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University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

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Comparative analysis of nuclear crisis communication: 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis and 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear crisis

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Comparative analysis of nuclear crisis communication: 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis and 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear crisis

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Content COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR CRISIS COMMUNICATION: 2011 FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR CRISIS AND 1979 THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR CRISIS by Yang Lu A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS) May 2012 Copyright 2012 Yang Lu ii Dedication This thesis would not have been possible without the great support from my family and my friends. Thank you for all your love, patience and words of encouragement throughout this long journey. Mom, Dad, Chen, Tracy and Joe, you have always taught me to believe in myself and pursue my dreams. I believe I have fulfilled my goals for the two-‐year graduate program with the completion of this thesis. My accomplishments are yours. iii Acknowledgements While writing a thesis can be difficult, the task is much less daunting when a lot of supporters are providing help for your success. I would like to thank my thesis committee chairman, Jerry Swerling, for always being by my side. His words of encouragement and vision for my thesis greatly inspired me. I highly appreciate his guidance and reassurance not only during this process, but also throughout my graduate career at USC. I would also like to thank my committee members Mei Fong and Matthew Leveque for their much appreciated feedback and instruction. In addition, I would like to thank my interviewees Bill Imada, Larry Kamer, and Gil Alexander for providing me rich knowledge and great insight on this interesting subject. iv Table of Contents Dedication..................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgements................................................................................................... iii List of Tables............................................................................................................. vi List of Figures............................................................................................................vii Abstract....................................................................................................................viii Introduction...............................................................................................................1 i. Crisis and Crisis Management...............................................................................................1 ii. The Importance of Crisis Management.............................................................................2 iii. Best Practices of Crisis Management..................................................................................3 a) Stage One: Pre-‐crisis.............................................................................................................3 b) Stage Two: Crisis....................................................................................................................5 c) Stage Three: Post-‐crisis.......................................................................................................6 Chapter One: Nuclear Crisis: Fukushima 2011 and TMI 1979....................................8 i. What happened in Fukushima 2011?.................................................................................8 ii. What happened in Three Mile Island (TMI) 1979?....................................................12 Chapter Two: Analysis: Fukushima 2011 and TMI 1979..........................................15 i. Crisis management of Fukushima 2011..........................................................................15 a) Overall performance assessment..................................................................................15 b) Pre-‐crisis planning...............................................................................................................16 c) Crisis..........................................................................................................................................19 d) Post-‐Crisis: Key Learnings from Fukushima Nuclear Crisis..............................51 ii. Crisis management of TMI 1979........................................................................................52 a) Overall Performance Assessment.................................................................................52 b) Pre-‐crisis planning...............................................................................................................53 c) Crisis..........................................................................................................................................54 d) Post-‐Crisis: Key Learnings from TMI Nuclear Crisis.............................................63 iii. Comparison of Fukushima 2011 and TMI 1979..........................................................65 a) Communication Environment........................................................................................65 b) Pre-‐crisis planning...............................................................................................................69 v c) Communication strategies/ tactics..............................................................................71 d) Communication Effects......................................................................................................75 Conclusions..............................................................................................................78 Bibliography.............................................................................................................84 vi List of Tables Table 1: Rating of TEPCO’s PR Tactics………………………………………………………………..36 Table 2: Rating of Japanese Government’s PR Tactics…………………………………………48 vii List of Figures Figure 1: TEPCO’s Twitter accounts…………………………………………………………………….29 Figure 2: Assessment of TEPCO’s Communication Activity…………………………………...38 Figure 3: Assessment of The Japanese Government’s Communication Activity……...50 viii Abstract This paper examines the crisis management of two prominent nuclear crises – 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Crisis in Japan and 1979 Three Mile Island Nuclear Crisis in the United States. More specifically, it chronicles how the two crises unfolded and analyzes the crisis management efforts using the Strategic Planning Model. The purpose of this study is to substantiate basic rules and complete the best practices for crisis communication today, by comparing crisis management in the two cases. The whole process of crisis communication is divided into three phases – pre-‐crisis planning, crisis, and post-‐crisis key learnings. Another aim is to study the differences in best practices of crisis communication between these two nuclear calamities. Different communication environment and utilization of social media in crisis communication are highlighted. The key issues discussed in this paper include analysis and comparison of risk assessment, crisis management plans (CMP), crisis management teams (CMT), communication strategies and tactics, communication effects, and post-‐crisis key learnings in the two cases. The principal conclusion is that the basic rules of crisis communication, “ACT FAST,” hold true in contemporary nuclear crisis communication. At the same time, the utilization of social media should be properly incorporated into the whole crisis communication plan. The best practices, “ACT FAST”, actually also mean that crisis communication should act fast according to the changes of communication technologies, tools, trends, etc, and optimize the communication resources and strategies. 1 Introduction i. Crisis and Crisis Management “A Crisis is the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes.” (Coombs, 2007: 2-‐3) In the first place, crisis is one or a series of unpredictable events. But a crisis can still be expected. The problem is that it is unknown when the crisis will take place. Thus, it is necessary to anticipate and prepare for crises in advance. Secondly, the severity of the crisis differentiates it from other incidents. It means that the crisis impacts the entire organization, and the failure to handle the crisis well will hamper the whole organization’s operations. Thirdly, a crisis is related to stakeholders’ perception of an organization. A stakeholder is a person or group that is affected by or can affect an organization. (Bryson, 2004: 21-‐52) Thus, an organization should carefully assess stakeholders’ perceptions to detect and mitigate any crisis in advance. Fourthly, crises tend to cause undesirable outcomes. The negative outcomes can be more than financial or property losses. They can also include injuries and fatalities, damage on reputation, etc. The damage might affect a variety of stakeholders. In addition, a crisis of one industry player might impact other players in the whole industry, within a single nation or even around the globe. “Crisis management represents a set of factors designed to combat crises and to lessen the actual damage inflicted. Put another way, crisis management seeks to 2 prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the organization, stakeholders, and industry from harm.” (Coombs, 2007: 5) Crisis management can be divided into three phases: pre-‐crisis, crisis, and post-‐crisis. (Coombs, 2007) ii. The Importance of Crisis Management No organization is immune to crises, no matter how effective and efficient their operations are or how strong their financial performance has been. Although it’s unpredictable when the crises might happen, it is possible that they will happen someday sooner or later. If the organization can establish a crisis management plan and crisis management team in advance, managers can have a greater control of the crisis, and reduce the possibility of rumors or even chaos. Furthermore, the effectiveness with which an organization deals with crises can enhance stakeholders’ trust. If an organization keeps being negligent of risks, and fails to control a crisis or even causes larger catastrophes, it will become more and more difficult for the managers to win public trust and tame crises in the future. In addition, the rapid development of communication technologies places an increased significance on crisis management nowadays. In the first place, with the help of the Internet, sensitive—especially negative—issues are spread rapidly online. It is almost impossible for an organization to cover up its troubles or mistakes because its actions (or inactions) have become so visible to its stakeholders. It also has become much easier for angry customers or other activist 3 groups to rally online and organize demonstrations or boycotts. Thirdly, people’s expectations for faster communication require quicker responses from the organization in a crisis. Lastly, crises today tend to have widespread impact within this global village. An international company’s crisis in one country might influence its reputation – and operations -‐ around the world. iii. Best Practices of Crisis Management a) Stage One: Pre-crisis 1. Risk Management An organization avoids crises by detecting warning signs and taking actions on them to reduce the risk factors. The cost of conducting risk management for an organization is likely to be much less than that of handling a real crisis. And in some cases, the organization may be wholly unable to recover from a massive crisis. Furthermore, the risk identification and risk assessment processes will provide vital information for detecting internal management flaws. Thus, the organization can revise its management methods and procedures to better fit the current operational environment. 2. Crisis Preparation A. Crisis Management Team (CMT) A crisis management team is a group of people from different functional areas of an organization to tackle possible crises that may hurt the organization, its stakeholders, or the general public. They are mainly responsible for drafting, testing, 4 reviewing, enacting, and revising the crisis management plans of an organization. Moreover, they take a leading role in the response to a crisis, even if the situation in a crisis is not covered by the existing crisis management plan. Members of a crisis management team should be selected from different fields within an organization, such as production, sales, customer service, communication, legal, finance, security, human resources, administration, etc. They bring knowledge, skills and perspectives from different departments of an organization. Their diversified background is vital for the team, since a crisis usually involves various functions of an organization. This group of people should also be well trained to function as a team and make group decisions promptly and appropriately. B. Crisis Management Plan (CMP) The crisis management plan should be well structured and include all of the information needed to tackle a crisis. It should also be concise and workable; otherwise, it may be difficult for crisis managers to follow when a quick and effective response is needed. Merely having a crisis management plan in place is far from enough. The crisis management plan should be tested with drills and simulation again and again over time. Then, after a certain crisis, the organization should assess the plan’s effectiveness and the team’s performance, and then make any necessary revisions. In the 2011 Crisis Management Survey conducted by Phillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman’s Crisis Management Team and Levick Strategic Communications, 60 5 percent of the participating companies said they had a crisis plan in place, but only 29 percent felt confident that their organization would respond effectively in a real crisis. One possible reason: among the companies that have a crisis plan, 63 percent reported that they do not conduct annual training drills to test the effectiveness of the plan. C. Crisis Communication System A spokesperson – especially one trained in media relations -‐ is crucial in the whole process of crisis management. Organizations need a spokesperson of high credibility and authority to disseminate information accurately to its target audiences in order to gain stability in a crisis. The crisis communication system also includes the risk detection system, crisis communication center, and online communication platform. b) Stage Two: Crisis 1. Basic rules – “A.C.T. F.A.S.T.”  Apologize appropriately and be sympathetic to the victims. If the crisis managers fail to be sympathetic with the victims, apologize promptly and shoulder responsibility bravely, it will be significantly more difficult for them to convince stakeholders that the organization is credible and responsible later.  Collect information about the stakeholders’ specific concerns. Situations are rapidly changing during a crisis. The managers should listen to the stakeholders and get to know their thoughts and expectations. 6  Tell the truth, and tell it as quickly as possible. It’s better to convey messages to stakeholders in a quick manner than to leave room for speculation or rumors.  Flow of information should be effectively managed. Managers should convey proper and specific messages to relevant stakeholders and monitor the flow of information to detect potential sources for confusion.  Assess the effectiveness of previous tactics and make adjustments on future communication methods. Constant assessment can help the managers avoid inappropriate steps in the fast-‐changing situation.  Safety and health of the public should be regarded as top priority in the efforts of crisis management.  Training for the spokespersons is crucial for the organization’s public image. Media training is indispensable for managing media relations before and during a crisis. As the organization’s representatives, spokespersons should grasp the right information before they speak and convey the messages strategically. c) Stage Three: Post-crisis After the crisis, it is crucial for the organization to evaluate the severity of the crisis, the crisis management team’s overall performance, and how the crisis management plan was implemented. Managers need to adapt and revise the plan to 7 keep it up to date. Internal management flaws detected in the crisis should be corrected. Additionally, it is necessary to continue monitoring relevant issues to make sure that the crisis is really over. Follow-‐up communication with all the stakeholders can benefit an organization by ending all the troubles, which otherwise may grow into big risks. (Coombs, 2007) 8 Chapter One: Nuclear Crisis: Fukushima 2011 and TMI 1979 i. What happened in Fukushima 2011? Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant locates on a 3.5-‐square-‐kilometre site in the Futaba District of Fukushima Prefecture, Japan. First commissioned in 1971, the plant consists of six reactors. General Electric (GE) originally designed the reactors. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) owned and maintained the plant at that time. Before the crisis, TEPCO is the largest power utility in Japan and even Asia, serving about one third of Japan’s electrical needs under normal circumstances. It covers Tokyo and some regions with most population in Japan.  On March 11, 2011, at 2:46pm, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, followed by a tsunami, hit the plant. The double catastrophes wiped out the normal power supply and backup generators of nearly all the plant's six reactors and also damaged infrastructure and communication channels through which the plant could seek external help. (“Timeline” 2011)  At 4:00pm, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of Japan established an emergency headquarters in Tokyo to gather information. At 7:30pm, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan declared a nuclear emergency. The government established the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters and the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. (Japanese government, 2011) The government also announced it had not detected any radioactive leaks. At 9:00pm, the 9 government issued an evacuation order within a radius of three kilometers. (“Timeline,” 2011)  On March 12, the core of Reactor 1 completely melted and fell to the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel, which was unknown at that time. At 7:00pm, TEPCO engineers decided to inject seawater into the reactors by using fire trucks. Then, the situation deteriorated further when a hydrogen explosion and fires took place at multiple reactors. (“Reactor core status,” 2011)  On March 20, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano declared that the heavily damaged nuclear reactors would be decommissioned after the crisis was over. (Tabuchi, “Japan extended reactors’ life,” 2011)  On March 30, water in the basements of the building next to the reactor buildings and also in an underground tunnel outside the buildings were detected to contain high levels of radioactivity. It caused delays for restoring the cooling system. (“Water Leaks,” 2011)  On April 2, TEPCO discovered that contaminated water was flowing into the sea from a crack. Workers’ efforts to plug the leak failed. (Belson & Tabuchi, “Japan Struggles to Plug Leak,” 2011) TEPCO also confirmed the first deaths at the Fukushima nuclear plant. (Makinen & Hall, “Two Workers' Bodies,” 2011)  On April 4, despite strong protests from the South Korean government, Russian scientists, and Japanese fishermen, the Japanese government 10 ordered the release of contaminated water into the Pacific Ocean. (“Japan Insists Discharge,” 2011) TEPCO began to inject nitrogen into Unit 1 to reduce the possibility of hydrogen explosion. (Makinen & Hall, “Japanese Nuclear Plant,” 2011)  On April 12, Japan raised the Fukushima crisis to INES Level 7, which is the same as the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster. (Strickland, 2011)  On April, 18, two remote–control robots entered Units 1 and 3 and measured temperature, pressure, and radioactivity levels inside the units. TEPCO officials said that the robots were quite limited people are needed to finally enter the buildings.” (Guizzo, 2011)  On April 22, TEPCO president apologized in Fukushima Prefecture. (“TEPCO President Apologizes,” 2011)  On May 20, it was reported that TEPCO experienced the largest financial losses in the company’s history. Then, TEPCO President Masataka Shimizu resigned. (Telegraph, 2011)  On June 3, the first case since the accident at the plant was confirmed where radiation levels in humans exceeded the exposure limit set by the government for emergency workers. (“Editorial: It Is Essential,” 2011)  On August 10, new cooling system was completely installed for all damaged reactors. Previously, giant pump trucks were used to inject water and cool the reactors. (JAIF, Earthquake Report No. 102, 2011) 11  On Sept. 16, research indicated that the meltdown of Reactor 2 could have been avoided if water was injected to cool the Reactor four hours earlier than had been done. (JAIF, Earthquake Report No. 170, 2011)  On Oct. 31, a study by the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety revealed that the Fukushima nuclear disaster resulted in the largest release of radioactive material into the ocean in history. The amount of radioactive cesium that leaked was 20 times the level previously estimated by TEPCO. (Thomas, 2011)  On Nov. 1, TEPCO reported the completion of a cover for the Unit 1 and incorporated a built-‐in ventilation system to filter radioactive material. (Amorphousnews, 2011)  On Nov. 29, TEPCO claimed that there had been no explosion at Reactor 2 on March 15, contrary to previous reports. Instead, the explosion occurred at Reactor 4. However, TEPCO had no explanation for the observed rise in radioactive emissions from Reactor 2 at that time. (JAIF, Earthquake Report No. 276, 2011)  On Dec. 15, a long-‐term timetable for decommissioning the Fukushima reactors was announced. It will take 40 years to fulfill the whole process. (JAIF, Earthquake Report No. 291, 2011)  On Dec. 16, according to a joint statement by TEPCO and the Japanese government, the reactors have achieved a state of cold shutdown. On Dec. 20, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Gregory Jaczko 12 visited Japan and confirmed that the Daiichi reactors were indeed stable. (Nagata, 2011) ii. What happened in Three Mile Island (TMI) 1979? The Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Generating Station power plant was located in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, United States. The plant has two separate units, known as TMI – 1 and TMI – 2. It was owned and maintained by Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed) and its parent company General Public Utilities (GPU). (Walker, 2004)  On March 28, 1979, a nuclear accident took place in TMI -‐ Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island Generating Station in Pennsylvania, the United States. (Walker, 2004: 71)  At 4:00am on March 28, 1979, a partial core meltdown takes place in Unit 2 as a result of mechanical and operational failures. At 6:22am, the operators realized that the power-‐operated relief valve was stuck open, and they closed a backup valve. By 6:55am, a site emergency had been declared. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 21-‐15)  At 7am, a team assembled at the site to provide assistance. The TMI personnel had notified the Pennsylvania Management Agency (PEMA), the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Radiological Assistance Plan Office. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 22-‐32) 13  By 7:24 am, the site emergency was adjusted to a general site emergency. But the radiation levels were found to be extremely low. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 22-‐32)  By 10:00 am, the story had spread across the nation, with broadcasts on major radio networks. An investigation team was sent to Goldsboro, a community on the west bank of the Susquehanna River across from Three Mile Island. The team erroneously reported that radioactive iodine was detected in the community. Representatives of the Pennsylvania BRP announced this finding at a news conference. However, in the meanwhile, Met Ed declared that no off-‐site readings had been found. Discrepancies in information led to confusion and beginning of the press’s distrust in Met Ed. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 22-‐32)  By noon, Lt. Gov. William Scranton held a news conference to discuss the TMI situation. Due to slow information sharing, the lieutenant governor made erroneous statements about the accident. For example, Scranton indicated that dumping steam into the atmosphere was the cause of the radiation measured off-‐site and condemned Met Ed for doing so. However, it turned out that such statement was incorrect. (Walker, 2004: 80-‐100)  On March 19, a report from a helicopter monitoring airborne radiation levels was announced during an NRC meeting, but it was erroneously 14 assumed to represent a ground-‐level recording. The NRC thus mistakenly recommended that state officials order an evacuation within 10 miles of the plant. As a result, more than 3,500 pregnant women and preschool-‐aged children left the area. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 22-‐ 32)  Meanwhile, due to media exaggeration about the “hydrogen bubble” inside the plant, the public went into fear of an ungrounded hydrogen explosion. (Walker, 2004: 165)  On April 1, President Jimmy Carter and his wife arrived at TMI nuclear plant and took a tour of the plant with plant and state government officials. It was sharp contrast with what happened with Japan, where the TEPCO CEO appeared in public almost one month since the accident. (Walker, 2004: 152-‐173)  On April 4, the reactor was stabilized. The accident was over. (Walker, 2004: 152-‐173)  On April 27, cold shutdown was achieved at Unit 2. (Walker, 2004: 152-‐ 173) 15 Chapter Two: Analysis: Fukushima 2011 and TMI 1979 i. Crisis management of Fukushima 2011 a) Overall performance assessment Mr. Bill Imada, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the IW Group, a public relations and communications firm headquartered in Los Angeles, was in Tokyo as the triple disaster in Japan took place on March 11, 2011 and witnessed its early stages. Overall, the “Japanese government and the nuclear plant operator, TEPCO, did a very poor job with the crisis and failed to fully understand the severity of the situation,” said Imada, a crisis management expert. On a scale of 0 to 10 — with 0 a complete failure and 10 a complete success — Imada gave the Japanese crisis managers a 1. Four reasons account for such a low score, Imada said. Firstly, the Japanese government failed to act quickly. Early on, they passively waited for TEPCO to give them information about the accident, and thus lost control over the messages that needed to be conveyed to the public. Secondly, the Japanese government was inexperienced in dealing with the media, including the foreign press. Thirdly, the Japanese government lacked coordination in their crisis management. They failed to carefully coordinate their messages with the plant operator, TEPCO. Discrepancies in the messages sent by the government and the company created public distrust in their credibility and ability to manage the crisis. Lastly, in the early stages, the 16 Japanese government refused to coordinate with its ally, the United States, which provided aid to Japanese earthquake and tsunami victims. Several factors in the Japanese political landscape hindered the crisis response, Imada said. In the first place, the ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), had little experience in governance. In addition, Japan had seven prime ministers from 2000 to 2011, weakening public confidence in the government. Furthermore, then-‐Prime Minister Naoto Kan had very low support rate in Japan. In terms of TEPCO’s performance, the biggest challenge for the plant operator was “the severity of the Fukushima nuclear accident,” Imada said. TEPCO, as well as the Japanese government, were apparently unprepared for the unprecedented nuclear accident, triggered by the massive earthquake and the tsunami that followed. The second challenge is the lack of “a clear and discernable crisis management plan.” The company should have planned for possible disasters in a nuclear plant, such as a total meltdown, natural or man-‐made disasters, etc. “Not having such a plan in place made them appear incompetent, uncaring and even deceitful,” Imada said. b) Pre-crisis planning Since the double natural disaster triggered an unprecedented nuclear crisis at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant on March 11, 2011, there is little evidence that TEPCO or the Japanese government has prepared any appropriate crisis management plans for such emergencies. It seemed that TEPCO and the government 17 had never given serious consideration to the risks posed by the plant’s location, design, and other factors. According to a 500-‐page interim report by a government-‐appointed investigative panel in Japan, Tokyo Electric has assumed that no wave would reach more than 20 feet, while the tsunami hit at more than twice that height. (Tabuchi, “Japan Panel,” 2011) TEPCO’s disaster-‐readiness plan only focused on small-‐scale accidents and includes no information about how to confront extensive damage, according to The Wall Street Journal. It also contained few guidelines for obtaining outside help. (Dvorak & Landers, 2011) However, Japan, where the word “tsunami” was born, should have thought about damage to the nuclear plant by such a possible natural disaster. Japan is prone to serious natural disasters and also heavily dependent on nuclear energy; it should have estimated a similar crisis scenario to the one experienced, according to the RSIS commentary 1 2011. Although it’s not likely to fully prepare for a serious nuclear accident, TEPCO should have prepared in advance for the unthinkable: a total meltdown of the nuclear reactors or a natural and/or man-‐made disaster around the plant, according to Bill Imada. What’s worse, Japan neglected early warning signs of safety problems and eventually caused the nuclear catastrophe. Japanese government regulators approved a 10-‐year extension for the oldest of the six reactors at Fukushima nuclear 1 RSIS Commentaries are publications of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, a graduate school of Nanyang Technological University. The RSIS Commentaries series serves as a platform for commentators on Asia who seek a global audience for opinions on issues that impact societies and states in the region and the world. Website: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/commentaries.html 18 plant just one month before the nuclear accident, despite warnings about its safety, according to The New York Times. TEPCO also admitted that there were inspection failures at the plant several weeks after the extension. (Tabuchi, Onishi, Belson, “Japan Extended Reactors’ Life,” 2011) Moreover, critics singled out the “Mark 1” nuclear reactor at the Fukushima plant for potential design problems over a period of nearly 40 years. (Zeller, 2011) Furthermore, TEPCO has a documented history of errors and cover-‐ups and a pattern of hiding the truth when things went wrong, according to CNN. (Fitzpatrick & Griffin, 2011) CNN quoted critics as saying that Japanese nuclear industry and the Japanese government did poorly in transparency and full disclosure of information. The critics also believed that TEPCO did not tell the entire truth of what’s been happening. Such a long history of covering up problems, manipulating data, and collusion with the government regulators eroded the company’s credibility and reputation. In addition, critics argue that the government shares blame with the regulatory agency, which is dependent on the government, for not heeding warnings and not ensuring the independent oversight of the nuclear industry oversight while encouraging the expansion of nuclear energy. (Kaufmann, 2011) Gil Alexander, Senior Communications Project Manager at Southern California Edison, which operates the San Onofre nuclear power plant on the Orange County coast, described pre-‐crisis planning in this way: “Rule #1 for all crisis communications is that the resource most needed during a crisis – mutual trust with 19 one’s key publics -‐ cannot be created during a crisis.” According to him, the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station of Southern California Edison became the target of the U.S. media after the Fukushima nuclear accident. The reason is that this nuclear plant was one of very few U.S. nuclear plants located in an earthquake zone and easily subject to tsunami threats. Alexander said that the most important communication strategy for his company was attempting to build trusting relationships with stakeholders prior to the crisis. Obviously, this is exactly what TEPCO has been lack of. c) Crisis Key stakeholders A. Employees (especially on-‐site workers) Starting on the third day of the Fukushima crisis, many plant workers fell ill from radioactive exposure. But a group of brave workers, originally known as “Fukushima 50,” kept struggling on site to prevent the reactors from full meltdown by pumping seawater into the ailing reactors, or operating valves inside the plant. They were considered heroes and won attention from media around the globe. However, how TEPCO dealt with the workers has aroused public anger. By the end of 2011, three workers have died. TEPCO claimed that their deaths were unrelated to their work at the plant and refused to disclose the cause of the third man’s death. (Hayashi, 2011) Moreover, radiation exposure amounts and the results of regular medical exams are supposed to be stated clearly on each worker’s radiation management record, but some workers said that their data were not 20 accurately recorded, or even intentionally left unrecorded by the plant managers to shirk responsibility. (“Journalists Keep Close Eye,” 2011) B. Local residents/evacuees Since the start of this crisis, local residents in Fukushima Prefecture and the neighboring areas, especially the evacuees, were angry with TEPCO and greatly distrusted the company, because of its slow and confusing responses. Later, the people’s confidence in TEPCO and the Japanese government’s credibility was eroded even further as information emerged from foreign agencies that conflicted with official TEPCO and Japanese statements about the crisis. Such great erosion began with the Japanese government’s problematic radiation data and evacuation order. A March 16, 2011 article in The New York Times indicated that the Japanese government might be withholding radiation information. It also reported that U.S. officials recommended a much larger evacuation area than the Japanese government did. The Japanese nuclear regulators also refused to acknowledge meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi reactors for three months in the beginning. Moreover, they flip-‐flopped on permissible radiation levels, which caused further confusion and fears among the public. Immediately after that, almost 10,000 residents fled, partially due to the spreading distrust in the government and the plant, according to the Japanese broadcasting agency NHK. (Fackler, “Japan to Cancel Plan,” 2011) Then, in August, another article in The New York Times seriously condemned the Japanese government for refusing to disclose information. Bureaucrats in Tokyo 21 withheld information about radiation forecasts to downplay the scope of the accident. The mayor of Namie, Tamotsu Baba, said that withholding information was akin to “murder.” In response, Goshi Hosono, the minister in charge of the nuclear crisis, said that they did not disclose the forecasts because the data was incomplete and inaccurate. But still, the public believed that the radiation forecasts were merely part of the many pieces of information that the authorities initially withheld from the public. Although the head of the company and other higher-‐ranking managers in TEPCO went to the Fukushima Prefecture and apologized to the evacuees on April 22, 2011, they did not gain forgiveness. Without any transparency in communication, their apology was considered nothing more than an insincere publicity stunt. In June, The Asahi Shimbun, one of the most circulated national newspapers in Japan, and a research team led by Akira Imai, a professor at Fukushima University, jointly conducted an interview survey of 407 evacuees from the accident. Seventy percent were opposed to the use of nuclear energy, while 26 percent were in favor of it. A total of 80 percent of respondents thought the government’s response was either totally inappropriate or somewhat inappropriate C. Nuclear Industry The severity of this nuclear accident greatly affected the whole nuclear energy industry and its image internationally. Broader public opinion polls have revealed a gradual and clear movement toward anti-‐nuclear sentiment. Polls conducted by 22 Japan’s Kyodo News Agency in July show that roughly 70 percent of Japanese respondents favored ending their country’s use of nuclear power. Stock prices of many energy companies depending on nuclear sources dropped, while renewable energy companies have increased dramatically in value. (Swann, 2011) Within Japan, other nuclear companies dispatched plant workers to the ailing reactors to help fix the problems. Internationally, IAEA started to offer help to Japan early in the crisis. There is little evidence pertaining to TEPCO’s efforts to coordinate directly with the nuclear energy industry at home and abroad. But obviously it’s a fairly important part for TEPCO to seek help and contribute to the whole industry by sharing important information about the nuclear reactors meltdown and prevention methods. D. Shareholders Tokyo Electric had about 933,000 shareholders at the end of March 2011. After the nuclear accident, Tokyo Electric shares experienced a great plunge of more than 80 percent. What’s worse, the company faced a huge compensation bill. Compensation was expected to be ¥3 trillion to ¥4 trillion ($39 million to $52 million). (“Compensation,” 2011) Many Tokyo Electric shareholders allied to demonstrate their opposition to the use of nuclear power after the Fukushima nuclear accident took place. More than 400 TEPCO shareholders asked the company to withdraw from nuclear power generation at the annual general meeting in June. The request was rejected, as 23 similar proposals were in the last two decades. With institutional investors and some individual investors on their side, TEPCO struck with its plan. Company executives argued that nuclear energy was indispensable for a stable supply of electricity and as a measure to deal with global warming. (Tabuchi, “TEPCO Stops Shareholders,” 2011) E. Other Industries As a result of the nuclear accident, other industries were affected, including food, farming, marine life, retail, electrical generation, tourism, cargo shipping and global car manufacturing. People in and outside Japan were concerned about radioactive contamination. Many stakeholders in these industries thought they were not treated fairly. On April 26, about 400 farmers protested outside TEPCO’s head office in Tokyo’s Chiyoda Ward, shouting slogans like “Return the safe farmland” and “TEPCO must pay for all damage.” TEPCO’s responses to their protests did not satisfy the protestors at all. The company stated that it only committed itself to paying compensation in line with the recommendations of the government-‐assigned panel. The Japanese government is planning to call on TEPCO to provide provisional compensation to farmers, fishermen and individual business operators. F. Other Nations If the Fukushima nuclear accident could not be handled properly, countries near Japan are likely to suffer from radiation problems. China and South Korea have 24 been keeping a close eye on radioactive contamination during the seawater pumping at the Fukushima nuclear plant. Other countries such as the United States, Russia, and India as well as many European countries have also been paying close attention to this massive nuclear accident. Especially, the United States offered help to the Japanese government immediately after the accident took place. Then, it kept monitoring the radiation levels in and around the plant during the crisis. In addition, the nuclear experts in the States also gave many recommendations to Japan with regard to issues like the evacuation area. Under such circumstances, the Japanese government disappointed the rest of the world, including its ally, the United States, with a weak response and much confusion. According to The New York Times, the Japanese government hedged when asked about the American recommendations of a larger evacuation zone, simply answering that they were not sure about the situation inside the reactors because they could not get into the plant. (Onishi, “Japan Offers Little Response,” 2011) G. Anti-‐Nuclear Groups Anti-‐nuclear groups grasped this chance to advocate their views. Especially in Japan — a country that once was devastated by two atomic bombs — anti-‐nuclear groups have a relatively long history and great cohesion. So far, TEPCO and/or the government have made no obvious efforts directly targeting anti-‐nuclear groups. During TEPCO’s shareholder’ meeting in June, protesters, including several activists from the environmental group Greenpeace, held up a banner that called 25 TEPCO “the worst ever polluting company.” “You can change things, get TEPCO to dismantle their nuclear plants,” they told shareholders. (Ito, 2011) In August, Fukushima residents joined forces with anti-‐nuclear groups led by the Japan Congress Against A-‐ and H-‐Bombs to stage an assembly in the city of Fukushima, according to Tokyo Times. It was a kick-‐off activity for the nationwide summer campaign by anti-‐nuclear groups calling for the elimination of nuclear power in Japan. On Sept. 19, the mounting anger and fear culminated in a rally of tens of thousands of anti-‐nuclear protesters in Tokyo — the largest such gathering since the March 11 disaster. (“Thousands March,” 2011) Crisis Management Team It wasn’t until five days into the crisis that the government finally assembled a joint crisis management team consisting of TEPCO and government officials to assess unprocessed information about the situation. (RSIS Commentary, 2011) The team included: TEPCO  TEPCO’s former President Masataka Shimizu  TEPCO’s Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata  TEPCO Managing Director Toshio Nishizawa (He was promoted to company president in June after Shimizu resigned.) 26  TEPCO’s on-‐site manager Masao Yoshida  TEPCO spokesman Osamu Yokokura Japanese government  (Former) Prime Minister Naoto Kan  Goshi Hosono, Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s special adviser  Japan’s top government spokesman was Yukio Edano. Edano served as the public face of the Japanese government during the disaster and gave frequent televised briefings on the nuclear plant’s status. As a former chief cabinet secretary under Kan, he was considered to have a good understanding of nuclear issues.  In September, the new Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda named a former cabinet spokesman as the new spokesman for the nuclear crisis. And Edano was named trade minister, in charge of energy policy. (“Japan: Former Cabinet Spokesman,” 2011)  Industry Minister Banri Kaieda (He is also in charge of the compensation issue.)  Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) Hiroyuki Imari is a spokesman with the Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). 27 Communication Strategies In the early stages, communication became a crisis in itself due to TEPCO’s slow response, as well as the unclear, opaque and even conflicting information the company provided to the Japanese government and the general public. To avoid panic, the Japanese government first sought to handle the disaster within Japan by slowly reacting and downplaying the seriousness of the crisis. It declined help offered by other nations and refused to admit the growing rate of radiation or to expand the evacuation zone. (RSIS Commentary, 2011) Also, the Japanese government wanted to convince the public that it was trying everything it could to handle the problems, which merely further frightened the Japanese people when the situation deteriorated at the plant. Later, while the accident accelerated, Japan started to provide information to the international community, including the IAEA, and neighboring countries and regions. (“Report of Japanese Government to IAEA,” 2011) Tactics A. General tactics  News conferences The local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters held news conferences and released materials, including graphs and pictures to help non-‐specialists to 28 understand technical and specialized information about reactors and radiation status.  Inquiries NISA staff responded to inquiries from the general public around the clock. NISA provided information and answered inquiries from IAEA; briefed diplomats of countries and regions around the world in Tokyo; and facilitated communication with foreign media and citizens. Social media, both English and Japanese, was utilized by TEPCO to report and update the accident situation to the public. But the English Twitter account “TEPCO_English” basically announces general information about the utility company, such as forecasted max electricity, outlook of power supply-‐demand, etc. TEPCO’s official website explained the major function of different social media accounts as follow: 29 Figure 1: TEPCO’s Twitter accounts 2  Apology Japanese former Prime Minister Kan visited Fukushima to apologize over the no-‐go zone. (“Kan Visited Fukushima to Apologize,” 2011) 2 TEPCO Website: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/twitter/index-‐e.html 30 B. Special Communication Activities This thesis project includes a content analysis and evaluation of the major public relations tactics that TEPCO and the Japanese government employed. The content analysis examined Japanese media coverage, including The Asahi Shimbun. U.S. and Chinese media coverage, including The New York Times and The China Daily, was also examined to gauge international reaction to Japan’s nuclear crisis management. The time frame is from March 11, 2011 to Dec. 31, 2011. Japanese media coverage about the crisis is examined around every major tactic respectively by the Japanese government and the nuclear plant operator, TEPCO, in order to reflect the effectiveness of every major tactic. The US and Chinese media coverage is also examined around the major tactics of Fukushima nuclear crisis management, especially in terms of international reaction to Japan’s nuclear crisis management. In each relevant article, sentiment toward TEPCO and the Japanese government was respectively assessed and rated as “highly positive,” “positive,” “relatively positive,” “neutral,” “relatively negative,” “negative,” and “highly negative.” TEPCO’s PR Activities A search of “Fukushima nuclear TEPCO” on Asahi.com, the official website of The Asahi Shimbun generated 312 results. Checking the titles and leads of each news reports identifies relevant reports about TEPCO’s major communication tactics. The same method is used in searches on NYTimes.com and Chinadaily.com.  At 3:42 p.m., on March 11, 2011, 56 minutes after the Great East Japan Earthquake struck, TEPCO declared a “Nuclear Emergency Situation” for 31 Units 1 and 2. (TEPCO news release, 2011) Asahi.com, the online Asahi Shimbun, reported about the emergency declaration and other measures taken by TEPCO, and indicated no signs of public sentiments. This can be counted as “neutral.”  On March 15, 2011, an “integrated headquarters” was established in Tokyo to deal with the nuclear accident. But the government, the plant’s operator TEPCO, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) were holding separate news conferences at that time. Repetitive and incoherent information from all these organizations aroused criticism and distrust. (“Authorities Try,” 2011) This effort can only be counted as “negative.”  On March 16, 2011, TEPCO offered a typically opaque and understated explanation when an explosion took place at one of the stricken reactors. Foreign nuclear experts, the Japanese press and the Japanese public were angry with the government and the plant operator’s failure to clearly and promptly communicate about the crisis. The Japanese government was criticized because it relied too much on TEPCO for information at the early stage of the crisis. (Tabuchi, Onishi, Belson, “Dearth of Candor,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.”  On March 17, 2011, TEPCO created a Twitter account “@TEPCO_Nuclear,” updating on the situation at the Fukushima nuclear plant according to Mashable. (Banks, 2011) The tweets were only in 32 Japanese, which held back many people outside Japan from getting the newest information abut the calamity. Nevertheless, this account got 190,000 followers in less than a day. This slow reaction on the social media site turned out to be less effective to meet the enormous demand of the public. This is counted as “Relatively negative.”  On April 13, 2011, TEPCO's president visited Fukushima to meet the governor. But his request for a meeting was turned down, and the president went back to Tokyo after apologizing before reporters. He has yet to apologize to residents who were told to evacuate because of leaking radioactivity. (“VOX POPULI: TEPCO,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.”  On April 17, 2011, TEPCO announced a road map to totally end the nuclear crisis, aiming to reach a cold shutdown of the reactors in six months. This is the most detailed timetable since the accident took place. But the chairman stated no guarantee of the schedule. The reporters also pointed out many risks in the process. (Belson & Myers, 2011) This is counted as “neutral.”  On April 17, 2011, TEPCO announced that its chairman or president would step down. But details about the resignation are unknown. (“TEPCO Chairman,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively negative.”  On April 22, 2011, TEPCO President Masataka Shimizu and other high-‐ level managers got down on their knees, apologizing to the evacuees in 33 an evacuation center. Shimizu also apologized in person to Fukushima’s local governor, Yuhei Sato. (“Japan earmarks,” 2011) The evacuees did not forgive him merely because of his apology, and they demanded quicker solutions to the problems, and thus, this is counted as “relatively negative.”  On April 25, 2011, all of the major organizations related to this nuclear accident held a joint news conference. The purpose of this move is to increase the transparency of information, according to Goshi Hosono, Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s special adviser. This motivation was appreciated but a concern was raised that this action might weaken NISA’s supervisory role. (“Authorities Try,” 2011) This move is counted as “relatively positive.”  On May 20, 2011, TEPCO Managing Director Toshio Nishizawa, who would soon be promoted to company president, said in a news conference that he was determined to end the crisis quickly and efficiently. The current TEPCO president and other officials, together with an executive with government’s Agency for Natural Resources and Energy all expressed confidence in Nishizawa. (“Incoming TEPCO President,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively positive.”  On May 26, 2011, TEPCO’s credibility was at risk again when it was reported that the head of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant continued pumping in seawater regardless of supervisor’s order to stop. 34 TEPCO’s weak internal communication was thus identified. (Onishi & Fackler, “In Nuclear Crisis,” 2011) Although some nuclear experts thought that this action of continuing pumping seawater might be correct, this case is counted as “highly negative” in the perspective of crisis communication.  On June 29, 2011, TEPCO stopped shareholders’ efforts to entirely end nuclear programs. Many shareholders acted furiously at the shareholders’ meeting. The shareholders’ demands mirrored a growing anti-‐nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public. (Tabuchi, “TEPCO Quells Push,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.”  On July 19, 2011, the Japanese government and TEPCO announced that they had largely achieved their first-‐stage goals of stabilizing the nuclear plant. However, this precarious system was thought to barely cool the reactors and many doubts were raised about the credibility of this “announcement of success.” (“TEPCO: 1 st -‐stage goals,” 2011) This is counted as “neutral.”  On Aug. 1, 2011, TEPCO announced the compensation framework for Fukushima nuclear disaster, which is based on recommendations from a government-‐appointed panel. (“TEPCO Announces,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively positive.”  On Sept. 20, 2011, TEPCO planed to cut corporate pension payouts to its employees and eliminate thousands of jobs to generate funds to 35 compensate the victims. But observers noted that the underlying reasons for these moves were a government bailout as well as TEPCO’s planned hike in electricity rates. Both the bailout and the price hike were viewed as asking the general residents to pay for the nuclear accident. In addition, implementing this plan was expected to be hard, based on other companies’ experiences in crises. (“TEPCO to Cut,” 2011) This is counted as “negative.”  On Oct. 18, 2011, TEPCO refused to pay out for burglaries in the evacuation zone due to Fukushima nuclear crisis. Critics argued that TEPCO should also pay for indirect losses related to the nuclear accident. (“TEPCO Refusing,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.”  On Dec. 28, 2011, TEPCO said that it would raise $2.4 billion through asset sales in an attempt to compensate victims in the nuclear crisis. The government wanted to keep the company afloat so that it can not only compensate the victims, but also continue to supply electricity to the nation. (Tabuchi, “With Asset Sale,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively positive.” The following table (Table 1) summarizes the aforementioned ratings. In this table each rating is calculated as a percentage: “highly positive” is counted as 95 percent; “positive,” 80 percent; “relatively positive,” 65 percent; “neutral,” 50 36 percent; “relatively negative,” 35 percent; “negative,” 20 percent; and “highly negative,” 5 percent. Table 1: Rating of TEPCO’s PR Tactics Date Negative (%) Positive (%) 3/11/11 50 50 3/15/11 80 20 3/16/11 95 5 3/17/11 65 35 4/13/11 95 5 4/17/11 50 50 4/17/11 65 35 4/22/11 65 35 4/25/11 35 65 5/20/11 35 65 5/26/11 95 5 6/29/11 95 5 7/19/11 50 50 8/1/11 35 65 9/20/11 80 20 10/18/11 95 5 12/28/11 35 65 The following chart (Figure 2) was created according to this table above. The vertical axis stands for the effectiveness of a certain communication tactic. The 37 horizontal axis stands for different tactics at different time. The color of the two areas has different meanings – blue stands for negative; and red, positive. 38 Figure 2: Assessment of TEPCO’s Communication Activity 39 Japanese Government’s PR Activities A search of “Fukushima nuclear government” on Asahi.com (online Asahi Shimbun) generated 736 results. Checking the titles and leads of each news reports identified relevant reports about the Japanese government’s major tactics. The same method is used in search on Nytimes.com and Chinadaily.com.  At 4:00 pm, on March 11, 2011, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of Japan established an emergency headquarters in Tokyo to gather information. (“Timeline,” 2011) Later, both Japanese and international media heavily criticized the government’s slow and ineffective response in the early stage of the crisis. This is counted as “highly negative.”  At 7:30 pm, on March 11, 2011, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano announced that Prime Minister Naoto Kan had declared a “nuclear emergency status.” The government also announced that no radioactive leaks had been detected. (“Timeline,” 2011) The report used words like “denied radioactive leaks.” In addition, the prime minister did not make the announcement himself, which weakened his leadership in the crisis management. This is counted as “negative.”  At 9:23pm, on March 11, 2011, the central government ordered an evacuation, requiring residents within a three-‐kilometer radius of the Daiichi Fukushima nuclear power plant to leave the region. According to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, no radiation leakage was detected. (“State of Emergency,” 2011) 40  The Japanese government continued to assure people that the radioactive materials would not cause a health hazard in the next five days. However, research by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) showed that the damage was much more serious than Tokyo had acknowledged. The NRC believed that the radiation levels were extremely high. They recommended a much larger evacuation zone. (Sanger, Wald, Tabuchi, 2011)  Responses from TEPCO and NISA mainly emphasized that they could not get inside the plant to check. The perfunctory statement damaged the Japanese government’s credibility in Japan and beyond. American officials said that their Japanese counterparts were unwilling to either communicate clearly about the severity of the accident or accept external help. At the end of March, organizations like the United Nations urged Japan to further expand the evacuation zone. (“Japan Nuclear Crisis,” 2011) This sequence of events as a whole was “highly negative.”  On March 15, 2011, an “integrated headquarters” was established in Tokyo to deal with the nuclear accident. But the government, the plant’s operator TEPCO, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) were holding separate news conferences at that time. Repetitive and incoherent information from all these organizations aroused criticism and distrust. (“Authorities try, ”2011) This effort can only be counted as “negative.” 41  On March 16, 2011, the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office launched an English Twitter account, “@JPN_PMO.” Since then, only 22 tweets contain words “Fukushima” or “nuclear” among all of its 892 tweets. On March 21, 2011, the Prime Minister’s Office opened an official Facebook account, “Prime Minister’s Office of Japan.” But both of the two accounts stated in the initial stage that they were mainly focusing on the quake-‐ related issues at that time. People demanding quick information about the nuclear crisis cannot get their answers here. The exploration into the social media arena can only be counted as “relatively negative” for communication of this nuclear crisis.  On March 21, 2011, the first daily meeting between Japanese and American officials to coordinate information and discuss responses was held at the Prime Minister’s office. The American side thought that their demands for more information improved Japan’s disaster management. (Onishi & Fackler, “In Nuclear Crisis,” 2011) This move was considered as progress in international cooperation and transparency. However, it was due to pressure from the American side that the Japanese government slowly took this action. This is counted as “relatively positive.”  On April 7, 2011, despite protests from abroad, the Japanese government said it was not in immediate violation of international law by discharging radioactive water into the sea from Fukushima Daiichi 42 nuclear power plant. (“Japanese Insist Discharge,” 2011) This statement is counted as “highly negative.”  On April 16, 2011, the Japanese government ordered TEPCO to pay an initial $12,000 for each household forced to evacuate. Many of the evacuees thought the amount was too little. The next day, TEPCO apologized for the nuclear disaster and explained details of the payments. But the compensation was still heavily criticized. (Bradsher & Pollack, 2011) This is counted as “relatively negative.”  On April 22, 2011, the Japanese government released the draft compensation plan, which indicated that taxpayers and other power firms would help pay TEPCO’s compensation bill. Some in the government were skeptical about the feasibility of the draft plan. (“Taxpayers,” 2011) This is counted as “negative.”  On April 25, 2011, all of the major organizations related to this nuclear accident held a joint news conference. The purpose of this move is to increase the transparency of information by means of a unified news conference, according to Goshi Hosono, Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s special adviser. Underlying motivation was appreciated but a concern was raised that this action might weaken NISA’s supervisory role. (“Authorities try,” 2011) This move is counted as “relatively positive.”  On May 10, 2011, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced that Japan was abandoning plans to build 14 new nuclear reactors. He said 43 that Japan would rethink its energy policy, focusing more on renewable energy. But The New York Times pointed out that Kan announced commitment to nuclear power merely a week before. His contradictory statements was most likely driven by public opinions at that time, especially when his position as prime minister was shaky. (Fackler, “Japan to Cancel Plan,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.”  On May 12, 2011, Japanese government announced a plan to help TEPCO compensate the victims. However, the plan was thought to lay the financial burden on consumers instead of the power company. Moreover, the plan did not solve problems for financial institutions that made loans to TEPCO. Questions were raised about fairness of this plan. (Tabuchi, “Japan Offers Help” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.”  On June 11, 2011, Japan’s nuclear safety officials reprimanded TEPCO because two workers were exposed to over twice the government limit of radiation. The officials ordered the plant operator to conduct an investigation and submit a report within one week, regarding causes of the case and new prevention measures at the plant. (“Fukushima Daiichi Plant,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively positive” for the government.  On June 12, 2011, the Japanese government protected independence of the investigative panel from the influence of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which oversees nuclear policy and plant operators. This panel was doing investigation into the nuclear accident 44 directly under order of the Japanese government. (Muramatsu, “METI Tried,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively positive.”  In late June 2011, a government agency, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of METI, opened a call for bids. The agency declared that they need a contractor to monitor blogs and tweets relevant to nuclear issues and radiation problems around the clock. Critics, including some Western reporters, condemned this move as attempt to censor online conversation about the nuclear crisis and eliminate unfavorable information for the government. (“Gov't Denies Online,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.”  On July 19, 2011, the Japanese government and TEPCO announced that they had largely achieved their first-‐stage goals of stabilizing the nuclear plant. However, this precarious system was thought to barely cool the reactors and many doubts were raised about the credibility of this “announcement of success.” (“TEPCO: 1 st -‐stage goals,” 2011) This is counted as “neutral.”  On July 19, 2011, Japanese officials published the first detailed timeline for decommissioning the crippled reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. A previous official plan published in April was criticized for its vagueness. The new plan was more specific, but it still did not provide exact dates for when to lift the evacuation orders. 45 (“Government Reveals Timeline,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively positive.”  On Sept. 17, 2011, it was reported that many Japanese people considered the “provisional” permissible radiation standards set by the Japanese government vague and unconvincing. Consumer affairs experts said that the state had not made sufficient efforts to disclose information on safety levels of radiation. (“Distrust of Government Standards,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative” for the Japanese government’s performance in communicating about food safety standards.  On Sept. 23, 2011, the credibility of a government panel was challenged, because it was revealed that two members of the panel accepted money per month from a research institute that has close ties to TEPCO. This panel was responsible for setting the compensation guidelines for Fukushima nuclear disaster. In response, both of the two members returned their monthly salary for the period from April to June. However, at that time the close ties of research departments with utility companies were revealed, and the credibility of the panel was tarnished. (“Panel’s Impartiality Questioned,” 2011) This is obviously counted as “highly negative.”  On Sept. 26, 2011, an article in The Asahi Shimbun slammed the new Prime Minister Noda’s contradictory opinions on the nation’s future energy policy. It was pointed out that Noda had only been in the position 46 for two weeks but his stance on this issue changed to the opposite side. (“Noda’s Flip-‐flop,” 2011) Obviously, this is counted as “highly negative.”  On Oct. 17, 2011, the Japanese government revised the roadmap, aiming at a cold shutdown by the end of 2011. The central government emphasized that the confirmation of a cold shutdown would depend on opinions of the NISA and experts outside Japan. This decision is an attempt to improve transparency. (“Revised Road Map,” 2011) This is counted as “relatively positive.”  On Oct. 27, 2011, the Japanese government reportedly ignored the advice from the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, which urged Tokyo to distribute iodine tablets to residents in the stricken areas. (“Tokyo Ignored Calls,” 2011) The refusal to listen to the public is obviously counted as “highly negative.”  On Dec. 16, 2011, Japanese Prime Minister declared Fukushima reactors stable. But even before this declaration, some experts had commented this announcement as premature. In their point of view, this cursory announcement was merely an attempt to appease public anger nationally and internationally. (“Japan’s Prime Minister,” 2011) This is counted as “highly negative.” The following table (Table 2) summarizes the aforementioned ratings. In this table each rating is calculated as a percentage: “highly positive” is counted as 95 47 percent; “positive,” 80 percent; “relatively positive,” 65 percent; “neutral,” 50 percent; “relatively negative,” 35 percent; “negative,” 20 percent; and “highly negative,” 5 percent. 48 Table 2: Rating of Japanese Government’s PR Tactics Date Negative(%) Positive(%) 3/11/11 95 5 3/11/11 80 20 3/11/11 95 5 3/15/11 95 5 3/21/11 35 65 4/7/11 95 5 4/16/11 65 35 4/22/11 80 20 4/25/11 35 65 5/10/11 95 5 5/12/11 95 5 6/11/11 35 65 6/12/11 35 65 7/19/11 50 50 7/19/11 35 65 9/17/11 95 5 9/23/11 95 5 9/26/11 95 5 10/17/11 35 65 10/27/11 95 5 12/16/11 95 5 49 The following chart (Figure 3) was created according to this table above. The vertical axis stands for the effectiveness of a certain communication tactic. The horizontal axis stands for different tactics at different time. The color of the two areas has different meanings – blue stands for negative; and red, positive. 50 Figure 3: Assessment of The Japanese Government’s Communication Activity 51 d) Post-Crisis: Key Learnings from Fukushima Nuclear Crisis It’s necessary and beneficial to evaluate the crisis communication after the safe shutdown of the nuclear reactors in Fukushima. Crisis managers can assess the effectiveness of communication strategies, tactics and channels that they utilized during the crisis. And then, the crisis management plans can be established or revised accordingly. Expected improvements on nuclear crisis communication are categorized as follow:  Establish efficient communication and assistance system for emergencies – The IAEA founded the Response Assistance Network (RANET), aiming to frame guidance and provide member countries with recommendations if necessary. Japanese government made commitment to contributing to development of this international organization, according to Japanese government’s report to the IAEA in June 2011. (“Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA,” 2011)  Strengthen information sharing in nuclear power industry worldwide – Japan has promised to communicate more with the international community. The information sharing in the nuclear power industry worldwide is necessary to ensure that other nuclear plant managers and the governments learn from previous accidents and the crisis communication cases. 52  Enhance communication with the public regarding nuclear issues – During the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis, Japan has become aware of the importance of making their messages more understandable for non-‐ specialists. Graphs and pictures were provided in the press release materials to help non-‐specialists more easily understand the technical and specialized information about reactors and radiation status. (“Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA,” 2011) ii. Crisis management of TMI 1979 a) Overall Performance Assessment First of all, the severity of the TMI nuclear crisis in 1979 is much less than that of the Fukushima crisis in 2011. The TMI case is rated as Level 5 on INES scale, which means, “limited release of radioactive material likely to require implementation of some planned countermeasures.” Fukushima accident is rated as Level 7 on INES scale, which is “major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.” (IAEA, “INES,” 1990) Then, the overall performance of crisis management in TMI 1979 case won relatively better appraisal due to its quicker response, stronger leadership and decisive centralization of information source, which are detailed in the following three sections – pre-‐crisis planning, crisis, and post-‐crisis. 53 b) Pre-crisis planning According to the “Staff Report to the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island,” (President’s Commission, “Staff Report,” 1980) there was an emergency operations plan for TMI Nuclear Generating Station in the event of a crisis. However, no effective communication plan was in place to disseminate information in an organized and effective way. As a result, the mess at the plant and managers’ slow and vague information brought about confusion in media coverage and ultimately generated distrust in the plant management group. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004) Before the nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island, the NRC had considered emergency planning, but it had never made the pre-‐crisis plan a regulation priority. In July 1979, NRC decided to enhance the regulations of the industry. It came up with the concept “emergency planning zone,” (Walker, 2004: 221) an area with a fifty-‐mile radius around the plant. The purpose of the zone is for state and local governments to make preparations for emergencies. Eventually, in August 1980, the NRC created a new rule requiring a well informed and well organized emergency plan in order to get a new license issued. (Walker, 2004: 209-‐222) In addition, the NRC and the plant designer, Babcock and Wilcox, failed to draw lessons from previous nuclear plant incidents when the Fukushima plant was first built. According to the Kemeny Commission report, they failed to collect the safety information and discuss the problems at the Davis-‐Besse reactor in Ohio in 1977. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 31) That case could have provided warnings to the 54 Fukushima nuclear plant, since it was quite similar to the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979. (Walker, 2004: 212) c) Crisis Key stakeholders A. Employees During the crisis, internal communication between TMI management and employees was inadequate. The management group did not discover the problems or grasp the severity of the situation in time. According to the Kemeny Commission, the management of GPU, Met Ed, and Babcock and Wilcox failed to grasp the severity of the situation in time. They failed to react promptly, due to their inability to collect enough information from employees in the front lines and make analysis accordingly. As a result, the plant designer and operator both suffered from severe lack of information about crucial safety issues. (Walker, 2004: 212) In addition, a utility company internal memorandum was leaked to the press before it was prepared for media release, which was a bad example of internal relations. (Walker, 2004) B. Local residents in the TMI area Local residents were assured by the fact that the radiation released from TMI nuclear station was so minuscule, that it did not threaten health. (Katz, 2011) There were no injuries or adverse effects from the accident except for the mental distress resulted from the nuclear crisis. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 60-‐75) 55 People around the stricken area were warned by the Pennsylvania Department of Health to avoid drinking any local milk that might be contaminated by iodine-‐131. The department carefully did testing and informed people about the results until the milk was finally safe. (Sandman, “IAEA Bulletin 47/2,” 2011) C. Nuclear Industry On the one side, nuclear industry was badly hit by the TMI nuclear accident. From 1979 to 2001, 71 nuclear plant construction plans were canceled in the United States, partially due to the TMI nuclear accident. American nuclear industry was heavily impacted. It suffered from plunge in public confidence, as well as government investigations after the accident. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 88-‐90) On the other side, this accident sounded the alarm bell for the nuclear industry, especially in terms of safety problems. On the 25 th anniversary of the TMI accident, Angelina Howard, an executive Vice President of the Nuclear Energy Institute said that the nuclear power industry has become more vigilant and experienced many positive changes. (Foulke, 2009) Since then, the industry established the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a self-‐regulatory body. This organization did make achievement in improving operator training, communication, management, and operations. NRC also implemented many changes related to nuclear power and security, including emergency planning, operator training, facility design, etc. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 88-‐90) 56 D. Other Industries Other industries such as agriculture, dairy production, fishing, boating and tourism were affected by the accident. The NRC and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources carried out monitoring on the safety of the water, food, and milk to ensure safety in certain areas. (Sandman, “IAEA Bulletin 47/2,” 2011) E. Anti-‐nuclear groups  Three Mile Island Alert (TMIA) was founded in 1977. It’s a citizens’ group criticizing the Three Mile Island nuclear accident and advocate other safe energy methods alternative to nuclear power. (Three Mile Island Alert)  On March 29, 1979, two famed and well-‐respected experts attended an anti-‐nuclear meeting – Nobel Laureate George Wald from Harvard, and Ernest J. Sternglass, a professor of radiology from the University of Pittsburgh. Sternglass harshly accused Met Ed and the governments of covering up the true severity of the radiation problems at the TMI plant. (Sandman, “At Three Mile Island,” 2000)  The Union of Concerned Scientists has become the leading watchdog for nuclear safety. It repeatedly challenged the utility companies about statements relevant to the radiation issues, and problems at nuclear plants. (“Founding Document”) 57 Crisis management team Once the site emergency and then the general emergency were declared, the response to the TMI nuclear accident exceeded the mere control of Met Ed. The crisis soon commanded more resources and expertise from local, state, and federal agencies. The following personnel from different organizations and positions made important decisions during the crisis. (Walker, 2004)  Emergency director at TMI: Gary Miller, the TMI station manager  Spokesman for Met Ed at the early stage of the accident: Jack Herbein, Met Ed’s vice president for generation. Although he was well trained and experienced in nuclear issues, he could not communicate well with government officials or reporters with little or no knowledge about nuclear power.  On March 31, Harold Denton of the NRC was assigned as the only spokesperson of the crisis, at the request of the White House.  Pennsylvania Gov. Richard L. Thornburgh  Pennsylvania Lt. Gov. William W. Scranton  The chairman of the NRC, Joseph M. Hendrie  PEMA Director, Oran K. Henderson  Director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection, Thomas Gerusky. He provided erroneous information about radiation to Scranton on March 28. 58  William E. Dornsife, is a staff member of the Bureau of Radiation Protection, Department of Environmental Resources. He was the only nuclear engineer hired by the state.  Two days after the accident, President Carter was reported about the detailed status at the plant. From 1952 to 1953, the president served as an officer in the nuclear submarine program of U.S. Navy, where he gained knowledge about nuclear issues and radiation hazards. Communication Strategies Organizations can centralize information sources to avoid confusion caused by discrepancies and conflicts in different news conferences and other information sources. The Pennsylvanian government adopted the centralized communication strategy by holding joint press conferences and conveying information with one consistent spokesman. This strategy can be simply described as “speak with one voice.” (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004) At the very beginning of the crisis, information about the accident was provided by Met Ed, Pennsylvania government offices, and the NRC offices respectively at different times. Information discrepancies and communication mistakes created distrust and confusion among the public and the crisis-‐related organizations themselves. On March 31, Harold Denton of the NRC was assigned as the sole spokesman of the crisis, at the White House’s direction. (Walker, 2004: 151-‐172) 59 Tactics Taken A. General tactics  News conferences Met Ed, the government and the NRC held news conferences and issued news releases frequently during the five days, but the news conferences and releases that came from different organizations contained conflicting information and caused confusion among the public.  Inquiries The nuclear plant operator and the NRC both answered inquiries from the media people and the public.  Apology The NRC chairman apologized for the NRC staff members erroneously recommending an unnecessary evacuation on March 30. (President’s Commission, 1980: 119) But the nuclear plant owners and operators who made mistakes at the plant never apologized. (Epstein) B. Special communication activities In the TMI 1979 case, the state government was in relatively greater control of the nuclear crisis management than any other organizations. It worked with Met Ed, the plant operator in the initial stage. Then after the state government got frustrated working with Met Ed, it turned to the NRC. State officials were disappointed with NRC’s handling of the crisis as well, and then tried to get other federal agencies involved. 60 Met Ed’s Major PR Activities  At 6:56 a.m. on March 28, 1979, a site emergency was declared; the NRC and the state of Pennsylvania were notified. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 26) About half an hour later, Gary Miller, the manager at TMI nuclear station, announced a general emergency. Miller arrived at the station at 7:05 a.m. and took the lead as emergency director. (Walker, 2004: 79)  At 8:30 a.m., Met Ed made an ambiguous statement about the accident, saying that they detected “no significant levels of radiation.” The next day, its parent company, GPU, complained about Met Ed’s misleading news release and made a new press release to give a more candid statement about the radiation and its impact. (Walker, 2004: 82-‐83)  On March 28, Met Ed’s spokesman Jack Herbein appeared at the site and left reporters there with a highly uncertain description of situation. Then he departed to meet the government officials in response to Scranton’s urgent request for information. But Herbein again left the officials an impression that he did not want to share information. After that, the government officials concluded that they could not regard Met Ed as a reliable source of information. (Walker, 2004: 86-‐87)  On March 29, 1979, Met Ed executives presented their views about the status at the plant and the risks the nuclear accident would cause on national TV programs, including NBC’s Today Show and ABC’s Good 61 Morning America, CBS Network News. They expressed confidence that the crisis would not impose a health hazard on people in the stricken area. (Walker, 2004: 102-‐104) Government’s Major PR Activities  At 7:36 a.m., Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) was notified about the general emergency. It immediately advised several government agencies about the necessity of an evacuation. Pennsylvania Gov. Richard L. Thornburgh assigned William W. Scranton, the lieutenant governor, to be responsible for collecting and reporting information about the nuclear accident. Scranton was informed of the accident details at 8:20 a.m. and scheduled a news conference for 10 a.m. (Walker, 2004: 86-‐95)  At noon, the press conference of the Pennsylvania state finally started. Due to slow information sharing process, Scranton made an erroneous statement about off-‐site radiation. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004:27)  Shortly unpleasant meeting with Herbein on March 28, Scranton held another news conference. He blamed Met Ed for hiding information and causing confusion among government officials and the new reporters. Then he decided to collaborate with the NRC. (Walker, 2004: 87)  NRC learnt about the accident shortly after Met Ed declared a general emergency. The NRC headquarters promptly activated the incident response center headquarters. Acting chairman Victor Gilinsky called 62 National Security Council staff, in preparation to inform President Carter at the White House. (Walker, 2004: 89-‐90) Later that morning President Carter was informed of the accident. Lacking clear information about the accident, NRC headquarters gave an incomplete situation summary at the plant.  At 5:15 p.m. on March 29, Gov. Thornburgh held his first news conference, assuring people in Pennsylvania that there was no potential health hazard. (Walker, 2004: 108) However, NRC officials arbitrarily asserted later in the meeting that the off-‐site danger had ended, which surprised Thornburgh and Scranton. Five hours later, the NRC officials got back to the governor with new measurements, which indicated that damage to the reactor core was far more severe than they had thought. Thus, the governor’s confidence in the NRC was highly diminished. (Walker, 2004: 108-‐109)  On March 30, the NRC erroneously recommended the state officials to order an evacuation of the residents within 10 miles of the plant. As a result, over 3,500 pregnant women and children left the area. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004:28-‐29)  On March 30, the White House became deeply involved in the nuclear crisis. President Carter sent NRC officials to the site and ordered the installation of a communication system to facilitate direct 63 communication between White House and the NRC’s incident response center. (Walker, 2004: 133-‐135)  On March 31, Harold Denton of the NRC was assigned as the sole spokesman of the TMI nuclear crisis, according to the request of the White House. (Walker, 2004: 160-‐163)  On April 1, 1979, President Jimmy Carter and his wife, accompanied by officials from Met Ed, the NRC and the state government, toured the TMI nuclear plant and visited the TMI-‐2 control room. After the visit, Carter held a joint news conference. His visit was reassuring to many and won acclaim from the local people. (Walker, 2004: 173-‐183) d) Post-Crisis: Key Learnings from TMI Nuclear Crisis During the post-‐crisis period of TMI nuclear accident, prominent improvements have been observed in the following aspects. These improvements are valuable lessons learnt from the TMI nuclear crisis communication. On the one hand, they can help prevent potential management risks in nuclear power plants. On the other hand, they can benefit the management of possible incidents, accidents or even crises in the future. In the first place, reporters are better trained in science and technology. Due to better sources and larger demand in the market, the news media started to regularly feature scientific and technological stories in depth. Then, two weeks after the accident, the chief executive officers in nuclear industry established a committee in order to develop their common goals and 64 coordinate among industry. The TMI crisis showed that a serious accident at one nuclear plan could impact the entire industry. The committee founded two organizations: the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a self-‐regulating body to improve information sharing, operator training, emergency response, and overall plant operation and management. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 87-‐90) After the accident, NRC members realized that the agency lacked knowledge, training, and preparation for the risks related to nuclear reactors, and started its own review of the crisis. The NRC instituted many positive changes about nuclear power and safety accordingly. All these changes have contributed to improved efficiency and safety records in nuclear power plants in the United States. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 89-‐90) Statistical indicators were utilized to measure these changes. For instance, “capacity factor,” which is a relative measure of the power generation, went up to 89% in 2001 from 50-‐60% in the 1970s for the entire American nuclear power industry. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 90) During the same period of time, the average number of unplanned reactor shutdown fell from 7.3 to 0 per plant per year. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 90) 65 iii. Comparison of Fukushima 2011 and TMI 1979 Communication is more convenient and faster nowadays with highly developed information technology. However, the severity of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, which involved multiple reactors as well as double natural disasters, overwhelmed the communication techniques and caused great confusion among audiences. The Fukushima nuclear accident also affected neighboring countries and regions, and ultimately the rest of the world, due to the radiation leakage resulting from dumping the contaminated water into the ocean. a) Communication Environment In 1979, communication tools were quite limited. It’s hard to imagine for people nowadays, but no major news networks existed at that time. CNN was founded one year after the accident. It depended on radio station, local TV station and newspapers to carry out news. Most people did not have access to computers, not to mention the Internet. News reporters could not search online for additional information, or verify facts instantly. In addition, media coverage of science and technologies was limited, since most of the news reporters did not have appropriate scientific and technological training or education. Since then, science and telecommunication technology has been developed rapidly. In 2011, people, including both news reporters and audiences, are getting more background knowledge to talk about scientific issues. Furthermore, many people now have access to the Internet. The audiences are no longer passive. They can search and verify the information they want, and also get self-‐educated about 66 certain scientific issues. With help of the multi-‐media content online, people can get to know a scientific issue more easily and quickly. More prominently, with all kinds of accessible communication platforms online, people now can exchange opinions about a certain issue anytime they want. Social media, for instance, the social networking sites Facebook and Twitter, is considered to have revolutionized communication recently. Social media, which are defined as “a group of Internet-‐based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user generated content,” (Kanplan & Haenlein, 2010: 59-‐68) exponentially speed up information sharing. Facebook had 845 million users by the end of 2011, (SEC, “S-‐1 Registration Statement,” 2011) which is more than twice the population of the United States. Twitter reported that the volume of tweets reached up to over 5,000 tweets per second after the 3-‐11 earthquake in Japan last year. (“Global Pulse,” 2012) At 11:45pm (EST) on May 1, 2011, President Obama announced the death of Osama Ben Laden. Sysomos, a social media analytics company, astonished the world with their findings about how fast the news spread via social media. Within 15 minutes, over 583,017 tweets, 796 mentions in blogs, and 1,751 postings in online forum were published. By 2am, it turned out to be over one million tweets, 6897 blog mentions, and 9416 forum postings. As a result, millions of people around the globe were interactively talking about this event via social media within ten hours since the announcement. (Levine, 2011) 67 According to a social media study by University of Texas at Austin in 2009, organizations need to respond quickly and in plain language when communicating to the public about safety issues during a crisis, otherwise the concerned audiences will actively seek and share information from other sources. (“Speed, Use of Social Media”) According to an American Red Cross survey in 2010, netizens increasingly reply on social media to seek help during a disaster. Among the 1,058 respondents in the survey, 74 percent expect to get answers within an hour after they request for information or seek help on social media. (“Web Users,” 2010) Communication specialists have begun to realize that Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other social media sites provide vast opportunities for organizations to monitor online conversation of their stakeholders, get important information out in a quick manner, and get stakeholders more engaged in organizational activities. Public Relations practitioners started to adopt utilization of social media tools in crisis management strategies and tactics for corporations, governments, universities or NGOs, etc. In 2009, PIER Systems, Inc., a leading technology provider for information management, crisis communications, and emergency response, announced to integrate Twitter feeds into its information distributed via the PIER System – Public Information Emergency Response System. (PIER systems, 2009) During the 2011 Japan earthquake, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube effectively created awareness about the calamities and encouraged a large-‐scale response to help victims. Aid organizations turned to social media to raise awareness and funds. 68 Web users participated in the fundraising event online and shared the information with their friends to finally form mass appeal. (Blackburn, 2011) While public relations practitioners benefit from effectively utilizing social media in crisis communication, they are also facing challenges in taming the power of social media in crises. In the first place, a company’s reputation and credibility may be at stake due to unfavorable Facebook posts, blogs, or Tweets from their customers, employees or competitors. By means of social media, negative comments or even rumors get spread out very quickly. Furthermore, any responses from the company are under exposure to the public. Its stakeholders may have negative perception of this corporation if it fails to give satisfactory responses in a timely manner. According to the 2010 American Red Cross social media study, 69 percent of the respondents are expecting crisis managers to be monitoring social media sites in order to quickly send help. Seventy four percent expect answers to come within an hour from the communication team after they post inquiries via social media. (“Web Users,” 2010) In addition, an organization’s confidential information may get quickly leaked out through some insiders’ social media posts. Thus, it is crucial for organizations to embrace social media as well as establish standards to utilize the tools in a proper way. Nevertheless, the earthquake and tsunami in Japan early on March 11, 2011 destroyed the social infrastructure in the disaster areas, including electricity supply, telecommunication networks, transportation systems, etc. Physical damage to the 69 communication system inhibited crisis communication and disaster relief efforts in the very first week. b) Pre-crisis planning In both cases, pre-‐crisis planning was revealed to be inadequate. Crisis managers in both accidents failed to properly conduct crisis preparation and risk management before the crises. It was reported that the Japanese government and TEPCO had never prepared for a natural disaster of such a scale, not to mention a double disaster of both massive earthquake and tsunami. But in Japan, a country that encounters earthquakes and tsunamis so frequently, pre-‐crisis planning should have included such a possible disastrous situation. Similarly, unpreparedness was found at TMI nuclear plant and the U.S. regulatory agency, the NRC. After the crisis, an NRC staff member said it was after the TMI tragedy, that they realized a lot of things about the reactors were still unknown to them. (Walker, 2004) Previously, the NRC did not make an emergency plan mandatory for nuclear plants. One year after the accident, the NRC created a new rule requiring a proper emergency plan in order to issue a new license for nuclear plant. In terms of risk management, the Japanese managers in the 2011 Fukushima case and U.S. managers in the 1979 TMI case were blamed for similar reasons. Firstly, both of them did not learn from previous nuclear incidents or accidents. Obviously, the Japanese did not learn from the TMI case 32 years prior. And even 70 the TMI mangers and the regulatory agencies could have learned from a similar incident at the Davis-‐Besse reactor in 1977. (Osif, Baratta, Conkling, 2004: 31) Secondly, the government regulatory agencies, which are responsible for overseeing the nuclear industry, are actually the major advocates for nuclear energy utilization. The cozy relationship between the government and the utility companies made it difficult for them to heed warnings about safety problems at the nuclear plants. This relationship was heavily criticized in the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The NISA, which regulates nuclear safety, is dependent on METI, which promotes nuclear power generation. (Department of International Affairs, Japan, 2011) Under such circumstances, TEPCO, the nuclear plant operator, reportedly covered up mistakes and manipulated data at its nuclear plants for many years. One outstanding difference between the two crises is the scale of severity. The 1979 Fukushima nuclear accident was rated 5 on the 7-‐point International nuclear Event Scale (INES) with a partial meltdown in Unit-‐2. In 2011, the Fukushima nuclear accident was rated Level 7 on the INES scale and caused radioactive contamination on land and in the sea, which impacted other nations. Under such circumstances, Japanese managers should have incorporated international coordination into their communication plan. Another fundamental distinction of these two nuclear crises is that TEPCO and the Japanese government failed to make full use of the powerful social media tools to facilitate its pre-‐crisis planning. In the first place, stakeholders’ conversations on social media platforms provide clues for public relations practitioners to detect 71 potential risks for an organization. Secondly, well-‐established social media channels can serve as a reliable communication tool during a crisis. The efficiency of social media tools, such as Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, can meet people’s demand for quick and clear information in a crisis. Thirdly, the interactive communication via social media platforms helps an organization to build up its credibility and corporate image among its stakeholders over time. c) Communication strategies/ tactics The most obvious difference between the communication strategies seen in the Japanese and American incidents is the managers’ attitudes towards the crises. The U.S. plant operator immediately informed the government and the regulatory agencies. The Pennsylvania state government took control of the crisis on the very first day of the accident. In contrast, the Japanese government failed to “respond quickly” or “tell the truth.” As Mr. Alexander mentioned in the interview, “Be first to tell the bad news,” and “Frame your mistakes before your critics do it for you.” In Japan, the central government did not recognize the severity of the accident in time and left TEPCO to handle the accident during the first several days. Even after the Japanese government found that the operator lacked credibility and took major control of the accident, it refused international assistance and failed to be transparent about the situation on site. Later, under pressure from the international community, especially its ally the United States, Japan started to coordinate with other nations. 72 In response to its slow reaction, Japanese regulators later said that they were waiting for more information to give better response. But Larry Kamer, owner of Kamer Consulting, a communication management consulting firm specializing in risk, controversy and crisis, said, “Responding quickly is better.” “You have to respond, even if it’s an imperfect response. Your credibility later, when you DO have the additional information, is at stake.” Kamer also pointed out that Japan’s refusal to be transparent at the beginning of the crisis “massively” damaged its credibility in crisis management later. Secondly, the U.S. government adopted the centralized spokesperson system quickly to mitigate information discrepancies among all the related organizations. It was a strategic move in “controlling the flow of information.” But “in Japan, the plant operator, its regulator, and the government seemed slow in establishing clear roles and responsibilities and making this known to the public,” said Kamer. He attributed the sharp contrast in U.S. and Japanese government credibility percentage to this difference. The Japanese government lost credibility very early in the crisis, and its efforts to counter unfounded rumors and disseminate scientific information about radiation to the public was viewed as online censorship and covering up its mistakes. Furthermore, public support for (former) Japanese Prime Minister Kan was low. He was not the appropriate public face for Fukushima crisis management. In contrast, U.S. President Jimmy Carter was a credible leader, especially known for his knowledge of nuclear power. 73 Additionally, the Japanese government officials apparently lacked media training. Trade minister Yoshio Hachiro resigned only after eight days in his position, following reports that he joked with reporters about radiation issues after a trip to the stricken area. (“Economy Minister Hachiro,” 2011) In contrast President Carter was given advice before his tour around the TMI nuclear plant and his post-‐ TMI visit news conference. He was reminded that the major purposes of the visit were to express his “personal concern” for people’s safety in the stricken area and to show his confidence that governments at all levels were making whatever efforts they can to deal with the situation. He was also warned that he should not convey any messages indicating that the crisis was over. Instead, he was advised to suggest that people in the area be prepared for a possible evacuation without arousing public panic. President Carter followed these advices very well in the press conference later. (Walker, 2004: 179-‐183) Fourthly, the U.S. government did a better job in “putting the welfare of people as their top priority” in crisis management. Although it made a mistake by ordering an unnecessary evacuation, officials did a good job in conveying the message that they made a mistake because they did not want to put people’s lives at risk. In contrast, the Japanese government only ordered an evacuation radius of 15 to 20 miles, while the U.S. nuclear agency suggested a radius of 50 miles. As a result, the Japanese government was interpreted as covering up severity of the accident. Fifthly, the scale of the Fukushima nuclear accident required Japan to coordinate with the international community. But the Japanese refused 74 international assistance at first and then dumped radiation-‐contaminated seawater into the sea, regardless of protests from neighboring countries. According to a joint survey conducted by The China Daily (major English newspaper) and The Genron NPO (a not-‐for-‐profit think tank in Japan) on Aug. 11, 2011, 65.9 percent of Chinese respondents have “unfavorable impressions” on Japan, which is the highest figure since this survey began in 2005. The most popular reason for the unfavorable sentiments was “the problematic response” to the Fukushima nuclear accident, at 40.9 percent of the respondents. (The Genron NPO, 2011) Fortunately, the situation started to get better with Japan being more active in international coordination. On Nov. 29, 2011, nuclear energy authorities from Japan, China and South Korea made an agreement to establish an early notification system to share information about at nuclear accidents at the power plants. The major purpose of this new move for Japan is to address criticism on its failure to keep other nations adequately informed during the Fukushima nuclear crisis. Lastly, TEPCO and the Japanese government failed to utilize the social media tools, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, for their own good. Firstly, one to two weeks after the crisis took place, TEPCO and the Japanese government started to react to Japan’s burgeoning social media conversation and the huge blogging community. They established official social media accounts on Twitter or Facebook. However, the accounts updating posts in English, such as “@TEPCO_English” and “@JPN_PMO” actually do not directly address nuclear problems, not to mention tough questions from concerned people. Secondly, the backlash resulting from the 75 Japanese government’s social media monitoring efforts actually hindered their crisis communication. In July 2011, the Japanese government was criticized as conducting online censorship by monitoring Tweets and blog posts relevant to the nuclear crisis. Although the Japanese government defended itself that the intention of this move is to discover existing erroneous information and give scientific explanations on its website in a Q & A format, seldom do people appreciate this effort. The Japanese government’s social media efforts triggered greater controversies and tarnished its reputation. d) Communication Effects The reputation and image of the nuclear industry were demolished in both crises. According to a final report done by the President’s Commission in 1980 in the United States, 41 percent of the American public favored nuclear power before the March 28 accident at Three Mile Island, 23 percent were opposed, and 35 percent expressed indifference. After the accident, 34 percent were still in favor, but 48 percent were opposed, and 17 percent were still indifferent. Japan experienced a steeper drop in public support for nuclear energy. In mid-‐ April, the Japan Research Center and Gallup released poll results indicating that Japanese public support for nuclear energy declined from 62 percent before the earthquake —one of the highest support rates internationally — to 39 percent in the aftermath of Fukushima nuclear accident. On July 24, a survey conducted by Japan’s Kyodo News Agency showed that 70.3 percent of the respondents supported (former) Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s policy of getting rid of nuclear power. On Sept. 76 11, 2011, another survey conducted by Kyodo News showed that two out of three municipalities were opposed to building more nuclear plants in their region. The reputation, image and credibility of nuclear plant operators in both cases —TEPCO in Japan and Met Ed in the United States — were severely damaged. In Japan, 73 percent of respondents did not think information provided by TEPCO about the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was reliable, far above the 15 percent who thought the utility company was credible, according to an Asahi Shimbun survey on May 28, 2011. Of the 34 percent who said they favor nuclear power generation, only 24 percent said they trusted TEPCO. It was more or less the same with what happened to Met Ed in the United States. According to the final social report conducted by the President’s Commission, only 3 percent believed in statements and reports from the utility company officials. However, the credibility of central government forms a sharp contrast in the two cases. In the TMI 1979 case, 80 percent of those surveyed by the President’s Commission believed in reports from the federal government. But that was not true with the Japanese central government. The Japanese media has continued to conduct opinion polls about how the public thought about crisis management performance of the Japanese government. The percentage of people dissatisfied with the Japanese government grew from 58 percent in March (Kyodo News), to 76 percent in April (Kyodo News), and then to 80 percent in June 2011 (The Asashi Shimbun). Another poll conducted by The Asahi Shimbun in June 2011 found that 75 percent of corporate executives surveyed did 77 not support Prime Minister Kan’s reconstruction measures. In August, Kan resigned as prime minister. (McCurry, 2011) Reputation and credibility of Japan’s regulatory agency NISA was greatly tarnished during the nuclear disaster. There were allegations that NISA manipulated public opinions in recent years’ hearings, and thus faked the impression that the public were in support of nuclear power. The agency has been struggling to regain public trust since then. Similarly, the TMI case demolished the credibility of the whole nuclear industry in the United States and the industry regulatory agency, the NRC. 78 Conclusions Although the Fukushima nuclear accident was far more severe than what happened at the Three Mile Island, both of the accidents were unprecedented for the nuclear industry, as well as the general public, in their times. The confusion and chaos caused among the public in these two nuclear crises further substantiated the importance of effective crisis management. No organizations are immune to any crises. Crisis management without any guidance or principles will end up solely as a management crisis. The above comparative analysis of the crisis management performances in United States’ TMI nuclear accident in 1979 and Japan’s Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 under the three-‐stage model provides much insight into nuclear crisis management. In the first place, the study suggests that practitioners engage more in the pre-‐ crisis stage of crisis communication to prevent crisis from occurring. Crisis managers in both nuclear accidents apparently lacked the appropriate risk management and crisis preparation processes. In terms of risk management, both TEPCO and Met Ed failed to draw lessons from previous nuclear incidents and accidents. Detecting warning signs is a critical part of risk management. Especially for nuclear plants, where accidents can impose great impact, plant managers should keep monitoring what is happening in other plants and communicate with their counterparts to get prepared for the flaws. Additionally, Japan’s TEPCO has a history of covering up mistakes and manipulating 79 data about the reactors. By doing so, the plant operator only avoided media exposure and criticism for a short period of time. Later, they suffered more from neglecting safety-‐warning signs and gained a tarnished reputation during the Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. In terms of crisis preparation, both TEPCO and Met Ed failed to establish a workable CMT, CMP and crisis communication system in advance. Both of the two crises are totally out of expectation for their managers. But the Pennsylvania government acted very quickly to take major control of the crisis and centralize the official information source. In contrast, Japan reacted slowly and responded vaguely to the crisis, without assigning clear roles for crisis managers across various inter-‐ related organizations. In addition, Japan failed to properly incorporate social media into its communication system. Japanese government aroused public anxiety by monitoring relevant social media conversation online. During the crisis, the study shows that following the basic rules of crisis management largely determines the communication effects, especially stakeholders’ perception of the related organizations. On the one hand, the most prominent difference in communication effects of the two crises is the credibility of the central governments in public perception after the crisis. Eighty percent of Americans found the U.S. government credible after the Three Mile Island accident, while 80 percent of Japanese were dissatisfied with their central government’s performance during the crisis. 80 The Japanese government failed to follow basic crisis practices, such as “respond quickly,” “be transparent and tell the truth,” “put people’s safety as first priority,” while the U.S. state and federal governments responded immediately, handled the flow of information well and conducted proper and timely media training. Firstly, the Japanese government responded slowly and vaguely to the nuclear crisis. It failed to recognize the severity of the crisis in time and left the plant operator to handle the accident for the first several days. Secondly, the Japanese government refused to be transparent with the outside world and tell the truth at the early stage of the crisis, which undermined its credibility in the international community. Thirdly, the fact that a U.S. nuclear agency, the NRC, recommended a much larger evacuation zone than what the Japanese government recommended aroused the public’s distrust about its government’s credibility and capability to handle the nuclear crisis. At the same time, many Japanese people were so disappointed or even angry, because they thought the central government did not put their safety as a priority. In contrast, the Pennsylvania government took major control of the crisis on the very first day. It quickly identified the communication problems and established a centralized “communication system” to mitigate public confusion. Later, when the White House became involved in the crisis management, President Carter showed great credibility and strong leadership. He benefited a lot from appropriate “media training” during his personal trip to the TMI nuclear plant and the news conference after the tour on the fifth day of the crisis. 81 On the other hand, the two nuclear plant operators, Met Ed and TEPCO, had quite low credibility after the nuclear accidents took place respectively. The TMI plant failed to do proper “media training,” did not “apologize properly and show sympathy for local residents.” The Fukushima plant also suffered from “slow response,” “improper apology,” and “lack of concern for its stakeholders.” According to the final report from the President’s Commission, only 3 percent expressed confidence in statements and reports issued by the utility company officials in the TMI case. The U.S. plant operators also failed to conduct the necessary media training. Its spokesman Jack Herbein, though a nuclear expert, could not communicate well with the government officials as well as new reporters, who had little or no knowledge about nuclear power. As a result, he left his audiences an impression that he did not share information and was not credible. (Walker, 2004) As for the Fukushima case, a survey by The Asahi Shimbun showed that 73 percent of the respondents did not think information provided by TEPCO about Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant was reliable. (“Survey: 73 Percent,” 2011) The Fukushima plant’s chief executive officer showed up late to lead the management work and communicate with the public. Even though he apologized later by kneeing down in front of the victims, he could not get their forgiveness because of his company’s tarnished credibility and reputation and failure in handling the crisis. Like Met Ed, TEPCO lost the government’s trust early on in the crisis. In addition, an outstanding attempt of Japan to monitor online conversations about the nuclear crisis did have its merits in the era of information technology. 82 Japan recognized the importance of social media for communication nowadays and tried to take active control of the information flow. As Kamer noted, companies today should utilize social media as a crisis management tool. He pointed out that companies should not only respond to information processed by the news station, but also deploy “equal resources (or more)” to manage online information and conversation. Alexander also mentioned that the Fukushima crisis has pushed Southern California Edison into the utilization of social media channels. The use of social media and online interaction with stakeholders is a trend for many companies nowadays. Nevertheless, the Japanese government suffered from the online backlash after officials announced this move, because many people did not trust the government any more and thought the online monitoring was actually an excuse for online censorship. This failure also proved that pre-‐crisis planning and initial response is highly significant. It cost much more to make up for the early mistakes later. This examination in social media tools provides another perspective in the basic rules “ACT FAST” for crisis management. Social media can empower individuals to ally against a certain organization. It is incredible to avoid addressing open conversation on social media platforms. Public relations “Best Practices” should also include “acting fast” according to changes in communication environment, that is to say, to self-‐evolve with the inevitable social media trends, or other trends in the future. Social media should be incorporated into the crisis communication plan. Social media should be integrated into the risk detection 83 system in pre-‐crisis planning. Furthermore, it’s crucial for public relations practitioners to establish standards or guidance for social media utilization according to a certain organization’s corporate image and positioning. After the TMI crisis, Met Ed has changed owners several times, but the nuclear accident in 1979 and the negative feelings of the crisis have been attached to every new owner, according to Mr. Kamer. He also thinks that the plant will be linked to the accident forever. Then more than three decades later, just as the American nuclear industry was slowly regaining public support within the country, the massive Fukushima nuclear disaster took place. Fukushima nuclear crisis heavily shook public confidence in the safety of nuclear power all over the world, said Yukiya Amano, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 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Abstract (if available)

Abstract This paper examines the crisis management of two prominent nuclear crises - 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Crisis in Japan and 1979 Three Mile Island Nuclear Crisis in the United States. More specifically, it chronicles how the two crises unfolded and analyzes the crisis management efforts using the Strategic Planning Model. The purpose of this study is to substantiate basic rules and complete the best practices for crisis communication today, by comparing crisis management in the two cases. The whole process of crisis communication is divided into three phases - pre-crisis planning, crisis, and post-crisis key learnings. Another aim is to study the differences in best practices of crisis communication between these two nuclear calamities. Different communication environment and utilization of social media in crisis communication are highlighted. The key issues discussed in this paper include analysis and comparison of risk assessment, crisis management plans (CMP), crisis management teams (CMT), communication strategies and tactics, communication effects, and post-crisis key learnings in the two cases. The principal conclusion is that the basic rules of crisis communication, ""ACT FAST,"" hold true in contemporary nuclear crisis communication. At the same time, the utilization of social media should be properly incorporated into the whole crisis communication plan. The best practices, ""ACT FAST"", actually also mean that crisis communication should act fast according to the changes of communication technologies, tools, trends, etc, and optimize the communication resources and strategies.

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