of the the AKP as a
democratic force concealed the authoritarian nature of its discourses and the inequalities
promoted by its economic policies. The flirtation between Islam and market economy
that started in the 1980s finally resulted in an articulation between the two in 2000s.
Political and economic conditions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, together with this
new discourse, drew the support of a variety of social groups and developed into a
hegemonic discourse.

In the case of Turkey, where a strong leftist tradition had existed until 1980, the
institutionalization of neoliberalism was made possible through a discourse that does not
promote class consciousness. This chapter explained that Islamic actors in general and
Islamic communities in particular played an important role in the constitution of the
hegemonic discourse. It showed that the promotion of religious identities was pivotal in
the implementation of neo-liberal reforms. The next two chapters will analyze the way in
which the discourses of Gülen and Erenköy communities interacted with the hegemonic
discourse of the 2000s.

146

CHAPTER V: SHIFTS IN THE GÜLEN COMMUNITY DISCOURSE

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to analyze the shifts in the Gülen Community (GC) discourse in the
process of neo-liberal restructuration in Turkey. Fethullah Gülen, its leader, is the most
central actor in the generation of the Community’s discourses. This chapter provides a
discourse analysis using the Discourse-Historical approach, which was discussed in
chapter 2. It begins with an introduction of the GC, its evolution, organization, sources,
production and dissemination of its discourse. Next, it discusses selection of time period
and provides an overview of the main discursive changes between these time periods.

In order to identify the changes in the discourse, the analysis starts one year before the
February 28
th
process, which introduced drastic changes in the hegemonic discourses in
Turkey and the discourses of the Islamic actors. Then the chapter analyzes the drastic
change in the GC discourse in the mid-1999. Next, the chapter analyzes the Community
discourses in the second half of the 2000s. The final part of the chapter analyzes the
connections between the shifts in the GC discourse and the AKP’s hegemonic discourse
and Third Way neoliberal discourses of Blair and Clinton Third Way programs which
were discussed in Chapter 3.

147

5.2. THE GÜLEN COMMUNITY

The GC broke away from the Nur Community circles
373
and became a separate Islamic
community in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
374
The Nur Community, Nur Sect or “the
Nurcu” is a broad term used to describe those who follow the teachings of Said-i Nursi
(1876-1960), a religious figure who strove for the revitalization of Islam in society.
375

Followers of Nursi divided among themselves and formed separate communities in
time.
376
Since its formation as a separate community, the GC has focused on education as
the primary form of altruistic service to the community,
377
or, in the community
discourse, hizmet (service).
378
Indeed, adherents of the community often use the term
“hizmet” or “hizmet movement” to refer to the community itself.
379

In the late 1960s, the community provided apartment units for students who lived away
from their families, units referred to as “Işık Evleri” (lighthouses). As the community

373
Markham and Birinci, 2011: 18. Çalışlar and Çelik: 20

374
Çalışlar and Çelik: 20, Çetin mentions that “Gülen’s ideas on education and service to the community began to take
definite form and mature”in the late 1960s. 2010: 31 For Gülen’s account of the origins and development of the
community, see Erdoğan, 2006

375
Mardin, 1989 :176

376
Yavuz, 2003: 130. See Çalışlar and Çelik an account of the various Nurcu divisions and relationships among them
.
377
Çetin, 2010: 31. For other fields of operation of the community see http://www.fethullahGülen.org/about-Gülen-
movement/3898-how-can-the-smos-of-the-Gülen-movement-be-categorized.html retrieved on January 3, 2012

378
The term hizmet (service) as an altruistic, religiously motivated service for the common good is not used only by the
Gülen community. Other Islamic communities in Turkey also use this term, with the same meaning.

379
Bilici, 2006.

148

attracted more adherents, it established university examination preparation centers,
380
and
private high schools.
381
In the first half of the 1990s, the community moved to establish
universities and schools in Central Asia. To provide for the needs of the community
adherents living in foreign countries where the schools were set up, small Turkish
companies took their businesses to these countries and established commercial relations
with the companies in the home countries.
382
Gülen also encouraged the adherents of the
community to open publishing houses and media companies. Çetin mentions that

Movement (the GC) participants established a national and international television station –
Samanyolu Televizyonu (STV), a major news agency – Cihan Haber Ajansı (CHA), an
independent daily newspaper – Zaman with a circulation of over a half a million copies nationally,
several leading magazines, and a prominent publishing house, The Light Inc.
383

In 1994 the GC adherents established the Journalists and Writers Foundation
(Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Derneği), which aims to organize events that bring together
religious leaders and intellectuals.
384
As discussed in Chapter 3, its members established a
business association, ĐŞ HAD (Business Life Solidarity Foundation ) in 1993; Asya

380
Çetin 2010: 34.

381
Çetin mentions that the first private high school was established in 1982.

382
Turam, 2007: 89 -108

383
Çetin, 2010: 76

384
The Journalists and Writers Foundation, accessed July 23, 2011.
http://www.gyv.org.tr/Hakkimizda/Detay/19/About%20the%20Foundation.

149

Finans, a participation bank with “no-interest” policy in 1996; and a confederation,
TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey) in 2005.
385

The GC has always been careful to maintain good relations with the Turkish state.
386

Since its formation as a separate Islamic community, it has emphasized that security and
stability are its central concern, that it supports the state and does not want to change the
regime. Lead articles that Fethullah Gülen wrote in the journal Sızıntı before and in 1980
attest to Gülen’s support for the military coup and for providing order and stability by
fighting against “anarchists and terrorists.”
387
Similarly, Gülen supported the military
during the “February 28
th
process,”
388
with his declarations on the politically sensitive
issues for the secular groups in Turkey.
389

With its non-confrontational attitude towards the secular establishment, the GC differs
from the Islamist political party, which took the successive names MNP (National Order

385
See Başkan, 2004. Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON), accessed July 23, 2011,
http://www.tuskon.org/hakkimizda/?id=tuskon. “Đş Dünyasında 'Gülen'li Örgütlenme” (Organization in the Business
World with Gülen), Milliyet, March 21, 2006, accessed July 24, 2011.

386
Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003.

387
Sızıntı, Lead Article “Son Karakol” November 1980 No: 21 “…ümidimizin tükendiği yerde, Hızır gibi imdadımıza
yetişen Mehmetçiğe bir kere daha selam duruyoruz.” (We are saluting the Turkish soldier who answered our cries for
help), See also Gülen’s article in Sızıntı in 1979, in which he supports military forces. Sızıntı, Lead Article “Soldier,”
June 1979. In the 1960s, several associations that aimed to struggle against communism were founded. Gülen was
active in one of these associations in the 1960s. Gülen as well as the military coup leaders referred to some of the
communist groups in Turkey as “anarchists and terrorists.”

388
The February 28
th
process was discussed in Chapter 3.

389
For Gülen’s declarations in various interviews regarding the headscarf issue see
http://tr.fGülen.com/content/view/2257/5/.

150

Party) in 1970, MSP (National Salvation Party) in 1972, and RP (Welfare Party) in
1983.
390
Instead of establishing a political party to Islamicize the society by becoming the
governing party, the GC opted to Islamize the everyday lives of individuals, and, as
Turam argues, to mobilize “to make more space for the faithful individual within the
boundaries of the secular Republic.”
391
The GC clearly distinguished itself from the RP in
the 1980s and 1990s.
392
In the 1990s, while Islamic businesses associated with Islamic
communities and/or with the Welfare Party established an Islamic business association,
MÜSĐ AD (Independent Industrialist and Businessmen's Association), as mentioned
above, Gülen’s followers established their own separate business associations. In this
way, Gülen’s followers further disassociated themselves from actors who were viewed as
a threat to secularism by the military. Various political leaders met with Gülen during the
1990s, commending him for the schools established by the community. However,
Gülen’s image as a moderate Islamic figure was shaken when, in June 1999, video
footage was released in which he seemed to advocate the Islamization of society and
state.
393
He argued that the images were taken out of context.
394
He went to the U.S.
around the same time. In August 2000, upon the demand of the state prosecutor, the State

390
With regard to the frequent disagreements among the Gülen community and the predecessors and successor parties
of the RP (Welfare Party), and various Islamic communities, see Turam, 2007; Çalışlar and Çelik, 2000.

391
Turam, 2007.

392
Gülen also made it clear that the GC is not a part of the larger Nur Community and its branches, some of which
supported center-right political parties rather than the Islamist MSP and its follower RP.

393
Çalışlar and Çelik: 169-185. About the video cassettes, see “Birand: General Staff Ordered Broadcasting of Anti-
Gülen Recordings,” accessed March 14, 2011.

394
Gülen, “Celâl ve Đ zzet Âhireti Đ ktiza Eder” (Greatness and Glory Necessitate Afterlife), accessed March 13, 2011.

151

Constitutional Court accepted a lawsuit against Gülen for “aiming to establish a state
based on Islamic principles.”
395
He was acquitted in 2006
396
but still resides in the U.S.
Despite the lawsuit against Gülen, the Community continued to grow both in terms of
followers and financial resources. Through her analysis of the GC’s institutions in
Kazakhstan, Turam demonstrates that the GC’s education and business networks and the
Turkish state have established ties with one another by cooperating on various national
and international projects.
397

5.3. ORGANIZATION OF THE GÜLEN COMMUNITY

The GC is composed of a complex network of business associations, foundations, mass
media companies and education institutions extending beyond national borders.
398
Yavuz
mentions that “day-to-day activities are organized by a hierarchical management based
on the tenets of trust, obedience and duty to the community.”
399
At the top of the decision
making structure there is a council that consists of Fethullah Gülen and his immediate
subordinates, referred to as “elder brothers” (abis), including the heads of the Community
institutions and heads of the Community activities in various countries. In each country

395
“Fethullah Gülen Trial Opens in Ankara,” October 17, 2000 accessed March 13, 2011.

396
Tahincioğlu, Gökçer “Fethullah Gülen Đ çin Beraat Kararı” (Verdict of Acquittal for Fethullah Gülen), accessed
February 10, 2011.

397
Turam, 2007: 89-108.

398
Yavuz, 1999.

399
Ibid.

152

where the Community operates, under the abis responsible for the country, there are abis
responsible for every region or city and under them there are abis and ablas (elder sisters)
responsible for neighborhoods. These abis and ablas supervise the abis and ablas who
are responsible from the student apartments called “Işıkevleri” (Lighthouses) and
dormitories.
400
Abis or ablas in student apartments provide instruction on Risale-i Nur
and Gülen’s teachings. They also act as liasons between the students and the higher
ranking abis and ablas.

The GC has been flexible in terms of devising different organizational strategies in
different socio-political contexts.
401
Despite the differences in the organizational
strategies and relative autonomy of some of the Community institutions from one
another, Çetin argues that the GC “has not revealed any internal disputes about tactics,
goals or personalities.”
402
Çapan mentions that the projects are continuously supervised
by all, and accountable to all. According to Çetin, the internal cohesion and solidarity in
the GC make it easier for the followers to mobilize and take collective action.
403

400
Hendrick 2009: 108. For further information various levels of affiliation with the Gülen community such as those
who are at the core of the Community such as heads of the Community institutions, those who attend meetings and give
monetary support, and sympathizers see Hendrick, 2009.

401
For an analysis of the Gülen Community’s organizational strategies in different political contexts, see Demir, 2007:
124-220.

402
Çetin, 2010: 238.

403
Çetin, 2010: 193.

153

In the GC, individuals are given responsibilities based on their talents and ability to carry
out the job, rather than the amount of time they have been adherents of the Community.
Highest ranking women followers are either ablas who are responsible for a particular
neighborhood or who are heads of the dormitories. These ablas convey the decisions
made at in the higher ranks to the women followers. Limited contact among men and
women followers and lack of women in the high ranks of community institutions mean
that women’s viewpoints and interpretations of Gülen discourse are not well reflected
either in Community publications or in high-level decisions regarding the Community’s
activities.

5.4. SOURCES, PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION OF DISCOURSE IN
THE GÜLEN COMMUNITY

5.4.1. Said-i Nursi’s Discourse

Islamism as an ideology emerged in the context of the modernization reforms initiated by
the Ottoman state in the mid-19
th
century.
404
While Islamism in the Ottoman state was
opposed to modernization and Westernization, it nonetheless used the concepts and

404
According to Ali Bulaç, the first Islamists emerged right after the 1856 Islahat Fermani (Reform Edict), in which
the Ottoman State announced administrative reforms, including extension of some of the social and political rights that
only Muslims had until had to non-Muslim subjects. Bulaç, 2004: 48-64; Aktay 2004: 379.

154

definitions provided by the discourse of modernism.
405
It envisaged the Islamization of
society both from top down, by the means of the state, and from the bottom up, by
Islamizing cultural life.
406

Said-i Nursi (1878-1960) was a religious figure who espoused the ideas of early Islamists
of the mid-19th century and re-interpreted them in the context of a secular regime in
Turkey.
407
Nursi’s letters to his disciples, the Risale-i Nur Kulliyati (The Epistles of Light
Collection), which include commentaries on the Qur’an and Nursi’s political ideas, still
act as a guide for his followers.
408
Similar to early Islamists in the Ottoman state, Nursi
emphasized the importance of the active individual, and de-emphasized concepts such as
patience, trust, and contentment with what one has.
409
Unlike the early Islamists, Nursi
argued that instead of theological debates and discussions of how to reform Islam,
Islamists first need to restore the faith of Islam in individuals’ hearts. Moreover, Nursi
saw direct confrontation with the state as harmful to the revitalizing of Islam. Instead,
faith should be disseminated in society first.
410
Only then could socio-cultural structures

405
Aktay, 2004: 358- 375. Aktay argues that Islamism in the Ottoman state reproduced the concepts of modernism, such
as freedom, equality, identity, and the dualities that modernist discourse produces, such as Islam vs. modernism.

406
Bulaç, 2004: 49

407
For the difference between Said-i Nursi’s and other Islamist figures, in the Republican era see Aktay, 2004: 88-90

408
Mardin 1989: 97

409
Kara argues that before the emergence of Islamism as an ideology in the Ottoman state, scholars of Islam (ulema)
placed greater emphasis on concepts such as patience.

410
Agai: 2005: 2; Kömeçoğlu, 1997.

155

be transformed.
411
As mentioned above, upon his death, the divisions among the Nurcus
led to the emergence of different interpretations of his teachings.
412
Nursi’s texts allow
much room for interpretation, firstly because the texts have not been translated into
modern Turkish and are very hard to understand for someone who does not speak Arabic
and Farsi, and secondly because the texts can be ambiguous at times.
413
It was Nursi’s
idea of placing primacy emphasis on restoring Islam, rather than on theological
discussions; on the active individual; and the strategy of avoiding direct confrontations
with the state that Fethullah Gülen adopted.

5.4.2. Production of Discourse

Gülen is the most important actor in the production of discourse in the GC. Adherents of
the community closely follow his books, articles, and commentaries on interview
videotapes recorded by his adherents and on mass media channels. Hendrick explains that
the GC’s central publishing house, called Akademi (Academy), is another significant
source of discourse in the community. In Akademi, Gülen’s first generation students give
lectures which are then a significant source of discourse for the younger generation
adherents. Hendrick mentions that of the nearly 100 employees at Akademi, nearly all are

411
Kömeçoğlu, 1997.

412
Aktay, 2004: 89.

413
Aktay, 2004: 90

156

male.
414
Thus, most important publications of the GC represent male followers’
viewpoints.

5.4.3. Dissemination of Discourse

Çetin mentions that “from 1966 onward, Gülen’s talks and lectures had been recorded on
audio cassettes and distributed throughout Turkey.”
415
As the community grew, student
dormitories, apartments (Işıkevleri) and schools became important spaces for the
dissemination of discourse
416
through what the community refers to as sohbet
(conversation) among followers. In sohbets, followers learn about Nursi’s text Risale-i
Nur and exchange ideas on principles of leading an Islamic life. Thus, sohbets serve as
tools for interpreting Risale-i Nur, Gülen’s texts and speeches, as well as the journals
published by the community members. Since women and men have separate sohbets,
women’s interpretations of the male-produced discourses cannot engage with men’s
interpretations of the publications.
417
Discourses may also vary according to one’s age,
position in the hierarchy of responsibility, and whether one resides in Turkey or in
another country. Moreover, Hendrick argues that there are differences between the
discourses of the small circle surrounding Gülen, adherents of the community who use

414
Hendrick 2009: 120-125.

415
Çetin, 2010: 36.

416
Çetin, 2010: 34

417
Turam, 2007.

157

specific Islamic concepts, the Turkish public at large and the GC’s publications aimed at
non Turkish speakers.
418

5.5. CHANGES IN THE GÜLEN COMMUNTY DISCOURSE

In order to analyze the discursive shifts in the GC discourse, this study draws from Hall’s
understanding of articulation. Hall views the establishment of hegemony as a process of
articulating and disarticulating ideas. For him, articulation means forming discursive
connections between different discourses. Laclau and Mouffe provide the framework of
the mechanism through which articulation takes place. According to them, articulation is
the process whereby certain concepts become reference points, or lenses in re-defining
other concepts and temporarily fixing this meaning. Reference points also establish
connections between various concepts. Different political actors compete to construct
new reference points. Among these actors, those who can establish reference points that
enable articulations between discourses of different socio-political actors can acquire
legitimacy and become hegemonic.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Discourse Historical Approach to discourse analysis
provides tools with which we can identify reference points and associated concepts in a
discourse. This chapter will analyze the uses of nomination and predication in GC
publications, Sızıntı, Kırık Testi and Bamteli. Once the reference points in different time

418
Hendrick, 2009: 231.
158

periods are identified, we can analyze the shifts in the reference points and whether
hegemonic discourses played a role in these shifts.

The aim of this study is to understand, first, whether and how hegemonic discourses
affect shifts in the community discourses, and vice versa. Second, this study aims to
understand the purpose discursive shifts have served for the community and for the
hegemonic power itself. A hegemonic discourse is composed of a hegemonic center and
various layers of discourses loosely bounded with the hegemonic center. The focus of this
study is the AKP’s discourse. It was argued in Chapter 3 that at the center of the AKP’s
discourse is what the party refers to as “conservative democracy,” which is connected to
dominant nationalist discourses traditionally associated with the center-right parties in
Turkey, neoliberal discourse as used by international actors such as the IMF, and an
Islamic language inherited from the Islamic Welfare Party (RP). The last portion of this
chapter will investigate the relationship between the shifts in the reference points and
AKP’s discourse.

This chapter analyzes the GC discourse in three different time periods. By starting the
analysis from the year 1996, we can assess whether and how the GC’s discourse shifted
as a result of the “February 28
th
process” in 1997, a process that significantly shaped the
dominant and hegemonic discourses in Turkey. An analysis of the GC discourse in the
late 1990s shows that there was a drastic change in June 1999, when the aforementioned
videotapes of Gülen’s speech were broadcast and the State Security Court accepted a
159

lawsuit against Gülen demanded by the state prosecutor. The public debates on Gülen’s
videotapes remained intense until about December 1999. Starting from 2000, the media
shifted its focus to other issues, and the GC journal Sızıntı started to take a less defensive
tone.

After 2000, two publications became prominent sources of discourse in addition to the
journal Sızıntı. Kırık Testi consists of videos of Gülen answering the questions of his
followers, while Bamteli comprise the transcriptions of the Gülen’s interviews and
sohbets (conversations). Some of the political issues Gülen discussed in Sızıntı prior to
2000 were increasingly discussed in these two outlets. After mid-1999, the community
discourses slowly and gradually evolved in the context of shifts in the broader political
and socio-economic structure. For this reason, a comparison of the second half of the
1990s and the second half of the 2000s will enable us to see the shifts in reference points
and the concepts that they bind together more clearly relative to the reference points in
late 1990s and early 2000s. From 2000 until around 2005 a number of new topics, such as
business life, public relations and social solidarity against poverty are introduced into
Sızıntı. In the latter half of the 2000s, concepts such as public relations, social capital or
social solidarity are defined and connected to the other discourses in the community.

An analysis of the GC discourse with the tools of DHA enables us to identify shifts in
three central reference points that bind together and shift the meanings of many of the
concepts prominently used in the GC discourse:
160

1. The GC discourse in the late 1990s was centered on the idea that in order to bring
about social change, individuals themselves must first change. To achieve an ideal
society, more and more individuals must adopt the personality traits Gülen described in
detail in Sızıntı. Human nature is a reference point in defining the characteristics of both
the ideal individual and the ideal social order. Those who do not adopt ideal personality
traits are acting against their nature. In the latter half of the 2000s, the role of community
and its norms are emphasized to a much greater degree in bringing about social change
compared to the role of personality traits.

2. In the late 1990s, “culture” and “order of morality” are reference points through which
concepts such as order, security, economy, and action are defined. What culture and
order of morality entail is explained by making reference to the “old social order,”
meaning the Ottoman social order up until the implementation of reforms in the 19
th

century. In the late 2000s, Gülen uses the term “collective consciousness,” which
indicates being aware of a common identity based on morality, religion, culture, and
human nature. Compared to “culture” or “order of morality,” this is a more
comprehensive and abstract concept. References to the “old social order” are also
significantly less frequent in the latter half of the 2000s, compared to what was the case a
decade before.

161

3. The GC’s discourse regarding what is considered public and private also shifted. The
boundary of the public sphere becomes broader, at the expense of the private sphere. In
the latter half of both the 1990s and 2000s, the definitions of public and private spheres
are reference points that re-define gender roles and, together with the reference point
“collective consciousness,” give meaning to concepts such as democracy, justice and
freedom.

In addition to the shifts in the reference points, a significant difference between the GC
discourses in the latter half of the 1990s and 2000s is related to the community’s use of
concepts such as democracy and human rights. In the late 1990s, these concepts are used
very rarely while discussing other subjects. In Sızıntı, there is no discussion of them or
how they relate to community discourse in general. In the latter half of the 2000s, articles
on democracy, human rights and other related concepts such as justice and freedom begin
to appear. More importantly, these concepts are re-defined through the lenses of the new
reference points discussed above, and linked to the other concepts and reference points in
the GC discourse.

The following section will focus on the GC discourses between 1996 and 1999. The
section will identify topics that are most commonly used in the GC discourse. In order to
identify reference points that re-define subject positions, the section will investigate how
the actors are nominated. Next, in order to identify reference points binding concepts
together, the section will examine the predicates regarding the concepts and processes.
162

Finally, reference points and related concepts, or, in other words, articulations, will be
mapped.

5.6. GÜLEN COMMUNITY DISCOURSE BETWEEN 1996 AND 1999

5.6.1. Topics

Between 1996 and 1999, the theme that dominated Sızıntı was the contrast between self
and other, pointing to the role of Sızıntı in the construction of identities within the GC.
The most common mechanism of identity construction was the formulation of the “other”
as a homogenous entity. Generally, the “other” in this context referred to the Westernized
masses in Turkey who internalized values of materialism and positivism.
419
At other
times, the other was the “West,” characterized as a single actor.
420
After February 28
th

1997, when the so-called “post-modern” military intervention took place, there was an
increase in the efforts by the GC to differentiate itself from other Islamic actors. Around
this time, in two different articles, various Islamist actors were also constructed as “the
other.”
421

419
Leading Article “Değişen Dünyanın Dinamikleri” (Dynamics of the Changing World) Sızıntı, No:206 March,1996;
Leading Article “Ahlak Aşkı“ (Love of Morality) Sızıntı, No: 210, July 1996.; Ünal, Taha B. “Sızıntı'nın
Dünyasından” (From the World of Sızıntı), Sızıntı, No:205 February 1996.

420
Leading Article “Ahlak Aşkı“ (Love of Morality) Sızıntı, No: 210. Leading Article “Kendi Ruhumuzu Araken”
(Searching for Our Own Soul) Sızıntı, No:212, September 1996.

421
Leading Article “Kaos Đ çindeki Işık” (The Light in Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 218, March 1997. Leading Article “Kaosun
Ötesindeki Dünya” (The World Beyond Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 219, April 1997.

163

Between 1996 and 1999, one of the most commonly covered topics was the difference
between science (bilim) and ilim, a combination of science and religion. The
conceptualization of matter and meaning (a combination of morality, religion and culture)
as two sides of reality undergirded many discussions of education, western culture, and
capitalism. The topic of education was covered by the journal at an increasing rate from
1996 to 1999, parallel to the rise in the educational activities of the community.
422
Other
topics that were covered a few times were gender differences, social change, the
relationship between individual and society, and what it means to be “a man of action.”
423

5.6.2. Nomination

In Sızıntı, the self was defined as the constitution of a person during his/her creation.
Although the authors emphasize that every person is created in a different way, they also
drew attention to the commonalities among their readers, as the most commonly used
strategy for discursive construction of social actors is collectivization.
424
Between 1996
and 1999, collectivization was achieved through the frequent use of the pronoun “we”
and possessive adjective “our.” “We as a nation”, “our country”, “our people”, “our

422
For a discussion of the educational activities of the Gülen Community see Agai, 2002.

423
Çaldıranlı, Fatih “Etki ve ilgi Çemberi Perspektifi” (Circle of Impact and Interest Perspective) Sızıntı No: 224,
September 1997.

424
Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 53

164

history”, “our customs,” “Muslim Turkish society,” “Muslims” were among the
commonly used phrases to describe the self.
425
Gülen described the ideal Community
follower as a “person of will power” (irade insani), “person of ideals”
426
(ideal insanı)
“person of action” (aksiyon insani) and “golden generation” (altın nesil).
427

Descriptions of the self almost always involved long descriptions of the other. The
“other” was mostly an abstract social actor and, except for the West, there was no clear
nomination for it. Instead of naming the “other,” partitives such as “a group of” or
indefinite adjectives such as “some,” “many,” or “certain” were used. This way of
describing an actor is what Van Leeuwen calls “generalization,”
428
and it serves to
maintain the ambiguity of the “other’s” identity. Islamic communities in general and the
GC in particular have used generalizations in their discourse to avoid open confrontation
with powerful secular actors. In Sızıntı one of the clearly identified social actors

425
For the use of “our history” see Pirim, Rıfat “Osmanlı Tarihini Nasıl Okumalıyız?” (How should we read Ottoman
history?) Sızıntı, No: 245, June 1999. Gönüllü, Ömer Said “Kimlik Meselesi Üzerine” (On the Identity Issue) Sızıntı,
No:225, October 1997. Demirbilek, Ahmed “Hicaz Demiryolu ve Sultan II.Abdülhamid Han” (Hicaz Railway and
Sultan Abdülhamid the Second), Sızıntı, No:228, January 1998.

For the use of Muslim Turkish Society see Aydın, Selim “Sosyal Enerji” (Social Energy), Sızıntı, No:209, June 1996.
Dindaş, Ahmet “Bir Temmuz Günü” (A Day in July) Sızıntı, No:217, February 1997. Avcı, Harun “Vakıf
Üniversitelerine Doğru” (Towards Foundation Schools) Sızıntı No:220 May 1997. Eren, Alp “Anadolu Fatihi
Kutalmışoğlu Süleyman Şah” Kutalmışoğlu Süleyman Şah, Conqueror of Anatolia), Sızıntı No:223, August 1997.
Kuru, Ahmet “Kutadgu Bilig Ve Siyasi Ahlak” (Kutadgu Bilig and Political Ethics) Sızıntı, No:229, February 1998.

426
Leading Article, “Mefkûre Đ nsanı” (Person of Ideals), Sızıntı, No:237, October 1998.

427
Leading Article “Kaos Đ çindeki Işık” (The Light in Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 218, March 1997. Garib, M. “Altın Nesil”
(Golden Generation) No:237 October 1997.

428
Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 53 When partitive adjectives are followed by generic references made by plural nouns
without articles, such as “people,” “circles,” or “groups.”

165

constructed as a homogenous other was the “West.”
429
Another clearly identified social
actor was the “Western media.”
430
The reader can infer that this term refers to media
owned by secular, Westernized groups in Turkey. Social actors in Sızıntı were also
constructed in terms of their relations to one another, or through the discursive tool called
relationalization. “Elites” and “society/people” (halk) were distinguished from one
another as more or less homogenous actors who have a repressor-repressed
relationship.
431
The construction of the elite as an actor outside (different from) the
society or the people both resulted from and reinforced the view that the former is
detached from the latter’s values and norms. This discourse element echoed the dominant
center-periphery discourse of the mid to late 1990s that was discussed in Chapter 3.

Social actors who were absent in the journal articles are as important as the social actors
who were represented. In Van Leeuwen’s categorization of discursive tools, the linguistic
de-emphasizing of an actor without complete lack of reference to it is referred to as
“backgrounding.”
432
In Sızıntı between 1996 and 1999 women were backgrounded. There
was only one article in three years about gender differences and very few other references

429
Ünal, Taha B. “Sızıntı'nın Dünyasından” (From the World of Sızıntı), Sızıntı, No:205 February 1996. Leading
Article “Ahlak Aşkı” (Love of Morality) Sızıntı, No: 210 July 1996

430
Leading Article “Kaos Đ çindeki Işık” (The Light in Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 218, March 1997. Leading Article “Şinasî'nin
Bir Kasidesi Ve Mustafa Reşit Paşa” (Şinasi’s Ode and Mustafa Reşit Paşa) Sızıntı, no:217, February 1997. Leading
Article, “Buhran ve Kahramanlar” (Crisis and Heroes), no: 217 February, 1997.

431
Leading Article, “Şinasî'nin Bir Kasidesi Ve Mustafa Reşit Paşa” (Şinasi’s Ode and Mustafa Reşit Paşa) Sızıntı,
no:217, February 1997. Leading Article, “Buhran ve Kahramanlar” (Crisis and Heroes), no: 215, Aralik 1996. Leading
Article “Varlığın Mânâ Buudu” (Meaning Aspect of Being) Sızıntı, No:230, March 1998.

432
Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 47
166

to women are made. Nor were political parties, other religious groups, various actors of
civil society, such as workers or businessmen associations, represented by nomination.

NOMINATION OF SELF AND OTHER BETWEEN 1996-1999
SELF

We (our people, our nation…)
Muslims
Muslim Turkish society
Turkey
Person of will power, Person of ideals,
Person of action
The Golden Generation

OTHER

West
Western (Western media)
Materialists
Anarchists
A group of people, certain circles, some
groups, these
Today’s generations

Table 5.1. Nomination of Self and Other in the GC Discourse between 1996 and 1999

5.6.3. Predication

a. Self and Other

The predication of the “other” usually involved explicit comparisons between the golden
generation and today’s generations. The two social actors were constructed as complete
opposites of one another. (See Table 2) In Sızıntı, explicit predicates regarding
167

community followers were as follows: “(They) will always live, think and talk in a
simple way.... In their wording styles, they will never imitate European ways and they
will voice their thoughts with their own instruments (meaning language instruments)….
The deeper their sincerity is, the more closed they will be to considerations other than
Hizmet…. As people from the society (meaning non-elites) they will sit, stand up, talk
and express their feelings similar to common people.”
433
Those who perform Hizmet are
also described as respectful, elegant, considerate, people with glittering eyes and pleasant
faces.
434
They possess a richness of feelings, thoughts, sensations and logic. As a
response to everyone else’s display of animosity, hatred, harshness and crudeness in
every chance they get, they (the followers) act with clemency and tolerant.
435

Members of the community were referred to as people of ideals and people of will power,
who have the determination to give to the world the balance and stability they have
achieved in their souls. “Person of action,” “person of ideals” and “person of will power”
construct an active person who exercises his/her will to achieve his/her ideas. A “person
of ideals” was also a gendered construct, for it was further described using the phrase
“babayiğit” in Turkish, which means a brave, fearless and strong person, but which
contains the word father (baba), thus implying that the brave person is a man. Gülen

433
In Turkish “Samimiyetlerinin derinligi ölçüsünde hizmetten baska bütün mülahazalara karsi kapali kalacak…”
Sızıntı, “Buhran ve Kahramanlar” (Crisis and Heroes), no: 215, Aralik 1996.

434
Leading Article “Kaosun Ötesindeki Dünya” (The World beyond Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 219, April 1997.

435
In Turkish “Samimiyetlerinin derinligi ölçüsünde hizmetten baska bütün mülahazalara karsi kapali kalacak…”
Sızıntı, “Buhran ve Kahramanlar” (Crisis and Heroes), no: 215, December, 1996.
168

described the “person of ideals” as “a brave man (babayiğit) with will power made of
steel.”
436
The idea of balance and stability of the soul as the source of balance and
stability in the world shows that in the GC discourse latter half of the 1990s, individuals’
character traits and behaviors have a significant role in their social and political
environment.

In the lead article in the March 1997 issue of Sızıntı Gülen described the characteristics of
“today’s generations.” In contrast to the golden generation, today’s generations were
referred to as “a group of banal materialists,” “those small people,” “materialists who try
to seem like intellectuals,” “these corpses without souls….”
437
Emphasis on materialism
was a continuation of the 19
th
century Islamist discourses’ criticism of Westernization
and the materialism associated with it. Today’s generations are referred to as “a circle
that sanctifies progressivism, Westernism and enlightenment.” “Their behaviors are
‘alafranga’ (imitation of European ways) and artificial ….” These generations have
learnt about the passion for money, fame, hypocrisy and egoism. They find their
consolation in frenzy, delirium and destruction.
438
“Today’s generations” were also

436
Leading Article, “Mefkûre Đ nsanı” (Person of Ideals), Sızıntı, No:237, October 1998.

437
Leading Article “Kaos Đ çindeki Işık” (The Light in Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 218, March 1997.

438
In the March 1997 issue, the leading article, “Western media”, meaning secular media, is described as more
horrendous than science-fiction in affecting pure minds in a negative way. In Turkish: “Istedigini istedigi zaman
göklere çikaran ve dilediginde gayyâlara batiran; batili tasvir edip safi zihinleri sirâzeden çikarmada kurgu-bilimlerde
oldugundan da ürpertici ve o ölçüde de bir büyüye sahip bulunan bir kisim medya.”

169

referred to as “anarchists,”
439
a term very frequently used after the 1980 coup to refer to
the communist organizations of the 1970s. The political polarization between Islamist
actors and secular actors in Turkey in the latter half of the 1990s was reflected in the
polarization between the materialist individual and religious individual in the GC’s
construction of self and other.

- In contrast to the golden generation, today’s generations are described as without
horizons, ideals, past or future.
- In contrast to the golden generation that is characterized by rationality, “today’s
generations are emotional and filled with deliriums, craziness, harshness and
destructiveness. They are childish.
- In contrast to those filled with life and energy, this is a group of frail and lethargic
souls.
- The disbelief (in God), lack of perseverance, and indecisiveness are in contrast to
“our own morality.”
- In contrast to the person of will power, their main characteristics are being without
spirituality, irresponsible, without any objectives, superficial, myopic, empty inside.
Their point of view is crooked. Their ideas are weak, and their discourses are
European.
440

439
Leading Article, “Fesada Açık Ruhlar” (Souls open to Depravity), Sızıntı, No: 235, August 1998. Saraçoğlu, Musa
“Tümör Hücreleri Ve Metastaz Yapan Terör” (Tumour Cells and Terror that Metastasized), Sızıntı, No:229 February,
1998.
440
Leading Article “Kaos Đ çindeki Işık” (The Light in Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 218, March 1997.

170

There were also a few references to “those who use religion for politics,” a phrase often
used by the secular actors as a response to the rising power of the Welfare Party in the
early 1990s. By harshly criticizing other Islamic actors without naming them, GC
differentiated itself from these actors.

b. Old Social Order versus New Social Order

The Westernization process began more or less in the 19
th
century, intensified with
Kemalist reforms and continues today. In Sızıntı authors used the phrase “last few
centuries” to refer to this process. On occasion “the past” was specified as being three
hundred years ago.
441
The reader understands that “a few centuries ago” referred to the
beginning of ideas of Westernization in the Ottoman Empire, concomitant with the
decline of its power. Similar to the construction of the self and the other, there were sharp
contrasts between the social order in the past and “social order in the last few centuries.”
This period was viewed as a period in which humanity as a whole suffered from
selfishness, individualism, utilitarianism, racism and egoism.
442
The most common

441
Leading Article “Değişen Dünyanın Dinamikleri” (Dynamics of the Changing World) Sızıntı, No:206 March,1996.
Leading Article “Buhranlar Ufku Ve Beklentilerimiz” (Horizons of Crisis and Our Expectations) Sızıntı No:215,
December 1996. Leading Article “Ahlak Aşkı“ (Love of Morality) Sızıntı, No: 210 July 1996., Sızıntı, “Buhran ve
Kahramanlar” (Crisis and Heroes), no: 215, December 1996. Leading Article “Kendi Ruhumuzu Araken” (Searching
for Our Own Soul) Sızıntı, No:212, September 1996. Leading Article “Varlığın Mânâ Buudu” (Meaning Aspect of
Being) Sızıntı, No:230, March 1998. Leading Article “Geçmiş ve Gelecek” (Past and Future) Sızıntı, No:227,
December 1997.

442
Leading Article “Geçmiş ve Gelecek” (Past and Future) Sızıntı, No: 227, December 1997.

171

criticism of this period was related to the change in moral values, especially family
values and the abandonment of medreses, shrines and men of religion. This was a time
when our (Turkish) nation lived in distress, having lost its place in the international
arena.
443

The social order of the last few centuries was contrasted with the previous social order,
which was idealized.
444
“The past in our memories, is always new/young, always
glittering and always beautiful.”
445
The term “Golden age” symbolized this idealized
period. The idea of reviving the old social order and Turkey’s power in world politics
was frequently mentioned in the articles on the contrasts between “the golden age” and
“last few centuries.”

c. Social Transformation

From 1996 to 1999, various articles discussed the issue of social transformation. The
common idea in these articles was that social change is good as long as the basic religious
and moral principles, national culture and identities are preserved.
446
Thus despite the

443
Leading Article “Geçmiş ve Gelecek” (Past and Future) Sızıntı, No: 227, December 1997.

444
Leading Article “Kaos Đ çindeki Işık” (The Light in Chaos) Sızıntı, no: 218, March 1997.

445
Leading Article “Geçmiş ve Gelecek” (Past and Future) Sızıntı, No: 227, December 1997.

446
Leading Article, “Đ lim Düşüncesi” (The Thought of Wisdom), Sızıntı, No: 207, April 1996.
172

negative connotations of politics
447
and ideology
448
in the GC discourse, the morality of
the nation, a very political issue by nature, as central. Gülen mentioned that the main
elements of our religion and national culture should be absorbed by the society, even if
this (making society absorb these values) is done in a disguised/covert way. None of the
groups in society such as family, school, religious shrines and barracks should be
deprived of these values.
449
Gülen was against establishing a completely new political
system or social order. Instead, he wanted to introduce novelties that are connected to old
values. The assertion that change should be achieved through evolution, not revolution
450

demonstrated the centrality of order, balance and harmony in the Community discourse.
In order to achieve order, balance and harmony, we need morality. The state was viewed
as an important factor in protecting and perpetuating morality and other elements of
national identity.
451
The importance of the state for the provision of order and stability
were aspects of the dominant discourse after the 1980 military coup. In the 1980s, Gülen
support for a strong state in providing order in the face of anarchy allowed the
Community to continue its activities. Similarly, in the late 1990s, when the electoral
success of the Islamic Welfare Party caused political tensions and led to the February 28
th

447
Ünal, T. “Sızıntı'nın Dünyasından” Sızıntı No:295, February 1996.

448
Leading Article “Yaşatma Đ deali” (Ideal of Keeping Others Alive), Sızıntı No:337, February 1997. Kont, Bayram
“Değişime Uyum Sağlamak” (Adapting to Change), Sızıntı, No:233, June 1996.

449
Leading Article “Đ lim Aşkı” Sızıntı, No: 208 May 1996. In this article instead of “values” Gülen uses the phrase “the
soul and meaning” to refer to elements of religion and national culture.

450
Kont, Bayram “Değişime Uyum Sağlamak” (Adapting to Change), Sızıntı, No:233, June 1996.

451
Ibid.

173

process, Gülen’s focus on individual transformation for an orderly social transformation
and its view of the state as the guarantor of the status quo as opposed to supporting
drastic socio-political changes once again differentiated the Community from Islamic
actors who viewed top-down changes as necessary for social transformation. Thanks to
its statist discourse, the GC was able to establish ties with the political leaders in this
period.

The GC often emphasizes that individual transformation is essential for social
transformation. What makes change possible are the actions of these individuals. Action,
one of the most important elements of Gülen communities’ discourse,
452
involves “trying
to make individuals and groups acquire a new culture and understanding.” It means
putting the ideas that emerge from our essence into practice. “Ideas that emerge from our
essence” is a continuation of the Islamist discourses of 19
th
century. However, unlike the
latter, the GC also used the word “terakki” (progress), a concept adopted from Western
enlightenment discourse by the Ottoman Westernist intellectuals in 19
th
century. The
concept of progress was incorporated into community discourse and given a new
meaning: progress without changing national culture and identity.

In Sızıntı, discussions of national identity and the existence of different identities focused
on the identity problems individuals might face as a result of increased interaction among

452
Leading Article “Değişen Dünyanın Dinamikleri” (Dynamics of a Changing World), Sızıntı No: 206 March 1996.
Berka, S. Emre “Moderniteden Post Moderniteye Problemler” (Problems from Modernity to Post-Modernity), Sızıntı
No:235, August 1998. Aydın, Selim “Potansiyel Güç Bakımından Doğrulara Bakış” Sızıntı No: 247, August 1999.
Gönüllü, Ömer Said “Yeni Bin Yıla Girerken” Sızıntı, No:247, August 1999.
174

different societies. Once again, national identity as social and political issue was
discussed primarily through identity issues of an individual. Possible identity problems
were exemplified by a man, who, while drinking beer, suggests to his German friend that
he convert to Islam. Being Muslim and consuming alcohol was viewed as an identity
crisis, because the two cultures here, the German and Muslim culture contradict one
another. Thus, in GC discourse, desirable self-identity was one that does not involve
contradictions. “Different identities” were acceptable as long as they do not contradict the
basic common identity of a nation.
453

d. Economy

The GC’s discourse on capitalism also involved elements from 19
th
century Islamist
discourses. In Sızıntı, capitalism had a negative connotation, associated with self-interest.
The emergence of self-centered individuals was viewed as a result of forgetting one’s
culture.
454
Colonialism was referred to as a devilish system, and countries that are
crushed between the teeth of this system are not likely to be able to walk towards the
future. It was argued that products and raw materials should be bought and sold for their
real prices so that less developed countries could avoid being tricked by the tools of the
strong economy of the West. Despite the negative connotation of capitalism, particularly
the economies of the West, adopting an “economic state of mind,” “economic

453
Gönüllü, November 1997.

454
Leading Article “Geçmiş ve Gelecek” (Past and Future) Sızıntı, No:227, December 1997.

175

consciousness” or “building a civilization of industrialization” was encouraged: “In
contrast to the West, Muslim Turkish society will not be a part of dirty and illegitimate
aspects of industrialization.”
455
The last sentence indicates that industrialization itself was
not viewed as inherently bad and that it was possible to avoid its dirty and illegitimate
aspects.

In the late 1990s there were various articles in Sızıntı that suggest a new understanding of
the economic system. “In order to overcome economic problems such as high inflation” a
new order of morality, understanding of the economy, conception of capital, philosophy
of labor, virtue and spirit of responsibility is required.
456
This economic system should
involve the use of resources (above and below ground) in the framework of justice and
fairness, solidarity, always for the good.
457
All of the suggestions for solving economic
problems focused on the cultural elements related to economic life. An “economic
consciousness and culture” involved an ideal of development, high morale, eagerness to
work and produce, elimination of wasteful expenditures, minimization of consumption,
and domination of our thoughts by moral values and the idea of social responsibility.
458

The idea of social responsibility was reinforced with the phrase, “We should not expect

455
Güngör, Turan “Asrı Saadetten Günümüze Piyasa Ahlakı” (Market Morality from “The Century of Happiness” until
Today), Sızıntı, No:208 May 1996.

456
Güngör, Turan “Enflasyon ve Çarpık Đ ktisadî Yapı” (Inflation and Distorted Economic Structure), Sızıntı, No: 227,
December 1997.

457
Leading Article “Değişen Dünyanın Dinamikleri” (Dynamics of a Changing World), Sızıntı, No:206, March 1996.

458
Güngör, Turan “Enflasyon ve Çarpık Đ ktisadî Yapı” (Inflation and Distorted Economic Structure), Sızıntı, No: 227,
December 1997.

176

everything from the state,” a dominant discursive element in Turkey during the 1980s. In
February 1997, Gülen indicated that aside from the state and the government, many
responsibilities fall on voluntary institutions and even on each individual.
459
In social life
outside of work, small groups provide togetherness (birliktelik)
460
and informal
education, which is the primary factor that shapes an individual’s life.
461

The significance of an order of morality and individual responsibility for economic
stability is a part of both the Third Way neoliberal discourse and the AKP’s neoliberal
discourse in the 2000s. It is no surprise that Sızıntı promoted social responsibility and
voluntary institutions in the late 1990s, also an important element of the neoliberal
discourses, since in this period the GC itself had already started to fulfill a neoliberal
economic role of a non-state safety network and a welfare provider.

e. Women

Between 1996 and 1999 there was only one article in Sızıntı on women and gender
differences.
462
The article first explained the differences in men’s and women’s brains
regarding the learning process. The author asserted that “There is no doubt in the fact that
the gender identity in the mind is determined in accordance with the biological program

459
Sızıntı, “Buhran ve Kahramanlar” (Crisis and Heroes), no: 215, December, 1996.

460
Ibid.

461
Çaldıranlı, Selim, “21.Yüzyıl Anlayışında Yeni Bir Model: Hizmetkâr Liderlik” (A New Model in the 21
st
Century
Mentality: Servant Leadership, Sızıntı, No: 239, December 1998.

462
Polat, Şemsettin “Eğitimde Cinsiyet Faktörü” (Gender Factor in Education), Sızıntı, no: 215, December 1996.

177

of the human body, not according to culture or social conditioning.”
463
The author
mentioned that men and women are equal individuals in society. However, they are
unequal in terms of their abilities and skills. The reason for the lower number of women
engineers is not socio-economic inequalities between the two genders that result from
gender constructions. Instead, it is a result of teaching men and women in a way more
suited to men. As a result of the gender revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, women fell to
the position of “a tool for satisfaction of desires” or a “commodity common to all”
instead of occupying an important place in society. From the article the reader infers that
“this inferior position” was considered to be a result of education styles and syllabi that
were not suitable for women. If we really want to encourage more women to become
engineers we can find a way to teach mathematics in a way that is more suitable to
women’s brains.
464
In the context of discussions of whether the religious community
schools teach girls and boys in separate classes, the argument that girls and boys need
different syllabi functioned as a legitimation for teaching girls and boys in different
classrooms.

f. Democracy, freedom, human rights

In the late 1990s, the concepts of democracy and human rights entered into the
Community discourse and had a positive connotation in the discourse. However, there

463
Ibid.

464
Ibid.

178

was no discussion of their meaning or how they were related to the other concepts in the
Community discourse. Between 1996 and November 1999, the concept of democracy
was mentioned once and the concept of human rights was mentioned twice. In 1997,
Gönüllü argued that concepts such as upholding democracy and human rights were
almost viewed as a part of national identity, and thus part of individual self-identity as
well.
465
In March 1996, Gülen mentioned that problems, whose source is the society,
cannot be solved by power over thought or fighting over public offices. Neither of the
concepts were substantiated or discussed in Sızıntı.

5.6.4. Reference points and Associated Concepts

The figure below shows the major reference points and concepts that are re-defined in
accordance with these reference points.

465
Gönüllü, Ömer Said “Kimlik Meselesi Üzerine” (On the Issue of Identity), Sızıntı, No:225, November, 1997.

Figure 5.1. Reference Points and Associated Concepts Used in the GC

In the late 1990s, fıtrat
constituted one of the central reference points, through which other concepts are defined.
In this period the GC discourse emphasized the role of individuals in generating social
transformation. Criticism of various philosophies,
materialism) was largely directed towards the individuals who espoused them.
Comparisons between the “golden age” and the social order in “the last few centuries”
were drawn through opposing personality traits. In brin
stressed the importance of specific personality traits, such as having a balance between
rationality and emotions and discipline to achieve one’s ideals. is a central reference point
that constructed subject positions. Aspec
5.1. Reference Points and Associated Concepts Used in the GC Discourse between 1996 and 1999
fıtrat (human nature) and an individuals’ characteristics together
constituted one of the central reference points, through which other concepts are defined.
In this period the GC discourse emphasized the role of individuals in generating social
transformation. Criticism of various philosophies, ideologies and beliefs (for example,
materialism) was largely directed towards the individuals who espoused them.
Comparisons between the “golden age” and the social order in “the last few centuries”
were drawn through opposing personality traits. In bringing about social change, Gülen
stressed the importance of specific personality traits, such as having a balance between
rationality and emotions and discipline to achieve one’s ideals. is a central reference point
that constructed subject positions. Aspects of human nature such as order, harmony,
179

Discourse between 1996 and 1999
’ characteristics together
constituted one of the central reference points, through which other concepts are defined.
In this period the GC discourse emphasized the role of individuals in generating social
ideologies and beliefs (for example,
materialism) was largely directed towards the individuals who espoused them.
Comparisons between the “golden age” and the social order in “the last few centuries”
ging about social change, Gülen
stressed the importance of specific personality traits, such as having a balance between
rationality and emotions and discipline to achieve one’s ideals. is a central reference point
ts of human nature such as order, harmony,
180

stability, and balance were also presented as constituting aspects of an ideal society.
Acting in line with these traits would result in a balanced, stable and harmonious society,
in other words, in the “a moral order.”

5.7. DISCURSIVE SHIFT : MARCH-DECEMBER 1999

The main discursive shift in the GC took place around June 1999, when videotapes in
which Gülen seemed to advocate an Islamic state were released.
466
This heralded a
significant and abrupt change in the GC discourse. After March 1999, the main difference
in Sızıntı was not the choice of topics, but the nomination and predication strategies
employed in addressing those topics. Prevalent topics between 1996 and 1999, such as
the difference between self and other, old social order and new social order, action and
criticism of capitalism, continued to be discussed in 1999.

Towards the latter half of the 1999, there was an increase in the articles focusing on
education, science (ilim) and media. One of the most significant changes in Sızıntı was
the introduction of the concept of dialog in the March 1999 issue. The concept was
defined as opening one’s mind, soul and heart to others, but it was not further elaborated.
Still, the inclusion of the concept of dialog into the discourse of the community is
significant, as it was central in the process of discursive articulation.

466
“1999 Hayat Kronolojisi” (1999 Chronology), accessed June 29, 2011,
http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/3028/128/.
181

Regarding characteristics of self and other, a significant and swift change took place in
the community discourse after March 1999, both in terms of mode of expression (tone)
and the substance of texts. The contrast between self and other continued, but the focus of
the contrast shifted towards the self and away from the other. Until mid-1999, the
Community discourse on “self and other” had centered around constructing an identity
for the Community followers through referring to the ideal follower as “the person of
action/ideals/volition” and through long descriptions of the other. In the second half of
1999, the focus is on explaining the self to those who are outside the Community. Long
descriptions of the self precede a short, yet severe, criticism of the other.

In the brief segments where identity of the other was constructed, the contents of the
descriptions were similar to pre-1999. Also similar to pre-1999, the other was not well-
specified. Until mid-1999, the social order established by the other, referred to as
materialists or “today’s generations,” was depicted as the prevalent social order.
Contrasts between the old and new social order, which were discussed above, conveyed
the idea that the existing social conditions need to be slowly gradually transformed.
Starting from June 1999, the other was described as a small group of people, only a
“marginal section of the society,” instead of “today’s generations.” Gülen mentioned that
almost ninety percent of the Turkish population approved the GC, and referred to the
182

activities of the Community as a “sacred process.” Remaining small group was causing
animosity, anarchy and making false accusations.
467

Starting with the leading article by Gülen himself in November 1999, the self was
constructed as wronged and aggrieved.
468
The self is a group of people, represented by
the pronoun “we,” who had always cried for “respect for people.”
469
They had accepted
the reality of other religious and philosophical views. For this reason the slogan of this
group of people had been “Respect for and acceptance of everyone as they are.”
470
They
had embraced the phrases “Respect for people, love for everything and everyone and
tolerance for the whole world.” Sızıntı called to its followers to respect and protect the
values of humanity at least from now on: “Let’s bury the disagreements in history, and
respect (different) opinions.”
471

The change in the characteristics of the self was accompanied by a change in the
description of the cultural values of the nation. Gülen argued that in our understanding of
culture and civilization, values of humanity have always been in the forefront.
472
In

467
Ibid.

468
Leading Article “Kendimizi Dinleme Zamanı” (Time to Listen to Ourselves) Sızıntı, No: 250, November 1999.

469
Leading Article “Gel Gönüllerimizle Konuşalım, Demiştik” (We Had Said Let’s Talk with Our Souls), Sızıntı,
No:249, October 1999.

470
Ibid.

471
Leading Article “Kendimizi Dinleme Zamanı” (Time to Listen to Ourselves) Sızıntı, No: 250, November 1999

472
Leading Article “Fanteziler ve Đ htiyaçlar” (Fantasies and Needs), Sızıntı, No:251 December 1999.

183

March 1999, a member of the editorial board of Sızıntı, Arif Sarsılmaz, wrote an article
on Sızıntı itself. Addressing the journal in the second person singular, he mentioned that
he learned how to “‘plow the field’ without irritating some people and how to avoid
making friends envious.”
473
What Sarsılmaz meant is that Sızıntı’s discourse carefully
avoided open confrontation with the secular actors in the society; at the same time it
made an effort to avoid the harsh criticisms of other Islamic actors who were wary of
Gülen’s discourse that exalted the state and emphasized the importance of order, stability
and slow, gradual social change. Using such a discourse, the GC aimed to survive the
polarization between Islamists and seculars in the 1990s.

The new self-identity constructed in a matter of months was presented as if it had always
been the identity of the GC. However, such a swift change highlighted numerous
contradictions. While the journal advised its readers to respect universal values and
different opinions and cultures,
474
in another issue, Gülen criticized the espousal of a
worldview different from our own cultural heritage.
475
The emphasis on culture instead
of religion and morality seemed to result from the GC’s effort not to challenge the secular
character of the state.

473
Sarsilmaz, A. “20 Senelik Arkadaşımla Hasbihal” (Conversation with my Friend of 20 Years), Sızıntı, No: 242,
March 1999.

474
Leading Article “Gel Gönüllerimizle Konuşalım, Demiştik” (We Had Said Let’s Talk with Our Souls), Sızıntı,
No:249, October 1999.

475
Leading Article “Fanteziler ve Đ htiyaçlar” (Fantasies and Needs), Sızıntı, No:251, December 1999.
184

5.8. DISCURSIVE ARTICULATION: 2006-2011

5.8.1. Topics

As the size and number of businesses owned by GC participants increased and they
became important actors of the economic system in Turkey, the Community itself
became more institutionalized, the reach of its institutions increased and the range of its
activities diversified. As a result, especially after 2006, there was a discernible increase in
the number and range of issues in the community’s publications. In Sızıntı, Kırık Testi
and Bamteli, identity construction through descriptions of self and others continued to be
one of the most prominent topics. As more and more women in the GC started to work
both in the institutions of the community and in the private sector, women’s role in the
public and private spheres became an issue of interest. The need to regulate the
relationship between men and women increased. As a result, after 2006, there was a
significant increase in the number of articles on marriage and family life, working
mothers and their families, and divorce. Compared to the early 2000s, in this period
concepts of dialog, human rights, justice and democracy were also much more elaborated
upon, and articulated into the community discourse. Articles on economic issues
increased in number. As community businesses became more successful, a need emerged
to regulate the relations between employer and employee. Community discourse evolved
in order to shape these relationships. Many diverse issues on the economy were covered
185

in the publications: how to conduct trade; business ethics; globalization and economic
crisis; worker’s rights; and relations between employers and employees in Islam. From
time to time these topics have been accompanied by a criticism of a consumption society.
In line with neo-liberal discourse, social services and altruism were offered as a remedy
for the economic hardships. Explanations of social justice and the principles of an Islamic
economic system were provided as a guide for Muslim businessmen.

5.8.2. Nomination

As a result of the diversification of community members’ activities, new categories for
construction of the self and other emerged. The other became more defined. Alongside
the “West,” publications started to identify the EU and USA as separate actors. Even
more specific, US corporations and European youth emerged as actors in community
publications. As community members started to interact with an increasing number of
actors in various settings, different constructions of self emerged with reference to
different others. In the US community, members saw themselves as “representatives of
the Turkish nation.”
476

476
For arguments on the representation of the GC for Turkey see Yılmaz, 2007; Haque, 2011.
186

NOMINATION OF SELF AND OTHER BETWEEN 2006-2011

SELF

We
Soldier Son of a Soldier Dad
Turkey
Muslim, pious, the faithful
Heroes, altruists, Soldiers of Hizmet
Businessmen, worker
Spiritual/moral person
Movement of Those who Volunteer

OTHER

You
West, Westeners
USA, , Cartels in the US
EU, European youth
The opposite side
Some people
Devil
Brother, neighbor

Table 5.2. Nomination of Self and Other in the GC Discourse between 2006 and 2011

5.8.3. Predication

a. Self and Other

In the latter half of the 2000s, the financial resources of the GC grew significantly,
increasing the range and reach of the Community activities. As a result, the Community
members started to interact with many different actors, including other Islamic business
187

associations such as MÜSĐ AD, as well as with non-Islamic TÜSĐ AD, international
governmental and non-governmental institutions. In the process, the discourses of the
Community regarding relationships between actors in the economic sphere, in families,
and in everyday life became more elaborate. As the Community started to interact with
more diverse actors, it felt to need to communicate with them, while preserving its own
identity. As a result, “dialog and tolerance between cultures,” and “inter-faith dialogue”
discourses dominated the Community’s interaction with non-Turkish social actors.

Another significant change in the community discourse has been the construction of a
division between the folk Muslimness or “cultural Muslimness” and “conscious
Muslimness.” This division served to differentiate community members, who are
“conscious Muslims,” from people who practice Islam in accordance with what they have
learnt from their environment. The latter group of people learns Islam from cultural
practices, while conscious Muslimness is acquired from authorities on Islam such as
Said-i Nursi. “Cultural” Muslimness was identified as one of the major threats, and a
disaster for the believers.
477
Those who view cultural Muslimness as sufficient, see Islam
as similar to other cultural traditions. It is imitated. A person cannot meet with/discover
true Islam in this way. This discourse involved the assumption that there is only one true
Islam, and it should be learnt from a theologian or religious authority. The distinction
between cultural and conscious Muslimness has given the community the power of

477
Gülen, “Kültür Müslümanlığı ve Tahkîkî Đ man” (Cultural Muslimness and Inquiring Faith) Kırık Testi, 12.12.2004.
Gülen “Şekilcilik Ağındaki Dinî Hayat veya Kültür Müslümanlığı” (Religious Life in the Web of Formalism or
Cultural Muslimness), Kırık Testi, 28.03.2011.
188

knowledge, which means that the community is constructing itself as an authority on
what “conscious Muslim” identity entails.

b. Working Women

Neoliberalization of the economic system and feminization of the workforce alongside it
increased women’s presence in the public sphere. Jobs in the informal economy with no
job security, low wages, flexible working hours, part time or done from home are
disproportionately filled by women.
478
In response to changing socioeconomic structure,
Sızıntı published articles on changes in gender roles and in relations in both the public
and private spheres. These articles mostly focused on working mothers, marriage and
family life. Followers of the community asked Gülen many questions abou these changes,
and his responses were published in Kırık Testi and Bamteli. In an article on working
mothers, he advises women to consider all the adverse effects of working on their
children.
479
The article does not mention any positive effects. Omission of the other side
of the story serves to legitimate staying at home. He argues that women are by nature
(italics mine) more sensitive to fatigue and stress. In addition, if the wages are barely
enough to cover the costs of commuting, food (consumed at work) and child care
expenses, staying home is argued to be more beneficial. Elsewhere Gülen frames daycare

478
Beneria, 2001.

479
Aydınlı, Hasan “Çalışan Anneler ve Onların Çocukları” (Working Mothers and Their Children), Sızıntı, No: 388,
May 2011.

189

for children in terms of their being alone, deprived of parents’ care, and more or less
abandoned.
480
So, the advice in the journal is that “working only if necessary” should be
the principle in deciding to work.

In Bamteli, Gülen mentioned that women can work as long as the workplace is run in
accordance with the basic principles of religion. Women and men decide on this together
and arrange their daily chores.
481
In an article in Sızıntı published three years later, details
regarding working women were elaborated. Accordingly, there are certain jobs that can
be performed by women. If the mother works in such a job, other family members need
to help (italics mine) her with the household chores. Aydınlı argued that in Islam women
and men have clearly assigned roles.
482
The head of the household is the father. If the
mother earns more than the father and is economically independent, she should be
respectful to her spouse as the head of the household. Children should see their father as
the authority at home. Working should not be understood as gaining power or self-
sufficiency. Working means providing the required support for the family. If mothers use
working as an advantage this will weaken the bonds in the family.

In the context of GC, women’s “nature” (fıtrat) was used as a reference point or “prism”
through which the concept of “working woman” was articulated into the community

480
Gülen, “Toplumda Çoğulculuk ve Ailede Beraberlik” (Pluralism in Society and Unity in the Family), Bamteli, April
18, 2010.

481
Ibid.

482
Aydınlı, Hasan “Aileye En Büyük Tehdit: Boşanma,” (The Biggest Threat for the Family: Divorce), Sızıntı, No:
378, July 2010.
190

discourse. A woman who acts according to her fıtrat does not work unless it is a necessity
for the family’s well-being. If she works, she works in a job that is appropriate to her
fıtrat. She respects gender relations in the household that are determined by fıtrat. The
concept of fıtrat provides an adjustment to and acceptance of the gender inequalities
exacerbated by the neo-liberal economy. A discourse which adopts the concept of
“citizen’s rights” as a reference point/prism in understanding social services would
characterize higher wages and childcare services for women as a “right” of the citizen. A
discourse that ignores or de-emphasizes the idea that provision welfare services is the
right of the citizens and an obligation of the state prevents the criticism of a political
system that overrides these rights or views welfare services as a “gift” from the stare to
its citizens. Such a discourse also accepts and legitimates the circumstances
neoliberalization pushes women into. Readers can infer that it is normal for women to
receive lower wages because women are constructed as physically weak and mentally
“more sensitive to stress” at work. Taking care of children is the mother’s job; therefore,
it is normal that childcare is not provided. By informing women that their children need
their mothers in various times of the day, part-time jobs and working from home are
encouraged, but again only if such work is absolutely necessary for the family. This
discourse not only serves to perpetuate the neoliberal system. It also supports the AKP’s
discourse which constructs the institution of family as the main protector of women from
injustices, as opposed to “rights” ensured by the state as discussed in Chapter 3.

191

c. The Economy

c.1. Lack of morality as the cause of economic problems and an “Islamic Economy” as
a remedy

Criticism of capitalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s evolved into criticism of more
specific aspects of the world economic system by the latter half of the 2000s. The
criticism by Gülen was now directed towards the self-interested homo-economicus, the
consumption society, the concentration of power in the world economic system and the
resulting inequalities between countries. Globalization was constructed as a threatening
process.
483
The problems caused by economic policies in Turkey were not discussed;
rather, economic inequalities were portrayed as resulting from a materialist culture based
on self-interest, and inequality between the countries’ economic powers. Turkey’s
economic interests were presented as unitary.

The main reason for economic crises and inequalities was viewed as the degeneration of
morality. Here, morality is understood as a timeless and universal measure of human
behavior. Degeneration of morality results from a loss of cultural values. It is significant
that since the mid-1990s, the economic system itself had never been viewed as a cause of
the spread of values such as self-interest. When morality degenerates, unsatisfied

483
Aydınlı, Hasan, “Çalışan Anneler ve Onların Çocukları” (Working Mothers and Their Children) Sızıntı No: 388,
May 2011.

192

ambition, self-interest and the blinding effect of one’s bodily appetites takes over
individuals. The financial crises seem to be a result of combined decisions of self-
interested individuals who lack moral values.
484
In the June 2011 issue of Sızıntı Yavaş
argued that “consumption madness”, indulgence in luxury and extravagance lead to
economic crises.
485

To avoid economic problems such as financial crises and inequality, we need to restore
morality. An Islamic economy would ensure moral practices and lead to economic
prosperity. An “Islamic economy” refers to the economic system adopted in the Prophet
Mohammed’s lifetime. Especially in the latter half of the 2000s, Sızıntı and Kırık Testi
published articles on how the economic system functioned in this period.
486
An Islamic
economy prevents socioeconomic inequalities and promotes economic development
through the system of zekat (alms), rules of fairness in trade, discouraging the use of
interest, thereby encouraging investment in productive industries and promoting
harmonious relations between employers and employees. The principles of an Islamic
economy are very similar to the remedies neoliberal discourse offers to solve economic
problems, as we shall see below.

484
Gönüllü, Ö.Said, “Temel(deki) Kriz Đ nsan” (Fundamental Crisis: Human Being), Sızıntı, No:359, December 2008.

485
Yavaş, Đ smail “Đ stenmeyen Bir Fırsat: Đş sizlik” (An Unwanted Opportunity: Unemployment), Sızıntı, No: 389, June,
2011.

486
Gülen, F., “Ticarî Anlaşmalar ve Kalblere Atılan Đ mzalar” (Commercial Agreements and Signatures on Hearts),
Bamteli, July 5, 2010. Gülen, F., “Geçim Standardı” (The Standard of Living) Kırık Testi, February 2, 2003. Gülen, F.
“Đş Ahlakı ve Ekonomik Kriz” (Business Ethics and Economic Crisis), Bamteli November 13, 2008.

193

c.2. Relations Between Employers and Employees

In March 2006 Gülen provided a detailed explanation of worker’s rights and relationships
between employers and employees. “Rights” is defined as power given to individuals by
the legitimate authority to fulfill material and spiritual needs in a religiously sanctioned
way.
487
In other words, the limits of rights are defined by religion. Gülen indicates
indicated that in Islam all people are equal in terms of value and rights. The Prophet
advised protecting the rights of the workers, payment of their wages on time and in full,
and behaving properly towards them. Gülen’s assertions on the relationship between
employers and employees exist in the discourses of other Islamic actors as well, such as
the businessmen’s association MÜSĐ AD. Gülen further explains that Islam protects child
workers. In Islam children are allowed to work to learn arts (artisan/crafts) only if their
parents give their consent. He mentions that in Islam any kind of work that is dangerous
for a worker’s health is forbidden. Islam prevents the exploitation of workers, and thus
“in a way developed the understanding of a classless society.” Here, Gülen’s
understanding of “classless society” seems to refer to a society where income differences
do exist but exploitation of worker is avoided. Gülen mentions that “worker” and
“employee” are concepts developed by the West. The words worker and employee are
also used in Islamic society; but they are not intended to denote a social class. What
Gülen means is these concepts refer to what individuals do for a living, their job, not their

487
Gülen, F., “Đ slam’da Đş çi Hakları ve Đş çi-Đş veren Münasebetleri” (Labor Rights and Labor-Employer Relations in
Islam), Kırık Testi, March 27, 2006.
194

place in social structure. In the social life of Muslims there is no class conflict. Gülen
mentions that “in Islam richness and poverty are viewed as tests for the Muslims,” which
means that income inequalities are not viewed primarily as the result of the socio-
economic system. Instead they are viewed as natural. Gülen refers to Islam’s
understanding of the economic system as a “just order.” In a just order, there is the
principle of the ‘brotherhood of religion” (din kardeşliği): nobody is always an employer
or employee. These roles can change. Islam is in favor of balance and harmony between
employers and employees. Therefore, in Islam strikes and lock-outs are discouraged and
socioeconomic conflicts should be avoided.
488
The erosion of class-based identity in
favor of cultural identities promoted since 1980 in Turkey constitutes a significant
element in the AKP’s hegemonic discourse discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, the GC
discourses support and help legitimate the AKP’s discourse.

d. Social Justice

The GC discourse does not completely exempt the state from providing social services.
Gülen mentions that if the individuals cannot find jobs, the state is obliged to find them
jobs or create new job opportunities. Safeguarding the livelihood of the sick, old,
homeless and poor is also among the state’s duties. In this sense, the state is similar to a

488
Ibid.

195

“caring father” of the society.
489
However, since the early 2000s, Gülen has encouraged
the provision of social justice through the establishment of voluntary social services,
social solidarity against poverty, and civil society institutions in keeping with neoliberal
discourse. In the January 2009 issue of Sızıntı social services provided by pious civil
society institutions are differentiated from secular civil society institutions.
490
Pious
social services have a spiritual dimension. This means that social services are provided
adhering to the model of a “moral person” and in accordance with national moral values.

e. Social Transformation: The Relationship between the Individual and Society

In the late 1990s, the GC’s discourse on the relationship between the individual and the
community (in the context of social transformation) was based on the idea of social
change through the transformation of the individual, an understanding of identity without
contradictions, and the acceptance of individual differences only after basic national
identities are consolidated. In the late 2000s, a change in the collective cognition was also
viewed as necessary to transform individuals and families. Collective cognition” was
defined as a combination of religion, morality, culture and fitrat (human nature by
creation). According to Gülen, collective cognition does not mean suppression of
differences; rather, it is synonymous with the creation of an environment suitable to the
emergence of different abilities and dispositions. In such an environment, people are

489
Ibid.

490
Seyyar, Ali “Mâneviyat Eksenli Sosyal Hizmetler” (Social Services with Spirituality), Sızıntı, No: 360, January
2009.
196

respectful of each other’s opinions and open to different observations. However, Gülen
argued that the form and re-creation (islah and ihya) of the institution of the family
depends on the reform and re-creation of society with religion and tradition, with all its
institutions.
491
Gülen also expressed his opinion that people should not be permitted to
get married until they get a diploma or certificate that says “he/she can get married.” It is
not clear who will give this certificate. Whether he means parents or someone who knows
religious and customary principles well, or someone who is experienced in marriage,
individuals should make certain life choices only with the permission of others.

The boundaries between collective cognition and individual choices are established by
controlling women’s place in society, as women’s empowerment is challenging and
shifting those boundaries. In the GC, feminism is viewed as one of the major causes of
increasing divorce rates, which is an indication of the loss of moral values and the
degeneration of Turkish culture. Feminist views lead to competition between men and
women and damage the peace in families. “A group of feminists” want to idolize women
(worshipping women instead of God). This idolization leads women to struggle with
“handicaps” that are not in keeping with their nature. (fıtrat). The handicaps are not
explained in this article but in the context of this and other texts on women, one can infer
that these “handicaps” are jobs and activities that are viewed as appropriate for men.
Gülen criticizes the “serazat” (i.e. free, independent, and comfortable) lives that both

491
Gülen, F., “Kendi Değerlerimiz ve Bizim Yuvamız” (Our Own Values and Our Home), Kırık Testi, January 3,
2011.

197

men and women lead.
492
Thus, challenging men’s position in society and engaging in
activities that are contrary to women’s nature indicate that the boundary of individual
freedom has been crossed and public, which acts with collective cognition, should
interfere to protect both society and woman.

The idea that differences are encouraged within collective cognition based on a
commonly accepted level of morality helps us understand the meaning of “difference” in
the community. Difference is understood in terms of variance in the abilities, capabilities
and dispositions within the limits of collective cognition. It does not mean making life
choices contrary to the collective cognition, being completely free and independent from
the family and community. Behaviors that are considered to be against one’s nature
(fıtrat) are not identified as being different, they are identified as acting in contradiction
to the collective cognition.

The discourse of “respect for differences” that has been constructed as a part of the
neoliberal hegemonic discourse by the intellectuals is articulated by the GC with the
reference point of morality. Morality, which is constituted of commonly accepted
traditions and religious principles, acts as a lens through which difference is understood.
Morality also sets the boundaries of what constitutes difference and what constitutes
deviant behavior. This boundary has been much more clearly defined in the late 2000s
compared to the early 2000s. The imbuing of everyday life with religious principles and

492
Gülen, F., “Evlilik ve Aile Hayatı” (Marriage and Family Life), Kırık Testi, May 16, 2011.
198

traditions is justified in the community discourse by the need for security and safety. This
discourse in the community serves to legitimate and support the neoliberal hegemonic
discourse in Turkey discussed on Chapter 3.

f. Liberty, Justice, Democracy and Human Rights

In the latter half of the 2000s, liberty was defined in the GC discourse as the ability to
realize unimpeded every wish that is not contrary to the spirit of religion. Liberty does
not mean excessive freedom. The boundaries of freedom are determined by morality.
True liberty can be realized only by setting aside worldly worries and burdens and
orienting oneself towards God. In today’s world, liberty is understood as realizing every
wish without any obstacles. This conceptualization of liberty is based on materialism
instead of morality. The concept of morality also plays the role of a prism through which
the concept of justice is re-constructed. Justice is defined as acting in accordance with
creation (fıtrat). Morality acts as a conflict resolution mechanism. Changing the rules set
by morality is viewed as anarchy and therefore illegitimate.

In the latter half of the 2000s, the concept of multiculturalism began to be articulated. In
multicultural societies, rules should protect the rights of everyone. For the sake of
harmony, everyone should be equal under the law, and there should be no discrimination.
It is significant that rule of law was mentioned and advocated for the first time in this
199

context. However, in discussions of multiculturalism, the focus was only on the rights of
pious people, and the emphasis was largely on the headscarf issue. How multiculturalism
would apply to other cultures in the society was not discussed. Moreover, Gülen’s
portrayal of the relationship between individual and society demonstrates the assumption
that “our own values,” traditions and religious principles are clearly identifiable and
therefore mutually agreed upon.

As Hall argues, articulation involves connections between earlier discourse patterns and
new ideologies, and a change in the relative weight of the earlier discourses. In the late
2000s the GC still made references to security and safety, which are the remnants of the
dominant discourse of the early 1980s. However, the Community discourse shifted the
meanings of these concepts by connecting them to the need for cultural boundaries in the
context of the intensification of economic, social and cultural ties between countries. As a
result of this articulation, security and safety have come to be portrayed in economic
terms. Support for the state, one of the most distinguishing features of the GC until the
late 1990s, also evolved in the late 2000s towards cultural independence and protecting
national identities. In sum, the GC discourse of the late 2000s involves elements from its
earlier discourses and from earlier hegemonic discourses in Turkey.

In the second half of the 2000s, however, there is much more emphasis on the role of the
community vis-à-vis the individual in bringing about social change. The community
becomes more important, not only in terms of shaping personality traits, but also in terms
200

of identifying the meaning of democracy, pluralism and human rights. The primary
means of social change is now viewed as the “collective cognition,” which is composed
of religion, morality, culture and human nature. The next section will focus on the
connections between these discursive shifts and changes in the socioeconomic and
political structure in Turkey in the process of neoliberal restructuring.

5.8.4. Reference Points And Related Concepts
The figure below shows the significant reference points and the concepts they redefine in
the GC discourse in the second half of 2000s. The reference points and associated
concepts will be discussed in the next section.

Figure 5.2. Reference Points and Associated Concepts in the GC

5.9. DISCURSIVE SHIFTS AND HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES

5.9.1. Shift from individual Centered Social Change
Social Change

As discussed in Chapter 4, neoliberal discourse in the 1980s that centered on
individualism was articulated in the 1990s with paternalism and referred to as the “Third
Way” discourse. The articulation of neoliberal
Figure 5.2. Reference Points and Associated Concepts in the GC Discourse between 2006 and 2011
DISCURSIVE SHIFTS AND HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES
Shift from individual Centered Social Change towards Community Centered
As discussed in Chapter 4, neoliberal discourse in the 1980s that centered on
individualism was articulated in the 1990s with paternalism and referred to as the “Third
Way” discourse. The articulation of neoliberalism and paternalism stresses the centrality
201

Discourse between 2006 and 2011
towards Community Centered
As discussed in Chapter 4, neoliberal discourse in the 1980s that centered on
individualism was articulated in the 1990s with paternalism and referred to as the “Third
ism and paternalism stresses the centrality
202

of communities and the welfare services they provide for groups or individuals who are
disadvantaged in the neoliberal order.
493
It was argued in Chapter 2 that in Turkey,
individualism never fully became an element of a hegemonic discourse. The Third Way
discourse, with its emphasis on the communities, was compatible with the hegemonic
discourses in Turkey which, from 1980 onwards, emphasized collective identity based on
nationalism and national culture. For this reason, relative to the individualism in the
neoliberal discourse, the integration of the Third Way discourse into the hegemonic
discourses in Turkey was deeper.

Parallel to the shift of emphasis from individualism towards communitarianism in global
neoliberal discourses, the GC’s individual-centered discourse shifted towards a more
community-centered discourse towards 2000. It is important to clarify that an individual-
centered discourse does not necessarily mean an individualistic discourse. Indeed, one of
the cornerstones of the Gülen discourse has been the construction of a Muslim as “an
individual responsible for others” (diğergam). Nevertheless, the increased emphasis on
the role of community in driving social change coincided with the rise of Third Way
neoliberal discourse. As a result, the Gülen discourse became more compatible with the
hegemonic discourses, allowing the emergence of new articulations within the
community discourse, as well as in the hegemonic discourses of the AKP. The concepts
of “active citizens/communities” in the Third Way discourse and “person of action” in

493
MacGregor, 1999: 95-100.
203

the Gülen discourse point to the rising importance of the citizen’s rather than the state’s
responsibility for welfare.

5.9.2. Shift from “Culture” towards “Collective cognition ” as the basis for social
peace

Increased emphasis on community in the Gülen discourse is accompanied by an emphasis
on “collective cognition” as a basis for common identity. Before 1980, class was a
reference point in defining collective consciousness. Parallel to this process, starting from
the 1980s “culture” became a new reference point for defining common identity in the
dominant/hegemonic discourses. In the late 1990s the GC saw culture and history as the
basis of social peace against materialism. In the late 2000s, the GC discourse shifted
away from the polarization between materialism and spirituality, and towards specifying
how to use culture, morality and religion to achieve the ideal society. Community
brought the term “collective cognition” to the fore. “Collective cognition” is more
abstract than the GC’s understanding of “culture,” which, until the early 2000s, was
based on the interpretation of the culture practiced “up until a few centuries ago,”
meaning prior to the introduction of Westernization. As such, through the dominant
interpretations of this era, it was known to, and more easily imaginable by, all.
Knowledge of what “collective cognition” entails means having discursive power over
defining the boundaries of acceptable “differences” between individuals and groups. As
204

such, it is a significant reference point (nodal point) in the GC discourse that acts as a
reference point for other concepts.

A shift towards the more abstract notion of “collective cognition” as the basis of social
peace increased the GC’s discursive power in the form of knowledge in various ways.
First, it gave the GC discursive flexibility to modify the boundaries of what constitutes
the basic requirement for establishing a peaceful society. Second, it enabled the
community to establish subject positions by defining what cognition entails and who
possesses it. The difference between a “conscious Muslim” and a “Muslim by culture”
(kültür Müslümanı) that had existed in the community discourse since the 1970s, was
increasingly emphasized in the publications towards the mid-2000s. This emphasis
enabled the community both to distinguish its discourse from the use of religion in
everyday life and to indicate that it had knowledge of the correct way to practice Islam.
Defining a “conscious way of practicing Islam” establishes boundaries, a sub-category
within the category of those who consider themselves as practicing Muslims in Turkey.
However, the GC was able to expand the borders/boundaries of what being a “conscious
Muslim” entailed by incorporating Sufi language (the language of “Anatolian Islam”)
into the community discourse more and more. In this way the community’s discursive
power began to comprise a broader discursive field.

205

5.9.3. Shifts in the boundaries of public and private

The emphasis on community-centered social change through collective cognition entails
an expansion in the boundaries of what is defined as “public” at the expense of what is
viewed as private. Inclusion of the concept of fitrat within the concept of collective
cognition means that working for the well-being of the community brings personal
fulfillment. Voluntary work to help others in the institutions of the Community, which is
a public activity, becomes a lifestyle for the individual. As the individual’s lifestyle is
shaped within the collective cognition, what is previously considered as falling within the
private sphere now becomes more important for the community as a whole, and therefore
a public matter. There is a similar trend in the Third Way neo-liberal discourse, which
casts “family life” as an important factor for a stable economy. As a result, in this
discourse, the morality of an individual becomes a public matter. Women’s increased
presence in public life, owing in part to the growing informal economy characterized by
feminized labor, made it necessary to reformulate women’s role in the public sphere. In
Sızıntı, the discourse on gender shifted from a discussion of biological differences
between men and women to a discussion of family life, feminism’s destructive impact on
the latter, and women’s role in everyday life. As the borders of the public sphere
expanded, a wide array of community discourses regarding how to conduct relations in
public life such as public service, rights, care, and responsibility emerged.

206

The concept of “public interest” is articulated within the global neo-liberal discourses as
the “consumerist desire for efficient and high quality services.” As discussed in Chapter
4, the dominant discourse in Turkey in the 1980s involved the same discursive element:
citizens should vote on the basis of whoever provides the most efficient public service,
not on their ideological approaches. Neoliberal discourse as articulated in Turkey through
the AKP has defined public benefit as using public funds as efficiently as possible. For
this reason the government’s decisions to rely on the private sector for the provision of
social services when doing so is economically efficient is referred as provision of public
benefit. As discussed in Chapter 3, neo-liberal discourse depoliticizes the inherently
political nature of the provision of public services, neglects its meaning in terms of the
provision of long- term public needs such as high quality educational institutions and
gives prominence to the notion of “citizen as consumer” and to the immediate demands
of the citizens. In this way, politics is reduced to the provision of services.
494
The
provision of welfare by the private sector, citizens’ responsibility towards one another
and a benevolent state that selectively provides charity are among the cornerstones of the
neoliberal discourse on public interests.

Global neo-liberal discourse, hegemonic discourse in Turkey in the AKP period and GC
discourse converged in the 2000s in their association of public interest with “service.” As
mentioned above, the presence of religious communities has been pivotal for the

494
Marinetto, 2003: 110.

207

functioning of the neoliberal economic system in Turkey. In the GC discourse, the
centrality of hizmet (service), which, as mentioned above, is also how the community
refers to itself, has remained unchanged since the formation of the community. Public
interests and service are regarded as the responsibility of citizens, or “person of action,”
rather than the state. In the 2000s, as the community grew financially stronger, its
publications increasingly encouraged the formation of civil society institutions that
provide social services. Provision of service has been portrayed as an apolitical endeavor,
due to the assumption that what service entails is determined by the human nature and
collective cognition that transcend politics.

5.9.4. Articulations of Democracy, Freedom and Justice

Neo-liberal discourse conceptualizes the “public” as a sphere composed of diverse
communities, most of which cross-cut cultural identities and common interests.
495
The
state ensures the “participation” of communities at the national and local level in decision
making by consulting them or establishing partnerships among them. Within the
communities, “community boards” are the main decision making bodies, and the
decisions are reached through negotiations among the partners in community boards.
Participation in decision making through consultation and negotiation is different than
participation in decision making through electoral representatives. The former type of

495
Rose 1999, Hughes and Mooney, 1998.
208

participation in decision making, along with the idea of “citizen as consumer,” forms the
basis of the neoliberal conception of democracy.

Some of the GC members have mentioned that the top-level decision making structure in
the community is a council (Abiler Heyeti) and different perspectives are discussed in this
council. This type of decision making is similar to the type of participation encouraged in
neoliberal discourse. Starting from early 2000s Gülen publications gave prominence to
the importance of negotiation and dialog between actors with different interests for a
stable and harmonious society. In the 1990s the community emphasized notions of
balance and harmony. What enables negotiation and dialog are the common values
among the actors. In the national sphere collective cognition is the basis for dialog and
negotiation.

Similar to the reconstruction of the concept of democracy through the lens of collective
cognition, concepts of justice, freedom and equality in the Gülen discourse are articulated
through the concept of collective cognition, specifically its morality aspect. In other
words, morality determines how these concepts are defined. Chapter 3 argued that the
AKP’s neoliberal discourse viewed the concepts of justice, freedom and equality through
the lens of morality rather than citizen’s rights. The GC goes one step further in
articulating these concepts by also redefining these rights in terms of their ability to fulfill
material and spiritual needs in a religiously permissible way. Thus, the concept of rights
itself is articulated through the lens of religion and morality.
209

5.10. DISCURSIVE DILEMMAS AND STRATEGIES USED TO ADDRESS
THEM

The GC used different strategies to cope with the challenge of integrating into the
community discourse new meanings, concepts and subject positions some of which
contradicted the existing discursive elements. One of the discursive challenges, which
emerged after the accusations of against Gülen in 1999, was to redefine subject positions,
and explain them to others. Those who held the power to transform the community
discourses faced a discursive dilemma: some of the elements of the redefined subject
positions did not sit well together with the pre-1999 subject positions. The GC’s strategy
to address this dilemma was to introduce the concept of “dialog” to the community
discourse. In this way, sharp contrasts between the self and the other used in constructing
subject positions before mid-1999 were now interpreted as a search for a dialog between
the two opposing identities.

After 2000, another discursive challenge arose out of the necessity to regulate the
relationships between businessmen and their employees; working women and their
families, and the role of women in society. A dilemma between capitalism and Islam was
underlying this challenge. Redrawing the boundaries of public and the private and the
concept of “collective consciousness” was used as a flexible discursive tool that can
210

regulate the relationship between the society and individual in a way that maintains the
“Islamic lifestyle” (or “the old social order”) as the socio-economic structure and the
community itself were changing rapidly. Collective consciousness as a reference point,
the redefined boundaries of public and private were also used to address the challenge of
reconciling universal values such as human rights with the GC’s values.

In the 2000s, the GC’s effort to expand its reach while differentiating itself from people
who are pious but not affiliated with any Islamic community, was addressed by
differentiating between “conscious Muslim” and “Muslim of culture.” As argued above,
this differentiation served as a reference point to define “Anatolian Islam.”

5.11. CONCLUSION

A comparison between the Gülen discourse in the second half of the 1990s and the
second half of the 2000s shows that changes in the socio-economic structure and political
structure as well as political events had a significant impact on the community discourse.
Between the second half of the 1990s and the second half of the 2000s political events
such as the February 28
th
decisions, the resulting ban on the Welfare Party, allegations
against Fethullah Gülen in mid-1999 and the establishment of the AKP also had
significant effects on the Community discourse. In the February 28
th
process the GC
supported the policies of the secular establishment and tried to differentiate itself from
the other Islamic actors. The most drastic discursive shift came about in mid-1999 as a
211

result of accusations against Gülen himself. The new discourse with its focus on
negotiation and dialog lay the groundwork for the community discourse of the second
half of the 2000s, when the GC expanded in terms of the number of its adherents, its
financial resources, extent of its activities and its geographical reach.

Structural factors also influenced the transformation of the GC discourses. The neoliberal
restructuration initiated in the early 1980s affected the community discourse in two ways.
First, structural changes in the economy accelerated the growth of Islamic capital and
thus the empowerment of religious communities. The GC benefited from this new
economic and political structure more than most of the other Islamic communities mostly
due to its statist discourse that supported the military coup. As the GC rapidly grew and
as its activities diversified, its discourses were also rapidly transformed. Second, in the
context of neo-liberal restructuring, the GC became an indispensable actor for the
functioning of the economic system by providing a social security system that the state is
unwilling to provide.

Political events led to sudden shifts in the GC discourse and as a result many
contradictions in the community discourse. Changes in the socio-economic and political
structure led to a gradual transformation in the community discourses, where
contradictions and dualisms were addressed through construction of new reference
points. While changes in the socio-economic and political structure and political context
have an effect on the general direction of the discursive transformation, they do not
212

explain why a particular reference point binds together particular subject positions and
concepts. The GC’s strategies for addressing the discursive challenges show that among a
range of possibilities of reference points, the ones that resolve a particular discursive
dilemma for that specific actor, at a certain time become reference points. Discursive
strategies used in the GC discourse also tells us that concepts which were promoted by
the community as a result of a political contingency, such as the concepts of negotiation
and dialog, may later become reference points that resolve the discursive challenges. In
the GC case, dialog and negotiation became reference points that defined democracy
without going outside the boundaries of “collective consciousness.”

From mid 1990s until the end of 2000s, as the GC faced new discursive challenges, the
reference points became progressively broader and less concrete. As such, these reference
points, such as collective consciousness, were flexible enough to address the new
discursive dilemmas GC encountered its activities and geographical reach expanded. The
use of broad reference points meant that the reference points can be articulated with a
diverse variety of concepts and that the meanings of concepts are transformed in relation
to one another as well. Thus, the discourses are transformed together, towards the same
direction and in a more or less coherent and holistic way.

The GC is a powerful political actor in Turkey. Through its mass media channels, which
feature Islamic intellectuals some of whom are not affiliated with the GC, the community
can influence the political agenda, the direction and terms of the debates. Scholars who
213

work on the relationship between Islamic actors and democratization in Turkey need to
explore the partially fixed meanings of and the connections among the concepts used by
these actors at a specific time period instead of assuming concepts such as “democracy”,
“justice” and “freedom” have meanings that are interpreted in the same way by all actors
in Turkey and elsewhere. Contextualizing the meanings of these concepts enables us to
identify the dimensions of the meanings of democracy and justice, such as morality,
collective values, gender roles and the understanding of the economic system. By
identifying these dimensions, we can also uncover the power relations that are embedded
in the discourses of social actors. In this way, scholars on Turkish politics can go beyond
the center-periphery or elite-society dualisms that dominate the academic discussions,
towards more refined analyses that take into account complexities and power relations
among different actors.

214

CHAPTER VI: SHIFTS IN THE ERENKÖY COMMUNITY DISCOURSE

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to analyze shifts in the discourses of the Erenköy community
journal, Altınoluk. It begins with an account of the Erenköy community, its evolution
since the early 1980s, sources of its discourse and its journal. The discussion analyzes
Altınoluk’s discourse in three periods: from 1995 until February 1997, which is the
beginning of the February 28
th
process in Turkey; from 1997 until 2000, just before the
2001 economic crisis and establishment of the AKP; and from 2001 until 2011. The
chapter demonstrates that the main changes in the Altınoluk discourse are: new
articulations between Islam and secularism/laicism, Islam and freedom; and constructing
the “traditional Turkish family” as a reference point to redefine gender roles in society as
socio-economic conditions force women to work outside their home. Another change has
been the construction of new discursive connections among capitalism, secularism,
modernity, cosmopolitanism and globalism to provide a more integrated criticism of the
secular system in Turkey. The chapter argues that these shifts in Altınoluk’s discourses
resulted in contradictions and dualities which served to legitimize and reproduce the
hegemonic discourses in Turkey on the one hand, and preserve the Erenköy community’s
identity on the other.

215

6.2. THE ERENKÖY COMMUNITY

The Erenköy Community is a branch of the Naqshbandi Sufi order (Naqshbandiyya), the
most influential sufi order in the Ottoman Empire since the beginning of the 19th
century.
496
Some view tasavvuf, the knowledge of Islamic mysticism, as “the
continuation of the Prophet Mohammad’s spiritual authority.”
497
Every sufi order has a
master, and they are known as sheiks.
498
The sheik’s authority regarding spiritual
knowledge is legitimized by an authorization called icazet entrusted by the previous
sheikh.
499
When a sheik is initiated, he becomes the last link of a chain of succession or
“initiatic chain”
500
, also referred to as “the golden chain” (altın silsile) that reaches back
to the Prophet Mohammed.
501
The sheik’s mission is to guide his disciples towards “the
right way” (hidayet) through ethical training (Sufi discipline) that involves the transfer of
knowledge of Islam (ilim).
502
In a sufi order, there is a spiritual bond between the sheikh
and his disciples. The transfer of this knowledge is accomplished mainly through sohbets,
meaning conversations among disciples or conversations between the sheikh and his

496
Silverstein, 2008: 127, 145; Yılmaz, 1999: 25, 241; Algar, 1976: 142.

497
“Silsile ve Đ cazet,” (Initiatic Chain and Authorization), Altın Silsile, Altınoluk, accessed July 23, 2011,

498
Sheik is also referred to as mürşid.

499
Đ cazet is a written document with the sheikh’s signature on.

500
Algar. 1976.

501
Algar. 1976.

502
“Silsile ve Đ cazet,” (Initiatic Chain and Authorization), Altın Silsile, Altınoluk.

216

disciples.
503
In different sufi orders, there are various rituals and rules of initiating the
new disciple into the order. As the disciples acquire more knowledge of Islam, they attain
higher spiritual degrees (makamat).

The Naqshbandi is a Sunni sufi order that emerged from the line of Central Asian Sufi
masters in the beginning of 12th century.
504
The order was clearly identified as a separate
entity, with rituals
505
and principles
506
different from those of other orders in the 14th
century and named after the then Sheikh of the order, Baha ad-Din Naqshband
(d.1389).
507
The golden chain of the order reaches back to Abu Bakr, the first caliph of
the Prophet Mohammad, and through Abu Bakr, to the Prophet himself. The order has
spread to many countries, including India, parts of Russia, Turkey, the Balkans, Syria and
Palestine, Australia, the US, and parts of South America.
508

A distinguishing characteristic of the Naqshbandiyya is the order’s involvement in
politics. Atay mentions that the Naqshbandi orders have never been completely apolitical,

503
Silverstein, 2008: 129.

504
Algar, 1976: 131-132.

505
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Nakshibandi order is the way they perform the ritual of zikir (dhikr),
meaning remembrance of God by mentioning his name. Naqshibandis perform hidden or silent zikir (zikri-i khafi) as
opposed to open or vocal zikir. Algar mentions that, “Although silent dhikr is the central and most distinctive part of
Naqshbandi practice, the cultivation of vocal dhikr is also to be encountered.” Algar: 129-130.

506
For the eleven principles of the Naqshbandi order, see Yılmaz, 1999: 241.

507
Algar, 1976: 131-136. Algar argues that separation of Baha ad-Din from Amir Kulal’s circle may be thought of as
marking the final crystallization of the Naqshband order.

508
“Naqshbandi, Sufi Way”, accessed July 20, 2011, http://www.naqshbandi.org/.

217

while Algar explains that Naqshbandis view political activity as complementary to
inward cultivation of spirituality. Unlike some other Sufi orders, Naqshbandis do not lead
ascetic lives. They approve and promote engagement with trade and commerce,
journeying within the borders of their homeland, and view themselves as entrusted with
the task of “securing the supremacy of God’s law.”
509

In the 19th-century Ottoman state, in addition to the Naqshbandis living in provincial
towns, many also were in the cities, including statesmen, bureaucrats, and, most
importantly, ulama.
510
Since the ulama consisted of highly educated experts in Islamic
studies, including Islamic law and hence had some authority over the state policies, the
Naqshbandis’ influence among the ulama meant they were a very important political
power. As such, Naqshbandis were one of the important powers behind the opposition to
the Westernization reforms in the 19
th
century.

In the Republican era after 1923, various Naqshbandi branches were able to preserve
their existence despite the reforms that banned lodges.

The most powerful Islamic actors
in Turkey are connected to various branches of the Naqshbandi order. Said-i Nursi, who
was not a sheikh but who was heavily influenced by Naqshbandiyya, became the leader
of the Nur community, which inherited some of the organizational rules and Islamic

509
Algar argues that the combination of spiritual development and outward activity in the Naqshbandi order are based
on the Naqshbandi principles of khalvat dar anjuman (exercising intense devotion to God within the context of society)
and the principle of safar dar vatan (journeying within the homeland). Algar, 1976: 134-138.

510
The most widespread form of Naqshibandiyya in the Ottoman state was the Naqshi-Khalidi. Silverstein, 2008: 145.

218

principles of the Naqshbandi order. The Gülen Community then grew out of the Nur
Community. There were other powerful Naqshbandi orders, such as the Erenköy
Community, the Süleymancıs, and the Đ skenderpaşa Community, which was the main
power behind the establishment of first Islamic party in Turkey in 1963, the MSP, and its
successors, the RP (Welfare Party) and the FP (Virtue Party), out of which the AKP
emerged.
511

The Erenköy community is referred to a branch of Nakshibanddiyya-Khalidi
512
order that
formed around Sheikh Mahmud Sami Ramazanoğlu (1892-1984).
513
Ramazanoğlu was
initiated by the Muhammed Esad Erbili (1847-1931), sheikh of the Kelami lodge in
Istanbul Fındıkzade.
514
Ramazanoğlu inherited a large fortune from his family, but did
not touch any of it; and, although he was a lawyer, he earned his living as a bookkeeper
for a small business in Tahtakale, a trading district in Istanbul. Ramazanoğlu’s preaching
and sohbets in a mosque (Erenköy Zihni mosque) in the Erenköy district of Istanbul, led
to the formation of circles of adherents around him. Adherents of the Erenköy
Community included a large number of small business owners, many of whom were

511
Yavuz 2003: 11, in Silverstein, 2008: 145.

512
Khalidi branch one of the widespread branches of Naqshbandi order in Anatolia. See Yılmaz, 1999.

513
For the Golden Chain of the Erenköy Community see Kamil, 1994. Also see “Hz. Mahmûd Sâmî Ramazanoğlu”
accessed July 28, 2011, http://www.Ramazanoğlumahmudsamiks.com/cd.aspx?mid=1&mcid=8&pt.

514
Çakır, 1990: 59. Sheikh Esad Erbili also mastered and thought principles of Kadiriyye tariqah in the Kelami lodge,
which was a Kadirriye lodge before Esad Erbili was appointed as its sheikh. “M. Es'ad Erbilî (k.s.),” Altın Silsile,
Altınoluk, accessed July 28, 2011, http://altinsilsile.altinoluk.com/index.php?pId=33.

219

manufacturers.
515
For this reason, the community is identified as an élite religious
community among the Naqshibandi orders.
516
In 1984, upon Ramazanoğlu’s death, Musa
Topbaş became the new sheikh, with Ramazanoğlu’s icazet (authorization). In 1999
Musa Topbaş was succeeded by his son Osman Nuri Topbaş.
517

Musa Topbaş came from a family that had been engaged in trade. In 1951, his father
established Bahariye Mensucat, a company that manufactured textiles and operated in
accordance with the “no-interest” principle of Islam.
518
Chapter 4 noted that in 1984 the
first no-interest participation bank in Turkey, Al Baraka Turk, was established by Musa
Topbaş’s nephew Eymen Topbaş, who was also the ANAP Istanbul chairman, and
Korkut Özal,
519
Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s brother, who was affiliated with another
Naqshbandi order, the Đ skenderpaşa Community.
520
Partnership between Islamic capital
in Turkey and Saudi capital via Al Baraka Turk contributed to the growth of businesses
associated with the Erenköy community in such diverse sectors as textiles, construction,

515
Yavuz, 2003.

516
Tuğal, 2002: 93.

517
Yavuz, 2003: 144-145.

518
Musa Topbaş’s grandfather Ahmet Kutsi Efendi engaged in trade in his hometown. His son and Musa Topbaş’s
father Ahmed Hamdi Efendi was the first CEO of Bahariye Mensucat. “Bahariye Mensucat,” accessed July 14, 2011,
http://www.bahariye.com.tr/index.php?sf=about.

519
Mardin 1989: 283. Hak Ticaret A.Ş., founded earlier by Topbaş and Özal was the founding partner of Al-Baraka
Turk. Korkut Ozal was also a consultant of Islamic Development Bank. Bulut, 1997: 288-289.

520
Mumcu, Uğur. “Al Baraka Türkiye’de Kurulurken Đ ki Isim Bulundu” (Two Persons Present at the Establishment of
Al Baraka in Turkey), Cumhuriyet, March 14, 1987. Also see Başkan, 2004: 224.

220

and trade in petro-chemicals.
521
Eymen Topbaş’s brother Mustafa Latif Topbaş was
president of BIM, a supermarket chain. He is listed as 19
th
wealthiest Turk in Forbes
Turkey in 2011.
522

Successful businesses affiliated with the Erenköy community contributed to the
establishment of foundations, such as the Bereket Vakfı (established by Al Baraka Türk),
Ensar Vakfı, Đ lim Hizmet Vakfı, Hikmet Vakfı, Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Vakfı
523
and
Muradiye Vakfı in Ankara. These foundations focused mostly on educational services
such as providing dormitories, boarding houses, Qur’an courses and scholarships. The
Community’s publication company, Erkam Publishing, was established in 1980.
524
The
Erenköy Community is also active in overseas, particularly in Azerbaijan. Balcı states
that since 1991 the group has developed charities and missionary activities in Azerbaijan
and that it collects funds and provides educational services such as computer courses,
Qur’an courses and madrasas.
525

521
Yılmaz, Serpil “Uzaklarda Arama Sanki Sen Đ çimdesin!” (Don’t Search in the Far, It’s Here), Milliyet, July 13,
2004.

522
Forbes announces 100 richest Turks, Hürriyet Dailynews, accessed July 25, 2012,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/finance/11117628.asp. Özdabakoğlu, O., “Ucuza Sattı Milyarder Oldu” (Sold
Cheap, Now Millionare), Radikal, March 13, 2011.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1042775&CategoryID=80

523
Yılmaz, 1999.

524
“Erkam Yayınları Yabancı Dillerdeki Yayınlar Hakkında” (Erkam Publications, about the Publications in Foreign
Languages), accessed July 25, 2011,
http://www.worldpublishings.com/ana_sayfa.asp?dil=144&gorev=tek_sayfalar_oku&id=37.

525
Balcı, 2004: 213.

221

Similar to most Naqshbandi orders, the Erenköy community has been closely involved in
politics and has established connections with the state from time to time. Esad Erbili was
himself a member of the “Council of Sheikhs” established by Meşiat dairesi, the highest
institution of the Ottoman state that represented the Ulama and that dealt with religious
affairs.
526
After the abolishment of Sufi lodges in 1925, Sheikh Esad Erbili’s disciple,
Sheikh Mahmut Sami Ramazanoğlu himself stayed away from politics, however some of
his disciples actively engaged in politics. Tahir Büyükkörükçü (1925-2011) in Konya,
one of the prominent members of the Erenköy community, was appointed in 1965 as the
Mufti in Konya by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, an institution directly under the
Prime Ministry of Turkey. Büyükkörükçü entered the parliament in 1977 as a member of
the Islamic MSP (National Salvation Party).
527
Eymen Topbaş, Sheikh Musa Topbaş’s
nephew, was among the founders of the center-right ANAP (the Motherland Party),
which came to government in 1983. The Erenköy Community’s ties with the government
continued in the 1980s through the business partnership between Eymen Topbaş and
Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s brother Korkut Özal.
528
Çakır argued that until the 1980
military coup, the Erenköy community supported the MSP, however after the
establishment of the ANAP while the Istanbul segment of the Community supported the

526
The Council of Sheiks (Meclis-i Meşayih) administered and checked whether the Sufi lodges operated in accordance
with the principles of their tariqah. The council also appointed proper individuals as the sheikhs of the lodges. “M.
Es'ad Erbilî (k.s.),” Altın Silsile, Altınoluk, accessed July 28, 2011, http://altinsilsile.altinoluk.com/index.php?pId=33.

527
Büyükkörükçü was arrested by the military administration in 1980. He was acquitted in 1985. “Đ slam Alimi Tahir
Büyükkörükçü Vefat Etti,” (Islam Intellectual Tahir Büyükkörükçü Died), Samanyolu Haber, March 5, 2011.

528
Chapter 4 mentioned that days after coming to power Turgut Özal passed the law allowing the establishment of no-
interest joint stock companies (SFI). ANAP became the government in December 14, 1983. The decree no 83/7506 on
SFIs was passed in December 16
th
1983. This law enabled Özal’s brother and Eymen Topbaş to establish Al Baraka
Turk, mentioned above. See Mumcu (1987).

222

ANAP, Community members elsewhere tended to support the RP.
529
Under the AKP
government, Hasan Kamil Yılmaz, who was the president of Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi
Foundation established by the Erenköy Community followers, became the Vice-president
of Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) in 2010.
530
He was the first person outside the
cadres of the DRA to be appointed to this post.
531

6.3. THE ALTINOLUK JOURNAL

Altınoluk is a monthly journal published by the Erkam Publishing company established
by Erenköy Community followers without interruption since 1986. Sheikh Osman Nuri
Topbaş writes articles in Altınoluk under the pseudonym Sadık Dana.
532
The editor of the
magazine, Ahmet Taşgetiren, defines the journal as a religious, mystical journal that
observes and evaluates the relationship between men and Islam, Muslim and Islam, and
Islam and society.
533
His remark that by finding the right style, one can express any
opinion reflects Altınoluk’s approach. Writers in for it state their political opinions in an

529
Çakır, 1990: 60.

530
“Nakşi Vakıftan Diyanet Vitrinine” (From Naqshi Foundation to the Directorate of Religious Affairs), Hürriyet,
December 30, 2010.

531
One of the founders of the AKP, Cuneyt Zapsu was also one of the partners of BIM which, as mentioned before
established by Mustafa Latif Topbaş. Yıkan, L., “Ak Parti Devrimci Bir Partidir” (The AKP is a Revolutionary Party),
Radikal, December 21, 2011.

532
These articles are also available at Topbaş’s personal website, http://www.osmannuriTopbaş.com/Altınoluk-dergisi.

533
Taşgetiren, Ahmet., Interview. “Türklük dayatması olmasaydı, Kürtçülük Çıkmazdı” (If There was No Imposition
of Turkish Identity, There Would be No Kurdish Identity), haberx, January 15, 2010.

223

open and direct way. In fact, Altınoluk frequently includes articles by and interviews with
Islamic actors other than the Erenköy Community. As a result there are occasionally

In the early 1990s, the focus of the journal was on political issues and how to maintain an
Islamic lifestyle. There were no issues specifically dedicated to economic issues. In July
1991 Baltacı mentioned that “it is satisfactory that the changes in the economic sphere are
reflected in the administrative and legal spheres,”
534
referring to the abolition of three
articles of the Turkish Criminal Court.
535
By changes in the economic sphere, Baltacı was
referring to the promotion of market economy in the Özal period. The first such issue is
published on May 1994.
536
Although there was not a direct reference to economic
policies in the journal in this period, there were discussions on globalization and “global
exploitation.” In April 1993, Altınoluk devoted a whole issue to “the new exploitation
system,” referring to the colonization of the Islamic world by economic means.
Taşgetiren argued that even if one assumes that the act of colonization against the Islamic
world is not conscious and develops naturally because of the ideological character of
dominant global norms, Islamic societies will go through a process of colonization.”
537

534
Baltacı, C. “Kendimizi Hyde Park’ta Zannetmemeliyiz” (We Should Not Assume We Are in Hyde Park), Altınoluk,
No: 65, 1991: 17.

535
On December 4, 1991, Constitution article 141 which considered certain organizational activitiesas crime; article
142 which considered certain expressions of thought as crime, and article 163 which considered demands for a system
based on religion crime of the Turkish Criminal Code were subverted. "Laikliğin yeniden yorumlanması sosyal bir
ihtiyaç"(Re-Interpreting Secularism Is a Social Need) November 13, 2011 accessed December 1, 2011.

536
“Sağlam Đ nsan, Sağlam Ekonomi” (Robust Person, Robust Economy) Altınoluk, no: 99 , May 1994.

537
Taşgetiren, A. “Küresel Sömürgeleşme Ya da…” (Global Colonization or…), Altınoluk, no: 86, April 1993: 3.

224

He identified globalization with loss of identity, economic colonization, control of the
military and acceptance of the role of a “satellite” in foreign policy.
538

The following sections analyze the discourses in Altınoluk during three different periods.
The first begins with 1995 in order to understand the difference between the Community
discourses before the February 28
th
process. The next period starts from 1997 and
analyzes the Community discourses during the February 28
th
process and its aftermath up
until the establishment of the AKP. Finally, the chapter analyzes the Community
discourses under the AKP government.

6.4. THE ERENKÖY COMMUNITY DISCOURSES BETWEEN 1995 AND 1997

6.4.1. Topics

Between 1995 and 1997 secularism was one of the most commonly covered topics in
Altınoluk. As discussed in Chapter 3, as Islamic actors became economically and
politically stronger in Turkey in the 1990s, the dominant discourses started to be oriented
along the axis of an Islamist/secular opposition. The authors who contributed to Altınoluk
challenged the secular regime in Turkey by constructing Islam and secularism as two
mutually exclusive philosophies of governance as the dominant discourses in Turkey at
the time did. Discussions of secularism were accompanied by articles on Islamic

538
Ibid.
225

principles regarding the interaction between society and the individual in the everyday
life of Muslims.

In the 1990s, as Islamic businesses grew, articles on the economy became an important
part of Altınoluk. In the latter half of the 1990s, its articles began to focus on the way that
Islamic businessmen should conduct their business. In 1996, it reported a meeting among
various Islamic actors in which, among other issues, the question of whether women
should be allowed to work was discussed, the first time this issue was covered. Another
issue that was intensely debated in public in Turkey during the 1990s was the relationship
between Turkey and the European Union (EU). Altınoluk discussed this relationship in
the context of the cultural hegemony of the West over Turkish society beginning in the
late 19
th
century.

6.4.2. Nomination

In line with the dominant discourses of the 1990s, identities of the self and the other are
constructed as polar opposites. In Altınoluk, an Islamic actor is referred to as a “Muslim”
or “person of Islam.” The limits of Muslimness are not clearly drawn in the journal.
However, when authors mention “Muslims,” they refer to a group of people who want to
lead their lives according to Islamic precepts, observe Islamic principles in all their
226

behavior,
539
establish an Islamic education system, and teach the works of Islamic
literature that were forbidden in the Republican era.
540
For a Muslim way of life, an
Islamic system is indispensable.
541
Although the Other is not referred to as non-Muslim,
the narrow definition of Muslimness indicates that those who do not fit the definition are
not considered true Muslims. The authors in the journal frequently associate Muslimness
with being outside the system,
542
and with being wronged or aggrieved (mazlum). In
contrast, the Others are referred to as system defenders, those who command the society,
thus showing the anti-system character of the Erenköy community in this period.

Parallel to the opposition of the aggrieved and the system defenders, the aggrieved are
associated with “the people.” According to Van Leeuwen’s categorization, this
association is the discursive tool called generalization, whereby the characteristics of a
group are generalized as the characteristics of a larger group, or the whole society. In this
way Islam was used as a reference point in the construction of subject positions for the
aggrieved on the one hand and for those who hold the power to maintain the status-quo
on the other. The stark opposition between the two categories did not allow any
discursive space for addressing those who did not fit either category or for identities other
than Islam-related ones. In this way, intellectuals who published in Altınoluk both

539
Yıldız, F., Hayatı Đ slâm'la Yönetmek (Governing Life with Islam), Altınoluk, No: 115, September 1995: 7.

540
Eygi, M. “Müslümanın Bio - Sosyal -Kültürel Ritim Çizelgesi” (Biologic and Socio-Cultural Chart of the Muslim),
Altınoluk, No: 118, December, 1995: 8.

541
Taşgetiren, A. “Müslüman ve Sistem” (Muslim and the System), Altınoluk, No: 115, September 1995: 3.

542
Ibid., Eygi, December 1995: 8.
227

contributed to the dominance of the center-periphery discourse of the traditional
intellectuals and legitimized this discourse in the eyes of its readers.

From a Gramscian perspective, the center-periphery discourse of the traditional
intellectuals parallels the “aggrieved versus system maintainers” discourse of organic
intellectuals. This discourse legitimizes the latter groups’ interests in the language of
“high culture,” a language that uses terminology of the social sciences and therefore
seems more objective. With a post-structural interpretation of Gramsci one can also say
that the discourses of organic intellectuals that construct and are constructed by their
subject positions are expressed by traditional intellectuals as if this discourse represents
an objective point of view. The discourses in Altınoluk in the late 1990s show that
organic and traditional intellectuals’ discourses contribute to and legitimize one another.

6.4.3. Predication

a. Economy

Starting from 1994, partly due to the economic crisis in Turkey in the same year,
Altınoluk began to devote entire issues to economic discussions, and many articles from
this period focus directly on economic policymaking. As mentioned above, until the mid-
1990s the few articles in Altınoluk on economic issues were in line with the Islamist
228

Welfare Party’s “Just Economic Order” discourse, which opposed opening the economy
to foreign markets, such as the EC.
543
Starting from 1994, which is also the year the
Welfare Party won local elections in many cities and in this way started to control
contracts with competitive biddings, religiously conservative small business owners
began to grow stronger economically.
544
In May 1994, Özel argued that the post-1980
economic reforms had failed to transform the economic structure
545
and that the post-
1994 economic policies included nothing to move Turkey towards a competitive,
productive society.
546
Özel’s argument shows his support for some degree of economic
liberalization, indicating a change in the economic interests of Islamic actors in the
process of neoliberalization.

By 1995, one can observe arguments in favor of privatization, reduction of state control
over the economy and the opening of the economy to foreign markets. In the 1990s, big
capital had the advantage over the small business owners of having close relationships
with the state. Partly for this reason, in this period Islamic actors argued for a reduction in
the state’s intervention in the market. They also argued that, as the productive sectors of
the economy in which Islamic businesses operated grew, economic policies should give

543
Just Economic Order is developed as an alternative to capitalism and communism. It is based on an assumption that
Islamic principals will bring about the best economic results. It is based on heavy state intervention in the economy,
exclusion of Western powers from national economy. Yayla, 1997.

544
Doğan, 2009: 284-288.

545
Mustafa Ozel is a columnist in a Turkish newspaper Yenişafak and a writer.

546
Özel, M., Interview, “Mustafa Özel’le Türkiye Ekonomisinin Bugünü ve Yarını Üzerine: ‘Ekonomik Dönüşüm
Hikaye’” (With Mustafa Özel on Turkish Economy s Today and Tomorrow: Economic Transformation is a Tale),
Altınoluk, No: 99, May 1994: 9.
229

priority to supporting the productive sectors rather than the financial sectors that operated
through speculation. These views were conveyed to Altınoluk readers through interviews
with various Islamic actors, including the members of MÜSĐ AD, the Islamic business
association founded in 1990. In one such interview, Ali Bulaç, an Islamist intellectual
who was not affiliated with Erenköy or any other religious community, mentioned that
one of Turkey’s basic problems was statism, and that the state needed to take its hands
off the market.
547
The March 1996 issue includes an interview with Erol Yarar, the
president of MÜSĐ AD. Yarar mentioned that Turkey needed to break free from the IMF’s
policy prescriptions.
548
He was in favor of “transformation from a protectionist economic
system oriented towards domestic markets, into an economy oriented towards foreign
markets.”
549
He also mentioned that for a country to develop, stability had to be provided
by an economic policy giving primacy to production rather than finance and by sound
monetary policies.
550
His argument reflected the changing interests of Islamic actors and
the accompanying shifts in the Islamist WP’s discourse in the 1990s.

Altınoluk provided one of the venues in which Islamic actors’ new discourse on economy,
with an emphasis on competitive markets, privatization and reduced state control, was

547
Bulaç, A., "Türkiye Zihinsel Sıçrama Noktasında" (Turkey is at the Point of Mental Leap), Altınoluk, No: 111, May
1995: 8.

548
Yarar, E., “MÜSĐ AD Genel Baskani Erol Yarar ile Türkiye Ekonomisi Üzerine: Üç Kağıt Ekonomisi” (With
MÜSĐ AD President Erol Yarar on Turkish Economy: “The Economy of Deceit”), Altınoluk, No: 121, March 1996: 9.

549
Ibid.

550
Ibid.

230

articulated with the Islamic discourse and in this way legitimized in the eyes of Erenköy
community adherents. The articulation is generated by forming discursive links between
economy, culture, religion and politics. Yarar explains that economic reforms since the
1980s were not accompanied with reforms in the state structure and did not rely on a
sound cultural framework. For this reason, political stability could not be established and
economic crises could not be averted. “Building economic reforms upon a cultural
framework” suggests a need for defining and understanding the economic structures in
which Islamic actors operate from a cultural point of view, which Altınoluk associates
with religion.

Economic activities are legitimate as long as they are within the boundaries of God’s
consent, as explained in the Qur’an and exemplified by the Prophet Mohammed.
551
Thus,
in the 1990s in Altınoluk, Islam was a central reference point for conducting business.
Starting from 1994, the contours of a model of a “Muslim businessman” began to
emerge. A Muslim businessman first and foremost wants to present his resources as a
service to society. He operates his business on the basis of “helal” (religiously
permissible) and “haram” (forbidden by religion).
552
The mindset of a Muslim
businessman is defined in opposition to a person with a capitalist mindset who aims to

551
Taşgetiren, A., “Bir Seçim Noktasında...” (At the Point of Making a Choice), No: 121, March 1996: 3. Also see
other articles in Altınoluk, March 1996 issue, “Ekonominin Çarkları Nasıl Dönüyor?” (How do the Wheels of the
Economy Turn?), No: 121.

552
Taşgetiren, A., “Bir Seçim Noktasında...” (At the Point of Making a Choice) Altınoluk, No: 121, March 1996: 3.
Also see Taşgetiren, A., “Karun Sistemi Islam Sistemi” (Karun’s System and Islam’s System), Altınoluk, No: 99, May
1994: 3.

231

maximize his profit with a monopolistic mindset and who does not think he has any
responsibility for others. In contrast, Muslim businessmen see themselves not as owners
but as custodians of material gains which belong to God. For this reason, Muslim
businessmen want to put their financial resources in society’s service. Instead of referring
to capitalism as an economic system, it is referred to as a mindset. Similarly, in this
period there is no mention of Islamic economics. Instead, there are individuals who
conduct their businesses according to the rules of Islam. Thus, discursive links between
economy, culture and religion are established through the individual.

b. Individual and Society

One of the most important objectives of Altınoluk is to lay out the characteristics of an
Islamic way of life in the modern world. The title of the November 1995 issue is
“Islamicizing One’s Own Area of Power.”
553
Taşgetiren explains that the title refers to
obeying the rules of the Sunna, the sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammad, and
internalizing the practices and perceptions Sunna requires, within the boundaries of one’s
sphere of authority, such as one’s home, work and relationships. Seeking an Islamic
system or state means working for the Islamization of the daily lives of Muslims.
554
The
agenda of Muslims should be rearranged according to Islam’s requirements. In the

553
“Kendi Đ ktidar Alanını Đ slâmlaştırmak” (Islamicizing One’s Own Area of Power), Altınoluk, No: 117, November
1995.
554
Ibid.

232

September 1995 issue, Taşgetiren mentions that Muslims should look to Islam to guide
them in all of their behavior. In other journal issues, various authors indicate that Islam
should become life itself,
555
that the Qur’an’s morality should become the axis of life, and
that the lives of human beings and every institution they form should be arranged
according to the principles of kulluk (being subject to God). The Islamic way of life is
understood as holistic, regulating every aspect between the individual and society. The
holistic view of kulluk (being subject to God) constitutes an important reference point in
the Erenköy community’s understanding of secularism, as will be discussed in the next
section.

c. Secularism and Democracy

From 1990 until 1997, the views regarding secularism are clear and uniform in Altınoluk.
The meaning of secularism is constituted by establishing discursive connections between
a holistic understanding of kulluk and the dominant discourses in the latter half of the
1990s that constructed a stark opposition between the political elite and society as a
whole. As discussed above, from the perspective of a holistic understanding of kulluk,
Islam is a way of life that requires an individual to act according to the rules of Islam in
every sphere of life, including the public sphere. Moreover, it establishes unity among
believers, who are referred to as the Umma. According to this formulation, an Islamic

555
Taşgetiren, A., “Batı, NATO, Đ slam” (The West, NATO and Islam), Altınoluk, No: 110, April 1995: 3.
Also see Yıldız, F., “Đ slam’ı Anlamak ve Yaşamak” (Understanding and Living Islam), Altınoluk, No: 112, Haziran
1995: 7.
233

way of life is inherently incompatible with secularism, which forces individuals to act
and make decisions in the public sphere independent of the requirements of their religion.
Thus, rather than understanding secularism merely as a political system, Altınoluk defines
secularism as a way of life that also dictates rules in the public sphere. Kara mentions
that, “Even those who uphold the widest and softest definition of laicisim do not accept a
re-structuration that will let Muslims apply Islam even in their private lives and social
relationships.”
556

In Altınoluk, secularism is associated with “the West” and a way of life alien to “our
society.”
557
Taşgetiren mentions that secularism means the organization of political and
everyday life according to Western interests.
558
It is a way of life forced upon society by
the political elite or the state. Through the discursive links between dualities such as
domestic versus foreign and political elites/state versus society, the idea that an Islamic
way of life and secularism can co-exist is ruled out.

During the 1990s, both secular and Islamic circles questioned and discussed the
compatibility of democracy and Islam.
559
Taşgetiren argued that democratic participation
may be used to change the basic principles of the Constitution, but if this fails to work,

556
Kara, Đ ., “Elit Zümre Yerli Yapı Peşinde Değil” (Elites Are Not After a Domestic Structure), Altınoluk, No: 111,
May 1995: 8.

557
Ibid.,

558
Taşgetiren, A. “Batı, NATO, Đ slâm” (The West, NATO and Islam), Altınoluk, No: 110, April 1995: 3.

559
Taşgetiren, A. “Sistem ve Đ slam” (System and Islam), Altınoluk, No: 111, May 1995: 3.

234

the system must be replaced. In September 1996, one of the prominent Islamic
intellectuals, Rasim Özdenören, discussed the same issue with a harsher tone. He argued
that, ultimately, Islam and Muslims cannot theoretically share common ground with a
democratic system.
560
In January 1997, Kademoğlu argued that secularism cannot be
approved or supported, as proponents of it see human rights and democratic participation
as the source of legitimacy, and this understanding is totally opposed to Islam’s
conceptualization of the source of legitimacy as being God.
561
In response to the
dominant “Turkish-Islam synthesis” discourse of the 1980s discussed in Chapter 3, and to
certain Islamic actors, notably Fethullah Gülen, who championed such a synthesis in the
1990s, Taşgetiren warned Muslims “to be careful not to form a synthesis outside Islam in
any aspect of life.”
562
He mentioned that those who talk about a synthesis between an
Islamic and a secular way of life are the defenders of the secular system and want to
redefine Islam within the boundaries determined by the secular system. For this reason,
“Islam” cannot accept the idea of “synthesis.”
563
In this way, Taşgetiren portrays Islam as
an entity that has preferences and can make decisions.

560
Özdenören, R., “Đ llüzyon Tehlikesi Söz Konusu” (There is the Danger of Illusion), Altınoluk, No: 128, September
1996: 10.

561
Kademoğlu, M. R., “Meşruiyetin Kaynağı” (The Source of Legitimacy) Altınoluk, No: 131, January 1997: 3.

562
Taşgetiren, A. “Müslüman ve Sistem” (Muslim and the System), Altınoluk, No: 115, September 1995: 3.

563
Taşgetiren, A. “Sistem ve Đ slam” (System and Islam), Altınoluk, No: 111, May 1995: 3.

235

6.4.4. Reference Points

In the Erenköy discourse between 1995 and 1997, Islam is a central reference point
through which other issues such as the relationship between the individual and society,
everyday life of individuals, secularism and democracy and economic activities are
interpreted. The relationship between the individual and the society and the everyday
lives of individuals in the public and private spheres are understood through a holistic
understanding of being subject to God (kulluk). Secularism is defined as a way of life
opposed to this holistic understanding. Thus, Altınoluk’s understanding of kulluk is
central.

Another important reference point is anti-statism, not in the sense that Altınoluk writers
opposed the state altogether,
564
but rather in that they reject the strong secular state in
Turkey. The state is viewed as an obstacle not only to economic development but also to
the political and social demands of society. Despite harsh criticisms of the state,
Altınoluk’s discourse is similar to discourse of the secular establishment in the 1990s in
terms of constructing a polarized view of society divided between secularists and
Islamists. As discussed in Chapter 3, this opposition was produced not only by traditional
intellectuals and Islamic actors but also by the secular establishment and subsequent

564
Although Bulaç criticizes the concept of the state altogether, he is not an adherent of the Erenköy community.
Regular writers in the journal indicate that the existence of the state is important for the umma.
236

governments. Thus, Altınoluk contributed to and served to legitimize the dominant
center-periphery discourse in the 1990s. Moreover, it contributed to transforming the
center-periphery discourse into one that was accepted as common sense. This
transformation was later useful for the AKP, which also capitalized on the center-
periphery discourse.

6.5. THE ERENKÖY COMMUNITY DISCOURSES, 1997-2000

6.5.1. Topics

In the months leading up to and after February 1997, many of the issues of Altınoluk
focus on how individuals can adopt an Islamic way of life. Unlike pre-1997 articles on
the Islamic way of life, however, the authors do not mention the societal aspect. The title
of one of the issues of Altınoluk is “Being Muslim in Difficult Times.”
565
Here, “difficult
times” refers to the February 28 process. The articles mainly discuss how to maintain and
promote Islamization in this period.
566
Dominant secular discourses during the February
28 process emphasized the idea that religion is a matter between God and his subject and
thus is not a social or political matter. Altınoluk challenged this idea in many issues in the
late 1990s. In these discussions, one of the important themes was to differentiate Islam
from irtica (Islamist reactionism) and explain how to reach true Islam. Once the February

565
“Zor Zamanda Musluman Olmak” (Being Muslim in Difficult Times), Altınoluk, No: 142, December 1997.

566
“Her Ev bir Kur’an Kursu” (Every House is a Qur’an School), Altınoluk, No: 140, October 1997.
237

28 process waned in 1999, Altınoluk writers started to discuss the characteristics of an
Islamic political system, and secularism and democracy. They also started to employ
concepts such as liberalism and individual freedoms, especially the freedom of belief.
After Turkey was declared an official candidate to the EU, Altınoluk started to discuss the
prospect of EU membership.

6.5.2. Nomination

As a result of the February 28 process, nomination of self and other significantly shifted
in Erenköy community discourse. One difference is that Altınoluk writers began to
differentiate Islamic actors from individuals who see themselves as Muslims but not as
Islamic. The latter group of people constitutes a new social actor, and society is as a
result no longer constituted by a uniform group of people. People who define themselves
as Muslim but not Islamic are referred to as “quotidians” or “average citizens” (sade
vatandaş). People who do not belong to this group are referred to as “pious,” a
nomination used by Islamic actors other than the Erenköy community as well.

238

NOMINATION OF SELF AND OTHER BETWEEN 1997-2001

SELF

Person of Islam
Pious
Muslim/Muslim administrator
Đ man Ehli (one who has faith)
Elite

OTHER

Secularist
Plain/quotidian/average person

Table 6.1. Nomination of Self and Other in the EC Discourse between 1997 and 2001

6.5.3. Predication

a. Economy

During the February 28

process, not many articles focused on economic issues. The July
1999 issue, for example, included an interview with the MÜSĐ AD president Ali
239

Bayramoğlu. In it, he mentioned that in order to manage economic crises better, the state
should relinquish its control over the economy and in this way promote dynamism in
domestic markets. The state should also continue with its privatization policy in a serious
way and quickly. Bayramoğlu also noted the need for the “Anatolian capital,” represented
in MÜSĐ AD, to become an important force in international markets.
567
Although
Bayramoğlu does not talk about neoliberalism, his discourse is similar to neoliberal
discourse with its emphasis on privatization, the reduced role of state in the economy and
the promotion of international trade.

While on the one hand Altınoluk published interviews with economic actors who
supported neoliberal policies, on the other hand it started to take a strong stance on
poverty and inequality. The April 1998 issue has an interview with the Islamic labor
union, Hak-Đş , and the theme of the February 1999 issue is poverty and global inequality.
In the lead article of this issue, Taşgetiren indicates that IMF and World Bank programs
contribute to income inequality.
568
In July 1999, he talks about the poor segments of the
society who struggle to earn enough money to buy food. He mentions that these people
cannot even think about freedom of thought and freedom of religion.

567
Bayramoğlu, A. Interview. “MÜSĐ AD Genel Başkanı Ali Bayramoğlu ile… ‘Ekonomi Kasisli Yoldan Giden
Minibüs Gibi’” (With MÜSĐ AD President Ali Bayramoğlu: ‘Economy is Like a Minibus on a Bumpy Road’),
Altınoluk, No: 161, July 1999: 7.

568
Demircioğlu, B., “Küresel Eşitsizlik” (Global Inequality), Altınoluk, No: 156, February 1999: 10.
240

When writers in Altınoluk mention poverty, they attribute it to colonization by rich
countries. However, the connection between foreign capital and domestic economic
actors, some of whom are directly related to the Erenköy community, who are at this
stage in the process of becoming integral parts of the world economy, is not mentioned at
all. Poverty is attributed either to the state’s excessive involvement in the economy or to
the consumption culture promoted by capitalism and globalization.

While on the one
hand Altınoluk preserves its long-standing anti-imperialist stance, on the other it
publishes interviews in which competition with international capital is encouraged. This
duality in its discourse enables the Erenköy community to promote the legitimacy of
neoliberal economic reforms without alienating its adherents.

b. Individual and Society

Until 1997-1998, the contributors to the magazine advised that an Islamic lifestyle should
be promoted as much as possible, given the political system. By the end of 1997 and the
beginning of 1998, however, articles on Islamic lifestyle began to focus on the behavior
of individuals rather than norms of society. In 1997 and 1998, in the months leading up to
and following February 28, the articles concerning the relationship between the
individual and the society without exception described how an individual should behave
in his/her daily life at the micro level, not how an Islamic society should function at the
macro level.

241

By 2000, we see two different discourses regarding the role of society as a whole in
enabling an Islamic lifestyle. Taşgetiren clarifies that being Muslim means seeing Islam
as the superior value and accepting its principles as the determinants of behavior in
everyday life. He asks the question, “to what extent can one live Islam in his own world,
only in his relationship with God?” and argues that it is impossible to differentiate
people’s “inner world” from the social environment. If the social environment is not
structured in a way that accords importance to Islamic sensitivities, it is difficult to
achieve sincere Islamic fulfillment.
569
In a similar vein, in November 2000, Kaplan
argued that Islam should not be only a supra identity that shapes Muslim identities, but
also a component of life among other components.
570
In the same issue, Abdullah Gül, a
deputy from the Islamic Virtue Party
571
argues for freedom to fulfill the requirements of
one’s religion, but also argues that one should not allow oppression in the name of
religion, referring to secular actors’ concern that what Islamic actors refer to as “religious
freedoms” may mean an imposition of religious rules on those leading non-Islamic
lifestyles. Around 2000, two discourses regarding the Islamic way of life coexisted in
Altınoluk: the idea that society needs to uphold Islamic values as a whole for an
individual to practice Islam; and the idea that an Islamic way of life should not be

569
Taşgetiren, A. “Marifetullah Olmadan” (Without Knowledge of Servitude to God), Altınoluk, No: 269, July, 2008:
4.

570
Kaplan, Yusuf. Interview. “Đ slâm Dünyasının Bugünü ve Geleceği Üzerine Yusuf Kaplan ile... "Đ slâm Dünyası,
Medeniyet Sıçraması Yapmaya Hazırlanıyor" (With Yusuf Kaplan on the Present and Future of the World of Islam:
Islamic World is Getting Ready for a Leap of Modernity) Altınoluk, No: 174, August 2000: 12.

571
Gül became the President of Turkey in August 2007 and served as Prime Minister between November 2002 and
March 2003.

242

imposed on everyone. However, the latter idea was short-lived; after the 2002 elections
all the writers, including Taşgetiren, argued in line with the first discourse.

c. Secularism and Democracy

The February 28 process led to some changes in Altınoluk’s discourse on secularism.
572

Writers in Altınoluk were still opposed to secularism, but instead of referring to it as a
“secular system” they started referring to it as “secular culture.” Instead of challenging
the secular political system, there were discussions of ways to protect Islamic culture and
ways of life from the secular culture that was viewed as becoming more and more
prevalent.
573
There was also an effort on the part of Altınoluk writers to explain that
sharia (Islamic law) and Islam itself are not one and the same. They also clarified that
what they wanted was not an Islamic state but “a state that makes use of Islam.” In this
way, the Erenköy community was challenging the purported threat of sharia frequently
mentioned by secular actors to secure public support for the February 28
th
process.

However, there was no drastic change in the stance towards secularism. In the May 1999
issue Taşgetiren depicts society as a whole and secular elites as two homogenous entities

572
“February 28 Process”, began following an 18-clause decision imposed by the military at the National Security
Council meeting of February 28, 1997, which dismissed the government of the time.” Keneş, Bülent “Has the February
28 process gone underground?,” Today’s Zaman, February 26, 2007.

573
“Behind the efforts to characterize belief as a personal issue lies the aim to narrow freedom and belief. This
understanding is the motive behind efforts to penetrate the secular lifestyle by replacing it with religion.” Kademoğlu,
M. R., “Đ nancın Sosyal Boyutu” (Social Aspect of Religious Belief), Altınoluk, No: 136, June 1997: 9.

243

opposed to one another and claims that “the society was not behind the February 28
project.”
574
Taşgetiren mentions elsewhere the idea that legitimacy is possible only to the
extent that political leaders believe in the values that God determines.
575
In April 2000
Ismail Kara, an Islamic intellectual, mentioned that, in Turkish history, religion and state
are not mechanisms that operate separately.
576
Cemil Çiçek, deputy for the Islamic Virtue
Party (Çiçek served as Minister of Internal Affairs and deputy Prime Minister in Turkey
between 2003 and 2007), denied the assertion that what they wanted was a theocracy.
Instead, he argued, the goal was a state that makes use of religion. He also argued that to
say that religion is between God and his subject, which is one of the credos of secularists,
amounts to atheism.
577
In the same issue, Taşgetiren argued that there are
incompatibilities between secularism and the way society views Islam as a reference in
their actions. He mentioned that there are also incompatibilities between how democracy
transfers society’s will to government, while secularism puts boundaries around
democratization.
578
This statement was a reflection of a changing view of democracy as a
system that reflects the viewpoints of “religious” sections of society. After the February

574
Taşgetiren, A., “Din-Toplum-Sistem Đ lişkileri Üzerine...” (On Religion-Society-System Relations), Altınoluk, No:
159, May 1999: 3.

575
Taşgetiren, A. “Nasıl Bir Sistem?” (What Kind of a System?), Altınoluk, No: 134, April 1997: 3.

576
Kara, Đ ., Interview. “Dr. Đ smail Kara Đ le: Din Đ le Devlet Birbirinin Mütemmim Cüzüdür" (With Dr. Đ smail Kara:
Religion and State Are One Anothers’ Integral Parts), Altınoluk, No: 170 , April, 2000: 17.

577
Çiçek, C., Interview, “Cemil Çiçek ile: Dinden Faydalanan Devlet" (With Cemil Çiçek: The State That Makes Use
of Religion), Altınoluk, No: 170, April, 2000: 5.

578
Taşgetiren, A. “Problemli Alan” (Problematic Area), Altınoluk, No:170, April 2000: 3.

244

28 process, the journal started to refer to democracy and secularism as two opposing
concepts.

While democracy was now defended by Altınoluk, in 2000 Turinay was critical of
“excessive democracy” (azdırılmış demokrasi)
579
--indicating that too much democracy
might not be good for society--but the exact limits of acceptable democracy are not
discussed in Altınoluk. However, Taşgetiren’s article in April 1997 provided some insight
into the Community’s understanding of democracy. He mentioned that, in an Islamic
system, there must be rule of law or of principles determined by God and his prophet.
Citizens must give consent to and supervise the government. In an Islamic system,
problems among citizens are solved by councils (Şura), but he does not mention whether
these councils must be elected. In the December 1999 issue, Taşgetiren mentioned
freedom and human rights when discussing the February 28
th
process. In the July issue of
the same year, MÜSĐ AD president Ali Bayramoğlu mentioned that the Qur’an is the
guarantor of rights and freedoms. Although concepts of freedom of thought, freedom of
religion, and human rights are mentioned much more frequently after 1997, the meaning
of these concepts and sources of rights and freedoms are not clear. In other words, these
concepts were not connected to and articulated with the community discourse.

579
Turinay, N. Interview. “Đ slâm Dünyasının Bugünü ve Geleceği Üzerine Necmettin Turinay ile... ‘Kimse Nevmid
Olmasın’” (On the Present and the Future of the World of Islam: ‘Nobody Should Be Hopeless’), Altınoluk, No: 174,
August 2000: 5.
245

d. The European Union

In Altınoluk, there is a clear shift in 1999 regarding the EU. Before the Helsinki summit
of 1999 at which Turkey was declared a candidate for inclusion in the EU, there is an
outright rejection of the EU in the journal in line with its anti-Western and anti-capitalist
stance. However, these views are stated between the lines, rather than there being full
articles devoted to the issue. In the November 1999 issue, after Turkey was declared a
candidate for EU membership, Altınoluk published an interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu.
Davutoğlu argued that the EU was ahead of Turkey in terms of norms of freedom of
religion and thought, and that closer relations with the EU could affect Turkey positively
in this sense.
580
He mentioned that if Turkey’s strategic target was to enter the EU, it
needed to respect human rights. The inclusion of such pro-European views is an
important shift in the journal’s discourse. Cemil Çiçek, expressed similar views to
Davutoğlu regarding the EU and how it upholds freedom of religion and belief.
581
In the
November 2000 issue, devoted to the EU, Abdullah Gül supports membership because he
thinks it will contribute to Turkey’s democratization and development of human rights
standards. However, he has concerns that if these freedoms help Turkey to develop its
own culture and readopt its religious identity, then there will be some groups in the EU

580
Davutoğlu, A., Interview, “2000'ler Eşiğinde Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu ile Durum Değerlendirmesi: Bunalımdan
Uyanış Çıkacak" (On the Verge of 2000s, Assessment of the Situation with Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu ‘Awakening
Will Rise from the Depression’), Altınoluk, November 1999. Davutoğlu became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in
2009.

581
Çiçek, Cemil, Interview. “Cemil Çiçek ile: Dinden Faydalanan Devlet" (With Cemil Çiçek: The State That Makes
Use of Religion), Altınoluk, No: 170, April, 2000: 5.

246

who would oppose that.
582
In the May 2001 issue, MÜSĐ AD president Bayramoğlu,
expresses his view that integration into the EU should be one of the priorities in
Turkey.
583

6.5.4. Reference Points

During and after the February 28
th
process, Islam continues to be the central reference
point in Altınoluk’s discourse. Islam is defined as an identity, a mindset, way of life and
behavior and as the source of principles in governing the society. Democracy is
articulated with the community discourse through the reference point of Islam. Taşgetiren
associated the Islamic concepts such as şura (council) and biat (fealty/pledge of
allegiance) with democracy to provide an understanding of it from an Islamic point of
view. One of the changes in Altınoluk’s discourse was that instead of referring to
secularism as a system or a regime, writers began to refer to secularism as a culture. This
change in discourse was brief. Once the February 28
th
process waned Altınoluk resumed
its harsh criticism of the secular “system.” While the journal retained its discourse on
secularism, its discourse on democracy shifted. Prior to 1997 democracy was viewed as
incompatible with Islam. After 1997, democracy is viewed as a necessity for expressing
the demand of the Islamic actors. As a result, democracy and secularism became two

582
Gül, A. Interview. “Abdullah Gül Đ le... ‘Politikacı Haksızlığı Görmeli’" (With Abdullah Gül…‘A Politician Must
See the Unfairness’), Altınoluk, No: 170, April 2000: 8.

583
Bayramoğlu, A. Interview. “MÜSĐ AD Genel Başkanı Ali Bayramoğlu ile: Kriz Değil Kaos Yaşıyoruz" (With
MÜSĐ AD President Ali Bayramoğlu: We Are Going through Chaos, Not Crisis), Altınoluk, No: 183, May 2001: 9.

247

opposing concepts. Similarly, a group of traditional intellectuals pitted democracy and
secularism against one another during and after the February 28
th
process as discussed in
Chapter 4. Thus, Altınoluk became one of the discursive spaces where organic
intellectuals re-produce discourses of traditional intellectuals in the 1990s regarding state-
society relationship.

Between 1997 and 2000, there were two sets of contradictory discourses espoused in
Altınoluk. First, a pro-EU attitude is accompanied by an anti-West discourse. Second,
alongside an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist discourse, Altınoluk incorporates Islamic
business owners’ discourse, which favors economic liberalization. These contradictions
serve to legitimize the discourses that emerge as a result of shifting interests and
identities of the Islamic actors, without challenging the pre-existing discourses in the
Erenköy community.

6.6. THE ERENKÖY COMMUNITY DISCOURSES BETWEEN 2001- 2011

6.6.1. Topics

One of the most significant shifts in Altınoluk ’s discourse after 2001 has been the
inclusion of discussions of family, marriage, and men’s and women’s roles in family life
248

and in the public sphere.
584
The interpretation of Islam and the problem of which
interpretation or who represents “true Islam” is another topic of discussion. After the
AKP’s victory in elections in 2000, Islamic actors with different discourses became more
visible in the public sphere, predominantly through Islamic mass media channels.
Altınoluk’s discussion of various interpretations of Islam represents a criticism of some of
these discourses. Parallel to the issue of differences in interpreting Islam, a few articles in
Altınoluk focused on the diversity among Muslims, limits of this diversity, what change
means in an Islamic society, and how to develop without changes. Towards the late
2000s, the writers of Altınoluk started to include the ideas of becoming a community, or a
bigger community (cemaatleşmek), being aware of one’s responsibilities towards one
another, the sacrifices one has to make for each other, and obeying a higher authority.
One can argue that these discussions are a reflection of the changing structure of Erenköy
community from a tightly knit section of a tarikat, into a larger community providing
services for more, and more diverse, sections of society.

The concept of freedom was mentioned in Altınoluk before 2001, but it was not discussed
in depth. After 2001, it was incorporated into the discourse, articulating this concept with

584
Yılmaz, H. K., “Nasıl Bir Yuva” (What Kind of a Home), Altınoluk, No: 211, September 2003: 6; “Zevce Đ le
Sohbetin Edebleri” (Rules of Conversation with Wife), Altınoluk, No: 211, September 2003: 16; Dânâ, S., “Aile
Saadeti” (Family Bliss), Altınoluk, No: 211, September 2003: 31; Kandemir, Y. “Đ ffetini Koruyana Cennet Var” (There
is Heaven for Those Who Protect Their Chastity), Altınoluk, No: 225, November 2004: 28; Topbaş, O. N., Interview.
“Đ çi Boş Mazeretlerle Helâl-Haram Sınırı Çiğnenmemeli” (Permissible - Non-Premissible Line Should Not Be Crossed
in Vein), Altınoluk, No: 241, March 2006: 5; Durmuş, C., “Örnek Hanımlar,” (Exemplar Ladies), Altınoluk, No: 254,
April 2007: 26; Kandemir, Y., “Kadınların Elçisi” (Representative of Women), Altınoluk, No: 260, November 2007:
28; Temel, A. R., “Đ slam’da Evliliğin Ufku Cennete Uzanan Beraberlik,” (In Islam Horizon of Marriage is Unity
towards Heaven), Altınoluk, No: 278, April 2009: 40; Dânâ, S., “Evlilerin Birbiri Üzerindeki Hakları” (Married
Couples’ Rights over Each Other), Altınoluk, No: 281, July 2009: 31; Temel, A. R., “Din Ayrı Dünya Ayrı Olabilir
mi?” (May the Religious and the Worldly be Separate), Altınoluk, No: 287, January 2010: 12.
249

Islam. In the 2000s, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, human rights are also
mentioned, and their limits are discussed. Aside from these new topics, Altınoluk
continued to focus on secularism and its meaning, capitalism, the link between the
economy and morality, and Turkey’s relationship with the EU.

6.6.2. Nomination

NOMINATION OF SELF AND OTHER BETWEEN 2001-2011

SELF

Good Muslim, Pious
Mother
Muslim lady, Muslim woman
People with Islamic sensitivities
Muslim, Person of Islam
Society of Islam
Homo Islamicus

OTHER

Deteriorated/degenerated Muslim
West, Western civilization
Westernists
Muslim men
Modernism
The ruling/dominant system

Table 6.2. Nomination of Self and Other in the EC Discourse between 2001 and 2011

250

During the 2000s, Altınoluk continued to uphold the opposition between the society and
the state,
585
and between the ‘secular minority’ and the society.
586
In November 2005
Taşgetiren suggested there may be a different dynamic between the state and the society
if the state can understand that the Islamic identity is the most solid pillar that will
support us in the storms of the modern age.
587
As gender became one of the most
frequently topics in Altınoluk, the opposition between the state and society is also
discussed in the context of women’s right to wear their headscarfs in universities.
588

Muslim ladies/Muslim women and Muslim men became frequently used nomination.
Despite the broad differentiation between the state and the society, in the 2000s new
categories within the category of society emerged. In 2001, Eygi differentiated “good
Muslims” and “deteriorated/degenerated Muslims” (çürük Müslümanlar). He also
mentioned that Muslims cannot become more powerful than anti-Islamists with the
mentality of an agrarian society or of people who live in the outfringes of a city. He
mentioned the necessity of a new Muslim identity with an “urban mentality”, indicating
the transformation of Islamic actors in the process of neoliberal restructuring.
589

585
Some of the articles constructing an opposition between society and the state see Taşgetiren, A., “AB Yolculuğu”
(The EU Journey), Altınoluk, No: 237, November 2005: 3. Taşgetiren, A., Başörtüsü Neyin Sembolü? (What does the
Headscarf Symbolize?), Altınoluk, No: 265, March 2008: 3; Taşgetiren, A., “Modern Çağda Din ve Đ nsan” (Religion
and Human in Modern Age) Altınoluk, No: 267, May 2008: 3.

586
Kaplan,Y., Interview, “Yusuf Kaplan ile... “Hayat Tarzı” Tartışmaları Üzerine...” (With Yusuf Kaplan, on the
Discussions Regarding ‘Life Style’) Altınoluk, No: 258, August 2007: 6.

587
Taşgetiren, A., “AB Yolculuğu” (The EU Journey), Altınoluk, No: 237, November 2005: 3.

588
Taşgetiren, A., Başörtüsü Neyin Sembolü? (What does the Headscarf Symbolize?), Altınoluk, No: 265, March 2008:
3.

589
Eygi, M. Ş., “Mehmet Şevket Eygi'nin Görüşleri ‘Yeniden Müslümanlaşma Başlatılmalı’” (Muslimization Should
Be Re-started), Altınoluk, No: 190, December 2001: 7.

251

During the 2000s, while some of the contributors to the journal emphasized the
opposition between Muslims and non-Muslims,
590
between Muslims and people who
appear to be modern,
591
and between secular minority and society, others emphasized the
similarities between the pious and “the regular citizens.”
592
Once, Taşgetiren mentioned
the existence of the secular sections of society and other Muslims groups who might be
opposed to a monolithic adoption of Islam.
593
Nomination for the other non-Islamic
sections of society indicates the continuation of the trend in the late 1990s to differentiate
Islamic groups from the society at large. Emergence of a variety of categories within the
category of “society” is also an important indicator of changing discourses on the
relationship between individual and the society, as will be discussed below. In the 2000s
in Altınoluk West continued to be the Other and Muslims continued to be constructed as
aggrieved and wronged.
594
The hope that Muslims will become more powerful than their
competitors – meaning the West- is a continuation of the 19
th
century Islamist discourses.

590
Temel, Ali Rıza, “Gerçek Müslümanın Farkı” (The Difference of a Muslim), Altınoluk, No: 285, November 2009:
12.

591
Kırış, Şemsettin, “Düşüncede Modernleşme Nasıl Başlar?” (How does Modernity Start at Thought?), Altınoluk, No:
281, July 2009: 48.

592
In July 2009, Taşgetiren mentioned that a common point between the pious and the regular citizen is their views on
the necessity of being virtuous. Taşgetiren, A., “Mürşidi Hayatta Đ ken Okuyabilmek” (Understanding the Mentor When
He is Alive), Altınoluk, No: 281, July 2009: 3.

593
Taşgetiren, A., “Đ slam Dünyasında Sistem Arayışları” (Search for System in the Islam World), Altınoluk, No: 310,
December 2011: 3.

594
Taşgetiren, A., “Batı’nın Đ slam’la Đ mtihanı” (The West’s Test with Islam), Altınoluk, No: 249, December 2006: 4.

252

6.6.3. Predication

a. Economy

After 2001, there is a clear shift in the number of articles devoted to economic issues.
“Homo-Islamicus”, a model for Muslim businessmen, which had been developing since
mid-1990s, started to take full shape.
595
This new type of businessman does not do
business on the basis of self-interest, does not waste his wealth, and helps other
businessmen and those who are less fortunate. There are also articles detailing the
practices of Islamic trade and how to make sure that the earnings are helal. In addition,
many of the articles in Altınoluk underline the importance of ethics in economic life. The
title of the interview with president of MÜSĐ AD Ömer Bolat in March 2006 is “Muslim
Businessmen Should Be the Conscience of Capital.”
596
In this interview, Bolat argues
that economic life depends on ethics more than it does on state laws.
597
He mentions that,
since interest is prohibited in Islam, it encourages fair and free competition and
cooperation for competition. Although Bolat makes it clear that the members of
MÜSĐ AD operate within a market economy, regular writers in Altınoluk as well as editor

595
Bolat, Ö. "Müslüman Đş adamı Sermayenin Vicdanı Olmalıdır" (Muslim Businessmen Shall Be the Conscience of
Capital), Altınoluk, No: 241, March 2006: 13; Alkan, Şükrü, “Đ GĐ AD Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı Şükrü Alkan'la
Ekonomik Kriz Üzerine: Krizde Derin Bir Ahlâkî Boyut Var” (With IGIAD’s Chairman of the Board of Directors
Şükrü Alkan on the Economic Crisis: There is a Deep Morality Aspect to the Crisis), Altınoluk, No: 275, January 2009:
14.

596
Bolat, Ö. "Müslüman Đş adamı Sermayenin Vicdanı Olmalıdır" (Muslim Businessmen Shall Be the Conscience of
Capital), Altınoluk, No: 241, March 2006: 13.

597
Ibid.
253

Ahmet Taşgetiren, associate capitalism with ambition, greed and unjust earnings. The
December 2006 lead article argues that capitalism is a system based on exploitation, in
which capital owners dominate the government.
598
There would seem to be a
contradiction in the promotion of a type of businessman who operates in a capitalist
system and the association of capitalism with exploitation. However, in Altınoluk ’s
discourse “capitalism” is conceptualized as a culture and a way of life rather than as only
an economic system. Capitalism is also viewed as a particular method of operating in an
economic system. In January 2009 Taşgetiren mentions that Islam offers an economic
system completely different than capitalism, mainly due to the distinction between helal
and haram, the requirement of a no-interest banking system, and sensitivity to avoid
waste and extravagance.
599
Contrary to these values, the capitalist system encourages
consumption. In Altınoluk, the concept of “kanaat economy” is encouraged. Kanaat
refers to being content with what one has, and an economic system based on kanaat asks
individuals not to consume more than they earn.
600
According to Osman Nuri Topbaş, the
president or CEO of several large companies associated with the Erenköy community,
601

the Islamic economy is different from both capitalism and socialism. In capitalism,

598
Demircioğlu, B., “Kapitalist Sömürünün Küresel Günahı” (Global Sin of Capitalist Exploitation), Altınoluk, No:
238, December 2005: 53.

599
Taşgetiren, A. “Đ slâm Ne Diyor?” (What Does Islam Say ?), Altınoluk, No: 275, January 2009: 3.

600
Bolat, Ö., “Üçüncü Dönem MÜSĐ AD Başkanı Dr. Ömer Bolat ile ekonomik kriz üzerine... “Kapitalizm Çok Büyük
Yara Aldı” (With the President of MÜSĐ AD Dr. Ömer Bolat on the Economic Crisis: Capitalism Has Been Severely
Wounded), Altınoluk, No: 275, January 2009: 10.

601
Mustafa Latif Topbaş, close relative of Musa Topbaş is in the board of directors of large companies such as BIM.
Hatısaru, Songül, “Topbaş, Sabancı'dan Gıdasa'yı alıyor” (Topbaş is Purchasing Gıdasa from Sabancı) August 15, 2007
accessed January 30, 2009.
254

property belongs to the individual, whereas in socialism it belongs to the government. In
the Islamic economy, property belongs to God. In a capitalist economy, human beings
come to resemble wild animals, and the sum total of their concerns comes to be money.
For this reason, Islam definitely denies the basic logic of capitalism, “laissez faire, laissez
passer.”
602

After the 2001 economic crisis, the Muslim businessmen model and Islamic trade were
revisited almost every month. During this period, we do not see the criticisms of the IMF
that were prevalent in the mid-1990s. While in the mid-1990s there were criticisms of
government policies for their inability to transform the economic system into a viable and
functioning system, there were no articles directly criticizing or praising the government
after 2002. Instead, the articles on economy focus on how Muslim businessmen should
adapt to changing economic conditions while preserving their identity. This change is in
line with the neoliberal de-politicization of economic policy. After 2001, however, we
see a seemingly contradictory discourse. While capitalism is vilified, a Muslim
businessman who makes a profit in the market economy is praised. This duality towards
the market economy points to an understanding of capitalism as a method of economic
practice rather than as the current international system. A Muslim businessman is
considered successful to the extent that he can function in the market economy while
upholding the Islamic rules regarding trade and finance.

602
Topbaş, O. N., Interview. “Đ çi Boş Mazeretlerle Helâl-Haram Sınırı Çiğnenmemeli” (Permissible - Non-Premissible
Line Should Not Be Crossed in Vein), Altınoluk, No: 241, March 2006: 5.
255

b. The European Union

Despite Altınoluk’s identification of West at the Other and as the boss of the global
exploitation,
603
in the 2000s, there is not a staunch opposition to the possibility of
accession in the EU. On the contrary, in 2001 in an interview with the then president of
MÜSĐ AD Bayramoğlu, he supported the plans and projects aiming EU integration.
604

Concerns regarding religious assimilation in the process of integration with the EU were
raised in the July 2004 issue. Temel argued that harmonizing policies with the EU does
not mean becoming its satellite.
605
In 2004, with regards to Turkey’s relationship with the
West, it is argued that becoming an honorable member of the Western world is only
possible by not giving up national honor. In this context of the article Islam is presented
as the basis of national honor.
606

In November 2005, Taşgetiren argued that when groups with Islamic sensitivities were in
search of an opening for greater freedom, the prospect of integration into the EU became
a hope. However, he also mentions that there is reason to be concerned about EU
membership. A Muslim society will come into much deeper contact with Western

603
Yıldırım, S. H. “Batılılaşma Projesi ve ‘Küçük’ Tavizler” (Westernization Project and ‘Small’ Concessions),
Altınoluk, No: 197, July 2002: 42.

604
Bayramoğlu, A. Interview. “MÜSĐ AD Genel Başkanı Ali Bayramoğlu ile: Kriz Değil Kaos Yaşıyoruz" (With
MÜSĐ AD President Ali Bayramoğlu: We Are Going through Chaos, Not Crisis), Altınoluk, No: 183, May 2001: 9.

605
Temel, A. R. “Avrupa Birliği ve Dini Etkileşim” (The European Union and Religious Interaction), Altınoluk, No:
221, July 2004: 50.

606
Ibid.

256

civilizations’ peculiar social structures, and at this point Muslim society needs to separate
the good effects from the bad.
607
Some of the possible negative impacts of the Western
civilization Taşgetiren mentions are homosexuality, annihilation of family, drugs, alcohol
and atheism.
608
In sum, in Altınoluk integration with the EU is supported mainly because
of the expected freedoms, but there are concerns regarding its broader cultural impact on
society. In line with this stance, in 2002 Taşgetiren mentioned that the process of
accession to the EU should go on, but meanwhile alternatives to the EU should be
investigated.
609

c. Secularism, Democracy and Human Rights

After 2001, there is a much more substantive change in the discourse on secularism.
Although there are still articles that pit secular values against Islamic ones and associate
the former with the elite and the latter with the majority of population, some of the
contributors, including the editor, mention that there may be different “interpretations of
secularism” or “levels of secularism” and there is the possibility of redefining
secularism.
610
New interpretations of secularism, which could be referred to as

607
Taşgetiren, A., “AB Yolculuğu” (The EU Journey), Altınoluk, No: 237, November 2005: 3.

608
Ibid.

609
Yıldırım, S. H., “AB Türkiye'yi Alacak mı?” (Will the EU Accept Turkey?), Altınoluk, No: 198, August 2002: 50.

610
Taşgetiren, A. “Modern Çağda Din ve Đ nsan” (Religion and Human in Modern Age), Altınoluk, No: 267, May 2008:
3.

257

“democratic secularism” or “positive secularism,” would reflect “the society’s” demands
rather than those of the state.
611
In December 2011, Taşgetiren, while criticizing
secularism in Turkey used the phrase “an interpretation of secularism” instead of
“secularism.”
612
This change in discourse suggests that Altınoluk was preparing a new
discursive sphere where the meaning of secularism could be debated in the future.
Although the contours of an acceptable interpretation of secularism was not discussed in
Altınoluk, an article in April 2004 issue gives us clues about the limits of an acceptable
definition of secularism. It is argued that Islam can never accept Islam’s exclusion from
social life. Islam also cannot accept the view that religion cannot have a say in worldy
affairs, as this assertion is based on a passive view of God.
613
In June 2008 Güler argued
that since people live in societies, the rules of God regarding the individual involve the
rules regarding the society.
614
These views on secularism indicate that there has not been
a change in the content of the concept of secularism and Taşgetiren’s idea of considering
different interpretations of secularism and how the rules of Islam regarding society and
“positive laicism” or “democratic secularism” can be reconciled are not discussed in
Altınoluk.

611
Ibid.

612
Taşgetiren, A., “Đ slam Dünyasında Sistem Arayışları” (Search for System in the Islam World ), Altınoluk, No: 310,
December 2011: 3.

613
Güler, Zekeriya “Đ nsanın Varoluşu ve Seküler Dünya Görüşü” (Human Being’s Existence and Secular World View),
Altınoluk, No: 218, April 2004: 7. Taşgetiren, A., “Günah Neden Günah?” (Why Is Sin a Sin?), Altınoluk, No: 268,
June 2008: 3.

614
Taşgetiren, A., “Günah Neden Günah?” (Why Is Sin a Sin?), Altınoluk, No: 268, June 2008: 3.
258

While Taşgetiren mentioned the possibility of different interpretations of secularism,
sharp criticisms of secularism continued in Altınoluk. In August 2007 Kaplan argued that
secularism is divisive, as it divides the religion and the world, which means that Muslims
need to form communities in order to resist secularism’s restriction of religion to private
sphere.
615
Kaplan’s argument indicates that division has a negative connotation, while
unity has a positive connotation, in a similar way to the Gülen Community discourses.
616

Kaplan associates secularism with capitalism and colonialism. He viewed secularism as
one of the causes of capitalism. According to Kaplan, as the society becomes more
secularized, people start to think only about their self-interest. As a result, capitalism
becomes even more prevalent.
617
Secular colonizers are disseminating the global pagan
culture, threatening to eliminate our Islamic values. Taşgetiren also associates secularism
with capitalism and colonization.
618
In January 2009, he mentions that, “In sacred culture
money serves people. In secular culture, people serve money.”
619
In February 2009,
secularism is associated with an occupation by the foreign armies, while Islam is

615
Kaplan,Y., Interview, “Yusuf Kaplan ile... “Hayat Tarzı” Tartışmaları Üzerine...” (With Yusuf Kaplan, on the
Discussions Regarding ‘Life Style’) Altınoluk, No: 258, August 2007: 6. Also see Taşgetiren, A. “Ateşten Yanmadan
Geçmek” (Passing Through Fire Without Getting Burned), Altınoluk, No: 241, March 2006: 3.
616
In a similar way unity of a Muslim society of a whole is emphasized in “Đ slam'ın Ahlâk Toplumu Nerede?” (Where
is the Moral Society of Islam?), Altınoluk, No: 278, April 2009; Taşgetiren, A. “Caminin Kalbi: Đ mam” (The Heart of
the Mosque: Imam), Altınoluk, No: 272, October 2008: 3; Bolat, Ömer, “Üçüncü Dönem MÜSĐ AD Başkanı Dr. Ömer
Bolat ile ekonomik kriz üzerine... “Kapitalizm Çok Büyük Yara Aldı” (With the President of MÜSĐ AD Dr. Ömer Bolat
on the Economic Crisis: Capitalism Has Been Severely Wounded), Altınoluk, No: 275, January 2009: 10.

617
Ibid.

618
Taşgetiren, A. “Đ slâm Ne Diyor?” (What Does Islam Say?) Altınoluk, No: 275, January 2009: 3. Taşgetiren, A.,
Başörtüsü Neyin Sembolü? (What does the Headscarf Symbolize?), Altınoluk, No: 265, March 2008: 3.

619
Taşgetiren, A. “Đ slâm Ne Diyor?” (Đ slâm Ne Diyor?), Altınoluk, No: 275, January 2009: 3.

259

associated with independence.
620
In 2007, globalism is associated with secularism.
According to Taşgetiren, a global siege is seen to threaten the consistency of Muslim life.
Global culture is secular and as such detached from sacredness.
621
Association of
secularism with division, capitalism, globalism
622
, colonialism and lack of independence
served to further differentiate capitalism from the “Islam economy” or “production
economy,” and differentiate secularism from democracy and independence.

In the 2000s, the writers of Altınoluk continued to view democracy as a system capable
of reflecting the ideas of “those with Islamic sensitivities.”
623
Concepts of democracy and
human rights were evoked in the context of the headscarf issue.
624
Human rights were
invoked with regard to the ban on wearing headscarfs for university students and those
who work in public institutions. It is argued that this ban is against any conception of
human rights.
625
The limits of human rights are also discussed in Altınoluk. In the March
2006 issue the concept of human rights is questioned. According to Taşgetiren, the

620
Taşgetiren, A. “21 yıl önce, 21 yıl sonra... Böyle Đ slam Dünyasına Böyle Filistin” (21 Years Before, 21 Years
After…This Kind of Palestine for This Kind of Islam World), Altınoluk, No :276, February 2009: 3.

621
Taşgetiren, A. “Hayat Tarzı Hassasiyeti” (Sensitivity for ‘Life Style’), Altınoluk, No: 258, August 2007: 3.

622
For association of secularism with globalism see Taşgetiren, A. “Faziletli Bir Toplum Đ çin...” (For a Society of
Virtue), No: 246, August 2006: 3; Kaplan,Y., Interview, “Yusuf Kaplan ile... “Hayat Tarzı” Tartışmaları Üzerine...”
(With Yusuf Kaplan, on the Discussions Regarding ‘Life Style’) Altınoluk, No: 258, August 2007: 6.

623
Arslan, M., “AB Yolunda Đ mam-Hatip Liseleri” (On the Road to the EU, Imam-Hatip High School), Altınoluk, No:
271, September 2008: 53. Taşgetiren, A. “Đ slam Dünyasında Sistem Arayışları” (Search for System in the Islam
World), Altınoluk, No: 310, December 2011: 3.

624
Taşgetiren, A. “Đ slam Dünyasında Sistem Arayışları” (Search for System in the Islam World), Altınoluk, No: 310,
December 2011: 3.

625
Taşgetiren, A., “Başörtüsü Neyin Sembolü?” (What does the Headscarf Symbolize?), Altınoluk, No: 265, March
2008: 3.

260

discourse of “human rights” is used by some to legitimate their sinful behavior.
626

Moreover, he criticized that adultery is not considered as a crime in Turkey, a country of
Islam, indicating that he equated legitimacy with religious acceptability, and thus implied
subjecting the segments of the society that have different lifestyles to the rules of
religion. After 2001, fewer articles on secularism appeared compared to the 1990s.
Rather than questioning a political system based on secularism, secular and Islamic
cultures were pitted against each other in the articles that focus on the Islamic lifestyle,
which will be discussed in the next section.

d. Individual and Society

After the AKP won the national elections, in the December 2002 issue of Altınoluk
Taşgetiren mentioned that Turkey needs a government that will give the groups who have
“Islamic sensitivities” assurance that their problems will be solved while not imposing
religious measures on the sections of society that have different lifestyles.
627
In the same
article, Taşgetiren mentioned the importance of “dialog,” one of the most important
aspects of the Gülen Community discourse, in the relationship between groups with
different lifestyles in society. Accepting different lifestyle and respecting the non-Islamic
actors’ fears regarding the imposition of Islamic rules on the society as a whole is a

626
Sin (günah) is defined as the going against the framework Islamic law determines. Taşgetiren, A. “Ateşten
Yanmadan Geçmek” (Passing Through Fire Without Getting Burned), No: 241, March 2006: 3.

627
Taşgetiren, A. “3 Kasım'da Türkiye'de Ne Oldu?” (What Happened in Turkey on the November 3
rd
), Altınoluk No:
202, December 2002: 3.

261

drastic change in Altınoluk’s discourse. However, after 2002 until the December 2011
issue where Taşgetiren makes similar remarks, the views on respecting different lifestyles
are replaced with the pre-2000s community discourse on the diversity in society. The
reason of the return to pre-2000s discourse might be disillusionment with the AKP
government’s assurances that problems of the more “religious” sectors will be solved. In
November 2005, Taşgetiren argues that, “It is apparent that no matter how much the
government cadres in Turkey define themselves with an Islamic identity, they cannot
reflect this in their government character.”
628
We thus see a return to a defensive tone that
was prevalent in the late 1990s in Altınoluk with regard to secular culture and the idea
that the social environment needs to uphold certain religious values so that Muslims can
achieve Islamic fulfillment.

In August 2005 issue, Muslim is defined as a person who views Islam as a standard to
regulate his/her life, and pledges to shape his/her life according to Islam.
629
Every
Muslim interprets Islam differently in accordance with his/her personality. However, the
more difference there is between Islam and our interpretation of Muslimness, the more
problematic our personality is. In the same way, the more our personalities are similar to
Islam, the healthier is our interpretation of Muslimness.
630
These views construct Islam as
a reference point for judging whether or not our personalities are problematic. They also

628
Taşgetiren, A., “AB Yolculuğu” (The EU Journey), Altınoluk, No: 237, November 2005: 3.

629
Taşgetiren, A., “En Hayati Soru: Ben Ne Kadar Müslümanım?” (The Most Vital Question: How Much of a Muslim
Am I?), Altınoluk, No: 234, August 2005: 3.

630
Ibid.

262

construct a conception an ideal society that has little room for diversity and that is
composed of individuals who have similar personalities, all shaped according to Islam.

The relationship between individuals’ lifestyle and society’s norms that prioritizes the
latter is further consolidated through the idea that Islam is lived holistically and it has
regulations on every sphere of life. In August 2007, Kaplan argued that Islamic lifestyle
is oppressed by the seculars. He mentions that a person’s lifestyle involves their political
views, the way they conduct their businesses, their viewpoints and behaviors. The same
idea is repeated in February 2009: “Islam is lived in a holistic way. This is possible only
if Islam is the determining factor of the system that shapes life.”
631
A culture based on
divine revelation necessitates a holistic outlook on life.
632
In the 2000s, in Altınoluk there
was an emphasis on the importance of “the community”, common thought, common
political attitudes, common goals and ideals.
633
In addition the importance of “conscious
masses” (who are conscious of the common goals), and unity in how to act are similar to
Gülen Community’s discourses. This similarity can be explained by the exchange of
ideas between different Islamic groups in the mass media platforms. It can also be
explained by the structural change the Erenköy Community has been going through, from
being a tarikat with few followers who excel in the teachings of their sheikh towards an

631
Taşgetiren, A. “21 yıl önce, 21 yıl sonra... Böyle Đ slam Dünyasına Böyle Filistin” (21 Years Before, 21 Years
After…This Kind of Palestine for This Kind of Islam World), Altınoluk, No: 276, February 2009: 3.

632
Şahin, A., “Yaz Kurslarında Beş Mesele” (Five Issues in Summer Camps), Altınoluk, No: 280, June 2009: 40.

633
Temel, A. R., “Ortak Düşünce, Ortak Tavır” (Common Thought, Common Attitude) Altınoluk, No: 206, April
2003: 18. Kaplan,Y., Interview, “Yusuf Kaplan ile... “Hayat Tarzı” Tartışmaları Üzerine...” (With Yusuf Kaplan, on
the Discussions Regarding ‘Life Style’) Altınoluk, No: 258, August 2007: 6. Taşgetiren, A. “Hayat Tarzı Hassasiyeti”
(Sensitivity for ‘Life Style’), Altınoluk, No: 258, August 2007: 3.
263

Islamic community who aims to have more followers, and provide extensive services to a
larger social group.

The implication of a holistic outlook to Islamic lifesytle is that when a society’s rules and
norms standards are not determined in accordance with Islamic sensitivities, it is difficult
for Muslims to protect the moral values of their life. Therefore, other people’s lifestyles
are as important as one’s own lifestyle for one to be a good Muslim. In this sense,
“secular lifestyle” becomes a threat for the Islamic lifestyle even if there is not a
systematic pressure of secular regime on Muslims. Thus, although the term democracy is
used more often after 2000, there are contradictory discourses with regard to the content
of democracy, specifically with respect to the sources of principles regulating the lives of
those who do not share Islamic sensitivities. Taşgetiren’s article in December 2011 issue
which mentions the necessity to establish a political system where the freedom of social
groups with different beliefs and lifestyles are not restricted. Taşgetiren’s stance
regarding the acceptable diversity in society is different from the arguments mentioned
above. It remains to be seen whether in the future other writers in Altınoluk adopt a
similar discourse.

e. Freedom

In the late 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, the concept of freedom was used in the
context of freedom of religious beliefs in Turkey. In the second half of the 2000s, articles
264

in Altınoluk discussed the concept of freedom in other concepts, articulating it with the
community discourses. Lack of freedom to regulate one’s life according to one’s wishes
is associated with a foreign occupation on everyday life.
634
Thus, although the country
one lives in may be independent, the everyday life may not be regulated in an
independent way. Association of secularism and occupation by foreign armies
reconstructed the meaning of freedom in the community discourse.

Another definition of freedom was based on Sufism. In August 2006, freedom was
associated with freeing the self from the needs and greed of the flesh. This understanding
of freedom, based on Sufism, was coupled with an emphasis on the responsibilities.
Similar to the Third Way neoliberal discourses, in which that freedom and rights cannot
be detached from duties, it is argued that as soon as one finds freedom (in the Sufism’s
sense), one’s awareness of his/her responsibilities towards their immediate surroundings
as well as distant places in the world start. In August 2009, “consciousness of
responsibility,” also emphasized in the Gülen Community discourse was discussed.
635

While the Erenköy Community’s traditional understanding of freedom is preserved, it is
articulated with the Third Way discourses on the inseparability of rights and obligations.
As the Erenköy Community’s structure was changing towards becoming a community

634
Taşgetiren, A. “21 yıl önce, 21 yıl sonra... Böyle Đ slam Dünyasına Böyle Filistin” (21 Years Before, 21 Years
After…This Kind of Palestine for This Kind of Islam World), Altınoluk, No: 276, February 2009: 3.

635
Arpat, Đ ., “Sorumluluk Şuuru: ‘Şeytan Tatil Yapmaz’” (Consciousness of Responsibility: ‘Devil Does Not Have
Vacation), Altınoluk, No: 282, August 2009: 24.
265

that takes over social services from the state, its discourse also aligned with the Third
Way discourses.

Understanding the community’s interpretation of freedom is also possible by analyzing
its discourse on authority. In July 2006 issue, the relationship between the society and
those who hold political power was discussed. In this article, necessity of leaders to view
themselves as the servants of the society is mentioned. In addition, a good leader should
submit to the warnings and guidance (irşad) of the alims (those who possess ilim,
knowledge of Islam and knowledge on sciences). The use of the concept of irşad
suggests that, here the meaning of alim is similar to the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire,
who were the group of scholars of Islamic studies. Aside from consulting with the alims,
a good leader should establish a council (şura) to discuss the political matters. The idea
of consulting groups are similar to Third Way discourses that emphasize negotiation,
consultation and local decision making groups in defining democracy. The article goes on
to discuss the responsibilities of the society. For the peace in the society, people should
be respectful and obedient as long as the leaders are fair. Although the article mentions
that the society should check the actions of the leaders and warn them in a kind way, it
does not specifically discuss how the society can check and warn the leaders. This article
is a discussion on political culture rather than political system. The authoritarian political
culture described in the article sets limits to what democracy and freedom entails. Thus,
understanding of “fair authority” is another reference point for the Community’s
definition of freedom and democracy.
266

g. Gender Roles

As mentioned above, a significant transformation in the Erenköy Community discourse in
the 2000s was the attention to the gender roles in Altınoluk. In the 1990s there was
almost no mention of women in the journal, as mentioned above. Kurucan mentioned that
family is one of the areas where Islam’s impact of everyday life can be observed.
636
In
the 2000s, the concept of woman was mostly constructed in the context of familial
relations, especially as a mother. Turkish society itself was described as a society with a
mother’s heart that is characterized with patience, affection and hope.
637
The gendered
construction of society reinforces the community discourse on the relationship between
the leaders and the society, which is kind, patient and respectful towards the authority.
The term obedience, which was used in describing the relationship between the people
and the fair authority, was also used in describing the relationship between husbands and
their wives.
638

In the July 2002 issue of Altınoluk, the importance of the role of the mother in protecting
the children from falling into the traps of Westerners was emphasized. “The institution of

636
Kurucan, H. Đ ., “Allah Dostlarından Mektuplar” (Letters from the Friends of Gods), Altınoluk, No: 279, May 2009:
52.

637
Demirci, S., “Unuttuğumuz ‘ana’larımız...” (Our “Mothers” Whom We Forgot), Altınoluk, No: 280, June 2009: 20.

638
Temel, A. R., “Đ slam’da Evliliğin Ufku Cennete Uzanan Beraberlik” (In Islam Horizon of Marriage is Unity towards
Heaven), Altınoluk, No: 278, April 2009: 40.

267

motherhood” holds the “traditional Turkish family” together. For this reason the
Westernists in Turkey who control the system do everything they can to hurt the
institution of motherhood. Another discussion in which women played central role was
the discussion on the headscarf. Beser identified headscarf as a symbol, a flag of Islam.
639

For this reason, discussing whether headscarf should be allowed or not is equal to
discussing whether Islam should be allowed or not.
640
Discussions on women’s role in
society, their behaviors and clothes became main discursive tools through which the
impact of Islam on everyday life, which is related to the discussions on the limits of
acceptable diversity in society and thus to the discussions on freedom and democracy.

In June 2002 issue, Altınoluk provided information about the decisions that came out of
the meeting in May 2002 held by the Directory of Religious Affairs, directly under the
Prime Ministry. Accordingly, in order to raise the status of women in society, their rights
to education and work should be secured. For this reason, the practices and perceptions
that constrain possibilities of education and work, such as prohibition of headscarves
universities and public institutions should be reconsidered.
641
The idea of raising the
status of women and importance of providing work opportunities in doing so has not been
a dominant view in Altınoluk. On the contrary, Western discursive constructs such as

639
Beşer, F., “Tesetttür ‘Đ nsanla Beraber Var Olan Đ badet’” (Being Covered: ‘Act of Worship That Exists with Human
Beings), Altınoluk, No: 265, March 2008: 7.

640
Ibid., Taşgetiren, A. “Başörtüsü Neyin Sembolü?” (What does the Headscarf Symbolize?), Altınoluk, No: 265,
March 2008: 3.

641
Döndüren, H., “Güncel Dini Meseleler Đ stişare Toplantısı Üzerine, Đ çtihadlar Arasında Bir Tercih” (Consultation
Meeting on Current Religious Issues : A Choice Among Religious Interpretation), Altınoluk, No:196, June 2002: 5.

268

“economic freedom” and “women’s social status” are criticized on the grounds that they
view women who choose to be housewives because they give importance to raising their
children as backwards, helpless and uneducated.
642
The booklet “Working Women and
Problematic Children” recommended by Yıldırım to the readers show that women’s
primary job is viewed as taking care of their children.
643
Although it is accepted that
women can work if necessary, the community discourse is cautious on the circumstances
of the work. Women and men have different natures and therefore they should be
employed in the jobs that suit their nature.
644

Throughout the 2000s, there were many articles in Altınoluk that discussed the
characteristics of Muslim women and Muslim men and the rights and duties of spouses
towards each other. Islam’s pervasive influence on everyday life, even on the matters of
sexual relations and how to propose to marry are reminded in these articles. Women are
characterized as inexperienced and uneducated: “Men can overcome women’s emotional
states with patience and their lack of knowledge with experience and knowledge.”
645

642
Yıldırım, S. H., “Batılılaşma Projesi ve ‘Küçük’ Tavizler” (Westernization Project and ‘Small’ Concessions), No :
197, Altınoluk, July 2002: 42.

643
Ibid.

644
Topbaş, O. N., Interview, “Đ çi Boş Mazeretlerle Helâl-Haram Sınırı Çiğnenmemeli” (Permissible - Non-Premissible
Line Should Not Be Crossed in Vein), Altınoluk, No: 241, March 2006: 5.

645
Yılmaz, H. K., “Nasıl Bir Yuva” (What Kind of a Home?), Altınoluk, No: 211, September 2003: 6.
269

6.6.4. Reference Points

In the late 2000s “Islam” continued to be the central reference point for defining
democracy, freedom, human rights and family life. “Islam” also was used as a reference
point to identify the limits of acceptable diversity among Muslims and of social
development. One of the most significant shifts in Altınoluk the 2000s was some of the
writers’ discourse on the secularism. While the understanding of secularism established
prior to 2000 was preserved by some, others began to discuss possibilities of new
articulations between Islam and secularism.

In the late 2000s, new reference points emerged in the community discourse. A group of
concepts indicating authority “fair authority”, “obedience” and “biat” (fealty/pledge of
allegiance) became reference points through which the concepts of democracy and
freedom were further characterized. Capitalism was also used as a reference point for
defining laicism and Westernization, modernity, urbanization, “global system”
(presumably what authors mean here is the “global economic system”), cosmopolitanism
and secularism. The discursive connection between capitalism and laicism enabled
association of laicism with an occupation of foreign armies that should be fought against
for independence. As a result, this association served as a reference point in articulating
the concept of freedom with the community discourses. Unity was another reference
point for understanding of family, gender roles, obedience and consciousness of
responsibility.
270

Another significant change in Altınoluk’s discourse was in discussions of family life and
women. Gendered construction of society reinforced the community discourse on the
relationship between the leaders and society and thus the discourse on freedom. Islam
became a reference point for defining gender roles, women’s status in society and
participation in economic activities. “Traditional Turkish family structure” is described as
one that centered around pious mothers and one in which fathers are the primary source
of knowledge on Islam and life in general for the other family members. Thus traditional
family structure is constructed as an Islamic family. In this way, Altınoluk legitimized
and reproduced “traditional Turkish family structure” discourse which became one of the
significant elements of AKP’s neoliberal discourse in Turkey after 2002. The holistic
view of Muslimness became one of the central reference points for defining the
relationship between individual and society, more specifically the limits of acceptable
diversity in society. These limits in turn give meaning to the Erenköy Community’s
interpretation of freedom, democracy, secularism and human rights.

6.7. DISCURSIVE DILEMMAS AND STRATEGIES USED TO ADDRESS THEM

In the Erenköy Community discourse discursive dilemmas were addressed in various
ways. One of the discursive strategies was to adopt new terms such as “positive laicism”
or “excessive democracy” so that while the community discourse retained the criticisms
for laicism and democracy, it also explored the possibilities of redefining these concepts
271

in an acceptable way for the adherents. As the EC was becoming more like a community
rather than a , and as it increasingly interacted with other Islamic actors in the mass
media channels, the community used the discursive strategy of adopting the terms that
other Islamic communities, notably the Gülen Community used such as “the spirit of
community”, “action”, “consciousness of responsibility.”

Another discursive strategy used in Altınoluk was to form new discursive connections
between certain concepts which were employed and discussed before 2001, but were not
connected with each other. Associating capitalism with laicism and both of these
concepts with culture allowed the community to reinforce its traditional discourses and
distinguish them from the market economy (or “production economy”) and democracy,
which had positive connotations in Altınoluk. Introducing new topics to Altınoluk and use
of new reference points were other strategies adopted to further delineate the concepts
that were being articulated with the community discourse and make them compatible
with the community discourses. Discussions on women’s role in their families, their
behavior and clothing became a discursive strategy to frame the community discourses
regarding the limits of diversity in society, relationship between fair authority and society
and interpretations of democracy and freedom in the context of human rights and
freedom of religion.

272

6.8. CONCLUSION

The main factors that influenced the change in the community’s discourses were the
economic empowerment of Islamic businesses, the February 28 process and the AKP’s
discourse on democracy, secularism and the EU. The February 28 process did not bring
any drastic changes in the discourse, except a toning down of its opposition to secularism
and a shift to criticizing secular “culture” instead of a secular “system.” A more
substantial change came when the AKP was established. One can argue that the
community emerged from its defensive stance by aligning its discourse with that of the
AKP. Even thereafter, however, some of the discourse regarding the “threat of the
West,” the meaning of capitalism, and the characteristics of an Islamic lifestyle were
more or less preserved as they were before 1997. Others, such as the approach towards
the EU, neo-liberal economic reforms, democracy and secularism, evolved.

The Erenköy Community discourses in Altınoluk shifted from an outright rejection of
democracy and secularism towards an articulation between Islam and democracy on the
one hand and discussions on possibility of accepting a redefined secularism. While the
community discourse in the 1990s were quite anti-systemic and critical of the state, in the
second half of the 2000s a few contributors to the Altınoluk indicate the importance of the
state for providing unity. Changing attitudes towards the state coincided with the Erenköy
Community’s changing relationship with the state, particularly in the field of business,
after the AKP came to power. The transformation of the community discourses through
273

new articulations presented various discursive challenges. Discursive strategies the
community used to address these challenges were manifold. In Altınoluk, these strategies
were mainly constructing new concepts such as “positive laicism”, transferring new terms
from other Islamic actors, forming new discursive links between concepts, establishing
new subject positions, and use of new reference points and new topics.

As opposed to the discursive strategies used in the Gülen Community, which involved
establishing new reference points that are all connected to one another through a central
and broad concept, collective consciousness, in Altınoluk a variety of discursive
strategies were adopted in a less coherent way. As a result, the Erenköy Community
discourses were transformed in a less holistic way compared to the Gülen Community
discourses. The variety of strategies used to overcome discursive challenges led to the
transformation of the community discourses through dual and sometimes opposing
meanings of concepts. Constructing capitalism and market economy (or “production
economy”) as opposites, differentiating between levels of democracy with the concept of
“excessive democracy,” establishing two types of secularism (secularism and “positive
secularism”) and defining each of these binaries through different reference points had
certain advantages for the Erenköy Community.

The use of dual meanings of concepts opened up the possibility for community members
to give their consent to the hegemonic discourse of the AKP government, without
seemingly challenging the established discourses of the community. While capitalism is
274

cast as the villain, the government’s neoliberal reforms are celebrated. By preserving,
redefining or rejecting some aspects of key concepts, traditional discourses of the
community are rendered compatible with changing socioeconomic conditions. Followers
can accept what they like and reject what they don’t in a way that does not seem to
challenge their established ideas. A cautious approach towards the EU rather than
outright rejection prevents community members from disassociating themselves from the
AKP. Reinterpretation of ideas such as democracy and secularism formerly opposed by
the community reinforces the hegemonic discourse of the government. Such a flexible
way of discourse transformation is mainly related to the Erenköy Community’s anti-
systemic discourse it adopted until the late 1990s, which was characterized by a staunch
criticism of democracy and secularism.

The transformation of the Erenköy Community discourses shows that in the context of
neo-liberal restructuring, the community became progressively more supportive of the
status-quo and started to emphasize the importance of state for providing national unity.
Similarly, the Islamic actors who called for democracy and freedom during the February
28
th
process but did not define these concepts, started to specify their limits as they were
articulating these concepts with their traditional discourses. Articulation of democracy
and freedom with the community discourses are accompanied with the use of
authoritarian discourses such as obedience and fair authority. One of the most important
finding in this chapter is that while in Altınoluk in the late 1990s issues of high politics
such as secularism, democracy and an Islamic society were the mostly covered topics, in
275

the 2000s issues regarding the everyday lives of Muslims were also frequently covered,
especially through discussions on family life and women’s roles in society. However, the
journal did not explore the implications of abstract concepts regarding high politics such
as positive secularism and fair authority in the everyday lives of the adherents and what
they mean in practice for the community followers. As a result it is likely that gendered
discourses constructed as common sense in daily life will become the lens through which
the community followers interpret concepts related to high politics.

276

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

This chapter presents a summary of the conclusions from previous chapters. It begins
with a comparison of the shifts in the Gülen and Erenköy Community discourses. Next, it
provides an overview of the connections between the shifts in the two Community
discourses and neo-liberal re-structuration in Turkey. It continues with a discussion of the
implications of the findings in the empirical chapters for Hall’s neo-Gramscianism and its
possible engagement with post-structural Discourse Theory. The chapter concludes with
suggestions for future research on the relationship between Islamic discourses and
neoliberal economic restructuring.

7.1. MAIN ARGUMENT

This dissertation argues that changes in the power that is diffused in everyday life are
influenced by and in turn influence more structural and thus, identifiable, power relations.
In other words, the diffused form of power in the form of discourses that become
common sense over time operates simultaneously with a more structural power that
affects the way in which diffused forms of discourses change. Identifying these structural
power relations can help us understand why a certain meaning or way of categorizing the
concepts and terrains of thought prevails over others, and why it changes in the way it
does. This study adopted tools provided by a Gramscian approach to identify the
relationships between the changes in reference points and associated concepts on the one
277

hand, and changes in the economic and political structure and thus in hegemonic
discourses, on the other.

An analysis of the relationship between the AKP’s hegemony in Turkey and the Gülen
and the Erenköy Community discourses shows that the hegemonic discourse of the AKP
played a role in the emergence of new reference points in the case of the Gülen
Community, and the adoption of new concepts in the case of the Erenköy Community.
Thus, the changes in the economic and political structure and then in hegemonic
discourses do shape the way in which discourses that became “common sense” in a
particular social group evolve. Gramsci’s understanding of civil society as an extension
of state power applies to the relationship between the AKP government and the Gülen
and Erenköy Communities, which generate legitimacy for the AKP’s discourses in the
eyes of the community followers, and in the Gülen Community case, in the eyes of wider
segments of society.

Different from the historical context in which Gramsci was writing, in Turkey during the
2000s, the role of generating legitimacy for the AKP government fell more on the
shoulders of Islamic communities than the public institutions controlled by the
government. In Turkey, although the AKP had a sweeping victory in two successive
general elections and although the AKP government, similar to previous governments in
Turkey, filled the bureaucracy with its followers, in turn influencing the functioning of
public education, religious and other services, the main channel by which its discourse
278

became hegemonic was in the private sphere. The two Islamic Communities under
investigation provided legitimacy for the AKP’s version of the Third Way neoliberal
discourse through their mass media companies, their journals targeting Community
followers, their schools, Qur’an Courses, and social assistance institutions. Thus, IR Neo-
Gramscianism, which tended to shift towards Classical Marxism in the second half of the
2000s, is at a disadvantage in trying to account for the mechanisms of hegemony
construction. For, as the case of Turkey shows, these mechanisms are built upon
discourses that transcend class differences and instead promote forms of Islamic
identities that encompass particular national and gender identities. Different from the way
in which a governmentimposes a certain ideology through its education system,
hegemony construction operates through a more diffused form of discursive power that
turns ideologies into common sense that an individual adopts in his or her everyday life.

7.2. NEOLIBERAL RE-STRUCTURATĐ ON AND SHIFTS IN THE ISLAMĐ C
COMMUNITY DISCOURSES

Neoliberal restructuring in Turkey influenced the Gülen and Erenköy Community
discourses directly and indirectly. The very actors who introduced neoliberal reforms,
including Prime Minister Özal himself, were closely linked to Islamic business owners.
Islamic businesses appreciated Özal’s reforms, mainly because he ensured that the
gradual opening up of the economy was accompanied by protection and economic
support for them: neoliberal restructuring as applied in Turkey led to the growth of
279

Islamic businesses. Connections among Islamic businesses, Islamic banks, Islamic
communities and their foundations constituted a sub-economy that benefited all of these
actors. In the late 1990s and especially after the AKP came to power in 2002, Islamic
businesses not only grew, but became integral parts of the national economic structure.
Islamic communities and foundations became indispensable to the functioning of the
emerging neoliberal economy, because of their ability to provide welfare services and to
accommodate the needs of flexible labor more efficiently than the labor unions. Goods
produced by Islamic companies began to be consumed by the masses, not merely the
Islamic groups. Islamic businesses established mass media companies which aimed to
reach wider segments of society.

As the Islamic businesses, Islamic communities and foundations flourished, the structure
of these communities changed, in terms of the numbers of their adherents, their fields of
operation (including the services they provided), and their relationship to the state.
Islamic community followers who became wealthier started to lead a more luxurious
lifestyle. More women started to work in the Islamic Community institutions. Thus,
particularly after 2000, both the structure of the Islamic communities and the everyday
activities of their followers shifted, leading to introduction of new topics into the
Community journals, such as the need to avoid excess consumption, the role of women in
the household, the kinds of works suitable for women, employer-employee relations, and
how Muslim businessmen should conduct their businesses.

280

As the Erenköy Community’s businesses grew, the number of its adherents increased,
and it gained the means to spread its services into different spheres of activity and into
countries outside Turkey (notably Azerbaijan). This expansion in turn changed the
structure of the Erenköy Community, from a tarikat composed of small number of
disciples of a sheikh who slowly learn about mysticism, towards an Islamic Community
(similar to the Gülen Community and other Nur communities), which does not have a
sheikh and which establishes voluntary associations and provides education, health, and
social security services to a large number of followers. This structural change in the
Erenköy Community, combined with the impact of mass media channels that bring
together Islamic actors from different Islamic communities, can be one of the reasons
behind its use of certain concepts such as “the community spirit”, movement, action and
active followers, towards the end of the 2000s, concepts that had been used by the Gülen
community since the 1980s.

As discussed in the Chapter 4, after the AKP came to power, new patron-client
relationships emerged between the government and a variety of Islamic actors. As a
result, Islamic actors, such as Islamic businesses, who before the AKP’s election had not
had much access to the central government, secured many favors from the state and
established new interests. Thus, the Islamic actors’ view of the state, democracy, and
secularism shifted. While the Gülen Community was favored and protected by various
state actors (the military in the 1980s and until 1999, many leaders of political parties and
Prime Ministers) before the AKP came to power, the Erenköy Community had had far
281

fewer connections with the state and, therefore, had a more anti-systemic discourse
compared with the Gülen Community. After the AKP’s election, the Gülen Community’s
influence over state institutions, such as the police force and the judiciary, increased,
while its already well-established presence in the education sector also grew. Similarly,
the Erenköy Community’s power over the Directory of Religious Affairs (DRA)
increased along with its economic power. Thus, while Gülen Community’s discourse
gradually changed and shifted towards an increased power of the community over the
individual, the Erenköy Community’s discourse changed more drastically, as it promoted
democracy, and mentioned the possibility of accepting some forms of secularism, if
accompanied by an emphasis on obedience to the authority figures in family life and
social life.

In sum, the differences in the discourses of the two communities can be attributed to
differences in their size, discursive sources, and their organizational styles, as much as to
their changing positions vis-à-vis the government and the evolution in their own
structures as a result of political and economic developments in Turkey. This dissertation
does not argue that the neoliberal restructuring caused discursive changes in the two
Islamic countries under investigation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the aim of the
dissertation was not to make causal arguments, but to understand the associations
between the hegemonic discourses and the Islamic community discourses. Thus, the
evolution of the Gülen and Erenköy discourses is associated with the actors’ responses to
changes in the socio-economic and political context, very much shaped by the neoliberal
282

restructuring, and with the discursive possibilities that emerged as a result of the
articulation process between the hegemonic discourses and the Community’s discourses.

An analysis of the changes in the Erenköy and Gülen Community discourses shows that
not only did neoliberal re-structuring and associated structural changes have an impact
on the Islamic community discourses, but vice versa. The Gülen and Erenköy
Community discourses served to legitimize the AKP’s hegemonic discourse; they
constructed new meanings that served to produce a more holistic and coherent version of
the hegemonic Third Way neo-liberal discourses more consistent with the ideologies of
the two Communities.

Both the Gülen and the Erenköy Communities’ discourses changed in a way that
legitimated and reproduced the Third Way neoliberal discourses as adopted by the AKP
government. Both Communities, as well as the AKP, support a neoliberal economic
system that prevents a social breakdown that results from an income gap, not via the
state that provides welfare to its citizens because this is their right, but via voluntary
associations established by the citizens and occasional selective help in goods from the
government because the government is benevolent towards its citizens. As a result, the
concept of “rights” of the citizens vis-à-vis the state is erased in favor of benevolence
provided to people who the government and the voluntary associations decide deserve it.

283

Both of the Communities defined “capitalism” as an element of Western culture rather
than an economic system. In Altınoluk capitalism has been depicted as one of the major
issues leading to the kind of political system and lifestyle the Erenköy Community has
been opposing. This strict opposition to capitalism has gone hand in hand with the
growing financial power of the businesses associated with the Erenköy Community,
particularly after the institutionalization of neoliberal reforms in Turkey by the AKP
government after 2002. Altınoluk resolved this contradiction between discourse and
practice by defining the “Islamic economy” as different from capitalism and communism.
An Islamic economy was constructed as the operation of Muslim businessmen, in
accordance with Islamic norms and rules within the market economy. Constructing
discursively an economic system based on a market economy but different from
capitalism legitimized the operation of the community businesses, as well as the
discourse of the Islamic businessmen’s association, MÜSĐ AD, whose presidents have
been regularly interviewed by Altınoluk. Although the Gülen Community’s criticism has
not centered on the negative impact of capitalism, the “Islamic economy” mentioned in
Erenköy Community and MÜSĐ AD discourse did receive more attention from the editors
of Sızıntı towards the end of the 2000s. Around this time, the leader of the Gülen
Community, Fethullah Gülen, gave more talks about how Muslim businessmen should
treat their workers and conduct their business in general.

The Erenköy Community’s discourse legitimated and reproduced the AKP’s Third Way
neoliberal discourse through its understanding of “fair authority” and associated
284

concepts, such as freedom, democracy, diversity, and social change. The concept of fair
authority indicates that in exchange for the just nature of a political authority (determined
by whether it obeys the rules of Islam),the citizens are required to exhibit obedience
towards that authority along with dedication, self-sacrifice, and the “consciousness of
responsibility” towards other citizens and social groups. The concept of obedience, which
is also emphasized with regard to women’s attitudes towards their husbands and
community, provides legitimacy for an authoritarian government, as long as the
government follows the rules of Islam. Concepts of dedication and “consciousness of
responsibility” towards others are similar to central elements in Third Way discourses,
such as the active citizen, sense of community and responsibility for others, and the need
for voluntary associations. Similarly, in the Gülen Community discourse, the concept of
service (Hizmet, which is how the Community refers to itself), entails exactly what the
voluntary associations proposed by the Third Way ideology are intended to be. In
discussions on democracy, emphasis of the two Islamic communities on the importance
of negotiations among powerful actors (or in the Gülen and Erenköy Community
discourses, istişare, among those who hold powerful positions), are similar to Third Way
neoliberal discourses that give prominence to negotiations among partners or community
boards in the privatised institutions at the expense of electoral accountability and rights
of people to receive social assistance from the state. In both Islamic communities,
boundaries of democracy, justice, freedom, and diversity among people in society are
determined by Islam, although what Islamic rules involve regarding these concepts
285

differs in the two communities. The Gülen Community seems to have a relatively more
flexible view regarding acceptable lifestyles compared with the Erenköy community.

7.3. COMPARISON OF THE SHIFTS IN THE GÜLEN AND ERENKÖY
COMMUNITY DISCOURSES

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Gülen and Erenköy Communities differ in terms of the
geographical reach and number of followers, the mystic traditions from which they
evolved, the Islamic teachings they follow, their views on how to protect Islamic
identities and their approaches to disseminating their knowledge regarding their version
of “true Islam” to the masses. As a result of the different ways in which the two
Communities, their discourses also evolved differently. In the Gülen Community
discourses gradually changed through the formation of new reference points, which gave
new meanings to associated concepts. In the Erenköy Community, on the other hand, in
general the discourses shifted more abruptly. In addition, the reference points in the
Erenköy Community discourses did not change as much as those of the Gülen
Community.

In the Erenköy Community discourse, “Islam” continued to be a central reference point
from the mid-1990s until 2011. Islam has also been an important element of the Gülen
Community discourse. However, the Gülen Community’s publication, Sızıntı, used the
word “religion” instead of “Islam.” In addition, in Sızıntı, Islam, or religion, has almost
286

always been used in association with the concepts of morality, culture, and social norms,
indicating the Gülen Community’s efforts to get along well with the secular regime by
synthesizing political Islam with elements such as culture, tradition, and morality upheld
by some of the secular sections of the society. The Erenköy Community criticized the
idea of such a synthesis and openly challenged the secular system, especially in the mid-
1990s.

Sızıntı never openly challenged the secular regime in Turkey. In the mid to late-1990s,
the journal mostly focused on the everyday lives of individuals rather than on macro level
issues, such as regime type. The Erenköy publication Altınoluk resorted to this method
only during the February 28th process (1997-1998), resuming its challenge towards
secularism once the February 28th process waned. The Gülen Community discourses
evolved from an individual level of analysis towards a more communitarian focus, still
not openly challenging the secular regime in the country. Instead, Gülen tried to find a
more acceptable concept than “Islamic society”-- such as “collective consciousness”-- for
non-Islamic actors in the country. Thus, the Gülen Community’s discourse regarding the
mechanism and direction of social change remained vague. This gradual discursive shift,
which tilted the balance of power towards society in the relationship between the
individual and society, took place by redrawing the boundaries of public and private, and
reconstructing the meanings of democracy, secularism, freedom, and justice by linking
these concepts carefully to the concept of “collective consciousness.”

287

The Erenköy Community discourse was been consistent in terms of its support for the
society/community’s power over individuals throughout the time period under
investigation. In Altınoluk the focus of articles was most often a criticism of socio-
political structures, although the journal did publish articles about how an individual
Muslim should lead his daily life. In terms of the journal’s discourse on the direction of
social change, one of the most important discursive shifts was the journal’s full support
for the concept of democracy and its construction of democracy as the opposite of
secularism, in line with the hegemonic discourses in Turkey in the late 1999s and early
2000s. After embracing democracy as a protection from secularism, the journal’s
discourse on social change shifted via articulations between Islam on the one hand and
secularism, freedom, and diversity in society on the other. New understandings of
secularism, such as “positive laicism” or a “state that makes use of Islam” (instead of an
“Islamic state”), emerged alongside the criticisms of other definitions of secularism. One
of the most significant shifts in Altınoluk in terms of its discourse on social change has
been the journal’s intensive focus on family life and the role of women in society.
Marriage and women were associated with the concept of “compliance,” while “freedom”
was associated with “being able to live Islam.” Thus, this approach to social change via
constructing a new understanding of secularism was accompanied by a bottom-up
approach that reconstructed women’s roles.

The two Communities also differ in terms of the mechanisms involved in the discursive
shifts. In contrast to the gradual changes in the Gülen Community discourse, the shifts in
288

the Erenköy Community discourse were much more sudden. In the Erenköy Community
discourse, shifts took place mostly through the construction of dualities of meanings of
the same concept. These meanings, at times, have been contradictory, as in the case of the
criticism of capitalism viewed as a kind of culture, while at the same time promoting a
market economy via interviews with presidents of Islamic business associations. At
other times, writers have interpreted the same concepts in contradictory ways. These
contradictions resulted from Altınoluk’s inclusion of writers representing Islamic actors
from outside the Erenköy community. In contrast, Sızıntı’s writers are all from the Gülen
Community, and hence its discourses are much less contradictory and much more
homogenous.

Another difference in the mechanisms of shifts in the two communities’ discourses was
the use of reference points. As mentioned above, in the Erenköy Community discourses,
Islam continued to be a central reference point throughout the period under investigation.
As a result, discursive shifts took place through the emergence of new articulations with
the same reference point. In addition, new oppositions between concepts and dual
discourses on the same concept emerged. In the Gülen Community discourses, in time,
new reference points and the concepts associated with these reference points were
constructed.
646
In other words, as reference points have shifted, meanings of associated

646
In Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, the concepts associated with the reference point are referred to as “the chains of
signification.”
289

concepts also shifted in relation to one another. This holistic shift is another reason that
underlies the comparatively less contradictory discourse of the Gülen Community.

7.4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE ENGAGEMENT
BETWEEN HALL’S NEO-GRAMSCIANISM AND POST-STRUCTURAL
DISCOURSE THEORY

An analysis of the changes in the Islamic community discourses in the context of neo-
liberal restructuring shows that Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory provides a useful
framework for analyzing discursive changes. Identifying the reference points in a
discourse at a particular point in time involves de-constructing the concepts associated
with these reference points, by distinguishing between concepts’ new and old meanings
after they are redefined through different reference points. By de-constructing the
meanings, we can shed light onto how they were constructed in the first place. The
articulations between various reference points and concepts generate new ways of
categorizing the concepts and processes, new oppositions and associations among
concepts new identities, new ways of defining the relationships between social actors,
and new terrains or axes of discussions at the expense of others. Deconstructing the
meanings of concepts via identifying the reference points and associated concepts enables
us to perceive and map out these new articulations that shape the way individuals think.
The discourses themselves constitute a form of power. To the extent they become
common sense, they are not forced upon anyone by anyone. Sturctural power is simply
290

present in the form of discourse, diffused in the everyday lives of the individuals. Laclau
and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory enables us to analyze the way in which what is viewed as
common sense shifts over time.

7.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEMINIST RESEARCH

Feminist scholars have explored the effects of neoliberal restructuring on women both in
developing and developed countries.
647
Beneria, who analyzed the gendered dimensions
of neoliberalism, argued that women’s increased participation in labor markets since the
1980s has been accompanied by the growth of participation in informal work
characterized by low wages, poor working conditions, and lack of work contracts.
648

Thus, the burden of neoliberalization has fallen disproportionately on women. Cornwall
et al. mentioned that any possibility of women’s empowerment in the neoliberal order has
been suffocated as a result of the convergence of neoliberalism and neoconservatism,
649
a
convergence referred to as Third Way neoliberalism in this dissertation. Cornwall et al.
have shown how feminist scholars have explored the ways that neoliberalism draws upon
and selectively reemphasizes patriarchal norms.
650
Especially for low income social
groups, the institution of the family and women’s unpaid work in the household, as well

647
Sparr, 1994: 50-51, 82; Standing, 1999; Marchand and Runyan, 2000; Balakrishnan, 2002; Beneria, 2001, 2003;
Moghadam, 1993.

648
Beneria 2001: 9

649
IDS Bulletin, Volume 39, No: 6, December 2008.

650
Cornwall et al. 2008: 3

291

as their provision of cheap labor in the informal labor market, are instrumental in
buffering the adverse effects of neoliberal restructuring.
651
In other words, preserving
patriarchal relations in the family ensures the continuation of neoliberal restructuring. In
the case of Turkey, Islamic communities have not only been useful in terms of providing
women some level of protection from the adverse effects of neoliberal restructuring, but
have also played an important role in reconstructing patriarchal relations in the context of
neoliberalization.

Shifts in the Gülen and Erenköy Community discourses show that gender discourses play
a pivotal role in embedding neoliberal discourses in Turkey. The discourses in both
communities on the boundaries of public and private regulate the relationship between
the individual and the society, freedom and democracy, obedience and authority, and
operate in everyday life, mostly through the gender discourses. Concepts not clearly
defined or abstract, such as “fair authority” or “collective consciousness”, are interpreted
in everyday life through these gender discourses. In the Erenköy Community discourse,
the concept of obedience is adopted both with regard to family relations and to high
politics. Gender discourses channel, give meaning to, and disseminate the discourses on
societal level into everyday life. In this way, the articulation of Third Way neoliberal
discourses within the local groups and the generation of legitimation for the hegemonic
discourse in society are translated into everyday life as a diffused form of power
operating through gender discourses. Thus, feminist perspectives are particularly useful

651
See IDS Bulletin December 2008, Singerman and Hoodfar 1996: xvii.
292

in forming linkages between structural forms of power with a post-structural,
Foucauldian understanding of power as discourse. Future feminist research on
neoliberalism in turn can benefit from employing a theoretical framework that analyzes
structural and diffuse forms of power together, since such a framework provides a holistic
look at how gender discourses and discourses on democracy, freedom, justice, and
collectivity are intertwined. Instead of analyzing the gendered aspects of discourses only,
mapping reference points and associated concepts on a variety of topics allow us to see
how different discursive elements of social actors complement and/or challenge one
another.

This study also shows that despite neoliberalism’s selective reinforcement of patriarchal
relations in many different settings, the way this reinforcement takes place can be very
different in different societies. It is important to pinpoint these nuances in future studies
to avoid overgeneralizing the impact of neoliberal restructuring on women. Cornwall et
al. mention that in the context of neoliberalization, feminist NGOs are becoming de-
politicized service providers because they rely on contracts from the state or grants from
the development industry.
652
Different from development NGOs, faith-based
organizations, such as the Islamic communities in Turkey, present a new way of
providing services based on forming networks that cut across classes and redistribute the
resources of richer followers to poorer ones. The services provided by Islamic
communities rely on market-based activities and voluntary work provided by their

652
Cornwall et.al.
293

adherents, relying on identity construction centered on religion rather than class. Thus,
while development NGOs are becoming depoliticized, Islamic communities are
becoming more politicized through their appropriation of Third Way neoliberal
discourses.

This study shows that political Islam’s articulation with neoliberal discourses resulted in
yet another difference in reconstructing the public-private distinction. The analysis of the
Gülen and Erenköy Community discourses suggest that unlike some neoliberal discourses
that consider family relations as part of a broad conception of the private sphere in civil
society, political Islam tends to consider familial issues as part of a broad conception of
the public sphere. In the specific context of the Gülen Community, the implication of a
broader definition of the public sphere is that “collective consciousness” and patriarchal
traditions have more of a say in a woman’s life, most of which is devoted to the public
sphere, as she is working for the community. Future feminist research on neoliberalism
can greatly benefit from an increased focus on political Islam and its various
appropriations of the public-private distinction, gender roles, and the latter’s connections
to various conceptions of democracy, freedom, and justice.

7.6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON TURKEY

Despite the existence of a hegemonic power that receives the support of most Islamic
actors, political Islam in Turkey is still very much fragmented. Nevertheless,
294

transformation of the Erenköy Community discourse from an anti-systemic to a statist
one suggests that in the process of neoliberal restructuring, Islamic actors went through a
significant transformation. Mass media channels and influential foundations owned by
Islamic actors provide new spaces for interaction among Islamic actors by organizing
conferences and meetings and inviting Islamic intellectuals affiliated by various groups to
work in their mass media channels. Thus, despite the significant differences in terms of
their discourses, interests, and goals, Islamic actors are likely to interact with each other
more and influence each other’s discourses to a greater extent that was the case in an
earlier period.

In both the Gülen and Erenköy Communities’ discourses, there is a clearly identifiable
trend towards focusing on gender roles in everyday life. As argued above, gendered
discourses constructed as common sense in daily life are likely to become the primary
means by which issues regarding high politics such as the government policies, the
regime type, the political and economic system can be interpreted and applied in daily
life. The trend towards the expansion of the public space at the expense of the private and
towards an emphasis on the traditions and moral codes of the collectivity also have
significant implications for individuals’ daily lives and gender relations. Future research
on political Islam in Turkey can greatly benefit from focusing on the way in which
Islamic discourses are used in the everyday lives of individuals, particularly in regards to
gender relations.

295

Analysis of the Gülen and Erenköy Communities’ discourses shows that arguments
regarding the role of Islamic actors in the democratization process in Turkey and Islamic
actors’ understanding of democracy are drawn from the limited and quite authoritarian
interpretations of democracy that became hegemonic in Turkey in the 1980s and in the
1990s, as argued in Chapter 4. While Islamic actors’ interpretations of democracy are not
independent of dominant understandings of democracy, in accordance with their
discursive roots each Islamic actor produces and reproduces his or her own version of it.
Studies that do not analyze the concepts used by social actors in context and in relation to
the other discursive elements adopted by this actor run the risk of imputing to these
actors’ discourse a definition of democracy as it is interpreted and practiced in the
developed countries. To avoid Western-centric analyses of the relationship between
democracy and Islam, contextualizing different Islamic actors’ discourses is essential.

As discussed in Chapter 2, there are few studies on the AKP’s neoliberal
authoritarianism. The majority of the works on Turkish politics remain in the confines of
the center-periphery and elite-society dualisms or simplistic analyses that attribute the
AKP’s rise to power either as a reaction of the people towards the elites, or to the
disillusionment of society with the economic policies and corruption of the previous
governments. Neglecting the impact of neoliberal restructuring on the political actors in
Turkey since the early 1980s leads to oversimplifications regarding the interests,
identities, and discourses of these actors. In the case of Islamic actors, this neglect results
in rendering invisible the relationship between these actors’ understanding of democracy
296

and their discourse on gender roles, boundaries of public and private, limits of freedom,
and acceptable diversity in society. By searching for articulations between the Third Way
neoliberal discourses and the two communities’ discourses, this study sheds light on the
relationship between the aforementioned concepts, provides a holistic look at the social
actors’ discourses, and sees in what way different issues are related to each other. It also
shows that Islamic actors constitute elements of neoliberal hegemony in Turkey and are
closely connected to the public institutions through their close business relationships with
the state. As such, Islamic actors in general and Islamic communities in particular cut
across the broad categories of elite and society and center and periphery.

Future research on different social actors’ discourses can help us understand how the
AKP’s discourse has become hegemonic and what kind of challenges and opportunities it
is likely to face. As hegemonic discourses are continuously reconstructed, social actors
will face new discursive challenges and new strategies to address those challenges. As the
Islamic communities’ financial power continues to increase, it is likely that their range of
activities and geographical reach will also continue to expand. The Gülen Community
discourses are already diversifying. Depending on the educational background of a
community follower or the country in which he or she lives, one can see variance in the
interpretation of the dominant community discourses explored in this study. New self-
identities and concepts will likely arise depending on the socio-political context. As a
result, discourses of Islamic communities are likely to become less coherent. New
discursive challenges might lead to the emergence of new broad and vague reference
297

points, or the dualities of the concepts might be preserved to ensure flexibility of the
discourse.

7.7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE IR RESEARCH

In a world where domestic groups are intricately tied to patterns of international trade and
finance, the social meanings constructed within these groups influence and are influenced
by discourses constructed by other social group in other countries. Islamic communities
not only possess the knowledge on how to live according to Islam, but they also hold the
power to represent these meanings at the international level through their transnational
ties. A dialogue between IR Neo-Gramscians and Post-Structuralists opens up venues for
exploring the articulation of international processes via discourses, with the identities,
culture, and everyday experiences of religious groups. Through this dialogue, IR critical
theory can provide new avenues for research on the intersection of religion and
international political economy. Contrary to the approaches that view various religions as
single, coherent categories, this dissertation aims to demonstrate that religious identity
takes different and often competing forms depending on a complex relationship among
religious actors and their institutional setting on the one hand, and political and economic
structures on the other. Research on these complexities can open the way for future
studies that investigate the local, national, and global processes that affect the way in
which particular religious interpretations and identities become dominant at the domestic
298

level, leading to new types of relationships between religious actors at the transnational
level.

Although studies on the role of religion in international affairs increased after the
September 11 attacks, most focus on the relationship between religion and conflict and
the role of religion in diplomacy and foreign policy.
653
Aside from a few studies on the
relationship between faith-based communities and development,
654
the relationship
between economic issues and religion has received little attention in the discipline of IR.
The transformation of the Islamic communities in Turkey in the process of neoliberal
restructuration shows that religion has played a central role in embedding neoliberal
discourses in the hegemonic discourses in Turkey. Islamic communities found new
discursive ways to resolve the dilemma between capitalism and religion. In the process of
neoliberal restructuring in Turkey, Islamic actors became essential for the functioning of
the neoliberal economic system, by providing a voluntary work force, cheap labor, and
welfare services that the state does not provide. Thus exploring the relationship between
religion and neoliberal restructuring will enable researchers, scholars and policymakers to
analyze different ways in which political and economic structures change in the context
of neoliberalization in various countries. Faith-based communities in developing and
developed countries are fulfilling the need of providing welfare services. Moreover, faith-
based communities representing different religions develop ties with one another,

653
James et al., 2011.

654
Clarke, 2007.
299

establishing transnational networks of religious communities. Understanding the
relationship between religion and neo-liberal restructuring will enable scholars to analyze
the different ways in which political and economic structures change in the context of
neoliberalization in various countries. Islamist political parties’ ascendance to power in
Egypt and Tunisia is likely to present new research avenues regarding the relationship
between the economic policies these new governments implement and their Islamist
discourses. This study can provide a theoretical framework and tools to analyze the
processes of economic and political restructuring and their impact on the understanding
of democracy, justice and freedom in these countries.

Although Critical IPE research paid attention to the processes of hegemony construction
in various countries, the role of identities, particularly religious identities has been very
much neglected due to the turn of IR Gramscianism towards structuralism. It is possible
to apply the theoretical model used in this study, which is based on an engagement
between Hall’s understanding of Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structural
Discourse Theory, to understand the relationship between international economic
processes and identity construction in different contexts. Such an engagement between
Critical IPE and discourse theory can generate new research questions such as why
neoliberal hegemony is established in a society in a particular way not another and why a
certain discourse become hegemonic in a society. We can also provide more nuanced
analyses of some of the issues explored in mainstream IPE, such as the relationship
between economic development, democratization and conflict or between economic
300

liberalization and democratization. This study demonstrates that economic development
and economic liberalization are not necessarily associated with a Western understanding
of democracy. In order to avoid making Western-centric assumptions regarding the
processes of economic liberalization in developing countries, we need to explore the
meanings of democracy and liberalism constructed in the socio-political context of a
specific country.

Identifying reference points and associated concepts using Discourse Theory and
connecting the shifts in the reference points to the broader structural issues using Hall’s
Gramscian perspective can also shed light on the complex relationship between economic
restructuring and knowledge production dynamics in particular societies in international
and transnational spaces. By exploring who controls knowledge production and
dissemination, what kind of knowledge is disseminated and how it is interpreted in local,
international and transnational networks, we can provide a more nuanced understanding
of dynamic of social movements, voting behavior, ideological conflicts and formulation
of foreign policy. Patterns and frames through which social groups define themselves and
give meaning to events around them constitute the basis of their interaction with other
socio political actors in national, international and transnational settings. While the
discourses we adopt provide opportunities for thinking about issues around us in new
ways, they also limit our thinking in others. For this reason deconstructing the power
relations that constitute dominant discourses will open up possibilities for finding new
and empowering ways to structure our everyday lives and our political systems
301

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Asset Metadata

Creator Çakirer, Deniz (author)

Core Title Neo-liberal hegemony and re-construction of Islamic community discourses in Turkey: the cases of the Gülen and Erenköy communities

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Politics and International Relations

Publication Date 05/16/2014

Defense Date 03/02/2012

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Islamic communities,neoliberalism,OAI-PMH Harvest,political Islam,Turkey

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Brand, Laurie (committee chair), Goodnight, Gerald Thomas (committee member), Tickner, Ann J. (committee member)

Creator Email cakirerdeniz@gmail.com,denizcakirer@hotmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-41298

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Legacy Identifier etd-akirerDeni-854.pdf

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Document Type Dissertation

Rights Çakirer, Deniz

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Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

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