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From Bernays to Baghdad: the evolution of propaganda as a recruitment tool: examining the Islamic State’s success through propaganda messaging on Twitter
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From Bernays to Baghdad: the evolution of propaganda as a recruitment tool: examining the Islamic State’s success through propaganda messaging on Twitter
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1 From Bernays to Baghdad: The Evolution of Propaganda as a Recruitment Tool Examining the Islamic State’s Success Through Propaganda Messaging on Twitter by Lacey Elizabeth Ehrlich A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS) May 2016 Copyright 2016 Lacey Elizabeth Ehrlich 2 For my family… “With him, life was routine; without him, life was unbearable.” To Kill a Mockingbird 3 Table of Contents Dedication 2 Table of Figures 4 Abstract 5 Introduction 6 Chapter One: A Brief History 7 Part One: The Modern Islamic State Part Two: The Earliest Forms of Propaganda Messaging Chapter Two: An Overview of the Landscape 11 Chapter Three: The Path to Radicalization 16 Chapter Four: The Benefits of Both Traditional & New Age Tactics 21 Part One: Competencies in Emerging Technology Part Two: The Importance of Traditional Content Dissemination Chapter Five: Branding the Islamic State 27 Part One: Building a Successful Brand Part Two: An Identity Crisis Chapter Six: Developing a Message Mix 33 Chapter Seven: A Sophisticated Approach to Recruitment 37 Part One: Audience Targeting Part Two: The Active and Strategic Use of Twitter Part Three: A Media Organization Designed for Effectiveness Part Four: Propaganda in Film Part Five: ‘Newsjacking’ Western Events Part Six: Utilizing an Editorial Calendar Chapter Eight: Measuring Success 64 Chapter Nine: Combatting The Islamic State’s Narrative 73 Part One: The Role of Western Media Part Two: The U.S.’s Attempt to Beat the Islamic State at Their Own Game Chapter Ten: Conclusion and Perspective 88 Glossary of Terms 89 Works Cited 91 Appendix 96 4 Table of Figures Figure 1. Summary of the radicalization process. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 18 Figure 2. Screen shot from The Flames of War video. Islamic State propaganda videos illustrate a lively and happy utopian society for its fighters in Syria. --------------------------------------------------------------- 19 Figure 3. Issue 12 of the Islamic State's monthly magazine Dabiq. -------------------------------------------- 24 Figure 4. Photos from Dabiq as part of an 'exclusive' story. ----------------------------------------------------- 25 Figure 5. The leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, speaking in his first and only known on- camera appearance. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 Figure 6. The flag of the Islamic State. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 Figure 7. Screen Shot from Flames of War video. Islamic State fighter rejoices, pointing to his God in celebration of a recent victory. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29 Figure 8. Islamic State message mix, according to research by the Quilliam Foundation. ------------------ 33 Figure 9. Breakdown of message themes by location of media unit, as researched and compiled by the Quilliam Foundation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 Figure 10. Women in the Islamic State, from an article in the Washington Times. -------------------------- 38 Figure 11. Screen shot of the personal data collected on the app; collected from The Atlantic.com. ----- 43 Figure 12. Organizational structure of the Islamic State's media functions; created by the Quilliam Foundation. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48 Figure 13. Young boys pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. Courtesy of VICE News. ------------------- 50 Figure 14. The Islamic State's Preaching Van travels through Syria recruiting locals and reinforcing the group's messages. Courtesy of VICE News. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 50 Figure 15. The Islamic State Press Officer granted VICE NEWS exclusive access to the day-to-day operations of the organization. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 51 Figure 16. The filming of an Islamic State video using visual propaganda to demonstrate a utopian society by giving candy to a small child. Courtesy of the Washington Post. ------------------------------------------- 53 Figure 17. Screen shot from Flames of War. Dozens of children, sprawled out, lifeless, following action by the Islamic State. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57 Figure 18. Screen shot from Flames of War. Islamic State fighters rejoice after a recent victory. --------- 57 Figure 19. Screen shot from the Flames of War recruitment video. -------------------------------------------- 60 Figure 20. Tweet from the Islamic State from the "newsjacking" of the World Cup. ------------------------ 62 Figure 21. Distribution of recruits from the United States based on the ISIS in America: From George Washington University’s From Retweets to Raqqa report. ------------------------------------------------------ 65 Figure 22. Selection of books Islamic State recruiters sent to Alex's home, according to the New York Times. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 67 Figure 23. Jaelyn Young and Muhammad Dakhlalla were arrested at a Mississippi airport after the FBI learned of their plans to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State. ----------------------------------------------- 69 Figure 24. Shahad suffered from severe blistering after a chemical warfare attack by the Islamic State. Photo courtesy of the New York Times. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73 Figure 25. Use of #NO2ISIS between July 2014 and December 2014. Collected by Radian6 through the USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. -------------------------------------------------- 76 Figure 26. Screenshots from an October 9, 2015 BuzzFeed article. -------------------------------------------- 76 Figure 27. Screenshots from BuzzFeed.com, showing comedy-driven responses to the story. ------------- 77 Figure 28. Cover photo for the @ThinkAgain_DOS account. -------------------------------------------------- 79 Figure 29. @ThinkAgain_DOS tweet from November 2014. --------------------------------------------------- 80 Figure 30. ThinkAgain_DOS tweet from November 2014. ------------------------------------------------------ 81 Figure 31. Screen shot of a Twitter user's utilization of the #ThinkAgainTurnAway hashtag. ------------- 82 Figure 32. Screen shot from @No2ISIS, demonstrating how to report ISIS Twitter accounts. ------------- 84 5 ABSTRACT This report will examine the Islamic State’s use of social media, primarily Twitter, to recruit and radicalize Westerners, encouraging them to fight with the organization in Syria or to carry out attacks in their country of residence. Beginning with the earliest uses of propaganda, the author explores the evolution of the practice, focusing on ways in which the dissemination of propaganda has shifted following the advent of social media and the democratization of information. The report uncovers the high level strategies of the Islamic State and dissects the various tactics utilized to recruit Westerners, with a focus on leveraging aspects of American culture. Concluding by outlining the U.S. government’s current practices for countering the Islamic State’s propaganda messages, the report raises questions about the future of terrorism in the digital age. The author conducted interviews with leading experts in the field of terrorism and the Islamic State’s use of social media, as well as studied several pieces of Islamic State recruitment propaganda, both on video and in print, and references several published reports from institutions and reputable news articles. 6 INTRODUCTION When Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004, he set into motion a series of events that would eventually spur the creation of a new kind of warfare: one that not only sought to gain territory on the ground, but also in the online space, in an attempt to build the digital caliphate. Now, the very tools that individuals across the globe utilize as a means to increase connectivity and broaden horizons are being successfully exploited by those with plans to disrupt and destroy the free world as we know it. 7 CHAPTER ONE A Brief History Part One: The Modern Islamic State Prior to 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was the leader of an insurgency against U.S. forces in Iraq. In 2004, however, he pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and changed his group’s name to AQI, or al-Qaeda in Iraq. Al Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike just two years later, and his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri changed the organization’s name yet again to the Islamic State in Iraq, largely in an attempt to regain local support. In 2010 Al-Masri blew himself up to avoid being captured after an ambush by U.S.-Iraqi forces, and the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the next leader. 1 Under his leadership, the Islamic State in Iraq merged with an al-Qaeda affiliate group based in Syria, and took on the name Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, which translates to the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria, more commonly referred to as ISIS. Frequent leadership and name changes didn't weaken the organization, however, and in January 2014, the group took control of Fallujah, a city roughly 50 miles west of Baghdad. Two weeks later, the group gained greater control by occupying the Syrian city of Raqqa, which would later become the organization’s headquarters. 2 ISIS broke away from its al-Qaeda affiliate and became a brand of its own in February 2014 when al-Qaeda's leader cut ties with the group, expressing his frustration with its takeover in Syria and extreme methods. On its own just four months later, ISIS advanced into the Iraqi city of Mosul. While ISIS had boots on the ground in Mosul, its members also launched a digital march into a new territory by initiating the #AllEyesonISIS campaign on social media. Soon 1 "This Timeline Shows the Rise of ISIS." Time. Time. Web. 12 Jan. 2016. <http://time.com/4030714/isis-timeline- islamic-state/>. 2 Ibid. 8 after, the Islamic State announced the establishment of a caliphate, and named Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi as Caliph, the living successor of the Prophet Muhammad. The U.S. launched airstrikes to avoid the takeover of additional cities, but ISIS didn't back down. In August 2014 American journalist James Foley was beheaded by one of ISIS’ strongest symbols of propaganda, Jihadi John, a masked fighter for the Islamic State, and the group warned that the beheadings would continue if the U.S. didn't end the airstrikes. Two weeks later, in September 2014, a second American journalist, Steven Sotloff, was executed. The month of September 2014 is arguably the beginning of the Islamic State’s aggressive, targeted, digital war, as more than 3,380 Twitter accounts were created to spread propaganda messages and videos during that 30 day period. 3 In mid-September, the Islamic State’s Jihadi John executed David Haines, a British aid worker, and the organization released the video across its various platforms. Five days later, the organization released one of its first message-driven propaganda videos, featuring British photojournalist John Cantlie, who had been held captive since 2012. On September 22, the group released another video encouraging its supporters in other parts of the world to conduct individual acts of terrorism in their own communities. The call to action worked, and an ISIS affiliate in Algeria beheaded a French citizen two days later. A series of brutal attacks, hostile takeovers and execution videos followed, and several groups pledged allegiance to ISIS. These groups planned attacks in various locations across the globe, from Libya to Texas, increasing the organization’s brand recognition and instilling fear in all of humanity. By May 2015, the Islamic State had gained control of half of Syria’s territory, as well as all border crossings into and out of the country. In July 2015, a report released by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and other 3 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 9 organizations suggested that ISIS was no weaker than it was in July 2014, despite 12 months of targeted bombing campaigns led by the United States. 4 By December 2015, ISIS, now referring to itself only as the “Islamic State” in an attempt to eliminate the boundaries of geography, had claimed responsibility for several sophisticated attacks, including bombings in Paris and the downing of a Russian jetliner, as well as attacks from homegrown Western supporters such as those at the helm of the San Bernardino, California shootings in late 2015. How is it that the Islamic State (hereafter IS) was able to expand its brand recognition, increase the level of fear across the world, and incite extreme violence in individuals whom they had never met? Part Two: The Earliest Forms of Propaganda Messaging While the Islamic State may have been one of the first organizations to successfully transcend the boundaries of physical space in the name of war, the use of propaganda to influence and recruit individuals is not a new concept. Although the term was coined in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV and was popularized by Edward Bernays in his 1928 book titled Propaganda, the practice of disseminating propaganda began far before its most notable association, when Nazi Germany used radio waves and printed posters to organize groups and garner support. 5 Ancient Greeks and Romans employed word-of-mouth propaganda messaging to mold public opinion and drive conversation; Paul Revere used propaganda messaging in early paintings of the Boston Massacre to gain support and enlist troops for the American Revolution; and in the early 1900’s, Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia produced propaganda-filled leaflets calling for acts of terrorism against its autocratic government. 4 John, Tara. "This Timeline Shows the Rise of ISIS." Time. Time, 9 Oct. 2015. Web. 12 Dec. 2015. <http://time.com/4030714/IS-timeline-islamic-state/>. 5 Bernays, Edward L. Propaganda. Brooklyn, NY: Ig Pub., 2005. Print. 10 These examples of propaganda, however, depict a more recent connotation of the term, “denoting lies, half-truths, [or] selective history,” 6 whereas Edward Bernays’ thoughts on propaganda were much less sinister, although many would argue equally as deceitful. Bernays believed in the writings of early 20 th Century pundit Walter Lippmann, who noted that “mass society” is “by and large incapable of lucid thought … driven by herd instincts” and finds itself unequipped “to make decisions or engage in national discourse.” 7 As a result of this mindset, Bernays advocated practicing propaganda not by deceitful messaging, but rather, by manipulating the “invisible governors” who “pull the wires which control the public mind.” 4 According to Bernays, once an individual understood the people whom society turns to for information, he or she had the ability to influence the thoughts, and more importantly, the behaviors of the masses. Bernays explained that “modern propaganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.” 8 This definition of propaganda, while originally expressed nearly 90 years ago, is perhaps even more relevant today than it was in 1928, as online conversations and engagement give enterprises and groups not only greater, but also faster, more efficient reach to a mass audience. 6 Bernays, Edward L. Propaganda. Brooklyn, NY: Ig Pub., 2005. Print. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 11 CHAPTER TWO An Overview of the Landscape Thanks in large part to social media, interconnectedness is the norm in 2016, and targeted interactions are not only accepted by the public, but welcomed and expected. While the Islamic State’s “morality may be centuries behind the times,” 9 experts J.M. Berger, a former nonresident fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institute, and Jessica Stern, an American policy consultant on terrorism and Harvard professor, explain that “their technical skills expand to fit their available resources,” 10 and the Islamic State’s use of social media, particularly Twitter, has given the organization an opportunity to capitalize on the benefits of such platforms, namely the ability to target individuals who are the most likely to respond to its propaganda messages. As part of a carefully crafted social media strategy, the IS has several well-established goals for utilizing social platforms. First, the IS uses social media to manipulate perceptions of its audiences. The most recognizable example of this is done in support of recruitment, as the Islamic State attempts to characterize Western military action and political rhetoric as a targeted attack on all Muslim people. Through the dissemination of self-created and self-published videos, stories and magazines, the Islamic State tells a compelling story for behavioral change, recasting any action against the organization, or against any one group of people for that matter, as an action (or warning of action) against Muslim people in general. Additionally, the Islamic State casts doubt over the citizens of Western countries, particularly in the United States, by making them out to be a racist, Muslim-hating culture. This spurs hatred for non-Muslim 9 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. 10 Ibid. 12 countries and their citizens, and gives potential recruits the ammunition they need to transition from belief into action. But agreement with such statements is not enough for an organization that relies on extremist action in order to make its desired impact. As with all organizations working to get buy-in from its audiences, there exists a secondary goal, beyond merely sharing information, of transforming agreement with the organization’s statements into decisive action. Because for the Islamic State, only action furthers the mission of the organization. Individuals simply understanding or identifying with the group’s statements or actions fall short of meeting the needs of the organization’s plan for global expansion. Instead, Islamic State messages are carefully crafted to not only develop an understanding of the group’s ideologies, but also inspire supporters to carry out their own set of actions. “I think the backlash is the point of these videos. ISIS, as part of its apocalyptic vision and as part of its strategy -- it wants to polarize populations. It doesn't like fence-sitters. And so videos like this are not necessarily meant to win popular support. They're meant to alienate and anger other countries and other people's populations. And, you know, part of that, also, is the hope that they can provoke people into doing something rash,” 11 J.M. Berger said. The IS portrays itself as the “legitimate future of Islam,” according to Phil Seib, a terrorism expert at the USC Annenberg School, and relies on its recruits’ willingness to see them as they see themselves. For those who are in a position to be radicalized, the IS utilizes social media to shift perceptions of the organization, away from ‘terrorists’, and into those fighting for the future of their religion and as loyal servants of Allah. “None of these foreign fighters see themselves as terrorists. They see themselves as knights…They see themselves as freedom fighters," Jonah 11 "'State Of Terror': Where ISIS Came From And How To Fight It." NPR. NPR, 15 Mar. 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=392365713>. 13 Blank, a former staff member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in an interview on National Public Radio. "So they're very interested in fighting for the Islamic State, and they do not regard what they are doing as in any way an act of terrorism." 12 As of this writing, the Islamic State remains a hot topic on the 2016 Presidential debate stage, particularly as Republican candidate Donald Trump makes bold statements about how to counteract the organization by taking precautionary measures on American soil. Trump has made several suggestions, including monitoring mosques around the county, creating a database of Muslims living in the United States and most significantly, recommending "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what the hell is going on." 13 This quote was subsequently repeated in a terrorist recruitment video from al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliate Somali group, that while different from the IS, utilized the message for the same purpose: to drive a wedge between its target audiene and the culture of the West. Al-Shabaab, like the IS, carefully crafted this message to meet the needs of a particular segment of its audience. Speaking directly to youth in the United States, the video’s narrator says “there are ominous clouds gathering on your horizon,” and reminds viewers that “yesterday, America was a place of slavery, segregation, lynching and the Ku Klux Klan.” The narrator, who speaks near-perfect English, is accompanied by images that recall recent claims of police brutality against black youth in the United States, and warns viewers that America will soon be a place with concentration camps, and that it is only a matter of time before America turns its back on the Muslims. “My advice to you is this,” the narrator said, “you have two choices, either 12 "ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State: What's In A Name?" NPR. NPR, 12 Sept. 2014. Web. 10 Sept. 2015. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/09/12/347711170/isis-isil-or-islamic-state-whats-in-a-name. 13 Donald J. Trump Is Calling for a Total and Complete Shutdown...YouTube. YouTube, 08 Dec. 2015. Web. 27 Dec. 2015. 14 hejira or jihad, you either leave or fight. You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and follow the example of Nidal Hasan and others who fulfilled their duty of fighting for Allah's cause. 14 ” Nidal Hasan is the American citizen convicted of killing 13 people and injuring more than 30 others in the shooting attack on Fort Hood in November 2009, reinforcing the idea that the message of taking violent action in one’s country of residence is consistent across extremist groups. The video goes further, attempting to recruit other demographics as well: “to the millions of oppressed black people living in the United States, however, there is an alternative. That alternative is Islam,” 15 the narrator explains, leveraging recent events around the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag and corresponding activities. This video is an alarming example of terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State using perceived hatred to influence home-grown, lone wolf attacks. Perhaps the most troubling takeaway is not the language itself, but rather who produced it. Previously, al-Qaeda had distanced itself from the Islamic State because its practices were too extreme, but with this video, the organization now seems to be taking notes from the IS’s playbook on recruitment. As the groups move closer together on recruitment strategy and building hatred for Westerners, the United States may be facing a greater extremist threat, whose combined forces are successful both on the ground and in the digital space. The IS’s social media channels are clearly an extension of the brand, supporting an image of power and tenacity. J.M Berger and Jessica Stern suggest that “the projection of an image of 14 Pleasance, Chris. "Trump Becomes Poster Boy for Al-Shabaab: Terror Group Releases Recruitment Video Featuring Tycoon Calling for Muslims to Be Banned from U.S." Mail Online. Associated Newspapers, 02 Jan. 2016. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3381612/Terror-group-Al-Shabaab- uses-clip-Donald-Trump-calling-Muslims-banned-U-S-new-propaganda-video-aimed-exploiting-racial- tensions.html#ixzz3wrZd3yzX>. 15 Robert Kraychik. "Islamist Propaganda Video Endorses #BlackLivesMatter: 'Institutionalized Racism/White Supremacy'" Daily Wire. 03 Jan. 2016. Web. 12 Jan. 2016. <http://www.dailywire.com/news/2283/isis- propaganda-video-endorses-blacklivesmatter-robert-kraychik>. 15 strength is critical to the success that they are having,” 16 however, this projection is different from that of other terrorism groups, particularly al-Qaeda, which thrive on the message of outsiders, underdogs fighting for their beliefs. The empowerment of its current members to take part in the recruitment of new members is perhaps the most important factor in the IS’s success on social media. The digital age, regardless of who one is or where they live, breeds opportunities for increased engagement and personal connection, even for the Islamic State’s audience who feel disconnected from society as a whole. 16 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. 16 CHAPTER THREE The Path to Radicalization The U.S. Department of State, through in-depth study of the Islamic State’s “successful” recruits, has identified three factors that signal individual moves down the “path to radicalization.” 17 It is common for Westerners, particularly Americans, to be unable to fathom an individual’s interest in being radicalized by the Islamic State. The organization recognizes that its audience is not widespread, but for a select few in the target audience, several factors trigger an interest in radicalization. “All of us have a natural firewall in our brain that keeps us from bad ideas,” said Nasser Weddady, a Middle East expert studying ways to combat extremist propaganda. “They [the Islamic State] look for weaknesses in the wall, and then they attack.” 18 Often, these factors stem from grievances against society, a feeling of underrepresentation, or lack of opportunity. Several “push factors,” as the U.S. State Department refers to them, such as poverty, illiteracy, and poor education, give the Islamic State the ammunition it needs to feed off of the existing grievances of its potential recruits. In the United States, the Islamic State disseminates a very specific narrative that resonates with these individuals in the United States. The group expertly and specifically highlights the various ways in which the U.S. government is contributing to the pain and suffering of Muslim individuals throughout the world. Whether it be in the political sphere, such as Donald Trump’s campaign speech about stopping the immigration of Muslim people, or the public outrage against the Muslim religion following terrorist attacks, the Islamic State frames single events as attacks 17 Hussain, Rashad. "A Strategy for Countering Terrorist Propaganda in the Digital Age." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 12 June 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.state.gov/r/cscc/releases/243877.htm>. 18 Callimachi, Rukmini. "ISIS and the Lonely Young American." The New York Times. The New York Times, 27 June 2015. Web. 10 Sept. 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online- recruiting-american.html?_r=0>. 17 on the entire group of people. This narrative breeds feelings of “discrimination and alienation, repression of freedom of expression and freedom of religion, violations of human rights, restrictions on political expression and activity, and lack of economic opportunity.” 19 Following identification of a potential recruit, which is the initial step in the radicalization process, the organization begins to introduce its ideologies. Throughout various pieces of propaganda, the Islamic State showcases a consistent, albeit highly misconstrued, definition of Muslim teachings. In addition to celebrating what the IS believes to be a utopian society within the organization, the group goes as far as to manipulate the verses of the Quran and hadith (sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad) 20 to encourage potential recruits to believe that Muslims have a pre-determined obligation to use violence to defend the religion itself as well as their place in the world. The Islamic State progresses the narrative, and plays deeper into the misguided psyche of potential recruits, by calling on individuals to work together to reestablish the Caliphate, a long- standing belief in the perfect society ruled by the Caliph, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. The Islamic State expertly spins the story, instilling a belief in its supporters and potential recruits that fighting for the IS makes for a greater purpose in life, luring recruits to join a community of like-minded individuals who are willing to die for a cause and live on in eternal paradise. While these messages of post-life Utopia may be found and read by potential recruits, they rarely resonate without the additional step of establishing a live connection with a current member or supporter. Individuals striving to make connections with potential recruits could be home grown supporters in their own communities, or fully radicalized members of the 19 Hussain, Rashad. "A Strategy for Countering Terrorist Propaganda in the Digital Age." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 12 June 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.state.gov/r/cscc/releases/243877.htm>. 20 Ibid. 18 organization who have already traveled to Syria to fight for the Caliphate. Ideally, in the eyes of the Islamic State, through personalized discussions about the organization as well as the short and long term gains for supporters, potential recruits become convinced, and begin making plans to either travel to Syria or plot attacks in their country of residence. Figure 1. Summary of the radicalization process. The IS’s strategy is particularly, and perhaps only, effective in cases of targeting the right people at the right time. Despite the fact that potential recruits are different than most members of society, it is likely that they have similar expectations when engaging with brands or organizations in the digital space. J.M. Berger, who has been studying terrorism for several years, says that even still, experts don’t have a reliable, accurate profile of a potential terrorist. The same goes for the Islamic State. The group’s members are diverse in age, gender, economic status, area of expertise and level of experience in war, and its recruitment messages must be tailored to meet those diverse expectations and needs. “I think one characteristic that we see from ISIS is that they pursue every avenue. So they have specific recruitment for women. They have Grievance • Leverage political grievances (discrimination, equal opportunity, etc.) • Focus on the West's responsibility for key "push factors" Ideology • Showcase a warped picture of Islam • Utilize religious callings to feed a sense of obligation and reward in the afterlife Presence of Influencers • Western recruits rarely, if ever, radicalize without connection to the organization • Online connectivity gives IS an opportunity to influence individuals with ease 19 specific recruitment for different countries, different languages,” 21 Berger said. This insight demonstrates the organization’s sophisticated understanding of not only the platforms it uses, but also, what its audiences expect when engaging with an organization via an online platform. This high-level understanding is perhaps matched only by Twitter’s most well-respected corporate accounts. JetBlue, for example, which has amassed more than 1.98M followers and was listed in TIME Magazine’s Best Twitter Feeds 22 , explains that "Our goal would be to make ourselves available, help whenever possible, and to show that our brand is built by real people who care about our customers." There are several concepts in this single statement that mirror the Islamic State’s strategy on Twitter. First and foremost, the organization uses Twitter as a primary tool for recruitment, so availability is key. Due to the sensitive, and potentially illegal, nature of these conversations, conversations that indicate initial interest are conducted via tweets and direct messages, but round-the-clock availability on more private platforms such as KIK and Skype is one key to the success of Islamic State recruitment. Second, just as JetBlue strives to do, the IS works to ensure that its potential recruits believe that the “brand is built by real people. 23 ” In support of this, the organization’s 21 "'State Of Terror': Where ISIS Came From And How To Fight It." NPR. NPR, 15 Mar. 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=392365713>. 22 "The 140 Best Twitter Feeds of 2014." Time. Time, 5 May 2015. Web. 11 Oct. 2015. <http://time.com/collection/twitter-140/introduction/>. 23 Ibid. Figure 2. Screen shot from The Flames of War video. Islamic State propaganda videos illustrate a lively and happy utopian society for its fighters in Syria. 20 propaganda messages consistently show average, everyday people living as part of the Islamic State. The IS showcases these individuals as satisfied, even happy, people who represent the Utopian society it attempts to portray. Despite the successes of corporate accounts like JetBlue, their retweets and favorites remain unmatched by those of IS accounts. The ISIS Twitter Census evaluated the tweets and retweets of a selection of accounts (that were later suspended by Twitter for amplifying extremist content,) and found that Islamic State tweets received an average of 141.2 retweets. In contrast, accounts that were never suspended received 15.2 retweets on average, which indicates that significant retweeting may force IS propaganda into the Twittersphere’s spotlight for potential recruits, but is does the same for the Twitter company, leading to the shutdown of highly influential accounts. Regardless of whether accounts were suspended, however, these retweet averages are astronomically high in comparison to even the best brand’s retweet numbers. In December 2014, the same month in which the ISIS Twitter Census examined tweets, JetBlue tweets received an average of 22.95 retweets 24 , more than six times fewer than those of the IS accounts, which have, on average, only 1,004 followers, compared to JetBlue’s 1.98 million. 25 This level of engagement demonstrates that despite having significantly fewer followers than other, more mainstream accounts, consumers of IS content and online followers of the brand are far more engaged than traditional consumers. 24 See the appendix for a complete list of JetBlue’s December 2014 tweets and retweet numbers. 25 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 21 CHAPTER FOUR The Benefits of Both Traditional & New Age Tactics Part One: Competencies in Emerging Technology Akin to the communications practices of more traditional organizations, terrorist groups follow the same trends as every day members of society. Building on the more primitive communication tactics of its predecessors, the IS is now fully integrated into the tangled web of advanced social media tactics crawling with hashtags, shares and retweets. The Islamic State is not the first extremist organization to capitalize on societal trends to reach its target audiences, however. In the 1990s, white supremacist groups utilized then-popular chatrooms to connect with potential supporters, and according to J.M. Berger and Jessica Stern, “radical recruiters signed up in droves, making friends and influencing people from a distance,” 26 just as recruiters do on social media today. Several of the reasons that the IS relies heavily on social media mirror why members of the general public use such platforms. For the Islamic State, perhaps the most important element of utilizing social media is its global reach. The fundamental benefit of social media platforms lies in the fact that no message is defined by the physical constraints of space. Geography and time zones become irrelevant, making way for more connected, more diverse interactions with potential recruits. Not only is information delivered worldwide, but it occurs almost instantaneously. The IS, thanks in large part to its extensive and strategic network of social media users, is able to reach the vast majority of its audiences, both internal and external, in a matter of minutes. With 82% of online adults ages 18 to 29 using Facebook, and 23% of online 26 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. 22 adults using Twitter, the Islamic State has unprecedented access to individuals spanning a range of ages, education levels, social classes and cultures. In the not-too-distant past, recruiters’ reach was confined to individuals who sought out extremist publications or gathered at planned rallies. 27 Today, however, the reverse is true, and recruiters have the technological tools to actively seek out individuals who fit their profile, and those same tools empower the organization to disseminate its content to its targeted publics. The benefit to the Islamic State, however, does not stop at the production of content. Instead, the Islamic State’s social media strategy allows the organization to publish with anonymity. Some experts may argue that IS members and advocates do not wish to remain anonymous; however, anonymity in this case refers less to knowing the name of the individual behind the computer screen, and more about manipulating the image of that individual. For example, IS Twitter users are often “deliberately misleading,” 28 when it comes to location of Tweets, creating an altered perception of its members for purposes of recruitment. A study of the top locations claimed by users revealed that following Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq, the United States was the most common location for IS Twitter users. However, according to the same study, none of the location-enabled users were based in the United States; Western countries showed only single-digit totals, signaling the use of misleading, self-reported data to “create the appearance of a homeland threat” 29 and substantiate the thoughts of potential United States-based recruits that others like them are already supporting the organization. Similarly, 20% of the 27 Duggan, Maeve. "The Demographics of Social Media Users." Pew Research Center Internet Science Tech RSS. Pew Research Center, 19 Aug. 2015. Web. 3 Jan. 2016. <http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the- demographics-of-social-media-users/>. 28 Duggan, Maeve. "The Demographics of Social Media Users." Pew Research Center Internet Science Tech RSS. Pew Research Center, 19 Aug. 2015. Web. 3 Jan. 2016. <http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the- demographics-of-social-media-users/>. 29 Ibid. 23 accounts studied in the ISIS Twitter Census identified English as their primary language. 30 These accounts, whether the users are native English speakers or not, were created to “reflect ISIS’s target audience in the U.S.” and places “an overemphasis on English” 31 to support the misleading, but often effectively persuasive, narrative that others like me are joining the fight. In addition to anonymity, cost is a significant benefit associated with disseminating messages across social media. Since the creation of the written word, content has been created and distributed to audiences in the “hard copy” form of the times, whether it be stone tablet, papyrus or newspaper. More recently, however, the cost of creating hard copy content has increased, drastically increasing the appeal of online self-publishing. Today, digital publishing tools cut costs to nearly zero, and Twitter gives the organizations unlimited access to spreading the same message to a greater number of people much more quickly. 30 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 31 Ibid. 24 Part Two: The Importance of Traditional Content Dissemination ……“Your grandfather’s al-Qaeda, if you wanted to get propaganda, you had to go find it. Find where Inspire magazine was and read it. If you want to talk to a terrorist, you had to send an email into Inspire magazine and hope that Anwar al Awlaki would email you back. Now all that’s in your pocket. All that propaganda is in your pocket, and the terrorist is in your pocket,” FBI Director James Comey said in July 2015 testimony to the U.S. Senate. While the Islamic State is advanced in its use of new social media technologies, the group also recognizes the power of more traditional communication tools. The Islamic State took a page from al-Qaeda’s playbook by creating its own magazine, Dabiq, but its communication tactics far exceed those of al- Qaeda. No longer is the group limited to relying on proactive outreach to its potential recruits. Instead, the Islamic State produces the high-quality, monthly magazine aimed at recruiting Westerners, to amplify its propaganda messages on social media and initiate a two-way dialogue. The name Dabiq is a propaganda message in and of itself, as it represents the location of the final battle in Muslim myths about the apocalypse. Dabiq, which is printed in several languages, is professionally designed and boasts sophisticated stories surrounding tawhid (unity), manhaj (truth seeking), hijrah (migration), jihad (holy war) and jama'ah (community). 32 The magazine mirrors components of several Western-based publications, 32 "News and Events | Clarion Project." ClarionProject.org. Clarion Project, Inc., 10 Sept. 2015. Web. 23 Dec. 2015. <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-IS-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>. Figure 3. Issue 12 of the Islamic State's monthly magazine Dabiq. 25 incorporating exclusive photos, infographics, meticulously designed pages and bold, eye- catching headlines. Figure 4. Photos from Dabiq as part of an 'exclusive' story. The IS clearly understands the fundamentals of effective content creation, including the concept of repurposing meaningful stories. One article in the magazine’s 12 th edition, titled Advice to the Mujahidin: Listen and Obey, utilizes repurposed content to reinforce the mission of the IS and underpin the recruitment message. “This article was first published in ‘Sawtul-Jihād,’ former magazine of al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula (before the partisan Yemeni branch),” the article reads. “The author of the piece did not suffice with seeking knowledge and training, but instead led the battle against Āl Salūl until he achieved shahādah for Allah’s sake. May Allah accept him, reward him, and bless him.” This message, true to the Islamic State’s mission, demonstrates the important transition from knowledge-seeking to action. A more recent edition titled Just Terror, published in December 2015, highlights the IS’s victories including the Paris attacks, the bombing in Beirut, and the downing of a Russian jet. Regarding Paris and Russia specifically, Dabiq says “Thus, the blessed attacks against the Russians and the French were successfully executed despite the international intelligence war against the Islamic State.” It goes on to blame the countries for their own fate, writing “both 26 crusader nations had undoubtedly destroyed their homes with their own hands through their hostilities towards Islam, the Muslims, and the Muslim body of the Khilāfah.” This message further supports the group’s narrative of characterizing Western countries as Muslim-hating nations. The magazine serves as an extension of the group’s online presence, with several pages within each publication devoted to the top 10 videos posted by IS on a particular subject. Not only does this provide a “best of” section, but also demonstrates the sophistication of the organization by highlighting its ability to rapidly produce high quality content. 27 CHAPTER FIVE Branding The Islamic State Part One: Building a Successful Brand The Islamic State’s slogan, Enduring and Expanding, does far more for the organization’s image than simply providing a recognizable tagline. Compared to the armed forces of large countries like the United States, the Islamic State is quite small, but it has done well to portray itself as much larger than its actual size. “If name recognition means success, I think they’ve been enormously successful. There’s no one in the world who hasn’t heard of the Islamic State,” Anjem Choudry, a UK-based former member of a banned Islamic group said. Unlike other terrorist organizations, the IS doesn’t present itself as an underdog, but rather, exudes a message of strength, according to William McLants, an expert on Middle East Policy. “Most quantitative approaches to ISIS show that its impact is far greater than its numerical strength.” 33 Perpetuating the image of power, a significant portion of Islamic State-produced videos demonstrate the organization’s fighters on the offensive, rather than retreating or recovering from attacks. 33 Petroff, Alanna. "ISIS: The Most Successful Terrorist Brand Ever?" CNNMoney. Cable News Network, 7 May 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/07/media/isis-brand-media-twitter/>. Figure 5. The leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, speaking in his first and only known on-camera appearance. 28 Defining the success of a terrorist organization may seem problematic, but compared to its predecessors, the IS has found success in new ways, in addition to its stated religious mission of establishing the caliphate and instilling fear in its enemies. The group has crafted a highly powerful brand name, recognizable not only by the harm they inflict, but also by the easy-to- recognize logo, embedded on the group’s flag. One U.S. intelligence official involved in the monitoring of the IS’s media work likened the organization’s brand stringency to that of Nike, one of the world’s most recognizable brand symbols. “The group is very image-conscious, much like a corporation,” 34 the official said. Although the organizational culture, goals and messages are drastically different, the Islamic State’s flag, its main symbolic identifier, has taken all of the success markers from Nike’s “swish” logo. First and foremost, like any good brand, the recognizable symbol, logo or flag is used to unite supporters and followers, giving them a simple way to demonstrate loyalty. As astute brand managers, IS officials understand this, and quoted an Ottoman historian to explain their reasoning. “The secret in creating a flag is that it gathers people under a single banner to unify them, meaning that this flag is a sign of the coming together of their words and a proof of the unity of their hearts,” 35 Islamic State leaders said. “They are like a single body and what knits them together is stronger than the bond of blood relatives. 36 ” Not only does its logo give IS supporters a single, unifying symbol, but it also serves, quite masterfully, as a visual reminder of 34 McCants, William. "How ISIS Got Its Flag." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 22 Sept. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/isis-flag-apocalypse/406498/>. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. Figure 6. The flag of the Islamic State. 29 the sense of community that accompanies becoming a part of the organization. Just as two runners donning the same Nike running shoes may share an early morning nod on the track, individuals flying the flag become immediate insiders or “compadres,” connected to one another, while outsiders fail to understand the benefits of the community, and the Islamic State capitalizes on that idealized connectedness. Second, the flag is stylistically simple. The flag’s monochromatic coloring makes for easy replication with few materials. When the organization first released its flag in January 2007, it once again turned to Twitter to explain its newest brand association. “The flag of the prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, is a black square made of striped wool,” 37 one account explained. The flag was strategically designed to draw on the long-standing, historic roots of the organization. “The white scrawl across the top, ‘No god but God,’ is deliberately ragged, meant to suggest an era before the precision of Photoshop, even though the flag was designed on a computer,” 38 McCants explains. Lastly, just as Nike does, the IS uses its flag and its logo with extreme consistency. Videos, Twitter avatars, press releases and other pieces of material are branded with the organization’s flag. Further playing into the messages of the organization, the flag is most commonly seen in 37 McCants, William. "How ISIS Got Its Flag." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 22 Sept. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/isis-flag-apocalypse/406498/>. 38 Ibid. Figure 7. Screen Shot from Flames of War video. Islamic State fighter rejoices, pointing to his God in celebration of a recent victory. 30 recruitment videos being held by a victorious fighter. This not only connects the dots for potential recruits about the promised utopian society within the Islamic State, but also further supports the Islamic State’s perceived strength and constant victory over its adversaries. Holding to brand guidelines that encourage the high visibility of a supporter-based utopian society, the Islamic State consistently features its fighters and supporters in its videos. Unlike al- Qaeda, who commonly featured its leaders, and much like organizations in corporate America are working to tell stories through the engagement of their followers as opposed to their leaders, the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Kakr al-Baghdadi, is rarely seen in recruitment videos. As of December 2015, al-Baghdadi was known to have only been captured one time on recorded, disseminated video. This demonstrates not only a keen understanding of the power of user engagement in today’s social landscape, but also deep knowledge of how brands must live their values, authentically showcasing their brand identity in all aspects of its propaganda. The leader’s lack of visibility, coupled with the significant use of supporters in its messages, signals the organization’s calculated strategy to continuously operate according to its brand principles. The organization’s protection of its brand image doesn’t end with the lack of visibility of its leaders, however. It also means monitoring competition and remedying any potentially harmful associations, even if it means severing the relationship between parent and child. According to The Washington Post, an IS fighter was criticized because his father was a high- ranking operative with the al-Qaeda organization. His father was killed in a U.S.-led drone strike, but the Islamic State forced the fighter to appear on camera to renounce the work of his father and the organization, simply because the groups are no longer affiliated. The fighter refused to do so, he said in an interview with The Washington Post, and eventually fled, fearing for his life 31 after defying the organization. 39 The Islamic State places such value on its brand that each individual within the organization is forced to either toe the party line, or face elimination, through either self-excommunication or organization-imposed death. Perhaps one of the most important principles of effective branding is consistent message delivery, and the Islamic State expertly executes this component of its strategy. Compared to other extremist organizations, particularly al-Qaeda, the volume of messages released by the organization “are staggering by comparison,” 40 and each of the organization’s hundreds of outputs tell a consistent story, with images and messages that are on-brand. In a single week in April 2015, the IS published an average of 18 media releases each day, with some days reaching as many as 24 published released. 41 IS videos are produced by the organization in more than half a dozen languages, so brand messages are rarely lost in translation. Furthermore, in 2014 when the Islamic State dropped the “In Iraq and Syria,” effectively changing its name to simply Islamic State, media leaders within the organization successfully made the transition across all offices and pieces of branded content, with new content reflecting the Islamic State name almost immediately. Heads of the media divisions of the organization were sophisticated and successful in their efforts to communicate changes across the organization, and from that day forward, the new logo was placed in a consistent location on each piece of propaganda. 42 This level of consistency not only gives the brand a coherent message, but also enables the organization to appear as a cohesive ‘state.’ 39 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda- machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html>. 40 Ibid. 41 Zelin, Aaron Y. "Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output." Perspectives on Terrorism. Terrorism Research Initiative, 2015. Web. 5 Jan. 2016. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445/html>. 42 Ibid. 32 Part Two: An Identity Crisis For an organization attempting to gain traction as a group perceived to be larger than its actual size, any attention is good attention. In the past several months, however, the world has seen changes in the way the organization’s name is portrayed in the media. From Islamic State to ISIL, and IS to Daesh, the organization has been called at least half a dozen names, none of which seem to impact the group’s potency. “What’s really worrying is that despite all the confusion over its name, the Islamic State brand actually seems pretty solid, and worryingly global,” 43 Adam Taylor said in an article in The Washington Post. The organization’s name change from ISIS to the Islamic State may be confusing for outsiders, but on the inside, the decision reflects a change in the organization’s overall strategy. Rather than focusing on its roots in Syria, "they're claiming to represent all Muslims everywhere — they have declared the establishment of a new caliphate," Jonah Blank, a member of the RAND Corp. Think Tank and former Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer, said. "So if they are to actually own this term, that'll be a huge propaganda victory for them." 44 Today, given that various media outlets utilize the name Islamic State, it is likely that the group considered its name change a success. That success, however, doesn’t end with name recognition. The fight against the Islamic State “is a war of ideologies as much as it is a physical war. And just as the physical war must be fought on the battlefield, so too must the ideological war be fought in the media.” 45 Perhaps better than other organizations, the IS understands this, and uses both owned and earned media to fight the battles of both brand recognition and recruitment. 43 Taylor, Adam. "It Doesn’t Matter If You Call It ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State, the Extremist Brand Is Winning." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 13 Aug. 2014. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/13/it-doesnt-matter-if-you-call-it-isis- isil-or-islamic-state-the-extremist-brand-is-winning/>. 44 "ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State: What's In A Name?" NPR. NPR, 12 Sept. 2014. Web. 10 Sept. 2015. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/09/12/347711170/isis-isil-or-islamic-state-whats-in-a-name. 45 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. 33 CHAPTER SIX Developing a Message Mix Although it seems the Islamic State’s messages center around violence, one study conducted by the Quilliam Foundation identified six specific elements of the organization’s brand: mercy, belonging, brutality, victimhood, war and utopia. Mentions of the latter three, victimhood, war and utopia, however, far outweigh the others, indicating the organization’s flexibility to adjust its message mix according to the goals of the organization and the response of its audience. The Quilliam Foundation’s research examined several pieces of the IS’s propaganda and developed a message mix with each of the six themes. Figure 8. Islamic State message mix, according to research by the Quilliam Foundation. Each of the themes represent a different section of the Islamic State’s narrative strategy, according to the group’s research. Mercy tells the story of the organization’s willingness “to grant clemency to those who repent,” while belonging speaks less to the organization evaluating members and more to “the collective nature of the caliphate.” Brutality represented a small .45% .89% 2.13% 6.84% 37.12% 52.57% Message Mix Mercy Belonging Brutality Victimhood War Utopia 34 portion of the Islamic State’s overall propaganda messaging, although the content seen by Westerners is often flooded with brutal acts. The Islamic State likely recognizes that intense brutality will not trigger support from all audiences, but it does well to garner mass attention. The Islamic State utilizes this type of content for brand awareness, leveraging the media coverage spurred by its horrific acts. To fully capture the victimhood component of the narrative, the IS capitalizes on the emotional reactions that come from seeing dead civilians, mostly women and children, in addition to the destruction of places of worship, providing a simple justification of their retaliation and proactive attacks. “Like all jihadist groups, the victimhood narrative,” the Quilliam Foundation report explains, is used “to justify not only its most heinous acts, but also its very existence.” 46 Finally, without images of war, the Islamic State would fail to “perpetuate the perception of its apocalyptic momentum.” 47 The Narrative Composition of Media Production Unit Outputs chart on the next page, tracked by the Quilliam Foundation, illustrates that while victimhood is powerful, surprisingly, utopian society is by far the most significant theme represented in Islamic State propaganda. This aligns with the group’s key message that joining the Islamic State means finding a sense of community here on earth, followed by an afterlife in paradise. The study subcategorized the theme of military, or war, into six additional components: preparation, panegyrics, offensive, aftermath, defense, attrition and summary. The organization’s key message is that of “winner’s messaging,” 48 and without the victories of war, the Islamic State has few proof points to support this mission. The Foundation also identified that 46 Winter, Charlie, and Haras Rafiq. Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Rep. London: Quilliam, 2015. <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual- caliphate.pdf>. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 35 more than half of the group’s produced pieces of propaganda centered around themes that tell a story of civilian life in Islamic State territories. Violent tendencies were consistently present, but the pieces focused more on the utopian elements of life in the caliphate. 36 Figure 9. Breakdown of message themes by location of media unit, as researched and compiled by the Quilliam Foundation. 37 CHAPTER SEVEN A Sophisticated Approach to Recruitment Part One: Audience Targeting As the Islamic State builds its online network, it also establishes a narrative framework on which it depends to recruit Western-based Twitter users. The organization, contrary to worldwide popular belief, does not recruit individuals to kill people. Instead, “they recruit people to build the caliphate.” 49 The speed and agility of social media “is ideal for reaching ISIS’s target audience – young, disillusioned westerners who are ripe for radicalization – and it gives them a sense of community.” 50 There is compelling evidence that “suggests social media taken as a whole tends to discourage extremism in the wider population, but for those already vulnerable to radicalization, it creates dark pools of social connections that can be found by terrorist recruits and influencers,” Berger and Stern explain in their 2015 book ISIS: The State of Terror. 51 According to Bernays, when an effective propaganda message is able to “touch a nerve at a sensitive spot and you get an automatic response from certain specific members of the organism,” 52 which speaks directly to the type of content and messaging put forth by the Islamic State. The IS’s propaganda messages, although disseminated on an open, public platform, are not meant to appeal to a mass audience. Instead, the Islamic State has identified key characteristics of its successful recruits. They are typically young individuals who believe they have a less-than- perfect life, and perceive the lifestyles of Western countries as the “West encroaching on their 49 "Islamic State Expert Interview with Phil Seib." Personal interview. 7 Oct. 2015. 50 Ryan, Laura. "ISIS Is Better Than Al-Qaeda At Using the Internet." Defense One. National Journal Group, Inc., 10 Oct. 2014. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/10/isis-better-al-qaeda- using-internet/96308/>. 51 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. 52 Bernays, Edward L. Propaganda. Brooklyn, NY: Ig Pub., 2005. Print. 38 land and lives,” Seib said. Although many recruits identify as Muslims, their understanding of the religion “is often rudimentary and so they do not question the authority of their leaders and believe what they are told.” 53 The Islamic State is “highly skilled at appealing to a small niche audience” even though it “generated widespread revulsion for its violent beheadings and public executions,” 54 which only feeds its recruitment machine. Western individuals who gravitate toward involvement with the organization come from diverse backgrounds, but share several characteristics. According to Phil Seib, it is widely believed that the individuals who are successfully recruited by the Islamic State through social media channels are disillusioned individuals seeking a sense of belonging. Most are between the ages of 18 and 29, although recent anecdotal evidence suggests that even younger Western individuals are getting involved with the organization. In Syria, school-age children have already pledged their allegiance to the caliphate, but online platform regulations and cultural standards in Western countries make it unlikely that children of this age will be targeted and radicalized through social media. Although the majority of recruits come from a wide variety of backgrounds and often have various options as to their involvement in the organization, female recruits find themselves with very few options for involvement with the organization. Ten of the 71 recruits arrested in the United States since 2014 were female, 53 Barrett, Richard. The Islamic State. Rep. New York: SOUFAN GROUP, 2014. < http://soufangroup.com/wp- content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf>. 54 Petroff, Alanna. “ISIS: The Most Successful Terrorist Brand Ever?” CNN Money. A Time Warner Company. 7 May 2015. Web. 7 Oct. 2015. <http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/07/media/isis-brand-media-twitter/.> Figure 10. Women in the Islamic State, from an article in the Washington Times. 39 and several sources suggest that the organization has a growing need for females. 55 Women are recruited using messages of feminine instinct, including being the “mother to the next generation” or becoming a jihadi bride, according to a Washington Times article. 56 Female and male recruits alike have little or no military training or fighting experience, and few appear to have connections to Syria or Syrian culture. Honing in on its audience allows the IS to set realistic, measurable and attainable goals to accompany their overarching social media recruitment strategy. The organization understands that recruiting “dozens or hundreds of recruits,” Seib said, means that the strategy is working, unlike larger organizations that would view dozens of engaged individuals as a failed campaign. Although these numbers may seem miniscule, the group is able to capture the attention of their key audiences. For these individuals, the “call to do something noble like building a caliphate is very appealing.” 57 The perceived community of the Islamic State, which has been carefully crafted and showcased in the group’s propaganda messages, speaks to those helpless individuals who feel a deep-seeded calling to “witness and take part in the battle prophesized 1400 years earlier” 58 in Islamic teachings. 55 Howell, Kellan. "Islamic State Attracts Increasing Number of Women to Help Carry out Jihadi Agenda." Washington Times. The Washington Times, 5 Dec. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/5/rise-isis-women-10-71-recruits-arrested-us-are-fem/>. 56 Howell, Kellan. "Islamic State Attracts Increasing Number of Women to Help Carry out Jihadi Agenda." Washington Times. The Washington Times, 5 Dec. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/5/rise-isis-women-10-71-recruits-arrested-us-are-fem/>. 57 "Islamic State Expert Interview with Phil Seib." Personal interview. 7 Oct. 2015. 58 McCoy, Terrence. "How ISIS and Other Jihadists Persuaded Thousands of Westerners to Fight Their War of Extremism." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 17 June 2014. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/17/how-isis-persuaded-thousands-of- westerners-to-fight-its-war-of-extremism/>. 40 Part Two: The Active and Strategic Use of Twitter In a more actionable and sophisticated fashion than even some of the world’s largest companies, the Islamic State has a clear, defined understanding of its target audience, and its social media strategy is built in a way to support reaching those individuals. The IS launched its first official Twitter account in October 2013 under the name al I’tisaam, commonly recognized as an Arabic reference to maintaining Islamic traditions “without deviation.” 59 According to ISIS: The State of Terror, the handle, @e3tasimo, quickly gained 24,000 followers. Twitter, Inc. quickly caught on to the account’s motives, likely through the help of activist groups who identify and report terrorist activity online, and shut the account down just a few months after its creation. The account resurfaced in February 2014 as @wa3tasimu and garnered more than 18,000 followers before being shut down once again. This continued with the opening and closing of five similar accounts before the name finally went dark. While it could not be confirmed that the original user, al I’tisaam, ceased digital fire, the individual may have abandoned the name and associated handles and started anew with an entirely different name, as is common practice throughout the organization. The constant opening and forced closing of Twitter accounts is commonly considered terrorist social media “whack-a-mole,” as counterterrorism agencies work with social media organizations to shut down accounts of this nature. In March 2015, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World completed the ISIS Twitter Census to explore use of the group’s most successful platform. At the time of publication, the number of overt IS supporters on Twitter ranged between 46,000 and 59 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. Pp. 154 41 90,000 accounts, and the Islamic State had itself operated more than 46,000 Twitter accounts 60 . This is a rather small piece of the platform’s pie, which supported 320 million active user accounts in 2015. 61 Of those 46,000 IS accounts, there are “two to three thousand accounts really making the difference…[they’re] hyperactive, and very engaged with everyone…they’re driving the success” 62 of the organization’s recruitment on Twitter. These hyperactive accounts, which not only create a high number of tweets, but also retweet and favorite existing tweets at an astonishing rate, amplifying the organization’s propaganda messages, and “promoting the message outside of just the circle of people interested in what they’re putting out. 63 ” Supporters and active recruiters on the Islamic State’s social media accounts utilize the platform significantly more frequently than the everyday Twitter user. IS users tweet an average of 7.3 times per day, according to the ISIS Twitter Census, which is significantly higher than the average Twitter user. In fact, 40% of Twitter users use the platform to read tweets but rarely tweet themselves, according to a 2011 study. 64 Similarly, 62% of the Islamic State’s total Twitter supporters had tweeted content in the past 30 days, 65 while only 23% of all Twitter users had done the same. 66 The organization’s success in disseminating its propaganda messages likely lies in the supporters’ own user followings, with the average IS user amassing 1,004 followers, 67 nearly five times more than the average Twitter user. The Islamic State’s followers amplify the organization’s content more rapidly than the organization could do solely on its owned channels. 60 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 61 "Company | About." Twitter. Web. 19 Jan. 2016. <https://about.twitter.com/company>. 62 "Islamic State Expert Interview J.M. Berger." Phone interview. 9 Dec. 2015. 63 Ibid. 64 Bosker, Bianca. "Twitter Finally Shares Key Stats: 40 Percent Of Active Users Are Lurkers." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 9 Aug. 2011. Web. 19 Jan. 2016. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/08/twitter-stats_n_954121.html>. NOTE: “Rarely” is defined as users who have not tweeted in the last month. 65 Ibid. 66 Sherman, Erik. "Many Twitter Users Don't Tweet, Finds Report." CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 14 Apr. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/many-twitter-users-dont-tweet-finds-report/>. 67 Ibid. 42 Twitter has perhaps become one of the Islamic State’s most successful communications tactics, and the strategy behind it is one that is widely utilized by other successful social media groups and individuals, particularly in the American music industry. In 2015, for example, superstar singer Taylor Swift invited 17 other celebrities to join her in the filming of her latest hit “Bad Blood.” 68 Just as the Islamic State does with its supporters, Swift leveraged the involvement of these celebrities to expand her exposure to new audiences. The IS employs those who have sworn bayat (allegiance) to the organization to increase its reach as well as underpin the authority, sophistication and worthiness of the group. Despite having only between 500 and 2,000 “hyperactive users” 69 on Twitter, a minuscule fraction of the platform’s 316 million-user base, the Islamic State has unearthed a way to reach many of the right people at the right time. The organization has several official Twitter accounts created by its leaders, but also leverages highly-engaged followers to amplify its keys messages. This amplification not only spreads the organization’s messages, but further supports its internal goal of appearing larger than its actual size by creating an inflated appearance. In addition to active user tweets, the Islamic State utilizes its own platforms to generate automated tweets containing these pre-determined hashtags. According to an article published by The Atlantic, the IS’s Dawn of Glad Tidings application (app) not only allows users to remain in the know regarding the organization’s triumphs, but also gains control of individual accounts and has the ability to post tweets without 68 Singer, P.W., and Emerson Brooking. "TERROR ON TWITTER." Popular Science. Bonnier Corporation Company, 11 Dec. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.popsci.com/terror-on-twitter-how-isis-is-taking- war-to-social-media>. 69 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 43 the individual’s permission each time. 70 These automated tweets contain links, photos and hashtags established by top-level media leaders in the organization, and are manually tweeted out by all live accounts, followed by the automated posts. During one of the Islamic State’s most noteworthy events, the takeover of the Iraqi city of Mosul, the app sent out nearly 40,000 tweets in a single day. 71 That volume of activity made it so that any individual Twitter user who searched “Baghdad” on the platform saw the application’s tweets on the top page of results. 72 The personal data collected by the application is extensive, which allows the app to function regularly, often entirely without any interruption to the user’s activities. Users likely forget about the app’s existence, allowing the Islamic State unfettered access to publish content on user’s accounts without permission. It is likely that the Islamic State recognizes that, despite the application’s lack of attention from government agencies now, it could, at any given time, be disrupted. In preparation for this, the Islamic State has established a network of tweeters to share messages and hashtags, and thus the dissemination of propaganda follows a predictable pattern. First, the group’s active Twitter users are strategically separated into three tiers: official ISIS members, a second-tier group of several dozen key activists, and a third-tier group, known as ansar 70 Berger, J.M. "How ISIS Games Twitter." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 16 June 2014. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media- strategy/372856/>. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. Figure 11. Screen shot of the personal data collected on the app; collected from The Atlantic.com. 44 muwahideen, or “general supporters.” Following authentication from the official members of ISIS, second-tier members retweet the link using a specific hashtag. Additionally, second-tier members retweet each other’s tweets, as well as create new tweets using the same hashtag. In the meantime, third-tier members began tweeting and retweeting content from the tiers above, creating a massive web of content and, ideally, a trending topic on Twitter. 73 John Rampton, president of a marketing agency focusing on understanding Google and its algorithms, highlighted five key elements necessary for establishing a trending hashtag on Twitter: creating a relatable topic, teaming up with other influencers, timing, evangelists, and longevity. Perhaps the three most critical, as well as those that the Islamic State expertly implements, are timing, evangelists and longevity. “In order to get a hashtag to trend, there needs to be a somewhat simultaneous push from influencers for several minutes, so that hashtag starts gaining traction.” 74 For the strategy to work, however, in addition to getting followers to share the messages, influencers must encourage their followers to join in. The organization’s tiered approach, which according to the ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA report, consists of “nodes, amplifiers, and shout-outs,” 75 essentially takes the guesswork out of asking audience members for participation. Tier one users, known as nodes, serve as the key content creators for the network of terrorists. These individuals form small groups that share engaging content such as “comedic memes, news articles, and official ISIS tweets” and share these pieces of content with their networks. Tier two and three activists are trained and willing to get involved, creating a “groundswell effect.” Amplifiers, most commonly in the second tier supporters, rarely create their own content, but rather tweet and 73 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. 74 Rampton, Jjohn. "How To Get Your Hashtag Trending." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 7 Aug. 2014. Web. 12 Nov. 2015. 75 Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus Hughes. ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA. Rep. Washington, DC: George Washington U, 2015. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20- %20Full%20Report.pdf. 45 retweet content from the nodes to further amplify the message’s reach, as their job title implies. The final tier, the “shout-out accounts,” are used primarily to promote accounts that were previously suspended. Shout-out users serve as strategic community builders to ensure that the organization consistently has a network of followers, despite social media companies (mainly Twitter) working to shut down terrorist accounts. For the IS, being shut down is less of a deterrent and more of a “badge of honor,” speaking to the “resilience” and determination of the organization. 76 Twitter users outside of the three tiers who tweet and retweet serve as bonus content in the quest to trend. Leveraging all three tiers, it is often the length of the simultaneous push that dictates a hashtag’s success. The Islamic State flawlessly executes on the understanding of the fact that the more tweets per second the hashtag receives, the more likely it is to trend. Once a topic or hashtag gains traction on Twitter, third party aggregators begin to pick up the content, exposing the Islamic State’s key messages to an entirely new subset of its audience. Similarly, because tweets were included in Google’s search results beginning in 2015, individuals searching for related topics (or unrelated topics if the IS is leveraging a current event) are exposed to the content as well. Twitter has strict rules about how to use trending topics, and how a brand or individual can and cannot attempt to trend a topic, but the Islamic State is able to outsmart the technology on a fairly regular basis. 77 The organization has even identified a way to avoid the spam detectors built into Twitter by spacing out its automated tweets. In corporate America, few organizations are able to deliver content to a wide audience with such precision. According to J.M. Berger, the Islamic State, however, has this down to a science, 76 Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus Hughes. ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA. Rep. Washington, DC: George Washington U, 2015. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20- %20Full%20Report.pdf. 77 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. 46 utilizing the 90-9-1 user pattern: with 90% passive Twitter users, 9% active users and 1% highly active users. These active users are “measurably more active” than even the most active participants on social media from competing organizations, and are often referred to as mujtahidun, meaning ‘industrious ones.’ However, very few of the Islamic State’s members fall into this category. On an average day, when the organization is not making a major push for amplifying content, 92% of accounts associated with the organization tweeted fewer than 50 times each day. A typical IS-associated account tweeted 7.3 times per day, for an average daily output of 133,422 tweets per day from all members. 78 This is an astounding number, as the average Twitter user has only tweeted 307 times throughout the lifetime of their account. 79 Instead of relying solely on human interaction, the Islamic State also hedges its bets against the use of its application by using Twitter bots. These bots are created with a software that mimics human activity on a Twitter account. 80 Part Three: A Media Organization Designed for Effectiveness Although its way of thinking and approach make little sense to those outside of its supporters, the Islamic State’s media group has expertly spread its propaganda messages to radicalize and recruit members of its target audience. "For the Islamic State, the media operation is as important as the actual fight,” Souad Mekhennet, a reporter at The Washington Post said. 81 The group demonstrates a highly sophisticated understanding of online networks and the power of digital engagement. This deep understanding of the benefits and uses of video on social media 78 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 79 Stadd, Allison. "50 Twitter Fun Facts." SocialTimes. 11 Jan. 2013. Web. 3 Jan. 2016. <http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/50-twitter-fun-facts/475073>. 80 Ibid. 81 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. 47 stems from the organization’s extreme appreciation for the work of these individuals. “Every fighter that we talked to, every defector, said that the media wing, its status in the organization exceeds that of its fighters,” Greg Miller, an IS-focused reporter at The Washington Post, who has spoken at length with past IS members, said. 82 For the Islamic State, strategic planning to maximize the propaganda’s effectiveness begins far before their media managers sit down to post. The organizational structure is well-developed, with a hierarchy and title structure similar to that of corporate America. A 2015 study by the Quilliam Foundation identified as many as 36 media offices reporting up to the organization’s headquarters in Raqqa. The offices are spread across several countries including Libya, Afghanistan and West Africa, suggesting an unrivaled level of successful coordination in a decentralized structure. 83 The Islamic State’s media offices, although based in a variety of geographic locations, report in to the Islamic State Central Media Command unit. In the corporate world, there is a significant trend toward centralization, particularly in smaller organizations, whose “communications functions are more likely to have centralized organizational structure.” 84 Centralized structures are typically executed by organizations in an attempt to maintain control over its brand properties and ensure alignment to the organization’s strategic priorities, but for the Islamic State, it’s decentralized structure is what makes this alignment possible. The Islamic State, however, has such strong leadership and accountability to the end goal that each unit within the decentralized structure is expertly aligned to the overarching strategies. The chart on the following page illustrates the Islamic State’s media group’s structure, according to research compiled by the Quilliam Foundation. 82 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. 83 Ibid. 84 2013 Resource Allocation Benchmarks. Rep. Corporate Executive Board, 2013. Print. 48 Figure 12. Organizational structure of the Islamic State's media functions; created by the Quilliam Foundation. 49 A study of the “Virtual Caliphate” revealed that in a one-month span, these decentralized offices created 1,146 individual pieces of Islamic State propaganda. 85 The study found “a mixture of photo essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, theological essays, and so on…” and calculated that the organization disseminated an average of 38.2 unique pieces per day, demonstrating an understanding of the evolving needs surrounding quantity and quality of content. 86 Abu Hajer, a former Islamic State cameraman who spoke directly with The Washington Post, knew this information, but said that individuals who are driving forces in the media strategy behind these videos are often separated from the majority of the other IS members. Senior-level leaders in the media division are considered “emirs,” which loosely translates to commander or prince, and make strategic decisions for the group. 87 According to those interviewed by The Washington Post, hundreds of videographers, producers and editors work for the organization and are considered invaluable to the group, often receiving “status, salaries and living arrangements that are the envy of ordinary fighters.” 88 The IS’s media army, then, is likely more valuable to the organization than its on-ground fighters, as propaganda development is what fuels the organization’s ability to continue deploying troops on the ground. “The media people are more important than the soldiers,” Abu Abdullah al-Maghribi, a defector who served with the IS’s propaganda teams, said. “Their monthly income is higher. They have better cars. They have the power to encourage those inside 85 Winter, Charlie, and Haras Rafiq. Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Rep. London: Quilliam, 2015. <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual- caliphate.pdf>. 86 Ibid. 87 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. "Emir." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.britannica.com/topic/emir>. 88 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda- machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html>. 50 to fight and the power to bring more recruits to the Islamic State.” 89 Without content to engage recruits with new skillsets, the IS’s position as a leader both digitally and physically is quickly diminished. With its strategic outreach, the media army has done well to win over the hearts and minds of people in Iraq and Syria, both young and old. According to a VICE News exclusive with the Islamic State, the group’s media team has created a “preaching van,” which according to members, appears to elicit a strong response from young men. Standing beside the van in one video, IS member Abdullah al-Belgian encouraged his young son to speak on camera. The boy, likely no more than five, claims that he doesn’t want to go back to Belgium, as there are “infidels” there. When asked, the boy says he 89 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda- machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html>. Figure 13. Young boys pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. Courtesy of VICE News. Figure 14. The Islamic State's Preaching Van travels through Syria recruiting locals and reinforcing the group's messages. Courtesy of VICE News. 51 wants to be a jihadist because the infidels “kill Muslims.” The boy appears anxious, but his father continues to push. This, which was filmed by VICE News, explains why the Islamic State’s power will continue to expand. Children, who wish not to disappoint their parents, are being told what to think and how to act, all in favor of the violent acts encouraged by the organization. Despite the questionable morality, this is not the first time this strategy has been used effectively. The Islamic State’s brainwashing of children as a means to provide sustainability within the organization mirrors Nazi Germany’s Hitler Youth movement. Young children were educated on the beliefs of Hitler and the Nazis, and subjected them to brainwashing until they “swore allegiance to Hitler and pledged to serve the nation and its leader as future soldiers.” 90 In just three years, the number of Hitler Youth members increased from 50,000 to 2 million. 91 As did the Nazis, the Islamic State focuses its recruitment of children in its home region, but the group’s leaders know full well that regional recruitment alone cannot sustain an organization. Part Four: Propaganda in Film Abu Mosa, the Islamic State Press Officer, understands the value of media relations in its quest to spread video content to new audiences, and invited the international news channel VICE News into the organization for an exclusive interview. The documentary- style, 42-minute video, shows the IS’s position in Syria, 90 "Indoctrinating Youth." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. United States Holocaust Memorial Council, 2016. Web. 4 Feb. 2016. 91 Ibid. Figure 15. The Islamic State Press Officer granted VICE NEWS exclusive access to the day-to-day operations of the organization. 52 focusing on its war with the Syrian’s 17 th Division base, which the Islamic State captured just two weeks later. Following the victory, the video shows bodies from the 17 th Division base put on display, their heads mounted on fence posts throughout the city. Hajer, during his time as a cameraman, uncovered several tactical elements that mirror the production lines of corporate America’s best social media teams. For the IS, which believes that “media is as much a jihad as the actual jihad,” 92 recruiting individuals who possess high-level expertise is a top priority. Many individuals in the organization’s “media wing,” as described by The Washington Post’s source, arrive with skills acquired in news and media organizations or software companies, giving the Islamic State a strategic advantage in disseminating information on common platforms, particularly those with video sharing capabilities. The IS’s video production is as, if not more, strategic than its on-ground fight. According to The Washington Post, coordinated shipments of cameras and other video equipment are delivered with regularity from Turkey, and are accepted by fighters with high skill level. However, even for those with previous work experience in digital or film production, the IS has a structured training system for new arrivals, Abu Hajer, who is now in a Moroccan prison, explained. Hajer says he digested a month-long “media operatives” training, which “specializes in how to do filming. How to mix footage. How to get the right voice and tone,” before doing any real work for the organization. According to former members of the Islamic State, at the time of their involvement, the media team included at least one American citizen. "The American does the editing," Hajer said. According to Hajer, this American was the creative mastermind behind the organization’s most prominent recruitment video, Flames of War. 92 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda- machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html>. 53 For the Islamic State, successful recruitment means more than simply bringing individuals to Syria to fight on the ground. The group, which consistently works to gain attention and fear on a global scale, leverages its propaganda videos to increase engagement outside of Syria and encourage lone wolf, or one off, attacks in locations other than Syria. The December 2015 attacks in Paris, for which the IS boasted responsibility, were carried out by a subset of IS followers, whose connections to the main IS group existed primarily online through social networks. Not only does the IS have a well-established plan for distribution, but the messages within that dissemination have been planned and carefully executed down to the last detail. "ISIS has started different ways of distributing information - could be beheading videos, could be breaking news about operations they're doing, or it could be even sometimes pictures of supermarkets where you find chocolate bars and all kinds of other things. Very simple things, but with a very deep message - that there's a normal life and, of course, also there's the punishment," Souad Mekhennet, a writer at The Washington Post, said. This juxtaposition between utopian society and the fight for the caliphate is apparent throughout several of the IS’s propaganda videos. Incorporating strategies and tactics that run parallel to that of the corporate social media world, the IS has found a way to harness all that Westerners have grown accustomed to while seamlessly weaving in their own propaganda messages into each video. Each of these videos are Figure 16. The filming of an Islamic State video using visual propaganda to demonstrate a utopian society by giving candy to a small child. Courtesy of the Washington Post. 54 designed with recruitment in mind, and thus aim to align themselves as closely as possible with the Western standards of video production. The Islamic State recognizes the importance of high quality production, not only in providing a sense of familiarity for viewers, but also in exhibiting the strength and sophistication of the organization. Given their video’s importance to the organization’s recruitment strategy, it is no surprise that makers of these propaganda films have a significant amount of control within the IS organization, particularly during production. According to The Washington Post’s conversations with former IS members, cameramen are required to film multiple takes of each scene, forcing IS fighters to march in and out of staged battle situations to obtain the most convincing image. Similarly, in some of the most recognizable videos to most Westerners, the executions of James Foley and Steve Sotloff are believed to have been choreographed and rehearsed. The Islamic State understood that “hyper violent content” 93 wasn’t a new concept, but the group had a new, more global stage because Foley was a Western victim. This newfound global reach meant that the IS had no room for error. A careful examination of these videos reveals inconsistencies in placement, revealing the careful planning, but lack of perfection, exhibited by the Islamic State’s media team. Similarly, in another execution, “they brought a white board scrawled with Arabic script to serve as an off-camera cue card … The hooded executioner raised and lowered his sword repeatedly so that crews could catch the blade from multiple angles,” Abdullah explained to The Washington Post. “The beheading took place only when the camera crew’s director said it was time to proceed. The execution wasn’t run by the executioner,” Abu Abdullah said. “It’s the media guy who says when they are ready.” There is “lots of attention paid to lighting,” Greg Miller, a writer at The Washington Post, said, as well as to other aspects of film production. According to Miller, producers follow each 93 "Islamic State Expert Interview J.M. Berger." Phone interview. 9 Dec. 2015. 55 cameraman to guide the emotions of the people in the videos. Much like a director would, these individuals provide instructions to those being filmed, both IS fighters and citizens, telling them “what kind of expression they should show … ‘don’t look so serious,” Mekhennet said. To magnify the intensity and ensure that the IS captures the desired shots, the group sends a fighter with a large weapon to each interview. “When they go to the market for filming, for example, the citizen is asked ‘how is life in the caliphate?” When faced with an IS fighter wielding a weapon, it’s unlikely that Syrian citizens will say anything negative,” Mekhennet said. 94 Once the proper images and sound bites have been captured, "there is an enormous amount of work that sometimes takes weeks or even months, to turn this into a highly polished piece of propaganda that’s ready for release," Miller said, based on his conversations with former members of the extremist group. When the post-production work begins, the IS capitalizes on the skills of its members to draw convincing parallels between its videos and traditional Western films. Perhaps one of the most overt uses of Western tactics is IS’s Hollywood-style video production value, expertly executed in the recent Flames of War film. 95 The film’s narrator speaks native speaker-level English, a form of propaganda messaging in and of itself. Flames of War was created to recruit Westerners, likely specifically from the United States, and the near- perfect use of the English language allows potential recruits to feel connected to IS supporters in Syria. This tactic paints a picture that those who have traveled to Syria are just like me, which suggests that the IS has a clear understanding of the disillusioned recruits it seeks, each longing 94 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda- machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html>. 95 "The Flames of War – The Fighting Has Just Begun." Pietervanostaeyen. 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2015. <https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/09/28/the-flames-of-war-the-fighting-has-just-begun/>. 56 for a sense of belonging and greater purpose. Each video from the IS, the Flames of War being no exception, utilizes English speakers and Arabic subtitles, giving potential recruits the impression that a large majority of IS fighters are from Western, English-speaking countries. Language is not the only similarity between IS videos and Western films, however. Experts have identified several similarities between American-made horror movies such as Saw, Natural Born Killers and The Evil Dead. These techniques, which use creative editing techniques to show horrific violence, give the IS a window to “represent their fighters as heroic warriors in a world of horrors. 96 ” In addition to creating full length videos, the IS capitalizes on the Western tactic of movie trailers to generate interest and excitement for upcoming films. The Flames of War, released in September 2014, utilized a traditional movie trailer release approach, whose timing demonstrates a clear and sophisticated understanding of the power of trailers distributed on social media leading up to the full length release. A careful look at the timeline suggests that the IS likely released the film’s trailer in response to General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s, suggestion that fighting the IS may require troops on the ground if the U.S.-led airstrikes failed to produce results. This, in addition to demonstrating the effectiveness of generating pre-movie excitement through a compelling trailer, shows great flexibility within the organization, as they were able to alter their approach quite quickly following Dempsey’s comments. It may have been a coincidence, but the timing appears to favor an argument for the organization’s agility. Flames of War utilizes “scenes of stylized violence … manipulated to augment the violence of the [IS] fighters” film studies professor Margaret Bruder, the author of several works 96 Dettmer, Jamie. "How ISIS Ripped Off ‘Natural Born Killers'" The Daily Beast. Newsweek/Daily Beast, 23 Sept. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/23/how-IS-ripped-off-natural- born-killers.html. 57 on the aesthetics of violence, said. 97 Adding to the dramatic effect, the IS utilizes a common video production edit, a musical overlay, to increase the emotions brought on by watching specific video. When instances of community victory are shown, the music becomes upbeat and loud, whereas when IS fighters are dying, the music shifts to something more calming, emulating a sense of peace that fills a fighter when he knows he has paid the ultimate price in the name of Allah. Directly supporting the aforementioned balance between brutality and utopian lifestyle, Flames of War alternates rapidly between horrific scenes of war and smiling, joyous people who have accepted the lifestyle projected by the IS. Examples of the latter demonstrate individuals living as part of a community, a critical desire for individuals seeking acceptance and life meaning when being recruited by the organization. Throughout the film, images alternate between IS fighters facing significant challenges, even death, and instances of victory. This idea is perpetuated by the message that even in death, victory is guaranteed. In one scene of Flames of War, viewers see an IS fighter struggling, clinging to life, while the narrator explains that the price for victory is heavy, but those who fight will be rewarded. The man “lied waiting, as his soul was gently listed on a journey to the after,” the narrator says as the fighter’s eyes slowly 97 Ibid. Figure 17. Screen shot from Flames of War. Dozens of children, sprawled out, lifeless, following action by the Islamic State. Figure 18. Screen shot from Flames of War. Islamic State fighters rejoice after a recent victory. 58 close. These Hollywood-style tactics not only establish credibility for the IS, but also remove one layer of the ‘unknown’ element of the organization. The more familiar the videos seem, the better connected and less foreign the organization feels to potential Western recruits. The film’s creators use specialized techniques such as ‘fade to black’ and transitioning between color and black and white scenes to create dramatic effect when necessary. The creators are careful, however, to use the editing tools selectively so as not to draw attention to these elements, but rather integrate them seamlessly into the overall well-produced full length film. Flames of War, a link to which was distributed on IS’s social media channels and amplified by its loyal followers, exemplifies each of the IS’s key goals for digital channels. Flames of War tells a compelling story for behavioral change, recasting any military action against the IS as an action against Muslim people in general. Within minutes of the film’s opening, the IS connects loyalty to the organization with an extreme “us versus them” mentality with the United States. “You are with us or against us,” an English-speaking narrator says as Arabic subtitles flash below. The image quickly shifts to former U.S. President George W. Bush saying either “you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” The film goes on to cast the American government and its people as liars, claiming that U.S.-based media outlets were distorting the realities of the fight against the IS and its supporters. While showing the CNN logo, the film states that U.S. media is “using preconceived lies to distort the reality of events on the ground.” Flames of War attempts to further vilify U.S. actions and portray them as attacks on all Muslims by contradicting experts on the issue: “any scholar who says that this organization is from the Khawarij 98 is mistaken, [that] this organization is atheist, and its members are heretics, they wage war against Allah and 98 Khawarij means outsiders or rebels in Arabic. 59 his messenger.” 99 Flames of War manipulates perceptions of its audiences and justifies the transition from belief to behavior. As with other videos, the horrific and shocking nature of images in The Flames of War do not lend themselves to significant viewership by those who are not on the brink of radicalization. The group understands this, and incorporates other recruitment messages into the fabric of the film, because for those susceptible to radicalization by extremist groups like the IS, the transition from belief to action is a critical step in the recruitment process. Drawing on what the organization knows to be the characteristics of its best prospects, IS incorporates rhetorical questions into Flames of War, drawing on feelings of loneliness and lack of life meaning. “Are you satisfied with the life of this world rather than the Hereafter?” the video says. The scene continues by showing the “brothers … anticipating the rewards of Allah.” The film speaks directly to individuals who are looking to make a difference or find meaning in their lives. Looking directly into the eyes of the viewers, a man in the film explains that the prophet says “those who, having taken their position on the battlefield, do not turn their faces away until they are killed; they will reside in the highest rooms of paradise.” As this is being said, the film shows IS fighters being blown backward by a powerful bomb, symbolizing the message that despite setbacks, Islamic State fighters will press on in the name of Allah and will be rewarded in death. 99 "The Flames of War – The Fighting Has Just Begun." Pietervanostaeyen. 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2015. <https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/09/28/the-flames-of-war-the-fighting-has-just-begun/>. 60 Figure 19. Screen shot from the Flames of War recruitment video. Flames of War serves as an extension of the brand, supporting an image of power and tenacity. Just minutes into Flames of War, the IS begins its reinforcement of its critical message, that of the organization’s strength and a demonstration of itself as a formidable opponent for the world’s greatest army: “…growing stronger, leaving the Americans in bewilderment, pondering what strategy to adopt in fighting the Islamic State.” 100 The film uses traditional Western symbols to instill a feeling of power over Americans. Before the film’s title appears on the screen, viewers see the White House with a vivid overlay of bright flames. As President Barack Obama speaks about the U.S. government’s plans to defeat ISIS, the flames move from the White House to engulfing Obama himself. “They lied,” the narrator says. “The fighting has just begun,” he continues. 101 The theme of Americans lying is carried throughout the film as the Islamic State tells a compelling story of Western governments thinking that the group will soon 100 "The Flames of War – The Fighting Has Just Begun." Pietervanostaeyen. 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2015. <https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/09/28/the-flames-of-war-the-fighting-has-just-begun/>. 101 Ibid. 61 be defeated. The IS uses this to its advantage, not only portraying the American government as deceitful, but also positioning itself as an underestimated organization that is continuously able to outsmart the U.S. and its allies. Throughout the film, the IS inserts key language that provides a powerful connotation of strength: “He and his brothers, firmly standing their ground…” and “the brothers brazenly push forward…. 102 ” Statements such as these reinforce the organization’s message that individuals become stronger by joining the IS; that together, the group has the overwhelming support of Allah. “What a difference between the two [sides]. Allah is our protector and they have no protection.” 103 Well-executed recruitment tactics within the Islamic State’s videos do not advance the organization, however, unless dissemination is mastered, allowing videos to be seen by the right people at the right time. Once the propaganda videos have been created and the timing is right, the Islamic State’s social media teams begin working on message amplification. “The group exerts extraordinarily tight control over the production of its videos and messages but relies on the chaos of the Internet and social media to disseminate them.” 104 The Islamic State fully leverages Twitter in its message dissemination procedures, and its highly sophisticated understanding of peripheral communications tools and tactics only serve to further amplify its content. 102 "The Flames of War – The Fighting Has Just Begun." Pietervanostaeyen. 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2015. <https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/09/28/the-flames-of-war-the-fighting-has-just-begun/>. 103 Ibid. 104 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. 62 Part Five: ‘Newsjacking’ Western Events While the IS sees the majority of its social media-based recruitment traction among individuals who are on the brink of radicalization, an audience of that size is bound to grow thin. Therefore, the Islamic State must continue to share its message with individuals who have yet to be exposed to its ideologies. In an attempt to share the details of life as an IS fighter with additional potential recruits, social media managers at the IS newsjack high profile existing events to gain traction for its own cause. Newsjacking is the purposeful use of a high-profile event that is unrelated to the topic at hand. Organizations typically latch on to trending hashtags and replace relevant content with their own. For example, throughout the 2014 World Cup games, Twitter users used the posted more than 618,000 tweets per minute at the height of the action. 105 The IS used this volume to its advantage, and both English and Arabic Twitter users were exposed to the beheading of a Sunni police officer. The hashtags and caption usage is purposely relevant to the current event, in this case the World Cup, and by tagging their content with the unrelated #WorldCup hashtag, any Twitter user searching for the #WorldCup content would see the Islamic State content in the search results. The sophisticated use of social media tactics not only exposes IS’s messages to potential new recruits, but also demonstrates to individuals that the organization has a deep understanding of new age communication tools, solidifying its place on 105 Purnell, Newley. "Facebook, Twitter Set Usage Records for World Cup Final."WSJ. Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2014. Web. 19 Dec. 2015. <http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/07/14/facebook-twitter-set-usage-records-for- world-cup-final/>. Figure 20. Tweet from the Islamic State from the "newsjacking" of the World Cup. 63 the virtual and traditional battlefields. Part Six: Utilizing an Editorial Calendar A mark of traditional corporate social media strategy is the use of an organized editorial calendar, and the strategic timing of the IS’s releases indicate that not only does the organization maintain such a calendar, but it also uses it to plan several months in advance. This advance planning, however, does not interfere with IS’s ability to act quickly in response to world events that can be leveraged for the IS’s advantage, just as they did when the Flames of War trailer was swiftly released following an announcement by the U.S. government about the possibility of sending ground troops to fight the terrorist organization in Syria. Similarly, the digital space was flooded with IS propaganda leading up to the organization’s charge to rebrand itself as the Islamic State, removing the previously used geographic identifiers of Iraq and Syria. This further serves to promote IS’s image of strength as its power now transcends geographic borders, and demonstrates the Islamic State’s sophisticated understanding of both legacy media, through the use of an editorial calendar, and social media, via the use of digital channels such as Twitter. 64 CHAPTER EIGHT Measuring Success The Islamic State’s carefully crafted social media strategy is successful, as estimates suggest that thousands of individuals from Western countries, inside and outside of the U.S., have traveled to Iraq and Syria to support the Islamic State 106 . Of those in the United States, 71 have been charged with crimes related to the organization since March 2014, with 56 arrests in 2015, according to a Study on Extremism report from George Washington University. 107 Of those charged, 86% are males who have been found interacting with Islamic State recruiters or planning home grown attacks in 21 U.S. states. The study found that 51% made attempts, some successful, to travel abroad, while 27% were involved in plans to carry out attacks in the United States. 108 The infographic on the next page, created for a report by George Washington University, illustrates the distribution of known Islamic State recruits throughout the United States. 106 Ryan, Laura. "ISIS Is Better Than Al-Qaeda At Using the Internet." Defense One. National Journal Group, Inc., 10 Oct. 2014. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/10/isis-better-al-qaeda- using-internet/96308/>. 107 Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus Hughes. ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA. Rep. Washington, DC: George Washington U, 2015. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20- %20Full%20Report.pdf. 108 Ibid. 65 Figure 21. Distribution of recruits from the United States based on the ISIS in America: From George Washington University’s From Retweets to Raqqa report. 66 More broadly, the majority of other supporters have traveled from Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, but the Islamic State has successfully recruited individuals from more than 80 countries. 109 The numbers certainly support the group’s recruitment success, but the more powerful evidence stems from the anecdotal support. In June 2015, following recruitment by the IS, “Alex” explained how she felt after talking with an Islamic State recruiter online for several months: “I felt like I was betraying God and Christianity,” 110 said Alex, who agreed to be interviewed by The New York Times on the condition that she be identified only by a fake name. “But I also felt excited because I had made a lot of new friends.” The girl’s grandmother later described her mindset at the time, saying she was “like a lost child,” and it only took one major event to pique her interest. When journalist James Foley’s beheading started being covered by mainstream media, Alex took to Twitter to find additional details, which likely became the first step in her radicalization process. Once Alex was entrenched in conversation with the Islamic State, the recruiter encouraged Alex to avoid her local mosque, insisting that Muslims in the United States are considered terrorists, and she must keep her conversion from Christianity a secret – even from her grandparents, with whom she lived. Members of the Islamic State and affiliated groups spent thousands of hours talking with Alex over a six-month period, the New York Times reported. The group was “very kind,” she said, and “they asked questions about my family, about where I was from, about what I wanted to do in life.” Once Islamic State recruiters recognized Alex’s serious consideration, it began the official recruitment tactics. 109 Mitchell, Anthea. "Why Are Foreign Muslims Joining ISIL?" CheatSheet.com. The Cheat Sheet, 9 Oct. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cheatsheet.com/politics/why-are-foreign-muslims-joining- isil.html/?a=viewall>. 110 Callimachi, Rukmini. "ISIS and the Lonely Young American." The New York Times. The New York Times, 27 June 2015. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting- american.html?_r=0>. NOTE: A copy of the manual was found by U.S. forces in Iraq in 2009. 67 The Islamic State, which uses a manual titled “A Course in the Art of Recruiting,” 111 took the time to understand her Christian beliefs, explaining that “What you do not know is that I am not inviting you to leave Christianity,” Hamad, her key contact, wrote. “Islam is the correction of Christianity.” Alex later explained that the group sent her money and showered her with boxes of chocolate to make her feel appreciated and welcome. One of her “sisters” from the Islamic State sent Alex a $200 gift certificate to IslamicBookstore.com, as well as hard copies of other books directly to her home. 112 Alex’s grandparents eventually discovered that their granddaughter was headed down a dangerous path, but their warnings did not deter her from contacting her newfound online friends. Alex’s grandparents confronted her Islamic State recruiter on Skype and the conversations stopped for a period of time. They changed her social media passwords and turned 111 Callimachi, Rukmini. "ISIS and the Lonely Young American." The New York Times. The New York Times, 27 June 2015. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting- american.html?_r=0>. NOTE: A copy of the manual was found by U.S. forces in Iraq in 2009. 112 Ibid. Figure 22. Selection of books Islamic State recruiters sent to Alex's home, according to the New York Times. 68 them over to the FBI. The strategy worked for awhile, but later, Alex began communicating with her recruiter again. “I told her [Alex’s grandmother] I would not communicate with you,” her recruiter wrote. “But I lied.” Alex, who during her recruitment cycle was living in a small rural town, expressed feelings of loneliness and a desire to be part of a community. As the Islamic State’s recruitment tactics strengthened, Alex grew closer and closer to the tight-knit community she met online, and withdrew from her relationships here in the U.S. Ultimately, despite the Islamic State’s best efforts, Alex did not travel to Syria to join the Islamic State, but stories like hers provide valuable insight into the group’s strategy for recruiting Westerners. In another example, in August 2015, Virginia-based 17-year-old Ali Ahukri Amin was sentenced to 11 years, 4 months in federal prison for actively operating a pro-ISIS Twitter account. His account, with handle @amreekiwitness, quickly amassed more than 4,000 followers, and used the platform to disseminate the organization’s propaganda messages. 113 In addition to sharing messages, he distributed instructions for using Bitcoin, an online currency sharing tool, to fund the organization. This action violates laws in the United States and several other Western countries, prohibiting citizens from providing support, monetary or otherwise, to terrorist organizations. Additionally, Amin later admitted to helping one of his followers travel to Syria to join the Islamic State. That individual is now facing federal charges on conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. Unfortunately, neither Alex nor Ali Ahukri Amin’s stories are unique. Also in August 2015, Muhammad Dakhlalla, 22, the son of a local imam, and Jaelyn Young, 20, the daughter of a police officer, were taken into federal custody on charges of conspiracy to join the Islamic State, according to a CNN story. The couple was flagged when talking to undercover FBI agents 113 Howell, Kellan. "Virginia Teen behind Pro-ISIS Twitter Account Sentenced to 11 Years." Washington Times. The Washington Times, 28 Aug. 2015. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/aug/28/ali-shukri-amin-va-teen-behind-pro-isis-twitter-ac/>. 69 pretending to be online recruiters for the Islamic State. In the conversation, Young allegedly said “our story will be that we are newlyweds on our honeymoon,” she told the ‘recruiter.’ Court documents show that Young was eager to contribute to the organization, explaining her skills in a hopeful tone. "I am good with computers, education and media," she allegedly wrote. Young also allegedly told FBI personnel that her skills could be helpful to the organization. "I am skilled in math and chemistry and worked at an analytical lab here on my college campus. My partner is very good with things like computer science/media. We learn very fast and would love to help with giving medical aid." Young went on to explain how the couple would make their escape from the United States. “We live in a small town with a very small (poor) airport that doesn't have much, if any, security. ... That's one U.S. weakness -- small towns' airports have poor funding and less educated staff so it is easier to get through.” The couple was arrested in early August 2015 at the Mississippi airport. 114 The narrative continues: In January 2015, Shannon Maureen Conley, a 19-year-old nurse from Denver, was sentenced to four years in prison after admitting to her plans to become an “ISIS bride” 115 and travel to Syria to support the fighters. Falling in line with one of the Islamic State’s key motivators for practicing extremism against Western countries, the perceived poor 114 Shoichet, Catherine E., and Sam Stringer. "Feds: Mississippi Couple Planned Honeymoon to Join ISIS." CNN. Cable News Network, 12 Aug. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/11/us/mississippi- couple-isis/index.html>. 115 Martinez, Michael, Ana Cabrera, and Sara Weisfeldt. "Colorado Woman Gets 4 Years for Wanting to Join ISIS." CNN. Cable News Network, 24 Jan. 2015. Web. 30 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/colorado-woman-isis-sentencing/>. Figure 23. Jaelyn Young and Muhammad Dakhlalla were arrested at a Mississippi airport after the FBI learned of their plans to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State. 70 treatment and distrust of Muslims, Conley explained “even though I was committed to the idea of jihad, I didn't want to hurt anyone. It was all about defending Muslims…It was after [my] arrest that I learned the truth about the ISIS that I was taught to respect.” 116 Conley’s prison time was intended to serve as a deterrent for Westerners planning travel to Syria in support of the Islamic State, but because social media is not bound by geographical borders, a recruit’s desire for community no longer requires that extremists actually travel to Syria. In fact, to capitalize on the organization’s reach, the Islamic State has encouraged individuals to carry out attacks on their own soil, wherever that may be. J.M. Berger says when it comes to “lone wolf” attacks, such as the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, CA, however, the Islamic State’s propaganda messages may not be solely responsible for individuals taking extreme action. Berger believes that for individuals who fit the profile, however, it is “unclear whether the attacks were inspired by the Islamic State and its extremist ideology, or whether the IS provided a convenient excuse for violence that was already brewing in the hearts of the perpetrators.” 117 What we do know is that increased accessibility to online content, particularly on social media, provides clear, concise details about the fame, vindication and eternal salvation that, in the minds of these individuals, comes with carrying out such acts. Claims such as these serve as considerable motivators for lonely, seemingly-disenfranchised, and disgruntled young people. Similarly, al-Qaeda has targeted these individuals and has made several attempts to motivate them to carry out lone wolf-style attacks, but has seen far less success than the IS, 116 Martinez, Michael, Ana Cabrera, and Sara Weisfeldt. "Colorado Woman Gets 4 Years for Wanting to Join ISIS." CNN. Cable News Network, 24 Jan. 2015. Web. 30 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/colorado-woman-isis-sentencing/>. 117 Berger, J.M. "The Islamic State's Irregulars." Foreign Policy The Islamic States Irregulars Comments. 23 Dec. 2014. Web. 30 Dec. 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/the-islamic-states-deranged-irregulars- lone-wolf-terrorists-IS/>. 71 particularly when considering each group’s longevity. In a short period of time, the Islamic State has seen significant success in motivating individuals to take violent action, which can likely be attributed to its highly strategic recruitment practices and content amplification. The IS’s use of propaganda and mindset of forced brutality are often compared to Nazi Germany, as both groups masterfully produced messages to gain support for and “justify an imperative to act” 118 among its people. However, the IS’s ability to drive behavior is predicated on a single differentiating factor: the contrast between horrific acts and a utopian lifestyle. Aside from the obvious differences in methods of dissemination between the Nazis and the Islamic State, primarily print/radio and social media, respectively, the IS uses a combination approach to its recruitment-focused propaganda messaging. The “IS presented its vision of a demented utopia in which children played with severed heads and ran laughing down streets lined with mangled bodies instead of trees.” 119 Rather than producing content that is singularly focused on the “ultra violent” 120 actions of the organization, the IS couples this content with “carefully manufactured visions of a utopian Islamic state within its territory, which stands in stark and unrealistic contrast to the carnage.” 121 This strategy is largely owed to The Management of Savagery, a jihadist tract, whose author Al Naji believes that “in order to awaken potential recruits to the reality of the jihadis’ war and to intimidate enemies by showing the price they would pay for their involvement,” 122 this balance of content is necessary. “The dual messages are designed to influence a divided audience. The beheadings, immolations and other spectacles are employed both to menace Western adversaries and to appeal to disenfranchised 118 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. Pp. 115 119 Ibid. 120 "Islamic State Expert Interview J.M. Berger." Phone interview. 9 Dec. 2015. 121 Berger, J.M. "The Islamic State's Irregulars." Foreign Policy The Islamic States Irregulars Comments. 23 Dec. 2014. Web. 30 Dec. 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/the-islamic-states-deranged-irregulars- lone-wolf-terrorists-IS/>. 122 Ibid. 72 Muslim males weighing a leap into the Islamist fray.” 123 This juxtaposition of content types is not only effective in enticing those with borderline personalities and provoking violence, says Berger, but also demonstrates an unprecedented level of understanding surrounding the use of propaganda messaging to not only change opinions, but to encourage a specific type of behavior as well. 124 123 Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda- machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html>. 124 "Islamic State Expert Interview J.M. Berger." Phone interview. 9 Dec. 2015. 73 CHAPTER NINE Combatting The Islamic State’s Narrative Part One: The Role of Western Media While Islamic State propaganda messaging has been successful in recruiting Westerners to fight both in Syria and at home, sheer numbers prove that IS does not have the ability to reach the masses like traditional media outlets. “A lot of what ISIS does or does not do depends on news coverage” in the United States, Seib said. 125 Intelligence agencies in the United States feed the media, utilizing it as a form of counter messaging, in an attempt to show the public how misguided the Islamic State’s ideologies are. In October 2015, the New York Times published What an ISIS Chemical Strike Did to One Syrian Family, a heart-wrenching story centered around Shahad, a three-year-old girl whose body was covered in blisters following a chemical warfare Islamic State attack that hit her family’s home. 125 "Islamic State Expert Interview with Phil Seib." Personal interview. 7 Oct. 2015. Figure 24. Shahad suffered from severe blistering after a chemical warfare attack by the Islamic State. Photo courtesy of the New York Times. 74 The Islamic State used a “blister-agent shell,” 126 a type of attack that ceased in the 1990s following the world-wide Convention on Chemical Weapons. It hadn’t been used by any groups since that time, until September 2015 when a laboratory in the United States found traces of its chemical components on pieces of clothing recovered after an attack. 127 In the minds of Islamic State leaders, any publicity is good publicity, and the presence of its name on the front page of The New York Times is likely considered a big win. Islamic State propagandists, much like PR practitioners around the world, would likely covet a NYT “hit,” however, while this level of exposure increases name recognition for the organization, it entirely fails to capture the key messages of the group. Successful U.S.-based companies track the pull through of key messages in earned media, something that, in this case, the Islamic State cannot consider to be a success. In other words, by traditional metrics, this is not an effective media hit. For the Islamic State, however, it demonstrates the group’s fearless brutality and instills fear in its readers, and is likely thought to be an overall success for the brand. For the United States, however, stories of this nature serve as a valuable piece of counter messaging, tapping into the emotionally charged feelings against the Islamic State. U.S. media outlets highlight stories of violence against children, often in collaboration with government agencies, to evoke sympathy for IS victims and further the narrative against the organization. The problem for the United States, however, is that counter messaging rarely resonates with individuals who are already on the path to radicalization. This form of counter messaging only serves to feed hatred in the hearts of individuals who would likely never consider joining the organization. 126 Chivers, C. J. "What an ISIS Chemical Strike Did to One Syrian Family." The New York Times. The New York Times, 06 Oct. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/middleeast/syrian- familys-agony-raises-specter-of-chemical-warfare.html?_r=0>. 127 Chivers, C. J., and Eric Schmitt. "Islamic State Ordnance Shows Traces of Chemical Agents, U.S. Says." The New York Times. The New York Times, 11 Sept. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/world/middleeast/ordnance-used-by-isis-shows-traces-of-chemical- agents.html>. 75 Part Two: The U.S.’s Attempt to Beat the Islamic State at Their Own Game In many ways, due to the ineffectiveness of Western-driven counter messaging, the Islamic State is winning the digital war. According to Seib, “ISIS is accomplishing its goals, and non- ISIS efforts, as a percentage, have not been as successful.” 128 Posts about the Islamic State infiltrate Western social media platforms on a daily basis, but one of the official counter campaigns, which originated in Iraq but has spread to several countries, has received significantly less attention. On English-language Twitter in August 2014, “Islamic State” was mentioned 193,222 times, “ISIS” was mentioned 1,371,277 times, and “ISIL” was mentioned 55,000 times, totaling more than 1.6 million. 129 During the same time period, the hashtag #NO2ISIS was used a mere 36,260 times, across more than 115 countries. Use of the #NO2ISIS hashtag gained traction in July 2014 and continued fairly steadily through August 2014, but then suffered a significant drop in use. The sharpest drop off occurred between August and September 2014, and later, September 2014 was found to be the month in which the most Islamic State Twitter accounts were created. 130 This is not to say that the creation of IS accounts was directly related to the drop off in #NO2ISIS use, but it does illustrate the Islamic State’s ability to sustain its follower base and keep supporters engaged through the continued use of trending topics and engaging content, something counter messaging experts have yet to master. 128 "Islamic State Expert Interview with Phil Seib." Personal interview. 7 Oct. 2015. 129 Barrett, Richard. The Islamic State. Rep. New York: SOUFAN GROUP, 2014. < http://soufangroup.com/wp- content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf>. 130 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 76 In addition to failing to match the Islamic State’s volume of social media content and number of supporters, young Westerners, particularly in the United States, continue to make light of the organization and the grave nature of their actions. In October 2015, a widely followed pop culture website, BuzzFeed.com, published an article comparing a member of ISIS to Drake, a well-known musician in today’s popular culture. Figure 26. Screenshots from an October 9, 2015 BuzzFeed article. Figure 25. Use of #NO2ISIS between July 2014 and December 2014. Collected by Radian6 through the USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism. 77 BuzzFeed content consumers, primarily Millennials, were far more engaged in the joke than they were in the acts or beliefs of the organization, demonstrating either an unwillingness to accept or a level of naiveté around the sophisticated nature and threat of the Islamic State. While content sites are leveraging pop culture icons to discuss the Islamic State, the government is not far behind, tapping into the minds of today’s biggest names and organizations for help in combatting the group’s propaganda. In September 2015, the U.S. State Department turned to HBO, Snapchat and Mark Boal, the screenwriter of the film “Zero Dark Thirty,” to continue discussions about “how to engage and empower storytellers [to] create alternative and positive narratives, and how to talk about youth empowerment,” a senior official at the U.S. State Figure 27. Screenshots from BuzzFeed.com, showing comedy- driven responses to the story. 78 department said. 131 As an extension of a three-day summit, the group met to identify creative ways to combat jihadist propaganda, including the creation of “content that promotes stories of young people living in the region who have rejected Islamist terror and work to improve their communities— entrepreneurial work, starting small businesses, launching NGOs, doing volunteer work, and so forth,” 132 a State Department official said. He believes that this type of content provides a positive counter message, and if shown in areas where the Islamic State is known to recruit, can diminish the organization’s ability to approach and radicalize individuals. Former State Department official Will McCants, however, is skeptical about the efficacy of this method. He says that while this seems as though it would be effective, “What you’d want instead is the [government] guy in the trenches talking to the edgy independent filmmaker. That’ll get you closer to the sensibility ISIS is tapping into.” 133 In an interview with The Daily Beast, McCants recalled a pitch he heard during his time at the State Department. For about $4 million, a company wanted to send filmmakers to Kabul to develop content with a “positive national narrative for the Afghans.” The creative content would then have been disseminated widely via social media. The concept of pushing content out in response to violent jihadist groups is very different now than it was when McCants began his work with the State Department. “When I started, the thinking was ‘We don’t dignify this stuff with a response.’ Well, that makes sense if you’re President Obama…That’ll just drive traffic to it.” Now, however, the landscape has changed and silence may not be the most effective response. “…at 131 Suebsaeng, Asawin. "U.S. Turns to ‘Zero Dark Thirty’ Writer for Anti-ISIS Propaganda." The Daily Beast. Newsweek/Daily Beast, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/28/u-s-turns-to-zero-dark-thirty-writer-for-anti-isis- propaganda.html>. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 79 least this way, we’re offering some American perspective and shooting down some of the more egregious examples. It’s targeted at blunting the recruitment pitches online.” 134 That mindset has caught on recently, and generally, the government is “beginning to see that winning the Internet is central to the fight against terrorism,” Laura Ryan, a staff correspondent covering technology for the National Journal said. 135 To win that fight, the U.S. government has modified its approach, utilizing the same tools leveraged by the Islamic State. This model for countering jihadist propaganda is not new, however, and several unsuccessful attempts have been made to combat propaganda through positive storytelling and truth messaging. Following what was described as “the absence of an effective campaign to counter al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology 136 ” at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, the State Department began creating Twitter accounts to beat extremist groups at their own game. The department created an official Twitter account called Think AgainTurn Away (@ThinkAgain_DOS) to disseminate “some truths about terrorism.” 134 Suebsaeng, Asawin. "The State Department Is Actively Trolling Terrorists on Twitter." Mother Jones. 5 Mar. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/state-department-cscc-troll- terrorists-twitter-think-again-turn-away>. 135 Ryan, Laura. "ISIS Is Better Than Al-Qaeda At Using the Internet." Defense One. National Journal Group, Inc., 10 Oct. 2014. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/10/isis-better-al-qaeda- using-internet/96308/>. 136 USA. The State Department. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Archives. 2 Aug. 2012. Web. 14 Oct. 2015. <http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>. Figure 28. Cover photo for the @ThinkAgain_DOS account. 80 The account was designed for trolling, or posting “deliberately provocative message to a newsgroup or message board with the intention of causing maximum disruption and argument,” 137 extremist groups, including, of course, the Islamic State. Unlike the approach in which producers create positive content, Think Again Turn Away tweets directly to extremists and their supporters, often calling into question the group’s moral standing, its actions and the truth behind its messages. Nearing the completion of this work, the @ThinkAgain_DOS account was abandoned, as the account merged with the Global Engagement Center, and now uses the Twitter name @TheGEC. The new content takes a news-based approach, but still focuses on condemning the actions of the Islamic State organization, along with questioning its moral standards. 137 "Troll." Urban Dictionary. Web. 4 Feb. 2016. <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=troll>. Figure 29. @ThinkAgain_DOS tweet from November 2014. 81 This form of counter-messaging is unlikely to reach individuals who are at risk of being radicalized. Confirmation bias, a well-respected theory in the field of psychology, suggests that individuals have a tendency to seek out information that confirms his or her existing beliefs or thoughts. Potential recruits are certainly not immune to the effects of confirmation bias, and are unlikely to seek out the @ThinkAgain_DOS Twitter feed, as it directly conflicts with their existing beliefs. Furthermore, if the account were found, preconceived notions injected into the minds of these recruits are likely to influence the way the content is interpreted, significantly undermining its effectiveness. Figure 30. ThinkAgain_DOS tweet from November 2014. 82 These images and the accompanying hashtag #thinkagainturnaway are powerful, but retweets are low compared to the average retweets of the Islamic State, and this content is typically consumed by individuals who are unlikely to ever consider supporting the Islamic State. Similarly, the hashtag is often used in a comedic sense, much like BuzzFeed did in late 2015. Although the government is actively pushing content of this nature out to Internet users, particularly on Twitter, the social media initiative has a low budget compared to other initiatives. The State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications’ requested social media budget for 2013 was a mere $5.15 million, 138 which pales in comparison to the 2014 budget to fight the Islamic State with airstrikes, in which the U.S. government spent nearly $300,000 an hour, or about $8 million each day. 139 Budget may be scarce, but the lack of measureable success as it relates to recruitment is not for lack of trying on the part of the State Department. Instead, there is concern over the effectiveness of the narrative that the United States has to share. According to a coordinator at the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, “we don’t have a counter-narrative that speaks to that. What we have is half a message: ‘Don’t do this.’ But we lack the ‘do this instead.’ That’s not very exciting. The positive narrative is always more powerful, especially if it 138 USA. The State Department. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Archives. 2 Aug. 2012. Web. 14 Oct. 2015. <http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>. 139 Friedman, Uri. "$300,000 an Hour: The Cost of Fighting ISIS." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 12 Nov. 2014. Web. 30 Dec. 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/300000-an-hour-the- cost-of-fighting-isis/382649/>. Figure 31. Screen shot of a Twitter user's utilization of the #ThinkAgainTurnAway hashtag. 83 involves dressing in black like a ninja, having a cool flag, being on television, and fighting for your people,” Alberto Fernandez told The Atlantic in 2015. Several additional government-supported initiatives exist, primarily centered around Hollywood-style content creation and powerful positive storytelling. Partnerships exist for workshops, including one with the University of Southern California’s School of Cinematic Arts, but the government’s ability to quantitatively measure the success of its counter messaging online is extremely limited. It is quite difficult to determine how much the State Department’s (and other anti-Islamic State groups’) efforts are in deterring potential recruits from joining the IS and traveling to Syria. However, anecdotal knowledge exists that may speak to the effectiveness of the government’s efforts. “…you can demonstrate that this kind of effort has gotten into the heads of senior leadership. With al-Shabaab, for instance, leaders issued a directive saying not to interact with the State Department accounts because they spread lies about the mujahideen,” or one participating in jihad. 140 Due to Twitter’s engagement algorithms, as more individuals see and interact with particular tweets, those tweets are transmitted into the feeds of other accounts. The fact that the Islamic State is working to limit engagement with the State Department’s tweets provides some indication that, if nothing else, the content is meaningful enough that the Islamic State does not want its potential recruits exposed to the content. 140 Suebsaeng, Asawin. "The State Department Is Actively Trolling Terrorists on Twitter." Mother Jones. 5 Mar. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/state-department-cscc-troll-terrorists- twitter-think-again-turn-away>. 84 Part Three: Cutting the Islamic State Off at its Source Despite increased attention to disseminating counter messaging on social media platforms, collaboration with the platforms that host the Islamic State’s content is still in its infancy. Several organizations exist that work to report radical extremist group content to social media platforms, particularly on Twitter. Accounts such as @No2ISIS create infographics that explain how individual users can identify and report content created by terrorist organizations like the Islamic State. Figure 32. Screen shot from @No2ISIS, demonstrating how to report ISIS Twitter accounts. 85 By individual users reporting tweets and accounts, Twitter can work to determine whether or not the account should be suspended or removed from the platform. Unfortunately, however, social media managers within the Islamic State view suspension or removal as a positive sign. Having an account suspended indicates that the user’s content was so offensive, or in their eyes, so successful, that the platform chose to remove it. When Islamic State accounts are suspended, the user commonly creates another account, often similar in name to the previous, and posts a screen shot of the Twitter notification of the suspension, sometimes occurring within just a few hours of the original suspension. When this occurs, the Islamic State’s Twitter network goes into overdrive, tweeting at and retweeting the account in an attempt to recreate the user’s follower base. 141 Although Twitter does shut down some accounts, some experts believe that the sheer number of Islamic State accounts coupled with the automated bots used to outsmart Twitter’s detection algorithm, make it difficult to make a significant impact on the organization’s platform strategy, leaving Twitter to play a “whack-a-mole” game with accounts that constantly close and reopen. The ISIS Twitter Census found that 790 accounts were suspended across the evaluation period of nearly three months. 142 Thousands of accounts have been suspended since the organization began utilizing Twitter for recruitment purposes, and many accounts have been suspended several times, J.M. Berger explained in a phone interview with the author. According to Berger, however, the organization’s reach is significantly hindered by the platform’s consistent shutdowns. One account, Berger recalls, had 2,000 followers before being suspended, 141 Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus Hughes. ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA. Rep. Washington, DC: George Washington U, 2015. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20- %20Full%20Report.pdf. 142 Berger, J.M., and Jonathon Morgan. The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter. Rep. no. 20. Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, 2015. Print. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 86 but even after the account’s attempt to regain followers under its new account name, it was only able to regain 100. This seriously “undercuts the ability to drive hashtag gaining,” Berger says, as less exposure around particular tweets makes it more difficult to gain attention, particularly from potential new recruits who learn of the group’s messages through trending topics. The Islamic State, Berger says is “clearly suffering” 143 with relation to its ability to disseminate messages, but “we’re not eradicating them.” 144 The U.S. is fighting against the group’s “pent up pressure of not being able to get their message out,” Berger says, and thus, they are attempting to find creative ways, such as the use of Twitter bots, to circumvent the United State’s efforts. Because the organization is sophisticated enough to detect the indicators of account shutdowns and alter its strategy accordingly, some experts believe that keeping accounts active to monitor their activity has important benefits, and serves as reason enough to keep the accounts active. In June 2015, in fact, the U.S. Air Force was able to drop a bomb on an Islamic State Command Center after a fighter posted a picture of himself standing in front of the buildings. Using location-based intel and other intelligence the Air Force located and leveled the center. Some believe, however, that despite the trade offs that may exist when shutting down Twitter accounts, the situation with the Islamic State may not be as threatening in the long term as U.S. media makes it seem. And to some extent, Berger agrees. The Islamic State has been losing ground in its key regions, and it Berger believes it is losing ground in the digital space, as well. “We haven’t been cracking down for long,” 145 he said. Berger believes that while it is “pretty likely that we’ll see an increase amount of terrorist attacks in the near future,” 146 the 143 "Islamic State Expert Interview J.M. Berger." Phone interview. 9 Dec. 2015. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 87 attacks will likely be at the hands of “people already in the system…who were radicalized a long time ago.” 147 Unfortunately, he explained, the world will have to wait for previous recruits to “cycle out” 148 before seeing a slowdown in attacks. It is important to note that Berger was correct. Following his interview with the author in December 2015 and as of this writing, the Islamic State and its affiliate groups claimed responsibility for attacks in several locations including Afghanistan, Brussels, California, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. 147 "Islamic State Expert Interview J.M. Berger." Phone interview. 9 Dec. 2015. 148 Ibid. 88 CHAPTER TEN Conclusion & Perspective Through its sophisticated web of Twitter contacts, the IS is successfully “crowd sourcing its propaganda,” 149 allowing messages to spread like digital wildfire. By using Americans and other Western cultures as a scapegoat, the Islamic State makes a compelling argument to attract disenfranchised, discouraged individuals who, because of strategic propaganda messaging, believe that joining the organization will lead to a more fulfilling life on earth, and an afterlife of eternal bliss in the name of Allah. Perhaps the most troubling thought is that despite its best efforts, as of this writing, the United States has failed to successfully counter any form of the group’s existing propaganda messages. The Islamic State has managed to gain expertise in emerging content dissemination tools at a significantly faster rate than most Fortune 500 companies, which begs the question: what will they master next? While recent reports indicate that the Islamic State may be losing territory on the ground, its highly effective digital presence enables the organization to maintain the perception of its immense size and strength. And in the age of digital warfare, online perception is reality. 149 Barrett, Richard. The Islamic State. Rep. New York: SOUFAN GROUP, 2014. < http://soufangroup.com/wp- content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf>. 89 GLOSSARY OF TERMS al Shabab al-Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia al-Qaeda An extremist organization founded in Afghanistan in 1988 by Osama bin Laden Allah “God” in Arabic Automated tweets Tweets sent automatically by a Twitter Bot Bayat Allegiance or loyalty Bitcoin An online payment system for sending and receiving funds digitally. Caliph The named ruler of a Muslim community; successor to the Prophet Muhammad Caliphate A religious and political state led by the Caliph Crowdsourcing Obtain information from a large number of people; usually at the same time or within a short timeframe Daesh Another name for the Islamic State; based on the organization’s acronym when written in Arabic Direct messages Connecting with an individual on social media in a private message not visible to the public or other platform users Earned media Publicity or coverage garnered through “free” efforts, as opposed to “paid” such as advertising. An example would be getting a story in The New York Times. Emir “Commander” in Arabic; the literal translation is “prince” Hadith The stories and teachings of Muhammad Hashtags Words or a phrase, used after a pound or hash sign, to categorize information on particular topics (Example: #No2ISIS) Imam The leader of prayer in a mosque Jihad “Struggle” in Arabic; its most common use is for war-like struggles of extremist organizations Lone wolf A person who acts alone; one who carries out attacks in their home country on behalf of an extremist organization Millennials A person born in the 1980’s or 1990’s; typically tech-savvy and fully engaged on social media Mosul A city in Iraq; captured by the Islamic State Mujtahidun A name for active supporters of the Islamic State on social media; literally means “industrious ones” Newsjack Leveraging an existing, high profile event by using specific hashtags from the event on another organization or initiative’s content Owned media Channels that are within one’s control including social media channels (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.), company website, email messages, or blogs. Panegyrics Praising someone or something in a published text or speech Quran Official religious text of Islam Retweet Reposting a message or “tweet” from another user on Twitter Trolling To post something online with the intention of hurting or upsetting an 90 individual or group of people Tweet An individual post on the Twitter platform Twitter A social networking platform that allows users to send and read 140- character messages, or "tweets.” Twitter bots A software the automatically sends tweets at a given time Twittersphere The Twitter universe; a collection of all tweets 91 WORKS CITED 2013 Resource Allocation Benchmarks. Rep. Corporate Executive Board, 2013. Print. Barrett, Richard. The Islamic State. Rep. New York: SOUFAN GROUP, 2014. Print. Berger, J.M. "How ISIS Games Twitter." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 16 June 2014. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq- twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/>. Berger, J.M. 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Web. 30 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/colorado-woman-isis-sentencing/>. McCants, William. "How ISIS Got Its Flag." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 22 Sept. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/isis-flag- apocalypse/406498/>. 93 McCoy, Terrence. "How ISIS and Other Jihadists Persuaded Thousands of Westerners to Fight Their War of Extremism." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 17 June 2014. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/17/how- isis-persuaded-thousands-of-westerners-to-fight-its-war-of-extremism/>. Mekhennet, Souad, and Greg Miller. "Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State's Propaganda Machine." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2015. Web. 18 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states- propaganda-machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html>. Mitchell, Anthea. "Why Are Foreign Muslims Joining ISIL?" CheatSheet.com. The Cheat Sheet, 9 Oct. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cheatsheet.com/politics/why-are-foreign- muslims-joining-isil.html/?a=viewall>. "News and Events | Clarion Project." ClarionProject.org. Clarion Project, Inc., 10 Sept. 2015. Web. 23 Dec. 2015. <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-IS-isil- propaganda-magazine-dabiq>. Petroff, Alanna. "ISIS: The Most Successful Terrorist Brand Ever?" CNNMoney. Cable News Network, 7 May 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. Pleasance, Chris. "Trump Becomes Poster Boy for Al-Shabaab: Terror Group Releases Recruitment Video Featuring Tycoon Calling for Muslims to Be Banned from U.S." Mail Online. Associated Newspapers, 02 Jan. 2016. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. Purnell, Newley. "Facebook, Twitter Set Usage Records for World Cup Final."WSJ. Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2014. Web. 19 Dec. 2015. <http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/07/14/facebook-twitter-set-usage-records-for-world- cup-final/>. Rampton, John. "How To Get Your Hashtag Trending." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 7 Aug. 2014. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnrampton/2014/08/07/how-to-get- you-hashtag-trending/>. Robert Kraychik. "Islamist Propaganda Video Endorses #BlackLivesMatter: 'Institutionalized Racism/White Supremacy'" Daily Wire. 03 Jan. 2016. Web. 12 Jan. 2016. <http://www.dailywire.com/news/2283/isis-propaganda-video-endorses-blacklivesmatter- robert-kraychik>. Ryan, Laura. "ISIS Is Better Than al-Qaeda At Using the Internet." Defense One. National Journal Group, Inc., 10 Oct. 2014. Web. 28 Dec. 2015. <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/10/isis-better-al-qaeda-using- internet/96308/>. 94 Sherman, Erik. "Many Twitter Users Don't Tweet, Finds Report." CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 14 Apr. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/many-twitter-users- dont-tweet-finds-report/>. Shoichet, Catherine E., and Sam Stringer. "Feds: Mississippi Couple Planned Honeymoon to Join ISIS." CNN. Cable News Network, 12 Aug. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/11/us/mississippi-couple-isis/index.html>. Singer, P.W., and Emerson Brooking. "TERROR ON TWITTER." Popular Science. Bonnier Corporation Company, 11 Dec. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.popsci.com/terror-on-twitter-how-isis-is-taking-war-to-social-media>. Stadd, Allison. "50 Twitter Fun Facts." SocialTimes. 11 Jan. 2013. Web. 3 Jan. 2016. <http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/50-twitter-fun-facts/475073>. "'State Of Terror': Where ISIS Came From And How To Fight It." NPR. NPR, 15 Mar. 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=392365713>. Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Harper Collins, 2015. Print. Suebsaeng, Asawin. "The State Department Is Actively Trolling Terrorists on Twitter." Mother Jones. 5 Mar. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/state-department-cscc-troll-terrorists- twitter-think-again-turn-away>. Suebsaeng, Asawin. "U.S. Turns to ‘Zero Dark Thirty’ Writer for Anti-ISIS Propaganda." The Daily Beast. Newsweek/Daily Beast, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/28/u-s-turns-to-zero-dark-thirty-writer- for-anti-isis-propaganda.html>. Taylor, Adam. "It Doesn’t Matter If You Call It ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State, the Extremist Brand Is Winning." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 13 Aug. 2014. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/13/it-doesnt-matter-if- you-call-it-isis-isil-or-islamic-state-the-extremist-brand-is-winning/>. "The 140 Best Twitter Feeds of 2014." Time. Time, 5 May 2015. Web. 11 Oct. 2015. <http://time.com/collection/twitter-140/introduction/>. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. "Emir." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica. Web. 29 Dec. 2015. <http://www.britannica.com/topic/emir>. "The Flames of War – The Fighting Has Just Begun." Pietervanostaeyen. 19 Sept. 2014. Web. 29 Oct. 2015. <https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/09/28/the-flames-of-war- the-fighting-has-just-begun/.>. 95 "This Timeline Shows the Rise of ISIS." Time. Time. Web. 12 Jan. 2016. <http://time.com/4030714/isis-timeline-islamic-state/>. "Troll." Urban Dictionary. Web. 4 Feb. 2016. <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=troll>. USA. The State Department. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Archives. 2 Aug. 2012. Web. 14 Oct. 2015. <http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>. Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus Hughes. ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM RETWEETS TO RAQQA. Rep. Washington, DC: George Washington U, 2015. Print. Winter, Charlie, and Haras Rafiq. Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Rep. London: Quilliam, 2015. Print. Zelin, Aaron Y. "Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output." Perspectives on Terrorism. Terrorism Research Initiative, 2015. Web. 5 Jan. 2016. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445/html>. 96 APPENDIX Interview Notes Interview with J.M. Berger Nonresident Fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings and author of ISIS: The State of Terror December 9, 2015 Began “organized effort” in 2013 Pretty aggressive and began to “pop up on social” “fewer followers but would outperform pretty regularly” on Twitter 2,000-3,000 accounts really making the difference…hyperactive, and very engaged w/ e/o…they’re driving the success. Rolled out Twitter app to “drive exposure way up” “promote message outside social circle of people interested in what they’re putting out” James Foley video – “hyper violent content” not new, but “because it was a western victim” it made a big impact “wave of suspensions” officials and key influencers getting knocked down Oct-Nov 2014 to mid 2015 “network which has been growing had been contracting somewhat” Amounts of activity are down Bakiah Shadat account- June to end of Sept. metrics were “at best flat” average number of followers; tweets/day down slightly Accounts repeatedly suspended – inciting violence – really devastated by suspensions 80k followers at height; now 2-3k before a suspension English language network is very contained and “undercuts their ability to drive hashtag gaining” but it does happen Brand – sophisticated; ability to disseminate They control internet access of members tightly. “exercise a virtual monopoly in their territories” They put out a really diverse mix of messaging – “ultra violent” mentally ill people attracted to it because of the violence 97 Lone wolf style attacks Studies show terrorist movements are more rational “civil society propaganda” headline grabbing videos of horrific, graphic violence ½ of content is more informational “depicts a utopian society” “previous apocalyptic movements relied on theoretical society” “present a view of society that is doing that” There is “not a lot of competing narrative” GWU – ISIS in America – arrests are way up; attacks in the name of ISIS are way up “Syrian conflict overall is comparable to Afghanistan all 10 years” Afghanistan was the previous record-setter “current level of counter messaging funding can’t compete” with them “deconstruct the ISIS narrative” Attacking the process (CTC article) “how can we disrupt…different elements that are vulnerable” “negative messaging is more fruitful than positive messaging” We are “limited by the bureaucracy of the US government” English network is clearly suffering but “we’re not eradicating them” Twitter is “easy to use…permissive” “what we’re doing now is pretty effective…I hate the term whack a mole” Free speech vs. corporate managed speech (Twitter’s responsibility?) “we’re in a brave new world” “threshold of what you need to kill a lot of people is low” We’re dealing with “people who entered the system previously” San Bernardino were “radicalized a long time ago” “we haven’t been cracking down for long…” 98 People already in the system need to “cycle out” “pretty likely we’ll see an increase amount of terrorist attacks other groups will learn from ISIS “social media takes away the gatekeepers of traditional media” “social media favors extremists” “instantaneous electronic media with vast reach” “pent up pressure of not being able to get their message out” Interview with Phil Sieb Vice Dean and Professor October 7, 2015 ISIS recruits people to “build the caliphate” “…young Muslim and you’re devout but you have a lousy life…west encroaching on Muslim land…call to do something noble like build the caliphate is very appealing.” Simplistic notion of the public beheadings is not a recruiting tool. “…depict ISIS as the legitimate future of Islam.” “…skillful liars.” ISIS propagandists are skilled. Know their audience; dozens or hundreds of recruits is successful; cut off that stream and they’re killed on the battlefield “Well produced production; audience is susceptible.” SOWAB – the right path US/UAE project They are a victim of their own success. Have ways to get around shut downs – dummy Twitter accounts. “Intellectual community” Re: shutdowns: North Carolina – we like to see who is communicating with them. There is a “certain value” to “actively letting them talk” 99 Re: counter messaging: Nothing is getting to the root of the problem. “counter messaging is more effective than shutting them down.” Whack-a-mole trying to shut them down ISIS is recognizable – defining and broadcasting their image “presumably just being reactive when you shut them down” – US action be proactive by sending your own messaging Both sides are thinking messaging ISIL’s “soft power” concept: win support through attraction over coercion “on the ground is all coercion” Re: propaganda British guy talking is a messaging in and of itself NYT Sunday – young woman; convo online. Man was spending so much time to recruit her. What is the “cost benefit” Idea of not sending messages to avoid being caught – save as drafts in an email and share the password so messages are not transmitted Q: Is ISIS winning on social? “Yes, ISIS is accomplishing its goals, and non-ISIS efforts, as a percentage matter, have not been as successful “A lot of what ISIS does or does not do depends on news coverage…pretty negative...to show how negative these people are” “do not have the capability to reach a mass audience “create a field…unlikely they can grow or will make it tougher for them.” 100 Reference Content JetBlue Tweets DATE (all Dec. 2014) TWEET RETWEETS 1 #BOS! The #FlyingItForward ticket is now arriving. Tell us where you would take it and why. You could be next. 32 2 Help shine a light on hope. Join us by donating $10 to @breadforthecity at @ShopTysons thru 12/11 #ShineOnDC 24 2 Sip, sip, hooray! 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Learn more about the app at http://bit.ly/1Yh1uGL 19 103 17 Flying #JetBlueMint soon? Enjoy treats from @Reserve, @YogaWorks, @Honest, @BlindBarber, @PairofThieves & @blueapron 20 17 Be liberal with your travels in #Liberia! #CoastThroughCostaRica #JetBlueGetaways http://bit.ly/1O9yBkH 13 17 Get out early! Early morning flights tend to have the least amount of delays. #TravelTip 24 17 In a New York State of wine? Those at JFK's T5 from 4-8pm can sample local ‘spirits.' Must be 21+. #TasteNYontheFly 23 17 Comfort food is better in the comfort of home. See how we surprised families with a trip back home. http://bddy.me/1J3sgbF #jetblueamicasa 13 18 Wave’ hello to beautiful Turks & Caicos! #DestinationFriday #JetBlueGetaways #TurksAndCaicos #HelloFromTheOtherSide 24 18 The #FlyingItForward traveling ticket is going home to #NYC for the holidays thanks to @23cover. Follow the journey: http://bit.ly/jbfiftwa 10 18 All we need is a little @RixtonOfficial love in our lives. Thanks, guys and @VH1SavetheMusic, for rocking T5! #LFT5 75 104 18 Last month, we brought @VanceJoy to JFK’s T5. @RixtonOfficial is playing today at 4! Don’t miss this free show #LFT5 37 19 St. Lucia has peaked – in the best way possible! #DestinationFriday #JetBlueGetaways 30 19 Now serving festive treats onboard while supplies last: @Snyders_Hanover Sweet & Salty Pretzel Pieces #FreeSnacks 14 19 #PDX do you or someone you know deserve to travel somewhere new? We're #FlyingItForward to someone in your city! http://bit.ly/jbfiftcs 12 20 Headed for the beach? For just $2 a day, leave your winter coat behind with Coat Chex at JFK Terminal 5. #TravelTip 67 21 Santa, Scrooge & a gingerbread man walk into an airport. #StopUsIfYouveHeardThisOne #LetsPlayAirport #HolidayTravel 25 21 TSA allows wrapped gifts, but might open them for inspection. So ship 'em or leave 'em unwrapped. #TravelTip 49 21 Small acts make big differences. Together we donated $37,264 to @breadforthecity. #ShineOnDC http://bit.ly/1ClexYY 23 21 The #FlyingItForward nominations keep coming! Follow the ticket to see where it's been and where it's going next! http://bddy.me/1AU0FUm 10 105 22 Holiday winter weather is on its way and we're waiving change/cxl fees for select cities on Dec. 24th. Details: http://bit.ly/JB_Trvl 18 22 Dashing through Twitter In hopes of a great gift O’er the tweets we go How about a lift? 15 22 If we like your #JetBlueJingle We’ll DM a promo code Save BIG on holiday flights Instant vacay mode! 14 22 OH! Send yourself, send yourself JetBlue all the way Oh, what fun it is to fly JetBlue this holiday! #JetBlueJingle http://bit.ly/JetBlueJingle 13 22 We want to hear your angelic voice. Create a video using all 9 verses of our JetBlue Jingle and tweet @JetBlue using #JetBlueJingle 11 22 Your feed is full of cheer Now your spirit’s bright What fun it is to fly and tweet A JetBlue song tonight! 11 22 OH! Send yourself, send yourself JetBlue all the way Oh, what fun it is to ride In a no-horse JetBlue plane! 11 22 The #JetBlueJingle promo has ended, but thanks for singing along with us today! ♫ To those who received a code – enjoy your holiday travels! 10 22 Now you’ve heard our tune We know you’re quite impressed O’er to you we go Just a simple request. 10 106 22 OH! Send yourself, send yourself JetBlue all the way Oh, what fun it is to fly JetBlue this holiday! 8 22 So tweet us your best try And we’ll help you get away Those on the naughty list? It’s still your lucky day. 8 22 Share your angelic voice Tweet #JetBlueJingle @JetBlue We promise not to laugh (We’ll always be your boo) 6 23 Enter to win a #JetBlueGetaways vacay & $1k for @JCrew! NoPurNec18+Rules@ http://jcrew.com/jetblue #JCrewXJetBlue 30 23 TSA allows only small snow globes— less than 3.4 ounces (approx. tennis-ball size) in carry-ons. #TravelTip 50 23 Congrats to @OBAPTakeFlight @wingsofeaglesdc @UVU on their 25k @JetBlue Foundation Grants #STEM #JetBlueFoundation 27 23 The spirit of giving is in the air! Learn more about #FlyingItForward & share your story for your chance to fly next: http://bddy.me/1wiwlhT 13 24 #HappyHolidays from our JetBlue family to yours! 26 24 Share a family vacay pic & tag it #JetBlueFamily for a chance to win a Getaways package! +T&Cs http://bit.ly/JetBlueFamilySweeps … 30 107 25 We love being home for the holidays. #NYC #DestinationFriday 27 27 The official airline of the @Patriots & @NYJets wishes the teams good luck! Who do u think will win? RT with #GoPatriots or #JetUp 15 29 Tag us & your favorite cause with #ICHIPINSWEEPSTAKES for a chance to win them $1K! http://www2.jetblue.com/ichipin *Terms 21 29 Traveling today? We've issued a fee waiver for the Northeast. For info, check out our Travel Alert: http://bit.ly/JB_Alert 20 30 The weather outside may be frightful, but blue chips onboard is delightful! #FreeSnacks 16 30 Your new beginnings can take flight in a new city with #FlyingItForward. Learn more and submit your story: http://bit.ly/1HfSUfk 15 31 Happy New Year! 87 AVERAGE 22.95522388
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
This report will examine the Islamic State’s use of social media, primarily Twitter, to recruit and radicalize Westerners, encouraging them to fight with the organization in Syria or to carry out attacks in their country of residence. Beginning with the earliest uses of propaganda, the author explores the evolution of the practice, focusing on ways in which the dissemination of propaganda has shifted following the advent of social media and the democratization of information. The report uncovers the high level strategies of the Islamic State and dissects the various tactics utilized to recruit Westerners, with a focus on leveraging aspects of American culture. Concluding by outlining the U.S. government’s current practices for countering the Islamic State’s propaganda messages, the report raises questions about the future of terrorism in the digital age. The author conducted interviews with leading experts in the field of terrorism and the Islamic State’s use of social media, as well as studied several pieces of Islamic State recruitment propaganda, both on video and in print, and references several published reports from institutions and reputable news articles.
Linked assets
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Ehrlich, Lacey Elizabeth
(author)
Core Title
From Bernays to Baghdad: the evolution of propaganda as a recruitment tool: examining the Islamic State’s success through propaganda messaging on Twitter
School
Annenberg School for Communication
Degree
Master of Arts
Degree Program
Strategic Public Relations
Publication Date
04/27/2016
Defense Date
04/27/2016
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
University of Southern California. Libraries
(digital)
Tag
Bernays,ISIS,ISIS propaganda,ISIS success on social media,ISIS Twitter,Islamic State on social media,Islamic State propaganda,Islamic State Twitter,Nazi propaganda,OAI-PMH Harvest,online recruitment,Paul Revere propaganda,propaganda,propaganda messaging,recruitment through propaganda,social media propaganda,social media recruitment
Format
application/pdf
(imt)
Language
English
Contributor
Electronically uploaded by the author
(provenance)
Advisor
Floto, Jennifer (
committee chair
), Jackson, Laura M. (
committee member
), Tenderich, Burghardt (
committee member
)
Creator Email
lacey.e.ehrlich@gmail.com,lehrlich@usc.edu
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c40-245041
Unique identifier
UC11277151
Identifier
etd-EhrlichLac-4385.pdf (filename),usctheses-c40-245041 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
etd-EhrlichLac-4385.pdf
Dmrecord
245041
Document Type
Thesis
Format
application/pdf (imt)
Rights
Ehrlich, Lacey Elizabeth
Type
texts
Source
University of Southern California
(contributing entity),
University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
(collection)
Access Conditions
The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...
Repository Name
University of Southern California Digital Library
Repository Location
USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA
Tags
Bernays
ISIS
ISIS propaganda
ISIS success on social media
ISIS Twitter
Islamic State on social media
Islamic State propaganda
Islamic State Twitter
Nazi propaganda
online recruitment
Paul Revere propaganda
propaganda
propaganda messaging
recruitment through propaganda
social media propaganda
social media recruitment