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The 2010 Haiti network relief movement: rhetoric in natural disaster, institutional intervention, and biosecurity

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The 2010 Haiti network relief movement: rhetoric in natural disaster, institutional intervention, and biosecurity

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THE 2010 HAITI NETWORK RELIEF MOVEMENT: RHETORIC IN NATURAL
DISASTER, INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTION,
AND BIOSECURITY

by
DIANA M. WINKELMAN

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(COMMUNICATION)
December 2012

Copyright 2012 Diana M. Winkelman

For Mom and Dad

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is only complete because of the support of USC faculty and my amazing
family and friends. Tom Goodnight, you have a way to articulate the most interesting patterns
and complexities of the human condition. You are a brilliant mind and a wonderful person.
Thank you for supporting me and being patient. Randy Lake, thank you for your detailed edits
and careful thoughts. Allison Dundes Renteln, thank you for your time and your fresh
perspective. Martin Medhurst, you care so such about your students. Without your support and
guidance this project would not have began..
Mom and dad, thank you for demonstrating commitment and family values. Mom, you
have the purest heart and you see the best in everything. Dad, you showed me the world and it
changed my life. I love you both. Kristina Brar, you are my twin sister and I am so proud of you,
your impact cannot be over stated. Thanks for giving me an example of a strong professional
woman. Jennifer Whalen, my older sister, thank you for being sensitive, kind and caring. Brian,
Kim, Cameron, Alyssa, and Brandon Winkelman--you are a wonderful family and I love you all.
I look forward to watching you all grow. Grandma Jean--thank you for the love of trees and
Skip-Bo.
Trevor Dahms, you left this world too soon, but I am eternally grateful for our memories,
your love, and the life lessons you taught me. Shalyn Varner, you are and will always be my best
friend. Rachel Miller, you are informed and sarcastic and I love you. Emily Thomas, I am sorry
but it does not get much better than you. Stay awesome. Jennifer Scott, thank you for listening to
my worries and concerns. Robbie Petro, I wish we bonded over smiles and laughter, but each
friendship has its own path. I am eternally grateful to have you in my life. Mike Lefevre, you
made me laugh when it was difficult to smile. Stephen Trousdale, I consider you family. I know
iv

you will always be there. Raul Barcelo, Stacey Davis, Liz Diaz, Tiffany Dyer, Brie MacFarland,
Erin Mason, Kristen Montiel, Sam Perry, Andy Radasa, Erin Schrader, Caitlin Throckmorton,
and Shirley Varner—your friendships keep me grounded and give me perspective. Thank you.
I am blessed to have amazing people in my life. They challenge me, they love me, and they
fulfill me.

v

ABSTRACT
On January 10, 2010, a major earthquake devastated the country of Haiti, resulting in
over 300,000 deaths, massive destruction of infrastructure, and a major relief movement. This
movement involved the interplay of media, not-for-profit, and government actors. Mainstream
media were responsible for telling the story of Haiti, representing the victims, and updating
audiences about emergency, relief, and reconstruction efforts. Non-governmental organizations
utilized new media to generate one of the largest humanitarian campaigns in recent history.
Governments donated military support, offered foreign aid, and situated the Haiti story within
national and global contexts. Media, NGOs, and governments formed a disaster relief network.
The ensuing discourses motivated audiences, set anticipations, and demonstrated needs were
being met. This project examines how these institutions cooperated and competed in shaping the
relief movement. The rhetorical themes are explored as the narrative of Haiti unfolded into a
global public sphere.

vi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CDC Center for Disease Control and Prevention
DEC Disasters Emergency Committee
DoD Department of Defense
GOH Government of Haiti
IHRC Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission
IOM International Organization for Migration
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MSM Mainstream Media
NGO Non-Government Organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
TAN Transnational Advocacy Network
UK United Kingdom
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
USGS United States Geological Survey
WFP United Nations Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication ii
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract v
List of Abbreviations vi
Chapter One
Introduction: Natural Disasters and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake Relief Movement 1
The 2010 Haiti Earthquake: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Disaster Relief 4
Research Questions 5
Literature Review 6
Disaster Sociology 7
The Haiti Earthquake 9
Relief Response 12
Justification for Research 14
Network Movements 21
Scope of Study 26
Chapter Breakdown 28
Chapter Two
Mainstream Media Interventions in Disaster Reporting 33
Initial Reporting: Speculation and Uncertainty 35
On the Scene Journalism 43
Special Interest Pieces 56
Children 57
Mental Illness 58
Prisoners 60
Intervention as Special Interest 62
viii

Tragedy and Remembrance: Anniversary Reports 65
Analysis of Mainstream Media Reporting about Haiti 66
Media Representation of Disenfranchised Groups 67
Summary of Findings 71
Chapter Three
Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief: New Media Intervention, the Epic
Frame, and the Rhetoric of Humanitarianism 78
NGOs in Disaster Relief 82
The Disasters Emergency Committee: An Umbrella Organization 84
The Red Cross: An International NGO 88
Yele: A Haitian NGO 93
Calls for Donations and New Media Interventions 95
Social Media 97
Mobile Fundraising 101
Anniversary Reports: Itemize Contributions and Displacement of Blame 103
Analysis and Comparison with Mainstream Media 105
Summary and Conclusions 111
Chapter Four
Government Intervention in Disaster Relief: Military Action, Public Policy Reform,
Public Address, and Biosecurity 117
The Haitian Government 119
Military Intervention and Biosecurity: The Role of the United States Military and United
Nations Security Forces 121
Removing Rubble 122
Providing Security 123
Military Intervention and the Performance of Nationalism 125
Foreign Aid 127
Public Address 130
ix

United States President Barack Obama 131
Haitian President Rene Preval 134
Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon 137
Public Policy Reform 137
Globalization and Sovereignty in the Modern World 142
Biopolitics in Disaster Relief 144
Competition, Cooperation, Praise, and Blame 145
Discourses of Government Interventions 148
Concluding Thoughts 150
Chapter Five
Conclusion 153
Findings 154
The Media 156
Non-Government Organizations 158
Government Interventions 160
Disaster Relief Networks 161
Relevance to Social Movement 163
Relevance to Biopolitics 167
The Future for Haiti 168
Limitations of this Study and Calls for Future Research 169
References 173
Appendix A 201
Appendix B 205
1

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION:
NATURAL DISASTERS AND THE 2010 HAITI RELIEF MOVEMENT
Natural disasters are catastrophic events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, wild
fires, tidal waves, and floods. They have the potential to kill humans and wildlife,
damage or destroy public spaces and private residences, and significantly impact the
physical, psychological, and economic well-being of a resident population.
Historically, natural disasters appear to be accelerating in frequency and in lives
taken.
1
By definition, one may assume that natural disasters are caused by natural
events; however, their effects are magnified by human population and development.
2

Precisely because natural disasters significantly disrupt social order, they catalyze
study in the fields of climatology, economics, engineering, geography, geology,
sociology, and law.
3
Jason David Rivera and DeMond Shondell Miller argue that,
“The increasing complexity of natural disasters is embedded in the interplay of
geospatial, social, cultural, and economic factors in a community’s environment.”
4

Natural disasters are indisputably important cases to study because they result in loss

1. David E. Alexander, Natural Disasters (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 1.
2. Ibid. The term “natural hazard” is preferred by some because human development and lack
of planning contributes to the gravity of a natural disaster. Not only do human actions impact
environmental factors, but errors in construction quality and location also exacerbate the damage of
natural disasters.
3. Dennis S. Mileti, Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United
States (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999), 2.
4. Jason David Rivera and Shondell Miller DeMond, “Continually Neglected: Situating
Natural Disasters in the African American Experience,” Journal of Black Studies 37 (2007): 503.

2
of life, affect the health and livelihood of those involved, and are catalysts for
economic and political action. Certainly, natural disasters are important and dynamic
subjects for academic research and critical inquiry.
Disaster communication is a field that inquires into the symbolic and mediated
dynamics of nature’s upheavals. However, given the significance of the topic, the
field is in great need of further development. In addition to traditional questions of
research, new means of reporting, coordinating, and ensuring responses evolve. In the
digital age, communication coordinates expedient and strategic disaster relief.
Individuals construct personal and mediated experiences of natural disasters that
influence how a disaster is named, perceived, and reacted to. While disasters have
local outcomes, modern news vehicles project short- and long-term consequences
onto a wider field that transcends local boundaries and, more than occasionally,
makes for a global spectacle.
5
User-generated content feeds and multiplies these
stories. Individually uploaded and shared data, pictures, and stories influence
perceptions of disaster in ever more complex patterns and trajectories.
6
As audiences
become more informed about the scientific and geological factors that increase the
impacts of natural disasters, the public becomes aware that natural disasters will
occur and constitute a fact of life. Generally, these populations remain uncertain
about how to live with, accommodate, and manage risk. At times, intriguing rhetoric

5. Simon Cottle, “Global Crises in the News: Staging New Wars, Disasters, and Climate
Change,” International Journal of Communication 3 (2009): 494-516. Cottle argues that global crises
are often distinguished in terms of global surveillance, global-focusing events, and global spectacle.
This is especially the case in disaster reporting.

6. Jose van Dijck, “Users Like You? Theorizing Agency in User-Generated Content,” Media
Culture Society 31 (2009): 45-58. van Dijck argues that “user agency is a lot more complex than these
bipolar terms suggest; we need to account for the multifarious roles of users in a media environment
where the boundaries between commerce, content, and information are currently being redrawn.”
3
is aimed at public policy reform, including disaster risk reduction plans and
comprehensive emergency procedures in case disaster occurs. At other times, victim
suffering becomes the visible face of narratives that invite sympathy and lend
consolation. Undoubtedly, communication plays a role in routine preparations, but it
also becomes entangled in the ensuing chaos.
Communication at a time of disaster provides a rhetorical crisis. According to
Thomas B. Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight, “A rhetorical crisis occurs when
discourse fails to fulfill ordinary epistemological and axiological expectations.”
7

Previous expectations in communication break down, information is demanded, and
“cooperative action is seen as vital.”
8
Rhetorical themes of disaster occur both in
strategic disaster preparation and humanitarian relief once a disaster occurs. Disaster
relief rhetoric can be partisan. In response to crises or catastrophes in the modern
world, disagreements are inevitable. Dramatistic theory explains the ongoing process
of identification and division that is expected in communicative acts.
9
Rhetorical
criticism may help identify these divisions and crises that occur in natural disaster
relief. Haiti is a clear example of a case in which available rhetorical strategies were
tested, energized, and renewed.
Although there seems to be a normative ideal within the public sphere that
directs how the communication process should take place, competing interests hinder

7. Thomas B. Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight, “Accidental Rhetoric: The Root Metaphors
of Three Mile Island,” Communication Monographs 48 (1981): 272.
8. Ibid.
9. Dramatism was Kenneth Burke’s contribution to a world that could not be explained by the
promises of science, religion, or other expert worldviews. This view defines man as “the symbol-using
inventor of the negative separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making goaded
by the spirit of hierarchy and rotten with perfection.” Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action:
Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 16.
4
implementation of planning, which in turn impedes the timing of response. A
disaster provides an opportunity for critical inquiry about the strengths and limits of
sociopolitical systems at the local, national, and international levels. Thus, natural
disasters are of significance to the field of rhetoric because they are socially
disruptive events and materialize in institutional negotiations for power,
representation, and biosecurity.
The 2010 Haiti Earthquake: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Disaster Relief
Undoubtedly, the most devastating disaster in modern history occurred in
Haiti on January 12, 2010 at approximately 4:53 in the evening. A devastating
magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit southern Haiti about fifteen miles southwest of the
capital Port-au-Prince.
10
There were so many dead bodies that they had to be disposed
of in mass graves.
11
Ultimately, 316,000 lives were lost.
12
The earthquake gravely
affected the lives of approximately three million people.
13
Like every major natural
disaster, the Haiti earthquake produces a case study that unfolds both unique and
common efforts at disaster communication.
The Haiti disaster was just one among numerous earthquakes that erupt
around the globe, but Haiti’s location and history contributed to its unique problems.
This particular disaster attracted attention because there was a rare convergence of the

10. “Magnitude 7.0-Haiti Region,” US Geological Survey Earthquake Hazards Program,
accessed August 10, 2011, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/.
11. David Muir and Christine Romo, “Haiti Earthquake Victims Get Mass Grave Burial,”
ABC News, January 23, 2010, accessed August 10, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/haitis-
government-told-people-leave-dead-bodies-open/story?id=9644753#.T4UTOY7A7UQ.
12. “Haiti—Earthquake,” USAID: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian
Assistance and the Office of US Foreign Disaster Relief, February 4, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011,
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/f
s_sr/fy2011/haiti_eq_fs010_02-04-2011.pdf.

13. Ibid.
5
poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere with devastation to its most populated
area and most important institutions. Haiti relief generated an important convergence
of different elements to report on the event, attract aid, provide relief, and determine
long-term policies. Thus, new media converged with the old, traditional relief
agencies utilized new media, and nation states were drawn into international
cooperation and conflict. Critical inquiry is necessary to understand communication
disruptions, experiments, and strategies of response to the Haiti disaster. The
repercussions of the Haiti earthquake were so complicated that critical inquiry is
necessarily incomplete; however, this study explores key moments and vectors of
communication within a normative range of concerns and an emergent frame for
disaster relief actions in the future.
Research Questions
A disaster relief network is an assembly of agents and agencies drawn to
intervention into and communication about a geophysical catastrophe. Of significance
in this field are questions regarding how imperative discourses of intervention and
recovery take place, how institutional players in disaster rhetoric correspond and
interconnect with one another, and whether major institutional actors represent
disasters and their victims in similar ways. Haiti is a relevant and rich case for
studying these important questions. More specifically, the questions that this
dissertation asks are, first, how did mainstream media describe, address, and cover the
earthquake? Second, how did NGOs frame the work of communication and create
identifications between the country of Haiti and the international community? Third,
how did the United States, the United Nations, and the country of Haiti respond to the
disaster and contextualize its meaning to the world? Fourth, during what moments do
6
these major institutional actors (mainstream media, non-governmental organizations,
and governments) interact with one another to configure disaster relief networks?
Also, when do these institutions engage in mutually beneficial relief behaviors and
when do they self-promote and place blame on each other?
This dissertation examines these questions by exploring selections of
communication that articulated the 2010 Haiti earthquake at the national and global
levels. The rhetoric of disaster relief is assembled through reading representative
discourses from distinct agencies involved in public and private deliberation and
decision-making. This study examines the most prevalent institutions in disaster relief
and draws important conclusions about their participation in networks, strategies of
representation, and global constructions, conversations, and tensions involved in
biosecurity.
Literature Review
In order to properly situate this study, it is important to ground inquiry in the
relevant literature. Early research on natural disaster, particularly earthquake research,
focused on the geological and scientific elements of natural upheavals. The scientific
community explored the causes and measurement of these events.
14
This approach
has a long history. In fact, the first seismographs in the United States were installed in
1887.
15
But disasters are also cultural topics of study, embedded in the history and
literature of a region. Closely related to environmental sociology, disaster sociology

14. Terry Cannon, “Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of ‘Natural’ Disasters,” In
Ann Varley (ed.), Disasters, Development, and Environment (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons,
1994), 14.
15. “1906 Marked the Dawn of the Scientific Revolution,” United States Geological Survey,
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/nca/1906/18april/revolution.php.
7
focuses on the social and human dynamics of local and global catastrophes.
16

Exploration of the social responses to disasters remains comparatively less developed
than scientific and geological studies. In the 1950s, researchers began to inquire into
the human components of natural disasters.
Disaster Sociology
The field of disaster sociology strives to understand how social groups and
organizations react, adapt, and survive after a catastrophic event.
17
Raymond Murphy
advocates “integrating social constructionism and critical realism to study natural
environment, technology, and government” during a natural disaster in order to
discover important characteristics of moments when social order is disrupted.
18

Murphy cleverly terms this a “dance of human agents with nature’s actants.”
19
This
view is appropriate because human and natural elements interact with one another
during times of catastrophe. Natural disasters can be conceptualized to incorporate the
social factors and influences that relate to natural and geological stimuli.
Disaster sociology attempts to do just this. This field studies organizations,
reactions, and economic and political factors that influence the mobilization of
emergency and disaster response. Rhetorical inquiry augments this research by
analyzing how varied agents name, frame, and contest the physical and social
dimensions of disasters. Changes, adaptations, and extensions of everyday

16. Thomas E. Drabek and David A. McEntire, “Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of
Disaster,” Disaster Prevention and Management 12 (2003): 97-112.
17. Russell R. Dynes and Thomas E. Drabek, The Structure of Disaster Research: Its Policy
and Disciplinary Implications (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1994), 7.
18. Raymond Murphy, “Disaster or Sustainability: The Dance of Human Agents with
Nature’s Actants,” The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 41 (2004): 250.
19. Ibid, 249.
8
communicative practices during times of emergency occur. New discourses open
communication, closing down damaged or older forms while forging new circuits of
flow. Because disaster events appear to extend beyond human control, guilt cannot be
placed on a particular evil at face value. Nonetheless, vital national and international
politics emerge, and blame is placed and guilt is implied. The rhetoric of
humanitarian relief movements works in interesting and complicated ways to extend
and supplement these discourses.
Natural disasters are always local catastrophes but, with the projection of
developing media, they become much more, ranging from international news pieces
to global spectacles. Rhetorical analysis focuses on the symbolic influences and
motivations in the process of communicating information about the disaster itself and
the efforts to alleviate pain and suffering and rebuild afterwards.
20
Post-disaster
narratives involve a complex web of public and private, individual and organizational
acts of charity, and domestic and global interventions. In a global age, crises are
followed by the mobilization of international networks, deployment of available
resources, fundraising, and promotion of international relief. In fact, natural disasters
can be viewed as rhetorical events that always unsettle expectations and reshape
social practices in varied and important ways.

20. “Symbol-use not only is something that separates us from other animals, it also is
essential to human activity, human meaning-making and human experience. Symbols create
identifications and divisions, they are also essential to the human condition. Because we understand
our condition through the negative, hierarchy is also a part of social relationships. Dramatism allows
for us to apply rhetoric to the fundamental nature of humanity, which is put to the collective test in
times of rupture, disturbance, and horror. Then, the accidents of history that separate human being are
either deeply renewed or for the moment overcome.” Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action:
Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 16.

9
Each type of natural disaster has its own communication problems, topics,
and motivating discourses. In the era of media convergence, earthquakes are cross-
cultural events, involving multiple authorities, language barriers, and usually some
form of ideological opposition.
21
Major earthquakes are usually followed by a
breakdown in communication systems and, at times, are further complicated by
tsunami disasters and fires as well.
22
On many occasions, earthquakes also invite
critical, reflexive inquiry into preparation policies and building codes. Although
earthquakes follow particularly interesting generalizations and characterizations, each
quake exhibits distinctive qualities that pose individualized topics and appeals. The
Haiti earthquake marked a time that demonstrated typical themes of disaster response,
but also intrigued the international community because of its distinctive
characteristics and horrific conditions.
The Haiti Earthquake
This study explores the 2010 Haiti earthquake relief movement in order to
capture and critique the rhetorical articulation and characteristic mediation of events.
Earthquakes are geological and natural events. Characteristic of major disasters,
earthquakes are disconcerting and disruptive for their victims and the audiences who
are exposed to their aftermath. Human beings appreciate and depend on a sense of
place and order. Modern societies prepare building standards and codes in order to
sustain development and create a sense of normalcy and consistency. Additionally,

23. Jun Xiao and Helin Li, “Online Discussion of Sharon Stone’s Karma Comment on China
Earthquake: the Intercultural Communication of Media Events in the Age of Media Convergence,”
China Media Research 8 (2012).
24. Jean-Claude Thouret, “Urban Hazards and Risks; Consequences of Earthquakes and
Volcanic Eruptions: An Introduction,” GeoJournal 49 (1999): 131-135.

10
measurements and emergency procedures are developed to minimize damage. Yet
plate tectonics are out of human control. The United States Geological Survey defines
an earthquake as “ground shaking caused by the sudden release of accumulated strain
by an abrupt shift of rock along a fracture in the earth or by volcanic and magmatic
activity, or other sudden stress changes in the earth.”
23
Although a technical definition
can provide some information, populations understand what an earthquake is without
necessarily having to understand how they affect modern life. In Haiti, the earthquake
was profoundly different for the people who experienced it, habitants of an
impoverished, unprepared, nation on the island of Hispaniola.
The initial event was coupled with a total of forty-two aftershocks, affecting
approximately three million people. One study showed that it was not just the local
geology, but also the geography of local surfaces that made this particular earthquake
so devastating.
24
For instance, a seismic ridge underneath Port-au-Prince increased the
extent and severity of the damage. Government buildings, hospitals and roads were
destroyed, compounding the feeling of terror and sense of chaos at the scene.
25
Not
only did Haitian citizens, civil servants, and public figures die,
26
but the earthquake
also resulted in massive damage to the country’s infrastructure and a deadly cholera

25. “Earthquakes,” United States Geological Survey,
http://www.usgs.gov/science/science.php?term=304.
26. Henry Fountain, “In Studying Haiti, a New Angle on an Earthquake’s Intensity,” New
York Times, October 18, 2010.
27. “Aftershock Mapping—Mainshock and 42 Aftershocks,” United States Geological
Survey, March 4, 2010, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/aftershocks/?event=2010rja6.
28. Archbishop Joseph Serge Miot and politician Micha Gaillard were among those that were
killed. “Haiti Archbishop Killed in Quake as Churches, Cathedral Reduced to Rubble,” Fox News,
January 13, 2010, accessed August 11, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,582942,00.html;
Jose de Cordoba, “Micha Gaillard, Fought For Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2010.

11
outbreak.
27
The United Nations characterized the earthquake as “the largest urban
disaster in modern history,” stirring the attention and the sympathy of the United
States and the international community.
28

The 2010 Haiti earthquake was not the first and, presumably, not the last
disaster to hit Haiti.
29
Haiti is an isolated nation, poor, and dependent on foreign aid.
Because of its lack of resources, Haiti does not have sufficient infrastructure for the
precautions necessary to minimize damage from earthquakes or other natural disasters
such as floods or hurricanes.
30
Haiti is also a country with a troubled history. As the
only nation founded on a successful slave rebellion, Haiti was historically isolated
from global trade routes and early economic capitalist development.
31
Joel Dreyfuss
concludes, “Haiti is a country with a glorious past, a brutal present, and a bleak
future.”
32
Social, political and economic troubles over a prolonged period of time
have increased Haiti’s vulnerability. Not only does this dissertation study the Haiti

29. Although cholera had been rare in Haiti’s recent history, an outbreak of the disease was
confirmed in October 19, 2010 by the CDC. “Haiti Cholera Outbreak,” Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/.
30. “Haiti—Earthquake,” USAID.
31. Most notably, the 2004 Tropical Storm Jeanne led to mudslides and floods that took the
lives of 3,000. In 2008, Tropical Storm Fay, Hurricane Gustav, Hurricane Hanna, and Hurricane Ike
collectively caused over 300 deaths and seriously damaged food supply. In fact, Jean-Pierre
Taschereau, a disaster management delegate with the International Federation’s Pan American Disaster
Response Unit (PADRU) reflected, “When the island was struck by three hurricanes in succession,
access to affected areas was hampered, bridges were destroyed, roads swept away and communities
left isolated. As people were beginning to recover from the first hurricane, along came the second, and
then the third.” “Haiti between the Hurricanes,” The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent, 2009.
32. Maureen Taft-Morales and Rhonda Margeeson, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response
(Darby: Diane Publishing, 2011), 1.

33. Henryk Szlajfer, “Against Dependent Capitalist Development in Nineteenth-Century Latin
America: The Case of Haiti and Paraguay,” Latin American Perspectives 13(1) (1986): 45-73.
34. Joel Dreyfuss, “Saving Haiti: Seeking Hope for my Native Land,” The Root, January 12,
2010.

12
disaster and how the event was articulated by institutional actors in national and
global contexts, it also isolates how Haiti’s history was reimagined and
contextualized as the earthquake came to be defined.
Relief Networks
The event invited action and intervention. The international community
promised aid, while the United Nations and the United States sent military and
security assistance.
33
Following the earthquake, $1.4 billion was donated to ninety-six
different organizations.
34
Non-profit organizations and government aid agencies
relied on an international network movement connected by emerging communication
technologies and networked relationships.
35
Congressional Representative James
McGovern explained, “Governments, international agencies, NGOs, corporations,
and individuals have responded and mobilized as never before.”
36
Thus, Haiti
network relief marked a time that introduced a powerful and effective means for
redistributing resources, addressing short-term emergency needs and extending issues
of social change. Arguably, the efforts constitute a model for influencing and
transforming global social life worlds. My reading of this movement identifies
distinct turns in storytelling, from initial definition and description, through scenes of

35. There were criticisms of the military presence in Haiti during the first ten days.
Approximately half of the initial flights coming into Haiti were military personnel, while doctors and
medical supplies had to compete for the airspace. Benoit Leduc, who works with Doctors Without
Borders, called the United States actions a “militarization of aid,” adding that this tactic brings
“extreme confusion of distributing food with a gun.” Mark Weisbrot, “Mark Weisbrot on the Haitian
Earthquake,” Extra! March 2010: 8.
36. Marisol Bello, “Much of Aid for Haiti is still Unspent,” USA Today, November 30, 2010,
accessed January 3, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/yourlife/mind-soul/doing-good/2010-11-29-
sharing-haiti_N.htm.

13
disaster, to appeals for relief, and to ongoing debates and refinement of appeals.
This project is unique because it traces the various strands of institutional rhetoric
during a major mediated and emotionally compelling international spectacle – the
2010 Haiti earthquake.
At a time of crisis, communication is difficult, of course. Old resources
disappear and new ones gain in importance. Old media and new media sometimes
connect in novel, powerful ways. Internet use became a crucial means for survivors to
contact loved ones when calling cards and cell phone towers were not functioning. On
the ground level, the initial communication concern was to locate individuals, call for
help, and supply information to families.
37
On the organizational level, the primary
goals were to inform the international community, inspire donations and support, and
collect information to assist in a strategic relief effort. Traditional media and new
media outlets reported the earthquake, communicated about relief strategies and acted
as critical agents of the politics of humanitarian relief. There were immediate
emotional reactions by the global community. Craig Calhoun argues that emotion can
be potentially dangerous because “it often propels movements towards climatic
confrontations.”
38
However, emotion can also lead to climatic moments, which propel

37. Network movements are a part modern society. NGOs can use the Internet to promote and
pressure for international causes, such women’s rights, clean water supplies, or disaster relief.
Humanitarian network movements often involve tensions between cultures. Quite commonly, these
network movements are aimed at impacting the actions of governments. See Jon Lunn, “The Power of
Justice, Justice as Power: Observations on the Trajectory of the International Human Rights
Movement,” Crises States 12 (2005).
38. James McGovern, “US and World Responds to Haiti’s Earthquake,” Congressional
Record 111th Congress, January 26, 2010, H3
39. Laura Fitzpatrick, “The Haiti Earthquake,” TIME, January 12, 2010, 29.
40. Craig Calhoun, “Putting Emotions in Their Place,” in Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and
Francesca Polletta, Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001), 56.
14
various movements toward the making of meaning, forming of identifications, and
promoting of a sense of urgency. Although these identifications can be short-lived,
the success and intrigue that Haiti invited should be explored.
Over two and a half years later, relief is still an ongoing process. According to
the Los Angeles Times, “The number of displaced Haitians has dropped from 1.5
million to just under 400,000.”
39
Not only does rubble still need to be removed, but
sturdy infrastructure also needs to be rebuilt. Seismologist Eric Calais emphasizes the
importance of rebuilding Haiti with proper materials and resilient construction plans:
“If people have to choose between buying better quality construction material which
is earthquake resilient, or building an extra room with the same cost, of course they
should choose the first.”
40
Reconstruction is an imperfect process, which needs to be
understood. Relief efforts have changed from providing immediate medical and
emergency aid, to providing financial resources that are focused on future prevention,
reduction of risk, and rebuilding infrastructure.
Justification for Research
Although the sheer magnitude of the Haiti earthquake justifies academic
study, many other elements of this disaster make it unique and fascinating. This
dissertation examines Haiti as a formative experience for interactions and
interventions of mainstream media, NGOs, and governments. Each institution relied
on new media and new communication technologies. Haiti is a model in an era of

41. Allyn Gaestel, “Quake Camps in Haiti Clearing Out,” Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2012,
A6.
42. “Haitian Buildings to be Reinforced against Earthquakes under UN-Backed Plan,” United
Nations News, March 29, 2011.

15
mixed media intervention into moments of social upheaval spawned by altered
material conditions upon which everyday social activity depends. The Haiti
earthquake was a drama staged by mainstream media, including newspaper
representation and on-the-scene journalism. This dissertation examines the websites
of relevant organizations and traces their inter-relationships in order to establish how
interactions occur and develop into powerful relief trajectories.
Thus far, insufficient attention has been devoted to the relationships of
rhetoric to networks; the purpose of this study is to clarify the extent of the
interrelation and complexity of the role of rhetoric in crisis relief in contemporary
society.
41
Social movements and networks have an important relationship.
42
They
share some of the same characteristics, such as connection, identification, and
exchange, but their differences offer a compelling area of research. Moreover, social
movements and networks have an interesting relationship to rhetoric.
This study builds on previous research in theoretical and critical contributions
made in rhetoric, social movements, networks and biopolitics. Although fact finding
and information disbursement are important, stories of natural disasters also move the
world, prompt or succor help, and challenge audiences.
43
This study explores the role
of media disaster reporting, identifies important non-profit interventions, and explains
the contributions of the United States and the United Nations in the humanitarian

43. Networks are popular because of renewed interest in meso-level social analysis and
relation of structure and agency, resurgence in interest in "social mechanisms," and the consolidation
of social network analysis as a distinct field in social science. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, Social
Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), 4.
44. Diani and McAdam define social movements as “complex and highly heterogeneous
network structures.” Diani and McAdam, Social Movements and Networks, 1.
45. Se-hoon Jeong, “Public Support for Haitian Earthquake Victims: Role of Attributions and
Emotions,” Public Relations Quarterly 36 (2010): 325-328.
16
process. These chapters augment understandings of communicative work in
humanitarian relief and network relationships.
Interventions by the media, non-governmental organizations, and public
figures deploy both new and traditional media. The differences among options
introduce complications, tensions, and constraints to audiences that are interpreting
meaning through layers of text and fragments of stories as mediated natural disasters
become represented and experienced. Through technological advances, ‘local’ natural
disasters become global. New media facilitate distribution of images, narratives, and
information in ways that bridge local events and global concerns, crossing national
and spatial boundaries faster than ever before. This creates unique challenges. David
Morley and Kevin Robins argue that there is a “restructuring of information and
image spaces and the production of a new communications geography, characterized
by global networks and an international space of information flows.”
44
In fact, they
say there is “an increasing crisis in the national sphere.”
45
This results in a significant
reconfiguration of audiences’ sense of “space and place.”
46
While traditional media
may focus on a politics of difference and one-dimensional power flows, new media
offers interactivity and self-storytelling, fundamentally transforming how news is

46. David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (New York: Routledge, 1995), 1.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.

17
created and received. These qualities of networked mediation will, undoubtedly,
continue to adapt and develop over time.
47

Interactivity in new media transforms the dimensions of power in story telling
worldwide. Traditionally, that power appears rooted in national biopolitics. Networks
change the landscape. Jun Xiao and Helen Li observe, “With the rapid development
of network technology, the digital communication system is widely applied in
Western media, and the application and research of media convergence has expanded
from technology to the transformation of industry, culture, and society.”
48
Jenny
Edkins claims that biopolitical authority produces conceptions of “failure, disaster, or
emergency” in order to sustain “the fantasy that were it not for this temporary hiccup,
all would be well.”
49
Therefore, biopolitics means that life is a form of rhetorical
capital, conceptions of security rely on the sustainment of life, and legitimation within
governments depends on rhetorically situating risk and redemption as well. When a
disaster occurs, the symbol-use embedded in its representation must indirectly
construct a consensus of biological and psychological norms that restore some
measures of safety and trust, while either creating identifications that promote a sense
of community or by playing upon difference in order to satisfy uncertainties and
insecurities that arise in the wake of a disaster. Networks race both to accomplish and
undo this end.

49. Carrie Lynn D. Reinhard, “Studying the Interpretive and Physical Aspects of Interactivity:
Revisiting Interactivity as a Situated Interplay of Structure and Agencies,” Communications: The
European Journal of Communications Research 36(3) (2011): 353-374.
50. Jun Xiao and Helin Li, “Online Discussion of Sharon Stone,” 26.
51. Jenny Edkins, “Biopolitics, Communication, and Global Governance,” Review of
International Studies 34 (2008): 219.

18
One network is the public. At times, publics respond to uncertainties with
charitable reactions. Audiences are shaped into a disaster community through shared
sympathy, communal donations, and identification with the Haitian victims. Mario
Diani and Doug McAdam argue that it is “not surprising that substantial attention has
been paid to the contribution of social networks to individual participation.”
50
Charity
can be an individual or collective act that enables feelings of empowerment during a
time when people are prone to feeling powerless and weak.
51
Any act that attempts to
undo the “naturally done” may act as a psychological blanket that comforts and
distracts individuals from thinking about the anxiety associated with risks in the
natural environment.
Focusing on relief instead of disaster, however, suppresses discussions about
the implications of economic policies and social systems that produce and sustain
global divisions of wealth, maintaining poverty and creating weak infrastructures that
threaten life. Emergency reactions, then, may help wealthier individuals maintain a
fantasy of biological security, that life is ordered and will continue to sustain itself.
Globalization, though, continues to challenge this sense of security. Environmental
conditions do change, technology increases, and uncertainty intensifies. Rhetoric
about biosecurity remains essential and meaningful as it assembles core values about
the future.
Natural disasters involve discourse about biosecurity, networking key players
that include experts, governments, nonprofits, activists, and the media. Individuals are

52. Diani and McAdam, Social Movements and Networks, 7.
53. Hazel Denhart, “Deconstructing Disaster: Psycho-Social Impact of Building
Deconstruction in Post-Katrina New Orleans,” Communication Studies 26 (2008): 195-201.

19
invited to donate financial resources but are excluded from decisions about
strategies of relief. Key players produce “an inside and an outside: a group of people
to whom certain standards apply and another group to whom they do not. Through
exclusions a social order is produced that appears bounded, complete, and safe.”
52

Globalization puts up questions of risk, security and vulnerability. Rhetoric works by
inviting viewers into the disaster experience while reiterating boundaries that create
comfort and distance. Threats to life, quality of life, security, and safety are debated,
measured, ranked, and prioritized by various groups, but only some privileged actors
are allowed to participate. The rhetoric of biosecurity works as a space to create
uniform network attention and capacity; however, it often constitutes a flawed and
imperfect attempt to quantify life and health variables. Individuals desire to feel safe.
Rhetoric addresses areas of risk, but rhetorical and political actions taken to reduce
risk frequently fail to protect people from the harm they fear and may even accentuate
panic.
Natural disasters disrupt notions of safety.
53
Rhetoric often makes sense of
distant natural disasters by producing difference and enacting a ritual of separation,
while simultaneously opening compensation spaces for performing roles of caregiver
or humanitarian. Although they may be well intended, key players in biopolitics can
react to natural disasters in ways that protect the status quo and maintain global power

54. Edkins, “Biopolitics, Communication, and Global Governance,” 219.
55. Alternatively, natural disasters also enhance our ability to understand disasters and
prepare for them. In fact. food security, relief systems, public health policies, flood control plans,
warning systems, and building codes have all benefited from the result of natural disasters. Piers M.
Blake, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis, and Ben Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability,
and Disasters (New York: Routledge, 1994), 223.

20
dynamics while, at face value, displaying outrage and demanding action and
change. Although the rhetoric of biosecurity can, in fact, be counterproductive, in a
globalized world such address is necessary to rebuild the ramparts of safety by
enacting a rhetorical place for discussions about how to repair and sustain security.
Modern debates about biosecurity, including the Haiti relief movement, are
the product of a globalized mediated rhetorical social movement. Humanitarian
movements are necessary in a global, digital age. For example, the United Way
explains that its mission is to “ignite a worldwide social movement, and thereby
mobilize millions to action – to give, advocate and volunteer to improve the
conditions in which they live.”
54
Social movement rhetoric is essential to analyze
network engagements because it offers a better appreciation of how a movement
utilizes words, actions and timing to grab attention, when there are a wide variety of
voices and issues from which to choose. This project examines biosecurity by
defining emergent frames, one of which will be networking as a frame that offers the
space of connection among stories during humanitarian relief.
55
Such emergent
frames initially appear as ‘fragments’ and are situated in postmodern stories
representing or identifying both disaster and destruction. Part of this connection
resembles melodrama, but this project uncovers the dramatistic frames peculiar to
such forging of social connections. Networks are imperative for these fragmented

56. “Mission and Vision,” United Way, accessed February 2, 2011,
http://worldwide.unitedway.org/pages/mission-and-vision.

57. Carlson argues, “Recognizing the appropriate frame for interpreting and assessing a
movement is vital because frames determine our attitudes, which immediately affect our actions since
we form ourselves and judge others (collaborating with them or against them) in accordance with our
attitudes,” Cheree A. Carlson, “Gandhi and the Comic Frame: ‘As Bellum Purificandum,’” Quarterly
Journal of Speech 72 (1986): 447.
21
stories to filter through various media channels and grow in non-institutionalized
mediated spaces.
Network Movements
Haiti constitutes a formative movement of emerging disaster networks. Thus,
it is important to explore previous contributions in network activism more generally
in order to set the context. Florence Passy and Marco Giugni explain the relationship
between social movements and networks.
56
They argue that a phenomenological
perspective enables a scholar to study the “constant work of definition and
redefinition of the social world by participants in social movements and at their self-
positioning within this world.”
57
However, a phenomenological perspective fails to
lend itself as a critical tool. I argue that a rhetorical network perspective better
accounts for the strong organizational influence of the social movement process.
Passy and Giugni describe and observe social movement networks:
[S]ustained participation, which is a direct result of the stabilization of
commitment, depends on the interplay of objective (factual) and subjective
(perceived) elements of the social world. More specifically, movement
activists are more likely to remain deeply involved when their embeddedness
in social networks and their perception of such embeddedness in relation to
their life-spheres are coherently and consistently interconnected.
58

Disaster communication, like other social movement networks, depends on the same
interplay of objective and subjective elements, scientific and dramatistic themes, and

58. Passy and Giugni distinguish roles of social networks. First, they have socialization
functions, which create initial disposition to participate. Second, they have structural-connection
functions, which generate practical opportunities for involvement. Last, they have decision-shaping
functions, which influences what decisions are made and how they are made. Florence Passy and
Marco Giugni, “Social Networks and Individual Perceptions: Explaining Differential Participation in
Social Movements,” Sociological Forum 16 (2001): 123-153.

59. Florence Passy and Marco Giugni, “Life-spheres, Networks, and Sustained Participation
in Social Movements: A Phenomenological Approach to Political Commitment,” Sociological Forum
15 (2000): 119.

60. Ibid., 119-120.
22
personal and institutional influences. The communicators in a disaster network co-
construct symbolic and cultural realities, as well as emphasize uncertainties
embedded in the disaster process. Sustained participation in a disaster movement is a
structural phenomenon; however, the personal and intimate nature of how individuals
experience distant disasters in a global world should not ignored.
Relief organizations construct these meanings through strategic
representations of victimhood. During relief, the heroic attributes of the First World
are stressed. Sometimes graphic images of victims adversely affect viewers, but they
attract attention to a disaster as well.
59
Sympathy is necessary, but it also exploits the
pain and vulnerably of the First World. Stories of victimhood often expose tensions in
institutional systems and conflicting frames.
60
In 2012, relief organizations needed to
operate in networks to achieve carefully balanced symbolic goals, represent victims
ethically, and motivate compassion. The United Way describes a need to “galvanize
and connect all sectors of society – individuals, non-profit organizations and
governments – to create long term social change.”
61

Networks have emerged as a topic of theoretical and social scientific research.
Concerned with connections and linkages in social behavior, network studies have
become fundamentally more dynamic and intriguing in contemporary society. Social
scientific research has also contributed to the field of social movement networks.

61. Jeffrey S. Wilkinson and James E. Fletcher, “Bloody News and Vulnerable Populations:
An Ethical Question,” Journal of Mass Media Ethics 10 (1995): 167-177.
62. One study examined the portrayal of refugees and found that there is a narrative of escape,
hope, and ultimately, the harsh reality that their hopes may never come true. Sarah J. Steimel,
“Refugees as People: The Portrayal of Refugees in American Human Interest Stories,” Journal of
Refugee Studies 23 (2010): 219-237.

63. “Mission and Vision,” United Way.
23
First, people are more likely to become involved in social movement networks if
they are previously linked to one or more movement members. Second, people are
more likely to become involved in a social movement network in the absence of
countervailing networks.
62
In the digital age, both social movements and applications
of dramatistic appeals are fundamentally transformed, making these connections more
identifiable.
Few scholars have attempted to clarify the significance of networks for the
field of rhetoric. G. Thomas Goodnight is one who has. In his article “The
Metapolitics of the 2002 Iraq Debate,” he concludes:
The social imaginary of national debate at the federal level appears to be
constituted in intertextual trajectories by advocates who hold one another
publicly accountable to the lessons of history, the unfolding relations among
nations, reflexive outcomes of dissent and consensus, and future policy costs
and consequences.
63

Kai Ericksson adds to this conceptualization by positing, “the concept of network has
become a precondition for thinking about contemporary society, of the ontological
‘structure’ of this metaphor.”
64

Networks are now taken for granted in our society as the primary organization
of our social and political processes. Networks are enabled by communication
technologies that decentralize power structures and empower individual action.
Castells argues that “networking logic substantially modifies the operation and

64. David A. Snow, Louis A .Zurcher, Jr. and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, “Social Networks and
Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment,” American Sociological
Review 45 (1980): 787-801.
65. G. Thomas Goodnight, “The Metapolitics of the 2002 Iraq Debate: Public Policy and the
Network Imaginary,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 13 (2002): 86.
66. Kai Eriksson, “On the Ontology of Networks,” Communication & Critical/Cultural
Studies (2005): 309.
24
outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture.”
65
Networks
can be a reflexive place for public accountability, but they are layered amongst key
players, relationships, and a fluidity that occurs between important decisions, their
aftermath, and the “public.” These relationships are essential to the performative and
humanitarian dimensions to social movements in the amassing of social capital to
restore conditions of biosecurity.
Modern social movements also utilize networks in order to promote social
change. A network social movement is a matrixed interconnection of motivating
discourses of authority, emotion, and narrative between and among organizations and
individuals aimed at promoting social causes.
66
Organizations, governments, and
media have long had contact and, in this sense, networks are nothing new. However,
due to the speed, volume, and complexity of Haiti’s relief network, interesting
dynamics took place. In addition, Haiti earthquake relief networks are an important
site of learning to figure out institutional connections, outlets for symbolic appeals,
and the mobilization of disaster drama.
Essentially, this dissertation is a rhetorical analysis of networked institutional
interventions during disaster relief. Much work examines the ideas and practices of
humanitarian actors, the diffusion of humanitarian ideas and how humanitarian actors
connect with different network actors.
67
This project examines some unsuccessful

67. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 469.
68. Scholars who have addressed the relationship between networks and social movements
include David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Roberto M. Fernandez, Doug
McAdam, Bert Klandermans, Dirk Oegema, and Mario Diani. See Bibliography for complete citations.
Although they approach social movements from a network perspective, the term “disaster relief
movement” is first used in this paper.
69. “The diffusion of ideas and practices beyond the people and organizations with which
international NGOs work is an important unexamined dynamic in assistance.” Mendelson and Glenn,
25
strategies of NGOs, in addition to some of their successes. The size, complexity,
and global linkages of networks have grown exponentially. Transnational activist
networks (TANs) attempt to influence policy outcomes by changing the terms and
nature of the debate.
68
Disasters can mobilize sympathy, but they also create
tremendous difficulties for the long-term goals of TANs.
Although depicting disorder can be an effective tool for activism, such
activism may be short-lived and problematic. In fact, disaster rhetoric frequently
reinforces the status quo. Certainly, humanitarian work is imperfect, selective and
complex.
69
Strategies initially include responses to the needs of local media, attention
to strong local partnerships, focusing on infrastructural needs and individual skill
building, skills training, and engaging in non-threatening dialog about the
effectiveness of efforts made so far. Other levels of governing intervene.
Communicative norms conflict with and adapt to the sociopolitical landscape of the
country addressed. TANs use the media to mobilize shame and create public
awareness. When the project is more subtle and requires more than international
awareness for changing ways of life and rebuilding infrastructures, NGOs should be
well-informed about the complications and anxieties that are associated with such
work. Humanitarian work is often an activity in symbolic politics.
70
Power is being
transferred and negotiated and meaning is being constructed along the way. In

The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and
Eurasia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 23.

70. Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001),
2.

71. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 199.

72. Murray J. Edelman introduced the theory of symbolic politics in his book, The Symbolic
Uses of Power (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 25.
26
addition, the future of relief networks needs to be critically evaluated in order to
better understand these emerging societal building blocks. This study hopes to inspire
such work.
Scope of Study
The digital age has fundamentally changed the way individuals and
organizations receive, process and understand information in complex interconnected
ways. Digital rhetorics influence social and political lives in an interactive dynamic.
71

Using a rhetorical lens, this project views Haiti as a spectacle or display that involves
the dance of media intervention and coverage of suffering. Drama creates urgency for
intervention, impatience, sympathy, and identification, while downplaying other
antagonisms. This project employs a rhetorical-critical approach to gauge the
discourse of actors in the humanitarian disaster relief network. In Haiti, there was a
notable incorporation of movements, networks and dramatism that involves
mainstream media, new media, non-profit organizations, and the state. Each chapter
focuses on these actors, while ultimately identifying how they interact. This project
concludes by comparing and contrasting overlapping strategies of institutional actors.
Strategies can be configured by exposing rhetorical ties. Rhetorical ties are
discourses that construct similar themes and narratives in different rhetorical contexts
for the sake of a common goal. In theory, “If movements are multi-organizational
fields, we should be able, using network analysis, to map the field in a sense of its

73. D. Travers Scott and Steven Maras discuss the importance of interactivity. See D. Travers
Scott, “The Postfeminist User,” Feminist Media Studies 10 (2010): 457-475 and Steven Maras, “The
Rhetoric of Interactivity,” Australian Screen Education 23 (2000): 36-44.
27
weak and strong ties and to look at the direction of links.”
72
This study examines
the rhetorical ties between rhetoric and relief institutions.
Network analysis “has enormous potential as a strategy for understanding
inter-movement relationships, illuminating the shape and texture of social movement
clusters, creating new historical syntheses, and defining social movement
boundaries.”
73
Because “the social field is not comprised of discrete sites, but from
events that are shifting and moving, grafted into and connected with other events,”
the different sites, relationships and interactions should be measurable or at least
observable.
74
During times of natural disaster, urgency catalyzes institutions to
interact, network, and reach important decisions. Jenny Edbauer describes the
implications of rhetorical network relationships:
The intensity, force, and circulatory range of a rhetoric are always
expanding through the mutations and new exposures attached to that
given rhetoric, much like a virus. An ecological, or affective, rhetorical
model is one that reads rhetoric both as a process of distributed
emergence and as an ongoing circulation process.
75

Rhetoric of identification and division is becoming a more interactive process. Once
news reports, NGO rhetoric, and government statements are produced, they are
circulated in whole or in part by various redistribution sites. These “mutations” and
“new exposures” can be redistributed and replicated over digital networks. These
transitions and re-circulations are characteristic of relief networks. The emergence of

74. Naomi Rosenthal et al., “Social Movements and Network Analysis: A Case Study of
Nineteenth-Century Women's Reform in New York State,” American Journal of Sociology 90 (1985):
1026-1027.
75. Ibid., 1029.

76. Jenny Edbauer, “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to
Rhetorical Ecologies,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35 (2005): 10.
77. Ibid., 13.
28
an ecology, however, may not be complete or self-sustaining. Biosecurity concerns
charge that critical attention be directed to the non-self-sustaining efforts as well.
Now that the relevant literature has been discussed and the scope of the study has
been identified, each chapter will aim at building on this important literature.
Chapter Breakdown
The subsequent chapters focus on the institutions involved in relief.
Institutions participated in networks that framed the Haiti earthquake. As the disaster
narrative unfolded, each institution in the disaster movement responded in unique
ways.
Chapter Two identifies mainstream media’s initial representation of the Haiti
earthquake. The first two days of Haiti earthquake coverage focused on information
gathering and exposing the difficulties of relief. In the following two weeks, appeals
for relief and updated organizational management narratives appeared. After that,
there was a rhetorical turn in mass media coverage that explored criticisms of relief
movements themselves. Traditional mass media focused on reporting about the event
but also built a case for aid. The media were necessary for spreading awareness about
disaster, but media attention was imperative to the fundraising process as well.
Journalists did this consciously. Reporting Haiti was problematic and
troublesome for some of the actors involved. Amy Bracken, a journalist who covered
Haiti, reflected, “One thing Haiti has taught me is to try to resist shutting out the
suffering I find around me and to ask about it, try to understand it, and do whatever I
can to help my audience to care. That’s why I love my job—but it’s also why I hate
it.”
76
She explained her job clearly: “seeing and hearing and ask questions and make

78. Amy Bracken, “Chasing Haiti,” Nieman Reports 64 (2010): 25.
29
real, in whatever ways I can, people’s experiences for those listening back home.”
77

Essentially, Bracken here indicates that her job is about telling stories in order to
motivate her audience. She is performing a drama, while psychologically
uncomfortable that her job is needed and necessary because people inherently should
care. Dramatic plays and performances are necessary in order to prompt public
sentiment, but they require cognitive strategies aimed to motivate an otherwise
indifferent audience.
This chapter explains the decisions media actors make in order to accomplish
these goals through an analysis of mainstream media (MSM) during distinctive
phases of earthquake reporting. For this study, I explored hundreds of articles and
over fifty hours of network broadcasts and reports, including ABC, CBS, New York
Times, Miami Herald, and USA Today. I focus on ABC, CBS, and the New York Times
reporting because of the prevalence of critical inquiry and on-the-scene journalism.
Although this is not an exhaustive approach to all mass media reporting, this analysis
displays the trends and rhetorical moves that took place in various newspapers and
network coverage during the time. By doing so, broad conclusions about the goals,
assumptions, and rhetorical strategies of traditional media broadcasting during natural
disaster relief are elucidated.
Mainstream media actors cannot work alone in disaster relief. NGOs were at
the forefront of the humanitarian story. In Chapter Three, I analyze NGO websites
and their use of new media. Although over ninety-seven major organizations
contributed to Haiti aid relief,
78
this chapter focuses on the Disaster Emergency

79. Ibid.
80. See Appendix A for a complete list of organizations that worked and contributed to Haiti.
30
Committee (DEC), the Red Cross,
79
and Yéle Haiti as case studies. These NGOs
represent three distinct forms: The DEC is an umbrella organization, the Red Cross is
an international NGO, and Yéle Haiti is a Haiti-specific NGO. These organizations
enjoyed a large scope of influence and financial support. At times, NGOs approached
Haiti relief by reinforcing their shared values, but they also operated in distinctive
ways.
In addition to mainstream media and NGO rhetoric, governments played an
imperative role in disaster relief. Chapter Four examines military action, public
address, and legal reform committed to intervention. Natural disasters often bring
about changes in sympathies toward politics and the law, including adjustments to
public policy and international relations. Some examples of public policy
modification include immigration policies, tariff reform, food politics, and adoption
policies. Humanitarian aid becomes more complex in a global economy. Not only is
foreign aid and non-profit assistance involved, but long-term financial restructuring
also takes place. At times this results in debt relief, rethinking food subsidies, or even
lowering tariffs. Thus, a struggling country is enabled to rebuild after a natural
disaster. Financial policies, however, are complicated in and of themselves.
80
While
natural disasters reignite discussions of pre-existing economic policies, they also
relax social regulatory laws. Family adoption policies and immigration policies, for
example, may be reviewed. In order to explore the role of government in the relief
process, I explore public address, United States Congressional debates, government

81. The American Red Cross received a substantial $476 million in donations for Haiti
Earthquake Relief.
82. e.g., Neil deMause, “It’s Tough to be Haitian, Isn’t It?” Extra (April 2010): 10.
31
websites, and United Nations’ press releases.
81
Governments sought to facilitate
and augment non-profit work, contributing symbolic and material help.
Chapter Five concludes the study. It identifies newly conceptualized
components of disaster relief rhetoric. Global social movements “are supranational
networks of actors that define their cause as global and organize their causes as global
and organize protest campaigns that involve more than one state.”
82
Humanitarian
relief workers increased activity following the Haiti disaster, but their work is never
terminated; it is ongoing and adaptive. Disaster relief networks operate as a social and
operational movement that appears to be dedicated to a common ideology.
Movements exist because people conceptualize them as such.
83
So, when
conceptualizations about movements are reshaped and reorganized, the results are
quite interesting. Relief workers appear to work together for a common good,
internalize communicative norms and mobilize through transnational activist
networks. Disaster networks may never complete their objectives, yet they have
become an integral part of modern society. Their work is integral to international
relations. Relief efforts are also an outlet for critical inquiry and expose some of the
tensions and anxieties embedded in modern society. Disaster relief networks continue
to be a part on our ongoing public dialogue and deliberation, and are thus subjects of
my study.

83. Government websites include OCHA, or the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Efforts, Relief Web, SOUTHCOM, and USAid.gov.
84. Donatella Della Porta et al., Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and
Protest Networks (Minneapolis, MN: University Of Minnesota Press, 2006), 18.

85. Michael C. McGee, “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology,” Quarterly
Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 1-16.
32
This project addresses significant theorists of the information age and
situates them in the digital age, augmenting understanding of social and symbolic
reactions to disaster in an increasingly diverse world. Relief movements take place
with liberal transnational activists’ networks appealing to sometimes conservative
audiences. Rhetoric makes critical contributions to understanding human motivation,
collective action, and social life. Disasters are social events. In the digital age,
communication is essential to mobilize people and organizations to assemble and
participate in disaster networks. It is hence productive to explore how disaster
networks continue to remain relevant and address challenges made by a society that is
continually changing and organizing. This project attempts the difficult task of re-
conceptualizing rhetoric in a networked society by exploring the rhetoric of the
institutions that operate in disaster relief.
The internet-based structure of human action does not impair or make
rhetorical studies any less relevant. In fact, quite the opposite is the case. Dramatism,
as applied here, helps the reader understand what occurred in Haiti and what future
rhetorical networks will look like. Websites and organizations will replicate and adapt
to a changing society. So will rhetoric. This project bridges gaps in current research
by articulating a useful method for rhetoric in a digital age, contributing an unfolding
narrative of important institutional actors, exploring their depiction of biosecurity,
and applying relevant research to make predictions about our rhetorical future.

33

CHAPTER TWO
MAINSTREAM MEDIA INTERVENTIONS IN DISASTER
REPORTING

“The Haiti story doesn’t need hyping; if anything, television understates the
horror by balancing harrowing sights with miniature portraits of hope.”
1

Mainstream media cover international catastrophes and natural disasters for
mass audiences.
2
Such reporting dramatizes natural disasters to diverse publics
through initial pieces, updates, and extended human-interest stories.
3
After a natural
disaster, mainstream media journalists mobilize readily to tell stories of the disaster
and initiation of relief.
4
Corporate networks financially support mainstream media.

1. Alessandra Stanley, “Broadcast Coverage: Compassion and Self-Congratulation,” New
York Times, January 15, 2010, A10, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/arts/television/16watch.html.

2. Mainstream media are generally considered to be radio, television and film. For the
purposes of this project, mainstream media were generalized by researching ABC and CBS network
news reporting and articles in the New York Times, USA Today, and Miami Herald. Mainstream media
are traditional in form, corporate, and widely distributed. According to Chomsky, mainstream media
are “elite,” “agenda-setting,” and “institutional.” Noam Chomsky, “What Makes Mainstream Media
Mainstream,” Z Magazine, October 1997.

3. Natural disasters have long been an important area of study. Sood, Stockdale, and Rogers
wrote one of the most influential articles that explores media acts during natural disasters and their
relief movements. They studied five natural disasters and found that media actors and local authorities
often cooperate, but sometimes conflict in their goals. Williams C. Adams was also an early
contributor to disaster media scholarship. His article finds a geographical bias in disaster television
coverage. Rahul Sood, Geoffrey Stockdale, and Everett M. Rogers, “How the News Media Operate in
Natural Disasters,” Journal of Communication 37 (1987): 27-41; Williams C. Adams, “Whose Lives
Count? TV Coverage of Natural Disasters,” Journal of Communication 36 (1986): 113-122.

4. The cost of foreign disaster reporting on the story was tremendously expensive. In fact, it
cost each news network an estimated $1.5 million,
54
with charter flights and satellite costs being the
bulk of the expense. Marisa Guthrie, “Covering Haiti, At a Cost,” Broadcasting & Cable 140 (January
25, 2010): 4.
34
Media portrayals of natural disasters have been subject to academic inquiry.
This chapter examines media interventions after the Haiti earthquake in a number of
unfolding narratives.
5
The media are essential to informing publics about a disaster
and warning them before disasters occur.
6
Although natural disaster reporting is often
selective, problematic, and short-lived, mainstream media’s initial coverage typically
appears driven by an imperative to build a case for aid.
7
Dramatic narratives and
performances influence public sentiment and deploy cognitive strategies to motivate
an otherwise somewhat voyeuristic or uninvolved audience. Strategies ranged from
disruption, victimhood, and remembrance. Each phase responded to changes in the
conditions in Haiti and also changes in audience sentiment.
Earthquakes, especially in remote, foreign locations pose problems for the
news, of course. Prior to the 2010 disaster, Haiti’s previous major earthquake had

5. Significant contributions in rhetoric focus on media representation of natural disasters.
Vevea, Littlefield, Fudge, and Weber found that print media and visual imagery can portray societal
values; in particular, they found that photographs can reflect an emphasis on human dominance over
nature. Littlefield and Quenette’s article on media authority during Hurricane Katrina argued that the
media can influence perceptions of reality because they are empowered to evaluate legitimate authority
figures and institutions. This project builds upon this existing research by identifying rhetorical shifts
in media representation after the Haiti earthquake. By doing so, this chapter expands scholarship in
media and natural disasters, but it also builds a case for comparison as the following chapters identify
NGO representation and government representation. By exploring the rhetoric of institutional actors
during disaster relief, this project makes valuable comparisons and distinctions about how these relief
actors network actors portray the Haiti earthquake and how they network amongst themselves. Nadene
N. Vevea et al., “Portrayals of Dominance: Local Newspaper Coverage of a Natural Disaster,” Visual
Communication Quarterly 18 (2011): 84-99; Robert S. Littlefield and Andrea M. Quenette, “Crisis
Leadership and Hurricane Katrina: The Portrayal of Authority by the Media in Natural Disasters,”
Journal of Applied Communication Research 35 (2007): 26-47.
6. Joseph Scanlon, “The Search for Non-Existent Facts in the Reporting of Disasters,”
Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 53 (1998): 46.
7. Simon Cottle and David Nolan, “Global Humanitarianism and the Changing Aid-Media
Field,” Journalism Studies 8 (2007): 862-878.
35
occurred in 1942.
8
Since then, new media technologies have developed and new
players provide 24-hour access to coverage. Mainstream media provided crucial
coverage of the earthquake to an invested global community.
But how does this coverage shape perceptions of the event? How does the
narrative of disaster unfold? This chapter identifies key moves and rhetorical turns of
mainstream media stories. Samples of initial news coverage are acknowledged and
key topics of media exposure are identified. Across competing themes, I isolate the
complex portrayal of victimhood across episodes of Haiti earthquake coverage. There
were three distinct phases of Haiti earthquake reporting. First, I argue that initial
reporting (January 12, 2010-January 14, 2010) contextualized the earthquake and
informed the public about the characteristics of damage. Second, I assemble victim
portrayals in the residual reporting (January 15, 2010-March 12, 2010) of the
earthquake. Third, memory and ritual in update reporting (March 12, 2010-January
12, 2012) are provided. These assess loss and lend perspective to the earthquake.
Initial Reporting (January 12, 2010-January 14, 2010): Speculation and
Uncertainty
Although people generally assume that natural disasters will occur, the
particular moment and place always follows with a sense of shock and surprise.
Disaster reporting, then, must interrupt previously planned news and entertainment.
Routine content undergoes disturbance. Reporters scramble to cover the newly

8. A magnitude 8.0 earthquake hit the Dominican Republic on August 4, 1942. It shook the
nearby country of Haiti and resulted in a tsunami. In Haiti, hurricanes have historically been more
common than earthquakes.
36
unfolding story about a natural disaster and its emergency aftermaths.
9
Natural
disasters, or any unpredicted major newsworthy event, force mainstream media to
adjust programming and feature a variety of remote reports from the scene. The Haiti
earthquake occurred on January 12, 2010, just before sunset, at the boundary
separating the Caribbean and North American plates, a part of the Enriquillo-Plantain
Garden fault system. Although the system had not generated a major earthquake in
recent decades, this ground shaker registered a strong magnitude of 7.0.
10
The
earthquake killed 316,000 people, injured 300,000, displaced 1.3 million people,
destroyed over 97,000 houses and damaged an additional 188,000 houses in the Port-
au-Prince area.
11
This was a newsworthy event. However, at the time of the
earthquake, little was known about the size and magnitude of the catastrophe.
After the initial halt to everyday programs, mainstream US networks began to
report basic data. Previous research has shown that preliminary earthquake reporting
includes a “general damage” assessment with an “earthquake agency” theme.
12
The
first hours of reporting were quite unique. In one of ABC’s first broadcasts about the
event, Dan Harris articulated anxious expectations: “It is hard to imagine a country

9. For example, ABC’s coverage of the earthquake interrupted Diane Sawyer’s previously
planned reporting from Afghanistan. “Major Quake, Haiti Quake,” World News With Diane Sawyer,
January 12, 2010, 6:30PM.

10. Earthquakes are measured by magnitude by an instrument known as a Richter scale.
Numerical values represent the scope of intensity. These numbers are made relevant by various
communicative strategies. For example, one method assigns a term that ranks the scope the earthquake:
a magnitude of 5-5.9 is considered “moderate,” 6-6.9 is considered “strong,” 7-7.9 is considered
“major,” and anything over a magnitude of 8 is considered “great.” The Haiti earthquake measured a
7.0.
11. “Magnitude 7.0-HAITI REGION,” United States Geological Survey.
12. Jodie Cowan, John McClure, and Marc Wilson, “What a Difference a Year Makes: How
Immediate and Anniversary Media Reports Influence Judgments about Earthquakes,” Asian Journal of
Social Psychology 5 (2002): 173.
37
less able to cope with a devastating earthquake. The 7.0 quake hit this afternoon about
ten miles west of Haiti’s capital city.”
13
The report was only the beginning. Without
specific facts, many initial reports focused on abstract geographical information such
as the earthquake’s calibrated strength and mapped location.
14
CBS News introduced
its Haiti Earthquake Updates by describing “a 7.0-magnitude earthquake that struck
Haiti at approximately 4:53 p.m. ET Tuesday.”
15

Katie Couric also introduced the earthquake: “A major disaster may be
unfolding right now in Haiti, hit today by a powerful earthquake. It was a magnitude
7, possibly the strongest quake ever to hit that region.”
16
The uncertainty as she
speculates that a major disaster may be occurring is telling. With only the magnitude
and location known, there was a sense that this would be an important story, but there
was only superficial information to report. With few working satellites, and chaos on
the ground, mainstream media deployed the few iconic images they could access.
ABC and CBS both showed a Google satellite image of Port-au-Prince,
illustrating extensive damage from the air.
17
Initial reporting began to take form.

13. “Major Quake; Haiti Quake,” World News with Diane Sawyer, January 12, 2010.

14. A New Scientist magazine study demonstrated that Haiti represents how journalists are
“increasingly telling stories that leverage datasets that are freely available to the public.” In this case,
the data from the United States Geological Survey and the International Disaster Database was retold
through mainstream media channels. Alex Williams, “How a Science Journalist Created a Data
Visualization to Show the Magnitude of the Haiti Earthquake,” ReadWriteWeb.com, January 12, 2011.
http://www.readwriteweb.com/hack/2011/01/how-a-science-journalist-creat.php.

15. “Haiti Earthquake Updates: Day Two, Three,” CBS News, January 25, 2010.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/14/world/main6096828.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBod
y (emphasis added).

16. Katie Couric, “Haiti Ambassador on Disaster,” CBS News, January 10, 2010, accessed on
June 13, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ca1eW4jXox8.

17. “Haiti Earthquake Update: Day Two,” CBS News, January 13, 2010.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-6091137-503543.html?tag=mncol;lst;1. To see the
Google image, see Appendix B, Figure 1.
38
First, there was a description of the earthquake’s magnitude, the time of the event,
and a brief indicator of massive damage. The epicenter and its proximity to the capital
were identified. At times, the large size and dense population of the area was
recounted. These initial reports mixed scientific descriptions with only imagined
scenes of unknown mayhem. The scientific description represented all the
information that was available. Resources on the ground were knocked out, even if
previously connected. The port, which normally delivers supplies and administers
relief, was significantly damaged.
18
Abstract information created an anticipation that
this story was going to be worth telling.
Initial narratives in Haiti earthquake coverage focused on the lack of viable
communication connections. If reporters could not get to Haiti itself, the fears of
those who could be contacted – friends and family in the United States – were
available to express concerns. Haitian Americans placed on the screen struggled with
uncertainty, fear, and frustration. “We have loved ones there and many of them will
be victims. We’re calling and calling, but there’s nothing on the other end,” Jean-
Robert Lafortune, Executive Director of the Miami based Haitian-American
Grassroots Coalition, said.
19
Such reports introduced the public to the emotional
dynamics taking place among the victims and their loved ones, rescaled for larger
audiences.

18. US Coast Guard Rear Adm. James A. Watson, Director of Atlantic area operations,
explained, “If the port is severely damaged, that makes it very, very difficult.” Michael D. Shear,
“Obama Orders Rapid Mobilization of US Rescue, Relief Efforts for Haiti,” The Washington Post,
January 14, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR2010011304840.html.

19. Simon Romero and Marc Lacey, “Fierce Quake Devastates Haiti; Worst is Feared,” New
York Times, January 13, 2010, A1.

39
The next day (January 13) more detailed information was accessible. Video
footage from Haiti emerged, placing some of the first Haiti earthquake images on the
global stage.
20
Part of building the story involved interviews with Haitian officials. In
lieu of more substantive content, Couric questioned the Haitian Ambassador to the
United States Raymond Alcide Joseph. By the time of this report, Joseph was only
able to contact one person on the ground in Haiti: General Secretary of the Presidency
Fritz Longchamp.
According to Ambassador Joseph, Longchamp was driving his car when the
earthquake started; he had to get out of his car and walk because buildings were
collapsing. Longchamp labeled the earthquake “a catastrophe of major proportions.”
21

Longchamp was not able to contact any official, including the President. Joseph
continued, “He was walking to his place, not knowing what was awaiting him, not
knowing if he could cross the bridge to get to his place.”
22
Uncertainty about the
damage on the scene in Haiti paralleled the uncertainty that the media actors were
experiencing as they reported initial news.
One of the primary characteristics of the initial disaster reporting was a
premature attempt to compile casualty information.
23
On January 13, the day after the
earthquake, Ambassador Joseph cautioned: “Nobody can count the dead yet.”
24
CBS

20. “Haiti Earthquake Caught on Tape,” CBS News Online, January 14, 2010, accessed June
20, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CcFVxl8oclY.

21. Couric, “Haiti Ambassador on Disaster.”

22. Ibid.

23. This is common in disaster reporting. William Metz, Newswriting from Lead to ’30,’
(Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1991), 297.

24. Couric, “Haiti Ambassador on Disaster.”
40
News’ Kelly Wallace reiterated, “We don’t know how many people were killed
yesterday as buildings crumbled around them and we may not know for weeks, but it
is likely well into the thousands.”
25
The media began to report estimates about the
extent of damage and loss of life. By January 14, Couric reported, “The Haitian Red
Cross estimates that as many as 50,000 have died. It ran out of body bags. The State
Department confirms at least one American death.”
26
The death toll began to climb
incrementally and achieved greater specificity after that, peaking at an estimate of
500,000 by Senator Youri Latortue.
27
One study reveals that initial media reports tend
to overdramatize social and individual reactions to earthquakes, overstating loss and
overestimating the number of victims.
28
This was difficult to do in Haiti because the
earthquake was so large, but there was an evident uncertainty and confusion about the
scope of the damage, which needs to be understood. Mainstream media were able to
report about this uncertainty, while building expectations by adding the opinions of
politicians and relief workers who were available to answer questions and posit
predictions.
Initial reporting demonstrated a network of information sharing between state
actors, NGOs, and the media. During his interview with Katie Couric, Ambassador
Joseph relayed information by referencing a World Vision worker with whom he had

25. Kelly Wallace, “Notebook: Haiti,” January 13, 2010, CBS News, accessed July 20, 2012,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RnC1UtC7Qk.

26. Katie Couric, “Race against Time in Haiti,” CBS News, January 14, 2010, accessed May
10, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mmQsW7cdyc.
27. “Haiti Earthquake Update: Day Two.”

28. JCowan, McClure, and Wilson, “What a Difference a Year Makes,” 171.
41
been jointly interviewed on CNN earlier that day.
29
Information was a privilege.
Actors who shared information among institutions became nodes of a matrix of
interconnected stories. Portrayals of government and non-profit relief workers were
generally positive. On January 13, 2010, CBS anchor Kelly Wallace described,
“Charities are rushing to get aid in as fast as possible to who have lost what little they
had.”
30
Some journalists relied on military or relief vessels to enter Haiti. Katie
Couric had a segment that was reported from a Coast Guard airplane.
31
Clearly there
was a reflexively generated interdependent network among these institutional actors.
Because relief organizations, state actors and reporters needed each other for the
transmission of information, there seemed to be a consensus of positive reinforcement
for one another during the initial reporting of the Haiti earthquake.
During the first three days of reporting, journalists assembled stories
providing background and context. Haiti was represented as a poor and vulnerable
nation, and reporters soon dipped into what was known about the country to add
history to the narrative. Kelly Wallace explained, “Haiti is the poorest nation in the
Western Hemisphere, a world apart from ours, yet it is only 600 miles from Miami.”
32

Mainstream media focused on contextualizing the natural disaster in terms of the
country’s history, economic status, and pre-existing hardships. Repetition substituted
for analysis.

29. Couric, “Haiti Ambassador on Disaster.”

30. Wallace, “Notebook: Haiti.”

31. Katie Couric, “Preview: Disaster in Haiti,” CBS News, January 14, 2010, accessed July
12, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rUpCLT2r6SQ.

32. Wallace, “Notebook: Haiti.”
42
Historical narratives compared Haiti to other disasters in public memory.
Most notably, the Haiti earthquake was assessed and related to Hurricane Katrina.
33

Kathleen Tierney reported, “Like Katrina, the earthquake has produced effects of
catastrophic proportions. Both events rank among the largest catastrophes ever
experienced in the Western Hemisphere.”
34
Comparison with another well-known
recent disaster had the effect of evoking public memory to generate understanding of
what a disaster means, what to expect, and the gravity of damage. Comparisons
fueled speculation on potential problems. Memories of other disaster narratives can
also promote mistrust of charities. Referring to the 2004 Asian tsunami, President of
the American Institute of Philanthropy, Daniel Borochoff, proclaimed, “We shouldn’t
repeat the mistakes of the Tsunami relief efforts.”
35
Put simply, the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami relief was hindered by confusing supply chains and disorganized aid
disbursement. Referencing previous natural disasters resonated with audiences.
Examples of flawed past experiences in well-intended relief efforts were vital in
setting anticipations about the complications of relief, while creating expectations for
the frustrations and difficulties of what was to come.
The initial reporting also named and defined the disaster by highlighting the
prospects for the tedious and lengthy rebuilding process. A day after the earthquake,

33. Casey Gane-McCalla, “OPINION: The Haitian Earthquake is the World’s Katrina,” News
One, January 13, 2010. http://newsone.com/412532/opinion-the-haitian-earthquake-is-the-worlds-
katrina/.
34. Kathleen Tierney, “Haiti is not Katrina,” CNN.com, January 15, 2010.
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-15/opinion/tierney.haiti.katrina_1_catastrophes-haiti-
earthquake?_s=PM:OPINION.

35. Rhonda Schwartz, “Haiti Earthquake: Be Careful about those ‘Impulse’ Donations,” ABC
News, January 13, 2010. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/HaitiEarthquake/haiti-earthquake-careful-
impulse-donations/story?id=9551890#.T3NwYY7A5aU.
43
ABC’s Nightline reporter, Terry Morgan, labeled initial moments after the
earthquake, “The first day of a humanitarian effort that will take years, even decades,
perhaps.”
36
Narrative forms established and satisfied expectations.
37
According to
Burke, form arouses and fulfills desires. Audiences anticipate what will happen and
are gratified when these anticipations are met.
38
Psychologically, stories harnessed
sympathy, heightened interest, and built and satisfied human curiosity. Media were
introducing a narrative form to their audiences that was mutually beneficial. As initial
reporting concluded, audiences were aware that the earthquake was devastating, but
particulars were still shadowed by speculation and uncertainty. It was the journalist’s
job to uncover the story. The drama included what was known and unknown, what
was approached and what was avoided, and what the audience should anticipate.
On-the-Scene Journalism (January 14-March 14)
Following initial reporting, reporters mobilized to go to the scene. A part of
the Haiti story itself was about the difficulties and challenges of disaster reporting.
CNN anchor, Anderson Cooper, was the first American anchor to arrive in Haiti. He
left on the night the earthquake occurred, flew to Santo Domingo in the Dominican
Republic, then rode in a relief helicopter to Port-au-Prince, and finally arrived by

36. “After the Quake, The Day After,” Nightline, ABC News, January 13, 2010.

37. Robert L. Heath states “form is an act constituted by the discursive progression of an idea
through various associations and stages to the satisfaction of audience expectations.” Robert L. Heath,
“Kenneth Burke on Form,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 65 (1979): 392.
38. Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968), 124.

44
January 13 to report in the field.
39
Other anchors followed shortly after. Katie Couric
chartered an airplane. On January 14, Diane Sawyer, who flew from Afghanistan to
Haiti, anchored an expanded hour-long special of “World News” on the catastrophe
and relief process. By January 14, CNN had forty-four correspondents, reporters, and
technicians in Port-au-Prince, with more on their way.
40
Fox News anchor, Bill
Hemmer, described, “I think it’s the most inaccessible story I’ve ever experienced,
and I’ve been to several dark corners of the world.”
41
Ann Curry slept on an airport
baggage cart when she arrived in Haiti, while Brian Williams and Al Roker had to
share a tent. Couric described Haiti reporting as “a huge technical challenge.”
42

Certainly, reporting from Haiti was a unique and difficult endeavor. Journalists
needed to strategize their transportation to Haiti and then had to report from a
landscape with no electricity, scarce water supply, and unknown accommodations.
The lack of communication remained a problem in reporting, “Lines of
communication are still poor, and conditions are not exactly cozy: some reporters are
sleeping on the ground and using car batteries to record their stand-ups.”
43
Alessandra
Stanley reported on terrible conditions, but acknowledged that it did not compare to
the hardships of the Haitian people, noting that reporters “were the only ones there
with food, water and power, but they were using those resources to provide reporting

39. Paul Farhi, “News Sources Scurry to Get Reporters to Haiti to Cover Earthquake’s
Aftermath,” Washington Post, January 15, 2010, accessed May 12, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/14/AR2010011405052.html

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Katie Couric, “Medical Attention Scarce in Haiti,” CBS News, January 13, 2010, accessed
July 20, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxU0xgOMWo4.

43. Stanley, “Broadcast Coverage,” A10.
45
that would galvanize viewers to get involved.”
44
Reporters explicitly recognized that
there were still technical obstacles to overcome. Journalists read the uncertainties on
the ground against the collected, cool, and in-control anchors who worked to create a
sense of security, clear communication, and credible reporting while speaking of
disaster.
Corporate media possess the finances and the networking capabilities to report
from the scene more readily than new media writers.
45
However, new media offered
content to report. Andy Carvin, a senior strategist at National Public Radio, asserted,
“There were a few dozen people who were in Haiti who turned their Twitter accounts
essentially into news wire services and were passing along information as they found
it. And we actually used a number of these individuals in our news stories in the first
few days after the earthquake.”
46
While some focused on utilizing new media, other
channels of journalism struggled for original accounts. Steve Capus, President of
NBC News, observes, “if you’re going to be in the network news business, you’d
better be ready to deploy aggressively. When the worst earthquake in this hemisphere
in more than 200 years takes place, you’ve gotta go.”
47
Some reporters had satellite

44. Ibid.

45. Priya Kumar argues, “Broadcast organizations increasingly rely on smaller one- or two-
person operations in most of their foreign bureaus, a strategy that makes sense when money is tight and
technology reduces the need for large crews.” Priya Kumar, “Backpack Journalism Overseas,”
American Journalism Review, December 1, 2010, 26. Although new developments in technology allow
broadcast news organizations to deploy fewer people, Haiti required additional satellite coverage and
expedient deployment that required more people and equipment than other foreign reports.

46. Larisa Epatko, “Haiti Quake Propels Use of Twitter as Disaster-Relief Tool,” PBS News
Hour, February 16, 2010, accessed June 10, 2011,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/02/haiti-quake-propels-twitter-community-mapping-
efforts.html

47. Guthrie, “Covering Haiti,” 31.
46
transmitters about the size of a laptop, which could send high-quality video footage.
On-the-scene disaster reporting in Haiti was expensive and airport clearance was
difficult. Reporting required labor, technology, and experience to mobilize news-
casting strategies that were both effective and expedient. This enabled mainstream
media to control, to a large extent, perceptions about the earthquake, the victims, and
the relief process.
Once reporters arrived on scene, disaster journalism took form. Katie Couric
reported with a large satellite phone, representing the communication challenges on
the scene. In fact, Couric usually brought attention to her phone during her news
pieces as a symbol of the difficulty of reporting.
48
Images of injured Haitians were
transmitted. News began to take shape with a dominant theme of devastation and
chaos, paired with representations of hope and rescue. For example, Couric reported
about children singing the night she arrived. Describing this experience as “kind of
surreal,” she elaborated, “Here you have amidst all this devastation; it was almost like
this joyful choir of kids broke out, not very far from where we were set up at our
location. They were singing a Haitian song, praising God.”
49
Balancing the heart-
breaking drama with portraits of hope, Couric continued, “There is an optimism and,
dare I say, joyfulness that you kind of see among the Haitian people, which is really
quite inspiring, but clearly people desperately need help.”
50
Goffman discusses this
aspect of storytelling here: “indeed a primary framework is one that is seen as

48. There are many examples of this, See Katie Couric, “Haiti: ‘No Coordinated Efforts,’”
CBS News, accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AhbJEnjlchc.
49. Couric, “Medical Attention Scarce in Haiti.”
50. Ibid.
47
rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something
that is meaningful.”
51
Perspective was generated in order to balance reporting and this
resulted in variations among on-the-scene reports.
Depictions of devastation were often paired with stories of rescue. Kate Snow
interviewed Louis St. Germaine, a pastor at a Haitian orphanage, on January 13 from
the scene; he described the earthquake as a moment of shaking and “panic,” resulting
in the whole city of Les Cayes being left on the streets.
52
This story was paired with a
more optimistic counter-narrative. Ian Rodgers, an aid worker, depicted the scene:
“You are hearing the grief of people as they realize they’ve lost people. They can’t
find their children. But then again, you suddenly hear these cries come out, people
who are rescuing other people from rubble as somebody comes out alive.”
53

Interviews enabled reporters to tell interesting stories to keep audiences
engaged. Needs were expressed and the environment was depicted, but the reports
attempted to balance devastating stories with tones of hope. Kate Snow explained,
“Buildings toppled, the power out. After the sunset, the rescues began.”
54
Media
focused on these rescues. One report focused on a man, Frank Thorpe, whose wife
called him from underneath concrete and broken rubble. He drove one hundred miles
and personally dug his wife out of the wreckage. Although it took him an hour,
Thorpe was able to rescue his wife, who amazingly suffered only minimal bruising.
55

51. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New
York: Harper & Row, 1974), 21.

52. “After the Quake, the Day After,” Nightline, ABC News, January 13, 2010.
53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.
48
Undoubtedly, there were far more deaths than rescues in Haiti, but optimistic stories
complemented the grotesque reporting and invited public interest.
Narratives of rescue offered hope to audiences. They also alleviated the sting
and monotony from the stories of death and destruction. Donyale R. Griffin-Padgett
and Donnetrice Allison identified similar themes after Hurricane Katrina and the
September 11 attacks. They argued that focusing on repair and recovery helped the
rhetor serve as a “sense-maker, whose task [was] not only to manage the crisis, but
also to manage the healing process from disaster to restoration.”
56
They termed this
restorative rhetoric. This strategy can “create a balance between managing high
levels of anxiety brought on by the destruction and [creates] a sense of hope that the
crisis would ultimately be resolved.”
57
Balancing stories of loss helped both the
audience and the media continue to engage in sense-making.
Rescue added tension and drama, bringing hope into play. More than one
hundred Haitian victims relied on rescuers to dig them out from underneath
concrete.
58
ABC’s Dan Harris reported about Sarah, an employee of the Hotel
Montana, who was trapped in the hotel’s rubble for over two days: “Sarah is one of
four people believed to be trapped inside the ocean of rubble that was once the

56. Donyale R. Griffin-Padgett and Donnetrice Allison, “Making a Case for Restorative
Rhetoric: Mayor Rudolph Giuliani & Mayor Ray Nagin’s Response to Disaster,” Communication
Monographs 77 (2010): 378.
57. Ibid., 380.
58. “Man Pulled from Haiti Earthquake Rubble,” CBS News, January 26, 2010.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-6144638-503543.html.

49
swankiest hotel in town.”
59
Clearly, the juxtaposition of the formerly-prestigious
property with the helplessness of those buried beneath it made an impact on those
who experienced it. Harris added, “In another portion of the ruins, they are trying to
dig out Chris Stephenson’s seven-year-old son, Iley.”
60
As late as twelve days after
the quake, a man was rescued from underneath the rubble.
61
These stories personified
the Haiti disaster experience. The narrative of disaster provided a context where
rescue invited joy; nevertheless, this traditional formula was difficult to sustain.
Stories of disaster and chaos overwhelmed the stories of happy outcomes.
A part of the on-the-scene reporting expressed the emotional tone in Haiti.
One relief worker, Kristie van der Wetering, described the level of chaos, “There is a
blanket of dust rising from the valley of the capital…We can hear people calling for
help from every corner. The aftershocks are ongoing and making people very
nervous.”
62
Reporters needed to convey the extent of damage and psychological fear
resulting from the earthquake. Mainstream media often interviewed humanitarian
workers who were already on site. Humanitarian workers and reporters collaborated,
in a sense, to inform the world and evoke compassion.

59. Dan Harris, “Haiti Relief Efforts: US Rescue Teams Pull Survivors,” ABC World News
with Diane Sawyer, January 14, 2010. http://abcnews.go.com/WN/haiti-earthquake-rescue-teams-
struggle-reach-haitian-survivors/story?id=9567025#.T7Cmx-1dAzY.

60. Ibid.

61. Rico Dibriell survived, suffering from dehydration and a broken leg. Harris, “Man Pulled
from Haiti Earthquake Rubble”; “Man rescued from Haiti Quake Rubble after 12 Days,” BBC News,
January 27, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8482068.stm. Another 25-year-old woman was rescued
one week after the earthquake. “Woman Rescued After Week Under Haiti Earthquake Rubble,” BBC
News, January 20, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8469445.stm.

62. Romero and Lacey, “Fierce Quake Devastates Haiti,” A1.
50
Some criticized the graphic nature of on-the-scene reporting. Valerie Payen-
Jean Baptiste, a Haitian elementary school principal, took on the media portrayal of
Haitian victims: “the tone of unnecessary pictures and videos show pieces of bodies,
dying people, the nudity of people, or the misery/tragedy of people in line for food
and water. Seriously, is the cruelty really necessary to mobilize massive humanitarian
action?”
63
Unfortunately, graphic photographs seem to generate sympathy. Narratives
about bodies and photos of the dead were certainly prevalent. Washington Post
reporter William Booth explained, “As body identification teams proceed with their
grim assignment, the list of the dead is growing – posted on a tree in the hotel's
circular drive because the reception desk is buried under rubble. Most reporters are
being kept away as workers in white biohazard suits pull bodies out and then stumble
off to vomit in the bushes.”
64
During one interview, a Haitian described, “There are
bodies lined up on both sides of the street.” Katie Couric asked, “You mean dead
bodies?” He responded, “Dead bodies, dead bodies.”
65
In another report, Couric
repeated, “Bodies piled up everywhere could lead to an outbreak of disease.”
66
Bodies
held rhetorical dimensions; they were material representations of the death that

63. Arielle Emmett, “Too Graphic?” American Journalism Review, March 2010,
http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=4858.

64. William Booth, “Death Toll Growing at Port-au-Prince’s Hotel Montana, Once a Symbol
of Stability,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/23/AR2010012302965.html. Descriptions of bodies were often paired with
graphic photographs. See Appendix B, Figure 2 and 3 for some examples.

65. Couric, “Haiti: ‘No Coordinated Efforts.”

66. Couric, “Race against Time in Haiti.”
51
occurred, the lack of relief work, and the emotional turmoil in Haiti. This was not
unique to Haiti, but the references to bodies had a profound effect nonetheless.
67

Even before it occurred, disaster journalists anticipated looting. Some reports
conjectured about the prospects for looting, hoarding, and lawlessness, comparing the
environment to Post-Katrina New Orleans.
68
Two days after the earthquake, reporters
were asking Haitians if they were worried about crime or riots.
69
Adding to the
excitement, stories of looting began to emerge.
70
By January 14 Couric was
announcing, “gangs of looters roam the streets.”
71
Video footage of Haitian youths
with machetes and buildings destroyed by looting challenged footage of police and
military order that also appeared. Matt Marek, a worker for the American Red Cross,
explained, “There is no other way to get provisions. Even if you have money, those
resources are going to be exhausted in a few days.”
72
Although a certain degree of

67. e.g. Bernie Cook, “Over My Dead Body: The Ideological Use of Dead Bodies in Network
News Coverage of Vietnam,” Quarterly Review of Film and Video 18, no. 2 (2001): 203-216.

68. Peter King, “Haiti Response: Worse than Katrina? CBS News, January 21, 2010.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-6125796-503543.html.

69. Couric, “Haiti: ‘No Coordinated Efforts.’”

70. Contrary to what many assume, research shows that riots and chaos are not the typical
responses by the majority of disaster victims. Victims predominantly respond by trying to help others
in need.

Jessica Moore, “Media and Expression: An Approach for Helping Girls Process Trauma,”
Youth Media Reporter 2 (2010): 36. The assumption that people take advantage of one another, steal,
and behave irrationally has become known as “disaster mythology.” In reality, people tend to gain a
sense of community and, for the most part, try to help one another in times of need. In fact, one study
showed that the public showed a high level of sympathy and pity for victims of disaster regardless of
the attribution condition. Drabek and McEntire, “Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster,”
97-112. In other words, despite any preconditions that impacted the level of damage, people still feel
compassion for the victims of the earthquake. Brian G. Smith, “Socially Distributing Public Relations:
Twitter, Haiti, and Interactivity in Social Media, Public Relations Review (2010): 328.

71. Couric, “Race against Time in Haiti.”

72. Daniel Carty, “Looting on Rise and Haiti’s Growing Desperation.” CBS News, January
14, 2010.http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-6097747-
503543.html?tag=contentMain%3bcontentBody.
52
survivalist behavior was understandable, other non-profit workers were more critical.
Cedric Perus, a spokesperson for Oxfam, described, “It is dangerous at night.
Lootings were widespread and some markets were ransacked.”
73
CBS News
contextualized the looting problem as well:
Looting and violence are not uncommon in the wake of severe natural
disasters that leave local communities isolated and desperate. After Hurricane
Katrina battered New Orleans, television cameras captured widespread looting
and there were reports of rooftop snipers firing upon rescue and news
helicopters.
74

Lootings were often topics of criticism that were problematic because of the tendency
to demonize victims. These images were important to share and they are poignant
human narratives of suffering; however, the Haitian people were already subjects of
prejudice and social stigma, and narratives that emphasize crime are not necessarily
constructive.
75

After studying Hurricane Katrina, Jason David Rivera and DeMond Shondell
Miller concluded, “Although both Whites and African Americans took part in the
looting, the media portrayal of African Americans as criminals and Whites as
survivors is another manifestation of the racial dichotomy.”
76
Media actors thus
portray limited awareness of their role in representing the victims and the country on

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.
75. Looting stories exposed Haitians as both criminals and victims. See Appendix B, Figure 4.
Phillip Sherwell and Patrick Sawer, “Haiti Earthquake: Looting and Gun-Fights Break Out,” The
Telegraph, January 16, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamerica
andthecaribbean/haiti/7005554/Haiti-earthquake-looting-and-gun-fights-break-out.html.

76. Jason David Rivera and DeMond Shondell Miller, “Continually Neglected: Situating
Natural Disasters in the African American Experience,” Journal of Black Studies 37 (2007): 513.
53
which they are reporting. Disturbing tales draw audiences by providing distance and
security.
As the airport opened and reporters found ways to get in, a vital part of
reporting turned to personal stories. News anchors Katie Couric and Diane Sawyer
modeled engagement. Their narratives communicated emotions, visual perceptions,
and personal stories, as an earthquake was communicated in size and scope but also
in terms of personal contact. Reporters communicated the mood and feel of the scene
through metaphors, analogies and outright comparisons. Earthquakes were also
described metaphorically, using similes or comparisons in an effort to communicate
unknown and distant human experiences into understandable and relatable terms.
Nicolas Rose, a British psychiatrist, described Haiti by comparing it to an
insane asylum as represented by William Hogarth in the eighteenth century: “It’s
straight out of Hogarth, really.”
77
Print media that reported at the scene depended on
metaphors in order to elaborate the extreme dimensions of chaos and calamity.
Network news coverage substituted words when images were unavailable. Reporter
Byron Pitts also voiced grave concern, likening the medical care in Haiti to “civil war
medicine.”
78
Stories about hacksaw amputations and vodka as the only available
antiseptic supported this evocation.
79
Matt Goldstein, Head of the Israeli ZAKA
International Rescue Unit, likened Haiti to the Holocaust.
80
Paul Farmer, a doctor on

77. Deborah Sontag, “In Haiti, Mental Health System is in Collapse,” New York Times, March
20, 2010, A1.

78. Byron Pitts, “Haiti,” 60 Minutes, CBS, January 17, 2010.

79. Ibid.

80. More specifically, he described Haiti as the “Shabbat from hell. Everywhere, the acrid
smell of bodies hangs in the air. It’s just like the stories we are told of the Holocaust – thousands of
54
the scene, elaborated as he described images of bodies “rotting in the sun in heat,”
and “bloody wounds of desperate and hopeless children.”
81
Frederick Auzate told
Katie Couric, “I have not seen any coordinated efforts in any rescue mission because
the same bodies that I saw on the streets the day after the incident took place, those
same bodies are still there.”
82
Appeals to emotions, or pathos, were paired with
appeals for donations and better world awareness.
By exposing the devastation, sharing hope for rescue, and appealing for
donations, journalists were vital to the Haiti relief networks. According to Marda
Dunsky,
Journalists often see themselves as writing the first draft of history, reporting
on events and conflicts as they unfold. However, journalists do much more
than that. In framing the issues that underlie those events, they also shape the
discourse that can directly or indirectly influence how those events will
continue to unfold.
83

Mainstream media gained a perception of credibility by sending credible news
reporters to the scene. In turn, news reporters also gained increased credibility by
their on-scene reporting. There was an evident attempt to balance the coverage, but
the conditions were horrific, and the story in Haiti was deemed important for the
international community to hear.
While initial reporting disrupted service and informed basic characteristics of
the earthquake, on-the-scene journalism began to spread personal stories that exposed

bodies everywhere. You have to understand that the situation is true madness.” Matt Goldstein, “8
Saved During ‘Shabbat From Hell,’” Israel21C.org, January 17, 2010,
http://www.israel21c.org/briefs/8-saved-during-qshabbat-from-hellq.

81. Pitts, “Haiti.”

82. Couric, “Haiti: ‘No Coordinated Efforts.’”

83. Marda Dunsky, Pens and Swords: How the American Mainstream Media Report the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 4.
55
horror and joy, hope and tragedy. Communication tensions and issues were
manifested in mainstream media’s portrayal of disaster victims. What was revealed
were problematic spaces for conduits of relief, blocked when people attempted to
convey tragedies and derive meaning from the disaster. The press focused on trying to
overcome these obstacles. They were given unusual license to be extremely vivid and
graphic in their reporting. Although it was necessary to create an expedient report,
there were limits of communication urgencies that led to frustrations, breakdowns,
misstatements, and diversions.
Unable to evaluate society-wide system collapse, mainstream media
frequently turned to personal interest pieces to frame the disaster as it affected certain
individuals. There was a profound mythic dimension at play in the construction of
this humanitarian drama. Vincent Mosco explains, “Myths are stories that animate
individuals and societies by providing paths to transcendence that lift people out of
everyday life. They offer an entrance to another reality, a reality once characterized
by the promise of the sublime.”
84
Mainstream media continued to show its anchors
and reporters, sharing in the dirt, sweat, and impatience for relief. Bodies piled up.
There was a drama of chance and recovery, fate and loss, which continued to play
out. NGOs and mainstream media sustained a nuanced relationship and worked
together to provide a mythic invitation for audiences into the disaster world.
Eventually, interest in the Haiti earthquake began to fade and mainstream media
actors began to focus on new ways of sharing the Haiti story.

84. Vincent Mosco, The Digital Sublime: Myth, Power, and Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2004), 3.
56
Special Interest Pieces: Focusing on the Vulnerable (March - May)
Haiti was still at the center of attention one month after the earthquake.
85

Interest in Haiti had already been established, but sustained news required a mix of
novelty and ritual. The dynamics of Haiti reporting, sustained by a proliferation of
contexts in which disaster approached different varieties of Haitian populations,
reinvigorated interest through spaces of tragic stories. During disaster coverage, news
actors needed to reinvigorate interest by reframing the narrative and focusing on
specific high-risk groups. Images were both news material and ideological platforms.
The first coverage focused on the scope of the disaster and the general information
about the damage, lives affected, and location. After the initial coverage, there was a
turn toward vivid descriptions of the post-earthquake environment. There seemed to
be a certain fear that the Haiti story would be dropped from the priorities of news
coverage.
According to Mark Libin, narratives of traumatic testimony tend to “perceive
trauma as complex and problematic, but also fundamental to the identity of the
contemporary Western subject.”
86
When interest seemed to be lessening, media
reports turned to trauma to reinvigorate interest and fill content.
87
Trauma is

85. According to a Pew Research Center Report, Americans tracked the Haiti earthquake
more closely than any other story in the year 2010. “Haiti, Snowstorms, Economy Vie for Public’s
Attention,” Pew Research Center Publications, February 17, 2010,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1496/public-see-right-amount-of-snow-coverage.

86. Mark Libin, “Can the Subaltern be Heard? Response and Responsibility in South Africa’s
Human Spirit,” Textual Practice 17 (2003): 119.
87. Human experiences contextualized the impact of the disaster. According to one report,
“The impacts of Haiti’s recent surge in crime endure long after the shooting stops. Children are
especially vulnerable when a death occurs in the family; many are pulled out of school and sent to live
with other families as restaveks, Creole for unpaid domestic servants.” Not only did stories focus in on
children and families, so did photos. See Appendix B, Figure 5. Athena Kolbe and Robert Muggah,
57
understood to be a painful and personal experience that has long-term consequence.
Focusing on trauma personified the post-earthquake world. Survivor metaphors
appear to influence perceptions, critiques, and evaluations of a disaster.
88
Media
coverage of Haiti treated survivors and victims differently. Special interest pieces
focused on individuals and groups, building a scene and representing survivors with
varying levels of agency. Among the fragmented and vulnerable populations focused
on were narratives about children, wards of mental health, and prisoners.
Children
During the weeks following the earthquake, mainstream media reporting
turned to personal interest stories. Karen Wells argues that images of children can be
powerful rhetorical devices to defend military action.
89
Children proved to be equally
effective as exposés during disaster coverage. On March 21, 2010, CBS aired a 60
Minutes segment entitled “The Lost Children of Haiti.”
90
Scott Pelley introduced this
report by focusing on the child victims of the earthquake: “Half a million children are
still living in the streets, crowded orphanages or foreign makeshift camps...threatened
by hunger, disease, sexual assault and even a modern day slave trade.”
91
One man’s

“The Economic Costs of Violent Crime in Haiti,” The Guardian, August 22, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/22/haiti-violent-crime-economic-costs.
88. Jo Anna Grant and Heather Hundley, “Fighting the Battle of Running the Race?:
Metaphor Analysis in the Associated Press,” Visual Communication Quarterly 15 (2008): 182.
89. Karen Wells, “Narratives of Liberation and Narratives of Innocent Suffering: The
Rhetorical Uses of Images of Iraqi Children in the British Press,” Visual Communication 6 (2007): 55-
71.

90. Scott Pelley, “The Lost Children of Haiti,” CBSNews, July 12, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/19/60minutes/main6315112.shtml

91. Pelley, “The Lost Children of Haiti.”
58
ten-week search for his son, who never returned home from school, was highlighted.
92

The segment showed relief workers removing rubble from the school. Only the son’s
backpack was found. These stories emphasized the defenseless nature of childhood.
In a post-disaster environment, many children who lost parents were especially at risk
to the disaster damages and its aftermath.
Personal stories of children appealed to audiences emotionally, gained
sympathy and produced identifications. The photographs of dead children were
bothersome, but also memorable and provocative. Michele McNally defended the use
of disturbing photographs, explaining, “One of the reasons the pictures were more
graphic in Haiti was that the Haitian people wanted the journalists to photograph the
dead bodies and tell their stories. They wanted the world to see, to know how horrible
it was.”
93
Children were vulnerable and were among the thousands of innocent
victims in Haiti. Disasters profoundly affected them in ways that are unique and
multifaceted. Audiences were more prone to identify with “virgin” and “virtuous”
child as opposed to adult counter narratives.
Mental Illness
Mental illness in Haiti was also examined during some mainstream media
special interest reports, including The New York Times and USA Today. Not only was
mental health medicine poor before the earthquake, disasters also increase the cases
of mental health problems, including “earthquake shock,” depression, and post-

92. Ibid.

93. Arielle Emmett, “Too Graphic?”
59
traumatic stress disorder.
94
Mental health illness affects its victims and their loved
ones. Mark Morocco, Professor of Emergency Medicine at UCLA, intoned, “This is a
post-apocalyptic urban setting. This is going to be a huge breeding ground for post-
traumatic stress disorder, including [for] the caregivers.”
95
Victims with post-
traumatic stress disorder had nowhere to go. Reporter Deborah Sontag shockingly
said, “In and around the two hospitals, apparently mentally ill men wander the streets,
ragged and filthy. One sits naked atop a pile of rubble, another wears caked mud.”
96

Not only was mental healthcare an important area of concern for medical relief, it was
also essential for the safety of others during the Haiti humanitarian story.
Mental health representation frequently involved feminine subjects. Deborah
Sontag reported a compelling story:
Guerline Présumé, a formerly mild-mannered young mother, was admitted a
few weeks ago for what was diagnosed as a manic disorder. On the day of the
earthquake, she ran from a collapsing house that killed her older sister and
disappeared, screaming, into the streets. It took her husband a month to find
her; when he did she was muttering and spitting obscenities.
97

Présumé’s husband described his wife’s condition simply: “The earthquake drove her
crazy.”
98
Coupled with the fear that she might be dead, there was also the very real
possibility of sexual assault, illness, and other tragic occurrences while they were
apart. This narrative combined aspects of femininity and mental health, which creates

94. “Earthquake shock” is the sensation that the ground is still shaking, causing increased
heart rate, anxiety, and chest pain. Sontag, “In Haiti, Mental Health System is in Collapse,” A1.

95. Mary Brophy Marcus, “Haiti’s Health Crisis Deepens as Recovery Efforts Continue,”
USA Today, January 19, 2010. http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-01-19-
haitihealth19_ST_N.htm

96. Sontag, “In Haiti, Mental Health System is in Collapse,” A1.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.
60
an interesting paradox: “just as the ideal of femininity is an impossible goal, so too is
the ideal mental health.”
99
Mothers experiencing post-traumatic stress or depression
also can increase risk of mental health illness in their children.
100
Certainly,
improving mental healthcare was essential to relief strategies. Rhetorically, focusing
on mental health also was a fresh frame for disaster reporting. Contextualizing the
mental health issues focused on a meaningful perspective that audience’s understood.
Victims were presented with different dimensions and multi-layered qualities that
initial reporting could not detail.
Prisoners
Prison issues were also showcased in post-earthquake Haiti reporting.
According to a UN report, approximately 4,250 prisoners escaped during the
earthquake.
101
Although stories of escaped prisoners emerged as early as January 13,
2010, the consequences and complications of escapes were elaborated during the
following weeks.
102
CBS aired specials that focused on prison inmates who
escaped.
103
Some segments focused on criminal activity in refugee camps headed by
escaped prisoners; but some segments focused on prisoners who were described as

99. Nicole E. Hurt, “Disciplining through Depression: An Analysis of Contemporary
Discourse on Women and Depression,” Women’s Studies in Communication 30 (2007): 305.
100. Anne Underwood, “Not Always ‘the Happiest Time,’” Newsweek, April 23, 2006,
accessed September 10, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2006/04/23/not-always-the-
happiest-time.html.

101. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,”
United Nations Security Council, February 22, 2010,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/200.

102. “Prison Collapses, Inmates Loose in Haiti,” CBSNews, January 13, 2010, 1:06PM,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/13/world/main6092182.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBod
y.

103. Byron Pitts, “Escaped Prisoners Pose Security Threat,” CBS Evening News, January 19,
2010. http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18563_162-6117192.html.
61
victims. Not only were thousands of prisoners released on a vulnerable public, but
prison riots became an issue as well.
The most notable prison story in Haiti was the Les Cayes prison massacre in
which over a dozen prisoners were killed and forty more injured. The police
contended that they were attempting to stop a riot, but contradictory reports emerged.
Although some reports verified that prisoners were killing others in an attempt to
break free, other accounts chastised the police violence. Stories depicted the guards
shooting prisoners in their cells and burying them in large unmarked graves.
104

Eventually, a commission was formed that investigated the Les Cayes incident. This
commission concluded that the Haitian prison guards “deliberately and without
justification” used “inappropriate, abusive and disproportionate force” against
inmates who were unarmed and “presented no immediate threat.”
105
Authorities had
to work under strenuous circumstances and under extreme pressure. They also
remained under the microscope of the global publicity that was invested in
meaningful outcome. One New York Times editorial took this to heart: “The first step
to building a new Haiti is figuring out what really happened at Les Cayes, and
assuring it never happens again.”
106
Prisoners may be controversial subjects of
victimhood, but police abuse is a systematic overuse of power.
By focusing on children, mental health victims, and prisoners, special interest
reporting told the Haiti story with diverse aspects of the disaster. Every Haitian

104. Editorial, “Slaughter in Les Cayes,” New York Times (May 26, 2010), A26.
105. Deborah Sontag and Walt Bogdanich, “Report Assails Haiti Officers in Prison Killings,”
New York Times, October 22, 2010, A6, accessed September 10, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/world/americas/22haiti.html.

106. Editorial, “Slaughter in Les Cayes,” A26.
62
experienced the earthquake in fundamentally different ways. Rhetorical tensions
emerged in victim-centered narratives in which most Haitians suffered from natural
elements of the earthquake, but some were further victimized by human elements.
These narratives shed light on the depth of the impact of the earthquake, while
explaining the institutional implications for society. Disruptions of schools, hospitals,
and even prisons—all signaled a damaged social order teetering unsteadily on the
brink of disintegration.
Interventions as Special Interest
Some narratives that emerged during special interest reporting emphasized the
intervention process. These stories focused on heroes attempting to help the
Haitians.
107
Promoting stories of heroism restored audience confidence and satisfied
the thirst to do something. Business Week proclaimed, “Americans were texting their
support big-time.”
108
According to Elsie St. Louis-Accilien, the Executive Director of
Haitian Americans United for Progress, “The people of Haiti are on the whole
grateful for the multifaceted American response to this emergency, which includes
moving tons of medical relief and supplies quickly to Haiti, using the capabilities of
troops.”
109
Undoubtedly, Americans were interested in how their tax dollars and
donations were being spent. However, stressing the American contribution and

107. Alternatively, some studies have maintained that newspaper coverage can focus on
human dominance over natural disasters, as in the case of forest fires in Fargo, North Dakota and
Moorhead, Minnesota. Nadene N. Vevea, et al., “Portrayals of Dominance,” 84-99.
108. Amy Feldman, “Haiti Earthquake Provokes Wave of Text Donations,” January 14, 2010,
accessed May 10, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2010-01-14/haiti-earthquake-provokes-
wave-of-text-donationsbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
109. Elsie St. Louis-Accilien, “Answers about New York’s Response to Haiti’s Earthquake,”
New York Times, January 27, 2010, accessed January 2, 2012,
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/answers-about-new-yorks-response-to-haitis-
earthquake/.
63
generosity may have satisfied audiences when the need for relief was still ongoing.
Sustained interest in Haiti was imperative.
But not all interventions were positive. One of the profound stories that struck
the attention of the world was when a group of Baptist missionaries attempted to
transport thirty-three Haitian orphans to the nearby Dominican Republic. Because
they did not move the children through proper legal channels, the American Baptists
were arrested, questioned, and faced child abduction charges. Laws faced constraints
and tensions after the Haiti earthquake. Many criminals took advantage of the chaos.
Not only were looting and theft evident following this devastating earthquake, but so
was child abduction for the purpose of sex trafficking. Lawlessness was a fear, but it
was also the time when swift and drastic actions were taken by relief workers and
state agents.
Vulnerability was a theme that interconnected narratives during disaster relief
reporting. Aspects of globalization complicated the traditional notions of
vulnerability. In natural disasters, the rhetoric of vulnerability is essential to build a
case for need, through inducing empathy and creating context. Thus, even while
dabbling in exposing vulnerability, most national and international narratives
emerged to substantiate trust, legitimation, and security. So, while some lawbreakers
were demonized as escaped prisoners, others were portrayed as trying to save the
lives of children. Research has demonstrated that there is an evident lack of
understanding about the human and institutional factors accompanying increases in
vulnerability.
110
Women, children, those suffering mental illness, and prisoners who

110. Stacey Menzel Baker, “Vulnerability and Resilience in Natural Disasters: A Marketing
and Public Policy Perspective,” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 28 (2009): 114-123.
64
suffer violence and social stigma are often more vulnerable in the environment that
follows natural disasters. Vulnerability and special interest pieces reinvigorated
interest and compassion. However, after a month of detailed coverage, there was
significantly less international interest in the progress in Haiti.
111

Although much later coverage focused on special interest stories, there was
also a period of reporting that challenged the audience to sustain compassion. Most
news did pressure for more expedient distribution of stocks of relief. Needs would be
shown, while simultaneously illustrating airport warehoused resources as remote but
transferable. This condition was matched by the struggle to sustain interest and media
sources. One New York Times editorial described the beginning of apathy toward the
earthquake: “Three weeks after Haiti’s earthquake, the search for survivors has been
called off, the TV crews are trickling home, and the celebrity telethon is over – usual
signs that the floodwaters of compassion will be ebbing soon.”
112
There was a
cognitive effort by some mainstream media to prevent apathy, neglect, and
forgetfulness.
113
Although fewer journalists were on the scene in Haiti, media actors
continued to re-introduce Haiti into their programming and content.

111. By February 19-22, the Winter Olympics was more closely followed than the Haiti
earthquake. Although the Haiti earthquake was the most closely followed earthquake in 2010, the Gulf
Coast oil leak was followed more closely for a longer period of time. See “Top Stories of 2010: Haiti
Earthquake, Gulf Oil Spill,” Pew Research Center, December 21, 2010, accessed March 3, 2011,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1837/top-news-stories-2010-public-interest-haiti-earthquake-gulf-oil-spill.

112. “Thinking about a New Haiti,” New York Times, February 1, 2010, A18.

113. Joseph Guyler Delva, “Don’t Forget Haiti, Top UN Aid Official Urges Donors,” Reuters,
September 29, 2011, accessed May 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/us-haiti-un-
idUSTRE78S6PB20110929
65
Tragedy and Remembrance: Anniversary Reports
Anniversary reports were prominent in Haiti earthquake reporting, occurring
at six months, one year and two years.
114
Jodie Cowan, John McClure, and Marc
Wilson argue that anniversary reports are important:
The mass portrayals of damage in reports written immediately after
earthquakes may lead readers to attribute the damage to the magnitude
of the earthquake, an uncontrollable cause. In contrast, the more
precise information given in later [anniversary] reports may lead
people to attribute to building design, a more controllable cause.
115

For this reason, anniversary reports, arguably, may be more productive spaces to
discuss disaster: if audiences are more likely to attribute human mistakes, the
possibility of rethinking disaster politics might be greater. There was increased
attention during the one-year anniversary.
116
Neil Genzlinger observed, “Often the
inevitable anniversary programs about a catastrophe undercut themselves by trying to
do too much.”
117
Re-introducing Haiti to the public during times of anniversaries
could have been constructive for a number of reasons, but this process was
problematic. Statistical representations of the amount of money not yet spent, the
amount of work that had not been done, and other findings were more understandable
when presented in an anniversary timeline. For example, Pooja Bhatia presented a
typical anniversary report:

114. Cowan, McClure, and Wilson, “What a Difference a Year Makes,” 172.
115. Ibid.

116. E.g., Ibid.;
117. Neil Genzlinger, “Lawlessness and Need Survives in Shaken Haiti,” New York Times,
January, 11, 2011, C2.
66
A year after the earthquake that devastated Haiti’s capital, just 5
percent of the rubble has been removed. The National Palace still sits
in a half-demolished pile. In its shadow, on the Champs de Mars plaza,
tens of thousands of Haitians live under torn or frayed tents and
tarpaulins. All over the city, buildings remain pancaked, keeled over,
smashed – just as they were after the earthquake on Jan. 12, 2010.
118

Mainstream media continued to report relevant material about the disaster; however,
the humanitarian story was unfinished and true “relief” was never obtained.
Anniversaries exposed the incomplete story that was introduced a year before. Like
the other phases of mainstream media reporting, anniversaries contributed to an
ongoing story.
Analysis of Mainstream Media Reporting about Haiti
Having explored the unfolding of the Haiti disaster narrative, I turn to how
mainstream media depicted victimhood in its various turns of storytelling. Kenneth
Burke argues that victims are important rhetorical catalysts.
119
Victimage traditionally
implies a sense of guilt, someone or something that is impure.
120
This produces
divisions.
121
Thus, the Haiti earthquake left great room for attribution of guilt, and
rhetors dealt with this in fundamentally different ways. Guilt is usually directed at
conflict between an antagonist and a protagonist in a disaster. When a social
geography collapses, guilt becomes a multi-vectored discourse. Victim portrayal was

118. Pooja Bhatia, “A Symbol of Hope for Haiti, a Landmark Again Stands Tall,” New York
Times, January 11, 2011, A4.
119. Burke wrote, “But if drama, then conflict. And if conflict, then victimage. Dramatism is
always on the edge of this vexing problem that comes to a culmination in tragedy, the song of the
scapegoat.” Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 55.
120. William H. Rueckert argues, “Generally, then, to make others suffer for our own sins is
victimage; to make ourselves suffer for our own sins is mortification.” William H. Rueckert, Kenneth
Burke and the Drama of Human Relations (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 147.
121. Mark P. Moore, “Capital Punishment: The Mortification and Scapegoating of Illinois
Governor George Ryan,” Western Journal of Communication 70 (2006): 311-330.
67
emotionally charged and focused on disparity. On-the-scene reporting stressed the
distressed environment and devastating aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. Emotional
depictions ranged from Haitians who were forced to sleep next to dead bodies,
amputees who were being disinfected with vodka, and prisoners who were roaming
the streets. Crisis and uncertainty was stressed – parents looking for their children, the
depiction of family grieving over the loss, and faces twisted with fear and pain. This
frame portrayed people as victims, the powerless and almost helpless.
Media Representation of Disenfranchised Groups
Mainstream media stressed the vulnerability of the Haitian victims by
historically contextualizing hardship and focusing on disenfranchised groups. One
New York Times article stressed the emotional impact that the earthquake had on the
elderly, stating: “No strangers to hardship, elderly Haitians find themselves distinctly
vulnerable and emotionally burdened these days. They have grown old in a place
where so many people die young. With longevity comes survivor’s guilt.”
122
These
words contextualized the Haitian experience, without placing blame on the Haitians
or stressing their dependency on American aid. Within this frame, there was an
emphasis on identification by portraying the victims as fathers, mothers, and children.
Such emphasis of familial relations brought forth relatable relationships and
understandable suffering to the hearts of the audience. Libin argues, “The horror of a
traumatic event displaces the victim from his or her experience – the event is
unrepresentable, incomprehensible, and therefore impossible to articulate – and so

122. Ian Urbina, “Earthquake’s Burdens Weigh Heavily on Haiti’s Elderly,” New York Times,
March 12, 2010, A4.
68
testimony can approach the site of trauma only obliquely and imperfectly.”
123

Although mainstream media was motivated to sensationalize the suffering of victims
and exploit their pains, this frame was useful, perhaps even necessary, to draw secure
audiences into an alien world. In time, such portrayals moved toward humanizing the
victims of Haiti, encouraging compassion and sympathy and facilitating international
aid and intervention.
Media also assembled counter-narratives about Haiti. Some voices
discouraged donations for either nationalistic or infrastructural reasons. Although
massive amounts of resources were committed to Haiti, it is important to note that not
everyone approved. Disasters, then, can offer continuation of left-right dissent and
contestation. Sometimes these took the form of dismissive generalizations about the
Haitian people. Bill O’Reilly of Fox News’s The O’Reilly Factor attributed Haiti’s
weakness to a lack of discipline, arguing, “No matter how much charity is given, no
matter how many good intentions there are, Haiti will remain chaotic until discipline
is imposed.”
124
New York Times journalist David Brooks theorized, “It’s time to
promote locally led paternalism. In this country, we first tried to tackle poverty by
throwing money at it, just as we did abroad. Then we tried micro community efforts,
just as we did abroad but the programs that really work involve intrusive
paternalism.”
125
This argument contends that the only hope for Haiti is a sacrifice of
sovereignty and acceptance of the powerless frame that emerged during media
representation.

123. Mark Libin, “Can the Subaltern be Heard?” 120.

124. Steve Rendall, “Haiti Disaster Provokes Hateful Pundits,” Extra! March 2010: 9.

125. Ibid.
69
Media reports offer spaces for criticism and defense. Yifat Susskind, a blogger
for MADRE, strongly opposed Brooks and his advocacy for neo-paternalism:
Ironically, Brooks' prescription of “intrusive paternalism” to “fix the culture,”
aptly sums up US policy towards Haiti for the past 100 years: a brutal military
occupation from 1915 to 1934; support for dictatorship from 1957 to 1986;
and more recently, the imposition of trade policies that have further
impoverished people. What the outside world needs to "fix" is not Haitian
culture, but its own self-serving policies that have left thousands of Haitians
literally buried alive.
126

Some mainstream media represented victims with a burlesque frame. Burke’s
burlesque frame paints the subject as “despicable, forlorn, or dissipated people.”
127
In
a sense, this frame was sustained so audiences would not feel any intimacy with the
subject. Victims were treated externally and superficially. Instead of attempting to
understand critically the state of some Haitians’ experiences, reporting merely
described the vulnerable and critical nature of Haitians. This frame emerged but did
not dominate the discourse.
128

There was an evident dissatisfaction with Haiti media reporting. Jessica
Moore, of Youth Media Reporter, identified a “real lack of media representation” and
apparent “frustration that their voices weren’t being heard.”
129
It was important to
include the victims in their own story telling. Teen Voices shared the stories of a few
young Haitian victims: “For both girls, it was in part a public expression of pain that
garnered them the air time to share their stories – not an easy or desirable experience,

126. Yifat Susskind, “David Brooks Blames the Victim in Haiti,” My Madre, January 15,
2010. http://madreblogs.typepad.com/mymadre/2010/01/david-brooks-blames-the-victim-in-haiti.html.

127. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1984), 53.

128. Burke argues, “we enjoy burlesque as an occasional dish, no critic has ever been inclined
to select it as the piece de resistance for a steady diet.” Ibid., 54.

129. Jessica Moore, “Media and Expression,” 35.
70
but a necessary one in the interest of adding their voices to the conversation.”
130

Although mainstream media were important to spread information and sentiment
about the Haiti earthquake, there was still an imperative for the Haitian voice to be
heard.
The Haitian people lacked a voice. Mainstream media overemphasized the
Western intervention. At times, mainstream media’s depiction of the Haiti earthquake
was extremely problematic. This turn was representative of the move that mainstream
media made in disaster reporting – stressing the role of the Western world as “Savior”
and the victims as “Saved.”
131
This rhetorical treatment emphasized the role of the
First World giving aid and helping the Third World. In the Haiti disaster this was
especially noticeable in reports about financial donations. Moreover, certain
communities emphasized their contribution.
132
Donations were stressed, as well as the
compassion for the victims of the Haiti earthquake. Some news content stressed
prayer or medical assistance given to the people of Haiti.
133
One New York Times
article described it well:

130. Ibid., 36.

131. This criticism is not isolated to Haiti disaster relief, but tends to emerge in international
political sentiments with racial and cultural differences. Nigerian-American novelist Teju Cole terms
this phenomenon “White Savior Industrial Complex.” Robert Mackey, “African Critics of Kony
Campaign See a ‘White Man’s Burden’ for the Facebook Generation,” New York Times, March 9,
2012, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/african-critics-of-kony-campaign-hear-echoes-of-
the-white-mans-burden/.

132. Local newspapers frequently stress their contribution to the relief effort. CBS News
station KCBS-TV in Los Angeles reported that as many as 80 California firefighters from the Orange
County Fire Authority's urban search and rescue team were sent to Haiti. The broadcast proclaimed,
“The Golden State connection doesn't end there.” “Haiti Earthquake Updates: Day Two, Three.”
Eleven members of an Orange County church group were in Haiti during the earthquake. All members
survived the quake, parishioners say, and are now contributing to relief efforts.

133. An example appears in “Century Marks,” Christian Century, November 1, 2011, 8.
71
On Thursday night Dr. Sanjay Gupta, CNN’s chief medical
correspondent, led a camera crew through one of the few remaining
hospitals in the region. As he passed wounded and dying victims, he
explained that there were no doctors or nurses there to treat them. But
CNN made a point of repeatedly showing another scene in which Dr.
Gupta ran through the street to minister to an infant, the camera
lingering on him as he cradled her in his arms and examined her head
for lacerations.
134

Mainstream media focused not only on external help toward Haiti but also on
American support – American military, American donations, and American support.
Summary of Findings
Disaster relief reporting ranged from initial coverage to anniversary reports.
Tensions were exposed between safety and chaos, identification and division, and
information and emotion. There were also evident tensions between positive and
negative portrayals of Haitian victims. While some stressed the corruption, poverty,
and crime occurring in Haiti, other narratives tried to counteract those destructive
perceptions of Haiti. For example, Joel Dreyfuss reminded his readers that Haiti “is
also a country sharply divided along class and cultural lines. You will hear over and
over in the coming days that it is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.
What you will not hear is that it is also a country rich in culture, world-class art, and
music that is celebrated all over the French-speaking world.”
135
The rhetoric of Haiti
was that the country needed help, but also that it was worth helping, that it was hurt
but not destroyed, that it is different, but not too different. The motivations of the
reporter dictated how the victims represented and personified these tensions.

134. Stanley, “Broadcast Coverage,” A10.

135. Joel Dreyfuss, “Saving Haiti.”
72
At times, media articulated clear infrastructure needs – a working airport,
functional roads, clean water, an open harbor; however, the actions of the
humanitarian agencies were also stressed in terms of immediate food, shelter, and
medicine. At other times, media focused on looting and sensationalized negative
victim portrayals, which indirectly alleviated guilt or responsibility on the
international community. Burke explains, when “negatives are highlighted, and even
exaggerated” it leads to “a complete rejection of them.”
136
There was an apparent
interplay of hope and terror that emerged and mixed into various events during the
Haiti relief movement. Media actors inevitably represented the disaster and its
victims, even if some such representations were inadvertent. Rhetoric functioned as
an imperative by creating identifications and addressing important issues of social
change. Alternatively, rhetoric was also responsible for sustaining divisions, resulting
in politics of stigma and exposing the tensions that can arise in disaster reporting.
Haiti earthquake relief and the initial humanitarian response followed a path
embedded in perception, prejudice, and public memory. Public memory and global
perceptions of Haiti were relevant topics of discussion. Haiti had a complicated
history and racial and cultural differences from the Western world. Economically,
Haiti was one of the poorest countries in the world, even prior to the earthquake.
137

Moreover, J. Michael Dash argued that Haiti suffers from negative connotations:

136. Brian T. Kaylor, “Savior, Fool or Demagogue: Burkean Frames Surrounding the Ten
Commandment Judge,” KB Journal 6 (2010).

137. According to the Human Development Index, Haiti ranks 158 of the 187 countries in
terms of health, education, and income. “Haiti, Country Profile: Human Development Indicators,”
United Nations Development Programme, Accessed April 10, 2012.
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI.html.
73
American attitudes to Haiti can be seen in terms of the creation of
self-serving or rather self-aggrandizing images designed to tame the
alien or threatening world on the outside. These images acquire a
cumulative force over time and consistently resurface in order to
define and reconstruct Haiti in terms which emphasize its difference
or ‘Otherness.
138

This may also be true about the Haiti earthquake relief and humanitarian intervention.
In this context, rhetoric implied blame and shaped perceptions about disasters. In
times of domestic economic crisis, there was some dissent in the support going to
Haiti.
139
In fact, Oxfam’s Nicholas Stockton reflects, “Perhaps the most insidious
challenge to humanitarian values has been the widely reported claim that many
disaster victims have no one but themselves to blame.”
140
Although natural disasters
are out of anyone’s immediate control, there were moments that media representation
situated guilt and blame.
141
By focusing on vulnerability, the difference of the Haitian
people is simultaneously stressed. Although explaining the depth of suffering is
important, downplaying the strength and agility of a people may be problematic.
News stories also engaged in extensive depictions of suffering only to mask
the enduring and overall impact by storytelling about the alleviating of suffering.
Augusta Del Zotto, whose research on media representation of women during the war

138. J. Michael Dash, Haiti and the United States: National Stereotypes and Literary
Imagination (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 1.

139. One of the more notable examples of this was Pat Robertson’s narrative that proclaimed
that Haiti’s earthquake was a result of a curse because they “made a pact with the devil” in order to
win their independence from France. Smith, Ryan, “Pat Robertson: Haiti 'Cursed' after 'Pact to the
Devil',” CBS News, January 13, 2010.

140. Nicolas Stockton, “In Defence of Humanitarianism,” Disasters 44 (1998): 354.

141. Placing guilt on the victim is accepting a tragic frame: the earthquake caused guilt and
that guilt required redemption. Redemption causes sacrifice. Sacrifices purge guilt until another
problem arises. The tragic frame projects evil onto a scapegoat, lays blame on it and “slays” it.
Alternatively, the comic frame enables people to be observers of themselves, while acting. Kenneth
Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 55.
74
in Kosovo found that reporting was selective, argued, “By focusing almost
exclusively on the strategies and discourses of elite actors, and relegating the role of
non-elite actors as ‘mere casualties’, media misses a very important aspect of war;
namely, that war is an intimate affair.”
142
The same can, and should, be said about the
Haiti earthquake. The underlying institutional poverty and long-term psychological
impact of this disaster invited donations, international support, and humanitarian aid.
It was important for media to focus on non-institutional actors when depicting a crisis
that was largely affecting individuals, not organizations or states.
Although rescue and relief efforts made news during the first month and
periodically thereafter, these stories had the potential to empower audiences and
alleviate some psychological guilt. However, reporting ignored the sense of
responsibility that powerful and privileged countries maintain. Pajackowksa and
Young argue, “An identity based on power never has to develop consciousness of
itself as responsible, it has no sense of its limits.”
143
The media can work as a space
where ideas about race are “articulated, worked on, transformed and elaborated.”
144
It
is important to recognize “the power-laden rhetorical strategies through which
whiteness masks and presents itself as a ‘norm’ against which all ‘others’ are

142. Augusta C. Del Zotto, “Weeping Women, Wringing Hands: How the Mainstream Media
Stereotyped Women’s Experiences in Kosovo,” Journal of Gender Studies 11 (2002): 142.

143. Claire Pajackowksa and Lola Young, “Racism, Representation and Psychoanalysis,” In
James and Rattans (eds) Race, Culture, and Difference (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), 202.

144. Stuart Hall, “The Whites of their Eyes,” in Bridge and Brunt (eds.) Silver Linings: Some
Strategies for the Eighties (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1981), 35.
75
measured and positioned.”
145
Reports from Haiti should have exhibited greater
sensitivity to racial prejudices and stereotypes.
News coverage had the potential to expose the significant obstacles of
humanitarian relief in Haiti. Daniele Magliore, a senior director at Fokal, explained,
“The United Nations, with its immense bureaucracy, cannot make it alone. We need
all the help we can get, and we know that it must come from the United States at this
critical moment.”
146
Moreover, one New York Times article emphasized the heroic
nature of the medical workers:
In the beginning, of course, those with immediate injuries were treated first.
But even after the earthquake victims had been taken care of, lines more than
a quarter-mile long still formed at hospital entrance. There were mothers
carrying babies with swollen bellies, prematurely old men and women with
waterlogged legs and labored breathing, people with painful sores and lots of
coughing. These were Haitians who’d had no access to medical care in a long
time and who suddenly saw hope in a hospital full of foreign doctors eager to
help at no charge.
147

Perhaps disaster reporting of Haiti should have continued to stress hope, for safety
and security, for a better future, and for a better adapted media.
Mainstream media played an imperative role in initial disaster reporting, on-
the-scene journalism, and special interest pieces as the narrative of Haiti unfolded.
Initially, mainstream media informed the world, even when information and details
about the earthquake were scarce. This period, which focused on uncertainty and
speculation, occurred during the first two days after the earthquake. During this time,

145. Raka Shome, “Race and Popular Cinema: The Rhetorical Strategies of Whiteness in City
of Joy,” Communication Quarterly 44 (1996): 515.

146. Ray Rivera, “Obstacles to Recovery in Haiti May Prove Daunting Beyond Other
Disasters,” New York Times, January 23, 2010, A7.

147. James Wilentz, “In Haiti, a Lesson for US Health Care,” New York Times, July 29,
2010, A29.
76
mainstream media established what they did know – the magnitude of the earthquake,
the location, and information about the country of Haiti in general. Haiti was
frequently associated with poverty during these reports. The disaster itself was
compared to other natural disasters in recent history.
The initial reports were followed by a series of on-the-scene journalism
stories. The theme of rescue and loss recurred frequently. Mainstream media
implemented emotional appeals that depicted chaos and devastation. The third phase
of reporting turned toward identifying particular disenfranchised groups and
highlighted their hardships. These key moves by the media instigated public interest
in the period when they were the losing interest in the disaster. Public interest stories
were both a spectacle and space for compassion.
148
Each rhetorical turn was a natural
progression of storytelling and also a reaction to adapt to pressures and the disaster
environment.
Mainstream media depended on experts, activists, and victims in order to
report about natural disasters effectively. Activists and mainstream media had
“interdependence.” In fact, “access for activists to radical and mainstream media
remains stratified and this, in the end, remains the most significant difference between
mainstream hegemonic news culture and its radical counterpart.”
149
Moreover,
problematic moments in Haiti disaster reporting misrepresented the Haitian people.
Victims could have been disempowered by their inability to tell their own stories, and

148. During the first two weeks after the disaster, the earthquake in Haiti was more google
searched and more reported by news agencies than any other phase that occurred thereafter. See
Appendix B, Figure 6 for visual and statistical support.

149. Chris Atton, “News Cultures and New Social Movements: Radical Journalism and the
Mainstream Media,” Journalism Studies 3 (2002): 503.
77
mainstream media were hence vital for relief progress. At times, the hegemonic news
culture explored sensationalized personal stories for content, but there were
limitations to the access and authenticity that mainstream media provided. I now turn
to a cadre of sources that worked outside and inside mainstream media with views
and strategies of their own.
78
CHAPTER THREE
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN DISASTER RELIEF:
NEW MEDIA INTERVENTION, THE EPIC FRAME, AND THE
RHETORIC OF HUMANITARIANISM

“We’re not a country anymore. It doesn’t seem like we have a government. We’re
a place where people go to give money.”
1

~Ronald Agenor, Haitian-American Tennis Player

Mainstream media plays a crucial role in informing the world about natural
disasters and updating audiences about humanitarian efforts. Non-government
organizations’ (NGO) work in disaster relief is equally important. It is necessary for
NGOs, which focus on humanitarian work, to prepare for and administer relief after
major disasters.
2
John Twigg and Diane Steiner argue, “Thinking about disasters and
vulnerability is beginning to penetrate NGO consciousness at the policy level.”
3

However, at the operational level, “disaster risk reduction activity tends to be

1. John Blake, “How Helping Hands Could Hurt Haiti,” CNN, March 12, 2010.
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/03/12/recovery.dangers.haiti/.

2. Not only do NGOs prepare for natural disasters so they can better aid their constituents in
disaster relief. Smaller NGOs’ long term sustainability depends on their preparation. Daniel J. Alesch,
James N. Holly, Elliott Mittler, and Robert Nagy, Organizations at Risk: What Happens When Small
Businesses and Not-for-Profits Encounter Natural Disasters, (University of Wisconsin-Green Bay:
Small Organizations Natural Hazards Project, October
2001.http://www.southarts.org/atf/cf/%7B15e1e84e-c906-4f67-9851-
a195a9baaf79%7D/ORGANIZATIONS_AT_RISK.PDF.

3. John Twigg and Diane Steiner, “Mainstreaming Disaster Mitigation: Challenges to
Organisational Learning in NGOs,” Development in Practice 12 (2002): 474.
79
sporadic, poorly integrated with development planning, and largely unsupported by
institutional structures and systems.”
4
Because disasters rupture everyday routines,
they pose particular challenges to humanitarian organizations. Their successes so far
have been contested. Previous research finds that individuals tend to perform well in
disasters but organizations tend to encounter difficulty.
5
During the Haiti earthquake
relief movement, non-profit organizations were at the forefront of rebuilding,
delivering supplies, and offering services,
6
but this process was not achieved without
complications. The Haiti earthquake marked a time that NGOs worked to overcome
traditional obstacles to relief by mobilizing network relationships a new media
movement. This event solidified alliances, while constellations of efforts were
imagined, invented, and implemented. NGO Haiti relief rhetoric constituted an epic
frame, in which the NGOs performed a heroic role, overcoming problematic
oppositions, and satisfying audience’s needs and expectations.
The Haiti earthquake was named “the largest urban disaster in modern
history.”
7
Thus, the humanitarian system encountered unique urban challenges.
Nicholas Stockton argues that there are four major challenges shaping disaster-related

4. Ibid.

5. Joseph Scanlon, “The Search for Non-Existent Facts in the Reporting of Disasters,”
Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 53 (1998): 45.

6. Successful post-earthquake disaster management depends on different factors: the technical
skills of rescue operators, coordination during relief workers and the people’s participation during
rehabilitation. Above all, some research has shown that “people-owned initiative” is “the best option
for successful post-disaster management.” C.G. Sammis and D. Sornette, “Positive Feedback,
Memory, and the Predictability of Earthquakes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America 99, no. 1 (February 19, 2002): 2501-2508.

7. “Haiti—Earthquake,” USAID: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian
Assistance and the Office of US Foreign Disaster Relief, February 4, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011,
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/f
s_sr/fy2011/haiti_eq_fs010_02-04-2011.pdf.
80
humanitarian interventions. First, there tends to be a demonization of the disaster
victim, implying the victim in some way deserved their hardships, making it difficult
to create sympathy and mobilize support.
8
Second, contemporary narratives in
disaster rhetoric favor local solutions to local problems, which poses problems to
well-established international agencies and organizations. Third, American and
international audiences have an evident and growing fear of welfare dependency, and
appeals for help may consequently be met with ambivalence. Fourth, there is a
noticeable end of the “age of innocence” in the media’s treatment of humanitarian
agencies.
9
This means that humanitarian agencies have to state a case for donations,
but also need to establish ethos as well. Nonetheless, donations for Haiti accumulated
to unprecedented levels. Gifts came in the form of monetary support, food, and
medical assistance, amongst other forms of external aid. Calls for intervention were
urgent and critical. The earthquake prompted thousands of volunteers and millions of
donations from across the globe.
Because Haiti 2010 earthquake relief was undoubtedly a critical event it is
important to understand how NGOs framed their work.
10
This chapter explores the
rhetoric of several major non-profits and their contribution to Haiti relief. NGOs
deployed a number of rhetorical strategies through a number of platforms and texts.
Barbara Warnick argues, “extended and complex argumentative forms…involve

8. This was addressed in my previous analysis of mainstream media disaster reporting. This is
an obstacle for NGOs to overcome, but my research did not see this tendency in NGO representations
of disaster.

9. Nicolas Stockton, “In Defence of Humanitarianism,” Disasters 44 (1998): 354.

10. Twigg and Steiner studied NGO responses to natural disasters and concluded, “We were
struck by how many NGO staff spoke of disasters as opportunities for change in thinking and the
adoption of new approaches.” John Twigg and Diane Steiner, “Mainstreaming Disaster Mitigation,”
474.
81
reasoning chains in which prior acceptance of earlier chains enables arguers to build
on what has been established earlier.”
11
Disaster relief efforts are as much rhetorical
movements as they are material actions of charity.
12
The epic frame can increase
ethos and create sense of “epic community.”
13
NGOs posited themselves in a Burkean
“epic” frame through multiple discourses, channeling new media to shape
identifications, create sympathy, and instill pride.
More tangibly, NGOs deployed new media technologies to raise money.
Arguably, NGOs act “socially isolated and narrowly self-interested” during the
fundraising process.
14
Regardless, NGOs used new media in instrumental ways. This
inevitably influenced how the international community perceived the Haiti
earthquake. David Morley and Kevin Robins argue, “The new media order is set to
become a global order.”
15
New media transform how audiences perceive and engage
in the world around them. During Haiti disaster relief, advancements in
communication technologies enabled new and successful rhetorical strategies.
But how do changes in communication technologies influence strategies and
mobilization of NGOs during disaster relief? This chapter explores how humanitarian

11. Barbara Warnick, Rhetoric Online: Persuasion and Politics in the World Wide Web (New
York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), 91-92.

12. Jeff Motter argues that the 2004 Indian Tsunami relief effort highlighted America’s moral
role and advanced a “rhetoric of humanitarian militarism.” Jeff Motter, “American Exceptionalism and
the Rhetoric of Humanitarian Militarism: The Case of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Relief Effort,”
Communication Studies 61 (2010): 508.
13. Bethany Keeley, “I May Not Get There With You: ‘I’ve Been to the Mountaintop’ as Epic
Discourse,” Southern Communication Journal 73 (2008): 291.
14. David Hulme, “Reflections on NGOs and Development: The Elephant, the Dinosaur,
Several Tigers but No Owl,” in Bebbington, Hickey, and Mitlin (eds.), Can NGOs Make a Difference?,
344.

15. David Morley and Kevin Robins, Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic
Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries (New York: Routledge, 1995), 11.
82
organizations operated after the 2010 Haiti earthquake through network connections
utilizing digital media. First, the actions and reactions of three major NGOs during
the first few days following the disaster are examined. Second, strategies for
collecting donations, specifically, the use of mobile phones and new media websites,
are identified. Third, comparisons between NGOs are drawn. Finally, there is a
discussion about the effectiveness of relief networks. It is important to identify
coherent themes throughout humanitarian aid groups in order to understand their
rhetorical power and strategies for disaster relief.
NGOs in Disaster Relief
From a biopolitical view, NGOs play an imperative role in providing security
for globalization, by filling in “gaps” created by neoliberalism.
16
In other words,
NGOs fulfill roles where media and state actors fall short. NGOs participated in
cooperative and competitive matrices between other NGOs, MSM, and state actors to
facilitate this role. Non-profit organizations tried to create identifications that would
make Haiti a permanent issue by identifying and gaining sympathy for the players
involved in the unfolding disaster drama. Each NGO had a similar goal, but the
groups took many forms. I studied roughly fifty different NGO websites and
discovered commonalities and distinctions among them.
17
NGOs ranged from very
broad humanitarian agendas to very distinct demographics of interest and methods of
relief. During disaster relief, NGOs had moments of isomorphism and shared

16. Mark Schuller, “Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti,” Political and
Legal Anthropology Review 32 (2009): 84-105.

17. See Appendix A for a list of the organizations.
83
common themes and strategies.
18
At other times, NGOs conflict with one another.
19

Some NGOs had relationships with other organizations and arrange disaster
intervention in distinctive ways. Haiti attracted a unique assembly of new media and
transnational activists.
Three broadly defined types of non-governmental organizations intervened.
First, “umbrella groups” aimed to fundraise and distribute funds to those who were
already involved in Haiti.
20
These organizations coordinated activities with other
working organizations.
21
Second, “international NGOs” were comprised of
transnational groups. These organizations had a worldwide presence but also had
offices or had undertaken previous work in Haiti. Third, there were local NGOs, or,
for the purposes of this study, “Haiti-specific NGOs.” These organizations feature
small specialized groups involved in the disaster relief. The Disasters Emergency
Committee, the Red Cross, and Yéle Haiti exemplify the different types of NGOs

18. Isomorphism occurs when organizations replicate one another, using similar strategies and
models. Li and Lee argue that this is more common during environments of uncertainty. Certainly,
NGOs experienced conditions of uncertainty during Haiti earthquake relief. Shu-Chu Sarrina Li and
Chen-Yi Lee, “Market uncertainty and Mimetic Isomorphism in the Newspaper Industry: A Study of
Taiwan’s Mainstream Newspapers from 1992 to 2003,” Asian Journal of Communication 20 (2010):
367.

19. Donald H. Schepers, “The Impact of NGO Network Conflict on the Corporate Social
Responsibility Strategies of Multinational Corporations,” Business and Society 45 (2006): 282-299.

20. It is important to note that not all umbrella organizations are large internationally
established institutions. However, disaster specific umbrella organizations emerge that are small in size
as well. Dine Out for Haiti was one example. This organization raised money through various New
York restaurants and distributed funds to Doctors Without Borders, Action Against Hunger, and
Partners in Health. Florence Fabricant, “Food and Wine Industry Raising Funds for Haiti,” New York
Times, January 20, 2010, D4.

21. The degree to which an umbrella group “coordinates” relief varies. Often, umbrella
organizations act as fundraising tools. For example, the We Are the World Foundation produced a
song to raise money but the NGOs they chose to distribute funds were obscure to the public. According
to the We Are the World 25 for Haiti website, “funds will be directed to worthwhile charities, hand
selected by the board of directors, which include Quincy Jones and Lionel Richie.” “Donate,” We Are
the World 25 for Haiti, accessed July 29, 2012, http://wearetheworldfoundation.org/donate/.
84
involved in Haiti relief. The activities of each were widely reported, as they focused
on emergency relief and deployed distinctive rhetorical themes. According to Mark
Schuller, “NGOs can have stronger or different bonds – can be closer to local
communities or to foreign donors – depending on their orientation.”
22
This chapter
groups NGOs into categories according to the respective degrees of intimacy they
have with the local community.
The Disaster Emergency Committee: An Umbrella Organization
The Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) is an umbrella NGO, founded in
1963. Umbrella organizations are “nonprofit associations whose members are
themselves nonprofit organizations.”
23
The DEC engages in fundraising targeting
disaster relief. It operates out of the United Kingdom (UK) during times of major
overseas emergencies occurring in the world's poorest countries. It does not directly
engage in relief or work in the countries where they send financial support. The DEC
currently raises funds distributed across their preferred fourteen NGOs; however, the
DEC only distributed funds to thirteen of these organizations for Haiti relief.
24

As an umbrella organization, the DEC’s strategy for networking is particularly
intriguing. A “Rapid Response Network” is formed out of a pre-existing agreement

22. Schuller, “Gluing Globalization,” 97.

23. Dennis R. Young, “Organizational Identity and the Structure of Nonprofit Umbrella
Associations,” Nonprofit Management and Leadership 11 (2003): 290.

24. These organizations include Oxfam, Merlin, Tear Fund, Islamic Relief, CARE, Save the
Children, Christian Aid, Action Aid, Concern Worldwide, British Red Cross, Age International,
CAFOD, Plan, and World Vision. Plan UK was added to the DEC network on July 1, 2011. Prior to
their membership, the Islamic Relief fund was the newest organization, but they joined the DEC 6
years ago. The DEC has specific requirements for the organizations they work with: they must have
been registered as a UK charity for at least five years, have an income of over four million pounds per
year and budget for ten million pounds overseas emergency work per year, and a history of achieving
their objectives. “DEC Welcomes Plan UK as Newest Member Agency,” Disaster Emergency
Committee, January 7, 2011.
85
between corporate sponsors and the public to participate in shared calls for relief.
These partnerships include the BBC and BBC Radio, with whom they have worked
for over forty years, and the Independent Television Network. Each partner
broadcasts DEC celebrity appeals. The DEC also partners with the British Bankers
Association, BT (a UK phone company), and the British Post Office to facilitate the
donation process. Ultimately, the DEC raised a total of £71 million.
25
The DEC was
essential to the overall success of every organization in its network. A pre-established
network for emergency relief fundraising undoubtedly has its advantages.
During the Haiti disaster, the DEC facilitated coordinated response between
NGOs and focused on fundraising and fund allocation, not administering aid. Even
though the DEC constitutes a particular umbrella organization that specializes in
disaster response, their work remains extremely difficult nonetheless. DEC Chief
Executive Brenden Gormley quickly explained, “DEC member agencies and their
partners are responding but face terrible suffering. We urgently need the public’s help
for their work.”
26
Umbrella organizations had to speak for themselves and the
organizations within their network. The umbrella group and the NGOs that receive
their support co-commit to mutually reinforcing narratives.
One of the distinctive aspects of the DEC is the selectivity of its projects.
Because the DEC specializes in disaster relief, it sets forth pre-established criteria for
what emergencies will be assisted. For example, a disaster is required to be large in

25. Appendix B, Figure 7 demonstrates how essential the DEC is to the overall success of
every organization in its network.

26. “Aid Agencies Announce DEC Disasters Broadcast Appeal for Haiti,” Disasters
Emergency Committee, January 14, 2010, accessed June 10, 2012,
http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/haiti-earthquake-appeal/press-release/aid-agencies-announce-dec-
disasters-broadcast-appeal.
86
scale and in need of urgent action for international humanitarian assistance. Also,
DEC agencies must be qualified and positioned to provide effective relief at a scale to
justify a national appeal. Finally, “There must be reasonable grounds for concluding
that a public appeal would be successful, either because of evidence of existing public
sympathy for humanitarian situation or because there is a compelling case indicating
the likelihood of significant support should an appeal be launched.”
27
Thus, the day
after the Haiti earthquake, among the first tasks for the DEC was acknowledging that
the Haiti disaster had occurred and “urgently assessing the situation against the
criteria for launching an appeal.”
28
Only hours later, the DEC Haiti Earthquake
Appeal was launched.
The DEC website was a natural place for interested individuals to learn about
the disaster. By January 13, the Haiti Earthquake Appeal was launched and a call for
donations was released. Their website saw an increase in hits by a startling 25,000%
in the first two weeks following the earthquake. Additionally, DEC Facebook fans
increased from 800 to 15,000 and it ranked in the top 0.10% in Twitter influence.
29

Located in the UK, with endorsement from the BBC, a staggering number of people

27. “Emergency Appeals,” BBC, accessed May 5, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/charityappeals/emergency_appeals.shtml.

28. “Haiti Earthquake Response,” Disasters Emergency Committee, January 13, 2010,
accessed July 31, 2012, http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/haiti-earthquake-appeal/press-release/haiti-
earthquake-response.

29. “Social Media Provides Unprecedented Support for Haiti,” Disasters Emergency
Committee, January 28, 2010, accessed July 16, 2012, http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/haiti-earthquake-
appeal/press-release/social-media-provides-unprecedented-support-haiti.
87
chose to donate to the DEC, totaling over £71 million.
30
They engaged in mobile
fundraising, advertising text donations on their Twitter page.
31

English actor John Hurt and presenter Kirsty Young broadcast DEC appeals.
Hurt pleaded, “Please give generously so aid agencies can bring medicine, clean
water, and other essentials to help get these people back on their feet.”
32
Brendan
Gormley, Chief Executive of the DEC, announced, “DEC member agencies and their
partners are responding but face terrible suffering. We urgently need the public’s help
for their work.”
33
Umbrella organizations, like the DEC, can broadly define relief
strategies because they are able to give to diverse NGOs. As a goal-centered system,
the DEC is structured with an “overall plan” and organizations work in a
“coordinated fashion.”
34
This means that even initial reports communicate
coordinated efforts and very broad explanations of needs, plans, and goals.
NGOs have to convey the urgent nature of disaster relief. The DEC appealed,
“families here are now relying on the outside world and on you and me as its only
lifeline, and why we must act immediately.”
35
Action needed to be expedient. “Haiti
needs our help now,” the DEC continued, “Even the smallest donation you can make
will mean more lives can be saved and we can prevent the frightening death toll from

30. “Anniversary Report,” Disasters Emergency Committee, December 6, 2011,
http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/haiti-earthquake-appeal/anniversary-report.

31. “Social Media Provides Unprecedented Support for Haiti.”
32. “Aid Agencies Announce DEC Disasters Broadcast Appeal for Haiti,” Disasters
Emergency Committee, January 14, 2010, accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/haiti-
earthquake-appeal/press-release/aid-agencies-announce-dec-disasters-broadcast-appeal.
33. “Aid Agencies Announce DEC Disasters Broadcast.”

34. Young, “Organizational Identity,” 293.

35. “DEC Launch Haiti Earthquake Appeal,” January 15, 2010,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tMWAm1y904.
88
this disaster from rising any further.”
36
Specific monetary amounts were stressed. The
DEC explained that ten pounds could provide buckets of water to families, twenty-
five pounds could provide a family with a kit of household essentials, and fifty
pounds could provide food for a family for two weeks.
37
Mainstream media conveyed
the disaster and acted as outlets for appeal, but NGO response had a stronger sense of
promise and agency. Donating to the DEC meant saving lives. Haiti was depending
on them, but the DEC was depending on donations from generous individuals.
The American Red Cross: An International NGO
While the DEC had a large network but did not engage in direct Haiti relief
work, the Red Cross had a large network but also had offices in Haiti as well. The
Red Cross is a traditional international NGO. Its operations were at the forefront of
Haiti relief. An in-depth examination of the actions of the Red Cross is important in
reaching a clear understanding of the Haiti earthquake relief network. The Red Cross
specializes in providing emergency assistance while acknowledging, “Over the years,
the organization has expanded its services, always with the aim of preventing and
relieving suffering.”
38
Certainly, the Red Cross remained visible and accessible
during Haiti relief. Not only were its activities more extensively covered by the media
than those of any other non-profit, the Red Cross also received more donations than

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.

38. “About Us,” American National Red Cross, accessed July 12, 2011.
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.d8aaecf214c576bf971e4cfe43181aa0/?vgnextoid=47
7859f392ce8110VgnVCM10000030f3870aRCRD&vgnextfmt=default.
89
any other international NGO.
39
The attention given toward the Red Cross was not
surprising, considering its long history in Haiti and in disaster relief as well.
Before the devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake, the Red Cross had a permanent
office in Haiti. This included fifteen workers who focused on year-round HIV
education and disaster preparation. Immediately following the earthquake, the Red
Cross directed inquiries about specific victims to the Department of State.
40
As with
mainstream media, there was an initial phase of information seeking and
acknowledgement of uncertainty. The Red Cross therefore pledged funds in
incremental amounts, slowly increasing pledges as information about the gravity of
the damage became accessible.
41
As an international NGO, the Red Cross had
multiple locations to assist in relief. The NGO had supplies stored in Panama,
including tarps, mosquito nets, and cooking sets. Although the American Red Cross
already had staff on the ground, six additional disaster specialists were deployed the
day after the earthquake to facilitate and coordinate Haiti relief. The immediate
supplies in the first few days included food, water, temporary shelters, and medical
assistance.
42

39. See Appendix B, Figure 8 for a graph depicting the worldwide coverage of the DEC, the
Red Cross and Yéle Haiti during January 2010.

40. “Disaster Alert: Earthquake in Haiti,” American Red Cross, January 12, 2010 at 5:55PM.
http://newsroom.redcross.org/2010/01/12/disaster-alert-earthquake-in-haiti/. United States citizens who
were in Haiti at the time of the earthquake were more quickly and more easily identified.

41. The Red Cross initially pledged $200,000 at 6:20pm on January 12, 2010. The next
morning, the pledge was increased to $1,000,000. On January 14, 2010, the Red Cross increased its
pledge to $10 million in total. “Earthquake in Haiti: Situational Update #5,” American Red Cross,
January 13, 2010 at 1:51pm. http://newsroom.redcross.org/2010/01/13/earthquake-in-haiti-situational-
update-5/.
42. “Earthquake in Haiti: Situational Update #6,” American Red Cross, January 13, 2010 at
1:53pm. http://newsroom.redcross.org/2010/01/13/earthquake-in-haiti-situational-update-6/.
90
Experienced in emergency relief, the Red Cross stressed its expertise to call
for donations. The first objective of major international NGOs was to itemize staff
and supplies needed. The implication of this is that the NGO is informed and capable
of administering relief. The website stressed, “The American Red Cross has about
100 relief specialists and volunteers helping with relief efforts in Haiti (including
Creole interpreters on the USNS Comfort hospital ship.)”
43
Doctors Without Borders
(MSF) did the same. Altogether, about seventy staff members joined a pre-existing
coterie of 800 MSF workers on the ground. The Red Cross also sent supplies,
including a 100-bed hospital, an inflatable surgical unit, and seven hospitalization
tents.
44
The Red Cross benefited from its widespread presence, specialization, and
overarching strategies. Although the Red Cross did not say definitively what the
greatest relief needs were, it operated under uncertainty, while presuming expertise.
Before communications were re-established in Haiti, NGOs operated at the
same level of uncertainty as mainstream media. The Red Cross made a preliminary
Youtube video during this time. On January 13, 2010, at 12:49AM, Tracy Reines, the
Director of Response Operations, informed the world of what little information was
available at the time. She explained that the Red Cross had to rely on a mix of “other
media reports, the US government, Red Cross colleagues in the area and on the

43. “Red Cross Raises More than $32 Million via Mobile Giving Program,” American Red
Cross, February 11, 2010, http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.94aae335470e2
33f6cf911df43181aa0/ ?vgnextoid=43ffe0b8da8b6210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD.

44. “Haiti: MSF Teams Set Up Clinics to Treat Injured After Facilities are Damaged,”
Doctors Without Borders, January 13, 2010.
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=4148.
91
ground, and our American Red Cross in Port-au-Prince.”
45
Already, networks
appeared to be emerging between NGOs, mainstream media, and governments; but,
lacking a single authoritative source, sharing fragments was the only option. This
video was among several that enabled the Red Cross to control its own information
and create a space for awareness independent of mainstream media. Both media and
the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters provided a unified system of
data and satellite images to provide information about the damage caused by the Haiti
earthquake.
46
However, there was an evident lag period where information remained
unreliable and incomplete.
Because Haiti has always been impoverished, some humanitarian workers and
non-profit organizations were already on the ground. Being on the ground in a
disaster implies both benefits and drawbacks for an NGO. However, Kate Snow
reported, “The Red Cross has been helping Haitians for decades, but today their
offices were in ruins. They improvised, tending to their own wounded as well as the
community’s.”
47
International NGOs with Haiti offices encountered problems with
communication. During the first few days, the Red Cross explained, “We have
limited contact with our staff in Haiti, but do now know that they are safe and

45. Tracy Reines, “Video: Earthquake in Haiti,” American Red Cross, Accessed April 15,
2012http://newsroom.redcross.org/2010/01/13/video-earthquake-in-haiti/.

46. The International Charter on Space and Major Disasters has assisted relief work
performed by countries and non-profit organizations since 2000. This charter acquires and transmits
satellite data of areas affected by man-made and natural disasters.

47. Kate Snow, “After the Quake, the Day After,” Nightline, ABC News, January 13, 2010.

92
responding to survivors’ needs.”
48
Large non-profit organizations benefit from large
networks, not only amongst other organizations but also within themselves. The
American Red Cross operated in conjunction with the International Committee of the
Red Cross. Major NGOs benefited from pre-existing disaster funds. The Red Cross
Annual Disaster Giving Program, for example, was a long-standing initiative with
numerous corporate sponsors.
49
Although donations specifically for Haiti were
received, general disaster programs allowed relief to flow more readily.
One of the tasks that major umbrella and international NGOs had to undertake
was to channel donations toward the most useful goals for expedient and efficient
relief efforts. Most humanitarian organizations, including the Red Cross and the
Disasters Emergency Committee, solicited cash donations as opposed to physical
supplies. The Red Cross explained, “Things like clothes are not helpful right now
because there is nowhere to store them, no one to sort them, and it would be difficult
to transport the items to Haiti. One good way to turn clothes into cash is to have a
garage sale and then donate the money to the relief efforts.”
50
The Red Cross
narrative introduced the disaster, claimed expertise, and asked for and channeled
preferred types of donations.

48. “Earthquake in Haiti: Situational Update #8,” American Red Cross, January 13, 2010 at
2:00pm. http://newsroom.redcross.org/2010/01/13/earthquake-in-haiti-situational-update-8/.

49. According to a Red Cross press release, corporate sponsors of the ADGP include 3M,
Bank of America, Caterpillar, Costco, Dell, Kraft Foods, Target, and Walmart. “Annual Disaster
Giving Program,” American Red Cross, accessed May 4, 2012,
http://www.redcross.org/supporters/corporate-foundations/annual-disaster-giving-program.

50. “Earthquake in Haiti: Situational Update #13,” American Red Cross, January 14, 2010 at
12:33PM. http://newsroom.redcross.org/2010/01/14/earthquake-in-haiti-situational-update-13/.
93
Yéle Haiti: A Haitian NGO
Now that the DEC and Red Cross have been introduced, the Haiti-specific
Yéle Haiti Foundation is important to explore. Grammy-award winning musicians
Wyclef Jean and Jerry Duplessis of the Black Eyed Peas founded the Yéle Haiti
Foundation in 2005. The organization works exclusively in Haiti. Its mission is to
remain non-political and focus on emergency relief, employment, education, and
agricultural development.
51
Unlike umbrella organizations and international NGOs,
Yéle Haiti promotes its “grassroots” approach to relief.
52
The 2010 earthquake
profoundly affected organizations that work exclusively within Haiti. One study
found that Yéle Haiti was “One of the most successful groups in terms of celebrity-
driven coverage.”
53
Although Yéle Haiti is a relatively small organization, it raised a
substantial $10.5 million in the six months that followed the earthquake.
54
As a
nation-specific organization, Yéle Haiti acknowledged that the earthquake
“profoundly and permanently changed” its work toward emergency relief and long-
term rebuilding.
55
However, the NGO maintained its pre-existing projects, Yéle Vert
and Youth Orchestra of Haiti, despite challenges that resulted from the earthquake.
56

51. “About Us,” Yéle Haiti, April 10, 2012. http://www.yele.org/view-content/11/Who-We-
Are.html.

52. Ibid.

53. A. Trevor Thrall, Jaime Lollio-Fakhreddine, Jon Berent et al., “Star Power: Celebrity
Advocacy and the Evolution of the Public Sphere,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13
(2008): 372.

54. “The Candidate and the Charity,” New York Times, August 19, 2010, A26.

55. “About Us,” Yéle Haiti.

56. Ibid.
94
Yéle Haiti was able to channel its celebrity leadership on unique fundraising
platforms. It received donations from MTV’s Haiti Earthquake Telethon.
57
Wyclef
Jean performed with other musicians in a BET benefit concert, “SOS Saving
Ourselves – Help for Haiti,” which allocated funds to Yéle Haiti, CARE, Project
Medishare, and Children’s Safe Drinking Water.
58
At one moment Jean declared “I
am the son of Haiti.”
59
He voiced how he had started the foundation as a Haitian, for
Haitians.
60
This narrative clearly appealed to some donors, while alienating others.
Although Yéle Haiti was successful in fundraising, the Haiti earthquake increased the
scrutiny brought to bear on the charity.
61
In fact, the former Executive Director
Sanjay Rawal disclosed that he did not think the charity was able to handle large
projects.
62
On the one hand, local charities may be preferred because local
interpersonal relationships are important for the success of humanitarian projects.
63

57. On January 22, the MTV network hosted “Hope for Haiti,” a global telethon that aired
commercial-free on MTV, ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, CNN, BET, the CW, HBO, VH1, and CMT.
George Clooney, Wyclef Jean, and Anderson Cooper hosted this successful event, which raised funds
for Oxfam America, Partners in Health, Red Cross, Unicef, and Yéle Haiti. Because of Jean’s celebrity
activism, his Yéle Haiti Foundation was the only non-umbrella, non-international organization selected
for this significant event. Eric Ditzian, “Wyclef Jean Joins George Clooney to Lead MTV’s ‘Hope for
Haiti’ Telethon,” MTV News, January 15, 2010, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1629832/wyclef-
joins-clooney-lead-mtvs-hope-haiti-telethon.jhtml.

58. Dave Itzkoff, “Performers Plan More Efforts for Haiti,” New York Times, January 30,
2010, C2.

59. Wyclef Jean, “Haiti Yéle Earthquake Update: Wyclef Jean Interview after Return from
Haiti,” Red Fish Media, January 16, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvnIegQ_QbA.

60. Jean, “Haiti Yéle Earthquake Update.”

61. The Chief Executive of the Wise Giving Alliance stated, “Wyclef Jean has been like a
magnet to attract money to his charity, and we don’t have even the slightest idea of how he or his
organization intend to use this money.” Stephanie Strom, “Haitian Quake Brings More Money and
Scrutiny to a Charity,” New York Times, February 5, 2010, A17.

62. Stephanie Strom, “Haitian Quake Brings More Money and Scrutiny to a Charity,” New
York Times, February 5, 2010, A17.

63. Steve Sampson, “The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania.” In
Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (1996): 140.
95
However, smaller and less established charities also experienced difficulty in Haiti.
Other organizations with experience in disaster relief, accompanied by more
extensive legal and tax experts, had the needed personnel to handle larger projects.
The larger, more experienced organizations enjoyed pre-existing relationships and
experiences that could be used to advance their work.
While umbrella relief organizations represent coordination of efforts and
disaster strategies, international organizations are able to mobilize and communicate
specifically about the disaster by calling attention to the greatest needs and providing
wide-ranging projects. More localized NGOs, such as Yéle Haiti, focused on
community-led organizations and grassroots approaches to relief. Most of the
organizations I explore utilized new media to fundraise, share stories about the
earthquake, and promote its organization. Having identified important distinctions
between NGOs involved in Haiti relief, use of new media will be categorized and
compared.
Calls for Donations and New Media Interventions
Haiti earthquake relief marked a significant moment when almost every NGO
involved – umbrella, international, and local – incorporated new media in one way or
another. NGOs’ Haiti earthquake relief strategies relied on reflexive individual
participation and identification. New media enabled outlets for fundraising,
identifying, and group promotion to occur in innovative and interesting ways. Beth
Kanter and Allison Fine identify the importance of individual empowerment in
networked NGOs’ effectiveness:
Free agents’ facility with social media gives them power and tools that
only organizations had just a few years ago. They have become
96
integral parts of ecosystems within which nonprofit organizations
work. While traditional organizations may bristle at their emergence,
Networked Nonprofits naturally work with them toward common
ends.
64

Although some organizations differ in their specializations, area of concentration, and
ideologies, one thing that every NGO must do is collect donations. New media
enabled more efficient transfer of funds. Before new media, a large obstacle to
emergency response was busy telephone lines and lack of clear outlets for
donations.
65
Most NGOs utilized new media in order to facilitate fundraising by
making electronic fund transfers available through their websites. New media also
invited participation and interactivity.
66
Interactivity is important because it “plays a
role in persuasion by bringing users to identify themselves with the speakers’
interests.”
67

Traditional media focuses on balancing narratives; NGOs almost exclusively
share stories of turmoil, paired with outlets for offering support. Immediately
following the Haiti earthquake, not-for-profits facilitated relief efforts with new
media. Using new media channels, NGOs could create interest in the disaster, itemize
specific needs, stress their ethos, and tell stories.

64. Beth Kanter and Allison Fine, The Networked Nonprofit: Connecting with Social Media to
Drive Social Change (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 4.

65. Scanlon, “The Search for Non-Existent Facts,” 50.

66. Some rhetorical scholars, most notably Barbara Warnick, have addressed new
technologies in communication and their relationship to rhetorical theory. This project builds upon this
important endeavor. Barbara Warnick, “Rhetorical Criticism of Public Discourse on the Internet:
Theoretical Implications,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 28 (1998): 73-84.
67. Warnick, Rhetoric Online, 71.
97
Social Media
The degree of new media activity in Haiti relief was unprecedented. Virtually
every NGO maintains a website in contemporary society.
68
Along with social
networking platforms like Twitter and Facebook, NGO websites increased
accessibility and community. Facebook and Twitter are inexpensive for not-for-
profits to maintain; umbrella organizations, international NGOs and Haiti-specific
NGOs maintained a presence on social media. Tweets and retweets enabled public
figures to spread the word and link to their preferred website for donations, additional
information, and other promotional behavior. Advancing advocacy on a non-profit
organization through online social networking is comparatively inexpensive.
Websites were structured so as to invite individuals’ participation in relief by
donating or reposting about the earthquake. “I would say Twitter is the No. 1 outlet
right now for spreading information about our organization,”
69
Jaime Connelly, Vice
President of the Samuel Dalembert Foundation, said. “After the initial post about [the
earthquake] there definitely was a surge. Now we’re getting a donation about every
minute,” she added.
70

Twitter and other social networking websites offered information and narratives
that reported events as they happened in real time. Timing was important for
mobilizing immediate support and awareness. Twitter faciliated pre-existing network

68. Generic criticism can be a useful way to study websites and other digital rhetorical
artifacts. In fact, websites themselves can be a genre, as established by Lynne A. Baab. Lynne M.
Baab, “Portraits of the Future Church,” Journal of Communication & Religion 31 (2008):143-181.

69. Joel Siegel, “Wyclef Jean’s Haiti Relief Tweets Raise $1 Million,” ABC News, January
14, 2010, accessed May 10, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/HaitiEarthquake/wyclef-jean-haiti-
relief-raises-million-twitter/story?id=9563592#.T_3v9o5dBaU.
70. Ibid.
98
structures to promote interactivity. When advocacy groups used networking logic,
powerful results materialized. New media forced “power flows” to take “precedence
over the flows of power.”
71
Relationships became less hierarchical because
interactivity and participation become more important than selective, elite, and
privledged representation. Individuals were empowered to choose which hyperlink to
click, which tweet to retweet, and which organization to endorse.
72
This formed a
sense of community in the donation process.
Websites like Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, and Skype allowed victims power
over their story. There is an interactivity assumed and appreciated in these platforms.
For example, Twitter continued to proliferate appeals and dissent. Social media and
mobile phones interacted powerfully during the Haiti earthquake relief. Wendy
Harmon of the American Red Cross explains, “we tweeted…celebrities retweeted.”
73

The celebrities who tweeted about the earthquake included Tyra Banks, Steve Nash,
Dr. Phil, Shaquille O’Neal, Lenny Kravitz, Ashton Kutcher, and Shakira.
74
Wendy
Harmon explained, “People weren’t just tweeting, they were taking action – they
were texting to donate. We raised $3 million in 48 hours, $10 at a time.”
75
New media
established connections between non-profit organizations, victims, activists,

71. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 500.

72. In digital artifacts, author, text and audiences are dispersed in hyperlink environments.
Warnick, “Rhetorical Criticism of Public Discourse on the Internet,” 73-84.

73. James Morgan, “Twitter and Facebook Users Respond to Haiti Crisis,” BBC, January 15,
2010, accessed May 10, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8460791.stm.

74. Siegel, “Wyclef Jean’s Haiti Relief Tweets Raise $1 Million.”

75. Farhad Manjoo, “Online Giving, One Person at a Time,” The New York Times, November
11, 2010, F13.
99
celebrities, and individuals – as well as mainstream media, political figures, and
corporations. These connections facilitated donations and consciousness.
Twitter, arguably, was the most widespread social media website. News on
Twitter initiated in multiple places, including mainstream media’s new media links.
Twitter links acted like a “core community that is interested in the disaster.”
76
Tweets
about natural disasters originated from countries across the globe.
77
The Nielsen
Company found that Twitter was the leading source of discussion about the
earthquake, followed by online videos, blogs, and online forums.
78
Early on, Haitians
were encouraged to use Twitter to share firsthand information or call for help or
support. One of the first tweets about the earthquake was by Haitian radio host Carel
Peder, who tweeted, “WE NEED HELPPPPPPPPPPPP!!!!!!!!”
79
Hashtags #Haiti or
#Haitiquake categorized the extensive tweets made about or for Haiti during this
time. Non-profit organizations and public figures also tweeted for Haiti. The Red
Cross gained 10,000 followers in the three days that followed the earthquake.
80

Certainly, new media informed people about the quake and connected individuals
with their preferred disaster organization.

76. Nagar Seema, Seth Aaditeshwar, and Joshi Anupam, “Characterization of Social Media
Response to Natural Disasters,” WWW 2012 Companion, April 16-20, 2012, Lyon, France.

77. Ibid.

78. “Social Media and Mobile Texting a Major Source of Info and Aid for Earthquake in
Haiti,” Nielsen Wire, January 15, 2010. http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/social-
media-and-mobile-texting-a-major-source-of-info-and-aid-for-earthquake-in-
haiti/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+NielsenWire+%28Nie
lsen+Wire%29.
79. Mike Sachoff, “Twitter Helping Haiti Earthquake Victims: Twitter Updates Valuable
During Quake Crisis,” WebProNews, January 16, 2010. http://www.webpronews.com/twitter-helping-
haiti-earthquake-victims-2010-01.

80. Before the earthquake, the Red Cross’ Twitter account was gaining an average of 50-100
new followers each day. “Social Media and Mobile Texting.”
100
Not only individuals, but also celebrities and public figures, connected with
NGO’s new media platforms. Celebrities took to Twitter to call for donations and to
contextualize the earthquake. Actor Misha Collins explains, “Technology has
changed the fan/actor interaction quite a bit. Now it’s really easy to communicate
with a large group of people in a really short time, and that opens a lot of
possibilities.”
81
Musician P. Diddy tweeted, “STATE OF EMERGENCY!!” to more
than 2.4 million people who followed him on Twitter.
82
Celebrities deployed new
media with calls for help, linking their tweets to their preferred charity.
New media were imperative to the Haitian victims. In fact, new media
generated a channel for victims to tell stories. Haitian musician, Richard Morse,
tweeted details of his experience: “Night has fallen...Night seems to take so long...I
guess those that are buried alive in the rubble are feeling it the worse.”
83
He later
became an advocate for effective humanitarian relief:
The best way to help Quake ravaged Port au Prince is to invest in the
people and the infrastructure in the Haitian countryside. This
investment shouldn't be funneled through Haiti's Economic Elite
Families who have brought Haiti to its current economic status. This is
precisely what Bill Clinton is trying to do and he should be stopped
immediately! These families have proven that their economic plans
only benefit a few and lead to poverty and squalor for the rest. The
lobbying efforts of the families and their ties to Washington have been
a detriment to the Haitian people.
84

81. Jefferson Graham, “Talking Your Tech,” USA Today, May 14, 2012, 2B.

82. Siegel, “Wyclef Jean’s Haiti Relief Tweets Raise $1 Million.”

83. “Haiti Earthquake Update, Day Two,” CBS News, January 13, 2010.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-6091137-503543.html?tag=mncol;lst;1.

84. Richard Morse, “Haiti for Haitians: Post Quake Haiti,” The Huffington Post, June 23,
2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-morse/haiti-for-haitians-post-q_b_622453.html.
101
Twitter created an outlet for someone crafting individual ownership of their story and
forming a channel for critical inquiry. Facebook users were encouraged to visit the
“Haiti Earthquake” Facebook group.
85
This website was created after the earthquake,
enabling Facebook users to share comments, ask questions, share information, upload
videos, and assist in locating displaced loved ones. “Earthquake Haiti” also directed
individuals to reputable and legitimate relief organizations. These groups were
significant because they created spaces of social solidarity, networks of information,
and updated information sharing.
86

Mobile Fundraising
In addition to Twitter’s contribution to Haiti relief, the mobile fundraising
efforts for Haiti also met with extreme success. As social media spread, mobile
donations surged. Not only were cell phones used to transfer money to Haitians, they
were also used to facilitate mobile giving worldwide.
87
Although mobile donating had
been initiated before, the Haiti campaign was extensive and extremely successful. In
fact, Haiti relief broke all previous records for any mobile giving campaign.
88
A
recent Pew Report found that 9% of American adults have used a mobile device to
donate money to charity.
89
Mobile donations were convenient and offered individuals

85. “EARTHQUAKE HAITI,” http://www.facebook.com/groups/252988675717/.
86. As of August 17, 2012, the “Earthquake Haiti” Facebook group is still active. However,
the goals have transitioned into continued fundraising and support.

87. Digecel, one of Haiti’s largest cell phone service providers, worked with the UNDP to
allow cash transfers and aid to Haitians’ cell phones. In Haiti, almost two-thirds of the population own
some form of cell phone but only ten per cent have bank accounts. “Mobile Phone Cash Transfers
Assists Rebuild Haiti,” The New York Times, March 4, 2012.
88. Morgan, “Twitter and Facebook Users Respond to Haiti Crisis.”

89. “Real Time Charitable Giving,” Pew Internet, January 12, 2012,
http://pewinternet.org/Press-Releases/2012/Real-Time-Charitable-Giving.aspx
102
an outlet for an immediate act of charity. A study of the Haiti mobile donations
showed that contributions were often spur-of-the-moment decisions that spread
through pre-existing friend networks.
90
Adam Smith, a senior research specialist at
the Pew Internet Project, explains, “mobile giving is often an ‘impulse purchase’ in
response to a major event or call to action.”
91

Many NGOs took advantage of this emerging method of receiving donations by
launching mobile giving. The DEC, the Red Cross, and Yéle Haiti all launched
campaigns specifically for Haiti. The Red Cross launched its mobile campaign on
January 12, 2010, almost three hours after the earthquake. This program called for
mobile users to text “Haiti” to 90999 to send a ten-dollar donation to the Red Cross,
raising a substantial thirty-two million dollars.
92
Individuals donated five pounds to
the DEC by texting “GIVE” to 70077. Texting “Yele” to 501501 pledged five dollars
to the Yele Haiti Foundation. This previously obscure charity received a substantial
two million dollars in text donations alone.
93
Mobile donation programs required
NGOs to build relationships with media to spread calls for donations. Mobile Accord
and the MGive Foundation are NGOs that coordinated and supported mobile giving
for Haiti. The US State Department also encouraged mobile giving.
94
Undoubtedly,
Haiti marked an exciting time that demonstrated the powerful capabilities of new

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.
92. “Red Cross Raises More than $32 Million via Mobile Giving Program,” The Red Cross,
February 11, 2010, http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem. 94aae33547
0e233f6cf911df43181aa0/?vgnextoid=43ffe0b8da8b6210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD.

93. Strom, “ Haitian Quake Brings More Money,” A17.
94. “Red Cross Raises More than $32 Million via Mobile Giving Program,” The Red Cross.
103
media and mobile donations. NGOs adapted to changing communication
environments, resulting in one of the most successful fundraising campaign in
history.
Anniversary Reports: Itemized Contributions and Displacement of Blame
NGOs enjoyed the benefits from developing technology and emerging social
network society, but they also had to continue with the long-term agenda.
Anniversary reports were an opportunity to update the public on their contributions.
Because there was an evident frustration with the progress made, media outlets and
NGOs needed to direct blame away and to defend their work.
95
Almost every NGO I
studied had some sort of anniversary report. Yéle Haiti’s report on the six-month
anniversary is particularly interesting. It used the opportunity to call for more
aggressive action and promote its recommended plan for recovery, including a
request that the Haiti Interim Recovery Commission appropriate $150 million to
“coherent public safety and security plans addressing current violence, kidnappings,
abductions, rapes and sexual abuse rampant in the most vulnerable communities.”
96

On the earthquake’s six-month anniversary, Jean released a song called “The
Day After,” aimed at generating revenue for Haiti. The same day, CNN interviewed
him and asked who was to blame for the lack of efficient relief. He responded by
placing blame on “bureaucratic red tape,” land disputes, and lack of donation

95. Post-disaster can serve as a space for critical inquiry. The Red Cross received criticism
after the Viejas fires in Southern California for lack of leadership and lack of accountability. Johanna
Hunsaker, “American Red Cross: Under Fire,” Journal of the Academy for Case Studies, 13(3), 105-
112. NGOs are aware of this, so they contribute on-going reports of their activities and contributions.

96. The report also requested $150 to remove the rubble in the damaged region. “Yéle Haiti’s
Wyclef Jean Urges Strong Call to Action as Six-Month Anniversary of Earthquake Approaches,” Yéle,
New York, July 12, 2010, http://www.yele.org/newyele/uploads/6%20month%20anniversary%20-
July%2012,%202010.pdf.
104
distribution.
97
Fundraising was still positioned in NGO anniversary reports, however,
the site shifted to explain and critique the lack of progress. Because NGOs made
promises and appealed to people so strongly, anticipations were set and anniversaries
exposed these as unmet.
Anniversary reports can also be spaces for expression of frustration and
criticism. Clearly painting himself in a heroic persona, Yéle Haiti’s Wyclef Jean
proclaimed, “I’m a warrior and can’t stand by quietly while promises aren’t kept. I
won’t ever surrender.”
98
Additionally, Jean took advantage of the six-month
anniversary of the Haiti earthquake to remind his audience of how much help is
needed: “We’ve seen the situation, and we’ve been listening to others on the ground.
It’s still bleak. Rubble and collapsed buildings are everywhere.”
99
In the epic frame,
“a pattern resides in its ability to make humility and self-glorification work
together.”
100
Reports employed a frame that reiterated the gravity of damage, while
promoting the organizations expertise and effectiveness. A need is stated, as well as a
confidence that the person or organization was capable of overcoming the obstacles
of relief. There was an evident sense of responsibility and heroism that existed in
NGO reports that was not as notable in mainstream media’s anniversary reports.
Anniversary reports also served as a space to itemize the contributions that
NGOs distributed to aid the Haitian people. Yéle Haiti listed the supplies that they

97. “CNN American Morning Interviews Wyclef Jean about Progress in Haiti,” July 12, 2010,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mt22L4f7bMw&list=UUanUJP9Nsfx4okpDd1N_MdQ&index=7&
feature=plcp.

98. “Yéle Haiti’s Wyclef Jean Urges Strong Call to Action.”

99. Ibid.

100. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press), 1984, 36.
105
distributed, including meals, water, medical supplies, diapers, tents, and clothing,
among other things.
101
Interestingly enough, six months after the earthquake, Doctors
Without Borders claimed, “Numbers of poor people who before the disaster were
effectively excluded from the public and private systems are now able to get
attention.”
102
Doctors Without Borders was essentially contextualizing their relief
work as extremely successful. NGO rhetoric praised the accomplishment of their
organization, while reminding their audiences that the situation in Haiti was
problematic. Blame was obscurely placed on others. However, this strategy failed to
be as effective when, clearly, a completed narrative was seen as unanswered by the
community.
Analysis and Comparison with Mainstream Media
Haiti gave NGOs an opportunity for renewed public interest. NGO websites
created a grammar of reporting that transmitted stories and appeals and motivated the
audience to participate. Links from celebrities, non-profit workers, and Haitian
Twitter accounts mobilized and facilitated this process. Virtually every NGO
highlighted Haiti on their organization’s front page within days of the earthquake.
Photos were important to emotionally and visually transport audiences and motivate
them to care and donate funds for help. There was an initial sense of terror and
devastation, which not-for-profits depicted and amplified. NGOs not only worked on
the ground, but also delivered narratives to the international community that adapted
pre-existing NGO ideologies toward meaningful work in Haiti. After demonstrating

101. “Yéle Haiti’s Wyclef Jean Urges Strong Call to Action.”
102. “Emergency Response After the Haiti Earthquake: Choices, Obstacles, Activities and
Finance, Six Months After the Earthquake,” Medecins Sans Frontieres: Doctors Without Borders, July
8, 2010. https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=4581&cat=special-report.
106
need, NGO websites invited those needs to be fulfilled through donations and NGO
support. The rhetorical project of NGOs was to voice a need and claim a capacity to
help.
NGOs adapted to the specific problems posed by the earthquake. Kanter and
Fine contend, “there is no universal rule about which tool will work under which
circumstances for which people.” In fact, networked nonprofits “use many tools to
engage in different kinds of conversations with different groups of people.”
103
In
Haiti, NGOs needed to be well versed in their institutional structure, but also needed
to adapt to changing technologies and understand Haitian culture and agency. Mobile
campaigns had been attempted before the Haiti earthquake, but it took this historical
moment to demonstrate just how successful this strategy can be. All types of NGOs,
umbrella organizations, international NGOs and Haitian NGOs needed to participate
in a rhetorical project that in many ways mirrored mainstream media. For example,
both media and not-for-profits needed to deal with uncertainty. According to Joseph
Scanlon, “The real problem isn’t that information [about natural disasters] is not
available immediately. It’s that it may never be available.”
104
Charity organizations,
certainly, have obstacles to overcome. Most people who are in the humanitarian
business are loyal to the ideology and cause of the charity. Uncertainty was not only
characteristic of the preliminary information about the earthquake, but the long-term
effectiveness of NGO strategies were obscure as well.

103. Beth Kanter and Allison Fine, The Networked Nonprofit: Connecting with Social Media
to Drive Change (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2010), 2.

104. Scanlon, “The Search for Non-Existent Facts,” 52.
107
Even so, disasters influenced humanitarian work; once interest is shaped or
formed, NGOs mobilize donations and call for support in interesting ways. There was
interplay of layered networking responses. NGOs were closely related and planned
strategic positioning. Some organizations used Haiti as a publicity site. Others have
always been interested in Haiti. Websites on Haiti exhibited particular patterns and
distinctions. For one, mainstream media showed dead bodies in mass graves, but
these pictures were not prevalent in NGO websites and appeals. One can assume that
their depiction of the Haitian people emphasized hope and agency. NGOs replicated
each other’s strategies by creating a pattern of “epic” frames.
Descriptions and other NGO interventions during the Haiti relief movement
can be viewed as dramatistic performances. Kenneth Burke contends that, “A moral
attitude may be adopted by one class, for instance, to help them in their work, and
may be promoted by another class to keep them in their work.”
105
Murali Balaji
argues that Haiti earthquake representation showed “black people as somehow
hopelessly dependent on the charity of whites.”
106
Undoubtedly, there were ongoing
politics of race and difference in NGO’s portrayal of Haiti earthquake relief. This was
not unique to Haiti. Neil deMause made an insightful observation: After Hurricane
Katrina, people would proclaim, “this isn’t supposed to happen here!” deMause found
this problematic because Haiti, not being in the United States, might invoke the
corollary that “This is supposed to happen there” – perpetuating “not outrage at the

105. Kenneth Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form, 243
106. Murali Balaji, “Radicalizing Pity: The Haiti Earthquake and the Plight of ‘Others,’”
Critical Studies in Media Communication 28 (2011): 51.
108
conditions that create and sustain poverty, but merely pity for its victims.”
107
In fact,
humanitarian projects may use one strategy for a domestic disaster and another for an
international one, which essentially produced and exploited divisions with motives
that were seeking to eradicate them.
Identification needed to be created for NGOs to be effective fundraisers. Haiti
disaster rhetoric sometimes used the epic frame, which understands that systems are
flawed but are nevertheless still valuable. Social movements followed a dramatic
figuration over time; network movements may create a public present by borrowing
from mainstream social news but then moving to establish a self-informing and
interacting matrix of exchange. NGOs stressed the heroic nature of the First World as
they rescued the Third World victims. Heroes embodied societal values. Disaster
narratives stressed humankind’s limitation in controlling nature, but also the heroic
capacity of those trying to rectify it. The audience felt as if they could share in the
virtues of the hero; the First World audience was able to praise the charity and
nobility of the First World relief effort.
Heroes, or saviors, are seen as inspirations, something or someone to emulate.
Victims are not. These problematic portrayals of “heroes” and “victims” are not
isolated to disaster work. According to Makau Mutua, “The grand narrative of human
rights contains a subtext which depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one
hand, against the victims and saviors, on the other.”
108
Viewed in contrast to the

107. Neil deMause, “It’s Tough to be Haitian, Isn’t It?”, 9.
108. Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 10.
109
helpless victims, the work of the NGOs may have been viewed as Christ-like. NGOs
often presented themselves in an epic frame. This frame, however, was accompanied
by some problems; Buerkle, Mayer, and Olson explain, “the epic is an acceptance
frame that celebrates the ideals of the dominating order through the admiration of a
hero who embodies the ideal attitudes and goals of the community.”
109
Ultimately,
heroes need to be humanized.
110
In fact, Burke argues, “a flaw serves happily to
promote an openness to realistic admonition.”
111
NGOs often had to praise their own
contribution while also highlighting their shortcomings in order to continue to build a
case for aid.
Hero narratives are problematic because they alleviate guilt and do not invite
critical inquiry or productive dialogue. Paul Farmer, an anthropologist who has
worked extensively in Haiti, proclaims, “we must understand that what happens to
poor people is never divorced from the actions of the powerful.” He continues,
“control of lives is related to control of land, systems of production, and the formal
political and legal structures in which lives are enmeshed.”
112
The hero narrative falls
short because it praises the First World while ignoring long-term institutional factors
of global poverty. Responsibility is never internalized. Bebbington, Hickey, and
Mitlin agree: “the disappointments of NGOs has been their tendency to identify more

109. C. Wesley Buerkle, Michael E. Mayer, and Clark D. Olson, “Our Hero the Buffoon:
Contradictory and Concurrent Burkean Framing of Arizona Governor Evan Mechan,” Western Journal
of Communication 67 (2003): 191.
110. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 36.

111. Ibid., 37.
112. Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on Poor
(Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2005): 158.

110
readily with alternative forms of interventions than with systematic changes, and
there are strong grounds for reversing this trend.”
113
Certainly, the hero narrative
concludes that guilt is alleviated and work has been effective. Systematic changes are,
in fact, needed.
Although there are evident limitations, natural disasters clearly redefine the
humanitarian project. Before the disasters, Third World needs are generally
understood, but there is no sense of immediacy. According to Richard A. Pride,
“Special attention needs to be given to the framing activities of movement activists
and media operatives before and after a critical event to specify when redefinition is
likely to occur.”
114
At first, drawing the attention of and motivating publics is
necessary. Previously mobilized NGOs in Haiti had an advantage in earthquake relief
because they had a presence and a voice for early information about the earthquake.
Sampson explains that, during humanitarian projects, “inequality between west and
east masquerades as ‘partnership’ or ‘coordination’” and problems emerge when
“‘models’ for development by which the east is supposed to replicate (if not imitate) a
Western experience which is only a representation taken out of context.”
115
Many
NGOs faced paradoxes that made their contributions unsustainable.
116
This process
was exacerbated in the context of disaster relief.

113. Anthony J. Bebbington, Samuel Hickey, and Diana C. Mitlin, Can NGOs Make a
Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives (New York: Zed Books, 2008), 5.

114. Richard A. Pride, “How Activists and Media Frame Social Problems Critical Events
Versus Performance Trends in Schools,” Political Communication 12, (1995): 23.

115. Steve Sampson, “The Social Life of Projects,” 141-142.

116. In Bangladesh, NGO-member relationship experienced tensions between perceived
social and political considerations and the economic considerations of development. Joe Devine, “The
Paradox of Sustainability: Reflections on NGOs in Bangladesh,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 590 (2003): 227.
111
New media created tensions among what was known, what was unknown,
what drew attention, who was expected to speak, and what was disturbing. CBS
reporter Kelly Wallace contrasted the technology of fundraising with the, at times,
archaic distribution of aid: “The system for distributing aid is very low tech. Roads
are damaged and now many of the charities based there are now victims
themselves.”
117
The narrative of modern technological giving of the First World
contrasted with narratives about the underdeveloped struggles in the Third World
conditions of Haiti. There was a level of interest after the earthquake because it was a
shocking event; however, this interest was short-lived. New media activity had to be
quick to adapt to growing concerns and needs while trying to sustain compassion. For
example, new media activism was interested in Haiti disaster relief, but not
necessarily international disaster preparedness. Disaster prevention was arguably
more important to the international humanitarian community.
118
Disasters are
dramatic events; however, the most climatic moments are the initial storytelling, this
sustaining long-term interest challenging. Once an NGO frames itself as a hero,
which it must do to compete with other NGOs, it is difficult to respond to the
problems of relief and rebuilding. Umbrella organizations are to some extent able to
avoid criticism and blame because their objective was solely to raise funds.
Summary and Conclusions
Natural disasters sometimes inspire widespread humanitarian work. In Haiti,
the humanitarian movement was well-funded and mobilized quickly. Relief was

117. Wallace, “Notebook: Aid to Haiti.”

118. Charles Cohen and Eric D. Werker argue, “the international humanitarian community
must be involved in disaster prevention if it is to offer free relief.” Charles Cohen and Eric D. Werker,
“The Political Economy of ‘Natural Disasters,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (2008): 797.
112
anticipated, but each natural disaster renews disruptions and challenges. Richard A.
Pride defines a “redefining critical event” as a moment “when the perception of
reality surrounding movement issues shifts markedly among elites and mass
publics.”
119
The Haiti earthquake certainly disrupted the continuities that made the
Haitian people feel temporarily safe and secure. The hope for activists during these
times is that they can inspire individuals to shift their perception of global social
issues and broader social movements.
Pride elaborates, “the collective definition of social problems is accelerated
more by critical events than by performance trends because critical events are more
likely to stimulate competition among movement activists and media activists over
the meaning to be given to newly problematic aspects of our collective lives.”
120

Natural disasters are critical events that influence how social movement activists
redefine and reframe social movement issues.
121
Pride further argues that future
research “must focus on the specific aspects of movement response to variety of
critical events.”
122
Natural disasters are critical events for social movements. Changes
in resources, strategies, tactics, and participation are likely to occur when the stakes
and public interest are high.
123
Moreover, “It is clear that these and other aspects of
collective action are conditioned by the claims-making process, and each merits full

119. Pride, “How Activists and Media Frame Social Problems,” 6.

120. Ibid., 23.

121. Susan Staggenborg, “Critical Events and the Mobilization of the Pro-Choice
Movement,” Research in Political Sociology 6 (1993): 319-345.

122. Pride, “How Activists and Media Frame Social Problems,” 23.

123. Staggenborg, “Critical Events.”
113
elaboration.”
124
NGOs are invigorated by natural disasters because they are redefining
critical events to advocate their cause, posit an epic frame, market their organization,
and tell humanitarian stories that highlight their work and core institutional values.
In post-disaster climates, non-profit organization websites, Twitter accounts,
and mobile fundraising enabled viewers to participate with organizations digitally.
Memory plays an important role in preventing and challenging disaster fatigue.
Finances and time constrain the ability of many individuals to visit a place physically,
but digital spaces can tell a story and remind audiences of the disaster and its
aftermath. The problem with new media is that even though they give victims
empowerment over their own stories and broaden the scope of discussion, they also
allows more space and opportunity for counterproductive talk.
125
Advances in
technology allow, undoubtedly, for a certain element of confusion. However, Haiti
demonstrates an inarguably productive moment in NGO new media intervention. The
possibilities of a more expedient strategy for relief were made evident.
Disaster networks depended on communicating information, mobilizing
support for participation and requesting monetary support from donors. There are
limitations to what transnational activists networks and NGOs can achieve. NGOs’
efforts can be counterproductive at times. Often, Western representations of disasters
and their victims obscure the local and global dynamics that are the driving forces of
economic disparity and environmental vulnerability. NGOs made imperative moves

124. Pride, “How Activists and Media Frame Social Problems,” 23.

125. For example the Pro-Life website LifeNews.com took the opportunity to explain “Haiti
was once on the receiving end of hatred from an abortion practitioner.” Steven Ertelt, “Abortion
Practitioner to Haiti: ‘Stew in Your Own Juices’ for having High Population,” Life News, January 13,
2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/01/13/int-1434/?pr=1.
114
and plays during the Haiti intervention and networking relief. Non-profit
organizations used their relationships to mainstream media to campaign for
fundraising among publics and individuals and proved to be successful in those
campaigns.
Although the monetary support provided to the 2010 Haiti Relief was
unprecedented, the strategies for effectively distributing the donations has been
scrutinized. Fundraising was imperative, but without an effective plan, these efforts
did not fulfill their potential. Moreover, NGOs must make use of the heightened
public interest after a natural disaster. Not only do audiences grow tired of disaster
relief, but institutions also lose interest. This makes NGO work complicated. During
Haiti relief, NGOs mobilized the public during their most interested phase of disaster
psychology. Not only was it essential to understand the scope and speed of
fundraising in Haiti, but careful consideration of the mistakes and weakness should
also be explored. NGOs collaborated amongst themselves and other actors in framing
appeals that served the interests and motivations specific to an NGO, but they also
associated with overall self-organizing relationships among terms, goals, and
identifications.
Haiti’s relief movement was constrained by typical problems that affect many
NGOs. The disaster was an opportunity to shift their rhetorical strategies, goals, and
use of communication technologies. However, the effectiveness of NGOs was
constrained by certain factors, including variations in public support and tensions
between localism and globalism.
126
Haiti was plagued with “structural violence”

126. Patrice C. MacMahon, “International Actors and Women’s NGOs in Poland and
Hungary,” in Mendelson and Glenn, The Power and Limits of NGOs.
115
before the earthquake, which is characterized by “a host of offensives against human
dignity: extreme and relative poverty, social inequities ranging from racism to gender
inequality, and the spectacular forms of violence that are uncontestably human rights
abuses.”
127
Although NGOs tried to provide support, they failed to articulate the
structural violence that afflicted Haiti before and would continue to obstruct progress
well after “relief” ends.
Certain factors influence NGO’s ability to be effective. The strongest NGOs are
typically those that have international support, mobility, and organization, but Haiti
new media relief also assisted local organizations like never before. Local
organizations are dependent on international resources to be effective and sustain
themselves. However, in natural disasters, local organizations are even more
dependent on international assistance because their organizations have been harmed
by the disaster and their work becomes exponentially more necessary.
NGOs are more effective when they have support from local leaders and
community members. In Haiti, this was particularly problematic. Many state leaders
died during the earthquake and communities were in disarray. Additionally, local
organizations have an independence from international support, which has unintended
consequences such as removing incentives to mobilize new members and fostering
competition for grants, resulting in mistrust, bitterness, and secrecy between
organizations.
128
Charity work involves the appropriation of resources, the
prioritization of programs, and a relationship with public figures and media

127. Farmer, Pathologies of Power, 8.

128. James Richter, “Evaluating Western Assistance to Russian Women’s Organizations,” in
Mendelson and Glenn. The Power and Limits of NGOs.
116
figureheads – charity work involves power. But post-disaster attempts to gain and
maintain power are not limited to NGOs; governments are integral to the networks
that negotiate these terms.
117
CHAPTER FOUR
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN DISASTER RELIEF:
MILITARY ACTION, PUBLIC POLICY REFORM, PUBLIC ADDRESS,
AND BIOSECURITY

“We’ve already donated to Haiti, it’s called US income tax.”
1

~Rush Limbaugh

Mainstream media informed the world about the natural disaster in Haiti. Non-
profit organizations collected donations and administered humanitarian relief.
Governments undertook more complicated roles in post-disaster politics.
2
According to
Charles Cohen and Eric D. Werker, “Natural disasters occur in a political space. They
are not driven by politics, nor are they immune from politics.”
3
Governments influence
humanitarian networks, but their roles have both material and symbolic dimensions
unique to state action as well.
In global politics, this becomes even more interesting. Interrelated public
policies and shared risk in globalized politics causes some advocates to recommend a

1. Nicholas Graham, “Limbaugh: ‘We’ve Already Donated to Haiti, It’s Called US Income
Tax,” Huffington Post, March 18, 2010, accessed April 20, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/14/limbaugh-weve-already-don_n_422958.html.

2. Most previous research focuses on vulnerability to disasters and public policy implications.
Mark Pelling wrote an influential book on urbanization and vulnerability during natural disasters,
concluding that resources to prepare and mitigate disasters are subject to political pressures. Mark
Pelling, Vulnerability and Cities: Natural Disasters and Social Resilience (London: Earthscan
Publications), 2003.

3. Cohen and Werker, 795.
118
unified global policy for disaster preparedness.
4
Global public policy involves
implementing plans for biosecurity, including disaster relief and foreign aid.
Involvement is not mandatory, but norms of humanitarian aid have been established.
Global political networks could potentially share risk and minimize disaster damage,
acknowledging that major natural disasters affect the hearts and routines of many
around the world. However, the present mix of reactive interventions may be driven
more fundamentally by legitimation concerns and needs to sustain current power
hierarchies than a true desire to eliminate disaster risk.
Because governments are ultimately responsible for long-term disaster
preparation and emergency planning, their work in relief policies is crucial. In an era of
globalization, the responsibility for disasters is shared and contested. Symbolic
discourses perform expected roles, but material and productive changes are difficult to
accomplish. These routines are a subject of biopolitics. Biopolitics challenges how
governments make decisions that affect the livelihood and wellbeing of their citizens.
How do states interact with and facilitate humanitarian movements? In what ways do
governments interact with one another during disaster relief? This chapter discusses the
military intervention in Haiti, the role of public figures and public address in rhetorical
disaster relief for Haiti, and the important reactive legal changes. I conclude by
analyzing the complicated tensions in natural disasters between nationalism and
globalization.
The most important governing groups during Haiti disaster relief were the
Haitian government, the United States, and the United Nations. This chapter identifies

4. Pedro Mas Bermejo, “Preparation and Response in Case of Natural Disasters: Cuban
Programs and Experience,” Journal of Public Health Policy 27 (2006): 13-21.
119
the key rhetorical moves and performances of these three government entities during
the Haiti earthquake relief. Government platforms constituted spaces for placement of
praise and blame, as well as implementing plans and procedures of biosecurity in post-
disaster politics. Ultimately, governments protected their own self-interest. Acts of
relief were performative and appreciated, but governments failed to implement agency
for change.
The Haitian Government
Before the earthquake, Haiti certainly had obstacles to its development.
5
The
Haitian government had additional and more needed responsibilities to its constituents
when the earthquake occurred. The pre-disaster status of national poverty made state
intervention difficult after the earthquake because the Haitian government experienced
serious distress and did not have the resources needed for efficient relief. The
earthquake inflicted serious and tangible consequences on the Haitian government: An
estimated 60,000 civil servants died, including two senators and seventy-seven police
officers, and many more were severely injured.
6
Most of the government’s buildings

5. Haiti experienced issues with human resources regardless of mass disaster. According to
Keith Crane, Haiti’s state institutions possessed weak human resources, a lack of clear organization and
records, and inconsistent procedures and policies before the earthquake Brain drain has always been a
problem for Haiti. Most skilled professionals leave the country to pursue more lucrative professions
elsewhere. Building Haiti’s economy has been problematic. Before the earthquake, there were no clear
termination procedures for public jobs. Civil service jobs changed as frequently as political jobs. In
disaster environments, a weak civil service becomes especially complicated. In Haiti, there is a
confusing budget process and government funding is often an avenue for corruption. Haiti appears to
have high turnover in political elections, “careless leadership of the powerful elite,” and a degree of
cronyism in election to public jobs. Although there are numerous laws, there is rare, selective, and
disproportionate enforcement of them. Even before the earthquake the country suffered from poor record
keeping, misuse of funds and non-competitive bidding procedures. See Keith Crane et al., Building a
More Resilient Haitian State (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

6. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,”
United Nations Security Council, February 22, 2010,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/200.
120
were destroyed, a total of thirteen of the fifteen ministry headquarters crumbled to the
ground. The National Palace, the Supreme Court, and the Parliament building were all
significantly damaged or collapsed completely. Seismologist Roger Bilham argues, “In
recent earthquakes, buildings have acted as weapons of mass destruction.”
7
Destroyed
buildings are bad enough, but they also killed citizens, public servants, and relief
workers. Post-earthquake Haiti was at even more risk for future earthquakes and
exponential damage because of the residual rubble and poorly built temporary shelters.
The Government of Haiti (GoH) had its work ahead of them.
State action had to adjust to post-earthquake Haiti and all that it entailed. The
election that was scheduled for February had to be postponed.
8
There was no way for
the Haitian government to collect taxes, which disrupted their routines and the behavior
of agencies. In addition to loss of civil service and infrastructure, victims of natural
disasters commonly suffer post-traumatic stress, depression, and increased suicide
rates,
9
which further strain government programs, civil servants, and citizens. There
was not only a huge decline in the population of Haiti, but also a loss of jobs, housing,

7. Images of ruined government buildings symbolized the destruction of the Haitian state.
Among these, the collapsed Capitol building was perhaps the most prominent. See Appendix B, Figure 9
for an example. Destroyed buildings represented ruined infrastructure, but they also represent the
calamity and harm that the earthquake caused to those who were underneath them. Roger Bilham,
“Seismologist Roger Bilham: ‘In Recent Earthquakes, Buildings Have Acted as Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” Democracy Now, March 1, 2010.
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/3/1/seismologist_roger_bilham_in_recent_earthquakes.
8. The central elections office was destroyed and United Nations workers who were assigned to
help carry out the election were killed. Voting machines were also destroyed. United Nations
spokesperson Vincenzo Pugliese declared, “Elections cannot take place under these circumstances.”
Damien Cave, “Haitian Lawmakers Seek to Delay Elections,” New York Times, January 29, 2010,
accessed July 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/americas/30haiti.html.

9. Etienne G. Krug et al., “Suicide after Natural Disasters,” The New England Journal of
Medicine, February 5, 1998: 373-378.
121
and infrastructure. To say the Haitian government was significantly impaired is an
understatement.
The earthquake substantially hindered Haiti’s ability to provide security,
administer justice, promote economic growth, and provide other public services.
10

Internal state communication moved from habitual and mundane decisions toward
unexpected eventualities, discontinuities, and suspense. Because the State of Haiti
suffered tangibly from political, psychological, economic, and material standpoints,
international and national state actors attempted to facilitate the state and intervened
into the relief efforts.
Each major disaster is unique because of the interactions between pre-existing
problems and multi-state interventions in each country operate in different ways. This
caused chaotic and confusing disaster response. However, the most significant
government contributions were military interventions, foreign aid, public address, and
public policy reform. This chapter explores these following the disaster.
Military Intervention and Biosecurity: The Role of the United States Military and
United Nations Security Forces
During times of emergency, increased security is necessary to maintain order.
Military interventions are complex. Yaacov Vertzberger argues, “Intervention
outcomes can be anticipated or unanticipated. Sometimes they can be contained; at
other times they become unmanageable.”
11
Vertzberger defines interventions as “a

10. “Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity,”
United States Geological Survey, January 3, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156448.pdf.

11. Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1998): 3.
122
complex and multifaceted phenomenon.”
12
Post-earthquake Haiti was characterized by
fear and panic that demanded increased security. Cledanor Sully, a Haitian hotel owner
explained, “We're all scared. We need the United Nations and we need the United
States Marines.”
13
During Haiti relief, the United States and the United Nations
provided crucial security, command, and technology that facilitated the transportation
and distribution of aid.
Removing Rubble

One of the first US agencies on the scene in Haiti was the US Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM), a unified Department of Defense Combat Command
located in Doral, Florida. SOUTHCOM arrived early in the morning following the
earthquake, taking only twelve hours to arrive in response to the catastrophe. Knowing
that re-opening the airport was critical to disaster assistance, SOUTHCOM’s 1st
Special Operations Wing arrived and, with the help the United Nations, reopened the
Toussaint Louverture International Airport.
14
Additionally, divers were able to remove
the rubble in the seaport, opening the way for ships and supplies.
15
The United Nations
cooperated with and assisted the United States in removing rubble and opening
infrastructure. MINUSTAH reported, “Humanitarian access was improved quickly,

12. Ibid.
13. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mary Beth Sheridan, and Michael E. Ruane, “Security Fears Mount
in Lawless Post-Earthquake Haiti,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2010, accessed July 1, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/17/AR2010011703389.html.
14. “Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010,” United States
Southern Command: Partnership for the Americas, accessed May 10, 2012,
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Unified-Response-Support-to-Haiti-Earthquake-
Relief-2010.aspx.

15. “US Army Divers Repair Haitian Seaport,” SOUTHCOM, February 20, 2010,
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/U-S--Army-divers-repair-Haitian-seaport.aspx.
123
with the assistance of the United States, to enable the reopening of the seaport on 22
January.”
16
Rebuilding infrastructure enabled the US Coast Guard and US military to
deliver supplies and evacuate American citizens. The USS Carl Vinson, USS Bataan,
USS Nassau, and USS Carter Hall arrived shortly thereafter. On January 14, 2010,
SOUTHCOM formed a joint task force that aimed to facilitate aid distributed by
USAID and various NGOs. For the three weeks following the earthquake,
SOUTHCOM continued to deliver emergency supplies.
On February 4, 2010, SOUTHCOM transitioned from emergency action to
relief services. Part of that process, along with the United Nations, was slowly
transitioning power back to Haitian officials, including Haitian management of the
airport. On March 16, 2010, the Ggovernment of Haiti took complete control over the
airport. The role of the US military slowly ended, paving the path for the Haitian
government and humanitarian groups.
Certainly, networks emerge among state actors. Cooperation took place among
the United States, the United Nations, and the Haitian government. Although
humanitarian military intervention was necessary, the assumption during these
interventions was that Haiti would resume its sovereignty and return to providing order
and regulating public spaces when able to do so.
Providing Security
During initial relief, the United States military and the United Nations were
accorded control of Haitian security and safety by the Haiti government and the

16. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission.”
124
international community.
17
The imminent risks of death motivated a complacent
acceptance of increased power of over their fates on the part of Haitians. Overall, the
United Nation’s Office of Internal Oversight Services evaluated MINUSTAH’s efforts
as “invaluable.” This report explained that, in 2011, Haiti was beginning to see
recovery and reconstruction, MINUSTAH “stayed relevant by realigning its activities,
focusing on maintaining political stability, facilitating the continued delivery of
humanitarian assistance, restoring and reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National
Police, and improving judicial and correctional institutions.”
18
Although security was
provided by an external entity, the long-term goal was to strengthen Haiti’s police and
court systems.
Like the United States, the United Nations has a history of providing security in
Haiti. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was
established on June 1, 2004. Its mandate was to “restore a secure and stable
environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s Government
institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and to protect human
rights.”
19
Unfortunately, the 2010 earthquake destroyed MINUSTAH’s headquarters
and killed Hédi Annabi, the Chief of the program, as well.
20
A total of 101 United

17. Major military presence lasted five months, although the US National Guard stayed longer,
mostly in rural areas. “Haiti: US Ends Earthquake Relief Effort,” New York Times, June 2, 2010, A13.

18. “Programme Evaluation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” Report of
the Office of Internal Oversight Services, Sixty Sixth Session, March 12, 2012.

19. “MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” United Nations, Accessed
April 10, 2010. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/.

20. Just five days before the earthquake Annabi said this about Haiti and its upcoming election:
“Haiti is today at a turning point in its history...It is now up to the Haitians, and only the Haitians, to
transform this hope into reality by working together in the greater interests of their country.” Stephen
Millet, “Remembering Hedi Annabi, Diplomat,” Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2010.
http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2010/01/13/remembering-hedi-annabi-diplomat/.
125
Nations’ employees were killed, the largest number of deaths in one day in the history
of the UN’s operation.
21
Ali Abdussalam Treki of Libya, the President of the UN
General Assembly, reflected, “In the midst of such suffering, the tragedy in Haiti did
not spare those who had volunteered and had come from so many different countries to
help the people and Government of Haiti.”
22
Thus, international support broke down at
precisely the time it was most needed.
Once certain military projects were completed, media celebrated the ongoing
progress. CBS News reported, “Mr. Obama said the US military has secured the
country's airport to direct food and supplies to devastated parts of the country.”
23
These
updates satisfied questions and needs for progress. They also demonstrated a
prioritization of power. Half of the flights coming into Haiti were military personnel,
while doctors and medical supplies had to compete for the airspace.
24
Although some
celebrated the contribution of the United States military, others criticized the emphasis
on military aid.
Military Intervention and the Performance of Nationalism
Police and emergency service are essential components of relief. Edkins argues
that biopolitics involve mythic dimensions and that humanitarian aid plays a role. She
argues for “a rethinking of how we expect our policing and emergency services to
behave in relation to us, and by extension, how we would like our government to

21. Neil MacFarquhar, “UN Honors the 101 Who Served and Died in Haiti,” The New York
Times, March 10, 2010, A6.

22. Ibid.

23. “Haiti Earthquake Updates: Days Two, Three,” CBS News.

24. Mark Weisbrot, Interview with CounterSpin, “Mark Weisbrot on the Haitian Earthquake,”
Extra! March 2010: 8.
126
behave.”
25
In the United States, congressional and presidential rhetoric stressed the
contribution and charity of the US military. On January 26, 2010, Congress officially
recognized the contributions.
26
Ike Skelton (D-MO) proclaimed, “Our men and women
in uniform represent the best in America. Never is that more apparent than when our
forces mobilized to people in need, most recently in the wake of the devastating
earthquake in Haiti.”
27
To summarize the US military support in Haiti, a total of 22,268
military personnel, 33 Navy and Coast Guard ships and 264 aircrafts were deployed,
and almost 3 million humanitarian relief rations, amongst other support.
28
Nationalism
as a theme emerged in American rhetoric toward Haiti almost immediately. United
States military intervention, in some ways, demonstrated US strength and good will.
The military presence was not celebrated by everyone. Benoit Leduc, who
worked with Doctors Without Borders, called the United States actions a
“militarization of aid,” adding that this tactic brings “extreme confusion of distributing
food with a gun.”
29
Alain Joyandet, the French Cooperation Minister, added to the
critique, “This is about helping Haiti, not about occupying Haiti.”
30
Not only did this

25. Jenny Edkins, “Biopolitics, Communication, and Global Governance,” Review of
International Studies 34, (2008): 231.

26. Congress also officially recognized Dillard Elementary School in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
,for raising $5,000. “Speech of Hon. Alcee L. Hastings of Florida in the House of Representatives,”
Congressional Record 111th Congress, January 26, 2010.

27. “Tribute to Our Remarkable Troops,” Congressional Record 111th Congress, January 26,
2010, H336.
28. “Operation Unified Response.”

29. “Analysis: US Military Deployment Stirs Tension in Haitian Tragedy,” EarthTimes, Buenos
Aires, 23 January 2010. http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/news/305317,analysis-us-military-
deployment-stirs-tension-in-haitian-tragedy.html.
30. Aislinn Laing and Tom Leonard, “Haiti Earthquake: US Denies ‘Occupying’ the Country,”
The Telegraph, accessed March 10, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamerica
andthecaribbean/haiti/7020735/Haiti-earthquake-US-denies-occupying-the-country.html.
127
demonstrate competitive undertones of institutional actors, it can also be seen as a
continuation of intervention policy into Haiti. The military tone of aid reflected the
Clinton-era policy, which was military intervention to ensure stability. However, a
country needed help, and the institutions that helped wanted to stake claim in their
contributions.
Foreign Aid
Individuals also exhibited pride when nations donated funds to help the Haiti
relief. The United States has a history of international humanitarian contributions.
31

The Executive Director for the Center for Democracy in the Americas, Sarah Stephens,
was optimistic about the US involvement in Haiti. She commented, “The classic US
role in the whole hemisphere is either complete neglect, or we come in and run the
show.” She said Haiti was a “great opportunity to do this in a new way.”
32
Certainly,
the United States recognized Haiti as a major tragedy, but the US neither neglected nor
ran the show. During the Haiti relief, the United States government donated
humanitarian aid, contributed military support, publicly offered condolences, and
adjusted some foreign and domestic policies.
Foreign aid involves moving humanitarian and political resources. Impoverished
countries do sometimes refuse aid, particularly when nations experience regime

31. Former President George W. Bush’s most notable humanitarian contribution was the $18.8
billion program called the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Although PEPFAR
received some criticism, it was extended in 2008 and is widely considered to have been a beneficial and
necessary program. Eran Bendavid and Jayanta Bhattacharya, “The President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief in Africa: An Evaluation of Outcomes,” Annals of Internal Medicine 150 (2009): 688-695.

32. Helene Cooper and Mark Lander, “Experts Wonder about US Role in Haiti after Cameras
Leave,” New York Times, January 18, 2010, A10.
128
change.
33
After a major disaster, the United States usually makes a form of public
statement and commits some sort of aid or support. Government aid and relief
strategies involve both giving financial assistance and forgiving outstanding debt. On
April 14, 2010, the United States Senate approved HR 4573, which offered some debt
relief to Haiti and encouraged the US Executive Director of the International Monetary
Fund to make available funds for various debt-relieving actions.
34
Haiti’s debt was
about $828 million and, with their GDP a fraction of that of the United States, getting
out of debt was virtually impossible. Haiti had received some debt relief before the
earthquake.
35
After the earthquake, additional debt relief was granted in addition to the
$2.8 billion in emergency spending for Haiti that President Obama requested for
Congressional approval.
36
A total of $3.1 billion was eventually donated.
37
By
September 30, 2011, $2.2 billion US aid had been disbursed in Haiti.
38

US Aid exemplifies the complexity of humanitarian aid: “Reconstruction
activities require in-depth exchanges with new partners and Government of Haiti
(GoH) officials to design and implement projects toward a more stable more

33. Travis Nelson, “Rejecting the Gift Horse: International Politics of Disaster Aid Refusal,”
Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 3 (2010): 379-402.

34. Joanna Anderson, “Legislation Urges Federal Efforts at Haiti Debt Relief,” CQ Weekly,
March 1, 2010, 503.

35. Most notably, in July 2009 the Paris Club cancelled claims to Haiti debt that totaled $214
million. The Paris Club is a conglomerate of nineteen major international economies. Alan Cowell,
“Rich Nations Call for Haiti Debt Relief,” New York Times, January 20, 2010.

36. Charlene Carter, “Bill Encouraging Debt Cancellation for Haiti Heads to Obama’s Desk,”
CQ Weekly, April 19, 2010, 966.
37. “Fast Facts on the Government’s Work in Haiti,” US AID, May 2012, accessed June 13,
2012, http://haiti.usaid.gov/issues/docs/201205_funding_and_procurement_fs.pdf.
38. Ibid.
129
economically viable Haiti.”
39
Thus, humanitarian aid becomes an entry point into
discussions about debt and finance. The transition of credit is legitimized by the
appearance of good will, but this becomes more complex in a global economy.
The United Nations donated funds, but also supplies and personnel. Although
the event erupted in Haiti on January 12, 2010, the first plane from the United Nations
Children’s’ Fund (UNICEF) arrived on Thursday January 14, 2010 – about two days
after the earthquake.
40
UNICEF shipped initial supplies from Panama. Even though the
United Nations is the most experienced institution in international disaster relief,
mobilizing strategies and resources requires a lag time. The first two days are the most
important for assistance to be there, but these first days are also the most difficult to
transport supplies, aid, and volunteers – if even possible at all. International aid needed
cooperation between relief suppliers and those removing the rubble.
International aid is not only about helping those in need, but creating a story
that places norms, values and charity in context with one another. In addition to the
United States, many countries donated foreign aid and supplies for relief. Most notably,
the European Union donated funds toward Haiti. The European Commission donated
three million euros, while Spain pledged three million euros, the Netherlands pledged
two million euros, and Germany pledged one and a half million euros in addition to the

39. Ibid.
40. The United Nations is perhaps the most experienced institution in human rights and disaster
relief intervention. The United Nations has experience in collecting information, appropriating funds,
and reporting on important findings in post-disaster environments. In 2010, the United Nations reported
on a total of 385 natural disasters that killed over 297,000 people, affected 217 million others, and cost
an estimated $123.9 billion in damages. The United Nations has a well-established system and
categorizes these disasters as climate-related hazard events, geological hazard events, epidemics, and
environmental hazards. “International Cooperation on Humanitarian Assistance in the Field of Natural
Disasters, from Relief to Development,” Report of the General Assembly, United Nations, Sixty-Sixth
Session, September 2, 2011, A/66/339.
130
European Union’s contribution.
41
Government aid was certainly widespread. Each
nation was motivated by an international myth that values charity and conforms to
normative ideals and expectations.
Foreign aid can be a performance of nationalism, self-congratulating the
generosity and spirit of the state donating relief. Nationalism is an interesting
motivation for European countries. The tension between a country and the emerging
pride in the European identity is certainly apparent. After the Haiti earthquake, the
European Union’s Foreign Affairs Chief Catherine Ashton responded, “It is important
to tell the people of Haiti that we stand ready to help them as much as we can in this
tragedy. They can count on Europe.”
42

Globalization involves a reflexive process in conceptions of self-identity.
43

There is a sense that disaster narratives evoke conceptions of nationalism within the
broader narratives of globalization. In Europe, there seems to be an increasing sense of
European identity that makes this especially interesting. Foreign aid is not only an act
of charity, but also a space for self-interest.
Public Address
The story of aid and the need for aid and relief was promoted by state figures
during moments of public address. Public figures situated the Haiti earthquake in terms
of the state they represented. Most notably, the voices of Haitian President René

41. Matthew Saltmarsh, “Europe Sends Aid and Pledges Money for Haiti,” New York Times,
January 16, 2010.

42. Ibid.

43. See Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1990).
131
Préval, President Obama, and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon will be
explored.
44

United States President Barack Obama
After a major natural disaster, the President of the United States is expected to
comment and address the nation. The Haiti earthquake occurred on January 12, 2010.
President Obama addressed the world about Haiti first on January 14, 2010 and then
again on January 16, 2010, calling the relief network “swift, coordinated, and
aggressive.”
45
On January 17, 2010, Obama labeled the relief effort “historical” and
stressed, “America has no greater resource than the strength and compassion of the
American people.”
46
Even at early stages in the relief process, Obama termed the relief
movement as “one of the largest relief efforts in our recent history.”
47
As president,
Obama was the spokesperson for the American public toward the international
community. His early commitment to Haiti was displayed by MSM and was available
online. This intertexuality increased the American President’s visibility during
institutional relief.

44. The Secretary General of the United Nations serves as a spokesperson for the UN’s values
and strategies. By exploring the leadership of Haitian, American, and international state institutions, this
section hopes to generate a well-rounded survey of important state speakers during Haiti relief.

45. Barrack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Recovery Efforts in Haiti,” The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 14, 2010, Thewhitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-recovery-efforts-haiti.

46. Helene Cooper, “3 Presidents Unite in Campaign to Raise Money for Earthquake Recovery
in Haiti,” New York Times, January 17, 2010, A15.

47. Obama, “Remarks by the President on Recovery.”
132
Mary Stuckey argues, “The president is an icon; and the current president is
resonating throughout popular culture in ways that may be unprecedented.”
48
As the
United States first black president advocating on behalf on a predominantly black
impoverished country, certainly there was a symbolic, racial, and global
representations taking place. George W. Bush was criticized for his late response to
Katrina. Some questioned if his inattention involved prejudices about race and
economic status. Similarly, some voices criticized Obama for catering to Haiti because
of race issues.
49
Certainly, it is important to explore Obama’s contributions and
rhetoric during Haiti disaster relief in order to evaluate and explore larger tensions and
methods in government disaster interventions.
President Obama requested an unprecedented sum for foreign aid, relief and
reconstruction efforts. He described this process clearly: “We will partner with other
nations and organizations” to create a “strong network of non-governmental
organizations across the country.”
50
Congressional Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA)
confirmed her support for the President’s plan: “Haiti needs increased attention and
resources from the United States and the international community to help it recover

48. Mary E. Stuckey, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Presidency and Presidential Rhetoric,” The
Review of Communication 10 (2010): 49.

49. Most notably, musician Kanye West proclaimed George W. Bush “doesn’t care about black
people.” Lisa de Moraes, “Kanye West’s Torrent of Criticism, Live on NBC,” The Washington Post,
September 3, 2005, accessed May 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090300165.html. Conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh
criticized Obama for using Haiti to “boost his credibility with the black community.” He added, “We’ve
already donated to Haiti. It’s called the US income tax.” Stephanie Condon, “Rush Limbaugh Slams
Obama’s Response to Haiti Earthquake,” CBS News, January 14, 2010, accessed May 16, 2011,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6097183-503544.html.

50. Obama, “Remarks by the President on Recovery.”
133
during this difficult period.”
51
Obama and other public figures set anticipations for the
audience, letting them know the process would be long and that the success of the
movement depended on cooperation and commitment of institutional actors. Of course,
monetary support was distributed at the discretion of the United States, including
forming partnerships with NGOs, constituting a relief network. This resulted in the
current power structures were sustained, while alleviating the US for problems or
insufficient outcomes.
Not only did leaders address their nations, they also met with one another. On
March 10, 2010, Obama met with Haitian President René Préval. Afterwards, Obama
addressed the nation, contextualizing the Haiti earthquake for his primarily American
audience: “To offer some perspective on the awful scale of Haitian loss, it’s as if the
United States, in a terrible instant, lost nearly 8 million people. Or, it’s as if one-third
of our country, 100 million Americans suddenly had no home, no food or water.”
52

Presidents and other public figures can influence not only public policy, but
also public sentiment. Leaders visited Haiti during humanitarian relief. On January 16,
2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Haiti, only four days after the
earthquake. She announced that the United States “will be here today, tomorrow and
the time ahead.”
53
Clinton met with Haitian President Préval and discussed the relief
movement. Former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush also visited Haiti.

51. Barbara Lee, “Moment of Silence for Haiti Earthquake Victims,” Congressional Record
111th Congress, January 13, 2010, H108.

52. Barack Obama, “Remarks Following a Meeting with President René Garcia Préval of
Haiti,” Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents.

53. Mark Landler, “In Show of Support, Clinton Goes to Haiti,” New York Times, January 17,
2010, A14. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/americas/17diplo.html.
134
Michelle Obama flew to Haiti with Jill Biden approximately three months after the
earthquake.
54
These visits opened up dialogue and set the stage for relief. Visits also
demonstrated support, while implying oversight. However, much of these visits were
opportunities for public address and media spectacle, not substantive strategy building
or research.
Haitian President René Préval
While US President Obama promised assistance, Haitian President Préval
personified the experience of the earthquake for audiences worldwide. As both
President of Haiti and the Chief Executive, René Préval was able to serve as a Haitian
voice to the international community, recommending what should be prioritized and
modified.
55
Undoubtedly, Préval was personally affected by the earthquake. When it
first shook, he was feeding his 8 month year-old granddaughter in the courtyard of his
presidential mansion; the mansion quickly collapsed. He later reflected, “Pain made me
speechless. As a person I was paralyzed.”
56
His experience was a public representation
of the emotional and physical turmoil that the Haitian people themselves experienced.
Not even its leader was isolated from the pain and emotional impact of the disaster.
Not only was President Préval a public figure who embodied the Haitian
experience, he also was able to vocalize recommendations and concerns for his
country. President Préval insisted that removing the rubble and dead bodies should be
the first priority: “we think there are more [dead bodies] beneath the rubble than we

54. Marc Lacey, “Michelle Obama Visits Haiti,” New York Times, April 13, 2010, A8.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/world/americas/14firstlady.html.
55. René Préval served two terms as President and one term as Prime Minister.

56. Joe Mozingo, “Haiti Quake Shook Leader to his Core; ‘As a Person I was Paralyzed,’
Préval says. His Silence since the Disaster Enrages Many,” Los Angeles Times, August 15, 2010, A1.
135
have buried.”
57
Although information was scarce, government officials had to estimate
the gravity of the damage. Government figures represent “officialness” in numbers and
information. On January 13, 2010, Raymond Joseph, Haitian ambassador to the United
States, suggested that medical needs were a prior, first concern. He also recommended
that aid be given to the people of Haiti in need of search and rescue as well as food and
water.
58
Having Haitian officials communicate desired priorities of assistance projects
a sense of legitimacy and authenticity to government projects and area of focus.
President Préval voiced criticism and made appeals for efficient humanitarian
strategy. On March 10, 2010, Préval visited Washington DC to meet with Obama to
discuss the future plans for Haiti. Préval was a public spokesperson, explaining that
food aid was hindering job promotion. He argued, “we should concentrate our efforts
on job creation to enable the people to earn money so they may be able to serve their
country.”
59
Even though there are examples of his vocal outcry, it is clear that the
Haitian people felt he did not do enough.
60

Natural disasters and other crises often complicate democratic elections of a
country. Democracy tends to function better in well-developed countries because the
term limits and change of leadership in underdeveloped countries can lead to

57. “Haiti’s Préval says Relation with Dominican Republic Unchanged,” BBC Monitoring
Americas, January 28, 2010.

58. “Haiti Earthquake Update: Day Two.”
59. “Haiti’s Préval Wants Donors to Review Food Aid,” BBC Monitoring Americas, March 23,
2010.

60. Although Préval received a temporary extension of his presidency because his election was
delayed in 2006 and many leaders were afraid of a “power vacuum,” Préval’s preferred candidate Jude
Celestin was eliminated from the next election. This is most commonly attributed to Préval’s
unpopularity, Haiti’s continued poverty and Préval’s “inaction in response to the earthquake.” “Préval
Confirms Term Extension,” Miami Times, February 9, 2011, 5C.
136
corruption and instability.
61
Rebuilding governments after a disaster is a long,
multifaceted process.
62
This was especially true in Haiti, as Préval’s work continued.
Two months after the earthquake, 600,000 students were still unable to attend school.
President Préval urged, “we have got to reopen schools as soon as possible.”
63
The
Haitian President was trying to direct resources to the areas of most dire need. But
advocating priorities are also an opportunity for leaders to appear powerful and
informed, while the state may be vulnerable and chaotic.
While some state actors benefited from self-promotion and performances
during Haiti relief, state officials also furnished spaces to place blame. One way to
evaluate Préval’s success would be by the opinion of the Haitian community. He was
ultimately considered as having failed to step up to the challenge in the way that the
Haitian people needed and deserved. According to the COHA, Préval did not step up
for the task at hand:
President René Préval continues to be engulfed in international criticism as well
as much abuse at home for demonstrating breathtaking failure in leadership at a
time when his country desperately required a firm hand. Immediately following
the earthquake, Préval disappeared from the public arena, and instead of taking
control, he chose to shy away from a decision-making role.
64

Certainly, there were moments in which Préval appeared, but his role was stressed
more by legitimating external policies rather than his domestic leadership. Public
figures often are evaluated by their most challenging moments. Perhaps to a lesser

61. Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is Another Way for
Africa (New York: Lane Allen, 2009).

62. One explanation can be found in Sampson, “The Social Life of Projects,” 121–142.

63. “Haiti’s Preval Wants Donors to Review Food Aid.”

64. Ritika Singh, “Haiti’s Yawning Leadership Vacuum: René Préval’s Crisis of Confidence,”
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, March 24, 2010, http://www.coha.org/haiti-yawning-leadership-
vacuum-rene-prevals-crisis-of-confidence/.
137
degree, all international leaders experience moments of increased visibility and
speculation.
Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon
As the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon was also a
public voice of government, advocating interventions during Haiti relief. One of his
jobs was to explain how difficult the job of UN Haiti relief was. He claimed, “What we
set up here would be similar to running a major airport…without any communications,
electricity or computers.”
65
He elaborated, “We have 2,000 police in Port-au-Prince
who are severely affected [by the quake]. And 3,000 bandits escaped from prison. This
gives you an idea about how bad the situation is.”
66
By asking for patience and
explaining the difficulty of efficient relief, Ban Ki-Moon prepared his audience for the
long process of humanitarian relief. State actors met with one another and visited the
disaster location. UN workers demonstrated authority with their public and private
partnerships, but they failed to build momentum for their human rights’ platforms.
Public Policy Reform
Now that significant military intervention, foreign aid, and public address has
been explored, it is necessary to examine the resulting public policy reform. The
United States adapted and amended public policies. Previous studies have shown that
natural disasters bring about changes in sympathies toward politics and the law,
including adjustments to public policies including but not limited to women’s rights,

65. Ban Ki-Moon, “UN Chief Ban Ki-Moon Calls for Haiti Aid Patience,” BBC News, January
18, 2010, accessed March 10, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8464679.stm.
66. Ibid.
138
healthcare concerns, immigration policies, tariffs, food politics, and adoption
policies.
67
The United States government had to act quickly. A number of legal and
political moves took place following the disaster.
Governments are always primarily responsible to their direct constituents. A
first priority of the United States was to help Americans affected by the earthquake. On
January 11, 2010, the State Department issued a travel warning for any US citizen
visiting Haiti until February 13. Interestingly enough, 45,000 United States citizens
were living in Haiti during the earthquake.
68
On January 27, 2010, President Obama
signed a bill that increased funding to help United States citizens after natural disasters
abroad.
69
Governments tend to place a priority on saving their own citizens.
On January 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law HR 4462, which
accelerated American income tax benefits for donations that were made for Haiti.
Endorsing this bill, Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) declared, “America is STILL doing
what it does best, giving much needed aid and hope to whomever is in need.” She
continued, “It is also in the United States’ best interest, especially pertaining to foreign
policy, to help, in any capacity, the relief and ultimate recovery of the nation of Haiti; it

67. According to USAID, “any development intervention in Haiti necessitates the consideration
of women and an analysis of their roles and activities, both in relation to men and as a population base in
their own right,” Alexis Gardella, “Gender Assessment: USAID/Haiti, USAID,” United States Agency
for International Development, June, 2006, 8, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH597.pdf.
68. Seth Stern, “Earthquake May Shake Immigration Policy,” CQ Weekly, January 18, 2010, p.
156.
69. The Emergency Aid to American Survivors of the Haiti Earthquake Act, sponsored by
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), was introduced on January 25, 2010. One week after the earthquake, over
14,000 American citizens evacuated Haiti. Niki Tsongas, “Speech of Hon. Niki Tsongas of
Massachusetts in the House of Representatives,” Congressional Record 111th Congress, January 26,
2010, E103.
139
will also help govern the global message of ‘goodwill.’”
70
The rhetoric and initial
actions of the United States emphasized the impact and spirit of the American people.
Humanitarian adjustments to international economic policies may temporarily
assist the disaster nation; however, they ignore the hardships of other struggling nations
and the institutionalized global conditions, which perpetuate conditions of poverty.
Food subsidies or a modification of tariffs to aid a struggling country after a natural
disaster are platitudes.
Food commodities offered one area of reform. International food politics
greatly affects the lives of the Haitian people. Alex Dupuy argued, “You can focus on
rice. Haiti was self-sufficient in rice production in the early ‘70s; now it has become
the largest food importer in the Caribbean. And this is a direct result of the ‘trade
liberalization’ policies that they’ve gotten the Haitian government to implement that
reduced tariffs.”
71
This resulted in the Haitian economy transforming “into a supply of
cheap labor for foreign assembly industries.”
72
Haitian musician Richard Morse
questioned, “Dear Bill Clinton, were Haitian farmers asked what they thought about
importing cheap rice to Haiti?”
73
Tariff policies directly affected global economic and
class divisions. The Haiti disaster exposed this inconsistency. A humanitarian frame
was being situated, but long-term reform was problematic.

70. Sheila Jackson Lee, “Speech of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas in the House of
Representatives,” Congressional Record 111th Congress, January 20, 2010, E57.
71. Neil deMause, “It’s Tough to be Haitian, Isn’t It?” Extra (April 2010): 10.

72. Ibid.

73. Morse, “Haiti for Haitians.”
140
Although well-intended policies may aid suffering nations, emotional and
politically motivated changes follow as well. After the Haiti earthquake, the United
States House of Representatives passed HR 5160 on May 5, 2010, which lowered
textile and apparel business tariffs in Haiti. Some criticized this policy because of its
impact on the textile and apparel industries in the United States and other Central
America Free Trade Agreement Countries.
74
On one hand, there was a tendency for the
United States to pressure governments politically to reduce tariffs. This facilitated
import industries. On the other hand, foreign debt relief and foreign aid was often
granted to those same countries. In moments of crisis and controversy, however,
tensions illustrate the limits of these goals. Thus, the natural disaster reignited
discussions on economic policies.
These debates revived pre-existing immigration conflicts and tensions.
75
Almost
immediately, the Department of Homeland Security announced a temporary ban on the
deportation of Haitians. This moratorium halted immigration for 18 months. In fact,
some Haitian victims were shipped to Florida and Atlanta hospitals in order to be
treated.
76
The Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano

74. Textile and apparel is Haiti’s largest industry. Suffering from damaged factories, roads and
seaports, Haiti’s exports decreased by 43%. According to Jennifer Schoites, “House to Lower Haiti’s
Textile and Apparel Tariffs Could have Negative Impact on CAFTA Nations,” CQ Weekly, May 10,
2010, 1155.

75. Although reforming immigration policy implies a “humanitarian” role of the United States
after the Haiti earthquake, immigration has a complicated history in the United States. Most notably, in
1954, the United Immigration and Naturalization Services implemented Operation Wetback, a
deportation initiative for illegal immigrants. This plan became unpopular after seven deportees died after
jumping overboard rather than be forcibly removed back to Mexico. Today, immigration policies remain
very polarizing in United States politics.

76. Robbie Brown, “Earthquake Victims from Haiti Arrive in Atlanta for Medical Aid,” New
York Times, February 4, 2010, A16.
141
said it was intended to give Haitians a “temporary refuge.”
77
Although such a step had
been proposed after other natural disasters since 2004, this marked the first time such a
step was taken. Congressional Representative Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL) said this action
would give Haitian immigrants the ability “to legally work and contribute to their
country’s recovery.”
78
France implemented the same policy reform. Immigration and
human rights rhetoric has a long and complex relationship that will continue to emerge
and re-emerge as the world becomes more globalized.
79
The Haiti disaster relief
movement promoted global solidarity and collective consciousness by adjusting
immigration policies, even if the temporary nature of this reform was clear.
The United States adjusted public policies to assuage any tangible or rhetorical
issues that the disaster may have given rise to. There was no acknowledgement of long-
term institutional dynamics that systematically ensured the status quo. One critic, Neil
deMause, maintained that the narratives of pain and suffering often overshadow more
productive discussions about worldwide poverty and hunger. deMause contends,
“viewers were almost never presented with any discussion of why Haiti is so
impoverished, and its government institutions so ineffective at helping its citizens.”
80

Short-term symbolic platitudes substituted for more material and productive analysis.
Biopolitics involves positioning these problems with the hope to rectify them.

77. “Secretary Napolitano Announces the Extension of Temporary Protected Status for Haiti
Beneficiaries,” Department of Homeland Security, May 17, 2011,
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1305643820292.shtm.

78. Stern, “Earthquake May Shake Immigration Policy,” 156.
79. Haitian immigrants tend to settle in the states of Florida and New York.

80. deMause, 10.
142
Globalization and Sovereignty in the Modern World
This project explored important government interventions during the Haiti
earthquake relief, including military action, foreign aid, public address, reconstruction
projects, and public policy reform. These moments of intervention reflected interesting
tensions in global biopolitics. Governments intervened in dynamic and interactive ways
during Haiti relief. During these decisions, characteristics of a global community were
exposed. Conceptions of nationalism and global public policies were important because
they influenced how global biopolitics took shape during government disaster relief.
One tension involved the nationalistic aspect of the global humanitarian
movement. Matt Klapper and James J. Riley describe how, “one inspiring moment of
the rescue stands out: after a Los Angeles search and rescue team pulled another
survivor from the rubble, bystanders in Port-au-Prince chanted, ‘USA! USA!’”
81
This
scenario was referenced in Obama’s State of the Union Address as well. The same
article emphasized, “The heroic work of just six American teams there – a small
fraction of the forty-three international search and rescue teams deployed – was
responsible for a third of the lives saved.”
82
This stressed the American contributions to
Haiti as charitable, but also implied that Americans were more effective than other
nations participating in relief.
It is crucial to understand the role of nationalism in the humanitarian process in
order to fully comprehend the field. Laura C. Prividera and John W. Howard III argue,
“National identities are not simply political identities; they are engendered and

81. Matt Klapper and James J. Riley, “Haiti Lessons: A Search and Rescue Corps,” New York
Times, February 13, 2010, A23.

82. Ibid.
143
raced.”
83
Government actors determined what public policies would best serve their
constituents, but this process was flawed and promoted a rhetoric of difference. The
irony of calling for help by emphasizing the common characteristics of humanity,
while simultaneously promoting a nationalistic ideology, is plainly evident.
Understanding the rhetoric of government interventions in disaster relief is
important because disasters can be powerful catalysts for change. Both nationalism and
globalization influence biopolitics. “Emergencies represent sites of global danger and
disorder vested with renewed political significance,” Julian Reid argues, and “they
occur where life is said not only to perform its adaptive functions in securing itself, but
where the very failure of life to adapt is construed as a threat to the security of world
order.”
84
Narratives of community and charity were frequently paired with narratives of
strength and power. At the times of the crisis, Haiti required additional social control
and security over its populations to organize relief, collect vital information, receive
resources, administer justice, and provide security.
85
This meant that the Haitian people
were under more surveillance and more policed by external militaries as well. The
Haitian people consented to increased security and control because the conditions of
their life had been disrupted so greatly. Disaster relief movements are biopolitical

83. Laura C. Prividera and John W. Howard III, “Masculinity, Whiteness, and the Warrior
Hero: Perpetuating the Strategic Rhetoric of US Nationalism and the Marginalization of Women,”
Women & Language 29 (2006): 36.

84. Julian Reid, “The Biopoliticalization of Humanitarianism: From Saving Bare Life to
Securing the Biohuman in Post-Inventionary Studies,” Journal of Intervention and State Building 4
(2010): 391.
85. One report emphasized, “American military commanders have repeatedly stressed that they
are not entering the country as an occupying force, and yesterday agreed with the UN to give
humanitarian aid flights priority in landing rather than military and rescue aircraft.” Clearly, there was
dialogue about the best method for administering aid. Laing and Leonard, “US Denies ‘Occupying.’”
144
because the burden of security is placed on national and international state institutions
that consent or feel obligated to provide that service.
Biopolitics in Disaster Relief
Biopolitics is embedded in state interventions. First, biopolitics enables us to
understand how discourses of security emerged over health of individuals, populations,
and nations during government disaster relief. When a major disaster occurs,
globalization allows for changes in legal, political, and military policy. Andrew Weber,
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs, explained that health problems transcend national boundaries: “An outbreak
anywhere, deliberate or natural, is a threat everywhere. It is not something we can just
deal with within our own borders.”
86

Government interventions to relief can ultimately affect who lives and who
dies. The stakes are high. From the amount of monetary support that is given, to where
and how relief and reconstruction are administered, imperative dynamics were at stake
in maintaining power of security and confidence in a global biopolitics.
Second, biopolitics affects risk management. Population control, Foucault
argues, is rationalized as “a relative control over life” because it “avert[s] some of the
imminent risks of death.”
87
When risk escalates, so do commitments of civil liberties
and sovereignty. Because there was increased risk after the earthquake, power shifted
in legitimate and unusual ways. Foucault elaborates on this trend, explaining that risk is
responsible for “broadening and organizing that space,” implementing “methods of

86. Megan Scudellari, “Can Biosecurity Go Global?” Miller-McCune 4, no. 3 (2011): 26.

87. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 142.
145
power and knowledge,” assuming “responsibility for the life processes,” and justifying
attempts “to control and modify them.”
88
Because the power and knowledge of the
Haitian government had been so impaired, the legitimacy and responsibility of external
states was assumed.
Third, biopolitics also affects decisions about security and administering
justice. According to Max Weber, the state is the only legitimate administrator of
justice.
89
In a globalized world, however, this is contested in an interesting way. Some
states are legitimated through the perceived level of appropriate administration of
justice. By creating a presumption of justice, the state can form solidarity – perhaps
only a fragile solidarity, but solidarity nonetheless. While allowing the American
military and United Nations to provide police work, Haiti strove to take over this role
to maintain its legitimacy and sovereignty. In global politics, state power is shared by
sovereigns and emerging global institutions. During major natural disasters, this
process creates tensions about state legitimacy. Struggles for place and legitimacy
characterize the institutions of intervening states as well.
Competition, Cooperation, Praise, and Blame
Disaster rhetoric was a space for competition, cooperation, praise and blame in
government discourse. Commissions emerged as sites for cooperation and co-
commitments to relief. In global society, international commissions frequently respond

88. Ibid.

89. Max Weber defines the state as a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the
enforcement of its order.” Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Routledge,
1970), 17. In Haiti, civil servants were in disarray. The United Nations and United States’ security forces
took on the role of the state, as it administered their aid.
146
to natural disasters.
90
The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) was
formed after the earthquake. Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and former
US President Bill Clinton served as co-chairs.
91
This Commission aimed to facilitate
the rebuilding efforts by coordinating a development plan that included government
aid, non-government donations, and private business support.
Specifically, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission sustains eighteen areas of
projects, including agriculture, budget support, cross sectorial, debris removal,
development, disaster preparedness, education, energy, environment, finance and
investment, health, housing, infrastructure, institutional, job creation, shelter, water and
sanitation, and women and children. The commission published its work in English and
French, with updates on public progress.
92
Certainly, governments working together in
material and performative commissions are an influential characteristic of relief
networks.
Biopolitics also considers moments of competition for power and resources.
Haiti relief caused institutional rivalries among US government agencies. One senior
congressional aid stated, “The Haiti response has made clear a lot of the divisions
going on between State and USAID over who should be in charge and what should

90. After the 2004 Indonesia tsunami, the Indonesian government formed a Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation Agency, which facilitated the relief and rebuilding efforts of national and international
agencies. Emiel A. Wegelin, “Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia,” Global Urban Development
Magazine 2 (2006), http://www.globalurban.org/GUDMag06Vol2Iss1/Wegelin.htm.

91. Jean-Max Bellerive resigned from his position as Prime Minister on May 14, 2011.
92. “Fast Fact on US Government’s Work in Haiti: Interim Haiti Recovery Commission,” US
Department of State, January 8, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2011/154141.htm.
147
happen.”
93
With all the resources and financial assistance going into humanitarian
relief, this translated into jobs and decision-making hierarchies for particular
government organizations. Among the government groups who received money for
Haiti were USAID, FEMA, OFDA, the Department of Defense, and USG. As opposed
to engaging in streamlined, controlled spending directly from the United States to
Haiti, the United States distributed funds to charity organizations. This substantiated
their participation in relief networks.
Government institutions also wanted to stake a claim for their contributions,
which can also promote competition. The United Nations reported:
Within hours of the earthquake, emergency operations were launched
by the United Nations and a number of Member States...MINUSTAH,
despite its own losses, acted as a crucial first responder, opening the
arterial road from the Port-au-Prince airport to the town centre, re-
establishing communications and opening its medical facilities to
victims.
94

Moreover, there were moments in which the media and government worked in
mutually beneficial ways; but there was also speculation about their future roles with
one another.
95
Changing priorities fundamentally transformed the institutions in the
Haiti relief network, which further complicated the networks and language sustaining
the process. Because the relief movement was fragmented and competitive, there was
confusing delegation. Roles were never clear. Therefore, praise and blame were
obscured in multifaceted, largely institutionally self-serving directives.

93. Emily Cadel, “Backers Say Time is Ripe for Foreign Aid Overhaul,” CQ Weekly, July, 19,
2010, 1728.
94. “MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” United Nations.

95. Cooper and Lander, A10.
148
State interventions often invite criticism. Although military and financial aid
was accepted, Haiti renewed critical inquiry into international relations. Journalist
Tracy Kidder explains that Haiti needs to strengthen its institutions “instead of doing
what the United States has done all too often there, which is weaken them.”
96
The
United States’ role in helping Haiti often reflexively generated perceptions about Haiti
as temporary victims and framed the United States as the noble humanitarian. The
matrix of donations, shortsighted adjustments in public policy and the obscurity of the
interconnected relationships hindered state intervention for Haiti.
Discourses of Government Interventions
Although governments commit material resources, rhetoric is still vital to their
work. Goodnight and Olson explore public memory of Haiti and foreign policy,
concluding that rhetorical debates about Haiti recollected in a broader historical context
of collective memory continue to overarch the US-Haiti relationship. However, public
memory is invoked with “great selectivity in the struggle over the intervention.”
97
As
future policies and decisions are made about Haiti, public memories influence the
context of “contestation for power in foreign policy.”
98
Disasters invite audiences to
remember the afflicted country in specific, yet problematic ways. Haiti has a troubled
history that makes this even more evident. A natural disaster in a world of modern
communications opens a space for international connection less fragmented by national
boundaries. Natural disasters also challenge conceptions about how governments

96. deMause, 10.

97. G. Thomas Goodnight and Kathryn M. Olson, “Shared Power, Foreign Policy, and Haiti:
Public Memories of War and Race,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 9(4) (2006): 604.
98. Ibid.
149
should operate. Global controversies in international relief make the limitations and
tensions in the global public sphere more “public,” in a sense.
The Haiti earthquake involved battles for power and legitimation. An essential
role of government is to protect its citizens from man-made security threats and those
posed by nature as well. In fact, once the people feel threatened and lack a sense of
security, legitimation comes into dispute. Natural disasters cannot be properly prepared
for or addressed without political community, the role of which is to provide safety and
security. The Haiti disaster made communication itself seem urgent and necessary.
However, communicating emergency relief plans was not timely, not possible, or
unfocused as the state attempted to regroup, re-strategize, and rebuild. Social
disruption occurred and communicative disturbances happened in the public as
individuals and groups tried to deal with disorder and stress. One scholar suggested,
“The purpose and the targets of the rescuers/protectors/liberators are mostly virtual
rather than real.”
99
Thus, the Haiti relief network then held a powerful symbolic
quality. Not only did they provide support, they also provided hope. Governments
participated in the relief movement, addressing physical needs (food, shelter, water) as
well as psychological needs (social solidarity and social regulation). Certainly,
governments were essential components of relief networks, but like all the institutions
that participated, governments were flawed; their roles were, at times, self-motivated,
and their work was left incomplete.

99. Aytül Kasapoğlu, Mehmet Ecevı ̇ t, and Yildiz Ecevı ̇ t. “Support Needs of the Survivors of
the August 17, 1999 Earthquake in Turkey,” Social Indicators Research 66 (2004): 242.
150
Concluding Thoughts
Although evident nationalistic themes emerged in government articulation of
relief, there were moments at which this flawed dynamic was recognized. On January
26, 2010, Congressman James McGovern (D-MA) publicly acknowledged this:
We see on our television and read in the papers and online of the generosity and
resilience of the human spirit: people helping people, comforting one another,
sacrificing for the well-being of one another. We often forget how much the
Haitian people are helping one another as we struggle to provide and get aid to
them.
100

Certainly, public figures needed to remember controversies and their representation, as
did mainstream media and NGOs. During the Haiti disaster, government responsibility
was both shared and transferred. Some responsibility was placed on the economic
conditions and poor infrastructure. In Haiti, in particular, better and more expensive
engineering could have averted much of the damage that occurred.
101

Some responsibility and authority moved out of Port-au-Prince as more board
histories and institutional stories were shared. Of course, the capital and the Haitian
government did not want to give away power permanently. Haiti lost citizens,
employees, infrastructure, and resources; it was imperative for the nation of Haiti and
the international community to commit to leading and rebuilding, while maintaining
some degree of sovereignty. Haiti was open to being helped and the international
community was willing to help assist.
The Haiti natural disaster and relief movement involved multiple state actors
and organizations playing roles and performing global acts of relief. The Haiti

100. James McGovern, “US and World Responses to Haiti’s Earthquake,” Congressional
Record 111th Congress, January 26, 2010, H333.

101. Keith Crane et al., Building a More Resilient Haitian State (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2010): 157.
151
earthquake was a moment of convergence between many government institutions that
intervened. However, the Haitian government, the United States, and the United
Nations were vital to the movement. They took shape as a network movement. These
institutions made rhetorical negotiations, identifications, and power plays during
disaster relief. There were tensions between nationalism and globalization, sovereignty
and security, and moments of praise and blame. Governments took advantage of the
opportunity to assist in this historic relief process, but ultimately fell short in creating a
long-term plan and discussions about disaster preparedness.
Part of the humanitarian process involved re-establishing trust and restoring
order. This is needed in post-disaster politics. Trust is needed for institutions to work
effectively. The disaster disrupted individuals’ trust in institutions because there is a
crisis in the institutions ability to perform normal tasks and responsibilities.
Furthermore, institutions themselves had lost personnel and infrastructure, which
hindered their ability to perform effectively to regain trust. On the individual level,
trust operates according to a fundamentality different dynamic than modern collective
trust in institutions.
102
In terms of natural disasters and humanitarian relief, not only did
individuals have to trust in institutions for information, they also had to trust in
institutional interpretations and implementations of abstracted knowledge and expert
systems. Power and trust go hand in hand with risk; power, trust, and risk are
embedded in biopolitics. Natural disasters are risks that publics need to assess and
presume in modern society. Comprehensive assessment and prediction is, for the most

102. Henry Farrell and Jack Knight, “Trust, Institutions, and Institutional Change: Industrial
Districts and the Capital Hypothesis,” Politics & Society 31 (2003): 537-566.
152
part, impossible.
103
Arguably, governments are the institution most qualified to address
these concerns.
The global economy is an interconnected matrix of sovereign interests, trade
interdependency, foreign aid and non-profit assistance. Not only do countries’
economies compete, they also achieve synergy and cooperation. Strategies range from
debt relief and foreign aid to military intervention and adjustments to immigration rules
and regulations. However, sustaining the pre-existing relationships of pre-disaster
politics also seems to be the goal. Global governance will continue to struggle with
nationalism, uncertainty, battles over power, and other tensions and complications in
the pursuit to gain and maintain trust.
However, it was important for governments to network with the state that was
hit with the crisis. The United States contributed by opening discussions up with
Haitian public figures, delivering important public address, contributing its military
and its monetary resources, and reforming public policy. The United Nations engaged
in ongoing security and stability work. The Haitian government was a voice for the
Haitian people. During the Haiti relief governments were both cooperative and
competitive, both participatory and partisan, both powerful and symbolic.

103. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in Late Modern Age
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 137.
153
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

“It’s tough to be Haitian, isn’t it?”
1

~Larry King

The hardships of Haiti did not begin with the devastating earthquake in 2010.
Haiti’s history has been plagued by famine, war, natural disasters and economic
difficulties. This troubled history played a role during post-earthquake relief.
Undoubtedly, the Haiti earthquake relief movement was a product of a horrible
natural disaster, which cost the people of Haiti hundreds of thousands of lives, while
increasing economic and psychological hardships. However passionate and well-
intended the movement, it exposed the prejudices and social stigma the international
community brought to bear on Haiti and the Haitian people. The earthquake exposed
tensions that commonly arise in global disaster relief movements and reflected the
anxiety of interventions aimed at biosecurity within the context of globalization. The
humanitarian process in a global environment entails representing pain and difference
with an agenda, but also building a rhetorical community invested in disaster
response and repair.

1. Neil deMause, “It’s Tough to be a Haitian, Isn't It?” Extra, April 2010: 9.
154
Findings
Nature is understood to pose a limited threat, yet it sometimes still surpasses
expectations and causes a crisis.
2
Catastrophic natural disasters are moments that
demand that people engage with and respond to matters ranging from local urgencies
to supranational, global politics. Such disasters are exacerbated when the current
systems aimed at preventing or lessening risk have failed or been proven inadequate.
In global news coverage, there appears to be a cycle of disaster disclosure, followed
by recovery and, finally, a reintroduction and discussion of vulnerabilities. Decisions
about preparing for and responding to natural disasters operate, even accelerate, in
conditions of uncertainty.
3
Amid this uncertainty, there are sets of alternative choices
that are articulated and argued.
For a nation, natural disasters generally seem risky and rare. However, across
the globe such catastrophes now appear to be taking place with disturbing frequency,
resulting in humanitarian crises. Disaster relief movements involve an interplay of
uncertainty, risk judgment and risk-taking preferences.
4
This project examined the
Haiti relief movement as a rhetorical project that communicated risk, uncertainty,
heroism, and victimhood. The earthquake was a dramatic moment that changed
sentiments toward the nation, altered trajectories of conversations about Haiti, and
made long-term issues about Haiti both more public and more obscure.

2. Reinhard Mechler, Natural Disaster Risk Management and Financing Disaster Losses in
Developing Countries (Karlsruhe, Germenay: Verlag Versicherungswirtsch, 2004).
3.Terry Cannon, “Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of ‘Natural’ Disasters,” in Ann
Varley (ed.), Disasters, Development, and Environment (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 1994).

4. Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decision-Making (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1998), 391.
155
Major disasters are critical moments that necessitate the cooperation of media,
not-for-profit organizations, and governments. Natural disasters mark a time when
shocking, dramatic, and motivating catalysts toward change emerge. Apart from
pragmatic interests, this relief movement merited study because there was an
interesting, successful, and powerful relationship between traditional norms and new
media technology. However, limitations and shortcomings of this movement were
also explored. While moments of critical inquiry took place, a problematic emphasis
on the First World saving the powerless Third World emerged across institutional
discourses. Rhetoric about Haiti exposed tensions between identification and
difference, power and charity, and nationalism and globalization.
The 2010 Haiti earthquake represented a moment of convergence between
well-established institutional actors. Part of the story of Haiti was about natural
disasters and the anxiety that global audiences feel toward poverty, capitalism, and
risk in general. More specific narratives about Haiti also influenced the representation
of relief. Before the earthquake, it was well-known that Haiti was a country in
trouble. Its noteworthy history was embedded in race politics, economic hardship, and
political turnover. The earthquake relief spectacle involved the dance of media
intervention, humanitarian actors, and politicians confronting preconceptions in
public memory and portrayals of public suffering. Thus, creating new public
memories of disaster risk and the country of Haiti. The drama of relief initially
created urgency for intervention, impatience, sympathy and identification – while
downplaying other antagonisms.
156
For Americans, a certain paradigm of intervention became clear: the nation
and many of its people wanted to help, but only as the strongest nation in the world.
During Haiti earthquake relief, narratives about American strength were downplayed
and narratives about American charity were substituted. However, the relief
movement relied on both strength and charity to be successful. Still, crucial
negotiations of power took place. Biosecurity, in a digital age, involves the
entwinement of media, NGOs, and governments. These institutional actors frame the
nature of natural disasters, the tensions in disaster representations, and the
complications that inevitably arise in disaster relief.
The Media
Natural catastrophes were once reported as local, delayed, and remote. In the
contemporary world, satellites, news reporting, and new media connect us across
great distances with blinding speed. Therefore, previously remote and distant
disasters are more immediately experienced by invested actors. Mainstream media is
responsible for this phenomenon. The Haiti earthquake exposed a world that was
transforming: traditionally local issues became a matter of global importance; delays
were evident but minimal; on-the-scene journalism enabled the Haitian earthquake
experience to be emotionally compelling for a concerned global community.
Initial remote disaster reporting experienced uncertainty and limitations.
There were profound moments of speculation. During the initial coverage, MSM co-
depended on other institutional disaster relief actors. For example, the United States
Geological Survey’s initial report contributed information to the media, Haitian
government officials and non-profit workers. This built anticipation for the upcoming
157
narrative that was about to emerge. Without the role of media, instigating discussions
and mobilizing relief for Haiti would have been difficult, if not impossible.
Many reporters visited Haiti and reported from the scene. Disaster reporting
followed an initial moment of uncertainty, with a descriptive role in storytelling.
There were special interest stories that focused on disenfranchised groups. This
secondary reporting was arguably more appealing and informative about the
substantial repercussions in a post-disaster world. Part of a reporter’s job includes
detailed accounts of various public institutions and buildings that experienced
detrimental consequences because of disaster. In providing such moving depictions,
part of the journalist’s job appeared to be motivating people to care. In the Burkean
sense, journalists utilized scene to create identifications.
Narratives about Haiti measured the scope of human lives lost, the scanty
infrastructure, the vulnerable state of terror, and loss of communication. Newspapers
and other mainstream media outlets conveyed the visual and emotional aftermath of
the earthquake, speculating at first, and then moving to on-the-ground resources.
Media coverage employed three themes: disruption, victimhood, and remembrance.
Each rhetorical turn emphasized different scenes, motives, and perspectives.
Although challenging publics for more competent relief measures was important, an
explication of long-term intervention was also necessary. The media were essential to
this process, but NGOs were as well. The media frequently had to coordinate with
NGOs and state actors to achieve their goals. During these moments of convergence,
new media accomplished great things. Haiti was a moment that generated discussion
about the wide-ranging capabilities of new media. The technology was already
158
developed, but the full impact and utilization of that technology has yet to be assessed
reflectively. New media generated images, videos, and appeals by stressing the
massive loss of life. These scenes created identifications among interested
institutional actors and contributed elements of spectacle that facilitated MSM
reporting and distinctive calls for relief.
Non-Governmental Organizations
Mainstream media are responsible for spreading information and introducing
narratives that invite sympathy. Mainstream media and new media are interactive.
Non-government organization representatives can act as experts and informers in
mainstream media reporting. There are evident moments of quid pro quo as NGOs,
MSM and new media rely on each other, share content, and piece together the story
of disaster.
NGOs relied on media to call attention to donation collections, promote their
work, and keep audiences updated about progress. Network relief constitutes an
unfolding rhetorical movement. Once there is a disaster, relief workers form a
partnership in myth-building, generating narratives with a beginning, middle and an
end. These relationships defy comprehensive identification or categorization. Stories
emerge from the ruins. Nevertheless, sources benefit from cooperation at the
beginning. Initially, mainstream media relies on interviewing government and non-
profit figures and translating government reports and information while mobilizing
more concrete disaster coverage. As disaster coverage develops, mainstream media
adapts to more critical coverage.
5
Non-profit organizations depend on mainstream

5. This was a common theme throughout this study, as demonstrated by the preceding
chapters. However, it is clear that early coverage posited advice as suggestions and later coverage
159
media for exposure, as do governments. These relationships are important for relief
networks to work, but they are fluid and constantly adapting because of institutional
norms and self-interests.
Unfortunately, massive natural disasters are not resolved simply by the offer
of support. Disaster results in multifaceted problems and complications. The 2010
Haiti earthquake relief exemplifies a transition in response in a biopolitical globalized
world. By critically evaluating rhetorical positions adopted during Haiti earthquake
relief, one is able to understand how arguments and identifications are made, how
they become replicated and reconfigured by different actors in the network
movement, how social expectations are communicated, how narratives emerge in the
wake of a natural disaster and how a space for expertise is created by both public and
private groups, that both legitimize and work with one another.
Haiti is a paradigm for new media network configuration in response to
natural disaster. The success of new media Haiti campaigns was unprecedented. The
interplay between social media, celebrity activism, and posts made a powerful story.
Social movements are always a matter of contingencies: the media depiction of the
event itself may not intend a particular response; however, a growing conviction
about the residual effects of some frames over others always unfolds and feeds further
development. Disaster rhetoric is uncontrollable even as institutions intervene to

exposed the insufficiencies of the rebuilding process in Haiti. See Steven Solomon, “Eight ways to
Rebuild Haiti: A Recovery Built on Water,” New York Times, January 17, 2010, WK9; Deborah
Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” New York Times, July 6, 2012, A1.
160
relieve and reestablish order.
6
Both disasters and rhetoric are complicated. However,
it is imperative to understand natural disasters, rhetoric, and perceptions of victimage.
Government Interventions
Governments played a key role in Haiti disaster relief. This project included
military intervention, foreign aid, public address and state rebuilding and relief
projects. The Haitian government faced significant obstacles before the earthquake
demolished important infrastructure, killed Haitian citizens and civil servants, and
created a catastrophic emergency. External government institutions intervened by
contributing security and donating monetary and personnel resources. US AID ended
up working with over 400 Haitian organizations.
7
Sometimes resources were
channeled through the governments themselves and at others they were distributed to
other governments or to not-for-profit organizations. Public figures addressed
constituents and represented the scope and weight of the disaster. Many politicians
responded to Haiti by promoting nationalism. Disaster relief relies on a global
community, but also a nation-state system in which states maintain sovereignty and
stressed difference. Governments cooperated. They interacted with one another,
taking advantage of media actors and NGOs. Non-government and government actors
alike relied on mainstream media to share the story and transmit important
developments. They also enjoyed airtime in these mutually reinforcing disaster
networks. Ultimately, disasters occur in national and international political spaces.

6. Andrew Leslie and Stephen O’Leary, “Rhizomik Rhetoric: Toward an Ecology of
Institutional Argument,” Conference Proceedings—National Communication Association/American
Forensic Association (Alta Conference on Argumentation, 1991), 65.
7. “Fast Facts on the Government’s Work in Haiti,” US AID, May 2012, accessed June 13,
2012, http://haiti.usaid.gov/issues/docs/201205_funding_and_procurement_fs.pdf.
161
Power and resources are transferred, yet maintained. Blame is rhetorically placed as
questions of globalization and future policies are introduced. Undoubtedly,
governments shape the tone and substance of disaster relief networks.
Disaster Relief Networks
The international response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake is an example of a
disaster relief network movement. These emerging networks depend on complex
interconnected relationships, utilization of new media, and a sociopolitical goal.
Disaster relief networks are different from humanitarian efforts because they must
adapt to a drastically different world. Rhetorical matrices involve major institutional
actors involved in shared storytelling. Although some rhetorical strategies and themes
are common through each institutional typology, institutions also have unique
tensions and characteristics. Joseph Scanlon argues, “Disasters disrupt communities
and systems that make them work.”
8
After a natural disaster, there is a period of
collapse, uncertainty, and intrigue. Mainstream media, NGOs, and governments
mobilize to administer relief, but the communicative reactions can be problematic.
Different institutional interventions take place during disaster relief. The
media informed the public, NGOs offered possible solutions, and governments
represented constituents in the relief networks. Relief actors participated in
communicative structures and political spaces,
9
and embodied elements of agent and
structure simultaneously.
10
Transnational advocacy networks shared information,

8. Joseph Scanlon, “The Search for Non-Existent Facts in the Reporting of Disasters,”
Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 53 (1996): 46.
9. Naim Kapucu, “Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies: Boundary
Spanners in Multiagency Coordination,” The American Review of Public Administration 36 (2006): 3.
10. Ibid., 5.
162
increased visibility, provided access to wider publics, and multiplied channels of
institutional access.
11
Relief rhetoric had moments of political posturing, social
stigma, and emergence of public memory, but less subjective moments also occurred.
Fact finding was critical in relief rhetoric, but so was sharing a compelling story.
Sometimes in merely distributing an image, a phase of communication was
completed. TANs used the MSM and their own new media outlets to mobilize shame
and create public awareness. Their work energized and articulated a symbolic
politics, bringing their organizations recognition, legitimacy, and credence to relief
projects.
Disaster relief networks exist in a risk culture. Risk is normalized in modern
society. Earthquakes rupture the calculating and habits of everyday life.
12
Risk
perception plays an important role in public policy decisions, international aid and
even migration.
13
Robert Danisch argues that the concept of risk has fundamentally
altered our political culture and requires a different form of prudence for political
rhetoric.
14
Natural disasters disrupt common social and political worlds.
During disaster relief, the media, state and private organizations are brought
together by mobilization efforts of ongoing relief agencies. The rise of

11. Ibid., 14.

12. Uncertainty and risk in late modernity is best described Beck and Giddens. See Anthony
Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1991) and Ulrich Beck, The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity,
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1992).
13. Lori M. Hunter, “Migration and Environmental Hazards,” Population and Environment 26
(2005): 273-302.
14. Robert Danisch, “Political Rhetoric in a World Risk Society,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly
40 (2010): 172-192.
163
communication and transportation technologies transform the way organizations
interact with each other, their members and the people they intend to help.
Information is more accessible and more reliable than ever before. Images are
mediated and strategically deployed to promote social change. Websites work to
intervene in natural disasters, but they remain as public spaces for continuing
information distribution, accountability and renewed objects of necessary
philanthropy.
Relevance to Social Movements
Disasters give rise to social movements propelled by disaster dramas of guilt
and redemption. This project identified a movement, advancing through change and
studied its dramatic phases of development from inception to consummation.
According to Leland Griffin, historical movements are similar to a play, and proceed
through dramatic phases. I believe this work can say the same about contemporary
disaster movements as well. Fundamentally, different characteristics make the
rhetorical progress when a disaster occurs. At first, there is surprise and needs are
introduced. Calls for change are made. Eventually, the movement loses its momentum
and interest wanes.
Critics should pay particular attention to discursive events in rhetorical
movements because rhetoric creates expectations, partial fulfillments, and
disappointments. There are distinctions during these particular phases, but also
consistent themes that remain throughout. As opposed to traditional social
movements, in natural disaster relief the crisis occurs first and inception follows.
Finally, the period of apparent consummation begins. Ultimately, rhetoricians cease
164
their efforts, either because they have won their cause or because they have concluded
that their efforts will not lead to victory.
15
Each rhetorical turn has a purpose: to
mobilize, influence, or resist the movement’s agenda. In Haiti’s disaster relief
movement, consummation occurred because of alleviated guilt and lack of innovative
storytelling.
A network movement creates a matrix of interconnected motives with mixed
goals and results. While movement criticism is useful for studying the variety of
appeals initiating, spreading, sustaining, and reviewing intervention into a disaster,
the matrix of connected actors assembled through networked exchange possess
special relations to the overall movement.
Haiti disaster relief involved innovative uses of new media. Internet related
movements do not always follow the same dramatic, linear structure as traditional
social counterparts. New communication technologies are less linear in form than
previous communication channels, but are perhaps constituted by more dispersive,
circulating, and iterative appeals – promoting a self-supporting matrix of reasons,
emotions, and authority vested in extra-institutional discourse formation aimed at
restoring biosecurity. Haiti relief offered a platform for an emerging change in relief
network communications, especially the redistribution of user-generated content.
16

Information about the earthquake, communication among organizations involved in

15. Leland M. Griffin, “The Rhetoric of Historical Movements,” Quarterly Journal of Speech
38 (1952): 184–188.
16. John Krumm, Nigel Davies, and Chandra Narayanaswami argue, “User generated content
comes from regular people who voluntarily contribute data, information, or media that appears before
others in a useful or entertaining way, usually on the Web – for example, restaurant rating, wikis, and
videos.” User-generated content is fairly inexpensive and in increasing in size and scope. John Krumm,
Nigel Davies, and Chandra Narayanaswami, “User-Generated Content,” Pervasive Computing 7
(2008): 10.
165
relief and strategic plans for assistance and redevelopment depended on digital
rhetoric from websites and other digital linkages in order to intervene. Internet related
movements are also the movements of the future. Just as social humanitarian
movements are not easily understood in linear paths, all of social life will in the future
probably be transformed to a more interconnected, multi-dimensional and replicated
experience. Not only are movements transformed, we are transformed in the process.
Humanitarian relief movements occur at the intersection of the public and
private realms. They are not self-contained, unique or different from other social
movements. However, they catalyze relief with a sense of immediacy, relying on
networks for reciprocal activities that push relief. They do consist of a collage of
various strategic actors – social networking through sharing publicity, appearing on
sight, associating discourse with event, linking in common cause, with direness at
issue.
The Haiti relief movement was a dramatic performance, as its naming led to
framing.
17
Everyone took credit. While mainstream media sensationalized stories and
speculated on perceived outcomes, NGOs glorified volunteer heroism, and
governments re-framed humanitarianism as nationalism. The press, NGOs, and public
figures told stories that ordered emotions, set agendas, and assessed blame. This
dissertation explored representations of victimhood, public memory, and the epic
frame to establish a comprehensive rhetorical understanding of disaster relief.

17. Erving Goffman introduced his conception of frames in “Frame Analysis” published in
1974. A frame is a mental orientation that organizes an individual’s perceptions and interpretations.
Goffman argues, “variability is complicated here by the fact that those who bring different persepctives
to the ‘same’ events are likely to employ different spans and levels of focus.” Erving Goffman, Frame
Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 8.
166
Hank Johnston contends, “there is an inextricable link between discourses and
frames: it is through intensive discursive analysis that the mental structures of social
movement participants are best restructured—from the bottom up, from the text to
frame.”
18
Rhetorical analysis examines the quality and makeup of the stories told, the
overall narrative that is brought to light, the anecdotes that change from day to day,
and those that are submerged from view, by exploring rhetorical artifacts and making
productive conclusions. One aspect that the dramatistic approach allows for is a
chance to examine how rhetors can better communicate the human condition.
19
One
way of improving communication is understanding it better.
Social movements and dramatism have a complementary, but at times
incompatible, relationship. Dramatism allows an investigation of a movement’s form
and frame. Carlson argues that “movements are vast ritual dramas wherein a
disaffected group internalizes and transcends social inequalities through confrontation
with an ‘enemy.’”
20
In this way, dramatism is a logical extension of movement
criticism. Not only can one examine a scope of rhetorical artifacts but, through the
critical process, one can also extend and contribute to the rhetorical theory of Kenneth

18. Hank Johnston, “A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive
Schemata,” In Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (ed.), Social Movements and Culture (Abington,
Oxon: Routledge, 1995), 219.
19. For example, Carlson’s article “Gandhi and the Comic Frame” explores Gandhi’s rhetoric of
non-violence. Carlson argues that Gandhi’s approach was comic because it treated the British as
mistaken rather than evil. Comedy is Burke’s ethical corrective. Within tragedy, the ‘Other’ is
considered evil, or the “perfect villain.” Alternatively, comedy sees the ‘Other’ as mistaken. Comedy,
according to Burke and Carlson agrees, is a more charitable approach because the opposition is worth
saving and being engaged with. Therefore, examining examples of utilization of the comic frame is
productive and important. In terms of the Haiti earthquake, there are interesting dynamics that occur
with blame and frames. Cheree A. Carlson, “Gandhi and the Comic Frame: ‘As Bellum
Purificandum.’” Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 (1986): 446-455.

20. Ibid., 446.
167
Burke. This study renews the usefulness of social movement criticism by examining
the novel forms brought into play by a natural disaster that invites and obstructs relief
and addresses a wider horizon of issues. A disaster in which multiple frames are in
play, movements is made by connections, stories vie for attention – all these factors
renew social movement study by emphasizing the qualities of a rhetorical movement
in defining the hazards, lack, disruptions but potential of a social sphere.
Relevance to Biopolitics
Biopolitics responds to disruptions of order by restoring security and
legitimacy to institutional actors. Massive natural disasters reinvigorate pre-existing
social movements and public policy reform as biopolitics. Natural disasters are
explained sociologically in terms increased vulnerability toward minorities and
economically disenfranchised groups, which invites critical invention and public
deliberation. One problem of rhetoric and social movements is the need to create a
sense of solidarity that describes a condition and imagines an escape. Movements
often build on one another
21
and disasters play critical roles in social movement
developments. Rhetoric can work within disasters and social movements to invite
social and political change, which rhetorically imagines the escape from the horrible
conditions that are exposed during natural disaster rhetoric.
Because earthquakes disrupt taken-for-granted notions of safety and security,
ethos recovery needs to work to restore trust. Disaster relief movements rhetorically
appropriate a sense of control in an uncontrolled environment. There are moments of

21. This has been asserted by various social movement scholars, including R.J. Schmidt,
“Harvesting the Past: The Social Mobilization of Bolivia’s Indigenous Peoples,” Strategic Insights 4
(2005).
168
reporting from the scene in order for information to appear more authentic. The
United States, United Nations, and NGOs pledged support and commitment to relief.
Disaster relief aims at material rebuilding, but symbolic acts also aimed to repair
emotional feelings of danger, loss, and uncertainty. After relief networks do their
work and time has gone by, trust and feelings of security replace the perceptions of
terror and disruption.
The Future for Haiti
The international community should not forget the ongoing struggles of the
Haitian people. There will be permanent consequences from this massive earthquake.
Many Haitians have moved from the capital to the countryside, in what one writer has
labeled “a historic exodus.”
22
This might be a minor benefit from the earthquake.
Pierre-Michel Fontaine explains, “The city does not have the capacity to sustain
millions of people. It never did, and even in ten years it will not have it.”
23
Regardless
of one’s opinion, Haiti will never be the same after this monumental earthquake. As it
is currently configured, international aid increases uncertainty about long-term
development strategies. According to Keith Crane, “Reconstruction is thus being
launched in a period of uncertainty to shape the next government and questions
concerning the government’s scope of authority in the absence of an open
parliament.”
24
The prospects for Haiti still appear bleak.

22. Damien Cave, “Exodus from Ruined Haiti Capitol to Countryside Reverses Long Trend,”
New York Times, January 21, 2010, A13.
23. Ibid.
24. Keith Crane, Building a More Resilient Haitian State, 34.
169
Unfortunately, the Haiti crisis produced only short-lived sympathy from the
international community. The long-term need for a comprehensive policy for global
disaster preparedness was not addressed in any meaningful way. Questions about
global wealth and health needed remain to be answered. Earthquakes may create a
consciousness of a system as a system, revealing its inherent weaknesses, and
creating an aware populace to deal with them. However, they are still stories. Even if
the Haiti story is incomplete, the story was still told.
Limitations of this Study and Suggestion for Future Work
This study did not explore corporate interventions or corporate donations.
This could be a rich area of study for future disaster studies. Monsanto, a
multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation, donated 60,000 corn and
vegetable seed sacks, which were genetically modified and chemically saturated.
Ronnie Cummins, the Director of the Organic Consumers Association argued,
“Monsanto wanted initially to dump GMO seeds on Haiti, but even the corrupt
Haitian government knew that this would spark a rebellion, so Monsanto cleverly
decided to dump hybrid seeds instead.”
25
Many criticized the motive of Monsanto, a
controversy that is an example of an emerging polarization in global food politics.
The Executive Director of the Peasant Movement of Papay, Chavannes Jean-Baptiste,
declared that the Monsanto seeds were “a very strong attack on small agriculture, on
farmers, on biodiversity, on seeds...and on what is left of our environment in Haiti.”
26

25. Ronnie Cummins, “Monsanto’s Poison Pills for Haiti,” Huffington Post, May 24, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronnie-cummins/monsantos-poison-pills-fo_b_587340.html.

26. Beverly Bell, “Haitian Farmers Commit to Burning Monsanto Hybrid Seeds,” Huffington
Post, May 17, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beverly-bell/haitian-farmers-commit-
to_b_578807.html.
170
One Haitian farmer explained, “People in the US need to help us produce, not give us
food and seeds. They’re ruining our chance to support ourselves.”
27
The seeds were
criticized for both their intrinsic and symbolic qualities. Even “humanitarian relief”
can be controversial; it, at times, exposes contests in biopolitics. It would be
interesting to see how particular controversies are framed and defended.
As bad as Haiti was, the next catastrophe may be worse. Modern coordinated
responses toward natural disasters should be considered and prepared for in modern
global society. Nicholas Garnham argues, “political theory has largely neglected the
implications of how…the institutions and processes of public communication are
sustained.”
28
This is especially true with the communicative reponses of disaster
relief. Undoubtedly, institutions would benefit from developing and securing a
communication system before disasters occur.
29
Preparation is vital, including
planning protocols and assembling resources for intervention before a major event
occurs. Although there are evident relief networks committed to humanitarian
projects, the informal and reactive nature of these networks hinder their success.
Hubert E. Huppert and Stephen J. Sparks argue, “The evidence for natural events on
the scale necessary for global catastrophe is robust; humanity will eventually have to
face and attempt to survive them.”
30
An essential component of the Haiti lesson is to

27. Ibid.
28. Nicholas Garnham, Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the Economics
of Information (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 104.
29. Kapucu, “Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies,” 207-225.
30. Hubert E. Huppert and R. Stephen J. Sparks, “Extreme Natural Hazards: Population
Growth, Globalization and Environmental Change,” Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences 364(1845) (2006): 1879.
171
understand that global disaster preparedness and plans for relief are necessary in
global biopolitics. New media might play an imperative role in this endeavor.
31

Although the findings from this study are limited to the Haiti relief movement,
it would be interesting to conduct a comparative analysis. Future work should explore
how earthquake relief movements replicate one another, differ from one another, and
build upon one another. Another interesting critical inquiry would be to explore if
human rights arguments and movements are facilitated by or contest with natural
disaster relief.
32
It is possible that progressive human rights movements that focus on
healthcare and anti-poverty gain momentum by natural disasters and the rhetorical
movements that address them. This paper argued that the Haiti relief movement fell
short in addressing long-term institutional systems of poverty, but is there an effort to
rectify this as relief movements become more common? Additionally, as new
communication technologies develop, scholars should revisit dynamics of disaster
representation and relief.
33
Although this project did not exhaust the outlets of inquiry

31. New media were utilized in some form or another by all of the institutional actors
involved in Haiti relief networks. New media did not only facilitate donations, it also quickened the
speed and access to information about the earthquake. New media generates useful and more
accessible information about disasters. Some non-profits work exclusively online. Ushahihi is a
nonprofit open source software company that collects, visualizes and maps information exposed on
text messages, emails, and user-generated websites, to aid crisis relief and transmit information. This
website organized updates from Twitter into six categories: Emergency, Collapsed Structure, Fire,
People Trapped, Contaminated Water Supply and Earthquake and Aftershocks. These categories
itemize the specific disasters that occurred during the Haiti earthquake. The norms that rhetorically
produce social orders and power hierarchies often frustrate victims and activists during times of natural
disasters and their subsequent relief efforts. Ushahihi mapped twitter reports for comprehensive user-
generated graphs that could assist relief workers and reporters. This technology is new but may prove
vital to the success of future disaster movements.

32. Anti-poverty movements certainly attempt to expose the vulnerability of disenfranchised
groups. “Did Haiti’s Poverty and Culture Worsen the Tragedy?” New York Times, January 16, 2010.
33. In the wake of Haiti, the British Department of International Development created a fund
that hoped to organize technologies after a natural disaster. This project includes mobile phone and
satellite technology, twitter and social media channels, gaming technology for disaster training, smart
172
that involve disaster relief movements, the findings of this project will augment future
studies.

cards for disaster aid, and e-mapping of disaster areas. Robin McKie, “Apps and Twitter will be New
Tools in Disaster Relief,” The Observer, April 8, 2012, 14.

173
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201
APPENDIX A
Networked Organizations that Assisted Haiti’s Earthquake Relief:
Action Against Hunger
ActionAid
ADRA International
American Friends Service Committee
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Inc.
American Jewish World Service
American National Red Cross: Emailed
American Nurses Foundation, Inc.
American Refugee Committee
AmeriCares
Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team
CARE
Catholic Relief Services
CDC Foundation
ChildFund International
Children Hope
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
Clean Water for Haiti
Compassion International
Concern Worldwide US, Inc.
CRUDEM
Direct Relief International: Emailed
Disaster Emergency Committee
Doctors Without Borders
Episcopal Relief and Development
202
Fernande Valme Minisitries, Inc.
FINCA International, Inc.
Fonkoze USA
Forward in Health, Inc.
Friends of Hospital Albert Schweitzer Haiti
Friends of the World Food Program
Global Giving
God’s Littlest Angels, Inc.
Haitian Health Foundation
Haitian Ministries
Haiti Projects, Inc.
Heart of God International Ministries
Hope for Haiti
Hope in Action, Inc.: Emailed
HUP Helping Haiti Foundation
THE IF Foundation
InterAction
International Crisis Aid Inc.: Emailed
International Disaster Emergency Service
International Medical Corps
International Orthodox Christian Charities
International Relief and Development Inc.
International Rescue Committee, Inc.
Islamic Relief USA
Jean Charles Hispaniola Fund, Inc.
Kids in Distressed Situations, Inc.
Konbit Pou Ayiti, Inc.
203
Lalanne Foundation
Lambi Fund of Haiti
The Lamp Foundation, Inc.
Lifeline Christian Mission
Limbs for Life Foundation
Lions Club International
Lutheran Disaster Response
Maison Fortune Orphanage Foundation Inc.
Medical Emergency Relief International USA, Inc.
Medical Teams International
Mennonite Central Committee
Mercy Corps
Mercy & Sharing
Merlin
Mission Aviation Fellowship
Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network
National Disaster Search Dog Foundation, Inc.
OCHA, or the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Efforts
Operation USA
Organization of Support to the Development of the Plateau Central
Oxfam
Partners in Health: Email
Plan International USA, Inc.
Project HOPE
Rebuilding Together, Inc.
Red Cross: Emailed them.
Reiser Relief
204
ReliefWeb
Rotary Foundation of Rotary International
Salvation Army
Save the Children
Seton Institute
Shelter Box USA
St. Boniface Haiti Foundation, Inc.
US Agency for International Development (USAID)
UNICEF
United Way Worldwide
Vision Chretienne, Inc.
Vision Haiti Foundation
Water Missions International
What If? Foundation
World Food and Disaster Relief Programme, Inc.
World Hope International, Inc.
World Relief Corp. of National Association of Evangelicals
World Vision International

205
APPENDIX B
Figure 1: Satellite Image of Haiti

Phil Han, “Satellite Images Show Devastation after Haiti Earthquake,” January 14, 2010,
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-14/world/haiti.google.maps.earthquake_ 1_google-maps-google-docs-
canape-vert?_s=PM:WORLD.
Figure 2: Image of Dead Bodies

Juan Barreto, “Year in Photos: Haiti Earthquake,” January 14, 2010,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/americas/101214/pictures-haiti-earthquake-2010.
206
Figure 3: Moving Bodies To Mass Graves

Jonathan Torgovnik, “Haiti Earthquake: Photos,” CNN, September 2, 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2010/01/world/gallery.large.haiti-1/index.2.html.

Figure 4: Looting and Gun Fights Break Out

207

Figure 5: Representation of the Vulnerable

Figure 6: Reports on the Earthquake in Haiti during 2010

This is a google trends search for “Haiti Earthquake.” Clearly Interest dwindled
sharply in the month of January. See,
http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=%22earthquake+in+haiti%22&date=1/201
0+12m&cmpt=q

208
Figure 7: DEC Contributions to Member Agencies

Figure 8: News Index for the DEC, the Red Cross and Yele
Red: Red Cross Orange: DEC Blue: Yele

209
Figure 9: Destroyed Capitol Building
Romero and Lacey, “Fierce Quake Devastates Haitian Capital.”

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The elemental rhetoric of performance

Asset Metadata

Creator Winkelman, Diana M. (author)

Core Title The 2010 Haiti network relief movement: rhetoric in natural disaster, institutional intervention, and biosecurity

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Communication

Publication Date 11/06/2012

Defense Date 09/04/2012

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag biosecurity,disaster journalism,disaster relief networks,Haiti earthquake,institutional intervention,natural disaster,NGOs and new media,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Goodnight, Gerald Thomas (committee chair), Lake, Randall A. (committee member), Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee member)

Creator Email dwinkelman@umhb.edu,winkelma@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-108577

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