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Marketing the beard: the use of propaganda in the attempt to Talibanize Pakistan

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Marketing the beard: the use of propaganda in the attempt to Talibanize Pakistan

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Content MARKETING THE BEARD: THE USE OF PROPAGANDA IN THE ATTEMPT TO TALIBANIZE PAKISTAN by Asma Shabab A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS) May 2012 Copyright 2012 Asma Shabab ii Epigraph First they came for the Ahmadis, and I did not speak out because I was not an Ahmadi, Then they came for the Christians, and I did not speak out because I was not a Christian, Then they came for the Shias, and I did not speak out because I was not a Shia, Then they came for the accused blasphemer, and I did not speak out because I was not a blasphemer, And then they came for me, and by then, there was no one left to speak out. Internet meme Adaptation of a poem by Martin Neomoller iii Dedication To World Peace. iv Acknowledgements Working on this thesis has been a fascinating experience but it would not have been possible without the support of many people. I would like to thank my thesis committee chair and mentor, Jerry Swerling, for allowing me to venture into this complex geo-political study. His demand for perfection and constant encouragement inspired me to finish this ambitious study. I would also like to thank Philip Seib for his insights, critique and guidance and Megan Reid for her encouragement and feedback. I would also like to thank all my interview sources who provided me with a wealth of knowledge on the subject. Thanks to Haider Ali Changezi for his time, insights and invaluable Facebook updates and to Seppe Verheyen who helped me approach the study more scientifically. And special thanks to my fabulous friends and family for cheering me on. v Table of Contents Epigraph .............................................................................................................................................................ii Dedication ....................................................................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................................... iv Table of Figures ........................................................................................................................................... vii Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................................. viii Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................ix Introduction .....................................................................................................................................................1 Chapter One: The Taliban Question ......................................................................................................4 The “AfPak” Conflation ........................................................................................................................... 4 How did the Taliban emerge?.............................................................................................................. 7 The Taliban Ideology ............................................................................................................................ 13 Chapter Two: The Radical Republic of Islam ................................................................................. 15 In search of Pakistan’s raison d‘etre ............................................................................................. 15 Offense Strategy: Islam ........................................................................................................................ 18 The Blowback from Islamic Obsession ........................................................................................ 27 Chapter Three: Agents of Ideological Genocide ........................................................................... 30 FATA: The hub of international terrorism ................................................................................. 30 Table I: Estimated strength of the rebels in Pakistan ........................................................... 31 The Pakistani Taliban ........................................................................................................................... 36 The Structure of the Organization.................................................................................................. 39 Genocidal tendencies ............................................................................................................................ 40 Organization of the right-wing landscape in Pakistan ......................................................... 41 Chapter Four: The Talibanization of Pakistan and the Role of Communication .......... 49 Talibanization of Pakistan ................................................................................................................. 49 Communication strategies ................................................................................................................. 53 Brand identities....................................................................................................................................... 59 Key Messages ........................................................................................................................................... 62 Taliban Tactics: Use of Conventional Media.............................................................................. 65 Taliban Tactics: Use of Contemporary Media ........................................................................... 71 Taliban Tactics: Use of Grassroots methods ............................................................................. 77 Taliban Tactics: Levying Fines ......................................................................................................... 82 vi Taliban Tactics: Education ................................................................................................................. 83 Taliban Tactics: Jihadist indoctrination ...................................................................................... 86 Chapter Five: The Taliban Propaganda ............................................................................................ 89 What is Propaganda? ............................................................................................................................ 89 Analyzing the Taliban propaganda ................................................................................................ 91 Taliban’s use of Propaganda Techniques ................................................................................... 96 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 101 Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................ 108 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 112 vii Table of Figures Figure I: Brand Identity of Jihadi Groups 60 Figure II: Flyer circulated by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Quetta 75 viii Abbreviations FATA - Federally Administered Tribal Areas HuJI - Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami HuM - Harkat-ul-Mujahideen ISI - Inter-Services Intelligence JeM - Jaesh-e-Muhammad JI - Jamaat-e-Islami JuD - Jamaat-ud-Dawa JUI - Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam KPT - Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KSA - Kingdom of Saudi Arabia LeJ - Lashkar -e- Jhangvi LeT - Lashkar-e-Taiba LET - Lashkar-e-Taiba NWFP - North West Frontier Province PD - Peshawar Declaration QTV - Quran TV SSP - Sipah-e-Sihaba TNSM - Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad TNSM - Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad TTP - Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan TTP - Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan ix Abstract This paper examines the revival of propaganda techniques and their application to the Taliban’s global jihad. More specifically, it is a study of the Pakistani Taliban’s efforts to use propaganda to “Talibanize” Pakistan. The purpose of this paper is to understand the Pakistani Taliban as a terror institution and to identify the various strategies they are pursuing to achieve their goals. The key issues discussed in this paper include the origins of the Taliban phenomenon, factors that led to a Taliban stronghold in Pakistan, Talibanization of Pakistan and how the Pakistani Taliban are using communication tactics to pursue their agenda. Analyses reveal that the Pakistani Taliban consist of militant groups, state and non-state actors and influential personalities. The principal conclusion is that the Talibanization of Pakistan is being pursued by a number of groups through various institutions and an aggressive and grassroots strategy is required to mitigate the risk Pakistan faces from the Taliban. 1 Introduction On May 1, 2011, Twitter, the micro-blogging site, experienced a record rate of sustained tweets between 10.45 p.m. and 12.30 a.m. ET (Kerr). The site averaged 3,440 tweets per second (TPS) and the most popular trending hashtags were #BinLaden and #OBL. The cause of all this activity was that the White House had just confirmed that Osama Bin Laden, global terrorist and the face of one of the most feared terrorist organizations, al Qaeda, had been killed in a U.S. military operation called “Geronimo” in Abbottabad, a small town near Pakistan’s capital. Many technology savvy Pakistan-based liberals tweeted away their jubilation, apprehensions, anxieties and curiosities. For the most part, they were happy that the inspiration of the Pakistani Taliban was dead, but at the other end of the political spectrum, 800 participants belonging to a religious party in Quetta, the capital of the southwestern province Balochistan, protested against Bin Laden’s assassination. According to Federal Lawmaker, Maulawi Asmatullah who led the protests, “Bin Laden was the hero of the Muslim world and after his martyrdom he has won the title of great mujahed (Muslim fighter)” ("Hundreds join"). This is the state of Pakistan. What was once a promising, progressive nation is now mired in an ideological divide between right-wing religious extremists and left- 2 leaning secular liberals. While the voices of these two groups find their way into the mainstream media, those of many millions of other citizens are largely ignored. The politics of religion has always been a stark reality in Pakistan with many political groups using Islam to influence people. The religious propaganda by religio-political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) and jihadi militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) has confused ordinary Pakistanis into thinking that progress equals westernization and that westernization is an existential threat to Islam. However, exposure to the Taliban rule in various regions of Pakistan has eroded the Pakistani Taliban’s popularity among the public. Radical group, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e- Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM)’s political win in the Swat Valley in 2009 was a preview to the Taliban rule which was characterized by repressive politics, religious fanaticism, bigotry and discrimination against girls and women, closing of schools, and burning of books. It is crucial to realize that while the public may not view the Taliban as leadership- material, it is still vulnerable to the use of religion for political purposes. Radical religious parties have never received more than 11 percent of the national vote and 85 percent of the Pakistanis strongly oppose al Qaeda (Zardari). However, age-old cultural values affected by a patriarchal society which is still dealing with the after 3 effects of centuries-long British colonial rule, has inculcated a hesitancy within the Pakistani people to stand up to political and religious bullies. The lack of education has resulted in millions following the rhetoric of self-proclaimed religious imams (learned scholars) who are leading the people astray with their own brand of customized Islam. This paper will examine the Taliban phenomenon and how Pakistan became the center of terrorist activity. It will further study the religious landscape of Pakistan to identify the various groups, institutions, and personalities that are working towards the Talibanization of Pakistan. The paper will also include an in-depth study of the communication strategies employed by radicals along with an analysis of their propaganda techniques. 4 Chapter One: The Taliban Question The Taliban Question is a study of how unyielding egos, failed dynasties, ignored responsibilities and misguided policies of some powerful nations such as the Soviet Union, United States and its allies such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, coupled with the complex regional culture of Afghanistan, led to an ideological contagion that threatens global security. The “AfPak” Conflation It was in early 2009, under the Obama administration, that the word, “AfPak” started frequently appearing in the international media. Michael Quinion, British etymologist and writer, traces AfPak to Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In a speech at a security conference in Munich on 8 February 2009, Holbrooke said: First of all, we often call the problem AfPak, as in Afghanistan Pakistan. This is not just an effort to save eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theater of war, straddling an ill- defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it’s the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located (Quinion). The Obama Administration’s policy on the War on Terror coupled Afghanistan and Pakistan together which made the international community perceive the two countries to be one entity and the problem of Islamic religious extremism to be acted out in a single theatre. It also suggested that the U.S. policy regarding the War on Terror was a single, dominant political and military situation that requires a joint policy objective (Garamone). 5 The AfPak conflation popularized by the U.S. is an inadequate attempt to understand the complexities of the region. Not only are the two countries remarkably different in terms of culture and history but their respective roles in the War on Terror and their motivations and reactions to the global Islamic jihad are also very different. The term itself is an affront to both countries which haven’t had the best of relations considering they share a common border, the Durand line. According to a report by the Hollings Center for International Dialogue, there is deep mistrust between the two countries going back to Pakistan’s Independence (2). At that time, the British annexed a large part of the Afghanistan territory that they had previously acquired by force, to Pakistan, rather than offering it back to Afghanistan. This was also why Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s membership into the United Nations (the only country to do so). Afghanistan is also resentful of Pakistan regarding the latter’s role in creating the Taliban. This is one of the main reasons why AfPak can never become an accurate neologism for the policy. Pakistan, in alliance with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, created and positioned the Taliban in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Pakistan’s Taliban- dilemma is not just about Islamic jihad, unlike that of Afghanistan, but is more complicated due to many internal and external factors, among them, the Kashmir issue which has created many Punjab-based Taliban. 6 In June 2009, former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, criticized the term in an interview with Der Spiegel: I am totally against the term AfPak. I do not support the word itself for two reasons: First, the strategy puts Pakistan on the same level as Afghanistan. We are not. Afghanistan has no government and the country is completely destabilized. Pakistan is not. Second, and this is much more important, is that there is an Indian element in the whole game. We have the Kashmir struggle, without which extremist elements like Lashkar-e-Taiba would not exist. Pakistan and Afghanistan have huge roles in the current global jihad epidemic. Both countries are under threat from growing Talibanization, however, each is facing a different brand of Taliban. It’s imperative to differentiate between the threats in order to effectively counter global jihad. 7 How did the Taliban emerge? The Taliban Question can be traced to the Soviet war in Afghanistan also known as the Afghan Jihad, a nine-year conflict that started in 1980 and included powerful global players such as the Soviet Union, the United States, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Pakistan. The war, based on contrasting ideological platforms, pitted the Soviet Union, which supported the Marxist-Leninist government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, against the U.S., the U.K., KSA and Pakistan, which backed the anti-Soviet troops called the Afghan mujahidin, some of whom later went on to become the Taliban. Afghanistan has a complex history. In the past, both Soviet and British invaders have experienced embarrassing retreats giving Afghanistan the nickname of the “graveyard of empires.” In his book, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid expands on a myth of how God made Afghanistan: When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw that there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. He collected them all together and threw them down on to the earth. That was Afghanistan... This myth encapsulates the complexity that is Afghanistan. A country that has influences from Genghis Khan, Moguls, Mongols, which are witnessed through the many ethnicities prevalent in Afghanistan such as Pashtuns, Persians, Hazaras, Tajiks, and Turks (7). The Communist influence in Afghanistan reached its peak in the 1950s under the leadership of President Sardar Mohammad Daud. The state received 40 percent of its revenues from the Soviet Union (Rashid, Taliban 13), which had tremendous 8 influence over the Afghan Army. Aslam Siddiqui, an official with the Pakistan Bureau of National Reconstruction, wrote in 1960: After the death of Stalin, Afghanistan was selected as the first target of Soviet economic penetration (Haqqani, Pakistan 163). The increasing Soviet control sent red flags across the global community and Pakistan, having its own reasons to increase its influence in Afghanistan (among them a desire to counter-balance the influence of its arch enemy, India), positioned itself as a strategic defense against the Soviet expansion into South Asia, thereby establishing an alliance with the U.S. and KSA. Pakistan took advantage of the stronghold that religious sentiment had in Afghanistan and used Afghan Islamists as weapons of war against the “Godless Communists.” 1 The positioning of Soviets as staunch atheists acted as a catalyst that motivated the jihadis to fight and they became convinced that Islam was vulnerable. Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), an Islamist-political party, had designs to instigate the spread of Islam globally and the writings of its founder, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, were translated into several languages which proved effective in mobilizing Islamist networks in several countries (Haqqani, Pakistan 171). With KSA sponsoring JI in its global outreach ambitions, especially in areas under communist influence, Pakistan also identified the potential of combating 1 According to Rashid, the use of the term “Godless Communists” to define Soviet Union was an influential factor in recruiting individuals to fight the war against the Soviets. 9 communism with religion. Both countries provided extensive support in the form of military funding and training camps and eventually in 1979, Pakistan delivered an Islamic army. These Islamist rebels, the mujahidin, became the U.S.-backed soldiers against Soviet occupation. Instilling the concept of “jihad” among these insurgents was done strategically and intentionally, with most of the training occurring in the Saudi-sponsored madrassahs (religious schools), in the tribal belts of Pakistan that bordered Afghanistan. These camps taught their students a radical, extremist ideology, and as Hassan Abbas writes: And as the United States got Saudi Arabia to match its own contribution to the war effort on a “dollar for dollar” basis, the seminaries mushroomed and their output increased exponentially, as did the radicalization of Sufi Islam when the puritanical strain of Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia found fertile soil for conversion in Deobandi seminaries (112). The effort to instill this radical ideology was compounded by Pakistan’s Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) agency propaganda, Abbas further writes: The psy-war experts of ISI coined the slogans “Islam in Danger” and “Holy War” as an apt motivation for the Afghan resistance against a godless foe (112). The U.S. involvement began in 1979 when President Jimmy Carter signed the first authorization “to help the Mujahideen covertly” (Haqqani, Pakistan 180). The authorization covered, “support for insurgent propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan; establishment of radio access to the Afghan population 10 through third-country facilities; and the provision either unilaterally or through third countries of support to the Afghan insurgents, in the form of either cash or nonmilitary supplies.” Haqqani further explains that between 1980 and 1992, the U.S. committed some USD four to five billion in aid to the mujahidin. The U.S. funds were matched by KSA, and together with the support of other Euro and Islamic countries, the mujahidin received a total of over USD10 billion. “Most of the aid was in the form of lethal modern weaponry given to a simple agricultural people who used it with devastating results” (13). Five million Afghan people became refugees as a result of the Afghan Jihad (Poppelwell), which ended only when the Soviet troops withdrew in 1989. The end of the communist influence saw the U.S. hastily exit from Afghanistan, but not without considerable repercussions. They left a country, vulnerable after a decade long ideological war, to a group of lawless warlords who rapaciously ruled various districts or regions, and to radical Islamists whose strength and powerful alliances lead to the creation of another faction who called themselves the Taliban, or students of Islam. Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban ruled over Afghanistan with Kabul as their base. For the people of Afghanistan, the Taliban were a refreshing change 11 symbolizing hope and progress. The Taliban were considered to be the revolution Afghanistan needed to free itself from the warlord factions. Rashid writes: At the beginning, the Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar aka Amir-ul-Momineen (Leader of the Faithful), were considered to be the soldiers of the people, and Omar was the Robin Hood figure, who helped the poor against the rapacious warlords (Taliban 25). Though the Taliban garnered public sympathies by providing swift justice to the Afghan people from the warlords, they had their own agenda for Islamic radicalization of the region. Their strict interpretation of Sunni Islam created a rift between the Sunnis and Shias in Afghanistan (Sunni and Shia Muslims follow the same fundamental Islamic beliefs and the differences between them are more political than religious. The two groups were created after dissent arose over who would lead Muslims after the death of Muhammad. Sunnis chose Muhammad’s closest companion, Abu Bakr, to lead (who later became the first caliphate) while Shias wanted Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, to be the leader.) The Sunni ideology was adhered to by the Taliban, Pashtuns and pro-Taliban factions and supported by Pakistan and KSA while the Shia ideology had the support of the Afghan’s Northern Alliance (a Taliban- opposition group), Hazaras (Shia ethnic group in Afghanistan), and allies including Iran, Turkey, India, Russia and four of the five Central Asian Republics (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). By the summer of 1998, the Taliban had control over 90 percent of the country. This led to regional destabilization; as Shia Iran, feeling threatened by Sunni Afghanistan, 12 issued warnings of an Iranian invasion of Afghanistan and accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban (Rashid, Taliban 25). Iran’s entry as an influential regional player sparked U.S. interest in the region, the U.S. – which had largely ignored Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 - had a lot at stake. Rashid writes: The Taliban were further strengthened by the re-emergence of US as key ally. In the mid-90s, the Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, as they were in line with Washington’s anti-Iran policy and were important for the success of any southern pipeline from Central Asia that would avoid Iran (46). From 1996 till 2001, the Taliban government institutionalized a staunch version of Islam that eroded the constitutional freedom of Afghans. The Taliban banned women’s education and imposed strict restrictions on their right to work; they banned television and forced men to grow beards. Their actions and methodology in enforcing their ideology, which utilized fear as an instrument of change, were met with international disapproval. The Taliban’s disregard for human rights, their role in sheltering Osama Bin Laden and the transformation of Afghanistan as the transnational hub of terrorism compelled the U.S. to invade the country. 13 The Taliban Ideology The Taliban school of thought has been influenced by Deobandi Islam, a conservative Islamic orthodoxy that was born out of the discriminatory practices of the British Raj after the Revolt of 1857. According to Suburban Emergency Management Project (SEMP) website, the British took advantage of the subversive undercurrents among Muslims in the subcontinent and subjected the Islamic community to humiliating collective punishments and totally excluded Muslims from public life. The psychological persecution of the Muslims led them to re-imagine their own post-colonial identity, different from that of the Hindus and British, and they chose to respond by institutionalizing a puritanical form of Islam known as Deobandi. One way the Muslim community in India chose to respond to the British oppression was to open a seminary in Deoband in 1866. The leadership of this seminary was composed of former students of the Delhi madressa that was destroyed when order was restored after the “Revolt of 1857”. Two forces motivated the leaders of the new seminary in Deoband: (1) a zeal to indoctrinate Muslim youth with Islamic values and (2) an intense hatred towards the British and all foreign (i.e. non-Islamic influences). The seminary shunned everything foreign, Hindu, Western or British and made a consorted [sic] effort to expose their students only to the rich spiritual and philosophical traditions of Islam ("Deobandi Islam" 3). Deobandis believe that a Muslim’s primary obligation and loyalty are to his religion. They oppose the social caste system, believe in the sacred right and obligation to wage jihad to protect Muslims of any country, have a restrictive view of women and regard Shias as non-Muslims (Johnson and Mason 76). 14 Though Deobandi madrassahs have flourished throughout South Asia, it was under General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule that religious education experienced unchallenged support in Pakistan (which won its independence and was separated from India in 1947.) Zia’s policy of Islamization of the state led to a 195 percent increase of graduates from religious schools in 1981, and the succeeding governments’ failure to vet these schools resulted in the establishment of 7000 Deobandi madrassahs by 2002 (Haider), some of which were radical in their approach. 15 Chapter Two: The Radical Republic of Islam Since its creation, Pakistan has been tangled in ideological confusion between secularism and religion. Political opportunists, a foreign policy that dictates the constitution and the unchallenged influence of a proxy establishment, the Army, has transformed Pakistan into a terrorist hub. In search of Pakistan’s raison d‘etre Since its creation 65 years ago, Pakistan has been embroiled in an ideological war regarding its reason for being. The unexpected death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder and visionary, in 1948, left Pakistan in an ideological war which continues till now, wherein the secularists and religious groups are fighting to validate Pakistan’s raison d'etre according to their own beliefs. Is Pakistan a secularist country or an Islamic one? This is a question that has had immense impact on the social and economic development of Pakistan over the years. The confusion continues from the pre-independence age, when Jinnah used Islam as an instrument to unite the Muslims of the sub-continent to support the creation of a separate nation. Jinnah, in his quest, assured religious leaders that Pakistan would follow Islamic laws. To shore up Muslim support, the Muslim League appealed to religious and communal sentiment. Although Jinnah… and most of his principal deputies in the campaign for Pakistan were secular individuals, the Muslim League’s 1945-1946 campaign was based entirely on Islamic rhetoric… The result was the almost total identification of Pakistan with Islam in the course of the campaign. The rural Muslim masses were encouraged to develop “a vague feeling that they would all become better Muslims once a Muslim state was established” (Sayeed 198). 16 According to Haqqani, the demand for the creation of Pakistan was based on the premise that a new constitutional arrangement would ensure that Muslims will have an equal share of power in the sub-continent. However, it was undecided whether the new state would seek a confederation with the non-Muslim state of pre-partition India or whether it would be a sovereign state. Haqqani writes: A few months before independence, Khwaja Nazimuddin, who later became Pakistan’s second governor general as well as its second prime minister, candidly told a British governor that he did not know “what Pakistan means and that nobody in the Muslim League knew” (Pakistan 6). The pre-partition environment was charged with religious fervor. In many pro- Pakistan rallies, officials would chant, “What does Pakistan mean?” which would be followed by cries of “La Illaha Il Allah” (there is no God except Allah) (Haqqani, Pakistan 15). The association between Pakistan and Islam became so strong that it is still used by religious parties to this day. While Jinnah was complicit in the use of Islamic rhetoric, he never spoke of Pakistan as an Islamic state. In fact, in his famous speech on August 11, 1947, three days before Pakistan’s independence, he addressed Pakistan’s Constitutional Assembly: You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state ("Archives"). 17 Liberals refer to this speech as proof that Jinnah wanted a secular state, a position vehemently opposed by religious groups in Pakistan. Dr. Meraj Siddiqi, Vice President, Jamaat-e-Islami, province of Sindh, explains: [Those people who understood from Quaid-e-Azam’s speech of 11th September] that Quaid wanted a secular state are blaming him to be a hypocrite …. If both the states in the sub-continent [India and Pakistan] were to be secular then there was really no need for two separate secularist political parties. Muslim League’s efforts were to provide Muslims with a nation where they would be free to live according to the Muslim ideology, rules and lifestyles. So if Muslims wanted something like this then it had to be an Islamic Republic. Jinnah’s death left Pakistan in a predicament over the role of religion in its constitution. The existing leadership based Pakistan’s ideology on the issues facing the country without any realization of the long-term consequences of their decision. In reality, Pakistan had multiple identities including Bengalis in East Pakistan, Pashtuns in the North-West, Balochis in the West, Punjabis, Sindhis and the newly migrated Urdu-speaking Muslims from India. Creating a national identity that integrated all ethnic elements was an impossible task and religion became the easy way out. Pakistan also faced an extremely insecure and hostile environment after its creation and many Indian leaders opined that the country would not last long. The threat from India seemed like an alarming possibility to Pakistan, and soon “Islamic Pakistan” was defining itself through the prism of resistance to “Hindu India.” The ideology was reinforced over time through the education system and constant propaganda (Haqqani, Pakistan 15). 18 Offense Strategy: Islam After Partition, Pakistan suffered from a lack of resources and was concerned about getting its due share from India’s pre-independence assets. According to Haqqani, India’s ruling class spoke continuously about “reunification” which exacerbated Pakistan’s insecurity (Pakistan 15). On top of it, the partition created the issue of Kashmir which has plagued the relationship between the neighbors till today (the Kashmir issue is a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. India says that the Instrument of Accession signed in October 1947 by the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, makes Kashmir a part of India while Pakistan argues that Kashmir should have become a part of Pakistan because it is a Muslim majority region.) Pakistan’s vulnerability against a bigger and better-armed India had a tremendous impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy which continues to dominate local politics. Haqqani explains the role of the conflict in the ideological evolution of Pakistan: Muslim officers of Pakistan’s army involved in the Kashmir military operation of 1947-1948 used the Islamic notion of jihad to mobilize the tribesmen they had recruited as raiders for the seizure of Kashmir… Religious scholars were invited by the government to issue fatwas (Islamic religious opinions issued by a mufti or jurisconsult) declaring the tribesmen’s foray into Kashmir as jihad, and both the tribesmen and the military officers assisting them were described as mujahideen. Notwithstanding the fact that the Pakistan army had been created out of the British army and had inherited all the professional qualifications of its colonial predecessor, within the first few months of independence it was also moving in the direction of adopting an Islamic ideological coloring (Pakistan 29). 19 At the time of partition, Pakistan received 30 percent of British India’s army, 40 percent of its navy, and 20 percent of its air force, but its share of revenues was a meager 17 percent, which made it difficult for Pakistan to pay for all its forces (Haqqani, Pakistan 26). According to Brig. (Retd) A. R. Siddiqi, the central government was forced to allocate 70 percent of its projected expenditure in its first year’s budget for defense (70). This eventually became a trend and contributed to the deterioration of other national institutes critical of any country’s progress. Every dollar provided to defense meant one less for development. Abbas writes: As the army grew in strength, it frequently took over the task of governance, diluted its own fiber, and weakened all other institutions, including the judiciary and the political parties. In all of this, the growth of religious parties seemed arrested… religious elements, due to politician’s failure, were making enough progress to take on the government from time to time with increasing vigor, irrespective of the result of the previous engagement. And there was just the right amount of education among the ruling elite not to be able to take the long-term view of history. And, most important, few seemed conscious of the fact that as poverty and insecurity increase, humans are driven to seek the embrace of religion. And it was the mullah whose influence would grow in such circumstances (10). As years passed, and in the face of insecurity and political ineptitude, the army transformed into Pakistan’s biggest and most stable establishment and martial law seemed the default solution to any glitch in the country’s democratic progress. In 1971, after almost 12 years of military rule under General Ayub Khan and then General Yahya, Pakistan got the taste of its first charismatic civilian leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who introduced the country to a socialist ideology. By this time, Islam 20 had penetrated the army, and the religious parties had gained a voice (if not overt popularity) among the masses. During Bhutto’s tenure, Pakistan hosted the second annual meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a global body that aims to protect the rights of Muslims. It was also during this time that the religious parties had their first coup; Bhutto gave in to pressure from religious parties and increased religious content in schools and declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims (Ahmadis belong to the Ahmadiyya sect, an Islamic revivalist movement, established at the end of the 19th century by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian who proclaimed to be the promised Messiah.) The declaration has resulted in various hate campaigns by radical groups against Ahmadis who continue to be prosecuted in the country because of their religious beliefs. Ordinary government forms such as application for a passport also require applicants to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Though Bhutto’s platform promoted socialist reforms and secularism in Pakistan, he inherited the national security issues that hindered his ability to execute his vision. “He continued to see India as Pakistan’s eternal enemy and persisted with the previous policy of seeking security through a mix of Islamic ideology and continued building military power” (Haqqani, Pakistan 105). With a blind ambition to hold on to power, Bhutto courted both the military and Islamist groups. Haqqani further writes, “while his opponents considered him as the elected dictator, Bhutto pursued 21 a ‘Napoleonic Order’ 2 which was a personalized system of governance aimed at benefiting the poor and dispossessed (106). Circumstantial as it may seem, Britain’s demarcation of Pakistan’s geographical presence indicates an almost intentional attempt to ensure that Pakistan never attains national unity. If the Kashmir and East-Pakistan issues were not enough to create ethnic divide, a large percentage of people in NWFP and Balochistan also opposed the partition and demanded an ethnic state for Pashtuns with Afghanistan’s support. They envisioned a separate state called “Pashtunistan” that combined Pashtun dominated areas of Pakistan with those of Afghanistan. When the Baloch insurgents rebelled during Bhutto’s tenure, he used it as an excuse to position Afghanistan as a security threat. Although it was understood that Afghanistan did not have the resources to enforce its vision through military attempts. Positioning Afghanistan as a security threat was a part of Pakistan’s attempt to adhere to its foreign policy, and it started expanding its influence in Afghanistan - during the reign of a secular politician, Bhutto - with the help of Islamists, years before Soviets invaded it (Haqqani, Pakistan 103). According to Robert D. Kaplan: Afghanistan has been a prize that Pakistan and India have fought over … for decades… Pakistan supported the anti-Soviet mujahadeen and then the Taliban "to ensure that in the event of conflict with India, Afghanistan would provide Pakistan with support and use of its land and air space if needed," 2 Haqqani explains: Bhutto used the term, “Napoleonic Oder” in an interview with Le Monde; cited in Richard S. Wheeler, “Pakistan in 1975: The Hydra of opposition,” Asian Survey, vol.16, no.2 (Feb. 1975), p.112 22 write Afghanistan experts Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique in a 2006 USIP report. Pakistani military planners, they write, refer to this as the quest for "strategic depth” (Bajoria, "India-Afghanistan"). In an attempt to continue his authoritarian rule, Bhutto inadvertently strengthened the Islamists and the intelligence agencies which led to the inevitable collapse of democratic institutions. Addicted to power, Bhutto even tried to appease the Islamists by prohibiting the sale and use of alcohol, banning gambling and closing nightclubs (Hussain 15). But Bhutto’s six and half years of civilian rule came to a shattering halt when General Zia-ul-Haq, who Bhutto had handpicked as the chief of army staff, succeeded at a bloodless coup and had Bhutto assassinated. It is widely believed that General Zia’s leadership was a black period in Pakistan’s history. Zia was deeply religious and at one point was involved with the Tablighi Jamaat, a popular religious movement. The Jamaat is one of the most influential grassroots Islamic movements in the South Asian subcontinent and has hardline traditionalist views on the role of Islam in modern society (Hussain 15). Zia was not only an authoritarian; he also aspired to turn Pakistan into an ideological state ruled by strict Islamic sharia laws. He was an unpopular and controversial leader, whose survival in power largely owned to external factors that emerged after the invasion of Soviet forces of Pakistan’s northern neighbor, Afghanistan, in 1979 (16). That the Afghan War happened during the tenure of a religious zealot was unfortunate for Pakistan but considering the narrow scope and rigidness of Pakistan’s foreign policies, it is doubtful that things would have turned out different 23 with a secular leader. To maintain strategic depth, Pakistan had to control Afghanistan's internal turmoil, and with Zia in-charge, the result was an uncontrollable epidemic of Islamic radicalism. Afghan jihad, also called “Islam’s holy war,” instigated the politics of religion and affected the framework of Pakistan. First, it provided impetus to the increasing Islamism within the army. According to Hussain: The Afghan resistance was projected as part of the global jihad against communism. The ISI’s training of guerillas was integrated with the teaching of Islam. The prominent theme was that Islam was a complete socio-political ideology under the threat from atheist communists (17). The Afghan jihad positioned Pakistan as a hub for Islamic extremists. Young Muslims from around the world flocked to Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight against a foreign invader. Some 35,000 holy warriors joined the Afghan war from 1979 to 1989 (Rashid, "The Taliban"), including Osama bin laden, whose arrival in Pakistan marked the beginning of his close association with Afghan and Pakistani radicals. The jihad also raised the profile of the military’s intelligence unit, ISI, which was constrained to gathering intelligence about political opponents during Bhutto’s regime. During Zia’s term, ISI became a “crucial cog” in the resistance against Soviet Forces (Hussain 16). The ISI, in partnership with the CIA, conducted the biggest covert operation in modern history. The two organizations had secretly collaborated for years, yet General Zia was not prepared to give a free hand to the CIA. He laid down strict rules to ensure that the ISI would maintain control of over contacts with Afghan Mujahideen groups. No CIA operatives would be allowed to 24 cross the border into Afghanistan. Distribution of weapons to the Afghan mujahideen would be the sole responsibility of the ISI. While the CIA supplied money and weapons, it was the ISI that moved them into Afghanistan. .. The decade long secret war raised the organization’s profile and gave it huge clout. With the active help of the CIA and Saudi Arabia, the ISI turned the Afghan resistance into Islam’s holy war (16). Zia also tried to give the army an Islamic orientation. Islam was incorporated into the army, and for the first time, Islamic teachings were introduced into the Pakistan Military Academy (Cohen 5). To gain promotion, an officer was required to be a devout Muslim (Hussain 19). The era also witnessed the rise of two popular cultural trends that have had a huge impact on Pakistani society; one was the Kalashinkov culture (it flourished when the U.S. sent huge supplies of AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles through Pakistan to arm the Afghan mujahidin which provided enormous opportunities for business in illegal arms in the NWFP (Hilazi 13)), and the other was the rise in religious schools or madrassahs. KSA provided funds to establish thousands of madrassahs to militarize the youth and convert them into an intolerant brand of Wahhabi Islam (Abbas 11). Zia may have been a devout Muslim, but he used Islam as a pawn to provide legitimacy to his rule. Hussain further writes: He [Zia] instituted changes in the legal system and Sharia courts were established to try cases under Islamic law. His government also assumed the role of the collector of religious taxes and Islam was promoted through print media, radio, television and mosques. Through a series of religious decrees, the government moved to Islamize civil service, the armed forces and the education system. School textbooks were overhauled to ensure their ideological purity. Books deemed un-Islamic were removed from syllabus 25 and university libraries. It was made compulsory for civil servants to pray five times a day. Confidential reports of government officials included a section in which the staff was given marks for regularly attending prayers and for having a good knowledge about Islam (19). Zia’s Islamization drive provided fodder for religious parties such as JI to penetrate state institutions. Thousands of party activists and sympathizers were given jobs in the judiciary, civil service, and educational institutions and JI also increased its influence in the army (Hussain 18). After Zia’s mysterious death in an air crash in 1988, Pakistan returned to a period of quasi-democratic volatility. From 1988 till 1999, the political landscape was a tug of war between two parties; the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by the daughter of late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Zia’s protégé, Nawaz Sharif, who aimed to continue Zia’s vision. Pakistan became the battleground for these political opportunists, both of whom got the opportunity to rule Pakistan twice and both times were unable to finish their terms on account of either army interference or their own political ineptitude. It is said that if Zia opened Pakistan’s door to global extremists, it was Benazir who made sure they felt right at home. Benazir played a significant role in drawing Pakistan deep into Islamic fundamentalism, escalating the Pakistani proxy war in Kashmir and giving active encouragement to the formation of the Taliban. 26 According to Dr. Kapili, Benazir used Islamic terrorism as state-sponsored foreign policy tool which increased Pakistan’s participation in the international- terrorist scene. He further writes: The Taliban emerged forcefully on the Afghan scene in the period 1993-94 and captured the whole of Afghanistan, less the Northern Provinces by September 1996. It requires to be noted that all these developments took place during Benazir Bhutto’s second tenure as Prime Minister, i.e., 1993- 1996. As one author puts it, "Furthermore, there was considerable evidence to suggest that the Taliban were being strongly supported by the Pakistani government led by Benazir Bhutto, ironically a woman educated at Oxford and Harvard. After the Afghan war, the jihadi spirit continued in Kashmir and created many Pakistani-based jihadist groups, some of which today form the Pakistani Taliban. The 1990s also saw the spread of anti-American sentiments. After the withdrawal of the Soviets, the U.S. cut off all aid to Pakistan though the latter had fought a proxy war that had consolidated U.S.’s position as the sole super power. Religio-political organizations portrayed U.S.’s action as a betrayal to Pakistan and started a successful anti-American campaign which continues till today. During Sharif’s tenure, Islamization continued to blossom. Sharif appeased the Islamists on cultural issues by ordering women to cover their heads on television (in Pakistan, covering the head has never been compulsory for women and it was General Zia who first ordered women on state-run television to cover their heads.) Throughout Sharif’s term, the Kashmir issue kept providing fodder to the expansion of jihadi ideology and the government did virtually nothing to scale it back. 27 The Blowback from Islamic Obsession It was during General Pervez Musharraf’s leadership (he ruled as Chief Executive from 1999-2001 and as President from 2001 – 2008) that the Islamist radicals truly emerged and turned Pakistan into a battleground of violence. The jihadist groups who had been fighting for Afghanistan and Kashmir started focusing on sectarian violence, spreading anti-American sentiment and subduing liberal ideology. Pervez Musharraf had successfully taken the reins from Sharif after a bloodless coup in 1999 and, after the 9/11 attacks on American soil, had been compelled to pledge unquestionable allegiance to America’s War on Terror. The 180 degree change in policy - from supporting Taliban to actively eliminating them - was something Pakistan was not ready for. As Hussain writes: After spending the past seven years helping the Taliban consolidate their rule, providing them with military, political and financial support, Pakistan was now being asked by the Bush administration to help USA dislodge the Islamic fundamentalist government (37). During Musharraf’s reign, he condemned all acts of terrorism carried out in the name of religion and banned many extremist groups that were operating in the country with the support of the Army and ISI. Though Musharraf promised unconditional support to the U.S. in the War on Terror, in reality, the Pakistan’s attitude towards militant groups kept flip-flopping. Sometimes the state would ban a terrorist group which would then start operating 28 under a new alias, sometimes the state would ignore the militant groups’ activities after negotiations with them, and sometimes the state would engage in retaliatory action after U.S. pressure. Thus, the militant groups were never entirely eliminated. In April 2001, Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), a religio-political group credited with inspiring the Taliban through its Deobandi madrassahs, hosted a world Deobandi conference in Peshawar. According to the World Organization for Resource Development & Education (WORDE) report, “One of the keynote addresses at the event was delivered – via tape - by the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar. Other speakers included Osama Bin laden, whose speech was prerecorded (Mirahmadi, Farooq and Ziad 11). The political landscape was tough for Musharraf. When his government declared Bin Laden and al Qaeda as “religious terrorists,” many mainstream religio-political parties banded together to form Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) (United Council of Action) to denounce Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror. According to MMA, “Osama is a hero to the Islamic world and the Musharraf government would not get any sympathy by branding him as a religious terrorist” (Manzar 20). Over the years, the Pakistani Taliban have enjoyed many successes, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 by the al Qaeda inspired militant organization, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the enforcement of Taliban 29 rule in Swat (in 2009, Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM), a jihadi organization succeeded in negotiating a deal with the government in the Swat district. The treaty called “Nizam-e-Adal” was turned to law for a short period and included establishment of Sharia courts and an Islamic alternate system of government. This was met with criticism from many mainstream parties within the country and from international organizations. It was considered to be the beginning of an end to the state’s fight against the Taliban. This was short lived since one of the stipulations was disarming other militant organizations in the region which was not followed through by the Taliban.) During the time of TNSM’s rule, public support for the Taliban started dwindling and many locals started resisting the militants, often with grave consequences. Public opinion further turned against the Taliban after a video showing the Taliban in Swat flogging a young girl went viral. The Taliban have found it difficult to regain the level of support they enjoyed prior to that incident. 30 Chapter Three: Agents of Ideological Genocide “They [the Taliban] are against human rights, civil liberties and democratic values. Their concept of Islam includes using compulsion and force to gain support for their ideology.” Dr. Meraj Siddiqi, Vice President, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) Sindh “They’re armed, we’re not. They’ve nothing to lose. They fight for their faith with bullets. We’re not ready to die.” Rehana Hakim, Editor, Newsline FATA: The hub of international terrorism Geographically, Pakistan is divided into four provinces (Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KPT, formerly NWFP]) plus the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, FATA became the hub of international terrorism. FATA can be considered home to Pakistan’s indigenous population. Historically, FATA has always functioned as a semi-autonomous region though its tribal areas come under federal jurisdiction (Gunaratna and Iqbal 19). According to Dr. Meraj: They [tribal areas] have a different history. They opted to become a part of Pakistan and Quaid-e-Azam said a couple of things about them [sic]; first being that the Army will never enter into that area, that they will protect themselves and will protect our [Pakistan’s] border. The government had also promised that it will not interfere with their customs and traditions. This autonomy has allowed FATA to establish its own rules which are constructed from the Pashtun code of conduct called “Pakhtunwali.” FATA is comprised of seven tribal agencies (Bajaur, Orakzai, Mohmand, Khyber, North Waziristan, and South 31 Waziristan), plus six frontier regions (Peshawar [Capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPT)], Kohat, Bannu, Laki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, and Tank). These regions lie along the Durand line making them an ideal launching pad for holy warriors, who came from all over the world to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Gunaratna and Iqbal 21). The area was never free from radicalism, but things grew out of control when a large number of Taliban started crossing the border after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Today, the region is home to over roughly 45,000 militants and forty militant groups (Qazi). Table I: Estimated strength of the rebels in Pakistan Groups 2002 2004 2006 2010 Pakistan Taliban (Pakistani) <40,000 <40,000 20,000-25,000 North Waziristan 10,000-15,000 Punjabi Taliban 2,000 Foreign Fighters (Arab, Uzbek, Tajik, and Sudanese fighters) <3,000 9,000-14,000 TOTAL <40,000 31,000-41,000 Total Pakistani Taliban 22,000-27,000 Source: Qazi, “Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban.” Proximity to Afghanistan, the Pakhtunwali code of conduct, Afghan jihad, the Kashmir issue, and the deprivation of the region at the hands of the federal government are the main factors why FATA became an attractive location for al Qaeda and Taliban refugees from Afghanistan to set up camp. 32 FATA has a population of approximately 3.2 million people who mostly belong to Pashtun tribes (Farooq 6). Given their cultural similarity, the people of Afghanistan and FATA consider each other as family and have aspired for a separate homeland “Pashtunistan” for centuries. Second is the code of conduct “Pakhtunwali” which is used to govern life in these areas. It is a set of principles, rather than laws, among which honor, chivalry, loyalty to the tribe and fierce opposition to foreign occupation are considered sacred. The code includes the hujra (the center of Pashtun society), jirga (a council formed to settle conflicts), malmastia (a regulator of host/guest relations), and da khazoo dranaway (the respect for females). It also includes jaba (promise), nanawatee (to seek mercy), panah (to give shelter), nang (to honor), badal (revenge), and swara (a female given as an act of compromise). The people of FATA had supported many mujahidins during the Afghan jihad and had established deep relations with them. Ayman al - Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s deputy leader, married a woman from the Bajaur Agency after his wife and children were killed in U.S.-led attacks in Afghanistan, which made him family to the tribal people (Gunaratna and Iqbal 26). When the Taliban started moving to these tribal areas, they were considered guests of the locals and were given shelter without any hesitations. According to the code, safeguarding the guest is the biggest honor a host can wish for. Dr. Meraj says: When a Pashtun promises something or gives his word to provide shelter to someone then he will never back out of that promise and those who do are considered traitors in Pashtun society. For example, when Mullah Omar 33 sheltered Osama Bin Laden and the U.S. demanded [Omar] to hand over Osama, he refused and said, “He [Osama] is my guest.” Within Pashtun traditions, protecting a guest is considered heroic... that made Omar a hero among the whole Pashtun tribe who thought that these [Taliban] were people who respected the Pashtun traditions and will not compromise the security of the guest even during hardships. The third factor is FATA’s state of deprivation. It is Pakistan’s most impoverished and economically backward area. According to Gunaratna and Iqbal: In the name of preserving traditional tribal culture and the independence of Pashtun tribes, these areas have been deliberately kept backwards over the years. Since independence, because no major development has taken place, we have seen political alienation, economic deprivation and deep-seated resentment against the center (21). The lack of an established judicial system has raised the profile of political agents who are backed by the government and enjoy unchecked powers of administration, legislation, revenue collection and economic planning. These political agents or maliks are notorious for misappropriating federal funds and using them for their own privileges (Gunaratna and Iqbal 24). Their unchallenged authority, characterized by corruption, nepotism and exploitation of local resources, had pushed the locals to consider the Taliban as saviors. The last factor was the Afghan jihad itself and the Kashmir issue. The jihad and the state’s deliberate attempt to promote pro-jihadi elements resulted in the local clergy’s monopoly over these areas (Gunaratna and Iqbal 20). The tribes in FATA that supported the Afghan mujahidin considered the American invasion in 34 Afghanistan as an extension of foreign control (Non-Muslims occupying Muslim lands] and thus supported the fight against the U.S. and its allies (29). The resentment against foreign control ran so high that many locals opposed the government’s help to America. Wahidullah, a 28-year-old Taxi driver, said: Anger against the army runs high among deeply conservative tribesmen in this tribal zone that both Pakistan and Kabul suspect to be safe havens for Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements, but tribal chieftains avoid openly criticizing the army. Younger tribesmen are more vocal… Someday our people might attack the army if such operations continue (Manzar 31). The militant groups who previously enjoyed government support for the jihad in Kashmir also found sanctuary in these regions after Musharraf denounced their cause. These militants had been indoctrinated to spend their lives fighting for a cause and experienced acute disenfranchisement. A. Manzar writes: The military capacity gap between India and Pakistan has also been an eternal catalyst in the process of the militants being treated as proxy warriors for Pakistan. Proxy warriors present a cheap solution in response to logical capacity gaps, and especially when these warriors are not afraid to die, they become valuable assets of the inter-state and inter-agency warfare. There is a significant problem with these warriors, they do not know when or how to stop (xii). These factors were welcoming for the al Qaeda and Afghan-Taliban leadership whose operational and ideological views influenced Pakistani tribal and mainland groups to different degrees, inspiring many groups to follow their footsteps (Gunaratna and Iqbal 16). 35 After the devastating earthquake on October 8, 2005 that hit the Northern areas of Pakistan, jihadi groups and other religio-political organizations carried out relief work much faster than the government and consolidated their place in the local society. For the people of FATA, the presence of the Taliban was a symbiotic relationship; the Taliban provided speedy justice and in return, the people provided security, support and shelter to them. 36 The Pakistani Taliban There have been many attempts to define the Pakistani Taliban, but so far none encompass the phenomenon completely. Pakistani Taliban are not a monolithic organization like their Afghan counterparts who have a centralized command structure and consider Mullah Omar as their chief executive. The term “Pakistan Taliban” was originally used by Pakistani and international news media in 2003 to refer to the armed militias of local tribesmen from FATA who rose to resist the government’s drive against foreign militants (Gunaratna and Iqbal 36). But this artificial construct ignores the differences among these groups whose only consistent resemblance to each other may be their ambition to promote and safeguard their own vision of Islam. The Terrorism Analysis Report by Charles P. Blair of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) says that the “Pakistan Taliban” term is better understood as a movement rather than a different entity. The report further says: (Pakistani Taliban) is an amalgamation of foreign and domestic non-state and state actors with few composite strategic aims. Typically, intra-group cooperation exists only when tactical interests dovetail. However, the strategic and tactical intra-group harmony that does exist revolves around a core commitment to the violent removal of secular authority; it is the scope of change sought and the degree of violence sanctioned in its pursuit that often differentiates the various groups that jointly comprise the PNT [Pakistani Neo-Taliban] (14). Their ambitions may include the creation of a separate homeland for Pashtuns i.e. Pashtunistan, fight against foreign invaders such as the U.S. and NATO, jihad against 37 the pro-West Pakistan army, fight against Indian influence, implementation of their version of Islam and eliminating the rights of Muslim minorities such as Barelvis (Sufi-Muslims), Shias, and Ahmadis. The Pakistani Neo-Taliban is an idea constructed primarily to give an anatomy to a movement that can be termed as “Talibanization.” It targets “un-Islamic” (e.g., Shi’ites and Sufis) or “Westernized” groups that are perceived as seeking social and political dominance (Blair 35). The Pakistani Taliban movement can be divided into three main groups; the militant groups that have been inspired from al Qaeda’s ideology and presence in the region, the puritans whose political ambitions are limited to enforcing their brand of Islam, and finally those who were heavily involved in the Kashmir jihad and are from Punjab. Those militants that are inspired from al Qaeda’s ideology joined hands to form a larger entity called Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) whose leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was selected by Mullah Omar. TTP is made of many jihadist groups and evidence suggests that it may be an extension of al Qaeda (Gunaratna and Iqbal 73). TTP’s indiscriminate killing of locals was denounced by the Afghan Taliban since the latter was afraid of losing public support. The second puritanical group aims to enforce its version of Deobandi Islam and is more local in its approach. Its biggest organizations include TNSM, Sipah-e-Sihaba (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Islam. The last group includes members of the Punjabi Taliban including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). These groups focus on sectarianism and attacks on India (a continuation of their fight in Kashmir.) 38 According to Shahzad H. Qazi from the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), the characteristics that define the Pakistani Taliban include:  A decentralized movement that follows the decisions taken by local Taliban chapters (3).  Decisions that are usually motivated by family, clan, tribal, and economic interests (3).  A fractured movement prone to rebel infighting (Qazi provides examples such as the power struggle between Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rahman after Baitullah Mehsud’s death) (3)  An opportunist existence where intergroup rivalry occurs for control of criminal networks, local markets, “taxes” on commercial activities and differences over religious opinions (3).  Variety of ideologies among the groups, for example, in the North and South Waziristan, the resistance is composed of ideologically motivated Taliban; while in the Khyber Agency, militant groups are composed of drug mafia, smugglers and local criminals. While Orakzai and Bajaur host militant groups motivated by ideology as well as criminality (3-5). Pakistani Taliban consider Osama bin Laden as the Hero of Islam. Faqir Mohammad, protégé of Sufi Mohammad (founder of TNSM), has remarked, “Sheikh Osama has become an ideology now and America’s $50 million bounty for his head is not even worthy for his turban. According to Pashtun tradition, we will definitely exact revenge on America” (Manzar 66). 39 The Structure of the Organization According to Manzar, the fluid nature of the militant groups and their desire for secrecy has made it difficult to understand their organizational structure. However, these groups have a presence in a certain area which acts as their headquarters and have a centralized structure when it comes to strategies and policies. The Central Amir (leader) assumes overall charge of the organization (like Baitullah Mehsud for TTP) while the policy decisions are made by a shura, a consultative body. The group has regional heads who have autonomy within their own regions. The operative structure is strategically designed to be decentralized. According to Manzar, “this kind of decentralized organization may adopt a ‘cell-based’ structure. The greatest utility of such a structure is security; if a cell is compromised, ideally it does not disclose the identity of the other cells, since it does not possess the information. The cellular structure thus has the obvious utility of being impervious to penetration at the organization level, even if compromised at cellular level” (39). The militant groups are well-financed and draw funds from a variety of sources including al Qaeda’s financial support, ransoms from abduction, bank robberies, donations, forced taxes, drug-money, extortions, and from forces hostile to Pakistan. 40 Genocidal tendencies Though the people in the tribal areas initially welcomed the Taliban, the latter’s reign was characterized by so much violence that eventually public support started dwindling. The presence of militant groups led to unprecedented violence in FATA including suicide bombings, target-killings, beheadings and the elimination of women’s rights, as well as attacks on jirgas, mosques and education institutes. The Taliban’s interpretation of Islam included beheading women accused of prostitution, blowing up thousands of video shops and internet cafes, terrorizing barbers and warning young people against wearing western clothes. Between July 2007 and 2009, the Pakistani Taliban were responsible for an estimated 136 suicide bombings, 316 rocket attacks, 119 remote-controlled bombs, 149 abductions, 69 beheadings, 12 missile attacks, 272 time bombs, 239 IEDS (Improvised Explosive Device also known as roadside bombs), 44 hand grenade attacks, 444 shootings, and 142 other acts (Gunaratna and Iqbal 70). In late 2008, locals started rising up against the Taliban and formed groups in their localities to protect the area from the Taliban threat. 41 Organization of the right-wing landscape in Pakistan The effort to Talibanize Pakistan has reached epic proportions in the past couple of years. To study its progression, we have to realize that it’s not just the Pakistani Taliban who are the agents of this ideological contagion but that there exist other groups of influence including those who are working with the Taliban and those who are indirectly helping the Taliban cause. To understand how various radical agents influence the masses, we will categorize them according to their domain of activity. Militant Landscape Militant Landscape refers to the domestic and international players that use violence, fear and compulsion to impose their ideology of radical Islam in Pakistan. Some of the most influential groups include TTP, LeT, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), TNSM, Lashkar-e-Islam, LeJ, Jaesh-e- Muhammad (JeM), and SSP. Political landscape There are three main religio-political parties in Pakistan that are sympathetic to the Taliban cause including JI, JUI, and Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal Jamaat. JI is the oldest and the most established party and enjoys support from students, unions and professional organizations from across Pakistan. JI played a monumental role in the Afghan jihad 42 and the East Pakistan War of 1971 and has been linked to the Taliban and the al Qaeda. In his book, Descent in Chaos: The U.S. and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Rashid writes: [Al Qaeda’s] attacks after 9/11 in Pakistan and abroad would have been impossible without the support … provided by … mainstream Islamic parties such as Jamiat-e-Islami (227). JI has strong links with SSP and has created militant groups such as Hizb-ul- Mujahideen to continue the jihadi cause (Haqqani, "The Ideologies" 18). In April 2009, GEO TV interviewed Munawar Hasan, the democratic leader of JI, who said that JI supports the Taliban, and among the 56 Islamic countries, the Taliban government has been the best. JUI is a mainstream radical and pro-Taliban party in Pakistan and is said to have founded the Taliban. It was created in 1945 by Deobandis as a movement to spread Islam but got involved in politics in the 1960s. The party then split into two factions: Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-S). JUI-F is headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and has close links with SSP while JUI-S is headed by Maulana Sami ul-Haq (sometimes referred to as “Father of the Taliban”) whose madrassah, Darul Uloom Haqqania, boasts Taliban leaders as its alumni. Both factions collectively operate over 65 percent of madrassahs in Pakistan (Blair 72). 43 Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal Jamaat is more commonly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and is not only a militant organization but is also registered as a political party in Pakistan. Although the group participates in elections, it is more commonly perceived as a hate group that instigates negative sentiments against the Shias and other minority communities. The group has had a love-hate relationship with the government but conducts its activities with freedom. Religious Landscape The biggest proselytizing organization in modern day Islamic history is Tablighi Jamaat, an offshoot of the Deobandi sect that claims to follow Sharia rules in order to execute its strategy and achieve its objective to convince Muslims to follow an orthodox version of Islam. Though Tablighi Jamaat considers itself to be apolitical, it has been linked to many terrorism plots around the world (Tohid). A report by Channel 4, U.K. asserted that “the United States believes that Tablighi Jamaat is a recruiting ground for Al-Qaeda” ("Terrorist Tablighi Jamaat "). The organization has a huge presence in Pakistan and has recently started recruiting Pakistani celebrities, such as singer Junaid Jamshed, and cricket personalities to attract the youth. In July 2011, Interior Minister, Rehman Malik said, “Tablighi missionary center in Raiwaind is the breeding ground of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan as the center has a major role in brainwashing the extremists” (Shah). 44 Educational Landscape Pakistan’s education system has been long considered the biggest catalyst to increasing radicalization in the country. The country’s education system works on three parallel streams; the public schools, private schools and religious schools. Mediocre government investments in education have led to an increase in madrassah enrollment. The main protagonists preaching extremist ideology include the Darul Uloom Haqqania (also known as the “University of Jihad”) and Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (Islamic Organization of Male Students) among others. Social Landscape Pakistan is also home to many organizations that finance and support a network of international Islamist terrorists such as Ummah Tamir-e-Nau, Al Rashid Trust, Al Akhtar Trust and Rabita Trust. Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK) is another key public welfare organization under the banner of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) that collects funds and undertakes other activities. Media Landscape Pakistan media is among the most vocal in South Asia and has managed to become a major player in the country’s state of affairs. In 2001, there were just three government channels that ran on terrestrial networks, by 2011, there were over 70 channels operating in Pakistan. 45 Television The Pakistan broadcast media includes a variety of programming that appeals to both liberals and conservatives, but there is no evidence that suggests that the religious media is a part of militant or jihadi media (jihadi media refers to material that forcefully propagates a jihad view of life and aspires to sharpen jihadi identity ("Policy Dialogue"). It is also unclear if the different media groups promote a particular agenda since most of them own channels that broadcast conservative as well as liberal perspectives. Pakistan’s media industry works more on ratings than agenda and has been accused of being sensational and lacking objectivity. According to a report by AudienceScapes, the top five Pakistani channels are Pakistan TV (PTV), GEO News, PTV World, GEO TV and Quran TV (QTV). The PTV network is a state-owned enterprise and operates terrestrially as well as through satellite, and its popularity is dependent upon the rural populations’ lack of access to private channels. The report also states that people with a higher level of educational attainment will prefer private channels like GEO. Quran TV (QTV) is one of the most watched television channels in Pakistan and has played a major role in increasing the profile of religious issues. QTV features a variety of programming that ranges from discussions on religion to shows that aim to reconcile religious teachings with science and technology (Murthy, "News Television"). 46 Broadcast media continues to evolve in Pakistan and has become an important pillar in the community. The channels have realized their influence on state policies but lack the responsibility that should complement such influence. They are vocal in their opinions and, while some may not be considered pro-Taliban, they do tacitly subscribe to a religious dogma that affects the whole industry. Taliban apologists were encouraged to enter print journalism during Ayub Khan’s regime where they created a large fan base for their personal brand of rhetoric (Mezzera and Sial 34). Their fan base as well as their ability to attract significant viewership made them an attractive choice for hosting talk-shows. The media has also played a role in instigating sectarianism in Pakistan. It was clearly observed in the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances in Punjab that the media was supporting the undemocratic forces. According to Mezzera and Sial: Mainstream media …has failed to inform the people about the realities accompanying the rise of extremism in Pakistan, and has been a source of great confusion. The media has mostly chosen not to use its tremendous outreach to counter extremist tendencies and propaganda. It has done so either to appease extremists or because it subscribes to the same extremist ideology… Media experts argue that newspapers and TV channels in Pakistan did not, and perhaps still do not, perceive the Taliban as a threat to the country or its people (33). Though the Taliban do not own any broadcast television channels, their propaganda is being spread by Taliban-apologists in mainstream media. The most notorious Taliban-apologists include Amir Liaquat Hussain, former Minister of State for Religious Affairs, who worked in the print media industry for almost 13 years prior 47 to joining broadcast media. Amir was fired from GEO TV for advocating violence against Ahmadis after hosting “Aalim Online” (Scholar Online) for almost five years. In 2010, Amir joined ARY Network as an Executive Director and Managing Director of QTV where he hosted “Aalim aur Aalam” (Scholar and Deeds). The pro-Taliban narrative is being propagated by many journalists-turned- television hosts such as Hamid Mir, award-winning journalist and Taliban- sympathizer (Mir is said to be working on a biography of Osama bin Laden), and Zaid Hamid, a conspiracy theorist and talk show host. Print Print media enjoys massive popularity in Pakistan. Daily Jang, Express News, and The Nation are some mainstream newspapers whose journalists fan religious extremism. Some noteworthy names include Ansar Abassi (Daily Jang), and Orya Maqbool Jan (Daily Express). There are numerous small scale publications which have a strong anti-American and pro-Taliban rhetoric that are popular among the lower economic segment of Pakistani society, such as Daily Jasarat, Daily Ummat, and Weekly Zarb-e-Momin among others (Rana, "Jihadi Print Media" 2-4). Radio Many areas in Pakistan remain rural, impoverished and hard-to-access, and radio remains the medium of choice for their residents. Though there are plenty of radio 48 channels, the government does not allow private channels to broadcast news programs, thus, providing militant-controlled illegal radio channels an opportunity to engage the audience. According to a BBC report, “With mullahs and militants using the air waves to broadcast propaganda against their opponents and Western governments, illegal FM radio stations have mushroomed in Pakistan's north-west” (Murthy, News on the Radio). 49 Chapter Four: The Talibanization of Pakistan and the Role of Communication “Wars today cannot be won without media. Media aims at the heart rather than the body, [and] if the heart is defeated, the battle is won.” Abdul Sattar Maiwandi, Administrator, Voice of Jihad “The success of a terrorist operation depends almost entirely on the amount of publicity it receives.” Laquer W. Talibanization of Pakistan The effort to describe “Talibanization” has been going on since the Taliban first took control of Afghanistan. Ever since then, this label has been used to describe a variety of ideologies and actions. The media has used “Talibanization” to describe the ambitions of the Afghan Taliban to enforce a strict form of Sharia, to label the actions of militant groups in Pakistan, to categorize the anti-pluralistic activities of political and militant groups in Pakistan, to describe regressive and parochial societies and so on. All of the above are true, but they fail to encapsulate the entirety of the Talibanization phenomenon. If Talibanization is an ideology then how can we explain the ideological difference between TTP and Farhat Hashmi (a religious scholar who advocates a radical version of Islam)? The former was against educating women and bombed schools and the latter considers schools to be crucial to Talibanize society. On the other hand, if Talibanization is a set of practices than 50 why did Mullah Omar denounce the activities of TTP when the latter killed innocent civilians to avenge the death of Osama Bin Laden? Talibanization is as much an ideology as it is a set of practices. Currently, there are numerous groups who are working towards the goal of Talibanization such as al Qaeda, Al-Shabab of Somalia, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, religio-political parties in Pakistan and individuals like Ansar Abassi of Pakistan and Yusuf al- Qaradawi of Egypt. These individuals and groups have overlapping ambitions as witnessed by their messaging. Some of their beliefs include the idea that the true Islam is the 7th Century Islam under the leadership of Muhammad, that Islam should be dominating the world like before and that a woman is subservient to man. The common theme among these beliefs is Islam, leading many critics to claim that Talibanization is caused by “Islamic Terrorists.” The term “Islamic Terrorist” is a misnomer since it fails to account for the countless studies which prove that mainstream Islam is different from Talibanized Islam. Taliban tactics and ideology have been repudiated as being against the spirit of Islam by many clerics worldwide. Thus, the complexity in defining Talibanization emanates from the assumption that it is an evangelical movement of Islam, but in reality, Talibanization encapsulates characteristics that are against Islam and where Islam is used as a political tool. Thus, Talibanization may be described as a concerted effort by Islamic opportunists 51 to create a society with a homogenized ideology that is characterized by patriarchy, intolerance, bigotry and civil regression. How did Pakistan become the Mecca of Talibanization? Why has it been so hard to promote anti-extremism, social justice, equal economic opportunities, and non- discrimination on the basis of race, religion, language, ethnicity, gender, caste, class or economic status? According to Zeenia Shaukat, Senior Research Associate at the Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), these are broad ideals but cover major macro and micro issues that define the reality of a Pakistani citizen’s life. Eventually, Pakistan’s biggest challenges: terrorism, weak state-society relations, a fragile rule-of-law structure, disempowered citizenship, absence of balance-of-power between state institutions, and social divisions compounded by lack of access to opportunities feed into the ills that Pakistani citizens face in their everyday life. This covers both an “untouchable” issue such as the blasphemy law as well as a violation of traffic signals by a speedy vehicle driver disregarding the laws. Zeenia further says that all civil society organizations in Pakistan have been working on issues such as equal rights, non-discrimination, justice, anti-extremism and even the state proclaims subscription to these ideals, but the influence of such movements on the thoughts and lives of citizens remains scarce. “The fact is that today we stand at a point where there is no level playing field when it comes to espousing values that are not in line with the ideals being promoted by the religious 52 right. Salman Taseer's murder 3 and subsequent threats to Parliamentarian Sherry Rehman [she had submitted a bill in the parliament to amend the blasphemy laws] was practically a shut up call to anyone daring to touch the forbidden territory. It is this fear that is further repressing any constructive debate on issues that fall under the manifesto of the religious right,” remarks Zeenia. An atmosphere riddled with fear and unease is certainly not helped by a state that, apart from its inability to protect fundamental rights of the citizens, kneels down too easily before the pressure of the religious right. Also, there is this inherent culture in Pakistan not to question things, especially those related to religion. Pakistanis have very rigid views about religion and are not open to exploring any possible interpretation that may invalidate their existing religious interpretations. Citizens are also not too mindful of the impact their statements and actions have on the lives of others and on the society in general. 3 On January 04, 2011, Salman Taseer, Governor Punjab, was gunned down by one of his bodyguards, Mumtaz Qadri, for supporting a Christian women who was due to be executed for blasphemy and for advocating a change in Pakistan’s blasphemy law. 53 Communication strategies The Talibanization of Pakistan is progressing successfully because of three reasons; the government’s inability to create and execute a committed and consistent anti- Taliban strategy (this includes the government’s refusal to acknowledge the long- term consequences of Talibanization and their timidity to stand up to the religious mafia.) The second reason is that there is no one source of Talibanization. Efforts are being made by numerous groups whose overarching ideology, associations and motivations are different, thus, making it nearly impossible for the state to pursue an effective strategy. The third reason is that Talibanization, both as an ideology and as a behavior change, is being inculcated through various channels in a large number of personal and professional institutions. These institutions do not only include definitive structures such as government, education and economics but also abstract constructs such as marriage, parenthood, and entertainment. When observing the strategies that various groups are pursuing in an effort to Talibanize Pakistan, we see numerous similarities. The most common and successful one is the religious indoctrination of individuals and institutions. One may argue that Talibanization is religious indoctrination itself, but by limiting it on religious 54 grounds, we fail to acknowledge the selective use of religion, exploitation of the country’s vulnerable democratic system and manipulation of a restrictive culture. The Taliban’s strategy to pursue religious indoctrination relies on utilizing selective messages from Islamic doctrines and the most common way they do so is by refusing to acknowledge the construct surrounding a specific scripture. Religious indoctrination is a very successful strategy because, in every religion, there are scriptures that need to be interpreted in reference to geographical and time-based contexts. The Taliban use promises of Afterlife and exploit an individual’s lack of clarity regarding religion to manipulate them into following their version of Islam. Another strategy that the Taliban started out with was creating an emotional bond with locals. This helped in establishing a base in the region and getting initial support from locals. Most of the locals already knew some of the Taliban as the mujahidin and establishing trust was an easy feat for the Taliban. The 2005 earthquake that hit the northern areas of Pakistan turned out to be a fantastic opportunity for radical groups to strengthen relationships. Militant groups as well as religio-political parties swiftly responded to the needs of the earthquake affectees before the local or national government which enlarged the trust deficit between the people of the region and the government. According to McAdams, activism is a “strong-tie” phenomenon (Stanford Sociologist, Doug McAdams, discovered that high-risk activism and social change requires sacrifices that one would only engage in for close friends and family) and the Taliban further strengthened the 55 relationship by acting as the salvation the locals had hoped for from the political agents in the region. This initial symbiotic relationship gave the Taliban the support system to grow into an organization with extensive impact. By the time the locals realized their Frankenstein creation, it had already been too late. Perpetuating anti-American sentiments among the public is another strategy that has helped the Taliban. They positioned America as a modern day villain bent on eliminating Islam from the world. In general, Taliban speak about waging a war against the West but America has always been highlighted. In 2003, Professor Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, founder and leader of LeT, wrote: I cannot bow my head before them. I consider India, Israel, and the United States the enemies of Islam ("Invitation to a new markaz"). The concept of “enemies of Islam” was an adaptation of the strategy used in the Afghan war against the Soviets. The people knew the enemy more as “something against Islam” than as being Soviets and after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the transition from Soviet to the United States was easy. There is also a predominant view among Pakistanis that their democratically-elect leaders are merely the U.S.’s puppets. The U.S. influence on Pakistani policies has created a trust deficit between the people and the government. Anti-American sentiments are echoed in militant-run madrassahs all over the country and are 56 further incensed by the U.S.-led drone attacks that have killed innocent civilians. In his book, Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence (Terrorism, Hot Spots and Conflict-Related Issues, A. Manzar writes: Zahir, a 33 year-old apple grower and self-described Taliban recruiter from the remote tribal district of Qila Abdullah along the Afghan border in northern Balochistan Province says, “The American have robbed us of the right to live, but still we have the right to die, and we are using the right (26). The anti-American sentiment is also very profitable to the media networks. There are scores of talk shows whose hosts focus on anti-American rhetoric because it attracts major ratings and makes viewers susceptible to the hosts’ influence. Furthermore, political parties are also aware of – and use to their advantage - the anti-American appeal. For example, on March 21, 2010, JI held a very successful “Go America Go” rally in Sialkot in which JI’s President, Syed Munawar Hassan said that all Islam and Pakistan loving forces must unite against America. The Taliban also exploit the Pakhtun code of conduct, Pakhtunwali, to attract people to their cause. Primarily, they used the concept of badal to indoctrinate and recruit fighters. Badal or revenge killing is an obligation to restore an honor that is violated, and by identifying drone attacks by U.S. - which the Pakistan government tacitly supports - as liable for revenge, the Taliban were successful in massive terrorist indoctrination. 57 The Taliban have extensively relied on religious cleansing. Non-Muslims such as Christians and Hindus, as well as Muslims who follow a different brand of Islam such as Shias and Ahmadis, feel a constant threat to their lives. Most politicians in Pakistan are hesitant to condemn such attacks, and those who do so are usually labeled as being anti-Islam ("Taliban oppresses Ahmadis"). The Taliban have also made a point to publicize the cost of infidelity to the Taliban. It is a practice adopted from the Afghan Taliban who used to hand out public beatings as well as executions to any person they thought was a spy or who did not follow their rule and they did so without any formal investigation (Shabbir). In December 1999, the Pakistani Taliban publically executed a person for murder which is considered as the first step towards the enforcement of Sharia (Manzar 18). Publicizing punishments was successful since it scared people from opposing the Taliban. Instilling fear among the people was the go-to approach of the Taliban which they exercised without discrimination. A. Manzar quotes M.I. Khan, a journalist for Nida-i- Millat, who describes how Mehsud (TTP leader) killed pro-government tribal leaders. “First, he would confirm that the guy is an informer and then he would send him a Rs.1000 note along with a thread and needle, telling the person to buy and have his kafan (shroud) stitched within 24 hours,” Khan says “and the guy is murdered within 24 hours” (71). 58 Shabbir, an IDP (Internally Displaced Person) living in Karachi, spoke about his experience with the Taliban in his hometown, the Orakzai Agency, in FATA. He said that the NGOs and the government officials had left the area, and the locals were at the mercy of the Taliban. It was only when the Taliban started bombing girls’ schools that the people found out that girls’ education was prohibited. So the people started keeping the girls at home. The militant groups have employed a very successful geo-strategy in encircling Pakistan with their presence. Though the Taliban started out of the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan (which is the west of Pakistan) due to convenience, they have created strong associations with like-minded militant groups in Punjab (the center of Pakistan) and are now trying to establish a strong hold in Karachi (the south of Pakistan.) A Foreign Policy article in November 2010 alleged that ISI was safeguarding al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership in Karachi and that the Quetta Shura had become the Karachi Shura (Chisti). If the Taliban succeed in gaining control of Karachi, it will be their most strategic asset. Already the TTP leadership has voiced their ambitions for a Taliban takeover of Karachi and some madrassahs in the city proudly acknowledge Taliban leadership as their alumni (Mullah Omar, Abdullah Mehsud, Qari Zafar and many other top leadership of the Taliban movement are graduates of Dar-ul-Uloom Islamia Binori in Jamshed Quarters, Karachi.) 59 Brand identities Jihadi groups have a long way to go in order to create brand awareness about their specific organizations. A search on Google and Bing indicates that most militant groups do not have brand logos and while they may be masters in rhetoric but fail to capitalize on visual opportunities. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Sipah-e-Sihaba Pakistan (SSP) are some jihadi groups that have a visual identity. Their brand logos have a similarity among them, for example, the logo of LeT and JuD showcase guns and swords respectively which indicates their reliance on violence and force to accomplish their objectives. All of the five have one thing in common i.e. a call to jihad. JeM and HuM’s flags have the world “jihad” on them, while LeT, SSP and JuD have Arabic text that refers to fighting in the name of Allah. LeT’s flag includes “And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah,” while SSP’s flag includes texts such as, “Allah’s blessing on those who love the last prophet” and “Allah’s curse on those who malign the last prophet.” 60 Figure I: Brand Identity of Jihadi Groups Figure II, Continued Harkat ul Mujahidin (HuM) Image sourced from globalihad.net Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) Image sourced from isvg.org Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) Image sourced from longwarjournal.org 61 Figure I, Continued Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Image sourced from adl.org Sipah Sihaba Pakistan (SSP) Image sourced from http://my- voice-my-blog.blogspot.com 62 Key Messages The Taliban predominantly use three types of appeals when it comes to messaging; religious appeal, fear appeal and a combination of the two. Recruitment for jihad is mainly done through religious appeals that describe jihad as a duty of a true Muslim like “jihad is the glory of Islam,” or “jihad is the only way to protect Islam.” Implementing Sharia law has always been difficult since the interpretation of what is allowed in Islam is ambiguous and any punishment requires certain pre- requisites. Self-proclaimed Islamic experts like the Taliban exercise moral judgment that is not in tune with what the people view Islam to be. They loosely charge people for “not walking the path of Sirat-e-Mustakeem” (the path of righteousness) (Gunaratna and Iqbal 94), they declare that it is Islam that does not condone a woman to work alongside men. The Taliban ensure that their vision is implemented by creating fear through both communication and use of force. For example, in Swat, the Taliban warned the people before they started violent attacks on schools. A news item that appeared in January 2009 on the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) website captured the state of affairs in Taliban-controlled areas of Pakistan: Ali, a government official, had heard the recent warning by Shah Dauran, deputy leader of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of Maulana Fazalullah on a clandestine FM radio station. 63 “He said we must take our daughters out of all schools - private or public - by 15 January 2009 at the latest. Failing this, he said the schools will be bombed and violators would face death. He also said they will throw acid into the faces of our daughters if we don’t comply, like their counterparts did in Afghanistan some months back.” It is not just the tribal areas where the Taliban are exercising influence. In Rawalpindi, a city near the nation’s capital, around 50 – 70 militants carrying iron rods barged into a girls’ school and threatened them to “dress modestly and wear hijabs” or face the music (A. Khan). Taliban are vehemently opposed to the rights of women, which they feel is not allowed in Islam. In her book, Transforming Faith: The story of Al Huda and Islamic Revivalism among Urban Pakistani Women, Sadah Ahmed writes that some schools preach sexual submission of women to their husbands. The burden of men’s piety is on women who must not reveal themselves lest men be helplessly sexually aroused. And the husband cannot rape because he must not be refused “or the angels will curse her till morning” (170). In 2009, TTP uploaded a message to the Pakistan government on YouTube from an account titled “OutUSA11”. In the video, the narrator says: They [Pakistan Army] claimed to have killed 1,596 Taliban but were surprisingly not able to show the bodies of at least 96 Taliban. When the Taliban were present in Swat, your honor and dignity was always preserved. Today, about 500 young girls who arrived back to Swat from the “refugee camps” are missing. We are your friends, not enemies. For God’s sake, please be able to distinguish between friends and foes. Today, neither your religion is protected nor your wealth; whereas the Taliban ensured the safety of the five 64 things. God willing, the Muslims of Pakistan will surely witness an Islamic administration for which the Taliban, your brothers, sacrifice for by leaving their children and parents, carrying out devoted operations, are martyred in the battles and attain Allah’s pleasure by meeting Him [in the afterlife].Praise be to Allah, we are not anyone’s agents, which you know very well. If you don’t believe, then spend time in the battlefields next to the Mujahid brothers and sisters. We remain humble and battle atomic bomb with hand bombs. Praise be to Allah. My Muslim brother and my Muslim sister, the Mujahideen of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan are Allah’s creation and Mohammad’s agents, we are the servants of the mercy of both worlds; Mohammad (peace be upon him). We are the Prophet’s servants and if hideous jokes and cartoons are made about my Prophet then only your Taliban brothers are the ones who will bring honor through retaliation, who challenge their lives and are martyred to show their love for Mohammad. Whereas people engage in demonstrations, protests, boycotts, and political statements. Do not think of your own people as strangers, do not view your friends as enemies, and do not think your protectors as thieves. America can never be your friend, democratic political parties can never be the solution to your problems, those who growl against the Taliban in the media can never be your allies. To revert to the pages of history and to retain the Islamic rules under Mohammad, help the Taliban. “Someday, the devoted ones will be deserving of the devotion. Today, these faithless ones are disloyal, but we are not distressed.” 65 Taliban Tactics: Use of Conventional Media Radio Radio has been the most effective tool in propagating Taliban rule across the tribal areas in Pakistan. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report titled, “Covering and Countering Extremism in Pakistan’s Developing Media” stated: The rapid rise of extremist radio stations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPT) provinces has paralleled an increase in terrorist attacks, facilitated by affordable access to FM radio, loose government regulation of broadcast media and militant control of pockets in KPT and FATA (Byam and Neu). The Taliban, it is widely believed, controlled everything through the radio. A New York Times article described how radio has amplified the Taliban terror in the tribal areas of Pakistan: Every night around 8 o’clock, the terrified residents of Swat …crowd around their radios. They know that failure to listen and learn might lead to a lashing — or a beheading. Using a portable radio transmitter, a local Taliban leader, Shah Doran, on most nights outlines newly proscribed “un-Islamic” activities in Swat, like selling DVDs, watching cable television, singing and dancing, criticizing the Taliban, shaving beards and allowing girls to attend school. He also reveals names of people the Taliban have recently killed for violating their decrees — and those they plan to kill (Oppel and Shah). For these “FM Mullahs,” radio is a tool that allows them to reach their targeted audiences. Maulana Fazlullah, nicknamed “Radio Mullah” of TNSM, was the first one to use radio when his party took over Swat. It is estimated that Fazlullah operated almost 30 radio channels in Swat that broadcasted Jihadi propaganda. Illegal radio 66 stations have been successfully operating under the government’s radar and the Pakistani Taliban are effectively using them to communicate decrees, advocate jihad, preach sectarianism and request funding (Manzar 67-92). A. Manzar highlights an interesting paradox about these FM Mullahs, that initially they are extremely popular among the class they oppress the most, i.e., women. The women in FATA tend to stay inside homes, where they exert an indiscernible but definite influence on shaping mindset of the children, particularly since males tend to stay outdoors for sometimes protracted periods in search of employment. … the Mullahs aired religion-based question-answer programs (often about social issues such as marriage and duty) which tended to appeal to the conservative, isolated women in these tribal villages. These clerics convinced the women that it was their bounden religious duty to ensure that their husbands, brothers and sons observe Islam properly, dress properly, grow beards etc. Debatably, this has shaped the worldview of many youngsters growing up under the tutelage of their mothers (87). Television The mainstream media in Pakistan has been successfully supporting the narratives of militants’ media. For the most part, Taliban propaganda and communication is conducted through proxies that have a considerable influence in Pakistan media. Before we analyze the different ways these proxies influence viewers, it is important to understand why the public is susceptible to political opinions. In Pakistani media, prime time shows are dominated by political talk shows which subscribe to sensationalism without any regard to objectivity. Such behavior has transformed politicians into celebrities with the media pulling the strings of their stardom. The 67 result is that greater time and space is allocated to those individuals who take a more sensationalist stance such as politicians and talk-show hosts who fan anti- American sentiments. The superficiality of these talk shows has increased polarizing views and nurtured a mindset whereby people believe that an anti-American ideology translates to protection of Islam and Pakistan’s sovereignty, while a pro- American ideology translates to support for the drone attacks that kill innocent Pakistanis. The media continues to profit from this ideological divergence and many channels continue using the Taliban as bait for higher ratings. The Washington Post’s study of the ratings of Pakistan’s largest media channel found that GEO TV was characterized by, “irresponsible reporting, negativity against modern liberal concepts, anti- American views, its pro-religious extremist approach and anti-democratic agenda.” It would be wrong however to condemn GEO TV altogether since the channel has successfully campaigned against laws equating rape with criminal adultery and has led campaigns to promote paying taxes and family planning in Pakistan (Washinton Post's report on Geo). There is no denying that many other mainstream channels in Pakistan give more airtime to Taliban apologists and very little to their critics. For example, in 2008, Amir Liaquat Hussain, then host of a religious show on GEO TV and Former Minister 68 of State of Religious affairs, incited hate against the Ahmadi sect which inspired his followers to murder two Ahmadis without fear. These channels have given Pakistani Taliban ample opportunity to air their views, and some channels have even humanized militant groups. Though some personalities in the Pakistan media still tacitly endorse Taliban propaganda, overall, the media has decreased its level of support. Print Print Media, which as previously stated, has a huge influence among the public, is another important weapon in Taliban’s communication arsenal. There are scores of influential journalists who endorse radicalism and sectarianism through their writings and succeed in spreading Taliban propaganda. Ansar Abbasi, investigative journalist of Pakistan’s largest selling daily, The News, is notorious for his pro- Taliban views. Similarly, media group, Nawa-e-Waqt, has two newspapers, The Nation and Nawa-e-Waqt, that frequently publish Taliban communication. There are some mainstream publications such as the Karachi-based Daily Ummat and Lahore-based Daily Insaf that have similar policies to those of Jihadi publications, while some religious and political publications have transformed into jihadi media that circulate among the general public. These include JI’s Daily Jisarat 69 and monthlies Al-Haq and Laulak. Most of these publications are usually read by the lower socio-economic class, since they cost less than the mainstream newspapers. Jihadi Publications There is a plethora of Jihadist publications being distributed in the streets of Pakistan. Some of these publications are distributed outside mosques while the more controversial ones, advocating jihad, remain hard to find. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) completed an in-depth study on Jihadi print media in 2008 and observed the following:  Jihadi publications have been in circulation since the Afghan war when they were created to attract financial and human resources and to promote the concept of Jihad… According to PIPS, militant media is gradually expanding in influence and outreach (1).  The term, “jihadi media” refers to material that forcefully propagates a jihad view of life and aspire to sharpen jihadi identity (2).  Jihadi print media emerged as an alternative media and due to its profitability, attracted individuals and religious and political leaders as investors. Jamaat-e-Islami and its subsidiary organizations launched more than a dozen jihadi publication and Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, Sunni and Shia organizations have followed suit (2).  In order to institutionalize jihadi media, efforts were made to form a union of Islamic media as well as a religious committee to guide the media and to draft the principles for Islamic journalism. Various organizations also started courses in Islamic journalism; Jamiatul Rasheed, a pro-Taliban madrassa in Karachi affiliated with the Al-Rashid trust offers a Masters degree in Islamic journalism (3).  JuD, JeM, Al-Rasheed Trust, Jamaat ul Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen and SSP are six militant organizations that publish a wide range of periodicals while JI and its subsidiaries publish at least 22 jihadi publications (3). 70  The publications boast circulation figures similar to mainstream media, but these are generally believed to be inflated. Many of the publications are available at newsstands across the country, but those publications that are affiliated with banned organizations are mailed or delivered to a group of subscribers (3).  These publications have common content themes, which include advocating global jihad, prioritizing Islam, criticizing the Pakistani government, and promoting the re-emergence of an Islamic emirate. The study quotes Social Activist, Zafarullah Khan: The jihadi publications described the global war against terrorism as ‘crusades’. They criticized the Pakistani government slogans of putting Pakistan first and emphasized that all believers are obliged to die for Islam and everything [else] comes later... These publications make fun of democracy and capitalism as instruments of obscene civilization and urge the Muslim youth not to study in Europe or America because they will end up losing [their] faith in the glitter of what they call ‘nude civilization’ of the west. The jihadi publications urge the Muslim children to immerse themselves in the spirit of jihad as early as possible. They should play with guns as toys and eventually should learn to use them against the infidels (5).  These publications distort the context of current issues and glorify news to make it beneficial to their cause. The West is constantly shown to be in a decline due to jihad. They also announce seminars and conferences related to jihad as well as training opportunities (5).  Although the Pakistani government has made strict efforts to restrict these publications, they reappear under different names and eliminating this tool remains the biggest challenge. There are two factors that make the government’s job difficult; one is the turnaround time between when the publication first appears and the ban levied on it which is usually eight months. The second factor is that publications of charities cannot be banned until the charity is defunct (Many militant groups are operating as charitable organizations and have their own jihadi publications such as JeM operates as Al-Rehmat Trust, Let as JuD, and Jamaat ul Furqaan as Al- Asar Trust) (8). 71 Taliban Tactics: Use of Contemporary Media Unregistered SIM cards and cell phones The availability of unregistered SIM cards for mobile phones has helped Pakistani Taliban communicate with each other and other like-minded people easily. At a time when the Pakistani Taliban were growing in influence, the Pakistan Telecommunications Industry was going through its own aggressive growth period, and checks and balances on SIM cards were not enforced. This provided the militant groups with an opportunity to spread their messages and propaganda without being tracked. Mobile phones are personal and remain with individuals at all times leading to a faster and easier response rate. Today, because of stringent government requirements on SIM registration, the problem has mitigated, but cell phones still prove to be a strong medium for Taliban propaganda (Tariq). A BBC report titled, “Jihadists use mobiles as propaganda tool,” states that jihadists were creating propaganda material for cell phones and smart phones that include videos, songs, speeches and images that go viral within minutes. The study also states that the anonymity that was previously acquired through unregistered SIMs is now replaced through the use of Bluetooth short-range radio technology which allows users to anonymously spread material. The material spread through phones is professionally produced and contains a variety of information including audio readings, speeches and videos. 72 Social Media and the Internet The Taliban, who once banned the internet, videos and photography for being too “un-Islamic” have now integrated the technology to help them spread their propaganda. The Afghan Taliban are steps ahead with their Voice of Jihad website (shahamat-english.com), twitter accounts and other virtual media campaigns which have become a source of learning for the Pakistani Taliban. As previously stated, unlike their Afghan counterparts, the Pakistani Taliban are not monolithic. Every militant and pro-Taliban group has its own communication unit, though many do not have their own websites. Those who do have websites, use them to upload messages that advocate jihad and promote anti-American sentiment. Some of the organizations which have an online presence include Hizbul Mujahideen and Sipah Sihaba Pakistan (SSP) whose websites and blogs publish information similar to that in jihadi periodicals. Hizbul Mujahideen’s website (hizbmedia.com) is poorly constructed with a very busy layout. The content is full of anti-American and pro-jihad rhetoric and has not been optimized for search engines. The Pakistani Taliban may still be finding their way around websites, but they are still taking full advantage of the web. They keep a close eye on Western media and contact websites directly to claim attacks on foreign soil. TTP dropped a casual 73 email to the administrator of the American Blog, the Long War Journal, to claim responsibility of the failed Times Square bombing (Avlon). Furthermore, the Taliban have hacked websites of mainstream news media in Pakistan to post their own stories. There are also numerous websites and blogs in Pakistan that promote a pro- Taliban ideology and have become forums to rally people towards a more radical behavior. Social networking continues to be a huge opportunity for the Pakistani Taliban. There are numerous Facebook accounts that promote sectarianism, jihad and anti- American sentiments. There may be many groups with the same name, for example, there are eight groups of JeM on Facebook, but each has a small number of fans ranging from 20-200. These groups post clippings of jihadi publications and link to other websites that contain more aggressive messages. YouTube continues to be another tool of choice for Taliban propaganda. There are numerous videos that incite hate and advocate jihad. There are videos of NATO soldiers allegedly killing civilians, while some videos of the U.S. drone attacks are so vivid that they can easily create doubt about the U.S.-ambitions. There are also many videos glorifying the Taliban such as videos that show Taliban successfully attacking the U.S. and NATO forces. Hizbul Mujahideen has also come out with an anthem, which evokes patriotic feelings in viewers, in an effort to recruit individuals for jihad. 74 Parallel Media Aside from the above mentioned conventional and contemporary media tools, the Taliban have also pursued alternative media channels such as CDs and night letters. Most of these were initially used in Pakistan’s tribal areas where the Taliban prohibited television, songs and other form of entertainment and the only thing available to the public were CDs distributed by the Taliban. These CDs included text from the Koran spoken enchantingly, as if to evoke emotions (Shabbir). The night letters included leaflets posted on residents’ doors by the Taliban to warn or instruct the local population about a new decree or a change in Taliban policy. 75 Figure II: Flyer circulated by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Quetta (Source: Facebook share) 76 Figure II, Continued Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Pakistan (Balochistan Unit) Shias are infidels Shias are Wajib-ul-Qatl All Shias are wajib-ul-qatl. We will get rid of the impure nation in Pakistan. Pakistan means land of pure and Shias don’t have any right to live here. We have all the fatwas and approvals of the experts where they have declared Shias as infidels. Our jihadis have successfully executed jihad against the Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan. Thus, our mission is to eliminate the impure religion like Shia Hazara and other impure nations from every city and every village in Pakistan. Like before in Pakistan, especially in Quetta, the jihad continues against Shia Hazaras and we will create their graveyard in Pakistan. Their homes will be destroyed from suicide bombing, and we will not rest until the flag of Islam is raised on this Earth. After successful work, our jihadi and fidayeen [Those who sacrifice] are now waiting for orders to work in Pakistan. The jihad against Shia Hazara has become our duty. On 20 th May, our fidayeen successfully operated in Hazara Town and now our target will be homes. Unless our innocent colleagues are released, we will continue our fight. Lashkar –e- Jhangvi Pakistan (Exhibit 2 - Translation) 77 Taliban Tactics: Use of Grassroots methods Friday sermons Friday prayer is an important event in the Muslim culture. It is a congregational prayer held just after noon and includes two sermons by an imam (a worship leader of a mosque.) The Taliban have used these sermons to convey their messages that vary from instructions on how to become a better Muslim, to more politically inclined messages such as advocating jihad, extremism and inciting hate against religious minorities. In recent past, a majority of imams affiliated with the Deobandi sect have declared political leaders, who advocate a change in Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy law, as being wajib-ul-qatl; have praised Bin Laden as a martyr and have led prayers for the destruction of United States and Israel. The ambiance inside the mosque during a sermon is almost theatrical and is charged with raw emotions. The imam would give a made-for-movie performance in an environment thick with religious gratification and listeners won’t be able to help but sway to the rhetoric, mesmerized by the imam’s apparent command over the information. The congregation is male-dominated, women, though allowed, are not assumed to attend a mosque due to cultural etiquettes. For the most part, these sermons go unchecked, and although law enforcement has come out with a “Loud Speaker Act” under which police will record all Friday sermons, the practice continues (Zuberi). Urooj Zia, Freelance journalist, shared an experience she had with hate speech inside a mosque: 78 There is a mosque near my home. This guy [the imam] started saying all sorts of crap [sic] that Taseer deserved this [assassination] and the rest [who support a change in blasphemy law] are also wajib-ul-qatl. I went to the police station to file a report [against the imam], that this is hate speech and it’s against the law. My case wasn’t filed. They [the police] refused to accept it and said that we have our agents inside the mosque and we are paying attention. They did not do anything. This is where the kids go for Friday prayers, and they are being exposed to such speech. Rallies The Taliban, with their reach and strength, are on the ground preaching through the mosque’s loudspeakers and encouraging aggressive protests on the streets. The basic premise of these rallies is to show the strength behind a particular cause and to attain media coverage, thus, establishing that a particular cause enjoys mass support. In May 2011, approximately 800 supporters of a hardline pro-Taliban group, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Nazaryati (JUI-N), protested against the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the U.S. forces. In December 2011, JuD, a banned organization, gathered almost 70,000 supporters in Lahore to protest against the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by NATO and the U.S. ("Tens of thousands rally"). Though it was a legitimate reason since the U.S. admitted the killings to be a mistake, it was surprising that the government allowed JuD, a banned organization, to conduct such. Fatwas A fatwa is an Islamic religious ruling or a scholarly opinion regarding Islamic law. Fatwas are supposed to be issued by a recognized religious authority, but since Pakistan has very few certified Islamic institutes for higher education, fatwas are 79 issued by anyone who proclaims to be an Islamic scholar. The lack of recognized Islamic leadership in Pakistan has perpetuated an irresponsible scenario where fatwas are issued based on a cleric’s whim, without any regard to the consequences of such. Fatwas’ strengths lie in the credibility they give to an issue, making them seem unquestionable and without reproach. The most common fatwas issued by the Taliban have been to declare someone “wajib-ul-qatl” (liable to be killed without evoking any religiously generated legal sanction), and this verbal weapon has been used to eliminate high-profile persons such as Governor Punjab, Salman Taseer, and Federal Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti. The term is also off-handedly used by politicians to eliminate a political opponent. The Taliban have used wajib-ul-qatl extensively for religious cleansing. SSP and LeJ both declare minorities such as Shias and Ahmadis to be wajib ul qatl, while fatwas have also been issued against women who have been working in Swat (Chandran 1) and to declare jihad against the U.S. The fatwa factory has gotten so strong that even multinationals succumb to its power, when Gillette organized a Shave-a-Thon to break India’s Guinness World Record of most men shaving under one roof, JuD declared a fatwa against the event on the grounds that shaving was against the teachings of Mohammad. It didn’t matter that there were more than 2000 young Pakistani men participating in the event as only a handful of religious protestors were enough to intimidate the organizers into cancelling the event. 80 Religious Preaching in Homes While Friday sermons target the men in Pakistani society, the “dars” targets the Pakistani women in households. Dars or religious preaching is a sermon that focuses on imparting information regarding a particular topic such as the correct way to pray. In Pakistan, dars have become a part of the culture. They had initially started as an excuse for women to get together, but today have become a prologue to wedding functions and other family affairs. Farhat Hashmi, a religious scholar who received a PhD in Hadith Sciences from the University of Scotland, Glassgow, is a celebrity in the dars world. Hashmi started giving dars to bored, rich housewives in Pakistan, after which she established the Al- Huda International, a school in Islamabad which imparts teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and cuts off “cultural accretions” that the Taliban reject (Ahmed). Hashmi’s approach to religion and her religious-celebrity status among the rich-urban elite has trickled to the masses who are now copying her approach. These groups move around the city and preach to women who have limited education and lack exposure to the real world to make well-informed decisions. Creating Religious Vigilantes The extent to which unchecked preaching has permeated into Pakistan’s society has resulted in the rise of a new phenomenon: religious vigilantes. These individuals or groups of people feel the need to protect Islam because they have been led to 81 believe that the country’s judiciary is incapable of protecting Islam and/or the authorities are subservient to Western (or Non-Muslim) demands. It’s almost as if people believe that the more “infidels” they identify, the more are their chances to get into heaven in the Afterlife. This has resulted in a culture that judges people on their clothes, their lifestyles, and their behavior. In 2011, a 13-year-old Christian girl was expelled from school for blasphemy and her mother was transferred from her job ("School in Havelian expels"). The young girl’s crime was a simple spelling mistake which according to the teacher was “intentional” and the matter was referred to clerics. Another incident involved a 24- year-old female curator who was harassed by the police for wearing a sleeveless top (Umar). The greatest example of the increasing misguided vigilantism is when Mumtaz Qadri, a member of Governor Taseer’s protocol, shot the Governor in a state of religious frenzy over the latter’s views on Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. News reports indicated that Qadri had been inspired from sermons of two clerics. 82 Taliban Tactics: Levying Fines In order to fund their operations and to discourage people from acts that they deem “un-Islamic,” the Taliban have levied fines. When Lashkar-e-Islam took control of the Khyber agency in 2005, they announced the formation of an Islamic government. They not only banned interest banking but levied penalties on a variety of infractions. A murderer was to pay a fine of Rs.500,000 while Rs.50,000 was the penalty for having a dish antennae (Manzar 91), the cost of a life compared to that of having satellite television was only ten-fold. The TTP took the idea further and applied penalties for prescribing to a certain religion. Though Sikhs (Sikhs are followers of Sikhism, a religion that originated in the 15 th Century in Punjab, South Asia) had been residing in the Orakzai agency for decades, they were forced to pay Jizya (a poll tax levied on non-Muslim minorities) under the TTP leadership (Manzar 85). 83 Taliban Tactics: Education The role of madrassahs in propagating militancy in Pakistan has been an ongoing debate in international circles, yet little information is available in how Pakistan’s education sector has played a role in radicalizing society. Pakistan’s education sector is in an abysmal state with a huge gap in demand and supply of educational institutes. Despite the new education policies of 2009 and greater foreign funding to elevate the education condition in the country, education remains a chief concern. Contrary to popular belief, less than one percent of Pakistani children attend madrassahs (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja 3); thus, the madrassahs cannot be blamed for the rise of militancy in Pakistan (Winthrop and Graff 2). According to Winthrop and Graff, lack of quality education increases the risk that an individual will be driven to militancy. Factors such as lack of access to a good school, unchecked curriculum in government-run schools, and inability of the schools to prepare students for the labor market results in intolerance and frustrates young achievers to adopt a life of militancy (1-3). The Pakistan education system has three parallel structures that include private schools, government-run schools and madrassahs. In the madrassah education system, there are approximately 20,000 madrassahs in the country of which 11,000 84 are registered with the government. Most of the madrassahs are not involved in preaching militancy and focus on imparting knowledge about the Koran and Sunnah, but there are a few bad apples that actively promote militancy (Winthrop and Graff 18). It will be improper to assume that all madrassahs fan militancy, however, those operated by militant groups are considered effective tools to recruit followers of a radical ideology. In our study of Taliban propaganda, we are referring to only those madrassahs that have affiliations with militant groups such as the Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqani in Akhora Khattak, Islamabad. It is important to understand why Pakistani parents send children to madrassahs. As mentioned before, there is a huge gap between the demand and supply of educational institutes, and for the most part, parents have no choice but to send their children to a madrassah since it is the only available option. The second factor is that religious schooling is considered important in Pakistani culture, which encourages parents to identify schools that produce upstanding Muslims. The third factor is the inability of parents to afford a good, private school and madrassahs remain their only available option. The third factor probably is the biggest opportunity for militant groups to recruit new fighters. 85 Madrassahs provide free food and board to students, thus eliminating parental responsibilities. Some militant schools have an incentive scheme in place: if a family provides one of its sons for “jihad,” not only do the siblings receive free education, but the family is granted subsistence allowance (Manzar 17). These niche militant seminaries promote inflexible and intolerant views among students and instigate a popular feeling of unfairness in the students against the state. 86 Taliban Tactics: Jihadist indoctrination Suicide bombers are a vital tool in the Taliban arsenal, and their training and indoctrination is crucial to ensure success. A. Manzar describes the initial process of recruiting suicide bombers: One of the standard ways in which the Taliban have recruited suicide bombers is by the use of ‘persuaders’; these are jihadists drawn from local mosques and madrassahs, which have been trained in the ideology of the particular group, along with some religious tents pertaining to martyrdom and Jihad. These persuaders spread to madrassahs and mosques in tribal areas and beyond to find suitable candidates. The ideal person they are looking for is a person exposed to half-baked ideas of religious ideology at some madrassah, or a person reeling from the death of a loved one, ideally in the wake of military operation or a drone attack. The persuader initiates the indoctrination process by inviting a person to a dars (a religious lecture) which focuses on the life hereafter, and the joys of Jihad and fighting in the cause of God. From here onwards the indoctrinators are trained to recognize the signs of interest, and how to build up on the emotional needs of the individuals by manipulating them with religious doctrines (123). The process of indoctrination is also shown in a movie “In the Name of God.” In the movie, the chosen recruit was initially subjected to religious preaching followed by isolation from the world. He was told that the physical world was a mere transition phase before the Afterlife where a person will get the rewards for his deeds in the current world. The movie effectively showed how recruiters neutralize the effect of the family and encourage the recruit to break off all ties. According to Manzar, a potential suicide bomber has to satisfy certain conditions before he is “awarded” with the opportunity to kill infidels. Such pre-conditions include being unmarried and not being the only son so that other male siblings are 87 available to take over responsibilities. Although these conditions keep changing to ensure a greater supply of suicide bombers, their role is to ensure a recruit’s commitment to the task. To bound the recruit to his fate, the recruiters motivate him to write “will letters” before the bombings, and very few recruits go back on their resolve after writing such a letter (123). Another training method identified by Manzar was that inspired by Hamas and involved the use of suicide cells. Suicide cells are a close-knit grouping of would-be suicide bombers that have different recruiting curricula depending on which stage the recruit is in. These range from fast-track for candidates who have volunteered themselves to a general curriculum for those candidates who need further ideological strengthening. A two-page manual titled, “A Guide to Mujahideen,” was recovered during a raid in Karachi, in 2005. The manual was in two languages, Urdu and Arabic, and detailed the operational condition of the suicide bombing attack. Following were some of the instructions (Rana, Terrorism: How the Suicide Attackers Operate 4-5):  Lock up mouth, if you are arrested, avoid to meet family members, don’t keep organizational material and Mujahideen’s address during travel, don’t rely on “Punjabis”, and always use code names (4).  Don’t discuss your personal matters with your companions and try not to get in touch with your family. You are chosen in the way of Allah and family relationships and friendships should not remain important in the way of God (5). 88  Don’t stay more on a place, always use the code names, don’t discuss organizational matters to your companions at public places and don’t tell the family about your activities especially about your party friend (5).  Be law obedient in daily life and always complete the vehicle papers, don’t quarrel with traffic sergeants and the police men at check posts (5).  [If arrested] Investigators usually give the gesture that they know everything about you and your organization but in fact they do not know anything, be careful and don’t fall in their trap (5).  Law enforcement agencies could insult your father, mother and women, don’t come in pressure and always remember you’re in the way of God and He would save your family (5). 89 Chapter Five: The Taliban Propaganda “Propaganda is to a democracy what violence is to a dictatorship.” Chomsky What is Propaganda? Propaganda may very well be the oldest method of strategic communication. It seeks to influence behavior change in the public by controlling information and manipulating perceptions. Historian, David Welch, describes propaganda as: The dissemination of ideas intended to convince people to think and act in a particular way and for a particular purpose. It is the deliberate attempt to employ techniques of persuasion to attain specific goals. It is the deliberate attempt to influence public opinion through the transmission of ideas and values for a specific persuasive purpose that has been consciously devised to serve the self-interest of the propagandist, either directly or indirectly” (Cull, David and Welch xix). In his book, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda, Philip Taylor traces the word propaganda to the Catholic Church. In the 16 th Century, when the Catholic Church was struggling for control in non-Catholic countries, it set up a Commission of Cardinals that was responsible for spreading Catholicism. The Commission took a more formal role in the 17 th Century when Gregory XV made the Commission permanent and titled it as the sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide (Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) (1-5). According to Welch: The first official propagandist institute was therefore a body charged with improving the dissemination of a group of religious dogmas. The word “propaganda” came to be applied to any organization set up to spread a doctrine; then it was applied to the doctrine itself which was being spread; and lastly to the methods employed in the dissemination” (Welch). 90 Historically, propaganda has always been considered a pejorative term that seeks to manipulate the minds and souls of people for the benefit of the propagandist. But it was the British propaganda against Germany during World War 1 that planted the negative connotations of “propaganda.” The term became almost evil when it was employed by the Nazis against the Jews. To say that propaganda is bad or manipulative implies that it works against the good of society and disregards the progress the world has experienced as a direct result of propaganda activities. Propaganda has been used effectively to promote polio vaccinations in societies that were unaware of its benefits, to rally the world against the atrocities committed by the Nazis and to advocate for women’s rights. Propaganda is essential for progress because, without it, a large fraction of society will not benefit from the work of a few people and will remain disenfranchised. The biggest example of this is the state of the Mascho-Piro, one of the world’s last uncontacted tribes, which lives in Peru and has been unable to reap the benefits of global progress because of their resistance to outside contact. Thus, for propaganda to be good or bad, it’s imperative that the people, to whom it is being applied, exercise judgment before being convinced of the propagandist’s claims. It is only when people have been unable to exercise judgment that propaganda has been successful in becoming evil. 91 Analyzing the Taliban propaganda It has been a struggle for anti-Taliban forces to realize that this war is not a military war but a psychological one. The Taliban’s cleverly-crafted anti-American and anti- Islam strategies have been effective in turning the people ambivalent about where the constitution ends and religion begins. It is disconcerting that the Pakistani Taliban still enjoy support within certain pockets of the populace considering Pakistan is the second largest victim of the War on Terror after Afghanistan. Almost 30,000 innocent Pakistani civilians have died in this war. More of Pakistani soldiers have died than all of NATO’s casualties combined. Two thousand police officers and a generation of social progress for the Pakistani people have been lost (Zardari). Pakistani Taliban have used aggressive communication strategies that resonate with the public such as using the threat to Islam to rally the public against the Western forces and the Pakistani government. Creating an anti-Taliban strategy has been tricky because there are no best-practices that can be applied to counter the Taliban propaganda machine. There have been attempts to compare the Taliban to the Nazis but the former’s scope of hate transcends a single race or ethnicity since they seek to persecute all humankind that comes in their way to power. The Taliban fight is not just against the Jews but is also against the Western world, women, non- Muslims and those Muslims who do not adhere to their strict interpretation of Islam. 92 The Taliban’s propaganda against the Ahmadis, however, has many similarities with the Third Reich’s propaganda. During the Nazi regime, Jews were required to wear the Star of David on their arm for quick and easy identification. It was a method to control the Jews and the identification made it easy for the regime to keep track of the Jews’ lives and to ensure that they were not exercising any rights that were denied to them. Similarly, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) in Pakistan now requires Ahmadis to insert the word “Qadiani” when filling out all government identification forms such as ID cards and passports. Pervez Hoodbhoy, in an article published in Express Tribune, writes: Ahmadis now do not have the option of declaring themselves non-Muslims. Instead the government demands that they open themselves to public persecution, a method that Nazi Germany used against Jews. Even dead Ahmadis are not spared: news had reached the Khatm-e-Nabuwat that Nadia Hanif, a 17-year old school teacher who had died of illness ten days ago, was actually an Ahmadi but buried in a Muslim graveyard in Chanda Singh village, Kasur. Her grave was promptly dug up, and the body removed for reburial. In April 1933, Hitler declared a boycott of Jewish shops, banks, offices and department stores. It was a fatal blow to the Jewish community that took away its ability to sustain a livelihood. In February 2012, religious conservatives in Pakistan called upon the public to boycott Shezan soft drinks whose owners were Ahmadis (Shezan is a household name in Pakistan. The company was founded in 1964 and has grown to be an industry leader in producing everything from juices and soft drinks to jams and ketchups.) 93 While atrocities against the Ahmadis are shaping up to merit international concerns, the Taliban’s hate for the Shias is also well developed. In February, 2012, 117 passengers were ordered by gunmen in militant uniforms to disembark from a bus on route to Gilgit from Rawalpindi. After the gunmen had checked out the identification cards of all passengers, they killed 16 individuals who were Shias (based on their Shia sounding names.) Foreign news agencies reported the incident as a sectarian attack as confirmed by the spokesperson for the Jandullah faction of the Taliban. The “Talibanization” of Pakistan has been largely successful because the propagandists have been able to synchronize their words and deeds to influence public opinions. They have simultaneously used violent tactics as well as psychological warfare to bring about a change in public perceptions. In their book, Terrorism and Media, Paletz and Schmid write: All the terrorist strategies… are fought on a psychological battleground: They are meant to bring about changes in attitudes or feelings of the public and/or opponents. Probably this is the reason some authors call terrorism the ‘weapon of the weak’- the strategy does not aim at a military victory, but at a psychological defeat of the enemy (31). The terrorist strategies that Paletz and Schmid refer to are identified by War Crimes Expert, M. Cherif Bassiouni, and are an accurate description of the way the Pakistani Taliban are communicating with the public. According to Bassiouni, there are five communication strategies that terrorists employ that include demonstrating that 94 the current government is vulnerable and impotent, getting public sympathies for their actions, radicalizing and polarizing the public, goading the government into repressive action likely to discredit it and presenting violent acts in a manner that makes them appear heroic. In the initial stages of their operations in the tribal areas, the Pakistani Taliban set up a state within a state through the establishment of Taliban-operated judiciaries. They positioned themselves as the saviors of the people and the government as incapable of protecting the locals. This was largely effective and they were able to cozy up to the people quickly. In December 1999, the Pakistani Taliban publically executed a person for murder in the tribal areas. This was met with approval from the local community who were fed up with the lawlessness in their region. The Taliban also executed those people who, they alleged, were working with the NATO forces and were providing information to the government for drone attacks. The biggest example that had a national impact was the assassination of Salman Taseer who sought to change the blasphemy law. The Taliban rallied huge support by positioning Taseer as an as “apostate” who wanted to implement the western agenda against the blasphemy laws in the country. 95 The Taliban are also working towards polarizing and radicalizing the public. They have promoted sectarianism through the distribution of radical texts and have exploited religious sensitivities of the public. In addition, by positioning Islam to be in danger, the Taliban have increased anti-pluralism within Pakistan. The response of Pakistani government to align with the U.S. government, to support drone attacks on civilians, has provided the Taliban with a reason to discredit the government. They have successfully positioned the government as bystanders to the murder of innocent civilians. Taliban have also positioned their deeds as heroic. Advocating jihad to safeguard Islam and assassinating the country’s leadership to retain the sovereignty of the state are some of the ways in which the Taliban have justified their violent acts. 96 Taliban’s use of Propaganda Techniques A deeper analysis of the Pakistani Taliban’s propaganda indicates that their techniques embody the seven commonly used propaganda techniques identified by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis in 1937. The first technique, Name calling, occurs when the propagandist gives a negative label to whatever the propagandist wants others to view negatively. The propagandist wants reactions to the negative label not to the evidence (Fleming 2). In this instance, the Taliban have used name calling against the West and more specifically, against America, by terming it as an “enemy of Islam.” By using this term, they have exploited the religious sensitivities of the Pakistani people. The word “enemy” evokes negative feelings and has been sufficient enough for the people to form an opinion against the U.S. without considering any evidence. What has prolonged the positioning of the West as enemies of Islam are drone attacks, which have been communicated as the West’s attempt to kill Muslims. A contrasting technique, called Glittering Generalities, includes the use of vague, abstract, positive terms to win approval. They want reactions to the positive label, not to evidence (Fleming 2). The Taliban groups such as Hizbul Mujahidin and other militant groups have used this technique effectively to advocate jihad against their opponents. By terming jihad as “the glory of 97 Islam” and “the only way to protect Islam”, they are invoking emotions of honor, glory and love for Islam. Religio-political parties such as JI have used these techniques effectively to rally the masses against the change in Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. JI’s Fareed Paracha defended Mumtaz Qadri, murderer of Salman Taseer, on Dawn News’ show Kab Tak by saying that, “A person [Qadri] who, in his heart, has the love of the Prophet and whose heart is stricken with grief and to whom neither the judiciary nor the police is accessible… to prove his honor he took the step [to assassinate Taseer.]” Another popular technique employed by the Taliban is transferring the positive qualities of an entity to what they are promoting. They are using the Koran’s image, the green color and scriptures from the Koran in their flags. These symbols are intricately associated with Islam and by using them in their flags, banners and publications, the Taliban seek to transfer the feelings Pakistanis have towards these symbols to their own organization. By using the image of the Koran, the Taliban do not want the audience to seek any more information than what is presented to them. Killing innocents may be against Islam, but the Taliban want people to form a perception of the organization based on the symbol-organization connection and not the acts. 98 JI makes use of transfer by presenting pictures of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in their banners. They also promote the association verbally in speeches and rallies. By associating Jinnah with their organization, they want people to believe that Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was that of an Islamic state. Testimonials are also regarded as a formidable technique since they are able to provide credibility to a cause. One way the Taliban use testimonial is by circulating, through video and print will-letters of suicide bombers. These will-letters are emotional statements from indoctrinated individuals that describe suicide bombing and jihad to be the duty of Muslims. The will-letters also state that the bomber is satisfied with his actions since the real world is in the Hereafter, and he will have no problem justifying his actions to his Creator. By issuing will-letters, the Taliban are only showing part of the picture in hopes that their audience will not try to rationalize the reasons for becoming a suicide bomber. Visually, the Taliban look like any other male from the tribal regions, they wear turbans, have long beards and appear religious. In fact, the use of the plain folks (the "plain folks" tactic occurs when the propagandist is presented like the persons it wants to influence) technique may not actually be considered propaganda, since they are what they preach, i.e. soldiers of Islam who are willing to deny the comfort of this world to safeguard their religion. But while they may appear to be just like any other individual, the militant 99 Taliban are not like plain folks in their psychology. They do not prescribe to the same family values and descriptions of happiness like others do. Card Stacking is another effective technique in which the propagandist selects and omits facts, distorts information, under-and over-emphasizes, confuses, and uses every deceptive device available to "stack the cards" against the truth (Fleming 4). The number of civilian casualties as a result of drone attacks has increasingly provided fodder to the Taliban apologists in Pakistan. There are conflicting reports of the number of terrorist killed versus that of civilians because the Pakistani government and NATO forces have been unable to identify the number of deaths resulting from a drone attack. Farhat Taj challenged the issue in an article in Daily Times: The reason why these estimates about civilian ‘casualties’ in the US and Pakistani media are wrong is that after every attack the terrorists cordon off the area and no one, including the local villagers, is allowed to come even near the targeted place. The militants themselves collect the bodies, bury the dead and then issue the statement that all of them were innocent civilians. This has been part of their propaganda to provide excuses to the pro-Taliban and al Qaeda media persons and political forces in Pakistan to generate public sympathies for the terrorists… According to the people of Waziristan, the only civilians who have been killed so far in the drone attacks are women or children of the militants in whose houses/compounds they hold meetings. The lack of credible information about drone attacks have increased anti-American sentiments, which is further perpetuated by pro-Taliban parties such as JI, JUI and many media personalities and is weakening the case against the Taliban. 100 The technique is also used in many jihadi publications that distort the context while covering major international and national events. PIPS study, “Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview,” further states: They glorify and magnify achievements of Mujahideen anywhere in the world. The language and expression used to narrate events is deliberately very radical, meant to ‘encourage’ the Mujahidin. While glorifying the Mujahideen, these jihad publications never forget to disparage the US and its allies. They portray that the troops and citizens of the US and allied countries are afraid of attacks by the Mujahideen and are on a gradual decline. For example, an excerpt from a news item narrates how a person who had recently returned from America told the reporter in a meeting: “I was walking on the road [in the US] when I saw a gathering of people watching something on a big screen…It was a person sitting in a chair. He was a soldier who had come back from Iraq. He had lost his legs and arms in a clash with the Mujahideen. He was crying and asking why Mujahideen left him alive. The people there were in fear of Mujahideen when they left the place.” Similarly, Japan’s decision not to send troops to Afghanistan was reported in a magazine as: “Japan refused to send its artillery to Afghanistan for fear of Taliban attacks” (Rana, "Jihadi Print Media" 5). The use of rallies to motivate individuals to support pro-Taliban causes is a great example of how the Taliban are using band wagon as a strategy to achieve their objectives. This is a "follow the crowd" device that promotes the idea that everyone else is doing what the propagandist wants the audience to do (Fleming 4). The Taliban rallies give the appearance of public support behind a cause and encourage other individuals to render their support because the larger community is doing the same. 101 Conclusion In sixty-five years of its existence, Pakistan has experienced a lot of wars and conflicts, but none proposed a greater threat as the Taliban phenomenon does now. The use of religion for political ambitions, the short-term vision of the benefits from supporting the Taliban and the intentional division of the different ethnicities by the government has resulted in the polarization of values, ideologies and culture. The distrust among Pakistanis is so deep and strong that it will require a long-term and dedicated strategy to make Pakistan united again. Pakistanis are becoming increasingly conservative because the Talibanization is being communicated through a variety of channels. It is not just the media, books, lectures and the internet that are propagating the ideology, but Talibanization is also influencing the way we spend our time, how we work, what we wear and how we entertain. The influence of groups and individuals desiring Talibanization has become so powerful that even the democratic leaders fail to stand up against them. Difa-e- Pakistan (DFC or the Defense of Pakistan Council) is a new, official and legal face of the Pakistani Taliban and their apologists. It is an umbrella organization of more than 40 religious and political parties that was created in the aftermath of the NATO air strike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in 2011 ("Pakistan leaders"). The organization advocates closing NATO supply routes to Afghanistan and revoking India’s status as the most-favored nation given by the Pakistani government. In the 102 past few weeks, DFC and thousands of its supporters have marched through major cities advocating anti-Semitism and jihad against the U.S. (S. S. Hasan). The organization also includes banned militant groups, such as the LeT and SSP, and with the level of police protocol awarded to their rallies, it is impossible not to assume state support. Pakistan, it seems, has an obsession with Islam. In his satire piece in Asian Correspondent, Ahsan Butt explains to the readers that without Pakistan, Islam would be in real trouble. He follows his claim with interesting examples such as how Tahaffuz Namoos-e-Risalat Mahaz (TNRS, or the protection of the sanctity of Prophethood Movement) protested against women running in a marathon because it was against the teachings of Islam. Blaise Pascal, 17 th century mathematician and philosopher once wrote, “Men never commit evil so fully and joyfully as when they do it for religious convictions.” The Pakistani Taliban are the real-life example of those words who justify the slaying of thousands of people as protection of Islam. Organized religion runs the risk of creating conflict, hate, and mass-violence against out-groups. Most indicators of social health such as crime rate, corruption rate, civil rights and freedoms and free speech enjoy higher values in more secular societies like Norway and Netherlands and lower values in countries like Pakistan and Saudi 103 Arabia. In secular societies, religion is considered a private matter between the individual and God but when it becomes state policy and a means of social control then it risks infesting the social fabric of communities since no one will agree which version of religion or God is the right one and everyone who holds opposing views is either dehumanized or killed. We witnessed the consequences of having a religion as state policy in Europe long ago, and today we are witnessing the same in Pakistan. Pakistan’s sustainability and its future will depend upon how it deals with the current ideological crises. Saudi Arabia has been successful due to its vast resources and ability to control the populace through acute media censorship and gender and ethnic discrimination, but it will be difficult for Pakistan to follow Saudi Arab’s footsteps. Pakistan has a very cosmopolitan culture, a booming art and literature industry, a population that is resilient as it is ambivalent and a media that does not prescribe to any particular ideology. Pakistan’s problem has always been considered to be a lack of unity among its various ethnic populations. The absence of a common denominator among various groups has never allowed the creation of a common national identity as a Pakistani. The Pakistani Taliban have aspirations of creating a common identity as Muslims rather than as Pakistanis, but their description of a Muslim is exclusive and too narrow to include every Pakistani. The lack of a common identity for Pakistanis has 104 so far mitigated Talibanization but if it continues to go unchecked then Pakistan’s future may include massive brain drain of liberals resulting it a homogenized and intolerant society. It will also increase the risk of economic sanctions from other nations and erosion of human rights. Without government support, a strong anti-Taliban network is difficult to establish but Pakistanis are getting together in small groups to protest against the rising radicalization. There are numerous organizational examples including Citizens for Democracy (CFD) that advocates the separation of religion and state and Citizens for Free and Responsible Media (CFRM) that is a media watchdog and aims to uphold the fundamental freedoms and rights that ought to be guaranteed in a democratic and open society. Individuals are also rising against radicalization; they include influential personalities like Salman Taseer who gave up his life for the cause, Najam Sethi who is an award-winning Pakistani journalist, Rehana Hakim who is the editor of Newsline (a leading political magazine in Pakistan.) There are also ordinary Pakistanis who are protesting against the Pakistani Taliban such as Malala Yousufzai. Malala, a 14-year-old girl residing in Swat, used the internet to inform the world about her daily battle with the Taliban who used fear and intimidation to force girls to stay at home (Habib). There are barbers like Dilshad who want their children, boys and girls, to get the best education (Khaliq), and the 11-year-old Wajiha, the only girl in her hometown, Tangi, who drives a rickshaw because her father was badly injured in a Taliban attack ("Wajiha"). 105 Recently, another anti-Taliban movement called Aman Tehreek (Peace Movement) was identified by left-liberal journalist, Nadeem Paracha. Aman Tehreek is an umbrella organization that was formed in 2009 by Peshawar’s civil society and includes a number of progressive intellectuals, lawyers, businessmen, doctors, and student and labor leaders. In his blog post, Nadeem brings light to the Movement which is not only against al Qaeda and the Taliban but is also against the way Pakistani military establishment and media is engaging with these organizations. Nadeem further remarks that since the Movement’s narratives on religious extremism, terrorism, the military- establishment and American drone attacks are largely anti-theistic to those of the right-wing mainstream electronic media, they don’t get much air time. Nadeem’s post is also an eye-opener for many people who believe that Talibanization is a Pashtun-dominated phenomenon. In 2009, the Movement organized a seminar in Peshawar which was attended by members of civil society, NGOs, and delegates from mainstream secular political parties and resulted in the “Peshawar Declaration” (PD). PD identifies the main causes of terrorism as the militant Islamic groups and the strategic depth policy of Pakistan. The declaration also suggests that the main method to propagate terrorism is through the institutionalized indoctrination of 106 civil and military personnel. It also makes many recommendations and is vocal about the tacit state support to terrorist organizations. Furthermore, it identifies education, gender equality, awareness and communication to be a priority in the fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, Taliban forces are aggressively using propaganda to achieve their goal of the Talibanization of Pakistan. It is also clear that they have their sights on spreading their ideology in different nations with the support of like-minded transnational groups such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Shabab and others. Another issue that is propagating the spread of Talibanization is the confusion regarding Pakistan’s reason for being. The country needs to move away from what Jinnah wanted because no one really knows whether he wanted a secular state or a Shariah state. The religious groups proclaim that Jinnah wanted Pakistan to be an Islamic entity that followed the Sharia while the liberals believe that Jinnah wanted a secular Pakistan. To assume that the decision is going to be a choice between an Islamic state and a non-Islamic state is wrong, because the decision should be based on the rights of individuals. Those fundamentalists and conservatives, who allow religion to supersede human rights, should be reminded that in Islam, the adherence to human rights is considered more important than pleasing God. 107 However, a larger debate which forces Pakistanis to support the separation of religion from state affairs will not be successful considering the already polarized situation. The debate needs to be rebranded and should be broken into smaller issues that make a difference to the average citizen. Instead of telling people to avoid sending their children to unregistered madrassahs, they should be sold the dream of future employment opportunities from sending children to schools with a broader curriculum. Instead of asking people to give equal rights to women, they should be made aware of the economic, health and lifestyle benefits of equal rights. Also investment in education, judiciary, and the economy is crucial to decrease the reliance on religion. The education system needs to be revamped in order to encourage pluralism and should include subjects which help students attain skills for employment. An impartial and transparent judiciary is vital for Pakistan’s future, one that has no qualms about punishing terrorists. 108 Glossary Afghan Jihad also known as the Soviet War in Afghanistan, was a nine-year long conflict that started in 1980 and included powerful global players such as the Soviet Union, the United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and Pakistan. The Afghan jihad is considered by many as a proxy war where the Soviet Union, supporting the Marxist-Leninist government of Afghanistan, fought the U.S.- backed mujahideen. AfPak is a popular neologism created by the U.S. to describe its policy on the War on Terror. The term, meaning “Afghanistan-Pakistan,” indicates that the problem of Islamic jihad lies in in the AfPak territory. The term also suggests that the U.S. believes that both countries require the same political and military approach. Ahmadis or Qadianis belong to the Ahmadiyya sect, an Islamic revivalist movement, established at the end of the 19th century by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian who proclaimed to be the promised Messiah. Al Qaeda is a global Islamic movement founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s that relies on militancy to enforce a radical Wahhabi Sunni ideology. It operates as a network of organizations across the world. Amir is the Arabic word meaning “central leader” or “commander” or “prince.” It is used throughout the Muslim world as a title given to a person of high office. Barelvi is a Muslim school of thought founded in 1904 in the Indian subcontinent by Ahmed Raza Barelvi. Barelvis follow a Sufi ideology that considers the Prophet to have superhuman capabilities. Bengalis are an ethnic community belonging to the Bengal region in the East of India. The region is divided into India and Bangladesh and the latter used to be East-Pakistan till the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 also called the Bangladesh Liberation War. Deobandi Islam is a Muslim school of thought founded in 1866 in the Indian Subcontinent. Deobandis follow a conservative Sunni ideology. Durand Line refers to the porous international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. East-Pakistan (now Bangladesh) is a region to the East of India which the British annexed to Pakistan at the time of Independence. 109 FATA or Federally Administered Tribal Areas are semi-autonomous regions that are surrounded by Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa and Afghanistan. FATA is comprised of seven tribal agencies (Bajaur, Orakzai, Mohmand, Khyber, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan), plus six frontier regions (Peshawar [Capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPT)], Kohat, Bannu, Laki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, and Tank). Fatwa is an Islamic religious ruling or a scholarly opinion regarding Islamic law that is issued by a recognized religious authority. Hazaras, many researchers believe Hazaras to be of Turko-Mongol ancestry. They are overwhelmingly Shia Muslims and comprise the third largest ethnic group of Afghanistan. Imam is a worship leader of a mosque and the Muslim community. Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), is the Pakistani state’s flagship intelligence agency responsible for providing crucial national security intelligence to the Government of Pakistan. Islamization refers to the imposition of the Islamic way of life on every aspect of society including but not limited to social, political and educational aspects. Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) is a mainstream radical and pro-Taliban party in Pakistan and is said to have founded the Taliban. It was created in 1945 by Deobandis in the Indian Subcontinent as a movement to spread Islam but got involved in politics in the 1960s. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is Pakistan’s oldest and most established religio-political party. Its objectives include the Islamization of Pakistan and to reduce the influence of non-practicing Muslims on society. It played a monumental role in the Afghan jihad and the East Pakistan War of 1971 and has been linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Jihad, an Islamic term meaning “to struggle,” is a duty of a Muslim. Its literal translation is to strive in God’s way. Jihadi media refers to material that propagates a jihad view of life and aspires to sharpen jihadi identity. Jizya is a tax, under Islamic Law, levied on non-Muslims who meet certain criteria. 110 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPT) is the North-Western province of Pakistan, formerly known as NWFP. Karachi Shura see Quetta Shura. Madrassahs or madressa are Islamic religious seminaries. Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) was a conglomeration of far-right Islamist parties, created in 2002, that contested the Parliamentary elections in Pakistan. Mujahid refers to a person doing jihad. Mujahideen or mujahidin is the plural of mujahid. Nizam-e-Adal was a peace treaty between the Pakistan government and militant group, Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat—e-Mohammad (TNSM) in Swat in 2009. The treaty called for the establishment of Sharia courts and an Islamic alternate system of government. Northern Alliance is an anti-Taliban military organization comprised mainly of non-Pashtuns and backed by Iran, Turkey, India, Russia and four of the five Central Asian Republics (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). NWFP see Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakhtunwali is the Pashtun code of conduct which is used to govern life. It is a set of principles, rather than laws, among which honor, chivalry, loyalty to the tribe and fierce opposition to foreign occupation are considered sacred. Pashtunistan refers to Pashtun-dominated regions along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. It also refers to the name of a state demanded by Pashtuns that seeks to combine Pashtun dominated areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan to create a separate homeland. Pashtuns or ethnic Afghans or Pathans are an Eastern Iranian ethnic group with population in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Punjabis are an ethnic group living in Punjab, a province of Pakistan. Qadianis see Ahmadis. Quetta Shura refers to a key Taliban group that comprises of the Afghan Taliban Leadership residing in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan. The Quetta Shura became the Karachi Shura when the leadership changed locations. 111 Religio-political party is a political party that contests elections with an aim to enforce a constitution based on a particular theology. Sharia is the Islamic system of governance. Shia is a Muslim sect that believes that Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, should have become the leader of the Muslim community. Sindhis are an ethnic group living in Sindh, a province of Pakistan. Strategic depth is a crucial foreign- policy strategy of Pakistan. It asserts that Pakistan should remain influential in Afghanistan to ensure support from Afghanistan and the use of its land and air space in event of a war with India. Sunni is an orthodox Muslim sect that claims to follow the Sunnah, or teachings of Muhammad. Swat is a valley and the administrative district in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and is located close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Tablighi Jamaat is one of the most influential grassroots Islamic movements in the South Asian subcontinent and has hardline traditionalist views on the role of Islam in modern society. Urdu-speaking or Mohajir refers to immigrants and their descendants who chose to settle in Pakistan after partition. Wahhabi Islam or Wahhabism is an orthodox religious movement within Sunni Islam that was founded in the 18 th Century in Saudi Arabia. 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Abstract (if available)

Abstract This paper examines the revival of propaganda techniques and their application to the Taliban’s global jihad. More specifically, it is a study of the Pakistani Taliban’s efforts to use propaganda to “Talibanize” Pakistan. The purpose of this paper is to understand the Pakistani Taliban as a terror institution and to identify the various strategies they are pursuing to achieve their goals. The key issues discussed in this paper include the origins of the Taliban phenomenon, factors that led to a Taliban stronghold in Pakistan, Talibanization of Pakistan and how the Pakistani Taliban are using communication tactics to pursue their agenda. Analyses reveal that the Pakistani Taliban consist of militant groups, state and non-state actors and influential personalities. The principal conclusion is that the Talibanization of Pakistan is being pursued by a number of groups through various institutions and an aggressive and grassroots strategy is required to mitigate the risk Pakistan faces from the Taliban.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Shabab, Asma (author)

Core Title Marketing the beard: the use of propaganda in the attempt to Talibanize Pakistan

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Strategic Public Relations

Publication Date 05/09/2012

Defense Date 05/09/2012

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Afghan jihad,OAI-PMH Harvest,Pakistan,Pakistani politics,religio-political parties,Taliban,Taliban communication,Taliban in Pakistan,Taliban propaganda,war on terror

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Swerling, Jerry (committee chair), Reid, Megan (committee member), Seib, Philip (committee member)

Creator Email asmashabab@gmail.com,shabab@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-38217

Unique identifier UC11290238

Identifier usctheses-c3-38217 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-ShababAsma-831.pdf

Dmrecord 38217

Document Type Thesis

Rights Shabab, Asma

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA